COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Defence Readiness Omnibus
Date: 2025-06-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, European Commission
Subjects: EU financing arrangements, European arms policy, European defence policy, European security, arms industry, defence expenditure, intra-EU trade, military equipment, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 17.6.2025  COM(2025) 820 final/2  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Defence Readiness Omnibus {SWD(2025) 820 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
Defence Readiness Omnibus 

Europe faces an acute and growing threat. The only way we can ensure European peace is 
to have the readiness to deter those who would do us harm. High intensity armed conflict 
has returned to Europe and the international order established after the Second World War 
and  the  Cold  war  has  been  put  into  question.  As  noted  in  the  Joint  White  Paper  for 
European Defence Readiness 2030 (1) (“White Paper”) “a new international order will be 
formed in the second half of this decade and beyond. Unless we shape this order – in both 
our region  and beyond  –  we will  be passive recipients  of  the outcome of  this  period  of 
interstate  competition  with  all  the  negative  consequences  that  could  flow  from  this, 
including the real prospect of full-scale war.”  

In today's rapidly evolving world, our security landscape has changed. The threats we face 
are larger, more global, ranging from powerful organised crime networks and terrorism to 
hybrid threats fuelled with disinformation, fear and sabotage to our critical infrastructure, 
often by hostile foreign state actors. They are directly threatening our way of life and our 
ability to choose our own future through democratic processes. While the Union is not at 
war, the highly intensive conflict at its borders and Russia’s aggressive posture mean that 
Europe faces a situation which is  not  peaceful, and our security  and purpose  to  build a 
future free from coercion and aggression cannot be taken for granted. We have seen how 
Russia has weaponised gas exports, leading to supply uncertainties and sharp price spikes, 
and how it has deliberately targeted energy infrastructure in Ukraine. Our security relies 
both on civilian and military preparedness. (2)  

According to threat assessments by several EU intelligence services, Russia’s capacity to 
produce  military  equipment  has  increased  tremendously  and  it  would  have  the  military 
capabilities to test the unity of Western countries and the effectiveness of Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and of Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union  within  the  next  three  to  five  years.  This  mandates  a  shift  to  a  defence-readiness 
mindset  and  the  immediate  ramp  up  of  efforts  to  re-establish  defence  readiness  and 
deterrence by 2030. In this context, defence readiness should be understood as the ability 
of  Member  States  and  Union  defence  industry  to  anticipate,  prevent  and  respond  to 
defence-related  crises.  Defence  readiness  relies  on  the  availability  of  defence  industrial 
capacity necessary to acquire and maintain the resources, capabilities and infrastructure 
required to respond effectively and in an agile way to crises and Member States’ related 
actions and to deter potential threats through credible preparedness. 

Rebuilding  European  defence  requires,  as  a  starting  point,  massive  investments  over  a 
sustained period in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation among the Union and the Member 
States, and as part of strategic alliances within NATO and with like-minded third countries. 
Accelerating  work  on  all  strands  to  urgently  ramp  up  European  defence  readiness  is 
essential to ensure that Europe has a strong and sufficient European defence posture by 
2030 at the latest.  

To  build  a  truly  independent  Europe,  it  is  imperative  to  develop  a  new  form  of  Pax 
Europaea for the 21st century – one that is shaped and managed by Europe itself. That is 
why, in an unprecedented action, the Union is enabling Member States to raise up to EUR 

(1)  Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030: JOIN/2025/120 final, 19.03.2025. 

(2)  The  Preparedness  Union  Strategy  aims  to  increase  the  EU’s  resilience  by  equipping  it  with  the 
capabilities required to anticipate  and manage  all threats and hazards. European  Preparedness Union 
Strategy: JOIN/2025/130 final, 26.03.2025. 

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800 billion for their additional defence spending to defend peace over the next four years 
under the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. More than half of the Member States have 
requested the activation of the national escape clause in the framework of the Stability and 
Growth  Pact,  taking  advantage  of  the  flexibility  to  significantly  increase  their  defence 
spending. Further to the European Council call on the European Commission to accelerate 
the work on all strands to decisively ramp up Europe’s defence readiness within the next 
five  years (3),  this  Defence  Readiness  Omnibus  will  support  Member  States’  efforts  to 
strengthen the defence industrial base and the EU’s overall defence readiness and agility 
by  2030,  by  creating  the  necessary  conditions  to  frontload  investments  in  defence 
capabilities, providing necessary predictability to industry and reducing red tape. 

The magnitude of the required effort should take in account the substantial and  chronic 
under-investments in defence over the last decades and the cumulated defence investment 
gap of Member States.    The example of heavy  artillery ammunition  illustrates well the 
issues resulting  from  decades of underinvestment.  Consequently, Member States would 
face critical shortages in case of a high-intensity conflict. Moreover, already limited stocks 
have  been  further  depleted  with  the  military  support  provided  to  Ukraine.  Due  to  low 
demand, the production capacities of the European Defence Technological and Industrial 
Base have been significantly reduced over the past  decades, which  tremendously  limits 
Member States’ capacity to  replenish  quickly  stocks quickly and  re-establish  a credible 
and reliable defence posture. 

A  truly  functioning  EU-wide  market  for  defence  equipment,  putting  innovation  and 
competitiveness at the heart of Europe's renewal, is the most effective way for Member 
States  to  re-stock  their  arsenals  and  build  up  their  readiness  in  case  of  conflict.  This  is 
because it offers three key benefits. Firstly, it allows Member States to unlock economies 
of  scale,  enabling  them  to  take  advantage  of  a  wide  and  more  stable  defence  market. 
Secondly, by facilitating access to all EU suppliers, it reduces their dependence on third-
country suppliers, which is a significant advantage in today's geopolitical landscape and 
ensures the long-term viability of the Union’s strategic independence. Thirdly, it supports 
the  competitiveness  of  the  European  Defence  Technological  and  Industrial  Base  by  
ensuring that defence spending contributes to the growth and development of the entire  
industry across Europe.  

