Measuring the quality of government at the sub-national level and comparing results with previous studies. Part II, Select case studies : Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava regions.
Date: 2025-05-20
Institutions: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy
Subjects: Attica, Bratislava region, Community of Madrid, EU regional policy, Prague, case study, governance, government, local government, public service, quality standard, report, sample survey, trust in government

Measuring the Quality of Government at 
the Sub-National Level and Comparing 
Results with Previous Studies: 

Part II: Select Case Studies - Madrid, Attica, 
Prague and Bratislava Regions 

Authors: Nicholas Charron, Monika Bauhr,  
Victor Lapuente & Georgios Xezonakis,  
Quality of Government Institute & Department  
of Political Science, University of Gothenburg;  
Pablo Fernández-Vázquez, Carlos III University,  
Madrid; Jan Kotýnek Krotký & Veronika Kotýnková  
Krotká, Masaryk University, Brno, Czechia 

April 2025 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 
Directorate  — Policy 
Unit B.2 — European Semester and Economic Analysis 

Contact:  Laura de Dominicis 

E-mail:   REGIO-B2-HEAD-OF-UNIT@ec.europa.eu     

European Commission 
B-1049 Brussels 

 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 

Measuring the Quality of Government 
at the Sub-National Level and 
Comparing Results with Previous 
Studies: 

Part II: Select Case Studies - Madrid, 
Attica, Prague and Bratislava Regions 

2025 

Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript completed in April 2025 

1st  edition 

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PDF 

ISBN 978-92-68-26831-5 

doi:10.2776/7505306               KN-01-25-041-EN-N 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level: Select Case Studies - 
Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Regions 

Contents 

Executive summary ........................................................................................ 7 

1. 

Introduction ............................................................................................ 10 

2.  Sub-national QoG in two southern EU regions: Madrid and Attica ... 15 

2.1.  Main findings........................................................................................ 15 

2.1.  Sub-National QoG: Madrid .................................................................. 19 

2.1.1.  Highlights ................................................................................................ 19 
2.1.2.  Introduction ............................................................................................. 20 
2.1.1.  Research design ..................................................................................... 23 
2.1.2.  Caracheristics of the region .................................................................... 25 
2.1.3.  Analysis .................................................................................................. 28 
2.1.4.  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 38 

2.2.  Sub-National QoG: Attica region .......................................................... 41 

2.2.1.  Highlights ................................................................................................ 41 
2.2.2.  Introduction ............................................................................................. 42 
2.2.3.  Background: The Region of Attica........................................................... 43 
2.2.4.  Methodology ........................................................................................... 54 
2.2.5.  Analysis of Stakeholder Interviews .......................................................... 55 
2.2.6.  Discussion .............................................................................................. 66 
2.2.7.  Conclusion .............................................................................................. 68 

3.  Sub-national QoG in two eastern EU regions: Bratislava and Prague

 ................................................................................................................. 71 

3.1.  Bratislava and Prague Self-Governing Regions .................................. 71 

3.1.1.  Main findings .......................................................................................... 71 
3.1.2.  Introduction ............................................................................................. 72 
3.1.3.  Carachteristics of the Prague and Bratislava Regions ............................. 73 
3.1.4.  Political Situation .................................................................................... 76 
3.1.5.  Methodology ........................................................................................... 77 
3.1.6.  Descriptive Analysis ................................................................................ 79 
3.1.7.  Transparency, Corruption and Impartiality .............................................. 80 
3.1.8.  Quality and Transparency in Public Education ........................................ 84 
3.1.9.  Quality and Transparency in Healthcare ................................................. 88 
3.1.10. Summary of Descriptive Analysis ............................................................ 92 
3.1.11. Explanatory Analysis............................................................................... 93 
3.1.12. The Role of National Politics ................................................................... 93 
3.1.13. Politicization at the Regional and Local Level ......................................... 95 
3.1.14. Organizational Culture ............................................................................ 99 
3.1.15. The Role of Local Media ....................................................................... 103 
3.1.16. Summary of Explanatory Analysis......................................................... 109 
3.1.17. Conclusions .......................................................................................... 110 

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Measuring the Quality of Government at the Sub-National Level: Select Case Studies - 
Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Regions 

3.1.18. Policy Recommendations ..................................................................... 112 

4.  References............................................................................................ 115 

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 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

Executive summary  

This report presents a detailed examination of the Part II (Select Case Studies) of 
Measuring  the  Quality  of  Government  at  the  Sub-National  Level  and  Comparing 
Results with Previous Studies. In the latest round in the EQI – as well as previous 
rounds – there is noteworthy variation of the relative position of capital regions within 
EU27  countries.    In  many  cases,  the  capital  is considered  to  have  the  lowest,  or 
among the lowest Quality of Government within a country.  For example, the capital 
region of Athens (Attica) is far below the national average in Greece. The same is 
true for Bratislava in Slovakia.  However, this is not the case for all countries, as the 
capital  regions  of  Prague  and  Madrid  are  the  top  performers  in  their  respective 
countries. The report provides an in-depth study of these four capital regions: Attica, 
Madrid, Prague, and Bratislava 

Regarding the two southern European regions: Madrid Region and the Attica region, 
the report indicates that Madrid has experienced a remarkable improvement in its 
EQI  score  between  2021  and  2024,  particularly  in  the  areas  of  impartiality  and 
corruption.  In contract, the Attica Region, which includes Athens, has long struggled 
with relatively low scores on the EQI, especially in comparison to other European 
capitals.  Despite  being  Greece’s  economic  and  political  center,  the  region  faces 
significant challenges in public service delivery. The experts interviewed in the Attica 
region  point  to  several  factors  that  hamper  the  effectiveness  of  health  care, 
include  chronic  underinvestment,  outdated 
education  and  policing.  These 
infrastructure, and persistent staffing shortages, all of which have been worsened 
by austerity measures. Furthermore, governance in Attica is affected by entrenched 
political patronage and the politicization of the civil service, where recruitment and 
career development often depend more on political loyalty than merit. These issues 
are exacerbated by weak accountability mechanisms, including media capture and 
ineffective  civil  society  organizations.  The  lack  of  strong  oversight  and  the  deep 
mistrust  between  citizens  and  the  state  further hinder meaningful  reforms.  At  the 
same time, the report highlights some incremental improvements, including efforts 
to make civil service recruitment more merit-based and transparent, and a growing 
trend  toward  involving  civil  society  organizations  in  decision-making  processes, 
allowing for greater citizen input and participation in deliberative processes. These 
small but meaningful shifts suggest that, while systemic problems remain, there are 
avenues for progress that could help rebuild trust in public institutions.  

By  contrast,  according  to  the  experts  surveyed  in  the  Madrid  region,  the 
improvements in the score cannot be attributed to genuine institutional reforms but 
also  to  the  region’s  robust  economic  growth  and  increasing  population.  Madrid's 
economic success has fostered an optimistic view of public services, contributing to 
an  "aspirational  culture"  where  residents  perceive  the  region  as  a  land  of 
7 

 
 
 
 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

opportunity. The political climate, marked by a honeymoon period for the regional 
government,  further  bolsters  these  positive  perceptions.  While  residents  express 
satisfaction with the education sector, the healthcare system has faced persistent 
issues,  such  as  long  waiting  lists  and  inadequate  primary  healthcare  investment. 
The  government's  increased  control over  media  and  recent  moves  to  reduce  the 
power of transparency and oversight agencies have raised concerns about the long-
term  sustainability  of 
the  strong  economic 
performance, the growing polarization of media and the weakening of accountability 
mechanisms suggest that the positive trends in governance could be unsustainable 
if the underlying institutional quality issues are not addressed. 

improvements.  Despite 

these 

Regarding the Prague and Bratislava Regions, the contrast between these regions 
offers valuable insights into the governance dynamics of Central Europe. Prague, 
the  capital  of  the  Czech  Republic,  is  the  top-performing  region  in  the  country 
according to the EQI, benefiting, according to the experts interviewed, from higher 
transparency and media scrutiny. The city’s public administration has seen steady 
improvements, particularly in healthcare and education, supported by a more open 
and  accountable  governance  model.  The  strong  media  presence  and  public 
oversight  further  enhance  the  quality  of  government  by  mechanisms  that  help 
holding  public  officials  accountable.  On  the  other  hand,  Bratislava,  the  capital  of 
Slovakia,  lags  behind  Prague  in  governance  quality,  despite  likewise  being  a 
wealthy  region.  Slovakia's  national  politics  play  a  significant  role  in  shaping 
governance in Bratislava, where politicization and low public sector salaries seem 
to  be  responsible  for  not  problems  in  the  public  service  delivery.  The  media 
landscape in Slovakia, much like in Attica, is seen, by the experts, as fragmented 
and  often  biased,  limiting  its  ability  to  hold  the  government  accountable.  While 
Bratislava has made some progress, particularly in education, the challenges posed 
by  political  interference  and  limited  media  freedom  remain  significant  barriers  to 
effective governance. 

The case studies across Attica, Madrid, Prague, and Bratislava reveal several key 
findings that contribute to our understanding of the quality of government at the sub-
national level. First, the political and economic conditions seem to matter crucially. 
Economic  performance  plays  a  crucial  role  in  shaping  public  perceptions  of 
government quality. Both Madrid and Prague indicate that strong economic growth 
seems to be highly correlated with improving perceptions of government services, 
even in the absence of substantial institutional reforms. However, as evidenced by 
Attica and Bratislava, economic prosperity alone is not enough to guarantee high-
quality  governance.  The  key  challenges  in  these  regions  are  deeply  rooted  in 
political  interference,  media  bias,  and  weak  accountability  mechanisms,  which 
prevent meaningful reforms and undermine citizens’ trust in public institutions. The 
cases also illustrate that regional governance is not only shaped by local factors but 
is  heavily  influenced  by  national  politics,  particularly  in  regions  with  centralized 
systems like Greece and Slovakia. All in all, the political climate seems to matter at 
least, slightly more than in previous case study reports. 

8 

 
 
 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

Policy Recommendations: 

1.  Investment  in  Infrastructure  and  Personnel:  Continued  investment  in 
healthcare, education, and law enforcement infrastructure seems crucial, to 
most observers, to improve service delivery in all four regions. This includes 
addressing 
issues  of  underinvestment  and  outdated 
infrastructure, particularly in regions like Attica. 

long-standing 

2.  Strengthening  Meritocracy:  To  overcome  the  challenges  posed  by  political 
patronage, public sector recruitment and promotion should be based on merit 
and transparency. Reducing the need for partisan loyalties and strengthening 
the professionalization of the civil service will help ensure that resources are 
allocated efficiently and equitably. 

3.  Improving  Transparency:    Enhancing  media  freedom,  reducing  political 
control  over  public  media,  and  strengthening  independent  oversight 
institutions  seem  also,  in  the  eyes  of  the  experts,  essential  for  improving 
accountability and reducing corruption in all four regions. 

4.  Building  Public  Trust:  rebuild  trust  in  government  institutions  (for  instance, 
through  methods  for  engaging  civil  society  in  decision-making  and 
implementation processes) seems fundamental.  

The EQI case studies of Attica, Madrid, Prague, and Bratislava provide important 
lessons for improving governance quality at the sub-national level. While economic 
growth and political stability can enhance public perceptions of government quality, 
lasting  improvements  require  genuine  reforms  in  institutional  transparency, 
meritocracy  and  accountability. The  experiences  of  these  regions  underscore  the 
importance  of  addressing  the  root  causes  of  governance  challenges,  particularly 
political interference, media bias, and a lack of investment in public services.  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

1.  Introduction 

The European Quality of Government Index (the EQI) is a large-scale regional level 
survey  that  investigates  citizens  perceptions  of  quality  of  government,  including 
impartiality,  favoritism  and  corruption  as  well  as  the  perceptions  of  the  quality  of 
public service delivery. 1Building on previous rounds of this survey.  the 2024 round 
of the EQI measures perceptions of quality of government in the European Union 
(EU), collecting the opinions and direct experiences of over 135,000 respondents 
living in 210 regions across all 27 EU member states (Charron, Lapuente and Bauhr 
2024).  In  order  to  explore  specific  aspects  of  these  findings,  the  survey  is 
complemented  by  in-depth  case  studies  that  focus  on  providing  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  evolution  of  quality  of  government  in  specific  European 
regions. 

In  previous  rounds,  the  case  study  portion  of  the  EQI  reports  have  relied  on  a 
research  design  that  compares  two  regions  -  one  stronger  performer  and  one 
weaker performer according to EQI data - in the same country. For example, in the 
fourth  round  of  the  EQI  data  (2021)  the  regions  selected  were  Basque  Country 
versus Catalonia in Spain and Opolskie versus Lubelskie in Poland. In this round, 
we shift the design to instead focus on capital regions, that has not been part of the 
case study analyses in any of previous rounds,  due to their unique status rendering 
them difficult to compare with other regions in the same country. The central aim is 
to continue to build on the previous research design of selecting high/low performers 
of otherwise similar regions in terms of other potentially confounding factors such 
as human capital, wealth, culture, size, etc. and then to identify key differences in 
the way the stronger performer is governed compared with the weaker one for policy 
lessons.  

First, in the latest round in the EQI – as well as previous rounds – there is noteworthy 
variation of the relative position of capital regions within EU27 countries.  In many 
cases, the capital is considered to have the lowest, or among the lowest QOG within 
a country.  For example, the capital region of Athens (Attica) is far below the national 
average  in  Greece.  The  same  is  true  for  Bratislava  in  Slovakia.  Also,  Brussels 
scores  far  below  the  national  average  of  Belgian  regions,  and  also  Zagreb, 
Bucharest and Berlin in Croatia, Romania and Germany respectively.  However, this 
is not the case for all countries, as the capital regions of Prague, Vilnius, Ljubljana 
are  the  top  performers in  their  respective  countries,  while  Madrid and Lisbon  are 
among the top in Spain and Portugal respectively.  While in most cases, the capital 
region is the strongest (or among the strongest) economic region in the country and 
have  in  common higher population density and more  educated  residents, among 
other  features,  what  explains  this  variation  of  capital  region  performance  across 
countries?  More  specifically,  can  we  identify  certain  common  features  in  capital 

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 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

regions where citizens perceive relatively high QoG, as well as common features 
among certain lower QoG capitals? Given the importance of capital regions, we view 
these questions as highly salient for researchers and policy makers alike.    

Figure 1: Relative Position of Capital Regions in the EQI 2024 

In selecting regions for case study analysis, we elected to choose pairs of regions 
that were as similar as possible to make comparisons more valid.  In this case, we 
selected two Southern EU capitals – Attica, rated the lowest performer in Greece, 
and Madrid, rated number two among the 17 Spanish regions.  Second, we analyse 
two central EU capital regions - Prague and Bratislava (Bratislavský kraj) regions - 
two regions that once belonged to the same country (Czechoslovakia).  

In the subsequent sections, we present the analysis for Madrid and Attica, while the 
Prague and Bratislava regions are presented in the final chapter. Each case was 
analysed  by  a  professional  researcher  and  native  speaker  in  the  country,  where 
interviews with local stakeholders constitutes the primary methodology.   

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

Figure 2: Select Case Study Regions 

In sum, the analysis of the four case studies reveals some very relevant insights that 
contribute to our understanding of the factors affecting the quality of governance in 
capital regions. In Attica, the findings suggest that service delivery is significantly 
hampered by chronic underinvestment and outdated infrastructure. Despite Attica's 
position as Greece's economic and administrative center, public investment remains 
inadequate, which has adversely affected health care facilities, school buildings, and 
the capacity of law enforcement agencies. Austerity measures implemented in the 
wake  of  the  financial  crisis  have  exacerbated  staff  shortages,  further  straining 
service delivery in some sectors. Another critical challenge is the entrenched system 
of patronage and politicization of the public sector, which affects recruitment, career 
development, and ultimately the efficient allocation of resources. These governance 
challenges are compounded by the weakness of institutions designed to promote 
accountability. Media capture, weak civil society organizations, and shortcomings in 
the judiciary allow inefficiencies and abuses to go unchecked. In addition, cultural 
factors, including deep-seated mistrust between citizens and the state and tolerance 
for unprofessionalism, hamper reform efforts. At the same time, the report highlights 
some incremental improvements, including efforts to make civil service recruitment 
more merit-based and transparent, and a growing trend toward involving civil society 

12 

 
 
 
 
 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

organizations in decision-making processes, allowing for greater citizen input and 
participation in deliberative processes. These small but meaningful shifts suggest 
that,  while  systemic  problems  remain,  there  are  avenues  for  progress  that  could 
help rebuild trust in public institutions.  

In  Madrid, on the other hand,  respondents  were  not  surprised  by  the  remarkable 
improvement  in  Madrid's  EQI  Index  score.  However,  they  provided  a  number  of 
arguments  for  such  a  rise  in  the  ranking.  Crucially,  none  of  them  suggested  that 
institutional  quality  was  responsible  for  the  region's  improved  performance  in  the 
latest  round.  Instead,  they  pointed  to  factors  such  as  economic  and  population 
growth,  which  create  an  optimistic  view  of  public  services  and  government 
performance in general and help create an "aspirational culture" in which citizens 
believe that Madrid is a "land of economic opportunity" with prospects for upward 
mobility.  A  political  honeymoon  with  the  regional  government,  some  participants 
say, also contributes to the positive ratings that Madrid residents give to government 
performance.  The  analysis  also  highlights  the  interesting  contrast  between  the 
education and health sectors, where citizens are largely satisfied with the education 
sector,  while  the  health  sector  faces  particular  challenges,  including  inconsistent 
policy design, long waiting lists and inadequate investment in primary health care.  

At the same time, the report highlights that government control over public media 
has  increased  in  recent  years,  both  at  the  regional  and  national  levels.  This 
contributes  to  media  bias  and  polarization.  Private  media  are  also  increasingly 
polarized,  with  clear  biases  either  in  favor  of  or  against  national  and  regional 
incumbents. Relatedly, transparency and horizontal accountability are declining. In 
recent years, the regional government has adopted new regulations that tighten its 
control  over  two  agencies  responsible  for  promoting  transparency  and  auditing 
regional accounts. These are worrying signs of institutional quality that raise crucial 
questions about the sustainability of such positive EQI scores in the future. 

factors, 

interrelated 

The  case  studies  on  Prague  and  Bratislava  seeks  to  understand  why  the  Czech 
capital outperforms  the  Slovak  capital relative  to  other regions  in their  respective 
countries, and also to explain Bratislava’s poor performance relative to the Prague 
region.  The  report  suggests  that  the  quality  of  government  in  both  capitals  - 
examined through the lens of corruption, transparency and impartiality - is shaped 
by  multiple 
including  national  politics,  politicisation, 
organisational culture and the media landscape. In the Bratislava region; national 
politics  significantly  influence  perceptions  of  governance.  Politicization  has  been 
particularly evident since Slovakia's 2023 elections, when Robert Fico's government 
introduced  significant  changes  in  public  administration.  The  report  suggests  that 
while Bratislava's citizens, who tend to support liberal parties, are generally satisfied 
with their regional and city governments, they remain dissatisfied with politicization 
at the national level. Moreover, the organizational culture of the public sector is rigid 
and  lacks  incentives  for  innovation  among  employees.    This  contrast  was  less 
pronounced in Prague. In addition, while both Prague and Bratislavský kraj operate 
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 Measuring the QoG at the Sub-National Level and Comparing Results with Previous Studies. Select Case 
Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

in  highly  regulated  but  underfunded  systems  constrained  by  rigid  salary  scales, 
public sector salaries in Bratislavský kraj are particularly inadequate compared to 
the  cost  of  living,  exacerbating  the  governance  challenge.  Prague  benefits  from 
greater  transparency  and  media  scrutiny,  while  the  media  in  Bratislava  focuses 
primarily  on  national  issues,  limiting  coverage  of  regional  governance.  Press 
freedom is also higher in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia, where recent political 
developments have raised concerns. The report also suggests that both countries 
share  a  "zero-tolerance"  administrative  culture,  which  reduces  efficiency  and 
undermines the prestige of the civil service.  

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2.  Sub-national QoG in two southern EU regions: 

Madrid and Attica 

2.1.  Main findings 

This chapter examines the two capital regions of Madrid and Attica. In the 2024 EQI 
the  capital  region  of  Athens  (Attica)  is  far  below  the  national  average  in  Greece, 
while  Madrid  is  among  the  top  performer  among  regions  in  Spain.    Since  both 
regions  are  economic  and  administrative  hubs  in  their  respective  countries,  this 
report seeks to understand the factors behind the strong and weak performances of 
the Spanish and Greek capitals compared to other regions within their countries.  It 
will also seek to explain Attika’s poor performance relative to the Madrid region.  The 
report points to several factors that may explain these regions performance.  

Economic and Political Context 

Madrid  and  Attica  contrasting  governance  dynamics  are  partly  shaped  by  their 
economic conditions and political environments. 

Madrid, Spain's capital, has experienced strong economic growth in recent years, 
positioning itself as a land of opportunity for its residents. For example, following the 
downturn in 2020 due to the pandemic, the region has experienced 2.5%, 8.1% and 
6.4% in GDP growth in 2023, 2022, and 2021 respectively, exceeding both national 
and  EU-27  averages  overall2.  The  rapid  economic  growth  has  contributed 
significantly  to  the  improvement  in  its  EQI  score,  with  rising  optimism  among 
citizens. This optimistic view is coupled with an "aspirational culture," where citizens 
believe in upward mobility and the economic opportunities available. This economic 
boom has been pivotal in shaping the perception of public services, with some of 
the experts interviewed attributing better government performance to the region's 
overall prosperity rather than institutional reforms. 

In contrast, Attica, Greece's capital region, faces a more difficult economic reality. 
Despite being Greece’s wealthiest region, it suffers from persistent underinvestment 
in  public  services,  particularly  in  the three  areas  explored  in  the  EQI:  healthcare, 
education,  and  policing.  The  region's  economic  output  is  high,  yet  there  is  a 
prevailing  view  that  the  benefits  are  unevenly  distributed.  The  region’s  economic 
struggles  have  been  exacerbated  by  the  financial  crisis  and  austerity  measures, 
which have led to cuts in public investment, particularly in critical public sectors. 

2 See Eurostat: 
 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP  

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Studies in Madrid, Attica, Prague and Bratislava Region 

Politically, Madrid has enjoyed relative stability, accentuated after the 2023 regional 
elections, which led to a strong majority for the center-right regional government. 
This “political honeymoon” has fostered positive perceptions of government quality 
in a highly decentralized administrative system such as Spain. However, in Attica, 
governance  remains  heavily  influenced  by  the  centralized  decision-making  in 
Greece. There is an overwhelming perception that political patronage undermines 
the efficiency of  public services, and this translates into the idea that policies are 
shaped  more  by  political  loyalty  than  by  actual  needs,  resulting  in  inefficient 
governance. 

Healthcare 

Healthcare in both Madrid and Attica are a key area of concern for citizens, but the 
challenges  differ  in  nature  and  scale.  In  Madrid,  despite  substantial  economic 
resources, the healthcare system has faced significant issues in recent years. Long 
waiting lists, understaffed healthcare centers, and inadequate investment in primary 
care are recurring problems according to the experts. Although there is a significant 
presence of both public and private healthcare providers, the system’s free-market 
approach—allowing  citizens  to  choose  between  public  and  private  options—has 
not, in the opinion of some experts, solved core issues such as resource shortages 
and growing inequality in access to care. Furthermore, Madrid’s healthcare system 
struggles  with  a  lack  of  investment  in  primary  healthcare,  leading  to  issues  with 
accessibility and service quality. 

Attica, on the other hand, experiences even more severe challenges in healthcare. 
Despite being the economic center of Greece, the region’s healthcare infrastructure 
is  outdated  and  chronically  underfunded.  There  are  indications  that  hospitals  are 
overwhelmed,  and  citizens  face  long  waiting  times  for  treatment.  The  public 
healthcare sector in Attica suffers from staffing shortages, which have worsened in 
the aftermath of austerity measures.  

These deficiencies are compounded by the lack of funding and but also embedded 
policy  inefficiencies  that  are  difficult  to  overcome  without  substantial  political  will. 
While reliance on private health care is not too unevenly distributed, access to public 
health  care  is  to  some  degree  related  to  socio  economic  status  and  personal 
networks. 

Education 

Education in both regions has seen mixed results in terms of public satisfaction, with 
each region facing distinct challenges and opportunities. In Madrid, education has 
experienced  a  notable  improvement  in  citizens'  perceptions  since  2010.  The 
region’s education system, driven by a market-oriented approach, offers a range of 

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school choices, including public, charter, and private schools. However, while many 
families in Madrid are satisfied with the diverse school options available, the system 
suffers  from  significant  underfunding,  particularly  in  public  schools.  Public  school 
infrastructure is outdated, and teacher salaries are relatively low compared to the 
cost  of  living.  Additionally,  there  is  growing  school  segregation  due  to  the  free-
market  model,  which  disproportionately  benefits  upper-middle-class  families  who 
can afford to choose better-performing schools, leaving disadvantaged communities 
with fewer educational opportunities. 

In contrast, Attica's education system has struggled with chronic underinvestment 
and poor infrastructure. Public schools in the region face overcrowded classrooms, 
outdated  facilities,  and  severe  staffing  shortages.  According  to  the  experts,  one 
reason  for  these  negative  views  is  political  interference,  with  a  prevalence  of 
patronage  systems  in  recruitment  and  career  advancement  that  undermine  the 
quality  of  education.  Citizens  in  Attica  also  express  significant  concerns  over 
perceived inequality in the education system, with those connected to political elites 
or  higher  socio-economic  backgrounds  enjoying  better  access  to  educational 
resources. This lack of fairness and transparency in the system has contributed to 
the negative perceptions of education in the region. 

Law enforcement 

The  perceptions  of  law  enforcement  also  significantly  differ  in  both  regions, 
reflecting the broader governance challenges each region faces. In Madrid, policing 
is seen more positively compared to other public services. A note is in order here, 
for it is the central government the one responsible for law enforcement, unlike in 
education  and  healthcare.  All  in  all,  the  region  benefits  from  relatively  low  crime 
rates. There has been an increase in the number of police officers in recent years, 
and  this,  along  with  the  overall  safety  in  the region,  contributes,  in opinion  of  the 
experts, to positive public perceptions of law enforcement.  

Attica's  law  enforcement  sector,  however,  faces  considerable  challenges.  The 
police  in  Athens  and  other  parts  of  Attica  are  often  criticized  for  inefficiency, 
corruption, unprofessionalism and partiality in law enforcement. While policing does 
not  suffer  from  the  staffing  shortages  reported  in  the  case  of  health  care  and 
education personnel seems to be irrationally distributed creating lapses in important 
services.  At  the  same  time,  infrastructure  and  technical  equipment  is  still  in  poor 
state and morale of police officers low. Citizens often report dissatisfaction with the 
police's  response  to  crime,  and  there  are  indications  of  a  remarkable  mistrust 
between the police and the public. This issue is exacerbated by political interference 
and a lack of professional accountability within the police force. 

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Meritocracy in the Public Administration 

Much in line with current evidence, the two case studies indicate that meritocracy in 
public administration seems to be a key factor that affects both the quality of services 
and public perceptions of government quality in Madrid and Attica. 

In Madrid, the regional government has made some efforts to increase merit-based 
recruitment and reduce political patronage in public service recruitment. However, 
there are still significant concerns regarding transparency and political influence in 
hiring practices. At the same time, while Madrid’s government has made progress, 
particularly  in  creating  a  more  dynamic  public  service  workforce,  the  region  still 
faces  challenges  related  to  bureaucratic  inefficiency,  especially  in  areas  like 
healthcare and education. 

In  Attica,  experts  coincide  that  the  public  sector  is  deeply  influenced  by  political 
patronage, which severely undermines meritocracy. Recruitment, and in particular 
promotions,  in  the  civil  service  is  often  based  on  political  loyalty  rather  than 
professional qualifications, leading to inefficiencies and poor service delivery. This 
lack of meritocracy contributes to widespread dissatisfaction among citizens, who 
feel that government services are not meeting their needs. The public administration 
in Attica seems, in opinion of some experts, resistant to reform, with little incentive 
for performance-based evaluations or professional development.  

Media and Transparency 

Media control and transparency are critical issues that shape public perceptions of 
governance. In Madrid, some experts believe that the regional government's control 
over public media has raised concerns about media independence and the overall 
transparency  of  the  government.  The  media  landscape  is  increasingly  polarized, 
with public media outlets (in the region, not at national level) aligning more closely 
with the regional government. This has led to concerns about the public's ability to 
hold the government accountable. Additionally, there is a perception that there has 
been  a  weakening  of  transparency  agencies  in  Madrid  that,  in  turn,  could  have 
contributed to a decline in horizontal accountability, undermining efforts to promote 
good governance. 

In  Attica,  the  closedness  of  media  to  political  parties  and the  relatively weak  civil 
society organizations  further exacerbate  the lack  of  accountability  in  governance. 
The media landscape in Greece, including in Attica, is seen as heavily influenced 
by  political  and  economic  elites,  which  limits  the  media’s  role  in  reporting  about 
government  activities.  The  lack  of  proper  transparency  in  government  decision-
making  is  a  persistent  issue,  and  the  weakness  of  independent  oversight 
mechanisms  may  allow,  in  opinion  of  some  experts,  that  the  inefficiencies  and 
corruption  to  persist  unchecked.  These  shortcomings  in  transparency  and 

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accountability  have  contributed  to  widespread  dissatisfaction  with  government 
services in Attica. 

In sum, both Madrid and Attica share some common challenges in terms of public 
service  delivery,  transparency,  and  political  interference,  but  they  also  show 
important  differences.  While  Madrid  benefits  from  a  pro-regional  government 
political culture (even if polarized) and relatively positive perceptions of policing and 
education, it faces significant challenges in healthcare in particular and transparency 
in  general.  Attica  may  suffer  by  structural  chronic  underinvestment,  and  chronic 
widespread political patronage, leading to low perceptions of the quality of public 
services, and extremely low levels of trust in government. Both regions highlight the 
importance  of  undertaking  institutional  reforms,  increased  investment  in  public 
services, and a commitment to greater transparency and accountability in improving 
the quality of governance. 

2.1. 

Sub-National QoG: Madrid 

2.1.1.  Highlights 

•  Spain is one of the most heterogeneous countries when it comes to regional 
European  Quality  of  Government  Index  (EQI)  scores.  Divergence  in  the 
perception of quality of government increased after 2013 albeit it seems to 
have reached a plateau in the latest EQI round. 

