REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Annual report on Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)
Date: 2025-04-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: Internet, activity report, competition law, consumer protection, digital economy, digital single market, electronic commerce, goods and services, provision of services, unfair terms of contract

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.4.2025  COM(2025) 166 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT Annual report on Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act)  
 
 
I. 

INTRODUCTION 

(1)  This report is addressed to the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union.  It  sets  out  the  activities  undertaken  by  the  European  Commission  (‘the 
Commission’  below)  in  connection  with  Regulation  (EU)  2022/19251  (the  Digital 
Markets Act, ‘DMA’ below) in 2024, as set out in Article 35 DMA2. 

(2)  The  first  annual  report  on  Commission  activities  in  connection  with  the  DMA  was 
adopted on 6 March 20243. In its first annual report the Commission reported primarily 
on  the  decisions  designating  Alphabet,  Amazon,  Apple,  ByteDance,  Meta,  and 
Microsoft as gatekeepers in September 2023. 

(3) 

In  2024,  the  Commission  designated  Booking  for  its  Booking.com  online 
intermediation service in May, and complemented Apple’s designation with a further 
core platform service, its operating system iPadOS, in April. 

(4)  The  Commission  also  concluded  four  market  investigations,  some  of  which  it  had 
started in 2023. The investigations initiated in 2023 relate to rebuttals submitted by 
undertakings  alongside  their  notifications  claiming  that,  despite  meeting  the 
designation  thresholds,  they  do  not  meet  the  requirements  for  being  designated  as 
gatekeepers. These investigations, as well as the  qualitative designation of iPadOS, 
entailed  seeking  the  expert  advice  of  the  Digital  Markets  Advisory  Committee 
(‘DMAC’)4. 

(5) 

In 2024, the DMA entered its implementation and enforcement phase, with 7 March 
2024 as the compliance deadline for designations dating from 5 September 2023. The 
Commission  engaged  in  regulatory  dialogue  with  all  designated  gatekeepers  and 
commenced six non-compliance investigations regarding three gatekeepers: Alphabet, 
Apple,  and  Meta.  In  two  of  the  proceedings,  the  Commission  issued  preliminary 
findings5.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  announced  preliminary  investigative 
steps regarding Amazon6. 

(6)  The  Commission  also  initiated  two  proceedings  to  specify  Apple’s  interoperability 
obligations under the DMA and issued preliminary findings, asking for feedback from 
third parties on measures Apple should take to ensure effective interoperability7. 

(7) 

In  parallel  to  its  monitoring  and  enforcement  activity,  the  Commission  hosted 
numerous  meetings  with  gatekeepers  and  a  wide  array  of  interested  third  parties, 
including  business  users,  developers, 
trade 
associations,  civil  society  organisations,  and  customer  representatives.  The 

those  challenging  gatekeepers, 

1 OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1-66. 
2 Article 35 DMA requires the Commission to submit an annual report on the implementation of the DMA and 
the progress made towards achieving its objectives. This is the second report of this kind, covering the second 
year of application of the DMA. 
3 Report to the Council and the European Parliament: Annual Report on the Digital Markets Act (2022/1925), 
COM(2024) 106 final. 
4 The DMAC supports the Commission in the adoption of implementing acts under the DMA. It is classified as a 
committee under Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 and functions in accordance with its Rules of Procedure. The 
DMAC was involved in all four market investigations and convened on 1 February, 20 March and 4 October 
2024. 
5 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-meta-over-its-pay-or-consent-
model-breach-digital-markets-act-2024-07-01_en and https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-
sends-preliminary-findings-apple-and-opens-additional-non-compliance-investigation-2024-06-24_en. 
6 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-opens-non-compliance-investigations-against-alphabet-
apple-and-meta-under-digital-markets-2024-03-25_en 
7 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-starts-first-proceedings-specify-apples-interoperability-
obligations-under-digital-2024-09-19_en and https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-seeks-
feedback-measures-apple-should-take-ensure-interoperability-under-digital-markets-2024-12-19_en. 

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Commission  also  organised  several  compliance  workshops,  providing  stakeholders 
with  the  opportunity  to  gain  insights  into  the  gatekeepers’  compliance  solutions. 
Additionally, the High-Level Group for the Digital Markets Act (‘HLG’) decided to 
create  three  thematic  subgroups  on  data,  interoperability,  and  artificial  intelligence, 
and  held  several  meetings  in  the  course  of  2024.  This  facilitated  cooperation  and 
fostered a collaborative dialogue with the community of European regulators8. 

(8)  The  following  sections  provide  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  Commission’s 
implementation of the DMA and the progress made towards achieving its objectives 
in 2024. Section II reports on designations and other non-monitoring activities. Section 
III  outlines  the  monitoring  of  gatekeepers’  compliance.  Section  IV  addresses  the 
reporting  requirements  for  gatekeepers  regarding  consumer  profiling  practices. 
Section  V  details  the  cooperation  and  coordination  between  the  Commission  and 
national authorities. Finally, Section VI describes the work carried out by the HLG. 

II. 

1. 

DESIGNATIONS AND OTHER NON-MONITORING ACTIVITIES  

Notifications, designations, and market investigations 

(9)  Under  Article  3(3)  DMA,  undertakings  must  notify  the  Commission  when  the  core 
platform  services  they provide  meet  the  thresholds  laid  down  in  Article  3(2)  of  the 
DMA. However, under Article 3(5) DMA, undertakings that meet these thresholds can 
present sufficiently substantiated arguments as to why they should not be designated 
as a gatekeeper. 

(10)  In  2024,  the  Commission  received  notifications  from  Booking,  ByteDance,  and  X 

pursuant to Article 3(3) DMA9. 