The  current  regulatory  environment  of  the  Union,  adopted  in  peacetime,  is  not  fully 
adapted to the objective of developing the necessary capabilities and military readiness to 
credibly  deter  armed  aggression  and  facilitate  the  effective  and  fast  deployment  of  the 
necessary  large  investments  mentioned  above.  Several  non-defence  specific  EU 
legislations  are  not  conducive  to  facilitating  the  European  Defence  Technological  and 
Industrial Base’s long-term investments in defence capabilities necessary to deter threats 
and ensure the security of the Union and its citizens. The European Defence Technological 
and Industrial Base is a highly specific sector, the primary objective of which is not purely 
economic.  It  is  focused  on  the  needs  of  Member  States’  Armed  Forces,  delivering  the 
required level of technical performance, in a timely manner, in the requisite volume and at 
a  competitive  cost.  The  Union’s  regulatory  framework  should  be  fit  for  the  defence 
readiness objective, enabling Member States to invest, build, conduct research and deliver 
high-quality products and services, authorise projects and procure at an accelerated and 
agile pace, while keeping up with the high research, environmental and social standards 
that make the European Union a world leader in these domains. Substantial simplification 
in  processes  and  removal  of  regulatory  and  administrative  burdens  across  sectors  are 

(3)  European Council, Conclusions, 20 March 2025. 

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necessary to accelerate the ramp up of European defence industrial production to rapidly 
reach the levels of production capacity required to prepare for and thereby deter a high-
intensity conflict.  

Furthermore, this massive effort is an opportunity to modernise Member States’ Armed 
Forces  and  ramp  up  the  European  Defence  Technological  and  Industrial  Base’s 
investments. The accelerated pace of the evolution of military technology and the risk of 
rapid obsolescence needs to be considered, as demonstrated by the ongoing high-intensity 
Russian aggression in Ukraine and the penetration of disruptive technologies in defence 
supply chains. To future-proof defence investments and to unlock the European Defence 
Technological  and  Industrial  Base’s  innovative  potential,  it  is  important  to  boost 
innovation  cycles,  notably  by  further  simplifying  and  accelerating  procedures  for 
collaborative  research  and  development  under  the  European  Defence  Fund  (4). 
Furthermore,  support  to  start-ups  and  scaleups  is  critical  to  promote  innovation  and 
competitiveness  in  the EU, notably by opening  the European  Innovation Council (EIC) 
Accelerator, STEP and Scaleup Europe Fund to dual-use and defence technologies. 

In strengthening European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, the dual-use nature 
of key technologies and materials must be better reflected. Digital, advanced electronics, 
connectivity or chemicals – all are critical elements in the Union’s competitiveness agenda 
as well as for its defence resilience. The Preparedness Union Strategy emphasises that the 
EU  must  integrate  dual-use  considerations  into  all  its  infrastructure  investments  and 
capability planning, such as military mobility, mass evacuations, secure communications 
and connectivity, maritime security, cyber capabilities, and space assets and services. To 
encourage  such  synergies  between  civil  and  defence  innovation  and  secure  the 
development  of  critical  value  and  supply  chains,  the  simplification  measures  adopted 
through this initiative will apply to dual use technologies and materials, where relevant. 

In this Communication, the Commission based on experience and inputs from wide public 
consultations,  puts  forward  ambitious  simplification  proposals  in  defence-specific 
legislation and programmes, as well as in non-defence-specific laws to remove regulatory 
barriers and facilitate EU defence readiness and industrial buildup. This Communication 
also puts forward clearer interpretations of available derogations in EU legislations, that 
Member States may not have made full use of. 

1.  EU defence legislation and defence industrial programmes 

Defence procurement 

The  Defence  and  Sensitive  Security  Procurement  Directive (5)  aims  at  ensuring  the 
conditions  for  the  functioning  of  an  EU-wide  market  for  defence  products.  However, 
stakeholders  often  view  procedures  under  the  Directive  as  overly  complex  and 
burdensome,  requiring  disproportionate  resources  from  Member  States.  It  is  therefore 
necessary to simplify the provisions of the Directive, while ensuring the achievement of 

(4)  Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing 
the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092: OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 149-
177. 

(5)  Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination 
of  procedures  for  the  award  of  certain  works  contracts,  supply  contracts  and  service  contracts  by 
contracting  authorities  or  entities  in  the  fields  of  defence  and  security,  and  amending  Directives 
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC, OJ L 216, 20.8.2009, p. 76–136. 

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its  goals,  notably  by  enabling  more  streamlined  and  efficient  processes  for  defence 
procurement.  This  will  allow  Member  States  to  focus  on  the  most  critical  contracts, 
allocate resources more effectively, as well as ease the administrative burden on industry. 

While a fully-fledged revision of the Directive is scheduled for 2026, procurement rules 
should be simplified already to address the urgency and priority for Europe to rebuild its 
defence, to give more flexibility to common procurements by several Member States and 
boost procurement of innovative solutions necessary to achieve defence readiness by 2030. 
The availability of procurement contracts and the long-term predictability  of demand are 
the  most  important  factors  for  industry  to  ramp  up  its  production  capacities  and  reach 
defence  readiness  objectives.  To  this  effect,  the  Commission  proposes  to  increase  the 
thresholds  of  applicability  of  the  Directive  to  EUR  900  000  for  supply  and  service 
contracts. This will exempt a substantial number of smaller contracts from the scope of the 
Directive,  which  have  an  insignificant  impact  on  the  internal  market,  while  leading  to 
economic efficiencies for Member States and for applicants, due to reduced administrative 
and economic burden.  

