Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 : main report.
Date: 2025-05-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for International Partnerships
Subjects: EU action, South Sudan, aid evaluation, cooperation policy, coordination of aid, development aid, food security, green economy, rule of law, the EU's international role

COUNTRY EVALUATION 

EVALUATION OF EU COOPERATION WITH 
SOUTH SUDAN, 2011-2023

MAIN REPORT 

April 2025 

International 
Partnerships 

 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prepared by: 

Landell Mills International Limited 

The Old Station House, 15A Main Street,  

Blackrock, Dublin,  

Ireland 

Contact person: Pascal O’Neill: pascal_oneill@landell-mills.com 

Framework Contract EuropeAid/140122/DH/SER/multi (EVA 2020) 

Contract No 300083360 

Contract title  

Evaluation of the EU Cooperation with South Sudan 2011-2023

Emery Brusset  

David Moore  

Anwar Al Shami  

Nicholas Wilson  

Pascal O’Neill  

Authors 

Saskia Van Crugten 

Rupinder Singh  

Nicole Ball  

Chol Deng  

The Forcier Enumerators and 

Data Collectors

Contact information: 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) 
Directorate D - Sustainable Development Policy and Coordination 
Unit D.4 – Quality and Results, Evaluation and Knowledge Management 
Email: INTPA-EVALUATIONS@ec.europa.eu  
B-1049 Brussels, Belgium 

EU International Partnerships: 
https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/our-impact/monitoring-and-evaluation_en 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 2 

 
 
 
 
 
       
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGAL NOTICE 

This document has been prepared for the European Commission, as part of the evaluations of the Directorate-General for 
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ISBN 978-92-68-27271-8 

ISSN 2529-3338 

doi: 10.2841/2856721 

MN-01-25-011-EN-N 

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cover; photo, UNICEF, Sigfried Modola, 2017;

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

Contents 

List of Annexes 

List of Figures 

List of Tables 

List of Boxes 

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Acknowledgements 

Executive Summary 

1. Introduction 

2. Findings 

3. Conclusions 

4. Recommendations 

5. Broader lessons to be drawn 

1. 

Introduction 

1.1. Description of the Evaluation 

1.1.1. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation 

1.1.2. Scope of the evaluation 

1.1.3. Evaluation criteria and questions 

1.1.4. Data Collection 

1.1.5. Limitations 

1.2. The evaluated portfolio 

1.3. Country context 

2.  Findings 

2.1. EQ 1 - Adaptation and Responsiveness to South Sudan's Needs 

2.1.1. The design has considered existing national priorities and policies (JC1.1) 

2.1.2. Designs succeeded in incorporating needs as allowed by constraints (JC1.2) 

2.1.3. Flexibility of EU response to evolving needs (JC1.3) 

2.2. EQ2 - Benefits of the MIP Compared to Past Cooperation 

2.2.1. More structured alignment with EU policy priorities (JC2.1) 

2.2.2. More coherent collaboration between EU and non-EU-interventions (JC2.2) 

2.2.3. More predictable, consistent and inclusive approach (JC2.3) 

2.2.4. More visible and lasting results (JC2.4) 

2.3. EQ3 - Joint Approach in EU and External Relations 

2.3.1. The EU and its Member States represented a meaningful contribution (JC3.1) 

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Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page v 

 
 
2.3.2. EU support coordinated and complementary to other major donors (JC3.2) 

2.3.3. EU joint approach effectively adopted in the bilateral cooperation (JC3.3) 

2.3.4. Improved aid effectiveness of EU and Member States with TEI (JC3.4) 

2.4. EQ4 - Use of a diversified funding toolbox 

2.4.1. The geographic programme is complemented by thematic ones (JC4.1) 

2.4.2. Use of rapid and contingency funding to tackle current challenges (JC4.2) 

2.4.3. Mix of implementation modalities appropriate to the context (JC4.3) 

2.4.4. Volume of financing allocated corresponds to the support identified (JC4.4) 

2.5. EQ5 - Implementation of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus 

2.5.1. Triple nexus approach integrated into the management processes (JC5.1) 

2.5.2. Triple nexus strengthened by spending and non-spending activities (JC5.2) 

2.5.3. EU spending and non-spending interventions allowed and strengthened the Humanitarian-
Development-Peace Nexus in the country 

2.6. EQ6 - Contributions to the Green Economy Sector 

2.6.1. Overall contribution to economic development (JC6.1) 

2.6.2. Contribution to an enabling environment for private sector. 

2.6.3. Contribution to improving food and nutrition security (JC6.3) 

2.6.4. Contribution to a more sustainable environment and resilience to climate change (JC6.4) 

2.7. EQ7 - Contributions to the Human Development Sector 

2.7.1. Contribution to development of the primary and secondary education sector (JC7.1) 

2.7.2. Contribution to a more inclusive access to primary and secondary education (JC7.2) 

2.7.3. Contribution to the development of the country primary health care (PHC), nutrition and reproductive 
health sector (JC7.3) 

2.7.4. Contribution to a more inclusive access to primary health care, nutrition and reproductive health 
services (JC7.4) 

2.8. EQ8 - Contributions to Governance and Rule of Law 

2.8.1. Contribution to improved PFM (JC8.1) 

2.8.2. Contribution to institutional and governance strengthening (JC8.2) 

2.8.3. Contribution to subnational development and local governance (JC8.3) 

2.8.4. Contribution to strengthening civil society and democratic participation (JC8.4) 

2.9. EQ9 - Mainstreaming of Cross-Cutting Issues 

2.9.1. Human rights, democracy, gender equality have been mainstreamed (JC9.1) 

2.9.2. Climate change adaptation and environmental protection have been mainstreamed (JC9.2) 

2.9.3. Conflict sensitivity has been mainstreamed (JC9.3) 

2.9.4. Sensitivity to displacement situation has been mainstreamed (JC9.4) 

3.  Conclusions and Recommendations 

3.1. Conclusions 

3.1.1. Introduction 

3.1.2. Overall assessment 

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Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page vi 

 
 
 
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3.1.3. Conclusion 

3.1.4. Adopting a new paradigm for cooperation 

3.1.5. Working from the local towards the centre 

3.1.6. Supporting local systems for resilience 

3.1.7. Building the Management Capacity of the EUD 

3.1.8. Specific recommendations for the Green Economy sector 

3.1.9. Specific recommendations for the Human Development sector 

3.1.10. Specific recommendations for the rule of law and human rights sector 

3.2. Lessons identified 

3.2.1. Areas where practices supported outcomes 

3.2.2. Areas where additional attention is required 

List of Annexes  

Annex I: Contributing Evaluators 

Annex II: List of persons and organisations consulted 

Annex III: Evaluation Matrix 

Annex IV: Overall Intervention Logic of EU cooperation with South Sudan 

Annex V: The EU funding toolbox: lessons learned and recommendations 

Annex VI: Appendices for the Green Economy sector 

Annex VII: Appendices for the Human Development sectors 

Annex VIII: Appendices for the Governance and Rule of Law sector 

Annex IX: Appendices on the triple nexus, peace and displacement 

Annex X: Evaluation Methodology 

Annex XI: Calendar of evaluation activities 

Annex XII: Summary assessment of robustness of evidence collected 

Annex XIII: Evidence Matrix 

1.  Evidence related to EQ1 – Adaptation and responsiveness 
2.  Evidence related to EQ2 – Benefits from the MIP 
3.  Evidence related to EQ3 – Joint approaches in EU and external relations 
4.  Evidence related to EQ4 – Use of diversified funding toolbox 
5.  Evidence related to EQ5 – Implementation of the HDP Nexus 
6.  Evidence related to EQ6 – Contribution to the Green Economy 
7.  Evidence related to EQ7 – Contribution to Human Development 
8.  Evidence related to EQ8 – Contribution to Governance and Rule of Law 
9.  Evidence related to EQ9 – Integration of cross-cutting issues 

Annex XIV: Terms of Reference 

Annex XV: List of documents consulted 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page vii 

 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures  

Figure 1 Overall Evaluation Calendar of Key Activities ................................................................................................ 3 

Figure 2 Disbursement timeline across financial management areas .......................................................................... 5 

Figure 3 EU spending disaggregated by sectors over time ........................................................................................ 14 

Figure 4 EU spending disaggregated by geographic and thematic funding tools-in blue (in M€ over time) .............. 21 

Figure 5 Mix of management mode in EU cooperation in South Sudan between 2011-2023 ................................... 23 

Figure 6 Yearly Payments by Directorate-General ..................................................................................................... 27 

List of Tables 

Table 1 Overview of the scope of the evaluation.......................................................................................................... 1 

Table 2 Evaluation Questions and their Coverage of Evaluation Criteria .................................................................... 2 

Table 3 The diversity of evaluation tools employed by the evaluation team ................................................................ 3 

Table 4 Overview of the evaluated portfolio ................................................................................................................. 6 

Table 5 Specificities of EU in the type of support provided to South Sudan compared to other donors .................... 18 

Table 6 From programming to commitment: pace per priority area of the MIP under NDICI GEO (amounts in EUR 
million and decisions) ................................................................................................................................................. 25 

List of Boxes 

Box 1 Example of pre-MIP internal coherence within EU portfolio ............................................................................. 12 

Box 2 Linking contextual and peace factors to EU spending over time ..................................................................... 13 

Box 3 Example of the budgetary additionality of EU to the health sector of South Sudan......................................... 15 

Box 4 Example of “atypical implementation modalities” consisting in non-spending activities for EU political and 
policy dialogues in South Sudan................................................................................................................................. 24 

Box 5 The EUD staffing challenges and their implication for implementing EU cooperation ..................................... 25 

Box 6 Key numbers of EU contribution to the economic infrastructure between 2011 and 2023 .............................. 30 

Box 7 EU contribution to food security at the macro and meso level ......................................................................... 33 

Box 8 Snapshot view of EU-results in food security in South Sudan between 2017 and 2022 ................................. 34 

Box 9 Examples of EU-supported governance, resilience and peacebuilding efforts at the subnational level .......... 47 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page viii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AC/ROL 

AJ/ROL 

AML 

ANC 

ART 

Accountability and rule of law 

Access to justice and rule of law 

Anti-money laundering 

Antenatal care 

Antiretroviral Therapy  

BEmONC 

Basic obstetric and neonatal care 

BHI 

BMZ 

BTL 

CAHW 

CEmONC 

CJS 

CC 

CEP 

CFT 

CO 

CPPB 

CRIS 

Boma Health Initiative 

German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 

Back to learning 

Community Animal Health Workers 

Comprehensive obstetric and neonatal care 

Criminal Justice System 

Climate Change 

Country Environmental Profile 

Combatting the financing of terrorism 

Country Office 

Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 

Common External Relations Information System 

CRS-OECD 

Common Reporting Standard – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

CSO 

CSRF 

Civil Society Organisation 

Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility 

CTSAMVM 

Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism 

DCI 

DG EAC 

DG ECHO 

DG INTPA 

EAMR 

EDF 

EEAS 

EFSD+ 

EIDHR 

EiE 

EiC 

EMIS 

EQ 

ET 

EU 

EUD 

EUTF  

FGD 

FPI 

FSTP 

GAP 

GDP 

Development Cooperation Instrument 

Directorate-General for Education and Culture 

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations 

Directorate-General for International Partnerships 

External Assistance Management Report 

European Development Fund 

European External Action Service 

European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus 

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 

Education in Emergencies 

Education in Conflict 

Education Management Information System 

Evaluation Question 

Evaluation Team 

European Union 

European Union Delegation 

European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular 
migration and displaced persons in Africa 
Focus Group Discussion 

Foreign Policy Instrument 

Food Security Thematic Programme 

Gender Action Plan 

Gross Domestic Product 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page ix 

 
 
GESI 

GESS 

GEWE 

GIZ 

GoSS 

HDI 

HDP 

HMIS 

HPF 

HRVP 

HRW 

HSS 

HSSP 

ICRC 

IcSP 

IDLO 

IDP 

IGAD 

ILO 

IMF 

IMR 

IOM 

IP 

IPC 

JC 

JRC 

KI 

MCH 

Gender and Social Inclusion 

Girls Education South Sudan 

Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Project 

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 

Government of South Sudan 

Human development indicator 

Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus 

Health Management Information System 

Health Pooled Fund 

High Representative / Vice President 

Human Rights Watch 

Health System Strengthening 

Health Sector Strategic Plan 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace 

International Development Law Organisation 

Internally displaced people 

Intergovernmental Authority on Development 

International Labour Organisation 

International Monetary Fund 

Infant Mortality Rate 

International Organisation for Migration 

Implementing Partner 

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 

Judgement Criteria 

Joint Research Centre 

Key Informant 

Maternal and Child Health 

MGCSW 

Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare 

MMR 

MFF 

MIP 

MoAFS 

MoEF 

MoFP 

MoGEI 

MoH 

MoJCA 

MoLF 

MoTI 

MoWT 

MS 

MSME 

MT 

NDICI 

NRSWG 

ODA 

OECD 

Maternal Mortality Ratio 

Multi-annual Financial Framework 

Multiannual Indicative Programme 

Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 

Ministry of Environment and Forestry 

Ministry of Finance and Planning 

Ministry of General Education and Instruction South Sudan 

Ministry of Health 

Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 

Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries 

Ministry of Trade and Industry 

Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation, and Tourism 

Member State 

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 

Metric tonnes 

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 

Natural Resource Sector Working Group 

Overseas Development Assistance 

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page x 

 
 
 
OVCs 

PEPFAR 

PFM 

PLHIV 

PHC 

PPP 

R-ARCSS 

RJMEC 

RG 

ROL 

ROL/AJ 

ROM 

RSRTF 

RTGoNU 

SDG 

SGBV 

SPLM/A 

SRHR 

SSHRC 

TA 

TEI 

ToC 

ToR 

TPD 

TVET 

UCT 

Orphans and Vulnerable Children  

US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

Public Finance Management 

People living with HIV 

Primary Health Care 

Public-Private Partnerships 

Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 

Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission 

Reference Group 

Rule of Law 

Rule of law and access to justice 

Results-Oriented Monitoring 

UN Reconciliation, Stabilisation, and Resilience Trust Fund 

Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity 

Sustainable Development Goals 

Sexual and gender-based violence 

Sudan People's Liberation Movement 

Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights 

Social Sciences Humanities Research Council 

Technical Assistance 

Team Europe Initiative 

Theory of Change 

Terms of Reference 

Teacher Professional Development 

Technical and Vocational Education and Training 

Unconditional cash transfers 

UK FCDO 

United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office 

UNDP 

UNEG 

UNFPA 

UNHCR 

UNICEF 

UNMISS 

UNOPS 

USAID 

USD 

VSLA 

WASH 

WFP 

WHO 

United Nations Development Programme 

United Nations Evaluation Group 

United Nations Population Fund 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

United Nations Children's Fund 

United Nations Mission in South Sudan 

United Nations Office for Project Services 

United States Agency for International Development 

United States Dollar 

Village Savings and Loan Association 

Water, sanitation and hygiene 

World Food Programme 

World Health Organisation 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xi 

 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 

The Evaluation Team would like to extend its sincerest thanks to the DG INTPA core evaluation management 
team (Cécile Delhez and Anna-Lorenza Pigazzini) for their contributions, diligence and attentiveness shown 
throughout this evaluation process. We would also like to thank the EU Delegation in Juba, the Steering 
Committee and wider pool of key informants for their candour and illuminating insights during stakeholder 
interviews. We are also very grateful to the EU implementing partners who supported the evaluation team in 
accessing the field.  

The evaluation team is composed of: 
•  Emery Brusset, Team Leader 
•  Saskia Van Crugten, Deputy Team Leader 
•  David Moore, Senior Evaluator 
•  Rupinder Singh, Senior Evaluator 
•  Anwar Al Shami, Research Analyst 
•  Nicole Ball, Quality Assurance 
•  Pascal O’Neill, Contract Manager 
•  Nicholas Wilson, Field Research Coordinator 
•  Chol Deng, Field Researcher 
•  The Forcier Enumerators and Data Collectors

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xii 

 
 
 
Executive Summary 

1. Introduction 

The evaluation provides an independent assessment of the performance of the cooperation managed by 
European Commission (referred to as the European Union (EU)) in South Sudan between 2011 and 2024, 
including the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the Foreign Policy Instrument, but excluding humanitarian aid. It 
covers financial assistance, political and policy dialogue, and the alignment of interventions with national 
priorities. The total spending reached EUR 521 million (aside from EUR 959 million in humanitarian aid) over 
the period. The evaluation identifies lessons learned, guides future programming, and improves cooperation 
in fragile contexts.  

In view of the considerable scope, the evaluation uses a combination of primary and secondary data: an 
extensive portfolio analysis (including a quantitative analysis of budget allocations); a review of the results 
attained for a sample of 51 interventions; a series of five field case studies. The evaluation was conducted 
between January 2024 and March 2025. The following analysis is structured on the basis of the Evaluation 
Questions (EQ) drawn from the Terms of Reference (TOR) and agreed with the Evaluation Reference Group 
(RG).  

2. Findings 

EQ1: To what extent has EU cooperation with South Sudan adapted and responded flexibly to the needs of 
the country?  

The EU’s cooperation proved to be highly adaptive to the dynamic context of South Sudan. There was in 
particular a well-managed shift from a full alignment with national priorities to a more self-driven programming 
approach from 2013 after the eruption of civil war in December 2013, marking a continual struggle for power 
and resources in the country. The EU recognised it was overly ambitious to conduct Public Finance 
Management (PFM) reform and capacity building coupled with budget support within a broader state building 
exercise under these conditions. The recognition of the lack of government interest triggered a move toward 
using implementing agencies without abandoning state building objectives.  

However, the weak governance capacity of South Sudan limited the effectiveness of these responses. To 
avoid becoming captive to the lack of a strong national framework the EU often relied on international 
standards and donor-driven strategies, but these only provide broad guidance. This in turn has constrained 
long-term impact and sustainability within a broad range of sectors with few mutual synergies. The 
establishment of the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) in 2021 provided a coherent framework for 
programming but did not fully address the challenges of implementing interventions in a volatile environment. 

EQ2: To what extent has the MIP for South Sudan brought additional benefits compared to past EU 
cooperation without multi-annual programming? 

EU cooperation under the 2021-2027 MIP, when compared to pre-2021 EU cooperation, shows enhanced 
alignment with policy priorities, in particular by formalising the focus on priority sectors like education, health, 
agriculture, and food security. The MIP fostered a more predictable and consistent programming approach 
within these core sectors, providing a clearer framework for EU programming efforts and strengthening 
continuity. This was especially valuable considering significant staff turnover within the Delegation of the EU 
to South Sudan (EUD).  

However, the MIP’s capacity as a tool to strategically drive implementation is constrained by the persistent 
challenges which prevail in the South Sudan context, and the limitations of top-down ambitious new priorities 
like digitalisation or the public-private partnership approach. While the programming clarified objectives for 
complementarity in programme design, notably reinforcing conflict sensitivity and the Humanitarian 
Development and Peace (HDP) Nexus across EU interventions, these were already central to previous EU 
instruments. Its wider impact on coordination among a diversity of actors including EU-based non-government 
organisations (NGO) and multilateral was limited as it was seen more as a useful informational document. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xiii 

 
 
The MIP’s benefit as a programming tool for concentrated support within priority sectors also delivered limited 
transformative change. Data shows no major shift in sectoral funding distribution within these core areas, nor 
a significant change in the diversity of implementing actors. From 2012 to 2023, the EU relied heavily on 
international NGOs, contractors and the UN, with increasing diversity from 2017. 

EQ3: To what extent has an increasingly joint approach (within the EU and with non-EU actors) allowed for 
more and better results from EU cooperation with South Sudan? 

From 2011 to 2022 the EU and its Member States (MS) were the second largest donors in South Sudan, 
collectively contributing EUR 3.06 billion, representing 34% of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Their 
harmonised policy dialogue and political engagement amplified impact, exemplified by the significant 
influence of the EU and its Member States in PFM and peace processes, despite limited direct spending.  

Key support sectors often exceeded one-third of total donor spending, included Stability and Peace Building 
(EUR 297.9 million) and Education (EUR 178.3 million), with significant contributions also in Food Security 
(EUR 400.8 million), Gender Equality (EUR 53.9 million), and Human Rights (EUR 33.1 million). This 
combined financial and non-spending approach, coordinated between EU and its Member States, made their 
response more impactful than individual efforts would have been. This is shown for example in the joint efforts 
in local seed production and value chains. 

The EU actively promoted donor coordination, leading mechanisms such as the Joint Donor Team and 
pioneering Joint Programming in South Sudan. This commitment to coordination aimed for complementarity, 
reducing aid duplication, which were further supported by mechanisms like the area-based joint programming 
in some interventions. Despite conflict disrupting formal plans, coordination persisted, formalised by the Team 
Europe Approach (TEA). Joint implementation via the contribution of the EU and its Member States to pooled 
funds and co-financing demonstrates tangible joint action. These frameworks led to a more cohesive EU 
support package.  

The Team Europe Initiative (TEI), a headquarters-driven effort to enhance aid effectiveness, had on the other 
hand a negligible impact in South Sudan. Constrained by the limited number of Member States present, 
misaligned programming cycles, and global EU visibility priorities, Team Europe remained weak. While 
isolated aid effectiveness improvements occurred (in particular joint coordination and implementation), 
systemic enhancement under TEI is not in evidence. Structural obstacles and limited joint action hindered the 
TEI's capacity to deliver better results compared to pre-TEI approaches. The TEI's top-down nature further 
limited its effectiveness in addressing locally perceived needs and context. 

EQ4: To what extent has EU cooperation in South Sudan made use of the diversified funding toolbox offered 
by the past and present EU financing frameworks? 

The EU employed a diversified funding approach through geographic and thematic programmes, adapting to 
challenges posed by the country’s exclusion from the Cotonou Agreement. The EU initially relied on regional 
European Development Fund (EDF) and European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF) resources, alongside humanitarian 
aid from the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations (DG ECHO). 
Being on the EU’s crisis-affected country list allowed for flexible contracting, with negotiated procedures 
frequently used to engage NGOs. The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation 
Instrument (NDICI) has enhanced adaptability, enabling rapid and contingency funding, as illustrated by the 
EU’s swift response to the regional instability caused by the conflict that broke out in Sudan in 2023.  

Pooled funding and delegated cooperation have been central to EU spending (representing 67% of EU 
spending between 2011 and 2023), particularly in education, health, and food security. Delegated cooperation 
through UN agencies has enabled wide-reaching support in remote areas but comes with challenges such as 
high transaction costs, reduced EU visibility, transparency issues on efficiency and results, and inconsistent 
implementation quality due to sub-granting practices.  

While pooled funding has increased the scale of operations, reliance on parallel mechanisms to the state has 
been risky. Direct grants, accounting for 29% of spending, have supported sectors such as the green 
economy, human rights, and peacebuilding, with NGO-led projects providing greater transparency and value 
for money compared to delegated cooperation. Service contracts, though limited in scope and comprising a 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xiv 

 
 
 
smaller proportion of the spending (4%), have been crucial for technical assistance (TA), ensuring strategic 
coherence, quality assurance, and sectoral learning, particularly in green economy and human rights 
initiatives. Non-spending activities, including coordination, political dialogue, and capacity building, play a vital 
role in ensuring that spending activities achieve results. EU staff in South Sudan contribute diplomatic 
expertise, local knowledge, and thematic skills, which are critical for progress in peace, governance, and 
human rights. However, systemic staffing challenges impact the well-being of EUD teams and the overall 
quality of EU cooperation. 

Overall, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness have been higher in the cases of direct cooperation 
through international NGOs. The UN agencies have an important footprint and certainly a comparative 
advantage in terms of logistics and continuity, however, the shortcomings in quality and transparency of the 
reporting by some of these agencies, which have been repeatedly pointed out, making it difficult to assess 
their efficiency and effectiveness in a meaningful way.  

The sub-granting system of EU funds by the UN to local and international NGOs contributes to uneven 
monitoring. The level of detail in the monitoring data of UN field team is much higher than what their country 
offices (CO) channel to EU through standard reporting.  While some UN agencies have been proven to be 
good implementing partners (IPs), service contracts that provide technical assistance, at times on a long-term 
basis, helped in ensuring greater continuity, monitoring, coordination. However, the difficulties encountered by 
the evaluation in obtaining performance data (aggregated outcome and impact indicator values) beyond the 
last three years is a symptom of the overall inability of the EUD to track implementation in sufficient detail. 

EQ5: To what extent was the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach implemented in EU 
interventions conducive to sustainable changes for stability and peace building in South Sudan? 

The EU’s emphasis on policy relating to the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus was a key strength in 
addressing South Sudan’s interconnected challenges. However, translating the triple nexus into practice has 
proven much more difficult. While it serves as a foundation for broad policy dialogue among donors, the UN, 
and various levels of government, its implementation is constrained by the country’s instability, which disrupts 
programming continuity, the prevalence of funding mechanisms which separate the plans for emergency 
projects from initiatives with a longer term focus on resilience, and the lack of readiness of authorities to 
transition to development. 

Localised interventions demonstrated promising outcomes in conflict resolution and resilience-building, yet 
systemic drivers of conflict, such as weak governance and corruption, remained unresolved. Structural 
barriers, including misaligned programming cycles and a large proportion of funding dedicated to emergency 
response over the years, further constrained the HDP Nexus approach’s effectiveness.  

The coordination of interventions across sectors and partners is limited by the disparity of instruments and the 
prevailing logic of IPs that have to follow the priorities of their various donors and headquarters even if those 
do not fully align with the situation in South Sudan. The burden of work weighing on EUD personnel is not 
conducive to the identification of synergies and thinking strategically across sectors. The most promising 
examples are to be found in programming that is based on geospatial and societal factors, and which can 
bring together the priorities of various actors, as evidenced by case studies which show significant gains in 
social cohesion. 

EQ6: To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the green economy sector 
(financial assistance, and political and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected objectives at 
country level? 

For the majority of South Sudanese facing chronic hunger and acute malnutrition, ensuring basic food 
availability, access, and production remains the paramount and most pressing concern. Against this 
backdrop, European Union interventions in South Sudan between 2011 and 2023 pursued a green economy 
strategy with a EUR 195 million budget, operating within a context marked by ongoing conflict, political 
instability, and recurrent flooding. A significant portion, EUR 99.2 million (51.2% of the green economy 
budget), was allocated to economic infrastructure.  

This investment aimed to enhance economic diversification by strategically targeting areas with high 
agricultural potential and connecting them to markets. Between 2017 and 2023, EU support resulted in the 
improvement of 935 km of feeder roads and track roads, representing a notable portion of South Sudan’s 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xv 

 
 
secondary road network. Of these, 465 kilometres were upgraded to year-round accessibility, increasing 
accessibility by 16% during rainy seasons. These EU-funded roads, often managed by the United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS), reportedly reduced travel times by a factor of 4 to 5 and provided 
improved access to over 1.8 million people across four states. In addition to roads, EU support created 3,046 
community assets and small-scale infrastructures and established over 1,500 Village Savings and Loan 
Associations (VSLAs), benefiting over 37,500 members with improved access to finance. This integrated 
approach aimed to establish a cohesive framework for economic development by combining infrastructure 
with agricultural and financial sector support. 

Concerning food and nutrition security, EU interventions directly targeted Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) 2 (zero hunger) with 42% of the green economy budget and indirectly SDG9 (road infrastructure) with 
46%. Operating against a backdrop where conflict and natural disasters are key barriers to food security, EU 
programs contributed to expanding cultivated areas and boosting agricultural output at macro and meso 
levels. Notably, in EU-benefitting areas, sorghum production rose from 764,167 metric tonnes (MT) to 
818,456 MT between 2017 and 2021, representing 60% of the country's annual cereal requirement. Between 
2017 and 2022, EU support covered 146,377 hectares cultivated with sorghum, which is 15% of the total area 
cultivated nationally.  

Beneficiary level data indicates households with acceptable food consumption scores more than doubled from 
20% to 43% between 2017 and 2022. This is linked to an increase in average cultivated area per household 
from 0.9 ha to 2.3 hectares and tripling of groundnut production volumes. EU initiatives directly supported 
183,014 farming households across 9 states, representing 17% of the estimated country population through 
food security interventions. Furthermore, since 2008, the EU has been the primary funder for the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations’ (FAO) food security information system, a critical tool for 
sector planning used by governmental, humanitarian, and development actors in South Sudan. 

However, in the area of environmental sustainability and climate resilience EU interventions have 
encountered limitations. Despite promoting climate-smart agriculture, inconsistencies in implementation and 
effectiveness persist. Flood control measures such as dikes have achieved mixed outcomes, sometimes 
exacerbating flood risks. Deforestation, driven by charcoal production and causing a significant annual forest 
loss of 1.5-2%, remains largely unaddressed. Concurrently, 20% of Green Economy technical assistance is 
allocated to wildlife conservation in protected areas. This resource allocation raises questions regarding the 
strategic balance, potentially indicating a disproportionate emphasis on biodiversity conservation when 
compared to the urgent needs in food production enhancement, economic development, and essential 
infrastructure resilience required. 

EQ7: To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the human development 
sector (financial assistance and political and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected 
objectives at country level? 

Over one third of the evaluated portfolio funded human development interventions. The bilateral, regional, and 
thematic interventions contributed to developing the education and health sectors under challenging 
conditions. They supplied basic needs in education, comprising sanitation facilities, teacher training, 
curriculum development, Education Management Information Systems (EMIS) strengthening, and increased 
primary teachers’ attendance by paying incentives.  

Training for staff, communities, and Parent Teacher Associations promoted girls’ education via community 
programmes. 33,404 teachers/volunteers in 3,417 schools received approximately EUR 2.5 of salary 
incentives. The education human resource information system (HRIS) was operationalised, with challenges to 
fulfilling its potential. Over 30 interventions maintained the education sector over 13 years and interventions 
increased inclusive, gender responsive, quality education, which included school feeding and basic literacy 
and numeracy for adults. 

Two major Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) programmes produced verified impacts on 
youth employability. Education in emergency interventions reached semi nomadic youth, internally displaced 
people (IDPs), and inaccessible areas. Youth at risk of joining militias received educational, conflict-
prevention, and entrepreneurship skills as a preventative measure. Programmes reduced girl-child marriage, 
increased girl primary completion rates and secondary enrolment rates via cash grants, community 
engagement and inclusion programmes. Some vulnerable girls and boys could not access cash grants, and 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xvi 

 
 
 
were thus unable to pay school fees. Inclusion of special needs children in education increased, although 
annually thousands of such children cannot complete primary level. Teacher training improved competences 
but is required for thousands more women trainees; only 20% of teachers were female in 2024 (up from 11% 
in 2011).  

The EU helped develop the primary health care (PHC), nutrition and reproductive health services, national 
health policy, and financed the PHC sector under exacting conditions. Despite national policies committed to 
replace the humanitarian focus with a health service one, the government was unwilling to adequately fund 
the health sector. The Health Pooled Fund (HPF) contributed to maintaining the country’s PHC system in 
most states. EU support increased inclusion of vulnerable groups, mainly malnourished/anaemic pregnant 
women and infants; female survivors of sexual/gender-based violence (SGBV); disabled persons, and people 
with HIV-AIDs.  

Achievements in human resources training and development, monitoring, evaluation, data quality and data 
collection represent important health outcomes. Education and health interventions included gender equality 
in planning documents, but some insufficiently addressed gender in programme implementation. Others 
considerably advanced the rights of girls to education. Despite achievements in developing the national 
education and health systems, potential impacts will be reduced/reversed as long as the government 
inadequately funds the education and health sectors, and impunity for the documented misappropriation of 
government revenues continues.  

The EU interventions in education and health depended on emergency cash grants to allow vulnerable 
children and adults, IDPs and host communities to access basic health, education, food, transport, fuel, water 
and other necessities. The major health interventions comprised a per capita expenditure of an average of 
USD 8.5. The increased inclusion of girls and vulnerable children in education deployed capitation payments 
and cash transfers to schools and individual schoolgirls/youth respectively. Additional fees are charged in 
health and education facilities, constituting an access barrier. Providing cash to children/youth enabled the EU 
to fill a gap in the national education budget. EU support to health and education continues to be vital until 
spending is increased to meet minimum United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)-recommended levels of 
10.3% of national budget to education and 15% to health. 

EQ8: To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the governance, and rule of 
law sector (financial assistance and political and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected 
objectives at country level? 

EU contributions overall were substantial, extremely important, and wide ranging. The principal PFM 
programmes established the planning, budgeting, and monitoring principles for transparent social sector 
delivery sub-nationally. Initial PFM gains were dissipated by political and institutional opposition to reform with 
PFM and transparency indicators generally worsening in the period.  

Ongoing PFM and money laundering prevention require redoubled government and donor support to 
succeed. The financial administration of human development interventions, managed by third parties, 
contributed to fragment the health sector. Improved financial oversight mechanisms were not absorbed into 
government structures. Despite support to subnational capacity building in PFM and other initiatives, 
government blocking of reforms to transparently utilise state funds led to disappointing results in PFM overall. 
Overall, improvements in PFM were not observed, amid ongoing concerns about fund misappropriation and 
the sustainability of even modest improvements.    

Institutional and governance strengthening initiatives included public policy reforms; capacity building for 
community justice stakeholders; infrastructure (community police stations); and supporting land governance. 
EU support had mixed results due to conflicts, population displacements, and government failure to prosecute 
human rights violations. Despite the EU’s investment since independence, efforts to improve governance and 
public administration have produced disappointing outcomes, due in part to impunity in government and 
military circles for economic crimes and human rights violations, a principal deterrent to peace as highlighted 
by the EU. 

EU support to rule of law, access to justice, and anti-corruption measures was essential for the delayed 
transition to peace and democracy. The major Trust Fund governance support led to improved institutional 
governance, anti-corruption measures, and improved conditions for the incarcerated. Rule of law programmes 
included judicial infrastructure development and the training of judges, court staff and traditional justice actors. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xvii 

 
 
Nonetheless, despite some promising signs, these efforts will continue to fail if individuals in both the 
Government and the military continue to fund militias, perpetrate land grabbing resulting in the displacement 
of citizens. Continued EU support to rule of law, governance, strengthening civil society, and human rights 
remains essential to complete the democratic transition.  

The results of EU interventions in institutional governance, human rights, and service delivery were 
inconsistent and generally unsustainable. In contrast, efforts to build resilience and support peacebuilding 
through community-focused projects showed promise, yet remain vulnerable to political dynamics, conflict, 
and limited potential scale-up of financing. Training of police and judges by the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) contributed to subnational development and local governance by facilitating soldiers’ 
return to barracks, and the introduction of principled policing. However, many demobilised soldiers are liable 
to take up arms again without housing and livelihood support. This contrast between interventions focused on 
the central institutions and a more community-based approach is striking. 

EU financing of subnational development was effective, off-budget, and provided basic services. The way 
forward is signposted by tangible successes in ongoing education, conflict reduction, alternative education 
and TVET projects for at risk youth. Assisting excluded youth to obtain technical education/life skills increased 
their employability, enabling conflict resolution with local businesses fostering private sector development.  

EU support to strengthen civil society and democratic participation, gender and women’s rights was vital to 
South Sudan’s development. Significant outcomes led to gains for civic participation, human rights, women’s 
rights, and democratisation (civic education preparing for elections). The EU prioritised strengthening civil 
society as a goal and means to facilitate democratic transition.  

Conditions for civil society organisations’ (CSO) operations initially improved. But obstacles exist concerning 
SDG 16’s aims, namely ethnic tensions, presence of armed groups, state interference, attempts to censure 
media, and insufficient human capital/funding opportunities. Due to ongoing conflicts many interventions 
assumed the character of peacebuilding and conflict reduction, psychosocial support for survivors of SGBV, 
including former child soldiers, with the overall objective of stabilisation and transition to democracy. The 
initiatives played a crucial role in helping stabilise flash points and suggest there were gains in peace and 
reconciliation efforts in conflict prone areas. 

EQ9: To what extent were cross-cutting issues reflecting key EU values mainstreamed in the EU support to 
South Sudan? 

The EU has effectively integrated several key cross-cutting issues into its support to South Sudan, striving for 
peace, security, resilience, and sustainable development. Human rights, democracy, and gender equality 
have been prioritised, as evidenced by the EU's focus on access to justice and the rule of law since 2011. 
Concrete achievements such as the Constitution Making Process Act (2022) and the establishment of 
community policing platforms demonstrate tangible progress. However, the persistence of systemic issues 
like human rights violations by state actors and dire prison conditions underscores the need for stronger 
advocacy and conditionality from the EU to ensure deeper impact and sustained reform. 

Climate change (CC) adaptation and environmental protection are also increasingly mainstreamed within EU 
programming, particularly in the green economy sector, driven by the evident impacts of frequent flooding. 
Climate and environmental assessments are utilised, and these issues are integrated into frameworks like 
Partnerships for Peace, Recovery and Resilience. Yet, this mainstreaming is not comprehensive, with limited 
specific SDG 13 and 14 spending and incomplete integration of environmental recommendations, especially 
beyond the green economy sector into areas like health and education. Further deepening of environmental 
mainstreaming is required to address critical issues like deforestation and the environmental impacts of 
extractives mining to fully address South Sudan's environmental vulnerabilities. 

The EU exhibits strong conflict sensitivity and sensitivity to displacement situations in its approach, relying 
increasingly on policies based on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. Successful programs such 
as literacy for pastoral communities and self-reliance initiatives for displaced populations highlight this. 
Despite these positive strides, reports indicate a need for greater emphasis on conflict-sensitive planning and 
land-use strategies, particularly regarding land registration and security of tenure. Establishing legal 
frameworks and institutions to address land grabbing and displacement-related conflicts is highlighted as 
urgently necessary for rights-based interventions that take into account the political economy in South Sudan.  

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xviii 

 
 
 
While progress is evident in mainstreaming these cross-cutting themes, persistent challenges and areas 
requiring further attention indicate that continued and intensified efforts are essential for the EU's support to 
fully realise its intended impact in South Sudan. 

