COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2024
Date: 2025-04-25
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, EU financial instrument, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of restrictive practices, merger control, restriction on competition, single market, twin transition

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.4.2025  SWD(2025) 102 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT   Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Report on Competition Policy 2024 {COM(2025) 181 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 5 

I.  LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................... 5 

1.  Antitrust and cartels ............................................................................................................. 5 

1.1. Review of antitrust rules and guidance ........................................................................ 7 

1.2. Significant judgments by EU Courts in antitrust enforcement ..................................... 9 

1.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in cartel enforcement ....................................... 14 

1.4. The fight against cartels remains a top priority .......................................................... 16 

1.5. Cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national Courts .. 17 

2.  Merger control ................................................................................................................... 19 

2.1. Recent enforcement trends ......................................................................................... 19 

2.2. Review of merger control rules and guidance ............................................................ 21 

2.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in merger control ............................................. 21 

3.  State aid control ................................................................................................................. 22 

3.1. State aid for horizontal objectives .............................................................................. 23 

3.2. Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework to support transition towards a net-zero economy
 ........................................................................................................................................... 30 

3.3.  Application  of  the  phased-out  Temporary  Framework  for  State  aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy during the COVID-19 pandemic........................................................................ 31 

3.4. Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) .................................................................... 31 

3.5. Significant judgments by EU Courts in State aid ....................................................... 31 

3.6. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts ...................................... 35 

4.  The Foreign Subsidy Regulation ....................................................................................... 37 

4.1. Context ....................................................................................................................... 37 

4.2. Enforcement ............................................................................................................... 38 

5.  The Digital Markets Act .................................................................................................... 41 

5.1. Context ....................................................................................................................... 41 

5.2. Enforcement ............................................................................................................... 42 

6.  Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy .................................. 45 

6.1. Multilateral relations .................................................................................................. 45 

6.2. Bilateral relations........................................................................................................ 46 

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7.  Supporting EU Competition Law Enforcement ................................................................ 47 

7.1. Digital Transformation ............................................................................................... 47 

7.2. Single Market Programme .......................................................................................... 49 

7.3. Staff Report on ‘Protecting competition in a changing world’ .................................. 49 

7.4. Ex post evaluation: study on ‘killer acquisitions’ in the pharma sector ..................... 51 

7.5. External Communication and Advocacy .................................................................... 52 

7.6. Estimation of the benefits of EU competition law enforcement for citizens ............. 53 

II.  SECTORAL OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 54 

1.  ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................ 54 

1.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 54 

1.2. Effective competition in the green economy. ............................................................. 55 

1.3. Secure energy supply .................................................................................................. 62 

1.4 Effective competition in energy markets ..................................................................... 63 

2. 

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA .................................... 64 

2.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 64 

2.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 65 

3.  FINANCIAL SERVICES ........................................................................................................ 71 

3.1. Overview of key challenges in the sector ................................................................... 71 

3.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 72 

4.  TAXATION AND STATE AID ................................................................................................ 78 

4.1. Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance, and fiscal aid ................ 78 

4.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 79 

5.  BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING ....................................................................... 82 

5.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 82 

5.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 83 

6.  AGRI-FOOD AND FISHERIES .............................................................................................. 85 

6.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 85 

6.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 86 

7.  PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES ..................................................................... 91 

7.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 91 

7.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 91 

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8.  TRANSPORT, POST AND OTHER SERVICES ........................................................................ 95 

8.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors ................................................................. 95 

8.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges ............................ 95 

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INTRODUCTION 

The present Staff Working Document (SWD) is composed of two parts. The first part presents the main 
legislative and policy developments in 2024 across the three competition instruments: State aid, antitrust 
(including cartels) and mergers. It also includes developments as regards to Single Market instruments: 
the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Foreign Subsidy Regulation (FSR). The second part focuses on 
specific enforcement actions in different sectors in 2024.  

I.  LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 

1. 

ANTITRUST AND CARTELS 

Articles 101, 102 and 106 TFEU 
According to Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), anti-competitive agreements are 
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market. Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements with an anti-competitive object 
or  effect  where  companies  coordinate  their  behaviour  instead  of  competing  independently.  However,  an  agreement  that 
restricts competition may be exempted from the prohibition under Article 101(3) TFEU if it ultimately fosters competition 
(for example by promoting technical progress or by improving distribution). 

Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse of a dominant position. It is not in itself illegal for an undertaking to be in a dominant 
position or to acquire such a position. Dominant undertakings, as any other undertaking in the market, are entitled to compete 
on  the  merits.  However,  Article  102  TFEU  prohibits  the  abusive  behaviour  by  dominant  undertakings  that,  for  example, 
directly or indirectly imposes unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions, or limits production, markets 
or technical development.  

Finally, in relation to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Article 
106 TFEU prevents Member States from enacting or maintaining in force measures contrary to the Treaty rules. 

The effective enforcement of the EU antitrust rules is of vital importance for a green, digital and resilient 
EU economy. Antitrust enforcement can indeed contribute to bringing down remaining barriers to the 
Single Market, removing restrictions to competitive and affordable clean technologies and the free flow 
of products and capitals necessary for the circular economy as well as ensuring that digital markets are 
contestable.  

The  graphs  below  give  an  overview  of  antitrust  enforcement  activity  in  the  past  ten  years,  including 
decisions rejecting complaints and letters informing complainants of the Commission’s intention to reject 
their complaint1. 

1  Pursuant  to  Article  7(1)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  773/2004,  where  the  Commission  considers  that  on  the  basis  of  the 
information in its possession there are insufficient grounds for acting on a complaint, it is to inform the complainant of its 
reasons  and  set  a  time-limit within  which  the  complainant  may  make  known  its  views  in  writing.  This  letter  may  not  be 
followed by a decision rejecting the complaint, if a complainant withdraws the complaint or fails to make known its views 
within the relevant time-limit. Figures for these letters are provided only for the past five years. 

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Figure 1: Antitrust and cartel decisions 2015-2024  

Figure 2: Rejection of complaint decisions 2015-2024 

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Rejection of complaint decisions

12

5

4

9

7

5

3

2

5

3

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Figures include decisions under Article 7(2) and Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004
Source: Directorate-General for Competition

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Figure 3: Rejection of complaint letters 2020-20242 

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Rejection of complaint letters

9

10

5

5

14

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

Figures include only letters adopted under Article 7(1) of Regulation (EC) No 773/2004
Source: Directorate-General for Competition

Alongside  enforcement,  in  2024,  the  Commission  continued  with  its  review  agenda  to  ensure  that 
competition rules remain fit for purpose to protect fair competition and aligned with the objectives of a 
green, digital and resilient EU economy.  

1.1. Review of antitrust rules and guidance 

1.1.1.  Evaluation of Regulation 1/2003 completed 

Regulation  1/20033  and  its  implementing  act,  Regulation  773/20044  establish  a  procedural  framework 
aimed at ensuring the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On 5 September 
2024, a Staff Working Document summarising the findings of the evaluation was published5. 

The evaluation, initiated in March 2022, aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the antitrust procedural 
framework in light of the changes to the economic landscape over the past 20 years, such as digitalisation 
and globalisation. As part of the process, information was collected to understand how the regulations have 
functioned since they entered into force in 2004. A public consultation was held in 2022, followed by a 
conference on the 20 years of Regulation 1/2003 in June 2023 and a stakeholder workshop in October 
2023.  

Throughout the evaluation, the national competition authorities of the Member States (NCAs) were closely 
associated. An external evaluation support study was commissioned: its final report was published together 
with the Staff Working Document. 

2 The figures included in Figure 3 include rejection of complaint letters (Article 7(1)) which have been followed by a decision 
rejecting the complaint (Article 7(2)) mentioned in Figure 2. 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L, 4.1.2003, p. 1. 
4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7.4.2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant 
to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 18. 
5 
See: 
evaluation_en  

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13431-EU-antitrust-procedural-rules-

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The Staff Working Document concludes that the Regulations have overall performed well and attained 
their  objectives  of  effective  and  uniform  application  of  Articles  101  and  102  TFEU,  both  through  the 
changes they brought to the Commission’s enforcement powers and by empowering NCAs to enforce EU 
competition rules. The evaluation also identified certain areas for reflection, to ensure that competition 
enforcement  keeps  up  with  digitalisation  and  to  ensure  coherent  and  swift  antitrust  enforcement.  The 
reflection on the evaluation results and possible follow-up actions is ongoing.  

1.1.2.  Work on Guidelines on Article 102 TFEU continued 

Exclusionary abuses harm both businesses and consumers. They lead to higher prices, less innovation and 
poorer quality of goods and services.  

In 2024, the Commission continued working on the Guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance. The 
purpose  of  the  initiative  is  to  systematise  the  case-law  on  Article  102  TFEU  in  order  to  ensure  legal 
certainty and predictability, and to provide operational guidance to companies. The initiative is also meant 
to promote a workable effects-based approach, which is grounded firmly in economic thinking and at the 
same time conducive to a robust and effective enforcement of Article 102 TFEU.  

A draft of the Guidelines was published on 1 August 2024 and stakeholders were invited to submit their 
comments until 31 October 20246. Throughout the initiative, NCAs were closely associated through the 
European Competition Network (ECN) which endorsed the draft Guidelines by means of a joint statement 
on 2 September 20247.  

The Commission will take into account the outcome of the public consultation and the judgments delivered 
by the EU Courts after the publication of the draft in the preparation of the final text of the Guidelines. 

1.1.3.  Evaluation of Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation launched 

The Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER)8 specifies the conditions under which motor 
vehicle spare parts distribution and repair and maintenance service agreements are exempted from the 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Supplementary Guidelines provide detailed guidance on the 
interpretation of the MVBER9. In April 2023, the Commission prolonged the MVBER for five years until 
31 May 202810. 

In 2024, the evaluation of the MVBER was launched, with a call for evidence published on 27 May 2024 
and an evaluation support study commissioned with the JRC (Joint Research Center)11. 

1.1.4.  Evaluation of rules on technology transfer agreements completed 

6 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2024-article-102-guidelines_en  
7 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/european-competition-network_en  
8 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27.5.2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ L 129, 
28.5.2010, p. 52 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/822 of 17 April 2023 on amending Regulation (EU) No 
461/2010 as regards its period of application, OJ L 102I, 17.4.2023, p. 1. 
9 Commission Notice on supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor 
vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles, OJ C 138, 28.5.2010, p. 16 as amended by 
Communication from the Commission Amendments to the Commission Notice – Supplementary guidelines on vertical 
restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for motor vehicles 
2023/C 133 I/01, OJ C 133I , 17.4.2023, p. 1. 
10 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2248  
11  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14126-Motor-Vehicle-Block-Exemption-
Regulation-evaluation_en  

8 

 
 
In 2024, the evaluation of the antitrust rules on technology transfer agreements (the Technology Transfer 
Block Exemption Regulation (TTBER)12 which  exempts certain technology transfer agreements from 
the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU, and the accompanying Guidelines (TTGL)) was finalised13.  

As part of the evaluation process, various fact-finding exercises were carried out to gather evidence on 
the functioning of the TTBER and the TTGL including a call for evidence, a questionnaire addressed to 
NCAs,  a  public  consultation  and  a  workshop.  An  external  evaluation  support  study  was  also 
commissioned. 

On  22  November  2024,  a  Staff  Working  Document14  setting  out  the  findings  of  evaluation  on  the 
functioning of the TTBER and the TTGL was published. The evaluation showed that the TTBER and the 
TTGL have been largely successful in ensuring the effective, efficient and uniform application of EU 
competition rules to technology transfer agreements. At the same time, the evaluation also showed that 
the  two  instruments  could  be  improved  in  certain  areas  to  increase  legal  certainty  and  reflect  recent 
market developments. The Commission will review the Technology Transfer framework to ensure that 
companies have clear, simple and up-to-date rules for procompetitive technology licensing agreements, 
thereby facilitating technology dissemination, incentivising initial R&D, and promoting innovation.  

1.2. Significant judgments by EU Courts in antitrust enforcement  

In 2024, the EU Courts adopted significant rulings regarding the enforcement of antitrust rules.  

1.2.1.  Anticompetitive agreements under Article 101 TFEU 

On 18 January 2024, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Lietuvos notarų rūmai15, in response 
to  a  preliminary  reference  from  the  Supreme  Administrative  Court  of  Lithuania  concerning  the 
application of Article 101 TFEU to rules adopted by the Chamber of Notaries of Lithuania. The Court of 
Justice first confirmed that notaries, in so far as they are engaged in a liberal profession involving the 
provision  of  services  for  remuneration,  are  in  principle  engaged  in  an  economic  activity  and  can  be 
regarded as undertakings. Then, the Court held that a decision by an association of notaries aiming to 
establish a mechanism for calculating the amount of notaries’ fees, which requires notaries, with respect 
to certain activities, to apply the highest price in the range provided by the relevant Minister, constitutes 
a restriction of competition by object. Finally, in relation to fines, the Court found that Article 101 TFEU 
precludes  an  NCA  from  imposing,  in  respect  of  an  infringement  committed  by  an  association  of 
undertakings, individual fines on undertakings members of the governing body of that association where 
those undertakings are not joint perpetrators of the infringement. However, the Court noted that NCAs 
can, in order to impose a dissuasive penalty, rely on the mechanisms set by Article 23 of Regulation 
1/2003 for calculating fines for associations of undertakings16. 

On 29 July 2024, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Banco BPN/BIC Português17, in response 
to  a  preliminary  reference  from  the  Portuguese  Competition,  Regulation  and  Supervision  Court, 

12 Commission Regulation (EU) No 316/2014 of 21 March 2014 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to categories of 
technology transfer agreements, OJ L 93, 28.3.2014, p. 17. 
13  Communication  from  the  Commission  —  Guidelines  on  the  application  of  Article  101  TFEU  to  technology  transfer 
agreements, OJ C 89, 28.3.2014, p. 3. 
14 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6003  
15 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 18.1.2024 in Case C-128/21, Lietuvos notarų rūmai, ECLI:EU:C:2024:49. 
16 Pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 (see ft 3), where an infringement of an association of undertakings relates 
to the activities of its members, the 10% turnover limit should be calculated taking into account the sum of the total turnover 
achieved by each member active on the market affected by the infringement of the association. 
17  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  29.07.2024  in  Case  C‑298/22,  Banco  BPN  v  BIC  Português  and  Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:638. 

9 

 
 
concerning  unlawful  exchanges  of  information.  The  Court  found  that  a  stand-alone  exchange  of 
information between competitors may constitute a restriction of competition, including by object. In the 
judgment, the Court first recalled that each economic operator must determine independently the policy 
which it intends to adopt on the market. Then, it noted that – for an exchange of information to be by its 
very nature harmful to competition – it must enable operators participating in the exchange to remove 
uncertainty  as  to  the  future  conduct  of  other  market  operators.  To  that  end,  it  is  sufficient  that  the 
information exchanged is confidential, meaning not already known to any economic operator active on 
the market concerned, and strategic, namely that it may reveal the strategy that some of the participants 
to  the  exchange  intend  to  implement.  In  this  regard,  the  Court  also  noted  that  information  related  to 
current  or  past  events  may  be  regarded  as  strategic  if  the  participant  to  the  exchange  receiving  the 
information may infer from it with sufficient precision the future conduct of other participants. 

On 19 September 2024, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Booking.com (Deutschland)18, in 
response  to  a  preliminary  reference  from  the  District  Court  of  Amsterdam  concerning  inter  alia  the 
possible qualification of price parity clauses as ancillary restraints. The Court held that neither wide19 
nor narrow20 price parity clauses imposed on hotels by online hotel booking platforms can be classified 
as ancillary restraints, as they are neither (i) objectively necessary for the main operation of providing 
online hotel reservation services nor (ii) proportionate to its objective. In support of its finding, the Court 
noted  that  Booking.com’s  services  had  not  been  compromised  by  the  prohibition  of  its  price  parity 
clauses in several Member States. It also held that the fact that the absence of price parity clauses might 
negatively impact the profitability of the platform or that the clauses combat possible free riding or are 
indispensable to achieve efficiencies is not sufficient to enable them to be classified as ancillary restraints. 

1.2.2.  Abuses of dominance under Article 102 TFEU 

On 10 September 2024, the Court of Justice dismissed Google’s appeal in Google Shopping21, and upheld 
the 2017 Commission’s decision22. The Commission had found that Google had given preference, on its 
general  search  results  pages,  to  the  results  of  its  own  comparison-shopping  service  over  those  of 
competing comparison-shopping services. Google promoted results from its own comparison-shopping 
service in a primary position in ‘boxes’ with accompanying image and text information. By contrast, the 
search results for competing comparison-shopping services appeared as simple generic results displayed 
as blue links. Google engaged in this behaviour in 13 countries in the European Economic Area (EEA). 
The Commission concluded that Google had abused its dominant position and imposed a fine of EUR 
2.4 billion. Google and its parent company Alphabet challenged the Commission’s decision before the 
General Court. In a judgment of November 2021, the General Court largely dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the fine. In its judgment upholding the Commission’s decision, the Court of Justice recalled that 
EU  law  does  not  sanction  the  existence  of  a  dominant  position  per  se,  but  only  the  abuse  of  such  a 
position. The Court of Justice stated that, in principle, a dominant firm which treats its own products or 
services more favourably than it treats those of its competitors cannot be in itself regarded as an abuse of 
its dominant market position. However, the Court of Justice found that in the light of the characteristics 

18  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  19.9.2024  in  Case  C-264/23,  Booking.com  and  Booking.com  (Deutschland), 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:764. 
19 Clauses prohibiting hotels from offering rooms through both their own sales channels and sales channels operated by third 
parties at prices lower than those offered on online hotel reservation platforms. 
20 Clauses prohibiting hotels from offering rooms through their own sales channels at prices lower than those offered on online 
hotel reservation platforms. 
21 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10.9.2024 in Case C-48/22, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping), 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:726.  
22 Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping). 

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of the market and the specific circumstances of the case, Google’s conduct was discriminatory and did 
not  constitute  competition  on  the  merits.  The  Court  of  Justice  also  upheld  the  fine  imposed  by  the 
Commission.  

On 18 September 2024, the General Court rendered its judgment in Google AdSense23 and annuled the 
Commission's decision of 20 March 2019 in its entirety24. The case concerned three types of contractual 
clauses included in a large number of contracts between Google and publishers. The first clause required 
publishers to source search ads exclusively from  Google AdSense. The second required publishers to 
give particular prominence to search ads supplied by Google AdSense in results pages. The third clause 
required publishers to seek Google's approval before making changes to the display of competing search 
ads. The General Court's main reasoning for annulling the Commission's decision was the finding that 
the Commission failed to consider all the relevant factors when determining the duration of the contracts 
containing the relevant clauses. In particular the Commission failed to take proper account of the impact 
of  renewals  and  extensions  of  contracts,  as  well  as  of  early  termination  rights.  The  General  Court 
considered  that  the  Commission  failed  to  verify  whether  these  factors  in  fact  granted  Google's 
competitors sufficient opportunities to compete. 

Also on 18 September 2024, the General Court largely upheld the Commission's decision in Qualcomm 
(predation)25. In 2019, the Commission had imposed on Qualcomm – a company active in the production 
of  chipsets  -  a  fine  of  approximately  EUR  242  million  for  abusing  its  dominant  position  to  drive  its 
competitor Icera out of the market. In its judgment, the General Court confirmed that the Commission 
did not breach Qualcomm’s rights of defence, and that the duration of the investigation was not excessive 
given the case’s complexity. The General Court also endorsed the Commission’s market definition and 
clarified that the Commission is not required to perform a SSNIP26 test when defining the relevant market 
for the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU. As regards Qualcomm’s abusive conduct, the General 
Court noted that, according to established case-law, prices below average total costs (ATC) but above 
average variable costs (AVC) are abusive if they are part of a plan to eliminate a competitor. The Court 
confirmed that the Commission could use Qualcomm’s long-run average incremental costs (LRAIC) as 
a benchmark to establish the existence of predatory pricing, considering the evidence of Qualcomm’s 
intent to exclude Icera. Furthermore, it ruled that the Commission does not need to conduct a separate 
‘as-efficient competitor’ test in predatory pricing cases, as this is included in assessing whether prices 
were set below the relevant cost benchmark. Finally, the Court found that, in calculating the fine, the 
Commission deviated slightly from its Fining Guidelines27 without justification. On that basis, the Court 
reduced the fine imposed on Qualcomm to approximately EUR 238.73 million. 

In  Intel,  on  24  October  2024  the  Court  of  Justice  dismissed  the  Commission’s  appeal28  against  the 
General Court’s judgment that partially annulled its 2009 decision29 finding that Intel abused its dominant 
position.  The  General  Court  had  annulled  the  Commission’s  findings  concerning  Intel’s  conditional 
rebates in the market for x86 CPUs, but confirmed that Intel's naked restrictions amounted to an abuse 

23 Judgment of the General court of 18.9.2024 in Case T-334/19,  Google and Alphabet  v Commission (Google AdSense), 
ECLI:EU:T:2024:634. 
24 Case AT.40411, Google AdSense. 
25  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  18.9.2024  in  Case  T-671/19,  Qualcomm  v  Commission  (Qualcomm  –  predation), 
ECLI:EU:T:2024:626 
26 SSNIP stands for ‘small but significant non-transitory increase in price’. 
27 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, 1.9.2006, 
p. 2-5. 
28 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24.10.2024 in Case C-240/22 P, Commission v Intel Corporation, ECLI:EU:C:2024:915.  
29 Case AT.37990, Intel.  

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of dominant position under EU competition rules. The General Court had also annulled the fine imposed 
on Intel in its entirety after concluding that it could not establish the amount of the fine relating only to 
the naked restrictions30. In its ruling, the Court of Justice recalled that it is not the purpose of Article 102 
TFEU to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, a dominant position on one or more 
markets or to ensure that competitors less efficient than the dominant undertaking should remain on the 
market. As regards, in particular, a practice consisting in the grant of loyalty rebates, the Court noted that 
when the dominant undertaking submits, during the administrative procedure, evidence that the practice 
was not capable of producing the alleged exclusionary effects, the Commission is required to analyse not 
only factors such as the extent of the dominant position, the share of market covered by the contested 
rebates and the conditions and arrangements for granting the rebates in question, their duration and their 
amount, but also the possible existence of a strategy aiming to exclude from the market competitors that 
are  at  least  as  efficient  as  the  dominant  undertaking.  In  this  context,  the  Court  of  Justice  found  that 
General Court did not err in its analysis of the errors it found in the ‘as-efficient-competitor test’ and 
therefore did not err in partially annulling the Commission decision. With regard to complex economic 
assessments, the Court noted that the Commission argued that the General Court infringed the discretion 
afforded by the case-law in reviewing such complex economic analyses, as in the case of the rebates 
granted to HP (particularly concerning their duration). Referring to AG Medina’s opinion31, the Court 
noted that the Commission may ‘extrapolate’ data to infer certain elements of the analysis, provided that 
such inferences are based on a concrete and explicit logical pattern. The Court however found that the 
Commission’s  decision  lacked  a  clear  explanation  as  to  why  the  data  used  for  extrapolation  were 
representative of the entire infringement period. 

1.2.3.  Rules on the organisation of sports 

On 4 October 2024, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in FIFA/BZ32, following a preliminary 
reference from the Court of Appeal of Mons (Belgium) concerning FIFA’s regulations on the status and 
transfers of players (RSTP). The RSTP maintain that (i) a football player who terminates its employment 
contract during the contract period is required to pay a compensation to that club, if FIFA subsequently 
decides that the player did so without ‘just cause’; (ii) if a football club initiates proceedings alleging that 
a player terminated a contract without just cause, that player is prevented from being registered in a club 
of a different Member State;  and (iii) any new club employing such a player, inter alia, may be held 
liable to pay the possible compensation to the former club. The Court explained that these rules ensure, 
in  practice,  that  each  club  is  certain  that  it  will  be  able  to  keep  its  own  players  for  as  long  as  the 
employment contract has not reached its term or until it decides to part with them. This causes a drastic 
restriction of cross-border competition in the form of the unilateral recruitment of players who are already 
employed, and therefore of access by clubs to the players. The Court then noted that, while it may be 
legitimate for FIFA to seek to ensure to a certain extent the stability of player rosters in a given season, 
the classic mechanisms of contract law are sufficient to ensure both the ongoing presence of players in 
their clubs and the normal application between clubs of market rules. The Court therefore concluded that 
these rules must be considered as a restriction of competition by object. 

1.2.4.  Antitrust procedure 

30 Judgment of the General Court of 26.1.2022 in  Case T-286/09 RENV, Intel Corporation Inc.  v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2022:19. Following the judgment of the General Court, the Commission adopted on 22 September 2023 a decision 
re-imposing on Intel a fine only for the naked restrictions. The 2023 Commission’s decision has been challenged before the 
General Court (Case T-1129/23, Intel v Commission, currently pending). 
31 Opinion of AG Medina of 18.01.2024 in Case C-240/22 P, Commission v Intel Corporation, ECLI:EU:C: 2024:65. 
32 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4.10.2024 in Case C-650/22, FIFA, ECLI:EU:C:2024:824. 

12 

 
 
On 11 June 2024, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in Deutsche Telekom33. The Court dismissed 
the Commission’s appeal and confirmed the General Court’s judgment which annulled the Commission’s 
decision rejecting Deutsche Telekom’s request for payment of default interest on the excess fine amount 
provisionally paid to the Commission by the company34. The Court noted that the Commission is required 
to repay the amount of the fine unduly collected together with interest for the period from the date of the 
provisional payment to the date of its repayment. This interest aims at compensating at a standard rate 
for the loss of enjoyment of the monies owed and should be paid by the Commission even if the interest 
actually yielded by the annulled part of the fine is negative. As regards which interest rate to apply, the 
Court held that the General Court, in the exercise of its discretion, had correctly applied the interest rate 
of the European Central Bank for its main refinancing operations (ECB REFI rate) plus 3.5 percentage 
points by analogy to the rate set by Article 83(2)(b) of Delegated Regulation No 1268/201235. The Court 
also  highlighted  that,  should  the  Commission  consider  that  the  existing  regulatory  provisions  do  not 
adequately  take  into  account  a  situation  such  as  the  one  in  the  present  case,  it  would  be  for  the 
Commission or the EU legislature to make the necessary adjustments in the interests of legal certainty 
and predictability36. Article 108(4) of the new Financial Regulation37 sets the interest rate applicable to 
situations where a fine provisionally paid has been annulled or reduced by the EU Courts at the ECB 
REFI rate plus 1.5 percentage points. 

On 2 October 2024, the General Court delivered its judgment in Pharol38. The Court dismissed Pharol’s 
action and confirmed in its entirety the re-adoption by the Commission in 2022 of a 2013 decision finding 
that a market sharing agreement between Pharol (at the time named Portugal Telecom) and Telefonica 
infringed  Article  101(1)  TFEU39.  The  Court  first  noted  that  the  assessment  made  in  the  re-adopted 
decision of a non-compete clause between the parties did not breach the principle of res judicata, given 
that  the  judgment  that  annulled  the  first  decision  did  not  address  the  issue.  The  Court  noted  that  the 
principle of res judicata is only applicable to the points of fact and law actually or necessarily settled by 
the  judicial  decision  in  question.  Second,  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  Commission  did  not  breach 
Pharol’s rights of defence in presenting its assessment on the non-compete clause in a Letter of Facts 
(LoF)  rather  than  a  Supplementary  Statement  of  Objections.  The  General  Court  noted  that  a  LoF  is 
sufficient  when  the  Commission  wants  to  corroborate  the  objection  included  in  the  Statement  of 
Objections (SO) with new factual elements. Finally, the General Court confirmed that the Commission 
was right to use, for the calculation of the fines, the same test on potential competition that it used to find 
an infringement. 

33 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 11.6.2024 in Case C-221/22 P, Commission v Deutsche Telekom, ECLI:EU:C:2024:488. 
34 In 2014, the Commission adopted a decisionimposing on Deutsche Telekom a fine of EUR 31.07 million for an abuse of 
dominant  position  on  the  Slovak  market for  broadband  telecommunications  services  (Case  AT.39523  –  Slovak  Telekom). 
Deutsche Telekom challenged that decision while provisionally paying the fine. In 2018, the General Court upheld Deutsche 
Telekom’s action in part and, in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, reduced the fine by approximately EUR 12 million. 
The Commission then repaid that amount to Deutsche Telekom. However, Deutsche Telekom asked the Commission to pay 
default interest on the amount unduly collected for the period starting from the date of provisional payment until the date of 
repayment. 
35 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of application of Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget 
of the Union, OJ L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1–111. 
36 See Case C-221/22 P, Deutsche Telekom, paragraph 89. 
37 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial 
rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast), OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024. 
38 Judgment of the General Court of 02.10.24 in Case T-181/22, Pharol v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:668. 
39 Case AT.39.839 – Telefónica/Portugal Telecom.  

13 

 
 
The  judgments  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  Orlen/Gazprom40  and  Servier41  are  described  below  in  the 
relevant sectoral sections of II. Sectoral Overview. 

1.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in cartel enforcement  

In  2024,  the  EU  Courts  dealt  with  a  number  of  actions  for  annulment  and  appeals  concerning  cartel 
decisions. All judgments rendered in 2024 confirmed the legality of the cases under appeal and decided 
by  the  Courts.  The  judgments  provide  further  support  and  clarifications  on  various  aspects  of  the 
Commission’s enforcement practice and fining policy. Several judgments concerned decisions adopted 
under the so-called hybrid settlement procedure, where the Commission had imposed a fine under the 
normal  prohibition  procedure  against  the  appealing  parties,  after  having  adopted  decisions  under  the 
cartel settlement procedure against other parties to the same cartel.  

On 1 February 2024, the Court of Justice dismissed Scania’s appeal42 relating to the 2017 Commission’s 
decision (Trucks cartel). The Court confirmed the ruling of the General Court which found that a series 
of  conducts  could  be  pursued  as  an  EEA-wide  single  and  continuous  infringement  and  that  the 
Commission  could,  on  that  basis,  impose  a  fine  on  Scania  that  was  not  time-barred.  The  Court  also 
confirmed the legality of the hybrid settlement procedure in this case and dismissed Scania’s claim that 
the General Court had erred in law by failing to acknowledge that the Commission had infringed Article 
(41)1  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union43  by  continuing  its  investigation 
against Scania (with the same case-team) after the Commission had adopted a settlement decision against 
the other cartelists.  

In Crédit Agricole and Crédit Suisse (SSA Bonds cartel)44, the General Court ruled on 6 November 2024 
on  the  actions  for  annulment  of  Crédit  Agricole  and  Crédit  Suisse.  It  largely  upheld  the  2021 
Commission’s  decision,  and  reduced  the  duration  of  Crédit  Agricole’s  infringement  by  one  day.  The 
General Court therefore annulled the fine imposed by the Commission but imposed a fine of the exact 
same amount. The judgment clarified a number of elements that are relevant for the legal assessment of 
most cartel cases, including the notions of restriction by object and of single and continuous infringement. 
The Court found that the Commission needs to show a ’sufficient degree’ of harmfulness to competition 
but  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  same  type  of  conduct  has  already  been  found  to  constitute  an 
infringement in order for it to be regarded as a restriction by object. Moreover, the Court held that the 
Commission could find a single and continuous infringement, even though there was a drastic change in 
the pattern and mechanism of the overall plan during the infringement period. The Court also found that 
gaps  between  individual  anticompetitive  contacts  in  this  case  did  not  interrupt  the  continuity  of  the 
infringement. As regards the fine, the Court confirmed that the Commission could use the best available 
figures as a proxy for the value of sales. In such a case, it is not sufficient for the parties to simply show 

40 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26.9.2024 in Case C-255/22 P, Orlen v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:790. See below 
II. Sectoral overview, section 1.4 Effective competition in energy markets. 
41 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27.6.2024 in Case C-176/19 P, Commission v Servier and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2024:549, 
and other judgments relating to the same Commission’s decision. See below II. Sectoral overview, section 7.2. Contribution 
of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges. 
42 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 1.2.2024 in case C-251/22 P, Scania AB, Scania CV AB, Scania Deutschland GmbH v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:103. 
43 Pursuant to Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 202, 7.6.2016), every person 
has the right to have his  or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies of the Union. 
44 Judgment of the General Court of 6.11.2024 in Cases T-386/21 and T-406/21, Crédit Agricole and Others v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2024:776. 

14 

 
 
shortcomings in the Commission’s data; they would need to demonstrate that there are in fact better data 
than those used by the Commission.  

In HSBC (Euro Interest Rate Derivatives cartel)45, the General Court dismissed on 27 November 2024 
the action for annulment by HSBC and confirmed the 2021 Commission’s decision re-imposing a fine. 
In 2019, the General Court had upheld the Commission’s decision on substance but partially annulled 
the prohibition decision (hybrid settlement decision adopted in 2016), since the Commission had failed 
to properly explain part of the methodology used to set the fine (an adjustment factor used to reduce the 
proxy value of sales)46. In 2021, the Commission re-adopted that part of the prohibition decision and re-
imposed  a  fine.  In  the  meantime,  the  Court  of  Justice  also  endorsed  the  Commission’s  decision  on 
substance, following an appeal by HSBC against the 2019 judgment47.  

In Canned Vegetable48, the General Court dismissed on 4 September 2024 the action for annulment by 
Conserve  Italia  (an  agricultural  cooperative)  against  the  2021  Commission’s  decision.  The  appeal 
concerned the turnover used to calculate the maximum fine that the Commission can impose in situations 
involving the activities of an association of undertakings. The Court confirmed that the Commission was 
right to base the 10% fining cap on Conserve Italia’s own consolidated turnover pursuant to the second 
indent of Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003, and not on the sum of the turnover of its (indirect) members, 
since  the  infringement  related  to  an  economic  activity  carried  out  by  Conserve  Italia,  and  not  by  its 
members.  

Furthermore, in  Crown/Silgan (Metal Packaging  cartel), the General  Court dealt with  the actions for 
annulment by the two settling parties Crown and Silgan against the settlement decision adopted by the 
Commission  in  202249. Crown and Silgan questioned the Commission’s competence to  deal  with  the 
case,  since  the  investigation  had  been  started  by  the  German  national  competition  authority  and  re-
allocated  to  the  Commission  more  than  two  months  thereafter,  that  is  the  period  indicated  in  the 
Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities50. In the judgments of 
2 October 2024, the General Court fully upheld the  Commission’s decision, after concluding that the 
Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities does not give rise to 
any legitimate expectations that a re-allocation of a case would take place within a two month period. In 
this case, the Commission had also introduced a counterclaim and requested the Court to increase the 
fine by 10%. The Commission argued that the actions frustrated the efficiencies gained in the settlement 
procedure which had been rewarded with the 10% settlement reduction. The General Court confirmed 
that the Commission can request the Court to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction and increase the fine in 
subsequent litigation, irrespective of whether the applicants have requested a fine reduction. The General 
Court  however  dismissed  the  counterclaim  due  to  case-specific  circumstances,  finding  that  the 
Commission had not sufficiently justified its claim.  

45  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  27.11.2024  in  Case  T-561/21,  HSBC  Holdings  and  Others  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2024:869. 
46  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  24.9.2019  in  Case  T-105/17,  HSBC  Holdings  plc  and  Others  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2019:675. 
47 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 12.1.2023 in Case C-883/19 P, HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC Bank plc, HSBC Continental 
Europe, formerly HSBC France v European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2023:11. 
48  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  of  4.9.2024  in  Case  T-59/22,  Conserve  Italia  and  Conserves  France  v  European 
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:574. 
49 Judgments of the General Court of 2.10.2024 in Case T-587/22, Crown Holdings and Crown Cork & Seal Deutschland v 
European Commission ECLI:EU:T:2024:661, and in Case T-589/22 Silgan Holdings and Others v European Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2024:662. 
50 Commission Notice on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43-53. 

15 

 
 
1.4. The fight against cartels remains a top priority 

Cartels cause an immense damage to the EU economy and harm businesses and consumers. The detection 
and sanction of cartels therefore remains a core mission for the Commission. Cartel enforcement is even 
more important at a time when companies are adjusting to new market realities, since the temptation to 
collude risks to increase.  

In 2024, the Commission advanced a diversified portfolio of cartel cases, covering different sectors and 
conducts. It also launched new investigations, either following leniency applications or based on leads 
obtained from its own ex officio activities, resulting in the adoption of one decision, two statements of 
objections  and  new  dawn  raids51.  The  Commission  also  sanctioned,  in  a  separate  fining  decision,  an 
obstruction during a dawn raid. This illustrates the clear determination to act against efforts that seek to 
undermine the Commission’s investigative powers.  

In 2024, the Commission continued to foster its ex officio strategy to detect new cartel cases outside the 
leniency regime. The strategy includes several tools to encourage the reporting of suspicious behaviours 
(including whistleblower tools and outreach activities) and to detect leads through market monitoring 
and close cooperation with other non-competition authorities. These activities benefit from the support 
of the dedicated forensic/intelligence Unit ‘Data Analysis and Technology’ (Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO) team). This investment has led to a growing number of investigations being initiated on the basis 
of the Commission’s ex officio work.  

In parallel, the Commission continued to receive a significant number of leniency applications covering 
a wide range of collusion scenarios. Stakeholders made increasingly use of practical arrangements put in 
place in 2022 to increase the attractiveness of the leniency programme, such as the possibility to contact 
designated  Leniency  Officers  for  informal  advice  and  guidance  and  to  discuss  potential  leniency 
applications on a ‘no-name’ basis. The Commission’s eLeniency tool52 continued to be the primary means 
for  applicants  to  submit  their  statements.  It  ensures  that  leniency  submissions  can  be  filed  and  made 
accessible in a secure online environment 24 hours a day/7 days a week, and facilitates efficient and safe 
two-way interactions between the Commissiona and the parties. Following its reinforcement in 2023, the 
tool is now also used to access documents that would, due to disclosure concerns, only be available at 
the  Commission’s  premises.  This  has  resulted  in  significant  savings  for  both  the  parties  and  the 
Commission.  

