COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland
Date: 2025-06-04
Institutions: European Commission, Reform and Investment Task Force
Subjects: Poland, budget policy, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, employment policy, energy policy, labour market, social policy, stability pact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 4.6.2025  SWD(2025) 221 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2025 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland {COM(2025) 221 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY POLICY 
CHALLENGES 

Overall,  macro-financial  challenges  and 
risks  remain  limited.  The  housing  market 
has  seen  strong  house  price  growth  (15% 
compared to an EU average of 3.3% in 2024), 
further  boosted  by  demand-side  measures 
adopted  in  2023  and  a  slow  supply-side 
response  (see  Section  “Skills,  quality  jobs  and 
social 
financial 
stability  risks  from  the  residential  real  estate 
market 
External 
sustainability  improved  in  2023  and  2024, 
with  Poland’s  current  account  moving  into 
surplus.  Financial  sector  risks  remain  limited, 
and  bank  profitability  has  increased  (see 
Annex 5). 

fairness”).  Nevertheless, 

contained. 

remain 

Labour market tightness eased somewhat 
in  2024,  but unemployment  remains  at a 
historic  low.  Total  employment  decreased  in 
2024  following  weak  economic  growth  during 
the  previous  year  and  rapid  rise  in  labour 
costs.  The  decrease  in  total  employment  was 
mainly  observed  in  the  agricultural  sector, 
while job counts rose in manufacturing and in 
In  2024, 
sectors. 
some 
the 
employment 
15–74-year-olds 
of 
increased.  The  unemployment  rate  remained 
broadly  unchanged,  reaching  2.9%  in  2024  in 
a 
context  of  a  shrinking  working-age 
population. 

service 

rate 

Challenges  to  competitiveness  persist,  in 
particular  in  relation  to  the  business 
environment,  research  and  innovation, 
skills  and  education,  and  the  clean 
transition.  These  challenges  are  especially 
pronounced in regions outside the capital (see 
Annex 17). At 67% of the EU aggregate, labour 
productivity  (GDP  per  hour  worked)  is  low  in 
Poland.  To 
is 
particularly important for Poland to ensure its 
business  sector  has  a  stable  and  clear  legal 
framework  and  for  barriers  to  the  marketing 
of  research  and  innovation  to  be  addressed 
(see Section “Innovation, business environment 

increase  productivity, 

it 

Economic growth is accelerating 
but competitiveness challenges 
remain 

Poland’s  economy  is  one  of  the  fastest 
growing in the EU. Polish GDP grew by 2.9% 
in  2024  and  is  set  to  surpass  this  figure  in 
2025,  driven  by  strong  private  consumption 
and  investment,  including  funded  by  the  EU. 
The  negative  contribution to  economic  growth 
from  net  exports  is  expected  to  lessen  as 
exports  gradually 
the 
economic outlook mainly stem from delays to 
public investments. 

increase.  Risks 

to 

Graph 1.1: Poland - real GDP growth and 
contributions 

Source: AMECO 

Price  pressures  are  continuing  to  ease 
while  concerns  remain  regarding  cost 
competitiveness. Inflation decreased to 3.7% 
in 2024. In 2025, inflation is set to edge down 
including  due  to  lower  energy  commodity 
prices.  Large  increases  in  unit  labour  costs, 
elevated  inflation,  and  złoty  exchange  rate 
appreciation against the euro could pose a risk 
to  cost  competitiveness  over  the  medium 
term. 

2 

-8-6-4-2024681017181920212223242526Net exportsInvestmentPriv. consumptionGov. consumptionInventoriesReal GDP (y-o-y%)forecastpps.  
 
  
to 

to 

remain 

broader 

sustainable 

and  productivity”).  Moreover,  for  the  Polish 
economy 
and 
competitive  in  the  long  term,  it  would  help  to 
ensure 
affordable 
access 
renewable  energy,  decarbonise  the  heating 
sector, reduce energy prices and ensure proper 
management  of  water 
(see 
Section “Decarbonisation,  energy  affordability 
it  would  be 
and  sustainability”).  Finally, 
beneficial  to  address  persistent  labour  and 
skills 
science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics, and 
inadequacies  in  the  education  system  (see 
Section “Skills,  quality 
social 
fairness”). 

jobs  and 

shortages, 

resources 

including 

in 

Fiscal adjustment takes shape to 
tackle growing fiscal challenges 

initiated 

excessive 

in  2023,  exceeding 

Poland  faces  fiscal  challenges  amid  a 
rising  budget  deficit  and  public  debt.  As 
the  general  government  deficit  reached  5.3% 
of  GDP 
the  Treaty 
reference  value  of  3%,  in  January 2025  the 
deficit 
the 
Council 
procedure (1) for Poland. At the same time, the 
Council  endorsed  Poland’s  medium-term 
fiscal-structural  plan,  which  sets  a  binding 
government  expenditure  path  aimed  at 
reducing the deficit to below 3% of GDP over 
the  2025-2028  period.  According  to  the 
Commission’s Spring 2025 Economic Forecast, 
Poland’s  budget  deficit  is  projected  to  fall 
from 6.6% of GDP in 2024 to 6.4% of GDP in 
2025. The consolidation of public finances will 
be  challenging  in  the  context  of  geopolitical 
rising  defence 
situation  and  high  and 
spending.  Public  debt  is  forecast  to  rise  from 
49.5%  of  GDP  in  2023  to  58.0%  of  GDP  in 
2025. 

The  annual  progress  report  sent  on  30 
April  2025  presents 
the  state  of 
implementation of the fiscal plan. In 2024, 

offset 

partially 

net  expenditure  (2)  in  Poland  grew  by  12.7% 
(see Annex 1). This increase was mainly driven 
by higher public consumption, including growth 
of  salaries  of  the  public  sector  employees,  as 
than  estimated  defence 
well  as  higher 
increase  of  government 
investments.  The 
expenditure  was 
by 
government  decisions  on  fiscal  measures 
increasing  revenues.  The  annual  impact  of 
those measures, estimated at 0.4% of GDP, is 
deducted  from  net  expenditure.  In  2025,  net 
expenditure  is  forecast  by  the  Commission  to 
grow  by  6.2%,  which  is  below  the  maximum 
growth  rate  recommended  by  the  Council  (3).  
The cumulative growth rate of net expenditure 
in 2024 and 2025 taken together is projected 
at  19.7%,  which  is  above  the  maximum  rate 
recommended  by  the  Council.  This  is  due  to 
higher growth rate of net expenditure in 2024 
compared  to  the  growth  rate  of  12.5% 
assumed in the medium-term fiscal-structural 
plan  The  projected  deviation  is  allowed  under 
the  conditions  of  the  national  escape  clause 
on current projections for defence spending. 

expenditure, 

(2)  Net expenditure is defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation 
(EU)  2024/1263  as  government  expenditure  net  of  (i) 
interest 
revenue 
(ii) 
measures, (iii) expenditure on programmes of the Union 
fully  matched  by  revenue  from  Union  funds,  (iv) 
national  expenditure  on  co-financing  of  programmes 
funded  by 
(v)  cyclical  elements  of 
unemployment  benefit  expenditure,  and  (vi)  one-off 
and other temporary measures. 

discretionary 

the  Union, 

(1)  The excessive deficit procedure aims to ensure that all 
member states maintain low government debt or 
reduce high debt to sustainable levels. 

(3)  Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end 

to the situation of an excessive deficit in Poland 
(C/2025/5037) and Council Recommendation of 21 
January 2025 endorsing the national medium-term 
fiscal-structural plan of Poland (OJ C, C/2025/642, 
10.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj). 

3 

 
 
 
 
Box 1: 

UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 

Poland has improved on the SDGs related to macroeconomic stability (SGDs 8, 16, 17), 
productivity (SDGs 4, 8, 9) and fairness (SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10) and exceeds the EU 
average  on  SDG  1  (no  poverty),  SDG  4  (quality  education),  SDG  10  (reduced 
inequalities), SDG 17 (partnerships for the goals). 

Nevertheless,  while  Poland  has  been  improving  on  some  of  the  SDGs  related  to 
environmental sustainability (SDGs 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14), it is moving away from some 
of  the  targets  for  SDG  2  (zero  hunger,  which  includes  indicators  on  malnutrition, 
sustainable  agricultural  production  and  the  environmental  impacts  of  agriculture),  and 
SDG 15 (life on land). 

Source of data: Eurostat 

is  set 

to  become 

Substantial  reforms  have  been  made  to 
In 
framework. 
fiscal 
the  national 
December  2024, 
the  Polish  parliament 
legislation  establishing  a  Fiscal 
enacted 
fully 
Council  which 
operational  in  January  2026.  Initially,  the 
Council  will  play  a  mostly  advisory  role,  with 
its  activities  slated  for  review  by  2029. 
several 
July 
Furthermore, 
amendments  were  made  to  the  stabilising 
expenditure  rule,  Poland’s  primary  national 
fiscal  rule,  following  a  comprehensive  review. 
The aim of these amendments is to make the 
rule  more  effective  and  align  it  with  the  new 
EU fiscal framework. 

2024, 

in 

Public  spending  efficiency  could  be 
further improved, particularly in the area 
of  social  expenditure.  Public  spending  as  a 
share  of  GDP  has  been  increasing,  reaching 
49% in 2024. Social programmes could better 
target  lower-income  and  vulnerable  groups, 
thereby  reducing  expenditure  flows  to  higher-
income  groups.  Moreover,  Poland  could 
strengthen 
limited  use  of 
spending  reviews  in  the  budgetary  process  to 
support the government’s consolidation efforts 
in the years to come. 

its  currently 

Similarly, 
the  efficiency  of  public 
investments  could  be  further  enhanced 
throughout  the  investment  cycle.  Public 
investments,  including  those  by  state-owned 
enterprises,  would  benefit  from  a  more 
integrated 
planning 
approach. The public investment system would 
also  benefit  from 
the 
monitoring  of  large  infrastructure  projects, 

comprehensive 

improvements 

and 

to 

more  systematic  ex post  evaluations  and 
enhanced IT systems. More broadly, adopting a 
longer-term  perspective  and  ensuring  stability 
in  the  governance  of  state-owned  enterprises 
would  enable  more  strategic  allocation  of 
funds, 
public 
and 
investment (see Box 2). 

effective 

promote 

hampers 

innovation 

The  Polish  tax  framework  is  complex, 
which 
and 
sustainable  growth.  Despite  recent  efforts 
to  reform  the  investment  landscape,  Polish 
companies  continue  to  cite  over-regulation  as 
a significant obstacle to investment. Moreover, 
the tax system appears to be very complex (4), 
indicating a need for substantial improvement. 
There is considerable scope for simplifying tax 
regulations  and  tax  administration  processes. 
To  enhance  the  business  environment,  efforts 
to achieve a simpler and more predictable tax 
system  would  need  to  continue.  Potential 
and 
measures 
eliminating 
and 
preferences, as well as simplifying the system 
for  calculating  and  collecting  taxes  and  social 
security contributions. 

consolidating 
reliefs 

include 
numerous 

tax 

(4)  Poland ranks last among the 27 EU Member States in 

the Tax Complexity Index 2022 
(https://www.taxcomplexity.org). 

4 

 
 
 
Addressing challenges linked to an 
ageing society 

society 

Poland’s  ageing 
is  putting 
pressure  on  its  pension  system  and  on 
health  and  long-term  care.  The  statutory 
retirement  age  in  Poland  is  60  years  for 
women  and  65  years  for men. Data  from the 
Polish  Social  Insurance  Institution  (ZUS)  for 
2023 (5) shows that the average age at which 
men were awarded their pension equalled the 
statutory age, while for women, it was slightly 
above  the  statutory  age  (60.7  vs  60)  having 
remained  stable  for  several  years.  A  recent 
evaluation  report  on  tax  relief  (PIT-0)  for 
senior  citizens –  which  entered  into  force  in 
2022  and  aims  at  increasing  the  effective 
retirement  age  –  revealed  small  but  growing 
uptake.  The  interest  of  PIT-0  could  be  higher, 
but  the  option  often  chosen  by  the  insured  is 
to receive a pension and a salary at the same 
time  which  lower  total  net  income  over  the 
entire period after retirement (6). According to 
the  2024  Ageing  Report  (7),  the  pension 
system’s  annuity  factor  will 
to  a 
substantial  decline  in  pension  benefits  due  to 
rising  life  expectancy  and  will  leave  effective 
retirement  ages  broadly  unchanged.  If  the 
current pension benefit ratio (average pension 
benefit  as  percentage  of  average  wage)  is 
maintained,  pension  spending  is  expected  to 
increase  by  2.5  percentage  points  of  GDP  by 
2045. Retaining a very low retirement age for 
women amidst a rapidly aging population  has 
the  potential  to  increase  pensioner  poverty  or 
cause  government  spending  on  pensions  to 
rise sharply in the future, which could present 
a  risk  to  the  sustainability  of  government 
finances.  Moreover,  there  are  several  special 
pension  schemes  in  Poland,  e.g.  for  judges, 

lead 

(5)  https://psz.zus.pl/kategorie/emerytury/nowoprzyznane. 

(6)  SGH Report: ‘Ocena wpływu działań na rzecz 

podniesienia efektywnego wieku emerytalnego na 
skutek zmian wprowadzonych reformą podatkową 
Polski Ład (tzw. PIT-0 dla seniora)’ 
https://www.gov.pl/attachment/2e62d93d-5c04-4bb6-
872a-1c74affb69eb. 

(7)  European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report. Economic 
and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States 
(2022-2070). 

prosecutors,  the  police  force  and  farmers, 
which have more generous conditions that are 
primarily  financed  by  the general  government 
budget.  These  schemes  are  considered  to  be 
highly  complex  when  compared  to  other  EU 
countries (8).  Different  schemes  with  specific 
rules  reduce  transparency  and  can  have  lock-
in  effects.  For 
instance,  the  method  of 
calculating social insurance contributions to be 
paid  by  farmers  if  they  shift  to  the  general 
pension scheme discourages them from taking 
up  this  option.  The  necessity  of  such  special 
schemes could therefore be reviewed as those 
not  clearly  linked  to  occupational  risks  could 
be a source of inequality (9). 

changes. 

Greater  uptake  of  private  pension 
schemes  could  help  to  improve  financial 
security and future pension adequacy. The 
current  pension  system  in  Poland  is  largely 
made  up  of  public  pensions  and  will  face 
significant  challenges  in  the  future  due  to 
demographic 
Individuals  who 
increase  their  retirement  savings  via  private 
schemes  can  bolster  their  financial  security 
and  at  the  same  time  support  economic 
growth  by  directing  savings  into  investments, 
in  the  Polish  economy.  Various 
including 
private  pension  investment  options  exist  in 
Poland,  e.g.  Employee  Pension  Plans  (PPE)  or 
Individual  Pension  Protection  Accounts  (IKZE). 
their  use  and  assets  under 
However, 
management  remain  limited,  with  only  about 
30%  of 
the  eligible  population  actively 
participating (10).  The  low  level  of  private 
pensions in Poland with total assets valued at 
around  10%  of  GDP  points  to  potential  for 
growth  over  the  long  term (11).  By  expanding 
the  use  of  default  enrolment  options, 
investment  and 
redesigning 

incentives  for 

(8)  https://economy-

finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-
04/dp125_en.pdf 

(9)  OECD Poland Economic Survey February 2025. 

(10)  Raport o stanie rynku emerytalnego w Polsce na koniec 

2023 r. 

(11)  For example, in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark 
the value of private pension assets is 200%, 100% and 
70% of GDP respectively 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Pensions_in_national_account
s_-_statistics. 

5 

 
 
 
legal 

recognition 

Increasing  the  availability  of  affordable 
long-term care services could support the 
labour market. Due to a lack of formal long-
term  care  capacity,  Poland’s  informal  carers 
face  a  heavy  care  burden  without  adequate 
support.  The  Minister  for  Senior  Policy  is 
planning to offer care vouchers for dependent 
older  persons  which  could  relieve  family 
members  from  their  care  responsibilities. 
However,  without 
for 
informal  carers, the planned support (training, 
information, psychological counselling) will not 
reach  all  those  who  need  it.  The  number  of 
long-term  care  workers  per  100  individuals 
aged  65  and  over  is  very  low  (0.3  in  Poland 
compared  to  an  EU  average  of  3.2  in  2023). 
The World Bank carried out a strategic review 
of  long-term  care  in  Poland (14).  The  results 
show  a  need  to  increase  access  to  high-
quality, affordable and accessible community-
based long-term care services, while improving 
working  conditions  and  work-life  balance  for 
carers going beyond the measures included in 
Poland’s recovery and resilience plan. 

literacy,  Poland  could 
enhancing  financial 
increase private pension participation and ease 
the pressure on the public system. 

poor 

labour 

effects 

the 
the 

health 
relatively 
Improving 
outcomes  and  working  conditions 
is 
becoming  increasingly  challenging  as  the 
population ages. In Poland, mortality among 
working-age  adults  as  a  proportion  of  total 
mortality  is  significantly  higher  than  the  EU 
of 
average, 
exacerbating 
population  ageing  on 
force. 
According  to  Eurostat  data,  spending  on 
preventive  healthcare  in  Poland  was  among 
the  lowest  in  the  EU  in  2022,  amounting  to 
only 1.9% of total healthcare spending. In fact, 
the  rate  of  treatable  mortality  in  Poland  has 
barely  improved  since  2012.  Cardiovascular 
diseases  and  cancer  remain  the 
leading 
causes  of  death,  with  mortality  rates  higher 
than  the  EU  average.  Under  its  recovery  and 
resilience  plan,  Poland  is  carrying  out  major 
reforms  in  this  area  that  should  improve 
health outcomes in future years. The results of 
the  SHARE  international  survey (12)  show  that 
job satisfaction in Poland among the 50+ age 
group  is  lower  than  in  other  countries.  At  the 
the  percentage  of  workers 
time, 
same 
discouraged 
tired  of 
from  working  or 
strenuous  or  routine  work  is  higher  than  the 
EU  average. 
in  better  working 
conditions could help to convince older people 
to  continue  working  beyond  retirement  age. 
Health  expenditure  per  inhabitant  in  Poland 
(adjusted for differences in purchasing power) 
was  EUR 1 960  in  2022,  compared  to  an  EU 
average  of  EUR 3 685.  A  large  proportion  of 
health  expenditure  (approximately  37%)  is 
allocated  to  inpatient  and  day  care (13).  To 
improve health outcomes, a concerted effort is 
needed to shift resources away from hospital-
centric  models 
and 
outpatient/ambulatory  care  and  to  address 
persistent shortages in health professionals, in 
particular  general  practitioners  and  nurses 
(see Annex 14). 

Investing 

towards 

primary 

(12)  SGH, Ministry of Family and Social Policy ‘Raport 

podsumowujący wyniki badań 8. Rundy badania SHARE: 
50+ w Europie’, Warszawa 2023, page 53-60. 

(13)  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?oldid=624730 

(14)  https://www.gov.pl/web/zdrowie/przeglad-strategiczny-
opieki-dlugoterminowej-w-polsce-opracowany-przez-
bank-swiatowy 

6 

 
 
 
Box 2: 

Barriers to private and public investment 

The share of Polish firms investing has been consistently fairly high (80%, slightly below 
the  EU  average  of  87% (15)).  Overall,  firms  in  Poland  report  higher  investment  obstacles 
than their EU counterparts. The main barriers to private investment were:  

•  Uncertainty  about  the  future  (92%).  A  high  share  of  Polish  businesses 
expressed  uncertainty  about  the future, above the EU  average  of 79%. This may 
be linked to frequent changes in the legal framework. 

•  High energy costs (88%). High energy costs are a major investment obstacle. To 
overcome  this,  Polish  firms  are  directing  a  high  share  of  investment  towards 
improving energy efficiency (17% in Poland vs an EU average of 12%). 

•  Shortage of skilled staff (87%). Labour market shortages pose a challenge for 
many businesses, notably in the construction, manufacturing and service sectors. 

Regarding  public  investment,  while  Poland  has  effective  procurement  practices  and 
ensures  capital  availability  over  the  lifetime  of  an  investment  project,  some  challenges 
remain to achieving the most efficient public investment decisions: 

•  Poland  lacks  a  unified state  investment  plan  aligned  with the  country’s long-
term  strategy  and  medium-term  fiscal-structural  plan  in  order  to  gain  a 
comprehensive overview of investment spending and sources. 

•  There  is  potential  for  enhanced  transparency  and  predictability  in  public 
investment  plans  in  order  to  foster  a  more  favourable  business  environment  for 
the private sector. 

•  There are no standardised procedures for project selection or prioritisation at 
central level involving external quality assurance to minimise underrepresentation 
of risks and costs. 

•  Standardised  methodologies  for  project  assessments  are  currently  mainly 
used for EU  co-financed projects but could be applied more widely especially for 
major projects. 

•  Ex post  assessments  are  not  systematically  required  or  frequently  conducted, 
limiting the opportunity to correct earlier planning and implementation mistakes. 

The  implementation  of  Poland’s  RRP  faces  challenges.  At  present,  Poland  has  fulfilled 
25%  of  the  milestones  and  targets  in  its  RRP.  It  remains  important  to  accelerate  the 
implementation  of  cohesion  policy  programmes.  The  mid-term  review  offers 
opportunities  to  speed  up  progress  and  better  address  EU  strategic  priorities  related  to 
competitiveness, defence, housing, water resilience and the energy transition. While Poland 
has 
towards 
competitiveness,  it  can  further  support  the  development  or  manufacturing  of  critical 
technologies  in  the  areas  of  digital  and  deep  tech,  clean  and  resource  efficient 
technologies, and biotechnologies. 

reallocate  some  cohesion  policy 

leveraged  STEP 

resources 

to 

(15)  EIB Investment Survey 2024 Poland overview. 

7 

 
 
 
INNOVATION, BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 

Simplification and reduced 
administrative burden for 
businesses 

framework 

institutional 

Poland’s 
is 
crucial for its competitiveness. The country 
has 
improved  regulatory  governance  and 
digitalisation  which  is  an  important  step  in 
building  trust  among  citizens  and  businesses. 
judicial 
is  being  taken  to  ensure 
Action 
independence  and  to  address  concerns  over 
corruption, with the roll-out of a new electronic 
case management and case allocation system 
(Annex 6).  A  stable  judicial  system  which 
offers  certainty  is  crucial  for  Poland’s  future 
prosperity.  To  further  increase  trust  among 
the  government  could  prioritise 
citizens, 
limiting 
increasing 
transparency  around  decision-making  and  the 
use  of  public  money (16).  Moreover,  reducing 
transposition  and  conformity  deficits,  which 
are  above  the  EU  average,  would  enable  the 
single  market  to  function  smoothly  in  Poland. 
(Annex 4) 

bureaucracy 

and 

The  business  environment  in  Poland  is 
subject  to  a  complex  and  fast-changing 
regulatory  framework,  which  can  deter 
investment  and  hinder  economic  growth. 
Frequent  changes  to  laws  and  regulations 
which  provide  companies,  on  average,  only 
31 days  to  prepare,  can  be  challenging,  in 
particular 
to  medium-sized 
enterprises.  Measures  have  been  taken  to 
improve the law-making process, such as more 
frequent  use  of  impact  assessments  and 
consultations.  However,  persistent 
public 
challenges 
to 
with 
ensuring 
administrative 

remain 

burden 

regard 

small 

and 

for 

regulations  are  proportionate  and  effective. 
More  could  also  be  done  to  strengthen  legal 
certainty  and  make  more  frequent  use  of 
periodic  in-depth  reviews,  codification,  and 
regulatory  consolidation,  in  conjunction  with 
efforts  to  increase  the  average  time  between 
adoption and the entry into force of new laws. 
By streamlining the regulatory framework and 
reducing  unnecessary  bureaucracy,  Poland 
could  create  a  more  favourable  business 
environment that encourages entrepreneurship 
and investment. 

Graph 2.1: Four most frequently cited 
problems when doing business in Poland (%) 

Source: Flash Eurobarometer 543. Businesses’ attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU. Fieldwork 02/04-
23/04/2024 

Government-led  initiatives  can  improve 
productivity. Labour productivity in Poland is 
lower  than  the  EU  aggregate  but  is  rapidly 
closing  in  on  it (17).  Recently,  the  government 
embarked  on  a  simplification  exercise  to 
improve 
for  businesses  and 
eliminate  unnecessary  administrative  burdens 

conditions 

(16)  Understanding Europeans’ views on reform needs 

Forecast). 

(17)  European Commission (Autumn 2024 Economic 

8 

01020304050607080Fast-changinglegislationTax ratesComplex adminproceduresRestrictivelabourregulationsPLEU-27 
 
 
  
 
for  citizens (18).  Moreover,  it  has  set  up  a 
governmental  task  force  that  will  work  with 
business  representatives (19).  These  initiatives 
are  promising,  but  there  remains  scope  for 
further  action,  for  example,  by  setting  up  a 
dedicated 
a  National 
Productivity  Board)  to  promote  productivity-
enhancing policies on a more permanent basis. 

institution 

(i.e. 

Digital transformation in fostering 
innovation and productivity 

in 

in 

its 

the 

indicators 

fostering 

innovation 

Digital  transformation  plays  a  crucial 
and 
role 
enhancing  productivity  in  Poland,  but 
progress  has  not  been  uniform.  As  shown 
by  Poland’s  achievements 
key 
on  digitalisation 
performance 
identified 
in  the  Digital  Decade  Country 
Report (20),  Poland  made  notable  progress  in 
connectivity  and  digital 
terms  of 
infrastructure, in particular gigabit connectivity 
and  fibre-to-the-premises  coverage.  However, 
it  is  lagging  behind  in  the  roll-out  of  5G 
technology, with coverage in Poland well below 
the  EU  average,  primarily  due  to  delays  in 
authorisation  of  5G  pioneer  bands 
(see 
Annex 4).  This  limits  businesses’  ability  to 
adopt  advanced  digital  solutions,  such  as 
Internet  of  Things  (IoT),  AI-driven  automation 
and 
the 
allocation  of  5G  spectrum  will thus  be  critical 
this  gap,  enhancing  business 
to  closing 
productivity and improving the share of ICT in 
Poland’s gross value added. 

computing.  Accelerating 

cloud 

technologies 

Challenges  persist  in  the  adoption  of 
digital 
businesses, 
to  medium-sized 
particularly 
impacting 
enterprises, 
is 
productivity 

negatively 
growth. 

Poland 

small 

by 

(18)  https://www.gov.pl/web/premier/uchwala-w-sprawie-
koordynacji-procesu-legislacyjnego-wdrazajacego-
deregulacje. 

(19)  Ruszyły prace zespołu ds. deregulacji - Kancelaria 

Prezesa Rady Ministrów - Portal Gov.pl 

(20)  Poland Country report. European Commission: Digital 

Decade 2024: Country reports | Shaping Europe’s digital 
future. 

9 

underperforming  in  digitisation  metrics  which 
have  a  high  potential  impact  on  productivity 
and  innovation,  such  as  take-up  of  AI.  Only 
4.9% of  small to medium-sized enterprises in 
Poland  have  adopted  AI  compared  to  an  EU 
average  of  12.6%.  Furthermore,  they  are  less 
likely to use data analytics, with usage at just 
17.6%, compared to an EU average of 32.1%. 
A  major  barrier  to  progress  is  a  shortage  of 
ICT  specialists,  which 
it  more 
difficult  for  businesses  to  implement  digital 
solutions  effectively.  Strengthening  the  ICT 
workforce  and  fostering  a  robust  start-up 
ecosystem  will  be  essential 
to  driving 
innovation  and  increasing  productivity  (see 
Annex 12). 

is  making 

Poland  is  achieving  mixed  results  in 
digital public services. Poland scored below 
the  EU  average  in  terms  of  the  availability, 
accessibility  and  use  of  digital  public  services 
by  citizens  and  businesses.  However,  it  excels 
in  online  access  to  e-health  records,  scoring 
well  in  excess  of  the  EU  average.  In  terms  of 
the use of eID in public services, Poland scored 
slightly above the EU average. Work is ongoing 
to  improve  digital  services,  with  the  annual 
growth  rate  in  such  services  for  citizens 
exceeding  the  EU  average  (6.4%  in  Poland 
compared  to  an  EU  average  of  3.1%).  This 
trend  is  being  reinforced  by  the  development 
of  an  electronic  documentation  management 
system  and  the  addition  of  new  key  public 
services (see Annex 6). 

Poland’s recovery and resilience plan and 
cohesion  policy  funding  are  driving 
forward  the  digital  transition.  Poland  has 
already  implemented  three  reforms  under  its 
recovery  and  resilience  plan  to  improve  the 
development  of  and  access  to  wired  and 
wireless  communication.  The  Polish  recovery 
and resilience plan and cohesion policy funding 
in  ultra-fast 
have  supported 
broadband  coverage  for  households  and 
schools  in  white  spots.  Moreover,  companies 
will  receive  support  to:  (i)  invest  in  advanced 
technologies  and  artificial 
in 
manufacturing  and  business  processes;  (ii) 
implement 
lines  and 
smart  production 
construct  smart  factories;  and  (iii)  deploy 
digital 
the 
impact  of  manufacturing. 
environmental 

technologies 

intelligence 

investment 

reduce 

to 

 
 
activities  and  collaboration  with  academic 
researchers  and  institutions 
is  particularly 
underused.  This  is  further  exacerbated  by 
insufficient 
programmes 
promoting  applied  research  and  academic-
private  collaboration  and  a  lack  of  systemic 
incentives  for  researchers  to  cooperate  with 
industry. 

targeting 

of 

has 

established 

Poland 
various 
instruments to bridge the gap between its 
research  community  and  business.  The 
Łukasiewicz  Research  Network  and  the  Polish 
Association of Centres for Technology Transfer 
(PACCT)  are  important  initiatives  which  will,  if 
effectively  implemented,  help  to  translate 
into  business  solutions.  The 
knowledge 
‘implementation 
programme 
allowing PhD students to work in the business 
sector while studying, aims at linking academic 
knowledge with practical business applications. 
Additionally,  a  set  of  R&D  tax  incentives  has 
been  introduced.  Assessing,  monitoring  and 
possibly improving those initiatives will be key 
to their success. 

doctorate’ 

collaboration 

A  strong  public  research  career  system 
with  systemic  incentives  for  researchers 
to  cooperate  with  industry  would  also 
reinforce  science-business  collaboration. 
To  this  end,  criteria  and  rewards  encouraging 
be 
science-business 
considered  as  part  of  an  ongoing  review  of 
Poland’s 
system. 
Moreover, better salaries and career prospects, 
support 
mobility 
framework  for  academics  could  help  to  make 
research  careers  more  attractive  and  address 
the shortage of public sector researchers (see 
Annex 3 and Annex 10). 

programmes 

evaluation 

research 

could 

and 

a 

Funding  under  cohesion  policy  and  the 
is 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility 
in 
instrumental 
the 
development 
science-business 
of 
collaboration  in  Poland.  Crucial  to  this  will 
be  the  timely  roll-out  of  the  European  Funds 
for  a  Modern  Economy  (FENG)  under  which 
Poland  and  the  EU  have  jointly  earmarked 

supporting 

Absorption  of  funds  under  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Facility and cohesion policy will also 
help  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  public 
administration.  This  will  be  achieved  by 
interoperable  and  secure  e-
investing 
services  for  individuals  and  businesses  (see 
Annex 6). 

in 

Enhancing innovation through 
stronger science-business 
collaboration and an attractive 
research career system 

its 

has 

(65.9% 

improved 

R&D 
Poland 
performance  but  continues 
to  face 
structural  challenges.  As  an  emerging 
innovator, Poland has made visible progress in 
its  R&D  performance,  narrowing  the  gap  with 
the  EU  average 
in  2024,  up 
3.3 percentage  points  on  2023) (21).  As  past 
improvements  were  largely  driven  by  gradual 
increases  in  R&D  spending,  further  increases 
would  therefore  be  beneficial.  Improvements 
to Poland’s R&D performance will also depend 
are 
on  whether 
addressed  in  relation  to  weak  collaboration 
between  science  and  business  and  Poland’s 
underperforming 
research  career  system. 
These efforts should be tailored to differences 
across  regional  innovation  ecosystems  and 
local competitiveness potential (see Annex 17). 

challenges 

structural 

science 

between 

in  Poland 

the  general 

is  conducive 

regulatory  and 

and 
Cooperation 
business  is  limited,  reducing  Poland’s 
ability to bring innovation to the market. 
legal 
While 
environment 
to 
innovation,  Poland  faces  difficulties  in  joining 
up  scientific  research  with  business  needs. 
Despite  some  improvement,  Poland  remains 
well  below  the  EU  average  in  terms  of 
business  participation 
research  and 
innovation  activities  run  by  public  institutions 
and the number of joint scientific publications 
(Annex 3). The potential  for  small to medium-
sized  enterprises  to  engage  in  innovation 

in 

(21)  European innovation scoreboard - European 

Commission 

10 

 
 
EUR 10 billion  over  a  seven-year  period (22) 
and  the  swift  implementation  of  investments 
in  modern  laboratories  financed  under  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility. 

(22)  Open Data Portal for the European Structural 

Investment Funds - European Commission | Cohesion 
Open Data 

11 

 
 
DECARBONISATION, ENERGY AFFORDABILITY AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 

investment 

should  be  on  lowering  energy  prices  through 
faster  decarbonisation  of  the  power  system 
(see  Annex 8)  and  facilitating  public  and 
private 
in  cleaner  modes  of 
production  that  help  industries  reduce  their 
carbon  footprint  while  cutting  pollution  and 
strengthening  the  circular  economy.  Poland 
would  also  benefit  from  drawing  on  existing 
instruments  to  increase demand  for  EU-made 
products,  e.g.  by  incorporating  sustainability, 
resilience,  and  made-in-Europe  criteria  into 
public and private procurement. 

Poland could also take action to accelerate the 
clean  transition  of  the  district  heating  sector. 
In Poland, 69% of district heating still runs on 
coal.  Poland’s  anticipated  Heating  Strategy  is 
an  opportunity  to  prioritise  investments  in 
energy  efficiency  and  electrification 
to 
advance  the  decarbonisation  of  the  district 
heating  sector  while  contributing  to  sector 
coupling.  Investment  plans  for  the  sector 
should therefore promote the diversification of 
sector  business  models,  including  through  the 
development  of  power  system  services  such 
as  demand  side  response  or  energy  storage 
and  energy  efficiency  improvements  for  end 
customers.  This  has  significant  potential  for 
stimulating 
the  development  of  ancillary 
sectors  such  as  bio-methane  production, 
facilitating 
integration,  while 
ensuring  the  long-term  economic  viability  of 
the district heating sector. The district heating 
sector  in  Poland  could play  a  part  in lowering 
energy prices due to its size  and potential  for 
into  this 
diversification.  However,  tapping 
invaluable potential will require a coherent set 
of  policies  and  coordinated,  strategically-
oriented investment plans. At the same time, it 
would  be  beneficial  for  public  investments  in 
the energy efficiency of buildings to continue, 
with  a  better  programme  design  where 
necessary, 
reduce  energy 
consumption  and  shield  households  from 
volatile and rising energy prices (see Annex 7). 
context,  Poland  has  benefited 
In 

renewables 

in  order 

this 

to 

Decarbonising industry and 
supporting the development of 
clean technologies 

in 

progress 

renewables 

is  making 

Poland 
on 
decarbonising  the  economy  but  remains 
heavily  reliant  on  fossil  fuels.  Poland’s 
share  of 
the  electricity 
generation  mix  increased to  30%  in  2024,  up 
from 27.2% in 2023, although this remains far 
below  the  EU  average  (47%).  Fossil  fuels, 
including coal, lignite and natural gas, account 
for  70%  of  electricity  generation,  which 
exacerbates  price  surges 
(see  Annex 8). 
Relatively  high  electricity  prices  are  leading 
consumers to choose different energy sources, 
such  as  gas,  slowing  down  the  electrification 
of  the  economy,  which  stands  at  16.6%, 
compared to an EU average of 22.9%. 

in  Poland 

Poland has emerged as a clean tech hub in the 
EU  and  is  playing  a  growing  role  in  clean 
technology  manufacturing,  while  conventional 
industries  are  facing  a  complex  challenge  in 
shifting  to  clean  modes  of  production  to 
remain  competitive.  60%  of  all  European-
made  lithium  batteries  are  manufactured  in 
Poland. Meanwhile, other clean tech industries, 
such  as  heat  pump  manufacturing,  are 
growing 
(see  Annex 7).  Clean 
technology manufacturing would  benefit from 
a  clear  strategic  outlook,  better  regulatory 
certainty  and  forward-looking  investments  in 
skills in order to scale up further. Action could 
also be taken through public procurement and 
other policies which stimulate steady domestic 
demand and promote clean tech growth while 
assisting  the  transition  of  other  sectors  such 
as  heating  and  transport.  At  the  same  time, 
Poland  would  strongly  benefit  from  a  policy 
framework  to  advance  the  transformation  of 
conventional  energy-intensive 
industries  to 
bolster their competitiveness. Its primary focus 

12 

 
 
significantly  from  EU-funded  programmes  for 
improving  energy  efficiency,  receiving  some 
EUR 6 billion in cohesion policy funding for the 
period  2021-27  and  EUR 9.4 billion  under  the 
recovery and resilience plan. 

the 

EUR 2.4 billion 

Poland would also benefit from reversing 
the  upward  trend  in  transport  emissions. 
To  this  end,  additional  investment  in  railway 
infrastructure  could  promote  a  modal  shift 
away  from  road  transport,  while  making  the 
economy  more  competitive.  Poland  has 
received  EU  funding  to  invest  in  its  railways, 
for 
including 
railway 
modernisation  under 
recovery  and 
resilience  plan.  Nevertheless,  road  transport 
emissions are continuing to rise (registering an 
increase  of  95%  between  2005  and  2023), 
reducing  the  likelihood  of  Poland  meeting  the 
2030  emission  reduction  targets  under  the 
Effort  Sharing  Regulation.  With  electric  cars 
accounting  for  a  low  share  (5%)  of  new  car 
registrations,  high  road  transport  emissions 
look  set  to  continue  in  the  coming  years  (see 
Annex 7).  It  would  be  useful  to  accelerate  the 
modal 
sustainable 
towards  more 
transport  modes,  in  particular  rail  transport. 
Wider  use  of  rail  freight  transport,  which 
reduces  the  carbon  footprint  of  end  products, 
is  crucial  to  maintaining  the  competitiveness 
of  Polish  industry.  As  regards  passenger  rail 
regional 
transport,  better  suburban  and 
connections  could  address 
labour  market 
shortages by facilitating commuter travel. 

shift 

Reducing energy prices and 
phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies 

energy 

ensuring 

intensive 

that  Polish 

Affordable  renewable  energy  is  essential 
to 
industry, 
users, 
especially 
remains  competitive.  Major  reforms  and 
investments  have  already  been  and  continue 
to  be  made  by  Poland  that  contribute  to  this 
objective,  including  through  the  recovery  and 
resilience  plan.  However,  more  could  be  done 
to  bring 
larger  volumes  of  clean  and 
affordable  energy  to  the  market  quickly  (see 
Annex 7).  In  this  context  it  is  crucial  to 
accelerate the roll-out of renewables and grid 
permitting processes and to bring the benefits 

of renewable energy to end users as quickly as 
possible, including through the implementation 
of relevant EU legislation (23). Specific policies 
that  could  contribute  to  those  objectives 
take-up  of 
include  encouraging 
corporate  power  purchase  agreements  and 
implementing renewables acceleration areas. 

faster 

Taxation could be used to reduce Poland’s 
relatively  high  electricity  prices  by 
shifting the tax burden from electricity to 
fossil  fuels.  In  Poland,  wholesale  electricity 
prices in 2024 were among the highest in the 
EU,  at  EUR 96  per  MWh,  which  had  a  major 
impact  on  industry  competitiveness  and  on 
households.  The  tax  burden  on  electricity  is  a 
contributing factor to high electricity prices. In 
Poland, taxes and levies on electricity account 
for  nearly  50%  of  the  total  price  paid  by 
households  and  32%  of  the  price  paid  by 
energy  intensive  industries,  compared  to  the 
EU  averages  of  24%  and 7-12%  respectively. 
By  contrast,  taxes  and  levies  on  gas  account 
for  only  19%  of  the  total  price  paid  by 
households  and  around  1%  of  the  price  paid 
by  energy  intensive  industries  (see  Annex 7). 
By  rebalancing  its  energy  taxation,  Poland 
could  lower  electricity  prices  for  consumers 
and  increase  the  competitiveness  of  industry 
while creating a stimulus for faster fossil fuel 
phase-out  and  electrification.  It  would  also 
curb  the  need  for  the  household  electricity 
price  cap,  introduced  in  2022  and  extended 
until  September 2025,  which  is  not  targeted 
and distorts the price signal for saving energy. 

in  non-fossil  grid 

Increased grid flexibility and cross-border 
interconnections  could  also  contribute  to 
a reduction in electricity prices. Significant 
flexibility, 
investments 
including  storage  and  demand-side  response, 
would  be  beneficial,  in  addition  to  addressing 
market  access  barriers.  This  would  help 
stabilise  electricity  prices  while  increasing  the 
penetration  of  renewable  energy  sources 
through storage of excess energy during peak 
generation  periods.  Poland’s  electricity  grid 
connections are underdeveloped, with only 5% 

(23)  Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources 
(recast). 

13 

 
 
to 

cross-border interconnections (EU  target: 15% 
by  2030).  Moreover,  there  are  no  significant 
projects  in  the  pipeline  to  increase  transfer 
capacity  on  the  western  border.  Increased 
improve 
interconnections  would  help 
electricity  prices,  system  flexibility,  renewable 
energy  penetration  and  supply  security. 
National  allocation  constraints  still  limit  the 
cross-border availability of electricity capacity. 
Finally,  broader  uptake  of  dynamic  pricing  for 
electricity  would  encourage  consumers  to 
adapt  their  energy  usage,  reducing  strain  on 
the  grid  and  allowing  utilities  to  offer  lower 
prices during off-peak hours. 

Poland  records  sizeable  relevant  fossil 
fuel  subsidies  without  a  planned  phase-
out  before  2030,  representing  0.92%  of 
Poland’s GDP. Scaling down and phasing out 
these subsidies is in line with EU commitments 
and  would  give  the  government  greater 
flexibility  for  its  spending  choices.  Priority 
could  be  given  to  phasing  out  fossil  fuel 
subsidies which do not address energy poverty 
in  a  targeted  way,  do  not  respond  to  genuine 
energy  security  concerns,  are  not  crucial  to 
industrial 
hinder 
include  ongoing 
electrification.  Examples 
subsidies  to  the  coal  mining  industry,  tax 
exemptions  for  coal  and  fuel  oil,  and  excise 
duty refunds on diesel used in agriculture (see 
also Annex 8). 

competitiveness 

and 

Strengthening climate 
preparedness and water resilience 

Climate change poses a growing threat to 
Poland’s  economic  security  and, 
in 
particular,  its  water  resilience.  Extreme 
weather  events  are  putting  infrastructure  at 
risk,  heatwaves  are  posing  an  ever-greater 
threat to public health and there is a growing 
risk  of  water  scarcity  undermining 
the 
sustainability  of  sectors  which  rely  on  water. 
Poland  is  increasingly  falling  victim  to  an 
alternating cycle of drought and floods, which 
is threatening household water supply security 
and  exposing  key  economic  sectors  to  losses 
(see Annex 9). Agriculture and food production, 
industry,  manufacturing 
the 

biomass 

industries,  the  energy  sector  and  tourism  all 
face  the  prospect  of  new  challenges  to  their 
competitiveness due to a growing risk of water 
scarcity. 

Poland  has  made  progress  in  building  up 
its  water  resilience  through  investments 
in  water  retention  in  rural  areas  under 
the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  and  the 
allocation  of  over  EUR 2 billion  to  water 
resilience  under  the  European  Regional 
Development  Fund  and  cohesion  funds, 
is  scope  for  further 
however  there 
progress. River valleys, forests, peatlands and 
farmland  currently  have  untapped  potential 
for  retaining  water  in  the  landscape  and 
mitigating floods and drought through nature-
based  solutions.  This  potential  should  be 
acknowledged,  exploited  and  preserved  under 
forest 
basin  management 
river 
management  policies  and 
the  way 
agricultural  subsidies  and  farm  advisory 
services  are  designed  (see  Annex 9).  Poland 
should  rebuild  the  knowledge  and  evidence 
base  necessary  for  policies  to  deliver  resilient 
water  management. 
the 
coming  years  should  exploit  the  full  potential 
of  nature-based  solutions  and  shift  the  focus 
from  present-day  uses  to  long-term  water 
resilience.  At  the  same  time  Poland  could 
develop  a  policy  framework  for  flood  and 
integrates 
drought 
investment  in  early  warning  systems  and 
rescue services on the one hand, with nature-
based disaster prevention on the other. 

preparedness 

Investments 

that 

and 

in 

in 

Addressing  the  high  costs  of  pollution  and 
boosting the circular economy 

Poland  still  faces  major  environmental 
challenges, 
including  air  and  water 
pollution,  while  its  circular  economy  is 
less  developed  than  the  EU  average. 
Simultaneously, these are also areas in which 
transition  presents 
the 
industry’s 
opportunities 
its 
environmental 
competitiveness. 

industrial 
for 
reducing 
impact  while  bolstering 

clean 

In  2023,  Poland’s  circular  material  use 
rate  was  7.5%,  up  slightly  on  the 
previous  year  having  steadily  declined 
since 2014. This puts Poland’s rate below the 

14 

 
EU  average  of  11.8%.  Poland  is  also  lagging 
behind the EU average in terms of its resource 
productivity,  although  it  has  been  steadily 
improving in this area for the past decade. 

Air pollution remains a serious problem in 
Poland despite positive trends. Poland has 
the second-worst industrial air pollution in the 
EU,  with  the  energy  sector  being  the  primary 
emitter,  followed  by  the  chemical  industry. 
Polish industry  still releases large amounts of 
water pollutants. Over the past decade, Poland 
has  seen  the  largest  decrease  of  any  EU 
Member  State  in  the  number  of  water  bodies 
considered  to  be  in  good  ecological  status, 
driven  by  pollutants  from  the  mining  and 
quarrying industries, agriculture and municipal 
and 
and  wastewater 
industrial  waste 
treatment (see Annex 9). 

the  EU.  The 

At  the  same  time,  the  costs  of  pollution 
continue  to  exceed  the  amount  invested 
in  pollution  prevention  and  control.  As  a 
result  of  coal  reliance  in  the  heating  sector 
and energy production, Poland  has one of the 
highest  exposures  to  fine  particulate  matters 
in 
latest  available  annual 
estimates  (for  2022)  from  the  European 
Environment  Agency  attribute  34  700  annual 
deaths  (or  391 000 years  of  life  lost)  to  fine 
particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  alone.  Poland’s 
investment needs for pollution prevention and 
control  are  estimated  at  EUR6.3 billion  per 
year  in  2021–2027.  Current  investments,  e.g. 
supporting  the  replacement  of  coal-based 
heating  systems  and  investments  into  clean 
technologies, 
estimated 
EUR 4.8 billion  per  year,  leaving  a  gap  of 
approximately  EUR  1.5  billion  per  year(24)  .  
Poland  needs  to  rapidly  advance  the  green 
transition in this sector. Investments to bolster 
its  competitiveness  should  work  hand-in-hand 
with  boosting  the  circular  economy  and 
reducing emissions. 

reach 

an 

(24)  European Commission, 2025 Environmental 

Implementation Review – Poland 

15 

 
 
SKILLS, QUALITY JOBS AND SOCIAL FAIRNESS 

improve 

ensuring 

To 
the  quality  of  school 
education,  Poland  would  benefit  from 
efficiently  implementing  its  curriculum 
reform,  while 
sufficient 
preparation and support for teachers. The 
share  of  students  who  are  top  performers  in 
basic  skills  has  fallen, 
indicating  quality 
challenges  in  general  education,  including  in 
teaching.  To  address  its  currently  ineffective 
knowledge-based  curriculum  and  the  recent 
shortening  of  its  general  education  cycle, 
Poland  is  preparing  a  curriculum  reform  at 
pre-primary and primary levels to improve the 
teaching  of  competences.  A  comprehensive 
approach 
stakeholder 
involvement,  substantial  teacher  training  and 
support,  and  monitoring  and  evaluation  from 
an early stage, will be critical to achieving the 
required  results.  Improving  the  quality  and 
relevance  of  initial  teacher  education,  also  in 
the 
the  context  of 
attractiveness  of  the  teaching  profession  and 
the  selection  criteria 
the 
teaching  profession  could  contribute  to  a 
better  quality  of  teaching  and  ensure  the 
reform has a long-lasting effect. 

inclusive  education, 

for  accessing 

reform, 

this 

to 

in  Poland. 

Persistently  low  enrolment  in  science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics 
study  programmes  (STEM)  is  limiting  the 
talent  pool,  including  digital  and  green 
skills  and  competences,  and  restricting 
innovation  capacity 
The 
proportion  of  higher  education  students  in 
STEM  study  programmes  has  decreased  over 
recent years, with Poland sliding further below 
the  EU  average  (21.1%  vs  EU  27.1%).  The 
enrolment  rate  in  natural  sciences  remains 
particularly  low  (see  Annex 12).  Although  the 
economy  needs  more  innovation  and  high-
skilled  specialists  (scientists,  teachers, 
ICT 
specialists  and  engineers),  skills  and  labour 
shortages persist especially in STEM fields and 
in  sectors  relevant  for  the  green  and  digital 
transition.  The  proportion  of  companies  which 
reported  a  labour  shortage  as  a  significant 

Facilitating learning in science, 
technology, engineering, and 
mathematics, and boosting basic 
skills to support competitiveness 

inequality 

in  particular 

A  decline  in  basic  skills  among  young 
in  vocational 
people, 
programmes,  and  rising 
in 
school  education  risk  affecting  Poland’s 
competitiveness  in  the  long  term.  Poland 
has witnessed a decline in basic skills (reading, 
mathematics,  science)  among  15-year-olds 
since  2018  in  excess  of  the  EU  average (25). 
Levels  of  underachievement  have  increased 
significantly, moving Poland further away from 
the EU’s 2030 target (see Annex 12). This risks 
limiting the scope for learning and upskilling of 
Polish students and subsequently reducing the 
talent  pool.  Increased  inequalities  between 
different  types  of  secondary  schools  (see 
Annex 12)  and  between  urban  and  rural 
schools  (see  Annex  11)  are  leaving  students 
attending  sectoral  vocational  schools  (szkoły 
branżowe) and rural schools at an educational 
low 
disadvantage 
attainment  of  basic  skills  is  far  more  acute 
among  disadvantaged  students,  with  39% 
lacking  the  minimum  competence  level  in 
mathematics,  hindering  their  educational  and 
professional  development  later  in  life  (OECD, 
2023).  Better  focusing  on  basic  skills  at 
primary  level  and  urgently  boosting  literacy 
and  numeracy  skills  in  sectoral  vocational 
schools  would  facilitate  subsequent  upskilling 
and improve the supply of relevant skills to the 
labour market. 

