The (geo)politics of democracy in wider Europe.
Date: 2025-07-10
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, democracy, enlargement of the Union, geopolitics, soft power

THE (GEO)POLITICS 
OF DEMOCRACY 
IN WIDER EUROPE

edited by
Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá

© European University Institute, 2025

Editorial matter and selection © Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá, 2025

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The (Geo)Politics  
of Democracy in  
Wider Europe

EDITED BY
Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá

European University Institute, Florence, Italy

Contributors

Ádám Bence Balázs is Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics (Passau Uni-
versity) and the Laboratoire du changement social et politique (Université Paris 
Cité). He holds a PhD in Political Philosophy from Paris 7 – Denis-Diderot (Uni-
versités de Paris). His current research focuses on sharp power in global conflicts, 
the Orbán regime in Hungary and its international impact, and the European in-
tegration of the Western Balkans. He co-edited a volume on regional identities in 
the Visegrad 4 and the Western Balkans with Christina Griessler (Nomos Verlag, 
2020)  and  a  volume  on  the  Europeanisation  of  Montenegro  (Nomos  Verlag, 
2022). 

Klodiana Beshku is an Associate Professor of the University of Tirana, Faculty 
of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. She is a Visiting Fellow at 
the  Robert  Schuman  Centre  of  Advanced  Studies  of  the  European  Universi-
ty Institute, where she was a Jean Monnet Fellow in 2020-2021. She has a PhD 
in Geopolitics from the University of Pisa. She has taught at the University of 
Florence, University of Salzburg, University of Catania, University of Palermo, 
Albanian-American Development Foundation, and Centre of Excellence of the 
Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania.

Daniel  Bochsler  is  an  Associate  Professor  in  Political  Science  at  Central 
European University, and a full Professor of Political Science at the University of 
Belgrade. He is a Privatdozent/Associated Researcher at the Centre for Democ-
racy Studies Aarau (ZDA) at the University of Zurich. He received his PhD in 
Political Science from the University of Geneva. His research deals with political 
institutions and social diversity, particularly with ethnic diversity, mostly in de-
mocracies in Central and Eastern Europe, or worldwide. His publications deal 
with political parties, elections, federalism, direct democracy, regime change, and 
separatism, mostly related to ethnic diversity and/or social minorities.

Ana  Bojinović  Fenko is Professor and Researcher in International Relations 
at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. Her fields of Research 
are Foreign Policy Analysis, International Regionalism and EU External Action. 
Empirically,  she  focuses  on  post-Yugoslav  small  states,  EU  enlargement  policy 
towards Western Balkans states and the Mediterranean region. Her recent publi-
cations on the topic include: an article in 2023 with S. Keil and Z. Šabič in Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding and a chapter in 2023 with F. Kočan (in edited 
volume The neoliberal world order in crisis, and beyond: an East European per-
spective). 

Jelena Džankić is Part-Time Professor in the Global Governance Programme at 
the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence, 
Italy.  She  is  Director  of  GGP  Southeastern  Europe  and  Co-Director  of  the 
Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT). She is the author of Citizen-
ship in Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Effects of Statehood 
and Identity Challenges (Routledge, 2015), and the edited volumes Europeani-
sation of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU Conditionality (2019, with S. Keil 
and M. Kmezic), The Europeanisation of Citizenship Governance in South-East 
Europe (2016, with S. Kacarska and N. Pantic), and A year later: war in Ukraine 
and Western Balkan (geo)politics (2023, with S. Kacarska and S. Keil). 

Filip Ejdus is a professor of security studies at the Faculty of Political Science, 
University of Belgrade. His research primarily explores how identity, memory, 
and  emotions  influence  security  dynamics  in  world  politics.  Ejdus  currently 
serves  as  the  Head  of  the  Centre  for  International  Security,  co-editor-in-chief 
of the Journal of Regional Security), a board member of the Belgrade Centre 
for Security Policy (BCSP), co-chair of the Regional Stability Study Group at 
the Partnership for Peace Consortium, and President of the Central and Eastern 
European International Studies Association (CEEISA). In December 2023, he 
was one of the initiators of the ProGlas pro-democracy movement in Serbia.

Ramadan Ilazi currently serves as the Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre 
for Security Studies (KCSS), where among other is a team leader in the frame-
work of the Horizon Europe-funded SMIDGE project, which investigates the 
rise of extremist narratives among middle-aged individuals in Europe. From 2015 
to  2016,  Ramadan  was  Kosovo’s  Deputy  Minister  for  European  Integration. 
Ramadan holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the Dublin 
City University (DCU), Ireland. He is the author of The European Union and 
Everyday Statebuilding: The Case of Kosovo, published by Routledge.

Simonida Kacarska is the director and co-founder of the European Policy Insti-
tute, a think tank in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. She has held research posi-
tions at the University of Edinburgh, the College of Europe as well as the Central 
European University. Simonida holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies 
at the University of Leeds. Her research interests are related to the political trans-
formation and European integration of the Balkans. Simonida was a Fellow of 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States and a Policy Leaders Fellow at 
the School of Transnational Governance of the European University Institute in 
Florence.

Damir Kapidžić is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the Faculty 
of Political Science, University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He studied 
political science and international relations at Free University Berlin, Humboldt 
University Berlin, University of Potsdam, and received his PhD from the Uni-
versity  of  Sarajevo.  His  research  looks  at  ethnic  conflict,  political  parties,  and 
power-sharing, as well as the process through which democratic or authoritarian 
politics are institutionalised.

Biljana Kotevska is a socio-legal feminist researcher. She holds a PhD in Law 
from Queen’s University Belfast, awarded for her doctoral research ‘Equality and 
Non-Discrimination in the Post-Yugoslav Space: Intersectionality under Law in 
Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia’. Biljana also holds an LLM in International 
Human Rights Law (with distinction) from the University of Essex (UK), an 
MA in Democracy and Human Rights in South-East Europe from the Univer-
sity of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the University of Bologna (Italy), 
and an LLB from the University ‘St. Cyril and Methodius’ (Macedonia). 

Miranda Loli is a political scientist, specialising in international relations. Her 
research explores the role of international organisations; she has a keen interest in 
how local non-governmental actors make space for themselves in the internation-
al arena. Miranda completed her PhD in 2023 at the University of Darmstadt 
with a dissertation titled ‘The Translocality of Anti-Corruption Practices: En-
counters between the Local and the International in Kosovo and Ukraine’, ex-
ploring the intersection between the global fight against corruption and security. 

Michał Matlak is managing editor of the Review of Democracy and fellow at 
the CEU Democracy Institute. He was a visiting scholar at the Princeton Univer-
sity, Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and the Institute for Human Sciences 
in Vienna (Józef Tischner Fellow). He works at the European Parliament as a 
policy advisor. His main research interests are: religion and politics, Europeanisa-
tion, the institutional design of the European Union. He holds a PhD in Political 
Science from the EUI. 

Alexander  Mesarovich  earned  his  PhD  (Politics)  at  the  University  of  Edin-
burgh. His thesis analysed the impact of informal political networks on the EU 
accession processes of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. Alexander has also worked 
on the H2020 projects ENGAGE, on EU external action, and REDEMOS, on 
EU  democracy  support  given  to  the  Eastern  Partnership.  Alexander  has  pub-
lished in Europe-Asia Studies and International Studies Quarterly, written book 
chapters and working papers, presented at numerous conferences, and has con-
tributed to research for the US government’s Chairmans Action Group advising 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Lucia Mokrá is Professor of International and European Law at Comenius Uni-
versity in Bratislava, Slovakia and dean of Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences 
there. She is also a visiting professor at other universities in Europe. Since 2019 
she is chairperson of the Trans European Policy Studies Association. Her main 
research interests include human rights in European and International law, EU 
legal and institutional framework, EU external relations and enforcement in in-
ternational and European law. Alongside, she is member of the High Council of 
the European University Institute in Florence and High Council of the College 
of Europe in Brugges.

Artan Mustafa, PhD, is currently a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European Uni-
versity Institute (EUI). His research focuses on welfare state politics, social basis 
of politics, and social sustainability. Artan is a Kosovo social protection writer 
at the European Social Policy Analysis Network (ESPAN). He has taught at the 
University of Vienna, and the University for Business and Technology – UBT in 
Kosovo. 

Jiří Němec is a PhD Candidate in Security and Strategic Studies at the Depart-
ment of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in 
Brno, Czech Republic. He focuses on Russian and Chinese foreign malign influ-
ence in the security sectors of the Western Balkan states. He is interested in the 
WB states' contemporary foreign and security policies, hybrid warfare, influence 
operations, sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, and the Eastern Partner-
ship region. Jiří is a former Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Southeast European 
Studies, University of Graz, Austria, and works as a Researcher at his home de-
partment. 

Teodora Stanković is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies at 
the University of Montenegro, holding a BSc in International Relations, an MSc 
in  Political  Science,  and  a  PhD  from  the  same  university,  where  she  defended 
a dissertation on the role of energy issues as sources of conflict in various tense 
regions. Stanković’s international experience includes studies and skill advance-
ment at Heidelberg University, the University of Salzburg, the University of Lju-
bljana, and the University of Buenos Aires.

Vuk Uskoković, research assistant at the Schuman Centre, European Univer-
sity Institute, holds a PhD in history from the same Institute. While primarily 
working on the early modern history of the East Adriatic and the Balkans, he has 
maintained an interest in the present-day politics of the region.

Milica  Uvalić  has  been  a  Visiting  Fellow  at  the  Robert  Schuman  Centre  for 
Advanced  Studies  (RSC),  European  University  Institute  (EUI)  in  Florence 
(Italy) since November 2023, and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, 
Tirana Campus (Albania) since October 2024. Previously she was Professor in 
Economics at the University of Perugia (Italy) (1992- 2023). She was member of 
the UN Committee for Development Policy (2008-2012) and Assistant Minister 
in the government of FR Yugoslavia (2001). Research interests include Central 
Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, European Union enlargement and Compar-
ative economics. She has published widely on Western Balkans’ socio-econom-
ic development, privatisation, FDI, trade, labour markets, regional cooperation, 
and EU integration

Table of Content

The (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Wider Europe: Step One 
Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá 

Part 1. Western Balkan Country Perspectives 

Nuances of (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Albania Explained  
through the Italy-Albania Agreement on Migrants 
Klodiana Beshku 

Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina    
Damir Kapidžić 

Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 
Ramadan Ilazi 

Democratic Decline in Montenegro: Internal Political Weakness,  
or External Geopolitical Interference? 
Jiří Němec 

When the EU’s Transformative Power Is Undermined by Its  
Member States: The Case of North Macedonia 
Simonida Kacarska 

Geopolitical Autocratisation in Serbia 
Filip Ejdus 

Part 2. Transversal Spaces 

The Geopolitics of Democracy in the Western Balkans 
Jelena Džankić 

Nationalist Outbidding in the Shadow of Geopolitical Change 
Daniel Bochsler 

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans 
Milica Uvalić 

1

7

8

18

30

41

55

64

72

73

85

95

   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
The Recent Illiberal Turn and Social Policy in the Western Balkans 
Artan Mustafa 

Intersectionality Lost? Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads  
of Rising Illiberalism and EU Enlargement 
Biljana Kotevska 

The Impact of the Geopolitical Tensions between the European Union  
and Russia on the Western Balkans 
Teodora Stanković 

Inside Out: Internal and External Pressures in the Western Balkans  
amidst Global Transformations and Counter-Peace Dynamics 
Miranda Loli 

Part 3. European Landscapes 

The Weak Link: the Orbán Regime’s Impact on European (Geo)Politics  
and Democracy 
Ádám Bence Balázs 

The EU’s Democratic Paradox: Tackling Democracy Deficits  
Across Candidates, Members, and Institutions 
Michał Matlak 

Towards ‘All Cardinal Directions’? At the Crossroads of Democracy  
and Foreign Policy in Slovakia’s Relationship with the EU 
Lucia Mokrá 

The role of the European Union in (De)Democratising Its ‘New’ Members:  
Insights from Slovenia 
Ana Bojinović Fenko 

From the Periphery to the Centre: Transnational Networks in Central  
and Eastern Europe 
Alexander Mesarovich 

Epilogue: From the ‘External’ to the ‘Internal’ Threats to Democracy 
Vuk Uskoković 

112

122

134

142

148

149

161

170

180

189

197

   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
The (Geo)Politics of 
Democracy in Wider 
Europe: Step One

Jelena Džankić,* Biljana Kotevska,** and Lucia Mokrá***123

When we started to think about this book, back in Autumn 2024, the world 
looked perhaps a little bit different. Indeed, the global geopolitical planes had 
already been shifted  with the full-scale Russian invasion  of Ukraine  and the 
war in Gaza. While removed from the Western Balkan region, which had been 
our original focus, these geopolitical shifts have revealed how intimately con-
nected democracy is to geopolitics, and how vulnerable are nascent democratic 
societies to external influence. Hence our initial goal was to look at the inter-
play  between  the  European  Union  (EU)  enlargement  and  democratic  devel-
opment, and how it has been affected by the political, economic and cultural 
influences of undemocratic third actors across the Western Balkan states. Such 
dependencies, including China’s rising economic influence, Russian religious 
and media impact, investments from the Gulf States and Türkiye have often 
been  described  as  the  by-product  of  the  stalemate  in  the  EU  enlargement 
process, and the Union’s continuous prioritisation of stability over democracy 
(Bieber 2018). 

To unpack the different trajectories of this interplay, we have first compiled 

* 

Jelena Džankić is Part-Time Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Insti-
tute.

**  Biljana Kotevska is Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

***  Lucia  Mokrá  is  Dean  of  the  Faculty  of  Social  and  Economic  Sciences  of  Comenius  University  in 

Bratislava.

2

six  contributions,  looking  at  the  impact  of  external  actors  in  each  of  the 
Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montene-
gro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). These have allowed us to understand that 
geopolitical interests across the region are far from uniform, and that different 
actors exercise different kinds of influence in different countries. For instance, 
Chinese economic interest has been notable across countries, especially in the 
mining  sector  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Serbia,  as  explored  by  Damir 
Kapidžić and Filip Ejdus. Jiří Němec shows us the extreme end of the economic 
dependency on China by zooming in on the case of the Bar-Boljare motorway 
in  Montenegro.  By  contrast,  the  Turkish  influence  has  been  described  as  a 
combination  of  economic  investment  and  cultural  outreach  through  the 
media. While generally seen as ‘soft’ throughout the region, in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and Kosovo, the Turkish influence has been linked to local conserv-
ative political actors. Across the post-Yugoslav space in the Western Balkans, 
the Russian influence remains a very visible and active ‘elephant in the room’. 
From blocking the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia high-
lighted by Ramadan Ilazi, to destabilising the integrity of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, to malign influence in Montenegro, Russia has been one of the key factors 
of instability and the related democratic decline in the region. Its close linkages 
with the Serbian regime, further highlight the disruptive nature of Russia on 
the different Western Balkan states. 

Furthermore, contributions to this volume show that the EU is not a ho-
mogenous actor in the Western Balkans, and – on occasion – interests and stakes 
of the Member States clash with the requirements of the accession process to 
build up democratic institutions. The clearest case is the one of the agreement 
between Albania and Italy to build a detention centre on an Albanian island for 
Italy-bound migrants. In her contribution, Klodiana Beshku shows how this 
agreement came about through the personal friendship between the leaders of 
the two countries, with little transparency or public debate on the controversial 
matter of externalisation of migration. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, 
Hungary under Viktor Orbán has emerged as a salient political force, substan-
tively affecting stability and democracy in both cases. Yet for our discussion, 
perhaps the case of North Macedonia, examined by Simonida Kacarska, is the 
most cautionary tale of how the interests and stakes of the EU’s Member States 
may adversely impact on democratisation and effectively block the EU acces-
sion process. 

Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá3

Complementing these six country studies, we have invited authors to reflect 
on specific areas of entanglement between democracy and geopolitical inter-
ests and influences. Jelena Džankić reminds us of the importance of democracy 
promotion by the EU and the United States in the early 2000s, and how – as a 
result of a number of interrelated factors, including multiple global crises – the 
last decade has seen a trend of democracy demotion and backsliding. Daniel 
Bochsler focuses on revisionist agendas in post-conflict countries with strong 
ties to both Russia and the West. Drawing insights from Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Georgia and Moldova, he highlights that the role of external actors should 
not be limited to providing security guarantees, but rather expanded to build 
trust among the former belligerents. In a similar vein, Miranda Loli zooms in 
on counter-peace efforts in the Western Balkans, highlighting structural con-
ditions that enable undemocratic actors to destabilise democratisation efforts. 
Teodora Stanković’s text is a perfect example of Russia’s endeavours to desta-
bilise the Western Balkan region and disrupt its democratic trajectory. Milica 
Uvalić and Artan Mustafa look at the socio-economic impact of geopolitics in 
the region, emphasising how often we overlook informal and intangible influ-
ences in our analyses. Uvalić argues that, in terms of economic development, 
the  primary  link  of  the  WB  countries  is  to  the  EU,  and  that  external  actors 
cannot  change  the  fact  that  a  long-term  perspective  for  the  region  is  bound 
to be one of further trade, economic, and financial integration with the EU. 
Looking at the domestic landscapes, Mustafa shows how geopolitical interests 
have driven a move from stability to contestations in the welfare systems, and 
how the limited effect of the existing social protection structures on enhanc-
ing equality has supported favourable conditions for illiberal politics. Finally, 
Biljana Kotevska explores how, in a region where democracy and EU enlarge-
ment are entangled with geopolitical bargains, intersectional justice is the silent 
casualty of Europe’s stabilitocracy. Her reflection on intersectional inequalities 
in  illiberal  contexts,  and  their  linkage  to  the  EU’s  democratic  conditionality 
concludes this section of the book.

The (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Wider Europe: Step One4

In the third, final section of this volume, our contributions reflect on the 
previous enlargements, highlighting how important it is to prevent experienc-
es that enable the rise of illiberal forces. Examples such as the Hungarian one, 
examined  by  Ádám  Bence  Balázs,  remind  us  that  democracy  is  not  a  status 
achieved by means of joining the EU. Rather, it is a process that continuously 
changes and needs to be addressed before, during and after accession. In her 
reflection  on  Slovakia,  Lucia  Mokrá  suggests  that  the  EU  is  not  an  alterna-
tive for the Western Balkan states, but rather lies at the core of democracy and 
prosperity. While populist challenges exist across the Eastern European coun-
tries that became EU Member States in 2004, the EU as a political communi-
ty may provide different forums for addressing not only the geopolitical chal-
lenges, including migration, environmental challenges and security threats, but 
also  for  building  democratic  values  of  freedom,  equality,  and  human  rights. 
Michał Matlak, however, notes that the expectations of the EU as a democra-
cy promoter within and beyond the EU borders should be sober, as the Union 
grapples  with  democratic  deficits  both  within  its  institutions,  and  across  its 
Member States, especially in recent years. Ana Bojinović-Fenko looks specifi-
cally at one such case, exploring Slovenia’s vulnerability to illiberalism and the 
factors that ultimately prevented backsliding after the accession. To conclude 
the section on experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, Alexander Me-
sarovich looks at the role of transnational networks in influencing ideological 
and (geo)political contestation in the region.

Writing a coda at a time when the transatlantic link has faced substantive 
disruption after the inauguration of Donald Trump as the 47th President of 
the United States, Vuk Uskoković rightly notes that the threats to democracy 
are multiple, multifaceted, ever-shifting, and come both from the inside and 
the outside. The Western Balkans is a region that over the past three decades 
has seen an uneasy cohabitation between democratisation efforts and substan-
tially illiberal political systems, both of which have been extremely sensitive to 
changing  geopolitics  and  domestic  political  shifts.  The  contributions  in  this 
book highlight five trends that embody this uneasy cohabitation.

First, while the EU positions itself as a normative power promoting dem-
ocratic  governance,  internal  democratic  backsliding  in  some  Member  States, 
such as Hungary and Poland, creates a more fragile image of the Union also 
externally.  This  situation,  combined  with  increasing  challenges  to  the  EU’s 
credibility from both internal sources and its enlargement policy, complicates 
its standing (Schimmelfennig 2023). This sui generis ‘democratic paradox’ of 

Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia Mokrá5

internal democracy erosion and aspirations to democratise externally has ad-
versely impacted the candidates’ trust in the EU, as well as their preparedness 
to enhance the state of democracy across their countries. 

Second, historically, geopolitics has been both a catalyst and constraint for 
EU enlargement (Schramm 2025). Each round of admission of new Member 
States has been driven by a change in geopolitical circumstances, and often ac-
companied by broader global ideological and political shifts. The reconfigura-
tion of global geopolitics, particularly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, 
has  revitalised  the  EU’s  enlargement  agenda.  Enlargement  has  become  inex-
tricable  from  the  Union’s  security  architecture  and  has  been  symbolically 
and  strategically  utilised  to  counterbalance  Russia’s  presence  in  the  Western 
Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries. Even so, as our contributions show, 
such  strategic  use  of  enlargement  remains  susceptible  to  being  exploited  by 
both  domestic  elites  and  foreign  actors  with  competing  interests,  including 
Russia, China, the Gulf States, and Türkiye.

Third,  the  entrenchment  of  stabilitocratic  regimes  across  the  Western 
Balkans  highlights  the  limitations  of  the  EU’s  conditionality  mechanism 
(Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019), as well as the general failure of democracy 
promotion by both the EU and the US. Countries in the region often present a 
façade of democratic reform while resisting substantial change. This situation 
is exacerbated by geopolitical ambiguity and the weak implementation of EU 
norms, playing back into the vicious circle of illiberalism and stabilitocracy as 
enduring patterns in the political evolution of the region. Such rule by stabili-
tocracy, as highlighted by a number of contributions to this book, has opened 
up spaces for actors such as China to extend its economic influence, or Russia 
to capitalise on political and cultural linkages across the region’s countries. 

Fourth,  the  enlargement  framework  of  the  EU  contains  notable  norma-
tive gaps in the context of intersectional inequalities and social justice. Despite 
progress in legal harmonisation, the EU’s approach to social justice and inter-
sectional  discrimination  has  remained  rather  formalistic  and  inadequate  for 
eradicating persisting ethnic, social, racial, gender, and economic inequalities 
across the region. The current enlargement tools often fail to address these ine-
qualities effectively, highlighting the need for a more inclusive and context-sen-
sitive application of EU conditionality, accompanied by concrete monitoring 
mechanisms. 

The (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Wider Europe: Step One6

Fifth, case studies included in the volume illustrate the crucial role of civil 
society  and  domestic  democratic  cultures  in  resisting  illiberalism.  Neverthe-
less, meaningful reform requires active support from local actors and the cul-
tivation  of democratic resilience from within. In  2025,  we  see  this  resilience 
from below most notably in the case of student-led protests in Serbia triggered 
by the collapse of a concrete canopy at a train station in November 2024 that 
took away 16 lives (Dinić 2025). The size and scale of the protests show the 
citizens’ increasing and continuous demand for democracy, dismantlement of 
a captured state, and dependencies on Russia and China. The EU’s caution in 
addressing the protests in Serbia is also telling of the EU’s ‘democracy paradox’ 
where particularistic interests often override universal values. How this paradox 
will evolve in the context of the radically changed transatlantic relationship will 
be our second step, and the driving question of our future enquiries in the geo-
politics of democracy in the Western Balkans and wider Europe.

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Balkan  (Geo)Politics,  185-93.  Florence:  European  University  Institute, 
2023.

Schramm,  Lucas.  “Navigating  Widening  and  Deepening:  The  European 
Council,  Geopolitical  Motives,  and  Union  Enlargement.”  Journal  of 
European Integration (2025): 1-22.

Jelena Džankić, Biljana Kotevska, and Lucia MokráPart 1
Western 
Balkan Country 
Perspectives

Nuances of (Geo)Politics 
of Democracy in Albania 
Explained through the 
Italy-Albania Agreement 
on Migrants

Klodiana Beshku*1

The war in Ukraine unblocked Albania’s path to European Integration. The 
country started the accession talks with the European Union (EU) in March 
2022,  held  the  first  Intergovernmental  Conference  with  the  Union  in  July 
2022,  and  completed  the  screening  for  all  six  clusters  in  November  2023. 
The accession negotiations kicked off in mid-October 2024. Albanian leader-
ship hopes to close all the negotiation chapters by the end of 2027 so that the 
country can become a full EU Member State by 2030. 

Scholarship on the Eastern EU enlargement has established that the more a 
country advances to the European Union, the more its democracy consolidates, 
at least at an institutional level (Pridham 2002). The relationship between ‘Eu-
ropeanisation’ and ‘democratisation’ has become so entrenched that the two 
have often been used interchangeably in scholarship on the Western Balkans. 
Even so, approximation to the EU does not always go hand in hand with the 
strengthening of the democracy in a candidate country. In the Western Balkan 

*  Klodiana  Beshku  is  an  Associate  Professor  at  the  University  of  Tirana  and  Visiting  Fellow  at  the 

Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute.

9

region, the backsliding of democracy (Bieber and Kmezić 2017), and the rise 
of authoritarianism (Bieber 2020) have often been linked to the weaknesses of 
the EU’s conditionality mechanism (Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2018). These 
adverse phenomena have also been related to the decoupling between formal 
compliance  with  the  EU  norms  and  the  democratic  transformation  of  the 
region (Richter and Wunsch 2020).

Albania  follows  a  twin  track  in  consolidating  its  democracy  and  seeking 
EU membership. The country holds a strong track record of alignment with 
the EU foreign policy despite its uneven democratic advancement. While cor-
ruption remains a serious concern (European Commission 2024), since 2022, 
a number of high-level politicians have been indicted and convicted by an in-
dependent  body  called  Special  Structure  against  Corruption  and  Organised 
Crime  (SPAK),  in  an  effort  to  undertake  a  thorough  reform  of  the  judici-
ary (Beshku and Mullisi 2018). Nonetheless, a number of democratic short-
comings persist, including a limited parliamentary oversight of the executive 
(European Commission 2023), or structural impediments that cause self-cen-
sorship among journalists (Bino 2023). 

Against this backdrop, the foreign policy efforts of Albania constitute an 
attempt to compensate for the democratic shortcomings. Albania fully aligns 
with the EU’s foreign policy (European Commission 2024), and as a non-per-
manent  member  of  the  UN  Security  Council  between  2022  and  2023  has 
actively engaged in resolutions condemning Russia’s war of aggression against 
Ukraine. Compensating for domestic democratic shortcomings by means of 
external engagement with the EU and the US is facilitated by a strong leader – 
Prime Minister Edi Rama – who personifies the country’s foreign policy. 

Rama’s strong leadership was pivotal in signing the Agreement on Strength-
ening  Cooperation  in  Migration  Matters  (hereinafter,  the  Agreement  on 
Migrants) with the Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in November 2023. 
Zooming in on the Agreement on Migrants, this chapter explores how a com-
bination of geopolitical interests and personalised foreign policy may influence 
democracy in a country. The analysis uses the lens of personalisation of foreign 
policy to unpack how untransparent practices can be detrimental to the quality 
of the democracy (Özdamar and Yanik 2024).

Nuances of (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Albania 10

The Rama-Meloni Agreement on Migrants

The  November  2023  Agreement  on  Migrants  foresaw  the  construction  of 
a  processing  and  a  detention  camp  on  Albanian  territory  for  sea-retrieved 
migrants headed to Italy. The camps would be under exclusive Italian jurisdic-
tion. One would be built in the coastal area of Shengjin, where the identifica-
tion procedures of asylum seekers would be carried out. The second one would 
be located in Gjader, where migrants would be detained pending the outcome 
of their applications for international protection (De Petris 2024). 

While  there  are  strong  historical  and  cultural  links  between  Italy  and 
Albania, the Agreement on Migrants was facilitated by the personal friendship 
between Rama and Meloni. An informal meeting between Rama and Meloni 
took place in the summer of 2023. The two leaders met in Valona and spent 
four days with their respective families in the Albanian Prime minister’s official 
residence in the coastal village of Dhërmi, among boat rides and non-official 
dinners (Logroscino 2023). Only months after the meeting would the Agree-
ment on Migrants accorded between the two parties in Dhërmi become known 
to the Albanian public, through the reporting of Italian media (Sinoruka and 
Siviero 2023). 

The opposition criticised Prime Minister Rama for signing an agreement 
without prior consultation with the Parliament. Thirty members of the parlia-
mentary opposition appealed to the Constitutional Court of Albania, flagging 
the Agreement on Migrants for its lack of transparency and concern for human 
rights. Despite criticism, the Albanian Constitutional Court ruled in favour of 
the agreement on 29 January 2024 (Griffini and Rossina 2025, 12). The agree-
ment, essentially, places a portion of the territory of Albania under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of Italy, where the latter can ‘externalise’ its asylum seekers, thus de-
terring potential immigrants from travelling towards Italy (Muharremaj and 
Cami 2024, 1). Even though the Agreement on Migrants involved questions 
of external governance in an EU Member State, and a candidate country’s ter-
ritorial  sovereignty,  neither  the  Albanian  public  opinion  and  media  nor  the 
European Commission had been informed about this agreement ahead of its 
conclusion (Hasa 2023). 

The agreement with Italy was unusual in the Albanian context, as Prime 
Minister Rama had previously rejected the idea of a similar collaboration with 
the UK (Hymas 2021). To justify its conclusion, Rama evoked the long friend-
ship  between  the  two  countries  and  the  gratitude  Albania  owed  to  Italy  for 

Klodiana Beshku11

having helped Albanian emigrants to Italy in the 1990s (Grignetti 2023). Based 
on vague appeals to historic friendship between the two countries and lacking 
parliamentary and public scrutiny, this agreement can be characterised not only 
as untransparent but in risk of non-compliance with European and international 
law (ECRE 2023; Amnesty International 2024; Broerse 2024). The Agreement 
of Migrants furthermore raised concerns about freedom from arbitrary deten-
tion, adequate asylum application procedures, and living conditions (Ekathimer-
ini 2024). As of April 2025, the agreement is still not enforced because the Court 
of Rome repeatedly ruled not to validate the Italian requests for migrants to be 
transferred to the detention Centre in Gjader (De Petris 2024).

The Agreement on Migrants received a mixed response. While the EU gave 
a tacit consent to the deal, some EU member countries saw it as a template for 
future collaborations between EU and non-EU states in the management of the 
migratory flows and in the security field (Hoxhaj 2024). Among the domestic 
opposition and Albanian diaspora it caused concern over moving the country 
away from alignment with European and international values (Ypi 2024). 

Personalisation of Foreign Policy to the Detriment of 
Democracy

It is difficult to assess a net democratic decline in Albania, since the country has 
remained within the spectrum of a consolidating democracy. Various democra-
cy indices, including Freedom House and the Global State of Democracy rank 
the country as ‘partly free’ or ‘flawed democracy’ (Freedom House 2024; IDEA 
2024). In an unstable democratic context, the personalisation of foreign policy 
may be detrimental to the quality of the democracy. This is the case because 
the interests of country’s leaders rather than the interests of the country itself 
may drive the country’s priorities, e.g. by undermining democratic values and 
procedures at home in order to pursue interests abroad. Such personalisation 
of foreign policy inevitably leads to the politicisation of external affairs. Person-
alisation increases politicisation, as foreign policy topics might be particularly 
suitable to generating popular support (Destradi and Plagemann 2019). That 
is,  the  leader  who  has  already  personalised  or  hyper-personalised  the  foreign 
policy is likely to use of it for internal propaganda and mobilising purposes. 

When foreign policy becomes personalised, it also becomes less transparent 
(Özdamar  and  Yanik  2024,  1856).  We  should  expect  more  personal,  one-to-
one, leader-to-leader, bilateral relations in conducting foreign policy and less 

Nuances of (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Albania 12

technical, less bureaucratic and institutional, and less multilateral approaches 
to foreign policy-making (Özdamar and Yanik 2024, 1854). In the case of Alba-
nia’s relationship with Italy, these practices are embodied in the personal friend-
ship between Rama and Meloni who forged an untransparent migration deal 
during a semi-formal vacation. This special friendship between the two leaders, 
has favoured the use of the personalisation of foreign policy and informal prac-
tices, which have subsequently spilled over into the sphere of domestic politics. 

In fact, the draft of the treaty had not been made public prior to its signing, 
highlighting the lack of public consultation. As noted above, the Agreement 
on Migrants has also gone through an express procedure and with a green light 
from  the  Constitutional  Court,  even  though  the  agreement  touched  upon 
the issues of sovereignty and extraterritoriality (Gjoka 2023). This is indicative 
of how personalisation foreign policy reduces the quality of decision-making 
(Özdamar and Yanik 2024, 1856), and by extension impairs democracy.

Why exchange favours?

Both Rama and Meloni have sought to employ the linkages forged abroad to 
consolidate  their  power  at  home  and  win  future  elections.  Rama  vindicated 
the Agreement on Migrants as an act of gratitude and a return of favour to 
Italy for its support of Albania. Moreover, the Albanian Prime Minister has 
made no secret of his good relations with the Italian counterpart and the ad-
miration of Italy (Carlucci 2023). At a session of the European Parliament in 
September 2024, he further highlighted that the agreement was “an exclusive 
agreement with Italy because we love everyone, but with Italy, we have uncon-
ditional  love”  (Jones  2024).  Indeed,  Italy  has  been  Albania’s  economic  and 
security partner since the beginning of the nineties, when it became one of Al-
bania’s major political and economic supporters in passing from a centralised 
to a free-market economy. 

In this context, the personalisation of politics under Rama and Meloni has 
been particularly strong when the leaders needed the public support of each 
other.  For  Meloni,  Rama  is  crucial  in  order  to  maintain  her  party’s  elector-
al promise from October 2022 that she would deal with the migrant crisis in 
Italy. Ever since her ascent to power, she has made migration a top priority and 
a key focus of its European agenda (Pirozzi 2025, 3). For Rama, Meloni has 
been pivotal to put into action the Social Security Agreement with Italy. This 
agreement ensures the recognition of pension rights to Albanian immigrants in 

Klodiana Beshku13

Italy in both Italy and in Albania. It was ratified with unanimity by the Senate 
in March 2025, which was described as a way to strengthen “the relationship 
between Italy and Albania” (Collettiva 2025). This agreement has important 
implications for Rama domestically. Since the Albanian diaspora is voting for 
the first time in the national elections of 11 May 2025 of Albania, the votes 
from Italy could be very important for Rama, who aims at a fourth mandate.

Conclusions

The case discussed in this chapter points to a wider pattern of the one-to-one, 
leader-to-leader type of bilateral relations. The personalisation of foreign policy 
rooted in the exchange of personal favours leads to decisions based on self-in-
terest of the leaders. The adverse impact of such personalisation is not obvious 
if the interest of the leader coincides with the national interest of the country, 
as  has  been  the  case  of  the  Agreement  on  Migrants.  The  leader  could  “sell” 
their own agenda as the national one, and argue that the policy has been made 
more effective. Yet should these interests diverge, the leaders’ behaviour – and 
as a consequence the country’s foreign policy – would become highly volatile. 
The personalisation of foreign policy thus contributes to surreptitious practic-
es in domestic politics. This is contrary to the core principles of democracy as 
a system with clear rules, procedures, and regulations designed to avoid unpre-
dictability. 

In sum, the personalisation of foreign policy negatively affects the quality 
of decision-making (Özdamar and Yanik 2024, 1856), because it favours form 
over content and the effectiveness of policymaking over the substance of de-
mocracy. As the case of Albania has shown, strong personalisation of foreign 
policy often comes with untransparent and clientelist practices that harm dem-
ocratic progress of a country. Therefore, it is always best to avoid it at all costs.

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Nuances of (Geo)Politics of Democracy in Albania Unpacking Foreign 
Influence on Democracy 
in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina

Damir Kapidžić*

Since  the  1990s  war,  the  democratisation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH) 
has  faced  several  internal  and  external  challenges.  The  Dayton  Peace  Agree-
ment established an intricate power-sharing system among Bosniaks, Croats, 
and Serbs, alongside the category of ‘Others’. However, this complex system 
has been misused by domestic and external actors to stall reforms, empower 
nationalist leaders, and foster democratic decline. Political elites have continu-
ously exploited the ethno-territorial post-war stability created by consociation-
al  democracy  to  entrench  illiberal  governance,  state  capture,  and  corruption 
(Kapidžić 2020). This system, characterised by ethnic clientelism, excludes large 
segments of society, weakening democratic accountability and the rule of law 
(Blagovčanin 2024). Key consequences of the system’s setup include persistent 
political illiberalism, slow economic growth, and a sluggish European integra-
tion process. Freedom House’s 2024 report labels BiH ‘partly free’, highlight-
ing  corruption  and  nationalist  dominance,  particularly  against  non-majority 
groups (Freedom House 2024). Transparency International ranks BiH 108th 
in corruption perceptions, reflecting its decentralised, ethnicity-based political 
system (Transparency International 2023).

*  Damir Kapidžić is Professor of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzego-

vina, Faculty of Political Science.

19

External  actors  like  the  European  Union  (EU),  the  United  States  of 
America  (US),  Russia,  China,  Turkey,  and  recently  Hungary  exert  signifi-
cant influence on BiH’s governance, yet in very different directions. Despite 
applying for EU membership in 2016, and receiving the long-awaited recom-
mendation to begin accession talks in 2024, the EU accession process has been 
hampered by internal political dynamics and the EU’s focus on internal and 
geopolitical priorities like Ukraine (Bechev 2024). The EU’s emphasis on sta-
bility over reforms in the Western Balkans allows illiberal governance to persist 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). Meanwhile, 
the  US  supports  democratisation  of  BiH’s  institutions  but  cannot  counter 
external autocratic actors due to its limited presence in the country. Russia acts 
as a spoiler and continuously undermines democratic governance by promot-
ing  ethnic  divisions  and  authoritarianism  in  Republika  Srpska  (RS),  and  by 
backing  secessionist  ambitions  of  the  RS  President  Milorad  Dodik.  China’s 
economic influence, including non-transparent infrastructure projects, under-
mines governance standards throughout the country (Pekmez 2022a, 12–14). 
Turkey’s  regional  involvement  and  Hungary’s  EU  role  under  Viktor  Orbán 
also hinder democratisation efforts (Ćerimagić 2024).

As  a  result,  BiH’s  democracy  remains  fragile,  with  external  pressures  and 
internal resistance enabling corruption, clientelism, and authoritarian tendencies 
of domestic political leaders. Progress depends on overcoming entrenched elite 
interests  and  external  influences  that  prioritise  particular  geopolitical  interests 
and stability over democratic development. This is a tall order to start with, not 
even considering the complex governance structure of BiH. The remainder of 
this chapter will investigate whether, and to what extent, democratic decline can 
be attributed to the influence of external actors and their geopolitical interests.

Who are the Main Geopolitical Actors in BiH?

