Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation
Date: 2025-06-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, European Commission
Subjects: bank, credit policy, financial instrument, financial legislation, financial risk, financial supervision, financial transaction, insurance company, investment

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Strasbourg, 17.6.2025  COM(2025) 826 final 2025/0826 (COD)  Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation (Text with EEA relevance) {SEC(2025) 825 final} - {SWD(2025) 826 final} - {SWD(2026) 825 final}  
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 

1. 

• 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

Relaunching the European securitisation market can help increasing the amount of financing 
available to the real economy. That is more important than ever in the current economic and 
geopolitical  environment  where  the  Union  faces  significant  investment  needs  to  remain 
resilient  and  competitive.  Well-functioning  securitisation  markets  can  contribute  to  higher 
economic  growth  and facilitate funding of Union  strategic objectives, including  investments 
in the green, digital and social transition, by allowing banks to transfer risks to those that are 
best  suited  to  bear  them  and  thereby  free  up  their  capital.  Banks  are  expected  to  use  this 
capital  for  additional  lending  to  households  and  businesses,  including  small  and  medium-
sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  By  redistributing  risk  within  the  wider  financial  system, 
securitisation  can  also  provide  capital  market  investors  with  more  investment  opportunities. 
The current EU securitisation framework is keeping the EU economy from reaping many of 
the benefits that securitisation can offer. 
The  reports  from  Enrico  Letta1  and  Mario  Draghi2  have  recommended  securitisation  as  a 
means  of  strengthening  the  lending  capacity  of  European  Union’s  banks  for  the  financing 
needs  of  EU  priorities  including  defence,  creating  deeper  capital  markets,  building  the 
Savings and Investments Union and increasing the EU’s competitiveness. 

The European Council has asked the European Commission to identify measures to relaunch 
the  European  securitisation  market,  including  “through  regulatory  and  prudential  changes, 
using available room for manoeuvre”3 and to swiftly propose, in 2025, a revised securitisation 
framework4. There is also a call for action by many stakeholders, including issuers, investors 
and  supervisors,  to  address  barriers  that  are  hindering  the  development  of  the  EU 
securitisation market5.  

The EU securitisation framework was put in place in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
and  responded  to  concerns  about  risky  US  securitisations.  At  the  time,  strict  requirements 
were  considered  necessary  to  restore  the  reputation  of  the  securitisation  market  which  had 
been suffering from inadequate protections and severe investor distrust. Now that appropriate 
safeguards  have  been  firmly  embedded  in  the  market’s  organisation  and  securitisation  is 
gaining back investors’ trust, a better balance between safeguards and growth opportunities - 
both  for  investments  and  issuance-  needs  to  be  found.  The  experience  with  the  framework 
indicates that it is  too  conservative  and limits  the potential use of securitisations in  the EU. 
High  operational  costs  and  overly  conservative  capital  requirements  keep  many  issuers  and 
investors out of the securitisation market.  

The  review  aims  to  recognise  the  risk  mitigants  implemented  in  the  EU  securitisation 
regulatory and supervisory frameworks, which have significantly reduced the risks embedded 
in  securitisation  transactions,  as  well  as  the  good  credit  performance  of  EU  securitisations. 

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3 
4 
5 

Letta,  E.  (2024).  Much  more  than  a  market  -  Speed,  Security,  Solidarity.  Empowering  the  Single 
Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens. 
Draghi, M. (2024). The Future of European Competitiveness—A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe.  
European Council conclusions of April 2024. 
European Council conclusions of March 2025. 
Feedback  on  call  for  evidence  on  review  of  the  Securitisation  Framework,  19  February  2025  –  26 
March  2025,  europa.eu;  feedback  on  2024  targeted  consultation  on  the  functioning  of  the  EU 
securitisation framework, 9 October – 4 December 2024, finance.ec.europa.eu. 

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This  proposal  contributes  to  the  2024-2029  Commission’s  priority  of  ‘A  new  plan  for 
Europe’s  sustainable  prosperity  and  competitiveness’.  The  proposal  is  a  component  of  the 
Savings  and  Investments  Union6,  which  is  a  cornerstone  of  the  2024-2029  Commission 
mandate, and it is the first legislative initiative under the Savings and Investments Union. At 
the  same  time,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  the  Securitisation  Review  is  not  a  ‘silver 
bullet’ on its own. The SIU project encompasses a broad range of other and complementary 
measures  to  achieve  its  goals.  Nevertheless,  the  European  Commission  expects  that  the 
amendments  to  the non-prudential  and prudential  requirements envisaged in this package of 
proposals  will  lead  financial  institutions  to  engage  in  more  securitisation  activity  and, 
importantly, to use the resultant capital relief for additional lending.  

The proposed review of the EU securitisation framework aims to remove undue issuance and 
investment barriers in the EU securitisation market, specifically:   

• 

• 

To reduce undue operational costs for issuers and investors, balancing with adequate 
standards of transparency, investor protection and supervision.   

To  adjust  the  prudential  framework  for  banks  and  insurers,  to  better  account  for 
actual  risks  and  remove  undue  prudential  costs  when  issuing  and  investing  in 
securitisations, while at the same time safeguarding financial stability.   

The  main  financial  stability  safeguards  in  the  framework  (risk  retention,  ban  on  re-
securitisation, robust credit granting standards) will not be affected by this reform. Moreover, 
the proposed changes are accompanied by changes to the supervisory framework that improve 
supervisory convergence and ensure that the supervisory framework is fit for a growing  EU 
securitisation market. 

The review of the  EU  securitisation  framework  aims to  remove undue obstacles that hinder 
the growth and development of the EU securitisation market, but without introducing risks to 
financial  stability,  market  integrity  or  investor  protection.  To  achieve  this,  the  proposed 
reforms  are  carefully  targeted  to  address  specific  impediments  to  issuance  and  (non-bank) 
investment. The review envisages changes to four legal acts: 

• 

• 

• 

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a  legislative  proposal  amending  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (the  ‘Securitisation  Regulation’7),  which  sets  out 
product rules and conduct rules for issuers and investors  

a proposal amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council (the ‘Capital Requirements Regulation’ or ‘CRR’8), which sets out the 
capital requirements for banks holding and investing into securitisation, as well as  

amendments  to  two  delegated  Regulations:  the  Commission  Delegated  Regulation 
(EU) 2015/61 (the ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) Delegated Act’9), governing the 

https://finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/13085856-09c8-4040-918e-
890a1ed7dbf2_en?filename=250319-communication-savings-investmlents-union_en.pdf 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 laying 
down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent 
and  standardised  securitisation,  and  amending  Directives  2009/65/EC,  2009/138/EC  and  2011/61/EU 
and  Regulations  (EC)  No  1060/2009  and  (EU)  No  648/2012,  OJ  L  347,  28.12.2017,  p.  35, 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2402/oj). 
Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26  June  2013  on 
prudential  requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj). 

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eligibility  criteria  for  assets  to  be  included  in  banks’  liquidity  buffer,  and  the 
Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2015/35  (the  ‘Solvency  II  (SII)  Delegated 
Act’10),  governing 
insurance  and  reinsurance 
undertakings. 

the  capital  requirements  for 

The  envisaged  changes  aim  to  make  targeted  improvements  to  the  framework,  rather  than 
overhaul  it.  Those  changes  should  be  viewed  as  a  package,  as  none  of  the  individual 
components  will  achieve  the  desired  outcome  on  its  own.  The  elements  of  the  package 
address both the supply and demand side of the market and reinforce each other to produce 
the  desired  impact.  Streamlining  reporting  requirements  and  lowering  capital  requirements 
will  both  lower  entry  barriers  and  make  it  cheaper  for  banks  to  originate  securitisations. 
Simplifying due diligence and amending the capital charges and liquidity treatment will make 
it easier and more  attractive to  invest in  securitisation. A larger and more dynamic investor 
base  will  also  incentivise  more  issuance.  Relaunching  the  EU  securitisation  market  is  a 
complex  issue  that  requires  changes  to  be  made  in  various  parts  of  the  framework  to  foster 
supply and demand in the securitisation market.  

Regulation alone can only go so far in terms of stimulating this market’s development: market 
participants  must  also  step  in  and  do  their  part,  e.g.  by  embracing  standardisation  and 
industry-wide  initiatives  towards  specific  segments  –  without  market  participant  efforts, 
scaling up of the market will not be possible. 

Various inputs have informed this review, including the  2020 EBA report on the significant 
risk  transfer,  the  2020  ESRB  report  on  Monitoring  systemic  risks  in  the  EU  securitisation 
market,  the  2022  Commission  Report  on  the  Securitisation  Regulation,  the  2022  Joint 
Committee of the ESAs advice on the prudential framework, the 2024 targeted consultation 
on the functioning of the EU securitisation framework, and the 2025 Joint Committee Report 
on the implementation and functioning of the securitisation framework. The Commission also 
held  various bilateral  meetings with  stakeholders  and organised a workshop in  July  2024 to 
discuss stakeholder views about the EU securitisation framework. 

In  terms  of  timing,  the  amendments  to  the  Securitisation  Regulation  and  the  Capital 
Requirements  Regulation  are  adopted  by  the  Commission  together.  On  the  same  date,  the 
draft amendments to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Delegated Regulation should be published 
on  Have  Your  Say  for  a  four-week  consultation.  The  Commission  plans  to  adopt  draft 
amendments to the Solvency II Delegated Regulation in a broader package of amendments to 
that Regulation that is expected to be published for consultation in the second half of July of 
this year. 

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

The  revision  to  the  non-prudential  provisions  of  the  EU  securitisation  framework  under  the 
Securitisation Regulation are part of a broader legislative package that includes amendments 

9 

10 

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61 of 10 October 2014 to supplement Regulation (EU) 
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement 
for Credit Institutions OJ L 11, 17.1.2015, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2015/61/oj).)) 
Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2015/35  of  10  October  2014  supplementing  Directive 
2009/138/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  taking-up  and  pursuit  of  the 
(OJ  L  12,  17/01/2015,  p.  1, 
business  of 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2015/35/oj) 

Insurance  and  Reinsurance 

(Solvency 

II) 

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to the Capital Requirements Regulation, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio Delegated Act and the 
Solvency  II  Delegated  Act.  The  proposed  changes  have  been  drafted  to  ensure  consistency 
across the various pieces of legislation and with the same general objective in mind.  

The current proposal aligns the provisions on the delegation of due diligence tasks with those 
contained  in  Directive  2011/61/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (the 
‘AIFMD’)11. 

In  addition  to  the  legislative  changes  included  in  this  package,  the  Commission  is  also 
considering  amending  the  issuer  limit  in  the  Undertakings  for  Collective  Investment  in 
Directive  2009/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (the  ‘UCITS 
Directive’)12  in  the  context  of  the  upcoming  overall  review  of  the  UCITS  Directive.  The 
UCITS Directive imposes a limit on UCITS funds not to acquire more than 10% of the debt 
securities of a single issuing body. In case of securitisation that means that UCITS funds are 
only  allowed  to  invest  up  to  10%  in  a  single  securitisation  issuance  since  the  securitisation 
vehicle itself is considered the issuer.  

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

By making the EU securitisation framework less burdensome and, more principles-based, the 
current  proposal  also  contributes  to  the  current  Commission-wide  effort  to  cut  red  tape  and 
simplify the business environment as announced in the Commission 2025 work programme.  

The review of the securitisation framework is  also in  line with  the European Commission’s 
broader  strategy  to  rejuvenate  the  EU's  economy,  as  outlined  in  the  Competitiveness 
Compass.  By  removing  undue  issuance  and  investment  barriers  in  the  EU  securitisation 
market, the Commission aims to ensure that the EU economy can benefit from increased risk 
sharing  opportunities  and  financing,  thereby  supporting  economic  growth  and  the  EU’s 
competitiveness.  

Part  of  the  identified  issuance  and  investment  barriers  stems  from  high  operational  costs 
linked to the regulation. Removing these costs is therefore also in line with the Commission’s 
communication on a "Simpler and Faster Europe", which emphasizes reducing the regulatory 
burden on both households and businesses.  

Finally,  the  proposal  is  consistent  with  the  Union's  objective  of  safeguarding  financial 
stability by ensuring that securitisation markets operate in a transparent, prudent, and resilient 
manner. 

2. 

• 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The  legal  basis  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402is  Article  114  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (the  ‘TFEU’)  which  confers  to  the  institutions  of  the 
European  Union  the  competence  to  lay  down  appropriate  provisions  that  have  as  their 
objective  the  establishment  and  functioning  of  the  single  market.  The  proposal  introduces 

11 

12 

Directive  2011/61/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  8 June  2011  on  Alternative 
Investment  Fund  Managers  and  amending  Directives  2003/41/EC  and  2009/65/EC  and  Regulations 
1, 
(EC)  No 1060/2009 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/61/oj). 
Directive  2009/65/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  July  2009  on  the 
coordination  of  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  relating  to  undertakings for  collective 
(recast),  OJ  L  302,  17.11.2009,  p.  32, 
investment 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/65/oj). 

(EU)  No 1095/2010,  OJ 

transferable  securities 

1.7.2011, 

(UCITS) 

174, 

and 

in 

p. 

L 

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targeted amendments to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402and is therefore based on the same legal 
basis. 

In  particular,  Article  114  TFEU  confers  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  with  the 
competence  to  adopt  measures  for  the  approximation  of  the  provisions  laid  down  by  law, 
regulation  or  administrative  action  in  Member  States  which  have,  as  their  object,  the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market. Article 114 TFEU allows the Union to 
take  measures  not  only  to  eliminate  current  obstacles  to  the  exercise  of  the  fundamental 
freedoms, but also to prevent, if they are sufficiently concretely foreseeable, the emergence of 
such  obstacles,  including  those  that  make  it  difficult  for  economic  operators,  including 
investors, to take full advantage of the benefits of the internal market. 

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

Securitisation products are an important segment of Union financial markets, contributing to 
Union financial integration. Securitisation links financial institutions from different sectors of 
the  financial  markets  and  from  different  Member  States  and  non-EU  jurisdictions  and  can 
raise financial stability issues when not properly regulated. Therefore, securitisation requires 
regulation at Union level.  

The purpose of the proposal is to make the EU securitisation framework less burdensome, and 
more  principles-based.  Achieving  that  objective  will  mean  that  financial  institutions  across 
the  Union  are  better  able  to  use  securitisation  as  a  tool  to  deepen  EU  capital  markets,  to 
diversify their risk profile and to free up banks’ balance sheets for additional lending to EU 
households and businesses. Action at EU level also ensures a high level of financial stability 
across  the  EU.  Overall,  that  aims  to  contribute  to  a  more  competitive  and  resilient  EU 
economy.   

In  particular,  the  proposal  examines  certain  provisions  on  due  diligence,  transparency  and 
supervision13.  Only  action  at  EU  level  can  ensure  that  going  forward,  those  regulatory 
provisions  are  applied  uniformly  and  guarantee  the  existence  of  the  well-established 
regulatory  framework  regarding  the  taking  up  and  the  pursuit  of  securitisation  and  business 
across  the  Single  Market.  That  is  especially  important  as  the  majority  of  EU  securitisation 
activity  is  concentrated  in  a  handful  of  EU  Member  States.  A  Union-wide  regulatory 
framework  is  fundamental  to  facilitating  cross-border  securitisations,  and  particularly  to 
enable such activity in Member States where  there is currently low uptake of securitisations 
overall.  The  ability  of  Member  States  to  adopt  national  measures  is  limited,  given  that  the 
existing  EU  securitisation  framework  already  provides  for  a  harmonised  set  of  rules  at  EU 
level and that changes at national level would conflict with Union law currently in force.  