(OECD,  2023).  Overall, 

(25)  Compared to 2018, the proportion of low achievers 

increased by 8.3 percentage points (pps) in 
mathematics (EU: 6.6 pps), 7.5 pps in reading (EU: 
3.7 pps), and 4.8 pps in science (EU: 2 pps). 

16 

 
 
 
in 

to 

struggled 
retain 
The  macroeconomic 

limiting  factor  for  production  was  very  high, 
reaching  63%  in  manufacturing  in  Q4-2024 
(EU  average  of  18%),  57.4%  in  services  (EU 
average  of  26.8%)  and  72.2%  in  construction 
(EU  average  of  26%) (26).  65%  of  employers 
indicate skills shortages as the main barrier to 
transformation  and  expect  talent  availability 
five  years (27). 
to  worsen 
the  next 
Furthermore,  82%  of  small  to  medium-sized 
enterprises  report  facing  skills  shortages,  and 
skilled 
88%  have 
workers (28). 
skills 
mismatch  in  Poland  rose  to  22.3  in  2023, 
against  a  decreasing  trend  in  the  EU  (from 
in  2023) (29).  On 
20.2 
upskilling  and  reskilling  needs  for  the  green 
transition,  there  are  shortages  in  occupations 
such  as  building  structure  cleaners,  insulation 
workers  and  roofers (30)  (see  Annexes 10  and 
12).  Improving  teaching  quality  in  science, 
technology,  engineering  and  mathematics  in 
schools 
is  needed,  while  promoting  their 
learning  as  from  early  childhood  education 
and  care  would  encourage  interest  from  an 
early  age.  Such  efforts  could  be  further 
supported  by  raising  awareness  across  the 
whole  of  society  about  the  importance  of 
and 
technology, 
science, 
mathematics learning. 

in  2022  to  19.6 

engineering 

education 

Improving  the  quality  and  relevance  of 
significant 
higher 
challenge. Poland’s system for evaluating the 
education 
scientific 
of 
reliable  or 
is  not  entirely 
institutions 

is  a 

output 

higher 

(26)  European Commission Business and Consumer Survey, 

publication date 8 January 2025. 

(27)  https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-

jobs-report-2025/. 

(28)  European Year of Skills - Skills shortages, recruitment 
and retention strategies in small and medium-sized 
enterprises - September 2023 - - Eurobarometer survey 

(29)  This indicator highlights the comparably greater 

difficulty for low- and medium-skilled workers to enter 
the labour market, as compared to the high-skilled 
workers. 

(30)  European Labour Authority EURES Report on labour 

shortages and surpluses 2024, 2025, based on data 
from EURES National Coordination Offices. Skills and 
knowledge requirements align with the ESCO taxonomy 
on skills for the green transition, with examples 
analysed using the ESCO green intensity index. 

are 

generally 

transparent (31).  The  proportion  of  Polish 
graduates with a PhD is low, which is limiting 
the innovation talent pool. Moreover, careers in 
academia 
unattractive, 
contributing  to  a  rise  in  the  average  age  of 
academic  staff (32).  Improving  the  evaluation 
system  and  the  quality  assurance  within  the 
higher  education  sector  alongside  more 
attractive  careers  in  academia  would  help 
ensure  that  the  necessary  talent  pool  is 
created, and optimise investment in a context 
of declining student numbers. 

Encouraging adult learning and 
improving the effectiveness of 
vocational education and training 

the 

and 
is 

digital 
in  turn 

Low levels of adult learning participation 
are  contributing  to  skills  mismatches 
green 
hampering 
limiting 
transition,  which 
Poland’s competitiveness. In contrast to the 
EU  trend,  rates  of  adult  learning  participation 
in Poland are falling. In 2022, some one in five 
adults  pursued  adult  learning  over  the  course 
of the previous 12 months, compared to an EU 
average  of  almost  40% 
(see  Annex 12). 
Poland’s  national  target  for  adult  learning  of 
51.7% by 2030 seems currently out of reach. 
Increasing  the 
is 
important 
skills  gaps  and 
for 
mismatches.  A  shrinking  labour  force  and 
growing  skills  shortages  are  exacerbating  the 
situation,  while  businesses  have  indicated  a 
lack  of  skilled  workers  as  a  barrier  to 
investment  (see  Annex 12).  Shortages  are 
particularly  acute 
technology, 
engineering  and  mathematics,  digital  skills, 
and  skills  needed  for  the  green  transition. 
Poland’s  vocational  education  and  training 
system is lacking in effectiveness, significantly 

level  of  adult 
closing 

in  science, 

learning 

(31)  Under the evaluation system, small higher education 

institutions in a specific discipline or with new faculties 
score disproportionately better than well-established, 
larger institutions, resulting in a financial impact on the 
latter. 

(32)  Academic staff aged 25-34 made up only 14.1% of 
total academic staff in 2022 (EU 20.9%). ESTAT 
educ_uoe_perp01. 

17 

 
 
 
undermining  the  supply  of  skills  which  are  in 
demand, 
the  employability  of 
graduates and putting them at greater risk of 
unemployment and social exclusion. 

reducing 

Important  policy  measures  to  enhance 
lifelong learning are being financed under 
cohesion  policy  and  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility.  Poland  aims  to  increase 
adult  learning  through  reinforced  cooperation 
and  coordination  across  ministries  and  local 
governments.  To  improve  the  supply  of  green 
skills,  Poland  is  creating  sectoral  qualification 
frameworks.  Poland 
is  also  developing  a 
strategic  framework  for  digital  skills.  Using 
investments  financed  under  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility,  Poland  is  in  the  process  of 
setting up 120 Sectoral Skills Centres aimed at 
encouraging  the  development  of  green  and 
digital  skills.  Regional  coordination  teams  for 
vocational  education  and training  and  lifelong 
learning  have  been  established  with  support 
from the Recovery and Resilience Facility with 
a  view  to  improving  the  coordination  of  skills 
policies at regional level. However, there is no 
clear  ownership  of  adult  learning  policies  at 
government  level.  Despite  action  taken  to 
promote adult learning, mostly financed by the 
EU,  Poland  is  still  no  closer  to  achieving  its 
2030 national skills target. 

and 

effective 

coordination,  monitoring  and 
Better 
evaluation,  as  well  as  better  facilitation 
by  employers,  can  help  increase  the  rate 
of  adult  learning  participation.  Poland’s 
working  group  on  skills  development could  be 
a  starting  point  for  establishing  a  well-
coordinated 
governance 
structure  for  adult  learning.  Ultimately,  the 
structure  should  arrive  at  clearly  defined  and 
complementary  roles  and  responsibilities  for 
all  parties  involved,  with  cooperation  between 
the  ministries  with  responsibilities  for  labour 
and  education, 
implementing  organisations 
and  social  partners.  By  evaluating  measures, 
evidence-based 
be 
supported and the efficiency and effectiveness 
of planned/existing measures can be improved. 
The 2023 amendment to the Labour Code also 
offers the potential to bolster adult learning as 
in  which 
it  specifies 
employers  must  inform  employees  of  their 
right to training, cover the cost of employees’ 

the  circumstances 

policymaking 

can 

training  and  provide  such  training  during 
working hours. 

An individual learning accounts scheme is 
currently being piloted with support from 
the  European  Social  Fund  Plus.  The  pilot 
project covers all adults between 18-69 years 
of  age  regardless  of  their  employment  status 
and  is  being  rolled  out  in  selected  regions. 
Individuals  receive  training  entitlements  and 
are  able  to  choose  which  training  they  take 
part  in  according to  their needs  from  a  range 
of  courses  published  in  an  easily  accessible 
portal,  the  Development  Services  Database 
(BUR).  However, 
to  create  an  effective 
individual learning accounts (ILA) scheme, it is 
important  to  embed  the  ILAs  in  an  enabling 
framework  and  to  underpin  the  scheme  with 
adequate funding to ensure its sustainability in 
the  longer  term.  To  drive  the  scheme  further, 
training entitlements could be accompanied by 
other enabling measures such as paid training 
leave. Paid training leave could offer adults an 
incentive  to  take  up  training  by  letting  them 
keep  their  salary  or  by  providing  income 
replacement  during  periods  of  training.  To 
ensure  consistency,  the  ILA  scheme  could  be 
integrated  with  existing  schemes,  such  as 
training  vouchers  for  lifelong  learning  offered 
to  unemployed  persons  and  jobseekers.  It 
to  develop  a 
would  also  be  useful 
framework 
comprehensive 
enabling,  for  example,  the  tracking  of  long-
term  outcomes  of  ILAs,  and  quality  and 
performance assessments of training courses. 
Engagement  of  social  partners  and  relevant 
stakeholders  is  critical  to  ensuring  adequate 
and  sustainable  funding  for  ILAs  beyond  the 
pilot  phase  through  a  combination  of  public 
and private financing. 

monitoring 

Labour market participation 
among disadvantaged groups is 
increasing, however gaps remain 

Poland’s  labour  market  performance  is 
strong  but  will  face  challenges  in  the 
future.  Poland’s  employment  rate  (persons 
aged 20-64) hit 78.4% in 2024, surpassing its 
2030  target  of  78.3%,  while  unemployment 

18 

 
society 

increasing 

and 
labour  market 

was  at  2.9%,  making  Poland  one  of  the  EU’s 
strongest  performers.  Nevertheless,  with  an 
ageing 
labour 
shortages, 
integration  of 
underrepresented  groups  will  be  important  in 
the future. Between 2022 and 2070, Poland’s 
population is expected to decline by 16%, four 
times  the  EU  average,  leading  to  a  9.8 
percentage  point  decrease  in  the  working-age 
labour  force  –even  with  increased  labour 
market 
– 
significantly  impacting  the  labour  supply  and 
underscoring  the  need  to  bring  more  people 
into the labour market. The primary causes of 
Poland’s ageing society are its historically low 
fertility rate (1.29 compared to an EU average 
of 1.46 in 2022) and changes in its population 
structure (see Annex 10). 

and  migration 

participation 

in 

to 

and 

the 

Facility, 

increasing 

rural  areas 

Obstacles 
labour 
market  participation  of  women  remain, 
although  progress  has  been  made.  Low 
labour  market  participation  of  women 
is 
hampering economic growth and highlights the 
existence  of  gender  disparities  caused  by 
long-term  care 
insufficient  childcare  and 
services,  especially 
(see 
investments 
Annexes 10  and  11).  Despite 
under  the  European  Social  Fund  Plus  and  the 
Recovery 
the 
Resilience 
percentage of children under 3 years of age in 
formal childcare has fallen in recent years and 
is  far  below  the  EU  average  (see  Annex 10). 
Poland  is  also  well  below  the  EU  average  in 
terms of the provision of public long-term care 
services (3.4% compared to an EU average of 
5.8%  in  2019),  with  responsibility  for  care 
mainly  assumed  by  families  (see  Annex 11). 
To increase the number of women in work, it is 
important  to  invest  in  expanding  the  female 
workforce,  enhancing  their  qualifications  and 
improving  working  conditions.  Additionally, 
efforts should focus on ensuring that the most 
disadvantaged  children  and  parents  have 
access 
to  high-quality  childcare.  Poland 
recently  adopted  several  measures  which  are 
now  being  rolled  out.  It  has  reformed  carer’s 
leave with the aim of more evenly distributing 
the care burden. It has also reformed parental 
leave and paternity leave and is rolling out the 
Active  Toddler  programme  with  support  from 
the  European  Social  Fund  Plus  and  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  which  will 
significantly  increase  the  number  of  places 

available  in  early  childhood  education  and 
care. Reform priorities in the area of long-term 
care  include increasing  access  to  high-quality, 
affordable  and  accessible  community-based 
improving 
long-term  care  services,  and 
working  conditions  and  work-life  balance  for 
carers (see Annex 11). 

The  disability  employment  gap  has 
widened further in recent years to 35.6% 
and  is  now  one  of  the  largest  in  the  EU. 
This  is  partly  due  to  the  absence  of  a  legal 
basis for supported employment and a lack of 
knowledge and skills among employers on how 
to  integrate  persons  with  disabilities  in  the 
workplace.  Although  Poland  has  set  itself  a 
target to increase the number of persons with 
disabilities  in  employment,  no  concrete  and 
measurable  actions  have  been  so 
far 
implemented 
for  employers  and  other 
stakeholders.  The  newly  launched  project  to 
develop  a  model  of  supported  employment 
and  prepare  for  its  introduction  as  a  labour 
market  instrument,  is  a  positive  step.  To 
further  support  persons  with  disabilities, 
measures  for  helping  them  find  employment 
could be strengthened, for example by tapping 
into the full potential of the social economy to 
create  economic  opportunities  and  promote 
of 
social 
and 
disadvantaged  groups. 
the 
persons  with 
between 
education 
disabilities and persons without, in particular in 
higher  education,  is  wide  (21.4 pps  compared 
to an EU average of 11.3 pps). To address the 
challenges  faced  by  young  persons  with 
disabilities  in  acquiring  competitive  skills  and 
transitioning  to  the  labour  market,  Poland’s 
current  policy  priority,  reform  measures  and 
inclusive  education  would 
investments 
benefit  from  an 
inclusive  education  and 
training strategy. 

integration 
Furthermore, 

inclusion 

gap 

in 

Social dialogue 

Meaningful  involvement  of  Polish  social 
partners  in  designing  and  implementing 
policies  could  increase  competitiveness 
and  reduce  labour  market  inequalities.  In 

19 

 
Poland,  there  are  still  regular  violations  of 
internationally  recognised  labour  rights (33). 
Meanwhile  collective  bargaining  coverage  has 
been  on  a  downward  trend  since  the  2000s, 
with Poland now registering one of the lowest 
levels  of  coverage  in  the  EU  (see  Annex 10). 
Laws on collective labour agreements and the 
minimum  wage,  presented  in  June 2024  are 
still  under  review  and  have  not  yet  been 
submitted  to  Parliament.  According  to  Polish 
social  partners,  the  proposed  legislation  on 
collective  agreements  fails  to  offer  real 
incentives  to  encourage  collective  bargaining. 
However,  the  Polish  government 
is  also 
planning  to  adopt  legislation  amending  the 
Social  Dialogue  Council  (RDS)  in  the  second 
quarter  of  2025  which  may  be  a  step  in  the 
right  direction.  To  make  social  dialogue  more 
inclusive  and  enable  more  effective  public 
consultations,  it  would  be  helpful  to  broaden 
the  scope  of  the  Social  Dialogue  Council, 
increase  social  partners’  legislative  rights  and 
extend  the  parties  represented  in  the  Council. 
Collective bargaining on important issues such 
as  technological  innovation,  new  forms  of 
work  organisation  and  lifelong  learning  could 
be  enhanced  by  measures  such  as  incentives 
to  encourage  collective  bargaining.  Other 
possible measures include extending the types 
of 
collective  agreements  available  and 
reducing  the  number  of  areas  not  covered  by 
collective agreements. 

An affordable and efficient 
housing market 

is  causing 
Poland’s  housing  shortage 
house  prices  and  rent  to  rise.  Poland  is 
faced  with  an  acute  housing  shortage,  which 
has  resulted  in  spiralling  house  price  and 
rental  inflation.  Since  2015,  house  prices  and 
rent  have  increased  by  107%  and  66% 
respectively, far exceeding the EU average and 
income 
slightly 

household 

exceeding 

larger 

in  Poland’s 

the  second  highest 

growth (34). This increase has been particularly 
marked 
cities  and 
metropolitan  areas.  Economic  uncertainties 
have  further  contributed  to  price  increases. 
real  mortgage 
With 
interest  rates  in  Q3-2024  in  the  EU (35), 
Poland’s  housing  situation 
is  especially 
challenging for first-time buyers and renters – 
primarily  young  people  –  decreasing  their 
mobility  and  making  planning  for  the  future 
more difficult. 

More  investment  in  housing  and  new 
policy  measures  could  help  to  address 
Poland’s  insufficient  housing  supply.  In 
Poland, investment in housing is the lowest in 
the  EU  (2.2%  of  GDP  compared  to  an  EU 
average  of  5.8%  in  2023),  while  the  rate  of 
overcrowded households is one of the highest. 
Between  2020  and  2024  housing  market 
shocks  were  observed  (such  as  the  COVID-19 
pandemic,  Russian  war  in  Ukraine,  energy 
crisis),  while  affordable  mortgage  programme 
(“Bezpieczny  Kredyt  2%”)  fuelled  additional 
demand  in  face  of  supply  bottlenecks,  which 
altogether  contributed  to  rapid  housing  price 
rises. Since 2022, Poland has seen a slowdown 
in  the  housing  supply  which  may  have 
contributed to higher nominal house prices and 
warrants  closer  monitoring.  Between  2021- 
2023  construction  producer  prices  for  new 
increased  by  25%, 
residential  buildings 
exceeding  the  EU  average  of  20%,  while  the 
number  of  building  permits  for  new  dwellings 
decreased  by  30%  (compared  to  an  EU 
average decrease of 23%). Housing measures 
already 
in  place,  such  as  subsidies  for 
municipalities  to  build  social  housing  and  a 
preferential 
for  social 
loans  programme 
housing  cooperatives,  could  be  expanded  to 
increase investment in housing, create a larger 
stock  of  affordable  housing  and  increase 
competition with the private housing stock and 
private rental properties (see Annex 11). 

(34)  Housing in Europe – 2024 edition; Eurostat housing 

statistics. Eurostat: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-
publications/housing-2024#housing-cost. 

(35)  The global cost of homes in 2024. Best Brokers 

(33)  International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC): 

https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/2024_ituc_global_rights_index_en.pdf. 

https://www.bestbrokers.com/forex-brokers/the-global-cost-
of-homes-in-2024-comparing-the-real-mortgage-
interest-rates-and-home-prices-around-the-world/. 

20 

 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 

To  boost  competitiveness,  sustainability  and 
social fairness, Poland would benefit from: 

REPowerEU 

•  accelerating the implementation of the 
recovery  and  resilience  plan,  including 
swiftly 
the 
implementing  cohesion  policy, 
taking 
advantage  of  the  opportunities  under  the 
mid-term  review  and  making  optimal  use 
of EU instruments, including InvestEU and 
STEP, to improve competitiveness;  

chapter; 

• 

increasing  the  efficiency  of  public 
spending  by  focusing  social  programmes 
on  lower-income  and  at-risk  groups  and 
strengthening 
the  efficiency  of  public 
investment  through  more  coordinated  and 
transparent 
systematic 
planning  and 
evaluations; 

age 

•  addressing the challenges of an ageing 
population  by  increasing  the  effective 
retirement 
the 
and 
retirement  age  for  men  and  women  to 
ensure  the  sustainability  and  adequacy  of 
pensions,  reforming    preferential  pension 
schemes, and strengthening the healthcare 
system; 

equalising 

•  ensuring an effective institutional and 
regulatory  framework  by  simplifying 
reducing  unnecessary 
legislation  and 
bureaucracy, simplifying the tax framework, 
and strengthening social dialogue; 

• 

intensity  of 
increasing  the  digital 
businesses  by  accelerating  the  adoption  of 
digital  technologies,  including  those  with  a 
high  impact  on  productivity,  particularly 
among  small  to  medium-sized  enterprises, 
and  improving  digitalisation  of  the  public 
sector; 

•  enhancing innovation through stronger 
science-business  collaboration  and  an 
attractive  research  career  system  by 

instruments, 
increasing 

carrying  out  a  comprehensive  review  of 
R&D 
existing 
investment, 
for 
researchers to cooperate with industry and 
tapping 
innovation 
ecosystems; 

boosting 
incentives 

regional 

into 

•  reducing  reliance  on  fossil  fuels  by 
improving  energy  efficiency,  phasing  out 
the 
fossil 
transition of the district heating sector, and 
taking further measures to decarbonise the 
transport sector; 

subsidies,  advancing 

fuel 

•  addressing the impact of energy prices 
on  households  and  competitiveness  by 
investments, 
further  grid 
accelerating 
improving  grid 
the 
through 
flexibility 
promotion  of  demand  side 
response, 
increased  energy  storage  capacities  and 
enhanced  cross  border  electricity  trading, 
promoting  the  deployment  of  renewables, 
and  reducing  the  tax  burden  on  clean 
energy; 

•  addressing the growing risk of drought 
and  floods  by  improving  the  coordination 
of  policies  that  affect  water  resources, 
making  better  use  and  protecting  the 
capacity of river valleys, forests, peatlands 
and  farmland  to  retain  water 
in  the 
landscape; 

inequalities 

•  reversing  the  decline  in  basic  skills 
in  school 
and  reducing 
the  efficient 
education  by  ensuring 
implementation  of  the  curriculum  reform, 
enhancing 
in 
vocational  programmes,  and  improving  the 
quality of teacher training; 

literacy  and  numeracy 

• 

in  science, 
increasing  participation 
technology, 
and 
mathematics  in  higher  education  by 
improving  the  quality  of  teaching  in  these 
disciplines  in  schools,  enhancing  career 

engineering 

21 

 
 
and 

science, 
guidance 
technology,  engineering  and  mathematics 
learning from an early age; 

promoting 

•  addressing 

shortages, 
skills 
particularly  digital  skills  and  basic 
increasing 
skills 
participation 
learning  through 
providing more support by employers and a 
strengthened VET system; 

in  adult 

adults, 

among 

• 

increasing  labour  market  participation 
of persons with disabilities and women 
by  better  targeting  measures  to  support 
disadvantaged 
to 
groups, 
improve the quality of and access to formal 
home-  and  community-based  long-term 
care  and  early  childhood  education  and 
care. 

continuing 

22 

 
ANNEXES 

 
 
 
 
LIST OF ANNEXES 

Fiscal 

A1.  Fiscal surveillance and debt sustainability 

A2.  Taxation 

Productivity 

A3. 

Innovation to business 

A4.  Making business easier 

A5.  Capital markets, financial stability and access to finance 

A6.  Effective institutional framework 

Sustainability 

A7.  Clean industry and climate mitigation 

A8.  Affordable energy transition 

A9.  Climate adaptation, preparedness and environment 

Fairness 

A10.  Labour market 

A11.  Social policies 

A12.  Education and skills 

A13.  Social Scoreboard 

A14.  Health and health systems 

Horizontal 

A15.  Sustainable development goals 

A16.  CSR progress and EU funds implementation 

A17.  Competitive regions 

LIST OF TABLES 

General government balance and debt 
Net expenditure growth 
Net expenditure (outturn and forecast), annual and cumulated deviations vis-à-vis the recommendation 
Defence expenditure and the national escape clause 

A1.1. 
A1.2. 
A1.3. 
A1.4. 
A1.5.  Macroeconomic developments and forecasts 
A1.6. 
A1.7. 
A1.8. 
A1.9. 

General government budgetary position 
Debt developments 
RRF – Grants 
RRF - Loans 

25 

27 

27 

34 

37 

37 

42 

47 

54 

59 

59 

66 

72 

78 

78 

82 

87 

91 

92 

95 

95 

98 

106 

29 
29 
30 
30 
31 
31 
32 
32 
33 

 
 
 
A1.10.  Projected change in age-related expenditure in 2024-2040 and 2024-2070 
A1.11.  Fiscal Governance Database Indicators 
A2.1. 
Taxation indicators 
A3.1. 
Key innovation indicators (*) 
A4.1.  Making Business Easier: indicators. 
A5.1. 
A6.1. 
A6.2. 
A7.1. 
A8.1. 
A9.1. 
A13.1.  Social Scoreboard for Poland 
A14.1.  Key health indicators 
A16.1.  Selected EU funds with adopted allocations - summary data (million EUR) 
A16.2.  Summary table on 2019-2024 CSRs 
A17.1.  Selection of indicators at regional level in Poland 

Financial indicators 
Poland. Selected indicators on administrative burden reduction and simplification 
Digital Decade targets monitored through the Digital Economy and Society Index 
Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland 
Key Energy Indicators 
Key indicators for progress on climate adaptation, preparedness and environment 

LIST OF GRAPHS 

A2.1. 
A2.2. 
A3.1. 

Tax revenue shares in 2023 
Tax wedge for single and second earners, % of total labour costs, 2024 
Patent applications filed under the PCT per billion GDP (in PPS €) in relation to business enterprise expenditure on R&D 
(BERD) as a percentage of GDP, 2021 
Public-private scientific co-publications as a percentage of the total number of publications, 2023 

Greenhouse gas emissions in the effort sharing sectors, 2005 and 2023 
Retail energy price components for household and non-household consumers, 2024 

A3.2. 
A4.1.  Making Business Easier: selected indicators. 
A5.1. 
Net savings-investment balance 
A5.2. 
International investment position 
A5.3. 
Capital markets and financial intermediaries 
A5.4. 
Composition of NFC funding as % of GDP 
A5.5. 
Composition of household financial assets per capita and as % of GDP 
A6.1. 
Trust in justice, regional / local authorities and in government 
A6.2. 
Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 
A7.1. 
GHG emission intensity of manu-facturing and energy-intensive sectors, 2022 
A7.2.  Manufacturing industry output production: total and selected sectors, index (2021 = 100), 2017-2023 
A7.3. 
A8.1. 
A8.2.  Monthly average day-ahead wholesale electricity prices and European benchmark natural gas prices (Dutch TTF) 
A8.3. 
A9.1. 
A9.2. 
A10.1.  Key labour market indicators 
A10.2.  Employment by age group and sex 
A11.1.  Components of AROPE, 2015-2023 
A11.2. 
In-work AROP rate for contract type 
A12.1.  Trends in underachievement in mathematics by students’ socio-economic background, PISA 2012-2022 (%) 
A14.1.  Life expectancy at birth, years 
A14.2.  Treatable mortality 
A15.1.  Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 
A16.1.  Distribution of RRF funding in Poland by policy field 
A16.2.  Distribution of cohesion policy funding across policy objectives in Poland 
A17.1.  Labour productivity per hour 

Poland’s installed renewable capacity (left) and electricity generation mix (right) 
Direct dependency(1) on ecosystem services(2) of the gross value added generated by economic sector in 2022 
Investment needs and gaps in EUR million, in 2022 constant prices 

LIST OF MAPS 

A17.1.  GDP per head (in purchasing power standard PPS), 2023 
A17.2.  Average speed for fixed internet, 2023 

26 

33 
34 
36 
42 
47 
54 
56 
57 
66 
72 
78 
92 
94 
102 
103 
108 

35 
37 

39 
40 
44 
48 
49 
49 
51 
52 
55 
56 
62 
62 
63 
67 
68 
70 
76 
76 
79 
80 
83 
84 
88 
93 
93 
96 
100 
100 
108 

106 
110 

 
 
 
FISCAL 
ANNEX 1: FISCAL SURVEILLANCE AND DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 

This  Annex  contains  a  series  of  tables  relevant  for  the  assessment  of  the  fiscal  situation  in  Poland, 
including  how  Poland  is  responding  to  Council  recommendations  issued  under  the  reformed  Economic 
Governance Framework. 

The  reformed  framework,  which  entered  into  force  on  30  April  2024(36),  aims  to  strengthen  debt 
sustainability  and  promote  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  through  growth-enhancing  reforms  and 
priority investments. The medium-term fiscal-structural plans (hereinafter, MTPs or plans) constitute the 
cornerstone  of  the  framework,  setting  the  budgetary  commitment  of  Member  States  over  the  medium 
term. The latter is defined in terms of net expenditure growth, which is the single operational indicator for 
fiscal surveillance.  

Poland submitted its plan on 9 October 2024. The plan covers the period until 2028, presenting a fiscal 
adjustment  over  four  years.  On  21  January  2025,  the  Council  adopted  the  Recommendation  endorsing 
Poland’s plan(37). On 21 January 2025, the Council also adopted a Recommendation under Article 126(7) 
TFEU (38) to correct the excessive deficit in Poland. The corrective net expenditure path recommended by 
the Council under the excessive deficit procedure is consistent with the path set out in the plan.  

The assessment of the implementation of the Council Recommendation endorsing Poland’s plan is carried 
out  on the basis  of  outturn  data  from  Eurostat  and  the Commission’s  Spring 2025  Forecast  and taking 
into account the Annual Progress Report (APR) that Poland submitted on 30 April 2025. Furthermore, given 
Poland’s  request  to  activate  the  National  Escape  Clause  (39)  in  accordance  with  the  Commission 
Communication  of  19  March  2025  (40),  the  assessment  also  considers,  as  appropriate,  the  projected 
increase in defence expenditure based on the Commission Spring 2025 Forecast.  

The Annex is organised as follows. First, developments in government deficit and debt are presented 
based  on  the  figures  reported  in  table  A1.1.  Then,  the  assessment  of  the  implementation  of  the 
Council Recommendation to correct the excessive deficit and of the Council Recommendation 
endorsing  the  plan  follows,  based  on  the  relevant  figures  presented  in  Tables  A1.2  to  A1.9,  including 
data on defence expenditure.  

The Annex also provides information on the cost of ageing and the national fiscal framework. Fiscal 
sustainability risks are discussed in the Debt Sustainability Monitor 2024(41). 

(36)  Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) on the effective coordination of economic policies 
and on multilateral budgetary surveillance, together with the amended Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure, and the amended Council Directive 2011/85/EU on the budgetary frameworks of Member States are the 
core elements of the reformed EU economic governance framework. 

(37)  OJ C, C/2025/642, 10.02.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/642/oj. 

(38)  Council Recommendation with a view to bringing an end to the situation of an excessive deficit in Poland, C/2025/5037. 

(39)  On 30 April 2025, Poland requested to the Commission the activation of the National Escape Clause. On this basis, the Commission 

adopted a Recommendation COM/2025/611. 

(40)  Communication  from  the  Commission  accommodating  increased  defence  expenditure  within  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact of  19 

March 2025, C(2025) 2000 final. 

(41)  European Commission (2025) ‘Debt Sustainability Monitor 2024,’ European Economy-Institutional Papers 306. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Developments in government deficit and debt  

Poland’s government deficit amounted to 6.6% of GDP in 2024. Based on the Commission’s Spring 2025 
Forecast,  it  is  projected  to  decrease  to  6.4%  in  2025.  The  government  debt-to-GDP  ratio  amounted  to 
55.3% at the end of 2024 and, according to the Commission, it is projected to increase to  58.0% by the 
end of 2025.  

Table A1.1:  General government balance and debt 

Source: Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR). 

Developments in net expenditure  

The  net  expenditure(42)  growth  of  Poland  in  2025  is  forecast  by  the  Commission(43)  to  be  below  the 
recommended  maximum.  Considering  2024  and  2025  together,  the  cumulative  growth  rate  of  net 
expenditure is projected to be above the recommended maximum cumulative growth rate, corresponding 
to a deviation of less than 0.1% of GDP.  

Table A1.2:  Net expenditure growth 

* The cumulative growth rates are calculated by reference to the base year of 2023. 
Source: Council Recommendation to correct the excessive deficit in Poland, Annual Progress Report (APR), and Commission Spring 
2025 Forecast (COM). 

The assessment of the net expenditure growth and, in particular, the comparison with the recommended 
net expenditure path considers that Poland has requested the activation of the national escape clause to 
facilitate transitioning to a higher level of defence expenditure. General government defence expenditure 
in  Poland  amounted  to  1.6%  of  GDP  in  2021,  1.6%  of  GDP  in  2022  and  2.0%  of  GDP  in  2023  (44). 
According  to  the  Commission  2025  Spring  Forecast,  expenditure  on  defence  is  projected  to  amount  to 
2.7% of GDP in 2024 and 2.8% of GDP in 2025. Based on current projections for defence spending, the 
deviation that is projected for Poland is within the flexibility provided by the national escape clause. 

(42)  Net expenditure is defined in Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 as government expenditure net of (i) interest expenditure, 
(ii) discretionary revenue measures, (iii) expenditure on programmes of the Union fully matched by revenue from Union funds,  (iv) 
national  expenditure  on  co-financing  of  programmes  funded  by  the  Union,  (v)  cyclical  elements  of  unemployment  benefit 
expenditure, and (vi) one-off and other temporary measures.  

(43)  Commission Spring 2025 Forecast, European Economy-Institutional paper 318, May 2025. 

(44)  Eurostat, government expenditure by classification of functions of government (COFOG).  

28 

2024OutturnAPRCOMAPRCOM1General government balance% GDP-6.6-6.3-6.4n.a.-6.12General government gross debt% GDP55.357.858.0n.a.65.3Variables20252026RECAPRCOMRECAPRCOM2024n.a.12.7%12.7%n.a.n.a.n.a.20256.3%5.8%6.2%19.6%19.2%19.7%20264.4%n.a.5.4%24.9%n.a.26.1%AnnualCumulative*Growth rates 
 
                                     
 
 
   
 
 
 
Table A1.3:  Net expenditure (outturn and forecast), annual and cumulated deviations vis-à-vis the 
recommendation 

* The growth rate for 2024 is not a recommendation but serves to anchor the base, as the latest year with outturn data when 
setting the net expenditure path is year 2023. 
Source: Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation. 

Table A1.4:  Defence expenditure and the national escape clause 

Source:  Eurostat (COFOG), Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation. 

29 

2023202420252026OutturnOutturnCOMCOM1Total expenditurebn NAC1600.51799.21967.22104.12Interest expenditurebn NAC70.880.299.8111.13Cyclical unemployment expenditurebn NAC-0.10.10.0-0.14Expenditure funded by transfers from the EUbn NAC46.034.871.783.85National co-financing of EU programmesbn NAC14.09.39.712.06One-off expenditure (levels, excl. EU funded)bn NAC0.02.43.70.07=1-2-3-4-5-6Net nationally financed primary expenditure (before discretionary revenue measures, DRM)bn NAC1469.91672.41782.31897.28Change in net nationally financed primary expenditure (before DRM)bn NAC202.5109.9114.89DRM (excl. one-off revenue, incremental impact)bn NAC15.46.719.410=8-9Change in net nationally financed primary expenditure (after DRM) bn NAC187.1103.295.411Outturn / forecast net expenditure growth% change12.73%6.2%5.4%12Recommended net expenditure growth*% change12.5%6.3%4.4%13=(11-12) x 7Annual deviationbn NAC3.4-2.117.014 (cumulated from 13)Cumulated deviationbn NAC3.41.218.315=13/17Annual balance% GDP0.1-0.10.416=14/17Cumulated balance% GDP0.10.00.417p.m. Nominal GDP  bn NAC3415.33641.23919.14161.1Variables2021202220232024202520261Total defence expenditure% GDP1.61.62.02.72.82.72of which: gross fixed capital formation% GDP0.30.00.61.21.31.23Flexibility from increases in defence expenditure% GDP1.21.24Cumulated balance after flexibility% GDP-1.2-0.7 
 
  
 
 
 
      
 
 
Table A1.5:  Macroeconomic developments and forecasts 

Source: Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR) 

Table A1.6:  General government budgetary position 

Source: Commission Spring 2025 Forecast (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR) 

30 

2024OutturnAPRCOMAPRCOM1=7+8+9Real GDP% change2.93.73.3n.a.3.02Private consumption% change3.03.33.4n.a.2.83Government consumption expenditure% change8.23.22.8n.a.3.24Gross fixed capital formation% change-2.28.96.9n.a.5.35Exports of goods and services% change2.02.41.6n.a.2.36Imports of goods and services% change4.23.83.0n.a.3.1Contributions to real GDP growth 7- Final domestic demandpps2.94.23.7n.a.3.28- Change in inventoriespps1.10.20.1n.a.0.09- Net exportspps-1.1-0.5-0.6n.a.-0.210Output gap% pot GDP-0.8-0.2-0.3n.a.0.011Employment % change-0.70.40.1n.a.0.312Unemployment rate%2.93.02.8n.a.2.813Labour productivity% change3.73.33.2n.a.2.714HICP % change3.74.53.6n.a.2.815GDP deflator% change3.64.14.2n.a.3.116Compensation of employees per head% change12.32.46.2n.a.4.817Net lending/borrowing vis-à-vis the rest of the world% GDP0.5n.a.1.3n.a.1.020252026Variables2024OutturnAPRCOMAPRCOM1=2+3+4+5Revenue42.844.043.8n.a.44.4of which:2- Taxes on production and imports14.514.314.3n.a.14.63- Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.7.88.38.1n.a.8.44- Social contributions15.215.215.1n.a.15.05- Other (residual)5.36.26.3n.a.6.58=9+16Expenditure 49.450.350.2n.a.50.6of which:9- Primary expenditure47.247.847.6n.a.47.9of which:10- Compensation of employees 11.511.511.5n.a.11.511- Intermediate consumption6.76.66.6n.a.6.712- Social payments19.419.920.0n.a.20.113- Subsidies1.20.70.7n.a.0.614- Gross fixed capital formation4.95.25.1n.a.5.215- Other3.53.93.7n.a.3.816- Interest expenditure2.22.52.5n.a.2.718=1-8General government balance-6.6-6.3-6.4n.a.-6.119=1-9Primary balance-4.4-3.8-3.8n.a.-3.420Cyclically adjusted balance-6.2n.a.-6.2n.a.-6.121One-offs-0.1-0.1-0.1n.a.0.022=20-21Structural balance-6.1-6.2-6.1n.a.-6.123=22+16Structural primary balance-3.9-3.6-3.6n.a.-3.4Variables (% GDP)20252026 
 
                                     
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
 
Table A1.7:  Debt developments 

* End of period. 
** The 'snow-ball' effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated general government debt, as well as the 
impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the general government debt-to-GDP ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow 
adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting (including leads and lags in Recovery and Resilience Facility grant 
disbursements), accumulation of financial assets, and valuation and other residual effects. 
Source: Commission Spring 2025 Forecast and Commission's calculation (COM), Annual Progress Report (APR) 

Table A1.8:  RRF – Grants 

Source: Annual Progress Report. 

31 

2024OutturnAPRCOMAPRCOM1Gross debt ratio* (% of GDP)55.357.858.0n.a.65.32=3+4+8Change in the ratio (pps. of GDP)5.72.62.8n.a.7.3Contributions**3Primary balance4.43.83.8n.a.3.44≈5+6+7'Snow-ball' effect-0.9-1.4-1.4n.a.-0.7of which:5- Interest expenditure2.22.52.5n.a.2.76- Real growth effect-1.4-1.9-1.7n.a.-1.67- Inflation effect-1.7-2.1-2.2n.a.-1.88'Stock-flow' adjustment2.20.20.3n.a.4.620252026VariablesRevenue from RRF grants (% of GDP)20202021202220232024202520261RRF grants as included in the revenue projectionsn.a.0.00.00.10.31.50.92Cash disbursements of RRF grants from EUn.a.0.00.00.10.80.41.420202021202220232024202520263Total current expenditure0.00.00.00.10.20.60.34Gross fixed capital formation0.00.0n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.5Capital transfers0.00.0n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.6=4+5Total capital expenditure0.00.00.00.00.10.90.620202021202220232024202520267Reduction in tax revenue0.00.00.00.00.00.00.08Other costs with impact on revenue0.00.00.00.00.00.00.09Financial transactions0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0Expenditure financed by RRF grants (% of GDP)Other costs financed by RRF grants (% of GDP) 
 
                                     
 
 
 
                                     
 
 
Table A1.9:  RRF - Loans 

Source: Annual Progress Report. 

Cost of ageing  

Total age-related spending in Poland is projected to rise from about 20% of GDP in 2024 to 
21% by 2070 (see Table A1.10). The overall increase is due to healthcare and long-term care spending, 
with a decline expected for pension expenditure at unchanged policy. Public pension spending is projected 
to  follow  a  downward trend  over the  next  decades.  The  pension  expenditure-to-GDP  ratio  would  fall  by 
0.9 pps, of which 0.4 pps by 2040, from 11% of GDP in 2024 to 10.1% in 2070. 

Public healthcare expenditure is projected at 4.4% of GDP in 2024 (below the EU average of 
6.6%)  and is  expected to  increase by 0.6 pps by  2040  and  by a further  0.5 pps  by  2070 (45). 
Public expenditure on long-term care is projected at 0.5% of GDP in 2024 (well below the EU average of 
1.7%)  and  is  expected  to  increase  by  0.3  pps  of  GDP  by  2040  and  by  a  further  0.6  pps  of  GDP  by 
2070 (46).  

Table A1.10:Projected change in age-related expenditure in 2024-2040 and 2024-2070 

Source: 2024 Ageing Report (EC/EPC). 

(45)  Key performance characteristics, recent reforms and investments of the Polish healthcare system are discussed in Annex 14 ‘Health 

and health systems’.   

(46)  The adequacy and quality of the Polish long-term care system are covered in Annex 11 ‘Social policies’.    

32 

Cash flow from RRF loans projected in the Plan (% of GDP)20202021202220232024202520261Disbursements of RRF loans from EUn.a.0.00.00.61.00.31.82Repayments of RRF loans to EUn.a.0.00.00.00.00.0n.a.20202021202220232024202520263Total current expenditure0.00.00.00.00.00.51.64Gross fixed capital formation0.00.00.00.0n.a.n.a.n.a.5Capital transfers0.00.00.00.0n.a.n.a.n.a.6=4+5Total capital expenditure0.00.00.00.00.10.51.020202021202220232024202520267Reduction in tax revenue0.00.00.00.00.00.00.08Other costs with impact on revenue0.00.00.00.00.00.00.09Financial transactions0.00.00.00.00.00.00.0Expenditure financed by RRF loans (% of GDP)Other costs financed by RRF loans (% of GDP)PL19.8-0.40.60.3-0.20.320.1PLEU24.30.50.30.4-0.30.925.2EUPL19.8-0.91.10.90.11.121.0PLEU24.30.20.60.8-0.41.325.6EUage-related expenditure 2024 (% GDP)change in 2024-2040 (pps GDP) due to:age-related expenditure 2040 (%GDP)pensionshealthcarelong-term careeducationtotalage-related expenditure 2024 (% GDP)change in 2024-2070 (pps GDP) due to:age-related expenditure 2070 (%GDP)pensionshealthcarelong-term careeducationtotal 
 
                                     
 
 
  
 
 
National fiscal framework 

Poland  is  the  only  Member  State  that  does  not  yet  have  an  independent  fiscal  institution. 
However, Poland is currently in the process of setting one up and it is expected to be fully operational as 
of 2026.  

Procedures  for  assessing  and  selecting  public  investment  projects  and  carrying  out  ex  post 
reviews  are  weak.  Standardised  methodologies  for  project  assessments  are  only  in  place  for  EU-
financed investments but could be applied to all major government funded investments. Project selection 
procedures vary across ministries. There are no standard criteria for project selection and prioritisation at 
central  government  level  (47).  Ex  post  reviews  focused  on  implementation  policies  and  procedures  are 
often  only  required  for  EU-financed  investments.  After  sufficient  time  since  a  project  started  delivering 
(e.g.  three  to  five  years),  a  comprehensive  ex-post  review  can  be  carried  out  to  assess  the  strategic 
performance. In Poland, ex-post reviews are neither systematically required, not frequently conducted. 

Table A1.11:Fiscal Governance Database Indicators 

The Country Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI) shows the strength of national fiscal rules aggregated at the country level based 
on i) the legal base, ii) how binding the rule is, iii) monitoring bodies, iv) correction mechanisms, and v) resilience to shocks. The 
Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI) shows the strength of the national MTBF based on i) coverage of the 
targets/ceilings included in the national medium-term fiscal plans; ii) connectedness between these targets/ceilings and the 
annual budgets; iii) involvement of the national parliament in the preparation of the plans; iv) involvement of independent fiscal 
institutions in their preparation; and v) their level of detail. A higher score is associated with higher rule and MTBF strength. 
Source: Fiscal Governance Database. 

(47)  IMF, 2022, Poland technical assistance report public investment management assessment, IMF Country Report no. 22/321. 

33 

2023PolandEU AverageCountry Fiscal Rule Strength Index (C-FRSI)13.0514.52Medium-Term Budgetary Framework Index (MTBFI)0.380.73 
 
   
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 2: TAXATION 

This  annex  provides  an 
indicator-based 
overview  of  Poland’s  tax  system.  It  includes 
information on: (i) the tax mix; (ii) competitiveness 
and  fairness  aspects  of  the  tax  system;  and  (iii) 
tax collection and compliance.  

Graph A2.1: Tax revenue shares in 2023 

Poland’s  tax  revenues  are  relatively  low  in 
relation  to  GDP  and  rely  on  consumption 
taxes  more  than  the  EU  average.  Table  A2.1 
shows  that  Poland’s  tax  revenues  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  GDP  were  considerably  below  the 
EU  aggregate  in  2023.  Poland’s  tax  mix  has  a 
taxation 
reliance  on 
relatively 
(equivalent to 13.5% of Polish GDP compared with 
an  EU  average  of  20%  in  2023)  but  a  greater 
reliance  on  consumption  taxes  than  the  EU 
average  (equivalent  to  11.7%  of  GDP  compared 
with an EU average of 10.5%).  

labour 

low 

To 

for 

the 

taxes). 

share  of 

strengthen 

Poland  has  untapped  potential  to  tax 
property and scope to improve environmental 
sustainability.  Property  taxation  is  underutilised, 
being  significantly  below  the  EU  aggregate  (1.4% 
of  GDP  vs  an  EU  average  of  1.9%).  In  2023,  the 
share of revenues from taxes on capital in Poland 
increased  (to  9.9%  of  GDP),  surpassing  the  EU 
average  (8.5%).  Although  Poland’s  revenues  from 
environmental taxes as a share of GDP are above 
the EU average (2.6% of Polish GDP), energy taxes 
account 
these 
largest 
environmental taxes (making up 7.4% of total tax 
in  Poland  and  91.3%  of  Polish 
revenue 
environmental 
the 
application  of  the  ‘polluter  pays’  principle,  Poland 
could consider introducing stricter vehicle-emission 
taxes to promote cleaner transportation (transport 
taxes make  up  only  0.5%  of  tax  revenue).  Poland 
also  needs  to  update  its  system  for  vehicle 
taxation  to  ensure  that  it  reflects  emissions  and 
impact.  This  point  was  also 
environmental 
reflected  in  the  2025  OECD  Economic  Survey (48). 
There  is  also  scope  to  increase  pollution  and 
resource taxes (they only account for 0.3% of total 
tax revenues in Poland at present), in particular by 
expanding  taxes  on  waste  disposal  (including 
incineration)  or  introducing  taxes  on:  (i)  NOx 
emissions;  (ii)  discharges  of  waste  into  water;  (iii) 
fertilisers;  and  (iv)  pesticides.  Poland’s  carbon-tax 
rate  remains  significantly  lower  than  the  EU 
average (EUR 68 per tonne of CO2 equivalent vs an 
EU average of EUR 84.80 per tonne).  

(48)  https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-

surveys-poland-2025_483d3bb9-en.html. 

34 

Source: Taxation Trends Data, DG TAXUD 

in  Poland 

The  corporate  tax  burden 
is 
relatively low. Poland’s forward-looking average 
effective  corporate  tax  rate,  which  indicates  the 
expected tax burden for investment, was 12.2% in 
2023,  significantly  below  the  EU  average  of 
18.9%.  Poland’s  standard  corporate-income  tax 
(CIT)  rate  is  19%,  also  below  the  EU  average 
(which  is  around  21%),  and  21  pps  lower  than  in 
1995,  when  Poland’s  standard  CIT  rate  was  40%. 
Since 1 January 2025, the new rules related to the 
transposition  of  the  Pillar  2  Directive  on  global 
minimum corporate tax have been in force. Poland 
has  various  tax  incentives  in  place,  including 
special  economic  zones,  incentives  for  R&D,  tax 
deductions  for  investment,  and  a  ‘patent  box’ 
regime. The Polish Deal (Polski Ład), a package of 
reforms  adopted  by  the  government  in  2022, (49) 
introduced  several  reforms  and  tax  incentives  to 
improve  the  country’s  investment  climate,  with  a 
special 
focus  on  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises, R&D, and innovation.  

Nevertheless,  there  are  indications  that  the 
tax  framework  is  not  fully  conducive  to 
innovation  and  sustainable  growth.  Despite 
recent  reforms,  Polish  companies  still  say  that 
over-regulation is one of the biggest impediments 
to  investment.  Annex  2  gives  more  detail  on  the 
challenges of predictability in legislation in Poland. 
A  2022  study 
the  European 
requested  by 
Commission  on  Tax  compliance  costs  for  SMEs 
suggests  that  tax  compliance  may  be  a  greater 
burden  in  Poland  than  the  EU  average (50).  As 

(49)  https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/the-polish-deal--a-

real-profit-for-18-million-poles  

(50)  https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-

12/221208%20DG%20GROW%20report%20-
%202022%20Tax%20Compliance%20Costs%20SMEs.pdf. 

51.226.921.938.533.428.2Tax revenue shares in 2023, Poland (outer ring) and EU (inner ring)Taxes on labourTaxes on consumptionTaxes on capital 
 
 
        
 
 
Table A2.1:  Taxation indicators 

(1) Forward-looking effective tax rate (KPMG).       
(2) A higher value indicates a stronger redistributive impact of taxation. 
(*) EU-27 simple average. 
(**) Forecast value for 2023. For more details on the VAT gap, see European Commission, Directorate-General for Taxation and 
Customs Union, VAT gap in the EU - 2024 report,  https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/2476549 
For more data on tax revenues as well as the methodology applied, see the Data on Taxation webpage, 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation-1/economic-analysis-taxation/data-taxation_en. 
Source: European Commission, OECD 

shown  by  the  last  edition  of  the  Doing  Business 
report,  produced  by  the  World  Bank,  a  medium-
sized  Polish  company  would  need  to  spend  an 
average  of  334  hours  per  year  to  fulfil  their  tax 
obligations – the second longest amount of time in 
the  EU-27 (51).  Moreover,  Poland  ranks  last  out  of 
the  27  Member  States  in  the  tax  complexity 
index (52),  which  comprehensively  measures  the 
complexity  of  national  CIT  systems  faced  by 
multinational  corporations.  Poland’s  complex  CIT 
system  has  many  negative  consequences.  Chief 
among  these  problems 
is  that  complex  CIT 
systems  generate  additional  costs  that  do  not 
contribute to economic growth in any way,  and in 
fact  inhibit  growth.  The  complexity  of  the  tax 
regulations particularly  affects smaller companies 
that  do  not  have  specialised  departments  dealing 
with  tax matters.  This  suggests  Poland  has  scope 
to improve both the structure of its tax regulations 
and the way that tax processes are carried out by 
the country’s tax authorities.  

