REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the implementation of Directive 2012/34/EU as amended by Directive (EU) 2016/2370
Date: 2025-07-08
Institutions: Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, European Commission
Subjects: application of EU law, carriage of goods, carriage of passengers, common transport policy, high-speed transport, provision of services, rail safety, rail transport, transport infrastructure

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 8.7.2025  COM(2025) 368 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on the implementation of Directive 2012/34/EU   as amended by Directive (EU) 2016/2370 {SWD(2025) 178 final}  
 
 
1.  Introduction 

This report reviews the implementation of Directive 2012/34/EU1 (‘the Directive’) as amended 
by Directive (EU) 2016/23702 (‘the Governance Directive’) on the rail sector as required by 
Article 63(1) of Directive 2012/34/EU. The aim of this report is to provide an overview of key 
issues and problems in implementation of the Directive. However, this report cannot provide 
an  exhaustive  account  of  all  national  implementation  measures  and  does  not  prejudge  any 
position the Commission might take in any future legal proceedings.  

As prescribed by Article 63(1) of Directive 2012/34/EU, the report evaluates in particular: (1) 
the  development  of  high-speed  rail  services  and  the  existence  of  discriminatory  practices 
regarding access to high-speed lines; and (2) whether discriminatory practices or other types 
of distortion of competition persist in relation to infrastructure managers (IMs) which are part 
of  a  vertically  integrated  undertaking  (VIU).  The  analysis  of  the  high-speed  market  in  the 
context  of  this  implementing  report  has  also  informed  the  drafting  of  the  high-speed-rail 
communication3 to be adopted by the Commission.  

Boosting rail is considered essential to decarbonise transport as rail is one of the most efficient 
transport modes. In 2022, it performed 7.2% of EU passenger transport and 11.9% of EU freight 
transport while being responsible for only 0.3% of transport greenhouse gas emissions. Rail 
accounts for only 1.8% of the EU transport final energy consumption.  

This report shows that some obstacles are still holding back the development of a true single 
European  railway  area.  However,  the  delays  in  national  transposition  of  the  Governance 
Directive,  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  and  the  energy  crisis  of  recent  years4  all 
mean that is not yet possible to make a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the Directive 
on the rail market. More extensive evidence would be required to justify the presentation of 
new legislative proposals at this stage. However, targeted interventions on the issues identified 
in this report might be possible through specific policy actions or through revisions of other 
acts, such as implementing acts, delegated acts or guidelines.  

The Commission valued the input to this report received by stakeholders, as reported in Annex 
A of the staff working document (SWD) accompanying this report, and will take this input into 
account in any possible follow-up actions.  

The report does not include figures on the latest market developments. However, an extensive 
overview, including statistics, can be found in Annex C of the SWD.  

2.  Transposition  

The Directive was last amended in 2016 by the Governance Directive, which deals with both 
the  opening  of  domestic  passenger  transport  services  and  the  governance  of  railway 
infrastructure. The Commission has monitored the transposition of the Directive into national 

1 Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a 
single European railway area (recast) Text with EEA relevance OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, pp. 32-77. 
2 Directive (EU) 2016/2370 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 amending 
Directive 2012/34/EU as regards the opening of the market for domestic passenger transport services by rail and 
the governance of the railway infrastructure, OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, pp. 1-17. 
3 High-speed-rail communication, forthcoming. 
4 European Commission, ‘Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the financial sustainability of the railway 
sector’ (2024).  

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law  and  launched  several  infringement  proceedings  against  Member  States.  Half  of  those 
proceedings were addressed at Member States which did not notify their transposing measures 
to the Commission on time. The other half targeted aspects of non-conformity, meaning cases 
in which the Directive was not transposed correctly. The aspects of non-conformity that arose 
the most were the following (listed in order of frequency):  

- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 

the governance of the IM; 
the charging framework; 
the role of the regulatory body (RB); 
the granting of infrastructure access rights; 
the allocation of infrastructure capacity; 
the granting of licences.  

