COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports
Date: 2025-05-12
Institutions: Directorate-General for Energy, European Commission
Subjects: EU action, EU energy policy, Russia, energy diversification, energy efficiency, import (EU), import restriction, renewable energy, security of supply, self-sufficiency in energy

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 12.5.2025  COM(2025) 440 final/2  CORRIGENDUM This document corrects COM(2025) 440 final of 06.05.2025. Concerns English version only. Formatting adjustments  The text shall read as follows:  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 

In  response  to  Russia’s  aggression  against  Ukraine  in  February  2022  and  in  line  with  the 
Versailles  Declaration  of  Heads  of  State  and  Government,  the  Commission  launched  the 
REPowerEU Plan1 in May 2022. The plan called for ending Europe’s dependency on Russian 
energy by enhancing energy efficiency and accelerating the deployment of renewable energy 
and  diversifying  supplies.  Since  then,  additional  renewable  energy  deployment  and  energy 
savings have enabled a reduction of more than 60 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually in gas 
imports between 2022 and 20242, which contributes to moving away from Russian gas. 

Despite these efforts, in 2024, the EU still imported 52 bcm of Russian gas (32 bcm via pipeline 
and 20 bcm via liquified natural gas (LNG) or around 19% of total EU gas imports), as well as 
13 million tonnes (MMt) of crude oil and more than 2800 tonnes of uranium3 in enriched or 
fuel  form.  Ten  Member  States  imported  Russian  gas  in  2024,  three  Member  States4  still 
imported Russian oil and seven Member States imported enriched uranium or uranium services 
from Russia. 

The dependency on Russian energy imports leads to serious security and economic risks for 
the Union and its Member States, as Russia has continuously used existing energy supply as a 
weapon to threaten the stability and prosperity of the Union.  

This Roadmap outlines the EU’s strategy to phase out remaining Russian energy imports. It 
also sets out a common vision of Europe working together in solidarity to ensure alternative 
and affordable energy supplies for all Member States, while undertaking joint action to reduce 
Russian  revenues,  which  fuel  its  war  machine  and  endangers  stability  of  the  continent5. 
Reducing  dependency  on  fossil  fuels  will  further  strengthen  EU  energy  security  and 
sovereignty in line with EU climate neutrality objective.  

The Roadmap is embedded in our strategy to boost the EU’s competitiveness, resilience and 
accelerate the clean energy transition. With the adoption of the Competitiveness Compass on 
29 January 2025 the Commission set out a comprehensive and ambitious pathway to regain 
Europe's industrial edge. The Clean Industrial Deal, the Action Plan for Affordable Energy and 
Preparedness Union Strategy further reinforce this commitment. These initiatives recognise the 
negative 
imports  on  European  economic  security  and 
competitiveness. 

impact  of  Russian  energy 

1 COM(2022) 230 final  
2 Eurostat natural gas statistics. Europe imported 273 bcm in 2024, compared to 334 bcm in 2022. 
3 Natural uranium equivalent contained in the imported products. 
4 Since April 2025 Czechia does not import Russian oil. 
5 In 2024, the EU paid for Russian energy a total of EUR 23 billion, including EUR 1 billion on nuclear fuels. 
Source: COMEX. 

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When combined with accelerated renewables deployment6, including renewable gases, further 
electrification, energy efficiency and alternative supplies, the phasing out of Russian fuels will 
contribute to  the objectives of the Clean Industrial Deal  and the Action Plan for Affordable 
Energy. This Roadmap is without prejudice to possible future EU sanctions. 

Actions undertaken to reduce dependency from Russian energy 

The  EU  has  already  significantly  reduced  dependencies  and  energy  imports  from  Russia, 
thanks  to  16 sanction  packages7.  Sanctions  have  effectively  banned  Russian  coal  and  oil 
imports  to  the  EU  and  prohibited  the  reloading  of  cargoes  in  EU  ports  carrying  LNG  from 
Russia. Particular attention should be brought to the issue of circumventing the EU oil sanctions 
by using “shadow fleets”. 

The implementation of the REPowerEU Plan has also significantly contributed to reducing gas 
demand8.  The  full  implementation  of  the  energy  transition  and  the  recent Action  Plan  for 
Affordable  Energy  are  expected  to  replace  up  to  100  bcm  of  natural  gas  by  2030.  This 
corresponds to saving the EU more than 15 bcm of gas per year, or a further reduction in gas 
demand by 40-50 bcm by 20279, which will also facilitate the phase out of Russian gas imports. 

As  a  result  of  coordinated  action  between  the  Commission  and  Member  States,  and  the 
enhanced  EU  energy  diplomacy  with  international  partners,  gas  imports  (both  LNG  and 
pipeline) from Russia have decreased from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024. These imports have 
been replaced by supplies from more reliable sources, domestically produced energy and were 
possible through reduced consumption. Projections point to a further fall to 13% in 2025 with 
the end of the Ukraine transit. The share of Russian oil imports has also shrunk from 27% at 
the beginning of 2022 to 3% now. Despite significant progress, Russian gas, oil, and nuclear 
supplies  remain  part  of  the  EU’s  energy  mix,  posing  risks  to  our  economic  security  and 
allowing financial support to Russian war economy. 

