COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2025-07-08
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Hungary, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, human rights, independence of the judiciary, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 8.7.2025  SWD(2025) 917 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Rule of Law Report                       Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Hungary Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2025 Rule of Law Report                         The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2025) 900 final} - {SWD(2025) 901 final} - {SWD(2025) 902 final} - {SWD(2025) 903 final} - {SWD(2025) 904 final} - {SWD(2025) 905 final} - {SWD(2025) 906 final} - {SWD(2025) 907 final} - {SWD(2025) 908 final} - {SWD(2025) 909 final} - {SWD(2025) 910 final} - {SWD(2025) 911 final} - {SWD(2025) 912 final} - {SWD(2025) 913 final} - {SWD(2025) 914 final} - {SWD(2025) 915 final} - {SWD(2025) 916 final} - {SWD(2025) 918 final} - {SWD(2025) 919 final} - {SWD(2025) 920 final} - {SWD(2025) 921 final} - {SWD(2025) 922 final} - {SWD(2025) 923 final} - {SWD(2025) 924 final} - {SWD(2025) 925 final} - {SWD(2025) 926 final} - {SWD(2025) 927 final} - {SWD(2025) 928 final} - {SWD(2025) 929 final} - {SWD(2025) 930 final} - {SWD(2025) 931 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

In Hungary, the National Judicial Council has continued to exercise the powers acquired 
by  means  of  the  judicial  reform  of  2023.  New  rules  have  been  introduced  on  the 
appointment and career of judges. In line with the legislation in force, the process did not 
always include the consultation of the National Judicial Council on some of the relevant 
legislative amendments. The transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been 
improved, whereas the case allocation in the Kúria is being implemented well. The Kúria 
continues  to  enforce  uniformity  of  case  law  through  its  uniformity  complaint  panel. 
Undue  pressure  on  some  judges  continues  within  the  judiciary,  notably  in  relation  to 
internal debates on key issues related to judicial independence. An increase in salaries in 
the justice system is being done in three steps until 2027. The efficiency of the judiciary 
and digitalisation of the justice system continues to be high overall. 

The  implementation  of  the  2024-2025  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  and  related 
Action  Plan  is  ongoing,  while  important  actions  remain  pending.  The  number  of 
convictions  for  corruption  crimes  has  decreased  and  there  has  been  no  progress  to 
establish  a  robust  track  record  on  high-level  corruption.  Court  decisions  reviewing 
prosecutorial  decisions  not  to  investigate  or  prosecute  corruption  continue  to  be  non-
binding.  There  has  been  no  progress  yet  to  adopt  new  lobbying  and  post-employment 
rules, although there are plans to legislate in this area by November 2025. The Integrity 
Authority  continues  to  report  obstacles  in  fulfilling  its  oversight  tasks  effectively.  Key 
shortcomings  with  regard  to  the  transparency  of  the  financing  of  political  parties  and 
electoral campaigns remain. Competition in public procurement has been improved, and 
different levels of control remain for national and EU-funds related procurements. 

to  media  outlets, 

The  threats  to  media  pluralism  highlighted  in  previous  Rule  of  Law  Reports  have 
remained  unaddressed.  No  measures  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  to  regulate  the 
channelling  of  state  advertising 
the  functional 
independence  of  the  media  authority  and  to  ensure  the  editorial  and  financial 
independence of public service media. Journalists continue to face numerous and serious 
challenges  to  their  work.  Journalists  and  media  outlets  have  been  investigated  by  the 
Sovereignty  Protection  Office  for  allegedly  ‘serving  foreign  interests’,  and  access  to 
public interest events and press conferences continues to be selectively denied. While the 
accelerated treatment of court cases related to access to information continues, the scope 
of access to information remains limited especially as regards public funding. 

to  guarantee 

The Government continues to use its emergency powers extensively, undermining legal 
certainty and affecting the operation of businesses in the single market. The law-making 
process remains a serious source of concern, with certain important legislative processes 
not being linked to public consultation requirements. Foreign companies, including from 
other  EU  Member  States,  operating  in  strategic  sectors  face  intensified  regulatory 
pressure  from  state  action.  The  possibility  for  the  Government  to  interfere  with  the 
application of merger control rules continues to create legal uncertainty. Concerns related 
to  the  absence  of  procedural  safeguards  and  effective  oversight  in  case  of  secret 
surveillance  measures  outside  criminal  proceedings  have  not  been  addressed.  A 
deteriorating  environment  for  civil  society  organisations  and  legal  uncertainty  further 
obstruct civic space. 

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary has 
made: 

•  No  progress  on  improving  the  transparency  of  case  allocation  systems  in  lower-

instance courts, taking into account European standards on case allocation. 

•  Significant  progress  on  increasing  the  remuneration  of  judges,  prosecutors,  and 
judicial  and  prosecutorial  staff,  without  however  taking  structural  measures,  taking 
into account European standards on remuneration for the justice system. 

•  No  progress  yet  on  adopting  comprehensive  reforms  on  lobbying  and  revolving 
doors, and further improving the system of asset declarations, providing for effective 
oversight and enforcement. 

•  No progress on establishing a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and 

final judgments for high-level corruption cases.  

•  No progressing on introducing  mechanisms to  enhance the  functional  independence 
of  the  media  regulatory  authority  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  the 
independence of media regulators. 

•  No  progress  on  adopting  legislation  to  ensure  fair  and  transparent  distribution  of 

advertising expenditure by the state and state-owned companies. 

•  No progress on strengthening the rules and mechanisms to enhance the independent 
governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into  account 
European standards on public service media. 

•  No progress on removing obstacles affecting civil society organisations and foster a 
safe  and  enabling  civic  space,  including  by  repealing  legislation  that  hampers  their 
capacity of working, in particular the immigration tax. 

On  this  basis,  and  considering  other  developments  that  took  place  in  the  period  of 
reference,  in  addition  to  recalling  the  obligation  to  comply  with  the  rule  of  law-related 
rulings of the CJEU and the rule of law-related infringement procedures referred to in the 
country  chapter, 
the  general  regime  of 
conditionality, the relevant concerns raised in the Article 7(1) TEU procedure initiated by 
the  European  Parliament,  the  relevant  commitments  made  under  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Plan, and the relevant country-specific recommendations under the European 
Semester, it is recommended to Hungary to: 

the  Commission’s  assessment  under 

• 

Improve the transparency of case allocation systems in lower-instance courts, taking 
into account European standards on case allocation.  

•  Take  measures  to  ensure  that  the  ongoing  increase  in  the  remuneration  of  judges, 
prosecutors and judicial and prosecutorial staff is carried out in a structured manner, 
taking into account European standards on remuneration for the justice system. 

•  Put forward comprehensive legislative reforms on lobbying and revolving doors, and 
further improve the system of asset declarations, providing for effective oversight and 
enforcement. 

•  Establish a robust track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments for 

• 

high-level corruption cases. 
Introduce  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  functional  independence  of  the  media 
regulatory authority taking into account European standards on the independence of 
media regulators.  

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•  Adopt measures to ensure fair and transparent distribution of advertising expenditure 

by the state and state-owned companies. 

•  Strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent  governance  and 
editorial  independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into  account  European 
standards on public service media. 

•  Ensure that there are no obstacles hindering the work of civil society organisations, 
including by repealing legislation that hampers their capacity of working, and foster a 
safe and enabling civic space. 

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I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM1  

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Hungary is low among the general 
public and companies. Overall, 37% of the general population and 38% of companies 
perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges  to  be  ‘fairly  or  very  good’  in 
20252. The perceived level  of independence among the general  public has decreased in 
comparison with 2024 (41%), as well as in comparison with 2021 (41%). The perceived 
level of judicial independence among companies has slightly decreased since 2024 (40%) 
but remains higher than in 2021 (32%). 

The  National  Judicial  Council  has  continued  to  exercise  the  powers  acquired  by 
means of the judicial reform of 2023. In particular, the Council gave positive opinions 
on the suitability of candidates for the post of Kúria Vice-Presidents3 and considered the 
2023 appointment by the Kúria President of four court managers in the Kúria in line with 
the law4. After the retirement of the head of the Civil Department and the appointment of 
the heads of the Criminal and Administrative Departments to the post of Vice-President, 
the  Kúria  President  did  not  propose  the  appointment  of  new  heads  of  department,  as  a 
Vice-President may also perform the duties of a head of department5. Also, the Council 
gave  consent  to  the  secondment  of  a  judge  to  the  National  Directorate-General  for 
Hospitals. 

New rules have been introduced on the appointment and career of judges, but the 
process did not always include the consultation of the National Judicial Council on 
some of the relevant legislative amendments, in line with the legislation in force. On 
22  November  2024,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  signed  an  agreement  with  the  National 
Judicial Council, the National Office for the Judiciary and the Kúria that includes salary 
increases for judges and court staff and announces some reforms to the judicial system6. 
As a follow-up to this four-party agreement, in December 2024, the National Assembly 
introduced  several  reforms.  First,  it  passed  legislation  introducing  the  first  step  of  a 
staggered  salary  raise  in  the  justice  system.  Second,  it  adopted  an  amendment  to  the 

1   An  overview  of  the  institutional  framework  for  all  four  pillars  can  be  found  here.  The  assessments 
included  in  this  country  chapter  do  not  prejudge  any  future  assessment  under  Regulation  (EU, 
Euratom) 2020/2092, Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241, or under Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 
2021/1060. 

2   Figures 51 and 53, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard and Figures 49 and 51,  2023 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
The  level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of 
respondents  perceive  judicial  independence  as  fairly  good  and  very  good);  low  (between  30-39%), 
average (between 40-59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Decision 51/2024 of 27 March 2024. 
4   Decision 151/2024 of 4 September 2024. 
5   See  Section  123(4)  of  Organisation  and  Administration  of  Courts  Act.  Kúria  Vice-Presidents  are 
appointed by the President of the Republic, upon the recommendation of the Kúria President. See also 
Kúria (2025a). 

6   The  topics  listed  in  the  agreement  include:  an  increase  of  salaries  of  judges  and  court  staff;  the 
possibility for judges to serve until the age of 70; raising the minimum age requirement for becoming a 
judge;  incentivising  applications  from  outside  the  judiciary;  centralised  training  for  trainee  judges, 
prosecutors,  lawyers,  notaries;  the  Kúria’s  role  in  securing  the  uniformity  of  case  law  at  all  court 
instances; extending the territorial jurisdiction of district court judges to the entire area of jurisdiction 
of the regional court (that is the given county); the possibility of online presence during hearings; the 
possibility not to hand down reasoned judicial decisions in civil cases if it is presumed that the parties 
will not exercise their right of appeal; moving the registration of companies and CSOs from courts to 
the public administration. 

4 

 
 
Fundamental Law (Fourteenth Amendment) which raises the minimum age for becoming 
a judge and opens the possibility to continue serving as a judge after reaching the general 
retirement age. Third, it introduced new requirements in terms of prior experience needed 
to appoint judges from outside the judiciary. The reforms proposed by the Government 
attracted  criticism  and  protests  from  judicial  associations  and  judges  on  the  grounds  of 
judicial  independence.  Following  these  protests,  the  President  of  the  National  Judicial 
Council  resigned  on  3  December  2024.  Although  the  National  Judicial  Council  had 
discussed  and  signed  the  four-party  agreement,  it  was  not  consulted  on  the  subsequent 
legislative amendments. In fact, the Council considered that new provisions will have a 
negative  impact  on  the  working  conditions  of  judges  and  on  judicial  training  and  will 
create unjustified differences of treatment within the judiciary. On 15 January 2025, the 
National  Judicial Council withdrew from  the four-party agreement,  declaring it invalid. 
However,  the  Minister  of  Justice  announced  that  the  Government  would  still  continue 
implementing  the  four-party  agreement.  On  11  June  2025,  the  National  Assembly 
adopted  a  cardinal  law  setting  in  statute  the  detailed  rules  of  some  of  the  reforms 
mentioned in that agreement7. The new law introduced rules related to the functioning of 
the justice system, including detailed rules on the possibility for judges and prosecutors 
to serve until the age of 70, the Kúria’s role in securing the uniformity of case law, the 
possibility  of  online  presence  during  hearings  for  members  of  the  audience,  the 
possibility not  to hand down reasoned judicial decisions in  civil  cases  if it is  presumed 
that the parties will not exercise their right of appeal and the obligation of the courts to 
pay the parties a daily lump sum as compensation for any breach of a procedural deadline 
by the judge hearing the civil or administrative case. The National Judicial Council was 
consulted on the draft in a procedure described by the Council as ineffective8. 

The  Fourteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fundamental  Law  and  other  legislative 
amendments9 changed the rules on judicial appointments. They raised the lower age 
limit for becoming a judge from 30 to 35 years as of 1 March 2025 and introduced new 
requirements  of  prior  experience  outside  the  judiciary  for  first-time  appointments  to 
judicial posts10. According to the Government, these changes will increase the quality of 
the judicial system11. The new appointment criteria are not applicable if the applicant for 
a  judicial  position  is  a  junior  judge  who  was  employed  in  the  judicial  system  before  1 
January  2025,  or  a  junior  judge  who  was  employed  in  the  judicial  system  as  a  trainee 
judge before 1 January 2025. According to stakeholders, these changes favour candidates 
who apply from outside the judiciary12. On 16 June 2025, the Venice Commission found 
that raising the minimum age for the appointment of judges from 30 to 35 years, although 

7  Act XLIX of 2025.  
8   See National Judicial Council (2025a) and National Judicial Council (2025b). The Council maintains 
that  the  time  allowed  for  comments  on  the  draft  law  was  insufficient,  its  representatives  were  not 
invited  to  a  consultation  meeting  held  before  the  tabling  of  the  draft  law  in  Parliament  and  its 
comments were not taken on board. On 1 July 2025, the National Judicial Council challenged the new 
law before the Constitutional Court, maintaining a breach of its prerogatives. 

9   Act LXXIV of 2024 and Act XLIX of 2025. 
10   Under  the  new  rules  applicable  from  1  March  2025,  candidates  must  meet  two  conditions:  (i)  have 
gained 2 years’ experience outside the judiciary (new requirement) and (ii) have worked at least 1 year 
as a junior judge, deputy prosecutor, lawyer, notary public, legal adviser, government official or civil 
servant, member of the Constitutional Court, judge, military judge, prosecutor, served as a judge at an 
international organisation or any EU institution or carried out any other justice-related activity (not a 
new requirement).  

11   Country visit, Ministries. The Venice Commission could not answer at this early stage whether these 
changes  will  serve,  alone  and  in  the  abstract,  to  enhance  public  confidence  in  the  judiciary  and  the 
quality of judicial decision-making. Venice Commission (2025), para. 49. 

12   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 5; Hungarian Association of Judges (2025), p. 9. 

5 

 
 
rather high, is not per se contrary to international standards, and the requirement to have 
a fresh outside view into the court system may be welcomed. The new rules introduced – 
as of 1 January 2026 – the possibility for judges who have already reached the general 
retirement age to stay on the bench until the age of 70. If the judge concerned requests 
such extension in the timeframe determined by law, the President of the National Office 
for  the  Judiciary  or  –  in  the  case  of  Kúria  judges  –  the  Kúria  President  must 
automatically grant the request13. 

The transparency of case allocation in lower courts has not been improved, whereas 
the  case  allocation  in  the  Kúria  is  being  implemented  well14.  According  to  the 
Government,  there  is  no  need  to  revise  the  legislation  applicable  to  case  allocation  in 
lower courts because the method of case allocation chosen by the court president has to 
ensure  the  objective  and  even  distribution  of  cases;  deviation  from  the  pre-established 
rules is only allowed for reasons defined by law or because of important circumstances 
affecting  the  functioning  of  the  court15.  Several  stakeholders  note  that  the  discretion 
allowed to court managers in lower courts, the existing exemptions to the case allocation 
rules and the  frequent  changes of these rules prevent  the general  public and the parties 
from  verifying  whether  the  rules  are  being  followed16.  Therefore,  there  has  been  no 
progress  on  the  recommendation  regarding  case  allocation  in  lower  courts.  As  regards 
case  allocation  in  the  Kúria,  following  legislative  reforms  in  2023,  the  parties  to  the 
proceedings at the Kúria are able to verify on the basis of the case file whether the rules 
on case allocation have been duly applied17. No complaints were reported from parties in 
proceedings as regards case allocation at the Kúria18.  

The  Kúria  continues  to  enforce  uniformity  of  case  law  through  its  uniformity 
complaint  panel.  In  2024,  the  Kúria  handed  down  17  uniformity  decisions  and  40 
uniformity  complaint  decisions  (14  of  them  being  on-the-merits  decisions,  including 
three having the effect of a uniformity decision)19. The Kúria’s uniformity decisions are 
binding on Hungarian courts until the uniformity complaint panel changes the decision. 
Preliminary references in the interest of uniformity of law and uniformity complaints are 
heard  by  the  uniformity  complaint  panel  composed  of  the  Kúria  President  or  Vice 
President  and  40  senior  judges  (the  Secretary  General,  heads  and  deputy  heads  of 
department  and  presiding  judges)20.  The  Kúria  maintains  that,  following  a  decision 
handed  down  by  the  Court  of  Justice  under  Article  267  TFEU  following  a  preliminary 
reference,  Kúria  judges  and  panels  are  required  to  seek  the  opinion  of  the  uniformity 
complaint  panel  before  setting  aside  (disapplying)  a  precedent  decision  of  the  Kúria, 

13   Sections 25/B to 25/F of the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges Act, as amended. This is in line 

with the recommendation of the Venice Commission.  

