COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament
Date: 2025-06-06
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: European Parliament, European election, European electoral system, data processing, disinformation, election result, organisation of elections, parliamentary election, right to stand for election, right to vote

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 6.6.2025  COM(2025) 287 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on the 2024 elections to the European Parliament {SWD(2025) 147 final}  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

Elections are  at the core of democracy and the  elections to the European Parliament are among the 
world’s largest democratic exercises. They should follow the highest democratic standards. 

Between  6  and  9  June  2024,  European  citizens  directly  elected  720  Members  of  the  European 
Parliament (MEPs) from around 18 400 candidates1. In casting their vote, they help to build a shared 
European  identity,  bound  together  by  our  rich  and  varied  cultural  tapestry.  People  with  disparate 
cultures, complex histories and differing perspectives all came together at the same time to articulate 
their wish for an entire EU of 27 countries. Of nearly 360 million eligible voters, approximately 180 
million votes were cast across the EU2.  

The turnout (50.74%) closely mirrored that of the 2019 elections, demonstrating the continued vibrancy 
of our democracy. When EU citizens exercise their electoral rights, it ensures that their voice is heard 
and gives them the opportunity to shape the political agenda. Europeans are very much aware of the 
importance of these elections3, and trust in European parliamentary democracy is at an unprecedented 
high4.  

The 2024 elections were organised amidst major transformations being faced by democracies in the EU 
and  beyond.  Election  campaigns  have  moved  significantly  to  the  online  sphere  with  social  media 
playing  an  increasingly  important  role.  As  highlighted  in  the  Commission’s  European  Democracy 
Action Plan5, this has brought new opportunities for direct interactions between political actors and 
voters. It can encourage democratic engagement and is also particularly effective in terms of involving 
young people in the democratic life. At the same time, the prevalence of campaigning online has also 
resulted in the need to mitigate specific risks. There is a higher need to address challenges such as those 
posed by cyber-threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), disinformation or by 
the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, than before. In this context, citizens show a high 
level  of  concern  about  various  forms  of  interference  in  elections,  including  through  disinformation 
(78%), cyber attacks (72%) or the covert influence of foreign countries (70%)6.  

The  main  responsibilities  regarding  elections  are  for the  Member  States.  It  is  their  competence and 
responsibility  to  lay  down  the  specific  conditions  for  the  conduct  and  organisation  of  elections,  in 
accordance with their national legislation, international obligations and applicable EU law, and their 
authorities  and courts  have  primary responsibility  for  exercising  oversight  and  ensuring compliance 
with  the  relevant  rules.  For  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  certain  common  principles  and 
procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act7 and the rules enabling mobile EU 

1 As reported by the Civil Society Organisation and Election Observer Network Election-Watch.EU. 
2 Eurostat, Persons eligible to vote in the 2024 European Parliament elections by category of voters, last updated 
2 August 2024. Related metadata: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/demo_popep_esms.htm. 
3 EP Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote - Countdown to the European elections: More than 26 000 respondents 
in all EU Member States. Findings of this survey suggest that EU citizens are very much aware of the 
importance of the elections in the current geopolitical context, with more than eight in ten (81%) agreeing that 
it makes voting even more important. 
4 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. Findings of this survey show that trust in European parliamentary democracy is 
particularly high at the beginning of the tenth EP parliamentary term: 42% of the citizens hold a positive image 
of the European Parliament - the highest result recorded since the question was first asked. 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European democracy action plan, COM/2020/790 
final, 3 December 2020. 
6 2023 Eurobarometer on citizenship and democracy. For more details see Staff Working Document. 
7 Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ L 218, 
8.10.1976. 

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citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the European Parliament in their 
country of residence.  

EU action in support of free and fair elections offers important added value. Since 2019, as part of a 
broader effort to promote and strengthen democracy, the EU has reinforced its support to Member States 
in  this  field.  Initiatives  such  as  those  under  the  2020  European  Democracy  Action  Plan,  the  2021 
package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections in the EU8, and the 
2023 Defence of Democracy package9 provide new tools to reinforce the resilience of democracies and 
elections in the EU.  

As  part  of  this  work,  the  December  2023  Commission  Recommendation  on  inclusive  and  resilient 
elections (hereafter,  ‘the  2023  Recommendation  on elections’)10,  provides an  important  blueprint to 
support the preparations for and conduct of elections. It is addressed to Member States, European and 
national political parties, political foundations, and campaign organisations in the context of preparation 
for elections in the EU, including the 2024 elections to the European Parliament. 

The  EU  toolbox  also includes  several legislative and regulatory measures  which  are relevant  in  the 
electoral context, including the Digital Services Act (DSA)11 and its Guidelines on the mitigation of 
systemic  risks  for  electoral  processes12,  the  Regulation  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political 
advertising13 and the Artificial Intelligence Act14.  

Preparations for the 2024 elections to the European Parliament saw unprecedented cooperation between 
the Member States, EU institutions and stakeholders. On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the 
Council activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements in information-sharing 
mode in relation to foreign interference in the 2024 European elections15, which aided the exchange of 
information among Member States and EU institutions.  

The European Cooperation Network on Elections16 (ECNE), a network supported by the Commission 
and consisting of national contact points appointed by Member States, held a wide range of thematic 
sessions  on  free,  fair  and  resilient  elections,  sharing  best  practices  and  information,  with  the 
participation  of  the  European  Parliament.  Cooperation  between  ECNE  and  other  EU  networks  took 
place,  as  well  as  engagement  with  a  broad  range  of  stakeholders  including  elections  observers.  In 
addition, a wide range of initiatives and cooperation structures were activated with new ones being set 
up to tackle threats such as  FIMI, disinformation, cybersecurity threats  or other issues affecting the 
integrity of elections. This includes for example the ad hoc Working Group in the European Board of 

8 European Commission, European Democracy: Commission sets out new laws on political advertising, electoral 
rights and party funding, 25 November 2021. 
9 European Commission, Defence of Democracy – Commission proposes to shed light on covert foreign influence, 
12 December 2023. 
10  Commission  Recommendation  (EU)  2023/2829  of  12  December  2023  on  inclusive  and  resilient  electoral 
processes  in  the  Union  and  enhancing  the  European  nature  and  efficient  conduct  of  the  elections  to  the 
European Parliament, presented as part of the Defence of Democracy Package, OJ L, 2023/2829, 20.12.2023. 
11 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single 
Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act), OJ L 277, 27.10.2022. 
12 European Commission, Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for 
electoral processes, 26 April 2024. 
13 Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the 
transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024. 
14 Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, 
(EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 
2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024.  
15 Council of the European Union, Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead of 
the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024. 
16 European Commission, European cooperation network on elections website. 

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Digital Services under the DSA, or the dedicated Taskforce of the European Digital Media Observatory, 
as well as the Expert group on electoral matters17. 

The  European  Parliament  actively  supported  the  smooth  conduct  of  the  2024  elections,  with  a 
communication strategy aimed at supporting and complementing Member States actions and providing 
a European perspective to the elections. The European Parliament also took specific measures to combat 
disinformation,  taking  an  approach  focusing  on  proactive  communication,  resilience-building, 
situational awareness and rapid response, ensuring a secure information environment for all EU citizens.  

In  its  Conclusions  on  democratic  resilience  and  safeguarding  electoral  processes  from  all  forms  of 
foreign  interference18,  the  Council  invited  the  Commission  to  thoroughly  analyse  the  lessons  to  be 
learned from the 2024 elections to the European Parliament19. In June 2024, the Council also approved 
Council Conclusions on enhancing and protecting free, open and informed democratic debate20.  

The  measures  taken  by  each  EU  institution  and  the  Member  States,  as  well  as  the  unprecedented 
cooperation between them, helped to ensure that the elections ran smoothly overall, without any major 
incidents,  despite  challenges  such  as  an  increase  in  EU-related  disinformation21  or  the  detection  of 
various cases of FIMI activity22. 

This  report  reviews  the  conduct  of  the  2024  elections23.  It  is  based  on  a  wide  variety  of  sources, 
including Commission surveys24 returned by Member States and European and national political parties, 
a call for evidence25, direct feedback from citizens and reports from election observers and civil society 
organisations.  Detailed  findings  and  an  overview  of  sources  are  set  out  in  the  accompanying  Staff 
Working Document. 

2.  PARTICIPATION IN THE 2024 ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  

2.1.  Turnout  

In the June 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the overall turnout remained stable at 50.74%, 
confirming  the  positive  trend  of  the  2019  elections26.  There  were  however  substantial  differences 
between Member States, ranging from 89.01% in Belgium27 to 21.35% in Croatia. Turnout increased 

17 Register of Commission Expert Groups and other Similar Entities, Expert group on electoral matters - Right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in elections for the EP and in municipal elections (E00617). 
18 Council of the European Union, Democratic resilience: Council approves conclusions on safeguarding electoral 
processes from foreign interference, 21 May 2024. 
19  The  Council  also  invited  the  Commission  to  ‘present  comprehensive  feedback  to  the  Council  on  the 
effectiveness of the relevant mechanisms, networks, tools and measures, and report on  any issues and gaps 
identified in the available tools so that they can be rectified’. 
20  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Council  conclusions  on  enhancing  and  protecting  free, open  and  informed 
democratic debate, 14 June 2024. 
21 European Digital Media Observatory, EDMO Task Force on EU elections 2024, 26 July 2024. 
22 EEAS, 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Exposing the 
architecture of FIMI operations, March 2025. 
23  An  initial  assessment  of  known  interference  operations  during  the  June  2024  elections  for  the  European 
Parliament  was  already  presented  by  Vice-President  for  Values  and  Transparency,  Věra  Jourová,  in  October 
2024. 
24 The Commission received responses to specific surveys from 25 Member States, 6 European Political Parties 
and almost 60 national political parties. 
25 The call for evidence was online from 6 November to 4 December 2024. 
26 In 2019, turnout amounted to 50.66% of eligible voters.  
27 In Belgium, voting is compulsory. Voting is also compulsory in Bulgaria, Greece and Luxembourg. More 
information on possible reasons explaining higher or lower turnout can be found in the Staff Working 
Document. 

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in 15 Member States28, with double-digit increases on the 2019 figures in Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, and significant increases in countries where turnout was previously low, such as Czechia, 
the Netherlands and Portugal. Meanwhile, turnout fell in 11 Member States29, including by double digits 
in Greece, Spain and Lithuania. There were also significant decreases in Denmark, Italy, Poland and 
Croatia.  

Three months before the elections, the European Parliament’s spring 2024 Eurobarometer survey30 had 
found that 60% of Europeans expressed an interest in the 2024 elections. This represented an increase 
of +11 percentage points compared to the survey of spring 2019, ahead of the previous elections to the 
European Parliament. Europeans also indicated they were very much aware of the importance of the 
elections in the ongoing geopolitical context. However, this overall increased interest in the elections 
to the European Parliament was not reflected in a significantly higher turnout compared to 2019.  

The European Parliament’s post-election survey31 showed that the main topics eventually motivating 
EU citizens to vote were rising prices and the cost of living (42%), followed by the general economic 
situation  (41%).  Voting  also  seems  to  have  become  a  democratic  habit  for  many,  while  non-
participation may be explained by reasons related to political engagement (such as a lack of trust or 
dissatisfaction  with  politics).  Socio-economic  conditions  and  level  of  education  also  continue  to 
influence turnout32. 