Low and fragmented Member States’ defence spending on innovation negatively impacts 
emerging disruptive technologies that are vital for future defence capabilities. Facilitating 
procurement  of  innovative  solutions  will  contribute  to  the  transformation  of  defence 
through disruptive innovation, as new technologies are fundamentally changing the nature 
of warfare in several domains (e.g. Artificial Intelligence, cloud and quantum computing, 
advanced and secure connectivity, autonomous systems). The new possibility for direct 
procurement of innovative products and services that result from parallel and competitive 
research projects contracted by Member States is suited for the most pioneering research 
and development projects where the definition of the expected results is not possible at the 
start of the research and development procurement. Combined with swifter conditions for 
innovative procurement and collaborative projects, including through the introduction of 
the simplified innovation partnership procedure and clarifications on the procurement of 
results of projects funded under the EDF, it will support seamless transition from research 
to  procurement,  enabling  Member  States  to  quickly  capitalise  on  innovative  solutions 
developed through these projects. 

The challenging pace at which Member States currently need to replenish their arsenals 
requires also the recourse to already available defence products. To allow Member States 
to swiftly procure identical readily available equipment, the negotiated procedure without 
prior  publication  of  a  contract  notice  should  be  temporarily  extended  to  common 
procurement and maintenance. This would allow Member States to pool resources together 
and benefit from economies of scale for quick acquisition of equipment and capabilities. It 
complements  existing  flexibility  embedded  in  the  Directive  for  urgency  resulting  from 
crisis,  which  encompasses  harmful  events  expected  in  the  future (6),  including  high 
intensity conflicts on EU borders and credible threats for the security of the Union and its 
Member States. 

Additional flexibility in framework agreements with extended duration up to 10 years and 
opening  to  other  Member  States,  as  proposed  in  the  European  Defence  Industry 

(6)  The definition of ‘crisis’ in Article 1(10) of Directive 2009/81/EC includes scenarios in which “a harmful 

event is deemed to be impending”. 

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Programme (EDIP) Regulation (7), will help Member States to deliver on their capability 
targets more quickly, at reduced cost and with enhanced interoperability. The Commission 
calls  on  Member  States  to  urgently  review  their  national  procurement  rules  to  remove 
additional  burdens  on  participants  in  public  procurement  procedures  (‘goldplating’). 
Removing statistical reporting obligations for Member States will cut red tape, while the 
application of the Energy Efficiency Directive (8) to the defence sector will be clarified in 
the evaluation of the Directive in 2026.  

Intra-EU transfers of defence products 

Swift transfers of defence-related products within the Union are essential to mobilise the 
full  industrial  and  technological  capacities  across  the  Union  and  achieve  synergies, 
economies of scale, innovation and ensure security of supply. Stakeholders in the public 
consultation pointed to the lack of harmonisation of control systems of Member States, 
insufficient  use  of  General  Transfer  Licences  (which  are  the  key  simplification  tool (9) 
foreseen in the Directive) and called to remove complexities and delays linked to intra-EU 
transfers’ control. They also pointed to bottlenecks due to lack of timely authorisations of 
transfers in the implementation of EDF projects and to heavy burden of managing multiple 
national End User Certificates or other forms of banning intra-EU transfers limitations .  

In respect of the competencies defined in the Treaties, the Commission will closely work 
with Member States to simplify transfers of defence products to Armed Forces of Member 
States, transfers in supply chains and transfers within EU-funded projects, as well as the 
management  of  End  User  Certificates.  The  proposed  changes  will  significantly  reduce 
delays in project implementation and cut red tape for participants to EDF projects. Member 
States are enabled to exempt further categories of transfers from the obligation of prior 
authorisation and are encouraged to widen the use of General Transfer Licences, extend 
and harmonise their scope. Extending the benefit of General Transfer Licences to transfers 
by  certified  companies  will  incentivise  companies’  certification  and  robust  compliance 
programmes  in  control  of  intra-EU  transfers,  while  significantly  lowering  their 
administrative  burden.  To  facilitate  cross-border  transactions  in  supply  chains  and 
accelerate  the  production  ramp  up,  in  line  with  the  Directive  on  intra-EU  transfers  of 
defence-related products (10), the Commission calls on Member States to refrain from intra-
EU transfers limitations for components that will be integrated in a final product in another 
Member  State  and  cannot  be  re-exported  separately,  at  least  by  implementing  the  de 
minimis principle already used by some Member States. Finally, the Commission proposes 
to simplify reporting obligations for intangible technology transfers. 

(7)  Proposal  for  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  establishing  the  European 
Defence Industry Programme and a framework of measures to ensure the timely availability and supply 
of defence products (‘EDIP’), 5.3.2024 , COM(2024) 150 final 

(8)  Directive  (EU) 2023/1791 of the  European  Parliament  and of  the  Council of 13  September  2023  on 
energy efficiency and amending Regulation (EU) 2023/955 (recast), OJ L 231, 20.9.2023, p. 1–111. 

(9)  General Transfer Licences enable to replace ex ante control (control prior to the transfer) by  ex post 
control (control after the transfer took place). This change typically enables a transfer to be performed 
within one to three days. In contrast, the average time for controlling authorities to process a simple 
individual  transfer  licence  ex  ante  can  be  roughly  estimated  to  be  approximately  6-7  weeks,  with 
authorisation processes often taking significantly longer times. 

(10)  Article 4(8) of Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 6 May 2009 
simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, OJ L 
146, 10.6.2009, p. 1–36, 

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European Defence Fund (EDF) 

The European Defence Fund is the only EU instrument supporting collaborative defence 
Research and Development. The Commission interim evaluation of the Fund and extensive 
consultations with stakeholders confirmed its overall effectiveness and relevance, while 
highlighting the need to  further simplify procedures and reduce administrative burdens. 
The Commission therefore proposes further flexibility in the EDF implementation. 

