JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL The European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea region
Date: 2025-05-28
Institutions: Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, European Commission
Subjects: Black Sea, EU strategy, Eastern Partnership, competitiveness, cooperation policy, economic growth, energy policy, environmental protection, maritime safety, regional security

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 28.5.2025  JOIN(2025) 135 final  JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL The European Union's strategic approach to the Black Sea region  
 
 
THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE BLACK SEA REGION  

The  Black  Sea  is  an  area  of  significant  geostrategic  importance,  bridging  Europe  to  Asia,  with 
untapped  potential  for  economic  development,  strategic  transit  routes  especially  for  access  to  energy 
resources and critical raw materials. 

Its critical importance is underscored by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine that has shaken the 
foundations of the rules-based international order and exposed the vulnerabilities of European and regional 
security.  It has plunged regional  security to its  lowest point  since  the  Cold  War  and  calls  for  a robust, 
coordinated EU response. In this evolving geopolitical landscape, with the Black Sea region at its core, the 
EU is stepping up with a comprehensive approach with the aim of supporting the democratic resilience 
of a region vital to Europe's stability and prosperity and asserting our interests. 

The  EU  is  committed  to  supporting  Ukraine  and  its  neighbours,  by  upholding  their  independence, 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  fostering  peace  and  dialogue,  providing  security  guarantees  and 
contributing to recovery and reconstruction. The security in the Black Sea region will equally need to be 
at the heart of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace.  

A number of countries in the region are on the path towards accession or closer alignment with the EU. The 
enlargement process, the gradual integration of candidate countries into the internal market and integrated 
partnerships in the region will unlock economic potential, strengthen the rule of law, and accelerate reforms. 
Peace and security are at the foundations of this renewed approach.  

Beyond its immediate neighbourhood, the Black Sea’s importance is global. As a critical connector between 
Europe, the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea region plays a 
strategic role for European and overall global security, international trade, energy and food security (notably 
grain). With its population of almost 174 million people1 the States surrounding the Black Sea2 (excluding 
Russia) generate a GDP of approximately EUR 2 trillion3. The EU is the largest trade partner for most 
of the countries in the Black Sea region with the overall trade volume of EUR 310 billion4  and the second 
largest trading partner for Central Asia5. Strengthening our cooperation and fostering enhanced economic 
links will contribute to the competitiveness of the region and of the EU itself.  

Next to its geopolitical and economic significance, the Black Sea is a dynamic hub of innovation and culture. 
The  environmental  challenges  of  the  Black Sea  equally demand stronger  regional  cooperation – to 
protect  marine  ecosystems,  develop  the  blue  economy,  and  increase  climate  resilience  among  coastal 
communities. A safe and secure Black Sea is essential to ensure freedom of navigation, maritime safety and 
security.  Furthermore,  we    must  swiftly  address  hybrid  threats,  such  as  cyber-attacks,  disinformation 
campaigns and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). 

THE EU STRATEGIC APPROACH: A HUB OF SECURITY, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY 

At the heart of this strategy lies a political project: to advance peace and security, economic development, 
and democratic consolidation in a region increasingly under geopolitical pressure. The EU’s vision is for 
the Black Sea region to be a secure, interconnected and prosperous space – anchored in shared values and 
regional cooperation. The EU’s strategy recognises the Black Sea as a pivotal gateway linking Europe to 
the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and beyond – underpinned by targeted investments in transport, energy  
and  digital  infrastructure,  to  increase  connectivity  and  trade.  Increased  intra-regional  and  inter-regional 

1 IMF April 2025 World Economic Outlook. 
2 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Türkiye, together with EU Member States Bulgaria, Greece 
and Romania – without Russia.  
3  EUROSTAT data 2023 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
4 Source: IMF, WTO, UNCTAD 
5 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2025/04/04/ 

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connectivity will be a key enabler to accelerate energy independence, integration of renewables and ensure 
energy system stability and resilience. Regional challenges will be addressed through mutually beneficial 
partnerships to promote long-term security, prosperity, stability and resilience.  

This strategy brings together internal and external EU instruments under a single framework. Under the 
Global Gateway the EU aims to mobilise strategic investments, deepen partnerships, and deliver tangible 
benefits in a Team Europe approach – reinforcing Europe’s role as a reliable geopolitical actor. In response 
to the evolving geopolitical context, the new EU strategic approach for the Black Sea region outlined in this 
Joint Communication proposes multiple avenues to forge closer cooperation with Ukraine, the Republic 
of Moldova, Georgia, Türkiye, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and with relevant partners and organisations.  

The EU’s role and responsibility in the Black Sea region is increasing, particularly with the opening of 
accession negotiations with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova; and with Georgia, should the country revert 
to the EU path. The EU enlargement process is a strategic investment to enhance regional security and 
resilience. The EU aims to support interested partners in EU integration by strengthening the rule of law, 
democracy, and climate resilience. Gradual integration of candidate countries and their involvement in EU 
initiatives will offer tangible benefits to citizen and address challenges already prior to accession. The EU 
will work closely with partners to align with its Common Foreign and Security Policy, including sanctions 
and defence policy. Particular focus will be on enforcement of the EU restrictive measures on Russia and 
Belarus, notably tackling sanctions circumvention. 

In  the  Black  Sea  region,  the  EU  focuses  on  peace    and  international  law  to  unlock  potential  for 
economic  growth,  sustainable  investments  and  enhanced  regional  connectivity.  In  this  respect. 
supporting Ukraine's overall resilience, security, and reconstruction is central, alongside peace 
and  stability  in  the  South  Caucasus,  particularly  normalisation  of  Armenia-Azerbaijan  relations, 
including  the  swift  signature  of  the  peace  treaty,  as  well  as  normalisation  of  Armenia-Türkiye 
relations. 

A  coordinated  approach  with  Türkiye,  an  EU  partner  of  strategic  importance  and  a  candidate 
country  is  also  important.  Re-engagement  remains  key  in  line  with  the  November  2023  Joint 
Communication6  and   relevant  European  Council  conclusions7.  This  is  a  common  responsibility 
towards peace and stability in the region, based on the UN Charter and international law. Türkiye and 
the EU share the objective of ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, respecting Ukraine’s 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty,  and  ensuring  security  in  the  region.  Türkiye’s  engagement  in 
diplomatic  efforts,  such  as  facilitating  the  Black  Sea  Grain  Initiative8  and  prisoner  exchanges, 
underscores  its  importance  as  a  security  and  economic  actor.  Furthermore,  Türkiye  can  play  a 
constructive role on countering Russia’s shadow fleet, and contributing to efforts to enhance maritime 
safety,  energy  security  and  connectivity  in  line  with  international  law  and  relevant  conventions. 
Türkiye and the EU are in a Customs Union and are important trade partners for each other. 