Building  on the recent  achievement of the Baltic  States' synchronisation and the end of the 
Ukraine gas transit agreement, this Roadmap aims to further advance on the EU's independence 
from  Russian  energy  by  phasing  out  imports  of  gas,  nuclear,  and  oil  to  reduce  risks  of 
weaponisation of energy supplies and prevent income to Russia’s budget from the EU.  

6 Share of energy from renewable sources in the EU gross final consumption of energy target of at least 42.5% by 
2030 but aiming at 45%. 
7 16th sanction package adopted on 24 February, which includes a ban to temporary storage of Russian oil and 
targets the shadow fleet. EU adopts 16th sanctions package against Russia. Russian natural gas is not included in 
the sanctions packages; see also Timeline - EU sanctions against Russia - Consilium. 
8 18% between August 2022 and January 2025. 
9 Estimates based on the Commission's long-term CETO projections, adjusted for the recent developments in gas 
demand. The projections reflect the information and expectations currently available and as such they are subject 
to uncertainties related to unforeseeable developments of, for example, energy prices, geopolitical situation and 
technological advancements in clean technologies.  

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Commission and Member States worked closely together to ensure that security of supply 
would  not  be  affected  by  the  end  of  the  Russian  gas  transit  through  Ukraine  in  December 
202410. Although  the  impact  has  varied  in  different  regions,  overall  security  of  supply  and 
prices  were  not  affected  significantly  EU  wide.  This  shows  that  coordinated  EU-wide 
preparatory  actions,  diversification  efforts  and  a  gradual  approach  in  phasing  out  Russian 
imports are essential to preserve price stability, market predictability and security of supply in 
the EU.  

Actions presented in this Roadmap should be implemented at EU level and in a coordinated 
manner, so they minimise the impact on energy prices, stabilise energy markets through secure 
and predictable alternative supplies and strive to provide legal certainty. 

2. NEED FOR ACTION 

2.1 Dependencies on Russian gas imports 

Russia has repeatedly threatened the EU’s security of supply by unilaterally cutting gas flows 
to its European customers in 2006, 2009, 2014 and more recently in 2022 after its aggression 
against Ukraine, as well as in the run-up to the invasion. Phasing out Russian gas imports is 
therefore critical to bolster the EU’s energy security against weaponisation of energy imports. 
It would also reduce Russia’s revenues used to finance the unjustified war against Ukraine and 
to continue its military build-up.  

Between 2021 and 2023, the EU reduced Russian gas imports by over 70%, from 150 bcm to 
43 bcm. In 2024 this downward trend stopped and imports from Russia increased. LNG imports 
grew by 12% compared to 2023, from 18 bcm to 20 bcm and pipeline by 26% from 25 bcm to 
32 bcm. 

Several Member States have taken early actions to reduce or even ban Russian gas imports, 
including by terminating existing contracts with Russian gas suppliers11. However, even after 
the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine in 2025, Russian gas still represents around 13% 
of  the  EU’s  overall  gas  imports.  Currently,  around  two  thirds  of  Russian  gas  imports  are 
supplied based on long-term contracts, with EU destination, while around one third is provided 
on  spot  (short-term)  basis.  Remaining  volumes  are  not  expected  to  be  eliminated  without 
further European action given the absence of commercial incentives and  ongoing long-term 
contracts. 

10 Transit agreement between Naftogaz and Gazprom. 
11 Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Poland, Croatia, Malta, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Austria and Czechia have prohibited or stopped gas supplies from Russia. Some Member States could, however, 
be indirectly supplied with gas of Russian origin through wholesale market purchases.  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action  at  EU  level  is  needed  to  phase  out  those  gas  supplies  and  at  the  same  time  ensure 
alternative supplies from international partners via LNG or pipeline gas, without creating new 
dependencies. In this context it will be important that infrastructure capacity booked on a long-
term basis for Russian imports is made available to imports of gas from alternative sources. 
The EU has already significantly supported diversification efforts with EUR 184.7 billion to 
energy-related initiatives under  the  national  Recovery and Resilience Plans and Connecting 
Europe  Facility-Energy  (CEF)  with  EUR  5.84  billion  (2021-2027)  financing  cross-border 
infrastructure and EUR 55 billion with budget from EU cohesion policy12. 

Despite advancing the energy transition, gas will remain part of the EU’s energy mix for the 
coming decades13. To ensure stable supplies, measures aimed at phasing out Russian gas should 
be  accompanied  by  efforts  to  diversify  the  EU’s  supply  portfolio.  This  could  be  achieved 
through  joint  actions  including  demand  aggregation  at  the  EU  level  and  by  engaging  in 
competitively  priced14  long-term  supply  arrangements  with  alternative  suppliers,  where 
appropriate.  The  upcoming  New  Pact  for  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Trans-Mediterranean 
Energy  Initiative  in  particular  will  provide  concrete  opportunities  to  further  strengthen 
diversification of energy supplies. 

