REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)
Date: 2025-06-02
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: civil procedure, civil rights, commercial law, enforcement of ruling, judicial cooperation in civil matters in the EU, jurisdiction, patent law, private international law, right to justice

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.6.2025  COM(2025) 268 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE on the application of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast)     {SWD(2025) 135 final}  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 

1.1. Background 

Regulation  (EU)  No  1215/2012  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast)1, hereafter ‘the Regulation’, is indisputably the backbone of 
EU private international law. It lays down uniform rules to settle conflicts of jurisdiction and 
sets  the  standard  for  the  free  circulation  of  judgments,  authentic  instruments,  and  court 
settlements in the European Union with the ultimate aim of facilitating access to justice in all 
areas  of  civil  and  commercial  law  outside  the  realm  of  family,  succession,  and  insolvency 
law.  It  repealed  and  replaced  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  44/2001  on  jurisdiction  and  the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters2 (‘the Brussels I 
Regulation’). The Regulation has to a large extent confirmed and reinforced the provisions of 
its predecessor, but has also introduced relevant novelties, such as the abolition of exequatur.  
The Regulation,  as amended in  20143, has been  applied since 10 January 2015 between  all 
Member States, including Denmark4.  

1.2. Preparation and the objectives of this Report 

This  Report  has  been  prepared  in  accordance  with  Article  79  of  the  Regulation.  In  its 
preparation, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the CJEU’ or ‘the 
Court’)5,  constituted  a  key  source  of  information  on  the  application  of  the  Regulation.  The 
Report also uses the findings of the study commissioned by the Commission to support the 
preparation of this Report6 (‘the Study’). Member States have been consulted as part of this 
Study and their views, as well as the additional elements provided by certain Member States 
following  the  Commission’s  request  at  the  meeting  of  the  Council  Working  Party  on  Civil 
Matters (General Questions) of 28 February 2024, have been considered.  
This  Report  has  also  been  informed  by  the  findings  of  the  JUDGTRUST  project7,  and  the 
information  on  the  practical  application  of  the  Regulation  collected  through  the  European 
Judicial  Network  in  Civil  and  Commercial  Matters  in  the  course  of  2023.  Finally,  relevant 
national case-law, where available, was consulted in the preparation of this Report.  

The  objective  of  the  Report  is  to  present  an  overall  assessment  of  the  application  of  the 
Regulation  with  a  special  focus  on  its  most  challenging  aspects  as  well  as  those  explicitly 

1   OJ L 351, 20.12.2012, p. 1. 
2   OJ L 12, 16.1.2001, p. 1. 
3   Regulation  (EU)  No  542/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014  amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 as regards the rules to be applied with respect to the Unified Patent Court and 
the Benelux Court of Justice, OJ L163, 29.5.2014, p.1. The amendment aimed at enabling the implementation 
of the so-called ‘patent package’ first, by allowing the entry into force of the Unified Patent Court Agreement 
(OJ C 175, 20.6.2013, p. 1) and second, by ensuring the compliance with the Regulation of this Agreement as 
well as the Protocol to the Benelux Treaty of 1965.  

4   Denmark  applies  the  Regulation  in  line  with  the  Agreement  of  19  October  2005  between  the  European 
Community  and  Denmark  on  jurisdiction  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and 
commercial matters, OJ L 299, 16.11.2005, p. 62. 

5   Only judgments and Opinions of the Advocates general issued before 1 April 2025 were considered.  
6   The Study was prepared by Milieu SRL and is available at Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu). 
7   The  project  ‘Regulation  Brussels  Ia:  a  standard  for  free  circulation  of  judgments  and  mutual  trust  in  the 
European  Union’  (JUDGTRUST)  funded  by  the  European  Commission’s  Justice  Programme  (JUST-AG-
2017/JUST-JCOO-AG-2017) was implemented by the T.M.C. Asser Instituut in cooperation with Universität 
Hamburg, University of Antwerp and Internationaal Juridisch Instituut. The main findings of the project are 
available at: Asser.nl.  

1 

 
 
 
listed  in Article  79.  Moreover,  it  looks  into  a  number  of  new  and  emerging  issues  such  as 
digitalisation,  collective  redress  and  areas  that  could  benefit  from  the  simplification  and 
modernisation of current rules. 

Additional information on selected issues, including more detailed analysis, and references to 
the  case-law  of  the  CJEU  are  included  in  the  Staff  working  document  accompanying  this 
Report. 

1.3. General overview of the application of the Regulation  

It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  Regulation  is  a  highly  successful  instrument  and  the 
enhancements that it provided, such as the abolition of exequatur, have strengthened judicial 
cooperation in civil and commercial matters and as such have been welcomed by the Member 
States  and  the  stakeholders.  The  rules  of  the  Regulation,  as  a  whole,  are  considered  to  be 
clear and simple and, for this reason, are highly appreciated amongst practitioners. 

There is also a broad consensus that in principle the case-law of the CJEU provides sufficient 
guidance  and  assistance  for  the  judiciary  when  applying  the  rules  of  the  Regulation. 
However, on some specific issues several Member States take the view that the interpretation 
of the Regulation raises complex issues, and they suggest clarifications by the legislator.  

Given the general satisfaction with the operation of the Regulation, any modifications should 
respond  to  real  practical  difficulties  and  should  not  lead  to  an  overhaul  of  the  well-
functioning system of the Regulation. In particular, such modifications should aim to further 
simplify  the  Regulation  and  reduce  administrative  burdens,  specifically  for  weaker  parties, 
such  as  consumers,  or  for  SMEs.  At  the  same  time,  difficulties  that  can  be  adequately 
resolved by future case-law should be left out from the scope of any legislative intervention. 

2. SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND DEFINITIONS  

2.1. Scope of application (Article 1)  

The  Regulation  applies  in  civil  and  commercial  matters  in  cases  with  cross-border 
implications.  A  number  of  subject  matters  which  could  otherwise  be  classified  as  civil  or 
commercial  are  expressly  excluded  from  the  scope  of  application.  Generally  speaking,  the 
scope  provisions  function  well,  but  some  questions  of  interpretation  seem  to  come  back 
regularly, in particular with regard to the notion of cross-border implications or the exclusion 
of arbitration.  

It follows from the case-law of the CJEU and the consultations conducted in the framework 
of  the  Study  that  a  number  of  issues  require  special  attention  in  the  assessment  of  the 
application of the Regulation: 

•  The  standard  to  be  used  in  order  to  decide  whether  a  matter  has  cross-border 

implications. 

•  The definition of ‘civil and commercial’. 

•  The delineation of insolvency-related claims (excluded from the scope). 

•  The exclusion of arbitration8. 

8   With the exception of this point, analysed below, the other three issues are presented in more detail in  Part I 

of the Staff working document accompanying this Report.  

2 

 
 
 
The exclusion of arbitration 

Matters related to arbitration have been excluded from the scope of the Regulation ever since 
the  Brussels  Convention  was  adopted  in  1968.  However,  the  Regulation  reinforced  this 
exclusion  by  inserting  clarifying  language  in  Recital  12,  as  well  as  a  specific  provision  in 
Article  73(2)  aimed  at  avoiding  any  overlap  with  the  Convention  on  the  Recognition  and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards9 (‘the New York Convention’).  

In  London  Steam-Ship  Owners’  Mutual  Insurance  Association  (C-700/20)  decided  in  2022 
under the Brussels I Regulation, the CJEU ruled that an irreconcilable judgment given in the 
terms of an arbitral award can prevent the recognition of  a judgment from another Member 
State on the basis of Article 34(3) of the Brussels I Regulation (Article 45 of the Regulation), 
but then tied the applicability of the refusal ground to the condition that it is only available 
where  the  content  of  the  arbitral  award  could  have  been  the  object  of  a  judgment  given  in 
accordance with the rules of the Brussels I Regulation. It should be noted in this context that 
the Court reached this decision  not on the basis of irreconcilability of the foreign judgment 
with an arbitral award but only with reference to a judgment confirming an arbitral award. At 
the same time, the Court ruled that the public policy exception cannot be relied upon on the 
basis of such irreconcilability.   

The Study revealed a mixed picture. While a majority of respondents did not encounter any 
issues with the application of this exclusion, national case-law in eight Member States shows 
that  the  arbitration  exception  covers  not  only  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  arbitral 
awards, but also that of judgments confirming such awards. This practice would seem to be at 
odds  with  the  Court’s  judgment  in  London  Steam-Ship  Owners’  Mutual  Insurance 
Association.  

The judgment of the CJEU also points to another issue, namely the lack of a lis pendens rule 
regarding arbitration proceedings. In fact, the risk of irreconcilability between arbitral awards 
or the judgments confirming such awards and other judgments would probably be reduced or 
even eliminated if the Regulation would have a clear rule of priority in such circumstances. 