Three pillars for future EU-Black Sea cooperation 

Future cooperation with the Black Sea region will be structured under three major pillars:  

➢  enhancing  security, stability, and resilience; 
➢  fostering sustainable growth and prosperity; 

6 Joint Communication to the European Council, State of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations JOIN(2023) 
50 final 
7 In line with Council Conclusions from June 2021 and April 2024 
8  Initiative  on  the  Safe  Transportation  of  Grain  and  Foodstuffs  from  Ukrainian  ports  launched  in  Türkiye  on  22  July  2022. 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukrainian-grain-exports-explained 

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➢  promoting environmental protection, climate change resilience and preparedness, civil 

protection. 

To increase the desired impact of joint actions, flagship initiatives will be implemented under each of these 
pillars. The initiatives will address the immediate challenges of conflict and security and unlock the region’s 
potential for growth. 

The way forward for EU engagement 

The EU strategic approach is a forward-looking policy framework, combining short-term and longer-
term measures.  

To leverage the potential of the Black Sea region, the EU will engage in: 

•  Deepening  partnerships:  Strengthen  bilateral  ties  with  Black  Sea  countries  to  foster  regional 
security and prosperity, while ensuring interconnections with the EU and boosting cross-regional 
cooperation, including cooperation with Baltic Sea. 

•  Security and conflict resolution: Support peace and conflict resolution, including by enhancing 
mediation and dialogue facilitation and stepping up cooperation on capability development, military 
mobility and demining. This also concerns supporting the negotiation and monitoring of ceasefires 
and facilitating inclusive peace-building efforts. 

•  Upholding the rule of law and democracy: Strengthen societal resilience, notably through the 
independence and efficiency of the judiciary as well as through addressing corruption, organised 
crime,  cybersecurity,  FIMI  and  disinformation  and  advancing  fundamental  rights  and  gender 
equality.  

•  Energy market integration: Advance policy reforms to enable more energy trading across borders, 
facilitate  the  roll-out  of  renewable  generation  capacity,  diversify  energy  supplies  to  reduce 
dependency on Russia, improve industrial competitiveness, increase access to affordable energy for 
households and ultimately enhance energy security.  

• 

•  Energy efficiency and decarbonisation: Promote energy efficiency measures to reduce energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions in line with the EU’s decarbonisation trajectory and 
international commitments and support the region's transition to a low-emission economy. 
Infrastructure development: Improve connectivity by developing transport, energy and digital 
infrastructure aligned with Trans-European Networks, linking Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean. 
•  Trade: Maximise mutual economic benefits by improving trade relations, fostering investments 
with  private  sector  involvement,  ensuring  further  economic  integration.  This  includes  access  to 
critical raw materials in Central Asia via the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor linked to a stable 
and secure Black Sea region.  

•  Preparedness  and  resilience:  Strengthen  collaboration  and  exchange  of  good  practices  to 
anticipate,  detect,  prevent  and  manage  threats  and  incidents,  particularly  with  a  view  to  shared 
challenges  in  the  Baltic  Sea,  including  to  counter  information  manipulation,  and  improve  the 
protection of critical infrastructure – including all types of energy infrastructure – against hybrid 
threats. Enhance ability to recover. 

•  Environmental protection and climate change: Enhance regional cooperation on environmental 
protection  and  restoration  work  to  preserve  the  potential  of  the  blue  economy  and  increase  the 
resilience  of  coastal  communities,  while  addressing  the  broader  environmental  threats  and  the 
impacts of climate change and environmental degradation, and fostering sustainable practices. 
•  Education, skills and research: Strengthen links between the research sector and academia and 
promote quality and cooperation in education. Promote skills development and employment policies 
across the region, in line with the objectives of the Union of Skills.  

•  Defence industry: Cooperate on developing defence related industrial assets in the region. 

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•  Culture: Strengthen cultural exchanges and cooperation to unlock growth potential, foster societal 

resilience, promote shared values and mutual understanding. 

Implementation will build on a range of partnerships and cooperation frameworks with the countries of 
the Black Sea region, notably the Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTA) with Ukraine9, the Republic of Moldova10 - and  their respective Negotiating frameworks with 
the EU - and Georgia11, the Association Agreement with Türkiye12, the November 2023 HRVP-European 
Commission  Joint  Communication  on  the  state  of  play  of  EU-Türkiye  political,  economic  and  trade 
relations13 and in line with European Council conclusions, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement with Armenia14, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Azerbaijan15, as well the 
as regional cooperation frameworks of the Black Sea Synergy16, the Common Maritime Agenda for the 
Black Sea17 the Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA)18, the Interreg NEXT Black Sea 
Basin programme19, and the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes20.  

In particular, the Eastern Partnership21 has been instrumental in supporting critical reforms, promoting 
cooperation  and  investments,  engaging  with  young  people  and  civil  society,  and  fostering  closer  ties 
between the EU and interested partners, and regional cooperation. The Black Sea region is central to the 
reinvigorated Eastern Partnership framework in the heart of which will be a dedicated regional connectivity 
agenda.  

The  Global  Gateway22  -  the  EU’s  strategy  for  promoting  sustainable  and  high-quality  infrastructure 
development worldwide - will be a primary framework for mobilising investments in connectivity and for 
fostering  stronger  business  ties  between  the  EU  and  the  wider  Black  Sea  region,  in  line  with  the 
implementation  of  the  Trans  European  Network  policy.  The  Global  Gateway  strategy  is  already  being 
actively implemented in Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Black Sea serves as a 
crucial connection between the EU and Central Asia, playing a pivotal role in enhancing connectivity and 
promoting trade. With strategic focus on the region, significant investments are underway to strengthen 
transport, energy and digital infrastructure to further improve trans-continental links between Europe and 
Asia and security of global supply chains.  