14   The  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  that  Hungary  ‘[i]mprove  the  transparency  of  case 
allocation  systems  in  lower-instance  courts,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  case 
allocation’.  

15   Hungarian Government (2025), written input, p. 4. 
16   Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2024),  p.  11;  CCBE  (2025),  p.  99;  Hungarian  Association  of 
Judges (2025), p. 8; Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025a); p. 12; MEDEL (2025), p. 7; Res Iudicata 
(2025), p. 8; Ügyvédkör (2025), p. 7. 

17   2023 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 5; 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 6. 
18   Kúria (2025c), p. 1.  
19   In 2023, the Kúria delivered 9 uniformity decisions and 52 uniformity complaint decisions (21 of them 
being on-the-merits decisions, including 4 having the effect of a uniformity decision).  See also 2024 
Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 7. 

20   Section  41/A  (1)  of  the  Organisation  and  Administration  of  Courts  Act.  According  to  the  case 
allocation scheme, the uniformity complaint panel has two subpanels, each composed of a chairperson 
and 20 members. 

6 

 
 
found incompatible with EU law21.  This  is  necessary because the uniformity  complaint 
panel has the exclusive competence to remove the binding force of legal interpretations 
contained in previously published Kúria decisions. In 2024, the Court of Justice already 
confirmed in a preliminary reference from a Hungarian court that any court must be able 
to  disregard  any  binding  ruling  of  a  national  court  if  it  considers,  in  the  light  of  the 
interpretation  of  EU  law  provided  by  the  Court  of  Justice,  that  such  ruling  is  not 
consistent with EU law22. A new law23 adopted on 11 June 2025 further strengthens as of 
1 January 2026 the Kúria’s role in enforcing the uniformity of case law when reviewing 
binding judicial decisions in civil cases. 

Undue pressure on some judges continues within the judiciary, notably in relation 
to  internal  debates  on  key  issues  related  to  judicial  independence.  The  Kúria 
President  regularly  questions  in  public  the  legitimacy  of  the  service  courts24  and  his 
criticism  intensified  after  the  presidents  of  the  service  courts  and  several  other  judges 
publicly criticised the four-party agreement25. This prompted reactions from the National 
Judicial Council, the Res Iudicata Association and the Hungarian Association of Judges, 
which  organised  a  demonstration  in  defence  of  judicial  independence26.  On  17  March 
2025,  the  Budapest  Regional  Court  found  that  the  Kúria  President  had  unlawfully 
relieved  a  presiding  judge  from  his  duties  as  a  sanction  for  expressing  his  criticism  in 
relation to the Kúria27. On 6 March 2025, in the context of the enhanced supervision of 
the implementation  of the  Baka judgment  of the European  Court of Human Rights, the 
Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  invited  the  Hungarian  authorities  to 
consider adopting further general measures to address the ‘chilling effect’ present in the 
judiciary and to ensure that judges’ freedom of expression, notably related to matters of 
public  interest  concerning  the  judiciary,  is  unambiguously  guaranteed28.  Smear 
campaigns against judges continue to be reported29. 

21   Information  received  from  the  Kúria  in  the  context  of  the country  visit.  According  to  the  applicable 
legal rules as interpreted by the Kúria, lower-level courts may depart from Kúria decisions considered 
incompatible with EU law but must state the reasons for such departure. 

22   CJEU judgment, Global Ink Trade. The Court of Justice held that the principle of the primacy of EU 
law does not preclude national legislation that merely requires lower national courts to state reasons 
for any departure from the rulings of higher courts (para 30).  

23   Act XLIX of 2025. 
24   Service courts (‘szolgálati bíróság’), composed of members elected by the National Judicial Council 
from among judges, hear cases related to the assessment, fitness for office and disciplinary liability of 
judges.  

25   Service courts (2025). See also Verfassungsblog (2025). 
26   The  International  Association  of  Judges,  the  European  Association  of  Judges,  the  Association  of 
European Administrative Judges, the Association of Administrative Judges (Austria), the Association 
of Polish Administrative Judges and the Judges for Judges Association expressed their solidarity. The 
demonstration  was  organised  on  22  February  2025.  The  ENCJ  Executive  Board  welcomed  and 
supported  the  fact  that  the  National  Judicial  Council,  the  Hungarian  Associations  of  Judges,  and 
individual judges decided to speak out about the need for judicial independence and the threats faced 
by the Hungarian judiciary (ENCJ (2025)). See also Kúria (2025b) and HVG.hu (2025). 

27   Judgment 20.M.71.080/2024/13, confirmed by the Budapest Regional Appeal Court on 17 June 2025. 
See also Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025d). According to the Government, the judge concerned 
retained his title and remuneration as presiding judge, continued to serve on the panel – including on 
the  uniformity  complaint  panel  where  only  presiding  judges  may  sit  –  and  could  also  preside  over 
panels in specific cases. 

28   CM/Del/Dec(2025)1521/H46-15. 
29   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 20; Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025), p. 16. See 
Magyar  Nemzet  (2025),  Reuters  (2025),  Szabad  Európa  (2025).  European  standards  require  that  if 
commenting  on  judges’  decisions,  the  executive  and  legislative  powers  avoid  criticism  that  would 

7 

 
 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law, adopted in December 2024, 
removes  the  requirement  that  the  Prosecutor  General  be  selected  from  among 
prosecutors. Following the entry into force of this constitutional amendment and related 
legislative changes, beside the mandatory three-year legal traineeship needed to pass the 
bar exam and the further requirement of having one year of professional experience, no 
further  professional  expertise  will  be  required  to  be  elected  as  the  Prosecutor  General. 
The  Fifteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fundamental  Law  also  fixes  the  retirement  age  of 
prosecutors at 70 as of 1 January 202630. As regards the appointment of the Prosecutor 
General, the Venice Commission considered that stricter criteria, coupled with adequate 
safeguards  in  the  appointment  process,  could  contribute  to  the  de-politicisation  of  the 
position,  and  recommended  to  this  end  further  amending  the  eligibility  criteria  for  the 
position  of  Prosecutor  General  and  considering  the  introduction  of  guarantees  in  the 
Prosecutor  General’s  appointment  process,  such  as  the  establishment  of a  Prosecutorial 
Council31. On 11 June 2025, the National Assembly elected a candidate from within the 
prosecution  service  to  serve  as  new  Prosecutor  General,  for  a  period  of  nine  years. 
Hungary  has  not  implemented  GRECO’s  recommendation  to  review  the  possibility  to 
keep the incumbent  Prosecutor General  in  office  after the expiry of their  mandate by  a 
parliamentary minority blocking the election of a successor. The hierarchical structure of 
the  prosecution  remains  intact.  This,  together  with  the  lack  of  internal  checks  and 
balances, means that the risk continues that senior prosecutors can influence the work of 
subordinate prosecutors, including in individual cases32. The Ministry of Justice can still 
access prosecutorial decisions relating to criminal procedures; according to stakeholders, 
this  allows  to  exert  political  influence  and  pressure  on  the  prosecution  service  in 
individual cases33.  

Quality  

Significant  progress  has  been  made  with  the  increase  in  salaries  in  the  justice 
system, which is being done in three steps until 202734. Judicial salaries are calculated 
by  applying  various  multiplying  factors  determined  by  law  to  the  salary  base35.  The 
salary  base  is  determined  by  the  National  Assembly  in  the  law  on  the  annual  central 
budget.  The  four-party  agreement  signed  on  22  November  2024  envisages  salary 
increases  for  judges  and  judicial  staffs  in  three  steps,  which,  as  regards  judges,  would 

undermine the independence of or public confidence in the judiciary (Council of Europe (2010), para. 
18). 

30   See  Sections  26/A  to  26/C  of  the  Legal  Status  of  Prosecutors  Act,  introduced  by  Section  75  of  Act 
XLIX of 2025. The office of Prosecutor General is excluded from the application of this age limit. A 
prosecutor who has reached the general retirement age may ask leave to remain in service until the age 
of 70. Contrary to the regime applicable to judges,  the  Prosecutor General has discretion to grant or 
deny such request. 

31   Venice Commission (2025), paras. 29, 43-45. 
32   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 9. 
33   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 19. See also, 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, pp. 

9-10. 

34   The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended that Hungary ‘[t]ake structural measures to increase the 
remuneration of judges, prosecutors, and judicial and prosecutorial staff, taking into account European 
standards on remuneration for the justice system’. 

35   EU law requires in particular that the  determination of the remuneration of judges by the legislature 
and  the  executive  do  not  involve  the  exercise  of  an  arbitrary  power  and  is  based  on  detailed  rules 
which  are  objective,  foreseeable,  stable  and  transparent,  and  ensure  that  judges  receive  a  level  of 
remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out, having regard to the 
economic, social and financial situation of the Member State concerned and the average salary in that 
Member State (CJEU judgment Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku). 

8 

 
 
lead  to  the  average  salary  for  these  categories  being  increased  by  48%  by  2027.  In 
December 2024, the National Assembly adopted the 2025 annual  central budget raising 
the  salary  base  for  judges  by  15%.  The  2026  annual  central  budget,  adopted  in  June 
2025,  raised  the  salary  base  for  judges  by  further  10%.  However,  the  measures  do  not 
introduce  structural  solutions,  such  as  an  automatic  indexation  of  the  salary  base  for 
judges,  as  is  the  case  for  salaries  of  a  number  of  key  public  officials36.  Since  January 
2022, when the salary base was last adjusted, inflation has had an accumulated effect of 
40%,  and  in  February  2024  the  National  Judicial  Council  and  the  President  of  the 
National Office for the Judiciary had proposed a 35% increase. Some structural changes 
raised more substantially the salaries for judicial  and prosecutorial  staff at all instances 
and  –  based  on  a  special  agreement  between  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  the  Kúria 
President  –  for  judges  and  court  managers  of  the  Kúria37.  Their  salaries  are  ultimately 
also  calculated  based  on  the  salary  base  for  judges  annually  determined  by  Parliament. 
Therefore, there has been significant progress with the increase in salaries in the justice 
system. 

Shortcomings  exist  in  the  legal  aid  scheme.  The  eligibility  threshold  for  legal  aid  in 
civil  procedure  is  high,  meaning  that  a  person  with  an  income  well  below  the  poverty 
threshold  may  not  be  eligible  for  legal  aid38.  At  the  same  time,  under  the  current  legal 
framework, the status of ‘certified victim’ provides a more favourable treatment for the 
purposes of access to legal aid under the condition of social vulnerability. Even though 
the fees for defence lawyers under the legal aid scheme were raised as of 2024, they are 
still regarded as  critically low,  possibly  impacting access  to  justice39. As of 28 January 
2025,  at  first  instance,  the  court  fee  payable  in  small-value  civil  and  commercial  cases 
decreased,  whilst  in  higher-value  cases  it  increased,  and  the  statutory  fee  cap  has  been 
removed.  Hungary  performs  well  as  regards  specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly 
justice/proceedings  (both  civil  and  criminal/juvenile  justice  proceedings)40.  Also,  as 
reported last year, access to justice could be improved through specific arrangements to 
persons at risk of discrimination and older persons. 

Digitalisation  of  the  justice  system  continues  to  be  overall  high.  The  courts  have 
several  digital  tools  at  their  disposal,  including  an  electronic  case  management  system, 
distance  communication  technology  and  secure  electronic  communication.  Hungary  is 

36   The  salaries  of  several  categories  of  key  public  officials  –  including  members  of  Parliament,  the 
President  of  the  Republic,  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  top  management  of  the  Hungarian  National 
Bank,  the  State  Audit  Office,  the  Competition  Authority,  the  Public  Procurement  Authority,  the 
National Atomic Energy Authority, the Hungarian Energy and Public Utility Regulatory Authority, the 
National Media and Infocommunications Authority, the Supervisory Authority for Regulatory Affairs, 
the  Integrity  Authority  and  the  Sovereignty  Protection  Office  –  are  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the 
previous  year’s  gross  average  salary  in  the  national  economy,  published  by  the  Central  Statistical 
Office.  

37   The remuneration for judges and court managers of the Kúria, as well as for prosecutors working at the 
Prosecutor  General’s  Office,  is  now  fixed  to  the  remuneration  of  the  Kúria  President.  Also,  the 
multipliers applicable to the calculation of the salaries of trainee judges and prosecutors, junior judges 
(‘bírósági  titkár’),  deputy  prosecutors  (‘alügyész’)  and  staff  of  forensic  institutions  have  been 
increased  by  0.15.  Finally,  the  salaries  of  other  judicial  and  prosecutorial  staff  are  now  calculated 
using a multiplier increased by 0.15. 

38   See Figure 23, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
39   Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2025),  p.  22;  CCBE  (2025),  p.  102.  See  Figure  23,  2025  EU 
Justice  Scoreboard.  The  fee  amounts  to  EUR  17  (HUF  7 000)  per  hour;  in  addition,  the  legal  aid 
lawyer  is  entitled  to  (i)  the  reimbursement  of  expenses,  determined  on  the  basis  of  an  itemised 
statement or in the form of a 25% lump sum and (ii) a ‘preparation fee’ (see Section 4(2) of Decree 
32/2017 (XII. 27) of the Minister of Justice). 

40   Figure 29, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.  

9 

 
 
among  the  best  performing  EU  Member  States  as  regards  the  availability  of  digital 
solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases41. Judgments are not 
yet assigned a European Case Law Identifier, and they are not yet modelled according to 
a  standard  which  would  enable  their  machine  readability42.  A  legislative  amendment 
introduced as of 1 January 2026 the online streaming of court hearings for pre-registered 
members of the audience in most civil and criminal cases43. 

Efficiency 

The efficiency of the judiciary continues to be high overall. Hungary performed best 
among Member States as regards the estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and 
commercial  cases  at  all  court  instances  in  202344.  The  number  of  pending  civil, 
commercial and administrative and other cases in 2023 was the fourth lowest in the EU45. 

There  is  still  no  adequate  compensation  scheme  for  cases  involving  protracted 
criminal  and  non-contentious  civil  proceedings,  while  such  a  scheme  has  been 
introduced for contentious civil and administrative proceedings. In the context of the 
enhanced  supervision  of  the  implementation  of  the  Gazsó  judgment  of  the  European 
Court of Human Rights, on 6 March 2025, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe reiterated its ‘profound concern’ about the continued lack of any development as 
regards  the  outstanding  issue  of  compensatory  remedy  in  respect  of  excessively  long 
criminal,  administrative,  and  non-contentious  civil  proceedings,  such  as  enforcement 
proceedings46. On 11 June 2025, the National Assembly adopted a new law47 amending 
the  procedural  rules  applicable  to  contentious  civil  and  –  as  of  1  July  2026  – 
administrative  proceedings,  obliging  the  court  to  pay  the  parties  a  daily  lump  sum  as 
compensation for any breach of a procedural deadline by the judge hearing the case48. 

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

The  perception  among experts,  citizens  and  business  executives  is  that  the  level  of 
corruption  in  the  public  sector  remains  high.  In  the  2024  Corruption  Perceptions 
Index by Transparency International, Hungary scores 41/10049 and ranks 27th in the EU 
and  82nd  globally. This  perception  has  been  relatively  stable  over  the  past  five  years50. 
The 2025 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 88% of respondents consider 
corruption widespread in their country (EU  average 69%) and 32% of respondents  feel 

41   Figure 46, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
42   Figure 48, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
43   Sections 147 and 196 of Act XLIX of 2025 inserting Sections 232/A to 232/D in the Civil Procedure 

Code and Sections 438/A to 438/G in the Criminal Procedure Code, respectively. 

44   Figure 6, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
45   Figure 12, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
46   CM/Del/Dec(2025)1521/H46-17. 
47   Sections 142 to 144 and 170 to 171 of Act XLIX of 2025 amending the Civil Procedure Code and the 
Code  of  Administrative  Court  Procedure,  respectively.  The  daily  lump  sum  equals  1.5%  of  the 
monthly minimum wage (currently EUR 11 or HUF 4 362 per day). 

48   The  National  Judicial  Council  points  to  the  risk  of  overlaps  between  the  new  compensation  scheme 
and  the  already  existing  one  applicable  to  civil  proceedings,  drawing  attention  to  the  impact  it  may 
have on court resources. National Judicial Council (2025a), National Judicial Council (2025b), pp. 9-
12. 

49   The  level of perceived corruption is categorised as follows: low (above 79); relatively low (between 

79-60), relatively high (between 59-50), high (below 50). 

50   In 2020, the score was 44, while, in 2024, the score is 41. The score significantly increases/decreases 
when  it  changes  more  than  five  points;  improves/deteriorates  (changes  between  4-5  points)  and  is 
relatively stable (changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

10 

 
 
personally  affected  by  corruption  in  their  daily  lives  (EU  average  30%).  As  regards 
businesses, 83% of companies consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 63%) 
and 50% consider that corruption is a problem when doing business (EU average 35%). 
Furthermore,  34%  of  respondents  find  that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to 
deter people from corrupt practices (EU average 36%), while 19% of companies believe 
that people and businesses caught for bribing a senior official are appropriately punished 
(EU average 33%)51.  