• 

Proportionality 

The policy choices within the proposal are considered proportionate as they target key areas 
such  as  streamlining  transparency  and  due  diligence  rules  without  compromising  financial 
stability  or  market  integrity.  The  measures  are  calibrated  to  make  the  framework  more 
proportionate  than  it  currently  is,  and  to  set  out  a  targeted  and  balanced  approach  foster 

13 

The targeted changes to supervision aim to enhance the effective functioning of supervision under the 
existing  framework.  Those  adjustments  aim  to  support  more  consistent  supervisory  practices  and 
facilitate  cross-border  securitisation  activity  within  the  Union.  By  clarifying  certain  aspects  and 
ensuring clearer delineation of responsibilities, the proposed amendments are expected to foster greater 
supervisory convergence without imposing significant new obligations on stakeholders 

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issuance,  investment,  and  market  confidence.  The  proposal’s  proportionality  is  further 
substantiated  by  the  Impact  Assessment,  which  assesses  the  potential  costs  and  benefits, 
ensuring the chosen measures are necessary and effective in meeting the overarching goals of 
the reform. 

At the same time, the policy choices do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the stated 
objectives and refrain from a complete overhaul of the regulatory framework.  

• 

Choice of the instrument 

The proposal is an amendment to Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 and, therefore, it is a proposal 
for a Regulation. No alternative means – legislative or operational – can be used to attain the 
objectives of this proposal. 

3. 

• 

RESULTS 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

EX-POST 

EVALUATIONS, 

OF 

STAKEHOLDER 

Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation 

An  evaluation  of  the  securitisation  framework  was  conducted  covering  the  period  from  the 
date  of  into  application  of  the  securitisation  framework  (1  January  2019)  until  present.  Its 
scope includes the legal framework in its entirety (Securitisation Regulation, relevant parts to 
the  CRR,  LCR  Delegated  Act  and  SII  Delegated  Act  that  pertain  to  securitisation 
transactions).  

In  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Toolbox,  it  examines  whether  the  objectives  of  the 
securitisation  framework  were  met  during  the  period  of  its  application  (effectiveness)  and 
continue to be appropriate (relevance) and whether the framework, taking account of the costs 
and benefits associated with applying it, was efficient in achieving its objectives (efficiency). 
The  evaluation  also  considers  whether  the  securitisation  framework,  as  legislation  at  Union 
level, provided added value (EU added value) and whether it is consistent with other related 
pieces  of  legislation  (coherence).  The  evaluation  was  conducted  in  parallel  with  the  impact 
assessment accompanying the proposal revising the securitisation framework.  

The  evaluation  concluded  that  the  securitisation  framework  was  partially  successful  in 
meeting its original objectives. It has supported the standardisation of processes and practices 
and  partly  tackled  regulatory  uncertainty.  However,  it  has  only  been  partly  successful  in 
removing the stigma associated with securitisation, and in removing regulatory disadvantages 
for simple and transparent  securitisations, despite the regulatory improvements put  in  place. 
Moreover, the Framework has not been successful in reducing high operational costs and in 
significantly scaling up the securitisation market in the EU.  

 As  a  result,  the  evaluation  concluded  that  more  is  needed  to  ensure  that  securitisation  can 
meaningfully contribute to improve the financing of the EU economy and further develop the 
Savings  and  Investments  Union.  More  specifically,  the  evaluation  assessed  that  very 
prescriptive  legal  requirements  in  the  area  of  transparency  and  due  diligence  result  in  high 
operational costs for issuers and investors in securitisations, and that a more principles-based 
approach  might  be  more  suitable.  The  prudential  framework  for  banks  and  insurers  is 
insufficiently risk sensitive and capital ‘non-neutrality’ is disproportionately high for certain 

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securitisation  transactions.  Therefore,  to  address  undue  prudential  barriers,  a  revision  of  the 
prudential treatment of securitisations is necessary. 

• 

Stakeholder consultations 

On  3  July  2024,  the  Commission  hosted  a  Securitisation  Workshop,  which  invited 
representatives  from  the  banking  industry/associations,  Ministries,  European  Supervisory 
Authorities  (ESAs),  the  Single  Supervisory  Mechanism  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  the 
European  Investment  Bank,  insurers,  asset  managers,  nongovernmental  organisations  and 
pension funds to share their views.  

A  targeted  public  consultation  on  the  functioning  of  the  EU  securitisation  framework  was 
carried out between 9 October 2024 to 4 December 2024. 133 responses were received from a 
variety  of  stakeholders14.  The  consultation  was  split  into  twelve  sections  which  sought  to 
gather  views  from  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders  active  in  the  EU  securitisation  market  on 
whether  the  securitisation  framework  met  and  continues  to  meet  its  objectives  in  terms  of 
market safety, operational cost reduction and prudential risk-sensitivity. The consultation was 
also  used  to  collect  feedback  on  the  operation  of  the  STS  standard,  the  effectiveness  of 
supervision,  and  the  prospect  of  a  future  securitisation  platform(s).  In  addition,  the 
Commission has carried a series of bilateral meetings with a wide range of stakeholders who 
confirmed the feedback already received. 

The feedback gathered in that consultation is reflected in the evaluation of the securitisation 
framework. 

A call for evidence was opened between 19 February 2025 and 26 March 202515 to request 
feedback from stakeholders on the review of the securitisation framework. Stakeholders were 
asked  to  provide  views  on  the  Commission's  understanding  of  the  problem  and  possible 
solutions, and to provide relevant information. 34 respondents replied to the call for evidence 
and  presented  their  views16.  Out  of  those  34  respondents,  2617  had  also  replied  to  the  2024 
targeted consultation, with their views remaining broadly the same. Points made by first-time 
respondents  were  also  consistent  with  the  feedback  of  the  targeted  consultation  previously 
received.  

• 

Collection and use of expertise 

The  preparation  of  this  proposal  has  benefited  from  extensive  expert  input,  including 
stakeholder  consultations,  meetings,  and  analytical  work  carried  out  by  the  ESAs.  In 
particular,  the  ESAs  delivered  the  2021  and  2025  Art.  44  Joint  Committee  reports  on  the 

14 

15 
16 

17 

at 

https://finance.ec.europa.eu/regulation-and-supervision/consultations-0/targeted-

Available 
consultation-functioning-eu-securitisation-framework-2024_en 
Securities and markets - review of the Securitisation Framework (europa.eu) 
One respondent made two separate (substantively similar) contributions; another respondent submitted 
three separate contributions. Therefore, 37 contributions were received, from 34 individual respondents. 
The 
represented:  7 
companies/businesses,  15  business  associations,  2  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs),  2  such 
respondents identified as “other 

targeted  consultation 

that  had  already 

respondents 

replied 

the 

to 

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implementation and functioning of the Securitisation Regulation18. Those reports focused on 
the  implementation  of  the  general  requirements  applicable  to  securitisations,  including  the 
risk retention, due-diligence and transparency requirements, and specific requirements related 
to STS securitisation, with respect to the Frameworks original objective of contributing to the 
sound revival of the EU securitisation framework. 

National authorities were consulted in the framework of the Eurogroup Working Group+ , the 
Council  Financial  Services  Committee  ,  and  the  Commission  Expert  Group  on  Banking, 
Payments  and  Insurance.  Several  Member  States  also  replied  to  the  Targeted  Consultation 
through their finance ministries and engaged with the Commission bilaterally.   

• 

Impact assessment 

For the preparation of this review an Impact Assessment was prepared and discussed with an 
Interservice Steering Group. The Impact Assessment report was submitted to the Regulatory 
Scrutiny Board on 12 March 2025. The board meeting took place on 9 April 2025. The Board 
gave  a  positive  opinion  and  called  for  changes  and  additional  input  in  the  following  areas: 
problem  definition  and  substantiation;  further  detail  on  the  assessed  options  and  associated 
trade-offs; additional assessment on the combined impacts of options, particularly in relation 
to their relative risk levels and impact on financial stability. Those issues have been addressed 
and  incorporated  in  the  final  version  which  is  available  on  the  Commission  website  and 
published together with this proposal.  

Policy options for the entire package were identified in three key areas. Options to (i) reduce 
high operational  costs, (ii)  reduce undue prudential barriers  for  banks to issue  and invest  in 
securitisation,  and  (iii)  remove  undue  prudential  costs  for  insurers  to  invest  in  the  EU 
securitisation  market,  were  considered.  That  assessment  resulted  in  a  “bundle”  of  preferred 
options which, taken together, were deemed to best achieve the stated objectives. 

To reduce high operational costs (estimated at 780 million per year for the market as a whole), 
both  a  targeted  and  broader  set  of  measures  were  considered.  Those  options  involve,  to 
varying  degrees,  simplifying  and  removing  certain  due  diligence  and  transparency 
requirements  that  are  deemed  duplicative  or  overly  prescriptive  (e.g.,  removing  verification 
requirements for EU transactions and streamlining reporting templates). Our preferred option 
results in cost savings of 310 million per year. Similarly, targeted and more radical changes to 
the existing prudential framework for banks were assessed. Those focused on adjustments to 
the  CRR  and  LCR,  seeking  to  ensure  greater  risk-sensitivity  for  the  capital  treatment  of 
securitisation  for  banks,  to  broaden  the  eligibility  of  securitisations  for  banks’  liquidity 
buffers,  and  to  make  supervisors’  assessment  of  transactions’  eligibility  for  capital  relief 
under  the  Significant  Risk  Transfer  Framework  faster  and  more  coherent.  A  fundamental 
revision  of  the  prudential  framework  for  banks  was  another  option  considered.  To  remove 
disincentives  for  insurers  to  invest  in  the  EU  securitisation  market,  three  options  were 
assessed, entailing different degrees and modalities of reductions in the capital requirements 
for insurers investing in securitisations.  

Based on the comparative assessment in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence, a 
preferred bundle of non-prudential and prudential measures was selected which were deemed 
the  best  avenue  for  the  EU  to  take  to  reduce  burden  and  compliance  costs  for  issuers  and 

18 

https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/system/files/2021-05/jc-2021-31-jc-report-on-the-implementation-and-
functioning-of-the-securitisation-regulation.pdf 

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investors,  to  revitalise  the  securitisation  market  and  enhance  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU 
financial  system.  Financial  institutions  across  the  EU  will  face  a  simpler  and  less  costly 
transparency and due diligence regime and greater risk-sensitivity with regards to the actual 
risk of the securitisation investment.  

The impact assessment of the various policy options primarily focused on their economic and 
regulatory  impacts.  The  options  can  be  considered  to  have  only  indirect  impacts  on  social, 
environmental, and fundamental rights issues. Indirectly, the proposal would improve access 
to  credit  and  financial  services,  particularly  for  corporates  and  SMEs,  thereby  promoting 
social  inclusion,  job  creation,  and  economic  growth.  Though  not  the  primary  focus,  the 
proposal may indirectly support environmental sustainability by facilitating green investments 
through improved capital access and alignment with existing green securitisation frameworks. 
There are no direct effects on fundamental rights, but the initiative supports financial stability 
and  complies  with  data  protection  laws,  thereby  indirectly  reinforcing  economic  rights  and 
privacy safeguards. 

• 

Regulatory fitness and simplification 

The proposal simplifies and refines the existing legal provisions applying to securitisations, to 
enhance  efficiency  within  the  securitisation  market.  Therefore,  it  is  of  relevance  to  the 
Regulatory  Fitness  Programme  (REFIT).  The  preferred  option  concerning  the  Securitisation 
Regulation entails a simplification of due diligence duties for businesses and a more efficient 
transparency  framework.  By  reducing  those  obligations,  businesses  will  face  lower 
compliance costs, enabling more resources to  be allocated to  core business  activities. While 
issuers may encounter some one-off adaptation costs, the recurrent reduction in administrative 
burdens  should  outweigh  those  initial  expenditures.  Through  targeted  adjustments  and 
strategic simplification, those measures are positioned to bolster the market's capacity, attract 
a broader base of investors, and encourage economic growth—while maintaining a resilient 
and transparent financial ecosystem.  

The  policy  options  taken  in  this  proposal  should  have  several  positive  effects  on  SME 
financing and competitiveness (see Annexes VII and VIII of the Impact Assessment report).  

• 

Fundamental rights 

The  proposal  is  not  likely  to  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  rights  provided  in  the  Charter  of 
Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union.  The  simplification  and  efficiency  measures  do 
not  directly  address  issues  relating  to  personal  data  or  privacy.  Nonetheless,  changes  to 
disclosure and reporting standards must comply with existing data protection laws to ensure 
the security and privacy of any personal data involved in the securitisation process. 

The  proposal  aims  to  reduce  high  operational  costs  and  remove  undue  prudential  barriers, 
while avoiding undue deterioration of protection and avoiding incentives for excessive risk-
taking. It therefore represents a balancing of the need for economic stimulus with maintaining 
robust  standards,  thus  minimising  negative  societal  impacts.  Overall,  while  the  proposed 
measures  mainly  focus  on  financial  regulation,  there  are  potential  indirect  benefits  that  can 
arise, impacting social, environmental, and fundamental  rights  in supportive and sustainable 
ways.  Ensuring  a  stable  securitisation  market  contributes  indirectly  to  the  protection  of 
fundamental economic rights by promoting financial stability through risk diversification.  

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4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

This legislative proposal would have limited consequences for the Union budget. It will imply 
further  policy  development  within  the  Commission  and  in  the  three  ESAs.  Specific 
coordination tasks will be assigned to the European Banking Authority (EBA) in the context 
of the securitisation sub-committee reporting to the Joint Committee of the ESAs. The EBA’s 
role  will  include  providing  the  secretariat,  permanent  vice-chairpersonship  to  securitisation 
committee of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities referred to in Art. 
36(3)  (securitisation  sub-committee)  and  leading  the  work  of  this  sub-committee  focusing, 
amongst  other  things,  on  supervisory  issues,  providing  guidance  to  market  participants, 
developing  technical  standards,  and  ensuring  a  consistent  implementation  of  the  regulatory 
framework in the Union. A financial fiche is provided as an annex hereto. 

5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

Since the instrument proposed is a Regulation that is based to a significant extent on existing 
Union law, there is no need to prepare an implementation plan. The proposal is accompanied 
by  a  complete  evaluation,  as  part  of  the  impact  assessment,  which  assesses,  among  other 
things,  how  effective  and  efficient  it  has  been  in  terms  of  achieving  its  objectives.  The 
proposal provides for a review report in Article 46 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. The review 
will  be  accompanied  by  a  legislative  proposal,  if  appropriate.  In  that  context,  the  reviewing 
and reporting requirements would be aligned, if needed. 

The Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this package of proposed amendments, five 
years after its date of application and present a report on the main findings to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee.  

• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

Interaction and consistency between elements of the package   

This  proposal  for  a  Regulation  makes  part  of  a  wider  securitisation  review  which 
encompasses  changes  to  two  Regulations  (in  addition  to  the  Securitisation  Regulation,  the 
CRR) and two Delegated Acts (the LCR Delegated Act and the Solvency II Delegated Act). 
The  proposed  changes  should  be  viewed  as  a  package  of  measures  that  tackles  in  a 
comprehensive manner supply and demand issues in the securitisation market.   

Subject-matter and scope (Article 1)  

The  proposal  clarifies  that  the  servicer  is  an  entity  that  manages  a  pool  of  purchased 
receivables or the underlying credit exposures on a day-to-day basis falls under the scope of 
Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  (the  ‘Securitisation  Regulation’).  The  amendment  is  a 
clarification and it is not meant to enlarge the scope since a servicer is already subject to the 
Securitisation Regulation. 