Further details of the infringement cases can be found in Annex B of the SWD.  

3.  Implementation of the main provisions 

a.  Market opening 

Market opening appears to have positive effects for customers, as shown by a study recently 
published by the Commission5.  

Preliminary  results  based  on  the  experience  of  frontrunners  in  the  opening  of  domestic 
passenger markets show that, where passengers had several options, railway services became 
cheaper and more frequent.  

Completing the process of gradual market opening, the Directive encouraged railway operators 
to become more responsive to customer needs and improve their cost-effectiveness, enhancing 
the role of rail in accelerating the reduction of transport emissions and congestion. 

Under the current EU regulatory framework, the provision of open-access passenger services 
can be limited only if an economic equilibrium test (EET), as per Article 11 of the Directive, 
determines  that  a  new  passenger  service  would  compromise  the  economic  equilibrium  of  a 
public service performed on the same or on an alternative route. The EET is an exception to 
market opening and should be used accordingly. The application of the EET presents different 
concerns, from the 18-months advance notification of new services required by Article 38(4) 
of the Directive to the inconsistent interpretation of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1795, 
laying down the procedure and criteria for the application of the EET6. 

Affordability and convenience remain critical factors for passengers choosing the train over 
other  modes,  and  the  competitiveness  of  rail  transport  still  needs  to  improve.  In  addition, 
measures have already been implemented within the European Union that only partially cover 
the external costs of more carbon intensive modes, notably the EU Emissions Trading System.  

5 European Commission, ‘Study on passenger and freight rail transport services’ prices for final customers’, 
(2024).  
6 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1795 of 20 November 2018 laying down procedure and 
criteria for the application of the economic equilibrium test pursuant to Article 11 of Directive 2012/34/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 294, 21.11.2018, pp. 5-14. 

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Providing  cross-border  services  remains  challenging  due  to  issues  with  interoperability  and 
capacity  coordination. These  issues  are  particularly  challenging  for  new  entrants  and  small 
start-ups, which have to rely on multiple partners. Night trains, which have negative or very 
narrow profit margins, are particularly difficult to set up.  

There continue to be significant barriers to entry for all passenger services and these barriers 
are not always addressed in EU legislation.  

The availability of rolling stock is essential for the provision of rail transport services. Buying 
new  rolling  stock  is  expensive  and  requires  long  delivery  times,  in  particular  for  passenger 
rolling  stock.  This  presents  a  challenge,  especially  for  smaller  operators  and  ‘pure’  new 
entrants, who often struggle to finance their investments as opposed to large incumbents and 
their subsidiaries.  

Well-functioning  leasing  or  second-hand  markets  for  passenger  rolling  stock  are  not  yet 
available, unlike in the freight sector, where market opening took place much earlier and the 
leasing market has had time to develop. In the passenger sector, active operators may prefer 
scrapping  rolling  stock  over  reselling  to  avoid  favouring  competitors.  In  some  cases,  the 
availability of second-hand rolling stock is further limited by the need to bring old material 
into line with recent regulations (for example for rolling stock containing asbestos). The current 
Directive is silent on this very significant barrier to entry.  

A fragmented ticketing landscape and the lack of through-tickets make rail travel less attractive 
for passengers7. The Commission is presently working on specific initiatives in this regard (for 
example on both multimodal digital mobility services and single digital booking/ticketing in 
addition  to  a  targeted  revision  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/782  on  rail  passengers’  rights  and 
obligations).  

The amendments introduced by the Governance Directive were less relevant for rail freight, 
which has operated in a fully open EU market since 2007. Nevertheless, recent developments 
in  the rail  freight  market  are not  so  encouraging  and a  modal  shift  towards rail  has not  yet 
materialised. In fact, different segments of the rail freight market show different dynamics. For 
example, the transformation of the European economy is shifting transport demand away from 
bulk commodities – such as coal, chemicals, basic metals, and petroleum products – towards 
containerised  transport.  The  generally  good  performance  of  intermodal  rail  transport  in  the 
recent years was thus more than offset by the decline of bulk transport, which constitutes the 
core of rail freight activity. The single wagon-load business is also struggling, due to its costs 
and complexity.  