1. SECURITY, STABILITY AND RESILIENCE 

9 OJ L 161 p. 3 of 29.5.2014 
10 OJ L 260 p. 4 of 30.8.2014 
11 OJ L 261 p. 4 of 30.8.2014 
12 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, OJ L 361 p. 29 of 31.12.1977 
13 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:52023JC0050  
14 OJ L 23 p. 4 of 26.1.2018 
15 OJ L 246 p. 3 of 17.9.1999 
16 Established in 2007, the Black Sea Synergy has successfully delivered on its objectives, facilitating a sea basin strategy and 
driving meaningful cooperation among regional stakeholders in areas such as maritime cooperation, marine research and innovation 
and investments in the blue economy.  
17 https://black-sea-maritime-agenda.ec.europa.eu/ 
18 European Commission: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation and EOSC Executive Board, Strategic Research and 
Innovation Agenda (SRIA) of  the  European  Open Science  Cloud (EOSC), Publications  Office of the  European  Union, 2022, 
https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/935288 
19 Transnational cooperation programme involving eight countries in the Black Sea region: Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, 
Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Türkiye, Ukraine https://www.blacksea-cbc.net/ 
20 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en 
21 Joint Communication: Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnership that delivers for 
all, JOIN(2020) 7 
22 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee 
of the Regions and the European Investment Bank The Global Gateway JOIN(2021) 30 final 

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Security in the Black Sea region and in Europe is closely interlinked with Ukraine’s security. The EU will 
take forward actions to contribute to security guarantees to Ukraine including in the maritime domain. Black 
Sea maritime security is essential to re-assuring regional partners and unleashing the untaped potential of 
the Black Sea region.  

The EU should step up and support and coordinate Member States and partners’ efforts to build up maritime 
capacities and enablers regarding sea monitoring, including for observation of a possible maritime ceasefire, 
mine cleaning efforts, protection of critical infrastructure, patrolling of commercial sea lines, countering 
hybrid threats, with the aim of deterring future aggressions in the region and, when conditions allow, to 
consolidate peace.  

The  EU  will  support  its  Member  States  and  like-minded  Black  Sea  partner  countries  to  build-up  their 
defence and get the needed capabilities to face growing and multi-faceted threats, including through the 
Defence  package  recently  agreed23  and  backed  by  the  funding  foreseen  by  the  ReArm  Europe 
Plan/Readiness  203024.  The  integration  of  the  Ukrainian  defence  industry  into  the  European  Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and by investing more into new technologies will contribute to 
the strengthening of maritime capabilities in the Black Sea. 

The EU is enhancing its engagement with the countries of the Black Sea region through security and defence 
dialogues,  capacity  building,  de-mining  action,  deploying  EU  CSDP  missions  and  providing  European 
Peace  Facility  (EPF)  support.  The  adoption  of  several  security  initiatives,  for  instance  the  Revised  EU 
Maritime Security Strategy25 or to counter hybrid threats26 and strengthen the security of critical maritime 
infrastructure27 offer new possibilities to enhance security in the region. The EU’s strategic partnership 
with NATO and the established staff-level formats and areas of cooperation can be further leveraged. 

FLAGSHIP 1: BLACK SEA MARITIME SECURITY 

In a short-term and with a sense of priority due to the Russian war of aggression, the Commission and the 
High Representative propose to establish a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub, leveraging EU and Black 
Sea states’ contributions to strengthen maritime security and safety, protect critical maritime infrastructure 
and the marine environment.  

The Hub will enhance maritime situational awareness and information sharing on the Black Sea, real-time 
monitoring from space to seabed, and early warning of potential threats and malicious activities. It will 
include the following services: 

- information exchange in real time on security situation, with more integrated and interoperable systems, 
including through the European Maritime Safety Agency, and by opening EU information sharing platforms 
and providing services by EU agencies to Ukraine and like-minded littoral States whenever possible. 

- monitoring of critical maritime infrastructure, including submarine cables, offshore installations, gas and 
wind energy operations off the Romanian and Bulgarian shores, and related maritime capabilities, using 
existing  and  new  technologies  such  as  underwater  sensors,  unmanned/remotely  piloted  vessels  and 
surveillance drones programmes (air, surface, underwater). It will enable taking preventive actions when 
necessary. 

23  White  Paper for  European  Defence  Readiness  2030, 30b50d2c-49aa-4250-9ca6-27a0347cf009_en  proposal for  a  Security 
Action for Europe (SAFE) new instrument, and Communication on activating the National Escape Clause of the SGP. 
24 JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030 JOIN/2025/120 final 
25 Council conclusions of 24 October 2023 on the Revised EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and its Action Plan 
26 2024 guiding framework for the establishment of the EU Hybrid Rapid Response Teams 
27 2025 Joint Communication on the EU Action Plan on Cable Security JOIN(2025) 9 final 

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- input for decisions to activate, accelerate or adapt ongoing and planned cooperative projects (including in 
PESCO28  and  EDF29  frameworks)  that  support  work  to  develop  maritime  assets  and/or  capabilities  to 
monitor and protect critical maritime infrastructure, including through supporting the assets and services 
based on satellite observation and satellite telecomunications. It will capitalise on the capabilities offered by 
the EU Space Programme, in particular the Copernicus Maritime Surveillance service30. 

- a mechanism for broadening coast-guard cooperation in the Black Sea basin, modelled on existing 
mechanisms31 

By  end  of summer,  the Commission  and  the  High  Representative  will map  specific  needs and  present 
operational options, including regarding CFSP and CSDP tools and European Maritime Security Strategy32. 

Support regional cooperation on demining and maritime safety, defence and security 
1.1 
A key challenge in the Black Sea is the danger posed by mined areas in the littoral States waters, drifting 
mines  and  other  unexploded  ordnance  (UXO),  creating  serious  risks  to  maritime  security,  safety,  blue 
economy activities, and the marine environment. Building on and coordinating with the existing trilateral 
demining initiative by Bulgaria, Romania and Türkiye for the Black Sea, the EU will work towards Black 
Sea shores and the region becoming mine-free, which is essential for the development of transport 
corridors supporting trade.  

Key actions include:  

•  Engaging  and  seeking  synergies  with  like-minded  partner  countries  and  organisations  on 

demining in the region in a long-term perspective.  

•  Using EU programmes and projects under the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture 

Fund (EMFAF), HORIZON and Interreg to map and assess the state of UXO. 

•  Leverage the SAFE instrument and European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) for 

collaborative opportunities to invest into new defence technologies. 

•  Addressing the tangible risks posed by the shadow fleet used by Russia to maritime safety and 

the environment in the Black Sea.  

•  Seeking partnerships with the private sector and the shipping industry in developing best 
practices  to  prevent  incidents  and  to  ensure  the  protection  and  resilience  of  critical  undersea 
infrastructure. 

•  Full implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code33 (ISPS) and 

of the EU maritime security acquis across EU Member States and candidate countries.  

•  Continued outreach and dialogue with concerned third countries and work with international 
partners, including with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to establish and uphold 
stringent maritime safety and security standards. 