The Commission proposes to clarify and simplify the award criteria for the evaluation of 
proposals and introduces the possibility of selecting only the most relevant award criteria 
based on the objectives of the calls for proposals, thus making the evaluation process faster, 
more agile and less burdensome. The possibility to implement the EDF through annual or 
multi-annual work programmes, together with the clarification of rules on direct awards, 
as well as broader possibilities for indirect management will provide more flexibility and 
predictability  in  planning  and  implementation  of  EDF  projects  with  agile  management 
process and reduced administrative burdens. Further to the proposal for a fourth area of 
investment for defence technologies under the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform 
(STEP) (11), the Commission proposes simplifications in pre-commercial procurement and 
access rights of co-financing Member States to the results of development projects, with 
the  aim  to  get  the  resulting  EDF  projects  up  and  running  as  quickly  as  possible,  thus 
boosting innovation and disruptive technologies for defence. 

Finally, the Commission will put in place additional measures to speed up the evaluation 
of proposals  and reduce  the time to  sign  grant  agreements and issue payments, such as 
higher  level  of  subcontracting  (above  30%),  extended  validity  of  ownership  control 
assessments for beneficiaries from 18 to at least 36 months and introduction of a standard 
non re-transfer clause. To respond to stakeholders calls for a simple and secure system to 
exchange confidential and sensitive information, the SUE (Secret de l’Union Européenne) 
system is progressively rolled out among the Commission, Member States and industry 
with the aim to equip all Member States early 2026, once the necessary accreditation and 
acceptance  processes  by  Member  States  are  completed,  while  the  establishment  of  a 
Classified Cloud for the exchange of information accredited up to RESTREINT UE/EU 
RESTRICTED level in the implementation of defence classified projects is being explored. 
The  simplifications  introduced  by  this  Omnibus  may  be  applied  retroactively  to  EDF 
projects already in place. 

In line with  the White Paper, which  calls for increasing  Ukraine's participation in  EDF 
actions and enhanced EU-Ukraine cooperation, costs for testing activities carried out in 
Ukraine should become eligible for funding under the EDF. This would allow the European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base to use Ukraine's active war situation in terms 
of testing (rapid testing capabilities, 24-hour testing and testing on the battlefield), allowing 
fast feedback of current modern warfare to be integrated into the development of defence 
technologies and products. 

(11)  Regulation  (EU)  2024/795  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  29  February  2024 
establishing  the  Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform  (STEP),  and  amending  Directive 
2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, 
(EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 
: PE/11/2024/REV/1 : OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024.  

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2.  EU non-defence legislation and programmes 

Eliminating bottlenecks and making full use of pathways to enhance defence readiness 

Permitting  processes for defence industrial  investments  and defence readiness activities 
are often too lengthy and burdensome. To expedite them, it is essential to ensure that the 
processes for environmental impact assessments and compliance with environmental laws 
(e.g. on urban/land planning, environmental impact assessments, noise, habitat and birds 
protection, water and waste management) are conducive to attaining defence readiness at 
the  current  juncture.  These  processes  -  adopted  in  peace  time  -  must  now  cater  for 
expedited authorisation or permitting procedures tailored to the urgent defence readiness 
needs, so as to facilitate the massive and quick ramp up of defence industrial investments 
and defence readiness activities that need strengthened agility and are essential to address 
emerging security needs. 

While  authorisations  are  the  responsibility  of Member  States,  Union  law  sets  out  some 
rules related to authorisations, including but not limited to environment assessments. It is 
crucial to streamline, simplify and accelerate the entire permitting processes for defence 
industrial investments and defence readiness activities, while ensuring the standards of the 
environmental  and  human  protection  in  a  timelier  way  across  the  Union.  This  can  be 
achieved by establishing fast-track and priority-rated national permitting processes with a 
single point of contact for industry, intended to reduce administrative burdens and expedite 
the permitting process for defence readiness activities. Upon request by Member States, 
the Commission stands ready to provide advice and capacity building in establishing the 
fast-track permitting regime. 

Ensuring  high  standards  of  protection  of  environment  and  human  health  through  the 
application of Union environmental  legislation, while securing the objective of  defence 
readiness by 2030 is fundamental. While most Union environmental legislation includes 
derogations  for  public  objectives,  divergent  interpretations  and  implementations  across 
Member  States  lead  to  complexity  and  uncertainties  in  the  applicable  rules  concerning 
defence  investments.  The  Commission  hereby  clarifies  that  Member  States  can  use 
existing  derogations  in  various  Union  legislations (12)  provided  for  “overriding  public 
interest”,  “public  safety”  or  “crisis”  to  include  defence  readiness  in  their  scope, 
encompassing  industrial  and  governmental  defence  investments  and  defence  readiness 
activities. When compensatory or mitigation measures are applied, those measures should 
ensure the objectives of the legislation and be proportionate regarding defence readiness 
considerations, so that the defence readiness 2030 objective can be timely achieved. The 
Directive  on  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  (13)  includes  an  exemption  for  projects 

(12)  For  example,  those  in  the  Habitats  Directive  (Council  Directive  92/43/EEC  of  21  May  1992  on  the 
conservation of  natural  habitats  and  of  wild  fauna  and  flora  :  OJ  L  206,  22.7.1992,  p.  7–50),  Water 
Framework  Directive  (Directive  2000/60/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23 
October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy : OJ L 327, 
22.12.2000, p. 1–73), Birds Directive (Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (Codified version) : OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, 
p. 7–25 ) and Waste Shipment Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1157 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 April 2024 on shipments of waste, amending Regulations (EU) 1257/2013 and (EU) 
2020/1056  and  repealing  Regulation  (EC)  No  1013/2006:  PE/84/2023/REV/1:  OJ  L,  2024/1157, 
30.4.2024). 

(13)  Directive  2011/92/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2011  on  the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment (codification): OJ L 
26, 28.1.2012, p. 1–21. 

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essential for purposes of defence, which can also be used for defence readiness projects 
and  activities.  Moreover,  the  Waste  Electrical  and  Electronic  Equipment (14)  and  the 
Restriction  of  Hazardous  Substances  (15)  directives  contain  an  exemption  for  military 
purposes that encompasses the objective of defence readiness.  