2.2.  Informing about the elections, engaging with and communicating to citizens, 

and supporting electoral rights  

Informing citizens and engaging with them as regards the European dimension of the elections, their 
electoral rights and the applicable electoral process empowers them to make informed electoral choices. 
National authorities, the European Parliament and the Commission, other EU institutions, bodies and 
agencies,  as  well  as  other  stakeholders  including  civil  society  organisations,  took  a  wide  range  of 
initiatives to inform, engage and communicate ahead of the 2024 elections.  

The European Parliament’s campaign sought to provide a European perspective to the elections and 
showing democracy in action.  The main and final phase of the campaign centred on the call for action: 
‘Use  your  vote,  or  others  will  decide  for  you’.  The  dedicated  ‘one-stop-shop’  website  for  the  2024 
elections33  (EE24  website)  provided  comprehensive  information  covering  organisation  and  voting 
processes in the Member States. It was organised in close cooperation with the Commission. 

The  Commission  also  approached  the  2024  elections  as  a  communication  priority.  Recognising  the 
shared  interest  in  a  resilient  democracy  and  the  common  responsibility  for  the  EU’s  democratic 
legitimacy, it complemented and supported the European Parliament’s communication efforts as part 
of a joint interinstitutional effort. 

The Commission communicated with impact both on the proactive and the defensive side. Extensive 
communication on the concrete results and benefits of its work for citizens during the previous mandate 
supported awareness of what was at stake. The Commission complemented these efforts by providing 
factual information to citizens about the elections, their electoral rights and the importance of voting. 

28 In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout increased in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Germany, Ireland, 
France, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia compared to the 
previous elections in 2019. In Estonia, turnout remained stable. 
29  In  the  2024  European  Parliament  elections  turnout  decreased  in  Denmark,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Austria, Poland, Finland and Sweden compared to the previous elections in 2019.  
30 EP Spring 2024 Survey: Use your vote - Countdown to the European elections: More than 26 000 respondents 
in all EU Member States. 
31 EU Post-electoral survey 2024. 
32 EU Post-electoral survey 2024; see also Staff Working Document for more details. 
33 European Parliament, European Elections 6-9 June 2024, last accessed 12 March 2025. 

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In  this  context,  it  activated  its  networks  and  different  groups  of  multipliers  and  helped  to  grow  the 
European Parliament’s ‘together.eu for democracy’-community. Young and first-time voters were an 
important target audience for EU-level activities, as were ‘mobile EU citizens’ (EU citizens who have 
moved to another Member State to work, live or study). The Commission also supported and amplified 
the European Parliament’s ‘Use your vote’-campaign through all its channels. Communication activities 
of  the  Commission  also  focused  on  preventing  and  tackling  FIMI,  including  disinformation,  as 
explained further in Section 4.2. 

Examples of specific communication activities ahead of the elections34  

•  The  ‘one-stop-shop’  EE24  website included practical  information, campaigning  materials 
and a dedicated helpline from the Commission’s Europe Direct Contact Centre (‘EDCC’) 
coordinated closely with the EP’s AskEP service (see Section 5.1 for more on the helpline). 
•  The  campaign’s  hero  video35  made  by  the  European  Parliament  gained  over  3.7  million 
impressions and 100 000 interactions across all social media platforms on the Commission’s 
central accounts. 

•  The  campaign  also  featured  unprecedented  cooperation  with  Member  States  via  the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections, which reviewed and verified the information 
on electoral procedures disseminated through EU channels. In this way, voters could easily 
obtain reliable information in support of their electoral rights.  

•  The  Commission  complemented  the  broad  ‘Use  your  vote’  campaign  with  a  targeted 
information  campaign  for  mobile  EU  citizens  living  in  another  EU  Member  State  or  the 
United Kingdom. This campaign was run by the Commission and the European Parliament 
and achieved a total cumulative reach of 24 million across two waves.  

•  Various  groups  of  multipliers  were  activated  such  as  influencers  and  content  creators, 
generating  41  000  engagements  with  an  estimated  reach  of  3  million  people.  The 
Commission  also  organised  an  event  with  influencers  during  its  dedicated  campaign 
targeting EU mobile citizens. 

•  Commission  Representations’  communication  actions  generated  a  total  reach  of  213.5 

million citizens, excluding social media. 

•  Commission Services, including the Representations, and Commission networks organised 
4  319  events  with  around  3.5  million  participants.  The  Europe  Direct  network  alone 
contributed with 3 185 events and 955 500 participants. 

•  The dissemination of information was supported through the ‘Guide to EU citizenship’36.  

The Commission used available funding to support national authorities and civil society organisations 
in implementing projects to encourage EU citizens to get involved in the democratic process, including 
under  the  Citizens,  Equality,  Rights and  Values  (CERV)  programme.  Between 2021  and  2024,  two 
CERV  strands  allocated  EUR  26.5  million  to  finance  46  projects  aimed  at  encouraging  European 
citizens to get involved in the democratic process and promoting and enhancing the exercise of  EU 
citizenship rights. 

The Member States also engaged in communication activities. In response to the survey launched by 
the  Commission,  most  Member  States  reported  having  engaged  in  numerous  awareness  raising 

34 See also Staff Working Document. 
35 European Parliament, Use your vote or other will decide for you campaign,  last accessed 18 February 2025. 
36 European Commission, Guide to EU citizenship, 06 December 2023. 8 Member States explicitly reported having 
used the Guide in their national communication efforts. 

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activities,  by  carrying  out  broad  communication  strategies,  developing  communication  kits  or 
programmes of public engagement, or supporting citizens’ participation by providing helplines37. 

The engagement of Member States and cooperation among and with the EU institutions was crucial for 
the impact of the communication campaign. The 2024 campaign was a cohesive, pan-European effort, 
promoting  the  importance  of  democracy  and  voting.  An  unprecedented  degree  of  cooperation  was 
observed, under the lead of the European Parliament, with a total of 4 487 institutional partners involved 
in  promoting  the  elections  (including  European,  national  and  regional  organisations).  These 
partnerships  made  it  possible  to  carry  out  joint  digital  campaigns  and  shared  public  information 
initiatives, and to take a coordinated approach to voter mobilisation efforts.  

2.3.  Participation  of  specific  groups:  young  people,  women,  persons  with 

disabilities, mobile EU citizens and other groups 

The inclusion of all groups is an essential element of healthy democracies. Every citizen should have 
real opportunities to choose their elected representatives. In general, the 2024 elections remained stable 
in terms of the inclusiveness of electoral participation and elected candidates. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections calls on Member States to take measures in support of broad 
turnout, including by providing the necessary information to citizens. The Recommendation provides 
that it is necessary for Member States and political parties to support the participation in elections, as 
voters  and  as  candidates,  of  all  groups  of  citizens,  taking  into  account  their  specific  needs  and 
challenges.  

Young people 

Overall, the participation of young people did not improve in 2024 compared to 2019. In most Member 
States,  citizens  can  vote  in  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  from  the  age  of  18.  The  2024 
elections saw more Member States lowering the voting age and allowing citizens to vote from 16 years 
old (Belgium, Germany, Malta and Austria)38. One country (Greece) gives citizens the right to vote 
from 17 years old39. There are also differences in the minimum age to stand as a candidate40.  

In the lead-up to the 2024 elections, Member States made specific efforts to increase young people’s 
participation, both as voters and candidates. 15 of the 25 Member States that replied to the Commission 
survey indicated that they had placed a specific emphasis on young people or first-time voters when it 
came to promoting easy access to the exercise of electoral rights41.  

Political parties also took measures to support turnout by young people. Of almost 60 national political 
parties that replied to the survey, around 57% explicitly reported that they had addressed first-time and 
young  voters42.  Young  people  were  also  a  specific  target  audience  of  the  interinstitutional 
communication campaigns. 

37 For more details see Staff Working Document. 
38 In the 2019 European Parliament elections, this was not yet the case for Belgium and Germany. 
39 Cyprus also approved a bill conferring voting rights to 17-year-olds in January 2025, which will apply as of the 
next national parliamentary elections in May 2026. 
40  Most  Member  States  requiring  candidates  to  be  18  years  old.  In  some  other  countries  it  is  21  (Bulgaria, 
Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia), 23 (Romania) or 25 (Greece and Italy). 
See also Briefing by the Parliament on the 2024 European elections, including an overview of the legal framework 
for the elections, February 2024. 
41  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Germany,  Ireland,  Greece,  France,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Malta, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland.  
42 For example by creating music and video content that appealed to young audiences, organising special 
events and targeted campaigns, and partnering with influencers. 

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Despite these efforts, and despite the fact that prior to the elections more than 6 in 10 (64%) young EU 
citizens (15-30) had expressed their intention to vote43, only 36% of those aged 15-24 (if eligible) and 
46% of those aged 25-39 actually voted in the 2024 elections. This represents a decrease of 6 percentage 
points since 2019, partially offsetting the 14 percentage points increase between 2014 and 2019.  

Age remains a determining factor in turnout, with older people still more likely to vote than young 
people. According to the February 2025 Youth survey44, the most common reasons for young people 
not  having  voted  in  the  2024  elections  were  other  commitments  (16%)  and  not  having  enough 
information to make a choice (16%), followed by not finding any relatable candidate or political party 
that represented their views (15%) and a general distrust or dissatisfaction with politicians and politics 
(15%). Age also determines when EU citizens decide to vote, with young voters more often deciding 
only a few weeks or even days before the elections whether they will vote or not45. 

In terms of representation (elected candidates) young people (under the age of 40) hold only 19.17% of 
the seats in the new European Parliament with 138 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), which 
is also a decrease compared to 2019 when they held 21% of the seats. 

Women 

The  participation  of  women  as  voters  in  the  2024  European  elections  fell  slightly  compared  to  the 
elections in 2019 (by one percentage point). While female representation in the European Parliament 
has more than doubled since the first direct elections in 1979, in 2024 the share of women decreased by 
0.9 percentage points, compared to the 2019 elections46. This is the first time that the representation of 
women in the European Parliament has fallen. Women make up only 38.5 % of all MEPs. Furthermore, 
there remain major differences between Member States in terms of elected female MEPs47.  

Responses to the Commission survey from Member States and political parties also revealed significant 
variations in efforts to promote gender equality in the conduct of the 2024 elections across Member 
States. Currently, 11 Member States have laid down quotas in their national legislation and some go 
further by alternating women and men on candidate lists (‘zipped lists’)48.  

Practices  by  Member  States  promoting  women’s  participation  included  the  organization  of  specific 
events  and  political  debates  on  the  topic,  linking  public  funding  to  the  promotion  of  political 
participation  by  women,  and  awareness  raising  campaigns.  Political  parties  reported  having taken  a 
variety of measures to support gender equality, such as encouraging gender balance on electoral lists 
and in governing bodies. At the same time, data collection, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms vary 
greatly across Member States.  

At the same time, the Commission’s Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men 
raised concerns on specific challenges women encountered, such as an unequal distribution of TV media 
space between male and female candidates in specific Member States. 

In the run-up to the elections, a rise in online gender-based disinformation about female EU leaders and 
candidates  was  observed.  Such  challenges  can  force  women  out  of  the  political  sphere  altogether, 
impacting democracy and women’s participation in the political arena49 (more information on violence 
against candidates can be found in Section 4.7). 