Definitions (Article 2)  

Public  and  private  securitisations  are  defined  Article  2,  points  (32)  and  (33).  Specifically,  a 
“public securitisation” is established to be one if it meets any of the following conditions:  

(i) a prospectus has to be drawn up;  

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(ii)  notes  constituting  securitisation  positions  are  admitted  to  trading  in  specific  trading 
venues, ;  

(iii)  the  securitisation  is  marketed  generally  to  investors  and  the  specific  terms  are  not 
negotiable among the parties, meaning that the transactions is offered to investors on take-it-
or-leave-it basis.  

A private securitisation is one that does not meet any of the aforementioned criteria – it does 
not have a prospectus, it is not admitted to trading, and the terms and conditions are bilaterally 
negotiated between the originator and a small group of investors. Clarifying the definition of 
public  and  private  securitisations  is  particularly  relevant  for  the  application  of  transparency 
requirements.  

Due diligence (Article 5) 

To  facilitate  simpler  and  more  streamlined  investment  in  Union  securitisations,  some 
amendments are made to Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Verification requirements 
(Article  5(1)  and  Article  5(3),  point  (c))  are  removed  for  investors  whenever  the  sell-side 
party  responsible  for  complying  with  the  relevant  sell-side  provisions  is  established  and 
supervised in  the Union. In  addition,  the risk assessment  in  Article 5(3),  point (a)  and 5(3), 
point  (b)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  is  made  more  principled  based  by  removing  the 
detailed  list  of  structural  features  that  investors  need  to  check  and  by  clarifying  in  a  recital 
that the due diligence assessment should be proportionate to the risk of the securitisation. The 
written  procedures  under  Article  5(4)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  are  also  made  more 
principled based by removing the detailed list of information in the second subparagraph of 
Article  5(4),  point  (a),  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402.  Secondary  market  transactions  are 
given an extra 15 days to document their due diligence. Finally, delegation of due diligence 
under  Article  5(5)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  is  aligned  with  other  sectoral  legislations 
where delegation of tasks does not transfer the legal responsibility. 

Due diligence requirements are waived where multilateral development banks fully guarantee 
the  securitisation  position,  making  it  very  low-risk.  This  means  that  investors  can  invest  in 
such positions without doing extensive checks.  

Lighter  due  diligence,  specifically  via  waiving  the  verification  and  documentation 
requirements,  is  provided  in  case  the  securitisation  includes  a  first  loss  tranche  that  is 
guaranteed  or  held  by  a  narrowly  defined  list  of  public  entities  and  where  that  tranche 
represents at least 15% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures. 

For investments in positions issued by non-EU issuers, investors will continue to be required 
to verify that a given transaction complies with EU rules.  

Risk Retention (Article 6) 

Risk  retention  is  waived  in  case  the  securitisation  includes  a  first  loss  tranche  that  is 
guaranteed  or  held  by  a  narrowly  defined  list  of  public  entities  and  where  that  tranche 
represents at least 15% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures. 

Transparency (Article 7) 

To lower the reporting  burden on issuers, the  reporting  templates  in  Commission Delegated 
Regulation  (EU)  2020/1224  and  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2020/1225 
should  be  reviewed.  In  particular,  the  number  of  required  fields  should  be  significantly 
reduced – by at least 35%, or more where feasible. To further reduce the compliance burden 

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on  the  reporting  entities,  the  review  should  consider  distinguishing  between  mandatory  and 
voluntary fields. In addition, the reporting templates should not require loan level information 
when  the  underlying  exposures  are  highly-granular  and  short-term  (such  as  credit  card 
exposures  or  certain  consumer  loans).  The  review  of  the  reporting  templates,  taking  into 
account  the  aforementioned  principles  set  in  this  proposal,  should  be  carried  out  by  the 
securitisation sub-committee of the ESAs Joint Committee, under the leadership of the EBA, 
in cooperation with the other ESAs. 

The  reporting  template  for  private  securitisations  should  be  much  lighter  than  the  one  for 
public  securitisations  and  focused  only  on  the  needs  of  supervisors.  To  minimise  the 
implementation  costs  for  industry,  this  template  should  follow  closely  existing  notification 
templates,  in  particular  the  guide  on  the  notification  of  securitisation  transactions  by  the 
Single  Supervisory  Mechanism.  To  ensure  greater  market  transparency  and  facilitate  the 
supervision  and  monitoring  of  the  private  market,  this  dedicated  template  for  private 
securitisations should be reported to the securitisation repositories. 

Securitisation Repository (Articles 10 and 17) 

Amendments to Article 10 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 rectify a wrong reference to Article 
5  of  that  Regulation,  which  should  be  replaced  with  a  reference  to  Article  7.  Proposed 
amendments  to  Article  17  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  are  introduced  in  light  of  the 
amendments  in  Article  7  that  will  extend  the  report  to  repository  also  for  private 
securitisation. In light of those changes, a differentiation in the immediate and free of charge 
access to the repository  has been proposed. Such access should be granted to the ESAs, the 
European  Systemic Risk  Board, the  competent  and resolution  authorities and, upon request, 
the  European  Commission.  In  light  of  the  different  nature  of  public  securitisation,  access  is 
granted also to investors and potential investors in such securitisations. Restricting the access 
of  investors  and  potential  investors  to  private  securitisations  is  meant  to  protect  the 
confidentiality of information in those securitisations. 

STS requirements (Articles 20, 26b, 26c, 26e) 

To  facilitate  the  securitisation  of  SME  loans  in  STS  securitisation,  the  homogeneity 
requirement in Articles 20(8), (15) and Article 26b(8) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402,  is to be 
amended  to  stipulate  that  a  securitisation  where  at  least  70%  of  the  underlying  pool  of 
exposures  consist  of  SME  loans  are  deemed  to  comply  with  that  requirement.  The  70% 
threshold is lower than the current 100% requirement. 

To enable insurance and reinsurance undertakings to participate meaningfully in the STS on-
balance-sheet  market,  the  eligibility  criteria  for  credit  protections  in  Article  26e(8)  of 
Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  are  amended  to  include  also  an  unfunded  guarantee  by  an 
insurance  or  reinsurance  undertaking 
that  meets  certain  robustness,  solvency  and 
diversification criteria. 

A number of other technical, but not substantive, amendments facilitate the implementation of 
the STS criteria. 

Third Party Verifiers (Article 28) 

The proposal stipulates that Third Party Verifiers of STS compliance need to be supervised in 
addition to authorised by their respective national competent authority. 

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Supervision (Articles 29, 30, 32 and 36) 

To  promote  supervisory  convergence  and  prevent  fragmentation  and  differential  regulatory 
interpretations, the proposal strengthens the role of of the securitisation sub-committee of the 
ESAs  Joint Committee.  In  particular,  the  securitisation  sub-committee  is  mandated  to  adopt 
guidelines to establish common supervisory procedures and to develop the reporting templates 
referred to in Article 7. To ensure greater accountability and continuity, the EBA is put in the 
lead  of  the  work  of  the  securitisation  sub-committee  of  the  ESAs  Joint  Committee,  will 
provide the secretariat and a vice-chairperson for it, supporting the chairperson in the exercise 
of his or her tasks and performing the tasks of the chairperson during the latter’s absence, on a 
permanent basis.  

To  ensure  efficient  and  consistent  supervision  of  the  STS  criteria,  Article  29  of  Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2402 should entrust banking national competent authorities with the responsibility 
to supervise the application of the STS criteria by bank-originated securitisations. For credit 
institutions  in  the  Banking  Union,  that  supervision  would  be  carried  out  by  the  Single 
Supervisory Mechanism.  

To  enable  supervisors  to  enforce  the  due  diligence  requirements,  Article  32  of  Regulation 
(EU)  2017/2402  is  amended  to  explicitly  include  in  the  list  of  situations  where  NCAs  may 
apply  administrative  sanctions  the  failure  of  institutional  investors  to  meet  due  diligence 
requirements in Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 

Reports and Review (Articles 44 and 46)  

The rolling mandate in Article 44 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 for the ESAs to report on the 
implementation of this Regulation is updated to require also an assessment of the contribution 
of securitisation to funding EU companies and economy. 

The Commission is mandated to review the functioning of this amending Regulation by five 
years after its date ofapplication. If found appropriate, the review will be accompanied by a 
legislative proposal. 

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2025/0826 (COD) 

Proposal for a 

REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 

amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2017 laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a 
specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation 

(Text with EEA relevance) 

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 114 thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank, 

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee,  

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

19 

Securitisation  can  boost  investment  by  allowing  banks  to  transfer  risks  to  those  that 
are  able  to  bear  them  and  thereby  free  up  their  capital,  which  they  could  use  for 
additional  lending  to  households  and  businesses,  including  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council19,  covering  both  simple,  transparent  and  standardised  (STS)  and  non-STS 
securitisations,  has  strengthened  market  transparency,  safety,  and  standardisation.  At 
the same time, that Regulation  should be further simplified to  more fully  exploit  the 
benefits that securitisations can offer. 

It is important that financial institutions employ their capital where it is most needed to 
reach  the  Union’s  economic  goals  and  funding  the  real  economy.  In  addition  to  the 
flexibility  provided  for  by  the  existing  rules,  targeted  changes  to  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/2402  would  ensure  that  the  Union  securitisation  framework  better  supports 
investments in the economy and facilitates lending to businesses. 

To  enhance  transparency  and  to  ensure  consistent  regulatory  treatment  aiming  at 
reducing costs for issuers, a definition of public and of private securitisation should be 
introduced.  The  scope  of  public  securitisations  should  cover  transactions  where  the 
underlying  notes  are  admitted  to  trading  on  regulated  markets,  Multilateral  Trading 

Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2017 laying 
down  a  general  framework  for  securitisation  and  creating  a  specific  framework  for  simple,  transparent 
and standardised securitisation, and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU and 
Regulations  (EC)  No  1060/2009  and  (EU)  No  648/2012  (OJ  L  347,  28.12.2017,  p.  35,  ELI:  
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/2402/oj). 

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Facilities (MTFs), Organised Trading Facilities (OTFs), or any other trading venue in 
the  Union,  and  transactions  marketed  to  investors  under  non-changeable  terms  and 
conditions where the package is offered on a ”take-it-or-leave-it” basis and investors 
have  no  direct  contact  with  the  originators  or  sponsor  and  can  therefore  not  directly 
receive  necessary  information  to  conduct  due  diligence  without  the  originator  or 
sponsor  disclosing  any  commercially  sensitive  information  to  the  market.  Defining 
those types of transactions as public, by virtue of their accessibility to a broad range of 
investors,  should  ensure  that  such  transactions  are  subject  to  the  appropriate 
transparency  requirements  and  regulatory  scrutiny  and  contribute  to  better  market 
oversight and functioning. 

Due diligence requirements should be proportionate to the risk profile of securitisation 
the  risks 
positions.  Investor  due  diligence  should 
characteristics and structural features that can materially affect the performance of the 
securitisation,  avoiding  duplicative,  overly  burdensome  or  generic  obligations  that 
may  not  be  meaningful  across  different  types  of  securitisation.  For  the  same  reason, 
due diligence obligations should be streamlined, thus  reducing unnecessary  costs for 
investors  —  particularly  in  lower-risk  securitisations  —  and  fostering  more 
proportionate and risk-sensitive investor behaviour in the securitisation market. 

therefore  be  focused  on 

Originators,  original  lenders,  sponsors  or  securitisation  special  purpose  entities 
(SSPEs) (the ‘sell-side entities’) that are established in the Union are already subject to 
supervision  in  the Union and can be sanctioned in case they breach their  obligations 
under  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402.  It  is  therefore  appropriate  that  investors  are  no 
longer  required  to  verify  whether  Union  sell-side  entities,  where  those  entities  are 
responsible  on  behalf  of  the  sell-side  parties  in  the  transaction,  comply  with  due 
diligence requirements set in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. Investors should, however, 
still  verify  whether  have  complied  with  their  obligations  for  which  third  countries’ 
sell-side entities are responsible under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 

Senior  tranches,  typically  benefiting  from  substantial  credit  enhancement  and  posing 
lower  risk,  should  require  a  less  extensive  due  diligence  review  than  junior  or 
mezzanine  tranches,  which  bear  higher  risk  and  greater  exposure  to  losses.  That 
proportional approach supports more efficient allocation of resources by investors and 
avoids excessive burdens for low-risk investments. 

Since compliance with the STS requirements is already subject to separate regulatory 
oversight and notification, the obligation for investors to verify compliance with those 
requirements  is  redundant.  Moreover,  verifying  compliance  with  the  STS  criteria  is 
not relevant for all types of investors. The corresponding requirement should therefore 
be deleted.  

Investors  should  be  allowed  to  conduct  simplified  due  diligence  to  investments  in 
repeat  transactions  where  key  risk  characteristics  are  already  well  understood.  For 
those purposes, investment in repeat transactions should be considered as  investment 
in  securitisation positions  issued by the same originator, backed by the same type of 
underlying  assets,  exhibiting  the  same  structural  features,  and  offering  the  same  or 
lower  level  of  credit  risk  compared  to  previous  investments.  That  change  should 
ensure consistency in due diligence practices while facilitating investor participation in 
well-known and transparent structures. 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

(7) 

(8) 

(9)  Multilateral  development  banks  can  play  a  significant  role  in  facilitating  investor 
access to securitisation markets, enhancing liquidity, and supporting the objectives of 
the  Savings  and  Investments  Union.  Where  a  securitisation  position  is  fully, 

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unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed by a multilateral development bank listed 
in Article 117(2) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council20,  the  credit  risk  arising  from  the  securitisation  position  is  effectively 
transferred from the pool of underlying assets to the guarantor, resulting in a 0% risk 
weight  of  such  exposure.  In  addition,  such  securitisation  position  is  categorised  as 
Level  1  asset  under  Article  10(1),  point  (g),  of  Commission  Delegated  Regulation 
(EU)  2015/6121.  In  such  cases,  it  is  appropriate  to  exempt  institutional  investors, 
except the entity providing the guarantee, from their due diligence requirements in full 
under Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. 

(10)  Transactions  where  the  first  loss  tranche  is  either  held  or  guaranteed  by  the  Union, 
national promotional banks or institutions within the meaning of point (3) of Article 2 
of  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1017  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council22 
inherently  possess  characteristics  that  mitigate  the  need  to  carry  out  the  full  due 
diligence  and  fulfil  the  risk  retention  requirement.  These  transactions  carry  an 
assurance by the guarantor, who carries out due diligence processes before affording 
such a guarantee. This  assessment removes the need for the institutional  investors to 
perform  a  full  due  diligence  assessment  under  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402. 
Furthermore,  the  essence  of  a  guarantee  is  the  assumption  of  risk  by  the  guarantor. 
Therefore,  it  is  appropriate  to  lift  the  risk  retention  requirement.  These  changes  are 
expected to crowd in private investment in derisked structures with a public guarantee.  

(11)  An institutional investor that delegates the authority to make investment management 
decisions  to  another  institutional  investor  should  be  able  to  instruct  the  delegate  to 
perform the due diligence obligations set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/2402. However, 
such  delegation  should  not  transfer  legal  responsibility.  The  delegating  institutional 
investor  should  remain  ultimately  responsible  for  ensuring  compliance  with  the  due 
diligence requirements. That specification is intended to reflect established regulatory 
practice and to ensure that obligations are fulfilled effectively while maintaining clear 
lines of accountability. 

