COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2025-07-08
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Serbia, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 8.7.2025  SWD(2025) 931 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report                                   Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Serbia Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report                                     The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2025) 900 final} - {SWD(2025) 901 final} - {SWD(2025) 902 final} - {SWD(2025) 903 final} - {SWD(2025) 904 final} - {SWD(2025) 905 final} - {SWD(2025) 906 final} - {SWD(2025) 907 final} - {SWD(2025) 908 final} - {SWD(2025) 909 final} - {SWD(2025) 910 final} - {SWD(2025) 911 final} - {SWD(2025) 912 final} - {SWD(2025) 913 final} - {SWD(2025) 914 final} - {SWD(2025) 915 final} - {SWD(2025) 916 final} - {SWD(2025) 917 final} - {SWD(2025) 918 final} - {SWD(2025) 919 final} - {SWD(2025) 920 final} - {SWD(2025) 921 final} - {SWD(2025) 922 final} - {SWD(2025) 923 final} - {SWD(2025) 924 final} - {SWD(2025) 925 final} - {SWD(2025) 926 final} - {SWD(2025) 927 final} - {SWD(2025) 928 final} - {SWD(2025) 929 final} - {SWD(2025) 930 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Serbia  continued  the  implementation  of  the  constitutional  reform  to  strengthen  judicial 
independence. Political  pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution services remained 
high,  with  little  or  no  follow-up  by  the  High  Judicial  and  Prosecutorial  Councils,  the 
Government  or  Parliament.  The  transparency  of  the  High  Judicial  Council  needs  to  be 
further strengthened. Challenges remain to fill the considerable number of vacant judge 
and  prosecutor  positions,  and  the  Constitutional  Court  annulled  for  the  first  time  an 
appointment procedure in line with the new appeal procedure. An IT solution for the new 
prosecutorial case management system was finalised and is being implemented, while a 
new  uniform  and  centralised  case  management  system  for  courts  is  still  lacking.  On 
efficiency the overall picture continues to be positive for civil, commercial, and criminal 
cases, while serious challenges in the handling of administrative cases and constitutional 
complaints remain. 

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2024-2028 was adopted in July 
2024.  Following  the  canopy  collapse  at  Novi  Sad  railway  station  in  November  2024, 
which  prompted  widespread  public  protests,  authorities  launched  investigations  into 
alleged  corruption  linked  to  the  tragic  incident  which  are  yet  to  be  completed.  The 
Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime still has shortcomings, such as the insufficient 
regulation of its role and mandate in the legal framework. This risks inconsistent action 
in corruption investigations of the different specialised bodies. Establishing a robust track 
record of investigations, indictments, and final convictions in high-level corruption cases, 
including the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets, remains a challenge. The Anti-
Corruption  Council  remained  active  in  exposing  and  analysing  cases  of  systemic 
corruption  with  limited  follow-up  by  other  institutions.  The  verification  of  asset 
declarations and conflict of interests continue to present weaknesses.  The limited scope 
of the Law on lobbying undermines its effectiveness in practice and the Law on financing 
of  political  activities  has  several  weaknesses.  Challenges  exist  for  whistleblowers 
exposing  corruption.  Exemptions  to  the  Law  on  public  procurement  continued  to  be 
widely used to circumvent its application, and oversight mechanisms are insufficient. 

Serbia adopted new media legislation  in  June 2025 to  align further  with  the EU acquis 
and European standards. Serious concerns remain on the independence of the Regulatory 
Authority for Electronic Media (REM), and the delay and shortcomings in the selection 
procedure  of  a  new  REM  Council  undermine  public  trust  in  the  process.  The  Press 
Council  continues  to  effectively  monitor  print  media’s  compliance  with  the  Serbian 
Journalists’ Code of Ethics. Issues of editorial autonomy and pluralism of public service 
media  have  become  an  increasing  concern.  Measures  to  increase  transparency  in 
ownership  structures  and  public  funding  of  the  media  sector  have  only  been  partially 
implemented.  Journalists  continue  to  face  either  frequent  refusals  by  public  bodies  to 
disclose information of public importance or no response at all. The safety of journalists 
has become a source of increasing concern.  

Parliament’s  effectiveness and oversight  function continued to  be hampered by the low 
frequency  of  sessions  and  the  lack  of  genuine  political  debate.  The  process  of  public 
consultations still needs further strengthening. The fact that four vacant positions at the 
Constitutional  Court  remained  unfilled  is  a  concern.  The  three  independent  bodies 
working  in  the  area  of  fundamental  rights  keep  facing  resource  constraints  and  the 
follow-up  to  their  recommendations  remains  inconsistent.  Civil  society  organisations 
face increasing  pressure. The impact  of the Strategy and the Action Plan for creating a 
stimulating environment for the development of civil society has yet to be demonstrated.  

1 

 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1  

Independence  

The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  in  Serbia  continues  to  be  low  among 
both  the  general  public  and  companies.  Overall,  30%  of  the  general  population  and 
36% of companies perceive the level of independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly 
or  very  good’  in  20252. The  perceived  judicial  independence  among  the  general  public 
has  decreased  in  comparison  with  2024  (36%),  while  among  companies  it  has  slightly 
increased in comparison with 2024 (34%)3. 

to 

to  strengthen 

implementation  of 

The 
judicial 
the  constitutional  reform 
independence continued.  The adoption of the by-laws  implementing the constitutional 
amendments  is  almost  completed,  with  thirty-six  out  of  thirty-seven  planned  by-laws 
adopted4.  Only  one  by-law  on  the  Rules  of  Court  remains  to  be  adopted5.  The  draft 
amendments 
to  consider  the 
recommendations of the December 2024 Venice Commission opinion, notably as regards 
the protection of the Academy from possible undue influence, in particular by removing 
the  ex  officio  membership  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  in  the  Academy’s  management 
board,  and  its  recommendation  to  entrust  the  exclusive  responsibility  for  entry  into  the 
judicial and prosecutorial professions to the Academy. The latter is important  to ensure 
adequate pre-service training and a uniform examination process for all candidates7.  

the  Judicial  Academy6  are  yet 

the  Law  on 

Political pressure on the judiciary and the prosecution services remained high, with 
little  or  no  follow-up  by  the  High  Judicial  and  Prosecutorial  Councils,  the 
Government  or  Parliament.  Government  and  public  officials  at  the  highest  level, 
including  the  President,  and  members  of  Parliament  continued  to  make  undue  public 
comments  on  ongoing  investigations  and  court  proceedings,  including  as  regards  the 
work of individual prosecutors and judges. These comments included criticism of judicial 
decisions  and  threats  with  removal  addressed  to  judges  and  prosecutors8.  While  the 
associations of judges and prosecutors defended judges and prosecutors in some of these 
instances9,  the  High  Judicial  Council  and  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  have  so  far 
remained largely passive. In 2024, five new requests for protection from undue influence 
were submitted to the High Judicial Council and ten requests were submitted to the High 

1   An overview of the institutional framework for all four pillars can be found here.  
2   Flash Eurobarometer 554 and 555 (2025). The level of perceived judicial independence is categorised 
as follows: very low (below 30% of respondents perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very 
good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 
75%). 

3   Flash Eurobarometer 554 and 555 (2025); Flash Eurobarometer 540 and 541 (2024). 
4   The details of the implementing laws were to be specified through the adoption of 37 by-laws by May 

2024. 

5  The  outstanding by-law needs to be jointly adopted by the High Judicial Council and the Ministry of 

Justice. Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 99. 

6   The Government decided not to amend the Law on Seats and Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts. 
7  Venice Commission (2024), p. 10. 
8   On  22  March  2025,  following  the  release  from  detention  of  protestors  arrested  for  throwing  eggs  at 
SNS officials at a protest in Nis, the President stated that policemen and prosecutors who do not want to 
protect law and order will be exchanged. In response, over 500 prosecutors and judges signed a public 
statement denouncing the President’s comments and the ‘enslavement and humiliation of the judiciary’. 
N1 (2025b); Insajder (2025). 

9   Judges Association of Serbia (2025); Association of Prosecutors of Serbia (2025). 

2 

 
 
Prosecutorial Council, which found undue influence had been exerted in certain cases10. 
Additionally, the Government and the Parliament have so far not acted in cases of undue 
public comments by their respective members, although such comments appear to be in 
contradiction with their code of conduct.  

There  are  concerns  with  regard  to  prosecutorial  autonomy,  and  the  effectiveness 
and confidentiality of criminal investigations are hampered by shortcomings in law 
and  practice.  The  launch  of  major  initiatives  by  the  prosecution,  including  an  anti-
corruption  operation11  and  the  search  of  the  offices  of  four  NGOs12,  which  both  took 
place in  February,  followed  public statements made by high  level  public officials. This 
raised  concerns  with  regard  to  prosecutorial  autonomy,  including  by  numerous 
stakeholders13.  Furthermore,  public  comments  made  by  officials  continue  to  raise 
concerns about leakage of information by institutions involved in criminal proceedings, 
since some of these comments contained information from ongoing cases which was not 
in the public domain14. Several shortcomings in law and practice contribute to the risk of 
information leaks and hamper the effectiveness of investigations. In particular, the legal 
framework  mandates  the  Security  Information  Agency  to  initiate  criminal  proceedings 
for  certain  types  of  offences  with  international  elements  and  the  Criminal  Procedure 
Code provides that,  in  addition  to  the police, special investigative measures are carried 
out by the Security Information Agency and the Military Security Agency15. However, in 
practice, the police cannot intercept communications without the support of the Security 
Intelligence Agency16. In addition, the police still lacks sufficient operational autonomy 
from the Ministry of Interior17.  