•  Spain’s capital region, Madrid, has dramatically improved its EQI indicators 
between the previous round (2021) and the latest one (2024). This applies to 
all three pillars of the quality of government index: quality, impartiality, and 
absence of corruption. There are intriguing differences, nonetheless, in how 
Madrid residents have changed their perceptions of the three services that 
the  study  focuses  on:  Policing,  Education,  and  Healthcare.  This  is  the 
motivation for this case study. 

•  Madrid is not a representative region within Spain. It does not have a long 
history as a separate cultural or political entity. It is geographically small but 
very  dense  in  population.  Most  crucially,  Madrid  has  experienced  faster 
economic  and  population  growth  than  the  rest  of  the  country  for  several 
decades. 

• 

In  terms  of  regional autonomy  and  funding, however,  Madrid  is part of  the 
common system, unlike the Basque Country or Navarre. It has some leeway 
to  set  income  tax  rates  and  can  define  gift  and  inheritance  taxes.  As  a 
wealthier region, (part of the) fiscal revenue collected in Madrid is allocated 
by the central government to other areas of the country. Additionally, Madrid 
is primarily responsible for both education and health policies.  

•  The methodology applied in this case study relies on two data sources. First, 
the  official  quantitative  data  on  Madrid’s  performance.  Second,  and  most 

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importantly,  information  from  16  semi-structured  interviews  conducted  with 
individuals with specific and expert knowledge of the region.  

•  Participants  in  the  interviews  were  not  surprised  by  the  remarkable 
improvement  in  Madrid’s  EQI  index  score.  They  provided  an  array  of 
arguments for such a rise in ranking. Crucially, none of them suggested that 
institutional quality is responsible for the better performance of the region in 
the latest round. 

•  Economic growth is one of the key factors suggested by participants in the 
study. Indeed, Madrid is growing fast, both in terms of economic output and 
in  terms  of  its  capacity  to  attract  population.  Such  growth,  they  suggest, 
produces  a  more  optimistic  view  of  public  services  and  of  government 
performance in general. 

•  Most  interestingly,  some  participants  have  highlighted  that  the  economic 
context is helping create an aspirational culture, one in which citizens believe 
that Madrid is a “land of economic chances” and that there are options for 
upward mobility. 

•  A political honeymoon with the regional government, some participants say, 
is  also  contributing  to  the  positive  scores  that  Madrid  residents  grant  to 
government performance. 

•  Several  experts  discussed  the  public  policy  choices  made  by  the  regional 
government.  The  philosophy  guiding  the  regional  government  in  both  the 
education  and  healthcare  sectors  is  quite  similar;  it  emphasizes  limited 
funding while allowing freedom of choice of service providers. However, the 
outcomes vary across different policy areas. Many residents are happy with 
the  choices  and  dynamism  in  the  education  sector,  while  the  healthcare 
sector  faces  challenges,  including  inconsistent  policy  design,  long  waiting 
lists, and inadequate investment in in primary healthcare. 

•  Government control of public media has tightened in recent years, both at the 
regional  and  the  national  level.  This  is  contributing  to  media  slant  and 
polarization. Private media outlets are also increasingly polarized, showing 
clear biases either in favor of or against the national and regional incumbents.  

•  Transparency and horizontal accountability are regressing. In recent years, 
the regional government has passed new rules that tighten its control over 
two agencies responsible for promoting transparency and auditing regional 
accounts, respectively. 

2.1.2.  Introduction 

Spanish  regions  have  received  rather  diverse  ratings  in  the  2024  release  of  the 
European Quality of Government Study. Some regions rank among the best in the 
whole  EU,  while  others  are  among  the  most  negatively  evaluated.  Figure  1 
graphically  presents  this  information.  It  illustrates  the  ranking  of  each  Spanish 
comunidad  autónoma  (region)  in  comparison  to  all  EU-27  NUTS2  regions.  One 
region, Cantabria (ES13), ranks in the top 33%, with an EQI score comparable to 
that  of  Alsace  in  France  or  Wallonie  in  Belgium.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the 

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spectrum, Castilla y León (ES41) has received one of the lowest ratings, placing it 
among the bottom 10% in Europe in the latest edition of the study. This puts Castilla 
y León in the same league as the Vest region in Romania or Puglia in Italy.  Most 
other regions are situated near the EU median, falling between the 40th and the 60th 
percentiles. Regardless, the data confirms that Spain cannot be represented by a 
single  measure  of  government  quality.  In  terms  of  citizen  perceptions,  there  is 
significant diversity in the quality of government across Spain.  

Figure 1: Regional EQI. Relative Position of Spanish Regions within the EU (2024 wave) 

Note: The position of Spanish regions within the overall distribution of regional EQI in the EU-27, 
2024 round. Dots represent the percentile of each region. Higher percentiles indicate that the 
region has a higher EQI value. The red dotted line indicates the EU median. 

Regional diversity within countries is not unique to Spain; it is also found in several 
other EU member states. Figure 2 presents the variation in regional EQI across all 
EU-27 countries that have more than one NUTS2-level region. This figure highlights 
that  within-country  heterogeneity  is  significant  in  several  nations,  not  just  Spain. 
Notably, Italy and Bulgaria show pronounced differences, with Spain, France, and 
Finland also exhibit relevant variations. In contrast, EQI scores in countries like the 
Netherlands, which has high average scores, and Hungary, which has low average 
scores, are much more concentrated.  

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Figure 2 Regional Variation in Spain vs that of other EU countries, 2024 

Note: Within-country variation in the EQI index, 2024 round, Boxplot. The horizontal line inside the 
‘box’ indicates the median in the distribution, the bottom and top borders of the box reflect the 1st 
and 3rd quartiles, respectively. Sample: only regions with >1 region. 

How has regional variation in Spain evolved over time? It has noticeably increased 
since the first wave of the study, although it may have reached a plateau. Figure 3 
plots how diversity in EQI scores has changed in each country over the period 2010-
2024, with Spain highlighted in red. The standard deviation in EQI scores in Spain 
is significantly higher in 2024 than it was in 2010, rising from 0.24 to 0.45. However, 
it has decreased somewhat since 2017, when it peaked at 0.50. Compared to other 
EU countries, Spain’s level of heterogeneity ranks among the highest, but it is lower 
in 2024 than in 2021. While Spain was the second most diverse country in 2021, 
following Italy, it has dropped to fifth place by 2024.     

Figure 3 Within-country variation in EQI scores. 2010-2024 

Note: Lines trace the standard deviation of EQI scores for all EU-27 countries with at least 2 
NUTS2 regions in the period 2010-2024. Spain is highlighted in red. 

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2.1.1. 

Research design 

This case study is an in-depth study of Spain’s capital region, the Madrid Comunidad 
Autónoma  (ES30),  henceforth  Madrid.  This  detailed  account  is  motivated  by  two 
factors: (1) Madrid’s 2024 score is the second highest in Spain. This sets Madrid 
apart from most other capital regions in Europe, which tend to perform poorly relative 
to  the  other  regions  in  their  countries.  (2)  Madrid’s  2024  score  represents  a 
noticeable improvement from the ratings obtained in the previous two rounds (2017 
and 2021). 

The Madrid region has obtained an EQI score of 0.34, ranking second in Spain, just 
behind the much smaller Cantabria (ES13).3 Madrid’s performance contrasts with 
that  of  many  EU  regions  that  host  their  countries’  capitals,  such  as  Vienna, 
Amsterdam,  Brussels,  Berlin, Athens,  or  Zagreb,  which  typically  rank  the  lowest 
within  their  nations.  The  second  noteworthy  aspect  that  caught  the  attention  of 
analysts  is the  trend  in  Madrid’s  EQI  score.  It  has  improved  remarkably from  the 
relatively  low  levels  recorded  in  2017  and  2021,  which  were  -0.12  and  -0.21, 
respectively. As a result, Madrid’s ranking within Spain has risen. While it ranked 9th 
in 2017 and 13th in 2021, it is now the second-best rated region in the country (see  

Figure 4 below).  

Figure 4 The evolution of the EQI in the Madrid region compared to the other Spanish regions, 2010-2024 

Note:  Points  indicate  the  EQI  score  of  each  of  Spain’s  17  NUTS  2  regions.  Lines  indicate  the 
evolution across rounds, starting in 2010. The Madrid region is highlighted in red. 

What explains the significant improvement in Madrid’s performance? To answer this 
question, we should examine the three component dimensions of the overall Quality 
of Government composite index: quality, impartiality, and lack of corruption. Figure 
5 presents the evolution of Madrid’s score in each dimension over the entire period 

3 Since the EQI index is standardized so that it takes a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, 

a score of 0.34 implies being 0.34 standard deviations above the mean. 

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(2010-2024).  As  shown,  Madrid’s  ratings  have  improved  across  all  dimensions. 
Notably,  the  improvement  in  terms  of  impartiality  and  corruption  is  especially 
striking: Madrid, which was once among the worst-performing regions in these areas 
now ranks above the median in both dimensions of good governance. 

Figure 5 Evolution of Madrid scores in Quality, Impartiality, and (lack of) Corruption, compared against the other 
NUTS regions in Spain. 2010-2024. 

Lastly,  it  is  important  to  examine  how  perceptions  of  government  quality  have 
evolved  across  the  three  policy  areas  highlighted  in  the  EQI  study:  education, 
healthcare, and policing. Figure 6 shows that perceptions of quality have changed 
at  different  rates  for  each  area.  In  education,  ratings  were  quite  low  in  the  2010 
round but have shown remarkable and consistent improvement since then. Citizens 
are most satisfied about policing: Ratings improved significantly after 2010 and have 
remained  at  a  high  level since  2017.  Healthcare,  in  contrast, presents  a different 
trend.  It  had  the  highest  ratings  among  the  three  areas  back  in  2010,  but  it  now 
receives the lowest evaluations. Importantly, perceptions of healthcare quality have 
been on a downward trend since 2017. 

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Figure 6 Quality ratings for all three policy areas: Education, Health, Policing. Madrid region vs the rest. 2010-
2024 

The methodology employed in this study is largely qualitative. The case study relies 
on three types of data sources: (1) Results of the European Quality of Government 
(EQI)  surveys,  (2)  Official  Quantitative  Data  (e.g.  GDP  per  capita)  and,  most 
importantly, (3) In-depth Interviews with active public officials, opposition politicians, 
journalists,  public  sector  employees,  academics,  civil  society  actors,  non-profit 
professional associations, unions, and industry-specific interest groups. In total, 16 
interviews have been conducted (see Appendix). Interviewees were initially given 
information regarding the results of the EQI study. They were then asked to share 
their  overall  reactions  to  the  score  obtained  by  the  Madrid  region,  expressing 
whether  they  largely  agreed  with  it  or  not,  along  with  their  reasoning.  Lastly, 
participants  were  encouraged  to  discuss  in  more  detail  the  factors  influencing 
citizens’ perceptions of government quality as captured in the EQI survey. 

2.1.2. 

Caracheristics of the region 

Spain is notorious for its regions with significant ethnolinguistic minorities and a long 
history of political demands for self-government. However, that is not the case of the 
Madrid region. It is home to the nation’s eponymous capital and does not have a 
lengthy  history  as  an  autonomous  political  entity.    Madrid  was  created  as  a 
Comunidad Autónoma (NUTS-2 level) in 1983. Before that, it had been designated 
as a Provincia (NUTS-3 level) in the early XIXth century, but without any institutions 
of self-government. Until 1983, the Madrid province was considered part of a wider 
region  called  Castilla  la  Nueva,  which  included  other  provinces  such  as  Toledo, 
Guadalajara, Cuenca, and Ciudad Real. With the regional devolution initiated by the 
Spanish democratic transition, however, it was decided that Madrid’s province would 
become a standalone region with its own regional parliament and government. 

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Structural Conditions 

The Comunidad de Madrid is a small yet densely populated region, covering 8,000 
square kilometers, making it the 12th largest of Spain’s 17 regions. However, it has 
the highest population density, with 841 people per square kilometer, far surpassing 
the next most densely populated region, the Basque Country, which has a density 
of 305 people per km2.4 While the overall Spanish population has increased in the 
past 40 years, the growth has been notably more rapid in the capital region, which 
has  experienced  an  increase  of  over  50%  since  1980. This  trend  is  illustrated  in 
Figure 7, which compares the evolution of Spain’s population as a whole to that of 
the Madrid region, both normalized to a base value of 100 based on their respective 
population levels in 1980. 

Figure 7 Evolution of Population in the Madrid region vs that of Spain as a whole. 1980 level normalized to 100. 

Madrid is the richest region in Spain. According to the 2023 figures, GDP per capita 
in Madrid amounts to €42,000 compared to €31,000 in Spain as a whole.5 Hence, it 
is 36% higher than the country’s average. Madrid is richer than two other economic 
powerhouses  in Spain,  Catalonia  and  the  Basque  Country,  with  per capita GPDs 
that  are  14%  and  27%  higher  than  the  average,  respectively.  Not  only  is  Madrid 
richer,  but  its  economic  output  is  growing  faster  than  the  country’s  average. 
Independiente  de 
According 
Responsabilidad Fiscal), Madrid has grown faster than Spain in 9 out of 11 quarters 

the  AIREF  (Autoridad 

to  recent  data 

from 

4 These data come from official statistics provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística and 

pertain to the year 2022: 
https://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736177012&i
dp=1254734710990 and https://www.ign.es/web/ign/portal/ane-datos-geograficos/-/datos-
geograficos/datosPoblacion?tipoBusqueda=CCAA.   

5 The source of these data is the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. The link to the information is: 

https://www.ine.es/dyngs/Prensa/es/CRE2023.htm#:~:text=PIB%20regional%20por%20habita
nte&text=(23.604%20euros).-
,La%20media%20nacional%20se%20situ%C3%B3%20en%2030.968%20euros%20por%20h
abitante,nacional%20y%20dos%20el%20europeo  

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since 2022.6 Such economic overperformance is not a new phenomenon. If we look 
at the longue durée, the Comunidad de Madrid’s influence on the overall Spanish 
economy has steadily increased since 2000, as illustrated in Figure 8.7  

Figure 8. The growing importance of Madrid’s region for the Spanish economy. 

Note: The line indicates the weight of the Madrid region’s economy over the entire Spanish GDP, in 
percentage. Data source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). 

Regional Autonomy and Funding 

The devolution of powers is generally homogeneous across Spanish regions.8 Like 
all other regions, Madrid has full authority over its public health services. The only 
significant aspect  determined  at  the national  level is the  minimum  list  of  services 
that  citizens  are  entitled  to.  However,  regions  can  choose  to  enhance  this  list  by 
adding  services  that  are  not  covered  by  public  insurance  in  other  areas  of  the 
country.  Regarding  education,  the  central  government  establishes  fundamental 
regulations  for  public  and  charter  schools  and  provides  mandatory  guidelines  for 
primary  and  secondary  education  curricula.  Nonetheless,  the  management  of 
educational services - including human resources, salary levels, and some aspects 
of the curriculum content - is entirely under the control of the regional governments. 
When it comes to policing and public safety, Madrid does not have its own regional 
police force, unlike the Basque Country or Catalonia. Hence, policing in Madrid is 
primarily handled by two national-level police entities: the National Police and the 
Guardia Civil, which is similar to the French Gendarmerie or the Italian Carabinieri. 

In terms of tax collection, Madrid is part of a system that regulates tax collection, 
rates, and transfers for 15 out of 17 Spanish regions.9 The most important taxes, 

6 These official statistics can be downloaded here: https://www.airef.es/wp-

content/uploads/2024/11/METCAP/COMPARADOR-INTERACTIVO-METCAP-TERCER-
TRIMESTRE-2024.xlsx  

7 The data can be obtained here: https://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/cre00/b2024/pr_cre.xlsx  
8 Except for the Basque Country and Navarra in the north, which have their own tax policy. 
9 The Basque Country and Navarra in the northeast of Spain have a separate system with their 

own regional tax collection agencies. 

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such  as  VAT,  income  tax  and  corporate  taxes,  are  collected  by  a  national-level 
agency, the Agencia Tributaria. While the regional government has some authority 
to set income tax rates it must operate within specific limits: part of income tax rates 
are defined by the central government and another portion is set by each region. 
Inheritance and gift taxes are set solely by each region.  

For over a decade, Madrid’s tax policy has remained consistent, largely due to the 
continuous  governance  of  the  center-right  Popular  Party.  Compared  to  other 
regions, Madrid has implemented lower income tax rates. A 2022 study shows that, 
among the 15 regions in the common system, Madrid has the most lenient effective 
tax  rate  across  all  income  levels.10  In  addition,  it  has  effectively  eliminated  both 
inheritance  and  gift  taxes.  Academic  studies  suggest  that  these  favorable  tax 
policies have attracted wealthier individuals to the Madrid region.11  

In  terms  of  regional  transfers,  some  of  the  total  tax  revenue  raised  from  Madrid 
residents  is  allocated  to  the  Madrid  regional  government  and  local  governments 
within  the  region.  Another  portion  funds  services  provided  by  the  Spanish 
government  in  Madrid,  such  as  the  Social  Security  Administration.  Additionally, 
some of the revenue is transferred to support public services in less affluent regions. 
As the richest per-capita region, it is a clear net contributor to inter-regional transfers, 
alongside Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. 

2.1.3. 

Analysis 

Overall Reaction to EQI Indicators 

Participants  were  not  surprised  by  the  significant  improvement  in  perceptions 
among  respondents  in  the  Madrid  region.  Even  politicians  or  public  officials  who 
oppose the current regional government appeared resigned to acknowledging that 
Madrid residents hold positive views about the quality of government. However, it is 
important to note that none of the participants identified improvements in institutional 
quality or transparency as the reasons for the increase in EQI scores. 

The explanations provided by interviewees mostly focused on various  performance 
factors and contextual variables, which included: (1) Strong economic performance, 
(2) a political honeymoon with the regional government, (3) pro-market education 
policies, (4) a cultural shift, (5) favorable media coverage, and (6) a reduction in the 
number  of  corruption  scandals  in  the  region  (at  least  at  the  time  the  survey  was 
conducted). The following sections elaborate on these accounts and others provided 
by participants. 

10 See 

https://economistas.es/Contenido/Consejo/Estudios%20y%20trabajos/Panorama%20de%20la
%20Fiscalidad%20Autonomica%20y%20Foral%202022.pdf, particularly pages 394 onwards.  

11 For more details, see https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3676031  

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Context: Economic Performance 

Many interviewees agreed that one of the key factors that help explain the significant 
improvement in EQI indicators in Madrid is the notable economic performance of 
the region since 2021. These participants suggested that there is a sense of shared 
optimism, of “economic opportunity within reach.” As one journalist noted, a large 
portion  of  the  population  in  the  region  perceives  that  “Madrid  va  bien”,  which 
translates  to  “Madrid  is  doing  well.”  This  perception  is  further  reinforced  by  the 
communication  strategies  of  local  and  regional  governments.  Good  economic 
indicators have fostered a sense of economic dynamism and possibilities for upward 
mobility, creating an aspirational culture that views both the present and the future 
with optimism. Public spending, primarily funded by national and EU-level transfers, 
also contributes to this sense of economic prosperity. As a result, there is a sense 
of  “generalized  optimism”  that  shapes  perceptions  of  public  service  performance 
and the overall quality of government. Along these lines, an academic pointed out 
that these perceptions are, at least in part, a reflection of “the population’s mood.” 
However,  despite  strong  economic  growth,  some  participants  noted  that  this 
economic  bonanza  does  not  benefit  everyone  equally,  leading  to  increasing 
inequality  that  leaves  significant  segments  of  the  population  worse  off  in  relative 
terms,  even  if  their  absolute  circumstances  may  not  have  worsened.  In  a  later 
section, the case study will elaborate on the arguments provided by  interviewees 
regarding  why  this  inequality  does  not  seem  to  affect  perceptions  of  government 
performance. 

Context: Regional Politics  

A former local politician and a local journalist suggested in their interviews that the 
political context also contributes to the positive evaluations of government services 
by Madrid residents. One of them posited that the timing in which the last round was 
fielded, late 2023, was one of a popular honeymoon with President Ayuso’s regional 
government. Ayuso and her Popular Party had obtained a resounding victory at the 
regional  polls  in  late  May  2023,  with  the  first  single-party  absolute  parliamentary 
majority  since  2011.  Indeed,  the  Popular  Party  was  supported  by  almost  1  in  2 
Madrid voters, a huge jump from the meager 22% received only 4 years before. This 
honeymoon may have produced a bandwagon effect that sweetens opinions about 
the Ayuso government and her performance, at least temporarily. 

Another important factor related to the outcome of these regional elections is the 
change  in  the  structure  of  the  current  regional  government,  which  is  no  longer  a 
coalition  cabinet.  From  2015  to  2021,  Madrid’s  region  was  governed  by  a  right-
leaning  coalition  composed  of  the  Popular  Party  and  Ciudadanos.  However,  as 
some interviewees suggested, this coalition was perceived as dysfunctional due to 
internal conflicts and public disputes between the partners. It was characterized by 
internal infighting and crossfire in the media between partners and that “noise” could 
have  negatively  impacted  the  perceptions  about  government  performance  in 
previous  editions  of  the  study,  particularly  in  2017  and  2021.  Since  2021,  the 
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regional cabinet has shifted to a single-party government, initially functioning as a 
minority cabinet and, since May 2023, as a majority one. This change has reduced 
internal conflict and allowed for more consistent messaging from the government. 
As  a  result,  regional President  Isabel Ayuso has  become  increasingly associated 
with the interests of Madrid as a whole. This has fostered open confrontation with 
the  central  government  of  Prime  Minister  Sánchez,  which  is  accused  of  “hating 
madrileños (Madrid residents).” 

Structural Conditions: Inequality 

Some interviewees mentioned inequality as a by-product of the political-economic 
model  in  the  Madrid  region.  Economic  growth  with  lower  income  and  inheritance 
taxes is favoring wealth accumulation. Wages are increasing, but not at the same 
rate. All  this begs  an  important question:  Why  is such  inequality  not  undermining 
perceptions of the quality of government? 

Some  of  the  experts  interviewed  raised  this  question  and  volunteered  some 
interesting explanations. The first one has to do with the context of good economic 
performance. Even those whose incomes are not growing as fast as those at the 
top feel that the economic environment offers opportunities, and that “I can still make 
it  if  I  try.”  The  second  point  has  a  methodological  nature. A  former  local  official 
indicated that “excluded populations probably do not participate in the EQI survey.” 
This would suggest that those structurally penalized by the current policies are more 
difficult to recruit in surveys and thus are underrepresented in the EQI sample. To 
the  extent  that  their  opinions  are  more  critical,  they  would  not  be reflected  in  the 
outcomes of the quantitative study. 

Institutions: Public Policies 

The EQI score has improved dramatically in the Madrid region in just three years 
(see  

Figure 4 above). In addition, Figure 5 indicates that progress has been made in all 
component dimensions of the score: quality, impartiality, and corruption. Yet digging 
deeper  into  the  rich  EQI  data,  an  important  heterogeneity  emerges.  Comparing 
across policy areas, i.e. education, health, and policing, we observe patterns that 
are clearly area-specific. Opinions about corruption and impartiality have improved 
across  the  board,  but  the  evaluation  of  quality  is  markedly  different  across  these 
sectors (see Figure 6). 

•  Policing:  Citizens  are  the  happiest  concerning  to  this  policy  area.  Their 
opinions, moreover, have been consistently positive since at least the 2017 
round. 

•  Education: Opinions started very low in the first wave of the study, but such 
quality evaluations have improved dramatically and continuously since 2017.  

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•  Health:  Quality  assessments  are  relatively  high,  but  they  have  been  on  a 
downward slope since 2017. We could thus say that the overall Madrid EQI 
has risen despite the worsening of opinions about healthcare. 

Which  level  of  government  is  responsible  for  each  policy  domain? As  mentioned 
above,  policing  is  essentially  in  the  hands  of  the  central  government,  which 
manages  the  Policía  Nacional  and  the  Guardia  Civil,  with  the  support  and 
contribution of local police forces in larger municipalities. The regional government 
has  no  authority  in  this  area.  In  contrast,  the  region’s  incumbent  is  the  chief 
responsible for managing the public provision of education and healthcare. 

The remainder of this section presents the vision of interviewees regarding these 
three  areas,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  contrast  between  education  and 
healthcare.  Their  diverging  performance  in  EQI  quality  ratings  is  particularly 
intriguing given the fact that the regional government is applying a similar philosophy 
to  both  policy  domains.  According  to  several  interviewees,  the  approach  of  the 
regional  government  hinges  on  two  pillars:  (1)  limited  public  funding  for  both 
services with (2) a free-market approach that emphasizes the right of the citizen to 
choose a service provider, regardless of whether the provider is a public or private 
entity.  

Public Sector Services: Education 

The  education  service  in  Madrid  is  provided  by  three  types  of  schools:  public, 
charter,  and  private.  Public  schools  are  managed  and  funded  by  the  regional 
government  and  are  free  for  students.  Charter  schools  are  privately  owned  but 
subsidized  by  the  regional  government.  These  schools  are  also  tuition-free, 
although some charter schools can request families to provide donations to support 
the activities of the school.12  

Several  experts  in  the  education  sector  were  interviewed,  from  academics  to 
stakeholders.  There  was  a  striking  consensus  in  their  definition  of  the  main 
characteristics of the education system in Madrid. They highlighted how the policy 
package is one in which the regional government invests limited amounts of public 
funding per student, below the Spanish average, while complementing this policy 
with free school choice by parents and the promotion of a dynamic supply of charter 
schools. From this general model, participants suggested several reasons that help 
explain the satisfaction of at least a sizeable proportion of citizens with the education 
service: 

•  There is a diverse and dynamic supply of schools in Madrid, primarily charter 
schools. This variety, combined with the freedom of school choice, meets the 

12 Government funding per pupil is somewhat lower for charter schools than for public schools. 

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demands  of  an  increasingly  concerned  population  regarding  the  quality  of 
education for their children. Most beneficiaries of this system tend to belong 
to the upper-middle class. As an urban and rich region, Madrid provides the 
critical  mass  of  both  households  and  education  providers  needed  for  this 
model to thrive. 

•  The  dynamic  supply  of  educational  options,  along  with  the  freedom  to 
choose, aligns very well with the aspirational culture prevalent among many 
Madrid  residents. This  case  study  will  elaborate on the  characteristics and 
origins of this aspirational culture in a later section of the case study. 

•  The  availability  of  diverse  charter  schools  allows  parents  dissatisfied  with 
public schools - and the ethnic diversity within them - to opt out, as long as 
they possess the necessary cultural, social, and economic capital to do so. 

•  This  freedom  of  choice  encourages  innovation  and  competition  among 
schools.  Events  such  as  school  fairs,  open-door  days,  and  external 
performance evaluations promoted by the regional government help facilitate 
this environment. 

•  Regarding  the  composition  of  the  Madrid’s  population,  several  participants 
suggested  that  it  enhances  performance  and  satisfaction  through  multiple 
mechanisms.  First,  compared  to  poorer  regions,  households  in  Madrid 
typically  possess  higher  cultural  capital,  which  translates  to  increased 
parental  investment  in  their  children’s  education,  often  through  parent 
associations. Second, although the proportion of migrants is high, compared 
to  other  regions,  their  profile  is  relatively  easier  to  integrate,  as  most 
immigrants  in  Madrid  come  from  Spanish-speaking  countries.  Finally, 
immigration can also contribute to positive perceptions, as recent migrants 
are generally less likely to notice a decline in public school quality since they 
lack a historical reference point from previous decades. 

issues,  many  of  which  stem 

Beyond  these  factors,  experts  interviewed  about  the  education  system  in  Madrid 
from 
also  highlighted  several  worrisome 
underinvestment but are not limited to that. They pointed out that low spending on 
public schools leads to very low teacher salaries, especially when compared to the 
rising  cost  of  living  in  the  region.  Additionally,  school  infrastructure  is  often 
neglected, and very few new public schools are being built. The increased freedom 
of  choice  and  diverse  supply  of  schools  has  also  resulted  in  a  more  segregated 
system,  with  varying  performance  levels  across  schools  and  neighborhoods. 
Furthermore,  the  scheduling  in  many  public  schools  does  align  well  with  the 
schedules of parents who work full-time, whereas charter schools tend to do a better 
job in that regard.  

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Public Sector Services: Health 

Despite  the  generally  positive  trends  in  perceptions  about  government  quality, 
assessments  about  healthcare  in  Madrid  have  worsened.  It  is  also  a  policy 
dimension that is much more politicized and divisive than education, to the point that 
it has spurred important citizen protests in the last few years. Why is that the case? 

Several  participants  in  the  study  have  provided  their  expert  assessment.  They 
comprise  health-sector  public  officials,  a  member  of  the  regional  parliament,  a 
healthcare professional, a retired healthcare professional and union representative, 
and  a  manager  in  the  private  health  insurance  sector.  Participants  suggested 
several reasons for the decline in assessments about healthcare. These factors they 
identify help explain the paradoxical divergence in opinions between education and 
healthcare  despite  the  similarity  in  policy  approaches:  below-average  public 
spending  and  freedom  of  choice  of  provider  for  users.  The  structure  of  service 
providers is also similar to that of the education sector: In healthcare, there are two 
types  of  providers  in  the  public  system:  (1)  public  hospitals  and  (2)  privately 
managed  ones  that  do  not  charge  patients  but  instead  receive  funds  from  the 
regional government for the services provided. 

Participants  have  identified  the  remarkable  increase  in  waiting  lists  as  the  main 
problem in healthcare. since 2020, the number of people waiting for care and the 
average length of time spent on these lists have risen dramatically, particularly in 
comparison  to  other  Spanish  regions.  This  issue  is  easily  noticeable  by  citizens. 
According to several interviewees, the increase in waiting times is partly attributable 
to  chronic  underinvestment  in  the  healthcare  system.  Despite  being  a  wealthy 
region,  Madrid  has  consistently  ranked  among  those  with  the  lowest  per  capita 
spending  in  public  healthcare.  This  lack  of  funding  negatively  impacts  service 
quality; one interviewee noted “There are not enough doctors, particularly primary 
care doctors and also in some specializations.” Additionally, there is a shortage of 
both doctors and nurses, and their salaries are significantly lower compared to those 
in  other  regions,  particularly  considering  the  higher  cost  of  living  in  the  Madrid 
region. Moreover, health professionals in public hospitals are increasingly restricted 
in their ability to work overtime to accommodate patients on the waiting list. 