Diversification  efforts  should  not  be  compromised  by  arrangements  involving  swaps,  i.e. 
purchases  of  de  facto  Russian  gas  from  third  parties.  These  practices  would  contradict  the 
objectives of REPowerEU, as they would maintain the revenue flows to Russia and keep the 
EU’s vulnerability to price manipulation. 

12  The  Cohesion  policy  mid-term  review  proposal  will  broaden  the  possibilities  to  invest  in  energy  transition, 
COM(2025) 123 final. 
13 See projections Europe’s 2040 climate target SWD (2024) 63 final. By 2040, fossil fuel supply for energy use 
will decrease by more than 70% compared to today. More than half of all fossil fuels used in the EU in 2050 are 
used in the non-energy sector as feedstock for chemical processes (plastic, fertilisers, etc.). The phase out of fossil 
natural gas imports from Russia accelerates the transition trajectory. The consumption of natural gas, biomethane 
and biogas is estimated to approximately 105 – 155 Mtoe by 2040 (4.5 – 6.5 EJ). In 2050, the consumption of 
those gaseous fuels in the EU is still between 70 and 80 Mtoe for all scenarios (3.0 – 3.5 EJ). 
14 For example: European or international hub prices, indices and benchmarks (TTF, Henri Hub, etc). 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Dependencies on Russia in the nuclear sector 

In  contrast  to  dependencies  in  the  gas  sector,  dependencies  in  the  nuclear  sector  are  multi-
facetted. Russia supplies products and services to EU customers across the whole nuclear fuel 
cycle. The dependency is most significant in the five Member States with Russian-designed 
reactors15, also known as VVER, reliant traditionally on fuel from a Russian supplier. Likewise, 
other Member States have been relying on Russia for nuclear materials, spare parts or nuclear 
fuel cycle services. Russia also holds a strong position in the supply of certain radioisotopes 
for medical procedures. 

2.2.1 Replacing Russian nuclear fuels with alternative suppliers in five Member 
States with Russian-designed nuclear reactors 

Progress has been made in replacing Russian nuclear fuel with fuel from other producers in the 
five Member States with Russian-designed VVER reactors. Utilities in four out of five Member 
States concerned have since 2022 signed supply contracts for alternative fuel. Still, alternative 
fuel needs to be tested and licensed in each Member State before it can replace Russian fuel. 
In 2024, first test fuel assemblies were loaded in reactors in Bulgaria and Finland. The EU is 
also financially supporting the development of alternative fuels through its SAVE and APIS 
projects16. A security of supply risks may arise in the short to medium term in the case of sudden 
policy changes.  

The development of alternative nuclear fuels for VVER reactors and their licensing need to be 
accelerated  and  contracting  with  alternative  suppliers  should  progress  quickly  towards  a 
complete replacement of Russian supplies. Important lessons can be drawn from the experience 
in Ukraine where progress is also being made in using non-Russian alternative fuels including 
their experience with nuclear safety related licencing and fuel testing. 

2.2.2 Diversifying supplies and building alternative capacity in nuclear fuel cycle 
for all Member States with nuclear installations 

While more than 14% of uranium was sourced in the EU from Russia in 2024, the global market 
in natural and processed uranium is rather diversified17. A major hurdle is the concentration of 
uranium conversion and enrichment services – needed to transform processed uranium into the 
material for nuclear fuel manufacturing – in a limited number of companies. Those located in 
the EU or other Western countries are currently not able to meet overall demand due to limited 
capacity of conversion and enrichment plants in operation.  In 2024, around 23% of the whole 

15 Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Hungary and Slovakia. 
16 The  EU  is  financially  supporting  the  development  of  alternative  fuels  for VVER  reactors  by Westinghouse 
(APIS project) and Framatome (SAVE project) with grants amounting to 10 Mio EUR for each project (total of 
20 Mio EUR) via the Euratom Research and Training Programme. 
17 While more than 85% of uranium is produced in six countries (Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia, Namibia, Niger, 
and Russia), uranium mines currently operate  in many countries and unmined deposits exist also in some EU 
Member States. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU  demand  for  uranium  conversion  services  was  satisfied  from  Russia  and  in  uranium 
enrichment services Russia covered almost 24% of EU needs18. 

While  European  enrichment  companies  have  announced  plans  to  extend  their  current 
enrichment capacity, the first new enrichment installation is not expected earlier than 2027. 
Moreover, the global uranium conversion industry is facing obstacles in ramping up production 
due to technological complexity and market uncertainties, and new conversion capacities are 
currently announced only for early 2030s. The EU’s nuclear sector also continues to rely on 
Russia  for  some  spare  parts  and  maintenance  services.  Continued  international  cooperation 
such as that in the G7 context is essential for ensuring sufficient enrichment and conversion 
capacity as well as spare parts and services in the years to come.  The Commission’s review of 
the approach to enriched uranium supplies will also support strengthening security of supply 
and openness to reliable suppliers. 

