Opinion of the European Central Bank of 10 June 2025 on the pensions of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique (CON/2025/13)
Date: 2025-06-10
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

ECB-PUBLIC 

EN 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 10 June 2025 

on the pensions of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique 

(CON/2025/13) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 14 May 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from the Belgian Deputy Prime Minister 

and Minister of Finances and Pensions for an opinion on a draft law for temporary public pension sustainability 

measures  (hereinafter  the  ‘draft  law’).  The  draft  law  amends  the  rules  applicable  to  the  pension  of  certain 

members of the board of directors and staff of the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique 

(NBB). 

The  ECB’s  competence  to  deliver  an  opinion  is  based  on  Articles  127(4)  and  282(5)  of  the  Treaty  on  the 

Functioning of the European Union and Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC1, as the draft 

law relates to the NBB.  

In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the 

Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The law of 5 August 1978 on economic and budgetary reforms 2 (hereinafter the ‘Wijninckx law’) provides 

for a maximum amount for pensions in the public sector3 (hereinafter the ‘Wijninckx cap’). The Wijninckx 

cap applies to the pensions of staff members and members of the management bodies of, inter alia, 

public institutions of credit (organismes publics de crédit / openbare kredietinstellingen) 4 such as the 

NBB, even though the NBB is organised as a public limited company, independent from the government. 

1.2  The draft law adapts the rules applicable to the Wijninckx cap. In particular, the draft law would suspend 

the annual adjustment of the Wijninckx cap on the basis of the Belgian consumer price index from 1 July 

2025 until 31 December 20295. According to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft law, 

the draft law aligns with the 2025-2029 federal coalition agreement, which notably limits the indexation 

of  the  State  pension  for  civil  servants  and  persons  with  mixed  public  and  private  careers  when  the 

Wijninckx  cap  is  exceeded.  As  noted  in  the  consultation  request  accompanying  the  draft  law,  the 

1 

2  

3  

4  
5  

Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, ELI: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/1998/415/oj). 

Loi du 5 août 1978 de réformes économiques et budgétaires/Wet van 5 augustus 1978 houdende economische en 
budgettaire hervormingen, telle que modifiée/zoals nader gewijzigd, Moniteur Belge/Belgisch Staatsblad, 17/8/1978, p. 
9106. 
Article 39, second paragraph, of the Wijninckx law. The Wijninckx cap amounts to EUR 46 882.74 per year at index 
138.01. The indexed amount is EUR 99 499.24 gross per year (since 1 February 2025 at index 2.1223), or EUR 8 
291.60 gross per month. 

Article 38, 2° of the Wijninckx law. 
Articles X+3 and X+4 of the draft law. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
ECB-PUBLIC 

measures  in  the  draft  law  primarily  aim  to  reduce  pension  costs  as  part  of  broader  fiscal  measures 

addressing the fiscal sustainability risks faced by Belgium.   

2. 

Observations 

2.1  As the draft law applies to and directly affects the NBB’s board members and some of its staff, the draft 

law should primarily be examined from the perspective of central bank independence requirements 6.  

2.2  Financial independence 

2.2.1  Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of 

the  European  Central  Bank  (hereinafter  the  ‘Statute  of  the  ESCB’)  require  that  third  parties  may  not 

influence,  directly  or  indirectly,  a  national  central  bank  (NCB)  in  the  performance  of  its  tasks  or  as 

regards  its  ability  to  fulfil  its  mandate  both  operationally  in  terms  of  manpower,  and  in  terms  of 

appropriate  financial  resources7.  In  this  regard,  Member  States  may  not  impair  an  NCB’s  ability  to 

employ and retain the qualified staff necessary for the NCB to perform independently the tasks conferred 

on it by the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. An NCB may not be put into a position where it has 

limited control or no control over its staff, or where the government of a Member State can influence its 

policy on staff matters. Amendments that lead to reductions in remuneration for members of an NCB’s 

decision-making body and its staff members should not interfere with that NCB’s powers to administer 

its  own  financial  resources,  including  the  funds  resulting  from  any  reduction  in  salaries  that  it  pays. 

Autonomy in staff matters extends to issues relating to staff pensions8. 

2.2.2  To protect autonomy in staff matters, the ECB has consistently recommended in its previous opinions 

and in its convergence reports that any amendment to legislation on remuneration for members of an 

NCB’s  decision-making  bodies  and  its  staff  members  should  be  decided  in  close  and  effective 

cooperation with the NCB, taking due account of its views, to ensure the ongoing ability of the NCB to 

independently carry out its tasks9.  