While  implementation  of  some  remedial  measures  in  response  to  the  EU 
conditionality procedure is ongoing, important shortcomings remain. To protect the 
EU  budget  against  corruption  and  systemic  rule  of  law  issues,  in  2022  the  Council 
temporarily  partially  suspended  funds  under  several  EU  programmes  and  prohibited 
entering into new legal commitments with public interest trusts, until the breaches of the 
principle  of  the  rule  of  law  and/or  their  effects  or  risks  for  the  Union  budget  or  the 
Union’s  financial  interests  were  remedied52.  On  2  December  2024,  Hungary  formally 
notified  legislative  amendments  regarding  certain  public  interest  trusts  and  entities 
maintained by them and requested the Commission to propose to the Council to adapt or 
lift  the  measure  on  public  interest  trusts  adopted  in  202253.  The  Commission,  having 
assessed the legislative amendments, considered that they do not adequately address the 
outstanding  concerns  on  conflicts  of  interest  in  the  boards  of  public  interest  trusts  and 
therefore  the  measures  related  to  public  interest  trusts  should  stay  in  place54. 
Furthermore, no disbursement of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Plan can be 
made  to  Hungary  until  all  the  ‘super  milestones’,  including  those  related  to  the 
conditionality procedure, have been satisfactorily fulfilled.  

The  implementation  of  the  2024-2025  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  and 
related  Action  Plan  is  ongoing,  while  important  actions  remain  pending55.  The 
implementation  of  the  Strategy  and Action  Plan,  applicable  as  of  15  February  2024,  is 
overseen  by  a  monitoring  committee  and  progress  is  tracked  regularly56.  Certain 
measures have been taken, such as  codes of conduct  for low or mid-level  officials, but 
important actions remain pending57. These include measures on asset declarations, Codes 
of  ethics  for  persons  in  top  executive  functions  and  members  of  Parliament,  political 
party  financing  and  the  review  of  the  motion  for  revision  procedure58.  A  final 

51   Data from Special Eurobarometer 561 (2025) and Flash Eurobarometer 557 (2025). 
52  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022.  
53   The written notification did not concern the partial suspension of funds under three EU programmes. 
54   Commission  Decision  C(2024)  9140  final  of  16  December  2024.  Hungary  has  challenged  this 

Decision before the General Court; the case is pending (T-138/25). 

55   Government Decision 1025/2024. A separate Anti-Fraud and Anti-Corruption Strategy specifically for 
the  protection of EU funds entered into force in 2022 and was revised in August 2024. See also the 
commitments  under  RRP  milestones  178,  179,  220,  221.  OECD  has  recommended  enhancing 
coherence between the two anti-corruption strategies, OECD (2024b).  

56   The  Monitoring  Support  Matrix  is  available  on  the  Corruption  Prevention  website  of  the  Hungarian 
Government  and  provides  general  information  on  actions  taken,  updated  every  three  months. 
Hungarian Government (2025), written input, p.15. 

57   At  least  60%  of  actions  supposed  to  be  implemented  by  31  December  2024  have  not  been 
implemented within the indicated timeline. As noted also by the OECD and the Council of Europe, a 
comprehensive  and  strategic  policy  approach  to  effectively  tackling  corruption,  including  high-level 
corruption,  remains  missing  from  the  strategy.  Most  integrity  and  corruption  prevention  measures 
target low and mid-level officials and the integrity framework applicable to persons with top executive 
functions remains weak. 

58   The possibility of ‘motion for revision’, which allows for the review of the decision by the prosecution 
service  not  to  prosecute  a  case  or  the  decision  of  the  investigative  authority  not  to  investigate,  was 

11 

 
 
 
implementation  report  is  planned  for  202659.  Concerns  previously  raised  by  the  OECD 
and  the  Council  of  Europe  regarding  the  lack  of  a  comprehensive  and  strategic  policy 
approach  to  effectively  tackling  corruption  remain  in  essence  valid60.  The  government 
informed  that  the  evaluation  of  Hungary’s  policy  approach  to  effectively  tackling 
corruption is ongoing. 

The Integrity Authority continues to report obstacles to fulfilling its oversight tasks 
effectively, and the practical impact of the proposals made by the Anti-Corruption 
Task  Force  has  so  far  been  limited.  The  Integrity  Authority  considers  that  it  has 
adequate  capacity  and  the  necessary  level  of  independence  to  carry  out  its  work. 
Obstacles  to  the  work  of  the  Integrity  Authority  remain,  particularly  where  it  needs  to 
rely on cooperation with other public bodies61. Whereas a government decree is expected 
to give the  Integrity Authority a right of direct  access to a number of state databases62, 
and  the  Government  indicated  that  the  current  legal  framework  provides  all  necessary 
access  rights,  the  Integrity  Authority  again  reported  obstacles  related  to  access63.  The 
Integrity Authority referred nine cases to the prosecution service in 202464. As part of a 
criminal  investigation  against  the  President  of  the  Integrity  Authority,  the  police  and 
prosecution  service  carried  out  an  extensive  raid  of  the  Integrity  Authority65.  The 
Government  agreed  or  partially  agreed  with  half  of  the  recommendations  made  by  the 
Integrity Authority in its second analytical integrity report, rejected about a third of them 
and  is  currently  assessing  the  remaining  recommendations66.  In  general,  however,  the 
concrete follow-up given to accepted recommendations remains unclear67. In May 2025, 
the non-governmental members of Anti-Corruption Task Force (ACTF) rejected its draft 
annual report68. The ACTF launched an evaluation process to avoid similar situations in 
the  future.  More  broadly,  non-governmental  members  of  the  Task  Force  remain 

introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code by Act XLIV of 2022 to address the concerns raised in the 
past as regards the accountability of the prosecution service. 

59   See RRP milestone 179. 
60   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 14. 
61   Country  visit  Hungary,  Integrity  Authority.  To  enhance  cooperation  with  other  public  bodies,  the 
Integrity Authority proposed to amend and mirror also in sectoral laws the powers it has under the Act 
XXVII of 2022 establishing the Integrity Authority. 

62   Country visit Hungary, Government. Government Decree 322/2024 of 6 November 2024. 
63   The  Authority  reported  not  having  access  to  banking,  tax  and  insurance  records  which  is  key  for 
investigations.  This  includes  the  central  register  on  beneficial  ownership  managed  by  the  Tax  and 
Customs  Administration,  Obstacles  related  to  access  to  data,  are  also  reported  in  the  Integrity 
Authority’s 2024 annual report to the Hungarian Parliament. See Integrity Authority (2025).  

64   Country visit Hungary, Integrity Authority. OLAF and the EPPO were also notified. 
65   Country visit Hungary, Integrity Authority. The President of the State Audit Office has the power by 
law  to  initiate  administrative  court  proceedings  to  dismiss  the  President  of  the  Integrity  Authority. 
Stakeholders consider that this is a disproportionate response considering the alleged irregularities, and 
that it risks undermining the independent and effective functioning of the Integrity Authority. Amnesty 
International Hungary et al (2024), p. 53.  

66   Integrity Authority (2025). The Integrity Authority addressed 74 recommendations to the Government 
on the audit system for EU funds, the effectiveness of public procurement rules, the analysis of public 
procurement  data  and  the  asset  declaration  system.  The  Government’s  position  on  the  findings 
presented  in  the  Integrity  Authority’s  2023  Annual  Analytical  Integrity  Report  is  available  on  its 
webpage. The Government is not required to agree with all of the recommendations, but it must reply 
to the report and explain how it will address the findings. 

67   The replies of the Government lack  clear implementation proposals and timeline. Integrity Authority 

(2023a). 

68   In particular, they considered that it did not correctly reflect the gravity of the corruption situation in 
Hungary  and  that  their  suggestions  to  the  report  were  dismissed  without  substantive  review.  Non-
governmental members will publish their own shadow report.  Átlátszó (2025). Anti-Corruption Task 
Force Meeting (2025).  

12 

 
 
concerned as regards its impact, capacities, powers and the Government’s limited uptake 
of proposals69. Two of the organisations that are members of the ACTF have been subject 
to an investigation by the Sovereignty Protection Office70. 

The number of submitted motions for revision of prosecutorial decisions doubled in 
2024 and nearly a third resulted in the continuation of investigations. Since January 
2023,  it  is  possible  for  a  judge  to  review  prosecutorial  authorities’  decisions  not  to 
investigate  corruption  suspicions  or  to  terminate  ongoing  corruption  investigations 
without indictment71. In 2024, 80 motions for such a revision were submitted to the Buda 
Central District Court (compared to 38 in 2023)72. Whereas nearly a third of all motions 
resulted  in  the  continuation  of  investigations73,  a  majority  of  the  motions  submitted  by 
the  Integrity  Authority  have  resulted  in  a  resumption  of  investigations74.  Motions  for 
revision have proven a useful tool for the Integrity Authority, however it considers that 
its  powers  remain  limited  as  regards  access  to  criminal  proceedings  and  the  ability  to 
present  evidence  in  that  context75.  Shortcomings  of  the  new  procedure  concern  the 
temporal scope of the new measure and the lack of binding authority for court decisions 
quashing  prosecutorial  decisions76.  The  review  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice  of  the 
functioning and effectiveness of the provisions on judicial review is ongoing with a view 
to proposing amendments77. According to stakeholders, restricted access to case files and 
stringent  procedural  deadlines  negate  the  possibility  to  use  the  procedure  for  private 
prosecution78.  

Integrity tests and lifestyle checks remain key tools to detect and deter corruption in 
the administration, although their effectiveness in detecting high-level corruption is 
limited.  According  to  the  prosecution,  detection  remains  the  main  challenge  in  the 
investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption  offences79.  Information  and  evidence  of 
corruption  crimes  are  primarily  obtained  in  ongoing  criminal  investigations  and 
prosecutions.  Reports  transmitted  to  prosecution  by  the  National  Protective  Service, 
which  is  tasked  with  carrying  out  integrity  tests  and  lifestyle  monitoring  for  staff 
subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and other public administrative bodies, generally 

69   Country visit Hungary, CSOs. See also K-Monitor and Transparency International Hungary (2024).  
70   The ACTF reportedly operates in an environment of distrust between the government and  CSOs. See 
Sovereignty Protection Office (2024). The Office states that foreign-funded political pressure groups 
exploited the Anti-Corruption Task Force to pressurise Hungary. See also Átlátszó (2024).  

71    2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 16. 
72   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 51, referring to a response by the Buda Central District 

Court (2024.El.IV.H.17/4). 

73   As reported by the Government, between 1 January 2023 and 31 December 2024, of the 185 motions 
submitted  in  separate  proceedings,  54  were  successful.  In  2023,  the  court  granted  the  motion  for 
judicial review in only five cases, while in 2024 it was granted in four cases. Most recently, after an 
initial refusal by the police, a logistics deal between the state-owned Magyar Posta and the Waberer’s 
Group  will  be  investigated  following  a  successful  motion  by  the  NGO  K-Monitor.  This  is  the  first 
CSO to successfully use the motion for revision. See K-monitor (2025). 

74   Integrity Authority (2025a).  
75   In 2024 the Integrity Authority submitted a motion for revision in 12 cases. The prosecution service 

and the court admitted the motion for revision in every case.  

76   Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, recital 46. 
77   Action  3.9  of  the  Action  Plan  to  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy,  with  a  deadline  of  15  May 

2024.  

78   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2024). See also K-Monitor (2023). 
79   Country visit Hungary, prosecution service. 

13 

 
 
concern more petty crimes of public officials80. There is no publicly available data on the 
reliability  tests  or  national  security  vettings  conducted  by  the  Constitution  Protection 
Office,  which  is  responsible  for  carrying  out  checks  as  regards  high-ranking  officials, 
given  the  confidentiality  of  its  activities81.  However,  the  prosecution  service  indicates 
receiving few reports related to suspicions of corruption from the Constitition Protection 
Office82.  Other  tools  that  could  be  more  effective  in  detecting  a  wider  variety  of 
corruption cases, such as asset declarations, whistleblower reports and data from various 
registers,  such  as  the  central  register  for  beneficial  ownership  information  managed  by 
the  Tax  and  Customs  Administration,  play  a  relatively  minor  role  in  corruption 
investigations83.  

The number of convictions for corruption crimes has decreased and there has been 
no  progress  to  establish  a  robust  track  record  on  high-level  corruption84.  Whereas 
the  prosecution  service  reports  that  sufficient  human  and  financial  resources,  with  an 
adequate  level  of  specialisation  are  allocated  to  corruption  cases,  it  also  highlights  the 
high rate of vacancies among junior prosecutors and the need for further specialisation85. 
The new IT system for the handling of case files by the prosecution service is planned to 
be operational by the end of 202586. The reported indictment rate for corruption crimes 
continues  to  be  high87.  In  2024,  264  persons  were  convicted  at  final  instance  for 
corruption  crimes,  which  is  a  decrease  compared  to  the  previous  year88.  Since  2023, 
criminal  proceedings  have  been  ongoing  in  a  corruption  and  money  laundering  case 
against  a  number  of  defendants  involving  a  former  high-level  official89.  While  four 
defendants  have  been  sentenced  to  prison  in  a  corruption  case  involving  primarily  EU 

80   In  2024,  integrity  checks  were  conducted  on  835  individuals,  resulting  in  nine  persons  reported  for 
breach  of  duty  for  undue  advantage.The  17 271  lifestyle  checks  undertaken  resulted  in findings  that 
149 people did not meet the ethical standards. 

81   Since  the  Constitution  Protection  Office  is  a  national  security  service,  the  detection  of  potential 
corruption by this Office falls under national security rules and remains undisclosed. The legality and 
compliance with the law of the investigations carried out, including the question of a possible criminal 
prosecution, is overseen by the designated prosecution service. No data on detected corruption cases is 
available. See also 2023 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 14.  

82   Country visit Hungary, prosecution service.  
83   Country visit Hungary, prosecution service.  
84   The  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘[e]stablish  a  robust  track  record  of 

investigations, prosecutions, and final judgments for high-level corruption cases’.  

85   Country visit Hungary, prosecution service.   
86   Financial data relevant for investigations is spread over numerous separate state registers. The new IT 
system for the handling of sensitive documents was originally planned to be supported under the RRP 
and fully functional and operational by Q2 2024, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 16, and 
RRP milestone 180. In addition, a new case management IT system facilitating administrative work, 
and the exchange of non-sensitive information is also planned under the RRP to be fully functional and 
operational by the end of 2025, see RRP milestone 181.  

87   A total of 164 investigations for corruption crimes were completed, with 120 procedures resulting with 

an indictment. Hungarian Government (2025), written input, Annex, pp. 1-2.  

88   Hungarian  Government  (2025),  written  input,  p.  24.  In  2023,  there  were  364  final  convictions.  In 
November 2024, four defendants out of 54 were sentenced to prison at first instance in a corruption 
case  involving  primarily  EU  funds  (Prosecution  service  (2024)).  In  another  case,  the  court-imposed 
prison sentences on three people, and another defendant was sentenced to a suspended prison sentence 
in a bribery case related to land tenders (Budapest Regional Court (2025)). 

89   Allegations  of  evidence-tampering by  the  prosecution service  upon Government instructions and the 
obstruction  of  justice  by  the  Government  in  this  high-level  corruption  case  involving  a  former  state 
secretary  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  and  the  chief  bailiff  prompted  the  prosecution  service  to  initiate 
investigations for failure to report bribery. See Reuters (2024) and Telex (2024). 

14 

 
 
funds90,  convictions  in  high-level  corruption  cases  continue  to  be  rare91.  Generally,  in 
complex  high-level  corruption  cases,  court  proceedings  tend  to  be  long92.  The  risk  of 
political influence and undue interference with individual cases in the prosecution service 
and the police, the absence of investigations of  corruption allegations concerning high-
level  officials  and  their  immediate  circle,  as  well  as  clientelism,  favouritism  and 
nepotism  in  high-level  public  administration  remain  areas  of  concern93.  The  lack  of 
enforcement against foreign bribery is a persistent concern, with no new investigations or 
convictions  and  long-standing  international  recommendations  remaining  unaddressed94. 
Overall, no progress  was  made on establishing  a robust track record to  fight high-level 
corruption, as recommended in the previous years. 

There  has  been  no  progress  yet  on  the  recommendation  regarding  lobbying  and 
post-employment  regulation,  although  there  are  plans  to  legislate  in  this  area  by 
November  202595.  The  Government  plans  to  adopt  legislation  on  lobbying,  including 
rules  on  revolving  doors,  by  30  November  2025.  Its  exact  elements  are  yet  to  be 
decided96. Pending its adoption, no steps have been taken to establish rules on contacts 
between members of Parliament and lobbyists97. Preparations are still ongoing for a non-
binding  code  of  conduct  for  members  of  Parliament,  including  guidelines  on  lobbying 
and  post-employment98.  No  steps  have  been  taken  to  prepare  the  code  of  conduct  for 
persons  in  top  executive  functions,  planned  by  30  April  202499.  Hungary’s  legislative 
framework  on  lobbying  and  post-employment  rules  remains  incomplete,  with  no 
systematic  follow-up  ensured  in  case  of  non-compliance100.  Since  no  steps  have  been 
taken  for  a  comprehensive  reform  on  lobbying  and  post-employment  rules,  there  has 
been no progress yet on the recommendation. 

There  has  been  no  progress  to  improve  the  asset  declaration  system,  including  to 
ensure effective oversight101. Actions to strengthen the asset declaration system foreseen 
in the 2024-2025 National Anti-Corruption Strategy are pending102. The power to verify 

90   The case involves 54 defendants and concerns a vast corruption network manipulating public tenders. 
Officials  from  multiple  ministries  were  implicated,  including  the  Finance  Ministry  and  the  Prime 
Minister’s Office. Prosecutor’s Office (2024).    