1.2 

Enhancing military mobility and dual use infrastructure 

A key strand of action is linked to the need to enhance military mobility in and around the Black Sea and to 
facilitate dual-use infrastructure projects in EU Member States, also connecting neighbouring countries, in 

28 (Permanent structured cooperation) designed to enable EU Member States to develop joint defence projects, enhance military 
capabilities, and improve defence cooperation in all operational domains. 
29 The European Defence Fund (EDF) is a financial tool designed to support the development of cutting-edge defence technologies 
and foster collaboration between EU Member States on joint defence projects. It aims to strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy 
and enhance its defence capabilities. 
30 Copernicus Maritime Surveillance - EMSA - European Maritime Safety Agency 
31 Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum (MCGFF) | European Cooperation on Coast Guard Functions 
32 JOIN/2023/8 dated 10 March 2023 
33 https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx 

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land, sea, and air domains. While bringing clear added value to the security of the EU, enhanced military 
mobility in the region will provide additional benefits to EU’s security and Ukraine’s security and 
reconstruction. 

At the heart of military mobility is the need to urgently upgrade the dual use transport infrastructure along 
the existing military mobility network – comprising multi-modal transport routes connected by logistical 
hubs – so that it is capable of handling potentially heavy and large-scale military transport. EU Black Sea 
and EU Danube ports of embarkation and debarkation, as well as the connecting rail and road infrastructure, 
are crucial for enabling military mobility. The ability to rapidly move military equipment and troops to 
Ukraine will serve as additional security guarantees to deter against future aggression. 

Key actions include: 

•  Upgrading transport infrastructure to enable its preparedness for dual use. 
•  Equipping a sufficient number of sea and river ports and airports in the region, particularly 
on  the  military  mobility  corridors,  with  the  specialised  infrastructure  necessary  to 
onload/offload  oversized  and  overweight  military  equipment  and  materiel  and  providing  for 
sufficient storage space to allow smooth inland forwarding of shipments. 

•  Protection of the critical infrastructure, including military mobility corridors and economic 

and energy platforms. 

•  Working with partners on mechanisms to ensure that the ownership and management of ports 
and critical maritime infrastructure is transparent, reliable, including through the implementation 
of the Foreign Direct Investment screening mechanism34 in the EU.  

1.3 

Countering hybrid threats 

Countries in the Black Sea region, their societies and infrastructure are targets of hybrid threats, including 
cyber threats, disinformation campaigns and FIMI. The EU and the Black Sea region will benefit from 
closer cooperation in these areas, especially with Baltic Sea region, to foster greater shared understanding 
of the threat picture, actors and their methods, as well as by exchanging policy approaches, responses 
and best practices. The EU offers the use of instruments, such as the EU Hybrid Toolbox and EU Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox to address these specific threats and boost the region's resilience.  

Key actions include: 

•  Establishing  a  network  for  joint  response  mechanisms  that  reduce  the  space  for  FIMI  and 

• 

disinformation campaigns, including in rural and border areas.  
Increasing capacity, cooperation and information sharing on hybrid and cyber threats, including 
for critical infrastructure, across the region by building on the dedicated CSDP Missions in the region 
and leveraging EU projects and frameworks, such as the Hybrid Risk Survey, and the EU Hybrid 
Rapid Response Teams or in coordination with NATO and other like-minded. 

•  Engaging in coordinated actions to impose costs on malign actors through demarches, statements, 

attribution or sanctions, making full use of the EU’s Hybrid, Cyber and FIMI Toolboxes. 

•  Enhancing partner countries’ ability to use innovative technology and artificial intelligence as 
tools to counter disinformation and FIMI, combined with tailored actions to promote media literacy 
and critical thinking across the population, fostering a culture of democratic engagement. 

•  Strengthening cooperation between regional networks of fact-checkers, building on EU Democracy 

Action Plan and Defence of Democracy Package.  

34 EU regulation 2019/452 

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•  Enhancing  multi-stakeholder  processes  to  mitigate  risks  on  online  platforms,  safeguarding 

fundamental rights online, in line with international human rights standards. 

1.4 

Fighting organised crime and trafficking  

In line with ProtectEU - the European Internal Security Strategy35, the EU actively supports its neighbours 
in  addressing  emerging  threats,  fostering  deeper  operational  collaboration,  facilitating  information 
exchange, and building capacities aligned with EU standards. The European Commission, the EMPACT 
firearms  and  Europol  have  highlighted  concerns  regarding  the  potential  proliferation  of  firearms  and 
explosives stemming from the military hostilities against Ukraine. The EU will reinforce cooperation in the 
fight against organised crime, with particular focus on the fight against human trafficking, firearms and drug 
smuggling.  

Key actions include: 

•  Encouraging the participation of partner countries in the European Multidisciplinary Platform 
Against  Criminal  Threats36  (EMPACT)  to  fight  organised  crime  and  to  take  leadership  or  co-
leadership positions in operational actions plans to tackle regional priority areas.  

•  Strengthening  partnerships  between  law  enforcement  agencies  and  border  and  customs 

authorities in the Black Sea region and Frontex, Eurojust, Europol and CEPOL. 

•  Put  in  place  a  programme  for  enhancing  expert  co-operation  in  preventing  and  combating 
corruption notably in ports, with a focus on restricting the influence of organised crime groups.  

•  Stepping up judicial cooperation through mutual legal assistance with focus on asset recovery and 

cooperation with EU agencies.   

• 

Improving data-driven insights to track corruption, money laundering, sanctions circumvention, 
organised crime, trafficking and smuggling of goods. 

GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 

2. 
The Black Sea region is a strategic economic zone. The EU will continue diversifying transport corridors 
and developing alternative, resilient and secure digital and energy connectivity networks. Challenges and 
opportunities related to connectivity expand beyond the Black Sea. This calls for a regional Connectivity 
Agenda, aligned with the extended Trans-European Networks, embracing all core partners from the 
EU, the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. In line with the EU’s decarbonisation 
trajectory and international commitments, the Connectivity Agenda will boost value chains, competitiveness 
and economic growth in the region.  

FLAGSHIP 2: CONNECTIVITY AGENDA  

The EU will develop  a  Connectivity Agenda linking Europe with Central Asia through the South 
Caucasus.  

35 COM(2025) 148 final 

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Transport corridors: The agenda will complement the newly established Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean 
Sea and the Rhine-Danube European Transport Corridors. In line with the EU’s Trans European Network 
Regulations,  the  Connectivity  Agenda  will  be  implemented  through  partnerships  with  participating 
countries and regions.  

Green energy links: Strategic investments will facilitate energy trading across the region, advance market 
integration and build a larger Energy Union. This will enable higher integration of intermittent renewable 
sources into energy systems, and ultimately enhance energy security and affordability. Options to deploy 
new submarine cables in the Black Sea will be considered.  