The Union's chemicals aquis has been instrumental in maintaining high levels of protection 
for human health and environment, facilitating free movement of substances in the internal 
market,  while  also  considering  socio-economic  benefits.  Maintaining  high  levels  of 
occupational safety and good working conditions is also crucial for making the defence 
sector’s  attractiveness  as  an  employment  option,  while  ensuring  that  defence  readiness 
objectives can be effectively reached.  

Currently,  Union’s  chemical  aquis  does  not  explicitly  foresee  early  assessment  of  the 
impact  on  the  defence  industry  in  the  processes  of  banning  or  restricting  chemical 
substances  Regarding  the  Regulation  on  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (16). The Commission notes that the possibility for an 
exemption in the interest of defence is already provided under REACH Regulation but that 
in certain Member States this exemption in the interest of defence has been applied in a 
restrictive manner. Moreover, this exception is application and on ad hoc basis, which does 
not align with the defence readiness 2030 objective and the requirements to urgently ramp 
up  defence  production  by  2030.  The  Commission  therefore  proposes  to  broaden  the 
conditions  for  the  use  of  the  national  exemption  under  the  REACH  Regulation  and 
encourages Member States to use its full potential for defence needs, including defence 
readiness  activities.  The  Commission’s  forthcoming  simplification  of  REACH  aims  to 
explicitly  incorporate  the  defence  readiness  objective,  ensuring  that  defence  concerns, 
including indirect impacts on defence supply chains, are comprehensively assessed. This 
would enable that the defence readiness objective, including indirect impacts on defence 
supply chains, can be assessed early and fully. To ensure consistency across the Union’s 
chemicals acquis, a similar exemption is proposed in the Regulations on Classification, 
Labelling and Packaging (17)) and Biocidal Products (18). Concerning the Regulation on 
Persistent  Organic  Polluants  (19),  that  implements  the  Stockholm  Convention,  the 
Commission  proposes  that  defence  readiness  needs,  should  be    addressed  in  the  EU’s 
preparatory  stages  before prohibitions or  restrictions are established at the international 

(14)  Directive  2002/96/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  January  2003  on  waste 

electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE): OJ L 37, 13.2.2003, p. 24–39. 

(15)  Directive 2011/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on the restriction 
of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment: OJ L 37, 13.2.2003, p. 
19–23. 

(16)  Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 
concerning  the  Registration,  Evaluation,  Authorisation  and  Restriction  of  Chemicals  (REACH), 
establishing  a  European  Chemicals  Agency,  amending  Directive  1999/45/EC  and  repealing  Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 793/93 and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 
76/769/EEC and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC:  OJ L 
396, 30.12.2006. 

(17)  Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on 
classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 
67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006: OJ L 353, 31.12.2008, p. 
1–1355. 

(18)  Regulation (EU) 528/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 concerning 
the making available on the market and use of biocidal products: OJ L 167, 27.6.2012, p. 1–123. 

(19)  Regulation (EU) 2019/1021 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on persistent 

organic pollutants (recast): PE/61/2019/REV/1 :OJ L 169, 25.6.2019, p. 45–77. 

8 

 
 
level in the Convention, as it is at that stage that potential exemptions may be considered. 
In addition, Member States may use exemptions from reporting requirements  to protect 
sensitive information based on national or Union security interests.  

As part of strengthening the Union’s defence industrial production capacity to be able to 
acquire the  critical  capabilities they currently lack, defence industry  and Armed Forces 
need to import defence equipment, components and raw materials in a fast, agile and cost-
effective way from outside the Union. To this end, the Commission encourages Member 
States to make full use of the possibility to suspend import duties on certain weapons and 
military  equipment  imported  by  or  on  behalf  of  military  defence  authorities  from  third 
countries (20). In addition, while continuing to promote and boost domestic capacity to the 
extent  possible,  notably  on  raw  materials,  the  waiver  of  duties  applicable  to  some 
industrial,  raw  materials,  semi-finished  goods  or  components  imported  from  non-EU 
countries (21) under the Autonomous Tariff Suspensions and Quotas Scheme, could be also 
used to improve the competitiveness of the defence sector, thus strengthening the Union’s 
defence readiness. 

The potential of some technologies for defence superiority, such as Artificial intelligence, 
is  an  important  lever  that  needs  to  be  urgently  strengthened  at  European  level.  The 
European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (22) promotes the development of Artificial 
Intelligence systems following a risk-based approach, introducing rules commensurate to 
risks. It does not regulate pre-market research in all domains, including defence, as well as 
development and use of Artificial Intelligence exclusively for military, defence or national 
security  purposes.  The  Commission  recalls  that  Member  States  can  set  up  regulatory 
sandboxes, which can support the flexible and swift development of high-risk Artificial 
Intelligence  systems  relevant  for  military  and  defence  purpose,  to  enable  legally  safe 
development and testing.  

Facilitating public and private investments in the defence sector 

Without prejudice to Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), competition rules apply to defence and contribute to a better functioning of the 
internal market. At the same time, these should not be an impediment to urgent ramping 
up of the sector, its contribution to the “defence readiness 2030” objective and Member 
States’  ability  to  effectively  respond  to  the  challenges  of  the  deteriorating  geopolitical 
environment. The Commission shall  take duly into consideration the specificities of the 
defence industry and the European Defence Equipment Market and its contribution to the 
objective of defence readiness in its competition enforcement (mergers, antitrust and State 
aid control). 

The  European  Union’s  merger  control  regime  aims  at  maintaining  well-functioning 
markets, including in the defence sector. The defence readiness of the European industry 

(20)  Council  Regulation (EU)  2021/2278  of  20  December  2021  suspending  the  Common  Customs  Tariff 
duties referred to in Article 56(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 on certain agricultural and 
industrial products, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1387/2013 : OJ L 466, 29.12.2021, p. 1, amended. 