Six  global  and  regional  actors,  each  with  distinct  and  competing  political, 
economic, and cultural approaches, have a significant geopolitical impact on 
democracy  (and  autocracy)  in  BiH.  To  them,  engagement  with  the  country 
remains  strategically  significant  for  their  foreign  policy  ambitions.  We  can 
broadly identify two groups of foreign actors – those who more or less suc-
cessfully seek to contribute to democratisation, the EU and US, and those that 
deliberately  hamper  it  for  political  gain,  such  as  Russia,  or  indirectly  out  of 
economic interests, such as China and Turkey. Hungary falls in between, sup-
porting BiH’s EU aspirations while weakening its democracy for self-interest.

Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina20

The EU is BiH’s largest trading partner and a key force shaping its democra-
tisation through the European integration process. Since BiH’s 2016 EU mem-
bership application, reforms have focused on judicial independence, anti-cor-
ruption, and public administration (European Commission 2024). However, 
very slow progress and perceived EU disengagement have led to an increase in 
local popular disillusionment in the country towards the Union. Despite these 
challenges, the EU remains essential to BiH’s democratisation (Ćeranić Perišić 
2023, 25–26). Membership in the EU enjoys wide – political and popular – 
support against any other alternative for future geopolitical alignment of BiH. 
This  makes  reforms  more  feasible  in  addition  to  the  EU’s  significant  politi-
cal and economic leverage over the country. The US has been a key driver of 
democratisation in the immediate post-war period. Today, the US maintain a 
strong presence through financial aid, building anti-corruption capacities, and 
support for civil society and judicial reforms (Kapidžić et al. 2023).

Russia, a key ally of Serb nationalists, acts to the detriment of democracy. It 
bolsters the separatist agenda of Milorad Dodik, the leader of Republika Srpska 
(RS), undermining BiH’s EU and NATO aspirations in the process. Russian 
media like RT and Sputnik amplify its influence, particularly in RS, fuelling 
ethnic divisions and weakening democratic institutions in the entity (Kapidžić 
2023). By contrast, China’s engagement in BiH is primarily economic, driven 
by the Belt and Road Initiative. Its projects, including infrastructure loans and 
trade  agreements,  focus  on  long-term  economic  integration  into  European 
markets. However, these projects face criticism for a lack of transparency, con-
tributing to governance challenges (Vangeli 2024; Hasić 2022, 16-21). Turkey 
leverages cultural and historical ties to influence BiH, restoring Ottoman-era 
monuments through initiatives like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordina-
tion Agency (TİKA). However, its relationships with Russia and the US com-
plicate its regional role, raising concerns over its alignment with illiberal regimes 
(Kayani  2021;  Szpala  2022).  Hungary,  under  Viktor  Orbán,  supports  BiH’s 
EU accession but often promotes nationalist and anti-democratic policies that 
bring  it  economic  benefit.  Orbán’s  stance  has  drawn  criticism  both  locally 
and internationally for undermining BiH’s stability while favouring Dodik’s 
agenda (Inotai 2024). 

Damir Kapidžić21

Channels of Influence and Policy Impact

External  actors  influence  the  state  of  democracy  in  BiH  through  formal 
channels, such as treaties, trade agreements, and investments, as well as informal 
means, including personal networks and cultural ties. All actors use both kinds 
of  channels,  albeit  formal  mechanisms  of  influence  are  more  visible  among 
actors that promote democracy, while informal channels are seen as the main 
avenue of autocratic influence.

The  EU  exercises  a  significant  impact  on  the  state  of  democracy  in  BiH 
through economic programmes, trade agreements, and funding, particularly 
via  the  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance.  It  also  contributes  to  BiH’s 
security through EUFOR ALTHEA and to education through the European 
Higher  Education  Area.  Informally,  the  EU  engages  with  local  leaders  to 
promote governance reforms and anti-corruption measures (European Com-
mission 2024). For example, this can happen through European party channels, 
twinning  programmes,  and  interparliamentary  cooperation.  However,  slow 
reform progress has shifted the channels to include more informal influence, 
such as through statements and public opinion, and initiatives by individual 
countries. This has led to a less rigorous application of EU conditionality while 
allowing  illiberal  actors  within  the  EU  to  appear  as  more  relevant  (Ćeranić 
Perišić  2023,  25–26).  The  US  maintain  their  influence  formally  through 
military presence, financial aid, and democratic reform initiatives, primarily via 
USAID. Relationships with NGOs and support for civil society organisations 
amplify its soft power. Informally, US diplomats leverage media and personal 
ties with local leaders to promote Euro-Atlantic integration, despite facing re-
sistance from nationalist actors (Latal 2023; Wiseman 2023).

In  BiH,  and  particularly  in  RS,  Russia’s  influence  mechanisms  are  both 
formal and informal. Moscow supports RS leader Milorad Dodik, while lev-
eraging political, cultural, and religious ties to the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Russian  energy  investments  and  media  outlets  like  Sputnik  and  RT  amplify 
pro-Russian, anti-Western narratives, fuelling ethnic divisions and undermin-
ing  BiH’s  central  government  (Zweers,  Drost,  Henry  2023;  Turčalo  2024). 
Conversely,  China’s  presence  is  primarily  economic,  exercised  through  both 
formal and informal channels. It is focused on infrastructure projects in both 
BiH entities. While offering unconditional loans, China’s lack of transparency 
and project delays weaken governance structures. Initiatives like the Prijedor 
hospital showcase China’s growing regional footprint, but BiH faces trade im-
balances and potential institutional erosion due to opaque agreements (Hasić 

Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina22

2022, 16–21; Pekmez 2022a, 12–14). We can see similar patterns of influence 
from  Turkey,  which  combines  formal  economic  ties,  such  as  a  Free  Trade 
Agreement, with informal cultural and religious connections, especially with 
Bosniaks. Erdoğan’s ties to BiH’s Party of Democratic Action (SDA) further 
deepen  its  influence  (Kayani  2021,  198–205).  Hungary  formally  supports 
EU enlargement that includes BiH, but informally supports RS and Dodik, 
aligning  with  nationalist  agendas.  These  actors’  competing  strategies  shape 
BiH’s fragile political landscape, often undermining its democratic and insti-
tutional integrity.

There is a key difference between the use of formal and informal channels. 
Formal mechanisms engage directly with institutions, for example, through bi-
lateral agreements, exchange programmes, and policy alignment. This approach 
strengthens the governance framework of the countries involved, institution-
alises cooperation, and brings them closer to each other on a more permanent 
basis. On the other hand, informal channels rely on individuals and personal 
connections. Coupled with weak or captured institutions, this can lead to an 
overreliance on individual leaders, who often exhibit autocratic tendencies.

Assessing Foreign Influence on Democratic 
Backsliding

Democratic backsliding is usually characterised by the erosion of democratic 
norms, institutions, and practices (Kapidžić 2020, 1–18). Although internal 
political dynamics can be marked as the main culprit of the decline in BiH, au-
thoritarian and democratic external actors also play a role. It is exactly through 
this interaction between external actors and local proxies that autocratisation 
happens  and  assessing  the  dynamics  of  interaction  is  crucial.  By  effectively 
acting in the interest of foreign influence, local actors eliminate the need for 
assertive foreign influence as they effectively handle tasks on the ground. This 
section will provide several examples that could illustrate this, including foreign 
influence by Russia, China, and the US, through actions by the domestic/in-
ternational hybrid of the Office of the High Representative (OHR).

Russia plays a central role in promoting autocratic tendencies in BiH, par-
ticularly through its local alliances. A striking example is the involvement of 
the  Russian  pro-regime  biker  group  “Night  Wolves”  in  the  celebrations  of 
January 9, the Day of RS, a holiday ruled unconstitutional by the Constitu-
tional Court of BiH. On different occasions, the group had openly displayed 

Damir Kapidžić23

pro-Russian and pro-RS messaging, promoted autocratic values and leaders, 
and questioned the sovereignty of BiH. Despite being banned from entering 
BiH since 2018, the group paraded in East Sarajevo in 2023 and Banja Luka in 
2024, under the pretence of cultural and humanitarian activities. These events, 
orchestrated by the RS leadership, demonstrate how Russia exploits local allies 
to project its influence and normalise undemocratic practices (Federalna 2023; 
Detektor 2023). Such occasions also provide a platform for Milorad Dodik to 
consolidate his power, deepen ethnic divisions, and undermine state unity and 
institutions in BiH.

Another example of Russian influence is political messaging aimed at ob-
structing  BiH’s  EU  and  NATO  integration.  The  Russian  Embassy  in  BiH 
has explicitly framed EU enlargement, and the aspirations of BiH to join the 
Union,  as  not  benefiting  the  country  (Kalabuhov  2022).  This  is  specifical-
ly related to foreign policy alignment between the EU and BiH following the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine. Opposition to NATO integration is even more 
overt and has been persistently vilified. Shortly after the invasion of Ukraine, 
the Russian Ambassador to BiH warned that Russia would “have to react” if 
BiH pursued NATO membership (Pekmez 2024). This kind of official mes-
saging exemplifies Russia’s use of coercive diplomacy to shape BiH’s foreign 
policy decisions.

Furthermore, the dealings between BiH authorities and Chinese compa-
nies  at  both  entity  and  state  levels  have  been  questionable,  and  have  had  an 
adverse impact on democracy in the country. Most of these dealings relate to 
infrastructure  investments  and  untransparent  contracting.  One  prominent 
case is the reconstruction of Sarajevo’s tram lines, a major infrastructure project 
awarded to the Chinese consortium CREC 10. The Sarajevo Canton transport 
ministry has consistently refused to release the contract or disclose details about 
the winning bid, prices, or deadlines, citing confidentiality (Pekmez 2022b). 
This secrecy violates the Law on Free Access to Information and undermines 
public oversight, weakening democratic accountability and setting a troubling 
precedent for governance in BiH. Such opaque partnerships enable local elites 
to operate outside established democratic frameworks, prioritising short-term 
economic gains over long-term democratic commitments.

A similar pattern is evident in the construction of the “Sveti apostol Luka” 
hospital in Doboj by the Chinese state-owned enterprise Sinopharm. Initially, 
the project was awarded to a different consortium, but following an appeal to 
the BiH Complaints Review Office, Sinopharm’s bid was revised and deemed 

Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina24

the “most favourable”. This decision overturned the original award in favour 
of  a  higher  bid,  raising  significant  concerns  about  the  integrity  of  the  deci-
sion-making process. Further complicating the hospital project is its controver-
sial location in a flood-prone area near a major road, adding to the scepticism 
surrounding the project’s execution (Gerila 2024). By using informal channels 
to pressure weak institutions to their favour, Chinese economic interests em-
phasise the arbitrary nature of rule of law in the BiH, contributing to percep-
tions of bad governance.

It is not only authoritarian foreign influence by actors like Russia and China 
that undermines democracy, but also haphazard and uncoordinated action by 
Western democratic actors – particularly through the OHR. The OHR, which 
was established to implement the Dayton Agreement, holds significant power 
in  BiH.  It  frequently  intervenes  in  political  affairs  to  maintain  stability  and 
promote democratic governance. However, this creates a paradox whereby the 
imposition of democratic norms through undemocratic methods undermines 
local ownership and legitimacy (Gilbert 2017). Throughout the past decades, 
it has developed into a hybrid local-international institution that has become 
an unaccountable element of the BiH political system. At times, actions by the 
OHR have inadvertently undermined democratic processes, despite being mo-
tivated by a desire to stabilise the country.

A notable example are the actions of Christian Schmidt, the High Repre-
sentative for BiH, in changing the electoral law. On 2 October 2022, the day of 
the general elections, Schmidt implemented significant changes to the electoral 
law, calling them a “Functionality Pack” aimed at preventing blockades within 
the Federation of BiH (FBiH). These changes, enacted just an hour after polling 
stations closed, were supported by the US and the United Kingdom, but drew 
widespread criticism for their timing and lack of consultation. Although the 
measures sought to address systemic dysfunction, which they successfully did, 
their  unilateral  imposition  undermined  democratic  norms  and  legitimacy  in 
the  process.  This  kind  of  external  legislative  imposition  without  any  public 
consultations or regard to local ownership plays into the hands of non-demo-
cratic actors who are empowered to act in similar ways. Such actions risk per-
petuating  weak  democratic  institutions  by  further  fostering  dependency  in 
external governance.

Damir Kapidžić25

Which Way to Democracy?

BiH’s illustrates the complex interplay between internal dynamics and external 
influences on democratic backsliding. It is impossible to fully assign responsi-
bility to either local or foreign actors, but their interactions and interests lead 
the country away from democracy. While domestic political elites exploit the 
post-war consociational framework to entrench illiberal governance, external 
actors  –  both  democratic  and  autocratic  –  use  their  influence  to  shape  the 
country’s  political  trajectory.  Russia’s  support  for  nationalist  leaders  and 
divisive policies exacerbates ethnic tensions and undermines BiH’s aspirations 
for EU and NATO integration. Similarly, China’s opaque economic engage-
ments  weaken  governance  structures  and  democratic  accountability.  On  the 
other hand, Western actors like the US and the EU, while promoting democrat-
ic reforms, often prioritise stability, inadvertently contributing to dependency 
on external governance. Actions by the OHR, such as the unilateral electoral 
changes by Christian Schmidt, highlight the paradox of imposing democrat-
ic  norms  through  undemocratic  methods,  further  complicating  BiH’s  path 
to  sustainable  democracy.  Addressing  these  challenges  requires  an  approach 
that  explicitly  strengthens  local  democratic  institutions  while  mitigating  the 
negative impacts of external geopolitical interests.

Acknowledgment: The author is thankful to Muamer Hirkić for his research 
assistance.

Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina26

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Unpacking Foreign Influence on Democracy in Bosnia and HerzegovinaGeopolitics and 
Democracy in Kosovo

Ramadan Ilazi*1

Kosovo serves as a compelling case study of geopolitical interference, with its 
entire state-building process shaped by external geopolitical and geostrategic in-
fluences. This trajectory began with the 1999 Rambouillet Agreement, which 
facilitated  liberation  from  Yugoslav/Serbian  rule  following  years  of  conflict. 
The process continued with the Vienna negotiations on Kosovo’s final status 
or the Ahtisaari Process (2006–2007), led by former Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari.  These  efforts  culminated  in  Kosovo’s  declaration  of  independ-
ence in 2008 and were followed by the Troika Process, a joint initiative by the 
European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Russia aimed at finding 
an acceptable compromise for Kosovo’s status. Despite extensive negotiations, 
the Troika Process ultimately reaffirmed the conclusions of the Ahtisaari Plan. 
Currently, the EU-led dialogue seeks to normalise relations between Kosovo 
and Serbia, a crucial step for Kosovo’s consolidation as a state and its integra-
tion into EU structures.

In essence, Kosovo’s history is intrinsically linked to sustained external in-
volvement, which has generally been welcomed from the country’s leadership 
and society. However, this reliance on external actors has also led to complex 
and sometimes counterintuitive outcomes. For instance, while the Rambouil-
let Agreement successfully ended the Serbian rule of Kosovo, it has also laid the 
groundwork for internal fragmentation by a heavy-handed and not quite dem-
ocratic international governance through the United Nations Interim Admin-
istration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Human Rights Watch has noted that 

*  Ramadan Ilazi is Head of Research at the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS).

31

“[d]uring its eight years, the mission has not succeeded in establishing itself as a 
model of good governance practices”. During this period, the Self-Determina-
tion Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje) emerged, targeting UNMIK as a colonial 
power and challenging its authority. Similarly, the Ahtisaari Process, which led 
to an independent Kosovo, inadvertently exacerbated political tensions within 
the country, through the decentralisation measures that created new Serb-ma-
jority municipalities in Kosovo.

Amidst  these  developments,  perhaps  the  most  impactful  process  with 
inadvertently  negative  effects  on  Kosovo’s  democracy  has  been  the  EU-led 
dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. The 
dialogue  began  in  2011  following  the  International  Court  of  Justice’s  (ICJ) 
ruling that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international 
law  (International  Court  of  Justice  2010).  The  EU  aimed  to  normalise  rela-
tions between the two states, while maintaining a status-neutral stance towards 
Kosovo.  A  particularly  contentious  issue  arose  from  the  First  Agreement  of 
Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations of 2013. This agreement 
obligated Kosovo to establish an Association of Serb-majority municipalities, 
a provision that became a focal point for opposition parties like Vetëvendosje, 
which framed this as an effort to fragment Kosovo and establish a “Republic of 
Srpska”, echoing the arguments used against the Ahtisaari Plan (Telegrafi n.d.).

These  examples  illustrate  how  initiatives  by  democratic  actors,  though 
well-intentioned, can sometimes backfire, leading to unintended setbacks in the 
democratic consolidation process. This chapter will zoom in on such instanc-
es, examining how external interventions have derailed Kosovo’s European in-
tegration  process  and  created  fractures  within  the  Euro-Atlantic  consensus 
in the country. By analysing these dynamics with a focus on four actors, the 
EU, the US, Serbia, and Russia, the chapter aims to unpack the complex inter-
play between external geopolitical influences and local political responses. In 
so doing, it offers insights into the broader question of the impact of external 
factors on democratic decline.

External Malign Influence and Proxy Politics in 
Kosovo

From the perspective of Kosovo’s policymakers and society, several actors exert 
both direct and indirect influence aimed at undermining its statehood, security, 
and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Among them, Serbia remains the most influen-

Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 32

tial one. Belgrade’s refusal to recognise Kosovo’s independence is accompanied 
by active efforts to block its international recognition and challenge its internal 
functionality. Serbia exerts influence through Srpska Lista, which dominates 
Kosovo Serb political representation. SL’s monopoly of power effectively elim-
inates political pluralism among Serbs in Kosovo. Critics of SL faced violence, 
including the assassination of Oliver Ivanović (Bami 2022). The SL derives its 
power  from  Kosovo’s  constitutional  arrangements,  which  require  a  double 
majority – two-thirds of the overall 120 Assembly seats and two-thirds of the 
20 reserved seats for non-majority communities – for changes to laws of vital 
interest,  such  as  education,  healthcare,  and  local  government.  Additionally, 
the constitution mandates that the government consult with the main politi-
cal group representing Kosovo Serbs in the Assembly when appointing minis-
ters from the Kosovo Serb community. This framework, originally conceived 
to protect minority rights, has been exploited by Belgrade through the SL to 
entrench its influence over the Kosovo Serb community and obstruct Kosovo’s 
institutional functioning.

One  stark  example  of  this  malign  influence  occurred  in  November  2022, 
when Kosovo Serbs resigned en masse from institutional positions in protest over 
the government’s ban on Serbia-issued license plates. This incident not only high-
lighted Serbia’s ability to destabilise Kosovo but also demonstrated the detrimen-
tal impact of Belgrade’s actions on the Kosovo Serb community. By pressuring 
Kosovo Serbs to abandon institutional roles, Serbia effectively undermined their 
agency and representation within Kosovo’s governance structures. As a result of 
the resignations, the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north came under 
the leadership of Kosovo Albanian mayors, and the area began to be policed by 
Kosovo Police officers from other parts of the country. 

The  Kosovo  government’s  lack  of  coordination  with  the  internation-
al community regarding actions in the north further alienated Kosovo Serbs 
and exacerbated deteriorating interethnic relations in the north and in Kosovo, 
more generally. Even so, one widely acknowledged positive outcome of the gov-
ernment’s actions was the dismantling of entrenched criminal structures in the 
north led by Milan Radoičić, which were deeply involved in different criminal 
activities, as well as undermining the authority of public institutions (Stojano-
vić 2021). These criminal structures retaliated in September 2023 by staging 
a terrorist attack in Banjska, resulting in the death of a Kosovo Police officer 
and several militia members (Radio Free Europe 2024). Milan Radoičić, who 
served at the same time as deputy leader of Srpska Lista, publicly admitted his 

Ramadan Ilazi33

involvement in the attack, underscoring the capacity of Serbia and its proxies 
in  the  north  to  challenge  not  only  the  Kosovo  government’s  authority  but 
also that of NATO/KFOR and the international community. Kosovo police 
provided  ample  evidence  showing  that  the  group  behind  the  Banjska  attack 
was trained and supported by Serbia’s security institutions (Isufi and Stojano-
vić 2023). Since 2023, the threat posed by these parallel structures to Kosovo’s 
security has greatly diminished. This is largely due to intensified efforts by the 
Kosovo Police, whose actions have led to the arrest of numerous individuals 
linked to these groups in northern Kosovo. The turning point came after the 
Banjska terrorist attack, when Milan Radoičić – widely seen as the kingpin of 
organised crime in the north – is now a wanted fugitive, reportedly hiding in 
plain sight in Serbia (Taylor-Braçe 2023).

The  role  of  Radoičić’s  in  the  attack  further  eroded  the  political  legiti-
macy  of  the  SL,  turning  the  party  into  a  liability  for  the  Kosovo  Serb  com-
munity.  Although  the  party  has  since  elected  new  leadership,  it  remains  ef-
fectively blacklisted by Kosovo Albanian political parties, making any future 
cooperation unlikely. This situation has created an opportunity for new polit-
ical actors, such as the Serb Democracy (SD) party, to emerge in the north and 
foster greater democratisation of political participation within the Kosovo Serb 
community. However, the current government in Belgrade is unlikely to allow 
what it perceives as a fragmentation of political representation among Kosovo 
Serbs. They remain committed to maintaining the SL as the sole representa-
tive of Kosovo Serbs in the institutions, as this enables it to control political 
agency of the Kosovo Serbs and prevent cooperation between Kosovo institu-
tions and any alternative Kosovo Serb political groups that might adopt a more 
integrationist and cooperative stance. This dynamic reflects the broader goal of 
Serbia’s malign influence in Kosovo: to undermine the functioning of Kosovo 
as a democratic and a cohesive state.

Serbia’s  relations  with  Russia  and  China  represent  another  critical  di-
mension of the country’s malign influence on Kosovo. Russia has been a vital 
partner  for  Serbia’s  efforts  to  undermine  Kosovo  on  the  international  stage. 
Most importantly for Kosovo, this partnership prevented the adoption of the 
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (CSP) in 2007 in 
the UN Security Council. Commonly known as the Ahtisaari Plan, the plan 
recommended independence for Kosovo. This effectively opened a process that 
continues to produce instability in the Western Balkans to this day. Russia has 
consistently blocked Kosovo’s membership in organisations like UNESCO and 

Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 34

INTERPOL. Moscow has delivered on every occasion. Russia always reminds 
Serbia of its role, and Serbia emphasises this support to reinforce its partner-
ship with Russia. Moreover, Russia leveraged its presence in the UNMIK to 
collect information and occasionally make an effort to influence the agenda of 
public institutions in Kosovo, albeit with limited success. Russia aims to stall 
Serbia-Kosovo normalisation, with the Kremlin fearing any conflict resolution 
would diminish Moscow’s own regional leverage. Analyst Maksim Samorukov 
noted that “[i]n the eyes of the Kremlin, Russia has very little to gain and poten-
tially everything to lose if the Kosovo conflict is resolved” (Samorukov 2019). 
Using Serbia as a hub, Russia projects its power across the Western Balkans via 
official outlets like Sputnik Srbija and RT Balkan, as well as via pro-Russian 
Telegram channels that push nationalist narratives and call for actions such as 
border blockades (Pacarizi and Haxha 2024).

However, Russia’s standing as Serbia’s preeminent ally is now being chal-
lenged due to its international isolation following the February 2022 invasion 
of Ukraine. Russia’s global reputation has become increasingly ‘toxic’, leading 
to  Serbia  looking  at  options  to  further  deepen  its  strategic  partnership  with 
China (Ilazi and Vladisavljev 2023). This shift is evidenced by Serbia’s growing 
economic and political alignment with Beijing. Serbia was one of only three 
European countries visited by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his Europe 
tour, alongside France and Hungary (Al Jazeera 2024). The approval of lithium 
mining projects in Serbia has further elevated Serbia’s geopolitical relevance, 
due  to  the  strategic  importance  of  lithium  for  both  the  EU  and  China  (see 
Ejdus, this volume). Serbian and the European Commission signed a memo-
randum of understanding on critical raw materials, battery value chains and 
electric vehicles in July, of 2024 in the presence of German Chancellor Olaf 
Scholz. This closer partnership with China allows Serbia to maintain its diver-
sified alliances, while maintaining its ‘balancing act’.

These developments pose a growing challenge for Kosovo’s efforts to con-
solidate  its  statehood  and  strengthen  its  position  in  the  international  com-
munity.  Serbia’s  elevated  geopolitical  relevance  with  the  lithium,  combined 
with the rise of far-right political movements in key EU states such as France, 
Germany, and Austria, creates an environment that is increasingly hostile to 
Kosovo’s aspirations. Far-right parties in the EU, often sympathetic to Russia 
and  Serbia’s  stance,  are  gaining  support  and  influence,  which  could  further 
complicate  Kosovo’s  pursuit  of  recognition  and  integration  in  the  Euro-At-
lantic community. For Kosovo, this means navigating an increasingly complex 

Ramadan Ilazi35

international landscape, where the convergence of Serbia’s alliances with au-
thoritarian powers and the rise of illiberal forces in EU threatens not only to 
stall its progress toward international integration, but potentially see regress in 
recognitions and support from key allies such as the US, Germany, and the UK.

Friendly Fire: Unintended Consequences of the EU’s 
and US’s efforts

External normative actors like the EU and the US – generally viewed locally 
in  Kosovo  as  well-intentioned  –  sometimes  wield  their  influence  too  force-
fully  or  ignore  the  wider  context  and  implications.  By  pressuring  local  deci-
sion-makers to adopt certain policies without fully considering the broader im-
plications, these actors risk stoking public frustration (Richmond 2018). Over 
time,  such  frustration  has  shaped  the  local  population’s  perception  of  how 
Kosovo is treated internationally and how these external actors have interacted 
with the Kosovar government. In Kosovo’s case, persistent pressure from the 
EU and the United States to implement specific policies has gradually created 
conditions that foster populism and nationalism. It has also fuelled demands 
for stronger leadership capable of standing up to Serbia and challenging what 
many perceive as unequal treatment by the international community. 

There are two examples that best illustrate how well-intentioned interven-
tions, coupled with a hardline approach, inadvertently boost nationalism and 
help bring more populist, ethno-centric leaders to power. These include the es-
tablishment of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) in 2013 
and the adoption of the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro in 
2016. Both were initially viewed as positive measures to help Kosovo consoli-
date its statehood. The ASM was meant to ensure Kosovo Serb integration and 
acceptance  of  Kosovo’s  authority  throughout  its  territory,  while  the  border 
agreement  sought  to  promote  regional  cooperation  by  delineating  borders 
with a NATO member state. Despite serving Kosovo’s broader interests, these 
initiatives were politicised and transformed into rallying points fuelling nation-
alism and division.

In 2013, Kosovo and Serbia signed an agreement to establish the Associa-
tion/Community  of  Serb-majority  Municipalities  (ASM),  as  means  to  facil-
itate integration of the north of Kosovo into Kosovo’s legal and institution-
al framework. Almost immediately, Kosovo’s opposition parties mobilised to 
undermine both the agreement and the broader process, framing it as a ploy to par-

Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 36

tition the country and create a runaway entity. The Vetëvendosje Movement even 
used the Serbian word “Zajednica” (community) to refer to the ASM, a populist 
tactic intended to underscore Serbian involvement and rally public opposition. In 
2015, Vetëvendosje escalated its resistance to unprecedented levels by deploying tear 
gas in the Kosovo Assembly – reportedly a global first in parliamentary history – thus 
halting discussions on the ASM and the ongoing normalisation dialogue. Despite 
the Constitutional Court’s 2015 ruling affirming the government’s obligation to es-
tablish the ASM while limiting its powers, many Kosovars still saw it as a threat to the 
country’s territorial integrity.

The EU’s approach to visa liberalisation for Kosovo, particularly the impo-
sition of stringent conditions and the subsequent border demarcation agree-
ment with Montenegro, exemplifies another instance where international in-
terventions had unintended adverse effects on Kosovo’s domestic politics. In 
2012, Kosovo received a visa liberalisation roadmap, two years later than other 
Western Balkans countries were granted free travel to the Schengen zone. This 
delay was accompanied by over 100 conditions – more than double the average 
requirements for neighboring countries – aimed at addressing issues such as 
corruption, judicial reform, and border management. Kosovar civil society per-
ceived these conditions as disproportionately burdensome and discriminatory, 
leading to widespread protests (Kosovo NGOs 2015). A notable symbolic act 
was the covering of the Newborn monument with a black sheet by protesters, 
signifying their discontent with the EU’s treatment of Kosovo. The European 
Commission’s vague and subjective assessment reports further fueled percep-
tions of unfairness, as Kosovars felt that the EU was imposing arbitrary stand-
ards without considering the unique challenges faced by the young state.

The  situation  intensified  in  2016  when  the  European  Commission  con-
ditionally  recommended  visa  liberalisation  for  Kosovo,  contingent  upon  the 
approval of the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro and further 
anti-corruption  measures  (European  Commission  2016).  The  border  agree-
ment,  intended  to  define  Kosovo’s  border  and  reduce  territorial  disputes, 
became  a  lightning  rod  for  opposition,  fuelling  nationalism  and  division  in 
society.  Critics  argued  that  the  agreement  conceded  land  to  Montenegro,  a 
claim that was debunked by an ad-hoc international commission established 
by  President  Atifete  Jahjaga.  Despite  the  commission’s  findings,  opposition 
parties continued to exploit the border demarcation as a means to rally nation-
alist support and challenge EU-led initiatives.

Ramadan Ilazi37

The  political  repercussions  were  profound.  The  delay  in  approving  the 
border  demarcation  agreement  not  only  prevented  Kosovo  from  potential-
ly achieving visa liberalisation in 2016, but also gave credence to opposition 
claims that the EU was encroaching on Kosovo’s sovereignty. This worsened 
the  EU’s  standing  among  Kosovars  –  especially  when  viewed  alongside  the 
EU’s perceived asymmetrical role in the normalisation dialogue with Serbia – 
further weakening Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic consensus (Maliqi and Ilazi 2021). 
These ruptures ultimately paved the way for ethno-centric and populist figures 
to rise to power, culminating in the decisive victory in the 2021 parliamentary 
elections of Vetëvendosje, where it secured around 50 per cent of the vote.

Both the Association/Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM) 
and the border demarcation issue opened the door for populism within Kosovo’s 
Euro-Atlantic integration process. Since 2016, Kosovo has arguably struggled 
to regain a more measured approach to foreign policy, instead adopting an in-
creasingly confrontational stance toward the EU and the United States. This 
culminated in 2023 with both actors’ imposition of restrictive measures against 
Kosovo. First, the United States canceled Kosovo’s participation in the US-led 
Defender  Europe  2023  military  exercise.  Then,  in  June  2023,  the  European 
Union introduced its own measures, suspending invitations for Kosovo’s par-
ticipation  in  high-level  events,  bilateral  visits,  and  meetings  under  the  Stabi-
lisation-Association  framework  (Gërgi  2024).  Funding  through  the  Instru-
ment of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) was also put on hold. Some estimates 
suggest these EU measures will cost Kosovo around 600 million Euro between 
2023 and 2024 (Monitor 2024). On the diplomatic front, the impact has been 
equally  severe:  Kosovo  has  become  more  isolated,  and  its  reputation  within 
the EU has deteriorated significantly. This situation has also fueled national-
ism and populism, as political actors, respectively the government, capitalise on 
perceptions of external pressure and unfair treatment to rally domestic support 
and deflect accountability.

Conclusion

Kosovo’s trajectory toward stable statehood is hindered by two major external 
forces:  Serbia’s  destabilising  interference  and  the  inconsistent  Euro-Atlan-
tic approach. Serbia actively exploits the constitutional mechanisms designed 
to safeguard minority rights to obstruct Kosovo’s rule of law and governance 
capacity, swaying the Kosovo Serb community in line with Belgrade’s agenda. 
Also, Serbia’s partnership with Russia and China bolsters its political leverage 

Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 38

over Kosovo, as these countries help Serbia block Kosovo’s recognition efforts 
and integration in international bodies. Compounding these pressures is the 
unintended impact of the Western engagement (the US and the EU). Although 
well-intentioned, EU and US interventions have applied disproportionate and, 
at times, poorly calibrated conditions on Kosovo’s leadership. Issues like the 
Association  of  Serb-Majority  Municipalities  (ASM)  and  the  border  demar-
cation agreement with Montenegro were abused by nationalist and populist 
leaders in Kosovo, who have effectively framed them as externally driven im-
positions that sacrificed Kosovo’s sovereignty, fuelling ethno-political radicali-
sation and paving the way for more populist and ethno-centric leaders to rise. 
The resulting disenchantment has been further stoked by uneven handling of 
the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, often undermining trust in EU and US and strain-
ing the traditional Euro-Atlantic consensus in Kosovo.

All these factors converge to create an increasingly volatile environment in 
which Kosovo’s long-term stability remains fragile, enabling the rise of populist 
and nationalist leaders. Kosovo’s state consolidation efforts are caught between 
Serbia’s malign influence – bolstered by Russian support – and a West increas-
ingly preoccupied with its own domestic priorities. As right-wing and national-
ist currents grow stronger in major Western capitals, international engagement 
in Kosovo and the normalisation dialogue risks waning, leaving Kosovo more 
vulnerable and its progress toward full statehood in jeopardy. Further exacer-
bating the situation is the rise of more populist and nationalist politics within 
Kosovo itself, fueled by frustration over perceived international double stand-
ards and a strong desire to assert sovereignty in the face of ongoing external 
pressures.

References

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and  Hungary.”  Al  Jazeera,  10  May  2024.  https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2024/5/10/key-takeaways-from-xi-jinpings-european-tour-to-
france-serbia-and-hungary. 

Bami,  Xhorxhina.  ”Kosovo  Serb  Politician  Murdered  for  Political  Reasons, 
Brother  Says.”  Balkan  Insight,  20  April  2022.  https://balkaninsight.
com/2022/04/20/kosovo-serb-politician-murdered-for-political-rea-
sons-brother-says/.

Ramadan Ilazi39

European Commission. ”European Commission proposes visa-free travel for 
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Gërgi,  Besar.  “The  One  Year  Anniversary  of  EU  Measures  against  Kosova.” 
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Geopolitics and Democracy in Kosovo 40

Radio Free Europe. ”Kosovo Indicts 45 over Alleged Roles in 2023 Attack that 
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kosovo-cracks-down-in-criminality-in-the-north/.

Telegrafi.  “Kurti  for  the  Association:  Republika  Srpska  also  started  as  ‘Za-
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cionin-si-zajednice-pati-nisur-edhe-republika-srpska/.

Ramadan IlaziDemocratic Decline in 
Montenegro: Internal 
Political Weakness, or 
External Geopolitical 
Interference?

Jiří Němec*

Montenegro’s  democratic  trajectory  has  faced  significant  challenges  over  the 
past decade. It has been shaped by both the domestic socio-political instabili-
ty and the global geopolitical dynamics. While internal issues such as corrup-
tion, state capture, and weak judicial independence are well-documented, the 
role of external actors in exacerbating democratic decline has only scarcely been 
addressed. Russia and China are the most prominent non-democratic malign 
external actors influencing the Montenegrin political landscape. These players 
often  exploit  the  state’s  main  vulnerabilities,  including  socio-political  divi-
sions,  economic  dependencies,  and  institutional  weaknesses,  to  further  their 
own strategic goals. This chapter discusses the extent to which the democratic 
decline in Montenegro can be attributed to external geopolitical interference, 
internal democratic shortcomings, or a combination of the two.

* 

Jiří Němec is a PhD Candidate in Security and Strategic Studies at the Department of Political Sci-
ence at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.

42

The Geopolitical Context of Montenegro’s Democracy

Montenegro’s  geopolitical  landscape  is  profoundly  influenced  by  its  strate-
gic position in the Western Balkans, being a crossroads between Eastern and 
Western  spheres  of  influence.  Since  declaring  independence  from  Serbia  in 
2006, Montenegro has actively pursued integration with Western institutions, 
notably  joining  NATO  in  2017  and  engaging  in  ongoing  negotiations  for 
European Union (EU) membership. Despite these efforts, this small state strug-
gles with internal political instability, marked by protracted crises and challeng-
es concerning state capture, clientelism, patronage systems, entrenched corrup-
tion, or weak rule of law (Kmezić 2020; Džankić and Keil 2017).

Compounding  such  internal  issues,  external  actors  such  as  Russia  and 
China have sought to exert influence, employing tactics such as disinformation 
campaigns and leveraging historical and cultural ties or economic dependence 
to sway public opinion and political dynamics. The EU has expressed concerns 
over  these  destabilising  efforts,  with  leaders  denouncing  Russia’s  hybrid  war 
aimed  at  undermining  Western  Balkan  democracies  (Milić  2024).  Despite 
these challenges, Montenegro remains committed to its EU aspirations, target-
ing readiness for accession by 2028 (Cabinet of the PM of Montenegro 2024). 
However, following this path necessitates addressing both internal socio-polit-
ical issues and mitigating external geopolitical pressures to ensure a stable and 
democratic future.

Russia’s Strategic Interference: Historical and 
Contemporary Dimensions

Russian influence in Montenegro is multifaceted, encompassing historical ties, 
cultural connections, and strategic geopolitical interests. Russia has tradition-
ally viewed the Balkans, including Montenegro, as places within its sphere of 
influence (Vuksanović 2023). Russia has often leveraged shared Slavic heritage 
and Orthodox Christian traditions to foster connections with local leadership. 
Lately, this influence has manifested through various means, including polit-
ical interventions, economic investments, and information warfare, all aimed 
at  countering  Western  integration  efforts  and  maintaining  a  foothold  in  the 
region.

Jiří Němec43

A significant avenue for Russian influence in Montenegro has been the ex-
ploitation of ethno-religious divisions. The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) 
holds substantial influence in Montenegro, not only as a religious institution 
but  also  as  a  cultural  and  political  entity.  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  being 
the Kremlin’s political instrument (Conley and Melino 2019), has historically 
aligned itself with the SOC to bolster its influence, capitalising on the church’s 
authority  among  ethnic  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  who  identify  with  Serbian 
heritage.  This  alignment  was  particularly  evident  during  the  2019  protests 
against  the  Montenegrin  government’s  Law  on  Religious  Freedoms,  which 
proposed  transferring  ownership  of  specific  religious  properties  to  the  state. 
The SOC, with implicit support from the Russian Federation, framed the law 
as an attack on Serbian cultural and religious identity, leading to widespread 
demonstrations (Němec 2020). Russian media outlets amplified these narra-
tives, portraying the Montenegrin government as oppressive and anti-Serbian, 
thus deepening societal divisions and undermining national cohesion (EUvs-
Disinfo  2020).  This  strategy  of  leveraging  religious  and  ethnic  identities  has 
allowed Russia to maintain a presence in the Montenegrin socio-political land-
scape,  influencing  public  opinion  and  political  dynamics  in  a  manner  that 
aligns with its strategic interests.