Black Sea digital links: Secure, high-capacity internet connections will be created in the region, when 
conditions allow, to contribute to safe and secure data flows and step up cooperation on digital skills, privacy 
and innovation as key drivers of competitiveness. Digital links will also help strengthen the digital resilience 
of the EU and its partners and underpin regional digital integration. 

The Eastern Partnership, as a strategic and ambitious policy framework based on common values, mutual 
interest and shared ownership, will be instrumental in developing the Connectivity Agenda based on existing 
partnerships and governance mechanisms in trade, energy, transport and digital sectors. Aligning rules and 
standards in the region rooted in shared interests in the context of the Eastern Partnership will improve 
the business and trade environment and unlock investment opportunities within the Black Sea region and 
beyond. 

The EU will leverage the full potential of the existing network of trade agreements37 between the EU and 
its Black Sea partners (the Customs Union and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas currently 
in force), which is a solid foundation for developing cross-border value chains and further regional trade 
integration and has already led to a significant increase in trade volumes in the region. 

The Ukraine Facility38, the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova39, the EU’s Resilience 
and  Growth  Plan  for  Armenia40  and  investments  in  Azerbaijan  under  the  Global  Gateway  will  create 
additional opportunities in this regard. Moreover, harnessing the potential of  progressively integrating 
candidate countries into the EU single market combined with reforms in all the partner countries of the 
Black Sea region in the areas of rule of law, justice and anti-corruption, will attract new investments and 
business opportunities.  

As a clear enabler of regional connectivity and catalyst for innovation and growth, support to digitalisation 
will be mainstreamed through all activities of the EU’s strategic approach. The full power of digital tools 
will be leveraged to secure critical transport and energy infrastructure. 

Cooperation on the digital transition, greening the economy, education, culture, research, science and 
innovation will provide the human dimension to the EU’s new approach in the Black Sea region.  

37 The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Ukraine is the trade part of the Association 
Agreement, which has been fully in force since 1 September 2017. The Priority Action Plan for enhanced implementation of the 
EU-Ukraine DCFTA, which was first created in 2021,  has been further extended and its latest version covers 2025-2026. Similarly, 
DCFTAs for Georgia and Moldova are part of the respective Association Agreements, both of which have fully entered into force 
on 1 July 2016. The Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between the EU and Armenia formally entered 
into  force  on  1  March  2021.  The  CEPA  is  a  non-preferential  agreement  and  aims  to  further  improve  EU-Armenia  trade  by 
enhancing the regulatory environment for businesses and facilitating trade in services. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) between the EU and Azerbaijan is in force since July 1999. In the area of trade, the PCA is a non-preferential agreement, 
and envisages progressive regulatory approximation of Azerbaijan’s legislation and procedures to the most important EU and 
international trade related laws and standards. 
38 Ukraine Facility - European Commission 
39 Commission adopts €1.8 billion support package to underpin the Republic of Moldova's economic growth plan on its path to the 
EU - European Commission 
40 Press statement by President von der Leyen on a Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia - European Commission 

9 

 
          
 
2.1 

Boosting connectivity and energy security 

Russia’s war of aggression has a significant negative impact on trade dynamics in the Black Sea region 
and globally. The disruption of Ukrainian grain exports initially has contributed to rising global food prices 
and global food insecurity. In response, the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes41 established new transport routes, 
providing  a  lifeline  to  the  Ukrainian  economy.  Even  more  important,  the  Solidarity  Lanes  continue 
providing vital new transport routes, including for non-agricultural Ukrainian export to the EU as well as 
for EU exports to Ukraine. The total value of trade via the Solidarity Lanes since May 2022 is around EUR 
213 billion, including around EUR 150 billion imports to Ukraine. Over EUR 2 billion has been mobilised 
to scale up the Solidarity Lanes, including contributions by the Commission, the European Investment Bank, 
the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development,  and  the  World  Bank42.  Ukraine’s  successful 
establishment of a new maritime corridor has helped restore exports of grain from its Black Sea ports, a 
development  further  supported  by  the  sustained  capacity  offered  by  Ukrainian  Danube  ports  that  link 
directly to Black Sea or EU seaports.  

Despite these successful efforts, Russia’s regular and  targeted attacks continue to impede transport and 
overall  investment  in  regional  projects  and  infrastructure  and  lead  to  high  insurance  costs.  Substantial 
investments will be needed not only to reconstruct the transport infrastructure in the Black Sea and Danube 
region, which has suffered extensive damage due to repeated attacks, negatively impacting trade, raising 
costs and undermining reliability of transport, but also to upgrade and modernise the outdated infrastructure, 
logistics systems and border control equipment to meet EU standards. 

As a direct response to the adverse consequences on trade dynamics in the Black Sea region and globally 
caused by Russia’s war of aggression, the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC) has seen trade 
volumes  doubling  in  2022,  with  a  surge  in  demand  leading  to  significant  increase  in  container  traffic. 
Effectively tackling bottlenecks and capacity shortages would create an economically viable alternative for 
private sector operators seeking to diversify trade routes, as well as shrinking the current estimated transit 
time of 14-45 days43. 

Cooperation with regional partners, particularly Azerbaijan44, is one among the essential actions to support 
the EU’s efforts to phase out remaining Russian energy imports and accelerate energy diversification, as 
outlined in the RePowerEU Roadmap45, thereby strengthening EU’s energy security. As host of COP29 
Azerbaijan furthermore committed itself to decarbonisation and the multilateral process, which is a core 
priority for the EU. 

The Black Sea region holds a vast and diverse renewable energy potential and scope to unlock energy 
efficiency gains, which can be leveraged to decarbonise economies in line with the countries’ international 
commitments. This makes the region an important energy partner for the EU and beyond. The acceleration 
of  the  deployment  of  renewable  fuels  will  be  essential  to  reduce  external  dependence  to  fossil  fuels. 
Technical and financial cooperation has strengthened energy security and accelerated the energy transition. 
At the same time, energy cooperation in the Black Sea region should be strengthened46 to address common 
challenges, reduce import dependency and streamline the diverse regulatory environments that hinder the 
interconnections  and  energy  market  integration.  By  investing  in  and  deepening  cross-border  energy 
interconnections and renewable energy projects, the EU and partner countries will be laying the groundwork 

41 https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes_en 
42 EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes - European Commission 
43 Sustainable transport connections between Europe and Central Asia’, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2023 
44 cf. Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy signed on 18 July 2022 
45 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the regions roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports com/2025/440 final/2 
46  The  membership  of  Georgia,  the  Republic  of  Moldova  and  Ukraine  in  the  Energy  Community  has  been  instrumental  in 
advancing sectoral reform and aligning with EU acquis. Similarly, the Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity 
(CESEC)  initiative,  fosters  dialogue  between  the  Republic  of  Moldova  and  Ukraine  with  counterparts  from  Western  Balkan 
countries to address shared energy challenges. 