43 Eurobarometer, Youth and democracy, May 2024. 
44 Eurobarometer, Youth survey 2024, February 2025.  
45 Eurobarometer, EU post-electoral survey 2024, October 2024. 
46 Following the 2019 elections, women represented 39.4% of members of the European Parliament. This figure 
corresponds with the gender balance of MEPs after the redistribution of seats post-Brexit (2020). 
47 The share of elected female MEPs ranges from 62% in Sweden to 0% in Cyprus, with an EU average of 39%. 
48 Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and Slovenia. 
49 Global Disinformation Index, Gendered Disinformation in the European Parliamentary Elections, June 10 2024. 

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Persons with disabilities 

More than 100 million people in the EU have some form of a disability50. Some improvements in their 
participation in the EU elections were observed.  

Following up on the Commission’s 2021-2030 Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities51 
and  the  2023  Recommendation  on  elections,  a  wide  range  of  measures  have  been  taken  to  foster 
participation in elections by persons with disabilities. This is all the more important as an accessible 
voting environment can improve everyone’s voting experience, and therefore ultimately benefits the 
whole of society.   

Most  Member  States  took  specific  measures  to  support  participation  in  elections  by  persons  with 
disabilities52. These include providing voters with specific tools such as magnifiers, large printouts of 
the ballot or candidate lists, tactile markings, audio information or ballots  containing information in 
Braille  format.  Member  States  also  provided  accessible  election information  or specific training  for 
polling  staff  on  election  accessibility.  These  efforts,  among  others,  were  supported  by  dedicated 
discussion and close cooperation with the European Cooperation Network on Elections53, and at the 
October 2023 High-Level Event on elections54. On 6 December 2023, the Commission published the 
Guide  on  good  electoral  practices  in  Member  States  addressing  the  participation  of  citizens  with 
disabilities55. 20 of the 25 Member States that responded to the Commission’s survey explicitly stated 
they had made use of this guide. The EE24 website also placed an emphasis on accessibility.  

Election observers reported that participation by persons with disabilities improved in 2024, thanks to 
alternative  voting  measures,  better  polling  station  accessibility  and  ballot  readability  for  example56. 
However, they noted that it still varies between Member States. Certain barriers to political participation 
for  persons  with  disabilities  remain,  including  due  to  a  lack  of  or  insufficient  accessibility57. 
Furthermore, persons with disabilities are still underrepresented as MEPs58. 

Mobile EU citizens 

Mobile EU citizens (EU citizens who have moved to another Member State to work, live or study) have 
the right to vote and stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament in their Member State 
of residence under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State, in line with EU law59.  

50 Council of the European Union, Disability in the EU: facts and figures, last updated 18 February 2025. 
51  Communication  from  the  European  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,  Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030, COM(2021) 101 final, 3 March 2021. 
52 A wide range of national good practices is highlighted in the Staff Working Document.  
53 Meetings of 16 January, 29 March and 27 September 2023. 
54 European Commission, High-level event on Elections, 23 October 2023.  
55 European Commission,  Guide of good electoral practices in  Member States addressing the participation of 
citizens with disabilities in the electoral process, 06 December 2023. 
56 See Staff Working Document. 
57 The Recommendation on elections called on Member States to support the electoral participation of persons 
with  disabilities,  both  as  voters  and  candidates,  and  prevent  and  remove  the  barriers  they  encounter  when 
participating  in  elections,  including  the  blanket  removal  of  electoral  rights  of  persons  with  intellectual  and 
psycho-social disabilities without individual assessment and possibility of judicial review. 
58 While official figures are not available, it is estimated that there are three MEPs with disabilities in the new 
Parliament compared to seven in the previous Parliament, as indicated by the Vice-Chair of the Employment and 
Social Affairs Committee Katrin Langensiepen.  
59 This right, enshrined in Article 22(2) TFEU and Article 39(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is given 
effect in Council Directive 93/109/EC of 6 December 1993 laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise 
of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for citizens of the Union 
residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals, OJ L 329, 30.12.1993, p. 34–38. Mobile EU citizens 

8 

 
 
 
 
Member  States  took  multiple  measures  to  promote  the  electoral  rights  of  mobile  EU  citizens  (who 
account  for  14  million  people60),  including  targeted  information  campaigns61  using  a  variety  of 
languages,  and  in  certain  cases  developing  specific  leaflets  or  digital  supports,  or  partnering  with 
specialised  organisations.  Mobile  EU  citizens  were  also  a  specific  target  audience  of  the 
interinstitutional communication campaigns at EU level. 

However, despite these efforts, turnout among mobile EU citizens appears to have remained lower than 
that of nationals, although the availability of relevant data varies greatly between Member States. Data 
received from Member States shows that the registration of mobile EU citizens in the Member States 
of residence remains low across the EU from 0.28% of registrations in Latvia to 22.03% in France. 
There are also positive signs, however. For example, in Luxembourg, despite the proportion of mobile 
EU citizens registering to vote in the elections only being around 17.82% for 2024, this is the highest 
number ever recorded in Luxembourg. This figure has consistently increased since 1994, when it was 
just 7.4%. Most Member States do not collect data on the turnout of mobile EU citizens who registered 
to vote. Where data are available, turnout of mobile EU citizens ranges from one third to two thirds of 
those who had registered. 

On the basis of the data available, 135 mobile EU citizens exercised their right to stand as a candidate 
in the elections. This is roughly consistent with the figures of 168 candidates in 2019 and 170 in 2014 
as mobile EU citizens continue to represent approximately 1% of the total number of candidates that 
stood in the elections62. Two such MEPs were elected63.  

Other groups 

Certain  Member  States  reported  about  measures  they  have  taken  to  foster  electoral  inclusion  and 
representation of specific other groups64. Some civil society organisations have reported on challenges 
faced by such groups, including on the basis of demographic background or geographical location, such 
as people with a minority racial or ethnic background65. For example, while there is no official data, 
civil society organisations report that of the eight known Roma candidates (the largest ethnic minority 
in Europe) in the 2024 elections, none of them were elected66. 

2.4.  Key findings and follow-up measures 

The overall turnout and trends observed for various specific groups show the importance of continuing 
efforts  to  promote  a  high  participation.  There  should  be  continued  efforts  to  engage  all  citizens  in 
European  democracy,  and  to  encourage  democratic  participation,  including  by  supporting  effective 

may vote on the lists of their countries of origin in line with applicable national law (e.g. postal voting, voting at 
consular posts etc.). 
60  On  1  January  2024  there  were  13.974.500  mobile  EU  citizens.  EU  population  diversity  by  citizenship  and 
country of birth - Statistics Explained. 
61 20 Member States (Bulgaria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden) conducted 
targeted  information  campaigns  to  increase  awareness  of  electoral  rights  and  obligations  among  mobile  EU 
citizens. 
62  A  notable  change  compared  to  2019  is  the  reduction  in  the  number  of  Member  States  where  mobile  EU 
citizens stood as candidates, decreasing from 21 Member States in 2019 to 15 in 2024. 
63 This appears consistent compared to 2019, when 3 MEPs were elected in France and 2 in the United Kingdom. 
64 See Staff Working Document.  
65 The EU Anti-racism Action Plan 2020-2025 points out the Commission’s intention to work with European 
political parties, the European Cooperation Network on Elections and civil society to improve participation of 
groups susceptible to marginalisation, such as people with a racial or ethnic background. The 2023 
Recommendation on elections further indicates that “it is necessary to support the participation in elections, as 
voters and as candidates, of all groups of citizens, taking into account their specific needs and the challenges 
they are confronted with”. See further in Staff Working Document. 
66 See Staff Working Document.  

9 

 
 
 
information  campaigns,  leveraging  civil  society  initiatives  and  simplifying  procedures.  All  relevant 
stakeholders, including national authorities, political parties, EU institutions and other actors including 
civil society organisations should contribute to the achievement of these objectives.  

Measures should be taken to ensure that the high and increased interest in elections, and the fact that 
most citizens believe their voice counts in the EU67 is reflected in a higher turnout. The substantial 
differences in turnout between Member States (ranging from 89.01% to 21.35%) should be addressed, 
focusing efforts on countries with a persistently low turnout.  

As regards communication to support electoral rights, Member States should continue their efforts. 
A high level of collaboration between institutions, Member States, and other stakeholders will remain 
essential to driving effective information campaigns, promoting good practices, and enhancing citizens 
engagement and understanding of the electoral process. 

As regards participation by specific groups, the relevant measures of the 2023 Recommendation on 
elections should be followed up further by Member States and political parties.  

For young people in particular, support to exercise their electoral rights, both as voters and candidates, 
should be reinforced. Education, digital and media literacy and critical thinking should be promoted to 
further empower young people and encourage them to engage in European democracy and trust that 
exercising their electoral rights will ensure that their voice is heard. As outlined in the Union of Skills 
Communication68  and  the  Preparedness  Union  Strategy69,  building  skills  for life  is vital  to  ensuring 
democratic resilience. Based on a review of the Digital Education Action Plan, the Commission will 
present a 2030 Roadmap on the future of digital education and skills to promote equal access to digital 
education for all70.  

Accessible and diverse voting options are also important to support turnout of young citizens. Member 
States, political parties and other entities including schools, universities, youth associations and civil 
society organisations, could also further promote youth-friendly policies and procedures, and provide 
training and resources for young candidates.  

The best possible use should be made of EU instruments aimed at enhancing youth citizens’ democratic 
engagement. A new preparedness priority will be created  under EU youth programmes, such as the 
European  Solidarity  Corps  and  Erasmus+,  to  promote  preparedness,  resilience,  participation  in 
democratic life and civic engagement.  

As  announced  in  the  Political  Guidelines  of  the  President  of  the  Commission  for  2024-202971,  a 
Presidents’ Youth Advisory Board will be set up. All Commissioners have already organised a first 
edition of the annual Youth Policy Dialogues within the first 100 days of their mandate. For example, 
the Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection, Commissioner 
McGrath, has already met with young people specifically to discuss how democratic participation of 
young people, including in elections, could be improved72.   

67 As shown in the European Parliament’s Spring 2024 Eurobarometer. 
68 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Union of Skills, 
COM(2025)90 final, 5 March 2025. 
69 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Preparedness Union 
Strategy, JOIN(2025)130 final, 26 March 2025.  
70 An initiative on AI in education and training will also lay down an AI literacy framework and support the 
integration of AI in the provision of in education and training. Teachers will have access to resources and 
professional development opportunities on the European School Education Platform. 
71 Ursula von der Leyen, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029, 18 July 2024. 
72 Youth Policy Dialogue with Commissioner Michael McGrath on democratic empowerment, 10 March 2025. 

10 

 
 
 
As regards women, more needs to be done to achieve gender equality in politics, at both EU and national 
level. Women need to be further empowered to participate in political life. Women’s full participation 
in  all  aspects  of  the  political  process  is  essential  to  building  strong,  representative  and  resilient 
democracies.  Women  need  to  be  better  protected  against  threats  (including  online)  targeting  them, 
which can limit their participation as candidates. Political parties have a central role to play in achieving 
this objective and should increase their efforts. More generally, further supporting measures at national 
level should be planned. At EU level, the Commission has recently presented a Roadmap for Women’s 
Rights73 which will help frame the work on a new Gender Equality Strategy, updating action on all 
issues affecting women, including their participation in politics. Support to improve safety of candidates 
and elected representatives should be enhanced (see Section 4.7 and 4.8). 