Russia  employs  sophisticated  information  operations  to  influence  Mon-
tenegrin  political  environment,  utilising  media  outlets  and  disinforma-
tion  campaigns  to  shape  narratives  favourable  to  its  interests.  Russia-affiliat-
ed  platforms  such  as  Sputnik  and  Russia  Today,  or  local  pro-Russian  media 
such as IN4S, Borba, Prva TV, Adria TV, or Aloonline.me disseminate nar-
ratives  that  often  challenge  Montenegro’s  Western  inclination  and  promote 
pro-Russian  sentiments.  These  outlets  have  been  instrumental  in  spreading 
disinformation,  particularly  during  critical  political  events  such  as  elections 
and  referenda.  For  instance,  during  Montenegro’s  NATO  accession  process, 
Russian media propagated narratives emphasising the alliance’s alleged threats 
to  regional  stability,  aiming  to  push  public  opinion  against  joining  (Dig-
italni  Forenzički  Centar  2024).  Beyond  media  influence,  Russia  has  directly 
supported  political  parties  and  movements  compactible  with  its  interests. 

Democratic Decline in Montenegro44

Pro-Russian  parties,  such  as  the  former  Democratic  Front  (which  ceased  to 
exist  in  May  2023)1,  as  well  as  the  New  Serb  Democracy  and  Democratic 
People’s Party, have received backing in various forms, including financial as-
sistance or strategic guidance (Bechev 2019). Such support has enabled these 
parties to effectively campaign against policies favouring Western integration, 
including opposition to Montenegro’s NATO accession. This has created po-
litical friction in the attempt to hinder Montenegrin Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 
By fostering and supporting political entities sympathetic to its cause, Russia 
seeks to cultivate a political landscape in Montenegro that is fragmented and 
more susceptible to influence, effectively challenging the country’s democratic 
transition and consolidation.

China’s Economic Leverage: The Debt Diplomacy 
Dilemma

China’s  economic  engagement  with  Montenegro  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
Bar-Boljare highway project, a venture that has significantly influenced Monte-
negro’s financial landscape and raised concerns about sovereignty and economic 
dependency (Vučković 2024). In 2014, Montenegro secured a 944-million-dol-
lar loan from the Export-Import Bank of China to finance the first phase of 
the highway, aiming to connect the port city of Bar with the Serbian border 
(Stankov 2023). The loan terms stipulated a 20-year repayment period with a 
six-year grace period, and the construction was undertaken by the China Road 
and Bridge Corporation, a state-owned enterprise (AidData n. d.). 

The financial implications of this project have been profound. By 2021, the 
debt incurred from the highway constituted a significant portion of Monte-
negro’s gross domestic product, leading to concerns about the country’s fiscal 

1  The Democratic Front was a political coalition founded in 2012, composed of several parties, primar-
ily pro-Serbian and pro-Russian in orientation. The coalition included groups such as the New Serb 
Democracy (NSD), the Democratic People’s Party (DNP), and the Movement for Changes (PzP), 
among others. Its ideological focus combined Serbian nationalism, Russophilia, and opposition to 
NATO membership, advocating for the withdrawal of Montenegro from NATO and the repeal of 
its recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The DF was pivotal in opposing the long-dominant Dem-
ocratic Party of Socialists (DPS) of Milo Đukanović. In 2020, it played a significant role in unseating 
the DPS after nearly three decades of rule, contributing to the formation of a new government coa-
lition. However, internal divisions and dissatisfaction with governance reforms eventually led to the 
dissolution of the DF in 2023. The DF’s positions were often controversial, particularly its alignment 
with Serbian and Russian interests. Its activities, such as protests against the Montenegrin govern-
ment’s  actions  regarding  the  Serbian  Orthodox  Church  and  its  criticism  of  EU  sanctions  against 
Russia, have highlighted its ideological leanings (EWB 2023).

Jiří Němec45

stability (Pizzolo 2024; Stankov 2023). The substantial debt burden prompted 
the Montenegrin government to seek financial assistance from the EU to re-
structure the loan. However, the EU declined direct financial aid, emphasising 
that it does not repay loans from third parties (Kajošević 2021). In response 
to  these  challenges,  Montenegro  mitigated  the  financial  strain.  In  2021,  the 
government successfully refinanced the Chinese loan through several Western 
banks,  converting  the  debt  from  U.S.  dollars  to  euros.  This  move  aimed  to 
reduce the risk associated with currency fluctuations and alleviate some of the 
financial pressure (Bogojević 2022). Despite these efforts, the economic ram-
ifications persist. As of July 2024, Montenegro had repaid the seventh instal-
ment of the loan, amounting to 33.49 million Euro (36,37 million dollars), to 
China’s Export-Import Bank (Pavlova 2024). The ongoing repayments strain 
the national budget, limiting the government’s capacity to invest in other vital 
areas such as healthcare, education, or infrastructure development. 

Beyond  the  immediate  financial  concerns,  Chinese  investments,  current 
or  potential,  have  broader  implications  for  Montenegrin  sovereignty  and  its 
relations  with  international  partners.  The  heavy  reliance  on  often  opaque 
Chinese financing has sparked debates about potential political leverage and 
Chinese influence over Montenegro’s policy decisions (Vučković 2024; Bieber 
and  Tzifakis  2019).  Sino-Montenegrin  interaction  also  swayed  several  times, 
making the state’s approach inconsistent. For instance, Montenegro’s Bar-Bol-
jare highway loan was initially denominated in U.S. dollars, later prompting 
the state to sign a hedging deal with a consortium of four Western banks to 
convert payments into euros to reduce currency fluctuation risks. The subse-
quent government, however, exited this deal, arguing that the country’s at-the-
time improved financial situation made the hedge unnecessary. Montenegro, 
then, re-engaged with China to fund another (Budva-Tivat) highway, raising 
concerns over renewed reliance on the Chinese loan and its potential geopoliti-
cal and financial implications. (Scepanovic 2023). Therefore, while Chinese in-
vestments in Montenegrin infrastructure have contributed to the country’s de-
velopment, they have also introduced significant economic challenges, raising 
questions about national sovereignty. Such large-scale infrastructure projects 
financed through substantial foreign loans underscore the need for a thorough 
assessment of long-term economic and political implications of Chinese influ-
ence in a small state.

Democratic Decline in Montenegro46

Contested Outcomes of EU’s Democracy Promotion

The EU has long championed promoting democracy in the Western Balkans, 
employing  the  Europeanisation  strategy,  which  entails  the  adoption  of  EU 
norms,  values,  and  policies  by  candidate  countries  (Vučković  2021).  This 
process is primarily driven by conditionality, where the promise of EU mem-
bership  is  dependent  upon  implementing  democratic  reforms,  strengthen-
ing the rule of law, and upholding human rights. However, the outcomes of 
such  an  approach  have  been  mixed,  with  some  countries  making  significant 
strides and others lagging behind. This has led to discussions about the extent 
to which Europeanisation has been successful.

The EU’s conditionality mechanism has often encountered challenges in the 
Western  Balkans  due  to  entrenched  socio-political  and  ethno-religious  divisions. 
The EU’s leverage in Montenegro is further diminished when local leaders prioritise 
nationalist agendas over European integration, resulting in stagnation or even back-
sliding of the democratisation process (Đuković 2024). Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 
(2019) further argue that EU conditionality has not worked effectively in bringing 
about social change because rule transfer remains contested due to veto players on 
the ground and strong legacies of the past. 

Moreover,  the  EU’s  approach  in  the  region  has  sometimes  led  to  unin-
tended  consequences.  In  some  instances,  the  focus  on  stability  rather  than 
on  genuine  democratic  transformation  has  resulted  in  the  entrenchment  of 
semi-authoritarian or hybrid regimes, as the analyst Milica Stojanović (2020) 
argues. Over time, leaders in the Western Balkans have learned to perform su-
perficial compliance with EU demands, building a façade of democratic insti-
tutions without implementing substantive changes. This has led to the emer-
gence of ‘stabilitocracies’, where regimes maintain stability at the expense of 
democratic reform (Bieber 2018). In the interest of regional stability, the EU’s 
tolerance of such regimes has inadvertently undermined its credibility and the 
overall goal of fostering genuine democracy (Džankić, Keil and Kmezić 2019). 

The discussion on the limits of Europeanisation also highlights the short-
comings of the EU’s regional strategy per se (see e.g. Bieber 2019). Despite ex-
tensive engagement and the prospect of membership, several Western Balkan 
countries  continue  to  grapple  with  issues  such  as  corruption,  weak  judicial 
systems,  and  limited  media  freedom  (Đorđević,  Turcsányi,  and  Vučkovič 
2021).  The  EU’s  inability  to  effectively  address  such  challenges  has  led  to 
scepticism about the transformative power of Europeanisation, and Vladimir 

Jiří Němec47

Vučković (2019) openly argued that the EU has failed to transform Montene-
gro effectively.

While  the  EU’s  promotion  of  democracy  through  Europeanisation  has 
achieved limited successes, it has also encountered or even co-created significant 
shortcomings. The persistence of authoritarian tendencies, coupled with the 
superficial adoption of democratic norms, underscores the need for the EU to 
refine its approach. Montenegro remains formally committed to the European 
path through ongoing reforms, as the country has achieved a positive Interim 
Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) in the wider rule of law area (Chapters 
23 and 24) on 26 June 2024 (EEAS 2024). However, only two days after this 
positive IBAR, the Montenegrin parliament adopted a resolution condemn-
ing crimes committed in Croatia’s World War II-era Jasenovac concentration 
camp,  a  move  that  strained  relations  with  Croatia,  leading  allegedly  also  to 
Croatia  blocking  the  closure  of  another  EU  accession  Chapter  of  Montene-
gro – that on foreign policy (Wax and Starcevic 2024). Beyond the Jasenovac 
resolution, Croatia has outlined ten conditions for Montenegro, including ad-
dressing historical grievances and concerns over the pro-Russian stance of some 
Montenegrin political parties (Marović 2024), and even declared three Monte-
negrin far-right politicians as personae non gratae (RFE/RL’s Balkan Service).

Internal Socio-Political Environment

Montenegro’s  pursuit  of  democratic  consolidation  is  hindered  by  several 
internal  socio-political  challenges  that  foster  stagnation  and  vulnerability  to 
external influences. The nation’s political environment is marked by deep divi-
sions and instability, leading to policy inconsistency and weakened governance 
(Kmezić 2020; Džankić and Keil 2017), which hampers the implementation 
of  long-term  democratic  reforms.  For  instance,  Montenegrin  political  land-
scape in 2024 was marked by significant frictions, as PM Milojko Spajić had 
to make compromises to maintain his fragile governing coalition. Thus, Spajić 
has  increasingly  relied  on  support  from  pro-Serb  and  pro-Russian  parties, 
granting them significant influence over domestic and foreign policy decisions 
(Golubović 2024a). For instance, Spajić allowed the reinstatement of Serbian 
Orthodox Church privileges, a controversial move that alienated pro-Europe-
an factions within his government (Memišević 2024). Additionally, his govern-
ment postponed judicial reforms critical for EU accession, yielding to pressure 
from nationalist parties opposed to rapid Europeanisation (Golubović 2024b). 

Democratic Decline in Montenegro48

Such a balancing underscores the deep divisions in Montenegrin politics, com-
plicating efforts to reconcile nationalist and reformist agendas.

Pervasive corruption undermines public trust and the effectiveness of institu-
tions. Freedom House’s 2024 report highlights ongoing political and judicial cor-
ruption issues, indicating a stagnation in anti-corruption efforts (Freedom House 
2024). Such an environment also facilitates state capture, where private interests 
dominate public policy to the detriment of democratic governance. The judici-
ary’s susceptibility to political influence compromises its role in upholding the 
rule of law (DG NEAR 2023). Also, while Montenegrin citizens favour a demo-
cratic system, the judiciary’s partiality remains a concern (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2024). This undermines accountability and public confidence in justice institu-
tions. Addressing such challenges requires comprehensive reforms to enhance in-
stitutional integrity, promote transparency, and foster social cohesion. Strength-
ening  internal  democratic  norms  will  also  bolster  resilience  against  external 
pressures seeking to exploit Montenegro’s vulnerabilities.

Ethnic  and  religious  divisions,  particularly  between  Montenegrins  and 
Serbs, are often exploited for political gain, diverting focus from democratic 
development.  The  politicisation  of  religious  institutions  exacerbates  societal 
fractures, impeding the formation of a cohesive national identity essential for 
democratic  progress.  Economic  instability  and  populist  policies  prioritising 
short-term gains over sustainable development also strain Montenegrin fiscal 
stability. Such approaches could undermine economic health, further compli-
cating democratic consolidation efforts (Golubović 2024c).

Circularity of Geopolitics and Democratic Decline

The democratic decline in Montenegro cannot be attributed solely to external 
geopolitical  influence,  although  such  interference  significantly  exacerbates 
existing vulnerabilities. Internal socio-political issues, such as corruption, state 
capture,  political  instability,  or  ethno-religious  divisions,  form  the  cleavages 
that external actors can exploit to advance their strategic objectives. Russia and 
China, the two most prominent malign external actors, amplify Montenegro’s 
internal  challenges  through  disinformation,  political  funding,  economic  de-
pendencies, or local socio-political proxy actors. However, their ability to shape 
Montenegrin  democratic  aspirations  is  contingent  on  pre-existing  internal 
cleavages.

Jiří Němec49

The  European  Union  plays  a  pivotal  geopolitical  role  in  the  country, 
acting as a primary driver of reform and offering the promise of integration, 
which has fuelled public support for EU membership and facilitated certain 
progress in the rule of law and governance. However, the EU’s prioritisation 
of regional stability over genuine democratic transformation has entrenched 
semi-authoritarian  practices,  as  local  elites  often  perform  superficial  compli-
ance  without  substantive  reforms.  While  the  EU’s  conditionality  remains  a 
critical tool, its limited ability to address deep-seated corruption or societal di-
visions has exposed Montenegro to competing external influences. Persistent 
political instability has stalled institutional consolidation, while socio-econom-
ic inequalities and media restrictions undermine democratic resilience. Thus, 
the question of the extent to which Montenegro’s democratic shortcomings 
can be attributed to external geopolitical influence is not linear, but somewhat 
circular. Resolving it requires increased domestic resilience, strengthening the 
positive role of the EU, mitigating the influence of negative dependencies on 
external actors, and anticipating foreign malign influence.

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Jiří NěmecWhen the EU’s 
Transformative Power 
Is Undermined by 
Its Member States: 
The Case of North 
Macedonia

Simonida Kacarska*

North Macedonia is the longest-standing candidate for European Union (EU) 
accession in the Western Balkans. The country began its accession journey in 
the early 2000s when it introduced extensive power-sharing between its two 
major  ethnic  groups  through  the  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement,  which  was 
largely supported by the EU and the United States (US). As a result, the EU 
has become the most significant external actor in the country. Having managed 
to obtain EU candidate status in 2005, Macedonia was a frontrunner in the 
EU accession process with steady democratic progress for the first decade of the 
21st century.1 In this period, EU membership conditionality was considered a 
strong incentive for the democratisation of the country, which implemented a 
range of difficult rule-of-law reforms (Kmezić 2017).

Simonida Kacarska is Director of the European Policy Institute, Skopje.

* 
1  For an overview of the trends see Freedom House (2014).

56

The first decade’s progress was interrupted by stagnation on the country’s 
EU accession path due to a bilateral dispute with neighbouring Greece. The 
dispute resulted in Greece’s last-minute veto of the country’s NATO member-
ship in 2008. In 2009, Greece also vetoed the start of the EU accession negotia-
tions. In so doing, it effectively undermined the transformative potential of the 
accession process. Since then, North Macedonia has experienced periods of back-
sliding and stagnation in its democratic development, culminating in a mass wire-
tapping scandal in 2015 and 2016 (Kacarska 2023). North Macedonia’s demo-
cratic retreat during this period has been considered a paradigmatic example of 
a severe backlash comparable to that of Hungary (Auerbach and Kartner 2023). 
As in many other instances since independence, the political crisis was resolved 
through intervention by the EU and the US, leading to a government change 
(Kacarska 2023) and, ultimately, a resolution of the name dispute with Greece, 
opening the way to NATO membership in early 2020. Yet, Macedonia’s advance-
ment on the EU’s path was once again blocked by an immediate veto from neigh-
bouring Bulgaria, related to historical and identity issues, restarting a trend of 
democratic stagnation (European Commission 2023). 

This chapter examines how the weakening of the EU accession perspective 
has  affected  the  trajectory  of  democratic  development  in  North  Macedonia. 
The analysis starts from the premise that although the EU, as an external actor, 
through its official policy, has by far the strongest democratic conditionality 
at its disposal, its effectiveness in North Macedonia has been undermined by 
several  factors.  These  include  stagnation  in  the  EU  accession  process  caused 
by bilateral disputes with neighbouring states, the EU’s policies of prioritising 
security over democracy, as well as the specific interests of illiberal EU Member 
States,  primarily  Hungary.  As  a  result,  the  positive  developmental  trend  of 
North Macedonia in the first decade of the century has been interrupted and 
followed by a period of crisis and stagnation, which is likely to continue.

The EU as an External Actor in North Macedonia: A 
Democratising Role Constrained by Bilateral Disputes 

Through its key institutions, the EU has been the most important key external 
actor in and relevant to North Macedonia since the signing of the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement in 2001 (Nechev and Nikolovski 2019). As a result 
of its long-term EU integration process, North Macedonia has the strongest 
economic ties with the EU, with more than 75 per cent of its trade conduct-

Simonida Kacarska57

ed with the EU. The country also has a high level of legal alignment with the 
Union’s acquis communautaire. Its linkages with the EU are threefold: politi-
cal – as a candidate country negotiating accession; economic – through trade; 
and societal – given that the public largely supports the EU accession process. 
Despite the cumbersome process of European integration, around 60 per cent 
of the population remains highly supportive of EU membership (Damjanovski 
2023).

Since the early 2000s, the EU has acted in North Macedonia through its 
mechanism of membership conditionality. The instrument of conditionality 
has also supported and developed the EU’s role as a conflict resolution since 
2001, when the EU implemented its first peacekeeping mission in the country, 
often  signalling  the  birth  of  the  EU’s  common  foreign  and  security  policy 
(Piana 2002). Since then, the EU has played a significant role as a mediator, 
both between and within the ethnically defined political camps in the country, 
with a strong role in fostering consensus and political dialogue on complex po-
litical issues (Markovikj and Damjanovski). Moreover, EU conditionality has 
been used to support the implementation of the internal power-sharing agree-
ment and to drive major judicial changes, enhancing the effectiveness and inde-
pendence of the judiciary (Koneska 2016). 

The  EU’s  relatively  strong  and  uniform  role  was  significantly  challenged 
during  the  Greek  and  then  Bulgarian  vetoes.  These  vetoes  created  a  power 
vacuum in which the EU could not fully leverage the potential of its condition-
ality, as the prospect for membership was effectively blocked. This vacuum, in 
turn, became fertile ground for the engagement of other external actors in the 
country. Between 2013 and 2016, third-country actors such as China gained 
more  prominent  roles  in  the  country.  China  has  maintained  a  geo-econom-
ic role in North Macedonia (Vangeli 2019), with its economic significance in-
creasing  between  2010  and  2020  through  investments  in  two  highway  con-
struction projects characterised by a lack of transparency. Major issues with the 
implementation of these projects have raised questions regarding good govern-
ance, institutional accountability, and corruption, leading to criminal investi-
gations (Vangeli 2021).

When the EU’s Transformative Power Is Undermined: The Case of North Macedonia58

Competing Interests of Member States as a Factor

The key challenges to the success of the EU’s engagement in North Macedo-
nia have come from the lack of a membership perspective, coupled with the al-
ternative forms of engagement by the EU, its institutions, and member states. 
Despite the formal importance assigned to the rule of law in the conditionality 
instrument, competing priorities and interests of the Union and its Member 
States have often taken precedence in relations with North Macedonia. In its 
engagement with North Macedonia, the EU has frequently prioritised stabili-
ty and security at the expense of internal democratisation. One example of this 
has been the management of the 2015–2016 refugee crisis, which coincided 
with the revelation of the illegal wiretapping of more than 20,000 people by the 
state security services. As a result, North Macedonia became the first country 
for which the European Commission used the term ‘state capture’ to illustrate 
the sheer scale of democratic backsliding (European Commission 2015). Due 
to the revelations of mass surveillance by state security services, the Commis-
sion  effectively  froze  its  recommendation  for  EU  accession  talks  and  condi-
tioned them on the substantial implementation of the rule of law reforms. 

Despite formal pressure to implement these reforms, various EU Member 
States and institutions actively supported autocratic leadership in the country in 
order to ensure their cooperation on the management of the so-called Western 
Balkans route (Kacarska 2023). In 2016, the then Chancellor of Austria, Se-
bastian  Kurz,  publicly  supported  VMRO–DPMNE  at  a  rally,  claiming  that 
the  country  was  on  the  right  path  to  EU  accession,  despite  the  aforemen-
tioned concerns over state capture (Marušić 2016). This event was one of many 
examples when partisan interests of a sister party from an EU Member State 
came into tension with EU priorities (see Chryssogelos 2021). Such tensions 
have been highlighted in earlier academic literature. Vachudova has argued that 
in North Macedonia, inconsistent conditionality has compounded problems 
of legitimacy and given political parties scope to reverse political reforms. As a 
result of the conflict between the formal and informal mechanisms of the EU’s 
conditionality, the transformative role of the EU and its impact on the coun-
try’s democratic transformation have been undermined (Vachudova 2014).

A  significant  challenge  to  the  EU’s  democratising  agenda  has  also  come 
from  within  the  Union,  namely  through  Hungary’s  linkages  and  actions  in 
the Western Balkans. Hungary’s role as a proponent of illiberalism in the EU 
has been widely research (Rupnik 2012). The stance of the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, Victor Orbán, gained ground during the 2015–2016 refugee/migra-

Simonida Kacarska59

tion crisis. During that period, Orbán built strong links with the leadership of 
North Macedonia and Serbia, the two key countries on the Balkan route. The link 
with North Macedonia was further strengthened due to the asylum granted by 
Orbán to Nikola Gruevski, the convicted former Prime Minister of North Mace-
donia, who was largely responsible for the 2015 political crisis.2 With this action, 
Hungary effectively undermined the credibility of the EU’s actions, despite being 
an EU Member State. Research has suggested that the path of North Macedonia 
and Hungary towards autocratisation during this period was notably similar – 
both countries strengthened informal institutions as spaces where political deci-
sions could be made, while formal democratic institutions served as proxies for 
whitewashing autocratic decision-making as ‘democratic’ (Vangelov 2020).

Beyond the political relationship, Hungarian companies have also bought 
several media outlets affiliated with the authoritarian former Prime Minister 
Nikola Gruevski and his conservative VMRO–DPMNE party (Marušić 2022). 
These  outlets  have  often  been  associated  with  right-wing  populist  policies 
aligned with Orbán’s Fidesz. In 2020, members of the European Parliament 
submitted  a  list  of  questions  to  the  European  Commission  about  Hungari-
an  media  investments  in  Slovenia  and  North  Macedonia  and  whether  these 
constituted Hungarian interference in the democratic process in the Balkans. 
These questions were followed by a debate in the European Parliament, during 
which MPs expressed serious concerns over the role of Hungary, particularly in 
view of its stagnation in the EU accession process (European Parliament 2020). 

The role of Hungary in North Macedonia has further strengthened since 
2024,  when  VMRO–DPMNE  returned  to  power.  Only  days  after  the  par-
liamentary elections, Hungary provided a loan of EUR 500 million to North 
Macedonia as a strategic economic partnership (Marušić 2024). At a joint gov-
ernment session held in the summer of 2024, Orbán also praised the ‘special 
economic relationship’ with North Macedonia while reiterating the important 
place the country holds on the migration route. “Without them [the Macedoni-
an government], we might not have been able to stop this migration invasion,” 
he  said,  noting  that  Hungary  had  sent  border  patrol  officers  to  North  Mac-
edonia’s southern border (Daily News Hungary 2024). The funds from the 
loan were disbursed to municipalities within a short period of time (SeeNews 
2024), giving a significant boost primarily to mayors from the governing coali-
tion ahead of the local elections scheduled to take place in the autumn of 2025.

2  Former  prime  minister  Gruevski  was  sentenced  to  two  years  in  prison  over  a  questionable  public 

procurement deal, but has several ongoing court proceedings against him.

When the EU’s Transformative Power Is Undermined: The Case of North Macedonia60

What Lies Ahead

The EU, through its institutions and Member States, is by far the most prom-
inent external actor in Macedonian politics. North Macedonia’s political de-
velopments have been highly dependent on its relationship with the EU, pri-
marily the existence of a credible membership perspective for more than two 
decades.  Research  has  shown  that  under  conditions  where  a  credible  mem-
bership perspective exists, the EU’s anchor has contributed to the democratic 
transformation in North Macedonia, especially from the signing of the Stabili-
sation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2001 until the halt in its accession 
process due to the Greek veto against the start of the accession negotiations in 
late 2009. In the decade that followed, bilateral disputes and the prioritisation 
of security concerns have undermined the transformative potential of the EU. 
The limbo in the accession process since 2010 contributed to democratic de-
terioration, including through the EU’s securitised approach to North Mace-
donia during the 2015–2016 refugee/migration crisis. During this period, the 
EU strongly prioritised stability and ensuring the cooperation of an autocratic 
government in managing the flow of refugees at the expense of its own democ-
ratisation agenda. 

The vacuum created by the vetoes in the accession process has been used 
by national elites to legitimise their own undemocratic practices and by other 
geopolitical actors to assert their influence. The engagement of third actors (i.e. 
Hungary and, to a lesser extent, China) overlaps with stagnation in EU acces-
sion, the political crisis in the country, and the 2015-2016 refugee/migration 
crisis. During this period, Hungary also played a decisive role in supporting the 
outgoing autocratic government of VMRO–DPMNE in exchange for its co-
operation on the Western Balkans route. 

Overall,  Hungary  has  remained  strongly  engaged  in  North  Macedonia 
by providing financial support and spreading the influence of its own illiber-
al  model  of  governance.  Given  the  already  strong  role  of  Hungarian-backed 
media outlets, it is expected that Hungary’s role will grow stronger, support-
ing an illiberal model of governance. By maintaining a strong partnership with 
Hungary in the international arena, North Macedonia is likely to move in the 
direction  of  other  Fidesz-associated  countries.  This  move  will  then  amplify 
Hungary’s influence in the Western Balkans and enhance the attractiveness of 
its model of governance, which already enjoys the considerable legitimacy of 
being the model of an EU Member State.

Simonida Kacarska61

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Chryssogelos,  Angelos.  “Europarties  in  the  Neighbourhood:  How  Transna-
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Daily  News  Hungary.  “PM  Orbán  from  North  Macedonia:  Hungary  Will 
Be  the  Winner  in  Coming  Decade.”  Daily  News  Hungary,  27  Septem-
ber  2024.  https://dailynewshungary.com/orban-in-north-macedonia-tur-
mp-migration/.

Damjanovski, Ivan. Analysis of Public Opinion on North Macedonia’s Accession 
to  the  European  Union  (2014–2023).  Institute  for  Democracy  “Societas 
Civilis” Skopje, 2023. https://idscs.org.mk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/
B5-Public-Opinion-Analysis-Paper-No.-27-2023-WEB.pdf.

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Report  (Commission  Staff  Working  Paper).  European  Commission, 
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republic_of_macedonia.pdf.

European Commission. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2023 
Report (Commission Staff Working Paper). European Commission, 2023. 
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North Macedonia (Debate): Verbatim Report of Proceedings, Wednesday, 
25 November 2020 – Brussels.” European Parliament, 2020.

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Freedom  House.  Macedonia,  Nations  in  Transit  Report.  Written  by  Ljubica 
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When the EU’s Transformative Power Is Undermined: The Case of North MacedoniaGeopolitical 
Autocratisation in Serbia

Filip Ejdus*1

Since the mid-2010s, the world has undergone a twin process of geopolitical 
deterioration and democratic decline. As tensions between countries rise, na-
tionalist  and  authoritarian  impulses  have  grown  stronger.  Serbia  is  a  glaring 
case in point of this ‘geopolitical autocratisation’. After the fall of Slobodan 
Milošević in 2000, Serbia embarked on a decade of democratisation that trans-
formed the country’s political system from a hybrid regime into an unconsoli-
dated liberal democracy. This process began to slow down around the time of 
the  global  economic  crisis  in  2009.  However,  following  Russia’s  annexation 
of Crimea in 2014, Serbia became caught in the crossfire of the growing ge-
opolitical rivalry between the West and other global powers. Its vulnerability 
stemmed from a combination of the Western-backed, slow-motion secession 
of Kosovo and Serbia’s own delicate balancing act between pursuing European 
Union (EU) membership and maintaining strategic partnerships with Russia 
and China, both of which supported Serbia’s territorial integrity.

What followed was a decade of geopolitical deterioration, marked by a series 
of crises, including the migration crisis, Brexit, COVID-19, and the full-scale 
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Within Serbia, this wider deteriorating 
geopolitical context facilitated the gradual entrenchment of the authoritarian 
regime led by Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party. According 
to Freedom House, Serbia was classified as a hybrid regime for the first time 
in 2019, and since then, authoritarian tendencies have continued to speed up 
unabated (see Graph 1).

* 

 Filip Ejdus is Professor of security studies at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade.

65

Chart 1: State of freedoms in Serbia according to the Freedom in the 
World index 2006-2024

The political landscape of the country reflects these tendencies at several 
levels. Elections in Serbia are held but lack fairness, as the political landscape 
heavily favours the incumbent, making outcomes predictable (Pavlović 2024). 
Although the country formally upholds the principle of separation of powers, 
actual  authority  is  captured  by  President  Aleksandar  Vučić  and  his  party 
(Petrović 2021; Keil 2018). Instead of adhering to the rule of law, governance 
often reflects rule by law (Kmezić 2021). While the freedom of speech is offi-
cially recognised, the media remains under tight regime control, with dissent-
ing voices suppressed through disinformation, illicit surveillance, smear cam-
paigns, SLAPP lawsuits, and other forms of intimidation (Vladisavljević 2019; 
Burazer 2021; Amnesty International 2024).

Although democratic backsliding after accession to the EU is not entirely 
uncommon, Serbia is unique in that it has substantively regressed during EU 
accession negotiations (Richter and Wunsch 2020). Authoritarian tendencies 
in Serbia certainly have strong domestic ideological, institutional, political, and 
economic drivers. However, Serbia’s autocratisation is linked to the geopoliti-
cal deterioration in at least five interconnected ways.

Geopolitical Autocratisation in Serbia66

First, the worsening global geopolitical situation has allowed Serbian po-
litical elites to increasingly restrict or suspend democratic principles under the 
pretext of safeguarding national security. The most recent example is the situ-
ation after the parliamentary and local elections held in December 2023 and 
June  2024,  which  both  international  and  domestic  observers  characterised 
as neither free nor fair. The regime repressed the post-election protests with 
the pretext that the opposition wanted to create a Maidan in Serbia (Informer 
2023). Some of the most vocal criticism of the rigged elections initially came 
from  the  German  government  (Euronews  Albania  2023).  In  July  2024,  this 
criticism was silenced when President Aleksandar Vučić and Chancellor Olaf 
Scholz signed a cooperation agreement promising Serbia’s lithium – a mineral 
critical to Europe’s green transition and independence from China – to the EU 
(Federal Government of Germany 2024).

Second, the global geopolitical instability has also led major Western powers 
to shift their focus toward securing strategic interests, maintaining stability, and 
ensuring geopolitical alignment in the Western Balkans, often at the expense 
of democratisation efforts. A case in point has been the prioritisation of the 
normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina over the democratic 
transition in Serbia. In line with Article 12 of the Brussels Agreement signed 
in April 2013, Serbia invited the Kosovo Serbs to take part in municipal elec-
tions in Kosovo in November of the same year, in accordance with the Kosovo 
law. When the turnout was too low, Belgrade sent masked thugs to storm the 
key  polling  station  in  Kosovska  Mitrovica,  invalidating  the  elections  there 
(RTV Vojvodina 2023). When the elections were rerun, the regime in Belgrade 
coerced the Serbs from northern Kosovo to vote for the Belgrade-sponsored 
Srpska Lista, increasing the turnout and granting legitimacy to the elections. 
Soon thereafter, through a combination of propaganda, coercion, and intim-
idation,  Srpska  Lista  became  virtually  the  only  political  party  representing 
Kosovo  Serbs  in  the  parliament  of  Kosovo  (Radosavljević  and  Ničić  2021). 
Once  prototyped  in  Kosovo,  this  model  of  imposing  a  de  facto  single-party 
system was later exported to the rest of Serbia, where the Serbian Progressive 
Party elbowed out all other political parties and became the dominant actor on 
the political scene (Spasojević 2021). Meanwhile, the US and the EU, preoccu-
pied with growing geopolitical challenges elsewhere, turned a blind eye to these 
undemocratic methods, for as long as these methods delivered stability in the 
region in times of amplified global uncertainty (Radeljić 2019).

Filip Ejdus67

Third,  the  relative  decline  of  Western  influence  and  the  EU’s  enlarge-
ment fatigue have opened the door for authoritarian actors to strengthen their 
presence in the region. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the 
EU was overwhelmed with its own challenges, China rushed to assist Serbia 
with vaccines and other medical aid, while President Vučić declared European 
solidarity to be a fairytale (Drajić, Bjeloš, and Stakić 2020). The ‘ironclad friend-
ship’  between  Belgrade  and  Beijing,  as  it  was  dubbed,  which  only  deepened 
since  COVID-19  pandemic,  turned  Belgrade  into  one  of  the  key  European 
partners in the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, the Kremlin has 
also capitalised on growing disillusionment in Serbia with the never-ending EU 
accession process. Russia traditionally enjoys the highest level of public trust in 
Serbia, which has not eroded even after its full invasion of Ukraine in February 
2022 (Vuksanović, Sterić, and Bjeloš 2022).

Fourth, Serbian political elites have actively fostered ties with non-Western 
actors, viewing them as alternative sources of economic and political support, 
which, in turn, has enhanced their ability to resist Western pressure for dem-
ocratic reforms. Like other governments caught in the geopolitical hybrid war 
between the West and Russia, Serbian elites have been attempting to profit from 
both sides (Orenstein 2019). The Russian and Chinese influence in Serbia is 
therefore neither imposed nor driven by genuine amity but rather by the prag-
matism of local elites (Bechev 2017; Vuksanović forthcoming). Following the 
fraudulent elections in December 2023, and amid criticism from the German 
Foreign Ministry and the European Parliament (European Parliament 2024) 
among others, the regime in Belgrade immediately tilted toward Moscow, alleg-
edly thwarting a Western-sponsored coup with the help of shared intelligence 
from the Russian intelligence services (N1 News 2023).

Fifth, the growing geopolitical turmoil has, in some cases, driven non-West-
ern actors to openly or covertly support non-democratic forces and processes in 
Serbia, further deepening the country’s democratic backsliding. Russia openly 
opposes the democratisation of Serbia, not only directly through the bilater-
al working group on the fight against “colour revolutions” (Associated Press 
News  2023)  but  also  indirectly  by  endorsing  various  far-right  organisations 
with illiberal agendas While China is not known to directly support non-dem-
ocratic forces in Serbia, it has also done so indirectly. For example, during the 
anti-government protests over the controversial lithium mine in western Serbia 
in the summer of 2024, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published a report that 
singled out the US-funded, Belgrade-based NGOs as key protagonists behind 

Geopolitical Autocratisation in Serbia68

the protests. This report was immediately used by pro-regime tabloids in Serbia 
to launch a smear campaign aimed at delegitimising the protests, which were 
unrelated  to  the  organisations  mentioned.  Moreover,  since  2017,  China’s 
model  of  digital  authoritarianism  has  spread  to  Serbia,  and  a  Chinese-made 
smart surveillance system was introduced en masse in public spaces, violating 
both domestic and European privacy regulation (SHARE Foundation 2019).

In  sum,  Serbia  is  not  the  only  country  whose  democratic  backsliding 
has  been  influenced  by  escalating  geopolitical  tensions  over  the  past  decade. 
However, the intensity of the geopolitical pressures it has faced, combined with 
the severity of its democratic erosion, makes its ‘geopolitical autocratisation’ 
one of the most pronounced in Europe. To be sure, not all drivers of Serbia’s 
backsliding are external, and this paper could not fully address domestic factors 
such  as  recent  conflicts,  illiberal  networks,  ideology,  political  culture,  or  the 
unjust transition to a market economy. Future studies could also explore the 
role of other external actors – be they states such as Hungary, the Gulf States, 
or Turkey, or various other entities such as donors or international organisa-
tions – which have also played a role in the processes described above. Finally, 
an intriguing avenue for future research could involve analysing the geopolitics 
of corrosive capital and its influence on state capture and democratic decline in 
Serbia and beyond.

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Vuksanović,  Vuk,  Luka  Sterić,  and  Maja  Bjeloš.  Public  perception  of  Serbian 
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London: Bloomsbury Publishing, forthcoming.

Geopolitical Autocratisation in SerbiaPart II
Transversal 
Spaces

The Geopolitics of 
Democracy in the 
Western Balkans

Jelena Džankić*1

Growing  up  in  the  remnants  of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  I  had  seen  different 
kinds of struggle for democracy after the fall of communism. From the struggle 
for bare survival, to the fight for legal recognition, to having one’s voice heard 
in in a community of presumably equal citizens. For the greatest chunk of my 
life, my own understanding of democracy has been twofold. Democracy was an 
idea, an ideal of freedom, equality, communal growth, and working together 
for  a  better  future.  Besides  this  -  nowadays  largely  utopian  -  understanding 
of the notion, for me, democracy meant having a system of accountable gov-
ernance, underpinned by a free competition of  political  agents  whose  access 
to power was enabled by an individual expression of preferences in the act of 
casting a vote. Complicated; and equally utopian. 

Similar  to  much  of  the  scholarship  on  post-communist  transformations 
(Kuzio  2001;  Gill  2003;  Bunce  2003),  I  have  hardly  envisaged  democracy  as 
more than a set of internal processes, occasionally enabled by external support 
for promoting democratic values and principles. Such an approach has, over 
time,  become  insufficient  for  explaining  the  ‘slippiness’  of  democracy  across 
the six Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mon-
tenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia), as well as within each one of them. In 
fact, the Western Balkan region has long been recognised as a site where democ-

* 

Jelena Džankić is Part-Time Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Insti-
tute.

74

racy - both as an ideology and as a political regime – has never become socially 
or  institutionally  embedded  (Vachudova  2020).  Ever  since  the  fall  of  com-
munism, the democratic development of the region has been accompanied by 
qualifiers ‘illiberal’, ‘electoral’, ‘fragile’, or ‘authoritarian’, while any democratic 
progress has been at best episodic and followed by near-immediate regression 
(Knutsen et al. 2024; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Mechkova, Lührmann, 
and Lindberg 2017). 