Poland  will  have  to  rely  increasingly  on 
accelerating  productivity  gains  to  boost 
growth.  Poland’s  current  focus  on  the  promotion 
of  a  digitalised  economy,  automation  and 
robotisation,  as  reflected  in  its  national  recovery 
and  resilience  plan  and  its  2030  productivity 
strategy, will be needed to pave the way for future 
economic  expansion  in  the  absence  of  a  growing 
population.  

labour 

tax  burden  was 

Poland’s 
less 
progressive  than  the  EU  average  in  2024. 
Graph  A2.2  shows  that  the  labour  tax  wedge(53) 
for Poland in 2024 was below the EU average for 
single  people  at  all  earnings  levels,  but  that  the 
labour-tax  system  was  overall  less  progressive 
than  the  EU  average  (i.e.  labour  taxes  in  Poland 
increase  by  less  than  the  EU  average  as  people 
earn  more).  Second  earners  at  a  wage  level  of 
67%  of  the  average  wage,  whose  spouses  earn 
the  average  wage,  were  also  subject  to  a  tax 
wedge that was somewhat below the EU average. 

(51)

https://archive.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreecono

mies/poland#DB_tax. 

(52)  https://www.taxcomplexity.org. 

(53)  The  tax  wedge  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  personal  income 
social-security 
taxes  and  employee  and  employer 
contributions  net  of  family  allowances,  expressed  as  a 
percentage of total labour costs (the sum of the gross wage 
and social-security contributions paid by the employer). 

35 

PLMedian (EU-27)2010202120222023202420102021202220232024Tax structureTotal taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of GDP)31.436.334.135.137.840.239.739.0Taxes on labour (% of GDP)11.914.113.413.519.820.520.120.0of which, social security contributions (SSC, % of GDP)10.812.812.713.312.913.012.712.7Taxes on consumption (% of GDP)12.413.312.011.710.911.210.910.5of which, value added taxes (VAT, % of GDP)7.68.57.27.36.87.37.47.1Taxes on capital (% of GDP)7.28.98.89.97.18.58.78.5Personal income taxes (PIT, % of GDP)4.45.34.54.48.69.69.49.3Corporate income taxes (CIT, % of GDP)2.02.62.82.62.22.93.23.2Total property taxes (% of GDP)1.41.61.51.41.92.22.11.9Recurrent taxes on immovable property (% of GDP)1.11.11.01.01.11.11.00.9Environmental taxes (% of GDP)2.72.92.82.62.52.42.12.0Effective carbon rate in EUR per tonne of CO2 equivalentsNA65.4NA68.0NA86.0NA84.8Tax wedge at 50% of average wage (single person) (*)32.333.629.430.431.233.931.831.531.531.8Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (single person) (*)34.234.933.834.334.740.939.939.940.240.3Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*)17.016.215.212.221.319.319.118.9Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*)4.74.74.65.38.68.27.97.7Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*)25.021.935.532.6VAT gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL) (**)5.68.410.56.67.0PolandEU-27Progressivity & fairnessTax administration & complianceBy tax baseSome tax types 
 
 
 
 
      
 
At  the  same  time,  the  tax  wedge  for  second 
earners  was  substantially  higher  than  the  tax 
wedge for single earners at the same wage level. 
It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  current  design  of 
the  tax-and-benefit  system  is  having  a  negative 
impact on the share of women entering the labour 
market.  

Graph A2.2: Tax wedge for single and second 
earners, % of total labour costs, 2024 

The tax wedge for second earners assumes a first earner at 
100% of the average wage and no children. For the full 
methodology, see OECD, 2016, Taxing Wages 2014-2015. 
Source: European Commission 

Although  income  inequality  in  Poland  is 
modest,  the  tax-and-benefit  system  has  one 
of the smallest inequality-reducing effects in 
the EU. In 2023, the difference between the Gini 
index  of  market  income  and  disposable  income 
distribution  was  only  5.3  pps  in  Poland  compared 
with  an  EU  average  of  7.7  pps.  This  indicates  a 
lower  effect  of  taxes  and  benefit  transfers  on 
reducing  income  inequality  than  in  other  EU 
Member States, although somewhat higher than in 
the  previous  year.  At  the  same  time,  in  terms  of 
disposable income after taxes and benefits, Poland 
shows  one  of  the  lowest  Gini  indexes  (26.3%) 
against  the  EU  average  (34.1%),  indicating  lower 
income inequality in Poland than in other Member 
States.  The  reforms  introduced  under  the  Polish 
Deal  in  2022  aimed  to  improve  the  progressivity 
of  the  tax  system,  reducing  the  tax  burden  on 
lower and middle-income earners. 

After  years  of  improving  VAT  collection, 
Poland  recently  reported  an  increase  in  the 
VAT gap. The VAT gap increased to 8.4% in 2022 
(although  this  is  still  a  decline  of  5.8  pps  in 
comparison with 2018 when it was 14.2%) and to 
a  forecasted  10.5%  in  2023.  This  is  higher  than 

the  measures 

the EU average which was 7.0% in 2022. Poland’s 
VAT policy gap was also among the highest in the 
EU due to the wide application of reduced rates. In 
2021, the VAT policy gap increased significantly – 
from 48% to 55%. This increase can be connected 
the  Polish 
to 
government  in  2022  and  2023,  including  ‘anti-
inflation  shields’  which  temporarily  reduced  VAT 
rates  on  specific  goods,  such  as  fuel,  electricity, 
and food. While these measures were intended to 
alleviate the effects of rising prices on consumers, 
they also resulted in lower VAT revenues (54). 

introduced  by 

Poland  is  relatively  advanced  in  digitally 
transforming its tax administration, which can 
help  reduce  tax  arrears.  Tax  arrears  currently 
amount  to  around  25%  of  total  tax  revenue.  This 
is  below  the  EU  average,  but  this  EU  average  is 
inflated  by  large  values  in  a  few  EU  countries. 
Poland  continues  to  develop  digital  platforms, 
including ‘e-tax Office’, a service to help taxpayers 
meet their tax obligations. However, the delay (due 
to audit recommendations) until February 2026 of 
the  introduction  of  the  mandatory  national  e-
invoicing  system  (which  aims  to  improve  tax 
compliance  by  ensuring  real-time  monitoring  of 
transactions  and  reducing  opportunities  for  VAT 
fraud) may postpone the expected benefits in VAT 
collection efficiency. 

(54)  VAT Gap in the EU 2024 Report pp. 146-147. 

36 

31.233.034.737.937.82025303540455050100150Tax wedge, % of total labour costsEarnings as % of the average wageSingle earner - PLSingle earner - EU averageSingle earner - Single earner - PL (with NTCP)Second earner -  PL 
      
 
 
PRODUCTIVITY 
ANNEX 3: INNOVATION TO BUSINESS  

Poland  is  an  emerging  innovator,  but  still 
faces challenges in boosting its research and 
innovation performance. As the 2024 European 
Innovation  Scoreboard  points  out,  Poland’s 
research  and  innovation  performance  is  catching 
up  with  the  EU  average  (currently  at  65.9%,  
3.3 percentage  points  up  from  the  previous 
year) (55),  but  the  country  is  still  considered  an 
‘emerging innovator’ (56). Improvements have been 
driven  by  R&D 
(gross  domestic 
intensity 
expenditure  on  R&D  as  a  percentage  of  GDP) 
increasing steadily from 1.03% in 2017 to 1.56% 
in  2023.  To  further  boost  R&D  and  innovation,  a 
new national target should be set closer to the EU 
(2023).  This  should  be 
average  of  2.24% 
combined with targeted measures to increase the 
research and innovation output and strengthen the 
attractiveness  of  research  careers.  Regarding  the 
innovation  output  of  firms,  Poland  faces  two  key 
challenges:  a  weak  science-business  collaboration 
system and sluggish adoption of (advanced) digital 
technologies,  resulting  in  enterprises,  especially 
SMEs, trailing the EU average. 

Science and innovative ecosystems 

improvement,  but 

Poland’s  scientific  performance  shows  signs 
further  progress 
of 
depends on sustained increases in public R&D 
expenditure  and  reforms  to  improve  the 
competitiveness  and  internationalisation  of 
scientific institutions. Excellent research output, 
as  measured  in  top-cited  scientific  publications, 
increased from 4.3% in 2015 to 5.5% in 2021 (57), 
but remains significantly below the EU average of 
international  co-
9.6%.  The 

low  number  of 

(55)  European Commission, 2024, European Innovation 

Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland. The EIS provides a 
comparative analysis of innovation performance in EU 
countries, including the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
their national innovation systems (also compared to the EU 
average). 

publications  as  a  percentage  of  the  total  number 
of  publications  also  demonstrates  this  (41.6  for 
Poland,  against  the  EU  average  of  55.9  in  2023). 
Public  R&D  expenditure  has  returned  to  its  2012 
level (0.55% in 2023), with further efforts needed 
to  get  closer  to  the  EU  average.  In  this  context, 
cohesion  policy  support  through  the  European 
Funds  for  Smart  Economy  (FENG),  channelled 
through  the  national  programme  and  16  regional 
programmes,  is  key  to  boost  R&I  investments 
(total  allocation  amounting  to  EUR 16  billion). 
Poland’s  scientific  progress  also  relies  on  the 
successful  and  still  ongoing  reform  of  the  Polish 
Academy  of  Science  (PAN),  also  part  of  the 
enabling  conditions  under  the  FENG  programme. 
The  reform  seeks  to  modernise  the  Academy’s 
structure,  improve  research  quality  and  align  its 
activities  with  national  innovation  goals.  It  is 
essential  to  ensure  that  the  reform  achieves  its 
objective  of  fostering  an  independent  research 
environment.  To  boost  competitiveness,  it  is  also 
essential  to  improve  the  evaluation  system  for 
scientific  performance  in  higher  education  (see 
Annex  12).  The  Excellence  Initiative  –  Research 
Universities (58)  has  shown  potential,  with  its  first 
strategic 
assessment  highlighting 
education 
planning 
initiatives (59).  The  next  steps  should  additionally 
focus on internationalisation to sustain progress. 

research-driven 

successful 

and 

Business innovation 

Poland  is  steadily  increasing  its  business 
R&D expenditure, but this has yet to produce 
stronger innovation outputs.  Poland’s business 
R&D  expenditure  as  a  percentage  of  GDP 
increased  from  0.46%  in  2015  to  1%  in  2023, 
with  a  shift  towards  activities  with  higher  added 
value  and  ICT.  This  is  reflected  in  the  growing 
number  of  business-sector  researchers  per  1 000 
active population, from 1.7 in 2015 to 4.6 in 2023. 
Through the introduction of R&D tax allowances in 

(56)  The European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) puts EU Member 
States in one of four performance groups based on their 
scores: innovation leaders, strong innovators, moderate 
innovators and emerging innovators. 

(58)  The Excellence Initiative – Research Universities aims to 

enhance the quality of research and education at the best 
Polish universities in order for them to become European 
universities in the field of research. 

(57)  As measured by scientific publications within the top 10% 

(59)  Holm (2020): Reflections on the First Progress Review 

most cited scientific publications worldwide as a percentage 
of the country’s total scientific publications. 

Conference of the 20 Universities in the ‘Excellence Initiative 
– Research Universities’ programme. 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
2016, a major publicly financed measure, R&D tax 
incentives  increased  from  0.003%  in  2016  to 
0.056% in 2023 as a percentage of GDP. Despite 
this increase, however, Poland’s tax incentives still 
trail  the  EU  average  (0.102%  of  GDP)  and 
innovation  output (60)  has  not 
significantly 
improved;  SMEs,  in  particular,  continue  to  lag 
behind  in  innovation  activities (61).  The  results  of 
the ongoing analysis with the support of OECD will 
be  crucial  to  better  understand  the  impact  of  the 
R&D 
innovation  activity. 
Moreover, Poland would benefit from participating 
in  the  unitary  patent  system,  which  offers  key 
advantages  in  terms  of  promoting innovation  and 
enhancing competitiveness (62). 

tax  allowances  on 

Graph A3.1: Patent applications filed under the PCT 
per billion GDP (in PPS €) in relation to business 
enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a 
percentage of GDP, 2021 

Source: Eurostat, Fraunhofer data (PATSTAT), 2024 

Despite  above  EU  average  growth  for 
relevant  Digital  Decade  indicators,  Poland 
lags  behind  in  the  uptake  of  basic (63)  and 
advanced digital technologies (64)(65) by SMEs. 
Poland  relies  on  both  national  measures  and 
investments  under  the  cohesion  policy  and  the 
recovery and resilience plan to support adoption of 

(60)  As measured in patent applications filed under the PCT per 
billion GDP (in PPS €): 0.4 for Poland (2022) vs 2.8 in the EU 
(2024). 

(61)  European Commission, 2024, European Innovation 

Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland. 

(62)  After joining the enhanced cooperation framework, Poland is 

expected to sign the Unified Patent Court Agreement. 

(63)  Basic digital intensity of SMEs in 2023: 50% in Poland vs 

57.7% in the EU. 

(64)  Uptake of AI in 2023: 3.7% in Poland vs 8% in the EU. 

(65)  Uptake of data analytics by SMEs in 2023: 19.3% in Poland 

vs 33.2% in the EU. 

digital  technologies  by  businesses  and  their 
further  development.  These  initiatives  range  from 
comprehensive  digitalisation  advice 
(including 
through the European Digital Innovation Hubs) and 
grants  to  SMEs  for  purchasing  and  implementing 
the  development  of  digital 
IT  solutions, 
technology and infrastructure. The uptake of cloud 
computing  by  enterprises  is  higher  than  the  EU-
average (66). Additionally, Poland is involved in two 
out of six EuroHPC JU quantum computer projects 
and plans to set up an AI Factory to develop, test 
and deploy state-of-the-art AI technologies. 

to 

the 

ability 

Poland’s 

reducing 

Cooperation between science and business is 
limited, 
to 
commercialise  its  research.  Science-business 
linkages  in  Poland  have  been  hampered  by  an 
underdeveloped  research  base  and  insufficiently 
targeted  programmes  promoting  applied  research 
and  academic-private  collaboration 
(see  also 
Graph  A3.2  below).  The  weakness  of  science-
business linkages in Poland is reflected in the low 
number  of  public-private scientific  co-publications 
as  a  percentage  of 
total  number  of 
publications  (5.6%  vs  the  EU  average  of  7.7%), 
and  in  the  low  proportion  of  public  research 
financed  by  businesses  (0.014  vs  the  EU  average 
of  0.050).  Efforts  made  to  address  this  issue 
include  the  establishment  of  the  Łukasiewicz 
Research  Network  and  the  creation  of  the  Polish 
Association of Centres for Technology Transfer as 
part of the Technology Transfer Office network. In 
addition, 
doctorate’ 
initiative (67) put in place in 2017 could help foster 
science-business  collaboration  by  aligning  skills. 
Several measures supporting cooperation between 
science  and  business  are also  being  implemented 
under  the  FENG  programme.  The  effectiveness  of 
these 
instruments  should  be 
assessed  soon  to  measure  the  impact,  improve 
them and identify gaps in the related policy mix. 

‘implementation 

initiatives  and 

the 

(66)  Uptake of cloud computing by enterprises in 2023: 46.5% in 

Poland vs 38.9% in the EU. 

(67)  The programme allows doctorate students to be employed in 
the business sector while simultaneously working to obtain 
their PhD at a university or research institute. 

38 

BGCZELESFRITCYLVLUHUMTPLPTROSISK00.511.522.533.500.511.52Patent applications filed under PCT per billion GDP (in PPS€)Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP 
           
 
 
Graph A3.2: Public-private scientific co-
publications as a percentage of the total number 
of publications, 2023 

assessment is needed to measure the impact and 
identify gaps. 

Financing innovation 

Source: Eurostat 2024 

still 

there  has  been  considerable 
Although 
progress, innovation barriers still persist and 
further reforms are needed to support Polish 
innovators.  Overall,  Poland  now  has  business-
friendly  regulations  and  low  barriers  to trade, but 
reforms (68).  The 
some  areas 
require 
administrative  burden  on  start-ups  remains  high, 
but  recent  reforms,  such  as  simplified  reporting 
and  tax  obligations,  are  a  step  in  the  right 
direction.  Service  trade  restrictions  are  above  the 
OECD  average;  liberalising  these  markets  could 
attract more expertise and benefit the country (69). 
The  lack  of  an  experienced,  highly  skilled  ICT 
workforce is also holding back Poland’s innovation 
capacity,  especially  in  the  ICT  sector  (70).  Finally, 
Poland’s  innovation  public  procurement  system  is 
not  yet  fully  developed (71).  However,  it  should  be 
improved  through  current  and  upcoming  reforms, 
including simplification and digitalisation of public 
procurement  processes.  A  positive  impact  is  also 
expected 
from  Poland’s  2022-2025  State 
purchasing  policy,  which  advises  all  Polish  public 
buyers  to  allocate  3%  of  their  budget  to  R&I 
to  procurement  of 
procurement  and  20% 
innovative  solutions.  The  policy  mix  for  fostering 
is  promising,  but  an 
innovation  procurement 

limits 

further  expansion 

capital  market  has 

financing  capabilities  of  Poland’s 
The 
improved 
venture 
considerably,  but 
is 
necessary.  Poland  is  the  leading  destination  for 
foreign  direct  investments  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe (72),  whereas  the  domestic  venture  capital 
market  accounted  for  only  0.021%  of  its  GDP  in 
2023, down from 0.028% in 2022 and below the 
EU average of 0.078% (73). Polish SMEs rely mainly 
on internal funding and bank loans to finance their 
investments,  which  greatly 
their  R&D 
capacity  and  scale-up  and  growth  opportunities 
compared  to  investments  financed  by  private 
equity  and  venture  capital (74).  The  Investment 
Fund  of  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and 
Development  will  finance  innovative  SMEs  via  its 
venture  capital  branch,  and  the National  Bank  for 
Development (BGK) is implementing a FENG equity 
instrument  targeting  innovative  SMEs.  This  is  a 
positive  step  towards  the  development  of  a 
venture  capital  culture  in  the  Polish  innovation 
ecosystem.  However,  a  more  comprehensive 
approach 
to  address  various 
shortcomings,  in  particular  to  improve  access  to 
financing  for  start-ups.  Mobilising  a  portion  of 
capital from various pension funds could be a way 
to increase the domestic financing capacity in the 
venture capital and private equity segments of the 
capital  market.  Moreover,  other  solutions  such  as 
IP-backed  financing  system  may  also  be  very 
attractive to the Polish startups and SME’s. 

is  necessary 

Innovative talent 

(68)  OECD, 2023, OECD Economic Survey of Poland, oecd-

ilibrary.org. 

(69)  ibid. 

Insufficient 
the 
recruitment and retention of top researchers 

incentives  hold  back 

(70)  Measured by the top 10% most cited ICT publications (%), 

Poland has a rate of 5.3% (2021) compared to 8.6% for the 
EU (2024). Science Metrix 2024. 

(71)  Measured by innovation procurement as a proportion of total 
public procurement, Poland has a rate of 4.3% compared to 
9.2% for the EU. European Commission, 2024, European 
Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland. 

(72)  OECD, 2024, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2024 – An 

OECD Scoreboard, oecd-ilibrary.org. 

(73)  Measured in Venture Capital (market statistics) as a 

percentage of GDP, Invest Europe, 2024. 

(74)  OECD, 2024, Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2024 – An 

OECD Scoreboard, oecd-ilibrary.org. 

39 

024681012DEHUSICZESPLEU 
           
 
 
entrepreneurship  education,  and  the  link  between 
higher education and business is weak.  

it  comes 

in Poland’s public sector. Poland’s difficulties in 
attracting  researchers  to  the  public  sector  is  the 
consequence  of  poor  working  conditions  and 
perspectives  for  researchers.  The  public  sector 
researcher workforce has remained stagnant since 
2017,  with  numbers  consistently  below  the  EU 
average (75).  Poland  struggles  to  attract  students 
to  science  and  engineering  programmes (76)  and 
to  producing 
underperforms  when 
doctoral  graduates  (see  Annex  12)  and  attracting 
foreign doctorate students (77). It also struggles to 
offer  attractive  research  careers  in  the  public 
sector, largely due to low academic remuneration, 
limited  transferable  skills  and  weak  mobility.  It 
must  address  these  shortcomings  to  develop  a 
performant  public  research  career  system (78). 
Concerning  the  issuance  of  EU  blue  cards,  Poland 
triplicated the number of new EU Blue Cards in the 
last  2  years  (last  available  data  for  2023  in 
Eurostat), becoming the 2nd country in the EU, after 
Germany,  to  use  the  most  this  EU  measure, 
pointing  to  an  increased  need  of  (highly)  skilled 
workers from employers. 

the 

and 

quality 

While  some  efforts  have  been  made  to 
strengthen  entrepreneurship  education 
in 
Poland,  the  lack  of  a  national  strategy  and 
monitoring  of  initiatives  remains  an  issue. 
Based  on  the  Global  Entrepreneurship  Monitoring 
Survey, 
of 
entrepreneurship  education  improved  in  Poland 
from  2022  to  2023.  However,  Poland  still  ranks 
below 
the  participating  EU 
countries (79).  A  lack  of  skills  remains  one  of  the 
barriers 
to  business  development.  Several 
initiatives  have  been  set  up  in  recent  years  to 
support entrepreneurship at all educational  levels. 
Nevertheless, some issues still need to be tackled: 
Poland  lacks  a  targeted  national  strategy  for 

the  average  of 

outcomes 

(75)  As measured by researchers employed (FTE) by the public 

sector per thousand active population: 3.5 (2023) in Poland 
compared to 4.2 (2024) in the EU. 

(76)  Poland lags far behind the EU average in terms of students 
enrolled and new graduates in science and engineering per 
thousand population aged 25-34. 

(77)  European Commission, 2024, European Innovation 

Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: Poland. 

(78)  European Commission (2017): Poland’s Higher Education and 
Science System and European Commission (2020): MORE4 
study - Support data collection and analysis concerning 
mobility patterns and career paths of researchers. 

(79)  Tarnawa A. (Ed.) (2024). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
Poland 2024. https://www.gemconsortium.org/report/gem-
poland-2024-report. 

40 

 
 
Table A3.1:  Key innovation indicators (*) 

(*) EU average for the last available year or the year with the largest number of country data. 
Source: Eurostat, DG JRC, OECD, Science-Metrix (Scopus database), Invest Europe, European Innovation Scoreboard 

41 

R&D intensity (gross domestic expenditure on R&D as % of GDP)0.881.031.371.421.441.56:2.243.45Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP0.550.360.510.520.490.55:0.720.64Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications of the country 3.44.55.15.5:::9.612.3Researchers (FTEs) employed by public sector (Gov+HEI) per thousand active population3.13.63.63.63.63.5:4.2:International co-publications as % of total number of publications27.631.734.636.139.541.6:55.939.3BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP0.330.660.860.890.951:1.492.7Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) performed by SMEs as % of GDP0.110.230.290.290.35::0.40.3Researchers employed by business per thousand active population0.93.23.74.24.64.6:5.7:Patent applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty per billion GDP (in PPS €)0.50.50.60.50.4::2.8:SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity% SMEs (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 90%)::::60.95:68.9572.91:Data analytics adoption% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%):::::19.31:33.17:Cloud adoption% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%):::19.17:46.5:38.86:Artificial intelligence adoption% enterprises (EU Digital Decade target by 2030: 75%):::2.86:3.675.913.48:Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications3.54.64.85.15.55.6:7.78.9Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprise (national) as % of GDP0.0190.0130.0150.0140.014::0.050.02Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP0.0550.1190.1910.2010.205::0.2040.251R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP00.0070.0290.0330.0450.056:0.1020.141BERD financed by the public sector (national and abroad) as % of GDP0.0550.1120.1620.1680.16::0.10.11Venture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP, total (calculated as a 3-year moving average)0.0040.0120.0170.0220.0280.021:0.078:Seed stage funding share (% of total venture capital)7.85.610.410.310.09.7:7.3:Start-up stage funding share (% of total venture capital)43.730.638.949.950.959.4:44.0:Later stage funding share (% of total venture capital)48.563.750.639.939.130.9:48.7:New graduates in science and engineering per thousand population aged 25-3417.317.11212.612.6::17.6:Graduates in the field of computing per thousand population aged 25-3433.12.93.33.5::3.6:Innovative talentHeadline indicatorScience and innovative ecosystemsR&D investment & researchers employed in businessesInnovation outputsDigitalisation of businessesAcademia-business collaboration2023EU averageUSAPublic support for business innovationFinancing innovationPoland201220172020202120222024 
 
           
 
ANNEX 4: MAKING BUSINESS EASIER 

Poland 

uncertainty. 

Poland’s investment climate is bolstered by a 
strong  economy  yet  hindered  by  challenges 
such  as  underdeveloped  infrastructure  and 
regulatory 
has 
demonstrated robust business dynamism in recent 
years  although  the  quality  of  lawmaking  still  has 
some scope for improvement. The country is highly 
integrated  into  the  EU  single  market  but  faces 
transposition  and  conformity  challenges.  Public 
procurement  competitiveness  is  low,  with  few 
bidders  and  lengthy  procedures,  though  modest 
innovation  procurement  improvements  have  been 
noted. 

Investment climate 

Poland  has  maintained  a  strong  position  as 
one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
EU,  underpinned  by  its  attractive  investment 
climate. Factors such as a large domestic market, 
relatively  low  labour  costs,  and  proximity  to  key 
European  markets  have  contributed  to  robust 
foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  inflows.  However, 
Poland faces challenges, including underdeveloped 
infrastructure 
regulatory 
uncertainty,  and  labour  shortages  exacerbated  by 
demographic decline. The proportion of businesses 
facing  labour  shortages  is  among  the  highest  in 
the  EU  (63.7%,  compared  to  an  EU  average  of 
20.2%).  Measures  to  address  labour  shortages, 
such  as  promoting  workforce  participation, 
upskilling  programmes,  and 
for 
innovation  in  automation,  can  bolster  productivity 
and reduce capacity constraints. 

in  certain 

incentives 

regions, 

Poland’s  growth  potential  could  be  raised 
investment  and 
further  through  higher 
innovation.  In  recent  years,  private  investment 
rates have been amongst the lowest in the EU and 
remain  concentrated  in  specific  sectors,  such  as 
like 
manufacturing,  while 
renewable  energy  and  advanced  technologies, 
critical  for  long-term  competitiveness.  Investment 
in 
intangible  assets,  such  as  research  and 
development  and  intellectual  property,  accounted 
for less than 10% of the total, hindering Poland’s 
ability to move further up the value chain and into 
the industries of the future (80). 

in  others 

lagging 

to 

investment 

the  future 

reported  are 
(92%  of 

Investment rates remain below EU averages. 
On average, Polish firms report higher investment 
obstacles  than  their  EU  peers.  The  three  main 
the 
obstacles 
uncertainty  about 
the 
it  as  a  major 
companies,  55%  considering 
obstacle),  the  high  energy  costs  (88%)  and  the 
shortage of skilled staff (87%) (81). Business-level 
analysis  confirms  that  uncertainty  about  future 
profitability  and  the  macroeconomy  environment 
have 
investment 
on 
decisions (82).  Furthermore,  FDI  remains  relatively 
low  in  Poland,  as  FDI  stock  has  been  stagnating 
below  50%  GDP  (compared  to  70%  in  the  euro 
area and round 80 in peer countries) (83). 

private 

impact 

an 

Infrastructure needs, particularly in terms of 
network  grids  and  transport  networks,  also 
weigh  on  businesses.  Poland’s  network  grid 
interconnections  and  transport  networks  require 
investment  to  meet  the  country’s 
significant 
growing  energy  needs  and 
the 
connectivity of its regions. Transport infrastructure 
was seen as an obstacle to investment by 48% of 
Polish  businesses (84).  The  development  of  energy 
network  interconnections,  supported  by  the  Polish 
recovery  and  resilience  plan,  aims  to  address 
capacity and reliability issues in the electricity grid, 
but progress remains slow. 

improve 

to 

Poland  has  made  considerable  progress  in 
connectivity,  but  5G  development  is  slow, 
mainly due to the delayed authorisation of the 5G 
pioneer bands. Very high-capacity network (VHCN) 
coverage  (81.1%)  is  higher  than  the  EU  average 
(78.8%).  This  performance  is  mostly  due  to  the 
deployment of fibre, as Poland is ahead of the EU 
in  general  for  fibre  to  the  premises  (FTTP) 
coverage  (75.4%  vs  64%)  and  showing  strong 
growth.  While  VHCN  rural  coverage  in  Poland 
(57.2%)  is  above  the  EU  average  (55.6%),  the 
urban/rural divide remains an issue, limiting access 
to  the  digital  world.  Poland  has  relied  on 
investments  under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility  and  cohesion  policy  to  improve  fixed 
broadband  network  coverage  where  access  to 
high-speed  internet  is  difficult.  5G  coverage  in 
Poland  (71.9%)  remains  below  the  EU  average 

(81)  EIB Investment Survey 2024 Poland overview, 2025. 

(82)  IMF, Article IV Poland, 2025. 

(83)  IMF, Selected issues, Poland, 2025.  

(80)  EIB Investment Survey Poland, EIB, 2023. 

(84)  EIB Investment Survey European Union 2024, EIB, 2024. 

42 

 
 
 
 
 
(89.3%)  and  authorisation  for  the  5G  pioneer 
bands came in late: only the 3.4-3.8 GHz band has 
been assigned so far, while the auction of 700 and 
800 MHz bands was launched in November 2024. 

leading 

security 

incidents 

is 
Business  awareness  of  cybersecurity 
improving.  The  percentage  of  enterprises  that 
experienced 
to 
unavailability of ICT services, due to attacks from 
outside (e.g. ransomware attacks, denial of service 
attacks) increased slightly in Poland between 2022 
and 2024 (2.9% vs 3.02%) but was lower than the 
EU  average  (3.43%).  For  countering  cyberattacks, 
in  Poland 
a  higher  proportion  of  businesses 
(94.11%)  declared  using  some 
ICT  security 
measures  than  the  EU  average  (92.76%).  On  the 
other  hand,  a  smaller  proportion  of  Polish 
enterprises 
the  EU  average 
(59.97%)  made  their  employees  aware  of  their 
obligations in ICT security related issues. 

(56.84%) 

than 

Graph A4.1: Making Business Easier: selected 
indicators. 

Share of (1) enterprises, (2) average intra-EU exports and 
imports in GDP, (3) firms, (4) SMEs. 
Sources: (1) EIB IS, (2) Eurostat, (3) ECFIN BCS, (4) SAFE 
survey. 

Late  payments  are  a  growing  concern.  In 
2024,  late  payments  from  business-to-business 
(B2B)  continued  to  increase,  risking  disrupting 
SMEs’ cash flows. The share of SMEs experiencing 
late  payment  in  Poland  is  53.4%,  above  the  EU 

43 

average (48.9%). The B2B payment gap in Poland 
is  16.5  days,  above  the  EU  average  (15.5 
days) (85). By contrast, the delay in payment by the 
public  sector  to  businesses  is  decreasing  and  is 
now  below  the  EU  average  (13.1  days  vs  15.2 
days). A similar trend can be observed in SMEs, as 
23%  of  Polish  companies  have  experienced 
problems  due  to  late  payments  from  private 
entities  (and  42%  suffered  them  occasionally) 
during 2024, some of the highest rates in Europe 
and  above  the  EU  averages  of  13%  and  34%, 
respectively (86).  The  situation  for  Polish  SMEs  is 
much  better  with  public  entities,  as  only  4% 
experienced  regular  late  payment  problems  with 
the  public  sector  (in  line  with  the  EU  average  of 
5%). 

Regulatory and administrative 
barriers 

indicator, 

Poland  has  demonstrated  robust  business 
dynamism  in  recent  years,  supported  by  its 
resilient  economy  and  a  favourable  business 
environment.  Poland’s  regulatory  framework  is 
pro-competitive  (87)  and  the  country  performs 
better  than  the  average  OECD  economies  in  the 
Product  Market  Regulation 
that 
measures the distortions to competition caused by 
the barriers to entry and expansion faced by firms 
across  the  economy (88).  The  business  churn  rate 
was  25.2%  in  2022,  above  the  EU  average  of 
19.2%,  making  Poland  one  of  the  most  dynamic 
countries 
in  the 
in  Europe.  Enterprise  births 
business  economy  were  12.22%  and  deaths  at 
12.95%,  also  above  the  EU  averages.  In  addition, 
high growth businesses (growth in employment by 
than  10%)  accounted  for  9.42%  of 
more 
companies and 14.29% of employees (against an 
EU average of 9.17% and 12.23%, respectively). 

Effective governance structures, with a clear 
commitment  to  consistent  and  predictable 
policies  and  coordination  efforts  with 
stakeholders  will  impact  growth  and  private 

(85)  European Payment Report, 2024. Intrum, 2024. 

(86)  Survey on the access to finance of enterprises, Analytical 

Report 2024. 

(87)  OECD Economic Surveys: Poland 2025, 2025.  

(88)  OECD Product Market Regulation indicators, 2024. 

65.314.59.235.230.847.916.61041.624.5010203040506070from private entitiesfrom public entitiesMaterial shortages as afactor limiting productionEU Trade IntegrationRegulation as a majorobstacle to investment(4) Late payments(3) Shortages(2) SingleMarket(1) RegulatoryburdenShare (%)EU27PL 
     
 
sector 

confidence 

investors  confidence.  Trust  in  Poland’s  justice 
in  recent  years,  raising 
system  has  eroded 
impact  on  the  business 
concerns  about 
its 
environment.  Private 
in 
investment  protection  is  among  the  lowest  in 
Europe,  reflecting  widespread  concerns  about  the 
judiciary’s  independence  and  dampening  business 
confidence (89). 
cite 
in  court, 
difficulties  in  enforcing  their  rights 
pointing to issues with the quality,  efficiency,  and 
impartiality  of  the  justice  sector.  However,  recent 
progress  on  the  disbursement  of  EU  funds  and 
significant efforts to implement the Action Plan on 
Rule of Law offer positive signs, with the potential 
to  bolster 
increase 
Poland’s  attractiveness  for  future 
investment 
opportunities. 

investor  confidence  and 

Businesses 

frequently 

know  someone  who  has  recently  started  a 
business,  and  a  similar  proportion  consider 
themselves to have the skills and experience to do 
the  same. Meanwhile,  around  three  in  four  adults 
see  opportunities  for  starting  a business  as  good, 
although a half of these would not do so for fear 
it  might  fail (91).  Despite 
these  comparable 
perceptions,  the  percentage  of  Polish  adults  who 
expect to start a business in the next three years 
was  2.6%,  the  lowest  by  a  substantial  margin  of 
all 
Global 
Entrepreneurship  Monitor  in  2023.  One  shadow 
over business intentions may be that nearly one in 
two  adults  reported  their  household  income  had 
fallen in 2023. 

economies 

covered 

the 

by 

The  quality  of  lawmaking  still  has  some 
scope for improvement. During the last decade, 
the  volatility  of  the  law  (number  of  changes  in 
business  rules)  has  more  than  doubled.  In  2023, 
24%  of  the  laws  were  approved  without  public 
consultation, slightly above the average of the last 
five  years  (and  49%,  despite  the  reference  to 
consultations,  did  not  include  the  government’s 
replies to the comments of the social partners) (90). 
Poland recently passed new legislation, included in 
the recovery and resilience plan, to limit the use of 
fast-track  procedures  and  requiring  an  impact 
assessment and public consultation of draft laws, 
which should increase transparency. Also, the time 
available  to  companies  to  prepare  for  changes  in 
the  law  was  reduced.  Laws  related  to  business 
activities have entered into force on average only 
31  days  after  adoption  (this  so-called  “vacatio 
legis” period has been reduced by 22 days over a 
decade).  According  to  the  EIB  Investment  Survey, 
25%  of  the  firms  devote  more  than  10%  of  the 
staff  to  regulatory  requirements  (above  the  EU 
average of 17%). The six-month ’vacatio legis’ for 
tax  laws  that  could  negatively  affect  taxpayers, 
recently  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  in 
May  2025,  could  contribute  to  a  more  stable 
regulatory environment. 

Perceptions  of  entrepreneurship  in  Poland 
are in line with many European economies on 
a  social  level.  Around  a  half  of  Polish  adults 

(89)  Eurobarometer 520, 2024, Perceived independence of the 
national justice systems in the EU among companies. 

Single market 

Poland  is  well  integrated  into  the  single 
market.  Around  70%  of  its  foreign  trade  takes 
place within the EU (in 2023, over 75% of Poland’s 
exports  and  50%  of  imports  involve  other  EU 
Member  States),  illustrating  the  importance  of 
intra-EU  economic  integration.  Polish  companies 
are also major service providers in the EU market 
–  in  the  transport  sector,  accounting  and  tax 
services,  and  the  ICT  industry,  among  others.  In 
addition,  in  2022  around  90%  of  FDI  came  from 
EU countries. 

Further  efforts  are  needed  to  reduce 
transposition  and  conformity  deficits,  which 
are above the EU average, to improve the smooth 
functioning  of  the  single  market  in  Poland.  The 
transposition  deficit  (the  percentage  of  single 
market directives not transposed) reached 1.7% in 
December  2024,  above  the  EU  average  of  0.8%. 
The  average  delay  in  transposing  directives  and 
the  conformity  deficit  (the  percentage  of  all 
directives transposed incorrectly)  were also above 
figures.  The  number  of 
the  average  EU 
infringements  was  also  quite  high,  again  above 
the  EU  average,  although  lower  than  for  Member 
States  of  comparable  size.  This  persistent 
compliance gap may undermine the trust of firms 
and  the  public  in  the  effective  functioning  of  the 
single  market. Poland resolved 97% of all SOLVIT 

(90)  Grand Thornton Barometer, 2024, Analysis of the stability of 

(91)  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, GEM Global Report 

the legal environment in the Polish economy. 

2023/2024, 2024. 

44 

 
 
 
EU  rights  resolution  cases  it  handled  as  lead 
centre (above the EU average of 4.9%) in 2024. 

The 

challenges  persist. 

Poland  has  made  great  strides  in  improving 
its regulatory environment in the last years, 
regulatory 
but 
arrangements  for  several  professional  services, 
such  as  lawyers,  architects  and  civil  engineers  is 
still  high  compared  to  peer  countries.  Reducing 
entry  barriers 
in  regulated  professions  could 
address the labour shortages in some sectors (92). 
Other  sectors  which  could  also  benefit  from 
regulatory  barriers  to  competition  being  reduced 
include electricity and transport. In some industries 
a lack of transparency over the issuing of permits 
and 
increased  uncertainty  about  government 
policies  are  affecting  investment  decisions  (for 
instance,  in  the  renewables  sector) (93).  In  retail, 
the regulatory environment has been made stricter 
in recent years with the introduction of a retail tax 
and a complete ban on shops opening on Sundays. 

Public procurement 

in 

Competition 
the  public  procurement 
system  could  be  improved.  Poland’s  overall 
performance  on  public  procurement  is  well  below 
the  EU  average,  as  it  attracts  too  few  bidders 
(especially for a large country) and the procedures 
lengthy  and  complex.  The  public 
can  be 
procurement law that entered into force in January 
2021  did  not 
immediately  address  the  key 
weaknesses  in  public  procurement  in  Poland,  so 
the  system  still  suffers  from  the  low  number  of 
companies  submitting  tenders.  This  results  in  a 
high level of single bids, which has remained at an 
exceptionally  high  level  for  years  (56%  in  2024 
and  above  50%  since  2018).  The  proportion  of 
direct  awards  is  7%,  in  line  with  the  EU  average. 
The data also indicate a decreasing trend in SMEs 
interest in  public  procurement  contracts  with  SME 
participation was 55% and SME bids 59% in 2023, 
both figures being below the EU averages. 

(92)  IMF, Article IV Poland, 2025. 

(93)  OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators, 2024. 

45 

 
 
 
Table A4.1:  Making Business Easier: indicators. 

*Change in methodology in 2024: reporting late payments from public and private entities separately. 
**The 2024 data on single bids is provisional and subject to revision. Please note that approximately 18% of the total data is 
currently missing, which may impact the accuracy and completeness of the information. Due to missing data, the EU average of 
direct awards data is calculated without Romania. 
Sources: (1) ECFIN BCS, (2) Eurostat, (3) EIB IS, (4) Digital Decade Country reports, (5) Intrum Payment Report, (6) SAFE survey, 
(7) OECD, (8) up to 2023: Single Market and Competitiveness Scoreboard, 2024: Public procurement data space (PPDS). 

46 

POLICY AREA20202021202220232024EU-27 average6.920.029.914.99.210.061.562.563.466.363.720.20.71.31.31.00.92.39.47.86.99.66.413.4-70.070.781.1-78.8-51.959.575.4-64.0-34.263.471.9-89.3Regulatory environment35.534.332.333.730.824.517.110.117.115.918.115.620.49.021.716.813.115.1from public or private entities in the last 6 months66.365.565.268.4--from private entities in the previous or current quarter----65.347.9from public entities in the previous or current quarter----14.516.634.838.843.138.835.241.60.0470.0470.0470.0470.0530.0501.81.52.11.61.70.81.61.61.71.51.30.990.088.091.380.097.084.939.037.034.031.031.024.45150525456-679977.0PolandINDICATOR NAMEInvestment climateShortagesMaterial shortage, firms facing constraints, %1Labour shortage, firms facing constraints, %1Vacancy rate, vacant posts as a % of all available ones (vacant + occupied)2InfrastructureTransport infrastructure as an obstacle to investment, % of firms reporting it as a major obstacle3VHCN coverage, %4FTTP coverage, %45G coverage, %4Reduction of regulatory and administrative barriersImpact of regulation on long-term investment, % firms reporting business regulation as a major obstacle3Late paymentsPayment gap - corporates B2B, difference in days between offered and actual payment5Payment gap - public sector, difference in days between offered and actual payment5Share of SMEs experiencing late payments, %*6Single MarketIntegrationEU trade integration, % (Average intra-EU imports + average intra EU exports)/GDP2EEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index7ComplianceTransposition deficit, % of all directives not transposed8Conformity deficit, % of all directives transposed incorrectly8SOLVIT, % resolution rate per country8Number of pending infringement proceedings8Competition and transparency in public procurementSingle bids, % of total contractors**8Direct awards, %**8Public procurement 
 
 
       
 
ANNEX 5: CAPITAL MARKETS, FINANCIAL STABILITY AND ACCESS TO FINANCE 

net 
investment,  combined  with  government 
deficits  has  been  overall  quite  volatile  over  the 
past decade and averaged a positive 0.3% of GDP 
(2014-2023) with a peak in 2020 at close to -4% 
of GDP. 

Graph A5.1: Net savings-investment balance 

Source: AMECO 

Between 2017 and 2024 the economy halved 
its  position  as  a  net  debtor  to  the  global 
market.  As  of  Q3  2024,  total  assets  held  by 
Polish  residents  abroad  reached  55.8%  of  GDP, 
while  liabilities  to  third  country  nationals  were 
equivalent  to  86.6%  of  GDP,  yielding  a  net 
international  investment  position (NIIP)  of  -30.8% 
of  GDP  (graph  A5.2).  Foreign  direct  investment 
liabilities,  standing  at  46.2%  of  GDP,  dwarf  direct 
investment assets at 11.4% of GDP, underscoring 
the  country’s  heavy  reliance  on  foreign  capital 
inflows.  Portfolio  investment  liabilities,  kept  on 
decreasing  over  the  years  and  stood  at  18%  of 
GDP in 2024, down from over 30% in 2017. Polish 
portfolio  assets  stood  at  7.5%  of  GDP  in  2024, 
contributing  to  the  negative  balance  in  Poland’s 
NIIP. Official reserve assets remained at 23.1% of 
GDP  in  2024,  offering  a  sizeable  safety  buffer 
investment 
against  external 
liabilities,  at  22.4%  of  GDP,  outweigh  assets 
(13.8%),  further  deepening  the  NIIP  deficit.  This 
the  economy’s  deep 
configuration  highlights 
flows, 
capital 
international 
integration 
predominantly  as  a  recipient  of  foreign  direct 
investment,  supporting  domestic  growth  while 
keeping Poland’s persistent net debtor status.   

shocks.  Other 

into 

intermediation  segment  and 

Poland’s  financial  sector  is  characterised  by 
a resilient banking system, growing non-bank 
financial 
is 
underpinned by a moderate level of domestic 
savings. Poland continues to attract international 
investors  and  remains  a  net  borrower  from  the 
global financial system. An overwhelming majority 
of  Polish  firms  (96.5%)  are  microenterprises. 
Neither  big  nor  small  firms  have  major  issues  in 
accessing external funding but they exhibit a clear 
preference  for  financing  investment  from  internal 
resources.  Not  surprisingly,  owners’  equity  is  a 
prevalent  source  of  funding,  followed  by  bank 
credit.  Direct  and  indirect  retail  participation  in 
Poland’s  capital  markets 
low  but  slowly 
improving.  The  investment  policies  of  domestic 
institutional  investors  are  quite  conservative  and 
very few dare to invest in financing new ventures. 
This  is  a  limiting  factor  for  the  set-up  and 
subsequent  scale-up  of  innovative  start-ups  with 
no  or  limited  profitability.  The  capital  markets, 
including  the  Warsaw  Stock  Exchange,  are  among 
the  region’s  leaders,  but  are  not  providing  a  true 
alternative  to  bank  finance  at  present.  Financial 
literacy,  at  43.5  (composite  indicator),  lags  the 
EU’s average of 45.5 and is spread very unevenly 
across the society. 

is 

Availability and use of domestic 
savings 

Net  savings  are  primarily  directed  toward 
investments  and  financing  the 
domestic 
government.  Over  the  past  decade,  the  private 
savings ratio, net of fixed capital consumption, has 
shown  moderate  fluctuations  around  a  ten-year 
average of approximately 7.1% of GDP, peaking at 
close to 12% in 2020 (graph A5.1). The net private 
investment  ratio,  which 
indicates  the  private 
sector’s contribution to capital accumulation within 
the  country,  has  been  relatively  stable,  averaging 
3.9% of GDP over the same period, with 2021 and 
2022 marking the highest points of the series (as 
the  post-Covid  recovery  settled  in)  at  6.9%  and 
7.2%,  respectively.  Meanwhile,  the  government 
budget  has  experienced  persistent  deficits, 
averaging around 2.8% of GDP annually (2014 to 
2023)  and  peaking  in  2020  at  6.9%.  Increased 
public spending has been driven predominantly by 
social  benefits,  energy  price  mitigation  measures 
and more recently increased spending on defence. 
The  balance  between  net  domestic  savings  and 

47 

-10-505101520252017201820192020202120222023% of GDPPrivate investment, netLending to the governmentPrivate saving, netPrivate saving, grossBorrowing from the rest of the world 
 
   
 
 
Graph A5.2: International investment position 

Graph A5.3: Capital markets and financial 
intermediaries 

Source: ECB 

Structure of the capital markets and 
size of the financial sector 

of  68% 

The  domestic  capital  market  is  relatively 
modest  in  European  comparison.  The  Warsaw 
Stock Exchange (WSE) is the primary platform for 
equity trading in Poland. The market capitalisation 
remained fairly stable in 2023 and 2024 at 21.5% 
of  the  GDP,  around  a  third  of  the  European 
average 
of  GDP.  Non-financial 
corporations  account  for  approximately  60%  of 
the capitalisation, underscoring the stock market’s 
role  in  supporting  mostly  some  of  the  largest 
Polish  non-financial  corporations.  The  outstanding 
volume  of  private  sector  debt  securities  stood  at 
11.9%  of  GDP  in  2023,  with  monetary  financial 
institutions (MFIs) contributing around 65% of this 
total,  driven  by  a  banking  sector  that  plays  a 
local 
central  role 
households  and 
clients.  General 
corporate 
government  bonds  dwarf  the  rest  of  the  bond 
market  and  account  for  35%  of  GDP  in  2023, 
influenced  by  increased  public  borrowing  to  fund 
infrastructure projects, energy transition initiatives 
and  investments  into  defence  amid  geopolitical 
tensions.  

in  providing  financing  for 

Source: ECB, EIOPA, AMECO 

sector 

financial 

Poland’s 
remains 
predominantly  bank-driven,  with  non-bank 
financial  intermediaries  gradually  expanding 
their footprint. By Q3 2024, the banking sector’s 
assets  reached  88.6%  of  GDP,  far  below  the  EU 
average of 247.2% but well above any other part 
of  the  domestic  financial  system.  The  banking 
system  is  moderately  concentrated  with  the  top 
five lenders owning 58.5% of total  assets. 58.6% 
of  the  sector  is  domestically  owned  with  a  large 
share  (49.6%)  of  state-owned  banks 
in  the 
system.  The  insurance  sector,  with  assets  below 
7%  of  GDP  in  2023  is  relatively  small  but  it  is  a 
rapidly  growing  market  segment  of  the  domestic 
financial  market.  PPension  funds  constitute  the 
third  pillar  of  the  pension  system.  These  include: 
employee  pension  schemes  (PPE)  and  employee 
capital  plans  (PPK)  which  are  slowly  getting 
traction. Altogether pension assets represent about 
6%  of  the  GDP,  whereas  local  asset  managers 
have  under  management  assets  worth  about 
10.5%  of  the  GDP.  In  addition,  under  the  third 
pillar there are individual retirement accounts (IKE) 
and individual retirement security accounts (IKZE). 