(12)  The disclosure requirements should consider the granularity of the underlying pool of 
exposures, i.e. how many loans are in the underlying pool. In addition, it is important 
to consider the average maturity of the underlying exposures. Loan level disclosure for 
highly-granular  pools  of  very  short-term  exposures  can  be  particularly  costly  and 
entails a considerable burden for issuers, often without offering significant benefits in 
terms  of  additional  information  to  investors.  Therefore,  disclosure  requirements  for 
securitisations of credit card exposures and certain types of consumer loans should not 
need  to  encompass  reporting  at  the  level  of  each  individual  underlying  exposure. 
However, competent  authorities should still have the possibility  to  ask for additional 
information to ensure that they have a complete overview of the market, including on 

20 

21 

22 

Regulation  (EU)  No 575/2013  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  26 June  2013  on 
prudential  requirements  for  credit  institutions  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No 648/201  (OJ  L  176, 
27.6.2013, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/575/oj). 
Commission  Delegated  Regulation  (EU)  2015/61  of  10 October  2014  to  supplement  Regulation  (EU) 
No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement 
for Credit Institutions (OJ L 11, 17.1.2015, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2015/61/oj). 
Regulation  (EU)  2015/1017  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  June  2015  on  the 
European  Fund  for  Strategic  Investments,  the  European  Investment  Advisory  Hub  and  the  European 
Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013  — the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments (OJ L 169, 1.7.2015, p. 1). 

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the  exposures  that  constitute  the  underlying  pool,  in  carrying  out  their  duties  under 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.  

(13)  The  current  reporting  templates23  both  for  public  and  private  securitisations  are  too 
costly  and  burdensome.  The  burden  on  entities  when  complying  with  their  reporting 
obligations  should  be  therefore  reduced,  without  undermining  the  goal  of  providing 
transparency  to  the  market.  The  reporting  templates  should  be  streamlined  to  reduce 
the number of mandatory data fields. The revision of the template should aim to bring 
a  reduction  of  at  least  35%  of  mandatory  data  fields.  The  conversion  of  certain 
mandatory  fields  into  voluntary  fields  could  add  further  flexibility,  but  appropriate 
attention  should  be  given  to  ensure  that  that  does  not  compromise  data  quality  or 
usability. 

template 

reporting 

(14)  The  reporting  framework  should  account  for  the  specific  characteristics  of  private 
for  private 
securitisations.  A  dedicated  and  simplified 
securitisations  should  be  developed.  In  specifying 
the  details  of  reporting 
requirements, the information required to be reported should be aligned as closely as 
possible  with  other  well-established  templates,  in  particular  with  the  guide  on  the 
notification of securitisation transactions developed by the European Central Bank in 
accordance with Article 6(5), point (a), of Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201324. 
Any  future  changes  to  the  European  Central  Bank  guide  should  be  assessed  and  the 
reporting  templates  may  need  to  be  reviewed,  where  appropriate.  To  allow  for  basic 
visibility for supervisors over the private market, private securitisations should report 
to  repositories.  Private  securitisations  should  not  need  to  report  the  same  amount  of 
information  as  public  securitisations.  Requiring  private  transactions  to  report  to 
securitisation  repositories,  using  a  simplified  template,  would  improve  supervisory 
oversight and market monitoring. However, to maintain the confidentiality of private 
transactions, data from those transactions should not be publicly disclosed. 

(15)  The securitisation sub-committee of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory 
Authorities  (the  “Joint  Committee  Securitisation  Committee  -  JCSC”),  referred  to  in 
Article  36(3)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402,  under  the  leadership  of  the  European 
Banking  Authority  (EBA),  should  develop  draft  regulatory  technical  standards  to 
further specify the information that the originator, sponsor and SSPE are to provide to 
comply  with  the  reporting  obligation.  Those  draft  regulatory  technical  standards 
should  take  into  account  the  usefulness  of  the  information  for  the  holder  of  the 
securitisation  position,  whether  the  securitisation  is  public  or  private,  whether  the 
securitisation  position  is  of  a  short-term  nature  and,  in  the  case  of  an  asset-backed 
commercial paper programme (ABCP) transaction, whether it is fully supported by a 
sponsor.  The  Commission  should  be  empowered  to  supplement  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/2402  by  adopting  those  regulatory  technical  standards  by  means  of  delegated 
acts pursuant to Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

23 

24 

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1224 of 16 October 2019 supplementing Regulation (EU) 
2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards 
specifying  the  information  and  the  details  of  a  securitisation  to  be  made  available  by  the  originator, 
sponsor and SSPE and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1225 of 29 October 2019 laying 
down implementing technical standards with regard to the format and standardised templates for making 
available the information and details of a securitisation by the originator, sponsor and SSPE (OJ L 289, 
3.9.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/2020/1224/oj). 
Council  Regulation  (EU)  No 1024/2013  of  15 October  2013  conferring  specific  tasks  on  the  European 
Central Bank  concerning policies relating to the  prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2013/1024/oj). 

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(TFEU)  and  in  accordance  with  Regulation  (EU)  No 1093/2010  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council25,  Regulation  (EU)  No 1094/2010  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council26 and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council27.  Moreover,  the  JCSC,  under  the  leadership  of  the 
EBA, should develop draft implementing technical standards to specify the format for 
the  provision  of  the  information  to  repositories.  The  Commission  should  be 
empowered  to  adopt  those  implementing  technical  standards  by  means  of  an 
implementing  act  pursuant  to  Article 291  TFEU  and  in  accordance  with  Regulations 
(EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010. 

(16)  To  support  access  to  market-based  financing  for  SMEs,  and  to  facilitate  the 
development  of  cross-border  securitisations  involving  exposures  from  multiple 
Member  States,  the  criteria  for  the  homogeneity  of  asset  pools  should  be  revised. 
While it is possible to have securitisations involving exposures from multiple Member 
States,  the  requirement  of  homogeneity,  as  defined  at  present,  is  considered  as  an 
obstacle  for  SMEs  securitisations.  To  overcome  that  obstacle,  a  pool  of  underlying 
exposures  should  be  deemed  homogeneous  where  at  least  70 %  of  the  exposures  at 
origination  consists  of  exposures  to  SMEs.  That  lower  threshold  recognises  the 
specific  financing  needs  and  characteristics  of  SMEs  and  ensures  that  mixed  pools 
with  a  predominant  SME  component  can  benefit  from  the  legal  certainty  and 
operational efficiencies associated with homogeneous pools. The remaining portion of 
the  pool  should  be  allowed  to  include  other  types  of  exposures,  also  from  different 
Member States, without affecting the securitisation’s status as STS. 

(17) 

In  2021,  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  was  amended  by  Regulation  (EU)  2021/557  of 
the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council28  to  extend  the  STS  framework  to 
synthetic  securitisations.  As  indicated  in  the  report  of  the  Joint  Committee  of 
European  Supervisory  Authorities,  that  extension  of  the  STS  label  has  led  to 
satisfactory  results  in  terms  of  opening  the  way  for  new  issuance  and  encouraging 
greater activity in this market segment. However, the practical implementation of the 
STS  requirements  has  revealed  the  necessity  to  further  improve  the  clarity  and 
consistency in specific requirements with some technical adjustments.  

(18)  To ensure the consistent selection of the underlying exposures in a securitisation and 
to enable investors to assess the credit risk of the asset pool prior to investment, active 
portfolio  management  on  a  discretionary  basis  of  a  securitisation  exposure  is 
prohibited.  Article  26b  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  contains  an  exhaustive  list  of 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  November  2010 
establishing  a  European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Banking  Authority),  amending  Decision  No 
716/2009/EC  and  repealing  Commission  Decision  2009/78/EC  (OJ  L  331,  15.12.2010,  p.  12,  ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2010/1093/oj). 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1094/2010  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  November  2010 
establishing  a  European  Supervisory  Authority  (European  Insurance  and  Occupational  Pensions 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC (OJ L 
331, 15.12.2010, p. 48) 
Regulation  (EU)  No  1095/2010  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  November  2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending 
Decision  No  716/2009/EC  and  repealing  Commission  Decision  2009/77/EC  (OJ  L  331,  15.12.2010,  p. 
84) 
Regulation (EU) 2021/557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2021 amending 
Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  laying  down  a  general framework  for  securitisation  and  creating  a  specific 
framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation to help the recovery from the COVID-
19 crisis (OJ L 116, 6.4.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/557/oj). 

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permitted  management  activities  and  stipulates  that  certain  activities  should  not  be 
considered active portfolio management on a discretionary basis and therefore not be 
prohibited.  It  is  necessary  to  update  that  list  to  include  removals  due  to  sanctions 
imposed  on  an  entity  during  the  life  of  the  transaction  or  fraudulent  practices,  or 
amendments to the loan due to a change in the law affecting the enforceability, which 
are outside the control of the originator. Both circumstances would have an impact on 
the  enforceability  of  the  underlying  exposures  (beyond  the  control  of  the  originator) 
and  the  removal  of  those  underlying  exposures  should  not  be  considered  as  active 
portfolio management on a discretionary basis. 

(19)  The  criteria  relating  to  standardisation  laid  down  in  Article  26c  of  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/2402 outline the mechanisms for loss allocation to securitisation position holders 
and determine the application of various amortisation methods to tranches. The central 
aim  of  those  criteria  is  to  ensure  that  non-sequential  amortisation  is  employed  only 
when  accompanied  by  distinctly  specified  contractual  triggers.  Those  triggers  are 
intended  to  prompt  a  switch  to  sequential  payments  based  on  the  hierarchy  of 
seniority, thereby protecting the transaction from the premature amortisation of credit 
enhancement in the event of a decline in credit quality. Such premature amortisation 
could expose originators holding those tranches to risks associated with a diminishing 
credit  enhancement  cushion.  However,  those  criteria  fail  to  adequately  consider  the 
loss-bearing  capacity  of  tranches  subordinated  to  the  protected  tranches  within  a 
securitisation,  leading  to  misapplication  when  interpreted  literally  in  the  context  of 
synthetic securitisations that include mezzanine tranches. Those criteria inadvertently 
assume that all associated losses fall solely on the protected tranche, and thus ignoring 
an  assignment  to  more  junior  tranches.  It  should  therefore  be  specified  that,  in 
instances  where  junior  tranches  absorb  portions  of  the  underlying  exposure  losses, 
their loss-bearing capacities should be taken into consideration for the application of 
the criteria.  

(20)  Article  26e(3)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  currently  specifies  that  the  credit 
protection  premiums  to  be  paid  under  the  credit  protection  agreement  are  to  be 
structured  as  contingent  on  the  outstanding  nominal  amount  of  the  performing 
securitised exposures at  the time of the payment and reflect  the risk of the protected 
tranche.  To  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  the  credit  protection  agreement  from  the 
originators’ perspective and at the same time provide legal  certainty for investors on 
the termination date to  make payments by specifying the maximum extension period 
for  the  debt  workout,  it  should  be  specified  that  only  credit  protection  premiums 
contingent  on  the  size  of  the  outstanding  tranche  and  credit  risk  of  the  protected 
tranche are allowed. 

(21)  Article 26e(7) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 specifies the conditions under which an 
originator  may  commit  synthetic  excess  spread  as  credit  enhancement  for  investors. 
One of those conditions is that, for originators not using the IRB Approach referred to 
in  Article 143  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 575/2013,  the  calculation  of  the  one-year 
expected loss of the underlying portfolio is to be clearly determined in the transaction 
documentation.  In  order  to  specify  the  requirements  for  the  synthetic  excess  spread 
committed  by  the  originator  and  available  as  credit  enhancement  for  the  investors,  a 
specific  criterion  has  been  introduced  in  the  2021  amendment  to  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/2402.  The  application  of  this  criterion  has  shown  that  it  requires  further 
clarification.  In  addition,  an  inconsistency  has  been  identified  regarding  the 
requirements for originators not using the IRB Approach. That requirement should be 
amended to align with the intent to set a cap, equivalent to one year's expected loss, on 

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the total amount of synthetic excess spread that the originator should commit per year, 
thereby ensuring consistency and clarity in the application of that provision.  

(22)  The current criterion requiring credit protection is to be funded in the STS framework 
for  on-balance-sheet  synthetic  securitisation  under  the  STS  regime  has  limited  the 
ability  of  insurance  or  reinsurance  companies  to  participate  in  the  on-balance-sheet 
STS securitisation market. That is detrimental to the development of the STS market 
and  the  ability  of  originators  to  transfer  credit  risk  outside  the  banking  system. 
Allowing unfunded credit protection to be eligible for the STS label should, however, 
not  undermine  the  quality  of  the  STS  label  or  the  reliability  of  the  credit  protection 
agreement, nor should it create incentives for inexperienced or undiversified insurance 
or  reinsurance  undertakings  to  become  exposed  to  high  levels  of  risk.  It  is  therefore 
appropriate to put in place safeguards to ensure that participation is limited to insurers 
with  a  certain  level  of  robustness  and  diversification.  Therefore,  eligibility  for 
providing unfunded credit protection under the STS label should be accompanied by 
requirements related to diversification, solvency, risk measurement, and minimum size 
of  the  protection  provider.  Specifically,  when  it  comes  to  risk  measurement,  the 
insurance  or  reinsurance  undertaking  should  use  an  approved  internal  model  to 
calculate capital requirements for such credit protection agreements. When it comes to 
solvency, the insurance or reinsurance undertaking should comply with the Solvency 
Capital  Requirement  and  Minimum  Capital  Requirement  referred  to  in  Articles  100 
and  128  of  Directive  2009/138/EC,  respectively,  and  should  have  been  assigned  to 
credit  quality  step  3  or  better.  When  it  comes  to  diversification,  the  insurance  or 
reinsurance  undertaking  should  effectively  operate  business  activities  in  at  least  two 
classes  of  non-life  insurance,  which  should  reduce  overexposure  to  any  single  risk 
type.  Finally,  when  it  comes  to  minimum  size,  the  insurance  or  reinsurance 
undertaking should have total assets above EUR 20 billion. 

(23)  Third-party verifiers have a role in assessing the compliance of securitisations to the 
STS  criteria.  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  only  requires  third-party  verifiers  to  be 
authorised  by  national  competent  authorities.  Such  authorisation  is,  however,  of 
limited assurance if competent authorities are not in position to assess whether those 
third-party verifiers continue to comply with the conditions for their authorisation on 
an ongoing basis. It is therefore appropriate to lay down that competent authorities are 
also  responsible  for  the  ongoing  supervision  of  such  third-party  verifiers  and 
adequately empowered to do so. 

(24)  To  ensure  the  effective  implementation  and  enforcement  of  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/2402,  it  is  necessary  to  clarify  the  responsibilities  of  competent  authorities  in 
supervising  the  compliance  of  all  relevant  parties  involved  in  a  securitisation. 
Competent  authorities  should  oversee  the  conduct  of  originators,  sponsors,  original 
lenders,  and  SSPEs.  This  includes  verification  of  whether  individual  securitisation 
transactions comply with the applicable requirements under this Regulation. 

(25) 

In  order  to  strengthen  compliance  with,  and  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of, 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the scope of sanctioning powers under Article 32 of that 
Regulation  should  be  broadened  to  explicitly  include  infringements  of  due  diligence 
obligations.  Institutional  investors  play  a  key  role  in  ensuring  the  soundness  and 
transparency  of  the  securitisation  market  by  conducting  appropriate  due  diligence 
before and during their exposures. To ensure consistent enforcement across the Union 
of those due diligence requirements, it should be specified that failure to comply with 
those requirements is to be subject to remedial measures and administrative sanctions 
by competent authorities.  