3. Conclusions 

The EU’s 13-year cooperation in South Sudan highlights achievements, challenges, and lessons for fragile 
states. While diverse interventions prevent generalisation, the evaluation finds consistent objective 
achievement, strong relevance, and coherence. The EU’s added value was high, offering political leverage 
and collective action. However, impact and sustainability were compromised due to a complex political and 
security environment. Nonetheless, the EU remained committed to addressing urgent and evolving needs. 
The conclusions aim to enhance future interventions. Six main conclusions emerge from this evaluation. 

Partnerships beyond the central state are critical 

The EU’s cooperation in South Sudan has addressed urgent needs and supported long-term development but 
remains constrained by political challenges and weak state engagement. Traditional cooperation models have 
struggled to integrate with local systems, prompting the EU to adopt innovative capacity-building initiatives 
that enhance human rights, healthcare, and education while fostering local ownership and community 
involvement. These efforts have yielded positive results despite limited national commitment to development. 

However, deeper subnational engagement alone cannot overcome challenges posed by ongoing conflict and 
governance-related violence. Impunity at state and county levels continues to hinder human development and 
resilience, while systemic issues such as weak governance, corruption, and aid dependency remain 
significant obstacles to sustainable impact and peace. 

Human development and green economy investments have strengthened resilience in many cases, 
but the government will not be able to build on these without reform 

EU support has contributed to strengthening education and healthcare systems, but persistent challenges 
have limited progress. Efforts to enhance community resilience and education access have been undermined 
by insufficient government funding, leading to irregular payment of teacher salaries and resource diversion. 
Despite investments, education sector improvements have fallen short due to unmet government budgetary 
and governance commitments. 

In healthcare, delivery systems, data management, and local planning have improved, yet key health 
indicators have stagnated or worsened. The under-five mortality rate, for example, has remained unchanged 
since 2014. Sustaining progress remains difficult amid ongoing conflict, violence, and gender-based violence. 
Without stronger government responsibility, long-term resilience and human development outcomes face 
continued risks. 

The EU green economy portfolio reflects a strategic and inclusive approach to rural development, 
progressively broadening its reach to address diverse agricultural and socio-economic challenges. It 
progressively extended beyond individual farmer categories to broader geographic concerns. At a macro 
level, EU-funded programmes have been crucial in increasing cultivated areas, improving overall food 
production and food security across significant portions of South Sudan. At state level, the EU’s contributions 
have been particularly impactful on resilience in zones where stability has allowed for the scaling of 
agricultural initiatives. EU-funded feeder roads have enhanced connections for rural communities to markets 
and services, which in turn supports the creation and sustainability of the local economy and small enterprise. 
These gains are however threatened by adverse political and environmental factors which affect the 
sustainability of EU’s achieved outcomes. 

Impunity for economic crimes and human rights violations threatens future human development, 
resilience, and peacebuilding impacts of EU support 

The EU cannot be held accountable for corruption and impunity, but this evaluation highlights how these 
issues have hindered its efforts in South Sudan. The EUD acknowledges that supporting a regime that 
impoverishes its people through poor governance, human rights violations, and fails to implement the R-
ARCSS roadmap is not best practice. The EU has used sanctions to push for action on prosecuting war 
criminals, protecting civilians, ensuring oil revenue transparency, and improving PFM. Key milestones 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xix 

 
 
achieved include disbursing government funds for the peace agreement and imposing further sanctions on 
individuals involved in economic crimes and human rights violations. 

EU support to building resilience and peace via PFM reform, governance, rule of law, access to 
justice, civil society strengthening has been key and requires continued support given the continuing 
situation of fragility and violence 

EU support has contributed to positive outcomes in subnational governance, service delivery, and rule of law, 
despite challenges posed by fragility and violence. Efforts in PFM reform and governance showed potential 
but were hindered by economic impunity and blocked reforms. Education and health initiatives improved 
service delivery, yet insecurity and inadequate infrastructure continued to disrupt progress, leaving many 
schools non-operational in 2024. 

Interventions in justice, land tenure reform, and civil society strengthening have secured important gains, such 
as improved land rights for women and judicial training. Technical assistance in civic education and election 
preparation shows promise, though its impact remains to be seen. Other areas of support, including prison 
reform and police training, have contributed to stability, particularly in high-violence areas. However, systemic 
obstacles continue to limit long-term progress. 

Long-term engagement at the local level requires a vastly greater management capacity. 

The EU has relied on implementing partners to deliver programs due to weak government capacity and the 
inability to use budget support. While this ensured service delivery, it limited the government's ability to 
function independently. Subnational systems in education and health improved, but challenges such as 
hyperinflation and the privatisation of essential services persisted . 

Despite successes in pooled funding, interventions remained fragmented, and transitioning key sectors to 
government-led implementation proved difficult. The most effective efforts involved geographically 
coordinated donor and partner groups with shared monitoring systems. However, excessive centralisation of 
engagement has restricted the practical application of analysis to action. 

Area-based programming has been the most effective in strengthening resilience and countering political 
instability. Yet, limitations in coordination, local knowledge, and staffing capacity continue to hinder long-term 
impact. The contrast between good results observed on the ground by the evaluation and the limited overview 
given to the EU is stark. This is caused by a dependence on grantee agencies, the absence of systematic 
data classification, storage and retrieval, and sheer lack of staff time to respond to the complexity of the 
situation. 

The concept of the triple nexus could be expanded. 

The evaluation highlights the EU’s strong reputation among donors and its positive impact on gender equality 
and inclusion. While resilience is a key focus, current efforts in this area primarily target household and 
community levels rather than broader systemic capacities. A more structured approach is needed to address 
governance and value chain limitations, shifting focus from central authorities to local and regional systems. 
The most realistic objectives centre on resilience and access to basic public services rather than broader 
economic growth and governance reforms. 

4. Recommendations 

Broad recommendations 

1.  The political and Cooperation services of the EU (European External Action Service (EEAS), Foreign 
Policy Instrument (FPI), Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA)) should 
consider increasing the responsiveness to the country environment by creating an independently 
defined EU approach. The new programming framework should respond to the lack of engagement by 
the State in development, and the need to revise many of the assumptions about partnership. It should 
revolve around the HDP Nexus and resilience objectives. It should do so by engaging more closely with 
Member States (as this remains the more stable policy base) to create a common core to engage with 
wider similarly-minded donor initiatives, pooled funds and strategies in relation to multilateral efforts. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xx 

 
 
 
This may be facilitated by the need for all donors to adjust programming as a result of the sudden shift 
in US funding occurring in 2025. 

2.  The EUD interventions should focus on local level activities and subnational partners, where delivery 

should be monitored and evaluated frequently to influence national-level dynamics. The monitoring and 
evaluation effort should be framed in terms of area-based programming rather than interventions, and 
focus on the achievement of outcomes and the contribution of the EU on factors of impact. At the same 
time partners should be selected for their ability to combine the work of various organisations and 
deploy small-scale conditionalities or reciprocity with South Sudanese actors. 

3.  Development should be designed around local systems that increase the anticipation, absorption and 
adaptation to shocks and pressures, building on the ability of communities to manage the assistance. 
The systems that provide area-based resources for development should be identified and supported. 
This should be done however after initial and continued conflict sensitivity analysis. 

4.  The Commission should urgently address the structural challenge of knowledge and personnel 

management in the EUD. The insufficient number of personnel dealing with a wide range of projects 
with limited institutional memory should be addressed as a matter of priority. This affects the delivery of 
activities across all sectors, as well as weakening the programme-policy linkages that would support 
priorities such as the triple nexus and cross-cutting priorities. Additionally, the absence of robust 
mechanisms for knowledge management and high staff turnover in the EUD and in Brussels weakens 
strategic coherence, pointing to a pre-condition for the implementation of the other recommendations. 

Sector specific recommendations 

5.  Green Economy: Given the recent evolution in the international and national landscape, achieving food 
security through enhanced local food production must be the paramount priority. Expanding cultivated 
area is identified as the most cost-effective and sustainable primary strategy to bolster household and 
community resilience in this regard. The EUD should actively pursue further expansion of cultivated 
areas for food security as the cornerstone of enhancing household and community resilience, 
recognise infrastructure as a fundamental enabler of both food security and expanded cultivation, 
ensure the long-term resilience and sustainability of local food production and expanded cultivation 
efforts. It should foster self-sufficiency and long-term viability of local food production, elevate local food 
security initiatives and address emerging challenges, particularly in the context of shifting international 
dynamics, ensure informed decision-making for local food security initiatives. 

6.  Human Development: The EU should continue to support human development, focusing, especially on 
education and health. This would involve making further assistance to human development dependent 
on milestones, scaling up the successful cash grants for girls, boys, youth and disability affected 
children and youth, improving protection mechanisms, targeting and programming, reinforce technical 
assistance, and supporting the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) to build a 
decentralised capacity. 

7.  Governance and Rule of Law: The EU should reinforce and continue support to rule of law, access to 
justice, and gender equality by engaging with the Government on human rights, continue to support 
expert agencies in police training on human rights principles, as well as interventions for constitution-
making, legal harmonisation and judicial reform in South Sudan, rule of law, access to justice, and 
gender equality. The EU should consider increasing support for CSOs experienced in human rights and 
women's rights, improving the police capacity, the planning and financing of juvenile justice courts and 
prison reform. The EU should support efforts to establish a family code. 

5. Broader lessons to be drawn 

The following points are where practices supported outcomes: 

1.  Flexibility and Adaptability 

The EU's ability to adapt programming to South Sudan’s volatile context, such as through the triple 
nexus approach, was critical for maintaining relevance. Regular adjustments to priorities ensured 
responsiveness to emerging needs. 

2. 

Integrated Approaches to Resilience 
Combining sectoral strategies, such as linking infrastructure with agricultural productivity, amplified 
impacts. This demonstrates the value of integrated approaches in fragile settings. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page xxi 

 
 
3.  Coordination and Partnerships 

Active participation in donor coordination mechanisms, such as pooled funds and joint programming, 
enhanced coherence and avoided duplication of efforts. 

4.  Focus on Localised Solutions 

Interventions like area-based programming showed success in aligning with local contexts and 
addressing community-specific needs. 

The following points are where where additional attention is required 

5.  Staffing and Institutional Memory 

High turnover at the EU Delegation and insufficient onboarding processes resulted in knowledge gaps 
and operational inefficiencies. This underlines the need for robust knowledge management systems. 

6.  Coordination Gaps in triple nexus Implementation 

Misalignment between humanitarian and development programming cycles created challenges in 
operationalising the triple nexus effectively, and could be overcome through area-based management 
– which is insufficiently developed. 

7.  Difficult Strategic Engagement with Governance 

Inadequate engagement with state governance structures weakened the institutional impact of EU 
interventions. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page xxii 

 
 
 
1. 

Introduction 

1.1. Description of the Evaluation 

1.1.1. Purpose and objectives of the evaluation 

This evaluation, commissioned by the unit D4 Quality and Results, Evaluation, Knowledge Management of 
Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) as part of its 2023-2025 strategic evaluation 
programme, assesses 12 years of European Union (EU) cooperation with South Sudan. Its aims are twofold: 
to provide an independent, evidence-based assessment of cumulative results on the ground (accountability 
function) and to offer recommendations for the second half of the MIP 2021-2027, as well as insights for EU 
engagement in similarly fragile contexts. 

The primary users include the EU Delegation to South Sudan (EUD), European External Action Service 
(EEAS), DG INTPA, and the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) services. Secondary users are the Government 
of South Sudan (GoSS), regional organisations (Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African 
Union, East African Community), European Commission (EC) services, EU Member States (MS), other 
donors, civil society, and the broader international development community. 

1.1.2. Scope of the evaluation 

The evaluation covers all EU agreements, cooperation frameworks, and official commitments, excluding 
Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations’ (DG ECHO) humanitarian 
work, which is considered only through the lens of the triple nexus. This nexus emphasises the balanced 
interaction between humanitarian, development, and peace efforts to identify complementarities with DG 
ECHO. The evaluation also excludes the EEAS’ political work but includes the EU’s joined-up programming 
and non-financial cooperation efforts. 

Focusing on the EU's strategic engagement with South Sudan, the evaluation reviews all financial 
instruments managed by DG INTPA, including the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and 
addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF) (2017 to 2024), a 
significant funding component in recent years. 

Table 1 Overview of the scope of the evaluation 

 Central Scope as defined by the TOR 

•  Geographic Scope: Republic of South Sudan 
•  Time Scope: July 2011 (South Sudan's 
independence) to December 2023 

•  Regulatory Scope: EU interventions managed 
by DG INTPA, including spending and non-
spending activities adopted or implemented 
during Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
periods 2008-2013, 2014-2020, and the first 
half of 2021-2027, Foreign Policy Instrument. 
•  Thematic Scope: Areas covered in the current 
Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP), 
including Green and Resilient Economy; 
Human Development (education and health); 
Good Governance, Peace, and Rule of Law; 
and MIP cross-cutting issues (human rights, 
gender, environment, conflict sensitivity, 
displacement). 

Extended scope 
External Coherence, Coordination, and 
Complementarity: 

•  Within the EU: 

o  EU support provided by DG ECHO 
(European Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations). 
o  EU support provided by the EEAS 

(European External Action Service). 

•  With External Partners: 

o 
Interventions by national authorities. 
o  Efforts by other donors targeting the 

same groups or sectors. 

1.1.3. Evaluation criteria and questions 

The data collection process was defined in the Inception Phase and includes the following elements: 

•  The formulation of nine EQs to frame the assessment. These have been selected to be consistent 

with the evaluation Reference Group’s (RG) interests and desired outcomes. The evaluation 
methodology is framed by a comprehensive evaluation matrix built around the EQs and using an 
articulated set of judgment criteria, evaluation indicators, sources of information and methods for data 
Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 1 

 
 
collection and data analysis. They are the result of a process that included a thorough analysis of the 
Terms of Reference (ToR) enriched by a documentation review and interviews.  

•  The evaluation adopted a ‘funnel’ approach, using in particular a thorough documentary analysis 

(including a quantitative analysis of available budget allocations), a review of the results attained for a 
representative sample of interventions, and a series of eight case studies. The intervention sample 
analysis helped contextualise the EU documentation. It includes non-spending as well as funded 
interventions, and a comprehensive geographic scope, allowing for sensitivity to cross-cutting issues 
at all levels. Refugee and displacement sensitivity is reflected in the disaggregation of data and as 
well as the sample of interventions selected for second tier sampling. The case studies enabled the 
evaluation to probe the effects of the context on the implementation, as well as the outcome and 
impact levels, of the interventions.  

The evaluation matrix lists a wide range of indicators to ensure that the responses to EQs are informed by a 
mix of data, allowing for preliminary findings at the end of the desk phase. This approach provides an 
emerging understanding of both the tangible outputs achieved and the broader impacts. The findings have 
been structured according to the Evaluation Matrix (see Annex III).  

Table 2 Evaluation Questions and their Coverage of Evaluation Criteria 

Evaluation Questions 

Evaluation criteria 

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1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

EQ1- To what extent has EU cooperation with South Sudan adapted 
and responded flexibly to the needs of the country?  

1 

EQ2- To what extent has the MIP for South Sudan brought additional 
benefits compared to past EU cooperation without multi-annual 
programming?  

EQ3- To what extent has an increasingly joint approach (within the EU 
and with non-EU actors) allowed for more and better results from EU 
cooperation with South Sudan?  

EQ4- To what extent has EU cooperation in South Sudan made use 
of the diversified funding toolbox offered by the past and present EU 
financing frameworks? 

1 

EQ5- To what extent was the humanitarian-development-peace nexus 
approach implemented in EU interventions conducive to sustainable 
changes for stability and peace building in South Sudan?  

EQ6- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different 
interventions in the green economy sector (financial assistance and 
policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected objectives at 
country level? 

EQ7- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different 
interventions in the human development sector (financial assistance 
and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected 
objectives at country level? 

EQ8- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different 
interventions in the governance, and rule of law sector (financial 
assistance and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's 
expected objectives at country level? 

s
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e
v
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a
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m

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1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

EQ9- To what extent were cross-cutting issues reflecting key EU 
values mainstreamed in the EU support to South Sudan? 

Evaluation criteria coverage (in number of EQ concerned by the 
criterion) 

1 

3 

4 

4 

6 

4 

1 

5 

1 

3 

1.1.4. Data Collection 

The evaluation was conducted in four phases: the Inception Phase, which established alignment on goals 
and expectations; the Desk Phase, focused on collecting and analysing existing information to guide 

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subsequent fieldwork; the Field Phase, involving direct engagement with stakeholders and on-the-ground 
data collection to provide practical insights; and the Synthesis Phase, which consolidated findings, analysed 
data, and developed conclusions and final recommendations. 

The graphic below presents an overview of the calendar of evaluation activities, from inception to 
dissemination phase, highlighting the key activities.  

Figure 1 Overall Evaluation Calendar of Key Activities 

The evaluation process employed a mix of quantitative and qualitative tools tailored to specific indicators as 
outlined in the evaluation matrix. The combination of tools used is presented in Table 3. 

Table 3 The diversity of evaluation tools employed by the evaluation team 

Evaluation tools related to specific indicators identified in the evaluation matrix 

Quantitative 

Qualitative 

•  Database consultation and statistical analysis  
• 
Text mining of Action Documents and matching 
analysis 
• 
Trend analysis 
•  Phone-based survey 
• 
•  Satellite imagery analysis for Land Use 

Field-based survey by local enumerators 

evolution quantification 

Evaluation tools related to overall analysis 

●  Documentation review 
●  Field observation 
●  Semi-structured interview 
●  Focus-group discussions 
●  Case studies 
●  Recall analysis 

Theory of change for the intervention logic 

• 
•  Case studies 
• 

Timeline reconstruction 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 3 

 
 
 
The evaluation utilised a mix of tools and data sources to enable triangulation, enhancing the reliability of the 
findings by combining diverse evidence. Multiple perspectives were gathered through interviews with both EU 
and non-EU stakeholders, surveys, and case studies, which included direct feedback from beneficiaries. 
Documentation was cross-checked against national strategies and analysed for historical context. 
Additionally, funding data and other databases were analysed for quantitative insights. Primary source tools 
included semi-structured interviews, internal team workshops, field surveys, focus groups, and case studies, 
while secondary sources involved documentation reviews, matching and textual analysis, text mining of 
Action Documents, statistical and trend analysis, and database consultation and extraction. 

The evaluation complied with EC and United Nations Evaluation Guidelines (UNEG) ethical standards and 
norms at all stages and throughout all activities. The team observed how gender was included in the design of 
interventions, gathering sex-disaggregated data, and allocating budget for gender-specific activities. The 
evaluation was inclusive and participatory, communicating amply with women, men, girls, and boys of diverse 
backgrounds, providing prompt and clear feedback. Gender equality is reflected across all the Evaluation 
Matrix. 

The evaluation questions, process, and deliverables were shaped by the needs and expectations of key 
stakeholders represented in the evaluation's reference group, including the EU Delegation in South Sudan, 
geographic and thematic units of DG INTPA and FPI, and representatives of DG ECHO and EEAS. These 
stakeholders not only guided the evaluation but also served as vital sources of information and facilitated 
access to other key informants. 

Additional stakeholders contributed by sharing information, participating in data collection, and enabling field 
access for the evaluation team. Together, these stakeholders were primary information sources referenced in 
the evaluation matrix (see Annex III). The diversity and number of interlocutors consulted are illustrated in 
Annex II. 

1.1.5. Limitations  

The evaluation faced several constraints in both primary and secondary data collection: 
Limitations in Secondary Data Collection: 
The evaluation was hindered as historical data were difficult to access, and few reports on intervention 
implementation were found in the Common External Relations Information System (CRIS). Inconsistent 
reporting categories, missing files, knowledge gaps, and a lack of institutional memory in EUD due to faster 
than usual staff turnover (staff normally stay two years in South Sudan, a hardship posting)- further 
complicated data retrieval. Sector-specific systems like Education Management Information System (EMIS) 
covered only parts of the portfolio and were often outdated or inaccessible. Keyword matching used by the 
EU to categorise interventions often resulted in misclassification, complicating statistical analysis. Inconsistent 
SDG tagging, CRS codes, and intervention descriptions further hindered analysis. Additionally, the use of 
different currency conversion rates between the EU and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Development Aid Committee skewed trend and comparative analysis. 

Limitations in Primary Data Collection: 
Although all case study visits were fully completed, stakeholder engagement was challenging. Public sector 
contacts were less responsive, and staff turnover among development agencies reduced interview availability. 
EU Delegation staff cited workload issues, and several key contractors did not respond to interview requests. 
For the Health Pooled Fund (HPF) intervention, the lead donor was initially reluctant to provide information, 
and the insolvency of the implementing partner, Crown Agents, in July 2024 prevented planned interviews. 
South Sudan’s diverse developmental, security, cultural, and environmental conditions required extrapolation 
for areas and projects not included in the final sample. Additionally, delays in case study work were caused by 
fieldwork conditions (insecurity, flooding, obtaining seats on in-country flights) and challenges in acquiring 
data collection permissions from South Sudanese authorities. 

Analytical Limitations 
The methodology employed for this evaluation has whenever possible triangulated findings. However, given 
the low quality of data and conflict in South Sudan, some key figures that have been relied on, for example 
the EMIS and the Health Management Information System (HMIS) data present inaccuracies. Obviously, it is 
not possible to avoid referring to the national data sets, all of which have been modified and enriched to 
reflect new programme and new requirements for M&E from donors. They have received significant technical 
assistance, support, training, and provision of IT systems and computer hardware in key locations from 
specialist agencies.  

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 4 

 
 
 
Examples of this effort to improve data can be found in the health sector, where United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) and World Food Programme (WFP) took steps in tandem with development partners to 
introduce reliable data monitoring and recording systems at the levels of operational schools and operational 
primary health care centres, to permit improved planning and relevant responses. The Evidence Matrix 
presents considerable data under EQ Judgement Criteria (JC) 7.3 and 7.4 of how over the years especially 
from 2014 and 2015 onwards up to 2021, there have been significant improvements in data collection and 
reliability for nutrition, malnutrition, and stunting. Finally, the Evaluation has used the findings of the qualitative 
health, education, green economy, and humanitarian intervention case study findings to triangulate the 
above-mentioned data sets, and the findings provided from the interviews that have been held during the 
evaluation with multiple stakeholders over several months. 

1.2. The evaluated portfolio 

The EU established a presence in South Sudan in 2012, following its 2011 independence referendum. Guided 
initially by the South Sudan Joint EU/Member State Programming Document (2011-2013), the EU planned an 
EUR 80 million State Building Contract, halted by conflict in December 2013. Relations were further strained 
by South Sudan’s non-signatory status to agreements like the Cotonou and Samoa Agreements, limiting 
bilateral EU funding until the 2021-2027 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP).  

Figure 2 Disbursement timeline across financial management areas 

EU funding sources included EDF regional funds managed by DG INTPA, EU budget funds managed by FPI 
and DG INTPA, and the EUTF. After 2021, EDF and EUTF funding decreased, as from this point in time it has 
not been possible to contract new projects under the EUTF, while EU budget contributions rose under the first 
MIP and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) . Between 
2011-2023, EU funding targeted humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, education, food security, justice access, 
and institutional strengthening, using mechanisms such as EDF, Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
thematic funds, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument for Stability 
(IfS), Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EUTF, and NDICI envelopes. 

The 2021-2027 MIP is the first post-independence strategic plan, adopting a “triple nexus” approach 
(humanitarian, development, peace) across three priorities: 
•  Green and Resilient Economy (EUR 83.2 million): Food security, agriculture, and resource 

management. 

•  Human Development (EUR 62.4 million): Education and healthcare. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 5 

 
 
 
•  Good Governance, Peace, and Rule of Law (EUR 52 million): Justice, public finance, and 

peacebuilding. 
Cross-cutting themes include conflict sensitivity, gender equality, and youth engagement1. 

The evaluation analysed the 2011-2023 portfolio, categorising interventions into 17 clusters loosely aligned 
with the 2021-2027 MIP priorities. The portfolio includes 254 contracts totalling EUR 521 million, with INTPA 
managing 92% of disbursements and balanced funding across the three priority areas2. 

Table 4 Overview of the evaluated portfolio 

Individual contracts within the evaluation scope were tagged according to their primary Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The analysis showed a strong focus on SDG 16 (Peace and Justice), SDG 4 
(Quality Education), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), and SDG 3 (Good 
Health). 

1 It should be noted that the three priority sectors were outlined in the TOR, but the MIP itself includes a large number of over-arching principles 
that beyond the aforementioned sectors, including: conflict sensitivity, a humanitarian, development, peace nexus approach, marginalised and 
conflict affected areas should be reached, gender equality, youth engagement, conservation of bio-diversity, sustainable natural resources 
management and climate change, voluntary and spontaneous, safe, dignified, informed and sustainable returns and (re)integration, a flexible 
and adaptable combination of off- and on-budget measures. 
2 The exact definitions of the clusters and the methodology used to generate this information can be found in Annex 4.11, along with further 
details on the portfolio. Table 4 highlights the significant humanitarian needs driven by conflict and climate-related factors such as drought and 
flooding, which were addressed through financial support from ECHO. This support effectively tripled the total EU financial assistance to South 
Sudan during the evaluation period. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 6 

 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Country context 

The following factors have shaped South Sudan’s needs during the 2011–2023 period and influenced the 
external support provided and its outcomes: 

Historical Background: 
Since Sudan’s independence in 1956, South Sudan has faced prolonged conflict driven by differences in 
language, religion, and governance between the North (Islamic) and the South (Animist/Christian). The civil 
war, spearheaded by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLM/A), culminated in South Sudan’s 2011 
secession. While the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement facilitated humanitarian aid, instability persisted 
due to ongoing conflicts. South Sudan’s strategic location, natural resources, and oil wealth have shaped its 
regional role and internal dynamics. 

Political and Governance Challenges: 
Governance has been undermined by corruption, mismanagement, and factionalism. Ethnic and political 
divisions, exemplified by the 2013 civil war between groups supporting President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and Vice 
President Riek Machar (Nuer), have hindered stability. While the 2018 peace deal brought hope, its 
implementation remains slow amid unresolved security issues. Corruption levels are high, with South Sudan 
scoring 13th from the most corrupt on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index. Weak institutions and over-
reliance on oil revenues further impede progress, with international donors providing essential support for 
basic services3. 

Economic Situation: 
South Sudan’s economy relies heavily on oil, accounting for 80% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 90% 
of government revenue. Declining production, transit disputes with Sudan, and conflict-induced disruptions 
have led to financial instability and food insecurity. Efforts to diversify are limited by poor infrastructure, 
governance challenges, and reliance on subsistence agriculture. Although real GDP growth is projected to 
recover gradually, inflation, debt, and fiscal deficits remain pressing issues. Donor funding plays a critical role 
in sectors like health, education, and food security4. 

Social and Cultural Dynamics: 
South Sudan’s ethnic diversity complicates national unity. Groups with specific identities are geographically 
distinct, fuelling inter-ethnic tensions combined with many different factors, not least by the political dimension 
and the conflict of land and access to resources between traditional pastoral groups and farming 
communities, as well as between different pastoral groups. Gender equality remains a challenge, with issues 
such as child marriage, gender-based violence, and limited female participation in governance. Despite 
women holding 29% of parliamentary seats as of 2021, gender inequities persist. Women’s empowerment 
and inclusion in decision-making are critical for sustainable development5. 
Humanitarian Needs and Vulnerability: 
South Sudan faces one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with over 2.2 million refugees and 2.4 million 
internally displaced persons, primarily women and children. Climate change exacerbates vulnerabilities 
through droughts, floods, and food insecurity. In 2021, South Sudan launched a National Adaptation Plan to 
build resilience in agriculture, water, health, and infrastructure, but success depends on strong national and 
international collaboration6. 
Current Outlook: 
South Sudan is in economic crisis, with oil revenues plummeting due to pipeline damage since February 
2024. This has caused a projected GDP contraction of -6% for 2023/24, currency depreciation, and 107.3% 
inflation (July 2024). Civil servants face delayed salaries amid budgetary strain. Politically, the indefinite 
postponement of elections now scheduled for December 20257 exacerbates instability. Additionally, over 
770,000 refugees from Sudan have overwhelmed South Sudan’s limited resources, worsening food insecurity 
for 7.1 million people8.

3 Medani (2012), Awolich (2018), UNHCR (2021), Council on Foreign Relations (2022), IMF (2022) 
4 World Bank (2023), AfDB (2023), IMF (2022) 
5 Madut (2015), Adesina (2019), UN Women (2023) 
6 UNHCR (2023), World Bank (2024), UNEP (2023) 
7 The 2018 R-ARCSS provided for elections 60 days before the end of a 36-month transitional period. This was later postponed until December 
2024, and now postponed yet again with 24 months. 
8 ReliefWeb (2024), Crisisgroup.org (2024), IMF (2024), The IRC (2024) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 7 

 
 
 
2.  Findings  

This section is organised by evaluation question (EQ), with summaries of the preliminary findings for each EQ 
followed by detailed findings based on the judgment criteria outlined in the evaluation matrix. (The full 
evaluation matrix can be found in Annex III). 

2.1. EQ 1 - Adaptation and Responsiveness to South Sudan's Needs  

EQ1- To what extent has EU cooperation with South Sudan adapted and responded flexibly to the needs of the 
country? 

JC1.1 The design of EU strategies and EU-interventions has considered existing national priorities and policies of South 
Sudan (to the extent that the political and security environments, allowed this to happen) 
JC1.2 The designs of EU strategies and EU interventions succeeded in identifying and incorporating the population's needs 
as allowed by security and political constraints 

JC1.3 The way EU has managed programming, design and implementation of its interventions (has) respond(ed) to the 
evolving country and population needs with flexibility 

From the outset of its engagement with South Sudan, the EU was attentive to aligning its activities with the 
country’s priorities and international best practices. However, the outbreak of violence in December 2013 led 
to the development of a more self-driven and responsive programming approach, adapting to the shocks and 
pressures that emerged. Despite this flexibility, the EU's programming was constrained by the significant 
workload of the EUD staff, which resulted from the complex situation in the country and the large number of 
implementing partners (IPs) and interventions. 

2.1.1. The design has considered existing national priorities and policies (JC1.1) 

Weak government capacity and ongoing conflict in South Sudan have limited the government's ability to 
develop national priorities and policies which could be implemented, during the evaluation period. The policies 
that did exist were heavily influenced by international partners, and were not implemented. The EU, however, 
made efforts to align with the priorities expressed in GoSS documents where possible. The political instability 
and weak governance capacity throughout much of the evaluation period presented challenges for the EU in 
developing a coherent programmatic approach that would have a reasonably long-term perspective – it was 
preferable to be reactive, until 2021. The introduction of the MIP in 2021 provided a framework for EU 
programming, which aligned broadly with stated Government priorities. 

The first programming document available to the evaluation, the South Sudan Joint EU/MS Programming 
Document 2011-2013, was an early example of the EU's Joint Programming approach, emerging at the time 
of the Dili Declaration in 20109. This approach framed 'Peacebuilding and State-building' as a collaborative 
process between conflict-affected countries and their development partners. The initial focus was on joint EU 
programming and aligning with the Government’s Interim Development Plan and draft Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper. This alignment also supported the Vision 2040 document launched by the Government at 
independence, which was reflected in the EU Single Country Strategy for South Sudan 2011-2013. 

However, this period of alignment faltered with the political crises of 2013, which led to fighting in Juba. Peace 
talks stalled, forcing the EU to draft a joint programming document for 2014-2016, aligned with the National 
Plan 2011-2013, which had to be rolled over due to the lack of new development plans. Programming in 
South Sudan became a core challenge for the EU, primarily due to the absence of a national partner 
relationship with South Sudan’s state structures and ongoing humanitarian crises. From 2013 until the MIP 
launch in 2021, there was no official EU strategy, and funding was allocated based on delegated authority to 
the EUD, driven by the sensitivities of decision-makers, particularly the Heads of Cooperation, towards 
particular programme types. 

EU programming has since been largely aligned with the priorities expressed by the government and 
international policies, including the National Development Strategy 2018-2021, which expired in 2021, and the 

9 Joint Programming has widely been recognised as a tool for bringing together the political and cooperation spheres, as well as involving other 
key actors (humanitarian, security, peacebuilding and stabilisation) in common planning processes. It is enshrined in the 2006 European 
Consensus for Development and strengthened by the new European Consensus in 2017, which puts joined-up EU and EU Member State 
actions at the heart of the implementation of development cooperation efforts. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 8 

 
 
 
 
New Deal on Engagement in Fragile States10. The Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity 
(RTGoNU) developed the "Revised National Development Strategy for South Sudan 2021-2024" with 
assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but it has not been endorsed by the 
main donors and remains largely neglected by the government. 
All the Action Documents11 reviewed are aligned with the MIP priority areas and the EU’s broader strategic 
frameworks, including the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS 2016) 
and 'A New Strategic Agenda for 2019–2024'. These documents emphasise promoting global peace and 
stability, with democracy and human rights as key objectives, and reflect the goals of the New Consensus on 
Development and the implementation of the EU-Africa Comprehensive Strategy. 

Additionally, the Action Documents align with South Sudan’s Comprehensive Agriculture Master Plan 
(CAMP), Irrigation Development Master Plan (IDMP), the targets set in South Sudan's second Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC), and the Great Green Wall of Africa Flagship Initiative. They also take into 
account the policy frameworks of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the Joint Assessment 
Mission (JAM). EU programming aligns with priorities identified by both the Government of National Unity 
(GoNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), though the non-ratification of the Cotonou 
Agreement by Sudan led to a special allocation in the EDF funds to address the needs of vulnerable 
populations. 

Each Action Document includes an up-to-date policy analysis and stakeholder analysis, meeting the 
requirements for country-led programming. It is widely recognised by interviewees and previous evaluations 
that donor efforts have been broadly aligned with GoSS strategies. This alignment also reflects a prevailing 
sentiment that South Sudanese authorities prefer a form of state substitution, with international support filling 
gaps in social services and relief that the government is unable to provide due to its limited resources. This 
perspective is further corroborated by political economy analyses and conflict sensitivity studies conducted by 
independent researchers12. 

2.1.2. Designs succeeded in incorporating needs as allowed by constraints (JC1.2) 

The EU's early engagement in South Sudan's post-independence period, coupled with its ability to coordinate 
with other donors and Member States (See Section 2.3) in Juba, enabled a responsive approach to the 
country's needs. Interviews with academic and civil society observers highlight that EU personnel in Juba 
played a crucial role in hosting meetings and discussions, helping to clarify the evolving needs of the 
population. This responsiveness was facilitated by the EU's substantial development and humanitarian 
funding, its focal position among Member States, and its reliance on trusted implementing partners (IPs). 

The Action Documents are of consistently high quality and reflect a clear focus on addressing critical issues 
such as food and nutrition insecurity, high unemployment, conflict, insecurity, low agricultural productivity, 
climatic threats, land degradation, and weak private sector participation. They also demonstrate a 
fundamental delegation of local risk analysis to operators on the ground, ensuring that funds for programme 
oversight, learning, and community engagement were not reduced. These functions, which require staff, time 
and flexibility, are essential for understanding where aid may inadvertently cause harm. As noted by 
organisations like the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF)13, these capacities allow IPs to build 
meaningful relationships with communities, develop creative solutions, and preserve lessons and institutional 
memory for the future. The case study of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
Yei, which has maintained an uninterrupted presence since 2007, underscores the importance of this 
continuous engagement. In their absence, aid organisations often outsource these responsibilities to local 
authorities, which can be problematic in areas with poor governance, where aid may be misappropriated for 
political or conflict-related purposes. 

10 This is an agreement between the members of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building — comprised of the g7+ group 
of 20 countries in situations of conflict and fragility, development partners and international organisations. The New Deal defines a global 
approach that supports fragile and conflict-affected countries in preparing and taking the necessary steps that lead to transformation from 
fragility to development. The document frames implementation of the New Deal between 2012 and 2015 as a trial period. It provides details on 
the three pillars of commitment: (i) peacebuilding and state-building goals, (ii) a focus on engagement to support country-owned and -led 
pathways out of fragility and (iii) mutual trust and strong partnerships between countries and their international partners. 
11 The full list of references is included in Annex 8.5 and includes 44 documents in total. This analysis is contained in a separate exhaustive 
excel file which can be made available by the evaluation. 
12 For example: ‘Community engagement with armed actors in South Sudan Reducing violence and protection risks’ Gemma Davies and Leigh 
Mayhew with The Bridge Network, Overseas Development Institute 2024. Or: ‘Humanitarian Assistance and State building in Conflict Affected 
South Sudan: Lessons Emerging for Nexus Programming’ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and WFP, 2023. 
13 It is worth citing in particular ‘CSRF Policy Brief: When Policies Backfire - Well-meaning donor policies can lead to bad aid, with examples 
from South Sudan’, Audrey Bottjen, CSRF, April 2024 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 9 

 
 
 
The EU has also benefited from a large network of international and national agencies in South Sudan, 
drawing on their experience and monitoring systems. This collaboration is reflected in the EU's proposals and 
decision documents, ensuring high-quality data. For instance, during the breakdown of the 2020 Integrated 
Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis, the EU, along with the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), 
commissioned an Independent Review to find ways to institutionalise the IPC process in the absence of a 
consistent government counterpart, through tailored technical consultations14. 
However, it is notable that the EU has conducted few evaluations of its interventions, with only three identified 
within the scope of this evaluation. Despite this, the EU has successfully incorporated contextual analysis into 
its programming, using Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports and external analytical literature, such as 
the Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility. Yet, this did not extend to strategic planning beyond basic resource 
allocation documents like the MIP. 

2.1.3. Flexibility of EU response to evolving needs (JC1.3) 

In the volatile, fragile, and politically unpredictable context of South Sudan, the EU's ongoing support was 
continuously monitored at both political and programming levels to adapt to evolving circumstances. This 
required considerable effort from EU Delegation (EUD) personnel, supported by timely risk-informed funding 
through instruments like the IcSP (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace), enabling the EU to address 
emerging challenges and maintain responsiveness. However, challenges such as rapid staff turnover within 
the EUD and weak cross-programme communication have affected the EU’s flexibility. By reducing 
institutional memory, the ability of the EUD to address issues identified at earlier points in time was limited. 

