COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament
Date: 2025-06-06
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: European Parliament, European election, European electoral system, data processing, disinformation, election result, organisation of elections, parliamentary election, right to stand for election, right to vote

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 6.6.2025  SWD(2025) 147 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament     {COM(2025) 287 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 
1. 

Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 2 

2.  Participation in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament ................................................... 7 

2.1. 

Turnout .................................................................................................................................. 7 

2.2. 
Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, and 
supporting electoral rights ................................................................................................................ 12 

2.3. 

Participation of specific groups ........................................................................................... 17 

2.3.1. 

2.3.2. 

2.3.3. 

2.3.4. 

2.3.5. 

2.3.6. 

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 17 

Young people .............................................................................................................. 17 

Women ....................................................................................................................... 22 

Persons with disabilities ............................................................................................. 27 

Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries ................................... 31 

Other groups ............................................................................................................... 36 

3.  Cooperation in support of free, fair and resilient elections ......................................................... 37 

4.  Protecting the integrity and resilience of the electoral process ................................................... 40 

4.1. 

4.2. 

4.3. 

4.4. 

4.5. 

4.6. 

Preparedness, monitoring and response ............................................................................ 40 

Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation ................................. 44 

Use of AI............................................................................................................................... 50 

Data protection.................................................................................................................... 53 

Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience .......................... 55 

Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign .................................................... 60 

4.6.1. 

4.6.2. 

Fair campaigning ......................................................................................................... 60 

Funding of the election campaign .............................................................................. 62 

4.7. 

Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives ........................................... 63 

5. 

European dimension and the exercise of EU electoral rights ....................................................... 65 

5.1. 

The European dimension ..................................................................................................... 65 

5.2.  Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law .............................. 67 

5.2.1. 

5.2.2. 

5.2.3. 

5.2.4. 

5.2.5. 

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 67 

Electoral Act ................................................................................................................ 68 

Electoral rights ............................................................................................................ 68 

Prevention of multiple voting ..................................................................................... 69 

Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law ....................... 72 

5.3. 

Publication of results (officials and polls) ............................................................................ 77 

6. 

Election observation ..................................................................................................................... 77 

1 

 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

This  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  accompanies  the  Report  on  the  2024  elections  to  the 
European Parliament, detailing its findings, following the same structure. 

The elections to the European Parliament, which take place every five years, are among the world’s 
largest democratic exercises.  

Between  6  and  9  June  2024,  European  Union  (‘EU’)  citizens  directly  elected  720  Members  of  the 
European Parliament (MEPs) from around 18 400 candidates1 with approximately 180 million votes 
cast across the EU, of nearly 360 million eligible voters2. The turnout (50.74%) closely mirrored that 
of the 2019 elections.  

The 2024 elections were organised amidst major transformations being faced by democracies in the EU 
and  beyond.  Election  campaigns  have  moved  significantly  to  the  online  sphere  with  social  media 
playing  an  increasingly  important  role.  As  highlighted  in  the  Commission’s  European  Democracy 
Action Plan3, this has brought new opportunities for direct interactions between political actors and 
voters. It can encourage democratic engagement and is also particularly effective in terms of involving 
young people in the democratic life. At the same time, the prevalence of campaigning online has also 
resulted in the need to mitigate specific risks. There is a higher need to address challenges such as those 
posed by cyber-threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation or by 
the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, than before. In this context, citizens show a high 
level  of  concern  about  various  forms  of  interference in  elections,  including  through  disinformation, 
cyber attacks or the covert influence of foreign countries.  

Background info on Eurobarometer 

In 2023, a survey on citizenship and democracy uncovered a high level of concern about various 
forms of interference in elections in Europe4. Indeed, almost eight in ten respondents (78%) expressed 
concerns about disinformation influencing people’s voting decisions, with almost half (47%) very 
concerned about this. Around seven in ten were concerned about elections being manipulated through 
cyberattacks  (72%)  and  about  foreign  countries  influencing  elections  covertly  (70%)5.  Alongside 
these concerns, more than six in ten respondents are also worried about being pressured into voting 
a particular way (65%), and about the results of an election being manipulated (63%). A slimmer 
majority (53%) express concern about people voting when they are not entitled to. 

The  main  responsibilities  regarding  elections  are  for the  Member  States.  It  is  their  competence and 
responsibility  to  lay  down  the  specific  conditions  for  the  conduct  and  organisation  of  elections,  in 
accordance with their national legislation, international obligations and applicable EU law,  and their 
authorities and courts have  primary responsibility  for  exercising  oversight  and  ensuring compliance 
with  the  relevant  rules.  For  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  certain  common  principles  and 

1 As reported by the Civil Society Organisation and Election Observer Network Election-Watch.EU. 
2 Eurostat, Persons eligible to vote in the 2024 European Parliament elections by category of voters, last updated 
2 August 2024. Related metadata: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/demo_popep_esms.htm.  
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European democracy action plan, COM/2020/790 
final, 3 December 2020. 
4 Eurobarometer 528 on Citizenship and democracy. Fieldwork: April-May 2023. Publication: 06 December 2023. 
5 About eight in ten respondents (81%)  agreed that foreign interference in our democratic system is a  serious 
problem that should be addressed, and over seven in ten (74%) agree that such interference can affect citizens’ 
voting behaviour. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act6 and the rules enabling mobile EU 
citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the European Parliament in their 
country of residence.  

EU action in support of free and fair elections offers important added value. Since 2019, as part of a 
broader effort to promote and strengthen democracy, the EU has reinforced its support to Member States 
in  this  field.  Initiatives  such  as  those  under  the  2020  European  Democracy  Action  Plan7,  the  2021 
package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections in the EU8, and the 
2023 Defence of Democracy package9 provide new tools to reinforce the resilience of democracies and 
elections in the EU.  

Non-exhaustive overview of actions undertaken to protect democracy in the 2019-2024 mandate 

European Democracy Action Plan (2020) 

1)  Protect the integrity of elections and promote democratic participation: 

•  See in particular 2021 package of measures to protect integrity of elections below  

2)  Strengthen media freedom and media pluralism 

•  See different measures on media freedom presented in 2021/2022 below 

3)  Counter foreign interference and disinformation  

•  Developing EU toolbox for countering foreign interference 
•  Code of Practice on Disinformation 
•  Work on media literacy 

Package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect integrity of elections (2021) 

1)  Regulation on transparency of political advertising: proposal on political advertising 

(Adopted in 2024, will fully apply as of Autumn 2025) 

2)  Proposals to update Directives on electoral rights of mobile EU citizens in municipal and 

European Parliament elections 

3)  Proposal to amend Regulation on European political parties and foundations 

Different measures to strengthen free media (2021-2022) 

•  Recommendation on safety of journalists (Presented by the Commission in 2021) 
•  Package on abusive litigation (SLAPP) to protect journalists and civil society: Directive 

(Entered into force 2024) and Recommendation (Presented in 2022) 

•  Package on media freedom: Recommendation on safeguards for editorial independence and 
ownership transparency in the media sector, and proposal for a Regulation: European 
Media Freedom Act – proposal for a Regulation (Adopted, entered into force 2024, will 
fully apply as of August 2025) 

Defence of Democracy Package (2023) 

1)  Directive on transparency of interest representation on behalf of third countries  
2)  Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes (Presented in December 

2023) 

3)  Recommendation to promote the inclusive and effective participation of citizens and civil 
society organisations in public policy making processes (Presented in December 2023) 

6 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ L 218, 
8.10.1976. 
7 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on  the European democracy action plan, COM/2020/790 
final, 3 December 2020. 
8 European Commission, European Democracy: Commission sets out new laws on political advertising, electoral 
rights and party funding, 21 November 2025. 
9 European Commission, Defence of Democracy – Commission proposes to shed light on covert foreign influence, 
12 December 2023.  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other tools 

• 

Important legislation in the digital field, notably the Digital Services Act (Adopted, fully 
applies as of February 2024) (and its Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for 
electoral processes10) and AI act (entered into force 2024, will fully apply as of August 
202611) 

As  part  of  this  work,  the  December  2023  Commission  Recommendation  on  inclusive  and  resilient 
elections (hereafter,  ‘the  2023  Recommendation  on elections’)12,  provides an  important  blueprint to 
support the preparations for and conduct of elections. It is addressed to Member States, European and 
national political parties, political foundations, and campaign organisations in the context of preparation 
for elections in the EU, including the 2024 elections to the European Parliament.  

The  Recommendation  on  elections  includes  measures  (1)  supporting  voter  turnout  and  inclusive 
participation,  (2)  encouraging  election  integrity  and  fair  campaigning,  (3)  on  transparency  for 
affiliations and political advertising, (4) promoting election observation, (5) protecting election-related 
infrastructure and ensuring resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats, (6) protecting election-
related information, (7) regarding funding from third countries of political parties, political foundations, 
electoral campaigns and candidates, (8) promoting easy access to electoral rights for elections to the 
European Parliament, (9) enhancing the European nature of the elections to the European Parliament, 
(10)  addressing  the  risk  of  multiple  voting  in  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  and  (11) 
strengthening election networks and electoral cooperation.  

The  EU  toolbox  also includes  several legislative and regulatory measures  which  are relevant  in  the 
electoral context, including the Digital Services Act (DSA)13 and its Guidelines on the mitigation of 
systemic  risks  for  electoral  processes14,  the  Regulation  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political 
advertising15 or the Artificial Intelligence Act16. 

Preparations for the 2024 elections to the European Parliament saw unprecedented cooperation between 
the Member States, EU institutions and stakeholders. On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the 
EU  activated  the  Integrated  Political  Crisis  Response  (IPCR)  arrangements  in  information-sharing 

10 European Commission, Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks 
for electoral processes, 26 April 2024. 
11 The AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024 and will be fully applicable 2 years later on 2 August 2026, 
with some exceptions: prohibitions and AI literacy obligations entered into application from 2 February 2025, 
the governance rules and the obligations for general-purpose AI models become applicable on 2 August 2025, 
and the rules for high-risk AI systems - embedded into regulated products - have an extended transition period 
until 2 August 2027. 
12  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2023/2829  of  12  December  2023  on  inclusive  and  resilient  electoral 
processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European 
Parliament, presented as part of the Defence of Democracy Package, OJ L, 2023/2829. 
13 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single 
Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 
14 European Commission, Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks 
for electoral processes, 26 April 2024. 
15 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the 
transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024. 
16 Register of Commission Expert Groups and other Similar Entities, Expert group on electoral matters - Right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections for the EP and in municipal elections (E00617). 
 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, 
(EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 
2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 European elections17, which aided the exchange of 
information among Member States and EU institutions. 

The European Cooperation Network on Elections18 (ECNE), a network supported by the Commission 
and consisting of national contact points appointed by Member States, held a wide range of thematic 
sessions  on  free,  fair  and  resilient  elections,  sharing  best  practices  and  information,  with  the 
participation  of  the  European  Parliament.  Cooperation  between  ECNE  and  other  EU  networks  took 
place,  as  well  as  engagement  with  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders  including  elections  observers.  In 
addition, a wide range of initiatives and cooperation structures were activated with new ones being set 
up to tackle threats such as  FIMI, disinformation, cybersecurity threats  or other issues affecting the 
integrity of elections. This includes for example the ad hoc Working Group in the European Board of 
Digital Services under the DSA, or the dedicated Taskforce of the European Digital Media Observatory, 
as well as the Expert group on electoral matters19. 

The  European  Parliament  actively  supported  the  smooth  conduct  of  the  2024  elections,  with  a 
communication strategy aimed at supporting and complementing Member States actions and providing 
a European perspective to the elections. The European Parliament also took specific measures to combat 
disinformation,  taking  an  approach  focusing  on  proactive  communication,  resilience-building, 
situational awareness and rapid response, ensuring a secure information environment for all EU citizens.  

In  its  Conclusions  on  democratic  resilience  and  safeguarding  electoral  processes  from  all  forms  of 
foreign  interference20  in  May  2024,  the  Council  invited  the  Commission  to  thoroughly  analyse  the 
lessons to be learned from the 2024 elections to the European Parliament21. In June 2024, the Council 
also approved Council Conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed democratic 
debate22.  

This Staff Working Document accompanies the Report on the conduct of the 2024 elections. It follows 
the same structure and adds further information on the findings contained in the Report. Both documents 
are based on a wide variety of sources including:  

- 

a call for evidence published in 202423; 

17 Council of the European Union, Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead of 
the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024. 
18 European Commission, European cooperation network on elections website. 
19  
20 Council of the EU, Democratic resilience: Council approves conclusions on safeguarding electoral processes 
from foreign interference, 21 May 2024. 
21  The  Council  also  invited  the  Commission  to  “present  comprehensive  feedback  to  the  Council  on  the 
effectiveness  of  the  relevant  mechanisms,  networks,  tools  and  measures,  and  report  on  any  issues  and  gaps 
identified in the available tools so that they can be rectified”. 
22 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed 
democratic debate, 14 June 2024. 
23 The call for evidence was online from 6 November to 4 December 2024. It received 22 responses from citizens 
and civil society organisations. The responses addressed a diverse range of concerns and recommendations. For 
instance, one respondent called for higher thresholds to limit their entry of anti-democratic parties into Parliament. 
Issues raised also related to inadequate voter engagement and fragmented information, particularly regarding the 
lack  of  transparency  on  candidates,  voting  records,  and  key  parliamentary  decisions.  Calls  were  made  for 
improved communication strategies, transnational candidate lists, and better platforms to empower voters in the 
future. Broader concerns included the need for the EU to remain a strong, democratic bloc amid rising geopolitical 
tensions and the resurgence of far-right ideologies. Participants emphasized the importance of reforming voting 
rules  to  prevent  individual  Member  States  blocking  decisions-making  processes.  The  need  for  pluralistic  and 
uncensored  media,  greater  innovation  in  sustainability,  healthcare,  and  environmental  solutions,  and  more 
localized  engagement  by  representatives  was  also  highlighted.  Several  civil  society  organizations  contributed 
analyses  on  election  integrity,  the  role  of  digital  platforms,  disinformation,  and  the  upcoming  European 

5 

 
 
 
 
- 

- 

- 

responses  to  Commission  surveys  returned  by  Member  States24  and  European  and  national 
political parties25; 
exchanges  with Member  States in  the  framework  of the  European  Cooperation Network  on 
Elections26  and  other  relevant  expert  groups  such  as  the  Expert  group  on  electoral  matters 
(E00617), and the Network and Information Systems (‘NIS’) group;  
feedback from the signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures taken 
around the 2024 European Parliament elections; 

-  Eurobarometer and other surveys including the post-election survey published by the European 

- 

- 

Parliament27, and other relevant studies; 
direct feedback from citizens  including  via  Europe  Direct  Contact  Centre  and  Your  Europe 
Advice; 
reports from election observers, civil society, and bodies such as the European Digital Media 
Observatory,  the  High-Level  Group  on  gender  mainstreaming,  the  Advisory  Committee  on 
Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the European Institute for Gender Equality and the 
European Data Protection Board. 

Democracy Shield initiative. Reports called attention to transparency and compliance issues with EU regulations, 
risks  to  democratic  resilience  from  disinformation  and  technology  misuse,  and  opportunities  to  generally 
strengthen trust and participation in democratic processes. 
24  25  Member  States  responded  to  this  questionnaire.  The  Commission  received  responses  from  Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Finland  and 
Sweden.The Commission did not receive responses from Cyprus and Poland. 
25 The Commission received 6 responses from European political parties and almost 60 responses from national 
political parties (see Annex). 
26 An overview of relevant ECNE meetings can be found in Section 3. 
27 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. 

6 

 
 
 
2.  PARTICIPATION IN THE 2024 ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  

2.1.  Turnout 

Observations 

In the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the overall turnout remained stable at 50.74%, 
confirming the positive trend of the 2019 elections28.  

Figure 1: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024 

TURNOUT IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ELECTIONS 1979-2019  (%)

61,99

58,98

58,41

56,67

49,51

45,47

42,97

42,61

50,66

50,74

80

60

40

20

0

E U - 9  
1 9 7 9

E U - 1 0  
1 9 8 4

E U - 1 2  
1 9 8 9

E U - 1 2  
1 9 9 4

E U - 1 5  
1 9 9 9

E U - 2 5  
2 0 0 4

E U - 2 7  
2 0 0 9

E U - 2 8  
2 0 1 4

E U - 2 8  
2 0 1 9

E U - 2 7  
2 0 2 4

Source:  European  Commission  (based  on  the  2024  European  election  results  as  published  by  the 
European Parliament) 

There  were  however  substantial  differences  between  Member  States,  ranging  from  89.01%  in 
Belgium29 to 21.35% in Croatia. Turnout increased in 15 Member States30, with double-digit increases 
on the 2019 figures in Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, and significant increases in countries 
where turnout was previously low, such as Czechia, the Netherlands and Portugal. Meanwhile, turnout 
decreased in 11 Member States31, including by double digits in Greece, Spain and Lithuania. There were 
also significant decreases in Denmark, Italy, Poland and Croatia. 

28 In 2019, turnout amounted to 50.66% of eligible voters. If the UK is excluded from the results, this number 
rises to 52.4%. 
29 In Belgium, voting is compulsory. Voting is also compulsory in Bulgaria, Greece and Luxembourg. The highest 
turnout for the European Parliament elections can indeed be seen in Belgium and Luxembourg. At the same time, 
Greece and Bulgaria show lower compliance. 
30 In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout increased in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Ireland, 
France, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia compared to the 
previous elections in 2019. In Estonia, turnout remained stable. 
31  In  the  2024  European  Parliament  elections  turnout  decreased  in  Denmark,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Finland and Sweden compared to the previous elections in 2019. 

7 

 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Overall turnout results 1979 to 2024 

Turnout - European Parliament elections 2019 and 
2024 (in %)

8
9
2
7

,

4
7
4
6

,

6
4
9
5

,

6
8
8
5

,

5
2
8
5

,

5
2
6
5

,

9
3
3
5

,

,

4
2
5

9
4
1
5

,

5
6
0
5

,

1
3
8
4

,

9
3
6
4

,

8
1
6
4

,

,

8
1
4

4
2
1
4

,

5
6
0
4

,

8
3
0
4

,

4
6
7
3

,

7
4
6
3

,

5
4
6
3

,

8
3
4
3

,

2
8
3
3

,

8
7
3
3

,

7
9
8
2

,

5
3
1
2

,

100

1
0
9
8

,

9
2
2
8

,

80

60

40

20

0

BE LU MT DE HU CY DK AT SE RO FR IE IT ES NL SI EL PL FI EE PT CZ SK LV BG LT HR

2019

2024

2024 EU average = 50.74

Source: European Commission (based on the 2024 European election results as published by the European Parliament) 

Several  circumstances  may  explain  the  changes  observed,  although  it  is  difficult  to  draw  concrete 
conclusions.   

One element that has an impact is whether the elections to the European Parliament are held alongside 
other elections. For example, in Hungary, which saw an increase in turnout of +16.10%, elections to 
the European Parliament were held alongside local elections. This merged election agenda seemed to 
have boosted participation significantly32. In Greece, Spain, and Lithuania, where turnout decreased 
compared  to  2019,  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  were  not  held  alongside  other 
elections, whereas this had been the case for  the 2019 elections33. At the same time, this correlation 
does not always hold: in Italy, a decrease in turnout of -6.19 percentage points can be noted, while local 
elections34  were  held  concurrently  with  the  2024  European  elections,  a  similar  setup  to  the  2019 
elections35.  Overall,  research  shows  that  there  is  indeed  a  significant  rise  in  turnout  for  almost  all 
countries with parallel electoral events, with a few exceptions36.  

Three months before the elections, the European Parliament’s spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey37 
had  found  that  60%  of  Europeans  expressed  an  interest  in  the  2024  elections.  This  represented  an 
increase of +11 percentage points compared to the survey of spring 2019, ahead of the previous elections 
to the European Parliament. This increase in interest applied to all Member States (see figure below). 

32 According to the European Parliament Spring 2024 Survey, the interest of Hungarian voters in the European 
elections increased by 15 percentage points since spring 2019 (from 50% of respondents in 2019 to 65% in 2024). 
33 In 2019, the European Parliament elections were held alongside the first round of local and regional elections 
in the case of Greece, local elections in the case of Spain, and the second round of Presidential elections in the 
case of Lithuania. 
34 In 3 698 municipalities out of a total 7 918. 
35 In 3 844 municipalities out of a total 7 914. 
36 European parliament, Stock-taking of the 2024 European Parliament Elections: Political Representation: 
Turnout and Vote Choice, briefing requested by AFCO Committee. 
37  ‘EP  Spring  2024  Survey:  Use  your  vote  –  Countdown  to  the  European  elections’  with  more  than  26  000 
respondents in all EU Member States. 

8 

 
 
 
 
Europeans also indicated they were very much aware of the importance of the elections in the ongoing 
geopolitical  context,  with  more  than  eight  in  ten  (81%)  agreeing  that  it  makes  voting  even  more 
important. Most Europeans agreed that ‘voting is important to keep democracy strong’ (86%) and that 
‘voting is important to ensure a better future for the next generations’ (84%). However, this overall 
increased interest in the elections to the European Parliament was not reflected in a significantly higher 
turnout  compared  to  2019.  In  addition,  interest  in  the  European  Parliament  elections  has  evolved 
differently across Member States since 2019. 

Figure 3: Evolution of EU citizens’ interest in the European Parliament elections 2019-2024 

E
U 

49 

B
E 

48 

D
K 

49 

D
E 

57 

2019 

2024 

60 

58 

63 

70 

11 

10 

14 

13 

Chan
ge 
(pp) 

I
E 

5
8 

6
9 

1
1 

F
R 

46 

47 

1 

I
T 

5
1 

5
9 

8 

L
U 

57 

N
L 

61 

E
L 

50 

68 

72 

56 

11 

11 

6 

E
S 

3
9 

5
8 

1
9 

P
T 

3
8 

5
1 

1
3 

S
E  

6
2 

6
5 

3 

A
T 

55 

66 

11 

F
I 

4
4 

6
4 

2
0 

C
Z 

16 

E
E 

35 

C
Y 

36 

L
T 

36 

L
V 

33 

H
U 

50 

M
T 

57 

38 

49 

55 

56 

47 

65 

68 

22 

14 

19 

20 

14 

15 

11 

S
I 

4
1 

4
6 

5 

S
K 

38 

B
G 

35 

R
O 

49 

H
R 

37 

43 

40 

60 

61 

5 

5 

11 

24 

P
L 

5
2 

6
3 

1
1 

Source: European Parliament Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote - Countdown to the European elections 

The European Parliament’s post-election survey38, held in June and July 2024, showed that the main 
topics  eventually  motivating  EU  citizens  to  vote  were  rising  prices  and  the  cost  of  living  (42%), 
followed by the general economic situation (41%). For a third of voters (34%) the international situation 
was a topic that encouraged them to vote, while a similar proportion mentioned defending democracy 
and the rule of law (32%).  

In that same survey, more than one in two EU citizens (56%) consider that their voice counts in the EU, 
which represents an increase of +8 percentage points compared to spring 2024. A similar, while slightly 
lower, increase was seen in 2019, with figures rising from 49% to 56% in the months leading up to the 
elections. Pro-EU attitudes translate directly into voting in the elections to the European Parliament: 
67% of people with a positive image of the EU voted, compared to 42% with a neutral image and 36% 
with a negative image. 

Voting in the elections to the European Parliament also seems to have become a democratic habit for 
many: asked why they voted, 46% of voters say they always do, while 42% say it is their duty as citizens. 
20% say they want to support the political party they feel close to. The decision on whom to vote for in 
the 2024 European elections was based mainly on how close the proposals of the parties were to the 
ideas and values held by voters. Proposals on European issues were the most frequent reason, given by 
47% (+4 percentage points since 2019) of the voters.  

The two main reasons for not voting in the 2024 European elections are a lack of trust or dissatisfaction 
with politics in general (21%, 1 percentage point decrease since 2019) and a lack of interest in politics 
(20%,  2  percentage  point  increase  since  2019).  Other  reasons  include  the  belief  that  voting  has  no 
consequences or does not change anything (17%, 3 percentage point increase since 2019). This means 
that genuine political engagement reasons may explain non-participation.  

38 EU Post-electoral survey. 

9 

 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Main reasons to vote in the 2024 elections compared to the 2019 elections 

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024 

Households’ financial situation poses differences in turnout in the European elections, with the socio-
economic divide widening since 201939. Those who encounter difficulties paying bills most of the time 
(35%, 3 percentage points less than in 2019) are much less likely to have voted than those who never 
or almost never do (57%, 3 percentage points more than in 2019). Another factor influencing turnout is 
the level of education: 59% of voters who finished their formal education at the age of 20 or older voted 
in the elections, while the turnout was 49% for those who finished at the age of 16-19, and 44% for 
those who finished at the age of 15 or younger40. On 21 March 2024, Member States discussed about 
drivers for political participation, including turnout in elections, in a thematic session of the European 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections.  According  to  research  presented  by  Professor  Kasper  Møller 
Hansen during the session41, social aspects may affect voting behaviour and turnout more than cost or 
ease of voting42. 

39 EU Post-electoral survey. 
40 EU Post-electoral survey. 
41  Kasper  Møller  Hansen  is  a  professor  of political  science  at  the  University  of  Copenhagen’s  Department  of 
Political Science. 
42 For instance, research by Professor Kasper Møller Hansen shows that if the mother of a household does not 
vote, this would affect the voting behaviour of her children their entire life, making them less prone to vote (more 
than in the case of the father not voting, especially for first time voters). Similarly, if the parents in a household 
vote, their children will most likely do so as well. It also shows the importance of the social dimension of voting, 
as most people go to the polls in groups. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Measures taken by Member States and political parties to increase turnout in the 2024 elections to 
the European Parliament  

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  calls  on  Member  States  to  take  measures  in  support  of 
broad turnout.  This  includes  taking the  necessary  steps  to  facilitate,  where applicable, voter  and 
candidate registration, including by providing the necessary information, tools and support at local 
level and making tools such as online registration or electronic collection of support signatures for 
candidates easily accessible and user friendly. The 2023 Recommendation on elections further calls 
on  Member  States  to  ensure  that  citizens  are informed  about  the  availability  and  accessibility  of 
complementary voting methods, such as advance, mobile, postal, and electronic voting (‘e-voting’) 
and  provide  them  with  the  necessary  support  at  all  levels,  including  at  local  level.  The  2023 
Recommendation on elections also calls on Member States to have in place voting hours long-enough 
to accommodate the needs of as many voters as possible and help ensure that the greatest number of 
people can exercise their right to vote.  

Many  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  taken  a wide  range  of measures  to  facilitate  voter  and 
candidate registration,  with  a large  majority  providing  a dedicated  website43.  For example,  Ireland's 
reported that, while the 31 electoral registers are run by the respective local authorities, there is a single 
website where the electorate could register to vote or check or update their details in less than three 
minutes. Hungary reported to have sent postal notices to all voters which contained QR codes leading 
to a dedicated website, to make electronic administration easier. All election offices also had a hotline 
to answer telephone and e-mail enquiries. Germany also provided an online tool to facilitate candidate 
registration. 

When it comes to complementary voting methods, France reported that citizens were able to register 
their delegate for proxy voting completely online, without presenting themselves physically before a 
competent authority, for the first time. Portugal allowed for the first time voters to vote in any polling 
station set up in Portugal or abroad, independently from their place of residence in Portugal. Italy, for 
the first time, introduced new rules allowing students domiciled in a municipality outside their region 
of residence to vote in the municipality of temporary residence, or in the commune capital of the Region, 
under  certain  circumstances.  Sweden  reported  that  advance  voting  is  possible  both  from  within  the 
country on various locations in every municipality and through mobile voting clerks (from day 18 before 
election day), as from abroad (from day 24 before election day). Postal voting from abroad starts 45 
days before election day. Other Member States such as Latvia, Malta, Lithuania and Estonia reported 
that they also provided for advance voting under certain circumstances. In Slovenia, voters can vote at 
specific polling stations outside their district of permanent residence or sometimes even at home, under 
certain  requirements.  In  Latvia,  voters  have  the  opportunity  to  vote  at  any  polling  station  without 
registration in advance. In Luxembourg, every voter can use postal voting without any justification and 
free of charge. Estonia provides for electronic voting (i-voting). Czechia reported that voters can apply 
for a voter’s absentee card (the voter applies to the municipal authority in his/her place of residence and 
then can vote at any polling station) or they can vote by mobile ballot box on request due to any serious 
reasons (e.g. at home or hospital). In Bulgaria, voters can cast their vote either by paper ballot or by 
machine (in all polling stations with at least 300 registered voters). 