Experts  also  agreed  that  the  situation  is  particularly  difficult  in  the  primary  care 
sector. The  number  of  general  practitioners  (GPs)  has  significantly  dropped. The 
number  of  primary  care  clinics  also  appear  insufficient:  “In  2004  there  were  250 
public primary care centers. Now there are 252, while the population has increased 
(and aged) significantly.” Another interviewee added: “In new urban developments, 
primary care  centers take  many  years to  be  built,  if  they are  built at  all.” Several 
participants  also  flagged  an  issue  with  the  scheduling  and  the  demographic 
composition  of  professionals:  Most  healthcare  professionals  are  women  and 
evening shifts conflict with their work-life balance compared to the traditional male 
breadwinner model. This reduces the availability of services in the evenings. 

Why is the freedom to choose a provider not solving the problem of waiting lists? 
Indeed,  patients  can  choose  primary  care  centers,  and  they  can  also  choose 

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specialist doctors. When patients living in areas under the responsibility of a public 
hospital decide to go to a privately managed one, funding “follows” the patient: the 
regional government pays the privately managed hospital for the service provided.  

Several  interviewees  indicated  that  the  current  incentive  structure  is  ineffective. 
Firstly,  attracting  patients  may  not  always  be  profitable  for  privately  managed 
hospitals.  While  some  procedures  yield  a  net  profit,  others  do  not.  Patients  with 
relatively  simple  conditions  are  often  profitable,  whereas  those  with  complex 
comorbidities  typically  are  not.  In  addition  to  this,  the  system  is  strikingly 
asymmetric: funding follows the patient when they move from a public hospital to a 
private  one,  but  this  does  not  apply  when  a  patient  transfers  between  public 
hospitals.  This  situation  limits  the  incentives  of  public  hospitals  to  enhance  their 
service quality in order to attract more patients. Last, but not least, private providers 
show little interest in participating in primary care, as most primary care users are 
chronic patients, who are usually not profitable. A A particularly insightful comment 
from a politician with healthcare experience highlighted that: “private hospitals have 
a rational interest in maintaining long waiting lists in public hospitals because they 
can  profit  when  patients  transfer  to  them.” According  to  some  participants,  these 
factors contribute to an inefficient healthcare system. 

The length of waiting lists is having an impact on the private insurance sector too. A 
growing number of Madrid residents have private health insurance (around 40%). 
These  policies  have  traditionally  been  used  to  complement  public  insurance,  but 
pressure  is  growing.  Citizens  are  increasingly  demanding  more  complex  health 
services from private insurers, which puts upward pressure on premiums and co-
payments. This may be contributing to popular anger and frustration. 

Mental health is no exception within the wider healthcare system. There have been 
some  advances  in  recent  years,  such  as  the  introduction  of  a  pilot  project  that 
incorporates mental health services in a host of primary care centers. However, it is 
a very small project and therapists who work both in primary care and in specialist 
care in hospitals complain about the huge numbers of patients they see and how far 
apart  they  can  see each  one. As a professional in  this area  indicated  “The  WHO 
recommends 18 mental health professionals for every hundred thousand residents. 
In Madrid, there are only six.” 

Several  structural  factors  add  to  the  pressure  on  the  Madrid  healthcare  system. 
First, the Spanish population is getting older. Coupled with growing life expectancy, 
this trend increases the demand for care of chronic conditions. Another factor is that 
care  itself  is  becoming  more  expensive.  As  a  retired  doctor  indicated,  “New 
diagnostic tests are very powerful but very expensive and so is the case of new drug 
treatments”. 

Still,  in  structural  terms,  Madrid  enjoys  some  advantages  over  its  neighboring 
regions. First, its population is on average less old, and it is also less geographically 
dispersed, a factor that lowers per capita costs. As a large city, moreover, Madrid 
has a remarkable pull factor. It offers the complementarities of a big city, which helps 
attract  professionals,  everything  else  equal.  Lastly,  the  region  hosts  some  of  the 

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best  public  hospitals  in  the  country  in  terms  of  innovation.  That  is  a  magnet  for 
doctors and nurses in training and for the most ambitious professionals.  

Public Sector Services: Law Enforcement 

The  EQI  survey  reveals  that  residents  in  Madrid  are  satisfied  with  the  quality  of 
policing  in  their  region,  a  sentiment  that  has  remained  consistent  over  several 
survey rounds. One participant suggested that this satisfaction can be attributed to 
two  main  factors:  First,  the  central  government’s  Ministry  of  the  Interior  has 
increased the number of national police ranks in recent years, with the number of 
police  agents  growing  by  over  10%  in  the  last  5  years.  Second,  according  to  a 
representative  from  a  federation  of  neighborhood  associations,  crime  rates  in 
Madrid have been low and have remained consistently low for the past decade. 

Institutions: Transparency and Corruption 

As shown in Figure 5, perceptions about corruption and impartiality in Madrid have 
improved  drastically  since  2021.  While  Madrid  ranked  well  below  the  median 
Spanish region in 2021 in both dimensions, it now ranks above the median in both 
and,  in  the  case  of  impartiality,  it  is  now  placed  second  among  the  17  Spanish 
NUTS2 units. 

What explains this improvement? Participants’ opinions seemed to converge on two 
points.  On  one  hand,  they  noted  that  both  the  number  and  severity  of  corruption 
scandals have significantly decreased in recent years. On the other hand, there was 
a  consensus  that  institutional  quality  has  not  improved  at  the  same  pace  as 
perceptions have. 

Let’s  first examine  the  question  of  corruption  scandals,  with  a  particular focus  on 
corruption allegations affecting regional politicians. After the 2008 economic crisis, 
several high-profile corruption accusations started surfacing against Popular Party 
politicians,  a  party  which  has  been  uninterruptedly  in  regional  office  since  1995. 
Major investigations  involved  several of  the  regional vice presidents  and  regional 
ministers (consejeros) under the Aguirre cabinet, which unexpectedly quit in 2012, 
partly due to this pressure. The following regional president, Ignacio González, was 
subsequently affected by new major scandals. The 2015 elections did not bring an 
end to the emergence of corruption allegations.  A minority government was formed 
between the Popular Party (PP) and Citizens, a party that partly arose in response 
to the corruption of the PP. Podemos emerged as a key left-populist opposition force 
dedicated to keeping corruption at the forefront of the public discourse. During this 
period, new scandals surfaced, leading to the resignation of the regional President, 
Cifuentes. Reflecting on these significant scandals, a participant summarized: “Lo 
previo ha sido muy gordo.” meaning that the atmosphere surrounding the corruption 
scandals has been truly overwhelming. Against this dark backdrop, corruption had 
lost much of its salience at the time the last EQI round was fielded (in late 2023). As 

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an interviewee declared, this is partly due to the current regional government being 
more proactive in tackling corruption scandals. Whatever the reason for the drop in 
salience, several participants agreed that the absence of corruption scandals at the 
forefront of social debates during data collection helps explain the improvement in 
corruption and impartiality indicators. 

Institutional  quality,  however,  does  not  seem  to  account  for  the  more  positive 
evaluations  of  citizen,  at  least  according  to  interviewees.  One  participant  even 
stated: “the quality of democracy has worsened.” Another one, a university scholar, 
indicated that “these changes in perceptions and in institutional trust do not reflect 
genuine  improvements  in  institutional  quality.”  To  support  their  claims,  these 
interviewees  pointed  to  worrying  developments  in  institutional  transparency  and 
oversight.  In  terms  of  transparency,  the  regional  Transparency  Council,  whose 
mission is to promote access to public information, is now completely controlled by 
the  regional  incumbent  instead  of  the  regional  parliament.  Regarding  oversight, 
appointments to the regional  Accounts Court previously required consensus from 
the opposition, needing support from two-thirds of regional MPs. However, a recent 
legislative  change has  modified  the  appointment  system:  now, only  three-fifths of 
the  regional  parliament  is  needed,  reducing  the  opposition’s  bargaining  power  to 
promote candidates who do not align with the incumbent. These participants also 
mentioned negative changes in the political control of public media, a point that will 
be elaborated in the next section. 

Media 

One of the topics that arose in conversations with interviewees is how the Madrid 
media ecosystem is rather polarized. Some media adopt a stance that is generous 
towards the right-wing regional government and very critical of the left-wing national 
government, and vice versa. Instead of softening, such polarization has increased 
since the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Government control of publicly owned media has also tightened both for regional 
and  national outlets,  such  as  the  regional  public TV  station  (Telemadrid)  and  the 
national TV network (Radiotelevisión Española). Let’s first examine Madrid’s public 
media. In 2015, the coalition government formed by the Popular Party and Citizens 
passed a law aimed at reducing incumbent control of the regional media. This law 
stipulated that members of the regional media board must be supported by a two-
thirds  majority  of  regional  MPs.  However,  independence  has  severely  weakened 
since then. In July 2021 and in April 2022, the Ayuso regional cabinet, led by the 
Popular  Party  with  the  support  of  far-right  VOX  party,  enacted  new  regulations 
allowing the director of the regional media network to be appointed with just a simple 
majority  of  regional  MPS. This  change  eliminated  the  requirement  for  consensus 
with the opposition. A similar trend has occurred within media owned by the central 
government.  In  2017, under Rajoy’s  (PP)  minority  government,  a new system  for 
selecting board members was set up with the aim of increasing transparency and 
independence.  However,  in  late  2024,  the  incumbent  Sánchez  cabinet  signed  a 

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decree permitting board members to be appointed by a majority in the lower house. 
This change further diminishes the need to achieve consensus with the opposition. 

All  these  changes  are  producing  more  pro-government  bias  in  these  media  (one 
pro-regional  incumbent,  another  pro-national  incumbent)  which,  in  turn,  further 
aggravates polarization. As a journalist interviewee stated, “La TV pública es muy 
sesgada”, meaning the public TV station is very slanted. This could lead to lower 
levels of popular trust in the media. 

Polarization  and  bias  are  not  only  found  in  publicly  owned  media;  they  are  also 
prevalent in private networks. There is an important debate regarding the reasons 
behind the apparent slant of private media, particularly regarding their support for 
the Madrid regional government. Some opinion leaders and politicians argue that 
this support stems from generous funding provided by the regional cabinet through 
government  advertising  in  these  private  outlets.  However,  a  journalist  who 
participated in the study disagreed with this perspective, suggesting that the support 
for  Ayuso’s  cabinet  is  “not  really  driven  by  government  sponsored  advertising.” 
Instead, this participant suggested that there is a genuine alignment between the 
majority  of  media  owners  and  executives  and  the  policies  of  the  regional 
government, which explains their support for Ayuso’s administration. 

Civil Society and Culture 

Several participants attributed the positive reviews on the quality of government in 
Madrid to the region’s culture. They referred not to long-standing cultural traits, but 
to a cultural change that began approximately two decades ago, which fostered a 
“cultura  aspiracional”  among  its  residents.  Interviewees  emphasized  how  many 
Madrid citizens view the institutional and economic environment in the region as one 
that  offers  both  economic  opportunity  and  freedom  of  choice  in  public  services, 
which contributes to individual prosperity. They also noted that the current regional 
government led by Isabel Ayuso has been politically savvy in presenting itself as the 
guarantor  of  this  economic  and  institutional  environment,  while  also  adopting  a 
communication strategy that reinforces this aspirational culture. Indeed, the regional 
President delivered a famous keynote speech in which she declared that “Libertad 
es la singularidad de Madrid”, or “Freedom is Madrid’s defining feature”. Indeed, in 
her latest election campaign, her slogan was “socialism or freedom.” 

But  how  does  this  culture  help  improve  evaluations  of  service  delivery  and 
institutional quality? As indicated in previous sections, the Madrid economy and its 
public services present a mixed picture. While certain areas are thriving, others are 
facing  significant  challenges.  Additionally,  there  is  an  important  increase  in 
inequality. So, where does the positive outlook among citizens originate? Several 
interviewees suggest that citizens perceive Madrid as a place of opportunities: those 
who have access to these opportunities are quite happy, while those who do not feel 
a  sense  of  optimism.  They  believe  that  if  the  economy  continues  to  grow,  an 
opportunity might eventually come their way. 

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2.1.4.  Conclusion 

Indicators of  the quality  of  government  have  improved  dramatically  in  the  Madrid 
region  between  2021  and  2024.  Even  more,  such  improvement  affects  all  three 
pillars  of  the  quality  of  government  index:  quality,  impartiality,  and  (lack  of) 
corruption. As  a  result  of  this,  Madrid’s  ranking  within  Spain  has  moved  from  a 
below-the-median position to second place, out of 17 NUTS2 regions in the country. 
Such a rise in performance is the motivation of this study, which relies on both official 
data  and  the  analysis  of  16  semi-structured  interviews  with  individuals  who  have 
specific knowledge about the status of the quality of government in Madrid. 

Participants in interviews were largely unsurprised by the change in Madrid’s EQI 
index, although they pointed to a diversity of factors for it. Many interviewees pointed 
to the role of contextual factors, highlighting a booming economy that generates an 
aspirational  culture,  a  political  honeymoon  period  after  the  May  2023  regional 
election, and the lower salience and frequency of corruption scandals at the time 
the 2024 EQI round was fielded.  

Their  expert  assessment  of  public  policy  was  of  particular  relevance  given  that 
citizen  perceptions  about  the  quality  of  public  services  vary  significantly  across 
sectors.  Policing  consistently  received  very  positive  reviews.  In  education, 
satisfaction was very low in 2010, but it has increased sharply and steadily since 
then.  In  contrast,  healthcare  is  viewed  in  more  critical  terms,  and  the  trend  is 
negative.  Interviewed  officials,  politicians,  industry  specialists,  and  stakeholders 
recognize public policy successes in both policing and education, but they identify 
very  important  challenges  concerning  healthcare.  The  difference  in  policy 
performance  between  education  and  healthcare  is  particularly  interesting,  as  the 
regional government applies a similar public policy philosophy to both areas. 

Crucially, participants emphasized that the increase in the EQI score does not reflect 
genuine improvements in institutional quality. In fact, several participants noted that 
transparency and horizontal accountability have weakened compared to just a few 
years ago. They attribute this decline to the government’s increasing control over 
public  media  and  the  agencies  responsible  for  public  transparency  and  auditing. 
This situation, they argue, does not bode well for the future. 

The assessment of participants poses a crucial question: How can we reconcile a 
decline  in  institutional  quality  (such  as  in  media  environment  and  government 
transparency) with the improvement in perceptions of government quality? Several 
speculative  reasons  may  explain  this  phenomenon.  The  clearest  one  is  that  the 
effects of the deterioration in institutional quality may not have been fully felt yet, as 
many  of  the  institutional  changes  were  introduced  only  in  the  last  2-3  years. A 
second  potential  factor  is  that,  during  challenging  economic  times,  issues  like 
corruption  and  fraud  often  become  more  noticeable  and  pressing  for  citizens. At 
present, Madrid is experiencing an economic boom, which may overshadow these 

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concerns.  A  third  possible  explanation  is  that  citizens  may  not  connect  present 
institutional changes with future issues related to corruption or lack of impartiality. 
Regardless, the lack of real positive advances in institutional quality raises questions 
about the sustainability of the current improvements in perceptions of government 
quality. 

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Appendix 1 

List of experts recruited for interview: 

Former local public official (currently working for a non-profit foundation) 
Former local politician 

position 

order 
Interview 1  Academic 
Interview 2  Member of industry-specific professional organization 
Interview 3 
Interview 4 
Interview 5  Academic 
Interview 6 
Journalist 
Interview 7  Chairperson, regional civil society organization 
Interview 8  Spokesperson, interest group 
Interview 9  Academic 
Interview 10  Former spokesperson, professional organization 
Interview 11  Director, interest group 
Interview 12  Regional politician 
Interview 13  Analyst, regional trade union 
Interview 14  Top bureaucrat, regional government 
Interview 15  Essayist 
Interview 16  National government official 

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2.2.  Sub-National QoG: Attica region 

2.2.1.  Highlights 

•  This  case  study  explores  the  quality  of  public  services—healthcare, 
education,  and  policing—in  the  Attica  region,  combining  survey  data  with 
qualitative interviews of stakeholders. From the citizens’ perspective, public 
dissatisfaction  with  services  is  widespread  with  respect  to  the  quality,  the 
fairness  and  access  to  service  provision,  and  overall  levels  of  corruption. 
Through  interviews  with  public  servants,  academics,  journalists,  and 
representatives from civil society this study attempts to uncover some of the 
root causes of these challenges.  

•  Findings  suggest  that  service  delivery  is  significantly  hindered  by  chronic 
underinvestment  and  outdated  infrastructure.  Despite  Attica’s  position  as 
Greece’s  economic  and  administrative  hub,  public  investment  remains 
insufficient,  and  that  has  adversely  affected  healthcare  facilities,  school 
buildings,  and  the  capacity  of  law  enforcement  agencies.  The  austerity 
measures implemented in the wake of the financial crisis exacerbated staffing 
shortages further straining service delivery in some sectors.   

•  A critical challenge is the entrenched system of patronage and public sector 
politicization  which  affects  recruitment,  career  development,  and  ultimately 
the efficient distribution of resources. The arm of patronage and corruption 
extends  beyond  the  civil  service,  and  has  implications  for  the  equitable 
access  to  services,  as  individuals  with  political  connections  or  with  higher 
socio-economic status can secure preferential treatment. 

•  These governance challenges are  further reinforced by the weaknesses of 
institutions  designed  to  promote  accountability.  Media  capture,  weak  civil 
society  organizations,  and  judicial  shortcomings  allow  inefficiencies  and 
malfeasance  to  persist  unchecked.  Additionally,  cultural  factors,  including 
deep-seated  mistrust  between  citizens  and  the  state  and  tolerance  for 
unprofessionalism, constrain reform efforts. 

•  Despite  these  challenges,  stakeholders  also  pointed  to  some  incremental 
improvements that could potentially be signals of a change in the ‘rules of the 
game’.  Some  recent  efforts  to  make  civil  service  recruitment  more  merit-
based and transparent have been noted as a positive development, limiting 
the  influence  of  political  patronage.  Additionally,  there  is  a  growing  trend 
towards  including  civil society  organizations in  decision-making processes, 
allowing for greater citizen input and participation in deliberation processes. 
These small but meaningful shifts indicate that while systemic issues remain, 
there  are  avenues  for  progress  that  could  help  rebuild  trust  in  public 
institutions. 

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•  However,  without  meaningful  investment,  political  commitment  and  large-
scale institutional change, Attica’s public services, or Greece’s for that matter, 
are unlikely to see significant improvement.  

2.2.2.  Introduction 

This research examines the quality of public services in the Attica region, focusing 
on policing, healthcare, and education. The study seeks to explore the factors that 
lay  behind  the  poor  ratings  of  those  services.  To  achieve  this,  the  research 
combines quantitative data from the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 
interviews  with  stakeholders,  such  as 
with 
policymakers,  academics,  journalists,  and  representatives  from  civil  society 
organizations.  

from  semi  structured 

insights 

One  of  the  central  themes  that  emerged  from  this  research  is  the  role  that 
underinvestment  in  services  plays.  Across  almost  all  interviews,  stakeholders 
pointed  to  issues  related  to  availability  of  resources,  funding  and  outdated 
infrastructure, as some of the main reasons behind the inefficiencies observed in 
healthcare, education, and policing services. Additionally, staff shortages, a legacy 
of the financial crisis, have left essential services struggling to meet public demand, 
further eroding trust in the ability of the state to deliver valued public goods. 

Stakeholders  also  noted  perennial  issues  related  to  recruitment  and  carer 
development  within  the  civil  service  where  partisan  loyalty  and  connections  are 
prioritized  over merit. This has  resulted  in a  workforce  that  is resistant  to  reform, 
with little incentive for professional development or performance-based evaluations. 
Stakeholders  also  noted  that  political  considerations  often  override  long-term 
planning, with governments or individual ministers hesitant to introduce necessary 
reforms for fear of electoral backlash. 

By analyzing these structural challenges, this case study provides an overview of 
the  factors  affecting  service  quality  in  Attica.  It  highlights  the  interplay  between 
political  dynamics,  institutional  limitations,  public  sector  inefficiencies  and  cultural 
aspects, offering some insights into the root causes of the expressed dissatisfaction. 
Results from this case study suggest that financial investment is crucial but should 
be  coupled  with  institutional  interventions  that  prioritize  accountability  and 
meritocracy.  

As noted below, unlike in many European countries where local governments have 
greater control over service provision, Attica’s services remain largely dependent on 
the central government for regulation and funding.  This means that whatever the 
governance challenges in the region are, they reflect broader systemic inefficiencies 
and cannot be attributed to regional dynamics. The sheer size of the region and the 
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concentration of the population magnifies the effect of these deficiencies, and this 
is likely what the EQI ratings capture. 

In  the  remainder,  characteristics  of  the  Attica  region  and  a  brief  overview  of  the 
levels of regional autonomy in Greece are presented, followed by a presentation of 
some of the key EQI data comparing the Attica region with regions within Greece 
and  across  Europe.  The  methodology  behind  the  data  collection  process  and 
analysis  is  discussed,  followed  by  a  detailed  presentation  and  analysis  of  the 
insights  obtained  from  the  semi structured  interviews.  This case  study  concludes 
with a discussion and a concluding section that summarizes the key findings from 
this research. 

2.2.3.  Background: The Region of Attica 

The  spatial  distribution  of  the  population  in  Greece  is  highly  uneven  and  the 
population density of the Attica region (Attiki), where Athens is located, exemplifies 
this trend.  Attiki is home to 3.8 million people, approximately 36% of the country's 
total population (ELSTAT, 2023) but covers only a fraction of the country’s total land 
area (about 3%). As such, Attiki exhibits one of the highest population densities in 
Europe with about 1100 people per km2 (Eurostat, 2022). This reflects the region’s 
socioeconomic  opportunities,  attracting  people  due  to  its  employment  prospects, 
educational  institutions,  and  infrastructure.  However,  this  concentration  also 
presents  significant  challenges 
for  service  providers.  Healthcare,  public 
transportation, housing, and waste management face increasing strain, leading to 
overcrowding, delays, and resource shortages. 

 As Greece’s economic hub, Attica offers diverse industries, cultural activities, and 
connectivity,  making  it  a  magnet  for  internal  and  international  migration.  With  a 
Gross  Domestic  Product  close  to  90  billion  Euros  the Attica  region  accounts  for 
almost half of the Greece’s total output and has a per capita GDP of 26,200 euros 
(Eurostat, 2024).  It is by far the richest region in the country but lags significantly 
from the EU-27 average (35,400 euros GDP per capita).  Figure 1 compares Attica 
to other Greek regions regarding their contribution to the country’s GDP. The relative 
importance of the capital region is obvious with Kentriki Makedonia (the region that 
includes Thessaloniki) in a distant second place.  

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Figure 1. Relative weight of the Greek regions 

This  relative  wealth  is  not  evenly  distributed  across  the  region.  Attica  presents 
distinct inequality patterns both regarding the overall levels of inequality but also its 
spatial distribution. Research indicates that Attica exhibits higher levels of income 
and consumption inequality compared to other parts of Greece. This trend is more 
pronounced during the years of the economic crisis (2010-2015) but in terms of the 
Gini coefficient Attica performs worse than the rest of the country in the more recent 
data  as  well  (Psycharis,  Georgiadis  and  Nikolopoulos,  2023).    It  also  exhibits 
substantial residential segregation along socio-economic status groups (SES). This 
is  more  evident  in  municipalities  in  the  greater  area  of Athens  with  higher  SES 
groups predominantly situated mostly in the northern but also eastern suburbs, while 
lower SES populations are concentrated in the western areas of the metropolitan 
region (Maloutas and Spyrelis, 2019; Psycharis and Panori, 2023). 

Regional Autonomy in Greece 

Greece  is divided  into  7  decentralized  administrations,  13  administrative  regions, 
Attica  being  one  of  them,  and  325  municipalities.  The  division  of  Greece  into 
administrative regions does not necessarily reflect the ‘true’ level of decentralization. 
Greece  is  a  unitary  state  and  key  competencies  remain  centralized  under  the 
national  government.  While  regions  like Attica  have  elected  authorities,  they  lack 
fiscal  autonomy  and  legislative  power,  relying  heavily  on  state  funding  and 

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ministerial approvals. This limits their ability to implement independent policies and 
adapt  governance  to  local  needs,  making  regional  administration  more  of  an 
extension of central government rather than an autonomous governing entity. 

 This  is  important  for  the  purposes  of  this  case  study  since  any  citizen  survey 
assessing  local  governance  in Attica  would  likely  reflect  systemic  issues  tied  to 
central government rather than regional administration inefficiencies. While regional 
governments  retain  some  competencies  (e.g.  on  transportation,  environmental 
planning,  regional  development)  they  have  limited  to  no  authority  as  regards  the 
administration and provision of public goods such as health, education or policing, 
the  three  main  areas  that  the  EQI  focuses  on.  In  some  cases,  such  as  in 
primary/secondary  education,  aspects  of  provision  (e.g  maintenance  of  school 
buildings) fall under the jurisdiction of local governments (municipal level) but the 
central  government  is  still  solely  responsible  to  legislate,  regulate  and  fund  any 
activity (Sotiropoulos, 2018). As a result, public (dis)satisfaction with governance in 
Attica is more indicative of central government challenges than the region’s actual 
administrative performance. This has implications for the research design followed 
here as it will be discussed below. 

Evaluation of Service: A Closer look at the 2024 EQI data 

The following figures illustrate the relative position of Attiki on the European Quality 
of  Government  Index  (EQI)  over  time,  both  in  comparison  to  selected  European 
capital regions  (denoted  only by  the  name of  the  Capital)  and  within  the  national 
context of Greece. These visualizations highlight Attiki’s consistently lower rankings, 
shedding  light  on  its  governance  challenges  relative  to  both  its  European  and 
domestic counterparts. 

Figure 2 presents the EQI Index trends for Attiki compared to other European capital 
regions over different waves of the EQI survey. The data indicate that Attiki in recent 
years ranks among the lower-performing regions in terms of EQI, closely aligning 
with capitals such as Zagreb, Bucharest, and Sofia. In 2010, Attiki was placed in a 
relative  better  position  but  still  significantly  below  cases  like  Vienna  and  Dublin, 
which are the highest-ranked regions in the selected capitals. Over time, there is no 
improvement in Attiki’s position relative to peers. By 2024, Attiki is among the least-
performing  capital  regions,  showing  little  convergence  with  the  better-ranked 
regions.  While  some  regions,  such  as  those  around  Madrid  or  Prague,  exhibit 
moderate  improvements, Attiki  remains  clustered  with  Bucharest,  Bratislava  and 
Zagreb at the lower end of the spectrum. This positioning suggests a persistent gap 
between the governance quality in Attiki and that of other capital regions in Western 
and Central Europe. 

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Figure 2. EQI in Attica compared 

Source: European Quality of Government Index (Charron, Lapuente & Bauhr 2024) 

Figure 3 focuses on the EQI Index for Attiki in comparison to other Greek regions. 
In 2010, Attica it is placed in first position, far above the national average. Over time, 
however, Attiki exhibits a declining trend relative to certain regions, and by 2024 is 
the worst performing region. Notably, the gap between Attiki and Greece’s higher-
ranked  regions  is  substantial. Attiki's  position  at  the  bottom  in  2024,  both  within 
Greece and in the broader European context, underscores the region's persistent 
service delivery challenges and highlights its comparatively weak standing in terms 
of quality of government. The region's decline was particularly pronounced during 
the financial crisis, and unlike some other areas, Attiki has struggled to recover, with 
its governance indicators continuing to lag behind over time. 

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Figure 3. EQI in the Greek Regions across time 

Source: European Quality of Government Index (Charron, Lapuente & Bauhr 2024) 

The picture regarding individual services and service provision is a bit more nuanced 
but overall, it still paints a somewhat bleak picture as regards the relative position of 
Attica  vis  a  vis  the  rest  of  Greece.  This  case  study  focuses  on  the  three  main 
services that respondents in the EQI surveys are asked to evaluate. Starting with 
education,  Figure  4  plots  the  respondents’  evaluations  in  their  region  on  three 
different dimensions. Panel (a) shows the overall evaluation regarding the quality of 
education, panel (b) is about perceptions of fairness in the educational system while 
panel  (c)  is  about  perceptions  of  corruption  in  the  educational  system.  Panel  (a) 
suggests that there are not too many differences between the different regions with 
the exception of the regions of Ionia Nisia and Dytiki Makedonia in terms of overall 
quality evaluation.  

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Figure 4. Education services in the regions of Greece 

Notes:  Estimates  are  averages  across  the  13  regions  of  Greece.  The  red  line  in  the  graph 
represents the country average. In panel (a) the question is “How would you evaluate the quality 
of  public  education  in  your  area  (1-very  poor  quality,  10-excellent  Quality)”.  In  panel  (b)  the 
question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree how would 
you respond to the question ‘Some people in my area get special privileges in the system of public 
education’”. In panel (c) the question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly agree and 10 
strongly disagree how would you respond to the question ‘There is corruption in the system of 
public education in my area’”. Source: European Quality of Government Index. 

We could potentially divide the regions into four different groups with ascending 
levels of quality evaluations. The first group would include the two larger regions, 
Attiki and Kentriki Makedonia, the second regions between Peloponisos and Kriti, 
the  third  group  those  regions  between Anatoliki  Makedonia  and  Voreio Aigaio 
while the final two regions of Dytiki Makedonia and Ionia Nisia seem to express 
on average more satisfaction with public education. Similar is the picture when 
we move to the other two panels. Attica is the region with higher perceptions of 
‘unfairness’ and corruption in the system of education. Figure 5 compares Attiki 
in the same indicators with three selected capital regions from Italy, Spain and 
Portugal. In all three cases Attiki is in the worst position. 

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Figure 5. Education services in Attica compared  

Notes: Estimates are averages for the region of Attica compared to 3 selected capital regions in 
the South. In panel a, the question is “How would you evaluate the quality of public education in 
your region (1-very poor quality, 10-excellent Quality)”. In panel b the question is: “On a scale 1-
10  where  1  means  strongly  disagree  and  10  strongly  agree  how  would  you  respond  to  the 
question ‘Some people in my area get special privileges in the system of public education’”. In 
panel c the question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly agree and 10 strongly disagree 
how would you respond to the question ‘There is corruption in the system of public education in 
my area’”. Source: European Quality of Government Index. 