Resilience of the banking sector 

The  banking  sector  is  resilient  despite  some 
country  specific  challenges.  Local  lenders  are 
well  capitalised  with  a  Common  Equity  Tier  1 
(CET1)  ratio  at  18.1%  (Q3  2024),  above  the  EU 
average  of  16.7%,  reflecting  the  sector’s  steady 
accumulation  of  high-quality  capital  amid  tighter 
risk  management  practices.  Both  liquidity  and 

48 

-140-120-100-80-60-40-2002040608020172018201920202021202220232024-Q3% of GDPForeign Direct Investment, AssetsPortfolio Investment, AssetsOther investment, AssetsOfficial reserve assetsForeign Direct Investment, LiabilitiesPortfolio Investment, LiabilitiesOther investment, LiabilitiesNIIPNon-financial corporationsFinancial corporationsNon-financial corporationsMFIsInsurance  and pension fundsOther financialsGovernmentMFIsInsurance corporationsInvestment funds020406080100120 Listed equity              Bonds                        Assets by sector% of GDP 
   
   
profitability metrics (in Table A5.1) are very strong, 
and all major domestic banks have navigated the 
EU-wide  stress 
tests  effectively,  showcasing 
resilience against adverse scenarios. However, the 
sector also has some soft spots. In particular, the 
legacy forex mortgages as well as the more recent 
legal  attempts  to  question  the  fairness  of  the 
Polish interest rates benchmark Wibor continue to 
pose  a  legal  and  possibly  very  costly  challenge. 
Most  of  the  banking  sector  meets  the  MREL 
(Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible 
Liabilities) and the combined buffer requirement in 
addition  to  MREL,  comfortably  exceeding  all 
regulatory  requirements  imposed  on  the  sector. 
Capital  surpluses  over 
the  combined  buffer 
requirement  considered  in  addition  to  the  MREL-
TREA reached over 5% of TREA just in the first half 
of 2024. 

Asset  quality  in  Polish  banks  has  seen  a 
gradual improvement.  The non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratio has been slowly but gradually declining 
over  the  past  years.  For  total  loans  it  stood  at 
3.9%  in  Q3  2024  and  was  almost  the  double  of 
EU’s  average  ratio  of  1.9%.  Households’  NPLs 
stood at 4%, while non-financial corporation NPLs 
reached 5.3%. The NPL coverage ratio, however, at 
57.1%  in  Q3  2024,  largely  surpassed  the  EU 
average of 42.6%, indicating the sector’s tendency 
for  rapid  and  strong  provisioning  for  potential 
losses.  While  mortgages  are  typically  a  well 
performing  asset  class,  Polish  banks  continue  to 
face ongoing pressure from legal disputes over the 
FX  mortgage  contracts,  with  court 
rulings 
increasingly  favouring  consumers,  necessitating 
higher  provisions  and  negatively  impacting  the 
lenders’ profitability.   

Liquidity  remains  solid,  bolstered  by  stable 
and  rather  conservative  funding  structures. 
Domestic  monetary  financial  institutions  (MFIs) 
exhibit  low  liquidity  funding  risk,  with  the  short-
term  aggregate  liquidity  coverage  ratio  (LCR)  at 
232.6% and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) at 
169.7%  in  Q3-2024,  both  well  above  minimum 
requirements.  The  loan-to-deposit  ratio  stood  at 
merely 68.8% in Q3 2024, well below the EU area 
average  of  95.5%,  reflecting  a  conservative 
funding model reliant on domestic deposits, which 
constitute  71%  of  total  assets.  A  distinctive 
feature of the Polish banking sector is its exposure 
to government securities, with banks holding close 
to  30%  of  the  balance  sheet  government  bonds. 
Debt  issuance  has  remained  steady  but  rather 
small. In fact, the role of debt instruments in bank 

49 

funding  has  been  insignificant  at  just  3%  of 
liabilities. 

Resilience of the non-bank financial 
intermediaries 

Poland’s insurance sector is expanding on the 
back of strong economic growth. The sector is 
among  the  largest  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe, 
reflecting a robust market that has grown steadily 
in  recent  years.  One  of  its  key  strengths  is  the 
strong  performance  of  the  non-life  insurance 
segment,  driven  predominantly  by 
  strong 
economic  growth.  In  mid-2024,  the  sector-wide 
ratio stood at 220% and was 30 percentage points 
below  the  EEA  average  of  251%.  In  the  life 
insurance segment, the ratio stood at 249%, some 
19  percentage  points  below  the  end-2023  figure, 
whereas in the non-life segment the ratio stood at 
209%, 7 percentage points less than at the end of 
2023. A domestic specificity is the sector’s reliance 
insurer  PZU,  which  hold  a 
on  state-owned 
significant  market  share  and  heavily  influence 
pricing policies. 

flood  and  windstorm 

Regulatory oversight remains proactive, with 
no  major  vulnerabilities  detected  in  the 
insurance segment.  The local supervisor KNF, in 
collaboration  with  EIOPA  conducts  regular  stress 
tests. The latest 2024 exercise   included a capital 
and  liquidity  scenario  and  revealed  resilience  of 
local  insurers.  Furthermore,  the  KNF  conducts 
regular  annual  stress  tests.  The  2023  exercise 
included 
risks,  where 
domestic  insurers  do  have  a  moderate  exposure. 
Insurance  penetration  in  Poland  reached  2.3%  of 
GDP  in  2023,  below  the  EU  average  of  6.4%, 
suggesting a moderate protection gap, particularly 
in rural  areas where agricultural insurance uptake 
lags. While there are no major vulnerabilities in the 
sector,  the  high  reliance  on  expected  profits 
included  in  future  premiums  (EPIFP)  within  own 
funds  persists,  alongside  the  unregulated  double 
gearing  of  capital.  By  end-2023,  EPIFP  in  life 
insurance  reached  approximately  EUR  2.7  bn, 
equivalent  to  over  half  of  own  funds.  Meanwhile, 
non-life 
in 
participations in insurance and banking entities by 
mid-2024,  not  deducted  from  own  funds  per 
regulations,  and  causing  a  double  gearing  across 
parent and subsidiary risks. Adjusting the solvency 

insurers  held  over  EUR  6  bn 

 
for  these  two  items  would  slash  the  non-life 
solvency ratio by 60 points down to 149%. 

Sources of business funding and the 
role of banks 

External  funding  does  not  play  a  major  role 
in  the  financing  of  Polish  firms.  The  overall 
external  funding  of  non-financial  corporations 
(NFCs)  was  equivalent  to  96%  of  GDP  in  2023 
(Graph  A5.4),  significantly 
less  than  the  EU 
average  of  230%  of  GDP.  Not  surprisingly,  given 
the  small  size  of  Polish  NFCs,  the  equity  of  the 
firms’ owners remains the most significant item in 
the  funding  mix,  accounting  for  over  35.5%  of 
total  external  funding.  This  is  followed  closely  by 
bank  loans,  representing  31.46%  of  the  funding 
mix,  a  few  percentage  points  above  the  EU 
average  of  27.23%.  Market  equity  financing, 
through  listed  shares  and  bonds,  represented  a 
modest  14%  of  the  funding  mix,  significantly 
lower  than  the  EU  average  of  around  24%.  This 
pattern  underscores  the  strong  reliance  of  Polish 
firms  on  traditional  bank  financing  over  capital-
market-related funding, which given the small size 
of local firms is not surprising. 

Graph A5.4: Composition of NFC funding as % of 
GDP 

approach towards external funding overall, and, on 
the  other,  some  possible  difficulties  that  the 
relatively  small  Polish  firms  (the  vast  majority 
being  microenterprises)  might  have  in  accessing 
external  financing.  Notwithstanding  these  figures, 
85%  of  Polish  entrepreneurs  believe  that  they 
made  adequate  investments  to  meet  market 
needs  (94)  over  the  past  three  years  compared  to 
the EU average of 80%. 

Credit  growth  remains  low  but  positive. 
Corporate  credit  growth  has  been  very  volatile  in 
the  past  few  years  with  an  almost  10%  uptick  in 
annual  growth  back  in  2022,  and  then  close  to 
zero lending growth in 2023. In 2024, demand for 
new corporate loans started to pick up again with 
0.9%  year-on-year  growth  in  the  first  half  of 
2024.  More  importantly,  in  2024,  credit  demand 
was widespread across both large and small firms’ 
segments.  This  credit  recovery  is  expected  to 
continue  into  2025  as  policy  rates  remain  stable. 
Lending 
relatively  more 
dynamic  in  2024,  with  year-on-year  growth  of 
4.5%  in  the  first  half  of  2024.  Both  mortgages 
and  consumer  lending  saw  a  marked  rise  in 
demand.  Overall,  household  credit  is  poised  for 
gradual  growth,  supported  by  economic  growth 
and generally positive consumer confidence data. 

to  households  was 

Capital markets and the participation 
of retail investors 

Foreign 

capital 

market 

investors. 

Poland's 
attracts 
investors 
international 
contribute the biggest share to equity turnover on 
the WSE main market, generating 65% of turnover 
(2023).  Overall,  domestic  institutional  investors 
generated 19% of the 2023 turnover whereas the 
share  of  retail  investors  was  16%.  The  Initial 
Public Offerings (IPO) activity of the WSE remains 
overall  rather  subdued,  with  only  a  handful  of 
companies listing on the main market in the years 
2023  and  2024.  The  much  smaller  NewConnect 
segment  is  more  dynamic  but  small  and  highly 
launched 
illiquid.  The  Polish  government  has 
several  measures  to  bolster  the  capital  market. 
The  main  one  was  the  2019  Capital  Market 
Development  Strategy,  developed  jointly  with  the 
EBRD  and  financed  largely  from  EU  funds.  The 

(94)  Source: EIB 2024 Investment Survey. 

The sum of NFC liabilities only reflects the total for the NFC 
liabilities considered. Reference period 2023. 
Source: Eurostat 

Polish  firms  are  heavily  reliant  on  internal 
funding.  According  to  the  2024  EIB  Investment 
Survey,  72%  of  investment  needs  of  Polish  firms  
are  covered  by  internal  funding,  against  an  EU 
average  of  66%.  This  reliance  on  internal  funds 
highlights,  on  the  one  hand,  a  rather  cautious 

50 

050100150200250PLEU% of GDPLoansTrade credit and advancesBondsListed sharesUnlisted sharesOther equity 
   
 
strategy covered the period 2019-2023 and aimed 
to increase market liquidity and the role of capital 
market instruments in financing local NFCs. 

in 

invested 

Polish  households 
take  a  conservative 
approach to managing their financial assets. 
About  60%  of  households’  financial  assets  are 
held in current accounts and bank deposits, almost 
twice the EU average of around 32% (Graph A5.5). 
The  capital  market  participation  of  households 
trails  behind  other  EU  Member  States.  Polish 
households have about a quarter of their financial 
listed  stocks,  bonds,  and 
wealth 
pension  and  investment  funds.  This  figure  is  low 
when compared to the EU average of around 45% 
and  reflects,  on  the  one  hand,  the  cautious 
behaviour  of  local  households,  and,  on  the  other, 
their  relatively  low  financial  wealth  compared  to 
the  EU  average.  In  aggregate,  Polish  households 
have financial assets equivalent to 81% of Polish 
GDP, whereas the EU average stands at 210% of 
GDP.  In  2023,  the  average  monthly  available 
income 
stood  at 
PLN 2 678 (95) (about EUR 620) and remains quite 
modest  by  European  standards,  whereas  the 
saving  rate  in  2023  stood  at  13.2%,  the  same 
level as the EU average. 

in  Poland 

capita 

per 

There  is  still  ample  space  to  increase  the 
level  of  direct  or  indirect  retail  investment. 
Boosting  the  weight  of  the  capital  market  in 
Poland has to go through educating and increasing 
investors’  confidence  in  the  market  and  making 
access  to  capital  easier  and  cheaper  for  local 
NFCs.  The  authorities  have  already  introduced 
to  encourage  greater  household 
measures 
participation  in  the  capital  markets,  including  tax 
incentives  through  pension  investment  accounts 
(such as the Individual Retirement Account (IKE) or 
the  Individual  Pension  Security  Account  (IKZE) 
allowing  for  tax-deductible  contributions(96)  and 
financial  education  programmes.  The  tangible 
impact of these initiatives has been limited so far 
but  the  process  of  getting  Polish  households  to 
invest in capital markets is ongoing. Nevertheless, 
the  relatively  low  level  of  wealth  of  Polish 
households  and,  on  average,  moderate  levels  of 

(95)  Source: Poland’s Statistical Office, the situation of 

households in 2023 based on the results of the household 
budget survey. 

(96)  IKE and IKZE individual accounts have jointly over 1 million 
users. These initiatives date back to 2004 and 2012 
respectively. 

51 

financial  literacy  result  in  a  very  conservative 
attitude  towards  investment  decisions.    In  this 
respect,  the  stability  and  predictability  around 
pensions  and  savings 
is  key  to  build  retail 
investors confidence. 

Graph A5.5: Composition of household financial 
assets per capita and as % of GDP 

The sum of household assets only reflects the total for the HH 
assets considered. Reference period 2023. 
Source: Eurostat 

The role of domestic institutional 
investors 

Poland’s  asset  management  industry:  still 
has  a  long  way  to  go  to  reach  the  EU’s 
average  size.  The  combined  assets  under 
management  (AUM)  of  local  asset  managers  at 
end-2023  were  around  EUR 74 bn,  equivalent  to 
about 10% of Poland’s GDP, very far from the EU 
average  of  198%  of  GDP  in  2023 (97).  Mutual 
funds  continue  to  dominate  the  market,  with  a 
significant  portion  of  investments  channelled  into 
bond  funds  (37%  of  the  market)  and  equity 
(around  20%).  The  market  has  good  chances  of 
continued growth as households become aware of 
investment  options  other  than  low-yielding  bank 
deposits.  Moreover,  the  introduction  of  employee 
capital  plans  (PPK)  –  the  voluntary  third-pillar 
long-term savings programme – back in 2019 has 
also  triggered  more  interest  in  the  opportunities 
offered  by  the  capital  markets.  Local  asset 
managers are hopeful for more inflows in the third 
pillar as the PPKs gradually gains a critical mass.  

(97)  Source: EFAMA, Asset Management in Europe, December 

2024. 

0501001502002500102030405060708090PLEUPLEUper capita (000 EUR) (lhs)% of GDP GDP (rhs)Currency and depositsInsurance and pension fundsInvestment fundsBondsListed sharesUnlisted sharesOther equityHH Debt (liability) 
 
   
 
The  Polish  insurance  sector  remains  a  small 
EU  player.  The  sector’s  investment  portfolio  is 
mainly  composed  of  fixed-income  securities,  with 
government  bonds  accounting  for  approximately 
45% of total assets (98) compared to just 19% for 
the  European  Economic  Area  as  a  whole.  This 
conservative  approach  ensures 
low  risk  and 
predictable  stable  returns.  Corporate  bonds  make 
up around 6% of AUM, whereas equities represent 
about 16% of the portfolio. Lastly, around 24% of 
AUM  are  invested  in  investment  funds,  with  a 
significant  portion  allocated  to  mixed  and  equity 
funds. Cash and deposits, held mostly for liquidity 
management, are roughly 2% of the allocation. 

Polish pension funds are undergoing a major 
transformation.  The  Polish  open  pension  funds 
(known as OFE in Poland) constitute the pension’s 
second  pillar  and  manage  over  EUR 50   bn  worth 
of  assets  of  future  retirees,  mostly  allocated  to 
listed equities (about 90% of AUM). Voluntary third 
pillar  funds,  PPK  (Pracownicze  Plany  Kapitalowe) 
are  bound  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  future  but 
currently  their  AUM  are  not  very  sizeable  (about 
EUR 7 bn  in  early  2024).  PPK  funds  have  a 
diversified  approach  to  investing,  with  40%  of 
AUM invested into equities, about 35% into bonds, 
and  a  further  25%  in  mixed  and  other  assets.  To 
further  develop  access  to  finance  and  capital 
markets,  and  to  make  the  pension  system  more 
sustainable in light of demographic challenges, the 
be 
current 
progressively supplemented with a funded capital-
based  system,  which  would  invest  contributions 
into a highly diversified financial portfolio. 

pay-as-you-go 

system 

could 

The  participation  of  domestic  institutional 
investors  in  providing  funding  for  start-ups 
and venture capital investors is low. A recent  
paper (99)  published  by  the  Centre  for  European 
Policy  Studies  (CEPS)  showed  that,  on  average, 
pension funds in Poland accounted for only 6% of 
private  equity  and  venture  capital  funds  raised 
annually  over  2007-2023,  a  figure  that  falls 
substantially short of the 19% for the Baltic states 
or  over  20%  shares  for  Nordic  Member  States. 
About  30%  of  the  funds  allocated  to  venture 
capital  are  provided  by  the  government  or 
government-related agencies and the rest through 
specialised investors. There seem to be particularly 

significant  limitations  for  pension  funds  to  invest 
in this asset class, even as low as 0% according to 
OECD  figures 
into  private 
investment  funds).  This  can  be  a  hurdle  for 
financing  innovation,  and  could  contribute  to  low 
returns for policyholders. 

investments 

(for 

The depth of available venture and 
growth capital 

The Polish venture capital market: promising 
but far from able to meet the needs of local 
start-ups.  The  market  has  been  growing 
undisputably  over  the  past  decade,  both  in  the 
segment  of  private  equity  (PE)  (equivalent  to 
0.15% of GDP in 2023) and in the venture capital 
(VC)  segment  (equivalent  to  0.02%  of  GDP  in 
2023). However, these figures are still significantly 
lower than the EU averages of 0.6% and 0.08% of 
GDP  respectively,  and  the  number  of  VC/PE  deals 
remains  relatively  low  in  Poland.  This  indicates 
that  this  part  of  the  capital  markets  is  still 
maturing (100).  Companies  in  the  growth  phase 
often  require  strong  backing  through  both  capital 
injections and the transfer of management know-
how,  which  local  investors  are  not  always  able  to 
provide 
the  appropriate  proportions.  This 
suggests that while there is a solid foundation for 
VC  in  Poland,  there  is  still  a  financing  gap  for 
early-stage  firms (101).  The  Polish  Development 
Fund (PFR) plays a crucial role in Poland’s strategy 
to  build  a  venture-capital-oriented  culture.  PFR 
offers  grants,  loans  and  equity  investments  to 
start-ups. Nevertheless, the authorities have yet to 
develop  a  more  comprehensive  strategy 
to 
address  various  shortcomings  in  the  local  VC 
market, including investment allocation hurdles. 

in 

Financing the green transition 

Poland’s green transition financing needs are 
enormous. Poland is the second highest source of 
carbon emissions in the EU after Germany. As is to 

(98)  Source: Polska Izba Ubezpieczeń, Insurance in figures. 

(99)  Source: Closing the gaping hole in the capital market for EU 

start-ups – the role of pension funds – CEPS. 

(100) Source: PFR Ventures, Polish VC Market Outlook Q3 2024. 

(101) Source: Endeavor Poland Report, Poland’s technology 

ecosystem needs to focus resources on companies with the 
most potential. 

52 

 
 
 
Table A5.1:  Financial indicators 

(1) Annualised data. 
Credit growth and pension funds EU data refers to the EA average. 
Source: ECB, ESTAT, EIOPA, DG FISMA CMU Dashboard, AMECO 

be  expected,  the  economy  requires  significant 
investments  to  meet  its  climate  goals.  The  Polish 
government  has  outlined  a 
comprehensive 
strategy, including its national energy and climate 
plan  (NECP),  which  aims  to  achieve  climate 
neutrality  by  2050.  This  strategy  places  a  lot  of 
emphasis  on  both  public  and  private  sector 
participation to finance this challenging transition. 
Poland  has  been  one  of  the  pioneers  in  issuing 
sovereign  green  bonds,  with  a  first  issuance  back 
in 2016. There have been a few more green bonds 
(EUR 5.5 bn  in  total)  issued  by  Poland  since  then. 
Nevertheless,  the  current  level  of  green  bond 
issuance  remains  below  the  EU  average (102), 
highlighting  the  need  for  further  development  in 
the green finance market. 

access to alternatives to bank credit for domestic 
firms.  Since  2017,  financial  education  has  been 
included 
in  the  curriculum  for  primary  and 
secondary  schools,  with  the  aim  of  equipping 
pupils  with  basic  financial  skills  and  knowledge. 
According  to  the  2023  Eurobarometer  survey(103), 
only  16%  of  Poles  have  a  high  level  of  financial 
literacy,  65%  a  medium  level,  and  19%  a  low 
level, compared to the EU averages of 18%, 64%, 
and  18%,  respectively.  This  results  in  an  overall 
financial literacy score of 43.5, vs the EU average 
of  45.5.  The  national  strategy  for  financial 
education focuses on several key objectives, which 
include increasing the ability of households to plan 
their  finances  responsibly,  manage  risks  and 
access unbiased financial information. 

Financial literacy 

Insufficient  levels  of  financial  literacy  in 
Poland  are  one  of  the  reasons  for  low 
capital 
the 
participation 
markets.  Financial 
is  essential  for 
literacy 
encouraging  retail-investor  participation  in  capital 
markets.  It  is  also  a  prerequisite  for  facilitating 

country’s 

in 

(102) Source: AFME CMU Key performance indicators, seventh 

edition, November 2024. 

(103) Source: (https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2953 

53 

20172018201920202021202220232024-Q3EUTotal assets of MFIs (% of GDP)94.891.591.3101.099.291.895.588.6247.2Common Equity Tier 1 ratio16.316.115.917.516.116.318.018.116.7Total capital adequacy ratio18.017.917.819.617.918.019.519.420.1Overall NPL ratio (% of all loans)6.66.26.16.05.04.34.13.91.9NPL (% loans to NFC-Non financial corporations)8.98.48.18.06.55.75.25.33.5NPL (% loans to HH-Households)6.05.85.75.44.74.54.74.02.1NPL-Non performing loans coverage ratio56.254.855.659.259.659.960.057.142.6Return on Equity16.97.06.93.14.87.311.616.110.1Loans to NFCs (% of GDP)17.016.516.014.413.512.811.910.930.1Loans to HHs (% of GDP)34.933.733.832.931.225.924.221.944.4NFC credit annual % growth8.66.62.9-6.44.59.60.60.90.5HH credit annual % growth6.45.66.51.55.0-4.41.04.50.3Stock market capitalisation (% of GDP)---23.024.117.922.221.567.6Initial public offerings (% of GDP)0.060.030.020.060.110.010.01-0.05Market funding ratio48.445.944.747.847.546.145.2-49.6Private equity (% of GDP)0.540.180.110.110.210.070.06-0.41Venture capital (% of GDP)0.010.010.020.030.020.030.01-0.05Financial literacy (composite)------42.5-45.5Bonds (as % of HH financial assets)0.60.60.70.50.40.80.8-2.7Listed shares (as % of HH financial assets)3.02.62.93.94.13.63.9-4.8Investment funds (as % of HH financial assets)7.46.06.75.85.84.55.2-10.0Insurance/pension funds (as % of HH financial assets)17.615.514.813.114.112.614.8-27.8Total assets of all insurers (% of GDP)10.18.88.48.47.35.96.66.053.4Pension funds assets (% of GDP)--------22.81-34-1011-1718-2425-27Colours indicate performance ranking among 27 EU Member States.Banking sectorNon-banks sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
ANNEX 6: EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 

in 

Poland’s  institutional  framework  influences 
its  competitiveness.  Poland  has  made  some 
regulatory  governance  and 
improvement 
digitalisation.  However, 
remain, 
challenges 
including  a  complex  and  fast-changing  legislative 
environment. While Poland performs well in digital 
health services, it lags in other digital services for 
citizens  and  businesses.  Poland  is  undertaking 
reforms to address low retention rates in the civil 
service,  which  are  mainly  due  to  an  unattractive 
working  environment.  Poland  is  also  taking  steps 
to combat corruption  as well as to ensure judicial 
independence.  

Graph A6.1: Trust in justice, regional / local 
authorities and in government 

(1) EU-27 from 2019; EU-28 before 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer surveys 

Public perceptions 

integrity 

to  more 

in 
(EU  23%).  Clearer 

and  35% 
the  public 
information 
administration 
about  procedures  and  services  and  more  user-
improve 
friendly  digital  services  could  also 
citizen’s 
public 
interactions  with 
administration  (105).  The  perceived  quality  of 
government has deteriorated slightly and remains 
at values below the EU average (106).  

Poland’s 

Quality of legislation and regulatory 
simplification 

governing 

in  developing  and 
Overall  performance 
is  above  the  EU 
legislation 
evaluating 
average.  Performance  is  more  developed  for 
stakeholder  engagement  and  regulatory  impact 
assessment  than  for  ex  post  evaluation  of 
legislation. The latter shows a gap with respect to 
the  EU  average  on  account  of  weaker 
requirements 
the  methodology, 
systematic  adoption  and  transparency  of  ex  post 
evaluation  of  both  primary  and  subordinate 
legislation. Moreover, there is scope for improving 
the  requirements  governing  the  transparency, 
oversight  and  quality  control  mechanisms  of 
regulatory  impact  assessments  (Graph  A6.2),  as 
well as for further strengthening the mechanisms 
for  simplifying  regulation.  For  example,  ex  post 
evaluations  of  legislation  are  required  to  contain 
an  assessment  of  administrative  burdens  and 
substantive  compliance  costs  but  only  for  some 
primary laws (table A6.1). The Polish recovery and 
resilience plan provides for reforms to improve the 
quality  of  law-making  and  involve  social  partners 
more in the legislative process.  

Trust  in  government  visibly  increased  in 
2024,  with  Poland  scoring  0.51,  well  above 
the EU-27 average of 0.33(104). Moreover, trust 
in  regional  /  local  authorities  and  trust  in  justice 
both  score  above  the  EU  average  and  have 
reached  their  highest  levels  since  2014  (Graph 
A6.1).  When  asked  about  improvements  that  can 
increase  trust  in  the  Polish  public  administration, 
55%  of  citizens  pointed  to  less  bureaucracy  (EU: 
52%), 47% to more transparency around decision-
making  and  the  use  of  public  money  (EU:  44%) 

(104) Understanding Europeans’ views on reform needs - April 
2023 - - Eurobarometer survey, Country Fact Sheet. 

Efficiency of selected administrative 
procedures 

Some  indicators  point  to  Poland’s  public 
administration  taking  longer  than  in  other 
Member  States  to  complete  procedures.  The 
OECD  product  market  regulation  indicator  shows 
that that Poland’s licensing system is slightly more 

(105) Flash Eurobarometer 526 - Understanding Europeans’ views 

on reform needs 

(106) Inforegio – European Quality of Government Index 

54 

00.10.20.30.40.50.60.7AutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSpringAutumnSummerWinterSummerWinterSpringAutumnSpringAutumn2014201520162017201820192020202220232024Justice,  legal system EU27Justice,  legal system PLRegional or local public authorities EU27Regional or local public authorities PLGovernment  EU27Government  PL 
 
      
 
 
 
 
Table A6.1:  Poland. Selected indicators on administrative burden reduction and simplification 

(1) This table presents a subset of iREG indicators focusing on regulatory costs. The indicators refer to primary legislation. 
Source: OECD (2025), Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 [https://doi.org/10.1787/56b60e39-en] and Better Regulation across the 
European Union 2025 (forthcoming). 

of 

all 

and 

permits 

burdensome  than  the  EU  average,  with  scope  for 
alignment  with  best  practices.  For  example,  while 
the  government  keeps  an  up-to-date  online 
licences 
inventory 
required/issued to businesses by public bodies, it is 
not  available  online  for  consultation  and  the 
inventory is not kept by a single body. In addition, 
there is no requirement for public bodies at central 
level  to  observe  the  once-only  principle  (see  also 
Annex  4).  Moreover,  according 
report 
monitoring  implementation  of  the  Commission 
Recommendation  and  Guidance  on  speeding  up 
permit-granting  procedures  for  renewable  energy 
and  related  infrastructure  projects  (107),  there  is 
scope  for  further  aligning  national  practices  in 
Poland with the guidance. Also, unlike 19 other EU 
Member  States,  Poland 
lacks  a  dedicated 
institution for promoting pro-productivity policies. 

to  a 

(107) European Commission: Directorate-General for 

Energy, Monitoring the implementation of the Commission 
recommendation and guidance on speeding up permit-
granting procedures for renewable energy and related 
infrastructure projects – Final report, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2025, .link.  

Graph A6.2: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and 
Governance (iREG) 

Source: OECD (2025), Regulatory Policy Outlook 2025 and 
Better Regulation across the European Union 2025 
(forthcoming). 

Social Dialogue 

Meaningful involvement of social partners in 
designing  and  implementing  reforms  and 
policies is crucial for their success.  In Poland, 
the  Social  Dialogue  Council  provides  a  forum  for 
unions  and  employers  to  influence  government 

55 

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.0Primary lawsSubordinateregulationsPrimary lawsSubordinateregulationsPrimary lawsSubordinateregulationsPL_StakeholderengagementPL_Regulatory ImpactAssessmentPL_Ex-post evaluation oflegislationMethodologySystematic adoptionTransparencyOversight and quality control2021EU-27Ex ante impact assessment of legislationEx post evaluation of legislationIdentify and assess the impacts of the baseline or ‘do nothing’ option.Is required to consider the consistency of regulations and address areas of duplication.Identify and assess the impacts of alternative non-regulatory options.Is required to contain an assessment of administrative burdens.Quantify administrative burdens of new regulations.Is required to contain an assessment of substantive compliance costs.Quantify substantial costs of compliance of new regulations.Compares the impact of the existing regulation to alternative options.Assess macroeconomic costs of new regulations. Periodic ex post evaluation of existing regulations is mandatory.Assess the level of compliance.Government uses stock-flow linkage rules when introducing new regulations (e.g., one-in one-out).Identify and assess potential enforcement mechanisms.A standing body has published an in-depth review of specific regulatory areas in the last 3 years.In the last 5 years, public stocktakes have invited businesses and citizens to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and burdens of legislation.When developing new legislation, regulators are required to …Yes /  For all primary laws For major primary laws For some primary lawsNo / Never 
 
   
 
 
   
 
Table A6.2:  Digital Decade targets monitored through the Digital Economy and Society Index 

Source: State of the Digital Decade report 2024 

always 

respected. 

policy,  including  by  commenting  on  employment 
and social legislation. According to social partners, 
the  social  dialogue  in  Poland  has  produced  no 
tangible  results  since  the Council  was  established 
in  2015,  and  they  signal  a  deterioration  in  their 
involvement (see also Annex 10). The opinions and 
demands  of  the  social  partners  are  not  always 
considered.  Deadlines  as  laid  down  in  the  act 
regulating  the  public  consultation  procedure,  are 
not 
public 
consultations  on  draft  legislation  are  omitted 
altogether.  Ensuring  proper  and  systematic 
involvement  and  capacity  building  of  social 
partners (including regional and sectoral ones) will 
be  key  for  the  successful  implementation  of 
economic,  labour  market,  and  social  policies.  For 
the  period  2021-2027,  Poland  allocated  nearly 
EUR  71  million  from  the  ESF+  to  support  social 
partners  at  the  regional  and  national  levels, 
enhancing  their  role  in  policy-making  and  social 
dialogue (108). 

Sometimes 

developing electronic documentation management 
system  and  adding  new  key  public  services, 
drawing on both national and EU funding.  

Poland already has an eID scheme. The use of 
eID  to  access  public  services  is  36.5%,  slightly 
above the EU-27 average of 36.1%. This result is 
likely due to the widespread use of the mObywatel 
(109)  application  and  the  personal  profile  (profil 
osobisty)  that  is  available  in  the  national  ID  card 
and that enables eID. However, Poland has not yet 
set up and notified eID schemes for legal persons 
under  the  eIDAS  Regulation  (110).  This  means  that 
Polish businesses  cannot authenticate themselves 
to  access  public  services  provided  by  other 
Member  States,  including  those  enabled  by  the 
Once-Only Technical System, part of the EU Single 
Digital  Gateway  (111).  Regarding  accessibility,  in 
addition 
is 
to 
implementing 
initiatives  aimed  at 
supporting  public  entities  in  meeting  accessibility 
standards. 

regulatory  measures,  Poland 

several 

Digital public services 

Civil service 

Performance 
regarding  digitalisation  of 
public  services  is  mixed.  Poland  scores  below 
the EU average on the provision of public services 
for citizens and businesses online, but its score for 
online  access  to  e-health  records  is  much  higher 
than  the  EU  average  (table  A6.2).  Poland  could 
improve  its  performance  in  this  area  by  further 

Poland’s  civil  service  has  a  good  age 
distribution  and  further  improved  its  good 
education profile. Poland has the second-highest 
ratio  of  25-49-year-olds 
to  50-64-year-olds 
among  public  sector  workers,  well  above  the  EU 

(108) For  an  analysis  of  the  involvement  of  Poland’s  social 
partners at national level in the European Semester and the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility,  see  Eurofound  (2025), 
National-level  social  governance  of  the  European  Semester 
and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. 

(109) https://www.gov.pl/web/mobywatel 

(110) European Commission, eIDAS Dashboard 

(111) European Commission, Once-Only Technical System 

Acceleratormeter 

56 

Digital Decadetarget by 20302022202320242024EU-27Digitalisation of public services157606479100Score (0 to 100)20212022202320232030270737385100Score (0 to 100)202120222023202320303na869079100Score (0 to 100)20212022202320232030PolandEU-27Digital public services for citizensDigital public services for businessesAccess to e-health records 
 
 
 
  
 
average  (2.9  compared  to  1.5).  In  Poland,  72.6% 
of public sector employees have completed higher 
education – significantly above the EU average of 
54%. Poland also scores above the EU average in 
terms  of  participation  of  employees  in  education 
and  training (20.7%  compared  to  18.9%)  (112). On 
the  other  hand,  the  share  of  women  in  senior 
administrative positions was 40.7% below the EU-
27 average of 46.5% (113). 

in 

Poland  is  facing  challenges  to  attract  and 
retain  talent  in  public  administration.  The 
interest  of  individuals  under  29  years  of  age  to 
vacancies  is  very  low  proportion  (only  6.5% 
compared  with  7.1%  in  2022  and  15.2%  in  the 
national economy as a whole) (114). The Polish civil 
service  is  deemed  unattractive  due  to  several 
factors,  including  the  significantly  lower  salaries 
than 
the 
attractiveness  of  working in  the  public  sector  is  a 
primary  goal  for  2023-2024  in  response  to  an 
ageing workforce. Reform initiatives include a new 
salary  scheme 
the 
benefits of working in the public sector through job 
fairs  and  student  meetings.  Offering  more 
teleworking  opportunities  could  also  help,  given 
that  frequent  teleworking  in  the  civil  service  is 
significantly less common than in the EU. 

the  private  sector.  Enhancing 

(115)  and  communicating 

Integrity 

consider 

corruption 

implemented 

Businesses 
is  not 
appropriately punished, but new reforms are 
the 
being 
legislative  framework  against  corruption.  In 
Poland,  43%  of 
that 
corruption  is  widespread  (EU  average  64%)  and 
27%  consider  that  corruption  is  a  problem  when 

strengthen 

companies 

consider 

to 

(112) Eurostat. Labour Force Survey. 2024 data. 

(113) European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), ‘Gender 

Statistics Database’, available at: link 

(114) 

Civil Service (2024). Report of the Head of the Civil 

Service on the state of the civil service and the 
implementation of the tasks of this service in 2023, 
available at: link. 

(115) 

The amended Civil Service Act endorsed on 14 June 

2023 made it possible to pay civil servants for overtime 
work as of 1 January 2024. Previously, only compensatory 
time off was the only option. link 

57 

tackled  all 

doing  business  (EU  average  36%)  (116).  Moreover, 
only  22%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and 
businesses caught for bribing a senior official  are 
appropriately  punished  (EU  average  31%)  (117). 
Poland  has  not  yet  fully 
risks 
concerning  effective  enforcement  against  high-
level  corruption  (118).  However,  some  steps  have 
been  taken  to  address  systemic  weaknesses  and 
to  enable  a  more  robust  track  record  against 
corruption,  with  several  investigations  ongoing. 
Progress  has  also  been  made  to  ensure  the 
independence  of  the prosecution  service  from the 
Government.  The  scope  of  immunities  for  top 
executives  and  impunity  clauses  are  also  issues 
(119).  Digitalisation  rates  of  asset  declarations  of 
public officials and politicians are low, and there is 
no  central  submission  and  monitoring  system  for 
asset  declarations  of  public  officials  in  place 
supporting  the  tracing  of  illicit  wealth  and  undue 
influence  (120).  The  effectiveness  of  combating 
foreign  bribery  in  practice  is  still  rather  low. 
Furthermore, public procurement remains in focus. 
24%  of  companies  (EU  average  27%)  think  that 
corruption  has  prevented  them  from  winning  a 
public  tender  or  a  public  procurement  contract  in 
practice in  the last  three years  (121).  Amendments 
to  the  Criminal  Code  introduced  law  enforcement 
measures  with  the  aim  to  increase  penalties  for 
undue interference in public tendering. Apart from 
public  procurement, 
the  construction  sector 
features as the main risk sector for corruption (122).  

While  Poland  has  public  registers  for 
lobbyists  in  place,  there  is  room  for  further 
transparency.  There  are  significant  concerns 
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  the  registers  for 
lobbyists  currently  in  place,  with  persistently  low 
registration 
rates,  some  deregistration  and 
insufficient oversight and enforcement in practice. 
In addition, Poland does not have lobbying rules in 
place  which  would  oblige  persons  exercising  top 

(116) Flash Eurobarometer 543 on businesses’ attitudes towards 

corruption in the EU (2024). 

(117) Ibid. 

(118) See the 2024 country-specific chapter for Poland of the Rule 

of Law Report, p. 18. 

(119) Ibid., pp. 19-20, 

(120) Ibid., pp. 21-22. 

(121) Flash Eurobarometer 543 on businesses’ attitudes towards 

corruption in the EU (2024). 

(122) See the 2024 country-specific chapter for Poland of the Rule 

of Law Report, p. 25. 

 
 
 
executive functions to disclose their contacts with 
interest representatives, including businesses (123). 

Justice 

The  overall  efficiency  of  ordinary  and 
administrative  courts  remains  relatively 
stable,  with  improvement  in  first  instance 
administrative cases. The average length of civil 
and  commercial  proceedings  in  first  instance 
courts  is  357  days  (compared  to  362  days  in 
2022).  The  average 
length  of  administrative 
proceedings  at  first  instance  courts  is  130  days 
(compared  to  163  days  in  2022).  The  quality  of 
the justice system is good overall. Poland adopted 
a system of electronic case management and case 
allocation  based  on  objective  criteria  and  is 
communication 
making 
technology.  Poland  is  continuing  to  implement  its 
2024  ‘Action  plan  on  the  rule  of  law’  to  address 
concerns regarding judicial independence (124). 

distance 

use 

of 

(123) Ibid., pp. 20-21. 

(124) For more detailed analysis of the performance of the justice 
system  in  Poland,  see  the  upcoming  2025  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard and 2024 Rule of Law Report. 

58 

 
 
 
SUSTAINABILITY 
ANNEX 7: CLEAN INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE MITIGATION 

behind 

industry 

Poland faces significant challenges regarding 
its  clean  industry  transition  and  climate 
mitigation:  its  investment  in  green  transition 
averages, 
EU 
lags 
technologies 
compounded  by  a  burdensome 
regulatory 
environment  impacting  new  business  creation. 
remains  highly  emission-
Poland’s 
intensive,  and  it  risks  missing  its  2030  effort 
sharing  target,  particularly  as  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  from  domestic  road  transport  have 
remained  on  an  increasing  trend.    Air  quality 
remains problematic, with high levels of emissions 
from  residential  buildings  and,  in  several  urban 
areas, from the road transport sector. Poland also 
struggles with waste management, being at risk of 
missing  EU  recycling  and  landfilling  targets.  The 
extended  producer  responsibility  for  packaging  is 
yet  to  be  implemented.  This  annex  reviews  the 
areas in need of urgent attention in Poland’s clean 
industry  transition  and  climate  mitigation,  looking 
at different dimensions. 

Strategic autonomy and technology 
for the green transition  

Net zero industry 

With 

Poland has emerged as a strategic cleantech 
hub  in  the  EU,  underpinned  by  growing 
investment,  expanding  renewable  energy 
deployment  and  a  growing  role  in  clean 
technology 
a 
manufacturing. 
manufacturing  capacity  amounting  to  between  8 
and 90 GWh/y (36 - 39% of total EU capacity)(125) 
for  battery  and  storage  technologies,  Poland’s 
growing  manufacturing  sector 
is  particularly 
important for batteries. The country produces 60% 
of  all  lithium batteries  made  in  Europe  and  ranks 
as  the  world’s  second-largest  battery  exporter 
after  China.  However,  Poland  still  faces  skill 
shortages in the battery sector, requiring upskilling 
and  reskilling  efforts  to  support  its  growing 
it  has  a  significant 
industry. 
participation in the Important Projects of Common 

In  addition, 

(125) European Commission: Directorate-General for Energy, The 
net-zero manufacturing industry landscape across the 
Member States 2025. 

European  Interest  (IPCEIs)  launched  for  batteries 
and hydrogen.  

Furthermore,  there  are  24  facilities  dedicated  to 
the  production  of  heat  pumps,  contributing to  the 
country’s  overall  manufacturing  capacity.  More 
modestly,  Poland  displays  between  400  and  450 
MW/y  (2%  of  EU  capacity)  of  manufacturing 
capacity for solar PV, approximately 1.75-2 GW for 
wind towers, and 2 – 2.5 GW for blades. 

Poland  has  a  strong  policy  framework 
supporting  the  scale-up  of  manufacturing 
capacity.  Poland’s  industrial  policy  supports  net-
technologies,  providing  an  overarching 
zero 
framework,  which  is  accompanied  by  various 
sectoral agreements aiming to develop production 
capacities,  namely 
in  hydrogen,  photovoltaics, 
biogas,  biomethane,  and  offshore  wind  energy.  In 
September  2024, 
the  European  Commission 
approved a state aid scheme in the amount of EUR 
1.2  billion  to  support  investment  (grants)  in  the 
production of batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, 
heat  pumps,  electrolysers  and  equipment  for 
carbon  capture  usage  and  storage,  as  well  as 
components of these net-zero technologies. 

the 

in  green 

transition  and 

However,  despite  expanding  R&D  spending 
and 
implementation  of  a  Green 
technology  Accelerator,  Poland's  investment 
clean 
rate 
technologies  is  below  the  EU  average.  There 
are  significant  gaps  in  funding  for  innovation, 
especially  for  high-risk,  early-stage  R&D  projects 
in  clean-tech  sectors,  and  Poland 
lacks  an 
for  energy  R&D  and 
overarching  strategy 
dedicated 
support 
that 
clusters 
innovation 
regulatory 
collaboration. 
environment  in  Poland  is  seen  as  burdensome, 
especially  regarding  the  creation  of  new  firms, 
which  increases  uncertainty  for  investors.  More 
to  streamline  permitting  and  green 
steps 
procurement 
further 
strengthen  Poland’s  clean  tech  manufacturing 
potential. 

requirements 

Additionally, 

would 

the 

Transforming the car industry   

The  auto  industry  accounts  for  7.2%  of 
manufacturing  jobs  in  Poland  (slightly  below 
the  EU  average  of  8.1%  in  2022),  employing 
directly  more  than  200  000  people.  In  terms  of 
production, some 615 000 vehicles were made in 

59 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland in 2023 (around 40% were cars and more 
than 50% vans) in 19 different plants (9 of them 
dedicated to battery electric vehicles) (126).  

Furthermore,  Poland’s  motorisation 
rate 
(the 
thousand 
cars  per 
number  of  passenger 
inhabitants) is 601, one of the highest in the EU in 
2023 (the EU average is 570). The average age in 
cars is 14.9 years, one of the highest in the EU and 
above the EU average of 12.3 years. 

of  the  Polish  production  of  coking  coal  (for  its 
derivative,  coke,  this  reaches  60–70%),  30–40% 
of  for  refined  copper,  more  than  50%  for 
elemental sulphur and more than 90% for refined 
silver.  Only  for  copper  does  this  share  have  a 
to  growing  domestic 
declining 
consumption.  Poland’s  strategic  dependency  on 
raw  material  in  2023  is  slightly  above  the  EU 
average,  indicating  a  moderate  level  of  import 
concentration (127). 

trend,  due 

in 

battery  manufacturing, 

The  transition  to  e-vehicles  represents  a 
business  opportunity  for  the  auto  industry. 
Poland  has  established  itself  globally  as  a  key 
player 
recently 
surpassing  the  United  States  to  become  the 
world’s  second-largest  producer  of  lithium-ion 
batteries, after China. However, faster progress in 
electrifying  its  passenger  car  fleet  is  needed  if 
Poland  is  to  achieve  the  decarbonisation  targets:  
the percentage of new zero-emission cars in 2023 
is still 3.6%, well below the EU average of 14.5% 
in  2023.  The  high  upfront  cost  of  e-vehicles 
(compared  to  conventional  vehicles)  and  the  lack 
of adequate charging infrastructure are two of the 
main 
fleet 
to 
electrification targets. 

achieving 

barriers 

these 

Critical raw materials  

Poland is a crucial link in the supply chain of 
several mineral raw materials (including some 
critical  ones)  for  the  sustainable  development  of 
the  EU.  In  some  cases,  the  minerals  produced  in 
Poland  play  an  important  role  in  ensuring  the 
bloc’s mineral security. This applies in particular to 
coking  coal  (and  its  derivative  product,  coke), 
copper, silver and elemental sulphur. The National 
Raw  Material  Policy  for  2050,  approved  in  March 
2022,  aims  to  ensure  Poland’s  raw  material 
security by guaranteeing access to necessary raw 
materials  (domestic  and  imported)  in  the  long 
term.  

Poland is a significant exporter of these raw 
materials  to  the  EU  and  some  non-European 
countries,  due  to  its  intensive  extraction  of 
high-quality minerals. Exports account for 20–30% 

(126) European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA) - 
The Automobile Industry Pocket Guide 2024/2025 (2024). 

60 

Climate mitigation 

Industry decarbonisation 

Manufacturing represents less than a fifth of 
Poland’s  greenhouse  gas  emissions  yet 
remains emissions intensive. At 15%, the share 
of industry in Poland’s total greenhouse emissions 
is below the EU average of 21% (128). By 2022, the 
emissions  intensity  of  Poland’s  manufacturing 
production  has  decreased  by  30%  compared  to 
2017 more than in the EU overall (20%). However, 
at  510  g  CO2eq  per  euro  of  gross  value  added 
(GVA),  it  emits  80% more  greenhouse  gases  than 
the  EU  overall.  At  55  and  45%  respectively,  the 
shares  of  energy-  and  non-energy-related 
emissions  in  manufacturing  in  Poland  (the  latter 
are  related  to  industrial  processes  and  product 
use)  show  an  opposite  relation  to  that  of  the  EU 
(43 and 57%).  

Poland’s manufacturing sector would benefit 
its  energy 
from  the  decarbonisation  of 
supply  and  process  electrification.  Between 
2017  and  2022,  the  energy-related  greenhouse 
emissions  intensity  of  manufacturing  in  Poland 
decreased  by  24%,  above  the  EU  average 

(127) Single Market Scoreboard 2024. ‘Import concentration’ 

measures how much a country relies on a limited number of 
sources for a basket of critical raw materials. 

(128) In  2023.  Manufacturing  includes  all  divisions  of  the  “C” 
section  of  the  NACE  Rev.  2  statistical  classification  of 
economic  activities.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section,  unless 
indicated  otherwise,  data  on  manufacturing  refer  to  the 
divisions  of  the  NACE  section  C  excluding  division  C19 
(manufacture  of  coke  and  refined  petroleum  products),  and 
the  year  2022.  The  source  of  all  data  in  this  section  is 
Eurostat;  data  following  the  UNFCCC  Common  Reporting 
Framework (CRF) are from the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), republished by Eurostat. 

 
 
 
(16%) (129).  At  the  same  time,  the  intensity  of 
manufacturing regarding process and product use-
related  greenhouse  emissions  declined  by  20%, 
slightly below the EU overall (23%). In this period, 
the share of electricity and renewables in the final 
energy  consumption  of  Polish  manufacturing  only 
increased  by  one  percentage  point,  to  41%. 
However,  the  energy  intensity  of  manufacturing 
decreased significantly – by 22% - from 2.2 GWh 
to  18  GWh/€.  Poland’s 
per  euro  of  GVA 
manufacturing sector relies on the grid for 78% of 
its  electricity  consumption  and  on  indirect  heat 
from  the  power  sector  for  39%  of  its  heat 
consumption. 

Graph A7.1: GHG emission intensity of manu-
facturing and energy-intensive sectors, 2022 

produce  hydrogen.  The  chemicals  industry  is  one 
of the biggest consumers of both natural gas and 
hydrogen. The metals sector too is quite emissions 
intensive  by  EU  standards,  with  4.1  kg  CO2eq/€ 
(EU overall: 3.5 kg). More broadly, Poland has third 
the  EU, 
highest  hydrogen  consumption 
dominated  by  fossil  fuels  in  production,  including 
imported natural gas (131). 

in 

Graph A7.2: Manufacturing industry output 
production: total and selected sectors, index 
(2021 = 100), 2017-2023 

Source: Eurostat. 

Source: Eurostat. 

The  greenhouse  emissions 
intensity  of 
Poland’s  chemicals  industry  is  the  fourth 
highest  in  the  EU,  at  3.2  kg  of  CO2eq  per  €  of 
GVA (130):  A  significant  share  of  the  sector’s 
emissions  stems  from  the  use  of  natural  gas  to 

(129) For the GHG emissions intensity of GVA related to energy use 
and  industrial  processes  and  product  use  respectively,  GHG 
emissions  are  from  inventory  data  in  line  with  the  UNFCCC 
Common  Reporting  Format  (CRF),  notably  referring  to  the 
source sectors CRF1.A.2 –  fuel combustion in manufacturing 
industries  and  construction  and  CRF2  –  industrial  processes 
and  product  use.  The  CRF1.A.2  data  broadly  correspond  to 
the NACE C and E sectors, excluding C-19. GVA data (in the 
denominator  for  both  intensities)  are  aligned  with  this 
sectoral  coverage.  Therefore,  they  are  not  fully  consistent 
with the data referred to in other part of this section. 

(130) The  two  sectors  considered  above  –  the  manufacture  of 
chemicals  and  chemical  products  (NACE  division  C20)  and 
the manufacture of basic metals (C24) are energy-intensive, 
consuming  much  energy  both  on  site  and/or  in  the  form  of 
purchased  electricity  –  and  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
intensive, 
the 
manufacture  of  paper  and  paper  products  (NACE  division 
C17)  and  of  “other”  non-metallic  mineral  products  (C23) 
(including  manufacturing  activities  related  to  a  single 
substance of mineral origin, such as glass, ceramic products, 
tiles,  and  cement  and  plaster)  are  typically  energy-  and 
greenhouse gas emission-intensive industries. 

in  various  combinations.  Furthermore, 

61 

industrial 

transformation. 