As regards voting hours and days: in most Member States44, the polling stations were opened at least 
until 8:00 pm. In Czechia the polling stations were opened on 7 and 8 June,  while Italy opened them 
on 8 and 9 June.  Compared to 2019 elections, voting hours on the day of the elections remained the 
same in all Member States.  

43 Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Malta, Austria, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland. 
44 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Spain, France, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 

11 

 
 
 
 
2.2.  Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, 

and supporting electoral rights  

National authorities, the European Parliament and the Commission, other EU institutions, bodies and 
agencies,  as  well  as  other  stakeholders  including  civil  society  organisations,  took  a  wide  range  of 
initiatives to inform, engage and communicate ahead of the 2024 elections.  

Efforts at EU level 

The European Parliament’s campaign sought to provide a European perspective to the elections and 
showing democracy in action.   

The main and final phase of the campaign centred on the call for action: ‘Use your vote, or others will 
decide  for  you’.  The  dedicated  ‘one-stop-shop’  website  for  the  2024  elections45  (EE24  website) 
provided comprehensive information covering organisation and voting processes in the Member States. 
It was organised in close cooperation with the Commission. 

The  Commission  also  approached  the  2024  elections  as  a  communication  priority.  Recognising  the 
shared  interest  in  a  resilient  democracy  and  the  common  responsibility  for  the  EU’s  democratic 
legitimacy, it complemented and supported the European Parliament’s communication efforts as part 
of a joint interinstitutional effort. 

The Commission communicated with impact both on the proactive and the defensive side. Extensive 
communication on the concrete results and benefits of its work for citizens during the previous mandate 
supported awareness of what was at stake. The Commission complemented these efforts by providing 
factual information to citizens about the elections, their electoral rights and the importance of voting. 
In  this  context,  it  activated  its  networks  and  different  groups  of  multipliers  and  helped  to  grow  the 
European Parliament’s ‘together.eu for democracy’-community. Young and first-time voters were an 
important target audience for EU-level activities, as were ‘mobile EU citizens’ (EU citizens who have 
moved to another Member State to work, live or study). The Commission also supported massively and 
amplified 
its  channels. 
Communication activities of the Commission also focused on preventing and tackling FIMI, including 
disinformation, as explained further in Section 4.2. 

the  European  Parliament’s  ‘Use  your  vote’-campaign 

through  all 

Some of the main outputs and results in key areas 

1)  COMMUNICATING THE COMMISSION’S ACHIEVEMENTS 

•  The webpages on the achievements of the College attracted 113 000 page views.  
•  The brochure‘Keeping our promise to YOU! aiming to inform young people about the 

Commission achievements, was published online in all EU languages. 

•  A total of 708 posts about #EUdelivers were published by the European Commission’s 

Social Media Network (SMN), i.e., the central and local accounts, DGs and 
Commissioners, generating over 14 million impressions and 307 000 interactions in the 
first semester of 2024. 

•  The hashtag #EUdelivers generated 2 600 mentions in the first semester of 2024. 
•  European Citizens’ Panels have become a regular feature of EU democracy. Since 2022, 
five panels took place: Tackling Hatred in Society (2024), Energy Efficiency (2024), 
Learning Mobility (2023), Virtual Worlds (2023), Food Waste (2022). The launch of the 
new digital, multilingual Citizens Engagement Platform helped reinforce the awareness of 
citizens that the EU is not only delivering policy for citizens but also with citizens by 
involving them in policymaking. 

45 European Parliament, European Elections 6-9 June 2024, last accessed 12 March 2025. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Directorate-General (DG) for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture (EAC) organised the 
European Week of Youth 2024 (12-19 April) jointly with the Parliament with 2 056 
activities across 39 countries, generating a direct reach of more than 2.3 million of which 
more than 1.8 million young / first-time voter participants. 

2)  INFORMING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS 

•  The Commission at all levels and through all channels informed citizens about the 
elections, electoral rights and the importance to vote, including through a targeted 
information campaign for mobile EU citizens living in another EU country or in the United 
Kingdom. This campaign was run by the DG for Justice and Consumers (JUST) in 
cooperation with DG for Communication (COMM) and the European Parliament and had a 
total cumulative reach of 24 million across two waves. It garnered more than 79 million 
impressions and drove over 350 000 clicks to the EP’s elections’ website. 

•  The EP’s elections website was promoted as the main reference on elections-related 

information. DG JUST helped feed its ‘how to vote’-section with accurate information. The 
EU website and the Commission core website generated 3.1 million views of pages 
promoting the European elections. 

•  The Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as citizens’ elections helpline and was 

referred to on the EP’s elections page as the single point of contact. 2 715 elections-related 
questions were answered. 

•  The hashtag #EUElections2024 generated 3 300 mentions from January to June 2024 on 

the Commission’s social media channels. 

•  The Commission produced a flyer for young people and first-time voters in 24 languages: 
Get ready! The countdown to the 2024 European elections has begun, generating close to 
400 000 distributed copies, 3 036 downloads and 5 331 visits. The Commission’s Learning 
Corner page on European elections was also actively used. 

•  The Commission’s Visitors’ Centre and Experience Europe exhibition centre in Brussels 
communicated about the European elections to visiting groups, reaching an overall figure 
of 44 796 visitors. 

•  The total reach of Representations’ elections related actions was 213.5 million, excluding 

social media actions. 

3)  ACTIVATING NETWORKS AND MULTIPLIERS 

•  Commission Services, including the Representations, and Commission networks organised 
4 319 events with around 3.5 million participants. As part of this effort, the EUROPE 
DIRECT network alone organised 3 185 events with 955 500 participants. Overall, some 
40 networks were activated. 

•  The Commission contributed to growing the together.eu for democracy-community of the 

European Parliament where 380 000 people registered altogether as a result of the 
collective efforts. 

•  The Commission activated different groups of multipliers. For example, the Commission 

activated influencers to boost awareness and engagement with new and younger audiences. 
Content creators participated in a study visit and a content creator bootcamp. Both 
activities combined generated 52 European election-specific posts, 2.9 million impressions 
and 41 000 engagements (estimated reach of 3 million people). DG COMM also activated 
UEFA Europa League winner of 2022, Eintracht Frankfurt, who ran an elections campaign 
reaching almost 1 million people. 

•  For its part, the EEAS set up a working group with the foreign ministries of the Member 
States to kick off communication on the European elections outside the EU and to 
encourage the exchange of best practices for such information campaigns. Coordinated by 
the EEAS and together with Member State embassies/consulates the 145 EU Delegations 
reached out to citizens living outside the EU. Concrete outputs included the creation of an 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EEAS European elections 2024 website as well as a dedicated European elections 2024 
page on every EU Delegation website bringing together information, links and contacts. 
The EEAS also launched a worldwide joint social media initiative of EU Delegations and 
EU Member States embassies/consulates on the European elections using the social media 
products of the European Parliament and additional 26 campaign videos. The EEAS and 
EU delegations posted more than 2000 posts on the European elections which estimate 
have reached more than 11 million recipients and had high levels of engagement with over 
600,000 views, reactions and comments across channels. The EEAS coordinated this 
communication with the Commission, the European Parliament and the European 
Parliament’s Local Offices. 

4)  SUPPORTING THE EP’S GO-TO-VOTE CAMPAIGN  
•  The Commission amplified the EP’s ‘use-your-vote’ campaign through all its channels, at a 

similarly ambitious level as in 2019. Across all social media platforms on the 
Commission’s central accounts, posts with the campaign’s hero video amassed over 3.7 
million impressions and close to 100 000 interactions. 

•  The Commission used the EP campaign hashtag #UseYourVote generating 920 posts, 18.6 
million impressions, nearly 470 000 interactions, and 4.4 million video views across the 
Commission’s social media accounts, including central, Representations, DGs, and 
Commissioners. Thanks to the coordinated interinstitutional effort, the hero video achieved 
525 million views altogether. 

5)  COMMUNICATING INTERNALLY AND EMPOWERING STAFF 

•  The Commission mobilised its staff and encouraged colleagues to engage as citizens and 

multipliers, too, while being mindful of their rights and obligations. 

•  Digital staff advocacy: the elections posts on Haiilo were shared 1 810 times and generated 

1 000 clicks on social media and 1 760 social media reactions. 

•  757 European Commission staff members conducted a Back to School/ University visit 

between 31 March 2023 and 10 June 2024, and helped raise awareness about the EU and 
the elections, reaching 52 595 students. 

The dissemination of information was  also supported by promoting the ‘Guide to EU citizenship’46. 
Eight Member States also explicitly reported having used the Guide in their national communication 
efforts47. 

The Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as an ‘elections helpline’ for the 2024 elections at EU 
level. Between September 2023 and June 2024, the EDCC replied to 2 797 questions related to the 2024 
elections to the European Parliament: 1 580 by webform, 975 by phone and 242 by chat. The EDCC 
was open during the election days (6 to 9 June, 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. CET). During the election days, the 
EDCC replied to 377 European elections related questions, mostly about electoral rights and formalities, 
perceived  missing  information  from  Member  States  and  perceived  obstacles/incidents  preventing 
citizens from voting during the election days, alleged electoral fraud, security threats and other matters 
related to the elections (such as, voting systems). More information about the content of the questions 
is included in Section 5.1.4. 

46 European Commission, Guide to EU citizenship, 06 December 2023.  
47 Czechia, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia. 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between September 2023 
and June 2024 per channel 

Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Communication 

The  Commission  used  available  funding  to  support  national  authorities  and  civil  society 
organisations in implementing projects to encourage EU citizens to get involved in the democratic 
process, including under the 2021-2027 Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme.  

Through the two CERV strands managed by the European Education and Culture Executive Agency 
(EACEA),  ‘Union  Values’  and  ‘Citizen’s  engagement  and  participation’,  the  programme  provides 
pathways for citizens to become engaged in the democratic life of their communities. Between 2021 
and  2024,  these  two  CERV  strands  allocated  EUR  26.5  million  to  finance  46  projects  aimed  at 
encouraging European citizens to get involved in the democratic process and promoting and enhancing 
the exercise of EU citizenship rights. 

Under the ‘Citizen’s engagement and participation’ strand, the Commission has given the possibility to 
people and civil society organisations to take part in and contribute to the EU's democratic and civic 
life. During these years, many activities have looked in particular at the European Parliament elections 
of 2024, and at innovative approaches and tools to help citizens make their voices heard and publicly 
exchange views on all areas of EU action, including via digital tools (e-democracy).  

With  regards  to  the  actions  involving  local  authorities  (mostly  Network  of  Towns  actions),  the 
Commission has promoted exchanges between people of different countries, with the aim to give them 
the opportunity to broaden their perspective and develop a sense of European belonging and identity. 
While maintaining a bottom-up approach, the programme has also provided an opportunity to focus on 
EU  priorities,  notably  contribute  to  increasing  the  turnout  and  inclusive  candidacy  at  the  European 
Parliament elections.  

Under  the  ‘Union Values’  strand,  the  aim  has  been  to  encourage  and  facilitate  active  and  inclusive 
participation  in  building  a  more  democratic  EU,  as  well  as  raising  awareness  on  rights  and  values 
through support to civil society organisations.  

Under this strand, the Commission has set up 4-year framework partnership agreements with European 
networks, civil society organisations active at EU level and European think tanks whose statutory aims 
are  to  protect  and  promote  Union  values.  It  has  also  provided  grants  to  support  the  annual  work 
programmes of the organisations which have signed framework partnership agreements active in the 
area citizens’ engagement.  

15 

 
 
 
 
Examples of projects supported by CERV  

•  The  “Digital  Civic  Participation”48  project  included innovative  tools  to raise  EU  citizens’ 
awareness of their political rights and of the procedures to participate in European Parliament 
elections. 

•  The  Network  of  Towns  project  NOTE49  (Network  of  Organizations  and  Towns  for  the 
European  Elections)  developed  tools  to  encourage  active  citizenship  and  informed 
participation in the 2024 European Elections through and with young citizens. 

•  The Make your Vote! Project50 raised awareness on the importance of the elections.  

•  The  Citizen  Z  initiative51  included  different  innovative  deliberative  practices  for  youth 

engagement ahead of the 2024 European Elections. 

Measures reported by Member States 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  encourages  Member  States  to  provide  the  necessary 
information  to  citizens,  including  with  a  sufficiently  wide  language  selection  for  explaining  the 
electoral process to voters and candidates. The Recommendation also calls on Member States to 
promote initiatives, including at local level, aiming at increasing election accessibility and political 
engagement,  well  ahead  of  the  election  days.  Such  activities  could  include  awareness-raising 
initiatives,  information  campaigns  and  other  outreach  through  platforms  and  channels  used  by 
different groups of citizens, conferences or debates, for instance by promoting exchanges between 
EU citizens on EU-related topics to foster a better understanding of different perspectives. Special 
focus should be placed on young people, especially first-time voters, as well as on addressing the 
barriers limiting the opportunities of members of different groups to vote and stand as candidate. 
Information about elections, including its form and content, should be adapted to the special needs 
of those different groups. 

The Member States also engaged in communication activities. In response to the survey launched by 
the Commission, most Member States reported having made efforts to support turnout, including via 
numerous communication and awareness-raising activities. A large majority of Member States reported 
to  have  carried  out  awareness  raising  initiatives  and/or  information  campaigns  to  increase  election 
accessibility  and  political  engagement52.  Some  also  organised  debates53.  For  example,  Germany 
organised a ‘Use your voice’ campaign to provide information on how to vote, accompanied by specific 
communication activities on the electoral process and debunking of disinformation. Luxembourg also 
launched  a  wide  ‘I  can  vote’  campaign  and  developed  a  communication  kit  for  municipalities  and 
associations. Ireland reported to have carried out a comprehensive six-week campaign to inform and 
engage  the  public  about  the  elections,  including  advertising  across  traditional  and  social  media 
channels. This was complimented by a programme of public engagement and events with community 
groups  to  encourage  voter  registration,  including  minority  groups,  young  voters  in  schools  and 
universities, older voters in community groups and those living in traditionally low electoral turnout 
areas.  Hungary  produced  different  film  and  radio  spots.  In  Slovenia,  a  dedicated  campaign  on  the 
elections and the 20th anniversary took place. Slovakia launched an extensive information campaign 
through  municipal  and  city  offices,  official  social  media  platforms,  television,  and  radio.  The 

48 Digital Civic Participation – D.C.P. v 2.0 (a project dedicated to digital participatory e-democracy tools). 
49 Network of Organizations and Towns for the European Elections - Fattoria Pugliese Diffusa, project start date 
01 January 2023. 
50 Foundation for entrepreneurship, culture and education, Make your Vote!, project duration 01 December 2022-
31 May 2024. 
51 Citizen Z.  
52 Czechia, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,  
Slovakia and Finland. 
53 Greece, Croatia, Lithuania and Portugal. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Netherlands  provided  communication  materials  to  interest  groups  and  municipalities,  taking  into 
account a wide spectrum of accessibility including on low literacy, mental disability or dementia. Malta 
undertook different campaigns on traditional and social media about different aspects of the electoral 
process, including on the new voting document delivery system. Other Member States stick to purely 
informing  about  the  organisation  of  elections  as  their  legislation  does  not  allow  them  to  promote 
political participation. Czechia used QR codes on their printed materials leading to the electoral website, 
where information could be found in easy-to-read format and also videos in Czech sign language. 

Member  States  authorities  further  supported  citizens’  participation  by  providing  helplines.  For 
example, Austria established a hotline and call centre. In Sweden, a voter customer service received 
over 8 000 contacts via phone, website and social media. In Hungary, an election helpline was reached 
more than 100 000 times. In the context of ECNE and supported by the Commission, an overview of 
election helplines was prepared for the EDCC to ensure for better coordination, complementarity of the 
services and streamline the service to the citizens for the appropriate support.  

Member States’ efforts to communicate to specific groups are further explained in Section 2.3. 

2.3.  Participation of specific groups 

2.3.1. 

Introduction 

The inclusion of all groups is an essential element of healthy democracies The Commission report on 
the 2019 elections to the European Parliament54 had underlined, among others, that there is still progress 
to  be  made  on  inclusiveness  and  democratic  participation  in  elections  of  younger  people,  women, 
citizens  residing  in  a  Member  State  other  than  their  own  (‘mobile  EU  citizens’),  persons  with 
disabilities, and other groups.  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections recalls that it is necessary to support the participation in 
elections, as voters and as candidates, of all groups of citizens, taking into account their specific 
needs and the challenges they are confronted with. The Recommendation suggests, among others, 
that to support high voter turnout and support broad citizen participation in the democratic process, 
Member States should pay attention to the fact that different groups, including older persons, may 
face obstacles when accessing internet and digital technologies or may lack skills to effectively use 
them. The Recommendation calls on Member States and political actors to take steps to effectively 
address the needs of the different groups, including in their communication activities. Moreover, it 
suggests that Member States should, well ahead of the election days, promote initiatives aiming at 
increasing  election  accessibility  and  political  engagement,  such  as  awareness-raising  initiatives, 
information campaigns and other outreach through platforms and channels used by different groups 
of citizens. The 2023 Recommendation on elections puts a special focus on young people, especially 
first-time  voters,  as  well  as  on  addressing  the  barriers  limiting  the  opportunities  of  members  of 
different groups to vote and stand as candidate.  

2.3.2.  Young people  

Introduction 

One out of 6 people in the EU is aged between 15 and 29 years old, representing 73.6 million people55. 
In the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, it was estimated that there were almost 21 million  
eligible ‘first-time voters’ (persons who have reached voting age since the last European elections in 
2019), with the highest number of eligible voters expected in Germany (5.1 million persons), France (4 

54 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee - Report on the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, 
COM/2020/252 final. 
55 Eurostat, Young people aged 15-29 years old, 01 January 2020, 05 January 2022. 

17 

 
 
 
 
million) and Italy (2.8 million). The highest shares of first-time voters were expected in Belgium, France 
and Germany with 9.7%, 8.0% and 7.9% of all eligible voters, respectively56. 

Young  people  may  experience  particular  challenges  to  exercise  their  electoral  rights.  For  example, 
limited access to postal or electronic voting options might be a barrier particularly for students studying 
abroad or from rural areas. High costs associated with sending ballots or traveling to vote might also 
discourage in particular young people from participating. The timing of elections, which often coincides 
with exam sessions, can also make it more difficult for students to vote57.  

In most Member States, citizens can vote in the elections to the European Parliament from the age of 
18. The 2024 elections saw more Member States lowering the voting age and allowing citizens to vote 
from 16 years old (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria)58. One country (Greece) gives citizens the 
right to vote from 17 years old59.  

Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), ‘Voting age for European elections’, May 2023, updated in August 
2023. 

There  are  also  differences  in  the  minimum  age  to  stand  as  a  candidate,  with  most  Member  States 
requiring candidates to be 18 years old. In some countries it is 21 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia), 23 (Romania) or 25 (Italy and Greece)60. 

56  European elections 2024: people eligible to vote, 04 April 2024. 
57 Meeting with the European Youth Forum and DG JUST, 16 September 2024. 
58 In the 2019 European Parliament elections, this was not yet the case for Belgium and Germany. 
59 Cyprus also approved a bill conferring voting rights to 17-year-olds in January 2025, which will apply as of the 
next national parliamentary elections in May 2026. 
60  Briefing  by  the  Parliament  on  the  2024  European  elections,  including  an  overview  of  the  legal  framework 
framing the elections, February 2024. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
Observations 

Before the elections, more than 6 in 10 (64%) young EU citizens (15-30) had expressed their intention 
to vote in the upcoming European elections, while 13% indicated they would not vote – despite being 
eligible61. Among the reasons why young people did not intend to vote in the 2024 European elections, 
the first three related to a lack of interest in, or distrust of, the political system in general (around 19%). 
Among  those  with  no  intention  to  vote  in  elections,  16%  did  not  believe  the  EU  deals  with  young 
people’s problems or said that they did not like any political groups or candidate, while around 14% 
were not aware of the elections. 10% of young people declared they did not vote because they did not 
understand the role of the EU, while 7% did not intend to take part in the elections because they oppose 
to the EU. 

Figure 6: Reasons not to vote in 2024 European elections, by age groups, EU average, 2024 (prior 
to the elections) 

Source: Eurobarometer on Youth and Democracy, 2024, VOLUME B. Q14 What are your reasons for not planning to vote or 
being  unsure  about  voting  in  the  European  elections?  (15-18;  19-24;  25-30)  [MULTIPLE  ANSWERS].  Notes:  Data  are 
ordered by decreasing number of young people (15-30) not intending to vote in the next European elections. Data extracted 
on 13.05.2024. 

According to the European Parliament’s post-election survey62, only 36% of those aged 15-24 (if 
eligible), and 46% of those aged 25-39 actually voted in the 2024 elections.  

This  represents  a  decrease  of  6  percentage  points  since  2019,  partially  offsetting  the  14  percentage 
points increase between 2014 and 2019. Indeed, in the 2019 elections to the European parliament, both 
Europe’s young and first-time voters drove turnout figures up.  

61 Eurobarometer, Youth and Democracy: In eight Member States the percentage of young people entitled to vote 
who intended to vote in the 2024 elections to the European Parliament was above the EU average (64%) with a 
peak in Romania and Portugal (almost 80%). Conversely, the highest share of young people stating they did not 
intend to vote although eligible was recorded in Malta and Luxemburg (31% and 25%). In Finland, Sweden and 
Latvia around 15% of young people did not know whether they were eligible to vote or whether they intended to 
vote.  
62 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Age 

16/18-24 

25-39 

40-54 

55+ 

Education (end of) 

15- 

16-19 

20+ 

Still studying 

Figure 7: Turnout by age group 

Voted 201963 

Voted 2024 

Difference 
‘24-‘19 (pps) 

44% 

49% 

53% 

56% 

47% 

50% 

61% 

53% 

36% 

46% 

51% 

58% 

44% 

49% 

59% 

45% 

-8 

-3 

-2 

-2 

-3 

-1 

-2 

-8 

Voted 2019 

Voted 2024 

Difference 
‘24-‘19 (pps) 

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024 

Age remains a determining factor in voter turnout, with older people still more likely to vote than young 
people: 51% of those aged 40-54, and 58% of citizens aged 55 and over voted64.  

Age  is  also  the  main  socio-demographic  difference  in  when  EU  citizens  decided  to  vote65:  older 
respondents mostly say that they always vote. This is lower among younger people (84% of those aged 
55 or over, falling to 58% of those aged under 25). Close to three in ten voters below 25 say they decided 
to vote a few weeks or months before the day of the elections (28% compared with 12% of those aged 
55 or over), and 14% on the day of the elections or a few days before (compared with 4%). 

In the February 2025 Youth survey, young people who declared they had voted in the 2024 elections 
were asked why they voted for the party or candidate they chose66. The most common reason for having 
voted for a specific party or candidate was that their ideas aligned with the respondent's views (selected 
by  30%  of  respondents).  The  second  most-mentioned  reason  is  the  belief  that  the  chosen  party  or 
candidate can change things, selected by 25% of respondents. About one in six respondents say they 
voted for a party or candidate because they heard or read positive things about them (17%); similar 
shares are found for having voted strategically to avoid the electoral success of another party (16%) and 
the party or candidate prioritizes matters important to young people (16%). Smaller shares mention that 
they usually vote for the chosen party or candidate (13%), they liked the party or candidate's electoral 
campaign on social media (13%), they disliked all other parties or candidates (12%), or people they 
trust were supporting the party or candidate (12%). 

Young people who declared that they did not vote in the 2024 European elections were also asked about 
their main reasons for not having voted. The most common reasons are other commitments (16%) and 
not having enough information to make a choice (16%), followed by not finding any relatable candidate 
or  political  party  that  represented  their  views  (15%)  and  a  general  distrust  or  dissatisfaction  with 
politicians and politics (15%). Slightly fewer non-voters mention technical or procedural issues, such 
as not registering on time (12%). One in ten respondents (10%) think that their vote would not have 
changed anything. Less common reasons for not having voted include not knowing there were European 
Elections in June 2024 (7%), not understanding the role of the European Parliament (6%), and the fact 

63 Numbers from 2019 represent those with the UK excluded from the count. 
64 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. 
65 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. 
66 Eurobarometer, Youth survey 2024, February 2025. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that none of their friends voted, so they did not feel like it mattered (6%). Opposition to the EU as 
reason for non-participation in the elections is mentioned by only 4% of non-voters. 

In  terms  of  representation  (elected  candidates)  young  people  (under  the  age  of  40)  remain 
underrepresented in EU decision-making following the 2024 elections. They hold only 19.17% of the 
seats in the new European Parliament with 138 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). This 
number has decreased: in 2019, MEPs under the age of 40 held 21% of the seats67.  

Five  Member  States  have  no  elected  MEPs  under  35  (Belgium,  Ireland,  Latvia,  Luxembourg  and 
Romania).  Eight  Member States have  only  one  MEP  under  35  (Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Czechia, 
Estonia, Finland, Hungary, and Lithuania)68. Average age of MEPs per Member State ranges from 40.5 
years to 6269. The share of seats for young people also differs between the different political groups, 
with some allocated only 4.79% of their seats to young people while others allocated 20.75%70. 

Measures reported by Member States and political parties  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections calls for Member States to promote initiatives aiming at 
increasing  election  accessibility  and  political  engagement  with  special  focus  on  young  people, 
especially  first-time  voters.  The  Recommendation  encourages  Member  States  to  support  young 
citizens in the exercise of their electoral rights, both as voters and candidates, for example through 
citizenship  education,  organisation  election  simulations  in schools  or  carrying out  youth-friendly 
communication  campaigns.  Member  States  are  also  encouraged  to  promote  the  ‘Guide  to  EU 
citizenship’71. 

15 of the 25 Member States that replied to the Commission survey indicated that they had placed a 
specific emphasis on young people or first-time voters when it came to promoting easy access to the 
exercise of electoral rights72. For example, Croatia worked on educating high school pupils as young 
voters about what they need to know to participate in elections. Malta undertook specific activities to 
inform first-time voters. 

Political parties also took measures to support turnout by young people. They sought innovative ways 
to engage these groups through tailored social media strategies and youth-centred initiatives. European 
political parties have made extensive use of social platforms to reach young audiences73. One party even 
enlisted young influencers to more effectively engage with first-time voters and young people74. Some 
parties reported tailoring their social media strategies to specific demographics: TikTok and Instagram 
for younger audiences, and Facebook for older age groups75. Young people and first-time voters also 
appeared to be high on the agenda for national political parties. Of almost 60 national parties that replied 
to the survey, around 57% explicitly reported that they hadaddressed young people or first-time voters 
in the run-up to the elections76. One notable practice was to specifically focus on topics that concern 
young people such as minimum wage or housing77, and providing explanations about the elections to 
first-time  voters78  or  hosting  special  events79.  Additionally,  some  parties  made  an  effort  to  address 

67 Statistics by the European Parliament on the 2024 European elections. 
68 European Youth Forum, European Elections 2024: Young People never had a chance, 31 July 2024. 
69 Luxembourg has the oldest MEPs on average, Malta has the youngest MEPs on average. 
70 European Youth Forum, European Elections 2024: Young People never had a chance, 31 July 2024. 
71 European Commission, Guide to EU citizenship, 06 December 2023. 
72  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Ireland,  Greece,  France,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta  
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. 
73 European Democratic Party, Party of European Socialists, European Green Party. 
74 European Democratic Party. 
75 European Free Alliance.  
76 Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
77 Croatia, Slovenia. 
78 Slovenia. 
79 Austria. 

21 

 
 
 
 
young people by translating election manifestos in shorter versions80. Further efforts included a range 
of  strategies  such  as  creating  music  and  video  content  that  appealed  to  young  audiences,  targeted 
advertising campaigns, and even partnering with influencers to connect with younger demographics 
and promote their party's message effectively.  

2.3.3.  Women 

Introduction 

In its Gender Equality Strategy 2020-202581 the Commission committed to apply equal opportunities 
to women and achieve gender balance in decision-making and in politics. In the 2024 Report on Gender 
Equality in the EU82, the Commission recalled the need for an equal participation of women and men 
in  political  decision-making  positions  to  better  reflect  the  composition  of  society  and  strengthen 
democracy in the EU. 