The  transparency  of  the  High  Judicial  Council  needs  to  be  further  strengthened. 
While the rules of procedure of the High Judicial Council stipulate that its sessions are 
audio-visually recorded and that the recording is to be made public within 24 hours after 
the  holding  of  the  session18,  the  sessions  are  currently  not  recorded  due  to  the  lack  of 
technical  capabilities19.  Conversely,  sessions  of  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  are 
recorded  and  livestreamed20.  While  the  launch  of  websites  for  both  Councils  in  2024 

10   The High Judicial Council found two  cases of undue influence. The High Prosecutorial Council found 
five  cases  of  undue  influence  and  communicated  this  via  one  general  press  statement.  High 
Prosecutorial Council (2025) . No other cases of undue influence were found.   

11   153 individuals were arrested in February 2025 as part of anti-corruption operations. For further details 

see pillar II.  

12   In  February  2025,  at  the  initiative  of  the  Special  Anti-Corruption  Department  of  the  Higher  Public 
Prosecutor's Office in Belgrade, four  civil society organisation premises were searched by police.  For 
further details see pillar IV. 

13   Country visit Serbia.  
14   In  a  TV  broadcast  on  9  March,  the  President  directly  referenced  information  obtained  during  the 

investigation. CRTA (2025). 

15   Article 12 of the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency provides for certain competences with regard 
to  criminal  offences.  The  Criminal  Procedure  Code  foresees  the  execution  of  all  special  evidentiary 
actions also for the Security Information Agency and Military Security Agency in  Articles. 168, 173, 
176, 180 and 185 
16   Country visit Serbia.  
17   Stakeholders  shared  concerns  that  as  a  result  the  police  is  prone  to  follow  instructions  from  their 
hierarchy  even  though  the  law  foresees  the  prosecution  in  the  lead  of  investigations.  Several 
stakeholders therefore proposed to establish a “prosecutorial police” within the specialised prosecution 
services. Country visit Serbia.  

18   Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the High Judicial Council. 
19   Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 98. 
20   During the country visit, the High Judicial Council expressed its intention to follow the same process as 

the High Prosecutorial Council and livestream its sessions. Country visit Serbia.  

3 

 
 
increased transparency, some challenges remain on access to information and to  ensure 
the systematic publication of documents21.  

Challenges  remain  to  fill  the  considerable  number  of  vacant  positions  for  judges 
and  prosecutors  and  the  Constitutional  Court  annulled  for  the  first  time  an 
appointment procedure in line with the new appeal procedure. As of May 2025, out 
of  899  positions  for  prosecutors,  139  were  vacant.  The  election  of  basic  public 
prosecutors  was  delayed  several  times  because  of  lack  of  quorum  of  the  High 
Prosecutorial Council due to the absence of the Minister of Justice and some of the lay 
members22.  In  February  2025,  the  Council  elected  51  basic  public  prosecutors  at  its 
fourth attempt. In September 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled for the first time an 
appointment procedure for prosecutors for the Belgrade Higher Prosecution Office based 
on the finding that the High Prosecutorial Council had breached the rules regarding the 
testing of the candidates. Until this point in time, the Constitutional Court had dismissed 
all  appeals  in  the  new  procedure  against  appointment  decisions  for  judges  and 
prosecutors through inadmissibility decisions23. As of May 2025, out of 3 117 positions 
for judges, 394 were vacant. To date, the Constitutional Court has dismissed 27 of the 33 
appeals filed in 2024 through inadmissibility decisions. From January to May 2025, the 
High Judicial Council passed decisions on the appointment of 90 judges and announced a 
public competition to fill judge vacancies in 93 courts24. 

Quality  

An IT solution for the new prosecutorial case management system was finalised and 
is  being  implemented,  while  a  new  uniform  and  centralised  case  management 
system  for  courts  is  still  lacking.  Development  of  the  IT  solution  for  the  new  case 
management  system  for  prosecution  offices  (SAPO)  was  finalised  in  2024.  Its 
implementation  began  in  2025  with  a  staggered  approach  across  prosecution  offices 
aiming  for  completion  at  the  end  of  202525.  The  new  uniform  and  centralised  case 
management  system  for  courts  is  still  stalled  due  to  a  contractual  dispute26.  While 
implementation of the ICT strategy is ongoing, it suffers from a lack of coordination and 
monitoring mechanisms which the Government plans to rectify with the formal adoption 
of a new strategy.  While the number  of cases for which legal  aid  has been granted has 
slightly increased between 2022-2023, there are shortcomings regarding the capacity of 
local  self-government  entities  dealing  with  these  requests  and  the  lack  of  awareness  of 
citizens about the existence of legal aid27. 

The implementation of the Human Resources Strategy is delayed, and shortcomings 
remain  regarding  the  quality  of  judicial  training.  Due  to  the  delay  in  the 
implementation of the Human Resources Strategy, the Ministry of Justice plans to amend 

21   Centre for Judicial Research (2025). 
22   Sessions  of  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  to  elect  new  prosecutors  were  therefore  postponed  on  24 

December 2024, 24 January and 28 January 2025. 

23   The Constitutional Court found the assessment of the candidates included a special test for prosecutors 
for  cybercrime,  which  was  outside  the  scope  of  the  selection  procedure.  Country  Visit  Serbia, 
Constitutional Court.  

24   Serbian Government (2025a), pp. 2f.; Serbian Government (2025), written input, pp. 100 f. 
25   Country visit Serbia.  
26   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 5. The Ministry of Justice explained that alternatives are currently 

being explored. Country visit Serbia.  

27   The number of cases for which legal aid has been grated rose from 0.06 per inhabitant in 2022 to 0.10 

in 2023. CEPEJ (2024), p. 29; ENNHRI (2024), p. 10; 2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 42.  

4 

 
 
it  and  the  accompanying  Action  Plan  in  the  course  of  202528.  There  is  still  room  for 
improvement as regards the Judicial Academy’s capacity, internal expertise, transparency 
of  the  initial  testing  process  and  the  quality  of  the  mentoring  system29.  Serbia  is  yet  to 
introduce a system of quality control to improve the quality of judicial training.  

Efficiency 

The  overall  picture  continues  to  be  positive  for  civil,  commercial,  and  criminal 
cases,  while  serious  challenges  remain  in  the  handling  of  administrative  cases  and 
constitutional  complaints.  For  civil  and  commercial  cases,  the  clearance  rate  in  2023 
fell for first instance cases and the disposition time improved, while for second instance 
cases the clearance rate improved and the disposition time increased30. For criminal cases 
the situation remained stable overall with a slight decrease in the clearance rate for first 
and second instance cases, and stable indicators on the disposition time31. However, the 
negative development on administrative cases continued and remains a challenge. Their 
clearance rate fell from 39% in 2022 to 35% in 2023 and the disposition time increased 
from  1 528  days  in  2022  to  2 095  days  in  2023.  The  number  of  pending  first  instance 
administrative  cases  also  increased  by  45.8%  in  202332.  As  of  May  2025,  a  total  of 
43 711  cases  were  pending  before  the  Constitutional  Court,  of  which  99%  are 
constitutional complaints33.  

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  perception  among experts,  citizens  and business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption  in  the  public  sector  remained  high.  In  the  2024  Corruption  Perceptions 
Index  by  Transparency  International,  Serbia  scores  35/100  and  ranks  105th  globally34. 
This  perception  has  remained  relatively  stable  over  the  past  five  years,  while  it  is  the 
lowest  score  recorded  for  Serbia35.  The  2025  Special  Eurobarometer  on  Corruption 
shows  that  85%  of  respondents  consider  corruption  widespread  in  their  country  (EU 
average  69%)  and  31%  of  respondents  feel  personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their 
daily  lives  (EU  average  30%).  As  regards  businesses,  84%  of  companies  consider  that 
corruption  is  widespread  (EU  average  63%)  and  53%  consider  that  corruption  is  a 
problem when doing business (EU average 35%). Furthermore, 26% of respondents find 
that there are enough successful prosecutions to deter people from corrupt practices (EU 

28   Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 116. 
29   2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 30. 
30   While  the  clearance  rate  fell  from  178%  to  140%,  for  first  instance  cases  and  the  disposition  time 
slightly  improved  from  299  days  to  278  days  between  2022  and  2023,  for  second  instance  cases  the 
clearance rate improved from 94 % in 2022 to 97% in 2023, while the disposition time increased from 
326 to 351 days. CEPEJ (2024), pp. 17-21.  

31   For  first  instance  criminal  cases  the  clearance  rate  fell  from  106%  in  2022  to  103%  in  2023  and  for 
second instance cases from 100% in 2022 to 99% in 2023. Disposition time changed from 220 to 219 
days in first instance between 2022 and 2023 and from 34 to 36 days in second instance. CEPEJ (2024), 
pp. 17-21.  

32   CEPEJ (2024), p. 18.  
33   Constitutional Court (2025), written input received after the country visit. 
34   Transparency International (2025). The level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (the 
perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector  corruption  scores  above  79); 
relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), high (scores below 50). 
35   In  2020,  the  score  was  38,  while  in  2024  the  score  decreased  to  35.  The  score  significantly 
increases/decreases when it changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 
points); is relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years.  

5 

 
 
average  36%),  while  47%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for 
bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 33%)36. 