91   Country visit, Transparency International Hungary and K-monitor. See also Council of Europe (2023) 

and Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 50. 

92   Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor (2024). In one case involving a former Member of 
Parliament indicted in 2019, the court case has restarted from the first hearing for the fourth time in 
2024. Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 51. 

93   See 2024 Rule of Law report, Hungary, p. 19.  See also GRECO (2022), p. 6, paras. 31-35; GRECO 
(2023b),  p.  29,  para.  126,  pointing  at  hierarchical  pressure  on  police  officers  to  discontinue 
investigations in certain sensitive cases. 
94   OECD (2023). See also OECD (2024). 
95   The  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘[a]dopt  comprehensive  reforms  on 

lobbying and revolving doors [...] providing for effective oversight and enforcement’. 

96   Country visit, Hungarian Government. 
97   See GRECO (2022), paras. 9-10.  
98   Country visit Hungary, National Assembly. 
99   Action  2.1  of  the  Action  Plan.  The  monitoring  table  indicates  that  the  Ministry  of  Justice  held 
consultations during which it has been established that Government Decree 477/2024 of 31 December 
2024  on  the  procedure  to  be  followed  in  relation  to  protocol  gifts  is  sufficient  for  the  fulfilment  of 
Action 2.1. 

100   2023 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, pp. 18-20. See also GRECO (2023a), p. 56. 
101   The  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘further  improve  the  system  of  asset 

declarations, providing for effective oversight and enforcement’. 

102   The Action Plan mandates the Ministry of Justice to create the possibility to submit asset declarations 
electronically,  to  consider  extending  the  personal  scope  and  to  introduce  an  effective,  proportionate, 
and dissuasive administrative and criminal sanctions’ regime by April 2024. 

15 

 
 
asset  declarations  has  not  yet  been  effectively  transferred  to  the  Integrity  Authority103. 
The  Government  did  not  provide  an  official  reply  to  the  Integrity  Authority’s  special 
report  on  the  asset  declaration  system104.  Publicity  requirements  do  not  apply  to  most 
persons entrusted with senior political functions and information about follow-up is not 
public either. Stakeholders highlight the narrow scope of the declarations, which provide 
for  opportunities  to  potentially  hide  assets105.  A  recent  amendment  to  the  anti-money 
laundering legislation, aiming to  increase transparency of ultimate beneficial owners of 
previously  established  private  equity  funds,  will  not  enter  into  force  until  July  2026106. 
Concerns  persist  regarding  the  effective  and  regular  monitoring  and  verification  asset 
declarations  of  members  of  Parliament107.  In  2024,  no  procedure  against  a  member  of 
Parliament was initiated, and six members of Parliament rectified their asset declarations 
after  errors  were  revealed  by  the  public108.  A  recent  amendment  introduced  minor 
changes to the procedure for declaring assets, without modifying the substantive rules109. 
In  2025,  the  National  Assembly  adopted  new  rules  for  Hungarian  members  of  the 
European  Parliament  which  foresee  that  non-compliance  with  asset  declaration 
obligations  could 
the  Electoral 
termination  of 
Commission110. Against this background,  no progress  has therefore been made towards 
implementing the recommendation made in the 2024 Rule of Law Report111. 

their  mandate  by 

lead 

the 

to 

Guides and awareness-raising measures on conflicts of interests are implemented in 
certain  sectors,  but  legislative  fragmentation  and  systemic  weaknesses  remain. 
Based  on  the  Action  Plan  of  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  2024-2025,  the 
Government plans to regulate conflicts of interest in the upcoming codes of conduct for 

103   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 22.  
104   Integrity Authority (2023b). In the context of the  case report on asset declarations, the Authority has 
submitted  to  the  Ministry  of  Justice  concrete  proposals  for  amendments  to  the  law.  The 
recommendations  include  the  creation  of  a  dedicated  electronic  platform  for  submission  of  asset 
declarations,  introduction  of an  adequate  sanctions  regime,  streamlining  the  verification  process  and 
automatic comparison of asset declarations with external databases. See the Government’s position on 
the findings presented in the Integrity Authority’s 2023 Annual Analytical Integrity Report. 

105   Country visit Hungary, CSOs and the Integrity Authority. 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 22. 
Private  equity  funds,  fiduciary  asset  management  arrangements  and  non-taxable  revenues  are  not 
included in the declarations, which means they are not subject to general oversight and access by the 
Integrity Authority. Moreover, the registration of beneficial ownership information for private equity 
funds  is  not  required  by  law.  An  infringement  procedure  (INFR(2023)2098)  against  Hungary  was 
launched in July 2024 for non-compliance with the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive.  
106   The Commission sent another letter of formal notice to Hungary in this regard on 7 May 2025. 
107   There  is  no  obligation  to  regularly  monitor,  check  the  correctness  or  the  completeness  of  the 
declarations.  Verification  of  asset  declarations  is  only  triggered  by  notification  of  suspicions.  Any 
possible  follow-up  is  at  the  discretion  of  the  public  official’s  employer  or,  in  case  of  members  of 
Parliament and other high-ranking officials, of the Immunity Committee. GRECO also found that the 
verification  of  declarations  was  clearly  insufficient  (GRECO  (2023),  p.  4,  para.  3).  Members  of 
Parliament continued largely to submit their asset declarations on paper. In 2025, 63 used electronic 
submission, while 134 completed the declaration on paper. Country visit Hungary, National Assembly.  

108   Country visit Hungary, National Assembly. 
109   Act LXXV of 2024 applies to declarations of assets and conflict of interest and introduces time limits 

for all procedural acts. The substantive examination remains with the Committee on Immunity. 

110   Act XX of 2025. Asset declarations to be submitted by MEPs are identical in format and detail to those 

required of national members of Parliament.  

111   Important  weaknesses,  risks  and  shortcomings  remain  as  regards  elements  of  the  asset  declaration 
system  which  create  possible  loopholes  undermining  the  effectiveness  of  the  measure  were  also 
identified  by  the  Communication  on  the  application  of  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2020/2092  (15 
January 2024). Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, recital 41. 

16 

 
 
persons in top executive functions and members of Parliament112. A new code of ethics 
and  conduct  for  parliamentary  civil  servants  was  adopted  in  October  2024  but  is  not 
publicly  available113.  Changes  were  made  to  the  ethics  framework  for  local  and  law 
enforement  authorities,  covering  also  conflicts  of  interest114.  In  2024,  the  National 
Assembly terminated the mandate of one of its members due to a conflict of interest115. 
However,  there  were  no  developments  to  address  the  systemic  weaknesses  reported  in 
2023 and 2024. These include the fragmentation of the regulatory framework on conflict 
of interests, including as regards public interest trusts, the lack of a general definition of 
conflicts  of interest  and  the absence of a central  supervisory body116. A recent  audit of 
the  Hungarian  National  Bank,  its  own  trusts  and  a  related  public  interest  trust 
maintaining  a  university  led  the  State  Audit  Office  to  file  a  criminal  report  against  the 
public interest trust concerned due to conflicts of interest117. 

The  framework  for  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  is  in  place,  however 
whistleblowing plays a limited role in the detection of corruption crimes. The Office 
of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights provides training to civil servants and the 
preparation of an information campaign on the functioning of whistleblowing platforms 
and whistleblower protection regimes  is still ongoing118. According to stakeholders and 
as  illustrated  by  survey  data,  whistleblowing  is  still  not  a  sufficiently  widespread 
practice119.  Reports  can  be  submitted  on  the  whistleblowing  channel  for  reports  on  EU 
fraud,  to  the  Integrity  Authority,  as  well  as  to  the  Public  Procurement  Authority,  the 
the  Competition  Authority120.  However,  the 
National  Development  Centre  and 
prosecution service reports that whistleblower reports do not play a role in the detection 
of corruption crimes121. Civil society organisations continue to raise concerns regarding 

112   Hungarian  Government  (2025),  written  input,  p.  11.  This  will  be  part  of  the  upcoming  codes  of 

conduct. 

113   Country  visit,  National  Assembly.  It  contains  guidance  for  the  proper  management  of  conflicts  of 

interest. 

114   Hungarian  Government  (2025),  written  input,  pp. 16-17.  This  includes  a  draft  methodological  guide 
for  local  authorities  and  revised  code  of  ethics  and  rules  of  ethical  procedure  for  law  enforcement 
officials. 

115   Country visit Hungary, National Assembly. 
116   2023 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, pp. 21-23.  
117   State Audit Office (2025). The State Audit Office found that nearly EUR 1.3 billion were affected by 
opaque and overpriced real estate and art acquisitions, complex and risky investment structures, and 
significant financial benefits directed towards companies linked to the son of the National Bank’s then 
governor.  It  also  found  that  the  decision  of  the  public  interest  trust  to  invest  in  bonds  issued  by  the 
fund manager of the National Bank’s own trusts violated the conflict of interest provision of the deed 
of foundation.  

118   Information concerning guidance on the functioning of the protected electronic submission system, the 
complaint  process,  whistleblower  protections,  and  the  availability  of  state  support  measures  is 
available on the website of the Office. Hungarian Government, written input, p. 18.  See Actions 4.3, 
4.4 and 4.5 of the Action Plan to the National Anti-Corruption Strategy.   

119   See also the Special Eurobarometer 584 on Corruption (2024) on the level of corruption reporting. See 

also Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025c). 

120   The anti-lop.hu whistleblowing channel for reports on EU fraud received only 19 reports between July 
2024 and March 2025, with investigations ongoing in 11 cases. The Integrity Authority received 172 
reports  in  2024,  of  which  90  fell  in  its  remit.  In  48  cases  the  information  did  not  give  rise  to  the 
opening of an investigation. Country visit Hungary, Integrity Authority.  

121   Country visit Hungary, prosecution service. 

17 

 
 
differences in protection levels for whistleblowers who report breaches of national rules 
which do not fall within the national legislation transposing Directive 2019/1937122.  

Key  shortcomings  with  regard  to  the  transparency  of  the  financing  of  political 
parties and electoral campaigns remain. No steps were taken in the reporting period to 
address long-standing recommendations to strengthen the transparency of political party 
and campaign financing123. While some measures have previously been taken to ensure 
that political party financial registries are transparent and up-to-date, deficiencies remain 
regarding the transparency and supervision of the accounts of foundations or third-party 
entities  directly  or  indirectly  related  to  or  under  the  control  of  political  parties124. 
Furthermore,  the  applicable  legislation  does  not  require  the  disclosure  of  campaign 
donations, nor does it prohibit the use of state resources for  campaigning during a pre-
election period125. The possibility for circumvention of campaign spending limits via the 
use  of  third-parties  and  intermediaries,  as  reported  during  the  2022  elections126,  also 
remains unaddressed. In February 2024, the State Audit Office had imposed fines on six 
opposition  political  parties  for  alleged  illegal  foreign  funding  during  the  2022  election 
campaign127. On 17 June 2025, in expedited procedure, the National Assembly passed a 
law that removes the cap on political campaign expenses128. 

Competition  in  public  procurement  has  been  improved,  and  different  levels  of 
control  remain  for  national  and  EU-funds  related  procurements.  Corruption  risk 
sectors  remain  largely  the  same  compared  to  previous  years,  with  high  risks  in  public 
procurement,  construction,  health,  IT,  and  communication  services129.  Corruption 
prevention carried out by the National Protective Service reportedly continues to play a 
major role in  reducing  corruption pressure on the health sector130. Businesses’ attitudes 
towards  corruption  in  the  EU  show  that  36%  of  companies  in  Hungary  (EU  average 
25%) think that corruption has prevented them from winning a public tender or a public 
procurement  contract  in  practice  in  the  last  three  years131.  Only  28%  of  businesses 
perceive  the  level  of  independence  of  the  public  procurement  review  body  (Public 

122   See also 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 24. Hungarian legislation includes specific safeguards 
for certain whistleblowing categories. Section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 155 of 
the Media Act provide legal protections for media informants. 

123   See  OSCE  ODIHR  and  Venice  Commission  (2020),  para.  194.  As  reported  last  year,  the  National 
Anti-corruption  Strategy  mandates  the  Government  to  examine  the  enforcement  of  political  party 
finance  rules  and  the  operational  practices  of  political  organisations,  with  an  exclusive  focus  on 
preventing foreign influence. 

124   See GRECO (2019). 
125   See  OSCE  ODIHR  (2022),  p.  22.  State  Audit  Office  audit  findings  cannot  be  challenged  before  an 

administrative court. 

126   As regards political advertising on the social media platform Facebook, financed by third parties and 
intermediaries,  including  the  social  media  incubator  Megafon  Centre  training  pro-government 
influencers and promoting their posts as one of the largest spenders on political ads on Facebook in the 
election campaign,  see 2023 Rule of Law  Report, Hungary, pp. 24-25; on the level of spending, see 
Lakmusz (2024); and Telex (2024). 

127   See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 24.  
128   Act LXVIII of 2025. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has recommended to states 
to prevent excessive funding needs of political parties, such as establishing limits  on expenditure on 
electoral campaigns. Council of Europe Committee of Ministers (2003). 

129   Hungarian Government (2025), written input, pp. 22-23; Amnesty International et al (2025), pp. 47-

48; Corruption Research Center Budapest (2024).  

130   Hungarian Government (2025), written input, p. 19. 
131   Flash  Eurobarometer  557  on  Businesses’  attitudes  towards  corruption  in  the  EU  (2025).  This  is  11 

percentage points above the EU average. 

18 

 
 
Procurement  Arbitration  Board)  as  very  or  fairly  good132.  The  competition  in  public 
procurement  procedures  is  improving  and  the  Single  Market  and  Competitiveness 
Scoreboard on access  to  public procurement in  Hungary reports 32% of single bids  for 
2023  (EU  average  29%)  and  23%  for  2024133.  While  the  share  of  public  procurement 
procedures with single bids decreased for both EU-financed and national procurements, 
the target committed to by Hungary for domestically financed public procurements was 
not met in 2023 (29% vs the target of 24%)  and 2024 (22.3% vs the target of 15%)134. 
Some  studies  point  to  an  increase  in  corruption  risks  for  such  procurements  where 
different  levels  of  control  and  oversight  apply135.  In  addition,  focussing  solely  on  the 
share of single bids can hide the root causes of lack of competition136. The Government’s 
action  plan  to  improve  competition  in  public  procurement  contains  several  measures 
aiming to foster competition137. According to stakeholders, the action plan lacks ambition 
and does not sufficiently reflect relevant recommendations of the Integrity Authority138. 
Stakeholders  report  increased  corruption  risks  due  to  an  excessive  use  of  concession 
contracts  and  an report that many  framework agreements were concluded with  a single 
bidder139. Framework agreements concluded by central purchasing bodies have allowed 
certain economic operators to become market leaders or to acquire a dominant position at 
the  expense  of  their  competitors140.  Concerns  remain  regarding  favouritism  in  tender 
processes and selective awarding to political affiliates, which increase corruption risks141.  

132   Figure 59, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
133  SWD(2025) 217 final. The 2024 data on single bids is provisional and subject to revision. 
134   Based  on  data  from  Public  Procurement  Data  Space  the  share  of  single-bid  procedures  within 
nationally financed public procurement showed a significant decrease of 6.7 percentage points in 2024 
compared to the previous year.  

135   Corruption Research Center Budapest (2023). On government communications contracts, see  Szabad 
Európa (2024). Regarding EU-related procurement, see Integrity Authority (2024a) and (2023c), with 
recommendations  for  the  Government.  Hungary  has  committed  to  reduce  to  15%  the  high  share  of 
calls for tenders that result in a single bid under the RRP, while the share of single bids is reportedly 
significantly higher for high-value, non-EU fund-related public procurements.  

136   These include supporting bids, collusion or a high ratio of invalid tenders. Integrity Authority (2023d). 
137  According to the government, these measures are based on the analysis carried out in the framework of 
the Public Procurement Performance Measurement Framework, reflect international best practices or 
address recommendations of the Integrity Authority and the Anti-Corruption Task Force. 

138   Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2025).  For  most  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Integrity 
Authority, the government did not see a need to take any action and/or did not commit to any action. 
139   Stakeholders  report  extreme  market  concentration  in  sectors  such  as  communications  and  IT  and 
excessively  long  concession  contracts,  such  as  the  35-year  concessions  of  waste  management  and 
motorway.  The  share  of  framework  agreements  with  a  single  bidder  has  been  rising  steadily  since 
2019, reaching around 70% in 2023 and 2024 (Integrity Authority (2024c), p. 54)). While Government 
Decree  63/2022  of  28  February  2022  increased  the  effectiveness  of  some  of  these  provisions 
subsequently  Government  Decree 53/2024  of 4 March 2024  exempted a number of procedures from 
their  application.  According  to  the  Government,  the  use  of  concession  contracts  and  framework 
agreements is in line with similar practices in other Member States.  

140   In April 2024, the Commission opened an infringement procedure against Hungary (INFR(2024)4006) 

for awarding the 35-year motorway concession contract in breach of EU rules on concessions.  

140   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 4. 
141   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 4. On 18 June 2025, the Commission opened an infringement 
procedure against Hungary (INFR(2025)2051) for failing to award a high-value exploitation contract 
for sand and gravel mining sites in an open and transparent tender procedure. 