Observations 

The participation of women as voters in the 2024 European elections fell slightly compared to the 
elections in 2019 (by one percentage point). The gender gap in turnout remained stable at 3 percentage 
points83.  

EU27 

Man 

Woman 

Figure 8: Turnout men/women 

Voted 2019 

Voted 2024 

Difference 
‘24-‘19 (pps) 

52% 

54% 

51% 

51% 

53% 

50% 

-1 

-1 

-1 

Voted 2019 

Voted 2024 

Difference 
‘24-‘19 (pps) 

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024 

According to the European Parliament’s post-election survey84, there are some differences regarding 
the main reasons why women and men decided to vote in the 2024 European elections. More women 
declared having voted because they always vote (47% of women, compared to 45% of men) or because 
this is their duty as a citizen (43% of women, compared to 41% of men). Conversely, more men declared 
that the main reason for voting was that they are in favour of the EU (18% of men, compared to 15% 
of women) or because they are very interested in European affairs (10% of men, compared to 8% of 
women).85  

While female representation in the European Parliament has more than doubled since the first direct 
elections in 1979, in 2024 the share of women decreased by 0.9 percentage points, compared to the 

80 Luxembourg. 
81 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, A Union of Equality: Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, COM(2020) 152 final, 5 March 
2020. 
82 European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2024 report on gender equality in the 
EU, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
83 The gender gap in voter turnout reduced from 4 percentage points in 2014 to 3 percentage points in 2019. 
84 Eurobarometer, EU post-electoral survey 2024, October 2024. 
85  When  asked  about  the main topics  that  encouraged  people  to  vote, more  women  than men  declared  voting 
because of the rising prices and the cost of living (44% of women, compared to 40% of men), the environment 
and  climate  change  (30%  of  women,  compared  to  26%  of  men)  and  social  protection,  welfare  and  access  to 
healthcare (26% of women, compared to 22% of men). Conversely, more men declared voting because of the 
economic situation (45% of men, compared to 38% of women), migration and asylum (30% of men, compared to 
26% of women), and the EU’s defence and security (30% of men, compared to 26% of women). 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
2019 elections86. This is the first time that the representation of women in the European Parliament has 
fallen. Women make up only 38.5 % of all MEPs87. 

Figure 9: Evolution of women MEPs in the European Parliament   

50,00%

40,00%

30,00%

36,80%

35%

40,70%

38,50%

30,30%

31%

25,90%

20,00%

15,90%

19,30%

17,90%

10,00%

0,00%

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

2014

2019

2024

Constitutive session following elections

Source: European Institute for Gender Equality 

Furthermore, there remain major differences between Member States in terms of elected female MEPs.  

Only Finland, France and Sweden elected more women than men with 9 of 15, 41 out of 81 and 13 out 
of  21  MEPs,  respectively.  This  represents  an  increase  compared  to  2019  where  only  Finland  and 
Sweden elected more women than men. In 2024, ten Member States elected at least 40% of each gender 
(Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain). 
In eight Member States women account for less than 30% of elected MEPs (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Romania). As in 2019, all MEPs from Cyprus are men. 

86 Following the 2019 elections, women represented 39.4% of members of the European Parliament. This figure 
corresponds with the gender balance of MEPs after the redistribution of seats post-Brexit (2020). 
87 European Parliament, MEP’s gender balance by country – 2024, 06 September 2024.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Female MEPs, 2024

Female Members of the European Parliament

Sweden

Finland

France

Spain

the Netherlands

Hungary

Slovakia

Ireland

Croatia

Belgium

Austria

EU average

Czechia

Portugal

Germany

Denmark

Luxembourg

Slovenia

Italy

Greece

Estonia

Poland

Bulgaria

Latvia

Romania

Lithuania

Malta

61,90%

60%

50,62%

50%

48,39%

47,62%

46,67%

42,86%

41,67%

40,91%

40%

38,53%

38,10%

38,01%

36,46%

33,33%

33,33%

33,33%

32,89%

28,57%

28,57%

28,30%

23,53%

22,22%

18,18%

18,18%

16,67%

Cyprus

0%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Female MEPs

Source: European Parliament Post-electoral survey 2024 

Five out of the 10 lead candidates put forward by European political parties were women. However, 
election observers88 have pointed out that generally only around 30% of total candidates for the elections 
were women.  

Finally, as also explained in Sections 4.7 below, female politicians also reportedly faced an acute risk 
of harassment, abuse, and disinformation campaigns online in the context of the 2024 elections to the 

88  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024. 

24 

 
 
 
 
European Parliament89. In the run-up to the elections, a rise in online gender-based disinformation about 
female EU leaders and candidates was observed90.   

Measures reported by Member States and political parties  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to promote measures to support 
gender equality regarding access to and participation in elections, such as alternating women and 
men on candidate lists, using other types of gender quotas, linking the allocation of public funding 
for political parties to the promotion of political participation of women or other similar measures. 
The Recommendation also encourages gender balance in governing bodies of electoral management 
bodies, as well as monitoring, supporting and regularly evaluating progress on gender equality in 
the exercise of electoral rights, including through the collection, analysis and dissemination of data 
on women and men both as voters and candidates in elections, in elected positions and in decision-
making positions in political parties. Moreover, the Recommendation encourages political parties to 
put in place internal policies on gender balance, targeted training and awareness raising, as well as 
gender  balance  in  electoral  lists  and  their  own  governing  bodies.  The  2023  Recommendation  on 
elections also encourages Member States and political parties to take measures to effectively prevent 
and address gender-based hate speech against politically active women that aims to discredit them 
or discourage them from political participation. 

In response to a Commission survey, Member States shared insights on gender equality in the conduct 
of the 2024 elections. The responses revealed significant variations in efforts to promote gender equality 
across Member States.  

Several  Member  States  have  adopted  legislative  mandates  to  support  gender  representation,  with 
notable examples like Greece and Spain, where laws require at least 40% representation of each gender 
on  candidate  lists.  Italy  and  Portugal  also  have  implemented  stringent  measures,  including  Italy's 
requirement for gender alternation on lists and voters needing to choose candidates of different genders. 
Currently, 11 Member States have laid down quotas in their national legislation (10 of those Member 
States also had legislative quotas applicable for the elections to the European Parliament) 91 and some 
go further, alternating women and men on candidate lists (‘zipped lists’)92. In addition to alternating 
women  and  men  on  candidate  lists  and  using  other  types  of  gender  quotas,  some  Member  States 
continue  to  link  the  allocation  of  public  funding  for  political  parties  to  the  promotion  of  political 
participation of women for example in Finland, Ireland and Italy. These are good practices that were 
highlighted in the 2023 Recommendation on elections as referred above. 

Data  collection,  monitoring  and  evaluation  mechanisms  vary  greatly  across  Member  States.  For 
instance, Denmark and Luxembourg have well-established systems for tracking progress through data-
driven reports and statistical monitoring.  

When it comes to gender balance in electoral management bodies, progress remains limited across most 
Member  States.  Although  some,  like  Denmark  and  Finland  encourage  balance  through  quotas  or 
statistical monitoring, many Member States do not promote gender parity in these roles. Notably, Latvia 
reports 77% of local election commission leadership positions being held by women. Emerging efforts 
were also reported by countries like Czechia, where a national Gender Equality Strategy (2021–2030) 

89 Global Disinformation Index, Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections, June 10 2024. 
90 Global Disinformation Index, Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections, June 10 2024. 
91 Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia. Ireland 
has a quote for national elections but not for the European Parliament elections. 
92 For example Spain, Italy and Portugal. In Spain, it is mandatory in any electoral list to have 60% of women in 
each group of 5 candidates. In addition, in Belgium, a quota system applies to electoral lists and the first two 
candidates on each list must be of different sexes. 

25 

 
 
 
 
includes measures to enhance women's political participation. Similarly, Slovakia highlighted a historic 
record of women candidates and elected representatives.  

The  High-Level  Group  on  gender  mainstreaming  (E01240)93  and  the  Commission’s  Advisory 
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men94 also reported on measures implemented in 
the Member States to promote women’s participation in the 2024 European Parliament elections and 
their  impact.  In  Bulgaria,  a  series  of  public  political  debates  were  organised  to  discuss  specific 
challenges women encounter in participating in elections at the individual, party and system level, with 
the  participation  of  female  candidates  for  the  European  elections  from  leading  political  parties.  In 
Cyprus, the Office of the Commissioner for Gender Equality organised an event in collaboration with 
civil society to promote the Cypriot female candidates for the 2024 European Parliament elections. In 
Ireland, state funding is provided to encourage and support women to run as candidates in elections by 
providing training and mentoring support.95 In France, political parties are obliged to present an equal 
number of men and women for regional, municipal, senatorial and European elections in order to have 
their lists registered. In Hungary, gender quotas on candidate lists in elections apply so that there are no 
less than 40% of candidates of each sex. Lithuania provided funding for NGOs to encourage women to 
get involved and participate in political life and elections, as well as to reduce stereotypes related to 
gender in political activity through educational, informational, analytical and advocacy activities. In 
Finland,  the  Council  for  Gender  Equality  carried  out  a  social  media  campaign  highlighting  the 
importance of the European Parliament and the EU for gender, and the National Council of Women of 
Finland  together  with  the  Coalition  of  Finnish  Women’s  Associations  organised  a  panel  discussion 
Europe at the Crossroads on 15 May 2024. In Latvia, two NGOs held pre-election debates for candidates 
on various issues of women's rights. In Greece, the Ministry of Social Cohesion and Family organises 
awareness-raising campaigns to support and empower women candidates as well as seminars for female 
candidates and elected officials. 

At  the  same  time,  in  response  to  a  survey,  the  Commission’s  Advisory  Committee  on  Equal 
Opportunities  for  Women  and  Men  also  reported  on  specific  challenges  women  encountered  in 
participating in the 2024 European Parliament elections. In Bulgaria, the Council for Electronic Media 
identified that, in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections, the male-female ratio varied 
95-69% men, 5-31% women for the 7 most influential radio and television programmes. 

In response to a Commission questionnaire on supporting gender equality in the context of the 2024 
European elections, European political parties outlined internal policies on gender balance, such as 
encouraging  gender  balance  on  electoral  lists  as  outlined  in  their  party  manifestos96,  appointing  the 
youngest-ever Spitzenkandidatin (female lead candidate) to demonstrate a commitment to promoting 
gender balance on electoral lists, or by having a  ‘Women’s Forum’97. In another European political 
party, the governing body is required to follow statutes that ensure gender balance and geographical 
diversity within the party’s leadership98. Additionally, gender balance was promoted in electoral lists 
through quotas and rules mandating that at least one co-chair or candidate must be held by a woman99. 
One party took no specific measures beyond encouraging gender balance on electoral lists in accordance 
with national laws100. Another did not report any efforts to promote gender equality in governing bodies, 
electoral lists, or internal party structures at all101. 

93 For more information on this committee, see Register of Commission Expert groups. 
94 For more information on this committee, see Summary on Eurolex. 
95  Ireland  contributes  funding,  through  the  Department  of  Housing,  Local  Government  and  Heritage,  and  the 
Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, towards Women for Election, a civil society 
non-governmental organisation, which together with the National Women’s Council of Ireland, held a hustings 
for women candidates to meet women voters in each of the three Irish European constituencies. 
96 European Democratic Party. 
97 European Free Alliance.  
98 Party of European Socialists.  
99 European Green Party. 
100 European People’s Party.  
101 European Conservatives and Reformists.  

26 

 
 
 
A similar trend can also be observed at national party level where some national parties reported having 
very ambitious internal gender policies in place for their electoral lists, governing bodies, or both, while 
others indicated having taken no measures at all102. For instance, one party ensured balance in electoral 
lists and governing bodies in accordance with party statutes103. Another national respondent followed 
gender quotas for electoral lists and governing bodies104, or promoted gender balance through programs 
designed to empower women105. One response to the survey showed a very high level of inclusiveness, 
where rules for the governing body following e.g. a “40/60 principle” also accounted for non-binary 
candidates106.  Several  respondents  reportedly  achieved  gender  balance  through  parity  on  both  the 
electoral lists and in governing bodies107. One other example of special measures to  achieve gender 
equality  within  the  governing  body  included  having  a  special  seat  for  women’s  organizations108,  or 
ensuring that 50% of the positions in governing bodies, such as presidents, were held by women109. 
Some  national  parties  focused  on  gender  equality  on  the  electoral  list,  for  example  through  parity. 
However, they focused less on gender equality in the governing bodies110. Additionally, it was reported 
by one national party that gender specific policies had little impact on gender equality in practice111. 

In Slovenia, four political parties signed a memorandum to use zipped systems in electoral lists, and 
three other parties used such zipped systems despite not signing the memorandum, and all parties put a 
woman in at least the second place on the list112. 

2.3.4.  Persons with disabilities  

Introduction 

More  than  100  million  people  in  the  EU  have  some  form  of  a  disability113.  In  March  2021,  the 
Commission’s 2021-2030 Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 114 announced several 
actions to foster participation in elections of persons with disabilities, such as working with Member 
States in the European Cooperation Network on Elections to support full electoral  participation and 
accessibility of the European elections, discussing inclusive candidate practices in the framework of the 
high-level on elections announced by the European Democracy Action Plan, and preparing a guide of 
good electoral practice addressing participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral processes. 
The following actions were taken in follow-up to the Strategy: 

•  Member States took different steps to support the electoral rights of persons with a disability 
which were, among others, supported by dedicated discussion and close cooperation with the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections115. Member States shared within the framework 
of  this  network  practices  promoting  electoral  participation  of  citizens  with  disabilities, 
including in the context of the preparation of election reforms, optimisation of postal voting 
and  Braille  ballots,  specific  training  for  election  officials,  and  use  of  generative  artificial 
intelligence to increase accessibility of electoral information.  

102 Czechia, Latvia, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Slovenia. 
103 Austria. 
104 Slovenia. 
105 Austria. 
106 Italy. 
107 Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy and Sweden. 
108 Estonia. 
109 Poland. 
110 Luxembourg and Slovenia.  
111 Finland. 
112 Replies to a Commission’s questionnaire by the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities 
for Women and Men. 
113  Council of the European Union, Disability in the EU: facts and figures, last reviewed 18 February 2025. 
114 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2021-2030, COM/2021/101 final, 03 March 2021. 
115 Meetings of 16 January, 29 March and 27 September 2023. 

27 

 
 
 
•  At a meeting of the European Cooperation Network on Elections on 12 June 2023, the European 
Parliament presented its communication plans for the European elections, including as regards 
persons with disabilities.  

•  During  the  same  meeting,  the  European  Disability  Forum  presented  the  EU-funded  project 
‘Disability Rights in European Elections’ aiming to increasing political participation of persons 
with disabilities through mobilisation and awareness raising.  

•  During the  high-level  event  on  elections  held  on  23 and  24  October  2023116,  a  session  was 
dedicated to measures fostering inclusive political representation of different groups, including 
persons with disabilities. The European Disability Forum presented the different barriers that 
persons  with  disabilities  face  when  exercising  their  election  rights,  including  in  terms  of 
insufficient funding for ensuring disability-inclusive elections. Member States, such as Spain, 
Austria and Czechia expounded on their constant efforts to remove all obstacles regarding the 
right to vote, including providing accessible information on election in different formats and 
modes, specific training for election officials and accessible Braille ballots. Finland presented 
its practices in engaging different groups, including persons with disabilities, to participate in 
society and politics. A further session addressed best practices for ensuring electoral rights for 
persons with disabilities, such as providing accessible communication and facilities.  

•  On  6  December  2023,  the  Commission  published  the  guide  on  good  electoral  practices  for 
persons with disabilities117, as part of a larger package of measures fostering EU citizenship118. 
In  the  preparation  of  the  guide,  the  Commission  relied  on  targeted  exchanges  among  the 
membership of the European Cooperation Network on Elections and the support of a dedicated 
subgroup of the same network. A vast majority of Member States sent contributions to a survey 
launched by the Commission on electoral frameworks and practices addressing participation in 
elections of persons with disabilities. A network of academics supporting the Commission in 
its work on EU citizenship also contributed with a targeted study on the participation of citizens 
with  disabilities  in  elections119.  The  Commission  actively  sought  to  involve  stakeholders, 
including through ad-hoc consultations of all actors active on the topic of electoral rights of 
persons  with  disabilities.  The  Guide  reflects  various  measures  taken  by  Member  States  to 
address  the  obstacles  faced  by  citizens  with  disabilities  when  interacting  with  the  electoral 
environment, including election materials, facilities, and procedures. It aims to support efforts 
to ensure that citizens with disabilities can exercise their electoral rights effectively. 

Findings and monitoring of election accessibility 

Election  observers  reported  that  participation  by  persons  with  disabilities  improved  in  the  2024 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  thanks  to  alternative  voting  measures,  better  polling  station 
accessibility  and  ballot  readability  for  example120.  However,  they  noted  that  it  still  varies  between 
Member  States.  Election  observers  indicated  that  some  Member  States,  including  Luxembourg, 
improved their legislation to require polling station accessibility and facilitate participation by providing 
free transport or other services. However, accessibility remains an issue, especially in Cyprus, Malta or 
Romania121. In addition, several Member States (i.e. France, Belgium, Cyprus and Malta) do not provide 

116 European Commission, High-level event on Elections, 23/24 October 2023.  
117 Guide of good electoral practices in Member States addressing the participation of citizens with disabilities in 
the electoral process, Brussels, SWD(2023) 408 final, 06 December 2023. 
118 The 2023 Citizenship package included a Compendium of e-voting and other Information and communication 
technology practices, prepared in cooperation with Member States and the Council of Europe. The Compendium 
also addresses the needs of persons with disabilities, fostering election accessibility. 
119  Election-Watch.EU,  Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June 
2024, September 2024. 
120 Election-Watch.EU, Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 
2024, September 2024. 
121  Election-Watch.EU,  Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June 
2024, September 2024. For instance according to data collected by other electoral observers (expertforum.ro) in 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
any alternative to vote in-person for persons with disabilities who cannot physically visit polling stations 
on election day122.  

As  regards  persons  with  disabilities  being  elected,  underrepresentation  still  persists  in  2024.  While 
official figures are not available, it seems that there are three MEPs with disabilities in the new European 
Parliament  (compared  to  seven  MEPs  with  disabilities  in  the  previous  Parliament)123.  Civil  society 
organisations and other relevant stakeholders working on disability-related issues continue to call for 
accessible electoral procedures and more candidates with disabilities, including by referring to Article 
29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the EU and all its Member 
States are parties124.  

Measures reported by Member States and political parties  

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  calls  on  Member  States  to  support  the  electoral 
participation of persons with disabilities, both as voters and candidates, and prevent and remove the 
barriers they encounter when participating in elections. Such barriers include the blanket removal 
of  electoral  rights  of  persons  with  intellectual  and  psycho-social  disabilities  without  individual 
assessment and possibility of judicial review.  

The Recommendation also encourages Member States to make best use of the guide of good electoral 
practices,  and  to  continue  to  work  with  the  Commission  in  the  framework  of  the  European 
Cooperation Network on Elections, also taking into account views expressed by entities representing 
the interests of persons with disabilities. 

Additionally,  the  Recommendation  invites  Member  States  to  consider  implementing  practical 
measures to ensure accessibility of polling stations, including by making use of means such as QR 
codes, Braille, large printouts, audio and easy-to-read guides, tactile stencils, magnifying glasses, 
extra lighting, stamps, and accessible writing utensils. Political parties  are also called to address 
the  needs  of  persons  with  disabilities  in  their  campaigning,  for  example  by  organising  events  in 
accessible locations and by using means, modes and formats of communication. Member States and 
political parties should also consider providing other forms of support, such as telephone assistance, 
sign interpretation, accessible transport and accessible procedures for requesting accommodation. 
Member States should also support the participation of persons with disabilities as election officials 
and  ensure  the  wide  dissemination  of  best  practices  supporting  participation  of  citizens  with 
disabilities in the electoral process. 

Most  Member  States  took  specific  measures  to  support  participation  in  elections  by  persons  with 
disabilities. In doing so, 20 of the 25 responding Member States explicitly stated that that responded to 
the Commission’s survey explicitly stated they had made use of the Commission’s guide addressing the 
participation of citizens with disabilities in the electoral process125. 

A wide range of national good practices can be highlighted in this regard. Austria improved the ballot 
paper by adding a bevel on one side for persons with visual impairments, to be used together with a 
template, and ensured suitable guidance for blind persons. In addition, a template with Braille lettering 
for signing the affidavit for postal ballots was introduced. Furthermore, new legislation ensured that in 

Romania, the electoral process is not fully accessible  to persons with disabilities even though there have been 
some improvements. There are no special tools for assisted voting (eg. Braille) and 225 out of the 917 polling 
stations visited by election observers on election day in Romania were not accessible to persons with disabilities. 
122  Election-Watch.EU,  Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June 
2024, September 2024. 
123 As indicated by the Vice-Chair of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee Katrin Langensiepen. 
124 Disability Intergroup: 2024 EU elections and re-establishment of the intergroup - European Disability Forum 
125  Belgium,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 

29 

 
 
 
 
every building where polling stations are located, at least one has to be fully accessible for people with 
disabilities. Belgium put in place free adapted transport service for persons with disabilities to get to 
the polling stations and enabled persons with disabilities to act as election officials. It also piloted the 
use of Braille ballots in two electoral cantons. Slovenia126 and Czechia passed legislation enabling all 
persons with disabilities to vote, regardless of their legal capacity. Slovenia’s new rules were already 
applicable for the 2024 European Parliament elections, Czechia’s rules will be applicable as of January 
2026.  Czechia  also  published  information  in  accessible  format,  advised  municipalities  to  place  the 
polling station, if possible, in accessible buildings and publish this information, and spread information 
through relevant representative organisations, among other measures. Greece made available online a 
specially adapted ballot and ensured full accessibility of official election information. Spain extended 
accessible signage on elections127 to all the capital cities of the Autonomous Communities, and to the 
Autonomous Cities of Ceuta and Melilla. It also supported election officials with disabilities by making 
provision  in  its  legislation  for  the  use  of  free  magnetic  induction  loop  service  for  deaf  or  hearing-
impaired people who use hearing aids (both holders and stand-in). Blind or severely visually impaired 
persons were provided with the necessary tools and mechanisms to enable them to carry out their duties 
with due autonomy. Estonia developed a checklist for the accessibility of polling stations and trained 
polling staff on the needs of voters with disabilities. In France, polling stations must be accessible to all 
types of disability; they must have at least one polling booth that is accessible to people in wheelchairs; 
the  ballot  box  must  be  accessible  and  the  president  of  the  polling  station  must  take  all  necessary 
measures  to  facilitate  independent  voting  by  persons  with  disabilities.  French  Electoral  Code  also 
obliges candidates to ensure campaigns’ accessibility. Croatia made specific efforts to train and guide 
its election officials on how to ensure the accessibility of the voting process, and made available election 
information through more than one sensory channel.  

Hungary  supported  the  accessibility  of  election  information  and  political  advertising  broadcast  on                    
audio-visual  media  services  and  provided  Braille  templates  for  voters  with  visual  impairments. 
Germany  indicated  polling  station  accessibility  on  voter  notifications  and  ensured  that  blind  and 
visually impaired voters were able to use free ballot paper templates provided by associations for the 
blind,  allowing  them  to  vote  independently.  These  templates  included  tactile  markings  and  audio 
instructions, ensuring secrecy and accessibility in the voting process. For orientation purposes, the upper 
right corners of all ballot papers were punched or cut off and the upper right corner of the ballot paper 
template was also cut off.  

Ireland put in place visual aids like photographs and emblems on ballots, large-print ballot displays, 
and ballot paper templates for visually impaired voters. It also conducted extensive outreach, including 
in  cooperation  with  disability  organisations.  Malta  supported  persons  with  visual  impairments  by 
providing Braille templates, as well as a playback listening devices and implemented priority queues 
for persons with disabilities (within a specific time bracket). Luxembourg facilitated transportation of 
persons with disabilities to the polling stations,  made use of tactile templates to ensure  independent 
voting,  organised  targeted  political  sessions  for  voters  encountering  difficulties  in  understanding 
political programmes and took additional steps to improve the legibility of ballot papers. 

The Netherlands organised a webinar and a workshop on accessible elections for election officials. It 
provided  accessible  voting  documents  and  subsidised  various  initiatives  to  disseminate  accessible 
information about which facilities can be found in polling stations to make voting more accessible for 
persons with disabilities (waarismijnstemlokaal.nl), to organise livestreams for persons with hearing 

126 In January 2024, the Slovenian Parliament confirmed an amendment to the National Assembly Election Act, 
which restores the right to vote to all adult citizens, who were deprived of the right to vote because they were 
placed under guardianship due to intellectual and psychosocial disabilities or parental rights were extended to 
their parents. 
127 Spanish Ministry of the Interior, Elecciones Europeas, Provisional Results,  last accessed 19 February 2025. 

30 

 
 
 
impairments with information on the European Parliament elections and to help municipalities recruit 
persons with intellectual disabilities as polling officials and support them doing this work.  

Portugal took specific measures to follow up on the Commission’s guide of good electoral practices for 
persons  with  disabilities,  including  by  raising  awareness,  improving  accessibility  of  election 
information  in  cooperation  with  disability  organisations,  and  using  Braille  matrices  and  enlarged 
printouts. Romania conducted a comprehensive assessment of the accessibility of the voting process 
with the consultation of disability organisations and provided election information in accessible formats 
and  modes.  Slovakia  provided  sound  recordings  of  candidate  lists  for  the  persons  with  hearing 
impairments  and  supported  the  accessibility  of  political  debates,  including  by  using  sign  language. 
Sweden produced information materials regarding when, where and how to vote in different forms of 
media and languages, for example videos in sign language, “easy to read Swedish”, and Braille. 

Regarding measures taken by  political parties to increase participation  in elections  of persons with 
disabilities,  about  26%  of  the  almost  60  national  political  parties  that  replied  to  a  Commission’s 
questionnaire indicated that they had taken such specific measures for the 2024 European Parliament 
elections.128  These  measures  included  adding  subtitles  to  campaign  materials  for  individuals  with 
hearing impairments, distributing accessible campaign materials, creating resources for the persons with 
visual impairments, hosting events in accessible venues, and using sign language during events. Only 
one party explicitly mentioned having candidates with disabilities129, while  another reported lacking 
data on this aspect.130 

In this regard, the European Disability Forum conducted tests on the accessibility of websites of seven 
European Political Parties ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, finding that they are vastly 
inaccessible  to  users  with  disabilities,  with  some  components  even  reversing  default  accessibility 
measures131. 

2.3.5.  Mobile EU citizens and EU citizens residing in third countries 

Introduction 

Mobile EU citizens (EU citizens who have moved to another Member State to work, live or study) have 
the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament in their Member State 
of residence under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State, in line with EU law132. Under 
national electoral rules and procedures, mobile EU citizens can also choose to vote in their Member 
State of origin133. The number of mobile EU citizens on 1 January 2023 was  14 million134. It is not 
known how many of them are eligible to vote or to stand as candidates.  

128 Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
129 Spain. 
130 Greece. 
131  European  Disability  Forum,  Access  Denied:  The  (in)accessibility  of  European  Political  Party  websites,  11 
April 2024. The findings are also endorsed by the Funka Foundation, a Swedish knowledge centre on accessibility. 
132 This right, enshrined in Article 22(2) TFEU and Article 39(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is 
given  effect  in  Council  Directive  93/109/EC  of  6  December  1993  laying  down  detailed  arrangements  for  the 
exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the 
Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34–38. Mobile EU 
citizens may vote on the lists of their countries of origin in line with applicable national law (e.g. postal voting, 
vote in consular posts etc.). 
133 All but four Member States (Czechia, Ireland, Malta and Slovakia) allow for some possibility of voting from 
another Member State, either at an embassy/consulate, by post or on the internet. Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
Cyprus and Malta limit the right to vote in the European elections in their state of origin when their citizens have 
been resident outside their territory for a certain period. Conditions vary. 
134 On 1 January 2024 there were 13.974.500 mobile EU citizens.  EU population diversity by citizenship and 
country of birth - Statistics Explained. 

31 

 
 
 
In addition, there are around 25-30 million EU citizens residing in third countries, outside the European 
Union,  who  have  the  right  to  vote  in  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  according  to  national 
electoral procedures. This opportunity, if provided by national law, allows them to participate in the 
democratic processes of their home Member State, maintaining their involvement with the EU despite 
being geographically distant.  