On  24  June  2024,  the  Commission  imposed  a  EUR  15.9  million  fine  on  International  Flavors  & 
Fragrances Inc. and International Flavors & Fragrances IFF France SAS (together IFF) for obstructing 
a Commission’s inspection in 202353. The Commission detected, with the support of the CTO forensic 
team,  that  a  senior  IFF  employee  intentionally  deleted,  during  the  inspection,  WhatsApp  messages 
exchanged with a competitor. IFF cooperated actively with the Commission both during the inspection 
(to  retrieve  the  deleted  data)  and  during  the  investigation.  The  fine  was  imposed  in  a  cooperation 
procedure where IFF acknowledged its liability and accepted the fine. The infringement committed by 
IFF  is  of  a  very  serious  nature,  particularly  given  that  the  senior  employee  intentionally  deleted  the 
WhatsApp  messages  after  having  been  informed  of  the  Commission's  inspection.  On  this  basis,  the 
Commission concluded that an overall fine  amounting to  0.3% of  IFF's  total turnover would be  both 
proportionate and deterrent. At the same time, the Commission decided to reward IFF for its proactive 

51  See  unannounced  inspections  in  the  tyres  sector:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_561  and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3365;  and 
sector: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5926.  
52 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/leniency/eleniency_en  
53 Case AT.40882, IFF. 

the  data  center  construction 

in 

16 

 
 
cooperation during and after the inspection and the fine was therefore reduced by 50%. This is the first 
time that the Commission sanctions the deletion of messages exchanged via a consumer communications 
app on a mobile phone. 

On  24  October  2024,  the  Commission  fined  České  dráhy  (ČD)  and  Österreichische  Bundesbahnen 
(ÖBB), the Czech and Austrian rail incumbents, a total of EUR 48.7 million for colluding to prevent a 
new entrant, RegioJet, from accessing used wagons, thereby restricting competition on the rail passenger 
transport market in infringement of Article 101 TFEU54. The Commission found that between 2012 and 
2016, ÖBB and ČD collusively rigged sales procedures for ÖBB’s used railway wagons for long-distance 
passenger  transport.  For  RegioJet,  these  wagons  were  an  important  input  for  competing  on  the  rail 
transport markets in Czechia and on the Prague–Vienna route. 

Furthermore,  in  January  2024,  the  Commission  informed  six  Norwegian  salmon  producers  of  its 
preliminary view that they infringed EU antitrust rules by colluding to distort competition in the market 
for spot sales of Norwegian farmed Atlantic salmon in the EU55. The Commission has concerns that, 
between 2011 and 2019, the six salmon producers exchanged commercially sensitive information relating 
to sales prices, available volumes, sales volumes, production volumes and production capacities, as well 
as other price-setting factors.  

In June 2024, the Commission also informed Alchem International Pvt. Ltd. and its subsidiary Alchem 
International (H.K.) Limited (together Alchem) of its preliminary view that they infringed EU antitrust 
rules by participating in a long-lasting cartel concerning a pharmaceutical ingredient (N-Butylbromide 
Scopolamine/  Hyoscine  -  SNBB)  necessary  to  produce  abdominal  antispasmodic  drugs56.  The 
Commission has concerns that Alchem may have entered into price fixing arrangements, allocation of 
quotas  and  exchange  of  sensitive  information  with  competitors.  In  October  2023,  the  Commission 
already adopted a settlement decision in the same cartel in relation to other cartel participants. 

The Commission stays committed to investigating possible anticompetitive conducts affecting the green 
and  digital  transitions.  In  2024,  the  Commission  continued  its  investigation  into  a  possible  collusion 
between car manufacturers in relation to the collection, treatment and recovery of end-of-life passenger 
vehicles,  launched  through  unannounced  inspections  in  several  Member  States  in  March  202257.  The 
Commission also continued its investigation into the synthetic turf industry in several Member States, 
following unannounced inspections in 202358. 

1.5. Cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national Courts 

1.5.1.  Cooperation with the national competition authorities within the European Competition 
Network 

The  Commission  and  NCAs  coordinate  their  EU  antitrust  enforcement  activities  and  they  cooperate 
through the ECN59. The objective of the network is to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applied 
in  an  effective  and  consistent  manner  against  companies  that  engage  in  business  practices  restricting 
competition and that are liable to affect trade between EU Member States.  

54 Case AT.40401, Second-hand Rolling Stock. 
55 Case AT.40606, Farmed Atlantic Salmon.  
56 Case AT.40636, SNBB. 
57 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1765  
58 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3133  
59 The functioning of the ECN is governed by the Notice on Cooperation within the ECN, the Joint Statement of the Council 
and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities as well as the ECN+ Directive. 

17 

 
 
The two key mechanisms to safeguard the effective and consistent application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU are the NCAs’ obligations (i) to inform the Commission about a new investigation at the stage of 
the  first  formal  investigative  measure,  and  (ii)  to  notify  to  the  Commission  their  envisaged  national 
decisions  applying  those  provisions.  In  2024,  the  Commission  and  the  NCAs  launched  191  new 
investigations. In the same year, the NCAs notified 66 envisaged decisions to the Commission.  

In addition to those cooperation mechanisms, the ECN members regularly meet to inform each other of 
new investigations, and to discuss and exchange views on ongoing investigations, case-law developments 
and various competition policy issues. In 2024, 37 ECN meetings took place. For example, the working 
group  for  digital  investigations  and  AI  promotes  exchanges  between  data  scientists  on  projects  of 
common interest within the ECN.   

1.5.2.  ECN+ Directive  

The ECN+ Directive60 aims to  ensure that NCAs have effective enforcement tools and the  necessary 
resources to detect and sanction companies infringing EU antitrust rules. It also aims to ensure that the 
NCAs can take their decisions in full independence.  

Member States had to transpose the ECN+ Directive into national law by 4 February 2021. By the end 
of 2023, 26 Member States had notified the full transposition of the Directive. Between July 2022 and 
October  2024,  the  Commission  carried  out  compliance  assessments  of  the  national  transposition 
measures.  In  November  2024,  the  Commission  adopted  a  report  on  the  transposition  of  the  ECN+ 
Directive61. The report provides an overview of how the main provisions of the ECN+ Directive have 
been transposed, highlighting the main improvements it brought to the national enforcement systems and 
the main issues identified regarding its transposition.  

The ECN+ Directive also provides national competition authorities with the power to impose interim 
measures.  Interim  measures  ensure  that  competition  is  preserved  while  an  antitrust  investigation  is 
ongoing. In a statement attached to the Directive, the Commission committed to ‘undertake an analysis 
of whether there are means to simplify the adoption of interim measures within the European Competition 
Network’.  The  Commission  issued  its  report  in  September  202462.  It  finds  that  national  competition 
authorities  that  make  more  use  of  interim  measures  often  have  lighter  procedural  rules,  sometimes 
coupled with less stringent legal requirements to impose those measures. 

1.5.3.  Cooperation with national courts 

In  addition  to  its  cooperation  with  the  NCAs  within  the  ECN,  the  Commission  also  cooperates  with 
national courts. The Commission supports national courts in enforcing the EU competition rules in an 
effective  and  consistent  manner  by  providing  case-related  information  or  opinions  on  matters  of 
substance, or by intervening as amicus curiae in proceedings pending before national courts. As part of 
the  evaluation  of  Regulation  1/2003,  the  Commission  services  assessed  the  current  framework  of 
cooperation with national courts63. The evaluation has shown that while the mechanisms for cooperation 
between national courts and the Commission may not have been widely used, they nevertheless provide 
a useful framework that has contributed to the consistent application of EU competition law across the 

60 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11.12.2018 to empower the competition authorities 
of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, OJ L 11, 
14.1.2019, p. 3. 
61 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/european-competition-network/ecn-directive_en  
62 Report on the legal framework for and the use of interim measures by national competition authorities: https://competition-
policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/european-competition-network/ecn-directive_en  
63 See ft 5. 

18 

 
 
EU. In 2024, the Comission intervened by way of amicus curiae before national courts and replied to 
requests by national courts for information or opinion concerning the application of EU competition rules 
under Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/200364. 

1.5.4. 

 Private enforcement 

The Damages Directive65 aims to make it easier for anyone harmed by an infringement of EU antitrust 
rules to  avail of the  right  to  compensation before  the national  courts. Since  its  adoption in  2014,  the 
number of damages actions before national courts has increased significantly and actions for damages 
have become much more widespread in the EU.  

Considering the increasing number of damages actions in the EU, DG Competition launched in summer 
2024  a  study  on  the  development  of  antitrust  damages  actions  in  the  EU  conducted  by  an  external 
consortium. The objective of the study is to take stock of the quantitative and qualitative development of 
private antitrust damages actions across various EU jurisdictions, including their interplay with public 
competitionl law enforcement. 

2. 

MERGER CONTROL 

The purpose of EU merger control is to ensure that market structures remain competitive while enabling smooth restructuring 
of the industry. This applies not only to EU-based companies, but also to any company active on the EU markets. Industry 
restructuring is an important way of fostering efficient allocation of production assets.  However, there are also situations 
where industry consolidation can give rise to harmful effects on competition, taking into account the merging companies’ 
degree of market power and other market features. EU merger control ensures that changes in the market structure which lead 
to harmful effects on competition do not occur.  

EU merger control ensures that companies active in EU markets can compete on fair and equal terms. 
Proposed transactions which may distort competition are subject to close scrutiny by the Commission 
under the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR)66. If necessary to protect competition, the Commission can 
give  merging  companies  the  possibility  to  dispel  competition  concerns  by  offering  commitments.  If 
sufficient commitments cannot be found or agreed upon, the Commission may prohibit the transaction. 
In its assessment, the Commission considers the efficiencies brought about by mergers. Efficiencies may 
have positive effects on costs and innovation, for example,  if they are verifiable, merger-specific and 
likely to be passed on to consumers. 

2.1. Recent enforcement trends  

The  Commission’s  enforcement  activity  remained  at  a  high  level  with  a  total  number  of  398  merger 
decisions adopted in 2024 (401 notifications). Moreover, in 2024 the Commission received 31 reasoned 
submissions by notifying parties in pre-notification, requesting a referral of a case from the Commission 
to  a  NCA  or  vice  versa.  The  Commission  accepted  to  examine  two  transactions  following  a  referral 

64  See:  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/national-courts/amicus-curiae-observations_en,  and 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/national-courts/requests-information-or-opinion_en  
65 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26.11.2014 on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1. 
66  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  139/2004  of  20.1.2004  on  the  control  of  concentrations  between  undertakings,  OJ  L  24, 
29.1.2004, p. 1. 

19 

 
 
 
pursuant  to  Article  22  EUMR67  and  did  not  refer  any  transaction  pursuant  to  Article  9  EUMR  to  be 
examined by NCAs. 

The  vast  majority  of  mergers  notified  in  2024  did  not  raise  competition  concerns  and  were  speedily 
reviewed. The simplified procedure was applied in 88% of all notified transactions under the EUMR. 
Nevertheless, in 2024, the Commission’s merger enforcement was intensive due to the large number of 
notified  transactions  as  well  as  the  complexity  of  a  significant  number  of  cases.  The  Commission 
intervened  in  ten  cases.  Out  of  those,  two  notified  transactions  were  abandoned  by  the  parties  and 
withdrawn  in  Phase  II  during  the  in-depth  investigation.68  A  significant  number  of  non-simplified 
transactions  concerned  already  concentrated  industries.  Reviewing  such  transactions  required  the 
Commission  to  carefully  assess  their  potential  impact  on  competition,  employing  sophisticated 
quantitative techniques and comprehensive qualitative investigative tools. 

In  2024,  the  Commission  opened  in-depth  investigations  (Phase  II)  in  three  cases,  concerning  the 
passenger air transport markets and the market for licensing of broadcasting rights for motorsports events. 

The Commission’s merger enforcement activities increased in comparison to the most recent years. In 
2024, the Commission  adopted  398 merger decisions  in  various sectors of which  351 were approved 
following  a  simplified  procedure.  Among  the  ten  proposed  acquisitions  in  which  the  Commission 
intervened, eight were approved subject to conditions. The Commission did not prohibit any transaction 
in 2024.  

Figure 4: Merger outcome 2015-2024  

67 See Section 2.2. below for developments on Article 22 EUMR in 2024. 
68  Cases  M.10920,  Amazon/iRobot  and  M.11109,  IAG/Air  Europa.  See  the  respective  statements  by  EVP  Vestager 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_521 
and 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_4142  

20 

 
 
 
Most remedies accepted by the Commission in 2024 consisted of divestitures of tangible or intangible 
assets. This confirms the Commission’s general preference for structural  remedies in merger cases as 
they are best suited to address competition concerns arising from a concentration in a durable manner. 

In addition to remedies offered in Phase II investigations, in five instances the Commission also cleared 
transactions  subject  to  remedies  where  the  notifying  parties  offered  comprehensive  remedy  packages 
already in Phase I, including in some complex transactions such as the acquisition of Viterra by Bunge69. 
In this case, the Commission’s clearance was conditional upon the divestment of Viterra’s origination, 
processing and refining assets and personnel in Hungary and Poland.  

2.2. Review of merger control rules and guidance 

2.2.1.  Revised Market Definition Notice adopted 

On  8  February  2024,  the  Commission  adopted  the  revised  Market  Definition  Notice70  (Notice).  The 
revised Notice, replacing the 1997 Notice71, brings the Commission’s guidance in line with new market 
realities, as well as with developments in the Commission’s decisional practice and EU case-law. The 
revised Notice recognises the importance of non-price parameters for market definition, including the 
level of innovation, quality, and sustainability.  

The Notice also outlines the Commission’s approach to market definition in digital markets, for instance 
with respect to multi-sided markets and ‘digital ecosystems’ (for example, products built around a mobile 
operating system including hardware, an application store and software applications), and innovation-
intensive industries, where companies compete on innovation, including through the development of new 
products.  Moreover,  the  Notice  entails  expanded  guidance  on  geographic  market  definition  with 
explanations on when it is appropriate to define markets as global, EEA-wide, and local as well as on 
how to take into account imports when defining the relevant geographic market. 

2.2.2.  Commission withdraws its guidance on Article 22 merger referrals for certain cases 

On  2  December  2024,  the  Commission  withdrew  its  2021  guidance  on  Article  22  EUMR,  which 
encouraged Member States to refer certain types of cases for review by the Commission, even if they did 
not meet the turnover thresholds for EU merger control. This withdrawal followed the Court of Justice’s 
ruling in Illumina72, which found that Member States cannot refer transactions they are not competent to 
review  under  their  national  merger  rules73,  thereby  invalidating  the  Commission’s  revised  approach 
towards referrals under Article 22 EUMR. Moreover, the Commission also removed the accompanying 
Q&As from its Competition website.  

2.3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in merger control 

In ThyssenKrupp, the General Court upheld on 12 February 2024 the Commission’s decision to prohibit 
the joint venture between ThyssenKrupp and Tata Steel.74 The 2019 Commission’s decision was based 
on the concerns that the joint venture would significantly impede effective competition in the European 
steel  market,  particularly  for  automotive  and  packaging  steel  products.  The  Court  confirmed  that  the 
Commission’s  assessment  of  the  likely  anti-competitive  effects  was  correct,  emphasising  that  the 

69  Case  M.11204,  Bunge/Viterra,  see  below  II,  Sectoral  overview,  section  6.2.  Contribution  of  EU  competition  policy  to 
tackling the challenges (Merger enforcement in the agri-food sector). 
70 Communication from the Commission - Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of 
Union competition law (C(2023) 6789, OJ C 22.2.2024, p.1.  
71 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law (97/C 372/03).  
72 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 3.9.2024 in Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:677.  
73 Except where they do not have a merger control regime (e.g., Luxembourg). 
74 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 4.10.2024 in Case C‑581/22 P, Thyssenkrupp AG v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:821. 

21 

 
 
companies had failed to provide sufficient remedies to address these concerns. This judgment is notable 
for  its  support  of  the  Commission’s  approach  to  horizontal  mergers  in  highly  concentrated  markets, 
especially in industries critical to the EU economy, such as steel production. 

In  Illumina,  the  Court  of  Justice  delivered  its  judgment  on  3  September  2024  and  annulled  the 
Commission’s  decisions  to  accept  jurisdiction  over  Illumina’s  acquisition  of  Grail  under  Article  22 
EUMR75.  The  case  focused  on  the  Commission’s  revised  policy  on  Article  22  EUMR,  consisting  in 
encouraging Member States that are not competent to review a given transaction under their national 
laws, to refer to the Commission a transaction not meeting the jurisdictional thresholds of the EUMR but 
likely to affect trade and competition within the EU. In this case, the Commission accepted a referral 
request from France, joined by Belgium, Greece, Iceland, the Netherlands and Norway, to review the 
proposed acquisition of GRAIL by Illumina. Illumina challenged the Commission’s decision to accept 
jurisdiction over the case. The Court  ruled that the Commission’s interpretation of Article 22  EUMR 
exceeded the intended scope of the EUMR depriving the Commission of jurisdiction over the merger. 
The judgment invalidates the revised approach to Article 22 developed by the Commission since 2021 
to capture so-called ‘killer acquisitions’ that do not meet established EU or national thresholds76. 

In Vodafone/Liberty Global, the General Court upheld on 13 November 2024 the 2019 Commission’s 
decision  to  approve  Vodafone’s  EUR  19  billion  acquisition  of  Liberty  Global’s  cable  networks  in 
Germany  and  Eastern  Europe77.  The  judgment  dismissed  the  appeals  by  Deutsche  Telekom,  Tele 
Columbus, and NetCologne, which had argued that the Commission failed to adequately assess the deal’s 
impact on competition in the retail market, in particular in the markets for the retail supply of TV signal 
transmission services in Germany. The Court confirmed that Vodafone and Liberty Global were neither 
actual competitors (directly or indirectly) nor potential competitors in that market, a key factor in the 
Commission’s approval.  

3. 

STATE AID CONTROL 

State aid control is an integral part of EU competition policy and a necessary safeguard to preserve effective competition 
and free trade in the Single Market. 

The Treaty establishes the principle that State aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition is prohibited in so far as it 
affects  trade  between  Member  States  (Article  107(1)  TFEU).  However,  certain  types  of  State  aid  may  be  considered 
compatible with the internal market (for example, under Article 107(3) TFEU).  

The objectives of the Commission’s control of State aid are to ensure that aid is growth-enhancing, efficient and effective, 
and better targeted in times of budgetary constraints and that aid does not unduly restrict competition. In addition to this, the 
Commission acts to prevent and recover State aid, which is incompatible with the Single Market. 

75 See Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission. 
76 Following the judgement, multiple Commission’s decisions addressed to Illumina were withdrawn in light of the principle 
of good administration, namely the decision of 22.7.2021 opening a phase II investigation into the proposed acquisition of 
GRAIL by Illumina (M.10188), the decision of 6.9.2022 prohibiting the acquisition of GRAIL by Illumina (M.10188), (iii) 
two  decisions  concerning  interim  measures  of  29.10.2021  (M.10493)  and  of  28.10.2022  (M.10938),  (iv)  the  decision  of 
12.10.2023  ordering  restorative  measures  requiring  Illumina  to  unwind  its  acquisition  of  GRAIL  (M.10939),  and  (v)  the 
decision  of  12.7.2023  fining  Illumina  and  GRAIL  for  implementing  their  merger  before  approval  by  the  Commission 
(M.10483). 
77 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13.11.2024 in Cases T-58/20, NetCologne v Commission (ECLI:EU:T:2024:813), T-
64/20,  Deutsche  Telekom  v  Commission  (ECLI:EU:T:2024:815)  and  T-69/20,  Tele  Columbus  v  Commission, 
(ECLI:EU:T:2024:814). 

22 

 
 
 
In the area of State-aid control, a number of policy initiatives brought the EU economy further on its 
route towards competitiveness and resilience. For example: amended rules for regional aid allowed more 
effective support for investment in strategic and critical technologies; the revision of three de minimis 
regulations raised the exemption ceilings and reduced the regulatory burden for companies, in particular 
SMEs; moreover, as market  disturbances  were still affecting the  agricultural,  fishery  and aquaculture 
sectors,  the  Commission  amended  the  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework,  to  allow  limited 
amounts of aid for these sectors for six additional months, until 31 December 2024.  

2024 also saw a number of Commission decisions approving aid measures in key policy areas, such as 
investments in the transition towards a net-zero economy, or in digital infrastructure, technologies and 
services as key drivers of economic growth.  

Figure 5: State aid decisions 2015-2024  

3.1. State aid for horizontal objectives 

As in previous years, Member States continued to award a substantial part of aid under block-exempted 
measures.  

23 

 
 
The Block Exemption Regulations (General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)78, Agriculture Block 
Exemption Regulation (ABER)79, and Fisheries Block Exemption Regulation (FIBER)80) allow Member 
States  to  implement  a  wide  range  of  public  support  measures  without  prior  notification  to  the 
Commission, reducing the administrative burden for public authorities and speeding up delivery of public 
support. 

While the ABER and FIBER are sector-specific block-exemption regulations, the implemented measures 
under the GBER can be in areas such as research and development, environmental protection, broadband 
connectivity,  regional  development,  employment  or  support  to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs). As illustrated by the graphs below, the greater part of horizontal aid falls under the GBER. 

Figure 6: State aid expenditure 2013-2023, in EUR billion, in constant prices 

Figure 7: GBER State aid expenditure by objective in the EU 2018-2023, in EUR billion, in constant 
prices 

78 Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal 
market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187/1, 26.6.2014, p.1. Last amended on 23 June 2023, with 
Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2023/1315  of  23  June  2023,  OJ  L  167,  30.6.2023,  p.  1.  Consolidated  text  of  the  amended 
Regulation for documentation purposes available under EUR-Lex - 02014R0651-20230701 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu)  
79 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2472 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid in the agricultural and 
forestry sectors and in rural areas compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European (OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 1). 
80 Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/2473 of 14 December 2022 declaring certain categories of aid to undertakings active in 
the  production,  processing  and  marketing  of  fishery  and  aquaculture  products  compatible  with  the  internal  market  in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJ L 327, 21.12.2022, p. 82).  

24 

 
 
 
 
3.1.1.  Evaluation of aid schemes 

The ex post evaluation of aid schemes was introduced by the 2012 State Aid Modernisation (SAM)81. 
The aim is to gather the necessary evidence to better identify the impact - positive and negative - of the 
aid and to provide input for future policy-making by the Member States and the Commission. Since 1 
July 2014, ex post evaluation is required for large block-exempted aid schemes in certain aid categories 
under the GBER82, as well as for a selection of notified schemes the Commission has approved under 
State aid guidelines83. Under ABER and FIBER, evaluation is required since 1 January 2023 also for 
certain aid categories84. For an aid scheme subject to the evaluation obligation, Member States must first 
notify an evaluation plan and later an evaluation report in line with the evaluation plan approved by the 
Commission. 

81 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/modernisation_en  
82 Schemes with an average annual State aid budget above EUR 150 million in the fields of regional aid, aid for SMEs and 
access to finance, aid for research and  development and innovation, energy and environmental aid and aid for broadband 
infrastructures. 
83 Evaluation can apply to notified aid schemes with large budgets, containing novel characteristics or when significant market, 
technology or regulatory changes are foreseen, and with a total duration that exceeds three three years, starting from 1 January 
2022. 
84 Aid schemes for certain aid categories under ABER and FIBER are subject to an ex post evaluation if they have a State aid 
budget or accounted expenditures over EUR 150 million in any given year or EUR 750 million over their total duration, that 
is  the  combined  duration  of  the  scheme  and  any  predecessor  scheme  covering  a  similar  objective  and  geographical  area, 
starting from 1 January 2023. Ex post evaluations is required for aid schemes the total duration of which exceeds three years, 
starting from 1 January 2023. 

25 

 
 
 
 
By the end of 2024, the Commission had in total approved 146 evaluation plans, covering a total of 19 
Member States85 and the United Kingdom. 

Most of the approved plans concerned either large regional aid projects or Research, Development and 
Innovation (RDI), aid schemes under the GBER or notified energy and broadband schemes. In total, these 
schemes account for over EUR 80 billion in annual State aid budget. By end of 2024, the Commission 
services have reviewed a total of 53 interim and 50 final evaluation reports and considered them to be of 
average to good quality, in particular the final reports86. 

By  assessing  the  evaluation  reports,  both  interim  and  final  ones,  the  Commission  seeks  to:  (i)  give 
appropriate feedback to Member States, (ii) make sure that results are used for better policy-making, and 
(iii) provide evidence to assist Member States when reflecting on future legal developments. 

3.1.2.  New general de minimis Regulation enters into force 

The new general de minimis Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2024 and will apply until 31 
December 203087. It exempts small aid amounts from EU State aid control because they are deemed to 
have no effect on trade between Member States and not to distort or threaten to distort competition. The 
new  regulation  replaces  the  previous  de  minimis  regulation  which  expired  on  31  December  202388. 
Pursuant to the new regulation, the de minimis ceiling is EUR 300 000 over three years (previously EUR 
200 000). The new regulation introduces an obligation for all Member States to provide as from 2026 
complete information on de minimis aid granted in a central register at national or EU level and to check 
that  any  new  grant  of  aid  does  not  exceed  the  de  minimis  ceiling.  This  new  requirement  increases 
transparency and will help to reduce the burden of the reporting obligations for companies. The raising 
of the ceiling and the central register for de minimis aid in this new Regulation significantly simplify the 
applicable rules. The raised ceilings allow Member States to deliver more support faster and simpler and 
the central registers reduce reporting obligations for stakeholders.  

3.1.3.  New SGEI de minimis Regulation enters into force 

Also on 1 January 2024, the new regulation on de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services 
of general  economic interest  (SGEI)  entered into force (SGEI  de minimis Regulation)89. It will apply 
until 31 December 2030. The new regulation replaces the previous SGEI de minimis Regulation90 which 
expired on 31 December 2023. The ceiling for compensation that is exempt from EU State aid rules has 

85 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. 
86 All the submitted evaluation reports are reviewed by the JRC within the framework of the Administrative Arrangement 
established between DG Competition and the JRC on the: ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation reports in the area 
of State Aid, 2018-2020’. The JRC has continued to support DG Competition under the new Administrative Arrangements 
for the ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation plans and reports in the area of State Aid, 2021-2023 (EVALSA II)’ 
and for the ‘Support to the quality assessment of evaluation plans and reports in the area of State Aid, 2024-2026 (EVALSA 
III)’. 
87 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 2023, 15.12.2023. 
88 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 1. 
89 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2832 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic 
interest, OJ L 2023, 15.12.2023. 
90 Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic 
interest, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8.   

26 

 
 
been raised from EUR 500 000 to EUR 750 000 per company over three years. Just as under the new 
general de minimis Regulation, an obligation for Member States to register de minimis aid in a central 
register  set  at  national  or  EU  level  as  of  1  January  2026  was  introduced:  this  new  requirement  also 
increases transparency and will help to reduce the burden of the reporting obligations for companies. As 
it is the case with the new general de minimis Regulation, the raising of the ceiling and the central register 
for de minimis aid in this new Regulation significantly simplify the applicable rules. The raised ceilings 
allow Member States to deliver more support faster and simpler and the central registers reduce reporting 
obligations for stakeholders. 

3.1.4.  EU environmental and State aid law – access to justice in relation to State aid decisions 
(Aarhus convention) 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are  parties  to  the  United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for  Europe 
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention). The EU has implemented the Convention as 
regards EU institutions and bodies through the the ‘Aarhus Regulation’91. State aid decisions where the 
Commission acts as an administrative review body under provisions of the TFEU are exempted from the 
scope of the Aarhus Regulation.  

The Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee (ACCC) is the main body for the review of compliance 
with the Convention. It found that by failing to provide access to administrative or judicial procedures 
for members of the public to challenge decisions on State aid measures taken by the Commission under 
Article 108(2) TFEU that contravene EU law relating to the environment, the EU fails to comply with 
Articles 9(3) and 9(4) of the Aarhus Convention (ACCC findings)92. 

The Commission is committed to following up on the ACCC findings. On 17 May 2023, it adopted a 
Communication  that  (i)  sets  out  the  Commission’s  assessment  of  the  implications  of  the  ACCC’s 
findings, and (ii) reports on the public consultation that the Commission organised to explore options for 
addressing  the  ACCC’s  findings  while  upholding  the  EU  Treaties  and  related  case-law  on  State  aid 
control93.  In  the  Communication,  the  Commission  concluded  that  an  adjustment  to  the  existing  legal 
framework or equivalent measures were required to ensure compliance with the ACCC findings, and that 
the design of such adjustment should preserve the efficiency of State aid control and complement in the 
most efficient manner the possibilities for review at national level.  

On 30 May 2024, the Commission published a Call for Evidence to inform the public and stakeholders 
about  the  ACCC’s  findings  and  the  Commission’s  aim  to  address  such  findings  within  the  EU  legal 
landscape, in line with the special characteristics of State aid. The public was given the opportunity to 
provide feedback until 27 June 202494. In addition, the Commission ran a targeted consultation between 
1 July and 13 September 2024, to gather feedback from the business community and public authorities 
dealing with State aid and environmental matters, on the impact of the proposed new procedure95. The 

91 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public  Participation  in  Decision-making  and  Access  to  Justice  in  Environmental  Matters  to  Community  institutions  and 
bodies, OJ L 264, 25.9.2006, p. 13, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2021/1767 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 6 October 2021, OJ L 356, 8.10.2021, p. 1.   
92 Case ACCC/C/2015/128 European Union, see: https://unece.org/env/pp/cc/accc.c.2015.128_european-union#   
93 Communication on the findings adopted by the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee in case ACCC/C/2015/128 as 
regards state aid: Analysing the implications of  the findings and assessing the options available, COM(2023) 307 final of 
17.5.2023.   
94 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14276-EU-environmental-and-State-aid-law-
access-to-justice-in-relation-to-State-aid-decisions-regulation-_en  
95 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/publications/targeted-consultation_en  

27 

 
 
Commission is analysing the feedback received and will use it to inform its decision on the new measures 
to be taken.  

3.1.5.  Aid for research, development, and innovation 

Research, development, and innovation (RDI) are key drivers of economic growth and are necessary to 
achieve a variety of policy objectives, including those of the European Green Deal and of the Digital 
Strategy. State support for such risky investments can be necessary to address market failures that may 
result in a level of RDI activities which is too low from the point of view of society. 

The vast majority of all RDI State aid measures are implemented under the GBER, without requiring 
prior notification to the Commission. Prior authorisation under the Framework for State aid for Research, 
Development and Innovation (RDI Framework)96 remains however necessary for large aid amounts, for 
example an aid measure of EUR 300 million for R&D on small modular nuclear reactors (for details, see 
II. Sectoral overview, section 1.2.2 below). 

3.1.6.  Important Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI) 

In  2024,  the  Commission  approved  two  new  IPCEIs  further  supporting  the  hydrogen  value  chain,  in 
particular  one  IPCEI  covering  hydrogen  infrastructure  and  one  covering  hydrogen  technologies  for 
mobility (for details, see II. Sectoral  overview, section.1.2.1 below),  as  well as the first  IPCEI in the 
health sector (for details, see II. Sectoral overview, section II.7.2 below).  

The  Commission  also  worked  in  close  cooperation  with  Member  States  in  a  partnership,  the  Joint 
European Forum for IPCEIs (JEF-IPCEI)97, to improve and speed-up the design and assessment process 
and facilitate the emergence of new IPCEIs. In 2024, the JEF-IPCEI continued working to increase the 
effectiveness and speed of the design, assessment and implementation of IPCEIs, and to identify areas 
of strategic EU interest for potential future IPCEIs. It worked in particular on recommendations on the 
roles of indirect and associated partners in the IPCEI ecosystem, on national best practices on the national 
assessment framework for participating in an IPCEI and on the national calls for expression of interest. 
Additionally, the JEF-IPCEI worked on identifying new technologies or important infrastructure suitable 
for possible IPCEIs. These areas include:  

•  Digital technologies: advanced Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies, advanced semiconductor 

technologies, next generation edge computing infrastructure technologies;  
•  Advanced materials for clean technologies (energy, mobility, and electronics);   
•  Nuclear technologies.   

To  facilitate  and  streamline  the  submission  of  information  by  Member  States,  the  Commission  also 
published in 2024 a standardised funding gap template98. 

3.1.7.  Aid to support EU semiconductor ecosystem 

Since outlining the principles of support for capacity building in the semiconductor industry in the Chips 
Act Communication99, the Commission approved five cases, authorising more than EUR 11.4 billion in 
public support in total. Three of these measures supporting new semiconductor manufacturing facilities, 

96 Communication from the Commission: Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ C 7388, 
19.10.2022, p. 1. 
97 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/joint-european-forum-ipcei_en  
98 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/ipcei/practical-information_en#templates  
99  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final. 

28 

 
 
two in Italy and one in Germany, were approved in 2024, with a total budget of EUR 8.3 billion (for 
details see II. Sectoral overview, section 5.2.3 below). 

3.1.8.  Regional aid 

The Guidelines on regional State aid100 adopted in April 2021, entered into force on 1 January 2022. A 
regional aid map for each Member State was adopted in 2021 or 2022. 

On 3 June 2024, the Commission published a Communication supplementing the Guidelines on Regional 
State  Aid  with  regard  to  the  Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform  (STEP)101.  As  from 
1 March 2024, for investments covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/795102, aid intensities can be increased 
by up to 10 percentage points in the areas identified as eligible for regional aid under Article 107(3)(a) 
TFEU  and  up  to  5  percentage  points  in  the  areas  identified  as  eligible  for  regional  aid  under  Article 
107(3)(c) TFEU. Accordingly, in 2024, the Commission approved, for almost every Member State, an 
amendment to its regional aid map, to reflect those higher aid intensities. Only a few Member States did 
not notify such an amendment. 

In parallel, the Commission adopted in 2024 several decisions concerning regional investment aid. The 
Commission approved regional investment aid in diverse industries such as chemicals, the manufacturing 
of electric vehicles, tyres or car components, or pharmaceuticals (for details see II. Sectoral overview, 
section 5.2.3, below).  

3.1.9.  Aid to risk finance  

In January 2024, DG Competition issued practical guidance for Member States to assess whether or not 
public measures to facilitate certain companies' access to finance, constitute State aid103. Risk finance is 
important for the financing of the economy, in particular for start-ups, SMEs and middle-capitalisation 
firms (mid-caps). 

Member States can design risk finance measures that do not entail aid within the meaning of EU State 
aid rules. The guidance aims at providing non-binding practical guidance for Member States on when 
and  how  the  market  economy  operator  principle  (MEOP)104  can  apply  to  risk  finance  measures.  In 
particular, it (i) describes how to assess the existence of aid at the level of investors, target companies, 
and  financial  intermediaries  or  managers;  (ii)  clarifies  which  investors  can  be  considered  private 
investors  for  the  purpose  of  the  MEOP;  and  (iii)  sets  out  how  the  MEOP  can  be  met  in  different 
circumstances, such as where public authorities co-invest alongside private investors. 

3.1.10. Infrastructure support measures 

100 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on regional State aid (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).  
101 Communication from the Commission (C/2024/3516) supplementing the Guidelines on regional State aid with regard to 
the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), OJ C, C/2024/3516, 3.6.2024, ELI. 
102 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic 
Technologies  for  Europe  Platform  (STEP),  and  amending  Directive  2003/87/EC  and  Regulations  (EU)  2021/1058,  (EU) 
2021/1056,  (EU)  2021/1057,  (EU) No 1303/2013,  (EU)  No  223/2014,  (EU)  2021/1060,  (EU)  2021/523,  (EU)  2021/695, 
(EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241, OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024. 
103  See  the  guidance  ‘The  Market  Economy  Operator  Test  for  Risk  Finance  Measures’:  https://competition-
policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/horizontal-rules/risk-finance-aid_en  
104 In the Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) TFEU,OJ C 262, 19.7.2016, p.1, the Commission 
clarifies that if a Member State intervenes as a private investor would do and is remunerated for the risk assumed in a way a 
private investor would accept under market conditions, such an intervention can be considered free of State aid. This is the 
so-called MEOP. 

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In 2024, the Commission closed its investigation into the Danish and Swedish public financing of the 
Øresund fixed rail-road link105. It  concluded that the State guarantee model  granted by Denmark and 
Sweden for the construction of the Øresund fixed rail-road link does not constitute new aid and found 
that part of the Danish tax support constitutes incompatible aid that is to be recovered. 

3.2.  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  to  support  transition  towards  a  net-zero 
economy 
On 17 March 2023 the Commission adopted a Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF)106, 
amending and prolonging in part the Temporary Crisis Framework for State aid to support the economy 
following Russia’s war of aggression againts Ukraine (TCF) adopted in 2022107. The TCTF also added 
possibilities to foster support measures in sectors which are key for the transition to a net-zero economy 
considering the Green Deal Industrial Plan.  

On 20 November 2023, the Commission adopted a limited prolongation until 30 June 2024 of the TCTF 
sections enabling Member States to continue to grant limited amounts of aid under section 2.1 TCTF, 
which was also subject to a proportionate increase in the aid ceilings to cover the winter heating period, 
and aid to compensate for high energy prices under section 2.4 TCTF, notably in view of the remaining 
vulnerability of energy markets to which energy intensive industries are particularly sensitive108. Sections 
2.5, 2.6 and 2.8 TCTF remain in force until the end of 2025 while sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.7 were phased 
out on 31 December 2023.  

On 2 May 2024, following a consultation of Member States, the Commission amended the TCTF for a 
second  time  in  light  of  the  specific  situation  of  undertakings  active  in  the  primary  production  of 
agricultural  products  as  well  as  in  the  fishery  and  aquaculture  sectors109.  The  Commission  adopted a 
limited prolongation of the provisions enabling Member States to continue to grant limited amounts of 
aid (section 2.1 TCTF) until 31 December 2024 for undertakings in those sectors. Section 2.1 TCTF for 
undertakings in all other sectors phase-out as planned on 30 June 2024,  and all other sections remain 
unchanged. 

