COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2025-07-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, application of EU law, digitisation, electronic government, independence of the judiciary, judicial proceedings, judicial reform, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 1.7.2025  COM(2025) 375 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

Effective  justice  systems  are  essential  for  the  application  and  enforcement  of  EU  law  and 
upholding the rule of law and other values the EU is founded on and which are common to the 
Member States. National courts act as EU courts when applying EU law. It is national courts in 
the first place that ensure that the rights and obligations  set in EU law are enforced effectively 
(Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). 

In  addition,  effective  justice  systems  are  also  essential  for  mutual  trust  and  for  improving  the 
investment  climate  and  the  sustainability  of  long-term  growth.  This  is  why  improving  the 
efficiency, quality and independence of national justice systems features among the priorities of 
the European Semester – the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The 2025 EU 
Competitiveness  Compass  ( 1 )  and  the  accompanying  2025  Annual  Single  Market  and 
Competitiveness Report (2) recall that respect for the rule of law is central for the functioning of 
the Single Market, as it provides a stable operating environment that gives the EU and its Member 
States a global competitive edge. The rule of law ensures a business environment in which laws 
apply effectively and uniformly, where businesses can work in another Member State on an equal 
footing with local companies, and budgets are spent on a transparent and objective basis. Well-
functioning and fully independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and 
are  key  for  investment  protection.  They  are  associated  with  greater  productivity  and 
competitiveness. They are also important for ensuring the effective cross-border enforcement of 
contracts,  administrative  decisions  and  dispute  resolution,  essential  for  the  functioning  of  the 
Single Market (3).  

In this context, the EU Justice Scoreboard gives an annual overview of indicators measuring the 
three essential parameters of effective justice systems:  

efficiency;  

- 
-  quality;  
- 

independence.  

The new and updated figures include data on accessibility to justice for victims of crime, victims 
of  violence  against  women/domestic  violence  and  persons  at  risk  of  discrimination  and  older 
persons, as well as on the digitalisation of justice (4). The 2025 Scoreboard also further develops 
other indicators, in light of the inclusion of a single market dimension to the Rule of Law Report, 
as announced in the 2024–2029 Political Guidelines of President von der Leyen. This edition of 
the Scoreboard presents, under a new title “Other indicators relevant for the single market”, the 
indicators relevant for the functioning of the single market, for which effective justice systems and 
respect for the rule of law are central. It solidifies the business and single market dimension by 

1   2025 EU Compass to regain competitiveness and secure sustainable prosperity, COM(2025) 30 final. 
2   COM(2025) 26 final. 
3   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Identifying and addressing barriers to the Single Market, 
COM(2020)93, and accompanying SWD(2020)54.  

4   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities, COM(2020)710, and accompanying SWD(2020)540. 

1 

 
 
 
 
presenting  new  indicators  on  first  instance  public  procurement  review  bodies,  supreme  audit 
institutions and national competition authorities.  

− The Annual Rule of Law Cycle – 

In  2020,  the  Commission  set  up  the  comprehensive  Annual  Rule  of  Law  Cycle  to  deepen  its 
monitoring  of  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Member  States.  The  Rule  of  Law  Cycle  acts  as  a 
preventive tool, promoting dialogue and joint awareness of rule of law issues. At the centre of the 
cycle is the annual Rule of Law Report, which provides a synthesis of significant developments – 
both positive and negative – in all Member States and in the EU as a whole. The report, whose 
latest  edition  was  published  on  24 July 2024,  draws  on  a  variety  of  sources,  including  the  EU 
Justice Scoreboard (5). The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard has also been further developed to reflect 
the need for additional comparative information identified during the preparation of the 2024 Rule 
of Law Report, so as to support forthcoming Rule of Law Reports. 

What is the EU Justice Scoreboard?  

The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist Member States 
in  improving  the  effectiveness  of  their  national  justice  systems  by  providing  objective,  reliable  and 
comparable data on a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the (i) efficiency, (ii) quality and 
(iii) independence of justice systems in all Member States. It does not present an overall single ranking. 
Rather, it gives an overview of how all Member States’ justice systems function, based on indicators that 
are of common interest and relevance for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an 
equal footing.  
Efficiency, quality and independence are the essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever 
the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition  on which it is based. Data for these three 
parameters should be read together, as the three are often interlinked (initiatives aimed at improving one 
may affect another).  
The  Scoreboard  presents  indicators  concerning  mainly  civil,  commercial  and  administrative  cases,  and, 
subject to the availability of data, certain criminal cases (i.e. cases concerning money laundering and bribery 
at first instance courts). Its aim is to assist Member States in their efforts to create an efficient, investment-
friendly  environment  which  works  in  the  interest  of  both  business  and  the  public.  The  Scoreboard  is  a 
comparative tool which evolves in the course of dialogue with Member States and the European Parliament 
(6). Its objective is to assess the essential parameters of an effective justice system and to provide relevant 
annual data. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for 
the  Efficiency  of  Justice  (CEPEJ),  with  which  the  Commission  has  concluded a  contract  to  carry  out a 
specific annual study, provides much of the quantitative data. The data cover 2014-2023, and have been 
provided  by  Member  States  in  line  with  the  CEPEJ’s  methodology.  The  study  also  provides  detailed 
comments and country-specific factsheets that give more context. They should be read together with the 
figures (7). 

5   https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en  
6   E.g. European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (P8_TA(2018)0216). 
7   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-

justice-scoreboard_en  

2 

 
 
 
Data on the length of proceedings collected by the CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ – the estimated length 
of court proceedings (calculated as the ratio between pending and resolved cases over the course of a year). 
Data on courts’ and administrative authorities’ efficiency in applying EU law in specific areas show the 
average length of proceedings derived from the actual length of court cases. Note that the length of court 
proceedings  may  vary  substantially  between  different  regions  in  a  Member  State;  cases  may  take 
particularly long in urban centres where the concentration of commercial activities may lead to a higher 
caseload. 
Other data sources, covering the period from 2014 to 2024, are:  
the group of contact persons on national justice systems (8); 
• 
the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (9);  
• 
the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (10);  
• 
• 
the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU (ACA-
Europe) (11);  
the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (12);  
the European Competition Network (ECN) (13);  
the Network of First Instance Review Bodies on Public Procurement (14);  
the Communications Committee (COCOM) (15);  
the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights (16); 

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

8   To  help prepare  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  and  promote  the  exchange of  best  practice on  the  effectiveness  of 
justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to designate two contact persons, one from the judiciary 
and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly. 

9   The  ENCJ  brings  together  Member  States’  national  institutions  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature,  and  are  responsible  for  supporting  the  judiciary  in  the  independent  delivery  of  justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 

10   The NPSJC provides a forum that gives European institutions the opportunity to request the opinions of supreme 
courts, and brings them closer by encouraging discussion and the exchange of ideas: http://network-presidents.eu/ 
11   ACA-Europe is composed of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Councils of State or the Supreme administrative 

jurisdictions of each EU Member State: https://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/  

12   CCBE  represents  European  bars  and  law  societies  in  their  common  interests  before  European  and  other 
international  institutions.  It  regularly  acts  as  a  liaison  between  its  members  and  the  European  institutions, 
international organisations, and other legal organisations around the world: https://www.ccbe.eu/  

13   The ECN was set up as a forum for discussion and cooperation between European competition authorities in cases 
where  Articles  101  and 102 of  the  Treaty on  the  Functioning  of  the  EU  (TFEU)  are  applied.  The  ECN  is  the 
framework  for  close  cooperation  referred  to  in  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1/2003.  Through  the  ECN,  the 
Commission  and  the  national  competition  authorities  in  all  EU  Member  States  cooperate  with  each  other: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 

14   The Network of First Instance Review Bodies on Public Procurement was set up to strengthen cooperation between 
national first instance public procurement review bodies in the EU. The group’s task is to advise the European 
Commission  on  matters  related  to  the  implementation  of  the  Remedies  Directives  and  the  functioning  of  the 
national remedies systems. As a result of the evaluation of the effectiveness of Remedies Directives (COM(2017) 
28 of 24 January 2017), the European Commission encourages first instance review bodies to cooperate to improve 
the exchange of information and good practice.    

15   The COCOM is composed of EU Member State representatives. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the draft 
issues: 

measures 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/comitology-register/screen/committees/C15401/consult?lang=en  

Commission 

intends 

market 

digital 

adopt 

that 

the 

on 

to 

16   The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network of experts and specialist 
stakeholders. It is composed of public and private sector representatives, who collaborate in active working groups: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  

3 

 
 
 
• 
• 
•  Eurostat (19); 
• 
• 

the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) (17);  
the Expert Group on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF) (18); 

the national contact points in the fight against corruption (20); 
the Network of Public Prosecutors or equivalent institutions at the Supreme Judicial Courts of the 
Member States of the European Union (NADAL Network) (21); and  
the Contact Committee on Supreme Audit Institutions (22). 

• 

Over the years, the Scoreboard methodology has been further developed and refined in close cooperation 
with the group of contact persons on national justice systems, particularly through the use of a questionnaire 
(updated annually) and by collecting data on certain aspects of the functioning of justice systems. 
The  availability  of  data,  in  particular  for  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  justice  systems,  continues  to 
improve. This is because many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial 
statistics. Where difficulties in gathering or providing data persist, this is due either to insufficient statistical 
capacity or to lack of exact correspondence between the national categories for which data are collected 
and the ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases is the data gap due to a lack of contributions 
from national authorities. The Commission continues to encourage Member States to further reduce this 
data gap. 

How  does  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  feed  into  the  European  Semester  and  how  is  it  related  to  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility? 

The Scoreboard provides data for assessing the efficiency, quality and independence of national justice 
systems. In doing so, it aims to help Member States make their national justice systems more effective. By 
comparing information on Member States’ justice systems, the Scoreboard makes it easier to identify best 
practices  and  shortcomings  and  to  keep  track  of  challenges  and  progress  made.  In  the  context  of  the 
European  Semester,  country-specific  assessments  are  carried  out  through  a  bilateral  dialogue  with  the 
national  authorities  and 
identified  have 
macroeconomic significance, the European Semester analysis may lead to the Commission proposing to 
the  Council  to  adopt  country-specific  recommendations  to  improve  the  national  justice  systems  in 
individual Member States (23).  

the  stakeholders  concerned.  Where 

the  shortcomings 

17   The CPC is a network of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and 
EEA  countries:  https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-
consumer-protection/consumer-protection-cooperation-network_en  

18   The EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new anti-money 
legislation:  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-

laundering  and  counter-terrorist 
register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2914  

financing 

19   Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/  
20   The Commission maintains an informal group of contact persons dealing with the fight against  corruption. See 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/democracy-eu-

also 
citizenship-anti-corruption/anti-corruption/eu-network-against-corruption_en 

21   https://attorneygeneral.mt/activities/nadal-network-conference/  
22   The Contact Committee brings together the heads of the supreme audit institutions of the Member States and the 
European Court of Auditors and provides a forum for discussing and enhancing cooperation in audit and related 
activities. https://www.eca.europa.eu/sites/CC/en/pages/about.aspx  

23   In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed 
country-specific recommendations on their justice systems to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, 
PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK). There were no country-
specific recommendations in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF processes. In 2022, there were two Member States (PL 
and HU) with country-specific recommendations related to judicial independence. In 2024, one Member State had 
a country-specific recommendation related to the effectiveness, independence and integrity of the judicial and anti-
corruption system (SK). 

4 

 
 
 
The Recovery and Resilience Facilty (RRF) has made available more than EUR 650 billion in loans and 
non-repayable financial support, of which each Member State would need to allocate a minimum of 20% 
to the digital transition and a minimum of 37% to measures contributing to climate objectives. So far, the 
reforms and investments proposed by Member States have exceeded these targets, with an estimated digital 
expenditure  at  26%  and  climate  expenditure  at  about  42%.  The  RRF  offers  an  opportunity  to  address 
country-specific recommendations related to national justice systems and to accelerate national efforts to 
complete the digital transformation of justice systems. Payments to Member States under the performance-
based RRF are contingent on the fulfilment of milestones and targets. Around 7 100 milestones and targets 
were proposed, of which about two thirds are related to investments and one third to reforms. Under the 
RRF Regulation, before their adoption, the Commission had to assess whether the Member States’ recovery 
and  resilience  plans  (RRPs)  could  contribute  to  effectively  addressing  all  or  a  significant  number  of 
challenges identified in  the  relevant  country-specific recommendations  or  challenges identified  in  other 
Commission  documents  adopted  in  the  context  of  the  European  Semester  (24).  Following  pre-financing 
payments as well as payment requests by the Member States and positive assessments by the Commission 
on the satisfactory fulfilment of the respective milestones and targets (25), a total of EUR 308.04 billion in 
RRF grants and loans have been disbursed to the Member States until May 2025. In the same timeframe, 
the fulfilment of 71% of milestones and targets remains to be assessed by the Commission.  
Why are effective justice systems important for an investment-friendly business environment? 
Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have a positive economic impact. The respect for the 
rule of law ensures a business environment in which laws apply effectively and uniformly, where businesses 
can operate in another Member State on an equal footing with local companies. The rule of law is central 
to the functioning of the single market and to maintaining a stable operating environment that gives the EU 
and its Member States a global competitive edge (26). Effective justice systems are also particularly relevant 
in the context of the European Semester and the RRF. Where judicial systems guarantee the enforcement 
of rights, creditors are more likely to lend, transaction costs are reduced and businesses are more likely to 
invest, have higher confidence and are dissuaded from opportunistic behaviour. In fact, an effective justice 
system is vital for sustained economic growth. It can improve the business climate, foster innovation, attract 
foreign  direct  investment,  secure  tax  revenues  and  support  economic  growth.  The  benefits  of  well-
functioning  national  justice  systems  for  the  economy  are  confirmed  by  a  wide-range  of  studies  ( 27), 
including  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  (28),  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  (29),  the 

24   Article 19(3)(b) and Article 24(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the 

Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. 

25   The  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  is  one  of  the  sources  of  information  feeding  into  the  European  Semester.  This 
information  does  not  prejudge  the  Commission’s  assessments  of  the  satisfactory  fulfilment  of  milestones  and 
targets under the RRF. 

26   A  Competitiveness  Compass  for  the  EU,  COM(2025)  30  final,  p. 19,  The  2025  Annual  Single  Market  and 

Competitiveness Report, COM(2025) 26 final, p. 3. 

27   “Justice and finance: Does judicial efficiency contribute to financial system efficiency?” (2024) Muhammad Atif 
Khan,  Muhammad  Asif  Khan,  Mohammed  Arshad  Khan,  Shahid  Hussain,  Veronika  Fenyves: 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845023001709 ; Chemin, M., 2020. “Judicial efficiency 
and  firm  productivity:  Evidence  from  a  world  database  of  judicial  reforms,”  The  Review  of  Economics  and 
Statistics  102(1):  p.  49–64,  https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/102/1/49/58536/Judicial-Efficiency-and-Firm-
Productivity-Evidence ; Kapopoulos, P. and Rizos, A., 2024. “Judicial efficiency and economic growth: Evidence 
based  on  European  Union  data,”  Scottish 
Journal  of  Political  Economy  71(1):  p.  101-131, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjpe.12357?msockid=1a8244b340af65701f02511641c36474 

28   IMF,  Regional  Economic  Outlook,  November  2017,  Europe:  Europe  Hitting  its  Stride,  p.  xviii,  pp.  40,  70: 

https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en  

29   ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  

5 

 
 
 
European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (30),  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development (OECD) (31), the World Economic Forum (32), and the World Bank (33). 
One study found a strong correlation between a reduction in the length of court proceedings (measured in 
disposition time (34)) and the growth rate of companies (35). In addition, according to the study, a higher 
percentage of companies perceiving the justice system as independent correlates with higher firm turnover 
and greater productivity growth (36). 
Other  surveys  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  an  effective  national  justice  system  for  companies’s 
investment decisions and ability to solve intellectual property rights conflicts. For example, in one survey, 
93% of large companies replied that they systematically and continuously review the rule of law conditions 
(including judicial independence) in the countries they invest in (37). In another survey, over half of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) replied that  high costs and lengthy  judicial proceedings were the 
main reasons for not starting court proceedings over the infringement of intellectual property rights (38). 
The  importance  of  effective  justice  systems  for  the  functioning  of  the  single  market,  in  particular  for 
businesses, is also stressed in the Commission’s communications Identifying and addressing barriers to the 
single market (39) and Single market enforcement action plan (40). 

How  does  the  Commission  support  the  implementation  of  good  justice  reforms  through  technical 
support? 

30   European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and the Montaigne Centre for the Rule of Law and Administration 
of Justice of Utrecht University, ‘Economic value of the judiciary  – A pilot study for five countries on volume, 
value  and  duration  of 
large  commercial  cases’,  June  2021:  https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/Reports/Economic%20value%20of%20te%20judiciary%20-
%20pilot%20study.pdf  

31   See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’ OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No 18, June 2013 and 
‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No 1060, August 2013. 
Forum, 
Economic 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report 

2019’,  October 

32   World 

2019: 

https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019. 

33   World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp.  83, 

140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  

34   The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the 
end of a year multiplied by 365 (days). It is a standard indicator developed by the Council of Europe’s European 
(CEPEJ): 
Efficiency 
Commission 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 

Justice 

the 

for 

of 

35   Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, ‘The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States’, 
the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 

JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_and
_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 

36   Idem. 
37   The  Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  ‘Risk  and  Return  –  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  the  Rule  of  Law’,  2015 

http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p. 22. 

38   EU 

Intellectual  Property  Office 

(EUIPO), 

Intellectual  Property 

(IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 

https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-
summary_en.pdf 

39   COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.  
40   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Long  term  action  plan  for  better  implementation  and 
enforcement of single market rules, COM(2020)94, in particular actions 4, 6 and 18.  

6 

 
 
 
Member  States  can  draw  on  the  Commission’s  technical  support  available  through  the  Reform  and 
Investment Task Force (SG REFORM) under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) (41). The aim of the 
TSI is to provide the requesting Member States with technical support to strengthen their institutional and 
administrative capacity for designing and implementing reforms. From 2021 to 2025 TSI has funded 36 
projects, which included 43 reforms, to support 20 Member States to implement their justice reforms. TSI 
has been supporting projects aiming to improve the quality and effectiveness of justice, such as leveraging 
technology  to  better  manage  case  workflows  and  take  a  data-driven  approach  to  allocate  caseload  and 
resources, facilitating access to justice for vulnerable groups, and enhancing the capacities of prosecution 
authorities for effective litigation of high profile and cross-border corruption cases. The 2025 TSI call for 
proposal provided the platform for Members States to apply for support on digitalisation reforms like using 
technology to address mass litigation challenges and automate routine tasks to reduce manual effort and 
error,  so  that  judges  and  administrative  staff  can  focus  on  the  more  demanding  tasks.  The  TSI  also 
complements other instruments, namely the RRF, since it can support Member States in the implementation 
of their recovery and resilience plans (RRPs). The RRPs include actions on improving the effectiveness of 
justice, namely by digitalisation, reduction of backlogs, improvement of courts’ and cases’ management, 
and judicial map reform. 

How does the justice programme support the effectiveness of justice systems? 

With a total budget of around EUR 305 million for 2021-2027, the justice programme supports the further 
development of the European area of Justice based on the rule of law including the independence, quality 
and  efficiency  of  the  justice  system,  based  on  mutual  recognition  and  mutual  trust,  and  on  judicial 
cooperation. In 2024, around EUR 41.2 million were provided to fund projects and other activities under 
the three specific objectives of the programme: 
•  EUR 11.1 million were provided to promote judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters; 

contribute to the effective and coherent application and enforcement of EU instruments; and support 
Member States’ connection to the European Criminal Records Information System-Third Country 
Nationals (ECRIS-TCN); 

•  EUR 15.9 million were provided for training of legal professionals on EU civil, criminal and 

fundamental rights law, legal systems of the Member States and the rule of law; 

•  EUR 14.2 million were provided to promote access to justice (including e-Justice); protect victims’ 
rights and the rights of persons suspected or accused of crime; and support the development and use 
of digital tools and the maintenance and extension of the e-Justice portal (jointly with the Digital 
Europe programme). 