To understand why, it is essential to put into conversation scholarship on 
democracy rooted in political science with the security-driven study of geopol-
itics. This is the case because democratic development of countries undergoing 
political transformation is not an insular process, driven by internal political 
and social forces. Rather, it is deeply affected by the competition for power and 
influence among states that takes place at the global, regional, and local levels. 
While these influences are yet to be systematically explored in scholarly research, 
in this short chapter, I highlight how different external actors have impacted 
democracy and autocracy promotion in the Western Balkans (Andjelic 2020; 
Bieber  2020;  Richter  2017),  employing  both  formal  (tangible)  and  informal 
(intangible)  mechanisms  of  influence.  Formal  mechanisms  employed  by  the 
European Union (EU) and the United States (US), such as foreign direct aid 
and investment in capacity-building of the courts and parliaments, have had as 
their overarching goal the promotion of democracy. However, over time, these 
mechanisms became inconsistent and transactional (Kmezić 2019; Fagan and 
Sircar 2012; Ejdus in this volume). This inconsistency and incremental transac-
tionalism cemented local power strongholds (Richter and Wunsch 2020), and 
their resulting practices of state and societal capture. Informal mechanisms of 
democracy  promotion  that  were  crucial  for  the  ‘democratic  moment’  of  the 
early 2000s, such as investments in civic education in the Western Balkans, ulti-
mately faded away because of the shifting global geopolitics. By contrast, formal 
mechanisms  of  third  actors  without  an  interest  in  democracy  promotion  – 
such as Russia, China, or the Gulf states – mainly encompass the creation of 
economic dependencies through trade and investment. While small in scale – 
when  compared  to  EU  economic  impact  (Uvalić  in  this  volume)  –  they  are 
accompanied by informal and often intangible cultural and political influence 
that frequently impairs the quality of democracy in transitional contexts.

Jelena Džankić75

The Geopolitics of Democracy Promotion

Since the 1990s, Western Balkan states have been one of the target areas for the 
democracy  promotion  efforts  by  the  EU  and  the  US.  Financial  aid,  conflict 
resolution,  different  forms  of  capacity-building  for  citizens,  as  well  as  policy 
support, were all mechanisms aimed at enhancing the quality of democratic 
governance across the turbulent region. Yet the impact of this support faded 
away over time, as a result of two overlapping dynamics. First, the inward turn 
of both the EU and the US, caused by multiple crises that ensued after the turn 
of the millennium, resulted in an inconsistent approach of these actors to dem-
ocratic development in the Western Balkans. Second, over time, the particu-
laristic interests of the different actors engaging in democracy promotion took 
over the general objective of fostering democracy in the region. 

Throughout  the  1990s,  the  US  perhaps  had  the  most  crucial  impact  on 
conflict resolution and the subsequent democracy promotion in the Western 
Balkan region (Gallagher 2003; ÓTuathail 2002). American engagement was 
critical in bringing about the ‘democratic moment’ of the 2000, largely marked 
by the demise of Milosevic in the (then) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and 
democratic  changes  across  the  region’s  countries  (Jano  2008).  Even  so,  fol-
lowing the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the foreign policy of the US 
changed direction, which marginalised the Western Balkan region as a concern 
for the US government (Peterson 2001). The slow withdrawal of the US also 
opened up the space for the EU en route to the 2004 enlargement to become 
more engaged with promoting democracy in its immediate and unstable neigh-
bourhood. Grappling with instability across the post-Yugoslav space – from 
the tensions in the early postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the dysfunctional 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and newly decentralised North Macedonia – 
democracy promotion from the EU became inextricable from the necessity to 
stabilise the region. As a result of the aspiration of the Western Balkan states to 
join the EU, this process became entrenched within the context of a member-
ship perspective (Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019). Yet over time, this perspec-
tive became increasingly distant, in part due to a series of political, economic, 
and social crises that the EU had faced since 2007. These ranged from the Euro-
crisis, to the poorly adapted institutional framework after the Eastern enlarge-
ment, to migration, energy, and security (Panagiotou 2021). Further to these, 
democracy  across  a  number  of  Eastern  European  Member  States,  including 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland, had become contested. Because of these crises, 
the  EU  ‘turned  inward’,  de-prioritising  further  enlargement,  as  attested  by 

The Geopolitics of Democracy in the Western Balkans76

the portfolios and the approach of the Juncker Commission (Troncota 2014; 
Juncos 2017). As the membership perspective became increasingly distant, for 
most  of  the  local  leadership  in  the  region,  democratic  development  became 
equalised with ‘ticking the boxes’ to formally meet the EU’s conditions without 
commitment to substantive reforms (Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019, “Intro-
duction”). Inconsistency in rewarding progress, as has been the case with the 
multiple vetoes of (now) North Macedonia (Kacarska in this volume), has also 
impaired the credibility of enlargement across the region and has weakened the 
transformative power of the Union. 

Simultaneously, since the late 2000s, the approach of the US to the region 
amounted  largely  to  monitoring  democracy  levels,  and  contributing  to  the 
region’s  security  through  US  troops  in  international  miliary  missions.  As  a 
result  of  the  accession  stalemate  and  the  region’s  poor  democratic  perfor-
mance, relationships with the EU evolved on two parallel tracks. On the one 
hand, the declarative commitment to membership remained. At least formally, 
much  of  the  EU’s  engagement  with  the  region  has  been  under  the  clout  of 
enlargement.  On  the  other  hand,  both  the  Union’s  officials  and  individual 
Member States developed a transactional approach to the region. Scholarship 
has long criticised the EU for its prioritisation of political stability of the region 
over democracy, which has become embedded in this transactional approach. 
Since  2016,  this  ‘stabilitocracy’  argument  has  become  a  dominant  analytical 
lens for examining the rise of repressive power strongholds across the region, as 
well as the increase in the political, cultural and economic dependencies on au-
thoritarian third countries, such as China, Russia, and Turkey (Bieber 2018). 
In addition to this, instances such as the Italian-Albanian arrangement on mi-
gration (Beshku in this volume), the Franco-Serbian fighter jet deal (Nestor-
ovic and Milhiet 2024), or the EU-Serbia lithium deal (Stuehlen and Anderl 
2024), signal particular interests in externalisation of border control, obtain-
ing military equipment, or critical raw materials. In all these instances, part-
nerships with the region’s (semi)authoritarians were essential and have led to 
positive  rhetoric  on  democratic  development  in  these  countries,  despite  the 
situation  on  the  ground.  These  dynamics  became  particularly  pronounced 
following the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which shifted the 
tectonic plates of the global geopolitical context, prioritising different elements 
of security (hard, cyber, border, energy, food) over democratic transformation. 

Jelena Džankić77

The Geopolitics of Democracy Demotion

Democratic decline in the Western Balkans has almost exclusively been studied 
as the result of unsuccessful democracy promotion, rather than as an outcome of 
strategic approaches to the global competition for power. The recent victory of 
Donald Trump in the US presidential race, Vladimir Putin’s growing ambition 
to destabilise the EU and the NATO, the economic rise of Xi Jinping’s China, 
and the rise of Hungary and Turkey as regional powers, all have massive impli-
cations on how democracy is understood and practised by local political actors 
in the Western Balkan states. The impact of these actors has become increas-
ingly visible in the new geopolitical context, and against the backdrop of the 
inconsistent and increasingly transactional approach to democracy promotion. 
While their impact is visible, the mechanisms used by external actors contribut-
ing to democratic decline are often intangible, informal, or difficult to quantify. 
They are also not necessarily directly aimed at bringing down democracy in the 
region, even if that is their immediate outcome. Rather, these mechanisms are 
a local reflection of the external actors’ broader global ambitions, interests, and 
strategies – as illustrated by the examples of China and Russia. 

For  instance,  in  this  volume,  Milica  Uvalić  shows  how  economic  indica-
tors – including the volume of trade and foreign direct investment – of the dif-
ferent third-country actors are lower in volume than those of the EU (Uvalić 
in this volume). Ostensibly, a strong economic influence of the EU should, in 
theory, give a greater leverage to the Union to enforce its democratic condition-
ality. Even so, as also Uvalić notes, while the economic indicators of influence 
of external actors such as China or Russia are low compared to the EU, their 
impact extends – in unquantifiable terms - beyond the economic realm. For 
instance, Chinese investments in physical and digital infrastructure have been 
a part of the country’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Tonchev 2022). Such 
investments have often been intended to consolidate the power of local leader-
ship and are carried out through largely untransparent negotiations and pro-
curement procedures (Zweers et al. 2020; Soyaltin-Colella 2023). The Chinese 
Exim  Bank  loan  to  Montenegro  for  a  motorway  built  by  China  Road  and 
Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and the re-construction of the Novi Sad Railway 
Station are some examples of such untransparent practices. Hence, it is not the 
investment  itself  that  harms  democratic  development.  Rather,  harmful  pro-
cesses  that  take  place  locally,  when  external  actors  work  in  synergy  with  the 
domestic political actors who – in turn – receive private kickbacks or funds for 
their party coffers. These processes remain largely informal and unexplored. 

The Geopolitics of Democracy in the Western Balkans78

Equally, the extent of political and cultural influence (‘soft power’) that may 
divert  the  Western  Balkan  states  and  societies  from  democracy  is  difficult  to 
capture empirically. Scholars have observed, for instance, the impact of Russia 
on the foreign policy of Serbia, or the Russian support to the secessionist po-
litical agenda of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ker-Lind-
say 2016). The cultural and media influence has also been noted, with Russian 
media  outlets  such  as  Sputnik  and  RT  Balkan  serving  as  important  sources 
of misinformation and fake news (Němec in this volume). Distorting public 
opinion  on  issues  regarding  global  events,  such  as  the  attack  on  Ukraine  or 
the war in Gaza, while fuelling local animosities in support of particular po-
litical agendas close to Russia, these outlets have fed into the region’s demo-
cratic decline. The actual extent to which they had shaped the local popula-
tion’s political choices and beliefs is however difficult to assess. In a similar vein, 
the  Russian  Orthodox  Church,  its  media  outlets  and  humanitarian  projects 
have been ‘used to fortify the Kremlin’s ties with political leaders, churches and 
independent  groups  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (Republika  Srpska),  North 
Macedonia,  Montenegro,  Serbia,  and  among  Orthodox  minority  groups  in 
non-Christian countries, such as Albania and Kosovo’ (Stanicek and Caprile 
2023). As such, these elusive ‘soft power’ channels of influence have proven to 
be harmful to both democracy as a value and to the notion of democratic gov-
ernance. 

A Geopolitical Lens on Democracy

In  the  study  of  post-communist  transformations,  the  democratic  trajecto-
ries of the six Western Balkan states stand out as outliers. Unlike the Central 
and East European states, which embraced a democratic route as a means of 
their ‘return to Europe’, countries in the Balkan region slipped into a decade 
of  conflict,  contestation,  and  nationalism  (Džankić  and  Keil  2017),  with 
uneven and short-lived spurs of democratic development from 1990 to date 
(Dolenec 2016). Explanations for such an unfulfilled ‘promise of democracy’, 
coupled with the growing illiberalism since the mid-2000s, have often been in-
ward-looking and idiosyncratic. That is, scholarship has focused on the con-
text-specific determinants of democratic decline, including post-conflict settle-
ments, state capture, corruption and clientelism, failed ‘Europeanisation’, and 
– more recently – external dependencies of individual countries on third actors 
(Kapidžić and Stojarová 2021; Sotiropoulos 2023). As a result, the question of 
how global geopolitics has impacted democratic development in the Western 

Jelena Džankić79

Balkan states has never been comprehensively addressed, despite the region’s 
strategic location at the historical, cultural and political crossroads. 

Adopting a geopolitical approach to democracy is useful in this regard, as it 
induces us to study the much-discussed developments through a different lens. 
This lens helps us to nuance how the larger global strategies and objectives of 
political actors play out in local contests. If, for instance, we see Russia’s global 
objective  as  geopolitical  primacy,  through  territorial  expansion  (Friedman 
2008;  Oulaalou  2021);  in  the  Western  Balkan  region,  this  strategy  takes  the 
shape of an alternative to EU integration by creating and leveraging on political 
and economic dependencies (Panagiotou 2021); and in individual countries, 
it ranges from supporting secessionist agendas (Bosnia and Herzegovina), to 
disinformation  campaigns  (Kosovo,  Serbia),  to  hybrid  threats  (Montenegro) 
(Cruz 2021; Džankić, Kacarska, and Keil 2023). Accompanied by a high degree 
of informality, each of these strategies has had a different outcome on local de-
mocracy: the global one deepened the polarisation over values associated with 
the ‘East’ and the ‘West’, or the ‘old’ and the ‘new’; the regional one cemented 
local oligarchies and their patronage networks; and the local ones challenged 
the stability of democratic institutions. 

This geopolitical approach also helps us to understand how and when good 
intentions, such as democracy promotion, may have unintended consequences 
and harm democratic development. While informal channels of influence lead 
to untransparent practices and are by default damaging to democratic govern-
ance,  the  emphasis  on  ‘form’  over  ‘content’  impairs  democratic  values.  This 
latter development has largely been visible in the EU’s approach to the Western 
Balkans, where the goal to stabilise the region, coupled with the prioritisation 
of particular interests over values, has weakened the Union’s power to achieve 
true democratic transformation by imposing conditions for EU accession. A 
systematic study of these instances and dynamics would enrich our knowledge 
and understanding of uneven and sometimes counterintuitive democratic de-
velopment across the Western Balkan states. It would also provide guidance on 
how to promote democracy in synergy with the enlargement process, ensuring 
the fulfilment of the accession criteria. 

The Geopolitics of Democracy in the Western Balkans80

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Damir KapidžićNationalist Outbidding 
in the Shadow of 
Geopolitical Change

Daniel Bochsler*2

Introduction

From 2022, as a consequence of the escalation of the Russian aggression against 
Ukraine, a window of opportunity has opened for destabilisation and revision-
ist agendas in post-conflict countries with strong ties to both Russia and the 
West. This chapter discusses the consequences of this escalation for national 
elections in these countries.

Rationale

External  actors  play  an  important  role  in  providing  stability  to  post-conflict 
countries or countries with frozen conflicts (Fortna 2008; Hegre et al. 2019). In 
an argument inspired by rational choice, I argue that the effect of foreign guar-
antees offered to secure the post-conflict or frozen conflict political and territo-
rial order evaporates when the external actors are divided in their vision of the 
political or territorial order. Domestically, this leads to an erosion of trust in 
the post-conflict order and pushes domestic actors to escalate their claims on 
conflict-related issues.

*  Associate  Professor  in  Political  Science  at  Central  European  University,  full  Professor  of  Political 

Science at the University of Belgrade.

86

Post-conflict  countries  or  countries  with  frozen  conflicts  are  associated 
with a security dilemma between the conflicting parties and an elevated level of 
mistrust between former warring parties (e.g. Glaser 1997; Saideman 1996). In 
the electoral arena, the security dilemma is mirrored by a nationalist or ethnic 
outbidding  dilemma:  in  a  segmented  electorate,  where  each  part  of  society 
votes  primarily  for  political  parties  or  candidates  of  their  ingroup,  elections 
may be associated with a radicalisation along conflict-related lines (Roe 2004). 
Amid fears of radicalisation of the outgroup, voters will vote for representa-
tives with fiercely nationalist (i.e. radical) claims as an insurance strategy, and 
this undermines the stability of peace and democracy (Rabushka and Shepsle 
1972; Stojanović 2014). Security guarantees offered by external actors do not 
only provide for security and trust with regards to the post-conflict order in the 
military sphere but also unfurl the same effect in the electoral arena. However, 
with two or more external actors (or alliances of actors), with different agendas 
for the post-conflict order, there is no single political/territorial order to trust 
in, and radicalisation takes its course.

This study is turning from the analysis of the choices of international actors 
to the agency of domestic actors (Zürcher 2018; Bochsler et al. 2020), and in 
particular to the concern that domestic electoral competition could undermine 
the efforts of international actors. Second, it explores situations where multiple 
external actors provide support or security but are disunited on the (political, 
territorial, and economic) issues associated with the conflict.13

Study

The problem is relevant to post-conflict countries and countries with frozen 
conflicts in Southeastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The war of aggres-
sion against Ukraine since 2022 has massively accelerated the long-term shift 
in Russia’s foreign policy towards a revisionist political order (Snyder 2018), 
demonstrating the lack of restraint and the boldness of the Russian leadership 
in the use of force and in destabilising the broader region for this purpose, but 
also in the decline in the availability of military capabilities, at least in the short 
and medium term, as their capacities were absorbed in the aggression against 
Ukraine.

1  For more empirical details, see Bochsler (2025).

Daniel Bochsler87

Since 24 February 2022, three countries with ambiguous or shifting polit-
ical alignments with Russia and the West (European Union and US) and with 
either frozen conflicts or a post-conflict peace treaty have held national elec-
tions: Bosnia and Herzegovina (general elections in 2022), Georgia (parliamen-
tary elections in 2024) and Moldova (presidential elections in 2024). I summa-
rise here the findings on:

•  whether 1. their election campaign was centred on the territorial order of 

the state (i.e. contentious issues of the past wars),

• 

and 2. whether the discussion of the geopolitical alignment was linked to 
this conflict.

The  context  differs,  though,  across  countries:  In  Bosnia  and  Herzegovi-
na and Moldova, the conflict dimension cuts across the domestic electorate, 
while in Georgia, citizens with a pro-Abkhaz or South Ossetian view do not 
participate in elections. Second, Georgia and Moldova are more directly subject 
to Russian military power. However, as demonstrated in the conflict in Na-
gorno-Karabakh  in  2022  and  2023,  Russian  military  capabilities  and  deter-
rence credibility have suffered as of 2022.

Georgia

Given the strong and rapidly growing economic links with Russia and Russia’s 
military  presence  in  the  two  breakaway  territories,  I  expect  polarisation  on 
issues related to the frozen conflict. However, while foreign policy and EU inte-
gration were central to the campaign ahead for the 2024 presidential elections, 
the status of the breakaway territories played a secondary role.

The elections were overshadowed by the rapid erosion of political freedoms. 
Parliament had passed an anti-LGBT law in the run-up to the elections. One 
of the most contentious issues was a ‘foreign agents’ law aimed at cutting off 
Western  funding  to  independent  media  and  civil  society  and  modelled  on 
similar laws in Russia and Belarus, which have been used to eradicate independ-
ent civil society (International Crisis Group 2024a). Accordingly, the law was 
dubbed the ‘Russian law’ by the civil society. While the opposition positioned 
itself as pro-European and pro-democracy, the incumbent took an ostensibly 
similar  position  on  these  issues  and  pointed  to  the  success  of  obtaining  EU 
candidate status under the Georgian Dream government in 2023. The subtlety 
that  the  candidate  status  was  granted  conditionally,  taking  into  account  the 

Nationalist Outbidding in the Shadow of Geopolitical Change88

strong support for EU integration in Georgian society, while the EU Commis-
sion deplored the lack of collaboration from the authorities, was interpreted 
differently (Civil Georgia 2025). On territorial integrity, the incumbent issued 
an apology for the 2008 war. The statement was read as an attempt to demon-
strate a will for reconciliation, and to signal to the electorate that good relations 
with the Kremlin would facilitate the reintegration of the breakaway regions, 
but given the negative public reaction, the strategy was not pursued any further 
(author’s interviews in Tbilisi 2025; Kakachia 2024; Narimanishvili and Pipia 
2024). Thus, with the incumbent and the opposition advocating largely the 
same goals, but with the disputable credibility of the incumbent, the Georgian 
Dream governing party aimed to turn the two issues into valence issues.

Moldova

The active electorate of Moldova includes both sides of the conflict division, 
with a small part of Transnistrians voting and, especially, Gagauzians (the group 
associated  with  the  second  issue  about  the  territorial  order  that  is  currently 
fuelling) voting at a rate similar to the national turnout. Moldova is subject to 
a strong Russian economic footprint and military presence on the left bank of 
the Dniester. Russia’s 2022 escalation has led to an energy crisis and created 
insecurities on multiple dimensions, in response to which the government has 
sought a stronger alignment with the West and cut links with Russian-led or-
ganisations (International Crisis Group 2024b, 4). Russia said that if successful 
in Ukraine, it would seek a neutral status for Moldova and a special status for 
Transnistria (International Crisis Group 2024b, 6). This would speak for an 
immanent link between geopolitics and conflict-related radicalisation.

With the presidential elections scheduled simultaneously with a non-man-
datory referendum on Moldova’s EU prospects, the authorities linked the pres-
idential elections to the geopolitical debate. A vocal part of the citizenry either 
favours strong ties with Russia or expresses scepticism about Western integra-
tion.  The  other  contentious  issues  were  the  government’s  performance  and 
economic hardship, both of which fuelled opposition to the incumbent (In-
ternational  Crisis  Group  2022,  19)  (author’s  interviews  in  Chisinau,  2024). 
However, the opposition candidates did not openly oppose Western integra-
tion and instead presented themselves as ‘apolitical’ technocrats or stressed the 
importance  of  political  and  military  ‘neutrality’  in  order  to  maintain  strong 
links with both geopolitical powers (Gulca 2024).

Daniel Bochsler89

Russia  appears  to  have  actively  interfered  in  the  voting  process:  The 
Moldovan authorities investigated vote-buying, illegal and secret campaign fi-
nancing and illegal transport of voters, either by Russia or Moldovan oligarchs 
exiled in Russia. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs even attempted to 
infiltrate secret service agents into the OSCE election observation mission (Ser-
viciul de Informații și Securitate 2024; Kirby 2024; International Crisis Group 
2024b, 20).

Despite the contentious issue of relations with Russia and the importance 
of Russia in the (non-)resolution of the territorial order, the issue of the break-
away territories was largely absent from the election campaign. The incumbent 
President, Maia Sandu, sought to de-emphasise the importance of Moscow for 
the reintegration of the Left Bank (the Russian-backed breakaway region), em-
phasising instead the strategy of incentivising the reintegration of Transnistriaas 
a solution for the financial and economic strains and the geographic isolation. 
Also, Transnistria would experience a welfare growth that would result from EU 
integration (Gulca 2024).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  much  less  economically  and  politically  linked  to 
Russia; in particular, it has no military presence or potential. The territorial 
and  political  order  was  a  highly  contentious  issue  in  the  election  campaign: 
The main Serb nationalist party argued that the federal entity of the Serbs was 
under threat and renewed its threat of secession (Dnevnik 2022; Reuters 2022). 
The key Damocles sword is Russia’s possible recognition of a Bosnian Serb se-
cession and its obstruction of the international institutions that uphold and 
secure the political unity of the country. While the Russian leadership has not 
openly stated its position on this issue, a meeting between Vladimir Putin and 
the incumbent party’s candidate for the presidency of the Serbian-controlled 
entity, Milorad Dodik, and Putin’s open backing for the candidate sent a clear 
enough  signal,  which  the  Serbian  incumbent  used  in  turn  to  claim  that  the 
Russian  administration  backed  his  political  agenda  (Jutarnji  List  2022;  RTS 
2022). The position of the political elites on the conflict dimension remains 
ambiguous; they primarily address the territorial integrity of the country and 
secessionist  dreams  rhetorically  but  avoid  putting  this  into  action  (Kapidžić 
and Hirkić 2025). Instead, the media, both the public broadcaster and private 
media under the influence of the Serbian-controlled entity government, have 
been much more vocal in fomenting the Russian narrative and linking the fate 

Nationalist Outbidding in the Shadow of Geopolitical Change90

of Serbian nationalist claims to their imagined foreign partner (Bubonjić and 
Delić Aščić 2022).

The West, especially NATO, was emphasised as the enemy of the Serbian 
agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bubonjić and Delić Aščić 2022, 166–167). 
The Bosniak nationalists (Džaferović) rhetorically linked the Serbs’ role in the 
Bosnian genocide to their current policies on statehood and their obstruction 
of EU and NATO integration (Buljubašić 2022, 113–119). Croat nationalists 
stressed the ‘Croats’ demand for sovereignty’.

Discussion

What explains the difference in the results between Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Georgia and Moldova? While the territorial order played only a secondary 
role in the elections in Georgia and Moldova, the foreign alignment of Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  was  closely  linked  to  the  internal  ethno-political  and  eth-
no-territorial  conflict  dimensions.  The  difference  is  surprising,  as  it  was  pri-
marily Russia’s unique role as protector of the separatist de-facto authorities 
in the breakaway territories of Georgia and Moldova that has been affected in 
practice, offering windows of opportunity to alter the status quo in favour of 
the state institutions. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia plays only a symbolic 
role as a political ally, but with very limited real power. Thus, the escalation 
of the aggression against the regional political order could have implications 
on Russia’s role in international organisations active in Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, as well as through political and diplomatic channels, but with very limited 
economic and no military power.

Thus, the comparative assessment points to other factors that could com-

plement or even alter the model:

•  Asymmetric external actors: First, the strategy of the external actors differs 
fundamentally in how they address the domestic dimension of the conflict. 
While the Russian leadership fuels narratives of changes to the status quo, 
the  West  has  clearly  expressed  its  disinterest  in  a  show  of  force.  The  EU 
even called on the government of Moldova to show more restraint in its 
attempts to advance a solution on territorial integrity (International Crisis 
Group 2024b). This does not allow Georgian or Moldovan pro-Western 
parties to link the geopolitical and the domestic conflict dimension credibly.

• 

Daniel Bochsler91

•  External links as the main campaign issue: Second, in countries with close 
links to Russia and/or the Eurasian Union, i.e. the two cases of Moldova 
and Georgia, the political importance of foreign economic links and the 
political alignment with Russia as opposed to EU integration (and related 
economic/political issues) has already rocketed after the 24 February 2022. 
This leaves little need or chance to affect the electoral dynamics by linking 
it to the (enormous) potential consequences that the external alignment 
may have for the further development of the domestic frozen conflicts.

•  Russia’s imaginary power. Third, electoral rivals, and especially the media 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, link nationalist issues to the foreign policy ori-
entation, in particular portraying Russia as a (potential) supporter or guar-
antor of a post-conflict order in which Serbian nationalist ambitions are 
realised. However, the discussion about Russia as a sword of Damocles is 
not matched by Russia’s real economic footprint, let alone its institution-
al political power and military capabilities in the Western Balkans. As dis-
cussed above, the key role of the external actors in a post-conflict order or 
frozen conflict is not only to provide security guarantees but thereby also 
to reduce the mistrust between the formerly conflicting parties. Russia may 
not have the real power to provide military guarantees or economic support 
for a change in the post-conflict order, but once symbolic threats are medi-
atised and believed to be credible, they inevitably undermine mutual trust, 
thereby unravelling the fragile stability.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for research support by Milan Varda and to the editors for helpful 
suggestions. This research was funded by Horizon Europe, within the ‘Embrac-
ing change. Overcoming obstacles and advancing democracy in the European 
Neighbourhood’ project.

Nationalist Outbidding in the Shadow of Geopolitical Change92

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Daniel BochslerEconomic Vulnerability 
and the State of 
Democracy in the 
Western Balkans

Milica Uvalić*4

Geoeconomic factors are among the key structural conditions that are considered 
to have strengthened the impact of undemocratic forces on democratic values 
and institutions in the Western Balkans (WBs). Over the past ten years, despite 
the strong integration primarily with the European Union (EU), the WB coun-
tries have also developed economic relations with a number of non-EU partners 
– including China, Russia, and Turkey – countries that are categorised as au-
thoritarian or hybrid political regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit 2023). The 
increasing economic cooperation with these countries has frequently led observ-
ers to conclude that this has become an important channel of influence on the 
domestic politics of the WB countries (Bieber and Tzifakis 2020). 

To what extent has the intensification of economic relations with undem-
ocratic countries hampered the consolidation of democratic institutions in the 
WB countries? In this chapter, we argue that there is no direct link between 
the  increasing  economic  presence  of  countries  with  authoritarian  political 
regimes and the de-democratisation of the WB countries. Although undem-
ocratic  external  actors  have  been  influential  in  important  spheres  –  politics, 
media, culture, religion (see chapters in this volume) – formally they play a rel-

*  Milica Uvalić is a Visiting Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre, EUI, Florence and Visiting Profes-

sor at the College of Europe, Tirana campus.

96

atively limited role in the economic domain. The presence of not entirely dem-
ocratic countries in the WBs may have influenced the methods of negotiations 
or stipulation of contracts (e.g. low transparency of deals). Their presence may 
also have been used by WB political leaders in their narratives for purposes of 
anti-western propaganda. Nevertheless, the current economic weight of these 
non-EU partners in the WB countries remains fairly limited, as measured by 
the volumes of trade, investments, financial assistance, or other financial links. 
The stagnation or reversals of democratic processes in the WB countries are 
primarily  the  outcome  of  internal  developments  (as  argued  further  below), 
related to the lack (or backsliding) of fundamental reforms of key government 
and non-government institutions. 

In what follows, we will first recall why the WB countries have become in-
creasingly economically vulnerable since 2010. We will then substantiate our 
claim that the presence of non-democratic actors in the economic sphere has 
not directly exercised a significant influence on WB countries’ political regimes, 
given that the magnitude of formal economic links between the WBs and these 
countries remains fairly limited. It will be shown that the main non-EU actors 
– China, Russia, and Turkey – still represent a relatively low share of WB coun-
tries’ trade and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) when compared to the EU or 
neighbouring WB countries. The main political implications of the analysis are 
given in the concluding section. 

Increasing Economic Vulnerability of the Western 
Balkan Countries

Over the past two decades, the WB countries have become increasingly inte-
grated with the EU economy. The EU Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP) launched in 1999 has offered the WB countries privileged access to its 
single market through substantial trade liberalisation, specific financial assis-
tance programmes and the possibility of establishing contractual relations with 
the EU. EU policies have greatly helped the economic recovery of the WBs in 
the 2000s, after a decade of military conflicts, international isolation, economic 
instability and falling living standards. 

Yet strong economic integration with the EU economy has also rendered 
the WB countries more vulnerable to external shocks coming from their sur-
rounding EU neighbours (Uvalić 2019). The high degree of dependence of the 
WB countries on the EU economy became particularly evident after the strong 

Milica Uvalić97

effects of the global financial and economic crisis in 2008-2009. Thereafter, the 
economic  growth  of  the  WB  countries  has  slowed  down,  also  influenced  by 
the multiple crises in the EU – the eurozone crisis (2011), the migration crisis 
(2015), Brexit (2018), the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021), and the geopo-
litical crisis caused by Russia’s attack on Ukraine (2022). Since 2010, economic 
recovery has been slow and rather erratic, as all WB countries have registered 
much lower or even negative GDP growth rates; Serbia as the largest economy 
in  the  region  has  had  four  recessions  during  the  2009-2023  period  (Uvalić 
2025). WB countries’ deteriorated growth performance has seriously compro-
mised their ability to converge towards the EU average income and has posed 
additional constraints on economic development. The model of growth imple-
mented during the past two decades has made the WB countries increasingly 
dependent on external sources of finance, including FDI, international donors’ 
assistance, foreign loans, and migrants’ remittances (Daviddi and Uvalić 2024). 

Regarding the influence of external actors, the EU has undoubtedly played 
an important role in sustaining the economic development of the WB coun-
tries since the early 2000s. The EU’s SAP and the prospects of EU member-
ship have been a strong incentive for the WB countries to initiate fundamen-
tal economic, political, legal and institutional reforms, laying the foundations 
for greater democratisation. However, the EU’s hesitant policies and rising am-
biguities regarding future enlargements have contributed to the loss of credi-
bility of the EU’s earlier promises and the deterioration of the EU’s image in 
the region (Teokarević 2023). The extremely slow dynamics of the EU inte-
gration  process  after  Croatia’s  entry  into  the  EU  in  2013  has  led  to  increas-
ing ‘reform fatigue’, widespread disappointment and declining public support 
for the EU in most WB countries (Uvalić 2023). As the prospect of EU mem-
bership  receded,  the  Union’s  power  to  drive  democratic  reforms  in  aspiring 
countries has significantly eroded (Džankić 2025). EU financial resources to 
the WBs have been scarce in comparison to what the poorer EU Member States 
have been receiving and have been offered under stringent conditionality. The 
WB countries have to fulfil not only the general EU accession criteria (polit-
ical, legal, economic) and the specific conditions regarding the respect of in-
ternational obligations and regional cooperation; but also, when applying for 
EU  funding,  they  have  to  provide  evidence  on  the  projects’  environmental 
impact and proof of their full maturity (Bartlett, Bonomi, and Uvalić 2022). 

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans98

For  the  public  administrations  of  the  WB  countries,  these  procedures  have 
rendered  the  use  of  EU  funds  extremely  complex  and  time-consuming. 
Moreover,  the  amount  of  EU  financial  resources  provided  to  the  region  has 
not been sufficient to finance large infrastructure projects in important areas 
such as transport, energy, climate, and the environment.

These  are  among  the  reasons  why  most  WB  countries  have  been  estab-
lishing closer relations with other economic partners outside the EU (Bieber 
and  Tzifakis  2020).  Trade  and  investment  deals  with  non-EU  partners  have 
been particularly welcome to the domestic leaders because they have usually 
not  been  subject  to  any  specific  conditionality.  Non-EU  countries  –  includ-
ing China, Russia and Turkey – have increased their economic role in the WB 
region through various channels: trade, FDI, as providers of loans, as donors of 
financial assistance or vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic (Radio Free 
Europe 2021; Aljazeera 2021). Although the main foreign policy objective of 
all the WB countries remains EU membership, developing closer economic re-
lations  with  non-EU  countries  has  been  a  means  for  tackling  key  economic 
challenges (Bonomi and Uvalić 2020). By relying more on non-EU partners, 
the WB countries have been able to diversify their trade relations, obtain ad-
ditional financial resources for undertaking new investments, counterbalance 
the volatility of FDI inflows from EU Member States, and supplement limited 
public resources to finance costly infrastructure projects. 

Along  with  the  increasing  economic  presence  of  non-EU  actors  in  the 
WBs, there has also been an erosion of democracy in most of the region’s coun-
tries (Keil 2018; Bieber 2020). In 2023, WB countries were classified among 
the  ‘flawed  democracies’  in  the  Democracy  Index  of  the  Economist  Intelli-
gence Unit (only Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a ‘hybrid regime’), while the 
overall score on democracy has deteriorated since 2013 in most cases (the only 
exceptions are Albania and Montenegro, that registered a slight improvement) 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2023; Freedom House n. d.). However, there is 
not necessarily a direct link between the regression or stagnation of democracy 
in most WB countries and the presence of undemocratic economic partners. 
The lack of a substantive influence of some external partners on WBs’ politi-
cal regimes can at least in part be explained by the fact that the magnitude of 
formal economic links between the WBs and the non-EU actors remains insig-
nificant compared to the EU or countries in the WB region (see section below).

Milica Uvalić99

The Role of Non-EU Economic Actors in the Western 
Balkans

Although  the  WB  countries  have  diversified  their  economic  relations  by  es-
tablishing more intense trade and investment links with a number of non-EU 
countries, the EU has been, and remains, the most important economic partner 
of all countries in the region regarding trade, FDI, financial links, and donors’ 
assistance.  China,  Russia,  and  Turkey  are  today  relatively  marginal  partners 
in comparison to the EU or other countries in the WB region, as illustrated 
further below.

Trade

The EU has been the dominant trade partner of all the WB countries through-
out the past two decades. In 2023, the six WB countries’ exports to the EU27 
ranged from 32 per cent in Kosovo to 79 per cent in North Macedonia, while 
imports from 39 per cent in Kosovo to 59 per cent in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina (see Table 1). During the past ten years, most WB countries have main-
tained a stable or slightly declining share of trade with the EU, which reflects 
gradual  trade  diversification  and  establishment  of  economic  relations  with 
other non-EU countries. 

Among the non-EU countries, China has emerged as an increasingly im-
portant trade partner for most WB countries, mainly in imports. Currently, 
the region’s countries have a very low share of total exports of goods to China. 
In 2023, exports to China amounted to less than a half per cent of total exports 
of Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 1,2 per cent and 
2,3 per cent of North Macedonia and Albania, respectively (see Table 1). Only 
Serbia has a slightly higher share of its exports directed towards the Chinese 
market, which stood at 4,2 per cent in 2023. On the import side, the shares 
have been substantially higher, representing between 9 and over 13 per cent of 
WB countries’ total imports. The coverage of imports by exports has been low, 
generating high trade deficits for most countries, signaling a rather unbalanced 
trade relationship between China and the WBs. This problem is not specific to 
the WBs, since most EU Member States (23 out of 27) in 2023 had deficits in 
their trade with China (Eurostat 2025). 

Milica UvalićTable 1. Trade of the Western Balkans with EU27 and selected countries (per cent of total), 2023

100

Country

Albania

BiH

Kosovo

Montenegro

71,8

73

32,3

36,1

N. Macedonia 78,7

Serbia

65,7

Exports of goods

Imports of goods

EU27 China Russia Turkey Hungary WB5 EU27 China Russia Turkey Hungary WB5

2,3

0,2

0,1

0,4

1,2

4,2

0

0,6

0

0

0,5

2,9

1,2

1,6

2,3

1,3

2,2

1,8

0,5

1,7

0,4

1,3

3,6

5,7

18,1

14,3

26,5

45,1

11,4

12,9

50,9

10,7

59

39

45,8

49,2

53,6

9,5

10

11,2

9,0

13,3

0,5

1,7

0

0,2

2,2

4,4

9,7

5,5

13,5

5,1

5,8

4,9

0,7

2,2

1,2

0,8

2,1

3,5

5,3

11,4

10,1

24,0

7,8

4,4

Note:  The  table  does  not  include  exports  and  imports  of  the  5  WB  countries  to/from  Albania,  and  Serbia’s  exports  and 
imports from Kosovo, as the data are not reported in the WIIW database.

Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the WIIW online database, accessed in December 2024.

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans101

Russia remains an insignificant exports market for the WB countries, repre-
senting between zero to around half per cent of total exports of most countries, 
except for Serbia that directed 2,9 per cent of its exports to Russia in 2023 (see 
Table 1). Imports from Russia are a bit higher, mainly due to energy imports. 
They still remain rather low, ranging from zero to around 2 per cent for most 
WB countries; only Serbia’s share of imports from Russia is 4,4 per cent. These 
low shares even for trade between Serbia and Russia suggest that the preferen-
tial trade agreements, the first concluded 25 years ago, have had a very limited 
impact in boosting trade (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001; Republic of 
Serbia  2013).  The  ongoing  Russia-Ukraine  war  has  further  reduced  the  im-
portance  of  trade  with  Russia,  especially  after  the  introduction  of  the  sixth 
package of sanctions in 2022. 

Turkey is another non-EU country that has strengthened its economic rela-
tions with the WB countries in recent years. Still, Turkey accounted for only 1 
to 2 per cent of total exports of the WBs in 2023, with minor variations across 
countries (see Table 1). Imports from Turkey are higher, ranging from around 
5 to 6 per cent for Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro 
and Serbia, to 9,7 per cent for Albania and 13,5 per cent for Kosovo. 