19 

 
 
III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

There  has  been  no  progress  to  strengthen  the  functional  independence  of  the 
Hungarian media regulator142. While the Media Act provides for formal independence 
of  the  National  Media  and  Infocommunications  Authority  (NMHH),  government 
influence remains significant due to the composition of the decision-making body of the 
Authority,  the  Media  Council,  which  remains  composed  of  members  all  nominated  by 
Parliament. The Council has undertaken investigations into private media considered to 
be  pro-government  for  potentially  racist  and  anti-immigrant  content  and  into  public 
service  media  for  airing  disguised  political  advertising  during  the  election  period. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  light  of  the  unresolved  concerns  with  regard  to  the  authority,  the 
2025  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  (MPM)  once  more  assesses  the  independence  and 
effectiveness  of  the  Media  Authority  as  an  area  presenting  high  risk,  referring  to  the 
authority’s composition, lack of transparency of its decision-making process and certain 
‘politically  motivated’  decisions143.  Given  that  no  measures  have  been  adopted  or  are 
planned to strengthen the regulator’s functional independence, there has been no progress 
as regards the recommendations made in previous years. 

There has been no progress to increase transparency and fairness in the distribution 
of state advertising144. The general rules and procedures regulating public procurement 
govern  these  expenditures  and  no  specific  rules  ensuring  transparency  and  fairness 
regulating  distribution  exist.  Public  sector  communications  are  carried  out  under  one 
framework  contract  with  the  National  Communications  Office  (NKOH)145.  The  State 
remains,  by  far,  the  most  important  player  in  the  media  advertising  market  channeling 
significant state resources to pro-government media and increasing its spending146. State 
advertising  accounts  for  over  30%  of  the  total  advertising  market,  while  the  Central 
European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a conglomeration of pro-government 
media outlets,  receives up to  75-80% of its  total  revenue from  state advertising147. The 
2025 MPM points out that ‘it is still the case that the state advertises almost exclusively 
in pro-government media outlets and that the majority of advertising revenues for several 
media products, typically pro-government, are generated by state advertising’ concluding 
that  this  remains  an  area  presenting  medium-high  risk148.  Given  that  no  legislative  or 
other  measures  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  by  the  Government  on  the  fair 
distribution  of  state  advertising, 
the 
recommendations made in previous years.  

there  has  been  no  progress  as  regards 

Transparency  in  the  ownership  structure  of  media  companies  is  not  regulated  by 
any specific provisions. Section 41 of the Media Act mandates the NMHH to maintain 
registers  on  media  service  providers,  but  these  registers  do  not,  however,  contain 
information on ownership or beneficial ownership of these companies. Direct ownership 
information is available via the business register. This leads the 2025 MPM to once more 

142   The 2024 Rule of Law Reports recommended to Hungary to ‘[i]ntroduce mechanisms to enhance the 
functional independence of the media regulatory authority taking into account European standards on 
the independence of media regulators’. 
143   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p.16.  
144   The  2024  Rule  of  Law  report  recommended  to  Hungary  to  ‘[a]dopt  legislation  to  ensure  fair  and 

transparent distribution of advertising expenditure by the state and state-owned companies’. 

145   On the operation of the National Communications Agency in this field see Corruption Research Center 

Budapest (2024). 

146   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025).  
147   International Press Institute (2025), p. 21.  
148   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 29.  

20 

 
 
consider  this  a  high-risk  area149.  There  has  been  no  change  to  the  system  of  review  of 
market concentration in the media market150. 

There has been no progress to enhance the independence of public service media151. 
Reports acknowledge that both the Media Act and the Public Service Code enshrine the 
principle  that  public  service  media  shall  be  independent  of  both  government  and 
economic actors and that financing has steadily increased152. However, no legislative or 
policy  changes  have  been  adopted  or  are  planned  to  address  the  concerns  expressed  in 
relation to the governance of public service media, in particular in relation to government 
influence. Reports suggest that the organisation and funding structure remain unchanged, 
maintaining  its  opacity  and  complexity153.  As  a  consequence,  the  2025  MPM  has 
maintained its very high-risk score for this area based on its findings, among others, that 
‘Hungarian  public  service  media  is  financially  dependent  on  the  governing  majority  in 
Parliament,  is  controlled  by  political  interests,  and  is  seen  as  extremely  biased  in  its 
reporting’154. There has thus been no progress on the recommendations made in previous 
years. 

While  the  accelerated  treatment  of  court  cases  related  to  access  to  information 
continues,  the scope of access  to information remains limited especially  as regards 
public  funding.  The  short  procedural  deadlines  introduced  in  2023  have  continued  to 
prompt  accelerated  litigation  in  cases  of  access  to  information  of  public  interest. 
Restrictions to freedom of information introduced in 2023 and 2024 remain in place155. 
The National Assembly  has still not implemented a 2020 decision of the Constitutional 
Court requiring legislative amendments  to  establish effective judicial protection in  case 
of freedom of information requests related to public funds, addressed to the recipients of 
such funds156. The enforcement of court orders granting access to documents remains a 
challenge157. At the same time, public access to anonymised official documents of a file 
in administrative proceedings has been removed by a precedent decision of the Kúria158. 
As regards proactive disclosure, in December 2024, an omnibus law broadened the scope 
of  entities  that  are  required  to  publish  data  in  the  Central  Public  Data  Information 

149   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 19. 
150   See 2020, 2021 and 2022 Rule of Law Reports, Hungary. An overview of the media market, including 
main players and trends, can be found in the Media Market Reports prepared by the National Media 
and Infocommunications Authority. 

151   The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended to Hungary to ‘[s]trengthen the rules and mechanisms to 
enhance  the  independent  governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into 
account European standards on public service media’. 

152   International Press Institute (2025), p. 18. 
153   See Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), p. 445. 
154   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), p. 30. 
155   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, pp. 28-29. 
156   Decision 7/2020 (V. 13.) AB of the Constitutional Court found that the right to freedom of information 
extends to all public data and judicial remedies must exist to fulfil this fundamental right vis-à-vis all 
persons handling public data. 

157   See  Rule of Law  Report 2024, Hungary. Also,  on 5 December 2024, in the context of the enhanced 
supervision  of  execution  of  the  judgment  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  in  the  Kenedi  v 
Hungary  case,  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  called  on  the  Hungarian 
authorities  to  adopt  additional  targeted  general  measures  to  address  the  recurring  reluctance  of  state 
authorities  to  comply  with  domestic  courts’  orders  granting  access  to  documents,  and  to  ensure  that 
effective and genuinely coercive enforcement tools are available for the implementation of such orders 
(CM/Del/Dec(2024)1514/H46-41).  

158   Judgment Pfv.IV.20.384/2024/5. The restriction does not affect access to  the decision concluding the 

administrative procedure. 

21 

 
 
Register159. While this is a step forward, entities managing significant amounts of public 
funding,  such  as  state-owned  companies160,  public  interest  trusts  and  the  Hungarian 
National Bank and its trusts are not required to publish data in the Register. In addition, 
many public interest trusts fail to comply with the Freedom of Information Act as they do 
not operate a website, their founding documents are  not publicly available, and they do 
not  publicly  disclose  data  related  to  their  activities.  The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor 
considers this to be an area presenting very high risk161. Hungary has ratified the Council 
of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents162. 

Pressure  on  journalists  and  other  media  professionals  has  increased,  as  they 
continue  to  encounter  numerous  and  serious  challenges  to  their  work.  While 
stakeholders point out that physical attacks against journalists are very rare in Hungary, 
they  draw  attention  to  the  prevalence  of  smear  campaigns  and  derogatory  statements 
against journalists163. Some stakeholders report that access to public interest events and 
government  press  conferences  continues  to  be  denied  on  a  selective  basis  and  that 
inquiries from the press often go unanswered164. With the investigative activities carried 
out  by  the  Sovereignty  Protection  Office  into  alleged  ‘foreign  funding’,  pressure  on 
independent journalists and media outlets has increased165. The 2025 MPM continues to 
consider the safety of journalists to be an area presenting medium risk166. The Council of 
Europe’s  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists 
registered  five  new  alerts  relating  to,  respectively,  an  investigative  outlet  accused  on 
engaging  in  foreign  influence  and  espionage  by  the  Sovereignty  Protection  Office;  two 
journalists  seeking  to  interview  the  PM  who  were  obstructed,  detained  and  charged; 
alerts relating to the Act on Transparency in the Public Sphere and a report claiming that 
intelligence  reports  had  been  drawn  up  on  media  outlets  and  CSOs167.  The  Mapping 
Media Freedom monitoring report has flagged thirty-seven alerts, eight of which concern 
derogatory statements and smear campaigns targeting journalists; seven of which relate 

159   An online repository where certain public entities upload metadata on their contracts (not the contracts 
themselves). As of 1 January 2025, Section 37/C of the Freedom of Information Act – amended by the 
Legal  Competitiveness  Act  –  refers,  instead  of  public  entities  having  a  budgetary  status,  to  public 
entities  registered  by  the  Hungarian  State  Treasury,  as  defined  in  the  Public  Finances  Act,  thereby 
extending  the  scope  to  public  bodies,  municipalities,  national  minority  self-governments,  municipal 
associations,  territorial  development  councils  and  other  entities  assimilated  by  law  to  public  entities 
having a budgetary status.  

160   E.g.  Hungarian  National  Asset  Management  Inc.,  Hungarian  Tourism  Agency,  Bethlen  Gábor  Fund 
Management Inc. These obliged to publish data in accordance with the ‘general disclosure list’ (Annex 
1  to  the  Freedom  of  Information  Act)  but  non-compliance  is  not  sanctioned.  The  Fundamental  Law 
limits  the  definition  of  public  funds  to  revenues,  expenditures  and  claims  of  the  State.  The  Kúria’s 
case  law  (Pfv.IV.20.904/2021/5),  confirmed  by  Decision  3258/2022  (VI.  3.)  of  the  Constitutional 
Court,  limits  transparency  by  relieving  subcontractors  from  the  obligation  to  give  access  to 
information related to the use of public funds. This is aggravated by the fact that government entities 
outsource  several  tasks  (e.g.  drafting  policy  documents,  running  government  communication)  to 
private companies through intermediaries. 
161   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), pp. 13-14. 
162   The Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (CETS No. 205), also known as 

the Tromsø Convention, entered into force on 1 December 2020. 

163   See, among others, the numerous alerts registered by the Media Freedom Rapid Response mechanism.  
164   See  Civil  Liberties  Union  for  Europe  (2025),  p.  449.  See  also  Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response 
Mechanism and the Council of Europe Platform on safety of journalists which have received several 
alerts of this nature. 

165   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p.  68; Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), p. 449. 
Stakeholders also cite a case where  journalists  were subjected to polygraph tests by the Constitution 
Protection Office in relation to news items that later turned out to be false.  

166   Media Pluralism Monitor (2025), pp. 14-15. 
167   Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (2025). 

22 

 
 
to refusal of accreditation, information or access to political events and six of which are 
linked to the operation of the Sovereignty Protection Office168. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

The  Government  continues  to  use  its  emergency  powers  extensively,  undermining 
legal  certainty  and  affecting  the  operation  of  businesses  in  the  single  market.  The 
Government further extended until 14 November 2025 the ‘state of danger’ declared on 
25 May 2022 ‘in view of the armed conflict and humanitarian catastrophe in Ukraine and 
with  a  view  to  averting  their  impact  on  Hungary’169.  In  this  way,  the  Government  can 
override Acts of Parliament. Several emergency measures adopted in the reporting period 
have an impact on the business environment and do not seem to be related to the ‘state of 
danger’170. The Constitutional Court examined various emergency measures in 14 cases 
in  2024171.  Stakeholders  reported  that  the  extensive  and  prolonged  use  of  the 
Government’s  emergency  powers  has  undermined  legal  certainty172.  The  Fifteenth 
Amendment  to  the  Fundamental  Law  changes  the  constitutional  rules  on  the  ‘state  of 
danger’  as  of  1  January  2026.  As  a  result,  setting  aside  any  law  through  a  government 
decree will require prior parliamentary authorisation. The constitutional rules (introduced 
in 2022), according to which the initial length of the ‘state of danger’ is 30 days and an 
extension  by  the  Government  requires  parliamentary  authorisation,  remain  unchanged. 
An amendment173 adopted on 14 April 2025 clarifies that the parliamentary authorisation 
to  extend  the  ‘state  of  danger’  or  to  set  aside  any  law  through  a  government  decree 
cannot be requested for a period longer than six months. 

The  law-making  process  remains  a  serious  source  of  concern,  with  certain 
important legislative processes not being linked to public consultation requirements. 
Almost 90% of the draft laws were adopted at the initiative of the Government, the vast 
majority  of  which  (90-92%)  were  submitted  to  Parliament  after  public  consultation. 
Nevertheless,  public  consultation  requirements  do  not  apply  with  certain  important 
individual  members  of  Parliament  or 
legislative  drafts 

introduced  directly  by 

168   European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025). 
169   Government Decrees 167/2023 of 11 May 2023, 515/2023 of 22 November 2023, 86/2024 of 17 April 
2024,  330/2024  of  14  November  2024  and  97/2025  of  12  May  2025  amended  Government  Decree 
424/2022 of 28 October 2022 by extending the ‘state of danger’ until 26 November 2023, 24 May, 19 
November  2024,  19  May  2025,  respectively.  The  Government  needed  an  authorisation  from  the 
National Assembly to extend the ‘state of danger’. This authorisation was given through Section 2(1) 
of Act XLII of 2022, as amended by Act XI of 2023, Act LXXII of 2023, Act VIII of 2024, Act LIV 
of 2024 and Act XXVI of 2025. In parallel, Hungary has been under a ‘crisis situation caused by mass 
immigration’ since 10 March 2016. 

170   E.g.  Government  Decree  5/2025  of 25  January  2025  amended  the  rules  on  exemption from  VAT  at 
source;  Government  Decree  25/2025  of  27  February  2025  limited  the  personal  scope  of  public 
procurement  rules;  Government  Decree  42/2025  of  11  March  2025  introduced  profit-margin  caps 
limiting commercial mark-up on 30 basic foodstuffs to 10% of the wholesale price. Certain emergency 
measures  have  been  incorporated  into  Acts  of  Parliament  (e.g.  excise  duty  rules,  tax  rules,  social 
contribution and other types of tax relief). 

171   In constitutional complaint procedures where emergency measures were under constitutional review, 
the average handling time in 2024 was 257 days, far below the deadlines established by the Rules of 
Procedure.  40%  of  the  petitions  aiming  at  the  constitutional  review  of  emergency  measures,  were 
decided on the merits. The Constitutional Court also established violation of the Fundamental Law in 
two decisions (Decisions 9/2024 (IV. 30.) AB and 3323/2024 (VII. 29.) AB). 

172   Stakeholders also consider that the Constitutional Court cannot ensure the effective and timely review 
of  emergency  measures.  Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2025),  p.  75;  Hungarian  Helsinki 
Committee (2025), p. 32. See also 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 31.  

173   Act V of 2025 amending Act XCIII of 2021. 

23 

 
 
parliamentary committees174. Examples include amendments to the Fundamental Law175 
or  legislation  with  impact  on  fundamental  rights  and  EU  law176.  The  Government  has 
continued  its  practice  to  include  only  technical  amendments  in  draft  laws  and  then 
introduce  new  and  substantive  amendments  in  the  bill  at  a  very  late  stage  in  the 
legislative  process,  through  the  Committee  on  Legislation,  just  before  the  final  vote  in 
Parliament177.  In  this  way,  a  regular  parliamentary  debate  and  public  consultation  are 
avoided.  Also,  frequent  changes  of  key  laws  continue  to  weaken  legal  certainty  and 
negatively  affect  the  business  environment.  For  instance,  last  year,  the  National 
Assembly  and  –  through  emergency  measures  –  the  Government,  amended  37  times 
Hungary’s central budget for 2024. 

Less  than  half  of  the  companies  surveyed  in  Hungary  express  high  levels  of 
confidence in the effectiveness of investment protection.  46% of companies are very 
or fairly confident that investments are protected by law and courts178. The main reasons 
among companies for their lack of confidence are the frequent changes in legislation or 
concerns about quality of the law-making process (32%)179. 37% of companies perceive 
the level of independence of the national competition authority (Competition Authority) 
as  very  or  fairly  good180.  A  limited  number  of  judicial  mechanisms  are  in  place  at  the 
level of the Kúria to ensure the implementation of administrative court judgments, which 
include  the  possibility  to  quash  administrative  decisions  for  continued  non-compliance 
with  the  court’s  instructions.  However,  these  mechanisms  do  not  include  disciplinary 
actions against the responsible officials or the possibility to award direct or consequential 
damages or compensation181. 

Foreign companies, including from other EU Member States, operating in strategic 
sectors face intensified regulatory pressure from state action. Stakeholders report the 
continued existence of visible patterns in  legislation  that cumulatively  and significantly 
damage the financial base for certain foreign investors, including from other EU Member 
States, leading to de-investment. This is done through tailor-made special taxes (e.g. in 
the  financial,  energy  and  building  materials  sectors182),  unpredictable  and  excessive 

174   The number of bills proposed by individual  members was 14 out of 121 laws passed in 2023 and 11 

out of 92 in 2024. 

175   E.g.  the  Thirteenth  Amendment  to  the  Fundamental  Law  (which  concerned  several  constitutional 
provisions, including the movement of military troops and borrowing by the EU) and  the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law. 

176   E.g. the Protection of National Sovereignty Law. 
177   In  2024,  the  Committee  on  Legislation  proposed  8  overreaching  amendments,  7  of  which  were 
adopted  by  the  National  Assembly  (information  received  from  the  National  Assembly). An  example 
where this technique was used was laws affecting the functioning of the justice system, with no prior 
consultation or plenary debate. 