In 2024, the Commission adopted 127 decisions (of which 55 amendment decisions) under the TCTF, 
approving 77 national measures notified by 24 Member States. The overall budget that Member States 
notified to the Commission under such State aid measures amounted to around EUR 68.03 billion. 

In particular, the Commission approved several investment aid schemes for the production of equipment 
necessary for the transition towards a net-zero economy, their key components and related critical raw 

105 Cases SA.52162 – Denmark – State aid in favour of the Oresund bridge consortium and SA.52617 – Sweden – State aid 
in favour of the Oresund bridge consortium. 
106  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  the  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures  to 
support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 101, 17.3.2023, p. 3. This TCTF replaced the 
TCF adopted on 28 October 2022, which had replaced the previous TCF adopted on 23 March 2022, as amended on 20 July 
2022. The TCF was withdrawn with effect from 9 March 2023. 
107 Communication from the Commission  – Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support the economy 
following  the  aggression  against  Ukraine  by  Russia,  OJ  C  131I,  24.3.2022,  p.  1.  The  TCF  was  amended  in  July  2022 
(Communication from the Commission – Amendment to the Temporary Crisis Framework for State Aid measures to support 
the  economy  following  the  aggression  against  Ukraine  by  Russia,  OJ  C  280,  21.7.2022,  p.  1)  and  then  replaced  by  a 
substantially updated text in October 2022 (Communication from the Commission - Temporary Crisis Framework for State 
Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 426, 9.11.2022, p. 1.). 
108 Communication from the Commission – Amendment to the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework for State Aid 
measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C, C/2023/1188, 21.11.2023. 
109 Communication from the Commission – Second amendment to the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework for State 
Aid measures to support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C, C/2024/3113. 

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materials, on the basis of section 2.8 TCTF, with a total budget of around EUR 8 billion. For example, 
the Commission approved State aid for EUR 902 million for the construction of an electric vehicle battery 
plant in Germany (for details see II. Sectoral overview, section 5.2.3 below)110.   

3.3. Application of the phased-out Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy during the COVID-19 pandemic  

The Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the COVID-19 pandemic 
(COVID  Temporary  Framework)111  enabled  Member  States  to  use  State  aid  to  tackle  the  difficulties 
undertakings were encountering as a result of the pandemic. Its provisions phased out gradually, the last 
ones,  on  investment  and  solvency  support  measures,  on  31  December  2023.  Therefore,  no  decisions 
approving  new  aid  schemes  were  adopted  under  the  Framework  in  2024.  However,  the  Commission 
adopted  two  decisions  under  the  lapsed  COVID  Temporary  Framework  in  cases  where  its  previous 
decisions had been annulled by the EU Courts: this concerned a German aid measure in the form of a 
recapitalisation of Deutsche Lufthansa AG, and two aid measures granted by France and the Netherlands, 
to the Air France/KLM Group (for details see II. Sectoral overview, section 8.2.1.1 below). 

3.4. Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)  

Where public funding from the RRF is subject to EU State aid rules, the Commission ensures that any 
competition distortions that measures included in the Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) may cause 
are limited to the minimum necessary. In 2024, the Commission adopted decisions in at least 40 cases 
for  which  the  Member  States  had  indicated  that  RRF  funding  will  be  used112.  To  facilitate  work  for 
Member States, the Commission provides guidance on State aid legislation and procedures in the RRF 
context, and updates it regularly113. 

3.5. Significant judgments by EU Courts in State aid 

In 2024, the EU Courts adopted a number of important judgments in the field of State aid, concerning in 
particular the notions of State resources, economic activity, selectivity, compatibility, as well as different 
issues related to State aid procedure and arbitration awards.  

3.5.1.  Notion of State resources 

In Germany v Commission114, the General Court annulled on 24 January 2024 the Commission's decision 
qualifying  as  State  aid  the  measures  adopted  by  Germany  to  support  the  production  of  electricity  by 
combined heat and power plants. The Court clarified the notion of State resources clarifying that it refers 
to,  alternatively,  funds  raised  by  a  tax  or  other  compulsory  levy  under  national  legislation  or  sums 
remaining constantly under public control. For funds to be considered State resources under the first of 
these two alternative criteria, they must derive from levies or from other mandatory surcharges imposed 
by the legislation of the State and must be allocated accordance with national legislation. The two criteria 
are cumulative and distinct. The existence of a tax or other levy compulsory by law concerns the source 
of the funds used to grant an advantage and is separate from the question of the allocation of funds in 

110 Case SA.107936 – Germany – TCTF – Aid to Northvolt Germany GmbH. 
111 Communication from the Commission: Temporary framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current 
COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 91 I, 20.3.2020, p. 1, as amended by Commission Communications C(2020) 2215, OJ C 112I, 
4.4.2020, p. 1; C(2020) 3156, OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3; C(2020) 4509, OJ C 218, 2.7.2020, p. 3; C(2020) 7127, OJ C 340I, 
13.10.2020, p. 1 and C(2021) 564, OJ C 34, 1.2.2021, p. 6, C(2021) 8442, OJ C 473, 24.11.2021, p. 1 and C(2022) 7902 of 
28.10. 2022. 
112 See below II. Sectoral overview below for examples of RRF cases. 
113 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/rrf-guiding-templates_en   
114 Judgment of the General Court of 24.2.2024 in Case T-409/21, Germany v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:34.  

31 

 
 
accordance with the law. Based on the above, the Court drew the following conclusions on the facts of 
the case. First, the obligation on electricity network managers to pay sums to operators in the supply 
chain without any other form of compulsory levy was not sufficient to involve the commitment of State 
resources.  Secondly,  as  the  surcharge  that  can  be  imposed  on  hydrogen  producers  by  the  network 
managers  does  not  constitute  State  resources,  the  cap  on  such  a  surcharge  does  not  constitute  a 
renuncement of State resources. 

3.5.2.  Advantage and economic activity 

In  two  judgments  of  28  February  2024  in  Fehmarn  Belt115,  the  General  Court  confirmed  the 
Commission's decision qualifying as State aid compatible with the internal market on the basis of Article 
107(3)b  TFEU  the  measures  granted  by  Denmark  to  the  public  undertaking  Femern  A/S  for  the 
construction and operation of a rail and road link between Germany and Denmark116. The rejection of 
the first action brought by Denmark clarified that the construction and operation of the Fixed Link (i.e. a 
rail  and  road  tunnel  under  the  Baltic  Sea  between  Rødby  on  the  island  of  Lolland  in  Denmark  and 
Puttgarden in Germany)  is an ‘economic activity’ subject to EU competition law. The second action, 
lodged by shipping companies, enabled the General Court to assert that aid paid in several instalments 
may constitute a single intervention if it is indissociable in terms of timing, purpose and context. The 
General  Court  also  clarified  that  a  project  can  be  classified  as  being  of  ‘common  European  interest’ 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU  only  if  it  forms  part  of  a  transnational  programme 
supported  by  several  Member  States  and  responds  to  concerted  action  to  attain  a  common  objective, 
while at the same time having an incentive effect. 

3.5.3.  Selectivity 

In Fallimento Esperia117, the Court of Justice delivered a preliminary ruling on an Italian law requiring 
electricity importers to purchase green certificates if they did not supply the grid with a specified share 
of renewable energy. Esperia SpA (Esperia), an Italian electricity importer fined by the Italian regulator 
ARERA  in  2010  for  not  meeting  the  legal  requirement,  challenged  the  law,  arguing  that  it  unfairly 
favoured domestic producers and could be in conflict with EU rules on State aid, customs duties and non-
discrimination. The Court carried out the three-step test to assess the selectivity of the support scheme 
for green electricity producers. To this end, the Court took into account a wide reference system (the 
overall electricity production, marketing and consumption system) and considered that the support of 
green electricity producers could be justified by the nature and general scheme of that system (that is to 
say environmental objectives), subject to the measure being strictly necessary to overcome the market 
failure preventing the supply of green electricity on the Italian electricity market. 

The  judgments  of  the  EU  Courts  in  Apple  (Commission  v  Ireland)118  and  Bankföreningen  and 
Länsförsäkringar Bank119 are described in II. Sectoral overview, sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3 below.  

3.5.4.  Compatibility 

115 Judgments of the General Court of 28.2.2024 in Cases T-364/20 and T-390/20, Fehmarn Belt cases,  ECLI:EU:T:2024:126 
and ECLI:EU:T:2024:125 (under appeal).    
116 Case SA.39078 – Denmark – Financing of the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link project. 
117  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (Second  Chamber)  of  7.3.2024  in  Case  C-558/22,  Fallimento  Esperia  and  GSE, 
EU:C:2024:209.  
118  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  10.9.2024  in  Case  C-465/20  P,  Commission  v  Ireland  and  Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:724.  
119  Judgment  of  the  General  Court  (Fourth  Chamber,  Extended  Composition)  of  17.4.2024  in  Case  T-112/22,  Svenska 
Bankföreningen and Länsförsäkringar Bank v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:250. 

32 

 
 
 
In Ryanair v Commission120, the Court of Justice confirmed on 6 June 2024 that the Solvency Support 
Fund for Strategic Enterprises (Fund) adopted in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic did not infringe 
the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. The EUR 10 billion Fund – approved by 
the Commission under the COVID Temporary Framework121 - financed recapitalisation measures, within 
the meaning of section 3.11 COVID Temporary Framework, granted to eligible undertakings. In order 
to be eligible for aid, the applicant had to be an undertaking established in Spain and be of systemic or 
strategic importance for the Spanish economy. The Court of Justice confirmed entirely the judgment of 
the General Court122 dismissing Ryanair’s application against the Commission’s decision. In particular, 
the Court of Justice confirmed that the eligibility criterion limiting the access to the Fund to undertakings 
established  in  Spain  is  in  line  with  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU,  with  the  general  principle  of  non-
discrimination  and  with  the  principles  of  free  provision  of  services  and  freedom  of  establishment.  In 
particular, regarding the general principle of non-discrimination laid down in Article 18 TFEU, the Court 
recalled that Article 18 TFEU applies independently only to situations where the TFEU lays down no 
specific prohibition of discrimination. Since Article 107(2) and (3) TFEU provide for derogations from 
the principle that State aid is incompatible with the internal market and therefore allow for differences in 
treatment between undertakings, those derogations must be regarded as ‘special provisions’ within the 
meaning of Article 18 TFEU. The Court of Justice therefore concluded that it is not necessary to examine 
the difference in treatment of the State aid in the light of the general principle of non-discrimination.  

In Condor123, the General Court set aside the 2021 Commission’s decision authorising restructuring aid 
granted by Germany to the airline Condor Flugdienst in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic124. This 
case concerned the burden sharing requirement under point 67 of the Guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty125, which requires restructuring aid that enhances the beneficiary’s 
equity  to  be  granted  on  terms  that  afford  the  State  a  reasonable  share  of  future  gains  in  value  of  the 
beneficiary. The General Court held that this requirement applied independently of the form of equity-
enhancing State intervention, and considered that the Commission should have had doubts on whether 
the  restructuring  aid  to  Condor  complied  with  this  requirement.  Those  doubts  should  have  led  the 
Commission to open a formal investigation with respect to the aid. To comply with that ruling, on 29 
July  2024,  the  Commission  opened  the  formal  investigation  procedure  into  the  aid  to  Condor, 
notwithstanding the fact that an appeal case is pending against that judgment. 

3.5.5.  Procedure 

In Hemweg, the Court of Justice upheld on 13 June 2024126 the General Court’s judgment127 annulling 
the Commission’s decision of May 2020128. In that decision, the Commission had found that, on the basis 
of the information provided by the Dutch authorities, it could not be concluded with a sufficient degree 
of certainty that the measure examined provided an advantage and thus constituted State aid, but that, in 
any event, the measure would be compatible with the internal market. The Court of Justice confirmed 
that the Commission does not have the power to decide on the compatibility with the internal market of 

120 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 6.6.2024 in Case C-441/21 P, Ryanair v Commission, EU:C:2024:477. 
121 Case SA.57659 – Spain – COVID-19 – Recapitalisation fund. 
122 Judgment of the General Court of 19.5.2021, Ryanair v Commission in Case T-628/20, ECLI:EU:T:2021:285. 
123 Judgment of the General Court of 8.5.2024 in Case T-28/22, Condor, ECLI:EU:T:2024:301 (under appeal in C-505/24 P). 
124 Case SA.63203 – Germany – Restructuring aid for Condor. 
125 Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty, other than financial institutions, OJ 2014 C 249, 
p. 1. 
126  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (Second  Chamber)  of  13.6.2024  in  Case  C-40/23  P,  Commission  v  Netherlands, 
EU:C:2024:492. 
127 Judgment of the General Court of 16.11.2022 in Case T-469/20, Netherlands / Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2022:713. 
128 Case SA.54537 – The Netherlands – Prohibition of coal for the production of electricity in the Netherlands. 

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measures which have not, first, been established as being State aid. As a result, the Commission cannot 
legally adopt a compatibility decision without having concluded on the presence of a State aid.  

On the notion of interested party, the Court of Justice delivered on 5 September 2024 a relevant judgment 
in PBL and WA129. The Court of Justice recalled that the person who relies on the status of ‘interested 
party’ within the meaning of Article 1(h) of Regulation 2015/1589 (or Procedural Regulation)130 must 
demonstrate to the requisite legal standard, first, that it is indeed the grant of the alleged aid as such that 
may affect his or her interests, to the exclusion of any other conduct or measure, in particular any legally 
distinct measure which may have been adopted by the Member State granting that aid, even if such a 
measure  is  in  fact  linked  to  that  aid.  Second,  that  person  has  to  show  that  it  is  indeed  ‘his’  or  ‘her’ 
interests, that is to say interests which are personal to him or her, which may be affected by the grant of 
the alleged aid. Third, that person should establish that the grant of the alleged aid actually has or, at the 
very least, is potentially likely to have a specific effect on his or her interests.  

With regard to economic continuity, the Court of Justice delivered a noteworthy judgment in Koiviston 
Auto Helsinki on 29 July 2024131. It clarified the procedural obligations of the Commission in the case 
where  a  successor  company  emerges  during  the  formal  investigation  procedure,  and  held  that  the 
Commission  must  seek  input  from  any  entity  that  inherits  the  economic  activities  of  an  original  aid 
recipient.  In  the  case  at  hand,  the  Court  found  that  that  the  transfer  of  the  former  undertaking  was  a 
‘relevant  issue’  for  the  Commission’s investigation  within  the meaning  of  Article  6(1)  of  Regulation 
2015/1589. Since this relevant issue arose after the opening decision, the Commission was required, in 
order to allow interested parties to submit their comments, to publish a supplementary opening decision. 
Without such a decision, neither the appellant nor other interested parties were given an opportunity to 
submit comments on economic continuity and on the possibility to recover the aid at issue from the new 
undertaking. Consequently, the Commission infringed an essential procedural requirement by failing to 
adopt such a supplementary opening and to involve the appellant in the formal investigation procedure. 
Moreover,  the  Court  found  that  the  Member  State  holds  the  responsibility  for  calculating  the  exact 
amount to be recovered from the new undertaking, ensuring it reflects only the competitive advantage 
that was retained. 

In its judgment of 5 September 2024 in Slovenia v Flašker132, the Court of Justice upheld the General 
Court’s  judgment133  annuling  the  Commission’s  decision  which  had  concluded  that  the  granting  of 
management  assets  to  a  public  establishment  operating  nearly  50  pharmacies  in  Slovenia  constituted 
existing  State  aid  that  it  did  not  raise  ‘serious  difficulties’  and  therefore  did  not  require  an  in-depth 
investigation procedure134. The Court of Justice clarified the concept of ‘serious difficulties’, holding that 
serious difficulties should be assessed both in terms of the context and the content of the decision, and 
that the burden of proof lies with the applicant for annulment to show such difficulties. However, mere 
assertions of the national authorities are not sufficient to exclude the existence of ‘serious difficulties’ or 
‘doubts’ which the Commission may face after a preliminary examination, since the Commission has, in 
particular,  under  Procedural  Regulation  2015/1589,  the  power  to  request  additional  information  from 
Member  States.  Furthermore,  the  Court  of  Justice  pointed  out  that  Article  108(3)  TFEU  leaves  the 

129 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5.9.2024 in Case C-224/23 P, PBL and WA v Commission, EU:C:2024:682. 
130 Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (codification), OJ L 248, 14.9.2015, p. 9. 
131  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  (Fourth  Chamber)  of  29.7.2024  in  Case  C‑697/22  P,  Koiviston  Auto  Helsinki  and 
Commission, EU:C:2024:641. 
132 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5.9.2024 in Case C-447/22 P, Slovenia v Flašker and Commission, EU:C:2024:678.  
133 Judgment of the General Court of 27.4.2022 in Case T-392/20, Slovenia v Flašker and Commission, EU:T:2022:245. 
134 Case SA.43546 – Slovenia – Alleged State aid to Lekarna Ljubljana. 

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Commission no margin of discretion, and that it is under an obligation to initiate a formal investigation 
procedure where serious difficulties remain following the preliminary examination. 

3.5.6.  Arbitration 

In its judgment of 2 October 2024 in Micula135, the General Court, acting upon referral from the Court 
of Justice, upheld the 2015 Commission’s decision which had found that the payment of damages by 
Romania to Swedish investors under an arbitral award constituted incompatible State aid136. The Court 
clarified that Article 351 TFEU, which applies to pre-EU accession agreements with third countries, did 
not apply, as the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) between Sweden and Romania became an internal 
EU matter post-accession. The General Court found that the compensation paid constituted an economic 
advantage under Article 107(1) TFEU, and that the beneficiaries included a single economic unit formed 
by the Micula brothers and their companies. As a consequence, the Court found that the Commission's 
decision  to  recover  the  aid  was  legally  justified,  confirming  that  the  aid  measure  should  restore  the 
situation  prior  to  the  payment,  eliminating  any  competitive  advantage  gained  by  the  investors.  The 
actions brought by the investors were therefore dismissed in their entirety. 

In Mytilinaios137, on 22 September 2024 the Court of Justice overturned the General Court's judgment138 
which  had  annulled  the  2015  and  2017  Commission’s  decisions  regarding  an  arbitration  award 
establishing  reduced  electricity  tariffs  for  Mytilinaios  AE139.  The  General  Court  had  qualified  the 
arbitration award as  a State measure capable of  constituting State aid.  However, the Court of Justice 
found this qualification legally flawed. It emphasised that the arbitration tribunal of the Greek Energy 
Regulator cannot be equated with a State court, as the arbitration process was founded on a contractual 
agreement between the parties rather than a State decision. Consequently, the Court of Justice held that 
the Commission was correct in concluding that the arbitration award did not involve State aid and referred 
the case back to the General Court for further proceedings. 

3.6. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 

3.6.1.  Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure competition on fair and equal terms 

As in previous years, most of the new State aid measures implemented in 2024 were covered by a block 
exemption  regulation  (for  example,  the  GBER)140.  It  is  essential  for  the  Commission  to  verify  that 
Member States apply State aid schemes correctly and that they only grant aid when all  conditions are 
met.  

The monitoring by the Commission is a regular ex post control based on a sample of existing aid schemes, 
both block exempted and approved. It is a necessary complement to the approval of State aid schemes 
by the Commission, and it is the counterweight to ‘self-assessment’ by Member States resulting from the 
exemption from the notification obligation.  

As part of the monitoring process, the Commission follows up on irregularities and uses the means at its 

135 Judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) of 2.10.2024 in Joined Cases T‑624/15 RENV, 
T‑694/15 RENV and T‑704/15 RENV, Micula and Others, EU:T:2024:659.  
136 Case SA.38517 – Romania – Arbitral award Micula v Romania. 
137  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  22.2.2024  in  Joined  Cases  C‑701/21  P  and  C‑739/21  P,  Mytilinaios  /  DEI  and 
Commission, EU:C:2024:146. 
138 Judgment of the General Court of 22.9.2021 in Joined Cases T‑639/14 RENV, T‑352/15 and T‑740/17, DEI v Commission, 
EU:T:2021:604. 
139 Case SA.38101 – Greece – Alleged State aid granted to Alouminion SA in the form of electricity tariffs below cost following 
an arbitration decision. 
140 See the State Aid Scoreboard 2024: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/scoreboard_en  

35 

 
 
disposal, as appropriate, to address the competition distortions that those irregularities may have caused. 
In some cases, Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected, for example to amend 
national legislation or to recover aid granted above the limits permitted by State aid rules. In other cases, 
the Commission may need to take formal action. 

In 2024, the Commission launched a new monitoring cycle of block exempted and approved aid granted 
by Member States in the period 2020 to 2022. The sample of schemes selected included also aid granted 
to support the economy in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and aid schemes put in place due to 
the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. This 2024 monitoring cycle is ongoing. 

3.6.2.  Restoring competition by recovering State aid granted in breach of the rules 

To ensure the integrity of the Single market, Member States must take all necessary measures to recover 
unlawful and incompatible aid. The purpose of recovery is to restore the situation that existed on the 
internal market prior to the granting of the aid. This is necessary to ensure effective competition in the 
Single Market. 

In 2024 the Commission adopted  seven new recovery decisions141. 35  recovery cases (resulting  from 
previously adopted negative decisions with recovery) were pending at the end of 2024. 

By 31 December 2024, the total of unlawful and incompatible aid recovered from beneficiaries amounted 
to EUR 28.7 billion142. At the same point in time, the outstanding amount pending recovery was EUR 7 
billion. 

Figure 8: Recovery Decisions in 2024  

Recovery decisions adopted in 2024  

Pending recovery cases on 31/12/2024 

7 

35  

In 2024, the Commission imposed penalties on Greece and Italy based on Court judgments condemning 
these two Member States for having infringed EU law on State aid143.  

3.6.3.  Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules 

The  Commission  cooperates  with  national  courts  under  Article  29  of  Regulation  2015/1589  and 
according  to  its  Notice  on  the  enforcement  of  State  aid  rules  by  national  courts  (the  Notice)144.  This 

141 Cases SA.39182 –- Estonia – Aid to AS Tartu Agro; SA.48580 – Germany – Casinos - State aid to WestSpiel; SA.43260 
– Germany – Measures implemented by Germany in favour of Flughafen Frankfurt Hahn GmbH and Ryanair DAC; SA.44944 
– Germany – Tax treatment of public casinos operators; SA.62829 – Romania – Restructuring aid to Blue Air; SA.52162 – 
Denmark – State aid in favour of the Oresund Bridge Consortium; and SA.50787 and SA.50837 – Czechia – Aid schemes 
implemented by Czechia in favour of large enterprises active in primary agricultural production. In the two last cases, the 
Commission in April 2024 concluded that Czechia's investment support granted to certain large Czech agricultural companies 
in 2017 and 2018 was not in line with EU State aid rules. Czechia must recover the incompatible State aid. The aid was based 
on  the  former  Agricultural  Block  Exemption  Regulation,   under  which  the  aid  can  only  be  granted  to  SMEs.  The  Czech 
authorities erroneously qualified some of the beneficiaries as SMEs, while they were in fact large enterprises. 
142 The reference period is 1 January 1999 to 31 December 2024. This amount includes also the amount of aid registered in 
pending insolvency proceedings. In addition, the amount of EUR 4.5 billion could not be recovered from concluded 
insolvency proceedings because of the lack of mass from the liquidation of assets which did not allow satisfying the State 
aid claims. 
143 Cases SA.15525 – Greece – Hellenic Shipyards; SA.34572 – Greece – State aid to Larko General Mining & 
Metallurgical Company S.A.; and SA.9398 – Italy – Employment measures. 
144 Communication from the Commission, Commission Notice on the enforcement of State aid rules by national courts, OJ C 
305, 30.7.2021, p. 1. 

36 

 
 
includes direct case-related assistance to national courts when they apply EU State aid rules. National 
courts and tribunals can ask the Commission to provide case related information, or to provide an opinion 
on the application of State aid rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae observations on its 
own initiative. To make its views publicly known, the Commission publishes its opinions and amicus 
curiae observations to national courts, as well as observations to other bodies, for example arbitration 
tribunals, on its website145. 

The  Commission  also  reaches  out  to  national  judges  by  providing  trainings  on  State  aid  rules  on the 
Notice and its concrete implications for national judges146. In this context, the Commission advocates for 
the use of the Notice among national judges to promote the coherent enforcement of State aid rules at 
national level. Past studies on the enforcement of State aid law at national level point towards a relatively 
limited number of State aid cases brought before national courts147.  

Since national courts can play a crucial and complementary role in the system of enforcement of State 
aid  rules,  the  Commission  recently  stepped  up  its  efforts  to  reach  out  to  judges  with  more  tailored 
trainings. For instance, following a general tender for the training of national judges148, the Commission 
cooperates  with  the  VUB  (Vrije  Universiteit  Brussel)  to  deliver  trainings  through  the  SUNAJUST 
programme  aimed  to  (i)  develop  accessible  and  engaging  course  material;  and  (ii)  organise  multiple 
training events targeting judges, prosecutors, apprentice national judges, and staff of national courts from 
EU Member States. Within that programme, a survey among EU judges will seek to identify the main 
hurdles encountered in State aid enforcement. 

4. 

THE FOREIGN SUBSIDY REGULATION  

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)149 is a Single Market legislation that aims at addressing possible 
distortions of competition in the Single Market when subsidies granted by non-EU governments benefit 
economic activities in the EU. It started to apply in July 2023. 

4.1. Context 

The FSR aims at filling a regulatory gap in tackling distortive effects in the internal market created by 
foreign  subsidies.  This  gap  concerned  instances  where  companies  benefitting  from  distortive  foreign 
subsidies have an advantage in acquiring undertakings active in the internal market, in participating in 
public procurement processes or more generally  in  their investment  and  commercial decisions in EU 
markets.  Such  distortive  subsidies,  like  below-market-interest  rate  loans,  unlimited  State  guarantees, 
favourable tax agreements or dedicated State funding, would be problematic if granted by an EU Member 
State, when assessed under EU State aid rules. 

Considering the challenge to find a multilateral solution to subsidies within a reasonable timeframe, the 
Commission  committed,  as  part  of  the  New  Industrial  Strategy  for  Europe,  to  explore  how  best  to 
strengthen  the  EU’s  anti-subsidies  mechanisms  and  tools.  As  a  result,  the  FSR  was  adopted  on  14 

145 See: https://ec.europa.eu/competition-policy/state-aid/national-courts_en   
146 See also, Competition state aid brief. Issue 2/2022 – March 2022, ‘The review of the Notice on the enforcement of State 
aid rules before national courts’. 
147 See ‘Final Study on the enforcement of State aid rules and decisions by national courts (COMP/2018/001)’, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxemburg, 2019. 
148 SMP-COMP-JUDG-2022 — Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-
tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/opportunities/topic-details/smp-comp-judg-2022  
149 Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of  the Council of 14 December 2022 on foreign subsidies 
distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1-45. 

37 

 
 
December 2022.  

Under the FSR, the Commission has the power to examine any foreign subsidy granted to an undertaking 
engaging in an economic activity in the internal market. The Commission has the power to act on its own 
initiative (ex officio) or through the review of compulsory notifications for large concentrations and large 
public  procurement  procedures.  Within  the  Commission,  DG  Competition  (Directorate  General  for 
Competition) is in charge of concentration notifications and ex officio investigations, while DG GROW 
(Directorate  General  for  Internal  Market,  Industry,  Entrepreneurship  and  SMEs)  deals  with  public 
procurement procedures (and related ex officio cases). 

To provide legal clarity on the implementation of the FSR towards undertakings and transparency of the 
Commission’s  action  towards  the  civil  society  DG  Competition  and  DG  GROW’s  websites  include 
Q&As providing clarifications on a number of procedural, jurisdictional and implementation issues which 
are regularly updated150.  

Moreover, at the time of the adoption of the FSR, the Commission committed to provide clarifications 
on key concepts of the regulation such as the distortion caused by a foreign subsidy on the internal market 
(Article 4(1) FSR), the application of the balancing test set out in Article 6 FSR, and the assessment of a 
distortion  in  a public procurement procedure set out  in  Article 27(1) FSR. These initial  clarifications 
were published on 26 July 2024151. 

This first step in clarification will be complemented with Guidelines to be adopted before 13 January 
2026 as provided for by Article 46 FSR. The Guidelines will cover: the application of the criteria for 
determining the existence of a distortion (Article 4(1)); the application of the balancing test (Article 6); 
the application of the Commission’s power to request the prior notification of any concentration (Article 
21(5)) or of foreign financial contributions received by an economic operator in a public procurement 
procedure (Article 29(8)); and the assessment of a distortion in a public procurement procedure (Article 
27). 

4.2. Enforcement  

Under the FSR, the Commission may review notified proposed concentrations, participations to public 
procurement procedures or carry out ex officio investigation if information indicates the existence of a 
foreign subsidy distorting the internal market. DG Competition is tasked with concentration notification 
cases and ex officio procedures: those activities are described below. FSR enforcement benefits from the 
support of the intelligence and forensic teams of the CTO Unit in DG Competition.  

In 2024, 102 concentrations were notified under the FSR.  

In the case of the acquisition by Emirates Telecommunications Group - e& (formerly known as Etisalat) 
of  sole  control  of  PPF  Telecom  Group,  the  Commission  opened  an  in-depth  investigation.  The 
acquisition was notified to the Commission on 26 April 2024 by Emirates Telecommunications Group 
Company PJSC. On 24 September 2024152, the Commission adopted a decision with commitments. This 
is the first Commission’s decision under the FSR. 

e& is a telecommunications operator based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and it is controlled by 
the federal sovereign wealth fund of the UAE, the Emirates Investment Authority (EIA). PPF Telecom 

150 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/foreign-subsidies-regulation/questions-and-answers_en and on https://single-
market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/public-procurement/foreign-subsidies-regulation/questions-and-answers_en  
151 Initial clarifications on the application of Article 4(1), Article 6 and Article 27(1) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market - Commission Staff Working document. 
152 Commission Decision C(2024) 6745 of 24.9.2024. 

38 

 
 
Group (the target) is a telecommunications operator active in Bulgaria, Hungary and in Serbia (under the 
brand ‘Yettel’) as well as in Slovakia (as ‘O2’).  

In the interest of addressing the Commission’s concerns, e& offered commitments early in the in-depth 
investigation. The Commission, while carrying out a detailed in-depth investigation, was therefore able 
to adopt the decision well ahead of the legal deadline, without needing to formalise its concerns in a 
Statement of Grounds.  

The decision finds that e& and the EIA benefitted from unlimited guarantees because of respectively 
partial  and  full  exemptions  from  the  ordinary  UAE  bankruptcy  rules  and  other  relevant  factors.  In 
addition, the EIA enjoyed other foreign subsidies in the form of grants, loans and repayable advances by 
the UAE Government, and of a revolving credit facility loan underwritten by banks ‘whose actions can 
be attributed’ to the UAE in the meaning of the FSR.  

The Commission assessed the possible distortive effects of the foreign subsidies both on the acquisition 
process and on the activities of the combined entity in the internal market. The decision concludes that 
because e& was the sole bidder and had sufficient own resources, the foreign subsidies did not distort 
the acquisition process. As to distortions on the activities of the combined entity in the internal market, 
the unlimited guarantees, which fall in the category of subsidies ‘most likely to distort the internal market’ 
within  the  meaning  of  Article  5(1)(b)  FSR,  would  likely  have  allowed  the  combined  entity  to  raise 
financing for its operations at preferential conditions. Using these subsidies, the merged entity could have 
made investments distorting competition in the Single Market. An unlimited guarantee also increases the 
beneficiary’s indifference to risk. Moreover, the EIA, as the owner of e&, has both the incentive and the 
ability to make the combined entity benefit from its subsidised funding.  

As  a  result,  in  the  specific  context  of  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  Commission  found  that  the 
combined entity could have engaged in investments, for instance spectrum auctions or the deployment 
of infrastructure or in acquisitions, through which it would distort the level-playing field by expanding 
its activities beyond what its own merits would have allowed, absent the subsidies.  

The commitments offered by e& provide that the company will, in the future, be subject to the ordinary 
UAE bankruptcy law. They also ensure that e& and the EIA cannot provide (unless there would be a 
situation of acute liquidity crisis) any type of financing to the merged entity’s activities in the internal 
market, to ensure that foreign subsidies are not channelled to those activities. e& also committed that 
commercial transactions between the EU businesses of the target and other companies controlled by e& 
or the EIA, would take place on market terms, in other words unsubsidised. Finally, e& will inform the 
Commission  of  future  acquisitions  which  do  not  qualify  as  notifiable  concentrations  under  the  FSR. 
Finally, e& will appoint a Trustee who will monitor compliance with the commitments. 

In  2024,  the  Commission  also  launched  preliminary  reviews  in  the  fields  of  security  equipment  for 
airports and ports and wind energy. 

For  instance,  the  Commission  carried  out  an  unannounced  inspection  in  the  premises  of  Nuctech,  a 
Chinese company active in the production and sale of security equipment in the EU on 23 April 2024. 
The Commission is currently reviewing the information gathered  in this context. In case of sufficient 
indications of distortive foreign subsidies, the Commission may open an in-depth investigation. 

On  29  May  2024,  the  EU  entities  of  Nuctech  lodged  an  appeal  to  the  General  Court  requesting  the 
annulment  of  the  inspection  decisions  and  of  any  subsequent  acts  or  requests  by  the  Commission 
including requests to have access to mailboxes located in China. On the same day, they applied for interim 
measures  to  suspend  the  execution  of  the  inspection  decisions,  together  with  any  subsequent  act  or 
request by the Commission and the legal hold requests.  

39 

 
On 12 August 2024, the President of the General Court issued an order rejecting Nuctech’s application 
for  interim  measures153.  The  President  of  the  Court  confirmed  that  the  Commission  can  address  an 
inspection decision to a business that is incorporated outside the EU if it operates within the EU and that 
it  can  inspect  the  EU  premises  of  such  businesses.  The  President  of  the  court  confirmed  that  the 
Commission must be able to inspect information accessible from a business’ EU premises even when 
that information is stored outside of the EU, in that case, in China. If it was not the case, the Commission 
could not carry out investigations effectively and companies might be encouraged to store data outside 
the EU to evade inspections.  

Further, the Court held that the EU entities had not proven that the data requested was not accessible to 
them. The applicants argued that providing access to such information would oblige the EU entities to 
violate Chinese laws, which would expose the company and individuals, to pecuniary fines and criminal 
sanctions. The President of the Court found that: (i) the applicants had failed to show that the Chinese 
law provisions that they referred to actually applied in this case; (ii) the laws in question did not seem to 
forbid Chinese companies from granting access to information but merely obliged them to obtain State 
authorisation before doing so, and that the EU entities had failed to show that they had either requested 
or been denied such authorisation; (iii) the EU entities did not substantiate why Chinese law prevented 
them (as opposed to their Chinese parent companies) from responding; and (iv) infringements of the laws 
in  question  would  only  result  in  financial  penalties  and,  if  imposed,  the  EU  entities  could  seek 
compensation from the Commission, hence, the mere threat of financial penalties did not exempt them 
from producing the information requested. 

In  April  2024,  the  Commission  also  launched  a  preliminary  review  into  the  conditions  for  the 
development of a number of wind parks in some Member States based on indications that some wind 
manufacturers  and  other  companies  active  in  the  internal  market  may  possibly  benefit  from  foreign 
subsidies granting them an unfair advantage over their competitors, and which may lead to distortions of 
competition154.  This  investigation  follows  the  European  Wind  Power  Action  Plan155  in  which  the 
Commission  committed  to  closely  monitor  potential  foreign  subsidies  which  create  distortions  of 
competition.  

The preliminary review is based on Articles 9 and 10 FSR, which enable the Commission to examine on 
its  own  initiative  any  information  from  any  source  regarding  alleged  foreign  subsidies  distorting  the 
internal  market,  and,  where  the  Commission  considers  that  the  information  available  indicate  the 
possibility  that  a  foreign  subsidy  distorting  the  internal  market  exists,  to  seek  all  the  information  it 
considers  necessary  to  assess,  on  a  preliminary  basis,  whether  the  financial  contribution  under 
examination  constitutes  a  foreign  subsidy  and  whether  it  distorts  the  internal  market.  To  further 
investigate the possible existence of distortive foreign subsidies in the context of the EU wind sector, the 
Commission sent requests for information to several undertakings, both wind park developers and wind 
turbine manufacturers active in the EU. The review of the information is ongoing. 

153  Order  of  the  President  of  the  General  Court  in  Case  T‑284/24  R,  Nuctech  Warsaw  Company  Limited  and  InsTech 
Netherlands v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2024:564, (under appeal). 
154 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_1927  
155  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘European Wind Power Action Plan’, COM/2023/669 final. 

40 

 
 
5. 

THE DIGITAL MARKETS ACT  

The  Digital  Markets  Act  (DMA)156  is  a  Single  Market  legislation  harmonising  the  obligations  of  so-
called gatekeepers - large digital platforms that provide an important gateway between business users 
and consumers - across the EU. It contributes to a well-functioning Single Market by laying down rules 
ensuring contestability and fairness in digital markets: it aims at creating a fair and contestable digital 
landscape  in  Europe  by  opening  ecosystems,  creating  real  opportunities  for  businesses  to  enter  and 
expand into new markets and providing end-users with real choices The DMA is one of the centrepieces 
of the European Digital Strategy157. It complements, but does not affect EU competition rules, which 
continue to apply fully.  

5.1. Context 

The DMA is one of the first regulatory tools in the world to comprehensively regulate the gatekeeper 
power of the largest digital companies. It entered into force on 1 November 2022 and became applicable 
on 2 May 2023. The Commission (with DG Competition and DG Communications Networks, Content 
and Technology in the lead) is the central enforcer of the DMA. It works in close cooperation with the 
NCAs within the ECN in accordance with Articles 37 and 38 DMA. 