(11)  On 1 March 2024, Booking notified the Commission that it met the thresholds set out 
in Article 3(2) DMA in relation to its online intermediation service, Booking.com. As 
a  result,  on  13 May  2024,  the  Commission  designated  Booking  as  a  gatekeeper  in 
relation to this core platform service10. Booking’s obligation to comply with the DMA 
started on 14 November 2024, six months after its designation11. 

(12)  On 1 March 2024, ByteDance notified the Commission that it met the thresholds set out 
in Article 3(2) DMA in relation to its online advertising service, TikTok Ads. ByteDance 
also submitted a rebuttal request, pursuant to Article 3(5) DMA, claiming that TikTok 
Ads did not qualify as an important gateway between business users and end users. On 
13 May 2024, the Commission accepted the rebuttal put forward by TikTok in relation 
to its online advertising service, TikTok Ads. The rebuttal was directly accepted within 
45 working days, as the undertaking demonstrated that its service does not satisfy the 
requirements of Article 3(1) DMA12. 

(13)  On 1 March 2024, X submitted a notification in relation to its online social networking 
service, X, and its online advertising service, X Ads, both accompanied by rebuttals 
arguing that even if the relevant thresholds were met, X did not qualify as an important 

8 The High-Level Group for the Digital Markets Act is comprised of the following bodies and networks of 
regulators: Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), the European Data 
Protection Supervisor and European Data Protection Board (EDPS/EDPB), the European Competition Network 
(ECN), the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC), and the European Regulatory Group of 
Audiovisual Media Regulators (ERGA). 
9 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/latest-news_en 
10 Commission Decision, Case DMA.100019 – Booking - Online Intermediation Services – Verticals: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4360/OJ. 
11 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/booking-must-comply-all-relevant-obligations-under-digital-markets-
act-2024-11-14_en 
12 Case DMA.100042 ByteDance – Online advertising services: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202441/DMA_100042_134.pdf. 

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gateway between business users and end users13. On 13 May 2024, the Commission 
adopted  a  decision  directly  accepting  the  rebuttal  in  relation  to  X  Ads14,  and  in  a 
separate decision opened a market investigation under Article 17(3) DMA to assess 
whether the online social networking service X should be designated15. Following an 
in-depth market investigation16, the Commission concluded on 16 October 2024 that 
the online social networking service X was not an important gateway for business users 
to reach end users. The Commission therefore decided to accept the rebuttal and not 
designate X17. The decision was adopted following a meeting of the DMAC, which 
provided a positive opinion, on 4 October 2024. 

(14)  In 2024, the Commission also completed the rebuttal market investigations that it had 
initiated on 5 September 2023 to determine whether Apple should be designated as a 
gatekeeper for iMessage, and Microsoft should be designated in relation to Bing, Edge, 
and  Microsoft  Advertising.  After  carrying  out  in-depth  market  investigations,  the 
Commission decided not to designate Apple18 and Microsoft19 as gatekeepers for these 
services.  The  decisions  were  adopted  following  a  meeting  of  the  DMAC,  which 
provided a positive opinion on the decisions, on 1 February 2024. 

(15)  In addition, based on an in-depth market investigation initiated in September 2023, the 
Commission designated Apple as a gatekeeper with respect to its core platform service 
iPadOS,  on  29 April  202420.  The  decision  was  adopted  following  a  meeting  of  the 
DMAC, which provided a positive opinion on the decision, on 20 March 2024. Apple’s 
obligation  to  comply  with  the  DMA  started  six  months  after  designation,  on 
4 November 2024. 

(16)  With the designation of Booking as a gatekeeper for its online intermediation service 
(Booking.com)  and  Apple  for  its  operating  system  (iPadOS)  the  total  number  of 
designated gatekeepers rose, in 2024, from 6 to 7 undertakings, while the number of 
designated core platform services reached 24, from the previous 2221. 

(17)  In 2024, the Commission has been party to three ongoing actions for annulment filed 
by  ByteDance,  Meta,  and  Apple  in  November  2023  against  their  respective 
designation  decisions.  With  respect  to  ByteDance’s  appeal,  in  February  2024,  the 
President of the General Court dismissed ByteDance’s application for interim relief, 
and, in July 2024, the General Court upheld the Commission’s decision to designate 
ByteDance following an expedited procedure22. In September 2024, ByteDance filed 

13 The next section of the DMA Annual Report examines how the Commission has responded to the rebuttal 
submission. For more details please see: Market investigations and rebuttals. 
14 Case DMA.100232 X – Online advertising services: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202441/DMA_100232_44.pdf. 
15 Case DMA.100041 - X - Online social networking service: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202441/DMA_100041_631.pdf. 
16 Including input by business users of X and other providers of online social networking services. 
17 This decision has not yet been published. 
18 Case DMA.100022 Apple – number-independent interpersonal communications services: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202416/DMA_100022_2757.pdf. 
19 Cases DMA.100015 Microsoft Online search engines; DMA.100028 Microsoft Web browsers; DMA.100034 
Microsoft Online advertising services: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/digital_markets_act/cases/202416/DMA_100015_700.pdf. 
20 Commission Decision, Case DMA.100047 - Apple – iPadOS: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4374/oj. 
21 For a schematic mapping of the relevant gatekeepers and core platform services please see this link to the 
DMA website: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers_en. 
22 Case T-1077/23 R Bytedance v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/476, 3.1.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2317/oj and Case T-1077/23, Bytedance v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/476, 
3.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/476/oj. 

3 

 
 
 
an appeal against the General Court’s decision to uphold its designation23. 