Why does the Commission monitor the digitalisation of national justice systems? 

The digitalisation of justice is key to increasing the effectiveness of justice systems and a highly efficient 
tool for facilitating access to justice and increasing the quality of justice. Digital tools also enhance judicial 
cooperation. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, Member States accelerated modernisation reforms in this 
area. AI is also increasingly being used in the field of justice42. 

41   https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/tsi 

The TSI Regulation was adopted in March 2021. According to its  Article 5, the aim is to support ‘institutional 
reform and efficient and service-oriented functioning of public administration and e-government, simplification of 
rules  and  procedures,  auditing,  enhancing  capacity  to  absorb  Union  funds,  promotion  of  administrative 
cooperation, effective rule of law, reform of the justice systems, capacity building of competition and antitrust 
authorities,  strengthening  of  financial  supervision  and  reinforcement  of  the  fight  against  fraud,  corruption  and 
money laundering’ (emphasis added). 

42   AI can contribute to a more efficient justice system by helping judges and justice professionals to focus on their 
substantive work. For example, AI has been used in  following cases, document filing or handling of repetitive 
tasks, as well as research of legislation and case law. 

7 

 
 
 
Since 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included comparative information on the digitalisation of justice 
across the Member States, for example in the areas of online access to judgments or online claim submission 
and follow-up. 
Regulation (EU) 2023/2844 on digitalisation of cross-border judicial cooperation in civil, commercial and 
criminal matters (43) entitles natural and legal persons to communicate electronically with the competent 
judicial authorities in the context of cross-border proceedings, as well as to pay court fees electronically. 
The  Regulation  also  creates  a  legal  basis  for  conducting  videoconferencing  in  cross-border  civil, 
commercial and criminal matters. A digital communication channel to be used for  the exchange of data 
between  the  competent  judicial  authorities  is  also  being  set  up.  In  this  context,  the  Justice  Scoreboard 
monitors the progress achieved by Member States in the implementation of the Regulation and the use of 
videoconferencing. 
The data from the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard will also feed into the forthcoming strategy on the use of 
digital technologies, to make EU civil and criminal justice systems more efficient, resilient and secure44. 

43   Regulation  (EU)  2023/2844  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2023  on  the 
digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, 
and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation, PE/50/2023/REV/1, OJ L, 2023/2844, 27.12.2023. 
44   https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14517-Digital-Justice-strategy-for-2025-

2030_en  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
2. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2025 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system. The 
Scoreboard presents indicators for each of these parameters. 

2.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, 
commercial and administrative cases  and in specific areas where administrative authorities and 
courts apply EU law (45).  

2.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The caseload of national justice systems decreased in five Member States, in two of which by a 
large amount compared to the previous year. It increased or remained stable in 20 Member States. 
Overall, it continues to vary considerably between Member States (Figure 1). 

Figure 1: Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 
– 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (46)) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases.  

45   The enforcement of court decisions is also important for the efficiency of a justice system. However, comparable 
data are not readily available. More details on the individual Member States’ situation are presented in the 2024 
study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States – country profiles, carried out by the CEPEJ 
Secretariat  for 
the  Commission:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-
justice/eu-justice-scoreboard_en. 

46   2024 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-

the  Commission: 

for 
rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents  

9 

 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) 
(at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. 

Figure  3 :  Number  of  incoming  administrative  cases  in  2014,  2021  –  2023  (*)  (at  first 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)  

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional 
or national authorities. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. Methodology changes in EL, SK 
and SE. 

10 

 
 
 
 
  
 
2.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are: (i) estimated length of proceedings (disposition time), (ii) clearance rate, 
and (iii) number of pending cases. 

− Estimated length of proceedings – 

The estimated length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case 
in court, meaning the time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance.  ‘Disposition 
time’  indicates  the  estimated  minimum  time  that  a  court  would  need  to  resolve  a  case  while 
maintaining  its  current  working  conditions.  This  indicator  is  calculated  as  the  number  of 
unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of a year multiplied by 365 
(days) (47). The higher the value, the higher the probability that it takes the court longer to reach a 
decision.  The  data  mostly  concern  proceedings  at  first  instance  courts  and  compare,  where 
available, data for 2014, 2021, 2022 and 2023 (48). Figure 6 shows the disposition time in 2023 in 
civil and commercial litigious cases at all court instances, and Figure 8 for administrative cases at 
all court instances. 

Figure 4: Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases 
in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, 
in SK. For LV, the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information 
system.  In  PT,  the  new  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  which  creates  a  new  enforcement  regime  entered  into  force  on 
1 September 2013. It is based on a new paradigm, which states that court proceedings must be clearly distinguished 
from out-of-court proceedings. However, so far it has not been possible to adjust the collection of data accordingly 
and provide the necessary data for this Figure. 

47   Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ: 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp. 

48   The  years  were  chosen  to  keep  the  nine-year  perspective  with  2014  as  a  baseline,  while  at  the  same  time  not 
overcrowding the figures. Data for 2010, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 are available in the 
CEPEJ report. 

11 

 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  at  first 
instance in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, up to 2016, in SK. For 
IT, the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to strict restrictive measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic 
affected the disposition time. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 6: Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court 
instances in 2023 (*) (at first, second and third instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order of Member States in the figure is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each 
Member State. No data are available for first and second instance courts in CY, NL and IE, for second instance courts 
in HR and ES and for third instance courts in EL and SK. There is no third instance court in DE and MT. Access to 
a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  

12 

 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2014, 2021 
– 2023 (*) (at first instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional 
or national authorities. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include courts of all instances in CZ and, 
until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately.  

Figure 8: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2023 
(*) (first and, where applicable, second and third instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (CY in second instance = 5.429). 
The order of Member States in the figure is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each 
Member State. No data available for second instance courts in BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK and FI, for 
third instance courts in LT, LU and MT. The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in CZ, IT, 
AT, SI and FI. There is no third instance court for these types of cases in LT, LU and MT. The highest administrative 
court is the first and only instance for certain cases in  BE. Access to third instance courts may be limited in some 
Member States. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. In CY, the organisation of the justice system 
underwent a significant reform in July 2023, including the establishment of a Court of Appeals and a third instance. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
− Clearance rate – 

The clearance rate is the ratio of resolved cases to incoming cases. It measures whether a court is 
keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance rate is around 100% or higher, it means 
that judicial system is able to resolve at least as many cases as come in. When the clearance rate 
is below 100%, it means that the courts are resolving fewer cases than the number of incoming 
cases. 

Figure 9: Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2014, 2021 – 
2023 (*) (at first instance/in % — values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved 
than  come  in,  while  values  below  100%  indicate  that  fewer  cases  are  resolved  than  come  in) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in  SK. In IE, the number of resolved cases is expected to be 
underreported due to the methodology. 

14 

 
 
 
Figure 10: Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at 
first instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. In IE, the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to 
the methodology. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 11: Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/in 
%) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)Methodology changes in EL and SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. In CY, the number 
of resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an 
administrative court was set up in 2015. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
− Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases is the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the end of the 
year in question. It also affects disposition time. 

Figure 12: Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2014, 
2021 – 2023 (*) (at first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances 
in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. 

Figure 13: Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (at 
first instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 
2016, in SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Figure  14 :  Number  of  pending  administrative  cases  in  2014,  2021  –  2023  (*)  (at  first 
instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 
2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

2.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

The data in this section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems. It shows 
the average length of proceedings (49) in specific areas of EU law. The 2025 Scoreboard builds on 
previous data for competition, electronic communications, the EU trademark, consumer law, anti-
money laundering and anti-corruption.  

The six areas of EU law were selected because of their relevance for the single market and the 
business environment. The overview of the efficiency of administrative authorities continues in 
this  edition  of  the  Scoreboard,  with  updated  figures  on  the  areas  of  competition  and  consumer 
protection. In general, long delays in judicial and administrative proceedings may have negative 
impacts on rights stemming from EU law e.g. when appropriate remedies are no longer available 
or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. For businesses in  particular, administrative 
delays  and  uncertainty  in  some  cases  can  lead  to  significant  costs  and  undermine  planned  or 
existing investments (50).  

– Competition – 

49   The  length of proceedings in specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting from the day on which an 
action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) until the day on which the court 
adopted  its  decision  (Figures  15-22).  Values  are  ranked  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  data  for  2014  and 
2021-2023 for Figures 15, 17, 18 and 19, and for 2014 and 2021-2023 for Figures 20 and 21. For Figure 16, data 
cover 2021-2023. For Figure 22, the data cover 2021-2023. Where data were not available for all years, the average 
reflects the available data presented in the chart, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or, in very few 
countries, estimations. 

50   Figure 18 of the Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and Policy Responses, 2019 

the World Bank Group. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
The effective enforcement of competition law is essential for an attractive business environment, 
as it ensures a level playing field for businesses. It promotes economic initiative and efficiency, 
and leads to a wider choice for consumers, lower prices and better quality. Figure 15 presents the 
average  length  of  cases  brought  against  decisions  of  national  competition  authorities  applying 
Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (51). Figure 
16 presents the average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities applying 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 

Figure 15: Competition:  average  length  of  judicial  review  in  2014,  2021  –  2023 (*)  (at  first 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*)  The  average  is  weighted  by  the  number  of  cases  in  the  respective  year.  AT:  data  for  2014  and  2021  include 
decisions of the Cartel Court on the substance, not the judicial review of these decisions by the Supreme Court. Since 
the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the decisions of the Cartel Court are included in the length of proceedings before 
the national competition authorities (see below). IT: an estimation of length was used for 2014, 2021 and 2022. An 
empty column can indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is 
low (below five a year) in many Member States. This can cause the annual data to rely heavily on one case that is 
exceptionally long or short (e.g. in. LU where there was only one case). ES: The number of appeals corresponds to 
the number of companies that filed an appeal against each CNMC’ decision. IE: Not applicable for 2020, 2021 and 
2022, as prior to 2023 the CCPC was not empowered to make decisions of the relevant type capable of being judicially 
reviewed. 

51   See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25, in particular 
Articles 3 and 5. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Figure  16 :  Competition:  average  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national  competition 
authorities  in  2021-2023  (*)  (in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European 
Competition Network) 

(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. Since the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, the 
average length of proceedings before the national competition authorities has been calculated as follows: the number 
of days between the first formal investigative measure and the adoption of a final decision by the national competition 
authority (by the administrative authority or, in Member States with a judicial system, by the court that has the power 
to adopt a prohibition decision and/or impose or confirm fines). For this reason, the data since the 2024 edition in 
the above figure cannot be compared to the data published in earlier editions. This calculation method allows for 
comparable data at EU level for the sole purpose of the EU Justice Scoreboard and may differ from the reporting at 
national level in certain Member States. CZ and SK have a two-instances administrative procedure. When appealed, 
first instances decisions are reviewed by the second instance body of the authority, which may prolong proceedings. 
DK: In 2021, following the transposition of the ECN+ Directive, Denmark moved from a purely criminal enforcement 
system to a system where the Danish competition authority can now directly apply for the imposition of a fine before 
a civil court and adopt settlement decisions in its own administrative proceedings. This led to an increase of decisions 
since 2022. For AT, DK and FI, the length of proceedings covers the combined duration of proceedings before the 
administrative and judicial national competition authorities. AT: data include proceedings relating to a large scale 
cartel in the construction sector. Due to the size of this case, proceedings triggered by the same first investigative 
measure  were  (and  still  are  being)  led  and  concluded  successively,  gradually  distorting  the  average  length  of 
proceedings. ES and IT: data excludes commitment decisions adopted by the national competition authority. IE: Not 
applicable for 2020, 2021 and 2022, as the CCPC did not have the power to make its own binding administrative 
decisions in antitrust cases until September 2023 (prior to that date, it could only take enforcement action in such 
cases through the courts). 

– Electronic communications – 

The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to encourage competition, contribute 
to  the  development  of  the  single  market  and  generate  investment,  innovation  and  growth.  The 
positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of this legislation 
which can lead to lower prices for end users and better quality services. Figure 17 presents the 
average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  the  decisions  of  national  regulatory  authorities 

19 

 
 
 
applying EU law on electronic communications (52). It covers a broad range of cases, from more 
complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to more straightforward consumer-focused issues.  

Figure 17: Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2014, 2021 – 2023 
(*) (first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee) 

(*) Values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (PT in 2023 = 2.830; CY in 2023 = 
3.285). The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. The number of cases varies from one 
Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no cases for the year. Sometimes, 
the limited number of relevant cases (CZ, DK, IE, ES, LV, AT, PT) can cause the annual data to rely heavily on a 
single case that is exceptionally long or short; this may result in wide variations in the data from one year to the next. 
In DK, a quasi-judicial body is in charge of first instance appeals. In ES, AT, and PL, different courts are in charge 
depending on the subject matter. 

– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  in 
innovation.  EU  legislation  on EU trademarks (53) gives the national  courts a significant  role to 
play, empowering them to act as EU courts and take decisions that affect the single market. Figure 
18  shows  the  average  length  of  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  in  litigation  between  private 
parties. 

52   The  calculation  was  made  based  on  the  length  of  appeal  cases  against  national  regulatory  authority  decisions 
applying national laws that implement the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications (Directives 
2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation  Directive),  Directive  2002/21/EC 
(Framework Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), as well as other relevant EU law such 
as the radio spectrum policy programme and Commission spectrum decisions, excluding Directive 2002/58/EC on 
privacy and electronic communications. 

53   Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union 

trademark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2014, 2021 
–  2023  (*)  (at  first  instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European 
Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights) 

(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. FR, IT, LT, LU: A sample of cases used 
for data for certain years. DK: Data from all trademark cases (not only EU) in commercial and maritime high courts; 
for 2023, 372 cases concerning intellectual property law were finalised. 53 were regular civil cases, 275 were handled 
as small claim procedures and 44 were prohibition proceedings and injunction proceedings. The information on the 
case  processing  times  is  not  available.  EL:  Data  based  on  weighted  average  length  from  two  courts.  ES:  Cases 
concerning other EU IP titles are included in the calculation of average length. PL: For 2023, the weighted average 
was calculated on the basis of number of cases resolved. FI: For 2023, a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice 
was requested in one of the two cases. The time during which the case was pending before the Court of Justice was 
included in the calculation of the average number of days. 

– Consumer protection – 

Effective  enforcement  of  consumer  law  ensures  that  consumers’  rights  are  protected  and  that 
companies  infringing  consumer  laws  do  not  gain  an  unfair  advantage.  Consumer  protection 
authorities and courts play a key role in enforcing EU consumer law (54) within the various national 
enforcement  systems.  Figure  19  illustrates  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against 
decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.  

For consumers or companies, effective enforcement can involve a chain of actors, which includes 
not only courts but also administrative authorities. To shed more light on this enforcement chain, 
the length of proceedings before consumer authorities is presented. Figure 20 shows the average 
length of time it took for administrative decisions to be reached by national consumer protection 
authorities  in  2014  and  2021-2023.  Decisions  include:  establishment  of  infringements  of 
substantive rules, interim measure, cease and desist orders, initiation of court proceedings and case 
closure. 

54   Figures 20 and 21 relate to the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) and the Consumer 
Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions. 

21 

 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) 
(first instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Network) 

(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as 
consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of the relevant consumer rules.. An estimate of 
average length was provided by EL and RO for certain years.  

Figure 20:  Consumer  protection:  average  length  of  administrative  decisions  by  consumer 
protection  authorities  in  2014,  2021  –  2023  (*)  (first  instance/in  days)  (source:  European 
Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) 

22 

 
 
 
 
(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. DE, LU, AT: Not applicable as consumer 
authorities are  not empowered to decide  on infringements of  the  relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average 
length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years. 

– Money laundering – 

In  addition  to  depriving  criminals  of  resources  for  perpetrating  their  illicit  acts  and  effectively 
dismantling organised crime networks, preventing and combating money laundering (55) is crucial 
for the soundness, integrity and stability of the financial sector, confidence in the financial system 
and  fair  competition  in  the  single  market  ( 56 ).  Money  laundering  can  discourage  foreign 
investment, distort international capital flows and negatively affect a country’s macroeconomic 
performance,  resulting  in  welfare  losses,  thereby  draining  resources  from  more  productive 
economic  activities  ( 57 ).  The  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directive  requires  Member  States  to 
maintain statistics on the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing (58). In cooperation with Member States, an updated questionnaire was used to collect 
data  on  the  judicial  aspects  in  national  anti-money  laundering  regimes.  Figure  21  shows  the 
average length of first instance court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences.  

Figure 21: Money laundering: average length of court cases in 2014, 2021 – 2023(*) (at first 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism) 

55   EU legislation addresses the fight against money laundering through Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European 

Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law. 

56   Recital  2  of  Directive  (EU)  2015/849  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 May  2015  on  the 

prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 

57   IMF factsheet, 8 March 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-

Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism  

58   Article  44(1)  of  Directive  (EU)  2015/849.  See  also  the  revised  Article  44  of  Directive  (EU)  2018/843,  which 

entered into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member States by January 2020.  

23 

 
 
 
 
(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. For PT: The database was filtered, for 
each judicial county, by the relevant criteria to reach the information related to money laundering files; regarding 
the average number of days, the dates of infraction and the date of final decision or closure were taken into account. 
CY:  Serious  cases,  before  the  Assize  Court,  are  on  average  tried  within  a  year.  Less  serious  offences,  before  the 
district courts, take longer to be tried. SK: Data correspond to the average length of the whole proceedings, including 
at appeal court. 

– Anti-corruption – 

Corruption is an impediment to sustainable economic growth, diverting resources from productive 
outcomes,  undermining  the  efficiency  of  public  spending  and  deepening  social  inequalities.  It 
hampers the effective and smooth functioning of the single market, creates uncertainties in doing 
business  and  holds  back  investment.  Corruption  is  particularly  complex  to  tackle  since,  unlike 
most  crimes,  both  parties  involved  in  a  corruption  case  are  generally  interested  in  maintaining 
secrecy about it. This also contributes to a general difficulty to quantify the true magnitude of the 
corruption  phenomenon  across the EU. Corruption is  a particularly  serious crime with  a cross-
border dimension, as referred to in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, and can only be effectively tackled by common minimum rules across the European Union. 
On 3 May 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption 
by criminal law, accompanied by a joint communication on the fight against corruption (59). The 
proposal for a directive updates and harmonises EU rules on the definitions of and penalties for 
corruption  offences,  to  ensure  high  standards  in  the  fight  against  the  full  range  of  corruption 
offences  (i.e.  bribery,  but  also  misappropriation,  trading  in  influence,  abuse  of  functions, 
obstruction of justice and the illicit enrichment related to corruption offences), to better prevent 
corruption and to improve enforcement. In cooperation with Member States, a new questionnaire 
was developed in 2022 to collect data on the length of court proceedings before first instance courts 
in bribery cases, which is presented in Figure 22 below (60).  

59   Proposal for a Directive on combating corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

60   This data collection has focused on criminal courts of first instance, which usually contribute the most to the overall 

length of criminal proceedings. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Corruption (bribery): average length of court cases from 2021 to 2023 (*) (at first 
instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  National  Contact  Points  for  Anti-
corruption) 

(*) The average is weighted by the number of cases in the respective year. No reply to this question from DE, IE, ES, 
IT, CY, MT. NL: In this calculation for 2022, the period starts to run from the date the public prosecution service 
summons the defendant to appear in court; the period ends on the day when the judge of first instance delivers the 
final verdict. The average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, account must be 
taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, it 
takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average length from first hearing until delivery of the 
final verdict is 194 days. 