Finally,  there  is  significant  dependence  on  Russia  for  certain  stable  radioisotopes  used  to 
produce  medical  radioisotopes  for  cancer  treatment  and  the  EU  needs  to  increase  efforts  to 
develop EU production of such medical radioisotopes for the benefit of all Member States. In 
particular, it will be important to strengthen the radioisotopes supply chain by securing access 
to  source  materials,  enhance  the  industrial-scale  production  of  radioisotopes,  and  support 
research and innovation into novel nuclear medicine therapies.  

2.3 Dependencies on Russia in the oil sector 

In  2022,  Russian  crude  oil  accounted  for  27%  of  EU  crude  oil  imports  while  now  it  only 
accounts for 3%. This is a direct consequence of the introduction and effective enforcement of 
EU sanctions, which banned Russian seaborne imports of crude oil from December 2022 and 
refined petroleum products from February 2023. 

Nevertheless,  Russian  pipeline oil accounted for an important  share of the  total imports for 
Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary at the end of 2024, which currently have temporary exemptions 
from the EU sanctions regime.  

With the completion of the TAL-PLUS project in April 2025, Czechia is now able to replace 
its Russian oil supplies with alternative sources. For Slovakia and Hungary on the other hand, 
Russian oil represents over 80% of their total oil imports19. This high dependency can pose a 
risk for their security of supply. The Commission continues supporting these Member States to 
progressively replace Russian oil and ensure alternative suppliers through the Adria pipeline. 

Russia  has  relied  on  a  shadow  fleet  of  tankers  to  maintain  its  oil  exports  and  circumvent 
sanctions. These vessels are often old, in bad shape, with obscure ownership and insurance. 

18 Market shares based on 2024 provisional data. 
19 According to COMEXT information from 2024 and 2023. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
They therefore present a tangible risk for the environment due to the risk of oil spills and other 
ship source pollution, which can cause environmental disasters. The EU has sanctioned specific 
ships, carried out extensive diplomatic outreach to flag and port states, and reinforced maritime 
safety obligations, in particular, through joint action by the Nordic-Baltic 8++ countries20.  

Further work and actions would be necessary to disrupt and deter Russia’s shadow fleet while 
enhancing  environmental  protection,  maritime  safety  and  security,  and  reduce  funding  for 
Russia’s war economy.  

3. ACTIONS TO PHASE OUT ENERGY IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA  

3.1 Pipeline gas and LNG 

Action 1: Transparency, monitoring and traceability 

Transparency,  monitoring  and  traceability  are  the  necessary  starting  point  for  action  to 
effectively phase out Russian gas and to ensure enforcement. Existing EU legislation already 
contributed to more transparency and traceability of gas imports to the EU, but the information 
is not granular enough: 

•  EU  rules21  require  Member  States  to  report  certain  gas  contract  details  to  the 
Commission,  such  as  long-term  contracts  covering  gas  of  Russian  origin. These  are 
shared  per  Member  State  without  disclosing  the  identity  of  the  counterparts  of 
individual contracts. Whole contracts can only be requested in specific circumstances. 

• 

In line with EU legislation22, some information on imported gas is communicated to 
customs authorities when entering the Union Customs Territory. However, there is no 
obligation to report to national authorities responsible for energy policy. 

While some Member States have national rules regarding traceability of Russian gas in place23, 
there is no coherent EU framework on transparency, monitoring and traceability of Russian gas 
imports to the EU. 

Therefore, the Commission will propose measures necessary for more effective monitoring and 
traceability.  One  measure  would  require  companies  to  provide  information  on  Russian  gas 
contracts  (e.g.  volumes,  duration)  to  Member  States’  relevant  authorities  and  to  the 
Commission. Another action would ensure that information on actual imports of Russian gas 
is shared among customs, national energy and security authorities, and the Commission. 

20 The Nordic-Baltic 8 ++ countries include Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
21 Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. 
22 Union Customs Code 
23 E.g. in Spain, www.enagas.es  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These measures would give governments and the Commission access to relevant information 
on  Russian  gas  entering  their  energy  systems,  allowing  the  implementation  of  EU-wide 
targeted  and  effective  measures  and  prepare  alternative  supplies.  With  this  information  the 
Commission  would  also  be  better  equipped  to  coordinate  EU-wide  actions  for  a  phase  out 
across the European Union and prepare for alternative supplies. 

To achieve this, the Commission intends to present by next month a legislative proposal on 
rules for increased transparency, monitoring and traceability of Russian gas. With a view to 
enhance  security  of  supply  and  preparedness,  the  Commission  aims  to  include  similar 
transparency requirements, for all gas imports to the EU in the future revision of the energy 
security architecture in 2026. 

Action 2: National plans to support EU action to phase out Russian gas  

A well prepared, orderly and secure phase out of Russian gas in the EU minimises the impact 
on  prices,  markets  and  security  of  supply.  The  Commission  intends  to  propose  legislation 
requiring Member States to plan and monitor the EU-wide phase out of Russian gas24. 