In a similar fashion, Figure 6 presents the relative position of Attiki in the same 
indicators for the health system. In this case Attiki seems to be right around the 
mean regarding overall quality evaluations (panel a) while it tends to belong to 
the  more  dissatisfied  group  regarding  corruption  (panel  c)  and  perceptions  of 
fairness (panel b). The relatively better position of Attica in the overall evaluation 
the  high  concentration  and  offer  of  modern  medical 
probably  reflects 
infrastructure  and  more  qualified  personnel  in  the  capital  region.  On  the  other 
hand,  given  that  objective  reality,  one  would  potentially  expect  an  even  higher 
evaluation.  The comparison with the other three capital regions gives the same 
picture  as  before. Attiki  scores  consistently  lower  from  the  comparison  cases 
mainly as regards quality and corruption perceptions while the four capital regions 
are not differentiated as much in the case of fairness perceptions (Figure 7). 

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Figure 6. Health services in the regions of Greece 

Notes:  Estimates  are  averages  across  the  13  regions  of  Greece.  The  red  line  in  the  graph 
represents the country average. In panel a the question is “How would you evaluate the quality 
of the public health system in your area (1-very poor quality, 10-excellent Quality)”. In panel b the 
question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree how would 
you respond to the question ‘Some people in my area get special privileges in the public health 
system”.  In  panel  c  the  question  is:  “On  a  scale  1-10  where  1  means  strongly  agree  and  10 
strongly disagree how would you respond to the question ‘There is corruption in the public health 
system in my area’”. Source: European Quality of Government Index. 

Finally, Figure 8 presents evaluation on the same indicators for policing services. 
The  story largely remains  the  same  in  this case  as  well.  Respondents  in Attiki 
tend to express less satisfaction with the overall quality of the police services and 
believe they tend to be somewhat more corrupt and less fair compared to citizens 
on most other regions of Greece (Attiki tends to cluster with Kentriki Makedonia 
and Dytiki Ellada in some of these indicators). The comparison with other capital 
regions  in  this  case  produces  even  starker  differences,  again,  not  in  favour  of 
Attica (Figure 9). 

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Figure 7. Health services in Attica compared  

Notes: Estimates are averages for the region of Attica compared to 3 selected capital regions in 
the South. In panel a, the question is “How would you evaluate the quality of the public health 
system in your area (1-very poor quality, 10-excellent Quality)”. In panel b the question is: “On a 
scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree how would you respond to 
the question ‘Some people in my area get special privileges in the public health system”. In panel 
c the question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly agree and 10 strongly disagree how 
would you respond to the question ‘There is corruption in the public health system in my area’”. 
Source: European Quality of Government Index. 

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Figure 8. Police services in the regions of Greece 

Notes:  Estimates  are  averages  across  the  13  regions  of  Greece.  The  red  line  in  the  graph 
represents the country average. In panel a the question is “How would you evaluate the quality 
of policing  in your area (1-very poor quality, 10-excellent Quality)”. In panel b the question is: “On 
a scale 1-10 where 1 means strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree how would you respond to 
the question ‘Some people in my area get special privileges in policing”. In panel c the question 
is:  “On  a  scale  1-10  where  1  means  strongly  agree  and  10  strongly  disagree  how  would  you 
respond  to  the  question  ‘There  is  corruption  in  the  system  of  policing  in  my  area’”.  Source: 
European Quality of Government Index. 

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Figure 9. Police services in Attica compared 

Notes: Estimates are averages for the region of Attica compared to 3 selected capital regions in 
the South. In panel a, the question is “How would you evaluate the quality of policing in your area 
(1-very poor quality, 10-excellent Quality)”. In panel b the question is: “On a scale 1-10 where 1 
means strongly disagree and 10 strongly agree how would you respond to the question ‘Some 
people in my area get special privileges in policing”. In panel c the question is: “Oe a scale 1-10 
where 1 means strongly agree and 10 strongly disagree how would you respond to the question 
‘There  is  corruption  in  the  system  of  policing  in  my  area’.”    Source:  European  Quality  of 
Government Index. 

Overall, a more nuanced exploration of the EQI data suggests that there is not 
much being lost in using aggregated EQI indicators when trying to ascertain the 
relative  position  of  Attica  in  Quality  of  Government  Indicators.  Focusing  on 
individual services, there are few redeeming factors for the Attica region. In the 
following  section,  the  report  delves  deeper  into  the  reasons  behind  these 
evaluations,  drawing  insights  from  stakeholder  interviews  to  better  understand 
the structural, institutional and other factors shaping public service performance. 

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2.2.4.  Methodology 

This  study  draws  on  in-depth  qualitative  interviews  conducted  with  key 
stakeholders  in  the Attica  region  to  explore  perceptions  of  institutional  quality, 
governance  effectiveness,  and  public  service  delivery. A  total  of  11  interviews 
were  carried  out  with  individuals  representing  diverse  sectors,  including  public 
administration, journalism, academia and civil society organizations (see table A1 
in the Appendix). These participants were selected to ensure a broad perspective 
on the issues affecting Attica’s governance and institutional performance. 

for 

The interviews were semi-structured and followed an interview guide designed to 
elicit insights on various indicators of the European Quality of Government Index 
(EQI). Questions focused on the perceived quality, fairness, and integrity of public 
services, as well as broader governance challenges in the region and Greece in 
general.  The  semi-structured  approach  allowed 
flexibility,  enabling 
interviewees to elaborate on their experiences and perspectives while ensuring 
consistency in the topics covered across all interviews. After seeing some of the 
results presented above, respondents were asked to give their views about what 
might  influence  the  evaluation  given  by  citizens.  Then  the  discussion  tried  to 
branch into explanations using previous literature as a guide. In that respect the 
interviews  tried  to  cover  issues  of  public  sector  recruitment  and  career 
development of civil servants (Dahlström et al., 2012; Dahlström and Lapuente, 
2022), the role of institutions that enhance monitoring and accountability such as 
the media (Brunetti and Weder, 2003), the strength of civil society organisations 
(Grimes,  2013)  and  the  prevalence  of  clientelistic  networks  (Keefer,  2007).  
However,  the  analysis  below  also  focuses  on  a  more  inductive  analysis  of  the 
data and includes themes that seem to ‘jump out’ from the interviews. 

Interviews  were  conducted  in  person  and  remotely,  depending  on  participant 
availability, and lasted between 30 minutes and 1.5 hours. They were recorded 
with  the  participants’  consent  (with  the  exception  of  2  interviews  for  which 
recording  was  not  permitted)  and  subsequently  transcribed  for  analysis.  A 
thematic coding approach was used to identify recurring patterns, key concerns, 
and areas of divergence or convergence among stakeholders. The findings from 
these  interviews  contextualize  the  quantitative  EQI  data,  providing  a  richer 
understanding of governance challenges in Attica. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  findings  from  these  interviews  reflect  broader 
challenges  within  the  Greek  state,  as  the  services  of  policing,  health,  and 
education  are  not  decentralized  in  Greece  (or  only  minimally  decentralised). 
Consequently,  any  systemic  issues  identified  in  Athens  are  indicative  of 
nationwide problems rather than localized anomalies. It is probably the peculiarity 
of  the  region  in  terms  of  size  and  concentration  but  also  in  terms  of  the 
characteristics of the population (e.g more highly educated people) that make it 
probably stand out even more. 

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2.2.5.  Analysis of Stakeholder Interviews 

Stakeholders largely agree with the low evaluations that citizens give to public 
services, acknowledging that the criticisms reflect real and persistent problems. 
They recognize that issues such as long wait times in hospitals, outdated school 
facilities, and inefficient policing contribute to widespread dissatisfaction. In their 
view,  these  shortcomings  are  not  merely a  matter  of  public  perception  but  are 
deeply  rooted  in  structural  failures,  including  chronic  underfunding,  poor 
infrastructure,  and  inadequate  staffing.  However,  some  respondents  caution 
against  painting  with  a  broad  brush:  “You  know,  some  of  this dissatisfaction  is 
also  stereotypical.  It  does  not  always  reflect  the  true  state  of  the  services” 
(Interview 5). 

The  presentation  of  the  analysis  below  is  organized  along  some  of  the  main 
themes that came out of these discussions. In that sense the goal is on the one 
hand to describe the lived reality but also uncover the main explanations behind 
it. 

Spending and Infrastructure 

to 

inadequate 

Stakeholders  overwhelmingly  pointed 
infrastructure  and 
insufficient public spending as major obstacles to effective public services. Many 
emphasized  that  chronic  underinvestment  has  left  key  sectors—healthcare, 
education, and policing—struggling with outdated facilities and limited resources. 
While  modern  infrastructure,  such  as  hospitals,  is  concentrated  in  the Athens 
region, this area also accounts for nearly 40% of the country’s population, leading 
to overcrowding and overstretched services. Due to persistent funding shortages, 
public  institutions  often  lack  the  necessary  equipment  and  capacity  to  meet 
growing demands. 

In  healthcare,  these  deficiencies  translate  into  long  wait  times,  overcrowded 
hospitals,  and  outdated  medical  equipment.  Similarly,  the  education  sector 
suffers from deteriorating school buildings, a lack of modern teaching materials, 
and an outdated curriculum that has seen limited revisions due to cost and other 
concerns.  Policing  infrastructure  is  also  inadequate,  with  equipment  shortages 
and poorly maintained facilities hampering law enforcement effectiveness. 

Respondents  frequently  highlighted  the  deteriorating  state  of  public  buildings: 
“Many of the schools were built in the 1970s and 1980s without proper insulation, 
with crumbling ceilings—this is the general picture.” (Interview 1) 

“The  hospital  wards  were  built  with  a  construction  logic  from  the  1940s  and 
1950s.” (Interview 5) 

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Beyond  physical  infrastructure,  stakeholders  pointed  to  severe  shortages  in 
essential equipment and resources. Teachers and students, for example, often 
lack even the most basic materials: 

“The  minister  is  talking  about  interactive  boards,  yet  during  the  heatwave  that 
coincided with exams, parents had to bring their own fans because the ceiling 
fans either didn’t work or didn’t exist.” (Interview 4) 

“In one area, the public hospital doesn’t have an MRI scanner, while the private 
sector has three.” (Interview 2) “The textbooks children are still using in schools 
were written in 2003.” (Interview 4) “Sometimes, police officers have to pay for 
some of their equipment themselves.” (Interview 9) 

Many  stakeholders  also  drew  attention  to  Greece’s  significant  gap  in  public 
spending  compared  to  the  EU  average:  “We  are  asking  for  5%  of  GDP  for 
education. We are currently at roughly 3%, and that is a huge gap.” (Interview 1) 
“Imagine what we could achieve with an extra €3.5 billion.” (Interview 2) 

Additionally,  low  salaries  for  public  sector  employees—particularly  doctors, 
teachers, and police officers—were cited as a major concern. These wages fail 
to reflect the importance and responsibilities of these professions, and combined 
with infrastructure deficiencies, contribute to low morale and difficulty in retaining 
skilled personnel: “Salaries are extremely low—this is widely acknowledged. You 
cannot pay a doctor the same as a call center employee in a private company.” 
(Interview 3). 

Personnel Quality, Organization and Staffing 

raised  serious  concerns 

Stakeholders 
regarding  staffing  shortages, 
organizational  inefficiencies,  and  skill  deficiencies  in  public  services.  In 
healthcare, education understaffing leads to delays or even the denial of services 
while  many  employees  work  under  flexible  contracts:  ”We  have  the  lowest 
number of nurses per capita (3, while in Finland it is 16).” (Interview 2). “We have 
50,000 substitute teachers, meaning that one-third of our workforce has a flexible 
employment relationship.” (Interview 1) 

The  financial  crisis  and  subsequent  austerity  measures  exacerbated  staffing 
issues, as hiring freezes, budget cuts, and early retirements led to a significant 
reduction  in  public  sector  employees.  Despite  some  economic  recovery,  many 
services  remain  understaffed  and  imbalanced.  The  effects  of  this  period  are 
particularly  evident  in  the  social  attributes  of  civil  servants:  “Before  the  bailout 
agreements, we were 110,352, and now we are 70,200.” (Interview 2) “We have 
the oldest workforce in the European Union; the average age of secondary school 
teachers  is  about  55.”  (Interview  1).  This  shortage  has  also  created  gaps  in 
leadership positions across public services: “They leave without a replacement 
behind them, creating serious gaps in the administrative hierarchy.” (Interview 6) 

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However, the problem is not just a lack of personnel as not all sectors are equally 
affected by staffing shortages. For example, Greece has a relatively high number 
of  police  officers  per  capita,  and  interviewees  noted  that  the  problem  in  police 
services is not one of force availability but of resource allocation: “It is not a matter 
of police force availability. We know that there are shortages in the emergency 
call center, and at the same time, we know that the security services for public 
figures are overstaffed.” (Interview 9). Not only police officers but also teachers 
are often reassigned to other roles, exacerbating shortages in critical areas: ‘’You 
have 3,000-4,000 teachers seconded to other public services, which worsens the 
hiring shortage.” (Interview 4) 

Beyond  numbers, stakeholders also  raised  concerns about  the  skill levels and 
professionalism of public employees. This issue is particularly pronounced in the 
police force but also affects healthcare administration and other sectors:  “Most 
police  officers  are  unaware  of  their  duties  and  responsibilities.”  (Interview  9). 
“Imagine  a person  at the  hospital reception desk  does  not  know how to  use  a 
computer.” (Interview 3) 

Quality disparities in staffing are often geographically uneven, reinforcing existing 
inequalities  in  public  services:  “It  depends  on  the  personnel;  you  may  go  to  a 
school  in  one  neighborhood  and  find  excellent  teachers,  while  in  another 
neighborhood, not so much.” (Interview 4) 

Stakeholders  also  noted  a  significant  lack  of  professional  development 
opportunities, with many employees pursuing training at their own expense while 
others seem reluctant to engage with opportunities for training:”[Teachers] train 
themselves  with  their  own  money;  they  pursue  a  master's  degree,  a  second 
degree, or even a doctorate.” (Interview 1). “Those who are already in the system 
will take a long time to leave and refuse to learn.” (Interview 3). “I asked my people 
to  register  for  professional  development  activities,  but  very  few  of  them  were 
willing to do so.” (Interview 11) 

Despite  these  challenges,  some  exceptions  exist.  Stakeholders  agreed  that 
doctors tend to be among the most highly skilled professionals within the public 
sector: “Doctors are among the best-trained personnel in the system.” (Interview 
2, Interview 5) 

These  workforce  challenges  create  multi-layered  problems  across  public 
services.  In  policing,  they  have  contributed  to  ineffective  law  enforcement  and 
strained  community  relations,  particularly  among  marginalized  groups  such  as 
Roma,  immigrants,  and  drug  users. In education, an  aging  teaching  workforce 
struggles  to  adapt  to  modern  pedagogical  methods.  In  healthcare,  there  is  a 
notable  skills  gap  between  highly  trained  doctors  and  underqualified  hospital 
administrators.  However,  there  are  signs  of  reform,  as  the  government  has 
recently  introduced  the  first  evaluations  of  hospital directors,  marking  an  initial 
step toward improving management practices. 

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In  the  next  section,  the  underlying  causes  of  these  governance  issues  are 
examined,  focusing  principally  on  systemic  issues  such  as  patronage  and 
corruption,  recruitment  practices,  political  influence  in  the  civil  service,  and 
mechanisms for monitoring and accountability. 

Patronage, Corruption, Special Privileges and Capture 

Stakeholders  highlighted  the  deeply  embedded  nature  of  patronage  in  public 
services, emphasizing how political connections, financial means, and informal 
networks shape  access  to  education,  healthcare, and  other  essential services. 
While some interviewees acknowledged that corruption levels might sometimes 
be overstated (“Sometimes the perception of corruption is greater than the actual 
extent of it” – Interview 6), most described systemic issues that affect governance 
and the quality of public service delivery. 

A recurring theme in the interviews was the role of political influence and personal 
connections in securing preferential treatment. Whether in education, healthcare, 
or administrative services, political figures and their associates often intervene to 
bypass standard procedures. “They will move heaven and earth—even members 
of Parliament—to get things done” (Interview 1). A typical example mentioned by 
stakeholders  was  political  interference  in  school  placements:  “They  call  the 
regional education director and say, ‘Please, I need my child to go to this specific 
school’” (Interview 1). 

This  culture  extends  into  healthcare  as  well,  where  status  can  determine  the 
speed and quality of service. “Doctors in the emergency room will work extra hard 
as soon as they realize that the patient is the wife of a certain MP” (Interview 3). 
Similarly,  media  professionals  noted  that  they  too  receive  calls  asking  for 
preferential treatment: “People call us journalists, asking us to intervene so they 
can  skip  the  waiting  list”  (Interview  3).  In  healthcare,  in  particular,  financial 
resources  often  determine  access  to  care.  “Income  is  the  primary  factor  in 
accessing the health system in Greece” (Interview 5), “Usually minorities cannot 
really make those phone calls” (Interview 2). 

Stakeholders also pointed to widespread informal payments and the outsourcing 
of public services to private providers as key indicators of corruption. “There is a 
web  of  entanglement—paying  private  providers  to  do  what  the  public  sector 
should be doing” (Interview 2). Some interviewees stressed that corruption is not 
always  about  direct  bribery  but  can  take  different  forms:  “There’s  a  difference 
between a ‘gift’ and giving money” (Interview 2). In the former case for many this 
is not  considered  a bribery but  is part of an established  culture  as  we  will  see 
below. 

The  absence  of  structural  reforms,  for  instance  in  public  healthcare,  was  also 
linked to economic or sectorial interests. For example, the reluctance to establish 

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a universal primary care system was seen as a way to protect private medical 
practices. “They don’t want to create a personal doctor system because, if they 
do, all those private doctors we pay directly—often in cash—what will happen to 
them?”  (Interview  5).  Additionally,  many  suggested  that  concentration  of 
competencies  in  the  central  government  is  a  convenient  way  for  politicians  to 
maintain  patronage  networks.  As  one  interviewee  explained:  “You  may  have 
more  responsibilities  and  a  heavier  workload,  but  at  the  same  time,  you  have 
greater  political  stakes  to  negotiate  with  your  base.  Can  you  imagine  that  to 
transfer  a  doctor  from  one  hospital  to  the  other  you  need  the  signature  of  the 
minister?  This  concentration  of  decision-making  authority  is  there  in  order  to 
sustain clientelistic networks” (Interview 5). 

This exchange of favors ensures the survival of patronage networks and makes 
reform  efforts  difficult,  as  those  benefiting  from  the  status  quo  resist  changes. 
“The losers of reforms are the small but stable group of people who are sustained 
by these systems” (Interview 8).  

Some interviewees pointed to direct financial corruption within the civil service. 
Senior officials accumulating wealth beyond what their salaries would allow raises 
concerns. “Well, —I had a department head who owned houses in different parts 
of the country. Hard to do that on a public sector salary” (Interview 10). Similarly, 
corruption  in  public  procurement  was  highlighted  as  an  issue.  “Sometimes  a 
project  gets  a  5%  discount,  sometimes  a  30%  discount.  There  are  certain 
‘practices’ involved” (Interview 7). Moreover, stakeholders pointed out that even 
law  enforcement  selectively  applies  regulations,  particularly  when  political  or 
economic  interests  are  at  play.  “During  COVID,  there  were  three  or  four 
businesses that kept operating despite restrictions, but the police never shut them 
down” (Interview 9). 

Despite the prevalence of patronage and corruption, some stakeholders argued 
that the failure of public services is not as much due to corruption but rather to 
underfunding and resource constraints. “The inability to provide services is not so 
much  a  matter  of  corruption.  It’s  a  matter  of  resources”  (Interview  6).  This 
suggests that while corruption plays a role in the inefficiency of public services, 
broader structural and financial issues must also be addressed. 

Civil Service Challenges: Meritocracy and Politicization  

Recruitment and promotion in Greece’s public sector remain highly vulnerable to 
political interference, favoritism, and loopholes that undermine meritocracy. While 
formal  evaluation  criteria  exist,  and  the  Supreme  Council  for  Civil  Personnel 
Selection  (ASEP)  is  an  independent  commission  of  high  status,  there  are  still 
cases  of  unfair  hiring  practices,  credential  inflation,  and  other  systemic 
inefficiencies.  While  in  many  cases  entrance  to  the  public  sector  is  based  on 

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meritocratic  criteria,  professional  advancement  is  often  determined  by  political 
affiliation and personal networks rather than competence and qualifications. 

One  of  the  most  significant  barriers  to  meritocracy  is  the  influence  of  political 
affiliations  in  recruitment  and  promotion.  The  selection  process  for  senior 
positions  often  serves  political  interests  rather  than  institutional  needs. As  one 
interviewee put it, “The position of director is always political” (Interview 2). This 
results in candidates being chosen based on party loyalty rather than experience 
or competence. “If someone is from PASOK and another candidate is from New 
Democracy, the probability of the latter being chosen is much higher” (Interview 
5). This dynamic extends beyond hiring, as politically connected employees often 
enjoy preferential treatment in transfers and promotions, while those without such 
networks face exclusion or even punitive reassignments. “If someone lacks those 
networks, they may even face retaliatory transfers” (Interview 9). 

However,  recent  changes  to  hirings  for  top  positions  through  exams  (even  if 
somewhat manipulated by the interview process as we will see below) are seen 
as positive incremental steps: “This new system has its problems but yes, it is a 
step in the right direction” (Interview 11). 

Although  recruitment  systems  are  theoretically  structured  around  objective 
criteria (the use of ASEP is widespread), in practice, they are often manipulated 
to favor specific candidates. For example, the interview component in selection 
processes  is  frequently  used  to  justify  predetermined  selections.  “Through  the 
interview process, some people suddenly found themselves ahead” (Interview 2). 
This  tool  allows  candidates  with  weaker  qualifications  to  bypass  objectively 
stronger competitors. “A candidate with objectively fewer points can overtake a 
better-qualified one just through the interview” (Interview 1). The lack of regular 
evaluations and transparent procedures further compounds the problem. “There 
is a formal evaluation process for appointing supervisors, but these have not been 
conducted since 2006” (Interview 2). While respondents suggest that there are 
mechanisms for oversight (e.g. ways to raise complaints), hiring decisions remain 
susceptible to favoritism and the use of informal networks. 

Another  major  issue  is  the  exploitation  of  qualification  requirements  through 
fraudulent or superficial certifications. In sectors such as healthcare, candidates 
have  been  known  to  present  academic  work  they  did  not  produce.  “There  are 
people  in  the  healthcare  sector  who  have  presented  dissertations  they  never 
wrote, having paid others to do them” (Interview 2). Such practices undermine 
the  credibility  of  professional  qualifications  and  contribute  to  the  erosion  of 
standards. Additionally,  the  introduction  of  a  point-based  system  for  hiring  has 
created an industry around certification programs. “The point system has created 
a  new  industry  of  fast-track  courses,  where  you  pay  money,  get  a  certificate 
quickly, and increase your points” (Interview 4). Instead of ensuring fairness and 
competence,  this  system  likely  rewards  those  with  financial  resources  while 

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disadvantaging  candidates  who  rely  solely  on  genuine  academic  and 
professional credentials. 

Some  interviewees  also  expressed  concerns  over  the  recruitment  of  special 
categories  of  public  sector  employees  with  minimal  qualifications.  Law 
enforcement was cited as a key example. “Right now, we are seeing large-scale 
recruitment of special categories of police officers, like the Delta motorbike units. 
These are high school graduates who undergo very brief training” (Interview 9).  

Addressing  these  issues  from  within  is  difficult  as  employees  who  recognize 
unfair practices often feel powerless to challenge them. “They cannot complain, 
as  it  will  impact  their  career  progression”  (Interview  2).  On  the  other  hand, 
changes from above, rather than being geared towards long-term reforms, focus 
on replacing previous appointees with each new administration’s loyalists. “They 
want to eliminate the previous appointees, and the best way to do that would be 
to ‘reform’ the hiring system” (Interview 6). 

Evaluation of Public Servants  

The evaluation of public servants remains a contentious issue, often perceived 
as  a  punitive  measure  rather  than  a  tool  for  improvement.  Many  view  it  as  a 
mechanism for enforcing restrictive policies that could lead to the downsizing of 
key public services, such as primary and secondary education. “They continue to 
see evaluation as a punitive tool, a vehicle for restrictive policies that will lead to 
the shrinking of primary and secondary education” (Interview 4). 

A  major  concern  revolves  around  transparency  and  oversight.  Critics  question 
whether evaluation  processes  are  conducted  fairly and  who ultimately controls 
the results. “The reactions are related to the transparency of the evaluation—or, 
ultimately, who controls the outcome” (Interview 4). 

In some cases, evaluations are needed in order to improve services or to judge 
reform efforts but that is rarely done. “Have we evaluated local health units? —
some  met  their  targets,  some  failed.  But  why?  Why  did  some  succeed  while 
others failed?” (Interview 5) 

Recognizing  resistance,  policymakers  have  sometimes  sought  to  implement 
evaluation frameworks under different names while ensuring they do not provoke 
strong  opposition.  “They  made  sure  to  introduce  evaluation,  even  under  a 
different name, while at the same time ensuring it would not provoke teachers” 
(Interview 4). 

Overall,  concerns  about  patronage,  corruption,  meritocracy  and  politicization 
continue to be the main issues shaping the debate regarding public sector reform. 

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Oversight and Media 

The  lack  of  robust  oversight  and  accountability  emerged  as  a  critical  factor 
exacerbating  systemic  issues  in  policing,  healthcare,  and  education.  Several 
interrelated challenges contribute to this problem, including media capture, the 
fragility  of  civil  society  organizations,  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  justice  system, 
and  the  limited  reach  of  constitutional  watchdogs  such  as  independent 
authorities.  These  shortcomings  allow  inefficiencies  and  misconduct  to  persist 
unchecked, ultimately eroding public trust in essential institutions. 

The  media,  which  could  serve  as  an  important  check  on  corruption  and 
inefficiency, is often compromised by corporate and state interests. Media outlets 
rarely  conduct  investigative  reporting  on  public  sector  failures,  limiting  public 
awareness and, consequently, pressure for change. As one interviewee noted, 
“The  press  in  Greece  is  controlled  by  more  than  80%”  (Interview  4). Another 
reinforced this view, arguing that  “The media is more embedded in the system 
than ever before” (Interview 6). 

Journalists who attempt to challenge this status quo often face professional or 
financial  repercussions.  “In  my  line  of  work,  for  example,  I  am  blacklisted  by 
pharmaceutical companies” (Interview 3). This dynamic is exacerbated by direct 
financial  dependencies  between  the  media  and  the  state.  One  interviewee 
illustrated this issue: “When a website is given €200,000, what do you think they 
will say?” (Interview 2). 

Beyond financial incentives, direct intimidation by state institutions also limits the 
ability  of  journalists  to  hold  power  to  account.  “The  people  who  work  in  these 
organizations are so powerful that as soon as they see a report they don’t like, 
they send an email to your director threatening to sue you and your media outlet” 
(Interview 3). 

Weak Civil Society 

Civil society organizations, which could act as advocates for transparency and 
accountability, remain relatively weak in Greece. A significant challenge is the lack 
of  public  mobilization  against  corruption.  “There  is  no  grassroots  mobilization 
around  issues  of  corruption”  (Interview  6).  This  disengagement  is  driven  by  a 
combination  of  apathy  and  a  belief  that  individual  actions  do  not  matter.  “This 
can’t be fixed. I focus on myself and my family” (Interview 8). 

The  state  itself  does  not  recognize  civil  society  organizations  as  allies  in  the 
pursuit  of  better  governance  but  rather  as  enemies.  “We  have  civil  society 
organizations that are actually under persecution” (Interview 9). Moreover, some 
of  these  organizations  often  struggle  with  financial  dependency,  making  them 
susceptible  to  state  or  corporate  influence.  Some  sectors,  such  as  patient 

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advocacy groups, rely heavily on corporate sponsorships, raising questions about 
their  independence.  “Patient  associations  survive  on  pharmaceutical funding—
that alone tells you everything” (Interview 3). Others argue that dependence on 
state or EU funding further weakens the autonomy of these organizations. “They 
are reliant on European money or national resources” (Interview 9). 

However,  there  are  signs  of  incremental  improvements  in  civil  society 
engagement,  particularly  in  the  healthcare  sector.  “Until  recently,  our  patients 
were  invisible,  but  now  their  voices  are  being  heard.  We’ve  seen  a  change” 
(Interview 5). 

Limited Impact of Independent Authorities 

independent  authorities 

The  effectiveness  of 
in  holding  public  officials 
accountable  remains  contested.  While  such  entities  theoretically  serve  as 
watchdogs, many question their actual independence.  “Independent authorities 
are  anything  but  independent”  (Interview  8).  Some  interviewees  noted  that 
political forces have sought to undermine these bodies.  “The government even 
aimed to change their composition” (Interview 8). 

One key example of this tension is the well-publicized wiretapping scandal, which 
sparked a clash between the Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and 
Privacy (ADAE) and the government. Beyond these high-profile cases, however, 
many watchdogs appear ineffective in everyday governance. “The ombudsman 
has  little  grip”  (Interview  6).  The  same  skepticism  extends  to  oversight  of  law 
enforcement: “The role of the ombudsman regarding the police is quite limited” 
(Interview  9).  However,  a  brief  overview  of  the  work  done  in  that  independent 
authority suggests that these limitations are not a matter of effort or output as that 
work is varied extensive. It is therefore still a matter of concern the reasons behind 
this limited effectiveness. 

Despite these concerns, some acknowledge the value of independent authorities, 
particularly  when  they  are  well-resourced  and  function  effectively.  “ADAE  has 
done  commendable  work”  (Interview  6).  Others  see  potential  in  local-level 
institutions  modeled  after  independent  authorities,  provided  they  receive 
adequate support. “The Citizen’s Advocate is a good institution” (Interview 7). 

The Role of the Courts 

Stakeholders  expressed  serious  concerns  about  the  functioning  of  the  Greek 
judicial  system,  highlighting  issues  of  independence,  inefficiency,  and  political 
interference.  Several  interviewees  emphasized  that  the  judiciary  does  not 
operate autonomously, raising questions about the rule of law and accountability 
in  the  country.  “The  Greek  judiciary  is  not  independent”  (Interview  1),  one 

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stakeholder  stated  bluntly,  summarizing  a  widespread  perception  of  external 
influences shaping judicial decisions. 

One concerning issue raised in the interviews is the perceived special treatment 
of law enforcement officers within the judicial system. Police officers often benefit 
from  lenient  legal  scrutiny,  fostering  a  culture  of  impunity.  “Police  officers  in 
Greece enjoy a special status when it comes to adhering to the law themselves, 
as well as a certain impunity granted to them by the judicial system” (Interview 
9). This sentiment reflects broader concerns about selective enforcement and the 
reluctance of the judiciary to hold security forces accountable. 