The DMA establishes criteria for identifying and designating gatekeepers. Where a platform provider 
meets the quantitative thresholds regarding (i) its size, (ii) its number of active business users and end 
users, and (iii) its  entrenched and durable position,  in  principle  it will  be designated as a  gatekeeper, 
unless the platform manages to rebut the presumption. The Commission will also be able to designate 
gatekeepers that do not meet these thresholds upon qualitative assessment.  

The DMA covers ten types of core platform services (CPSs), i.e. digital services that feature a number 
of characteristics that can be exploited by the undertakings providing them, namely online intermediation 
services;  online  search  engines;  online  social  networking  services;  video-sharing  platform  services; 
number-independent  interpersonal  communication  services  (N-IICS);  operating  systems;  cloud 
computing services; advertising services; web browsers and, virtual assistants. 

Under the DMA, designated gatekeepers are obliged to comply with a set of clearly defined obligations. 
If a gatekeeper fails to comply with those obligations, the Commission may take formal enforcement 
actions, including imposing fines and additional remedies (such as obliging a gatekeeper to sell a business 
or parts of it or banning acquisitions). 

As a result of the implementation of these obligations, business users will benefit, for example, from a 
fair treatment and a level playing field when competing with gatekeeper services, such as the ability to 
sell applications (apps) through alternative channels (other than gatekeeper’s app stores); interoperability 
with  gatekeeper  services  to  offer  innovative  services;  access  to  data  generated  by  their  activities  on 
gatekeeper  platforms  or  the  ability  to  promote  offers  and  conclude  contracts  with  customers  outside 
gatekeeper platforms. 

The implementation of the obligations under the DMA will also benefit end-users who will be able, for 
example, to choose alternative app stores and services (not just gatekeeper’s defaults); to exercise better 
control over their data, including the ability to decide whether gatekeepers can link accounts; to easily 

156 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair 
markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), OJ L 265, 
12.10.2022, p. 1–66.  
157 See: A Europe fit for the digital age - European Commission  

41 

 
 
access  data  from  one  service  or  app  to  another,  allowing  for  seamless  data  backups  and  movement 
between services; to use alternative electronic identification or in-app payment services. 

The DMA provides for a close cooperation mechanism between the Commission as the sole enforcer and 
NCAs, as well as a High Level Group composed of European bodies and networks identified in the DMA. 
The main objectives of the High Level Group are to support a coherent and effective implementation of 
the DMA and other sector-specific regulations applicable to gatekeepers. It convenes several times a year 
to discuss and coordinate on actual topics of regulatory relevance158. 

5.2. Enforcement  

5.2.1.  Gatekeeper designations 

As of 7 March 2024, six undertakings which had been designated as gatekeepers in September 2023 with 
respect  to  22  CPSs  (namely  Alphabet’s  Google  Maps,  Google  Play,  Google  Shopping,  Google  Ads, 
Chrome, Google Android, YouTube and Google Search; Amazon’s Marketplace and Ads; Apple’s App 
Store, Safari and iOS; ByteDance’s Tiktok; Meta’s Facebook, Instagram, Marketplace, Ads, Whatsapp 
and Messenger; Microsoft’s LinkedIn and Windows PC OS), were required to fully comply with all the 
obligations  under  the  DMA  and  to  report  on  the  implementation  of  those  obligations  in  compliance 
reports159. 

On  12  February  2024,  the  Commission  concluded  the  four  market  investigations  launched  on  5 
September  2023  to  further  assess  Microsoft’s  and  Apple’s  submissions  that,  despite  meeting  the 
thresholds,  some  of  their  CPSs  do  not  qualify  as  gatekeeper  services  (so-called  gateways),  namely 
Microsoft’s  online  search  engine  Bing,  web  browser  Edge  and  online  advertising  service  Microsoft 
Advertising and Apple’s messaging service iMessage. Following a thorough assessment, the Commission 
found that iMessage160, Bing161, Edge162 and Microsoft Advertising163 do not qualify as gateways. 

On 29 April 2024, concluding the market investigation launched on 6 September 2023, the Commission 
designated  Apple  as  a  gatekeeper  with  respect  to  iPadOS164.  The  DMA’s  obligations  applied  as  of 4 
November 2024 to iPadOS165. 

On 1 March 2024, Booking, ByteDance and X notified to the Commission that their services meet the 
DMA thresholds. On 13 May 2024, the Commission designated Booking as a gatekeeper with regard to 
its  online intermediation  service  Booking.com166. On 13 November, Booking published a  compliance 
report  detailing  the  measures  it  has  taken  for  Booking.com  to  comply  with  the  DMA167.  The  DMA 
obligations  applied  to  Booking.com  as  of  14  November  2024168.  In  parallel,  on  13  May  2024  the 

158  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/high-level-group-digital-markets-act-agrees-coordinate-efforts-ensure-ai-
development-aligns-dma-2024-05-23_en   
159  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/designated-gatekeepers-must-now-comply-all-obligations-under-digital-
markets-act-2024-03-07_en and https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/reports/compliance-reports 
160 Case DMA.100022, Apple - number-independent interpersonal communications services. 
161 Case DMA.100015, Microsoft - online search engines. 
162 Case DMA.100028, Microsoft - web browsers. 
163 Case DMA.100034, Microsoft - online advertising services. 
164 Case DMA.100047, Apple – iPadOS.  
165 
under-digital-markets-act-2024-11-04_en 
166 Case DMA.100019, Booking - Online intermediation services – verticals.  
167 See: https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/reports/compliance-reports. 
168  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/booking-must-comply-all-relevant-obligations-under-digital-markets-act-
2024-11-14_en  

https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/apples-operating-system-ipados-must-comply-all-relevant-obligations-

See: 

42 

 
 
Commission  decided  not  to  designate  X  Ads169  and  TikTok  Ads170  as  CPSs,  and  following  a  market 
investigation  on  16  October  2024  it  reached  the  same  conclusion  in  relation  to  the  online  social 
networking service X171, based on the rebuttals filed by the three companies respectively. 

5.2.2  Non-compliance 

On 25 March 2024, the Commission opened non-compliance investigations, against Alphabet with regard 
to its rules on steering in Google Play and self-preferencing on Google Search; against Apple with regard 
to its rules on steering in the App Store and with regard to user choice obligations, including the choice 
screen for its web browser Safari, uninstallation and defaults, and against Meta for the ‘pay or consent’ 
model for users in the EU172. The Commission was concerned that the measures that these gatekeepers 
put in place fall short of effective compliance with their obligations under the DMA. Notably, with regard 
to Alphabet, steering rules in Google Play may not be fully compliant with Article 5(4) DMA and self-
preferencing in Google Search may lead to discrimination against third-party services. With regard to 
Apple’s obligations on choice screen, uninstallation and defaults, Apple may not be fully compliant with 
Article 6(3) DMA which obliges it to display a browser choice screen, enable uninstallation of apps and 
allow for an easy change of defaults where Apple is steering users from its operating system to its own 
services.  

On 24 June 2024, the Commission sent preliminary findings to Apple stating that its steering rules for 
the App Store are in breach of the DMA as they prevent app developers from freely steering consumers 
to  alternative  channels  for  offers  and  content173.  In  addition,  the  Commission  opened  a  new  non-
compliance investigation against Apple over concerns that its new contractual requirements for third-
party app developers and app stores, including Apple's new ‘Core Technology Fee’, fall short of ensuring 
effective compliance with Apple's obligations under the DMA174. 

On  1  July  2024,  the  Commission  sent  preliminary  findings  to  Meta  stating  that  its  ‘pay  or  consent’ 
advertising model fails to comply with the DMA's requirements under Article 5(2) DMA175. Specifically, 
the Commission’s preliminary view is that the model does not allow users to opt for a service that uses 
less of their personal data but is otherwise equivalent to the ‘personalised ads’ based service and does 
not allow users to exercise their right to freely consent to the combination of their personal data. 

On  19  September  2024,  the  Commission  initiated  two  specification  proceedings  to  assist  Apple  in 
complying with its obligations under Article 6(7) DMA to provide free and effective interoperability to 
third  party  developers  and  businesses  with  hardware  and  software  features  controlled  by  Apple's 
operating  systems  iOS  and  iPadOS,  designated  under  the  DMA176.  The  specification  proceedings 
formalise  the  Commission's  regulatory  dialogue  with  Apple  on  certain  specific  areas  of  Apple's 
compliance with such provisions. In particular, the first proceeding focuses on several iOS connectivity 
features and functionalities, including notifications; device pairing and connectivity and other features 
predominantly used for and by connected devices (for example, smartwatches, headphones, virtual reality 

169 Case DMA.100232, X - online advertising services. 
170 Case DMA.100042, ByteDance - online advertising services. 
171 Case DMA.100041, X - online social networking services.  
172  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-opens-non-compliance-investigations-against-alphabet-apple-
and-meta-under-digital-markets-202  
173 Case DMA.100206, Apple - New business terms.  
174 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3433  
175 
model-breach-digital-markets-act-2024-07-01_en  
176 
obligations-under-digital-2024-09-19_en  

https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-sends-preliminary-findings-meta-over-its-pay-or-consent-

https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-starts-first-proceedings-specify-apples-interoperability-

See: 

See: 

43 

 
 
headsets). The second proceeding focuses on the process Apple has set up to address interoperability 
requests  submitted  by  developers  and  third  parties  for  iOS  and  iPadOS,  including  transparency, 
timeliness and fairness. On 18 December 2024, the Commission sent preliminary findings to Apple in 
the  context  of  both  proceedings.  These  findings  indicate  the  proposed  measures  for  Apple  to  ensure 
interoperability of connected devices with iPhones and to make interoperability by third parties more 
predictable and transparent, as required by the DMA177. To ensure that these proposed measures achieve 
effective  interoperability  in  compliance  with  the  DMA,  the  Commission  launched  two  public 
consultations178. The input from the consultations as well as Apple’s observations will feed into the final 
measures. 

In  addition  to  formal  enforcement  proceedings,  the  Commission  held  regulatory  dialogues  with  all 
gatekeepers across various CPSs and obligations with a view to adress non-compliant solutions. These 
dialogues lead to gatekeepers improving their compliance measures in several instances, for example in 
relation to data access obligations or the prohibition of tying. The input of affected third parties is key in 
these discussions. The Commission therefore held general compliance workshops179 with stakeholders 
of all gatekeepers, as well as several more dedicated ones on specific obligations. 

Finally, in April 2024, the Commission launched a whistleblower tool for the DMA, to enable individuals 
to provide information, without fear of reprisals, allowing to identify and uncover any violations of the 
DMA obligations by designated gatekeepers180. 

5.3. 

Regulatory cooperation and transparency 

On 22 May 2024, the High Level Group for the DMA, which convened for the third time in Brussels after 
its its inaugural meeting on 12 May 2023, agreed on the need to coordinate enforcement and adopted a 
public statement on AI181. 

The  Commission  also  cooperated  regularly  with  NCAs  under  the  DMA’s  specific  mechanism  to 
coordinate  the  complementary  application  of  the  DMA  and  national  competition  law  as  well  as  in 
multilateral fora such as the G7 Competition Summit182. In addition, in October 2024, the Commission 
launched a call for tenders for a study to assess the foreseeable impact of emerging technologies towards 
existing online platforms and implementation of the regulatory framework, with a particular focus on the 
DMA183. 

Finally, in 2024, the Commission received information about nine submissions pursuant to Article 14 
DMA,  which  requires  gatekeepers  to  inform  the  Commission  of  any  intended  acquisition  within  the 

and 

See: 

https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/dma100203-consultation-proposed-measures-interoperability-between-
https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/dma100204-consultation-proposed-

177 Cases DMA.100204, SP - Apple - Article 6(7) – process, and DMA.100203, Apple – Operating systems – iOS – Article 
6(7) – SP – Features for Connected Physical Devices. 
178 
apples-ios-operating-system-and_en 
measures-requesting-interoperability-apples-ios-and-ipados-operating  
179 See: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/events_en  
180  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/commission-launches-whistleblower-tools-digital-services-act-and-digital-
markets-act-2024-04-30_en  
181 See: https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/high-level-group-digital-markets-act-public-statement-artificial-intelligence-
2024-05-22_en  
182  See,  for  example:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/g7-competition-summit-effective-international-cooperation-
contributing-fair-open-and-contestable-ai-2024-10-04_en    
183  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/study-how-emerging-technologies-may-impact-digital-market-regulation-
2024-10-14_en  

44 

 
 
digital sector184.  

6. 

DEVELOPING THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION POLICY 

As world markets continue to integrate and more companies rely on global value chains, competition 
agencies need to increase their collaboration more than ever before. Effectively enforcing competition 
rules  depends  to  a  growing  extent  on  cooperation  with  other  enforcement  authorities  and  on  having 
effective tools to ensure a fair business environment in the EU. 

6.1. Multilateral relations 

In 2024, the Commission continued to engage actively in international competition related fora such as 
the  Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  Competition  Committee,  the 
International  Competition  Network  (ICN),  the  G7  Competition  Summit  and  the  United  Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 

At the OECD Competition Committee meeting in June 2024, the Commission presented the judgment of 
the Court of Justice in Super League185 and contributed to exchanges on monopolisation, moat building 
and  entrenchment  strategies186.  It  also  contributed  to  the  revision  of  the  2005  Recommendation  on 
Merger Review by actively engaging in dedicated drafting working group meetings. The Commission 
further took part in discussions on AI, data and competition, and pro-competitive industrial policy. In 
September, the Commission took part in the launch event of the OECD Competitive Neutrality Toolkit187. 
In December 2024, the Commission took part in the Competition Committee’s deliberations on the use 
of structural presumptions in antitrust and the standard and burden of proof in competition law cases188, 
and to the OECD Global Forum on Competition’s roundtable on competition in the food supply chain189.   

The Commission further continued acting as co-chair of the ICN Merger Working Group. In this context, 
it  delivered  a  new  draft  chapter  on  non-horizontal  mergers  for  the  ICN  Recommended  Practices  for 
Merger Analysis190, and continued work on updating chapters on unilateral and coordinated effects. In 
May 2024, the Commission also participated in the annual ICN Annual Conference191, with the Director 
General of DG Competition speaking on the Merger Working Group plenary panel and in one Cartel 
Working  Group  breakout  session,  and  other  Commission  speakers  contributing  in  various  breakout 
sessions192. The Commission also actively participated in the organisation of the ICN Merger Workshop, 
which  took  place  in  November  2024  in  Taiwan,  where  DG  Competition’s  delegation  moderated  and 
facilitated various break-out sessions193. 

At the G7 Competition Summit held in Rome in October 2024, the discussions focused on competition 
and  regulatory  challenges  linked  to  the  rapid  growth  of  AI,  in  particular  Generative  AI  models  and 

184 See: https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/acquisitions  
185 See: EUR-Lex - 62021CJ0333 - EN - EUR-Lex  
186 See: OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers | OECD 
187 See: Launch event of the OECD Competitive Neutrality Toolkit | OECD 
188 See: OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers | OECD 
189 See: Global Forum on Competition 2024 | OECD 
190 See: MWG-RPs-on-Non-Horizontal-Mergers-2024.pdf 
191 See: https://icn2024sauipe.cade.gov.br/  
192 See: https://icn2024sauipe.cade.gov.br/sessions/  
193 See: ICN Merger Workshop 

45 

 
 
 
algorithms194. Authorities and agencies present at the Summit also exchanged views on other concerns 
in digital markets and on how to act ex ante and ex post to address related challenges. The Commission 
shared its experience on the enforcement of the DMA, with a particular focus on AI. The Commission 
also briefed the G7 partners about the regulatory developments in the EU, including the recently adopted 
AI  Act195.  The  participants  agreed to  promote  cooperation,  exchange  of  knowledge  and  develop  a 
common vision for the future of competition policy and other policies, and their enforcement among G7 
countries in the era of AI. 

In July 2024, the Commission attended the 22nd meeting of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Competition Law and Policy196 where the discussions focused on ways to improve global 
cooperation  in  competition  policy  enforcement  and  to  enhance  convergence  through  dialogue.  The 
Commission also participated, as one of three reviewers, in the peer review of Egypt’s competition law 
and policy.  

6.2. Bilateral relations  

In April 2024, the Commission and the U.S. competition authorities held the fourth high-level meeting 
of  the  Joint  Technology  Competition  Policy  Dialogue197  to  continue  working  together  to  ensure  and 
promote  fair  competition  in  the  digital  economy.  The  dialogue  focused  on  the  evolving  business 
strategies of big tech companies, including the recent investments and partnerships between major cloud 
providers and AI providers, as well as their implications for competition enforcement. 

In 2024, the Commission also continued working on bilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom as 
foreseen in the EU/UK Trade Cooperation Agreement (TCA)198 and the Withdrawal Agreement199. The 
Commission’s work focused on control of potentially competition distorting subsidy schemes in the UK, 
which entails monitoring and reporting on subsidy and competition legislation and enforcement. It also 
represented the EU in the formal Committees foreseen in the TCA and Withdrawal Agreement. 

Early  2024,  the  Commission  started  negotiations  with  Switzerland  on  eight  themes  relevant  to  the 
bilateral relations, including one on State aid200. Those negotiations have been conducted at a rapid pace 
throughout  the  year  and  conluded  in  record  time.  On  20  December  2024,  the  Commission  President 
announced the conclusion of the negotiations between the European Union and Switzerland201. 

The Commission also continued its cooperation on competition policy with the Korean and the Japanese 
Fair  Trade  Commissions.  DG  Competition's  multilateral  technical  cooperation  with  the  Chinese, 
Japanese, Korean, Indian and ASEAN competition authorities continued as well202.  

194  See:  https://digital-markets-act.ec.europa.eu/g7-competition-summit-effective-international-cooperation-contributing-
fair-open-and-contestable-ai-2024-10-04_en  
195  Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised 
rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 
2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial 
Intelligence Act) (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 
196 See: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-roundtables-on-competition-policy-papers_20758677  
197  See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1952 
198 Trade and cooperation agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one 
part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the other part, OJ L 444, 31.12.2020, p. 14. 
199 Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and 
the European Atomic Energy Community, OJ C 384I, 12.11.2019, p. 1–177. 
200 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1508  
201 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6562  
202 See: https://asia.competitioncooperation.eu/  

46 

 
 
The Commission also aims to include provisions on competition and subsidy control when negotiating 
Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs).  In  2024,  the  Commission  continued  FTA  negotiations  with  India, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and ESA5203.  

As  regards  Competition  Cooperation  Agreements,  the  Commission  continued  the  negotiations  with 
Canada to ensure that the provisions on data protection line up with the standards established by the 
Opinion  of  the  Court  of  Justice  on  the  2014  EU  Canada  Passenger  Name  Record  Agreement204.  In 
October,  the  Commission  and  the  UK  finalised  technical  discussions  on  a  Competition  Cooperation 
Agreement.  The  future  agreement  would  be  a  'supplementing  agreement'  to  the  EU-UK  TCA,  which 
foresees the possibility to enter into a separate agreement on competition cooperation. The agreement 
would not only allow the Commission but also the national competition authorities of the EU Member 
States enforcing EU competition law to cooperate with the UK competition authority205.  

As regards candidate 206 and potential candidate207 countries, the Commission's main policy objective 
with regard to competition law is to provide support for setting up of legislative frameworks with well-
functioning and operationally independent competition and State aid authorities that will build up a solid 
enforcement record. In 2024, the Commission continued to monitor the compliance of the candidate and 
potential candidate countries with their commitments under the Stabilisation and Association/Deep and 
Comprehensive FTA and to assess the legal alignment of their national rules with the EU acquis. The 
Commission is also working on the implementation of Support Facilities for Ukraine and for the Western 
Balkan countries and the setting up of a Support Facility for Moldova to assist the legal, administrative 
but also economic integration of the candidate countries with the EU internal market. 

In 2024, the Commission also engaged actively with several African national and regional authorities to 
develop further cooperation in the competition field208. The Commission organised the third Africa-EU 
Competition Week to foster dialogue with African competition authorities at national and regional level. 
The  Commission  has  also  prepared  the  launch  of  pan-African  (African  Continental  Free  Trade  Area 
(AfCFTA))  and  regional  (EAC,  WAEMU-UEMOA/ECOWAS  and  COMESA)  capacity  building 
programmes for their start of implementation. 

7. 

SUPPORTING EU COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 

7.1. Digital Transformation 

Adapting  to  an  increasingly  digital  and  fast-paced  environment  is  a  constant  challenge  for  the 
enforcement of EU competition policy. New sophisticated digital tools and algorithms used by economic 
operators, combined with an exponential increase in electronic communications, the sheer quantity of 
data and the number of  documents on case  files  render many  competition  investigations increasingly 
complex. DG Competition identified digital transformation as a key priority and concentrates efforts to 
put in place innovative and optimised digital solutions to make competition enforcement more effective 
by working on the implementation of its Digital Solutions Modernisation Plan and IT strategy, in line 

203 Five Eastern and Southern Countries: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. 
204 Opinion of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 26.7.2017, Opinion 1/15, Draft agreement between Canada and the EU — 
Transfer of Passenger Name Record data from the EU to Canada, EU:C:2016:656. 
205 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_5468  
206 Countries granted candidate country status by the European Council on the basis of a recommendation by the European 
Commission:  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Georgia,  Moldova,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia,  Serbia,  Türkiye  and 
Ukraine. 
207 Potential candidate for EU membership: Kosovo. 
208 See: https://africa.competitioncooperation.eu/ 

47 

 
 
with the Commission’s revised Digital Strategy209. 

7.1.1.  Case Management modernisation 

In 2024, the modernisation of DG Competition’s case management further progressed. The replacement 
of the ageing case management system for Antitrust, Cartels, and Mergers with CASE@EC is expected 
to be completed in 2025. The CASE@EC modules supporting the DMA and the FSR were also improved.  

7.1.2.  Improving digital exchanges with Member states’ administrations, businesses and citizens 

DG  Competition  continued  improving  its  digital  solutions  to  improve  and  fully  digitise  its 
communication  and  collaboration  processes  with  external  stakeholders,  notably  Member  State 
administrations, NCAs, citizens, businesses and legal representatives. 

Two  new  digital  solutions  started  to  be  developed,  including  a  new  future  eNotifications  solution  to 
digitise the notification process in the field of Merger and State Aid control, as well as a new solution 
that will help Member States comply with the enhanced transparency requirements from the new General, 
SGEI and Agriculture de minimis regulations210. This solution will allow Member States to document de 
minimis aids, enhancing transparency and reducing reporting obligations for companies receiving aid. 

Other digital solutions supporting DG Competition’s activities were also improved, including requests 
for information (eRFI)211, leniency programme (eLeniency)212, negotiation on confidentiality claims in 
access  to  file  procedures  (eConfidentiality)213,  public  search  tool  for  competition  decisions  (COMP 
Cases)214, collaboration and communication tool within the ECN (ECN2), calculation of interests due on 
State Aid recovery cases aid (AIDCAL)215, State Aid Notification (SANI2)216 and Reporting (SARI2). 

7.1.3.  Advanced data support and digital solutions for competition investigations  

As  DG  Competition  continues  to  face  an  exponential  increase  in  the  volume  of  electronic 
communications  and  of  electronic  evidence,  digital  solutions  are  further  developed  to  improve  the 
handling of large volumes of submissions and the ‘on-premises’ access to file. For instance, in 2024 the 
Commission initiated the procurement of an AI-based eDiscovery software with Technology Assisted 
Review (TAR) to provide support in the analysis of voluminous files. 

DG Competition’s horizontal unit ‘Data Analysis and Technology’ (CTO team) supports competition 
enforcement  activities  with  specialist  skills  to  make  the  most  of  technological  advances  for  digital 
investigations, intelligence collection and market monitoring, forensics and eDiscovery (in particular the 
AI-based  eDiscovery  software).  It  also  provides  assistance  with  advanced  data  services  to  assist 
processing  and  exploiting  non-standard  submissions  of  large  volumes  of  documents.  The  CTO  team 
collaborates with among others European Institutions, Member States and organisations.  

209 Communication of the Commission, European Commission digital strategy - Next generation digital Commission, C(2022) 
4388 final, 30.6.2022. 
210 See more on the new de minimis regulations above in I. Legislation and Policy developments, section 3.1. State aid for 
horizontal  objectives  and  in  II.  Sectoral  Overview,  section  6.2.  Contribution  of  EU  competition  policy  to  tackling  the 
challenges. 
211 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/procedures/erfi_en  
212 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/leniency/eleniency_en   
213 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/index/it-tools/econfidentiality_en  
214 See: https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/  
215 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/procedures/recovery-unlawful-aid_en 
216 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/forms-notifications-and-reporting_en  

48 

 
 
7.2. Single Market Programme 

DG  Competition  benefits  from  a  dedicated  Competition  Programme  as  part  of  the  Single  Market 
Programme (SMP) to finance actions to enhance the Commission’s competition enforcement capacity, 
policy  initiatives,  international  cooperation,  and  competition  policy  advocacy.  In  addition  to  the 
development  of  digital  business  solutions,  the  programme  also  supported  the  training  of  judges  in 
competition  law, as  well  as  initiatives of exchange and capacity-building among  enforcement bodies, 
national  authorities  and  international  organisations.  Moreover,  it  allowed  DG  Competition  to  fund 
studies, evaluations, and research to underpin effective policymaking217. With an EU budget contribution 
of EUR 20.5 million for 2024, the Competition Programme channeled investments into areas that support 
effective and up-to-date enforcement of EU competition policy.  

7.3. Staff Report on ‘Protecting competition in a changing world’  

On  24  June  2024,  DG  Competition  published  a  Staff  Report  entitled  ‘Protecting  competition  in  a 
changing world - Evidence on the evolution of competition in the EU during the past 25 years’218. The 
Staff Report draws on  research  contributions  from  the OECD219, insights  of a consortium of external 
consultants and academics220, and from research done by DG Competition itself. The main objective of 
the report was to gather evidence on (i) how and why the conditions of competition have evolved in the 
EU  over  the  past  20-25  years,  (ii)  how  and  why  effective  competition  matters  for  broader  economic 
outcomes (prices, productivity, competitiveness, growth).  

The research presented in the first  part of the report suggests that on average  and in  a wide range of 
sectors in the EU over the past 25 years the following trends can be observed:  

•  European industries (defined at broad NACE 3-digits levels) have become more concentrated over 
time,  as  measured  by  the  joint  production  share of  the  four  largest  firms  (CR4).  Average  CR4  at 
industry  level  increased  by  5  percentage  points  from  2000-2019  (see  Figure  9(a)  below).  CR4 
increased mostly in already more concentrated sectors with industry CR4s in the 30%-80% range.  
•  Using retail sales data from a novel dataset (Euromonitor), it is found that European consumer facing 
markets are characterised by significantly higher concentration levels (average CR4 > 60%) than the 
corresponding broad industry shares. Recently, those markets have also become more concentrated 
and less dynamic (2012-2019). Average concentration in consumer facing markets is lower in the EU 
than in the US, Japan, Korea and Canada. Within the EU there are however significant differences 
between Member States even when controlling for population size. Concentration is particularly high 
in consumer facing markets which matter most for poor households (energy, food).  

•  Markups  have  increased  from  2000-2019  by  7%,  in  particular  for  firms  at  the  top  of  the  markup 
distribution  (+12%)  (Figure  9(b)  below).  Markups  have  increased  more  in  digitally  intensive 
industries than in industries with low digital intensity.  

217 For example, research in support of staff report ‘Protecting competition in a changing world. Evidence on the evolution of 
competition in the EU during the past 25 years’. 
218 See: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/c03374f1-3833-11ef-b441-01aa75ed71a1  
219 OECD (Calligaris et al., 2024), Exploring the evolution and state of competition in the EU; OECD (Abele et al., 2024), A 
taxonomy  of  industry  competition.  Both  studies  available  at:  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/publications/ex-post-
economic-evaluations_en  
220  Lear  et  al.  (2024),  Exploring  aspects  of  the  state  of  competition  in  the  EU  –  Final  report,  Publications  Office  of  the 
European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/012974  

49 

 
 
•  Net profits of firms as a share of EU GDP have significantly increased from 1990-2022 (Figure 9(c) 
below). The average profit rates of the world’s 50 most profitable large firms (‘Global superstars’) 
have almost doubled, growing from 11% in 1998 to 20% in 2022. 

•  The  level  of  business  dynamism/churn  among  market  leading  firms  is  low  and  seems  to  have 
decreased,  as  shown,  for  example,  by  decreasing  industry  share  volatility  at  the  top  of  the  firm 
distribution. Entry by new firms seems to have declined. 

Figure 9: Evolution of industry concentration, markups, net profit share of GDP and volatility of industry 
shares 

• 

In addition, the gap between leading firms on the one hand and followers and entrants on the other 
hand appears to  have grown as  regards markups, profits and productivity. Followers and  entrants 
seem to find it increasingly difficult to catch up with leaders. 

•  The trends in the EU regarding concentration, markups and profits seem to have gone in the same 
direction as in other advanced economies, although they appear to be somewhat less pronounced than 
in the US. 

In examining what may have been the drivers of these trends, the presented evidence suggests that: 

• 

Important drivers of the above trends may have been (i) changing economies of scale due to the rise 
of  investments  in  proprietary  IT  solutions  and  other  intangibles  (R&D,  patents,  brands),  (ii) 
globalisation, (iii) regulatory barriers to entry and (v) possibly to a more limited extent, rising M&A 
activity. 

•  These  changes  may  have  produced  both  benign  effects  (efficiencies)  and  adverse  effects  (more 
concentrated sectors, more pronounced market power, higher barriers to entry). While the trends and 
the mix of contributing factors will vary by sector, on average, the intensity of competition seems to 
be weaker and the market power of firms at the top of the markup and profit distribution seems to be 
more pronounced than in the past. 

50 

 
 
•  These developments may have contributed to adverse macro-economic trends in the EU such as (i) 
reduced business dynamism and (re-)allocation of resources, (ii) higher productivity dispersion and 
slower productivity growth, (iii) higher wage inequality and a lower labour share and (iv) a lower 
resilience to economic shocks and a lower responsiveness to economic policy measures. 

•  An analysis of competition risk at industry level uses several indicators of competition to rank sectors 
according to their degree of competition risk, resulting in a sector ‘scorecard’. Relating this scorecard 
to data on EU competition interventions the analysis finds that EU interventions in merger control 
and antitrust have occurred most frequently in sectors with high competition risks. This suggests that 
the European Commission’s enforcement priorities were by and large correctly focused. 

Additional research presented in the second part of the report confirms and supplements prior research 
that effective (or weak) competition can have significant positive (or negative) effects not only on prices 
and thus on the purchasing power of consumers, but also on the productivity and competitiveness of EU 
firms and thus on overall economic growth:   

•  A study on price-concentration relationships in six sectors with notable price variations across EU 
Member States provides qualitative and, for mobile telecoms and airlines, empirical evidence that 
higher  concentration  levels  appear  to  be  associated  with  higher  prices.  Consistent  with  previous 
studies,  it  also  finds  that  European  customers  benefit  from  significantly  lower  prices  than  US 
customers in both mobile telecoms and airlines markets. For mobile telecoms the research finds for 
the period 2009 to 2019 that higher concentration levels were not associated with higher investment.   

•  A survey of EU-based exporting firms suggests that effective domestic competition within the EU 
Single Market (i) is an important driver of their global export competitiveness - in particular effective 
competition in upstream goods markets - and (ii) for a majority of respondents does not constrain 
their scale in a way that would hinder their success on global export markets. 

•  A study on the macroeconomic effects of competition, relying on simulations in a general equilibrium 
macroeconomic model, estimates first that the increase in markups observed in the EU since 2000 
may have reduced EU GDP by up to 5-7% compared to a scenario without such an increase. However, 
without the EU’s competition interventions taken over the last ten years the impact might have been 
even larger by almost one quarter. The study also estimates that strengthening competition in the EU 
could  yield  substantial  macroeconomic  benefits:  measures  limiting  the  market  power  of  the  most 
powerful firms or pro-competitive regulatory reforms across the EU might each increase GDP by up 
to 2%-4%, depending on the time horizon. 

7.4. Ex post evaluation: study on ‘killer acquisitions’ in the pharma sector  

On 28 November 2024, the Commission published an ex-post evaluation study commissioned by DG 
Competition covering ‘killer acquisitions’ in the pharmaceutical sector221. For the purposes of the study, 
the authors defined killer acquisitions as the acquisitions of innovative pharmaceutical pipeline products 
which have as their object or effect to discontinue one of overlapping R&D projects. There is a significant 
risk that such killer acquisitions reduce innovation competition involved in the transaction and ultimately 
in the entire market.  

221 Buccirossi, P., Marrazzo, A. et al. (2024), Ex-post evaluation: EU competition enforcement and acquisitions of innovative 
competitors in the pharma sector leading to the discontinuation of overlapping drug research and development projects, Final 
report 
https://competition-
the  European  Commission,  November 
policy.ec.europa.eu/publications/ex-post-economic-evaluations_en  

2024.  See 

by  Lear 

prepared 

for 

51 

 
 
The study assessed not only M&A deals, but also other types of transactions including licensing deals 
and R&D co-operation agreements222. According to the study, between 2014 and 2018, on average 48 
transactions  per  year  involved  the  acquisition  of  narrowly  overlapping  R&D  projects  at  the  level  of 
clinical trials. In a significant number of these, one of the R&D projects of the parties were subsequently 
abandoned.  While  without  access  to  internal  documents  the  study  was  not  able  to  identify  specific 
examples of deals that are confirmed (‘proven’) killer acquisitions, around 18 transactions per year were 
found to  ‘deserve further scrutiny’, meaning  that there was no clearly identifiable technical  or safety 
reason  explaining  the  discontinuation  in  question.  The  study  assessed  the  Commission’s  past 
enforcement addressing potential killer acquisitions and the legal framework guiding the Commission’s 
actions in this respect. It found that the Commission had correctly assessed the theories of harm in five 
merger cases involving killer acquisitions223. Moreover, the study included suggestions for improving 
the design of remedies. Finally, the study analysed the suitability of the merger and antitrust tools used 
to deal with killer acquisition cases where the Commission does not have jurisdiction. 

7.5. External Communication and Advocacy  

DG Competition engages in communication activities with businesses, national courts, lawyers, policy 
makers, academics, students, and civil society. Various channels are used, such as the participation of 
the Executive Vice-President responsible for competition in events, press conferences and speeches, as 
well as press releases, newsletters, conferences, specialised publications, and social media.  

Some  of  the  cases  and  policy  initiatives  generated  broad  media  coverage  in  2024,  for  example  the 
upcoming guidelines on exclusionary abuses of dominance, the revised market definition notice, the first 
decision under the FSR, the IPCEIs on the Hydrogen Value Chain, and high-profile cases such as the 
Mondelēz and Apple music streaming cases. Important communication efforts were also undertaken at 
the occasion of the publication of the DG Competition staff report ‘Protecting competition in a changing 
world.  Evidence  on  the  evolution  of  competition  in  the  EU  during  the  past  25  years’,  with  a  launch 
conference on 27 June 2024224 and an expert workshop on 15 October 2024.225 University students were 
invited to take part in a ‘Student Challenge’ to answer the question: ‘What would you have said if you 
had been a speaker?’226 

In terms of events, DG Competition completed the travelling debate series ‘Making Markets Work for 
People’227,  bringing  competition  policy  to  non-specialist  settings  and  locations  outside  the  national 
capitals.  After  debates  in  Italy,  Austria,  Spain  and  the  Czech  Republic  in  2023,  in  May  2024  DG 
Competition  closed  the  series  with  an  event  in  Aarhus,  Denmark  entitled  ‘This  is  why  we  need 
competition policy’. 

DG Competition also continued its ‘Let’s Talk Competition’ series228 to debate some of the most relevant 
competition policy developments with experts from academia, the legal world, and national authorities. 

222 Without access to internal documents the authors were unable to confirm (‘prove’) specific examples of killer acquisitions, 
The order of magnitude of the findings in the study is comparable to what other researchers using different methods and 
datasets have found. 
223 The five cases were selected for the purposes of the study and do not indicate the total number of cases involving potential 
killer acquisitions. 
224 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/protecting-competition-changing-world_en 
225 
workshop_en  
226 
challenge_en  
227 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/making-markets-work-people_en 
228 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/lets-talk-competition_en  

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/protecting-competition-changing-world/student-

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/protecting-competition-changing-world-public-

See: 

See: 

52 

 
 
The topics covered in 2024 included State aid and industrial policy, the revised market definition notice, 
and  the  past  and  future  of  competition  policy.  This  format  allows  DG  Competition  to  reach  a  wide 
audience of people interested in competition policy: the seven episodes produced so far have accumulated 
more than 15 000 views on YouTube. 

DG Competition’s social media accounts have increased their reach and followers base: the LinkedIn 
account has now more than 33 000 followers – making it one of the most followed LinkedIn accounts 
among all DGs – and the X account has more than 24 000 followers. DG Competition has also focused 
on the development of a YouTube channel, with more than 1 400 subscribers. The channel hosts videos 
and animations created to highlight and explain policy instruments. Two were produced in 2024, one on 
State aid, and another on the Merger Regulation. The channel also hosts the ‘COMP Flash’ series, where 
DG  Competition  officials  explain  high-profile  cases  in  a  very  short  video.  In  addition,  in  2024  DG 
Competition’s  weekly  newsletter  reached  12 500  subscribers,  its  publications  were  viewed  or 
downloaded  more  than  40 000  times,  and  its  website  attracted  over  10  million  views.  Finally,  DG 
Competition issued more than 150 press releases during 2024.  

In 2024, Executive Vice-President Vestager delivered 26 speeches to a variety of audiences, both within 
and  outside  Europe  and  Executive  Vice-President  Ribeira  opened  her  mandate  by  giving  a  keynote 
address  at  the  CRA  annual  Conference  on  Competition  policy  adapted  to  the  new  global  realities229. 
Supported  by  the  Commission’s  representations,  the  Director  General  of  DG  Competition  also 
participated in more than 50 international events and, together with other senior managers, engaged in 
extensive outreach efforts on the benefits of a strong and effective competition policy and enforcement. 