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(26)  Fostering  supervisory  convergence  is  essential  to  the  proper  functioning  and  further 
development  of  the  securitisation  market  which  brings  together  a  wide  range  of 
economic  actors  often  based in  different  jurisdictions, even for the same transaction. 
The  involvement  of  several  competent  authorities,  combined  with  the  current 
complexity  of  the  decision-making  process,  highlights  the  need  to  strengthen  the 
supervisory  coordination.  Simplifying  and  reinforcing  existing  frameworks  for 
supervisory  coordination,  where  feasible,  should  support  the  broader  aim  of 
simplification in regulation and supervision. Stronger convergence can be achieved by 
using more efficiently and effectively existing powers that allocated to the ESAs and 
the  competent  authorities.  This  outcome  should  be  also  supported  by  giving  a  more 
prominent  role  to  the  EBA,  which  should  assume  permanent  stewardship  of 
supervision coordination issues for the securitisation market in the Union.  

(27)  The  Joint  Committee  Securitisation  Committee,  composed  of  market  and  prudential 
competent authorities, should focus on issues stemming from supervision and should 
facilitate  and  promote  supervisory  convergence  through  common  supervisory 
practices.  The  current  mandate  of  the  JCSC  should  be  reviewed  to  put  emphasis  on 
supervisory convergence and work related to Article 44 of this Regulation. The JCSC 
can meet in different formats or establish subgroups for specific tasks according to the 
issues to be discussed. The EBA should provide the secretariat and a vice-chairperson 
for  the  Joint  Committee  Securitisation  Committee  on  a  permanent  basis,  deputising 
and supporting the chairperson in the exercise of his or her duties.  In the absence of 
the  chairperson,  the  vice-chairperson  should  perform  the  tasks  of  the  chairperson, 
including  in  situations  where  no  chairperson  is  elected.  Representatives  to  this  body 
from  participating  market  and  prudential  competent  authorities  should  have  the 
appropriate  level  of  knowledge  and  experience  in  matters  under  discussion.  The 
regular  monitoring  of  the  state  of  the  market  and  evaluation  of  the  supervisory 
securitisation  framework  in  the  Union  through  monitoring  reports,  development  of 
guidelines  and  regular  peer  reviews  would  further  strengthen  the  supervisory 
framework promoting best (supervisory) practices. 

(28)  Given that securitisation activity in the Union is primarily concentrated in the banking 
sector, it is  appropriate  that  the EBA assumes  the permanent  stewardship  role in  the 
Joint Committee Securitisation Committee. In the exercise of its permanent role in the 
Joint Committee Securitisation Committee, the EBA should attach particular attention 
to  nourishing  strong  and  collaborative  working  relationships  with  the  European 
Securities Markets  Authority  (ESMA)  and the European  Insurance and  Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and duly taking account of their sectoral perspectives. It 
should  be  expected  that  such  reinforced  supervisory  coordination  will  result  in  more 
robust  and  consistent  supervision  of  the  securitisation  market  in  the  Union.  In  this 
capacity,  the  EBA  should  also  lead  the  work  on  the  development  of  the  disclosure 
templates as provided for in Article 7 of this Regulation. This will be instrumental in 
preparing the market  for the anticipated growth  and  developing  supervisory capacity 
and  preparedness  to  support  this  expansion.  Assigning  a  stewardship  role  to  EBA  in 
this supervisory capacity aligns with the strategic vision of an efficient and simplified 
regulatory landscape. 

(29) 

In case of cross-border securitisations, appointing a lead supervisor would streamline 
the  supervision  of  compliance  with  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  and  ensure 
consistency  and  better  coordination  among  the  different  competent  authorities.  The 
lead  supervisor  should  be  appointed  from  among  the  competent  authorities  of  the 
entities  involved  in  the  transaction,  with  the  decision  taken  by  the  competent 

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(30) 

authorities concerned. In case of disagreements the matter should be dealt with at the 
level  of  the  Joint  Committee  Securitisation  Committee.  Whenever  a  new  transaction 
involves  entities  supervised  by  the  same  competent  authorities,  the  lead  previously 
appointed can keep that role. 

It  is  important  to  ensure  that  the  regulatory  framework  for  securitisations  remains 
effective  and  adapts  to  the  evolving  financial  landscape.  For  that  reason,  the 
Commission  should  comprehensively  review  the  impact  and  functionality  of  this 
Regulation within 5 years after its adoption, with careful attention to its influence on 
the  securitisation  market  and  its  broader  economic  implications.  That  review  should 
focus  on  critical  aspects,  including  market  dynamics,  the  accessibility  of  credit  in 
particular for SMEs, investments, and the interconnectedness of financial institutions 
which is vital for maintaining the stability of the financial sector. Combining insights 
from  the  reports  referred  to  in  Article  44  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  and  further 
analyses,  the  Commission  should  determine  the  necessity  for  legislative  updates  to 
safeguard the role of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 in supporting a resilient and dynamic 
economy within the European Union. 

(31)  Since the objectives of this Regulation cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States given that securitisation markets operate globally and that a level playing field 
in  the  internal  market  for  all  institutional  investors  and  entities  involved  in 
securitisation should be ensured but, by reason of their scale and effects, can be better 
achieved  at  Union  level,  the  Union  may  adopt  measures,  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  of  subsidiarity  set  out  in  Article  5  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  In 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  proportionality  as  set  out  in  that  Article,  this 
Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. 

(32)  Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 should therefore be amended accordingly, 

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 

Article 1 
Amendment to Regulation (EU) No 2017/2402 

Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 is amended as follows:  

(1) 

in Article 1, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: 

‘This  Regulation  applies  to  institutional  investors  and  to  originators,  sponsors, 
original lenders, servicers and securitisation special purpose entities.’; 

(2) 

in Article 2, the following points (32) and (33) are added: 

‘(32)  ‘public  securitisation’  means  a  securitisation  that  meets  any  of  the  following 
criteria: 

(a) 

a prospectus has to be drawn up for that securitisation pursuant to Article 
3  of  Regulation  (EU) 2017/1129  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council29; 

29 

Regulation  (EU)  2017/1129  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  June  2017  on  the 
prospectus  to  be  published  when  securities  are  offered  to  the  public  or  admitted  to  trading  on  a 
(OJ  L  168,  30.6.2017,  p.  12, 
regulated  market,  and 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1129/oj). 

repealing  Directive  2003/71/EC 

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(b) 

the  securitisation  is  marketed  with  notes  constituting  securitisation 
positions  admitted  to  trading  on  a  Union  trading  venue  as  defined  in 
Article  4(1),  point  (24)  of  Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council30;  

(c) 

the  securitisation  is  marketed  to  investors  and  the  terms  and  conditions 
are not negotiable among the parties. 

(33)  ‘private  securitisation’  means  a  securitisation  that  does  not  meet  any  of  the 
criteria laid down in point (32).’ 

(3) 

Article 5 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (c) is deleted; 

(ii)  points (e) and (f) are replaced by the following: 

‘(e) 

if  established  in  a  third  country,  the  originator,  sponsor  or  SSPE 
designated  in  accordance  with  Article  7(2)  has  made  available  the 
information required by Article 7(1) in accordance with the frequency 
and modalities provided for in that paragraph; 

(f) 

if  established  in  a  third  country,  in  the  case  of  non-performing 
exposures, the originator, sponsor or original lender has applied sound 
standards in the selection and pricing of the exposures.’; 

(b)  paragraph 3 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

point (b) is replaced by the following: 

‘(b)  all  the  structural  features  of  the  securitisation  that  can  materially 

impact the performance of the securitisation position;’; 

(ii)  point (c) is deleted; 

(c) 

paragraph 4 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

in point (a), the second subparagraph is deleted; 

(ii) 

the following point (g) is added: 

‘(g) 

in  the  case  of  secondary  market  investments,  document  the  due 
diligence  assessment  and  verifications  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time  which  in  any  case  shall  not  exceed  15  calendar  days  after  the 
investment.’; 

(d) 

the following paragraphs 4a and 4b are inserted: 

‘(4a)  Paragraphs  1  to  4  shall  not  apply  to  institutional  investors  that  hold  a 
securitisation  position  where  such  securitisation  position  is  guaranteed  by  a 
multilateral  development  bank  listed  in  Article  117(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
575/2013.  

For the purposes of the first subparagraph, the guarantee shall meet the conditions 
of Article 213 and 215 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. 

30 

Directive  2014/65/EU  of  the European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014 on  markets  in 
financial  instruments  and  amending  Directive  2002/92/EC  and  Directive  2011/61/EU  (recast)  (OJ  L 
173, 12.6.2014, p. 349, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/65/oj).’; 

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(4b)  Paragraphs  1  and  4  shall  not  apply  to  institutional  investors  that  hold  a 
securitisation position where the first loss tranche representing at least 15% of the 
nominal  value  of  the  securitised  exposures  is  either  held  or  guaranteed  by  the 
Union  or  by  national  promotional  banks  or  institutions  within  the  meaning  of 
point (3) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council.’; 

(e) 

paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

‘(5) Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, where an institutional 
investor  has  given  another  institutional  investor  authority  to  make  investment 
management  decisions  that  might  expose  it  to  a  securitisation,  the  delegating 
institutional  investor  may  instruct  the  delegated  institutional  investor  to  fulfil  its 
obligations under this Article in respect of any exposure to a securitisation arising 
from  those  decisions.  The  delegating  institutional  investor’s  liability  under  this 
Article shall not be affected by the fact that the institutional investor has delegated 
functions.’ 

(4) 

Article 6 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 5 point (f) is added:  

‘(f) the Union.’ 

(b)  paragraph 5a is inserted:  

‘(5a) Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the first loss tranche representing at least 
15% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures is either held or guaranteed 
by one of the entities listed under points (a) to (f) of paragraph 5.’   

(5) 

Article 7 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 1 the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:  

‘In the case of an ABCP or of a securitisation of highly-granular pools of short-
term  exposures,  the  information  described  in  points  (a),  (c)(ii)  and  (e)(i)  of  the 
first  subparagraph  shall  be  made  available  in  aggregate  form  to  holders  of 
securitisation positions and, upon request, to potential investors.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following:  

‘Private  securitisations  shall  be  subject  to  a  distinct  reporting  framework  that 
acknowledges their unique characteristics, differing from public securitisation, in 
a  dedicated  and  simplified  reporting  template.  That  dedicated  and  simplified 
reporting  template  shall  ensure  that  essential  information  relevant  to  national 
competent authorities is adequately reported, without imposing the full extent of 
reporting  obligations  applicable  to  public  securitisations.  Private  securitisations 
shall fulfil their obligations under this subparagraph as of [date set  in  the fourth 
subparagraphs of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article.].’  

(c) 

paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 

‘3.  The  ESAs  shall  develop,  through  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  European 
Supervisory Authorities, under the leadership of the EBA and in close cooperation 
with ESMA and EIOPA, draft regulatory technical standards  in accordance with 
Articles 10  to 14  of  Regulations  (EU)  No 1093/2010,  (EU)  No 1094/2010  and 
(EU)  No 1095/2010  to  specify  the  information  that  the  originator,  sponsor  and 

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SSPE shall provide to comply with paragraph 1, first subparagraph, points (a) and 
(e), and paragraph 2 taking into account: 

(a) 

the usefulness of information for the holder of the securitisation position and 
for supervisors; 

(b)  whether the securitisation is public or private; 

(c)  whether the securitisation position is of a short-term nature; 

(d) 

in  the  case  of  an  ABCP  transaction,  whether  that  transaction  is  fully 
supported by a sponsor. 

The ESAs, through the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, 
under  the  leadership  of  the  EBA  and  in  close  cooperation  with  ESMA  and 
EIOPA, shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission 
by [6 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation]. 

The  Commission  is  empowered  to  supplement  this  Regulation  by  adopting  the 
regulatory  technical  standards  referred  to  in  this  paragraph  in  accordance  with 
Articles  10  to  14  of  Regulations  (EU)  No 1093/2010,  (EU)  No 1094/2010  and 
(EU) No 1095/2010. 

The  regulatory  technical  standards  shall  enter  into  force  [12  months]  after  the 
adoption by the Commission. 

At least every three years from the date of their adoption by the Commission the 
ESAs,  through  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities, 
shall  assess  the  regulatory  technical  standards  to  determine  their  continued 
relevance and accuracy, to ensure they remain effective, up to date, aligned with 
market  practices  and  needs.  The  ESAs,  through  the  Joint  Committee  of  the 
European Supervisory Authorities, shall inform the Commission of the results of 
the assessment.’ 

(d)  paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 

In order to  ensure uniform  conditions  of application for the information  to 
‘4. 
be  specified  in  accordance  with  paragraph  3,  the  ESAs,  through  the  Joint 
Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, under the leadership of the 
EBA  and  in  close  cooperation  with  ESMA  and  EIOPA,  shall  develop  draft 
implementing  technical  standards  in  accordance  with  Article 15  of  Regulations 
(EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010  specifying the 
format thereof by means of standardised templates. 

The ESAs, through the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, 
shall submit those draft implementing technical  standards to  the Commission  by 
[6 months after the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation]. 

The  Commission  is  empowered  to  adopt  the  implementing  technical  standards 
referred  to  in  this  paragraph  in  accordance  with  Article  15  of  Regulations  (EU) 
No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010. 

The implementing technical standards shall enter into force [12 months] after the 
adoption by the Commission. 

At least every three years from the date of their adoption by the Commission the 
ESAs,  through  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities, 
shall  assess  the  implementing  regulatory  technical  standards  to  determine  their 

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continued  relevance  and  accuracy,  to  ensure  they  remain  effective,  up  to  date, 
aligned with market practices and needs. The ESAs, through the Joint Committee 
of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities,  shall  inform  the  Commission  of  the 
results of that assessment.’; 

(6) 

Article 10 is amended as follows:   

(a) 

paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1.  A  securitisation  repository  shall  register  with  ESMA  for  the  purposes  of 
Article 7 under the conditions and the procedure set out in this Article.’; 

(b)  paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:  

‘2.  To  be  eligible  to  be  registered  under  this  Article,  a  securitisation  repository 
shall  be  a  legal  person  established  in  the  Union,  apply  procedures  to  verify  the 
completeness  and  consistency  of  the  information  made  available  to  it  under 
Article 7(1) of this Regulation, and meet the requirements laid down in in Articles 
78  and  79,  and  Article  80(1),  (2),  (3),  (5)  and  (6)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
648/2012.  For  the  purposes  of  this  Article,  references  in  Articles  78  and  80  of 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 to Article 9 thereof shall be construed as references 
to Article 7 of this Regulation.’ 

(7) 

Article 17 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 

‘1.  Without prejudice to Article 7(2), the securitisation repository referred to in 
Article 10 shall collect and maintain details of the securitisation. It shall provide 
direct and immediate access free of charge to all of the following entities to enable 
them to fulfil their respective responsibilities, mandates and obligations: 

(a) 

the EBA; 

(b)  EIOPA; 

(c)  ESMA; 

(d) 

the ESRB; 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 

the  relevant  members  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB), 
including the European Central Bank (ECB) in carrying out its tasks within 
a single supervisory mechanism under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013; 

the  relevant  authorities  whose  respective  supervisory  responsibilities  and 
mandates  cover  transactions,  markets,  participants  and  assets  which  fall 
within the scope of this Regulation; 

the  resolution  authorities  designated  under  Article  3  of  Directive 
2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council31; 

the  Single  Resolution  Board  established  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014 
of the European Parliament and of the Council32; 

31 

Directive  2014/59/EU  of  the European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 15  May  2014 establishing  a 
framework  for  the  recovery  and  resolution  of  credit  institutions  and  investment  firms  and  amending 
Council  Directive  82/891/EEC,  and  Directives  2001/24/EC,  2002/47/EC,  2004/25/EC,  2005/56/EC, 
2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) 
No  648/2012,  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  (OJ  L  173,  12.6.2014,  p.  190, 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/59/oj). 

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(i) 

(j) 

the authorities referred to in Article 29 of this Regulation; 

the Commission, upon request; 

(k) 

in case of public securitisations, investors and potential investors.’ 