Stakeholders also pointed to structural dysfunctions in the judiciary that further 
undermine  the  credibility  of  the  system.  The  inefficiency  of  the  courts—
manifested  in  severe  delays,  backlogged  cases,  and  legal  uncertainty—was 
frequently mentioned. “We have a non-functioning judicial system” (Interview 8). 

One  stakeholder  linked  the  lack  of  judicial  reform  to  the  broader  political 
landscape of Greece, particularly in the post-financial crisis period. “Because the 
political  system  has  a  relationship  of  dependence  with  the  judiciary,  it  never 
seriously engaged in judicial reform during the bailout years. In general, public 
administration  went  through  many  phases  of  modernization,  but  the  judiciary 
remained  outside  of  that  process”  (Interview  6).  This  suggests  that  judicial 
stagnation is not just a result of inefficiency but is also a deliberate outcome of 
political considerations. 

Overall,  the  interviews  paint  a  picture  of  a  judicial  system  that  suffers  from 
structural  weaknesses,  political  entanglements,  but  also  managerial 
inefficiencies. These factors, in turn, have contributed to growing mistrust in the 
judiciary  an  issue  which  is  currently  very  high  in  the  governance  agenda  in 
Greece.  

The Role of the Culture 

Stakeholders highlighted deep-rooted  cultural factors as a  significant  barrier to 
improving public services. The issue of culture operates on three levels. First it 
has  to  do  with  established  practices  within  the  public  sector.  Many  noted  a 
tendency  to  resist  change,  with  some  actively  seeking  to  restore  outdated 
systems rather than embrace reforms: “Unfortunately, even we ourselves try to 
bring the system back to how it was before.” (Interview 3). A culture of tolerance 
toward many systematic shortcomings was also frequently mentioned: “There is 
a  culture  of  tolerance  for  unprofessionalism.”  (Interview 9).  Some  respondents 
emphasized  that  workplace  culture  in  the  public  sector  is  part  of  the  problem, 
shaped  by 
lack  of  continuous  professional 
development:  “Culture  is  something  that  is  cultivated.  It  develops  through 

training  and  a 

inadequate 

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education, from the training police officers receive to their ongoing professional 
development.” (Interview 9). 

The influence of leadership was another key theme, with stakeholders pointing 
out that the behavior and priorities of those in power set the tone for the entire 
system: 
“The example matters. What message is being sent from the top?” (Interview 6). 
On top of that, mid-level public sector managers have internalized some of these 
constraints  and  shy  away  from  undertaking  important  changes  in  their 
departments as they seem to lack adequate support from their directors:  “They 
will support you as long as nothing gets back to them. Then you are on your own” 
(Interview 11). 

Additionally, a perverse ‘esprit de corps’ leads civil servants to turn a blind eye to 
corruption,  incompetence  or  mismanagement  or  close  ranks  to  protect 
colleagues: “In Greece cases against doctors or hospital directors never reach 
the  courts  because  such  cases  are  never  won.”    (Interview  3). This  tendency, 
however,  is  also  related  to  an  apparent  reluctance  of  the  system  to  protect 
‘whistleblowers’: “(If someone says anything) they will likely find themselves in a 
mess” (Interview 1) 

The  second  level  has  to  do  with  a  culture  of  mistrust.  Mistrust  between  civil 
servants  and  the  government,  between  citizens  and  the  government,  and 
between  citizens  and  civil  servants.  Each  group  views  reforms  with  suspicion, 
often perceiving them as benefiting certain interests at the expense of others. As 
suggested  above,  this  is  obvious  when  talking  about  evaluations  of  the  civil 
servants:  “Who  ensures  that  evaluation  of  civil  servants  will  be  done  fairly? 
“(Interview 1). Citizens on the other hand, fear that changes could lead to higher 
taxes or disrupt services they value (such as the freedom to choose their own 
doctor as mentioned earlier). “When you hear the word reform, you think of cuts 
or you think that you are going to lose something” (Interview 5). These dynamics 
create significant resistance to change, as any proposed reforms are scrutinized 
for potential winners and losers rather than their overall benefits to society. 

The third level has to do with the expectations that citizens have from the system. 
For example, waiting times in the health sector might be long (and unpopular) but 
in  many  cases  scientifically  justifiable  and  in  any  event  not  beyond  global 
practises. However, “Waiting is also something that drives quality of services but 
we have not learned to wait. We are also used to the freedom to pick are own 
doctor  something  that  goes  against  international  practises”  (Interview  5). 
Similarly, citizens have internalised a thinking that some services are provided in 
exchange for something “It is has become an established culture that you need 
to give (i.e a bribe) otherwise you are not going to get (good) services” (Interview 
2). 

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Overall, there are some entrenched behaviours and attitudes such as resistance 
to  change,  deep  mistrust,  and  entrenched  public  expectations  that  reinforce 
inefficiencies and prevent needed reforms. 

Political Will 

Stakeholders also emphasized the lack of political will to address systemic issues 
in public services.  Stakeholders highlighted that even “Even a government that 
has the political will cannot really change it.” (Interview 2). A major reason for this 
reluctance  is  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  political  cost  of  reforms. As  one 
respondent put it, “It's simple—they can’t know the political cost in advance, so 
they  avoid  the  risk  altogether.”  (Interview 4). This is very relevant  to  what  was 
described  before  regarding  the  outdated  school  materials  (i.e  books)  where 
political  costs  might  make  ministers  reluctant  to  proceed  to  updating  them. 
Politicians  often  prioritize  electoral  considerations  over  long-term  institutional 
improvements, with one stakeholder emphasizing that probably the double role 
of minister and member of parliament can be problematic so ministers, “… must 
be free from the vote-seeking process every four years.” (Interview 5). 

Resistance from public sector employees also plays a significant role in stalling 
reforms as it constraints political efforts. One example cited was a politician who 
attempted  changes  but  was  ultimately  forced  out:  “The  party  took  him  down 
completely  because  he  saw  the  backlash  from  public  sector  employees.” 
(Interview  3).  This  is  especially  relevant  in  regions  like  Attica,  where  a  large 
portion of the electorate consists of public servants: “Those who determine the 
fate of each government in Greece are public employees, especially in Attica.” 
(Interview 3). 

Even in areas like law enforcement, where reforms might seem straightforward, 
institutional resistance is strong. “There may be political will in some governments 
to push for changes, but the police as an institution resist them, and it's not easy 
at all.” (Interview 9). Additionally, politicians may be reluctant to enforce certain 
measures that could be unpopular with key groups: “If a minister takes something 
away from the police, it comes with political consequences.” (Interview 9). 

Ultimately, stakeholders emphasized that without structural changes to insulate 
decision-makers  from  short-term  political  pressures,  deep  institutional  reforms 
remain difficult to achieve. 

2.2.6.  Discussion 

The  qualitative  analysis  of  stakeholder  interviews  reveals  several  recurring 
themes that help explain the persistent governance challenges in Attica’s public 

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services. Above all, resources constraints and outdated infrastructure emerged 
as the primary concerns of the respondents. Stakeholders noted that while Attica 
benefits from a concentration of modern infrastructure (e.g. in medical facilities), 
the  sheer  population  density  in  the  region  places  immense  pressure  on  these 
services, exacerbating overcrowding and resource shortages. 

Along  with  resources,  staff  shortages  aggravate  an  already  difficult  situation. 
These shortages are not only a matter of absolute numbers but also of a non-
rational allocation of the personnel. The legacy of austerity is evident in the cases 
of education and healthcare where hiring freezes have led to an aging workforce 
or  to  severe  shortages  in  personnel  far  below  European  standards.  However, 
even  in  services  where  staff  numbers are not  an  issue  (e.g  the police) human 
resource allocation is very inefficient.  

The structural problems are further compounded by well documented ailments of 
the Greek state and relate to issues of patronage and corruption. These mainly 
operate  at  two  levels.  First,  stakeholders  note  how  personal  networks  often 
determine  access  to  services.  Those  networks  are  mainly  based  on  political 
connections  or  related  to  socio  economic  status.  Second,  patronage  is  also 
evident in the recruitment and career development of civil servants undermining 
meritocracy  and  leading  to  other  externalities  such  as  the  resistance  of  public 
service to reform efforts.  

Another  key  theme  emerging  from  the  analysis  is  the  weakness  of  institutions 
that are tasked with monitoring and sanctioning misconduct. Media organizations 
are  captured  by  the  state  or  by  economic  interests  while  civil  society 
organizations have limited capacity to play the role of the watchdog. This limited 
reach  is  also  evident  in  the  case  of  independent  authorities  while  judicial 
inefficiencies further weaken governance and limit the ability of other agents to 
sound ‘fire-alarms’ or find refuge in courts. 

Culture also emerged as a factor behind the observed governance challenges. 
First,  a  deep-seated  mistrust  between  public  servants  and  the  government 
creates resistance to necessary reform as is evident from the reluctance of public 
servants to be subjected to performance evaluations, a measure that they see as 
punitive rather than constructive. At the same time, the ‘demand’ for reform from 
the side of the citizens is sometimes limited from fear of disrupting a convenient 
status quo despite the ineffectiveness that it displays. 

Overall,  the  analysis  underscores  the  complexity  of  Greece’s,  and  therefore 
Attica’s,  governance  challenges.  While  technical  solutions  such  as  increased 
funding  and  institutional  reforms  are  necessary,  addressing  these  issues  also 
requires  political  commitment  and  longer  time  horizons  for  both  citizens  and 
political elites. 

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2.2.7.  Conclusion 

The main question explored in this case study is what lays behind the widespread 
dissatisfaction with public services in the Attica region. A dissatisfaction that is 
markedly different from other regions in Greece but also from ‘peers’ in Europe. 
To address this question semi structured interviews with stakeholders from the 
public  service,  political  elites,  academics,  journalists  and  representatives  from 
civil society organizations were conducted. The findings highlight the complexity 
of  the  governance  challenges  that  the  region  faces.  These  are not in  any  way 
dissimilar to those that the state itself faces given first, the limited decentralization 
of services at the regional level and second, the population concentration in the 
area (almost 40% of the total population).  

The analysis of the interviews does not reveal any discrepancy between the views 
of  the  citizens  and  those  of  the  stakeholders.  While  some  suggested  that 
dissatisfaction  with  services  in  Greece  can  be  sometimes  ‘stereotypical’  all 
agreed that these services are severely lacking. A common denominator behind 
the  observed  deficiencies  is  the  lack  of  adequate  funding,  the  outdated 
infrastructure and the need for more, and better distributed personnel. Behind the 
observed reality lay complex governance challenges that relate to ailments of the 
public  sector,  such  as  patronage  and  the  influence  of  sectorial  interests, 
institutional  lapses  in  monitoring  and  sanctioning,  and  deep-rooted  cultural 
impediments as discussed above. These findings are in line with research that 
delves deep into governance and public administration in Greece (Sotiropoulos, 
2012).    

In some respects, Greece is a textbook example of the governance interventions 
that  are  necessary  in  order  to  restore  public  services  and  the  public’s  trust  in 
them.  Strengthening  accountability  enhancing 
institutions,  expanding 
meritocracy  in  the  public  sector,  and  making  significant  investments  in 
infrastructure and personnel are all important steps in the short and long term. 
However, those  will  require  significant  mobilization  from  the  political elites  and 
sustained political will if they are to be implemented.  

It is definitely no small feat, and stakeholders were not optimistic as regards the 
ability and the willingness of the actors involved to engage into such large-scale 
change.  However,  without  addressing  the  aforementioned  structural  and 
institutional barriers, citizen dissatisfaction is likely to persist, further eroding trust 
in the state and its capacity to deliver essential services effectively. 

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Appendix- Attica 

Table A1. Participants in the semi structured interviews 
Code 
Interview 1 
Interview 2 
Interview 3 
Interview 4 
Interview 5 
Interview 6 
Interview 7 
Interview 8 
Interview 9 
Interview 10 
Interview 11 

Role 
Public servant 
Public servant 
Journalist 
Journalist 
Academic 
Politician 
Former political appointee 
Academic 
Civil society organisation 
Former public servant  
Public servant 

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3.  Sub-national QoG in two eastern EU regions: 

Bratislava and Prague 

3.1.  Bratislava and Prague Self-Governing Regions 

3.1.1.  Main findings 

This chapter examins the two capital regions of Prague and the Bratislava self-
governing  region  (Bratislavský  kraj)—which  performed  best  and  worst  in  their 
countries in the 2024 European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 13.  

The  case  study  aims  to  understand  the  factors  behind  the  strong  and  weak 
performances of the Czech and Slovak capitals compared to other regions within 
their  countries.  Additionally,  it  seeked  to  explain  Bratislavský  kraj’s  poor 
performance relative to the Prague region. This analysis was achieved through 
20 expert interviews, triangulated with other data sources.  

The  quality  of  governance  in  both  capitals—examined  through  the  lenses  of 
corruption, transparency, and impartiality—is shaped by multiple interconnected 
factors,  including  national  politics,  politicisation,  organisational  culture,  and  the 
media landscape.  

Our findings  suggest that  national politics  significantly  influence  perceptions  of 
governance in Bratislavský kraj. While Bratislava’s citizens, who tend to support 
liberal parties,  are generally  satisfied  with  their  regional and  city  governments, 
they remain dissatisfied with the politicisation stemming from the national level. 
This contrast was less pronounced in Prague. Further, in Slovakia, politicisation 
has  been  particularly  evident  since  the  2023  elections,  when  Robert  Fico’s 
government  introduced  significant  changes  in  public  administration.  Both 
countries  share  a  “zero-error  tolerance”  administrative  culture,  which  reduces 
efficiency and undermines the prestige of public service. 

Additionally,  Prague  and  Bratislavský  kraj  operate  within  highly  regulated  but 
underfunded systems constrained by rigid salary scales. Our data indicate that 
public sector salaries in Bratislavský kraj are particularly inadequate compared to 
living costs, exacerbating governance challenges.  

Finally, Prague benefits from stronger media scrutiny, while media in Bratislava 
primarily focuses  on national issues,  limiting  coverage  of  regional governance. 
Press  freedom  is  also  higher  in  Czechia  than  Slovakia,  where  recent  political 
developments have raised concerns. 

13 We would like to acknowledge and thank Simona Strejčková and Martina Kunová for their 

assistance with transcription and the recruitment process. 

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3.1.2.  Introduction 

The 2024 European Quality of Government Index (EQI) revealed an interesting 
divide between some capital regions (Charron, Lapuente, and Bauhr 2024). On 
the one hand, we have capitals that perform the best in their countries, such as 
Prague, Madrid, Vilnius, or Ljubljana. Then, some capitals score in the middle. 
On  the  other  hand,  capital  regions  rank  the  worst  in  their  countries,  such  as 
Vienna, Amsterdam, Brussels, Berlin, Athens, Zagreb, Bucharest-Ilfov, and the 
Bratislava  self-governing  region  (Bratislavský  kraj).  To  explain  the  capital 
variance, we focus on two capital regions from a similar macro-region, one which 
performs  the  best  (Prague  self-governing  region)  and  the  worst  (Bratislavský 
kraj), see Figure 1. In 2024, the Prague region also performed better in the eyes 
of the public than in 2021, and only one is above the EU average. In contrast, the 
Bratislavský kraj performed worse in 2024 than in 2021, see Figure 1.  

Figure 1: Progress in EQI scores in Slovakian and Czech regions: 2021-2024 

The  other  sources  indeed  confirm  the  good  position  of  the  Prague  region 
compared to other regions in the Czech Republic (Czechia). The project “A Place 
for Life,” run by the NGO Communa, uses over sixty criteria to rank the quality of 
life  in  Czech  regions  (Communa  2024).  These  criteria  include  crime  rates, 
kilometres of railway per area, the number of protected areas, sports clubs, and 
kindergarten  capacities.  Additionally,  Communa  surveys  residents’  satisfaction 
with their region’s functioning. In 2024, Prague achieved the highest satisfaction 
levels 
infrastructure 
development,  including  internet  accessibility  and  the  highest  number  of 
completed  housing  units  (Communa  2024).  In  the  Slovak  Republic  (Slovakia), 
there  is  limited  knowledge  about  the  satisfaction  with  living  in  regions.  This 
research addresses this gap. 

in  education,  healthcare,  civic  engagement,  and 

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Furthermore, this study aims to explain the poor and best performances of the 
Czech and Slovak capitals compared to other regions in the respective countries. 
Second,  it  aims  to  explain  the  poor  performance  of  Bratislavský  kraj  in 
comparison  with  the  Prague  region.  The  comparison  between  Czechia  and 
Slovakia is valuable, as both countries share historical and cultural similarities, 
having  formed  a  common  state  until  1993.  To  achieve  this,  we  conduct  elite 
interviews with experts on public administration, transparency, and the quality of 
healthcare and education sectors in the capital regions of Czechia and Slovakia. 
The  other  available  sources,  such  as  public  opinion,  rankings,  and  external 
analysis and research, triangulate the interviews. 

The  case  study  is  structured  as  follows.  First,  we  introduce  the  basic 
characteristics of the regions, followed by a description of the political situation in 
Prague and Bratislavský kraj. Next, we outline the methodology and the selection 
of experts. The analytical section is divided into two main parts: descriptive and 
explanatory.  The  descriptive  part  sets  the  stage  by  discussing  transparency, 
corruption, and impartiality in general, plus the quality and transparency of public 
education and healthcare. The explanatory part consists of sections devoted to 
the  role  of  national  politics,  politicisation  at  the  regional  and  local  levels, 
organisational structure, and the role of regional media. The chapter concludes 
with  a  summary  of  the  findings  and  policy  recommendations.  For  clarity  and 
where  possible,  sections  begin  with  a  brief  introduction,  followed  by  two  parts 
addressing Prague and Bratislavský kraj separately. 

3.1.3.  Carachteristics of the Prague and Bratislava Regions 

Both  capital  regions  are  the  wealthiest  NUTS  2  regions  in  their  country.  The 
disparity  between  Prague  and  other  regions  is  significant;  in  2022,  Prague’s 
regional  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  per  inhabitant  was  €73,400,  while  the 
second  wealthiest  region  had  only  €29,300  per  inhabitant  (Eurostat  2024). 
Bratislavský  kraj’s  GDP  per  inhabitant  was  €51,900  in  2022.  The  other  three 
NUTS  2  regions  had  GDPs  ranging  from  €18,400  to  €23,100  per  inhabitant 
(Eurostat 2024). The amount of money received from the country or EU sources 
is  proportionally  smaller  than  that  of  other  regions  in  Czechia  and  Slovakia. 
Bratislavský kraj and Prague are the only regions that fall under the category of 
more  developed  regions  with  GDP  per  inhabitant  above  100%  of  the  EU-27 
average.  It  is  much  harder  for  these  regions  to  access  EU  funds  than  other 
regions in Czechia or Slovakia.  

The economic affluence of Prague and Bratislavský kraj likely influences both the 
perception and quality of governance compared to other regions in Czechia and 
Slovakia. Wealthier regions tend to have better-funded public services, greater 
administrative capacity, and a more educated population with higher expectations 
of  governance.  This  may  result  in  actual  improvements  in  the  quality  of 
healthcare, education, and law enforcement and more critical citizen perceptions 

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due  to  higher  standards.  However,  economic  affluence  alone  does  not  fully 
explain  the  differences  between  the  two  regions,  as  both  are  among  the 
wealthiest in their respective countries. Therefore, the next sections describe the 
current situation in terms of transparency, corruption, impartiality, and quality of 
public education and healthcare. 

3.1.3.1.  Prague 

Regions  in  Czechia  are  higher  territorial  self-governing  units,  functioning  as 
communities of citizens with the right to self-governance. Established in 2000 by 
a Constitutional Act, they gained their authority through the Act no. 129/2000 Coll. 
on  Regions.  The  country  is  divided  into  14  regions,  corresponding  to  NUTS  3 
regions, with Prague uniquely serving as both a region and a municipality under 
the Prague Capital City Act. Regional council elections are held every four years, 
leading to the election of a regional council and governor. The county authority 
manages regional administration. In Prague, local authorities carry municipal and 
regional responsibilities; the mayor also serves as the region’s governor. Local 
elections  replace  regional  elections  in  Prague.  The  Czech  regions  establish 
secondary  schools,  hospitals,  and  social  facilities  such  as  institutions  for  the 
elderly. It is responsible for the construction and repair of II. and III. classes roads, 
the integrated rescue system, and declares nature parks, reserves, or historical 
monuments.  Regions and municipalities  derive  their  revenues from  a  statutory 
share of joint taxes, known as the budgetary allocation of taxes. They also have 
the  autonomy  to  independently  manage  their  assets  and  finances  (Janas  and 
Jánošková  2022).  Moreover,  the  regional  council  can  propose  laws  to  the 
Chamber of Deputies and lodge complaints with the Constitutional Court.  

Regional authorities in Czechia also carry out delegated state administration. This 
involves  the  state  transferring  certain  responsibilities  and  competencies  to  the 
regional level. However, the state does not fully fund these activities, providing 
only partial financial  support for state  administration  costs  at  the  regional level 
(Janas and Jánošková 2022). As Prague is a relatively rich region, access to EU 
funds is limited. For example, in the 2014-2020 programming period, Prague had 
the  lowest  level  of  absorption  in  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds 
(ESIF) co-financed projects (Páleníková and Staníčková 2023).  

With EU accession, Czechia needed to establish a new level of territorial division 
aligned with the NUTS 2 classification, which directs EU development funds. The 
country’s  14  regions  were  combined  into  eight  cohesion  regions  to  meet  this 
requirement.  Within  these  8  NUTS  2  regions,  Prague  forms  a  single  cohesion 
area. Prague  is, therefore,  both  a  city  and  a region,  as  well as  a  NUTS  3  and 
NUTS  2  area. Prague  is geographically the smallest  region  in  Czechia but  the 
second most populated, with almost 1.4 million inhabitants in 2024 (ČSO, n.d.). 

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3.1.3.2.  Bratislava 

The  National  Council  of  the  Slovak  Republic,  in  §  1  (3)  of  Act  No.  302/2001, 
decided to establish eight self-governing regions corresponding to NUTS 3 areas. 
Like Czechia, Slovak regions administer and maintain roads of II. and III. classes, 
transport, and manage secondary education, social facilities, health care, cultural 
infrastructure, and tourism. Compared to Czechia, Bratislava as capital does not 
establish  the  region  itself.  Bratislavský  kraj  comprises  eight  districts  and  73 
municipalities, including Bratislava as the capital and six cities. The governors of 
each region are elected directly by a relative majority system every four years. 
Bratislavský kraj is the smallest region in Slovakia but the most populated, with 
over 700 thousand inhabitants in 2023 (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
2024). Slovakia is composed of four NUTS 2 regions. However, the Bratislavský 
kraj is the only region that forms a single cohesion area. Self-governing regions 
in  Slovakia  have  long  highlighted  the  shortcomings  of  the  current  regional 
financing system. In contrast to Czechia, Slovak’s regions rely solely on personal 
income  tax  revenue  as  a  single  funding  source,  making  financial  planning  for 
regions highly unpredictable (Janas and Jánošková 2022). Moreover, according 
to the Report on the evaluation of the implementation of the Economic and Social 
Development  Programme  published  by  the  Bratislava  region,  “The  Bratislava 
region faces specific problems compared to other regions, as it is the region with 
the fastest growing population in Slovakia, with a high proportion of undeclared 
permanent  residents  and  a  high  density  of  built-up  area.  This  puts  extreme 
pressure on the territory not only in terms of quality of life but also in terms of the 
development of towns and villages” (Bratislavský kraj 2024). 

In Slovakia, state-delegated power is managed through district offices, unlike in 
Czechia. A law from 2013 established these offices as subordinate entities of the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  without  their  legal  personality  (Prachárová  and  Kačur 
2018). Under this arrangement, district offices lack direct authority over personnel 
and  financial  decisions  within  their  jurisdiction.  Each  office  is  led  by  a  head 
appointed and dismissed by the government based on the recommendation of 
the Minister of the Interior. Consequently, these positions are highly vulnerable 
to political influence, as illustrated in the analytical section.  

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3.1.4.  Political Situation 

Bratislava and Prague are very often a place of civic protests against democratic 
backsliding  (Vachudova,  Dolenec,  and  Fagan  2024)  or  the  place  of  (un)civic 
movements against particular policies, such as the protests against the COVID-
19 pandemic restrictions (Skrzypek 2023).  In both capital regions, the city/region 
is run by democratic and liberal parties or candidates. Compared to Prague, the 
political orientation of Bratislavský kraj residents thus contrasts with the national 
government, led by populist leaders. 

3.1.4.1.  Prague 

After the last local elections in 2022, Prague is run by a coalition that mirrors the 
national government, ranging from the conservative right-wing party of the Civic 
Party (ODS) to the center-liberal party of Pirates. The opposition comprises ANO, 
a technocratic and populist party (Havlík 2019); Freedom and Direct Democracy 
(SPD),  a  far-right  party;  and  Prague  Together,  a  local  liberal  movement  of 
independent candidates.  

Prague has the highest voter turnout, opportunities to engage in social activities, 
the  highest  number  of  foreigners  per  population,  and  the  highest  number  of 
immigrants  (Communa  2024).  Several  protest  movements  against  the  current 
Czech government have been held in Prague since 2022. Still, none of them has 
been equal to the demonstrations in 2019 against the then-populist government 
led  by  Andrej  Babiš,  who  was  accused  of  a  conflict  of  interest.  The 
demonstrations organised by the association A Million Moments for Democracy 
attracted up to 300,000 people (iRozhlas 2019).  

3.1.4.2. 

 Bratislava 

In 2022, the local elections and elections into self-governing regions took place 
simultaneously. In Bratislavský kraj, the liberal candidate supported by the centre-
right party Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), the centre-liberal party of Progressive 
Slovakia,  and  the  local  movement  of  Team  Bratislava  achieved  63.6%.  The 
second,  only  with  13.42%,  was  the  candidate  of  the  Nationalist  coalition 
composed  of  Direction  (Smer), a  populist  party,  and  the Slovak  National Party 
(SNS), a far-right party. The results of the local election for Bratislava as a city 
ended  up  in  a  similar  vein.  The  winning  candidate  achieved  60.20%  and  was 

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supported by Progressive Slovakia and Together (Spolu), a centre-right party and 
local movement of Team Bratislava. The second, with 27.72%, was the candidate 
supported by We Are Family (SOS), a conservative-populist party, the Christian 
Democratic Movement (KDH), and other small parties. The third, only 4.31%, was 
the  candidate  supported  by  the  National  Coalition/Independent  Candidates,  a 
conservative nationalist movement. Although Direction (Smer), SNS, and Voice 
(Hlas)  candidates  performed  poorly  in  the  local  and  regional  elections  in 
Bratislava,  they  received  a  majority  of  votes  in  the  national  election  and  have 
formed a government since the autumn of 2023.  

In  contrast  to  Czechia,  since  Robert  Fico’s  re-election  as  prime  minister  in 
October 2023, regular protests have been held in Bratislava (and partly in other 
larger cities like Košice), criticising the government’s actions on issues related to 
corruption, the judiciary, changes in the police force, and media freedom (Denník 
N,  n.d.).  Unlike  the  (mainly  civic)  demonstrations  in  early  2018  following  the 
murder of journalist Jan Kuciak and his partner Martina Kušnírová, which led to 
the resignation of then-Prime Minister Robert Fico, the current protests are being 
held  with  the  help  of  opposition  democratic  parties.  The  escalating  political 
situation  in  Slovakia  may,  therefore,  negatively  affect  the  results  of  the 
governance in the Bratislava region, as the EQI survey was conducted at the time 
of the formation of the new populist and far-right government, as will be further 
explained.  

3.1.5.  Methodology 

We conducted semi-structured interviews with experts from diverse fields to gain 
deeper  insights  into  the  different  dimensions  of  government  quality.  The 
interviewees  came  from  a  range  of  sectors,  including:  (1)  civil  servants  (both 
regional and national administration); (2) journalists; (3) NGOs and think tanks 
(e.g.,  Transparency  International,  Reconstruction  of  the  State);  and  (4) 
researchers; see Table 1 

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Table 1: Research participants in the Bratislava and Prague self-governing region 

Code 

Region 

Occupation and expertise 

Interview 1 
Interview 2 
Interview 3 
Interview 4 
Interview 5 
Interview 6 

Bratislava 
Prague 
Prague 
Bratislava 
Bratislava 
Prague 

Interview 7 

Prague 

Interview 8 

Prague 

Interview 12  Bratislava 
Interview 13  Bratislava 
Interview 14  Prague 
Interview 15  Both 
Interview 16  Prague 
Interview 17  Bratislava 
Interview 18  Prague 
Interview 19  Bratislava 
Interview 20  Bratislava 

Analyst, Ministry of Interior 
NGO (public administration) 
Journalist 
Journalist 
NGO (public administration) 
Political 
municipality 
Former  local  politician  working  in  an 
NGO (public administration) 
Researcher  (work  experience  in  the 
NGO and public sector) 
Analyst, Ministry of Interior 

advisor, 

Prague 

city 

Regional 

of 

Analyst,  Ministry 
Development 
Lawyer (public administration) 
Expert on education  
Expert on education 
Expert on gender policies 
Researcher (healthcare policy) 
Researcher (public administration) 
Researcher (public administration) 
Expert on healthcare policy 
Lawyer (expert on gender policies) 

Gend
er 
F 
F 
M 
F 
M 

M 

F 

M 

M 
F 

F 

M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
M 
F 
F 

Bratislava 

Interview 9 
Interview 10  Bratislava  Municipal officer  
Interview 11  Prague 

Participants  were  selected  based  on  their  professional  expertise,  insights,  and 
knowledge in areas relevant to the report. They were identified through searches 
on relevant NGO websites, within the government sector, and among journalists. 
Each  participant  was  contacted  with  a  request  for  a  research  interview  on 
government  quality  in  a  specific  region.  Participants  sometimes  recommended 
others from different fields who could contribute to the research sample. These 
expert  interviews  explained  the  region’s  specific  circumstances  or  shared 
personal  experiences  within  their  sector,  offering  deeper  insights  into  regional 
governance, transparency, effectiveness, and public perception. The interviews 
were  audio-recorded  and  transcribed  for  analysis.  On  average,  each  session 
lasted  about  60  minutes.  To  maintain  anonymity,  codes  were  assigned  to 
participants,  and  their  professions  and  employers  were  described  in  general 
terms. 