The National Anti-Corruption Strategy for the period of 2024-2028 was adopted in 
July 2024. Following the adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2024, 
an accompanying action plan (2024-2025) was adopted in December37. The new Strategy 
includes  measures  recommended  by  the  Commission,  namely  to  counter  corruption  in 
sectors  vulnerable  to  corruption,  including  health,  taxes,  customs,  education,  local  self-
government,  privatisation,  public  procurement  and  police  and  features  both  prevention 
and  repression  objectives38.  However,  the  activities  included  in  the  Action  Plan  are  to 
some  extent  narrower  in  terms  of  addressing  the  corruption  problems  and  challenges 
identified  in  the  Strategy  and  does  not  comprehensively  address  the  GRECO 
recommendations  of  the  4th  and  5th  evaluation  rounds39.  While  the  Agency  for  the 
Prevention  of  Corruption  is  tasked  with  monitoring  its  implementation40,  adequate 
coordination  mechanisms,  budgetary  means,  as  well  as  an  effective  monitoring  and 
evaluation  system  to  track  progress  and  impact  should  be  put  in  place  for  its  effective 
implementation.  The  legal  framework  to  fight  corruption  remains  broadly  in  place  and 
most  forms  of  corruption  are  criminalised41.  Illicit  enrichment  is  still  not  criminalised. 
Serbia is not a signatory party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention42. 

launched 

investigations 

Following  the  canopy  collapse  at  Novi  Sad  railway  station,  which  prompted 
widespread  public  protests,  authorities 
into  alleged 
corruption  linked  to  the  tragic  incident  which  are  yet  to  be  completed.  The  tragic 
incident, in which 16 people were killed in November 2024, prompted widespread public 
protests  over  corruption  and  the  perceived  lack  of  accountability  and  transparency  in 
Government 
the  Higher 
infrastructure  and  construction  projects.  In  December, 
Prosecutor’s Office in Novi Sad filed indictments against 13 public officials43 on charges 
for endangering public safety, including the former Minister of Construction, Transport 
and Infrastructure, who subsequently resigned from his post. Parallel investigations into 
related corruption crimes caused risks of uncoordinated proceedings at the outset, due to 
the divided competences between the four specialised Anti-Corruption Departments and 
the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime44.  Initially,  both  the  Higher 
Prosecution  Office  in  Novi  Sad  and  the  Higher  Prosecution  Office  in  Belgrade  started 

36  Data from Special Eurobarometer 561 (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer 558 (2025). 
37   Serbian Government (2024a,b). 
38   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8. 
39  Serbia states its intention to address all GRECO recommendations of the 4th and 5th evaluation rounds 

in the Action Plan for 2026-2028. Serbian Government (2025a), p. 5.  

40   Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 157. 
41   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 8. 
42   OECD (2024).  
43   Amongst whom the acting director of Serbian  Railways Infrastructure at the time of the incident,  the 
acting assistant construction minister, and the general director of Serbian Railways Infrastructure at the 
time when Novi Sad station was being rebuilt. Other indictees are representatives of constriction design 
companies,  construction  contractors,  and  technical  and  expert  supervisors  who  are  charged  with  a 
criminal offence against public safety. BIRN (2024). 

44   Serbia  has  for  specialised  Anti-Corruption  Departments  within  the  Higher  Prosecution  Offices  in 
Belgrade,  Novi  Sad,  Nis  and Kraljevo  competent for  corruption  cases  not  exceeding  a value  of  RSD 
200 million and a Public Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime which is the main body in charge for 
corruption cases exceeding this value (Art. 3 of the Law on the Organisation and Competence of State 
Authorities in the Suppression of Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption). Stakeholders during the 
country  visit  underlined  that  the  divided  competences  lead  to  challenges  with  regard  to  coordination 
and consistency of corruption related offences in Serbia. Country visit Serbia. 

6 

 
 
separate corruption related investigations45, which were later transferred by the Supreme 
Public  Prosecutor  to  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime.  The  transfer 
allowed  for  investigations  by  one  prosecutorial  entity  and  this  investigation  is  still 
ongoing46.  In  March  2025,  the  European  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  (EPPO)  also 
launched an investigation related to the reconstruction of the railway station47. 

Shortcomings in law and practice remain for the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised 
Crime, which has jurisdiction over high-level corruption cases. The role and mandate 
of  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime  regarding  the  overall  coordination  of 
corruption  related  investigations,  including  by  the  special  departments  of  the  Higher 
Public  Prosecutors’  offices,  is  insufficiently  regulated  in  the  law.  This  risks  hindering 
consistency  of  action  in  corruption  investigations  of  the  different  specialised  bodies, 
resulting in a lack of effectiveness in practice. Moreover, insufficient transparency in the 
prosecution  service  and  weak  oversight  of  dismissed  corruption  cases  and  delays 
continued  to  affect  public  trust  and  accountability48.  Staff  shortages  at  the  Prosecutor’s 
Office for Organised Crime persist, with only 19 of 25 posts being currently filled49. The 
High  Prosecutorial  Council  annulled  a  public  competition50  for  the  selection  of  new 
public prosecutors in November51. Insufficient human resources are limiting the capacity 
of  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  for  Organised  Crime  to  process  and  investigate  complex 
organised  crime  and  high-level  corruption  cases.  While  two  financial  forensic  experts 
were  hired  in  the  Special  Departments  for  Suppression  of  Corruption  in  the  Higher 
Public  Prosecution  Office  in  Belgrade  and  Novi  Sad,  positions  in  Kraljevo  and  Niš 
remain  vacant52. The  specialised  organised  crime  unit  in  the  police  investigating  high-
level corruption offences lacks sufficient staff53. 

Investigations  launched  in  the  context  of  a  new  anti-corruption  operation  raise 
concerns  over  the  systematic  fight  against  corruption  free  from  political 
interference. In February 2025, 153 individuals were arrested as part of anti-corruption 
operations,  while  certain  arrests  related  to  long-standing  cases  without  any  recent 
developments54.  Among  those  detained  were  state  officials,  directors  of  public 
enterprises,  representatives  of  local  governments  and  directors  of  health  centres55. 
Overall,  challenges  remain  in  establishing  a  robust  track  record  of  investigations, 
indictments  and  final  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases,  including  the  seizure 

45   N1 (2025a). 
46   Country visit Serbia.   
47   Serbian Monitor (2025).  
48   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 9-10.  
49   Country visit Serbia. Of the 19 public prosecutors, nine have been elected to their position, whilst ten 
are  temporality  assigned.  The  total  number  of  posts  is  insufficient  considering  that  Serbia  has  a 
prosecution-led  pre-investigation  and  investigation  system.  Moreover,  the  current  premises  of  the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office are not sufficient to accommodate new staff.  
50   Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 99/23 of 10 November 2023. 
51   During  the  country  visit,  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  explained  that  the  decision  to  annul  the 
competition was due to missing security checks of the selected candidates in contravention of the Law 
on  organisation  and  competence  of  state  authorities  in  suppression  of  organised  crime,  terrorism  and 
corruption.  

52   Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 176. 
53   2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 34. 
54   In a TV interview on 10 February President Vucic stated that the fight against corruption will happen 
soon.  RTV  Pink  Official  (2025).  Three  days  later  the  arrests  of  the  new  anti-corruption  campaign 
started. See also Transparency Serbia (2025).  

55   Ministry of Interior (2025).  

7 

 
 
and  confiscation  of  criminal  assets56.  In  this  context,  stakeholders  highlighted  as  a 
remaining concern the reluctance on the side of the prosecution and the police to pursue 
investigations against corruption suspects close to political and economic power57. 

The  verification  and  enforcement  of  asset  declarations  and  conflict  of  interests 
continue to present weaknesses. The Law on prevention of corruption, which prescribes 
the  duty  for  public  officials  to  file  asset  declarations  and  to  report  conflicts  of  interest, 
still needs to be amended to broaden the definition of public official in line with GRECO 
recommendations58.  The  advance  publishing  of  the  annual  verification  plan  by  the 
Agency  for  the  Prevention  of  Corruption,  informing  which  category  of  public  officials 
will be subject to substantive checks in the respective year, risks limiting its effectiveness 
in  practice.  The  human  and  technical  resources  of  the  Agency  for  the  Prevention  of 
Corruption  are  still  too  limited  to  carry  out  its  corruption  prevention  tasks  in  a 
comprehensive  and  effective  manner.  This  is  also  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that, 
according  to  the  annual  verification  plan  for  2024,  the  Agency  carries  out  substantive 
checks for the asset-declarations of around 290 public officials representing less than 1% 
of  all  asset-declarations  in  the  public  sector59.  Sanctions  for  non-compliance  are 
uncommon and are predominantly for misdemeanour offences60.  

The  Anti-Corruption  Council  remained  active  in  exposing  and  analysing  cases  of 
systemic  corruption,  with  limited  follow-up  by  other  institutions.  The  Government 
does  not  systematically  consult  the  Anti-Corruption  Council  on  draft  legislation,  and  it 
does  not  follow  up  on  the  reports  and  recommendations  produced  by  the  Council.  The 
Council  continues  to  carry  out  its  work  in  exposing  and  analysing  cases  of  systemic 
corruption. However, it still lacks financial and human resources and no steps were taken 
to  address  the  significant  number  of  vacancies61.  Limited  action  is  taken  by  the 
prosecution offices to investigate cases exposed by the Council62.  

The  limited  scope  of  the  Law  on  lobbying  undermines  its  effectiveness  in  practice 
and  the  Law  on  financing  of  political  activities  has  several  weaknesses.  While  it  is 
positive  that  lobbying  is  regulated  by  law,  its  scope  is  still  limited  to  formal,  written 
contacts  between  interest  representatives  and  persons  in  top  executive  functions  and 
excludes  any  other  forms  of  interaction.  Furthermore,  neither  the  lobbying  records  nor 
lobbyists  are  made  public.  GRECO 
the  required  annual  activity  report  from 

56   2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, pp. 9 and 47. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 9.  
57   Country visit Serbia. 
58   The current definition of the term “public official” does not include certain individuals with potentially 
high-influence,  such  as  advisors  to  the  president,  prime  minister  and  heads  of  cabinets.  See  also 
GRECO (2022), pp. 4,21; 2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 11 and 13. 

59   Fewer than 20 people currently work in the asset declaration department,  of which only five conduct 
deep  verifications.  According  to  the  national  register,  around  30  000  public  officials  exist  in  Serbia. 
Country visit Serbia, Agency for Prevention of Corruption. 

60   In 2024, the Agency only reported one criminal offence to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Country visit 

Serbia, Agency for Prevention of Corruption. 