(18)  In  addition,  the  Commission  is  active  as  a  defendant  in  two  other  ongoing  judicial 
proceedings: (i) an action filed by ByteDance’s counsel in their own name in August 
2024,  challenging  the  Commission’s  decision  to  reject  the  request  for  access  to 
documents relating to ByteDance’s designation24 and (ii) an action brought before the 
General Court in July 2024 by Opera against the non-designation of Microsoft as a 
gatekeeper in relation to its web browser, Edge25. 

2. 

Other non-monitoring activities 

(19)  The Commission has placed significant emphasis on enhancing its investigatory tools 
under  the  DMA  since  its  adoption.  On  30 April  2024,  the  Commission  launched  a 
DMA  whistleblower  tool26,  which  is  similar  to  the  one  available  for  antitrust 
enforcement  and for Regulation  (EU) 2022/2065  (‘Digital  Services Act’). This  tool 
makes it possible for individuals to provide, privately and confidentially, information 
relating to any possible non-compliance by gatekeepers of their obligations under the 
DMA27. In 2024, the Commission received 20 submissions via this tool. 

(20)  In terms of public engagement, the Commission maintains and regularly updates the 
DMA  website28.  This  website  provides  background  on  the  DMA,  offers  a  search 
function for DMA-related official acts of the Commission, includes a Q&A section 
that is frequently updated29, and contains all relevant press releases. The Commission 
also  communicates  on  DMA-relevant  developments  through  its  social  media 
accounts30. 

(21)  In  2024,  the  Commission  contracted  nine  DMA-related  studies,  expert  consultancy 

services, or pilot projects. 

MONITORING OF GATEKEEPERS’ COMPLIANCE 

Monitoring activity 

III. 

1. 

(22)  Gatekeepers must comply with the obligations laid down in Articles 5, 6, 7, 14, and 15 
DMA.  The  compliance  requirement  starts  immediately  after  designation  for  the 
obligation to inform the Commission about concentrations (Article 14 DMA), and not 
later than six months after designation for the obligations and prohibitions provided in 
Articles  5,  6,  7  (pursuant  to  Article  3(10)  DMA),  and  Article  15  DMA.  For  the 
undertakings  designated  on  5 September  2023,  this  six-month  period  ended  on 
7 March 2024. Considering the subsequent designation of iPadOS on 29 April 2024, 
Apple also had to comply with the DMA for this core platform service by 4 November 
2024, while Booking, designated on 13 May 2024, had to comply by 14 November 

23 Case C-627/24 P, Bytedance v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/6639, 11.11.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6639/oj. 
24 Case T-433/24, Batchelor v Commission, OJ C, C/2024/6103, 21.10.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6103/oj. 
25 Case T-357/24, Opera Norway v Commission OJ C, C/2024/5640, 30.9.2024, ELI: 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5640/oj. 
26 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/whistleblower-tool_en 
27 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-launches-whistleblower-tools-digital-services-act-and-
digital-markets-act-2024-04-30_en 
28 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/index_en 
29 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/about-dma/questions-and-answers_en 
30 The Commission’s news and reports on the DMA can be followed via several accounts: 
https://www.instagram.com/DigitalEU/; https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/digital-eu/; 
https://twitter.com/DigitalEU; https://www.youtube.com/c/DigitalEU; https://www.facebook.com/DigitalEU; 
https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/dg-competition; https://twitter.com/EU_Competition; 
https://www.youtube.com/@dgcompetition44. 

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2024 for Booking.com. 

(23)  Six  months  after  designation,  all  gatekeepers  submitted  compliance  reports,  as 
required  by  Article 11  DMA,  as  well  as  independently  audited  descriptions  of  any 
techniques for profiling consumers applied to or across their core platform services, in 
line with Article 15 DMA. Links to the non-confidential versions of these documents 
have  been  published  on  the  Commission’s  DMA  website31.  The  next  iteration  of 
gatekeeper’s  compliance  reports  was  due  by  7 March  202532.  These  reports  should 
include the gatekeepers’ updates to their compliance measures. 

(24)  The Commission has assessed all compliance reports received in 2024 and followed 
up with gatekeepers on their content. In March 2024, the Commission organised six 
compliance  workshops  with  interested  stakeholders,  one  for  each  gatekeeper 
designated on 5 September 2023. Another workshop was organised in November 2024 
for Booking, following its designation in May 2024. The workshops aimed to offer 
third  parties  the  opportunity  to  seek  clarifications  from  and  provide  feedback  to 
gatekeepers on their compliance solutions. Attendance at all workshops was open to 
the  public,  with  business  users,  civil  society,  and  business  associations  enjoying 
priority for in-person attendance. The workshops were also made accessible online. 
Recordings of all workshops held in 2024 are available on the Commission’s DMA 
website33. 

(25)  Besides  the  compliance  workshops  and  the  work  on  the  compliance  reports34,  the 
Commission constantly engaged with gatekeepers and interested third parties through 
various channels to monitor and assess compliance. This included bilateral meetings 
and technical workshops bringing together representatives of the gatekeepers and of 
interested third parties. In addition, the Commission sent requests for information to 
gatekeepers and third parties. It also consistently encouraged gatekeepers to engage 
directly with market players by stressing that this engagement is an important part of 
demonstrating effective compliance for gatekeepers. 

(26)  The Commission monitored how gatekeepers have implemented the requirements of 
Article 28 DMA to introduce a compliance function which must be independent of the 
gatekeeper’s operational functions and consist of one or more compliance officers with 
sufficient authority, stature, and resources to enable them to monitor the gatekeeper’s 
compliance with the DMA and advise them on it. All designated gatekeepers appointed 
compliance officers in accordance with the principles laid down in Article 28 DMA 
and communicated the details to the Commission. The Commission had two in-person 
meetings  with  the  compliance  officers  of  each  gatekeeper  in  2024.  The  purpose  of 
these meetings was for the Commission to understand how the compliance function 
was set up and organised and take stock of the ongoing regulatory dialogue. Finally, 
in  support  of  potential  enforcement  actions,  the  Commission  has  adopted,  in  2024, 
retention  orders  requesting  six  gatekeepers  –  Alphabet,  Amazon,  Apple,  Meta, 
Microsoft,  and  Booking  –  to  retain  documents  which  might  be  used  to  assess  their 
compliance with specific DMA obligations35. 