7.6. Estimation of the benefits of EU competition law enforcement for citizens 

The Commission’s enforcement actions in the fields of antitrust and mergers generate direct benefits for 
citizens. DG Competition measures the impact of its activities in several ways. An important measure is 
the ‘direct customer savings’, that is the likely direct price effects for customers in the markets where the 
Commission intervened via merger control, cartel and antitrust enforcement.  

DG Competition estimates (based on a simplified OECD method) that direct customer savings generated 
by the Commission’s antitrust (cartels and non-cartel antitrust) and merger enforcement over the period 
2012-2023 amount to on average EUR 12 to 21 billion per annum. 

Figure 10: Customer savings (midpoints) 2012-2023  

The Commission is not the only enforcer of EU competition rules. For this reason, DG Competition has 

229 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_24_6341  

53 

 
 
 
in  2024,  for  the  first  time,  started  to  measure  the  additional  customer  savings  generated  by  the 
enforcement actions taken by NCAs within the ECN. For a 3-year period (2020-2022), the estimated 
total direct customer savings from all interventions by the 13 NCAs which provided data230 were in a 
range of EUR 7-11 billion per year. The combined (Commission and NCAs) customer savings therefore 
sum up to a range of EUR 23-38 billion per year during the period 2020-2022. While these are rough and 
partial  estimates,  they provide a  an impression  of the order of magnitude of the likely  direct  savings 
generated by competition enforcement, both by the Commission and the 13 NCAs231. 

In addition to these direct customer savings, there are also the (indirect) deterrent effects of enforcement 
and  the  positive  effects  on  innovation  and  quality.  While  both  effects  are  more  difficult  to  estimate, 
economists tend to agree that they are likely more significant than the direct customer savings. In 2023, 
the Commission commissioned a study on the deterrence effects of competition enforcement. The selected 
contractor  is  currently  conducting  a  survey  among  businesses  and  competition  lawyers  to  better 
understand how companies take into account EU competition rules, and their enforcement, when making 
business decisions. The results will be fed into a final report. 

Customer savings have further been used as a starting point to model and estimate the macroeconomic 
impact of the Commission’s competition enforcement. Using the QUEST III model, the Commission’s 
basic  macro-economic  forecasting  model,  modelling  by  the  JRC  suggests  that  the  Commission’s 
competition enforcement activities may trigger an increase of real EU GDP relative to the baseline in the 
range of 0.6%-1.1% in the medium to long term (= the equivalent of an uplift of EUR 100-180 billion in 
current GDP), a 0.3%-0.7% reduction in the overall price level and an increase in consumption (0.5%) 
and investment (1.1%)232. 

II.  SECTORAL OVERVIEW  

1. 

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT  

1.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors  

In 2024, the situation in the energy markets improved, with gas and electricity prices gradually decreasing 
and  stabilising.  However,  Europe  continued  to  be  affected  by  the  economic  disturbance  caused  by 
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and by wider geopolitical tensions. Energy prices remained 
above pre-crisis levels, and this context continued to pose risks and remained a source of uncertainty. 
Despite the general positive trend, energy markets remained vulnerable.  

To prevent price shocks in the future, the EU adopted in 2024 a structural reform of its electricity market. 
The  Electricity  Market  Design  (EMD)  reform233  elaborated  new  rules  to  make  electricity  prices  less 
dependent  on  the  price  of  fossil  fuels,  and  to  create  a  price-shock  absorber  between  markets  and  the 
electricity  bills  paid  by  consumers  during  electricity  crisis,  essentially  by  implementing  two-way 

230 At this initial stage, the NCAs of 13 Member States submitted data for the calculation of customer benefits. Several further 
NCAs may contribute for the next stage of this project. 
231 In addition, it is worth noting that this initial exercise covered three years during which enforcement was likely affected 
by the Covid pandemic. 
232  European  Commission:  Directorate-General for  Competition,  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs, 
Joint Research Centre, Dierx, A., Fedotenkov, I. et al., Modelling the macroeconomic impact of competition policy – 2023 
update and further development, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/959314 
233 Regulation (EU) 2024/1747 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 amending Regulations (EU) 
2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 as regards improving the Union’s electricity market design. 

54 

 
 
’Contracts for Difference’ (CfDs)234. The EMD reform largely dominated the work on energy files in 
2024. In the long term, its implementation will ensure greater stability in European electricity prices. The 
reform entered into force on 16 July 2024, while the obligation to support Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) and nuclear electricity production through two-way CfDs will apply from 17 July 2027 onwards. 
In the meantime, Member States are required to limit profitability and/or introduce clawbacks for newly 
signed contracts.  

In parallel, to adjust its temporary response to the persistence of high energy prices and uncertainty in 
energy markets and contribute to stabilising prices, the Commission prolonged in 2023 certain provisions 
of the TCTF235. Section 2.4 (aid to compensate for high energy prices) was prolonged by six months until 
30  June  2024.  Under  this  section,  Member  States  continued  to  provide  support  by  covering  parts  of 
additional energy costs only as far as the energy prices significantly exceed pre-crisis levels.   

The structural European strategy to make energy prices less dependent on volatile fossil-fuels and to keep 
reducing  prices for European electricity consumers consists in further accelerating the deployment  of 
renewables  and  clean  energy  production,  as  well  as  decarbonising  the  European  economy.  For  this 
reason,  the  sections  of  the  TCTF  covering  the  transition  towards  a  net-zero  economy,  required  to 
accelerate  the  decarbonisation  of  the  European  economy  and  reduce  dependencies  from  fossil  fuels 
(sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8) remain available until 31 December 2025.  

Apart from the TCTF, the main tools to assess State aid regarding energy and environmental protection 
are the Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection, and energy (CEEAG)236 and the 
GBER237. Since their adoption in January 2022, 50 cases have been adopted under the CEEAG, out of 
which 13 in 2024. The Guidelines continue to be a structuring framework for the Commission to assess 
the compatibility of support measures with the internal market in order to ensure a level-playing-field, 
while at the same time reaching the ambitious objectives of the European Green Deal and reducing the 
EU’s dependence on fossil fuel imports.  

1.2. Effective competition in the green economy.  

In 2024, competition enforcement continued to contribute to the EU environmental objectives through 
the application of the State aid,  antitrust  and merger rules. The reduction and avoidance of industrial 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  is  fundamental  to  reach  the  objectives  of  the  European  Green  Deal  and  to 
reduce dependency on fossil fuels, notably from Russia. In 2024, the Commission approved 51 State aid 
measures238 aimed at accelerating the green transition across various sectors.  

1.2.1.  Supporting hydrogen production and use at large scale  

234 A two-way contract for difference is a contract signed between an electricity generator and a public entity, typically the 
State, which sets a strike price, usually by a competitive tender. The generator sells the electricity in the market but then settles 
with the public entity the difference between the market price and the strike price. It thus allows the generator to receive a 
stable revenue  for the electricity it produces, while at the  same time it provides a revenue limitation for generators when 
market prices are high. In a two-way CfD, if the market price is below the strike price, the generator receives the difference; 
if the market price is above the strike price, the generator pays back the difference. 
235 See more details above in I. Legislation and Policy developments, section 3.2. Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework 
to support transition towards a net-zero economy. 
236 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection, and energy, OJ C 
80, 18.2.2022, p.1. 
237 The Green Deal GBER amendment - adopted on 23 June 2023 - modifies the section related to energy and environment to 
further simplify and speed up  support for the EU's green transition, whilst protecting the level playing field in the Single 
Market. 
238 This number does not include aid granted under the GBER. 

55 

 
 
 
On  21  June  2024,  under  section  4.9  CEEAG,  the  Commission  approved  a  German  scheme  with  an 
estimated budget of EUR 3 billion to support the construction of the Hydrogen Core Network (HCN)239. 
The HCN will contain projects of common interest (PCIs), such as those included in the 6th PCI list240, 
and it is also expected to include projects that are part of the IPCEI Hy2Infra241. The construction and 
operation of the HCN will be financed by hydrogen transmission system operators (TSOs). The aid will 
take the form of a state guarantee which will allow the TSOs to obtain more favourable loans to cover 
initial  losses  in  the  ramp-up  phase  of  the  HCN.  At  first,  Germany  expects  only  a  small  number  of 
consumers to be using the network. The tariffs set by the regulator will be lower than otherwise needed 
to  cover  the  relevant  costs  of  the  TSOs,  to  encourage  this  use  and  facilitate  the  uptake  of  hydrogen. 
Therefore, the measure facilitates an intertemporal allocation of the investment’s costs, stretching them 
over  a  longer  period.  The  first  major  pipeline  is  expected  to  be  operational  as  from  2025,  while  the 
completion of the entire HCN is expected in 2032. The HCN will be regulated under the internal energy 
market legislation, making it subject to non-discriminatory third-party access and tariff regulation.  

On  29  July  2024,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  990  million  Dutch  scheme  to  support  hydrogen 
production through electrolysis242, under section 4.1 CEEAG. The project will play a significant role in 
diversifying the country’s gas supplies and phasing-out its dependence on fossil fuels from Russia before 
2030. As both the renewable hydrogen targets set by the Netherlands and those set in the EU Hydrogen 
Strategy require a swift scale up of electrolysis capacity, the project aims to ramp up electrolysis capacity 
through targeted support to large scale electrolysis projects (at least 0.5 MegaWatt (MW)). The support 
will  cover  both  the  costs  for  installation  of  electrolysers  and  the  costs  for  production  of  renewable 
hydrogen.  

In February 2024, the Commission approved, also under the CEEAG, an innovative EUR 350 million 
German  scheme  to  support  the  production  of  renewable  hydrogen  through  the  European  Hydrogen 
Bank's ‘Auctions-as-a-Service’ tool243. The Hydrogen Bank is a financing instrument to accelerate the 
establishment of a full hydrogen value chain in Europe. Under the  approved scheme, the competitive 
bidding process supervised by the European Climate, Infrastructure, and Environment Executive Agency 
will  not  only  allocate  support  under  the  Innovation  fund  but  also  State  aid  earmarked  to  support  the 
construction of up to 90 MW of new electrolysis capacity and the production of up to 75 000 tonnes of 
renewable hydrogen in Germany. The aid will take the form of a direct grant per kilogram of renewable 
hydrogen produced. It will be granted for a maximum duration of ten years. Beneficiaries will have to 
prove compliance with EU criteria to produce renewable fuels of non-biological origin. This includes 
contributing to the deployment or financing of the additional renewable electricity which is needed to 
produce the hydrogen supported under the scheme.   

This  decision  paves  the  way  for  other  EEA  Member  States  to  use  the  European  Hydrogen  Bank’s 
hydrogen auction to allocate additional, national funds to projects that could not be awarded under the 
Innovation Fund244 budget. It is a service offered by the Commissionto Member States to make use of an 
auction scheme that was designed to be compatible with the CEEAG, thereby streamlining the process 

are 

key 

PCIs 

cross-border 

239 Case SA.113565 – Germany – Aid for the construction of the Hydrogen Core Network in Germany. 
240 
infrastructure 
countries. See: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest-and-projects-mutual-interest_en  
241 Cases SA.102821  – France; SA.102810  – Poland; SA.102825  – Germany; SA.103494 – Portugal; SA.102815  – Italy; 
SA.102811 – Slovakia; SA.102807 – The Netherlands, RRF – Important Project of Common European Interest on Hydrogen 
Infrastructure‘. The HCN will not be limited to projects that are part of the 6th PCI list or Hy2Infra. 
242 Case SA.110068 – The Netherlands – Hydrogen production through electrolysis 2024. 
243 Case SA.109550 – Germany – European Hydrogen Bank Auctions-as-a-Service 2023.  
244 See: Innovation Fund - Performance - European Commission  

of  EU 

systems 

projects 

energy 

link 

that 

the 

56 

 
 
of notifying and approving State aid. Auctions-as-a-Service can play a significant  role in  the nascent 
hydrogen market. In new markets, it is crucial to prevent market fragmentation with different national 
support schemes and the resulting divergent price signals. Project developers, too, would benefit from a 
single set of rules for obtaining a subsidy across Europe rather than having to apply for various funding 
schemes with different application procedures and timelines. The service can also save the administrative 
costs of developing several support schemes in different Member States and bring such subsidies to the 
market earlier, when they are most needed.  

IPCEI Hy2Infra  
On 15 February 2024, the Commission approved the IPCEI Hy2Infra245. A total of 32 companies from seven Member States 
are participating in this IPCEI with 33 projects. 

The IPCEI Hy2Infra covers a wide part of the hydrogen value chain by supporting (i) the deployment of 3.2 GW of large-
scale electrolysers to produce renewable hydrogen; (ii) the deployment of new and repurposed hydrogen transmission and 
distribution pipelines of approximately 2 700 km; (iii) the development of large-scale hydrogen storage facilities with capacity 
of at least 370 GWh; and (iv) the construction of handling terminals and related port infrastructure for liquid organic hydrogen 
carriers (LOHC) to handle 6 000 tonnes of hydrogen a year. Participants will also collaborate on interoperability and common 
standards to prevent barriers and facilitate future market integration. The seven Member States will provide up to EUR 6.9 
billion in public funding, which is expected to unlock an additional EUR 5.4 billion in private investments. 

IPCEI Hy2Move 
On 27 May 2024, the Commission approved EUR 1.4 billion of State aid for the IPCEI Hy2Move246. A total of 11 companies 
from seven Member States (Estonia, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia and Spain) are participating in this IPCEI 
with 13 projects. The approved State aid is expected to unlock EUR 3,3 billion in private investments. The IPCEI Hy2Move 
covers a wide part of the hydrogen technology value chain, including hydrogen applications in transport means (e.g. fuel cell 
cars and trucks), high performing fuels cells, on-board storage solution for hydrogen and electrolysers and components for 
hydrogen refuelling stations for on-site production of pressurised, pure fuel cell grade hydrogen.  

1.2.2.  Consolidating nuclear-based energy  

In the nuclear sector, 2024 was characterized by several emblematic cases.  

On 26 April 2024, the Commission approved a EUR 300 million aid to Electricité de France's (EDF) 
subsidiary Nuward for early phase research and development activities on small modular nuclear reactors 
as a possible technology to decarbonise energy systems247.  

On  30  April  2024,  the  Commission  approved  pursuant  to  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU,  after  an  in-depth 
investigation, a Czech measure to support the development of a new nuclear power plant in Dukovany248. 
As part of a wider programme to support low carbon generation sources, Czechia aims at nuclear power 
generation accounting for approximately 50% of the overall electricity generation capacity in Czechia by 
2030. The beneficiary of the measure is Elektrárna Dukovany II (EDU II), a fully owned subsidiary of 
the ČEZ Group, the only nuclear power plant operator in Czechia. Under the measure, the beneficiary 
will benefit of direct price support in the form of a power purchasing contract with a State-owned Special 
Purpose Vehicle which will ensure stable revenues for the nuclear power plant for a period of 40 years. 
This  measure  replicates  the  design  of  a  two-way  CfD  and  therefore  has  similar  effects  in  terms  of 

245  Cases  SA.102821  –  France; SA.102825  –  Germany;  SA.102815  –  Italy;  SA.102807  – The  Netherlands;  SA.102810  – 
Poland; SA.103494 – Portugal; SA.102811 – Slovakia – RRF – Important Project of Common European Interest on Hydrogen 
Infrastructure (IPCEI Hy2Infra). 
246  Cases  SA.104442  –  Estonia;  SA.104668  –  France;  SA.104676  –  Germany;  SA.104453  –  Italy;  SA.104440  –  The 
Netherlands;  SA.104434  –  Slovakia;  SA.104435  –  Spain  –  RRF  –  Important  Project  of  Common  European  Interest  on 
Hydrogen on Mobility & Transport (IPCEI Hy2Move). 
247 Case SA.106964 – France – Soutien à la phase APD du projet Nuward. 
248 Case SA.58207 – Czech Republic – Support for Dukovany II, a new nuclear power plant in Czechia. 

57 

 
 
 
 
providing revenue stability and limiting overcompensation, as well as efficient operation incentives for 
the power plant. The beneficiary will also benefit of a subsidised State loan to cover a majority of the 
construction costs and a protection mechanism against unforeseen  events or policy  changes that  may 
make the realisation of the project impossible.  

In the context of the 2022 energy  crisis  and  Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the Belgian 
government  decided  to  extend  the  lifetime  of  two  nuclear  reactors  (Doel  4  and  Tihange  3)249  for  ten 
years,  to  reduce  Belgium’s  dependency  on  fossil  fuels  and  to  contribute  to  security  of  supply.  The 
Commission had doubts on the compatibility of the proposed aid measure with the internal market and 
had thus decided to open a formal investigation procedure. The decision opening the formal investigation 
procedure was adopted on 22 July 2024.   

On 18 December 2024, the Commission opened the formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) 
TFEU  concerning  aid  measures  for  the  first  nuclear  power  plant  in  Poland250.  Poland  notified  the 
Commission of its plan to support State-owned company Polskie Elektrownie Jądrowe sp. z o.o (PEJ) in 
the construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lubiatowo-Kopalino. The plant would increase security 
of electricity supply for Poland and for neighbouring countries, helping the decarbonisation of the energy 
sector  and  diversifying  the  Polish  energy  mix.  Based  on  its  preliminary assessment,  the  Commission 
found that the aid package is necessary and has an incentive effect, as PEJ would not carry out the project 
without public support. Nevertheless, the Commission had doubts at this stage on whether the measure 
is fully in line with EU State aid rules. For this reason, the Commission decided to open an in-depth 
investigation.  

1.2.3.  Encouraging the deployment of renewable energy sources   

On  2  July  2024,  the  Commission  approved,  under  section  2.5.2  TCTF,  a  EUR  10.82  billion  French 
scheme  to  support  renewable  offshore  wind  energy251.  The  scheme  supports  the  construction  and 
operation of two bottom-fixed offshore wind farms. The first farm is expected to generate 3.9 TWh of 
renewable electricity per year and the second 6.1 TWh. The aid for the electricity produced takes the 
form of a monthly variable premium under a two-way CfD. The tender process includes non-price award 
criteria (in particular, carbon footprint) in line with EU law and WTO requirements. This case allowed 
to  share  experience  and  prepare  for  the  forthcoming  Net  Zero  Industry  act  (NZIA)  non-price  criteria 
horizontal implementing provisions.  

On 13 September 2024, the Commission approved a complex support measure for the deployment of a 
700-MW  offshore  wind  farm  in  Belgium  in  the  Princess  Elizabeth  Offshore  Zone  (the  world’s  first 
artificial energy island, located in the North Sea and enabling the connection of several future offshore 
wind farms)252. Besides the industrial innovation of this project, the discussions between the Commission 
and the Belgian authorities led to contractual innovation: the support contract designed for this measure 
takes the form  of a  ’capability-based’ two-way CfD. Capability-based CfD remunerates power plants 
based on the estimated production potential of a reference project, having similar characteristics as the 
supported asset. The price premium is paid based on the potential electricity production of the wind farm, 
independently  from  its  actual  electricity  production.  This  design  enables  a  better  integration  of  the 
renewable assets into the electricity markets because it exposes the actual electricity production to market 
prices signals (as the RES producer revenues are directly linked to their electricity sales on the market) 

249 Case SA.106107 – Belgium – Lifetime extension of two nuclear reactors (Doel 4 and Tihange 3). 
250 Case SA.109707 – Poland – Aid measures for the first nuclear power plant in Poland. 
251 Case SA.109161 – France – Support to two offshore windfarms in Atlantic and Manche zones. 
252 Case SA.107336 – Belgium – Support mechanism for lot 1 of the Princess Elisabeth offshore Zone. 

58 

 
 
 
while limiting the level of risks to which the RES producers are exposed (and hence the overall cost of 
the project). In that respect, this State aid decision sets a good practice towards an improved integration 
of clean energy production into the internal market. Capability-based CfDs are also expected to lead to 
the minimisation of taxpayers’ costs.  

On 4 June 2024, the Commission approved under section 4.1 CEEAG, Italy’s Renewable Energy Scheme 
2024 (FER II)253. The scheme provides aid to produce electricity from renewable technologies that are 
innovative  or  not  yet  fully  mature,  meaning  traditional  geothermal  energy  with  innovations,  zero-
emission geothermal energy, offshore wind power (floating or fixed), thermodynamic solar, floating solar 
(offshore or on inland waters) etc., as well as energy produced from biogas and biomass. The aid takes 
the form  of a two-way  CfD applied to  the production of electricity fed  into the network, and will be 
granted until 31 December 2028. The objective of the measure is to increase the share of energy from 
renewable  sources  in  the  total  energy  consumption  through  the  development  of  renewable  energy 
technologies.   

On 23 October 2024, following an in-depth investigation, the Commission concluded that two Swedish 
tax exemption schemes for non-food biogas and bio-propane254 are in line with EU State aid rules (in 
particular Section 4.1 CEEAG). The Swedish tax exemption schemes are aimed at increasing the use of 
biogas and bio-propane and reducing the use of fossil fuels and their greenhouse gas emissions. The tax 
exemptions apply to both domestic and imported biogas and bio-propane. The Commission concluded 
that the schemes contribute to the development of renewable energy, in line with national and EU energy 
and  climate  objectives  and  that  they  are  necessary,  appropriate  and  proportionate.  Moreover,  the 
Commission's investigation confirmed that both Sweden and Denmark consider the impact of potential 
support from other Member States when monitoring their schemes and that the risk of overcompensation 
is  appropriately  addressed  through  the  combination  of  the  Swedish  and  the  Danish  monitoring 
mechanisms.  

On 17 December 2024, the Commission approved under Section 4.1 CEEAG a EUR 1.7 billion Danish 
State aid scheme to support the production of upgraded biogas and e-methane255 to be injected into the 
Danish  grid.  The  scheme  will  support  the  construction  of  biogas  plants,  as  well  as  the  extension  of 
existing plants. The aid will take the form of a price premium per gigajoule of renewable gas produced, 
paid on top of the market price for natural gas, over a 20-year period. The aid will be awarded through a 
competitive bidding process where beneficiaries will bid on the price premium needed to carry out their 
project.  Denmark  plans  to  conduct  five  bidding  rounds  from  2024  until  2030.  The  plants  must  be 
connected to the grid within three years after the granting of the aid. The scheme is expected to reduce 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  by  approximately  450  000  tonnes  of  CO2  annually  from  2033.  It  will  also 
contribute to Denmark's efforts to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 70% by 2030 compared to the 
1990 levels and to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.  

Under  Section  2.5.2  TCTF,  the  Commission  approved  Romania’s  EUR  3  billion  support  scheme  to 
produce renewable electricity from onshore wind and solar photovoltaic256. Aid will be granted through 
two-way CfD and take the form of a variable premium paid for each MWh of electricity delivered to the 

253 Case SA.105880 – Italy – Renewable Energy Scheme 2024 (FER II). 
254 Cases SA.56125 and SA.56908 – Sweden – Prolongation and modification of scheme SA.49893 (2018/N) - Tax exemption 
for nonfood-based biogas and bio-propane in heat generation implemented by Sweden and Prolongation and modification of 
biogas scheme for motor fuel in Sweden. 
255 Case SA.102206 – Denmark – Aid for upgraded biogas and other gases from renewable sources that can be injected into 
the Danish gas system. 
256 Case SA.108510 – Romania – TCTF/RRF – Contracts for Difference support scheme for the production of renewable 
electricity from onshore wind and solar photovoltaic. 

59 

 
 
 
 
grid, calculated as the difference between  a  fixed price set  in  the  competitive bidding procedure  (the 
‘strike price’) and a monthly output-weighted average day-ahead market prices (the ‘reference price’). 
The beneficiaries are onshore wind and solar photovoltaic energy producers of all sizes.   

1.2.4.  Addressing the risk of carbon leakage  

On 25 October 2024, the Commission approved a EUR 724 million Danish scheme to lower the rate of 
a new greenhouse gas emissions tax for certain companies under Section 4.7.1 CEEAG257. The measure 
intends to prevent the risk of carbon leakage, where companies relocate production outside of the EU to 
countries with less ambitious climate policies, resulting in increased greenhouse gas emissions globally. 
The  tax  aims  to  further  encourage  the  reduction  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  Denmark,  through 
boosting the impact of the EU emission trading system (ETS1) by providing operators with a stronger 
financial incentive to cut their emissions. The measure will benefit companies that (i) are subject to ETS1, 
(ii)  are  active  in  sectors  listed  in  the  EU  ETS  Carbon  Leakage  List,  and  (iii)  cause  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  through  eligible  production  processes,  namely  mineralogical  and  metallurgical  processes, 
chemical reduction and electrolysis. Eligible companies will benefit from a reduced tax rate which will 
be set at 33% of the standard rate.  

1.2.5.  Addressing electricity costs for energy-intensive industries 

Under  Section  4.11  CEEAG,  the  Commission  approved  three  schemes  for  electricity  levy  reduction 
targeted at energy intensive users (EIUs) in 2024. Those schemes aim to decrease the risk that activities 
in certain economic sectors, particularly exposed to international trade and relying heavily on electricity 
for their value creation, would relocate outside the EU where environmental policies are absent or less 
ambitious. 

On  8  August  2024,  the  Commission  approved  an  amendment  to  Slovakia’s  scheme  supporting  EIUs 
through a levy reduction on the part of the system operation tariff related to the component financing 
RES support258, extending the scheme until 2030 with an estimated budget of EUR 300 million.   

On 14 October 2024, the Commission approved the scheme of the Wallonia region in Belgium providing 
aid for EIUs in the form of a levy reduction259, from the levy aimed at financing the TSO’s obligation to 
purchase green energy certificates supporting RES electricity production. The scheme has an estimated 
budget of EUR 150 million and a duration of eight years.   

On 21 November 2024, the Commission approved the Romanian scheme providing aid for EIUs in the 
form of a levy reduction linked to the cost of green certificates supporting RES development and paid by 
energy suppliers260. The scheme has an estimated budget of EUR 578 million and a duration of seven 
years.  

The  beneficiaries  of  these  schemes  are  required  to  conduct  energy  audits,  as  defined  by  Article  8  of 
Directive  2012/27/EU261,  and  commit  to  at  least  one  of  the  following  actions:  implementation  of 
investments  recommended  by  the  audit  that  do  not  exceed  three  years;  cover  at  least  30  %  of  their 
electricity consumption from carbon-free sources; or invest at least 50 % of the aid amount in projects 
leading to substantial reductions of their greenhouse gas emissions.  

257 Case SA.109130 – Denmark – Reduced CO2e emissions tax rate for certain production processes. 
258 Case SA.110954 – Slovakia – Amendment of SA.53564 Compensation for EIUs for the part of the system operation tariff 
in relation to the RES component. 
259 Case SA.113672 – Belgium – Electricity levy reduction for energy-intensive users in the Walloon Region. 
260 Case SA.110166 – Romania – Electricity levy reduction for energy-intensive users in Romania. 
261 See: Directive - 2012/27 - EN - EUR-Lex 

60 

 
 
 
 
1.2.6.  Removing entry barriers in the collection of packaging waste sector  

In a Letter of Formal Notice issued in June 2024, the Commission informed Czechia of its preliminary 
view that certain provisions of the Czech Packaging Act as well as Czechia's enforcement of such rules 
may be infringing the EU competition rules (Article 106 TFEU in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU)262. 
The Commission considers that these measures may have created significant entry barriers for companies 
seeking to compete with EKO-KOM, which is currently the only company authorised for the collection 
and recovery of packaging waste in Czechia. These measures would have prevented other companies 
from being authorised by the Czech authorities to offer the same services on the market and allowed 
EKO-KOM  to  operate  as  a  de  facto  monopolist  for  more  than  two  decades,  thereby  hindering  the 
development of effective competition in the Czech market for waste collection and recovery.   

1.2.7.  Supporting the shift to clean mobility 

The shift to zero-emission mobility remains one of the key objectives of the European sustainable and 
smart mobility strategy and makes an important contribution to the European Green Deal. It can also help 
reducing dependency on imported fossil fuels.  

The Commission continued in 2024 to advise Member States on several clean mobility schemes to bring 
them under the GBER. 

In addition, on 17 June 2024, the Commission approved under the CEEAG, a EUR 570 million Italian 
scheme  to  incentivise  ships  to  use  shore-side  electricity  to  power  onboard  services,  systems  and 
equipment when they are at berth in maritime ports instead of burning diesel263. The measure contributes 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and noise in line with the objectives of the European 
Green Deal. The aid takes the form of a reduction of electricity charges to bring the cost of electricity at 
a competitive level compared to the cost of producing electricity on-board with diesel-powered engines. 

1.2.8.  Reducing industrial emissions 

Reduction and avoidance of industrial greenhouse gas emissions is another important leg of the European 
Green Deal and is equally important to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. 

In 2024, the Commission approved under the CEEAG several ad hoc State aid measures aiming at the 
decarbonisation of the industrial processes such as steel and fertilisers through the uptake of hydrogen-
based technologies264. For example, in February 2024, a EUR 1.3 billion German State aid measure was 
approved: it supports ArcelorMittal in decarbonising part of their steel production processes. The State 
aid scheme contributes to the targets set up in the EU Hydrogen Strategy, the European Green Deal, and 
the Green Deal Industrial Plan. Moreover, the scheme measure reduces dependence  on Russian fossil 
fuels and will fast-forward the green transition, in line with the REPowerEU Plan265. Furthermore, the 
Commission approved one ad hoc State aid measure for the production of renewable synthetic aviation 
fuels266  using  renewable  hydrogen  and  biogenic  CO2,  which  will  contribute  to  the  objectives  of  the 

262 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_3188   
263 Case SA.105117 – Italy – Aid scheme for the use of shore-side electricity in the form of a reduction in general system 
charges for ship operators.  
264  Case  SA.109640  –  Sweden  –  Support  to  SSAB  Lulea  for  the  transition  to  carbon-neutral  production  of  slabs;  Case 
SA.108431 – Lithuania – Aid to Achema for the integration of electrolysis into ammonia production – JTF; Case SA.110031 
– Sweden – RRF – H2GS – decarbonisation of steel production.  
265 Case SA.104898 – Germany – RRF – ArcelorMittal (Bremen & Eisenhüttenstadt).  
266 Case SA.106395 – Germany – Concrete Chemicals project. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation267.  

Such measures to decarbonise the industry aim at swiftly abandoning the use of the most polluting fossil 
fuels such as oil, lignite and coal, especially in energy-intensive industrial sectors (steel, refiners, cement, 
chemicals, fertilisers etc.) and gradually shifting from natural gas to renewable and low-carbon hydrogen 
to avoid huge quantities of GHG emissions, thereby contributing to the goals of the Green Deal. 

The Commission further approved in 2024 four aid schemes for a total budget of around EUR 13 billion 
in Germany, Austria, Sweden and France in the form of carbon contracts for difference. The aid is paid 
per tonne of CO2 abated or captured and stored along operation of industrial plants and the projects are 
selected based on a competitive bidding process. While the Swedish case exclusively concerned projects 
avoiding  biogenic  CO2  emissions  via  carbon  capture  and  storage,  the  German,  Austrian  and  French 
schemes encompassed a wide range of industrial sectors and decarbonisation technologies268.  

The Commission also approved seven support schemes for investments aiming at the decarbonisation of 
the industry through electrification, the switch to hydrogen or improved energy efficiency under section 
2.6 TCTF for France, Germany, Italy (two schemes), the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland269.   

1.3. Secure energy supply  

In 2024, the Commission coordinated an external study on demand response (DR)270. DR is recognised 
as one of the key tools to help rebalance the electricity market and ensure the stability of electrity supply 
in the EU. The final report ‘Barriers for demand response participation in electricity markets and State 
aid support’ was published on 19 November 2024271. The study was led by a consortium of joint partners 
(MRC Consultants, BIP Consulting and Grimaldi Studio Legale). The report highlights the key issues 
and challenges faced by DR operators and aggregators and it investigates the cost and revenues streams 
from  the  supply  of  DR  services.  It  also  analyses  the  barriers  hindering  a  fair  competition  of  demand 
response with other competing technologies in State aid measures implemented by eight EU Member 
States.  Finally,  the  report  provides  a  review  of  the  EU  legal  framework  on  State  aid  for  flexibility 
measures  and  a  list  of  aspects  that  Member  States  could  consider  before  putting  into  place  measures 
supporting demand response among other technologies providing flexibility services. The results of this 

267 Regulation (EU) 2023/2405 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on ensuring a level playing 
field for sustainable air transport (ReFuelEU Aviation), OJ L, 2023/2405, 31.10.2023.  
268 Case SA.107009 – Sweden – Reversed auction for state aid for biogenic CCS; Case SA.109730 – Austria – Transformation 
der  Industrie:  transformation  and  investment  grants  under  the  CEEAG;  Case  SA.104880  –  Germany  –  RRF  –  Climate 
protection contracts support scheme; Case SA.112361 – France – Régime d'aides en faveur de la décarbonation des industries 
les plus émettrices. 
269 Case SA.107476 – Italy – RRF – Aid scheme to support investments for the use of hydrogen in industrial processes in 
Italy;  Case  SA.108729  –  Germany  –  Investment  aid  for  industrial  decarbonisation  through  electrification  and  hydrogen 
switch;  Case  SA.108810  –  France  –  Régime  d’aides  en  faveur  de  la  décarbonation  des  procédés  industriels  grâce  à 
l’électrification, ainsi qu’en faveur des mesures d’efficacité énergétique; Case SA.109439 – Italy – RRF – Aid scheme to 
support decarbonisation and energy efficiency in industrial production processes; Case SA.112112 – the Netherlands – Aid 
for decarbonisation of industrial production processes through electrification; Case SA.107987 – Luxembourg – Aid for the 
transition towards a net-zero economy; Case SA.113721 – Finland – Aid to promote the transition towards a climate-neutral 
economy.  
270 Demand response is defined as the change of electricity load by final customers from their normal or current consumption 
patterns in response to market signals, including in response to time-variable electricity prices or incentive payments, or in 
response to the acceptance of the final customer's bid to sell demand reduction or increase at a price in an organised market, 
whether alone or through aggregation (Article 2 of the Electricity Regulation). 
271 
74bc4146b257_en?filename=KD0124004enn_study_barriers_for_demand_response.pdf  

https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/2996a788-4807-42a0-9907-

See: 

62 

 
 
study will help the Commission to exercise State aid control more efficiently and to address flexibility 
needs of electricity systems without undue distortions of competition and trade.  

In parallel in 2024, the Commission continued to provide guidance to Member States regarding measures 
to  ensure  security  of  energy  supply,  including  through  participation  in  conferences  and  workshops272 
organised by stakeholders and EU institutions. These contributions led to (i) increase of the knowledge 
of the stakeholders (capacity building), (ii) improvement of the design of the measures for security of 
supply, and (iii) facilitation and acceleration of approval of the measures. 

Moreover, on 27 May 2024, a EUR 3.2 billion Czech scheme was approved by the Commission, which 
will  support  the  electricity  generation  from  new  and  modernised  high-efficiency  combined  heat  and 
power plants273. The scheme will contribute to  the implementation  of Czechia's National  Energy and 
Climate Plan, the European Green Deal and EU's energy efficiency targets. 

1.4 Effective competition in energy markets   

With respect to mergers, the energy sector saw a slight increase in the total number of cases  in 2024 
(relative to 2022 and 2023). Most cases were dealt with under the simplified procedure: the majority of 
those simplified cases involved electricity generation, with a strong emphasis on the production of solar 
energy.  

The  Commission  examined  several  merger  cases.  For  example,  in  a  case  concerning  the  trading  and 
clearing  of  Nordic,  French  and  German  power  derivatives  (acquisition  of  Nasdaq  by  EEX),  the 
transaction was abandoned in the course of the Commission’s investigation into its impact in the energy 
market concerned, following the submission by the notifying party of commitments in the first phase of 
the  Commission‘s  proceedings274.  The  Commission  also  assessed  and  approved  other  important 
transactions in the Italian gas import and transmission network275, in the Czech gas distribution network 
and gas retail to small and large customers276, and in the production of electricity in Hungary277.   

With  respect  to  antitrust  enforcement,  the  Commission  continued  its  investigation  against  the  Greek 
electricity  incumbent  Public  Power  Corporation  (PPC).  In  February  2024,  it  sent  a  Statement  of 
Objections to PPC informing the company of its preliminary view that, between 2013 and 2019, it abused 
its dominant position on the Greek wholesale electricity market by supplying the electricity generated by 
its thermal (lignite and gas) units at prices below variable costs278. The Commission suspects that this 
conduct  may  have  marginalised  PPC’s  rivals  in  the  Greek  wholesale  electricity  market  and  deterred 
investment  into  more  environmentally  friendly  energy  sources,  thereby  resulting  in  higher  prices  for 
Greek consumers and higher emission levels of local pollution.   

The Commission also continued its investigation into a possible collusion between car manufacturers in 
relation  to  the  collection,  treatment  and  recovery  of  end-of-life  passenger  vehicles.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission  continued  its  investigation  into  the  synthetic  turf  industry  in  several  Member  States  to 
determine whether the companies active in this sector have infringed EU competition rules279. 

272 Such as EASE annual storage global conference 2024 Energy Storage Global Conference | EASE: Why Energy Storage? | 
EASE ; Annual capacity mechanisms forum 7th Capacity Mechanisms Forum — GlobalBSG 
273 Case SA.108368 – Czechia – Support for electricity from high-efficiency combined heat and power generation. 
274 See ft 336, for more information. 
275 Case M.11568, VTTI/Snam/ALNG. 
276 Case M.11538, CEZ/BCI/Czech Gas Networks JV. 
277 Case M.11515, Veolia Environnement/Uniper Hungary Energetikai. 
278 Case AT.40278, Greek wholesale electricity market. 
279 See I. Legislation and Policy developments, section 1.4, above. 

63 

 
 
In 2024, the Court of Justice rendered a significant judgment in the energy sector.  