25 

 
 
 
 
2.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 

An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions 
without undue delay. The main indicators used by the EU Justice Scoreboard to monitor the 
efficiency  of  justice  systems  are  therefore  the  length  of  proceedings  (disposition  time  or 
average time in days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate ( the ratio of resolved cases 
to incoming cases ) and the number of pending cases (that remain to be dealt with at the end of 
the year). 
General data on efficiency 
The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning nine years (2014-2023). 
This  timespan  was  updated  from  2012  to  2014  to  allow  for  better  data  availability,  while 
maintaining a similar length to allow trends to become apparent. This timespan also makes it 
possible to take account of the fact that it often takes time for the effect of justice reforms to be 
felt. 
The data from 2014 to 2023 in civil, commercial and administrative cases shows positive trends 
in  most  cases.  After  the  dip  in  efficiency  observed  in  2020,  possibly  due  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, 2021 and (even more so) 2022 saw a return to the efficiency levels of 2019. In 2023, 
some of the Member States that are reporting data have continued improving their efficiency, 
while in others efficiency levels remained stable. This shows the effect of the measures taken 
by Member States to make their systems more resilient to future disruptions. 
There  were  some  positive  developments  in  the  Member  States  that  in  the  past  years  were 
considered to be facing specific challenges, in the context of the European Semester (61). 

•  From  2014,  based  on  the  existing  data  for  these  Member  States,  the  length  of  first 
instance court proceedings in the broad ‘all cases’ category (Figure 4) in 16 Member 
States  decreased  or  remained  stable.  For  the  ‘litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases’ 
category (Figure 5) the length of first instance court proceedings continued to decrease 
or remained stable in 13 Member States. Compared to the previous year, figures 4 and 5 
show a decrease in the length of proceedings for eight Member States, in each category, 
in  some  cases  to  below  2020  levels.  In  administrative  cases  (Figure 7),  the  length  of 
proceedings since 2012 has decreased or remained stable in about  15 Member States. 
Compared  to  the  previous  year,  12  Member  States  saw  a  decrease  in  the  length  of 
proceedings in administrative cases in 2023. 

•  The Scoreboard presents data on the length of proceedings in all court instances for 
litigious civil and commercial cases (Figure 6) and administrative cases (Figure 8). Data 

61   In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed 
country-specific recommendations (CSRs) on their justice systems to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, 
HU, MT, PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK). There were no 
CSRs in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF process. In 2022, there were two Member States (PL and HU) with CSRs 
related to judicial independence. In addition, in 2023 the justice system was mentioned for two Member States 
(HU, PL). In 2023, only PL received a CSR on its justice system, which was based on the 2022 CSR. In 2024, SK 
received a CSR related to the justice system and anti-corruption framework, HU received a CSR related to the rule 
of law more generally, while BG received a CSR regarding the regulatory authorities and their independence. As 
per the Commission’s June 2025 draft, CSRs reiterate the same issues for SK, HU and BG. Additionally, they 
address effectiveness of anti-corruption measures for BG and the legislative process for SK, while a CSR regarding 
judicial  efficiency  is  issued  to  ES.  Several  RRPs  include  measures  to  increase  the  efficiency,  quality,  or 
independence of justice.  

26 

 
 
 
• 

show that in five of the Member States identified as facing challenges with the length of 
proceedings  in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  have  performed  more 
efficiently. However, for five other Member States facing challenges, the average length 
of proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 
In the broad ‘all cases’ and ‘litigious civil and commercial cases’ categories (Figures 9 
and  10),  the  overall  number  of  Member  States  whose  clearance  rate  is  over  100% 
remained  the  same  as  in  2022.  In  2023,  18 Member  States,  including  those  facing 
challenges, reported a high clearance rate (more than 97%). This means that courts are 
generally able to deal with the incoming cases in these categories. In administrative cases 
(Figure 11), the clearance rate in 14 Member States in 2023 remained broadly the same 
as in 2022. While the clearance rate in administrative cases is generally lower than for 
other  categories  of  cases,  15 Member  States  continue  to  make  good  progress.  In 
particular,  seven of  the  Member  States  facing  challenges  report  an  increase  in  the 
clearance rate for administrative cases since 2014. 

•  Since  2014,  the  situation  has  remained  stable  or  continued  to  improve  in  four  of  the 
Member States facing the most substantial challenges with their backlogs, regardless of 
the category of cases (Figure 12). In 2023, despite the increase in the number of pending 
cases,  the number of pending  cases remained stable in  litigious civil  and commercial 
cases (Figure 13) and in administrative cases (Figure 14) in 10 Member States. However, 
significant differences remain between Member States with comparatively few pending 
cases and those with a high number of pending cases. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 
Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 15-22) provide 
an insight into the functioning of justice systems in concrete types of business-related disputes. 
Data on efficiency in specific areas of EU law are collected based on narrowly defined scenarios, 
so the number of relevant cases may be low. However, compared to the calculated length of 
proceedings presented in the general data on efficiency, these figures show an actual average 
length of all relevant  cases in specific areas in  a year.  It is worth noting that Member States 
where  the  general  data  on  efficiency  do  not  appear  to  show  challenges  nonetheless  report 
significantly  longer  average  case  lengths  in  specific  areas  of  EU  law.  At  the  same  time,  the 
length of proceedings in different specific areas may also vary considerably  within the same 
Member State. 
Another figure introduced last year focuses on the length of criminal proceedings, particularly 
those involving bribery, revealing the level of efficiency in that area of EU law.  
Finally,  the  2025  Scoreboard  continues  to  provide  insight  into  the  efficiency  of  the  overall 
enforcement chain, which is important for a positive business and investment environment. For 
example, in competition law cases, there is a chart focusing on the length of proceedings before 
the national competition authority and of the judicial review of the decisions of this authority. 

•  For judicial review of competition cases (Figure 15), as the overall caseload faced by 
courts  across  the  EU  increased,  the  length  of  judicial  review  decreased  or  remained 
stable in five Member States, while it increased in seven. Despite the moderately positive 
trend, seven Member States reported an average length exceeding 1 000 days in 2023. 
For proceedings before the national competition authorities (Figure 16), 11 Member 
States reported that proceedings took less than 1 000 days. Among the Member States 

27 

 
 
cited as experiencing issues with efficiency in the judicial review of competition cases, 
three are  among  the  most  efficient  when  it  comes  to  proceedings  before  the  national 
competition authorities. 

•  For  electronic  communications  (Figure 17),  the  caseload  faced  by  courts  decreased 
compared to previous years, continuing the positive trend observed in 2022 regarding 
reductions  in  the  length  of  proceedings.  In  2023,  nine  Member  States  registered  a 
decrease in the average length of proceedings compared to 2022 or saw this figure remain 
stable, and seven showed an increase. 

• 

•  For  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  (Figure 18),  in  2023  the  overall  caseload 
decreased in comparison to 2022. However, while four Member States managed their 
caseload more efficiently, registering reduced or stable lengths of proceedings, six saw 
a clear increase in the average length of proceedings. 
In the area of EU consumer law, the possible combined effect of the enforcement chain 
consisting  of  both  administrative  and  judicial  review  proceedings  can  be  seen 
(Figures 19 and 20). In 2023, six Member States reported that their consumer protection 
authorities took less than three months on average to issue a decision in a case covered 
by  EU  consumer  law.  In  nine other  Member  States,  they  took  up  to  a  year.  Where 
decisions by the consumer protection authorities were challenged in court, trends in the 
length  of  the  judicial  review  of  an  administrative  decision  in  2023  diverged,  with 
increases  in  five  Member  States  and  decreases  in  five  others  compared  to  2022.  In 
two Member States, the average length of a judicial review is still over 1 000 days. 
•  Effective measures to combat money laundering are crucial to protecting the financial 
system,  ensuring  fair  competition  and  preventing  negative  economic  consequences. 
Excessively  long  court  proceedings  may  hamper  the  EU’s  ability  to  fight  money 
laundering or reduce the effectiveness of efforts in this field. Figure 21 presents updated 
data on the length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences. It 
shows that, while in seven Member States first instance court proceedings take up to a 
year on average, they take up to two years on average in five Member States, and in five 
Member States they take up to 3.5 years on average (62). 

•  Corruption is a particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. It has negative 
economic consequences and can only be effectively tackled by common minimum rules 
across the EU. The Scoreboard presents  figures  on the length of judicial proceedings 
dealing with bribery cases. Figure 22 shows varying levels of data availability among 
Member States, and differences in the average length of proceedings before first-instance 
criminal courts. Looking at 2023 data, proceedings are concluded within about a year in 
eight Member States, while in the remaining seven where data are available, proceedings 
can last up to two years. Overall, the complexity of prosecuting and adjudicating bribery 
offences reflects the serious nature of the crime. This is also reflected in the length of 
proceedings. 

62   Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money 
laundering by criminal law will eliminate certain legal obstacles that may delay prosecution, such as a rule that 
prosecution for money laundering can only start when the proceedings for the underlying predicate offence have 
been concluded. Member States were required to transpose the Directive by 8 December 2020. 

28 

 
 
 
2.2. Quality of justice systems 

There is no single way to measure the quality of justice systems. The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard 
continues to examine factors that are generally accepted as relevant for improving the quality of 
justice. They fall into four categories: 

1) access to justice for the public and businesses; 

2) adequate financial and human resources; 

3) putting in place of assessment tools; 

4) digitalisation. 

2.2.1. Access to justice 

Accessibility is required throughout the whole justice chain to enable all people, including people 
at risk of discrimination, older persons and victims of crime, to obtain relevant information – about 
the justice system, about how to make a claim and the related financial aspects, about the state of 
play of proceedings up until they are complete – and to access the judgment online. 

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees – 

The  cost  of  litigation  is  a  key  factor  that  determines  access  to  justice.  High  litigation  costs, 
including court fees (63) and legal fees (64), may hinder access to justice. Litigation costs in civil 
and commercial matters are not harmonised at EU level. They are governed by national legislation 
and vary from one Member State to another. 

Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (65). It allows access to justice to people who would not otherwise be able to bear or advance 
the costs of litigation. Most Member States grant legal aid based on the applicant’s income (66). 

Figure 23 shows the availability of full or partial legal aid in a specific consumer case involving a 
claim  of  EUR  6 000.  It  compares  the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  each  Member  State  (67).  For  example,  if  the 
threshold  for  legal  aid  is  20%  it  means  that  an  applicant  with  an  income  20%  higher  than  the 
Eurostat poverty threshold for their Member State will still be eligible for legal aid. However, if 

63   Court fees are understood as an amount to be paid to start non-criminal legal proceedings in a court or tribunal. 
64   Legal fees are the bill for services provided by lawyers to their clients. 
65   Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
66   Member  States  use  different  methods  to  set  the  eligibility  threshold,  e.g.  different  reference  periods 
(monthly/annual income). In 14 Member States there is also a threshold tied to the applicant’s personal capital. 
This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LT, LU, NL and PT, certain groups 
of  people  (e.g.  individuals  who  receive  certain  benefits)  are  automatically  entitled  to  receive  legal  aid  in 
civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use, such as the merits of the case, are not 
reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, in several Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, IT, 
NL, PL, SI) legal aid is not limited to natural persons. In EE, the decision to grant legal aid is not based on the 
level of financial resources of the applicant. In IE, partial legal aid has to take into account also the disposable 
assets of the applicant. In LV, the data are not comparable with the previous year due to adaptation of the method 
of calculation. 

67   To collect comparable data, each Member State’s Eurostat poverty threshold has been converted to a monthly 
income.  The  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  is  set  at  60%  of  the  national  median  equivalised  disposable 
household 
ilc_li01, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_li01/default/table?lang=en. 

Income  and  Living  Conditions,  Eurostat 

income.  European  Survey  on 

table 

29 

 
 
 
the threshold for legal aid is below 0, this means that a person with an income below the poverty 
threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. 

Nine Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for 100% coverage of the costs linked 
to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal aid) 
which applies different eligibility criteria. Ten Member States operate either a full or partial legal 
aid system, but not both. In four Member States, the courts have discretion over granting legal aid.  

Figure 23: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2024 (*) (differences in 
% from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (68))  

(*) Calculations are based on 2023 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. BE, DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU, 
NL, SI, SK, FI: Legal aid also has to take into account the applicant’s disposable assets.  EL: Beneficiary of legal 
aid is a person whose capital annual income does not exceed 2/3 of the lowest annual salaries as provided for by the 
existing legislation. LU: A partial legal aid regime was introduced. There is no specific threshold, granting legal aid 
depends on the overall financial and family situation of the applicant. BG, HR, LV, MT and RO: No data provided. 

Recipients  of  legal  aid  are  often  exempt  from  paying  court  fees.  Only  in  six  Member  States 
(Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Austria, Malta and Poland) are recipients of legal aid not automatically 
exempt from paying court fees. In Czechia, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether or 
not to exempt a legal aid recipient from paying court fees. In Luxembourg, litigants who benefit 
from legal aid do not have to pay bailiff fees. Figure 24 compares, for two scenarios, the amount 
of the court fee presented as a proportion of the value of the claim. For example, if the court fee in 

68   The 2024 data are collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to 
a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different 
claim  values  indicated:  EUR  6 000  and  the  Eurostat  AROP  threshold  for  each  Member  State).  Given  that 
conditions for legal aid depend on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old 
employed  applicant  without  any  dependant  or  legal  expenses  insurance,  with  a  regular  income  and  a  rented 
apartment.  

30 

 
 
 
 
the figure below is 10% of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court 
fee to start judicial proceedings. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty 
(AROP) threshold for each Member State.  

Figure 24: Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2024 (*) (amount 
of court fee as a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the 
Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (69)) 

(*)  Calculations  are  based  on  2023  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  values.  A  ‘low-value  claim’  is  a  claim 
corresponding  to  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  a  single  person  in  each  Member  State,  converted  to  monthly 
income (e.g. in 2022, this value ranged from EUR 326 in BG to EUR 2 381 in LU). BE: EUR 24 contribution to the 
Fund for the second line legal aid; Court registry fees:  EUR  50 or  EUR  165. Afterwards, if dismissed/convicted: 
possibly EUR 1 350 for the procedural indemnity. NL: Court fees values correspond to a litigant with less than EUR 
30 000 annual income. SE: The court fee applies if the value of the claim exceeds EUR 2 329. 

Figure 25 presents the rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific criminal case based 
on a case study (70). Respondents have indicated  how much lawyers would be paid from the public 
budget in the fictional scenario described. 

69   The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2023, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute 
between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP 
threshold for each Member State).  

70   See footnote 70, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard for the description of the case study. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific criminal case, 2024 
(*) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) 
(71)) 

(*) The data are gathered based on a specific case study. The amounts are all in EUR, and where needed they were 
converted from national currencies72. To take account of the economic differences between Member States the added 
value of the fee and expense were divided by the comparative price level indices expressed in percentage where the 
EU average is 100%, DK is 149% and BG is 59%73. This adjusts the sum of fees and expenses that the lawyers receive. 
AT:  The  Austrian  legal  aid  system  is  state  funded  and  based  on  the  solidarity  of  all  Austrian  lawyers  who  all 
participate on a rotation-based system in the legal aid system. In general, the individual lawyer does not receive any 
direct remuneration for legal aid services. Instead, the Austrian state pays a yearly lump sum to the Austrian Bar for 
the total of legal aid services rendered by all lawyers. The Austrian Bar distributes this sum to the regional bars on 
the basis of the number of registered lawyers who provided legal aid services and on the basis of the number of legal 
aid cases which were handled by the regional bars. The money is used for the lawyers’ social security and pension 
scheme, which is not state funded. IE:The legal profession is split into barristers and solicitors. The legal aid of each 
of the professions is entitled to differs. The figure above presents the maximum that could be charged as a fee under 
the legal aid scheme in the particular scenario. 

– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure  26  shows  Member  States’  efforts  to  promote  the  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods with specific incentives. These may vary depending on the area of law 
(74).  

71   The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute 
between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP 
threshold for each Member State).  

72   Conversion made using the European Central Bank’s Euro Foreign Exchange Reference Rates applicable on 30 
September 2024 - BGN 1.9558, CZK 25.184, DKK 7.4560, HUF 396.88, PLN 4.2788, RON 4.9753, SEK 11.3000. 

73   https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00120/default/table?lang=en&category=t_prc.t_prc_ppp  
74   The methods for promoting and incentivising the use of ADR do not include compulsory requirements to use ADR 
before going to court. Such requirements may raise concerns about their compatibility with the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 

32 

 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2024 (*) (source: European 
Commission (75)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  68  points.  Aggregated  indicators  based  on  the  following  indicators:  1)  website  providing 
information on ADR; 2) media publicity campaigns; 3) brochures for the general public; 4) provision by the court of 
specific  information  sessions  on  ADR  upon  request;  5)  court  ADR/mediation  coordinator;  6)  publication  of 
evaluations on the use of ADR; 7) publication of statistics on the use of ADR; 8) partial or full coverage by legal aid 
of costs ADR incurred; 9) full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is successful; 10) no 
requirement for a lawyer for ADR procedures; 11) judge can act as a mediator; 12) agreement reached by the parties 
becomes enforceable by the court; 13) possibility to initiate proceedings/file a claim and submit documentary evidence 
online; 14) parties can be informed of the initiation and different steps of procedures electronically; 15) possibility of 
online payment of applicable fees; 16) use of technology (artificial intelligence applications, chat bots) to facilitate 
the  submission  and  resolution  of  disputes;  and  17)  other  means.  For  each  of  these  17  indicators,  one  point  was 
awarded for each area of law. IE: Administrative cases fall into the category of civil and commercial cases. EL: ADR 
exists in public procurement procedures before administrative courts of appeal. ES: ADR is mandatory in labour law 
cases. PT: For civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in the case of justices of the peace. SK: The 
Slovak legal order does not support the use of ADR for administrative purposes. FI: Consumer and labour disputes 
are also considered to be civil cases. SE: Judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute 
settlement is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case. 

75   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Specific arrangements for access to justice – 

The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard presented dedicated figures on specific arrangements to facilitate 
equal access to justice of persons with disabilities. The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard continued to 
further explore selected specific arrangements that facilitate equal access to justice for persons at 
risk  of  discrimination,  and  also  for  two  specific  groups:  older  people  and  victims  of  violence 
against women and domestic violence. The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard again takes stock of these 
selected specific arrangements two years after the last time these data were presented. 

The chart below outlines the steps each Member State has taken to address barriers to justice for 
persons  at  risk  of  discrimination,  including  older  people.  This  also  includes  the  physical 
accessibility of court buildings, access to legal information, assistance or legal aid, and the format 
of the online information. 

The chart shows a number of positive trends including in relation to the physical accessibility of 
court buildings and court rooms, the accessibility of legal aid, or solutions in place to help older 
persons participate in court proceedings. It also shows that information is more available online in 
formats  easily  accessible  for  older  persons  and  that  NGOs  or  equality  bodies  have  the  right  to 
initiate or participate in judicial proceedings in a higher number of Member States. Some Member 
States, however, continue to face challenges. There are still Member States where progress is slow 
and in which the situation is stagnant or even worsening. 