(21) Communication from the Commission concerning autonomous tariff suspensions and quotas: OJ C 363, 

13.12.2011, p. 6. 

(22)  Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, 
(EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, 
(EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act): PE/24/2024/REV/1: OJ L, 2024/1689, 
12.7.2024.  

9 

 
 
 
critically  depends  on  competitive  markets  that  can  deliver  cutting-edge  technology  and 
innovation,  as  well  as  adequate  and  agile  production  capacity,  while  ensuring  that 
concentrations will not lead to levels of market power that will likely increase  costs for 
Member State budgets. In the ongoing review of merger Guidelines, the Commission will 
give adequate weight to the changed security and defence environment and is seeking input 
from stakeholders to address these aspects effectively. The Commission will particularly 
assess the overall benefits from enhanced defence and security within the Union leading 
to efficiencies.  

As regards antitrust, the Commission stands ready to provide the European industry with 
guidance on cooperation projects of companies in the defence sector, particularly where 
such  collaboration  is  necessary  to  scale  up  production  or  where  individual  companies 
would otherwise be unable to develop or manufacture a product on their own. This may 
also  be  the  case  in  joint  procurement  of  raw  materials  by  defence  companies.  When 
assessing such agreements, the Commission will also consider the efficiencies generated, 
including, for example, positive effects of such cooperation in terms of defence readiness, 
resilience of the defence supply chains and of the internal market.  

Substantial public and private investment are essential for industry scale up to reach the 
EU defence readiness 2030 objective. As part of this endeavour, Member States can use 
the opportunities offered by the mid-term review of the cohesion funding for supporting 
defence industrial capacities and military mobility (23). They can also use resources from 
their recovery and resilience plans for equity injections in National Promotional Banks and 
Institutions  (NPBIs),  as  well  as  for  contributions  to  EU  programmes  for  satellite 
communications and to the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) – as highlighted 
in  the  Communication  “NextGenerationEU  –  The  road  to  2026” (24).  To  enable 
contributions to EDIP, it is necessary to very quickly finalise the ongoing legislative trilogues 
and to insert an enabling provision. These additional opportunities to use EU funds for defence 
further strengthen the volume of available resources and therefore the rationale for removing 
unnecessary obstacles or administrative burdens to  the effective deployment  of defence 
investments. 

In this context, first, state measures to support investments in general infrastructures, such 
as widening of railway tunnels or reinforcing of road or railway bridges to create mobility 
corridors,  do  not  constitute  State  aid,  as  they  are  public-remit  activities  related  to  the 
exercise of State prerogatives. The same is valid for the functions of the Member States’ 
armed forces, which generally also fall within public-remit activities. Member States do 
not need to notify these measures to the Commission.  

Second, in the current context, there is a compelling Union as well as national interest in 
ramping up defence production and  an observed failure of market operators to  respond 
sufficiently  timely  to  this  need  due  to  a  number  of  objective  factors  (e.g.  fragmented 
procurement markets, uncertainty of demand over time, access to finance). Therefore, the 
specific  case  of  State  aid  measures  to  support  investment  in  production  capacity  for 
defence  products  and  services  can  normally  be  deemed  to  support  essential  security 

(23)  Commission  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending 
Regulations  (EU)  2021/694,  (EU)  2021/695,  (EU)  2021/697,  (EU)  2021/1153,  (EU)  2023/1525  and 
2024/795,  as  regards  incentivising  defence-related  investments  in  the  EU  budget  to  implement  the 
ReArm Europe Plan: COM/2025/188 final, 22.04.2025. 

(24)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, NextGenerationEU 

- The road to 2026, 4.6.2025, COM(2025) 310 final. 

10 

 
 
interests without adversely affecting the conditions of competition in the internal market 
and  thus  would  fall  within  the  scope  of  Article  346  TFEU.  Where  Article  346  TFEU 
applies to State aid measures, Member States do not need to notify such measures to the 
Commission.  Under  Article  346  TFEU  and  the  related  case-law,  the  necessity  and 
proportionality of national measures to protect essential security interests is examined case 
by case for each such measure, having regard to its context and effects. Thus, such a finding 
regarding  State  aid  measures  is  without  prejudice  to  the  assessment  of  applicability  of 
Article  346  TFEU  to  national  measures  affecting  other  Union  rules,  e.g.  in  the  field  of 
defence  procurement.  Rules  to  promote  a  Europe-wide  market  for  defence  products 
enhance economic conditions for investment in defence production, and thus reinforce the 
security of the Union and its individual Member States. In fields other than State aid, all 
claims for Article 346 TFEU derogation will therefore continue to be closely scrutinised. 

Third,  where  public  support  constitutes  State  aid  and  does  not  fall  under  Article  346 
TFEU, it may be covered by the compatibility possibilities offered under existing State aid 
guidelines, frameworks or the General Block Exemption Regulation (25). Such aid, either 
in the form of individual aid or of aid schemes, can also be approved directly under Article 
107(3)(c) TFEU. Under this provision, the Commission may consider aid to facilitate the 
development  of  certain  economic  activities,  including  also  essential  inputs  for  the 
production  of  defence  products  and  services,  to  be  compatible  with  State  aid  rules, 
provided  it  does  not  adversely  affect  trading  conditions  to  an  extent  contrary  to  the 
common interest. In the overall balancing of the positive effects against negative effects 
on  competition  and  trade,  the  Commission  will  take  due  account  of  the  measure’s 
contribution  to  the  defence  readiness  2030  objective,  as  well  as  the  specificities  of  the 
defence market,  where demand comes  from  Member States,  who control  acquisition of 
defence-related products and technologies, including exports. Elements to be taken into 
account positively in the overall balancing test can, for instance, include the fact that the 
aid is granted in the context of EU programmes (26), the contribution by the investment to 
the resilience  needs  of the Union, the need for  Member States  to  protect  their essential 
security interest; the cross-border cooperation supported by the project, where applicable; 
the positive effects on interoperability and security of supply of defence-related products 
or  inputs  thereof  across  the  Union (27),  reduction  of  dependencies  on  third  countries  or 
contribution  of  the  project  to  closing  critical  defence  capability  gaps,  including  but  not 
limited to those identified in the White Paper and SAFE (28). 

