Case C-333/25 P: Appeal brought on 15 May 2025 by Aleksandra Melnichenko against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26/02/2025 in Case T-498/22, Melnichenko v Conseil
Date: 2025-05-15
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EU restrictive measure, Russo-Ukrainian issue, economic sanctions, freezing of assets, international sanctions, natural person, presumption of innocence, principle of proportionality, rights of the defence, trust company








C_202503637EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/3637


14.7.2025






Appeal brought on 15 May 2025 by Aleksandra Melnichenko against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 26/02/2025 in Case T-498/22, Melnichenko v Conseil


(Case C-333/25 P)

(C/2025/3637)
Language of the case: English

Parties


Appellant: Aleksandra Melnichenko (represented by: H. Bajer Pellet, A. Beauchemin, A. Miron, D. Müller, avocats, C. Zatschler SC, barrister and Y. Shumilov, solicitor)

Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, EuroChem Group AG, Siberian Coal Energy Company AO (Suek) and Kingdom of Belgium

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside the Judgment of the General Court of 26 February 2025 in Melnichenko v. Council, T-498/22 in whole; and










—


dispose of the actions on the merits and annul the Contested Acts, insofar as they concern the Appellant; and










—


order the Council to pay the costs of the proceedings at both instances;










—


or in the alternative, remit the case to the General Court.





Pleas in law and main arguments







1)


The General Court erred in finding that the criterion of ‘association’ with a person or entity listed under criterion (g) is lawful
The General Court committed an error of law in considering that Article 215 TFEU permitted the designation of non-State actors not connected to the State or the situation combatted to coerce a State.
The lack of definition of the criterion of ‘association’ and the General Court’s own interpretation of it violated the principle of foreseeability and legal certainty.










2)


The General Court violated the rules of evidence and of the rights of defence of the Appellant
The General Court erred in law by holding that the demonstration of a specific risk of circumvention on the part of the Appellant was not required, thus creating a presumption not provided by law and in practice irrebuttable. This illegal presumption amounts to an illegitimate reversal of the burden of proof.
The General Court infringed the Appellant’s rights of defence by breaching the presumption of innocence, insofar as it made assertions tantamount to accusations of circumvention, unsupported by solid evidence.










3)


The General Court wrongly applied the criterion of association in respect of the Appellant
The General Court erred in finding ‘association’ between the Appellant and her husband based on their (successive) involvement in the Firstline Trust. It failed to consider the legal nature of the trust and to establish a genuine commonality of interests.
The General Court distorted evidence in finding that such common economic interests is proven by the (automatic) change of beneficiary in the trust as being part of scheme design the prevent the freeze of the assets in the trust.
The General Court substituted its own reasoning for that of the Council and distorted the evidence by concluding that the Appellant took advantage of her husband’s fortune and benefited from his wealth because of the distribution of shares by the trustees.










4)


The General Court erred in finding that the infringement of the Appellant’s fundamental rights and freedoms was proportionate
The General Court failed to assess whether the measure was appropriate to advance the objective of the Contested Acts by refusing to require that ‘association’ encompass an objective link to the government or the situation combatted.
The General Court failed to conduct an individualised assessment of appropriateness as part of its full review and thus did not engage with the minimum safeguard to the discretionary power of the Council.
The General Court undermined the rule of law by permitting the restriction of rights attached to Union citizenship without reference to any personal conduct or substantive rights-based assessment.
The General Court’s interpretation of the listing conditions has the effect of locking the Appellant indefinitely into restrictive measures as she is not listed on account of her conduct, in violation of her right to human dignity.






ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3637/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)