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The  interviews  were  structured  around  key  themes  derived  from  the  EQI 
questionnaire.  However,  after  conducting  several  interviews  (13),  responses 
began  to  overlap.  To  address  this,  we  introduced  more  open-ended  questions 
and,  where  appropriate,  more  detailed  questions  tailored  to  respondents’ 
expertise and profession. First, respondents were shown a graph depicting the 
results  for  their  country  (with  separate  results  for  Czechia  and  Slovakia)  and 
asked for their opinions on the presented data. They were then asked for their 
views on the main reasons behind their region’s relative standing compared to 
other regions. Next, we explored the political situation in the region and how it 
influences perceptions of government quality. Specifically, we inquired about how 
regional  funding  and  the  region’s  economic  position  affect  government  quality 
and, where possible, asked respondents to compare this with other regions in the 
country. Subsequent sections of the interviews focused on the quality of public 
education,  healthcare,  and  law  enforcement  in  the  region  and  the  impact  of 
corruption  on  government  quality.  Additionally,  we  explored  the  role  of  media, 
particularly local media, along with civic engagement and civil society’s influence 
on transparency and efficiency. When participants had expertise in a specific field 
(e.g.,  education,  healthcare),  we  delved  deeper  into  those  topics  to  gain  more 
detailed  insights.  With  specialists  on  specific  themes  (such  as  education  and 
healthcare), we covered mainly these topics and did not inquire much about the 
others to follow and respect their expertise. We also asked how the expectations 
and  perceptions  of  government  quality  might  differ  between  people  living  in 
Prague and Bratislavský kraj compared to those in other regions, exploring socio-
cultural differences across regions. Finally, participants were asked to reflect on 
changes over the past 5-10 years and share their visions for the region’s future 
to understand perceived trends and the direction of its development. 

3.1.6.  Descriptive Analysis 

In  this  analytical  section,  we  first  describe  transparency,  corruption,  and 
impartiality  in  depth  using  experts’  views.  We  also  assess  the  quality  and 
corruption in public education and healthcare policy. As the academic literature 
reveals, corruption generally changes the structure of public spending, shifting it 
to less important areas of the public sector. In the case of Slovakia, corruption 
harms public health and education spending (Liptáková 2020). Indeed, EQI data 
from 2024 indicates that public education and healthcare in Bratislavský kraj are 
perceived as lower in quality than the national average, while the police force14 is 

14 To the question, “How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?” the 

average rating for Bratislavský kraj is 6.13, while the national average for Slovakia is 6.06 in 
the EQI 2024 survey data. The perception was measured on a scale of 1-10. “1” means 
extremely poor quality, and “10” is extremely high quality. 

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seen  as  better  in  Bratislava  than  in  the  rest  of  Slovakia.  In  contrast,  Prague 
outperforms in all three policy areas. Since police force quality is not a decisive 
factor  in  the  EQI  index  and  does  not  explain  Bratislava’s  weaker  performance 
relative to other regions, we focus exclusively on education and healthcare.  

3.1.7.  Transparency, Corruption and Impartiality  

In both regions, transparency has improved in recent years, but there is still room 
for  progress.  Both  regions  operate  within  a  highly  regulated  administrative 
system, where it is not always clear who holds responsibility. While information 
is made accessible to the public, it is often only available formally, which means 
it  is difficult  for the public  to  find  it.  Since  the  administrative  apparatus  of  local 
government  is  generally  underfunded,  it  undermines  the  effectiveness  of 
governance, raises questions about its capability, and may create an environment 
conducive to unethical practices (Interviews 6, 7). 

3.1.7.1.  Prague 

The NGO Oživení (2023) has published a transparency ranking for Czech regions 
and cities. However, they included Prague at the city level, not regions. Prague 
performs  third  best  in  the  openness  of  local  government;  it  received  the  best 
ranking in whistleblowing together with the other three Czech cities. In terms of 
openness to public procurement, Prague has its shortcomings and is around the 
Czech average. A project completed in 2019, which mapped corruption risks in 
regions, revealed that representatives of self-governments identified subsidies, 
construction, and, more broadly, EU funds as the most problematic areas. The 
perceived risk in these areas increased with the size of the municipality. Regions 
such as Moravian-Silesian, Zlín, Plzeň, and Central Bohemia assigned relatively 
low-risk values to these issues. However, the capital city, Prague, performed the 
worst among self-government bodies in the evaluation by officials (Stehnová and 
Lenochová 2019). According to an expert (Interview 8), “the relatively small share 
of  so-called  petty  corruption—corruption  involving  public  officials—is  notable 
compared  to  the  far  greater  risk  of  large-scale  corruption  linked  to  business, 
public  contracts,  and big  projects.” Another respondent  (Interview 6) adds  that 
the most corruption-prone areas today are those with high complexity, such as 
urban planning or municipal companies. “In practice, these companies represent 
another  category  of  public  funds,  which,  although  not  part  of  the  city  budget, 
remain public assets. However, inadequate legislation makes it extremely difficult 
to  implement  effective  control  or  anti-corruption  mechanisms  within  these 
companies” (Interview 6). 

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As an expert on EU funding (Interview 11) argues, with the change in EU funding 
in  2014  and  the  shift  of  subsidy  management  to  Prague,  there  has  been  an 
increase in oversight and a reduction in opportunities for corruption in the area of 
EU  funds.  Furthermore,  in  Prague,  we  can  observe  the  rapid  development  of 
transparency and prevention tools, such as a basic database of resolutions and 
supporting documents, discussions within the city council or its bodies, and the 
involvement of independent entities in major procurement processes (Interviews 
6, 8, 11, 18). This progress is also evident when compared with other regions and 
is linked to Prague’s past corruption scandals: “Prague has always faced slightly 
bigger  challenges  because  the  first  major  corruption  scandals  emerged  here 
around  the  turn  of  the  millennium.  These  issues  were  so  significant  that  they 
created a strong public demand for greater transparency. Prague was also one 
of  the  first  regions  in  Czechia  to  actively  address  corruption  by  formalising  an 
anti-corruption  policy”  (Interview  6).  Despite  these  developments,  some  argue 
that  the  level  of  transparency  remains  insufficient  in  terms  of  access  to 
information, as noted by a former local politician (Interview 7): “Then there are, I 
would say, undignified failures. For example, (…) if I told you to find out within 
half an hour who is responsible for what on the city council, and where to find 
them and in which office, I would bet that you wouldn’t be able to do it within that 
half hour. You might not even manage it by the next day. And to me, that seems 
completely absurd. (…) the fact that the city doesn’t have a system in place for 
citizens  to  easily  connect  with  their  council  members—without  overwhelming 
them—is strange.”  

the 

local  government 

Direct impartiality from civil servants was not explicitly present in the interviews 
from Prague; instead, experts primarily focused on issues of “grand corruption.” 
However,  a  degree  of  impartiality  emerged  when  analysed  through  a  gender 
perspective.  Specifically,  we  asked gender policy  experts whether Prague  and 
Bratislavský kraj have policies to counter gender bias in public administration and 
ensure  gender  accessibility.  Our  findings  indicate  that  gender  equality  is  not 
systematically  embedded  at 
level.  Regions  and 
municipalities are primarily incentivised to promote gender equality through the 
annual competition “Office on the Path to Equality,” organised by the Ministry of 
the Interior, which Prague won in both 2022 and 2023. An expert (Interview 15) 
confirmed  Prague’s  leadership  in  institutional  gender  policies,  citing  measures 
such as a gender equality plan, work-life balance mechanisms, and harassment 
prevention systems. However, progress in gender policies targeting the public—
known as “gender mainstreaming”—remains slow. The expert noted that across 
Czech cities, towns, and regions, gender mainstreaming is often limited to social 
issues, such as support for mothers or single mothers. At the same time, aspects 
like gender accessibility in public transport, infrastructure, and urban planning are 
largely  overlooked.  In  sum,  while  gender  policies  within  public  institutions  are 
remain 
slowly  advancing, 

those  addressing  broader  societal  needs 

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underdeveloped.  As  a  consequence,  it  means  that  structural  conditions  make 
women disadvantaged when hiring people.  

3.1.7.2.  Bratislava 

Slovak Transparency International (STI) publishes data (STI, n.d.-a) highlighting 
the extent of corruption in Slovakia on a national level as perceived by the public 
across  several  sectors,  including  healthcare,  courts  and  prosecution,  police, 
ministries,  education,  district  and  regional  offices, 
local 
government,  banks,  and  others.  The  top  three  areas  where  people  believe 
corruption exists are the healthcare system (96%), courts and prosecution (90%), 
and the police (89%) in 2024 (STI, n.d.-a). Local governments rank in the middle 
at  around  74%,  while  banks  have  the  lowest  perceived  corruption,  at 
approximately 58%. Generally, the willingness to blow the whistle on corruption 
indicates that around 40% would report it, while about 50% would prefer not to. 
However,  this  willingness  has  been  increasing  in  recent  years,  and  the 
experience of giving bribes has been steadily decreasing (STI, n.d.-a).  

local  councils, 

STI  also  regularly  publishes  a  ranking  of  transparency  among  Slovak  regions 
(STI, n.d.-b). In this ranking, the Bratislavský kraj falls below the Slovak average, 
performing worst in Sales and Rental of Property, Personnel Policy, particularly 
in regard to information about selection procedures, and Public Participation in 
Decision-making (STI, n.d.-b). However, as explored in one of our interviews, the 
ranking rather mirrors the priority of the regions. For some regions, such as the 
Trenčín  region,  ranking  was  a  priority,  and  they  tried  to  deliver  as  much 
information as they could to rank better. For the Bratislavský kraj, the ranking was 
not such a priority: “So, the Bratislava region apparently did not consider this a 
major priority and did nothing specific compared to, say, some other regions that 
deliberately  worked 
(Interview  5).  The 
transparency  ranking  is  thus  not  a  sufficient  source  to  explain  the  differences 
among NUTS 2 regions. 

towards  greater 

transparency” 

On the other hand, according to the municipal officer (Interview 10), Bratislavský 
kraj scores better in transparency than other Slovakian regions in terms of access 
to information: “I think the Bratislava region is certainly doing better in terms of 
transparency. Since I live in central Slovakia, I have some insight into the situation 
there. When I recall some of the more well-known cases, scandals, or incidents, 
I  remember  that  in  Eastern  Slovakia,  there  were  also  instances  where  some 
council  members  opposed  recording  or  documenting  council  meetings.  Or 
situations where certain documents, which were legally required to be published 
on time, were not. But in the Bratislava region, I think this is handled better. Of 
course, there are situations where someone might try to circumvent the rules, but 
it is no longer as easy to do so.” 

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In  terms  of  accountability  and  access  to  information,  a  journalist  from  Prague 
(Interview 3) compares the situation in Prague to that in Bratislava, arguing that 
“The politicians we elect to represent certain interests, whether good or bad, are 
often  unable  to  deliver  results.  It  is  frequently  compared  to  Bratislava,  for 
example, where governance in Slovakia has undergone some improvements in 
effectiveness with Matúš Vallo [Mayor of Bratislava]. However, while information 
may  technically  comply  with  the  law  (Act  No.  106/1999  Coll.)  on  information 
accessibility (e.g., being published on a website), in practice, it might be difficult 
to find them. “Basically, the information law specifies certain types of information 
that  must  be  made  publicly  available.  These  are  typically  found  on  the 
municipalities’  websites.  However,  citizens  sometimes  inquire  about  them 
because they are unaware of where to look. In such cases, we can simply redirect 
them and provide access by sharing a link“ (Interview 10).  

In Slovakia, discussions on impartiality in relation to gender issues were framed 
from  the  national  politics  level,  where  the  government  elites  “are  openly 
misogynistic and are not ashamed of it, nor do they hide it.  They don’t understand 
why  they  should  care  and  deal  with  something  like  gender  policies”  (Interview 
20). This, however, is not new; the previous government was even described as 
“consciously politically  anti-gender in  its  orientation” by the  expert.  At  the  local 
level,  “the  city  of  Bratislava, as  the  capital, or the  Bratislavský  kraj region,  has 
essentially  been  in  the  hands of  liberal political parties  for a  long  time.  …  And 
there, certain issues are being addressed. For example, at the level of the capital 
city, measures are implemented that can be perceived positively from a gender 
perspective” (Interview 20). As confirmed by another expert (Interview 15), the 
Bratislava City Council has a plan to eliminate the gender pay gap, although it is 
not a priority due to the tensions this topic creates in Slovakia. 

However, major issues regarding impartiality and transparency of hiring practices 
were depicted in the interviews. Generally, the transparency of hiring practices in 
public  institutions  varies  significantly  by  region.  While  some  areas,  such  as 
Bratislava,  have  made  progress  in  conducting  open  selection  processes,  the 
overall trend seems to be regressing. Many institutions are cancelling selection 
procedures,  leading  to  more  politically  motivated  appointments  and  nepotism. 
The  expert  (Interview  12)  talks  about  the  experience  of  setting  up  the  proper 
procedures for a tender, which has been improving in recent years, “Just about 
two weeks ago, I was looking at a selection process that Bratislava conducted for 
its municipal company responsible for waste management. It seems that at least 
some  public  institutions  have  already  established  proper  procedures  for  these 
processes—they now know how to approach them and what kind of information 
to gather. These selection processes are often publicly broadcasted, and people 
have the opportunity to ask candidates questions.” However, the expert further 
argues that with the change in the government, the transparency in the tender 
has  worsened.  “There  is  a  regression  happening—instead  of  strengthening 

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selection  processes,  they  are  being  cancelled.  It  wasn’t  ideal  even  under  the 
previous government; for example, district office heads, who are part of the state 
administration,  were  also  appointed  based  on  political  affiliations  rather  than 
through  selection processes.  The  previous  government  tried  to  professionalise 
the state administration, but selection processes were still not conducted. So, it 
cannot  be  said  that  the  situation  was  ideal  before,  but  at  least  the  trend  was 
moving  toward  greater  transparency  and  open  selection  processes”  (Interview 
12).  The  expert  (Interview  12)  continues:  “It  is  often  evident  from  the  fact  that 
selection  processes  are  won  by  individuals  who  have  already  held  certain 
positions and have  connections  there.“  The other expert  (Interview 10) agrees 
and  compares  the  impartiality  and  transparency  in  Bratislavský  kraj  with  other 
regions  in  Slovakia  by  saying:  “For  example,  regarding  the  issue  of  hiring 
practices and nepotism, I think the rest of Slovakia is probably in an even worse 
situation. I’m from the Banská Bystrica region, and even here, it varies a lot. When 
Marián Kotleba15 was the regional governor of Banská Bystrica, everyone knew 
about it. The region was not receiving EU funds because he had essentially hired 
his entire family at the regional office. So, in that case, it wasn’t just speculation 
or media  reports—it  was  a  confirmed fact.”  In  this vein,  the  experts  agree that 
historically, even previous governments did not handle this perfectly. However, 
at  least  there  was  an  effort  to  move  toward  more  transparency  and 
professionalism. Now, that progress is being reversed. Overall, while there are 
attempts to maintain  transparency  in  certain institutions,  political influence and 
personal connections still play a major role in public-sector hiring, which will be 
further developed in the explanatory section. The shift away from open selection 
processes threatens accountability and fairness, making it easier for corruption 
and cronyism to persist. 

3.1.8.  Quality and Transparency in Public Education 

According to EQI data from 2024, the quality of public education in the Prague 
region (6.89) is almost identical to the Czech national average (6.88). Conversely, 
in  the  Bratislavský  kraj,  the  quality  score  for  public  education  (6.03)  is  slightly 
below the Slovak average (6.11), see Figure 1. As this section argues, Prague 
hosts  the  best  educational  institutions.  However,  it  faces  challenges  such  as 
limited  availability  of  school  places  and  unqualified  teaching  staff,  as  will  be 
elaborated below. These issues may explain why public education in Prague is 
not perceived as significantly better than in other regions despite its strengths. In 

15 Marián Kotleba is a far-right politician known for his nationalist, anti-EU, and anti-immigrant 
views. He led the extremist ĽSNS (People’s Party Our Slovakia) and served as the 
governor of the Banská Bystrica region (2013–2017). His party has been criticised for its 
neo-fascist tendencies, and he was convicted in 2020 for propagating a movement whose 
aim is the repression of human rights and freedoms. 

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contrast, data and interviews from Bratislava do not support the perception that 
its  public  education  is  worse  than  that  of  other  Slovak  regions.  Although 
Bratislava struggles with high demand for school places, it benefits from certain 
privileges and  greater transparency.  Residents  of  Bratislavský  kraj may  simply 
be more critical and demanding, often comparing the quality of local education to 
that in Czechia, where many Slovak students choose to study. 

Note: Measured on the scale 1-10. “1” means extremely poor quality, and “10” is 
extremely high quality. 

3.1.8.1.  Prague 

According  to  the  analysis  measuring  the  quality  of  life  in  Czech  regions 
(Communa  2024),  Prague  has  the  highest  attractiveness  of  universities,  the 
highest  success  rate  in  state  matriculation,  the  highest  number  of  grammar 
schools  per  100,000  inhabitants,  and  the  highest  proportion  of  students  in 
grammar  schools  in  the  age  group  10-19  (PAQ  Research,  n.d.-a).  In  Prague, 
there  is  also  a  very  low  rate  of  educational  failure  in  primary  schools,  which 
includes  factors  such  as  absenteeism,  underachievement,  and  not  completing 
primary education (PAQ Research, n.d.-b). According to the expert on education, 
“educational  success  is  most  significantly  influenced  by  the  socio-economic 
status of the student and their family. […] This means that the northwest regions, 

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specifically Ústí nad Labem and Karlovy Vary, traditionally face challenges with 
completing primary schools.  In contrast, Prague stands out as the strongest in 
this regard” (Interview 14).  

The Czech education system struggles with the segregation of Roma children, 
especially  those  living  in  poverty  and  social  exclusion,  most  often  in  Ústí  nad 
Labem  and  Karlovy  Vary  regions  and  areas  of  the  Moravian-Silesian  region 
(Gargulák  et  al.  2023).  Prague  is  not  an  exception:  “As  far  as  segregation  is 
concerned,  there  is  a  school  in  Holešovice  [a  district  in  Prague]  that  is 
predominantly  attended  by  Roma  people,  even  though  those  Roma  people  do 
not live next door to the school, and that is how it works at a few other schools in 
Prague” (Interview 14). Further, according to the expert (Interview 14), Prague 
struggles  with  unqualified  teaching,  with  16%  of  lessons  taught  by  unqualified 
teachers.  This  issue  is  driven  by  inadequate  teacher  salaries,  which  fail  to 
compete  with  wages  in  other  fields,  particularly  for  graduates  in  high-demand 
disciplines  like  mathematics,  IT,  and  physics.  As  a  result,  many  young 
professionals choose alternative careers, especially in Prague, where the cost of 
living further exacerbates the problem. The Czech public education system has 
also faced pressure in recent years, with the number of students exceeding the 
availability  of  secondary  schools,  evident  across  Czechia  and,  most  visibly,  in 
Prague  (Sobíšková  2024).  According  to  some  experts  (Interviews  6,  8),  the 
imbalance between demand and the availability of school places is attributed to 
the integration of Prague with the Central Bohemian region, from which students 
frequently commute to the capital.  

recommendation.  As 

the  expert  highlights, 

Further, the education expert (Interview 14) highlighted three dimensions of non-
transparency  and  impartiality  in  Czechia,  which  also  apply  to  Prague:  the 
selection  of  school  principals,  the  lack  of  consumer  protection,  and  catchment 
area tourism. The selection of school directors is determined by the municipality 
[the  founder]  and  an  expert  committee.  However,  the  expert  committee  only 
issues  a  non-binding 
this 
recommendation “can be circumvented.” The expert (Interview 14) further states, 
“It  wouldn’t  be  far-fetched  to  hypothesise  that  local  politics  might  influence 
positions  at  grammar schools and  similar  institutions.  For example,  individuals 
could  be  rotating  roles  between  running  a  school  and  holding  a  position  in 
regional government, and then switching back again.” This kind of politicisation 
was also mentioned by a researcher (Interview 18). Due to the lack of consumer 
protection,  the  expert  refers  to  situations  where  “institutions  can  often  take 
advantage of parents’ lack of knowledge. For example, Roma parents might be 
told their child won’t fit in at a certain school, even though they have the right to 
attend,  and  are  instead  encouraged  to  choose  another  school”  (Interview  14). 
The issue with catchment area tourism arises when “families change their official 
residence to access preferred schools. While not outright bribery, it reflects the 
advantage of knowing how to navigate the system effectively” (Interview 14).  

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3.1.8.2.  Bratislava 

Despite the worse perception of public education in Bratislava, according to the 
EQI results, see Figure 1, the quality of education in Bratislavský kraj regions is 
better than in other Slovak regions, according to various measures. For example, 
students in Bratislavský kraj achieved the best results in the graduation exams 
for Slovak, Hungarian, and English languages and ranked third in mathematics 
in 2024 (NIVAM, n.d.). The Bratislavský kraj has a greater diversity of schools. In 
addition to public schools, there are many religious and private schools, giving 
parents  more  options  (CVTI  SR  2024).  However,  the  preference  for  private 
education may also imply a “distrust in the traditional institutions” (Interview 13).  

In Slovakia, up to 65% of Roma students aged 6–15 attend schools where the 
majority of students are also Roma. This makes Slovakia the EU member state 
with the highest rate of segregation of Roma in education. As a result, in 2023, 
the European Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice of the EU for 
violating  the  prohibition  of  discrimination  in  education  (Amnesty  International 
2023). However, this issue affects other regions more than Bratislava (Interview 
13). Students from this community achieve poorer results, and teaching in these 
regions  is more  challenging.  Moreover, the Metropolitan  Institute of  Bratislava, 
established  by  the  city  rather  than  the  region,  employs  analysts  who  focus  on 
planning school capacities. In this context, the expert poses a rhetorical question: 
“Which other region or city even has the resources or personnel to attempt doing 
this at all?” (Interview 13).  

Further, according to the expert on education (Interview 13), Bratislava appears 
to  be  the  only municipality  with  a  clear map  of  school  districts.  These  districts 
have been applied to primary schools and kindergartens since the introduction of 
mandatory  preschool  for  five-year-olds.  It  is  transparently  outlined  which 
residence belongs to which school, leaving little flexibility—schools must accept 
children from their assigned district. However, overcrowding in kindergartens and 
schools can complicate admissions. “You have to prioritise someone when you 
don’t have enough seats. Sometimes you don’t even have enough seats for those 
in  your  district”  (Interview  20).  A  major  concern  is  the  lack  of  transparency  in 
kindergarten  admissions,  especially  for  children  aged  3–4,  as  mandatory 
preschool prioritises older children, and the remaining spots are filled without a 
clear system. An electronic application system could improve transparency, as 
the current paper-based process makes it difficult to track rejected applications 
and ensure fair admissions (Interview 13). 

Similarly to Prague, Bratislava faces challenges with high demand for secondary 
grammar  schools,  creating  intense  competition  and  leaving  many  students 
without a spot—unlike in other Slovak regions. Teachers’ salaries, standardised 
nationwide, fail to account for Bratislava’s high cost of living, making recruitment 
difficult.  Kindergartens  also  face  capacity  issues,  worsened  by  an  influx  of 
Ukrainian children, while higher fees in Bratislava place additional financial strain 

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on families (Interview 13). Slovak experts did not consider political influence in 
selecting school directors a significant issue. 

Besides that, Slovakia has a long-standing issue with the exodus of young people 
and  students  to  Czechia  and  the  West  (Farkašová  and  Lodová  2023).  The 
highest  number  of  students  leaves  from  the  Bratislavský  kraj.  According  to  an 
expert  (Interview  13),  the  factors  contributing  to  the  brain  drain  are:  a) 
geographical proximity, b) the socio-economic conditions of Bratislava families – 
they can simply afford it, and c) the related family cultural capital (see also Bahna 
2018).  However,  there  is  a  greater  chance  that  a  young  person  will  return  to 
Bratislava after their studies, as the city offers better opportunities for professional 
growth than other regions in Slovakia  (see also MŠVVaM SR 2021). 

3.1.9.  Quality and Transparency in Healthcare 

The EQI survey reveals significant differences in the quality of public healthcare 
systems.  In  Prague,  the  quality  rate  (7.38)  is  higher  than  the  Czech  national 
average  (6.79),  while  in  Bratislavský  kraj,  the  rate  (5.0)  falls  below  the  Slovak 
average (5.38), see Figure 2. Although Prague faces challenges similar to those 
in other Czech regions, it offers the best healthcare services in the country. In 
contrast,  Bratislava  exhibits  stark  disparities  between  the  quality  and  public 
perception of (semi-)private healthcare providers and public ones. Additionally, 
healthcare  policy  in  Slovakia,  including  the  management  of  hospitals,  is 
vulnerable to politicisation, contributing to systemic fragility. 

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Figure 9: Quality of health care system in the EU, Slovakia, Czechia, Prague, and 
Bratislavský kraj according to EQI 2024 data 

Note: Measured on the scale 1-10. “1” means extremely poor quality, and “10” is 
extremely high quality. 

3.1.9.1.  Prague 

Similarly, like in education, Prague is far above the other regions in the healthcare 
sector. There is the highest number of doctors per 1000 inhabitants, the highest 
number of dentists per 1000 inhabitants, the lowest average morbidity rate, the 
highest  life  expectancy  for  both  men  and  women  and  the  highest  number  of 
hospital  beds  per  1000  inhabitants  (Communa  2024).  The  Military  University 
Hospital in Prague staff, a state-run hospital, was also rated as the most patient-
friendly in communication with patients in 2023 (HCI 2023). Indeed, as the expert 
(Interview  16)  on  healthcare  in  the  interview  confirms,  “Prague  always  has 
relatively decent availability [of health services]. ... As soon as you leave Prague, 
the regions are significantly worse in terms of access to basic services.” Prague 
also has a much greater offer of private healthcare providers, partly due to the 
higher purchasing power of Prague’s residents. Regarding the quality of health 
services, “there is a big difference between top-notch institutions, faculties, etc., 
and district hospitals, mostly. This is because you can’t attract top-notch doctors 
to small district hospitals” (Interview 16). Although Prague is characterised by a 

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relatively high availability of outpatient specialists, it faces a notable shortage of 
general practitioners (Medical Tribune 2023).  

According  to  the  Czech  Medical  Chamber  (2023),  the  Czech  health  system 
across regions suffers from the inability to train and retain a sufficient number of 
young general practitioners, the ageing demographic of the medical workforce, 
the increasing feminisation of the profession, inadequate financial remuneration, 
and substandard working conditions—often involving frequent violations of labour 
laws—represent significant challenges to the healthcare system. The decline and 
ageing of the medical workforce is a pressing issue in Prague, where the average 
age of general practitioners is 54 (Portál hlavního města Prahy 2024).  

Despite  the  generally  good  quality  of  the  health  system,  the  healthcare  expert 
(Interview  16)  addressed  the  broad  shortcomings  related  to  funding  the 
healthcare system or the relatively large number of smaller hospitals with unclear 
quality and low bed utilisation. We also discussed the question of transparency 
and corruption, “a grey zone” present in Prague, as the expert argues: “I think 
you also have people around you, or people you know, who were given priority 
access to a doctor in exchange for some form of bribe, whether it’s a bottle of 
wine, a small amount of money in an envelope, or a larger sum. It's just absolutely 
normal these days or through connections. These happen regularly, and I think 
the  grey  zone  is  still  there”  (Interview  16).  The  significance  of  personal 
connections—or,  in  some  cases,  elements  of  bribery—in  securing  medical 
appointments,  deeply rooted  in  and perceived  as part of  the  system,  was  also 
highlighted in other interviews (e.g. Interviews 6, 11).  

The  healthcare  sector  has  historically  been  susceptible  to  corruption  (e.g. 
Interviews  8,  11),  impartiality,  and  politicisation  (Interview  18).  “The  indirect 
politicisation is very much in the healthcare system. Again, we’re talking about 
the management of these hospitals. ... Their main shield is expertise, and they 
can  have  informal  ties  with  politicians  because  they’re  just  friends.  …  Look  at 
Motol [University  Hospital in  Prague],  where the director,  Miloslav Ludvík,  who 
was associated with the ČSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party] for a very long 
time, was a semi-expert, … then he was a friend with ANO [populist party], and 
so on. And he gets along with all those political parties.” 

3.1.9.2.  Bratislava 

In  contrast  to  Prague,  in  Bratislava,  “the  availability  of  health  care,  particularly 
adult general practitioners and paediatricians, is under threat in the Bratislavský 
kraj region in the next few years. The average age of physicians in 2022 was 56 
years old. At the end of 2023, Bratislavský kraj region announced a call under the 
Bratislava  Regional  Subsidy  Scheme,  which  supported  the  reconstruction  and 
modernisation of outpatient clinics, including material and technical equipment” 
(Bratislavský  kraj  2024).  In  Slovakia,  an  annual  ranking  of  hospitals  based  on 

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various  quality  indicators  is  published  (INEKO,  n.d.).  The  University  Hospital 
Bratislava (UHB) ranks only sixth, with the top five positions occupied by hospitals 
from other regions in 2024. Patient satisfaction at the UHB is notably low, scoring 
just 19 out of 100. According to the expert on healthcare (Interview 19), the UHB 
requires extensive reconstruction or the construction of a new facility, a topic of 
discussion for several years. In contrast, public hospitals in other regions have 
recently benefited from significant investments.  

the 

label  of 

Bratislava, similar to Prague, has significant purchasing power, which increases 
the number of different (semi)-private healthcare providers. “Many providers are 
emerging  who,  while  formally  tied  to  public  health  insurance  for  certain 
procedures,  also  offer  additional  services  under 
‘patient 
management,’ for which they charge fees” (Interview 19). This situation blurs the 
distinction  between  the  public  healthcare  system  and  private  offerings.  “In  my 
opinion, once patients pay, they no longer perceive it as part of the public system. 
They notice the contrast most clearly when they pay: suddenly, the premises are 
more pleasant, the doctor is more polite, they receive appointment reminders via 
text message, and they no longer need to call the outpatient clinic multiple times 
to schedule an appointment. These experiences highlight the disparity between 
publicly  funded  healthcare  services  and  those  enhanced  by  private  payments, 
even if the core services remain tied to public insurance” (Interview 19). In other 
words, Bratislava faces challenges in providing completely free public healthcare 
services of high quality without long waiting times.  

Additionally, in Bratislava, a private investor, Penta Hospitals, has constructed a 
new healthcare facility. Penta Hospitals operates healthcare services in Czechia, 
Poland, and Slovakia. “This is a modern, state-of-the-art hospital. Even compared 
to  Penta’s  facilities  in  other  regions,  this  one  has  been  completely  rebuilt.  It 
features single rooms and offers these services without additional charges. This 
highlights  the  stark  contrast  between  the  public  sector  and  a  private  company 
acting as both manager and investor” (Interview 19). 