As  a  result,  a  possible  future  review  could  further  look  into  whether  certain  practical 
situations  can be addressed in  the Regulation,  for instance by  providing a clear  lis  pendens 
rule  which  could  prevent  situations  of  irreconcilability  between  an  arbitral  award/judgment 
confirming such an award and another judgment. 

2.2. Definitions (Articles 2 and 3) 

The  Regulation  contains  a  number  of  definitions  in Article  2,  among  others  of  ‘judgment’, 
‘court settlement’ or ‘authentic instrument’.   

The definition of ‘judgment’ refers to any such act of the judiciary, whatever it may be called, 
issued  by  a  ‘court  or  tribunal  of  a  Member  State’.  The  Regulation  does  not  contain  a 
definition of ‘court or tribunal’. 

As a novelty in the Regulation, Article 2(a) expressly extended the definition of judgment to 
include certain types of provisional, including protective, measures. However, it subjects the 
recognition and enforcement of such measures in other Member States to two conditions.  

First,  it  limits  the  circulation  of  provisional  measures  to  those  ordered  by  courts  having 
jurisdiction  as  to  the  substance  of  the  matter  under  the  Regulation.  This  means  that  while 

9   Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards adopted 10 June 1958, entered into 

force on 7 June 1959 330 UNTS 38. 

3 

 
 
 
provisional measures can still be ordered by courts that have jurisdiction as to the substance 
of  the  matter  under  national  law,  such  decisions  cannot  be  recognised  and  enforced  abroad 
under the Regulation. 

Second,  the  definition  codifies  existing  case-law  (see,  for  instance,  Denilauler,  125/79)  to 
exclude purely ex parte measures from circulation. As a result, provisional measures can be 
recognised or enforced only if the debtor has been summoned to appear or has been served 
with  the  decision  containing  the  measures  prior  to  enforcement.  This  exclusion  of  ex  parte 
provisional  measures  from  circulation  under  the  Regulation  seems  to  pose  some  practical 
problems. For instance, the Study showed that in AT and CZ most provisional measures are 
ex  parte  and  thus  cannot  benefit  from  enforcement  under  the  Regulation.  More  generally, 
while  the  current  system  favours  the  protection  of  the  procedural  rights  of  the  defendant,  a 
key  element  of  provisional  measures,  namely  their  ability  to  be  quickly  and  efficiently 
enforced, is affected. Under the current regime a creditor has to choose between the surprise 
effect inherent in ex parte proceedings and a restriction of the enforceability of the measures 
to the Member State where they were granted or between a decision that can circulate but has 
to be based on the prior involvement (and thus warning) of the debtor.  

Another issue concerns the authorities expressly stipulated in Article 3 as being a “court” for 
the  purposes  of  the  Regulation.  In  Pula  Parking  (C-551/15),  when  faced  with  the  question 
whether Croatian notaries can be qualified as a  ‘court or tribunal’ under the Regulation, the 
CJEU replied in the negative, citing the lack of inter partes proceedings as the main reason in 
line  with  previous  case-law  (Denilauler,  125/79).  It  needs  to  be  taken  into  account  though 
that  the  Croatian  procedure  is  very  similar  to  the  Hungarian  notarial  summary  order  for 
payment  proceedings  referred  to  in Article  3(a)  of  the  Regulation.  It  is  not  surprising,  also 
from an equal treatment perspective, that most of the respondents that considered the concept 
of ‘court or tribunal’ problematic were from Croatia and that some Member States stated that 
in the event of an amendment or recast they would like to introduce additional entities under 
the exceptions of Article 3. The overwhelming majority of respondents in the Study did not 
find any issues with the definitions in the Regulation.  

As  a  result,  a  possible  future  review  of  the  Regulation  could  further  look  into  this  matter, 
including  the  possibility  to  provide  a  definition  or  description  of  the  concept  of  ‘court  or 
tribunal’ that would, on the one hand, enhance the effectiveness of the Regulation and, on the 
other  hand,  would  possibly  do  away  with  the  need  to  provide  for  exceptions.  Further 
reflection is also needed on the concept of provisional measures, in particular on whether ex 
parte measures should be included.  

3. JURISDICTION  

3.1.  Possible  extension  of  the  jurisdiction  rules  to  defendants  domiciled  in  third 
countries 

The  rules  on  jurisdiction  set  out  in  Chapter  II  of  the  Regulation  apply  to  cases  where  the 
defendant  is  domiciled  in  a  Member  State,  save  for  some  specific  situations  (consumer 
contracts,  individual  contracts  of  employment,  situations  where  courts  have  exclusive 
jurisdiction  or  where  a  court  is  chosen  by  the  parties).  For  any  other  disputes  involving  a 
defendant  domiciled outside  the Union, jurisdiction is  governed by the national  laws of the 
Member States10.  

10  See Article 6 of the Regulation. 

4 

 
 
 
The  2010  Commission  proposal  for  the  recast  of  the  Brussels  I  Regulation11  (the  ‘2010 
Proposal’)  suggested  the  extension  of  the  Regulation  to  also  cover  jurisdiction  in  disputes 
where the defendants are domiciled outside the Union. During the legislative process it was 
considered that such a solution would be appropriate in some situations, for instance where 
one  of  the  parties  to  the  contract  is  considered  to  be  a  weaker  party  (such  as  in  consumer 
contracts  or  in  individual  contracts  of  employment),  but  that  for  an  application  across  the 
board  a  multilateral  solution  would  be  preferable. At  the  time  such  a  multilateral  solution 
could  have  been  envisaged,  in  particular  in  the  framework  of  the  Hague  Conference  on 
Private International Law. 

Such a solution could have been found in the framework of the then ongoing negotiations that 
eventually led to the adoption in 2019 of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of  Foreign  Judgments  in  Civil  or  Commercial  Matters  (the  ‘Judgments  Convention’). 
However,  that  instrument  does  not  contain  direct  grounds  of  jurisdiction,  but  only  refers  to 
jurisdiction  in  an  indirect  manner,  as  a  pre-condition  for  recognition  and  enforcement. 
Currently work is still ongoing at the Hague Conference in the area of jurisdiction, but this 
work is unlikely to lead to a binding multilateral solution on direct grounds of jurisdiction. 
The absence of such rules in the Regulation poses several challenges12. Firstly, as the national 
laws of the Member States vary greatly, the current state of affairs creates an unequal access 
to  justice  and an unequal  playing field  for EU  and non-EU businesses and citizens that  are 
involved  in  international  (extra-EU)  dealings  depending  simply  on  where  they  have  their 
domicile. While parties in some Member States can sue third country defendants based on a 
large  array  of  jurisdictional  grounds,  including  sometimes  exorbitant  ones,  other  parties  in 
other Member States may face a more limited spectrum of jurisdictional grounds to sue such 
parties13. This unequal footing is further exacerbated  by the fact that the judgments  at hand 
can be recognised and enforced throughout the Union based on the Regulation, even where 
the jurisdiction of the court of origin is exorbitant. 

In addition, this state of affairs seems to have a negative impact on business and human rights 
litigation. In this type of litigation often victims14 would seek to sue both a foreign business 
domiciled outside the EU and a controlling parent company, often based in the EU. Different 
Member  States  have  different  rules  on  the  possibility  to  establish  jurisdiction  on  the  third-
country subsidiary at the seat of the parent company. This situation creates legal uncertainty 
and, once again, puts EU parties, in this case both the plaintiff and the defendant parent EU 
company,  on  an  unequal  footing.  The  current  rules  of  Article  8,  which  enable  the 
concentration of proceeding at the domicile of one of the defendants, do not apply if one of 
them is domiciled outside the EU (see Sapir and Others (C-645/11)). This means that if the 
national  rules  do  not  allow  concentration  of  proceedings  there  could  be  two  parallel  cases, 
one against the parent company in the EU and the other one against the subsidiary in the third 
country, with the risk of having irreconcilable judgments. 

The Study revealed a mixed picture on  the  extension  of the jurisdiction rules  to  defendants 
domiciled in third countries. Many respondents did not have an opinion on whether the lack 
of such rules constitutes a problem. A majority of Member States did not consider the absence 

11  See  the  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  jurisdiction  and  the 
recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and  commercial  matters,  14.12.2010  COM(2010)  748 
final.  

12  As confirmed by the consultation activities conducted in the framework of the Study.  
13  This could be of relevance for example in relation to influencers domiciled outside the EU who are involved 
in the marketing of products vis-à-vis EU buyers without being the sellers of those products.  
14  Irrespective of the domicile of the victim, in or outside the EU. 

5 

 
 
 
of rules  as being  an issue  but  some  criticised the current  situation as  increasing  transaction 
costs and adding complexity for plaintiffs, practitioners, and the judiciary.  