One of the most critical factors for the success of the rail freight sector is the availability of 
network  capacity  of  good  quality,  which  allows  rail  operators  to  respond  rapidly  to  market 
requests and provide a reliable service to shippers. Currently, rail freight has low priority in the 
allocation of rail capacity (with passenger transport taking priority) and ends up suffering the 

7 Article 13a of Directive 2012/34/EU states: ‘The Commission shall monitor rail market developments 
concerning the introduction and use of common information and through-ticketing systems and shall assess the 
need for action at Union level, taking into account market initiatives’. In addition, Article 12 of Regulation 
2021/782 on rail passengers’ rights and obligations provides for some obligations for railway undertakings to 
offer through-tickets. 

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most  from  temporary  capacity  restrictions  due  to  maintenance  and  repair  works.  Capacity 
management aspects are further discussed in point (e), below. 

Another  critical  issue  is  the  funding  of  infrastructure  and  the  predictability  of  this  funding, 
because IMs’ need to draw up business plans to ensure sufficient investment in rail transport. 
Further  analysis  of  the  implementation  of  Article  8,  which  sets  out  requirements  for  the 
financing of the IMs, is needed in this respect.  

Finally, a comprehensive assessment of the effects of market opening should also look at social 
aspects, including: (i) job security; (ii) working conditions; and (iii) the sustainability of the 
sector more generally. The lack of specialised rail staff is a well-acknowledged problem.  

b.  Access to service facilities and to the services provided in those facilities 

Access  to  service  facilities  and  to  the  services  these  facilities  provide  is  essential  for  the 
provision of rail transport services.  

The distinction between railway infrastructure and service facilities is not always understood 
in the same way by different stakeholders, and this lack of a common understanding has an 
impact on the enforcement of rules governing access and charging. The lack of a precise and 
usable definition of specific items of infrastructure or service facilities also makes it difficult 
to  unequivocally  categorise  these  items  and  apply  the  corresponding  provisions.  The 
combination  of  unclear  definitions  and  a  lack  of  comprehensiveness  (for  example  on  what 
should be considered as an additional or an ancillary service in the context of Annex II) is also 
problematic. In some cases, more than one facility coexists on the same site or more than one 
service is provided in the same facility, creating uncertainties as to the applicable rules (major 
examples of this are ports, heavy and light maintenance services in high-speed-rail facilities 
and multi-activity freight terminals).  

The availability of information on service facilities and the accessibility of services within these 
facilities,  as  required  by  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2177  concerning  access  to 
service facilities and rail related services8, is also limited.  

Finally, the EU regulatory framework lacks provisions to prevent discriminatory practices by 
service  facilities  owned  by  established  railway  undertakings  (RUs),  when  the  use  of  these 
service facilities can be crucial for the RUs’ competitors to provide rail services.  

c.  Licensing  

As  the  repository  of  notifications  from  national  licensing  authorities  (Article  24(8)),  the 
European  Union  Railways  Agency  (ERA)  contributed  significantly  to  the  Commission’s 
assessment  of  provisions  on  the  licensing  of  RUs,  highlighting  issues  related  to:  (i)  the 
notifications (delays, diverging interpretations of the procedures, limited digitalisation); (ii) the 
lack  of  information  on  different  national  civil  liability  frameworks;  and  (iii)  the  interaction 

8 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2177 of 22 November 2017 on access to service facilities 
and rail-related services (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 307, 23.11.2017, pp. 1-13. 