In this light, corruption and bribery in the healthcare sector are relatively common, 
as  revealed  by  survey  data  from  2023  (STI,  n.d.-a).  Although  only  9%  of 
respondents  reported  giving  bribes  in  the  past  three  years,  most  of  these 
instances  were  linked  to  the  healthcare  sector.  Furthermore,  53.6%  of 
respondents  believe  bribery  and  corruption  are  prevalent  in  healthcare.  By 
comparison, the ministerial level ranks second-highest in perceived corruption, 
with 46% of respondents considering it widespread (STI, n.d.-a).    

The  perception  of  healthcare  policy  is  also  influenced  by  national  politics,  as 
claimed  by  Bratislava’s  respondents.  One  expert  (Interview  10)  argues  that 
citizens see healthcare as a national topic: “But I think that overall, the population 
certainly  sees  healthcare  as  a  national  issue,  that  they  don’t  feel  like  there’s 
anything  there  at  all  for  local  governments  to  do.  At  the  same  time,  local 
governments are substituting for the national government in many things related 

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to healthcare. For example, which is a great initiative, the Bratislavský kraj is now 
organising  cervical  cancer  vaccinations  itself.”  Regarding  politicisation,  in 
Slovakia,  it  is  common  for  directors of  public  hospitals  to  be  replaced  with  the 
appointment of new health ministers: “It is standard practice that with the arrival 
of a new minister, hospital directors are changed. This is extremely common and 
a  key  difference  between  state  and  private  hospitals.  In  private  hospitals, 
directors often remain in their roles for several years, whereas in state hospitals, 
the  average  director  tenure  is  sometimes  only  2  or  3  years”  (Interview  19).  “I 
would say the governance of health policy in our country works on a rotation. This 
means that these people move between hospitals, the ministry, and, for example, 
insurance companies“(Interview 17). The political nominations (see also Zachar 
and  Iršová  2023)  and  frequent  changes  of  directors  limit  the  potential  for 
structural reforms and continuity of the healthcare policy. 

Thus,  generally,  the  Slovak  healthcare  system  faces  challenges  such  as  the 
ageing  of  doctors,  a  high  density  of  healthcare  providers—leading 
to 
inefficiency—and low salaries. In October 2024, more than half of hospital doctors 
submitted their resignations due to the lack of solutions to structural problems in 
Slovak healthcare and a reduction in the planned salary increases for physicians. 
They also oppose the privatisation of public healthcare services (iRozhlas 2024). 
Similar structural issues are observed in Czechia, as seen above.  

3.1.10. Summary of Descriptive Analysis 

As  implied  above,  both  Prague  and  Bratislavský  kraj  operate  within  a  highly 
regulated  but  underfunded  administrative  system,  where  transparency  has 
improved but remains imperfect. While public information is formally accessible, 
it  is  often  difficult  to  navigate,  and  unclear  accountability  further  complicates 
governance, creating conditions for inefficiency and potential unethical practices. 
Experts  in  Prague  addressed  issues  related  to  the  organisational  structure, 
while  experts  in  Slovakia  highlighted  the  influence  of  national  politics  on  the 
perception of the quality of government in the area where respondents live. 

In the case of impartiality, experts in Prague do not mention it; they rather speak 
about “softer” issues such as gender equality. On the other hand, in Slovakia and 
the Bratislavský  kraj  region,  experts contend  that  although  some progress has 
been  made  in  improving  transparency,  the  cancellation  of  selection  processes 
and  the  influence  of  political  connections  continue  to  undermine  fair  hiring 
practices.  Without  stricter  safeguards,  nepotism  and  cronyism  will  remain 
persistent issues in Slovakia’s public sector. 

The  subsection  on  education  and  healthcare  outlines  key  differences  between 
Prague and Bratislavský kraj. Although Prague faces similar challenges in these 

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policy  areas,  it  still  offers  some  of  the  best  services  compared  to  other  Czech 
regions. In contrast, Slovak experts emphasised structural problems, particularly 
in healthcare, which are more pronounced in Bratislavský kraj than elsewhere. 
Overall, the EQI results appear to reflect the national level of governance rather 
than the local level of the Bratislava region, as evidenced by data on the national 
perception of corruption  (STI, n.d.-a). It is also influenced by the role of (local) 
media,  as  discussed  more  below  in  the  explanatory  part.  In  both  regions, 
transparency  and  quality  issues  in  these  sectors  were  largely  linked  to  the 
politicisation of the administrative system. 

3.1.11. Explanatory Analysis 

In  this  section,  we  examine  the  role  of  national  politics,  politicisation,  and 
organisational structure in Bratislavský kraj and Prague regions on the impact 
of corruption, transparency, and impartiality. In addition, we also explore the role 
of local media as another factor explaining Bratislavský kraj’s lower ranking in 
the EQI index compared to Prague. However, these factors also shed light on the 
shortcomings identified by experts in Prague. As the section shows, these factors 
are interlinked and impact each other. 

3.1.12. The Role of National Politics 

The broader national political environment plays a crucial role. The area where 
Bratislavský kraj and Prague respondents live consists of several administrative 
levels,  from  state  to  regional  and  local  administration.  Mostly  liberal-leaning 
respondents  in  Bratislavský  kraj  and  Prague  may  have  reflected  their 
dissatisfaction  with  the  national  government  in  their  EQI  survey  responses 
despite  being  generally  satisfied  with  regional leadership.  In  both Czechia and 
Slovakia,  trust  in  regional  or  local  governments  is  higher  than  in  national 
governments.  In  Slovakia,  26%  of  respondents  trust  the  national  government, 
compared to 52% who trust local governments as of December 2023 (Median SK 
2024).  In  Czechia,  20%  of  respondents  trust  the  national  government  and  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  while  44%  trust  regional  councils,  45%  trust  regional 
governors, 52% trust municipal councils, and 76% trust mayors as of February 
2024  (Červenka  2024).  However,  as  this  subsection  shows,  Bratislavský  kraj 
respondents are long-term dissatisfied with the national leadership, which might 
impact their perceptions of corruption more generally than in Prague.  

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3.1.12.1.  Prague 

Experts  in  our  sample  questioned  whether  respondents  in  capital  cities  could 
distinguish  between  different  administrative  levels.  When  the  EQI  2024  asks, 
“Corruption  in  my  area  is  used  to  get  access  to  special  unfair  privileges  and 
wealth,”  the  phrase  “my  area”  could  refer  to  the  municipality,  district,  capital, 
region (in the case of Slovakia), or even national level. As one expert (Interview 
6) explained, “As an ordinary citizen, one often does not distinguish between the 
state and Prague. Take, for example, the incomplete city circuit—whether it is the 
state’s  or  Prague’s  responsibility  is  unclear  to  most  people.  They  just  want  it 
completed. When asked about governance, they assume those they elect should 
be responsible, even if the decision ultimately lies with the Ministry of Transport. 
Understanding  regional  responsibilities  is  limited.”  This  aligns  with  scholars’ 
(Janas and Jánošková 2022, 68) assumption, who note that even after 20 years 
of  functioning,  the  competencies  of  regional  governments  remain  poorly 
understood. While residents recognise regional leaders, they are far less aware 
of their actual responsibilities. 

However, Prague’s governance largely mirrors national politics. The ruling Czech 
coalition achieved its best electoral result in Prague, winning 40% of the vote in 
the  2021  parliamentary  elections  (ČSO  2021).  Moreover,  Prague’s  mayor 
belongs  to  the  same  political  party  as  the  prime  minister,  likely  contributing  to 
relative  political  satisfaction  among  Prague  respondents.  Thus,  Prague’s 
respondents are less likely to express their dissatisfaction with the national level. 
This  contrasts  sharply  with  Bratislava,  where  political  dynamics  between  the 
state, regional and local levels differ significantly.  

3.1.12.2.  Bratislava 

In Bratislava, both the regional governor and the city mayor represent markedly 
different styles of governance compared to the current prime minister. In the 2023 
parliamentary  elections,  the  liberal  party  of  Progressive  Slovakia  won  in  the 
Bratislavský kraj region, while the governing Direction (Smer) party prevailed in 
other regions (Mahdalová and Škop 2023). Consequently, dissatisfaction with the 
national government’s leadership could be likely more pronounced in responses 
to  the  EQI  survey  in  Bratislava  than  in  Prague.  For  instance,  a  public 
management 
that: 
“Dissatisfaction will be perceived by people in Bratislava, where even statistically 
it comes out that there is more of the urban population, so in the context of the 
electoral map in these elections it may be that they are more critical and see it 
more [illiberal style of politics].“  

from  Slovakia  argued 

(Interview  17) 

researcher 

Residents of Bratislavský kraj are generally, according to experts, satisfied with 
local and regional leadership, which is dominated by liberal candidates. However, 
they  express  frustration  with  the poor performance  of  the national  government 

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(see  also  Kotýnek  Krotký  2024),  led  by  populist  and  far-right  parties. 
Dissatisfaction with the Slovak government has been a long-term issue (Median 
SK 2024). Although there was hope for change in 2018  (Kotýnek Krotký 2024) 
following  mass  civic  protests  that  led  to  Robert  Fico’s  resignation  as  prime 
minister, his successor, Igor Matovič, and his government were characterised by 
chaotic  governance,  instability,  and  a  lack  of  professionalism.  The  long-term 
dissatisfaction  with  national  governments  among  Bratislava  citizens  correlates 
with the persistently poor EQI performance of the Bratislavský kraj region. This is 
also portrayed by the expert (Interview 1) claim: “The question is whether those 
respondents who answered that questionnaire were able to divide governance at 
the  regional  and  national  level.  Whether  the  national  level  of  governance  also 
happened  to  influence  the  feeling  of  governance  in  the  region  subliminally” 
(Interview  1).  In  other  words,  in  responding  to  the  EQI  survey  question, 
respondents might imagine the national level instead of the regional one, as both 
governments  are  located  in  the  capital.  Similarly,  it  was  argued  in  other 
interviews. For instance, “The Bratislava region, unlike all the other seven, has 
the vast majority of the state administration, as it were, on its territory. And those 
people  can,  therefore,  be  more  responsive  and  more  evaluative  of  how  they 
evaluate,  say,  those  national  institutions.  Whereas  if  you  ask  people  in  the 
Trenčín region how they rate the access to some public services in their region, 
they will probably not rate those national institutions that much” (Interview 5). 

Similarly  to  Prague,  experts  in  Slovakia  also  noted  that  citizens  have  limited 
knowledge  about  the  competencies  of  regional  governments.  Moreover,  in 
capitals like Bratislava, additional levels of governance come into play, making 
the  issue  more  complex  and  difficult  for  ordinary  citizens  to  understand:  “In 
Bratislava, but also, for example, in Košice, there is an additional layer—there’s 
the  city  of  Bratislava  with  a  magistrate  that  has  certain  powers  and 
responsibilities, and then it is further divided into city districts, which essentially 
have the status of municipalities and their own agendas. These relationships are 
regulated by the statute of the capital city, the Municipal Act, and so on. I think 
this creates significant confusion for people. … Only those who are perhaps more 
educated  or  directly  involved  can  clearly  distinguish  what  falls  under  the 
responsibility of the city district, the city, the region, or the national government” 
(Interview 10).  Meanwhile, in Prague, the city functions as both a municipality 
and a regional authority. 

3.1.13. Politicization at the Regional and Local Level 

As  the  research  (Meyer-Sahling  and  Veen  2012;  Kohoutek  and  Nekola  2021; 
Rybář and Podmaník 2020) shows, Central and Eastern European countries are 
fragile  in  the  context  of  the  senior  civil  service  politicisation.  In  other  words, 

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the 

research  considering 

political influence on public administration is manifested at the highest levels of 
bureaucracy  and  government.  However, 
the 
politicisation at the lower level of public administration is missing (cf. Prachárová 
and Kačur 2018). As the data and interviews indicate, politicisation occurs, to a 
certain  extent,  at  the  local  level  in  both  examined  regions.  However,  the 
politicisation of the administrative system in Slovakia is far more fragile, as the 
highest political leaders heavily influence the administration. Following the 2023 
elections, the new government made significant efforts to reshape the civil service 
and professional apparatus. 

3.1.13.1.  Prague 

According  to  a  public  management  researcher  (Interview  18),  politicisation  in 
Czechia  manifests  in  three  dimensions.  First,  to  a  certain  extent,  positive 
politicisation is associated with bringing in experts to advance a specific agenda 
or policy. The second type of politicisation relates to reciprocal transactions, such 
as appointing individuals to lucrative positions as a reward for campaign support. 
The third dimension involves placing party members in designated positions. As 
the  other  researcher  (Interview  8)  argues,  especially  “at  the  highest  levels  of 
officials,  particularly  in  the  municipal  government,  the  situation  is,  of  course, 
significantly influenced by politics. However, this does not seem to be the case at 
the lower levels, whether at the municipal office or city districts. These positions 
are  likely  less  politically  influenced,  primarily  because  they  are  not  as  highly 
lucrative”  (Interview  8).  Further,  the  expert  argues  that  during  periods  of 
corruption scandals,16 “the role of politics was, in my opinion, much greater. In 
the current era, however, I believe its influence is not as pronounced” (Interview 
8).  

Nevertheless, politicisation and its connected corruption, non-transparency and 
impartiality  were  mentioned  in  the  context  of  the  healthcare  policy  sector  or 
municipal companies (Interviews 6, 18). “There are many municipal companies 
in  Prague,  and  they  are  large  entities—essentially  states  within  the  state” 
(Interview 6). As a public management researcher (Interview 18) argues: “Well, 
as far as like the city companies, I think there’s like a freer hand there because 
you  hide  everything  underneath,  you  let  the  managers  run  it.  And  there’s  that 
market imperative, and there’s more asymmetry of information, there may not be 
as much transparency, so you do that politicisation easier there because actually 
if you put a CEO who is beholden to you in some way. … You can put your people 
in that middle management without all the complicated selection process.”  

16 Most experts mention the era of Mayor Pavel Bém (2002-2010). 

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Thus, the respondents suggest that the politicisation of administrative levels in 
Czechia primarily concerns the senior civil service (see also Meyer-Sahling and 
Veen 2012; Kohoutek and Nekola 2021; Rybář and Podmaník 2020). However, 
politicisation is also evident in top positions within specific policy sectors at the 
local  level,  such  as  hospital  and  municipal  company  directors.  Nonetheless, 
political  influence  on  the  administration  peaked  in  the  first  decade  of  the  21st 
century. As outlined in the descriptive section, Prague’s administration responded 
to  corruption  scandals  and  political 
implementing 
transparency and prevention measures, including a basic database of resolutions 
and supporting documents, discussions within the city council and its bodies, and 
the  involvement  of  independent  entities  in  major  procurement  processes 
(Interviews 6, 8, 11, 18). 

influence  by  swiftly 

3.1.13.2.  Bratislava 

When discussing politicisation in Slovakia, respondents primarily referred to the 
state level, which impacts the functioning of public institutions at other levels. This 
became particularly evident following the early elections in 2023. “But I say that 
the early parliamentary elections in September 2023 were a significant milestone 
in this regard because the current government has a rather predatory approach 
to  public  institutions.  The  previous  government  at  least  tried  to  implement 
selection  procedures  for  some  oversight,  regulatory,  or  investigative  bodies, 
where  professionalism,  independence,  and  integrity  were  considered.  This 
government is not trying to do that. I would say that, generally, political backing 
plays a significant role in top positions” (Interview 5). The other interview second 
that. “With the arrival of the last government, … the first thing that happened was 
that  the  analytical  departments  at the ministry  level were  abolished” (Interview 
20). 

typically  within  government 

The researcher (Interview 17) even mentions “purges” that occurred at analytical 
and senior levels within ministries and district offices under the Ministry of Interior. 
“Within a month of the new government taking office, it was simply cleared out” 
(Interview 17). “Purges” refer to the systematic removal or dismissal of individuals 
from  positions, 
institutions,  ministries,  or 
organisations. According  to  respondents  (Interviews 5,  17), these “purges” are 
particularly  visible  in  Bratislava,  where  the  state  bureaucracy  is  concentrated. 
Additionally,  the  influence  of  local  connections  is  more  pronounced  in  Eastern 
Slovakia—an  area  that  performed  similarly  poorly  in  the  EQI  results  as  the 
Bratislavský  kraj.  One  respondent  (Interview  17)  noted:  “Local  [political] 
connections are much more visible there, and it is possible that changes [in the 
public offices] happened more frequently. When the government changed, they 
simply cleaned house everywhere.”  

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Furthermore, Municipal officer (Interview 10) share experience with hiring people 
at the local administrative level (city district) and the city level. “One thing I notice, 
in Bratislava districts, is that politicians often have a history of working with certain 
people in the past. When they move to new positions, they tend to bring entire 
teams with them because they trust these people and have previous experience 
working with them. Many of these individuals are undoubtedly experts, but in a 
way,  this  practice  bypasses  the  principles  of  open  selection  processes.”  She 
continues  with  an  example  from  when  she  first  started  in  the  administrative 
position at the city district: “For example, when I first started working in one of the 
Bratislava district [the name of the district was anonymised], there was a directive 
requiring  selection  processes  for  every  position,  including  administrative  roles 
and department heads. However, this has changed, and now selection processes 
are no longer required for administrative positions.” She further comments on a 
similar  situation  at  the  city  level.  “I  know  it  works  similarly  at  the  city  hall—if 
someone has previous experience with a candidate, they might be hired without 
a formal selection process. There have also been public selection processes for 
directors  of  various  municipal  companies.  However,  based  on  what  I’ve  heard 
from people who applied, as well as reports in the media, the selection process 
was  often  just  a  formality,  with  a  predetermined  candidate  already  chosen  in 
advance. It seems like the justification for this is that they already know and trust 
these people, believing them to be competent.” The hiring practices at the city-
district, city-level, and national levels often rely on bringing in trusted individuals 
from  previous  roles,  bypassing  open  selection  processes.  Thus,  the  municipal 
officer criticises what the other respondent (Interview 18) calls a kind of positive 
politicisation because it undermines fairness in the selection process. 

While  some  positions  still  undergo  formal  hiring,  there  are  cases  where  the 
process is perceived as formal, with predetermined candidates chosen based on 
prior  experience,  and  this  change  was  reinforced  by  the  new  administration 
following  the  2023  election.  The  argument  for  bypassing  the  hiring  process  is 
based  on  the  assumption  of  competence  drawn  from  personal  experience 
working with the candidate in a previous role. Since administrative positions are 
often  underpaid,  attracting  qualified  and  capable  candidates  can  be  difficult, 
which further supports this practice (see more in the next section). However, this 
approach still bypasses the democratic principles of an open selection process. 
As  the  next  section  elaborates,  relatively  lucrative  salaries  offered  in  Eastern 
Slovakia  compared  to  Western  Slovakia  facilitate  these  changes,  as  there  is 
significant interest in such positions. 

Conducted  analysis  of  turnover  among  district  office  heads  following  the  2016 
parliamentary elections did not record substantial staff turnover (Prachárová and 
Kačur 2018). However, the 2016 elections did not result in significant changes in 
government, as Direction (Smer) remained the winning party, just as in 2012. It 
is, therefore, unsurprising that limited political impact was found (see also Meyer-

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Sahling 2008). In contrast, the 2023 elections led to a complete transformation of 
the  government,  with  Robert  Fico  once  again  assuming  power.  As  our 
respondents  indicate,  the  newly  formed  government  immediately  seized  this 
opportunity to replace employees in senior and expert positions at the ministry 
levels and in the lower positions within district offices under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior.  Indeed,  as  the  comparative  analysis  among  post-
communist  countries  shows,  the  level  of  politicisation  in  Slovak  public 
administration  also  affects  lower  management  positions,  whereas,  in  other 
countries,  politicisation  primarily  impacts  only  the  most  senior  positions  at  the 
ministries  (Meyer-Sahling  and  Veen  2012).  The  leadership  of  the  Fico 
government  makes  Slovak  public  administration  highly  vulnerable  to  political 
influence, potentially affecting its impartiality and perceptions of corruption among 
Bratislavský  kraj  respondents.  Despite  the  shortcomings  in  Czechia  (Prague), 
politicisation in Slovakia appears more pronounced and severe. 

3.1.14. Organizational Culture 

In  this  section,  we  explore  the  organisational  structure  in  Prague  and  the 
Bratislavský  kraj.  First,  the  experts  in  both  regions  lamented  the  insufficient 
funding  allocated  to  capitals  by  the  state.  Moreover,  a  key  issue  is  the 
standardised  pay  scale  system,  which  deters  highly motivated  individuals from 
pursuing positions in public administration. Second, according to recent research 
(Plaček et al. 2024), the public sector in Czechia and Slovakia is characterised 
by a zero-error tolerance culture, reinforcing the rigidity of public administration. 
This  approach  prioritises  minimising  inputs  and  strictly  adhering  to  legal 
regulations, often at the expense of riskier but effective solutions.  

3.1.14.1.  Prague 

One  of  the  experts  (Interview  6)  expressed  concerns  that  Prague  does  not 
receive  sufficient  funding  from  the  state  budget  to  effectively  manage  public 
administration and  delegated  state powers.  “This means  that  Prague  does  not 
receive as much funding as it should. The central government could behave more 
rationally  and  actually  appreciate  or  better  understand 
the  scope  of 
responsibilities that Prague, as the capital, has to manage. Another issue directly 
related to the civil service apparatus is that the self-government cannot simply 
decide to  hire  someone.  However, since  it  is  a  public  authority,  it  is  subject  to 
certain  regulations  imposed  by  the  central government, particularly concerning 
pay scale salaries. … This is, in my view, one of the major shortcomings of the 
public administration system, where we must follow a pay scale salary system 

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and  cannot  reward  people  or  recruit  qualified  civil  servants  or  managers  for 
certain roles” (Interview 6). Moreover, the unattractiveness of state institutions in 
terms of salary is evident when compared to wage levels in the broader economy. 
Since  2017/2018,  salaries  in  public  institutions  have  been  declining  in 
competitiveness relative to overall wage trends  (Bouchal 2024). Public officials 
have  been  feeling  a  real decline  in earnings  for longer than  private  employers 
(Seznam Zprávy 2024). 

To  “bypass”  this  rigid  system,  large  cities  such  as  Prague  establish  their  own 
municipal companies with limited regulations regarding civil servants. “Thanks to 
this,  you  can  hire  qualified  managers,  whom  you  can  reward  and  make 
competitive  in  the  labour  market”  (Interview  6).  Another  way  to  promote  civil 
servants  is  surprisingly  politicisation.  “This  is  where  politicisation  can  have  a 
positive effect—when politicians identify talented individuals who might never rise 
through the traditional pathways and create opportunities for them to succeed” 
(Interview 18). The recruitment of civil servants through traditional career paths 
is limited, prompting public administration to explore alternative mechanisms for 
attracting qualified professionals with the possibility of appropriate remuneration. 

The rigidness of the public administration relates to a zero-error tolerance culture 
(Interview  18):  “The  public  sector  is  not  able  to  take  on  some  risk,  which  is  a 
problem even for those municipalities. ... It means that we don’t ask those civil 
servants,  and  we  punish  them  when  they  come  up  with  some,  like,  creative 
solution.” The  lack  of  effectivity  of  the  public  sector is also  connected  with  the 
over-regulation and distrust, as argued by the political advisor (Interview 6): “My 
feeling and it’s not the last ten years, but it’s been graduating very strongly, is that 
our society is very much like over-regulated. … These are like little things that, of 
course, extremely hinder the effective performance of that local government, and 
paradoxically, it also causes those particular executors of some decisions to be 
really  afraid  and  not  want  to  put  their  personal  responsibility  into  it  basically.  I 
mean, it’s a combination of some general distrust, distrust in the rule of law and 
basically fear of making decisions. It can relate to, we see it a lot just in public 
procurement,  where  everybody  is  afraid  of  being  prosecuted,  that  they’re 
following  like  basically a  well-trodden  template  that’s  somehow prejudiced  that 
this is a safe route, but it’s not an effective route, for example.”  

According to the public management researcher (Interview 18), distrust in public 
administration stems from a narrative popularised by Václav Klaus, a key figure 
in the 1990s transformation and former president of Czechia. Klaus advanced the 
notion that “everything the public sector does is wrong” and that “the market and 
companies are inherently more efficient.” This perspective has deeply influenced 
public perception and attitudes toward public administration,   

fostering  stereotypes  that  “working  for  the  state  implies  being  less  competent, 
inflexible, or even lazy” (Interview 18).  

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A zero-error tolerance culture, combined with a strong fear of corruption, often 
results in overregulation and the fragmentation of responsibilities across multiple 
levels of local and national government. According to a local journalist (Interview 
3), this ultimately leads to a lack of transparency regarding who is accountable 
for specific issues: “I have long perceived it as problematic, and I know this from 
Prague, but I believe it is the same elsewhere. The system of governance that 
we have here at the Prague level and the way it works here, I think the problem 
is that responsibility is so significantly fragmented. This creates an environment 
conducive to corrupt practices, even if they aren’t necessarily present, but it often 
deprives people of real power and, at the same time, responsibility for running 
the  city.“  The  journalist  (Interview  3)  further  claims  that  such  a  robust 
administrative  system  leads  to  ineffective  governance:  “So  this  system  of 
fragmented responsibility, which arose because we were so afraid of corruption 
for so long, led us to create a state administration that is supposed to make the 
decisions—an independent state administration that doesn’t necessarily have to 
be independent at all, because they are, in quotation marks, just bureaucrats. I 
perceive this as something that, in a way, handicaps the ability to govern here 
and,  at  the  same  time,  creates  an  environment  conducive  to  corruption.  If  we 
want to achieve something, we often have to—or it seems necessary to—resort 
to  certain  persuasive  methods.”  Thus,  although  Prague  has  made  significant 
progress in transparency in recent years and faces the closest scrutiny from city-
based media (as discussed more in the following subsection) compared to other 
cities in Czechia, there is still room for improvement 

3.1.14.2.  Bratislava 

Interviews from Bratislava mentioned that Bratislavský kraj is on the edge of its 
capacity, which might impact the quality and effectiveness of the administration. 
According  to  some  experts  (Interviews  1,  5),  regional  and  EU  funding  should 
reflect  the  absorption  capacity  and  number  of  services  provided  in  the  capital 
regions. For instance, the “Bratislava Region faces the disadvantage of not being 
able  to  receive  as  many  resources  as  other  regions  because  it  is  considered 
wealthier. This may also be related to the region’s overburdened state due to an 
influx  of  people  commuting  there  for  work,  leading  to  issues  such  as 
overpopulation. The lack of solutions to address problems with transportation or 
soft and hard infrastructure affects the quality of life in the region” (Interview 1). 
“It  can  be  said  that  Bratislava  is  a  rich  city  by  European  standards,  but  it  is 
basically poor in the sense of redistribution of public resources from the state to 
the  local  government  level”  (Interview  5).  “Regions  remain  dependent  on  how 
much funding the government allocates to them in each electoral cycle” (Interview 
1).  Given  the  longstanding  differences  between  regional  representatives  and 

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government officials, tensions frequently arise during negotiations over-allocating 
funds  for  regional  operations.  One  respondent  observed  that  the  state 
government “probably didn’t want to make a lot of concessions to them either in 
terms of funding or some kind of share taxes” (Interview 10). 

Like in Czechia, wages in the public sector are mainly determined by a pay scale 
system. The employee is classified according to the content of the work, which 
depends mainly on education or the number of years of service. The scope for 
higher salaries for higher-quality employees or those who are in short supply is 
thus limited. The problem is also caused by the combination of pay scale salaries, 
which  are  the  same  throughout  Slovakia,  with  different  costs  of  living  in  the 
regions. An example is Bratislava, where the cost of living, especially housing, is 
high,  and  workers  there  also  have  many  alternatives  for  employment  (MFSR 
2024). Conversely, in Eastern Slovakia, public sector positions are comparatively 
more  lucrative  than  the  average  wage  (Černěnko  2020),  enabling  central 
authorities  to  replace  officials  more  readily.  As  the  scholar  (Interview  17) 
elaborated,  these  positions  are  viewed  as  relatively  attractive,  whereas  in 
Western Slovakia, “you can’t really carry out purges because you wouldn’t find 
people to replace them”. Indeed, while public administration in the western part 
of Slovakia (including the Bratislavský kraj region) selects candidates from just 
1–2  applicants,  the  number  of  applicants  is  higher  in  eastern  Slovakia  (MFSR 
2024).  Furthermore,  a  comprehensive  comparison  of  the  Slovak  Ministry  of 
Finance that accounts for observable employee and job characteristics suggests 
that public sector employees earn 3% less than their private sector counterparts 
(MFSR 2020). The findings indicate that certain groups face significantly lower 
earnings  than  their  private  sector  counterparts:  women  (7%  less),  young 
employees under 29 (9% less), and university-educated employees (11% less) 
(MFSR  2020).  Low  financial  compensation  undermines  the  attractiveness  of 
bureaucratic positions.  Consequently,  younger and  highly educated  individuals 
may opt for employment in the private sector or seek opportunities abroad. 

Experts contest the notion that the quality of public services in the Bratislavský 
kraj region is inferior to that in other regions of Slovakia. Instead, they posit that 
respondents in Bratislavský kraj may exhibit greater criticality due to heightened 
awareness and expectations, as reflected in the assertion that “they just have the 
knowledge that it should be better, and they see more of that need, or they see 
the  gaps”  (Interview  17).  Furthermore,  a  scholar  specialising  in  public 
administration  highlighted  that  in  Central  and  Eastern  Slovakia,  there  exists  a 
more entrenched perception “that they really needed to know someone to get into 
some positions” (Interview 17), suggesting regional variations in attitudes toward 
public service access and governance. 

Besides funding, the effectiveness of administration also depends on strict rules 
and  deadlines  to  ensure  transparency.  The  expert  (Interview  12)  argues  that 
“[t]ransparency  in  our  countries  [Central  and  Eastern  European  countries] 
reached a higher level compared to Western states. For example, when I worked 

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on the Freedom of Information Act, we had relatively strict deadlines—currently, 
it’s around eight calendar days to respond to a request. In other countries, it is 
often  30  days  or  more  because  they  need  time  to  protect  personal  data  and 
address  various  issues  before  deciding  whether  to  disclose  information.  This 
transparency,  therefore,  compensated for some  state  control mechanisms that 
were not functioning and were meant to be gradually developed. In Slovakia, for 
instance,  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  operates  fairly  well.  It  provides  relevant 
findings and reports, although it does not have executive powers—it can issue 
warnings  and  submit  reports  to  parliament,  but  at  the  very  least,  it  conducts 
investigations.”  