61   Presently the Council has six members out of 11. While the Rules of Procedure of the Council entail 
safeguards aimed at promoting its independence, such as that appointments by the Government must be 
based on proposals of candidates by the Anti-Corruption Council, two members were appointed in 2017 
without proposal by the Council. Against this background, the Anti-Corruption Council has expressed 
concern that adoption of new Rules of procedure, as foreseen by the anti-corruption action plan 2024-
2025, could effectively undermine its independence. Country visit Serbia.  

62   Limited action is taken by the prosecution offices to investigate corruption cases. The Council cited the 
long-pending  issue  of  police  autonomy  from  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  which  undermines  the 
authority of the prosecution. Country visit Serbia, Anti-Corruption Council. 

8 

 
 
recommended to address both points63. Amendments to the Law on financing of political 
activities are yet to be adopted to address outstanding ODIHR recommendations, such as 
the  absence  of  a  campaign  expenditure  limit,  lack  of  rules  on  campaigning  by  third 
parties, and the effectiveness of the oversight mechanism64. 

Challenges exist for whistleblowers exposing corruption. Serbia has a dedicated Law 
on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  in  place,  which  is  yet  to  be  aligned  with  the  EU 
acquis. In particular, the law does not include all types of disclosures and persons, such 
as former employees, and it does not explicitly protect whistleblowers if their disclosure 
is  not  grounded65.  Furthermore,  there  is  room  for  improvement  to  strengthen  support 
mechanisms  for  whistleblowers  including  the  provision  of  legal  aid.  In  practice, 
challenges  remain  with  regard  to  oversight  and  the  enforcement  of  whistleblowers’ 
protection  against  any  form  of  retaliation.  Oversight  duties  are  shared  between  several 
ministries  with  no  overall  supervision  mechanism  of  the  effective  follow-up  of 
whistleblower  reports.  Consequently,  enforcement  is  lacking  in  practice,  including  in 
prominent cases66.  

Exemptions to the Law on public procurement continued to be widely used, thereby 
circumventing its application, and oversight mechanisms are insufficient. While the 
Law  on  public  procurement  provides  for  basic  principles  in  the  public  procurement 
system, in 2023, the value of procurement exempted from application of the law nearly 
reached  the  value  of  concluded  public  procurement  contracts  that  were  carried  out 
through  regular  proceedings,  thereby  undermining  the  effectiveness  of  the  law67. 
Challenges persist in ensuring that exemptions from the Law on public procurement are 
in line with the EU acquis, in particular in the context of intergovernmental agreements68. 
The  oversight  of  public  procurement  procedures  presents  weaknesses  which  risks 
allowing violations to go unchecked and can lead to impunity69. Although the Criminal 
Code provides for a specific offense for abuse in  public procurement70, convictions are 
rare. The State Audit Institution found irregularities in 21.2% of the total value of public 
procurement  contracts  inspected  in  202471.  Other  areas  of  particular  risk  to  corruption 
include State-owned enterprises, concessions, bankruptcy proceedings and public-private 
partnerships and the health sector72. 

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

Serbia  adopted  new  media  legislation  in  June  2025  to  align  further  with  the  EU 
acquis and European standards. The amendments to the Law on Electronic Media and 
the Law on Public Information and Media continue the legislative alignment which was 
initiated  in  2023  when  the  laws  were  first  amended.  The  drafting  process  lacked 
transparent and inclusive consultations and did not respect the legal obligation of holding 

63   GRECO (2022), pp. 18 f., paras 64-68. Serbia plans to amend the Law on lobbying by the end of 2025. 

Serbian Government (2025), written input, p. 154.  

64   OSCE/ODIHR (2024), pp. 15 ff.; Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), pp. 22 ff. 
65   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, pp. 13-14. 
66   Transparency International (2024), pp. 47-48. 
67   Transparency Serbia (2024). 
68   2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 43. 
69   Transparency Serbia (2024).  
70   Article 228 Criminal Code. 
71   In 105 of the audited entities, it was determined that the procurement of goods, services and works was 
not carried out in accordance with the aforementioned law in 923 cases, corresponding to an amount of 
108.22 billion dinars. State Audit Institution (2025), p. 25. 

72   See Anti-Corruption Council (2025).   

9 

 
 
a public debate73. Following the provisions of 2023 that allow state-owned companies to 
be  media  owners74,  additional  safeguards  to  protect  media  pluralism  and  editorial 
independence  have  been  introduced  and  will  need  to  be  monitored  in  practice. 
Meanwhile, TV channels seen as critical of the authorities were removed in April 2025 
from  a  cable  offer  following  the  purchase  of  such  cable  by  Telekom  Srbija  whose 
majority stakeholder is the state75. 

Serious  concerns  remain  on  the  independence  of  the  Regulatory  Authority  for 
Electronic Media (REM), and the delay and shortcomings in the selection procedure 
of a new REM Council undermine public trust in the process.  In 2024, REM issued 
five  measures,  namely:  two  reprimands,  one  warning  and  two  temporary  bans  on 
broadcasting  advertising  messages,  while  sanctions  were  not  imposed  on  broadcasters 
frequently violating rules, such as reality shows prone to violence76. In November 2024, 
the  parliamentary  committee  for  culture  and  information  –  not  yet  the  Parliament  in 
plenary – gave consent to the new statute of the REM Council which contains provisions 
on  the  secrecy  of  certain  documents  adopted  by  the  Council,  thus  hindering 
transparency77. REM published the full report on media monitoring 14 months after the 
2023 parliamentary elections78. The competition for the allocation of the fifth frequency 
for national broadcasting, launched in 2022, has still not been finalised without justified 
reason for the delay79. REM has also not been effective in countering foreign information 
manipulation  and  interference,  notably  in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression 
against Ukraine80. On the contrary, in October 2024 REM awarded a cable license to RT 
Balkans which has since then launched its TV programme in Serbian language, broadcast 
via the majority state-owned Telekom  cable operator.  The  Parliament has  not  elected a 
new  REM  Council  by  the  deadline  of  4  November  2024  as  per  the  Law  on  Electronic 
Media and, as a result, Serbia has been without the decision-making body of the media 
regulator since. The Committee for Culture and Information of the Parliament published 
the call for nominations of REM Council members only  on 25 November. Following a 
number of reported irregularities that remained unaddressed by the Committee, 7 out of 
18  candidates  withdrew  their  candidacies  on  28  January  2025,  leaving  5  out  of  9 
categories  of  authorised  proponents81  with  no  or  only  one  candidate.  On  28  April, 
following  a  two-week  student  blockade  of  the  public  broadcaster  RTS,  the  Committee 

73  The  Serbian  authorities  conducted  a  48-hour  consultation  of  media  associations  at  the  end  of  the 

process. 

74   Reversing the previous prohibition in Serbian legislation. 
75   Total TV cable which serves the diaspora. Media Freedom Rapid Response (2025). 
76   2025 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) p. 17. 
77   Parliament of Serbia (2024).  
78   REM (2025). The report notes that the ruling party election list was by far the most represented in all 
categories  of  analysed  election  content  on  all  commercial  media  service  providers  with  national 
coverage. 

79  According  to  REM,  the  procedure  was  interrupted  and  will  continue  after  the  decision  of  the 
Administrative Court on the lawsuit against the decision on the award of four national licenses. This, 
however, would not prevent a fifth license from being allocated. 

80   Russia Today’s (RT) international channel in the English language was not banned by REM and is still 

broadcast in Serbia on cable TV. 

81   The  Law  on  electronic  media  defines  nine  categories  of  “authorised  proponents”  which  should  each 
propose  two  candidates  for  members  of  the  REM  Council:  1)  the  Protector  of  Citizens,  the  Equality 
Commissioner, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection; 
2)  universities;  3)  associations  of  electronic  media  publishers;  4)  associations  of  journalists;  5) 
associations of film, performing and theatre artists and associations of composers; 6) associations with 
the aim to achieve freedom of expression, 7) associations with the aim to protect children, 8) national 
councils of national minorities; 9) churches and religious communities. 

10 

 
 
decided to annul the procedure, and published on 8 May a new call for candidates which 
ran  until  23  May.  The  review  of  candidacies  is  ongoing.  The  overall  delay  and  the 
unaddressed  shortcomings  in  the  former  procedure  raise  doubts  on  the  commitment  to 
safeguard the nomination process against political influence and to thus increase REM’s 
independence. Public trust is thus undermined.  

The  Press  Council  continues  to  effectively  monitor  print  media’s  compliance  with 
the  Serbian  Journalists’  Code  of  Ethics.  In  2024,  the  Press  Council  received  88 
complaints (125 in 2023) and found in almost all cases that several points of the Code of 
Ethics were violated82. Some media outlets that violated the Code of Ethics continued to 
receive public co-financing, while the Law on Public Information and Media prescribes 
the extent to which the respective media outlets adhere to ethical standards as one of the 
criteria for receiving co-funding83. 

Issues of editorial autonomy and pluralism of public service media have become an 
increasing  concern.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM)  2025  found  that  the 
‘independence of public  service media’ indicator  worsened in  2024 and  considered it a 
high-risk  area  (70%)84.  Amendments  to  the  Law  on  Public  Broadcasting  Services  were 
adopted  in  June  2025  to  make  the  public  broadcasters  more  institutionally  and 
functionally  independent85.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  amount  of  the  public 
broadcasting  service  fee  set  in  this  law  is  sufficient  to  cover  the  needs  of  the  public 
broadcasters and that the latter no longer need to rely on complementary State funding, 
which  would  prevent  full  financial  independence.  Concerns  remain  over  issues  of 
editorial autonomy, limited pluralism and biased reporting in favour of the government86, 
as demonstrated by aggregated data. Stakeholders report that in 2024, the ruling majority 
was covered in 94% of airtime in the central RTS news broadcasts, compared with 6% 
for  opposition  parties.  Both  public  broadcasters  have  been  criticised  by  some  of  their 
employees, as well as by civil society and media associations87, for their lack of reporting 
of the student protests following the tragic incident at the Novi Sad railway station88. 