Continued efforts to facilitate the exercise of electoral rights by mobile EU citizens are also important, 
including the need for Member States to carry out more targeted information campaigns in multiple 
languages  and  ensure  simplified  registration  processes.  Finding  an  agreement  on  the  recast  of  the 
Directive on voting rights of mobile EU citizens (currently being discussed at interinstitutional level, 
see  Section  5.1)  is  essential  to  providing  a  more  robust  framework  to  support  the  exercise  of  these 
citizens’ electoral rights.  

Finally, all actors should continue to take active measures to meet the specific needs of certain groups, 
including  persons  with  disabilities.  The  Commission  is  preparing  a  progress  report  to  assess  the 
implementation of the 2021-2030 Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, including on the 
possible  gaps  and  barriers  that  remain  for  persons  with  disabilities  and,  if  deemed  necessary,  will 
propose  new  actions.  The  Commission  will  also,  among  others,  continue  to  work  on  the  full 
implementation of the EU Strategic Framework for Roma equality, inclusion and participation.  

3.  COOPERATION IN SUPPORT OF FREE, FAIR AND RESILIENT ELECTIONS 

3.1.  The  role  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections  and  other 

cooperation efforts 

Supporting  free  fair  and  resilient  elections  requires  a  whole-of-society  and  a  whole-of-government 
approach.   

Unprecedented  cooperation  took  place  to  support  the  resilience  of  the  2024  elections.  The  specific 
measures  taken  to  coordinate  responses  to  FIMI  and  disinformation,  but  also  on  cyberattacks,  the 
malicious use of AI and other threats are discussed in more detail in Section 4.1. 

The Commission has actively supported Member States’ authorities by organising regular meetings of 
the European Cooperation Network on Elections since early 2019. ECNE consists of national contact 
points appointed by Member  States  to represent  their  national  networks  on  elections and serve as  a 
liaison point between national and European levels of coordination. The Network has organised more 
than 25 meetings since 2019.  

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  calls  on  Member  States  to  strengthen  cooperation  on 
election-related matters in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. The 
Recommendation also refers to cooperation of this Network with other relevant European networks. 

ECNE  discussions  were  held  in  close  cooperation  with  other  structures  such  as  the  Rapid  Alert 
System74,  in  relation  to  FIMI,  and  the  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services 

73 European Commission, The EU Roadmap for Women’s rights, 7 March 2025. 
74 The Rapid Alert System is set up among the EU institutions and Member States to facilitate the sharing of 
insights related to disinformation campaigns and to coordinate responses. It consists of a dedicated digital 
platform and a network of 28 national contact points. 

11 

 
 
 
(ERGA)  in  relation  to  the  issues  within  its  remit75.  The  European  Data  Protection  Board  also 
participated  in  some  meetings  on  issues  related  to  the  application  of  EU  data  protection  law  in  the 
electoral context. 

Interactions were also fostered with international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  

In the lead-up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the work of the European Cooperation 
Network on Elections intensified. In October 2023, the Commission organized a High-Level Event on 
Elections with the membership of the Network. In November 2023, the Network took part in a joint 
tabletop exercise on cybersecurity of elections (see Section 4.5).  

In addition to regular meetings, in the run-up to the elections eight thematic sessions were organised in 
the  framework  of  the  Network,  including  on inclusive  participation  and communication,  countering 
disinformation and ensuring cybersecurity, the smooth organisation of voting for different groups of 
voters, and candidate safety76.   

Cooperation between Member States’ authorities was facilitated among others through a collaborative 
space, a mapping of the roles and responsibilities of different EU networks and bodies that support the 
organisation of free, fair and resilient elections to the European Parliament and contact lists to support 
operational exchanges during elections.  

3.2.  Key findings and follow-up measures 

Inclusive and resilient elections cannot be achieved by any one stakeholder acting alone. While elections 
to the European Parliament are organised at national level, a growing set of EU common references on 
free, fair and resilient elections, based on EU Treaties, EU law, soft law, best practices and cooperation 
frameworks is gradually emerging. These common references address the digital field and inclusive 
democratic participation. They also go beyond that, supporting preparedness. 

Reinforced mutual support and cooperation among Member States is now well established, centred on 
specific cooperation structures such as the European Cooperation Network on Elections which acts as 
a  focal  point,  and  drawing  on  the  EU  structures  to  promote  information  security  and  tackle 
disinformation and information manipulation, cooperating with other institutions and entities including 
the European Parliament.  

The result has been that challenges have been addressed more rapidly and in a more coordinated manner, 
contributing to collective electoral resilience in the EU. Enhanced cooperation for the EU elections can 
also have a positive spill-over effect on national elections.   

To effectively tackle an increasing number of evolving challenges, there is a need to further build on 
and strengthen this cooperation. The Commission will continue to foster a common approach in support 
of  free,  fair  and  resilient  elections,  gradually  moving  towards  enhanced  preparedness,  operational 
cooperation and capacity-building.  

75 A new independent European Board for Media Services, composed of representatives from the national media 
authorities or bodies and assisted by a Commission secretariat, was set up and became operational in February 
2025.  The  Board  replaces  the  European  Regulators  Group  for  Audiovisual  Media  Services  (ERGA)  that  was 
established under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. 
76 The Staff Working Document contains a detailed overview of meetings held.  

12 

 
 
 
4.  PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 

4.1.  Preparedness, monitoring and response 

Leading up to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, the Commission and other EU institutions 
launched several key actions to strengthen the EU’s preparedness and ability to respond to challenges 
to the integrity of the electoral process, in close collaboration and coordination with Member States and 
different entities, such as the media, fact-checkers and civil society organisations. This effort allowed 
those involved to share insights, exchange experiences and best practices and coordinate responses to 
FIMI and disinformation, as well as cyberattacks, the inappropriate use of AI and other threats. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections includes different recommendations on protecting the integrity 
and resilience of the electoral process. For example, it encourages Member States to take measures to 
protect  the  information  environment  around  elections  and  ensure  that  voters  receive  correct 
information. It recommends building resilience and developing public awareness, media literacy and 
critical  thinking  to  address  information  manipulation,  interference  and  disinformation  related  to 
elections. It also calls on Member States to develop training to relevant authorities and to facilitate 
cooperation  among  relevant  stakeholders  to  tackle  the  information  manipulation  risks.  It  also 
encourages  European  and  national  political  parties  to  consider  making  their  political  advertising 
available  with  information  about  the  identity  of  the  political  party  which  sponsors  it  and  where 
applicable, meaningful information about the targeting of the advertising and on the use of AI systems. 
The Recommendation also encourages Member States to take several measures to protect the election-
related infrastructure and ensure resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats.  

On 24 April 2024, the Belgian Presidency of the EU activated the Integrated Political Crisis Response 
(IPCR)  arrangements  in  information-sharing  mode  in  relation  to  foreign  interference  in  the  2024 
elections to the European Parliament77. Under the coordination of the Commission, this facilitated the 
exchange of information among Member States and EU institutions. Monitoring and response were also 
ensured through the Commission’s Network against Disinformation (NaD). 

The Vice-President of the Commission responsible for values and transparency visited several Member 
States to support preparedness for the 2024 elections as part of a Democracy Tour78.  

Member  States  had  continued  to  come  together  in  the  framework  of  the  European  Cooperation 
Network on Elections to discuss practical solutions to a wide range of threats. One of the operational 
tools that the Commission has made available to support Member States’ authorities in building their 
capacity  to  detect  and  react  appropriately  to  threats  in  the  context  of  elections  is  the  joint  election 
resilience  mechanism79.  That  mechanism  supports  exchanges  among  Member  State  experts,  which 
several Member States used in the run-up to the elections80. 

The European Parliament also stepped up its activities in this area and strengthened networks both 
internally and with other EU institutions, Member State authorities and external partners. For example, 
in December 2023, the European Parliament hosted an elections-themed meeting of the Rapid Alert 
System, with the  European Cooperation Network on Elections  and the Council Horizontal Working 
Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats (‘ERCHT’). The EE24 website included 
a section dedicated to integrity, providing practical tips.   

77 Council of the European Union, Foreign interference: Presidency reinforces exchange of information ahead of 
the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024. 
78 After the elections, the Vice-President presented an initial assessment of known interference operations 
during the June 2024 elections for the European Parliament which was presented to the European 
Cooperation Network on Elections. 
79 European Commission, European cooperation network on elections, last accessed 18 February 2025. 
80 See Staff Working Document for more details. 

13 

 
 
 
In the context of the implementation of Digital Services  Act (DSA), specific actions were taken to 
support election preparedness81. In this regard, the Commission issued guidelines on recommended risk 
mitigation measures  providers of very large online platforms  (VLOPs)  and very large  online  search 
engines (VLOSEs) should take to mitigate systemic risks related to elections82. As a follow-up to these 
guidelines, the Commission organised a stress test in the form of a tabletop exercise to prepare providers 
of VLOPs and VLOSEs, civil society organisations, Digital Services Coordinators (DSCs) from the 
Member  States,  and  other  stakeholders  for  information  manipulation  scenarios,  and  exercise 
coordinated responses within the framework of the DSA.  

At the time of the elections to the European Parliament, the Commission had also initiated proceedings 
under  the  DSA  against  Meta  and  X  for  matters  related  to  platforms  manipulation,  coordinated 
inauthentic behaviour and deceptive advertisements used to disseminate disinformation campaigns83. 
The Commission also sent several Requests for Information (RFIs) to designated providers of VLOPs 
and VLOSEs about election risk mitigation measures and disinformation84.  

During the first meeting of the European Board for Digital Services (EBDS) on 19 February 2024, 
an ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Elections’ was established, with the aim of gathering expertise of Digital 
Services Coordinators and competent authorities on electoral issues at the national level falling within 
the scope of the DSA, and to engage in dialogue and learn of country- and context-specific challenges85.  

The Code of Practice on Disinformation, the first worldwide industry-led framework in the digital 
field and source of industry best practices to limit the spread of online disinformation, also played a key 
role in supporting preparedness for the elections. Under the Code, online platforms signatories (Meta, 
TikTok, Google and Microsoft) made a series of commitments to tackle disinformation including in the 
context of elections. Signatories have implemented a series of actions to ensure preparedness during the 
electoral period, including enhanced cooperation with other civil society and factcheckers signatories. 

Building on the  Code’s  commitments,  the  signatories  also  implemented  a  Rapid  Response  System 
(RRS)86, which enabled non-platform signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or 
trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with 
the platforms in light of their respective policies.  

The  European  Digital  Media  Observatory  (‘EDMO’)  which  is  an  independent  network  of  fact-
checkers, researchers and media literacy practitioners covering all EU Member States set up a Taskforce 
dedicated to the 2024 elections to the European Parliament to monitor the European information space 
during  the  electoral  period87.  The  Task  Force  played  an  important  role  in  exposing  disinformation 
during  the  elections.  EDMO  issued  daily  briefs,  weekly  insights,  early  warnings  and  targeted 

81  A  report  dedicated  to  the  2024  elections  has  been  prepared  by  the  European  Board  of  Digital  Services 
Coordinators  listing the action taken  under the framework  of the Digital  Services Act (DSA) and the Code of 
Practice and by EDMO. European Board for Digital Services publishes post-election report on the EU elections, 29 
July 2024. 
82 European Commission, Guidelines for providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs on the mitigation of systemic risks for 
electoral processes, 26 April 2024. 
83 European Commission, Vera Jourova Memo, Known information interference operations during the June 2024 
elections for the European Parliament, October 2024.  
84 Supervision of the designated very large online platforms and search engines under DSA | Shaping Europe’s 
digital future.   
85 The Ad Hoc Working group has since been integrated into one of the permanent working groups of the 
EBDS., Working Group 4  – Integrity of the information space. See Working Group 4 of the European Board for 
Digital Services – Integrity of the information space | Shaping Europe’s digital future. 
86 Transparency Center, Code of Practice Signatories implement the Code’s commitment for a Rapid Response 
System ahead of EP elections.  
87 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EDMO Taskforce on 2024 European Elections. 