178   Figure 54, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
179   Figure 55, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 26% of the surveyed investors perceive the quality, efficiency 

or independence of justice as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection.  

180   Figure 60, 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
181   Figure  49,  2025  EU  Justice  Scoreboard.  The  data  presented  reflects  exclusively  the  mechanisms  in 
place at the level of the highest administrative jurisdictions; the same or other mechanisms may be in 
place at lower instance administrative courts. 

182   In 2021, the Government approved two decrees which established an official price below the market 
price for basic construction materials such as sand, gravel and cement. The undertakings that extract 
those materials – almost all of which are controlled by companies established in other Member States 
– must also pay an additional mining fee set at 90% of the difference between the official price and the 
sales  price  exceeding  that  official  price.  In  addition,  the  permits  to  mine  depend  on  maintaining  a 
minimum level of extraction set by the Government. Since those government decrees were approved 
for a  transitional period  – originally only for the duration of the  COVID-19 outbreak  – the National 

24 

 
 
 
fines, 

restrictions  on  companies’  expansion 

administrative 
strategies,  export 
restrictions183 and the nationalisation of typical company assets/logistics184. In the retail 
sector, specific building  regulations continue to  restrict access  to  the Hungarian market 
and  special  taxes  are  combined  with  measures  directly  or  indirectly  imposing  product 
price  restrictions  with  the  effect  that  foreign  companies  are  de  facto  discriminated 
against185.  On  12  September  2024,  the  Court  of  Justice  found  that  measures  requiring 
fixed  prices  and  sales  obligations  for  certain  agricultural  products  by  a  government 
decree introduced under the ‘state of danger’ imposed significant restrictions which were 
not  justified or proportionate, and therefore were incompatible with  EU law186. Despite 
that  ruling,  Hungary  has  not  yet  amended  the  legal  framework  and  discriminatory 
product  price  restrictions  affecting  foreign  companies  continue  to  be  applied187.  On  3 
October  2024,  the  Commission  opened  infringement  proceedings  against  Hungary  for 
failing to bring its retail tax regime in line with the freedom of establishment guaranteed 
by  EU  law  considering  that  the  regime  disproportionally  burdens  larger  foreign 
companies188.  

The  possibility  for  the  Government  to  interfere  with  the  application  of  merger 
control rules continues to create legal uncertainty.  The Government can still declare 
certain  mergers  and  acquisitions  to  be  of  ‘strategic  importance  for  the  national 
economy’189. Such transactions do not need to be notified to the Competition Authority 
which  consequently  cannot  perform  its  control  function.  Such  Government  decrees  are 
not  subject  to  judicial  review190  and  increase  legal  uncertainty  for  both  domestic  and 
foreign  companies.  This  practice  has  enabled  the  implementation  of  a  nationalisation 
strategy in key sectors, such as energy, media and telecommunication.  

Institutional  checks and balances remain weak.  The Constitutional  Court, composed 
of members elected by the National Assembly without the involvement of the judiciary, 
still reviews the merits of final rulings of ordinary courts in politically sensitive cases191. 

Assembly  also  amended  the  Mining  Law  at  the  same  time  and  authorised  the  president  of  the 
competent  supervisory  authority  to  adopt  similar  measures.  On  23  February  2024,  the  Commission 
referred Hungary to the Court of Justice; the case is pending (C-144/24). 

183   In  2021,  the  Government  adopted  a  decree  requiring  the  prior  notification  of  the  export  of  certain 
construction  materials  and  products  considered  of  strategic  importance  and  granting  a  pre-emption 
right to the State on the notified goods. According to the Government, this was necessary because due 
to  its  high  energy  exposure  and  proximity  to  the  war  zone,  Hungary  has  experienced  inflation  rates 
well  above  the  EU  average.  On  4  August  2023,  the  Commission  referred  Hungary  to  the  Court  of 
Justice (C-499/23) on this matter. 

184   Ost-Ausschuss  –  German  Eastern  Business  Association  (2025),  WKÖ  –  Austrian  Federal  Economic 

Chamber (2025). 

185   Government  Decree  6/2022  of  14  January  2022  imposing  fixed  prices  (from  2022  to  2023)  and 

162/2023 of 5 May 2023 requiring mandatory discounts (from 2023 to 2024).  

186   Judgment of the CJEU, case C-557/23, SPAR Magyarország concerning Government Decree 6/2022. 
187   E.g. Government Decrees  42/2025 of 11 March 2025 and 93/2025 of 8 May 2025 introducing price 
margin  restrictions  (as  of  March  and  May  2025,  respectively).  On  18  June  2025,  the  Commission 
opened  infringement  procedures  against  Hungary  (INFR(2025)2052  and  INFR(2025)2102)  for 
imposing  price  margin  restrictions  on  non-Hungarian  companies.  The  first  procedure  concerns 
restrictions on the sale of certain food products by food retailers. The second procedure covers similar 
restrictions for the sale of certain non-food products by drugstores. 

188   INFR(2024)4022. On 18 June 2025, the Commission sent a reasoned opinion. 
189   Section 24/A of the Competition Act. 
190   The Constitutional Court could review the constitutionality of such individual measures (see Decision 

16/2020. (VII. 8.) AB, para 33). 

191   2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Hungary,  p.  35.  On  13  June  2024,  the  Constitutional  Court  quashed  the 
decision of the Kúria that dismissed the complaint – filed by a candidate supported by the governing 
parties  –  regarding  an  opposition  candidate’s  campaign  activity  during  the  municipal  elections 

25 

 
 
 
On 20 May 2025, the National Assembly elected its Deputy Speaker and the Prosecutor 
General  to  the  Constitutional  Court192.  The  Constitutional  Court  does  not  have  a  case 
allocation scheme and is not bound by procedural deadlines when hearing constitutional 
complaints193.  Concerns  regarding  the  independence  and  effective  functioning  of  the 
Commissioner  for  Fundamental  Rights  remain194.  Stakeholders  have  also  expressed 
concerns about the impartiality of the State Audit Office, which has imposed severe fines 
on  opposition  parties  because  of  campaign  financing  practices  and  not  investigating 
similar practices of the governing parties195. Similar concerns have also been expressed 
in relation to the Competition Authority and the Public Procurement Authority which are 
seen as selectively applying the rules196. 

Concerns related to the absence of procedural safeguards and effective oversight in 
case  of  secret  surveillance  measures  outside  criminal  proceedings  have  not  been 
addressed197.  The  execution  of  relevant  judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Human 

(Decision  3210/2024.  (VI.  13.)  AB).  On  17  December  2024,  the  Constitutional  Court  quashed  the 
Kúria  decision  which  allowed  a  referendum  on  the  organisation  of  Olympic  games  in  Budapest 
(Decision 24/2024. (XII. 30.) AB). 

192   The  proposal  is  made  by  a  parliamentary  committee.  According  to  the  Constitutional  Court  Act,  as 
amended by Act LXVII of 2024 as of 1 January 2025, while it is still required that candidates for the 
office  of  a  member  of  the  Constitutional  Court  have  a  law  degree  and  be  either  academics  with 
‘outstanding theoretical knowledge’ (meaning, according  to the law, university professors or doctors 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) or have at least twenty years of professional experience in the 
field of law, it is no longer necessary that such professional experience ‘in the field of law’ be acquired 
in  a  position  for  which  there is  a  statutory  requirement  to have  a  law  degree.  On  16  June  2025,  the 
Venice Commission recommended clarifying what kind of experience ‘in the field of law’ (acquired in 
a position for which a law degree is not needed by law) would qualify a candidate to be appointed. See 
Venice Commission (2025), paras 56 and 62. 

193   2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, pp. 31 and 35. According to the Government, the case allocation 
scheme of the Constitutional Court has customary nature. When allocating the case, its President takes 
the specific knowledge (specialisation) and the workload of members, as well as the pending cases that 
are  interrelated,  into  consideration  when  assigning  the  cases  to  members.  Although  there  is  no 
statutory  deadline  for  the  final  decision  to  be  taken  in  a  constitutional  complaint  procedure,  the 
Internal  Rules  of  Procedure  (‘Ügyrend’)  establish  internal  deadlines  that  ensure  the  closure  of  cases 
within reasonable time. 

194   2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Hungary,  p.  33  and  Háttér  Society  et  al  (2025).  According  to  the 
Government, in 2024 the Commissioner received 8 853 individual complaints and inquiries, and public 
authorities demonstrated a high rate of compliance (approximately 90%) with the recommendations set 
out in the Office’s publicly available and transparent reports. According to the Government, this shows 
both the Commissioner’s functional independence and his impact in safeguarding fundamental rights.  
195   The  State  Audit  Office  imposed  large  fines  on  opposition  parties  on  several  occasions  (HUF  660 
million, c. EUR 1.7 million in 2017, HUF 520 million, c. EUR 1.3 million in 2024). These decisions 
were 
(judgments  104.K.701.004/2024/43, 
104.K.701.005/2024/40 and  104.K.701.006/2024/37 of 18 March 2025). At the same time, it did not 
impose  fines  on  the  ruling  party,  despite  evidence  of  similar  practices  in  campaign  financing  (e.g. 
buying services at reduced prices, sharing campaign costs with related organisations, etc.) (see OSCE 
ODIHR  (2022),  p.  3,  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2022)  and  Transparency  International 
Hungary (2023)). 

the  Budapest  Regional  Court 

confirmed  by 

196   Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2025),  p.  52.  For  instance,  the  Competition  Authority  unduly 
singled  out  a  foreign-owned  retailer  by  enforcing  various  rules  in  an  apparent  attempt  to  dissuade  it 
from challenging  government-imposed price  regulations. Also, the Competition Authority imposed a 
HUF 11 billion (EUR 26.7 million) cartel fine on a chemical company whose owner openly supported 
the opposition; on 3 October 2024, the Budapest Regional Court quashed the Authority’s decision as 
ill-founded  (judgment  105.K.706.686/2021/138).  The  Public  Procurement  Authority  failed  to 
investigate  the  award  of  two  public  contracts  from  a  contracting  authority  primarily  owned  by  the 
same Government-affiliated businessman as the winner of the tenders. 

197   See 2024 Rule of Law Report, Hungary, p. 34. 

26 

 
 
Rights is still pending198. On 12 June 2025, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe urged the Hungarian authorities to adopt measures required to bring the domestic 
legislation  on  secret  surveillance  for  national  security  purposes  fully  and  effectively  in 
line  with  the  Convention  requirements199.  In  a  new  judgment  of  28  November  2024 
related to the wiretapping of a journalist, the European Court of Human Rights found that 
there had been no adequate procedural safeguards in place for the applicant to challenge 
the  alleged  use  of  secret  surveillance  against  her  with  a  view  to  discovering  her 
journalistic sources200. In previous cases of journalists allegedly targeted by the Pegasus 
spyware, the National  Data Protection and Freedom  of Information Authority  found no 
proof  that  the  bodies  authorised  to  conduct  secret  surveillance  would  have  used  the 
spyware for any purpose other than the discharge of the duties specified by law and those 
specified  by  the  company  providing  the  spyware  (prevention  and  detection  of  criminal 
acts and acts of terrorism)201.  

On 1 January 2025, Hungary had 47 leading judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights pending implementation, an increase of 2 compared to the previous 
year202. At that time, Hungary’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that had 
been implemented was at 26% (compared to 24% in 2024; 74% remained pending), and 
the average time that the judgments had been pending implementation was 6 years and 6 
months  (compared  to  6  years  and  2  months  in  2024)203.  The  oldest  leading  judgment, 
pending  implementation  for  more  than  15  years,  concerns  the  violation  of  the  right  to 
freedom of  assembly204. As regards the respect  of  payment deadlines, on 31 December 
2024 there were 32 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 47 in 
2023)205.  On  16  June  2025,  the  number  of  leading  judgments  pending  implementation 
had increased to 52206. 

A  deteriorating  environment  for  civil  society  organisations  and  legal  uncertainty 
further  obstruct  civic  space207.  The  space  for  civil  society  continues  to  be  rated  as 
‘obstructed’208.  A  new  law209  moves  the  register  of  civil  society  organisations  (CSOs) 
from the courts to a central administrative authority as of 1 January 2027. Stakeholders 

198   Judgments of the ECtHR, 37138/14, Szabó and Vissy v Hungary and 58032/16, Hüttl v Hungary. 
199  CM/Del/Dec(2025)1531/H46-22. 
200   Judgment of the ECtHR, case 31091/16, Klaudia Csikós v Hungary.  
201   National  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  Authority  (2022).  According  to  the 
Government,  Hungarian  legislation  does  not  differentiate  between  professions  and  professional 
activities (e.g. ‘journalist, human rights activist, opposition politician, lawyer and businessman’) with 
regard  to  secret  surveillance  when  it  does  not  restrict  in  that  respect  national  security  services  in 
carrying out the activities under Section 56 of National Security Act. 

202   For an explanation of the supervision process, see the website of the Council of Europe.   
203   All  figures  calculated  by  the  European  Implementation  Network  (EIN)  and  based  on  the  number  of 
cases  that  are  considered  pending  at  the  annual  cut-off  date  of  1  January  2025.  EIN  (2025),  written 
input, p. 5. 

204   Judgment of the ECtHR, 5529/05,  Patyi and Others v Hungary, pending implementation since 2009. 
According to the Government, the length of this process is often due  to the working methods of the 
Committee of Ministers, involving constant monitoring of the development of domestic jurisprudence 
and grouping together cases concerning remotely similar issues. 

205   Council of Europe (2025), p. 156.   
206   Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
207   The 2024 Rule of Law Report recommended that Hungary ‘[r]emove obstacles affecting civil society 
organisations  and  foster  a  safe  and  enabling  civic  space,  including  by  repealing  legislation  that 
hampers their capacity of working, in particular the immigration tax’. 

208   CIVICUS  (2025).  In  2023,  approximately  61 076  CSOs  were  active  according  to  the  Hungarian 

Central Statistical Office; no forced dissolutions of CSOs were reported.  
 Act LIX of 2025. 

209 

27 

 
 
report  that  government  attacks  on  independent  CSOs  have  continued210.  On  3  October 
2024,  the  Commission  decided  to  refer  Hungary  to  the  Court  of  Justice  over  the 
Protection  of  National  Sovereignty  Law211.  The  Sovereignty  Protection  Office  started 
several  investigations  concerning  various  civil  society  organisations,  notably  anti-
corruption  CSOs212,  including  those  receiving  EU  funds.  In  some  of  these  reports,  the 
Office  labelled  the  activities  of  several  Commission  intermediaries  tasked  with  the 
disbursement  of  the  EU’s  Citizens  Equality  Rights  and  Values  (CERV)  programme  as 
carrying ‘a serious sovereignty risk’213. On 13 May 2025, a draft law ‘on transparency in 
public life’ was tabled in the National Assembly. On 4 June 2025, it was announced that 
the parliamentary work on this draft law would be postponed to the autumn session. The 
draft  law  increases  the  powers  of  the  Sovereignty  Protection  Office,  introducing 
significant  consequences  for  the  activities  of  civil  society  organisations,  media  outlets 
and other entities within its scope, and considerably restricts their access  to funding. In 
particular,  the  investigations  of  the  Office  would  serve  as  the  basis  for  a  government 
decree  listing  entities  whose  activities  are  qualified  as  endangering  ‘Hungary’s 
sovereignty  through  influence  on  public  life’214.  The  draft  law  sparked  protest  from 
independent media outlets and civil society organisations, which deem it serves to restrict 
critical voices in Hungary215. The Commission has voiced its serious concerns about this 
draft  law  with  the  Hungarian  authorities216.  Recent  amendments  to  legislation  and  the 
Constitution, as well as their application in practice resulted in legal uncertainty for the 
organisers  and  participants  of  public  assemblies  aimed  at  promoting  equality  and 
diversity.  Stakeholders  note  that  the  distribution  of  public  funding  continues  to  be 
uneven217,  untransparent,  privileging  government-aligned  organisations  against  CSOs 

210   Amnesty International Hungary et al (2025), p. 88. 
211   The  case  is  pending  before  the  Court  of  Justice  (C-829/24).  The  Commission  considers  that  the 
Protection  of  National  Sovereignty  Law  breaches  several  fundamental  freedoms  and  secondary 
legislation  in  the  internal  market,  several  fundamental  rights  enshrined  in  the  EU  Charter  of 
Fundamental Rights and EU Data protection legislation. The European Parliament, fourteen Member 
States and Norway have intervened in the case in support of the Commission’s position. 

212   The law has had a deterring effect on CSOs that are members of monitoring committees of EU funded 
programmes.  Also,  during  the  5  December  2024  meeting  of  the  Partnership  Agreement  monitoring 
committee  they  expressed  concerns  that  the  Sovereignty  Protection  Office  can  target  them  for  their 
work. 

213   Sovereignty  Protection  Office  (2024),  Sovereignty  Protection  Office  (2025).  Until  March  2025, 
Hungarian entities were granted more than EUR 26.5 million in total for the implementation of CERV-
funded projects. Most of the beneficiaries are private non-profit organisations and most of the grants 
are  running.  See  the  Financial  Transparency  System  and  the  EU  Funding  and  Tenders  portal  for 
details. 