34 

 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Specific arrangements for access to justice to persons at risk of discrimination76 
and older persons77 (source: European Commission (78)) 

(*) BE: Unia is an independent public institution that promotes equality and combats discrimination. There are also 
dedicated  websites  including  Just-on-web  and  e-deposit.  DK:  People  can  be  exempted  from  using  digital  public 
solutions, for example if they do not have access to a computer, smartphone, or tablet at their place of residence. In 
special cases, the court can decide that a person may be exempted from using minretssag.dk if the person lacks digital 
skills or has specific disabilities. IE: The Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission has the power to apply to the 
High  Court,  Court  of  Appeal  or  the  Supreme  Court  for  liberty  to  appear  before  the  court  as  amicus  curiae  in 
proceedings involving human rights and/or equality; digital filing does not replace traditional forms of filing and 
serving. ES: Article 7 bis of the Spanish Civil Procedure Act introduces several new provisions to ensure that older 
people have easy access to justice. HR: the last survey of this kind was in 2017. A new survey in 2025 will  divide 
questions according the age groups of the participants. IT: not all court premisses are accessible to older persons. 
FI: legal aid officers can organise visits to an older person to get their issue handled. LT: According to the Law on 
State-Guaranteed  Legal  Aid,  victims  of  criminal  acts  committed  with  the  intent  to  express  hatred  towards  them, 
including on grounds of age, are eligible for legal aid regardless of their income and assets. MT: In 2023, Legal Aid 
Malta signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Active Ageing and Community Care in order 
to provide free legal assistance to elderly clients (clients over 60 years) in both civil and criminal cases, including 
cases in which older persons are victims of criminality or have suffered gender-related violence. NL: The Judiciary 
informs the public about where they can go for legal advice (Juridisch Loket, lawyers, etc.). This information should 
be user-friendly and understandable for everyone, including older persons. User research conducted to check this. 
AT:  Court  buildings  are  (with  a  few  exceptions)  barrier-free  and  therefore  physically  easily  accessible  to  older 
persons. PL: NGOs whose statutory task is not to conduct business may, for the protection of citizens' rights, in cases 
provided for by law, initiate proceedings and participate in pending proceedings. PT: When a vulnerable person is 
victim of a public crime (for public crimes proceedings are initiated ex officio by the public prosecutor), NGOs or 

76   Persons  at  risk  of  discrimination,  in  particular  on  the  grounds  enumerated  in  Article  19  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union:  “sex,  racial  or  ethnic  origin,  religion  or  belief,  disability,  age  or  sexual 
orientation,” and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: “sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, 
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 

77   For the purpose of this chart, persons aged 65 years or more. 
78   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

35 

 
 
 
 
equality  bodies  may  initiate  the  proceedings.  SI:  dedicated  websites  provide  information  about  procedures  in  an 
informative  and  friendly  manner.  SK:  Access  to  the  constitutionally  guaranteed  right  of  citizens  to  legal  aid  is 
implemented mainly through Legal Aid Centres and public defenders of rights.  

Figure 28 complements Figures 19 and 20 on the efficiency of proceedings in the area of consumer 
law  by  showing  specific  selected  measures  undertaken  by  EU  Member  States  to  increase 
awareness on the new European model of collective redress (79) aimed at improving consumers’ 
access to justice in mass harm situations.  

Figure 28: Specific arrangements for representative actions protecting the collective interests 
of consumers, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission (80)) 

(*) Representative actions as set out by Directive (EU) 2020/1828.  They are actions brought by qualified entities 
before national courts or administrative authorities on behalf of groups of consumers to seek injunctive measures (i.e. 
to  stop  a  trader’s  unlawful  practices,  similarly  to  what  is  provided  for  in  the  Injunctions  Directive  2009/22/EC), 
redress measures (such as refund, replacement, repair) or both injunctive and redress measures. This question intends 
to collect information on specific practices, which are not necessarily directly linked to the implementation of the 
Directive. Data are not reported for HR, LU, HU, RO. NL: All courts (the civil law divisions) in the Netherlands are 
competent  in  representative  action  cases.  In  practice,  these  cases  are  handled  by  a  national  pool  of  judges 
specialised/experienced in this type of procedure. It is an opt out system, meaning that consumers only need to act if 
they do not want to be represented in the action. This must be expressed to the court in writing. BE: there is no registry 
but certain decisions have to be published on the website of the Ministry of Economy and the official journal. DK: 
Currently, the qualified entities are the Danish Consumer Ombudsman (Forbrugerombudsmanden) and the Danish 
Medicines Agency (Lægemiddelstyrelsen) which are both supported by public funding.  EE: consumer disputes are 
heard at the Consumer Disputes Committee which is an independent and impartial entity resolving consumer disputes. 
IE:  the  Citizens  Information  website  has  published  an  article  on  representative  actions  as  part  of  their  ‘How  to 
complain’ information page for consumers. EL: Law 5019/2023 puts in place a new system of representative actions. 
LV: There is one cross-border qualified entity designated in Latvia. There have not been any representative action 

79   As  introduced  by  Directive  (EU)  2020/1828  on  representative  actions,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-
topic/consumer-protection-law/representative-actions-directive_en, for the protection of the collective interests of 
consumers.  

80   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the European 

Judicial Training Network. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
 
(e.g. 

associations 

cases yet.  LT: Public awareness measures regarding consumer representative actions are mainly implemented by 
providing  relevant  information  on  the  websites  of  the  State  Consumer  Rights  Protection  Authority  (SCRPA)  and 
consumer 
SCRPA, 
https://vvtat.lrv.lt/media/viesa/saugykla/2024/2/o2moBOazC4c.pdf).  PT:  The  list  of  the  representative  actions 
brought before PT courts is available on the Directorate-General for Consumers’ website, as well as the contact of 
the  entity  and  any  relevant  document  for  consumers:  https://www.consumidor.gov.pt/consumidor_4/acoes-
coletivas/informacoes-sobre-acoes-coletivas. SK: consumers are able to join the collective action through any notary. 
The 
https://static.slov-
at 
lex.sk/pdf/prilohy/SK/ZZ/2023/289/20230725_5563264-2.pdf.  

application 

published 

following 

available 

website 

memo 

form 

link 

the 

the 

on 

of 

is 

The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard extends the analysis of child-friendly justice. Figure 29 looks at 
a  broader  variety  of  specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly  justice  (both  civil  and 
criminal/juvenile justice proceedings). Figure 30 explores a broader range of specific arrangements 
available  when  a  child  is  involved  as  a  victim  or  as  a  suspect/accused  person  in  judicial 
proceedings. 

Figure  29 :  Specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly  justice/proceedings  (both  civil  and 
criminal/juvenile justice proceedings), 2024 (*) (source: European Commission (81). 

(*)Children: persons under 18 years of age. 

81   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

37 

 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Specific arrangements for children involved in criminal proceedings as victims or 
suspects  and  accused persons  (children:  persons  below  18  years  of  age),  2024  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (82)) 

(*) Children: persons under 18 years of age. 

82   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard extends the analysis of access to justice to victims of crime and 
victims of violence against women/domestic violence. 

Figure 31: Legal remedies for victims of crime, 2024 (source: European Commission ( 83)) 

83   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

39 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Legal remedies for victims of violence against women/domestic violence, 2024 (source: 
European Commission ( 84)) 

2.2.2. Resources 

Sufficient  resources  are  necessary  for  the  justice  system  to  work  properly.  This  includes  the 
necessary  investments  in  physical  and  technical  infrastructure  and  well  qualified,  trained  and 
adequately  paid  staff  of  all  kinds.  Without  adequate  facilities,  tools  or  staff  with  the  required 
qualifications, skills and access to continuous training, the quality of proceedings and decisions is 
undermined. 

– Financial resources – 

The figures below show the actual government expenditure on the operation of the justice system 
(excluding prisons), both per inhabitant (Figure 33) and as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Figure 34). 

84   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2013, 
2021 – 2023 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2023 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2022 for DE, 
ES, FR and SK are provisional. Data for BE, DE, ES, FR, PT and SK for 2023 are provisional. Data for PL have a 
break in series in 2022. Source: Eurostat, Gov_10a_exp 

Figure 34: General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2013, 
2021 – 2023 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*)Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2023 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2022 for DE, 
ES, FR and SK are provisional. Data for BE, DE, ES, FR, PT and SK for 2023 are provisional. Data for PL have a 
break in series in 2022. Source: Eurostat, Gov_10a_exp 

Figure 35 presents the ratio of the annual salaries of judges and prosecutors to the average annual 
salary in the country. For each country, the bars present these ratios for judges and prosecutors at 

41 

 
 
 
 
the beginning of their respective careers and at their peak. By virtue of Article 19(1) TEU, Member 
States have to ensure that both their courts as a whole and the individual judges are independent 
in  the  fields  covered  by  EU  law.  While  temporary  reduction  in  remuneration  in  the  context  of 
austerity measures has not been considered to violate this provision, the Court of Justice of the EU 
has stated that the receipt by members of the judiciary of a level of remuneration commensurate 
with  the  importance  of  the  functions  carried  out  constitutes  an  essential  guarantee  of  judicial 
independence (85). 

Figure 35: Ratio of annual salaries of judges and prosecutors to annual average gross salary 
in the country in 2023 (*) (source: Council of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency 
of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) Member States specific comments on the data are accessible in the CEPEJ study (86).  

Figure 36 presents the ratio of annual salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff compared 
to the average annual salary in the country. For each country, the first two bars present the ratios 
for judicial expert staff at the beginning of their career and after 10 years service, while the third 
and fourth bars present the ratios for prosecutorial expert staff at the beginning of their careers and 
after 10 years service. 

85   Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  Case  C‑64/16  Associação  Sindical  dos  Juízes 
Portugueses, (ECLI:EU:C:2018:117) para. 45, ‘Like the protection against removal from office of the members 
of the  body concerned (see, in particular, judgment of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C-506/04, EU:C:2006:587, 
paragraph 51), the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the 
functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.’ See also Judgment of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, Joined Cases C-146/23 and C-374/23 Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku and Adoreikė 
(ECLI:EU:C:2025:109),  where  the  Court  confirms  that  the  detailed  rules  for  determining  the  remuneration  of 
judges must be objective, foreseeable, stable and transparent. The determination of that remuneration must have a 
legal basis and meet the criteria of objectivity, foreseeability, stability and transparency. Any derogation from the 
method for determining the remuneration must be justified by an objective of general interest. 

86   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-

law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents  

42 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Ratio of annual salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff to annual full-
time adjusted average gross salary in the country in 2023 (*) (source: European Commission 
and Eurostat (87)) 

(*) Indicator developed in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. Data on salaries 
refers to the minimum gross annual starting salary, in 2023, in euro, and minimum gross annual salary after 10 years 
of experience, in 2023, in euro. The gross salary is calculated before any welfare costs and taxes have been paid. 
Bonuses that are regularly paid to all staff irrespective of their personal circumstances are included (for example 
13th  salary  that  is  paid  without  exception  to  staff  in  the  court/public  prosecution).  Bonuses  linked  to  personal 
circumstances (for example family allowances depending on the number of children) are excluded from the amount. 
Unless  indicated  otherwise,  the  minimum  salary  value  from  among  the  staff  categories  falling  into  the  respective 
group of staff is used. The ratio was calculated against the Eurostat indicator ‘Average full-time adjusted salary per 
employee’, nama_10_fte, for 2023. Judicial staff refers to expert staff at courts of first instance  contributing to the 
judicial proceedings/involved in the decision-making, such as assistant judges, Rechtspfleger, assistants to judges, 
auxilliares de justice, court registrars. Public prosecution staff refers to expert staff at the lowest level of prosecution 
offices  contributing  to  the  proceedings/involved  in  decision-making  such  as  assistants  of  prosecutors,  trainee 
prosecutors. The specific categories referred to by the individual Member States within these two broader groups and 
represented  in  the  chart  are,  respectively;  J:  refers  to  judicial  staff,  P:  refers  to  prosecutorial  staff.  BE: 
griffier/greffier (J), secretaris/secrétaire (P). The data provided include the holiday pay and end-of-year bonus. BG: 
judicial assistant (J), prosecutorial assistant  (P). CZ: higher judicial officer (J), public prosecution staff (P).  DK: 
assistant judge (J), prosecutor trainee (P). The assistant judge salary after 10 years of experience is based on average 
salary. DE: not indicated. EE: law clerk (J), assistant prosecutor (P). IE: judicial assistant (J), legal executive (P). 
EL: court registrar (J). ES: Letrados de la Administración de Justicia (J), Cuerpo de Auxilio Judicial (P). FR : legal 
assistant/clerks (J), legal assistant/clerks (P). HR: judicial assistant (J), assistant of prosecutor (P). IT: judicial court 
staff  belonging  to  III  area  and  economic  segment  F1(J),  judicial  court  staff  belonging  to  III  area  and  economic 
segment F2(J), public prosecution staff belonging to III area and economic segment F1(P), public prosecution staff 

87   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and Eurostat. The 
source of data on annual average gross salary used for calculating the ratios in Figures 34 and 35 differ (in Figure 
34, they are provided by CEPEJ, using information provided by their national correspondents, while in Figure 35, 
the source is Eurostat). Therefore, the ratios are not directly comparable between the two figures.  

43 

 
 
 
 
belonging to III area and economic segment F2(P). CY: registrar (J). LV: assistant to judge (J), Lawyer-consultant, 
lawyer in the field of criminal law, lawyer – analyst (P). Judicial staff consists of assistants of judges only. There is 
no range of salaries in this category. In relation to the category ’assistant to a judge’, the indicated data was the 
maximum salary in 2022. The salary for all assistants to judges are the same in first instance courts. For example, if 
the assistant to a judge receives the highest evaluation mark in the annual evaluation process, then they can already 
receive the maximum salary within the first working year. As regards the staff of the Prosecution Office, the data are 
an average of the salary for the indicated positions. Staff at both levels of the Prosecution Office has a set salary that 
does not depend on the years worked in the office. LT: Judicial assistants (senior judicial assistants) (J), assistants of 
prosecutors and assistants of the chief prosecutors (P). The salary values of judicial and public prosecution assistant 
and  clerical  staff  is  an  average  of  specific  salaries  within  a  given  category.  LU:  Référendaires:  Employé  A1(J), 
Référendaires: Employé A1(J). HU: Agent of the public prosecutor’s office (P). MT: judicial assistant (J), trainee 
lawyer (P). NL: Not available due to missing Eurostat indicator of average full-time adjusted salary per employee. 
AT: Judges in training/legal assistants/auditors/judicial officials (Rechtspfleger) (J), prosecutor in training (P). The 
data represents statutory  salary  rates. Staff  members or different salary groups are  grouped together in one  staff 
member category, with an average value given based on the statutory salary and renumeration rates.  PL: assistant 
judge (J). The data are an average of specific salaries within a given category. RO: trainee prosecutor (P). RO only 
has the category ’trainee prosecutor’ - not ’assistants of prosecutors’ nor other categories of expert staff contributing 
to the proceedings/involved in decision-making. Consequently, only the starting salary for trainee prosecutors was 
provided. The category of judicial staff in courts of first instance did not exist in Romania in 2022, hence no data are 
provided for that category. SI: judicial assistant (J), senior judicial adviser (P). SK: assistant (J), legal trainee (P). 
FI: trainee judge (J), prosecutor’s assistant (P). SE: law clerk step 1(J), trainee public prosecutor (P). 

– Human resources – 

Adequate  human  resources  are  essential  for  the  quality  of  a  justice  system.  Diversity  among 
judges,  including  gender  balance,  adds  complementary  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  and 
reflects the reality of society. 

Figure 37: Number of judges, 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, according to the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include the 
Rechtspfleger/court  clerks  that  exist  in  some  Member States.  EL:  since  2016, data  on  the  number  of professional 
judges  include  all  the  ranks  for  criminal  and  civil  justice  as  well  as  administrative  judges.  IT:  Regional  audit 
commissions, local tax commissions and military courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has 
been taken into account since 2018. AT: data on administrative justice have been part of the data since 2016. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2022 – 2024 (*) (source: 
European Commission (88)) 

(*) The data are sorted by 2024 values, from the highest to the lowest.  

Figure 39: Number of lawyers, 2014, 2021 – 2023 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) According to the CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised by national law to plead and 
act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of law; to appear before the courts or advise and represent 
their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). DE: No distinction is made between different groups of lawyers 
in Germany. FI: Since 2015, the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working in the 
private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector. 

88   European 

Institute 

for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database:  https://eige.europa.eu/gender-

statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt/datatable  

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3. Digitalisation 

The use of information  and communication technologies (ICT) can strengthen  Member States’ 
justice systems and make them more accessible, efficient, resilient and ready to face current and 
future challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted a number of challenges affecting the 
functioning of the judiciary and shown the need for national justice systems to further improve 
their digitalisation. 

Earlier editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard provided comparative data on certain aspects of ICT 
in  justice systems. As announced in  the Commission’s Communication on the digitalisation of 
justice in the EU of 2 December 2020 (89), the Scoreboard has been substantially augmented with 
further data on digitalisation in the Member States. This should allow for more in-depth monitoring 
of progress areas and outstanding challenges. 

Citizen-friendly justice requires that information about national judicial systems is not only easily 
accessible but is also tailored to specific groups of society that would otherwise have difficulties 
in accessing the information, including people with disabilities. Figure 40 shows the availability 
of online information and specific public services that can help people access justice. 

Figure 40: Availability of online information about the judicial system for the general public, 
2024 (*) (source: European Commission (90))  

(*) DE: Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online. 

89   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities’ COM(2020) 710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540. 

90   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

46 

 
 
 
 
– Digital-ready rules – 

The use of digital solutions in civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases often requires 
appropriate regulation in national procedural rules. Figure 41 illustrates the possibilities set out by 
law for various actors to use distance communication technology (such as videoconferencing) for 
court and court related procedures, and reflects the current situation on the admissibility of digital 
evidence.  

Figure  41 :  Procedural  rules  allowing  digital  technology  in  courts  in  civil/commercial, 
administrative and criminal cases, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission (91) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  12  points.  For  each  criterion,  two  points  were  given  if  the  possibility  exists  in  all 
civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  respectively  (in  criminal  cases,  the possibility  of  hearing  the 
parties was split to cover both defendants and victims). The points are divided by two when the possibility does not 
exist in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish between civil/commercial and administrative cases, 
the same number of points has been given for both areas. EL, LU: none for administrative cases. 

91   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Use of digital tools – 

Beyond digital-ready procedural rules, courts and prosecution services need to have appropriate 
tools  and  infrastructure  in  place  for  distance  communication  and  secure  remote  access  to  the 
workplace (Figure 42). Adequate infrastructure and equipment is also needed for secure electronic 
communication  between  courts/prosecution  services  and  legal  professionals  and  institutions 
(Figures 43 and 44). 

ICT, including innovative technology, plays an important role in supporting the work of judicial 
authorities. It therefore contributes significantly to the quality of justice systems. The availability 
of various digital tools at the disposal of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff can streamline work 
processes, ensure fair workload allocation and lead to a significant time reduction. 

Figure 42: Use  of  digital  technology  by  courts  and  prosecution  services,  2024  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (92)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  7  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  courts  and  prosecution  services, 
respectively, use a given technology and 0.5 point was awarded when the technology is not always used by them. 

Secure electronic communication can contribute to improving the quality of justice systems. The 
possibility  for  courts  to  communicate  electronically  between  themselves  and  with  legal 
professionals and other institutions can streamline processes and reduce the need for paper-based 
communication and physical presence. This would lead to a reduction in the length of pre-trial 
activities and court proceedings. 

92   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

48 

 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Courts: electronic communication tools,  2024 (*)  (source: European Commission 
(93)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for courts. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not exist in all cases. FI: the tasks of notaries do not 
relate to courts. Therefore, there is no reason to provide them with secure connection. 

Prosecution services are essential for the functioning of the criminal justice system. Access to a 
secure  electronic  channel  of  communication  could  facilitate  their  work  and  thus  improve  the 
quality  of  court  proceedings.  The  possibility  for  secure  electronic  communication  between 
prosecution services and investigating authorities, defence lawyers and courts would enable a more 
expedient and efficient preparation of the proceedings before the court. 

93   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: Prosecution service: electronic communication tools, 2024 (*) (source: European 
Commission (94))  

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for prosecution services. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not  exist in all cases. Availability of 
electronic  communication  tools  within  prosecution  service  includes  communication  with  lawyers  employed  by  the 
prosecution service. 

– Online access to courts – 

The ability to carry out specific steps in a judicial procedure electronically is an important aspect 
of the quality of justice systems. The electronic submission of claims, the possibility to monitor 
and advance proceedings online or serve documents electronically can noticeably facilitate access 
to justice for citizens and businesses (or their legal representatives) and reduce delays and costs. 
The availability of such digital public services would help bring courts one step closer to citizens 
and businesses, and by extension increase public trust in the justice system. 

94   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  45 :  Digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil/commercial  and 
administrative cases, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission (95)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial 
and administrative cases, respectively. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For 
those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points 
has been given for both areas. 

The use of digital tools for conducting and following court proceedings in criminal cases can also 
help  guarantee  the  rights  of  victims  and  defendants.  For  example,  digital  solutions  can  enable 
confidential  remote  communication  between  defendants  and  their  lawyers,  allow  defendants  in 
detention to prepare for their hearing and help victims of crime avoid secondary victimisation. 

95   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases, 2024 
(*) (source: European Commission (96)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 6 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all criminal cases. 
0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. 