Measures  to  increase  transparency  in  ownership  structures  and  public  funding  of 
the  media  sector  have  only  been  partially  implemented.  Political  and  economic 
influence  on  the  media  remains  a  source  of  concern.  The  MPM  2025  considered  the 
‘political  independence  of  media’  indicator  a  very  high-risk  (92%)89.  Due  to  a  large 
number  of  registered  media  combined  with  a  limited  advertising  market,  especially  at 
local  level,  media  often  strongly  depend  on  public  co-funding.  Despite  the  2023  law, 
which  had  improved  the  transparency  provisions  of  such  calls  by  laying  down  binding 

82   6 complaints were resolved through mediation, 15 complaints were rejected because they did  not meet 
the formal requirement and the Press Council decided in only 4 cases that the Code of Journalism was 
not violated. Press Council (2024).  

83   For example, the City of Vranje awarded the majority of its public co-financing to Vranjska Plus and 
Radio  Television  Vranje  which  repeatedly  violated  the  Journalists’  Code  of  Ethics  in  2024.  NUNS 
(2025). 

84   Compared with a medium risk of 63% in 2023. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 26 and 31. 
85   A general act will need to be adopted within six months of adoption of the law to regulate further the 
procedure  of  election,  scope  of  work,  and  termination  of  the  new  position  within  RTS  of  the 
Commissioner for the Protection of the Rights of Listeners, Viewers and Readers. 

86   2024 Enlargement, Report, Serbia, p. 39. 
87   Country visit Serbia, media associations.  
88   In  March  and  April  2025,  students  blocked  RTS  and  RTV  main  buildings,  demanding  the  public 

broadcasters to adapt their editorial policy in line with public interest.  

89   2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 27. 

11 

 
 
criteria to comply with the Code of Ethics, as monitored by the Press Council, the calls 
published  in  2024  significantly  reduced  public  funding  in  a  few  municipalities.  The 
remaining  public  funding  is  awarded  through  less  transparent  processes,  such  as  the 
procurement of information services and advertising90. The Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunication increased the 2025 budget for public co-financing of media content 
at the national level by 27%91. In January 2025, Serbia established a Unified Information 
System on public co-financing of media, as required by the Law on Public Information 
and  Media.  Media  associations  expressed  criticism  over  its  functioning  as  well  as  over 
the changes introduced in the by-laws on public co-financing92. As regards other sources 
of public funding, including advertising, the objective of the media strategy93 to present 
them  in  the  media  register  in  a  transparent,  comprehensive  and  user-friendly  manner 
remains  to  be  fully  implemented.  Legal  provisions  on  supervisory  inspections  of  the 
media  register  have  yet  to  start  being  implemented94.  Similarly,  the  media  sector 
privatisation process and measures to make public procurement in the media sector more 
transparent, as planned by the media strategy, remain to be completed95. 

Journalists  continue  to  face  either  frequent  refusals  by  public  bodies  to  disclose 
information  of  public  importance  or  no  response  at  all.  Serbia  has  signed  but  not 
ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents96. The fact 
that the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance cannot directly enforce the 
execution  of  its  decisions  by  coercive  action  remains  one  of  the  main  obstacles  to  the 
exercise  of  free  access  to  information97.  In  2024,  the  rate  of  execution  of  the 
Commissioner’s  decisions  was  77.98%  (74 .8%  in  2023)98.  According  to  the  2024 
Commissioner’s  report,  the  percentage  of  unexecuted  Commissioner’s  decisions  on 
complaints by journalists is higher than for other complainants (31.94% of their requests 
go  unanswered),  and  the  authorities  often  refuse  to  disclose  information  on  the 
unjustified ground that the requests come from journalists. 

The safety of journalists has become a source of increasing concern. Cases of threats, 
intimidation,  hate  speech  and  physical  violence  against  journalists,  including  female 
journalists,  continue  to  be  registered.  Journalists  at  the  local  level  are  particularly 
vulnerable  to  such  attacks.  The  MPM  2025  found  that  the  ‘journalistic  profession, 
standards and protection’ indicator worsened in  2024 and considered it a high-risk area 
(68%)99. Recurrent statements by high-level officials on the daily and investigative work 
of journalists have  a chilling  effect  on freedom  of expression100. Journalists have faced 
increasing pressure and attacks in the context of student and citizen protests taking place 

90   2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 39. 
91   New calls were also launched in self-government units by the deadline of March 2025 and, for some, 

after that deadline. 

92   Country visit Serbia, media associations. 
93   Adopted by the Government on 30 January 2020. 
94   The 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM) also found that “there is no effective legal instrument that 
would force the media registers to update their databases more often, nor that would compel the media 
to send their reports and  information to the competent authorities. Also, these registers fail to reveal 
ultimate ownership for each media, since many owners are listed as subsidiary companies”, p. 21. 

95   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 17. 
96   The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as 

the Tromsø Convention, entered into force on 1 December 2020. 

97   2024 Rule of Law Report, Serbia, p. 18. 
98   Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (2025). 
99   Compared with 61% in 2023. 2025 Media Pluralism Monitor, pp. 12 and 15. 
100  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 38. 

12 

 
 
since  the  tragic  incident  in  Novi  Sad101.  Civil  society  reported  in  December  2024  and 
March  2025  that  the  Serbian  authorities  used  spyware  to  unlawfully  target  journalists, 
environmental  activists  and  other  individuals102.  Human  rights  defenders  that  were 
reportedly targeted by spyware attacks did not file a formal complaint due to the lack of 
trust  in  the  process103.  Several  foreign  journalists,  including  from  EU  Member  States, 
were  denied  entry  to  Serbia  prior  to  protests  that  took  place  on  15  March  2025.  Since 
July 2024, the Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and 
safety  of  journalists  reports  20  alerts104.  The  Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  project 
reports  113  alerts  since  July  2024,  consisting  of  23  ‘physical  assaults’,  25  ‘attack  to 
property’,  73  ‘verbal  attacks’,  8  ‘legal  incidents’,  and  23  ‘interferences’105.  Serbian 
journalists’  associations  recorded  a  slight  decrease  in  the  total  number  of  registered 
attacks in 2024 (166, compared with 182 in 2023); however, just in the first three months 
of 2025, there were already 90 registered attacks and pressures, some of which took place 
in  the  presence  of  the  police106.  In  addition,  few  of  the  reported  cases  result  in  final 
convictions107.  Death  threats  and  attacks  against  property  of  journalists  and  media 
associations  in  Novi  Sad  were  noted  in  February  2025.  Several  media  associations 
suspended their membership of the Standing Working Group for the Safety of Journalists 
reportedly  due  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  competent  authorities  in  processing  attacks 
against  journalists  or  to  general  criticism  of  the  authorities’  failure  to  meet  basic 
democratic  standards  and  rule  of  law  principles.  No  progress  has  been  made  in  the 
prosecution of the three murders of journalists of 1994, 1999 and 2001, one of which has 
in  the  meantime  reached  the  statute  of  limitation108.  Cases  of  strategic  lawsuits  against 
public  participation  (SLAPPs)  increasingly  hinder  the  work  of  investigative  media  and 
civil  society  organisations.  Serbia  still  needs  to  align  with  the  EU  acquis,  including  by 
covering  the  early  dismissal  of  manifestly  unfounded  claims  and  remedies  against 
abusive  court  proceedings109.  In  this  regard,  courts  have  not  followed  consistently  the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights110.  

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Parliament’s effectiveness and oversight function continued to be hampered by the 
low  frequency  of  sessions  and  the  lack  of  genuine  political  debate.  Since  its 
constitutive  session  of  6  February  2024,  nine  plenary  sessions  were  held.  During  these 

101  A columnist was detained in April 2024 for his statement allegedly “causing panic and disorder”: Safe 

Journalists Network (2025). For further information see pillar IV. 

102  Amnesty International (2024 and 2025). 
103  Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations. One case was formally reported to the Supreme Public 

Prosecution Office and is at a pre-investigation stage. 

104  Including five with a state reply. The alerts consist in nine attacks on ‘physical safety and integrity of 
journalists’, two ‘detention and imprisonment of journalists’, and six ‘harassment and intimidation of 
journalists’.  Three  other  alerts  relate  to  instances  when  journalists  reporting  on  protests  were  denied 
entry to Serbia in March 2025; Serbian media denigrated in a manipulated video broadcast on three TV 
stations  with  national  coverage  in  July  2024,  leading  to  numerous  death  threats;  and  the  lack  of 
adequate protection under defamation and insult laws and the need to adopt effective legal safeguards 
against SLAPPs. In accordance with data at the disposal of the Supreme Public Prosecution Office, in 
2024 and 2025 until 31 May 2025, 96 cases brought by prosecution services resulted in 1 conviction, 1 
other sanction and 21 rejections while 73 cases are ongoing. 

105  European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, Media Freedom Rapid Response – Serbia. 
106  Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (2024).  
107  Country visit Serbia, media associations. 
108  As referred to in Chapter 23 interim benchmark. Council of the European Union (2024), p. 28. 
109  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 38. 
110  Country visit Serbia, media associations. 