14 

 
 
 
investigations  during the electoral  period.  It  also ran a  dedicated  EU-wide media  literacy campaign 
#BeElectionsSmart, to raise awareness about the risks of disinformation around the 2024 elections. 

While  most  of  the  provisions  of  the  new  Regulation  on  transparency  and  targeting  of  political 
advertising88 will take effect as of 10 October 2025, within the scope of application of this Regulation, 
Article 3 (definitions) and Article 5 (provision of political advertising services in the Union), paragraph 
1 were already applicable during the elections to the European Parliament, ensuring in particular that 
political advertisement services would  not be restricted to a ‘European political party’ or a political 
group in the European Parliament, solely on the basis of its place of establishment. 

A series of actions were taken by the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Rapid Alert 
System, coordinated by the EEAS, supported cooperation across Member States, including during the 
elections to the European Parliament. Updates were regularly provided to the European Cooperation 
Network on Elections, which provides a comprehensive scope for cooperation regarding issues related 
to electoral processes.  

Finally,  in  2022  the  Council  had  adopted  the  Strategic  Compass  on  Security  and  Defence89,  which 
features an EU Hybrid Toolbox bringing together all the relevant instruments to tackle hybrid threats 
to elections, including the FIMI Toolbox90. 

4.2.  Foreign information manipulation and interference and disinformation 

The  Commission,  the  Parliament  and  the  EEAS,  closely  monitored  the  foreign  information 
manipulation  and  interference  and  disinformation  threats  before  and  during  the  elections  and 
coordinated responses, actively intervening to support a fair electoral space. Swift situational awareness 
updates were ensured through the IPCR. 

While there was an increase in the volume of information manipulation around the elections91, no large-
scale disinformation or information manipulation  incident or campaign was detected during election 
days.  

As of 8 April 2024, the EDMO Taskforce issued daily and weekly briefs describing the disinformation 
narratives being spread in the EU, with the inputs of its 14 regional hubs (covering 100% of the EU)92.  

Providers of online platforms reported under the Code of Practice on Disinformation on the measures 
taken to protect the integrity of electoral processes based on the Code’s commitments, and under the 
DSA’s transparency database93 on the number of content moderation decisions taken.   

According to EDMO’s estimates, EU-related disinformation increased from 5% in January to 15% in 
May 202494. The narratives identified as problematic sought to diminish trust in the organisation of the 
ballots or undermine the credibility of the results, and addressed topics of key social interest (such as 
Ukraine, climate change or migrants).  

88  Regulation  (EU)  2024/900  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  March  2024  on  the 
transparency and targeting of political advertising, OJ L, 2024/900.  
89 Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade, 21 March 
2022. 
90 EEAS, Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference, 14 November 2024. 
91 As confirmed by the activation of the Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements for addressing foreign 
interference.  Council  of  the  European  Union,  Foreign  interference:  Presidency  reinforces  exchange  of 
information ahead of the June 2024 European elections, 24 April 2024; see also  European Commission, Vera 
Jourova  Memo,  Known  information  interference  operations  during  the  June  2024  elections  for  the  European 
Parliament, October 2024.  
92 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), EU election Disinfo Bulletin. 
93 European Commission, DSA Transparency Database.  
94 European Digital Media Observatory, EDMO Task Force on EU elections 2024, 26 July 2024. 

15 

 
 
 
The EEAS regularly reported via its EUvsDisinfo website and social media accounts95 on attempts of 
election interference by Russia and its proxies. A dedicated series of articles96 and social media products 
were published in the months leading up to the elections to analyse, expose and pre-bunk Kremlin/ 
Russian state-affiliated actors’ deceptive narratives as well as tactics, techniques and procedures. The 
Russian malign activity focused on creating or stimulating splits and division in societies by spreading 
false  information  or  flooding  the  information  space  with  inauthentic  content.  Other  tactics  include 
smearing political leaders, sowing distrust and undermining public authorities. This outreach helped 
raise public awareness including among journalists, academia and civil society97. 

A handful of major Kremlin-linked operations that remained active during the elections period have 
been exposed by the EEAS in this context. For instance, the Doppelganger campaigns impersonated 
legitimate media  websites and  created  inauthentic  accounts  on  social  media98.  Overall,  42  incidents 
linked to Russian FIMI activity were detected99, which escalated in the weeks leading up to the vote, 
peaking between 6 and 9 June, and continuing well beyond that. The pattern used was not new: setting 
up  the  FIMI  infrastructure  well  in  advance,  attacks  on  the  democratic  process,  cyber-enabled 
interference, a surge in activity just before the vote, and post-election efforts to undermine trust in the 
results. 

Member  States  also took  various measures to  protect the information  environment  around  the  2024 
elections from foreign information manipulation, interference and disinformation.  In response to the 
Commission survey, 15 Member States reported that they had taken measures to support or facilitate 
the transmission of swift messages and responses to protect the information environment100. 14 Member 
States  reported  that  they  had  provided  specific  support  for  independent  media  and  factchecking 
organisations101, while 13 developed training for election or other relevant authorities102.   

To  support  people  navigating  the  information  space  around  the  elections,  a  specific  emphasis  was 
placed on measures aimed at improving societal resilience and preparedness. This included support for 
digital and media literacy and critical thinking.  

Specific initiatives taken by the EU institutions to improve societal resilience  

•  A  dedicated  joint  multi-channel  and  multi-lingual  awareness-raising  campaign  on  risks 
related to information manipulation and the importance of developing critical thinking was 
carried out by the Commission and the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media 
Services (ERGA) and broadcast in the Member States. The campaign video103 generated 217 
million impressions on social media, 7 million YouTube views and reaching 53 radio and 
TV channels in 17 countries whose population total 330 million. 

•  The  Commission’s  toolkit  on  how  to  spot  disinformation104  was  updated,  encouraging 
secondary  school  teachers to  equip  their  students  with  the  essential  skills  to  navigate  the 

95 EUvsDisinfo. 
96 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/european-elections/.  
97 The product material saw a very good pick-up which is in line with the trend of increased growth of users of 
EUvsDisinfo material (cfr. at least 38 million users reached in 2024 vs. ca. 25 million in 2023). 
98 For more details see Staff Working Document.  
99 EEAS, 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, Exposing the 
architecture of FIMI operations, March 2025. 
100  Belgium,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
101  Belgium,  Czechia,  Germany,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  Latvia,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. 
102 Belgium, Czechia, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia 
and Sweden. 
103 https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256994.  
104 https://learning-corner.learning.europa.eu/learning-materials/spot-and-fight-disinformation_en.  

16 

 
 
 
online landscape. A new webpage105 provided a single access point to all useful information 
and resources on strategic communication and combating information manipulation.  

•  The statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat) launched a data and fact checking 
service for the European elections which facilitated journalists and fact-checkers’ access to 
data and statistics on the EU106. 

•  The European Parliament launched a series of videos (in 24 official EU languages) providing 

information on the techniques used by disinformation actors to deceive people. 

•  The European Parliament produced a leaflet with 10 tips on how to tackle disinformation. 
•  The  EEAS  produced  a  dedicated  series  of  articles  and  insights  on  foreign  information 

manipulation and interference107. 

4.3.  Use of AI 

The 2024 elections also brought AI increasingly into focus. AI has the potential to enhance efficiency, 
transparency, inclusiveness, and security in electoral processes.  At the same time, it raises concerns 
about  possible  misuse,  such  as  disinformation  campaigns,  election  manipulation,  and  foreign 
interference, affecting the fairness of the democratic sphere and trust in institutions. 

In  the  weeks  before  the  vote,  the  amount  of  fact-checked  disinformation  containing  AI-generated 
content detected by EDMO remained constant, at around 4% of the overall amount of fact-checked 
disinformation (5% during the months before)108.  

Civil society, researchers, and fact-checkers uncovered at least 131 instances of undeclared generative 
AI content during the election campaign, particularly from parties at national level (i.e. five different 
political  parties  in  France,  Belgium,  and  Italy)109.  With  limited  exceptions,  highly-manipulative 
‘deepfakes’  were  not  prominent  during  the  2024  elections.  Instead,  AI  was  used  to  produce 
‘shallowfakes’,  combining  out-of-context  captions  with  images  of  politicians  or  events,  and 
‘cheapfakes’, with rather obvious manipulation of video and image110.  

AI was used to some extent both as a tool for disinformation and FIMI, and within domestic political 
debate. Findings from civil society organisations highlighted that some political parties used unlabelled 
generative  AI  to  spread  misleading  messages111.  In  addition,  AI  tools  were  reportedly  exploited  in 
foreign  influence  operations,  such  as  Russian  campaigns  and  deepfake  audio  targeting  European 
political leaders.  

The European Union is leading the way in making AI safer and more trustworthy, while ambitiously 
addressing the risks posed by its misuse. Important new legislative tools in this regard, including the AI 

105 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/strategic-communication-and-tackling-disinformation_en.  
106 Eurostat, Eurostat launches data and fact-checking service for the European elections, 10 May 2024. 
107 European Commission, European elections: EU institutions prepared to counter disinformation, 05 June 2024. 
108 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO),  Final Report  – Outputs and outcomes of a community-wide 
effort, 24 July 2024. 
109 See Staff Working Document. 
110  European  Commission,  Known  information  interference  operations  during  the June  2024  elections  for  the 
European Parliament, October 2024. 
111 In the context of domestic political communication, investigations by DFRLab, Alliance4 Europe and AI 
Forensics collected 131 instances of unlabelled generative-AI content shared by European and national 
political parties on platforms such as Instagram, X, Facebook, Vkontakte and Telegram. 

17 

 
 
 
 
Act112 and the Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising were not yet, however, 
fully in application for the 2024 elections.  

At the same time, providers of VLOPs and VLOSEs are already subject to a clear obligation under the 
DSA to assess and mitigate systemic risks to electoral processes and civic discourse, including when 
linked to the spread of manipulated content. In this context, the DSA election guidelines therefore also 
recommended  mitigation  measures  linked  to  generative  AI  that  providers  of  VLOPs  and  VLOSEs 
should take113. In view of the elections, the Commission sent requests for information on generative AI 
risks to six Very Large Online Platforms and two Very Large Online Search Engines114. 

To support the identification of AI related issues, the EDMO Task Force was assisted by a pool of AI 
experts to swiftly detect and expose deceptive or misleading AI-generated content. 

In  addition,  the  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  encouraged  political  parties  to  adopt  campaign 
pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity, which should encompass in particular the pledge to 
refrain  from  manipulative  behaviour,  in  particular  producing,  using  or  disseminating  falsified, 
fabricated, doxed or stolen data or material, including deep fakes generated by AI systems. Political 
parties  should  also  provide  information  about  the  use  of  AI  systems  in  election  campaigns.  The 
Recommendation led to a joint Code of Conduct for political parties (see Section 4.6).    