10 

 
          
 
for truly integrated regional energy markets that support decarbonisation, boost resilience, and unlock new 
investment opportunities for clean technology deployment. The EU will work closely together with regional 
partners to develop a common way forward. Several infrastructure projects are being discussed already, 
including a Black Sea electricity connection. The EU stands ready to assess them for possible EU support 
as a Project of Mutual Interest and to look into ways to support broader green energy links across the region 
also through Global Gateway or with the European Investment Bank. 

In terms of nuclear safety, nuclear power plants around the Black Sea region are also exposed to multiple 
risks, including risks related to natural hazards and armed conflict. Countries that have opted to use nuclear 
energy must uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.  

Key actions include:  

•  Coordinating investment planning and developing strategic cross-border customs and transport 
infrastructure on  the  extended TEN-T network  and  leveraging  enhanced  multimodal transport 
links, including rail, road and waterway connections to key Black Sea ports and links to the Danube 
region, will strengthen the region's position as a vital trade hub and its key role in the Trans-Caspian 
Transport Corridor. 

•  Transition  to  cleaner,  safer,  energy  efficient  and decarbonised maritime  transport and port 
system.  Tackling  gaps  in  regulatory  frameworks,  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  maritime 
administrations and encouraging the exchange of good practices and institution building will enable 
the transition towards a cleaner, safer, more energy-efficient and decarbonised maritime transport and 
port system. 

•  Energy efficiency measures and a higher uptake of renewable energy sources can be achieved 
by enhancing the planning for grid development, convergence of regulatory frameworks and network 
codes, potential cross-border renewable energy projects, pilot projects such as floating offshore wind 
farms or  enhanced  geothermal systems.  These  actions  can help decarbonise  heating, industry  and 
transport by supporting electrification and clean hydrogen.  

•  Critical raw materials. Deepen cooperation on critical raw materials aimed at ensuring sustainable 
and diversified supply chains and mutual prosperity, including as part of the follow up to the EU-
Central Asia Summit.    

•  Bolster energy security and infrastructure protection. Energy security and infrastructure protection 
will be strengthened by improving physical security, optimising energy flows with smart grids, and 
ensuring existing submarine cables in the Black Sea are safeguarded against security threats, in line 
with the EU Action Plan on Cable Security47.  

•  Supporting energy links between the countries around the Black Sea, and in particular the creation of 
a green energy corridor linking clean energy production in the Caucasian region and EU markets 
through - for example - submarine electricity interconnectors under the Black Sea. 

•  Ensure the highest level of nuclear safety through cooperation with regional partners will continue 

in the areas of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. 

•  Creating  digital  links  and  a  trustworthy  digital  environment  is  necessary  to  ensure  secure 
cooperation of law enforcement agencies, the digitalisation of customs procedures, single window 
initiatives  and  cross-border  interoperability  of  digital  services,  actions  to  digitalise  businesses  and 
promote digital skills, innovation and research. 

Integrated development for a competitive Black Sea region  

2.2 
Next to connectivity, modernising and decarbonising the core sectors of the economy, including the blue 
economy and agriculture, will boost economic growth and competitiveness in the region. In this process, 

47 JOIN(2025) 9 final of 21.02.2025 

11 

 
          
 
 
cohesion and balanced development should be prioritised to create a more prosperous and resilient economy, 
where all regions and communities can benefit from sustainable growth and development. 

The blue economy in the Black Sea region has seen concrete progress thanks to the Common Maritime 
Agenda for the Black Sea (CMA)48, supported by the EU, in marine pollution management, blue economy 
entrepreneurship, coastal tourism, innovation, and environmental protection. Within the framework of the 
General  Fisheries  Commission  for  the  Mediterranean  (GFCM),  sustainable  Black  Sea  fisheries  and 
aquaculture will remain a key area of shared interest, substantial long-term benefits that extend beyond the 
fisheries and aquaculture sector.  

Agriculture is another critical focus area for integrated regional development. Export of staple foods like 
wheat, maize and sunflower oil, in particular towards global partners, plays crucial role in ensuring global 
food security. Maintaining these traditional export routes, which have been disrupted by Russia’s war of 
aggression, is crucial and supports the stability of global food supplies. To unlock the region’s full potential, 
a  multifaceted  approach  to  agricultural  development  should  focus  on  enhancing  standards  applied  to 
agricultural  production,  trade  capacity  including  food  logistics  and  promotion  of  sustainable  farming 
practices that minimise the sector's ecological footprint and exposure to climate change. Cooperation among 
partners to adress critical dependencies will be explored.  

Education, skills, research and innovation are key drivers of competitiveness and economic growth. The 
EU will build on its existing partnerships with its counterparts in the Black Sea region, including those 
established through the Erasmus+ programme, to assess the skills needs, enhance the quality of education 
and provide citizens with the skills needed to equip them for changing society and job market and to drive 
future growth.  

The  Black  Sea  region  can  also  benefit  from  increased  research  and  innovation  linkages  with  the  EU’s 
innovation  and  startups  ecosystem  enabling  the  commercialisation  of  research  outcomes  driving 
productivity and economic gains for the whole region. Scientific cooperation can build bridges in the region 
and beyond. Most partners in the region are already associated with the EU framework programmes for 
research and innovation and can access training and capacity building support provided by the European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre. Participation of the region in framework programmes is increasing. 
Initiatives like the Danube and Black Sea lighthouse of the EU Mission ‘Restore our Ocean and Waters by 
2030’ supports freshwater and marine research and innovation, bringing together community and sectoral 
stakeholders  in  the  region.  The  Sustainable  Blue  Economy  partnership  also  focuses  on  the  Black  Sea. 
BIOEAST initiative plans to extend its activities towards Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the Western 
Balkans in knowledge-based agriculture, forestry and aquaculture in the bioeconomy.  

The EU support for territorial cohesion through the Interreg NEXT Black Sea Basin programme will 
help reduce the gaps in development opportunities between different areas and make the Black Sea region 
a more appealing place to live, work, and invest. This includes support to strengthen regional governance 
structures and to build administrative and investment capacity in local and regional projects, especially for 
countries on the path to EU accession. The EU and its partners will also continue cooperation to enhance 
gender equality, including closing gender gaps and pay gaps as well as to enhance access to high quality 
affordable care services for those in need, including for children and for older people, to facilitate active 
participation in the labor market, crucial for further development of communities and overall prosperity of 
the region.  