Poland urgently needs a policy framework to 
advance 
The 
manufacturing  sector  accounts  for  about  16%  of 
GDP  and  31%  of  employment 
in  Poland. 
Meanwhile,  its  transformation  to  date  fails  to 
effectively 
decarbonisation, 
competitiveness and resilience. An effective policy 
framework,  grounded  in  sectoral  analysis,  could 
help  accelerate  the  clean industry  transformation. 
This  could  include  tax  incentives  to  promote 
electricity over fossil fuels and a stable legal rules 
to  support  projects 
in  carbon  capture  and 
storage/use, among others. 

balance 

Reduction  of  emissions  in  the  effort  sharing 
sectors 

To  attain  its  2030  effort  sharing  target, 
Poland  needs 
to  swiftly  specify  and 
implement further climate mitigation policies 
(132).  In  2023,  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from 

(131) See European Hydrogen Observatory – Hydrogen Demand. 

(132) The national greenhouse gas emission reduction target is set 
(the  Effort  Sharing 
(EU)  2023/857 

in  Regulation 

out 

00.511.522.533.544.5C-C19C17C20C23C24KG CO2eq / €PolandEU-277075808590951001051101152017201820192020202120222023ManufacturingManufacture of paper and paper productsManufacture of chemicals and chemical productsManufacture of other non-metallic mineral productsManufacture of basic metals 
  
 
      
 
 
Poland’s  effort  sharing  sectors  are  expected  to 
If 
have  been  4.1%  above  those  of  2005. 
implemented,  additional  policies  considered  by 
Poland are projected – by 2030 – to reduce these 
emissions  by  7.2%  (or  18.2%)  relative  to  2005 
levels,  depending  on  the  additional  measure 
scenario chosen (133). In the most ambitious range, 
this provides for the overachievement of Poland’s 
effort sharing target, a reduction of 17.7%, by 0.5 
percentage  points.  Given  the  large  impact  of  the 
additional measures that are not yet implemented, 
swift  and  steady  adoption  will  be  critical  for  the 
implementation of the full set of measures.  

Swift  action  on  decarbonising  transport 
appears  necessary  in  Poland.  Between  2005 
and  2023,  greenhouse  gas  emissions  from  road 
transport nearly doubled in Poland, while they fell 
by  5%  in  the  EU  overall.  Road  transport  remains 
dominated by internal combustion engine vehicles, 
with  less  than  5%  of  newly  registered  cars  in 
2023  being  electric.  Poland  also  has  the  largest 
stock of trucks and vans in the EU, accounting for 
18% in 2023. Policies to help bring road transport 
emissions down are underway, but they are yet to 
deliver  results.  Under  its  resilience  and  recovery 
plan (RRP), Poland is deploying policies to promote 
an uptake of electric vehicles by private users and 
businesses  and  to  subsidise  the  purchase  of 
electric  buses  by  municipalities.  Poland  is  also 
using EUR 444 million from the ETS (EU Emissions 
Trading  Scheme)  Modernisation  Fund  to  deploy 
charging stations inter alia for heavy-duty electric 
vehicles.  

Regulation).  It  applies  jointly  to  buildings  (heating  and 
cooling); road transport, agriculture; waste; and small industry 
(known as the effort sharing sectors). 

(133) The effort sharing and sectoral emissions for 2023 are 

based on approximated inventory data. The final data will be 
established in 2027 after a comprehensive review. 
Projections on the impact of current policies (“with existing 
measures”, WEM) and additional policies (“with additional 
measures”, WAM) are based on Poland’s final energy and 
climate plan.  

62 

Graph A7.3: Greenhouse gas emissions in the 
effort sharing sectors, 2005 and 2023 

Source: European Environment Agency 

The  decarbonisation  of  the  buildings  sector 
needs to accelerate to help reduce emissions, 
air  pollution  and  energy  poverty.  Emissions 
from  the  buildings  sector  have  been  decreasing 
gradually,  falling  to  25%  below  2005  levels  by 
2023,  less  than  the  EU  average  (33%).  Poland 
remains  among  the  ten  EU  Member  States  where 
emissions  reductions  have  been  advancing  most 
slowly.  Recent  progress  can  be  attributed  to  the 
policies  promoting  heat  source  replacement  for 
e.g., Clean Air priority programme, and installation 
of  small-scale  renewable  sources.  Since  2018, 
Poland  has  earmarked  nearly  EUR  7  billion  to 
support heat source replacement and EUR 1 billion 
to  support 
installation  of  small-scale 
renewables in residential buildings. However, about 
1.5  million  households in Poland  still  use  coal  for 
individual  heating  and  7.5  million  buildings  need 
thermal modernisation. Poland has been reviewing 
its policies for the building sector with a view to (i) 
incentivising  heat  source  replacement,  together 
with  investment  in  building  renovation  and  (ii) 
accelerating implementation.  

the 

Sustainable industry 

Circular economy transition 

is 

room 

There 
for  boosting  Poland’s 
circularity  transition.  Poland’s  circular  use  of 
material  was  7.5%  in  2023,  showing  a  slight 
increase  following  a  gradual  decline  since  2014. 
This  puts  Poland’s  rate  below  the  EU  average  of 
11.8%.  Poland  also  lags  in  terms  of  resource 

05010015020025020052023MtCO2eDomestic transport (excl. aviation)Buildings (under ESR)AgricultureSmall industryWaste 
 
      
productivity,  although  its  performance  has  been 
constantly improving over the past decade.  

risk  of  not  meeting the  2035  target  of  max  10% 
of municipal waste landfilled (136). 

industrial 

to  create 

sustainable 

the  conditions 

In 2023, the country generated EUR 0.86 per kg of 
material consumed, which is below the EU average 
of EUR 2.22 per kg. Poland has a Roadmap for the 
Transition  to  a  Circular  Economy (134)  in  place 
(adopted in 2019), which focuses on four areas of 
action: 
production, 
sustainable  consumption,  bioeconomy  and  new 
business  models.  The  roadmap  contains  a  set  of 
tools  aiming 
for 
implementing  a  new  economic  model  in  Poland. 
The  measures  included  mainly  concern  analytical 
and  conceptual  work,  information  and  promotion, 
as  well  as  coordination  in  areas  in  the  remit  of 
individual  ministries.  The  implementation  of  the 
roadmap has been slow, but first steps include the 
establishment  of  a  circular  economy  government 
information  platform  and  an  indicator  system 
assessing the progress of the transition. As part of 
Poland’s  National  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Plan (135),  new  end-of-waste  regulations  for  key 
industrial  waste  are  planned.  They  shall  include 
definitions  of  selected  secondary  raw  materials 
and  facilitate  the  circulation  and  use  of  waste  as 
secondary raw materials.  

Municipal  waste  generation  in  Poland  has 
increased  in  the  last  decade,  but  with  364 
kg/cap  of  municipal  waste  generated  in 
2022,  the  country  is  still  significantly  below 
the  estimated  EU  average  of  515  kg/cap. 
Positive  trends  have  been  observed 
in 
recycling.  After  a  period  of  stagnation,  the 
municipal  waste  recycling  rate  (incl.  preparing  for 
reuse)  has  significantly  increased  in  recent  years. 
In 2022, the rate was 41%, which is slightly below 
the estimated EU average of 49%. Poland’s overall 
rate  significantly 
recycling 
packaging  waste 
increased  between  2010  and  2019  and  reached 
56%  in  2019.  Still,  Poland  is  at  risk  of  missing 
both 2025 targets set out in the Waste Framework 
Directive:  the  55%  preparing  for  re-use  and 
recycling target for municipal waste and the 65% 
packaging waste recycling target. Poland is also at 

(134) Polish Roadmap for the Transition to Circular Economy, 2019. 

(https://gozwpraktyce.pl/regulacja/mapa-drogowa/ ). 

(135) Poland’s recovery and resilience plan, 2022. 

(https://www.funduszeeuropejskie.gov.pl/media/109762/KPO.
pdf ). 

63 

in 

the 

investment 

Current 
circularity 
transition  has  been  insufficient.  Poland  is 
estimated    to  need  total  additional  investment 
worth  at  least  EUR  1.25  billion  a  year  for  its 
circular  economy 
including  waste 
transition, 
management,  representing  0.2%  of  Poland’s GDP. 
Of  the  circular  economy  gap,  EUR  265  million 
relate to recent initiatives, such as eco-design for 
sustainable  products,  packaging  and  packaging 
waste,  labelling  and  digital  tools,  critical  raw 
materials  recycling  and measures  proposed  under 
the amended Waste Framework Directive, and EUR 
723 million constitutes a further investment need 
to unlock Poland’s circular economy potential (137). 

Zero pollution industry 

Despite positive trends in emission reduction 
from  individual  heating  sources  in  buildings, 
air quality in Poland continues to give cause 
for  concern.  Emissions  of  several  air  pollutants 
have  fallen  significantly  since  2005,  while  GDP 
growth  has 
continued.  Poland  has  made 
substantial  progress  in  reducing  emissions  under 
the National  Air  Pollution  Control  Programme 
(NAPCP).  The  latest  reported  data  show  that  the 
2020-2029 emission reduction commitments have 
been  met  and  that  the  2030  onwards  emission 
reduction  commitments  are  projected  to  be 
reached.  Still,  in  2023,  exceedances  above  the 
limit  values  set  by  the  Ambient  Air  Quality  (AAQ) 
Directive (138)  were  registered  for  NO2  in  four  air 
quality  zones (139),  and  for  PM10  in  two  air  quality 
zones  (140)  in  Poland.  Furthermore,  the  target 
values  for  ozone  concentrations  have  not  been 
met  in  one  air  quality  zone,  the  target  values  for 
arsenic concentrations in two air quality zones, and 

(136) Circular economy country profile – Poland. (Link) accessed 9 

November 2024. 

(137) European Commission, DG Environment, Environmental 

investment needs & gaps assessment programme, 2025 
update. Expressed in 2022 prices. 

(138) Directive 2008/50/EU on ambient air quality and cleaner air 

for Europe. 

(139) Aglomeracja Wroclawska, Aglomeracja Krakowska, 

Aglomeracja Warszawska and Aglomeracja Górnoslaska. 

(140) Strefa Dolnoslaska and Strefa Malopolska. 

 
 
 
for benzo(a)pyrene (BaP) concentrations in twenty-
one air quality zones (141). 

Polish  industry  still  releases  large  amounts 
of  air  and  water  pollutants.  Poland  has  the 
second-highest  industrial  air  pollution  damage  in 
the  EU,  and  ranks  third  in  emissions  intensity, 
significantly  exceeding  the  EU  average  of  EUR 
27.5 / EUR thousand GVA (gross value added). The 
primary  source  of  air  emissions  in  Poland  is  the 
energy  sector,  which  is  a  major  contributor  to 
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur dioxide 
(SO2),  mercury  (Hg)  and  nickel  (Ni),  while  the 
metal  industry  is  a  significant  source  of  copper 
(Cu), lead (Pb) and zinc (Zn) emissions. Additionally, 
the  chemical  industry  is  a  key  contributor  to 
emissions  of  non-methane  volatile  organic 
compounds  (NMVOC).  Moreover,  in  EU  rankings 
Poland  has  the  3rd  highest  emissions  of  heavy 
metals to water and is in 4th position for emissions 
intensity, above the EU average intensity of 0.864 
kg/EUR  billion  GVA.  The  main  contributors  to 
emissions  to  water  in  Poland  are  the  waste 
management  sector  for  nitrogen,  total  organic 
carbon  and  heavy  metals,  and  wastewater 
treatment for phosphorus. 

The costs of pollution remain far higher than 
the investment into pollution prevention and 
control. The latest available annual estimates (for 
2022)  by  the  European  Environment  Agency (142) 
for  Poland  attribute  391 000  years  of  life  lost  to 
fine  particulate  matter  (PM2.5) (143).  To  meet  its 
environmental  objectives  on  pollution  prevention 
and control  and address the health and economic 
costs of pollution, Poland needs an additional EUR 
1.6 billion per year (0.24% of GDP), mostly related 
to clean air and noise (144). 

(141) European Environment Agency, Eionet Central Data 

Repository. 

(142) European Environment Agency, Harm to human health from 

air pollution in Europe: burden of disease 2024. 

(143) Particulate matter (PM) is a mixture of aerosol particles (solid 
and liquid) covering a wide range of sizes and chemical 
compositions. PM10 refers to particles with a diameter of 10 
micrometres or less. PM2.5 refers to particles with a diameter 
of 2.5 micrometres or less. PM is emitted from many human 
sources, including combustion. 

(144) European Commission, DG Environment, Environmental 

investment needs & gaps assessment programme, 2025 
update. Expressed in 2022 prices. 

64 

 
 
Table A7.1:  Key clean industry and climate mitigation indicators: Poland 

Source:  Net zero industry: European Commission: The net-zero manufacturing industry landscape across Member States: final 
report, 2025. Automotive industry transformation: Eurostat. Critical raw materials: Eurostat. Climate mitigation: See 
footnotes in the "climate mitigation" section; reduction of effort sharing emissions: EEA greenhouse gases data viewer; European 
Commission, Climate Action Progress Report, 2024. Sustainable industry: Years of life lost due to PM2.5: Eurostat and EEA, 
Harm to human health from air pollution in Europe: burden of disease status, 2024. Air pollution damage: EEA, EU large industry 
air pollution damage costs intensity, 2024. Emissions covered: As, benzene, Cd, Cr, Hg, NH3, Ni, NMVOC, NOX, Pb, dioxins, PM10, 
PAH, SOX. Water pollution intensity: EEA, EU large industry water pollution intensity, 2024. Releases into water covered from 
cadmium, lead, mercury, nickel. Other indicators: Eurostat. 

65 

Strategic autonomy and technology for the green transitionNet zero industryOperational manufacturing capacity 2023- Solar PV (c: cell, w: wafer, m: module), MW400-450 (m)- Electrolyzer, MW-- Wind (b: blade, t: turbine, n: nacelle), MW2000-2500 (b), 1750-2000 (t)- battery, MWh85000-90000Automotive industry transformation201720182019202020212022202320182021Motorisation rate (passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants), %507524541566579584601539561New zero-emission vehicles, electricity motor, %0.100.130.260.851.572.683.581.038.96Critical raw materials201720182019202020212022202320182021Material import dependency, %19.519.519.319.720.819.924.222.6Climate mitigationTrendIndustry decarbonisation201720182019202020212022202320172022GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing production, kg/€0.670.650.60.60.610.51 0.340.27Share of energy-related emissions in industrial GHG emissions46.244.744.844.645.945.045.944.842.5Energy-related GHG emissions intensity of manufacturing264.7249.8236.1233.0238.3201.9-158.4132.9and construction, kg/€Share of electricity and renewables in final energy consumption40.039.840.541.839.240.838.343.344.2in manufacturing, %Energy intensity of manufacturing, GWh/€2.242.182.072.122.141.751.581.291.09Share of energy-intensive industries in manufacturing production14.47.3GHG emissions intensity of production in sector [...], kg/€- paper and paper products (NACE C-17)0.900.790.820.720.680.61--0.730.68- chemicals and chemical products (NACE C20)3.623.553.423.363.733.22--1.251.26- other non-metallic mineral products (NACE C23)3.553.573.823.793.873.60--2.532.24- basic metals (NACE C24)4.084.704.193.914.164.08--2.793.49Reduction of effort sharing emissions20182019202020212022202320182023GHG emission reductions relative to base year, % 7.72.04.1- domestic road transport79.782.574.488.791.495.41.45.2- buildings-2.6-12.7-11.2-8.8-20.5-25.021.432.92005202120222023TargetWEMWAMEffort sharing: GHG emissions, Mt; target, gap, %192.5207.3196.2200.4-17.7-3.40.5Sustainable industryTrendCircular economy transition20182019202020212022202320182021Material footprint, tonnes per person16.816.115.816.216.115.814.715.0Circular material use rate, %10.5      9.2        7.4        7.0        6.7        7.5        11.611.1Resource productivity, €/kg0.7        0.8        0.8        0.9        1.0        1.1        2.12.3Zero pollution industryYears of life lost due to PM2.5, per 100,000 inhabitants1,479    1,148    1,056    1,335    1,541    -702571Air pollution damage cost intensity, per thousand € of GVA    77.4          27.5      Water pollution intensity, kg weighted by human factors per bn € GVA    1.8   0.9PolandEU-27PolandEU-27PolandEU-27 
 
  
 
ANNEX 8: AFFORDABLE ENERGY TRANSITION 

This  annex  outlines  the  progress  made  and 
the  ongoing  challenges  faced  in  enhancing 
energy  competitiveness  and  affordability, 
while advancing the transition to net zero.  It 
examines  the  measures  and  targets  proposed  in 
the  final  (draft)  updates  to  the  national  energy 
and climate plans (NECPs) for 2030. 

industry  pays  among 

The  decarbonisation  of  the  Polish  energy 
system is progressing, but challenges persist. 
District heating remains largely reliant on coal and 
grid  bottlenecks  hinder  further  renewable  energy 
penetration.  While  household  energy  prices  are 
capped, 
the  highest 
electricity  prices  in  the  EU.  Significant  investment 
in non-fossil grid flexibility, enhanced cross-border 
flows  and  more  consumer  empowerment  could 
play  an 
is 
progressing  slowly,  also  due  to  the  unfavourable 
electricity/gas  price  ratio,  exacerbated  by  high 
taxation  on  electricity  compared  to  gas.  Both 
Industrial and household consumers pay electricity 
around 3 times as much as gas. 

role.  Electrification 

important 

Energy prices and costs 

Graph A8.1: Retail energy price components for 
household and non-household consumers, 2024 

(i) For household consumers, consumption includes all bands 
for electricity and gas. Taxes and levies are shown including 
VAT. 
(ii) For non-household consumers, consumption band is ID for 
electricity and I4 for gas. Taxes and levies are shown 
excluding VAT and recoverable charges, as these are typically 
recovered by businesses. 
Source: Eurostat 

In  2024,  Poland’s  retail  electricity  prices for 
households  have  risen  slightly,  driven  by 
increases  across  all  price  components—

energy,  network  costs,  and  taxes.  However, 
prices remain below the EU average, primarily 
due  to  government  intervention.  Taxes  represent 
46.6% of the total electricity cost  for households, 
significantly  higher  than  the  EU  average  of  25%. 
This  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  gas,  where  taxes 
account for only 19.4% of the total cost, compared 
to  the  EU  average  of  27.8%.Since  2022,  Poland 
has  frozen  regulated  household  electricity  prices 
at  2021 
(PLN  412/MWh)  for  annual 
consumption  up  to  3,000  kWh,  with  higher 
thresholds 
families. 
farmers  and 
Consumption above these limits is charged at PLN 
693/MWh. 

levels 

large 

for 

In contrast, retail energy prices for industrial 
consumers  have  declined  but  remain  above 
the  EU  average.  As  with  households,  taxes  and 
levies  are  heavily  weighted  towards  electricity: 
they  account  for  37.2%  of  the  total  cost  of 
electricity (compared to the EU average of 15.4%), 
but only 1.4% for gas (vs 11.6% EU average). 

they  surged  during 

With an average of 96 EUR/MWh in 2024(145), 
the  EU’s  seventh  highest 
Poland  had 
wholesale  electricity  prices.  While  prices  in 
Poland  declined  early  in  the  year  amid  falling 
the 
natural  gas  costs, 
spring/summer  and  again  in  the  winter,  diverging 
from  Central  Western  European  (CWE)  markets. 
Despite  lower  consumption  compared  to  2023, 
lower  coal  output  (-8%  in  2024),  a  strained  net 
importing  position1  as  well  as  limited  non-fossil 
flexibility created an electricity supply-demand gap 
(which was exacerbated in the winter due to lower 
wind  power  generation  compared  to  2023).  This 
gap  was  mainly  covered  by  costly  natural  gas-
fired  generation  (+24%  in  2024)  ramping  up 
especially  during  peak  demand  hours.  These 
conditions caused price spikes in the evening hours 
(18h-21h),  when  solar  output  declined  and 
demand  remained  high,  especially  during  the 
summer.  On  the  other  hand,  average  daytime 
hourly prices were lower compared to 2023, likely 
owing  to  the  uptake  of  solar  output  in  Poland 
(+37%  in  2024).  More  broadly,  fossil  fuels  still 
accounted  for  70%  of  electricity  generation  in 
their 
throughout  2024,  maintaining 
Poland 

(145) Fraunhofer (ENTSO-E data). 

66 

 
 
 
 
 
 
structural  role  as  dominant  –  and  costly  – 
marginal price-setting technologies(146). 

Graph A8.2: Monthly average day-ahead wholesale 
electricity prices and European benchmark 
natural gas prices (Dutch TTF) 

(i) the Title Transfer Facility (TTF) is a virtual trading point for 
natural gas in the Netherlands. It serves as the primary 
benchmark for European natural gas prices. 
(ii) CEE and CWE respectively provide average prices in the 
central-western European (Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria) and central-
eastern European (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Slovenia and Romania) markets. 
Source: S&P Platts and ENTSO-E 

Flexibility and electricity grids 

to 

its 

The 

improve 

development 

The Polish electricity system remains weakly 
and 
interconnected. 
modernisation of the network is crucial for further 
deployment of renewables. In recent years, Poland 
has  not  managed 
level  of 
interconnectivity with other countries. In 2024 this 
stood at 5%, well below the 15% target for 2030. 
While  capacity  allocation  constraints  play  a  role 
here, there are also no projects in the pipeline that 
would  increase  transfer  capacity  on  the  western 
borders. The only electricity cross-border project of 
common  interest  at  the  moment  is  the  Harmony 
Link  with  Lithuania.  The  project  has  faced  some 
delays  and  is  now  planned  to  be  an  overland 
alternating current line (initially high voltage direct 
current subsea cable) to be commissioned in 2030. 

(146) 
consumption data throughout the paragraph). 

Yearly electricity data, Ember (generation and 

67 

envisages  PLN 64  billion 

The  planned  investments  focus  more  on  the 
internal  constraints  of  the  grid.  The  new 
national  network  development  plan,  which  runs 
until  2034, 
of 
investments  to  modernise  transmission  networks. 
The modernisation plan assumes that the network 
will  have  greater  capacity  to  connect  renewable 
energy  sources.  Also,  the  Polish  transmission 
system  operator  has  already  started  to  make 
investments that will allow energy to be collected 
from  offshore  wind  farms  and  a  nuclear  power 
plant to be built in the future. 

Poland  is  part  of  three  capacity  calculation 
regions  (CCRs),  namely  Core(147),  Baltic(148) 
and  Hansa(149).  Member  States  should  ensure 
that a minimum of 70% of technical cross-border 
capacity  is  available  for  trading.  With  regard  to 
this target of 70%, Poland has declared allocation 
constraints  limiting  total  exchanges  to  and  from 
the  Polish  bidding  zone(150).  In  June  2024,  the 
Polish  transmission  system  operator implemented 
significant  reform  of  the  balancing  market,  which 
is  expected  to  first  mitigate  and  ultimately 
eliminate  the  allocation  constraint.  To  increase 
cross-border  capacity,  Poland  drew  up  an  action 
plan  to  reinforce  the  internal  electricity  grid. 
Furthermore, Poland has a derogation in place for 
the  70%  criterion  granted  on  the  grounds  of 
excessive  loop  flow  from  neighbouring  Member 
States.  A  derogation  enables  a  lower  level  of 
trades  for  a  time-limited  period  if  needed  for 
operational security reasons. 

Permitting  remains  an  obstacle  for  grid 
development. The general permitting process for 
infrastructure projects is complicated. Obtaining all 
the necessary opinions and consents necessary at 
various  steps  of  the  procedure  may  take  several 
years(151). Although there are no special provisions 

Core is the CCR which covers central European 

Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland 

(147) 
countries namely Austria, Belgium Czechia, Germany, France, 
Croatia, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and, once connected, Ireland. A CCR is a group of 
countries which calculate cross-border electricity trade flows 
together. 
(148) 
are part of the Baltic CCR. 
(149) 
and Poland are in the Hansa CCR. 
(150) See 2024 ACER market monitoring report. 
(151) 
process applicable to energy transmission infrastructure projects 
with a focus on projects of common interest and projects of 
mutual interest under Chapter III of Regulation (EU) 2022/869. 
Overview Report. 

Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany 

Milieu (2025) Study on national permit-granting 

 
 
 
 
these  projects  was  published 

for projects of common interest/projects of mutual 
interest, an updated manual of procedures tailored 
to 
in  2023. 
Furthermore,  the  Transmission  Act  and  Gas  Act 
established  accelerated  and  more  effective 
it 
permit-granting  procedures,  which  make 
possible to implement projects in an effective and 
satisfactory manner. 

Despite  some  progress,  non-fossil  flexibility, 
including storage and demand-side response, 
is  underutilised.  Demand  response  faces  large 
market  access  barriers.  While  demand  response 
can  participate  in  the  capacity  market  and  has 
been awarded contracts representing 4-8% of the 
total  awarded  capacity  over  the  2021-2028 
period,  its  access  to  wholesale  energy  markets  is 
currently  not  allowed.  Access  to  the  balancing 
market  is  possible  but  barriers  remain,  such  as  a 
long  prequalification  time  or  minimum  bid  size. 
The  Polish  capacity  market  has  also  awarded 
contracts  to  non-fossil  flexibility  assets  such  as 
battery  storage  or  pumped  hydro  storage 
(respectively 2 GW and 1.15 GW for 2028). Today, 
1.76 GW of storage is operational in Poland and a 
further 2.7 GW has been announced.  

In  the  last  few  years,  Poland  has  experienced  an 
increasing occurrence of negative prices. While this 
is still a rarer phenomenon than in other Member 
States, it has taken on greater significance due to 
the  growth  of  renewables  in  the  mix  leading  to 
periodic energy surpluses when weather conditions 
are  favourable.  Traditional  sources,  like  coal-fired 
plants,  have 
limited  operation  flexibility  and 
struggle  to  adjust  output  to  match  the  varying 
production  of  renewable  energy  sources  (RES. 
Negative prices occurred 43 times in 2023 and 53 
times  in  2024.  In  July  2023,  Poland  amended  its 
energy  law  to  introduce  mandatory  compensation 
for generators affected by redispatching. However, 
its 
in  the 
calculation of fair compensation. 

lacks  transparency 

implementation 

Consumer  empowerment 
is  progressing 
slowly,  despite  its  high  potential  (7.9%  of 
households  in  Poland  generated  electricity  in 
2023, one of the highest values in the EU). As of 
August  2024,  customers  will  have  the  right  to 
enter  into  contracts  involving  dynamic  electricity 
prices  with  any  supplier  that  serves  more  than 
there  was  a 
200 000  customers.  Although 
significant increase in  rolling  out  smart meters to 
household  consumers 
(by  9.3  pps 
to  2022),  only  27%  of  Polish 
compared 

in  2023 

68 

households  have  access  to  smart  meters,  well 
below the EU average of 63% and the 2030 80% 
target. Households have been taking up the role of 
prosumers  gradually,  with  7.9%  generating  their 
own electricity(152). Despite the 2023 update of the 
legislative  framework,  the  development  of  energy 
communities  remains  limited,  with  around  50 
reported(153).  National  public  procurement  rules 
have  been  reported  as  a  significant  obstacle, 
preventing  municipalities  from  prioritising  locally 
produced energy and making suppliers hesitant to 
enter  into  an  agreement  to  take  on  balancing 
energy 
responsibilities 
communities(154). 

behalf 

on 

of 

largely  stagnant 

In  2023,  electricity  accounted  for  16.6%  of 
Poland’s final energy consumption, below the 
EU  average  of  22.9%,  and  this  share  has 
remained 
last 
in  the 
decade(155)  also  due 
to  an  extremely 
ratio. 
unfavourable  electricity/gas  price 
Further progress in electrification across sectors is 
required  for  cost  effectively  decarbonising  the 
economy  and  bringing  the  benefits  of  affordable 
renewable  generation  to  consumers.  When  it 
comes  to  households,  electricity  accounts  for 
12.5%  of  final  energy  consumption,  while  in 
industry  it  represents  26.4%  (see  also  Annex  7). 
For  the  transport  sector,  this  share  remains 
negligible  at  1.4%.  Electricity  was  2.9 times more 
expensive than gas for Polish households in 2024, 
mainly due to unfavourable tax treatment. Before 
taxes,  the  ratio  is  only  1.6.  Similarly,  the  ratio  for 
energy intensive industrial consumers in 2024 was 
3.1, while it was only 2 before taxes (156).   

CAGR (compound annual growth rate) of -0.3% 

All data on consumer empowerment are from the 

Energy Communities Repository: Barriers and action 

(152) 
ACER Market Monitoring report 2023, i.e. based on data covering 
2022. 
(153) ESPON TANDEM project. 
(154) 
drivers for the development of different activities by renewable 
and citizen energy communities. 
(155) 
between 2013 and 2023 and minimum/maximum share of 
16.5% and 18.1%, respectively. 
(156) 
Analysis  based  on  Eurostat  data  for  the  second 
semester  of  2024  and  on  ACER  data  for  2025.  For  household 
consumers,  consumption  bands  include  all  bands  for  electricity 
and gas. For non-household consumers, consumption band is ID 
for electricity and I4 for gas, referring to large-sized consumers, 
providing  an  insight  into  international  competitiveness  (price 
used  for  the  calculation  excludes  VAT  and  other  recoverable 
taxes/levies/fees  as  non-household  consumers  are  usually  able 
to recover VAT and some other taxes). 

 
 
Renewables and long-term contracts 

Solar  power  continued  its  steep  upward 
trajectory.  In  2024,  total  capacity  installed 
increased  by  45%,  to  5.8GW.  Despite  the 
relaxation  of  the  10h  rule,  the  potential  of  wind 
energy  in  Poland  remains  largely  untapped.  In 
2024,  total  onshore  wind  installed  capacity 
increased  only  by  7.5%,  from  9.3 GW  to 
10 GW. Hydropower capacity remained unchanged 
at  2.4 GW  in  2023  compared  to  2022.  In  2024 
renewable  energy  sources  accounted  for  30%  of 
the electricity mix, increasing from 27.2% in 2023 
(vs EU overall RES share of 47%)(157). 

Graph A8.3: Poland’s installed renewable capacity 
(left) and electricity generation mix (right) 

"Other" includes solid biofuels, renewable municipal 
waste, liquid biofuels and biogas 
Source: IRENA, Ember 

to 

improve 

visible  efforts 

Poland  has  made  some  progress  towards 
speeding up permitting, also by implementing 
reforms  included  in  its  recovery  plan.  It  has 
internal 
made 
coordination,  digitalise  procedures  and  ease 
conditions  for  grid  connection.  Progress  includes 
new  rules  on  cable  pooling  and  more  coordinated 
grid development as well as the identification and 
planning  of 
for  projects.  Several 
significant  initiatives  have  been  undertaken,  such 
as  identifying  necessary  priority  investments  in 
grid expansion and modernising the law on spatial 
planning.  The  envisaged  reform  of  the  distance 
law  for  wind  installations  with  a  reduction  of  the 
minimum distance from 700m to 500m is likely to 
significantly  increase  the  area  available  for  wind 
power.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  unified 
process for the single contact point, and there are 
no  established  rules  for  repowering.  Moreover, 

locations 

more  personnel  will  be  required  to  deal  with  the 
expected increase in permitting procedures. (Add if 
available  amount  of  capacity  permitted  in  2024.) 
There  is  thus  room  for  further  improvement  to 
shorten  the  permit-granting  procedure  for  RES, 
especially  taking  into  consideration  the  guidance 
on  speeding  up  permit-granting  procedures.  The 
share  of  renewables  in  final  energy  consumption, 
calculated  as  per  the  RED  methodology,  has 
slightly  declined  in  2023  to  16.5%,  one  of  the 
lowest values in the EU.  

The  Polish  energy  mix  is  still  dominated  by 
fossil  fuels,  which  cover  85%  of  total 
available  energy.  This  is  higher  that  the  EU 
average  of  75%.  Between  2022  and  2023,  the 
share  of  coal  has  significantly  declined  by  more 
than  5  percentage  points,  from  40.2%  to  34.7%. 
Renewables  have  slightly  increased,  from  12.8% 
to 14.3%.  

Poland  has  provided  a  clear  picture  on  upcoming 
auctions of offshore wind for the coming years in 
the Union Renewables Development Platform, with 
4 GW  being  auctioned  in  2025,  2027  and  2029. 
Poland  also  pledged  to  boost  onshore  wind 
generation,  albeit  by  comparatively  modest 
amounts.  

Regarding  power  purchase  agreements(158), 
Poland is among the top 8 EU countries with a 
contracted  volume  of  0.7  GW  and  231  deals  in 
2024.  This  marks  a  slight  decrease  in  contracted 
capacity  (from  0.75  GW)  but  an  increase  in  the 
number of deals (from 16) concluded compared to 
the previous year.  

In  Q4  of 2024,  Poland  adopted  a  dedicated 
Hydrogen  Act,  which  updates  the  existing  energy 
legislation  and  is  expected  to  accelerate  the 
growth of the low-carbon and renewable hydrogen 
economy,  as  well  as  the  planning  of  supporting 
infrastructure. However, Poland has yet to explore 
the  potential  benefits  of  system  integration,  such 
as  utilising  excess  renewable  energy  to  produce 
fully  renewable  hydrogen by  strategically  locating 
electrolysers 
Power-to-X 
technologies  to  produce  hydrogen  and  other 
derivatives. 

leveraging 

and 

(157) Yearly electricity data, Ember. 

(158) European PPA Market Outlook 2025, Pexapark. 

69 

 
 
 
 
81%  of  residential  energy  consumption,  with  only 
20% from renewables. Heat pump incentives exist, 
covering  up 
installation. 
to  EUR 10 750  per 
However,  their  impact  is  likely  to  be  offset  by 
electricity’s  expensiveness  compared  to  other 
fossil solutions.  

despite 

decarbonisation, 

in  district 
Structural  challenges  persist 
coal 
heating 
reliance  in  this  area  declining  from  73%  in 
2022  to  69%  in  2023.  Poland  has  put  in  place 
policies to phase out individual coal-based heating 
and set targets to eliminate the installation of gas 
boilers  in  new  buildings.  However,  challenges 
remain. The share of households using coal-based 
individual  heating  fell  from  40% in  2012  to  20% 
in  2021.  However,  50%  of  households  are 
connected  to  district  heating,  where  coal  remains 
by far the main energy source. Such a large share 
of coal in heating supply is quite unique in Europe, 
as  no  other  country  presents  comparable  levels. 
challenges, 
Despite 
decarbonisation  efforts  can 
leverage  district 
heating  as  a  key  enabler  of  system  flexibility, 
using  power-to-heat  technologies  to  stabilise  the 
electricity grid, integrate renewable energy sources 
and  unlock  the  potential  of  geothermal  and  solar 
thermal heating. 

technical  and 

financial 

Fossil fuel subsidies 

In  2023,  environmentally  harmful(159)  fossil 
fuel  subsidies  without  a  planned  phase-out 
before  2030  represented  0.92%(160)  of 
Poland’s  GDP(161),  above  the  EU  weighted 
average of 0.49%. Tax measures accounted for 
75%  of  this  volume,  while  income/price  support 
and  direct  grants  represented  23%  and  2%, 
respectively.  Fossil  fuel  subsidies  without  a 
planned phase-out before 2030 and which do not 

(159) Direct fossil fuel subsidies that incentivise maintaining or 
increasing in the availability of fossil fuels and/or use of 
fossil fuels. 

(160) Numerator is based on volumes cross-checked with the 

Polish authorities. For all Member States, it includes public 
R&D expenditures for fossil fuels as reported by the IEA 
(Energy Technology RD&D Budgets) and excludes, for 
methodological consistency, excise tax exemption on 
kerosene consumed in intra-EU27 air traffic. 

(161) 2023 Gross Domestic Product at market prices, Eurostat. 

Energy efficiency 

In  2023,  energy  consumption  continued  its 
decline  after  years  of  steady  growth,  with 
exceptions in 2020 and 2022. Primary and final 
energy  consumption  fell  by  5.1%  and  2.3%, 
reaching  93.6 Mtoe  and  69.9 Mtoe,  respectively. 
While Poland’s draft updated NECP aligns with the 
formula laid down in Annex I to the recast Energy 
Efficiency  Directive,  additional  measures  are 
needed to meet the ambitious 2030 targets. 

limited  progress 

Energy 
intensity  decreased  across  all 
sectors,  but  transport  remains  the  largest 
energy  consumer  (over  30%  final  energy 
consumption)  with 
in 
reducing  consumption.  Poland’s  cumulative 
energy savings target under Articles 8 to 10 of the 
Energy  Efficiency  Directive  for  2021-2030  is 
44 870 ktoe.  Data  from  the  NECP  for  2023 
indicate  that  expected  savings  would  significantly 
exceed this, correcting the underperformance seen 
in  2021.  The draft  NECP update in  2024 includes 
three  new  energy  efficiency  programs  alongside 
the  existing  white  certificate  scheme  to  ensure 
targets are met. 

involves  grants 

for  energy  efficiency 

Poland  has  an  effective  national  financing 
framework 
that 
(35%),  mixed 
primarily 
schemes  (32%)  and  financial  instruments 
(27%).  Funding  targets 
industry/SMEs  (26%), 
residential buildings (24%), public buildings (12%), 
and  district  heating  (12%).  However,  Poland  has 
notified  the  Commission  of  its  comprehensive 
heating  and  cooling  assessment  required  under 
the Energy Efficiency Directive.  

The  long-term  renovation  strategy  aims  to 
cut buildings’ primary energy consumption by 
4%  between  2018  and  2030.  Heating  and 
cooling  accounted  for  82%  of  residential  final 
energy  use  in  2022,  with  renewables  supplying 
23%. Final  energy consumption in households fell 
3.8%  in  2023,  though  it  increased  by  3%  after 
climate  corrections.  Greater  efforts  are  needed  to 
meet the 2030 efficiency targets in buildings. 

Heat  pump  deployment  fell  by  40%  in  2023 
due  to  an  unfavourable  electricity/gas  price 
ratio and  increased  popularity  of  gas  and 
biomass boilers. Heating and cooling account for 

70 

 
 
 
Table A8.1:  Key Energy Indicators 

Source: Eurostat, ENTSO-E, S&P Platts 

specifically  address,  in  a  targeted  way,  energy 
poverty  nor  genuine  energy  security  concerns 
included  ongoing  subsidies  to  the  coal  mining 
industry,  tax  exemptions  for  coal  and  fuel  oil(162), 
in 
and  excise  duty  refunds  on  diesel  used 
agriculture.  Additionally,  Poland’s  2023  average 
Effective  Carbon  Rate(163)  averaged  EUR  68  per 
tonne of CO₂, below the EU weighted mean of EUR 
84.80(164). 

In  2024,  Poland  confirmed  its  EUR 1.6 billion 
subsidy  to  coal  mining.  The  2021  social  contract 
outlines a gradual phase-out  of coal until 2049  – 
the latest phase-out date in the EU. Coal mining in 
Poland  has  become  increasingly  uncompetitive. 
Similarly,  the  share  of  coal  in  the  power  mix  is 
rapidly  declining,  to  the  advantage  of  renewable 
energy  sources.  Poland  has 
the 
opportunity to act in advance of the official phase-
out date and send a strong and credible signal to 
the market and to investors. 

therefore 

(162) Fuel oil used for the following purposes is exempted from 
excise duty the production of electricity and heat in 
cogeneration, in agricultural, horticultural, greenhouse and 
forestry activities. 

(163) The Effective Carbon Rate is the sum of carbon taxes, ETS 
permit prices and fuel excise taxes, representing the 
aggregate effective carbon rate paid on emissions. 

(164) OECD (2024), Pricing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2024. 

71 

2017201820192020202120222023Gas Consumption (in bcm)20.1               20.2                  20.8                  21.3               22.8                  19.6               20.2               Gas Consumption year-on-year change [%]4.4%0.5%2.9%2.6%7.2%-13.9%2.9%Gas Imports - by type (in bcm)15.7               15.8                  17.5                  17.4               18.5                  15.2               15.9               Gas imports - pipeline14.0               13.0                  14.0                  13.6               14.4                  9.0                 9.2                 Gas imports - LNG1.82.73.53.84.16.26.7Gas Imports - by main source supplier [%]Germany22.7%18.8%22.6%21.0%17.7%28.9%7.3%Ukraine0.0%0.0%0.0%0.6%2.0%0.5%3.5%United States0.6%0.5%5.4%5.7%8.6%22.6%0.0%Russia65.6%61.6%55.0%54.9%56.6%19.6%0.0%PolandEU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
ANNEX 9: CLIMATE ADAPTATION, PREPAREDNESS AND ENVIRONMENT 

are 

ecosystems 

The  impacts  of  climate  change  threaten 
Poland’s  economy  and  society,  and  water-
related 
particularly 
vulnerable.  Better  governance  of  adaptation  is 
including  better 
critical  to  building  resilience, 
coordination  between  national,  regional  and  local 
bodies and integration of climate risk assessment 
into  sectoral  policy  design  and  strategic  planning. 
Some  progress  has  been  made  in  Poland  in  this 
respect,  but  a  comprehensive  and  systematic 
approach to adaptation governance is still lacking. 
Recent  events,  such  as  the  Oder  River  disaster  in 
2022  and  the  floods  in  2024,  show  that  water-
related  ecosystems  are  particularly  vulnerable  to 
climate change impacts. Meanwhile, the design of 
Poland's water management system prioritises the 
industrial  use  of  rivers,  without  giving  sufficient 
consideration  to  environmental  and  resilience 
aspects.  A  more  balanced  and  preparedness-
oriented  approach  to  governance 
is  urgently 
long-term 
to  ensure  not 
needed 
sustainability  of  water-related  ecosystems,  but 
also  the  competitiveness  of  sectors  that  rely  on 
their ecosystem services. 

just 

the 

Climate adaptation and preparedness 

Poland faces intensifying impacts of climate 
change,  in  particular  an  increased  risk  of 
drought,  flooding  and  heatwaves,  as  well  as 
other  extreme  weather  events.  These  impacts 
threaten  the  security  of  critical  infrastructure  and 
expose  important  sectors  of  the  economy  to 
losses,  such  as  agriculture  and  food  production, 
the biomass industry and tourism. They also pose 
a  welfare  risk,  putting  emergency,  health  and 
sanitary services under pressure. The severity and 
frequency  of  climate  change 
impacts  vary 
regionally,  which  poses  an  additional  challenge  in 
terms  of  adaptation  governance.  An  effective 
approach  needs  to  draw  from  regularly  updated 
sector-specific  climate  risk  assessments  and 
mobilise  action  at  both  national  and  regional 
levels. 

Losses  and  damage  caused  by  climate 
change-related  extreme  events  are  a 
growing  threat  to  Poland’s  economy  and  its 
people.  Between  1980  and  2023,  economic 
losses  due  to  extreme  weather  events  amounted 
to  EUR 20.6  billion.  The  largest direct losses  were 
caused by droughts and floods, with flood-related 

72 

losses  accounting  for  EUR 13.7  billion  between 
1980  and  2023 (165).  Their  impact  was  further 
exacerbated by productivity deficits as well as the 
costs  of  rehabilitation  and  assistance (166).  In 
September  2024,  south-west  Poland  suffered 
severe  floods,  with  the  resulting  direct  losses 
estimated  at  EUR 3  to  6  billion  and  rehabilitation 
and  recovery  still  underway  A  wide  climate 
protection  gap  continues  to  pose  a  challenge  to 
Poland’s  public  finances,  at  both  national  and 
regional  levels.  On  average,  only  7%  of  losses 
from extreme weather- and climate-related events 
insured, 
over 
compared to 62% in Denmark (167). 

the  period  1980-2023  were 

the 

shows 

climate 

growing 

the  EU-27  average.  A 

Poland's  agricultural  sector  needs  systemic 
adaptation  to  climate  change  in  order  to 
maintain  its  strategic  importance  for  the 
economy and food security. In 2023, agriculture 
accounted  for  3%  of  the  Polish  gross  domestic 
product  (GDP),  the  seventh  highest  in  the  EU  and 
composite 
above 
assessment 
resilience  of 
that 
agriculture in Poland has improved in 2007-2021; 
change-related 
however, 
pressures  call  for  further  effort  to 
increase 
resilience and preparedness. In addition to drought, 
flooding, heatwaves and frost damage, as well as 
extreme weather events, agriculture is exposed to 
new  diseases  and  pests,  and  environmental 
pressures, 
soil  quality 
chiefly  water  and 
degradation.  The  wide-scale  uptake  of  nature-
based agricultural practices to boost resilience and 
biodiversity,  protect  against  erosion  and  improve 
the retention of water is key to fostering resilience. 
A  good  understanding  of  climate  change  impacts 
and risks would also help identify opportunities for 
the sector to diversify. 

Poland  is  deploying  investment  programmes 
and  support  schemes  to  boost  preparedness 
and  improve  adaptation  in  the  face  of  an 
increased  flood  and  drought  risks.  In  2024, 
Poland  announced  EUR  250  million  investment  in 
water  infrastructure  to  manage  flood  waves  and 
to  increase  water  retention.  In  parallel,  Poland 
to  environmental 
allocated  EUR  55  million 

(165) EEA, 2024, Economic losses from weather- and climate-

related extremes in Europe, Link. 

(166) ING, 2024, Updated: Polish flood damages may be limited 

but GDP impact could be higher than that, Link. 

(167) EEA, 2024, Economic losses from weather- and climate-

related extremes in Europe, Link. 

 
 
 
 
 
in  cities.  Under 

restoration  projects  to  improve  adaptation (168).   
Poland  is  also  using  over  EUR  2.5  in  EU  cohesion 
to  support  adaptation  and 
policy 
funding 
preparedness  measures 
the 
common  agricultural  policy  (CAP)  strategic  plan, 
Poland has initiated measures to help retain water 
in soils and grasslands (e.g. eco-schemes involving 
the  protection  of  peatlands  and  wetlands).  They 
involve  creating  water  retention  areas  to mitigate 
control  carbon  emissions  by 
drought  and 
preserving organic matter. 

Still, 

Vulnerable  groups  in  Poland  are  particularly 
threatened  by  climate  change  impacts.  The 
heat-related  mortality 
rate  doubled  between 
2003-2012  and  2013-2022,  with  children  and 
older  people  (around  40%  of  people  in  Poland) 
particularly  exposed  to  an 
increased  risk  of 
heatwaves. 
preparedness  measures 
coordinated  at  national  level  are  lacking.  Also, 
changing  seasonal  blooming  patterns  and  the 
emergence of new allergens, exacerbated by poor 
air quality, pose a threat to some 30% of people in 
Poland  who  suffer  from  pollen  allergies.  In  2024, 
the Polish Health Council issued recommendations 
for 
interministerial  measures  to  help  reduce 
exposure  to  climate  change  impacts  and  air 
pollution.  Among  other  measures,  the  Council 
recommended  extending medical  studies  curricula 
to  cover  climate  and  environmental  pressures, 
raising  awareness  of  those  pressures  among 
patients  and  improving  the  resilience  of  medical 
infrastructure to climate change impacts. 

In  the  absence  of  nationally  coordinated 
action,  a  dedicated  project  for  cities  helps 
advance  climate  adaptation  in  the  health 
sector  in  Poland.  The  project  establishes  a 
methodology  for  developing  urban  adaptation 
plans that consider vulnerable sectors' and groups’ 
exposure to climate change impacts. In almost all 
of  the  44  cities  with  over  100 000  inhabitants 
participating in the project, actions to improve the 
public health sector’s resilience to climate change 
impacts  have  been  developed.  These  actions 
involve  improving  the  functioning  of  municipal 
services  and  social  infrastructure,  broadening  the 
uptake  of  early  warning  systems,  and  increasing 
public  awareness.  They  are  directed  towards 
vulnerable  groups  –  the  elderly,  isolated,  persons 

(168) Polish Government, 2024, Działania MKiŚ związane z 

adaptacją do zmian klimatu, Link. 

73 

with  disabilities  and  chronically  ill,  as  well  as 
people in the crisis of homelessness. 

Strategic  documents  underpinning  climate 
adaptation  governance  in  Poland  are  yet  to 
be  updated.  An  update  of  Poland’s  national 
adaptation  strategy  has  been  underway  since 
2022.  The  updated  document  is  expected  to 
expand  on  priority  action  points  included  in  the 
original strategy,  adopted in 2013  – afforestation 
to mitigate drought, improved water retention and 
sustainable  management  of  rainwater.  However, 
the update also needs to cover emerging risks and 
reflect  a  growing  knowledge  and  experience  base 
by  means  of  adaptation  solutions.  Poland  is  also 
yet  to  develop  its  vulnerability  assessment  that 
the  national 
the  update  of 
should 
adaptation strategy. 

inform 

Poland  still  lacks  appropriate  institutional 
mechanisms for effective climate adaptation 
governance.  A  legal  framework  with  regularly 
updated targets and strategic objectives is lacking, 
as  is  effective  central  coordination  between  the 
local, regional and national levels. Moreover, there 
is  considerable  scope  for 
integrating  climate 
adaptation  and  public  funding  considerations  into 
sectoral  policies,  for  policy  monitoring  and  for 
risks.  Climate  adaptation 
predicting  climate 
solutions  also  need  to  be  backed  by  legal  and 
procurement  frameworks  to  enable  and  facilitate 
their deployment. 