In Orlen280 the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal against the General Court's judgment of 2 February 
2022281 which fully upheld the Commission’s decision to accept binding commitments from Gazprom282. 
In its judgment of 26 September 2024, the Court of Justice clarified that, in a procedure leading to the 
adoption of a commitments decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, there is no need for the 
Commission to state reasons regarding objections which were set out in a Statement of Objection (SO) 
but not further pursued in the post-SO investigation. The Court of Justice also clarified that, in the context 
of such a procedure, the Commission cannot accept commitments that would result in an infringement 
of other Treaty objectives such as the principles of energy solidarity or energy security of supply. This, 
however, does not mean that the Commission, acting as a competition regulator in the context of the 
procedure provided for in Article 9 of  Regulation 1/2003, has the power to impose obligations going 
beyond those intended to remedy the competition issues identified in its investigation by requiring more 
binding commitments in that regard.   

2. 

INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGIES AND MEDIA  

2.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Markets in the information, communication, technologies and media sectors (ICT) continue to be key 
drivers for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Digital services have increased consumer choice, 
and  improved  efficiency  and  competitiveness.  Large  platforms  in  the  provision  of  digital  services 
represent key structural elements of today’s economy.  

At the same time, certain features of ICT markets, such as access to critical inputs, network effects and 
increasing returns to scale render them particularly apt to lock in consumers and entrench positions of 
dominant firms. Some dominant firms also impose unfair trading conditions that are detrimental to their 
business partners or consumers. These risks have been identified as being equally acute in the AI space 
and virtual worlds. 

In 2024, the Commission monitored AI and virtual worlds spaces using a variety of investigative steps 
from its antitrust and merger toolboxes. Compute-intensive tasks, such as AI and machine learning, are 
driving a significant increase in demand for specialised chips (such as graphics processing units (GPUs) 
as well as customised (in-house) AI accelerators).  

As  recognised  in  the  Joint  Statement  on  Competition  in  Generative  AI  Foundation  Models  and  AI 
Products of 23 July 2024283, specialised chips, compute resources284, the availability of quality data at 
scale, and specialist technical expertise are among the most critical ingredients for AI foundation models. 
The  control  of  these  strategic  inputs  could  put  a  small  number  of  companies  in  a  position  to  exploit 
bottlenecks, for example by entrenching or leveraging market power, with consequences for competition 
and  innovation  across  the  AI  ecosystem.  Furthermore,  the  distribution  of  generative  AI  can  pose 
numerous challenges. For instance, vertically integrated undertakings developing proprietary AI models 
can have limited incentives to distribute third-party AI models on equal terms. Existing partnerships and 
financial investment arrangements, which can be in many instances beneficial for the development of 
startups,  may also  in  certain cases create dissimilar distribution conditions for third-party AI models. 

280 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26.9.2024, in Case C-255/22 P, Orlen v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:790. 
281 Judgment of the General Court of 2.2.2022, in Case T-616/18, Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:T:2022:43.  
282 Case AT.39816, Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. 
283  See:  https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/news/joint-statement-competition-generative-ai-foundation-models-
and-ai-products-2024-07-23_en  
284 i.e. physical data centers or cloud services providing access to large clusters of specialised chips.  

64 

 
 
Finally, when creating AI-based solutions developers might choose to call upon AI models which are 
pre-installed/pre-integrated, which can limit use of other AI models. 

In September 2024, the Commission published a Competition Policy Brief on competition in generative 
AI and virtual worlds285. The policy brief explores market dynamics, emerging tendencies and barriers 
to  entry,  as  well  as  anticompetitive  concerns  that  may  emerge  and  how  they  could  be  addressed  by 
antitrust enforcement, merger control and the DMA. The brief builds on a workshop held in June 2024 
and  on  two  calls  for  contributions  launched  in  January  2024  which  prompted  120  contributions  on 
generative AI and just above 50 contributions on virtual worlds286. In parallel, the Commission also sent 
requests  for  information  to  large  digital  companies  and  AI  developers  to  investigate  whether  their 
agreements and partnerships may raise potential anticompetitive concerns287. 

As regards mergers, the Commission closely monitored partnerships between AI startups and established 
firms, as well as the structure of those transactions. Lately, a number of transactions raised questions on 
the boundaries of what can be reviewed under merger control rules, notably whether certain investments 
into, or the hiring of staff of, small AI developers by large companies may constitute a concentration 
under  the  EUMR288.  The  Commission  intends  to  ensure  that  no  transaction  avoid  effective  merger 
control. 

2.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

2.2.1.  Technology markets 

2024 was characterised by findings of the Commission of large dominant digital players imposing unfair 
trading conditions, capable of harming consumers’ interests or those of the dominant player’s business 
partners. 

For instance, on 4 March 2024, the Commission fined Apple EUR 1.84 billion for abusing its dominant 
position on the market for the distribution of music streaming apps used by iPhone and iPad users through 
its App Store289. In particular, the Commission found that Apple applied restrictions on app developers 
preventing them from informing iPhone and iPad users about alternative and cheaper music subscription 
services available outside of the app (anti-steering provisions). Apple’s conduct, which lasted for almost 
ten years, may have led many iPhone and iPad users to pay significantly higher prices for music streaming 
subscriptions. Apple's anti-steering provisions also led to non-monetary harm in the form of a degraded 
user experience.   

Moreover,  the  Commission  finalised  its  investigation  into  Meta  (Facebook  Marketplace).  On  14 
November 2024, it adopted a decision finding that Meta abused its dominant position by tying its online 
classified ads service Facebook Marketplace to its personal social network Facebook and by imposing 
unfair trading conditions on other online classified ads service providers, and imposed on Meta a fine of 
EUR 797.72 million290.  

The Commission also pursued its investigation into Google’s advertising technology and data-related 
practices (Google adtech). This follows up the Statement of Objections of 14 June 2023, in which the 

285  Competition  Policy  Brief,  Issue  3,  September  2024,  Competition  in  Generative  AI  and  Virtual  Worlds,  see: 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/publications/competition-policy-briefs_en 
https://digital-
strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-publishes-policy-brief-competition-generative-ai-and-virtual-worlds. 
286  The  contributions 
recording  of 
policy.ec.europa.eu/about/europes-digital-future_en  
287 See ft 285. 
288 See ft 297 and 298 below. 
289 Case AT.40437, Apple – App Store Practices (music streaming). 
290 Case AT.40684, Facebook Marketplace. 

the  workshop  are  available  at  https://competition-

received  and  a 

and 

65 

 
 
Commission preliminarly found that Google is favouring its own online display advertising technology 
services  to  the  detriment  of  competing  providers  of  advertising  technology  services,  advertisers,  and 
online publishers, thereby infringing Article 102 TFEU. 

In the context of the increasing importance of compute-intensive tasks, such as AI and machine learning, 
in 2024 the Commission sent requests for information to several companies in the industry to investigate 
whether any anti-competitive practices are taking place on the markets for different types of computer 
chips and related hardware and software needed for such compute-intensive tasks291.  

On  25  June  2024,  the  Commission  sent  a  Statement  of  Objections  to  Microsoft  in  which  it  took  the 
preliminary  view  that  the  company  is  infringing  Article 102  TFEU  by  anticompetitively  tying  its 
communication and collaboration product Teams to its popular productivity applications included in its 
Office 365 and Microsoft 365 suites for businesses292. The Commission is concerned that Microsoft may 
be abusing its market position in the market for SaaS (Software as a Service) productivity applications 
for professional use by restricting competition in the EU for communication and collaboration products, 
and that Teams may be granted a distribution advantage by the company not giving customers the choice 
whether  or  not  to  acquire  access  to  Teams  when  they  subscribe  to  Microsoft’s  SaaS  productivity 
applications. Microsoft may also have limited the interoperability between Teams’ competitors and its 
own offerings. 

With respect to mergers, the Commission assessed in 2024 a number of transactions. 

On 29 January 2024, Amazon abandoned its proposed acquisition of sole control over iRobot following 
the findings of the Commission's in-depth investigation and the sending of a Statement of Objections293. 
Amazon, based in the U.S., provides an online marketplace (the Amazon Stores) which allows retailers 
to advertise and sell products to customers. iRobot, also based in the U.S., manufactures robot vacuum 
cleaners  (RVCs)  and  sells  them  on  Amazon's  online  marketplace.  On  6  July  2023,  the  Commission 
opened an in-depth investigation into this proposed acquisition and sent a Statement of Objections on 27 
November 2023. As a result of its in-depth investigation, the Commission was concerned that Amazon 
might restrict competition in the EEA-wide and/or national markets for RVCs, by hampering rival RVC 
suppliers’ ability to effectively compete. 

On  21  June  2024,  the  Commission  approved  unconditionally  the  acquisition  of  the  webMethods  and 
StreamSets  software  products  of  Software  AG,  based  in  Germany,  by  IBM,  based  in  the  U.S.294 
webMethods is a suite of application integration middleware tools deployed on-premises and in the cloud, 
and StreamSets is a cloud-native real-time data streaming integration product. IBM is active worldwide 
in  the  development,  production,  and  marketing  of  a  wide  variety  of  IT  solutions.  Following  its 
investigation, the Commission concluded that the transaction would raise no competition concerns as the 
parties’  market  position  would  remain  moderate,  a  number  of  sizable  competitors  would  likely  exert 
sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity, and the merged entity would not have the ability to 
engage in any foreclosure strategy. 

On 1 August 2024, the Commission also approved unconditionally the acquisition of Juniper by HPE, 
both based in the U.S.295. HPE supplies IT infrastructure, related software, and cloud solutions. Juniper 
supplies  networking,  infrastructure  and  security  solutions.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the 

291 See ft 285. 
292 Cases AT.40721, Microsoft Teams, and AT.40873, Microsoft Teams II. 
293 Case M.10920, Amazon/iRobot.  
294 Case M.11468, IBM/Certain Software AG Products.  
295 Case M.11457, HPE/Juniper. 

66 

 
 
transaction would not significantly reduce competition on the markets for wireless local area network 
(WLAN) equipment, wireless access points (WAPs) and Ethernet campus switches because, in the EEA, 
the parties’ market position would remain moderate and a number of sizable competitors would likely 
exert sufficient competitive pressure on the merged entity. In addition, the Commission found that in the 
EEA,  the  merged  entity  would  not  have  the  ability  to  engage  in  anticompetitive  bundling  or  tying 
practices in relation to Juniper's switches and HPE’s activities in the global markets for the supply of 
high-performance computing systems and mid-range servers. 

Moreover, in 2024, the Commission initiated the review of a number of partnerships in the AI sector, 
namely  those  between  large  companies  and  small  AI  developers296.  For  instance,  the  Commission 
monitored Microsoft’s significant investment in OpenAI, both based in the U.S. Based on a review of 
internal documents, the Commission preliminarily concluded that the partnership between Microsoft and 
OpenAI  currently  does  not  constitute  an  acquisition  of  control  on  a  lasting  basis,  and  hence  is  not  a 
concentration  under  the  EUMR297.  The  Commission  also  monitored  so  called  ‘acqui-hires’,  meaning 
transactions whereby a player acquires all or almost all the key employees of the target company. In that 
context, the Commission reviewed Microsoft’s hiring of the two co-founders of Inflection combined with 
the employment offers made to most of Inflection’s staff and a non-exclusive licence for Inflection’s IP. 
Both companies are based in the U.S. While this concentration does not meet the turnover thresholds 
under the EUMR, the Commission considers that the transaction involves all assets necessary to transfer 
Inflection’s  position  in  the  markets  for  generative  AI  foundation  models  and  for  AI  chatbots  to 
Microsoft298. The Commission will continue working with the Member States and the parties to assess 
whether the transactions will be reviewed under national merger control or referred to the Commission, 
in line with the legal requirements for such referrals as clarified in the recent Illumina judgment by the 
Court of Justice299. 

On 20 October 2024, the Commission approved unconditionally the acquisition of Run:ai by NVIDIA300. 
NVIDIA, based in the U.S., is a global supplier of GPUs for datacentre applications. Run:ai, based in 
Israel, supplies GPU orchestration software allowing corporate customers to manage and optimise their 
AI compute infrastructure, whether on premises, in the cloud or in hybrid environments. The proposed 
acquisition had been initially notified in Italy, as required by the Italian Competition Act, upon request 
by the national competition authority, which used its ‘call in’ powers301. Italy submitted a referral request 
to  the  Commission  pursuant  to  Article  22(1)  EUMR.  The  Commission  accepted  the  referral  on  31 
October 2024, concluding that the transaction met the criteria for referral under Article 22 EUMR. In 
particular, the transaction threatened to significantly affect competition in the markets where NVIDIA 
and Run:ai are active, which are likely to be at least EEA-wide and therefore include the referring country 
Italy.  The  Commission  also  concluded  that  it  was  best  placed  to  examine  the  transaction  given  its 
knowledge  and  case  experience  in  related  markets.  The  Commission  investigated  the  impact  of  the 
transaction  on  the  markets  for  the  supply  of  (i)  discrete  Graphic  Processing  Units  (GPUs)  for  use  in 

296 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/api/files/document/print/cs/ip_24_85/IP_24_85_EN.pdf  
297  Competition  Policy  Brief,  Issue  3,  September  2024,  ‘Competition  in  Generative  AI  and  Virtual  Worlds’,  see’ 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c86d461f-062e-4dde-a662-
15228d6ca385_en?filename=kdak24003enn_competition_policy_brief_generative_AI_and_virtual_worlds.pdf  
298 Case M.11671, Microsoft/Inflection. The referral requests by Member States in this case were withdrawn following the 
Court of Justice’s judgment in Illumina. 
299 See ft 72. 
300 Case M.11766, NVIDIA/Run:ai. 
301 Such powers enable the Italian competition authority to review transactions not meeting the relevant national turnover 
thresholds  when  it  finds  that  they  pose  concrete  risks  for  competition  and  the  other  conditions  laid  down  in  the  Italian 
Competition Act are met. 

67 

 
 
datacentres and (ii) GPU orchestration software. It concluded that it would not raise competition concerns 
on any of the markets examined in the EEA or in Italy, as NVIDIA will have neither the technical ability 
nor the incentive to hamper the compatibility of its GPUs with competing GPU orchestration software 
due  to  the  availability  and  widespread  use  of  tools  that  ensure  such  compatibility.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  found  that  customers  will  continue  to  have  access  to  sufficient  credible  alternatives  to 
Run:ai or the possibility of building their GPU orchestration software in-house. 

From  a  State  aid  perspective,  the  Commission  monitored  the  respect  of  EU  state  aid  rules  in  the 
technology markets, including the compliance of public contracts with those rules.  

In  particular,  the  Commission  dealt  with  a  case  involving  the  German  software  company  Cosinex. 
Following  a  complaint,  the  Commission  investigated  whether  Cosinex  received  undue  economic 
advantages  through  a  public-private  partnership  formed  in  2002.  Over  the  years,  Cosinex  and  its 
subsidiaries were subcontracted for contracts worth approximately EUR 26 million. On 26 March 2024, 
the Commission adopted a decision in which it concluded that these contracts were awarded under market 
conditions and therefore no advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU was granted, as the 
public procurement procedures were respected302. 

2.2.2.  Electronic communications sector 

In the field of standard essential patents (SEPs), the Commission submitted  on 15 April 2024 written 
(amicus  curiae)  observations  to  the  Higher  Regional  Court  of  Munich303.  The  Commission’s 
observations clarify the legal requirements of the Huawei case-law304, in particular regarding the extent 
and the substance of the obligations imposed by Article 102 TFEU on SEP holders and implementers 
when an injunctive relief is sought. Through this specific intervention, the Commission intends to ensure 
the coherent application of the existing Huawei case-law framework, in particular by ensuring that it is 
interpreted and applied by national courts in an uniform manner.  

As regards mergers, on 20 February 2024, the Commission approved the creation of a joint venture by 
Orange and MásMóvil, subject to conditions305. Orange, based in France, is a global telecommunications 
operator active on the Spanish telecommunications market. MásMóvil, based in Spain, provides fixed 
and  mobile  telecommunications  services  mainly  to  residential  customers  in  Spain.  In  this  first  ‘gap 
case’306 involving mobile network operators after the CK Telecoms judgment307, the Commission carried 
out an in-depth investigation over concerns that the transaction would harm competition in the Spanish 
markets for the retail supply of mobile and fixed internet services, offered standalone or in bundles. To 
address the Commission’s concerns, Orange and MásMóvil offered (i) to divest mobile spectrum assets 
to Digi, a small but fast-growing mobile virtual  network operator, sufficiently to allow it to deploy a 
mobile  network  comparable  to  that  of  MásMóvil;  and  (ii)  to  enter  into  an  optional  national  roaming 
agreement allowing Digi to use the joint venture’s mobile network to complement its own future mobile 
network if needed. The Commission concluded that the transaction, as modified by the remedies, would 
no longer raise competition concerns. 

302 Case SA.47650 – Germany – State aid to public procurement platform Cosinex. 
303 Observations submitted in Case HMD Global Oy gegen VoiceAge EVS GmbH & Co.. See: Amicus curiae observations - 
European Commission (europa.eu) 
304 Judgment of the Court of  Justice of 16.7.2015 in Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies Co.  Ltd v ZTE Corp. and ZTE 
Deutschland GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.  
305 Case M.10896, Orange/MásMóvil/JV.  
306 A ‘gap case’ is a case involving mergers in oligopolistic markets that do not create or strengthen a dominant player. 
307 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 13.7.2023 in Case C-376/20 P, European Commission v CK Telecoms UK Investments 
Ltd, 13 July 2023, EU:C:2023:561. 

68 

 
 
On 30 May 2024, the Commission approved unconditionally the acquisition of NetCo by KKR308. NetCo, 
based in Italy, comprises the primary and backbone fixed-line network business of Telecom Italia (TIM) 
and FiberCop, a joint venture between TIM and KKR comprising TIM’s secondary fixed-line network. 
KKR, based in the U.S., is a global investment firm.  The Commission investigated the impact of  the 
transaction on the market for wholesale broadband access services in Italy. It concluded that it would not 
significantly  reduce  the  level  of  competition  as  KKR  would  not  have  the  ability  to  restrict  access  to 
passive services and the transaction would not increase the likelihood of coordination on the market.  

Continuous investments in both fibre and 5G infrastructure are of critical importance and the Commission 
pursued in 2024 its enforcement of State aid rules in the sector.  

For instance, on 23 July 2024 the Commission approved an important amendment to the German State 
aid  scheme  to  support  deployment  of  Gigabit  networks309.  The  scheme  was  assessed  under  Article 
107(3)(c) TFEU and the 2023 Broadband Guidelines310 which provide guidance on the assessment of the 
compatibility of State aid for the deployment of fixed broadband networks and services with EU State 
aid rules. The Commission found in particular that the amended scheme encouraged Gigabit network 
rollout  in  high-cost  areas  where  private  investment  is  lacking  and  that  it  addressed  specific  market 
failures.  

The Commission also approved on 19 July 2024 an EUR 80 million Greek Gigabit voucher scheme to 
promote the uptake of broadband services. This voucher scheme will support consumers and SMEs in 
Greece  in  subscribing  to  broadband  services  offering  at  least  250  Mbps  download  or  100  Mbps 
symmetric speeds. The scheme was also assessed under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the 2023 Broadband 
Guidelines. The Commission concluded that the scheme is necessary and appropriate to improve internet 
connectivity and access to high-quality services, thus stimulating economic growth in Greece311. 

In 2024, Member States implemented a variety of publicly supported broadband measures, some of which 
approved  by  the  Commission  (see  above),  while  other  were  implemented  by  the  Member  States  in 
application of the GBER. As an example, on 15 January 2024 the Commission approved the evaluation 
plan  for  a  GBER  exempted  French  aid  scheme  concerning  aid  for  very  high-speed  broadband 
infrastructure with a budget of EUR 500 million per year312. These initiatives represent significant State 
aid spending aimed at advancing broadband infrastructure. 

2.2.3.  Media 

The Commission’s competition enforcement activity in the media sector aims at ensuring that consumers 
can benefit both from a wide choice and unrestricted access to high quality content at competitive prices, 
as well as from increased technological innovation. 

As regards mergers, on 19 December 2024, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into the 
proposed acquisition of Dorna Sports, based in Spain, by Liberty Media, based in the U.S., which was 
notified to the Commission. Liberty Media, based in U.S., operates and owns interests in media, sports 
and entertainment businesses, including the exclusive commercial rights for the FIA Formula One World 
Championship. Dorna Sports, based in Spain, is the organiser and the holder of exclusive commercial 
and television rights of the FIM World Championship Grand Prix, commonly referred to as MotoGP. 

308 Case M.11386, KKR/NetCo.  
309 Case SA.109748 – Germany – Amendment to and prolongation of the National gigabit scheme Germany. 
310 Communication from the Commission ‘Guidelines on State aid for broadband networks’, OJ C 36, 31.1.2023, p.1. 
311 Case SA.112911 – Greece – RRF – Gigabit Voucher Scheme. 
312  Case  SA.108574  –  France  –-  Plan  d’évaluation  du  régime  exempté  n°  SA.108574  relatif  aux  aides  en  faveur  des 
infrastructures à très haut debit. 

69 

 
 
The  Commission  is  concerned  that  the  transaction  may  reduce  competition  in  the  licensing  of 
broadcasting rights for motorsports content. In particular, the Commission considers that the transaction 
may strengthen the position  of Liberty Media and Dorna Sports vis-à-vis broadcasters of motorsports 
content, which could ultimately lead to higher prices313.  

In  2024,  the  Commission  examined  several  State  aid  measures  in  the  news  media  sector.  Particular 
attention was paid to the fact that media play a key role for democracy, where support is provided in a 
way that respects and promotes quality independent journalism, media freedom and pluralism.  

For  example,  the  Commission  approved  on  4  July  2024  a  measure  supporting  the  production  and 
dissemination  of  printed  newspapers  and  periodicals  in  Italy,  published  in  Italian  language314.  In 
addition, the Commission approved on 7 August 2024 aid to film production in Malta and Poland315, and 
on 10 October 2024 videogames production in Germany316 to sustain the cultural diversity of the EU in 
the audio-visual sector. 

2.2.4.  Facilitating the Digital Transition 

Performant, reliable and secure electronic communications networks are essential enablers to facilitate 
the EU Digital Transition. They are a crucial to bridge the digital divide and ensure social cohesion as 
well as a competitive, sustainable and resilient economy.  

In 2024, the Commission published a White Paper on ’How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure 
needs?’317, which served as a basis for a broad consultation among various stakeholders. The White Paper 
focuses  on  three  pillars  (i)  creating  the  ‘3C  Network’  –  ‘Connected  Collaborative  Computing’,  (ii) 
complementing the Digital Single Market, and (iii) secure and resilient digital infrastructures for Europe. 
It summarises the trends and challenges in the digital infrastructure sector and outlines different scenarios 
and possible solutions to these challenges.  

The Letta Report on the future of the Single Market318 and the Draghi Report on the future of European 
competitiveness319 highlight the value of the Single Market and the role that fair competition has played 
and will continue to play. The Draghi report proposes a reform of EU regulation to complete the Single 
Market  for  electronic  communications.  In  addition  to  advocating  for  a  more  flexible  approach  to 
consolidation, it suggests that country-level ex ante regulation be reduced in favour of ex post competition 
enforcement. Similarly, the Letta report calls for a fully integrated Single Market. At present, electronic 
communication markets remain national in scope and that determines the basis for the merger assessment. 
As  a  consequence,  ‘cross  border’  consolidation  -  in  the  sense  of  a  merger  between  electronic 
communications operators active in distinct national markets - has been generally unproblematic from a 
competition point of view, and leads to reducing the overall number of operators active within the EU 
without  eliminating  competition  between  direct  competitors,  as  is  generally  the  case  for  in-country 
consolidation.  As  to  reducing  ex  ante  regulation,  it  should  be  noted  that  it  is  a  process  which  has 
considerably accelerated over the past years to the point that several markets throughout the EU are now 

313 Case M.11539, Liberty Media/Dorna Sports. 
314 Case SA.113437 – Italy – Tax credit for newspapers and periodicals. 
315 Cases SA.108170 – Poland – Polish Audiovisual Fund, and SA.109768 – Malta – Financial Incentives for the Audiovisual 
Industry. 
316 Case SA.114290 – Germany – Promotion of digital games and interactive media content in central Germany. 
317 See: White Paper - How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs? |Shaping Europe’s digital future 
318 Enrico Letta, Speed, Security, Solidarity: Empowering the Single Market to Deliver a Sustainable Future and Prosperity 
for All EU Citizens, April 2024. 
319 Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness: A competitiveness strategy for Europe, Part A, September 2024 
and The Future of European Competitiveness: In-depth Analysis and Recommendations, Part B, September 2024.  

70 

 
 
deregulated. The overarching goal of the regulatory framework has always been to roll ex ante regulation 
back  progressively  as  competition  develops  over  time.  It  has  been  largely  successful  in  this  regard, 
making it possible for the Commission to reduce the number of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation 
from 18 to two. The remaining markets as identified in the current Commission’s Recommendation on 
relevant markets320, include only fixed bottleneck infrastructure markets, with no mobile markets subject 
to ex ante review any longer. Exceptions still persist in some Member States, where national regulatory 
authorities keep other markets regulated as a result of the strict application of the three criteria test321, but 
they are constantly decreasing.  

3. 

FINANCIAL SERVICES 

3.1. Overview of key challenges in the sector 

Both  the  Draghi  Report322  and  the  Letta  Report323  emphasise  the  importance  of  reducing  the 
fragmentation of the Single Market by removing barriers for innovation, and enhancing company growth 
and  large  infrastructure  projects  in  Europe,  also  for  achieving  a  Capital  Markets  Union  (CMU)  and 
financial  services  integration.  The  Letta  Report  also  calls  for  the  establishment  of  a  Savings  and 
Investments Union (E-SIU) to keep European private savings within the EU, but also attract additional 
resources from abroad.  

Both reports emphasise the need to complete the Banking Union and also highlight the crucial need for 
financial integration within the Single Market to achieve broader EU objectives (for example the green 
transition). According to both reports, integrating financial services is vital for mobilising resources to 
support the EU's strategic goals. In this context, State aid rules play an important role. The Draghi Report 
highlights that the overall process for accessing EU financing and obtaining approvals for national State 
aid schemes and projects from the Commission is overly complex. EU's procedures for prior approval 
and reporting are complicated and lengthy, which  in itself constitutes a challenge to be addressed.  In 
addition, according to the Draghi Report, National Promotional Banks could provide counter-guarantees 
and tailored financial products for small consumers or suppliers lacking a strong credit rating to allow 
expanding market access for SMEs, in particular in the context of energy related market platforms.  

In 2024, the financial services sector continued to evolve rapidly. Digitalisation and the ability of certain 
firms  operating  digital  platforms  to  leverage  enormous  volumes  of  data  in  their  possession  have 
fundamentally changed most financial services markets. As a result, distortions of competition can have 
particularly severe effects, for example by preventing market entry by innovative competitors or pushing 
them to exit the market.  

The  increasing  importance  of  data  possession  and  digitalisation  is  reflected  in  corporate  acquisitions 
aimed  at  acquiring  data,  building  data  analytics  competencies  and  moving  certain  data  processing 
activities to the ‘cloud’.  

The transition to a more sustainable and decarbonised EU economy influences market developments also 
in the financial services sector. An increasing number of financial institutions, including banks, insurers, 

320 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/2245 of 18 December 2020 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with the Code, OJ L 439, 29.12.2020, p. 23-
31. 
321 As referred in Article 67(1)(a), (b), (c) of Directive (EU) 2018/1972, establishing the European Electronic Communications 
Code, OJ L 321, 17.12.2018, p. 36–214. 
322 See ft 319 
323 See ft 318 

71 

 
 
 
as  well  as  asset  owners/managers  have  committed  to  net-zero  initiatives  and  the  joint  setting  of CO2 
emission targets. In parallel, the market for environmental, social and corporate governance data (ESG 
data) is growing rapidly. 

3.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

EU  competition  policy  and  enforcement  continues  to  contribute  to  more  resilient  and  competitive 
financial  services  markets  by  safeguarding  and  nurturing  competition  on  fair  and  equal  terms. 
Competitive markets benefit consumers and stimulate the creation of innovative business models  and 
financial  services.  In  2024,  the  Commission  investigated  market  consolidation,  anti-competitive 
unilateral conduct, and coordination between competing firms. The Commission also continued to review 
State aid granted to banks and other financial institutions in order to minimise possible distortive effects 
in the Single Market. 

3.2.1. 

 Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation in payments 

Payments  are  the  backbone  of  the  economy  and  contribute  substantially  to  economic  growth  and 
development.  The  payments  sector  is  very  dynamic  and  continues  to  change  rapidly  in  view  of 
digitalisation. Competition enforcement is central to increase competitiveness of the European payments 
sector and to allow payment providers to compete effectively.  

The commitment decision in Apple – Mobile Payments (see section 3.2.2. below) enhanced innovation 
in payments: the first alternative wallet developed under the commitments was launched on iPhones on 
9 December 2024 (Vipps MobilePay). The Commission continued in 2024 to monitor International Card 
Schemes and the expansion of BigTech into the payments sector. In parallel, the Commission continued 
its Market Study on Competition in Online Payment Services in view of publishing a final report.  

Regulation  complements  the  efforts  of  competition  enforcement  to  increase  competitiveness  of  the 
European payments sector. For instance, the Commission’s proposal for a digital euro Regulation324 may 
lead to the creation of an additional, innovative and cheap pan-European means of payment. Digital euro 
would  offer greater  choice  to  consumers  and  businesses, including  in  situations  where  physical  cash 
cannot be used. It could strengthen the international role of the euro and support the EU’s open strategic 
autonomy325   by  setting  up  a  competing  means  of  payment  to  existing  pan-European  card  payment 
solutions.  

3.2.2. 

 Antitrust enforcement in the financial services sector 

On 11 July 2024, the Commission concluded its investigation into Apple’s conduct in the market for 
mobile payment services (mobile wallets). The Commission adopted a decision in which it found that 
Apple's final commitments addressed its competition concerns in relation to the company’s conduct and 
decided to make them legally binding326. 

Commission accepts commitments by Apple opening access to 'tap and go' technology on iPhones 
In 2022, the Commission informed Apple of its preliminarily view that it abused its dominant position by refusing to supply 

324  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  establishment  of  the  digital  euro  of 
28.6.2023, COM (2023) 369 final. 
325 
openness-strength-and-resilience_en  
326 Case AT.40452, Apple – Mobile Payments.  

https://finance.ec.europa.eu/publications/communication-european-economic-and-financial-system-fostering-

See: 

72 

 
 
the Near Field Communication  (NFC)327 function on iPhones for payments in stores, reserving the NFC access to its own 
solution Apple Pay. The Commission was concerned that Apple’s conduct may exclude competitors, and reduce innovation 
and choice for mobile wallet users on iPhones. 

To  address  the  Commission's  competition  concerns,  Apple  initially  offered  to  the  Commission  the  following  first  set  of 
commitments: 
- 

allow third-party wallet providers access to the NFC input on iOS devices free of charge, without having to use Apple 
Pay  or  Apple  Wallet  in  Host  Card  Emulation  mode  (‘HCE').  HCE  allows  to  securely  store  payment  credentials  and 
complete transactions using NFC, without relying on an in-device secure element; 
apply a fair, objective, transparent and non-discriminatory procedure and eligibility criteria to grant NFC access to third-
party mobile wallet app developers; 
enable users to easily set an HCE payment app as default app for payments in stores and to use relevant functionalities 
such as Field Detect (opening the default payment app when a locked iPhone is presented to an NFC reader), Double-
click (launching the default payment app when double clicking the phone's side or home button), and authentication such 
as Touch ID, Face ID and device passcode; 
establish a monitoring mechanism and separate dispute settlement to allow for independent review of Apple's decisions 
restricting access; 
apply the commitments to all third-party mobile app developers established in the EEA and to all iOS users with an Apple 
ID registered in the EEA, also while traveling temporarily outside the EEA. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Between  19  January  2024  and  19  February  2024,  the  Commission  market  tested  Apple's  commitments  and  consulted  all 
interested third parties to verify whether they would remove the competition concerns.  
In light of the outcome of this market test, Apple amended the initial proposal and further committed to: 
- 

 extend the possibility to initiate payments with  Host Card Emulation (HCE) payment apps at other industry-certified 
terminals, such as merchant phones or devices used as terminal (so called SoftPOS), if this is enabled; 
explicitly acknowledge that HCE developers are not prevented from combining the HCE payment function with other 
NFC functionalities or use cases; 
remove the requirement for developers to have a licence as a Payment Service Provider (PSP) or a binding agreement 
with a PSP to access the NFC input; 
allow NFC access for developers pre-building payment apps for third party mobile wallet providers; 
update the HCE architecture to comply with evolving industry standards used by Apple Pay, and update standards even 
if they are no longer implemented by Apple Pay, under certain conditions; 
enable developers to prompt users to easily set up their default payment app and redirect users to the default settings page, 
enabling defaulting with a few clicks; 
comply with the same industry standard-specifications as developers of HCE payment apps and to protect confidential 
information obtained in the context of an audit; 
shorten  deadlines  for  resolving  disputes  and  additional  independence  and  procedural  guarantees  for  the  monitoring 
trustee. 

- 

- 

- 
- 

- 

- 

- 

The Commission concluded that Apple’s final commitments would address its competition concerns over Apple’s restriction 
of third-party mobile wallet developers’ access to NFC payments in stores for EEA iOS users. The commitments will remain 
in  force  for  ten  years  and  apply  throughout  the  EEA.  Their  implementation  will  be  monitored  by  an  independent  trustee 
appointed by Apple who will report to the Commission for the same time period.  

The  Commission  also  continued  in  2024  to  monitor  the  commitments  made  binding  on  Visa  and 
Mastercard as regards interchange fees for inter regional card transactions328. These commitments were 
set  to  be  in  place  until  November  2024.  In  addition,  the  Commission  took  note  of  the  voluntary 
continuation by Visa and Mastercard of the caps for inter-regional interchange fees beyond November 
2024, meaning that inter-regional interchange fees will remain capped for another 5 years until November 
2029. 

327 The NFC ‘tap and go' technology enables communication between a mobile phone and payments terminals in stores. NFC 
is an industry standard neither developed nor owned by Apple, available in almost all payment terminals in EEA stores and 
allowing for the safest and most seamless mobile payments. 
328 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_2311  

73 

 
 
 
In the area of financial derivatives, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises 
of companies active in the financial services sector in two Member States. The Commission has concerns 
that the inspected companies may have violated Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 EEA329. 

In retail banking, the Commission - in cooperation with the NCAs - closely monitored the stickiness of 
deposit rates in banks in several Member States. Depositors complained that banks were quick to raise 
interest rates of mortgage accounts while being slow to increase interest rates of savings’ accounts. The 
Commission and the NCAs remained vigilant throughout 2024 to detect and address, at an early stage, 
potential antitrust concerns. For example, the Dutch NCA concluded a study on the impact of lack of 
competition on interest rates for savings accounts in the Netherlands330, while the Hellenic NCA recently 
launched a sector inquiry on the development of deposit rates in Greece331. DG Competition is following 
the developments at ECN level in close cooperation with the NCAs. 

In the field of motor insurance, the Commission continued in 2024 to monitor the commitments made 
binding on Insurance Ireland concerning competitor access to its data sharing system332. As a result of 
these commitments,  new companies were granted access  to  Insurance Ireland and to  the data sharing 
system. The commitments apply until 2032.  

In the area of licencing inputs for trading credit default swaps, the Commission continued in 2024 to 
monitor  compliance  of  the  International  Swaps  and  Derivatives  Association  and  the  provider  of 
commodity and financial data, IHS Markit (now part of S&P Global) with the commitments made binding 
on them in 2016333. 

3.2.3.  Merger enforcement in the financial services sector 

In  2024,  the  Commission  continued  to  review  proposed  mergers  across  the  financial  services  sector, 
notably in the markets for payments and banking services, as well as proposed mergers between financial 
market infrastructure providers. 

On 4 March 2024, the Commission  unconditionally  approved the creation of a joint venture between 
Worldline  and  Crédit  Agricole334  which  combined  Crédit  Agricole’s  payment  acquiring  services  and 
Worldline’s payment acceptance services for merchants. The joint venture creates an integrated payment 
solutions provider for merchants in France. The Commission did not identify any significant impediment 
to effective competition as the services provided by the parties were found to be largely complementary, 
and because the joint venture would not have a strong enough market position for it to be able to foreclose 
its competitors or the customers of the payment services concerned. 

Early 2024, the Commission investigated the proposed acquisition of Nasdaq's European power trading 
and clearing business by European Energy Exchange AG (EEX), having accepted referral requests under 
Article 22 EUMR from Denmark and Finland in August 2023335. According to the referral requests, the 
proposed  merger  would  have  significantly  affected  competition  between  on-exchange  providers  of 
trading and clearing services for Nordic electricity derivatives in these countries, potentially removing 

https://www.epant.gr/en/enimerosi/press-releases/item/2890-press-release-sector-inquiry-by-the-hellenic-

See: 

329 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4832  
330 See: https://www.acm.nl/system/files/documents/acm-study-competition-on%20the-dutch-savings-market.pdf  
331 
competition-commission-into-bank-deposits.html  
332 Case AT.40511, Insurance Ireland: Insurance claims database and conditions of access.   
333 Case AT 39745, CDS Information Mark. 
334 Case M.11120, Worldline/Crédit Agricole/JV. 
335 Also supported by Sweden and Norway. 

74 

 
 
the choice of trading platform and clearing provider altogether. EEX notified the proposed merger to the 
Commission on 3 May 2024, but the notification was ultimately withdrawn336.  

In  June  2024,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  sole  control  of  Alpha  Bank  Romania  by 
UniCredit337. The transaction related to various banking and financial services in Romania, such as retail 
and corporate banking, and financial market services. 