Observations 

Turnout among mobile EU citizens in the 2024 elections appears to have remained lower than that of 
nationals. The availability of relevant data varies greatly between Member States. Data received from 
Member States shows that the registration of mobile EU citizens in the Member States  of residence 
remains  low  across  the  EU  from  0.28%  of  registrations  in  Latvia  to  22.03%  in  France.  There  also 
positive signs, however. For example, in Luxembourg, despite the proportion of mobile EU citizens 
registering to vote in the elections only being around 17.82% for 2024, this is the highest number ever 
recorded in Luxembourg. This figure has consistently increased since 1994, when it was just 7.4%. 

Most Member States do not collect data on the turnout of mobile EU citizens who registered to vote. 
Where data are available, turnout of mobile EU citizens ranges from one third to two thirds of those 
who registered: 27.2% in Finland, 40.1% in Lithuania, and 59.63% in Czechia135.  

Table 1: Number of national and non-national (mobile) EU citizen voters on the electoral roll, 
2024 European elections 

Member 
State 

Resident 
nationals on 
electoral roll 
in own 
country 

Resident 
non-national 
EU citizens 

Resident non-national EU 
citizens on electoral roll in 
resident country 

Proportion of 
non-national 
EU residents to 
national 
residents on 
roll 

Proportion of 
resident non-
national EU 
citizens on 
electoral roll (of all 
resident non-
national EU 
citizens) 

8.359.908 

845.687 

76.464 

0,91% 

9,04% 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

8.208.687 

Denmark 

4.283.496 

Germany 

61.760.719 

229.890 

3.848.716
136 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Croatia 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

980.014 

3.510.970 

581.075 

35.361.672 

47.667.283 

3.515.07 

49.552.399 

683.981 

1.362.341 

Lithuania 

2.410.924 

1.989.947 

1.221.770 

16681 

7162 

Luxembour
g 
Hungary 

288.883 

171.713 

7.672.167 

137.201 

3.498 

15.602 

202.301 

1.753 

40.660 

13.023 

302.991 

269.127 

83.438 

11.840 

46 

340 

30.605 

4.635 

0,04% 

0,36% 

0,33% 

0,18% 

1,16% 

2,24% 

0,86% 

0,56% 

0,17% 

1.73% 

0,00% 

0,01% 

10,59% 

0,06% 

6,79% 

5,26% 

15,23% 

22,03% 

0,28% 

4,75% 

17,82% 

3,38% 

135 3498 mobile EU citizens registered for the elections in Czechia, while 2084 voted. 
136 Based on the population as of 31 December 2023 as determined by the 2011 Census. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Malta 

355.082 

Netherland
s 
Austria 

Poland 

13.452.006 

648.622 

6.281.282 

Portugal 

9.262.075 

Romania 

18.025.329 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

1.581.304 

4.377.093 

4.293.213 

7.708.624 

18.865 

269.554 

15.102 

67.766 

45.186 

11.255 

9.699 

1.151 

7.945 

7680 

43.189 

4,25% 

0,50% 

0,72% 

0,12% 

0,05% 

0,07% 

0,18% 

0,18% 

0,56% 

10,45% 

6,10% 

16,02% 

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024 

On the basis of data available, 135 mobile EU citizens exercised their right to stand as a candidate in 
the elections in 15 Member States. The overall  number of mobile EU citizens candidates  would  be 
roughly consistent compared to 168 candidates in 2019 and 170 in 2014, as mobile EU citizens continue 
to represent approximately 1% of the total number of candidates that stood in the elections. A notable 
change from 2019 is the reduction in the number of Member States where mobile EU citizens stood as 
candidates, decreasing from 21 Member States in 2019 to 15 in 2024, due to the absence of mobile EU 
candidates for these elections in Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania and Portugal. 

In certain Member States, while the overall number of candidates increased compared to 2019, a drop 
is observed for mobile EU citizens candidates (Germany, France, Latvia). In other Member States, the 
number  remained  stable  (Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Slovakia).  Conversely,  other  Member  States 
experienced an increase in mobile EU citizens standing as candidates (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria).   

Two  MEPs  were  elected  (one  in  France  and  one  in  The  Netherlands).  This  could  be  considered 
consistent compared to 2019, when three MEPs were elected in France and two in the United Kingdom. 

Table 2: national and non-national (‘mobile’) EU citizens candidates in EP elections 2024  

Member 
State 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Croatia 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Own 
National 
candidates  

Non-
national 
EU citizen 
candidates 

280 

45 

671 

167 

1413 

78 

72 

1168 

2250 

3078 

300 

784 

63 

270 

3 

3 

2 

8 

0 

1 

15 

21 

0 

0 

0 

1 

33 

Non-national EU citizens 
elected  

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

319 

76137 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

Total 

306 

39 

493 

234 

478 

542 

98 

310 

231 

1333 

11912 

0 

2 

0 

0 

4 

21 

0 

0 

0 

1 

1 

7 

135 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

2 

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024 

Measures reported by Member States  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections calls on Member States to take appropriate measures to 
increase mobile EU citizens awareness of their electoral rights and obligations, both as voters and 
candidates. It encourages Member States to create conditions in which mobile EU citizens can easily 
access information about the progress and status of their registration. Where local authorities are 
competent to enter mobile EU citizens on the electoral rolls, it encourages Member States to take the 
necessary steps to support those authorities, including via administrative guidance, in their actions 
to  inform  mobile  EU  citizens  about  their  electoral  rights  under  EU  law.  It  further  encourages 
Member States, in line with their electoral rules, to equally take measures to inform their citizens 
living in third countries on how and where they can exercise their right to vote. 

20 Member States138 conducted targeted information campaigns to increase awareness of electoral rights 
and  obligations  among  mobile  EU  citizens. Member  States  also  used  a  variety  of  languages  to 
communicate with mobile EU citizens, including English, the official language of the country, and other 
languages such as French, German, Italian, and Spanish. Finland provided information in 17 languages, 
while Sweden provided information in 41 languages, both Member States including non-EU languages 
such as Arabic, Russian, Somali, Northern Sami, Inari Sami, Skolt Sami, Albanian, Chinese, Karelian, 
Sorani, Turkish, Vietnamese.   

Ireland and Malta published information leaflets on the electoral process, which were made available 
in  multiple  languages,  organized  events  and  meetings  with  mobile  EU  citizens  and  partnered  with 
organizations to provide them with information on the electoral process.  

137 Luxembourg informed that, of the 76 candidates having the Luxembourg nationality, 9 also have a second 
EU nationality. 1 candidate with a double nationality (Luxembourg & Portugal) has been elected. We do not 
have such information from other Member States so candidates with double nationality are not explicitly 
reflected in this table.  
138  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Germany,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Some Member States139 have digital supports and online platforms to provide information and facilitate 
the registration of mobile EU citizens and offer ‘online self-check’ tools and portals for registration and 
information access where citizens can verify their electoral registration status and receive updates140. 

Direct communication with eligible voters through individual letters or emails is used in  half of the 
Member States141 about their registration status and how to register or deregister, where relevant. As 
explained in Section 2.2, Ministries and electoral commissions provide support via email, telephone, 
and municipal offices to assist citizens with queries related to registration and voting procedures.  

Electoral observers142 in particular highlighted Belgium’s dedicated elections website143 that took into 
account mobile EU citizens and provided information in all EU official languages. 

Several Member States took measures to support local authorities in informing mobile EU citizens about 
their rights and the procedures of registration  on electoral rolls. Various ministries and departments 
provided guidelines, handbooks, circulars, and digital materials to assist municipalities. Training for 
local officials, hotlines for queries, and templates for registration were also offered. Online registration 
options and federal or ministerial support for technical and organizational questions were available in 
some instances, alongside written or digital guidance provided through government websites.  

In the Netherlands, municipalities handle the registration of mobile EU citizens wishing to vote, guided 
by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The Ministry provided a registration form (Y 
32 form), translations in several languages, and advised municipalities to actively inform citizens. They 
also developed flyers and web text examples. All information was shared with municipalities and made 
publicly available online. 

In Ireland, significant electoral reforms have led to rolling or continuous registration, replacing annual 
canvassing.  The  Department  supported  local  authorities  with  workshops  and  made  administrative 
process improvements to handle the expected increase in European Parliament election applications. 

In  Italy,  the  Central  Directorate  for  Electoral  Services  has  issued  circulars  addressed  to  the 
municipalities  for  the  dissemination  of  information  on  the  arrangements  for  access  to  voting  by 
particular  categories  of  voters,  including  mobile  EU  citizens;  some  of  these  circulars  and  other 
information to facilitate voting were published on the Ministry’s website, in particular in the form of 
FAQs. 

EU citizens residing in third countries 

Concerning  EU  citizens  abroad,  all  Member  States144  that  allow  their  citizens  to  vote  from  third 
countries have reported measures to inform them about how and where they can exercise their right to 
vote. These measures include the creation of dedicated official resources145 like Electoral Commission’s 
websites,  social  media  pages  and  press  releases  providing  information  on  registration  and  voting 
procedures  with  information  available  in  multiple  languages.  Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs  and 
embassies played a crucial role, disseminating information through their official platforms146. 

139 Finland and Sweden. 
140 Greece and Spain. 
141 Hungary and Slovenia.  
142 Election-Watch.eu 
143 https://europeanelections.belgium.be/node/111322. 
144 21 Member States. 
145 Spain, France, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden. 
146 Czechia, Croatia, Latvia and Slovakia. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Various media campaigns, including TV spots147, radio programs148, and social media initiatives, have 
also  been  deployed  to  ensure  timely  communication  to  voters  abroad  of  all  necessary  information, 
including on when and how to register.  

Personalized letters149 or emails150 have been sent to citizens abroad to inform them of their voting rights 
and/or  registration  status.  In  Spain,  electoral reforms concluded in 2022  have ensured  that electoral 
documentation  is  now  sent  automatically  to  registered  citizens  abroad  without  the  need  for  an 
application.  In  Austria,  legal  obligations  require  municipalities  to  notify  citizens  listed  in  electoral 
register about postal voting options immediately following election announcements.  

Information  on  electoral  processes  and  procedures  in  third  countries  has  also  been  shared  through 
diaspora organizations to reach wider audiences151. Sweden highlighted the cooperation with Swedish 
Armed  Forces  to  ensure  that  material  was  distributed  to  soldiers  as  well  as  contacts  with  shipping 
companies to reach voters on board vessels on foreign water. 

Dual nationals 

EU citizens can be nationals of more than one Member State, one or all of which may use compulsory 
voting for the European Parliament elections. Where a Member State of nationality of a dual national 
imposes  an  obligation  to  vote,  they  may  be  prevented  from  voting  in  the  other  Member  State  of 
nationality even if they wish so, and even if they reside there. Currently, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece and 
Luxembourg have laws which require citizens to vote and punish the failure to vote without a valid 
excuse. The specific conditions and penalties vary.  

2.3.6.  Other groups 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  calls  on  Member  States  to  foster  broad  and  inclusive 
democratic participation in elections in the EU and to offer accessible and user-friendly registration 
tools for candidates and voters, taking into account the needs of different groups. Inclusiveness of 
elections and participation of all groups can be supported by Member States and political parties 
through specific actions and measures, which consider the needs and challenges of different groups 
(e.g., demographic background, geographical location, etc.). 

The  EU  Anti-racism  Action  Plan  2020-2025152  points  out  the  Commission’s  intention  to  work  with 
European political parties, the European Cooperation Network on Elections and civil society to improve 
participation of groups susceptible to marginalisation, such as people with a racial or ethnic background. 
As highlighted in the 2020-2030 EU Roma Strategic framework153, the participation of Roma people to 
the political life should be encouraged in Member States, in particular some with a significant Roma 
population,  including  their  registration  as  candidates  and  voters.  During  the  high-level  event  on 
elections held on 23 and 24 October 2023154, a session was dedicated to measures fostering inclusive 
political  representation  of  different  groups,  which  addressed  the  participation  of  Roma  people  in 
particular. 

147 Greece and Hungary. 
148 Greece and Portugal. 
149 Belgium, Hungary, Finland (so called ‘notice on the right to vote’) and Sweden (so called ‘voting card).  
150 Greece and Lithuania. 
151 Latvia and Portugal. 
152 European Commission, EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025, 18 September 2020. 
153 European Commission, The new EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation (full 
package), 07 October 2020. 
154 European Commission, High-level event on Elections, 23/24 October 2023. 

36 

 
 
 
 
Measures were implemented in some Member States to foster electoral inclusion and representation 
among underrepresented groups including minorities. Slovenia and Sweden reported offering ballots 
and  other  electoral  materials  in  minority  languages.  Ireland  reported  having  introduced  targeted 
communication measures to specific groups (such as traveller communities) to support and encourage 
to register to vote (e.g., Ireland’s national Migrant Integration Strategy). 

About 14% of the almost 60 national political parties that replied to a Commission’s questionnaire on 
the 2024 elections, indicated that they had candidates from national minorities155. While the specific 
minorities were mostly not detailed, two parties mentioned a Roma candidate156. 

In the absence of official data, civil society organisations have published their own analyses. They have 
reported on challenges faced by specific groups, including on the basis of demographic background or 
geographical location, such as people with a minority racial or ethnic background. For example, the 
civil society organization Election-Watch.EU reported that, during the previous mandate, the European 
Parliament  included  4  out  of  705  members  of  Roma  origin  (0,5%  in  total)  from  Spain,  Germany, 
Hungary  and  Slovakia.  Of  the  eight  known  Roma  candidates  to  the  2024 elections to the  European 
Parliament, none was elected157. 

3.  COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF FREE, FAIR AND RESILIENT ELECTIONS  

The Commission has actively supported Member States’ authorities by organising regular meetings of 
the European Cooperation Network on Elections since early 2019. ECNE consists of national contact 
points appointed by Member  States  to represent  their  national  networks  on  elections and serve as  a 
liaison point between national and European levels of coordination.  

All Member States have appointed contact points for ECNE. The contact points vary across Member 
States in terms of the functions of nominated individuals or bodies, and can include (representatives of) 
electoral authorities, ministries of the Interior, Justice, Public administration, or the State Chancellery. 
Many representatives have remained the same for several years, which has helped build relations and 
foster collaboration also beyond the meetings of the Network. 

The Network has organised more than 25 meetings since 2019.  

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  calls  on  Member  States  to  strengthen  cooperation  on 
election-related  matters  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections, 
including through operational work streams addressing covert funding from third countries, and on 
awareness raising activities and strategies, among other issues. The Recommendation also refers to 
cooperation of this Network with other relevant European networks including the Rapid Alert System 
and  the  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services.  Member  States  have  been 
encouraged to  continue  exchanging  best  practices  and  perspectives  on  promoting  the  exercise  of 
electoral  rights  and  supporting  democratic  conduct  of  elections  and  a  high  turnout  in  the  2024 
elections to the European Parliament and beyond. 

ECNE discussions were held in close cooperation with other relevant structures such as the Rapid Alert 
System158, in relation to FIMI, and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services 

155 Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden. 
156  Czechia and Italy. 
157 Election-Watch.EU, Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 
2024, September 2024. 
158 The Rapid Alert System is set up among the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate the sharing of 
insights related to disinformation campaigns and coordinate responses. It consists of a dedicated digital platform 
and a network of 28 national contact points. 

37 

 
 
 
 
(ERGA)  in  relation  to  the  issues  within  its  remit159.  The  European  Data  Protection  Board  also 
participated in meetings on issues related to the application of EU data protection law in the electoral 
context. 

Interactions were also fostered with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  

In the lead-up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the work of the European Cooperation 
Network on Elections intensified. In October 2023, the Commission organized a High-Level Event on 
Elections with the membership of the Network. In November 2023, the Network  took part in a joint 
tabletop exercise on cyber security of elections (see Section 4.5).  

In addition to regular meetings, in the run-up to the elections  eight thematic sessions were organised in 
the  framework  of  the  Network,  including  on inclusive  participation  and communication,  countering 
disinformation and ensuring cyber security, the smooth organisation of voting for different groups of 
voters, and candidate safety. 

Examples of meetings of the European Cooperation Network leading up to and after the 2024 
elections, and topics covered 

Meeting 
12th meeting – 
January 2022 
13th meeting –  
May 2022 
14th meeting – 
September 2022 

15th meeting – 
November 2022 

16th meeting – 
January 2023 

17th meeting –  
March 2023 
18th meeting –  
June 2023 

19th meeting – 
September 2023 

20th meeting – 
December 2023 

Topics (non-exhaustive) 
E-voting;  election  accessibility  for  persons  with  disabilities;  high  election 
standards during pandemics 
Strategic lawsuits against public participation (anti-SLAPP); e-voting; parity 
of treatment and balanced media coverage during elections 
E-voting;  election  accessibility  for  persons  with  disabilities; 
joint 
mechanism of electoral resilience; preparation of the 2024 elections to the 
European  Parliament  including  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  and 
tabletop exercise 
Joint sessions with expert group on electoral matters; preparation of the 2024 
elections to the European Parliament including election observation; crypto 
tool 
Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
inclusive  democratic  participation  and  gender  balance;  Defence  of 
Democracy 
Cybersecurity and disinformation; Defence of Democracy 

Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
supporting  turnout  and  inclusive  participation;  cyber  security;  electoral 
participation of persons with disabilities; absentee voters abroad; protecting 
the information environment 
Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
presentation by the European Data Protection Board; turnout and inclusive 
participation (including women); cybersecurity; voting in third countries; AI 
and disinformation 
Joint session with expert group on electoral matters; Preparation of the 2024 
elections to the European Parliament including communication and support 
to high turnout; election observation; youth participation; cybersecurity and 
feedback from tabletop exercise; EU Citizenship Package 

159 A new independent European Board for Media Services, composed of representatives from the national media 
authorities or bodies and assisted by a Commission secretariat, will be set up and will start operating in February 
2025. The Board will replace the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) that was 
established under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 

38 

 
 
 
21st meeting – 
February 2024 

22nd meeting –  
March 2024 

23rd meeting –  
May 2024 

24th meeting –  
July 2024 
25th meeting – 
October 2024 

Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
electoral disputes and election information systems; protection information 
environment  including  from  disinformation;  voter  turnout;  cybersecurity; 
election observation; campaign funding and awareness raising on electoral 
integrity; European Political Parties; data collection for post-election report 
Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
exchange on recent developments and best practices; women’s participation: 
resilient ICT systems in elections including AI and deepfakes in electoral 
context; encouraging election integrity and fair campaigning 
Preparation  of  the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  including 
exchange  on  recent  developments  and  best  practices;  the  media  and 
information  environment  around  elections;  mutual  support  to  address 
threats; measures regarding funding from third countries 
First experiences of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament including 
exchange on recent developments and best practices; political advertising 
Experiences of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, including a 
keynote  intervention  by  Vice-President  Jourová;  feedback  discussion  and 
exchange  on  recent  developments  and  best  practices;  inclusiveness  and 
resilience  of  elections;  participation  in  elections  and  politics  including  by 
women.  First participation of certain candidate countries. 

Cooperation between Member States’ authorities was facilitated among others through a collaborative 
space, a mapping of the roles and responsibilities of different EU networks and bodies that support the 
organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament and contact lists to support 
operational exchanges during elections.  

In December 2023, the Commission presented a Guide of good electoral practices in Member States 
addressing  the  participation  of  citizens  with  disabilities  in  the  electoral  process  (see  also  above  in 
Section 2.3.4), and a  Compendium of e-voting and other ICT practices in December 2023 (see also 
further below in Section 4.5). Both tools were prepared in close cooperation with the Network. 

Several Member States160 reported having taken into account the 2023 Recommendation in the context 
of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. For instance, 2 months before the elections, in Croatia, 
the National Election Cooperation Network (NECN) established on February 2019161 held a meeting to 
ensure its full compliance with the 2023 Commission’s Recommendation. 

Elections networks are formally established in 10 Member States162. 12 Member States indicated that 
Digital Services Coordinators had been integrated to their elections network or consulted in the context 
of the 2024 elections163. A broad majority of Member States noted their engagement with stakeholders 
such as researchers and academia, elections observer, media platforms164.  

160 Czechia, Germany, France, Croatia, Malta and Portugal. 
161  In  compliance, values  and  objectives  of  the  2018  Commission’s  Recommendation  on election  cooperation 
networks, online transparency, protection against cybersecurity incidents and fighting disinformation campaigns 
in the context of elections to the European Parliament. 
162  Czechia, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Latvia, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
163  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Greece,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Romania  and 
Slovenia. 
164 Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 

39 

 
 
 
 
The final report of Election-Watch.EU165 notes that ECNE has become a valuable forum for facilitating 
contacts  between  Member  States,  mutual  learning,  and  inspiring  improvements,  with  national 
representatives increasingly coordinating and exchanging on good electoral practices.  

4.  PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 

4.1.  Preparedness, monitoring and response 

Leading up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the Commission and other EU institutions 
launched several key actions to strengthen the EU’s preparedness and ability to respond to challenges 
to the integrity of the electoral process, in close collaboration and coordination with Member States and 
different entities such as the media, fact-checkers and civil society organisations. This effort allowed 
those involved to share insights, exchange experiences and best practices and coordinate responses to 
FIMI and disinformation, as well as cyberattacks, the inappropriate use of AI and other threats. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections includes different recommendations on protecting the integrity 
and resilience of the electoral process. For example, it encourages Member States to take measures to 
protect  the  information  environment  around  elections  and  ensure  that  voters  receive  correct 
information. It recommends building resilience and developing public awareness, media literacy and 
critical  thinking  to  address  information  manipulation,  interference  and  disinformation  related  to 
elections. It also calls on Member States to develop training to relevant authorities and  to facilitate 
cooperation  among  relevant  stakeholders  to  tackle  the  information  manipulation  risks.  It  also 
encourages  European  and  national  political  parties  to  consider  making  their  political  advertising 
available  with  information  about  the  identity  of  the  political  party  which  sponsors  it  and  where 
applicable, meaningful information about the targeting of the advertising and on the use of AI systems. 
The Recommendation also encourages Member States to take several measures to protect the election-
related infrastructure and ensure resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats.  

On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the EU activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response 
(IPCR)  arrangements  in  information-sharing  mode  in  relation  to  foreign  interference  in  the  2024 
elections to the European Parliament166. Under the coordination of the Commission, this facilitated the 
exchange of information among Member States and EU institutions. 

Monitoring and response were ensured also through the Commission’s Network against Disinformation 
(NaD), in association with the Parliament and EEAS, including through a specific subgroup ensuring 
swift exchange of information and response.   

The Vice-President of the Commission responsible for values and transparency visited several Member 
States to support preparedness for the 2024 elections as part of a Democracy Tour167.  

Member  States  had  continued  to  come  together  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Cooperation 
Network on Elections to discuss practical solutions to a wide range of threats. One of the operational 
tools that the Commission has made available to support Member States’ authorities in building their 
capacity  to  detect  and  react  appropriately  to  threats  in  the  context  of  elections  is  the  joint  election 

165 Election-Watch.EU,   Election Assessment Mission, Final Report,  European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 
2024, September 2024. 
166 Council of the European Union, Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead 
of the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024. 
167 After the elections, the Vice-President presented an initial assessment of known interference operations 
during the June 2024 elections for the European Parliament which was presented to the European Cooperation 
Network on Elections. 

40 

 
 
 
resilience mechanism168. That mechanism supports exchanges among Member State experts,  which 
several Member States used in the run-up to the elections. 

Use of the Joint Resilience Mechanism by Member States 

11-12  December  2023,  Helsinki  –  Cybersecurity  and  Elections;  Disinformation  and  Election 
Interference. The Finnish Ministry of Justice invited ECNE Member States to participate in an expert 
exchange meeting to discuss election security related issues. Experts from Estonian State Electoral 
Office, Estonian Information System Authority, The Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania and 
National Cyber and Information Security Agency (Czech Republic) responded to the activity request.  

12-13 January 2023, Stockholm –  the Swedish Election Authority organized an expert exchange 
visit for the Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania. Focus for the meeting was election security 
and protection of electoral infrastructure, cybersecurity and IT-systems, national election cooperation 
network as well as postal voting from abroad. 

6-7 October 2022, Vilnius - Expert exchange of the electoral management bodies from Croatia and 
Lithuania  to  strengthen  cooperation  in  elections.  During  the  meeting  the  experts  from  electoral 
management bodies exchanged experience on the topics on voting technologies, political finance, 
electoral communication, and training. 

16 May 2022, Bucharest - The first visit of a joint expert team under the mechanism on election 
resilience, organised in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, brought 
to Bucharest experts from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, between 16 and 20 May 2022. The agenda 
of  the  visit  spanned  a  variety  of  topics  such  as  new  technologies  and  cybersecurity  in  elections, 
countering electoral threats and protection of electoral infrastructure, and oversight of online political 
advertising. 

The European Parliament also stepped up its activities in this area and strengthened networks both 
internally and with other EU institutions, Member State authorities and external partners. For example, 
in December 2023, the European Parliament hosted an elections-themed meeting of the Rapid Alert 
System, with the European Cooperation Network  on Elections  and the Council Horizontal Working 
Party  on  Enhancing  Resilience  and  Countering  Hybrid  Threats  (ERCHT).  In  November  2023,  the 
European  parliament  hosted  a  three-day  conference  “Fact-checking  and  beyond“,  organised  in 
collaboration  with  pan-European  fact-checking  organisations  European  Fact-Checking  Standards 
Network (EFCSN) and the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). EU institutions and fact-
checkers from across the EU and beyond exchanged views on how to counter disinformation ahead of 
the  2024  elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  The  EE24  website  included  a  section  dedicated  to 
integrity, providing practical tips.   

The Digital Services Act (DSA)169 is a horizontal regulatory framework which seeks to ensure a safe 
digital  space  for  recipients  of  intermediary  services,  while  ensuring  that  fundamental  rights  are 
respected. It does so by imposing obligations on providers of intermediary services in the Union and by 
taking a tiered approach to the regulation of such services. Obligations apply asymmetrically, with the 
strictest due diligence obligations applying to providers of very large online platforms (‘VLOPs’) and 
of  very large  online  search  engines  (‘VLOSEs’)170.  This  includes  assessing and mitigating systemic 
risks stemming from the design, functioning or use made of their designated services related to civic 

168 European Commission, European cooperation network on elections, last accessed 18 February 2025. 
169 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single 
Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 
170 European Commission, Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under 
DSA.  

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
discourse  and  electoral  processes,  including  through  disinformation,  intentional  and,  oftentimes, 
coordinated manipulation and use of their services or tactics involving artificially generated content. It 
has been a critical step in ensuring that providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs uphold higher standards of 
transparency and accountability on their services, as it requires them to adopt a risk-based approach, 
conduct yearly risk assessments and independent audits and address illegal and harmful content and 
behaviour  on  their  services,  including  disinformation.  In  connection  to  the  Digital  Services  Act, 
specific actions were taken for election preparedness171. 

In  this  regard,  the  Commission  issued  guidelines  on  recommended  risk  mitigation  measures 
providers of VLOPs) and VLOSEs should take to mitigate systemic risks related to elections172. As a 
follow-up to these guidelines, the Commission organised a stress test in the form of a tabletop exercise 
to prepare providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs, civil society organisations, Digital Services Coordinators 
(DSCs) from the Member States and other stakeholders for information manipulation scenarios, and 
exercise coordinated responses within the framework of the DSA.  

At  the  time  of  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Commission  had  also  initiated  formal 
proceedings  under  the  DSA  against  Meta  and  X  for  matters  related  to  platforms  manipulation, 
coordinated  inauthentic  behaviour  and  deceptive  advertisements  used  to  disseminate  disinformation 
campaigns173.  The  Commission  also  sent  several  Requests  for  Information  (RFIs)  to  designated 
providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs about election risk mitigation measures and disinformation174.  

During the first meeting of the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS) on 19 February 2024, 
an ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Elections’ was established, with the aim of gathering expertise of DSCs 
and competent authorities on electoral issues at the national level falling within the scope of the DSA. 
The Working Group on Elections has proven to be a successful collaborative effort by the Commission 
and DSCs to engage in dialogue, learn of country- and context-specific challenges and support efforts 
to curb systemic risks to civic discourse and electoral processes175.  