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between  the  Directive  and  Directive  (EU)  2016/798  (the  Railway  Safety  Directive)9.  The 
Commission observed that stakeholders lack clarity on whether a subsidiary or branch RU can 
rely on the licence of its mother company. Stakeholders referred to: (i) the potential ambiguity 
in the interpretation of some of the documents required to prove financial fitness listed in Annex 
III; and (ii) the lack of reference to current standard financial reports.  

Finally, the ERA also reported issues encountered with the notification template and procedure 
as defined by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/17110.  

d.  Charging  

IMs adopt different approaches to track access charges (TACs), especially for setting mark-ups 
and determining the market segments in which TACs are applied. Stakeholders also: (i) pointed 
to the lack of coordination of IMs on TACs applied to international routes for cross-border rail 
services; and (ii) reported different interpretations and applications of the parts of the Directive 
related to charging in conjunction with Annexes V and VI. For this reason, the Commission 
has adopted guidelines11 to provide clarity on existing legal obligations, as well as examples of 
best practices and developments observed in different EU railway markets.  

Difficulties faced by IMs in gathering data from RUs to calculate TACs are also reported by 
stakeholders, as well as the lack of clarity in the concept of direct costs introduced in Article 
30 and detailed in the Regulation (EU) 2015/90912. National RBs have an important role  in 
monitoring and enforcement in this respect. 

e.  Capacity management  

The  current  rules  for  managing  rail  infrastructure  capacity  are  laid  down  in  the  Directive. 
Evidence  shows  that  the  current  framework  does  not  serve  all  segments  of  the  rail  market 
equally  well.  In  particular,  freight  and  cross-border  transport  struggle  to  get  capacity  of 
adequate quantity and quality to meet customers’ needs.  

In  2023,  the  Commission  presented  a  proposal  for  a  Regulation  that  revises  those  rules13, 
introducing: (i) a new multi-annual planning cycle; (ii) better cross-border coordination; and 
(iii) greater use of economic incentives, performance review, and digital tools. The proposal, 
currently being negotiated in trilogues, will replace the existing legal framework with a single, 
directly applicable framework for the whole EU rail network.  

9 Directive (EU) 2016/798 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on railway safety 
(recast), OJ L 138, 26.5.2016, pp. 102-149. 
10 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/171 of 4 February 2015 on certain aspects of the procedure 
of licensing railway undertakings, OJ L 29, 5.2.2015, pp. 3-10. 
11 Communication from the Commission – Interpretative guidelines concerning the setting up of charges for the 
use of railway infrastructure, OJ C, C/2025/2606, 7.5.2025. 
12 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/909 of 12 June 2015 on the modalities for the calculation 
of the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the train service, OJ L 148, 13.6.2015, pp. 17-22. 
13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of railway infrastructure 
capacity in the single European railway area, amending Directive 2012/34/EU and repealing Regulation (EU) 
No 913/2010 - COM/2023/443 final. 

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Stakeholders systematically mention traffic management and maintenance planning as having 
a significant impact on the development of the rail transport and in some cases observe that the 
Directive’s requirements on these topics are unclear or unevenly applied. Poor prioritisation 
criteria for international traffic, limited and untimely access to works planning, and capacity 
restrictions are also mentioned as significant sources of disruption. Some consider that only the 
inclusion of traffic management and maintenance planning within the essential functions would 
ensure the independence of the IMs, but others are afraid this could make critical operations 
more rigid. Many consider that performance incentives for IMs should be made more effective. 
Framework  agreements  provide  long-term  to  RUs’  business  plans  but  must  not  create 
uncertainty  (for  example  about  the  renewal  of  these  framework  agreements)  or  be  used  to 
prevent  market  entry.  According  to  RBs,  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2016/545  on 
framework agreements does not currently prevent these risks14.  

f.  Regulatory bodies  

Ensuring the healthy development of the rail market requires strong and independent RBs. This 
is particularly true during the rolling out of competition and in the presence of VIUs. To carry 
out  the  significant  and  extended  duties  laid  down  by  the  Directive,  the  RBs  must  have  the 
necessary skilled staff and funding. The Directive remains quite general on this point, leaving 
Member States free to decide on both the funding mechanism and the number of employees 
which  are  required  to  be  ‘proportionate  to  the  importance  of  the  rail  sector  in  the  Member 
State’. 