– Access to judgments – 

Ensuring online access to judgments increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens 
and businesses understand their rights and can contribute to consistency in case-law. Appropriate 
arrangements for publishing judicial decisions online are essential for creating user-friendly search 
facilities (97) that make case-law more  accessible to legal  professionals  and the general public, 
including persons with disabilities. Seamless access to case law and its easy reuse make the justice 
system algorithm-friendly, enabling innovative ‘legal tech’ applications that support practitioners. 

The  online  publication  of  court  decisions  requires  balancing  a  variety  of  interests,  within  the 
boundaries set by legal and policy frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (98) fully 
applies to the processing of personal data by courts. When assessing what data to make public, a 
fair balance has to be struck between the right to data protection and the obligation to publicise 
court decisions to ensure the transparency of the justice system. This is particularly true when there 
is a prevailing public interest that justifies the disclosure of those data. In many countries, the law 
or  practice  requires  the  anonymisation  or  pseudonymisation  ( 99)  of  judicial  decisions  before 

96   2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
97   See  Best  practice  guide  for  managing  Supreme  Courts,  under  the  project  Supreme  Courts  as  guarantee  for 

effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 

98   Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 

99   Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is more efficient if assisted by an algorithm. However, human supervision is 

needed since the algorithms do not understand context. 

52 

 
 
 
 
publication,  either  systematically  or  upon  request.  Data  produced  by  the  judiciary  are  also 
governed by EU legislation on open data and the reuse of public sector information (100). 
The availability of judicial decisions in a machine-readable format (101), as displayed in Figure 47, 
facilitates an algorithm-friendly justice system (102). 

Figure  47 :  Online  access  to  published  judgments  by  the  general  public,  2023  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (103))  

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each court instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for civil/commercial 
and administrative and criminal cases respectively, 0.75 points when most judgments (more than 50% are available) and 0.5 points 
when some judgments (less than 50%) are available. For Member States with only two court instances, points have been given for 
three court instances by mirroring the respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that 
do not distinguish the two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points has been given for both 
areas. BE: For civil and criminal cases, each court is in charge of deciding on the publication of its own judgments.  DE: Each 
federal state decides on the online availability of first instance judgments. AT: For first and second instance, judges decide which 
judgments are published. Decisions of the Supreme Court that reject an appeal without substantial reasoning are not published. 
Decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court taken by a single judge are published if the judge concerned decides to publish 
them.  Furthermore,  decisions  only  containing  legal  issues  where  there  is  already  continuous  jurisprudence  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative Court and non-complicated decisions concerning discontinuance of proceedings are not published.  NL: Courts 
decide on publication according to published criteria. PT: A commission within the court decides on the publication. SI: procedural 

100  Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the reuse of public 
sector information (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90) and Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the reuse of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, 
p. 56). 

101  Judgments modelled according to standards (e.g. Akoma Ntoso) and their associated metadata are downloadable 
free of charge in the form of a database or by other automated means (e.g. Application Programming Interface). 
102  See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final, 
Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 
65 final, and Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council on Best Practices regarding the Online Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, 
p. 2). 

103  2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

53 

 
 
 
 
decisions with little or no significance for case law are not published; from decisions in cases which are identical in substance 
(e.g. bulk cases), only the leading decision is published (together with the list of case files with the same content). Individual higher 
courts decide which judgments can be published.  SK: Decisions on several types of civil cases such as inheritance matters or 
determining paternity are not published. FI: Courts decide which judgments are published.  

Figure  48 :  Arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  2024  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (104))  

(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of case. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point can 
be given if all judicial decisions are covered. If only some judicial decisions are covered at a given instance, only half 
a point is awarded. Where a Member State has only two instances, points have been given for three instances by 
mirroring the respective higher instance as the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not distinguish 
between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for both areas of law.  ES: 
The use of the General Council for the Judiciary (CGPJ) database for commercial purposes, or the massive download 
of information is not allowed. The reuse of this information for developing databases or for commercial purposes 
must follow the procedure and conditions laid down by the CGPJ through its Judicial Documentation Centre. IE: 
anonymisation of judgments is done in family law, child care and other areas where statute requires or a judge directs 
the identities of parties or persons not to be disclosed. 

104  2024 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Implementation of judgments – 

In a State governed by the rule of law, public institutions must comply with judgments and enforce them 
in a timely manner. The effective enforcement of binding judicial decisions is also essential to ensure 
public trust in the independence and authority of the judiciary (105). Figure 49, for the first time, presents 
mechanisms that are in place to assist in implementing judgments by supreme administrative courts. The 
figure presents which mechanisms are in place in each Member State and does not assess how effective 
they are or how often they are used in practice. 

Figure 49: Judicial mechanisms in place to ensure the implementation of administrative court 
judgments, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission with the ACA-Europe (106))  

105  CCJE Opinion No 13 (2010) on the role of judges in the enforcement of judicial decisions. 
106  The 2024 data are collected through replies by ACA-Europe members to a questionnaire. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.4. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy access, sufficient resources, effective assessment tools and digitalisation all contribute to a 
high-quality  justice  system.  The  public  and  businesses  expect  high-quality  decisions  from  an 
effective justice system. The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard makes a comparative analysis of these 
factors. 

Accessibility 

The 2025 Scoreboard looks again at a number of elements that contribute to a people-friendly 
justice system: 

1)  The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a major impact on access to 
justice, in particular for people living in poverty or at risk of poverty. Figure 23 shows that in 
three Member States, people whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold cannot 
receive legal aid. The level of court fees (Figure 24) has remained largely stable since 2016, 
although in four Member States court fees were higher than in 2023, in particular for low-
value claims. The burden of court fees continues to be proportionally higher for low-value 
claims.  Difficulties  in  claiming  legal  aid  combined  with  high  court  fees  in  three Member 
States could discourage people living in poverty from accessing justice. The 2025 EU Justice 
Scoreboard  presents,  for  the  second  time,  the  rate  of  legal  aid  paid  to  criminal  defence 
lawyers in a specific criminal case, showing that a wide disparity exists  between Member 
States in the amounts lawyers would be paid from the public budget (Figure 25). 

2)  The  2025  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  continues  to  analyse  the  ways  in  which  Member  States 
promote  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  methods  (ADR)  (Figure 26), 
including the possibility of using digital technologies. In 2024, the overall promotion effort 
increased, with six Member States reporting more means of promotion, in particular for ADR 
methods  in  consumer  disputes.  The  number  of  ways  used  to  promote  ADR  methods  for 
administrative disputes is still lower than for other disputes, but has also increased since 2023. 

3)  The 2025  EU Justice Scoreboard takes  stock  again  of specific arrangements  for  access  to 
justice to persons at risk of discrimination and older persons. Figure 27 shows that 18 
Member States have taken steps to raise awareness among persons at risk of discrimination 
on where to obtain legal information and assistance. In 16 Member States, steps are taken to 
make legal aid more accessible for older persons, and in 17 Member States, NGOs or equality 
bodies have the right to initiate or participate in judicial proceedings on behalf of or in support 
of  one  or  several  victims.  In  20  Member  States,  there  are  solutions  in  place  to  help  older 
persons participate in court proceedings, including receiving court communication by post. 

4)  For the second time, the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard presents specific selected measures 
for representative actions protecting the collective interests of consumers. Figure 28 shows 
that 23  Member States have at  least  one such measure in  place. From among the selected 
measures, specific arrangements to inform consumers about the actions and the outcomes and 
measures  to  train  judges  in  effective  management  of  representative  actions  are  the  most 
widespread, being in place in 12 Member States. 

5)  Figure 29 shows that all Member States have some specific arrangements for child-friendly 
justice  and  proceedings,  for  both  civil  and  criminal/juvenile  justice  proceedings.  11 
Member  States  have  all  9  of  the  monitored  specific  arrangements  in  place,  including,  for 

56 

 
 
example,  a  website  specifically  designed  to  be  child-friendly  and  helplines  to  provide 
information about the justice system or measures in place to hold children separately from 
adults when they are deprived of their liberty. In all Member States, the privacy and personal 
data of children involved in judicial or non-judicial proceedings are protected in accordance 
with  national  law.  Furthermore,  all  Member  States  have  child-friendly  specialised 
settings/hearing rooms for children to be heard. A mapping of specific arrangements for 
children involved in criminal proceedings as victims or suspects and accused persons 
(Figure 30)  shows,  for  example,  that  26  Member  States  provide  information  about  the 
victim’s or suspect’s rights and the proceedings in a child-friendly way and in 15 Member 
States, any form of deprivation of liberty of children is used as a measure of last resort and 
for the shortest appropriate period of time. 

6)  Figure 31 shows that all Member States have some specific arrangements for victims of 
crime.  Most  Member  States  have  most  of  the  monitored  specific  arrangements  in  place, 
including, for example, providing financial assistance in cases where the offender does not 
pay the adjudicated  compensation or the possibility for the victims to  request  a review of 
decisions to provide a protection measure or interpretation or translation. In case of violation 
of their rights within the criminal proceedings, in most Member States victims have rights to 
protection measures, to legal aid, or to be heard. Figure 32 shows that all Member States have 
some specific arrangements for victims of violence against women/domestic violence. In 
almost all Member States, measures are in place to protect the rights and interests of victims 
and witnesses and to ensure that contact between victims and perpetrators is avoided when 
necessary.  In  almost  all  Member  States,  NGOs  and/or  equality  bodies  can  assist  and/or 
support the victims. 

Resources 

High-quality  justice  systems  in  Member  States  depend  on  sufficient  financial  and  human 
resources. This  requires appropriate investment  in  physical  and technical  infrastructure, initial 
and  continuing  training, and  diversity  among  judges,  including  gender  balance.  The  2025  EU 
Justice Scoreboard shows the following. 

7)  In terms of financial resources, overall in 2023 general government spending on law courts 
increased  in  all  Member  States  taking  into  account  the  number  of  inhabitants,  while  it 
decreased  in  6  Member  States  as  compared  to  GDP.  It  still  shows  significant  differences 
between Member States in spending levels, both per inhabitant and as a percentage of GDP 
(Figures 33 and 34). 

8)  The 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard continues to explore the situation in the Member States as 
regards salaries in the justice system. It presents, for the third time, the ratio of annual salaries 
of judges and prosecutors to the average annual salary in the country (Figure 35). For the 
second  time,  it  also  presents  the  ratio  of  annual  salaries  of  judicial  and  prosecutorial 
expert staff to the average annual salary in the country (Figure 36). Both figures show wide-
ranging  differences  among  the  Member  States.  Moreover,  Figure  36  reveals  that  in  16 
Member States, judicial  expert staff at  the beginning  of their careers receive less than the 
national average salary. In 13 Member States, this is also the case of public prosecution expert 
staff. 

9)  Women  still  account  for  fewer  than  50%  of  judges  at  supreme  court  level  in  19 Member 

57 

 
 
States (Figure 38), while in 8 Member States at least half the judges at supreme court level 
are female. Figures for the three-year period from 2021 to 2024 show diverging levels and 
trends between Member States. 

Digitalisation 

Since 2021, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included a large, detailed section on aspects related 
to the digitalisation of justice. Although Member States already use digital solutions in different 
contexts and to varying degrees, there is significant room for improvement. 

10) All  27 Member  States  provide  some  online  information  about  their  judicial  system, 
including  websites  with  clear  information  on  accessing  legal  aid,  on  court  fees  and  on 
eligibility criteria for reduced fees (Figure 40). The situation remains stable compared to last 
year but some differences still exist between Member States as regards information and the 
degree  to  which  it  responds  to  people’s  needs.  For  example,  11 Member  States  provide 
education  on  legal  rights  to  the  general  public  through  online  interactive  learning  tools. 
26 Member States provide clearly visible and understandable information on legal aid. 

11) Six Member States have digital-ready procedural rules (Figure 41), which allow fully or 
mostly for the use of distance communication and for the admissibility of evidence in digital 
format only.  In 23 Member States,  this is  possible only  in  a limited number of situations. 
Nonetheless, there has been steady overall progress in this regard since 2020.  

12) Figure 42 reveals the use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services. It shows 
that  Member  States  do  not  fully  use  the  potential  allowed  by  their  procedural  rules  (cf. 
Figure 41). Member States’ courts, prosecutors and court staff already have various digital 
tools  at  their  disposal,  such  as  case-management  systems,  videoconferencing  systems  and 
teleworking  arrangements.  However,  further  progress  could  still  be  achieved  in  electronic 
case allocation systems, with automatic distribution based on objective criteria.  

13) Courts in all Member States have some secure electronic tools for communication at their 
disposal although only 14 Member States have such tools for all types of communication that 
are monitored and for all cases (Figure 43). Five Member States still lack tools for digital 
communication  with  notaries,  detention  facilities  or  bailiffs/judicial  officers.  All  Member 
States also provide for secure electronic communication within the prosecution services 
(Figure 44). All Member States except for one provide for secure electronic communication 
between prosecution services and courts. Five Member States still lack tools for electronic 
communication between the prosecution services and defence lawyers. 

14) In  civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  24  Member  States  provide  individuals  and 
businesses (or their legal representatives) with online access to their ongoing or closed cases 
(Figure 45), albeit to varying degrees. As regards digital solutions to conduct and follow court 
proceedings in criminal cases, Figure 46 shows that victims can submit written statements 
online either partly or fully in 18 Member States. However, in 11 Member States, defendants 
and victims do not have the possibility to follow or pursue their case electronically. 

15) Online access to court judgments (Figure 47) has remained stable compared to last year. It 

is mainly judgments from the highest instances that are made accessible online. 

16) As in previous years, the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard analyses arrangements for producing 
machine-readable  judicial  decisions  (Figure 48).  All  Member  States  have  at  least  some 

58 

 
 
arrangements in place for civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases, although there 
is  considerable  variation  between  them.  In  general,  there  is  a  tendency  to  introduce  more 
arrangements, particularly for downloading the judgments free of charge (databases and other 
automated  solutions),  for  modelling  judgments  to  make  them  machine-readable,  or  for 
anonymising/pseudonymising  judgments  using  algorithms.  In  2023,  9 Member  States 
reported improvement compared to the previous year, while the situation in 10 Member States 
remained  stable.  Justice  systems  with  arrangements  for  modelling  judgments  in  line  with 
standards to make them machine-readable seem to have the potential to achieve better results 
in the future. 

17) For the first time, the 2025 EU Justice Scoreboard presents data on mechanisms to enforce 
administrative judgments (Figure 49), at the level of supreme administrative jurisdictions. 
The  majority  of  Member  States  (17)  have  some  type  of  mechanism  in  place  to  enforce 
decisions,  and  in  16  Member  States  supreme  administrative  courts  are  entitled  to  apply 
penalties  for  the  non-execution  of  their  judgments.  Direct  enforcement  measures,  such  as 
seizure of assets, are only available in two Member States. 

59 

 
 
 
 
2.3. Independence of justice systems 

Judicial independence, which is integral to the task of judicial decision-making, is a requirement 
in EU law stemming from the principle of effective judicial protection referred to in Article 19 
TEU and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal enshrined in Article 47 
of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU  ( 107 ).  Judicial  independence  presumes  the 
following: 

(a) external independence, where the relevant body exercises its functions autonomously, without 
being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking 
orders  or  instructions  from  any  source  whatsoever,  thus  being  protected  against  external 
interventions  or  pressure  that  could  impair  the  independent  judgement  of  its  members  and 
influence their decisions; and 

(b)  internal  independence  and  impartiality,  where  an  equal  distance  is  maintained  from  the 
parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those 
proceedings (108), and when individual judges are protected from undue internal pressure within 
the judiciary (109).  

Judicial independence is vital to guarantee that all the rights that individuals derive from EU law 
will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in 

107  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
108  Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. and Others v Prokuratura Rejonowa (Withdrawal of cases), 
joined cases C-647/21 and C-648/21, EU:C:2025:143, judgment of 25 February 2025 (Grand Chamber), XL and 
Others (Judicial salaries), joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23, EU:C:2025:109, judgment of 14 November 2024, 
S. S.A. v C. sp. z o.o. (Allocation of cases), C-197/23, EU:C:2024:956; judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect 
of the decisions of a constitutional court), C-430/21, EU:C:2022:99; judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal 
proceedings against WB and Others, Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, EU:C:2021:931; judgment of 6 October 
2021,  W.  Ż.,  C-487/19,  EU:C:2021:798;  judgment  of  15  July  2021,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-791/19, 
EU:C:2021:366; judgment of 2 March 2021, AB, C-824/18, EU:C:2021:153; judgment of 19 November 2019, A. 
K. and Others, C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 5 November 
2019, Commission v Poland, C-192/18, EU:C:2019:924; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-
619/18,  EU:C:2019:531  paras.  73  and  74;  judgment  of  27  February  2018,  Associação  Sindical  dos  Juízes 
Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para.  44; judgment of 25 July 2018,  Minister for Justice and Equality, 
C‑216/18 PPU,EU:C:2018:586, para. 65. 

109  Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  11  July  2024  (Grand  Chamber),  Hann-Invest,  C-554/21  and  C-622/21, 
EU:C:2024:594.  Supreme  Courts,  as  final  instance  courts, and higher/appeal  courts  in  general,  are  essential  to 
secure  the  uniform  application  of  the  law  in  Member  States.  Nevertheless,  hierarchical  judicial  organisations 
should not undermine individual independence (Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 22). Superior courts 
should not address instructions to judges about the way they should decide individual cases, except in national 
preliminary rulings or when deciding on legal remedies according to the law (Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, 
para. 23). A hierarchical organisation of the judiciary in the sense of a subordination of judges to higher instances 
in  their  judicial  decision-making  activity  would  be  a  clear  violation  of  the  principle  of  internal  independence, 
according to the Venice Commission (Venice Commission, Report on the independence of the judicial system, 
Part I: the independence of courts, Study No 494/2008, 16 March 2010, CDL-AD(2010)004, paras. 68 - 72). Any 
procedure for the unification of case law must comply with fundamental principles of separation of powers, and 
even after such a decision by a higher/Supreme Court, all courts and judges must remain competent to assess their 
cases independently and impartially, and to distinguish new cases from the interpretation previously unified by a 
higher/supreme court (2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 45). 

60 

 
 
 
particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (110). Preserving the EU legal order is 
fundamental for all people and businesses whose rights and freedoms are protected under EU law.  

A high level of perceived independence of the judiciary is vital for the trust which justice must 
inspire in  individuals in a society governed by the rule of law.  It  also  contributes to  a growth-
friendly  business  environment,  as  a  perceived  lack  of  independence  can  deter  investment.  The 
Scoreboard includes indicators  for the judiciary’s independence  relating to  the  effectiveness of 
investment protection. In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence from various 
sources, the Scoreboard presents indicators on how justice systems are organised to protect judicial 
independence in certain types of situations where independence could be at risk. This reflects input 
from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network of the Presidents 
of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU  (NPSJC),  and  the  Network  of  Public  Prosecutors  or 
equivalent institutions at the Supreme Judicial Courts of the Member States of the European Union 
(NADAL Network).  

2.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection 

Figure 50:  How  the  general  public  perceives  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (111) – from left to right, light colours: 2016, 2023 and 2024, dark colours: 
2025)  

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of ‘total good’, 
then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is ‘fairly 
bad’ or ‘very bad’ (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they 
are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if 

110  Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v. Poland, C-204/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 354 and 

the case law cited. 

111  Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025. Replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys. 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

61 

 
 
 
 
some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and ‘very good’ then they are ordered by the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is ‘very bad’. 
Figure 51 shows the main reasons given by respondents for a perceived lack of independence of 
courts and judges. Respondents among the general public who rated the independence of the justice 
system  as being  ‘fairly  bad’ or ‘very bad’ could choose between three reasons  to  explain  their 
rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 50.  

62 

 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Main reasons among the general  public for the perceived  lack of independence 
(share of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (112)) 

Figure 52:  How  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (113) – from left to right, light colours: 2016, 2023 and 2024, dark colours: 2025) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is ‘very good’ or ‘fairly good’ (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, 

112  Eurobarometer survey  FL555, replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in your country: very much, somewhat, not 
really, not at all?’ if the reply to Q1 is ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’. 