The  Commission  will  prioritise  the  treatment  of  cases  with  the  objective  of  defence 
readiness, whether notified as individual aid or as aid schemes. In its assessment, it will 
ensure  that,  to  the  extent  it  constitutes  notifiable  State  aid,  such  support  is  necessary, 
proportionate and does not lead to overcompensation. The Commission will be particularly 
attentive  to  issues  or  requests  for  clarification  raised  in  the  context  of  Member  State 
preparations  to  implement  SAFE,  in  accordance  with  the  timeline  laid  down  in  that 

(25)  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No 651/2014  of  17 June  2014  declaring  certain  categories  of  aid 

compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty. 

(26)  Such as the EU defence industry programmes and cohesion funds. 

(27)  Eg.  when products  can  serve the  needs  of  multiple  users  across  the  Union,  takes  place as  structured 

efforts to ensure diversified supply. 

(28)  Council  Regulation  (EU)  2025/1106  of  27  May  2025  establishing  the  Security  Action  for  Europe 
(SAFE)  through  the  Reinforcement  of  the  European  Defence  Industry  Instrument,  OJ  L,  2025/1106, 
28.5.2025.. 

11 

 
 
instrument (29) but also to assess whether the ramp-up of defence production and/or scale 
up of the defence industry to reach defence readiness by 2030 results in certain constraints 
within defence related sectors arising amongst other factors, notably from limited access 
to financing. If necessary, the Commission will provide appropriate and timely guidance 
on  the  assessment  of  public  support  for  the  defence  sector (30).  With  a  view  to 
understanding  whether  such  guidance  is  needed  and,  if  so,  its  possible  scope,  the 
Commission  will proactively  seek inputs,  through a continuous and structured dialogue 
with Member States (including jointly all relevant authorities, e.g. those responsible for 
State aid, industry and defence) and other stakeholders.  

Boosting  public  investment  in  defence  is  indispensable  and  urgent,  but  it  will  not  be 
sufficient. The Savings and Investments Union Communication (31), in alignment with the 
White Paper on Defence Readiness 2030, underlined the importance of mobilising private 
financing for the defence industry and noted that decisive and urgent action is necessary to 
significantly  increase  funding  opportunities  for  companies  of  the  European  Defence 
Technological  and  Industrial  Base.  European  companies  including  Small  and  Medium 
Enterprises  and  Mid-Caps (32)  must  have  better  and  more  flexible  access  to  capital, 
including  guarantee  instruments  for  de-risking  investments,  to  bring  their  solutions  to 
industrial scale and to drive the industrial ramp-up that the Union requires.  

Under the InvestEU Fund (33), financing or investment operations designated as "strategic 
investments",  including  those  in  defence,  are  subject  to  specific  eligibility  limitations, 
which can hinder the ability to effectively utilise the InvestEU Fund to support investments 
in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The Commission proposes to 
adapt  the  eligibility  criteria  for  the  defence  sector  to  the  specificities  of  financial 
instruments (debt, debt guarantees and equity financing) offered under the InvestEU fund, 
while  maintaining  necessary  safeguards.  This  will  enhance  and  simplify  access  to 
financing  and  allow  better  supporting  European  Defence  Technological  and  Industrial 
Base’s growth and development. 

While the Union’s Sustainable Finance Framework (34) does not prevent financing of the 
defence  sector,  both  the  finance  and  defence  sector  may  benefit  from  additional 

(29)  Member  States  willing  to  receive  financial  assistance  under  the  SAFE  instrument  shall express  their 
interest  by  end  July  2025.  Shortly  after,  they  will  receive  by  the  Commission  a  notification  on  the 
tentative  allocations  of  the  loan  amounts  available  to  each  Member  State.  By  end  November  2025, 
Member States will have to present a request for financial assistance, accompanied by their European 
defence industrial investment plan. The signature of a loan agreement with the Commission will allow 
Member States to receive funding. 

(30)  Guidance on State aid compatibility can take different forms according to needs, from a vade mecum of 
relevant precedents or an interpretative notice to self-binding Commission guidelines or frameworks. 

(31)  Commission Communication, Savings and Investments Union: A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth 

and Economic Competitiveness in the EU: COM/2025/124 final. 

(32)  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2025/1099  of  21  May  2025  on  the  definition  of  small  mid-cap 

enterprises, C/2025/3500: OJ L, 2025/1099. 

(33)  Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing 
the  InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017: PE/74/2020/REV/1: OJ L 107, 
26.3.2021, p. 30–89. 

(34)  Regulation  (EU)  2020/852  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18  June  2020  on  the 
establishment  of  a  framework  to  facilitate  sustainable  investment,  and  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
2019/2088, OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13. 

12 

 
 
 
clarification on its application through a Guidance Notice. To provide legal certainty to 
investors, the Commission clarifies that only weapons prohibited by the international arms 
conventions to which the majority of Member State is party should be considered in the 
context of the Paris-Aligned and Climate Transition Benchmark exclusions. In addition, 
the Commission clarifies that the needs and specificities of the defence industry are fully 
taken into account in the sustainable reporting obligations, notably by clarifying that the 
defence industry is more likely than other sectors to use provisions to withhold sensitive 
information (for example on raw material supply volumes or certain sustainability-related 
financial  information).  If  warranted,  further  to  the  ongoing  revisions  of  the  Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting Directive (35), the Commission will make additional adjustments 
in the upcoming review of the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (36) in 2025. 
Finally, in the review of the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (37), if necessary, 
the  Commission  will  provide  clarifications  on  the  relationship  between  defence 
investments and the EU sustainability framework to reach the defence readiness objective.  