The Code of Practice on Disinformation, the first worldwide industry-led framework in the digital 
field and source of industry best practices to limit the spread of online disinformation, also played a key 
role  in  supporting  preparedness  for  the  elections.  It  constitutes  a  comprehensive  multistakeholder 
framework  established  through  consensus  among  online  platforms,  fact-checkers,  researchers,  civil 
society  organisations  (CSOs),  advertisers  and  other  specialised  players.  The  Code  sets  out  detailed 
commitments by major online platforms and other players (ad industry, factcheckers, CSOs, smaller 
platforms  etc)  to  addresses  online  disinformation  from  key  angles:  demonetisation,  transparency  of 
political advertising, integrity of services, empowering users, researchers and factcheckers. 

Under the Code, online platforms signatories (Meta, TikTok, Google and Microsoft) made a series of 
commitments  to  tackle  disinformation  including  in  the  context  of  elections.  Signatories  have 
implemented a series of actions to ensure preparedness during the electoral period, including enhanced 
cooperation with other civil society and factcheckers signatories. 

171  European  Commission,  European  Board  for  Digital  Services  publishes  post-election  report  on  the  EU 
elections, 29 July 2024. 
172 European Commission, Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for 
electoral processes, 26 April 2024.  
173 Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA | Shaping Europe’s 
digital future.  
174 Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA | Shaping Europe’s 
digital future.  
175 The Ad Hoc Working group has since been integrated into one of the permanent working groups of the 
EBDS., Working Group 4  – Integrity of the information space. See Working Group 4 of the European Board 
for Digital Services – Integrity of the information space | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 

42 

 
 
 
The  signatories  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation  committed  to  collaborate  during  special 
situations such as elections and, as foreseen in the Code, set up a Rapid Response System (RRS) for 
elections in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. The system ensured a streamlined 
exchange  of  information  between  civil  society  organisations,  fact-checkers  and  online  platforms  to 
ensure  rapid  and  effective  cooperation  between  them  ahead  and  during  the  election  period.  This 
collaborative  initiative  allowed  non-platform  signatories  to  swiftly  report  time-sensitive  content, 
accounts,  or  trends  that  they  deemed  to  present  threats  to  the  integrity  of  the  electoral  process  and 
discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies.  

Signatories of the Code also published – ahead of and after the European elections –  reporting on the 
measures put in place to reduce the spread of disinformation in relation to the European elections, based 
on the Code’s commitments. 

The  Code  also  comes  with  a  solid  monitoring  framework  and  since  13  February  2025  when  the 
Commission issued its positive assessment (following a formal request by its signatories), it is under 
the  DSA  regulatory  framework,  offering  pertinent  risk  mitigation  measures  to  its  signatories  in  the 
context of their legal obligations under the DSA. 

The  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  (EDMO),  which  is  an  independent  network  of  fact-
checkers, researchers and media literacy practitioners covering all EU Member States set up a Taskforce 
dedicated to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament to monitor the European information space 
during  the  electoral  period176.  The  Task  Force  played  an  important  role  in  exposing  disinformation 
during  the  elections.  EDMO  issued  daily  briefs,  weekly  insights,  early  warnings  and  targeted 
investigations  during  the electoral  period.  It  also ran a  dedicated  EU-wide media  literacy campaign 
#BeElectionsSmart, to raise awareness about the risks of disinformation around the 2024 elections to 
the European Parliament. It also provided training series for journalists and other stakeholders dedicated 
to election integrity. 

In April 2024, a new Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising entered 
partially  into  application.  The  regulation  will  make  it  easier  for  citizens  to  recognise  political 
advertisements,  understand  who  is  behind  them  and  know  whether  they  have  received  a  targeted 
advertisement, so that they are better placed to make informed choices. It will also ensure that online 
targeting and ad delivery of political advertising are subject to strengthened requirements, which will 
limit abusive use of personal data to potentially manipulate voters. All online political advertisements 
will  be  available  in  a  European  repository  of  online  political  advertisements.  Sponsoring  political 
advertising from outside the EU will be prohibited three months before elections. 

While  most  of  the  provisions  of  the  new  Regulation  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political 
advertising177 will take effect as of 10 October 2025, within the scope of application of this Regulation, 
Article 3 (definitions) and Article 5 (provision of political advertising services in the Union), paragraph 
1 were already applicable during the elections to the European Parliament, ensuring in particular that 
political advertisement services would not be restricted to a ‘European political party’ or a political 
group in the European Parliament, solely on the basis of its place of establishment.  

A series of actions were taken by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Rapid Alert 
System  (RAS)  coordinated  by  the  EEAS,  supported  cooperation  across  Member  States,  including 
during  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  Updates  were  regularly  provided  to  the  European 
Cooperation  Network  on  Elections,  which  provides  a  wider  scope  for  cooperation  regarding  issues 
related to electoral processes.  

176 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections. 
177  Regulation  (EU)  2024/900  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  March  2024  on  the 
transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900.  

43 

 
 
 
Finally,  in  2022 the  Council  had  adopted  the  Strategic  Compass  on  Security  and  Defence178,  which 
features an EU Hybrid Toolbox bringing together all the relevant instruments to tackle hybrid threats 
to elections, including the FIMI Toolbox179. 

4.2.  Foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation  

Introduction and preparedness at EU level 

According  to  the  Eurobarometer,  81%  of  the  EU  citizens  agree  that  news  or  information  that 
misrepresent reality or is even false is a problem for democracy. At the same time, it remains difficult 
to understand exactly how and if such disinformation impacts voting behaviour180.  

Foreign interference in the information domain, often part of a broader hybrid operation, may be carried 
out by a foreign state or its agents as part of coercive and deceptive efforts to disrupt the free formation 
and expression of individuals’ democratic choice181. FIMI is a pattern of behaviour that threatens or has 
the  potential  to  negatively  impact  values,  procedures  and  political  processes.  Such  activity  is 
manipulative in character, conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner. Actors of such activity 
can be state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory182. 

The  Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the  EEAS,  closely  monitored  the  foreign  information 
manipulation  and  interference  and  disinformation  threats  before  and  during  the  elections  and 
coordinated responses, actively intervening to support a fair electoral space. The activation of the IPCR 
arrangements  contributed  to  ensuring  swift  situational  awareness  updates  and  to  detect  and  counter 
FIMI. 

The  three  institutions  have  cooperated  in  the  setting  of  the  Tripartite,  consisting  of  a  series  of 
coordination  meetings  to  share  situational  awareness  and  inform  each  other  about  counter-
disinformation activities during the elections. 

As of 8 April 2024, the EDMO Taskforce dedicated to the 2024 European elections183 issued daily and 
weekly briefs describing disinformation narratives  being spread in the EU, with the inputs of its 14 
regional  hubs  (covering  100%  of  the  EU)184.  It  conducted  in-depth  investigations,  for  example  by 
analysing election-related risks based on 1000 fact-checking articles published in the context of past 
elections185, and another uncovering FIMI operations such as the Pravda network186. 

Providers of online platforms reported under the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures 
taken to protect the integrity of electoral processes based on the Code’s commitments, and under the 
DSA’s transparency database187 on the number of content moderation decisions taken.  Platforms have 
multiple  policies,  which  are  reflected  in  their  terms  and  conditions,  to  mitigate  risks  for  electoral 
processes  and  civic  discourse.  In  addition,  these  policies  can  differ  per  platform,  depending  on  the 
specificities  of  their  service.  Therefore,  a  precise  comparison  cross-service  on  the  scale  of 

178 Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade, 21 March 
2022. 
179 EEAS, Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference, 14 November 2024. 
180 See for example: Misinformation Review, Misinformed about misinformation: On the polarizing discourse on 
misinformation and its consequences for the field, 03 October 2024. 
181 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European democracy action plan, COM/2020/790 
final, 3 December 2020. 
182 European External Action Service, 2021 Stratcom Activity Report,  24 March 2022. 
183 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections.  
184 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EU election Disinfo Bulletin. 
185  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  (EDMO),  Second  edition  (March  2024):  Disinformation  narratives 
during the 2023 elections in Europe. 
186 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), Russian disinformation network “Pravda” grew bigger in the 
EU, even after its uncovering  
187 European Commission, DSA Transparency Database.  

44 

 
 
 
disinformation  spread  is  difficult  to  make.  The  reports  from  signatories  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on 
Disinformation show that the cooperation under the Code was seen as successful by all actors involved.  

The EUvsDisinfo website188 and social media, run by EEAS and supported by their situational analysis 
capability and strategic communication, reported regularly about attempts of election interference by 
Russia and its proxies. 

A dedicated series of articles189 and social media products were published in the months leading up to 
the  elections  to  analyse,  expose  and  pre-bunk  Kremlin/  Russian  state-affiliated  actors’  deceptive 
narratives as well as tactics, techniques and procedures. The Russian malign activity focused on creating 
or stimulating splits and division in societies by spreading false information or flooding the information 
space  with inauthentic content.  Other  tactics  include  smearing  political  leaders, sowing  distrust and 
undermining  public  authorities190.  This  outreach  helped  raise  public  awareness  including  among 
journalists, academia and civil society. 

Observations 

While there was an increase in the volume of information manipulation around the elections191, no large-
scale disinformation or information manipulation incident or campaign was detected during elections 
days.  

According to EDMO’s estimates, EU-related disinformation increased from 5% in January to 15% in 
May 2024192.  

According to the EDMO, the main disinformation narratives about the EU encountered on social 
media platforms were:  

•  False stories questioning election integrity.193  

•  False narratives alleging the escalation of the war in Ukraine and direct involvement of EU 

countries in the conflict.194 

•  Recurring false narratives on climate change.  

•  False content portraying migrants as “seizing power” in the EU. 

Disinformation  questioning  election  integrity  suggested  that  EU  voting  procedures  were  unfair  or 
raising fears about rigged elections, manipulated outcomes and invalid ballots. There were significant 
disinformation  stories  aimed  at  reducing  participation  in  the  elections  or  pushing  citizens  towards 
practices that would invalidate their votes. For example, in Italy, false claims circulated regarding how 
low voter turnout could trigger a withdrawal from the EU. In Germany, false stories suggested that 
voting in the EU elections could be considered a crime or that ballots with holes or corners cut are 
invalid when in fact these were put in place to help blind and visually impaired citizens to vote. In 

188 EUvsDisinfo. 
189 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/european-elections/.  
190 The product material saw a very good pick-up which is in line with the trend of increased growth of users of 
EUvsDisinfo material (cfr. at least 38 million users reached in 2024 vs. ca. 25 million in 2023. 
191 As confirmed by the activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements for addressing foreign 
interference.  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Foreign  interference:  Presidency  reinforces  exchange  of 
information ahead of the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024. 
192 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), Final Report – Outputs and outcomes of a community-wide 
effort, 24 July 2024.  
193 A study carried out to assess the structural indicators under the Code of Practice on Disinformation showed 
that  only  5%  of  the  disinformation  posts  detected  in  the  sample  were  directly  referring  to  civic  and  election 
integrity.  
194 For instance, the Commission’s Representation in Berlin and the German Ministry of Finance debunked a false 
narrative about the EU introducing a solidarity levy to finance support or Ukraine. 

45 

 
 
 
Bulgaria, social media, websites and traditional media were used to spread disinformation around fake 
polls. 

Disinformation  also  targeted  political  figures  and  parties.  False  narratives  portrayed  the  Slovak 
opposition  leader  as  a  foreign  agent,  alleging  his  involvement  in  planning  a  coup.  In  Spain,  false 
allegations were made that Volt, a registered political party since 2019, was a fake and was created to 
divert votes from the political party Vox195. 

Disinformation also deployed general anti-EU narratives, political hate and other deceitful narratives.  
Russian narratives on social media in Germany196, France197, Italy198, and Poland199 aimed to discredit 
Western governments and criticized support for Ukraine, while also trying to boost support for far-right 
political parties in the EU. In the Netherlands, messages on social media falsely alleged how the EU’s 
Green Deal was destroying Europe’s food supply200. Further disinformation to discredit the EU has been 
circulating in the Baltic States, claiming falsely that the EU mandated the immediate adoption of electric 
cars, banning repairs of older vehicles and prohibiting the use of firewood for heating201. Other well 
know  narratives  were  re-tailored  specifically  for  the  elections  to  build  false  stories  around  EU 
policies202. 

·  EDMO’s reporting showed that most narratives have cross-border spillovers. It also shows that they are 
often  adapted  to  the  specific  national  contexts.  This  matches  the  experiences  of  Member  States  as 
reported in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, where they informed of 
measures  to  taken  to  protect  the  information  environment  around  the  2024  European  elections  and 
described disinformation narratives identified during the electoral period.  

The  OSCE  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR)  Special  Election 
Assessment Mission found that disinformation, especially online and in social networks, including the 
use of deep fake videos discrediting politicians, was used across Member States, often in connection 
with negative campaigning and reportedly as foreign interference.203 

·  Beyond online platforms, the automated clustering of articles from a list of websites repeatedly found 
by fact-checkers to be publishing disinformation shows that the main topics covered by such websites 
are similar to those covered by disinformation narratives on social media. The peak in the production 
of articles on such websites was found to have happened in the period from two weeks ahead of the 
ballots until election days. This is an indication of efforts to influence the elections. The same pattern 
was recognised in the case of national elections in some of the Member States in 2023204. 

A handful of major Kremlin-linked operations that remained active during the elections period have 
been exposed by the EEAS.  

195 EDMO Task Force on 2024 European Elections, Disinfo Bulletin – Issue n.43. 
196 Reuters, Russia-lined propaganda campaign pushes to undercut German support for Ukraine, 18 February 
2025. 
197 France24, Russia behind dozens of disinformation campaigns targeting Ukraine and allies, France says, 7 May 
2025. 
198 The Guardian, Disinformation networks ‘flooded’ X before EU elections, report says, 12 July 2024. 
199 Reuters, Poland says Russia is trying to interference in presidential election, 06 May 2025. 
200 Euronews, Conspiracy theorists have turned from COVID to climate. How will it impact the EU elections?, 30 
April 2024. 
201 European Digital Media Observatory, Disinfo Bulletin-Issue n.44; European Digital Media Observatory, Old 
cars, immigrants and war-how EU related misinformation is spread in the Baltics, 07 June 2024. 
202 Global Disinformation Index, Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections: Analysis and Policy 
Context, 08 July 2024. 
203  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024, Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions, preliminary conclusions. 
204 European Commission, Vera Jourova Memo, Known information interference operations during the June 2024 
elections for the European Parliament, October 2024.  

46 

 
 
 
According to the 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats205, 
the  EEAS  detected  42  incidents  linked  to  Russian  FIMI  activity  around  the  2024  elections  to  the 
European Parliament, which escalated in the weeks leading up to the  vote, peaking between 6 and 9 
June, and continuing well beyond that. The pattern used was not new: setting up the FIMI infrastructure 
well in advance, attacks on the democratic process, cyber-enabled interference, a surge in activity just 
before the vote, and post-election efforts to undermine trust in the results. 

According to internal documents assessed in an extensive FBI affidavit as well as by a consortium of 
independent media outlets206, the Russian Social Design Agency (‘SDA’) is responsible for a range of 
Kremlin  led  information  interference  operations  around  the  world,  including  in  EU  countries. 
Operations Doppelganger, Matryochka, Overload, and Portal Kombat share characteristics of SDA’s 
strategies, though the exact boundaries between operations is at present unclear. 

Doppelganger207  activities  targeting  the  European  Parliament  elections  were  detected  in  France, 
Germany, Poland, Italy and Spain. This was the most notorious case of FIMI in the context of the 2024 
European  Parliament  elections.  The  EEASinvestigation  found  that  7  legitimate  media  outlets  were 
impersonated, while 47 other inauthentic news outlets were used to promote FIMI about the elections208. 
Thousands of inauthentic accounts on X and Facebook were used to drive traffic to over 100 articles 
that mentioned the elections. Over 1 200 posts were discovered on X during June 2024 that appear to 
follow the sharing pattern associated with Doppelganger209. The focus of the posts was to cease support 
for Ukraine, discredit Western governments and political parties, and to generate fear around the decline 
of the West. Those posts generated over 4 million views. 

Another Russian campaign named Operation Matrioska attempted to manipulate fact-checkers globally, 
creating numerous social media accounts and sending fake emails to distract media and fact-checkers 
from real disinformation. The campaign operated since at least August 2023210.  

The  Counter  Disinformation  Network211  reported,  among  other  cases  a  pro-Russian  disinformation 
campaign  “Operation  Overload”,  targeting  fact-checkers,  newsrooms,  and  researchers  worldwide, 
aiming to deplete their resources and encourage them to amplify false narratives. The actors operate 
through a coordinated email campaign, an ecosystem of popular Russia-aligned websites, and networks 
of Telegram channels and inauthentic accounts on X. They also reported violations of bans on Russian 
media entities and individuals, which were accessible on TikTok: early June 2024 at least 29 TikTok 
channels  of  Russian  media  entities  banned  by  the  EU  or  posing  as  such,  were  accessible  to  EU 
audiences, including the official Spanish-language account of Russia Today with 2.9 million followers. 

Measures reported by Member States  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to take measures to protect the 
information environment around elections and ensure that voters receive correct information. It aims 

205  EEAS,  3rd  EEAS  Report  on  Foreign  Information  Manipulation  and  Interference  Threats,  Exposing  the 
architecture of FIMI operations, March 2025. 
206 United States of America v Certain Domains, Case No.: 24-mj-1395. 
207 Doppelganger is an operation attributed to two Russian companies that initially produced clone websites of 
trusted entities, such as established media sites and governmental websites. Their content was primarily distributed 
through posts and comments by coordinated and inauthentic profiles on Facebook and X. The techniques of the 
operation  have  evolved,  likely  due  to  measures  taken  on  the  affected  platforms,  such  as  domain  blocking. 
Recently, the operation distributes image-based content, such as cartoons, through paid advertising published by 
inauthentic accounts and pages, particularly on Facebook. 
208 European External Action Service, Doppelganger strikes back: FIMI activities in the context of the EE24, June 
2024. 
209 European External Action Service, Doppelganger strikes back: FIMI activities in the context of the EE24, June 
2024. 
210  European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections. 
211 The Counter Disinformation Network gathered 40 organisations and independent researchers, and monitored 
information manipulation in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. 

47 

 
 
 
among others to build resilience and develop public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking 
to address information manipulation, interference and disinformation related to elections, including 
the 2024 European elections. The Recommendation encourages Member States to support projects 
building resilience and developing public awareness, media literacy and critical thinking, including 
by  promoting  EU  funding  opportunities  such  as  the  CERV  Programme.  Training  of  election  and 
other  relevant  authorities  on  how  to  efficiently  pre-bunk  and  debunk  information  manipulation, 
interference  and  disinformation,  online  and  offline,  about  election  procedures  is  particularly 
relevant in this context. One of the operational tools that the Commission has been using to support 
Member States’ authorities to build their capacity to detect and react appropriately to disinformation 
in the context of elections is the joint election resilience mechanism, which several Member States 
used to prior to the elections. 

Member States also took various measures to protect the information environment around the 2024 
elections to the European Parliament from disinformation  and foreign information manipulation and 
interference. 

In response to the  Commission  survey, 15 Member States reported that they had taken measures to 
support  or  facilitate  the  transmission  of  swift  messages  and  responses  to  protect  the  information 
environment  (such  as  message  pre-bunking  or  debunking 
information  manipulation  and 
disinformation)212. 14 Member States reported that the had provided specific support for independent 
media  and  factchecking  organisations213,  while  13  developed  training  for  election  or  other  relevant 
authorities214.  10  Member  States  reported  specifically  to  have  made  use  of  tools  such  as  actions 
contained in the FIMI toolbox or the Rapid Alert System215. Regular meetings and information sharing 
with  Member  States  were  organised  within  the  Rapid  Alert  System  before  and  during  the  election 
period. 

Some  examples  of  measures  taken  are  as  follows:  Austria  raised  public  awareness,  held  awareness 
classes and security briefings, set up a network against disinformation and organised a tabletop exercise 
regarding  the  interministerial  cooperation  in  cases  of  election  related  disinformation.  In  order  to 
guarantee  proper  coordination  and  preparedness  among  the  different  departments  involved  in  the 
detection, analysis and response to disinformation campaigns, Spain put in place a special coordination 
plan in the framework of the Standing Committee against disinformation, which was integrated in the 
national election network for the  security of elections. The Plan led to a joint risk analysis report,  a 
protocol for information exchange and periodical reports on the evaluation of threats that were shared 
among  the  departments  involved.  Ireland  published  a  Framework  on  Online  Electoral  Process 
information,  Political  Advertising  and  Deceptive  AI  Content216.  The  Framework  was  developed  in 
response  to  concerns  and  evidence  from  a  range  of  international  bodies  and  actors  including  the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral  Affairs  and  the  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  regarding  the  potential  for 
disinformation,  deceptive  use  of  artificial  intelligence  and  other  online  activity  to  compromise  the 
integrity  of  electoral  processes  and  undermine  democratic  values  and  principles.  The  Netherlands 
developed a reactive approach, also based on analysis of media early reports and fact checkers’ reports 
on possible disinformation about the electoral process. In Portugal, the National Electoral Commission 
(CNE)  has  signed  a  collaboration  protocol  with  ISCTE  -  University  Institute  of  Lisbon,  through its 
MediaLab CIES-ISCTE research project, for the monitoring and screening of political disinformation 

212  Belgium,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Netherlands,  
Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
213    Belgium,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. 
214 Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, France, Greece, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia 
and Sweden. 
215 Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Spain, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
216 Irish Legal News, Electoral commission tackling ‘deceptive use of AI’ ahead of elections, 24 April 2024. 

48 

 
 
 
 
in the context of the electoral campaign. In Slovenia authorities organised training with public officials 
on  disinformation.  There  is  a  task  force  dedicated  to  counter  disinformation  and  FIMI.  Anti-
disinformation campaign under slogan “stop the disinformation, read, think, check” was launched as 
well as awareness-raising campaign on 20th EU accession anniversary.  

Media literacy 

To  support  people  navigating  the  information  space  around  the  elections,  a  specific  emphasis  was 
placed on measures aimed at improving societal resilience and preparedness. This included support for 
digital and media literacy and critical thinking.  

Specific initiatives taken by the EU institutions to improve societal resilience  

•  A  dedicated  joint  multi-channel  and  multi-lingual  awareness-raising  campaign  on  risks 
related to information manipulation and the importance of developing critical thinking was 
carried out by the Commission and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media 
Services (ERGA) and broadcast in the Member States. The campaign video217 generated 217 
million impressions on social media, 7 million YouTube views as well as reaching 53 radio 
and TV channels in 17 countries whose population total 330 million. 

•  The  Commission’s  toolkit  on  how  to  spot  disinformation218  was  updated,  encouraging 
secondary  school  teachers  to  equip  their  students  with  the  essential  skills  to  navigate  the 
online landscape. A new webpage219 provided a single access point to all useful information 
and  resources  on  strategic  communication  and  combating  information  manipulation, 
including short videos and factsheet.  

•  The statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) launched a data and fact checking 
service for the European elections which facilitated journalists and fact-checkers’ access to 
data and statistics on the EU220. 

•  The European Parliament produced and distributed written and audio-visual material for the 
public.  The  European  Parliament  published  on Meta, LinkedIn,  YouTube,  X  and  TikTok 
with content giving users tips to counter disinformation in the two months prior to EE24. 
This led to a total of 2,3 million video views. This included for instance a video series ”How 
to spot disinformation: the tactics used to trick you  - 435,000 organic view, and a series of 
TikTok/Instagram videos with tips on how to spot disinformation - 426,000 organic views. 
•  For  together.eu  volunteers,  the  youth  and  general  audiences,  the  European  Parliament 
produced a leaflet “10 ways to tackle disinformation”, completed by an interactive quiz to 
learn about disinformation.  

•  The  EEAS  produced  a  dedicated  series  of  articles  and  insights  on  foreign  information 

manipulation and interference221. 

On media literacy, it can also be noted that the EU-funded projects (EACEA open call for cross-border 
media literacy projects) and the Media Literacy Expert Group met to discuss the European elections222. 
The meeting was very successful in mobilizing the media literacy community ahead of the European 
elections, inform about relevant EU initiatives, as well as exchanging best practices from Member States 
in preparing for elections. 

217 https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256994.  
218 https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/spot-and-fight-disinformation_en.  
219 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strategic-communication-and-tackling-disinformation_en.  
220 Eurostat, Eurostat launches data and fact-checking service for the European elections, 10 May 2024. 
221 European Commission, European elections: EU institutions prepared to counter disinformation, 05 June 2024. 
222 A meeting of the Media Literacy Expert Group, held on 26/02/2024 in Brussels, which had a special focus on 
elections. 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.  Use of AI  

 Introduction  

The 2024 elections also brought AI increasingly into focus. Artificial intelligence has the potential to 
improve  the  efficiency,  precision,  and  openness  of  election  processes  by  positively  changing  voter 
interaction and the administration of elections. AI-driven solutions, like interactive virtual assistants, 
can deliver tailored communication, offering up-to-the-minute details about polling sites, candidates’ 
policies, and how to vote, thus making the voting process easier for the public to navigate. In addition, 
AI can help optimise the management of electoral data by enabling the precise gathering, storage, and 
evaluation  of  large  datasets,  helping  election  authorities  make  better  decisions,  swiftly  recognize 
patterns,  and  minimize  human  error.  AI  can  also  improve  election  security  by  strengthening 
cybersecurity  defences,  spotting  irregularities,  and  uncovering  possible  fraudulent  activity,  thereby 
protecting the integrity of electoral systems223.  

However, AI also presents challenges, notably in the context of disinformation and FIMI, and the use 
of generative AI. When misused, AI-based tools can be used to undermine electoral integrity, erode 
trust in democratic processes and polarize entire societies. Sometimes these attempts to deceive consist 
of flooding the information space with an abundance of false and misleading information, all with the 
aim  of  hijacking  the  public  debate.  Often  top  politicians  and  leaders  are  targeted  by  information 
manipulation campaigns. 

Observations 

In  the  weeks  before  the  vote,  the  amount  of  fact-checked  disinformation  containing  AI-generated 
content detected by EDMO remained constant, at around 4% of the overall amount of fact-checked 
disinformation (5% during the months before)224. AI was used both as a tool for disinformation and 
FIMI, and part of the domestic political communication. 

Civil society, researchers, and fact-checkers uncovered at least 131 instances of undeclared generative 
AI  content  during  the  election  campaign  especially  from  parties  at  national  level  (i.e.  five  different 
political parties in France, Belgium, and Italy)225.  

With  limited  exceptions,  highly-manipulative  ‘deepfakes’  were  not  prominent  during  the  2024 
elections.  Instead,  AI  was  used  to  produce  ‘shallowfakes’,  combining  out-of-context  captions  with 
images  of  politicians  or  events,  and  ‘cheapfakes’,  with  rather  obvious  manipulation  of  video  and 
image226.  EDMO  points  to  a  case  where  a  deepfake  audio  was  used  to  target  a  political  leader, 

223 United Nations Regional Information Centre  for Western Europe,  Can artificial intelligence (AI) influence 
decisions?, 07 June 2024. 
224 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), Final Report – Outputs and outcomes of a community-wide 
effort, 24 July 2024.  
225  In  the  context  of  domestic  political  communication,  investigations  by  DFRLab,  Alliance4Europe  and  AI 
Forensics collected 131 instances of unlabelled generative-AI content shared by European and national political 
parties on platforms such as Instagram, X, Facebook, Vkontakte and Telegram. The DFR Lab reported that far-
right  parties  such  as  Rassemblement  National  and  Lega  used  AI-generated  content  to  spread  misleading  and 
inflammatory messages. According to Alliance4Europe,  Salvini’s Lega party used AI-generated images to deepen 
societal divisions and promote false narratives, such as the "Muslim Great Replacement." Using AI-generated 
images without watermarks is not in line with commitment 3.b of the 2024 European Parliament Elections Code 
of Conduct signed by all European political groups. 
226 European Commission, Vera Jourova Memo, Known information interference operations during the June 2024 
elections for the European Parliament, October 2024.  

50 

 
 
 
demonstrating  how  easily  and  cheaply  false  information  can  be  spread  to  discredit  candidates  and 
undermine the integrity of the entire election process227.  

A satirical video featuring Chancellor Olaf Scholz was created with deep fake technology by activist 
group the Centre for Political Beauty (ZPS). In the video, Scholz appears to announce a ban on the far-
right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party at the Federal Constitutional Court on the fifth anniversary 
of the death of Walter Lübcke. The video was part of a wider campaign by ZPS that includes a website 
collecting  "incriminating  information"  about  the  AfD  and  an  installation  outside  the  chancellery  in 
Berlin. This has prompted the German government to consider legal action and review its approach to 
deepfake technology228. 