It is also of interest to consider the role of Hungary as one of the less dem-
ocratic EU Member States that has increased its political presence in the WB 
region (see chapters in this volume). President Viktor Orbán’s political engage-
ment in some WB countries does not seem to have led to substantial changes 
in economic relations so far. In 2023, WB countries’ exports to Hungary were 
above 2 per cent only in the case of North Macedonia (3.6 per cent of total) 
and Serbia (5,7 per cent of the total), while they remain negligible for the other 
countries (ranging from 0,5 to 1,7 per cent of the total; see Table 1). The shares 
of goods that the WB countries import from Hungary are even lower, ranging 
from 0,5 to 2,2 per cent in most cases, except for Serbia where they amount to 
3,5 per cent of total imports. 

A  feature  that  is  sometimes  overlooked  in  discussions  on  trade  relations 
with non-EU countries is that the neighbouring countries in the WB region 
itself are among their most important trading partners. The regional market 
maintains a very important role particularly for Kosovo and Montenegro, the 
two countries that have integrated least with the EU economy (Bonomi and 
Uvalić 2023). If we consider the six WB countries as a single trading block, the 
regional market is far more important than the non-EU trading partners con-
sidered earlier, in most cases. Exports to the other WB countries in 2023 repre-

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans102

sented 26 per cent of Kosovo’s and 45 per cent of Montenegro’s total exports, 
but the export shares are double-digit also for the other countries: over 11 per 
cent for North Macedonia, 13 per cent for Serbia, 14 per cent for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and 18 per cent for Albania, therefore several times higher than 
for the other non-EU countries (see Table 1). The regional market is less im-
portant for imports of some WB countries, representing 4-5 per cent of total 
imports for Albania and Serbia, 8 per cent for North Macedonia, 10-11 per 
cent for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, but as much as 24 per cent for 
Montenegro. The analysis shows that the WB region is currently the second 
most important destination of all the WB countries’ exports (after the EU). 
However, regarding imports, for three WB countries – Albania, North Mac-
edonia  and  especially  Serbia  –  China  has  become  more  important  than  the 
regional  market,  representing  the  second  most  important  import  market  in 
2023 (after the EU). 

Foreign Direct Investments

The situation is not dissimilar regarding FDI. Investors from the EU Member 
States have been the most present and are today responsible for the bulk of FDI 
inward stock in all countries – by 2023, 38-40 per cent in Kosovo and Mon-
tenegro,  54  per  cent  in  Albania,  59  per  cent  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  62 
per cent in Serbia, and as much as 67 per cent in North Macedonia (see Table 
2). Although there have been increasing investments from China, Russia, and 
Turkey in recent years, this has not substantially influenced the dominant role 
of the EU. In most WB countries, the magnitude of FDI originating from EU 
Member States cannot be compared with several times lower investments by 
firms from non-EU countries. In the case of China, however, financial resourc-
es sometimes come in the form of loans rather than FDI. Hence, its economic 
presence in the region is not fully represented through statistics on FDI.

Milica Uvalić103

Table 2. FDI Inward Stock in the Western Balkan countries (per 
cent of total), 2023

Country

Albania

BiH

Kosovo

Montenegro

N. Macedonia

Serbia

EU27

China

Russia

Turkey Hungary

54,4

59,4

40,1

37,7

66,8

61,5

0

0,5

0

0,9

1,3

11,3

0

2,3

0

12,6

0,3

5,6

7,7

3,3

8,0

2,4

9,5

0,7

2,5

0,3

1,4

7,3

3,0

3,4

Note: The data refer to 2022 for BiH, and for Montenegro’s share of FDI from EU27.
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of the WIIW online database, accessed in December 2024.

Chinese  investments  have  increased  particularly  in  Serbia  over  the  past 
decade, rising from a negligible 0,1 per cent in 2013 to 2.3 per cent in 2017 
and increasing further to 11,3 per cent of the total FDI inward stock in 2023. 
Despite such an increase, even in Serbia the FDI inward stock attributable to 
China (11,3 per cent) remains almost six times lower than that of the EU27 
(61,5 per cent of the total) (see Table 2). However, if we look at the annual 
FDI  inflows  to  Serbia  from  China,  in  2022  they  were  almost  at  the  level  of 
those from EU Member States - 31,1 per cent of total (compared to 31,4 per 
cent of the EU) (WIIW n.d.). In 2023, annual inflows of FDI to Serbia from 
China have again been lower (30,4 per cent of the total) than those from the 
EU (47,8 per cent of the total), illustrating the high volatility of foreign invest-
ments. Trade and investment relations between China and Serbia are expected 
to continue increasing further, however, following the signature of a free trade 
agreement in October 2023 (People’s Republic od China 2023). 

Russian investments during the past decade have played an important role par-
ticularly in Montenegro in sectors such as infrastructure, real estate and tourism, 
by 2023 reaching 12,6 per cent of the country’s total FDI inward stock. Russian in-
vestments have been substantially lower in Serbia, representing 5,6 per cent of FDI 
inward stock in 2023, even lower in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2,3 per cent of the FDI 
inward stock) and have been practically non-existent in the other WB countries (see 
Table 2). 

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans104

Russia has maintained its economic influence in Serbia primarily through 
the  energy  sector.  The  Serbian  oil  company  NIS  (Naftna  Industrija  Srbije) 
has been in dominant Russian ownership (56 per cent) after Gazprom Neft 
bought a majority share in 2008 (the Republic of Serbia holds slightly less than 
30 per cent, while around 14 per cent of shares are owned by small sharehold-
ers).  With  the  US  sanctions  against  Russian  companies  announced  in  early 
2025, NIS will most likely be bought by the Serbian government, thus elimi-
nating this important channel of Russian influence (Novaković and Savković 
2025). Until 2023, Serbia also relied on imports of crude oil from Russia. In 
2021, the share of Russian crude oil in Serbia’s total imports was still 23 per 
cent and in 2022 even 47 per cent; however, in 2023, for the first time in the 
history of the Serbian oil industry there were no imports of Russian crude oil as 
a result of the sixth package of sanctions against the Russian Federation in May 
2022. These measures led to greater diversification in the origins of crude oil 
imports, now imported from Azerbaijan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Norway, Nigeria, 
Egypt, and Libya (Energy Agency of the Republic of Serbia 2023).

Turkish enterprises have also been investing in the WB region (see Table 
2). FDI has reached relatively high shares primarily in three countries: Albania 
– 7,7 per cent, Kosovo – 8 per cent, and North Macedonia – 9,5 per cent of 
the total FDI inward stock in 2023. Hungary has not been a very important 
investor in the WB countries for now, representing 0,3–3,4 per cent of the FDI 
inward stock in 2023; the only exception is Montenegro, where Hungarian in-
vestments have reached 7,3 per cent of the total FDI inward stock. 

Financial Links and Donors’ Assistance

We should also recall the strong financial links between the WB countries and the 
EU that have been established through different channels. First, the dominant part 
of the banking sector in all the WB countries, from 66 to 96 per cent, is owned by 
EU banks. Second, WB countries’ exchange rate regimes rely strongly on the euro: 
Kosovo and Montenegro have unilaterally adopted the euro as the legal tender, while 
the other countries link their national currency, officially or unofficially, to the euro. 
Third, the largest part of savings of enterprises and citizens in the WB countries is 
held in euros; strategies implemented to incentivise savings in national currencies 
(e.g. by the Serbian National Bank) have not been successful. Finally, the EU, its insti-
tutions and Member States have been by far the largest donors of financial assistance 
to the WB (Bartlett 2023a). These are important channels of the EU’s economic 
presence and influence in the WB countries. They strongly link the WB countries to 
the EU, which is unlikely to radically change in the foreseeable future. 

Milica Uvalić105

Concluding Remarks

The factors that have influenced the de-democratisation of the WB countries 
over the past ten years are numerous, country-specific, and too complex to be 
merely reduced to the rising economic (or even political) influence of non-dem-
ocratic external actors – as is sometimes done in the public discourse of politi-
cians, influential political circles, the disinformed local media, and even in parts 
of the academic literature. Bieber and Tzifakis draw attention to the one-sided 
view that “sinister threat emanates from all engagement by non-Western actors” 
providing a more balanced interpretation of the influence of external powers in 
the WBs (Bieber and Tzifakis 2020, 5). In the international relations literature, 
the high degree of economic integration of the WB countries with the EU is 
frequently insufficiently acknowledged simply because the actual (very high) 
degree of EU presence in the areas of trade, FDI, finance, and donors’ assis-
tance in the region, not being the primary focus of interest, is not considered 
in greater detail, leaving room for attributing an exaggerated influence to the 
non-EU undemocratic political actors. 

Three main reflections on political developments follow from the economic 
analysis in this chapter. First, the stagnation or reversals of democratic process-
es in the WB countries are primarily the consequence of internal developments: 
the lack of fundamental reforms of key government and non-government in-
stitutions. The quality of governance in the WBs has substantially deteriorated 
in  recent  years,  as  clearly  illustrated  by  the  World  Bank’s  governance  indica-
tors that report very low ranks of the WB countries especially regarding gov-
ernment effectiveness, rule of law, and corruption, and their deterioration in 
most countries during the past ten years (World Bank n.d.). Historical legacies 
have contributed to the low quality of institutions in the WB countries. In the 
early 2000s, the WBs did not start transition-related reforms from scratch but 
had inherited poorly-functioning institutions, heavily ruined by the impact of 
military conflicts, international sanctions, war profiteering, illegal trade, organ-
ised crime and the absence of rule of law. The general conditions in the WB 
countries in the early 2000s were far worse than those in Central and Eastern 
Europe  in  the  early  1990s  (Uvalić  2010).  Although  the  WB  countries  have 
taken an important turn towards major democratisation after 2000, some in-
stitutional features inherited from the 1990s have proved difficult to disman-
tle. Liberalist policies applied in the WB countries have neglected important 
functions of the state, permitting the emergence of many features of unregulat-
ed, crony, or ‘laissez-faire’ capitalism. The WBs are increasingly characterised as 

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans106

countries with serious institutional weaknesses, typical of non-democratic po-
litical regimes. These include state capture (i.e. public power exercised mainly 
for  private  gains),  clientelism,  replacement  of  meritocracy  by  particularistic 
personal connections, strong political control of the media, corruption, arbi-
trary application of the rule of law, and inefficient judiciary (Keil 2018; Bieber 
2020; Bartlett 2023b). The lack of transparency in trade, investment, or other 
deals with foreign companies is one of the institutional weaknesses of the WBs 
that is part of the general business culture, not reserved exclusively for business 
partners from authoritarian non-EU countries.15

Second,  if  there  are  factors  that  have  contributed  to  de-democratisation 
processes in the WBs to be attributed to the influence of external actors, they 
are to be sought primarily in EU policies rather than the rising influence of un-
democratic political actors. EU policies have been transformed from a system 
offering  the  WBs  strong  incentives  for  fundamental  economic  and  political 
reforms to one of highly uncertain prospects for EU membership (Džankić, 
Keil, and Kmezić 2019). Democratic reversals are partly the reflection of the 
extremely slow process of EU enlargement towards the WBs, that more than 
20  years  since  the  promise  of  EU  membership  has  still  not  been  concluded. 
This  is  the  most  fundamental  reason  for  the  decline  in  EU  influence  in  the 
WB region. Tackling this decline is imperative in today’s shifting geopolitical 
landscape; ultimately, democracy and stability in the WBs have been compro-
mised by the broken promise of enlargement and the EU’s weak transformative 
power (Džankić 2025).

Third,  key  economic  factors  do  not  seem  to  have  had  a  major  influence 
on the direction of political change in the WB countries, as the link between 
formal economic relations and internal political developments has been a loose 
one and only indirect. This is true for both the EU and non-EU external actors 
in the WBs. The increasing economic presence of the EU in the WB region 
after  2001  has  not  brought  a  linear  process  of  continuous  consolidation  of 
democratisation and Europeanisation, but this is not a unique feature of the 
WBs. Economic dependence and the gradual convergence with the EU have 
not always been important drivers of Europeanisation, as can be seen from a 
number of examples of both old and newer EU Member States (particularly 
Hungary and Poland). In 2023, China was the third most important market 
for EU exports responsible for 8,8 per cent of EU exports of goods, and the 

1  Serbia’s  deal  with  Rio  Tinto,  a  British-Australian  multinational  company,  on  the  lithium  mining 

project is a good example of non-transparent business practices.

Milica Uvalić107

largest partner regarding EU imports of goods, responsible for 20.5 per cent of its 
imports (Eurostat 2025), but this has not undermined democratic practices in the 
large majority of EU Member States. Particularly Germany has strongly intensified 
its economic relations with China: in 2023, China was responsible for 20 per cent of 
German imports and 13,6 per cent of its exports of goods – therefore representing 
a much more important trading partner than it is for any of the WB countries. Yet 
increasing trade with China has in no way compromised Germany’s solid institu-
tions and governance mechanisms – Germany remains one of the best-ranked coun-
tries regarding the World Bank’s governance indicators. Conversely, the increasing 
economic presence of countries with undemocratic political regimes in the WBs has 
not necessarily eroded democratisation efforts of European institutions. China has 
emerged as the second most important exporter to three of the six WB countries 
and the second most important investor in Serbia (after the EU), yet this can hardly 
be considered among the main reasons why the WB countries have drifted towards 
undemocratic political regimes. The reasons are rather linked to the earlier discussed 
more general institutional weaknesses of the WBs.

In conclusion, given the importance of the EU as a large and influential political 
and economic partner of all the WB countries, alternative economic linkages have 
not diminished its dominant position. While the new opportunities outside the EU 
have undoubtedly contributed to the economic development of the WB countries, 
the region is primarily linked to the EU, politically and economically. Particularly in 
a longer-term perspective, further trade, economic, and financial integration with 
the EU cannot be substituted in any substantial way by other external players. 

However, the EU leadership ought to reflect on the failures of its policies 
in the WBs, since the continuous postponements of enlargement to the WBs 
have been detrimental to internal processes of democratisation and consolida-
tion of democratic institutions. Despite the renewed EU engagement with the 
WBs following Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022, persistent divi-
sions among the EU Member States over expansion continue to hinder the en-
largement process. If this engagement is not channelled into an explicit path 
towards full membership and accompanied by clearly defined strategic objec-
tives,  such  an  approach  based  on  differentiated  cooperation,  instability,  and 
eroded trust between the EU and the WB countries is a likely scenario (Viceré 
and Bonomi 2024). In order to accelerate EU enlargement to the WB coun-
tries, it is important to openly recognise that the benefits of letting the WBs 
into the EU could be much higher than the potential costs of accession of these 
states (Jović and Uvalić 2023).

Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western Balkans108

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Economic Vulnerability and the State of Democracy in the Western BalkansThe Recent Illiberal Turn 
and Social Policy in the 
Western Balkans

Artan Mustafa*

After  some  considerable  democratisation  progress  since  20001,  the  Western 
Balkans has become home to various manifestations of the global illiberal turn 
in politics, such as sovereignism, majoritarianism, contestation of constitution-
al courts and other courts of law, threats to freedom of speech, etc (cf. Enyedi 
2024; Bieber 2020). Although the political systems in the region have long been 
substantially illiberal (including with features such as ethnic nationalism and 
dominant party control of public bureaucracy) (Bieber 2020),2 the conjunc-
ture in which these manifestations occur is new. That is, the Western Balkans 
more or less mirror the trajectory of the decline of liberal democracy in Europe 
and  it  often  emulates  the  recent  illiberal  articulation,  style  and  performance 
of power in the European Union (EU) countries, the United States and else-
where. The illiberal turn makes the region more open to new and traditional 
illiberal geopolitical influences and to illiberal policymaking.3

*  Artan Mustafa is Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
1 

 See, for instance, the electoral and liberal democracy indexes on the Varieties of Democracy website 
(V-DEM n. d.).

2 

 Consider also the low quality of government index (icrg_qog) (QoG Institute n. d.).

3  The  country  chapters  in  the  first  part  of  this  book  show  examples  of  the  direct  influence  of  new 
illiberal forces, such as, for example, Meloni’s Italy in Albania or Orbán’s Hungary in North Mace-
donia. This occurs alongside the more traditional influences of authoritarian powers such as Turkey 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia), Russia and China (Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Serbia, North Macedonia).

113

As long-term commitments, liberal democratisation and Europeanisation4 
had no real ideological competition in the region after the fall of communism. 
However, during that period, in the sector of social policy, most foreign influ-
ence in the Western Balkans came via the World Bank group, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European Commission and was oriented in 
a  neoliberal  and  privatisation  direction  (Deacon  and  Stubbs  2007,  1-21).  In 
Kosovo, that foreign influence was the main driver of the post-socialist reforms 
that  entirely  removed  the  bulk  of  the  former  social  insurance-based  institu-
tional legacy of socialism. In the rest of the region, however, despite the active 
presence of the same international actors, the more effective long-term foreign 
influence  was  limited  to  sub-sectoral  dimensions  such  as  minimum  income 
programmes  and  statistical  reporting  (Žarković,  Mustafa,  and  Arandarenko 
2023). The core of socialism’s social policy legacy – made by social insurance 
institutions – was generally maintained. Some particularistic rights, usually to 
accommodate  the  legacy  of  recent  wars,  were  added  to  this  structure  by  the 
local politics.

In some Eastern European EU-member countries, the recent illiberal turn 
has  impacted  social  policy  articulation  and  its  change.  One  of  its  distinctive 
features seems to be the prioritisation of a productivist vision and the re-gen-
derisation  of  society  in  which  women  are  incentivised  via  discourses,  cash 
benefits, taxes and credit opportunities to give birth to children. On the other 
hand, the illiberal politics seem to erode the minimum floors of social rights, 
such as by reducing the benefits for the poor and unemployed (under a rein-
forced workfare approach that conditions benefits with work efforts) as well as 
the elderly in retirement, by reducing the state involvement in care for depend-
ent persons, and by reopening the space for religious institutions to provide 
both care and poverty relief. In some countries, such as Hungary, authors have 
described the overall consequences even as the end of the welfare state (as it 
was  known)  due  to  its  restructuration  (Lendvai-Bainton  and  Szelewa  2021, 
564;  Szikra  and  Öktem  2023).  There,  pension  savings  were  also  confiscated 
and  renationalised,  labour  rights  were  made  more  flexible,  tax  changes  were 
made  more  favourable  for  the  well-doing,  various  healthcare  functions  were 
recentralised, and the state administration was filled with dominant party loy-
alists  (Szikra  and  Öktem  2023).  Generally,  the  recent  illiberal  turn  seems  to 
promote a communitarian vision of society centred around the core national 

4  Maarten Vink has defined (liberal democratic) Europeanisation as “a process of domestic political 

change caused (somehow) by the process of European integration” (Vink 2003).

The Recent Illiberal Turn and Social Policy in the Western Balkans114

groups,  to  prioritise  labour  and  productivity,  and  to  often  embrace  a  chau-
vinistic approach when it comes to the access of groups such as refugees and 
others to social rights. The changes have usually been more of a result of ex-
perimentation of national politics or of policy learning and diffusion, rather 
than direct influence from foreign actors. However, with illiberalism, countries 
like Hungary became openly more receptive of the authoritarian powers like 
Russia and China.

Some Policy Change (Especially in Family Policy) 

The illiberal turn in the Western Balkans, one of the most visible recent features 
of which is the consolidation of majoritarianism5 in the political system, has 
not had major social policy effects so far. Nevertheless, some relevant changes 
have  taken  place  via  tax-financed  family  policy  under  productivist  purposes. 
Namely,  in  Serbia,  in  2018,  a  benefit  for  mothers  giving  birth  to  children 
was introduced that was arguably “modelled on Poland’s Family 500+” pro-
gramme. The generosity of the benefit for women with children increases with 
more children (Orenstein and Bugarič 2022, 188).6 During the same year, the 
‘baby bonus’ was increased and expanded (for the second and third baby) in a 
similar way in Albania,7 and access to it was simplified. It was explicitly aimed 
to “encourage families to have more children” (Government of Albania 2018). 
In 2009, North Macedonia introduced a parental allowance for the third child 
born, which currently is an income-tested programme (Gerovska-Mitev 2019). 
In 2016, Montenegro (which has a permanent one-off modest birth grant in 
place) had also introduced a life-long allowance for mothers giving birth to a 
third child (Kaluđerović and Golubović 2019). That allowance was abandoned 
in 2017 due to a constitutional court ruling but was reinstated in 2022 (World 
Bank 2023). Under the explicit purpose of increasing the fertility rate, one-off 
municipal  transfers  upon  the  birth  of  a  child  were  additionally  introduced 

5 

 In the second half of 2024, four of the six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Kosovo, North Mace-
donia [short of three MPs] and Serbia) were effectively run by one party or one pre-electoral alliance 
parliamentary majority.

6  The programme provides “a mother a payment worth 845 Euro for her ﬁrst child, 85 Euro per month 
for two years for the second, 100 Euro per month for 10 years for the third, and 18,000 Euro over the 
course of 10 years for the fourth child […], administered by a minister without portfolio for demog-
raphy and population policy”.

7  The  benefit  amounted  to  400,000  Lek  (first  child),  800,000  (second  child),  and  1,200,000  (third 

child), respectively (Government of Albania 2018).

Artan Mustafa115

(World Bank 2023, 14). In 2021, Kosovo launched three monthly top-ups for 
employed  women  already  in  paid  maternity  leave.  This  was  done  in  parallel 
with  the  introduction  of  a  cash  benefit  for  unemployed  mothers  to  cover  a 
period of six months after giving birth.8 Kosovo’s benefit for the unemployed 
women could be interpreted as an extension of maternity rights based on cit-
izenship  along  the  model  of  some  other  European  countries  (Dobrotic  and 
Blum 2020), but it was also criticised by feminist activists for having (implicit) 
productivist purposes and for potentially encouraging women to remain un-
employed (Shahini 2024). The scheme was advanced by the biggest-ever par-
liament  majority  made  by  one  party  (Lëvizja  Vetëvendosje  [Self-Determina-
tion Movement], LVV), which, on the other hand, famously failed to pass a 
civic code that would have allowed same-sex marriage. The code failed to pass 
through because several religiously conservative members of parliament (MPs) 
of LVV refused to vote for it. In early 2025, the same MPs joined other like-
minded conservative politicians and were competing in new parliament elec-
tions as “The Coalition for Family”. During the election campaign, LVV itself 
was promoting cash benefits for grandparents to take care of children in the 
family  and  thus  to  encourage  maintenance  of  three-generational  households 
(LVV  2025),  resembling  Orbán’s  Hungarian  model  (LVV  2025;  Orenstein 
and Bugarič, 183). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, maternity benefits are extended 
to  unemployed  mothers,  while  benefits  for  newborns  are  limited  to  equip-
ment  (FBiH)  or  a  one-off  transfer  (Republika  Srpska)  (World  Bank  2024). 
All  of  this  shows  that  the  region  of  the  Western  Balkans  has  been  generally 
affected by policy change and policy change articulation towards a more pro-
ductivist family policy. Emulations of policies in Eastern European EU-mem-
ber countries and real needs to respond to the demographic change contribut-
ed to it. Research on the detailed processes that led to these policies and their 
effects is still missing, but as in Hungary and Poland, policy change should have 
improved the disposable income of families with children.

Pension policy has also seen some change. There were, for example, various 
parametric reforms (such as penalties for early retirement, pension compres-
sions,  and  extension  of  retirement  age  for  women)  between  2014  and  2018 
in  Serbia  that  considerably  reduced  pension  benefits  for  the  poorer  half  of 
retirees (Pejin Stokić and Bajec 2019). Similar parametric reforms took place 

8  Both the top-up for employed women already in paid maternity leave and the benefit for unemployed 
women were worth 170 Euro a month, at that time the equivalent of the official national minimum 
wage for adults.

The Recent Illiberal Turn and Social Policy in the Western Balkans116

in Montenegro in 2020, but, there, at the same time, the minimum pension 
was increased (World Bank 2023, 21). However, since in late 2024 contribu-
tion rates on social insurance were reduced by about 50 per cent, Montene-
gro’s long-term pension financing became more uncertain. In North Macedo-
nia, some mandatory pension saving contributions of older age workers were 
switched to the main public insurance-based pensions (Gerovska-Mitev 2019, 
8).  In  Kosovo,  emulating  policy  choices  in  Latin  America,  in  late  2020  and 
early 2021, owners of mandatory pension savings were allowed to premature-
ly withdraw 10 per cent of their savings to cope with income shortfalls caused 
by the Covid-19 pandemic. There was never a convincing explanation made 
on  why  the  opportunity  for  withdrawals  was  opened  since  there  were  alter-
native resources available. Once that path was taken, various political parties, 
unions,  and  people  wanted  more  withdrawals.  The  opened  path  of  prema-
ture  withdrawals  threatens  the  stability  of  the  pension  system,  akin  to  what 
has happened in Chile and Peru, where substantial repeated withdrawals, made 
possible by populist and not well-thought-through decisions, have wiped out 
large portions of savings (Casey and Mustafa 2024). System instabilities such 
as those recently seen in Montenegro and Kosovo could have long-term conse-
quences for the worse off since future increased needs for interventions by gov-
ernments to tame instabilities will likely have to be financed via general taxation, 
which relies heavily on consumption taxation (thus relationally burdening the 
worse off more). Such interventions to ameliorate low income in retirement, 
as seen recently in Serbia and Kosovo, increasingly come through one-off (un-
predictable) payments around election cycles.9 On the other hand, Albania (in 
2014) introduced a social pension for people aged 70 years or older (Mustafa 
and  Gerovska-Mitev  2022).  Therefore,  these  pension  policy  changes  were 
not entirely linear. Like in some other contexts of the illiberal turn in Eastern 
Europe, there were reductions in incomes of large pension groups, threats to 
pension  system  stability,  and  potentially  even  less  fair  financing  of  pension 
benefits. Yet, there were also some improvements for the elderly without other 
income  sources  (e.g.,  Montenegro  and  Albania).  There  was  furthermore  no 
deliberate  reduction  of  minimum  income  benefits  targeting  the  population 
in  poverty,  although  (except  in  Serbia)  substantial  decline  in  their  coverage 
took  place  in  all  countries  (Žarković,  Mustafa,  and  Arandarenko  2023,  7). 

9  For Serbia, see Pavlović (2023, 5). For Kosovo, the most recent one-off payment also came shortly 

ahead of the national elections, see Government of Kosovo (2024).

Artan Mustafa117

This  was  an  outcome  of  long-unchanged  stringent  eligibility  criteria  rather 
than  of  an  illiberal  influence  since  minimum  income  rights  in  the  Western 
Balkans  were  never  prioritised  by  neoliberal  and  socialist  transformations, 
which instead (albeit in different ways) prioritised labour.

When it comes to public bureaucracies in the Western Balkans, they have 
long been partisan. Dominant parties have used public bureaucracies to employ 
their  loyalists,  who  implement  their  policies  and  contract  out  clientelist  ser-
vices.10 Since both social insurance and pension saving benefits reflect earning 
capacities, the existing social protection system benefits tend to reinforce the 
position of the better-off, who are often found in the public sector or business-
es contracted by governments. As the graph below shows, in Balkan countries, 
the poorest sections of society tend to be worse off compared to Europe. This is 
why, in essence, they are welfare systems for the rich.11 In turn, these structures 
of inequalities and inequality-maintaining social policies have been and remain 
positive conditions for illiberalism. Approaching policy from the lenses of the 
neoliberal paradigm, the Western-dominated international organisations such 
as the World Bank, IMF, and the European Commission had also done little to 
transform this structure via their influence during the preceding decades.

Figure  1:  Income  quintile  share  ratio  S80/S20  for  disposable 
income, 2018 (Eurostat 2025)

10  See e.g. Bieber (2020), and the index of clientelism in V-DEM (n. d.).

11 

'Welfare for the rich’ was recently used by Mihail Arandarenko to describe Serbia; in essence, it applies 
to the entire region; see Arandarenko (2023).

The Recent Illiberal Turn and Social Policy in the Western Balkans118

And Some Untraditional West-Originating Policy 
Influence

Beyond  the  regular  social  protection  systems,  some  relevant  untraditional 
West-originating  illiberal  policy  influence  was  seen  in  Kosovo  and  Albania. 
Namely, in June 2024, Kosovo voted through a controversial law to approve 
a treaty with Denmark (negotiations on which began in 2021) for the use of 
a correctional facility in Kosovo for purposes of execution of Danish sentenc-
es  (Official  Gazette  of  the  Republic  of  Kosovo  2024).  Although  Kosovo  is 
expected to receive 15 million Euro each year in compensation from Denmark, 
the agreement has raised human rights concerns (Reuters 2024). It followed 
Denmark’s controversial externalisation of asylum processing (Rausis 2024). 
In the same fashion, in February 2024, Albania approved a controversial agree-
ment  with  Italy  that  externalised  (against  financial  compensation)  the  pro-
cessing  of  Italy’s  asylum  seekers  rescued  at  sea  with  processing  to  take  place 
in Albania (Piccoli 2023). In both Kosovo and Albania, the motives of finan-
cial compensation were unconvincing, while agreements risk their internation-
al reputation as well as, potentially, the international human rights standards. 
The agreements were approved by strong ruling majorities and both countries 
rely heavily on Western geopolitical support. This means that, beyond Eastern 
European EU-member countries, democratic decline and increased “contesta-
tion of international liberal order” (Rausis 2024, 22) in Western democracies 
are likely to impact the Western Balkans as well. It also adds to the findings that 
openness to foreign illiberal influence may be impacted by contextual geopolit-
ical links and local understandings of them (Fisher, Hale, and Peshkopia 2022).

Conclusion

As the past decades have shown, Western Balkan welfare systems are no excep-
tion in that they tend to be generally sticky and not prone to radical change 
despite dramatic political events surrounding them. However, in combination 
with real concerns due to ageing and population outmigration, the recent illib-
eral turn in the Western Balkans has contributed to the appearance of a more 
productivist  family  policy.  In  some  Balkan  countries,  pension  systems  and 
incomes  were  also  threatened  with  more  insecurity.  In  Albania  and  Kosovo, 
new modes of concerning externalisation from the Western countries of asylum 
seekers and detainees arrived. These all demonstrate that diffusion/emulations 
and a rising contestation of the liberal international order may potentially in-

Artan Mustafa119

fluence policy reconfigurations in an illiberal direction even more. The existing 
social  protection  structures,  which  have  limited  equality-enhancing  effects, 
already help create favourable conditions for illiberal politics.

Acknowledgements

The  author  is  thankful  to  Mihail  Arandarenko  for  his  inputs  on  the  manu-
script.

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Artan MustafaIntersectionality 
Lost? Intersectional 
Inequalities at the 
Crossroads of Rising 
Illiberalism and EU 
Enlargement

Biljana Kotevska*1

The Scene

Globally, we are ending the first quarter of the 21st century in a free fall, as 
far as equality is concerned. Central, East, and Southeast Europe are no differ-
ent. With political turmoil in full swing, it is not the burgeoning and multi-
plying crises of economic and political nature, such as staggering poverty and 
ongoing wars, nor is it the terrifying climate change effects which we see on an 
almost daily basis, that took the primacy in political agendas and campaigns. 
It is an equality issue. Outcries of wokeism, ‘gender ideology’, and, of course, 
the ever-so-present feminism gone mad; moral panic is filling the news and the 
social media feeds, but more importantly – people’s hearts and minds (Möser 
2018). Using sex and gender equality as a tool by illiberal actors is nothing new 

* 

 Biljana Kotevska is Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

123

(Roggeband and Krizsán 2024). However, its instrumentalisation has become 
central in the political arenas, turning issues that need to be the subject of po-
litical debate into trench-digging impulsions, which deeply polarise people and 
societies around the globe.

This gives rise to an ever so clear obligation for the states, as per the existing 
human  rights  law,  to  protect  all  persons  from  discrimination,  violence,  and 
harm, particularly the most marginalised ones, as they find themselves simul-
taneously under relentless fire while remaining on the fringes of society. Part 
of grappling with this challenge means addressing the existing power relations 
and the resulting inequalities, which often lay at their intersections (Crenshaw 
1989). In the past, one of the key drivers of legal and policy reform for dealing 
with discrimination and inequalities in general was the EU. With its steadfastly 
built acquis on gender equality and the 2000 equality directives (Schiek, Wad-
dington, and Bell 2007), complemented by the equality policy uptake of the 
‘Union of Equality’ European Commission (EC) mandate exercised by Ursula 
von der Leyen (von der Leyen 2019), the EU seems to have been pacing itself 
well for dealing with inequalities while trying not to push the Member States 
away. Even so, moving beyond single-ground inequalities, where does the EU 
stand on intersectionality these days?

The Plot

With all the recent lip service being paid to intersectionality in Europe, one is 
right to be curious about whether and to what extent an intersectional approach 
is reflected in the Union’s actions, internally and externally. Internally, the EU 
has a deplorable record for dealing with intersectional inequalities and intersec-
tional discrimination. Its policy efforts are found to deal with intersectionality 
superficially, essentially working to “maintain the status quo” (Debusscher and 
Maes 2024). Its legal efforts have been almost non-existent until the adoption 
of  the  Pay  Transparency  Directive  (Howard  2024,  293).  And  the  CJEU  has 
been notoriously failing to make a step and embrace the concept in any mean-
ingful  way  (Schiek  2018).  This  chapter  considers  the  external  actions  of  the 
EU and is mainly concerned with whether and how the European Union deals 
with intersectionality in the enlargement process. A fundamental presupposi-
tion of this chapter is that an intersectional approach cannot really be intersec-
tional if it is devoid of its revolutionary potential to dismantle power relations 
(May 2015; Hancock 2016). If it does not bite.

Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads of Rising Illiberalism and EU Enlargement124

I argue that, despite its already identified crucial role in spearheading and 
supporting  the  adoption  of  comprehensive  non-discrimination  legislation 
in the new Member States, the EU is failing when it comes to preparing the 
enlargement  countries  for  addressing  intersectional  inequalities  due  to  three 
key  factors.  First,  the  EU  is  exporting  the  limitations  of  its  legal  framework 
to the enlargement countries, breeding minimal satisfaction in some respects 
while tolerating the downsides of gold-plating in others. Second, being geared 
towards ‘stability’, the EU’s stabilitocracy approach towards the region encour-
ages a status quo and supports sustaining power relations (Džankić 2025, this 
volume)  –  the  opposite  of  what  is  needed  for  encouraging  an  intersectional 
approach. Third, these two factors, taken together, result in the EU having a 
disjointed approach towards the two types of intersectional inequalities that 
need  to  be  grappled  with  –  the  vertical  (individual)  ones  and  the  horizontal 
(group)  ones.  This  failure,  then,  leaves  the  new  Member  States  and  the  en-
largement countries unprepared when illiberal actors from CEE and SEE pick 
up tools from authoritarian and illiberal actors elsewhere and employ them at 
home. The following analysis focuses on addressing these three points.

Incongruency

The EU has been instrumental in laying down the foundations of the compre-
hensive treatment of equality and non-discrimination law through the enlarge-
ment process (Petričević 2015). Whether and to which degree these laws take 
root in the national systems is still contested (Selanec 2012). It is clear, however, 
that when there is hard acquis, the EU will press firmly for compliance with it 
as part of its conditionality.

Biljana Kotevska125

The EU equality law, a large chunk of which are the EU equality gender 
equality and non-discrimination directives,2 is largely a collection of minimal 
standards the Member States can then introduce in their national legal systems 
as appropriate (Ellis and Watson 2012). However, for the issue at hand – inter-
sectional inequalities and intersectional discrimination in particular, there is no 
established EU standard. EU law is quite notorious for the lack of treatment 
of intersectional discrimination3 due to the hierarchies between the protected 
grounds, which is deeply related to the uneven personal and material scope of 
protection against discrimination (Schiek, Waddington, and Bell 2007). How 
is this relevant for the enlargement countries?

This is relevant because the EU has been asking for the bare minimum from 
the candidate countries throughout all enlargement rounds. Notwithstanding 
the  positive  change  in  its  enlargement  approach  over  the  years,  which  went 
from favouring enactment to favouring enforcement (Selanec 2012), the EU 
will still be looking only within the shallow waters of what is actually needed 
as a comprehensive legal framework for addressing intersectional inequalities 
(Kotevska 2020).

2  Directive (EU) 2024/1500 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal oppor-
tunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, (OJ L, 29.05.2024); Council 
Directive (EU) 2024/1499 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation be-
tween persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment 
between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services 
(OJ L, 29.05.2024); Directive (EU) 2022/2381 on improving the gender balance among directors of listed 
companies and related measures (OJ L 315, 7.12.2022, p 44-59); Directive (EU) 2023/970 to strengthen the 
application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women 
through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms (OJ L 132, 17.5.2023, p 21-44); Council Directive 
2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to 
and supply of goods and services (OJ L 373, 21122004, p 37–43); Directive 2006/54/EC on the imple-
mentation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast) (OJ L 204, 2672006, p 23–36); Directive 2010/41/EU on the applica-
tion of the principle of equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed 
capacity (OJ L 180, 1572010, p 1–6); Directive (EU) 2019/1158 on work-life balance for parents and carers 
(OJ L 188, 1272019, p 79–93); Council Directive 79/7/EEC on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ L 6, 1011979, p 24–25); 
Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage improve-
ments in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or 
are breastfeeding (OJ L 348, 28111992, p 1–7); Council Directive 2010/18/EU implementing the revised 
Framework Agreement on parental leave (OJ L 68, 1832010, p 13–20).

3  Very recently, the pay transparency directive introduced an obligation related to dealing with intersectional 
discrimination. Whether this will change anything as to how the EU treats equality and non-discrimination 
law in the enlargement process remains to be seen.

Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads of Rising Illiberalism and EU Enlargement126

What exacerbates this situation is that the breeding of minimal satisfaction 
in some respects goes hand in hand with tolerating the downsides of gold-plat-
ing in others. Transposing EU law in ways that go well beyond what the EU 
acquis  is  asking  for  is  a  recognised  phenomenon  across  the  new  Member 
States  (Thomann  2015;  Thomann  and  Zhelyazkova  2017),  and  seems  to  be 
no stranger to the enlargement countries as well (Kotevska 2020). However, 
gold-plating stretches out a country’s already limited resources to implement 
legislation effectively. It looks good on paper, but it can significantly compli-
cate things in practice. The EU navigates these two processes under a flawed 
congruence presumption. While one approach that the EU takes holds small 
but firm ground when establishing protection standards, the other approach 
seeks cover a lot of ground de lege but then fails to cover it all de facto. Simply 
put, the former approach threads carefully, while the latter bites off more than 
it could chew.

The Status Quo

The EU has been favouring a regional ‘stabilitocracy’ approach (Bieber 2020), 
“meaning  weak  democracies  with  autocratically  minded  leaders  who  govern 
through informal patronage networks and claim to provide pro-Western sta-
bility in the region” (BiEPAG 2017). This ‘external legitimacy’ of the authori-
tarian rule in the enlargement countries has presumably been thriving “on the 
promise of stability” (Bieber 2020, 99). Such a way of according to legitimacy 
encourages the status quo by sustaining the existing power relations. This is the 
opposite of what is needed to encourage an intersectional approach.