2. 

Findings on compliance with Articles 5, 6, and 7 DMA36 

31 https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/reports/compliance-reports and https://digital-markets-act-
cases.ec.europa.eu/reports/consumer-profiling-reports. 
32 This would not include Booking, for which this would be due on 14 November 2024. 
33 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/events/workshops_en 
34 https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/reports/compliance-reports 
35 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1689 
36 Nothing in this report endorses the compliance measures taken by the gatekeepers as fully or partially 
complaint with the DMA. 

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(27)  This section reports on the Commission’s findings on themes covered in Articles 5, 6, 
and 7 DMA and actions it has undertaken. The examples below are not exhaustive but 
describe the main instances of the Commission’s actions in terms of DMA compliance. 

a)  Giving users control over their data 

(28)  The  DMA  recognises  the  importance  of  data  in  digital  markets,  emphasising  that 
accumulation  of  data  with  the  gatekeeper,  and  restricted  access  to  data  by  their 
competitors, can lead to less contestability, less choice for end users over their own 
data, and less innovation. In relation to contestability in particular, the DMA explains 
that data accumulation by gatekeepers through their platform services can give rise to 
entry  barriers  in  markets  where  these  gatekeepers  are  present.  In  other  words,  data 
accumulation can make it more difficult for new players to offer their services on those 
markets. 

(29)  In  a  similar  vein,  contestability  can  also  be  undermined  by  a  gatekeeper  restricting 
switching or multi-homing, for example by not allowing end users to port their data. 
Such restrictions can, for instance, make it difficult for end users to switch from one 
established social media network to an emerging one, out of fear that contacts or own 
content will be lost in the process. The DMA seeks to address these issues by providing 
end users with more choice over how their data is used and how they wish to use it, 
while also  ensuring that  business  users have better access  to  the data they generate 
through their use of core platform services. 

(30)  Pursuant to Article 5(2) DMA, gatekeepers have to implement measures that enable 
end users to choose whether or not they consent to their data being combined and/or 
cross-used across gatekeepers’ services. On 25 March 2024, the Commission decided 
to  open  a  non-compliance  investigation  against  Meta  in  connection  with  this 
obligation.37 The investigation assesses whether Meta’s ‘pay or consent’ advertising-
based  business  model  is  compliant  with  its  obligation  to  obtain  consent  from  users 
whenever  Meta  intends  to  combine  or  cross-use  end  user  personal  data  across  its 
different services. In its preliminary findings issued on 1 July 2024, the Commission 
outlined its concern that the binary choice imposed by Meta’s ‘pay or consent’ model 
may  not  provide  a  real  alternative  for  users  who  do  not  want  to  consent  to  the 
processing of their personal data. In August 2024, the European Data Protection Board 
(‘EDPB’) adopted an Opinion under Article 64(2) of the the General Data Protection 
Regulation (‘GDPR’) on the deployment of ‘pay or consent’ models by large online 
platforms.  On  13 November  2024,  Meta  updated  its  ‘pay  or  consent’  model  by 
providing  what  it  referred  to  as  a  ‘less  personalised  alternative’.  In  addition  to  its 
investigation  on  Meta’s  compliance  in  the  period  before  13  November  2024,  the 
Commission  is  currently  also  assessing  Meta’s  revised  compliance  solution.  As  for 
data  portability  and  access,  in  2024,  gatekeepers  started  to  enhance  their  data 
portability solutions to move closer to enabling real-time, continuous data portability 
and access so that end users can easily port, and business users easily access their data. 
All  designated  gatekeepers  implemented  solutions  over  the  course  of  2024.  This 
includes data transfer solutions enabling end users, such as those of Google Search or 
Facebook or TikTok, to give authorised third parties access to their historic and future 
data, which those third parties can use to offer competing or innovative services. In 
addition,  already  implemented  and  significantly  improved  data  transfer  solutions 
enable business users of the various designated services (e.g. Amazon Marketplace, 
Booking.com, or YouTube) to access the data that they generate on these services. 

(31)  The Commission has been closely monitoring the functioning of these new tools, in 

37 The Commission has cooperated with the Irish Data Protection Commission, which is also investigating 
Meta’s ‘Consent or Pay’ model under the GDPR, to ensure full coherence in the application of EU law. 

6 

 
 
 
consultation  with  gatekeepers  and  a  wide  range  of  interested  third  parties.  The 
Commission engaged in intense regulatory dialogue with all gatekeepers to encourage 
them  to  improve,  where  relevant,  their  compliance  solutions  based  on  third-party 
feedback. The gatekeepers’ next compliance reports, which were due in March 2025, 
should reflect some of these improvements as well as ongoing work. The Commission 
will  continue  to  collect  market  feedback  on  whether  the  implemented  solutions  are 
effective in achieving the objectives of the DMA. 

b)  Opening-up of mobile ecosystems 

(32)  The  objectives  of  contestability  and  fairness  in  gatekeepers’  ecosystems  entail 
enabling  consumer  choice  by  allowing  end  users  to  access  diverse  and  innovative 
products and services that meet their needs, while also allowing them to switch easily 
between alternative products and services. Among the DMA provisions that play a key 
role in the opening-up of mobile ecosystems are those which address the possibility 
for  developers  to  distribute  apps  via  alternative  sources38  and  those  that  mandate 
effective interoperability, easy switching of defaults, uninstallation, or the showing of 
a choice screen (in particular Articles 6(3), (4), and (7) DMA). 