The EU has confronted an extensive list of challenges, including the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), the Revitalised ARCSS (R-ARCSS) in 2018, its extension in 2021, and the 
prolonged nature of these agreements. Additionally, protracted conflicts, climate-related shocks, and the 
COVID-19 pandemic have been significant contextual factors. These challenges are well-documented and 
highlighted in interviews and EU assessments (such as Action Documents). ROM reports point out that the 
high volume of information and intense programming activities made cross-programme communication a 
persistent issue for the EUD15. The evaluation also encountered difficulties accessing information on older 
interventions, further compounded by the heavy workload and frequent staff turnover, which impacted the 
EUD’s ability to retain critical contextual knowledge. 

Studies have emphasised the need for knowledge management to be an internal function rather than 
outsourced16. Analysts often felt the need for collaborative or partner-driven contextual analysis, as relying 
solely on external service providers can limit the depth of understanding. A 2021 evaluation highlighted that 
the EU's flexible contracting and management procedures in South Sudan17 helped to expedite processes 
and avoid delays, enabling timely interventions, especially in politically sensitive situations and difficult local 
contexts18. Interviews, particularly with senior management at UNHCR in the Yei case study, confirmed that 
the EU’s diverse funding sources, including DG ECHO and regional programmes, played a crucial role in 
ensuring continued operations in South Sudan, especially amid a sharp funding decline since 202119. 

2.2. EQ2 - Benefits of the MIP Compared to Past Cooperation  

EQ2- To what extent has the MIP for South Sudan brought additional benefits compared to past EU cooperation 
without multi-annual programming? 

JC2.1 The MIP contributed to a more structured alignment of the EU portfolio in South Sudan with the policy priorities of the 
"geopolitical Commission" 
JC2.2 The MIP has been used to ensure a more coherent collaboration between EU and non-EU-interventions in South 
Sudan 
JC2.3 The MIP contributed to a more predictable and consistent approach between programming and implementation of EU 
support to South Sudan, increasingly inclusive of South Sudanese authorities  

14 https://odi.org/en/publications/independent-review-of-the-ipc-south-
sudan/#:~:text=The%20October%2FNovember%202020%20Integrated,insecurity%20in%20six%20critical%20counties.   
15 For example ROM Review EUTF - T05-EUTF-HOA-SS-93-01 Jobs creation and trade development project. 
16 ‘Evaluation of Norad’s use of knowledge in portfolio management’, NORAD Report 4, 2024. 
17 ‘Impact assessment of EU funded actions contributing to sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan’, Elizabeth Marsh for Altair 
2021. 
18 ‘Final evaluation Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas of the Horn of Africa, T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-26’, Emery Brusset, Altair 2023. 
19 ‘Evaluation of the UNHCR Country Strategic Plan in South Sudan, 2018-2023’, Margie Buchanan-Smith et al. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 10 

 
 
 
 
JC2.4 The MIP has brought about the more visible and lasting results expected from a concentration of support in priority 
areas while remaining compliant with EU policies requiring to work with a diversity of stakeholders 

The 2021-2027 MIP, the first one in South Sudan, has been studied at the midpoint of its implementation to 
understand its benefits compared to the pre-2021 EU cooperation without multi-annual programming. It has 
provided a long-term strategic framework, ensuring a consistent approach to programming and 
implementation, and facilitating phased priority-setting, coherence, and continuity in decision-making. This 
framework has been especially valuable in mitigating the effects of high staff turnover within the EUD. It aligns 
with EU policy priorities and has served as a useful reference for donors and UN agencies, clarifying the EU’s 
intentions. However, the MIP objectives in areas like digitalisation and public-private partnerships, while 
aligned with the EU’s global policy priorities, appear to be challenging goals, as they are contingent on 
improved security and governance in South Sudan. While the MIP maintained focus on past priority areas 
such as agriculture, livelihoods, education, and health, it introduced a more structured approach to conflict 
sensitivity and the triple nexus approach, placing these two approaches as top 2 of EU overarching principles 
of work in South Sudan. These approaches were already mentioned in the 2011-2013 EU joint country 
strategy, and were in the very DNA of the EUTF instrument20, which helped EU interventions to follow these 
orientations over the years. However, the current 2012-2027 MIP is the first real EU multiannual programming 
document for South Sudan, allowing a clearer country-specific mainstreaming effort in conflict sensitivity and 
triple nexus approaches across all EU interventions. Between 2011 and 2023, limited shifts in funding 
patterns reflected political developments in South Sudan and the evolving EU-Member State (MS) relations, 
particularly regarding governance reform and peace processes. However, after three years of implementation, 
the MIP’s impact as programming tool in making the visibility and sustainability of results is not clear. 
Additionally, its impact on coordination with non-EU actors has been limited, as coordination mechanisms 
were already well-established. 

2.2.1. More structured alignment with EU policy priorities (JC2.1) 

The 2021-2027 MIP marked the first time since the 2012 draft country strategy that EU programming was 
framed in a comprehensive manner21. Prior to 2021, objectives were primarily tied to the financing 
instruments used. While a comparison between pre-2021 External Assistance Management Reports (EAMRs) 
shows continuity in the EU areas of interventions, the MIP signalled the EU Delegation's intention to adopt a 
more integrated approach, such as combining education and health sectors. However, the challenging South 
Sudanese environment has made it difficult to realise this vision. 

The MIP aligns with recent EU policy priorities, including connectivity, public-private partnerships (PPP), 
digitalisation, agricultural sector competitiveness, and blending through the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development Plus (EFSD+) and the Team Europe Initiative (TEI). However, these goals remain largely 
aspirational given the realities on the ground in South Sudan, which ranks 161st out of 163 on the 2024 
Global Peace Index22 and scores 4.4/5 on the INFORM Risk Index23 for extreme vulnerability to natural 
hazards24. The EU's MIP is grounded in pragmatic assumptions, acknowledging that progress in security and 
governance is critical for achieving these goals. Field-phase respondents from the EUD confirmed this 
disconnect between aspirational objectives and the current challenges faced in South Sudan. 

2.2.2. More coherent collaboration between EU and non-EU-interventions (JC2.2) 

While South Sudan already possessed established donor coordination mechanisms, primarily the weekly 
Heads of Cooperation meetings, the MIP process introduced a more structured approach to EU-non-EU 
complementarity, albeit with limitations in direct, demonstrable impact on collaboration beyond these pre-
existing structures. The MIP did not fundamentally alter the landscape of donor coordination in South Sudan, 
where the EU has historically been a strong advocate for coherence. Evidence, particularly from interviews, 
indicates that the MIP document itself served mainly as a reference point, primarily for donors and UN 
agencies seeking to understand EU priorities for their own reflection on complementarity (I 2.2.1). This 

20  LRRD ( Linking relief, rehabilitation and development) and conflict sensitivity can be found explicitly or implicitly mentioned in all key EUTF 
strategic and operational documents: “EUTF strategic orientation document, 2015”; “Operational Framework of the EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa Horn of Africa Window”; “2015/2018 HoA EUTF evolution of priorities”; “2018 theory of change of the EUTF”; “Theory of change of 
SO2 EUTF (strengthening resilience of communities)”,… 
21 An EU joint programming 2011-2013 document had been drafted by EU and its MS in 2011, but could never be fully implemented due to the 
outbreak of civil conflict. 
22 https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/GPI-2024-web.pdf  
23 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Country-Risk-Profile  
24 https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Risk/Country-Risk-Profile 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 11 

 
 
 
suggests the MIP's influence was more indirect, shaping the informational context rather than directly 
instigating new collaborative initiatives. 

The primary contribution of the MIP to improved coherence lies in the institutionalisation of complementarity 
analysis. The EU demonstrably deepened its commitment to structured complementarity analysis (I 2.2.2). 
These studies, inherently including complementarity considerations, promoted a more systematic approach to 
aligning EU and non-EU actions. While complementarity analysis wasn't entirely novel, the MIP process 
significantly amplified and formalised this practice within the EU's programming. For example, a new 
Technical Assistance contract in Green Economy (2023) (I 2.2.1) could be interpreted as a concrete output of 
this more structured approach to coherence, potentially informed by MIP-related analysis, although direct 
attribution remains challenging. 

However, the expectation that the MIP would be a widely recognised driver of new joint initiatives with non-EU 
actors is not fully supported by the evidence. Interviews across various stakeholder groups, except for donors 
and UN representatives, revealed limited awareness of the MIP itself. This awareness gap suggests that the 
MIP did not act as a major catalyst for direct, demonstrably improved collaboration in the eyes of many 
stakeholders on the ground. Instead, its impact appears to be more nuanced: strengthening the EU's internal 
processes for ensuring complementarity and providing a reference point for key international partners. 
Therefore, while the MIP institutionalised a more structured approach to complementarity, concrete examples 
of new collaborative initiatives directly attributable to the MIP and going significantly beyond pre-existing 
coordination mechanisms remain limited. 

2.2.3. More predictable, consistent and inclusive approach (JC2.3) 

The EU has maintained consistent disbursement rates for financial assistance between 2011 and 2023, with 
the MIP contributing to continuity despite high EUD staff turnover. However, the MIP alone is insufficient to 
guarantee consistent disbursement in areas like infrastructure, biodiversity, climate change resilience, and 
digitalisation. Sectors such as Food Security and Agricultural Development have seen high disbursement 
relative to commitments, while institutional and governance strengthening has experienced slower 
implementation, likely due to challenges in collaborating with the State. Areas where payments have 
exceeded initial commitments, such as stability, peacebuilding, and the Humanitarian-Development-Peace 
(HDP) Nexus, reflect EU responsiveness to evolving needs. 

The MIP has provided a longer-term framework for setting sector priorities, ensuring continuity despite staff 
turnover, particularly in the green economy sector, which has seen diverse interventions and implementing 
partners. The consistency between EU programming strategy and implemented intervention with and without 
MIP (I.2.3.1) can be seen in the figure “EU spending disaggregated by sectors over time“ in the below JC2.4 
section. It has been also analysed with more granularity in the green economy sector that is largest portfolio 
and the most diversified in terms of number of contracts and number of implementing partners. The EU 
portfolio was managed from the onset with a careful search for consistent design and implementation 
between its various waves of interventions (see Box 1).  

Before the MIP, the green economy sector was already showing a very good internal coherence, as per design in 
Action Documents describing very large rural development programmes with a lot of complementary and 
interconnected interventions, but also as per implementation, with the sustained effort of an EU-Technical assistance 
team who ensured the liaison and coherence between IPs. 

Coherence between successive EU-funded interventions: Beneficiaries of value chain support interventions were 
strategically selected in locations where EU-supported infrastructure (like community access roads from SORUDEV 
programme) to facilitate market access.  

Coherence in complementarity and synergy between the EU implementing partners and their interventions: SALPI 
project worked with World Food Programme (WFP) to register farmers it was supporting. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) provided veterinary vaccines to SALPI supported animal health activities. 
SALPI connected to the FAO implemented peace interventions to promote peaceful co-existence for grazing and 
water between livestock of the Dinka Malual and the Sudanese migrant. In addition, WFP smallholder grain 
aggregation project also targeted SALPI producers organised in production groups for marketing their products. 

(source: (endline evaluation report for SALPI - Sustainable Agriculture and Livestock Production Initiative in Northern 
Bahr El Ghazal State, Republic of South Sudan, Vétérinaires Sans Frontières - Suisse (VSF-Suisse), 2022; Rural 
development EU-TA progress reports, Key Informant Interview (KII)) 

Box 1 Example of pre-MIP internal coherence within EU portfolio 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 12 

 
 
 
However, discrepancies between the announced programming and its implementation in the first half of the 
MFF show that the MIP alone is not sufficient: 

• 

Infrastructure: While “market connectivity” and “inclusive value chains development” were mentioned 
in the MIP, they have not been pursued in the current MFF, except for a regional road programme. 
Additionally, the planned infrastructure technical assistance (TA) has been suspended. 
•  Biodiversity: While absent from the MIP objectives, the EUD allocated 20% of overall Green 
Economy TA to biodiversity and EUR 8 million for three wildlife conservation interventions. 

•  Climate change resilience: While planned in the MIP, it is not visible as a distinct share of the EU 

portfolio and is instead embedded within broader green economy interventions. 

•  Digitalisation, Public-Private Partnerships: These areas of intervention have not materialised. 

Several donors and UN agencies interviewed specified that the MIP document was a good reference to them 
to know what the EU was intending to do in its cooperation, notably for their own reflection on 
complementarity and coherence. During the field phase, the evaluation team consulted with EU officers, other 
donors and South Sudanese authorities at central and subnational level to see if the existence of a MIP could 
be related to a more effective EU disbursement. The MIP did not seem to be known from the governmental 
sources interviewed (I 2.3.3), however donor agency and UN agency representatives seem to be aware of it. 
They consider the MIP as a reference document to know what the EU is intending to do in its cooperation, 
notably for their own programming and planning (I 2.3.2).  

2.2.4. More visible and lasting results (JC2.4) 

The scope of the evaluation covers formally two years of the MIP 2021-2027 and does not allow for a 
conclusive analysis of the impact of the MIP 2021-2027. This section looks at how the MIP is likely to bring 
more visibility and higher likelihood of visible impacts coming from a concentration of EU support in the MIP 
priority areas. It also looks at whether the sectoral concentration might create a reduction in the diversity of 
stakeholders, likely to affect the compliance of EU cooperation in South Sudan with EU policies requiring to 
work with a diversity of stakeholders. 
Available data indicates that the MIP did not significantly affect the distribution of EU funds across sectors 
(see evidence matrix I 2.4.1). The distribution of funds was influenced more by the country context, especially 
the degree of conflict, the peace process, and the EU’s trust in the government. EU and Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) data show no clear shifts in sectoral allocations following 
the introduction of the MIP in 202125, with funding levels remaining stable. However, the country’s historical 
context, including conflict and the peace process, is clearly reflected in the EU funding timeline (Box 2). These 
findings are also supportive of the evaluation’s response to EQ1. 

Between 2012 and 2015: EU funding across various intervention areas remained relatively steady, with a slight increase in 
food security and agricultural development after the 2013 conflict outbreak. In response to the conflict, the EU reduced funding 
for institutional and governance strengthening, reflecting a shift in policy away from close collaboration with the government. 
Instead, investment increased in stability and peace-building efforts, underscoring the EU’s commitment to addressing the 
conflict’s impact.  

From 2015 to 2018: EU funding saw a significant increase, driven largely by investments in food security and agricultural 
development, which included infrastructure support. Additionally, healthcare system strengthening, education sector 
development, and HDP nexus initiatives received increased funding. This period of heightened financial commitment aligns 
with the post-peace agreement era when conditions were favourable for supporting recovery from conflict. 

Post-MIP (2021-2023): In 2020 occurred a notable peak, with funding rising for stability and peacebuilding, as well as for 
improving education access in conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas, though overall support for the education sector 
decreased. Funding also increased for food security and agricultural development, and youth employment26 became an 
emerging focus area. This peak corresponds to the period following the R-ARCSS, reflecting the EU’s support for South 
Sudanese stakeholders during this optimistic phase. Following the MFF in 2021, funding distribution became more balanced. 
The main priorities now include inclusive education access, food security and agricultural development, stability and 
peacebuilding, and the HDP nexus. These funding areas mirror the MIP’s strategic priorities. Since 2022, two new cooperation 
areas have emerged: support for civil society and civic engagement, and subnational and local governance. These areas are 
essential in preparation for the anticipated electoral process supposed to be planned for 2024. 

Box 2 Linking contextual and peace factors to EU spending over time 

25 EU spending disaggregated by sectors over time with and without the MIP is based on the Common Reporting Standard – Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (CRS-OECD) databases and extracts of EU statistical dashboard 
26 Although it could seem obvious to link this peak to the covid crisis response, the additional financial support to cope with the covid crisis 
amounted only for EUR 3 million 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 13 

 
 
 
The MIP played a key role in institutionalising the prior efforts and ensuring that funding remained aligned with 
strategic priorities despite the complexities of the South Sudanese context. The analysis of the evolution of 
spending disaggregated by sector over time (figure below) further reveal the responsiveness of EU support to 
the country context. 

Figure 3 EU spending disaggregated by sectors over time 

Key insights regarding EU funding distribution include: 

•  Sectoral discrepancies: While funding distribution does not always reflect strategic priorities, the 

MIP provides a clearer framework for understanding EU actions27. For example: 

o  Public Financial Management (PFM): Despite significant EU engagement in PFM reform, 

actual spending has been limited. Support for PFM has been constrained by the government’s 
lack of willingness to reform, with most PFM funding directed toward technical assistance, 
training, and studies. 

o  Peace Process Support: While peace and stability funding accounted for only 16% of total EU 

expenditure between 2011 and 2023, many other sectors, such as food security, also 
incorporated conflict reduction, dialogue, and reconciliation components, indicating that 
peace-related objectives were often embedded in broader interventions. 

•  Diversity in funding channels: From 2012 to 2023, EU funding relied heavily on EU-based NGOs, 
multilateral organisations like WFP, FAO, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and 
EU entities such as the Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG-EAC), the Joint Research 
Centre (JRC), and the EUTF28. From 2017 onwards, there was an evident increase in the diversity of 
funding channels, which expanded to include private sector institutions, non-EU NGOs, and other 
multilateral entities. This shift helped to maintain coherence and reflected the evolving priorities of the 
EU in South Sudan. 

Relationship between the MIP and the non-spending activities of EU in South Sudan. The EAMRs, 
MIP29, Risk Management Framework Plus (RMF+) and AAPs reveal a low correlation between the level of 
spending in the sector and EU’s appreciation of its importance. For example, the EU has spent very little on 
PFM, but has showed a very high level of priority on the PFM reform process while engaging only in small 
spending measures (i.e. communication, political dialogue, policy dialogue, support to capacity building…). 
Same applies for support to peace process spending that has been low until 2020 and does not reflect the 
importance of the EU's diplomatic and political engagement in the various post-2013 peace processes 
through non-spending activities. The assumption for the above findings differs for the case of PFM support 
and for the case of support to peace process. Spending in PFM reform support can be high if a government is 
entrusted enough in its willingness for reform or in its capacity to implement reform. Neither of these two 
conditions are met in South Sudan where EU as most donors has deliberately chosen to keep financing at a 

27 Internal Risk Management Framework (Extracts from RMF+2021 et RMF+2023 shared for the purpose of this evaluation) 
28 This “internal” transfers to EUTF might be the reason for the problem of double counting in the EU statistical dashboard. As the payment from 
EU budget to EUTF and then contracts under the EUTF funds are both listed.  
29 Internal Risk Management Framework (Extracts from RMF+2021 et RMF+2023 shared for the purpose of this evaluation) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
distance from the government. This means that spending on PFM can only be done through some technical 
assistance contracts for support, training and studies, which does not amount for important budgets. The 
support to the peace process is a more complex matter. The whole “peace and stability” and “HDP” clusters 
have represented EUR 86.8 million between 2011 and 2023, barely 16% of the total spending for a country 
where conflict is the major issue that prevents any structural change in other sectors. However, the desk and 
field analysis revealed that a lot of the peace-related spending is also made within other clusters of 
intervention (e.g. nearly all the food security interventions have a conflict reduction/ dialogue/ reconciliation 
component). 

Budgetary additionality brought by EU in its areas of support to South Sudan. The evaluation 
methodology intended to analyse the budgetary additionality brought by EU to the national sector budgets 
over time (I 2.4.2). By looking at the national budget documentation, it was impossible to compile data on the 
national budget, less so with the functional budget per sector, as the sector delineation and the currency used 
change from one year to another. This is also complicated by the level of inflation30 which has been volatile 
(ranging from -6% to +380%), making comparisons over time difficult. However, a clearly delineated sector in 
the EU reporting (like MIP allows) and in the international databases, allows to capture the budgetary 
additionality of EU support (see Box 3).  

Being able to report on the overall EU support to a given sector as the MIP should facilitate it, provides with a clearer 
idea of the actual budgetary additionality of EU in South Sudan. As an example, the way South Sudan health sector 
heavily relied on external support in 2021. Government expenditure represented 16% of the total health expenditure, 
while development and humanitarian partners financed 50%. Out-of-pocket health expenditure filled the remaining 
gap (33%). Of the total health spending in South Sudan recorded for 2021 (USD 32 million), 17% came from EU 
support, more than the Government itself, representing approximately a third of the overall development and 
humanitarian partners funding to the sector. 31 

Box 3 Example of the budgetary additionality of EU to the health sector of South Sudan 

Change in concentration of support in terms of stakeholders 
As the above shown, there has been a concentration of support in certain sectors that reflected the political 
history of the country and the MIP orientation. The change in the concentration of support in terms of 
stakeholders (I 2.4.3) also revealed interesting trends. 

From 2012 to 2023, EU funding disbursements to various channels show a notable reliance on EU-based 
NGOs, WFP, FAO, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), and other multilateral 
organisations. Significant funding was also channelled through EU bodies such as DG-EAC, the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), and particularly the EUTF32. Over time, especially post-2017, there is an evident 
increase in the diversity of funding channels, following here again the more conducive context created by the 
peace agreement and the transitional unity government.  

Initially, from 2012 to 2015, the funding was directed to a more limited set of IPs, which is not surprising given 
the constraints of the political and security environment. However, from 2017 onward, the number receiving 
funding expanded significantly. This period saw increased funding to private sector institutions, non-EU-based 
NGOs, and other multilateral entities, notably thanks to the EUTF as implementation framework. In the future, 
EU has announced its intention to implement more delegated cooperation through the UN agencies and 
Member States. 

2.3. EQ3 - Joint Approach in EU and External Relations 

EQ3- To what extent has an increasingly joint approach (within the EU and with non-EU actors) allowed for more and 
better results from EU cooperation with South Sudan? 
JC3.1 The support provided by the EU and its Member States represented overall a meaningful contribution to the various 
aid-supported sectors of South Sudan 
JC3.2 EU support to South Sudan was provided in a coordinated and complementary manner with the other major donors 
supporting the country 
JC3.3 The EU joint approach has been effectively adopted in the bilateral cooperation with South Sudan  

30 Data basis: International Monetary Fund, World Bank and OECD Inflation CPI indicator (doi:10.1787/eee82e6e-en) consulted on 
https://www.worlddata.info/africa/south-sudan/inflation-rates.php   
31 Source Global Health Expenditure Database. World Health Organization. 2021 (Accessed October 2024) 
https://apps.who.int/nha/database/country_profile/Index/en 
32 This “internal” transfers to EUTF might be the reason for the problem of double counting in the EU statistical dashboard. As the payment from 
EU budget to EUTF and then contracts under the EUTF funds are both listed.  

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 15 

 
 
 
JC3.4 The aid effectiveness of EU and Member States agencies in South Sudan has improved since the Team Europe 
Approach has been adopted in 2020 

From 2011 to 2022, the EU and its Member States were the second largest donor in South Sudan, providing 
EUR 3.06 billion (34% of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)), representing a meaningful contribution 
(JC3.1). Beyond finance, their harmonised policy dialogue and political engagement amplified impact, 
exemplified by significant influence of EU and its Member States in PFM and peace processes despite limited 
direct spending. Key support sectors of EU and its Member States, often exceeding one-third of total donor 
spending, included Stability and Peace Building (EUR 297.9 million) and Education (EUR 178.3 million), with 
significant contributions also in Food Security (EUR 400.8 million), Gender Equality (EUR 53.9 million), and 
Human Rights (EUR 33.1 million). This combined financial and non-spending approach, coordinated between 
EU and its Member States, enhanced their collective contribution’s meaningfulness, enabling a more 
impactful response than fragmented efforts. 

The EU actively promoted donor coordination, leading mechanisms like the Joint Donor Team and pioneering 
Joint Programming in South Sudan (JC3.2). This commitment to coordination aimed for complementarity, 
likely reducing aid duplication, further supported by mechanisms like the area-based joint programming. While 
the EU's coordination efforts were evident and beneficial in reducing fragmentation, identifying definitively 
“better” outcomes solely due to coordination, beyond this, remains complex particularly in the South Sudan 
context of weak government-led coordination. 

Joint programming and implementation with MS were actively pursued; South Sudan was a Joint 
Programming pilot. Despite conflict disrupting formal plans, coordination as a guiding principle persisted, 
formalised further by the Team Europe Approach (TEA) (JC3.3). Joint implementation via contribution of EU 
and its Member States to pooled funds and co-financing demonstrates tangible joint action. The established 
joint frameworks led to a more cohesive EU support package compared to individual Member States actions.  

The TEI, a headquarters-driven effort to enhance aid effectiveness (JC3.4), had limited impact in South 
Sudan. Constrained by a limited number of Member States present, misaligned cycles, and global EU visibility 
priorities, joint implementation and a unified Team Europe political agenda remained weak under TEIs. While 
isolated aid effectiveness improvements occurred (e.g., joint reporting), systemic enhancement under TEI is 
not strongly evidenced. Structural obstacles and limited deep joint action hindered the TEI's capacity to 
deliver demonstrably better results compared to pre-TEI approaches. The TEI's top-down nature further 
limited its effectiveness in addressing locally perceived needs and context. 

2.3.1. The EU and its Member States represented a meaningful contribution (JC3.1)  

Between 2011 and 202233, the EU and its Member States were the second-largest donor of development 
assistance to South Sudan, contributing EUR 3.06 billion, or 34% of the total EUR 15.8 billion in official 
development assistance (ODA) from all donors34. Their contributions were particularly significant in sectors 
like Stability and Peace Building, Education Sector Development, Gender Equality, Women’s Empowerment, 
and Human Rights, where they accounted for more than one-third of total donor spending. 

Notable sectors receiving 30-40% of their assistance from the EU and its Member States include Food 
Security and Agricultural Development (EUR 400.8 million), Stability and Peace Building (EUR 297.9 million), 
Education Sector Development (EUR 178.3 million), Subnational Development and Local Governance (EUR 
67.2 million), Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (EUR 53.9 million), and Human Rights (EUR 33.1 
million). The area of "Refugees, Internally Displaced People (IDP), and Vulnerable Populations" was the most 
supported, with EUR 1.32 billion, representing 16% of total ODA. 

The EU played a leading role in supporting Public Finance Management and Transparency, contributing 
99.6% of the EUR 9.2 million allocated. It also made significant contributions to Inclusive Access to Education 
(59.8% of EUR 51.7 million), Institutional and Governance Strengthening (47.9% of EUR 39 million), Food 
Security and Agricultural Development (40.9% of EUR 163.9 million), and Healthcare System Strengthening 
(33.8% of EUR 55.5 million). 

Beyond the substantial financial contributions, the EU and its Member States also utilised its significant 
leverage and harmonised policy dialogue, amplifying its overall impact. For instance, in Public Finance 

33 ODA data from OECD available until 2022 
34 ODA data from OECD have been converted to EUR amounts based on the conversion rates OECD uses to convert to USD available at 
based on https://webfs.oecd.org/oda/DataCollection/Resources/Exchange-rates.xls 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 16 

 
 
 
 
 
Management (PFM), despite limited direct spending, the EU exerted significant influence through consistent 
political and policy dialogue, alongside targeted capacity building.  

This demonstrates a strategic leveraging of its non-spending tools to prioritise critical reforms, even in a 
context where direct financial engagement with the government was deliberately constrained. Similarly, in 
support of the peace process, while direct financial allocations within dedicated “peace and stability” clusters 
may appear modest compared to the overall aid portfolio, the EU's extensive diplomatic and political 
engagement in various peace processes, conducted through non-spending activities, has been paramount. 
This multifaceted approach, combining targeted financial support with diplomatic and policy leverage across 
EU actors and Member States, allows for a more nuanced way of understanding how meaningful the 
contribution of EU and its Member States has been to South Sudan’s aid-supported sectors, going beyond 
what funding levels alone would indicate. 

2.3.2. EU support coordinated and complementary to other major donors (JC3.2) 

The EU has actively engaged in development assistance coordination throughout the evaluation period, 
despite limited effectiveness of government-led mechanisms for donor coordination. Due to the South 
Sudanese government's lack of interest in development and donors' reluctance to channel funds through 
state structures, coordination mechanisms have faced challenges35. However, the Natural Resources Sector 
Working Group, which includes agriculture, food security, and environment, has seen more engagement from 
the government and donors36. Research papers confirm KII findings that the EU has played an important role 
in peace process coordination (I 3.2.2), as a member of the P5 group37, and has supported coordination 
among its implementing partners, among which bilateral and multilateral agencies implementing delegated 
EU cooperation, particularly in the green economy sector through technical assistance contracts and 
participation in the UN Reconciliation, Stabilisation, and Resilience Trust Fund (RSRTF) 38. 
The EU has been actively involved in donor coordination forums, both at the country and sector levels, and 
has been recognised for its consistent engagement39. While the government's limited interest in development 
and South Sudan's volatile political situation have hindered the effectiveness of government-led coordination, 
the EU has continued to support and lead donor coordination mechanisms. It has participated in sector 
coordination mechanisms for roads, food security, agriculture, and peacebuilding. 
Since 2011, the EU has engaged in joint donor mapping and programming exercises40, working closely with 
Member States and other key donors in the country. The EU’s contributions, especially in trust funds like the 
RSRTF (following shortcomings in UN coordination reported by donors41), have enhanced donor 
coordination, particularly in transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance through initiatives like 
the Partnership for Peace, Recovery and Resilience (PfPRR) and the A3 seed initiative42 which aim at 
reducing aid fragmentation by adopting a joint area-based or sub-sector based coordination. Despite these 
efforts, the EU has yet to fully integrate area-based programming across its entire portfolio43, though it has 
encouraged its implementing partners to adopt this approach. The EU’s donor mapping exercises have 

35 Aid coordination mechanisms existing as of 2011 are described in Aid Strategy for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning Republic of South Sudan November 2011 (updated version of the 2006 comprehensive aid coordination 
strategy developed before the independence of South Sudan) 
36 Triangulated during interviews EUD operational managers. The EU also concluded a TA agreement for the green economy sector under the 
Cooperation Facility 11 Service and Framework Contracts to support the Delegation’s work and the multi-stakeholder coordination related to the 
Green and Resilient Economy component of the MIP. 
37 The P5 partner group in South Sudan refers to the five key international partners involved in supporting the peace process and political 
stability in the country: United States, United Kingdom, Norway, European Union and the United Nations. 
38 The Quarterly Review Meeting of the EU's Rural Development Programme in South Sudan started more than 8 years ago. These meetings 
are platforms for coordination, lesson learning, synergy building, and information sharing among EU partners and stakeholders to enhance the 
implementation of food resilience and rural development programmes in the country. EU-TA also participates in the Livelihoods and Food 
Security Cluster Meetings (bi- weekly) funded by WFP-FAO (Final Report of the TA to the EU Rural Development Portfolio, AESA, 2022). EU-
TA attends Agricultural and Livestock Technical Working Groups of the Food Security and Livelihood Cluster (Green Economy TA - inception 
report, 2023). EU-TA participates in the VSLA and Rural Financing Technical Working Group sessions. (Green Economy TA - inception report, 
2023) 
39 “Donor coordination has been on the top of EU delegation agenda, co-chairing HoCs group in second half of 2023” (EAMR 2023) 
40 South Sudan Joint EU/MS Programming Document 2011-2013, European Union, 2010; EU Single Country Strategy (Response Strategy) for 
South Sudan 2011-2013 (2011) 
41 For example the PfPRR, a “new” model created in 2020 based on a territorial approach to the HDP Nexus, failed to create a credible frame for 
humanitarian and development assistance activities to adjust as communities increase resilience over time and failed to receive sufficient 
funding over the years to influence local decisions. 
42 e.g.: PfPRR Annual Events; Launch of the Dutch Funded A3 Seed initiative, to reduce the country’s dependency on foreign-sourced seeds, 
and humanitarian support, with the aim to transform the seed sector into a commercially viable one 
43 decentralised coordination of HDP stakeholders based on civil society and local authorities’ ability to collaborate 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 17 

 
 
 
provided regular, up-to-date analysis of donor engagement and coordination efforts44, reflecting the EU's 
ongoing commitment to improving coherence and complementarity in its interventions. 

2.3.3. EU joint approach effectively adopted in the bilateral cooperation (JC3.3) 

Among the specificities of EU and its Members States in terms of the type of support provided to South Sudan 
compared to other donors (I 3.3.1 – see Table 5, the concern for coordination and joint approaches is a 
characteristic that emerged from the documentation review. The effort on non-spending activities such as 
policy dialogue and political dialogue appears to be an important aspect of EU cooperation to South Sudan. 
The political dialogue is not unique to the EU. A number of key donors (especially the US, Norway, the UK) 
have played important peace process roles in the political sphere. What was specific to the EU was its 
initiative called the “Extended HoMs process”, chaired by the EU Ambassador and highly regarded by other 
donors including members of the Troika45. 

Table 5 Specificities of EU in the type of support provided to South Sudan compared to other donors 

Financing specificities 
•  The EU is given credit for its important 

developmental funding compared to many other 
stakeholders, which tend to be more relief oriented. 

•  When there is an urgent funding need, EU is good at 
“finding money” or creatively engage with the DG 
INTPA headquarter to use non allocated funds or 
residual envelopes. 

•  EU is very flexible as a donor to adjust an 
intervention such as a contract extension. 

Communication specificities  
•  EU is perceived as a discreet donor compared to 
others. EU leaves its implementing partners 
benefitting from the visibility outcomes of its funding. 

•  EU is perceived as being prone to engage in 

coordination mechanisms. EU engagement in sector 
and donor coordination (notably HoC meetings, 
Natural Resource Sector Working Group (NRSWG)) 
is often highlighted by other donors and by the 
government, acknowledging the EU constructive 
contribution to coordination efforts. 

Thematic specificities 
•  Peacebuilding - EU’s political engagement in the past peace process has been significant, but the weight of 

multilateral actors and international donors is nowadays limited. 

•  Biodiversity - EU funding for biodiversity and conservation has been noted by other development partners as 

being unique, as it seems that no other actor is involved in this sub-sector in South Sudan.46 

•  Rural development - The EU-TA to the green economy portfolio is seen as a real specificity of EU cooperation. It 
provides a critical continuous support mechanism, from coordinating with Implementing Partners to coordinating 
with other donors and the government. Implementing partners report how the EU-TA is a key driver for results. 
Other donors acknowledge it as being a great asset for development interventions to not fall back into the usual 
humanitarian assistance scheme. 

The documentation review revealed joint programming and joint implementation practices between EU and its 
Member States (I 3.3.2) across the evaluation scope. South Sudan was one of the first two countries where 
the EU piloted a joint programming exercise, starting from 201047. The outbreak of civil war unfortunately 
suspended the formal implementation of the joint plans, but their underlying philosophy - coordination through 
political dialogue, complementary funding, and synergies between regional and bilateral funds- survived 
through the DCI regulations48 which emboldened the EU to take a lead role in promoting coordination among 
Member States and joint programming 49. Joint implementation in pooled funds for sector programmes has 
continuously been an important EU practice in South Sudan, and the joint implementation of political dialogue 
has been a reality through EU support to the troika and participation as P5-partners. 

44 CSO mapping in the EU Human right and CSO study (2012); EU Outline for the human rights country strategy paper (2012); EU Draft human 
rights country strategy (2013); Mapping of Projects in the Greater Bahr el Ghazal Region of South Sudan (2016); 2016-2019 Country analysis of 
external financing and domestic public resources to food security, agriculture and nutrition (Global Network Against Foos crisis, EU-FAO-WFP, 
2019); Mapping exercise of Team Europe Financial Contributions in South-Sudan based on OECD DAC data from 2017 to 2021 (2020 and 
annually to date), EAMRs of EUD in Juba (from 2020 to 2023) 
45 The peace process was supported by IGAD, in addition to a "troika" of donor countries comprising the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Norway.  
46 The GIZ expressed its potential interest for joining EU in investing together in this subsector. 
47 The JP instrument emerged from the 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour, in which EU donors 
committed to engage in no more than three sectors per country and five donors per sector but became only the norm under the 2014-2020 
Budget.. (EU Joint Programming: Lessons from South Sudan for EU Aid Coordination, DIE, 2013) 
48 DCI Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 233/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing a financing 
instrument for development co-operation for the period 2014-2020). 
49 Joint Programming has been embedded in the programming process across EU cooperation as part of the way the DCI was guiding EUDs 
work (“DCI’s structured programming process includes joint programming with EU MS and cooperation agreements with other development 
partners and actors (e.g. third countries, UN organisations” in External Evaluation of the Development Co-operation Instrument (2014 – mid 
2017); Final Report - 2017 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 18 

 
 
 
 
The emergence of the Team Europe Approach (TEA) in 2020 further formalised these efforts50, enhancing 
collaboration on key priorities like COVID-19 response, the Juba Peace Agreement, and the South Sudan 
Reconciliation, Stabilisation, and Resilience Trust Fund (RSRTF), to which Team Europe contributed 68% of 
funding (EU EUR 22 million and MS EUR 56 million between 2018–2023) 51. 

Despite the suspension of formal joint programming plans due to conflict, practices such as pooled funds, 
political dialogue, and complementary financing have endured, in which EU and its Member States had an 
important role in joined-up efforts. Major pooled funds include: “Multi-Donor Trust Fund” (MDTF-SS) (2005-
2013); “South Sudan Recovery Fund (SSRF) (2011-2013); “South Sudan Trust Fund for Capacity Building on 
Macroeconomics, Statistics and Policies” (SS-TFSCB) (2014-2019); “Health Pooled Fund” (HPF) (2012-
ongoing); and South Sudan RSRTF (2018-ongoing), and “South Sudan Multi-Donor Transition Trust Fund 
(MDTTF-SS) (2022-2024)” 52.   
Joint implementation has also taken the shape of complementary financing between the EU and its Member 
States. In the green economy sector for example, the EU-funded interventions implemented by the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) that were a component of the larger rural development 
programmes ZEAT-BEAD and SORUDEV, were also component of the German Federal Ministry of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) programmes53. Similarly, EU and Germany co-financed an economic 
and financial analysis of major regional slaughterhouses54. EU and several of its Member States (Sweden, 
The Netherlands and UK) jointly financed the same road sector programme in the Greater Bahr El Ghazal55. 
The EU also co-financed initiatives with MS, such as rural development programmes and infrastructure 
projects in the green economy and road sectors. During the 2021-2027 programming period, the EU and MS 
prioritised resilience, human development, and governance, building on the 2011 joint programming 
framework. The TEA facilitated alignment of resources and joint advocacy efforts, advancing initiatives such 
as the PfPRR,56 which uses an area-based approach to support the HDP Nexus and resilience in seven pilot 
areas57. 
The EU has also integrated regional and bilateral funding strategies58, supporting projects with both national 
and regional dimensions. These approaches exemplify innovative ways to achieve coordinated, impactful 
development assistance in a volatile context like South Sudan. 