4.4.  Data protection  

Electoral campaigns are accompanied by personalised messages to voters, relying on the processing of 
their personal data. The 2024 elections were the second European elections to which the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)115 applied. In 2018, the Commission also published specific guidance 
on the application of EU data protection law in the electoral context, which remained relevant for the 
2024 elections116. 

As authorities in charge of oversight and enforcement of the GDPR in the Member States, national data 
protection  authorities  (DPAs)  reported  varying  levels  of  involvement  in  election-related  activities. 
While some DPAs were involved in the work of national election networks, other DPAs reported limited 
to no involvement in that work.  

Various DPAs took proactive measures to address data protection issues and ensure compliance with 
data protection rules in the electoral process, for example by issuing recommendations, instructions and 
guidelines,  though  engagement  with  social  media  platforms  was  overall  limited.  Several  DPAs 
conducted investigations on the application of data protection rules in the context of elections based on 
information on suspected cases of non-compliance reported to them and on complaints submitted under 
Article 77 GDPR.  

112  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1689  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  June  2024  laying  down 
harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) 
No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 
and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 
113 Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidelines for providers of Very Large Online 
Platforms and Very Large Online Search Engines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes 
pursuant to Article 35(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, OJ C, C/2024/3014, 26.4.2024. 
114 European Commission, Commission sends requests for information on generative AI risks to  six Very Large 
Online Platforms and two Very Large Online Search Engines under the Digital Services Act, 14 March 2024. 
115 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016. 
116 Guidance on the application of Union data protection law in the electoral Context— contribution from the 
European Commission to the Leaders' meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018, COM(2018) 638 final, 12 
September 2018. 

18 

 
 
 
4.5.  Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring cyber resilience 

Voter registration databases, e-voting systems and other information systems used to manage electoral 
operations could be at risk of cyberattack. The physical security of polling stations and counting places, 
and facilities, assets and systems for the printing, transportation and storage of ballots and other relevant 
election materials must also be ensured.  

The Commission worked with Member State authorities to manage  such risks in the 2024 elections, 
and,  with  the  support  of  the  EU  Agency  for  Cybersecurity  (ENISA)  and  in  cooperation  with  the 
European Parliament, organised a tabletop exercise on cybersecurity involving the membership of the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections. The exercise was funded by the Commission through the 
joint  electoral  resilience  mechanism.  It  sought  to  test  and  support  preparedness  of  Member  States 
against cyberattacks and hybrid threats, including in the framework of information manipulation and 
disinformation campaigns. 

Following up on the 2023 Recommendation on elections and the tabletop exercise, the Network and 
Information  Systems  (NIS)  Cooperation  Group  supported  by  the  Commission,  ECNE  and  ENISA 
updated  the  Compendium  on  the  Cybersecurity  of  Election  Technology.  The  Commission  also 
presented a Compendium of e-voting and other information and communication technology practices117 
in  December  2023.  This  Compendium  was  developed  in  cooperation  with  Member  States  in  the 
framework  of  the  European  Cooperation  Network  on  Elections,  and  the  Council  of  Europe.  The 
European Cooperation Network on Elections also frequently discussed cybersecurity risks in its work. 

The NIS Cooperation Group, the Computer Security Incident Response Team Network, and the EU 
Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network also strengthened their cooperation ahead of the elections. 
Cyber-preparedness exercises were organised and an interinstitutional Cyber Crisis Task Force was set 
up. 

Member States have reportedly taken steps to secure physical and digital election infrastructure. Most 
Member States carried out or updated risk assessments of the infrastructure and took measures to ensure 
a  high  level  of  security.  Almost  all  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  conducted  test  crisis 
managements and contingency plans, and offered support and training to all relevant stakeholders.  

Several Member States reported that they had cooperated with private entities to ensure a high level of 
cybersecurity118,  while  a  majority  noted  that  the  authority  responsible  for  cybersecurity  had  been 
involved  in  their  national  electoral  network.  Many  Member  States  also  made  efforts  to  increase 
awareness of the online safety of political parties, candidates and elections officials119. 

Cybersecurity efforts by political parties during the 2024 elections varied greatly. Among all national 
political parties surveyed, about half reported that they had taken cybersecurity measures of some sort. 
Of  these,  almost  30%  had  adopted  more  advanced  practices  such  as  risk  assessments,  training,  and 
penetration testing. Among the European political parties surveyed, around 83% implemented advanced 
cybersecurity measures.  

During  the  electoral  period,  minor  cybersecurity  incidents  were  recorded,  mostly  in  the  form  of 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks led by pro-Russian hacktivist groups120.  

117 European Commission, Compendium of e-voting and other ICT practices, 06 December 2023. 
118 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden. 
119  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Greece,  Spain,  Croatia,  Netherlands,  Austria,  Portugal  and 
Slovenia. 
120 European Commission, Known information interference operations during the June 2024 elections for the 
European Parliament, October 2024. 

19 

 
 
 
4.6.  Fair campaigning and funding of the election campaign 

Fair campaigning 

The  2023  Recommendation  on  elections  encouraged  European  and  national  political  parties  and 
campaign organisations to develop and adhere to voluntary codes of conduct or campaign pledges that 
support free, fair, and resilient elections. Based on this Recommendation, all European political parties 
signed a Code of Conduct for the 2024 European Parliament elections  at a ceremony hosted by the 
Commission121. The Code was also signed by a limited number of national political parties. The Code 
of Conduct promotes core values such as transparency, fairness, and truthfulness in communication, 
while actively countering disinformation and AI-driven manipulation.  

National  and  European  political  parties  demonstrated  differing  levels  of  adherence  to  the  Code  of 
Conduct,  with  some  being  proactive  by  introducing  additional  pledges,  conducting  post-election 
reviews, and promoting transparency in campaign financing.   

For their  part, Member  States adopted  a  variety  of  approaches  to  support  election  integrity and fair 
campaigning  in  preparation  for  the  elections.  Some  Member  States  reported  that  they  had  robust 
legislative provisions to ensure election integrity, while others relied on integrity pledges and voluntary 
ethical codes122.  

Funding of the election campaign 

The  integrity  of  elections  is  dependent  on  many  factors,  including  transparency  in  party  financing, 
which helps to maintain trust, prevent undue influence, and ensure accountability, particularly regarding 
donations from third countries or undisclosed sources. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections recommends Member States to address possible gaps related 
to  donations  and  other  funding  from  third  countries,  in  particular  by  promoting  transparency  of 
donations and other funding and by limiting donations up to a certain amount or prohibiting donations 
to national political actors, when such donations come from third countries. Political parties should 
assess risks stemming from donations from third countries and donations potentially linked to criminal 
activity including corruption, money laundering and organised crime.  

The rules and frameworks on political funding are rather diverse among the Member States.  Several 
Member States have adopted or are considering measures to increase transparency and oversight for 
political  party  financing,  also  with  a  view  to  supporting  democratic  accountability  and  preventing 
foreign interference123.  

Some Member States have reported that they allow donations from natural persons from third countries, 
with limits in certain cases, while others allow funding from third countries under specific conditions. 
Several Member States impose thresholds for donations from third countries, while others allow certain 
narrow exceptions for contributions  complying with national rules or from specific entities. Several 
others have introduced, or are considering, complete bans on funding from third countries. 

Rules applying to European political parties and their affiliated foundations are laid down in Regulation 
(EU) 1141/2014, which is currently under revision, in particular to clarify the funding provisions (see 
Section 5.2)124.  

121  International Idea, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS, 04 April 2024. 
122 See Staff Working Document. 
123 European Commission, 2024 Rule of Law report, 24 July 2024. 
124 Following the judgement of the General Court of 25 November 2020 in case T-107/19 ACRE v. Parliament.  

20 

 
 
 
4.7.  Safety: protection of candidates and elected representatives 

Politicians and political candidates can face undue pressures and threats to their security, which has a 
negative spill-over effect on inclusive democratic representation.  Ensuring their safety emerged as a 
topic of discussion during these elections. 

In their replies to the Commission survey, several European and national political parties reported that 
they  were  aware  of  incidents  of  harassment  and  violence,  both  online  and  offline,  with  women 
candidates and minorities being more frequently targeted, proportionately. Around 41% of the national 
parties  surveyed  had  put  in  place  measures  to  prevent  or  combat  online  violence  or  threats  against 
candidates.  

Reports  by  electoral  observers125  also  highlight  alarming  incidents  of  violence,  harassment,  and 
intimidation in several Member States. Specific groups, including women, are particularly at risk.  

4.8.  Key findings and follow-up measures 

The 2024 elections took place amidst significant and deep changes in the information ecosystem. The 
pressure  on  the  electoral  process  has  increased  both  online  and  offline,  hostile  interference  and 
disinformation  attempts  are  becoming  stronger,  and  manipulation  methods  more  diverse  and 
sophisticated. 

At the same time, despite the difficult information environment, the absence of major incidents capable 
of disrupting the 2024 elections to the European Parliament, demonstrates the EU’s preparedness for 
safeguarding electoral processes and ensuring free, fair and resilient elections.  

The  wide  range  of  preparedness  measures,  such  as  the  activation  of  the  Integrated  Political  Crisis 
Response,  the  guidelines  on  elections  for  providers  of  VLOPs  and  VLOSEs,  the  discussions  in  the 
European Cooperation Network on Elections, the various tabletop exercises and the use of the Rapid 
Response  System  under  the  Code  of  Practice  on  Disinformation,  all  contributed  to  heightened 
preparedness,  easier  exchange  of  information  and  quick  detection  and  follow-up  of  incidents.  The 
unprecedented preparedness and cooperation structures, supported by a wide range of communication 
measures to boost societal resilience, have proven essential to address the risks of foreign information 
manipulation,  interference  and  disinformation  during  the  elections.  Proactive  measures  by  data 
protection  authorities  helped  to  address  data  protection  issues  and  ensure  compliance  with  data 
protection  rules  in  the  electoral  process.  A  high  level  of  cybersecurity  was  ensured,  and  fair 
campaigning was supported. 

Nevertheless, continued vigilance is needed. Threats continue to evolve very quickly, highlighting the 
need  to  reinforce  efforts  and  operational  capability  in  terms  of  situational  awareness  and  response, 
building on cross-sectoral stakeholder cooperation. 

Looking ahead, implementation of relevant national and EU legislation is essential, as well as strong 
oversight building on collaboration between the various authorities involved in the electoral process.  

Exchanges of experiences on elections, including the assessment of incidents and unexpected events 
affecting the smooth conduct of elections will continue to be important.  

In the context of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, the Commission has supported the 
development of an operational checklist on election integrity and a risk management matrix to serve as 
accessible points of reference for national preparedness. It is also mapping the applicable frameworks 
regarding equal opportunities for political candidates. 

125  OSCE/ODIHR,  Special  Election  Assessment  Mission,  European  Parliament  Elections  6-9  June  2024,  27 
November 2024; Election-Watch.EU, Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, European Parliament Elections 
6-9 June 2024, September 2024. 

21 

 
 
 
Online platforms providing services in the EU should abide by relevant legislation support a fair EU 
democratic space including in terms of equal opportunities for candidates. Other actors, including civil 
society, elections observers and the media also play a key role in support of a fair democratic space.  