The  Commission  also  continued  to  monitor  mergers  in  the  financial  services  industry  to  identify 
transactions  that  could  warrant  a  referral  to  the  Commission.  Since  the  judgment  on  the  scope  of 
application of Article 22 in Illumina338, the monitoring is confined to possible referrals under Article 22 
by Member States that are competent under their national merger control regime, or do not have such a 
regime  at  all,  namely  Luxembourg,  as  well  as  further  deepening  the  Commission’s  understanding  of 
market trends. 

3.2.4.  State aid investigations in the financial services sector 

In 2024, the Commission authorised the prolongations and reintroductions of certain existing State aid 
schemes under which Member States can provide aid to foster the restructuring or orderly market exit of 
entities in distress in case of need.  

For instance, as regards to Poland, the Commission authorised the reintroductions of the scheme for the 
liquidation  of  credit  unions  (in  place  since  February  2014)339,  and  the  scheme  for  the  resolution  of 
cooperative  and  small  commercial  banks  (in  place  since  December  2016)340.  As  regards  Ireland,  the 
Commission authorised two prolongations of the restructuring scheme for credit unions (in place since 
October 2014)341, and one extension of the orderly winding-up scheme for credit unions (in place since 
December 2011)342. For Denmark, the Commission approved the third re-introduction of the winding-up 
scheme for small banks343. 

On  29  February  2024  the  Commission  decided  not  to  raise  objections  to  the  proposed  alteration  by 
Germany of the existing INVEST Scheme – Direct grants for risk capital investments344. The existing aid 
scheme supports investments in small, young and innovative companies with an acquisition grant as well 
as  an  exit  grant  provided  to  natural  persons  (direct  grants).  The  alteration  to  the  existing  aid  scheme 
consists in a reduction in aid intensity from the current 25% of the invested amount to 15% of the invested 
amount. The German authorities may award aid on the basis of applications submitted until 31 December 
2026 for acquisition grants and 30 June 2037 for exit grants. The overall budget of the existing aid scheme 
is EUR 183.72 million (EUR 45.93 million per year).  

On  24  April  2024, the Commission  approved  a  reintroduction  and  amendment  of  the  scheme  for  the 
management of loans granted under Government Housing Plans (OIKIA scheme)345. The Commission 

336 Case M.11241, EES/Nasdaq Power. 
337 Case M.11546, Unicredit/Alpha Bank Romania.  
338 See Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission. 
339 Case SA.114922 – Poland – Reintroduction of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme. 
340 Case SA.115557 – Poland – Reintroduction of the Resolution Scheme for Cooperative Banks and Small Commercial Banks. 
341 Cases SA.113513 – Ireland – 19th Prolongation of the Restructuring and Stabilisation Scheme for the Credit Union Sector 
and SA.115809 – Ireland – 20th Prolongation of the Restructuring and Stabilisation Scheme for the Credit Union Sector. 
342 Case SA.113879 – Ireland – 20th Prolongation of the Credit Union Resolution Scheme 2024-2025. 
343 Case SA.114237 – Denmark – Reintroduction of winding-up scheme for small banks. 
344 Case SA.112196 – Germany – INVEST Scheme – Direct grants for risk capital investments – Amendment of the INVEST 
Guidelines. 
345 Case SA.112704  – Cyprus – Scheme for the management of loans granted under Government Housing Plans  (OIKIA 
scheme). 

75 

 
 
did  not  raise  objections  to  the  the  reintroduction  of  the  scheme  and  certain  changes  in  the  eligibility 
criteria of its beneficiaries. The scheme provides grants in the form of partial debt write-offs to borrowers 
encountering  difficulties  in  repaying  their  loans  under  a  ‘Government  Housing  Plan’.  The  need  for 
reintroduction  of  the  scheme  was  justified  by  significant  delays  in  processing  the  applications  in  the 
Member State. The eligibility for the scheme was expanded to include applicants who either (i) were 
initially eligible but failed to submit required documents on time and have since corrected this, or (ii) 
were  initially  ineligible  but  now  can  settle  their  non-performing  loans  due  to  improved  economic 
circumstances. On 5 December 2024, the Commission further approved an amendment of that scheme 
extending its implementation deadlines and approving targeted changes in the eligibility criteria of its 
beneficiaries346. 

On  30  May  2024,  the  Commission  closed  a  case  involving  alleged  State  aid  provided  by  the  French 
government to various entities, including a fund called Fonds Écotechnologies347. The case was triggered 
by a complaint alleging illegal aid in the context of the creation and operation of Fonds Écotechnologies 
– a fund established in 2012 by the French government, the Agence de l'environnement et de la maîtrise 
de l'énergie (ADEME), and the Caisse des dépôts (CDC). The fund's primary objective is to invest in 
SMEs in the field of ecology and technology. The French government has provided financial resources 
for  the  fund,  with  an  initial  capital  of  EUR  150  million.  Following  an  investigation  triggered  by  a 
complaint about alleged illegal aid, the Commission concluded that the measure does not constitute aid. 

On 3 July 2024 the Commission did not raise objections to the reintroduction of the increased rate for 
the income tax reduction scheme for direct investments in Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) ventures 
in France348. The case is related to the Investment Tax Credit for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(IR-PME) scheme, which aims to encourage investments in SSE ventures and SMEs. The Commission 
had previously authorized the IR-PME scheme in 2020, which allowed for a reduced income tax rate of 
18% for investments in SMEs and SSE ventures. However, in 2023, the French government introduced 
a new law that reintroduced a higher tax reduction rate of 25% for investments in SSE ventures, effective 
from 2024 to 2025. The Commission assessed the reintroduction of the higher tax reduction rate under 
the State aid rules and found that it was compatible with the internal market. The Commission noted that 
the SSE ventures are subject to specific eligibility criteria, including a requirement to have a genuine 
social  purpose  and  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  their  financial  statements.  The  aid  will  help  SSE 
ventures to  access  financing  and achieve their social objectives. The Commission also found that  the 
reintroduction of the reduction from a higher tax rate is proportionate and does not exceed the maximum 
allowed amount under the State aid rules. Additionally, the aid is limited in time and scope, and that it 
does not create undue distortions in the market. 

On 22 July 2024, the Commission approved the prolongation of two risk finance measures, namely the 
Enterprise  Investment  Scheme  (EIS)  and  the  Venture  Capital  Trust  (VCT)  (together  the  EIS/VCT 
schemes) 349. The EIS/VCT schemes were first approved in April 2009, and amendments were authorised 
by the Commission in the past years. In October 2023, the U.K. authorities notified a prolongation of the 
existing EIS/VCT schemes for another ten years after their due expiry on 6 April 2025. The notification 

346 Case SA.116563 – Cyprus – Amendment of the scheme for the management of loans granted under Government Housing 
Plans (OIKIA scheme). 
347 Case SA.110551 – France – Aides potentielles liées au Fonds Écotechnologies. 
348 Case SA.113388 – France – Réintroduction du taux majoré du dispositif IR-PME de réduction d’impôt sur le revenu pour 
les  investissements  directs  dans  les  entreprises  solidaires  d’utilité  sociale  (SA.55869,  tel  que  modifié  par  SA.59985,  par 
SA.100943 et par SA.104703). 
349 Case SA.107221 – United Kingdom – Prolongation of Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) and the Venture Capital Trust 
scheme (VCT). 

76 

 
 
by the U.K. authorities is limited to the prolongation of the EIS/VCT schemes as regards aid granted to 
beneficiaries located and registered in Northern Ireland and the Commission’s assessment is limited to 
the  scope  of  notification.  The  existing  EIS/VCT  schemes  aim  to  promote  investments  in  early-stage 
SMEs  and  knowledge-intensive  SMEs  and  mid-caps  which  have  difficulties  accessing  finance.  The 
Commission considered the market failure faced by knowledge-intensive companies in Northern Ireland, 
including the lack of collateral for external financing and the presence of deep-pocket competitors. It 
noted  that  the  schemes  are  designed  to  address  this  market  failure  by  providing  a  fiscal  incentive  to 
investors to support these companies. 

On  13  December  2024,  the  Commission  approved  an  additional  extension  and  amendment  of  the 
Hercules asset protection scheme in Greece350. Initially approved in October 2019, the scheme's first 
extension expired in October 2022. Subsequently, in 2023, the Commission approved its reintroduction, 
extending  its  applicability  until  the  end  of  2024.  The  scheme  assists  banks  in  the  securitisation  and 
offloading  of  non-performing  loans  from  their  balance  sheets.  Under  the  scheme,  a  separate  private 
securitisation vehicle will buy non-performing loans from the banks and sell notes to investors. Greece 
facilitates the process by granting guarantees on the senior tranche of those notes, in exchange for market 
conform remuneration. The 2024 Greek notification addressed the extension of the scheme's expiry date, 
the increased budget, and the revised methodologies related to spread. 

On 18 December 2024 the Commission approved the prolongation of the aid scheme notified by Croatia 
on  the  continuation  of  the  exception  clause  for  Croatian  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(HBOR) short-term export credit insurance and reinsurance scheme351. The scheme aims to enable the 
continuation of the provision of short-term export credit insurance and reinsurance by the Croatian State 
through its  public export credit agency, the state-owned HBOR,  in  cases  where cover for marketable 
export credit risks is temporarily unavailable. The scheme’s duration is scheduled until 31 December 
2030. 

On 18 December 2024, the Commission took the decision not to object to the extension of French public 
development  bank  (SFIL)  remit  and  subsequent  amendment  of  the  existing  commitments352.  The 
extension of activities of SFIL353 will not involve any new aid and the foreseen new SFIL’s activities 
will be carried out on market terms. 

Regarding State aid in the form of public guarantees, the Commission adopted two decisions in 2024 
under the Guarantee Notice354. In these decisions, the Commission approved the methodologies used to 
determine the market conform guarantee premiums, which in turn serve as a reference to calculate the 
aid element included in public guarantees. First, on 19 June 2024 in a Spanish case355, and secondly on 
17  July  2024  in  a  Belgian  case356,  the  Commission  did  not  raise  objections  with  regard  to  notified 
methodologies  for  the  calculation  of  aid  amounts  for  public  guarantees  provided  to  SMEs  in  the 
agriculture, agri-food, forestry, fishery and aquaculture sectors. 

350 Case SA.116229 – Greece – Prolongation and amendment of the reintroduced Hercules Scheme. 
351 Case SA.116082  – Croatia – Continuation of the exception clause for HBOR's short-term export credit insurance and 
reinsurance scheme. 
352 Case SA.107658 – France – SFIL – Levée des limites imposées à SFIL quant aux activités qu’elle est autorisée à exercer, 
en qualité d’établissement de crédit public de développement. 
353 SFIL’s remit of activities, which covered the financing of local municipalities and hospitals, will be extended to a broader 
scope of public beneficiaries. 
354 Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees, OJ C 
155, 20.6.2008, p. 10-22.  
355 Case SA.108449 – Spain – Guarantee methodology MAPA-SAECA. 
356 Case SA.113219 – Belgium – Methodology of PMV to calculate the aid element in agricultural guarantees. 

77 

 
 
3.2.5. 

 Evaluation of State aid rules in the financial sector 

In 2024, the Commission continued its evaluation of the State aid rules for banks in difficulty357. The 
objective is to assess how the rules have functioned, as well as the role of State aid control in preserving 
financial stability in the EU single market while ensuring a level-playing field by mitigating competition 
distortions. Following a public consultation, the Commission published the summary of the replies to 
this consultation in 2022. An econometric analysis of State aid approved in the period 2008-2022 was 
carried out by an external consultant, and the final report was submitted to the Commission in November 
2023. This analysis, along with the input received through the public consultation, will feed into a Staff 
Working Document on the evaluation.  

The work in this field goes hand in hand with the ongoing review of the EU bank Crisis Management 
and Deposit Insurance framework for which trilogues between the European Parliament, the Council of 
the EU and the Commission that started at the end of 2024. 

In the ongoing  evaluation  of  the Guarantee Notice358, the Commission  published in  February 2023 a 
summary  of  replies  and  contributions  to  the  public  consultation  on  the  effectiveness,  efficiency, 
relevance, coherence, and added value of the Notice359. The final report of an econometric analysis of 
State aid approved in the period 2010-2022 carried out by an external consultant in 2024, was submitted 
to the Commission in November 2024. This analysis, along with the input received through the public 
consultation, will feed into a Staff Working Document on the evaluation. 

4. 

TAXATION AND STATE AID  

4.1. Overview of key challenges on tax evasion and avoidance, and fiscal aid 

Outside the spheres in which EU tax law has been harmonised, Member States can decide on their own 
how to tax economic activities, which ones to tax, which rates to apply, and which tax base to take into 
account. Member States’ fiscal sovereignty is however not absolute: this competence must be exercised 
in accordance with EU law, including State aid rules.  

The Commission enforces State aid rules in certain fiscal matters. For instance, aggressive tax planning 
practices involving the granting of State aid that lead to discriminatory treatment of companies. 

In the context of fiscal measures, the key aspect to find State aid is the existence of a selective advantage. 
It  is  for the Commission  to  assess whether fiscal  measures selectively  favour certain  undertakings or 
certain sectors of activity360. The Court of Justice  has clarified that, in order to identify the reference 
system  (in  direct  taxation),  the  Commission  must  rely  on  national  law361  following  an  exchange  of 
arguments with the Member State, and carry out an objective examination of the content, structure and 

357 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2022-sa-banking-rules_en 
358 Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees, OJ C 
155, 20.6.2008, p. 10. 
359  See:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13466-State-aid-rules-for-assessing-State-
guarantees-on-loans-evaluation_en  
360 Judgments of the Court of Justice of 4.6.2015 in Case C-15/14 P, Commission v MOL, EU:C:2015:362, and of 30.6. 
2016 in Case C-270/15 P, Belgium v Commission, EU:C:2016:489.   
361 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 8.11.2022 in Joined Cases C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P, Fiat Chrysler 
Finance Europe and Ireland v European Commission, EU:C:2022:859. 

78 

 
 
 
effects of the applicable rules362. 

The so-called three-step test, usually applied to assess selectivity in relation to tax measures, involves: 
(i)  the  determination  of  the  reference  system;  (ii)  the  identification  of  a  derogation,  and  (iii)  the 
justification by the logic of the tax system. The Commission cannot rely on any parameters and rules 
external to the national tax system, unless the national tax system refers explicitly to such parameters or 
rules363. As regards the assessment of selectivity in relation to an individual application of the tax rules 
(for example a tax ruling), the Court of Justice also clarified that to identify the reference system or the 
‘normal’ tax regime on the basis of which that individual application must be analysed, the Commission 
must rely on the provisions of national law as interpreted by the Member State (during an exchange of 
arguments), provided that  this  interpretation  is  compatible with  the wording of those provisions.  The 
Commission may only depart from the Member State’s interpretation if it is able to establish, on the basis 
of  reliable  and  consistent  evidence,  that  another  interpretation  prevails  in  the  case-law  or  the 
administrative practice of the Member State concerned364. In the recent Engie365 and Apple366 judgments, 
the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice provided further consistent guidance on the identification of 
the  reference  framework  in  individual  tax  cases.  It  focused  in  particular  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
national tax provisions presented by the relevant Member State and the Commission respectively in the 
light of the wording but also the objective and effects of those provisions.    

Aggressive  tax  planning  strategies  involving  the  granting  of  State  aid  can  take  a  variety  of  forms. 
Companies may strike individual ‘sweetheart deals’ with tax authorities, by which they achieve a lower 
level of taxation than what would apply to other taxpayers. They may also benefit from schemes that 
selectively offer fiscal advantages and that are based on legislation or administrative practice. Either way, 
such practices may have distortive effects on the internal market, as they unduly reinforce the competitive 
position  of  certain  companies,  as  opposed  to  others.  They  also  reduce  public  funding  that  would 
otherwise be available for investments, which are particularly needed to meet the objectives of a green, 
digital and resilient EU economy.  

In parallel  with  the  recently adopted legislation367 and  legislative  proposals368 existing  at  EU level to 
address  aggressive tax planning, the Commission’s State aid  enforcement activities also contribute to 
tackling tax base erosion and profit shifting, in particular where a favourable tax treatment is granted to 
internationally mobile activities. Relevant developments took place in the case law of the EU Courts in 
2024 as discussed below. 

4.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

In 2024, the Commission continued to enforce State aid rules in both direct and indirect tax matters. 

362 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5.12.2023 in Case C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, Luxembourg and Others v Commission 
(Engie), EU:C:2023:948, paragraph 111. See also World Duty Free Group SA and others v Commission C-51/19 P and C-
64/19 P. EU:C:2021:793, paragraph 62. 
363 See Cases C-885/19 P and C-898/19 P, Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe and Ireland v European Commission, paragraph 96. 
364 See Case C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, Luxembourg and Others v Commission, paragraph 121. 
365 See Case C-451/21 P and C-454/21 P, Luxembourg and Others v Commission, paragraphs 120, 121, 122 and 130. 
366 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 10.9.2024 in C465/20 P, Commission v Ireland and Others, EU:C:2024:724, paragraphs 
200, 201, 374, 375, 376 and 377. 
367 See  for example Directive (EU) 2022/2523 of 15 December 2022 on ensuring a global minimum level of taxation for 
multinational enterprise groups and large-scale domestic groups in the Union, OJ L 328, 22.12.2022, p. 1. 
368 See the Commission’s proposals for directives of 12 September 2023 to simplify tax rules and reduce costs for cross-border 
businesses, including the BEFIT proposal (‘Business in Europe: Framework for Income Taxation’) and a proposal aimed at 
harmonising 
on 
pricing 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4405). 

information 

transfer 

within 

more 

rules 

(see 

EU 

the 

79 

 
 
4.2.1. 

 State aid investigations and decisions concerning aggressive tax planning 

The  Commission  continued  the  investigation  of  pending  cases  concerning  alleged  aid  granted  by  the 
Netherlands to Inter Ikea369, Starbucks370 and Nike371, as well as alleged State aid granted by Luxembourg 
to Huhtamäki372, Fiat373 and Amazon374, and by Gibraltar to the Mead Johnson Nutrition group375. State 
aid  investigations  into  Starbucks,  Fiat  and  Amazon  over  their  tax  treatment  in  the  Netherlands  and 
Luxembourg were closed on 28 November 2024, with the Commission confirming the arrangements did 
not amount to selective tax advantages376. 

At  the  same  time,  the  Commission  continued  monitoring  Member  States’  tax  rulings  legislation  and 
practice. 

4.2.2. 

 Important judgments in relation to aggressive tax planning 

In 2024, the EU courts rendered several important judgments on aggressive tax planning.  

The Apple case 

On 10 September 2024 in Apple, the Court of Justice upheld the 2016 Commission’s decision finding that Ireland had granted 
unlawful State aid to Apple through favourable tax rulings, and required the recovery of approximately EUR 13 billion (plus 
interest)377. 

In 1991 and 2007, Ireland issued two tax rulings in favour of two companies in the Apple Group, Apple Sales International 
(ASI) and Apple Operations Europe (AOE) which were incorporated - but not tax residents - in Ireland. Those tax rulings 
approved the methods used by ASI and AOE to determine their taxable profits in Ireland in relation to the trading activity of 
their respective Irish branches. 

In 2016, the Commission decided that, by excluding from the tax base the profits generated by the use of intellectual property 
licences held by ASI and AOE on the ground that the head offices of those companies were located outside Ireland and that 
the management of those licences depended on decisions taken at the level of the Apple Group in the  U.S., the tax rulings 
conferred to those companies unlawful and incompatible State aid benefitting to the Apple Group. The Commission ordered 
Ireland to recover the aid estimated at EUR 13 billion. 

In July 2020, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision on the ground that the Commission had been unable to 
show that a selective advantage arose from the adoption of the tax rulings and that it resulted in a preferential reduction of the 
tax base in Ireland378. 

On 10 September 2024, on appeal by the Commission, the Court of Justice set aside the judgment of the General Court and 
rendered a final judgment on the matter. 

The  Court  found  that  the  General  Court  erred  when  it  ruled  that  the  Commission  had  not  sufficiently  proved  that  the 
intellectual property licences held by ASI and AOE and related profits, generated by sales of Apple products outside the U.S., 
should have been allocated for tax purposes to the Irish branches. In particular, the General Court erred when it ruled that the 
Commission’s  primary  line  of  reasoning  was  based  on  erroneous  assessments  of  normal  taxation  under  the  Irish  tax  law 
applicable  in  the  case,  and  when  the  Court  upheld  Ireland’s  and  ASI  and  AOE’s  arguments  regarding  the  Commission’s 
factual assessments of the activities of the Irish branches of ASI and AOE. 

The Court further confirmed the Commission’s approach that, under the relevant provision of Irish law, the activities of the 
branches of ASI and AOE in Ireland had to be compared to those of other entities of those companies, particularly their head 

369 Case SA.46470 – Netherlands – Netherlands Potential aid to IKEA. 
370 Case SA. 38374 – Netherlands – State aid implemented by the Netherlands to Starbucks. The investigation was resumed 
in  2022  after  the  final  decision  was  annulled  by  the  General  Court  in  Joined  Cases  T-760/15,  T-636/16,  Kingdom  of  the 
Netherlands and Others v European Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2019:669. 
371 Case SA.51284 – the Netherlands – Alleged aid to Nike. 
372 Case SA.50400 – Luxembourg – Huhtamäki. 
373 Case SA.38375 – Luxembourg – Potential State aid to Fiat. 
374 Case SA. 38944 – Luxembourg – Aid to Amazon. 
375 Case SA.34914 – United Kingdom – Gibraltar Corporate Income Tax Regime. 
376 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_6105  
377 See Case C-465/20 P, Commission v Ireland and Others.  
378 Judgment of the General Court of 15.7.2020 in Case T-778/16 and T-892/16, Ireland v Commission, EU:T:2020:338. 

80 

 
 
offices outside Ireland, and not to the activities of other Apple Group companies (for example a parent company in the U.S.). 
The Court thereby confirmed the Commission’s assessment of the selective advantage conferred by the tax rulings. 

The Apple judgment complements the Engie case-law. While in Engie, the Court found that the Member States’ interpretation 
of  a  tax  rule  was  compatible with  both  the  wording  and  the  objective  of  that  law  (while  the  interpretation  thereof  by the 
Commission  contradicted  both  the  wording  and  objective of  the  law),  in  Apple,  the  Court  considered  that  while  both  the 
Member  State’  and  the  Commission’s  interpretation  of  the  tax  rule  were  compatible  with  the  wording  of  the  law,  the 
interpretation of Ireland was not coherent with the objective of the Irish rules (while the Commission’s interpretation was in 
line with it). On that basis, the Court rejected the interpretation by Ireland that leads to a result which contradicts the objective 
of the law.  

The UK CFC case 
On 19 September 2024, the Court of Justice rendered a jugdment in UK CFC379, and annulled the 2019 Commission’s negative 
decision380 for failing to correctly identify the appropriate reference system in the tax selectivity analysis.  
The Court of Justice concluded that the Commission and the General Court381 erred in defining the reference framework as 
the UK Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) rules, by considering that it is severable from the general corporate income tax 
system.  

In this judgment, the Court of Justice extended the reasoning developed in Engie to the definition of the reference framework 
for schemes, when it considered that the CFC rules follow the same logic as the general corporate income tax system and 
form an integral part of it. In this context, the Court explained  that the Member State’s interpretation of its tax provisions 
should  be  followed,  unless  it  is  incompatible  with  the  letter  of  the  law  or  there  is  clear  evidence  towards  a  different 
interpretation  in  the  national  case  law  or  administrative  practice.  The  Court  then  found  that  the  UK’s  interpretation  is 
compatible with the wording of the law and with the logic of the general corporate income tax system. 

4.2.3. 

 Important cases in relation to tax schemes 

The case-law stresses the importance of an appropriate motivation and correct definition of the reference 
framework  considering  that  the  existence  of  a  selective  advantage  may  be  established  only  when 
compared with ‘normal’ taxation382. It has been clarified in recent case-law that the reference system or 
the ‘normal’ tax regime (in direct taxation), on the basis of which the selectivity of a tax must be analysed, 
includes the provisions laying  down the exemptions  which the national  tax authorities consider to  be 
applicable where those provisions do not, in themselves, confer a selective advantage383. In that regard, 
the Court of Justice also held that, in the light of the Member States’ own competence in the matter of 
direct taxation, the Commission cannot establish a derogation from a reference framework merely by 
finding that a measure departs from a general objective of taxing all companies resident in the Member 
State concerned, without taking account of provisions of national law specifying the manner in which 

379 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19.9.2024 in Joined Cases C-555/22 P, United Kingdom and Others v Commission, C-
556/22 P, ITV v Commission and Others and C-564/22 P, LSEGH (Luxembourg) and London Stock Exchange Group Holdings 
(Italy) v Commission and Others, EU:C:2024:763 . 
380 Case SA.44896 – United Kingdom – State aid scheme UK CFC Group Financing Exemption.  
381 See Joined Cases C-555/22 P, United Kingdom and Others v Commission, C-556/22 P, ITV v Commission and Others and 
C-564/22 P, LSEGH (Luxembourg) and London Stock Exchange Group Holdings (Italy) v Commission and Others,  paragraph 
135.  
382 See Judgments of the Court of Justice of 16.3.2021 in Cases C-562/19 P, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2021:201 and C-
596/19 P, Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2021:202; see also Judgments of the Court of Justice of 6.10.2021 in Case C-50/19 
P, Sigma Alimentos Exterior SL, EU:C:2021:792; Joined cases C-51/19 and C-64/19 P, World Duty Free Group SA and others 
v Commission, EU:C:2021:793; Case C-52/19 P, Banco Santander SA v Commission, EU:C:2021:794; Joined cases C-53/19 P 
and C-65/19 P, Banco Santander and Santusa v Commission, EU:C:2021:795. 
383  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  5.12.2023  in  Cases,  C-451/21  P  and  C-454/21  P,  Luxembourg  and  Others  v 
Commission, EU:C:2023:948, paragraphs 118 and 177. See also Judgment of the Court of Justice of 19.9.2024, in Cases C-
555/22 P, C-556/22 P and C-564/22 P, United Kingdom and others v Commission, EU:C:2024:763, paragraph 96. 

81 

 
 
 
that  objective  is  to  be  implemented384.  Finally,  the  Court  of  Justice  provided  guidance  in  relation  to 
situations where a set of rules can be considered severable from the overall reference system385. 

In 2024, the EU courts also provided additional guidance on the notion of selectivity in the following 
case.  

The Swedish risk tax on credit institutions 
In 2021, the Commission adopted a decision regarding a Swedish tax on systemic risk payable by credit institutions386. The 
tax sought to strengthen public finances with contributions from large credit institutions that risk creating significant indirect 
costs to society in the event of a financial crisis. The tax is payable by credit institutions in Sweden whose liabilities exceed a 
certain threshold (SEK 150 bn in 2022). The Commission found that the tax was not selective and therefore did not constitute 
State aid. 
The  Swedish  Bankers  Association  and  a  Swedish  bank  challenged  the  Commission’s  decision  before  the  General  Court, 
alleging that the Commission should have opened the formal investigation procedure.  
In its judgment of 17 April 2024387, the General Court confirmed the Commission's decision not qualifying as State aid the 
Swedish tax. The General Court applied the three-step test to assess selectivity and held that a tax is not selective if differences 
in taxation result from the application of the reference system, that is to say if comparable situations are treated in a comparable 
manner and if the modulation mechanisms do not disregard the objective of the tax in question. In this case, the objective was 
to  strengthen public  finances  in  order  to  manage  future  financial  crises  and  the  General  Court  found  that  exemptions  for 
smaller credit institutions that do not create systemic risks were in line with this objective. 

In the area of tax schemes, the Commission continued its investigations in 2024.  

In  particular,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  on  the  tax  treatment  of  casinos  operators  in 
Germany388. In Germany, public casino operators are subject to special tax schemes (one scheme in each 
State, Bundesland) replacing the otherwise applicable general taxes, in particular corporate or income 
tax, and a local entertainment tax. Based on its in-depth investigation, the Commission found that the 
special  tax  schemes  entail  an  economic  advantage  for  the  public  casinos  operators  in  the  form  of  a 
potentially lower tax burden in comparison to the normal tax rules. The Commission also found that, as 
a result of the design of the special tax rules, the advantage is not automatic, and it does not materialize 
in all tax years and for all operators. Therefore, based on the Commission’s decision, it is now for the 
German authorities to determine whether or not an advantage was granted to the public casinos operators, 
and if this is the case, to recover the incompatible aid plus interest. 

5. 

BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING  

5.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

Making up almost one-fifth of the EU’s economy, manufacturing is a driver of growth and innovation 
and employs around 30 million people (approximately 15% of the EU workforce). European businesses 
active in the sector face substantial challenges in the form of energy price increases, trade tensions, the 
introduction of advanced technologies and the need to adapt their practices and processes to make their 
products  climate-friendly.  This  was  exacerbated  by  the  pandemic  and  the  Russian  war  of  aggression 
against Ukraine, which both negatively impacted supply chains and led to price increases for energy, raw 
materials and components, which persisted into and throughout 2024. The RRF and the REPowerEU 

384  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  5.12.2023,  in  Cases  C-451/21  P  and  C-454/21  P,  Luxembourg  and  Others  v 
Commission, EU:C:2023:948, paragraph 177. 
385 See ft 379. 
386 Case SA.56348 – Sweden – Swedish tax on credit institutions. 
387 Judgment of the General Court of 17.4.2024 in Case T-112/22, Svenska Bankföreningen and Länsförsäkringar Bank  v 
Commission, EU:T:2024:250, (judgment under appeal). 
388 Cases SA.44944 – Germany – Tax treatment of public casinos operators in Germany, and SA.53552 – Germany – Alleged 
guarantee for public casinos operators in Germany (Wirtschaftlichkeitsgarantie).  

82 

 
 
Plan aim to address these challenges by continuing to boost investment during the recovery from the 
pandemic and the transition to a clean, digital and resilient economy independent of Russian fossil fuels. 

Enforcing antitrust and merger rules in the manufacturing and basic industries sectors facilitates these 
transformations in the spirit of the Single Market goals, by ensuring that innovation is not hampered and 
that companies can compete on fair and equal terms. Meanwhile, the application of State aid rules ensures 
that purely national interests do not distort competition. 

5.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

5.2.1.  Antitrust enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

In 2024, the Commission continued enforcing antitrust rules in the basic industries and manufacturing 
sectors. 

On 28 November 2024, the Commission imposed a EUR 5.7 million fine on Pierre Cardin and Ahlers 
for infringing EU antitrust rules. The Commission found that Pierre Cardin - a French fashion house that 
licenses its trademark to allow third parties to manufacture and distribute Pierre Cardin branded clothing 
– and Ahlers, its main licensee, infringed Article 101 TFEU by restricting cross-border sales of Pierre 
Cardin-branded clothing, as well as sales of such products to specific customers in the EEA389. 

On 6 November 2024, the Commission opened proceedings against Corning Incorporated (Corning)390 
regarding an alleged infringement of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission has concerns that Corning may 
have  been  imposing  exclusive  purchasing  obligations  and  exclusive  rebates  on  mobile  phones 
manufacturers (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and companies that process raw glass (Finishers) in 
relation to the supply of raw Alkali-aluminosilciate glass used for cover glass in handheld electronics 
devices. The Commission sent its Preliminary Assessment to Corning on the same day. In response to 
the preliminary assessment Corning submitted commitments to address the Commission’s concerns. On 
29  November  2024  the  Commission  invited  all  interested  parties  to  submit  their  views  on  the 
commitments. Interested parties have until 13 January 2025 to submit their comments. 

5.2.2.  Merger enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

In January 2024, the Commission approved the purchaser of the divestment business related to the merger 
between Novozymes and Christian Hansen391. This decision follows the Commission’s 2023 decision 
clearing the merger subject to the divestment of Novozymes’ lactase production facility, and Christian 
Hansen’s lactase distribution business including its project to enter the market for the manufacture of 
lactase.  The  Commission’s  investigation  of  the  transaction  had  shown  that  the  merger  would  have 
reduced competition in the market for the manufacture and supply of one specific enzyme, lactase, using 
genetic modification technology. In particular, the Commission found that Christian Hansen had a project 
to start manufacturing this product and would very likely grow into an effective competitor within a short 
timeframe, and that post-merger there would not be sufficient potential competitors to exert sufficient 
competitive pressure on the merged entity.  

On  16  October  2024,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  EQOS  by  Eiffage,  subject  to 
conditions392. EQOS and Eiffage, respectively headquartered in Germany and France, are active in the 
installation and maintenance of catenaries and overhead contact lines for long distance railway lines in 
Belgium.  The Commission found that the merger would lead to  higher prices, lower quality  and  less 

389 Case AT. 40642, Pierre Cardin/Ahlers.  
390 Case AT.40728, Corning. 
391 Case M.11043, Novozymes/Chr Hansen Holding. 
392 Case M.11577, Eiffage/Eqos. 

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innovation, to the detriment of the railway infrastructure manager in Belgium and ultimately consumers. 
The Commission’s decision was conditional upon the divestment of EQOS Belgium, which regroups all 
of EQOS’ activities for the installation and maintenance of catenaries and overhead contact lines for long 
distance railway lines in Belgium. This will enable an independent player to act as a new competitive 
constraint  on  the  market. On  18  December  2024,  the  Commission  approved  Stadsbader,  a  Belgian 
company active in the railway infrastructure sector, as the purchaser of EQOS Belgium.  

On 22 October 2024, the Commission conditionally approved the acquisition by JD Sports of Courir393. 
Both companies are multi-brand sports goods retailers, and more specifically retailers of leisure sports 
footwear and apparel in several EEA countries. The Commission found that the merger would allow for 
high combined market shares in several local markets in France and Portugal, leading to less competition, 
higher prices and less choice for consumers in these local markets. The Commission’s clearance was 
conditional upon the divestment of all Courir stores in Portugal and several stores in certain local markets 
in France to Snipes, a direct competitor of the parties.  

Finally,  in  March  2024  the  Commission  sent  a  statement  of  objections  to  Kingspan  informing  the 
company of its preliminary view that it had provided, intentionally or negligently, incorrect, incomplete 
and misleading information during the Commission’s merger review of Kingspan’s planned acquisition 
of Trimo, notified in March 2021394. The incorrect, incomplete and misleading information concerned 
basic facts related to Kingspan’s internal organisation, as well as basic facts aimed at assessing: (i) the 
scope of the relevant product and geographic market; (ii) the existence of barriers to entry and expansion; 
(iii) the importance of innovation; and (iv) the closeness of competition between Kingspan and Trimo, 
and  vis-à-vis  their  competitors.  If  the  Commission  were  to  conclude  that  Kingspan  intentionally,  or 
negligently, provided incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, it could for each instance impose 
a  fine  of  up  to  1%  of  the  company's  annual  worldwide  turnover.  The  Commission’s  investigation  is 
ongoing.   

5.2.3.  State aid enforcement in the basic industries and manufacturing sectors 

In  2024,  the  Commission  approved  State  aid  measures  that  effectively  build  up  capacity  in  the  EU 
semiconductor industry, as an objective of the Chips Act Communication395.  

On 31 May 2024, the Commission approved around EUR 2 billion for an Italian State aid measure to 
support STMicroelectronics to set up a new semiconductor manufacturing facility for a fully integrated 
silicon carbide (SiC) production line based on 8-inch wafer technology in Catania, Sicily396. The total 
investment is worth about EUR 5 billion.  

On  20  August  2024,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  5  billion  German  measure  to  support  TSMC, 
Bosch,  Infineon  and  NXP  with  setting  up  a  new  semiconductor  manufacturing  facility  (ESMC)  in 
Dresden, serving in particular automotive and industry demand397.  

On  18  December  2024,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  1.3  billion  Italian  aid  measure  to  support 
Silicon Box in the construction of a first-of-a-kind semiconductor advanced packaging and testing facility 
in Novara, Italy. Advanced packaging will improve performance and power efficiency, by integrating 

393 Case M.11159, JD Sports/Groupe Courir. 
394 Case M.9938, Kingspan Group/Trimo. 
395  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final. 
396 Case SA.107594 – Italy, Catania Campus – STMicroelectronics S.r.l. 
397 Case SA.107553 – Germany, European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (ESMC) New Fab Investment [BMWK 
IVA2 Microelectronics]. 

84 

 
 
multiple chips, often with different functions, into a ‘chiplet’ that functions like a single chip398. The total 
investment is worth about EUR 3.2 billion. 
In 2024, the Commission approved, under the Guidelines on regional State aid399, a series of investment 
aid measures: to Repsol Polimeros for the extension of a chemical plant in Portugal400; to Volvo Car for 
the  construction  of  an  electric  vehicle  factory  in  Slovakia401;  to  a  Procter  &  Gamble  subisidiary, 
Hyginett, for an investment in electric toothbrushes in Hungary,402 to Nokian Tyres Europe for the set up 
of a new tyre plant in Romania403, to Diamond Foundry for the set up of a new factory for the production 
of  semiconductor-grade  rough  synthetic  diamonds  in  Spain404  and  to  Lek  Pharmaceuticals  for  the 
construction of a high-tech plant to produce biological drug substances in Slovenia405. In one case, the 
Commission decided that the planned aid was not compatible with State aid rules because Hungary failed 
to  prove  that  the  aid  was  decisive  for  Rubin  NewCo  (now  GKN  Automotive  Hungary)  to  locate  its 
automotive component plant in Hungary406.  

Also in 2024 the Commission approved several investment aid measures for the production of equipment 
necessary for the transition towards a net-zero economy, their key components and related critical raw 
materials, under section 2.8 TCTF, for example a EUR 902 million German investment aid to Northvolt, 
for the construction of an electric vehicle battery plant407. The Commission notably found that, absent 
the aid, the company would rather have invested in the United States. 

6. 

AGRI-FOOD AND FISHERIES 

6.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

In 2024, the agricultural markets showed a positive sign of partial return to stability, but weather-related 
problems and trade disruptions continued to pose significants risks408.  