2.3.4. Improved aid effectiveness of EU and Member States with TEI (JC3.4) 

The EU’s joint programming experience since 2010 informed the development of a TEI for South Sudan’s 
2021–2027 programming. However, the small number of EU MS present in South Sudan and misaligned 
programming cycles limited the TEI’s scale and impact. Team Europe’s visibility did not improve as a result, 
and collaboration has mostly involved information-sharing during project design and co-financing preliminary 
studies, with limited joint implementation. There is no unified Team Europe agenda for political and policy 
dialogue, and EU development and political teams often operate independently, reducing the potential for 
coordinated strategies. 

Between 2011 and 2020, the EU used a non-programmable aid envelope for South Sudan, but its initial joint 
Single Country Strategy (2011–2013) was abandoned after the 2013 civil war. Despite this, the EU and Team 
Europe partners continued participating in joint programmes and trust funds, such as those managed by the 

50 situation in August 2020: Team Europe had a consolidated ongoing support (humanitarian, development and peace) of about EUR 224 million 
on a yearly basis (EU + ECHO: EUR 100 million) and EUR 657 million (EU +ECHO: EUR 281 million) in total. 
51 https://mptf.undp.org/fund/ssr00 
52 To that list of major pooled funds can be added the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) (2012-2016) and the South Sudan 
Humanitarian Fund (SSHF) (2016-present), pooled funds to facilitate rapid and flexible funding to meet urgent needs and improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian actions, in which EU through ECHO has been a significant contributor. 
53  AMTIP ''Agricultural Marketing and Transformation Investment Programme'' (CRIS# 354446 - EUR 3,9 million), was a component of the wider 
programme ZEAT BEAD ‘'Zonal Effort for Agricultural Transformation - Bahr El Ghazal Effort for Agricultural Development'‘ funded by the 
European Commission. AMTIP was also a component of the “Support to Food Security and the Development of Agricultural Markets in South 
Sudan (FSDAM)” funded by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)).  
54 Feasibility studies co-financed by BMZ and EU (“Financial and Economic Analysis of Slaughterhouses in Wau-Western Bahr el Ghazal State / 
Aweil-Northern Bahr el Ghazal State / Kuajok-Warrap State / Yirol- Lakes State”, 2015) (“Identification of areas for rehabilitation and 
improvement of 2 existing slaughterhouses and advice on design of 2 new slaughterhouses”, 2015) 
55 Contributors supported notably through co-financing via the multi-donor trust fund of the “Feeder Road Construction in support of WFP 
operations in South Sudan” (CRIS 297100). Together, EU and its Member States have represented 57% of the USD 90 million of this pool fund, 
EU and the Netherlands being the biggest contributors ex aequo. (WFP - pool fund budget page) 
56 https://www.southsudanpfprr.org/ . The partnership is a collective of development and humanitarian partners working in locations known as 
Partnership Areas, selected based on civil society and local authorities’ ability to collaborate and leverage resources. 
57 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/south-sudan/european-union-partakes-torit-livestock-show_und_en?s=121 
58 Most of the information is derived from the EAMR (2020 to 2023), for pre-2020 no EAMR or equivalent annual report has been shared yet with 
the evaluation team and the EU statistical dashboard does not allow for capturing the rich diversity of regional/bilateral synergies. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 19 

 
 
 
UN and World Bank, benefiting from collective decision-making. However, worsening political conditions and 
misaligned programming cycles weakened EU coordination, while the USA and China assumed dominant 
roles in South Sudan’s development landscape. 

By 2021, only four MS (Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden) maintained offices in South Sudan, 
with three providing substantial bilateral support by the end of 2024. For the 2021–2027 period, five MS joined 
the EU in a TEI combining financial and non-financial activities. However, TEIs are perceived as driven by 
visibility aims coming from EU headquarter, rather than being relevant to the European donor landscape of 
the country, especially given the EU delegation’s limited staffing and the decrease in Member State presence.  

To address challenges, the EU, Germany, and the Netherlands scaled down TEIs to focus on country-specific 
initiatives of a manageable joint-effort scope. The choice was to avoid a wider sector scope that would 
encompass each and every intervention in the sector where team Europe members would be present, that 
would then be showing a kind of “a-posteriori reconstructed logic”. While this approach improved coherence 
and alignment with resources, visibility and unified action remained limited due to modest MS presence and 
budgets, but also by the fact that the TEI identified to date are still at the stage of agreement and scoping. 

Beyond TEIs, Team Europe’s collaboration generally stops short of implementation, with coordination needing 
to justify its cost through clear benefits. Potential strategies include joint technical assistance, co-financed 
studies, or shared evaluations, though these remain underutilised. A unified "Team Europe spirit" is not 
evident, and interactions between EU representatives resemble those with non-EU donors. Coordinated 
positions in sectoral and donor forums remain limited. 

In non-spending activities like political dialogue, the TEA has had little effect, with no Team Europe-specific 
agenda developed. Cooperation with the South Sudanese government follows standard frameworks shared 
with non-EU donors. Some improvements in aid effectiveness have emerged59, such as joint reporting (e.g., 
the EU Delegation’s CIIS database including MS results), joint sector assessments, and collaborative project 
identification, but these examples are exceptions rather than the norm. 

2.4. EQ4 - Use of a Diversified Funding Toolbox  

EQ4- To what extent has EU cooperation in South Sudan made use of the diversified funding toolbox offered by the 
past and present EU financing frameworks? 
JC4.1 The geographic programme of EU support to South Sudan is adequately complemented by NDICI thematic 
programmes 
JC4.2 EU cooperation to South Sudan has used rapid and contingency funding to tackle current geopolitical challenges in the 
country and in the region 
JC4.3 The mix of implementation modalities used by EU cooperation is appropriate to the current national and regional 
context of South Sudan 
JC4.4 The volume of financing allocated to South Sudan corresponds to the amount of support identified by the relevant units 
and EUD. 

Overall, the EU has employed a range of funding instruments and modalities in South Sudan, reflecting a 
diversified approach. While this strategy has enabled substantial operations in a challenging context, realising 
its full potential requires addressing persistent issues related to visibility, efficiency, and transparency, 
particularly within indirect management. A comprehensive analysis of the risks and trade-offs associated with 
each modality is documented in a dedicated annex, suggesting an awareness of these complexities within EU 
cooperation. 

The EU cooperation in South Sudan has employed a diverse funding approach through geographic and 
thematic programmes (JC4.1), adapting to challenges posed by the country’s exclusion from the Cotonou 
Agreement. The EU cooperation in South Sudan initially relied on regional EDF and EUTF resources, 
alongside humanitarian aid from DG ECHO. Being on the EU’s crisis-affected country list allowed for flexible 
contracting, with negotiated procedures frequently used to engage NGOs. The NDICI has enhanced 
adaptability, enabling rapid and contingency funding, as illustrated by the EU’s swift response to the regional 
instability caused by the conflict that broke out in Sudan in 2023 (JC4.2).  

Pooled funding and delegated cooperation have been central to EU spending (representing 67% of EU 
spending between 2011 and 2023 (JC4.3)), particularly in education, health, and food security. Delegated 
cooperation through UN agencies has enabled wide-reaching support in remote areas but comes with 
challenges such as high transaction costs, reduced EU visibility, transparency issues on efficiency and 

59 (Final Report of the TA to the EU Rural Development Portfolio, AESA, 2022).  (Green Economy TA - inception report, .2023) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 20 

 
 
 
 
results, and inconsistent implementation quality due to sub-granting practices. While pooled funding has 
scaled operations, reliance on parallel mechanisms to the state has been risky and not always yielded 
expected results. 

Direct grants, accounting for 29% of spending, have supported sectors such as the green economy, human 
rights, and peacebuilding, with NGO-led projects providing greater transparency and value for money 
compared to delegated cooperation. Service contracts, though limited in scope and comprising a smaller 
proportion of the spending (4%), have been crucial for technical assistance, ensuring strategic coherence, 
quality assurance, and sectoral learning (JC4.3), particularly in green economy and human rights initiatives. 

Non-spending activities by the EUD in Juba, including coordination, political dialogue, and capacity building, 
play a vital role in ensuring spending activities achieve results. EU staff in South Sudan contribute diplomatic 
expertise, local knowledge, and thematic skills, critical for progress in peace, governance, and human rights. 
However, systemic staffing challenges impact the well-being of EUD teams and the overall quality of EU 
cooperation. 

Overall, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness have been higher in the cases of direct cooperation 
through iNGOs. The UN agencies have an important footprint and certainly a comparative advantage in terms 
of logistics and continuity, however, some of these agencies have a major shortcoming in the quality and 
transparency of their reporting, making it difficult to assess their efficiency and effectiveness in a meaningful 
way. In South Sudan, a UN agency having a technical mandate does not necessarily produce the 
corresponding technical performance on the field. The sub-granting system of EU funds by UN to local/iNGO 
is certainly one of the reasons, the uneven monitoring is another one. The level of detail in the monitoring 
data produced by a UN agency field team is much higher than what the UN agency country office is 
channelling to EU in its standard reporting. In South Sudan, some agencies, like WFP and UNOPS have been 
proven to be very good partners to EU nevertheless (see triangulated evidence in the green economy 
annexes and in the JC6. Section of the evidence matrix). In addition, the service contracts put in place by EU 
to provide technical assistance, some on a long-term basis, have really helped in ensuring continuity, close 
monitoring, coordination and harmonisation between the diversity of stakeholder implementing EU funds. So 
far technical assistance providing portfolio-level monitoring has been the most effective way to cope with this 
issue. (See the EU funding toolbox annex and evidence matrix I 4.3.3) 

2.4.1. The geographic programme is complemented by thematic ones (JC4.1) 

The EU’s financial support to South Sudan, while primarily driven by geographic programmes, has been 
consistently complemented by interventions funded through thematic mechanisms. Regional funding tools like 
the EDF and the EUTF have played a crucial role in bypassing South Sudan’s limited access to bilateral EDF 
funding, as the country had not signed the Cotonou Agreement. These mechanisms have allowed South 
Sudan to benefit from EU development aid beyond the emergency and humanitarian assistance provided by 
DG ECHO. 

Figure 4 EU spending disaggregated by geographic and thematic funding tools-in blue (in M€ over time) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 21 

 
 
 
Bilateral interventions have been supplemented by thematic funding tools60, including CSO-LA programmes, 
food security initiatives, human rights and democracy instruments, and peace and stability instruments as 
needs were emerging and as opportunities offered by some thematic budget lines appeared. The evaluation 
did not find any trace of plans for a strategic integration of geographic and thematic fundings. This is further 
evidenced by the fact that similar interventions have been funded by thematic fundings and by geographic 
fundings. Between 2011 and 2023, 81% of EU funding was geographic: 33% from EDF, 35% from EUTF, and 
12% from NDICI. Thematic funding accounted for 19%, split among Peace and Stability (8%), CSOs and 
Local Authorities (5%), Food Security (5%), and Human Rights and Democracy (2%). While South Sudan’s 
protracted crisis and severe food insecurity could justify using both thematic and geographic funding to 
address the “Security-Development nexus,” multiple sources suggest the EU instead employed a pragmatic 
approach, utilising any available funding lines to meet the country’s needs. 

During the first half of the current MFF, the EU leveraged the NDICI thematic envelope to support civil society 
and human rights initiatives. These efforts aimed to foster an enabling environment for the 2024 elections by 
strengthening civic space, promoting democratic dialogue, empowering CSOs as governance actors, and 
supporting independent information dissemination. This more recent way of integrating thematic and 
geographic envelops seem to stem from a more strategic perspective on the complementarity of funding tools 
than in the pre-MIP period.  

2.4.2. Use of rapid and contingency funding to tackle current challenges (JC4.2) 

During the pre-NDICI period, EUTF has been a major financing instrument of EU in South Sudan. While it is 
not mandated for being a contingency response funding, but rather to “provide a medium-term response to 
the challenges of the region”61, EUTF contains a substantial dimension of flexibility, notably in the design and 
approval process of interventions, which is EUTF-specific and differs from the standard INTPA comitology 
process62.   EUTF operational framework reveals also flexibility and simplification in the contracting process63, 
as evidenced by the large number of interventions quickly launched in the field as acknowledged by its board 
members and implementing partners64. (See also evidence matrix I 4.2.1)  
Throughout the evaluated period, the use of the FPI is also to be considered in the flexible and responsive 
feature of the EU funding toolbox. The FPI's streamlined procedures and capacity for quick decision-making 
allows the EU to adjust its interventions to address emerging needs, support peace processes at critical 
junctures, and respond to unforeseen crises more swiftly than through traditional, slower instruments. The 
very nature of the FPI aligns with the demanding operational environment of South Sudan, as the visible in 
the timeline of funding in the above figure 4 and in the textbox “Linking contextual and peace factor to the EU 
spending over time” in chapter 2.2.4.  

For the more recent period with the NDICI instrument, the evaluation found limited sources of information 
regarding the EUD experience with flexible or rapid response funding tools, though such mechanisms can be 
valuable.65 A notable example is the use of a flexible NDICI envelope in 2023 to address the regional impact 
of the Sudan conflict. The EUD coordinated a EUR 17 million multi-country contract covering South Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Chad, with EUR 8 million allocated to South Sudan66. This funding aims to mitigate the strain on 
resources and services caused by displaced populations, supporting regional stability and economic 
resilience. 

While negotiated procedures (I 4.2.2) have been frequently used during the evaluated period to expedite 
contracting with NGOs, their application is being phased down as per recent DG INTPA Headquarters 
guidance. This has been found relevant and feasible by several EUD past and present team members during 

60 The figure displays in shades of orange the geographic funding (country- or region-specific), and in shade of blue the thematic funding (that 
targets global issues across multiple locations). Geographic fundings are linked to bilateral and regional cooperation with specific countries or 
regions. It is tailored to the needs, priorities, and agreements established with partner countries or regional organisations. It supports long-term 
development, economic partnerships, and stability efforts in designated areas. Thematic Budget Lines are focused on global priorities and 
cross-border challenges, related to themes like human rights, climate change, migration, gender equality, and civil society support; they are 
often complementing geographic programs. Prior to 2020, geographical funding in South Sudan was only ensured by regional envelopes such 
as EUTF and regional EDF. 
61 Establishing Agreement of the EUTF for Africa, 2015 
62 “INTPA Companion to financial and contractual procedures applicable to external actions financed from the general budget of the EU and 
from the 11th EDF”, - chapter 10 “Guidelines on EU Trust Funds, EU, 2022” 
63 Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and 
Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019, GDSI, 2020” 
64 “EUTF board meeting minutes 1 -8”  
65 “Learning Lessons from the EUTF - Phase 2 - Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement.; Altaï 
Consulting, 2021” 
66 “European Union provides EUR 17 million new development funding to UNHCR and IOM for thousands affected by Sudan conflict”, News, 
2013 IOM. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 22 

 
 
 
 
the field phase interviews. In various IP interviews, there is an appreciation of the collaborative spirit that 
negotiated procedures brought between them and EUD. However, perception of being overly directed has 
been found in some cases when the EUD instructions were not consistent and leading to multiple re-writing of 
an intervention design or to multiple versions of the guidance on the consortium profile to set up.  

Apart from the above elements, documentation and the EU Statistical dashboard analysis provide little 
additional insight into the EUD’s broader use of flexible or rapid response tools (I 4.2.1). 

2.4.3. Mix of implementation modalities appropriate to the context (JC4.3) 

Since 2011, the EU’s financial support to South Sudan has predominantly relied on indirect management, 
complemented by direct management approaches in specific contexts. Indirect management has facilitated 
large-scale operations, particularly in challenging and hard-to-reach areas, while direct management through 
grants and service contracts has ensured value for money, transparency, and crucial support for the 
understaffed EU Delegation (EUD). 

Pooled funding and delegated cooperation have accounted for 67% of EU spending between 2011 and 2023, 
with 44% implemented through UN agencies and 15% via bilateral partners. These modalities have been 
essential in scaling operations, delivering countrywide support, and addressing needs in remote regions. UN 
agencies have been instrumental in leveraging their established networks and field presence. However, these 
approaches have faced challenges, including high transaction costs, limited EU visibility, transparency 
shortcomings, and inconsistent implementation quality due to sub-granting practices (see evidence matrix 
JC4.3 and dedicated annex on EU funding toolbox). Dependence on external mechanisms also posed risks, 
such as the fallout from the Crown Agents’ bankruptcy affecting the Health Pool Fund. Despite these 
limitations, indirect management has filled gaps in EU capacity and ensured continuity in high-priority sectors 
such as education, health, and food security 67. 

Figure 5 Mix of management mode in EU cooperation in South Sudan between 2011-2023 

Budget support, considered during South Sudan’s early years of independence, has never been implemented 
due to persistent fragility, governance shortcomings, and weak institutional capacity. No financing agreements 
with the government had been signed by mid-202468, and while the World Bank is channelling some funds 
through state systems69, the EU remains cautious about such approaches for the foreseeable future. 
Similarly, blending and guarantees, identified in the 2021-2027 Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) as 
potential tools to leverage private sector resources, have not materialised due to the poor business 
environment. 

67  The EU-UNDP Partnership and Added Value in EU Development Cooperation,  Erik Lundsgaarde, German Development Institute (2021) 
68 Apart from the attempt of budget support in the first years of EU cooperation with South Sudan, that finally was never implemented.  
69 World Bank – IDA provides interest-free loans – called credits – and grants to governments of the poorest countries. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 23 

 
 
 
 
Direct management approaches, which have accounted for 29% of EU spending since 2011, have primarily 
taken the form of grant contracts with NGOs70. These grants have demonstrated higher transparency, 
flexibility, and value for money compared to some interventions under indirect management. NGOs have 
been particularly effective in the green economy, human rights, and peacebuilding sectors, showing 
adaptability and quality reporting that supports accountability71.  
In the biodiversity conservation subsector, some practices have been found of EUD staff member directing 
the formation or dissolution of NGO consortia, occasionally disrupting natural partnerships (see evidence 
matrix I 4.3.3). Direct awards have been valuable in crisis contexts, allowing rapid implementation, though it 
created a window of opportunity that allowed, in this particular subsector of biodiversity conservation, to skip 
the well-needed in depth stakeholder and context analysis, which in turn led to unconvincing choices in terms 
of relevance or quality of design of the various biodiversity-focused interventions funded by the EU since the 
beginning of the current MFF. 

Service contracts, representing about 4% of spending have provided essential technical assistance to the 
EU’s work in South Sudan. These contracts have been instrumental in managing complex technical portfolios, 
ensuring quality oversight, and maintaining institutional memory, particularly in sectors like infrastructure, 
governance, and the green economy72. Technical assistance has also supported institutional capacity-
building efforts, helping to develop policies and strategies in key sectors such as public financial 
management, education, and rule of law. In the context of the EUD’s chronic understaffing and high staff 
turnover, these contracts have been critical to sustaining EU operations and maintaining coherence across 
interventions. 

Non-spending activities such as management, coordination, policy dialogue, and capacity building, while not 
formally categorised in the EU procedures as an implementation modality73, play a pivotal role in achieving 
development outcomes. These activities rely heavily on the EUD’s local and expatriate staff, who contribute 
time, expertise, and diplomatic skills to support cooperation efforts. Political engagement, especially on issues 
like peace, governance, and human rights, has been critical for creating an enabling environment for 
development. However, staffing challenges, including difficulties filling international positions and high 
turnover, have constrained the EUD’s ability to sustain quality and results. 

• 

• 

• 

The EU political engagement pre-MIP was paramount to support peace efforts. EU initiated and chaired the 
« Extended Head of Missions process” to support peace process with weekly meetings between 2015 and 2019. 

The EU Delegation participated in the PFM Oversight Committee (providing political backup and steer of the 
reform) and in the PFM Technical Committee (for technical input). In coordination with World Bank, the 
Delegation prepared for support of the establishment of the South Sudan’s Public Procurement and Asset 
Disposal of Asset Authority (PPADA).) 

The EU support to the multi-donor Health Pooled Fund - HPF – dates back to 2012. Via HPF and in coordination 
with other donors (including DG ECHO in particular), the Delegation has been able to contribute to the political 
and policy advocacy to the government for improving South Sudan's health framework and commitment to 
increase national budgetary allocations and actual execution for health in South Sudan. 

Box 4 Example of “atypical implementation modalities” consisting in non-spending activities for EU political and policy dialogues in South Sudan 

The EU’s implementation modalities have been flexible and effective in addressing the complex needs of 
South Sudan’s volatile environment74. However, addressing gaps in visibility, enhancing local partnerships, 

70 In average, this represents EUR 2 million per year in actual service contracts.  
71 The EU interventions in Education and Health sector represent very few partners. In these sectors, most of the EU support is channelled 
through directly managed Grant contracts implemented via delegated cooperation. EU funding in South Sudan for PFM, institutional 
strengthening and local governance sector represent also very few partners. Threse sectors are a very small segment of EU cooperation 
(EUR 55 million in total between 2011 and 2023, out of which only EUR 18 million have been implemented by NGOs) 
72 Between 2011 and 2013, the following spending has been recorded in EU TA for policy support and institutional strengthening: PFM 
EUR 5 million, Governance and rule of law EUR 1,5 million, Peace and stability EUR 1,17 million, Education EUR 2 million, Health EUR 0,34 
million. In social sectors like education and health, a lot of TA support happened probably subcontracted by the delegated entity and not 
captured here. In green economy sector, isolating policy support is difficult as the TA contracts covered both portfolio management support and 
institutional strengthening.  
73 The implementing modality of an intervention is the combination of i) type of financing (contractual relationship between the Commission and 
the beneficiary: budget support, grant, public procurement or financial instrument); and of ii) management mode (direct – by the Commission - or 
indirect – through an implementing partner) 
74 Although the evaluation scope span from 2011 to December 2023, this total amount includes the payment recorded until June 2024 in order 
to better capture the more recent evolution during the first half of the MIP. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 24 

 
 
 
 
and resolving persistent staffing constraints are critical for sustaining impact and improving cooperation 
outcomes in the future. 

The EU Delegation serves as a primary instrument for implementing the EU’s support initiatives in South Sudan. However, 
the EUD team is currently under significant pressure, primarily due to staffing challenges. A consistent issue has been the 
lengthy gap in filling vacant positions, with delays ranging from two to ten months (often more than 6 months). These 
extended gaps hinder the opportunity for effective handovers, as new hires often do not overlap with their predecessors 
and hand over notes are quickly outdated in a volatile country like South Sudan. 

The recruitment delays are exacerbated by the fact that EUD postings in fragile contexts like South Sudan are less 
attractive to candidates through the EU’s standard rotation exercises. This trend is not unique to South Sudan but has been 
observed in EU Delegation in other fragile countries as well. As a result, when positions are not filled internally during the 
rotation exercise, the vacancies must be opened to external applicants. This approach, however, has its one periodicity, 
adding cycles to the hiring process, prolonging the time needed to secure suitable personnel. In countries from the crisis 
list, flexibility is given to EU Delegations for contracting IPs, but there is no specific procedure for facilitating the contracting 
of EUD staff. 

The evaluation found clear consequences of this issue on the quality of the EU cooperation in South Sudan: insufficient 
onboarding of newcomers to EU to master critical EU-IT platforms, encoding mistakes and gaps in uploading intervention 
documents in EU information systems, loss of institutional memory, cascading delays in contracting IPs, gaps in monitoring, 
late feedback or even absence of reaction to questions and issues reported by IPs, low level of collegial decision making, 
discontinuity and permanent reconfiguration in portfolio composition (or even thematic focus) managed per staff member, 
delays in contraction and in payments… 

Interviews indicate that prolonged periods of high workload have led to visible health issues among some EUD team 
members. These challenges underscore the need for an internal reflection (EEAS, DG INTPA, DG HR) for more adaptable 
human resource management practices and recruitment procedures that consider the complexities and specificities of EU 
delegations in fragile countries.  

Box 5 The EUD staffing challenges and their implication for implementing EU cooperation 

2.4.4. Volume of financing allocated corresponds to the support identified (JC4.4) 

Between 2011 and 2023, the EU contracted EUR 661.7 million for South Sudan, achieving an execution rate 
of 79%. Of the 253 contracts during this period, 72 remained active in 2024, with 50 linked to the 2021-2027 
programming instruments, particularly the EUTF and NDICI thematic and geographic envelopes. The MIP has 
allowed the achievement of results expected from a concentration of support in priority areas, while remaining 
compliant with EU policies requiring to work with a diversity of stakeholders. The visibility of the EU funding 
has not risen accordingly with this programming weight however, as discussed in the other sections of the 
report. 

Table 6 From programming to commitment: pace per priority area of the MIP under NDICI GEO (amounts in EUR million and decisions) 

For the 2021-2023 period, EUR 159.6 million were committed under NDICI geographic envelopes, 
representing 77% of the EUR 208 million planned for 2021-2024. Given that this evaluation covers 75% of the 
indicative period, the EU’s commitment pace is considered timely. Commitment levels were strong in the 
Human Development and Governance, Peace, and Rule of Law sectors. However, delays in the Green and 
Resilient Economy sector stemmed from staffing shortages in the EUD's green economy team, which 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 25 

 
 
 
disrupted management support and caused a one-year gap in technical assistance75. This delay affected the 
formulation phase of new green economy programmes, slowing the sector’s overall execution pace. 

2.5. EQ5 - Implementation of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus  

EQ5- To what extent was the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach implemented in EU interventions 
conducive to sustainable changes for stability and peace building in South Sudan? 
JC5.1 EU has effectively integrated a Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus approach into its programming and 
intervention management cycle processes 
JC5.2 EU spending and non-spending interventions allowed and strengthened the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus 
in the country 
JC5.3 Some of the sustainable changes in stability and peace building in South Sudan are perceived as direct and indirect 
effects of EU contribution 

The triple nexus plays a central role in EU cooperation in South Sudan, offering a framework to integrate 
humanitarian, development, and peace efforts in the country’s complex context. Its prominence reflects both 
its alignment with EU policy priorities and its potential to address South Sudan's interconnected challenges. 
However, translating the triple nexus into practice has proven difficult. While it serves as a foundation for 
broad policy dialogue among donors, the UN, and various levels of government, its implementation is often 
constrained by the country’s instability, which disrupts programming continuity, as well as the country’s 
readiness to allow a transition to development. 
Further complications arise from the entrenched structures and objectives of implementing partners, which 
are embedded into agreements and may not fully align with nexus principles. Delegation staff, including those 
from DG ECHO, often struggle to identify clear examples of the triple nexus in action. Its on-the-ground 
application depends heavily on the effectiveness of area-based programming, which can bridge the gap 
between Nexus ambitions and practical outcomes in specific regions. 

2.5.1. Triple nexus approach integrated into the management processes (JC5.1) 

The EU has established a robust policy framework to integrate humanitarian aid, development cooperation, 
and political engagement under the triple nexus (or HDP). While examples of implementation exist, such as in 
South Sudan, EU officials face challenges operationalising the Nexus due to differing programming cycles 
and structural constraints. 

Efforts to operationalise the Nexus have encountered obstacles, including humanitarian actors’ hesitance to 
engage with political entities, misaligned institutional mandates, lack of coordination among development 
partners, and volatility in local contexts. Despite long-standing EU advocacy for integrated approaches, as 
reiterated in the March 2021 Communication on EU humanitarian action, no clear strategy has emerged to 
transition from humanitarian aid to peace and development.  

EU programming reflects the triple nexus in two ways: (1) interventions explicitly designated for the Nexus 
(EUR 37 million across seven decisions and 14 contracts) and (2) stability and peacebuilding efforts 
incorporating emergency relief and developmental components (EUR 49 million across 13 decisions and 25 
contracts). Broader Nexus-related activities also address governance and sectoral issues, with coordination 
evident in areas like health, education, and resettlement76. 
However, practical integration faces hurdles, including mismatched programming timelines (one-year cycles 
for DG ECHO vs. seven years for MIPs), lack of cross-service strategy, and limited evaluation of IP activities. 
Coordination between DG ECHO, FPI, and DG INTPA remains informal and fragmented. Structural 
constraints further hinder integration, such as the dominance of humanitarian assistance guided by the 
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, which resist the policy steering implied by 
the Nexus77. 

75 Out of the EUR 39.2 million committed, only EUR 2 million has been contracted and EUR 0.4 million paid, primarily for the Green Economy 
TA, which began in 2023. This caused a one-year gap in management support due to delayed procurement. By September 2024, with 91% of 
the 2021–2024 programming period elapsed, the evaluation team found the programme still in early stages: concept notes for the delegated 
cooperation component and information sessions for direct management. Potential IPs engaged in 2022 had disengaged, citing a lack of clarity 
on the EU’s strategic vision and funding agenda. 
76 The International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) intervention decided in December 2012, “Enhancing the Capacity of the Judiciary of 
South Sudan” FED/2012/307-871, aims to ‘not only assist the Judiciary to uphold the rule of law, protect human rights and resolve disputes in 
an impartial, fair and efficient manner, but should also increase the public’s confidence in the Judiciary and its administration of justice.’ 
77 These universal constraints are discussed in ‘HDP Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for its Implementation’, Tony Land and Volker Hauck 
for ECDPM and the INTPA Evaluation Unit, 2021. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 26 

 
 
 
 
Ambassadors in South Sudan advocate for centralised coordination under their leadership, but divisions 
between EEAS (political work) and the Cooperation Section (project funding) impede alignment. Short-term 
projects, influenced by Brussels and Member States, remain detached from triple nexus goals. Despite some 
sectoral collaboration, systemic challenges limit the Nexus's potential to address South Sudan's complex 
needs. 

2.5.2. Triple nexus strengthened by spending and non-spending activities (JC5.2) 

The EU's efforts to implement triple nexus programming in South Sudan face significant challenges: 

1.  Policy Gaps: There is no formal triple nexus policy that articulates priorities between the MIP, 

EEAS/FPI, or DG ECHO programming, preventing a strategic shift from humanitarian aid to peace 
and development78. 

2.  Reliance on International Partners: The EU depends heavily on international organisations, with 

limited government engagement, threatening the sustainability of interventions. 

3.  Complex Conflict Drivers: The deep-rooted causes of South Sudan’s conflicts, including economic 
factors, political systems, and corruption, are beyond the control of international partners and hinder 
the long-term impact of aid. 

Despite these obstacles, progress includes joint assessment work between DG INTPA and DG ECHO (e.g., 
in food security clusters) and integrated programming like the NaturAfrica-supported intervention, which 
combines peacebuilding and natural resource management. 

EU cooperation is mainly channelled through the UN and NGOs, as government systems are underfunded 
and overshadowed by international contributions. This dependency creates risks of service collapse if donor 
aid declines, as seen with budget cuts to HPF following reduced UK ODA. Efforts to create large-scale peace 
dividends or improve governance face limited success due to the persistent nature of conflict drivers, which 
require long-term approaches often incompatible with typical aid project timelines79. 
From 2011–2023, the EU allocated EUR 1.48 billion to South Sudan, with DG ECHO providing 64%, DG 
INTPA 32%, and FPI 3%. This highlights that the Nexus challenge is less about financial resources and more 
about the design, sequencing, and interconnection of interventions. Nexus-related activities, such as 
community mechanisms and national conflict mediation, represent a small portion of funding but are critical 
for achieving broader developmental outcomes. 

Figure 6 Yearly Payments by Directorate-General 

78 There is a formal policy affirming triple nexus principle. There is also an explicit statement of this policy in ECHO programming documents 
and in INTPA programming documents for South Sudan. However there are no clear procedures or processes that says how in practice 
intervention cycles and work processes can be interlinked. 
79 ‘CSRF Policy Brief: When Policies Backfire - Well-meaning donor policies can lead to bad aid, with examples from South Sudan’, Audrey 
Bottjen, CSRF April 2024. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 27 

 
 
 
 
The MIP underscores the EU's geopolitical priorities, emphasising conflict sensitivity across all sectors and a 
growing focus on Nexus approaches. Examples include multi-sector assessments80 and mapping tools 
involving humanitarian and development partners. These efforts reflect a gradual trend towards more 
integrated programming, though significant structural and contextual challenges remain. 

2.5.3. EU spending and non-spending interventions allowed and strengthened the 
Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in the country  

The EU has been a significant contributor to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (CPPB), and security in 
South Sudan, increasing its funding over the years. Between 2011 and 2023, CPPB interventions accounted 
for 11,6% of the EU's total cooperation portfolio in South Sudan, amounting to EUR 60.51 million out of EUR 
521.14 million. Despite this investment, the support has not significantly influenced national political or 
communal tensions, violence, or displacement, which remain high due to the deep and complex roots of 
South Sudan’s conflicts. However, local-level interventions, particularly area-based programming, have 
shown potential to positively influence conflict dynamics. 

The EU’s Action Documents aim to foster an inclusive and peaceful society in South Sudan by promoting 
peace, human rights, the rule of law, and accountable governance. These objectives are ambitious, and their 
effects are often diffuse, with indicators showing low attribution to the complex realities on the ground. While 
the EU has progressively adapted its spending instruments for crisis contexts, improving flexibility and 
responsiveness, there is no clear correlation between phases of EU programming and broader reductions in 
conflict intensity or societal tensions. 

Conflict data, such as from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), highlights a rise in violence 
post-2011, plateauing after 2016, with hotspots in Central and Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, and the Unity 
Region81. Structural issues, such as weak governance, historical grievances, corruption, and socio-economic 
inequities, drive these conflicts, making short-term aid projects less impactful for addressing long-term 
challenges like democratic legitimacy or institutional reforms. This disconnect underscores the limitations of 
external actors in influencing South Sudan’s entrenched conflict drivers. 

EU CPPB funding fluctuated from EUR 1.5 million in 2013 to EUR 14.9 million in 2020, showing a peak of 
EUR 10.3 million in recent years. The EU is the fifth-largest donor for CPPB in South Sudan, contributing 
USD 50.2 million82. However, its contributions often focus on ceasefire implementation and localised 
agreements rather than broader systemic change, with shocks like COVID-19 hindering progress. While 
funding supports ceasefires and local agreements, it is not closely tied to the (R-)ARCSS peace process. 

Local-level interventions, such as area-based programming, have demonstrated encouraging results. This is 
demonstrated in the UN RSRTF evaluations83. In Yei, UNHCR programming addressed key conflict drivers, 
including insecurity and collapsed trade routes. Focus group discussions (FGDs) revealed perceptions of 
untapped potential but frustrations over inadequate international aid and government collaboration compared 
to neighbouring Uganda. In Pibor, efforts by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and WFP 
focused on peaceful coexistence, with cash-for-work programmes and livelihood support fostering community 
bonds and reducing tensions. Respondents noted improved relationships and some reduction in tensions, but 
significant challenges, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), polygamy, and resource 
competition, remain prevalent. Both case studies underscore the importance of continuous engagement and 
community-driven solutions but highlight the persistent challenges of perceived inequality in aid distribution 
and weak local authority engagement. 

Participation in peacebuilding and development efforts was high, with 98% of respondents reporting improved 
community relationships. However, 75% highlighted non-inclusion in activities as a concern, and only 26% 
reported engaging local authorities in conflict management. These findings underscore the need for greater 

80 https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-aweil-east-county-nbeg-state-multi-cluster-assessment-conflict-affected-january-2022  
81 With Central Equatoria experiencing 957 events in total, Jonglei 738, Eastern Equatoria 407, and Unity 446. 
82 With data drawn from database consultation and extraction, quantitative analysis based on textual data exploration, statistical analysis trend 
analysis: quantitative analysis based on textual data exploration, trend analysis, statistical analysis of CRS-OECD databases and extracts of EU 
statistical dashboard. 
83 Starting with “Independent Early-Stage Evaluation of the South Sudan Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Reconciliation, Stabilisation, and 
Resilience (RSRTF)”, David Deng, Kuyang Harriet Logo and Jan Pospisil, October 2021. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 28 

 
 
 
 
inclusivity and stronger institutional engagement. Localised efforts, while impactful, require stronger 
integration with national governance structures to ensure sustainability. 

While the EU has enhanced its capacity to support CPPB, its interventions face limitations in addressing 
South Sudan’s entrenched conflict drivers84. Localised approaches, such as area-based programming, show 
promise in fostering community cohesion and addressing immediate needs but struggle to tackle systemic 
challenges. 

2.6. EQ6 - Contributions to the Green Economy Sector  

EQ6- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the green economy sector (financial 
assistance and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected objectives at country level? 
JC6.1 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to diversifying the economy to the extent 
possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 
JC6.2 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to employment and decent work, with a 
focus on youth to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country. 
JC6.3 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to improving food and nutrition security to 
the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 
JC6.4 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to more sustainable environment and 
resilience to climate change to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 

For the majority of South Sudanese facing chronic hunger and acute malnutrition, ensuring basic food 
availability, access, and production remains the paramount and most pressing concern. Against this 
backdrop, EU interventions in South Sudan between 2011 and 2023 pursued a green economy strategy with 
a EUR 195 million budget, operating within a context marked by ongoing conflict, political instability, and 
recurrent flooding. A significant portion, EUR 99.2 million (51.2% of the green economy budget), was 
allocated to economic infrastructure (JC6.1). This investment aimed to enhance economic diversification by 
strategically targeting areas with high agricultural potential and connecting them to markets, supporting value 
chain development with Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) and employment initiatives 
(JC6.2). 

Between 2017 and 2023, EU support resulted in the improvement of 935 kilometres of feeder roads and track 
roads, representing a notable proportion of South Sudan’s secondary road network. Of these, 465 kilometres 
were upgraded to year-round accessibility, increasing accessibility by 16% during rainy seasons. These EU-
funded roads, often managed by UNOPS to ensure higher technical standards, reportedly reduced travel 
times by a factor of four to five and provided improved access to over 1.8 million people across four states. In 
addition to roads, EU support created 3,046 community assets and small-scale infrastructures and 
established over 1,500 Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs), benefiting over 37,500 members with 
improved access to finance. This integrated approach aimed to establish a cohesive framework for economic 
development by combining infrastructure with agricultural and financial sector support. 