How does this look in practice? A candidate country, like North Macedo-
nia,  has  an  elaborate  power-sharing  system  built  around  ethnicity  (Koneska 
2016). However, such power-sharing arrangements have been assessed to not 
only not work in favour of gender equality, but also to suppress other axes of 
inequality in favour of ethnicity (Kotevska 2020). As a result, aiming for sta-
bility,  perceived  only  through  the  prism  of  hard  security  and  the  securitised 
minority rights issues, overfloods the other axes of inequality, rendering them 
invisible and therefore perceived as unimportant.

An approach centred on stability is contrary to what is needed in an inter-
sectional approach to policy and decision-making. An intersectional approach 
seeks that no power relation goes unquestioned and that sustained efforts are 
made towards the dismantling of these power relations. This is the opposite of 
what a ‘stabilitocracy’ approach seeks to achieve. As a result, intentionally or 

Biljana Kotevska127

not, the EU supports a strong status quo when dealing with societal inequali-
ties, including the intersectional ones.

A  hierarchy  of  inequalities  comes  as  further  consequence  of  the  EU’s 
approach. This hierarchy dictates where the state’s attention will go. It does so 
in a way that demonstrates a serious disconnect from the needs of society. For 
example, staggering poverty, education disparities, and gaps in social protection 
coverage compared to social needs all suggest that class and classism should be 
an important focus for the political actors and the state. Addressing the ine-
qualities arising at the intersections between ethnicity and class should be as 
important. However, this is not the case.

Instead of encouraging the candidate countries to use their existing struc-
tures  to  address  the  many  pressing  inequalities  through  its  ‘stabilitocracy’ 
approach, the EU supports the focus on a single axis – ethnicity. The focus on 
ethnicity is warranted from this perspective, as well as based on the Copenha-
gen criteria which prescribe guarantees of minority rights (understood through 
an ethnic prism). Nonetheless, such an approach disables efforts to bring an 
intersectional perspective forward. This often  happens  even  when  the  legiti-
mate choice, for instance in terms of resource spending, would be to adopt an 
intersectional perspective. North Macedonia is a case in point. On grounds of 
ethnicity, one will need to mind the representation of all ethnic groups in the 
public administration on the basis of the Constitution and the national laws 
and bylaws for employment in the public sector. At the same time, according 
to national law, representation among the workforce in the public administra-
tion should also be done on the grounds of gender, in relation to the standard 
prescribed in the law on gender equality. Even so, these two efforts remain dis-
jointed, with the Albanian political elites fencing off the principle of just and 
equitable  representation  from  any  efforts  for  any  adjustments  which  could 
bring an intersectional perspective to it (Kotevska 2020). This enables them to 
preserve their power position as gatekeepers for persons from the ethnic com-
munities  (primarily  the  Albanians)  and  sustain  a  clientelist  relationship  that 
disregards intersectional aspects, including gender.

Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads of Rising Illiberalism and EU Enlargement128

Disjointing

Taken  together,  the  two  previously  discussed  factors  also  work  towards  shaping 
what I identify as the EU’s disjointed approach towards intersectional inequalities. 
I conclude this by assessing the European Commission’s annual reports against a 
framework for analysing how intersectional inequalities are addressed under law in 
civil law countries (Kotevska 2020). In view of this framework, countries need to 
engage in addressing both the vertical or individual inequalities – those affecting a 
single person (via, for example, protection against discrimination), and the horizon-
tal or group inequalities – those affecting whole groups (via, for example, positive 
action). A number of legal institutes need to be introduced (Kotevska 2020), and 
they need to be calibrated (Atrey 2019) in order for them to work when addressing 
intersectional discrimination and inequalities. Some of the key components of this 
framework include (1) a wide and equal personal and material scope of protection, 
ideally via open-ended provisions listing discrimination grounds, (2) explicit prohi-
bition of intersectional discrimination as a form of discrimination, (3) calibration 
of the procedural institutes shifting the burden of proof (which should be treated 
as necessary and deployed as early as possible), comparator (which should be treated 
as a useful device, but not as a mandatory element), and contextualisation (which is 
an overlooked, yet very potent, tool), and (4) requiring positive action that can work 
towards dismantling power relations (Kotevska 2022b; 2020).

In line with the analytical framework, the grounds of discrimination need to be 
laid out in an open-ended provision for protection from discrimination grounds 
and an overall equal personal and material scope of protection covering all fields of 
social life. However, under the EU equality directives, the protection extends to a 
closed list of grounds and in an unequal personal and material scope. This, then, 
spills  over  into  how  the  EU  assesses  the  national  laws.  The  annual  reports  never 
dispute the scope of protection that is wider than the one under the equality direc-
tives; that is, they never problematise gold-plating. They, however, insist on the EU 
directive’s grounds, which is visible through the consistent requirements for protect-
ing sexual orientation as a ground at the times when it was left out of the national 
laws, followed by noting its introduction once it was added. Also, the reports seem 
to point to a limited understanding od what the different discrimination grounds 
mean in the different countries. This shows a lack of substantive engagement with 
candidate countries, which may be detrimental to the scope of protection after a 
country joins the Union. It may also confirm a very formalistic approach in the as-
sessment rather than spotlighting implementation and effectiveness.4

4 

I thank Lucia Mokrá for this argument.

Biljana Kotevska129

Regarding  the  forms  of  discrimination,  the  analysis  framework  suggests 
that  multiple  and  intersectional  discrimination  needs  to  be  protected  as  a 
separate form of discrimination. Moreover, the definitions of the other forms 
matter as well. EU law does put forward clear definitions and asks for the out-
lawing of the majority of the most important forms of discrimination but not 
of intersectional discrimination. This is, then, reflected in the annual reports, 
which are silent on multiple and intersectional  discrimination. For  instance, 
they never ask of the countries to protect against these forms of discrimination. 
In relation to the other forms of discrimination, there are technical inconsist-
encies, but the focus of the progress reports is mainly on requesting an intro-
duction or on noting the introduction of forms of discrimination.

The introduction and calibration of the procedural elements is the third 
key  component.  The  analysis  framework  positions  shifting  the  burden  of 
proof as a necessary element, whereas the comparator is not and should only be 
used if useful and easily available. This is not the case under EU law, whereby 
while shifting the burden of proof is needed, a comparator is also required. The 
progress  reports  approach  this  issue  superficially  by  requesting  an  introduc-
tion or noting the institute’s introduction. Contextualisation is not part of EU 
law’s requirements, and it has not been subject to the progress reports either.

The fourth and final element extracted for this analysis is positive action. While 
the analytical framework places positive action as something that needs to be required 
and that needs to be executed in a manner that can work towards dismantling the 
existing power relations, under EU law, positive action is, at best, tolerated (Kotevska 
2022a). However, the way positive action is approached in the annual reports is not 
so much through the prism of EU law as it is through the prism of security, as dis-
cussed above. Moreover, the approach also favours certain groups and grounds (eth-
nicity and ethnic minorities, but not the Roma). In contrast, other groups received 
much less traction (women, including Roma women and women from rural areas, 
as well as persons with disabilities, including women with disabilities and children 
with disabilities).

Looking  at  these  four  elements,  it  is  clear  that  the  way  the  conditionality  is 
applied when it comes to equality and non-discrimination law is in a manner which 
can work towards disjoining intersectional inequalities. In turn, this entails treating 
inequalities along a single axis and without any potential for dismantling power rela-
tions. The conditionality about the non-discrimination legislation, while important 
for the individual level and the single-ground discrimination forms, fails to capture 
the complexity and need for protecting against intersectional discrimination.

Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads of Rising Illiberalism and EU Enlargement130

Denouement

To move towards resolution, the question before us is how do we go from a 
performative approach to intersectionality to a substantive one? Can the EU 
move past its current limitations when addressing intersectional inequalities in 
the conceptualisation and deployment of its acquis conditionality, and how? 
There are three options.

The first option is related to using the space the EC has been giving itself 
even so far to pick up on issues relevant in the national context. As the analysis 
above has shown, the EC has been picking up on issues arising at the national 
level and then pressing for these issues through its annual reports. However, it 
has not done this so far for intersectional discrimination and intersectional in-
equalities.

The second option would be for the EC to tease out the conditionality of 
international  human  rights  law,  specifically  the  United  Nations  Convention 
on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  against  Women  and  the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). These instru-
ments offer the most potential for addressing intersectional discrimination to 
date and, in lieu of other, more advanced tools, can start to move the conversa-
tion forward. It has done so previously regarding minority rights and drawing 
on Council of Europe standards (Kacarska 2013), so this will not be a prec-
edent. Moreover, the EU is, itself, a party to the CRPD, which increases the 
grounds for introducing this instrument more strongly in the conditionality.

The third option is for the EU to pick up on the pace of developments at 
the national level and insist on full implementation, thus also working towards 
mitigating the downsides of gold-plating. Unlike the EU Member States, several 
SEE countries have intersectional discrimination as an explicitly outlawed form 
of  discrimination.  The  EU  can  insist  on  the  implementation  of  these  provi-
sions. It can also seek to identify any challenges standing in the way of this im-
plementation, asking the countries to step up their game since they already in-
troduced these elements in their national laws.

All three options do not require changes in EU law itself. Changes to EU 
equality and non-discrimination law have always been an uphill battle inside 
the EU, often faced with significant resistance. Hence, waiting for the EU to 
get its own house in order is not useful to the current enlargement context, 
even more so since national laws are already more advanced than EU law when 
it comes to intersectional discrimination. This is why the approaches proposed 

Biljana Kotevska131

herein are dependent on the willingness on the part of the EC to be effective-
ly mindful of intersectional inequalities and discrimination both in law, and 
in the law’s implementation. That is – the EC needs to start doing for inter-
sectional  inequalities  what  it  has  already  been  doing  for  inequalities  on  the 
grounds of ethnicity – take them seriously.

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Intersectional Inequalities at the Crossroads of Rising Illiberalism and EU EnlargementThe Impact of the 
Geopolitical Tensions 
between the European 
Union and Russia on the 
Western Balkans

Teodora Stanković*

The rise of geopolitical tensions between the European Union (EU) and Russia 
has significantly affected the dynamics in the Western Balkan region, which was 
already facing internal challenges, such as democratic backsliding, the rise of 
nationalism, and the slow implementation of reforms that further complicat-
ed the process of European integration. The combination of these factors has 
made the Western Balkan countries even more vulnerable to external influence. 
In order to reduce this vulnerability, the region’s countries need to strength-
en their institutions and enhance economic stability, as well as promote social 
cohesion  and  intensify  integration  with  the  EU  and  NATO  (Seroka  2012, 
511). Unless these structural weaknesses are properly addressed, the region will 
become a target for autocratic regimes (Lavrič and Bieber 2021, 17-18).

Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the key factors 
that  influenced  the  governance,  rule  of  law,  and  interethnic  relations  in  the 
Western  Balkans  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  influence  of  the  EU  and 
Russia  in  this  region  before  the  Russian  full-scale  invasion  of  Ukraine  in 

* 

 Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the University of Montenegro.

135

February 2022. The chapter examines the hesitation of the EU regarding the 
enlargement  process  and  the  resulting  growing  room  for  Russian  presence 
and influence in the Western Balkans. It also looks at how this dynamic has 
affected the stability and democratisation in the region. Additionally, the paper 
explores the effect of ethnic tensions and social cleavages on political stabili-
ty and democratisation in the region. Finally, the impact of the Russian full-
scale invasion of Ukraine on the change of priorities of the European Union 
is analysed, with a particular emphasis on the possibility for accelerating the 
accession process.

Disengaged EU, Backsliding Balkans 

The lack of engagement of the EU and the uncertainty of the accession pros-
pects have been key factors influencing the slow pace of political and economic 
transformation of the region. Before the Russian full scale invasion of Ukraine, 
the EU’s Member States have shown a certain degree of indecisiveness regarding 
the enlargement process in the Western Balkans. This was particularly evident 
after the statement of then President of the European Commission, Jean Claude 
Juncker,  when  he  announced,  in  2014,  that  there  would  be  no  enlargement 
within the respective Commission’s five-year mandate (Zorić 2017, 7). Such a 
rhetoric has slowed down the integration process, and has caused a sense of disil-
lusionment and lack of motivation across the Western Balkan countries to work 
on accession-related reforms. Since the European Union’s attention was drawn 
inwards  by  internal  challenges,  such  as  the  migration  crisis  in  2015,  as  well  as 
Brexit in 2017, the enlargement was set as a low priority (Petrović and Tzifakis 
2021, 157). In 2019, the French President Emmanuel Macron stressed that the 
EU should focus on resolving internal issues before continuing the process of EU 
enlargement (Petrović and Tzifakis 2021, 158), and moved towards proposing 
an amended enlargement methodology. The revised enlargement methodology, 
which was adopted in 2020, resulted in a more rigorous process and standards 
compared to the previous enlargement rounds. As a result, it led to further stag-
nation in negotiations and caused the rise of Euroscepticism. This left plenty of 
room for Russia to strengthen its influence via stronger presence and involve-
ment in the Western Balkans, a region it perceives as geostrategically important 
(Stanković 2022, 454; Panagiotou 2021, 230).

A further factor that facilitated the democratic decline of the region has 
been  the  lack  of  true  commitment  of  the  Western  Balkan  states  to  EU  inte-
gration, and the required reforms. While officially declaring commitment to 

Tensions between the European Union and Russia on the Western Balkans136

EU accession, each of the countries in the region faces difficulties in adapting 
to European rules and standards. Issues such as weak rule of law and politi-
cal instability lead to the inability to create resilient and strong institutions. In 
addition, data show that democratic standards in the region have been declin-
ing, with the average democracy index decreasing by 9 per cent in recent years 
(Gafuri and Muftuler-Bac 2021, 267). Bearing in mind the ethnic tensions in 
the region, the EU put great emphasis on preserving political stability and peace, 
rather than strengthening democratic institutions, which resulted in empow-
ering autocratic regimes in some countries (Richter 2012, 509-10). Hence the 
EU’s contribution to advancing the democratic values in the Western Balkans 
has not been effective enough.

The Russian Soft Power in the Western Balkans 

Despite  the  fact  that  EU  membership  remains  the  main  goal  of  all  Western 
Balkan  countries,  it  seems  that  the  region  is  not  immune  to  the  competing 
interests of the great powers. Russia plays a particularly important role as an 
external actor. Its presence in the Western Balkans is reflected in various strate-
gies, which range from economic cooperation and energy projects to using his-
torical and cultural ties with the Christian Orthodox population (Panagiotou 
2021, 221). Furthermore, Russia has presented itself as ally in preserving tradi-
tional values, often contrasting itself to the perception of the ‘intrusive’ West 
(Belloni 2016, 541-42).

With the Western Balkan countries remaining outside of the EU, Russia 
furthered  its  influence  across  certain  countries.  One  of  the  main  soft  power 
instruments that Russia has used to this effect has been religion (Cruz 2021, 
319-20). The national Orthodox churches in the region, which have the power 
to shape public opinion, maintain close cultural ties with Russia. For example, 
in Serbia, the Serbian Orthodox Church not only promotes shared values with 
Russia, but also acts as a counterweight to European integration. While po-
litical elites in Serbia formally express their commitment to the process of EU 
accession, religious and cultural institutions often support narratives coming 
from Russia, which complicates Serbia’s process of joining the EU. Under the 
influence  of  the  church,  a  share  of  the  Western  Balkan  population  associat-
ing with Orthodox Christianity is kept in cultural isolation, with a strong in-
fluence of historical national identity imbued with many myths and legends 
(Bieber 2002, 103-04). Intertwined in such a manner with the church, Russia’s 
soft power is situated in a very sensitive religious and cultural realm. 

Teodora Stanković137

The  media  is  another  powerful  instrument  used  to  further  the  Russian 
influence  in  the  Western  Balkan  countries.  Spreading  misinformation  to 
strengthen  Russia’s  position  in  the  Western  Balkans,  but  also  the  support 
for Eurosceptic organisations and civic associations fostering the disenchant-
ment in the EU integration process, is a well-documented practice (Cruz 2021, 
323-26). The Russian news agency Russia Today established the media house 
Sputnik  Srbija  to  promote  anti-EU  and  anti-NATO  narratives.  Moreover,  a 
number of Serbian local media have been used to disseminate pro-Russian at-
titudes, especially regarding the complex situation with Kosovo and the threat 
from the ‘Greater Albania’ (Panagiotou 2021, 224). Beyond the case of Serbia, 
Russian influence has also been notable in parts of Bosnia and Herzegobina. 
After the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Russian-affiliated media advocat-
ed for the secession of the Republika Srpska entity, mainly populated by Serbs 
(Boduszynski and Li 2023, 96-97). 

In sum, Russia’s soft power in the Western Balkans relies on a strategy of 
shaping political narratives and public perceptions through cultural, religious 
and media influence. By promoting traditionalist values, Russia continues to 
have an impact on political dynamics in the region. This, in turn, contributes 
to political polarisation and reinforces nationalist sentiments. As long as its soft 
power strategy remains effective, Russia’s presence in the Western Balkans will 
continue to challenge EU efforts to promote the reforms and institutional re-
silience.

Ethnic Tensions and the Rise of Nationalism

Ethnic tensions have historically played a role in shaping the political landscape 
in the Western Balkans. Ethnic and social cleavages have often been instrumen-
talised  by  political  elites.  They  have  strongly  influenced  political  stability  and 
the  process  of  democratisation  across  the  region.  In  societies  with  ethnic  and 
social cleavages, the period of democratic transition often brings uncertainty and 
opens space for political elites to use ethnicity as a basis to gain political support 
(Morrison 2018, 43). This has been exacerbated in the countries created after the 
Yugoslav break-up, as the process of Yugoslav dissolution was accompanied by 
a dismantling of the minority protections. The 1990s were marred with ethnic 
tensions and conflicts across the region (Roberts 2007, 437).

Tensions between the European Union and Russia on the Western Balkans138

The persistent use of ethnic identities as a political tool has undermined 
democratic consolidation in the Western Balkans in the subsequent decades. 
The political elites used nationalist rhetoric and policies in order to ensure the 
stability of their political power, leading to the emergence of ethnic tensions 
that  could  escalate  into  ethnic  conflicts  (Oberschall  2000,  994).  The  lack  of 
strong democratic institutions in these transitional societies left plenty of room 
for manipulations of ethnic identities for the purpose of political gain. Institu-
tional weakness or even paralysis was, in numerous instances, instrumentalised 
in ethnic and political power struggles (Oberschall 2000, 989). Such a situation 
exacerbated citizens’ distrust in the ability of institutions to provide justice and 
equality for all ethnic groups, foster reconciliation and inclusive governance. 
Without  addressing  these  issues,  ethnic  divisions  remain  a  major  obstacle  to 
long-term political stability and democratisation in the region, and a token in 
the region’s geopolitical environment.

Global Geopolitics: a Game-Changer for the Western 
Balkans?

The global geopolitical landscape has changed tremendously since the Russian 
full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It has given a greater politi-
cal  relevance  to  EU  enlargement,  expanding  the  pool  of  candidate  countries 
beyond the Western Balkans, to Ukraine and, Moldova and Georgia (German 
2024, 259-60). The subsequent dynamics of the process, including the start of 
accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova shows how the global geo-
politics has pushed the stagnating enlargement process forward (Anghel and 
Džankić 2023, 490-91). The change in the enlargement dynamics had initially 
raised concerns among the Western Balkan countries, that the new candidates 
would have a higher priority for EU membership. 

This concern was somewhat overcome by a renewed focus on the region, 
which  signalled  its  geopolitical  significance  for  the  EU.  In  December  2022, 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  granted  candidate  status  for  EU  membership, 
while  Albania  began  negotiations  in  July  2022,  after  a  stagnation  of  several 
years. Montenegro, which is among the most advanced countries in the acces-
sion process, has received a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report, 
as  well  as  the  green  light  for  closing  three  accession  negotiation  chapters 
((European Commission 2024). The EU has also set new priorities that include 
the improvement of relations between Serbia and Kosovo in order to remove 
obstacles to further integration of the region.

Teodora Stanković139

Further  to  these  political  steps,  the  EU  has  also  adopted  a  number  of 
economic initiatives to accelerate the integration of the Western Balkans. At 
the end of 2023, the European Commission presented a Growth Plan worth 
about six billion euros, which is intended to support the economic growth of 
Western Balkan countries. This plan aims to accelerate the region’s convergence 
with the EU, encourage governance and economic reforms and advance the in-
tegration into the common European market (European Commission 2024). 

These changes in the EU’s approach to enlargement clearly indicate how 
geopolitical shifts have led the EU to reconsider its priorities and act more de-
cisively regarding enlargement. By starting to integrate the region into its po-
litical, economic and security structures, the EU began to respond to the chal-
lenges posed by Russia. In so doing, it also confirmed the strategic importance 
of the Western Balkans for the stability of Europe. Reactivating the enlarge-
ment process with political and economic initiatives lays the foundations for 
prosperity and stability in the Western Balkans, as well as integration of this 
region in the EU. These foundations, in turn would be the springboard for the 
domestic policymakers to speed up the pace of reforms, many of which have 
been stalled due to the EU’s wavering commitment to enlargement. A proac-
tive approach of the EU could help balance the need for political stability with 
the promotion of democratic governance. Such an approach would also reduce 
the risks associated with authoritarian tendencies and exploitation of depend-
encies by undemocratic external actors across the Western Balkan region.

References

Anghel,  Veronica,  and  Jelena  Džankić.  “Wartime  EU:  Consequences  of  the 
Russia – Ukraine War on the Enlargement Process.” Journal of European 
Integration 45, no. 3 (May 2023): 487–501.

Belloni,  Roberto.  “The  European  Union  Blowback?  Euroscepticism  and 
its  Consequences  in  the  Western  Balkans.”  Journal  of  Intervention  and 
Statebuilding 10, no. 6 (August 2016): 530–547.

Bieber, Florian. “Nationalist Mobilization and Stories of Serb Suffering: The 
Kosovo Myth from 600th Anniversary to the Present.” Rethinking History 
6, no. 1 (June 2002): 95–110.

Tensions between the European Union and Russia on the Western Balkans140

Boduszynski, Mieczyslaw P., and Calla Li. “External Autocratic Influence, the 
Balkans, and Democratic Decline.” In Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans 
and  Eastern  Mediterranean,  edited  by  Hall  Gardner,  89–118.  Cham: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2023.

Cruz,  Marco.  “Russia  in  the  Western  Balkans:  Interests  and  Tools  of  Influ-
ence.” In The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare: Influence 
Operations  in  Europe  and  Its  Neighbourhood,  edited  by  Holger  Mölder, 
Vladimir Sazonov, Archil Chochia, and Tanel Kerikmäe, 315–333. Cham: 
Springer, 2021.

European Commission. “Montenegro 2024 Enlargement Package Factsheet.” 
European Commission, Directorate General for Neighbourhood and En-
largement Negotiations, 2024. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/montenegro-2024-enlargement-package-factsheet_en.

Gafuri, Adea, and Meltem Muftuler-Bac. “Caught between Stability and Democra-
cy in the Western Balkans: A Comparative Analysis of Paths of Accession to the 
European Union.” East European Politics 37, no. 2 (2021): 267–291.

German,  Tracey.  “Russia’s  War  on  Ukraine,  the  EU,  and  its  Eastern  Neigh-
borhood:  Layers  of  Liminality.”  Problems  of  Post-Communism  71,  no.  3 
(March 2024): 259–270.

Lavrič, Miran, and Florian Bieber. “Shifts in Support for Authoritarianism and 
Democracy in the Western Balkans.” Problems of Post-Communism 68, no. 
1 (2021): 17–26.

Morrison,  Kenneth.  Nationalism,  Identity  and  Statehood  in  Post-Yugoslav 

Montenegro. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

Oberschall, Anthony. “The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Coopera-
tion to Violence and War in Yugoslavia.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 23, no. 
6 (2000): 982–1001.

Panagiotou, Ritsa. “The Western Balkans between Russia and the European 
Union: Perceptions, Reality and Impact on Enlargement.” Journal of Con-
temporary European Studies 29, no. 2 (2021): 219–233.

Teodora Stanković141

Petrović, Milenko, and Nikolaos Tzifakis. “A Geopolitical Turn to EU Enlarge-
ment, or Another Postponement? An Introduction.” Journal of Contempo-
rary European Studies 29, no. 2 (February 2021): 157–168.

Richter, Solveig. “Two at One Blow? The EU and Its Quest for Security and 
Democracy by Political Conditionality in the Western Balkans.” Democra-
tization 19, no. 3 (June 2012): 507–534. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351
0347.2012.674360.

Roberts, Elizabeth. The Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montene-

gro. London: Hurst & Company, 2007.

Seroka, Jim. “Revisiting Regional Security in the Western Balkans.” Journal of 

Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 4 (November 2012): 493–511.

Stanković, Teodora. “Competing Interests of the European Union and Russia 
in  the  Western  Balkans  Countries  with  a  Comprehensive  Analysis  of 
Economic  Leverage.”  Annales  –  Annals  for  Istrian  and  Mediterranean 
Studies – Series Historia et Sociologia 32, no. 3 (December 2022): 449–464.

Zorić, Bojana. “Assessing Russian Impact on the Western Balkan Countries’ 
EU Accession: Case of Croatia and Serbia.” Journal of Liberty and Interna-
tional Affairs 3, no. 2 (October 2017): 9–18. 

Tensions between the European Union and Russia on the Western BalkansInside Out: Internal and 
External Pressures in the 
Western Balkans amidst 
Global Transformations 
and Counter-Peace 
Dynamics

Miranda Loli*
This contribution examines the structural conditions that strengthen the in-
fluence of undemocratic forces in the Western Balkans. It focuses on two key 
elements:  undemocratic  pressures  within  the  European  Union  (EU)  or  its 
Member States and transnational counter-peace dynamics. With regard to the 
first  element,  the  EU’s  enlargement  process  has  increasingly  become  securi-
ty-driven, emphasising stability over genuine democratic transformation, with 
migration  management  being  outsourced  to  the  borderland  region  and  tied 
to enlargement. Meanwhile, counter-peace dynamics, defined as patterns that 
emerge when peace processes are stalled or undermined, have recently surfaced, 
further  complicating  the  region’s  political  landscape.  Empirically  they  can 
manifest  as  national  strategies  against  peace  reforms  as  well  as  internation-
al dynamics that complicate peace-making efforts (Pogodda, Richmond, and 
Visoka 2023).

* 

 Miranda Loli is Max Weber Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, Florence.

143

In regard to elements within the EU, the enlargement process, described 
as the most powerful foreign policy tool of the EU, has increasingly been char-
acterised by a pronounced focus on security concerns. There are two impor-
tant issues to consider here. Firstly, the EU’s framing of security as protection 
against  external  threats  has  led  to  policies  that  prioritise  containment  rather 
than integration. Critically, this shift is exemplified by the way migration man-
agement has been tied in practice to accession negotiations, effectively sidelin-
ing discussions about democratic governance and human rights. 

As  a  result,  candidate  countries  have  been  pressured  to  adopt  repressive 
measures to control transit migration. While the EU continues to push forward 
the securitisation of migration (Bianchini, Cittadini, and Zoppi 2022), polit-
ical elites both within the EU and in candidate countries may exploit security 
narratives to justify authoritarian practices. 

The  intertwining  of  security  concerns  with  migration  management  has 
profound implications for democratic values in the Western Balkans. As EU 
Member  States  confront  migration  stemming  from  conflicts  in  neighbour-
ing regions, they often look to candidate countries as buffers against potential 
migrant inflows. This securitisation of migration fosters an environment con-
ducive  to  authoritarian  practices,  where  governments  may  implement  harsh 
measures  against  migrants  while  simultaneously  cracking  down  on  dissent 
within  their  own  populations.  Such  actions  not  only  violate  human  rights 
but also erode public trust in democratic institutions. Furthermore, as politi-
cal elites leverage security narratives to justify repressive measures, citizens may 
become  increasingly  disillusioned  with  their  governments  and  international 
actors like the EU, which ostensibly promote democracy but prioritise security 
interests. This disillusionment often leads to apathy towards democratic pro-
cesses and the increased popularity of populist movements that exploit fears 
surrounding migration and national identity.

Secondly,  the  idea  of  ‘broken  promises  diplomacy’  (Anghel  and  Jones 
2023)  has  become  increasingly  relevant  in  the  context  of  EU  enlargement 
in  the  Western  Balkans,  where  repeated  assurances  of  integration  have  often 
failed  to  materialise,  leading  to  scepticism  among  local  populations  and  po-
litical leaders alike. Nevertheless, enlargement continues to be a crucial policy 
issue, as Anghel emphasizes that the EU’s credibility in the region relies on its 
ability to fulfil its commitments and that the strategic significance of enlarge-
ment (Anghel 2024).

Internal and External Pressures in the Western Balkans amidst Global Transformations and Counter-Peace Dynamics144

Geostrategic Shifts and the Multi-Order World

Beyond the EU, the geopolitical landscape surrounding the Western Balkans 
has  undergone  substantial  changes  in  recent  years  and  has  influenced  how 
external  actors  engage  with  the  region.  This  competition  manifests  itself  in 
various forms, including economic investments, political influence campaigns, 
and military cooperation.

High-level policy dialogues have increasingly focused on security strategies 
that prioritise immediate geopolitical interests. The EU’s response to these ge-
ostrategic shifts has often been reactive rather than proactive (European Union 
External Action 2023).1 As external actors seek to expand their influence in the 
region, EU Member States face pressure to adopt more stringent measures to 
maintain their relevance.2

While foresight  about the second  Trump  administration  in  the  region is 
limited, the first Trump administration’s foreign policy can be studied. In the 
regional context of the Western Balkans, it marked a departure from traditional 
diplomatic approaches towards more transactional relationships with regional 
leaders. The Washington Agreement, a normalisation deal between Serbia and 
Kosovo, illustrates this trend by emphasising economic cooperation while ne-
glecting  crucial  issues  related  to  human  rights  and  governance  (Bami  2021). 
This dynamic can lead to further entrenchment of undemocratic forces as gov-
ernments  prioritise  short-term  stability  over  long-term  democratic  develop-
ment. The absence of normalised relations between Belgrade and Pristina sows 
the threat of conflict with potential regional implications.

The influence of external actors in the Western Balkans extends beyond tra-
ditional geopolitical rivalries, encompassing economic dependencies that shape 
domestic political dynamics. Russian investments in energy infrastructure, for 
example, have created leverage over local governments. Similarly, China’s Belt 
and Road Initiative has introduced substantial financial resources to the region, 
though it often lacks transparency and adherence to environmental standards. 
These external influences contribute to an environment where undemocratic 
practices can thrive. Political leaders may align themselves with foreign powers 
offering  economic  support  without  demanding  adherence  to  democratic 
norms or human rights standards.

1  Full quote from Josep Borrell Fontelles, “Overall, we are too often in a reactive mode, responding to 
other people’s plans and decisions. I also believe we have to avoid bureaucratic routine (‘what did we 
do last time?’) and regain a sense of initiative” (European Union External Action 2023, 61).

Miranda Loli145

Counter-Peace Dynamics

The concept of counter-peace is elaborated in detail by Pogodda, Richmond, 
and Visoka (2023) and refers to the forces that actively undermine peacebuild-
ing  efforts  in  post-conflict  societies.  These  dynamics  represent  a  significant 
challenge to the stability and democratic development of the Western Balkans. 
Counter-peace  dynamics  emerge  when  peace  processes  are  stalled  or  under-
mined by internal and external actors, leading to a resurgence of violence and the 
entrenchment of authoritarian practices. In the Western Balkans, where histor-
ical grievances and ethnic divisions are deeply entrenched, these dynamics are 
particularly destabilising. Internally, political elites often exploit nationalist sen-
timents to consolidate power, distracting from pressing socio-economic issues. 
In  countries  like  Serbia  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  leaders  invoke  histori-
cal narratives or ethnic identities to rally support while exacerbating tensions. 
Moreover, entrenched political structures prioritise personal or party interests 
over  national  unity,  further  exacerbating  these  counter-peace  dynamics.  In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, political paralysis and the resurgence of 
separatist rhetoric from entities like Republika Srpska have stalled democratic 
processes (Wankiewicz 2025).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this contribution highlights the structural conditions that sig-
nificantly bolster the influence of undemocratic forces in the Western Balkans, 
focusing on two critical elements: pressures arising from the European Union 
(EU)  and  transnational  counter-peace  dynamics.  The  EU’s  enlargement 
process has increasingly shifted towards a security-driven approach, prioritis-
ing  stability  over  authentic  democratic  transformation,  particularly  through 
the outsourcing of migration management to the borderland region. This shift 
complicates  the  prospects  for  genuine  reform  and  democratic  governance. 
Concurrently, counter-peace dynamics have emerged as a significant challenge, 
characterised by stalled or undermined peace processes that manifest in both 
national strategies against reform and international factors that hinder effec-
tive peace-making efforts. Together, these elements create a complex political 
landscape in which undemocratic practices can thrive, underscoring the urgent 
need for a reevaluation of strategies aimed at promoting democracy and stabil-
ity in the region.

Internal and External Pressures in the Western Balkans amidst Global Transformations and Counter-Peace Dynamics146

References

Anghel,  Veronica,  and  Erik  Jones.  “Broken  Promises:  Diplomacy:  The  Rus-
sia-Ukraine  War  and  the  End  of  Enlargement  as  We  Know  It.”  In  A  Year 
Later: War in Ukraine and Western Balkan (Geo)Politics, edited by Jelena 
Džankić,  Simonida  Kacarska,  and  Soeren  Keil,  6–14.  Florence:  European 
University Institute, 2023.

Anghel, Veronica. “Why EU Enlargement Is a Strategic Necessity.” The Loop, 
20 December 2024. https://theloop.ecpr.eu/why-eu-enlargement-is-a-strate-
gic-necessity/.

Bami, Xhorxhina. “BIRN Fact-Check: Trump’s ‘Historic’ Kosovo-Serbia Deal 
Gathering Dust.” Balkan Insight, 3 September 2021. https://balkaninsight.
com/2021/09/03/birn-fact-check-trumps-historic-kosovo-serbia-deal-gath-
ering-dust/.

Bianchini, Stefano, Silvia Cittadini, and Marco Zoppi. “In-Securitization through 
Externalization? The EU and the Western Balkans ‘Borderlands’.” In Fences, 
Refugee  Boats,  and  the  New  Borderlands:  Making  Sense  of  the  European 
Union’s Emerging Internal and External Borders, edited by Andras Szalai, 
Owen Parker, Sonia Lucarelli, and Alexandra Prodromidou, 97–. Budapest: 
CEU Democracy Institute, 2022.

European  Union  External  Action  (EEAS).  “The  Year  that  War  Returned 
to  Europe.  EU  Foreign  Policy  in  2022.”  March  2023.  https://www.
eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/20230369_PDF_
OF0323029ENN_002.pdf.

Pogodda,  Sandra,  Oliver  P.  Richmond,  and  Gëzim  Visoka.  “Counter-Peace: 
From Isolated Blockages in Peace Processes to Systemic Patterns.” Review of 
International Studies 49, no. 3 (July 2023): 491–512.

Richmond, Oliver P., Sandra Pogodda, and Gëzim Visoka. “The International 
Dynamics of Counter-Peace.” European Journal of International Relations 
30, no. 1 (March 2024): 126–50.

Miranda Loli147

Wankiewicz, Paulina. “Crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Weakened Dodik Is 
Seeking Support Abroad.” Centre for Eastern Studies, 15 April 2025. https://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-04-15/crisis-bosnia-and-her-
zegovina-a-weakened-dodik-seeking-support. 

Internal and External Pressures in the Western Balkans amidst Global Transformations and Counter-Peace DynamicsPart III
European 
Landscapes

The Weak Link: the 
Orbán Regime’s Impact 
on European (Geo)
Politics and Democracy

Ádám Bence Balázs*

Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, has become a suspiciously central 
character of European integration. On the side of the European Union’s (EU) 
internal cohesion, the Orbán regime has relentlessly mongered discord to un-
dermine the Member States’ unity in facing challenges from global migration 
to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Without any mandate or legitimacy, 
Orbán hijacked the Presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 
2024 to promote his ‘non-aligned’ standpoint, i.e. his close ties to autocratic 
leaders (Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, etc.) and lasting support for the re-elected 
US President Donald Trump, who threatens NATO’s integrity (Müller 2024; 
Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a). All this harms the Euro-Atlantic 
system of alliances, its priorities, and its need for solidarity. These are essential 
in a multipolar global world characterised by the rapid escalation of macro-re-
gional conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East to the Sahel (Rácz 2023a). 

On  the  side  of  EU  enlargement,  Orbán’s  Hungary  has  played  a  confus-
ing role. Budapest acts like a determined advocate for the accession of Western 
Balkan  (WB)  candidate  countries  while  supporting  political  actors  (Milorad 
Dodik)  and  regimes  (Aleksandar  Vučić’s  Serbia)  that  show  growing  disdain 

* 

 Ádám Bence Balázs is Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics (Passau University) and an Associate 
Researcher at LCSP (Université Paris Cité).

150

for the European model of liberal democracy and recklessly threaten the pre-
carious status quo in the post-Yugoslav area. Likewise, the official Hungarian 
standpoint on ‘peace’ in Ukraine is in line with Putin’s imperialist demands 
rather than Eastern European countries’ essential need for security in the face 
of the newest wave of Russian expansion.

One  might  wonder  why  Hungary,  a  smaller  peripheric  country  whose 
security entirely depends on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
and a country that could benefit from all the privileges of EU integration to 
assert its political and economic interests, follows such a disintegrative strategy. 
At this stage, open sources do not allow guessing the Orbán regime’s exact mo-
tivations (Szilágyi 2023; Dezső 2024). Let us rephrase the question: How come 
the  ruler  of  this  geostrategically  insignificant  Eastern  European  country  has 
gained such fame in Europe and beyond, and how come has he had a corrosive 
impact on Euro-Atlantic (geo)politics? The Orbán regime has challenged the 
ideal of integrated liberal democracies by promoting democracy backsliding in 
the Union and its neighbourhood. Its critical examination through the lens of 
democracy should contribute to a sober diagnosis of the European project’s 
fallacies  and  inherent  weaknesses  –  constructive  self-criticism  is  essential  for 
the EU when geopolitical challenges are intertwined with transatlantic demo-
cratic stability.

Democracy Capture

Orbán  consolidated  his  rule  through  a  multilayered  capture  of  the  country. 
While state capture is a well-known tactic, and thoroughly documented in the 
Hungarian case (Martin and Ligeti 2017; Fazekas and Tóth 2016), the very phe-
nomenon of ‘capture’ calls for a more detailed analysis. Democracy capture was 
a condition for state capture. Before 2010, Orbán’s party had already gained 
command of the national narrative (Political Capital 2002), polarising the Hun-
garians’ national sense of belonging (Kapelner 2017). Throughout the process 
that started when Orbán’s Fidesz party lost the 2002 elections and refused to 
admit defeat, the Hungarian society became trapped in apathy, sad aggressivity, 
and nostalgia. As a result, state, democracy, nation, and society capture largely 
overlap (on state weakness see Badie 2018, 114–121). A number of different 
elements have shaped democracy capture.