The  ability  of  RBs  to  enforce  rules  depends  also  on  their  powers  in  national  legislation. 
Whenever the Directive remains general on the level of strength of specific regulatory powers, 
national frameworks can differ, and this could jeopardise the equal treatment of undertakings 
across the EU. Examples of this are the sanctioning powers and the level of penalties that RBs 
can impose (which the Directive simply states must be ‘appropriate’), or the role of RBs in 
monitoring  charges,  which  in  some  Member  States  include  an  ex  ante  evaluation  power, 
whereas  in  others  is  limited  to  ex post checks.  In general,  the effectiveness  of RBs’ actions 
could benefit from a clearer interpretation of their powers.  

Finally, unclear or missing definitions of some elements of the Directive further complicate the 
RBs’ work and create uncertainty for market players.  

4.  High-speed services  

The favourable regulatory framework defined by the Directive has been a key factor for the 
growth of high-speed rail services, increasingly linking people and markets in a fast and cost-
effective way with a more sustainable mode of transport15.  

14 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/545 of 7 April 2016 on procedures and criteria concerning 
framework agreements for the allocation of rail infrastructure capacity, C/2016/1954, OJ L 94, 8.4.2016, pp. 1-
11. 
15 Recital (29) of Directive (EU) 2016/2370.  

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Better  high-speed  rail  connections  are  a  critical  step  towards  forging  a  more  connected, 
accessible, and unified Europe. The Commission acknowledged this in its forthcoming high-
speed-rail  communication,  which  sets  out  the  necessary  steps  to  deliver:  (1)  a  completely 
interoperable and high-performing high-speed rail network; (2) a competitive service model 
oriented towards the public; and (3) a vision for a competitive European rail supply industry. 

The high-speed rail segment saw a significant drop in prices and increase in ridership after the 
introduction of competition in domestic services in Italy, Spain and more recently France. The 
impact of competition on fares, frequencies, onboard services and travel times depends on the 
business strategies adopted by the competing RUs but is generally favourable to high-speed-
rail travellers. 

However,  discriminatory practices  and several  barriers to  entry in  accessing  high-speed-rail 
lines still exist, and these weaken the positive impact of market opening. The availability of 
rolling stock is a major barrier to entry for high-speed markets in rapid growth. Multiple cases 
have been brought to the attention of the Commission where new entrants face hurdles created 
by  remaining  national  rules,  long  delays  for  receiving  necessary  authorisations,  and 
considerable  time  and  cost  to  adapt  the  rolling  stock  to  different  technical  specifications, 
particularly when providing a cross-border service. 

Existing service facilities, such as maintenance workshops, are not always capable of providing 
the  services  needed  by  high-speed  trains,  and  where  they  are  capable  of  providing  these 
services,  their  territorial  distribution  might  not  be  adapted  to  the  needs  of  new  entrants. 
However, setting up new maintenance workshops or adapting existing ones require substantial 
time  and  investment,  as  well  as  the  availability  of  an  appropriate  location,  which  is  often 
unfeasible  for  smaller  operators  lacking  the  economies  of  scale  or  the  legacy  infrastructure 
enjoyed by incumbents.  

The level, structure and stability of TACs are other elements that influence the market offering 
and the level of competition in the high-speed rail sector. TACs are a substantial portion of the 
operational costs  for high-speed RUs and at the same time a source of income for the IMs. 
High-speed rail services, which tend to be more profitable than conventional services due to 
higher passenger volumes and premium pricing, are often subject to mark-ups on top of direct 
cost-based  charges.  This  benefits  the  IMs’  bottom  line  but  has  a  negative  impact  on  the 
operators’ costs and ultimately on  ticket  prices,  reducing  the ability of rail to  compete with 
other transport modes. Depending on price elasticity, RUs’ savings from lower TACs could be 
passed  on  to  passengers  in  the  form  of  lower  fares,  boosting  demand  and  ultimately  IMs’ 
revenues.  Even without passing  on these savings, improved profit margins  could  encourage 
operators to expand their services, also increasing IMs’ revenues.  