113  Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys. 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is ‘fairly 
bad’ or ‘very bad’ (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they 
are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is ‘very good’; 
if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, total bad and ‘very good’, then they are ordered by 
the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is ‘very bad’. 

Figure 53 shows the main reasons given by companies for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts and judges. Respondents rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly bad’ 
or ‘very bad,’ could choose between three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States are 
listed in the same order as in Figure 52. 

Figure 53: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all 
respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (114)) 

114  Eurobarometer survey  FL555; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (your country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’ if the response to Q1 was ‘fairly bad’ or ‘very bad’. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoting, facilitating and protecting investments are key priorities within the EU single market. 
EU law aims to maintain a harmonious equilibrium between protecting investments and pursuing 
other public interest goals that enhance the welfare of its people. Figure 54 shows, for the fourth 
time, the indicator on how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the 
law and courts as regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State. 

Figure 54: How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and 
courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer (115) – from left to right, light colours: 2022, 2023 and 2024, 
dark colours: 2025) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly 
confident  in  investment  protection  by  the  law  and  courts  (total  confident);  if  some  Member  States  have  the  same 
percentage of total confident, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that they are ‘fairly 
unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’ in the effectiveness of investment protection (total unconfident); if some Member 
States have the same percentage of total confident and total unconfident, then they are ordered by the percentage of 
respondents who stated that they are ‘very confident’ in the effectiveness of investment protection; if some Member 
States have the same percentage of total confident, total unconfident and ‘very confident’, then they are ordered by 
the percentage of respondents who stated that they are ‘very unconfident’ in the effectiveness of investment protection.  

Figure 55 shows the main reasons given by companies for the perceived lack of effectiveness of 
investment protection. Respondents which rated their level of confidence as ‘fairly unconfident’ 
or  ‘very  unconfident’,  could  choose  between  four  reasons  to  explain  their  rating  (and  some 
indicated ‘other’). The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 54. 

115  Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question Q3: ‘To what 
extent are you confident that your investments are protected by the law and courts in (your country) if something 
goes wrong?’ For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that a company 
owns or controls and that is characterised by the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain 
or profit or the assumption of risk. 

65 

 
 
 
 
Figure  55 :  Main  reasons  among  companies  for  their  perceived  lack  of  effectiveness  of 
investment  protection  (rate  of  all  respondents  -  higher  value  means  more  influence)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (116)) 

. 

116  Eurobarometer  survey  FL555;  replies  to  the  question:  ‘What  are  your  main  reasons  for  concern  about  the 
effectiveness of investment protection?’ if the response to Q3 was ‘fairly unconfident’ or ‘very unconfident’. 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2. Structural judicial independence 

The guarantees of structural  independence  require rules, particularly  on the composition  of the 
court and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of 
its members, that are such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the 
imperviousness of the court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before 
it (117). They must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form 
of instructions,  but also types of influence that are more indirect  and that are liable to  have an 
effect on the decisions of the judges concerned (118). 

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in 
the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities  (119).  The  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  certain  indicators  on  issues  that  are 
relevant  when assessing  how justice systems  are  organised to  safeguard judicial  independence. 
Implementing  policies  and  practices  to  promote  integrity  and  prevent  corruption  within  the 
judiciary is also essential to guarantee judicial independence. Ultimately, the effective protection 
of judicial independence also requires, beyond whatever necessary norms, a culture of integrity 
and impartiality shared by magistrates and respected by wider society. 

en 

(Maintien 

fonctions  d’un 

117  See Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2025, D. K. and Others v Prokuratura Rejonowa (Withdrawal of cases), 
joined cases C-647/21 and C-648/21, judgment of 25 February 2025 (Grand Chamber), XL and Others (Judicial 
salaries), joined cases C-146/23 and C-374/23, judgment of 14 November 2024, S. S.A. v C. sp. z o.o. (Allocation 
of  cases),  C-197/23,  judgment  of  11  July  2024  (Grand  Chamber),  Hann-Invest,  C-554/21,  judgment  of  21 
December  2023,  Krajowa  Rada  Sądownictwa 
juge),  C-718/21, 
ECLI:EU:C:2023:1015, paras. 76-77, and the case-law cited, judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission v. Poland, C-
204/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 355; judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against WB and 
Others, Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19, para. 67; judgment of 6 October 2021,  W.Ż., C-487/19, para. 109; 
judgment of 15 July 2021, Commission v. Poland, C-791/19, para. 59; judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B., C-824/18, 
para.117; judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the 
Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 24 
June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 paras. 73 and 74; judgment of 25 July 2018, 
LM,  C-216/18  PPU,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:586,  para.  66;  judgment  of  27  February  2018,  Associação  Sindical  dos 
Juízes  Portugueses,  C‑64/16,  ECLI:EU:C:2018:117,  para.  44.  See  also  paragraphs  46  and  47  of  the 
Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges:  Independence,  Efficiency  and  Responsibility  (adopted  by  the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010) and the explanatory memorandum. These 
provide  that  the  authority  taking  decisions  on  the  selection  and  career of  judges  should be  independent  of  the 
executive and legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of 
the authority should be judges chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions 
prescribe that the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection 
and career of judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without 
prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to 
make recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.  

118  See  Court of Justice, judgment of  5 June 2023,  Commission v. Poland, C-204/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 
355; judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B., C-824/18, para. 119; judgment of 19 November 2019,  A. K. and Others 
(Independence  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,  para.  123; 
judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 para. 112.  

119  See  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges:  Independence,  Efficiency  and  Responsibility,  adopted  by  the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010 and the explanatory memorandum (‘the 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 

67 

 
 
 
This edition of the Scoreboard contains new and updated indicators on: withdrawal and recusal of 
judges  (Figure  56)  ( 120 ),  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  heads  of 
prosecution offices (Figure 57) (121), and on the independence of bars and lawyers (Figure 58) (122). 
The figures present the national frameworks as they were in December 2024. 

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data 
on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details 
of the procedures and accompanying safeguards.  

– Withdrawal and recusal of judges – 

Figure 56, first presented in the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard (now updated) shows whether or not 
judges may be subject  to sanctions for failure to comply with  the obligation  to  withdraw from 
adjudicating a case in which their impartiality is in question, compromised, or where there is a 
reasonable perception of bias. The figure also shows which authority (123) is responsible for taking 
a decision on a request for recusal made by a party intending to challenge a judge (124). 

120  The figure is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 
with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no councils for the judiciary 
or that are not ENCJ members (CZ, DE, EE, AT and PL) were obtained in cooperation with the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 

121  Figures are based on responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with 
the Network of Public Prosecutors or equivalent institutions at the Supreme Judicial Courts of the Member States 
of the European Union – the NADAL Network. 

122  Figure is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 

with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE). 

123  Sometimes more than one authority can take this decision, depending on the level of the court where the recused 

judge sits. 

124  Paragraphs 59, 60 and 61 of the Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 provide that judges should act independently 
and impartially in all cases and should withdraw from a case or decline to act where there are valid reasons defined 
by law, and not otherwise. 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: Withdrawal and recusal of a judge (*) (source: European Network of Councils for 
the Judiciary and Network of Presidents of Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (125)) 

– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU – 

Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system and in cooperation between 
Member States in criminal matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution service is 
crucial for the effective fight against crime, including economic and financial crime, such as money 
laundering  and  corruption.  According  to  the  case  law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  relating  to  the 
European  Arrest  Warrant  Framework  Decision  ( 126 ),  the  public  prosecutor’s  office  can  be 
considered a Member State judicial authority for the purposes of issuing and executing a European 
arrest  warrant  whenever  it  can  act  independently,  without  being  exposed  to  the  risk  of  being 
subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, 
such as a Minister for Justice (127).  

125  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 
Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary are not ENCJ 
members, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC. 

126  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 

Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 

127  Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  27 May  2019,  OG  and  PI  (Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  Lübeck  and  Zwickau), 
Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, paras 73, 74 and 88, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; judgment of 27 May 2019, 
C‑509/18, para 52, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457; see also judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-
Duché  de  Luxembourg and  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Public  Prosecutors  of  Lyon  and  Tours),  in  Joined  Cases  C-
566/19 PPU  and  C-626/19,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077;  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Swedish  Prosecution  Authority),  C-
625/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078, and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels), C-627/19 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079; judgment of 24 November 2020, AZ, C-510/19, para 54, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953. See also 
judgment  of  10 November  2016,  Kovalkovas,  C-477/16  PPU,  paras  34  and  36,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:861,  and 
judgment of 10 November 2016, Poltorak, C-452/16 PPU, para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, 
‘which must […] be distinguished, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises 
the operation of the rule of law, from the executive’. See also Opinion No 13(2018) Independence, accountability 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no uniform 
model for all Member States. However, the Council of Europe has noted a widespread tendency 
to  have  a  more  independent  prosecutor’s  office,  rather  than  one  subordinate  or  linked  to  the 
executive (128). According to the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, an effective and 
autonomous prosecution service committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights in the 
administration of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic state (129). 

Procedures  for  appointing  national  prosecutors  may  influence  the  extent  of  the  prosecution 
service’s independence. Whatever the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in 
which it is anchored, European standards provide that Member States take effective measures to 
guarantee that public prosecutors are  able to  fulfil their professional  duties and  responsibilities 
under  appropriate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  (130)  and  without  unjustified  interference 
(131).  

Figure 57 presents the appointment and dismissal procedures for heads of prosecution offices. The 
figure  shows  the  diversity  of  organisational  models  of  the  prosecution  service  across  Member 
States  around  the  executive  power  or  the  judiciary.  The  figure  also  shows  the  role  of  the 
prosecutor-general and councils for the judiciary/prosecutorial councils as important actors in the 
appointment and dismissal of heads of prosecution offices. 

and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation 
xii. 

128  CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - 
the  Prosecution  Service  -  Adopted  by  the  Venice  Commission  -  at  its  85th  plenary  session  (Venice,  17-
18 December 2010), para. 26. 

129  In a democratic society, both courts and the investigative authorities must remain free from political pressure. The 
concept of independence means that prosecutors are free from unlawful interference in the exercise of their duties 
to ensure full respect for and application of the law and the principle of the rule of law and that they are not subject 
to any political pressure or unlawful influence of any kind. Independence applies not only to the prosecution service 
as  a  whole,  but  also  to  its  particular  bodies  and  to  individual  prosecutors.  Whatever  the  model  of  the  national 
justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards provide that Member States take 
effective  measures  to  guarantee  that  public  prosecutors  are  able  to  fulfil  their  professional  duties  and 
responsibilities  under  appropriate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  and  without  unjustified  interference. 
See Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No 15 (2020) on the role of prosecutors in 
emergency  situations,  in particular  when  facing  a  pandemic;  Opinion  No 16  (2021)  on  the  implications  of  the 
decisions of international courts and treaty bodies as regards the practical independence of prosecutors, para. 13. 
See also Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), paras. 
4,  11  and  13.  Opinion  No 13(2018)  Independence,  accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the 
Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE),  recommendations  i  and  iii;  Group  of  States  against 
corruption  (GRECO),  fourth  evaluation  round  ‘Corruption  prevention  -  Members  of  Parliament,  Judges  and 
Prosecutors’,  a  large  number  of  recommendations  ask  for  the  introduction  of  arrangements  to  shield  the 
prosecution service from undue influence and interference in the investigation of criminal cases. 

130  Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the 

Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), para. 4. 

131  The 2000 Recommendation, paras 11 and 13. See also Opinion No 13(2018) Independence, accountability and 
ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendations i 
and iii. 

70 

 
 
 
Figure 57: Heads  of  prosecution  offices:  appointment  and  dismissal  (*)  (Source:  European 
Commission with the NADAL (132)) 

BE: The Council for the Judiciary proposes the candidates to the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Justice proposes 
them to the King. A disciplinary court dismisses them. BG: The charts shows the situation of administrative heads, 
not of deputy administrative heads. The Prosecutor General for the heads of the appellate prosecution offices, the 
heads of the superior prosecution offices for head of a prosecution office in the respective judicial district and the 
Minister of Justice for all candidates can propose, while candidates can also self-nominate. The Prosecutorial Council 
appoints. The Prosecutorial Council, the Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice may propose dismissal, the 
Supreme  Judicial  Council  dismisses.  The  Director  of  the  National  Investigation  Service  is  dismissed  by  the 
Prosecutors Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council on a proposal by at least three members of the Prosecutors 
Chamber,  or  the  Prosecutor  General,  or  the  Minister  of  Justice.  CZ:  The  heads  of  district,  regional  and  high 
prosecution offices are appointed by the Minister of Justice upon a proposal by the head of the next closest superior 
prosecution office or upon a proposal by the Prosecutor General or the Ministry of Justice. The Prosecutor General 
and  the  heads  of  superior  prosecution  offices  can  propose  the  dismissal  of  the  head  of  high,  regional  or  district 
prosecution office. A disciplinary court dismisses. DK: The responsibility for appointing heads of offices in the Local 
Prosecution  Service  is  delegated  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (Prosecutor 
General). DE: After a public call, the Federal Ministry of Justice appoints the public prosecutors at the federal state 
level.  There  is  no  proposal  for  a  dismissal.  The  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice  can  temporarily  dismiss  the  public 
prosecutors or transfer them to another post for service-related reasons, the specific judicial branch of service courts 
(civil servant courts) can dismiss from civil service. EE : The Prosecutor General proposes the appointment/dismissal 
and the Minister of Justice appoints/dismisses. IE: The Director of Public Prosecutions is the sole prosecution office 
responsible  for  prosecutions  in  IE.  The  proposals  for  the  appointment  and  dismissal  are  done  by  the  Top-Level 
Appointments Committee (TLAC), and the Government has the final decision on both appointment and dismissal. EL: 
The decision of the Highest Judicial Council is executed after a decree by the President of the Republic is issued. As 
an exception, the heads of the prosecution offices at the Courts of First Instance of Athens and Thessaloniki and the 
head of the prosecution office at the Court of Appeal of Athens are elected by the prosecutors serving at the respective 
offices in secret ballot.  The Head of the Economic  Crime  Prosecution Office is appointed by the Highest Judicial 
Council. The Highest Judicial Council proposes a dismissal, the President dismisses.  ES: The Prosecutor General 

132  Data  collected  through  a  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close  association  with  the  NADAL 

Network of Prosecutors. 

71 

 
 
 
 
nominates the candidates for a particular post within the Prosecution Office, the Deputy Chief Regional Prosecutors 
and Deputy Chief Prosecutors of the Special Public Prosecutor's Office, which are then appointed by the Government 
(the  King  formally  appoints).  Beforehand,  the  Prosecutor  General  consults  the  Public  Prosecution  Council  (a 
collegiate and representative body of the PPO) as well as the Chief Regional Prosecutors when positions of their 
respective regions are involved. The Prosecutor General proposes dismissal, after consulting the Prosecution Council 
and, when appropriate, the Chief Regional Prosecutor, and the Government decides on dismissal. FR: The Minister 
of Justice makes a proposal, the Council for the judiciary gives its opinion, and the President of the Republic appoints 
by decree. The opinion of the Council for the judiciary is consultative, but according to a well-established custom, the 
Ministry and the President respect unfavourable opinions. The Conseil supérieur de la magistrature proposes the 
dismissal and the Minister of Justice dismisses. CY: The Attorney General is the sole head of prosecution office. The 
appointment is done by the President. The dismissal is done by the Supreme Constitutional Court acting as a Judicial 
Council.  LV:  After  a  public  call,  the  Prosecutor's  Attestation  Commission  (established  by  the  Council  of  the 
Prosecutor  General  and  composed  of prosecutors  of  different  level)  proposes  the  candidate  for  appointment,  and 
proposes  dismissal.  LT:  The  Selection  Commission  for  Prosecutors  (composed  of  4  prosecutors  and  3  non-
prosecutors) proposes the candidates after an open call. The Attestation Commission (composed of 4 prosecutors and 
3 non-prosecutors) or the prosecutor who carried out internal investigation towards actions of the prosecutor can 
propose a dismissal. LU: The Council for the Judiciary appoints. The Council of the Judiciary files a disciplinary 
procedure,  upon  which  a  disciplinary  tribunal  decides  on  dismissal.  HU:  After  a  public  job  advertisement,  the 
Prosecutor General decides upon the applications and appoints prosecutors to the senior positions. The Prosecutor's 
Council gives its opinion. The Prosecutor General revocates managerial and senior appointments at any time without 
justification.  Heads  of  prosecution  offices  may  propose  the  revocation, but  this  is  non-binding  for  the  Prosecutor 
General. MT: The chart reflects the situation regarding the Attorney General (Prosecutor General). After a public 
call, the President appoints in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. The dismissal of the Attorney General 
is  proposed  by  Parliament  supported  by  the  votes  of  not  less  than  two  thirds  of  all  the  members,  the  President 
dismisses. NL: The Board of Prosecutors General as head of the Public Prosecution Service submits nominations to 
the Minister of Justice and Security, who decides whether nominations qualify for appointment by royal decree. The 
Board  of  Prosecutors  General  dismisses  with  consent  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  Security.  AT:  A  Personnel 
Commission at the Federal Ministry of Justice, composed of prosecutors, proposes a candidate for the Heads of the 
Offices of Senior Public Prosecutors and the Head of the Prosecutor General's Office. The Personnel Commission at 
an  Office  of  Senior  Public  Prosecutors  proposes  candidates  for  heads  of  all  Public  Prosecutor's  Offices  in  their 
region/area  of  competence  to  the  Federal  Ministry  of  Justice.  The  Federal  President  appoints  the  candidates.  A 
disciplinary court dismisses them. The Supreme Court acts as the disciplinary court for members of the Prosecutor 
General's  Office  and  the  Head  of  the  Office  of  Senior  Public  Prosecutors  (and  their  first  deputies);  for  other 
prosecutors, the Higher Regional Court (of another region) acts as disciplinary court (1st instance). PL: The National 
Prosecutor proposes the appointment after presenting the candidate to the assembly of prosecutors that the candidate 
is supposed to preside over. The National Prosecutor is the appointing authority. The same procedure applies to the 
dismissal.  RO:  The  chart  reflects  the  situation  of  heads  of  prosecution  offices  except  the  heads  of  specialised 
prosecution  offices.  After  a  public  call,  heads  of  prosecution  offices  are  appointed  by  the  Supreme  Council  of 
Magistracy. The dismissal of heads of prosecution offices is proposed by the Prosecutor General or the Judiciary 
Inspection,  the  Supreme  Council  of  Magistracy  dismisses.  SI:  The  heads  of  district  state  prosecutor’s  offices  are 
appointed by the Prosecutorial Council on the reasoned proposal of the Minister of Justice after obtaining the prior 
opinion of the State Prosecutor General. The Prosecutorial Council dismisses the head of a district state prosecutor’s 
office on the proposal of the Minister after obtaining the prior opinion of the State Prosecutor General. SK: Following 
an open call, a 5-member selection committee (composed of prosecutors chosen by the Prosecutor General) proposes 
the  chief  prosecutors  after  a  prior  statement  by  the  Prosecutorial  Council.  The  Prosecutor  General  appoints. 
Theexceptions to this procedure are the Deputies of the Prosecutor General, which he himself/her herself appoints, 
and Deputy Regional/Deputy District Prosecutors, appointed by the Prosecutor General based on a proposal from 
the relevant Regional/District Prosecutor. Deputies are also considered as chief prosecutors. The Prosecutor General 
dismisses chief prosecutors. Prosecutor General has to dismiss if disciplinary court issued a decision on the dismissal. 
A disciplinary motion may be filed against the Prosecutor General by three fifths of the members of Parliament, or 
the President of the Republic. In the cases of chief prosecutors, it is the Prosecutor General, the Public Defender of 
Rights, and the Deputy Prosecutor General (against the prosecutors of the General Prosecutor's Office and leading 
prosecutors who fall within his or her management competence). FI: A senior prosecutor in the Prosecutor General’s 
Office proposes the appointment or dismissal, which is then executed by the Prosecutor General. Additionally, a court 
may dissmiss the Head of the Prosecution Office in case of imprisonment, with some exceptions. SE: The Employment 
Advisory  Board  for  prosecutors  proposes  the  Deputy  Chief  Public  Prosecutor  (non-binding  proposal),  the  Chief 

72 

 
 
Public  Prosecutor  as  well  as  Senior  Public  Prosecutors,  the  Prosecutor  General  appoints  them.  The  Prosecutor 
General  proposes  the  dismissal,  the  Government  Disciplinary  Board  for  Higher  Officials  decides  regarding  the 
dismissal.  