As a result, a possible future review of the Regulation  could further look into the matter of 
extending the jurisdictional rules to include disputes involving defendants domiciled outside 
the Union. 

3.2. Special jurisdiction (Articles 7 – 9) 

The  Study  and  the  National  Reports  of  the  JUDGTRUST  project  unsurprisingly  illustrate 
that, amongst the rules on special jurisdiction, Article 7 is most frequently relied upon, whilst 
Article  8  is  rarely  applied15  and  there  is  almost  no  practice  or  discussions  in  the  literature 
relating to Article 916.  

Article 7 has been only slightly modified during the prior recast process and continues to be 
extensively  applied  by  national  courts.  As  a  result,  it  has  generated  more  referrals  for 
preliminary rulings to the CJEU than any other provision of the Regulation.  

The  majority  of  the  Member  States  reported  the  application  of  Article  7  to  be  non-
problematic. According to the Study, no issues were reported on the operation of Articles 7(3) 
to 7(7)17, as they continue to be rarely applied in practice. However, numerous referrals from 
national courts to the CJEU, as supported by the responses of several Member States, reveal 
several major issues related to Articles 7(1) and 7(2): 

•  An increasingly broad interpretation of the scope of ‘matters relating to a contract’. 

•  Determination of the place of performance of contractual obligations. 

•  Determination of the place of damage in cases of pure financial loss. 

•  The application of the ‘mosaic’ principle in cases involving the violation of privacy 

rights. 

3.2.1. Article 7(1) 

Article  7(1)  establishes  a  rule  of  special  jurisdiction  in  disputes  concerning  contractual 
obligations. However, it does not establish the definition of contractual matters and does not 
provide any indicia in this respect.  

Recent judgments of the CJEU, such as flightright GmbH (Joined Cases C-274/16, C-447/16, 
and C-448/16) and Feniks (C-337/17), illustrate that concept of ‘matters relating to a contract’ 
is  interpreted  in  a  broad  manner.  This  concept  extends  to  actions  that  can  be  linked  to  a 
contract,  even if no contract  was  concluded between the parties to  the proceedings18, if the 
contract is disputed or void, or if the contract was made between different parties than those 
involved in the proceedings.  

The  Study  and  the  referrals  from  national  courts  to  the  CJEU  show  that  the  broad 
interpretation  of  ‘matters  relating  to  a  contract’  may  present  practical  difficulties  in  some 
cases,  in  particular  when  such  an  interpretation  differs  from  the  interpretation  of  similar 

15  It is worth noting however that recent referrals to the CJEU show an increasing use of Article 8(1) in cartel 
cases.  Detailed analysis of the application of Article 8(1) is included in  Part I of the  Staff working document 
accompanying this Report to this Report.  
16  For this reason, this Report does not look into the application of Article 9. 
17  Except for academic discussions concerning Articles 7(4) and 7(5) in a handful of the Member States. 
18  For example, where a passenger asks the operating carrier to pay compensation for a delayed flight, despite 

the fact that the contract was concluded with a different carrier.  

6 

 
 
 
national  concepts  or is  considered challenging  to  reconcile with  the principles of proximity 
and  predictability  underlying  Article  7(1).  In  this  regard,  it  is  suggested  that  the  broad 
interpretation  of the notion of ‘matters  relating  to a contract’ could  lead  to  significant  legal 
uncertainties for third parties, which might find themselves sued in the place of performance 
of a contract they were unaware of. This concern is particularly relevant for claims based on 
actio  pauliana,  which,  according  to  the  ruling  in  Feniks  (C-337/17),  are  also  considered 
‘matters relating to a contract’.  

Once  a  national  court  establishes  that  a  situation  falls  withing  the  scope  of  application  of 
Article  7(1),  i.e.,  is  ‘a  matter  relating  to  a  contract’,  it  has  to  determine  the  place  of 
performance of the contractual obligation. This appears to be challenging due to the fact that 
the  solutions  adopted  by  the  CJEU19  in  specific  cases  cannot  always  be  extended  to  cases 
with  different  factual  settings,  especially  in  situations  involving  multiple  places  of 
performance,  and  multiple  obligations,  or  in  relation  to  contracts  that  do  not  involve  any 
physical  transfer  of  goods,  which  are  increasingly  relevant  in  the  digital  economy  (e.g. 
contracts  for  the  provision  of  digital  services  or  digital  content,  including  data).  The  latter 
aspect  is  illustrated  by  a  recent  judgment  in  VariusSystems  (C-526/23),  where  the  place  of 
performance had to be determined for a contract under which the applicant, based in Austria, 
developed and supplied software for the defendant, based in Germany, for the evaluation of 
COVID-19 screening tests for use in German testing centres. In this case the referring court 
doubted  whether  the  place  of  performance  is  in  Austria,  where  the  intellectual  creation 
(‘programming’)  behind  the  software  is  performed  and  the  undertaking  is  established  or  in 
Germany where the software reaches the customer and is accessed and used. 

When it comes to determining the place of performance in cases involving multiple places of 
performance,  the  fact  that  national  courts  continue  to  seek  guidance  on  the  application  of 
Article 7(1) from the CJEU each time a situation in the main proceedings differs from those 
previously  addressed  by  the  CJEU  suggests  that  there  may  be  a  need  for  more  general 
guidance,  all  the  more  so  since  the  rule  in  Article  7(1)  governs  not  only  international 
jurisdiction but also territorial jurisdiction within a Member State.2021 

Finally, regarding the determination of the place of performance, the Study reveals that some 
Member  States  express  concerns  over  what  they  perceive  as  a  complex  structure  of Article 
7(1). Article  7(1)  provides  for  an  autonomous  concept  of  the  place  of  performance  for  two 
types  of  contracts  (sales  and  services)  in  Article  7(1)(b),  while  maintaining  the  seldom- 
applied Tessili-formula for other types of contracts in Article 7(1)(c), although that formula is 
seen  as  particularly  complicated  and  unsuitable  in  practice.  In  line  with  Tessili  (12/76), 
national  courts  must  rely  on  the  applicable  national  law  to  determine  the  place  of 
performance in the absence of  an agreement by the parties in that respect. This means that, 
already  at  the  stage  of  assessing  jurisdiction,  national  courts  must  engage  in  a  multi-step 
exercise:  they  must  first  determine  which  is  the  ‘obligation  in  question’,  as  a  second  step, 
they have to determine the applicable substantive law based on the conflict of law rules and 

19  See, to that effect, the judgments of 3 May 2007,  Color Drack, C-386/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:262, of 9 July 
2009,  Rehder,  C-204/98,  ECLI:EU:C:2009:439,  of  11  March  2010,  Wood  Floor  Solutions  Andreas 
Domberger GmbH v Silva Trade SA, C-19/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:137. 

20  Similar issues when applying Article 7(2) in cases where damage occurs in multiple places were evidenced 

by the Dutch court in recent referral (Apple, C-34/24)).  

21  According to the Study, in such cases (and more generally in all cases where the determination of the place of 
performance is difficult), some scholars suggest making Article 7(1) unavailable for claimants. Alternatively, 
they  suggest,  subject  to  various  conditions,  replacing  the  criterion  in  Article  7(1)  by  the  domicile  of  the 
claimant.  

7 

 
 
 
only  then  the  courts  can  apply  that  national  substantive  law  to  determine  the  place  of 
performance. 

The future review of the Regulation could look into the possibilities to simplify rules on the 
place of performance in Article 7(1).  

3.2.2. Article 7(2) 

While  Article  7(1)  concerns  contractual  obligations,  Article  7(2)  lays  down  special 
jurisdiction rules for torts. The autonomous interpretation of the concept of ‘torts’ has created 
some complexities22 but the delineation between Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) has not caused 
major problems in practice, partly because of the recent comprehensive guidance provided by 
the CJEU in Wikingerhof (C-59/19)23.  

The localisation of the place of damage in cases of pure financial loss and the maintenance of 
the  mosaic  principle  in  cases  involving  the  violation  of  personality  rights  appear  to  be  the 
most problematic aspects of the application of Article 7(2).  

•  Localisation of purely financial loss 

Regarding the localisation of purely financial damage, the CJEU has developed a substantial 
body of case-law, that may, however, not always offer the desired level of legal certainty. It 
seems  judgments  such  as  Kolassa  (C-375/13)  and  Universal  Music  (C-12/15)24  have  not 
provided  comprehensive  guidance,  leading  to  further  requests  from  national  courts  for 
clarification of Article 7(2).  