Finally, uncertainty around applicable TACs (lack of transparency, overly complex formulas, 
frequent changes) can also act as a barrier to market entry. The absence of predictability on the 
cost of accessing the infrastructure complicates the development of solid business plans and 
undermines the confidence of potential investors, who require stability over extended periods. 

High-speed  rail  services  are  offered  predominantly  in  an  open-access  regime,  but  there  are 
cases  where  these  services  are  combined  with  the  provision  of  State-funded  public  service 
obligations  (PSOs).  This  combination  can  represent  an  issue  when:  (i)  there  is  no  clear 
accounting and operational separation between the commercial and the PSO parts of the service 

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to  avoid  cross-subsidisation;  or  (ii)  priority  rules  lead  to  preferential  treatment  to  providers 
offering combined services to the detriment of the purely commercial ones.  

Finally, any action to boost high-speed rail connections will require reliable market monitoring. 
However,  there  is  a  lack  of  comprehensive  indicators  in  European  statistics  specifically 
designed for monitoring high-speed rail markets on both the lines and the services. This is in 
part  due  to  unprecise  or  incoherent  definitions  of  high-speed  lines  or  services  across  EU 
legislation. Initiatives at EU level will address this issue16. 

5.  Vertically integrated undertakings  

The Directive does not impose a specific form of governance in the rail sector, and there are 
widely differing views among stakeholders as to whether the current provisions are effective 
in preventing anti-competitive behaviour from VIUs, where IMs and RUs are part of the same 
entity. Some stakeholders consider full unbundling the only effective way to avoid conflicts of 
interest  and  anti-competitive  behaviour,  while  others  stress  the  benefits  of  integrated 
governance for the society (‘system vision’). RBs consider that the impact of the governance 
model  on  competition  cannot  be  generalised  but  argue  that  VIUs  require  more  intense 
supervision.  

The Governance Directive introduced specific provisions to ensure the absence of conflicts of 
interest  and  anti-competitive  behaviour  by  VIUs.  The  amended Article  7  of  the  Directive 
focuses  on  the  independence  of  IMs,  in  particular  within  VIUs,  imposing  organisational 
separation in separate legal entities, forbidding concurrent appointments or the employment of 
senior  management  from  the  IM  in  the  RU  (or  vice  versa)  among  others. This  last  point  is 
particularly relevant, as some examples of double mandates and staff transfers within integrated 
entities suggest the persistence of significant conflicts of interest, even in cases where VIUs 
are  formally  complying  with  the  legal  provisions.  The  supervisory  powers  of  the  RBs 
concerning conflicts of interest differ across countries.  

The  Directive  lays  down  several  conditions  to  ensure  that  the  IM  has  organisational  and 
decision-making  independence  as  regards  essential  functions  (Article  7a)  to  avoid 
discrimination  in  favour of integrated RUs. Member States may also  decide  to  attribute the 
essential functions (charging and path allocation) to an independent essential functions body. 
Currently only Ireland, Hungary, Luxembourg and Latvia have opted for this solution.  

VIUs increasingly engage in non-core activities such as rolling stock maintenance, ticketing, 
energy  management,  or  the  production  and  provision  of  telecommunication  services.  The 
performance of energy-supply and rolling-stock-maintenance activities by VIUs could create 
competitive  barriers  that  warrant  closer  attention  –  in  particular  when  these  VIUs  use  rail 
infrastructure originally financed by public funds.  