– Independence of bars and lawyers in the EU – 

Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in ensuring the protection of 
fundamental rights and the rule of law (133). A fair system of administering justice requires that 
lawyers  be  free  to  pursue  their  activities  of  advising  and  representing  their  clients.  Lawyers’ 
membership of a liberal profession and the authority deriving from that membership help maintain 
their  independence,  and  bar  associations  play  an  important  role  in  helping  to  ensure  lawyers’ 
independence. European standards set out the freedom of exercise of the profession of a lawyer 
and  the  independence  of  bar  associations.  These  standards  also  set  out  the  basic  principles  for 
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers (134).  

Figure 58: Independence of bars and lawyers, 2024 (*) (source: European Commission with 
the CCBE (135))  

(*) Based on the survey results, Member States could score a maximum of 9 points. The survey was conducted at end 
of  2024.  For  the  question  on  guarantees  of  the  confidentiality  of  the  lawyer/client  relationship,  0.5  points  were 
awarded for each scenario fully covered (search and seizure  of e-data held by the lawyer, search of the lawyer’s 
premises, interception of lawyer/client communication, surveillance of the lawyer or their premises, tax audit of the 
law  firm  and  other  administrative  checks).  For  all  other  criteria  fully  met,  1  point  was  awarded.  No  points  were 
awarded if the criterion was not met. MT: 2020 replies, adapted to the new methodology. EE: The Ministry of Justice 

133  ‘Lawyers  play  an  important  role  in  protecting  the  rule  of  law  and  judicial  independence,  while  respecting  the 
separation of powers and fundamental rights.’, ‘Access to a lawyer and rule of law’, Presidency discussion paper 
and  4 March  2022: 
Justice 
for 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6319-2022-INIT/en/pdf. 

and  Home  Affairs  Council  on  3 

the  meeting  of 

the 

134  Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
135  The 2024 data are collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire. 

73 

 
 
 
 
has broad supervisory powers over the organisation of the legal aid system. LT: According to the Law on the Bar, 
disciplinary action against lawyers can be taken by the bar council. However, it also lays down that the Minister of 
Justice has such a right. If the Minister of Justice decides to initiate disciplinary action against a lawyer, the bar has 
no say in such proceedings, and the case goes directly to the disciplinary court. The disciplinary court consists of five 
lawyers, who are members of the bar. Three of the five are elected by the general assembly of the bar, and another 
two  are  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  Justice.  PL:  The  Ministry  of  Justice  has  a  supervisory  role  over  the  bar, 
organising bar examinations and setting the amount of minimal legal fees (following non-mandatory opinion of the 
supreme bar council). SI: Disciplinary proceedings are conducted exclusively within the bar association itself. An 
appeal is possible against the decision of the disciplinary committee of the first instance, which is considered by the 
disciplinary committee of the second instance. There is no possibility of appeal against the decisions of the disciplinary 
committee  of  the  second  instance.  This  is  determined  in  Article  65  of  the  Attorneys  Act:  ‘The  decisions  of  the 
disciplinary  bodies of  the  bar  association  shall  be  enforceable.’;  SK:  Primarily,  it  is  the  independent  supervision 
committee of the Slovak Bar Association that files a petition based on the complaint. However, the Minister of Justice 
may also initiate a disciplinary proceeding if ‘a lawyer performed an act which might be viewed as a professional 
misconduct under the legal rules which were in force so far, the chair of the supervision committee or the Minister of 
Justice (acting in their capacity of a petitioner) may submit an application for the commencement of the disciplinary 
proceeding  under  this  Act  to  the  appropriate  bar´s  governing  body  within  the  time  limit  which  applied  to 
commencement of the disciplinary proceeding under the legal rule which was in force so far.’ FI: The bar association 
is under the supervision of the Chancellor of Justice as public authority. The Chancellor has supervisory authority 
over attorneys as regulated in the Advocates Act. 

2.3.3. Summary on judicial independence  

Judicial independence is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy before a court or 
tribunal,  as  enshrined  in  Article  47  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU,  and 
indispensable for ensuring effective judicial protection, as required under Article 19 of the Treaty 
on European Union. It is a fundamental element of an effective justice system and essential for 
upholding the rule of law. It is vital for ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings and the trust 
of the public and businesses in the legal system. The national judicial systems must therefore fully 
respect the requirements as regards judicial independence following from EU law as interpreted 
by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  EU  and  take  due  account  of  European  standards  on  judicial 
independence.  The  2025  Scoreboard  shows  trends  in  the  general  public’s  and  companies’ 
perceptions  of  judicial  independence.  This  edition  also  presents  some  new  indicators  on  the 
situation  regarding  the  withdrawal  and  recusal  of  a  judge  in  all  Member  States,  and  the 
appointment and dismissal of heads of prosecution offices.  

The  structural  indicators  do  not  in  themselves  allow  for  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  the 
independence of these bodies, but represent possible elements which may be taken as a starting 
point for such an analysis. 

a)  The 2025 Scoreboard presents the developments in perceived independence from surveys of 

the general public (Eurobarometer FL554) and companies (Eurobarometer FL555):  

• 

On the one hand, the Eurobarometer survey among the general public (Figure 50) shows 
that the perception of independence of courts and judges has improved or remained stable 
in 17 Member States when compared to 2016, while five Member States face challenges. 
On the other hand, compared to last year, the general public’s perception of independence 
improved or remained stable in 21 Member States while it decreased in 6 Members States. 
In three Member States, the level of perceived independence remains particularly low.  

74 

 
 
 
 
• 

• 

The  Eurobarometer  survey  of  companies  (Figure  52)  shows  that  the  perception  of 
independence of courts and judges has improved or remained stable in 18 Member States 
when compared to 2016, while it decreased in nine Member States. Compared to last year, 
the companies’ perception of independence improved or remained stable in 18 Member 
States and decreased in 9 Members States. In three Member States, the level of perceived 
independence remains particularly low.  
Among  the  reasons  for  the  perceived  lack  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges, 
interference or pressure from government and politicians was the most often stated reason, 
followed  by  pressure  from  economic  or  other  specific  interests.  Both  reasons  remain 
notable for the three Member States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 
51 and 53).  

b)  Since 2022, the EU Justice Scoreboard has presented the results of a Eurobarometer survey on 
how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and courts as 
regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State (Figure 54). Administrative 
conduct, stability and quality of the law-making process, as well as effectiveness of courts and 
property  protection  still  remain  key  factors  of  comparable  significance  for  confidence  in 
investment protection (Figure 55). Compared to last year, confidence in investment protection 
improved in 13 Member States.  

c)  Figure 56 presents the situation regarding the withdrawal and recusal of a judge in all Member 

States.  

d)  Figure 57 looks at appointment and dismissal of heads of prosecution offices and thus at some 

of the safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU. 

e)  Figure 58 shows that the independence of lawyers is generally ensured, allowing lawyers to 

freely pursue their activities of advising and representing their clients. 

75 

 
 
 
 
3. 

OTHER INDICATORS RELEVANT FOR THE SINGLE MARKET  

Beyond  the  courts,  prosecution  services  and  other  judicial  bodies,  which  are  important  for  the 
independent application of EU law, several other public authorities are tasked with applying EU 
law in specific areas, such as anti-corruption, public procurement and competition. This edition of 
the Scoreboard includes additional charts that are related to bodies that are pivotal for the good 
functioning of the single market.  

In addition to the regularly covered topics, the 2025 Scoreboard shows for the first time indicators 
for the powers and independence of Supreme Audit Institutions, which play an important role in 
the area of anti-corruption, and presents  data on the perceived independence, as  well as  on the 
authorities involved in the appointment and dismissal of national competition authorities and first 
instance  public  procurement  review  bodies,  which  are  some  of  the  key  authorities  for  the 
functioning of the single market.  

3.1. Independent authorities relevant for the functioning of the single market 

Independent authorities are a key rule of law safeguard for the functioning of the single market. 
For the first time, the Scoreboard presents certain structural aspects of some of these authorities, 
such as the first instance review bodies on public procurement, national competition authorities 
and the supreme audit institutions. It also presents for the first time the perceived independence of 
the first instance review bodies on public procurement, and of the national competition authorities. 

Figure  59  presents  how  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  the  first-instance  public 
procurement review bodies. These bodies are set up in Member States on the basis of the Remedies 
Directives (Directive 89/665/EEC and Directive 92/13/EEC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC 
and Directive 2014/23/EU). According to  the Remedies Directives,  contracts  falling  within the 
scope of Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 2014/25 and decisions taken 
by  the  contracting  authorities  and  contracting  entities  may  be  reviewed  effectively  and,  in 
particular, as rapidly as possible on the grounds that such decisions have infringed Union law in 
the field of public procurement or national rules transposing that law. The body responsible for the 
review may be judicial or non-judicial. Non-judicial bodies usually take the form of an independent 

76 

 
 
administrative  authority.  In  that  case,  Remedies  Directives  stipulate  further  procedural 
requirements as well as the availability of further judicial review.  

Figure  59 :  How  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  the  first  instance  public 
procurement review bodies (*) (source: Eurobarometer (136) - 2025) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is ‘very good’ 
or ‘fairly good’ (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by 
the  percentage  of  respondents  who  stated  that  the  independence  is  ‘fairly  bad’  or  ‘very  bad’ (total  bad);  if  some 
Member States have the same percentage of total  good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage of 
respondents who stated that the independence is ‘very good’; if some Member States have the same percentage of 
total good, total bad and ‘very good’, then they are ordered by the percentage of  respondents who stated that the 
independence is ‘very bad’. 

Figure  60  presents  how  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  the  national  competition 
authorities. These authorities form a part of a decentralised system that is based on the parallel 
competence of the Commission and the national competition authorities and national courts of the 
Member States to enforce EU antitrust rules. As such, they are one of the key authorities for the 
functioning of the single market. 

136  Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between  13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the public procurement review body that reviews public procurement cases in terms 
of  its  independence?  Would  you  say  it  is  very  good,  fairly  good,  fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’,  see: 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys. 

77 

 
 
 
 
Figure 60: How companies perceive the independence of the national competition authorities 
(*) (source: Eurobarometer (137) - 2025) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence is ‘very good’ 
or ‘fairly good’ (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then they are ordered by 
the  percentage  of  respondents  who  stated  that  the  independence  is  ‘fairly  bad’  or  ‘very  bad’ (total  bad);  if  some 
Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are ordered by the percentage  of 
respondents who stated that the independence is ‘very good’; if some Member States have the same percentage of 
total good, total bad and ‘very good’, then they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the 
independence is ‘very bad’. 

Figure 61 presents the authorities involved in the appointment and dismissal procedures for first 
instance review bodies on public procurement. The figure reflects the procedures either regarding 
the  members  of  the  first  instance  public  procurement  review  bodies  (when  these  are  of  a  non-
judicial character or are not part of the regular court system and decide in panels) or their heads 
when the bodies consist of public officials. 

137  Eurobarometer survey FL555, conducted between 13 and 29 January 2025, replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the national competition authority that decides in competition matters in terms of 
its 
is  very  good,  fairly  good,  fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’,  see: 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys. 

independence?  Would  you  say 

it 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61: First instance public  procurement review bodies: appointment and dismissal (*) 
(source:  European  Commission  with  the  Network  of  First  Instance  Review  Bodies  on  Public 
Procurement) 

(*)  The  chart  refers  to  the  appointment  and  dismissal  procedures  of  the  following  bodies:  BG:  After  a  public 
procedure,  each  political  party  represented  in  Parliament  proposes  its  own  candidates  for  members  and  the 
chairperson of the Commission for Protection of Competition, and then Parliament starts to elect them with a certain 
quorum. According to the Law on protection of competition, the powers of the chairperson, deputy chairperson and 
members shall be terminated by Parliament priort to expirt of their term of office for specific reasons stated in the 
law. CZ: The chart reflects the situation for the Vice-Chairperson for Public Procurement. The public procurement 
review body consists of two instances. The first-instance decisions are  signed by  the Vice-Chairperson for Public 
Procurement  and  can  be  reviewed  by  the  second  instance  represented  by  the  Chairperson  of  the  Office  for  the 
Protection of Competition (OPC). The Vice-Chairperson for Public Procurement is appointed and dismissed by the 
Chairperson of the OPC. The Chairperson is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic on proposal 
of the Government. DK: The chart reflects the situation of the members of the presidency (10 judges) including the 
head of the review body, and the 20 experts. All members are appointed by the Minister of Industry, Business and 
Financial Affairs. Members of the presidency are proposed by the president of the court under which the judges reside. 
The proposal from the president of the court is always followed.  Experts are proposed partially by ministries and 
other government bodies, partially by certain associations and organisations mentioned in the law. The members and 
the head of the Complaints Board can be dismissed by the Danish Minister of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs. 
The minister does not need a proposal in order to dismiss a member or the head of the Complaints Board. DE: The 
chart reflects the situation of the appointing and the dismissal of the members of Public Procurement Tribunals (a 
specialized department of the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartelamt) at the federal level and Vergabekammern – 
Public Procurement Tribunals at the State level). The authority responsible for the appointment of the head of the first 
instance review body is the administrative authority the body belongs to (deviating rules on the states level possible). 
The  members  of  the  Tribunal  are  appointed  for  a  term  of  office  of  five  years  by  law.  They  take  their  decisions 
independently  and  are  bound  only  by  the  law.  See  Section  157  (4)  GWB  (German  Competition  Act).  There  is  no 
specific  regulation  about  a  dismissal  in  German  procurement  law.  Only  general  civil  service  regulations 
(“Beamtenrecht”)  are  likely  to  give  rise  to  the  possibility  of  dismissal  from  civil  service  by  the  head  of  the 
administrative body the Public Procurement Tribunal belongs to in exceptional cases, for example in the event of 
serious misconduct or long-term illness. However, the head of the administrative body may displace members into 
another position as an organisational decision. EE: The chart reflects the situation of the head and of the members 
of the Public Procurement Review Committee. Ministry of Finance proposes and the government appoints/dismisses. 
EL: The chart reflects the situation of the members of the panel of the Hellenic Single Public Procurement Authority. 
The  selection  of  candidates  for  the  positions  of  Members  is  carried  out  after  an  open  procedure  by  the  Supreme 

79 

 
 
 
Personnel Selection Council (ASEP, independent administrative authority), in accordance with the procedure of L. 
4765/2021 (A` 6). The members are appointed by a Decision of the Minister of Justice. The disciplinary procedure 
for the members of the Authority is initiated by the Minister of Justice, following a recommendation by the President 
of the Authority. A Disciplinary Council is established, which consists of a Vice President of the Council of State, a 
Vice President of the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos) and a Vice President of the Court of Audit. The head of the first 
instance review body (President) is proposed by the Minister of Justice and is appointed by an act of the Council of 
Ministers  issued  following  the  opinion  of  the  Parliament’s  Special  Permanent  Committee  on  Institutions  and 
Transparency. For dismissal, the disciplinary procedure for the members of the Authority is initiated by the Minister 
of Justice, following a recommendation by the President of the Authority. A Disciplinary Council is established, which 
consists of a Vice President of the Council of State, a Vice President of the Supreme Court and a Vice President of the 
Court  of  Audit.  ES:  There  is  a  joint  proposal  from  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Ministry  of  Justice  to  the 
Government (Council of ministers), which appoints. There is no dismissal, as the head of TACRC is appointed for a 
term of six years. Nevertheless, law establishes a list of reasons that put an end to this term of office. CY: The chart 
reflects the  situation for the head and members of the Tenders Review Authority. For appointment, the proposing 
authority  is  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  appointing  authority  is  the  Council  of  Ministers.  For  dismissal,  the 
Council of Ministers is the proposing and dismissing authority. LV: Procurement Monitoring Bureau (PMB) is a state 
institution of direct administration under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. The decisions within the review 
procedures are made by the complaint examination commission consisting of three members and specially established 
within  the  PMB  for  each  case.  Commissions  are  established  by  order  of  the  head  of  the  PMB.  Members  of  the 
commission  are  civil  servants/public  officials  (including  the  head  of  PMB).  A  commission  for  the  assessment  of 
candidates established by the head of the PMB proposes a candidate to the position. The members are appointed to 
the position by the head of the PMB. The members are dismissed by a decision of the head of the PMB. HU: The chart 
reflects the situation of the chairperson and the vice-chairperson of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board. The 
Council operating within the  Public Procurement  Authority appoints and/or discharges the  chairperson and vice-
chairperson of the Public Procurement Arbitration Board. The Public Procurement Authority is a central budgetary 
organ  operating  as  an  autonomous  state  administration  organ  subordinated  to  Parliament.  The  members  of  the 
Council are set out in Section 183 (b) of the Act CXLIII of 2015 on public procurement. PL: The head of the first 
instance review body, National Appeal Chamber (NAC), the President of the NAC is appointed and dismissed, at the 
request of the President of the Public Procurement Office, by the Minister responsible for the economy for a term of 
three  years.  RO:  The  head  of  the  first  instance  review  body,  National  Council  for  Solving  Complaints,  is 
elected/dismissed by the Plenum within Council's members. SI: The chart reflects the situation for both the members 
of the panel and the head of the National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures 
(NRC). For appointment, Judicial Council Commission for the Assessment of the Suitability of Candidates interviews 
the candidates and issues a reasoned opinion on the fulfilment of the special conditions referred to in Article 61.b of 
ZPVPJN and the suitability of the candidates. The Commission of Parliament responsible for mandates and elections 
by a process of voting chooses among the candidates who meet all the conditions and the President of the NRC is then 
appointed by Parliament. For dismissal, the Commission of Parliament responsible for mandates and elections sends 
a proposal for dismissal to the Commission and then the President is dismissed by Parliament. SK: The chart reflects 
the situation of the Vice-Chairperson of the first instance public procurement review body, Public Procurement Office 
(PPO). Review of public procurement is carried out by the Review Section of the PPO, which is headed by the Vice-
Chairman, who is proposed by the head of the governmental office and appointed by the government. The second vice-
charperson of PPO, the Vice-Chairperson for the strategic agenda is dismissed by the government on the proposal of 
the head of the governmental office. HR: The chart reflects the situation for both the members of the panel and the 
head of the first instance public procurement review body, State Commission for Supervision of Public Procurement 
Procedures. The Government proposes, Parliament appoints and dismisses. 

Figure  62  presents  the  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  procedures  for 
members of the national competion authorities. 