However,  while  such  transparency  measures—particularly  strict  deadlines  for 
accessing information—are intended to compensate for weak or underdeveloped 
control  mechanisms,  they  may  inadvertently  contribute  to  further  inefficiency 
through overregulation. This reflects a broader culture of institutional distrust and 
a  zero-tolerance  attitude  toward  errors.  In  this  context,  a  Slovak  researcher 
(Interview 17) emphasised how risk aversion among bureaucrats is shaped by 
leadership and the level of support they receive from senior staff. In line with the 
insights  of  a  Czech  expert  (Interview  18),  the  Slovak  scholar  noted  that 
bureaucrats often hesitate to pursue new initiatives because such actions “could 
simply  be  used  against  them  at  the  wrong  time”  (Interview  17).  Consequently, 
transparency  alone  cannot 
fear  of 
repercussions continues to hinder innovation and proactive governance. 

fully  overcome  systemic 

issues 

if 

3.1.15. The Role of Local Media 

High-quality  journalism  is  essential  for  safeguarding  democracy,  ensuring 
transparency,  and,  subsequently,  strengthening  quality  government.  However, 
Reporters  Without  Borders  (2024a)  warns  that  those  who  are  supposed  to 
support  a  free  press—such  as  politicians  and  government  officials—are 
increasingly undermining  it.  They note a  worrying  decline  in  support for media 
autonomy, accompanied by growing pressure from the state and other political 
actors. The media also serves as a vital bridge between politics and the public, 
helping  to  make  political  issues  more  relatable  and  easier  to  comprehend. 
Regional  journalism  in  Czechia  and  Slovakia,  as  well  as  in  other  Visegrad 
countries,  is  facing  significant  challenges.  All  of  these  countries  share  a 
dysfunctional regulatory system and legal framework, resulting in a confusing and 
unclear media landscape (Oživení, n.d.).  

Changes in the media market have led to a decline in regional coverage, leaving 
only outlets that maintain close ties with local or government politics. The regional 
situation (outside the capital) is neglected, creating a space where problems can 
develop  and  flourish  (Oživení,  n.d.).  Thus,  while  the  media  plays  an  important 

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role, its impact is somewhat limited at the regional level. They shape how people 
understand  regional  politics;  as  one  of  the  interviewees  noted  (Interview  7): 
“People  don’t  understand  regional  politics.  And  why  don’t  they  understand? 
Because we don’t have any quality media that would focus on it. Yes, the problem 
with governance quality in Czechia is that we have completely undernourished 
and dysfunctional regional journalism.” In other words, the role of the media is 
understood  as  bringing  local  politics  closer  to  the  public.  However,  as  long  as 
local media remains underfunded, effective communication and proper scrutiny 
of  politics  are  not  possible.  Larger  cities  like  Prague  and  Bratislava  host  the 
majority  of  journalists,  while  the  situation  in  other  regions  is  even  more 
problematic. Besides, this disparity likely contributes to fewer investigations into 
government transparency outside central areas.  

3.1.15.1.  Prague 

Media  presence  is  significantly  higher  in  capital  cities,  which  creates  greater 
pressure  on  both  local  administrations  and  national  governments,  as  noted  by 
our  respondents.  In  particular,  in  Prague,  the  media,  in  collaboration  with  civil 
society, have played a key role in pushing for increased transparency. Experts 
(Interviews 2, 3, 6) agree that local media in Prague are of high quality and play 
an important role in reporting on corruption and political issues. Political advisor 
(Interview 6) argues that: “Prague, as a region, is under much greater journalistic 
scrutiny.  Compared to  other regions, Prague  is covered  very intensively  in  the 
press  and  media.  This  means  that,  again,  I  believe  we  place  slightly  more 
pressure on the political representation there than in other regions. Yes, because 
Prague is the centre, it is in the interest of journalists to cover it in every possible 
way.” Furthermore, it is claimed by a journalist (Interview 3) that in Prague, the 
media reports considerably about local issues; however, the focus is on details 
rather than long-scale issues. “In Prague, the coverage of local politics is of good 
quality. From personal experience, I know that we have high-quality public media, 
which,  despite  the  underfunding  of  actual  journalists,  still  provides  good 
coverage. National television is also interested in it; reports on Prague’s traffic 
regularly make it to the main news on Nova TV [a major public medium], which is 
probably as high-profile as it gets. So, I do perceive that the coverage is there, 
but often it feels like the focus is more on the details rather than on longer-term 
efforts.” Since Prague  is considered  the  centre,  it  attracts  the majority  of  high-
quality journalism positions, providing better conditions for investigating both local 
and  national  politics.  However,  at  the  regional  level  outside  the  capital,  local 
journalists  and  media  are  generally  underrepresented,  and  their  influence 
remains limited, as discussed further. 

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The report by the European Federation of Journalists (2019) contends that local 
media are in crisis. According to the Press Freedom ranking made by Reporters 
Without Border, the Czech Republic has dropped 27 places in five to ten years, 
from 13 in 2014 to 40 in 2019. However, in 2022, the position of Czechia improved 
and got to 19th place, and in 2024, even to 17th place (Reporters Without Borders 
2024a). There is a significant concentration of large media (Czech New Centre, 
MAFRA, Economia, etc.), while the prime minister of the country [in years 2017-
2021], Andrej Babiš, was the owner and is still the shadow owner of 30% of the 
biggest  private  media  in  the  country  (MAFRA).  However,  in  2023,  Babiš  sold 
MAFRA,  which positively impacted  the  position of  the  Czech  media  landscape 
(Reporters  Without  Borders  2024b).  Yet,  local  media  are  under  threat;  the 
position of public service media is challenged by parliament and politicians, and 
verbal attacks are being made by both the public and politicians.   

The number of local newspapers in Czechia has decreased drastically in the last 
few years. In 2009, there were about 60 regional newspapers, but currently, there 
are less than 30 local newspapers (Waschková Císařová 2024). There is a trend 
in media centralisation and content delocalisation (Waschková Císařová 2017). 
As  discussed  by  an  expert  (Interview  2):  “Regional  news  is  produced  from 
Prague, Brno, or other major cities. What interests us most in this regard is the 
situation  in  the  regions—what  independent  media  outlets  exist  there  that  can 
provide balance and context to the situation, and where to place the city council’s 
publications,  for  example,  in  terms  of  who  they  compete  with  for  advertising 
revenue, and so on. The situation in Prague is different and specific because it 
receives the most attention, even at the local level within the city itself.” The expert 
(Interview 2) develops the argument further when referring to the missing role of 
media as a watchdog in other regions: “The media in Prague fulfil this watchdog 
role,  which  is  not  the  case  in  the  regions.  As  a  result,  it  often  happens  that 
someone  enters  national  politics,  and  only  then  is  it  discovered  that  they 
plagiarised their thesis or have a fake degree because when they were a local 
councillor in the region, the media there failed to play this role.”  

The report by the European Federation of Journalists (2019) further indicates that 
local media are in a difficult position since “Free independent and impartial private 
media hardly exist as they are more or less instruments for either businessmen 
and oligarchs for marketing or for politicians running their campaigns”. Journalists 
are limited regarding the topic of political news as they are dependent on money 
from  advertisers.  They  block  the  news,  which  could  potentially  harm  their 
business.  Consequently,  local  media  have  limited  space  to  report  on  regional 
political issues or regional affairs. Journalists are locked in such positions as there 
is a lack of independent local media, which means they would not have any other 
choice  for a  job.  These  media  are  often  perceived  as  neutral,  as  their  primary 
focus is reporting practical, everyday matters related to the city’s operations. Yet 
their reliance on funding—whether through direct ties to the local government or 
advertising revenues—means that their content is, to some extent, shaped by the 

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political priorities and interests of those who provide the financial support. In other 
words,  with  declining  advertising  revenue  and  lack  of  state  subsidies,  private 
media  rely more  on  monetised  content,  while  small  independent media  turn  to 
non-profits and private foundations. However, Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s ruling 
coalition has implemented several legislative changes that may prove beneficial 
(Reporters Without Borders 2024b). Despite the unstable quality and funding of 
Czech  media,  their  overall  standard  remains  relatively  good,  with  significantly 
higher quality in Prague compared to other regions. This contributes to greater 
public  awareness  of  governance 
in  Prague,  and, 
consequently, to increased transparency. 

issues,  particularly 

3.1.15.2.  Bratislava 

National  media  in  Slovakia  have  experienced  a  long-term  decline  in  focus  on 
issues  related  to  democracy  at  the  local  and  regional  levels  (Kostelanský  and 
Kroková 2022). Journalists tend to be concentrated in Bratislava, where the more 
prestigious national media outlets are based. At the same time, local print media 
have shifted their focus to outlets covering multiple districts or larger geographic 
areas. However, the media landscape remains highly fragmented. The traditional 
role of regional media is increasingly being taken over by news outlets produced 
by  local  governments  and  commercial  advertising  newspapers,  which  are 
typically distributed directly to households (Kostelanský and Kroková 2022). This 
is also reflected by an interviewee (Interview 9) who argues that there is not much 
media coverage regarding the regions but at the city level. “Regarding regional 
politics, I can’t recall seeing anything about regions in larger daily newspapers. 
There are various city newspapers and similar publications, but these are typically 
published directly by the city or district, so they tend to be quite apolitical. They 
focus on what the city is doing, public events, and are mostly distributed for free 
to  households.“  Although  the  expert  (Interview  9)  describes  these  media  as 
apolitical, they are apolitical in the sense that they focus on reporting the everyday 
duties  and  responsibilities  of  the  city  (or  region)  and  provide  rather  practical 
information for daily life. However, since they are either produced by the local city 
council or heavily reliant on advertising, they are inevitably influenced by politics, 
as  the  content  must  align  with  the  provider’s  preferences.  This  means,  for 
example, there is little room for discussing larger political issues or problems at 
both  the  regional  and  national  levels.  Thus,  the  situation  is  similar  to  that  in 
Czechia. 

According  to  the  ranking  by  Reporters  Without  Borders  (2024a),  Slovakia 
experienced  a  significant  decline  over  five  years,  dropping  from  20th  place  in 
2014  to  35th  in  2019  (Reporters Without Borders 2024a).  By 2022,  before  the 
elections, Slovakia improved slightly to 27th place. However, this progress was 

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not  sustained,  as  the  country  slipped  back  to  29th  place  in  2024  (Reporters 
Without Borders 2024a). After several administrations aimed at improving press 
freedom, the 2023 parliamentary elections returned Prime Minister Robert Fico 
to power, ending these efforts. The instigator behind Jan Kuciak’s 2018 murder 
remains unconvinced, and journalists continue to face a hostile environment, with 
both public and private media vulnerable to external interests (Reporters Without 
Borders 2024c). While both countries have faced fluctuations in press freedom, 
Czech’s  recent  improvements  suggest  a  stronger  effort  to  rebuild  media 
autonomy, whereas Slovakia’s progress has been more inconsistent. 

According to the report of Slovak Transparency International  (Kostelanský and 
Kroková 2022), there are currently around 39 independent printed regional titles. 
However, a single publishing house manages half of these media, and five of the 
39  regional  titles  are  exclusively  in  Hungarian,  serving  only  the  Hungarian 
minority. As noted by the expert (Interview 5), local news coverage is generally 
less extensive than national coverage: “The local and regional level, I would say, 
is quite overlooked, with both journalists from Bratislava and regional journalists 
from  other  areas  paying  little  attention  to  it.  Occasionally,  something  might 
emerge  at  the  local  or  regional  level,  but  it’s  significantly  less  covered  than 
national issues. Media based in Bratislava and Bratislavský kraj focus much more 
on  national-level  scandals.”  The  expert  (Interview  5)  further  argues  that 
“Bratislava  is not  strong  at all  regarding  regional media; on  the  contrary, other 
regions in Slovakia, such as Košice, Žilina, or Nitra, are stronger. Bratislava truly 
focuses on the national level, and we don’t have any strong regional media here 
[in Bratislava].”  

Although Bratislavský kraj has stronger media coverage than other regions, the 
focus  is  not  particularly  on  local  issues;  instead,  the  media  mainly  report  on 
national matters. However, as noted by the other interviewees (Interviews 4, 9), 
the local government in Bratislava uses social media as an effective tool to inform 
citizens.  “In  many  cases,  I  notice  that  there  is  even  direct  communication  on 
social media in Bratislava. For example, a district mayor might personally respond 
to comments on Facebook. I’m not saying this is a widespread practice, but it’s 
definitely a significant channel for communication about local and regional issues 
and is quite powerful” (Interview 4). Thus, there are at least some initiatives aimed 
at improving communication between the city council and the public.  

While  local  media  are  not  strong  enough  to  report  on  local  politics,  generally, 
media are argued to be the most important factor in reporting corruption and non-
transparent behaviour. This is particularly relevant to whistleblowing as a lawyer 
(Interview  12)  notes:  “When  it  comes  to  politically  exposed  persons,  such  as 
mayors, municipal leaders, and similar figures, the tendency is to use the media, 
meaning they push information to the media so that someone else can uncover 
or bring attention to it. This regularly happens when a scandal emerges, clearly 
originating  from  the  local  environment,  meaning  someone  has  provided  the 
information, thus acting as a whistle-blower in the public interest. However, cases 

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where someone files a criminal complaint and actively engages in the matter are 
rare.  There  are  very  few  instances  of  a  personally  involved  citizen  taking  the 
initiative with a criminal complaint or similar actions.” Although the willingness to 
blow the whistle is increasing (as mentioned above), people are still quite hesitant 
to file a complaint directly. Thus, the role of media in transparency is claimed to 
be irreplaceable. 

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3.1.16. Summary of Explanatory Analysis  

In  the  explanatory  section,  we  examined  the  factors  influencing  the  quality  of 
governance—specifically  corruption,  transparency,  and  impartiality—in  the 
Bratislavský  kraj  and  Prague  regions.  Our  expert  interviews  emphasised  the 
significance of national-level dynamics and political culture, which may impact the 
EQI results. Although both regions represent capital areas, we observed a strong 
national  dimension  influence  in  Bratislavský  kraj,  as  Bratislava  residents’ 
preferences  often  diverge 
this, 
politicisation  in  Slovakia  is  notably  more  pronounced  and  pervasive.  While 
experts  acknowledged  the  presence  of  politicisation  in  Prague,  they 
emphasised that in Slovakia, it is more systemic, originating from the state level. 
This  became  particularly  evident  following  the  2023  elections  when  the  newly 
formed  Robert  Fico  government  undertook  significant  personnel  changes  in 
ministerial departments and local district administrations. 

from  national-level  politics.  Related 

to 

The  effectiveness  of  public  administration  in  both  Czechia  and  Slovakia  is 
constrained  by  a  zero-error  tolerance  culture  and  rigid  salary  scales.  The 
emphasis on avoiding errors has resulted in excessive regulation and a climate 
of  distrust,  hampering  administrative  efficiency.  Additionally,  the  inflexibility  of 
public sector salary structures has led municipal administrations in Prague and 
Bratislavský kraj to circumvent these constraints by establishing publicly owned 
companies. These entities, not bound by standard pay scales and strict oversight 
mechanisms, provide a means to mitigate the challenges posed by the zero-error 
tolerance  culture.  However,  they  also  introduce  risks  of  corruption  and 
politicisation. While salary unattractiveness in the public sector was highlighted 
as  a  concern  in  both  regions,  experts  and  data  indicate  that  this  issue  is 
particularly acute in Slovakia. 

Both Prague and Bratislava share similar challenges and strengths in their media 
landscapes,  although  the  scope  and  focus  of  these  issues  vary.  In  Prague,  a 
stronger  media  presence  with  higher-quality 
journalism  provides  more 
transparency  and  robust  coverage  of  political  issues.  However,  this  coverage 
often  emphasises  short-term  developments  rather  than  long-term,  systemic 
themes.  The  centralisation  of  media  and  the  decline  of  local  newspapers  in 
Czechia  have  weakened  regional  media’s  ability  to  consistently  cover  local 
politics. In Slovakia, Bratislava also dominates the national media landscape, but 
regional  media  are  more  fragmented  and  weaker.  This  has  contributed  to 
declining press freedom rankings and limited coverage of local politics. Moreover, 
Slovakia’s media environment is constrained by political influence and reliance 
on  advertising,  and  the  return  of  Prime  Minister  Robert  Fico  has  reversed 
progress on press freedom. Both cities illustrate how the centralisation of media 
and political challenges impact the quality and breadth of journalism at the local 
and  national  levels.  Despite  these  challenges,  media  play  a  critical  role  in 
uncovering corruption and fostering public accountability in both countries 

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and regions. Strengthening regional journalism in both Prague and Bratislava is 
vital  for  improving  transparency  and  democratic  oversight  in  their  respective 
nations. 

3.1.17. Conclusions 

This case study sought to explain the poor and outstanding performances of the 
Czech and Slovak capitals compared to other regions in their respective countries 
in  the  2024  EQI  results  (Charron,  Lapuente,  and  Bauhr  2024).  Additionally,  it 
aimed  to  understand  why  Bratislavský  kraj  underperforms  compared  to  the 
Prague  region.  To  address  these  goals,  we  interviewed  20  experts  from 
academia,  media,  public  administration,  and  NGOs.  We  triangulated  these 
interviews with other sources and academic literature. 

Firstly, in the descriptive section, we revealed that both Prague and Bratislavský 
kraj  operate  within  a  highly  regulated  but  underfunded  administrative  system, 
where  transparency,  impartiality  and  corruption  have  improved  but  remain 
imperfect.  The  subsection  on  public  education  and  healthcare  outlines  key 
differences  between  Prague  and  Bratislavský  kraj.  Although  Prague  faces 
similar  challenges  in  these  policy  areas,  it  still  offers  some  of  the  best 
services  compared  to  other  Czech  regions.  In  contrast,  Slovak  experts 
emphasised structural problems, particularly in healthcare, which are more 
visible  in  Bratislavský  kraj  than  elsewhere.  Secondly,  in  the  explanatory 
section, we argue that the perception of governance quality—specifically in 
terms of corruption, transparency, and impartiality—is influenced by views 
on  national  politics,  politicisation,  organisational  culture,  and  the  role  of 
local media. These factors are interconnected, as demonstrated by our study. In 
other  words,  politicisation  and  the  influence  of  the  national  level  shape 
administrative culture and are reflected not only in governance quality but also in 
media quality and media content. 

Prague is a pioneer in transparency and gender policy within public administration 
compared to other regions in Czechia. It also excels in the quality and availability 
of public education and healthcare services. Similarly, Bratislava is undergoing 
rapid change under a liberal regional and city government. In some cases, our 
experts argued that governance and public education quality in the Bratislavský 
kraj region surpass that of other regions. Why, then, were Czech experts critical 
of  public  administration  in  Prague,  while  Slovak  experts  generally  praised 
governance  in  Bratislavský  kraj—contrasting  with  the  EQI  results?  In  Prague, 
participants acknowledged that governance quality is higher than in other regions 
but  remained  critical  in  emphasising  the  need  for  continuous  improvement. 
Conversely,  in  Bratislava,  experts  were  more  sceptical  of  the  EQI  results, 
attributing  governance  challenges  to  national  rather  than  regional  issues.  In 

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particular,    people  often  struggle  to  distinguish  between  regional  and  national 
responsibilities  (Janas  and  Jánošková  2022).  Due  to  overlapping  governance 
levels, respondents answering EQI questions in the Bratislavský kraj region may 
envision municipal districts, the city, regional, or national government. The area 
where  they  live  may  thus  consist  of  several  governance  levels.  In  contrast, 
Prague’s situation is simpler since it functions as a city and a region, and Prague’s 
city  government  typically  mirrors  the  national  political  landscape.  Conversely, 
Bratislava’s  political  context  differs  significantly:  while  Bratislava’s  citizens 
generally  vote  for  liberal  parties,  the  national  government  is  dominated  by 
conservative  forces  and  illiberal  democratic  performances.  While  democratic 
backsliding is not currently a concern in Czechia, it is a significant worry 
for  liberal  Slovak  citizens  living  in  the  Bratislavský  kraj  region.  In  other 
words,  although  generally  satisfied  with  regional  political  leadership, 
Bratislava’s respondents may have reflected their dissatisfaction with the 
national government in the EQI survey responses.  

Further, in line with academic research (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012; Kohoutek 
and Nekola 2021; Rybář and Podmaník 2020), we have found that Slovakia and 
Czechia  are  both  fragile  in  the  context  of  senior  civil  service  politicisation.  We 
aimed to fill the gap in looking at the politicisation at the local level (cf. Prachárová 
and Kačur 2018).  Our data  suggests  that  in  Prague,  the  politicisation at the 
city level is receding with the rise of increased transparency and regulation. 
Politicisation  was  mainly  perceived  through  the  management  of  the  city 
companies  or  hospital  management.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Slovakia,  the 
politicisation is much more vivid in the senior positions at the ministries, 
but  also  at  the  lower  levels  of  administration  (see  also  Meyer-Sahling  and 
Veen 2012). This was especially evident after the 2023 elections when Robert 
Fico’s  populist  government  returned  to  power.  The  leadership  of  the  Fico 
government  makes  Slovak  public  administration  highly  vulnerable  to  political 
influence, potentially affecting its impartiality and perceptions of corruption among 
Bratislavský  kraj  respondents.  Despite  the  shortcomings  in  Czechia  (Prague), 
politicisation in Slovakia appears more pronounced and severe. 

Given that both  countries  formed a  common  state  until 1993,  it  is unsurprising 
that  we  found  similar  characteristics  in  their  bureaucratic  administration.  Both 
regions  and  their  countries,  in  general,  are  marked  by  a  zero-error  tolerance 
culture (Plaček et al. 2024) and widespread distrust between public officials and 
the  public  and  towards  the  public  administration  as a  system.  This  zero-error 
tolerance  culture  within  public  institutions,  combined  with  a  fear  of 
fragmentation  of 
corruption, 
responsibilities.  Moreover, 
individuals  often 
perceiving  public  servants’  actions  as  self-interested  or  lazy,  undermining  the 
prestige of official positions. Subsequently, the inflexibility of the public pay scale 
salary system has driven municipal administrations in Prague and Bratislavský 
kraj to establish municipal companies as a workaround. These entities, operating 

in  overregulation  and 

fosters  scepticism,  with 

results 

the 

it 

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outside  standard pay  regulations  and oversight  mechanisms,  help mitigate  the 
challenges posed by the zero-error culture but also increase risks of corruption 
and  politicisation.  While  low  public  sector  salaries  are  a  concern  in  both 
regions, experts and data (Černěnko 2020; MFSR 2020; 2024) suggest that 
the  issue  is  particularly  pronounced  in  Bratislavský  kraj  compared  to 
Prague.  Consequently,  younger  and  highly  educated 
from 
Bratislavský kraj are more likely to pursue employment in the private sector or 
seek opportunities abroad, which negatively impacts governance quality. 

individuals 

The media landscape in Prague and Bratislava highlights differences in local and 
national coverage, press  freedom,  and the  role  of  local journalism.  In  Prague, 
the media play a critical role in promoting transparency, as emphasised by 
experts. Due to Prague’s status as the political and economic centre, it attracts 
top  journalistic  talent,  resulting  in  more  intensive  political  coverage.  Reporters 
Without Borders (2024a) confirms improvements in press freedom in the Czech 
Republic, with the country rising from 40th place in 2019 to 17th in 2024. This 
progress was partly influenced by former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš’s sale of 
MAFRA  (Reporters  Without  Borders  2024b),  which  positively  impacted  media 
independence. However, regional journalism remains underserved, as noted by 
Waschková  Císařová  (2024),  which  potentially  enables  local  political  issues 
outside  of  Prague  to  go  unexamined.  In  contrast,  in  Slovakia,  Bratislava’s 
media  primarily  focuses  on  national  issues,  with  less  attention  given  to 
local  and  regional  topics.  Much  of  the  local  news  is  produced  by  city 
governments or advertising-driven newspapers, which limits the space for critical 
reporting  (Kostelanský  and  Kroková  2022).  Slovakia’s  press  freedom  has 
fluctuated, declining from 20th place in 2014 to 29th in 2024 (Reporters Without 
Borders  2024a),  with  the  situation  worsening  following  Prime  Minister  Robert 
Fico’s return to power. Despite the challenges, both cities rely on media exposure 
as a critical mechanism for addressing corruption and non-transparent behaviour, 
highlighting the indispensable role of journalism in democratic governance. 

3.1.18. Policy Recommendations 

In  this  last  subsection,  suggesting  policy  recommendations,  we  begin  with  the 
knowledge  gap,  which  emerged  as  one  of  the  key  issues  in  the  interviews.  A 
significant challenge in ensuring informed and transparent governance is the lack 
of  clarity  surrounding  the  competencies  assigned  to  different  levels  of 
government. While residents recognise regional and city leaders, they are much 
less aware of their actual responsibilities. Consequently, this lack of transparency 
often limits public awareness and engagement with local and regional issues, as 
citizens struggle to understand which government bodies are responsible for what 
(Janas and Jánošková 2022, 68). Therefore, public authorities should take the 

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to 

improve  communication  regarding 

initiative 
the  distribution  of 
responsibilities  across  various  levels  of  governance.  By  investing  in 
clearer public outreach and providing more accessible information about 
the  roles  and  duties  of  different  governmental  bodies,  authorities  can 
enhance  transparency.  This  proactive  approach  would  help  citizens  better 
navigate the complexities of governance and contribute to a more informed and 
engaged electorate. Increased efforts to clarify these distinctions would increase 
public trust and transparency in decision-making processes. 

The  impact  of  politicisation  on  public  administration  and  its  impartiality  is 
particularly  concerning  in  Slovakia,  where  the  government  can  easily  replace 
senior  public  officials  and  lower-level  public  administration  employees.  State-
delegated  power  is  managed  through  district  offices,  which  operate  as 
subordinate  entities  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  without  legal  personality 
(Prachárová and Kačur 2018). As demonstrated in the analytical section, these 
positions are highly susceptible to political influence. A key recommendation is 
to reduce political interference and strengthen the independence of district 
offices in Slovakia. 

In  post-communist  countries,  public  administration  remains  undervalued  and 
poorly compensated, exacerbating systemic inefficiencies  (Liebert, Condrey, and 
Goncharov  2013).  We  recommend  increasing  public  sector  funding  and 
salaries  to  reduce  corruption,  limit  bribery,  and  enhance  impartiality.  In 
Bratislavský kraj specifically, higher salaries would make public sector positions 
more  competitive  and  help  counteract  politicisation  in  public  procurement. 
Challenging  the  prevailing  cost-cutting  approach,  Liptáková  (2020)  notes  that 
countries  with  the  lowest  corruption  levels—such  as  Denmark,  Finland,  and 
Sweden—typically have robust public sectors. 

To strengthen local and regional media, increasing public funding from diverse 
sources—state subsidies, NGOs, the EU, or international organisations—could 
reduce  dependence  on  advertising  or  political  ties,  ensuring  more  balanced 
reporting  across  regions.  Transparent  criteria  for  fund  allocation,  prioritising 
journalistic  quality,  public  impact,  and  regional  coverage  are  essential  to 
safeguarding  editorial  independence.  Drawing  on  mechanisms  such  as 
legislative safeguards that have enhanced media freedom elsewhere could 
help  mitigate  political  and  financial  pressures  and  reinforce  editorial 
autonomy.  Additionally,  establishing  grants  or 
to  support 
investigative journalism in underserved regions would enhance coverage of local 
issues, fostering greater transparency and accountability. These measures would 
promote a more independent and resilient regional media environment. 

fellowships 

Enhancing  digitalisation  and  e-government  could  significantly  improve 
governance  in  Czechia  and  Slovakia.  Digitalisation  has  been  designated  a 
national priority in both countries (Jākobsone 2022; OECD 2023). A notable case 
that  drew  public  and  media  attention  occurred  in  September  2024,  when  the 

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Attica, Prague and Bratislava Regions 

Czech  Prime  Minister  dismissed  Ivan  Bartoš  (Pirate  Party),  the  Minister  for 
Regional  Development,  over  the  failed  digitalisation  of  the  building  permit 
process.  This  led  the  Pirate  Party  to  withdraw  from  the  government.  E-
government  was  a  recurring  topic  in  our  interviews  with  Slovak  and  Czech 
experts,  who  emphasised  the  sluggish  progress.  Key  challenges  include  low 
public  sector  salaries,  inadequate  government  office  infrastructure,  and  poorly 
designed  legislation.  Additionally,  experts  frequently  highlighted  deficiencies  in 
housing  availability  and  transportation  infrastructure  despite  not  being  our 
research’s  primary  focus.  The  spontaneous  mention  of  these  issues  suggests 
broader dissatisfaction with public services. Future research should explore these 
policies and their impact on the quality of governance. 

114 

 
 
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Waschková  Císařová.  2017.  ‘Should  We  Consider  Local  Newspaper  Chains 
Local  Media?  Development  of  the  Local  Press  Chain  in  the  Czech 
Republic’. Mediální Studia 11 (2): 112–28 

Waschková Císařová, Lenka. 2024. ‘We Were Innovators, but We Gave up: The 
Muted Digital Transition of Local Newspapers’. Digital Journalism 12 (1): 83–100. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2023.2180405 

Zachar,  Dušan,  and  Dominika  Iršová.  2023.  ‘Výberové  konania  riaditeľov  v 
International  Slovensko.  6  March  2023. 
zdravotníctve’.  Transparency 
https://transparency.sk/sk/analyza-vyberovych-konani-na-riaditelske-posty-v-
zdravotnictve/  

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Getting in touch with the EU 

In person 

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct centres. 
You can find the address of the centre nearest you online (european-
union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en). 

On the phone or in writing 

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European 
Union. You can contact this service: 

–  by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for 

these calls), 

–  at the following standard number: +32 22999696, 
–  via the following form: european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en. 

Finding information about the EU 

Online 

Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is 
available on the Europa website (european-union.europa.eu). 

EU publications 

You can view or order EU publications at op.europa.eu/en/publications. 
Multiple copies of free publications can be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local documentation centre (european-union.europa.eu/contact-
eu/meet-us_en). 

EU law and related documents 

For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 
in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex (eur-lex.europa.eu). 

EU open data 

The portal data.europa.eu provides access to open datasets from the EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies. These can be downloaded and reused for 
free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. The portal also 
provides access to a wealth of datasets from European countries. 

 
 
 
 
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