Water resilience 

Water-related  ecosystem  services  in  Poland 
continue  to  be  compromised  in  the  absence 
of sustainable water management. Meanwhile, 
pressures related to water availability, quality and 
rehabilitation,  as  well  as  its  efficient  use,  are 
increasingly  severe  droughts. 
exacerbated  by 
Poland’s  water  productivity,  standing  at  EUR 61 
per  m3  of  abstracted  water  in  2022,  has  slightly 
improved  over 
is 
considerably  lower  than  that  of  many  other 
Member  States,  being  among  the  ten  lowest 
values  in  the  EU-27.  The  water  exploitation  index 
plus  (WEI+)  reached  6.3  in  2022,  which  is  the 
eighth  highest  value  in  the  EU-27.  Seasonal  data 
show  that  the  highest  WEI+  value  (11.6)  was 
reached  in  the  third  quarter  of  2019  and  the 
second highest value (10.4) in the second quarter 

last  five  years,  but 

the 

 
 
of  2016.  The  economic  sector  responsible  for  the 
greatest  water  consumption  is  electricity  cooling, 
which absorbed 1.6 billion m3 of water in 2022. To 
reduce  the  use  of  water  in  the  energy  sector, 
Poland  would  need  to  rely  more  on  renewable 
energy sources. 

in 

The  assessment  of  the  third  river  basin 
management plan shows that there has been 
significant  deterioration  in  the  ecological 
status and potential and the chemical status 
of  surface  water  bodies,  as  compared  to  the 
status  reported  in  the  second  plan  (covering  the 
period  2015-2021).  There  has  been  a  slight 
deterioration 
the  quantitative  status  of 
groundwater  bodies,  and  a  slight  improvement  in 
their  chemical  status.  Worryingly,  the  number  of 
surface  water  bodies  reported  as  having  good  or 
better  ecological  status/potential  has  fallen  from 
31%  to  8.4%,  compared  with  the  second  plan. 
Among  all  of  the  Member  States,  this  is  the 
greatest  reduction  in  ecological  status  between 
the two assessments. It is particularly striking that 
none  of  the  transitional  and  coastal  water  bodies 
are  in  good  ecological  status.  Only  24.8%  of 
surface  water  bodies  have  good  chemical  status, 
representing  a  significant  deterioration  since  the 
second plan. The failure to achieve good chemical 
status  is  mostly  due  to  ubiquitous  persistent  bio-
accumulative  and  toxic  substances  which  are 
difficult 
from 
transboundary sources. In Poland, these are mainly 
polycyclic 
(PAHs), 
aromatic 
polibrominated  diphenyl  ethers 
(PBDEs),  and 
mercury and its compounds. 

to  address  and  are  often 

hydrocarbons 

cause 

treatment 

is  a 
Poland’s  wastewater 
particular 
concern.  Despite 
for 
investments  co-financed  from  EU  funds,  Poland 
has yet to fully implement the Urban Wastewater 
Treatment  Directive.  Overall,  the  compliance  rate 
was  87% 
in  2020,  which  means  that  340 
agglomerations,  generating  10.7  million  p.e.  of 
urban  wastewater,  did  not  comply  with  the 
requirements  of  the  Directive.  It  is  essential  that 
Poland  takes  the  necessary  measures  to  fully 
comply  with  those  requirements,  making  use  of 
i.e.  the  European 
the  available  EU  funding, 
Regional Development Fund and the Recovery and 
Resilience  Facility.  This  is  all  the  more  important 
as  the  Directive  has  been  revised,  strengthening 
existing  treatment  standards  and  establishing  a 
new  additional  treatment  of  micropollutants  in 

urban wastewater (169). In Poland, discharges from 
urban wastewater contribute  to bad water quality 
in  27.7%  of  rivers,  8%  of  lakes,  85.7%  of 
transitional and 50% of coastal waters. As shown 
in  Graph  A9.2,  the  investment  needs  for  water 
protection and water management are substantial, 
with  a  financing  gap  of  EUR 1.5  billion  (0.23%  of 
gross  domestic  product  (GDP))  per  year  by  2027. 
Roughly  73%  of  the  gap  can  be  attributed  to 
in  wastewater 
unaddressed 
management.  Further  infrastructure  development 
would  help 
improve  water  management,  e.g. 
wastewater collection and treatment, water reuse, 
reducing  leaks  in  the  networks  and  the  general 
water  supply.  Additional  investments  are  needed 
to  improve  monitoring  (quality  and  quantity)  and 
support  nature-based  solutions,  flood  prevention 
and river restoration. 

financing  needs 

Biodiversity and ecosystems 

The  state  of  nature  and  ecosystems 
continues to degrade in Poland, reducing the 
country’s  climate  resilience.  According  to  the 
latest  available  data,  only  20%  of  the  country’s 
habitats  have  a  good  status,  while  the  share  of 
habitats  classified  as  having  bad  or  poor 
conservation  status  has  increased  to  78.3%.  This 
situation  has  severe  implications  for  Poland’s 
climate  resilience,  as  the  loss  of  biodiversity 
impairs ecosystems’ ability to provide services that 
help  mitigate  the  effects  of  climate  change,  such 
as regulating water cycles, maintaining soil health, 
and sequestering carbon. 

Progressive  environmental  degradation  and 
biodiversity 
loss  also  pose  significant 
economic and social risks. Poland is among the 
Member  States  with  a  high  supply  chain 
dependency  on  ecosystem  services,  with  69%  of 
its  gross  value  added  showing  a  medium  to  high 
level  of  dependency,  compared  to  the  EU-27 
average  of  55%.  Several  sectors,  such  as 
agriculture,  forestry,  fisheries,  construction  and 
water  utilities  (see  Graph  A9.1)  are  particularly 
dependent  on  ecosystem  services,  with  100%  of 
those  sectors'  gross  value  added  directly 
dependent on ecosystem services. This means that 

(169) Directive 2024/3 019, of 27 November 2024. The deadline 

for transposition is 31 July 2027. 

74 

 
 
failure to maintain ecosystems' capacity to deliver 
services could entail significant costs or even stop 
production 
these  sectors.  Protecting  and 
restoring  key  ecosystems  would  ensure  that  the 
long-term  competitiveness  of  these  economic 
sectors is preserved. 

in 

Graph A9.1: Direct dependency(1) on ecosystem 
services(2) of the gross value added generated by 
economic sector in 2022 

Directive, corresponding to 4% of its territory (170). 
Poland  will  need  EUR 5  billion  of  investment  per 
year  over  the  period  2021-2027  to  effectively 
conserve  and  restore  its  natural  capital,  mitigate 
the  impacts  of  climate  change,  and  preserve  the 
country’s  rich  biodiversity  (see  Graph  A9.2).  The 
current level of biodiversity financing is estimated 
at  EUR 1.3  billion  per  year.  To  meet 
the 
environmental objectives concerning the protection 
and  restoration  of  biodiversity  and  ecosystems 
and  other  relevant  horizontal  measures,  Poland 
would need an additional EUR 3.7 billion per year, 
leaving  an investment  gap  corresponding to  0.6% 
of its GDP. 

Graph A9.2: Investment needs and gaps in EUR 
million, in 2022 constant prices 

(1) Dependency based on the sector’s own operations, 
excluding value chain operations within countries and across 
international value chains. A high dependency indicates a high 
potential exposure to nature-related shocks or deteriorating 
trends, which means that the disruption of an ecosystem  
service could cause production failure and severe financial 
loss. 
(2) Ecosystem services are the contributions of ecosystems to 
the benefits that are used in economic and other human 
activity, including provisioning services (e.g. biomass 
provisioning or water supply), regulating and maintenance 
services (e.g. soil quality regulation or pollination), and cultural 
services (e.g. recreational activities). 
Source: Hirschbuehl et al., 2025, The EU economy's 
dependency on nature, Link. 

Targeted  action  on  nature  protection  and 
restoration 
is  needed  to  meet  Poland’s 
nature restoration targets. Taking Natura 2000 
and  other  nationally  designated  protected  areas 
into  account,  Poland  legally  protects  39.6%  of  its 
land areas (EU-27 average 26%) and 21.9% of its 
marine areas (EU-27 average 12%). Poland strictly 
its  territory 
protects  approximately  1.5%  of 
(combined  area  of  national  parks  and  natures 
reserves).  It  also  needs  to  restore  up  to  14 483 
km2  of  habitats  listed  in  Annex  I  to  the  Habitats 

75 

Source: European Commission, DG Environment, 
Environmental investment needs & gaps assessment 
programme, 2025 update. 

Sustainable agriculture and land use 

Poland’s  carbon  removals  fall  short  of  the 
level  of  ambition  needed  to  meet  its  2030 
target  for  land  use,  land  use  change  and 
forestry  (LULUCF).  Poland  is  facing  significant 
challenges  in  enhancing  the  carbon-absorbing 

(170) European Commission, 2022, Impact Assessment 

accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on nature restoration, part 
1/12, p. 22. 

0%20%40%60%80%100%AgricultureForestryFishery and acquacultureMining and metalsConstructionWater utilitiesHealthcare deliveryAviation travel and tourismFood beverages and tobaccoSupply chain and transportPublic services and othersElectricityChemical and materials industryElectronicsOil and gasReal estateHeat utilitiesAutomotiveRetail consumer goods and…Information technologyBanking and capital marketsInsurance and asset…Digital communicationsHighMediumLow - 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000BiodiversityWaterBaselineGap 
   
   
 
capacity of its land-use sector, as carbon removals 
have declined at a worrying speed in recent years. 
To meet its 2030 LULUCF target, additional carbon 
removals of  -3.3 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
(CO2eq)  are  needed  (171).  The  latest  available 
projections  show  a  gap  to  target  of  5.9  million 
(172).  Additional 
tonnes  of  CO2eq  for  2030 
measures  therefore  need  to  be  applied  to  reach 
the 2030 target.  

Poland’s agriculture sector remains a steady 
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and 
continues to have a significant impact on air, 
water  and  soils. 
In  2022,  agriculture  was 
responsible  for  a  total  of  33.3  million  tonnes  of 
CO2eq, accounting for around 9% of the country’s 
total  emissions.  Poland's  utilised  agricultural  area 
(UAA)  covered  14.6  million  hectares  in  2023  and 
has remained stable over the last decade. Poland’s 
nitrogen  balance  of  47.4 kg  of  nitrogen  per 
hectare  of  UAA  in  2019  (the  most  recent  data 
available)  has  only  slightly  improved  since  2013. 
However,  the  data  published  by  Statistics  Poland 
(173)  suggests  that  the  situation  has  recently 
improved, with nitrogen values going down to 38.7 
kg per hectare of UAA (174) in 2021 and 30.5 kg in 
2020.  Although  the  livestock  density  index  was 
0.69  in  2020,  thus  slightly  below  the  EU  average 
of 0.75, ammonia emissions accounted for 96% of 
total  emissions  from  agriculture,  which  is  above 
the  EU-27  average  of  90%,  and  has  not  changed 
significantly  over  the  last  decade. Poland  is  only 
slowly  transitioning  to  a  sustainable  food  system 
by 
the 
policies 
environmental  impact  of  agriculture.  In  2022, 
landscape 
3.6%  of 
features  such  as  woods  and  non-productive 
grasslands, below the EU average of 5.6%. Organic 
farming,  with  reduced  use  of  synthetic  fertilisers 
and  pesticides,  made  up  3.9%  of  Poland’s 
agricultural land, which is among the worst results 
in the EU-27. 

its  agricultural 

implementing 

land  had 

reduce 

to 

(171) National LULUCF targets of the Member States in line with 

Regulation (EU) 2023/839. 

(172) Climate Action Progress Report 2024 COM/2024/498. 

(173) Green economy indicators in Poland 2024 (Link) 

(174) As the UUA definition used by Statistic Poland is slightly 
different, the values might not be fully comparable with 
those quoted above, but nevertheless they show a declining 
trend. 

76 

 
 
Table A9.1:  Key indicators for progress on climate adaptation, preparedness and environment 

(1) The data show the average for the timespan 2006-2023 based on EFFIS - European Forest Fire Information System. 
(2) Scale: 0 (no protection gap) – 4 (very high gap). EIOPA, 2024, Dashboard on insurance protection gap for natural catastrophes. 
(3) van Daalen, K. R. et al., 2024, The 2024 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: unprecedented 
warming demands unprecedented action. The Lancet Public Health. 
(4) This indicator measures total water consumption as a percentage of the renewable freshwater resources available for a given 
territory and period. Values above 20% are generally considered to be a sign of water scarcity, while values equal or greater than 
40% indicate situations of severe water scarcity. 
(5) European Commission, 2024, seventh Implementation Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) (Third 
River Basin Management Plans and Second Flood Risk Management Plans). 
(6) For this indicator, the EU average includes the figure for the UK under the previous configuration, EU-28. 
(7) European Commission, 2023, EU Bioeconomy Monitoring System dashboards. 
(8) Nitrates can persist in groundwater for a long time and accumulate at a high level through inputs from anthropogenic sources 
(mainly agriculture). The EU drinking water standard sets a limit of 50 mg NO3/L to avoid threats to human health. 
(9) Net removals are expressed in negative figures, net emissions in positive figures. Reported data are from the 2024 
greenhouse gas inventory submission. 2030 value of net greenhouse gas removals as in Regulation (EU) 2023/839 – Annex IIa. 
Source: Eurostat, EEA 

77 

Climate adaptation and preparedness:20182019202020212022202320182021Drought impact on ecosystems5.4314.512.571.827.167.966.772.76[area impacted by drought as % of total]Forest-fire burnt area (1)386          386          386          386          386          386          [ha, annual average 2006-2023]Economic losses from extreme events890          -           51            30            1              1              24 142       62 981       [EUR million at constant 2022 prices]Insurance protection gap (2)----1.38         1.38         [composite score between 0 and 4]Heat-related mortality (3)15            15            15            15            15            [number of deaths per 100 000 inhabitants in 2013-2022]Sub-national climate adaptation action12            13            15            15            16            17            4144[% of population covered by the EU Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy]Water resilience:20182019202020212022202320182021Water Exploitation Index Plus, WEI+ (4)5.26.86.25.16.3-4.54.5[total water consumption as % of renewable freshwater resources]Water consumption3 314       3 101       2 875       2 996       3 076       -           [million m3]Ecological/quantitative status of water bodies (5)[% of water bodies failing to achieve good status]Surface water bodies---64%---59%Groundwater bodies---9%---93%Biodiversity and ecosystems:20182019202020212022202320182021Conservation status of habitats (6)20.0-----14.7-[% of habitats having a good conservation status]Common farmland bird index------72.274.42000=100Protected areas---4040--26[% of protected land areas]Sustainable agriculture and land use:20182019202020212022202320182021Bioeconomy's added value (7)34 378     36 509     37 846     39 006     634 378     716 124     [EUR million]Landscape features----4              -[% of agricultural land covered with landscape features]Food waste--119122123-[kg per capita]Area under organic farming3.33.53.53.83.97.99-[% of total UAA]Nitrogen balance61.847.4----[kg of nitrogen per ha of UAA]Nitrates in groundwater (8)------[mgNO3/l]Net greenhouse gas removals from LULUCF (9)40 960-     22 561-     23 330-     23 917-     35 644-     -           256 077-     240 984-     [Kt CO2-eq]PolandEU-27PolandEU-27PolandEU-27PolandEU-27 
 
  
 
FAIRNESS 
ANNEX 10: LABOUR MARKET 

the  country  still 

In  recent  years,  Poland's  labour  market  has 
been resilient and continues to perform well. 
However, 
faces  structural 
challenges  that  have  a  detrimental  impact  on  its 
competitiveness  and  potential  economic  growth. 
These  challenges  are  exacerbated  by  a  lack  of 
progress  in  social  dialogue  and  labour  rights,  and 
include  stark  regional  imbalances,  demographic 
change  and  the  underrepresentation  of  women 
and  vulnerable  groups  in  the  labour  market.  The 
2030  employment  rate  target  has  been  reached. 
However,  further  steps  to  help  achieve  the  target 
include creating a more inclusive labour market to 
harness the potential of underrepresented groups, 
tackling  labour  shortages,  and  enhancing  job 
quality. 

Graph A10.1: Key labour market indicators 

Activity rate and Employment rate (% of population), 20-64 
Unemployment long-term unemployment rate (% of labour 
force), 15-74 
Youth unemployment rate (% of labour force), 15-24 
NEET: Not in employment, education or training (% of 
population), 15-29 
Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsi_emp_a, une_rt_a, edat_lfse_20, 
une_ltu_a] 

labour  market  remains  robust, 
Poland's 
albeit  with  regional  variations.  In  2024  the 
labour  market  in  Poland  continued  to  improve 
despite  weak  economic  growth.  The  employment 
rate  (age  20-64)  reached  78.4%,  higher  than  the 
EU  average  of  75.8%,  and  above  the  national 
target  2030  (78.3%)  (see  Social  Scoreboard  in 
Annex  13).  The  activity  rate  in  2024  rose  to 

78 

imbalances 

there  are  major 
regional 
to 

historically  high  level  of  74.7%,  below  the  EU 
average  (75.4%).  With  unemployment  at  2.9%, 
Poland  is  among  the  ‘best  performers’  in  the  EU, 
which  has  an  average  unemployment  rate  of 
territorial 
5.9%.  However, 
disparities  due 
in 
socioeconomic  development  (see  Annex  17):  in 
less  developed,  generally  post-industrial,  regions, 
the employment rate is lower, and the workforce is 
lower-skilled. In 2023, the difference between the 
highest  and  lowest  employment  rate  in  provinces 
was  8.7  percentage  points  (pps)  (Dolnośląskie 
Province - 74.3%, Podkarpackie Province - 65.6%). 
Similar  patterns  have  been  recorded  for  activity 
and  unemployment  rates.  Looking  ahead,  the 
growth of the employment rate is expected to slow 
down  in  2025  and  2026,  due  to  the  shrinking 
working-age  population, 
rising 
employment rate of displaced people from Ukraine 
may partly offset this trend. 

though 

the 

Insufficient  childcare  services  contribute  to 
fewer  women  in  work,  hampering  economic 
growth and highlighting gender disparities. In 
2024, Poland’s gender equality score improved but 
remains  significantly  below  the  EU  average  (175). 
While  the  gender  employment  gap  (age  20-64) 
decreased  by  3.2  pps  from  the  2020  figure  to 
11.6 pps in 2024, it remains above the EU average 
of  10  pps.    Disparities  between  men  and  women 
tend  to  be  caused  by  parenthood,  in  the  case  of 
women,  and their prevalent role in caregiving and 
domestic  work.  Continued  efforts  are  needed  to 
address  challenges  in  the  availability  of  and 
access  to  high-quality  affordable  childcare  and 
insufficient  work-life  balance  opportunities.  A 
recent study found that 94% of mothers who are 
not  working  would  like  to  rejoin  the  workforce. 
However,  70%  of  them  say  that  they  are  afraid 
that after returning to work they will not be able to 
find a healthy balance between work and childcare 
(176).  Most  people  fleeing the  war  in  Ukraine  were 
women  with  children  who,  due 
family 
responsibilities,  stay  home,  or  can  only  look  for 
part-time  work  (177).  The  proportion  of  children 

to 

(175) Poland’s Gender Equality Index score was 63.4 in 2024, up 

from 61.9 in 2023, out of 100 points. EU average was 71 in 
2024. 

(176) "Macierzyństwo a aktywność zawodowa" (Motherhood and 

professional activity), Rodzic Foundation, 2021 

(177) National Bank of Poland: Living and economic situation of 
Ukrainian migrants in Poland in 2024. Survey report. 

586062646668707274760510152025302012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024Activity rate 15-64 (rhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)Long-term unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)Youth unemployment rate 15-24 (lhs)NEET rate 15-29 (lhs) 
 
 
     
 
 
 
leave  and  paternity 

under  the  age  of  3  receiving  formal  childcare 
decreased  by  2.1  pps  between  2021  and  2024 
and  is  now  15.1%,  far  below  the  EU  average 
(39.2%). Amendments to the Labour Code in  April 
2023  include  provisions  for  carers'  leave,  shared 
leave.  Existing 
parental 
measures supported by the ESF+ and the Recovery 
and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF), 
including  Active 
Toddler on Early Childhood Education and Care and 
benefits  under  the  Active  Parent,  are  steps  in  the 
right  direction,  but  it  would  also  be  beneficial  to 
adopt  more targeted measures  to  help  women to 
enter and stay in the workforce. Poland is also well 
below  the  EU  average  in  providing  public  long-
term  care  services  (3.4%  vs  5.8%  in  the  EU  in 
2019); care responsibilities fall mainly on families 
(see Annex 11). Closing (territorial) gaps in access 
to  quality  and  affordable childcare  and  long-term 
care  services,  particularly  for 
lagging 
those 
furthest  behind, 
important.  Also,  greater 
flexibility  and  improved  benefits  during  parental 
leave  may  contribute  to  domestic  tasks  being 
shared  more  fairly,  a 
in  gender 
stereotypes  and  a  narrowing  of  the  gender 
employment gap. 

reduction 

is 

Graph A10.2: Employment by age group and sex 

2024 Employment rate, % of population 
Source: Eurostat, LFS [lfsa_ergaed] 

Vulnerable  groups,  including  persons  with 
disabilities,  older  people  and  low-qualified 
adults,  also  face  barriers  to  labour  market 
integration. Following an increase from 31.1 pps 
in  2022  to  35.6 pps  in  2024,  the  disability 
employment  gap  is  among  the  widest  in  the  EU 
(24 pps).  Disability  or  illness  is  one  of  the  main 
causes of economic inactivity in Poland. Initiatives 

79 

are being undertaken to support the labour market 
integration  of  persons  with  disabilities,  including 
the development of a network of information and 
counselling  centres,  support  programmes  for 
students  and  graduates  with  disabilities 
to 
facilitate  their  transition  into  the  labour  market, 
and  actions  to  increase  the  accessibility  of  higher 
education  institutions,  partly  funded  via  ESF+. 
Existing  labour  market  tools  are  still  not  meeting 
the  required  objectives,  despite  a  comprehensive 
diagnosis  of  obstacles  and  a  call  for  bold 
investment  in  evidence-based  policy  reform(178). 
Employers’  preparedness  to  employ  persons  with 
disabilities remains a challenge due to the absence 
of a legal basis for supported employment and the 
knowledge  and  skills  on  how  to  integrate  such 
people  into  the  workplace.  The  education  gap  of 
this group is also a concern. The tertiary education 
rate  of  persons  with  disabilities  was  32%  in 
2021/2022,  and  the  mean  tertiary  education  gap 
in those years stood at 18.4 pps (EU 11.3 pps)(179). 
In  addition,  the  proportion  of  young  people  (aged 
16-29)  not  in  employment,  education  or  training 
(NEETs)  with  disabilities  (40%)  is  one  of  the 
highest in the EU. Poland has set a target of 40% 
for the employment of persons with disabilities by 
2030.  

population. 

Older people (aged 55 to 64) also experience 
relatively  low  employment  rates,  accounting 
for more than 32% of Poland's economically 
The 
inactive  working-age 
employment  rate  of  older  women  is  particularly 
low,  at  48.3%  as  opposed  to  59.4%  in  the  EU, 
compared  to  70.7%  for  older  men  (71.4%  in  the 
EU). This is largely due to the lower retirement age 
for  women  (60  vs  65  for  men).  The  employment 
rate  of  people  aged  20-64  with  lower  levels  of 
educational  attainment  is  also  much  lower  than 
the  EU  average  (47.7%  vs  58.7%  EU)  and  this  is 
especially true of older people (55-64) with lower 
skills  (38.1%  vs  49.6%  in  the  EU).  Most  of  the 
labour-market  instruments  currently  implemented 
in  Poland  to  tackle  these  problems  are  highly 
dependent  on  the  EU  cohesion  policy  funds  and 
the recovery and resilience plan (RRP), which poses 
challenges  for  their  long-term  sustainability.  To 
further  support  vulnerable  groups,  it  would  be 
beneficial  to  strengthen  measures  to  help  them 

(178) European Semester 2024-2025 country fiche on disability 

equality 

(179) European comparative data on persons with disabilities - 

Publications Office of the EUI 

02040608010015-1920-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-74MaleFemale 
   
 
find  employment,  including  tapping  into  the  full 
potential of the social economy. 

it 

Given  Poland’s  ageing  population  and 
declining  birth  rates, 
is  essential  to 
integrate  underrepresented  groups  more 
effectively.  Poland's  population  has  fallen  by 
over  1.35  million  since  2018,  the  last  year  in 
which the population  grew. In 2024,  the country’s 
population fell by 133 000, the largest such fall in 
the  EU.  The  demographic  trend  is  deteriorating 
despite  unprecedented  levels  of  immigration  in 
recent  years, mostly  from  Ukraine. Causes  of  this 
include  the  country's  historically  low  fertility  rate 
(1.29  vs  1.46  in  the  EU  in  2022),  changes  in  the 
population  structure  and  delayed  parenthood. 
Between  2022  and  2070,  Poland's  population  is 
expected  to  fall  by  16%,  four  times  the  EU  (4%), 
with the working-age population (20-64) expected 
to decrease by 9.8 pps (7 pps for the EU)(180).  

talent  development 

is  particularly  concerning,  as 

Nine  Polish  regions  are  among  the  82  EU 
in  their 
regions  facing  a  sharp  decline 
working-age  population.  The  situation 
in 
is 
it 
Łodzkie 
experiencing  a 
trap,  a 
shrinking  working-age  population  and  a  lack  of 
individuals  with  higher  education.  Eight  other 
Polish regions, mostly in Eastern Poland, are at risk 
of  falling  into  this  trap  due  to  net  migration  of 
people aged 15-39. These demographic shifts will 
exacerbate  shortages  of  people  entering  work.  It 
would  therefore  be  of  benefit  to  implement 
measures  to  get  underrepresented  groups  into 
work. One reform  under the RRP  aims to increase 
the  labour-market  participation  with  a  view  to 
helping  the  Polish  economy  to  achieve  higher 
productivity, 
global 
competitiveness.  Cohesion  policy  supports  the 
functioning  of  the  public  employment  services, 
specifically  for  persons  with  disabilities,  and 
inclusive education for children with disabilities. In 
2023,  the  ESF  funded  23  education  support 
centres,  a  qualification  framework  for  special-
needs  assistants,  and  training  of  28 000  school 
staff on inclusive education.  

resilience 

crisis 

and 

There  is  a  growing  shortage  of  workers, 
posing  challenges 
in  some  sectors.  The 
proportion  of  companies  reporting  a  shortage  of 
limiting 
labour  force  as  a  significant  factor 
in 
production  was 

at  63% 

high, 

very 

(180) 2024 Commission Ageing Report 

80 

manufacturing in Q4-2024 (18% in the EU), 57.4% 
in  services  (26.8%  in  the  EU),  and  72.2%  in 
construction  (26%  in  the  EU)  (181).  The  challenges 
in  the  construction  sector  may  be  even  more 
severe  given  its  relative  dependency  on  workers 
from  other  countries,  including  non-EU  nationals 
(ELA  report,  2023).  At  the  same  time,  the  job-
vacancy  rate  remains  relatively  low  at  0.9%  in 
2024 and below its pre-pandemic level of 1.1% in 
2019.  In  December  2023,  the  Polish  government 
approved a law to improve third country nationals’ 
access  to  the  Polish  labour  market,  including 
integration  programmes  such  as  Polish  language 
tuition.  In  addition  to  targeted  active  labour 
market  policies  and  upskilling  and  reskilling,  legal 
migration  and  attracting  talent  could  help  retain 
workers  with  adequate  skills  in  key  sectors  and 
bolster Poland’s competitiveness.  

Poland has seen robust wage growth but real 
wages  remained  subdued.  Nominal  wage 
growth  reached  12.3%  in  2022  and  13.1%  in 
2023,  more  than  twice  the  EU  average  of  4.8% 
and  5.9%,  respectively(182).  However,  due  to  high 
inflation  this  has  not  led  to  significant  real  wage 
growth,  which  decreased by  0.7%  in  2022  before 
increasing slightly by 1.6% in 2023. Nominal wage 
growth is expected to reach 11.5% in 2024 before 
falling to 5.9% in 2025. The increase in real wages 
(by  7.4%  in  2024)  is  driven  by  continued  wage 
growth  and  steep  disinflation  (inflation  fell  from 
13.2%  in  2022  to  3.7%  in  2024).  The  statutory 
minimum  wage  also  increased  by  almost  55% 
between  January  2022  and  January  2025,  an 
increase of around 23% in real terms.  

While  in-work  poverty  has  decreased  from 
pre-pandemic highs, it remains slightly above 
the EU average (9.1% vs 8.2%). Over the past 
decade, wage growth has fallen short of what may 
be  expected  based  on  the  usual  macroeconomic 
drivers  of  wage  growth  (183).  More  recently,  unit 

(181) European Commission Business and Consumer Survey, 

publication date 8 January 2025 

(182) For nominal wage growth, pay per employee is considered. It 
includes: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind; 
and ii) Social contributions payable by employers. For real 
gross wages, the deflator used is HICP. Real wages using this 
deflator then can differ from real wages shown in AMECO 
(that uses private consumption as deflator). Data for 2024 
and 2025 are based on the European Commission Autumn 
2024 economic forecast. 

(183) Wage benchmarks are predicted by developments in 
inflation, productivity, the trade balance and the 
unemployment rate. 

 
 
 
government also plans to adopt  a bill  on changes 
to  the  Social  Dialogue  Council  in  the  second 
quarter of 2025, which may prove to be a step in 
a  right  direction.  Properly  functioning  collective 
bargaining  on  wage  setting  and  the  effective 
involvement  of  social  partners  in  setting  and 
statutory  minimum  wages 
updating 
can 
strengthen 
incentives  to  work,  support  wage 
adequacy and ensuring that productivity gains are 
shared  more  fairly  across  society.  A  more 
collaborative approach can lead to more balanced 
and  sustainable  wage  policies,  which  would boost 
economic 
standards 
living 
workers' 
competitiveness. 

and 

The  workforce  is  adapting  to  the  green  and 
digital  transitions,  with  a  growing  need  for 
skilled  workers  in  emerging  sectors.  In  2024, 
employment 
in  the  country’s  energy-intensive 
industries  was  relatively  high  at  5.4%  of  total 
employment,  while  jobs  in  the  green  economy 
have  expanded.  Between  2016  and  2021, 
employment  in  the  environmental  goods  and 
services  sector  grew  by  44.3%,  reaching  1.8%  of 
total employment (EU: 2.7%). The job vacancy rate 
in  construction,  a  key  sector  for  the  green 
transition,  is  well  below  the  EU  average  (1.6%  vs 
3.8%  in  2023).  Although  the  greenhouse  gas 
emission  intensity  of  Poland’s  workforce  has 
improved,  down  from  21.3  tonnes  per  worker  in 
2015 to 18.7 in 2023, it is still 6.4 pps above the 
EU  average  of  12.3),  reflecting  some  progress  in 
the green transition.  

The  digital  transition  has  also  seen  steady 
growth,  with  ICT  specialists  accounting  for 
4.3% of total employment in 2023, compared 
to  4.8%  in  the  EU.  Small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  in  Poland  have  reported  a  lack  of 
qualified ICT personnel as one of the main barriers 
for digitalisation of businesses. Women accounted 
for  19.1%  of  ICT  specialists,  just  below  the  EU 
average (19.4%), but still lower than in many other 
Member  States  and  some  way  off  the  29.0% 
target  Poland  set  itself  in  the  Digital  Decade 
strategic 
the 
working population in Poland are still short of what 
may be expected. It would therefore be beneficial 
to enhance upskilling and reskilling (see Annex 12). 

roadmap.  Digital  skills  among 

labour  costs  (ULCs)(184)  rose  more  steeply  in 
Poland  than  in  most  EU  Member  States,  growing 
by  7.9%  in  2022,  13.6%  in  2023  and  7.9%  in 
2024, although they are forecast to fall sharply to 
2.4% in 2025. Poland’s export market shares have 
been growing since 2019, well above EU average, 
strong  wage  developments  may  weigh  on 
competitiveness prospects. 

Poland's  underdeveloped  social  dialogue  and 
labour  rights  framework  exacerbates  labour 
market inequalities. Poland has not improved its 
social  dialogue  in  recent  years  and  the  social 
partners  have  noted  a  deterioration  in  their 
engagement.  The  2024  Global  Rights  Index  (185), 
which  documents  breaches  of 
internationally 
recognised  labour  rights,  listed  Poland  among the 
countries  where  governments  and/or  companies 
regularly  interfere  in,  or  fail  to  fully  guarantee, 
important  aspects  of  collective 
labour  rights. 
Furthermore, there are deficiencies in laws as well 
as  established  practices,  which  enable  frequent 
violations (see Annex 6) (186).  

Collective bargaining coverage in Poland has 
been  on  a  long-term  downward  trend  since 
the 2000s and, at 13.4% is one of the lowest 
in the EU (187). It has been 10 years since the last 
industry-wide collective agreement was concluded 
in  Poland.  At  company  level,  social  dialogue  is 
characterised  by  a  small  number  of  collective 
agreements  and  coverage  for  few  employees.  - 
Two  draft  laws,  on  collective  labour  agreements 
and minimum wage, were drawn up in June 2024 
but have not yet been submitted to Parliament. In 
took  an 
July  2024, 
unfavourable view of a new draft law on collective 
agreements,  as  it  offers  no  real  incentives  to 
The 
encourage 

social  partners 

bargaining 

collective 

(188). 

the 

(184) Unit labour costs are defined as the ratio of total labour pay 
per employee to output per persons employed (labour 
productivity). 

(185) International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC): 

https://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/2024_ituc_global_rights_index_en.pdf 
(186) This was also the case with the national medium-term 
fiscal-structural plan submitted to the Commission in 
November 2024, in which Poland cited time pressure as the 
reason for not conducting mandatory consultations, using an 
exception of Regulation 2024/1263. 

(187) OECD (2019) 

(188)

https://legislacja.gov.pl/docs//2/12386550/13066364/

13066367/dokument704962.pdf 

81 

 
 
 
ANNEX 11: SOCIAL POLICIES 

social 

Overall,  Poland’s 
situation  has 
improved,  but  the  country  continues  to  face 
challenges with higher poverty levels among 
people  in  rural  areas  and  older  people.  The 
key contributing factors include inadequate access 
to early childhood education and care, health and 
social  services,  especially  in  rural  areas  and  for 
disadvantaged  groups.  Demographic  shifts  raise 
concerns  about  the  sustainability  of  pensions, 
including  their  future  adequacy,  especially  for 
women.  Adressing 
limited  capacity  and 
coverage  of  the  social  protection  system  and 
segmentation of the labour market will contribute 
to  Poland’s  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth  and 
competitiveness. 

the 

A  stable  decline  in  poverty  is  visible  across 
its  components.  In  2024,  the  at-risk-of-poverty 
or social exclusion (AROPE) rate decreased slightly 
(0.3 pps) compared to 2023, and was 16% , close 
to  the  rate  in  2022.  Relatively  high  annual 
inflation  rates  (10.9%  in  2023)  (189)  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, the unprecedented influx of refugees 
from Ukraine may have impacted the development 
of poverty indicators. Nevertheless, the AROPE rate 
in 2023 remained lower than in the EU on average 
(21%),  also  for  children:  16.1%  vs  24.2%  in  the 
EU).  For  the  components  of  AROPE,  the  at  risk  of 
poverty  (AROP)  and  severe  material  and  social 
deprivation  (SMSD)  slightly  increased  between 
2022 and 2023 (respectively from 13.7% to 14% 
and  from  2.8%  to  3%),  while  the  very  low  work 
intensity  (VLWI)  decreased  (see  Graph  A11.1). 
Addressing  the  existing  challenges  will  contribute 
to  achieving  the  2030  national  target  on  poverty 
reduction,  which  is  a  decrease  by  1.5  million 
people compared to the 2019 level, so far reduced 
by 603 000 people. 

Graph A11.1: Components of AROPE, 2015-2023 

% of total population 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_peps01n, ilc_li02, ilc_mdsd11, 
ilc_lvhl11n] 

(24.7%) 

Regional  disparities  are  high  while  rural 
areas and vulnerable groups are particularly 
affected  by  poverty  and  social  exclusion.  In 
2023,  AROPE  rates  in  some  regions  doubled  or 
almost  tripled  those  in  other  regions:  Podlaskie 
and 
(27%),  Warminsko-Mazurskie 
compared to Śląskie (10.7%)  or Opolskie (11.9%). 
Poverty 
limited 
risks  are  mainly  driven  by 
economic  opportunities, 
inadequate  access  to 
quality  education  and  employment  support,  gaps 
in  social  protection,  health  and  social  services, 
especially in rural areas and for vulnerable groups 
(see Annex 10 and 11). In 2023, the AROPE rate in 
rural  areas  was  10.5 pps  higher  than  in  urban 
areas.  In  2022,  students  from  rural  secondary 
schools  achieved  on  average  significantly  lower 
results in basic skills than those in urban schools, 
and  the  gap  is  wider  than  the  EU  average  (190). 
Consequently,  the  urban-rural  gap  in  tertiary 
educational  attainment  level  remains  wide  in 
Poland  (61.3%  in  cities  vs  rural  33.5%  in  2023), 
innovation 
limiting 
capacity  of  the  rural  areas.  Vulnerable  groups 
include also persons with disabilities and refugees 
(almost  1 million  from  Ukraine)  of  which  half  live 
below the poverty line. For the 2021-2027 period, 
Poland  dedicates  over  4%  of  the  European  Social 

the  competitiveness  and 

(189) Annual inflation up to 2.0% in the euro area - Euro indicators 

- Eurostat 

(190) Students in rural schools achieved 70 score points less in 
reading (EU 52), 64 in maths and 62 in science (EU 46). 
OECD (2023). PISA 2022 Results (Volume I). 
https://doi.org/10.1787/53f23881-en . 

82 

0510152025201520162017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion rateAt-risk-of-poverty rateSevere material and social deprivationPeople living in low work intensity households 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Fund  Plus  (ESF+)  national  envelope  to  the  new 
for  Food  Aid  programme 
European  Funds 
(EUR 525 million), with 10% of the target group of 
refugees. 
the  programme  being  Ukrainian 
Moreover, 
regional 
the  ESF +  national  and 
programmes  are  allocating  EUR 4 818  million  on 
active  inclusion  and  affordable  services,  part  of 
which  will  go  to  poverty  reduction  activities. 
Complementary 
support 
systems  for  non-EU  nationals  and  opportunities 
for  their  comprehensive  integration  could  further 
help address the challenges. 

such  as 

initiatives 

Poland  faces  challenges  in  improving  early 
childhood education and care, particularly for 
children  at  risk  of  poverty  and  exclusion.  By 
2030,  Poland  aims  to  reduce  the  number  of 
children  experiencing  AROPE  by  at  least  300 000 
compared  to  2019.  The  underlying  numbers 
(1 089 000 in 2019 vs 1 136 000 in 2023), are so 
far not showing progress towards the 2030 target. 
The  universal  child  benefit  was  significantly 
increased  (by  60%)  in  January  2024.  Risks  of 
poverty  are  more  pronounced  for  children  whose 
parents  have  low  educational  attainment  or  in 
households  with  many  children.  To  mitigate  the 
impact  of  poverty  on  children,  Poland 
is 
implementing  the  European  Child  Guarantee  with 
support  from  the  EU  cohesion  policy  funds.  The 
2024  progress  report  shows  progress  in  some 
areas,  e.g. 
the ‘For  Life  Programme’ provides 
comprehensive support to children with disabilities 
and  their  families,  while  more  efforts  are  needed 
to achieve the 2030 target. EUR 704 million from 
the  ESF+  and  EUR 610  million  from  the  Recovery 
and Resilience Fund (RRF) were allocated to create 
over  100 000  new  childcare  places  and  improve 
services, 
for  children  with 
those 
disabilities. The design, rollout,  and impact of this 
reform should be closely monitored to ensure that 
children in need indeed benefit from it. The share 
of  children  under  three  participating  in    formal 
childcare  declined  by  0.8  pps  between  2022  and 
2024,  from  15.9%  to  15.1%.  The  participation  of 
children  above  three  in  early  childhood  education 
and care  remains below the EU-level 2030 target 
(92.4%  vs  96%)  (see  Annex  12)  .  Participation  is 
even  lower  among  children  at  risk  of  poverty  or 
social exclusion, barely 1.6% of those under three 
and  55.7%  in  the  older  age  group  in  2023  (see 
Annex 10). 

including 

status  has  an 

Employment 
important 
influence  on  poverty  risks.  Poland  has  a  high 
share of workers in atypical forms of employment, 

(15%  of 

notably  solo  self-employed, 
total 
employment  vs  9%  in  the  EU),  and  temporary 
contracts (15.5% of total salaried employment vs 
13.5% in the EU). Figures for 2023 point to a high 
AROP  rate  for  the  self-employed  (28.4%),  almost 
8 pps  higher  than  in  the  EU  (20.7%).  Part-timers 
are  also  affected  by  higher-than-average  AROP 
(18.6%  compared  to  8.6%  among  full  timers)  as 
well  as  material  and  social  deprivation  (9.4% 
compared  to  3.9%  among  full  timers).  The  higher 
AROP  rate  among  individuals  in  non-standard 
forms  of  work  is  largely  attributed  to  persistent 
gaps  in  access  to  social  protection.  This  means 
that,  despite  slight  declines  in  last  years,  in-work 
at-risk-of poverty in Poland remains high, at 9.1% 
in  2023  (EU:  8.3%),  specifically  for  part-time 
(see  Graph  A11.2).  Persons  with 
employees 
disabilities  are  also  at  a  highest  rate  of  poverty 
and  social  exclusion,  at  25.5%,  which  is  linked  to 
their 
and 
employment,  and  high  disability  employment  gap 
(see Annex 10). 

educational 

attainment 

lower 

Graph A11.2: In-work AROP rate for contract type 

In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate (% of employed). Employed 
who have an equivalised disposable income below 60% of the 
national equivalised median income. 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC [ilc_iw01, ilc_iw05, ilc_iw07] 

The  social  protection  system  presents 
adequacy  and  coverage  gaps.  Despite  one  of 
the  highest  growth  levels,  spending  on  social 
protection benefits still lags behind the EU average 
(22.1%  of  GDP  in  2023  vs  EU:  26.8%).  It  relies 
heavily  on  non-means-tested  cash  benefits 
(72.9% 
in  total  expenditure  vs  EU:  64.5%), 
particularly in the form of universal allowances for 

83 

05101520252014201520162017201820192020202120222023% of employed Total% Temporary% Part-time% Permanent% Full-time 
   
families with children (15.6% vs EU: 8.6%), which 
limited 
in  a  welfare  system  with 
results 
redistributive  capacity.  While  there  was  a  recent 
substantial  increase  in  family  and  child  benefits, 
Poland’s spending on unemployment and disability 
benefits as a percentage of GDP is very low (0.2% 
vs EU: 1% on unemployment and 1% vs EU: 1.9% 
on disability in 2023) and has fallen. In 2023, the 
share  of  those  in  working  age  (16-64)  and  AROP 
receiving any benefits before social transfers was 
very  low  for  self-employed  (2.9%  vs  EU:  12.7%), 
temporary  contract  workers  (5.1%  vs  EU:  39.2%), 
part-timers (7.1% vs  EU: 33.3%)  and unemployed 
(12.2%  vs  EU:  52.4%).  Among  short-term 
(15-64),  around  28% 
registered  unemployed 
received  unemployment  benefits/assistance 
in 
2023,  compared  to  58%  in  the  EU.  Adequacy  of 
minimum  income  benefits  was  very  low  in  2022. 
Households  on  minimum  income  benefits  had  a 
net  income  of  33.9%  of  the  at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold, and 31.2% of the net income of a low-
wage worker (55.6% vs EU: 46.1%). 

Demographic 
trends  pose  a  significant 
challenge  for  the  future  adequacy  and 
sustainability of  the pension  system. Old-age 
poverty  is  below  the  EU  average,  with  AROPE  for 
people aged 65 and above at 18% vs EU: 19.7%). 
However,  the  pension  system  faces  increasing 
challenges  as  the  population  in  Poland  is  one  of 
the fastest-ageing populations in the EU. The very 
low  pensionable  age  of  women  (60  years  for 
women vs 65 years for men) implies low effective 
retirement  ages,  negatively  impacting  women’s 
labour  market  participation  and  their  future 
pension  adequacy.  The  employment  rate  of 
women  aged  55-64  is  47%  vs  EU  58%  while  for 
men  in  the  same  age  group  it  is  70.3%  vs  EU 
70.1% 
(see  Annex  10).  The  existence  of 
preferential  pension  schemes  for  miners  and 
farmers  puts  a  further  strain  on  the  fairness  and 
sustainability  of  the  pension  system.  With  the 
projected decrease in working-age population (20-
64)  by  30%  to  16  million  in  2070  and  expected 
increase  in  the  population  aged  65  and  over  to 
10.3  million  (191),  the  old-age  dependency  ratio) 
will increase from 0.3% in 2022 to about 0.6% in 
2070. The pension replacement rate is projected to 
drop between 2022 and 2062 from 76.3% to 54% 
for single men, and from 63.3% to 45% for single 

women  (192).  To  ensure  pension  adequacy  and 
sustainability, as well as increase competitiveness, 
it  would  beneficial  if  Poland  introduced  reforms 
that  promote  longer  working  lives,  especially  for 
women and existing preferential pension regimes. 

is  poorer.  LTC  quality  assurance 

The long-term care system is unable to meet 
the  needs  of  the  ageing  population.  In  2022, 
Poland’s  public  spending  on  long-term  care  (LTC) 
was  0.5%  of  GDP,  less  than  one  third  of  the  EU 
average  (1.7%)  and  accounted  for  only  2.8%  of 
Poland’s total cost of ageing, compared to 7.1% in 
the  EU.  Public  LTC  spending  in  2022  was  mainly 
directed to residential care (65.4% vs EU: 46.2%), 
followed  by  home  care  (34%  vs  EU:  28.8%)  with 
only a small share going to cash benefits (0.5% vs 
EU:  25%)  (193).  In  2019,  Poland’s  older  population 
(65+)  in  need  of  LTC  accounted  for  35.9%,  while 
the EU average was 26.6%. In contrast, the share 
of  older  individuals  using  formal  home  care 
services  was  much  lower  (18.8%  vs  EU:  28.6%). 
Relatively high share of people in need of care live 
in  rural  areas,  where  the  provision  of  formal 
services 
is 
fragmented, lacks quality standards for home care 
and  provides  only  minimal  quality  standards  in 
residential  care.  With  responsibility  for  care  lying 
within local authorities, the absence of a coherent 
regional 
approach 
disparities. Due to the lack of formal LTC capacity, 
Poland’s informal carers face a heavy care burden, 
without  recognition  or  adequate  support.  There  is 
no legal definition of informal care and legislation 
to  identify  carers.  Also,  professional  training  or 
requirements  regarding  informal  care  are  not  in 
place. The Ministry of Senior Policy is working on a 
care voucher to support older dependent people or 
their  care  providers.  However,  without 
legal 
recognition  of  informal  carers,  planned  support 
(training,  information,  psychological  counselling) 
would not reach all those who need it. The number 
of  LTC  workers  per  100  individuals  65+  is  very 
low,  standing  at  0.4  in  Poland  vs  3.2 in the  EU in 
2023).  The  World  Bank  carried  out  a  strategic 
review of LTC in Poland to identify and implement 
reform  priorities  which  feature  into  recovery  and 

to  quality  contributes 

to 

(192) Theoretical replacement rates after a 40 year career ending 

at the standard pensionable age. Source: European 
Commission: Directorate-General for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Inclusion, The 2024 pension adequacy report – 
Current and future income adequacy in old age in the EU. 
Volume II, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2767/550848. 

(191) 2024 Ageing Report – Country Fiche for Poland 

(193) 2024 Ageing Report 

84 

 
 
 
resilience  plan  (RRP).  The  results  show  a  need  to 
increase  access  to  high-quality,  affordable  and 
accessible  community-based  LTC  services,  while 
improving  working  conditions  and  the  work-life 
balance for carers. 

impact 

negatively 

lack  of  public  transport  and  poor  housing 
conditions 
living 
standards. Between 2011 and 2022, the share of 
trains and buses in inland transport in Poland has 
declined  from  22.6%  to  17.3%  and  reliance  on 
private  cars  for  inland  transport  increased  from 
77.4%  to  82.7%.  As  rural  areas  often  lack 
effective  public  transport  infrastructure,  people  in 
these  areas  are  more  reliant  on  private  cars 
(41.9% of people living in rural areas compared to 
34.3% of people in cities in 2023). While the share 
of  the  Polish  population  facing  housing  costs 
above  40%  of  their  total  disposable  household 
income is lower than the EU average (5.9 vs 8.8%), 
it  has  been  increasing  in  recent  years  and  the 
share  of  people 
in  an  overcrowded 
household  was  more  than  double  that  of  the  EU 
(33.9%  vs  16.8%)  in  2023.  For  people  below  the 
poverty threshold, this share is 40.3% (EU: 29.7%). 

living 

House prices are sharply rising. House prices in 
Poland have increased by 107% since 2015. They 
grew  by  8.8%  in  2023  and  accelerated  further  in 
2024 (+15% year-on-year) in the context of rising 
demand  for  housing  as  well  as  additional 
mortgage support for first time buyers adopted in 
the  run-up  to  the  2023  parliamentary  elections. 
However,  there  are  no  signs  of  overvaluation. 
Mortgage  rates  increased  significantly  from  3.1% 
in  2021  to  8.3%  in  2023.  Housing  transactions 
increased by 3.9% in 2023 after having fallen by 
8.2% in 2022. Building permits dropped by 12.6% 
and  18.9%  in  2022  and  2023  respectively  but 
have started to increase in 2024. The slowdown of 
new housing supply may support further increases 
in  nominal  house  prices,  which  would  warrant 
closer monitoring. 