It  follows  from  the  case-law  of  the  Court  that  the  mere  location  of  an  investment  account 
cannot  be considered  as  sufficient to  establish the place  where purely  financial loss occurs. 
Moreover,  no  approach  yet  exists  that  is  clear  and  consistent  in  all  respects  regarding  the 
specific circumstances that must be present to determine court jurisdiction in cases involving 
the  place  where  the  damage  occurred. This  is  illustrated  by  the  judgment  in Kronhofer  (C-
168/02), where the CJEU ruled that neither the place of the applicant’s domicile nor the place 
where his assets are concentrated could be considered as a factor attributing jurisdiction if the 

22  Several  Member  States  reported  that  they  consider  this  autonomous  interpretation  as  complex,  inconsistent 
and a source of legal uncertainty. For example, in Brogsitter (C-548/12) the CJEU ruled that the civil liability 
claim at issue was to be considered as ‘a matter relating to a contract’ despite its qualification as tort under 
national  law.  Moreover,  under  the  case-law  of  the  CJEU  one  concept  within  the  scope  the  Rome  II 
Regulation (culpa in contrahendo) falls within the scope of Article 7(2) of the Regulation, whereas another 
(unjust enrichment) does not. 

23  In paragraphs 32 and 33 of this judgment, the CJEU established that an action concerns matters relating to a 
contract if the interpretation of the contract between the defendant and the applicant appears indispensable to 
establish the lawful or, on the contrary, unlawful nature of the conduct complained of against the former by 
the latter. That is in particular the case of an action based on the terms of a contract or on rules of law which 
are applicable by reason of that contract. By contrast, where the applicant relies on rules of liability in tort, 
delict  or  quasi-delict,  namely  breach  of  an  obligation  imposed  by  law,  and  where  it  does  not  appear 
indispensable to examine the content of the contract concluded with the defendant in order to assess whether 
the conduct of which the latter is accused is lawful or unlawful, since that obligation applies to the defendant 
independently of that contract, the cause of the action is a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within 
the meaning of point 2 of Article 7 of the Regulation. 

24  In both Kolassa and Universal Music a party that suffered pure financial loss as a result of an unfavourable 
contract claimed damages on a non-contractual basis from a third party, that was not a party to the contract 
but that was responsible for the unfavourable contract and the consequential damages. In Kolassa, the CJEU 
ruled  that  the  courts  of  the  Member  State  where  the  investor  is  domiciled  and  where  the  damaged  bank 
account  is  located  have  jurisdiction  to  hear  cross-border  non-contractual  claims  concerning  pure  financial 
loss. In  Universal Music, the CJEU  found that it would be insufficient to look solely at the  location of the 
bank account where the financial damage directly materialized. 

8 

 
 
 
relevant investment account is in another jurisdiction, but did not indicate which connecting 
factor would suffice.  

In  the  recent  judgment  of  the  CJEU  in  VEB  (C-709/19),  the  CJEU  relied  on  the  so-called 
‘market  localisation’  of  the  damage  and  ruled  that  only  the  courts  of  the  Member  State  in 
which  a  listed  company  must  fulfil  its  statutory  reporting  obligations  have  international 
jurisdiction  and  dismissed  the  residence  of  the  shareholders  that  suffered  financial  loss  on 
their  investment  accounts  as  a  decisive  factor  in  establishing  the  location  where  the  loss 
occurred.  It  is  however  not  entirely  clear  whether  the  national  courts  still  need  to  consider 
those two criteria or not when determining the place of purely financial loss. 

The uncertainty about the criteria that the national courts have to consider when determining 
the  place  of  purely  financial  loss  for  the  purpose  of  international  and  territorial  jurisdiction 
and the lack of clarity in the case-law of the CJEU in this respect is undesirable and creates a 
risk of non-uniform application of Article 7(2) of the Regulation. For this reason, it has been 
suggested to abandon the choice between the place of the event giving rise to the damage and 
the place where the damage occurred in situations involving purely financial loss, and to give 
jurisdiction only to the courts of the place of the event giving rise to the damage (locus delicti 
commissi).25  In  this  context,  it  should  however  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Rome  II 
Regulation26 only admits the country where the damage occurs to determine applicable law.  

•  Violation of personality rights 

As for the protection of personality rights, the main controversies concern the application of 
the  criterion  of  the  place  where  damage  occurs  to  publications,  and  the  so-called  ‘mosaic’ 
principle  first  established  in  Shevill  (C-68/93)  in  respect  to  paper  publications  and  later 
extended to online publications. In Shevill the CJEU ruled that Article 7(2) of the Regulation 
attributes  jurisdiction  to  the  courts  of  each  Member  State  in  which  the  publication  was 
distributed and where the victim claims to have suffered injury to his or her reputation as the 
place where damage materialized, but only in respect of the harm caused in that State, not for 
the  world-wide  damage27.  In eDate  (C-509/09  and  C-161/10),  the  mosaic  principle  was 
extended  to  cases  of  personality  rights  violations  online.  However,  in  the  case  of  online 
content,  the  courts  of  the  place  where  the  victim’s  centre  of  interests  is  located28  were 
considered  to  have  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  entirety  of  damage29.  The  distinction 
between online and offline content could be criticised as difficult to apply in practice, since 
most of the newspapers are available both in print (offline) and online30. 

25  See  the  Opinion  of  the  Advocate  General  Sánchez-Bordona  delivered  on  17  December  2020  in  VEB, 

paragraph 33. 

26  Regulation  (EC)  No  864/2007  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11 July  2007  on  the  law 

applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II). 

27  That damage can only be claimed in the Member State where the defendant is domiciled (Article 4) or where 

the event giving rise to the damage occurred (Article 7(2)).  

28  Understood as referring more precisely to the place where  the person  concerned draws the most important 

economic, political, social or even simply relational benefits from his or her reputation. 

29  This was confirmed in Bolagsupplysningen (C-194/16), Mittelbayerischer Verlag (C-800/19) and Gtflix Tv v 
DR (C-251/20) as well as the fact that the courts of every other Member State, in which the information was 
accessible, are competent to adjudicate only for the damage accruing in that Member State. The CJEU further 
clarified  that  only  courts  having  jurisdiction  over  the  entire  damage  are  competent  to  rule  on  requests  for 
removal and rectification of allegedly disparaging content since those requests are not separable per Member 
State as the amount of damages. 

30  As a  result, the courts are required to complete  the  challenging task of finding out at the centre  of interest 
which  damage  has  been  caused  online  (can  be  claimed  world-wide)  or  offline  (can  only  be  claimed  in  a 
single Member State). 

9 

 
 
 
According to the Study and the findings of the JUDGTRUST project, the CJEU’s case-law on 
the  violation  of  personality  rights  has  been  criticized  by  scholars,  some Advocates  General 
and  practitioners.  Critics  claim  that  the  mere  accessibility  of  the  infringing  content  is  not 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction based on the place where the damage occurred, and that the 
application of the mosaic principle  brings about  a multiplication of fora that does not serve 
the  legitimate  interest  of  any  party  and  defies  the  objectives  of  predictability  and  sound 
administration of justice31.  

This criticism is particularly pertinent in the context of the phenomenon of strategic lawsuits 
against  public  participation  (‘SLAPPs’)  that  the  recently  adopted  Anti-SLAPP  Directive32 
aims to combat. SLAPPs constitute an abuse of court proceedings as their objective is not to 
genuinely  exercise  the  right  of  access  to  justice,  but  to  serve  as  a  tool  to  intimidate  the 
defendant. These proceedings can be based on various grounds,  with  allegations relating  to 
defamation  or  other  violations  of  privacy  rights  being  most  common.  Defamation  lawsuits 
claiming  compensation  for  damages  or  injunctions  often  target  journalists  and  may  be 
intentionally  used  to  silence  criticism  or  to  prevent  the  media  from  exercising  its  role  as 
‘watchdog’. Such judicial harassment can be facilitated through the application of the mosaic 
approach, which leads to a large number of available jurisdictions that can be seised by the 
applicant,  also  in  parallel,  in  order  to  exhaust  the  defendant’s  resources.  For  this  reason, 
during the negotiations of the Anti-SLAPP Directive, the Commission engaged, by means of 
a  declaration,  to  further  look  into  this  issue  in  the  context  of  the  upcoming  review  of  the 
Regulation. 

In  conclusion,  while  Article  7  generally  functions  well,  numerous  referrals  from  national 
courts  to  the  CJEU,  supported  by  the  responses  of  Member  States,  highlight  issues  in  the 
application of Article 7(1) and 7(2). With respect to Article 7(1), the main issues are the broad 
interpretation  of the  concept of ‘matters relating  to  a contract’ and the determination of the 
place of performance. Regarding Article 7(2), debates focus on the difficulties in relation to 
the  determination  of  the  place  of  damage  in  cases  of  purely  financial  loss,  as  well  as  the 
continued relevance of the mosaic principle in cases involving the violation of privacy rights. 
A future review of the Regulation could therefore consider ways to simplify and modernize 
Article 7(1) and 7(2). 