Key actions include:  

•  Prioritising investment in the blue economy. The EU will mobilise investments in blue economy 
projects, including sustainable aquaculture and coastal and maritime tourism, by strengthening local 

48 European Commission, Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea, 21 May 2019 

12 

 
          
 
community  and  regional  stakeholder  engagement.  Strengthening  their  capacity  building  notably 
regarding the priorities of the forthcoming European Ocean Pact.  

•  Mobilising  private  sector  investment  for  the  blue  economy.  Facilitating  access  to  funding 
mechanisms for innovative SMEs, mobilising the private sector and leveraging funding mechanisms 
that can secure larger-scale investments in the blue economy, including under the EU cohesion policy 
funds will strengthen the competitiveness and decarbonisation of key blue economy sectors as well as 
their capacity to innovate. 

•  Sustainable use of marine resources. Enhancing maritime spatial planning in the sea basin, effective 
fisheries management49 and sustainable aquaculture to ensure a balanced and sustainable use of the 
marine space and marine living resources. 

•  Preserving traditional trade routes to global partners, while boosting production standards and 
sustainable  farming.  The  EU  will  facilitate  and  preserve  established  trade  routes,  in  particular 
towards  global  partners,  including  transportation  and  storage  of  food  products  combined  with 
improvement of production standards and sustainable farming practices, including energy and water 
efficiency. 

•  Smart specialisation across borders. The EU will step up cooperation with Black Sea partners smart 

specialisation across borders to foster regional economic integration. 

•  Supporting cooperation on territorial cohesion and development, including on enhanced access to 

• 

services notably high quality care services for those in need in society. 
Investors  and  business  dialogues.  The  EU  will  step  up  private  sector  involvement  through 
dedicated and tailored business dialogues and outreach facilitating business partnerships between EU 
companies, including SMEs, and those of partner countries; using financial instruments to de-risk 
innovative investments with growth potential, both in civil and defence industry domains, including 
for a protection of the marine enviroment. 

•  Strengthening cooperation and synergies with regional frameworks and initiatives beyond the 
Black Sea region towards other Sea Basins, such as the Caspian Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Western 
Mediterranean, the Atlantic and the Greater North Sea, as well as with macro-regional strategies, such 
as the Danube macro-regional strategy. Macro-regional partnerships will be deployed in thematic areas 
such as (blue) bioeconomy, biomass, food and water nexus. 
Implementation  of  the  Black  Sea  Strategic  Research  and  Innovation  Agenda  (SRIA)  which 
defines common regional priorities, including the blue economy and research infrastructures, as well 
as education and capacity building. We will build on the work of the Operational Network of Funders, 
facilitate joint priority setting and the development of potential targeted funding calls that address the 
region's specific needs. 

• 

•  The  EU  will  build  on  Erasmus  +  programme,  promoting  partnerships,  enhance  cooperation, 
modernise curricula and increase mobility between education and training institutions in the 
Black Sea region and EU Member States, including in Vocational Education and Training (VET) 
and Higher Education, to equip workers and job seekers with the necessary skills and to nurture talents 
by re- and upskilling people in line with the objectives of the Union of Skills.  

•  Science diplomacy. Closer links will be established between the European Research Area and Black 
Sea  partners  will  enable  greater  mobility  for  researchers,  enhance  their  capacity  to  conduct  free 
research and promote research security.  

•  Culture Diplomacy. Building on the Creative Europe programme, the EU will promote cooperation 

in cultural and creative sectorswith partners in the Black Sea region. 

•  Enhancing  digital  connectivity  between  Black  Sea  countries’  universities  and  academia  and 
organising  exchanges  with  the  Mediterranean  to  build  relevant  experience.  This  will  involve 
leveraging the opportunities provided by Horizon Europe cooperation projects as well as under the 
newly established European Digital Innovation Hubs in the region. 

49 Including in the framework of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, 

13 

 
          
 
•  Preparing for a ‘Black Sea Digital Twin’ linked to the EU Digital Twin of the Ocean to support 
resilience, monitor pollution, contribute to biodiversity protection, improve vessel traffic coordination, 
and maritime security aspects and facilitate cross-border data sharing. 

3.  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION,  CLIMATE  CHANGE  RESILIENCE  AND  PREPAREDNESS,  CIVIL 

PROTECTION  

The Black Sea region has a highly complex disaster profile. It is exposed to a wide range of disaster risks, 
from earthquakes, floods, landslides, forest and ground fires to extreme temperature fluctuations. Climate 
change impacts are stronger here than in the rest of Europe: the sea surface temperature increases twice as 
fast as in the North Sea50 marine litter is almost twice as high as in the Mediterranean Sea, while many 
pollutant concentrations exceed toxicity thresholds. The region is susceptible to sea-level rise and vulnerable 
to  industrial,  chemical,  biological,  radiological  and  nuclear  risks,  with  significant  threats  to  countries’ 
economies and livelihoods51.  

In the marine environment, environmental degradation52 is further amplified by Russia’s actions in its war 
against Ukraine53, as illustrated by the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam54, the use of drifting mines 
and other explosives. The risks of marine disasters persist due to possible accidents with tankers, as well as 
pollution reaching the sea via rivers.  

The “source-to-sea” approach, which recognises the links between inland waters and marine pollution, is 
particularly relevant for the Black Sea with its large catchment area and potential for aquaculture growth. 
The EU will support this approach in the region in line with the forthcoming EU water resilience strategy, 
the European Ocean Pact, the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive55 and the EU Water Framework 
Directive56.  

The EU enlargement countries of the Black Sea, including Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and 
Türkiye (within the framework of EU enlargement), as well as Armenia as an associated partner, have 
committed to the  EU  water  and marine  environment  legislation  and  achieving  global  goals on oceans 
protection, including restoring 30% of all degraded ecosystems and conservation of land, waters and seas 
by 2030.  

FLAGSHIP 3: Reinforcing preparedness of coastal communities and blue economy sectors  

Improve preparedness to anticipate, manage and respond  to the climate change related risks, building on Black 
Sea countries’ policies on climate change adaptation and drawing from EU best practices. Special emphasis 
will be on cooperation with  local authorities, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders on the ground, 
including youth. 