214   According to the draft law,  once an entity is listed, it may not receive foreign support without prior 
authorisation  from  the  tax  administration.  The  potential  duration  of  the  authorisation  procedure  can 
last 180 days, even where the support is ultimately qualified as not being granted to influence  public 
opinion. Listed entities would be  required to request from their donors a written declaration that the 
support  provided  to  it  has  not  been  received  from  a  foreign  source.  In  addition  to  the  restriction  on 
foreign  support,  entities  will  be  excluded  from  a  state  subsidy  scheme  whereby  an  entity  can  be 
nominated  by  individual  tax-payers  to  receive  an  amount  corresponding  to  one  per  cent  of  their 
personal  income  tax.  Senior  officers,  founders  of  a  listed  entity  and  members  of  its  supervisory 
committee would be subject to enhanced customer due diligence by financial institutions and would be 
obliged to make a public declaration of assets. 

215   European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (2025),  Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee  (2025b), 

International Federation of Journalists (2025). 

216   On 23 May 2025, the Commission sent a letter to the Hungarian authorities expressing concerns about 

the draft law. 

217   The total income of associations and foundations in 2023 was HUF 1 345 billion (EUR 3.36 billion), 
more than the year before (HUF 1 270 billion; EUR 3.2 billion). Of this, some 40% came from public 
funding,  22%  from  private  sources,  with  the  rest  originating  from  business  and  other  income. 

28 

 
 
 
critical  of  government  policies,  which  are  not  able  to  secure  public  funding  in 
Hungary218. Overall, no progress has been made on the recommendation and the situation 
has instead further deteriorated. 

Crowdsourcing remained an important source of income for many CSOs. The majority of CSOs work 
on a small annual budget (less than HUF 5 million or EUR 12 500) on a mostly voluntary basis, which 
seriously limits their capacities. This is visible especially in the countryside. 

218   Amnesty  International  Hungary  et  al  (2025),  p.  90.  According  to  the  Hungarian  Central  Statistical 
Office,  funding  provided  through  the  National  Cooperation  Fund  increased  from  EUR  8.5  million 
(HUF 3.4 billion) in 2012 to EUR 32.6 million (HUF 13 billion) in 2025. Also, the State provides free 
professional assistance to  CSOs across the country through Civil Community Service Centres  (‘Civil 
Közösségi Szolgáltató Központok’). 

29 

 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2025 Rule of Law 
Report  can  be 
found  at  https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2025-rule-law-report-
targeted-stakeholder-consultation_en. 

24.hu  (2024),  Scandal  in  court:  security  guards  led  out  the  main  accused  of  corruption  in  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  (Botrány  a  bíróságon:  biztonsági  őrök  vezették  ki  a  pénzügyminisztériumi 
korrupció 
fővádlottját),  https://24.hu/belfold/2024/10/21/varga-mihaly-penzugyminiszterium-
korrupcio-vesztegetes-volt-helyettes-allamtitkar-karsai-tamas-palkovics-laszlo-barta-eke-gyula-
eu-palyazat-kenopenz-miniszterelnokseg-birosag-elokeszito-ules/  

Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  Hungarian  Helsinki 
Committee, K-Monitor, Mérték Media Monitor, Ökotárs – Hungarian Environmental Partnership 
Foundation,  Political  Capital,  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2024),  Contribution  for  the 
2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  https://www.amnesty.hu/hungarian-csos-contribute-to-the-european-
commissions-2024-rule-of-law-report/. 

Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Hungarian  Civil  Liberties  Union,  Hungarian  Helsinki 
Committee, K-Monitor, Mérték Media Monitor, Ökotárs – Hungarian Environmental Partnership 
Foundation,  Political  Capital,  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2025),  Contribution  for  the 
https://transparency.hu/wp-
2025 
content/uploads/2025/01/HUN_CSO_contribution_EC_RoL_Report_2025.pdf. 

Report, 

Rule 

Law 

of 

Anti-Corruption  Task  Force  (2025),  Minutes  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Task  Force  Meeting 
https://kemcs.hu/wp-
(Jegyzőkönyv), 
content/uploads/2025/04/KEMCS_jegyzokonyv_20250312.pdf. 

Átlátszó  (2024),  Investigative  Outlet  Átlátszó  Accused  of  Foreign  Influence  and  Espionage, 
https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte/detail/107641772. 

Átlátszó  (2025),  The  Anti-Corruption  Task  Force  has  not  adopted  an  annual  report.  (Nincs 
elfogadott  éves 
jelentése  a  Korrupcióellenes  Munkacsoportnak),  https://atlatszo.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2025/05/KEMCS_civil_sajtokozlemeny_20250502.pdf. 

Bertelsmann  Stiftung  (2024),  Transformation  Index:  Hungary  Country  Report,  https://bti-
project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2024_HUN.pdf.  

Budapest  Regional  Court  (2025),  Two  former  Deputy  State  Secretaries  sentenced  to  prison  for 
accepting  bribes  (Vesztegetés  elfogadása  miatt  börtönbüntetésre  ítéltek  két  volt  helyettes 
államtitkárt), 
https://birosag.hu/aktualis-kozlemenyek/fovarosi-torvenyszek-vesztegetes-
elfogadasa-miatt-bortonbuntetesre-iteltek-ket-volt-helyettes 

(2025), 

CCBE 
https://ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/ROL/EN_ROL_20250227_C
CBE-Contribution-for-the-2025-Rule-of-Law-Report.pdf. 

Contribution 

2025 

Rule 

Law 

the 

for 

of 

Report. 

Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (2025), Media Pluralism Monitor 2025, Country 
report for Hungary, https://cmpf.eui.eu/projects/media-pluralism-monitor/.  

Civil  Liberties  Union 
https://www.liberties.eu/f/vdxw3e. 

for  Europe 

(2025),  Rule 

of  Law  Report,  Hungary, 

Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  6  March  2025,  C-155/23,  Commission  v  Hungary  (Directive 
lanceurs d’alerte), EU:C:2025:151. 

30 

 
Court  of  Justice,  judgment  6  March  2025  in  joined  cases  C-647/21,  C-648/21,  D.  K. 
(Dessaisissement d’un juge), EU:C:2025:143. 

Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  25  February  2025,  C-146/23  and  C-374/23,  Sąd  Rejonowy  w 
Białymstoku, EU:C:2025:109. 

Court  of  Justice, 
EU:C:2024:737. 

judgment  of  12  September  2024,  C-557/23,  SPAR  Magyarország, 

Court of Justice, judgment of 11 January 2024, C-537/22, Global Ink Trade, EU:C:2024:6. 

Corruption  Research  Center  Budapest  (2023),  Fourteen  Graphs  and  Two  Tables  on  the  New 
Trends 
2005-2022, 
https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3400. 

the  Hungarian 

of  Corruption 

Procurement 

Public 

in 

procurement, 

Corruption Research Center Budapest (2023),  The new trends of corruption risks in Hungarian 
public 
https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3450#:~:text=Lord%20Kelvin-
,The%20New%20Trends%20of%20Corruption%20Risk%20in%20Hungarian%20Public,January
%201998%20to%20July%202023&text=In%202023%2C%20corruption%20risk%20increased,c
ompanies%20with%20no%20political%20ties. 

Corruption Research Center Budapest (2023), White Elephants in Hungary – Lessons of some EU 
funded projects, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4403151. 

Corruption Research Center Budapest (2024), Two Communication Companies in the Hungarian 
Public Procurement Market 2012-2023, https://www.crcb.eu/?p=3530. 

Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, OJ L 325, 20.12.2022, p. 
94–109. 

Council  of  Europe  (2003),  Recommendation  Rec(2003)4  of  the  Committee  of  Ministers  to 
member  states  on  common  rules  against  corruption  in  the  funding  of  political  parties  and 
electoral campaigns, 8 April 2003, https://rm.coe.int/16806cc1f1.  

Council  of  Europe  (2023),  Hungary:  anti-corruption  group  calls  for  measures  to  prevent 
corruption  in  central  government  and  law  enforcement,  https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/-
/hungary-anti-corruption-group-calls-for-measures-to-prevent-corruption-in-central-government-
and-law-enforcement.  

Council  of  Europe  Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists 
(2025), https://fom.coe.int/en/accueil. 

Council  of  Europe  (2020),  Convention  on  Access  to  Official  Documents  (CETS  No.  205), 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detail&treatynum=205. 

De  Tijd  (2024),  From  searched  hotel  rooms  to  chased  fraud  detectives:  Hungary  spies  on  EU 
fraudespeurders:  Hongarije 
institutions  (Van  doorzochte  hotelkamers 
bespioneert 
https://www.tijd.be/politiek-economie/europa/algemeen/van-
doorzochte-hotelkamers-tot-achtervolgde-fraudespeurders-hongarije-bespioneert-eu-
instellingen/10577507.html  

tot  achtervolgde 

EU-instellingen), 

Direkt36  (2024),  EU  Investigators  Probing  Orbán’s  Son-in-Law  Surveilled,  Sparking 
Intelligence  Agency  Infighting,  https://www.direkt36.hu/en/english-eu-investigators-probing-
orbans-son-in-law-surveilled-sparking-intelligence-agency-infighting/. 

Direkt36 (2025), The State Audit Office found huge asset losses and other serious problems at the 
report, 
foundation,  according 
Hungarian  National  Bank’s 

leaked  draft 

to  a 

31 

 
https://www.direkt36.hu/en/hatalmas-vagyonvesztest-es-mas-sulyos-problemakat-talalt-az-asz-
matolcsyek-alapitvanyanal-a-kiszivargott-jelentestervezet-szerint/. 

European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (ENCJ)  (2025),  The  situation  in  Hungary 
https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-
p/Final%20statement%20Hungary%2021%2002%202025.pdf. 

European  Centre  for  Press  and  Media  Freedom  (2025),  Media  Freedom  Rapid  Response  – 
Hungary,  https://www.mfrr.eu/.  

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (2025), Hungary: Foreign funding bill poses most 
serious  threat  to  independent  media  in  years,  https://www.ecpmf.eu/hungary-foreign-funding-
bill-poses-most-serious-threat-to-independent-media-in-years/. 

European  Commission,  Decision  C(2024)  9140 
https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/8003e1ad-8e79-4238-bf76-
af1fcd2b5efe_en?filename=20241216%20Decision%20on%20PITs%20notification%20-
%20EN.pdf. 

final  of  16  December  2024, 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  28  November  2024,  application  no.  31091/16, 
Klaudia Csikós v Hungary. 

European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  judgment  of  29  September  2022,  application  no.  58032/16, 
Hüttl v Hungary. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 23 June 2016, application no. 20261/12,  Baka v 
Hungary. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 12 January 2016, application no. 37138/14, Szabó 
and Vissy v Hungary. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 16 July 2015, application no. 48322/12, Gazsó v 
Hungary. 

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 26 May 2009, application no. 31475/05, Kenedi v 
Hungary.  

European Court of Human Rights, judgment of  7 October 2008, application  no. 5529/05, Patyi 
and Others v Hungary. 

G7.hu  (2024),  The  state  has  spent  HUF  1360  billion  on  Rogán’s  communication  since  2015 
(1360  milliárdot 
óta), 
https://g7.hu/kozelet/20240219/1360-milliardot-koltott-az-allam-a-rogan-fele-kommunikaciora-
2015-ota/. 

kommunikációra 

a  Rogán-féle 

költött 

állam 

2015 

az 

General Court of the European Union, judgment of 27 June 2019, Hungary v Commission, case 
T-138/25, EU:T:2019:448. 

GRECO (2019), Third Evaluation Round – Second Addendum to the Second Compliance Report 
on  Hungary  on  incriminations  and  transparency  of  party  funding  (1  August  2019), 
https://rm.coe.int/third-evaluation-round-second-addendum-to-the-second-compliance-
report/168096947e. 

GRECO  (2022),  Fourth  Evaluation  Round  –  Third  Interim  Compliance  Report,  (8  September 
2022),  https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-
of/1680a7f171. 

32 

 
GRECO  (2023a),  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  –  Evaluation  Report  on  Hungary  on  preventing 
corruption  and  promoting  integrity  in  central  governments  (top  executive  functions)  and  law 
enforcement  agencies  (9  June  2023),  https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-
corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680ab87f5. 

GRECO (2023b), Fourth Evaluation Round – Fourth Interim Compliance Report on Hungary on 
corruption  prevention  in  respect  of  members  of  parliament,  judges  and  prosecutors  (9  June 
2023),  https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-
of/1680ab87f1. 

Háttér  Society,  Amnesty  International  Hungary,  Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee,  Polgár 
Foundation, Street Lawyer, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (2025), Persisting failure to step up 
for  human  rights  -  Background  paper  on  Hungary’s  national  human  rights  institution, 
https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/06/HU_NHRI_assessment_June2025.pdf.  

Hungarian  Association  of  Judges  (MABIE)  (2025),  Contribution  for  the  2025  Rule  of  Law 
Report. 

Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (2025), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian  Government  (2024),  Government  Decision  1025/2024  of  14  February  2024  on  the 
adoption  of 
for  2024-2025, 
https://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/strategiai-dokumentumok1. 

the  medium-term  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy 

Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025a), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Hungarian  Helsinki  Committee  (2025b),  Operation  Starve  and  Strangle:  Hungary’s  proposed 
“Transparency” Law threatens core European democratic values and attacks independent civil 
society and media organisations, https://helsinki.hu/en/operation-starve-and-strangle-2025/. 

Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025c), He was fired because he stood up for the public interest, 
but  he  won’t  let  himself  go  (Kirúgták,  mert  kiállt  a  közérdekért,  de  nem  hagyja  magát),  13 
January 2025, https://helsinki.hu/kirugtak-kiallt-a-kozerdekert-batonyi-peter/. 

authority 

Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2025d), The Kúria President broke the law when he overstepped 
his 
túllépett  hatáskörén), 
https://helsinki.hu/torvenyt-sertett-a-kuria-elnoke-amikor-tullepett-
hataskoren/https://helsinki.hu/torvenyt-sertett-a-kuria-elnoke-amikor-tullepett-hataskoren/. 

sértett  a  Kúria 

elnöke,  amikor 

(Törvényt 

Hungary Today (2025), Government Challenges European Commission Decision on Universities 
in EU Court, https://hungarytoday.hu/government-challenges-european-commission-decision-on-
universities-in-eu-court/. 

HVG.HU (2025), We did not get special treatment for free - the Kúria President’s New Year’s 
message was telling (A kiemelt bánásmódot nem ingyen kaptuk – sokatmondó volt a Kúria-elnök 
újévi  köszöntője),  https://hvg.hu/itthon/20250104_kuria-birok-kiemelt-banasmod-fizetesemeles-
Varga-Zs-Andras-ujevi-koszonto-ebx. 

Institut  für  Europäische  Politik  (2024),  German  Companies  in  Hungary.  To  adapt,  endure,  or 
engage?, https://iep-berlin.de/site/assets/files/3853/iep_study_germancompaniesinhungary-1.pdf. 

Integrity Authority (2023a), The position of the Integrity Authority regarding the Government’s 
answer 
Integritás  Hatóság  álláspontja  a  Kormány  válaszaival  kapcsolatban), 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/12/Integritas_Hatosag_osszegzes_Kormanyvalaszokra_20231206.pdf. 

(Az 

33 

 
Integrity  Authority  (2023b),  Ad-hoc  report  on  asset  declarations  (Vagyonnyilatkozatokról  szóló 
eseti 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/12/Integritas_Hatosag_Vagyonnyilatkozatok_Eseti_Jelentes_2023-1.pdf.  

jelentés), 

Integrity  Authority  (2023c),  2022  Annual  Analytical  Report,  https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2023/06/Integritas_Hatosag_Eves_Elemzo_Integritasjelentes_20220629.pdf 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Annual-Analytical-Integrity-Report-
2022-ENG.pdf.  

Integrity  Autjority  (2023d),  Integrity  Risk  Assessment  Report  of  the  Hungarian  Public 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/integrity-
Procurement 
authority-integrity-risk-assessment-report-310323.pdf. 

System, 

Integrity  Authority  (2024a),  Conclusion  of  inquiry  III_86_2023  –  modernisation  of  cattle  farm 
korszerűsítése), 
lezárása 
(III_86_2023. 
https://integritashatosag.hu/case/iii_86_2023-sz-vizsgalat-lezarasa-szarvasmarhatelep-
korszerusitese/.  

szarvasmarhatelep 

vizsgálat 

sz. 

– 

Integrity  Authority  (2024b),  Annual  Report  to  the  Hungarian  National  Assembly  2023  , 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/integrity-authority-annual-report-
2023.pdf.   

Integrity  Authority  (2024c),  Annual  Analytical  Report  2023,  https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-
content/uploads/2025/02/Integritas_Hatosag_Eves_Elemzo_Integritasjelentes_2023_0612_angol.
pdf. 

Integrity  Authority  (2024d),  Closing  of  investigation  no.  VIZSG_27_2023  –  abuse  involving 
funds 
in  Nógrád  County,  https://integritashatosag.hu/en/case/closing-of-
investigation-no-vizsg_27_2023-abuse-involving-funds-for-fishponds-in-nograd-county/. 

fishponds 

for 

Integrity  Authority  (2024e),  Closing  of  investigation  no.  VIZSG/3/2023  –  overpricing  of  the 
Operational  Programme 
(RSZTOP), 
https://integritashatosag.hu/en/case/closing-of-investigation-no-vizsg-3-2023-overpricing-of-the-
operational-programme-for-supporting-socially-disadvantaged-persons-rsztop/. 

for  Supporting  Socially  Disadvantaged  Persons 

Integrity  Authority 
https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/integrity-authority-hungary-2024-
annual-report-to-the-hungarian-parliament-1.pdf. 