In  a  way,  Hungary  does  not  have  a  government.  Orbán  is  the  head  of  a 
regime that used the democratic legitimacy of the 2010 legislative elections to 
replace  the  country’s  constitutional  framework  with  the  so-called  ‘system  of 

Ádám Bence Balázs151

national cooperation’, a new establishment that dismissed the post-communist 
process of democratic transformation. In other words, the Fidesz party used its 
landslide victory fifteen years ago to capture Hungarian democracy.

The 2010 elections were the last truly free and fair legislative elections from 
1989 to this date. The electoral system was changed after the Fidesz obtained a 
two-third constitutional majority in 2010. In theory, a one-round mixed-mem-
ber majoritarian system is not undemocratic. In practice, the timing of intro-
duction made it questionable: a winner-take-all system implemented right after 
the landslide victory of a big block opposed to a fragmenting left and liberal 
group of parties could only confirm the 2010 power relations at the next elec-
tions. As a result of this change, the ruling party repeated its victory three times 
(2014,  2018,  2022)  (Bozóki  2014;  Political  Capital  2022).  By  participating 
in these elections, the opposition unwillingly contributed to legitimising the 
new system while progressively losing credit throughout the last fifteen years. 
The hopeless attempts to join forces against the more and more homogeneous 
Fidesz block have only weakened the left and liberal swarm of political parties 
(Népszava 2018). Leaving governmental topics to the overheated yet impotent 
opposition and instrumentalising the pro-democrats’ political and intellectual 
shortcomings to consolidate a lasting rule is characteristic of the Orbán regime. 
It  instrumentalises  the  opposition’s  lack  of  courage  to  challenge  the  regime 
with extra-parliamentary means. Thus the chances to defeat the Fidesz block in 
elections became more than questionable following the 2018 elections.12

Democracy, Nation, and the Region

Democracy  capture  joins  the  regime’s  hold  on  the  national  narrative.  The 
massive distribution of Hungarian citizenship in the neighbouring countries 
has resulted in a significant amount of biased ballots for the Fidesz by voters 
who do not live or pay taxes in Hungary (Világgazdaság 2010). The financial, 
political, and overall moral corruption of Hungarian minorities in Romania, 
Slovakia,  Serbia,  and  Ukraine  is  a  clear  illustration  of  the  Orbán  regime’s 
politics of weakness: the precarious minority condition of Hungarian-speak-
ing communities (Klingová 2022; Kazharski 2024), and their understandable 
longing  for  symbolic  and  institutional  recognition  by  the  ‘motherland’  have 
been abused to fuel the unfair electoral system (Parászka 2023). A Hungarian 
external citizen is thus highly susceptible to exploitative tactics. 

1  Orbán did not hesitate after his 2002 defeat to bring politics to the streets. Unlike today, it was not 

necessary to opt for such a strategy.

The Orbán Regime’s Impact on European (Geo)Politics and Democracy152

Moreover, these communities become even more exposed in their respective 
home countries. Left without parties – except for Orbán’s allies of the moment 
(Robert Fico’s Smer or Aleksandar Vučić’s SNS) – these unconscious victims 
of the Hungarian ruler might pay the price of political change in Slovakia or 
Serbia if they get identified with these countries’ present leaders. In Serbia, the 
use of Hungarian speakers as an electoral resource for Vučić is part of Orbán’s 
obscure yet active interference in the Balkan region. The Hungarian model has 
‘followers’  among  Serbian  and  North  Macedonian  leadership.  This  model’s 
short-term success in Slovenia allows one to guess how hazardous this gamble 
could become in a country with a Hungarian minority like Serbia.

The Hungarian electoral system, made to repeat the 2010 victory, shows 
an undemocratic tendency. The winner inventing new rules (and citizens) to 
keep winning undermines the equality of chances on the political spectrum. 
General elections since 2014 resemble artificial repetitions of the first and au-
thentic ‘show’ (the 2010 landslide). The transition of power has thus become 
as hazardous as in clear-cut autocratic regimes. How can this regime be aban-
doned if a change of direction cannot be obtained through elections?

Disturbingly, this undemocratic mindset of Hungarian citizens is based on 
a  fair  understanding  of  essential  democratic  experiences:  the  thrill  of  victory 
(Palonen  2011)  and  the  proximity  between  democracy  and  civil  war  (Loraux 
2005a, 61–69; Loraux 2005b, 125–143). We see how fracturing (national) unity 
and pushing the logic of democracy close to civil war-like situations is a tool that 
the inner ‘enemies of democracy’ (in Hungary or nowadays in the United States) 
use for political gain. By exploiting democratic norms, these ‘enemies of democ-
racy’ show that they know more about the essence of democracy than the enthu-
siastic defenders of democratic ‘values’. The thrill of victory seems to be the core 
and, as such, a major touchstone of any democratic establishment.

EU Capture

The Orbán regime has often been compared to Turkish and Russian autocra-
cies and previous authoritarian rules in Hungary (Teczár 2017; Bozóki 2021, 
346–366).  Such  comparisons  make  sense  when  they  highlight  differences  to 
emphasise  specificities,  or  vice  versa.  The  most  characteristic  aspect  of  the 
Orbán regime is that it could only emerge within the EU. In addition to cap-
turing the state, democracy, the nation, and society, the Orbán regime has also 
captured the EU and its privileges. Instead of following the democratic model 

Ádám Bence Balázs153

of the Union, Hungary has shaped a counter-model by hijacking the significant 
benefits of membership.

The misappropriation of EU funds to finance Orbán’s autocratic regime 
has  already  been  noted  in  literature.  The  ‘double  theft’  is  extensively  docu-
mented: the Orbán regime uses European taxpayers’ money and deprives Hun-
garian citizens of it (Kállay 2015). The hijacking of EU mobility and publici-
ty has been less examined. Unlike in János Kádár’s repressive socialist satellite 
regime after 1956, under Orbán’s rule, dissenters are free and even encouraged 
to leave the country (Lados et al. 2013). While emigration and brain drain is a 
concern in other Eastern European EU Member States as well (Ileš and Karačić 
2024; Zubașcu 2019), European mobility has been instrumentalised by Orbán 
to let out the steam of dissatisfaction. With emigration, the spirit of initiative, 
change, and entrepreneurship has left the country since 2010. This has diluted 
those protesting crowds that express discontent at home and provided the au-
tocratic regime with the possibility to exercise relatively non-violent means of 
control (unlike in Turkey or Russia). There is no democratic exit door to guar-
antee non-violent change of regime in Hungary. For citizens, the only ‘door’ is 
ensured by the Schengen zone and free circulation and work in the EU. Ulti-
mately, the Orbán regime has significantly contributed to the erosion of trust 
at the EU level, making this ‘exit door’ less and less sustainable.

The  EU  also  offers  the  privilege  of  publicity  and  visibility  to  the  regime 
in  Hungary.  The  Orbán  regime  has  gained  fame  and  popularity  in  Europe 
and beyond thanks to the visibility provided by the EU’s public platforms. A 
Western Balkan stabilitocracy (Bieber 2018) could hardly expect such attention 
– except when Orbán uses WB capitals to attack the EU verbally, a habit that 
shows the Hungarian leader’s isolation in the EU (Verseck 2024) and his coun-
terproductive support for Western Balkan candidate countries (Reményi, Pap, 
and Pap 2021; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Kovács 2022). When the Hun-
garian prime minister speaks, twenty-six European heads of government listen; 
when he indulges in crude insults against the EU or the ‘West’ while visiting a 
WB counterpart, this attention will impact that candidate country negatively 
(Majláth 2021).

The Orbán Regime’s Impact on European (Geo)Politics and Democracy154

The Hungarian ‘Siren Call’

The  Orbán  regime  is  the  opposite  of  an  integration  model.  The  regime  has 
been built on the multilayered instrumentalisation of weaknesses in Hungary, 
the EU, and the candidate countries. Characteristic of reluctant Global-South 
players  resisting  the  international  order  (Badie  2018,  13-14),  it  is  somewhat 
puzzling to witness such a deliberate case of corrosive ‘politics of weakness’ in 
an EU and NATO member state. 

However, the Hungarian counter-model provides a reverse perspective on 
the EU’s democratic shortcomings. The European citizens could better reflect 
on the EU’s inherent fallacies and shortcomings, based on the Hungarian ex-
perience. The challenge is to hear what the counter-model reveals about the 
European  project  without  listening  to  the  tempting  Hungarian  ‘siren  call’. 
As István Bibó has noted, “[t]o be a democrat is first and foremost not to be 
afraid”  (Bibó  2015,  152).  Orbán’s  ‘freedom  fighting’,  anti-Western,  and  Eu-
rophobic  discourse  is  an  ideological  cover  that  dissimulates  a  servile  regime, 
an absence of courage used and abused by Putin’s Russia (Rácz 2023b). The 
regime’s confusing geopolitical agenda, including Hungary’s schemes against 
support to Ukraine and sanctions against Russia is an essential indicator of the 
alarming state of democracy in Hungary. 

Could  a  well-fledged  democracy  show  such  a  lack  of  courage?  Orbán’s 
‘peace  camp’  narrative  (Mizsur  2023;  Cabinet  Office  of  the  Prime  Minister 
2022b; Magyar Nemzet 2024), propagating that Russian imperialist expansion 
will bring peace, security, and renewed welfare to Europe (Cohen 2022), shows 
how the regime’s deliberate exploitation of fear and anxiety at home can spread 
in the EU and impact democratic governments. Undeniably, acting recklessly 
in front of an aggressive nuclear power could be hazardous. Yet, Orbán’s ‘peace 
camp’ is a siren song Europe should not listen to. Hearing and deconstructing 
this tempting melody is essential in overcoming the existing European anxie-
ties in the face of Putin’s threats (Sz. Bíró 2024). The absence of fear, that is – 
perfect security as a condition to a democratic establishment, is a pipedream.

That is why the geopolitical moment of danger puts democracies to the test. 
Security in Europe calls for courage, which is not a synonym for recklessness 
but a democratic virtue. It is the ability to control our legitimate fears through 
responsible decision-making. Reckless declarations on the EU as a military (ge-
opolitical)  power  raise  the  question  of  international  credibility.  So  does  the 
absence of courage when Orbán’s siren call exploits the European communi-

Ádám Bence Balázs155

ty’s worries in a context where the US ally has also shown a lack of determina-
tion in supporting Ukraine.

Eventually, the question is to what extent it is relevant for the EU to promote 
itself as a model of democracy. The postwar template of European construction 
emerged in the exceptional and bygone context of the Cold War. It was a privi-
leged model. The founding Members could ask themselves if it is productive to 
promote a structure that the EU's regional (and global) neighbourhood might 
not afford. Western European democracies (France and Germany), weakened 
by domestic shortcomings and worried about the unreliable American partner 
in times of war, might reconsider the EU’s vocation in a global world where the 
Old Continent is yet to find its place and role.

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Ádám Bence BalázsThe EU’s Democratic 
Paradox: Tackling 
Democracy Deficits 
Across Candidates, 
Members, and 
Institutions

Michał Matlak*

The European Union (EU) finds itself at the intersection of two contrasting roles: 
a promoter of democracy and rule of law in its Member States and candidates as 
well as an institution grappling with its democratic deficits – both at the institution-
al level (‘Brussels’) and at the level of its Member States. This paradox becomes es-
pecially evident when examining the experiences of Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries that joined during the 2004 enlargement. While the EU has been 
instrumental in fostering democratic transitions and institutional reforms in these 
post-communist states, the persistence of rule-of-law backsliding and rising Euro-
scepticism  challenge  its  effectiveness  and  credibility.  Moreover,  the  EU’s  internal 
struggles with democratic accountability have further complicated its ability to lead 
by example. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores the EU’s role, focusing on 
Poland as a case study to evaluate how the Union influences democracy within its 
borders while addressing its internal challenges.

* 

 Michał Matlak is Assistant professor at the Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Łódź.

162

At  the  core  of  this  paper  is  the  argument  that  both  the  political  and 
economic  context  of  candidate  countries,  alongside  their  domestic  political 
dynamics, can obstruct reform implementation. Simultaneously, internal divi-
sions within the EU and the rise of populist movements among Member States 
weaken the Union’s credibility as a champion of democracy. These challenges 
cast doubt on the long-term effectiveness of the revised EU enlargement meth-
odology and of the future of EU enlargement.

The EU and Democracy: A Troubled Relationship

Democracy fundamentally requires a demos – a collective body of citizens who 
share a sense of ownership and influence over governance. The EU, however, 
lacks  such  a  demos.  While  scholars,  such  as  Kalypso  Nicolaïdis  (2013),  have 
proposed  the  concept  of  demoicracy  –  a  union  of  multiple  demoi  –  this 
remains  unlikely  to  materialise.  Eurosceptics  have  capitalised  on  this  lack  of 
unity, highlighting the frustration of many citizens who feel disconnected from 
decision-making in Brussels. While every decision of the Union is accepted (or 
not) by European governments and the European Parliament, both possessing 
democratic legitimacy, the EU’s remoteness creates a sense of disempowerment 
among citizens. It is much more difficult for a body grappling with a ‘demo-
cratic deficit’ to support democracy within the Member States.

This disconnect is rooted in the Union’s historical evolution. As Jan-Wer-
ner Müller (2011) has argued, the EU embodies the ‘disciplining of democracy’ 
after World War II, functioning as a conservative, aristocratic correction to the 
extremes of democratic populism. Over time, pressing crises – be it economic 
recovery, the eurozone crisis, migration, or the war in Ukraine – have neces-
sitated emergency policies that often bypass democratic mechanisms, further 
alienating citizens. The EU’s reliance on messianic legitimacy, as Joseph H.H. 
Weiler  (2012)  observed,  frames  its  decisions  as  inherently  righteous  and  for-
ward-looking, leaving little room for critique of its democratic processes.

One  of  the  most  significant  threats  to  democracy  within  the  EU  is  the 
phenomenon  of  rule-of-law  backsliding  in  Member  States,  especially  after 
their EU accession. The erosion of judicial independence and the weakening 
of democratic institutions in countries like Poland and Hungary undermine 
the fundamental values of the Union and exacerbate the disconnect between 
EU institutions and its citizens. Rule-of-law backsliding directly challenges the 
EU’s ability to present itself as a democratic model for its citizens and candidate 

Michał Matlak163

countries. By failing to decisively address such issues, the EU risks normalising 
anti-democratic practices within its borders, thereby weakening its legitimacy 
both internally and externally.

Ultimately, the EU’s survival and success depend on closing the gap between 
its institutions and citizens. One option – though unlikely in the near future 
due to a lack of political will – is a new treaty and institutional framework with 
stronger democratic mechanisms. Another is the reform of political practices 
in Brussels. To identify the necessary changes or reforms, it is crucial to examine 
the enlargement process – the Union’s flagship policy – and its implementa-
tion in Poland, where it has been both a success and a source of contention.

The EU and Polish Democracy: Democratisation, 
Backsliding, and Renewal

Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 marked a pivotal moment in its post-com-
munist transition. The Copenhagen criteria, established as prerequisites for EU 
membership, required candidate countries to demonstrate stable democratic 
institutions,  respect  for  the  rule  of  law,  and  a  functioning  market  economy. 
These criteria were instrumental in fostering institutional reforms in Poland, as 
political elites viewed EU membership as the ultimate goal of their transition – 
their ‘end of history’ (CASE 2019).

In the pre-accession period, the EU’s conditionality mechanism ensured that 
reforms were depoliticised (taken out from a political conflict, supported by the 
biggest political forces on the left and the right), focusing on technocratic solu-
tions to meet the EU’s benchmarks. This technocratic approach facilitated the 
adoption  of  comprehensive  reforms,  including  the  adoption  of  the  constitu-
tion in 1997, the strengthening of judicial independence, and anti-corruption 
measures (Trzeciak 2010). These developments were accompanied by the devel-
opment of civil society and non-governmental organisations that supported the 
development of democracy and the rule of law – such as the Batory Foundation, 
the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, and associations of judges.

EU membership was perceived as a national project, transcending political 
divisions and uniting disparate groups in pursuit of a common goal (Trzeciak 
2010).  However,  the  depoliticised  nature  of  the  accession  process  left  un-
resolved  political  tensions  that  resurfaced  after  2004.  By  2005,  Poland’s  two 
major  political  parties,  Civic  Platform  (PO)  and  Law  and  Justice  (PiS),  had 
abandoned their brief coalition talks, becoming bitter adversaries. This politi-

Tackling Democracy Deficits Across Candidates, Members, and Institutions164

cal polarisation coincided with a shift in public perception of the EU. While the 
first decade of membership was characterised by economic growth and a sense 
of inclusion in the European project, the second decade maintained economic 
progress but was marked by increasing scepticism, particularly among conserv-
ative and nationalist groups. The EU began to be portrayed as an ally of liberal 
elites, imposing an ideological agenda disconnected from the values and needs 
of ordinary citizens (Balcer et al. 2016).

This narrative gained traction under the PiS government, which came to 
power for the second time in 2015. The party’s populist rhetoric framed the 
EU as a threat to national sovereignty, accusing it of overreach in areas such as 
judicial reform and migration policy (Balcer et al. 2016). The dismantling of 
democratic  institutions,  including  the  judiciary  and  media,  took  Brussels  by 
surprise. Initially, the EU struggled to respond effectively, as its existing tools 
for addressing democratic backsliding were inadequate (Seidelmeier 2017). It 
was not until 2020 that the EU introduced a conditionality mechanism linking 
access to EU funds to adherence to the rule of law.

The Conditionality Mechanism 

The EU’s conditionality has been central to its efforts to promote democracy 
and  the  rule  of  law  among  Member  States  and  candidate  countries  (Schim-
melfennig 20214). During the accession process, conditionality was highly ef-
fective, as candidate countries had a strong incentive to comply with EU re-
quirements. The promise of membership – and the associated economic and 
political benefits – motivated governments to implement far-reaching reforms.

For  new  Member  States,  EU  funds  played  a  crucial  role  in  supporting 
economic development and reducing regional disparities. Poland, for example, 
became one of the largest recipients of EU structural and cohesion funds (235 
billion euros), which financed infrastructure projects, education, and innova-
tion. These funds were instrumental in modernising the Polish economy and 
improving  living  standards.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  conditionality  di-
minished  after  accession.  Once  countries  became  EU  members,  the  leverage 
provided by the promise of membership disappeared. 

This created another paradox: while the EU’s pre-accession conditionality 
was highly successful, its post-accession mechanisms for ensuring compliance 
with democratic were virtually non-existent beyond Article 7 TEU providing 
a mechanism for the EU to address breaches of fundamental values, allowing 

Michał Matlak165

it to suspend certain rights of a Member State, including voting rights in the 
Council, if there is a clear risk or a serious and persistent breach of EU values 
such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The introduction of the 
rule-of-law conditionality mechanism in 2020 was a step forward, but its im-
plementation has faced legal and political challenges. For instance, Poland and 
Hungary  have  sought  to  undermine  the  mechanism  through  legal  disputes 
(European Court of Justice 2022).

The rule-of-law conditionality regulation, adopted in 2020, allows the EU 
to withhold funds from Member States that breach core EU values, such as 
the rule of law (European Union 2020). The regulation applies a procedural 
framework:  the  European  Commission  identifies  breaches,  notifies  the  con-
cerned Member State, and allows for a response before proposing corrective 
measures.  The  measures  must  then  be  approved  by  a  qualified  majority  of 
Member States in the Council. This process is said to ensure transparency and 
fairness, but it has faced criticism for being politically contentious and legally 
complex  (Staudinger  2022).  However,  the  successful  withholding  of  funds 
for Hungary demonstrates the mechanism’s operational effectiveness, yet the 
broader political objective – restoring a Member State’s adherence to the rule 
of law – remains unachieved. 

The politically polarised environment poses a significant challenge to this 
mechanism, as governing parties frequently succeed in portraying Brussels as 
an  adversary  intent  on  withholding  funds  from  the  entire  nation  (Foy  and 
Fleming 2021). Furthermore, Member States may take advantage of procedur-
al loopholes to avoid compliance. The effectiveness of the regulation hinges on 
the EU’s ability to strategically communicate its objectives.

The  limitations  of  the  conditionality  mechanism  highlight  the  difficulty 
of  addressing  democratic  backsliding  within  the  EU.  While  financial  incen-
tives can encourage compliance, they are not sufficient to counter deeply en-
trenched political and ideological divisions. Moreover, the perception that the 
EU uses conditionality to impose its values can fuel nationalist and populist 
narratives, further complicating efforts to uphold democratic standards.

Tackling Democracy Deficits Across Candidates, Members, and Institutions166

Lessons from Previous Rounds and the New 
Enlargement Framework

One  could  argue  that  recognising  the  challenges  of  democratic  backsliding 
(Dąbrowski 2020), the EU adopted a new enlargement methodology in 2020, 
with  a  focus  on  strengthening  the  rule  of  law.  This  methodology,  designed 
with the Western Balkans in mind, places the rule of law at the heart of the 
negotiation process. Under this approach, candidate countries must demon-
strate substantial progress in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corrup-
tion measures, and fundamental rights before advancing to other negotiation 
chapters.  The  rule-of-law  cluster  is  the  first  to  be  opened  and  the  last  to  be 
closed, ensuring that it remains a priority throughout the accession process.

This methodology, outlined in the European Commission’s Communica-
tion on EU Enlargement Policy,1 introduces a structured negotiation frame-
work (European Commission 2020). It emphasises reversibility, allowing the 
EU to pause or reverse progress in negotiations if a candidate country back-
slides on key reforms. Also, it introduces more frequent monitoring and clearer 
benchmarks to ensure accountability. However, the methodology also reflects 
the  EU’s  cautious  approach  to  further  enlargement,  shaped  by  the  lessons 
learned from the 2004 enlargement and subsequent challenges.2

While  the  methodology  represents  an  improvement  over  previous  ap-
proaches,  its  implementation  faces  significant  obstacles.  The  political  and 
economic  context  of  candidate  countries,  as  well  as  their  domestic  political 
dynamics,  can  hinder  the  implementation  of  reforms.  These  challenges  are 
particularly evident in the Western Balkans, where entrenched political elites 
operate within a stabilitocracy (Bieber 2017) —a system in which authoritarian 
tendencies are tolerated as long as leaders provide regional stability – hindering 
genuine  democratic  reforms.  Additionally,  economic  instability,  high  unem-
ployment rates, and public scepticism about the benefits of EU membership 
further weaken the momentum for reform, making the implementation of the 
EU’s requirements a slow and politically contentious process. Additionally, the 
EU’s  internal  divisions  and  the  rise  of  populist  movements  within  Member 
States undermine its credibility as a promoter of democracy. These factors raise 
questions about the long-term effectiveness of the new methodology and the 
future of EU enlargement.

1  European Commission, Communication on EU Enlargement Policy (COM(2020) 57 final), March 
5, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0057.

Michał Matlak167

The  EU’s  dual  role  as  both  a  promoter  of  democracy  and  an  institu-
tion  grappling  with  its  own  democratic  deficits  underscores  the  fundamen-
tal paradox at the heart of its governance model. While enlargement remains 
one  of  its  most  powerful  tools  for  fostering  democratic  transformation,  the 
limits  of  conditionality  –  particularly  post-accession  –  reveal  the  fragility  of 
the EU’s normative influence. The erosion of the rule of law in Member States 
like Poland and Hungary, coupled with Brussels’ struggles to enforce compli-
ance, illustrates how the Union’s credibility as a guardian of democracy is in-
creasingly being challenged from within. Moreover, the EU’s own democratic 
shortcomings – its perceived distance from citizens, reliance on technocratic 
decision-making, and lack of a true demos – further complicate its ability to 
lead by example. The introduction of rule-of-law conditionality and the revised 
enlargement methodology mark important institutional responses, but their 
effectiveness remains contingent on political will, strategic enforcement, and 
the Union’s ability to navigate the rising tide of Euroscepticism. 

The  Polish  case  exemplifies  both  the  successes  and  pitfalls  of  EU-led 
democratisation: while pre-accession conditionality drove significant reforms, 
post-accession political shifts exposed the limitations of external incentives in 
sustaining democratic norms. This broader trend raises critical questions about 
the future of European integration – whether the EU can reconcile its norma-
tive aspirations with political realities, whether it can reassert its legitimacy as 
a democratic actor, and ultimately, whether it can maintain cohesion in an era 
of internal fragmentation. If the EU fails to resolve these tensions, its model of 
democracy promotion may become increasingly unsustainable, undermining 
both its enlargement strategy and its foundational claim to be a union based on 
shared democratic values.

References

Balcer,  Adam,  Piotr  Buras,  Grzegorz  Gromadzki,  and  Eugeniusz  Smolar. 
Polacy wobec UE: koniec konsensusu (Poles towards the EU: The End of 
Consensus). Warsaw: Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, 2016.

Bieber, Florian. “What Is a Stabilitocracy?” Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory 
Group (BiEPAG), 5 May 2017. https://www.biepag.eu/blog/what-is-a-sta-
bilitocracy.

Tackling Democracy Deficits Across Candidates, Members, and Institutions168

CASE. Nasza Europa: 15 lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej (Our Europe: 15 Years 
of Poland in the European Union). Warsaw: CASE – Center for Social and 
Economic Research, 2019.

Dąbrowski,  Marek.  “Can  the  EU  Overcome  Its  Enlargement  Impasse?” 
Bruegel, 27 February 2020. https://www.bruegel.org/2020/02/can-the-eu-
overcome-its-enlargement-impasse.

European  Commission.  Communication  on  EU  Enlargement  Policy 
(COM(2020) 57 final). 5 March 2020. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0057.

European Court of Justice. “Press Release No 28/22: Measures for the Pro-
tection of the Union Budget: The Court of Justice, Sitting as a Full Court, 
Dismisses the Actions Brought by Hungary and Poland against the Con-
ditionality Mechanism Which Makes the Receipt of Financing from the 
Union Budget Subject to the Respect by the Member States for the Prin-
ciples of the Rule of Law.” European Court of Justice, 16 February 2022. 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2022-02/
cp220028en.pdf.

European Union. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of 16 December 2020 
on a General Regime of Conditionality for the Protection of the Union 
Budget.  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union  L  433I  (22  December 
2020): 1-10. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.

Foy, Henry, and Sam Fleming. “Poland’s Prime Minister Accuses EU of Making 
Demands with ‘Gun to Our Head’.” Financial Times, 24 October 2021. 
https://www.ft.com/content/ac57409d-20c9-4d65-9a5d-6661277cd9af.

Müller, Jan-Werner. Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Centu-

ry Europe. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.

Nicolaïdis, Kalypso. “European Demoicracy and Its Crisis.” Journal of Common 

Market Studies 51, no. 2 (2013): 351–369.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. “EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 
Enlargement.” In International Influence Beyond Conditionality: Postcom-

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munist  Europe  after  EU  Enlargement,  edited  by  Rachel  A.  Epstein  and 
Ulrich Sedelmeier, 105–23. London: Routledge, 2014.

Sedelmeier, Ulrich. “Political Safeguards against Democratic Backsliding in the 
EU: The Limits of Material Sanctions and the Scope of Social Pressure.” 
Journal of European Public Policy 24, no. 3 (2017): 337–351.

Staudinger,  Isabel.  “The  Rule  of  Law  Conditionality  Mechanism:  The 
Long-awaited Step Towards Enforcing EU Values?” European Papers 7, no. 
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version/EP_eJ_2022_2_SS2_5_Isabel_Staudinger_00595.pdf.

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jską  (The  Game  for  Europe:  Poland’s  Accession  Negotiations  with  the 
European  Union).  Warsaw:  Polski  Instytut  Spraw  Międzynarodowych, 
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Tackling Democracy Deficits Across Candidates, Members, and InstitutionsTowards ‘All Cardinal 
Directions’? At 
the Crossroads of 
Democracy and Foreign 
Policy in Slovakia’s 
Relationship with the EU

Lucia Mokrá*

Historically, over the last century, Slovakia has always been a part of common 
states, whether within the Habsburg Monarchy, Austro-Hungary or Czecho-
slovakia. The modern history of Slovakia began to be written only with the es-
tablishment of the sovereign republic in 1993, which from its beginnings was 
undergoing a process of transition towards democracy. The creation of a stable 
and democratic state that is part of the European and international structures 
has not been an easy path and, even after more than 30 years, it is still full of 
obstacles, challenges and has failed many times precisely because of the illiberal 
tendencies of political parties, their individual leaders or governments (Šimko 
2018; Kotian and Štulajter 2019). One would say that just overcoming such an 
obstacle on the road to the EU would be a lesson learned on mitigating undem-
ocratic and illiberal tendencies. However, the opposite turned out to be true: 

* 

 Lucia Mokrá is Professor of International and European Law and Dean of Faculty of Social and 
Economic Sciences at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia.

171

at the 20th anniversary of Slovakia’s EU membership, the country is once again 
at a crossroads between democratic values and the illiberal aspirations of the 
country’s political leadership.

En Route to Democracy and the European Union
In 1991, following the collapse of the communist regimes, Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic (CSFR, Czechoslovakia), Hungary, and Poland applied for 
EU  membership  (Mokrá  2017,  28),  framing  it  as  a  “return  to  Europe  after 
decades  of  enforced  isolation”  (European  Commission  1992,  70).  In  1992, 
Czechoslovakia  signed  the  ‘Europe  Agreement’,  but  dissolved  soon  after 
(Europe Agreement 1992). In 1993, Slovakia reaffirmed its desire for European 
integration, signing an Association Agreement with the European Communi-
ties (MZV ČR, 2021).

The Slovak republic faced significant challenges in achieving EU member-
ship, including building a market-oriented economy and democratic institu-
tions.  The  political  regime  was  unprepared  for  these  reforms,  leading  to  the 
creation of a government under Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, who had il-
liberal tendencies, resulting in the ‘Slovak long knife night’, when the parlia-
ment removed 38 people from important state posts after 12 hours of delib-
erations (National Council of the Slovak Republic 1994). The EU excluded 
Slovakia from the group discussing EU accession negotiations in 1997 due to 
instability in democracy, rule of law, human rights, and protection of minori-
ties (Mokrá and Kováčiková 2022). In 1998, the former Prime Minister’s party 
won the election but struggled to form a coalition due to previous illiberal ten-
dencies and political power abuse (Mokrá and Kováčiková 2022).

In 1998, the European Commission and the Slovak Republic confirmed 
the  Partnership  for  Accession  and  the  Slovak  National  Programme  for  the 
Adoption of the Acquis Communautaire (Úrad Vlády Slovenskej Republiky 
1998). The European Parliament recommended a flexible approach for Slova-
kia’s EU accession (European Parliament 2000). Slovakia was invited to start 
negotiations  at  the  Helsinki  summit  in  1999  and  pre-accession  negotiations 
concluded at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002, leading to the ad-
mission of ten new Member States in 2004 (European Council 1999, 2002; 
European Commission 1999; National Council of the Slovak Republic 2004). 
Slovakia ratified the accession by referendum with strong support of 92,46 per 
cent of those who participated (Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic 2003). 

Towards ‘All Cardinal Directions’? 172

Democratic Transition’s ‘Miracle’ and Beyond

As an EU Member State, the Slovak Republic is to respect the values and prin-
ciples set out in the founding Treaties. At the same time, in accordance with the 
Copenhagen criteria, it is to be a democratic country that respects the rule of 
law and human rights. Regardless of the rocky period during the accession talks 
(1994-1998), there has always been strong support for the EU and its values in 
the country, understanding the concept of cooperation, common values, and 
economic  prosperity.  That  confirms  also  increase  in  positive  public  opinion 
towards EU supported by 59.4 per cent of citizens at 1996 and 79 per cent in 
1998 (Institute of Public Affairs 1998). 

This positive relationship has gradually slightly declined in public support. 
This can be attributed to the lack of improvement of the living standard, fi-
nancial security, and salaries (Cingel 2024). Despite this, support for the EU 
in  Slovakia  has  never  fallen  below  50  per  cent.  Increasingly,  however,  there 
was also strong public support of the former communist regime, especially in 
relation to Russia as a ‘big brother’.

Hanging  on  to  the  past,  Slovakia  maintained  certain  economic  relations 
with Russia. Although some Slovak companies left the Russian market, espe-
cially at the end of the 1990s, ongoing relations were mainly focused on energy 
supplies and related commodities, as with other countries in the region. Bilat-
eral relations had been regulated by the Agreement on economic and scientif-
ic-technic cooperation between Slovakia and the Russian Federation, but re-
lations between the contracting countries were not equal (Government of the 
Slovak Republic 2006). Following the signing of a bilateral agreement in 2005, 
the deficit of international trade between Slovakia and the Russian Federation 
was SKK 73.333 billion (approximately EUR 2.43 billion) (SME Index 2005).

A cooling of relations with Russia up to 2014 culminated with a complete 
freeze  following  Russia’s  annexation  of  Crimea.  Slovakia  made  its  position 
clear  by  supporting  the  UN  General  Assembly  Resolution  calling  upon  all 
States not to recognise changes in the Crimea region’s status (United Nations 
General Assembly 2014). Slovakia considered Russia’s behaviour as a gross vio-
lation of international law (Spectator 2021) .

The official state’s strong support for EU sanctions against Russia was not 
always positively perceived by the public in Slovakia. Slovakia is considered one 
of the countries with a very strong public perception of Russia as the ‘good 
big brother’ and strong economic leader. As some experts argue, this percep-

Lucia Mokrá173

tion is misleadingly based on the historical legacy of Russia as a regional leader 
and, especially, counterpart to Western economies. However, in a 2020 public 
opinion  survey,  60  per  cent  of  Slovak  people  still  perceive  Russia  positively, 
which presents the second highest positive perception in the Central European 
Region (Huang and Chia 2020). As Duleba explained, “Slovaks used to have 
their own vision of Russia due to historical legacy and a priori expect positive 
relations” (Duleba 2020). This positive attitude toward Russia based on the 
image of the ‘Big Brother’ providing a helping hand is constantly broken by 
different affairs when Russia and its authorities do not respect the sovereign-
ty  of  other  states.  The  cyberattacks  and  disinformation  campaigns  had  also 
been identified by the Slovak authorities, and therefore three Russian diplo-
mats were expelled as persona non grata in October 2020 after the Slovak Infor-
mation Service published a report on hybrid threats and disinformation cam-
paigns (Mesežnikov 2020). 

However, today, Slovakia, with the current government, despite its clear an-
chorage in the EU and NATO, is presenting a new direction in foreign policy, 
i.e. a policy towards all four world directions and presenting again friendly re-
lations towards Russia.

Slovakia and EU: Swinging Relationship with Illiberal 
Hints

After Slovakia ‘settled in’ as the EU member within the institutional structures 
and decision-making, different interests that divided the society, also from the 
European perspective, gradually began to manifest themselves. While Slovakia 
had  never  used  its  veto  until  the  end  of  2024  in  the  decision-making  of  the 
European Council, it has in the Council of Ministers. The national clash between 
liberal and conservative forces, or some national (even nationalist) interests, has 
led in several cases to the good pupil also showing their rebellious side.

In the 2000s, Greece faced a financial crisis due to the 2008-2009 global 
financial  crisis  and  falsified  statistical  data.  The  EU,  the  European  Central 
Bank,  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund  announced  financial  assistance 
packages and economic reforms in May 2010. In July 2011, European leaders 
announced a second set of crisis response measures, including the strengthen-
ing of the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). The Slovak Republic was 
the last euro area country to ratify the documents related to the changes to the 
temporary and permanent euro area bailout. The SR did not support the EFSF 

Towards ‘All Cardinal Directions’? 174

increase in the first vote and did not express confidence in the national govern-
ment. This led to early parliamentary elections in spring 2012 and a re-vote on 
the EFSF in June 2012.

Additionally, in 2015, during the Council of interior ministers the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia opposed the adoption of a migrant 
relocation  mechanism.  Slovakia  and  Hungary  challenged  the  decision  on 
refugees’ quotas before the Court of Justice asking for annulling the decision, 
arguing it was procedurally error-ridden and not an appropriate response to 
the migration crisis. Advocate General Yves Bot argued that Article 78(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union allows the Council to 
adopt temporary measures in response to the migration crisis, without infring-
ing on EU legislative procedure. The CJEU dismissed the actions of Slovakia 
and Hungary, concerning the redistribution of 120,000 refugees. The CJEU 
argued  that  the  compulsory  quota  mechanism  contributed  to  Greece  and 
Italy’s ability to cope with the 2015 migrant crisis.

The Slovak-EU relations failed due to the purchase of the Russian Sputnik 
V vaccine without recognition by EMA, which was used politically in fighting 
COVID-19. Prime-minister Igor Matovič signed a contract against coalition 
partners and EU coordinated action, leading to his replacement in March 2021 
(Tódová 2021). The vaccine was used from June to August 2021, for approxi-
mately 10,500 people, before the rest of this delivery was repurchased by Russia.

Democracy on the Edge – Foreign Policy ‘to All 
Cardinal Directions’

The Covid-19 pandemic in Slovakia affected public health and political affairs. 
Prime Minister Igor Matovic’s government changed, and his successor stepped 
down  in  2023.  A  ‘government  of  officials’  was  appointed  but  had  limited 
powers. The SMER party won early elections, which formed a coalition with 
the party Hlas and the Slovak National Party.

In  September  2024,  the  Slovak  government  signed  a  Joint  Declaration 
declaring Slovakia’s strong anchorage in the EU and NATO. The document 
aimed to serve as a ‘legacy’ and safeguard against Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. 
However, the escalation of the conflict led to a contradictory approach, ques-
tioning the scope of sanctions against Russia. As stated in the Analysis of the 
dissemination of deceptive and misleading content related to the 2023 Slovak 
National Council elections by the Centre for Combating Hybrid Threats of the 

Lucia Mokrá175

Slovak Ministry of the Interior, “cooperation with social networks and online 
platforms was insufficient with the increased intensity and severity of the dis-
semination of deceptive and misleading information just before and during the 
election day” (Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic 2023). Transpar-
ency Slovakia offered the same assessment, stating that even the election mora-
torium did not prevent the spread of misinformation that could have impacted 
voters (Piško, Hilbertová, Kostelanský 2023). Such was visible also in the 2024 
presidential  and  European  elections  campaign  was  marked  by  the  so-called 
‘Russian card’ and by the presentation of how media space, populism, and dis-
information can impact elections.

All these events, the manner of the intervention, and the hybrid threats that 
had an impact on the course of the election campaign were, on the one hand, a 
warning to the EU and, on the other hand, reinforced the narrative of the ruling 
coalition in relation to Russia. Thus, despite 20 years of EU membership and 
a memorandum of clear anchoring in the EU and NATO structures, Slovakia, 
under its current leadership, has begun to pursue a so-called foreign policy to ‘all 
cardinal directions’, including Russia, regardless of EU’s several sanctions mech-
anisms since 2022. The so-called argumentation of ‘Slovak national interests’ and 
the negative impact due to the cessation of the transit of Russian gas through 
the Ukrainian territory from 1 January 2025 has played into the hands of the 
ruling establishment. It has publicly argued that unless the EU secures the re-
sumption of Russian gas supplies via Ukraine to Slovakia and onwards to the 
EU, it will do so itself. That is why first a ministerial delegation from Slovakia 
visited St. Petersburg, and then the Prime Minister personally negotiated with 
the Russian President at the end of 2024. While the content of the meeting has 
not been clearly communicated by both the government and the Foreign Office 
to date, one message is clear. Since this visit, the Slovak government has begun to 
communicate much more intensively its positive attitude towards Russia, Slova-
kia’s relationship with Russia, including the alternative of leaving the EU.