80 

 
 
 
 
Figure 62: National competition authorities: appointment and dismissal (*) (source: European 
Commission with the Network of National Competition Authorities) 

(*) BE: The Minister for the Economy proposes and appoints.  The minister appoints a selection committee for the 
members. The Minister for the Economy proposes the dismissal, the Head of State (King) dismisses. CZ: The Chart 
reflects the situation of the Chairperson of the Office. The Government proposes the Chairperson of the Office, the 
President of the Republic appoints. The Government proposes the dismissal, the President of the Republic dismisses. 
The  Chairperson  of  the  Office  is  represented  by  3  Vice-Chairpersons,  which  are  appointed  and  dismissed  by  the 
Chairperson of the Office on her/his own proposal.  DK: The Ministry of Industry, Business and Financial Affairs 
proposes, the Government appoints. There is no authority, which proposes a dismissal. The Government dismisses. 
DE: The decision-making bodies of the Bundeskartellamt are the decision divisions. The decisions of the decision 
divisions are taken by the division members (the Chairperson and two associate members). They are civil servants 
appointed for life and must be qualified to serve as judges or senior civil servants. It is the Authority that proposes 
case handlers to become a division member, they are appointed by Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. 
There is no explicit provision for a member of a decision division to be removed from its function. A dismissal, ordered 
by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, is only possible under general civil service regulations. 
The Authority may transfer division members from the division to any other department within the Authority. IE: The 
Public Appointments Service proposes, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment appoints the chairperson 
and the two to four commissions. The Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment dismisses the chairperson and 
the two to four commissioners. EE: The Director General of the Estonian Competition Authority is appointed to and 
released from office by the Minister of Justice on the proposal of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice. EL: 
The  Board  of  the  Hellenic  Competition  Commission,  the  decision-making  body  of  the  Authority,  consists  of  ten 
members, including a President, a Vice-President, six Rapporteurs and two regular members, with their alternates. 
The  President  and  the  Vice-President  of  the  Commission  are  selected,  following  a  proposal  of  the  Minister  of 
Development, by a decision of the Council of Ministers, issued following the consent of the parliamentary Committee 
on Institutions and Transparency. The selection of the Rapporteurs and the two regular and alternate members of the 
Commission  is  made  by  the  Minister  of  Development,  following  the  consent  of  the  parliamentary  Committee  on 
Institutions and Transparency, on the basis of a list of candidates, drawn up by the Selection Committee, following an 
open  competition,  which  includes  submission  of  a  personal  dossier  and  an  interview.  The  regular  and  alternate 
members of the Competition Commission, as well as the Rapporteurs are appointed by decision of the Minister of 
Development and Investments, which is published in the Government Gazette. The five-member Selection Committee 
consists of: a) the President or Vice-President of the Council of State or the President or Vice-President of the State 
Legal Counsel, as Chair, b) the President or Vice-President of the Supreme Council  for Civil Personnel Selection 
(ASEP), c) a former President or Vice-President of the Competition Commission, appointed by  lot,  d) a TSS HEI 
member  specialised  in  competition  law,  nominated  by  the  Minister  of  Development,  and  e)  a  TSS  HEI  member 
specialised in competition economics, nominated by the Minister of Development.  Disciplinary proceedings before 
the  Disciplinary  Council  shall  be  initiated  by  the  Council  of  Ministers,  following  a  proposal  of  the  Minister  of 

81 

 
 
 
Development and Investments, with regard to the President and its members. The Disciplinary Council consists of two 
(2) State Counselors, one (1) Supreme Court judge and two (2) university professors, active or emeritus, specialised 
in competition law, in commercial, criminal or public law or economics, and their term of office shall be five years. 
ES:  The  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Competitiveness  proposes  the  10  Board  members  of  the  CNMC,  including  its 
President and Vice-President, the Government appoints them. Parliament may veto the appointment of the proposed 
candidates by absolute majority (50% +1). The Government proposes the dismissal and dismisses the Board members. 
FR: The President of the Republic appoints all four Vice-Presidents of the Board (permanent members) as well as the 
12  non-permanent  members  and  the  2  specialist  members  who  sit  when  the  NCA  rules  on  matters  pertaining  to 
regulated  legal  professions.  The  NCA  Board  proposes  the  dismissal,  the  President  of  the  Republic  dismisses  the 
member of the Board. HR: The Government proposes, Parliament appoints the members of the NCA. The Government 
proposes the dismissal, Parliament dismisses the members of the NCA. IT: The Presidents of the House and Senate 
appoint the chairman and members of the Authority’s Board. The Presidents of Parliament take the final decision on 
dismissal, once judge’s decision to apply the accessory penalty of disqualification from public office is final. CY: The 
Minister  of  Energy,  Commerce  and  Industry  proposes,  the  Government  (Council  of  Ministers)  appoints.  The 
Government (Council of Ministers) proposes a dismissal and dismisses. LV: The Ministry of Economics proposes the 
chairperson  of  the  Competition  Council  and  four  council  members,  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers  appoints  them.  The 
Ministry of Economic proposes their dismissal, a committee established by the Cabinet of Ministers dismisses.  LT: 
The Prime Minister proposes the members in the decision-making body of the Lithuanian Competition Council, the 
President appoints. The Prime Minister proposes the dismissal of the members in the decision-making body of the 
Lithuanian Competition Council, the President dismisses. LU: There is a public call for application, the President of 
the  Competition  Authority  appoints.  The  Government  proposes  the  dismissal,  the  Head  of  State  (Grand-Duke) 
dismisses. HU: The President of the Hungarian Competition Authority proposes, the President of Hungary appoints 
the members of the Competition Council, which acts like a separated decision-making forum within the Hungarian 
Competition Authority. The President of the Hungarian Competition Authority proposes a dismissal, the President of 
Hungary dismisses the members of the Competition Council. MT: There is a public call for application. The Board of 
Governors of the Malta Competition and Consumer Affairs Authority appoints the Director General of the Office for 
Competition  (the  national  administrative  competition  authority)  by  following  consultation  with  the  Minister 
responsible  for  competition  matters.  The  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Malta  Competition  and  Consumer  Affairs 
Authority  dismisses  the  Director  General.  NL:  A  selection  Commission,  which  consists  of  an  NCA  (ACM)  board 
member, the director of the policy directorate responsible for NCA at the Ministry, an NCA director, on request an 
“outsider”, and a consultant of the Dutch Senior Civil Service (ABD), proposes the chair and the other two board 
members of the NCA to the Minister of Economic Affairs, who then proposes them further. The Council of Minister 
appoints  them.  The  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs  proposes  the  dismissal  and  dismisses  the  members.  AT:  The 
Government  proposes  the  Director-General  of  the  Federal  Competition  Authority,  the  President  appoints.  The 
Government  proposes  the  dismissal  of  the  Director-General  of  the  Federal  Competition  Authority,  the  President 
dismisses. PL: The Prime Minister proposes and appoints the members of the NCA. The Prime Minister proposes the 
dismissal and dismisses the members of the NCA. PT: The Ministry of Economy proposes the members of the decision-
making body of the NCA, Parliament gives a reasoned opinion, the Government appoints them. Parliament or the 
Council of Ministers propose a dismissal, the Council of Ministers dismisses. RO: There is an open call for application 
for the 9 members of the Plenum of the Competition Council. The Standing Bureaus of the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate and the Legal and Economic Committees of the Chambers propose the candidates, the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate elect and appoint the members. The dismissal of the members takes place de iure, when the Supreme 
Court decides upon an infringement. SI: The Government and the Ministry of Economy propose the members of the 
national competition authority, Parliament elects them. The Government proposes the dismissal, Parliament dismisses 
them. SK: The decision-making of the Antimonopoly Office consists of two instances, the Office and the Council of 
the Antimonopoly Office. In the first instance, the decision is adopted by respective department of the Office. In the 
second instance, the Council of the Antimonopoly Office of the SR (the “Council”) decides on appeals and reviews 
the Office´s decisions. The chart reflects the situation of the Council of the Antimonopoly Board. The Chairperson of 
the Office proposes the members of the Council of the Antimonopoly Office, which consists of the Chairperson of the 
Office  himself  and  six  members  of  the  Council.  The  Government  appoints  them.  The  Chairperson  of  the  Office 
proposes  the  dismissal,  the  Government  dismisses.  Chairman  of  the  Council  is  appointed  and  dismissed  by  the 
President of the Republic. FI: The Ministry of the Economic Affairs and Employment proposes the Director-General 
as well as the Head of Competition Division of the Competition and Consumer Authority, the Government appoints 
them. The Government dismisses the Directors. SE: The Government proposes and appoints the Director-General of 
the NCA. The Government proposes his dismissal, the Government Disciplinary Board for Higher Officials dismisses 
the Director-General. 

82 

 
 
Supreme audit institutions (SAIs) are public oversight institutions which audit the use of public 
funds. Their principal task is to examine whether public funds are spent economically, efficiently 
and effectively in compliance with existing rules and regulations. Effective auditing helps build 
integrity in  the public  finances  and combat corruption. It  leads to  the detection of illicit use of 
funds and corruption and helps to bring perpetrators to justice. SAIs are also part of the national 
systems of checks and balances in safeguarding the rule of law. Cooperation between the SAIs of 
the EU and the European Court of Auditors (ECA) principally takes place within the framework 
of the Contact Committee138). 

The  organisation  of  SAIs  varies  across  the  EU  and  there  is  no  uniform  model  for  all  Member 
States. SAIs can be divided into two types: bodies with judicial authority (139) and those without. 
SAIs are either headed by a single person (140) or governed by a collegiate body (141). SAIs need 
to  be  independent  operationally  and  financially  autonomous.  International  standards  on  the 
independence of SAIs indicate that the head of the SAI and members of collegial institutions need 
to  be  appointed,  reappointed  or  removed  by  a  process  that  ensures  independence  from  the 
executive (142). 

Figures 63 and 64 present the authorities involved in the appointment and dismissal of the head of 
the SAI or its members, depending on whether the SAI is a single-headed or a collegiate body. 

Figure 63: Supreme  audit institutions:  appointment (*) (source: European Commission  with 
the Contact Committee on Supreme Audit Institutions) 

(*) BE: Collegiate body - The Members of the Court of Audit are judges. They are elected to the Court of Audit by the 
House of Representatives. BG: Collegiate Body - The Vice-Presidents and the Members of the Audit Office are elected 
by the Parliament upon a proposal by the President of the Audit Office. The President is elected by the Parliament. 
CZ: Collegiate Body - The Chamber of Deputies elects the 15 Members based on the proposal made by the President 
of the SAI. The President and the Vice-President are appointed by the President of the Republic based on a proposal 
from the Chamber of Deputies. DK: The Auditor General is appointed by the Speaker of the Danish Parliament, upon 
recommendation  by  Parliament's  Public  Accounts  Committee  and  approval  of  Parliaments’  Standing  Orders 

138  The Contact Committee structure consists of the Contact Committee itself, composed of the heads of the EU SAIs 
and the ECA, the Liaison Officers, who provide an active network of professional contacts around Europe, as well 
as working groups, networks and task forces on specific audit topics. 

139  BE, FR, EL, IT, PT, ES. 
140  AT, HR, CY, DK, EE, FI, HU, IRE, LT, MT, SK, SE. 
141  BE, BG, CZ, FR, DE, EL, LV, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, ES. 
142  INTOSAI (2019), Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence, Principle 2. 

83 

 
 
 
 
Committee. DE: The membrers of the SAI are appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany on a 
proposal of the President of SAI. The President is elected by the two houses of parliament on a proposal from the 
federal government and is appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany. EE: Proposal: President 
of the Republic (EE consider the President of the Republic not to be part of the executive), Decision: Parliament. IE: 
The  Comptroller  and  Auditor  General  is  appointed  by  the  Irish  President  on  nomination  by  the  Parliament.  EL: 
Collegiate  body  -  the  Court  of  Audit  is  the  Supreme  Financial  Court.  Its  members  are  judges,  appointed  by 
Presidential  Decree  upon  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Council.  Its  president  and  vice-presidents  are 
appointed by Presidential Decree upon a proposal from the Council of Ministers, following non binding opinions from 
Parliament  and  the  Court's  plenun.  There  is  no  review  of  decisions  to  appoint  the  President/vice-presidents.  ES: 
Collegiate  body  -  Counsellors  are  judges,  appointed  by  the  Spanish  Parliament  (six  by  Congress  and  six  by  the 
Senate). The President of the Court of Auditors is appointed by the King of Spain from among the Counsellors of the 
Court, following a proposal by the Court’s Plenum. FR: Collegiate body - The First president and the presidents of 
the  chambers  are  magistrates,  appointed  by  a  decree  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  issued  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  HR:  The  Auditor  General  is  appointed  by  the  Parliament  on  the basis  of  a proposal  by  the  committee 
responsible  for  selection  and  appointment,  together  with  an  opinion  provided  by  the  committee  responsible  for 
finances and the State Budget. IT: Collegiate body. The Court of Audit has central and regional offices. Its members 
are magistrates, recruited by means of an open competition. The Government has the power to appoint a quota of 
magistrates of the Court of Audit, after consulting the Presidency of the Court of Audit. The President of the Court is 
appointed by Decree of the President of the Republic upon proposal of the Council of Ministers (which must consult 
the Council of the Presidency of the Court of Audit). CY: The President of the Republic appoints the Auditor General 
and the Deputy Auditor General. No other body participates in the appointment. LV: Collegiate body.The members 
of the SAI are appointed by the Parliament upon recommendation by the Auditor General. The Auditor General is 
appointed by  the  Parliament.  LT:  Proposal:  President  of  the  Republic;  Appointment:  Parliament.  LU:  Collegiate 
body, the President and members of the SAI are appointed by the Grand Duke on the proposal of Parliament, which 
prepares a list with candidates. HU: The President of the State Audit Office is elected by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members of the National Assembly, following a proposal by the parliamentary standing committee dealing with issues 
pertaining to the audit office. MT: The Auditor General is an officer of the House of Representatives and is appointed 
by decision of the President of the Republic, implementing the resolution of the House of Representatives (two-thirds-
majority). The President has no discretion in this respect. NL: Collegiate body. The members of the Court of Audit 
are appointed by Royal Decree from a list of three persons drawn up by the Lower House of Parliament. Its President 
is appointed among its members by the Head of State acting on the recommendation of the Government.  AT: The 
President of the Austrian Court of Audit is elected by a two-thirds-majority in Parliament, on proposal of its Main 
Committee. PL: Collegiate body. The Members are appointed by the Speaker of Sejm (lower chamber of Parliament) 
upon request of the President of the SAI. The President is appointed by the Sejm upon consent by the Senate, following 
a proposal of the Speaker of Sejm or a group of at least 35 of its members. PT: Collegiate body. The members of the 
Court of Auditors are judges, recruited through a public competition. The President is appointed by the President of 
the Republic on a proposal from the Government. RO: Collegiate body The members and the president of the Court 
of Accounts are proposed and appointed by the Legislature. SI: Collegiate body. Its Members are the President and 
two  Vice-Presidents,  appointed  by  Parliament  (absolute  majority  vote)  on  a  proposal  from  the  President  of  the 
Republic. SK: The Head of SAI is elected by Parliament. FI: The Auditor General is elected by Parliament. SE: The 
Auditor General and the Deputy Auditor General are elected and appointed by Parliament. 

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Figure 64: Supreme  audit institutions:  dismissal (*)  (source: European Commission  with the 
Contact Committee on Supreme Audit Institutions) 

(*)  CZ:  The  Members  of  the  SAI  can  be  dismissed  by  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  following  the  decision  of  the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the SAI proposing the dismissal. The President and the Vice-President of the SAI could be 
dismissed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Chamber of Deputies. DK: The Auditor General is 
removed  from  office  by  decision  of  the  Speaker  of  the  Parliament,  following  a  complaint  to  the  Public  Accounts 
Committee and after consulting the Deputy Speakers. DE: There is no specific dismissal procedure; due to a lack of 
possible re-election, the head of SAI are dismissed at the end of their 12-year term of office. Members of the SAI can 
however be subject to disciplinary procedures which can lead to a dismissal in certain cases. Those procedures are 
held before a specialised senate of the Federal Supreme Court (‘Dienstgericht des Bundes’). The proposal for such a 
procedure  would  be  made  by  the  President  of  either  chamber  of  Parliament.  EE:  The  Auditor  General  can  be 
dismissed by decision of the Supreme Court following a request by the Chancellor of Justice with the consent of the 
majority of the Parliament. IE: The Auditor General can be removed from office by decision of the President only 
upon resolutions passed by both chambers of Parliament calling for his removal. EL: Members are judges.Proposal 
for Dismissal/Initiating of disciplinary actions: Minister of Justice; Decision for Dismissal: Supreme Disciplinary 
Council. ES: Members of the Court of Audit can only be removed for a serious breach of their duties following judicial 
proceedings. FR: The appointment authority decides on removals on the recommendation of the High Council of the 
Court of Accounts in its disciplinary formation. HR: The decision on removal is made by the Croatian Parliament. 
IT: Magistrates of the Court can only be removed following disciplinary or criminal proceedings before the Judicial 
Council of the Court of Audit. The President of the Court can not be revoked from his role, which he leaves because 
of voluntary resignation or retirement because of the age limit. CY: The Auditor General can only be dismissed for 
serious misconduct following a judgment by the Supreme Constitutional Court. The President of the Republic and the 
Attorney General can submit a request for dismissal. The President formally issues the decision dismissing the Auditor 
General but he is bound by the judgment. LV: The Auditor General and members of the Council of the State Audit 
Office  may  be  removed  from  office  by  Parliament  only  on  the  basis  of  a  court  judgment  in  a  criminal  case.  LT: 
Parliament  is  competent  to  release  and  dismiss  the  Auditor  General.  The  grounds  for  release  and  dismissal  are 
exhaustivelly listed in the legislation. LU: Removal by grand-ducal decree upon proposal by the Parliament with the 
prior opinion of the SAI. HU: The President of the State Audit Office can be removed from office by decision of the 
Parliament. The procedure is initiated by the competent parliamentary committee. MT: Removal on grounds of proved 
inability to perform the functions of his/her Office or proved misbehaviour.Proposal: House of Representatives (two-
thirds-majority). Decision: The President of the Republic formally issues the decision but he is bound by Parliament's 
address. NL: The Supreme Court can dismiss or suspend the members of the SAI. AT: Decision for Dismissal requires 
a two-thirds-majority in the National Council. PL: Proposal to dismiss can be made by the Marshal of the Sejm or a 
group of at least 35 Members of the Sejm (the lower chamber of Pariament); the dismissal decision is taken by the 
Sejm and by the Senate, which needs to consent to the dismissal by the Sejm.  PT: The members of the SAI are not 
removable,  except  for  disciplinary  proceedings,  held  within  the  SAI.  A  standing  committee,  presided  over  by  the 

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President and composed of the Vice President and a judge from each Chamber elected by their peers, is responsible 
for the exercise of disciplinary authority, with a possible appeal to the general plenary. The Head of the SAI may be 
removed by the Head of State, upon the proposal of the Government. In practice, this possibility has never been used. 
RO: The members of the SAI can only be dismissed by Parliament, upon the proposal of the standing committees for 
budget, finance and banks of the  two  Chambers of Parliament.  SI: A minimum of 15  members of  Parliament can 
propose the dismissal of the President or the Vice-presidents of the SAI. The final decision is taken by Parliament. 
SK:  Parliament  can  remove  the  President/Vice-presidents  under  the  conditions  prescribed  by  the  legislation.  FI: 
Parliament decides on removal acting on proposal of the Parliament's Office Commission (Speaker, the two Deputy-
Speakers  and  four  other  members  of  Parliament).  SE:  Parliament  may  dismiss  an  Auditor  General  from  the 
assignment only if the Auditor General no longer fulfils the requirements that apply to the assignment or if the Auditor 
General has been guilty of serious negligence (three-quarters of the voters and more than half of the members of the 
Riksdag). 

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3.2. Summary of indicators relevant for the single market  

Beyond the courts, prosecution services  and other judicial bodies, the 2025 Justice Scoreboard 
presents for the first time characteristics of several other public authorities, which are tasked with 
applying EU law in specific areas, such as anti-corruption, public procurement and competition.  

Figures 59 and 60 present how companies perceive the independence of the first instance public 
procurement review bodies and of the national competition authorities. 

The 2025 Justice Scoreboard further presents characteristics of independent authorities which are 
relevant for the functioning of the single market. Figure 61 presents the way in which members 
and/or heads of first instance public procurement review bodies are appointed and dismissed, while 
Figure 62 presents the same for national competition authorities, and Figures 63 and 64 present 
the  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  the  head  of  the  supreme  audit 
institutions or its members, depending on whether it is a single-headed or a collegiate body. 

4.  CONCLUSIONS 

The  2025  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  further  develops  an  in-depth  insight  into  the  effectiveness  of 
justice systems in the Member States. The indicators present continuous  efforts to improve the 
efficiency,  quality  and  independence  of  the  justice  systems.  In  addition,  they  show  certain 
structural aspects of other public authorities tasked with applying EU law. However, challenges 
remain to ensure the public’s full trust in the legal systems of all Member States. The information 
in the EU Justice Scoreboard contributes to the monitoring carried out as part of the European Rule 
of Law Cycle and feeds into the Commission’s annual Rule of Law report.  

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