Overall  housing  affordability  has  remained 
stable  over  the  past  decade.  House  price 
growth  has  been  broadly  in  line  with  household 
income since 2015. The standardised house price-
to-income ratio increased from 2016 to 2021 but 
has  eased  since  then,  returning  close  to  its  2015 
level.  It  is  currently  around  10%  below  its  long-
term  average.  Taking  into  account  the  cost  of 
mortgages,  the  borrowing  capacity  of  households 
remained  broadly  stable  over  the  past  decade. 
While the rental market is rather small, the ratio of 

new  rents  to  incomes  remained  stable  over  the 
last decade. 30 330 people, representing 0.08% of 
the  total  population  have  been  homeless  in  the 
country  (2019)  (194).  Of  these,  15%  are  women, 
85% are men. The Ministry of Family, Labour and 
Social  Policy  in  Poland  conducted  a  nationwide 
study of homelessness in February 2024 (195). The 
study found that approximately 31 000 people are 
living  in  homelessness  in  Poland,  10%  of  whom 
are migrants. As many  as 60% of these migrants 
are  Ukrainian.  There  has  been  a  sharp  rise  in  the 
number of homeless children, with non-Polish born 
children  accounting  for  40%  (compared  to  9%  in 
2019).  Most  of  these  children  live  in  special 
institutions or homes for mothers with children or 
pregnant  women  (196). Poland  has  implemented 
measures  to  improve  housing  affordability  and 
availability  with  the  use  of  cohesion  policy  funds. 
Through  these  funds,  Poland  has  invested  in 
to  address  homelessness 
services 
including 
‘street  working  services’  to  support 
through 
homeless  people,  as  well  as  housing  projects,  in 
particular 
First  model. 
the  Housing 
Interventions include the creation and operation of 
training and assisted housing (e.g. for people with 
mental  health 
refugees)  and 
issues  and 
investments  in  infrastructure  and  equipment  to 
support social housing. 

via 

is 

energy 

While 
decreasing, 
poverty 
untargeted  retail  price  interventions  might 
hinder  further  progress.  The  share  of  the 
population unable to keep their homes adequately 
warm  is  below  the  EU  average  (4.7%  in  2023  vs 
10.6%),  but  showing  an  increase  of  1.5 pps 
compared  to  2021.  In  contrast,  4%  of  people 
faced  arrears  on  utility  bills  in  2023,  which  has 
fallen by 1.2 pps since 2021, and is still well below 
the  EU  average  of  6.9%.  However,  this  positive 
situation  is  influenced  by  continued  untargeted 
price  interventions  in  the  retail  sector  which  were 
introduced  in  2022  and  are  going  to  continue  in 
2025. Poland is actively addressing energy poverty 
interventions, 
with 
including  subsidies  and  financial  assistance,  such 
as  the  ‘energy  allowance’  and  the  ‘energy  lump 
sums’, and ongoing price interventions for gas and 

social  policy 

immediate 

(194) OECD Country Notes on Homelessness data. 

(195) https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/news/poland-

homelessness-among-migrants_en and 
https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/wyniki-ogolnopolskiego-
badania-liczby-osob-bezdomnych---edycja-2024. 

(196) Ibid. 

85 

 
 
caps  on  electricity.  Poland’s  long-term  measures 
focus  on  energy  efficiency  when  renovating 
buildings and the integration of renewable energy 
in residential buildings. Currently, there is a limited 
focus  on  vulnerable  households  which  is  likely  to 
change  with  the  implementation  of  the  Social 
Climate Fund. The country’s strategy also aims to 
phase  out  fossil  fuels  (coal  and  oil)  in  residential 
heating  by  2030,  which  is  applied  across  the 
whole population. 

86 

 
education  period  by  one  year  and  advancing 
tracking  between  general  and 
student 
vocational  paths,  which  was  introduced  in 
2017. Therefore, there is a need for systemic and 
targeted  measures  to  improve  basic  skills  among 
disadvantaged  groups  and  in  VET  schools.  The 
steep  decline  in  the  proportion  of  top-performing 
students in basic skills points to structural  quality 
issues  in  general  education,  which  may  further 
decrease  participation  in  STEM  fields  in  higher 
education.  The  learning  loss  recorded  by  PISA 
between  2018  and  2022  risks 
limiting  the 
competitiveness  and  innovation  capacity  of  the 
Polish economy (199). 

in 

early 

participation 

Low 
childhood 
education  and  care  (ECEC)  among  children 
aged three and below also hampers learning 
foundational  skills.  At  12.6%,  participation  in 
formal childcare of children below three is among 
the  lowest  in the  EU,  and  participation  is  minimal 
for  children  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion 
(1.6%) 
is  also 
comparatively  low  for  three-year-olds  (80.2%  vs 
EU  88.7%  in  2022),  and  for  the  whole  3-6  age 
group  in  the  regions  of  Warminsko-Mazurskie, 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie,  and  Mazowieckie,  excluding 
Warsaw (around 88%) (200). 

(see  Annex  11).  The 

rate 

Graph A12.1: Trends in underachievement in 
mathematics by students’ socio-economic 
background, PISA 2012-2022 (%) 

ANNEX 12: EDUCATION AND SKILLS 

and 

(STEM), 

technology, 

engineering 
the 

Poland’s competitiveness is limited by falling 
basic  skills,  the  limited  pool  of  skills  in 
and 
science, 
mathematics 
low 
effectiveness  of  VET  and  participation  in 
adult learning. The higher proportion of 15-year-
olds failing to meet the minimum basic skills level 
and  increased  inequalities  in  education  result  in 
more  than  a  third  of  disadvantaged  pupils  (39%) 
lacking  basic  skills,  which  affects  their  upskilling 
opportunities  and  employment  prospects  later  in 
life. Vocational education and training (VET) do not 
labour  market  needs, 
adequately  respond  to 
leading  to  skills  shortages  and  mismatches.  The 
low  attractiveness  of  teaching  and  insufficient 
preparation  of  teachers  further  affects  student 
outcomes.  Higher  education  does  not  sufficiently 
support  innovation  and  sustainable  development, 
partly  due  to  the  low  number  of  STEM  students, 
particularly  in  natural  sciences.  Additionally,  the 
level  of  digital  skills  exacerbates  skills 
low 
shortages,  and  participation  in  adult  learning 
remains  very  low.  Major  weaknesses  in  skills 
development  and  human  capital  formation  hinder 
Poland’s  potential  for  research  and  innovation, 
productivity growth and competitiveness. 

risks 

people 

hampering 

The  strong  decline  in  basic  skills  among 
young 
skills 
development  later  in  life  and  harms  the 
economy  in  the  long  run.  In  the  2022  OECD 
Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment 
(PISA),  23%  of  15-year-olds  underperformed  in 
mathematics,  22.2%  in  reading  and  18.6%  in 
science.  While  these  rates  are  below  the  EU 
averages,  they  show  a  worrying  trend.  Compared 
to  2018,  the  underachievement  rates  increased 
more  than  the  EU  average (197).  The  highest 
proportion 
(over  60%)  of  underperforming 
students  is  clustered  in  VET  stage  I  sectoral 
vocational  schools  (szkoły  branżowe),  which  are 
attended  by  12%  of  all  students (198).  These 
students  will  likely  face  learning  difficulties  and 
employment challenges later in life.  

The  decline  in  basic  skills  can  be  attributed 
to  the  shortening  the  common  general 

(197) Compared to 2018, the proportion of low achievers 

increased by 8.3 percentage points (pps) in mathematics (EU: 
6.6 pps), 7.5 pps in reading (EU: 3.7 pps), and 4.8 pps in 
science (EU: 2 pps). 

Source: OECD (2023). 

Deteriorating  equity  affects  basic  skills 
achievement and risks deepening inequalities 
in  education.  The  socio-economic  gap  in  basic 

(198) 66% in mathematics, 65% in reading, and 55% in science 

(199) M. Jakubowski, T. Gajderowicz, H. A. Patrinos, SSRN. (2023). 

(Bulkowski, et al., 2023). 
PISA2022_najwazniejsze_wyniki_badania.pdf 

https://ssrn.com/abstract=4462427 . 

(200) Eurostat: educ_uoe_enra21. 

87 

051015202530354045502012201520182022%Disadvantaged PLDisadvantaged EUAdvantaged PLAdvantaged EU2030 EU target 
 
 
   
 
 
 
skills  among  15-year-olds  widened  by  10.6 pps 
between  2018  and  2022  (EU:  7.7 pps),  reflecting 
the  increased  impact  of  students’  socio-economic 
background  on  their  performance  (Graph  A12.1). 
The  achievement  gap  between  students  in  rural 
and  urban  schools  is  higher  than  the  EU  average 
issues  with  teaching 
(Annex  10),  suggesting 
quality.  The  notable  shift 
towards  private 
education  and  homeschooling  in  recent  years 
deepens inequalities in the system (201). Boys make 
up the majority of students attending VET stage I 
sectoral  schools  (66.7%),  which  often  have  poor 
is 
educational  outcomes.  The  gender  divide 
reflected  later  in  the  wide  tertiary  educational 
attainment  gap  in  favour  of  women.  Poland  has 
been  implementing  inclusive  education  measures 
and  investments  supporting  the  needs  of  pupils 
with disabilities. Nevertheless,  a  targeted  national 
strategy is missing, and a significant proportion of 
students with special educational needs is enrolled 
in  special  schools,  especially  at  upper  secondary 
level (80%) (202). 

including  transversal  ones 

Poland  is  preparing  a  curricular  reform  to 
better equip students for life and the future 
world  of  work.  It  aims  to  improve  teaching 
competences, 
(e.g. 
problem-solving,  cooperation,  critical 
thinking, 
socio-emotional  competences)  to  help  students 
better  adapt  to  future  labour  market  needs.  The 
reform at pre-primary and primary levels is to be 
launched in September 2026. The new subjects of 
health  education  and  civic  education  are  to  be 
introduced  in  September  2025.  To  ensure  the 
reform is implemented efficiently and sustainably, 
the  following  will  be  crucial:  (i)  stakeholder 
involvement; 
(iii) 
substantial  training  and  support  for  teachers  and 
schools;  and 
including 
evaluation and monitoring from an early stage. 

(iv)  careful  planning, 

communication; 

clear 

(ii) 

mainly due to a lack of candidates (203). Shortages 
affect teachers of all subjects and in VET, and they 
have increased among ECEC, special teachers and 
pedagogues.  Teachers’  actual  salaries  are  low 
compared  to  those  of  other  tertiary-educated 
professionals, ranging from 59% at pre-primary to 
72% at upper secondary level (EU: 72% and 87% 
respectively) (204).  Teachers’  high  workloads  and 
poor  working  conditions  deter  young  people  from 
the  profession (205).  Consequently,  the  teaching 
profession is ageing fast (206) and does not attract 
high-performing  graduates (207).  Teachers  do  not 
including  on 
receive  sufficient 
The 
teaching  multinational 
requirements 
teacher 
education  were  lowered  in  2023 (210),  abandoning 
efforts to improve its quality. The newly prepared 
curriculum  reform  will  also  require  modernising 
and  improving  the  relevance  of  teacher  training 
programmes. 

classes (209). 
initial 

training (208), 

providing 

for 

The VET system’s low effectiveness hampers 
the supply of skilled workers. The employment 
rate of recent VET graduates was 78.7% in 2023 
(compared to 81% in the EU and 85.6% for higher 
education graduates), down by 3.6 pps from 2022. 
Polish VET students benefit less from work-based 
learning  than  their  EU  peers  (58.4%  vs  64.5%  in 
school  without  any 
the  EU).  25% 
qualifications,  and  almost 
two  years  after 
graduation, 20% of students that left were still not 
in education, employment or training (NEET). A lack 
of  professional  qualifications,  combined  with  low 
levels  of  basic 
risk  of 
unemployment  and  social  exclusion  later  in  life. 
Technical  secondary  schools  are  more  effective, 
but  only  33%  of  graduates  continue  education  at 
tertiary level. 

create  a 

skills, 

left 

Worsening teacher shortages and insufficient 
quality  of  teacher  education  programmes 
lowering  student  outcomes.  Despite 
risk 
measures  in  place  since  2024,  national  statistics 
show  persisting  teacher  shortages  across  Poland, 

(201) In 2024, 10% of students attended private secondary 

schools and more than 5% primary schools, compared to 
4.2% and 3.2%, respectively, a decade ago. 
https://wydawnictwo.krytykapolityczna.pl/nierownosci-po-
polsku-1277 

(202)Statistics Poland (2024). 

https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultakt
ualnosci/5487/26/6/1/osoby_niepelnosprawne_w_2023_r..
pdf . 

(203)  https://www.barometrzawodow.pl/modul/publi 
kacje?publication=national&year=2025. 

(204)  OECD (2024). Education at a Glance 2024. http://data-

explorer.oecd.org/s/5q. 
(205)  https://nauczyciel2040.pl/. 
(206)  Eurostat, UOE, [educ_uoe_perp01]. 
(207)  Integrated Skills Strategy 2030 (2020). 

https://zsu2030.men.gov.pl/app/files/ZSU2030_ogolna.p
df;. 

(208)  S.M. Kwiatkowski, J. Łaszczyk, Kandydaci na studia 

w perspektywie 2025-2030. Trendy …, op.cit., page. 218 
https://www.frp.org.pl/images/publikacje/publication/kras
p_2022.pdf. 

(209)  CEO (2024). https://ceo.org.pl/przedstawiamy-raport-

uczniowie-i-uczennice-z-ukrainy-w-polskiej-szkole-rok-
szkolny-2023-24/. 

(210)  https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2023/1672. 

88 

 
 
 
(42.3%  vs  36.2% 

Despite  high  tertiary  attainment,  policy 
efforts  are  needed  to  increase  enrolment  in 
STEM,  in  particular  in  natural  sciences.  In 
2024,  the  proportion  of  people  aged  25-34 
holding a tertiary diploma was 45.7%, in line with 
the EU target. The gender gap in favour of women 
(17.9 pps)  is  one  the  widest  in  the  EU.  The 
proportion  of  students  (ISCED  5-8)  in  STEM 
decreased from 26.8% in 2017 to 21.1% in 2022, 
remaining  below  the  EU  average  (27.1%).  At  VET 
ISCED  3-4,  participation  in  STEM  is  above  the  EU 
average 
in  the  EU).  The 
enrolment  rate  in  ICT  is  close  to  the  EU  average 
(5.1% vs 5.2% in the EU); however, the proportion 
of female students is comparatively low (16.1% vs 
20.2%  in  the  EU).  The  proportion  of  graduates  in 
natural sciences, mathematics and statistics is less 
than half the EU average (3.3% vs 7.3% in the EU 
in  2022).  Only  26.2%  of  students  are  female  in 
technology  programmes (211). 
engineering  and 
Poland  has  also  the  lowest  proportion  of  PhD 
students in the EU (212), and the rates are likely to 
remain  low  as  only  13%  of  top-performing  15-
year-olds  in  mathematics  and  science  plan  a 
(OECD 
career  as  a  scientist  or  engineer 
21.2%) (213).  The  low  proportion  of  STEM  tertiary 
students  will  exacerbate  skills  shortages,  limiting 
Poland’s  competitiveness  and  innovation  capacity 
(see Annex 3). 

Improving  the  quality  and  relevance  of 
higher  education  are  major  challenges, 
including with regard to the green transition. 
The  content  and  forms  of  studies  are  not  aligned 
with  labour  market  needs,  which  need  profiles  in 
topics  such  as  climate  change,  energy  security, 
and  transversal  and  social  competences (214). 
There is a need for Poland to make the evaluation 
system  of  higher  education  institutions’  scientific 
reliable. 
performance  more 
transparent  and 
Although 
improving  the  quality  of  academic 
teaching  and  learning  has  been  one  of  the 
country’s recent objectives, no new measures have 
is 
been 
education 
developing 

implemented so 
a 

(215).  Poland 
higher 

far 
long-term 

internationalisation strategy, also supported by the 
ESF+ (216). 

to 

Given  the  shrinking  labour  force  and  skills 
shortages,  skills  development  is  crucial  for 
competitiveness, resilience and fairness. 65% 
of  organisations  indicate  skills  shortages  as  the 
main  barrier  to  transformation  and  expect  talent 
availability to worsen in five years (217). Also, 82% 
of  SMEs  report  facing  skills  shortages,  and  88% 
retain  skilled  workers (218).  The 
struggle 
macroeconomic  skills  mismatch  in  Poland  rose  to 
23.1 in 2024, against a decreasing trend in the EU 
(from  20.2  in  2022  to  19.2  in  2024)  (219).  This 
highlights  the  need  for  upskilling  and  reskilling, 
especially  for  the  green  and  digital  transitions. 
Policy  measures  financed  by  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  aim  to  boost  lifelong 
learning through cooperation and coordination and 
improve the supply of green skills through sectoral 
qualification frameworks. To support this objective, 
Poland  aims  to  create  120  sectoral  skills  centres 
to boost the quality of VET by involving employers 
more in the learning process and to develop green 
and  digital  skills.  Additionally,  under  European 
Social  Fund  Plus 
Industry 
Agreement for VET is being implemented; however 
there is still a lot of room for improvement. 

(ESF+)  project, 

As  part  of  the  broader  need  for  upskilling 
and reskilling, developing green competences 
and skills is particularly critical for the green 
transition.  The  country’s  economy  is  energy 
intensive  and  is  facing  restructuring  to  decrease 
dependence  on  coal.  Decarbonising  Poland’s 
economy could lead to a two-thirds decline in coal 
sector  employment  by  2030  compared  to  2019, 
requiring support for 14 000-36 000 workers (220). 
Poland 
largest  recipient  of  the  Just 
Transition Fund (JTF): the Silesia region, with 90% 
of  employment  in  the  coal  industry  in  Poland,  is 
the  biggest  beneficiary  in  the  EU  (EUR 2.2  billion, 
57.6% of Poland’s allocation). The JTF will support 
mining  industry  workers  by  improving  their  skills 
and  training,  focusing  on  the  green  and  digital 

is  the 

(211) Knapinska, 2024. 

https://www.dziewczynynapolitechniki.pl/pdfy/raport-kobiety-
na-politechnikach-2023.pdf 
(212) ESTAT: 0.5% vs EU 1.3%, 2022. 
(213) OECD, 2019. PISA 2018 Results. Volume II. 
(214) Development forecast of higher education. (KRASP, 2024) 
53-IV-2024_Raport_Prognoza_rozwoju_Woznicki.pdf. 

(215) https://www.gov.pl/web/nauka/zgromadzenie-plenarne-krasp-

z-udzialem-ministra-nauki. 

(216) https://mapadotacji.gov.pl/projekty/1686834/. 
(217) https://www.weforum.org/publications/the-future-of-jobs-

report-2025/. 

(218) European Year of Skills - Skills shortages, recruitment and 

retention strategies in small and medium-sized enterprises - 
September 2023 - - Eurobarometer survey. 

(219) This indicator highlights the relatively higher difficulty of the 
low- and medium-qualified in entering the labour market, as 
compared to the high-qualified 
(220) IBS-Research-Report-01-2021.pdf. 

89 

 
 
 
economies.  On  upskilling  and  reskilling  needs  for 
in 
the  green  transition,  there  are  shortages 
occupations,  such  as  building  structure  cleaners, 
insulation workers and roofers (221). 

To  tackle  the  high  level  of  digital  skills 
shortages,  Poland  has  adopted  a  strategic 
approach  to  digital  education.  In  2023,  only 
44.3% of people aged 16-74 had at least a basic 
level of digital skills, well below the EU average of 
55.6% (222).  87%  of  businesses  indicate  that  the 
lack of skilled staff poses a barrier for investment 
(223).  Many  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs)  struggle  with  employees’  low  levels  of 
digital  skills,  which  hinders  these  businesses’ 
competitiveness and ability to innovate and adapt 
to new technologies. In 2023, only 50% of SMEs in 
Poland  had  reached  a  basic  level  of  digital 
intensity  (EU  58%) (224).  A  lack  of  digital  skills  is 
reflected in lower levels of innovation compared to 
the  EU  average:  only  43.5%  of  SMEs  in  Poland 
introduce  innovative  products.  In  2024,  Poland 
adopted  a  comprehensive  digital  education 
strategy 
focuses  on 
improving teachers and students’ digital skills and 
integrating  digital  technologies  into  teaching  and 
learning.  By  2026,  31 000  schoolteachers  will 
have  been  trained  in  digital  skills  (financed  from 
the  RRF),  and  by  2027,  2 000  higher  education 
staff  will  have  received  similar  training  (financed 
from the ESF+). In 2024, the pilot phase of Digital 
Development  Clubs  project  was  launched.  The 
project aims to establish local digital competences 
in  municipalities  across 
development  centres 
Poland.  After  the  pilot  phase 
in  up  to  64 
municipalities,  the  project  is  to  be  expanded  to 
approximately  2  000  municipalities  and  provide 
training in digital skills to around 463 850 adults 

for  2035 (225),  which 

learning 

in  adult 

low, 
Participation 
hindering  the  workforce’s  adaptability.  In 
2022, the rate of adult participation in learning (in 
the  previous  12  months)  was  low  at  20.3%  (EU 
39.5%).  This  was  down  slightly  (by  0.6 pps)  from 

is 

reading  and  21 

2016  and  also  significantly 
lower  than  the 
country’s  2030  target  of  51.7%.  Based  on  the 
2023 OECD Survey of Adult Skills (226), Poland saw 
significant drops in results compared to 2012, with 
a  31-point  decline 
in 
in 
mathematics  reasoning.  39%  of  respondents 
struggled with reading, 38% with maths, and 48% 
with  problem-solving  tasks (227).  The  low  share  of 
adult participation in learning is largely due to low 
participation  in  non-formal  education,  which  is 
17.8%  (EU  38.1%),  particularly  among  older  age 
groups, people with lower educational  attainment, 
and  those  outside  the  labour  force.  Focusing  on 
groups  who  are  less  qualified  is  essential  for 
closing 
the 
workforce and labour market needs and increasing 
competitiveness. 

the  qualification  gap  between 

Measures are needed to boost adult learning. 
Lifelong  learning  suffers  from  a  lack  of  policy 
coordination  at  national  and  regional  levels,  and 
there  is  no  clear  ‘owner’  of  adult  learning  policy. 
Regional  coordination  teams  for  VET  and  lifelong 
learning have been set up with the support of the 
RRF  to  improve  the  coordination  of  policies  at 
regional  level.  Despite  ongoing  action  promoting 
adult  learning,  mostly  financed  from  EU  funds, 
there  is  no  visible  progress  towards  the  national 
skills target. After ongoing public consultations are 
completed,  a  pilot  project  will  be  launched  on 
individual  learning  accounts  (ILAs)  to  overcome 
individuals’  financial  and  motivational  barriers. 
Dialogue  with  social  partners  on  implementing 
effective  measures,  such  as  ILAs,  is  needed,  as 
well as more awareness of the benefits of lifelong 
learning.  The  skills  validation  system  in  Poland  is 
highly  formalised  and  does  not  improve  the 
recognition  of  skills  or  qualifications  developed 
outside  the  formal  system.  Only  a  few  Polish 
institutions  have  signed  up  to  the  Pact  for  Skills, 
despite  the  presence  of  numerous  sectoral  skills 
councils already supported by the ESF+. 

(221) European Labour Authority EURES Report on labour 

shortages and surpluses 2024, 2025, based on data from 
EURES National Coordination Offices. Skills and knowledge 
requirements align with the ESCO taxonomy on skills for the 
green transition, with examples analysed using the ESCO 
green intensity index. 

(222) DESI 2024. 
(223) EIB Investment Survey 2024 

(224) Digitalisation in Europe – 2024 edition - Interactive 

publications - Eurostat. 

(225) https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/M2024000081201.pdf. 

(226) PIAAC: 

https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/piaac.html. 
(227) Patterns identified for Poland could suggest disengagement 
or lack of effort during the assessment, which may have an 
impact on the estimated proficiency of the overall Polish 
population. 

90 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX 13: SOCIAL SCOREBOARD 

Table A13.1:Social Scoreboard for Poland 

(1) Update of 5 May 2025. Members States are categorised based on the Social Scoreboard according to a methodology agreed 
with the EMCO and SPC Committees. Please consult the Annex of the Joint Employment Report 2025 for details on the 
methodology (https://employment-social-affairs.ec.europa.eu/joint-employment-report-2025-0). 
Source: Eurostat 

91 

20,34,144,39,411,63,8578,42,90,8151,916,016,141,535,65,215,13,8Critical situationTo watchWeak but improvingGood but to monitorOn averageAdult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the job training, % of the population aged 25-64, 2022)Equal opportunities and access to the labour marketSocial Scoreboard for PolandBest performersBetter than averageEarly leavers from education and training(% of  the population aged 18-24, 2024)Young people not in employment, education or training(% of the population aged 15-29, 2024)Gender employment gap(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2024)Income quintile ratio (S80/S20, 2024)Dynamic labour markets and fair working conditionsSocial protection and inclusionShare of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills(% of the population aged 16-74, 2023)Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction(% reduction of AROP, 2024)Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of the under 3-years-old population, 2024)Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of the population aged 16+, 2024)Disability employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2024)Housing cost overburden (% of the total population, 2024)At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of the total population, 2024)Employment rate(% of the population aged 20-64, 2024)Unemployment rate(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2024)Long term unemployment(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2024)Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth(index, 2008=100, 2023)At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children(% of the population aged 0-17, 2024) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ANNEX 14: HEALTH AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 

Poland’s  health  system  faces  significant 
challenges. These need to be addressed if the 
country  is  to  improve  the  health  of  its 
population  and 
fairness,  while 
social 
boosting the competitiveness of its economy. 
The  key  challenge is low  life  expectancy,  which  is 
linked to high preventable and treatable mortality. 
These factors are associated with suboptimal cost-
effectiveness  and  funding  of  the  health  system, 
which still features a hospital-centred care model, 
insufficient  focus  on  disease  prevention  and 
outpatient  care,  and  shortages  of  healthcare 
workers.  

Life expectancy at birth in Poland rebounded 
above  its  pre-COVID-19  level  but  was  still 
below the EU average in 2023. The country has 
a striking gender gap, with women expected to live 
7.5 years longer than men and 3.3 years longer in 
good  health  (see  Annex  17).  As  mortality  from 
COVID-19  had  started  to  fall  by  2022,  life 
expectancy 
increased  again,  rising  to  slightly 
above  pre-pandemic  levels.  Treatable  mortality 
rates  are  higher  in  Poland  than  the  EU  average, 
suggesting  shortcomings  in  the  effectiveness  of 
the  health  system.  In  fact,  the  rate  of  treatable 
mortality  in  Poland  has  barely  improved  since 
2012.  Poland  participates  in  several  joint  actions 
funded  by  EU4Health  aimed  at  reducing  the 
burden  of 
cancer, 
diabetes and respiratory diseases.    

cardiovascular  diseases, 

Graph A14.1: Life expectancy at birth, years 

Source: Eurostat (demo_mlexpec) 

productivity 

Shortcomings  in  the  effectiveness  of  the 
impacts 
health  system  also  negatively 
Poland’s  workforce, 
and 
competitiveness. In Poland, mortality at working 
age  as  a  proportion  of 
is 
total  mortality 
the  EU  average, 
than 
significantly  higher 
exacerbating the effects of population ageing on a 
shrinking  labour  force.  The  rate  of  potential 
to  non-
productive 

lost  due 

years 

life 

communicable  diseases  such  as  cancer  and  
diseases of the circulatory system (‘cardiovascular 
diseases’) is  high  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  EU 
(228).  Between  2022  and  2040,  the  population  at 
working  age  in  Poland  is  forecast  to  shrink  by 
0.5%  every  year  as  a  result  of  lower  birth  rates 
(EU average: 0.3%).  

Graph A14.2: Treatable mortality 

Age-standardised death rate (mortality that could be 
avoided through optimal quality healthcare) 
Source: Eurostat (hlth_cd_apr) 

is  still  strongly 
Poland’s  health  system 
hospital  centred.  In  2022,  health  spending  per 
inhabitant  was  lower  than  the  EU  average,  with 
the  largest  share  going  to  inpatient  and  day  care 
(around  37%  of  total  health  expenditure).  This, 
together with a high number of hospital beds (567 
per 100 000 population in 2022, much higher than 
the  EU  average),  illustrates  the  country’s  strongly 
hospital-centred  model  of  healthcare.  Over-
reliance  on  hospitals  within  a  health  system  can 
hamper  healthcare  accessibility,  and  suggests 
opportunities  for  optimising  the  cost-effective 
allocation  of  resources.  The  Polish  recovery  and 
resilience plan (RRP) sets out to transform some of 
these  hospital  beds  into  long-term  care  and 
geriatric care beds.  

Poland’s  share  of  health  spending  covered  by 
public  funds  is  among  the  lowest  in  the  EU,  and 
the  level  of  out-of-pocket  payments  is  above  the 
EU average. Around two thirds of all out-of-pocket 
payments are for outpatient pharmaceuticals (229). 
Investment  in  the  health  system  has  historically 
been  low  in  Poland.  This  is  reflected  in  the  low 
availability  of  key  diagnostic  technology:  Poland 

(228) Update to 2022 data of analysis presented by Health at a 

Glance: Europe 2016 - © OECD 2016 

(229) OECD/European Commission (2024), Health at a Glance: 

Europe 2024: State of Health in the EU Cycle, pp. 186-187. 

92 

78.076.475.477.278.481.380.480.180.681.420192020202120222023PolandEU133.1133.7144.2145.9140.091.389.291.793.389.720182019202020212022per 100 000 populationPolandEU 
 
        
        
 
 
 
Table A14.1:Key health indicators 

*The EU average is weighted for all indicators except for doctors and nurses per 1 000 population, for which the EU simple 
average is used based on 2022 (or latest 2021) data except for Luxembourg (2017). Doctors’ density data refer to practising 
doctors in all countries except Greece, Portugal (licensed to practise) and Slovakia (professionally active). Density of nurses: data 
refer to practising nurses (EU recognised qualification) in most countries except France and Slovakia (professionally active) and 
Greece (hospital only). **‘Available hospital beds’ covers somatic care, not psychiatric care. ***The EU median is used for patents. 
Source:  Eurostat database; European Patent Office; ****European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) for 2023. 

has  among  the  EU’s  fewest  medical  imaging 
devices per capita.  

Of  the  country’s  health  allocation  under  the 
cohesion  policy  funds  for  2021-2027  (EUR  2.58 
billion), EUR 1.87 billion is planned for investments 
in health infrastructure and equipment. In addition, 
the  Polish  RRP  allocates  EUR  3.8  billion  to  health 
reforms  and  supporting  investments.  These  funds 
will  be  used 
to  develop  and  modernise 
infrastructure,  and  to  restructure  public  hospitals, 
including  by  shifting  certain  health  services  from 
hospitals  to  lower  levels  of  care.  Other  RRP 
reforms aim to align the hospital care system with 
demographic  trends  and  population  health  needs 
by  concentrating  services  where  they  are  needed 
and (re-)profiling hospitals. 

Poland  places  insufficient  focus  on  disease 
prevention.  In  2022,  Poland  spent  among  the 
least  on  prevention  in  the  EU  as  a  share  of  total 
spending  on  health 
(1.9%).  Cardiovascular 
diseases and cancer remain the leading causes of 
death,  with  mortality  rates  higher  than  the  EU 
average.  Mortality  linked  to  air  pollution  is  also 
high  (see  Annex  7).  The  rate  of  preventable 
mortality  remains  consistently  above  the  EU 
average. Behavioural risk factors are key drivers of 
preventable mortality rates in Poland, for example 
smoking,  poor  diet  and  consequent  obesity,  and 
levels  of 
alcohol 
hospitalisation  for  congestive  heart  failure  and 
diabetes  suggest  a  lack  of  care  coordination, 
further  suggesting  a  need  to  strengthen  primary 
care.  Reforms  set  out  in  the  Polish  RRP  aim  to 

consumption 

(230).  High 

(230) Health at a Glance: Europe 2024, Chapter 4. 

93 

improve  access  to  and  the  quality  of  oncological 
and  cardiological  care  by  introducing  national 
networks  in  these  areas  and  standardised  care 
along  the  entire  patient  pathway  in  the  areas  of 
primary  care,  specialised  outpatient  healthcare, 
hospital treatment and rehabilitation. In 2023, the 
consumption  of  antibiotics  was  above  the  EU 
average, despite the national target (231) to reduce 
total  consumption  by  27%  between  2019  and 
2030.  This  raises  concerns  about  antimicrobial 
resistance.  A  strategy  to  prevent  and 
limit 
healthcare-associated  infections  was  approved  at 
the end of 2023. 

and 

in  access 

geographical 

to 
Poland  faces  challenges 
healthcare  related  to  waiting  times,  as  well 
as 
income-related 
disparities  in  unmet  needs  for  medical  care 
(see  Annex  17).  In  2024,  the  proportion  of  the 
Polish  population  reporting  unmet  needs  for 
medical  care  was  higher  than  the  EU  average 
(3.8%  vs  2.5%)  (see  Annex  11).  This  was  due  to 
cost  (15.8%),  distance  (5.3%)  and  waiting  times 
(78.9%).  Moreover,  unmet  needs  reported  by 
people reporting needs in Poland is higher than EU 
average 
the  uneven 
geographical  distribution  of  doctors  is  a  major 
barrier to access to care in peripheral regions. 

(5.2%  vs  3.6%).  Also, 

Poland  faces  persistent  shortages  of  health 
lowest 
professionals,  with  among 
numbers  of  doctors  and  nurses  per 
inhabitant  in  the  EU,  which  hampers  the 

the 

(231) National target set by the Council Recommendation on 

stepping up EU actions to combat antimicrobial resistance in 
a ‘one health’ approach, 2023/C 220/01. 

20192020202120222023EU average* (latest year) Cancer mortality per 100 000 population283.4279.7259.9268.0n.a.234.7 (2022)Mortality due to circulatory diseases per 100 000 population 492.5 523.8 541.4 489.6n.a.336.4 (2022)Current expenditure on health, purchasing power standards, per capita1 5921 6161 7831 960n.a.3 684.6 (2022)Public share of health expenditure, % of current health expenditure 71.8 72.3 72.5 73.7n.a.81.3 (2022)Spending on prevention, % of current health expenditure 2.11.92.11.9n.a.5.5 (2022)Available hospital beds per 100 000 population** 554 563 578 567n.a.444 (2022)Doctors per 1 000 population*3.33.43.53.6n.a.4.2 (2022)*Nurses per 1 000 population* 5.6 5.6 5.8 5.8n.a.7.6 (2022)*Mortality at working age (20-64 years), % of total mortality23.121.420.920.519.914.3 (2023)Number of patents (pharma / biotech / medical technology)394237245029 (2023)***Total consumption of antibacterials for systemic use,                    daily defined dose per 1 000 inhabitants****23.618.520.223.623.220.0 (2023) 
 
 
 
        
 
provision  of  healthcare.  The  density  of doctors 
in  Poland  is  still  below  the  EU  average  (3.6  per 
1 000 population in 2022 vs 4.2). Poland has one 
of the lowest shares of general practitioners (GPs) 
in  the  EU  (9%  vs  an  EU  average  of  21%). 
Furthermore,  around  22%  of  physicians  are  aged 
between  55  and  64,  raising  concerns  about  the 
long-term  accessibility  of  health  services.    Poland 
is  taking  measures  to  address  these  challenges. 
The  remuneration  of  GPs  have  risen  sharply  and 
faster  than  those  of  specialists  since  2012, 
thereby 
gap. 
the 
the  number  of  newly-physician 
Moreover, 
graduates  has  increased  since  2019,  approaching 
the EU average in 2022 (15.1% vs 15.5%).  

remuneration 

narrowing 

The  density  of  practising  nurses  in  Poland  is  also 
among  the  lowest  in  the  EU  with  5.8  nurses  per 
1000  in  2022  (EU  average:  7.6).  The  nursing 
workforce is generally older, with almost a third of 
nurses aged 50-59 compared to a fifth of doctors 
(232).  Nurses  in  Poland  received  substantial  pay 
increases  in  2022  -  of  close  to  30%  on  average. 
This  includes  a  higher  pay  hike  for  nurses  with 
certain qualifications. The remuneration of hospital 
nurses  in  relation  to  the  country’s  average  wage 
was one of the highest in the EU in 2022. This has 
resulted in worsening financial situations for many 
county  hospitals,  and  some  have  stopped 
recognising  qualifications  acquired  by  nurses  and 
non-medical  health  workers  to  avoid  increasing 
pay.  Increases  in  the  prices  of  hospital  services 
introduced in 2023 are expected to alleviate some 
of these problems (233). Further pay increases were 
granted in 2023 to improve the attractiveness and 
retention of nurses. Through its RRP, Poland is also 
implementing reforms to incentivise young people 
to  pursue  medical  studies  and  subsequently 
practise  medicine  in  the  country.  Poland  has  also 
the 
introduced 
attractiveness  of  medical  professions  and  boost 
working  conditions.  Finally,  Poland  is  investing  in 
increasing  the  capacity  of  medical  teaching 
facilities  and  supporting  students  undertaking 
medical studies. Poland participates in the HEROES 
joint  action  (234)  under  EU4Health,  through  which 

legislation 

increase 

to 

EU  countries  share  knowledge  and  experience  on 
health workforce planning. 

foster 

innovation  and 

The  potential  of  Poland’s  health  system  to 
drive 
industrial 
development  in  the  EU  medical  sector  is  not 
being  fully  exploited.  Poland  is  among  the  EU 
countries that  report  considerable  public  spending 
on  health  research  and  development.  This  is 
reflected  in  the  number  of  European  patents 
granted:  50  in  2023  in  the  combined  areas  of 
pharmaceuticals,  biotechnologies  and  medical 
technologies  (vs  an  EU-level  median  of  29)  (235). 
Clinical  trial  activity  in  Poland  is  comparatively 
high  (236).  RRP  measures  aim  to  improve  the 
quality and efficiency of the healthcare system by 
supporting research and development in the areas 
of medicine and health.  

increased 

levels  above 

consultations 
to  2022 

Poland aims to scale up the digitalisation of 
its  health  system,  with  support  from  EU 
programmes.  The  shares  of  people  accessing 
their  personal  health  records  online  and  using 
online health services (excluding phone) instead of 
in  2024 
in-person 
compared 
the 
(with 
respective  EU  averages)  (see  Annex  6).  That  said, 
there is considerable room for further deployment. 
Moreover, there are wide differences in patient use 
depending  on  their  socio-economic  background. 
Significant  investments  under  the  RRP  and  the 
the  digital 
cohesion  policy  aim 
transformation  of  the  healthcare  sector  in  Poland 
(see  Annex  16).  Measures  focus  on  accelerating 
the digital transformation of health by introducing 
new digital health services and further developing 
existing  ones.  Poland  participates 
in  several 
EU4Health-funded  projects  which  facilitate  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Health  Data 
Space  and  strengthen  digital  infrastructure  in 
Poland (237).  

to  boost 

(232) OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and 

Policies (2023), Poland: Country Health Profile 2023, State 
of Health in the EU. 

(233) 

OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies (2023), Poland: Country Health Profile 2023, State 
of Health in the EU. 

(234) JA HEROES | Health workforce planning project. 

(235) 
(236) 

European Patent Office, Data to download | epo.org. 
EMA (2024), Monitoring the European clinical trials 

environment, p. 9. 

(237) TEHDAS2 - Second Joint Action Towards the European Health 
Data Space, eCAN - Joint Action on strengthening ehealth 
including telemedicine and remote monitoring for health care 
systems for cancer prevention and care, Xt-EHR - Extended 
EHR@EU Data Space for Primary Use 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
HORIZONTAL 
ANNEX 15: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

dimensions 

This Annex assesses Poland’s progress on the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) along 
competitiveness, 
of 
the 
and 
fairness 
social 
sustainability, 
macroeconomic stability. The 17 SDGs and their 
related  indicators  provide  a  policy  framework 
under  the  UN’s  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable 
Development.  The  aim  is  to  end  all  forms  of 
inequalities  and  tackle  climate 
poverty,  fight 
change  and 
the  environmental  crisis,  while 
ensuring that no one is left behind. The EU and its 
Member  States  are  committed  to  this  historic 
global  framework  agreement  and  to  playing  an 
active  role  in  maximising  progress  on  the  SDGs. 
The graph below is based on the EU SDG indicator 
set developed to monitor progress on the SDGs in 
the EU. 

Poland  is  improving  on  SDGs  related  to 
competitiveness  (SDGs  4,  8  and  9).  Poland 
performs  well  on  its  employment  rate  among 
people  aged  20-64  (SDG 8;  78.4%  in  2024,  vs 
72.6% in 2019; EU average of 75.8% in 2024). On 

Graph A15.1: Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 

the  downside,  the  share  of  adults  with  at  least 
basic  digital  skills  (SDG 4)  remains  low  (44.3%  in 
2023;  EU  average:  55.6%).  Poland  is  also  moving 
away from the EU average on the indicator for the 
investment  share  of GDP (SDG 8;  17.7%  in  2023, 
vs 18.8% in 2018; EU average of 22.4% in 2023). 
The  Polish  recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP) 
the 
includes  several  measures 
investment  climate.  Poland  is  improving,  but  still 
needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU  average  on 
indicators  for  and  innovation,  and  sustainable 
including  gross  domestic 
industry 
expenditure  on  R&D  (1.56%  of  GDP  in  2023,  vs 
1.19%  of  GDP  in  2018;  EU  average  of  2.24%  in 
2023). The same is true of air emissions intensity 
of  fine  particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  from  industry 
(0.13 g per euro in 2022; EU average: 0.06 g). 

(SDG 9), 

improve 

to 

While  Poland  is  improving  on  some  of  the 
SDGs  related  to  sustainability  (SDGs 6,  7,  9, 
11, 12, 13, 14), it is moving away from some 
of  the  targets  for  SDG 2  (Zero  hunger)  and 
SDG 15  (Life  on  land).  Under  SDG 2,  the  area 

For detailed datasets on the various SDGs, see the annual Eurostat report ‘Sustainable development in the European Union’; for 
details on extensive country-specific data on the short-term progress of Member States: Key findings – Sustainable development 
indicators - Eurostat (europa.eu). A high status does not mean that a country is close to reaching a specific SDG, but signals that it 
is doing better than the EU on average. The progress score is an absolute measure based on the indicator trends over the past 
five years. The calculation does not take into account any target values, as most EU policy targets are only valid for the aggregate 
EU level. Depending on data availability for each goal, not all 17 SDGs are shown for each country. 
Source:  Eurostat, latest update of 28 April 2025. Data refer mainly to the period 2018-2023 or 2019-2024. Data on SDGs may 
vary across the report and its annexes due to different cut-off dates. 

95 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under  organic  farming  in  Poland  (3.9%  of  the 
utilised agricultural area in 2022) is below the EU 
average  (10.5%  in  2022).  Government  support  to 
agricultural  R&D  was  only  EUR 0.2  per  inhabitant 
in Poland in 2023, compared to the EU average of 
EUR 8.1.  As  for  SDG 6,  the  percentage  of  inland 
water bathing sites with excellent water quality in 
Poland  rose  from  26.7%  in  2018  to  54.9%  in 
2023  but  needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU  average 
of  78.6%  in  2023.  Poland  has  made  some 
progress  on  energy  consumption 
indicators, 
including  the  share  of  renewable  energy  in  gross 
final  energy  consumption  (SDG 7;  from  14.9%  in 
2018  to  16.6%  in  2023;  EU  average  24.6%  in 
2023). However, it needs to catch up with the EU 
average  on  per  capita  net  greenhouse  gas  (GHG) 
emissions  (SDG  13;  8.6  tonnes  in  2023;  EU 
average: 6.8 tonnes in 2023). Moreover, Poland is 
rapidly  losing  carbon  sinks,  with  the  net  GHG 
emissions  from  land  use  and  forestry  (LULUCF) 
increasing from -131.3 tonnes CO2 eq. per km² in 
2018  to  104.7  in  2023;  EU  average:  -47.0).  In 
addition,  Poland’s  energy 
import  dependency 
(SDG 7)  increased  from  43.5%  in  2018  to  48.0% 
in  2023  (EU  average:  58.3%  in  2023).  As  for 
affordable  energy,  the  percentage  of  the  Polish 
population unable to keep their homes adequately 
warm  was  lower  (4.7%  in  2023)  than  the  EU 
average  (10.6%).  Poland’s  RRP  includes  measures 
to address some of the energy-related challenges, 
namely the energy renovation of buildings, energy 
efficiency  of  business  and  the  decarbonisation  of 
energy  production.  While  Poland  is  improving  on 
several  SDG 
to  SDG 11 
(Sustainable  cities  and  communities),  its  share  of 
buses  and  trains  in  total  passenger  transport  has 
fallen but remains above EU average (from 20.3% 
in  2017  to  17.3%  in  2022;  EU  average  16.6%  in 
2022). The country is improving on the number of 
premature  deaths  due  to  exposure  to  fine 
particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  but  is  still  performing 
below EU average (a decrease of 118 per 100 000 
in  2017  to  94  in  2022;  EU  average:  53).  On 
SDG 14,  Poland  is  progressing  on  the  share  of 
coastal  water  bathing  sites  with  excellent  water 
quality  (55.1%  in  2023,  vs  30.8  in  2018),  but  is 
below  the  EU  average  (88.8%).  Poland  does  not 
provide  data  for  half  of  the  SDG 14  sub-themes. 
The  country  is  moving  away  from  the  targets  for 
SDG 15  (Life  on  land),  due  an  increase  in  the 
impact  of  drought  on  ecosystems  (from  5.4%  of 
the  land  area  in  2018  to  8.0%  in  2023).  It  also 
remains  above  the  EU  average  on  this  (3.6%  in 
2023). 

indicators 

related 

(ii) 

Poland is improving on most SDGs related to 
social  fairness  (SDGs 1,  3,  4,  5,  7,  8,  10).  It 
performs  well  on  the  indicators  for:  (i)  people  at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion (SDG 1; 16.3% in 
2023, vs 18.2% in 2018; EU average of 21.3% in 
2023); 
the  severe  material  and  social 
deprivation rate (SDG 1; 2.3% of the population in 
2024, vs 4.5% in 2018; 6.4% EU average in 2024); 
and (iii) income distribution (SDG 10; 3.85 in 2024, 
vs  4.25 in  2018;  EU  average  of  4.66 in  2024).  In 
addition,  the  long-term  unemployment  rate  fell 
(SDG 8;  0.8%  in  2024  vs  1.0%  in  2018;  EU 
average  of  1.9%  in  2024).  Poland  also  improved 
and  performed  better  than  the  EU  average  on 
early  leavers  from  education  and  training  (SDG 4; 
4.1% in 2024; EU average: 9.3%). However, Poland 
needs  to  take  measures  to  significantly  reduce 
avoidable  mortality  (SDG 3;  383.7  deaths  per 
100 000 in 2022; EU average: 257.8). Poland also 
needs to catch up with the EU average on gender 
equality  in  employment,  in  particular  on  positions 
held  by  women  in  senior  management  (SDG 5; 
20.5%  of  positions  in  senior  management  were 
held  by  women  in  2024;  EU  average:  32.6%).  On 
SDG 4 (Quality education), the percentage of low-
achieving 
in  mathematics 
increased strongly (from 14.7% in 2018 to 23% in 
2022)  moving  away  from  the  EU-level  2030 
target,  even  though  it  is  still  lower  than  the  EU 
average (29.5% in 2022). 

fifteen-year-olds 

Poland  is  improving  on  SDGs  related  to 
macroeconomic stability (SDGs 8, 16, 17), but 
still  needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU  average 
on  some  indicators.  It  has  improved  on  SDG 8 
(Decent work and economic growth), although real 
GDP  per  capita  (increase  from  EUR 12  870  in 
2017  to  EUR 16 470  in  2024)  remains  below  the 
EU  average (EUR 33 530 in 2024). On justice and 
strong institutions (SDG 16), Poland has increased 
its  general  government  total  expenditure  on  the 
law  courts  (SDG 16;  increase  from  EUR 61.8  in 
2017  per  capita  to  EUR 91.9  per  capita  in  2023) 
but  needs  to  catch  up  with  the  EU  average  of 
EUR 121.7.  However, 
the 
independence  of  the  justice  system  have  become 
more negative, with the percentage of people who 
consider it to be fairly good and very good sharply 
dropping from 39% in 2019 to 28% in 2024 (the 
EU  average  in  2023  was  52%).  The  perceived 
judicial 
independence  among  companies  has 
slightly  increased  from  18%  in  2021  to  22%  in 
2024.  Poland’s  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  has 
also deteriorated (from 58 in 2018 to 53 in 2023; 
EU  average:  62  in  2024). The  Polish  RRP  includes 

perceptions 

of 

96 

 
measures  on  the  independence  of  the  justice 
system.  On  the  share  of  households  with  a  high-
speed  internet  connection  (SDG 17),  Poland  has 
made considerable progress (from 60.3% in 2019 
to  81.1%  in  2023)  and  is  above  the  EU  average 
(78.8% in 2023). 

As the SDGs form an overarching framework, any 
links  to  relevant  SDGs  are  either  explained  or 
depicted with icons in the other annexes. 

97 

 
 
ANNEX 16: CSR PROGRESS AND EU FUNDS IMPLEMENTATION 

recommendations 

Poland faces  structural  challenges  in a  wide 
range  of  policy  areas,  as  identified  in  the 
country-specific 
(CSRs) 
addressed  to  the  country  as  part  of  the 
European  Semester.  They  refer,  among  other 
things,  to  improving  the  adequacy  of  the  pension 
system, 
benefits, 
targeting 
healthcare,  improving  labour  market  participation, 
education  and  skills,  research  and  innovation, 
improving the regulatory environment, investing in 
digital  transformation  and  infrastructure,  as  well 
as  in  energy,  renewables  and  energy  efficiency 
and in the sustainable use of water resources. 

better 

social 

The Commission has assessed the 2019-2024 
CSRs  considering  the  policy  action  taken  by 
Poland  to  date  and  the  commitments  in  its 
recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP).  At  this 
stage,  Poland  has  made  at  least  ‘some  progress’ 
on 45% of the CSRs (238), and ‘limited progress’ on 
45% (Table A16.2). 

to 

by 

competitiveness, 

EU funding instruments  provide considerable 
supporting 
Poland 
resources 
investments  and  structural  reforms  to 
increase 
environmental 
sustainability  and  social  fairness,  while 
helping  to  address  challenges  identified  in 
the  CSRs.  In  addition  to  the  EUR 59.8  billion 
funding  from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility 
(RRF) in 2021-2026, EU cohesion policy funds (239) 
to  Poland 
are  providing  EUR 75.5  billion 
(amounting  to  EUR 92  billion  with  national  co-
financing)  for  2021-2027  (240)  to  boost  regional 
competitiveness  and  growth.  Support  from  these 
instruments  combined  represents  around  18%  of 
these 
2024  GDP 
instruments  to  different  policy  objectives 
is 
in  Graphs  A16.1  and  A16.2.  This 
outlined 
substantial  support  comes  on  top  of  financing 

(241).  The  contribution  of 

to  Poland  under 

provided 
the  2014-2020 
multiannual  financial  framework,  which  financed 
projects  until  2023  and  has  had  significant 
benefits  for  the  economy  and  Polish  society. 
Project  selection  under  the  2021-2027  cohesion 
policy  programmes  has  accelerated,  while 
significant  volumes  of  investment  are  yet  to  be 
mobilised.  

strengthen 

transition  and 

The  Polish  RRP  contains  56  investments  and 
55  reforms  to  stimulate  sustainable  growth, 
decarbonise  the  economy,  accelerate  the 
the 
digital 
independence  of  the  judiciary.  A  year  before 
the end of the RRF timespan, implementation is on 
its  way,  with  35%  of  the  funds  disbursed.  At 
the 
present,  Poland  has 
milestones  and  targets  in  its  RRP  (242).  The  initial 
delays  in implementation have  been  offset  in  the 
past  year.  Since  December  2023,  there  has  been 
to  Poland 
significant  acceleration, 
submitting three payment requests, covering 5 out 
of  9  instalments.  Still,  considerable  efforts  are 
needed to ensure completion of all RRP measures 
by 31 August 2026.  

fulfilled  25%  of 

leading 

the 

Poland  also  receives  funding  from  several 
other  EU  instruments,  including  those  listed  in 
Table  A16.1.  Most  notably, 
common 
agricultural  policy  (CAP)  provides  Poland  with  an 
EU  contribution  of  EUR 22.1  billion  under  the CAP 
strategic  plan  for  2023-2027  (243).  A  further 
EUR 504.9 million are available under the Asylum, 
Migration  and  Integration  Fund  (AMIF),  together 
with the border management and visa instrument 
(BMVI)  and  internal  security  funds.  Operations 
amounting  to  EUR  1.01  billion  (244)  have  been 
signed  under  the  InvestEU  instrument  backed  by 
the  EU  guarantee,  improving  access  to  financing 
for riskier operations in Poland. 