Tools  such as those provided by the DSA have shown their added value in the context of the 2024 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament  to  ensure  that  systemic  risks  to  civic  discourse  and  electoral 
processes on very large online platforms and search engines were adequately addressed and mitigated. 
The  Commission  will  continue  to monitor the  situation  and take  action  within  the  framework of  its 
responsibility under the DSA where warranted. Since the integration of the voluntary Code of Practice 
on Disinformation into the regulatory framework of the DSA in February 2025, the Commission may 
rely on the Code as a benchmark for measures that platforms can apply to address systemic risks related 
to disinformation. 

Once the AI Act is fully implemented126, deepfakes will have to be clearly labelled and all AI-generated 
content marked, allowing social media users to easily detect such content. General-purpose AI models 
posing  systemic  risks  will  also  have  to  be  subject  to  measures  to  address  and  mitigate  risks  to 
democracies and elections. Certain unacceptable manipulative AI practices are prohibited (for instance 
subliminal message generation) under the AI Act. High-risk AI systems – including those intended to 
influence the outcome of an election or referendum – will have to meet stringent requirements before 
they are placed on the market and will be subject to regular assessments. 

The full application of the new Regulation on transparency and targeting of political advertising as of 
October 2025 will further enrich the toolbox, while fully respecting freedom of expression, by providing 
common transparency standards and framing the targeting and delivering of political advertising. This 
Regulation, which was not yet fully applicable during  the  2024 elections,  provides for EU common 
standards addressing certain problematic practices in the dissemination of political advertising in the 
EU, contributing to a fair democratic debate. The Regulation will also impose specific requirements in 
the context of targeting and ad-delivery techniques involving personal data, including when using AI. 
The Commission is supporting the upcoming full entry into application of the Regulation by preparing 
guidance  and  implementing  acts  on  labels  and  notices.  National  authorities  will  need  to  have  the 
necessary resources to adequately supervise compliance with this Regulation.  

Furthermore, supporting robust data protection compliance while addressing emerging challenges, such 
as the processing of personal data in the context of social media and AI, will also remain essential to 
safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process. 

It is important to remain alert to the risk of cyberattacks, making use of increasingly refined technology. 
More  should  also  be  done at the  level  of  national  political  parties, such  as  increasing  preparedness, 
awareness, coordination and support to address the disparities in cybersecurity protective measures, and 
to ensure consistent protection that covers election-related infrastructure at both EU and national level. 

The signature of the Code of Conduct by European Political Parties was a positive step forward in terms 
of  supporting  fair  campaigning,  and  further  commitment  and  adherence  to  codes  and  pledges  by 
political  parties,  including  national  parties,  would  help  to  enhance  campaign  integrity, including  by 
making party financing  more transparent.  An  agreement  as regards  the  revision  of  Regulation  (EU) 
1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, 
currently pending with the co-legislators, will also contribute to address risks related to funding.   

126 The AI Act entered into force on 1 August 2024 and will be fully applicable 2 years later on 2 August 2026, 
with some exceptions: prohibitions and AI literacy obligations entered into application from 2 February 2025, 
the governance rules and the obligations for general-purpose AI models become applicable on 2 August 2025, 
and the rules for high-risk AI systems - embedded into regulated products - have an extended transition period 
until 2 August 2027. 

22 

 
 
 
There is a need to foster a positive and secure environment, to enable political candidates and those 
elected to exercise their political responsibilities, without fear. Improved data gathering with a view to 
better understanding the increased threats to candidates and elected representatives would be helpful. 
The Commission is committed to work to better protect the safety of political candidates and elected 
representatives in the context of the preparation of the European Democracy Shield. 

A  further  strengthening  of  the  operational  frameworks  on  electoral  integrity,  fostering  cooperation 
among Member States on this topic, enhancing alignment and consistency between measures taken in 
other  fields,  and  engaging  the  whole  of  society,  will  also  be  important  in  terms  of  building 
‘comprehensive  preparedness’  for  the  EU  as  a  whole,  as  highlighted  among  others  in  the  Niinistö 
report127. 

5.  THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION AND THE EXERCISE OF EU ELECTORAL RIGHTS 

5.1.  The European dimension 

The  outcome  of  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  has  direct  implications  for  citizens.  It  has  an 
impact  for  instance  on  how  policies  are  shaped  and  what  laws  are  passed  at  European  level  and 
implemented across the EU. Citizens need to know what is at stake at European level if they are to make 
informed choices. However, the political debate and campaign for the 2024 elections in the Member 
States remained dominated by national and local issues, with the link to the European level being less 
well discussed and understood.  

The European Parliament actively promoted the European dimension of the elections by organising an 
election  night,  providing  the  media  with  real-time  updates  on  turnout  and  the  composition  of  the 
Parliament. 

Promoting  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections  strengthens  the  link  between  citizens  and  the 
European institutions and therefore the democratic legitimacy of European decision-making. 

Regulation (EU) 1141/2014 establishes a specific legal, financial and regulatory system for European 
political parties and European political foundations. In 2021 the Commission proposed a recast of this 
Regulation  with  amendments  to  clarify  the  funding  provisions,  facilitate  European  political  parties’ 
interactions with their national member parties and across borders, increase transparency, in particular 
in relation to political advertisements and donations, cut excessive administrative burden and increase 
the  financial  viability  of  European  political  parties  and  foundations.  This  proposal  remains  under 
negotiation. 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections encourages Member States to take measures to enhance the 
European nature of the elections to the European Parliament, including to help European political 
parties and political groups of the European Parliament conduct their campaigns. It calls on Member 
States to enable the announcement of candidates and the start of campaigning in elections to the 
European Parliament at least 6 weeks prior to the election day. It encourages giving information to 
the public on affiliations between national political parties and European political parties before 
and during the elections. The Recommendation also encourages national political parties to make 
publicly known before the start of the electoral campaign, which European political party they are 
affiliated with. 

127  European  Commission,  ‘Strengthening  Europe’s  civil  and  military  preparedness  and  readiness:  Report  by 
Special Adviser Niinistö’, 30 October 2024. 

23 

 
 
 
Member  States  apply  a  range  of  timeframes  for  the  announcement  of  candidates  and  campaigning 
timelines  for  the  European  Parliament  elections.  For  example,  in  Germany,  Portugal,  and  Sweden, 
campaigning  can  begin  more  than  nine  months  before  election  day,  offering  extended  periods  for 
political engagement. In Finland, campaigning starts between six and nine months before the elections, 
while in countries such as Belgium, Czechia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia, campaigns typically begin 
three to six months ahead. In the majority of countries, the announcement of candidates and the start of 
campaigning was only permitted within three months of the elections. 

Several Member States have taken steps to enhance transparency regarding affiliations between national 
and European political parties. For instance, Italy facilitates public access to this information through 
its Central Directorate for Electoral Services, publishing detailed instructions referencing EU rules and 
ensuring that affiliations are indicated on ballots. Similarly, Lithuania highlights these affiliations on 
ballots and encourages public awareness efforts. In many other countries, the relevant authorities rely 
on institutional websites to disseminate details. 

National  political  parties  are  gradually  introducing  more  transparency  regarding  their  affiliations  to 
European  political  parties.  In  the  Commission  survey,  many  parties  across  all  political  spectrums 
reported that they had publicly declared their European political party affiliations before the start of the 
European  electoral  campaign.  Some  also  invited  prominent  European  political  figures  to  dedicated 
congresses and training sessions on the elections that were aimed at boosting voter turnout. 

5.2.  Monitoring and enforcement of EU electoral rights and electoral law 

The  elections  to  the  European  Parliament  are  unique.  The  Member  States,  each  with  their  national 
campaigns,  national  lists  and  distinctive  rules  and  traditions,  contribute  to  a  collective  result,  with 
elected MEPs representing all EU citizens. 

Certain common principles and procedures are set out in EU law, including the 1976 Electoral Act and 
the rules enabling mobile EU citizens to exercise their right to vote and stand in the elections to the 
European Parliament in their country of residence.  

Electoral Act 

In  2015,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  on  the  reform  of  the  EU’s  electoral  law, 
suggesting certain targeted amendments to enhance the democratic dimension of the European elections 
and the legitimacy of the EU’s decision-making process. On 7 June 2018, the Council approved a draft 
decision  amending  the  Electoral  Act  (Council  Decision  2018/994).  Ratification  of  this  decision  has 
advanced but is not yet concluded. 

On 3 May 2022 the European Parliament adopted its proposal for a new Council Regulation on the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, aimed at repealing the 
existing Electoral Act128. It proposes a comprehensive reform and extension of the electoral rules laid 
down at EU level for the organisation of the elections to the European Parliament, including a European 
constituency to allow for the election of an additional 28 MEPs from EU-wide lists (in addition to the 
national lists)129. Discussions on this proposal did not progress in the Council. 

128 European Parliament legislative resolution of 3 May 2022 on the proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, repealing Council Decision 
(76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom) and the Act concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament 
by direct universal suffrage annexed to that Decision (2020/2220(INL) – 2022/0902(APP)). 
129 The proposal also includes provisions on common campaigning rules, administrative deadlines, a single 
election day on 9 May, common voting and candidacy periods, compulsory access to postal voting and support 
for other methods, provisions to strengthen the participation of citizens with disabilities and to promote 
gender equality in the candidates standing for elections. 

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Although the Commission does not have a formal role in the process, it has committed to supporting 
the European Parliament in securing an agreement on this proposal.  

Electoral rights 

The 2021 package of measures to reinforce democracy and protect the integrity of elections, adopted 
by the Commission, included two legislative proposals to recast the Directives on the right to vote and 
stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections  for EU citizens 
residing in a Member State other than their country of origin130. These initiatives aim to update, clarify 
and strengthen the existing rules in order to address the difficulties faced by mobile EU citizens, and to 
ensure broad and inclusive participation in elections to the European Parliament, support mobile EU 
citizens in the exercise of their rights and protect the integrity of elections.   

The European Parliament adopted its opinions on these proposals on 14 February 2023. The discussions 
in the Council have progressed significantly on both files131. An agreement in Council was found in 
April  2024  on  the  Directive  on  European  Parliament  elections  and  the  text  is  currently  with  the 
European Parliament for a consultation process132.  

Prevention of multiple voting 

By means of technical updates, the Commission improved the crypto tool and the secure platform for 
data encryption of mobile EU citizen voters and candidates, supporting exchanges between Member 
States aiming at preventing multiple voting. In the context of the Expert Group on electoral matters133, 
it  also  organised  testing  and  provided  updated  guidelines  on  the  crypto  tool  and  secure  platform  to 
support Member States in the efficient use of these tools. This facilitated secure data exchange between 
Member States in order to prevent multiple voting and double candidacies, among mobile EU citizens.  

On this basis, between January and June 2024, Member States encrypted more than 1 600 voters and 
candidates list files and exchanged data on around 1 million voters and 135 candidates. This exchange 
resulted in the identification of over 300 000 multiple registrations of citizens. 

Reports  by  electoral  observers  such  as  OSCE/OIDHR  highlight  the  substantial  efforts  by  the 
Commission and Member States to curb multiple voting, stating that the practice of multiple voting 
does  not  appear  to  be  widespread.  At  the  same  time,  observers  recommend  strengthening  the  data 
exchange process to enhance the overall effectiveness of the prevention of multiple voting.  