In the context of FIMI, AI was used in influence operations from Russia, including Doppelganger229. In 
a report published on May 30, OpenAI, the company that owns ChatGPT, disclosed that its AI tools 
were exploited by state actors from Russia, China, Iran, and Israel in covert online influence campaigns. 
However, the campaigns struggled to gain significant traction, according to OpenAI230. This marked 
the  first disclosure  by  a  major  AI  company  of its tools being  used  in  FIMI  operations,  highlighting 
concerns about AI’s role in online disinformation231.  

Another risk AI poses to elections is using generative AI, particularly in large search engines. These 
systems  can  discourage  users  from  checking  original  sources,  instead  promoting  AI-generated 
responses that may contain errors or biases. This limits access to reliable, fact-checked information, a 
key component of informed decision-making232. 

An  experiment  by  Correctiv  –  an  investigative  and  fact-checking  organization  part  of  the  EDMO 
network  –  revealed  that  three  of  the  most  used  chatbots  (Google  Gemini,  Microsoft  Copilot,  and 
ChatGPT) fail to provide accurate answers to political questions, especially about the upcoming EU 
elections. The chatbots either fabricate information, recommend non-existent Telegram channels, or 
provide incorrect details about candidates. For instance, none of them correctly identified the German 
front-runners  for  the  EU  elections,  and  in  some  cases,  they  even  suggested  content  from  far-right 
sources.  

Preparedness and EU legislation 

Europe is leading the way in making AI safer and more trustworthy, while ambitiously addressing the 
risks posed by its misuse. Important new legislative tools in this regard, including the AI Act233 and the 
Regulation  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political  advertising  were  not  yet,  however,  fully  in 
application for the 2024 elections.  

At  the  same  time,  providers  of  very  large  online  platforms  (VLOPs)  and  very  large  search  engines 
(VLOSEs) are already subject to a clear obligation to assess and mitigate systemic risks to electoral 
processes  and  civic  discourse,  including  when  linked  to  the  spread  of  manipulated  content.  In  this 

227 Vera.ai, AI4Trust,  AI4media, Titan,  Generative AI and Disinformation: Recent Advances,  Challenges, and 
Opportunities, February 2024. 
228 Vera.ai, AI4Trust,  AI4media, Titan,  Generative AI and Disinformation: Recent Advances,  Challenges, and 
Opportunities, February 2024. 
229  Meta,  2024  European  Parliament  Post-Elections  Report  Digital  Services  Act  -  Elections  Guidelines,  21 
November 2024. 
230 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EU election Disinfo Bulletin, issue no 38. 
231 OpenAI, Disrupting deceptive uses of AI by covert influence operations, 30 May 2024. 
232 AI Forensics, Algorithm Watch, Generative AI and elections: Are chatbots a reliable source of information 
for voters?, December 2023. 
233  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1689  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  June  2024  laying  down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) 
No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 
and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 12.7.2024. 

51 

 
 
 
context, the DSA Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the Mitigation of Systemic Risks 
for  Electoral  Processes  therefore  also  recommend  mitigation  measures  linked  to  generative  AI  that 
providers  of  VLOPs  and  VLOSEs  should  take.  This  includes  recommendations  in  the  area  of 
watermarking,  labelling  AI-generated  content,  but  also  testing  such  systems  and  the  input  data  and 
sources used to generate content. In view of the elections, the Commission sent requests for information 
on  generative  AI  risks  to  six  Very  Large  Online  Platforms  and  two  Very  Large  Online  Search 
Engines234. 

 In  addition,  the  Permanent  Taskforce  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation,  composed  of 
representatives of signatories, the European Regulators' Group for Audiovisual Media Services, EDMO 
and the EEAS, includes a specific AI subgroup for signatories to reflect on and address the challenges 
raised by AI in the context of disinformation, including in the context of elections. 

To support the identification of AI related issues, the EDMO Task Force was assisted by a pool of AI 
experts to swiftly detect and expose deceptive or misleading AI-generated content. 

The  European  Cooperation  Network  on  elections  also  tackled  the  topic  of  AI  in  the  context  of 
disinformation in a plenary session on 27 September 2023. Member States highlighted the future of 
threats emerging in the cyber and information areas and discussed the benefits, threats, and risks of AI. 
They also discussed the possibility of promoting voter turnout with AI and using machine learning to 
predict  different  voter  patterns.  Additionally,  AI  can  simplify  voter  registration  processes,  and  AI 
powered language translation can help reduce language barriers and improve accessibility of elections 
for voters with disabilities. 

In  addition,  the  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  encouraged  political  parties  to  adopt  campaign 
pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity, which should encompass in particular the pledge to 
refrain  from  manipulative  behaviour,  in  particular  producing,  using  or  disseminating  falsified, 
fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated by AI systems. Political 
parties  should  also  provide  information  about  the  use  of  AI  systems  in  election  campaigns.  The 
Recommendation also led to a joint Code of Conduct for political parties (see Section 4.6.1).   The AI 
Act, whose provisions will apply as of August 2026235, aims to ensure trustworthy development and use 
of AI in the EU. It categorises AI systems by risk levels: minimal risk systems face no obligations, 
specific transparency risk systems (like chatbots) must disclose their nature, and high-risk systems (like 
those used in recruitment) must comply with strict requirements. Unacceptable risk systems, such as 
those manipulating behaviour or enabling social scoring, are banned. The use of generative AI and deep 
fakes  is  regulated  by  the  AI  Act,  including  as  regards  labelling  by  the  content  creator,  and  risk 
management obligations.  

The Regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (most of its provisions will 
take effect as of 10 October 2025) will ensure that all political advertising is labelled as such and that 
additional information is provided with the ad or from it (e.g., with a link) about the sponsor, the money 
used for the ad and its sources, and, where relevant, the linked elections,  referendum, legislative or 
regulatory process, and the use of targeting and ad-delivery techniques, including the use of AI systems 
in the targeting. 

234 European Commission,  Commission sends requests for information on generative AI risks to 6 Very Large 
Online Platforms and 2 Very Large Online Search Engines under the Digital Services Act, 14 March 2024. 
235 The AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024, and will be fully applicable 2 years later on 2 August 2026, 
with some exceptions: prohibitions and AI literacy obligations entered into application from 2 February 2025, the 
governance rules and the obligations for general-purpose AI models become applicable on 2 August 2025, and 
the rules for high-risk AI systems - embedded into regulated products - have an extended transition period until 2 
August 2027. 

52 

 
 
 
 
Measures reported by political parties 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  stresses  that  AI  can  be  used  to  generate  or  manipulate 
image,  audio  or  video  content  that  appreciably  resembles  existing  persons,  places  or  events  and 
would falsely appear to a person to be authentic (so called ‘deep fakes’). It highlights the role of civil 
society, media organisations, research institutions and academia in developing public awareness, 
media literacy skills and critical thinking, which are key to equipping citizens with the skills required 
to exercise judgment in complex realities affecting the democratic sphere, particularly in the context 
of the increasing role of AI, including in election campaigns for instance when citizens use AI systems 
to inform their electoral choices. It encourages European and national political parties to consider 
making their political advertising available with information about the identity of the political party 
which  sponsors  it  and  where  applicable,  meaningful  information  about  the  targeting  of  the 
advertising  and  on  the  use  of  AI  systems.  Competent  national  authorities  are  invited  to  further 
develop  and  update  practices  on  the  identification,  mitigation  and  management  of  risks  to  the 
electoral process, including by making use of AI detection tools. It also encourages political parties 
adopt  campaign  pledges  and  codes  of  conduct  on  election  integrity,  which  should  encompass  in 
particular  the  pledge  to  refrain  from  manipulative  behaviour,  in  particular  producing,  using  or 
disseminating falsified, fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated 
by artificial intelligence systems. 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  also  led  to a  joint  Code  of  Conduct  for  political  parties 
which addresses AI (see Section 4.6.1).  

In the Commission survey for political parties, only a few respondents mentioned that they had refrained 
from using AI-generated content236, labelled it accordingly237, or even shared a specific code of conduct 
for AI and social media platforms like TikTok238. Most national respondents did not provide details on 
their use of such new technologies.  

4.4.  Data protection 

Introduction 

The  2024  elections  were  the  second  European  elections  to  which  the  General  Data  Protection 
Regulation  (GDPR)239  applied.  In  2018,  the  Commission  had  published  specific  guidance240  on  the 
application of EU data protection law in the electoral context which remained relevant for the 2024 
elections241. In this context, the national data protection authorities (DPAs) were called on to make full 
use of their strengthened powers to address possible infringements, in particular those relating to the 
micro-targeting of voters. 

236 Finland. 
237 European Free Alliance. 
238 European Green Party. 
239 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1–88. 
240 European Commission, Guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral Context— 
contribution  from  the  European  Commission  to  the  Leaders'  meeting  in  Salzburg  on  19-20  September  2018, 
COM(2018) 638 final, 12 September 2018. 
241 The guidance provides clarity to those actors involved in election processes  - national electoral authorities, 
political  parties,  data  brokers  and  data  analytics  companies,  social  media  platforms  and  online  advertising 
networks  on  the  principles  and  obligations  of  GDPR  regarding  the  lawfulness  of  processing  of  personal  data 
(including sensitive data such as political opinions), transparency requirements, automated decision-making and 
micro-targeting. It called on the national data protection authorities, as enforcers of the GDPR, to make full use 
of their strengthened powers to monitor the situation and address possible data protection breaches. 

53 

 
 
 
 
Observations and measures taken by data protection authorities 

In the context of the 2024 elections, the European Data Protection Board, composed of Member States’ 
data protection authorities (DPAs), sent questions by DG Justice and Consumer Protection, inquiring 
about  the  DPAs'  involvement  in  national  election  networks,  specific  measures  taken  to  ensure 
compliance  with  data  protection  rules,  potential  infringements  identified,  and  any  engagement  with 
social  media  platforms  or  other  actors,  particularly  regarding  the  use  of  new  technologies  such  as 
artificial intelligence in the electoral context. Fourteen DPAs responded242. 

They reported varying levels of involvement in election-related activities as enforcers of the GDPR.  

While some DPAs were indeed involved in the work of national election networks, other DPAs reported 
limited to no involvement in that work243.  

Various DPAs took proactive measures to address data protection issues and ensure compliance with 
data  protection  rules  in  the  electoral  process.  Belgium’s  Data  Protection  Authority244  issued 
recommendations on the provision of copies of voters’ registers to political parties and candidates for 
the purposes of carrying out electoral advertising activities by mail. It also issued info notes on data 
processing in the context of electoral communication, and two opinions (no 160/2023, no 61/2024) on 
relevant draft legislation. Croatia’s Personal Data Protection Agency245 promoted compliance with data 
protection rules by issuing recommendations on the processing of personal data during the electoral 
campaign.  In  Cyprus,  the  Commissioner  for  Personal  Data  Protection246issued  instructions  to  the 
Ministry of Interior and candidates before the elections and conducted audits on election day to monitor 
compliance. In France, the CNIL247 engaged in several meetings with political parties to raise awareness 
about data protection. It sent letters to top candidates, party leaders and service providers to remind 
them of their responsibilities and updated its guidelines for political communication. The CNIL also 
updated its guidelines on political canvassing and examined the impact of AI on electoral processes 
through a detailed study. The Irish Data Protection Commission provided guidance for campaigners on 
canvassing and elections. In Luxembourg, the CNDP248 updated its electoral campaign guidelines and 
raised  awareness  about  data  protection  as  well  as  fair  and  free  elections.  Malta’s  Office  of  the 
Information and Data Protection Commissioner249 published guidance on data protection for political 
campaigns. In Poland, the Personal Data Protection Office250 reviewed an amendment to the Election 
Code  and  updated  its  election  data  protection  guide.  Other  DPAs  reported  no  specific  measures  to 
monitor compliance with data protection rules in the context of the 2024 elections251. 

242  Belgium,  Germany,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  Malta, 
Poland and Romania. 
243 While Croatia and Ireland reported that their national data protection authorities had been involved in the work 
of the national election network, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Malta reported no involvement with this work. 
The  Data  State  Inspectorate  of  Latvia  (DSI)  was  not  directly  involved  in  the  election  network  but  consulted 
occasionally with the national electoral authority upon its request. In Estonia, a data security expert participated 
as an observer in the e-voting process. In Romania, the Romanian Supervisory Authority was involved in the 
approval procedure of several normative acts initiated by the Permanent Electoral Authority and participated in a 
workshop on ‘Digitalization to increase the level of transparency, ethics and integrity of electoral management 
activities and financing of political parties and of electoral campaigns’. In France, meetings were set up with the 
CNIL and several national authorities and state departments during the election period. 
244 Autorité de la protection des données - Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit (APD-GBA). 
245 Agencija za zaštitu osobnih podataka. 
246 Γραφείο Επιτρόπου Δεδομένων Προσωπικού Χαρακτήρα. 
247 Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés. 
248 Commission Nationale pour la Protection des Données. 
249 Kummissarju għall-Informazzjoni u l-Protezzjoni tad-Data. 
250 Urząd Ochrony Danych Osobowych. 
251 Estonia, Croatia and Austria. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
Several DPAs conducted investigations based on information on suspected non-compliance reported to 
them and on complaints submitted under Article 77 GDPR252.  

Most DPAs had limited or no engagement with social media platforms or other actors in this context253. 
In France, no major engagement with social media platforms was reported, though the  DPA worked 
with  the  Audiovisual  and  Digital  Regulation  Authority  (Arcom)  to  ensure  that  the  major  online 
platforms  and  major  search  engines  comply  with  relevant  obligations.  The  Irish  DPA  reported  no 
specific social media engagement related to elections. At the same time, it reported significant ongoing 
engagement  with  many  of the  leading  social  media  and  internet  platforms  as  EU  Lead  Supervisory 
Authority on a broad range of matters concerning those entities’ compliance with the GDPR. In Spain, 
there was significant engagement with social media platforms, in particular to prevent potential data 
misuse and AI-driven targeting practices. 

Measures taken by political parties 

A survey conducted among national political parties to assess how they ensured compliance with data 
protection rules in the context of the elections provided only limited insights. A number of national 
parties have declared their compliance with the GDPR, but they did not provide further specifics in the 
questionnaire  on  how  they  are  implementing  it  in  practice254.  Although  detailed  reports  on  data 
protection  measures  from national  parties  were limited,  several  national  parties  report  that  they had 
adopted  comprehensive  data  protection  strategies,  employed  a  dedicated  data  protection  officer  for 
campaign activities, implemented specific technical security measures such as encryption, developed a 
data delivery process or reviewed data breach incident response plans255. One party highlighted their 
data  protection  plan,  which  includes  information  and  consent  forms,  secure  data  processing,  staff 
training, and cooperation with data protection authorities256.  

4.5.  Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience  

Introduction and preparedness at EU level 

Voter registration databases, e-voting systems and other information systems used to manage electoral 
operations such as the counting, auditing, and displaying of election results, and post-election reporting 
to certify and validate results, could be at risk of cyberattack. The physical security of polling stations 

252 Estonia, Ireland, Austria and Romania did not report on complaints. The Litigation Chamber of the Belgian 
SA  issued  three  decisions  related  to  personal  data  processing  by  Belgian  political  parties.  The  French  CNIL 
received 167 alerts resulting in reprimands to four different political parties, focusing on practices like SMS and 
email campaigns without the consent of the concerned persons. In Cyprus, two complaints regarding political 
messages were received, but no issues related to processing of personal data with new technologies, such as AI, 
were reported. In Germany, two complaints were submitted at Länderlevel and none at federal level. In Latvia, 
several complaints were received, including on concerns about the personal data of election candidates and issues 
involving the national electoral authority’s processing of personal data. None related to AI technologies or new 
forms of data processing. In Luxembourg, several complaints were received regarding data processing of personal 
data but no significant issues related to AI or new technologies were identified. In Malta, few complaints were 
received,  mainly  concerning  unsolicited  campaign  messages.  In  Poland,  the  DPA  received  three  complaints 
related to data protection in the electoral process, including on improper data sharing and SMS campaigns. One 
alleged data breach concerning a voter list was reported, but no corrective administrative proceedings followed. 
In Spain, the DPA handled several complaints related to electoral data  processing, including high-profile cases 
involving Meta’s electoral applications. A precautionary measure was issued to halt Meta’s plans for new electoral 
functionalities in Spain. 
253  Belgium,  Germany,  Estonia,  Croatia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Austria  and  Poland  reported  no 
engagement with social media platforms.  
254 Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
255 Greece, Spain, Austria and Poland. 
256 Greece. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
and counting places, and facilities, assets and systems for the printing, transportation and storage of 
ballots and other relevant election materials, such as specifically secured ballot boxes or stamps must 
also be ensured.  

Several networks for cyber and hybrid action have been set up to address these risks (e.g. the NIS 
Cooperation  Group,  the  Joint  Mechanism  for  Electoral  Resilience,  the  Computer  Security  Incident 
Response Team Network, and the EU Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network).  

The Commission worked with Member State authorities to manage such risks also in the context of the 
2024 elections.  

The Commission, with the support of the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and in cooperation 
with  the  European  Parliament,  organised  a  tabletop  exercise  on  cybersecurity  involving  the 
membership  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections.  The  exercise  was  funded  by  the 
Commission through the joint electoral resilience mechanism. It sought to test and support preparedness 
of Member States against cyberattacks and hybrid threats, including in the framework of information 
manipulation and disinformation campaigns. 

Also following up on the 2023 Recommendation on elections and the tabletop exercise is the update of 
the  Compendium  on  the Cybersecurity  of  Election  Technology  by the  Network  and  Information 
System  (NIS)  Cooperation  Group  supported  by  the  Commission,  ECNE  and  ENISA.  It  lays  out 
recommendations  to  Member  States,  steps  to  take  and  useful  guidance in  managing  potential  cyber 
incidents  throughout  the  election  processes.  Amongst  the  proposed  measures  are  best  practices  on 
information  sharing,  awareness  raising  and  trainings  together  with  risk  management,  cybersecurity 
support for campaigns, parties and candidates, as well e-voting technology. 

In  addition,  as  part  of  the  measures  announced  in  the  European  Democracy  Action  Plan,  the 
Commission also presented a Compendium of e-voting and other information and communication 
technology  practices.  This  Compendium  was  developed  in  cooperation  with  Member  States  in  the 
framework  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  and  the  Council  of  Europe.  The 
compendium highlighted the importance of robust measures addressing cyber risks, such as hack-and-
leak operations to gain access to voter information and interfere with the electoral process, or distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, preventing voters from accessing connected online voting services 
and websites.  

The  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  frequently  discussed  cybersecurity  risks  in  its 
works. The Commission provided a mapping on the roles and responsibilities of different networks and 
bodies supporting the organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the  European Parliament, to 
facilitate cooperation of different authorities and networks in Member States and at EU level, ensuring 
that authorities and networks were aware of each other and could, where necessary, contact each other 
in the course of carrying out their tasks. 

The NIS Cooperation Group, the Computer Security Incident Response Team Network, and the 
EU  Cyber  Crisis  Liaison Organisation  Network  also  strengthened  their  cooperation ahead  of the 
elections. Cyber-preparedness exercises were organised with Member States and European institutions. 
An inter-institutional Cyber Crisis Task Force, involving Commission services, EEAS, ENISA, Europol 
and CERT-EU was also set up. 

Measures reported by Member States and political parties 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  encourages  Member  States  to  take  several  measures  to 
protect  the  election-related  infrastructure  and  ensure  resilience  against  cyber  and  other  hybrid 
threats. This includes, among others, promoting awareness of and planning for all contingencies that 
could have significant disruptive effects on the smooth running of elections; identifying the entities 
operating  election-related  infrastructure  that  are  critical  for  the  organisation  and  conduct  of 

56 

 
 
elections, and taking the necessary measures to enhance the resilience of those entities and helping 
them address the risks inherent in their operations. It also calls on Member States to take measures 
ensuring preparedness for, responsiveness to and recovery from cybersecurity incidents related to 
elections, and in particular, ensuring that technology used in elections is designed, developed and 
produced to ensure a high level of cybersecurity; to cooperate with private entities involved in the 
cybersecurity of elections; to increase awareness on cyber hygiene of political parties, candidates, 
election  officials  and  other  entities  related  to  elections;  to  carry  out  or  update  risk  assessments 
regarding the resilience of election-related infrastructure and of entities operating it, and collect and 
aggregate data resulting from such risk assessments. 

Some Member States protect physical election infrastructure by restricting access to certain facilities to 
accredited personnel, sealing off certain areas from public access, conducting regular assessments and 
setting  up  contingency  plans  for  the  interruption  of  voting,  increasing  security  and  surveillance  of 
polling stations. For instance, in some cases extra voting locations are set up as back up for physical 
election-related infrastructure issues. Specific training and cooperation with police are also in focus. 

Some  Member  States  identified  as  critical  entities  public  and  private  stakeholders,  such  as 
telecommunications providers, energy suppliers, cloud services, police authorities, cybersecurity teams, 
regulators,  government  IT  and  cybersecurity  organisations.  Measures  to  enhance  resilience  include 
multi-entity collaboration, audits, evaluations, and workflow definitions with precise response times. 
One  Member  State  reported  that  evaluation,  auditing,  and  testing  are  periodic,  phased,  and  adapted 
based on lessons learned from previous elections. 

Most Member States reported that they had carried out or updated risk assessments of the infrastructure 
and took measures to ensure a high level of security. Almost all Member States reported that they had 
conducted test crisis managements and contingency plans, offered support and training to all relevant 
stakeholders.  

Several Member States reported that they had cooperated with private entities to ensure a high level of 
cybersecurity257,  while  a  majority  noted  that  the  authority  responsible  for  cyber  security  had  been 
involved  in  their  national  electoral  network.  Portugal  indicated  that  creation  of  a  permanent  an 
Information  Sharing  and  Analysis  Centers  (ISACs)  dedicated  to  elections  cybersecurity  was  being 
discussed.  Ireland  reported  its  collaboration  with  the  European  Centre  of  Excellence  of  Coutering 
Hybrid Threats.  

Many Member States also made efforts to increase awareness of the online safety of political parties, 
candidates and elections officials258. 

Member States also reported on the extent to which they took specific measures described in the revised 
Compendium on the Cybersecurity of Election Technology and the Compendium of e-voting and other 
information and communication technology practices. A large majority of Member States reported to 
have  ensured  effective  testing  and  auditing  (24  out  of  25  replying  Member  States),  ensuring  that 
elections  officials  receive  appropriate  training  (20  Member  States),  and  relying  on  secure  digital 
identification (16 Member States). Other common measures to protect election-related infrastructure 
and  ensure  cyber  resilience  included  using  state  of  the  art  ICT  (15  Member  States),  including 
cybersecurity requirements in procurement and outsourcing contracts (14 Member States) or ensuring 
that no state, region or municipality is in a situation of long-term electoral dependency on a specific 
private provider (9 Member States). 

257 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden.  
258  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal  and 
Slovenia.  

57 

 
 
 
While not directly related to the elections, it is also relevant to mention Operation Endgame259. This 
operation, coordinated from Europol’s headquarters between 27 and 29 May 2024, targeted droppers 
including, IcedID, SystemBC, Pikabot, Smokeloader, Bumblebee and Trickbot. The actions focused on 
disrupting  criminal  services  through  arresting  High  Value  Targets,  taking  down  the  criminal 
infrastructures  and  freezing  illegal  proceeds.  This  approach  had  a  global  impact  on  the  dropper 
ecosystem.  The  malware,  whose  infrastructure  was  taken  down  during  the  action  days,  facilitated 
attacks with ransomware and other malicious software. Following the action days, eight fugitives linked 
to these criminal activities, wanted by Germany, were added to Europe’s Most Wanted list on 30 May 
2024. The individuals are wanted for their involvement in serious cybercrime activities. 

This  was  the  largest  ever  operation  against  botnets,  which  play  a  major  role  in  the  deployment  of 
ransomware.  The  operation,  initiated  and  led  by  France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  was  also 
supported by Eurojust and involved Denmark, the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, 
Armenia,  Bulgaria,  Lithuania,  Portugal,  Romania,  Switzerland  and  Ukraine  also  supported  the 
operation  with  different  actions,  such  as  arrests,  interviewing  suspects,  searches,  and  seizures  or 
takedowns of servers and domains. The operation was also supported by a number of private partners 
at national and international level including Bitdefender, Cryptolaemus, Sekoia, Shadowserver, Team 
Cymru,  Prodaft,  Proofpoint,  NFIR,  Computest,  Northwave,  Fox-IT,  HaveIBeenPwned,  Spamhaus, 
DIVD, abuse.ch and Zscaler. 

The survey addressed to European and national political parties reveals that national political parties 
across Member States have taken different approaches to addressing cybersecurity risks during their 
campaigns in the 2024 European Parliament elections. These approaches vary in terms of efforts and 
precautions taken. 

Among  all national  political  parties surveyed,  about half reported that  they  had  taken cybersecurity 
measures  of  some  sort.  Of  these,  almost  30%  had  adopted  more  advanced  practices  such  as  risk 
assessments, training, and penetration testing. 

Some  parties  took  significant  steps  to  secure  their  digital  infrastructure.  For  example,  one  party 
implemented two-factor authentication (2FA), introduced a secure password manager, and conducted a 
post-election  penetration  test260.  The  party  also  received  assistance  from  IT  companies  and  GDPR 
advisors, encountering no cyber incidents. Another party maintained regular briefings with the national 
parliament’s IT department and security services and regularly modernized its IT infrastructure. It also 
migrated their servers to a high-security location before the European Parliament election and optimized 
its firewall, utilizing external service providers to monitor IT security. It reported no significant cyber 
incidents  either261.  Another  surveyed  party  also  implemented  comparably  extensive  cybersecurity 
measures including vulnerability analysis, threat assessment, log file monitoring, patch management, 
regular backups, firewalls, VPNs, cybersecurity training, and prevention strategies such as antivirus 
software, spam filters, encryption, Cloudflare usage, secure passwords, and SSL/TLS certificates.262 
Another  implemented  cybersecurity  protocols,  risk  assessments,  and  provided  unspecified  training, 
with no cyber incidents reported263. One surveyed party had proactively conducted a comprehensive 
risk  assessment,  provided  cybersecurity  training,  implemented  secure  communication  tools,  and 
collaborated with experts for penetration testing264. Reportedly, it faced several unsuccessful hacking 
attempts. IT teams were assigned by one party to prevent cyberattacks and it introduced internal rules 

259 Europol, Largest ever operation against botnets hits dropper malware ecosystem, last updated 30 May 2024. 
260 Austria. 
261 Austria. 
262 Italy. 
263 Croatia. 
264 Slovenia.  

58 

 
 
 
for online safety, with no incidents reported265. Another party participated in events organized by the 
national Security and Intelligence Service and maintained contact with the agency during the campaign, 
though no other specific cybersecurity steps were reported266. 

In contrast, for or some national parties, including smaller parties, cybersecurity efforts were expressly 
limited.  One  party  did  not  report  any  specific  cybersecurity  measures  but  acknowledged  general 
warnings from the national Federal Electoral Authority about hacking risks267. Another party expressed 
limited concern over cybersecurity threats, believing that its exposure to cyberattacks was limited to 
“state entities and social networks”268. Some national parties from different EU countries did not report 
on cyber measures at all in this questionnaire269. 

Compared  to  national  political  parties,  European  political  parties  reported  a  higher  level  of 
cybersecurity preparedness. Among the European political parties surveyed, around 83% implemented 
advanced cybersecurity measures.  

Observations 

In the last report on the conduct of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament, it was reported that 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against the websites of public authorities offering advice 
about the elections were observed in a number of Member States, but at the same time that detection 
and recovery were very prompt.  

Such attacks continued during the 2024 elections in a few Member States. At the same time, mitigation 
and contingency measures were in place to prevent impact on the conduct on elections. In Bulgaria, two 
DDoS attacks against state private cloud infrastructures were neutralised during election days. Czechia 
experienced  three  cyber-attacks  during  elections,  although  not  directed  to  election  infrastructure.  In 
Spain,  DDoS  against  regional  parliament  webpages  were  detected.  Also,  airport  websites  were 
concerned.  The  Dutch  Military  Intelligence  and  Security  Service  published  a  report  indicating  that 
Russian hacktivists had launched DDoS attacks against websites of political parties and public transport 
companies in the Netherlands, among other things, in an attempt to make it difficult for Dutch people 
to vote in the European elections270. 