Defaults, choice screens and uninstallation 

(33)  One of the Commission’s enforcement priorities has been to prevent gatekeepers from 
exploiting  consumers’  behavioural  biases  via  default  settings,  and  to  empower  end 
users to switch easily between various digital solutions on the gatekeepers’ operating 
system  or  web  browser,  as  provided  for  in  Article  6(3)  DMA.  Limiting  the 
gatekeepers’ ability to steer people to their products or services gives business users, 
such as alternative web browser and search engine providers, a chance to increase their 
visibility  and  to  improve  the  products  and  services  they  offer.  This  increased 
contestability of gatekeepers’ services translates into a greater range of options for end 
users. 

(34)  The Commission has taken decisive action to ensure that gatekeepers swiftly deliver 
broader  choice  to  users.  The  Commission  opened  proceedings  against  Apple  on 
25 March  2024,  in  response  to  evidence  that  the  gatekeeper  was  not  effectively 
complying with its obligations to enable end users to easily change default settings on 
iOS (including via the web browser choice screen) or un-install Apple’s own software 
applications on iOS. The Commission also engaged in intense regulatory exchanges 
with Alphabet and Microsoft which must also provide end users with the possibility to 
easily switch default settings and un-install software applications. 

(35)  The Commission’s efforts have led to clear and tangible outcomes. Apple announced 
a  series  of  changes  in  August  2024:  it  removed  several  friction  points  in  the  user 
journey for choosing a web browser on the choice screen and increased the number of 
software applications for which end users can switch the default or un-install. There is 
also  a new default apps  settings section, making it  easier to  change defaults.  These 
changes  have  now  been  implemented  on  both  iOS  and  iPadOS.  Apple  plans  to 
introduce  further updates in Spring 2025. The Commission  will  continue to  closely 
monitor the measures implemented by Apple and whether the gatekeeper is effectively 
compliant with the DMA. 

(36)  Alphabet  now  displays  an  improved  choice  screen  for  search  engines  and  web 
browsers  on  Chrome  and  Pixel,  which  is  gradually  being  rolled  out  on  all  Android 
devices. The improved screen presents users with a fully randomised list of available 
alternative services. The Commission continues to engage in regulatory dialogue with 
Alphabet regarding the roll-out of choice screens and the measures implemented in 

38 Such as third-party app stores. 

7 

 
 
 
relation to easy default switching and app uninstallation. 

(37)  Microsoft made its web browser and online search engine applications un-installable 
on its Windows operating system. It also ended recommendations in various Windows 
experiences to set Edge as the default web browser for users in the European Economic 
Area (EEA). The Commission is keeping Microsoft’s compliance plan under review, 
to ensure that it effectively complies with all aspects of its obligations. 

(38)  As an overall result, more market opportunities are being created as end users in the 
EEA can more effectively discover and install alternative options and set them as their 
default choice if they wish. Moreover, the Commission continues to assess whether 
further improvements are needed to enable genuine choice. 

Steering 

(39)  On  25  March  2024,  the  Commission  launched  two  investigations  into  Apple  and 
Alphabet,  which  provide  the  main  distribution  channels  for  software  applications 
(apps) on mobile devices in the EEA. The investigations were launched to examine 
whether  the  two  gatekeepers  complied  with  the obligation,  pursuant  to Article  5(4) 
DMA, requiring them to allow app developers – many of which are European small 
and medium-sized enterprises and start‐ups – to ‘steer’ consumers free of charge to 
offers outside the gatekeepers’ application stores (app stores). 

(40)  On 24 June 2024, the Commission informed Apple of its preliminary view that its App 
Store policies contravened the DMA due to restrictions on app developers promoting 
external offers and content to consumers, thus depriving end users of alternative and 
possibly cheaper purchasing possibilities. 

Interoperability 

(41)  Fair and contestable markets also rely on interoperability to thrive, so that gatekeepers 
cannot exploit their dual roles39, driven by product integration, to stifle competition. 
By facilitating access to gatekeepers’ critical functionalities for alternative providers, 
the Commission seeks to safeguard those alternative providers’ ability to compete by 
continuing to innovate. 

(42)  On 19 September 2024, the Commission started two specification proceedings to assist 
Apple in complying with its interoperability obligations under the DMA under Article 
6(7)  DMA.  The  first  proceeding  focuses  on  several  iOS  connectivity  features  and 
functionalities, predominantly used for and by connected devices (e.g. smartwatches 
or headphones). The second proceeding focuses on the process Apple has set up to 
process interoperability requests submitted by developers and third parties for iOS and 
iPadOS. On 19 December 2024, the Commission sent preliminary findings to Apple 
in  connection  with  the  two  specification  proceedings,  and  in  parallel  launched  two 
corresponding public consultations. 

(43)  A lack of interoperability also allows gatekeepers that provide messaging services to 
benefit  from  strong  network  effects,  which  act  as  a  barrier  to  switching  and  limit 
consumer  choice  and  contestability.  In  this  context,  the  Commission  is  monitoring 
Meta’s  progress  on  making  WhatsApp  and  Messenger  interoperable  pursuant  to  its 
obligation  under  the  DMA.  Following  feedback  from  the  Commission  and  third 
parties, Meta has made some changes to its solution. The Commission is monitoring 
these developments to ensure that interested third parties can effectively interoperate 
with WhatsApp and Messenger. 