The illiberal tendencies of the government establishment continue in 2025, 
with several legislative proposals or policies and measures aimed at curtailing 
fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of assembly, freedom of 
expression, and the right to family and private life. So once again, Slovakia is 
twisting its position in the EU and the current government with its actions and 
decisions threatens the system of liberal democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights, i.e. the values, the EU is founded on.

Towards ‘All Cardinal Directions’? 176

Conclusion

Since its foundation, the Slovak Republic has had clear pro-European and pro-in-
tegration  orientations.  In  the  same  way,  although  support  for  Slovakia’s  EU 
membership has had its swings, a strong positive narrative has always prevailed.

However, after joining the EU, the Slovak Republic has repeatedly shown 
through  its  leadership  that  it  does  not  always  stand  by  its  clearly  articulated 
values and principles. Several historical events confirm that illiberal tendencies 
of the government and the ‘national interest’ emerge when individual ambi-
tions and populism are used as tools of political competition.

However, with the strong public support, the EU is particularly important, 
considered  as  one  of  the  alternatives,  especially  if  the  national  government’s 
narrative  tended  to  follow  illiberal  trajectories  –  which  ultimately  led  to  its 
manifestation, like the visit of the Slovak political delegation to Petersburg and 
Moscow in 2024. This would require immediate action from the EU’s side by 
initiating the discussion with the highest political representation, followed by 
the political or economic sanctions. Otherwise, the threat of the next ‘exit’ and 
shortcut to illiberal, even autocratic regime is of the high risk.

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Towards ‘All Cardinal Directions’? The role of the 
European Union in (De)
Democratising Its ‘New’ 
Members: Insights from 
Slovenia

Ana Bojinović Fenko2

With the establishment of its own statehood in 1991, Slovenia created a demo-
cratic polity. Democratic values prevailed in the course of a decade-long struggle 
for liberalisation spearheaded by local social movements, against the backdrop 
of strong societal, economic, and cultural cross-border links with the neigh-
bouring Italy and Austria. Even before independence, European Union (EU) 
values were seen as protecting the survival of the Slovenian state, its prosperi-
ty, and its social values. Slovenia, once a model of EU accession, experienced 
a brief decline in democratic performance during the right-wing government 
from 2020 to 2022. Thanks to the overwhelming commitment of civil society 
and  the  swift  and  effective  criticism  of  the  EU’s  democratic  control  institu-
tions, this period of slippage ended within two years, and Slovenia has since 
returned to its self-positioning as ‘core Europe state’ and to its Euro-optimist 
stance.

2 

 Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences.

181

Illiberal Synergies

For  Slovenia,  membership  in  the  European  governmental  organisations  that 
ensure regional peace, security, and justice – and drive the liberal world order – 
is the most important external factor in ensuring a democratic society of states. 
These external settings also serve as a benchmark and provision for domestic 
democratic  practices.  The  domestic  factor  of  liberalism  is  a  vigorous  civil 
society that cultivates a strong Euro-optimist attitude based on a historically 
formed national identity of a Kulturnation (Bojinović Fenko, Keil, and Šabič 
2023). Slovenians have had strong links with Western European societies via 
people-to-people  contacts  (cross-border  communities  of  national  minorities 
in Italy and Austria) and via outward economic orientation towards Western 
European  markets  since  the  1970s,  which  led  to  a  shift  in  domestic  values 
towards party pluralism and a market economy in the 1980s. As this process 
was  driven  by  social  movements  advocating  liberalisation,  it  was  referred  to 
as  ‘retrieving  revolution’  towards  party  pluralism  and  market  economy  (Toš 
1993). 

The EU’s economic and financial crisis revealed Slovenia’s vulnerability to 
following  internalised  EU  norms  in  its  foreign  policy  in  the  face  of  a  major 
national interest challenge ‘caused’ by the EU itself. For example, in November 
2012 Slovenia abstained from voting on the Palestinian observer status in the 
United Nations General Assembly, which was related to the United States’ fi-
nancial rescue of the high state budget deficit. Again, in March 2012, Slovenia 
vetoed  in  the  Council  of  the  EU  the  sanctions  proposed,  in  the  form  of  a 
visa blacklist, against individuals allegedly tied to human rights violations in 
Belarus, as one of the names on the list was involved in a business deal with 
an  important  Slovenian  firm  (Bojinović  Fenko  and  Lovec  2015).  A  further 
turning point in the democratic backsliding was the migration crisis in 2015, 
because right-wing opposition parties securitised the issue of migration. The 
then  government  managed  to  contain  the  anti-European  rhetoric  through  a 
strategic move: though the government did placate the anti-immigration fears 
by building a barbed wire fence on a sensitive segment of the Slovenian-Croa-
tian border, it did so by appealing to a common EU solution to the migration 
challenges (Požgan and Bojinović Fenko 2022, 176).

The  weakening  of  the  liberal  world  order  impacted  all  Central  and  East 
European  countries  (CEECs)  (Mearsheimer  2019).  In  a  comparative  study, 
Bojinović Fenko and Kočan (2023) established that CEECs, emulating illiber-
al trends from Russia and specifically the United States of America (US) since 

The role of the European Union in (De)Democratising Its ‘New’ Members182

2014,  have  omitted  the  legislative  branch  from  policy  planning  and  mostly 
issued  strategic  foreign  policy  documents  in  the  form  of  a  government  pro-
grammes or a foreign ministry papers. This reduced the possibility of building 
a  wide  domestic  consensus  and,  in  effect,  contributed  to  the  potential  for  
executive  aggrandisement.  In  substance,  a  notable  shift  occurred  from  the 
previous consensus on the US’s role as a liberal hegemon. CEECs expressed 
worry about the serious difficulties with the Western-led multilateralism; they 
became  silent  on  the  US  exuded  world  leadership  or  mentioned  other  com-
peting  powers;  and  they  made  strong  calls  to  respect  the  fundamental  prin-
ciples of international law, listing particular EU values to be upheld. Slovenia 
under the 2020-2022 government, in particular, abandoned the shelter-seeking 
strategy of the EU for a new strategy of status-seeking in a like-minded Visegrad 
group. This group was composed of four CEECs with, at the time, right or ex-
treme-right, anti-liberal, and Eurosceptic governments.

The illiberal challenge in Slovenia started in March 2020, when the then 
government resigned and a new one was formed under the leadership of Prime 
Minister  Janez  Janša  from  the  SDS  (Slovenska  demokratska  stranka  –  Slove-
nian Democratic Party), lasting until April 2022. This period of domestical-
ly driven illiberalism directly coincided with COVID-19 pandemic. The gov-
ernment expressed a partially deconstructive Euro-optimism, especially in the 
discourse on sovereignty and legitimacy (Požgan, Bojinović Fenko and Kočan 
2025). “Instead of capitalising on its second Council presidency (from July to 
December 2021) – Slovenia has moved towards the EU periphery and joined 
the  group  of  ‘Europeanisation  spoilers’  from  CEE,  most  notably  Hungary 
and Poland” (Požgan and Bojinović Fenko 2022). However, in comparison to 
the illiberal practices of governing parties in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, Janša’s government only partially, and for a rather limited time, suc-
ceeded in implementing illiberalism. Fink-Hafner (2024, 139) lists illiberal con-
stitutional changes and restrictions to the freedom of expression: attempts at 
incremental regime change, the political practice of illiberal legality, diminish-
ing the role of the National Assembly, limiting or obstructing the opposition, 
attempts at limiting the independence of the judiciary, shrinking civil liberties 
via restrictions, including the use of unprecedented physical violence at public 
protests, state capture via own oligarchic networks, a tendency to rule by gov-
ernmental decrees, supporting biased media in favour of incumbents, restrict-
ing independent media and funding/cultivating conservative civil society and 
pressure on opposing NGOs. Yet, the SDS lost support “because of its ties with 
the Orbán regime, and this can be partly attributed to the public’s rejection of 

Ana Bojinović Fenko183

illiberalism” since the support of the Slovenian public for independent judici-
ary, media, and civil society is very strong, just slightly below the EU average on 
each of the issues (Lovec, Kočan, and Roškar 2022, 31). 

De-democratisation of Slovenia mostly manifested during various EU crises, 
which, as noted by Lovec, Kočan, and Roškar, exposed the vulnerability to il-
liberalism  and  authoritarian  trends  of  the  transition  countries  (2022,  39).  In 
Slovenia, illiberalism was overcome by civil society – a traditionally strong and 
active actor in domestic politics, which voted for a liberal party in 2022 to return 
Slovenia to a Euro-optimist stance (Požgan, Bojinović Fenko, and Kočan 2025).

The EU as an Agent of (De)Democratisation

Slovenian people experienced life in a democracy for the first time in history after 
establishing their own state in June 1991. Paradoxically, even before fully assuming 
statehood, Slovenians were eager to engage in the EU and transfer full sovereignty to 
collective decision-making. Rather than as an elite project, Slovenia’s EU member-
ship bid was undertaken as a collective wager of historic importance for the country’s 
society and economy (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2022). 

An important factor in understanding the EU’s role in liberalisation has been 
the process of political and economic transformation from communism and social-
ism to market economy and democracy. In this transformation, the “EU’s neolib-
eral capitalism promotion did not lead to Slovenia’s immediate or full convergence 
with the proposed policies; on the contrary, full privatisation to foreign companies 
along with strict flexibilisation of the labour market and privatisation of the state-
owned banks and companies, was only completed during the sovereign debt crisis of 
2008” (Hočevar 2023, 9). Furthermore, Lovec and Crnčec (2014) show that shortly 
after Slovenia’s accession to the EU, when EU conditionality had diminished, quan-
titative  indicators  measuring  institutional  quality  (democracy,  perception  of  cor-
ruption, freedom of the press, rule of law) began to reveal certain shortcomings and 
pointed to the problem of shallow Europeanisation. This trend can be explained by 
the implementation of more liberal economic and democratic policies immediate-
ly after accession, but also by the inability of political institutions to solve the tran-
sition related to corruption, clientelism, and inefficient judicial procedures (Lovec 
and Crnčec 2014, 245). With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, not only 
did political institutions prove to be inefficient in dealing with the above-mentioned 
problems, but also they were further impaired by the adverse economic, social, and 
political effects of the crisis. 

The role of the European Union in (De)Democratising Its ‘New’ Members184

Crises within the EU had an important impact on Slovenia and its people. 
Slovenian national identity is seen as complementary to the European identity. 
Slovenians  feel  positive  about  the  EU  even  in  times  of  crises.  However,  when 
specific groups feel negative consequences of such crises, they develop negative 
attitudes towards those whom they believe to be responsible. This responsibili-
ty is often labelled as ‘Brussels’ (Lovec, Kočan, and Roškar 2022, 39). However, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, the two-level blaming game no longer worked, 
partially also due to the EU institutions’ direct concern over illiberal Slovenian 
government.  This  concern  was  expressed  via  two  documents  –  the  European 
Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report in Slovenia and the European Parlia-
ment Resolution of 16 December 2021 on Fundamental Rights and the Rule 
of Law in Slovenia – and reflected in the domestic political discourse and subse-
quent political choices (Bojinović Fenko and Svetličič 2022).

A Pragmatism towards Russia 

Slovenia’s political and historical reality of a longue durée reveals its dissimilari-
ty vis-à-vis the other Yugoslav successor states and post-Soviet CEECs. Slovenia 
is one of the few US and NATO allies known for having non-problematic re-
lations with Russia. As argued by Benedejčič (2016, 1160), this was something 
that the Slovenian governments tried to present as a ‘comparative advantage’ 
when pursuing NATO membership already in 1997. Russia has never played 
the role of a Great Power in the Slovenian territory; thus, in Slovenia, there is 
no negative historical political baggage related to Russia. In bilateral relations, 
the most relevant elements are trade and culture. In Slovenian domestic society, 
Russian culture is understood as legitimate in terms of common Slavic roots, 
but this positive element displays very limited influence in daily political life 
(Bojinović Fenko and Kočan 2023, 228). 

Another  important  difference  between  Slovenia  and  most  CEECs  is  its 
energy independence from Russian gas supplies. The share of Russian gas in 
the energy mix is low, and the volume of long-term contracts traditionally con-
cluded directly with Russian gas producers is declining. Furthermore, Slovenia 
would not be affected in a scenario in which Russian gas supplies are interrupt-
ed (Crnčec and Bojinović Fenko 2022, 17). Jirušek (2017, 178–185) confirmed 
that  Russian  gas  supplies  were  not  politicised,  and  there  were  no  reports  of 
Russian interventions.

Ana Bojinović Fenko185

Slovenia pursues a foreign policy of friendly pragmatism towards Russia. 
Russia  is  labelled  as  an  “important  market  for  Slovenia”,  and  following  the 
annexation of Crimea, Russia was identified in the Slovenian Foreign Policy 
strategy of 2015 as “a European state for which Slovenia will make long-term 
endeavours  to  bring  it  into  the  orbit  of  shared  European  values”  (Bojinović 
Fenko and Kočan 2023, 236). For example, after the poisoning of Sergei and 
Yulia Skripal in Salisbury in March 2018, Slovenia decided not to follow the 
other  16  EU  Member  States  and  the  US,  which  expelled  Russian  diplomats 
from  their  countries  due  to  Russia’s  alleged  involvement  in  the  affair  (Boji-
nović Fenko and Kočan 2023, 237). The most politicised element of Russian 
intrusion into Slovenian domestic politics was the possible construction of the 
South Stream gas pipeline. Slovenia was to become one of the countries along 
the  South  Stream  on  which  an  intergovernmental  agreement  was  signed  in 
November 2009 and high-level visits, including Prime Minister Putin in March 
2011, took place (Crnčec and Bojinović Fenko 2022, 21). Although Slovenia, 
on  its  own  initiative,  sought  European  Commission’s  legal  advice  on  this  
bilateral agreement and received the green light, due to the strategic politici-
sation  of  the  EU  as  a  global  actor,  the  Commission  considered  all  intergov-
ernmental South Stream agreements to be in breach of the EU energy frame-
work.  The  agreements  were  subsequently  annulled  (Bojinović  Fenko  and 
Kočan 2023, 23). In 2023, Slovenia had an Embassy in Moscow, three Consu-
lates general, three Honorary Consuls (altogether seven institutions), whereas 
Russia had an Embassy in Ljubljana, five Consulates, five Honorary Consuls, 
and a Centre for the Promotion of Russian Culture (altogether twelve insti-
tutions)  (Bojinović  Fenko  and  Kočan  2023,  246).  As  diplomatic  sanctions 
against the Russian war in Ukraine, no serious cuts were made to these institu-
tions except for a small (three persons) reciprocal reduction in the number of 
state representatives stationed in the embassies (Senior Official at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, 2024).

Democratic Performance and Vulnerability to 
Illiberalism: Three Takeaways from a Small State

Slovenia’s  case  of  democratic  performance  and  vulnerability  to  illiberalism 
stand as a lesson and a warning to other smaller states seeking to strengthen or 
preserve their democratic institutions from domestic and international threats 
(Baldacchino and Wivel 2020, pp. 7-10). First, cosmopolitanism (EU values) 
has prevailed over nationalism even before statehood. Second, small and tightly 

The role of the European Union in (De)Democratising Its ‘New’ Members186

knit political and economic elites prone to illiberalism groupthink have been 
sufficiently counterbalanced by proactive vigorous civil society restoring liberal 
values. Third, Slovenia does not see its strong dependence on European institu-
tions as a loss of national autonomy; rather, it defines such an identity-comple-
mentarity as a mechanism of assuring democratic standards. These are the key 
elements that prevented the growth of illiberalism in Slovenia. 

They will likely be reflected in the broader geopolitical environment during 
the  second  term  of  Donald  Trump  as  US  President.  Trump’s  first  presiden-
cy has contributed to political illiberalism. In Slovenia, Prime Minister Janša’s 
starstruck  fandom  of  Trump  has  been  widely  mocked,  from  which  it  is  to 
be  expected  that  Trump’s  second  presidency  will  not  substantially  influence 
the  domestic  political  developments  in  the  country.  Rather,  one  can  expect 
Trump’s administration to affect la grande politique, to which Slovenia con-
tributes its voice chiefly via multilateral coordination within the EU. In that 
respect,  one  could  foresee  that  Slovenia  will  instead  try  to  strengthen  liberal 
values within the EU and contribute to the EU’s support of liberal agenda in 
its immediate neighbourhood, namely in the Western Balkan states.

References

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Ana Bojinović FenkoFrom the Periphery to 
the Centre: Transnational 
Networks in Central and 
Eastern Europe

Alexander Mesarovich*1

Twenty years on from EU accession, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a very 
different place. On average, people are richer and live longer, the air is cleaner, 
transport is easier and quicker, and the lovely cities of the region are thronged 
with tourists (World Bank 2025). Although challenges remain and economic 
convergence has not uniformly come to pass, the people of the region are gen-
erally living the European dream. However, with the rise of the populist radical 
right  (see  recent  elections  in  Slovakia  and  Poland;  Priebus  2024;  Armeanu 
2025;  Anghel  2024)  and  declining  levels  of  democracy  (such  as  in  Hungary 
under Orbán; Buzogány 2017), you would be forgiven for not knowing this.

What  explains  this  discrepancy  and  what  role  has  the  EU  played  in  the 
regions  dramatic  social  and  economic  transformation,  and  in  the  observed 
backsliding?  Although  a  full  answer  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  short  piece, 
one often overlooked factor is the role of transnational networks in influenc-
ing  political  outcomes  both  in  the  CEE  region  and  more  widely.  By  joining 
the EU, the countries of CEE had the opportunity, capacity, and legitimacy 
to engage more fully with EU-wide and transnational networks. While initial-
ly positive for the region and for democracy, shifts in the political character of 

* 

 Alexander Mesarovich is Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy.

190

such networks have, instead, enabled democratic backsliding and helped to le-
gitimise illiberal public policy. In this chapter, I detail some of the history and 
evolution  of  transnational  networks  as  they  have  passed  through  the  region, 
and how the countries of the region have been impacted by and also shaped 
such networks.

Socialisation and Democratic Practices

Joining  the  EU  is,  at  the  most  basic  level,  an  institutional  process,  involving 
the updating of rules, regulations, and procedures. However, it is also a social 
practice, whereby policymakers in candidate states are socialised into EU-prac-
tice,  or  ‘Europeanised’.  This  social  process  is  driven  by  interaction,  with  in-
dividuals  being  socialised  into  EU  norms  of  behaviour  and  logic  of  action 
through repeated visits, trainings, and inclusion in EU networks (Mesarovich 
2023). While these social practices changed upon membership, as the candi-
date states had now officially become ‘Europeanised’, they did not diminish in 
relevance and actually increased in intensity. Indeed, the new Member States 
were now regularly included in a variety of institutional and informal transna-
tional networks, enabled by EU membership (Kaiser 2009; Bocse 2015).

From  this  inclusion,  novel  forms  of  transnational  coalition-building 
emerged.  Alongside  more  regular  connection  via  Europarties  and  participa-
tion in EU institutions, novel coalitions of CEE-CEE actors emerged to lobby 
for regional interests. Such connections often began with a pro-EU agenda or 
framework. For example, the creation of the Visegrád Group was coupled with 
new scholarships and funding opportunities to increase the regional integration 
of the four Member States and increase scholarly and social contact. However, 
as time passed these same groups became increasingly captured by anti-reform 
forces (Végh 2018). For example, failures in gas market reform, coupled with 
the costs of transitioning away from it as an energy source, enabled transna-
tional  networks  of  companies  and  policymakers  to  resist  moving  away  from 
Russian gas (Kazantsev 2012). 

Politically, as the 2010s developed, the CEE region became increasingly a 
hub for transnational populist radical right or illiberal networks. The region 
became  a  central  part  of  the  anti-gender  or  anti-refugee  block  in  the  EU, 
providing  inspiration  and  guidance  for  allied  politicians  both  in  the  region 
and  in  the  West.  Poland,  for  example,  became  a  global  hub  of  anti-abortion 
activism, with groups as far removed as the US contributing time and resourc-

Alexander Mesarovich191

es to support further restrictions on abortion (Kocemba 2023). The electoral 
success of Orbán in Hungary or PiS in Poland, created new homes for trans-
national illiberal networks in the region as well as increased financing and re-
sources (Buzogány and Varga 2021; Buzogány 2017). Despite criticisms by the 
European Commission and the Venice Commission, CEE became a ‘laborato-
ry of illiberalism’ (Krekó and Enyedi 2018), helping to create policy entrepre-
neurs and networks of illiberal activists dedicated to restricting the freedom of 
media,  rolling  back  freedom  of  association,  and  restricting  immigration  and 
the rights of LGBTIQ+ individuals (Knott 2018; Enyedi 2016; Bartha, Boda, 
and Szikra 2020). Collectively, the once staunchly pro-EU, pro-reform region 
became one of contestation of core EU principles like democracy, liberalism, or 
the rule of law (Blauberger and Sedelmeier 2024).

Socialising New Candidate States?

Legitimised  by  EU  membership,  these  networks  of  actors  were  then  able  to 
support ideological brethren in the candidate states. These anti-reform practic-
es could be, then, passed on to candidate states, with networks providing essen-
tial information and support to anti-reform actors (Parau 2010). When coupled 
with strong transnational connexions from outside the region, and proactive 
misinformation and electoral interference from authoritarian regimes (primar-
ily Russia) (Tyushka and Schumacher 2022), anti-reform actors in candidate 
countries became increasingly powerful (Soyaltin-Colella 2023). Furthermore, 
it became increasingly difficult for the EU to promote democratic reform and 
the rule of law externally while suffering from its own, internal, democratic and 
rule of law crisis (Emmons and Pavone 2021; Elbasani and Šelo Šabić 2018). 
This contributed to a breakdown in the core mechanics of socialisation which 
are supposed to underpin the EU enlargement process.

While not the sole factor, this had a detrimental effect on the process of en-
largement. Candidate states pretended to reform, and the EU pretended to be 
interested in enlargement (Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019; Kmezić 2019). EU 
Member States also got more actively involved, and not always for the better, 
such as with the French veto on the opening of accession talks with Albania 
and  North  Macedonia,  which  severely  hampered  the  EU’s  credibility  in  the 
Western Balkans (BBC News 2019; Geddes and Taylor 2016). This situation 
continued until the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, when en-
largement returned to the top of the agenda, with EU membership now open 
to  Ukraine,  Moldova,  and  Georgia  for  the  first  time  (Anghel  and  Džankić 

From the Periphery to the Centre: Transnational Networks in Central and Eastern Europe192

2023; Griessler 2023). In these circumstances, CEE states played a mixed role 
in the European perspective of the candidate countries. Close Hungarian-Ser-
bian  and  Hungarian-Bosnian  relations  helped  to  support  the  accession  pro-
cesses of the two states (Balkan Insight 2021a; Balkan Insight 2021b), but to 
the  detriment  of  their  democratic  character  and  broader  reform  agenda.  Al-
ternatively, Bulgaria has taken on the role of spoiler in blocking North Mac-
edonia’s  accession  negotiations  under  the  guise  of  protecting  the  Bulgarian 
minority  community,  a  role  which  Orbán  has  been  keen  to  play  in  Ukraine 
regarding the small Hungarian minority community there (Balogh and Kovály 
2024; Kamberi 2023). That current members leverage their position in bilater-
al disputes is not a new phenomenon (Geddes and Taylor 2016), but the deeper 
entanglement of illiberal networks is new. The flight of former North Macedo-
nian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski to Hungary, where he received political 
asylum from corruption charges back in North Macedonia, is exemplary of the 
mixed role which CEE states have played in the political and economic develop-
ment of the candidate countries (Karišik 2021; Euronews 2022).

Conclusions

Twenty years on from EU accession, the CEE states have taken advantage of 
the range of benefits which the EU offers. From increasing economic prosper-
ity to liberalised travel and integration in a whole range of transnational com-
munities and networks, the countries of the region have become integral parts 
of  the  EU.  Unfortunately,  this  process  has  not  resulted  in  continuing  dem-
ocratic  consolidation  and  reform  but,  instead,  provided  cover  and  resources 
to those who would challenge or resist these processes. Ironically, this ability 
to resist reform is a direct outcome of prior successful reform and integration 
processes, enabled by the very liberal internationalism which such illiberal or 
populist radical right groups rail against. In turn, the countries of CEE play a 
role in further socialising and influencing the new candidate states, sometimes 
supporting and other times opposing reform actors. 

Thus, twenty years on from accession, the CEE region remains a site of po-
litical, ideological, and geopolitical contestation. Although networks of liberal 
reformist actors remain, they are increasingly opposed by illiberal and author-
itarian  networks  who  have  learned  from  the  successes  and  failures  of  other 
would-be authoritarians and illiberals, by creating a ‘reactionary internation-
al’ to foster best practice (Progressive International n. d.). The EU, scholars, 
and policymakers must be vigilant regarding these groups, and not accept at 

Alexander Mesarovich193

face value the claims of local authenticity voiced by populist radical-right actors 
within the region. Further, it is essential that the EU and reform-minded pol-
icymakers  and  scholars  support  local  activists  and  political  parties  in  candi-
date states in breaking the ‘stabilitocracy’ cycle of the previous decade. Only 
through fostering deep, durable reform both in the CEE region and in candi-
date states can the institutions of the region successfully weather the stormy 
geopolitical winds of our current era.

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Alexander MesarovichEpilogue: From the 
‘External’ to the 
‘Internal’ Threats to 
Democracy

Vuk Uskoković*

The papers collected in this volume were presented in December 2024 at the 
workshop  held  in  the  Robert  Schuman  Centre  of  the  European  University 
Institute.  The  workshop,  under  the  title  “The  Geopolitics  of  Democracy”, 
explored the interplay between geopolitics and the decline of ‘new democra-
cies’ in Eastern and Southeastern Europe within what, at the time, still seemed 
a durable if for a while tottering international order. It was hard to imagine – 
though the war in Ukraine, the genocidal carnage in Gaza, and the election of 
Donald Trump on a rising right-wing tide across the ‘old democracies’ could 
have suggested otherwise – just how quickly and how steeply in the coming 
months this order would undergo decline at its very core. When in February 
2025, at the 61st Munich Security Conference, the new American administra-
tion  outrightly  rejected  the  possibility  of  Ukraine’s  NATO  membership,  on 
the  side  of  delivering  scathing  remarks  on  the  state  of  ‘free  speech’  and  mi-
gration in Europe, the Conference was concluded by its chairman Christoph 
Heusgen with a lament over the loss of common values between the two shores 
of the Atlantic alliance (Chassany, Pitel, and Foy 2024; Xinhua 2025). The de-
mocracy of the ‘old democracies’ hardly seems now some inherent, unalienable 

* 

 Vuk Uskoković is a research assistant at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, 
Florence.

198

attribute and state of theirs, to be graciously imparted upon the ‘transitioning’ 
ones. This had been one of the glum conclusions afforded by the specific optics 
assumed by the workshop of December 2024.23

The workshop sought to relate the dynamics of (de)democratisation in the 
peripheral areas of the European Union to the influence and strategies of global 
power-players. This was not aimed at finding a purely geopolitical explanation 
to the democratic decline of Central and Southeastern Europe – which would 
effectively  amount  to  securitisation,  and  thereby  negation,  of  democracy  as 
such. Rather, the idea was to reconsider the problem of the transformation of 
formerly socialist countries into liberal democracies from within the networks 
and linkages of power, influence, and interdependence forged in the process, 
across the often essentialised boundaries between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ (the 
‘core’ and ‘non-core’ Europe in the iteration of Habermas and Derrida [2003]), 
the established and the defective democracies, and even their supposedly diver-
gent temporalities.1 Indeed, in the back of various theories of democratic trans-
formation there runs a common temporal framework which understands the 
process as ‘synchronisation’, or catching up, of the laggard time of the other 
Europe with the current time of the Western Europe.2 Where the latter time 
flows upwardly and progressively, the other, sluggish time seems ever to be at 
risk of slipping back into the past. In such hierarchically structured temporal-
ities, agency is also conceived in terms of subordination: a successful outcome 
of  the  ‘synchronisation’  is  primarily  predicated  on  the  capacity  of  Western 
Europe to pull the Eastern counterpart into its timeline. The instruments of 
this ‘synchronisation’ are usually thought to be strong institutions (whether 
national, international, or nongovernmental) and free markets, both operating 
within the rule of law and a democratic political culture. Once transplanted 
into transitioning countries, these instruments were expected gradually but in-
eluctably to replicate the wealth, wellbeing, and orderliness of the ‘old democ-
racies’. When the desired result failed after decades to materialise, the blame 
was either to be lain on the failed agency of the EU itself or, slipping back into 

1  The classic studies on the ‘invention’ of Eastern Europe are Wolff (1994), Todorova (2007 [1997]), 
Goldsworthy (1998). These works have reverberated strongly across scholarship dealing with East-
ern Europe. Some of the relevant works to remember here are Neumann (1999), Kuus (2004), Diez 
(2004), Melegh (2006), Scott (2006), Nicolaïdis, Sèbe, and Maas (2015), and Del Sarto and Tholens 
(2020).

2  For a discussion on the issue of temporality and EU enlargement see Vukasović (2025), Abazi and 
Doja (2017), and Avery (2009). The last article was part of a special edition of Journal of European 
Public Policy dedicated to temporality in EU integration; the volume was subsequently published in 
Goetz and Meyer-Sahling (2012).

Vuk Uskoković199

Orientalist discourse, on the fundamental incorrigibility of the other Europe. 
To avoid oscillating between the two, the idea behind this workshop had been 
to refocus on the spatial aspects of (de)democratisation instead of treating it as 
a temporal issue, one of incremental advancement or ‘backsliding’.

In this, the workshop built upon, among other things, a by now sizable body 
of scholarship which in the past years has sought to understand the rise of ‘sta-
bilocracies’ in the Western Balkans – and of illiberal governments in formerly 
consolidated democracies of Central Europe – in terms of the policies pursued 
vis-à-vis these regions from Brussels (Džankić, Keil, and Kmezić 2019; Bieber 
2020). The relations between the EU and its peripheral regions cannot be un-
derstood as merely a technical, one-way process of institutional and cultural 
synchronisation, thwarted by socialist-era atavisms and local vested interest. In 
fact, local ‘illiberal’ and undemocratic powerbases were often built up through 
cooperation with the EU (and the United States).3 The most recent volume in 
this line of scholarship documented in some detail the services provided by the 
financial market of London in legalising and managing the ill-gotten and corrup-
tive wealth of post-communist elites (Heathershaw, Prelec, and Mayne 2025). 
But to think of ‘democratic backsliding’ in the EU’s neighbourhood in terms 
of the EU’s own failure to promote democracy effectively and consistently is, in 
a sense, to reinforce the temporal hierarchies that this particular line of scholar-
ship seeks to challenge. The term itself – ‘backsliding’ – is indicative of a way of 
thinking that conceived democratic erosion as temporal regression rather than 
as a present-day outcome of structural constraints and (geo-)political linkages.

To focus on such linkages as a new perspective of understanding (de)democ-
ratisation was the specific optics of the workshop of December 2024. Whether 
in  preparing  individual  reports  on  the  six  Western  Balkan  candidates  or  in 
considering the state of democracy in the Central Eastern European Member 
States, the participants of the workshop tried to identify the geopolitical strat-
egies, channels of influence, and economic presence of non-EU actors as these 
could have affected democratic decline. Such an approach revealed, instead of 
neatly demarcated worlds of established, ‘old’ democracies and the struggling, 
ever backsliding news ones, a unified political space of complex and unequal 
entanglements and interdependences. 

3  Consider e.g. the curious case of Montenegro (Clapp 2024).

Epilogue: From the ‘External’ to the ‘Internal’ Threats to Democracy200

The firm integration of the EU’s peripheries within its markets and its sphere 
of influence is one of the recurrent themes of most of the volume’s contribu-
tions.4 The presence of external actors, even if at times not negligible, was not 
such to have challenged either that integration or to have substantially contrib-
uted to democratic erosion. Milica Uvalić’s contribution on the broad geoeco-
nomics of the Western Balkan candidate countries has made this abundantly 
clear, as did, in greater detail, individual contributions on these countries. In 
fact – and this was another recurrent theme – the single most frequently iden-
tified hub of illiberalism and antidemocratic influence came from within the 
boundaries of the EU, namely Hungary under Viktor Orbán. A careful look 
at  ‘external’  sources  of  democratic  decline  thus  foregrounded  the  ‘internal’  
democratic deficiencies of an (unequally) integrated Europe.

Orbán’s  regime  as  a  major  source  of  illiberalism,  as  the  contribution  of 
Ádám Bence Balász highlighted, was one that arose out of an integrated Europe 
and through an adept and strategic capture of its funds and deliberative pro-
cedures. Michał Matlak made a similar argument about the efficiency of the 
EU’s  pre-accession  conditionality  on  Poland’s  democratisation  as  opposed 
to  the  limited  post-accession  effects  on  democratic  sustainability.  Again,  as 
we read in Alexander Mesarovich’s analysis of the transnational networks in 
Central and Eastern Europe, the region’s Europeanisation facilitated not only 
an institutional aggregation of regional interests through Europarties and lobby 
groups, but also participation in more informal transnational networks, such as 
those of the international and transatlantic populist, anti-refugee, and religious 
right.  Among  the  Western  Balkans  countries,  the  example  of  North  Macedo-
nia, analysed by Simonida Kacarska, constitutes perhaps the most severe one of 
democratic  transformation  thwarted  through  accession.  On  top  of  a  cumber-
some  and  ultimately  prospectless  accession  process,  North  Macedonia,  which 
at its outset had perhaps been the region’s best-prepared candidate country, was 
repeatedly drawn back by vetoes from EU and NATO member states, first by 
Greece and then Bulgaria, before being ultimately drawn into Hungary’s orbit, 
with dire effects on the nation’s democracy. The case of Albania’s untransparent 
cooperation with Italy to set up migrant-processing centres on its territories – the 
subject of Klodiana Beshku’s text – is another cautionary tale of an EU Member 
State taking advantage of a candidate country to impose asymmetrical and ex-
ploitative relations. Artan Mustafa’s piece on the social policies in the Western 

5  For a recent overview of the economic relations between Europe’s southern and eastern peripheries 

with the centre see Celi, Petrović, and Sušová-Salminen 2022.

Vuk Uskoković201

Balkans adduces another project of the sort, that of a Danish correctional facility 
outsourced in Kosovo. At the other end of the spectrum, Ana Bojinović-Fen-
ko’s contribution ascribes the reversal of an incipient rightward shift in Sloveni-
an politics in 2020 to the country’s vibrant civil society and a national consensus 
which sees EU institutions as guarantees of national autonomy. Could a case also 
be made for Slovenia’s gradual and cautious privatisation – briefly mentioned 
in the paper – as another contributing factor, which repurposed, instead of dis-
mantling, the inherited economic capacities of the country and the structures of 
social partnership and welfare built around them? Divorced from a productive 
base and deprived of an equality-enhancing purpose, the institutions and policies 
of social security otherwise risk becoming – as argued in Mustafa’s contribution 
– themselves vehicles of illiberalism.

The  political  landscape  –  and  the  ‘timescape’  –  of  postsocialist  coun-
tries that emerges from the contributions of this volume hardly appears to be 
hanging on that of Western Europe through more or less effective policies of 
democracy promotion, institutional synchronisation, and cultural approxima-
tion.  Rather,  the  two  seem  stitched  through  and  through  by  varying  ties  of 
formal political integration, economic subjugation to Western capital, and elite 
strategies in navigating the regional, European, and global politics. It is in the 
cracks of these stiches that the main channels of ‘external’ influence and leverage 
were  identified  in  the  contributions  of  this  volume,  whether  that  of  Russia, 
which  principally  acts  through  allies  among  the  Europe’s  right-wing  parties 
and movements, that of China, which finances infrastructure projects, or that 
of the US, which has acted, long before Trump’s second term, as probably the 
most egregious sponsor of populism and religious extremism in Europe. And 
it is these cracks that afford a different perspectives on the problem of demo-
cratic sustainability both within and outside of the political borders of the EU. 
How  is  democracy  viable  in  a  Western  Balkans  economically  subordinate  to 
European markets yet without a political say in their management, effectively 
reduced to Europe’s ‘super-periphery’ (Bartlett and Prica 2013)? The pressures 
of green extractivism on Serbia’s mineral wealth, the drain of ‘skilled’ and ‘un-
skilled’ labour from the region to the EU, profit repatriation, and the underin-
vestment in infrastructure render this question all the more relevant. Nor is the 
question of economic subordination and ‘asymmetric interdependence’ irrel-
evant in the politically integrated and consolidated Central Eastern European 
democracies,  in  which  the  very  foreign  investments  that  initially  kicked-off 
their  economies  have  turned  into  a  stifling  force  (Artner  2017).  Conversely, 
one could ask how is a supranational European project of integration, prosper-

Epilogue: From the ‘External’ to the ‘Internal’ Threats to Democracy202

ity, and democracy to outlive the economic asymmetries on which it is built? 
How can there be, in the long run, democracy on either of the two sides bound 
up in relations of economic inequality?

The events of the past months underscore the relevance of such questions. 
The gradual dismantling of the postwar welfare state and coordinated economy, 
first undertaken by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, then applied with 
shock and awe in Eastern Europe, and finally cemented through the neoliber-
al consensus at the turn of the millennia (Harvey 2007), is now haunting the 
centre of the world capitalist economy with a renascent nativism, right-wing 
extremism, and even unabashed neofascism. At the dawn of the new millenni-
um, Donald Trump, seated in the executive’s chair of his show The Apprentice 
as upon a throne, played the unfettered, absolute ruler of the economic sphere, 
in which the wisdom of the Zeitgeist saw the final triumph of democracy, lib-
eralism, and open society, indeed the very ‘end of history’. Should it come as 
any  surprise  that  from  such  a  throne  he  was  able  to  move,  within  the  space 
of years, to pretending unfettered, quasi-monarchical authority over the po-
litical sphere as well? Such a development should call for a reconsideration of 
the very idea of large-scale political integration based entirely around the forces 
of the markets and the needs of capital. If in the face of a resurgent fascism – 
and a looming climate disaster for which the present growth-addicted global 
economy is woefully unprepared – this particular ‘common value’ of the two 
Atlantic shores is indeed gone, that is probably for the better.

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Epilogue: From the ‘External’ to the ‘Internal’ Threats to DemocracyISBN:978-92-9466-675-8
doi:10.2870/8404095
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