Concerning food and nutrition security (JC6.3), EU interventions directly targeted SDG2 (zero hunger) with 
42% of the green economy budget and indirectly SDG9 (road infrastructure) with 46%. Operating against a 
backdrop where conflict and natural disasters are key barriers to food security, EU programmes contributed to 
expanding cultivated areas and boosting agricultural output at macro and meso levels. Notably, in EU-
benefitting areas, sorghum production rose from 764,167 MT to 818,456 MT between 2017 and 2021, 
representing 60% of the country's annual cereal requirement. Between 2017 and 2022, EU support covered 
146,377 ha cultivated with sorghum, which is 15% of the total area cultivated nationally.  

Beneficiary level data indicates households with acceptable food consumption scores more than doubled from 
20% to 43% between 2017 and 2022. This is linked to an increase in average cultivated area per household 
from 0.9 ha to 2.3 ha and tripling of groundnut production volumes. EU-funded interventions directly 
supported 183,014 households practicing family farming85 across nine states, representing 17% of the 
estimated country population through food security interventions. Furthermore, since 2008, the EU has been 
the primary funder for the FAO’s Climate Information System database (CLIMIS), a critical tool for sector 
planning used by governmental, humanitarian and development actors in South Sudan. 

84 “External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2013-2018)” Nicole Ball et al. on behalf of Particip GmBH for 
INTPA.  
85 Family farming is “a means of organising agricultural, forestry, fisheries, pastoral and aquaculture production which is managed and operated 
by a family and predominantly reliant on family capital and labour, including both women’s and men’s. The family and the farm are linked, co-
evolve and combine economic, environmental, social and cultural function (FAO definition) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 29 

 
 
 
 
However, EU interventions have encountered limitations in the domain of environmental sustainability and 
climate resilience (JC6.4). Despite promoting climate-smart agriculture, inconsistencies in implementation and 
effectiveness persist. Flood control measures like dikes have shown mixed outcomes, sometimes 
exacerbating flood risks. Deforestation, driven by charcoal production and causing a significant annual forest 
loss of 1.5-2%, remains largely unaddressed. Concurrently, 20% of Green Economy technical assistance is 
allocated to wildlife conservation in protected areas. This resource allocation raises questions regarding the 
strategic balance, potentially indicating a disproportionate emphasis on biodiversity conservation when 
compared to the urgent needs in food production enhancement, economic development, and essential 
infrastructure resilience required in the current South Sudanese context (See Annex VI on the Green 
Economy). 

2.6.1. Overall contribution to economic development (JC6.1) 

Between 2011 and 2023, the EU contributed significantly to the diversification of South Sudan’s economy 
through a comprehensive approach focused on green economy and rural development. For the green 
economy sector, the EU spent a total of EUR 195 million (16 decisions, 51 contracts), which included a 
substantial budget spend on economic infrastructure: road and bridge development, small-scale infrastructure 
for post-harvest management, and water access for off-season agriculture. The EU’s strategy to support 
South Sudan’s economic diversification was grounded in a careful selection of intervention zones. This 
approach prioritised areas with high agricultural potential and sought to connect these zones to markets 
through targeted road infrastructure investments. Once these priority routes were established, the EU 
introduced additional programmes to support economic activities around the infrastructure. These included 
initiatives to improve agricultural production, support value chains, expand access to finance, and develop 
essential community infrastructure, such as storage facilities, water access points, and local markets. This 
integrated approach in designing green economy interventions has been consistently implemented across the 
years, maximising the impact of EU investments by establishing a cohesive framework for economic 
development. 

Road and bridge infrastructure: economic connectivity and technical quality. Road infrastructure has 
been a major component of the EU investment in South Sudan’s green economy sector from 2011 to 2023 
(see evidence matrix I 6.1.2). This investment was crucial for enhancing market access by connecting 
agricultural production zones to local and regional markets, facilitating surplus commercialisation. These 
improved transport routes have created economic opportunities and enhanced access to essential services 
for rural communities. The high technical quality of EU-funded road infrastructure has been a key feature of 
this support. Managed mostly by UNOPS and benefitting from EU TA, these road projects met higher 
durability standards than typical national infrastructures, ensuring longer-lasting benefits. The use of high 
labour-intensive construction approach initially envisaged proved less suitable for secondary roads but was 
effective for building tertiary routes connecting small village centres. This commitment to technical excellence 
has increased the resilience and viability of the EU-supported infrastructure network, even in challenging 
conditions (See Annex VI on the Green Economy for additional analysis). 

The EU contribution to the economic infrastructure has been significant between 2011 and 2023 
-  Between 2011 and 2023, the EU support to the infrastructure subsector amounted to EUR 99.2 million, which 

represented 51.2% of the overall EU support to the Green economy sector during the period  

-  Between 2017 and 2023, the EU support to the infrastructure subsector 935 km of feeder roads and track roads 

improved (constructed or maintained) thanks to EU (12.6% of South Sudan’s secondary road network and 5.5% of the 
total national road infrastructure) 

-  Out of the 935 kilometres, 465 kilometres were made accessible year-round, increasing the accessibility of the 

secondary road network during rainy seasons by 16% 

-  EU-funded roads have provided improved access to over 1.8 million people across four states 
-  According to humanitarian agencies, EU-funded roads have reduced travel times by a factor of four to five 
-  Between 2017 and 2022, the EU support to the green economy sector has contributed to the creation of 3 046 

community assets and small-scale infrastructures (marketplaces, mills, shallow wells, boreholes, water ponds, agrovet 
retail shops, improved granaries, rural aggregation centres, seed banks, agro-processing centres etc.) 
1500+ Village and saving loan associations have been created with EU support (more than 37,500 VSLA members have 
benefitted from improved access to finance). 

- 

Box 6 Key numbers of EU contribution to the economic infrastructure between 2011 and 2023 

Although support to feeder roads has been a major component of European assistance from 2011 to date, the 
new programming document remains unclear regarding future prospects. The evaluation found that the EUD 
does not plan to continue this infrastructure component after 2024. This is due to MIP funding envelope 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 30 

 
 
 
limitation in keeping the feeder road sector in the current MFF, but also to concerns regarding the viability of 
investments and the capacity for local maintenance. These aspects are further analysed in the dedicated 
annex (Annex VI) and pragmatic targeted recommendations are provided for the next period.  

Small-scale infrastructure: storage facilities and water access. Alongside road development, the EU 
invested in smaller-scale infrastructure projects essential for post-harvest management and counter-season 
agriculture. These include cereal storage warehouses, seed banks, and water access facilities, such as water 
ponds, boreholes and shallow wells. Improved storage facilities have helped reduce post-harvest losses, 
which are typically high, enabling farmers to store produce until market prices are favourable. The EU-
supported water infrastructure has facilitated off-season production, based on cash-crops like fruits and 
vegetables, providing farmers with a new source of income during dry season. 

Support for value chain development and diversification. A key aspect of the EU’s support was its 
comprehensive approach to value chain development, focusing on the entire length of the value chain 
(I 6.1.4). Successful projects in the portfolio emphasised from the outset both ends of the chain, ensuring that 
inputs and production needs were met while also strengthening market access and commercial opportunities 
for agriculture products. On the input side, the EU provided support for access to essential supplies, such as 
seeds, agricultural tools, vaccines for livestock and agro-veterinary services.  

A notable component of this support was the training and assistance provided to rural blacksmiths, who 
played a crucial role in the value chain by making, repairing, and maintaining agricultural tools (ranging from 
traditional tools to more advanced tools for animal traction, such as ox-ploughs and donkey-ploughs). 
Enhanced access to critical farming tools like ploughs, coupled to training famers on animal traction, had a 
very significant effect in increasing the cultivated area per households and in the total volume of grain 
production in the targeted areas. By generating a surplus sold in local and regional markets, this has widely 
resulted into a transition from subsistence farming to income-generating farming for the beneficiaries of EU-
funded interventions (see full qualitative and quantitative analysis in Annex VI on the Green Economy).  

At the other end of the value chain, the EU worked to facilitate commercialisation by connecting producers 
with buyers able to purchase in larger quantities or at better prices. This was often achieved through support 
for agricultural cooperatives and farmer groups, which enabled smallholders to aggregate their production, 
thereby creating an “economy of scale” effect for the buyers. These groups were also supported with training 
in business practices, which helped to strengthen their market position. In addition, the EU provided critical 
support for intermediary services within the value chain, such as local transport and veterinary services. The 
creation of small cooperatives for transport allowed groups of farmers to collectively purchase motorcycles 
equipped with small trailers, providing an effective means of transporting people and products to local 
markets. The EU also supported infrastructure for market access, such as market shelters. Although there is 
mixed feedback on these EU-funded market-sheds, numerous stakeholders reported it improved market 
conditions and created more attractiveness for buyers. 

The EU’s approach to creating a favourable environment for value chain development also included 
expanding access to rural finance through the establishment of VSLAs, which strengthened access to finance 
for local communities. Connected to the VSLAs, the EU supported the development of Micro Small and 
Medium Enterprises (MSME) by providing financial literacy training and business management. This has 
helped improve conditions for small-scale private sector development across diverse sectors beyond 
agricultural value chains (bakery, small grocery shops, small restaurants, tea rooms, transport service, tailors 
etc.). This rural finance support is part of a broader framework, for which EU supports legal and regulatory 
development aiming at the diversification of the economy and the growth of value chains. (“Fruits and 
vegetables sector strategy”; “National Quality Policy”). 

2.6.2. Contribution to an enabling environment for private sector.  

EU contribution in employment and vocational training development. Between 2011 and 2023, EU 
allocated around 11% of its overall green economy spending to interventions tagged as having a primary 
focus on youth, TVET and employment (EUR 21.28 million) (I 6.2.3). EU contributes around 12% of the 
overall TVET and employment ODA to South Sudan (I 6.2.3), the third contributor after UK and Canada. EU 
and its Member States together have become the primary donor for TVET and employment support of the 
country. 

Institutional support and capacity building. Some EU interventions have supported vocational training 
institutions, agricultural training centres and curriculum development. These programs aimed to build local 
capacity by training teachers, developing educational materials, and fostering stronger institutional structures. 
Additionally, the EU worked on enhancing the financial self-sufficiency of vocational centres by helping them 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 31 

 
 
engage in income-generating activities. However, limited governmental budget allocations for vocational 
training remain a barrier. 

Direct employment creation through high-intensity labour approach. The EU funded several high-
intensity labour projects, especially in infrastructure development, such as road construction (see Annex VI for 
extended analysis in the dedicated green economy annex). These projects initially provided temporary jobs 
primarily to young people from local communities; however, challenges arose with the quality of the work 
delivered. Due to these challenges, a shift towards hiring contractors rather than relying solely on local labour 
limited the impact on local employment. Although the approach did create jobs, the employment effect was 
less than anticipated and short-term. Some youths, however, did gain technical capacity in road maintenance 
by working with EU contractors and obtained a stable job afterward. 

Vocational training for income diversification in rural areas. To diversify income sources, most EU green 
economy projects included vocational training and employment support in sectors with high local demand. 
The outcome (see evidence matrix I 6.2.6) varied according to the type of trade concerned. Successes were 
observed in blacksmithing, hairdressing, tailoring, and nursery work (such as fruit tree cultivation), livestock 
extension, all of which proved successful in creating sustainable income opportunities. These sectors were 
well-matched to the needs of local communities, with trainees often creating small businesses or becoming 
self-employed. In many cases, a very interesting multiplier effect has been found with trained individuals 
sharing skills with others (ratio found 1:2 in tailoring; 1:10 in blacksmithing), and even hiring them as 
employees, extending the reach of EU-supported vocational programs. Challenges were faced with more 
technical fields, such as information technology and solar panel installation, which faced significant obstacles 
due to infrastructure limitations outside the capital city of Juba. In rural areas, unreliable electricity and lack of 
access to affordable technology made IT training less viable. Solar panel installation training also faced 
challenges, as there was limited demand in these areas without corresponding investment in energy 
infrastructure. This mismatch between technical skills and local conditions hindered the effectiveness of 
training in these fields. 

EU interventions in infrastructure, particularly road construction, had notable indirect effects on local 
employment and economic activity. The construction of new roads facilitated increased commerce and 
created opportunities for small businesses, such as shops, restaurants, and service-based enterprises along 
major routes. This boost in economic activity spurred job creation indirectly by encouraging the growth of local 
businesses that could capitalise on increased traffic and accessibility. The EU-funded intervention focused on 
agriculture development also contributed to indirect job creation. By expanding the land available for 
cultivation, especially through training in animal traction and other agricultural techniques, the demand for on-
farm labour increased (weeding, harvesting), justifying hiring workers. (see extended analysis in the dedicated 
green economy annex) 

2.6.3. Contribution to improving food and nutrition security (JC6.3) 

The European Union’s Contribution to Food Security and Nutrition in South Sudan. Between 2011 and 
2023, EU interventions significantly improved food and nutrition security in South Sudan by increasing 
cultivated areas, boosting agricultural output, and enhancing infrastructure. Food security in South Sudan is 
significantly impacted by two main barriers: ongoing conflict and political instability; and natural disasters, 
particularly recurrent flooding. These external factors heavily influence food production and access, with 
conflict leading to displacement, reduced agricultural activity, and strained community resources, while 
frequent flooding damages crops and disrupts market systems (I 6.3.1).  At a macro level, EU-funded 
programmes have been crucial in increasing cultivated areas, improving overall food production and food 
security across significant portions of South Sudan (I 6.3.2). The impact of EU programmes is evident in both 
regional production statistics as well as improved resilience and stronger shock recovery in targeted States 
(see Box 7). 

-  Since 2008, the EU has been the main contributor for the development and maintenance of the FAO food security 

information system CLIMIS used as planning reference by all governmental, humanitarian and development actors in 
South Sudan. (SIFSIA (2008 –2012); AFIS (2013-2016); “Cross-border project” (2017-2021); “PRO-SRVP” (2021-2023)) 
-  Between 2011 and 2023, the EU supported the development or review of key sector policies: “Country Food Policy draft” 
(2010-?), “2012-2016 National Agriculture and Livestock Extension Policy; “2022-2027 fruits and vegetables sector 
strategy”; “One Range Management and Grass Fire Policy” (2023); “National Quality Policy” (ongoing) 

-  Since 2011, nine States out of 10 have benefitted from EU support to Food security sector. 
- 

The historical geo focus of EU in Greater Bar el Ghazal correlates with the highest expansion in harvested areas 
observed in the country (Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission, WFP) 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 32 

 
 
 
-  Between 2011 and 2023, out of the EUR 199 million that EU spent under the green economy portfolio, 42% targeted 

- 

food security directly (SDG2-zero hunger) and 46% indirectly (SDG9 road infrastructures). 
From 2017 to 2021, despite conflict, insecurity and flooding, sorghum production in EU benefitting areas rose from 
764 167 MT to 818 456 MT, representing 60% of the country annual cereal requirement 

-  Between 2017 and 2022, 146 377 ha were cultivated to sorghum with EU support comes (15% of the total area 

cultivated in the country of 987 467 ha). 

-  Between 2017 and 2022 EU supported directly 183 014 farming households, representing 17% of the estimated country 

population through its food security interventions 

Box 7 EU contribution to food security at the macro and meso level 

At meso level, the EU’s contributions have been particularly impactful in zones where stability has allowed for 
the scaling of agricultural initiatives. By improving total production volume and yields within beneficiary areas, 
EU-supported programs have enabled communities to better withstand and recover from natural disasters. 
Greater Bar el Ghazaal shows higher cultivated area/household than the rest of the country (notably the 
conflict affected area); Northern Bar el Ghazal, while particularly affected by flooding, maintained its cultivated 
area; Warrap, while receiving important population influxes due to the war in Sudan, demonstrated an even 
sharper increase of cultivated area indicating proof of a meso-level resilience. At local level, the EU’s 
approach has shown considerable success in improving food security and nutritional outcomes among 
beneficiaries (see evidence matrix I 6.3.5 and in-depth analysis in the dedicated green economy annex). The 
integrated strategy—combining infrastructure support, crop and livestock production, storage improvements, 
and conflict management—has had a measurable impact on food availability, income, and resilience in 
targeted areas. In areas affected by conflict and displacement, the EU has contributed to strengthening 
household food security and economic stability.  

Institutional support for enhancing food security at country level. Overall, the EU support to institutional 
sustainability related to food and nutrition security (I 6.3.6) produced some results, although the most 
impactful EU contribution to food security rather came from direct support to food production and agricultural 
value chains. One of the EU’s most impactful contributions has been the establishment and continued support 
of the CLIMIS database, managed by FAO. CLIMIS has become a critical tool for all humanitarian and 
development stakeholders in South Sudan, allowing tracking food security, anticipating food crisis, guiding 
interventions, and identifying priority zones for humanitarian and development aid. However, CLIMIS faces 
challenges related to sustainability, as it operates somewhat independently of national institutions, outside of 
the National Bureau of Statistics officially in charge. 

The EU has also supported sectoral policy development, which includes producing technical guidelines for 
country-wide governmental extension services (crop production, livestock management, seed production, 
commercial farming). As for all sector policies in South Sudan, the agri-food policies don’t benefit from 
necessary political support and resources for their implementation. The green economy EU-TA successfully 
engaged at sector level in supporting the Natural Resource Sector Working Group (NRSWG), which brings 
together government, donors, and implementing partners to align strategies for food security and natural 
resource management. 

The IPs have been asked to engage systematically at subnational level with State Ministries of livestock and 
agriculture, but the strengthening of local agricultural governance and institutional capacity has always been 
limited by challenges such as high turnover among government officials, limited political commitment, and 
underfunding. There does not seem to be a single good answer to that issue. Given the very specific dynamic 
at local level in South Sudan, it is the identification of windows of opportunity in the singular mix of persons 
and context at local and subnational level that can help find the good entry points. This is the reason why 
area-based programming seems to be a good approach, even more if disaggregated along the lines of the 
actual territorial dynamics, which may not be following the administrative boundaries of subnational entities. 

The EU has strengthened the capacity of agricultural extension workers and Community Animal Health 
Workers (CAHW) serving in county-level ministry offices. These workers, affiliated with the Ministry of 
Livestock, have become vital in vaccination campaigns and animal health efforts. Although they are 
unsalaried by the Government, EU support (including training, infrastructure, and motorbikes) has enabled 
animal health workers to form micro-enterprises, providing mobile veterinary services that farmers and 
herders are willing to pay for, allowing animal health workers to operate independently. Conversely, 
agricultural extension workers under the Ministry of Agriculture face sustainability issues. Farmers generally 
lack the willingness to pay for their services, and authorities do not provide adequate financial or logistical 
support. Despite EU training efforts, these interventions have shown limited sustainability, even though 
technical support for rural farmers remains essential. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 33 

 
 
Targeting of beneficiaries and data-driven interventions. The EU’s implementing partners have 
strategically targeted different types of households based on their specific vulnerabilities and economic 
capacity. Programmes supporting subsistence farming have targeted highly vulnerable households to 
enhance resilience, while others have focused on households with the potential to engage in commercial 
agriculture. This targeted approach has been guided by the IPC stored within the EU-funded CLIMIS 
database. Thanks to EU-TA ensuring logframe coherence and data collection between IPs, some results 
have been aggregated, showing a very significant impact across the EU green economy portfolio despite 
recurrent and increased flooding impacts since 2019 in EU targeted areas. 

Food security indicators in targeted households 

2017 

2022 

Benchmark data 

Contextual indicators at country level 

Number of IDP because of conflict 

Number of people in EU-targeted states falling in the IPC 
phase 3 (crisis) and 4 (emergency) 

EU results collected by EU-IP at beneficiary level  

Household with acceptable food consumption score 
(FCS) across EU supported portfolio 

Average area cultivated per household 

Total volume of Sorghum produced  

Total volume of Groundnuts produced  

Average crop yields – sorghum  

1,7 Mo 

4,9 Mo 
(42%) 

2,2 Mo 

6,6 Mo 
(57%) 

- 

- 

20% 

43% 

0,9 ha/hh  2,3 ha/hh 

764,1 MT  818,5 MT 

48,1 MT 

144,2 MT 

1,5 T/ha 

0,7 T/ha in non EU location 

0,8 T/ha as national average 

1,8 T/ha as EAC average 

Average crop yields – groundnuts 

1,1 T/ha 

0,59 T/ha in non EU location 

2,5 T/ha as Uganda average 

Box 8 Snapshot view of EU-results in food security in South Sudan between 2017 and 2022 

Expansion of cultivated areas and agricultural yields. The EU’s support has led to a substantial 
expansion in the cultivated area per household among programme beneficiaries (see Box 8). By providing 
access to animal traction, primarily oxen and donkey ploughs, EU programmes have enabled families to 
increase their cultivated land by three to six times. This increase in cultivated land has been the primary driver 
of food security improvements, as expanding the cultivated area directly multiplies the volume of agricultural 
production by the same factor.  

Reduced post-harvest losses and enhanced food availability on local market. To address post-harvest 
losses, which are estimated at around 40% due to inadequate storage and pest infestation, EU programmes 
have supported the construction of grain storage facilities. These facilities, often elevated to protect against 
flooding, have effectively reduced losses and increased food availability year-round in rural areas. By 
improving storage conditions, the EU has strengthened food security by enabling households to retain a 
larger portion of their harvest, which they can later consume or sell. The success of these storage 
improvements demonstrates the impact of targeted infrastructure investments on household food availability 
and resilience. Transport remains a critical barrier to market access and food distribution in South Sudan. 
High transport costs-driven by poor road conditions, multiple checkpoints, and fuel price increases have 
raised the cost of food, affecting household purchasing power. EU investments in rural road infrastructure 
have improved market access, facilitating the movement of surplus agricultural products to local and regional 
markets, increasing food availability across the supported territories. The Seed Banks and Rural Aggregation 
Centres created with EU support have also allowed cooperatives to store larger quantities and preserve them 
from post-harvest loss, increasing food availability on market during the lean season, but also increasing the 
share of locally procured grains and seeds by WFP and other humanitarian actors in their food assistance 
activities (see also Annex VI). 

Livestock development and veterinary support. The EU has invested in livestock health, organising 
vaccination campaigns and training CAHWs. While commercial livestock production does not reach its full 
potential, due to cultural norms that prioritise cattle as social assets, the combined EU support to 
dissemination of animal traction (ox-ploughs and donkey-ploughs) has changed mindsets toward increased 
use of cattle for productive purposes. CAHWs trained and supported by EU programs, have been effective in 
providing routine care, vaccinations, and livestock management advice that increased productivity. The EU-
funded slaughterhouses, while having technical design issues (energy supply and spare parts), have been 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reported as having positive food safety outcomes, representing a benefit for meat buyers and consumers. EU-
funded programmes have also promoted small-scale animal husbandry (goat and poultry), which has 
economically empowered women and enhanced household economic resilience. Besides generating a 
complementary income and being a productive saving when in need of cash, EU support increased goat milk 
productivity and egg production, both reportedly beneficial protein sources, particularly to children.  

Fruit and vegetables: off-season crop production and school gardens. To reduce food insecurity in the 
lean season, the EU has promoted off-season agriculture, mainly fruit and vegetable cultivation, sometimes 
supported also by EU-funded water access infrastructures. Though not widely consumed directly by 
households, these serve as cash crops that generate income during the lean season, allowing the purchase 
of essential food items like sorghum and groundnuts. The school garden activities that have been embedded 
in several EU-funded interventions did not appear to produce significant nutrition outcomes in school feeding 
(too small area) nor in building kids’ capacity to replicate it at home as the initiative was abandoned by school 
directors as soon as project was over. However, planting mango trees in schools’ courts proved impactful, as 
it provided sustainable access to nutritious food for the kids in mango season.  

Addressing conflict and its impact on food security. Conflict remains a persistent barrier to food security 
in South Sudan, as displacement and instability disrupt farming activities and create tensions between local 
communities and displaced populations. In response, the EU has integrated conflict management and 
resolution components into its rural development programs, with a particular focus on mitigating disputes over 
land and resources between farmers and pastoralists. Localised conflict resolution initiatives demonstrated 
positive outcomes, improving social cohesion and allowing stable agricultural activity in areas affected by 
conflict. Despite these efforts, conflict and forced displacement continue to strain food production systems 
and exacerbate food insecurity, especially in areas where forcibly displaced populations have settled. 

Negative externalities: dependency challenge, inadequate technology. In South Sudan, the prolonged 
crisis and continuous humanitarian aid have contributed to a systemic dependency on aid (I 6.3.7). Some IPs 
involved in EU-funded development projects have continued a humanitarian approach, distributing inputs like 
seeds and tools for free. This method has inadvertently discouraged local markets and limited the growth of 
private seed producers, suppliers, and blacksmiths. It has also led to beneficiaries using seeds as food rather 
than for planting, while showing minimal care in maintaining or replacing tools. By contrast, IPs like WFP have 
implemented a cost-sharing model, requiring beneficiaries to contribute 30% of the input costs with a 
progressive repayment option linked to generated income. This approach has fostered greater ownership, 
leading to more productive use of tools and increased food production.  

The EU TA facilitated knowledge sharing among IPs to support harmonising these practices across the EU 
portfolio. EU support for larger-scale mechanised agriculture has consistently faced sustainability challenges 
due to high maintenance costs, fuel expenses, and lack of spare parts supply chains. Despite periodic interest 
in large-scale production, this approach has not proven effective or sustainable. In South Sudan’s current 
context, animal traction remains a more viable and cost-effective solution to sustainably increase food 
production across the country. 

2.6.4. Contribution to a more sustainable environment and resilience to climate 
change (JC6.4) 

The outcome of the EU's interventions aimed at enhancing resilience to climate change in South Sudan have 
been mixed, particularly in controlling flooding and addressing environmental degradation. Since 2019, the 
country has seen increased climate-related disasters, with millions exposed annually to floods and significant 
droughts (I 6.4.1). Populations impacted by these events are growing, with approximately two million people 
affected by floods yearly, especially in the Greater Bar El Ghazaal, historical geo-focus of EU support. 
Climate change, coupled with local issues like deforestation due to charcoal production and construction 
needs, exacerbates these environmental impacts. Deforestation affects water absorption and increases 
erosion, causing rapid runoff during rainy seasons. This runoff leads to significant sedimentation in rivers, 
triggering more severe flooding and river overflow. 

Uneven integration of climate-smart practices. Climate-smart agricultural practices are mentioned in all 
EU green economy interventions; however, field observation reveals an uneven impact in terms of 
productivity as some IPs do not demonstrate the necessary technical knowledge to guide beneficiaries toward 
the best mitigation (or adaptation) strategy. Climate smart practices found in EU documentation are (I 6.4.5): 
planting trees along flood-prone areas, sustainable land management, water conservation practices, 
mulching, agroforestry, alternate cropping, hill-top farming around boreholes, dissemination of early crop 
varieties, mounds crops and changing cultivation calendar. However, the interviews and observations during 
the evaluation field mission, revealed a gap in the quality of implementation of these techniques. The EU IPs 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 35 

 
 
currently involved in disseminating these climate smart practices are largely UN agencies. EU interventions in 
climate-smart agriculture have not focused a lot on crops adapted to flooding. Some sweet potatoes and 
yams are proposed, but rainfed crops like rice are not yet adopted. However, some farmers are contemplating 
a move to rice production, and some promising results in Northern Bahr el Ghazal demonstrate a yield of up 
to 3,5 T/ha in small-scale farming conditions if proper agricultural extension is provided. 

Challenges and externalities of flood control. The use of dikes to control floods has been reported in 
several EU-funded interventions, however with mixed results and with unintended consequences (I 6.4.6). 
When protecting some EU supported areas, poorly constructed dikes can exacerbate flood risks downstream. 
Poor engineering sometimes caused rainwater accumulation inside the area protected from river flooding. 
Some dikes accelerated the water kinetics, increasing erosion and damage to crops and homes. These 
unintended effects demonstrate the limitations in technical capacity and local engineering knowledge. 
Comprehensive resilience planning for high-flood-risk areas seems still insufficient as the topics of land 
management and possible resettlements have not yet been mainstreamed in the design of EU-funded 
interventions.  

Charcoal value chain and deforestation challenges. In South Sudan, 1,5-2% of forest cover is lost 
annually due to charcoal production and wood harvesting, primarily for domestic energy use. EU interventions 
have yet to fully address this deforestation, as alternative energy sources like biogas and solar have faced 
challenges due to limited technological adaptation and parts availability. Meanwhile, charcoal remains the 
dominant fuel source for local industries, such as brick-making, bakeries, and other small businesses. This 
dependency underscores the importance of implementing sustainable charcoal production practices and 
reforestation initiatives to curb forest degradation. 

EU’s Green Economy Portfolio and Biodiversity Efforts. The MIP mentions biodiversity linked to wildlife 
protection and protected areas, a narrow focus that is not really developed in the programming document. 
The few EU interventions are modest in financial scale and somewhat isolated in the wider portfolio, while 
20% of the overall Green Economy technical assistance days are allocated to wildlife conservation in 
protected areas. South Sudan’s national biodiversity strategy prioritises biodiversity topics related to basic 
needs over strict conservation (genetic diversity of local breeds and varieties, freshwater biodiversity and fish 
stock, limitation of deforestation…). The EU approach to conservation, specifically protecting wildlife and 
combating deforestation, is too narrowly focused around protected areas, it does not address the country-
wide landscape degradation caused by charcoal production and is seen as somewhat misaligned with the 
country’s immediate priorities highlighted in the CEP (Country Environmental Profile, European Union, 2022). 
Protected area management and anti-poaching efforts are also justified in EU documentation for their 
potential for new value chains, jobs and ecotourism, however it seems unlikely in current country context as 
the first initiatives are already confronted to ongoing security risks and limited accessibility. The country 
immediate priorities as identified in the CEP entail acknowledging the energy needs of urban areas and the 
need of rural areas to claim more agricultural lands, while reducing the environmental impact of small-scale 
businesses charcoal value chain and integrating more agroforestry in the agri-food systems. 

2.7. EQ7 - Contributions to the Human Development Sector  

EQ7- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the human development sector 
(financial assistance and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected objectives at country level? 
JC7.1 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to the development of the primary and 
secondary education sector to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 
JC7.2 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to a more inclusive access to primary 
and secondary education to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 
JC7.3 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to the development of the country 
primary health care, nutrition and reproductive health sector to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security 
context of the country 
JC7.4 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to a more inclusive access to primary 
health care, nutrition and reproductive health services to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context 
of the country 

EU contributions to human development represented over one third of the evaluated portfolio. The bilateral, 
regional, and thematic interventions contributed to developing the education and health sectors under 
challenging conditions. They contributed to meeting basic needs in primary and secondary education, 
comprising sanitation facilities in schools, teacher training, curriculum development, EMIS strengthening, 
increasing primary teachers’ attendance by paying incentives, training Parent Teacher Associations, and 
promoting girls’ inclusion in education and reducing girl-child marriage by educating parents through 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 36 

 
 
 
community programmes. Incentives were paid to 33,404 government and volunteer teachers in 3,417 
schools, thereby maintaining the essential primary education system. The education human resource 
information system (HRIS) was operationalised, albeit with challenges to fulfil its potential. Over the evaluated 
period, more than 30 interventions served to increase inclusive, gender responsive, quality education, 
including school feeding and literacy and numeracy for adults. Two TVET programmes produced tangible 
impacts on youth employability. Education in emergencies (EiE) interventions reached semi nomadic youth, 
IDPs, hard to reach areas, and children at risk of recruitment into militias. At-risk youth received basic 
educational, conflict-prevention, and entrepreneurship skills.  

Nevertheless, there are fundamental threats to the sustainability of these gains. The expensive budgets for 
GESS and IMPACT type programmes, including cash transfers (girl pupils) and capitation payments 
(teachers) cannot be sustained in the future given the dim perspectives for increasing the education budget to 
the needed levels. School and clinic fees – applied often non-transparently- are a preponderant issue for 
attendance and access to services. Chronic underfunding of the social sector budgets and reduced donor 
inputs in the critical human development area - exacerbated by the recent suspension and possible closing 
down of USAID support to these areas - imply that human development gains cannot likely be maintained 
except by continued reliance on ramped up external support86. 

In health, there were substantive improvements in the health care delivery system, concerning HMIS and 
health and logistics management, health and nutrition data collection and management; and improved local 
level health planning. Despite these achievements, health indicators have in several cases stagnated, or 
worsened. In 2011, for example, the under-five mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) was 104.3. It 
improved to 98.8 by 2014 but has remained unchanged ever since. EU support to health and nutrition, and to 
building resilience, has been extraordinarily challenged because avoidable conflict and violence have 
worsened, femicides and SGBV involving militias and government soldiers have not been prevented and 
prosecuted. These challenges do not imply that the EU should discontinue its support to education, health, 
and civil society strengthening. However, the expected outcomes in human development, resilience- and 
peace-building - are likely to be further diminished over time without tackling impunity for economic and 
human rights crimes. 

2.7.1. Contribution to development of the primary and secondary education sector 
(JC7.1) 

EU support to the education sector constituted fundamental contributions to educational development in 
policy, primary and secondary and TVET, and supported the survival of the education sector in the evaluation 
period characterised by endemic conflicts and insecurity in large areas countrywide. Outcomes in the primary 
and secondary education sector were mixed, due in large part to political and security conditions in South 
Sudan after 2013. Comparison between the 2013 and 2023 primary school EMIS data shows there was not a 
general improvement in the key education indicators, despite coordinated EU and partner support to primary 
and secondary education, and TVET87. This finding does not imply implementation failures or incorrect 
design, rather it is attributable to the two civil wars, population displacements and generalised violence 
caused by unlawful actions of militias connected to/directed by influential people in the Government. For 
secondary education’s objective of increasing the enrolment and retention of final year primary school girls 
and secondary school age girls, the GESS programme was extremely successful. EU support helped sustain 
education nation-wide during conflict, boosting girls' primary completion rates and secondary enrolment. 
However, progress has stalled due to factors largely beyond the control of the EU, notably political instability, 
poor governance, and GRSS underfunding of the social sectors. Of critical concern is the January 2025 
shutting down of USAID and its considerable support to education which is an added challenge to EU future 
education support. Key EU programmes focused on curriculum development, human resource management, 
and training for education staff. The 2023 AEC report showed a 12% increase in enrolment, reaching 2.2 
million students, though attendance remains low at 70%. 83% of schools were operational at end-2024, but 
resource constraints (salary non-payment causing closures), overcrowding, and infrastructure limitations 
persist. 

The GESS’s strategy of using cash bursaries to increase inclusion of girls in education and reduce child 
marriage places it within the strategy of the National Social Protection Policy Framework88 with its emphasis 

86 Interviews- ID 7, 8, 17,35,44, 46. 
87 TVET was supported by EU directly up to approximately 2016. Current EU support to TVET is via i) EiE interventions implemented by IOM 
and NGO partners; ii) green economy and livelihood interventions.   
88 The Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare developed the Framework. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 37 

 
 
 
on ending child marriage89. Supporting gender and social inclusion initiatives like GESS demonstrates EU’s 
strong commitment to enhancing social protection in South Sudan90. 
Findings on results that can be expected from EU funding are geographically based as concerns EiE and 
Education in Conflict (EiC) interventions. The most conflict prone areas were no-go zones and could not be 
included in larger, national EU-financed education initiatives, explaining the largely disappointing results of the 
sector. IMPACT, OUTREACH, and GESS covered all states, in theory, with many areas not covered where 
schools were destroyed or damaged, or because the threat of forced recruitment into militias kept girls and 
boys away from school91. EiE programmes (e.g., under EUTF) covered (and continue to do so92) specific 
conflict prone areas93.  
The Back to Learning (BTL) programme (budget USD 190 million) critically contributed to ensuring the 
education system continued to operate and extend schooling access to children and youth affected by 
poverty, instability and conflict. BTL made significant early impacts on learner enrolment especially for girls; 
on teacher and learner retention; and on school governance. BTL also successfully enhanced community 
awareness of the need for education and created a platform for high level coordination around the agenda of 
getting children back to school. Coverage was good in respect of social mobilisation, particularly regarding 
girls’ enrolment and provision to IDP camp schools94. 
These EiE/EiC projects focused on conflict affected states/payams, and inclusion of girls and other vulnerable 
children. The examples of EiE and BTL projects are one of many supported by EU which were geographically 
targeted from necessity at the most vulnerable and at risk of exclusion from education95.  
The 11th EDF’s support to Basic Education, with three result areas, was successful, and paved the way for 
the achievements of the evaluation period. Shortcomings mainly derived from insecurity, endemic violence, 
and two civil wars that reversed progress in education delivery and generally reduced overall impact. Results 
included:  

1) Institution building for Ministry of General Education and Instruction South Sudan (MoGEI) and 
SMoEs which led to policy, budget, planning and monitoring functions being performed. The Improved 
Management of Education Delivery (IMED)96 programme assisted Ministry of Education (MoEST) to 
make structural changes in financial management, EMIS data collection and analysis, and human 
resources, in the form of policy development and dissemination and capacity strengthening in four states 
(2014–16)97. Key MoGEI staff who received EMIS training in 2015-2016 under IMED acknowledged EU’s 
contribution to capacity building and that the EMIS system still functions, is increasingly improved and 
expanded to include new indicators on inclusion and disability98.  

2) Increased access to quality basic education services for vulnerable communities and 
marginalised groups (mainly women) via support to Alternative Education System (continued support to 
Pastoralist Education Programme and Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)). A total of 2,215,494 
students were enrolled in 2023, reflecting a 12% increase from 2020’s total of 1,974667. However, 
gender disparity in ALP persists: 53% (1,176,239) boys and 47% (1,039,255) girls99. 

3) Foundations established to develop a demand-driven TVET system to respond to national 
development needs in skills and capacities. Promising TVET results emerged via EU support between 
2011-2016. Thereafter, EU support to TVET tapered off, with little support between 2016-2021. TVET 
then became in the 2021-2027 MIP, TVET for value chains: i.e., TVET in agriculture and livelihoods. 