On 1 March 2024 a false dispatch was published twice on the Polish Press Agency’s website regarding 
a "partial mobilization" allegedly announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. It was quickly established 
that this was not true, and that the publication was the result of a cyberattack on the servers of the largest 
state news agency271. 

This illustrates how much of the malicious cyber activity had minimal impact and emphasized the need 
for clear and consistent public communications among EU entities and Member States, in order to avoid 
low impact incidents like DDOS being exploited for propaganda or disinformation purposes. 

265 Slovenia. 
266 Finland.  
267 Austria. 
268 Czechia. 
269 Belgium, Czechia, Greece, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, Slovenia and Sweden. 
270 Dutch Military and Intelligence Service, Public Annual report 2024, 22 April 2025 (‘Openbaar jaarverslag 
2024 Militaire Inlichtingen-en VeiligheidsDienst’). 
271 Wiadomości, "Zaplanowany atak", "duże nasilenie". Wicepremier zabrał głos ws. fałszywej depeszy PAP, 03 
June 2024. 

59 

 
 
 
4.6.  Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign 

4.6.1.  Fair campaigning 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections calls on political parties to promote election integrity and 
fair  campaigning.  While  not  legally  binding,  it  encourages  political  parties  and  campaign 
organizations to develop and adhere to voluntary codes of conduct or campaign pledges that support 
free,  fair,  and  resilient  elections.  These  commitments  should  uphold  high  democratic  standards, 
including rejecting financial contributions in exchange for political advantages and refraining from 
promoting stereotypes or discriminatory statements based on gender, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.  

Based  on  this  recommendation,  on  8  April  2024,  all  European  political  parties  signed  the  Code  of 
Conduct for the 2024 European Parliament elections at a ceremony hosted by the Commission. 272 The 
Code was also signed by a limited number of national political parties. 

The  Code  of  Conduct  promotes  core  values  such  as  transparency,  fairness,  and  truthfulness  in 
communication, while actively countering disinformation and AI-driven manipulation. For example, 
signatories  commit  to  ensuring  an  ethical  and  transparent  use  of  campaign  tools  and  technologies, 
including  AI,  by  avoiding  misleading  content,  such  as  falsified  data,  while  clearly  labelling  AI-
generated content. The Code also sets ethical standards for both online and offline campaign activities, 
enhancing public trust by improving cybersecurity and providing better access to campaign information. 
Parties are encouraged to promote these commitments within their ranks, with the Code available online 
for public monitoring and accountability.  

Measures reported by political parties 

European and national political parties reportedly also adopted diverse approaches to integrity and fair 
campaigning,  with  varying  levels  of  adherence  to  the  Code  of  Conduct  and  other  campaign-related 
pledges. 

European political parties have implemented various measures to comply with the Code of Conduct and 
its campaign standards273. Notable good practices include: raising awareness through internal briefings 
and promoting the code to member and aspiring parties; translating commitments into internal rules, 
reviewing them with the general assembly, and publishing them in user-friendly formats; organizing 
post-election  reviews  and  discussions  between  parties;  and  being  open  to  mutual  discussions  and 
recommendations with other political groups274. Three European political parties reported publishing 
information on their websites about online political advertising, including details on usage, spending 
amounts, and funding sources275.  

At the same time, as indicated in Section 4.3 on Artificial Intelligence above, there were some instances 
of using non-watermarked AI images going against the commitments made on the basis of the Code.   

In a reply to the dedicated survey, one national party confirmed full adherence to the Code of Conduct 
and  introduced  additional  pledges  focused  on  transparency  in  financing,  equal  representation, 
responsible communication, protection of personal data, and youth engagement276. It also conducted 

272  International Idea, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, 04 
April 2024. 
273 International IDEA, Advisory note Implementation of the Code of conduct for the 2024 European Parliament 
elections – Takeaways from survey responses, 2024. 
274  European  Democratic  Party,  European  Conservatives  and  Reformists,  European  Free  Alliance,  Party  of 
European Socialists, European Green Party, European People's Party. 
275 European Democratic Party, Party of European Socialists, European People’s Party. 
276 Croatia. 

60 

 
 
 
post-election  reviews,  including  internal  assessments  and  feedback  collection.  Another  party  also 
explicitly confirmed their adherence to the Code but had not yet conducted a post-election review277. 
Moreover, it signed the Luxembourg Election Treaty, ensuring that the pledge was circulated internally 
among staff, politicians, and candidates. Certain parties took an even more active role in establishing 
their ethical  guidelines.  For  instance,  one created  and  monitored  a  "Commitment to  Tolerance"  and 
conducted  a  post-election  review.  Another  carried  out  an  internal  post-election  analysis  but  did  not 
adopt formal pledges278. Finally, some parties gave unclear responses regarding their adherence to the 
Code.  Although  they  did  not  appear  to  follow  it,  one  party  had  their  own  ethics  commission  and 
candidate’s charter, reflecting a proactive stance on integrity and fairness279. Moreover, another decided 
not to follow the Code280. Meanwhile, others adhered to its own code of conduct, focusing on “decency 
and national pride”281. 

Furthermore, out of almost 60 national parties surveyed, 16 confirmed that they had publicly provided 
information on their use of political advertising ahead of the 2024 elections to the European parliament 
(around 32%). This included details, oftentimes in form of a weblink, on the amounts spent on political 
advertising and the sources of funding used282. 

Political  Capital,  one  of  the  main  members  of  EDMO’s  Hungarian  hub  (HDMO),  published  new 
research283 analysing pre-election campaign spending on Meta and Google ads in Hungary. The study 
points to concerns about political pluralism on Meta and Google’s services due to highly asymmetric 
spending on political ads in Hungary. The pro-government camp spent EUR 4.3 million on Meta and 
Google ads (EUR 2.0 million spent by Fidesz and its politicians and EUR 2.3 million spent by third 
party  proxies),  while  all  14  opposition  parties  and their  proxies spent less than a  fifth of that,  EUR 
839,000.  

Measures reported by Member States 

For their  part, Member  States adopted  a  variety  of  approaches  to  support  election  integrity and fair 
campaigning in preparation for the elections.  

In  response  to  a  Commission  questionnaire,  some  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  robust 
legislative provisions to ensure election integrity and fair campaigning. For example, in Greece, national 
legislation codifies standards aligned with international guidelines, ensuring compliance by political 
parties and campaign organizations. Similarly, Italy reported to have several laws governing electoral 
propaganda, equal media access, and public administration and communication in place. Luxembourg 
stands out with a gentleman’s agreement signed by several political parties to conduct fair campaigns. 
In  another  example,  Croatia  also  highlights  adherence  to  integrity  pledges  and  data  protection 
regulations for digital campaigning, reinforcing democratic principles. Voluntary ethical codes are also 
observed  in  some  Member  States.  For  instance,  Slovakia  reported  that  a  voluntary  ethical  code  for 
electoral  campaigning  is  available  online,  offering  guidance  to  participants  despite  its  lack  of 
association with official authorities. 

277 Luxembourg. 
278 Slovenia.  
279 France.  
280 Sweden. 
281 Czechia. 
282 Czechia, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
283  Political  Capital,  Fidesz  &  Co.  flood  social  media  with  anti-Western  hostile  disinformation  in  Hungary’s 
election campaign, reaching EU spending records, 08 June 2024. 

61 

 
 
 
4.6.2.  Funding of the election campaign 

The  integrity  of  elections  is  dependent  on  many  factors,  including  transparency  in  party  financing, 
which helps to maintain trust, prevent undue influence, and ensure accountability, particularly regarding 
donations from third countries or undisclosed sources. 

Situation in Member States 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to identify possible gaps in their 
legislation related to donations and other funding from third countries to national political parties, 
political foundations, political candidates and campaign organisations; and to address such gaps by 
promoting  transparency  and  by  limiting  donations  up  to  a  certain  amount  or  prohibiting  such 
donations when they come from third countries and entities based in third countries or from third-
country nationals who are not entitled to vote in elections to the European Parliament or national 
elections.  

The rules and frameworks on political funding are rather diverse among the Member States. Several 
Member States have adopted or are considering measures to increase transparency and oversight for 
political party financing, also with a view to supporting democratic accountability and prevent foreign 
interference284. For instance, Germany has adopted new political party financing rules, regulating party 
sponsoring  and  hidden  party  campaign  finance  by  other  persons.  In  Denmark, a  new  law  on  public 
financing of political parties has entered into force, and a proposal for increased transparency for private 
financing of political parties is pending. In Slovenia, new rules should lead to more frequent audits of 
the largest political parties and of a larger proportion of state funding. In Czechia, a reform strengthened 
the office supervising political parties financing, with further reforms to close gaps on the funding of 
presidential candidates and eligible donors being contemplated.  

Funding from third countries 

Some Member States have reported that they allow donations from natural persons from third countries, 
with limits in certain cases. Others allow funding from third countries for both natural and legal persons, 
but  under  specific  conditions.  Several  others  such  as  the  Netherlands,  Romania  and  Poland  have 
introduced or are considering funding’s bans from third countries altogether.  

For instance, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg allow political parties and candidates to be funded 
by way of donations by individuals from third countries.  

In Denmark, funding from third countries is allowed, except for funding from physical and legal persons 
that are on a public prohibition list.285. 

Austria bans donations from entities from third countries exceeding 500 EUR. Cyprus also prohibits 
donations to a party exceeding 5 000 EUR from third countries.  

284 European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law report, 24 July 2024. 
285 The Danish Minister of Integration (Udlændinge  – og integrationsministeren) can decide to record physical 
and legal persons that counter work and undermine democracy and fundamental freedom and human rights on a 
public prohibition list if there is a certain probability that the person has the intention of donating to one of more 
recipients in Denmark. Physical and legal persons are included on the Prohibition list for a 4-year period with the 
possibility of extending the period 4 years at the time. See public prohibition list. 

62 

 
 
 
 
Other  Member  States,  such  as  Finland,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy  or  Spain,  have  introduced  specific 
exceptions related to the donors286 and the type of support287.  

Political parties 

The  2023  Recommendation  on elections  encourages  political parties and their  affiliated  entities  to 
assess risks stemming from donations from third countries and donations potentially linked to criminal 
activity including corruption, money laundering and organised crime. 

The Code of Conduct referred to the need to for political parties to ensure transparency of received 
financial  contributions,  including  benefits  in  kind  such  as  gifts  and  hospitality  received,  loans, 
donations,  campaign  contributions  and  expenditure  to  be  in  line  with  the  applicable  European  and 
national legislation. It also referred to the need to ensure transparency of political advertising and 
campaign messages, including by providing information on sponsors, sources of funding and amounts 
spent. 

Rules applying to European political parties and their affiliated foundations are laid down in Regulation 
(EU) 1141/2014, which is currently under revision, in particular to clarify the funding provisions (see 
Section 5.2).  

In  the  survey  for  national  political  parties,  it  can  be  observed  that  the  issue  of  funding  from  third 
countries was approached with caution, with rather few parties conducting thorough risk assessments 
to prevent inappropriate or unwanted donations288. 

Some parties reported strict compliance with national rules, including a ban on foreign donations above 
a certain threshold and the requirement to report all donations exceeding €150 to the national Court of 
Audit289.  Several  other  parties  also  reported  conducting  risk  assessments  regarding  third  country 
donations but did not identify significant threats290. However, many other national parties reported that 
they had taken no action in this area at all291. 

4.7.  Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives 

Introduction 

Politicians and political candidates can face undue pressures and threats to their security, which has 
negative spill-over effect on inclusive democratic representation.  Ensuring their safety emerged as a 
topic of discussion during the 2024 elections. 

Findings 

In  their  replies  to the  Commission survey,  several European  (about 67%) and  national (about  36%) 
political parties292 reported that they were aware of incidents of harassment and violence, both online 

286 For instance, Finland bans donations from from third countries to political parties, but a party may receive 
contributions from individuals and from international associations and foundations that represent the party’s 
ideology (the definition is not specified in the law) 
287 For instance, in Spain, it is forbidden to receive electoral funding (for “electoral costs”) from from third 
countries, but it is possible for political parties to receive funding “without a concrete purpose”, only from 
individuals from third countries and up to EUR 50,000 per person per year. Loans from private persons or 
companies from third countries are also allowed.  
288  Czechia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
289 Austria. 
290 Slovenia.  
291  Belgium,  Czechia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Italy,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. 
292 This discrepancy could potentially be explained because of the fact that national political parties are smaller 
with less information available on this matter.  

63 

 
 
 
and  offline,  with  women  candidates  and  minorities  being more  frequently targeted,  proportionately. 
Around 41% of the national parties surveyed had put in place measures to prevent or combat online 
violence  or  threats  against  candidates.  Examples  of  some  measures  against  violence  include  social 
media monitoring, content moderation, specific guidelines,  police reporting, as well as education of 
candidates on preventative measures.  

The European Green Party reported accounts of physical violence towards their politicians in Germany 
during  the  election  period,  as  well  as  digital  violence,  such  as  smear  campaigns  or  attempts  to 
deplatform293. They also reported that violence, physical and digital, towards politicians is increasing, 
especially towards women candidates and ethnic minorities. The Party of European Socialists reported 
that one of their candidates for the European Parliament, was physically attacked while campaigning in 
Dresden, and just days later, a female Senator was also attacked. The European Free Alliance reported 
that  their  members and  candidates  frequently receive  harassment, insults  and  occasionally  violence, 
usually based on their belonging to a national minority and their advocacy of minority interests. They 
also reported harassing comments online including sexist or ageist comments directed towards one of 
their female candidates. 

At  national  level,  online  violence  against  candidates  was  also reported294,  including  notably  against 
women and ethnic minorities, as well as instances of physical threats and violence295. For instance, an 
Austrian party reported a smear campaign against a female leading candidate which spread across social 
media and e-mail channels. In Belgium, a leading female candidate’s car was damaged by unknown 
perpetrators. A national Czech party reported that candidates were frequently targeted by online abuse 
via social media, with women being proportionately more affected. In Finland, a national party reported 
3-4  instances  of  physical  threats  against  female  candidates;  with  frequent  but  underreported  online 
violence as well. A Swedish party reported having a ‘security action plan’ in place. In Slovenia, a top 
candidate was physically attacked by a man after a local event, leaving the candidate slightly injured.  

Reports  by  electoral  observers296  also  highlight  alarming  incidents  of  violence,  harassment,  and 
intimidation in several Member States, creating a hostile environment for those who seek public office. 
For example:  

•  On 12 May 2024, in Ireland,  a Councillor and her husband were assaulted by an individual 

probing her immigration stance during their campaign activities in West Dublin. 

•  On  17  May  2024,  a  Fine  Gael  candidate  faced  harassment  and  racist  abuse  while  posting 

election posters, forcing him to remove them. 

•  On 20 May 2024 in Lisbon, a confrontation involving the Ergue-te party was documented on 

video and corroborated by ODIHR SEAM interlocutors.  

•  On 8 June 2024, the Prime Minister of Denmark was victim of an attack.  

Reports by electoral observers also note that political polarisation, mis- and disinformation, and specific 
incidents of harassment and violence contributed to an ‘antagonistic environment’ for politicians and 
candidates,  media  outlets,  and  journalists  in  Member  States,  most  significantly  targeting  women, 
LGBTI,  and  immigrant  communities297.  Election-Watch.EU  further  notices  that  “acts  of  violence 

293  Deplatforming,  also  called  no-platforming,  is  a  form  of  Internet  censorship  of  an  individual  or  group  by 
preventing them from posting on the platforms they use to share their information/ideas. 
294 Czechia, Greece, Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
295 Slovenia and Finland.  
296  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November  2024;  and  Election-Watch.EU,    Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament 
Elections 6-9 June 2024, September 2024. 
297  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024. 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
against politicians in some Member States were a pronounced sign of a growing societal polarisation, 
compounded by fears of a wider political rift and concerns about foreign interference”298. 

The Global Information Index also observed299 that female politicians in Europe face a disproportionate 
amount of gendered disinformation, next to harassment and hate, particularly during elections. These 
attacks often involve misogynistic, racist, and xenophobic narratives aimed at undermining women's 
credibility and discouraging their participation in politics. Prominent figures like Ursula von der Leyen 
are frequent targets, with narratives questioning their competence and legitimacy.  

The OSCE/ODIHR election assessment also highlights the violence against women in the campaign to 
be an issue and recommended that “Violence against women in the campaign should be recognised by 
political parties and institutions as a barrier to women’s active political participation. Consideration 
should be given to introducing or strengthening existing proactive and preventive measures against such 
actions”300. 

5.  EUROPEAN DIMENSION AND THE EXERCISE OF EU ELECTORAL RIGHTS 

5.1.  The European dimension 

The  outcome  of  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  has  direct  implications  for  citizens.  It  has  an 
impact  for  instance  on  how  policies  are  shaped  and  what  laws  are  passed  at  European  level  and 
implemented across the EU. Citizens need to know what is at stake at European level if they are to make 
informed choices. However, the political debate and campaign for the 2024 elections in the Member 
States remained dominated by national and local issues, with the link to the European level being less 
well discussed and understood.  

The European Parliament actively promoted the European dimension of the elections by organising an 
election night, providing the media with real-time updates on turnout and composition of the Parliament. 

Promoting  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections  strengthens  the  link  between  citizens  and  the 
European institutions and therefore the democratic legitimacy of European decision-making. 

Regulation (EU) 1141/2014 establishes a specific legal, financial and regulatory system for European 
political parties and European political foundations. In 2021 the Commission proposed a recast of this 
Regulation  with amendments to facilitate  European political  parties’ interactions  with their  national 
member  parties  and  across  borders,  increase  transparency,  in  particular  in  relation  to  political 
advertisement and donations, cut excessive administrative burden and increase the financial viability of 
European political parties and foundations. This proposal remains under negotiation. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to take measures to enhance 
the  European  nature  of  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  including  to  help  European 
political parties and political groups of the European Parliament conduct their campaigns in the 
context  of  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  It  calls  on  Member  States  to  enable  the 
announcement of candidates and the start of campaigning in elections to the European Parliament 
at  least  6  weeks  prior  to  the  election  day.  It  encourages  giving  information  to  the  public  on  the 
affiliation between national political parties and European political parties before and during the 

298 Election-Watch.EU,   Election Assessment Mission, Final Report,  European Parliament Elections 6-9 June 
2024, September 2024. 
299 Global Disinformation Index,  Gendered Disinformation in the  European Parliamentary Elections, June  10 
2024. 
300  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  This  could  be  done  for  instance  by  indicating  such  an 
affiliation  on  the  ballots  and  by  supporting  the  distribution  of  such  information  by  the  relevant 
competent authorities.  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections also encourages national political parties participating in 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament  to  make  publicly  known  before  the  start  of  the  electoral 
campaign, which European political party they are affiliated with or in the process of affiliating with 
and to promote measures aimed at increasing the knowledge of their members about the elections to 
the European Parliament. 

Member  States  apply  a  range  of  timeframes  for  the  announcement  of  candidates  and  campaigning 
timelines  for  the  European  Parliament  elections.  For  example,  in  Germany,  Portugal,  and  Sweden, 
campaigning  can  begin  more  than  nine  months  before  election  day,  offering  extended  periods  for 
political engagement. In Finland, campaigning starts between six and nine months before the elections, 
while in countries such as Belgium, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia, campaigns typically begin 
three to six months ahead. In a majority of countries301, the announcement of candidates and the start 
of campaigning was only permitted within three months of the elections. 

Several  Member  States  have  taken  steps  to  enhance  transparency  regarding  affiliations  between 
national and European political parties. For instance, Italy facilitates public access to this information 
through its Central Directorate for Electoral Services, publishing detailed instructions referencing EU 
rules  and  ensuring  that  affiliations  are  indicated  on  ballots.  Similarly,  Lithuania  highlights  these 
affiliations on ballots and encourages public awareness efforts. Affiliations were indicated on ballots in 
four  Member  States302,  while  in  seven  Member  States303  such  information  is  disseminated  by  the 
relevant authorities on institutional websites. 

No measures were taken by any Member States to facilitate the conduct of cross-border campaigns by 
actors at Union level (such as European political parties) or multi-national political parties in the context 
of the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. Four Member States304 underlined that such measures 
were  not  of  competence  of  national  authorities,  who  should  maintain  a  neutral  role  and  respect  the 
principle of autonomy of political parties. In Slovenia and Estonia, during electoral campaigns, only 
national parties and candidates can participate to the campaign; support (including financial one) from 
foreign persons or entities, including European political parties, is not allowed.  

In response to the Commission survey, many national political parties across all political spectrums 
reported that they had publicly declared their European political party affiliations before the start of the 
European electoral campaign. 

One national political party not only proactively declared its affiliation with a European political party 
but  also  prominently  displayed  their  logo  on  their  website  and  materials,  while  keeping  members 
informed through multiple channels about the EU elections305. In addition, another national political 
party  boosted  members'  knowledge  through  numerous  training  sessions  and  launched  a  dedicated 
campaign to emphasize the European dimension of the elections306.  

301 Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, 
Romania and Slovenia. 
302 Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Lithuania. 
303 Czechia, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. 
304 Czechia, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
305 Austria. 
306 Austria. 

66 

 
 
 
 
Many surveyed parties publicly acknowledged their European political affiliation particularly through 
social media, email, brochures, and educational sessions to inform and engage members307. Meanwhile, 
another national political party published the European Political Party’s Manifesto on its website, and 
parties conducted ongoing training and online sessions for members, and even showcased a Ukrainian 
artist and a foreign EU Minister in their campaign to increase visibility of the European dimension308. 
Another national party held election congresses to educate its members, and prioritized EU issues in its 
manifesto309. 

However, not all the national parties surveyed chose to emphasize the European dimension.  Several 
parties did not use European party logos on their materials, and it occurred that some parties did not 
disclose any European political party affiliation at all310.  

Campaign  obstacles  were  reported  across  various  Member  States,  primarily  affecting  smaller,  less 
established  parties.  These  challenges  often  impacted  minority-focused  or  niche  groups  that  struggle 
with media access and visibility compared to larger mainstream parties. Some smaller national parties 
reported media access issues or encountered "media incorrectness"311. Other parties reportedly faced 
delays in social network ad approvals, while others reported media blockades and allegedly falsified 
statistics by specific media outlets in the run-up to the elections312. One national party faced obstacles 
by not being given time to present on media broadcasting313. Additionally, small parties noted that it 
was  particularly  difficult  to  campaign  due  to  lack  of  media  attention  and  exclusion  from  electoral 
debates314. One national party noted that they had been prohibited from campaigning in a third language, 
namely Russian315 and another reported that their candidates were even subjected to plainclothes police 
checks316. 

5.2.  Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law 

5.2.1. 

Introduction  

The  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  are  unique.  The  Member  States,  each  with  their  national 
campaigns,  national  lists  and  distinctive  rules  and  traditions,  contribute  to  a  collective  result,  with 
elected MEPs representing all EU citizens. 

It is the competence and the responsibility of the Member States to lay down the specific conditions for 
the conduct of elections, subject to the respect of certain basic principles, such as those laid down in 
Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty on European Union, and their international commitments. Additionally, 
it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  competent  national  administrative  and  judicial  authorities  to  ensure 
compliance with applicable law and relevant international standards.  

Certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act and 
the rules enabling mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the 
European Parliament in their country of residence.  

307 Czechia, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia. 
308 Czechia, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 
309 Luxembourg. 
310 Czechia, Greece, France, Croatia and Sweden. 
311 Czechia. 
312 Slovenia.  
313 France.  
314 Czechia, France, Italy and Luxembourg. 
315 Latvia. 
316 Greece. 

67 

 
 
 
5.2.2.  Electoral Act 

As regards the elections to the European Parliament, national electoral procedures must comply with 
the principles set out in the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage (1976 Electoral Act) 317, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, 
Euratom of 20 September 1976. Under Article 1(3) of the 1976 Electoral Act, elections must be by 
direct universal suffrage and shall be free and secret. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 8 of the 1976 
Electoral  Act,  subject  to  the  provisions  of  the  1976  Electoral  Act,  the  electoral  procedure  is  to  be 
governed in each Member State by its national provisions. These national provisions, which may if 
appropriate take account of the specific situation in the Member States, must not affect the essentially 
proportional nature of the voting system. 

Under the special legislative procedure envisaged by Article 223 of the TFEU, it is up to the European 
Parliament to draw up a proposal to lay down the provisions necessary for the election of its members 
by  direct  universal  suffrage  in  accordance  with  a  uniform  procedure  in  all  Member  States  or  in 
accordance  with  principles  common  to  all  Member  States.  The  Council,  acting  unanimously  in 
accordance  with  a  special  legislative  procedure  and  after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  European 
Parliament,  which  would  act  based  on  a  majority  of  its  component  Members,  would  lay  down  the 
necessary provisions. These provisions would enter into force following their approval by the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The Commission does not have 
a formal role in this process.  

In  2015,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  on  the  reform  of  the  EU’s  electoral  law, 
suggesting certain targeted amendments to enhance the democratic dimension of the European elections 
and the legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making process. On 7 June 2018, the Council approved a draft 
decision  amending  the  Electoral  Act  (Council  Decision  2018/994).  Ratification  of  this  decision  has 
advanced but is not yet concluded. 

On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted its proposal for a new Council Regulation on the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, aiming at repealing 
the existing Electoral Act318. It proposes a comprehensive reform and extension of the electoral rules 
laid  down  at  EU level for the  organisation  of  the  elections to the  European  Parliament, including  a 
European  constituency  to  allow  for  the  election  of  an  additional  28  MEPs  from  EU-wide  lists  (in 
addition to the national lists). The proposal also includes provisions on common campaigning rules, 
administrative  deadlines,  a  single  Election  Day  on  9  May,  common  voting  and  candidacy  periods, 
compulsory  access  to  postal  voting  and  support  for  other  methods,  provisions  to  strengthen  the 
participation of citizens with disabilities and to promote gender equality in the candidates standing for 
elections, and other measures. Discussions on this proposal did not progress in the Council. 

5.2.3.  Electoral rights 

EU electoral rights include the rights provided to all citizens under the Treaties to participate in the 
democratic life of the Union, and to elect the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal 
suffrage in a free and secret ballot.  

317 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ L 218, 
8.10.1976. 
318 European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision 
(76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament 
by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision (2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP)) 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-05-03_EN.html  

68 

 
 
 
They also include the rights provided to EU citizens which exercise their right to move freely to another 
Member State, to vote and stand in the European elections in their Member State of residence. These 
rights are enshrined in the Treaties and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, and 
are elaborated in the 1976 Electoral Act, Directive 93/109/EC and the relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice.  

The 2021 package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections, adopted 
by the Commission, included two legislative proposals to recast the Directives on the right to vote and 
stand  as  candidates in elections  to  the European  Parliament  and  municipal  elections  by EU  citizens 
residing in a Member State other than their country of origin319. These initiatives aim to update, clarify 
and strengthen the existing rules in order to address the difficulties faced by mobile EU citizens, and to 
ensure broad and inclusive participation in elections to the European Parliament, support mobile EU 
citizens in the exercise of their rights and protect the integrity of elections.  

The European Parliament adopted its opinions on these proposals on 14 February 2023. The discussions 
in the Council have progressed significantly on both files320. An agreement in Council was found in 
April  2024  on  the  Directive  on  European  Parliament  elections  and  the  text  is  currently  with  the 
European Parliament for a consultation process.  

5.2.4.  Prevention of multiple voting 

Introduction 

Article 9 of the 1976 Electoral Act prohibits voting more than once. It is also restated in Article 4(1) of 
Directive 93/109/EC, which states that no person may vote more than once at the same election. 

Council Decision 2018/994321amending the 1976 Electoral Act provides that in accordance with their 
national electoral procedures, Member States are required to take measures necessary to ensure that 
double  voting  in  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  is  subject  to  effective,  proportionate,  and 
dissuasive penalties. The foregoing Decision has not yet entered into force yet as approval has not been 
given by all Member States, but most Member States have sanctions in place. 

In line with Directive 93/109/EC, Member States have to exchange information on EU citizens who 
plan to vote or be candidates in their Member State of residence to prevent multiple voting and double 
candidacies. Member States exchange voter roll data and check for duplicates. Given the sensitivity of 
the personal data exchanged it is crucial that this is done in a secure manner.  