(2025a),  2024  Annual  Report 

the  Hungarian  Parliament, 

to 

Integrity Authority (2025b), Closing of investigation no. VIZSG_11_2024 – cases of misuse in six 
Somlószőlős 
https://integritashatosag.hu/en/case/closing-of-investigation-no-
vizsg_11_2024-cases-of-misuse-in-six-somloszolos-projects/. 

projects, 

Integrity  Authority  (2025c),  Integrity  risk  assessment  report  of  the  Hungarian  public 
procurement 
system,  https://integritashatosag.hu/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Integrity-Risk-
Assessment-Report-of-the-Hungarian-Public-Procurement-System-2023.pdf. 

International Federation of Journalists (2025),  Hungary: Foreign Agent bill targets independent 
media  and  NGOs  https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/europe/article/hungary-
foreign-agent-bill-targets-independent-media-and-ngos. 

International  Press  Institute  (IPI)  (2025):  Media  Capture  Monitoring  Report,  Media  Capture 
Monitoring Report: Hungary – ipi.media.  

K-Monitor  (2023),  Hungarian  MP’s  Assets:  Less  Declared  and  Still  not  Monitored, 
https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored.  

34 

 
K-Monitor  and  Transparency  International  Hungary  (2024),  Special  report  on  the  2023  Anti-
Corruption  Task  Force  Report:  Current  issues  in  the  fight  against  corruption  in  Hungary, 
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content/uploads/2024/03/KEMCS_2023_civil_kulonjelentes_final.pdf. 

Kúria (2025a), The appointment of the Vice-Presidents of the Kúria fully complied with the law 
(A  Kúria  elnökhelyetteseinek  kinevezése  maradéktalanul  megfelelt  a  törvény  előírásainak) 
https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-elnokhelyetteseinek-kinevezese-maradektalanul-megfelelt-
torveny-eloirasainak.  

Kúria (2025b), The Kúria President’s letter in reply to the press release of the National Judicial 
Council  and  the  President  of  the  National  Office  for  the  Judiciary  (A  Kúria  elnökének 
válaszlevele az Országos Bírói Tanács és az Országos Bírósági Hivatal elnökének közleményére), 
https://kuria-birosag.hu/hu/sajto/kuria-elnokenek-valaszlevele-az-orszagos-biroi-tanacs-es-az-
orszagos-birosagi-hivatal. 

Kúria (2025c), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Lakmusz  (2024),  How  does  anyone  who  is  not  a  friend  of  Fidesz  become  a  ‘leftist’?, 
https://www.lakmusz.hu/hogy-lesz-barkibol-baloldali-aki-nem-a-fidesz-baratja-2/. 

Magyar  Nemzet 
https://magyarnemzet.hu/english/2025/04/pressmans-favorite-judge-releases-drug-lab-suspects. 

(2025),  Pressman’s  Favorite  Judge  Releases  Drug  Lab  Suspects, 

MEDEL (2025), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Media1 (2024), ‘Hacked’ public procurement: The Integrity Authority has taken legal action in 
the  case involving  New  Land  Media,  https://integritashatosag.hu/en/hacked-public-procurement-
the-integrity-authority-has-taken-legal-action-in-the-case-involving-new-land-media-interview-
with-ferenc-pal-biro-president-of-the-integrity-au/.  

Ministry  of  Interior  (2025),  Monitoring  Support  Matrix  serving  as  the  basis for the  monitoring 
activity  of  monitoring  committee  of  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  for  2024-2025  (A 
2024-2025  közötti  időszakra  szóló  Nemzeti  Korrupcióellenes  Stratégia  Monitoring  Bizottság 
Mátrix), 
képező 
monitoring 
https://korrupciomegelozes.kormany.hu/strategiai-dokumentumok1. 

tevékenysége 

Monitoring 

Támogató 

alapját 

National  Data  Protection  and  Freedom  of  Information  Authority  (2022),  Findings  of  the 
investigation  of  the  Nemzeti  Adatvédelmi  és  Információszabadság  Hatóság  launched  ex  officio 
concerning  the  application  of  the  ‘Pegasus’  spyware  in  Hungary,  https://www.naih.hu/data-
protection/data-protection-reports/file/492-findings-of-the-investigation-of-the-nemzeti-
adatvedelmi-es-informacioszabadsag-hatosag-hungarian-national-authority-for-data-protection-
and-freedom-of-information-launched-ex-officio-concerning-the-application-of-the-pegasus-
spyware-in-hungary. 

National Judicial Council (2024), Statement of 19 December 2024, https://obt-jud.hu/hu/birosagi-
szervezetrendszer-reformjaval-kapcsolatos-jogalkotasi-folyamatrol. 

National  Judicial  Council  (2024),  Verbatim  minutes  of  the  11  December  2024  meeting, 
https://obt-jud.hu/sites/default/files/ulesek/Jegyzokonyv_2024.12.11.pdf. 

National  Judicial  Council  (2025a),  The  NJC  President’s  letter  to  the  European  Commission, 
dated  23  May  2025  https://obt-jud.hu/sites/default/files/sajtokozlemenyek-mellekletek/Letter-to-
Mr-McGrath.pdf 

35 

 
National  Judicial  Council  (2025b),  Comments  on  the  proposal  to  amend  justice-related  laws 
(Észrevételek  az  igazságügyi  tárgyú  törvények  módosításáról  szóló  javaslathoz)  https://obt-
jud.hu/sites/default/files/sajtokozlemenyek-mellekletek/Eszrevetelek-OBT-20250422.pdf  

OECD (2021), Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Phase 4 Two-Year Follow-Up 
Report: Hungary https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/hungary-phase-4-follow-up-report.pdf.  

OECD  (2023a),  A  strategic  approach  to  public  integrity  in  Hungary:  The  2023-2025  National 
Anti-Corruption  Strategy  and  Action  Plan,  https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/a5461405-
en.pdf?expires=1710511674&id=id&accname=oid031827&checksum=A968A42BA18AE86076
9123CD88C99C24. 

OECD  (2023b),  Implementing  the  OECD  Anti-Bribery  Convention,  Phase  4  Evaluation  of 
Hungary: 
report, 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/WGB(2023)35/FINAL/en/pdf?sessionId=1700663306729. 

additional 

follow-up 

written 

(2023c), 

OECD 
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/government-at-a-glance-2023_c4200b14-
en/hungary_dacc7f00-en.html. 

Government 

Glance 

at 

a 

2023: 

Hungary, 

OECD  (2023d),  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery  public  statement  on  Hungary, 
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecd-working-group-on-bribery-public-statement-on-hungary-
31-01-2023.htm.  

OECD  (2024a),  OECD  Working  Group  on  Bribery  cancels  High-Level  Mission  to  Hungary, 
https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/speech-statements/2024/10/oecd-working-group-on-
bribery-cancels-high-level-mission-to-hungary.html. 

OECD 
2024, 
Economic 
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-hungary-2024_795451e5-en.html. 

Hungary 

Surveys: 

(2024b), 

OECD 

OSCE  ODIHR  (2022),  Hungary  Parliamentary  Elections  and  Referendum  -  3  April  2022  - 
ODIHR 
Report 
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/6/523568.pdf.  

Observation 

Election 

Mission 

Final 

OSCE  ODIHR  and  Venice  Commission  (2020),  Guidelines  on  Political  Party  Regulation, 
Second Edition https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/1/538473.pdf.  

Ost-Ausschuss  der  Deutschen  Wirtschaft  –  German  Eastern  Business  Association  (2025), 
Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Prosecutor’s  office  (2024),  Indictment  in  a  case  related  to  tender  grants  obtained  through 
corruption  –  with  video  –  press  release  of  the  Central  Chief  Investigating  Prosecution  Office 
(Vádemelés  a  korrupció  útján  szerzett  pályázati  támogatások  ügyében-  videóval  -  a  Központi 
Nyomozó  Főügyészség  sajtóközleménye),  https://ugyeszseg.hu/vademeles-a-korrupcio-utjan-
szerzett-palyazati-tamogatasok-ugyeben-videoval-a-kozponti-nyomozo-fougyeszseg-
sajtokozlemenye/.  

Res Iudicata - Judges for Social Awareness Association (2025), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of 
Law Report. 

Reuters (2024), Hungary prosecutors probe graft case tape leaked by former government insider, 
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungary-prosecutors-probe-graft-case-tape-leaked-by-
former-government-insider-2024-03-28/. 

36 

 
Reuters  (2025),  Hungary's  opposition  rallies  as  Orban  pledges  crackdown  on  media,  NGOs, 
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/hungarys-orban-vows-fast-crackdown-media-ngos-over-
foreign-funding-2025-03-15/. 

SELDI (2023), Bridges to nowhere – State Capture and Corruption Risks in Fiscal Transfers and 
Public 
Europe, 
Local 
https://seldi.net/publications/reports/bridges-to-nowhere-state-capture-and-corruption-risks-in-
fiscal-transfers-and-public-procurement-at-the-local-level-in-southeast-europe/. 

Procurement 

Southeast 

Level 

the 

at 

in 

Service 
2025, 
https://mabie.hu/images/A%20SZOLGALATI%20BIROSAGOK%20KOZLEMENYE.docx.pdf. 

Statement 

January 

(2025), 

courts 

14 

of 

Sovereignty  Protection  Office  (2024),  The  impact  of  the  activities  of  Ökotárs  on  Hungarian 
sovereignty,  https://szuverenitasvedelmihivatal.hu/dokumentumok/The-impact-of-the-activities-
of-%C3%96kot%C3%A1rs-on-Hungarian-sovereignty.pdf. 

Sovereignty Protection Office (2025), The European Commission’s CERV Programme – This is 
how Brussels turned on the money tap to fund the Soros network (Az Európai Bizottság CERV 
Programja  -  Így  nyitotta  meg  Brüsszel  a  pénzcsapot  a  Soros-hálózat  finanszírozására) 
https://szuverenitasvedelmihivatal.hu/dokumentumok/Az-Europai-Bizottsag-CERV-programja-
Igy-nyitotta-meg-Brusszel-a-penzcsapot-a-Soros-halozat-finanszirozasara.pdf. 

Sovereignty Protection Office (2024), Reply to ACTF Resolution No. 17/2024 (IX.17.) (Válasz a 
KEMCS 17/2024. (IX.17.) sz. határozatára), https://szuverenitasvedelmihivatal.hu/hirek/valasz-a-
kemcs-17-2024-hatarozatara. 

State Audit Office (2025), 25035 - SUMMARY of the Audit Report on the management of the 
Pallas Athéné Domus Meriti Foundation, https://www.asz.hu/files/PADME_summary_EN.pdf. 

State  Audit  Office  (2025),  25036  -  SUMMARY  of  the  Audit  Report  of  the  Neumann  János 
University Foundation, https://www.asz.hu/files/NJE_summary_EN.pdf. 

State  Audit  Office  (2025),  25038  -  SUMMARY  of  the  Audit  Report  of  the  National  Bank  of 
Hungary, https://www.asz.hu/files/MNB_summary_EN.pdf. 

Szabad Európa (2024), Overpricing is only one of the tricks – this is how Gyula Balásy gets all 
state  orders  (A  túlárazás  csak  az  egyik  trükk  –  így  tarol  Balásy  Gyula  az  állami 
megrendeléseken), 
https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/rogan-balasy-gyula-lounge-new-land-
tularazas/32843686.html. 

Szabad Európa (2025), Fidesz is again inciting against judges, attacking them personally and for 
their judgments (Újra a bírók ellen hangol a Fidesz, személyükben és ítéletek miatt támadja őket) 
https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/ujra-a-birok-ellen-hangol-a-fidesz-szemelyukben-es-iteletek-
miatt-tamadja-oket/33381260.html. 

Telex (2024), Former Justice Minister’s ex-husband releases recording he claims proof of high-
level  involvement  in  corruption  case,  https://telex.hu/english/2024/03/26/damning-recording-
about-orbans-right-hand-man-trying-to-cover-up-involvement-in-corruption-published-by-
former-justice-ministers-ex-husband. 

Transparency  International  Hungary  (2014),  Lifting  the  lid  on  lobbying:  national  report  of 
Hungary 
environment, 
https://transparency.hu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Lifting-The-Lid-On-Lobbying-National-
Report-of-Hungary.pdf.  

regulatory 

uncertain 

lobbying 

business 

and 

an 

in 

Transparency 
https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/exporting-corruption-2022. 

International 

(2022), 

Exporting 

Corruption, 

37 

 
Transparency International Hungary (2022), Orban’s Fidesz to overspend in Hungary’s election 
campaign 
https://transparency.hu/en/news/orbans-fidesz-to-overspend-in-hungarys-election-
campaign/. 

Transparency  International  Hungary  (2023),  We  invite  the  SAO  to  investigate  campaign 
spending (A kampányköltések vizsgálatára kérjük az ÁSZ-t), https://transparency.hu/hirek/proxy-
kampany-asz-nyilt-level/. 

Transparency  International  Hungary  (2024),  Owners  of  multi-billion-forint  private  equity  funds 
must  reveal  their  identity,  https://transparency.hu/en/news/opacity-of-hungarian-private-equity-
funds/. 

Transparency 
(2025), 
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2024.  

International 

Corruption 

Perceptions 

Index 

2024, 

Ügyvédkör (2025), Contribution for the 2025 Rule of Law Report. 

Venice Commission (2025), Hungary - Opinion on the constitutional and legislative amendments 
concerning the requirements to be appointed Prosecutor General and Constitutional Court Judge 
of  Hungary, 
judges, 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2025)028-e  

appointment 

retirement 

as  well 

and 

the 

as 

of 

Verfassungsblog (2025), Targeting Disciplinary Courts - Why Hungary Is on the Verge of a Full-
scale Judicial Capture, https://verfassungsblog.de/targeting-disciplinary-courts/. 

WKÖ  –  Austrian  Federal  Economic  Chamber  (2025),  Contribution  for  the  2025  Rule  of  Law 
Report. 

38 

 
 
 
National legislation: 

Act XLVIII of 1993 on mining (‘the Mining Law’) 

Act on XXXIV of 1994 on Police (‘the Police Act’) 

Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services (‘the National Security Act’) 

Act  LVII  of  1996  on  the  prohibition  of  unfair  trading  practices  and  unfair  competition  (‘the 
Competition Act’) 

Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and on the mass media (‘the Media Act’) 

Act CXCV of 2011 on public finances (‘the Public Finances Act’) 

Act  CXII  of  2011  on  the  right  of  informational  self-determination  and  freedom  of  information 
(‘the Freedom of Information Act’) 

Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (‘the Constitutional Court Act’) 

Act  CLXI  of  2011  on  the  organisation  and  administration  of  courts  (‘the  Organisation  and 
Administration of Courts Act’) 

Act  CLXII  of  2011  on  the  legal  status  and  remuneration  of  judges  (‘the  Legal  Status  and 
Remuneration of Judges Act’) 

Act  CLXIV  of  2011  on  the  status  of  the  prosecutor  general,  prosecutors  and  other  prosecution 
employees and the prosecution career of Hungary (‘the Legal Status of Prosecutors Act’) 

Act CXXX of 2016 on civil procedure (‘the Civil Procedure Code’) 

Act I of 2017 on administrative court procedure (‘the Code of Administrative Court Procedure’) 

Act XC of 2017 on criminal procedure (‘the Criminal Procedure Code’) 

Act LV of 2018 on freedom of assembly (‘the Freedom of Assembly Act’) 

Act XCIII of 2021 on the coordination of defence and security activities 

Act LV of 2023 on Hungary’s central budget for the year 2024 

Act  LXXXVIII  of  2023  on  the  protection  of  national  sovereignty  (‘the  Protection  of  National 
Sovereignty Law’) 

Act  LXXXV  of  2024  amending  certain  laws  for  deregulation  in  the  interests  of  legal 
competitiveness (‘the Legal Competitiveness Act’) 

Act V 2025 amending certain rules in relation to the Fifteenth Amendment 

Act XX of 2025 amending certain laws in relation to the obligation of members of the European 
Parliament to submit asset declarations 

39 

 
Annex II: Country visit to Hungary 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in February 2025 with: 

IntegrityAuthority  

•  Amnesty International Hungary 
•  Átlátszó 
•  Bea Bodrogi lawyer, media expert  
•  Buda Central District Court  
•  Corruption Research Center Budapest  
•  ELTE Media Department  
•  Hungarian Association of Journalists (MÚOSZ)  
•  Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE)  
•  Hungarian Bar Association (MÜK)  
•  Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ)  
•  Hungarian Helsinki Committee  
• 
•  K-Monitor  
•  Kúria (Supreme Court)  
•  Mérték Media Monitor  
•  Ministry for European Affairs  
•  Ministry of Finance  
•  Ministry of Interior  
•  Ministry of Justice  
•  National Assembly (Országgyűlés)  
•  National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority (NAIH)  
•  National Judicial Council (OBT)  
•  National Office for the Judiciary (OBH)  
•  Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights  
•  Prosecution Service of Hungary  
•  Res Iudicata - Judges for Social Awareness Association 
•  State Audit Office (Állami Számvevőszék)  
•  Transparency International Hungary  

*  The  Commission  also  met  the  following  organisations  in  a  number  of  horizontal 
meetings:  

•  Amnesty International  
•  Araminta  
•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe   
•  Civil Society Europe   
•  European Civic Forum   
•  European Partnership for Democracy  
•  European Youth Forum,  
• 
• 
•  JEF Europe  

International Commission of Jurists   
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)  

40 

 
 
•  Philea – Philanthropy Europe Association.  
•  Transparency International   

41