39 Gatekeepers can play two connected roles, such as being both a provider of a critical service and a competitor 
in the same market. In a ‘dual role,’ the gatekeeper can use its control over essential functionalities to favour its 
own products or services, stifling competition from alternative providers. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
Alternative distribution channels 

(44)  Ensuring contestability regarding the distribution of apps and app stores gives business 
users the freedom to decide which channels they wish to use for distributing their apps, 
and end users the freedom to access these apps or app stores outside the core platform 
services of a gatekeeper. To ensure contestability, which provides both business and 
end users with more choice and encourages innovation, gatekeepers must be prevented 
from imposing restrictions on end users as to what apps or app stores they can access. 

(45)  In practice, this means that Apple must allow end users of iPhone devices to install 
apps  other  than  through  Apple’s  own  App  Store,  for  example  by  enabling  the 
installation and use of third-party app stores and the direct downloading of apps from 
the web. The DMA obligations, applicable to Apple since March 2024, have led to a 
number  of  third-party  app  stores  being  launched  in  the  European  Union,  such  as 
AltStore, Aptoide, and Epic. 

(46)  While  these  are  positive  developments,  in  its  pursuit  of  effective  contestability,  on 
24 June  2024  the  Commission  opened  an  investigation  in  relation  to  Apple’ 
compliance with the DMA regarding the contractual terms which Apple imposed on 
developers wanting to provide third-party app stores or to offer their apps through such 
app  stores.  In  particular,  the  investigation  is  looking  into:  Apple’s  proposed  Core 
Technology Fee, under which developers of third-party app stores and third-party apps 
must pay a €0.50 fee per installed app; the multi-step user journey imposed by Apple 
for downloading and installing alternative app stores or apps on iOS; and the eligibility 
requirements  for  developers  to  be  able  to  offer  alternative  app  stores  or  directly 
distribute apps from the web on iOS. 

(47)  Like  Apple,  Alphabet  must  ensure  that  alternative  app  distribution  sources  are 
effectively  enabled  on  its  Android  operating  system.  The  Commission  continues  to 
engage with Alphabet and interested third parties to address potential concerns about 
the effective compliance of Alphabet’s Android terms with the DMA. 

c) 

Fair online search 

(48)  Ensuring  equal  treatment  and  safeguarding  against  discriminatory  practices  are 
amongst  the  prerequisites  for  fair  search  and  contestable  online  search  markets. 
Against  this  background,  the  DMA  aims  to  protect  business  users  from  unfair 
competition  from  gatekeepers’  services,  and  to  offer  other  online  search  engine 
providers more opportunities to develop new search alternatives. 

(49)  The ban on self-preferencing by gatekeepers, set out in Article 6(5) DMA, is wide-
ranging and addresses all forms of self‐preferencing. As regards Alphabet, it covers its 
own vertical search services ranked or embedded in the Google Search results. This 
also covers instances where Alphabet treats its own content services more favourably 
than other content providers also ranked on Google Search. The Commission opened 
proceedings  against  Alphabet  on  25 March  2024  because  of  concerns  that  the 
gatekeeper  is  preferencing  its  own  vertical  search  or  content  services  over  similar 
rivals active in areas such as hospitality, travel, e‐commerce, or content creation, in 
breach of Article 6(5) DMA. 

(50)  In  addition,  Article  6(11)  DMA  mandates  the  sharing  of  click  and  query  data  by 
designated search engines with alternative providers of search engines. This obligation 
is intended to foster contestability from third-party search engines. 

(51)  In March 2024, Alphabet proposed a data licensing solution to comply with the DMA 
obligation  to  share  ranking,  query,  click,  and  view  data.  The  Commission  is  in  the 
process of assessing the compliance of this licensing solution with Article 6(11) DMA. 

9 

 
 
The Commission has been in contact with Alphabet and potential beneficiaries about 
the matter. It has also been discussing the conditions for effective data-sharing under 
Article 6(11) DMA with data protection authorities, in particular in the context of the 
HLG. 

d)  Online marketplaces 

(52)  The objective of a fair and contestable business environment for online marketplaces 
and online intermediation is pursued by a number of DMA provisions, such as those 
banning parity clauses, prohibiting self-preferencing in ranking, mitigating unfair data 
advantages, and fostering data access and portability for users. 

(53)  The  DMA  prohibits  any  form  of  parity  (narrow  or  broad),  covering  commercial 
practices beyond price and including any measure which would lead to the same effect 
as a parity clause. It thus establishes the possibility for business users to differentiate 
commercial terms across various distribution channels. As a result, the DMA aims to 
remove parity obstacles concerning business users’ options to offer goods or services 
via alternative platforms and direct sales channels. Such a restriction applies to any 
measure with equivalent effect to parity clauses, such as increased commission rates 
or the de-listing of the offers of business users. 

(54)  In this regard, Booking indicated40 that to comply with the DMA it had, first, removed 
the EEA from the list of territories subject to parity requirements in its general terms 
and conditions and, second, introduced an updated version of those terms which no 
longer  refers  to  parity41.  Booking  also  indicated  that  it  had  stopped  using  external 
prices as input for its Premium Programmes. 

(55)  Amazon reported that, according to its own self-assessment, it did not employ parity 
clauses  that  would  be  incompatible  with  the  DMA.  Other  gatekeepers  reported 
forward-looking compliance mechanisms that should prevent the introduction of parity 
obligations for business users in the future42. The Commission will continue to monitor 
and assess whether the relevant DMA obligations are being effectively met, whether 
there are any risks of circumvention, and whether gatekeepers may be using alternative 
measures with a similar effect. 