2.2.3  Situations where the government of a Member State exempts the NCB of that Member State from the 

scope  of  the  legislation  involved,  while  at  the  same  time  inviting  the  NCB  to  consider  whether  the 

underlying reasons for the legislative provisions can be achieved without prejudicing the performance 

of the NCB’s tasks under the Treaty, the Statute of the ESCB and national legislation10, or where the 

relevant national legislative provisions provide that the public service pension plan is only applicable to 

the  NCB  with  its  consent,  constitute  examples  of  effective  cooperation  between  a  Member  State 

government and an NCB. These approaches would allow the NBB to take into account the particularities 

of its own legal framework and special legal regime as well as any other relevant considerations – in 

6  
7  

8  

9  

10  

This examination is without prejudice to the Member States’ competences under Article 153(4) of the Treaty. 

See paragraph 6 of Opinion CON/2012/89 and paragraph 4.2 of Opinion CON/2013/46. All ECB opinions are published 
on EUR-Lex. 

See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2024, paragraph 2.2.3 (sub-section entitled ‘Autonomy in staff matters’), available 
on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. See also paragraph 4.3 of Opinion CON/2013/46, paragraph 2.4 of 
Opinion CON/2017/49, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2022/34 and paragraph 3.2 of Opinion CON/2023/37. 
See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2024, paragraph 2.2.3 (sub-section entitled ‘Autonomy in staff matters’). See also 
paragraph 4.4 of Opinion CON/2013/46, paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2022/34 and paragraph 3.3 of Opinion 
CON/2023/37. 
See paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion CON/2010/58 and paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2010/80. 

2 

 
 
 
 
ECB-PUBLIC 

particular, obligations arising under the Treaty – in deciding upon the form and extent of its consent or 

objection to the application of the plan to NBB staff11. 

2.3  Personal independence of the members of the NBB’s decision-making bodies 

2.3.1  Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB prohibit national governments from 

seeking to influence the members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. 

The ECB understands that the Wijninckx cap applies generally to all public servants in Belgium who 

come  within  its  scope,  including  the  Governor  of  the  NBB  and  the  members  of  the  NBB’s  board  of 

directors. In view of  this,  the draft law  does not seek to influence the NBB’s decision-making bodies 

either directly or indirectly in the performance of their tasks.  

2.3.2  However, to comply with the Treaty requirements with regard to the personal independence of members 

of an NCB’s decision-making bodies and to exclude any kind of influence on the members of an NCB’s 

decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks, adjustments to the remuneration, including 

the pensions, of the Governor and other members of an NCB’s decision-making bodies who are involved 

in the performance of ESCB-related tasks may not affect the terms under which the current members 

of an NCB’s decision-making bodies have been appointed. Therefore, such adjustments may only apply 

to  future  appointments 12.  The  requirements  in  respect  of  the  principle  of  financial  independence 

discussed in paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 must also be taken into account13.  

2.4  Compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing 

The ECB understands that any savings resulting from the suspension of the yearly adjustment of the 

Wijninckx cap on the basis of the Belgian consumer price index would be returned to the NBB, as the 

employer14. The ECB understands that the draft law would not therefore trigger any financing by the 

NBB  of the  Belgian  State that could raise concerns from the  prohibition of monetary financing  under 

Article 123 of the Treaty. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex.  

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 10 June 2025. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

11  

12  

13  

14  

See paragraph 2.1.3 of Opinion CON/2010/58, paragraph 3.2.2 of Opinion CON/2010/80 and paragraph 2.5 of Opinion 
CON/2022/34. 
See the ECB’s Convergence Report, 2024, paragraph 2.2.3 (sub-section entitled ‘Personal independence’). See also 
paragraph 3.5 of Opinion CON/2010/56, paragraph 3.2.9 of Opinion CON/2010/80, paragraph 4.3 of Opinion 
CON/2011/106, paragraph 3.5.2 of Opinion CON/2021/9 and paragraph 3.3.1 of Opinion CON/2024/38. 

See paragraph 3.2.10 of   Opinion CON/2010/80, paragraph 4.6 of Opinion CON/2013/46, paragraph 2.6 of Opinion 
CON/2015/44 and paragraph 2.9 of Opinion CON/2017/49. 
See Article 44 of the Wijninckx law. 

3