National plans should, inter alia, lay out: 

• 

the volume of Russian gas imports under existing contracts, including for contracts with 
take-or-pay clauses25; 

•  a timeline, including milestones supporting EU measures to achieve the objective of 

phasing out Russian gas; 

•  diversification  options  and  technical  capabilities  to  replace  Russian  gas,  including 

through cooperation in existing regional groups.  

The  Commission  will  support  Member  States  in  the  preparation  of  the  plans,  through 
established  working  and  coordination  groups,  such  as  the  Gas  Coordination  Group,  or  a 
dedicated subgroup as well as regional groups. 

The Commission intends to present a legislative proposal next month on national plans for the 
phase  out  of  Russian  gas,  and  recommends  that  Member  States  already  submit  their  first 
national plans by the end of 2025 to allow for a secure, coordinated and well-prepared phase 
out. 

24 See for the proposed rules on the phase out under Action 3 below. 
25 A take-or-pay contract is a type of agreement commonly used in the energy industry, particularly in gas sales. 
This contract stipulates that the buyer must either take delivery of a specified amount of gas or pay a predetermined 
penalty if they do not take the delivery. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action 3: Stepwise prohibition of Russian gas imports 

Building on joint European preparations, the assessment of the impact of the measures carried 
out by the Commission since the Versailles Declaration, including effects on gas security of 
supply,  market,  prices  and  legal  aspects  (including  contracts),  the  Commission  intends  to 
propose legal measures for the effective phase out of gas imports from Russia. 

Provided  the  phase  out  is  gradual  and  alternative  supplies  are  ensured,  the  prohibition  of 
Russian gas imports is expected to have a limited impact on prices and on security of supply in 
Member States for the following reasons: 

•  The implementation of EU energy targets and supportive regulatory frameworks26 will 
accelerate the deployment of renewable energy and energy efficiency across the EU. It 
is estimated that the EU can save more than 15 bcm of gas per year, reducing the EU 
overall gas demand by 40-50 bcm by 2027. 

•  Additional  global  LNG supply  is  expected  to  become  available  in  the  coming  years 
improving  the  global  market  balance,  according  to  the  International  Energy Agency 
(IEA)27. While global LNG markets will remain tight in 2025, new LNG capacities of 
85-90  bcm  are  forecast  for  end  2026,  in  particular  from  the  US,  Canada,  Qatar  and 
African  countries. This  is  expected  to  outweigh  the  projected  increase  in  the  global 
demand. By 2030, global LNG export capacity is set to grow by about 250 bcm, an 
increase of almost 50% compared to the existing LNG supply.  

•  Member States are well equipped to receive LNG supplies from global partners due to 
coordinated efforts and investments at the onset of the energy crisis. Between 2022 and 
2024  a  record  of  twelve  new  LNG  terminals  and  six  expansion  projects  were 
commissioned, adding 70 bcm of LNG import capacity to the EU. These include LNG 
terminals  in Alexandroupolis  (Greece),  Ravenna  (Italy),  Krk  (Croatia),  Swinoujscie 
(Poland) and Wilhelmshaven 2, Mukran, Stade and Lubmin (Germany). As a result, the 
EU’s total LNG import capacity amounts to approximately 250 bcm per year, more than 
twice the current LNG imports. 

•  More gas volumes will also become available in the coming years in Central and South-
East Europe, a region traditionally dependent on Russian pipeline supplies. As of 2027 
the Neptun Deep offshore gas field in Romania is expected to produce 8 bcm of natural 
gas per year in the first 10 years of its operation. From 2026, the capacity of the Trans 
Adriatic Pipeline  will be expanded  by 1.2 bcm  allowing increased gas  imports from 
Azerbaijan.  

26  Including  the  existing  Renewable  Energy  Directive,  the  Hydrogen  and  Decarbonised  Gas  Market  package, 
Energy Efficiency Directive, Electricity Market Design, Grids Action Plan, the Action Plan for Affordable Energy 
and the planned Electrification Action Plan. 
27 Source: World Energy Outlook 2024 (IEA) and gas-market-report-q1-2025 (IEA). 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•  The  gas  infrastructure  in  the  EU  is  sufficiently  flexible,  with  alternative  routes  and 
cross-border  interconnection  points  enabling  all  Member  States  to  access  LNG  and 
pipeline imports from non-Russian sources. Since 2022, Member States have developed 
key infrastructure, and additional ones will be finalised by the end of 2028. 

Around two thirds of the Russian LNG and pipeline gas imports are based on existing long-
term contracts with EU destination. The remaining volumes are supplied on short-term (spot) 
basis,  with  importers  deciding  on  purchases  based  on  their  needs  and  prevailing  market 
conditions. With longer contract duration and higher volumes in the existing long-term contacts 
than the volumes typically purchased in spot supply contracts, it is appropriate to organise the 
phase out of Russian gas imports in two steps, starting immediately with all new contracts and 
existing spot (short-term) contracts.  

A phased approach to eliminating Russian gas imports would allow markets to better adjust 
and minimise market impact and potential implications for security of supply. 