(b) 

in paragraph 2, point (a) is deleted. 

(8) 

Article 20 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 8, the following subparagraph is added: 

‘A  pool  of  underlying  exposures  shall  be  deemed  to  comply  with  the  first 
subparagraph  where  at  least  70%  of  the  exposures  in  the  pool  at  origination 
consists of exposures to SMEs.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 11, in point (a), point (ii) is replaced by the following: 

‘(ii) 

the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE explicitly sets 
out the proportion of restructured underlying exposures, the time and details 
of  the  restructuring,  and  their  performance  since  the  date  of  the 
restructuring;’; 

(9) 

Article 22 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 4, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

‘In case of a securitisation where the underlying exposures are residential loans or 
auto  loans  or  leases,  the  originator  and  sponsor  shall  publish  the  available 
information  related  to  the  environmental  performance  of  the  assets  financed  by 
such residential loans or auto loans or leases.’; 

(b)  paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: 

‘5.  The  originator  and  the  sponsor  shall  be  responsible  for  compliance  with 
Article  7.  In  case  of  a  public  securitisation,  the  information  required  by  Article 
7(1),  first  subparagraph,  point  (a),  shall  be  made  available  to  potential  investors 
before  pricing  upon  request.  In  case  of  a  public  securitisation,  the  information 
required  by  Article  7(1),  first  subparagraph,  points  (b)  to  (d),  shall  be  made 
available before pricing  at  least  in  draft or initial form.  The final  documentation 
shall  be  made  available  to  investors  at  the  latest  15  days  after  closing  of  the 
transaction.’; 

(10) 

Article 24 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 9, in point (a), point (ii) is replaced by the following: 

‘(ii) 

the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE explicitly sets 
out the proportion of restructured underlying exposures, the time and details 
of  the  restructuring,  and  their  performance  since  the  date  of  the 
restructuring;’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 15 the following subparagraph is added: 

32 

EN 

Regulation  (EU)  No  806/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  July  2014 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
1, 
amending 
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/806/oj). 

(EU)  No 

Regulation 

1093/2010 

30.7.2014, 

225, 

(OJ 

p. 

L 

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‘A  pool  of  underlying  exposures  shall  be  deemed  to  comply  with  the  first 
subparagraph  where  at  least  70%  of  the  exposures  in  the  pool  at  origination 
consists of exposures to SMEs.’; 

(11) 

Article 26b is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 7, in the fourth subparagraph, the following points (e) and (f) are 
added: 

‘(e)  has  been  the  object  of  Union  restrictive  measures  or  of  proven  fraudulent 

practices; 

‘(f)  has  been  subject  to  changes  in  the  national  legal  framework  that  would 

affect the enforceability of the claims of the underlying exposures.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 8, the following subparagraph is added: 

‘A  pool  of  underlying  exposures  shall  be  deemed  to  comply  with  the  first 
subparagraph  where  at  least  70%  of  the  exposures  in  the  pool  at  origination 
consists of exposures to SMEs.’; 

(c) 

in paragraph 11, in point (a), point (ii) is replaced by the following: 

‘(ii) 

the information provided by the originator, sponsor and SSPE explicitly sets 
out the proportion of restructured underlying exposures, the time and details 
of  the  restructuring,  and  their  performance  since  the  date  of  the 
restructuring;’; 

(12) 

in Article 26c, in paragraph 5, the eighth subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

‘Where  a  credit  event,  as  referred  to  in  Article  26e,  has  occurred  in  relation  to 
underlying  exposures  and  the  debt  workout  for  those  exposures  has  not  been 
completed, the amount of credit protection remaining at any payment date plus the 
amount of any retained tranches which rank junior to the tranches covered by the 
credit protection remaining at any payment date shall be at least equivalent to the 
outstanding nominal amount of those underlying exposures, minus the amount of 
any interim payment made in relation to those underlying exposures.’; 

(13) 

Article 26e is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in paragraph 3, the third subparagraph is replaced by the following: 

‘The credit protection premiums to be paid under the credit protection agreement 
shall be structured as contingent on the outstanding size of the tranche and credit 
risk of the protected tranche. For those purposes, the credit protection agreement 
shall  not  stipulate  guaranteed  premiums,  upfront  premium  payments,  rebate 
mechanisms or other mechanisms that may avoid or reduce the actual allocation 
of losses to the investors or return part of the paid premiums to the originator after 
the maturity of the transaction.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 7, point (d) is replaced by the following: 

‘(d)  for  originators  not  using  the  IRB  Approach  referred  to  in  Article  143  of 

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013: 

the total committed amount per year shall not be higher than the one-

(i) 
year expected loss of the portfolio for that year; 

the calculation of the one-year expected loss of the underlying portfolio 

(ii) 
shall be clearly determined in the transaction documentation.’; 

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(c) 

paragraph 8 is amended as follows: 

(i) 

the following point (aa) is inserted: 

‘(aa)  a  guarantee  meeting  the  requirements  set  out  in  Part  Three,  Title  II, 
Chapter 4  of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, by which the credit risk 
is transferred to an insurance or reinsurance undertaking that meets all 
of the following criteria: 

(i) 

(ii) 

the undertaking  uses an internal  model approved in  accordance 
with  Articles  112  and  113  of  Directive  2009/138/EC  for  the 
calculation of capital requirements for such guarantees;  

the undertaking complies with its Solvency Capital Requirement 
and  its  Minimum  Capital  Requirement  referred  to  in  Articles 
100  and  128  of  Directive  2009/138/EC,  respectively,  and  has 
been assigned to credit quality step 3 or better; 

(iii) 

the undertaking effectively operates business activities in at least 
two classes of non-life insurance within the meaning of Annex I 
to Directive 2009/138/EC; 

(iv) 

the  assets  under  management  by  the  insurance  or  reinsurance 
undertaking exceed 20 billion euro; 

(ii)  point (c) is replaced by the following: 

(c) 

another  credit  protection  not  referred  to  in  points  (a),  (aa)  and 
(b)  of  this  paragraph  in  the  form  of  a  guarantee,  a  credit 
derivative or a credit linked note that meets the requirements set 
out  in  Article  249  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  575/2013,  provided 
that  the  obligations  of  the  investor  are  secured  by  collateral 
meeting  the  requirements  laid  down  in  paragraphs  9  and  10  of 
this Article.’; 

(14) 

in  Article  28(1),  first  subparagraph,  the  introductory  wording  is  replaced  by  the 
following: 

‘A third party as referred to in Article 27(2) shall be authorised and supervised by 
the  competent  authority  to  assess  compliance  of  securitisations  with  the  STS 
criteria  provided  for  in  Articles 19  to 22,  Articles 23  to 26,  and  Articles 26a 
to 26e.  The  competent  authority  shall  grant  the  authorisation  if  the  following 
conditions are met:’; 

(15) 

Article 29 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

the following paragraph 4a is inserted: 

‘4a.  Competent  authorities  responsible  for  the  supervision  of  originators, 
sponsors and SSPEs in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU, including the ECB 
with  regard  to  specific  tasks  conferred  on  it  by  Regulation  (EU)  No  1024/2013, 
shall  supervise  compliance  by  originators,  sponsors  and  SSPEs  with  the 
obligations set out in Articles 18 to 27 of this Regulation.’; 

(b) 

in paragraph 5, the first sentence is replaced by the following:  

‘For entities supervised by competent authorities other than the ones referred to in 
paragraph 4a, Member States shall designate one or more competent authorities to 

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supervise the compliance of originators, sponsors and SSPEs with Articles 18 to 
27, and the compliance of third parties with Article 28.’; 

(16) 

Article 30 is amended as follows 

(a) 

the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 

‘1a.  The  competent  authority  shall  supervise  the  compliance  of  originators, 
sponsors,  SSPEs  and  original  lenders  with  this  Regulation  in  accordance  with 
Article 29.’; 

(b)  paragraph 5 is deleted. 

(17) 

in Article 32(1), first subparagraph, the following point (i) is added: 

‘(i)  an institutional investor, other than the originator, sponsor or original lender, 
has failed to meet the requirements provided for in Article 5.’; 

(18) 

Article 36 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

paragraph 2 is deleted  

(b)  paragraph 3, is replaced by the following: 

‘A  specific  securitisation  sub-committee  shall  be  established  within 
the 
framework  of  the  Joint  Committee  of  the  European  Supervisory  Authorities, 
within which competent  authorities shall closely cooperate, in  order to  carry out 
their duties pursuant to Articles 30 to 34. The securitisation sub-committee shall 
be  led  by  the  EBA  with  the  cooperation  of  ESMA  and  EIOPA.  The  EBA  shall 
provide the secretariat and a vice-chairperson to the securitisation sub-committee 
on  a  permanent  basis.  The  securitisation  sub-committee  shall  foster  supervisory 
convergence  to  ensure  common  supervisory  practices.  The  members  of  the 
securitisation  sub-committee,  under  the  stewardship  of  the  EBA,  shall  closely 
coordinate their supervisory actions in order to identify and remedy infringements 
of  this  Regulation,  develop  and  promote  best  practices,  facilitate  collaboration, 
foster consistentapplication of law and provide cross-jurisdictional assessments in 
the event  of any disagreements.  The securitisation  sub-committee  shall  regularly 
monitor the state of the market and the application of this Regulation.’;  

(c) 

the following paragraphs 3a and 3b are inserted: 

‘3a.  The  securitisation  sub-committee  referred  to  in  paragraph  3  shall  by  [12 
months  after  adoption]  develop  guidelines  to  establish  common  supervisory 
procedures. 

3b.  Following  the  notification  to  the  competent  authorities  under  Article  7(1), 
the competent authorities of the sell-side entities in the transaction shall appoint a 
lead supervisor to coordinate actions and avoid divergences of application of this 
Regulation  for  transactions  involving  sell-side  entities  under  the  remit  of 
competent authorities from more than one Member State. A competent authority 
may delegate the exercise of some or all of the tasks and powers referred to in this 
Regulation to the lead supervisor. In case the competent authorities of the sell-side 
entities do not reach an agreement on the appointment of the lead supervisor, the 
securitisation sub-committee established under paragraph 3 shall appoint the lead 
supervisor.’; 

(d) 

in  paragraph  6,  the  first  and  second  subparagraphs  are  replaced  by  the 
following: 

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‘Upon  receipt  of  the  information  referred  to  in  paragraph  4,  the  competent 
authority of the entity suspected of the infringement shall take within 15 working 
days  any  action  necessary  to  address  the  infringement  identified  and  notify  the 
other competent authorities involved, in particular those of the originator, sponsor 
and SSPE, and the competent authorities of the holder of a securitisation position, 
where  known.  A  competent  authority  that  disagrees  with  another  competent 
authority regarding the procedure or content of the action or inaction or that other 
competent authority shall notify all other competent authorities involved about its 
disagreement  without  undue  delay.  Where  that  disagreement  is  not  resolved 
within three months of the date on which all competent authorities involved were 
notified,  the  matter  shall  be  referred  to  the  EBA  in  accordance  with  Article  19 
and,  where  applicable,  Article 20  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1093/2010.  The 
conciliation period referred to in Article 19(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
shall be one month. 

Where the competent authorities concerned fail to reach an agreement within the 
conciliation  phase  referred  to  in  the  first  subparagraph,  the  EBA  shall  take  the 
decision referred to in Article 19(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 within one 
month. During the procedure set out in this Article, a securitisation appearing on 
the  list  maintained  by  ESMA  pursuant  to  Article  27  of  this  Regulation  shall 
continue  to  be  considered  an  STS  pursuant  to  Chapter  4  of  this  Regulation  and 
shall be kept on that list.’; 

(e) 

paragraph 7 is replaced by the following 

‘7.  Three years from the date of application of this Regulation, and every three 
years thereafter, the EBA, in cooperation with ESMA and EIOPA, shall conduct a 
peer review in accordance with Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 on 
the  implementation  of  the  supervisory  powers  provided  for  in  Article  30  of  this 
Regulation.’; 

(f) 

paragraph 8 is deleted;  

(19) 

Article 44 is amended as follows: 

(a) 

in the first subparagraph, point (e) is replaced by the following: 

‘(e) 

the  contribution  of  securitisation  to  funding  Union  companies  and  to  the 
economy of the Union.’; 

(b) 

the second subparagraph is deleted; 

(20) 

Article 46 is replaced by the following: 

’Article 46 

Review 

By …[PO please insert the date: 5 years after date of entry into force], the Commission 
shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of 
this Regulation, accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal. 

That report shall consider in particular the findings of the reports referred to in Article 
44, and shall assess: 

(a) 

the  effects  of  this  Regulation  on  the  functioning  and  the  development  of  the 
market for securitisations in the Union; 

(b) 

the contribution of securitisation to: 

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(i) 

(ii) 

 to funding EU companies and economy, in particular on access to credit for 
SMEs and investments; 

the interconnectedness between financial institutions and the stability of the 
financial sector; 

(c)  whether  in  the  area  of  STS  securitisations,  an  equivalence  regime  could  be 
introduced for third country originators, sponsors and SSPEs, including in relation 
to  due-diligence 
international 
taking 
developments  in  the  area  of  securitisation,  in  particular  initiatives  on  simple, 
transparent and comparable securitisations; 

requirements, 

consideration 

into 

(d) 

the implementation of the requirements set out in Article 22(4) and Article 26d(4) 
and  whether  those  requirements  may  be  extended  to  securitisation  where  the 
underlying exposures are not residential loans or auto loans or leases, with a view 
to mainstreaming environmental, social and governance disclosures. 

Article 2  
Entry into force 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of the European Union. 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 

Done at Strasbourg, 

For the European Parliament 
The President 

For the Council 
The President 

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LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL AND DIGITAL STATEMENT – AGENCIES 

1. 

1.1. 

1.2. 

1.3. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ................................................. 3 

Title of the proposal/initiative ...................................................................................... 3 

Policy area(s) concerned .............................................................................................. 3 

Objective(s) .................................................................................................................. 3 

1.3.1.  General objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3 

1.3.2.  Specific objective(s) ..................................................................................................... 3 

1.3.3.  Expected result(s) and impact ...................................................................................... 3 

1.3.4. 

Indicators of performance ............................................................................................ 4 

1.4. 

1.5. 

The proposal/initiative relates to: ................................................................................. 4 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative .............................................................................. 4 

1.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for 

roll-out of the implementation of the initiative ............................................................ 4 

1.5.2.  Added value of EU involvement (it may result from different factors, e.g. 

coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For 
the purposes of this section 'added value of EU involvement' is the value resulting 
from EU action that is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created 
by Member States alone. .............................................................................................. 4 

1.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past .................................................. 5 

1.5.4.  Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with 
other appropriate instruments ....................................................................................... 5 

1.5.5.  Assessment of the different available financing options, including scope for 

redeployment ................................................................................................................ 6 

1.6. 

1.7. 

2. 

2.1. 

2.2. 

2.2.1. 

2.2.2. 

Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact .................................... 7 

Method(s) of budget implementation planned ............................................................. 7 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES................................................................................... 9 

Monitoring and reporting rules .................................................................................... 9 

Management and control system(s) ............................................................................. 9 

Justification of the budget implementation method(s), the funding implementation 
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed .................. 9 

Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up 
to mitigate them............................................................................................................ 9 

2.2.3.  Estimation and justification of the cost-effectiveness of the controls (ratio between 
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the 
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure) ........................................... 9 

2.3. 

3. 

Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities .............................................................. 10 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE ............ 11 

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3.1. 

Heading(s) of the multiannual financial framework and expenditure budget line(s) 
affected ....................................................................................................................... 11 

3.2. 

Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations ................................... 12 

3.2.1.  Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations (select, if appropriate, 

also for decentralised agencies) ................................................................................. 12 

3.2.1.1.  Appropriations from voted budget ............................................................................. 12 

3.2.1.2.  Appropriations from external assigned revenues (not to be completed for 

decentralised agencies)............................................................................................... 15 

3.2.2.  Estimated output funded from operational appropriations (not to be completed for 

decentralised agencies)............................................................................................... 16 

3.2.3.  Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations (not to be completed 
for decentralised agencies) ......................................................................................... 18 

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget .............................................................................. 18 

3.2.4.  Estimated requirements of human resources (not to be completed for decentralised 

agencies) ..................................................................................................................... 18 

3.2.4.1.  Financed from voted budget....................................................................................... 18 

3.2.5.  Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments (not to be 

completed for decentralised agencies) ....................................................................... 19 

3.2.6.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework (not to be completed 
for decentralised agencies) ......................................................................................... 20 

3.2.7.  Third-party contributions (not to be completed for decentralised agencies) ............. 20 

3.2.8.  Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a decentralised 

agency ........................................................................................................................ 20 

3.3. 

4. 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

Estimated impact on revenue (not to be completed for decentralised agencies) ....... 24 

Digital dimensions (not to be completed for decentralised agencies)........................ 24 

Requirements of digital relevance .............................................................................. 24 

Data ............................................................................................................................ 24 

Digital solutions ......................................................................................................... 24 

Interoperability assessment ........................................................................................ 24 

Measures to support digital implementation .............................................................. 25 

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1. 

FRAMEWORK OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

1.1. 

Title of the proposal/initiative 

Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  amending  Regulation 
(EU)  2017/2402  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  December 
2017  laying  down  a  general  framework  for  securitisation  and  creating  a  specific 
framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation. 

1.2. 

Policy area(s) concerned  

Policy area: Financial stability, financial services and Capital Markets Union 

Activity: Financial markets 

1.3. 

Objective(s) 

1.3.1.  General objective(s) 

This initiative is one of the components of the Savings and Investments Union. This 
proposal aims to: 

(1) to revive a securitisation market that will improve financing of the EU economy 
and  

(2) to strike a better balance between safety and market development.  

The  aim  is  to  create  conditions  and  environment  for  greater  lending  to  the  real 
economy. A well-functioning securitisation market will incentivise banks to be more 
active in the market ultimately also making them lend more to the economy.   

1.3.2. 

Specific objective(s) 

This proposal has the following objectives: 

(1)  Reduction  of  high  operational  costs  for  issuers  and  investors  balancing  with 
robust  and  proportionate  standards  of  transparency,  investor  protection  and 
supervision;.  

(2)  Removal  of  regulatory  barriers,  allowing  the  market  to  develop  in  a  more 
sustainable and resilient way;  

(3) Contribute to the Commission's effort to reduce the regulatory burden on market 
participants. 

Securitisation  can  be  an  important  channel  for  diversifying  funding  sources  and 
allocating risk more efficiently within the EU financial system. It would allow for a 
broader  distribution  of  financial  sector  risk  and  can  help  to  free  up  banks'  balance 
sheets to allow for further lending to the different categories of economic agent (e.g. 
non-financial  companies, SME, individuals). Overall, it can improve efficiencies in 
the  financial  system  and  provide  additional  investment  opportunities. Securitisation 
can  bridge  banks  and  capital  markets  with  an  indirect  benefit  for  businesses  and 
citizens (through, for example, less expensive loans, mortgages and credit cards). 

1.3.3.  Expected result(s) and impact 

Specify the effects which the proposal/initiative should have on the beneficiaries / groups targeted. 

Suggested  changes  will  revitalise  securitisation  market  and  allow  securitisation  to 
play a role in the development of the Savings and Investments Union and to reduce 

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burden  and  compliance  costs  for  issuers  and  investors.  By  addressing  the  high 
operational costs that have deterred banks and insurers from participating in the EU 
securitisation market, proposed changes will contribute to the Commission's effort to 
reduce  the  regulatory  burden  on  market  participants  and  stimulate  market 
development  the use of securitisation. At the same time, the proposed changes will 
continue  to  safeguard  financial  stability  and  provide  an  adequate  level  of  investor 
and consumer protection. 

1.3.4. 

Indicators of performance 

Specify the indicators for monitoring progress and achievements. 

The following indicators will be used to monitor progress and achievements:  

Monitoring  the  cost  of  conducting  due  diligence  to  invest  in  securitisation 
transactions. 

Monitoring issuance cost stemming from the reporting requirements.  

Tracking the number of securitisation issuers and investors. 

1.4. 

The proposal/initiative relates to:  

 a new action  
 a new action following a pilot project / preparatory action33  

 the extension of an existing action  

 a merger or redirection of one or more actions towards another/a new action 

1.5. 

Grounds for the proposal/initiative  

1.5.1.  Requirement(s) to be met in the short or long term including a detailed timeline for 

roll-out of the implementation of the initiative 

The  proposal  presents  a  series  of  simplifications  and  refinements  to  enhance 
efficiency  within  the  securitisation  market.  Through  targeted  adjustments  and 
simplification, these measures are positioned to bolster the market's capacity, attract 
a  broader  base  of  investors,  and  encourage  economic  growth—while  maintaining  a 
resilient and transparent financial ecosystem. The changes are expected to boost the 
competitiveness  and  sustainability  of  the  EU  Securitisation  Framework,  driving 
growth for all stakeholders involved. 

A  significant  simplification  of  due  diligence  duties  for  businesses  and  a  more 
efficient  transparency  framework  would  involve  a  streamlining  of  the  processes 
companies  need  to  follow  to  ensure  compliance.  By  reducing  these  obligations, 
businesses will face lower compliance costs, enabling more resources to be allocated 
to core business activities. 

1.5.2.  Added  value  of  EU  involvement  (it  may  result  from  different  factors,  e.g. 
coordination gains, legal certainty, greater effectiveness or complementarities). For 
the  purposes  of  this  section  'added  value  of  EU  involvement'  is  the  value  resulting 
from  EU  action  that  is  additional  to  the  value  that  would  have  been  otherwise 
created by Member States alone. 

Reasons for action at EU level (ex-ante): 

33 

As referred to in Article 58(2), point (a) or (b) of the Financial Regulation. 

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Securitisation products are part of EU capital markets which are open and integrated. 
Securitisation  links  financial  institutions  from  different  Member  States  and  non-
Member  States:  often  banks  originate  the  loans  that  are  securitised,  while  financial 
institutions such as insurers and investment funds invest in these products and they 
do so across European borders.  

Securitisation  is  a  tool  to  deepen  EU  capital  markets,  to  diversify  their  risk  profile 
and  to  free  up  banks’  balance  sheet  for  additional  lending,  for  EU  households  and 
businesses, to make the EU economy more competitive and resilient. 

The  ability  of  Member  States  to  adopt  national  measures  is  limited,  given  that  the 
existing EU securitisation framework, already provides for a harmonised set of rules 
at  EU  level  and  that  changes  at  national  level  would  conflict  with  Union  law 
currently  in  force.  Individual  Member  State  action  cannot  by  itself  attain  the 
objectives outlined above.  

Expected generated EU added value (ex-post): 

The proposal aims to aims to remove undue issuance and investment barriers in the 
EU securitisation market and will deliver a level playing field in the internal market 
for all institutional investors and entities involved in securitisation. 

1.5.3.  Lessons learned from similar experiences in the past 

The  evaluation  and  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  legislative  proposal  have 
assessed  how 
identify  a  few 
the  existing  framework  has  performed  and 
shortcomings. The general objective “to revive a safer securitisation market that will 
improve  the  financing  of  the  EU  economy,  weakening  the  link  between  banks’ 
deleveraging  needs  and  credit  tightening  in  the  short  run,  and  creating  a  more 
balanced and stable funding structure of the EU economy in the long run” has been 
only partially achieved because, while the securitisation market is safer, the initiative 
has not been sufficient to revive the market or improve financing opportunities. Most 
of the measures  that were introduced in  the framework aimed first and foremost to 
mitigate  potential  risks  associated  with  securitisation,  rather  than  support  market 
development.  Going  forward,  the  objective  is  to  strike  a  better  balance  between 
safety and market development. For this reason, most of the proposed changes focus 
on developing further the EU securitisation market by making the framework more 
proportionate. 

1.5.4.  Compatibility with the multiannual financial framework and possible synergies with 

other appropriate instruments 

The objectives of the initiative are consistent with a number of other EU policies and 
ongoing  initiatives,  in  particular  with  the  Union  policies  aimed  at  creating  Savings 
and  Investments  Union.  In  its  March  2025  Communication  on  Savings  and 
Investments  Union,  the  European  Commission  announced  adoption  of  measures 
focusing on simplifying due diligence and transparency to further boost securitisation 
market. 

The  legislative  proposal  would  remain  compatible  with  the  MFF  with  limited 
budgetary impacts as it foresees additional Union contribution to European Banking 
Authority (EBA) stemming from the additional 2 FTEs that the EBA would receive 
to implement additional tasks conferred by the legislators. 

Synergies  and  room  for  redeployment  were  examined,  resulting  in  one  FTE  who 
would be transferred from ESMA to the EBA to reflect the transfer of a task between 

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the  authorities.  The  FTE  transferred  from  ESMA  would  have  no  significant 
budgetary impacts except for a transfer within Heading 1. 

Altogether,  the  proposal  will  increase  of  3  more  FTEs  the  authorised  staff  of  the 
EBA during the future annual budgetary procedure, including 1 FTE transferred from 
ESMA.  The  EBA  will  continue  to  work  towards  maximising  synergies  and 
efficiency  gains  (inter  alia  via  IT  systems),  and  closely  monitor  the  additional 
workload  associated  with  this  proposal,  which  would  be  reflected  in  the  level  of 
authorised staff requested by the agency in the annual budgetary procedure. 

1.5.5.  Assessment  of  the  different  available  financing  options,  including  scope  for 

redeployment 

Different financing options were discussed, including in particular covering the costs 
by fees and internal redeployment. The fee option is practically unworkable as fees 
levied  on  firms  would  not  be  able  to  cover  the  costs  of  the  proposals.  Such  an 
approach  would  also  be  difficult  to  justify,  as  the  considered  measures  are  not 
directly  linked  to  supervisory  powers,  but  part  of  developing  the  regulatory 
framework. 

Potential  for  redeployment  was  examined,  resulting  in  the  transfer  of  1  temporary 
agent from ESMA to the EBA. Further internal redeployment within the ESAs is not 
an  option,  given  that  ESAs  already  struggle  significantly  to  deliver  on  their 
regulatory tasks.  

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1.6. 

Duration of the proposal/initiative and of its financial impact 

 limited duration  

–    in effect from [DD/MM]YYYY to [DD/MM]YYYY  

–    financial  impact  from  YYYY  to  YYYY  for  commitment  appropriations  and 

from YYYY to YYYY for payment appropriations.  

 unlimited duration 

–  Implementation with a start-up period from 2027 to 2029, 

–  followed by full-scale operation. 

1.7.  Method(s) of budget implementation planned34  

 Direct management by the Commission 

–   by its departments, including by its staff in the Union delegations;  

–    by the executive agencies  

 Shared management with the Member States  

 Indirect management by entrusting budget implementation tasks to: 

–   third countries or the bodies they have designated 

–   international organisations and their agencies (to be specified) 

–   the European Investment Bank and the European Investment Fund 

–   bodies referred to in Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation 

–   public law bodies 

–   bodies governed by private law with a public service mission to the extent that 

they are provided with adequate financial guarantees 

–   bodies governed by the private law of a Member State that are entrusted with 
the  implementation  of  a  public-private  partnership  and  that  are  provided  with 
adequate financial guarantees 

–   bodies or persons entrusted with the implementation of specific actions in the 
common  foreign  and  security  policy  pursuant  to  Title  V  of  the  Treaty  on 
European Union, and identified in the relevant basic act 

–  bodies  established  in  a  Member  State,  governed  by  the  private  law  of  a 
Member  State  or  Union  law  and  eligible  to  be  entrusted,  in  accordance  with 
sector-specific  rules,  with  the  implementation  of  Union  funds  or  budgetary 
guarantees,  to  the extent that such bodies are controlled by public law bodies or 
by bodies governed by private law with a public service mission, and are provided 
with adequate financial guarantees in the form of joint and several liability by the 
controlling bodies or equivalent financial guarantees and which may be, for each 
action, limited to the maximum amount of the Union support. 

Comments  

34 

Details of budget implementation methods and references to the Financial Regulation may be found on 
the BUDGpedia site: https://myintracomm.ec.europa.eu/corp/budget/financial-rules/budget-
implementation/Pages/implementation-methods.aspx. 

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N/A 

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2. 

MANAGEMENT MEASURES  

2.1.  Monitoring and reporting rules  

In  line  with  standard  arrangements  practiced  in  existing  agencies,  the  European 
Banking  Authority  (EBA)  will  prepare  regular  reports  on  its  activity  (including 
internal reporting to Senior Management, reporting to Boards and the production of 
the  annual  report),  and  will  be  subject  to  audits  by  the  Court  of  Auditors  and  the 
Commission's Internal Audit Service on its use of resources and performance. 

The EBA Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 is subject to regular reviews. 

2.2.  Management and control system(s)  

2.2.1. 

Justification  of  the  budget  implementation  method(s),  the  funding  implementation 
mechanism(s), the payment modalities and the control strategy proposed 

The  European  Supervisory  Agencies  for  financial  services  (EBA,  EIOPA,  ESMA), 
are decentralised regulatory agencies pursuant to Art. 70 Financial Regulation.  

Management  and  control  systems  of  the  European  Banking  Authority  are  provided 
for in Chapter VI of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing it, in combination 
with  the  applicable  framework  financial  Regulation  (EU)  2019/715  as  endorsed  by 
the Authority. 

The Authority must ensure that the appropriate standards are met in all areas of the 
internal  control  framework  and  is  subject  to  audits  by  the  Commission’s  Internal 
Audit Service. In addition, every financial year, the European Parliament, following 
a  recommendation  from  the  Council,  grants  discharge  to  this  agency  for  the 
implementation of its budget. 

2.2.2. 

Information concerning the risks identified and the internal control system(s) set up 
to mitigate them 

In  relation  to  the  legal,  economic,  efficient  and  effective  use  of  appropriations 
resulting  from  the  actions  to  be  carried  out  in  the  context  of  this  proposal  by  the 
EBA,  this  initiative  does  not  bring  about  new  significant  risks  that  would  not  be 
covered by an existing internal control framework. 

2.2.3.  Estimation  and  justification  of  the  cost-effectiveness  of  the  controls  (ratio  between 
the control costs and the value of the related funds managed), and assessment of the 
expected levels of risk of error (at payment & at closure)  

Management  and  control  systems  are  provided  in  the  Regulation  (EU)  1093/2010 
which  governs  the  functioning  of  the  EBA.  These  are  deemed  to  be  cost  effective. 
The initiative will have no significant effect on costs to be supported by those of the 
Member  States  or  the  EBA  from  that  angle.  Impacts  on  risks  of  error  rates  are 
expected to be very low. 

Historically DG FISMA’s costs of the overall supervision of an Authority such as the 
EBA have been estimated at 0.5% of the annual contributions paid to it. Such costs 
include,  for  example  but  not  exclusively,  the  costs  related  to  the  assessment  of  the 
annual programming and budget, the participation of DG FISMA's representatives in 
Management Boards, Boards of Supervisors and related preparatory work. 

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2.3.  Measures to prevent fraud and irregularities  

For  the  purposes  of  combating  fraud,  corruption  and  any  other  illegal  activity,  the 
provisions of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) applies to EBA without any restrictions. 