13 

 
 
sessions  the lack of genuine political  debate that would focus on the subject-matters of 
the legislative proposals continued. Some plenary sessions were called with a short notice 
of  only  24  hours,  despite  rules  limiting  this  to  in  exceptional  circumstances111.  This 
resulted  in  limited  possibilities  for  Members  of  Parliament  to  propose  changes  to  the 
agenda or table amendments to the adopted laws or proposed bills, which were nearly all 
tabled by the Government. In addition, public scrutiny and involvement in the legislative 
process  were  limited.  The  practice  of  amalgamating  large  numbers  of,  often  unrelated, 
agenda  and  legislative  items  into  a  single  item  on  the  agenda  also  continued,  making 
detailed  scrutiny  and  debate  difficult.  In  November  2024,  68  items,  including  the  2025 
budget,  were  dealt  with  as  one  discussion  point  and  adopted  without  any  debate. 
Parliamentary oversight of the executive is weak. Only two sessions with questions to the 
Prime Minister and the Government, which should take place monthly when Parliament 
is in session112, were held in 2024, none in 2025. Moreover, debates in the Parliament are 
marked  by  tensions  with  reports  of  derogatory  language  and  occasional  incidents, 
disruptions, including violence, and boycotts113. The rules of procedure and the Code of 
Conduct to penalise offences by parliamentarians are not systematically applied114. 

The  exercise  of  presidential  powers  is  intensively  debated  in  the  public  discourse. 
Against  the  background  that  the  Constitution  foresees  relatively  limited  presidential 
powers, mainly the right to propose a Prime Minister, express state unity, represent the 
country at home and abroad and to promulgate the laws of the  Parliament115, the actual 
exercise  of  presidential  powers  is  intensively  debated  in  the  public  discourse.  In  this 
context civil society and other stakeholders expressed concerns that the political debate 
and  the  decision-making  is  in  practice  steered  by  the  President  in  a  way  which  is  not 
foreseen by the Constitution116.  

The process of public consultations still needs further strengthening. The percentage 
of public consultations on draft laws has increased slightly from 52.9% in 2023 to 58.3% 
in  2024117.  In  the  same  period  the  percentage  of  public  consultations  on  by-laws  for 
which  public  consultations  is  mandatory  has  slightly  decreased  from  31%  in  2023  to 
29.7% in 2024118. While public consultations in these areas need to be strengthened, they 
were  conducted  for  all  draft  policy  planning  documents  in  2024.  Despite  the  legal 
obligation to provide information on the results of public consultations119, reports on the 
results  of  public  consultations  are  not  systematically  published.  Civil  society 
organisations  continued  to  report  that  the  time  given  for  public  consultations  is  not 
sufficient, and that their comments on draft laws of public interest were rarely taken into 
account120.  There  is  still  no  central  body  in  charge  of  the  quality  control  of  public 
consultations. 

111  Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 86(1).  
112  Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, Article 205. 
113  Most  recently,  on  4  March  several  MPs  were  injured  following  a  parliamentary  session  which  was 
seriously disrupted by opposition members throwing smoke grenades and flares. The Guardian (2025); 
The European External Action Service (2025); 2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 24. 

114  Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 4.  
115  Constitution of Serbia,  Articles 101, 109, 110 and 111. See also Venice  Commission,  OSCE/ODIHR 

(2022), para 152. 

116  Country visit Serbia. Freedom House (2024). See also Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR (2022), para 

152. 

117  Laws that ratify international agreements are not included in the calculation. 
118  Statistics provided by Serbian Government (2025a), p. 22. 
119  Law on the planning system. 
120  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25. 

14 

 
 
Over  half  of  the  companies  surveyed  in  Serbia  express  confidence  in  the 
effectiveness of investment protection.  57% of companies are very or fairly confident 
that  investments  are  protected  by  law  and  courts121.  32%  perceive  the  level  of 
independence  of  the  public  procurement  review  body  (Republic  Commission  for 
Protection  of  Rights  in  Public  Procurement  Procedures)  as  very  or  fairly  good122.  33% 
perceive the level of independence of the national competition authority (Commission for 
Protection of Competition) as very or fairly good123. 

The fact that four positions at the Constitutional Court remain vacant is a concern. 
The  High  Judicial  Council,  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council  and  the  President  have  still 
not  made  their  nominations  to  the  respective  appointment  bodies  for  the  four  positions 
which  have  been  vacant  for  a  considerable  amount  of  time124.  The  High  Judicial  and 
Prosecutorial Council plan to adopt a joint Rulebook on the nomination procedure before 
proceeding  with  their  nominations125.  The  efficiency  of  the  Constitutional  Court  is 
already negatively  impacted by the vacant  positions. Moreover, seven of the remaining 
eleven  judges  are  due  to  retire  at  the  end  of  the  year126,  which  would  lead  to  the 
Constitutional  Court  losing  its  quorum127.  No  steps  were  taken  to  introduce  a  qualified 
majority with an anti-deadlock mechanism for the election of some of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court by Parliament, as recommended by the Venice Commission128. 

On  1  January  2025,  Serbia  had  20  leading  judgments  of  the  European  Court  of 
Human Rights pending implementation, an increase of 6 compared to the previous 
year129. At that time, Serbia’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had 
been implemented was at 62% (compared to 73% in 2024; 38% remaining pending), and 
the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 5 years and 7 
months  (compared  to  7  years  in  2024)130.  The  oldest  group  of  leading  judgments, 
pending implementation for 17 years, concern instances where the applicants’ right to a 
fair  trial  was  violated  due  to  excessive  length  civil,  family-related  and  commercial 
judicial  proceedings131.  As  regards  the  respect  of  payment  deadlines,  on  31  December 
2024 there were 16 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 52 in 
2023)132.  On  16  June  2025,  the  number  of  leading  judgments  pending  implementation 
had increased to 21133.  

121  Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025). Only  15% and 17% of the surveyed investors  respectively  perceive 
the  frequent  changes  in  legislation  or  concerns  about  the  quality  of  the  law-making  process  and  the 
quality,  efficiency  or  independence  of  justice  as  a  reason  for  the  lack  of  confidence  in  investment 
protection. 

122  Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025). 
123  Flash Eurobarometer 555 (2025). 
124  Two positions are vacant since 2019, one since 2022 and another one since 2023.  
125  Country visit Serbia.  
126  Country visit Serbia, Constitutional Court. 
127  According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court the prescribed quorum of 8 judges and the 

requirement of 8 positive votes for a plenary decision are not reduced in case of vacancies.  

128  Venice Commission (2023), p. 3. 
129  For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.   
130  All  figures  calculated  by  the  European  Implementation  Network  (EIN)  and  based  on  the  number  of 
cases  that  are  considered  pending  at  the  annual  cut-off  date  of  1  January  2025.  EIN  (2025),  written 
input, p. 2. 

131  Judgment of the ECtHR, 3150/05, Jevremonic v. Serbia, pending implementation since 2007.  
132  Council of Europe (2025), p. 157.  
133  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 

15 

 
 
The three independent bodies working in the area of fundamental rights keep facing 
resource  constraints  and  the  follow-up  to  their  recommendations  remains 
inconsistent.  The  Ombudsperson  is  the  national  human  rights  institution  (NHRI) 
accredited  with  A-Status134.  Some  recruitments  have  taken  place  in  the  offices  of  the 
Ombudsperson,  the  Commissioner  for  Information  of  Public  Importance  and  Personal 
Data Protection, and the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, but the number of 
filled  posts  is  still  below  their  staffing  plans135.  Staff  turnover  in  the  Office  of  the 
Ombudsperson continues to hamper its efficiency136. There continues to be no systematic 
follow-up on the recommendations of the independent bodies137. Stakeholders considered 
that  the  independent  bodies  needed  to  be  more  vocal  in  denouncing  violations  of 
fundamental rights, for example, they considered that there was little public reaction by 
the  Ombudsperson  to  human  rights  violations  during  the  protests  following  the  tragic 
incident at the Novi Sad railway station138. 

Civil society organisations face  increasing pressure and attacks.  The space for civil 
society  is  rated  as  ‘obstructed’139.  Organisations  and  individuals  that  criticise  the 
authorities  are  under  increasing  pressure140,  in  particular  those  monitoring  alleged 
electoral irregularities and environmental damage, or protesting against lithium mining or 
the  glorification  of  war  criminals.  The  student  and  citizens  protests  which  started  after 
the  canopy  collapse  at  Novi  Sad  turned  into  nation  wide  mobilisations  demanding 
accountability and a more effective fight against corruption141. Verbal attacks and smear 
campaigns against CSOs advocating for the rule of law have intensified since the start of 
the protests and there were constant attempts by high-level officials to delegitimise these 
protests142. Campaigns were also waged by tabloids, including in the form of disclosure 
of  CSOs’  activists’  personal  data143.  While  freedom  of  assembly  was  ensured  and  the 
aforementioned  protests  were  allowed  to  take  place,  several  violent  incidents  against 
demonstrators occurred, and the Prime Minister announced his resignation on 28 January 
2025 after one student in Novi Sad got severely injured. Only some of the perpetrators of 
these violent incidents have so far been prosecuted. In January 2025, several foreign civil 

134  Accreditation by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). 
135  For the Ombudsman: 67 staff as of December 2024 compared with 106 in the Action Plan for Chapter 
23 (revised in 2020). This is the main document in which Serbia sets out how it will reach the Interim 
Benchmarks for this chapter. For the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal 
Data Protection: 121 staff as of February 2025, compared with 129 in the Action Plan for Chapter 23. 
For the Commissioner for the Protection of Equality: 44 staff as of December 2024 compared with 60 
in  the  Action  Plan  for  Chapter  23.  For  a  staff  increase  the  independent  bodies  would  need  first  the 
consent  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  before  seeking  the  approval  by  the  Parliament.  According  to  the 
information provided by the Parliament, there are currently no pending requests. 

136  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 36.  
137  Annual  reports  are  submitted  to  the  Parliament  by  15  March  of  each  year,  which  then  adopts 
conclusions  on  them.  The  2022,  2023  and 2024  annual  reports  were  discussed,  after  several  years  of 
delay, in a plenary session of the Parliament on 16 June 2025. Parliamentary discussions tend to remain 
general and do not focus on key recommendations. 