3.3. Protective jurisdiction rules over consumer contracts33 (Articles 17 – 19)  

Articles  10  to  23  of  the  Regulation  lay  down  the  jurisdiction  rules  that  aim  to  protect  the 
procedural  position  of  the  weaker  party  in  disputes  relating  to  insurance,  consumer,  and 
employment matters.  

Compared to its predecessors, the Regulation further strengthened this protection. The major 
change,  introduced  via  the  extension  of  personal  scope  in  Article  6(1)  and  subsequent 
adjustments to Articles 18(1), and 21(2), enabled the use of the protective jurisdiction rules 
by  consumers  domiciled  in  a  Member  State  and  employees  in  disputes  against  traders  and 

31  In  turn,  most  of  the  Member  States  request  guidance  on  the  practical  quantification  of  damages,  the 
distinction between the habitual residence and the centre of interests to be provided either by the CJEU or by 
the legislator. 

32  Directive  (EU)  2024/1069  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  11 April  2024  on  protecting 
persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings 
(‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’), OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024. 

33  The application of jurisdiction rules over consumer contracts raised most of the questions in practice. For this 
reason, the analysis of the application of these rules is included in the main text of the Report. The analysis of 
the  application  of  jurisdiction  rules  in  insurance  matters  and  over  the  individual  employment  contracts  is 
included in Part I of the Staff working document accompanying this Report.  

10 

 
 
 
employers domiciled outside the EU. Furthermore, the amendment  of Article 20(1) enabled 
the filing of claims by the employees against multiple employers under Article 8(1), altering 
the position as articulated previously in Glaxosmithkline (C-462/06)34.  

The  protective  jurisdiction  rules  over  consumer  contracts  provide  consumers  a  choice 
between the forum rei and forum actoris for consumer contracts within the meaning of Article 
17  of  the  Regulation.  Conversely,  Article  18(2)  restricts  the  possibility  to  sue  consumers 
exclusively to the courts of the place where they are domiciled.  

Based  on  the  National  Reports  of  the  JUDGTRUST  project,  the  majority  of  the  Member 
States find that the rules in the Regulation ensure a sufficient level of consumer protection, 
even  though  scholarship  in  some  Member  States  suggests  the  level  should  be  further 
enhanced through, for example, the extension of the scope of application of Articles 17-19 to 
tort  claims  going  beyond  those  indissociably  linked  to  a  liability  under  a  contract  that  a 
consumer actually concluded with the seller or supplier. 

The  major  difficulties  relating  to  the  application  of  protective  jurisdiction  rules  over 
consumer contracts concern: 

•  The notion of a ‘consumer’.  

•  The notion of ‘directing the commercial activity’.  

•  The exclusion of transport contracts in Article 17(3).  

•  The non-applicability of jurisdiction rules in collective redress actions35. 

a)  Notion of ‘consumer’ and the consequences of change in the consumer’s domicile 

The Study underscored the challenges involved in classifying a person as a consumer. 

As a rule, the CJEU interprets the notion of ‘consumer’ restrictively and defines it by contrast 
to an ‘economic operator’ (a professional)36. Nevertheless, in some cases, the CJEU seems to 
have adopted a somewhat broader interpretation. For example, in Petruchová (C-218/18), the 
CJEU concluded for online investments  that financial expertise alone does not preclude the 
consumer status. Similarly, in Personal Exchange International (C-774/19), an online poker 
player was considered a consumer, despite playing the game for a large number of hours per 
day  and  receiving  substantial  winnings,  as  long  as  he  has  neither  officially  declared  such 
activity nor offered it to third parties as a paid service. In Schrems (C-498/16) the CJEU ruled 
that the change of use of the Facebook account from exclusively non-professional to partially 
professional,  does  not  entail  the  loss  of  a  ‘consumer’  status  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Regulation provided that the predominately non-professional use of those services, for which 
the  applicant  initially  concluded  a  contract,  has  not  subsequently  become  predominately 
professional.  Concretely,  the  Court  ruled  that  the  use  of  the  account  for  the  activities  of 
publishing books, lecturing, operating websites, fundraising and being assigned the claims of 
numerous consumers for the purpose of their enforcement do not entail the loss of a private 
Facebook account user’s status as a ‘consumer’. 

34  In  addition,  a  new  rule  was  introduced  in Article  26(2)  to  the  rule  on  the  tacit  prorogation  of  jurisdiction 
following the CJEU judgment in ČPP Vienna Insurance Group (C-111/09): the court seised is now obliged to 
ensure that a weaker party (defendant) is informed of the right to raise the objection of a lack of jurisdiction 
and of the consequences of failing to do so. 

35  This issue is addressed in point 6.1 of the Report. 
36  See, to this end, Schrems (C-498/16), paragraph 29 and the case-law cited. 

11 

 
 
 
By contrast, in Wurth Automotive GmbH (C-177/22), the CJEU relied on its earlier judgment 
in Gruber (C-464/01) to rule that, when establishing whether a person can be considered as 
consumer, it may also be taken into account whether a person who is a customer had in fact, 
by his or her own conduct with respect to the other party, given the latter the impression that 
he or she was acting for business purposes, such that the other party could legitimately have 
been unaware of the non-professional purpose of the transaction at issue. If that was the case, 
the special rules of jurisdiction for matters relating to consumer contracts would not apply in 
spite of the objective existence of a consumer contract. 

b)  Notion of ‘directing the commercial activity’ 

In Pammer (C-585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof  (C-144/09), the CJEU has ruled that among the 
factors for establishing whether an activity is directed to the Member State of the consumer’s 
domicile   are  ‘all  clear  expressions  of  the  intention  to  solicit  the  custom  of  that  State’s 
consumers’ and a rather extensive non-exhaustive list of circumstances that may be taken into 
account  for  this  purpose37.  Those  circumstances  include  the  international  nature  of  the 
activity  at  issue,  such  as  certain  tourist  activities;  mention  of  telephone  numbers  with  the 
international  code;  use  of  a  top-level  domain  name  other  than  that  of  the  Member  State  in 
which the trader is established, for example  ‘.de’, or use of neutral top-level domain names 
such as ‘.com’ or ‘.eu’; the description of itineraries from one or more other Member States to 
the place where the service is provided; and mention of an international clientele composed 
of customers domiciled in various Member States, in  particular by presentation  of accounts 
written by such customers38. 

Nevertheless, the national courts have continued to refer questions for preliminary rulings in 
different cases involving the offering of services and products on the internet 39, thus showing 
that the interpretation and application of the requirement of directing the commercial activity 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  17(1)(c)  of  the  Regulation  remains  challenging  in  a  digital 
context.  

c)  The exclusion of transport contracts in Article 17(3) 

The rules of the Regulation governing jurisdiction in respect of consumer contracts cover all 
types of contracts. The only exclusion is provided in Article 17(3) relating to transportation 
contracts other than those which, for a fixed price, combine travel and accommodation. 

Although the underlying reasons for such exclusion did not evolve, i.e. special sectoral rules 
in  international  conventions  and  other  EU  instruments  on  transport  continue  to  apply,  the 
Study and the National Reports show that many Member States now consider the exclusion to 
be unjustified and call for its deletion. Some Member States state that this exclusion restricts 
consumer’s  access  to  justice  in  disputes  over  flight  passenger  rights,  in  particular  in  cases 
where the consumer’s domicile does not coincide with the place of departure or arrival of the 
plane that are the fora available on the basis of the place of performance.  

Moreover, the Study shows that the lack of coverage of transport contracts leads to an uneven 
application  of  the  Regulation  in  the  Member  States.  Several  Member  States  determine  the 

37  Paragraph 80. 
38  Paragraph 81. 
39  As 
regards, 

in  particular,  Article 15(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 44/2001, 

judgments 
Mühlleitner (C-190/11),  Emrek  (C-218/12),  and  in Hobohm  (C-297/14).  More  recently,  see,  for  example, 
request  for  the  preliminary  ruling  in  Commerzbank  (C-296/20)  that  concerns  the  interpretation  of  the 
identical provision in Lugano convention; in Lännen MCE (C-104/22) that rotated around the interpretation 
of this concept in the field of EU trademark. 

see 

the 

12 

 
 
 
jurisdiction for such contracts based on the general rules of the Regulation (DE, DK, BG, NL, 
PT), on international conventions prevailing over the Regulation (CY, DE, HU, IT, PT), or on 
national rules (LT, PT).  

In  order  to  decide  whether  the  exclusion  should  be  maintained  or  deleted  from  the 
Regulation,  it  is  necessary  to  assess,  in  particular,  whether  other  EU  instruments  or 
international  agreements  provide  adequate  protection  for  consumers 
to 
international jurisdiction.  

in  relation 

In conclusion,  the  rules  on protective jurisdiction of the Regulation generally function  well 
and  provide  a  satisfactory  level  of  consumer  protection.  However,  certain  aspects  of 
consumer  protection  could  be  further  clarified  through  the  case-law  or  strengthened  by  a 
legislative intervention, subject to further analysis during the review. 