Developing skills and ensuring employment frameworks adapted to defence readiness 

Closing the capability gaps and ramping up defence production relies on the availability 
of specialised skills and innovative talents in the defence industry, including supply chain 
players from Small and Medium Enterprises to prime contractors. Although the European 
defence  sector  has  skilled  and  specialised  employees,  a  large-scale  defence  industrial 
ramp-up  will  require  industry  to  attract,  train,  employ,  up-  and  reskill  and  retain  more 
talents,  from  technicians  to  engineers  and  specialised  experts.  Increasing  the  share  of 
STEM  graduates  is  a  prerequisite  in  this  regard.  The  Union  of  Skills (38),  including  its 
underpinning  STEM  Education  Strategic  Plan,  will  facilitate  up-  and  re-skilling  of  the 
workforce  to  support  the  defence  industry,  including  by  strengthening  the  Pact  for 
Skills (39) and by reviewing and implementing targeted skills academies and supporting 
vocational  excellence  centres.  The  Commission  will  support  additional  vocational 
excellence  centres  for  the  defence  industry,  as  well  as  workforce  mobility  and  support 
defence-related  education,  in  line  with  the  European  Defence  Industrial  Strategy (40), 
notably through opportunities provided by the European defence industrial programmes 
and Erasmus+. 

Ensuring high standards for health, safety and labour rights of military forces and defence 
industry workers is crucial to achieve fully the objective of defence readiness of Europe 
and to attract and retain skilled personnel. Military personnel and industry workers perform 
vital roles when war is raging at our borders but also to build long-lasting European peace. 

(35)  COM(2025)81 final 

(36)  Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2023/2772  of  31  July  2023  supplementing  Directive 
2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards sustainability reporting standards: 
C/2023/5303: OJ L, 2023/2772, 22.12.2023.  

(37)  Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 on 
sustainability‐related  disclosures  in  the  financial  services  sector:  PE/87/2019/REV/1:  OJ  L  317, 
9.12.2019, p. 1–16. 

(38)  Commission Communication on the Union of Skills: COM/2025/90 final, 5.03.2025. 

(39)  Commission  Communication  on  a  European  Skills  Agenda  for  sustainable  competitiveness,  social 

fairness and resilience: COM/2020/274 final, 1.07.2020. 

(40)  Joint Communication on a new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through 

a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry: JOIN/2024/10 final, 5.03.2024. 

13 

 
 
The Working Time Directive (41) is a cornerstone of the Union’s employment and social 
acquis, safeguarding workers’ health and safety through minimum standards for working 
hours and rest periods. In the prevailing geopolitical landscape, to make defence agility a 
reality and to drive the industrial ramp-up by 2030, careful attention must be attributed to 
the  objective  of  defence  readiness  when  applying  the  Directive’s  provisions.  When  it 
comes to industrial production and the provision of related services in the defence sector, 
the Commission clarifies that  the derogations foreseen in  the Directive (42) can be used 
where there is a surge of activity, including for defence readiness, and invites the Member 
States to provide legal clarity and ensure legal certainty when it comes to their application. 
Concerning the Armed Forces, the Court of Justice has confirmed that the Directive may 
be disapplied in relation to certain specific activities, including active deployment. While 
preserving  existing  flexibilities,  the  Commission  will  engage  with    Member  States  and 
social  partners  on  the  application  of  the  Directive  to  military  personnel  in  the  Armed 
Forces, including on whether it is opportune to amend the Directive to enhance existing 
exemptions. 

Conclusion  

Armed conflict has returned to Europe and geostrategic and hybrid threats are multiplying 
around  us.  A  new  international  order  will  emerge  in  this  decade.  If  we  do  not  want  to 
simply accept the consequences this will have for Europe and the world, we must shape 
this  new  order.  It  is  now  the  time  to  boost  Europe’s  defence  readiness,  weakened  by 
decades  of  underinvestment  in  defence  capabilities,  important  capability  gaps  and 
unnecessary red tape that Member States need to urgently address. 

The  massive  increase  in  European  defence  spending  announced  by  the  ReArm  Europe 
Plan/Readiness 2030, accompanied by a dedicated financial instrument to support Member 
States’ defence investments, requires revisiting existing EU legislation to be more flexible 
and attract greater defence investments. Simpler, faster and more agile. Building on the 
outcome  of  wide  public  consultations,  as  well  as  on  the  strategic  and  implementation 
dialogues  held  with  industry  and  Member  States,  this  Defence  Readiness  Omnibus 
proposes  a  mindset  shift  for  defence  readiness  and  agility  in  the  Union’s  legislative 
framework: remove regulatory hurdles, simplify and harmonise rules and procedures that 
are specific to the defence sector as well as on Union’s regulations impacting the defence 
industry and which are not defence specific. It tackles the defence industry challenges that 
impede the European  Defence  Technological  and  Industrial  Base from responding with 
maximum agility to the current heightened needs by the Union, particularly considering 
increased global tensions and the war of aggression in Ukraine.  

History  does  not  forgive  either  dithering  or  delaying.  Our  mission  is  European 
independence.  This  European  Defence  Readiness  Omnibus  marks  an  important  step 
towards  building  an  independent  Europe  that  serves  the  Pax  Europaea,  strengthening 
Europe’s  capacity  to  safeguard  peace  and  security,  so  that  our  future  can  be  free  from 
coercion and aggression and the next generations will be able to live the European dream 
our  founders  fought  so  hard  for,  in  peace  and  prosperity,  averting  war  and  the  ensuing 
massive human casualties and environmental damages.  

(41)  Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 

certain aspects of the organisation of working time: OJ L 299, 18.11.2003, p. 9–19. 

(42) Notably Articles 17 and 18 of Directive 2003/88/EC. 

14