50 European sea surface temperature | European Environment Agency's home page 
51  Based  on  the  findings  of  the  joint  EU-UNDP  project  “Improving  Environmental  Monitoring  in  the  Black  Sea”. 
https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/black-sea-twice-polluted-marine-litter-mediterranean-sea-eu-projects-survey 
52 https://emblasproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/EMBLAS_Scientific-Report_ISBN-978-617-8111-01-4-web.pdf 
53 Belis, C., Petrosian, A., Turos, O., Maremuhka, T., Morhulova, V., Kona, A., Djatkov, D., Caudullo, G., Ceccherini, G., Beck, 
P.S.A., San-Miguel, J., Arias Navarro, C., Wojda, P., Jones, A., Hanke, G., Mariani, G. And Carravieri, A., Status of Environment 
and  Climate  in  Ukraine,  Publications  Office  of  the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2025,  https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/6292177, 
JRC141480. 
54 United Nations Environment Programme (2023). Rapid Environmental Assessment of Kakhovka Dam Breach; Ukraine, 2023. 
Nairobi, Kenya. https://wedocs.unep.org/20.500.11822/43696 
55 OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19–40 
56 OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1–73 

14 

 
          
 
 
Key actions include:  

•  Tackling environmental damages from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with special 
attention to reducing contamination, preventing oil spills and restoring affected ecosystems and protected 
areas. 

•  Tackling  environmental  challenges  in  the  region  by  leveraging  new  technologies,  including  in  the 

domains of defence and space.  

•  The EU will enable Black Sea partners to join the European Flood Awareness System57, the European 

Forest Fire Information System58 and the European Drought Observatory.  

•  Forging scientific cooperation in conjunction with the Copernicus Emergency Management Service.  
•  Expanding joint monitoring, data exchange, and assessment of environmental quality and pollution 
and climate risks, based on, among others, the Black Sea Environmental Data Platform59. Connecting 
relevant data systems with the European Marine Observation and Data Network60 and with the Copernicus 
Marine Environment Monitoring Service, in particular its Black Sea Monitoring and Forecasting Centre61, 
will be gradually ensured. 

•  Strengthening  regional  environmental  cooperation  and  governance,  including  through  the  EU 

accession to the Bucharest Convention for the protection of the Black Sea. 

•  Engaging  in  policy  dialogue,  and  putting  forward  joint  initiatives  to  improve  environmental  and 
climate  change  resilience,  including  water  resilience;  strengthening  the  role  of  civil  society  and 
promoting dialogue with private sector bodies. 

•  Advancing  regional  cooperation  on  preparedness  by  a  common  understanding  of  crises  and  their 
implications; minimum criteria for preparedness related to environment, climate, and natural hazards; and 
improving communication networks.  

•  Associating the Black Sea countries, where feasible, with relevant EU preparedness initiatives in line 
with the European Preparedness Union Strategy62 and the crisis management framework. This will build 
on cooperation related to the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and other frameworks.  

•  Setting up “Black Sea Resilience” as a multi-stakeholder platform for preparedness and crisis response to 
maritime incidents. Focus on reinforcing disaster management systems through improving emergency 
plans and early warning systems, harmonised standard operating procedures, updating national disaster 
risk assessments and conducting additional full-scale exercises when relevant.  

57 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Ukraine are part of the EFAS network. 
58 All the countries in the region are part of the Expert Group on Forest Fires. 
59 https://blackseadb.org/ 
60 https://emodnet.ec.europa.eu/en 
61 Black Sea – Monitoring Forecasting Centre (BS MFC) | CMEMS 
62 JOIN/2025/130 final 

15 

 
          
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 

This  strategic  approach  for  the  Black  Sea  region  will  govern  the  EU  initiatives  and  policies  furthering 
security and democratic resilience, inclusive and sustainable growth, and improved connectivity for 
the EU and its Black Sea partners through mutually-beneficial partnerships.  

In this context, the EU will continue its efforts to promote democracy, human rights, good governance, 
rule of law, conflict resolution and inclusive peacebuilding with respect for the international order based 
on international law. This vision aims to ensure long-term economic growth, resilience, environmental 
protection and restoration, and enhanced cooperation, while supporting the region’s integration with the EU 
through strategic initiatives and partnerships. 

The EU will implement the new strategic approach to the Black Sea in synergy with the enlargement 
process  and  the  Eastern  Partnership  policy,  which  provides  a  well-established  framework  for 
cooperation. Engagement and collaboration with strategic partners in the Black Sea region will be reinforced 
by leveraging the Eastern Partnership actions across all key areas, including people-to-people exchanges 
and civil society engagement, alongside cooperation on education, culture, youth and gender equality that 
will provide an important human dimension to the EU’s approach. 

This strategic approach also amplifies the EU’s links to the Caucasus and Central Asia. It builds on the 
Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia63 and the outcomes of the Central Asia 
- EU Summit in April 2025, with progress in this area guided by a regional Connectivity Agenda to increase 
trade and focus on the key sectors of transport, energy and digital connectivity across key sectors such as 
transport, energy and digital connectivity.  

The EU will continue its action to promote regional prosperity and economic stability through investments 
under  the  Global  Gateway,  complemented  by  financing  from  EU  Member  States,  development  and 
financial institutions (DFIs) and the European Investment Bank (EIB), respecting the EU agreed framework 
of  cooperation  with  each  partner,  in  a  Team Europe  approach.  Furthermore,  the  EU  will  also seek  to 
maximise the potential for synergies through investments and reforms undertaken under the Ukraine Plan, 
the  Growth  Plan  for  the  Republic  of  Moldova,  the  Resilience  and  Growth  Package  for  Armenia  and 
investments in Azerbaijan and the overall region under Global Gateway.  

The implementation of activities outlined in this document will depend on the evolving security situation 
in the Black Sea. Activities may be implemented through existing financing instruments and budgetary 
availability  over  the  course  of  the  2021-27  Multiannual  Financial  Framework,  including  through  the 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA III), the Connecting Europe Facility, Horizon Europe, European Defence Fund 
(EDF) and EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), the Cohesion policy (ERDF), the Digital Europe 
Programme,  InvestEU,  the LIFE  programme,  Erasmus+,  the ReArm Europe Plan, the  European Peace 
Facility, and the Ukraine Facility.  

The Commission and the High Representative propose the organisation of a dedicated EU ministerial 
meeting  with  partner  countries  in  the  Black  Sea  region  to  develop  and  advance  different  aspects  of 
cooperation under the new EU approach to the Black Sea region based on a jointly agreed way forward. 
Follow-up  ministerial  meetings  could  be  organised  as  appropriate  to  monitor  and  evaluate  progress  of 
specific actions agreed in this context.  

The Commission and the High Representative invite the European Parliament and the Council to endorse 
the approach set out in this Joint Communication and to work together on its implementation and review. 

63 https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14587-2023-INIT/en/pdf 

16 

 
          
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The Commission and the High Representative will provide  a first report on the  implementation of this 
strategic approach to the Black Sea region after one year of implementation.  

17