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3. 

3.1. 

ESTIMATED FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE  

Heading(s)  of  the  multiannual  financial  framework  and  expenditure  budget 
line(s) affected  

•  Existing budget lines  

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure 

Contribution  

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Number  

1. 

1. 

03 10 02 00: European Banking Authority 
(EBA) 

03  10  04  00:  European  Securities  and 
Markets Auhority (ESMA) 

•  New budget lines requested  

Diff./Non-
diff.35 

from 
EFTA 
countries
36 

from 
candidate 
countries 
and 
potential 
candidates
37 

From 
other 
third 
countries 

other assigned 
revenue 

Diff. 

NO 

NO 

NO 

Diff. 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

NO 

In order of multiannual financial framework headings and budget lines. 

Budget line 

Type of 
expenditure 

Diff./Non-
diff. 

from 
EFTA 
countries 

Contribution  

from 
candidate 
countries 
and 
potential 
candidates 

from 
other 
third 
countries 

other assigned 
revenue  

Heading of 
multiannual 
financial 
framework 

Number  

N/A 

35 
36 
37 

Diff. = Differentiated appropriations / Non-diff. = Non-differentiated appropriations. 
EFTA: European Free Trade Association.  
Candidate countries and, where applicable, potential candidates from the Western Balkans. 

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3.2. 

Estimated financial impact of the proposal on appropriations  

3.2.1. 

Summary of estimated impact on operational appropriations 

–    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of operational appropriations  

–   The proposal/initiative requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below 

3.2.1.1.  Appropriations from voted budget 

Heading of multiannual financial  framework  

Number 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

DG: <…….> 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

Operational appropriations  

Budget line 

Budget line 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1a) 

(2a) 

(1b) 

(2b) 

Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes38 
Budget line 

(3) 

TOTAL appropriations 
for DG <…….> 

Commitments 

Payments 

=1a+1b+3 

=2a+2b+3 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

European Banking Authority 

Year 

Year 

Year 

Year 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

38 

Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research. 

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2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Budget line: 03 10 02 002 / EU Budget contribution to the agency 

0.263 

0.263 

The Union subsidy to ESMA will be reduced by the amounts shown in the table below: 

European Securities and Markets Authority 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

Budget line: 03 10 04 00 / EU Budget contribution to the agency 

(0.088) 

(0.088) 

The appropriations and EU budget contribution to the European Banking Authority (EBA) will be compensated in part by a reduction 
of  the  appropriations  and  EU  budget  contribution  to  the  European  Securities  and  Markets  Authority  (ESMA)  –  resulting  in  the  net 
amounts shown in the tables below. 

operational 
TOTAL 
(including  contribution 
agency) 

appropriations  
to  decentralised 

Commitments 

Payments 

TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature  financed 
from the envelope for specific programmes  

TOTAL appropriations under 
HEADING 1 

Commitments 

of the multiannual financial framework 

Payments 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

=4+6 

=5+6 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0175 

0.175 

0.175 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL 
MFF2021-
2027 

EN 

13 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  TOTAL  operational  appropriations 
operational headings) 

(all 

Commitments 

Payments 

•  TOTAL  appropriations  of  an  administrative  nature  financed 
from  the  envelope  for  specific  programmes  (all  operational 
headings) 

TOTAL appropriations under Headings 1 
to 6 

Commitments 

of the multiannual financial framework 
(Reference amount) 

Payments 

(4) 

(5) 

(6) 

=4+6 

=5+6 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0175 

0.175 

0.175 

Heading of multiannual financial framework  

7 

‘Administrative expenditure’39 

 Human resources  
 Other administrative expenditure  
TOTAL DG <…….> 

DG: <…….> 

Appropriations  

DG: <…….> 

 Human resources  
 Other administrative expenditure  
TOTAL DG <…….> 

Appropriations  

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

TOTAL 
MFF 2021-
2027 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

TOTAL 
MFF 
2021-2027 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

39 

The necessary appropriations should be determined using the annual average cost figures available on the appropriate BUDGpedia webpage. 

EN 

14 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL appropriations under HEADING 7 of the multiannual financial 
framework  

(Total 
commitments 
= Total 
payments) 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

TOTAL appropriations under HEADINGS 1 to 7 

Commitments 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

of the multiannual financial framework  

Payments 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.175 

0.175 

0.175 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

3.2.1.2.  Appropriations from external assigned revenues  

Heading of multiannual financial framework  

Number 

EUR million (to three decimal places) 

DG: <…….> 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL MFF 
2021-2027 

Operational appropriations  

Budget line 

Budget line 

Commitments 

Payments 

Commitments 

Payments 

(1a) 

(2a) 

(1b) 

(2b) 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

EN 

15 

EN 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Appropriations of an administrative nature financed from the envelope of specific programmes40 
Budget line 

(3) 

TOTAL appropriations 
for DG <…….> 

Commitments 

Payments 

=1a+1b+3 

=2a+2b+3 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

3.2.2.  Estimated output funded from operational appropriations  

Year  
2024 

Year  
2025 

Year  
2026 

Year  
2027 

OUTPUTS 

Commitment appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Enter as many years as necessary to show the 
duration of the impact (see Section 1.6) 

TOTAL 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

o
N

Cost  N

o

Cost 

o
N

Cost 

Total 
No 

Total 
cost 

Indicate 
objectives and 
outputs  

 

Type41 

Avera
ge 
cost 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 142… 

- Output 

- Output 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 1 

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE No 2 ... 

- Output 

Subtotal for specific objective No 2 

40 
41 
42 

Technical and/or administrative assistance and expenditure in support of the implementation of EU programmes and/or actions (former ‘BA’ lines), indirect research, direct research. 
Outputs are products and services to be supplied (e.g.: number of student exchanges financed, number of km of roads built, etc.). 
As described in Section 1.3.2. ‘Specific objective(s)’  

EN 

16 

EN 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTALS 

EN 

17 

EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3. 

Summary of estimated impact on administrative appropriations  

–    The  proposal/initiative  does  not  require  the  use  of  appropriations  of  an 

administrative nature  

–    The proposal/initiative requires the use of appropriations of an administrative 

nature, as explained below 

3.2.3.1. Appropriations from voted budget 

VOTED APPROPRIATIONS 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

HEADING 7 

Human resources  

Other administrative expenditure  

Subtotal HEADING 7 

Outside HEADING 7 

Human resources  

Other expenditure of an administrative nature 

Subtotal outside HEADING 7 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

TOTAL 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

3.2.4.  Estimated requirements of human resources  

–    The proposal/initiative does not require the use of human resources  

–    The  proposal/initiative  requires  the  use  of  human  resources,  as  explained 

below 

3.2.4.1.  Financed from voted budget 

Estimate to be expressed in full-time equivalent units (FTEs)43 

VOTED APPROPRIATIONS 

Year 

2024 

Year 

2025 

Year 

2026 

Year 

2027 

 Establishment plan posts (officials and temporary staff) 

20 01 02 01 (Headquarters and Commission’s Representation Offices) 

20 01 02 03 (EU Delegations) 

01 01 01 01 (Indirect research) 

01 01 01 11 (Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) 

• External staff (in FTEs) 

20 02 01 (AC, END from the ‘global envelope’) 

20 02 03 (AC, AL, END and JPD in the EU Delegations) 

Admin. Support 
line 
[XX.01.YY.YY] 

- at Headquarters 

- in EU Delegations  

01 01 01 02 (AC, END - Indirect research) 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

43 

Please specify below the table how many FTEs within the number indicated are already assigned to the 
management of the action and/or can be redeployed within your DG and what are your net needs. 

EN 

18 

  EN 

 
  
 
 
 01 01 01 12 (AC, END - Direct research) 

Other budget lines (specify) - Heading 7 

Other budget lines (specify) - Outside Heading 7 

TOTAL 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

The staff required to implement the proposal (in FTEs): 

Current staff 
available in the 
Commission 
services 

Additional staff* 

To be financed 
under Heading 
7 or Research 

To be financed 
from BA line 

To be financed 
from fees 

N/A 

Establishment  plan 
posts 

External  staff  (CA, 
SNEs, INT) 

Description of tasks to be carried out by: 

Officials and temporary staff 

External staff 

3.2.5.  Overview of estimated impact on digital technology-related investments  

Compulsory: the best estimate of the digital technology-related investments entailed 
by the proposal/initiative should be included in the table below.  

Exceptionally,  when  required  for  the  implementation  of  the  proposal/initiative,  the 
appropriations under Heading 7 should be presented in the designated line.  

The appropriations under Headings 1-6 should be reflected as “Policy IT expenditure 
on operational programmes”. This expenditure refers to the operational budget to be 
used to re-use/ buy/ develop IT platforms/tools directly linked to the implementation 
of the initiative and their associated investments (e.g. licences, studies, data storage 
etc).  The  information  provided  in  this  table  should  be  consistent  with  details 
presented under Section 4 “Digital dimensions”. 

TOTAL Digital and IT appropriations 

Year 

Year 

Year 

Year 

2024 

2025 

2026 

2027 

TOTAL 
MFF 
2021 - 
2027 

HEADING 7 

IT expenditure (corporate)  

Subtotal HEADING 7 

Outside HEADING 7 

Policy IT expenditure on operational 
programmes 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

EN 

19 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subtotal outside HEADING 7 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

TOTAL 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

3.2.6.  Compatibility with the current multiannual financial framework  

The proposal/initiative: 

–    can be fully financed through redeployment within the relevant heading of the 

multiannual financial framework (MFF) 

Not applicable as the tasks would be undertaken by decentralised agencies. 

–    requires use of the unallocated margin under the relevant heading of the MFF 

and/or use of the special instruments as defined in the MFF Regulation 

Not applicable as the tasks would be undertaken by decentralised agencies. 

–    requires a revision of the MFF 

Not applicable as the tasks would be undertaken by decentralised agencies. 

3.2.7.  Third-party contributions  

The proposal/initiative: 

–    does not provide for co-financing by third parties 

–    provides for the co-financing by third parties estimated below: 

Appropriations in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Year 2024 

Year 2025 

Year 2026 

Year 2027 

Total 

Specify the co-financing body  

TOTAL appropriations co-
financed  

3.2.8.  Estimated human resources and the use of appropriations required in a decentralised 
agency  

Staff requirements (fulll-time equivalent units) 

Agency: European Banking Authority 

Year 2024 

Year 2025 

Year 2026 

Year 2027 

Temporary agents (AD Grades) 

Temporary agents (AST grades) 

Temporary agents (AD+AST) subtotal 

0 

0 

0 

3 

3 

Contract agents 

Seconded national experts 

EN 

20 

  EN 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract agents and seconded national 
experts subtotal 

TOTAL staff 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

Agency: European Securities and 
Markets Authority 

Temporary agents (AD Grades) 

Temporary agents (AST grades) 

Temporary agents (AD+AST) subtotal 

Contract agents 

Seconded national experts 

Contract agents and seconded national 
experts subtotal 

TOTAL staff 

Year 2024 

Year 2025 

Year 2026 

Year 2027 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

(1) 

(1) 

0 

(1) 

Appropriations covered by the EU budget contribution in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Agency: European Banking Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Title 1: Staff expenditure 

Title 2: Infrastructure and operating 
expenditure 

Title 3: Operational expenditure 

0.225 

0.225 

0.037 

0.037 

0.000 

TOTAL of appropriations covered by 
the EU budget  

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.263 

0.263 

Agency: European Securities and 
Markets Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Title 1: Staff expenditure 

Title 2: Infrastructure and operating 
expenditure 

Title 3: Operational expenditure 

(0.075) 

(0.075) 

(0.013) 

(0.013) 

0.000 

EN 

21 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL of appropriations covered by 
the EU budget  

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

(0.088) 

(0.088) 

Appropriations covered by fees, if applicable, in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

N/A 

Appropriations covered by co-financing, if applicable, in EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Contribution  by  national  competent  authorities  to  the  European  Banking  Authority  will  be 
compensated in part by a reduction of contributions by national competent authorities to the 
European Securities and Markets Authority. 

Agency: European Banking Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Title 1: Staff expenditure 

Title 2: Infrastructure and operating 
expenditure 

Title 3: Operational expenditure 

0.338 

0.338 

0.056 

0.056 

0.000 

TOTAL of appropriations covered by 
the EU budget  

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.394 

0.394 

Contributions  by  national  competent  authorities  to  ESMA  will  be  reduced  by  the  amounts 
shown in the table below, corresponding to 1 FTE: 

Agency: European Securities and 
Markets Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Title 1: Staff expenditure 

Title 2: Infrastructure and operating 
expenditure 

Title 3: Operational expenditure 

(0.112) 

(0.112) 

(0.019) 

(0.019) 

0.000 

TOTAL of appropriations covered by 
the EU budget  

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

(0.131) 

(0.131) 

Overview/summary  of  human  resources  and  appropriations  (in  EUR  million)  required  by  the 
proposal/initiative in a decentralised agency  

The subsidy of the Union and contribution by national competent authorities to the European 
Banking Authority will be compensated in part by a reduction of subsidy and contribution to 
the European Securities and Markets Authority. 

EN 

22 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agency: European Banking Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Temporary agents (AD+AST) 

Contract agents 

Seconded national experts 

Total staff 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

3 

0 

0 

3 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Appropriations covered by the EU budget 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.263 

0.263 

Appropriations covered by fees  
(if applicable) 

Appropriations co-financed  
(if applicable) 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.394 

0.394 

TOTAL appropriations 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.657 

0.657 

The headcount of ESMA will be reduced by 1 FTE, allowing for a reduction of the subsidy of 
the Union and contribution by national competent authorities to ESMA, as shown in the table 
below: 

Agency: European Securities and 
Markets Authority 

Year 2024  Year 2025  Year 2026  Year 2027 

TOTAL 
2021 - 2027 

Temporary agents (AD+AST) 

Contract agents 

Seconded national experts 

Total staff 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

(1) 

0 

0 

(1) 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Appropriations covered by the EU budget 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

(0.088) 

(0.088) 

Appropriations covered by fees  
(if applicable) 

Appropriations co-financed  
(if applicable) 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

(0.131) 

(0.131) 

TOTAL appropriations 

0.000 

0.000 

0.000 

(0.219) 

(0.219) 

EN 

23 

  EN 

 
3.3. 

Estimated impact on revenue  

–    The proposal/initiative has no financial impact on revenue. 

–    The proposal/initiative has the following financial impact: 

–   on own resources  

–   on other revenue 

–   please indicate, if the revenue is assigned to expenditure lines 

Appropriations 
available for the 
current financial 
year 

     EUR million (to three decimal places) 

Impact of the proposal/initiative44 

Year 2024 

Year 2025  Year 2026 

Year 2027 

Budget revenue line: 

Article …………. 

For assigned revenue, specify the budget expenditure line(s) affected. 

Other  remarks  (e.g.  method/formula  used  for  calculating  the  impact  on  revenue  or 
any other information). 

4. 

DIGITAL DIMENSIONS 

The  proposed  amendments  to  Regulation  (EU)  2017/2402  do  not  substantially  modify 
the digital infrastructure and processes that support the implementation of the 
Regulation. Consequently, the proposal is considered of no digital relevance. 

4.1. 

Requirements of digital relevance 

Not applicable 

4.2. 

Data 

Not applicable 

4.3. 

Digital solutions 

Not applicable 

4.4. 

Interoperability assessment 

Not applicable 

44 

As regards traditional own resources (customs duties, sugar levies), the amounts indicated must be net 
amounts, i.e. gross amounts after deduction of 20 % for collection costs. 

EN 

24 

  EN 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.  Measures to support digital implementation 

Not applicable 

EN 

25 

  EN