(238) 11% of the 2019-2024 CSRs have been fully implemented, 
0% substantially implemented, and some progress has been 
made on 34%. 

(239) In 2021-2027, cohesion policy funds include the European 
Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the 
European Social Fund Plus and the Just Transition Fund. The 
information on cohesion policy included in this Annex is 
based on adopted programmes with the cut-off date of 5 
May 2025. 

(240) European territorial cooperation (ETC) programmes are 

excluded from the figure. 

(241) RRF funding includes both grants and loans, where 

(242) As of mid-May 2025, Poland has submitted 3 payment 

requests; the last one being under assessment. 

(243) An overview of Poland’s formally approved strategy to 

implement the EU’s common agricultural policy nationally 
can be found at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/cap-my-
country/cap-strategic-plans/poland_en .   

applicable. GDP figures are based on Eurostat data for 2024. 

(244) Data reflect the situation on 31.12.2024. 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph A16.1: Distribution of RRF funding in Poland 
by policy field 

(1) Each RRP measure helps achieve the aims of two of the 
six policy pillars of the RRF. The primary contribution is shown 
in the outer circle, while the secondary contribution is shown 
in the inner circle. Each circle represents 100% of the RRF 
funds. Therefore, the total contribution to all pillars displayed 
on this chart amounts to 200% of the RRF funds allocated. 
Source: European Commission 

Graph A16.2: Distribution of cohesion policy 
funding across policy objectives in Poland 

Source: European Commission 

the 

growth 

towards 

supporting 

Cohesion  policy  funds  aim  to  increase  the 
productivity  and  competitiveness  of  Polish 
firms and improve the business environment. 
is  earmarked  for  enhancing 
EUR 8.9  billion 
research  and  innovation,  while  EUR 3.7  billion  will 
go 
and 
competitiveness  of  small  and  medium-sized 
(SMEs).  The  European  Regional 
enterprises 
Development Fund (ERDF) supports investments in 
43 000  businesses,  including  over  7 000  SMEs 
introducing  product  or  process  innovations.  This 
funding  will  support  cooperation  between  the 
science  and  business  sectors,  which  is  important 
for strengthening technology transfers. More than 
to 
1 000  businesses  will 
collaborate with research organisations, while over 
300 research organisations will participate in joint 
research  projects.  The  ERDF  will  invest  EUR 153 
smart 
million 

development 

support 

receive 

skills 

for 

in 

99 

industrial 

infrastructure, 

specialisation, 
transition, 
entrepreneurship,  and  business  adaptability. 
Poland  has  already  started  to  take  up  the 
opportunities  of  the  Strategic  Technologies  for 
Europe Platform under cohesion policy by investing 
into  cutting  edge  technologies  and  bolstering  the 
EUs  biotech  industry  with  a  pioneering  project 
developed  in  the  Bródnowski  Hospital  on  gene 
for  Parkinson  Disease.  Additionally, 
therapy 
complete 
funds  will  help 
cohesion  policy 
broadband 
targeting  additional 
businesses  that  will  gain  access  to  very  high-
capacity  broadband.  A  further  EUR 6  billion, 
primarily  from  European  Social  Fund  Plus  (ESF+) 
and  complemented  by  the  Just  Transition  Fund 
(JTF)  and  ERDF,  is  supporting  skills  development. 
The ERDF will specifically invest EUR 153 million in 
for  smart  specialisation, 
skills  development 
industrial 
and 
business  adaptability.  Under  the  European  Funds 
for  Social  Development  programme,  a  training 
loan  project  was  launched  in  2023  and  now  has 
over  16 150  participants.  A  new  EUR 26  million 
ESF+  pilot  for  individual  learning  accounts  will 
support  7 700  adults  from  2026.  Additionally, 
ESF+  regional  programmes  support  upskilling  for 
low-skilled adults through upskilling pathways and 
local  knowledge  centres,  focusing  on  green  and 
digital skills.   

entrepreneurship, 

transition, 

and 

are 

fuel 

infrastructure 

contributing 

integration  of 

in  Poland,  for 

to 
Other 
funds 
competitiveness 
instance 
through  open  calls.  The  Connecting  Europe 
Facility  has  financed  strategic  investments  for 
instance in  rail  infrastructure,  the development  of 
the 
alternative 
modernisation  of  Poland's  maritime  transport 
network; 
the  energy  market, 
decarbonisation of the energy system and security 
of  energy  supply,  including  the  diversification  of 
natural  gas  sources  and  routes;  as  well  as 
capacity,  resilience  and  security  of  backbone 
digital infrastructure and advanced 5G connectivity 
transport  paths.  Horizon  Europe  has 
along 
supported  research  and  innovation  from  scientific 
breakthroughs  to  scaling  up  innovations,  with 
Digital,  Industry  and  Space  and  Climate,  Energy 
and  Mobility  as  top  priorities  in  Poland.  The 
Technical  Support 
(TSI)  supports 
actions  in  Poland  for  instance  for  enhancing  the 
implementation  of 
the  Just  Transition  and 
improving regional capacity to access EU funding.  

Instrument 

Poland’s  RRP  also 
measures 

to 

improve 

contains  ambitious 
business 

the 

Green transitionDigital transformationSmart, sustainable andinclusive growthSocial & territorial cohesionHealth & resilienceNext generationSmarter EuropeGreener EuropeConnected EuropeSocial EuropeEurope closer to citizensJTF specific objective 
     
 
     
environment  and  competitiveness.  As  part  of 
the  measures  covered  by  payment  requests 
submitted over the past year, a legislative package 
entered  into  force  aimed  at  eliminating  legal 
the  business  climate.  An 
barriers  affecting 
important reform was also adopted to improve the 
business environment, by limiting the use of fast-
track  legislative  procedures  in  the  Sejm,  the 
Senate  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  by 
requiring 
public 
consultations for draft legislation. 

assessments 

impact 

and 

EU  funds  are  playing  a  significant  role  in 
promoting  environmental  sustainability  and 
the  green  transition  in  Poland  during  the 
current  seven-year  EU  budget  (multiannual 
financial  framework).  A  significant  investment 
amounting  to  a  EUR 26.6  billion  is  earmarked  for 
climate  action  under  the  cohesion  policy.  Annual 
investments estimated at EUR 4.8 billion focus on 
reducing  pollution,  with  most  of  this  funding 
targeting improvements in air quality. In the water 
sector,  annual  investments  of  around  EUR 2.8 
billion  are  supported  by  the  Cohesion  Fund,  with 
the  European  Regional  Development  Fund  (ERDF) 
financing  projects 
focusing  on  wastewater 
management  and  the  supply  of  drinking  water. 
These efforts reflect the strategic use of cohesion 
policy  to  boost  Poland’s  compliance  with  the  EU 
Water Framework Directive. Furthermore, Poland’s 
CAP  strategic  plan  allocates  EUR 2  billion  for 
environmental  and  climate  objectives  under  rural 
development and EUR 4.3 billion for eco-schemes. 
The  plan  focuses  on  enhancing  sustainability  in 
in  renewable 
agriculture  through 
energy, organic farming (aiming to double the area 
covered  by  organic  farming  by  2030),  and  eco-
schemes  promoting  environmentally 
friendly 
practices. The plan also allocates funds to improve 
energy  efficiency  in  farm  buildings  and  raise 
animal welfare standards. Additionally, it supports 
knowledge  exchange  and 
for  over 
127 000  individuals,  emphasising  environmental 
and climate performance. 

investments 

training 

Poland 

The  Polish  RRP,  including  the  REPowerEU 
chapter, has a comprehensive set of reforms 
and  investments  for  the  green  transition.  In 
particular, 
the 
amended 
the  Monitoring  and 
Electromobility  Act  and 
Controlling  Quality  of  Fuels  Act  to  pave  the  way 
for  low-carbon  and  renewable  hydrogen  to  serve 
as  alternative  fuel  for  transport  and  amended 
legislation  to  incentivise  investments  in  onshore 

already 

wind power by allowing plants to be located closer 
to residential buildings than the minimum distance 
of  10  times  the  height  of  the  installation.  On  top 
of  an  initial  increase  of  installed  capacity  of 
onshore  wind  and  photovoltaic  installations  from 
11.2  GW  to  23.13  GW,  the  REPowerEU  chapter 
sets a target to reach 30 GW of onshore wind and 
photovoltaics  installed  capacity.  Poland  is  also 
supporting  investments  in  offshore  wind  farms; 
updated  its  ‘Clean  Air’  priority  programme  by 
increasing  support  for  low-income  groups  for 
energy renovations of buildings, created a support 
scheme targeting energy efficiency and renewable 
energy  sources  in  companies,  and  supported  the 
development of sustainable urban mobility plans.  

the 

support 

for  Ukrainian 

Promoting  fairness,  social  cohesion  and 
improving  access  to  basic  services  are 
among  the  key  priorities  of  EU  funding  in 
Poland. Over 8.5% of the ERDF funding has been 
earmarked 
for  supporting  education,  social 
inclusion  and  equal  access  to  healthcare,  as  well 
as  for  enhancing 
role  of  culture  and 
sustainable  tourism.  Some  13  million  people  per 
year  will  be  using  new  or  modernised  healthcare 
facilities and more than 4 600 people will benefit 
from  new  or  modernised  social  housing. 
In 
addition,  16 000  children will  have  access  to  new 
or  modernised  childcare  facilities.  Poland  is  using 
the  ESF+  to  address  material  deprivation  through 
a  food  aid  programme  worth  EUR 525  million, 
including 
refugees. 
Combined  ESF+  and  ERDF  funding  of  EUR 4.8 
billion  is  improving  access  to  social  services  and 
promoting  inclusion,  while  EUR 503  million  is 
supporting job  creation through social enterprises. 
To  increase  childcare  accessibility,  EUR 1.3  billion 
from  ESF+  and  the  RRF  will  create  100 000  new 
places, including specialised care for children with 
a  disability. 
In  addition,  the  AMIF  supports 
integration  measures,  including  language  training, 
civic  orientation  courses,  exchanges  with  host 
society,  information  and  other  support  services. 
the  creation  of  a 
Emphasis 
comprehensive 
the 
structure 
integration  of  third-country  nationals  (‘one-stop 
shops’).  Support  is  provided  for  the  integration  of 
vulnerable  Ukrainians,  to  help  them  transition  to 
independent  housing,  reduce  language  barriers, 
and integrate in the labour market. 

is  placed  on 
support 

for 

Poland’s  RRP  contains  several  reforms  and 
investments  related  to  fairness  and  social 
policies.  Measures  covered  by  the  payment 

100 

 
 
Table A16.1:Selected EU funds with adopted allocations - summary data (million EUR) 

(1) The cut-off date for data on disbursements under the RRF is 31 May 2025. 
(2) Cohesion policy 2014-2020 allocations include REACT-EU appropriations committed in 2021-2022. 
(3) These amounts relate only to disbursements made from 2021 onwards and do not include payments made to the Member 
State before 2021.  Hence the figures do not comprise the totality of payments corresponding to the 2014-2020 allocation. The 
cut-off date for data on disbursements under EMFAF and EMFF is 29 April 2025.  The cut-off date for data on disbursements 
under cohesion policy funds, AMIF, BMVI and ISF is 5 May 2025. 
(4) AMIF - Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund; BMVI - Border Management and Visa Instrument; ISF - Internal Security Fund. 
(5) Expenditure outside the CAP strategic plan is not included. 
(6) The cut-off date for data on EARDF disbursements is 5 May 2025. The information on EAGF disbursements is based on the 
Member State declarations until March 2025.  Disbursements for the Direct Payments (EAGF) started in 2024. 
Source: European Commission 

services, 

by  medical 
improve 
to 

introduced 
provided 
legislation 
the  attractiveness  of 
medical  jobs  and  improve  the  working  conditions 
of medical  workers, as well as a strategic plan to 
develop the biomedical sector. 

coordinating 

policies  on 

requests  submitted  over  the  last  year  include, 
among  others,  the  set-up  of  at  least  14  regional 
teams 
vocational 
education  and  training  and  lifelong  learning,  an 
amendment  to  the  Labour  Code  introducing  the 
possibility  of  remote  work  outside  the  workplace 
and flexible forms of working time arrangements, 
and  a  reform  of  personal  income  taxation  to 
incentivise workers to continue working beyond the 
statutory  retirement  age.  In  the  field  of  digital 
skills,  Poland 
introduced  minimum  binding 
standards  for  equipping  schools  with  digital 
launched  a  digital  competence 
infrastructure, 
development 
down 
and 
programme 
requirements  to  support  the  development  and 
monitoring  of  digital  competences  in  education; 
and  created  a  Digital  Competence  Development 
Centre. In the area of health, Poland introduced a 
reform to strengthen the quality of health services 

laid 

101 

Instrument/policyDisbursed since 2021   (1)             RRF grants (including the RepowerEU allocation)7 301.3RRF loans13 464.2Instrument/policyAllocation 2014-2020 (2)Allocation 2021-2027 Disbursed since 2021 (3)    (covering total payments to the Member State on commitments originating from both 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 programming periods) Cohesion policy (total)78 797.375 460.139 785.7European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)42 163.947 416.721 713.7Cohesion Fund (CF)23 139.911 283.19 670.9European Social Fund (ESF, ESF+) and the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI)13 493.512 913.07 150.1Just Transition Fund (JTF)3 847.31 251.0European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) 531.2 512.4338.4Migration, border management and internal security - AMIF, BMVI and ISF (4) 282.5 504.9222.9The common agricultural policy under the CAP strategic plan (5)Disbursements under the CAP Strategic Plan (6)Total under the CAP strategic plan7 142.1European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF)6 614.2European Fund for Agricultural Development (EAFRD) 527.9Allocation 2023-202722 131.317 430.74 700.6Allocation 2021-2026 25 276.934 541.3FisheriesMigration and home affairs 
 
 
   
 
Table A16.2:Summary table on 2019-2024 CSRs 

(Continued on the next page) 

102 

PolandAssessment in May 2025Relevant SDGs2019 CSR 1Some progressEnsure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not exceed 4.4% in 2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of GDP. Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Take further steps to improve the efficiency of public spending, including by improving the budgetary process.Some progressSDG 8, 162019 CSR 2Limited progressEnsure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the preferential pension schemes. Limited progressSDG 8Take steps to increase labour market participation, including by improving access to childcare and long-term care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of employment. Some progressSDG 3, 4, 5, 8Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult learning.Limited progressSDG 42019 CSR 3Some progressStrengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research institutions and their closer collaboration with business. Limited progressSDG 9Focus investment-related economic policy on innovationSome progressSDG 9, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on transport, notably on its sustainabilitySome progressSDG 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on digital infrastructureSome progressSDG 9, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on energy infrastructureLimited progressSDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13Focus investment-related economic policy on healthcareSome progressSDG 3, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on cleaner energy, taking into account regional disparitiesSome progressSDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13Improve the regulatory environment, in particular by strengthening the role of consultations of social partners and public consultations in the legislative process.Some progressSDG 162020 CSR 1Limited progressTake all necessary measures, in line with the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, to effectively address the COVID-19 pandemic, sustain the economy and support the ensuing recovery. When economic conditions allow, pursue fiscal policies aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring debt sustainability, while enhancing investment. Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Improveresilience,accessibilityandeffectivenessofthehealthsystem,includingbyproviding sufficient resources and accelerating the deployment of e-health services. Limited progressSDG 32020 CSR 2Limited progressMitigatetheemploymentimpactofthecrisis,inparticularbyenhancingflexibleandshorttime working arrangements. Some progressSDG 8Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.No progressSDG 1, 2, 10Improve digital skills. Limited progressSDG 4Further promote the digital transformation of companies and public administration. Some progressSDG 9, 16 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

103 

2020 CSR 3Some progressContinue efforts to secure access to finance and liquidity for companies. Some progressSDG 8, 9Front-load mature public investment projectsLimited progressSDG 8, 16and promote private investment to foster the economic recovery. Limited progressSDG 8, 9Focus investment on the green and digital transition, in particular on digital infrastructure, Some progressSDG 9, 10, 11clean and efficient production and use of energy, Some progressSDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13and sustainable transport, Limited progressSDG 10, 11contributing to a progressive decarbonisation of the economy, including in the coal regions.Limited progressSDG 6, 10, 11, 12, 152020 CSR 4Substantial progressEnhance the investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence. Full implementationSDG 16Ensureeffectivepublicconsultationsandinvolvementofsocialpartnersinthepolicymakingprocess.Some progressSDG 162021 CSR 1Not relevant anymoreIn2022,pursueasupportivefiscalstance,includingtheimpulseprovidedbytheRecoveryand Resilience Facility, and preserve nationally financed investment.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Wheneconomicconditionsallow,pursueafiscalpolicyaimedatachievingprudentmedium-term fiscal positions and ensuring fiscal sustainability in the medium term.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Atthesametime,enhanceinvestmenttoboostgrowthpotential.Payparticularattentiontothecompositionofpublicfinances,onboththerevenueandexpendituresidesofthebudget,andtothequalityofbudgetarymeasuresinordertoensureasustainableandinclusiverecovery.Prioritisesustainableandgrowth-enhancinginvestment,inparticularinvestment supporting the green and digital transition.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Giveprioritytofiscalstructuralreformsthatwillhelpprovidefinancingforpublicpolicyprioritiesandcontributetothelong-termsustainabilityofpublicfinances,including,whererelevant,bystrengtheningthecoverage,adequacyandsustainabilityofhealthandsocialprotection systems for all.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 162022 CSR 1Limited progressIn 2023, ensure that the growth of nationally financed primary current expenditure is in line with an overall neutral policy stance, taking into account continued temporary and targeted support to households and firms most vulnerable to energy price hikes and to people fleeing Ukraine. Stand ready to adjust current spending to the evolving situation.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Expand public investment for the green and digital transitions, and for energy security taking into account the REPowerEU initiative, including by making use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other Union funds.Full implementationSDG 8, 16For the period beyond 2023, pursue a fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Improvetheefficiencyofpublicspending,includingbycontinuingthereformofthebudgetsystem.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the preferential pension schemes.Limited progressSDG 82022 CSR 2Swiftly finalise the negotiations with the Commission of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy programming documents with a view to starting their implementation.Progress on the cohesion policy programming documents is monitored under the EU cohesion policy. 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

104 

2022 CSR 3Limited progressIncrease labour market participation, including by improving access to childcare and long-term care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of employment.Some progressSDG 3, 4, 5, 8Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult learning and improving digital skills.Limited progressSDG 4Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.No progressSDG 1, 2, 102022 CSR 4Limited progressImprove the resilience, accessibility and effectiveness of the health system, including by providing sufficient resources to reverse the pyramid of care and accelerating the deployment of e-health services.Limited progressSDG 3Strengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research institutions and their closer collaboration with business.Limited progressSDG 9Enhancefurtherdigitalisationofbusinessesandpublicadministration,includingthroughdevelopment of infrastructure.Some progressSDG 9, 162022 CSR 5Substantial progressEnhance the investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence.Full implementationSDG 16Ensure effective public consultations and involvement of social partners in the policymaking process.Some progressSDG 162022 CSR 6Limited progressReduce overall reliance on fossil fuelsLimited progressSDG 7, 9, 13by removing regulatory, administrative and infrastructural barriers to accelerate permitting procedures and deployment of renewable energy sources.Limited progressSDG 7, 8, 9, 13Reformbuildingrenovationpoliciesandsupportschemestoincentivisedeeperenergyefficiency,promoteenergysavingsandfasterphase-outoffossilfuelsinheatingandaccelerated deployment of heat pumps.Limited progressSDG 7Accelerate modal shift towards public transport and active mobility and promote faster uptake of electric vehicles with incentives and investment in charging infrastructure.Limited progressSDG 11Improve long- and medium-term strategic planning of the green transition by updating national energy policies in line with the European Green Deal objectives and the REPowerEU Communication to provide certainty to the business community and use funding effectively with a view to accelerating clean energy investments.Limited progressSDG 7, 9, 11, 132023 CSR 1Limited progressWind down the emergency energy support measures in force, using the related savings to reduce the government deficit, as soon as possible in 2023 and 2024. Should renewed energy price increases necessitate new or continued support measures, ensure that these are targeted at protecting vulnerable households and firms, fiscally affordable, and preserve incentives for energy savings.Limited progressSDG 8, 16Ensure prudent fiscal policy, in particular by limiting the nominal increase in nationally financed net primary expenditure in 2024 to not more than 7.8%.No progressSDG 8, 16PreservenationallyfinancedpublicinvestmentandensuretheeffectiveabsorptionofRRFgrants and other EU funds, in particular to foster the green and digital transitions.Full implementationSDG 8, 16For the period beyond 2024, continue to pursue a medium-term fiscal strategy of gradual and sustainable consolidation, combined with investments and reforms conducive to higher sustainable growth, to achieve a prudent medium-term fiscal position.Not relevant anymoreSDG 8, 16Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social benefits.No progressSDG 1, 2, 8, 10, 16Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and reforming preferential pension schemes.Limited progressSDG 82023 CSR 2Urgently fulfil the required milestones and targets related to the protection of the financial interests of the Union with a view to allowing for a swift and steady implementation of its recovery and resilience plan. Swiftly finalise the REPowerEU+C66 chapter with a view to rapidly starting its implementation. Proceed with the speedy implementation of cohesion policy programmes, in close complementarity and synergy with the recovery and resilience plan.RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union. 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

Source: European Commission 

105 

2023 CSR 3Full implementationEnhance the investment climate, including by safeguarding judicial independence.Full implementationSDG 8, 9, 162023 CSR 4Limited progressAccelerate the phase-out of fossil fuelsLimited progressSDG 7, 9, 13and (accelerate) the deployment of renewable energy. Reform the legal framework for grid connection permitting and for renewable energy sources, including energy communities, biomethane and renewable hydrogen.Some progressSDG 7, 8, 9, 13Implement measures to promote energy savings and gas demand reductions. Scale up investment in energy efficiency for buildings and decarbonise the heat supply in district heating to address energy poverty.Limited progressSDG 1, 2, 7, 10Further promote sustainable public transport modes.Limited progressSDG 11Step up policy efforts aimed at the provision and acquisition of skills and competences needed for the green transition, including for building renovation.Limited progressSDG 42024 CSR 1Some progressSubmit the medium-term fiscal-structural plan in a timely manner. Full implementationSDG 8, 16In line with the requirements of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact, limit the growth in net expenditure  in 2025 to a rate consistent with, inter alia, reducing the general government deficit towards the 3% of GDP Treaty reference value and keeping the general government debt at a prudent level over the medium term. Full implementationSDG 8, 16Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social benefits No progressSDG 1,2,8, 10, 16as well as more transparency in investment planning and wider use of standardised procedures for project assessment and selection. No progressSDG 8, 16Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and reinforce the sustainability of the pension system, including by taking measures on effective retirement age and reforming preferential pension schemes. Limited progressSDG 82024 CSR 2Strengthen administrative capacity to manage the recovery and resilience plan, accelerate investments and maintain momentum in the implementation of reforms. Address relevant challenges to allow for continued, swift and effective implementation of the recovery and resilience plan, including the REPowerEU chapter, ensuring completion of reforms and investments by August 2026. Accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes. In the context of the mid-term review continue focusing on the agreed priorities, taking action to better support and integrate non-EU nationals, while considering the opportunities provided by the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform initiative to improve competitiveness.2024 CSR 3Some progressTake steps to increase labour market participation of disadvantaged groups, including by improving quality of and access to formal home- and community-based long-term care. Limited progressSDG 3, 8, 10Foster competition in public procurement processes, making these more efficient and less cumbersome, especially for SMEs. Some progressSDG 9Support private investments by fostering digitisation of companies.  Some progressSDG 92024 CSR 4Limited progressTake measures to accelerate the phase-out of fossil fuels in the district heating sector by shifting to renewable energy. Limited progressSDG 7, 9, 13Improve policies related to the protection and sustainable use of water resources to ensure the long-term sustainability of sectors that rely on ecosystem services. Limited progressSDG 6, 12, 15RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union. 
 
  
 
ANNEX 17: COMPETITIVE REGIONS 

The  Polish  economy  continues 
to  be 
characterised  by  a  more  competitive  capital 
and western regions, which  also  have  higher 
labour  productivity  compared  to  the  eastern 
part  of  the  country.  Furthermore,  regions 
bordering Russia and Belarus experience additional 
challenges. The picture is more nuanced regarding 
the green transition, which is a major challenge at 
national  level,  but  where eastern  regions  are  well 
placed  to  take  advantage  of  opportunities  in 
renewable  energy.  The  south-western  regions 
reliant  on  coal  and  heavy  industries,  as  well  as 
more industrialised central Poland, face additional 
challenges.  In  some  regions,  housing  affordability 
is  increasingly  becoming  a  concern.  Innovation 
levels  are  below  the  EU  average  throughout 
Poland except in the capital. 

Map A17.1:  GDP per head (in purchasing power 
standard PPS), 2023 

its  GDP  per  head  since  2014.  Between  2014 
and  2023,  average  annual  real  GDP  per 
capita  growth  in  Poland  (4.1%)  and  all  its 
regions  was  more  than  double  the  EU  rate 
(1.6%). The economy grew by 2.9% in 2024, and, 
according  to  the  European  Commission  Autumn 
2024 Forecast, is expected to increase by 3.6% in 
2025, as consumption growth remains strong and 
investment  accelerates  (245).  The  largest  increase 
in  GDP  compared  to  2013  (4%  or  more  per  year) 
took place in the regions of Warszawski Stołeczny, 
Pomorskie, 
Mazowiecki 
Regionalny (246). Looking at NUTS 3 subregions, the 
eight  biggest  and  richest  metropolises  (out  of  73 
NUTS 3  subregions),  primarily  Miasto  Warszawa 
(14%),  together  with  Miasto  Kraków,  Trójmiejski, 
Miasto  Poznań,  Miasto  Wrocław,  Katowicki, 
Warszawski  Zachodni  and  Miasto  Łódź,  generate 
one  third  of  Polish  GDP.  Five  (Trójmiejski,  Miasto 
Krakow,  Katowicki,  Miasto  Poznań  and  Miasto 
Łódź)  reached  annual  growth  above  4%  between 
2014  and  2022  being  outpaced  by  several  less 
trend  provides  an 
regions.  This 
prosperous 
opportunity 
economic 
regional 
reduce 
disparities, which have remained broadly static. 

Małopolskie, 

and 

to 

by 

regions 

impacted 

Despite  significant  economic  progress,  the 
(247) 
competitiveness  of  Polish 
remains  low  compared  to  the  EU  average, 
except  for  the  capital  region,  and  varies 
significantly, 
geographic 
location,  demographic  trends,  productivity 
and investment patterns. While western regions 
and  the  capital  city  show  strong  performance, 
eastern  regions  lag  behind.  Warszawski  Stołeczny 
including 
leads  across  multiple 
demographic  growth,  foreign  direct  investment, 
R&D 
skilled 
innovation 
workforce  availability,  employment  rates  and 
infrastructure connectivity (see Annex 3). 

indicators, 

spending, 

capacity, 

Source: Eurostat 

Competitiveness 

Poland  has  been  steadily  catching  up  with 
the rest of the EU for two decades, doubling 

(245) Council Recommendation endorsing the national medium-

term fiscal-structural plan of Poland COM(2024) 723 final. 

(246) This translated into average GDP per head growth of 3.8% in 

Warszawski Stołeczny (with a significant increase in 
population) and 4.6% in Mazowiecki Regionalny (with a 
decline in population). 

(247) EU Regional Competitiveness Index 2.0, 2022 

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A17.1:Selection of indicators at regional level in Poland 

Source: Eurostat and JRC 

Graph A17.1: Labour productivity per hour 

Unit: Real GDP per hour worked (EUR, 2015 prices) 
Source: ARDECO (JRC) 

Gaps  in  labour  productivity  levels  between 
Warszawski  Stołeczny  and  other  regions 
have  remained  constant  over  the  last  five 
years (Graph A17.1), while Poland as a whole 
has  been  catching  up  with  more  developed 
Member States. Labour productivity in the capital 
is much higher not only compared  to other Polish 
regions,  but  also  other  Member  States.  Warsaw 
attracts 
of 
multinational corporations, particularly in business 
services  (finance,  IT,  consulting)  which  bring  in 
advanced  technologies  and  skilled  jobs,  raising 
productivity  levels.  Additionally,  the  availability  of 

concentration 

significant 

a 

a  highly  educated  workforce,  with  many 
universities  and  research  institutions  in  Warsaw, 
contributes to higher productivity. Warsaw’s higher 
productivity  is  also  due  to  strong  infrastructure 
and  its  greater  integration  with  global  markets. 
Although their productivity is lower than Warsaw’s, 
Miasto  Poznań  (the  capital  of  Wielkopolskie,  with 
its  diversified  economy,  strong  education  and 
research and skilled workforce), Trójmiasto (with a 
strategic 
industry, 
location,  strong  maritime 
investments  in  logistics  and  infrastructure,  and 
growing  IT  sector),  and  Miasto  Wrocław  (the 
capital  of  Dolnośląskie,  with 
its  diversified 
economy  and  strong  industrial  sectors  and  a 
growing  knowledge  economy  with  highly  skilled 
workforces  and  strong  R&D  infrastructure),  show 
leading  to  relatively  high  productivity  levels  for 
regional cities. Wrocław’s proximity to the German 
border  provides  added  advantages  in  trade  and 
cross-border cooperation. 

Intraregional  differences  indicate  that  the 
highest  productivity  per  hour  was  still 
characteristic  of  sub-regions  of  large  urban 
agglomerations.  The  highest  were  Miasto 
Warszawa (117% of the EU), Warszawski Zachodni 
(97%) and Poznań (85%). Highest productivity per 
hour 
regions  with 
significant  economic  activities,  such  as  Płock 
in  oil  refining  and 
(17%),  which  specialises 

is  also  concentrated 

in 

107 

51015202530354045201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222015 EUR per hour workedOther NUTS2 regionsCapital regionNational averageEU27GDP per head (PPS)Real GDP per head growthProductivity - GDP per person employed (PPS)Real productivity growth (per person employed)Productivity - GDP per hour worked (PPS)Real productivity growth (per hour worked)Employment in high-technology sectorsEuropean Quality of Government IndexRegional innovation indexHousing afordabilityGreenhouse gas emissionsAir qualityIndex EU-27 = 100Average annual % changeIndex EU-27 = 100Average annual % changeIndex EU-27 = 100Average annual % change% of total employmentEU-27=0Price-to-income ratiotCO2eq. per personConcentra-tion of PM 2.520232014-202320232014-202320222013-2022202420242023201920232021European Union (27 MS)1001.61000.61000.95.21097.110.1Poland774.1822.4652.64.76411.09.916.1Małopolskie694.1722.1581.86.2-1.08712.85.419.4Śląskie804.2872.6702.94.8-0.8637.912.420.9Wielkopolskie813.9832.6632.52.8-0.6619.77.815.9Zachodniopomorskie633.9691.8562.03.6-0.95611.010.810.8Lubuskie623.8682.1562.12.3-1.1508.79.112.1Dolnośląskie833.7871.3752.46.0-1.37510.29.714.8Opolskie623.5691.7571.91.8-0.9517.925.916.5Kujawsko-pomorskie623.7672.2552.73.9-0.96010.310.814.7Warmińsko-mazurskie543.9601.9471.62.0-1.05910.06.211.9Pomorskie744.1782.2662.36.8-0.77315.45.611.9Łódzkie733.8782.8592.34.0-0.7649.615.618.0Świętokrzyskie583.7642.6451.71.0-1.24910.816.016.3Lubelskie533.7593.0472.72.7-1.16412.210.414.9Podkarpackie553.9642.8512.22.0-1.16211.06.015.3Podlaskie604.4622.7492.82.4-0.96312.77.111.8Warszawski stołeczny1553.81341.81072.711.1-1.110315.13.518.7Mazowiecki regionalny704.6863.9673.01.6-0.94010.618.115.4 
 
      
 
   
 
its 

transportation  and 

the  Vistula 
in 

favourable 
petrochemicals,  supported  by 
river  and  ongoing 
location  on 
investments 
energy 
infrastructure, and Legnicko-Glogowski (99%), with 
its  industrial  specialisation  and  renewable  energy 
replacing  mining.  The  lowest  indicators  (below 
60%  of  the  EU  average)  were  recorded  in  the 
eastern and south-eastern sub-regions. 

improve  productivity  may  be 
Efforts  to 
undermined  by  the  deepening  unfavourable 
demographic trends, notably by the decline in 
(248)  and 
the  working-age  population 
population  ageing  (249).  It  is  assumed  that  the 
proportion of people aged over 65 in large cities in 
2060 will range from approximately 29% to 40% 
(250),  which  creates  economic,  fiscal  and  social 
challenges.  The  population  will  decrease  in  most 
regions  (most  notably  in  Śląskie),  except  for 
Warszawski Stołeczny (where population growth is 
assumed).  This  negative  trend  is  already  felt 
severely  in  Eastern  Poland.  Some  of  the  least 
developed  eastern  regions  (Świętokrzyskie  and 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie)  were  loosing  1.7%  of  the 
working-age population (20-64 years old) per year 
and  1.4-1.6%  of  the  young  population  per  year. 
Świętokrzyskie  and  Łódzkie  are  the  regions  with 
the  least  sustainable  population  structure,  with 
22%  of  the  population  aged  65+,  while  the 
proportion of older people (aged 65+) is increasing 
in  all  regions,  with  the  highest 
in 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie.  Only  the  capital  city,  being 
the  most  popular  destination  for  regional  and 
international  migration,  bucked  these  trends,  with 
an increase of 0.2% in the working-age population 
and 1.6% in the young population per year. 

increase 

Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in  Poland 
shows  pronounced  regional  concentration, 
with such investment heavily concentrated in 
two  regions,  Dolnośląskie  and  Warszawski 
Stołeczny, which together account for nearly 
40%  of  the  country’s  FDI  (2010-2024).  This 
concentration  contrasts  sharply  with  regions  like 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie,  where  FDI  contributes  only 
0.14%  to  regional  GDP,  compared  to  the  national 
average  of  2.63%.  Similarly,  Podlaskie  and 

struggle 

to  attract 

Świętokrzyskie 
foreign 
investment, limiting their capital formation and job 
creation 
regional 
imbalances,  FDI’s  still  has  an  overall  impact  on 
employment in Polish regions (251). 

potential.  Despite 

these 

Poland  could  build  on  its  economic  potential 
opportunities  while  tapping  into  clean  tech 
value  chains  with  specific  manufacturing 
competencies.  These  are:  electric  vehicle  (EV) 
batteries  (electrical  control / distribution  boards, 
Direct  Current  motors);  wind  energy  components 
(gearing,  ball  screws,  carbon/graphite  electrodes); 
and  solar  components  (glass  mirrors,  lighting 
arresters)  (252).  Initial  mapping  suggests  regional 
The 
concentration 
strongest 
in  western  and 
manufacturing  base  appears 
southern  Poland,  particularly  in  the  Dolnośląskie, 
Śląskie  and  Wielkopolskie  regions,  which  combine 
an  automotive  sector  legacy  with  growing  clean 
tech  manufacturing  capabilities.  These  regions 
show  particular  potential  for  EV  battery  value 
chain  development,  building  on  their  electrical 
control systems and DC motors competencies. 

patterns. 

Diversified  regional  competitive  potential  is 
linked  with  economic  differences  between 
regions  showing  uneven  innovation  patterns. 
The  leading  region,  Warszawski  Stołeczny  (with 
Summary Innovation Index at 103) scored at least 
twice  as  high  in  comparison  with  the  lowest 
performing  regions  of  Świętokrzyskie,  Lubuskie, 
Opolskie  (around  50)  and  its  neighbouring  region 
Mazowiecki  Regionalny  (40).  Notably,  only  two 
regions  were  classified  as  Moderate  Innovators 
(the  capital  city  region  and  Małopolskie),  while  all 
the others were classified as Emerging Innovators. 
However,  all  regions  have  registered  steady 
progress  since  2016,  in  particular  thanks  to 
increased innovation activities (253). In 2022, over 4 
in  10  (43%)  Polish  firms  developed  or  introduced 
new  products,  processes  or  services  as  part  of 
their  investment  activities.  This  is  above  the  EU 
average (39%) (254). 

(248) DG JRC/DG REGIO elaboration. 

(249) Statistics Poland, Regional Development of Poland. Analytical 

Report 2023. 

(250) Statistics Poland, Regional Development of Poland. Analytical 

report 2023. 

(251) OECD: Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages in Poland, 2025.  

(252) World Bank, EU Regular Economic Report, Clean Tech Value 

Chains, 2024. 

(253) Regional Innovation Scoreboard 2023, EIS interactive tool 

2024 | Research and Innovation. 

(254) EIB Investment Survey Country Overview 2023: Poland. 

108 

 
 
 
in  knowledge-intensive 

This  pattern  is  also  visible  in  business  R&D 
investment (1% of GDP, compared to 1.5% in 
the  EU)  highly  concentrated  in  the  capital 
region. In 2022, only Warszawski Stołeczny (2.1% 
of GDP) and Małopolskie (1.7%) exceeded the EU's 
GDP  share  for  business  enterprise  R&D  (255). 
Warszawski  Stołeczny  also  leads  with  the  highest 
employment 
services 
(54%)  and  high-tech  sectors  (11%)  in  2024. 
Pomorskie, Małopolskie, and Dolnośląskie are also 
above  the  EU  average  (5.2%)  for  high-tech 
regions  such  as 
employment. 
and 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie, 
Mazowiecki  Regionalny  spent  less  than  0.3%  of 
GDP  on  business  enterprise  R&D  and  employed 
less  than  2%  of  workers  in  high-tech  sectors, 
making  them  the  worst  innovation  performers  in 
Poland, with productivity levels significantly below 
the Polish average. 

Świętokrzyskie 

In  contrast, 

suffer 

regions 

eastern 

Further  challenges  arise  from  the  impact  of 
the  Russian  war  of  aggression,  which 
affected  the  ability  to  do  business  of  small 
in  eastern 
and  medium-size  enterprises 
regions,  in  particular  those  bordering  Russia 
increased  threat 
and  Belarus.  Due  to  the 
perception, 
from  
a  decline  of  flows  of  trade  and  people,  disrupted 
movement  of  goods  and  damage  to  energy  and 
communication  connections, 
leading  to  socio-
economic  difficulties  and  rising  security  concerns. 
In  all  four  eastern  regions,  particularly  those 
bordering  Russia  and  Belarus,  war  affects  key 
areas  of  business  operations,  such  as  company 
operating costs, business risk and prices of supply 
and  investment  goods,  and  therefore  affects  its 
competitiveness.  Most  companies  reduced  their 
investment outlays and frequently had to increase 
the prices of their products or services (256). 

eastern 

Insufficient  infrastructure  and  connectivity 
remain  the  major  problem  for  the  less 
hindering 
developed 
productivity  and  mobility 
labour 
market. Despite the dynamic development of the 
road  infrastructure  between  2011-2022  (increase 
of the total length of motorways and expressways 
by  717%  in  the  eastern  regions  vs.  170%  in 

regions, 

in  the 

Poland in relative numbers (257), a low level of the 
transport  accessibility  creates  barriers  for  the 
competitiveness,  mobility  on  the  labour  market 
and access to the public services of these regions 
(258).  Better  accessibility  is  crucial  for  attracting 
and  retaining  investments  and  contributes  to 
competitiveness.  Improving  connectivity  by  road 
and  rail  networks 
in  the  peripheral  regions, 
improves  the ease  with  which goods  and  services 
are  transported,  facilitating  better  market  access. 
Meanwhile,  only  the  capital  region  was  above  the 
EU  average  in  2021  (81%  of  the  population 
reachable within 1.5 hours by car). Świętokrzyskie 
was  the  worst  performing  region  (39%).  Only  the 
capital region (24%) and Pomorskie (21%) have a 
rail  performance  above  the  EU  average,  while 
Świętokrzyskie and Lubelskie lag behind on around 
3%. Compared to 2011, the total length of railway 
lines in use in the country decreased by 4.1%, with 
the 
in  the  Warmińsko-
Mazurskie region (-11.9%). 

largest  fall  recorded 

Ensuring access to high-speed internet in all 
regions,  particularly rural and  remote areas, 
is  crucial  for  bridging  the  digital  divide  and 
helping  regions  be  competitive.  Poland  made 
good  progress  in  fast  and  ultra-fast  broadband 
coverage, but regional disparities remain. In 2023, 
93%  of  Polish  households  had  access  to  the 
internet (compared with 70% in 2012). This figure 
ranged  from  95%  in  Warszawski  Stołeczny  and 
Opolskie  to  87%  in  Zachodniopomorskie.  Fixed 
High-Capacity  Network  coverage  in  Poland  is 
almost 82%, compared to the EU average of 79%. 
At  the  same  time,  at  regional  level  there  are 
disparities  in  the  access  to  ultra-fast  broadband. 
Lubuskie,  Warmińsko-Mazurskie  in  the  east  and 
Zachodniopomorskie,  Pomorskie  and  Dolnośląskie 
are  the  regions  with  the  lowest  percentage  of 
households  with  the  access  to  100 Mpbs  internet 
(between  72-78%  coverage).  The  expansion  of 
broadband internet access and the development of 
digital 
infrastructure  are  necessary  to  allow 
businesses in less developed regions to participate 
in  the  digital  economy,  boost  innovation,  and 
attract tech-based industries. 

(255) Statistics Poland. 

report 2023. 

(256) Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny, Wpływ wojny w Ukrainie na 

(258) PARP, Raport o stanie sektora malych i srednich 

działalność polskich firm, 2023. 

przedsiebiorstw w Polsce, 2024. 

(257) Statistics Poland, Regional development of Poland. Analytical 

109 

 
 
 
Map A17.2:  Average speed for fixed internet, 2023 

capacity, economic growth and access to essential 
public services. 

Social fairness 

The  problem of  access to  high  quality public 
services is particularly acute in smaller cities 
and  rural  areas  of  Poland,  affecting  various 
aspects  of  life,  including  healthcare.  Only 
19%  of  people  in  rural  areas  live  within  a  10-
the  nearest  health  centre, 
minute  drive  of 
compared with 29% in the EU, and the situation is 
even  more  dire 
in  certain  regions,  such  as 
Lubuskie.  According  to  Statistics  Poland  (GUS), 
people living in rural areas, particularly the eastern 
regions of Poland, live shorter lives in good health 
than those living in urban areas and in the west of 
the  country.  There  are  also  differences  between 
men  and  women,  with  women  living  longer  (see 
Annex  14). 
infrastructure, 
improving  transport  options  and  increasing  the 
availability  of  healthcare  services  could  help  to 
bridge  the  existing  gaps.  Moreover,  a  well-
organised  social  care  system,  including  long-term 
care,  would  help  to  relieve  the  burden  the 
healthcare system. 

Investing 

rural 

in 

and 

quickly 

In  some  Polish  regions,  demand  for  housing 
still  outstrips  supply,  leading  to  rapid  price 
diminishing 
increases 
affordability.  In  2022,  the  number  of  dwellings 
per  1 000  inhabitants  was  among  the  lowest  in 
the  EU  (412),  also  leading  to  overcrowding.  The 
price  of  new  apartments’  in  major  Polish  cities 
(such as Warsaw, Krakow and Wrocław) exceeded 
EUR 2 000  per  square  metre  (a  50%  increase 
to  2015).  Although  approximately 
compared 
100 000  new  units  were  built  demand  still 
outstrips  supply.  In  2023  approximately  4.9%  of 
the  Polish  households  faced  energy  poverty, 
their  home 
measured  by 
adequately  warm,  ranging  from  8.1%  in  Opolskie 
to 2.5% in Podlaskie (262). Housing policies to date 
have  proven 
the  allocated 
ineffective,  and 
financial  resources  insufficient.  In  2024,  housing 
cost  overburden  (263)  in  Poland  was  5.2%,  below 

to  keep 

inability 

(262) Eurostat, EU-SILC. 

(263) The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the 

population living in households where the total housing costs 
(‘net’ of housing allowances) represent more than 40% of 
disposable income (‘net’ of housing allowances’). 

110 

Source: Eurostat, JRC 

improving 

The  European  Quality  of  Government  Index 
(259)  shows  that  the  regional  quality  of 
government in Poland has deteriorated since 
2021  despite  improvement  between  2010 
and  2017.  The  recent  fiscal  reform  of  local 
governments’  units  (260)  is  an  important  step 
regional 
towards 
governance  in  Poland.  The  improved  capacity  of 
regions  to  co-finance  investments,  particularly 
those  under  EU  funds,  should  help 
improve 
competitiveness  at  regional  level.  A  transparent 
and  stable  financing  system,  independent  of  the 
central  government, should help regions and local 
administrations 
planning, 
particularly in the areas of investment and human 
capital  (261), 
improving  regions'  administrative 

the  quality  of 

long-term 

with 

(259) European Quality of Government Index 2024| University of 

Gothenburg 

(260) Act on the revenues of the self-government units (Dz. Ustaw 

RP, Poz. 1572, 1/10/2024). 

(261) Human capital encompasses knowledge, skills and 

competences, highlighting the importance of education, 
training and experience in building a workforce that drives 
economic growth, innovation and productivity. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
and 

industry 

background 

investments and favourable geographic conditions. 
Zachodniopomorskie  also 
Wielkopolskie  and 
perform  strongly,  contributing  74.6%  and  70.0% 
to 
renewable  energy  production,  highlighting 
successful  targeted  initiatives.  Overall,  Pomorskie 
and Zachodniopomorskie, making the most of their 
maritime 
port 
infrastructure, are well positioned to develop wind 
energy  component  manufacturing,  particularly  for 
the growing offshore wind sector. At the other end 
of  the  spectrum,  Opolskie  and  Mazowieckie  lag 
behind,  with  renewable  shares  of  6.2%  and  9.8% 
respectively,  indicating  significant  potential  for 
growth  and  development.  These  disparities 
underscore  the  need  for  tailored  strategies  to 
boost  take-up  of  renewables  in  lower-performing 
regions.  Continued  investment,  supportive  policies 
and technological advancements will be  crucial to 
bridge 
these  gaps  and  advance  Poland’s 
renewable energy landscape. 

Most regions lag behind other less developed 
EU regions in developing green infrastructure 
and creating environmental sector jobs. Green 
employment in Poland, with 10% of jobs classified 
as  sustainable  and  competitive,  is  also  below  the 
EU  average  of  15% (265).  It  is  concentrated  in  the 
capital region (31%), followed by Dolnośląskie and 
Śląskie  (20%  and  16%  respectively).  In  contrast, 
10  of  the  remaining  regions,  including  the  less 
economically developed regions, are below the EU 
benchmark  for  less  developed  regions  (6%),  with 
Lubelskie and Świętokrzyskie at the bottom on less 
than 1%. 

the  EU  average  (8.2%),  with  relatively  small 
differences  between  cities  (5.7%)  and  rural  areas 
(4.9%).  At  regional  level,  however,  it  varies  from 
2.4%  in  the  least  economically  developed  region 
of  Podkarpackie  to  7.5%  in  Zachodniopomorskie 
and  Pomorskie.  A  large  influx  of  refugees  from 
Ukraine  has  put  additional  pressure  on  Poland’s 
housing market. Finally, a substantial challenge for 
the construction industry is the need to align with 
environmental,  social  and  government  regulations 
and improve buildings' energy efficiency (264). 

Sustainability 

Transitioning  to  a  greener  economy  is  a 
challenge,  especially  for  five  regions  reliant 
on  coal  and  heavy  industries.  These  regions 
(Dolnośląskie,  Małopolskie,  Wielkopolskie,  Śląskie 
and  Łódzkie)  receive  support  from  the  Just 
Transition Fund. Shifting away from coal threatens 
local  economies,  risking  job  losses  and  social 
unrest. 

Additionally,  the  infrastructure  needed  to  support 
green  energy  is  still  underdeveloped.  In  2023, 
Poland’s  average  greenhouse  gas  emissions  per 
capita  were  significantly  higher  than  the  EU 
average  (9.9  tonnes  of  CO2  equivalent,  compared 
to  7.1  tonnes  in  the  EU).  Values  above  the  EU 
average  were  recorded  in  11  of  the  17  regions, 
reaching  26  tCO2eq in  Opolskie.  These transitions, 
while challenging, present significant opportunities 
for 
their 
local 
technological 
competitiveness 
modernisation  and  access  to  growing  green 
technology  markets,  particularly  as  environmental 
standards become increasingly important in global 
supply chains. 

to 
through 

industries 

increase 

importance  of 

Polish  regions  face  both  challenges  and 
opportunities  in  transitioning  to  renewable 
energy. The country’s official  reports confirm the 
growing 
renewables,  which 
exceeded  27%  of  national  energy  production  in 
2023.  Warmińsko-Mazurskie  and  Podlaskie  lead 
the  way,  with  outstanding  renewable  energy 
respectively, 
shares  of  97.6%  and  85.4% 
regional 
demonstrating 

the  effectiveness  of 

(264) Real Estate Guidebook Poland 2024: Awaiting market revival. 
Key trends driving the real estate market in Poland (Real 
Estate Guide in Poland 2024 | EY - Global). 

(265) JRC :Measuring transition to a competitive and sustainable 

economy. 

111