138  Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations. 
139  CIVICUS  (2025a,b).  Rating  by  CIVICUS;  ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open, 
narrowed,  obstructed,  repressed  and  closed.  In  addition,  in  March  2025,  Serbia  was  added  to  the 
CIVICUS  Monitor  watchlist  “as  authorities  severely  clamp  down  on  civic  space  and  incite  violence 
against tens of thousands of people protesting against government corruption.”  

140  2024  Enlargement  Report,  Serbia,  p.  25.  See  also  pillar  III  on  Media  Pluralism  and  Media  Freedom 

regarding SLAPPs targeting civil society organisations and media.  

141  Pro government protests and rallies also took place. 
142  The  protests  were  often  portrayed  as  a  foreign  backed  “coloured  revolution”  undermining  the 

legitimacy of the issues raised by the students and citizens. European Western Balkans (2025). 

143  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25. 

16 

 
 
society  activists,  including  from  EU  Member  States,  were  detained  and  expelled  from 
Serbia. Some were subsequently banned from entering the country due to representing a 
“security  risk”.  In  addition,  some  EU  citizens  legally  residing  in  Serbia  had  their 
residence  status  removed  after  expressing  support  for  the  protests  and  were  asked  to 
leave the country at  short  notice. On 25 and 26 February 2025, the police searched the 
offices  of  four  CSOs  at  the  request  of  the  Special  Anti-Corruption  Department  of  the 
Higher  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  in  Belgrade.  In  this  context,  29  civil  society 
organisations  announced  in  February  2025  their  withdrawal  from  working  groups 
organised by the Government and ministries. On 29 April 2025, the European Court of 
Human  Rights  issued  an  interim  measure  in  the  case  concerning  the  alleged  use  of  a 
sonic weapon for  crowd control by the authorities at  demonstrations in  Belgrade on 15 
March and indicated to the Government that it should prevent any use of sound devices 
for crowd control (other than for communication purposes)144. 

The  impact  of  the  Strategy  and  the  Action  Plan  for  creating  a  stimulating 
environment for the development of civil society has yet to be demonstrated. While 
the  implementation  of  the  2022-2030  Strategy  and  the  Action  Plan  2025-2026  for 
creating a stimulating environment for the development of civil society has continued, its 
impact has still to be demonstrated. Civil society organisations froze their membership in 
the Council for cooperation and development of civil society in January 2025. This was 
due  to  the  Council’s  lack  of  institutional  reaction  to  increasing  attacks  on  civil  society 
organisations  and  human  rights  defenders145.  The  transparency  and  fairness  of  public 
funding  to  civil  society  remains  to  be  improved.  Key  challenges  include  the  lack  of 
transparent criteria for approving support to civil society organisations and for selecting 
independent  experts  in  evaluation  commissions,  and  insufficient  transparency  in  the 
reporting on spent funds146. 

144  While  observing  15  minutes  silence,  loud  sounds  and  airwaves  disrupted  the  demonstration.  Up  to 
4 000 people reported their experiences of the incident, alleging they experienced fear, panic, shock and 
various  physical  symptoms.  Some  allegedly  sustained  physical  injuries  due  to  the  panic.  The  Court 
noted that the use of such weapons for crowd control was unlawful in Serbia, and the potentially serious 
health effects that could be caused to a large number of persons. It reiterated that the decision did not 
mean  it  had  taken  any position  as  to  whether  use  of  such  weapons  had  occurred  on  15  March  2025: 
European Court of Human Rights (30 April 2025). Concerns were also expressed by the co-rapporteurs 
on Serbia of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: Council of Europe (2025b). 

145  Country visit Serbia, civil society organisations.  
146  2024 Enlargement Report, Serbia, p. 25. 

17 

 
 
 Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the  consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law 
report can be found at https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en . 

Amnesty  International  (2024),  Serbian  authorities  using  spyware  to  hack  activists  and 
journalists, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/serbia-authorities-using-spyware-
and-cellebrite-forensic-extraction-tools-to-hack-journalists-and-activists/.  

Amnesty  International  (2025),  Serbia:  BIRN  journalists  targeted  with  Pegasus  spyware, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/serbia-birn-journalists-targeted-with-pegasus-
spyware/. 

Anti-Corruption  Council  (2025),  Annual  Reports,  http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/en-
GB/page/home/ . 

Association of Prosecutors of Serbia (2025),  Komlen Nikolić (Association of Prosecutors): The 
fountain  of  wishes  has  opened,  and  the  President  of  Serbia  is  also  there  (Komlen  Nikolić 
(Udruženje 
i  predsednik  Srbije), 
fontana 
https://uts.org.rs/komlen-nikolic-udruzenje-tuzilaca-otvorila-se-fontana-zelja-tu-je-i-predsednik-
srbije/.   

tužilaca):  Otvorila 

želja, 

se 

tu 

je 

(2024),  Serbian  Prosecution  Charges  13  Over  Railway  Station  Disaster, 

BIRN 
https://balkaninsight.com/2024/12/30/serbian-prosecution-charges-13-over-railway-station-
disaster/ . 

Center  for  Research,  Transparency  and  Accountability  (CRTA)  (2025),  Criminal  complaint 
against President Vučić and others over leaked information from the investigation against CRTA, 
https://crta.rs/en/criminal-complaint-against-president-vucic-and-others-over-leaked-information-
from-the-investigation-against-crta/.  

Centre for Judicial Research (CEPRIS) (2025), Report on Publicity of work of the High Judicial 
Council  and  High  Prosecutorial  Council  (Izveštaj  o  javnosti  rada  Visokog  saveta  sudstva  i 
Visokog  saveta  tužilaštva),  https://www.cepris.org/istrazivanja-i-analize/izvestaj-o-javnosti-rada-
visokog-saveta-sudstva-i-visokog-saveta-tuzilastva-2023-2024/. 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (2025), Media Pluralism Monitor, Country report for 
Serbia. 

(2024),  Dashboard  Western 

CEPEJ 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/towards-a-better-evaluation-of-the-results-of-judicial-reforms-
in-the-western-balkans-dashboard-western-balkans-. 

2023  Data 

Balkans 

Collection, 

– 

CIVICUS (2025), https://monitor.civicus.org/country/serbia/. 

CIVICUS (2025a), March Watchlist 2025, https://monitor.civicus.org/watchlist-march-2025/. 

Commissioner for information of public importance and personal data protection (2025), Annual 
Report for 2024 (Извештај о раду поверeника за информације од јавног значаја и заштиту 
Годину), 
података 

личности 

2024. 

за 

о 

18 

 
https://www.poverenik.rs/images/stories/dokumentacija-
nova/izvestajiPoverenika/2024/Godi%C5%A1nji_izve%C5%A1taj_2024.pdf.  

Constitutional  Court  (2025),  Written  input  from  the  Constitutional  Court  in  the  context  of  the 
country visit to Serbia. 

Council  of  Europe:  Committee  of  Ministers  (2025),  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  judgments 
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, 18th Annual Report of the Committee of 
Ministers, https://rm.coe.int/gbr-2001-18e-rapport-annuel-2024/1680b4d77d. 

Council  of  Europe  (2025a),  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of 
journalists  -  Europe  Press  Freedom  Report,  https://rm.coe.int/prems-013425-gbr-2519-annual-
report-2025-correction-cartooning/1680b48f7b. 

Council of Europe (20 March 2025b), PACE monitoring co-rapporteurs express concern about 
the  escalation  of 
in  Serbia,  https://pace.coe.int/news/9806/pace-monitoring-co-
rapporteurs-express-concern-about-the-escalation-of-tensions-in-serbia-.  

tensions 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  &  OSCE/ODIHR  (2022),  Joint  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission  and  the  OSCE/ODIHR  on  the  constitutional  and  legal  framework  governing  the 
functioning  of  democratic  institutions  in  Serbia  -  Electoral  law  and  electoral  administration 
(CDL-AD(2022)046) . 

Council of Europe: Venice Commission (2023), Information to the Follow-up on three previous 
opinions on Judiciary (CDL-PI(2023)005). 

Council  of  Europe:  Venice  Commission  (2024),  Opinion  on  the  draft  Law  on  the  Judicial 
Academy and draft amendments to the Law on Judges and the Law on the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (CDL-AD(2024)036). 

Council  of  the  European  Union  (2024),  European  Union  Common  Position,  Chapter  23: 
Judiciary 
20/16, 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10777-2024-INIT/en/pdf. 

Fundamental 

Rights, 

and 

AD 

European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (2025),  Mapping  Media  Freedom, 
https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/mapping-media-freedom/. 

European Commission (2024), 2024 Communication on EU Enlargement policy, Serbia Report. 

European  Commission  (2024),  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law 
situation in Serbia. 

European Court of Human Rights (2007), Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 
17 July 2007, Jevremovic v. Serbia, 3150/05. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (30  April  2025),  Press  release,  Interim  measure  issued  in 
sonic-weapon  case,  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre-press#{%22itemid%22:[%22003-8218363-
11546489%22]}. 

European  Implementation  Network  on  Enlargement  Countries  (2025),  Written  contribution  for 
the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

19 

 
European  Network  of  National  Human  Rights  Institutions  (ENNHRI)  (2024),  Written 
contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report. 

European Western Balkans (2025), In the midst of mass protests, Serbian officials are recycling 
the  narrative  of  a  “colour  revolution”,  https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2025/02/20/in-the-
midst-of-mass-protests-serbian-officials-are-recycling-the-narrative-of-a-colour-revolution/ 

European Western Balkans (2022), Whistleblowers in Serbia: High profile cases, but no support 
of 
institutions,  https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/10/18/whistleblowers-in-serbia-
high-profile-cases-but-no-support-of-the-institutions/. 

the 

Freedom 
Transit, 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/serbia/nations-transit/2024.. 

Nations 

(2024), 

House 

in 

Country 

report 

Serbia, 

GRECO (2022), Fifth Evaluation Report, Evaluation Report on Serbia on Preventing corruption 
and  promoting  integrity  in  central  governments  (top  executive  functions)  and  law  enforcement 
agencies, https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/serbia.  