The remaining challenges in terms of preventing double voting are mainly linked to the differences in 
national laws and procedures, especially regarding electoral rolls deadlines, which has an impact on the 
period of the data exchange134.  

130 Proposal for a Council Directive laying down detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and 
stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament for Union citizens residing in a Member State of 
which they are not nationals (recast), COM/2021/732 final; Proposal for a Council Directive laying down 
detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections 
by Union citizens residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals (recast), COM(2021)733 final. 
131 The discussions on the Directive on municipal elections are still ongoing. 
132 The text is subject to a special legislative procedure with unanimity in Council and consultation of the 
European Parliament. 
133 Register of Commission Expert Groups and other Similar Entities, Expert group on electoral matters - Right 
to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections for the EP and in municipal elections (E00617). 
134 As Member States usually do not know which of their nationals also have the nationality of another 
Member State, dual nationals can register in two Member States. The 1976 Electoral Acts prohibits voting 
more than once. Most Member States have in place sanctions against double voting. Most Member States that 
replied to the survey launched by the Commission also reported having provided information on the 
prohibition of multiple voting and the applicable sanctions, in their awareness raising campaigns. 

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As part of their efforts to provide mobile EU citizens with information, Member States reported having 
raised awareness regarding the prohibition of multiple voting and related sanctions. 

The  entry  into  application  of  the  Council  Decision  2018/994  amending  the  Electoral  Law  and  the 
adoption of the recast of the Directive 93/109/EC would reinforce the tools available to Member States 
to address double voting. 

Oversight by the Commission and evolution of relevant EU case-law 

National competent authorities and courts have the primary responsibility of ensuring compliance with 
national  legislation,  EU  law  and  relevant  international  standards  applicable  to  the  conduct  and 
organisation of elections. 

As guardian of the Treaties, the Commission took various actions to ensure that EU law was being 
implemented and to eliminate potential obstacles to the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights. The 
Commission is in regular dialogue with Member States and provides support to citizens.  

On 13 November 2024, in a case brought by the Commission against Czechia and Poland regarding 
restrictions on joining domestic political parties for mobile EU citizens135, the Court of Justice of the 
EU ruled that if the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in local and European elections is to be 
exercised  effectively,  mobile  EU  citizens  must  be  afforded  equal  access  to  the  means  available  to 
nationals of that Member State for the purpose of exercising that right. Given that membership of a 
political party contributes significantly to the exercise of the electoral rights conferred by EU law, the 
Court of Justice of the EU found that Czechia and Poland infringed EU law by denying mobile EU 
citizens the right to become members of a political party136. 

The Commission received several letters from EU citizens raising specific issues in different Member 
States  including  deadlines  for  candidate  registration,  voting  by  dual  nationals,  available  remedies, 
electoral rights of specific groups or voting from a third country. 

Certain difficulties in participation by mobile EU citizens have been reported by Member States and 
electoral observers:  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

returning nationals (citizens who moved back to their country of origin from other Member 
States) who were not aware of having to take steps to be deleted from the electoral roll of the 
Member State of previous residence or not  able to apply for removal from the electoral roll 
after a certain deadline; 
citizens who were not aware of their EU citizenship right to vote for candidates of the Member 
State of residence instead of the Member State of origin;  
citizens who were not aware of the formalities and deadlines for submitting applications to be 
registered in the electoral roll in the Member State of residence and for postal voting; 
citizens not being aware of their registration status (whether they are in the electoral roll in the 
Member State of origin or in the Member State of residence);  
language barriers and cumbersome or unclear procedures for registration in Member State of 
residence.  

The Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC) acted as citizens’ helpline for the 2024 elections at EU level 
and  answered  2  797  questions  related  to  the  elections  between  September  2023  and  June  2024. 
Approximately 60% of cases related to electoral rights and formalities137. Most people contacted the 
EDCC with questions about practicalities, such as the locations and opening times of polling stations 
and  which  documents  they  should  bring.  Approximately  20%  of  cases  related to  perceived  missing 

135 European Commission – Press release, EU citizens' electoral rights: Commission decides to refer CZECHIA 
and POLAND to the Court of Justice, 09 June 2021. 
136 Cases C-808/21 and C-814/21. 
137 For more details see the accompanying Staff Working Document. 

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information from Member States and perceived obstacles or incidents preventing people from voting 
on election days138.  

5.3.  Key findings and follow-up measures 

Strengthening  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections  to  the  European  Parliament,  by  enhancing 
transparency, raising public awareness of affiliations between national and European political parties, 
and ensuring equal campaign opportunities for all will remain a key objective ahead of the next electoral 
term.   

In  this  regard,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  support  the  European  Parliament  in  securing  an 
agreement on its proposal for a new Electoral Act, and will support co-legislators in concluding the 
negotiations on the revision of Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political 
parties and European political foundations. 

Reaching  an  agreement  on  the  recast  of  the  Directive  on  electoral  rights  of  mobile  EU  citizens  in 
elections to the European Parliament is essential to providing a more robust framework to support the 
exercise  of  electoral  rights  by mobile  EU  citizens, including  the  prevention  of multiple  voting.  The 
Directive  will  provide  common  templates that  Member  States may  use  in  their  voter  and  candidate 
registration  procedures.  It  will  contribute  to  the  harmonisation  of  voter  and  candidate  registration 
procedures in Member States and increase the  likelihood that mobile EU citizens will be accurately 
identified  by  their  home  Member  State,  consequently  ensuring  that  they  do  not  vote  or  stand  as  a 
candidate twice in the same elections. This is consistent with the specific measures for ensuring easy 
registration set out in the 2023 Recommendation on elections. 

Close cooperation among EU institutions to inform and engage citizens, including by maintaining an 
elections helpline providing EU citizens with an easy way to contact EU Institutions on their electoral 
rights, through the Europe Direct Contact Centre (EDCC), is crucial.  

The Commission will continue to take measures to ensure that EU law is being implemented and to 
eliminate potential obstacles to the exercise of EU citizens’ electoral rights, including mobile citizens.  

6.  ELECTION OBSERVATION 

The 2023 Recommendation on elections promotes election observation including by citizens as it is an 
efficient way to engage citizens with the electoral process and improve public trust in elections.  

Elections observation supports the integrity of electoral processes. The Commission actively engaged 
with electoral observers in the context of the follow-up to its 2023 Recommendation on elections, and 
the invitation addressed to Member States to encourage and facilitate independent election observation. 
Measures  to  promote  election  observation  have  been  discussed  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Cooperation Network on Elections and election observers took part in various meetings. 

In response to the Commission survey, almost 70% of Member States confirmed that they had taken 
specific steps to facilitate observation of the 2024 elections by citizens and international organisations. 
Many  Member  States  supported  election  observation  through  national  frameworks,  training 
programmes, and partnerships with international organisations such as OSCE/ODIHR and with civil 
society organisations such as Election-Watch.EU. 

Approximately  40%  of  almost  60  national  political  parties  that  replied  to  the  Commission’s  survey 
reported some form of collaboration with election observers. In this regard, multiple parties reported 
having cooperated with the OSCE/ODIHR observation work. 

OSCE  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR)  deployed  a  special  election 
assessment mission (SEAM) consisting of a core team of seven international experts based in Brussels 

138 For more details see the accompanying Staff Working Document. 

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and 10 regional analysts deployed across EU Member States. The final report issued by OSCE/ODIHR 
indicates that the elections were genuinely competitive, professionally organised and inclusive. Some 
areas identified for more attention concerned accessibility for persons with disabilities, inconsistencies 
in electoral regulations, and the need to address threats and intimidation including towards journalists.  

The civil society organisation Election-Watch.EU conducted its second election assessment mission to 
the European Parliament elections in all 27 EU Member States with 77 election experts and observers 
and 10 like-minded citizen election observer organisations.  

Facilitating  access  for  election  observation,  including  by  citizens,  should  be  further  supported.  The 
Commission will increase its efforts to support the exchange of best practice on election observation, 
including in the framework of the European Cooperation Network on Elections. 

7.  CONCLUSIONS 

‘Europe’s future in a fractured world will depend on having a strong democracy and on defending the 
values that give us the freedoms and rights that we cherish’139. 

Free, fair and resilient elections are at the core of EU democracy and trust in EU institutions. The 2024 
elections to the European Parliament saw a stable turnout and a broad range of communication activities 
to support this. The EU stepped up to the challenge of ensuring the resilience and integrity of the 2024 
elections. Thanks to thorough preparedness and strengthened cooperation at all levels, the elections took 
place without major disruptions. The 2024 elections saw an unprecedented level of cooperation between 
institutions, Member States and a variety of other stakeholders. 

At  the same time, the  data  in  this  report suggests that  further improvements  of the inclusiveness  of 
electoral participation and citizens’ engagement are needed. Support to a high turnout and inclusive 
participation in European democracy, including of young people, therefore remains essential. There is 
also  a  need to  further  support  efforts  to  enhance  the  European  dimension  of  the  elections,  and  best 
practices  in  election  observation.  Efforts  to  protect  the  rights  of  EU  citizens  and  EU  values  should 
continue. To achieve these goals, a wide range of actors have an important role to play under a whole-
of-society approach. Member States also play a key role as the main responsibilities for the conduct and 
organisation of elections lie with them. 

Since the elections to the European Parliament, developments related to national elections in the EU 
Member States, in candidate countries and in the  European neighbourhood, show  the importance of 
reinforcing situational awareness and other efforts to monitor, detect, analyse and address challenges 
and threats to electoral processes.  

The environment in which challenges and threats to elections are arising is evolving quickly, as are the 
tactics and techniques used. Disinformation campaigns and other manipulations of information by a 
variety of hostile actors, from outside and from within the EU, are frequent occurrences, attempting to 
diminish citizens’ motivation to vote, affecting trust in democratic institutions. Manipulative techniques 
rely on constantly evolving technology, including using artificial intelligence. Opaque funding systems 
in the new digital  ecosystems  present a  challenge  to oversight mechanisms. Traditional frameworks 
developed  to  ensure  equal  opportunities  for  political  parties  and  candidates  in  elections  (as  regards 
media coverage for example) may not be sufficient to address the realities of new digital ecosystems. 

Election resilience at national and EU level is mutually reinforcing. There is a need to further support 
the integrity of electoral environments, including by addressing gaps in the regulatory environment and 
providing  strong  and  coordinated  oversight  by  competent  authorities.  To  support  such  coherent 
oversight, it would be important to ensure stronger cooperation among the national authorities relevant 
to electoral processes, including through national election networks.  

139 Ursula von der Leyen, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2024-2029, 18 July 2024. 

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Enhancing preparedness, risk mitigation and support between Member States is also essential. As the 
work of the European Cooperation Network on Elections has shown its added value by bringing together 
contact points of national networks, its work should be fostered, with that network playing its role as a 
focal point of cooperation on elections in the EU.  

In order to protect free and fair elections, particular attention should be paid to ensuring that elections 
take place in an environment in which independent and pluralistic media and civil society organisations 
can play their democratic role. Independent election observation should be further supported.  

Building on the European Democracy Action Plan and the Defence of Democracy Package, as well as 
the lessons learned from the 2024 European elections that are outlined in this report, the Commission 
will present a strategic framework to further safeguard and strengthen democracy in the EU under the 
forthcoming European Democracy Shield.  

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