3.4. Exclusive jurisdiction (Article 24) 

Provisions on exclusive jurisdiction that have primacy over general rules and are mandatory 
are  contained  in  the  Section  6  of  Chapter  II  of  the  Regulation,  which  consists  of  a  single 
Article  24.  Except  for  a  codification  of  the  GAT  (C-4/03)  case-law  in  Article  24(4),  the 
Regulation did not further modify this head of jurisdiction. 

The  Study  shows  that  the  Member  States  did  not  identify  major  difficulties  relating  to  the 
application of this head of jurisdiction or reported scarce national case-law on the matter. The 
main  criticism  concerns  the  unique  modification  brought  by  the  Regulation,  namely,  the 
extension  of  the  scope  of  application  of  Article  24(4)  to  proceedings  concerned  with  the 
validity of patents where the issue is raised as a defence40.  
Some  Member  States,  supported  by  Advocate  General  Emiliou41,  have  criticized  the 
codification of the GAT case-law in Article 24(4) as failing to provide clarity on whether the 
infringement  of  an  industrial  property  right  falls  within  its  scope;  extending  the  solution 
adopted by the CJEU in a very specific (‘abnormal’) case that concerned an action by which a 
company sought a declaration from  the  German courts that it had  not  infringed two French 
patents held by a German company (‘negative declaration’) to ‘normal’ patent infringement 
cases; standing out in the system of exclusive jurisdiction in so far as other rules in Article 24 
do not apply to proceedings in which the issues referred thereof are raised only by way of a 
defence; enabling the abuse via so-called ‘torpedo’ claims and hindering  the patent holder’s 
right  to  an  effective  remedy  as  well  as  the  requirement  of  efficiency  of  procedure  and  the 
sound administration of justice. 

In  addition,  it  has  been  questioned  whether  Article  24  could  have  reflexive  effect  (effet 
réflexe)  and  whether  Member  State  courts  are  obliged  to  adjudicate  on  disputes  within  the 
scope of Article 24 that feature strong connections to third States. In particular, the question 
was whether Article 24  gives an option to the courts of the Member States  or obliges them 
not  to  adjudicate  the  case,  although  the  defendant  is  domiciled  in  the  Member  State  or  the 
court of the Member State can base its jurisdiction on other rules in the Regulation, in cases 
where a patent is registered, or immovable property is situated in a third State as it does with 
respect to patents registered or immovable property situated in other Member States. 

The recent ruling by the CJEU in BSH Hausgeräte (C-339/22) has provided an answer to the 
question  that  had  previously  split  the  courts  of  the  Member  States  and  scholars  into  two 

40  Several other difficulties relating to the application of Article 24 were reported by  few Member States: the 
problematic  distinction  between  rights  in  rem  and  rights  in  personam,  and  inconsistent  case-law  on  the 
matter. 

41  Opinion of AG Emiliou of 22 February 2024 in BSH Hausgeräte, C-339/22, ECLI:EU:C:2024:159. 

13 

 
 
 
opposing  camps.  In  this  judgment,  the  CJEU  clarified  that  Article  24(4)  does  not  have  a 
reflexive effect.42 This conclusion can be extrapolated to the entire Article 24. 

In  addition,  in  its  judgment  in  BSH  Hausgeräte  (C-339/22),  the  CJEU  further  clarified  its 
GAT  ruling  stating  that  a  court  of  the  Member  State  of  domicile  of  the  defendant  which  is 
seised,  pursuant  to  Article 4(1)  of  the  Regulation,  of  an  action  alleging  infringement  of  a 
patent granted in another Member State, still has jurisdiction to hear that action where, in the 
context  of  that  action,  that  defendant  challenges,  as  its  defence,  the  validity  of  that  patent, 
whereas  the  courts  of  that  other  Member  State  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  rule  on  that 
validity.  

In conclusion, the rules establishing exclusive jurisdiction of the Regulation generally operate 
well. Nevertheless, a future review of the Regulation could reconsider the wording of Article 
24(4) that aimed at codifying the GAT jurisprudence in the light of the recent developments in 
BSH Hausgeräte. 

4. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT  

The Regulation abolished the need for a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) in order to 
have  a  foreign  judgment  enforced,  a  shift  justified  on  the  basis  of  mutual  trust  in  the 
administration  of  justice  among  Member  States.  The  new  system  works  rather  well  in 
practice  and  has  had  a  positive  effect  on  the  reduction  of  costs  and  the  workload  of  the 
courts43.  There  are  some  national  variations  related  especially  to  the  interpretation  of  the 
refusal  grounds,  but  this  does  not  affect  the  overall  good  functioning  of  the  system  of 
recognition and enforcement. The Court has interpreted these refusal grounds in a consistent 
manner throughout the years and the few cases lodged under the Regulation do not alter this 
situation. All in all, while no particular issues related to the (new) system for recognition and 
enforcement were reported, a number of technical issues may warrant further reflection in a 
possible future review process.  

Application of the refusal grounds 

Article  45  of  the  Regulation  lists  a  number  of  grounds  that  can  lead  to  the  refusal  of 
recognition  and  enforcement.  These  grounds  range  from  breach  of  public  policy  in  the 
Member  State  addressed,  to  proper  service  of  process  to  the  defaulting  defendant  and 
irreconcilability with other judgments. 

The  concept  of  public  policy  has  been  the  object  of  referrals  to  the  Court  on  several 
occasions. While the Court leaves the interpretation of this concept to national courts, it can 
review the limits of that application (Diageo Brands, C-681/13). For instance, in H Limited 
(C-568/20), the Court reiterated its established case-law that public policy should be narrowly 
interpreted  and  could  be  resorted  to  ‘only  if  recognition  of  the  judgment  given  in  that 
Member  State  were  to  constitute  a  manifest  infringement  of  a  rule  of  law  regarded  as 
essential in the legal order of the State in which recognition is sought or of a right recognised 
as being  fundamental  within that legal  order’.  In a more  recent  case (Real  Madrid Club  de 
Fútbol (C-633/22)), the Court considered that a manifest infringement of a fundamental right 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU may constitute a breach of public policy 
which justifies the refusal of enforcement. At the same time, the Court recognised in the same 

42  The  questions  referred  by  the  Swedish  court  concern  the  interpretation  and  scope  of Article  24(4)  of  the 
Regulation  in  a  patent  infringement  dispute  in  which  the  defendant  claims  the  invalidity  of  the  patents  in 
question in the countries in which they are filed or registered. 

43  Indeed, while the Study confirmed these findings in many Member States, some respondents also highlighted 

a more limited impact due mainly to the persistence of refusal grounds.  

14 

 
 
 
judgment that the principle of mutual trust requires all Member States to consider that other 
Member  States  comply  with  EU  law,  in  particular  with  the  fundamental  rights  enshrined 
therein.  

At  the  national  level,  public  policy  is  rarely  invoked  to  deny  recognition  and  enforcement 
and, when it is, it is rarely successful44. This shows that, in general, national courts follow the 
case-law of the Court and apply a restrictive interpretation of this concept.  

Article 45(1), points (c) and (d) contain two grounds of refusal that refer to an irreconcilable 
judgment between the same parties in the Member State addressed (point (c)), or to an earlier 
judgment between the same parties and on the same cause of action given in another Member 
State  or  in  a  third  State  (point  (d)).  The  Court  in  London  Steam-Ship  Owners’  Mutual 
Insurance  (C-700/20)  raised  questions  as  to  the  significance  of  the  observance  of  the  lis 
pendens rules of Articles 29-30 in the context of invoking the refusal ground of irreconcilable 
judgments45.  

Indeed,  except  for  the  case  where  the  court  of  origin  has  exclusive  jurisdiction,  the 
Regulation does not contain any mechanism of control of the lis pendens rules applicable by 
virtue  of Articles  29-3046.  Contrary  to  these  provisions,  which  favour  the  court  first  seised, 
point  (d)  of Article  45(1)  favours  the  earlier  judgment,  even  where  the  proceedings  started 
after those that led to the judgment to be recognised and enforced. On the other hand,  point 
(c)  of Article  45(1)  does  not  contain  any  time  requirement,  but  its  scope  of  application  is 
wider than that of the lis pendens rules. 

As a result, while the refusal ground related to public policy does not seem to pose practical 
difficulties, a possible future review of the Regulation  could further look  at the consistency 
between points (c) and (d) of Article 45(1) and the lis pendens rules. 

5. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS (ARTICLES 67 – 74) 

The  Regulation  has  not  substantially  altered  the  rules  governing  its  relationship  with  other 
EU  or  international  instruments  aside  from  the  new  entries  aimed  at  enabling  the 
implementation of the so-called ‘patent package’ in Articles 71a-71d, and the clarification of 
the  relationship  between  the  Regulation  and  the  Lugano  convention47,  the  New  York 
convention48 and bilateral conventions and agreements between the third State and a Member 
State concluded before 1 March 2002, in Article 73.  

The  application  of  these  rules  across  the  Member  States  is  very  uneven.  Since  the  United 
Paten  Court  became  operational  only  on  1  June  2023,  Articles  71a-71d  have  not  yet 
influenced court practice in any of the Member States or at the EU judicial level. By contrast, 
an  extensive  application  of  Article  71  by  the  national  courts  is  observed  in  most  Member 
States.  The  list  of  international  conventions  that  triggered  the  application  of  Article  71  in 

44  The JUDGTRUST project shows that this ground of refusal is rarely invoked in some Member States (ET, 
FR, IT, NL). Even where it is invoked more often courts rarely apply it to refuse recognition and enforcement 
(BG, PL).   

45  The case at hand related to the specific situation of the judgment by the court second seised being a judgment 

entered in the terms of an arbitral award.  

46 This became clear in Liberato judgment, a case decided in 2019 by the Court under the Brussels I Regulation. 
In this judgment the Court stated that even where the lis pendens rule was breached, the courts in the Member 
State of the court first seised cannot refuse recognition solely for this reason. Likewise, such a breach is not 
manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State where recognition is sought. 

47  Convention  on  jurisdiction  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and  commercial 

matters of 30 October 2007, OJ L 339, 21.12.2007, p. 1. 

48  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted 10 June 1958, entered 

into force on 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 38 (New York Convention). 

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various Member States is quite broad, with the CMR49 and other conventions in the field of 
transport being most often referred to.  

In its ruling in TNT Express Netherland (C-533/08), the Court ruled that the provision of the 
Brussels  I  Regulation  identical  to  the  current Article  71  aims  to  coordinate  the  Regulation 
with  specialised  international  conventions.  Furthermore,  the  Court  set  out  that  such 
coordination is to be enacted without undermining the fundamental principles underlying the 
Regulation,  specifically  the  free  movement  of  judgments  in  civil  and  commercial  matters, 
predictability  as  to  jurisdiction,  sound  administration  of  justice,  minimisation  of  the  risk  of 
concurrent  proceedings  and  mutual  trust  in  the  administration  of  justice  in  the  European 
Union. In this judgment, the Court established the so-called ‘TNT test’ that the national courts 
are expected to  apply  in situations where rules of the Regulation  and those of a specialised 
convention, falling within the scope of Article 71 of that Regulation, apply, in order to ensure 
that rules of the specialised conventions only  apply where they do not negatively affect the 
fundamental  principles  underpinning  the  Brussels  regime.  The  CJEU  has  repeatedly 
reiterated these principles, most recently in Gjensidige (C-90/22). 

The referral order of the Lithuanian Supreme Court in case  Gjensidige (C-90/22) illustrates 
well the difficulties that the national courts face when applying Article 71 of the Regulation. 
These  difficulties  are  primarily  attributed  to  the  vagueness  of  the TNT  test  and  are  seen  as 
jeopardizing the uniform application of Article 71 across the Member States, especially since 
similar challenges have been reported by other Member States 

In  conclusion,  overall,  the  Regulation  provisions  governing  the  relationship  between  the 
Regulation and other EU instruments and international conventions, where applied, appear to 
operate well and bring the necessary clarity on the place of the Regulation within the system 
of EU and international  instruments  that also  govern matters of international  jurisdiction or 
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Nevertheless, a future review could look into the 
possibility to further clarify Article 71 in light of the interpretation provided by the CJEU.  

6. HORIZONTAL ISSUES  

6.1. Collective redress 

The Regulation  does  not provide specific rules  applicable to  mass actions,  typically actions 
where  a  group  of  plaintiffs  seeks  damages  from  one  or  several  defendants,  referred  to  as 
collective  redress  as  defined  in  the  European  Commission  2013  Recommendation50.  The 
representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers as set out by 
Representative  Actions  Directive  (EU)  2020/182851  fall  under  the  definition  of  collective 
redress present in the latter Recommendation. A number of questions have been raised as to 
whether  the  application  of  the  ordinary  rules  on  jurisdiction  in  matters  related  to  tort  or 
consumer  contracts  are  fit  for  purpose  in  order  to  effectively  deal  with  collective  redress 
claims.  

49  The  Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, signed in Geneva on 19 

May 1956, as amended by the Protocol signed at Geneva on 5 July 1978. 

50  See Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law 
(2013/396/EU), OJ L 201 of 26.7.2013.  

51  Directive  (EU)  2020/1828  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  25  November  2020  on 
representative  actions  for  the  protection  of  the  collective  interests  of  consumers  and  repealing  Directive 
2009/22/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 409, 4.12.2020, p. 1. 

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The CJEU dealt with this type of cases on several occasions: In Henkel (C-167/00), the Court 
concluded  that  Article  5(3)  of  the  Brussels  Convention  (Article  7(2)  of  the  Regulation) 
applies to actions brought by an organisation representing consumers’ interests. However, the 
Court was also of the opinion that the special protection afforded to individual consumers in 
Section 4 of the Regulation does not apply to such organisations. In Schrems (C-498/16) the 
Court  held  that  where  the  claims  have  been  assigned  to  a  consumer  plaintiff  by  other 
consumers, domiciled in the same Member State or elsewhere (in another Member State or 
even outside the EU) the plaintiff cannot invoke jurisdiction at his domicile for these assigned 
claims on the basis of Article 18 of the Regulation.  

In  two  further  decisions  in  collective  redress  cases  the  Court  provided  additional 
clarifications on the application of Article 7(2) in such situations, namely that the location of 
the harmful event has to be assessed for each claim irrespective of any subsequent assignment 
or consolidation (CDC Hydrogen Peroxide SA, C-352/13) or that the place where the damage 
occurs in the case of vehicles equipped with rigged software is in the Member State where the 
defective  goods  were  purchased  (VKI  v  Volkswagen,  C-343/19).  The  question  of 
interpretation  of Article  7(2)  in  this  context  arose  also  in  a  recent  case,  still  pending  at  the 
time this report was being finalised (Stichting Right to Consumer Justice v Apple, C-34/32). 
In  this  case  several  questions  on  the  interpretation  of  the  place  where  the  harmful  event 
occurred or where the damages occurred were referred to the Court in the context of a claim 
for damages for an alleged infringement of EU competition law by an online platform which 
is  in  principle  accessible  worldwide.  In  his  opinion  issued  on  27  March  2025,  Advocate 
General  Sánchez-Bordona  concluded  that  for  both  places  a  key  connecting  factor  is  the 
domicile of the user. Importantly, the Advocate General was of the opinion that Article 7(2) 
should not  be interpreted differently if the action is  brought  by an entity  which is  qualified 
under national law to bring representative actions. Finally, the Advocate General considered 
that a national procedural rule allowing a court to consolidate similar actions pending within 
the same Member State is compatible with Article 7(2).  

The questions raised in these cases were all related to the jurisdiction of courts, namely the 
current difficult application of Article 7(2) in collective claims because of the impossibility to 
consolidate  proceedings  in  one  court  or  the  absence  of  the  possibility  to  consolidate 
proceedings  at  the  domicile  of  one  of  the  plaintiffs  (forum  actoris)  in  collective  consumer 
claims, where the consumers are domiciled in the same Member State or in different Member 
States52.  

It  seems  that  the  Regulation  may  create  unnecessary  burdens  for  the  plaintiffs  in  collective 
redress claims because in most cases they would have to turn to more than one court in order 
to litigate. This, in turn, can lead to irreconcilable judgments. While the related claims rule in 
Article 30 of the Regulation can provide solutions to this situation, the plaintiffs still have to 
lodge  the  application  in  different  courts  before  a  possible  consolidation  in  the  court  first 
seised.  This  creates  additional  burden  for  the  plaintiffs,  in  particular  if  they  are  weaker 
parties. 

As a result, a possible future review of the Regulation could further look into this matter, in 
particular  on  whether  the  Regulation  regulates  in  a  satisfactory  manner  jurisdiction  in 
collective (consumer) claims.  