89 GOVERNMENT, End Child Marriage Strategic Plan 2018-2022. 
90 World Bank, “Republic of South Sudan THE STATE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN SOUTH SUDAN, Sept. 2018. 
91 Interviews EUD, Education and Governance leads, August 2024. 
92 E.g., “Strengthened access to education and livelihoods and enhanced reintegration and community cohesion in areas affected by 
displacement and returns.” This programme is IOM-implemented with UNICEF and WFP. Total budget is €M25, ongoing until 2028. 
93 E.g., the UNICEF EDUCATION IN EMERGENCY PROGRAMME IN FOUR FORMER STATES IN SOUTH SUDAN (NBEG and WBEG, 
WARRAP AND EASTERN EQUATORIA);” and the Back to Learning (BTL) education programme. implemented 2015-2017, funded by EU, 
USAID, Norway, Japan; implemented by UNICEF. 
94 Cambridge Education, Evaluation of the back to learning initiative in South Sudan. July, 2019. 
95 Evaluation of the South Sudan BTL initiative. Final report. Cambridge Education, 2019. 
96 The EU financed “Improved Management of Education Delivery” (IMED) programme. 
97 IMED’s operations were prematurely finalised in April 2016 due to South Sudan’s transition from 10 to 28 states (Source: UNESCO Report. 
Diaz-Varela, A., et al., What to prioritise when everything is a priority? Crisis-sensitive education sector planning in South Sudan. Paris, 2016.) 
98 ID28. 
99 NEC Report 2023 p.22. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 38 

 
 
 
 
Other partners continued to support TVET which has made some progress as a sector. Education experts 
indicate massive future support is required to meet the huge needs of youth in South Sudan100. 

EU’s contribution to institutional sustainability related to primary education was considerable, despite the 
challenges of shortening the IMED programme due to the creation of new states in 2016, and violence 
making it impossible to deliver TA to local education authorities in some states. Some of the outcomes are still 
seen today. The EMIS, arguably one of the most important tools in the education sector, was still functioning 
in 2024, during fieldwork. Despite the overall success of the education initiatives, female enrolment in primary 
education decreased from 50% to 47%, with persistent gender disparities favouring boys101. By 2023, 17% of 
schools were non-operational, 20% shared facilities, and approximately 2.8 million children were still out of 
education. This reflected the harmful consequences of continued violence, intensifying resource shortages, 
government under funding of the education budget, lack of trained women and men teachers, and 
nonpayment of teachers’ salaries which are negatively affecting education delivery.  

2.7.2. Contribution to a more inclusive access to primary and secondary education 
(JC7.2) 

EU support to the education sector led to more inclusive access across all levels. Design of education sector 
support from the 11th EDF onward was conflict sensitive. EU-funded IMPACT and OUTREACH, the BTL 
initiative, the UNICEF EiE programme in four former states, and several other EiE interventions were 
designed with a conflict sensitivity objective to reduce conflict drivers and provide EiE to thousands of children 
displaced from schooling by violence. The number of marginalised102 children who therefore benefitted from 
improved inclusion in primary and secondary education thanks to EU contributions is considerable103. Over 
the period, thousands of teachers benefitted from capacity development thanks to EU contributions. Although 
data on IMPACT and OUTREACH on this area are not yet available104 under GESS, 2,587 teachers received 
training and 4,500 school management committees were created to improve governance105. To address the 
absence of a strategic framework for teacher development and management, GESS piloted a school-based 
Teacher Professional Development (TPD) programme. 218 schools were included in the TPD pilot; 191 
schools received training on low-cost teaching and learning materials; 2,587 teachers and head teachers 
receiving TPD training106. GESS’s Accelerated Secondary Education Programme assisted many unqualified 
teachers needing to complete secondary education to enrol in teacher training institutes (TTIs).  

GESS targeted children with disabilities more systematically from Phase II onwards. GESS II set up a 
disability inclusion team, with increasing numbers of schools establishing inclusion education sub-committees 
107. Despite improved inclusion of children with disabilities, many challenges remain, including transport and 
access problems and insufficiently trained teachers. In July 2024 GESS began piloting inclusion of boys (as 
well as girls) with disabilities to receive grants to attend school. MoGEI estimated in 2024 around 12,000 
seeing- and hearing-impaired children each year are “lost” to education after leaving primary school because 
they cannot enrol in secondary education108.  GESS did assist with cash grants permitting some disability 
affected children to get to school. A major problem remains: the lack of Braille teaching materials and 
teachers who can teach seeing- and hearing-impaired children. MoGEI partnering with NGOs109 supports 
scaling up training of teachers in sign language and Braille for 45 teachers at Rombur National Teachers 
Training Institute. EU support in this area could be very beneficial for the future given the massive needs in 
this area of disability (more detailed findings and results of GESS are in Annex VII). 

The geographic scope of EU interventions in primary/secondary education was inclusive of remote and 
conflict-affected areas under the conditions prevailing. IMPACT targeted the whole country, and reached most 
counties with incentives whose purpose was to encourage teachers to return to schools and teach in early 
2017 after the second civil war stopped. OUTREACH targeted conflict-affected and hard-to-reach areas, and 
areas where IDPs and their host communities required urgent education services. Several EiE and EiC 

100 Interview: SIDA Education Lead, Juba, Aug. 2024; Charlie Goldmsith CGA Technologies website; Interviews: ID 16, 38, 39. 
101 MoGEI. The Annual Education Census (AEC) report 2023. MoGEI/UNICEF. Juba. 
102 The term, “marginalised,” is defined in EMIS as “demobilised child soldiers, orphans (no parents present), special needs children, girl 
survivors of conflict related SGBV, SGBV, IDP children, refugee children. 
103 However, the exact number of marginalised children benefitting from improved inclusion into primary education due to EU’s contribution is 
difficult to calculate reliably, as there are discrepancies between EMIS data, and differences in parameters used and data produced by IMPACT 
and GESS programmes. 
104 Neither IMPACT nor OUTREACH have been finally evaluated. 
105 IBF report, ENDLINE EVALUATION GESS PROGRAM. SPECIFIC CONTRACT N°300086098. FINAL REPORT. JUNE 2024- VERSION 2. 
106 MOGEI. GESS: Lessons from Girls’ Education South Sudan (GESS). 
107 IBF report, ENDLINE EVALUATION GESS PROGRAM. Op. cit. 
108 Interview Disability Gender and Inclusion Lead, MOGEI August 2024. 
109 E.g, Light For The World. Cf. MOGEI website. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 39 

 
 
 
interventions included remote, conflict–affected regions. EU interventions produced positive inclusivity results, 
concerning: i) semi-nomadic/pastoral education services; ii) female inclusion in teaching; iii) rebuilding 
education in COVID-19 hit communities; and iv) permitting IMPACT and OUTREACH to pay incentives to 
volunteer teachers, and teachers in faith-based schools. The impact of GESS on girls’ participation in 
education was substantial. In 2011, girls accounted for 38% of children in school; by 2023 it was 49%, with 
the number of girls enrolled increasing from 540,000 to more than 1.2 million110.  
However, while primary school enrolment increased in 2023 due to population growth, enrolment in 
secondary and pre-primary education declined, as population growth outpaced enrolment. The number of 
learners in secondary and pre-primary schools in 2023 was lower than expected for the school-age 
population. Attendance remains a concern, with an average of only 70% in operational schools in 2023, 
meaning three out of 10 enrolled children were absent111. Key education indicators stagnated or worsened 
due to insufficient funding, halted PFM reforms, and negative effects of displacement, violence, and climate 
shocks. 

Efforts to improve inclusion for marginalised children, especially through IMPACT, BTL Initiative, 
OUTREACH, and GESS, were overall successful. The eligibility criteria of IMPACT and OUTREACH were 
altered to permit inclusion of unqualified teachers on the payroll; and also permitted inclusion of faith-based 
and community schools in capitation payments under IMPACT112. These initiatives targeted forcibly displaced 
children, children in areas with damaged schools, and those at risk of child soldier recruitment113.  
GESS significantly increased girl enrolment, adding 800,000 girls between 2013 and 2018, but gender 
disparities remain, with boys outnumbering girls in primary and secondary levels. GESS also made strides in 
improving the inclusion of children with special needs, though attendance rates for children with disabilities, 
especially girls, remain low. GESS addressed disability by reducing stigma and providing disability-inclusive 
teacher training. Despite the existence of the cash payments to girls to attend secondary school, student 
informants in focus groups reported knowing many girls and boys in their communities who are excluded from 
attending school because “their parents cannot afford fees” which are levied for 52% of a representative 
sample of 837 schools in South Sudan114. Several students interviewed in government schools during 
evaluation fieldwork stated they have friends in their villages whose families are too poor to pay fees, thus 
excluding them from getting GESS cash payments115. These data are concerning, implying that girls from 
families not “wealthy enough” to pay school fees cannot enrol in school and receive cash benefits116. 
The IMPACT programme improved teacher retention and attendance, positively impacting learner 
enrolment117. Smaller EiE and EiC interventions implemented by IOM, UNICEF, WFP, and NGOs further 
improved access to primary education, literacy, and numeracy, particularly for semi-nomadic populations, 
women, and at-risk youth. These interventions including EiE in former states118 and OUTREACH included 
target communities hosting IDPs. However, the situation for children with special needs remains critical 
overall. The number of special needs children enrolled in school has declined from 16,454 in 2013 to 12,963 
in 2023, despite overall population and enrolment growth119. This decline is attributed to limited resources and 
worsening teacher-pupil ratios, with many sight- and hearing-impaired children excluded from education, 
especially during the transition to secondary school. 

2.7.3. Contribution to the development of the country primary health care (PHC), 
nutrition and reproductive health sector (JC7.3) 

The HPF was a multi-donor project and comprised FCDO (lead donor), Canada, EU, Sweden and USAID 
(joined in Phase 2). Crown Agents was contracted to manage the fund, and administer HPF1,2,3. HPF closed 
abruptly on 31 July 2024, when Crown Agents went into receivership. This abrupt closure negatively impacted 
the timely six-month transition period (August 1 -31 December 2024) from HPF to the World Bank led Health 

110 GESS website. 
111 I.e., on the day the EMIS teams visited the schools during the education census: cf. MOGEI, National Education Census Report, 2023. 
112 Source: Musker, P., / IBF, IMPACT MTR, Dec 208; interviews with teachers conducted by Forcier; and interview in MOGEI, August 2024. 
113 Cambridge Education, Evaluation of the BTL initiative in South Sudan. Final report, 23 July 2019. 
114 GESS, Cambridge Education, “School Financing Study: School Level Financing Requirements for Public Primary and Secondary Education 
in South Sudan.” Final Report. August 2021. 
115 Fees appear to be levied for most students in at least 50% of government primary and secondary schools in South Sudan. 
116 The cash payment was 30,000 SSP as of September 2024 in education case study fieldwork areas visited by Forcier field teams.   
117 “The payments to teachers have been a major contribution to the increased enrolment of children in school”. A senior MoGEI official reported 
improved learning outcomes, but noted the main contribution of IMPACT is retention of teachers,” MTE – IMPACT Dec. 2018, op.cit. 
118 T05-EUTF-HOA-SS-48. Education in Emergency Programme in Four Former States in South Sudan. Total cost: EUR 24,4 million, co-
financed by UNICEF: EUR 1 million. WFP: EUR 1 million. 
119 ID28. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 40 

 
 
 
 
Sector Transformation Project120. Implementation was carried out in 23 smaller geographical areas, named 
‘lots’, in eight (from HPF2 onwards) out of ten former states, by contracted implementing partners, using 
Ministry of Health (MoH) facilities and health staff. Drug supply was contracted externally in HPF1, but was 
included under HPF2,3. Drug and staff shortages were reported in fieldwork in South Sudan, and in 
documentation. HPF aimed to meet South Sudan’s immense health needs which have been exacerbated by 
years of conflict, economic crisis, and population displacement, by supporting the implementation of 
government policies to build a national health service based on PHC precepts and deliver the Basic Package 
of Health and Nutrition Services (BPHNS). The key expected outputs in HPF focused on women and children, 
including: i) Strengthened service delivery; ii) Strengthened health systems; iii) Community engagement; and 
iv) Improved nutrition services (added for HPF2). The envisaged implementation of Health Systems 
Strengthening at the central level was halted to some extent due to the context of conflict in South Sudan. 
Gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) was included as a specific strategy during HPF2. 

The HPF, South Sudan's largest health programme, operated across eight states and supported nearly 8,000 
health workers in 797 public health facilities. It greatly assisted the establishment and consolidation of a 
national health service, but the lack of sufficient counterpart funding from the Government has hindered its 
long-term viability121. Despite efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality and ensure universal health 
coverage, key health indicators showed little improvement. The under-five mortality rate improved slightly 
from 104.3 to 98.8 deaths per 1,000 live births between 2011 and 2014 but remained stagnant thereafter. 
Other indicators relating to reproductive health, maternal mortality, and SGBV worsened. SGBV escalated to 
near epidemic levels by 2019122, and nutrition indicators deteriorated significantly, worsened by conflict and 
food insecurity123. 
EU support focused on developing South Sudan's health policy and transitioning from humanitarian relief to 
long-term health development124. Health interventions did improve outcomes in PHC, nutrition, and 
reproductive health, with HPF 2 increasing service delivery and strengthening the health system125, despite 
challenges of underfunding and inadequate staffing126. However, despite substantial investments, key health 
outcomes stagnated or worsened. By 2021, acute malnutrition affected over 1.4 million children, and 72% of 
counties were in critical nutrition phases127.  
The transition of HPF from Crown Agents to government-led service delivery (August-December 2024) was 
delayed, contributing to critical medicine and general supplies shortages (anti malarials), non transparent fee 
charges, and a lack of skilled staff. These issues contributed to dissatisfaction within the MoH, which reported 
feeling excluded from decision-making128, despite the existence of a Steering Committee chaired by the MoH, 
further fragmenting the health sector129. Variations in incentive rates for health workers offered by 
implementing partners of the HPF exacerbated sustainability issues130; and also effective, needs-based 
human resource planning for nursing and medical staff131. Before the Crown Agents closure, there were 
already shortages in programme delivery. This was due to variations in the effectiveness of the agencies 
delivering the services and operational complexities, with some areas experiencing insufficient staffing and 
others experiencing heightened levels of violence and conflict causing disruption to services. There was a 
sudden stop, with all contacts lost. An external HPF evaluation has been conducted, but little information has 
been shared with the evaluation team.  

The challenges and disappointing outcomes overall of EU support to PHC and nutrition over the evaluation 
period derive from the extremely difficult operating conditions, namely conflict, violence, civil wars and 
population displacements which caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, starvation, and stunting and 
malnutrition of the population. By 2014, civil war had worsened food security and nutrition indicators, with 
resulting malnutrition and starvation132. By 2015 South Sudan continued in a state of nutrition emergency, 
with the global acute malnutrition rate, nationally and in five out of 10 states, above the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) classification of 15%, as indicated by the March-April 2015 FSNMS133. In 2018 

120 ID 26, ID 44, 45. 
121 ID18; ID26; ID45. 
122 UNICEF, 2019 Briefing Note: South Sudan. 
123 South Sudan, UNICEF and WFP Scale-Up Nutrition Plan: One Year Report, South Sudan, 2015. 
124 WHO, “South Sudan – Strengthening PHC in fragile settings”. https://www.who.int/news-room / 2021. 
125 Evaluation of HPF. Final Report submitted to: DFID and Global Affairs Canada. Integrity. 10 July 2018. 
126 See fieldwork report, health case study. 
127 UNICEF Nutrition Briefing Note: UNICEF South Sudan, Oct.-Dec. 2021. 
128 ID34;ID42;ID26. 
129ID26. 
130 ID26. 
131 ID26. 
132 UNICEF Annual Report 2014 South Sudan, 2014. UNICEF, South Sudan, UNICEF and WFP Scale-Up Nutrition Plan: One Year Report, 
South Sudan, 2015. 
133 FSNMS -Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 41 

 
 
 
displacement and insecurity caused the malnutrition burden to steadily increase with acute malnutrition 
caseloads by 2018 hitting a historic high since 2013. 

The estimated number of children suffering from severe acute malnutrition incrementally rose from a pre-crisis 
estimate of 108,000 per year in 2014 to 229,000 in 2015 to 362,000 in 2016, 276,000 in 2017 and 269,000 in 
2018, which is over a 150% increase up to the end of 2018134. The nutritional status of South Sudan in 2021 
was critical, with 57 (72%) counties projected to be IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN) Phase 3 and above. In 
2023, the proportion of people facing severe acute food insecurity was at the highest level ever, surpassing 
levels seen during conflicts in 2013 and 2016 (See Annex XII Evidence Matrix for detailed indicator results). 
No health programme or series of interventions could be expected to improve basic health and nutrition 
indicators in such circumstances of worsening resilience and increasing conflicts.  

Despite the overall disappointing health and nutrition outcomes of the overall health portfolio, and in 
particular, the HPF, EU support to the Government’s development of health policy in the context of ongoing 
conflict and instability made fundamental contributions to improving the policy environment in the health and 
nutrition sectors. This included strengthening health services delivery, establishing PHC structures at the 
community level and training/supporting community health workers (CHWs), increasing the local 
accountability of health services and health system strengthening (HSS)135 136.     
However, the HPF’s planned implementation of HSS at the central level was halted to some extent due to 
conflict and violence137. HPF contributed to improving the HMIS, judged in 2018 as reasonably effective in 
providing data on progress138. Given the continuing high malnutrition and starvation levels, EU has supported 
stand-alone cash transfer schemes (mainly via DG ECHO) to reduce nutrition deprivation in early childhood, 
which are showing success. In 2019, EU provided USD 10.4 million to the WFP to provide cash assistance to 
over 520,000 people (EEAS website). This and similar initiatives139 appear promising in the current volatile 
climate indicating that humanitarian aid, nutrition, and PHC programmes are increasingly necessary. This also 
raises questions about sustainability of the gains achieved through EU support, mentioned above for the 
education sector where, arguably, the EU and other donors have had a bigger positive impact. 

2.7.4. Contribution to a more inclusive access to primary health care, nutrition and 
reproductive health services (JC7.4) 

EU support helped improve inclusive access to reproductive and nutrition health services for girls, women, 
and survivors of SGBV, as well as for other vulnerable groups. The HPF successfully mainstreamed gender 
issues into its national programme, evidenced by increased knowledge and awareness of GESI issues among 
implementing partners and some gender-focused interventions in communities and health facilities. HPF's 
activities targeting SGBV promoted inclusivity for adolescent girls and female survivors of SGBV. People 
living with HIV (PLHIV), especially pregnant women, were also targeted for inclusion, with improved access to 
anti-retroviral medicines. HPF supported Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVCs) by coordinating with the 
U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Global Fund initiatives, providing HIV-AIDS 
support and antiretroviral therapy (ART) to PLHIV, OVCs, and HIV-positive children140. 
Since 2003, PEPFAR has saved over 25 million lives141, prevented millions of HIV infections, and supported 
countries like South Sudan in HIV epidemic control. PEPFAR is incredibly successful in increasing HIV 
testing, providing lifesaving treatment, and improving health systems. Now (February 2025) under the US aid 
freeze, PEPFAR’s future is threatened, potentially leaving more than 20 million people – including 500,000 
children – at risk without adequate HIV treatment and services142. 
HPF also achieved other GESI gains, including improvements in maternal health outcomes. It helped 
increase the uptake of antenatal care (ANC) and enhanced the provision of basic obstetric and neonatal care 
(BEmONC) and comprehensive obstetric and neonatal care (CEmONC). Despite these successes, the 
maternal mortality rate (MMR) and infant mortality rate (IMR) have not improved nationally. According to 

134 UNICEF, South Sudan Nutrition Programme Sectoral and OR+ (Thematic) Report Jan. – Dec. 2018. UNICEF South Sudan March 2019. 
135 HEART, HEALTH POOLED FUND: SOUTH SUDAN Mid-Term Review Report: Jan 2015. 
136 Integrity, Evaluation of the South Sudan Health Pooled Fund. July, 2018. 
137 Integrity, Evaluation of Health Pooled Fund. Op.cit. 
138 Integrity, Evaluation of Health Pooled Fund. Op.cit. 
139 An ongoing project being implemented in 2024, by UNICEF (FCDO-funded)) in NBEG, called “UNICEF cash transfers programme to 
vulnerable mothers” appears successful although costly to implement (Source: UNICEF, Cash transfers improve livelihoods for children and 
mothers in Aweil East 23 Feb. 2024). 
140 Republic of South Sudan. Country Operational Plan (COP) 2022. Strategic Direction Summary. May 20, 2022. 
141 UN AIDS: https://www.unaids.org/en/topic /PEPFAR_impact#: 
~:text=The%20importance%20of%20the%20United,support%20programs%20in%2055%20countries. 
142 Oxfam America, “What USAID does, its impact and what Trump’s cuts mean.” Feb. 5, 2025.   

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 42 

 
 
 
 
UNICEF data, the IMR stagnated over the evaluated period, while the MMR worsened. A major cause of the 
massive increase in extreme poverty, and the disappointing results in nutrition and food security, MMR, IMR 
and other basic HDIs after such a concerted, long term commitment from the EU and partners in the HPF and 
other health interventions, lies with Government’s failure to increase spending to fund health services, reduce 
military spending, and fulfil its commitments under the R-ARCSS, while funding militias controlled by vice 
presidents and militia leaders which continue to spread violence and misery nation-wide143.  
From 2011 to 2020, the HPF made significant strides in advancing GESI in maternal and child health (MCH). 
Key achievements include an increase in the percentage of mothers delivering babies in health facilities, from 
16% to 42%, and an increase in those delivering with skilled health personnel, from 22% to 40%. The 
proportion of mothers receiving at least one ANC visit during their last pregnancy grew from 45% in 2011 to 
80% in 2020, surpassing the National Health Sector Strategic Plan's target of 60%. Postnatal care also saw 
an increase, from 9% in 2011 to 21% in 2020. Furthermore, HPF and its collaborators succeeded in providing 
life-saving medications to prevent postpartum haemorrhage. Despite these improvements in maternal health, 
the MMR did not show significant progress. 

The increased employment of female staff at health facilities further enhanced GESI outcomes in PHC 
delivery. The HPF also worked to improve access to MCH services and Sexual and Reproductive Health and 
Rights (SRHR) services, including modern contraceptives, safe abortion, and HIV/AIDS testing and 
counselling. However, despite substantial efforts, national statistics for PHC, nutrition, and reproductive health 
services, particularly for vulnerable groups like adolescent girls, pregnant women, and malnourished under-
fives, remained poor, often worsening. 

EU support played a significant role in furthering the inclusion of several vulnerable groups, including 
survivors of SGBV, individuals affected by disabilities, and girls and women in need of safe and reliable 
SRHR services, contraception, HIV/AIDS services, and SGBV counselling. While data on male survivors of 
SGBV is unavailable, it is acknowledged that this group exists, with many men and boys suffering from SGBV 
at the hands of militias, police, and others. SGBV and counselling services have been integrated into the 
HPF, but the overall success of these services remains difficult to assess144. Smaller programmes addressing 
SGBV, mental health, and disability also received support, yielding generally positive results. However, SGBV 
services specifically for males and boys do not appear to have been adequately supported by the EU. 

As of February 2025, life saving supplies of vials of Oxytocin and IV fluid sets for BEmONC and CEmONC, 
usually financed and provided to a large degree by USAID and distributed through the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF in South Sudan, are threatened and will likely cause increases in 
rates of preventable maternal deaths. The closing down of USAID will also affect immediately supplies of life 
saving ART drugs.  

2.8. EQ8 - Contributions to Governance and Rule of Law  

EQ8- To what extent did the cumulative combination of different interventions in the governance, and rule of law 
sector (financial assistance and policy dialogue) contribute to meeting the EU's expected objectives at country level? 
JC8.1 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to improved Public Finance Management 
(PFM) and transparency (such as budgeting, predictability, financial oversight mechanisms, accountability in budget 
execution, and fiscal policy) to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country. 

JC8.2 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to institutional and governance 
strengthening (such as public administration, public policy reforms, support to judicial infrastructure development, and support 
to land governance) to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 

JC8.3 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to subnational development and local 
governance to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 
JC8.4 EU interventions in South Sudan (bilateral, regional and thematic) contributed to strengthening civil society and 
democratic participation to the extent possible under the prevailing political and security context of the country 

EU contributions to improved PFM and transparency; institutional and governance strengthening including 
judicial infrastructural development and land governance; subnational development; civil society 

143 ID 1.2, ID 5, ID 6, ID 23, ID 36, ID 46. UNMISS, “Brief on Violence Affecting Civilians,” Apr.-June 2024. UNMISS website. 
144 The following 8 projects are examples: Enhancing Community Participation in Reproductive and Child Health Services in Yirol West County. 
Eliminating Violence Against women in South Sudan through Women's Empowerment, Access to Legal rights and Legal Literacy. Supporting 
people with disabilities in South Sudan through the strengthening of Non-State Actors and Local Authorities to provide services and promote 
access to rights. Promotion of Human Rights of People with Disabilities in Juba County through the enhancement of socio-sanitary conditions. 
Touching Minds, Raising Dignity; to stop the stigma towards people with mental health problems. #defyhatenow, South Sudan 2020-2021. 
Support the reintegration of sexual violence survivors including former female abductees by pro Riek Machar SPLA in opposition in Western 
Equatoria. T05-EUTF-HOA-SS-85-03 (T05.1386) PRIDE!: Empowered women, including persons with disabilities, contribute to inclusive 
development of their communities in and around Wau and Gogrial West counties. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 43 

 
 
 
strengthening; conflict prevention and peace building were substantial and wide ranging. The EU has 
consistently supported governance, and accountability and rule of law (AC/ROL) through capacity-building, 
training of judges and police officers (the latter via the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and 
UNHCR police trainers), and infrastructure investments, such as Community Police Stations145 in high-crime 
urban areas like Gudele Block 9, Juba. However, the effectiveness of initiatives to reform PFM and 
investigate and prosecute money laundering was considerably reduced by a lack of political will to apply the 
new best practices.  
EU supported efforts to enhance subnational governance in the areas of the judiciary and land governance146, 
and financed two rule of law (ROL) projects that provided legal capacity building to key ROL actors (the 
judiciary, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA), the Transitional National Legislative 
Assembly, the bar association and lawyers, among others). EU also supported improving conditions for 
incarcerated people on remand and imprisoned, by financing FAO and other initiatives in prison farms and 
efforts to secure separation of women from men, and children from adults in prisons/remand centres to 
protect vulnerable minors and women in custody.  

EU financing has also supported the constitutional process in South Sudan, civic education programmes, and 
projects to preparate citizens for democratic elections, whilst also supporting several NGOs that work in 
democratisation, conflict reduction and peace building, human rights, land governance, women’s rights and 
child rights, and democratic governance. Several of these state building, judicial strengthening, democratic-, 
constitution- and peace-building programmes are in progress. It is therefore difficult at this stage to objectively 
assess outcomes and impacts on state building, rule of law and access to justice (ROL/AJ) and human rights 
outcomes, or on how sustainable these subnational governance initiatives will be. Interviews with EUD and 
international agency officials suggest these initiatives are showing results but that they require significant and 
sustained future support to effect the desired changes in state building and democratisation for the country. 

Many of the important EU financed efforts have been undermined by periodic violence and conflict, and the 
continued lack of basic infrastructure and even accommodation for judges in rural areas, preventing the 
efficient and effective application of judicial procedures.  

More broadly, infrastructural and capacity weaknesses in Government have hindered the effectiveness of EU 
support for governance, including TA, training, and capacity building in PFM. Despite these efforts, there have 
been no sustainable improvements. Key challenges include widespread corruption within the kleptocratic 
state, with documented misuse of state funds, including oil revenue and all of a close to USD 1 billion loan 
intended for essential medical and fuel supplies to maintain basic health services during crisis. Allegedly, 
funds have been misappropriated by the President, his family and military officers/leaders, often funnelled to 
companies abroad147. Despite documented148 allegations of corruption by some high-ranking members of the 
transitional government, the EU has not directly criticised the Government or demanded independent 
investigations, prosecutions, or the repayment of misappropriated funds. Additionally, the EU has not pressed 
for the timely implementation of agreed PFM reforms outlined in key peace process documents and the 
revitalised peace agreement. Nevertheless, the EU is considering actively how best to press for reforms149. 

2.8.1. Contribution to improved PFM (JC8.1) 

The EU has supported improved PFM in South Sudan from 2011-2023, including through the MDTTF 
administered by the World Bank. The MDTTF aims to help South Sudan transition from humanitarian aid to a 
development-oriented focus, with an emphasis on strengthening PFM practices. However, despite the 
MDTTF beginning in 2023, significant improvements in PFM have not been observed, and there are ongoing 
concerns about fund misappropriation and the sustainability of even modest improvements. 

Social sector programmes like GESS, IMPACT, and HPF included components to improve planning and 
budgeting at the County and payam levels. However, misappropriation of funds and supplies in the HPF, as 

145 Saferworld, “Living in Gudele Block 9 Was a Nightmare”: People and Police Working Together for Better Safety and Security in Juba. 
https://www.saferworld-global.org/en-stories-of-change/aliving-in-gudele-block-9-was-a-nightmarea-people-and-police-working-together-for-
jubas-security. Accessed 25/8/2024 
146 For example, 24828: “Promoting the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Land Tenure in South Sudan”-Budget EUR 36.6 million.   
147 The Sentry, Cash Grab. How a Billion-Dollar Credit Scam Robbed South Sudan of Fuel, Food, and Medicine. October 2022. Transparency 
International, U4 Helpdesk.  “Answer 2023 South Sudan: Overview of corruption and anti- corruption efforts.” Author: K. Harutyunyan. 03 May 
2023. 
148 ID 26; and Radio Tamazuj, “Cabinet Affairs Minister Dr. Lomuro denies diverting peace funds to Kiir’s office,” June 10, 2024. 
149 ID 18; ID 46. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 44 

 
 
 
 
reported by the World Bank150, and governance issues within GESS and HPF were acknowledged by the 
EU151. These issues were not effectively addressed during project implementation. 
Four specific PFM technical assistance interventions were implemented, including initiatives focused on 
subnational payroll and PFM capacity, as well as strengthening budget processes. While these efforts led to 
some achievements, such as identifying ghost workers on payrolls, the overall governance and corruption 
within the South Sudanese state make it unlikely that improvements will be sustained. One key example is the 
continued failure to pay health and education workers, which is due to misappropriation of funds, including oil 
revenues being diverted for militia use152 rather than being properly accounted for or used as mandated by 
law153. 
The lack of leadership and transparency in both the central and state governments have prevented effective 
PFM reform, despite the well-designed EU interventions. Misappropriation of development and donor funds 
continues to exemplify the disregard for transparent state fund utilisation. The EU’s efforts to improve PFM 
governance have not led to efficient administration at the central and state levels154. 
Despite these setbacks, the EU and Sweden signed a programme on January 30, 2023, supporting PFM 
reform through the MDTTF (EUR 3 million + budget strengthening), administered by the World Bank155. The 
EU Ambassador has indicated that the MDTTF and other interventions under the MIP 2021-2027 mark the 
EU’s push to help South Sudan shift from a humanitarian to a development trajectory156. However, if the 
Government does not implement necessary reforms, South Sudan’s service delivery and governance will not 
improve, and the country will remain reliant on international aid. Due to the government’s weak capacity and 
its not allocating sufficient budget to basic health, education, water and sanitation service delivery157, much of 
the work is outsourced to NGOs and other service providers. 

2.8.2. Contribution to institutional and governance strengthening (JC8.2) 

The EU’s interventions in South Sudan have led to some improvements in governance, human rights, and 
service delivery, but the outcomes have been inconsistent and often unsustainable. Challenges such as 
political will, weak institutional ownership, and limited local capacity have impeded progress in strengthening 
governance, accountability, and PFM. The EU’s reliance on pooled funding approaches, which bypass local 
government structures, has reduced the potential for sustainable institutional ownership and increased 
transaction costs. While community-focused projects like those under the RSRTF show promise, they remain 
vulnerable to political instability and limited scalability. A balanced approach integrating capacity-building for 
government institutions with community-driven development remains essential but difficult to implement. 

Overall, the EU’s support for institutional and governance strengthening in South Sudan has had mixed 
results, with some exceptions. Two projects aimed at strengthening local governance, started in 2012, were 
never assessed. In 2022, the EU shifted to a pooled funding approach due to the GoSS’s lack of political will 
and ownership of PFM reforms. However, this approach has significant weaknesses, as noted in the EU’s 
support to the health sector, where government structures were bypassed, weakening institutional ownership. 
The same issue occurred in the education sector through GESS, where NGOs handled service delivery and 
reporting, rather than government authorities. This reduced opportunities for governance-oriented learning, 
raised concerns about accountability, and led to higher transaction costs. 

Despite significant EU investment since independence, efforts to improve governance and public 
administration have largely failed due to impunity among high-level authorities158. Strengthening access to 
ROL/AJ, and anti-corruption measures is essential for the country’s transition to peace and democracy159. 
The RSRTF’s governance support is part of its community-based, sub-national programmes. RSRTF 
interventions led to improving institutional governance, anti-corruption, ROL, and human rights in the criminal 

150 ID2.1. ID 26. 
151 ID46. 
152 Crisis Group, Oil or Nothing: Dealing with South Sudan’s Bleeding Finances. Africa Report N°305, 6 Oct., 2021.  Nilepet receives oil 
revenues from producing companies and the government; these allocations are not reliably disclosed and have never been audited. Tightly 
controlled by Kiir loyalists and security elite, Nilepet appears to fund parts of South Sudan’s security services and war machine” op. cit., p.13). 
153  World Bank, Republic of South Sudan. THE STATE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS IN SOUTH SUDAN. September 2018: 
“widespread fiscal mismanagement has further reduced spending on social sectors, including the social protection, and weakened both internal 
and external confidence and support.” 
154 ID1.3. 
155 World Bank, MDTTF documents. https://documents.worldbank.org/pt/publication/documents-
reports/documentdetail/845101468340277416/main-report 
156 ID18. 
157 ID18. 
158 Human Rights Council. 48th Session. 13 Sept.–8 Oct. 2021. Agenda item 4. Human rights violations and related economic crimes in the 
Republic of South Sudan. 2021 and interviews with DPs, OHCHR and CSOs. 
159 ID18. ID5. ID 30. ID 36. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 45 

 
 
 
justice system and public administration. RSRTF programmes and stand-alone ROL/AJ ones include judicial 
infrastructure development, training judges and court staff, supporting traditional justice systems, and land 
governance160. While these efforts show promise for reducing violence and fostering peacebuilding, they will 
fail if the government and military continue to fund militias and perpetuate violence. 

PFM and anti-money laundering (AML) interventions in South Sudan have failed to establish transparent 
accounting systems or reduce money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). 
Despite enacting an AML law in 2012161, South Sudan has struggled with enforcement, as noted in the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 2024 assessment162. The EU’s regional AML/CFT programme faced 
significant challenges, with unclear impacts on key institutions163. The shift to a demand-driven approach, 
based on capacity assessments, has yet to show results. Given the threat these reforms pose to the 
governing elite’s income from misappropriated funds, prospects for success remain uncertain164. 

2.8.3. Contribution to subnational development and local governance (JC8.3) 

Although the EU has supported interventions aimed at improving subnational development and local 
governance from 2011 to 2023, the outcomes have been mixed. Promising initiatives in local governance 
include those supported through the RSRTF. The EU’s engagement in the Fund’s governance and its 
continuous high level of support (while other donors have decreased their funding for example in 2023) 
strengthened the RSRTF’s area-based programming methods, and its implementation of the triple nexus. 

Reconciliation efforts are relevant to subnational development and local governance because unless peace 
and reconciliation can prevail, communities will continue to be fractured and volatile, and there will remain 
high risks of violence and conflict occurring. Reconciliation efforts require basic funding and TA (training of 
social capital resources such as police, judges, local authorities, women and men leaders, and youth 
leaders), consequently decentralised bodies of the key sector ministries require support from civil society and 
international donors to introduce programmes in peace building and resilience sub-nationally.  Resilience and 
stabilisation initiatives, for instance, frequently supported reconciliation efforts. In Greater Tonj, the Fund 
supported outreach and dialogues with armed cattle camp youth to encourage alternative livelihoods and 
resilience building. IOM initiatives funded by EU have been very important and shown promising results in this 
area.  

EU components and activities of ongoing EU funded projects target local authorities and aim to strengthen 
their ability to deliver services and respond to the rural population’s basic needs. Examples include “Support 
on an Enabling Environment for Elections in South Sudan” (initiated in 2022)165 which aims to strengthen 
EU’s role in enabling key-reform processes and EU support to the monitoring body of the ceasefire 
agreement, the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism 
(CTSAMVM), the monitoring body of R-ARCSS – the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation 
Commission (RJMEC), to the Constitution Making Process, and to the RSRTF which is linked to UNMISS’s 
operations.  

These initiatives if successful will strengthen governance, civic participation and oversight of local 
government, democratisation, and state building at decentralised levels. They are complemented by GIZ 
initiatives to promote rural governance and participation. Examples are “Rural Governance in South Sudan 
(2020-2024), and the GIZ- and EU-financed “Promoting local administrations and peaceful coexistence in 
South Sudan.” The latter project’s strategy is to train selected individuals from local administration and civil 
society to contribute in communities to constructive relationships between state and society; and ultimately to 
improve service provision to rural populations, taking a needs-based approach and expanding citizen 
participation. 

Examples of EU supported governance, resilience and peacebuilding efforts at subnational levels 
The EU supported various other interventions aimed at improving subnational development and local governance from 2011 
to 2023. 
Notable efforts include: 

160 For example, “Strengthened Access to Education and Livelihoods and Enhanced Reintegration and Community Cohesion in areas affected 
by displacement and returns. Implemented by IOM, UNICEF, WFP, ongoing (Budget €25 million); an ongoing UNDP-implemented project, 
“Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening Programme in South Sudan”.  
161 LAWS OF SOUTH SUDAN. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTER TERRORIST FINANCING ACT, 2012. Act No.29. 
162 IMF Executive Board Concludes 2023 Article IV Consultation and IMF Management Completes First and Second Reviews and Extends Staff-
Monitored Program with Board Involvement with the Republic of South Sudan. June 10, 2024. 
163 ID9. 
164  Human Rights Council. 48th Session op. cit. The Sentry, Cash Grab., op. cit., 2022. Transparency International, South Sudan: Overview of 
corruption and anti- corruption efforts.” 2023, op. cit. 
165 Financed under NDICI-Global Europe. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 46 

 
 
 
 
•  TA for payroll and PFM support (2014-2016) with a subnational focus on PFM. Other interventions aimed at 

strengthening governance, AC/ROL, and the judicial system, such as projects supporting the courts, community police 
stations, traditional justice systems, and prison infrastructure reform, also took place. However, as mentioned above, the 
results of these interventions have been mixed. 