Measures taken to prevent multiple voting 

The Commission supports this exchange of information by providing Member States with a crypto tool 
to  encrypt  the  data  exchanged322,  a  secure  platform  to  perform  the  exchange  (Commission’s 

319 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of 
which they are not nationals (recast), COM/2021/732 final; Proposal for a Council Directive laying down 
detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast), COM(2021)733 final. 
320 The discussions on the Directive on municipal elections are still ongoing. 
321 Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the 
members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, 13 July 2018. 
322  European  Commission,  Crypto  Tool  for  the  European  Parliament  Elections  and  for  the European  Citizens' 
Initiative | Interoperable Europe Portal,, last accessed 14 April 2025.  

69 

 
 
 
collaborative platform S-CIRCABC) and supports the process to achieve this efficiently323, which is 
coordinated with Member States’ experts in the framework of the Expert Group on Electoral Matters324.  

By means of technical updates, the Commission improved the crypto tool and the secure platform for 
data encryption of mobile EU citizen voters and candidates, supporting exchanges between Member 
States. In the context of the Expert Group on electoral matters, it also organised testing and provided 
updated guidelines on the crypto tools and secure platform to support Member States in the efficient 
use of these tools. This facilitated secure data exchange between Member States  in order to prevent 
multiple voting and double candidacies, among mobile EU citizens.  

Building on the best practices developed ahead of the 2019 elections, the Commission also continued 
to support the Member States by compiling an overview of the relevant procedural deadlines in the run-
up to the elections with information on the date of opening and closing of the electoral register, period 
of the exchange , and on date of the closure of the polls in the different Member States. The Commission 
also encouraged the use of a multilingual form developed in 2019 to facilitate the prompt exchange of 
information  on  candidates,  which  was  used  by  10  Member  States325.  Member  States’  replies  to  the 
survey confirm that this support provided by the Commission in the framework of Expert Group on 
electoral matters was useful, well organised and efficient.  

The process runs smoothly from the technical point of view, and it has improved both in terms of its 
security and efficiency. 

On this basis, between January and June 2024, Member States encrypted more than 1 600 voters and 
candidates list files and exchanged data on around 1 million voters and 135 candidates. This exchange 
resulted in the identification of over 300 000 multiple registrations of citizens. 

Challenges resulting  from  incompatible  national laws  and  procedures  remain  and  were  signalled by 
Member States in their replies to the survey. Although the uniformity of the data was improved by some 
Member  States,  the  diversity  of  the  national  electoral  processes,  including  incompatible  national 
deadlines to prepare and close the electoral roll remained. This diversity in the types of data exchanged 
and the timetables to which the data was being collected affected its quality and its usability. This is 
also acknowledged by electoral observers reports which recommend harmonising the deadline for voter 
registration across Member States with the view to strengthen the data exchange mechanism. 

Reports  by  electoral  observers  such  as  OSCE/OIDHR  highlight  the  substantial  efforts  by  the 
Commission and Member States to curb multiple voting, stating that the practice of multiple voting 
does not appear to be widespread.. At the same time, OSCE/ODHIR considers that there is no ‘sufficient 
mechanism to prevent double voting’ 326.  

323 Every country creates a file for each Member State whose nationals are registered to vote there as mobile EU 
citizens, encrypts them using the crypto-tool (which can also perform some basic validation) and uploads them 
onto the secure platform according to the specified process. Once the encrypted files are uploaded, every Member 
State downloads its relevant files, including data about its own-national voters registered in another country, so 
as to match them to its own electoral roll and take the necessary measures to remove them from the home country 
electoral  roll,  as  well  as  taking  other  necessary  steps  including  to  inform  citizens  of  this  step,  when  possible. 
Member States need to set up a contact point, connect the administration in charge of the European Parliament 
elections  electoral  roll  to  the  crypto  tool,  send,  receive,  process  and  match  the  data  received  through  the 
information exchange, and provide for the necessary actions.  
324 European Commission, Expert group on electoral matters - Right to vote and to stand as a candidate in 
elections for the EP and in municipal elections (E00617). 
325 Several Member States reported to not have the need to use the form because there were no mobile EU citizens 
candidates in their countries.  
326  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024, p.2.  

70 

 
 
 
The entry into application of the Council Decision 2018/994 amending the Electoral Law327 and the 
adoption of the recast of the Directive 93/109/EC328 would reinforce tools available to Member States 
to address double voting.  

Table 3: Data exchange to help prevent multiple voting of mobile EU citizens 

Member 
States 

Used 
multilingual 
form 

Records sent 

Records 
received 

Duplicate 
records 
identified 

identification 
rate 

yes 

yes 

n/a 

 no 

n/a 

yes 

yes 

yes 

n/a 

yes 

n/a  

yes 

no 

no 

yes 

n/a 

no 

yes 

n/a 

n/a 
n/a 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Germany 

Estonia 

Ireland 

Greece 

Spain 

France 

Croatia 

Italy 

Cyprus 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Hungary 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Austria 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovenia 

Slovakia 

Finland 

Sweden 

76.337 

3.498 

8.158 

3.266 

40.0% 

202.301  

119.427 

1.249 

1,04% 

1.753 

2.139 

13.023 

229.834 

269.126 

0 

83.438 

11.698  

47 

340 

81.869 

4.693 

15.102 

67.766 

45.376  

11.255 

121 

4.275 

235 

7730 

43.101 

2.995 

10.450 

23.486 

61.700 

111.498 

11.738 

173.619 

1909 

2.991 

6.095 

4.232 

13.044 

540 

70.127 

 16.614 

139.253 

139.845 

2.681 

10.075 

14057 

37.067 

89.591 

60,08% 

80,35% 

116.556 

67.1% 

2442 

1780 

81.6% 

29.2% 

6.525 

50.0% 

7.956 

956 

11.34% 

5.75%  

51745 

37.15% 

892 

33.27% 

11296 

4807 

80,35% 

Source: Replies from Member States to the Commission’s questionnaire, 2024. Different Member States highlighted that the 
data is not complete. 

Complementary measures 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to provide mobile EU citizens 
with  information  on  the  rules  and  sanctions  related  to  multiple  voting  in  due  time  ahead  of  the 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament.  Where,  in  the  context  of  the  elections  to  the  European 

327 Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2018/994 of 13 July 2018 amending the Act concerning the election of the 
members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Council Decision 76/787/ECSC, 
EEC, Euratom of 20 September 1976, OJ L 178, 16.7.2018, p. 1–3. 
328 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are 
not nationals (recast), COM(2021) 733 final. 

71 

 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parliament,  a  citizen  was  removed  from  the  electoral  roll  of  a  Member  State  in  order  to  vote  in 
another Member State, the Recommendation  encourages the former Member State to time consider 
taking measures to avoid that such a removal affects the registration of that citizen in electoral rolls 
for national elections. 

For the 2024 elections, the Commission, together with other EU institutions, raised awareness about 
the prohibition of multiple voting as part of the joint interinstitutional campaign.  

Most Member States that replied to the survey launched by the Commission reported having provided 
information on the prohibition of multiple voting, including potential sanctions, as integral part of their 
efforts  in  raising  awareness  of  electoral  procedures  applying  to  mobile  EU  citizens:  government 
websites, Electoral Commission channels, press releases, and social media to reach a broad audience. 
When  the  Member  States  used  personalized  letters  or  emails  to  inform  mobile  EU  citizens,  these 
included information on the legal implications of multiple voting. 

In  the  meantime,  Member  States  are  gradually  implementing  several  measures  to  ensure  that  the 
removal  of  a  citizen  from  the  electoral  roll  for  European  Parliament  elections  does  not  affect  their 
registration for national elections. Many countries maintain separate electoral rolls for different types 
of  elections.  For  instance,  Czechia,  Malta,  Spain,  Luxembourg,  Sweden  and  Austria  have  distinct 
registers for elections to the European Parliament and national elections, ensuring that removal from 
one does not affect the other. Greece, Slovenia, France, Hungary and the Netherlands use centralized 
databases  that  distinguish  between  different  voting  rights.  These  systems  allow  election  officials  to 
manage  individual  voting  rights  without  impacting  other  electoral  registrations.  For  some  Member 
States like Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Portugal the electoral roll is produced before each election.  

5.2.5.  Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law 

National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with 
national  legislation,  EU  law  and  relevant  international  standards  applicable  to  the  conduct  and 
organisation of elections. 

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission took various actions to ensure that EU law was being 
implemented and to eliminate potential obstacles to the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights.  The 
Commission is in regular dialogue with Member States and provides support to citizens. 

On 13 November 2024, in a case brought by the Commission against Czechia and Poland regarding 
restrictions on joining domestic political parties for mobile EU citizens329,  the Court of Justice of the 
EU ruled that if the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local and European elections is to be 
exercised  effectively,  mobile  EU  citizens  must  be  afforded  equal  access  to  the  means  available  to 
nationals of that Member State for the purpose of exercising that right. Given that membership of a 
political party contributes significantly to the exercise of the electoral rights conferred by EU law, the 
Court of Justice found that the Czech Republic and Poland infringed EU law by denying mobile EU 
citizens the right to become members of a political party330.  

Between the period of 2019 to 2024, no other infringement cases or EU Pilot procedures have been 
initiated concerning the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights under Council Directive 93/109/EC. 

329 European Commission – Press release, EU citizens' electoral rights: Commission decides to refer CZECHIA 
and POLAND to the Court of Justice, 09 June 2021. 
330 Cases C-808/21 and C-814/21. 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission received several letters from EU citizens raising specific issues in different Member 
States,  including  voting  by  dual  nationals,  deadlines  for  candidate  registration,  available  remedies, 
electoral rights of specific groups or voting from a third country. 

With regard to the right to be informed about the right to vote and stand as candidate in the elections to 
the European Parliament, Article 12 of Council Directive 93/109/EC states that the Member State of 
residence  must  inform  EU  voters  in  good  time  and  in  an  appropriate  manner  of  the  conditions  and 
detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections in that 
State. The responsibility of informing mobile EU citizens about their voting rights lies with the Member 
States,  which  are  granted  a  certain  autonomy  to  determine  the  most  effective  methods  to  fulfil  this 
obligation. This includes deciding on the appropriate means of communication and strategies to ensure 
that mobile EU citizens are adequately informed. The obligation can be met through a wide variety of 
methods,  including  publishing  relevant  information  on  official  websites,  conducting  awareness 
campaigns, and distributing informational materials. 

Details on the implementation of Article 13 of Council Directive 93/109/EC are instead provided in 
Section 5.2.4 on the prevention of multiple voting.  

Finally, as parts of its obligation under Article 14(3) of Council Directive 93/109/EC, on 7 November 
2023, the Commission adopted a report331 on granting a derogation under Article 22(2) of Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union to  Luxembourg,  in  accordance  with  Article  14(1)  of  Council 
Directive 93/109/EC332. In its conclusions, the Commission welcomed the fact that Luxembourg has 
stopped making mobile EU citizens’ right to vote or stand as candidates in the elections to the European 
Parliament conditional on a minimum period of residence in Luxembourg, it acknowledged that, based 
on the fact that the proportion of mobile EU citizens of voting age resident in Luxembourg remains 
significantly higher than the threshold of 20% referred to in Article 14(1), the granting of a derogation 
is still warranted and encouraged Luxembourg to continue taking measures fostering the integration of 
mobile EU citizens, including as regards the composition of lists of candidates. 

There is not much information available regarding issues encountered by mobile EU citizens voters and 
candidates. It was however reported that some mobile EU citizens voters faced difficulties during the 
registration  process  in  certain  EU  countries.  For  example,  some  voters  were  unaware  that  regional 
election registration also applied to EU elections333, while in other cases, voters and candidates missed 
the deadline to register334.  One party noted that it had not collected data on these issues335.  

The majority of Member States336 that replied to the survey  were not aware of  their citizens having 
difficulties with registration formalities when seeking to vote and stand in the 2024 elections to the 
European Parliament in other Member States. Those that reported to be aware of certain difficulties, 
they mainly concerned: 

331  Report  From  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  granting  a  derogation  under 
Article 22(2) on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, presented under Article 14(3) of Directive 
93/109/EC on the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament, COM/2023/688 
final, 7 November 2023. 
332 Article 14(1) states that if, in a given Member State, the proportion of mobile EU citizens of voting age exceeds 
20% of the total number of EU citizens of voting age resident there, that Member State may, by way of derogation 
from Articles 3, 9 and 10: (a) restrict the right to vote to mobile EU citizens who have resided in that Member 
State for a minimum period (which may not exceed five years);(b) restrict the right to stand as a candidate to 
mobile EU citizen who have resided in that Member State for a minimum period (which may not exceed 10 years). 
Luxembourg is the only Member State that applies a derogation under the Directive. 
333 Austria. 
334 Czechia. 
335 Greece. 
336  18  Member  States  (Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czechia,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Spain,  Ireland,  France,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Finland). 

73 

 
 
 
• 

•  Returning nationals (citizens who moved back to their country of origin from other Member 
States) who were not aware of having to take steps to be deleted from the electoral roll of the 
Member State of previous residence or not able to apply for removal from  the electoral roll 
after a certain deadline: 
citizens who were not aware of their EU citizenship right to vote for candidates of the 
Member State of residence instead of the Member State of origin:  
citizens who were not aware of the formalities and deadlines for submitting applications to be 
registered in the electoral roll in the Member State of residence and for postal voting: 
citizens not being aware of their registration status (whether they are in the electoral roll in the 
Member State of origin or in the Member State of residence).  

• 

• 

Electoral observers also reported several problems of mobile EU citizens when exercising their rights 
in  their  Member  States  of  residence,  including  lack  of  interest,  low  level  of  awareness  about  the 
possibility to vote  in the Member States of residence, cumbersome or unclear procedures, language 
barriers to register to vote337.  

The  early  registration  requirement  for  mobile  EU  citizens  to  be  added  on  the  electoral  rolls  in  the 
Member State of residence is also considered not helpful to increase the participation of mobile EU 
citizens338. Finally, the fact that Member States like Denmark uses predominantly digital interfaces, 
could be a challenge for mobile EU citizens without computer skills to register339. 

As indicated in Section 2.2, the Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as citizens’ helpline for 
the 2024 elections at EU level and answered 2 797 questions related to the elections between September 
2023  and  June  2024.  The  questions  received  by  EDCC  regarded  multiples  topics.  These  included 
registration procedures and electoral rights, including digital and remote voting from citizens living in 
the EU or abroad (around 65%); perceived missing information from Member States and administrative 
obstacles  to  voting  (approx.  10%);  candidates  and  national  political  parties,  their  positions  and 
affiliations with the European political parties and groups (approx. 10%); expressions of opinions about 
the EU and its political leaders (approx. 10%); communication and promotional materials to inform and 
mobilise  voters  (approx.  5%) and alleged  disinformation/FIMI,  hybrid  incidents,  threats (very few). 
Individual incidents related to disinformation/FIMI, cyber-attacks, electoral fraud and potential security 
threats were immediately brought to the attention of the competent services.    

337  EU-Election  Watch  reported  especially  in  Austria,  Hungary,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Latvia,  Malta,  Poland  and 
Romania. 
338 EU-Election Watch reported in particular Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Croatia. 
339  Election-Watch.EU,  Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June 
2024, September 2024.  

74 

 
 
 
Figure 11: European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between 6-9 June 2024 
per channel 

Source: EDCC 

The EDCC answered an average of 94 cases per day. The day on which the most cases were closed was 
Sunday 9 June 2024, with 120 cases, corresponding to 32% of the total cases of the election days. 

Figure 12: European elections related questions answered by the EDCC between 6-9 June 2024 

Source: EDCC 

The EU countries with the highest share of questions were Germany with 19% (71 questions), followed 
by Spain with 10% (36 questions), Belgium with 7% (26 questions) and France with 7% (26 questions).  

As the election days vary from country to country, the  following figure shows the number of cases 
closed by country during the respective election day(s). 

75 

 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Number of cases closed by country during the respective election day(s) 

Source: EDCC 

Approximately  60%  of  cases  related  to  electoral  rights  and  formalities.  Most  citizens  contacted  the 
EDCC with questions about practicalities, such as the locations and opening times of polling stations 
and which documents they should bring. Some citizens asked for advice when they had misplaced the 
voting documents that had been sent to them. Throughout the voting period, EU citizens living in non-
EU countries continued to ask about their voting rights or complain about their country of nationality 
not allowing them to vote from outside the EU. Over the course of the four voting days, these enquiries 
came  from  the  United  Kingdom  (3),  Switzerland  (2),  Norway  (2)  Australia  (1),  Singapore  (1),  and 
Russia (1). Next to enquiries from EU citizens, the EDCC received messages from UK citizens who 
expressed their disappointment at no longer being able to vote.  

Approximately  20%  of  cases  related  to  perceived  missing  information  from  Member  States  and 
perceived  obstacles  and  incidents  preventing  citizens  from  voting  during  the  election  days.  Several 
citizens reported obstacles or not receiving adequate information about registration deadlines and voting 
procedures from their home countries, leading to missed opportunities to vote. Most enquiries about 
administrative  issues  concerned  citizens  not  receiving  their  voting  documents  or  not  being  on  the 
electoral roll. In some cases, this may not have been an administrative error, but due to the citizen not 
registering (on time) to vote (meaning that they were clearly unaware of the necessity).  

The EDCC received a total of two reports of alleged electoral fraud. This included one citizen alleging 
irregularities in relation to Romanian voter rolls and one claiming that an Estonian MEP is engaged in 
fraud.  These  cases  were  handled  in  line  with  the  established  procedures  involving  the  competent 
Commission services. The EDCC received two cases referring to security threats340. These cases were 
handled in line with the established procedures involving the competent Commission services. 

Approximately 20% of cases related to other matters related to the elections341.  

340  One  was  a  message  in  which  the  citizen  alleged  being  attacked  at  a  polling  station,  although  no  further 
information  was  given  when asked.  The  second  was  a  warning  of  a  terror  attack  at  Pride  events  in  Paris  and 
Vienna. 
341 This included citizens sharing their opinions on various candidates. Many citizens provided their feedback on 
the European Parliament’s website on the elections, often stating that more information about candidates should 
be  available,  expressing  their  disapproval  of  the  inclusive  writing  used  in  the  French  version,  and  addressing 
translation mistakes or signalling technical issues. Some citizens asked for information about the political group 
affiliations of national parties, whether they could vote for candidates from other member states, the number of 
potential  voters,  or  specific  issues  about  constituencies  in  their  countries.  There  were  also  fewer  citizens 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
5.3.  Publication of results (officials and polls) 

Article 10 (2) of the 1976 Act prohibits publication of definitive electoral results of an entire Member 
State,  but  also  of  any  preliminary,  partial  or  regional  results  by  central  or  local  authorities  until  all 
polling  station  across  the  EU  are  closed.  This  prohibition  is  addressed  exclusively  to  electoral 
authorities of the Member States, not to polling institutes which conduct exit polls or to media (whether 
public or private) which publish estimates based on such polls.  

From  February  2024  onwards,  to  ensure  the  coordination  among  Member  States  of  the  process  of 
publication of the results, the Commission collected from electoral authorities and shared information 
in the European Cooperation Network on Elections of voting hours and opening and closing of polling 
stations for the elections to the European Parliament. The last polling stations closed in Italy at 23:00 
CET on 9 June 2024, after which Member States could publish the results.  

No incidents of early publication of results were reported to the Commission. Some Member States 
have called for the earlier publication of election results, referring to the need to mitigate the risk of 
disinformation, suggesting results should be released without waiting for all polling stations across the 
EU to close342.  

6.  ELECTION OBSERVATION 

Elections observation supports the integrity of electoral processes. The Commission actively engaged 
with electoral observers in the context of  the follow-up to its Recommendation on elections and the 
invitation addressed to Member States to encourage and facilitate independent election observation.  

The 2023 Recommendation on elections promotes election observation including by citizens as it is 
an efficient way to engage citizens with the electoral process and improve public trust in elections. 
It calls on Member States to encourage and facilitate impartial and independent election observation 
including by citizens as well as international organisations, at all the stages of the electoral process, 
taking into account their legal frameworks and international commitments. This should include, in 
particular, observation of voter registration, counting of ballots, participation of specific groups, the 
monitoring  of  political  advertising  and  financing,  and  the  application  of  electoral  rules  online. 
Member States are invited support the development of capacity and expertise in election observation, 
including by supporting training for election observers, drawing on the knowledge shared within the 
European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  and  international  standards  and  best  practices. 
Specific training could be provided to younger election observers. Supporting the participation of 
young  citizens,  including  first  time  voters,  may  include  actions  such  as  encouraging  students  to 
become election observers. 

Member  States  discussed  measures  to  promote  election  observation  in  several  meetings  of  the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections and in the High-Level Event on Elections that took place 
in October 2023. Both Election-Watch.EU and OSCE/ODIHR took part in various meetings of ECNE 
that facilitated observation activities and contacts between election observers and election authorities.  

In response to the Commission survey, almost 70% of Member States confirmed that they had taken 
specific steps to facilitate observation of the 2024 elections by citizens and international organisations. 
Regarding  the  cooperation  through  national  election  networks  or  with  election  observers,  responses 
varied as multiple answers were allowed. Ten Member States reportedly did not cooperate with election 

expressing their personal opinions or requesting communication materials. Several citizens contacted the EDCC 
with questions about what would happen after the election days, including when the results would be published, 
when the new MEPs would take their seats, and when the new Commission would be voted on. Some who had 
been selected as poll workers asked for information on how they could avoid this duty. 
342 As reported for example by Latvia in the ECNE meeting of 11 October 2024.  

77 

 
 
 
 
observer organisations, while 12 selected "Other", stating that they had for example cooperated with 
the OCSE-ODHIR.  

Some practices reported include: 

•  Training provided for e-voting observers and opportunities for observers to attend training for 

precinct committee members (Estonia); 

•  Observation  opportunities for  OSCE-ODIHR,  political  party  representatives,  and  candidates 

• 

during elections, with legal provisions to submit objections (Greece); 
Issuance  of  certificates  for  international  observers  to  access  electoral  offices  and  observe 
operations (Italy); 

•  Training and promotion of election observation opportunities for NGOs and political parties 

• 

(Latvia); 
facilitating  election  observation  by  accrediting  102  national  NGOs  as  election  observers 
(Romania); 

•  Robust citizen observation system involving all eligible voters as randomly selected polling 
station members (mandatory participation), ensuring diverse representation, including women 
and persons with disabilities (Spain). 

Approximately  40%  of  almost  60  national  political  parties  that  replied  to  the  Commission  survey 
reported some form of collaboration with election observers. In this regard, multiple parties reported 
having  cooperated  with  the  OSCE/ODIHR  observation  work343.  In  addition,  one  party  reportedly 
coordinated with their election observation association344 or another with local municipal authorities345. 
One national party also designated observers to monitor the vote-counting process346. 

OSCE  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR)  deployed  a  special  election 
assessment mission (SEAM) consisting of a core team of seven international experts based in Brussels 
and 10 regional analysts deployed across EU Member States. The final report issued by OSCE/ODIHR 
indicates that the elections were genuinely competitive, professionally organized and inclusive. Some 
areas identified for more attention concerned accessibility for persons with disabilities, inconsistencies 
in electoral regulations, and the need to address threats and intimidation including towards journalists347. 

The civil society organisation Election-Watch.EU conducted its second election assessment mission to 
the European Parliament elections348 in all 27 EU Member States with 77 election experts and observers 
and  10  like-minded citizen  election  observer organisations.  The mission covered  a  variety  of topics 
from  equality  of  participation  and  representation  and  inclusion  of  underrepresented  groups  to 
transparency and accountability and from integrity of electoral conduct to resilience to risks and threats 
growing societal polarisation.  

The final report of Election-Watch.EU349 included 21 recommendations. The recommendations focused 
on harmonisation of rules and procedures at EU level, intensifying collaborative efforts to advance the 
pending electoral reforms and harmonising different aspects of elections, including voter registration, 
conditions  for  candidacy  and  electoral  campaign  regulations  across  all  Member  States.  The  lack  of 
uniformity  in  national  electoral  regulations  and  the  differing  timelines  for  key  electoral  processes 

343 France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
344 Slovenia and Sweden. 
345 Sweden. 
346 Spain. 
347 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, European Parliament Elections, 6-9 June 
2024: Final Report, 28 November 2024. 
348 Election-Watch.eu, Election Assessment Mission to the 2024 European Parliament Elections, 10 June 2024. 
349  Election-Watch.EU,  Election  Assessment  Mission,  Final  Report,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June 
2024, September 2024. 

78 

 
 
 
impact  adversely  the  equality  of  rights  and  opportunities.  Advance  and  alternative  voting  methods 
should  be  uniformly  available,  and  that  could  enable  participation  of  persons  with  disabilities. 
Recommendations also highlight civic and voter education to young and first-time voters and increasing 
participation and representation of women. 

Election-Watch.EU  also  addressed  among  others  inclusivity,  including  of  persons  with  disabilities, 
highlighting the importance of the following measures: ensure physical accessibility of polling stations, 
provide election information in multiple accessible formats, train election staff, deploy assistive tools 
and technologies, and engage with Disabled Persons Organisations.  

For inclusion of disadvantaged communities, increased awareness raising for electoral participation of 
national  minorities,  including  the  Roma,  and  of  other  underprivileged  groups,  Election-Watch  EU 
highlighted that further special measures for their participation, would be needed, as well as the use of 
minority languages for electoral materials and voter information. 

Other recommendations of Election-Watch cover topics such as limitations to election observation and 
judicial redress, campaign finance oversight and oversight authorities and bodies, media pluralism and 
freedom,  implementation  of  online  rules  freedom  of  expression  and  journalistic  freedom  including 
protection  from  false  defamation  accusations.  In  addition,  detailed  election  results  should  be 
consistently published, including polling station data, the number of invalid votes, and data on voter 
demographics such as double citizens. 

79 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 

Respondents to European Commission Survey   
Questionnaire on the conduct of the 2024 European Parliament Elections - For political parties  

European Political Parties   

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

European Conservatives and Reformists  
European Democratic Party  
European Free Alliance  
European Green Party  
European People's Party  
Party of European Socialists  

National Political Parties   
Country  
Austria   

Belgium  
Croatia  

Czechia  

Estonia  
Finland  

France  

Greece  

Italy  

Luxembourg  

Latvia  
Netherlands  

Party   
Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative  
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs  
NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum  
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)  
Voor U  
Pokret za modernu Hrvatsku  
HRVATSKA SOCIJALNO-LIBERALNA STRANKA (HSLS)  
PRAVEDNA HRVATSKA  
Social Democratic Party of Croatia  
ALIANCE NÁRODNÍCH SIL  
ČSSD - Česká suverenita sociální demokracie  
Mimozemstani  
Starostové a nezávislí - STAN  
Social Democrats  
Vasemmistoliitto  
Vihreä liitto r.p.  
Swedish People's Party of Finland  
Pour Une Autre Europe  
Europe Démocratie Espéranto  
Patriots.eu  
DIMOKRATES ANDREAS LOVERDOS  
PATRIOTES - PRODROMOS EMFIETZOGLOU  
ΚΙΝΗΜΑ ΕΘΝΙΚΗΣ ΑΝΕΞΑΡΤΗΣΙΑΣ  
Friendship Equality and Peace Party (Κόμμα Ισότητας και 
Φιλίας)  
PASOK - Kinima Allagis  
ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΟ ΠΑΤΡΙΩΤΙΚΟ ΚΙΝΗΜΑ "ΝΙΚI"  
Rassemblement Valdôtain  
SINISTRA ITALIANA (AVS - ALLEAZA VERDI 
SINISTRA)  
Partito Democratico  
ALTERNATIVA POPOLARE  
Demokratesch Partei - DP  
CSV - Chrëschtlech-Sozial Vollekspartei  
Déi gréng  
Déi Lénk  
Sociāldemokrātiskā partija "Saskaņa"  
European Christian Political Movement  

80 

 
 
  
  
Poland  
Portugal  
Slovenia  

Spain  

Sweden  

.  

Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej  
Nós, Cidadãos!  
Gibanje Svoboda  
Levica  
NIČ OD TEGA  
Nova Slovenija - krščanski demokrati  
Dobra država  
SLOVENSKA LJUDSKA STRANKA  
Vesna - zelena stranka  
CEUS-Coalición por una Europa solidaria / EAJ-PNV  
Volt España  
Kristna Värdepartiet  
Valsamverkanspartiet  
Moderata Samlingspartiet (Moderaterna)  
Värdigt Liv  
Willy Tiger  
Liberalerna  
Socialdemokraterna  

81