6.2. The impact of the digitalisation on the Regulation 

Digital transformation started well before the adoption of the Regulation but has accelerated 
in  an unprecedented manner, also  in  view of the COVID-19 crisis. An unparalleled shift  of 

52  The Study identified the same issue of the very limited possibilities for consolidation. 

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commercial activities has occurred from predominantly offline to online, including the use of 
social  media,  smart  devices,  cryptocurrencies,  and  blockchain  technologies  as  well  as  an 
explosion  in  demand  for  remote  and  platform  work  which  has  accelerated  the  digital 
transformation  of  workplaces  in  the  European  Union  and  beyond.  At  the  same  time,  the 
COVID-19  crisis  has  also  underlined  the  importance  of  the  digitalisation  of  judicial 
procedures in ensuring access to justice. 

6.2.1. Digitalisation of ‘content’ 

The  multiplication  of  ‘digital’  relationships  that  are  intrinsically  aterritorial  and  an  ever-
increasing  use  of  digital  technologies  that  are  ubiquitous  in  nature,  unsurprisingly  posed 
multiple  challenges  for  the  application  of  the  Regulation  that  lays  down  jurisdiction  rules 
traditionally based on geographical connecting factors.  

The referrals to the CJEU seeking guidance as to the application of the Regulation to ‘digital 
content’  illustrate  well  these  main  challenges.  National  courts  encounter  difficulties  when 
determining  whether  the  agreement  on  prorogation  of  jurisdiction  was  validly  concluded 
online (Tilman, C-358/21), the place of performance concerning the delivery of digital goods 
or the provision of online services (VariusSystems, C-526/23), where damage is caused by an 
application that can be downloaded worldwide (Apple, C-34/24), just to name a few.  

The  expected  increase  in  the  use  of  blockchain  technologies,  the  increased  digitalisation  of 
the setting-up of companies, the deployment of Artificial Intelligence in multiple sectors and 
the  creations  of  metaverses  will  certainly  pose  new  questions  and  challenges  as  well.  For 
example, the pseudonymity (or anonymity) of the parties involved in the transactions  or the 
often-unknown number of participants in a blockchain network could raise difficulties for the 
application of the very basic rule of the defendant’s domicile.  

However,  for  the  time  being,  the  difficulties  encountered  by  the  national  courts  when 
applying the Regulation in a digital context are not so different from those arising in a ‘non-
digital’ context. For example, the number of referrals seeking guidance on the establishment 
of  the  place  of  performance  of  an  online  contract  for  the  purposes  of  Article  7  of  the 
Regulation  is  not  bigger  than  that  concerning  offline  contracts.  Moreover,  just  like  for  the 
application of the Regulation in the non-digital area, the CJEU has provided useful guidance 
on the application of the Regulation rules to the digital content. 

In conclusion, at this stage, neither the questions referred to the CJEU or the decisions of the 
latter, nor the scarce data collected at the national level53 allows to draw firm conclusions as 
to  the  suitability  of  the  current  rules  of  the  Regulation  in  an  ever-increasing  digital 
environment.  

6.2.2. Digitalisation of judicial procedures 

As  far  as  the  digitalisation  of  judicial  procedures  is  concerned,  the  Commission  has  been 
actively  working  on  the  digitalisation  of  justice  systems  with  a  particular  focus  on  digital 
cross-border cooperation for civil and commercial matters to ensure uninterrupted access to 
justice  and  smooth  and  efficient  judicial  cooperation,  and  to  reduce  procedural  delays, 
administrative  burden  and  costs.  This  effort  that  has  culminated  in  the  adoption  of  the 
Digitalisation  package54  at  the  end  of  2023  that  changed  the  communication  channel  for 

53  The collection of data on the impact of the digitalisation of content on the application of the Regulation, done 
as  part  of  the  Study,  yielded  scarce  results  at  the  Union  and  at  national  level.  It  is  unclear  whether  this  is 
explained by a lack of information on these cases or by a lack of litigation. 

54  Regulation  (EU)  2023/2844  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2023  on  the 
digitalisation  of  judicial  cooperation  and  access  to  justice  in  cross-border  civil,  commercial  and  criminal 
matters, and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation and Directive (EU) 2023/2843 of the 

18 

 
 
 
competent judicial authorities for 24 legal acts (among others the Regulation) to digital and 
established  a  digital  communication  channel  (European  electronic  access  point  (EEAP)) 
between  natural  or  legal  persons  and  the  competent  authorities  for  certain  limited 
communication  instances  in  civil  and  commercial  matters,  including  the  proceedings  for 
recognition,  a  declaration  of  enforceability  or  refusal  of  recognition  and  the  procedures 
related to the issuance, rectification and withdrawal of certificate under the Regulation. These 
efforts  go  hand  in  hand  with  increased  national  efforts  by  Member  States  in  this  area,  as 
reflected  in  the  annual  EU  Justice  Scoreboard55  and  in  the  Council’s  European  e-Justice 
Strategy 2024 - 202856. 

In order to  meet  the objectives of the Digitalisation package, the  Commission  is  obliged to 
adopt  a  number  of  implementing  acts.  For  the  Regulation,  the  implementing  act  must  be 
adopted by 17 January 2029, and it will mainly concern the establishment of a decentralised 
IT  system  for  communication  between  competent  judicial  authorities  and  the  integration  of 
the  EEAP  for  several  communication  processes,  such  as  proceedings  for  refusal  of 
recognition according to Article 45 of the Regulation as well as the procedures related to the 
issuance, rectification and  withdrawal  of certificates. After implementation, these new rules 
will  become  applicable  in  Member  States  by  early  2031  and  will  simplify  and  speed  up 
procedures in civil and commercial matters with cross-border implications. 

In  addition  to  digitalising  the  existing  procedures  by  changing  the  communication  channel 
with the Digitalisation Package, a future review of the Regulation could also look into further 
ways to modernise the functioning of the Regulation. Such a modernisation of the Regulation 
could take into account the benefits of digitalisation and consider the shortening of different 
deadlines or improvements to the communication between the courts, for example in case of 
parallel proceedings. Full digitalisation of judicial procedures in cases where the Regulation 
applies could be also explored. 

In  conclusion,  at  this  point  the  Commission  does  not  have  sufficient  data  showing  the 
unsuitability of the rules of the Regulation  on international jurisdiction for digital scenarios 
and transactions, but  developments  should continue to  be  closely  monitored.  By  contrast,  a 
review  of  the  Regulation  could  investigate  possible  ways  to  revise  and  simplify  the 
procedures  under  the  Regulation  as  part  of  the  digital  reform  of  civil  justice  systems 
spearheaded by the Digitalisation package. 

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 

During  more  than  ten  years  of  its  application,  the  Regulation  operated  well  and  generally 
achieved its main objectives – to improve legal certainty as to the courts having jurisdiction 
in  cross-border disputes  and  to simplify the mechanism for recognition  and enforcement of 
judgments.  

Nevertheless, in an area that was not fully addressed in the recast of the Regulation, namely 
the extension of the rules of jurisdiction to cover defendants not domiciled in a Member 

European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2023  amending  Directives  2011/99/EU  and 
2014/41/EU  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council,  Council  Directive  2003/8/EC  and  Council 
Framework  Decisions  2002/584/JHA,  2003/577/JHA,  2005/214/JHA,  2006/783/JHA,  2008/909/JHA, 
2008/947/JHA, 2009/829/JHA and 2009/948/JHA, as regards digitalisation of judicial cooperation.  

55  Communication  of  20  March  2024  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
(COM (2023) 309 final): The Annual EU Justice Scoreboard 2023. 

56  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15509-2023-INIT/en/pdf  

19 

 
 
 
State, further analysis is needed in order to decide whether such an extension should be the 
object of a legislative intervention.  

In  addition,  a  number  of  concepts  could  be  considered  for  further  clarification  or 
simplification  in  order  to  improve  their  application  in  practice. This  is  the  case  for  several 
provisions  dealing  with  the  scope  of  application,  such  as  the  exclusion  of  arbitration,  as 
well  as  the  notion  of  ‘court  or  tribunal’  or  the  one  related  to  provisional,  including 
protective, measures. 

Likewise, the possibility to further simplify and enhance the effectiveness of the provisions 
on  jurisdiction,  in  particular  those  in  Article  7(1)  and  7(2),  as  well  as  those  related  to 
consumer contracts, could be explored. A similar reflection could consider whether the rules 
on recognition and enforcement could be further streamlined and simplified.   

Further analysis is also needed in order to decide whether the necessary procedural tools to 
cover certain type of claims, such as those commonly referred to as collective redress, could 
be further enhanced through legislative intervention.  

Finally,  the  possibility  to  improve  the  coordination  between  the  Regulation  and 
international instruments and the ways to modernise and simplify the procedures under 
the Regulation as part of the digital reform of civil justice systems could be looked at. 

The  Commission  will  therefore  initiate  a  formal  review  of  the  Regulation  in  order  to 
consider and potentially prepare a proposal to amend or recast the Regulation in accordance 
with the Better Regulation rules should this review conclude that changes are necessary and 
appropriate. 

20