•  Criminal Justice System (CJS) interventions, such as those by the International Development Law Organisation 
(IDLO) and UNMISS, aimed at strengthening the judiciary and training police and judges with EU financing, have yielded 
mixed results. The IDLO's "Enhancing the Capacity of the Judiciary of South Sudan" project, initially focused on the 
subnational level, faced challenges as key elements were eliminated, ultimately failing to improve access to legal 
resources locally.  

• 

IOM’s education and vocational training projects have been successful in Abyei and other areas. By training local 
youth in technical skills, these initiatives boost employability and foster subnational, community-based business 
incubation and private sector development. These initiatives, part of the RSRTF’s area-based programming, have 
contributed to subnational development and governance by enabling the return of military personnel to barracks and 
promoting principled policing, essential for rule of law and a democratic society. 

Box 9 Examples of EU-supported governance, resilience and peacebuilding efforts at the subnational level 

After 10 years of EU and partner support, challenges to subnational development and local governance 
persist, particularly in establishing efficient and transparent systems. A key obstacle is the provision of clean 
and reliable energy, which is essential for running administrative systems and enabling the digitalisation of 
governance and administration. Another enduring obstacle is the absence of viable roads which could 
increase farmers’ access to markets. 

Challenges such as deforestation from unregulated charcoal production and energy poverty 
disproportionately affects women and children166. Specific local opportunities exist and remain under-funded, 
such as solar energy systems which can help connect citizens to economic opportunities167, and support 
modern government functions, including transparent accounting and administrative systems. A World Bank 
study highlighted significant energy needs168. 

2.8.4. Contribution to strengthening civil society and democratic participation (JC8.4) 

The evaluation period prioritised strengthening civil society as a prerequisite for open, democratic society, and 
as a strategic approach to enable policy priorities of humanitarian aid-peacebuilding nexus, human 
development and green and inclusive economic development. The fundamental aim of EU support in 
strengthening civil society and democratic participation was to support civilian space to hold power elites to 
account and support subnational initiatives to solve land tenure disputes and reduce conflict-drivers, and 
peace building efforts which depend on local and not central levels of the administration to be effective. A 
second important aim noted in the MIP is for civil society to partner with the state and development partners 
to implement food security, human development, and peace and reconciliation work that require local 
ownership to be successful. 

The commitment of EU support over the period to civil society to fulfil its role of sustaining an open society, 
was underpinned by the assumption that the South Sudanese state would be able to operate with complete 
disregard for public opinion and become an increasingly undemocratic state. Despite the sustained support to 
civil society, and rule of law, the state has progressively become more repressive since 2012169, necessitating 
renewed EU support to civil society and human rights in 2024170. The current MIP includes support measures 
in favour of civil society to build a peaceful, rights-based and inclusive society. The MIP also supports civil 
society to achieve the SDGs by holding authorities accountable for responding to the population’s needs and 
being representative of the interests of all citizens171.  
In addition to mainstreaming civil society in all three priority areas, the civil society strengthening measures in 
the areas of human development, human rights, humanitarian aid, peacebuilding, and good governance have 
played an important part in trying to consolidate the peace process and stabilise the country. Despite 
successes of EU supported civil society interventions in peace and reconciliation and conflict reduction, 

166 C. Leonardi et al., Fuelling Poverty. The challenges of accessing energy among urban households in Juba, South Sudan. RVI, 2013. 
167 Hu, I., et al., “Pathways to Electricity Access Expansion in South Sudan: Off-Grid and Mini-Grid Market Assessment. Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank Group. http:// documents.worldbank.org 
168 “Only 5.4% of the population have access to electricity in 2023; 94.7% of households do not have access to any electricity source; only 1.8% 
are connected to a mini-grid; 0.03% use diesel generators; 3.44% use off-grid technologies (solar lanterns, lighting systems, and rechargeable 
batteries”. Hu, I., et al., “Pathways to Electricity Access Expansion in South Sudan. ESMAP/World Bank, 2023. 
169 Human Rights Council. 52nd session. State of Impunity: the persistence of violence and human rights violations in South Sudan. Detailed 
findings of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan. 3 April 2023.  
170 EUD, South Sudan, Implementation of the EU Human Rights and Democracy Country Strategy: Author: Lothar Jaaske, Juba. Jan., 2024. 
171 MIP 2021-2027. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 47 

 
 
 
violence and conflict outbreaks have grown to the highest reported level in 2024. There were significant 
outcomes in capacity strengthening of civil society leading to gains for civic participation, women’s rights, and 
democratisation, civic education and preparation for elections. However, the growth of repression and 
attempts to clamp down on media, free speech, and democratic processes, point to the need for considerable 
future EU support to civil society, and continue to threaten the gains made, as noted in the recent EUD 
human rights policy paper172. 

2.9. EQ9 - Mainstreaming of Cross-Cutting Issues 

EQ9- To what extent were cross-cutting issues reflecting key EU values mainstreamed in the EU support to South 
Sudan? 
JC9.1 Human rights, democracy and gender equality have been mainstreamed in the programming and implementation of EU 
interventions 
JC9.2 Climate change adaptation and environmental protection have been mainstreamed in the programming and 
implementation of EU interventions 
JC9.3 Conflict sensitivity has been mainstreamed in the programming and implementation of EU interventions 

JC9.4 Sensitivity to displacement situation has been mainstreamed in the programming and implementation of EU 
interventions 

The EU has effectively integrated human rights, democracy, gender equality, women’s rights, child rights 
(JC9.1), climate adaptation, and conflict sensitivity, aiming for peace, security, resilience, and sustainable 
development in its support to South Sudan over the evaluated period. Notable achievements include the 
Constitution Making Process Act (2022) and community policing platforms, although systemic issues such as 
human rights violations by state actors and poor prison conditions highlight the need for stronger advocacy 
and conditionality.  

There is an important gender and child rights dimension in cruel and arbitrary detention in substandard or 
unofficial places of detention such as barely adapted shipping containers used as joint police and prison 
detention facilities, in which there have been cases of prisoners dying from starvation thirst and overheating 
due to extremely high temperatures in the sun. Examples of the gendered violation of women and girls’ rights 
are documented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Human 
rights violations attributed to both state security elements and non-state armed groups include women and 
girls subjected to arbitrary, unlawful arrests for refusing arranged marriages, seeking divorce, or for alleged 
adultery, in patterns of abuse reinforcing the use of gender as an instrument of control173. 
Substandard prison conditions are highlighted in reports by OHCHR174, Human Rights Watch (HRW)175, and 
the Social Sciences Humanities Research Council (SSHRC)176. Prison visits to Kuajok state prison revealed: 
overcrowding, insanitary conditions, “imprisonment by proxy" (i.e., incarceration of relatives of alleged 
perpetrators of crimes until the presumed perpetrators hand themselves into the authorities); operation of a 
“Blue Book” (list of people for possible execution); lack of access to legal counsel, few/no judges to try court 
cases; insufficient or no medicines for treating and managing health conditions of imprisoned people; children 
and pregnant women crowded into in unsafe, unsanitary, overcrowded spaces. In Kuajok state prison the 
health conditions of the inmates are concerning. Most inmates suffer from skin diseases, malaria and 
tuberculosis (TB). Death and injury can occur due to poor sanitation in the prison, inadequate diet, unsafe 
drinking water, and overcrowding (70 inmates sleep in cell of 7 by 4)177. More positively, the Government, with 
EU support, has introduced measures to improve legal aid and justice sector reform, including establishing 
the Judicial Reform Committee, and deploying mobile courts and special courts. The EUD is actively 
considering effective ways to introduce conditionalities on the Government, especially as concerns human 
rights violations, land invasions and forced relocation of groups targeted due to ethnicity or other factors.  

While climate change adaptation and environmental protection have been increasingly mainstreamed (JC9.2) 
into EU programming in South Sudan, particularly within the green economy sector and driven by frequent 
flooding, the integration is not comprehensive. EU interventions demonstrate a growing awareness and 
practical responses to climate change, as evidenced using climate and environmental assessments, 

172 EUD, South Sudan, Implementation of the EU Human Rights and Democracy op.cit.., 2024. 
173 UN OHCHR, “South Sudan: Arbitrary arrests and detentions remain serious concern,” 18 Dec. 2024. 
174 UN OHCHR, “South Sudan: Arbitrary arrests and detentions remain serious concern,” 18 Dec. 2024. 
175 HRW, “What Crime Was I Paying For?” Abuses by South Sudan’s National Security Service. Dec 24, 2020. 
176 SSHRC, “REPORT ON FIELD VISIT ON HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, INVESTIGATION AND REPORTING IN KUAJOK, WARAP 
STATE. A PROJECT IMPLEMENTED BY SSHRC IN PARTNERSHIP AND WITH FUNDING FROM UNMISS HUMAN RIGHT DIVISION. Mar., 
2024. 
177 SSHRC, “REPORT ON FIELD VISIT ON HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING, 2024 op. cit,. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 48 

 
 
 
 
 
incorporation within the PfPRR framework, and the prominence of climate resilience in migration and conflict-
related programmes. However, the absence of specific SDG 13 and 14 spending, incomplete integration of 
recommendations from environmental profiles like the 2022 CEP (especially regarding deforestation and 
agroforestry),and limited comprehensive integration in sectors beyond the green economy like health and 
education, indicate that mainstreaming is still partial and requires further deepening. Broader integration of 
environmental strategies across sectors remains limited, highlighting the need for further efforts to address 
critical issues such as deforestation, the environmental and human rights consequences of extractives 
mining, and the promotion of sustainable land use to fully address the environmental vulnerabilities of South 
Sudan.  

The EU showed strong conflict (JC9.3) and displacement sensitivity (JC9.4), using the Humanitarian-
Development-Peace Nexus to tackle local conflicts and support forcibly displaced populations. Successful 
programmes include literacy for pastoral communities and self-reliance initiatives for forcibly displaced 
groups. More focus on conflict-sensitive planning and land-use strategies that provide financing for land 
registration and security of tenure for vulnerable women and men, is urgently needed for a rights-based, 
sustainable, inclusive development (JC3). As is characteristic to countries riven by conflict, the secondary 
occupation of landholdings belonging to displaced populations is widespread across South Sudan. While 
most of these instances involve situations in which IDPs have settled on other people’s land, in some cases 
land has been forcibly grabbed by political and military actors (JC4)178. 
Interviewees/reports179 note that more focus on conflict-sensitive planning and land-use strategies that 
provide financing for land registration and security of tenure for vulnerable women and men, is urgently 
needed for a rights-based, sustainable, inclusive development, in urban, peri urban and many rural areas. 
The interviewees/reports stress the urgent need for: 1) establishing a Law Review Commission to concretise 
laws related to town planning, land surveys and the registration of plots (to prevent land grabbing);  2) 
establishment of a special state land court to investigate suspected crimes of land-grabbing; 3) An 
independent land assessment and valuation body to calculate compensation for people forced to resettle; and 
4) decentralised land management and enhanced law enforcement mechanisms with regards to customary 
land rights, including for farming and grazing (JC9.3). Secondary occupation of landholdings belonging to 
displaced populations is widespread across rural and urban parts of South Sudan. While most of these 
instances involve situations in which IDPs have settled on other people’s land because of no other option, in 
some cases land has been forcibly grabbed by political and military actors180. A concern is that temporarily 
accommodating IDPs on other’s land could become permanent, causing land conflicts between IDP and host 
communities (JC9.3)181. 
A major challenge to improving human rights, improving resilience, and bringing peace remains South 
Sudan’s unelected leaders, several of whom continue unpunished for human rights violations and fuelling 
insecurity.182 The significant outcomes of EU support to human rights, women’s rights, civil society capacity 
building, and reducing SGBV were undermined by the transitional Government authorities over the period.  

2.9.1. Human rights, democracy, gender equality have been mainstreamed (JC9.1) 

The EUD183 acknowledged the need for contingencies and sanctions to persuade the Government to reform 
PFM, prevent and prosecute human rights violations, and carry out the roadmap for R-ARCSS184. EU already 
sanctioned South Sudan individuals in 2014 (and ongoing)185 to act against economic crimes regarding oil 
revenue transparency, PFM and resources management to render donors more responsive to government 
requests for development assistance186. Contingent milestones on Government to be considered include 
actual disbursement of government earmarked funds in national budgets to implement the peace agreement 
and roadmap; and successfully reducing human rights violation indicators (e.g., accepting ideas mentioned by 
OHCHR187 to use EU RSRTF funds to include police operating the unofficial detention facilities to 

178 ID 1.2. Deng, D. Land Governance and the Conflict in South Sudan. London School of Economics: Conflict Research Programme. 2021. 
179  UNMISS, Sokir, J. & Andersson, F., “Central Equatoria stakeholders agree on need for land rights reforms and conflict resolution.”  
Interviews: ID: 1.2.19,22,30,37. 
180 ID 1.2. Deng, D. Land Governance and the Conflict in South Sudan. London School of Economics: Conflict Research Programme. 2021. 
181 Deng, D. Land Governance. Op. cit. 
182 UN Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner. “South Sudan: extension of transitional government will compound dire human rights 
crisis if leaders do not change course - UN experts.” 25 Sept., 2024. OHCHR website. 
183 ID 18; ID44, ID46; ID 49.  
184 EEAS, “Statement by the Troika, the EU and its Member States on the Extension of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan,” 09.08.2022.   
185 EU Sanctions List on South Sudan: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02015R0735-20230404 
186 EEAS, “Statement by the Troika… op. cit. 09.08.2022.  
187 ID 12; ID 36. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 49 

 
 
 
professionalise them and encourage them away from cruel and degrading methods of interrogation and 
detention and respect the rule of law.  

Since 2011, the EU has prioritised creating a democratic, inclusive state in South Sudan, focusing on access 
to justice and the rule of law as central objectives. Human rights have been key to restoring security, with 
security-related interventions addressing the criminal justice system. These efforts have led to some 
successes, including the development of legislation, policies, and the establishment of institutions at both the 
central and community levels. While democracy has not been fully mainstreamed, specific democracy and 
civic education projects have focused on this area. Strengthening CSOs has been crucial for promoting 
democracy and enabling South Sudanese CSOs to play an important role in improving human rights 
conditions within the criminal justice system. 

From 2011 to 2023, EU support to South Sudan focused on helping the new state become stable, peaceful, 
democratic, and grounded in access to justice and rule of law (AJ/ROL). The EU’s initial direct mediation 
efforts188 with like-minded partners in 2012-2013 aimed to prevent civil war, reflecting the EU’s commitment to 
supporting peace and development in South Sudan. Over time, these efforts189 expanded into a large 
Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) aid portfolio, funding numerous interventions with various delivery 
mechanisms and implementing partners, all driven by the goal of building a democratic and inclusive state 
based on AJ/ROL and the protection of human and civil rights. 

Throughout South Sudan’s turbulent history, the EU has consistently aimed to support state-building by 
financing Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) interventions with explicit or integrated human rights 
objectives. Notably, the EU has implemented a due diligence policy to incorporate human rights into its 
security sector support190, recognising that security is essential for ensuring the protection of human rights, 
women's rights, and democracy in the new state. This focus is reflected in a wide range of innovative 
interventions that have promoted human rights, AC/ROL, traditional justice, land governance, and gender 
equality. These efforts also include the prevention of SGBV, discrimination against girls and women in 
education and employment, and the protection of children and youth through access to education, health, 
nutrition, and a life free from violence and injustice. 

The EU and its partners have integrated the three cross-cutting themes of human rights, democracy, and 
gender equality into interventions targeting security, prisons191, and the broader criminal justice system. A key 
initiative in this regard is the Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening 
Programme in South Sudan192. This programme has achieved significant results, including the approval of the 
Constitution Making Process Act, 2022, which sets out a clear process for replacing the Transitional 
Constitution of 2011 and outlines a roadmap with appropriate institutional arrangements. Other successes 
include drafting the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing Bill and the Compensation and 
Reparations Authority Bill of 2022, as well as establishing a Community Policing Directorate, which now 
oversees 44 community policing platforms, led by women, youth, and internally displaced persons. 

Women’s rights and the rights of the girl child have been supported in two main ways throughout the 2011-
2023 period193: firstly, as an explicit intervention, for example under the NDICI-funded project to support and 
reintegrate sexual violence survivors194, and secondly, as a gender mainstreamed theme, strategy, or 
components and expected outcomes to improve the wellbeing and rights of girls and women (such as in the 
GESS, and HPF).  

Over the evaluation period, EU-supported interventions have primarily focused on specific democracy and 
civic education projects rather than mainstreaming democratic concerns. These initiatives became 
increasingly important, particularly with the postponed December 2024 elections in mind. Strengthening 
CSOs has been a key aspect of the EU’s democracy promotion strategy in South Sudan, yielding benefits not 

188ID1.1. 
189 ID1.1. 
190 EU adopts due diligence policy to anchor human rights systematically into its security sector support. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-
adopts-due-diligence-policy-anchor-human-rights-systematically-its-security-sector-support_en27.02. 2024. 
191   Human rights concerns and the security sector are intertwined. OHCHR has identified a number of the fundamental HR infringements in the 
South Sudan security (prisons) sector. Interview, Juba, with Human Rights Officer, OHRCH, 11/8/24.  
192 UNDP. Annual Report. Support to Access to Justice, Security and Human Rights Strengthening Programme in South Sudan. Country: South 
Sudan. Project Duration: April 2021 to March 2025. Total budget: USD 38,919,057. 2022. 
193 Strictly speaking gender mainstreaming should acknowledge the roles and rights of boys and men.  Where possible, and relevant, the 
evaluation findings have distinguished between these nuances. 
194 The NDICI-funded project’s full title is: “Support the reintegration of sexual violence survivors including former female abductees by pro Riek 
Machar SPLA in opposition in Western Equatoria.” IcSP/2020/417-269. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 50 

 
 
 
 
only in democracy-building but also in areas like criminal justice reform and human rights, as discussed in 
section 2.8.4195. 
EU-financed interventions in human rights, democracy, and gender equality have achieved some positive 
outcomes. For instance, through the RSRTF, the EU has empowered communities affected by violence, 
enabling them to address the root causes of conflict and human rights abuses, particularly where the state is 
either unwilling or unable to intervene196. This approach has contributed to a reduction in conflict and human 
rights abuses in some areas, despite limited support from state authorities and elites197. 
Despite efforts to mainstream human rights in EU-supported interventions, democratisation has stalled, 
human rights abuses continue unabated, and gender equality remains largely unrealised. While the EU has 
designed programmes aimed at improving human rights, it has also leveraged policy and political dialogue to 
push the Government to change its course. This is especially true in the face of documented human rights 
violations by state agents and militias198, including the forced displacement of ethnic groups, torture in 
“container prisons” and abuses199 by security services like the National Security Service (NSS)200. While the 
EU has maintained a human rights mainstreaming approach, it has yet to make a significant impact on 
impunity or effect real change. A major challenge to improving human rights, improving resilience, and 
bringing peace remains South Sudan’s unelected leaders, several of whom have not been prosecuted for 
human rights violations and fuelling insecurity201. The important outcomes of EU support to human rights, 
women’s rights, civil society strengthening, and reducing SGBV were undermined by Government authorities 
over the period.  

2.9.2. Climate change adaptation and environmental protection have been 
mainstreamed (JC9.2) 

From 2011 to 2023, the EU has increasingly incorporated climate adaptation and environmental protection 
into its planning and implementation, particularly within the green economy sector. The emphasis on climate-
smart agriculture has been driven by widespread flooding in regions where EU support is concentrated. 
Through the PfPRR coordination, the EU has provided technical assistance to enhance local resilience by 
addressing climate change at the grassroots level. Climate and environmental risk assessments, such as 
those in the green economy portfolio, have been used, though the recommendations from the 2022 EU CEP, 
particularly on deforestation, have not been fully integrated into EU programming. Although climate concerns 
are acknowledged in sectors like health and education, they are not always comprehensively addressed. 
Climate-related issues are more prominent in migration, refugee management, and conflict reduction 
programmes, especially those dealing with climate-induced displacement and flooding-related conflicts 
between farmers and herders. 

While climate adaptation and environmental protection have been increasingly integrated into EU 
programming, there has been no specific spending tagged for SDG 13 (Climate Action) or SDG 14 (Life on 
Land). However, the green economy sector, with its potentials from climate-smart agriculture, has been seen 
as the priority sector for integrating climate adaptation, even more given the frequent flooding in supported 
areas. Other sectors acknowledge climate issues, but they lack substantial integration. New interventions 
focusing on wildlife conservation and protected area management are underway, though biodiversity was 
minimally addressed in the MIP. 

In practice, climate adaptation is incorporated within EU activities through PfPRR, though not always explicitly 
documented. This integration supports local resilience with practical responses to climate challenges. 
Discussions focus on the effects of climate change on food security, agriculture, and the relocation of 
communities impacted by flooding. However, structured land-use strategies are still in development. 

The 2022 CEP identified critical environmental issues such as deforestation, vegetation degradation, soil 
erosion, and river siltation, which exacerbate flood risks. The CEP also stressed the need for river and fish 
stock management and the expansion of agroforestry to meet energy needs, reduce erosion, and diversify 
production. Despite these findings, the recommendations have not been fully integrated into EU 

195 SSHRC, Report on field visit on human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting in Kuajok, Warrap State.  Funded by UNMISS Human 
Rights Division. March, 2024 
196 RSRTF Annual Report 2023. UN House, Juba. 
197 RSRTF Annual Report 2023. UN House, Juba; Interview in August 2024, with EUD Juba. See also section 2.8.3 above. 
198 ID1.2. 
199 ID11. 
200 HRW, “South Sudan: Inaction on Dire Security Agency Abuse. Failure to Enact Reforms, Ensure Accountability, Emboldens Agency.” 
Dec.14, 2020. 
201 UN Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner. “South Sudan: extension of transitional government will compound dire human rights 
crisis if leaders do not change course - UN experts.” 25 Sept., 2024. OHCHR website. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 51 

 
 
 
programming, with limited support for agroforestry and minimal measures to combat deforestation, driven by 
the exploitation of forest resources for firewood and charcoal production, which accounts for 80% of the 
country’s energy needs. 

In addition to the CEP, various environmental and climate assessments are used for EU-supported projects. 
Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVA) are conducted for initiatives like the “Promoting a Green 
and Resilient Economy in South Sudan” project, with a 2023 inception report. An ex-ante study for biodiversity 
and conservation also took place, including a 2024 assessment of wildlife trade and crime. Environmental 
Impact Assessments (EIA) are applied to EU-funded projects, such as the UNOPS SORUDEV feeder road 
initiative, ensuring environmental sustainability. Moreover, the World Food Programme (WFP) has developed 
satellite imagery monitoring to track natural disasters and ecosystem changes, informing climate risk 
exposure and adaptation strategies. 

Climate change significantly impacts public health in South Sudan, with frequent flooding creating stagnant 
water pools that increase the risk of malaria, cholera, snake bites, and other waterborne diseases. Flooding 
also disrupts infrastructure and transportation, impeding access to health and education services. While these 
public health challenges are acknowledged, they are not consistently reflected in targeted EU programming 
for health and education sectors. Climate-related issues are more prominently addressed in migration, 
refugee management, and conflict reduction programmes, particularly those dealing with forced displacement 
and flooding-induced conflicts. 

International organisations like WHO have raised awareness about the need for climate-resilient health 
systems, yet this focus has not yet been integrated into EU programming. Despite these efforts, some EU 
interventions in non-green economy sectors could benefit from further attention to environmental impact. For 
instance, improved site selection and planning for community assets or health facilities could help minimise 
adverse environmental effects. 

2.9.3. Conflict sensitivity has been mainstreamed (JC9.3) 

Conflict sensitivity aims to maximise the positive impacts of humanitarian and development initiatives on 
peace while avoiding harm. Several interventions have made this a core aim. For example, since 2016, the 
CSRF in Juba, implemented by Saferworld and Swisspeace, has provided advice on the integration of conflict 
sensitivity into donor strategies and programmes in South Sudan, which have been read and used by EUD 
personnel. The EU provided support to it under the ‘Strengthening the civil society and democratic space in 
South Sudan’ programme. The evaluation, which covered the period of 1 September 2022 to end of August 
2024, concluded that EU funding has allowed the facility to significantly step-up engagement at the sub-
national level. This has led to changes in the way that agencies operate at the field level, whilst also helping it 
to become more effective and credible in its engagement at the national level. 

EU programming documents reflect an awareness of the need for a conflict-sensitive approach, although its 
consistent application in implementation is variable. Nonetheless, there is evidence of the EU making serious 
efforts to increase conflict sensitivity across its portfolio, aligning with the broader principle of precaution or 
due diligence, which is especially important in fragile contexts. This approach supports the triple nexus, a key 
priority for the EU and international actors in fragile environments. The aim is to integrate conflict sensitivity by 
focusing on prevention, development, and humanitarian action, when necessary, as outlined in the EU’s 
Guidance Notes on Conflict Sensitivity in Development Cooperation202. 

While the EU Action Documents and those of IPs consistently reference conflict-sensitive planning and 
implementation, access to conflict sensitivity assessments commissioned at the EUD level was not possible, 
as they are labelled sensitive and not widely circulated. However, there are indications that these 
assessments are closely informed by conflict analysis and annual risk assessments. A broader assignment, 
not specific to South Sudan203, found that EUD staff are generally familiar with conflict sensitivity principles 
but may lack practical experience, with a tendency for technical approaches to overshadow the importance of 
relationships. The study noted the challenge of high staff turnover, which can erode institutional memory and 
hinder the development of relationships, and it emphasised the need for more sustained engagement with 
CSOs.  

202 ‘Guidance Notes on Conflict Sensitivity in Development Cooperation: An update and supplement to the EU staff handbook on ‘Operating in 
situations of conflict and fragility’. Directorate
General for International Cooperation and Development European Commission, October 2021. 
203 ‘Conflict Sensitivity in Support of Programming’, Tim Midgley on behalf of GFA Consulting, FWC SIEA LOT 3 Human Rights, Democracy and 
Peace EuropeAid/138778/DH/SER/Multi’ 

‐

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 52 

 
 
 
 
Conflict sensitivity is a cross-cutting priority for most IPs, who also make careful reference to conflict-sensitive 
planning. However, the evaluation found that, in practice, this focus was often limited to security dynamics 
and the screening of local implementing partners, with less emphasis on the local context. While the projects 
sampled by the evaluation were generally sensitive to displacement and local conflicts, there were consistent 
reports that interventions, particularly in areas such as shelter, new settlements, and property rights, did not 
sufficiently consider local conditions before implementation204. 
Overall, the EU’s efforts to increase conflict sensitivity are viewed positively. A recent evaluation of the EU’s 
collaboration with the CSRF highlighted the impact of EU support in improving conflict sensitivity at both 
national and sub-national levels. This support has helped increase the effectiveness and sustainability of 
selected national NGOs (NNGOs), raised awareness of conflict sensitivity in practice, and deepened 
understanding of the HDP Nexus among UN and donor agencies. Several agencies reported that the CSRF 
added value to their work, fostering strong coherence and collaboration within the sector. 
Several interviewees/reports205 note that more focus on conflict-sensitive planning and land-use strategies 
that provide financing for land registration and security of tenure for vulnerable women and men, is urgently 
needed for a rights-based, sustainable, inclusive development, in urban, peri urban and many rural areas. 
The interviewees/reports stress the urgent need for: 1) establishing a Law Review Commission at all levels of 
governance to concretise laws related to town planning, land surveys and the registration of plots (to prevent 
the epidemic of land grabbing);  2) establishment of a special state land court to investigate suspected crimes 
of land-grabbing; 3) An independent land assessment and valuation body to calculate adequate 
compensation for people forced to resettle; 4) decentralisation of land management and enhanced law 
enforcement mechanisms with regards to customary land rights, including for farming and grazing.   

As in many conflict situations, the secondary occupation of landholdings belonging to displaced populations is 
widespread across rural and urban parts of South Sudan. While most of these instances involve situations in 
which IDPs have settled on other people’s land because of no other option, in some cases land has been 
forcibly grabbed by political and military actors206. A concern is that temporarily accommodating IDPs on 
other’s land could become permanent, causing land conflicts between IDP and host communities207. 

2.9.4. Sensitivity to displacement situation has been mainstreamed (JC9.4) 

In South Sudan, most displacement situations are driven by conflict and internecine violence within the 
country or by the civil war in Sudan, which underscores the importance of programming that takes 
displacement as a foremost indicator of vulnerability. Two EU initiatives that demonstrate an awareness within 
the EUD of the impact of displacement are the Pastoralist Livelihoods and Education Field Schools project 
and the Promoting Self-Reliance Among Displacement-Affected Communities in South Sudan and Sudan 
project. 

Interviews in Juba highlighted these two key EU interventions that effectively demonstrate the understanding 
the implications of displacement situations: 

•  Pastoralist Livelihoods and Education Field Schools Project: This EU-funded initiative aimed to 

mitigate conflicts between nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoral communities by providing education 
services tailored to children and youth from these mobile pastoral communities. The initiative engaged 
local communities to ensure long-term sustainability and reached over 1,000 children, adolescents, 
and adults with literacy, numeracy, and life skills training. A key feature of this initiative was its focus 
on peacebuilding, with life skills integrated into the accelerated learning curriculum. This curriculum 
was designed to help youth resolve conflicts and contribute to peace efforts in their communities208. 

•  Promoting Self-Reliance Among Displacement-Affected Communities in South Sudan and Sudan: 

This project209, launched in August 2022 and running until July 2024, focuses on improving the lives of 
34,000 vulnerable displaced individuals in both South Sudan and Sudan. It acknowledges that host 
communities are frequently overwhelmed by the influx of displaced populations. The project increased 
recognition of the human rights of displacement-affected individuals and strengthened the capacity of 
community groups in both countries to provide protection, livelihood support, and integrated services. 

204 ‘Evaluation of UNHCR South Sudan Country Strategic Plan’, Margie Buchanan-Smith et al. 2023. 
205  UNMISS, Sokir, J. & Andersson, F., “Central Equatoria stakeholders agree on need for land rights reforms and conflict resolution.”  
Interviews: ID: 1.2.19,22,30,37. 
206 ID 1.2. Deng, D. Land Governance and the Conflict in South Sudan. London School of Economics: Conflict Research Programme. 2021. 
207 Deng, D. Land Governance. Op. cit. 
208 Bekele, S.,”Enhancing capacity to resolve conflicts and build peace.”  Enhanced Knowledge and Education for Resilience Pastoralist 
Livelihoods project: Three-year EU-funded project implemented in the former Lakes State. 23 February., 2017.: https://www.unv.org/Success-
stories/enhancing-capacity-resolve-conflicts-and-build-peace 
209 Project locations, South Sudan and Sudan; overall budget: €2,550,000; EU contribution, €2 550 000.  

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 53 

 
 
 
It also addresses the challenges posed by disaster and climate-related human mobility. The project is 
funded by the EU Lives in Dignity Grant Facility210, exemplifying an integrated, conflict-sensitive 
approach to displacement. 

Across the work of the EUD since 2011, and as visible in the selection of its partners, in the formulation of 
strategies and Action Documents, there is a wide recognition of both the prevalence of displacement and the 
impact this has on all other EU objectives. At the same time the important contrasts between conditions in 
different areas of South Sudan, the political sensitivity of how population movements are depicted (including 
cases of land grabbing and clashes around land rights), and the traditional dimensions of movement, mean 
that considerable detail is required. Interviews with the EUD indicate that the analysis of such information has 
had to be delegated to the IPs, as a result of the lack of time and analytical capacity (personnel will tend to 
stay two years at most). Despite the challenges of insufficient  human resources, institutional memory, the 
huge EU portfolio and the great difficulty to conduct adequate monitoring of it by EUD staff, EU programming 
does adequately take the needs of the displaced into account, as far as possible and given the constraints of 
the violence and instability on the ground, and the human resources constraints in the EUD.  

3.  Conclusions and Recommendations 

3.1. Conclusions 

3.1.1. Introduction 

The EU’s cooperation over 13 years in South Sudan provides a wide range of insights into its achievements, 
challenges, and areas for future improvement, which in turn reflect much learning about cooperation in fragile 
countries. While the considerable diversity of interventions precludes a generalisation on the median of 
results achieved by the EU, the evaluation finds consistent achievement of objectives, and particularly high 
relevance and coherence. There was high EU added value, bringing unique strengths such as political 
leverage and collective action. At the same time, impact and sustainability were compromised. Across various 
sectors, the EU demonstrated a commitment to addressing urgent and evolving needs while contending with 
a highly complex political and security environment. The following conclusions present the implications of the 
evaluation findings, to enhance future interventions. 

3.1.2. Overall assessment  

Overall conclusion 1: Partnerships beyond the central state are critical.  
The EU’s cooperation in South Sudan has been instrumental in addressing urgent needs and laying the 
groundwork for long-term development. However, its impact has been continually constrained by the 
entrenched challenges of South Sudan’s political context. The country’s socio-economic actors struggle to 
provide sustained structured solutions of their own at scale. In a pattern that can also be found in many other 
countries over the past 15 years, the traditional concept of partnerships in such situations (where the EU finds 
itself unable to engage with the State for various reasons) has significantly hindered performance. 

This traditional approach to international cooperation (consultation with central and local authorities that 
structure decisions into a portfolio of convergent objectives defined centrally by the EUD and implemented by 
an array of partners) has struggled in this context to integrate interventions more deeply with local systems. 
Examples of where the EU has moved beyond the traditional approach include the deployment of innovative 
approaches to capacity building such as: 

•  Localised incentives;  
• 

Improvement of incarcerated people's human rights and living conditions by training of prison and 
police officers and local judiciary, and supporting prison farms;  

•  Engagement with communities about the need for institutional births and attending antenatal care 

under HPF;  

210 The Lives in Dignity Grant Facility was founded to channel funding to promote development-oriented approaches to displacement crises. The 
EU-UNOPS Lives in Dignity Grant Facility was founded in 2020 to efficiently and effectively channel funding to promote development-oriented 
approaches to new, recurrent and protracted displacement crises, focusing on early operational engagement. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 54 

 
 
 
 
 
•  Capacity building of community committees, parent teacher associations, and parents about the need 

to send girls to school to reduce intergenerational poverty; and 

•  Local ownership (through value chain development for example or area-based programming) which 

achieve encouraging outcomes in a context where national governance does not prioritise 
development.  

However, engaging more at the sub national level will not of itself resolve the developmental problems caused 
by continuing conflict, instability, and violence instigated by influential people in central, state, and country 
level governance structures.  

As long as impunity continues at the levels of the states, counties, it will hinder the local level human 
development and resilience achievements in the different sectors of EU’s massive support. Addressing 
systemic challenges, such as weak governance, corruption, impunity, and dependency on aid, is critical to 
achieving sustainable impact and peace.  

Overall conclusion 2: Human development and green economy investments have strengthened 
resilience in many cases, but the government will not be able to build on these without reform.  
From 2011 to 2023, EU support initiatives significantly contributed to South Sudan’s economic diversification 
through a structured, multi-faceted approach. By concentrating on zones with strong agricultural potential, the 
EU selected areas for infrastructure improvements, particularly road construction, to enhance rural 
accessibility. These infrastructure projects were combined with programmes designed to promote agricultural 
productivity, diversify local economies, and develop essential community resources. By targeting all stages of 
the value chain—inputs, production, intermediary services, and commercialization—the EU’s approach 
extended beyond basic production support, creating a more resilient and diversified economic foundation. 

In addition to economic diversification, the EU’s interventions addressed employment needs in South Sudan 
through institutional support, direct job creation, vocational training, and development in infrastructure and 
agriculture. While challenges persist, especially in aligning technical training with local infrastructure 
capacities, these initiatives have positively impacted employment in sectors where local demand matches the 
training outcomes. By fostering job growth across various capacities, the EU’s strategy has contributed both 
directly and indirectly to employment, though further alignment with local capacities could enhance these 
impacts. 

These initiatives significantly strengthened food security by increasing resilience and enhancing shock 
recovery in several states. Institutional support for food and nutrition security has produced valuable results, 
but the most substantial impacts came from direct support for food production and agricultural value chains. 
The larger-scale mechanized agriculture explored in the early days encountered sustainability issues. Despite 
periodic interest in large-scale production, these challenges are less viable considering climate and socio-
political risks. Comprehensive resilience planning is required, particularly in terms of land management and 
potential resettlement.  

In education, EU projects’ objective was strengthening resilience of communities and vulnerable refugees and 
displaced people. Its geographical reach was country wide. For example IMPACT’s intervention logic was 
supporting implementation of the peace agreement by facilitating reconstruction efforts and return of IDPs to 
their areas of origin. Increasing teachers' attendance in primary schools nationwide helped to build the peace 
process by enabling teachers to reopen schools (where safe to do so, and if schools were infrastructurally 
functional). The evaluation of IMPACT’s main outcome (improved teacher attendance) shows that IMPACT 
was successful. Nonetheless, after three years (2017-2020) of implementation, insufficient Government 
budgetary allocations mean irregular payment of teacher salaries remains a major obstruction to improve 
education outcomes.  

Insufficient Government budget allocations have led to GESS permitting use of capitation payments to pay 
teacher incentives, using money intended for other purposes. Teachers also report dissatisfaction with their 
situation of irregular/remuneration, while students receive cash grants.211  As of January 2024, the primary 
and secondary education sector had not progressed as could be expected from EU investments. Government 
budgetary and governance undertakings that could have consolidated the education sector were not kept.  

Similarly, in health, there have been substantive improvements in the health care delivery system, concerning 
epidemiological data, health and logistics management, health and nutrition data collection and management; 
and improved local level health planning. However, health indicators have in several cases stagnated, or 
worsened. In 2011, for example, the under-five mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) was 104.3. It 
improved to 98.8 by 2014 but has remained unchanged ever since. This suggests the EU support to health 

211 Forcier qualitative education sector fieldwork. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 55 

 
 
 
and nutrition, and to building resilience, is an uphill battle if conflict and violence worsen generally in the 
country; and if femicides and SGBV are not prevented and prosecuted.  