High  Prosecutorial  Council  (2025),  Press  statement  of  9  May  2025,  https://vst.jt.rs/wp-
content/uploads/2025/05/Saopstenje-Visokog-saveta-tuzilastva-090525.pdf. 

Independent  Association  of  Journalists  of  Serbia  (NUNS)  (2024),  Annual  report  2024, 
https://www.bazenuns.rs/srpski/napadi-na-novinare  

Independent  Journalists  Association  of  Serbia  (NUNS)  (2025),  Municipality  of  Sjenica  Must 
Launch  Calls  for  All  Types  of  Media,  and  Vranje  Should  Reconsider  Its  Funding  Decision, 
https://en.nuns.rs/ijas-the-municipality-of-sjenica-must-launch-calls-for-all-types-of-media-and-
vranje-should-reconsider-its-funding-decision/. 

Insajder.net (2025), The number of judges and prosecutors who responded to Aleksandar Vučić's 
statement  is  growing,  so  far  more  than  500  signatories.  (Raste  broj  sudija  i  tužilaca  koji  su 
reagovali 
potpisnika), 
https://www.insajder.net/prenosimo/za-dan-gotovo-udvostrucen-broj-sudija-i-tuzilaca-koji-su-
reagovali-na-izjavu-aleksandra-vucica-preko-380-potpisnika. 

izjavu  Aleksandra  Vučića, 

sada 

više 

500 

na 

od 

do 

Judges  Association  of  Serbia 
https://www.sudije.rs/Item/Details/1034 . 

(2025),  Public  Statement  of  9  February  2025, 

European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (2025),  Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  – 
Serbia. 

Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  (2024),  Mapping  Media  Freedom  –  Monitoring  Report  2024, 
https://www.ecpmf.eu/mfrr-monitoring-report-2024/. 

Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  (2025),  Report:  Media  Freedom  Crisis  in  Serbia  Demands 
Urgent Action, https://www.mfrr.eu/serbia-media-freedom-in-a-state-of-emergency-new-report 

Ministry of Interior of Serbia (2025), Press release: 153 individuals arrested in anti-corruption 
operations  in  February,  https://www.srbija.gov.rs/vest/en/244507/153-individuals-arrested-in-
anti-corruption-operations-in-february.php. 

20 

 
N1  (2025b),  Judges  and  prosecutors  responded  to  Vučić:  The  president  wrote  a  new  page  in 
humiliating the judiciary (Sudije i tužioci odgovorili Vučiću: Predsednik ispisao novu stranicu u 
https://n1info-rs.translate.goog/vesti/sudije-tuzioci-odgovor-
ponižavanju 
vucicu/?_x_tr_sl=sr&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=wapp.  

pravosuđa), 

(2025a),  Prosecution 

N1 
https://n1info.rs/english/news/prosecution-in-belgrade-charges-three-over-canopy-collapse/. 

in  Belgrade 

charges 

canopy 

three 

over 

collapse, 

Office  of 
https://ombudsman.rs/index.php/izvestaji/godisnji-izvestaji.  

the  Ombudsperson 

(2025),  Annual 

report  of 

the  Ombudsperson  2024,  

Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (2024),  Convention  on  Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Ratification Status as 
of August 2024, https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf.  

OSCE/ODIHR International Observation Mission (2024), Serbia, Early Parliamentary Elections, 
17 December 2023: Final Report, https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/serbia/563505. 

Parliament  of  Serbia  (2024),  Fourth  session  of  the  Committee  for  Culture  and  Information, 
http://www.parlament.gov.rs/%C4%8Cetvrta_sednica_Odbora_za_kulturu_i_informisanje.50216
.941.html. 

Press Council (2024), Annual Report 2024, https://savetzastampu.rs/lat/izvestaji/izvestaj-o-radu-
saveta-za-stampu-u-2024-godini-2/. 

Prosecutors  Association  of  Serbia  (2025),  Komlen  Nikolić  (Association  of  Prosecutors):  The 
fountain  of  wishes  has  opened,  and  the  President  of  Serbia  is  there  too  (Komlen  Nikolić 
(Udruženje 
i  predsednik  Srbije), 
fontana 
https://uts.org.rs/komlen-nikolic-udruzenje-tuzilaca-otvorila-se-fontana-zelja-tu-je-i-predsednik-
srbije/ . 

tužilaca):  Otvorila 

želja, 

se 

tu 

je 

Regulatory  Authority  for  Electronic  Media  (REM)  (2024),  REM  regular  session  (250.redovna 
sednica), https://www.rem.rs/sr-lat/arhiva/sednice/2024/11/250-redovna-sednica.  

Regulatory  Authority  for  Electronic  Media  (REM)  (2025),  Elections  2023  –  Final  Report, 
Monitoring and  Analysis  of  Media  Service  Providers'  Programs  During the  Election  Campaign 
for the Republican, Provincial and Local Elections (Избори 2023. Завршни извештај Надзор и 
анализа  програма  пружалаца  медијских  услуга  током  изборне  кампање  за  републичке, 
покрајинске 
изборе), 
https://www.rem.rs/uploads/files/Izbori%202023/Izbori%202023%20zavrsni%20izvestaj.pdf. 

локалне 

и 

RTV 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I3_2O80ypwQ. 

Pink  Official 

(2025), 

Emission:  Hit 

Tweet 

(Emisija:  Hit 

Tvit), 

Serbian Government (2025), Written input for the 2025 Rule of Law Report.  

Serbian Government (2025a), Additional written contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Serbian  Government 
https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/files/ENG_nac_strat_borba_protiv_korupc_2024-
2028_017_lat%20(1).pdf. 

(2024a),  National  Anti-corruption 

Strategy 

2024-2028,  

21 

 
2024-2028 

Serbian  Government  (2024b),  Action  plan  for  the  period  2024-2025  for  the  Implementation  of 
the 
Corruption, 
https://www.mpravde.gov.rs/files/Prevod%20usvojenog%20Akcionog%20plana%20za%20borbu
%20protiv%20korupcije%202024-2025%20ENG.doc  

National 

Strategy 

Against 

Fight 

the 

for 

Serbian  Monitor  (2025),  Laura  Kövesi:  “We  are  investigating  misuse  of  EU  funds  in  the  Novi 
Sad  railway  station  renovation”,  https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/laura-kovesi-we-are-
investigating-misuse-of-eu-funds-in-the-novi-sad-railway-station-renovation/. 

State  Audit  Institution  (2025),  report  for  the  year  2024,  https://www.dri.rs/godisnji-izvestaji-o-
radu?godina=2024 . 

The European External Action Service (2025), Serbia: Statement by the Spokesperson on recent 
developments, 
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/serbia-statement-spokesperson-recent-
developments_en. 

The  Guardian  (2025),  Serbian  MPs  set  off  flares  and  smoke  grenades  inside  parliament, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/04/serbian-mps-set-off-flares-and-smoke-
grenades-inside-parliament. 

Transparency International (2025), Corruption Perceptions Index 2024. 

Transparency International (2024), Between Anti-Corruption Reform and Decline: Examining key 
actors,  strengths  and  weaknesses  in  the  Western  Balkans  and  Turkiye’s  national  integrity 
systems, 
https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/2024_NISReport_BetweenAnti-
CoruptionReformAndDecline_English.pdf. 

Transparency  Serbia  (12  February  2025)  Serious  doubts  about  the  work  of  the  prosecution 
(Ozbiljne 
https://transparentnost.org.rs/sr/aktivnosti-2/pod-
u 
lupom/12834-ozbiljne-sumnje-u-rad-tuzilastva.  

tužilaštva), 

sumnje 

rad 

Transparency  Serbia  (2024),  Wasting  of  Public  Resources  through  Public  Procurement, 
https://www.transparentnost.org.rs/images/dokumenti_uz_vesti/WASTING_OF_PUBLIC_RESO
URCES_-_public_procurement.pdf 

.  

22 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Serbia  

The Commission services held hybrid meetings in March 2025 with: 

•  A11 Initiative 
•  Agency for the Prevention of Corruption 
•  Anti-Corruption Council 
•  Appellate Court 
•  Appellate Public Prosecution Office 
•  Astra 
•  Association of independent electronic media (ANEM)  
•  Asylum Protection Center 
•  ATINA 
•  Autonomous Women’s Center 
•  Basic Public Prosecution Office 
•  Belgrade Centre for Human Rights 
•  BIRN 
•  BIRODI 
•  CEPRIS 
•  Child Rights Centre 
•  Civic Initiatives 
•  Commissioner for Personal Data Protection and Access to Information of Public  

Importance  

Independent Journalists' Association of Serbia 

•  Constitutional Court 
•  CRTA 
•  High Judicial Council 
•  High Prosecutorial Council 
•  Higher Court 
•  Higher Public Prosecution Office 
•  Humanitarian Law Foundation 
• 
•  Judges Association of Serbia 
•  KRIK 
•  Lawyers’ Association of Serbia 
•  Ministry of European Integration 
•  Ministry of Interior 
•  Ministry of Justice 
•  MODS 
•  Ombudsman 
•  Partners Serbia 
•  Police specialised department for corruption 
•  Press Council 
•  Prosecutor Association of Serbia 
•  Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) 
•  Share 
•  Special Public Prosecution Office for Organized Crime  

23 

 
•  Supreme Court 
•  Supreme Public Prosecution Office 
•  Transparency Serbia 
•  29 
•  UNS 
•  YUCOM 

*  The  Commission  also  met  the  following  organisations  in  a  number  of  horizontal 

meetings:  

•  Amnesty International 
•  Araminta 
•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  European Youth Forum, 
• 
• 
• 
•  Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association. 
•  Transparency International  

International Commission of Jurists 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
JEF Europe 

24