(56)  Similarly to the prohibition applicable to online search, online intermediation services 
are  also  subject  to  the  DMA  ban  on  self-preferencing.  This  is  to  ensure  fair  and 
contestable  online  marketplaces  for  the  thousands  of  business  users  that  compete 
directly with gatekeepers’ products and services on these gatekeepers’ own platforms. 
In turn, this also benefits end users who can thus find a wider selection of products and 
services on gatekeepers’ platforms. As announced on 25 March 2024, the Commission 
has been carrying out preliminary investigatory steps to assess Amazon’s compliance 
with the DMA in relation to potential self-preferencing practices. 

3. 

 Information about concentrations 

(57)  Under  Article 14  DMA,  gatekeepers  are required  to  inform the Commission of any 
concentration they intend to undertake where the merging entities or the target of the 
concentration provide core platforms services or other services in the digital sector or 
enable the collection of data. 

40 bookingholdings.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/DMA-Compliance-Report.pdf 
41 This version was communicated to business users and announced during the compliance workshop in 
November 2024. 
42 Also linked to Article 5(3) of the DMA compliance, Alphabet identified relevant contracts in relation Play 
Store and Maps that may have contained parity clauses. For such contracts, it sent waivers in early 2024. Apple 
considered that it already complied with Article 5(3) with regard to its App Store prior to 7 March 2024. 

10 

 
 
 
(58)  In  2024,  the  Commission  received  15 submissions  of  intended  concentrations  by 
gatekeepers. Non-confidential summaries of the information submitted by gatekeepers 
in line with Article 14 DMA were published on the Commission’s website for nine of 
those submissions43, along with the notification date and the identity of the undertakings. 

(59)  Notably,  several  submissions,  received  in  line  with  Article 14  DMA,  concerned 
agreements relating to the acquisition of talent, a practice that is also known as ‘acqui-
hiring’44.  Such  transactions  can  take  different  forms.  They  typically  involve  hiring 
agreements  for  key  staff  in  the  target  company  but  do  not  always  involve  the 
acquisition  of  shares  or  assets  of  the  target  company.  Whether  an  ‘acqui-hiring’ 
transaction constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation 
(EC) 139/2004 is not always clear and may require a thorough case-by-case analysis45. 

(60)  Article 14 DMA enhances transparency on acquisitions by gatekeepers and allows the 
Commission to identify broader acquisition trends in the digital sector. Furthermore, 
the  Commission  shares  information  on  acquisitions  with  Member  States.  These,  in 
turn, may use this information for national merger-control purposes. Where Member 
States have national jurisdiction, it remains possible for national competent authorities 
(‘NCAs’) to refer concentrations to the Commission. 

IV. 

ASSESSEMENT  OF  THE  AUDITED  DESCRIPTION  OF  CONSUMER 
PROFILING TECHNIQUES 

(61)  Under  Article 15  DMA,  gatekeepers  are  required  to  submit  to  the  Commission  an 
independently audited description of any techniques for profiling consumers that they 
apply  to,  or  across,  any  of  the  core  platform  services  listed  in  their  designation 
decisions in line with Article 3(9) DMA. They should also publish an overview of the 
description. The deadline for submitting the audited descriptions and publishing the 
overview is six months after the designation decision. Gatekeepers are also required 
to update these documents on an annual basis going forward. 

(62)  The Commission was prepared to offer guidance and provided advice to gatekeepers 

in preparation for their reporting obligations, as part of pre-compliance discussions. 

(63)  The  six  gatekeepers  designated  on  5 September  2023  needed  to  submit  the  audited 
description of their reports to the Commission and publish the corresponding public 
overviews  by  7 March  2024.  By  that  date,  the  Commission  had  received  audited 
descriptions  of  such  reports  from  Alphabet,  Amazon,  Apple,  Meta,  and  Microsoft. 
ByteDance’s audited description followed with some delay, of which the Commission 
was previously informed, on 9 April 2024. Booking Holdings, designated on 13 May 
2024,  submitted  its  audited  description  and  published  the  corresponding  public 
overview on 13 November 2024. As required by Article 15(1) DMA, the Commission 
duly sent all audited descriptions to the European Data Protection Board (‘EDPB’). 

(64)  The Commission provided feedback to gatekeepers on their audited reports and will 
continue to analyse all material submitted by gatekeepers to the Commission in line 
with  Article 15  DMA.  The  Commission  will  consider  follow-up  measures  where 
appropriate, such as updating the template46. It will also continue to engage with the 

43 The remaining 2024 submissions will be published in 2025 on a rolling basis and not earlier than four months 
after receipt of the information. 
44 See, for example, Microsoft / Inflection AI, Inc., reported under Article 14 DMA on 17 October 2024. 
45 For instance, in Microsoft / Inflection, the Commission considered that the transaction involved all necessary 
assets to transfer Inflection’s market position to Microsoft and concluded that the transaction amounts to a 
concentration under Article 3 of Regulation (EC) 139/2004. See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4727. 
46 https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
12/Article%2015%20DMA%20Template%20%28consumer%20profiling%20report%29.pdf 

11 

 
 
 
EDPB  and  the  HLG  regarding  Article 15  DMA  as  a  potential  area  of  interest  for, 
among  others,  European  and  national  data  protection  and  consumer  enforcement 
authorities. 

V. 

COOPERATION  BETWEEN  THE  COMMISSION  AND  NATIONAL 
AUTHORITIES 

(65)  The DMA lays down the general principles governing its interplay with other relevant 
Union  legal  instruments,  such  as  competition,  data  protection,  and  consumer 
protection  law.  These  principles  are  outlined  in  Articles  1(5)  and  1(6)  DMA. 
Moreover, Article 37 DMA provides that the Commission and Member States should 
work in close cooperation and coordinate their enforcement actions to ensure coherent, 
effective, and complementary enforcement. Article 38 DMA requires the Commission 
and  NCAs  enforcing  competition  rules  to  cooperate  with  each  other  through  the 
European Competition Network (‘ECN’). 