This does not imply that the EU should not continue supporting education and health sectors, and civil society 
strengthening, but the expected outcomes in human development, resilience- and peace-building are likely to 
be further diminished over time if the GoSS does not accept greater responsibility for ensuring human 
development outcomes. 

Overall conclusion 3: Impunity for economic crimes and human rights violations threatens future 
human development, resilience, and peace building impacts of EU support. 
The EU cannot be held accountable for corruption and impunity, but this evaluation has documented the ways 
in which economic and political impunity have hampered EU efforts to enhance sustainable development in 
South Sudan. The EUD212 has acknowledged it is not development best practice to support a regime that 
actively impoverishes and endangers its own population because of its failure to reform PFM, prevent and 
prosecute human rights violations, and carry out the roadmap for R-ARCSS213. EU has already used 
sanctions to signal that sustained action and results on prosecuting war criminals and instigators of attacks 
and murders of civilians and humanitarian agency staff214 and actions on oil revenue transparency, and PFM 
and resources management will generate the donor support Government requests. 215  Contingent milestones  
include actual disbursement of government earmarked funds in national budgets to implement the peace 
agreement and roadmap; and further individual sanctions on persons believed to be involved in economic 
crimes and human rights violations.  

Overall conclusion 4: EU support to building resilience and peace via PFM reform, governance, rule of 
law, access to justice, civil society strengthening has been key, and requires continued support given 
the continuing situation of fragility and violence. 
Positive outcomes have been identified from support to sub national governance support and service delivery 
in the communities, via individual projects and components of the UN Reconciliation, Stabilisation, and 
Resilience Trust Fund. Directly implemented interventions in Public Finance Management reform and sub 
national governance promised to be impactful. However, the environment of fragility and violence have 
reduced considerably the achievement of positive outcomes in Public Finance Management, and sub national 
governance. Important programmes such as IMPACT, or GESS, have successfully increased teachers’ 
participation in education, with attendance, inclusion, and enrolment gains. The Health Pooled Fund also 
successfully introduced improved Health Monitoring Information System (HMIS) and health management 
protocols, community health care worker training, with attendance and institutional delivery gains. However, 
simultaneously, economic impunity and blocking of PFM reforms centrally have continued to slow or reverse 
education and health, and continued to reduce resilience gains in long-term EU supported human 
development investments. To take just one example, 17% (7,737) of schools in 2024 were not operational 
due to violence, insecurity, and infrastructural damage. 

Interventions managed via partners (such as Max Planck, NGOs, and UN agencies- UNHCR, IOM, UNDP, 
UNICEF) in rule of law and access to justice, land tenure reform initiatives, and civil society strengthening led 
to the achievement of important outcomes; in some cases, for example, securing land rights for women and 
giving them security and the ability to grow food. Initiatives such as training of judiciary and constitution 
building have led to important progress in areas essential to implement the peace process. The current EU 
supported TA in civic education and in preparation for democratic elections have shown promise although it is 
too early to assess impacts. Other areas of valuable support have included support to improving the human 
rights and living conditions of incarcerated populations; improving police capacity via police training in 
principled policing and human rights precepts, and supporting community police stations in high violence 
hotspots of the capital, Juba. 

Overall conclusion 5: Long term engagement at the local level requires a vastly greater management 
capacity.  
The EU has relied on implementing partners, mainly UN agencies and NGOs, to design and deliver human 
development, green economy, rule of law, promotion of human rights and women’s rights, governance and 
democratisation support, conflict reduction and peace building programmes.    

212 ID 18; ID44, ID46; ID 49.  
213 EEAS, “Statement by the Troika, the EU and its Member States on the Extension of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in South Sudan,” 09.08.2022.   
214 EU Sanctioins List on South Sudan: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02015R0735-20230404 
215 EEAS, “Statement by the Troika… op. cit. 09.08.2022.  

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 56 

 
 
 
 
The reliance on IPs was necessary due to the impossibility of using budget support and because of weak 
(insufficient staff and insufficient capacity) and underfunded central and state government agencies. The EU 
is a respected actor operating at a variety of levels with its donor partners, but less influential than its funding 
and reach would allow. This derives partially from using IPs and insufficient staff to manage such large 
portfolios and aid flows. 

The high reliance on IPs as opposed to Technical Assistance has limited the Government’s ability to govern 
and deliver services without continued support. IPs have inadvertently discouraged local markets and limited 
the growth of private seed producers, suppliers, and blacksmiths. More broadly the prolonged crisis and 
continuous humanitarian aid have contributed to a systemic dependency on aid.  

Nevertheless, sub national service delivery systems were strengthened by enhancing education systems and 
health systems, community health referral systems, and health service delivery focused primarily on women’s 
and children’s needs. Smaller but impactful have also fostered local ownership and capacity building. The EU 
encouraged IPs to implement cost-sharing models, requiring beneficiaries to contribute a percentage of the 
input costs with a progressive repayment option linked to generated income. This approach has fostered 
greater ownership, leading to productive use of tools and increased food production. The EU TA facilitated 
experience sharing among IPs to support harmonizing these practices across the EU portfolio. 

Despite the  achievements of pooled funding, their mode of operation, for example separated from the 
Ministry of Health in the case of the Health Pooled Fund, has not prevented the fragmenting or disappearance 
of social services. The interventions could not for example address hyperinflation, and increasing fee 
introduction and de facto privatisation of essential health services (such as triage, preliminary diagnosis, and 
deliveries by trained midwives, which are supposed to remain free). The health service has been challenged 
to transition the health sector into a government-led implementation modality, fully publicly funded. 

The most promising interventions are those that have created geospatially defined reference groups of donors 
and IPs which have the authority to make spending decisions in reference to specific population groups, using 
a common monitoring system under which different agencies implement complementary projects. The 
evaluation finds that the contrast between the quality of public administration officials at the technical level 
within line Ministries, the State and County levels is an opportunity.  

The EU was able to leverage its leadership role to a greater extent among donors when deploying TA teams 
to advocate for more cohesive and complementary approaches in specific geographic areas. By applying 
lessons learned and adopting a long-term, inclusive perspective, assistance has been delivered through a 
maximum range of modalities and sectors. Without such area-based management there is a risk of creating 
overlapping areas of intervention and a complexity of outcomes which are difficult to monitor and evaluate. 
The prevalence of highly developed and experienced IPs increases the duty of care as well as creating 
distance to local partners.  

The ability of the EUD to store and retrieve information over time is excessively limited. Failing to support the 
types of programmes that work on longer-term issues means that cooperation misses important opportunities 
to engage with the structures that can drive the slow change required to build resilience, reducing the need for 
international aid over the coming years and decades. While the EU generally recognises that conflict 
situations require much higher levels of local knowledge and a constant evaluation of the performance of 
partners216, the staffing numbers and access to expertise of the EUD has been, since 2011, no different to 
that which prevails in more stable partnership countries. The fragility of the country, the prevalence of 
countervailing factors, extend far beyond the ability of the team in Juba to address them. The higher-level 
assumptions made in the logic of intervention are not met, which consequently prevents the achievement of 
impact and sustainability. 

The linkages between non-spending engagement, FPI, INTPA and DG ECHO are growing, but hampered by 
an excessive focus on the central levels of the State. Despite (or perhaps because of) the many forums and 
regular meetings, the practical application of analysis to action remains very difficult. The areas where most 
effectiveness is achieved are those where a comprehensive approach is taken with a group of donors and 
agencies organised geographically around an identified set of interacting population groups, allowing for 
greater continuity of programming on the ground, an approach called area-based programming. This creates 
a stronger position of power in relation to the destructive practices of political entrepreneurs, which interviews 
indicate is a significant factor of sustainability. 
Overall conclusion 6: The concept of the triple nexus could be expanded.  
The evaluation testifies to the EU’s good reputation among donors and reached positive conclusions on 
gender equality (women’s rights) and broader inclusion aspects. The EU achieved major adjustments to its 
programming in response to consecutive crises in an environment fraught with risks. Considering this along 

216 See for example: “Joint Programming in Conflict-Affected and Fragile States”, Sybille Koenig, Emery Brusset, EU Relex 2029 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 57 

 
 
 
with the previous conclusions suggests that future EU cooperation in South Sudan can expand by building on 
the triple nexus and linking it to political dialogue and to resilience.  

The EU would benefit from clearer policy linkages between non-financial cooperation, political engagement, 
and a more visible European development cooperation. The MIP provides a broad programming space, but 
the Team Europe and triple nexus priorities remain ill defined. The centrifugal pressure of events and the 
range of financial commitments is not balanced by the existence of a critical mass of human resources and 
stronger knowledge management functions.  

This points to the need for stronger priority definition within the MIP, extending beyond development to peace 
and humanitarian aid. The experience gained over the period 2011-2023 indicates there is a clear need to 
develop an alternative planning framework when confronted by the absence of state-centred cooperation, 
which could help articulate programming. This would need to focus on local and regional systems which are 
not dependent on the centre. Rather than growth and good governance the evaluation finds that the most 
realistic expectations of the population and of development actors revolve around resilience and ways to 
access minimum public services. 

Resilience is mentioned at a high level in the EU documentation but is limited mostly to asset creation and to 
household and community levels, with limited concrete applications beyond livelihoods when climate and 
conflict call for a new approach. The evaluation finds a clear need to consider capacities at community and 
systems-levels, rather than central institutions, to respond to shocks and pressures, such as providing direct 
support to students rather than relying on state systems. Resilience requires a more extensive analysis of 
local capacities than currently exists, including local emergency preparedness and response infrastructure 
and mechanisms.  

3.1.3. Conclusion 

The EU’s efforts in South Sudan are confronted with four deep-rooted but interlinked challenges. These are 
reflected in the first four clusters of recommendations below and can be labelled as a development paradigm 
challenge:  

1.  How to work with a transitional government that contains elements that are creating conflict and 

violence in the country, and violating the human rights of citizens.  

2.  The difficulty of working at the subnational level, due to ongoing conflict, high poverty levels, low fiscal 

revenues, hyperinflation, and generalised displacement and effects of climate change.   
3.  The challenge of adapting strategies to promote resilience given the varying levels of political 

economy, across a wide range of local actors - including extremely limited financial and human 
resources for service delivery. 

4.  Over reliance on implementing partners to deliver basic services, with intervention-based reporting 

that compiles the results achieved at various levels of sub-contracting of grantees, with little continuity 
over the years. 

Continued investments in human capital development and social protection are urgently required and work 
best when they are contingent on agreed increased commitments from the national authorities. Future 
investments in governance and the rule of law can be combined with peacebuilding, while recognising that 
partnerships beyond the central state are critical. Long-Term engagement at the local level is deserving of 
support. This has to be premised on stronger knowledge management by the EU, and targeted forms of joint 
EU and Member State programming.Recommendations  

3.1.4. Adopting a new paradigm for cooperation 

1. 

Increase responsiveness to the country environment by creating a more independently defined EU 
approach (Judgement Criteria (JC) 1.1, 3.3, 4.3, 5.2, 8.1, 8.2 and Conclusion 1 and 3). The EU should 
adopt a programming framework which responds to the lack of engagement by the State in 
development, and the need to revise many of the assumptions about partnership. It should do so by 
engaging more closely with Member States to create a common core among wider donor initiatives, 
pooled funds and strategies in relation to multilateral efforts. This may be facilitated by the need for all 
donors to adjust programming as a result of the sudden shift in US funding occurring in 2025. 

Sub recommendation  

Responsible Entity 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 58 

 
 
 
EUD Political and 
Cooperation Sections 

EUD Cooperation Section, 
DG INTPA Technical 
Unites, Foreign Policy 
Instrument (FPI) and DG 
ECHO 

EUD Political Section 

1.1 Shift the balance of linkages in the triple nexus to primarily State 

or County level objectives.  
- The EU focus should contain objectives combining peace, 
development, and humanitarian aid around an area-based 
programming framework.  
- Area-based objectives should integrate different interventions’ 
objectives to increasingly reflect the value of contextualised 
programming around identified population categories, including 
considerations such as climate sensitivity, conflict sensitivity, and 
the ability to respond rapidly to contingencies. 

1.2 Change the strategic paradigm to placing an emphasis on 

resilience.  
- By recognising that better results may be achieved by focusing 
on communities and local systems, the EU can help to create 
stronger links between its strategic objectives in the long term 
and can strengthen the coordination across the teams of the 
EUD. Resilience, referring as it does to shocks and pressures, 
offers a conceptual link to emergency assistance as well as to 
conflict prevention and peace initiatives. 
- The resilience perspective should include an extensive analysis 
of key community-level assets and basic infrastructure defined in 
spatial and geographic terms, and should encourage the 
increased localisation of emergency response, for example 
through local procurement aimed at strengthening food systems, 
or through support for emergency preparedness capacities for 
managing sudden-onset crises.  
- This work could also include strengthening capacity for private 
sector entities engaged in common services provision or home-
grown school feeding to help build local food systems. 

1.3 Create Team Europe policy priorities to engage with other like-

minded donors. 
- The Team Europe consultations and policies should build on 
the similarity of goals and risk assessments conducted by the 
remaining Member States present in the country, to create 
common policy priorities, to then reflect these into international 
donor initiatives (such as the World Bank, UK, Norway).  
- This should be situated at a level above joint programming, 
which is rendered difficult by the differences in procedures and 
modalities among Member States and be defined in the triple 
nexus.  

3.1.5. Working from the local towards the centre 

2.  The EU interventions should focus on local level activities and subnational partners, where 
delivery should be monitored and evaluated frequently (JC 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2, 8.2, 9.3 and 
Conclusion 2) to influence national-level dynamics. The monitoring and evaluation effort should be 
framed in terms of area-based programming rather than interventions, and focus on the achievement of 
outcomes and the contribution of the EU on factors of impact. At the same time partners should be 
selected for their ability to combine the work of various organisations and deploy small-scale 
conditionalities or reciprocity with South Sudanese actors. 

Sub recommendation  

2.1 The results of interventions should be defined at the meso 

(County) and technical levels (line Ministry, State, but also civil 
society and value chain level):  
- The most reliable development partners are situated at the 

Responsible Entity 

EUD Political and 
Cooperation Sections 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 59 

 
 
subnational level, where the EUD and IPs should consider a 
realistic scope for the future value chain development 
considering the economic opportunities in the country.  
- This should include ensuring minimal security for people and 
goods on roads, and a nation-wide improvement of the road 
network. Greater programming integrity is managed when 
combining different agencies and donors 

2.2 Subnational entry points should be used with well-defined 
reciprocities or mutually agreed verified contributions.  
- The EUD should continue to encourage projects containing 
partnerships at the subnational level (not DG or state Minister, 
but rather a lower more “technical” level in State administrations, 
or County level, establishing incentives for results).  
- There should also be technical entry points at the central level, 
with a priority given to the lower and technical level of ministries, 
focusing the collaboration on short-term, tangible activities with 
clear outcomes. 

2.3 A revised M&E system should expand beyond the intervention-

focused ROM system and reflect the systems-level resilience 
within its scope (as opposed to state or household levels of 
resilience, the former being at the edges of EU spheres of 
influence and the latter being a focus for humanitarian 
programming. 
- The spatial definition of objectives and indicators should assist 
in linking peace, environment, humanitarian and development 
interventions.  
- The evidence collected should be more easily shared across 
assessments, using a longitudinal (i.e. the same populations 
monitored over time) approach. 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

3.1.6. Supporting local systems for resilience 

3.  Development should be more locally driven on local systems that increase the anticipation, 

absorption and adaptation to shocks and pressures, building on the ability of communities to 
manage the assistance (JC 5.3, EQ 6 in whole, JC 7.2, 7.4, 9.2, Conclusions 2 and 3). The systems 
that provide common goods should be identified and supported. Programming should consider 
expanding the monetary transfers made to beneficiary groups. This should be done however after an 
initial and continued conflict sensitivity analysis. 

Sub recommendation  

3.1 Greater use of locally driven definition of priorities and modalities 

should lead to the careful extension of monetary transfers. 
- These should be linked to the programming of DG ECHO and 
the development of community and systems level resilience , 
such as the recent World Bank and UK emphasis on cash-based 
transfers.  

3.2 Prioritise interventions with a foundation in systems resilience to 
enhance anticipation, absorption and adaptation to multiple 
shocks and pressures.  
- The next planning period should be used to test and gradually 
integrate a wider resilience perspective throughout programmes 
so as to address structural vulnerabilities. The aim will be to 
ensure that when shocks occur, communities and actors can rely 

Responsible Entity 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 60 

 
 
 
 
on local capacities and will require less humanitarian assistance. 
- Focusing on communities and systems can help to create 
stronger links between the strategic objectives in the long term 
and can strengthen the coordination across Cooperation teams. 
This will enhance the relevance and use of resources for affected 
people, given that crises are likely to be protracted.  
- A resilience perspective should be integrated into the strategic 
objectives of the EU, in particular as regards disaster risk 
reduction.  
- While continuing to avoid creating tensions, specific dimensions 
of human rights protection and local dialogue should be elevated 
in the objectives of interventions. Social cohesion and the 
avoidance of tension in particular should be seen as factors in 
the resilience of communities to shocks. 

3.3 An inclusive, principled and risk-sensitive approach should be 
adopted so as to reflect the diversity of situations and the 
adjustments required by a country such as South Sudan. 
- Difficult ethical and practical choices related to the balancing of 
risk management priorities will continue to present themselves 
into the near future. The EUD must find ways to sustain 
consistency in internal decision-making processes. 
- Support for the individuals making decisions must be constant 
and tailored to operational situations. The key role of 
Implementing and Service partners calls for full and constant 
consideration of their capacities and status in operations than is 
currently being granted under existing systems (data storage, 
real time monitoring of performance). The frame of reference for 
these assessments should be the area-based achievement of 
results. 

EUD Cooperation Section 

3.1.7. Building the Management Capacity of the EUD 

4.  The Commission should urgently address the structural challenge of knowledge and personnel 
management in the EUD (JC 1.2, 1.3, 3.4, 4.3, 9.3, 9.4, Conclusions 1 and 3). The insufficient number 
of personnel dealing with a wide range of projects with limited institutional memory should be 
addressed as a matter of priority. This affects the delivery of activities across all sectors, as well as 
weakening the programme-policy linkages that would support priorities such as the triple nexus and 
cross-cutting priorities. Additionally, the absence of robust mechanisms for knowledge management 
and high staff turnover in the EUD and in Brussels weakens strategic coherence, pointing to a pre-
condition for the implementation of the other recommendations. 

Sub recommendation  

4.1 Consider that crisis-affected countries could be granted greater 
flexibility in their human resource management and recruitment 
processes, like the flexible procedures available for contracting 
IPs. 
- This should include in particular the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity in recruitment, with controls exercised at the point 
when recruitment offers are formulated and signed.  
- There should be an assessment of the possibility for the EUD to 
identify and retain a pool of locally or regionally available 
specialists to cope with the challenge in continuity of portfolio 
monitoring and capacity building. 

Responsible Entity 

DG INTPA 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 61 

 
 
 
4.2 Develop an appropriate handover and onboarding strategy for 
EUD newcomers in crisis countries, including in particular the 
various IT systems and interfaces, introduction to HQ structures, 
helpdesks and functional mailboxes. 
- There should be a mechanism for briefing and information 
sharing organised locally for the EUD team (with the Political 
Section, and the DG ECHO team).  
- There should be a clear mechanism to manage frequently 
changing portfolio profiles and to distribute additional 
responsibilities fairly during transitions, ensuring continuity and 
balance in workload. 

4.3 The EU should prioritise IPs that allow for a collaborative 

continuous assessment of their management of consortia, 
transparency of cost structures, validation of indicators, and 
context sensitivity. 
- This should be systematic over the years for multiannual 
funding and be supported by long-term TA teams with country 
knowledge and long-term deployments. 
- The M&E and TA should be concentrated on the subsector 
level (multi-projects), and cover context, risks and capacities. 

4.4 The EUD should be able to contract local bodies of expertise 
over multiple years to provide informed contextual analysis to 
enable programming to be fully aware of dynamics at the Country 
and State levels, as is being done with the CSRF. 
- The available staff and consultancy resources should be able to 
concentrate on fewer and more geographically defined priority 
portfolios as per Recommendation 3, which would receive more 
targeted support in the short term. 
- This would be designed to improve EUD capacity to implement 
MIP pillar-level area-based M&E. 

DG INTPA 

EUD Cooperation Section 
and IPs 

EUD Cooperation Section 

3.1.8. Specific recommendations for the Green Economy sector 

5.  Given the recent evolution in the international and national (geo)political landscape, achieving 

food security through enhanced local food production must be the paramount priority. 
Expanding cultivated area is identified as the most cost-effective and sustainable primary 
strategy to bolster household and community resilience in this regard (JC 6.1,. 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 
Conclusion 2). Building upon this overarching priority focused on local food production and expanded 
cultivation, the evaluation proposes the following recommendations 

Sub recommendation  

5.1 The EU should expand Cultivated Area for Food Security. 

Actively pursue further expansion of cultivated areas for food 
security as the cornerstone of enhancing household and 
community resilience. This necessitates: 
- Prioritising and scaling up support for animal traction through 
cost-sharing models for oxen and donkey ploughs in specific 
areas of the country. A coordinated donor effort at the country 
level is recommended to maximise the impact of this initiative 
and directly support increased cultivation. 
- Maintaining a comprehensive approach to food security that 
encompasses infrastructure development, improved water 

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EUD Cooperation Section 

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access, value chain development, enhanced agricultural 
productivity, income diversification, and gender inclusion, all 
geared towards supporting and sustaining the expansion of 
cultivated areas and local food production. 

5.2 The EU should enhance Support for Infrastructure as a Key 
Driver for Food Security. Recognise infrastructure as a 
fundamental enabler of both food security and expanded 
cultivation: 
- Sustain support for feeder road networks, with a prioritisation 
shift towards maintenance over new construction. This is 
particularly critical for ensuring robust and reliable supply chains 
for locally produced food. 
- Expand the availability of local storage facilities, specifically 
focusing on hermetically sealed and climate-resistant granaries 
to minimise post-harvest losses of locally produced food and 
enhance preservation for local consumption. 

5.3 The EU should demand higher standards for climate adaptation 
and land management integration in EU-funded interventions. 
Ensure the long-term resilience and sustainability of local food 
production and expanded cultivation efforts:  
- Integrate support for land tenure security and land planning 
initiatives to proactively prevent potential conflicts that could 
hinder agricultural expansion and local food production. 
- Mandate higher technical standards in EU-funded projects 
focused on flood-resistant crop varieties and flood mitigation 
infrastructure to safeguard local food production from increasing 
climate-related risks. 
- Expand and harmonise reforestation efforts across both EU and 
non-EU interventions, recognising the dual benefits of wood 
energy provision and sustainable forestry practices for 
environmental and economic resilience in support of long-term 
local food production. 
- Mainstream climate-smart agriculture practices, while 
simultaneously demanding adherence to elevated technical 
standards in areas such as agroforestry and soil management to 
maximise their effectiveness and impact on local food production 
systems. 

5.4 The EU should promote localised value chain development to 
reduce dependency and increase sustainability. Foster self-
sufficiency and long-term viability of local food production: 
- Prioritise the development of local value chains over initiatives 
focused on export-oriented crops. This shift aims to strengthen 
local economies and build robust local markets for increased 
local food production. 
- Expand access to financial services, specifically through 
VSLAs. However, the integration of financial inclusion with 
traditional banking sector savings should only be considered 
once currency stability is firmly established to mitigate potential 
risks and ensure the protection of beneficiaries' savings within 
the context of supporting local food production. 
- Secure both ends of supported local value chains, ensuring a 
strategic alignment between supply and demand to guarantee 
the viability and effectiveness of value chain interventions for 
locally produced food. 
- Simplify energy systems within EU-funded community facilities, 
prioritising low-technology and low-maintenance solutions to 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 63 

 
 
enhance long-term operational sustainability and reduce reliance 
on complex external expertise in support of local food processing 
and value addition. 

5.5 The EU should strengthen partnerships and quality assurance to 
prioritise food security and enhance its impact. Elevate local food 
security initiatives and address emerging challenges, particularly 
in the context of shifting international dynamics: 
- Advocate for large-scale coordination efforts to mitigate the 
impact of shifts in international partnerships and to further 
advance local food security agendas. Specific areas for 
coordinated action include animal traction and water access 
initiatives, both crucial for expanding local food production. 
- Promote local seed distribution by humanitarian donors to 
progressively reduce aid dependency and empower local 
communities in seed production and access, directly supporting 
the sustainability of local food production systems. 
- Ensure that the role of TA expands to encompass delegated 
interventions and pooled funding mechanisms within the sector. 
TA should focus on quality assurance, experience sharing, and 
harmonisation to enhance overall program effectiveness and 
coherence in supporting local food production initiatives. 

5.6 The EU should enhance sustainability of databases and 

monitoring systems for portfolio and sectoral oversight. Ensure 
robust programme management and informed decision-making 
for local food security initiatives: 
- Upgrade the EU Delegation's monitoring systems for the 
portfolio, emphasising the establishment of sustainable database 
management practices that extend beyond the duration of 
Technical Assistance contracts to ensure data continuity and 
long-term accessibility for tracking progress in local food 
production. 
- Support the transfer of sectoral food security monitoring 
responsibilities to South Sudanese institutions to build local 
capacity and ensure long-term ownership and sustainability of 
sector monitoring efforts related to local food production. 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

3.1.9. Specific recommendations for the Human Development sector 

6.  The EU should continue to support human development, in a way that becomes more catalytic 
for social services and local public administration (JC 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, Conclusions 2 and 4). 
There are ways of allocating resources which can circumvent predatory practices and create continued 
synergies with other donors. The meso-level of Ministries should receive greater support. 

Sub recommendation  

6.1 The EU should continue to support human development, 

focusing especially on education and health:  
- Make further development assistance to human development 
dependent on milestones. Ensure future human development 
investments are contingent on verifiable increases in social 
spending to permit creation of sustainable and quality national 
health and education services. 
-  Scale up the successful cash grants for girls, boys, youth and 

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disability affected children and youth. Given the resounding 
success of the cash grants scheme in the GESS programme, 
cash grants should be scaled up considerably to include children 
and youth currently unable to enrol in school due to inability to 
pay fees or other costs; and -as an equal priority- for youth 
wanting to attend TVET colleges. 
- Improve social protection mechanisms, targeting and 
programming. Pilot and roll out increased social safety nets 
(unconditional cash transfers) using the experience gained from 
EU, KfW, Oxfam programmes in South Sudan and Malawi. 
Support subnational (local government) structures to build 
capacity and resources to manage social protection schemes  

6.2 Scale up the successful cash grants for girls, boys, youth and 

disability affected children and youth.  
- Given the resounding success of the cash grants scheme in the 
GESS programme, cash grants should be scaled up 
considerably to include children and youth currently unable to 
enrol in school due to inability to pay fees or other costs; and -as 
an equal priority- for youth wanting to attend TVET colleges. 

6.3 Improve social protection mechanisms, targeting and 

programming.  
- Pilot and roll out increased social safety nets (unconditional 
cash transfers) using the experience gained from EU, KfW, 
Oxfam programmes in South Sudan and Malawi. Support 
subnational (local government) structures to build capacity and 
resources to manage social protection schemes 

6.4 Scale up the successful cash grants for girls, boys, youth and 

disability affected children and youths.  
- Given the resounding success of the cash grants scheme in the 
GESS programme, cash grants should be scaled up 
considerably to include children and youth currently unable to 
enrol in school due to inability to pay fees or other costs; and – 
as an equal priority – for youth anting to attend TVET colleges. 

6.5 Improve social protection mechanisms, targeting and 

programming: 
- Pilot and roll out increased social safety nets (unconditional 
cash transfers) using the experience gained from EU, KfW, 
Oxfam programmes in South Sudan and Malawi. Support 
subnational (local government) structures to build capacity and 
resources to manage social protection schemes 

6.6 Reinforce earlier promising PFM reforms and technical 

assistance: 
- Prioritise the introduction of tangible and operational PFM 
systems in the social and justice sectors (continuing to support 
recently begun World Bank-implemented PFM reforms that could 
build on the former EU supported TA interventions in PFM in five 
states). 

6.7 Support the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare 

(MGCSW) to build a decentralised capacity: 
- Reinforce decentralised offices of MGCSW (responsible for 
promoting gender equality, women’s empowerment, child 
protection and welfare, social protection and welfare, and human 
rights) to complement current donor funded humanitarian 

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EUD Cooperation Section 

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EUD Cooperation Section 

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Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 65 

 
 
protection interventions to take ownership of them for 
sustainability. 

3.1.10. Specific recommendations for the rule of law and human rights sector 

7. 

In view of the adverse conditions that prevail for the most vulnerable and remote populations, 
the rule of law and policing roles of the state should receive enhanced support. This should be 
done in the frame of local structures and in synergy with community efforts, with a stronger gender and 
age sensitivity emphasis (JC 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 9.1. Conclusions 3 and 4). 

Sub recommendation  

7.1 The EU should continue engaging with the GoSS on human 

rights and supporting expert agencies such as UNMISS, UNHCR 
and OHCHR in police training on human rights principles. 
- Continued support of community policing initiatives at the 
lowest appropriate urban and rural levels to reduce conflict and 
increase peace in urban and rural centres. 

7.2 The EU should continue supporting interventions for constitution-
making, legal harmonisation and judicial reform in South Sudan. 
- Additional support at the decentralised levels of the country are 
required to support the judiciary implement the judicial reform 
agenda and to comply with the judiciary’s mandate to deliver 
accessible justice to women and men in the community. Judges 
and justices at all levels and the Judicial Service Commission will 
require future support especially at community levels where 
accommodation for judges and electricity and water is lacking, 
constituting obstacles to conducting court sessions. 

7.3 Continue supporting interventions for strengthening ROL. 

- Build on the former Max Planck Foundation-implemented 
achievements in ROL-strengthening by supporting decentralised 
(state and county) levels of the judiciary and the courts, in 
coordination and with ownership by the MOJCA, and other 
justice sector stakeholders (the bar association, lawyers and 
academia). 

7.4 The EU should support agencies in civil society and improving 

ROL, access to justice and gender equality. 
- Continue to prioritise initiatives in police training, increasing 
numbers of trained women police officers, and creation of 
community police stations; improving the human rights and 
conditions of the incarcerated population; increasing and 
expanding training of the judiciary and supporting community 
justice initiatives already supported by EU financed partners 
(primarily UN agencies and some NGOs). 

7.5 The EU would benefit from increasing support for CSOs 

experienced in human rights and women’s rights. 
- In conjunction with interventions to improve prison conditions, 
recruit and train women prison wardens, train prison warders, 
and professionalise the prison services, and increase initiatives 
such as the EU-FAO one funding a prison farm for good nutrition 
and therapy and job training for incarcerated people. 

Responsible Entity 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

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7.6 Increase support to improving the policy capacity. 

- To be prioritised in criminal investigation, maintaining criminal 
records, creating a reliable database on crimes, and supporting 
creation of a country-wide criminal justice system database. 

7.7 Supporting the planning and financing of juvenile justice courts, 

- Currently only one juvenile justice court exists in the country. 
Several are urgently required to deal with youth in conflict and to 
separate them from adult prison populations where they are at 
greater risk of criminalisation and abuse. 

7.8 The EU should continue supporting prison reform. 

- Interventions to permit incarcerated females to be separate 
from male prisoners, and to permit juveniles and children to be 
held in child-centred remand centres, not in the national prison 
system. 

7.9 Support efforts to establish a family code. 

- Support the parliamentary members and CSOs and lawyers 
attempting to introduce a bill for a family code in Parliament. 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

EUD Cooperation Section 

3.2. Lessons identified  

3.2.1. Areas where practices supported outcomes 

1.  Flexibility and Adaptability 

The EU's ability to adapt programming to South Sudan’s volatile context, such as through the triple 
nexus approach, was critical for maintaining relevance. Regular adjustments to priorities ensured 
responsiveness to emerging needs. 

The triple nexus has provided a broad umbrella for the formulation of interventions that combine 
emergency assistance, peace efforts and recovery activities. For these to expand there is a need for 
donor support. At the same time it is much more relevant to achieve that in the frame of a clear 
contextual analysis, taking into account societal composition. A project that is locally managed and 
uses participatory methods will be able to involve a greater number of local stakeholders in a more 
meaningful way, including local officials, community-based organisations and civil society 
organisations, and communities. The multi-sectoral approach is well-suited to enable triple nexus 
collaboration, as aid actors from different sectors develop and act on shared goals that are continued 
over time. 

2. 

Integrated Approaches to Resilience 
Combining sectoral strategies, such as linking infrastructure with agricultural productivity, amplified 
impacts. This demonstrates the value of integrated approaches in fragile settings. 

Resilience is not an end objective but is widely mentioned in South Sudan across IP and EU 
reporting. It is described as a means to achieving and sustaining wellbeing outcomes in the face of 
shocks and stressors. Resilience is scale-independent, meaning it can be observed at several levels 
simultaneously, and that resilience at one level (for example the state) is not necessarily related to 
resilience at another (for example community or systems level). This means that influencing and 
measuring resilience at multiple scales within the same context may show different results. This 
requires that donors consider the concept simultaneously at multiple levels of thinking. 

3.  Coordination and Partnerships 

Active participation in donor coordination mechanisms, such as pooled funds and joint programming, 
enhanced coherence and avoided duplication of efforts. 

The highest quality reporting was obtained using common monitoring for pooled funding and trust 
funds, both because of the level of scale achieved, and the possibility for implementers to use a single 
reporting format. The same is true about initiatives to improve agricultural production, expand access 
to finance, and develop essential community infrastructure, such as storage facilities, water access 
points, and local markets. This integrated approach in designing green economy interventions has 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 67 

 
 
 
been consistently implemented over the years, which maximised the impact of EU investments by 
establishing a cohesive framework for economic development 

4.  Focus on Localised Solutions 

Interventions like area-based programming showed success in aligning with local contexts and 
addressing community-specific needs. 

The EUD aimed to decentralise policymaking and oversight within its programmes, to be implemented 
by IPs. When this decentralisation was accompanied by training and support to those actors with new 
responsibilities, including in particular contextual training for staff who are new, this increased 
transparency, accountability, diversity, effectiveness. The case studies show that where these 
responsibilities are clear and unified, they can be championed by field staff, which contributes to the 
enrichment of policies that strive to marry the principles with the complex realities on the ground. 

3.2.2. Areas where additional attention is required 

8.  Staffing and Institutional Memory 

High turnover at the EU Delegation and insufficient onboarding processes resulted in knowledge gaps 
and operational inefficiencies. This underlines the need for robust knowledge management systems. 

The focus on minimising operating costs is hard to enforce due to the way in which agencies disguise 
staffing expenditure in multiple ways. For the EU this has translated into a difficulty to find personnel 
for positions, frequent rotations away from the offices of the EUD, and in particular the loss of 
documentation due to staff turnover and lack of historical filing systems. This translates into reduced 
funding for organisations’ ability to conduct quality programming by reducing funds for programme 
oversight, learning, analysis, or engagement with populations. These functions require staff, time, and 
flexibility, and are critical to understanding where aid may be causing unintended harm. These 
capacities also enable meaningful relationships with IPs, and with communities, the ability to develop 
creative options for doing things differently, and the preservation of lessons and institutional memory 
for the following years. The EUD has had to effectively ‘outsource’ these responsibilities to local 
actors, which can be problematic in areas where poor governance and accountability means that aid 
is often captured for political or even conflict purposes 

9.  Coordination Gaps in Triple Nexus Implementation 

Misalignment between humanitarian and development programming cycles created challenges in 
operationalising the triple nexus effectively and could be overcome through Area Based Management 
– which is insufficiently developed. 

The pursuit of a positive contribution to peace was implemented through a wide number of separate 
projects, modalities and partners. These ranged from support to refugee returns and rehabilitation, 
through helping communities to adopt and promote conflict management and mitigation practices to 
minimise conflict incidents, to monitoring ceasefires, and engaging in the highest levels of political 
dialogue. Humanitarian programmes sought to contribute to peace (such as WFP work on social 
cohesion) but did not share a common analysis of needs or entry points while operating in the same 
areas. Furthermore, decisions were separated between those of the Political and Development 
Sections of the EUD. Addressing conflict across many levels did not lead to a wider scope or longer 
timespan. An EU evaluation concluded that coordination between EUD funded interventions in 
peacebuilding and other EU MS and non-EU development partners working in peace building lacked 
effective coordination mechanisms and opportunities for sharing lessons217. This evaluation and 
others point to the positive impact of area-based programming which does not oblige adjustments on 
the part of agencies that prefer a more sectoral and vertical form of programme, but helps overcome 
the structural challenges to the HDP triple nexus. 

10. Difficult Strategic Engagement with Governance 

Inadequate engagement with state governance structures weakened the institutional impact of EU 
interventions. 

The sub national government levels are key for several reasons, of which the most important are 
located around the logistical challenges of working from the central to the state levels in South Sudan 
and the governance and corruption problems that characterise the central and state government 

217 ‘Impact assessment of EU funded actions contributing to sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan’ Liz Marsh, Altair, 2021. See 
also ‘Successes and Shortfalls of EU CFSP Missions – South Sudan’. Gitte Hojstrup Christensen, Royal Danish Military College, 2017. 

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023: Page 68 

 
 
 
 
administrations. Endemic corruption and politicisation of the administration of funds at the state levels 
in South Sudan are highlighted by World Bank and IMF in recent assessments of South Sudan as the 
major challenge to development. Evaluation examples illustrate the obstructions to change. A high-
profile anti money laundering intervention supported by the EUTF (ongoing in a new phase) is 
struggling. This five-year TA programme aims to improve PFM in South Sudan focusing on six states 
and six state ministries in health, WASH, and education, and their country level financial 
administration departments. The anti-money laundering intervention, despite initial challenges and 
lack of staff and physical office space and computer equipment, successfully trained government 
personnel to introduce financial surveillance best practices to provide intelligence for possible 
prosecution of financial wrongdoing in government structures. However, once trained, staff were 
transferred to another post

Evaluation of EU cooperation with South Sudan, 2011-2023 Page 69 

 
 
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