The  Commission  will  ensure  that  the  measures  to  eliminate  Russian  gas  imports  will  be 
designed  in  a  manner  that  minimises  economic  impact  on  market  actors  and  is  in  full 
compliance with EU law and obligations under international law. 

a.  Prohibition of imports under new contracts and existing spot contracts on Russian 

gas  

Since spot contracts concern a less significant part of the overall Russian volumes and involve 
short-term  deliveries, phasing  out  the corresponding  volumes is  possible within a  relatively 
shorter timeframe. The Commission intends to present a legal proposal next month to ban all 
imports under new Russian gas contracts and existing spot contracts. Such prohibition should 
take effect by the end of 2025 at the latest.  

b.  Prohibition of imports of Russian gas under existing long-term contracts 

The  Commission  intends  to  propose  next  month  measures  to  ban  the  remaining  imports  of 
Russian  gas,  both  pipeline  and  LNG,  i.e.  the  volumes  imported  under  existing  long-term 
contracts. The necessary phase out of these imports requires a longer transition time due to the 
larger volumes for affected importers. Such prohibition should take effect no later than the end 
of 2027. 

The Commission will involve concerned Member States and ensure that the proposal will be 
based on an adequate assessment of legal and economic impacts. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Impact of phase out of Russian gas  

Since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  the  EU  has  been  increasingly  reliant  on  LNG,  which  played  a 
fundamental role in replacing Russian gas imports and currently accounts for about 40% of the EU 
imports. As a result, the EU gas prices are now more exposed to the dynamics of LNG markets which 
are global in scope.  

As  of  2025,  the  LNG  global  supply  is  set  to  grow  at  increasingly  high  pace,  with  25-30  bcm  of 
additional capacity in 2025, around 60 bcm in 2026, around 80 bcm in 2027, and around 40 bcm in 
2028.This will increase the total LNG capacity by about 200 bcm by 2028, five times more than the 
EU imports of Russian gas (IEA (January 2025) “Gas Market Report, Q1-2025). According to the IEA 
(IEA (October 2024) ‘World Energy Outlook 2024’), this will determine a surplus of at least 130 bcm 
of LNG by 2030 (see graph below) and this is set to ‘depress international gas prices’. 

Source: Figure 4.7 – World Energy Outlook 2024 
Note: STEPS, APS and NZE reflect demand projections under different scenarios. 

While some uncertainty remains about the timing for the new LNG projects to become operational, if 
implemented in alignment with global market developments and reliable suppliers, the phase out 
of Russian gas imports is expected to have limited impact on European energy prices and security of 
supply.  

In  view  of  the  expected  deployment  of  new  liquefaction  capacity,  it  is  sensible  to  start  with  spot 
supplies  (around  one  third  of  overall  Russian  imports).  The  additional  expected  export  capacity 
available globally by 2026 (+85-90 bcm/y) should be largely sufficient to compensate for the spot 
volume that the EU would no longer source from Russia. Moreover, large part of the EU’s Russian 
spot supply is LNG and its removal would likely lead to a reshuffling of LNG trades between regions 
with no significant alteration of the supply available globally. 

As the global balance improves (+165-170 bcm/y of new liquefaction capacity by 2027) and more 
domestic production becomes available in the EU (Neptun Deep field), the EU could safely complete 
the phase out of the remaining Russian gas currently under long-term contracts (20-25 bcm/y). 
A longer lead-time would also enable European buyers to rearrange existing contracts and, if required, 
to sign new contracts for alternative supplies.  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action 4: Supporting diversification by demand aggregation and better use of infrastructure  

Securing alternative supplies from reliable partners is critical to limiting any market or security 
of supply impact. For example, Norway, the EU’s largest gas supplier, as well as Romania and 
Greece,  can  help  diversification  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  traditionally  dominated  by 
Russian  gas,  through  the  Baltic  Pipe  and  the  Trans-Balkan  pipeline  respectively.  The 
Commission will continue its discussions with reliable suppliers and will substantially step up 
its energy cooperation with partner countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, around the 
Black Sea, and through the Global Gateway28.  

In parallel, alternatives to natural gas imports should continue to be developed where possible, 
notably  via  electrification  or  boosting  the  production  of  biogas  and  biomethane  and  clean 
hydrogen in line with REPowerEU.  

During  the  crisis,  AggregateEU29  has  proven  to  be  an  effective  tool  contributing  to  the 
REPowerEU objectives by supporting European consumers and companies in procuring non-
Russian  gas.  The  second  mid-term  round  of  demand  aggregation  and  matching  under 
AggregateEU was completed on 26 March 2025 and gathered significant interest on both the 
demand and the supply side, with 29 bcm of demand, 31 bcm of supply offers and almost 20 
bcm of matched supply-demand interests. It covered gas demand between 2025 and 2030 and 
allowed buyers to indicate a preferred terminal in the EU or deliveries free-on-board, providing 
buyers with additional flexibility. 

Looking forward, options going beyond demand aggregation should be also explored in view 
of harnessing EU purchasing power to support its diversification efforts.  