Accounting  separation  and  the  financial  transparency  of  intra-group  financial  flows  remain 
significant issues. Other significant issues include a lack of transparency and the difficulties 
faced by RBs in accessing the financial information needed to perform their monitoring and 
enforcement  duties.  Examples  of  forbidden  conduct  of  this  kind  include:  (i)  intra-group 

16See Annex C of the accompanying SWD  

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favourable financing terms (ii) intra-VIU cumulation of tasks and responsibilities; (iii) lack of 
transparency; and (iv) a failure to separate accounts. Direct transfers of assets between entities 
in the same group could also represent a problem. 

The  activity  of  RBs  is  fundamental  to  ensure  compliance  with  rules  related  to  VIUs,  in 
particular rules on accounting separation and safeguards against non-discriminatory practices. 
Article 56(12) of the Directive empowers RBs to verify compliance with Article 6 (accounting 
separation)  and  Article  7d  (financial  transparency).  However,  the  effectiveness  of  RBs’ 
investigative powers depends on the national legislative framework and is not uniform across 
the Member States. Remaining challenges include the resource-intensiveness of audits and the 
difficulties in accessing critical information. Streamlining RBs’ powers, improving their access 
to data, and considering third-party audits funded by operators could improve efficiency and 
ensure consistent regulatory enforcement.  

Distortions  of  competition  and  discriminatory  practices  could  be  further  prevented  by 
regulatory initiatives, such as: (i) addressing legal ambiguities in key definitions; (ii) increasing 
transparency in data access and financial flows; (iii) physical and operational separation of IT 
systems between IMs and RUs; (iv) fair access to service facilities and stations’ spaces; and (v) 
strengthening the independence, resources, and enforcement capabilities of RBs17.  

6.  Conclusions 

It is challenging to give a full and reliable assessment at this stage of the effects of the revised 
Directive. This is because of: (i) the short span of time since the Directive was fully enacted in 
Member  States;  (ii)  the  impact  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the  rail  sector;  and  (iii)  the 
impact of the energy crisis on the rail sector. However, despite the positive developments in 
some  markets,  there  are  strong  indications  that  many  obstacles  continue  to  limit  the 
establishment of a Single European Rail Area, as envisaged by the Directive, and that there are 
aspects of the Directive that do not properly address those remaining barriers. 

In the past few years, the Commission has taken initiatives to address specific areas of concern 
in the Directive. These initiatives include the proposal for a Regulation on the use of railway 
infrastructure  capacity  and  the  TAC  guidelines.  The  forthcoming  EU  high-speed  rail 
communication tackles market regulation issues and the need for infrastructure investments. 
Initiatives on ticketing are also already underway. 

Despite 
implementation of rail regulation remain to be addressed. 

these  recent  Commission 

initiatives,  further  problematic  elements 

in 

the 

The  EET  is  a  key  element  of  market  opening  and  should  be  applied  consistently  and  used 
appropriately. Depending on the results of the assessment of the EET use and implementation 
of Regulation (EU) 2018/1795, the Commission could decide to review that Regulation.  

17 For more details on this paragraph see the ‘Input study on vertically integrated rail undertakings in the 
European Union’ on DG MOVE website.  

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Rail transport services require fair and non-discriminatory access to service facilities and the 
services provided in those facilities, but major obstacles remain in this field. The Commission 
will assess these obstacles when reviewing Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/2177. 

Given the issues around licensing, the Commission will also look at Implementing Regulation 
(EU) 2015/171, to see how it can be updated and improved.  

On the lack of comprehensive specific indicators for market monitoring, the Commission will 
revise Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1100 to include specific indicators on high-speed 
rail and indicators on social and work aspects, at the same time simplifying as much as possible 
the reporting obligations.  

The Commission is aware that some problematic aspects of the Directive require further in-
depth assessment and will continue to work with the sector to address them. The availability 
and  financing  of  rolling  stock  is  a  major  example  of  these  problematic  aspects. As  for  the 
persisting  issues  related  to  VIUs,  the  Commission  is  determined  to  effectively  enforce  the 
current provisions in this domain. 

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