(66)  In line with Article 38 DMA, the Commission cooperated and coordinated closely with 
NCAs through the ECN, continuing a long history of close cooperation through this 
framework dating back more than 20 years. In particular, the Commission and NCAs 
kept each other systematically informed about their respective enforcement actions, in 
line with Article 38(1) DMA. Thanks to this exchange of information and the working 
of  the  ECN,  the  Commission  and  NCAs  cooperated  and  coordinated  well  and 
effectively in 2024. 

(67)  In 2024, the Commission received from NCAs one notification, pursuant to Article 
38(2)  DMA,  of  an  intention  to  launch  an  investigation  on  a  gatekeeper  based  on 
national laws referred in Article 1(6) DMA, and two notifications, pursuant to Article 
38(3) DMA, of an intention to impose obligations on gatekeepers based on the same 
laws. These notifications were submitted in addition to the notifications from NCAs 
under Regulation 1/2003. 

VI. 

THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP FOR THE DIGITAL MARKETS ACT47 

(68)  The High-Level Group for the Digital Markets Act (‘HLG’) was set up by Commission 
Decision of 23 March 2023 based on Article 40 DMA48. The HLG is composed of the 
European bodies and networks identified in the DMA and has been set up as a group of 
experts, in compliance with the Commission Decision establishing horizontal rules on 
the creation and operation of Commission expert groups49. The HLG is chaired by the 
Commission, which also offers secretariat support. The HLG aims to support coherent 
and  effective  implementation  of  the  DMA  and  other  sector-specific  regulations 
applicable to gatekeepers. 

(69)  The HLG also plays a relevant role in identifying and evaluating interactions between 
the  DMA  and  sector-specific  rules.  Moreover,  the  Commission  can  leverage  the 
expertise  of  relevant  sectoral  bodies  and  networks  during  potential  market 
investigations into new services and practices50. 

(70)  In  2024,  three  thematic  subgroups  were  established  focused  on  data-related 
obligations,  Article  7  DMA  (interoperability),  and  artificial  intelligence  (‘AI’)51.  In 
total, the three subgroups held seven meetings, in addition to the plenary session that 

47 In the context of the DMA, the High-Level Group for the Digital Markets Act is synonymous with the High-
Level Group of Digital Regulators. 
48 https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-03/High_Level_Group_on_the_DMA_0.pdf 
49 Commission Decision C(2016) 3301 final establishing horizontal rules on the creation and operation of 
Commission expert groups. 
50 Ibid. Art. 40(7). 
51 The work of the subgroups is guided by individual terms of reference. 

12 

 
 
 
took place in March52. 

(71)  Regarding  the  plenary’s  work,  members  of  the  HLG  endorsed  their  first  joint 
statement, highlighting the HLG’s position on AI. The statement clarifies that, to the 
extent  AI  systems  are  integrated  into  designated  core  platform  services,  DMA 
obligations will apply to them53. 

(72)  Major  developments  in  the  field  of  AI  prompted  the  setting-up  of  the  AI-related 
subgroup, which held its first meeting in October 2024. This provided an opportunity 
to invite gatekeepers to showcase their AI initiatives and respond to questions from 
HLG members54. This was also an opportunity for the Union’s AI Office to present the 
AI Act and AI Board, while HLG members discussed ongoing work on AI taking place 
within their networks or bodies. 

(73)  The data-related obligations subgroup held four meetings in 202455. Key areas of focus 
included  the  obligation  to  obtain  consent  for  the  combination  of  data  between 
designated  services  and  distinct  services  as  provided  for  in  Article 5(2)  DMA, 
including Meta’s implementation and the interplay of this provision with the GDPR56. 
After a mandate extension by HLG members, this particular subgroup has broadened 
its  mandate  since  its  second  meeting57.  The  mandate  now  also  covers  the 
Commission’s work regarding data access and portability, as well as the sharing of 
ranking,  query,  click,  and  view  data  by  online  search  engines.  Discussions  further 
touched on the consumer profiling reports submitted by gatekeepers under the DMA 
and the EDPB – Commission Joint Guidance on the interplay between the GDPR and 
DMA, with the latter being also presented in the Article 7 subgroup. 

(74)  Further to this, the Article 7 subgroup convened in April and September 2024, where 
discussions  centred on the latest  developments  regarding compliance by  designated 
number-independent interpersonal communication services58, including the reference 
offer and effective user discovery mechanisms. 

(75)  A key conclusion emphasised at both the plenary and subgroup levels is the need to 
ensure  seamless  cooperation  across  different  policy  instruments  and  prevent 
gatekeepers  from  exploiting  one  policy  to  evade  another.  Looking  ahead,  the  HLG 
formats will facilitate the necessary cooperation and coordination to ensure that DMA 
enforcement remains robust and predictable. 

52 For more details of each HLG plenary or subgroup meeting, including agendas and meeting minutes, see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-register/screen/expert-
groups/consult?lang=en&groupId=3904&fromMembers=true&memberType=5&memberId=111640. 
53 Moreover, the document identifies directions for cooperation as well as key areas relevant to AI needing 
complementary monitoring and coordinated enforcement. 
54 With Apple, Microsoft, and Meta attending in person, while Alphabet sent a briefing note shared with the 
HLG members. 
55 In February, April, September, and October 2024. 
56 In this respect, the EDPB presented Opinion 08/2024 on Valid Consent in the Context of Consent or Pay 
Models Implemented by Large Online Platforms, adopted on 17 April 2024. 
57 Including Articles 6(9), 6(10), and 6(11), alongside Article 5(2). 
58 "Over-the-top (OTT) messaging services" or simply "messaging apps". 

13