Based on the experience of AggregateEU, the Commission is  evaluating the feasibility  of a 
platform to support the scale-up and trade of gaseous molecules of non-fossil origin, including 
biomethane. 

In addition, the Commission is working with the industry and other stakeholders to advance 
the deployment of sustainable biogas and biomethane. Considerable progress has been made 
since the adoption of the Biomethane Action Plan in 2022, including through the Biomethane 
Industrial  Partnership.  Building  on  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  Biomethane  Industrial 
Partnership, the Commission will set up a new biogas network of Member States as part of a 
tripartite contract to better address the diverging needs in different areas of the EU and include 
national and local stakeholders. 

Given the specific challenges in Member States and Energy Community Contracting Parties in 
Central  and  South-East  Europe  (CESEC)  in  cross-border  trade,  the  Commission  will  work 

28 See on Global Gateway: Global Gateway - European Commission 
29 AggregateEU - European Commission 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under  the  CESEC  High-Level  Group30,  with  the  Energy  Community  Secretariat31  and  with 
enlargement  countries  to  maximise  the  use  of  existing  infrastructure,  aiming  at  removing 
regulatory and market barriers and to enhance diversification and assist candidate countries in 
shedding their dependencies on Russian energy imports. 

3.2. Nuclear  

Action 5: New restrictions to phase out Russian imports of uranium, enriched uranium and 
other nuclear materials  

In  contrast  to  dependencies  in  the  gas  sector,  dependencies  in  the  nuclear  sector  are  multi-
facetted and security of supply risks may still arise in the short to medium term in the case of 
sudden policy changes. Therefore, the purpose of this action is to support a gradual phasing out 
of the supply from Russia of uranium, enriched uranium and other nuclear materials, which are 
used  for  the  manufacturing  of  fuel  for  European  nuclear  reactors,  including  by  the  Russian 
supplier of the fuel for Russian-designed VVER reactors.  

a.   Measures on enriched uranium 

The Commission will seek to make Russian imports of enriched uranium economically less 
viable by presenting, next month, trade measures on the import of enriched uranium. This will 
level the playing field and encourage political and business decisions in the relevant Member 
States to accelerate investment and capacity-building, develop an EU value chain and diversify 
away from Russia in a gradual manner, while allowing for supplies from other international 
partners.  

b.  Restrictions on contracts co-signed by the Euratom Supply Agency 

Next  month  the  Commission  intends  also  to  restrict  new  supply  contracts  co-signed  by  the 
Euratom  Supply Agency  for  uranium,  enriched  uranium  and  other  nuclear  materials32  with 
Russian suppliers as of a certain date. Deliveries based on existing contracts will continue but 
prolongations as well as new supply contracts would no longer be approved by the Euratom 
Supply Agency. This measure will strengthen long-term security of supply and predictability, 
and support European industrial and economic actors involved in nuclear fuel cycle activities 
by providing reassurance and predictability for investment decisions.  

30 Central and South-Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity. 
31 Energy Community. 
32 See Article 52 in connection with Article 197 of the Euratom Treaty. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action 6: Diversification obligation and transparency: national plans to phase out Russian 
nuclear supplies  

The  Commission  will  seek  systematic  action  from  Member  States  to  phase  out  supplies  of 
nuclear fuel, fuel services and spare parts from Russia and to replace them including, over time, 
with fully European alternatives. Member States will be required to develop national plans with 
concrete actions and timelines, and recommends that Member States already submit their first 
national plans by the end of 2025, aiming to provide reassurance and predictability to economic 
actors when taking investment decisions to make available sufficient uranium conversion and 
enrichment capacity.  

Concretely, the Commission intends to propose, next month, a legislative proposal with specific 
targets for Member States to:  

•  Replace Russian nuclear fuels with alternative fuels by accelerating the contracting and 

licensing of such fuels and developing further fully European alternatives. 

•  Phase out reliance on Russia for uranium, enriched uranium and other nuclear materials. 
• 
Increase  transparency  on  dependencies  and  encourage  diversification  of  Russian 
supplies of spare parts and maintenance services.  

The Commission and the Euratom Supply Agency will continue their engagement and dialogue 
with  the five affected Member States and stakeholders in  the nuclear sector to  ensure good 
coordination and monitoring of progress of diversification efforts. 

Action  7:  Ramping-up  EU  production:  Proposal  for  a  European  Radioisotopes  Valley 
Initiative (ERVI) 

The Commission intends to propose the creation of an EU structure - a European Radioisotopes 
Valley  -  to  secure  EU  supply  of  medical  radioisotopes  through  increased  own  production, 
reduce EU dependency on foreign suppliers, in particular Russia, and increase the resilience of 
the European supply chain, taking into account different needs of Member States.  

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 Impact of phase out of Russian nuclear imports  

While diversification efforts might create uranium and fuel price volatility over access to uranium 
supply on global markets, major impacts on electricity prices are unlikely as the price of nuclear 
fuel and related services represent only a small portion of the final cost of electricity from nuclear 
power plants.  

In the short term, certain security of supply risks related to nuclear supplies from Russia remain. 
However, the following factors are expected to mitigate these risks: 

❖  the  Member  States  operating  VVER  nuclear  reactors  have  stockpiles  of  nuclear  fuel 

covering their needs for the next few years; 

❖  fuels from alternative suppliers can be both available and licensed in the near term, before 

the stockpiles are used up; 

❖  additional nuclear fuel cycle services capacity is being built and should become available 

in the short- to medium term. 

In addition to mitigate security of supply risks, the measures proposed will be carefully calibrated 
and gradually phased in to provide predictability to economic actors, create a nudging effect and 
avoid distortions in the market. 

3.3 Oil 

Action 8: National plans to phase out Russian oil and ensure alternative supplies  

In line with the proposal for the preparation of national plans to phase out Russian gas, the 
Commission recommends that the two concerned Member States plan and monitor the phase 
out of oil imports from Russia. Sufficient infrastructure is available to replace such oil imports 
with  non-Russian  supply.  Therefore,  the  Commission  intends  to  propose  an  obligation 
requiring those Member States to establish such plan and its monitoring.  

Member States concerned would be required to draft and submit to the Commission national 
plans outlining their strategies for replacing Russian oil imports by the end of 2027 with: 

•  a timeline, including milestones with corresponding measures, to achieve the objective 

of phasing out Russian oil;  

•  diversification options and technical capabilities to replace Russian oil;  
• 

the volume of Russian oil imports under existing contracts, and their expiry. 

Such plans could be included as a chapter in the national plans to phase out Russian gas. 

Existing working and coordination groups, such as the Oil Coordination Group or dedicated 
subgroups,  and  regional  groups  will  ensure  coordination  and  support.  The  Commission 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
encourages  affected  Member  States  to  prioritise  alternative  supply  infrastructure  when 
available. 

The Commission intends to present the legislative proposal next month on national plans to 
phase  out  remaining  Russian  oil  imports  and  recommends  that  concerned  Member  States 
already submit their first national plans in by the end of 2025. 

Action 9: Continue imposing and enforcing sanctions on entities and vessels  suspected of 
illicit activities 

To address the problem of circumvention of EU oil sanctions by using “shadow fleets”, the 
following actions are envisaged: 

•  Continue outreach and dialogue with concerned third countries.  
•  Work  with 

international  partners, 

the  International  Maritime 
Organization  (IMO)  to  establish  and  uphold  stringent  maritime  safety  and  security 
standards. 

including  with 

•  Encourage Member States to enhance maritime surveillance, building on the integrated 

services hosted in the European Maritime Safety Agency, enabling:  

o  Continuous monitoring and information sharing regarding vessels of interest to 

identify suspicious activity or behaviour; 

o  enhanced deterrence of illegal maritime activities and enforcement international 

maritime law. 

•  High  Representative  will  explore  with  the  Member  States  the  deployment  of  an  EU 

Common Security and Defence Policy mission with a view to: 

o  Conducting  surveillance,  continuous  monitoring  of  maritime  activities  to 

identify suspicious vessels or behaviours; 

o  Deterring illegal maritime activities; 
o  Enforcing  international  maritime  law,  including  through  requesting  the  Flag 
State of a suspicious vessel, or its master, that the vessel enters the territorial sea 
of  a  State,  where  that  coastal  State  may  take  all  necessary  measures  in 
accordance with UNCLOS and its domestic law. 

o  Boarding and inspecting vessels of interest in the high seas or in the exclusive 
economic zones of the EU Member States, where allowed under UNCLOS or 
after obtaining the consent of the Flag State to that effect. 

•  Conclude  agreements  with  concerned    Flag  States  to  secure  their  consent  for  pre-
authorized boarding operations on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zones of 
EU Member States. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 

This Roadmap towards ending Russian energy imports aims at ensuring the EU's independence 
from  Russian  energy  by  gradual  phasing  out  imports  of  gas,  nuclear,  and  oil  in  an  orderly, 
secure and well-prepared manner in line with EU climate neutrality objective.  

It complements the EU’s strategic goals, as set out in the Competitiveness Compass for the EU, 
the Clean Industrial Deal and the Action Plan for Affordable Energy by reducing imports of 
fossil fuels from suppliers that create economic security concerns and accelerating the clean 
transition, moving away from fossil fuels.  

The nine proposed measures in this Roadmap will effectively remove Russian energy from EU 
markets, without jeopardising security of supply while minimising the impact on prices and 
markets.  

Delivering  on  the  Roadmap  will  require  strong  commitment,  solidarity,  engagement  and 
cooperation of all Member States, EU institutions and energy market actors.  

The Commission will assess the impact of and closely monitor progress in the phase out of 
Russian energy imports and provide necessary support to all Member States in addressing any 
challenges  they  may  face.  These  regular  exchanges  of  information  in  existing  coordination 
groups  and  regional  cooperation  groups  will  ensure  that  the  EU  stays  on  track  to  meet  its 
objectives, while making any necessary adjustments in a timely and effective manner in light 
of security of supply and dynamic market developments. 

17