Food inflation returned to a moderate rate409. While food prices remained relatively stable in 2024, prices 
remained  much  higher  than  pre-COVID  levels  for  products  such  as  olive  oil,  sugar  and  certain 
vegetables410, and consumers paid on average 30% more for food than before the start of the cost-of-
living  crisis  in  2022411.  Input  costs  for  agriculture  declined  throughout  2024  after  reaching  a  peak in 
2022412. Prices of fertilizers slightly declined with levels of EU domestic showing signs of recovery, but 

398 Case SA.113264 – Italy, Aid to Silicon Box for project 'Vulcan'. 
399 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on regional State aid (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).  
400 Case SA.104316 – Portugal – LIP – Regional investment aid to Repsol Polimeros, Unipessoal, Lda.  
401 Case SA.103740 – Slovakia – LIP – Regional investment aid to Volvo Car Slovakia s.r.o. The investment aid amounts 
EUR 267 million and will support the establishment of a new electric passenger vehicles production plant in Valaliky near 
Košice in Eastern Slovakia. It will contribute to job creation, regional development, and the European Green Deal. 

402 Case SA.103309 – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid to Hyginett Magyar. 
403 Case SA.107012 – Romania – LIP – Nokian Tyres Europe Operations SRL. 
404 Case SA.106779 – Spain – LIP – Regional investment aid to Diamond Foundry Europe 
405 Case SA.112940 – Slovenia – LIP – Biopharmaceutials Lendava 
406 Case SA.63470 – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid to Rubin NewCo 2021 Kft. 
407 Case SA.107936 – Germany – TCTF – Aid to Northvolt Germany GmbH. 
408  See:  https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/048136bf-53f1-4f74-b92d-d13954196505_en?filename=short-
term-outlook-spring-2024_en.pdf  
409 The inflation for 2024 is projected to be 2.4% in the euro area according to the ECB while food inflation in particular is 
projected at 2.9% in the euro area. These projections are based on information up to 16.8.2024. 
410 Food prices (of selected food products such as bread and cereals, fruit, milk, cheese and eggs, sugar, etc.) on average 
remain 43% higher than 2015 with the difference in certain countries being significantly above the average levels. 
411 See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/website/economy/food-price-monitoring/  
412 See: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20240626-1  

85 

 
 
they are still at levels above those preceding the Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine413.  

In 2024, farmers complained about the increasing ambition of environmental regulations inspired by the 
European Green Deal and about administrative burden.  As a response, the Commission committed to 
ease their administrative burden and to provide greater flexibility by reviewing, among others, certain 
provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)414.  

The Commission also launched a Strategic Dialogue on the future of agriculture415 to address challenges 
and  opportunities,  such  as  a  ensuring  a  fair  standard  of  living  for  farmers  and  rural  communities, 
supporting agriculture within the boundaries of our planet and its ecosystems, exploiting the opportunities 
offered by knowledge and technological innovation, and promoting a thriving future for the EU's food 
system  in  a  competitive  world416.  The  Strategic  Dialogue  issued  a  report  in  September  2024417, 
supporting the market-based approach of the CAP and calling for farms to derive their main income from 
the market. The report encourages farmers to join cooperatives and associations to reduce costs, increase 
efficiency  and  improve  prices  that  they  obtain  in  the  markets.  It  recommends  strengthening  and 
encouraging sectoral organisation, sharing best practices, simplifying recognition, supporting capacity 
building  and  providing  financial  support  for  sustainability  efforts.  It  also  calls  for  collective  farm 
initiatives to make use of the new antitrust rules regarding sustainability agreements in agriculture418. 

At the Competitiveness Council on 24 May 2024419, several Member States asked the Commission to 
eliminate all territorial supply constraints (TSCs)420. They called on the current Commission to address 
this issue as a priority and in particular investigate the extent to which manufacturers use differentiated 
languages on labels and packaging to justify why the same products cannot be sold in all Member States. 
Member States particularly highlighted the fact that price differences for identical products exist between 
Member States.  

In his report on the future of the Single Market421, Enrico Letta noted that a renationalisation of sourcing 
and trading through TSCs is bound to reduce the benefits that consumers derive from the Single Market. 
The report further called to address national measures aimed at restricting the possibility of sourcing and 
trading freely within the Single Market. 

6.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges  

6.2.1. 

 Revision of Agriculture de minimis Regulation 

On  10  December  2024  the  Commission  adopted  an  amendment  to  the  agricultural  de  minimis 

413  See:  https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/048136bf-53f1-4f74-b92d-d13954196505_en?filename=short-
term-outlook-spring-2024_en.pdf  
414 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_1494  
415 See: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/cap-overview/main-initiatives-strategic-dialogue-future-
eu-agriculture_en#strategic-dialogue-report  
416 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_417  
417 See: Main initiatives: Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture - European Commission (europa.eu) 
418  Communication  of  the  Commission,  Commission  guidelines  on  the  exclusion  from  Article  101  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  for  sustainability  agreements  of  agricultural  producers  pursuant  to  Article  201a  of 
regulation (EU) No 1308/2013. 
419 See: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9757-2024-INIT/en/pdf  
420 TSCs are defined as barriers imposed by private operators that deliberately make it difficult or impossible in practice for 
wholesalers or retailers to buy products in one Member State and resell them in other Member States. 
421 See ft 318.  

86 

 
 
Regulation422. The regulation on de minimis aid in the agriculture sector423 allows small aid amounts to 
fall outside the scope of EU State aid control because they are deemed to have no effect on trade between 
Member  States  and  not  to  distort  or  threaten  to  distort  competition.  It  reduces  significantly  the 
administrative burden for companies (in particular SMEs) and Member States. A review of this regulation 
was  originally  planned  for  2027,  when  it  was  set  to  expire.  However,  in  view  of  the  increasing 
inflationary pressure on the farming sector and high commodity prices, and taking note of the European 
Council’s  conclusions  of  17  and  18  April  2024  on  the  importance  of  a  competitive,  sustainable,  and 
resilient agricultural sector, the Commission decided to launch a targeted review on 2 May 2024.  

The main changes introduced with the amendment are an increase of the individual ceiling per company 
over three years from  EUR 25 000 to  EUR 50 000, an  increase  of the  ‘national  caps’ (upper limit  of 
agricultural  de minimis aid  each Member State is  allowed to  grant) from  1.5% to  2% of the value of 
agricultural output of the Member State concerned, a deletion of the so-called ‘sectoral cap’ (upper limit 
of  measures  per  Member  State  targeting  only  one  product  market),  as  well  as  an  introduction  of  a 
mandatory de minimis register to align the regulation with the general de minimis Regulation424, and with 
the SGEI de minimis Regulation425. Lastly, the period of validity of the regulation was extended until 31 
December  2032.  The  raising  of  the  ceiling  and  the  central  register  for  de  minimis  aid  in  this  new 
Regulation significantly simplify the applicable rules. The raised ceilings allow Member States to deliver 
more support faster and simpler and the central registers reduce reporting obligations for stakeholders. 

6.2.2. 

 Antitrust enforcement in the agri-food sector 

On 23 May 2024, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a fine of EUR 337.5 million on Mondelēz 
International,  Inc.  (Mondelēz)  for  hindering  the  cross-border  trade  of  chocolate,  biscuits  and  coffee 
products between Member States426. The Commission's investigation found that Mondelēz infringed EU 
competition  rules  by:  (i)  engaging  in  anticompetitive  agreements  or  concerted  practices  aimed  at 
restricting  cross-border  trade  of  various  chocolate,  biscuit  and  coffee  products;  and  (ii)  abusing  its 
dominant position in certain national markets for the sale of chocolate tablets. In particular, Mondelēz 
engaged  in  22  anticompetitive  agreements  or  concerted  practices  by  (i)  limiting  the  territories  or 
customers to which seven wholesale customers could resell Mondelēz' products, and by (ii) preventing 
ten exclusive distributors active in certain Member States from replying to sale requests from customers 
located in  other Member States without prior permission from  Mondelēz.  One practice  also  involved 
setting higher discriminatory prices for exports compared to domestic sales. The Commission also found 
that, Mondelēz abused its dominant position, by (i) refusing to supply a broker in Germany to prevent 
the resale of chocolate tablet products in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria and Romania where prices were 
higher; and (ii) ceasing the supply of chocolate tablet products in the Netherlands to prevent them from 
being imported into Belgium, where Mondelēz was selling these products at higher prices. Mondelēz' 
aim was to avoid that cross-border trade would lead to price decreases in countries with higher prices. 
Such illegal practices allowed Mondelēz to continue charging more for its own products, to the ultimate 
detriment of consumers in the EU. The Commission’s intervention shows its commitment to bring down 
unjustified barriers to ensure a better functioning of the Single Market and sanction territorial supply 

422  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2024/3118  of  10  December  2024  amending  Regulation  EU  (No)  1408/2013  on  the 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture 
sector, OJ L 2024/3118, 13.12.2024. 
423 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1408/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid in the agriculture sector, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 9. 
424 See ft 87. 
425 See ft 89. 
426 Case AT.40632, Mondelēz Trade Restrictions.  

87 

 
 
constraints that infringe competition rules. 

The Commission also continued advancing in other investigations in the food supply chain, in particular 
in the market for online ordering and delivery of food, groceries and other consumer goods. On 23 July 
2024, the European Commission opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether Delivery Hero 
and Glovo – two of the largest food delivery companies in Europe - have infringed EU competition rules 
by participating in a cartel in the sector of online ordering and delivery of food, grocery and other daily 
consumer goods in the EEA427. The initiation of proceedings follows unannounced inspections carried 
out in June 2022 and November 2023. 

Furthermore, the Commission continued to investigate Red Bull for suspected anticompetitive practices 
concerning  energy  drinks.  The  Commission  also  addressed  complaints  concerning  the  alcoholic 
beverages sector including monopolies for the supply of alcohol products in Sweden428.  

6.2.3. 

 Merger enforcement in the agri-food sector  

EU merger control enforcement is essential to maintaining fair competition in the agricultural sector, as 
it  prevents  the  concentration  of  market  power  to  the  detriment  of  smaller  market  players,  including 
farmers.  By  scrutinizing  mergers,  the  Commission  ensures  that  agricultural  supply  chains  remain 
competitive, allowing farmers to access a diverse customer base to sell their products at fair prices. This 
helps sustain  a more  resilient  and competitive agricultural  landscape, particularly in  the face of trade 
disruptions and geopolitical tensions affecting the farming sector.  

On 1 August 2024, the Commission conditionally approved Bunge’s acquisition of Viterra429. The two 
companies  are  global  agribusinesses  active  across  the  agricultural  value  chain,  from  the  upstream 
origination  of  crops  to  the  downstream  supply  of  food,  feed  and  fuel  products.  The  Commission’s 
investigation showed that Bunge and Viterra exert significant market power towards upstream farmers 
as well as downstream customers throughout the value chains of rapeseed and sunflower seed in Central 
Europe.  The  Commission’s  clearance  is  conditional  upon  the  divestment  of  Viterra’s  origination, 
processing and refining assets and personnel in Hungary and Poland. 

6.2.4. 

 State aid enforcement in the agriculture and fisheries sectors 

State aid to promote economic development of the agriculture and fisheries sectors is embedded in the 
broader CAP and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). State aid plays an important role in facilitating the 
economic activities in those sectors to enhance food security and accompany farmers and fishers in the 
green and digital transition, also in line with the Farm to Fork strategy. The main agricultural (ABER 
and agriculture, forestry and rural development Guidelines430) and fisheries (FIBER and fisheries and 
aquaculture Guidelines431) State aid rules entered into force in 2023.  

In 2024, Member States adopted  1005 schemes  under the sectorial  block exemption  regulations  (913 
under the ABER, and 92 under the FIBER), and the Commission approved 202 aid measures in these 
sectors out of which 120 under the agriculture, forestry and rural development Guidelines, 15 under the 

427 Case AT.40795, Food delivery services. 
428 Case AT.40834, Green Screen. 
429 Case M.11204, Bunge/Viterra. 
430 Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural and forestry sectors and in rural areas (OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1–90 ). 
431 Guidelines for State aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector (OJ C 107, 23.3.2023, p. 1–48).  

88 

 
 
fisheries  and  aquaculture  Guidelines  and  67  under  the  TCTF  (mainly  under  section  2.1,  which  was 
prolonged for the agriculture and fisheries sector until 31 December 2024)432.  

In the agriculture sector, the Commission approved State aid granted for a wide range of objectives, under 
the agriculture, forestry and rural development Guidelines. Many aid measures were approved to support 
farmers in achieving environmental and climate objectives, and to support them in the green transition. 
For  example,  aid  measures  were  approved  for  implementing  voluntary  agri-environment-climate 
commitments,  including  result-based  eco  schemes  and  organic  farming433;  to  support  farmers  in 
increasing animal welfare434; for non-productive investments with environmental objectives435; to foster 
the transfer of knowledge and experience regarding innovative and sustainable farming methods436; for 
voluntary closure of lifestock farming437; or for the relocation of lifestock activities438.  

The  Commission  also  approved  aid  for  investments  in  methane-reducing  technologies,  including  to 
research and development of such technologies in livestock farming such as feed additives and advanced 
manure  management  systems,  with  the  aim  of  reducing  the  climate  and  environmental  impact  of 
agriculture439. 

Moreover, the Commission approved aid for the prevention of and to make good the damage caused by 
animal  diseases440  and  aid  to  compensate  for  the  damage  caused  by  natural  disasters  and  adverse 
climatic events441.  

432 See for example: cases SA.112447 – Netherlands – Scheme for subsidy additional financing for eco-activities in the context 
of the crisis caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine; SA.113258 – Slovakia – State aid scheme to support primary 
agricultural production, fisheries and aquaculture; SA.113894 – Poland – Aid for the cereal producer, who is at risk of losing 
financial  liquidity  due  to  restrictions  on  the  agricultural  market;  SA.115943  –  France  –  Exceptional  aid  scheme  for  the 
definitive reduction of wine-growing potential following the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. 
433 See, for example, cases SA.107675 – Belgium – Aides en faveur de la mesure agroenvironnementale et climatique ‘Sols’ 
(‘Aides MAEC Sols’); SA.111602 – Germany – Lower Saxony – aid for the protection of birds on grassland; SA.113459 – 
Germany – Hessen – Species and biotope protection in the open country; SA.113163 – Germany – Hessen – Conservation of 
steep-slope viticulture; SA.115250 – Germany – Bayern – Aid for peatland friendly management. 
434 See, for example, case SA.107046 – Czechia – Aid for improvement of welfare of pigs; SA.107835 – Germany – Bund – 
Investment aid for the conversion of livestock farming 20242030; SA.107837 – Germany – Bund – Guidelines on support for 
the conversion of livestock farming 2024-2030; SA.114488 – Denmark – Aid for animal welfare commitments to reduce the 
need for tail-docking of piglets. 
435 See, for example, case SA.110961 – Germany – Bavaria – Renewal of hedgerow and field copses. 
436 Case SA.109689 – Czechia – Aid for demonstration activities. 
437  See  for  example  cases  SA.110017  –  Belgium  – Support  for  the  voluntary  cessation  of  livestock  farming  in  respect  of 
holdings indicated with orange colour (oranje bedrijven) and of holdings in special area of conservation with area specific 
measures  (in  de  maatwerkgebieden  ligt)  in  order  to  implement  the  programmatic  nitrogen  approach;  SA.114339  – 
Netherlands  –  Provincial  area-based  cessation  of  livestock  farming  sites  (MGB);  SA.114713  –  Netherlands  –  National 
cessation scheme for animal husbandry sites smaller sectors. 
438 Case SA.111058– Netherlands – Relocation scheme for peak-load nitrogen deposition. 
439 See for example case SA.113145 – Denmark – Aid for the promotion of changes in feed practices aimed at reducing the 
production of methane in the digestive system of dairy cattle. 
440 See, for example, cases SA.107695– Czechia – Aid for the costs of prevention of spread of certain pig diseases; SA.108787 
–  Czechia  –  Aid  for  the  costs  of  prevention  of  spread  of  certain  poultry  diseases  and  increased  biosecurity  measures; 
SA.113826 – Slovakia – State aid scheme to make good the damage caused by animal diseases and to cover certain costs for 
the prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases. 
441 See, for example, cases SA.114194 – Italy – Decree laying down the criteria and procedures for granting aid to support 
undertakings affected by flood and landslide events that occurred since 1 May 2023 referred to in Decree-Law No 61 of June 
2023 in the regions of Emilia Romagna, Tuscany and Marche; SA.115222 – Germany – Rheinland-Palatinate: State aid to 
compensate for the damage caused by floods in July 2021. 

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Furthermore,  schemes442  as  well  as  individual  measures443  were  approved  for  investment  aid  for  the 
processing and marketing of agricultural products. 

In the fisheries sector, under the fisheries and aquaculture Guidelines, the Commission approved aid to 
facilitate the economic development  of the  fishery and  aquaculture sectors  ensuring balance between 
stock capacities and fishing opportunities, as well as to compensate for damages. Aid also contributed to 
the development of the fisheries activities in the EU outermost regions.  

For example, the Commission approved aid measures to foster the development of sectoral contracts in 
the  fisheries  and  aquaculture  sector,  promoting  cooperation  and  integration  among  operators  in  the 
sector,  starting  from  production  and  ending  in  marketing444;  aid  to  undertakings  active  in  freshwater 
fishing  and aquaculture  for investments  to  prevent  and mitigate the damage caused by risk events to 
fishponds and reservoirs445; aid to remedy the damage caused by the rapid spread of alien species with 
unprecedented  adverse  impacts  on  biodiversity  and  related  ecosystem  services446;  aid  for  temporary 
cessation of fishing activity due to emergency measures adopted in order to reduce incidental catches of 
cetaceans  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay  cetaceous447;  investment  aid  for  the  acquisition  of  new  vessels  in 
outermost regions448; and, aid for compensating partially the loss of gross operating profit by wholesalers 
and processors following the deployment of a prior Brexit-related measure449. 

6.2.5. 

 State aid enforcement in the forestry sector 

The EU Forest Strategy450 is one of the flagship initiatives of the European Green Deal and builds on 
the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030451. The strategy will contribute to achieving the EU’s biodiversity 
objectives  as  well  as  greenhouse  gas  emission  reduction  target  of  at  least  55%  by  2030  and  climate 
neutrality by 2050. Only resilient forests will be able to produce the biomass needed in a climate-neutral 
economy, and to deliver at the same time the indispensable ecosystem services, such as carbon removals 
and biodiversity.  

442  See,  for  example,  case  SA.107366  –  France  –  Aides  aux  investissements  des  grandes  entreprises  actives  dans  la 
transformation et la commercialisation de produits agricoles pour la période 2023-2029. 
443 Cases SA.110593 – Italy – Agro-industrial development contract – Newlat Food S.p.A.; SA.110974 – Italy – Individual 
investment  aid  to  Monge  &C  for  development  of  pet  food  production;  SA.115174  –  Italy  –  Agri-industrial  development 
contract -industrial development with Nestlè Italiana s.p.a. 
444 See, for example, case SA.109663 – Italy – Measures to facilitate the implementation of the Programmes for Sectoral 
contracts in the fisheries and aquaculture sector. 
445 See, for example, cases SA.109038 – Czechia – Sub-programme 129 383, ‘Elimination of emergency situations in ponds 
and reservoirs – stage 2’ (Podprogram 129 383 ‘Odstranění havarijních situací na rybnících a vodních nádržích – 2. Etapa’) 
Re-introduction with modifications of scheme SA.43449; and SA.109425 – Czechia – Sub-programme 129384, ‘Elimination 
of  flood  damage  to  ponds  and  reservoirs’  (Podprogram  129  384  Odstranění  povodňových  škod  na  rybnících  a  vodních 
nádržích’) Re-introduction with modifications of scheme SA.43450. 
446 See for example case SA.109998 – Germany – Directive on the granting of compensatory aid to deal with damage caused 
by fish mortality in the river Oder in 2022 and repeated fish deaths of the same cause to commercial fishing companies. 
447 In particular, cases SA. 111687 – France – Support scheme for certain fishing undertakings operating vessels affected by 
spatial and temporal measures aimed at reducing incidental catches of small cetaceans in the Bay of Biscay; SA. 111922 – 
France – Aid scheme to support fish wholesale traders particularly affected by the cessation of activity from 22 January to 20 
February in 2024, 2025 and 2026 for all French vessels over 8 m using risk gear in the Bay of Biscay, and  SA.114781 – 
Spain – Aid to shipowners for temporary cessation of fishing activity due to emergency measures’. 
448 Case SA.113862 – France – Aide publique à l’investissement pour l’achat de navires en Guyane. 
449 Case SA.111510 – France – Aid scheme to support fish wholesale traders particularly affected by the consequences of the 
individual support plan in the context of Brexit. 
450 See: Forest strategy (europa.eu)  
451 See: Biodiversity strategy for 2030 (europa.eu)  

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State  aid  for  foresters  is  a  tool  to  facilitate  the  transition  to  resilient  forests  which  are  better  for 
biodiversity, climate and the bioeconomy. In 2024, the Commission approved national452 and regional453 
aid  schemes  for  improving  the  quality  and  quantity  of  forests  in  the  EU,  and  for  strengthening  their 
protection, restoration and resilience.   

7. 

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES  

7.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

The access of patients to innovative and affordable medicines is one of the pillars of the Commission’s 
Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe454. To contribute to these objectives, the Commission and the NCAs 
have continued to vigorously enforce EU competition rules in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors 
in 2024. Competition enforcement complements the regulatory framework in these sectors455, and fosters 
both dynamic competition, which leads to more innovative medicines, and effective price competition, 
which contributes to more affordable and accessible medicines and treatments. 

7.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

7.2.1.  Antitrust enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector 

In January 2024, the Commission published a report to the Council and the European Parliament on 
competition enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector456. The report provides an overview of how the 
Commission and the NCAs enforced EU antitrust and merger rules in the pharmaceutical sector in the 
period 2018-2022. It also highlights how competition law enforcement contributed to ensure that patients 
and healthcare systems have better access to affordable and innovative medicines and treatments. 

In terms of antitrust enforcement during 2024, the Commission concluded its investigations into potential 
anticompetitive behaviours by Teva and Vifor Pharma.  

On 31 October 2024, the Commission imposed on Teva a fine of EUR 462.6 million. The Commission 
found that Teva infringed Article 102 TFEU by a single and continuous infringement consisting of two 
distinct abuses on the market for glatiramer acetate medicines (used to treat multiple sclerosis): (i) misuse 
of divisional patents and (ii) exclusionary disparagement457. From 2015 to 2024, Teva implemented a 
strategy designed to prevent and/or hinder market entry of Synthon’s glatiramer acetate, the only generic-
like medicine competing with Teva’s blockbuster multiple sclerosis treatment, Copaxone. In view of the 
expiry of its basic patent protecting Copaxone, Teva filed, in a staggered manner, several generations of 
divisional  patents  sharing  essential  features  and  related  legal  weaknesses.  Teva  then  strategically 
withdrew the challenged patents to obstruct legal review and avoid adverse legal rulings, maintaining 
legal uncertainty concerning its remaining patents which it continued to enforce against rivals (so-called 

452 For example, cases SA.114216 – Italy – Plan 2023-2027, Special Directive of the Federal Minister for Agriculture, Regions 
and  Tourism  for  the  implementation  and  execution  of  aids  in  accordance  with  the  Forest  Fund  Act  (Prolongation  and 
Amendment of SA.59973) and SA.115721 – Malta – State Aid for an Agroforestry Scheme. 
453 For example, case SA.115571 –Germany – Bavaria: Forestry support programme (WALDFÖPR 2025) (Prolongation and 
Amendment of SA.39842). 
454  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe COM (2020) 761 final. 
455 On 26 April 2023 the Commission adopted a proposal for a new Directive and a new Regulation, which revise and replace 
the existing general pharmaceutical legislation; see https://health.ec.europa.eu/medicinal-products/pharmaceutical-strategy-
europe/reform-eu-pharmaceutical-legislation_en  
456 Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament  - Update on Competition Enforcement in the 
Pharmaceutical  Sector  (2018-2022)  –  European  competition  authorities  working  together  for  affordable  and  innovative 
medicines. 
457 Case AT.40588, Teva Copaxone. 

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‘divisionals game’ in the industry). Simultaneously, Teva implemented a disparagement campaign by 
misleadingly questioning – contrary to the findings of competent authorities – the safety and efficacy of 
Synthon’s product and its therapeutic equivalence to Copaxone. Teva’s disparagement campaign targeted 
health care professionals, health insurers and other bodies, that are the main drivers of demand on the 
pharmaceutical  markets.  The  Commission  found  that  Teva’s  conduct  was  capable  of  delaying  and/or 
hindering price competition to Copaxone and patients’ access to affordable treatments options in seven 
Member States (Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain). 

On  22  July  2024,  the  Commission  accepted  binding  commitments  from  Vifor  Pharma  to  address  its 
competition concerns relating to the potential disparagement of Monofer, the closest – and potentially 
only  –  competitor  in  Europe  of  Vifor  Pharma’s  blockbuster  high-dose  intravenous  iron  medicine, 
Ferinject (used to treat iron deficiency)458. The Commission was concerned that Vifor may have unduly 
hindered Monofer’s uptake in Europe by disseminating to healthcare professionals potentially misleading 
information about Monofer’s safety, despite its approval by the European Medicines Agency. Under the 
commitments,  Vifor  agreed  to  launch  a  comprehensive  and  multi-channel  communication  campaign 
targeting  nearly  200  000  European  healthcare  professionals  to  rectify  and  undo  the  effects  of  its 
potentially  misleading  messages.  Vifor  also  committed  not  to  communicate  about  Monofer's  safety 
unless the information is based on Monofer's label or valid clinical trials. The commitments aimed to 
quickly stop Vifor’s potential disparagement and prevent any possible long-term anticompetitive effects. 
This was crucial, as Vifor’s past actions could have continued to influence doctors’ future prescriptions, 
which  would  have  been  especially  harmful  in  a  fast-growing  market.  While  in  the  Teva  case  the 
disparagement  occurred  between  branded  and  generic  drugs,  the  Vifor  case  tackled  potential 
disparagement between two branded and innovative drugs. 

In  March  2024,  following  inspections  carried  out  in  late  2021,  the  Commission  opened  a  formal 
investigation into possible anticompetitive conduct by Zoetis over a novel pain medicine for dogs459. The 
Commission is concerned that Zoetis may have engaged in exclusionary behaviour by terminating the 
development  of  a  late-stage  pipeline  product  and  refusing  to  transfer  it  to  a  third  party  which  had 
exclusive commercialisation rights, to protect Zoetis’ other pipeline product for the same indication. In-
depth investigation is ongoing.  

Furthermore, following inspections in the medical devices sector460, the Commission continued in 2024 
its preliminary investigation in the sector. 

458 Case AT.40577, Vifor (IV iron products).  
459 Case AT.40734, Zoetis-Librela. 
460 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4517. 

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The Servier pay-for-delay case 

On 27 June 2024, the Court of Justice delivered nine judgments461 largely confirming the Commission’s 2014 
decision  to  fine  Les  Laboratoires  Servier  and  generic  pharmaceutical  manufacturers.  In  its  decision,  the 
Commission found that Servier and generic challengers entered into five pay-for-delay agreements relating to the 
blood  pressure  medication  perindopril  and  that  Servier  abused  its  dominant  position462.  This  decision  was 
challenged before the General Court which, in 2018, confirmed the Commission’s findings that the agreements 
between Servier and respectively Niche, Unichem, Matrix (now Mylan), Teva, and Lupin constituted prohibited 
pay-for-delay  agreements  but  also  annulled  the  Commission’s  decision  on  two  points:  (i)  the  qualification  of 
agreements between Servier and Krka and (ii) the definition of the relevant market and therefore on finding of 
abuse by Servier. 

Following the appeals from both the Commission and the pharmaceutical companies, the Court of Justice, first, 
confirmed the General Court’s judgment and the Commission decision finding that the agreements concluded by 
Niche, Unichem, Matrix, Teva and Biogaran were anti-competitive pay-for-delay agreements. Second, the Court 
upheld the Commission’s appeal against the General Court’s judgments, and confirmed the Commission’s finding 
that the Settlement Agreement and the Licence Agreement between Servier and Krka constituted an infringement 
of Article 101 TFEU both by object and by effect. The Court also agreed with the Commission and underlined the 
importance of economic substitutability for the purpose of defining the relevant market (as opposed to the General 
Court’s greater emphasis on therapeutic substitutability), and overturned the General Court’s annulment of the 
Commission’s decision on this point. On that basis, the Court referred the assessment of the relevant market, of 
the dominance and of the abuse as well as of one of the agreements between Servier and Krka back to the General 
Court. 

7.2.2.  Merger enforcement in the pharmaceutical sector 

In 2024, the Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the pharmaceutical sector do not lead 
to  consumers  paying  higher  prices,  having  less  choice  or  to  reduced  innovation.  The  Commission 
reviewed several transactions in the sector, some of which under the simplified procedure.  

On 26 June 2024, the Commission approved the acquisition of the European over-the-counter business 
of  Viatris  by  Cooper,  subject  to  conditions463.  Based  on  its  market  investigation,  the  Commission 
concluded that the transaction would have reduced competition in the markets for laxative enemas for 
infants in Portugal, and earwax removal products in Germany. In particular, the Commission found that 
the transaction would have led to high combined market shares as well as high concentration levels in 
the affected markets and that, post-transaction, the merged entity would not face sufficient competitive 
pressure from actual or potential competitors. To address the Commission’s competition concerns, the 
parties committed to divest the rights to develop, manufacture, sell and market Viatris’s infant laxative 
medicine, Bebegel, in Portugal, as well as Viatris’s earwax removal product, Otowaxol, in Germany. The 
Commission approved the proposed purchaser of the Otowaxol divestment business in December 2024.  

On 6 December 2024, the Commission unconditionally approved the acquisition of Catalent by Novo 

461  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024  in  Case  C-176/19  P,  Commission  v  Servier  and  Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:549;  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024,  C-201/19  P,  Servier  and  Others  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:552;  Judgment  of 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024,  C-144/19  P,  Lupin  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:545;  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024,  C-164/19  P,  Niche  Generics  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:547;  Judgment  of 
the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024,  C-151/19  P,  Commission  v  Krka, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:546; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27.06.2024, C-166/19 P, Unichem Laboratories v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:548;  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  27.06.2024,  C-197/19  P,  Mylan  Laboratories  and  Mylan  v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:550; Judgment of the  Court of Justice of 27.06.2024,  C-198/19 P, Teva UK and Others  v 
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:551; Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27.06.2024, C-207/19 P, Biogaran v Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:553. 
462 Case AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier). 
463 Case M.11383, Cooper/Viatris (European OTC Business). 

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Holdings, the parent company of Novo Nordisk464. The Commission undertook a thorough investigation 
as  to  whether  Catalent’s  customers  for  pre-filled  syringes  would  be  negatively  impacted  by  the 
transaction in the event that Novo Nordisk were to use Catalent’s facilities for its weight loss and type II 
diabeties  treatments,  Wegovy  and  Ozempic,  which  are  also  supplied  in  pre-filled  syringes.  The 
Commission’s  investigation  found  that  Catalent’s  pre-filled  syringe  customers  will  continue  to  have 
access to a number of significant, credible CDMOs after the transaction and thus the transaction would 
not  lead  to  customers  lacking  sources  of  supply  alternative  to  Catalent.  In  addition,  the  Commission 
found that there is sufficient spare capacity in the market.  

Furthermore, notable developments took place during 2024 with respect to the Commission’s application 
of Article 22 of the EUMR following the judgment of the Court of Justice in Illumina465, which annulled 
the Commission’s decisions to accept jurisdiction over Illumina’s acquisition of Grail. In 2022, following 
a referral from several Member States, the Commission had prohibited the transaction over concerns that 
it would have stifled innovation and reduced choice in the emerging market for blood-based early cancer 
detection  tests466.  While  the  Commission  continues  its  pro-active  monitoring  of  transactions  in  the 
pharmaceutical  sector,  since  the  Illumina  judgment,  this  monitoring  is  confined  to  possible  referrals 
under Article 22 by Member States that are competent under their national merger control regime, or do 
not  have  such  a  regime  at  all,  namely  Luxembourg,  as  well  as  further  deepening  the  Commission’s 
understanding of market trends. 

7.2.3.  State aid enforcement in the health services sector 

State aid control in the health services sectors aims to ensure that aid to service providers does not unduly 
disadvantage their competitors.  

IPCEI Med4Cure 
In May 2024, the European Commission approved the IPCEI Med4Cure467. 13 companies from six Member States (Belgium, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Spain), most of them SMEs, are participating in this IPCEI with 14 projects. This IPCEI 
will notably contribute to the European Health Union objectives by delivering innovations addressing diseases for which there 
are no satisfactory means of prevention or treatment and by increasing the EU’s preparedness for emerging health threats. 
The six Member States will provide up to EUR 1 billion in public funding in the coming years, which is expected to  unlock 
an additional EUR 5.9 billion in private investments. 

On 10 June 2024, the Commission adopted a decision finding that the Slovenian healthcare system is 
non-economic in nature, as (i) it is based on mandatory affiliation and universal coverage, (ii) it pursues 
a social purpose, (iii) it is based on the principle of solidarity, (iv) it is regulated and controlled by the 
public authorities, and (v) it stipulates that public healthcare services are provided for no or limited out-
of-pocket  payment468.  On  that  basis,  the  Commission  concluded  that  financing  to  public  hospitals  in 
Slovenia does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.  

On  26  July  2024,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  2  billion  Dutch  aid  measure  to  the  PALLAS 
Foundation and New Co (once it is set up), in the form of loans and public funding469. The PALLAS 
project consists in the construction of a new reactor and of a nuclear health centre to ensure long-term 

464 Case M.11486, Novo Holdings/Novo Nordisk/Catalent. 
465 See Case C‑611/22 P, Illumina v Commission. 
466 Case M.10188, Illumina/GRAIL.  
467 Cases SA.105088 – Belgium; SA.104974 – France; SA.105126 – Hungary; SA.105085 – Italy; SA.105097 – Slovakia; 
SA.105098 – Spain; RRF – Important Project of Common European Interest on health (IPCEI-Med4Cure). 
468 Case SA.45844 – Slovenia – Slovenian Healthcare system. 
469 Cases SA.103925 and SA.103004 – The Netherlands – VWS Medical isotopes NewCo: PALLAS-programme. See also case 
SA.103926 – The Netherlands – VWS Medical isotopes Loans PALLAS Foundation 2019-2022. 

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security of supply of medical radioisotopes for cancer diagnosis and treatment in the Netherlands. The 
measure  contributes  to  the  security  of  supply  of  essential  and  live-saving  medicines  in  line  with  the 
Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe. 

On 18 December 2024, the Commission concluded that  public funding of Luxembourg’s Large-Scale 
Testing programme to combat the spread of COVID-19 in 2020 and 2021 did not involve the granting of 
State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU470.  

8. 

TRANSPORT, POST AND OTHER SERVICES 

8.1. Overview of key challenges in the sectors 

An  efficient  and  sustainable  European  transport  system  is  a  key  component  of  a  clean,  just  and 
competitive transition in the EU. In particular, it is critical to achieving the Green Deal’s objective of net 
zero emissions by 2050, strengthening the economic and social cohesion of the EU and building agile 
and  resilient  supply  chains.  The  sector  is  confronted  with  massive  investment  needs  to  accelerate 
decarbonisation and digitisation, to cope with a growing demand from passengers and shippers, and to 
reduce regional disparities. It  is  also  confronted  with  major barriers to  entry, which hinder the actual 
liberalisation of the sector. In particular, the Letta report471 highlights, on the one hand, the essential role 
of  the  railway  sector  for  the  vitality  of  the  Single  Market,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  persistence  of 
fragmented  markets  and  infrastructure,  of  legal  and  de  facto  monopolies  and  of  formidable  technical 
barriers, including in ticketing. 

The  maritime  transport  sector  is  of  key  importance  for  trade  within  the  EU  as  well  as  globally.  Its 
competitiveness  has a significant  importance for the functioning  of the Single Market,  also  thanks to 
spill-over effects for other sectors in the globally-integrated European maritime economy. As highlighted 
in the Draghi report472, the share of the global fleet owned by EU companies is shrinking, despite the 
2004 Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport (Maritime Guidelines)473 enabling certain 
forms of support to the maritime transport sector. 

The aviation sector is a crucial component of the EU's transport network, contributing to the region's 
connectivity and economic prosperity. The aviation sector assumes a position of strategic significance 
within the EU, playing a vital role in fostering connectivity and driving economic growth. Following its 
successful liberalisation and expansion, the sector, which currently accounts for approximately 8% of 
EU  transport  emissions,  must  now  confront  the  substantial  challenge  of  decarbonisation  while 
maintaining its competitiveness.  

Other services, such as postal services, also have a significant economic and social value in the EU.  

8.2. Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 

8.2.1. 

 State aid to the aviation sector 

8.2.1.1. Commission’s decisional practice 

In 2024, the Commission assessed a number of aid measures in the aviation sector under the Guidelines 
for rescuing and restructuring undertakings in difficulties (R&R Guidelines)474. 

470 Case SA.100547 – Luxembourg – Bionext Large Scale Testing COVID-19. 
471 See ft 318. 
472 See ft 319. 
473 Commission communication — Community guidelines on State aid to maritime transport, OJ C 17.1.2004, p. 13. 
474 See ft 125. 

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On 16 February 2024, the Commission adopted a decision finding that the Romanian restructuring plan 
to Blue Air was not capable of restoring the airline's long-term viability. The Commission concluded that 
the aid underpinning the plan was incompatible with EU State aid rules and that Romania must recover 
from Blue Air illegal State aid amounting to approximately EUR 33.84 million475. This decision followed 
the opening of a formal investigation in April 2023 regarding a public guarantee on a rescue loan granted 
to Blue Air to partly cover its short term liquidity needs. In its decision the Commission concluded that 
the  plan  submitted  by  Romania  did  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  R&R  Guidelines.  The 
Commission therefore found that, by continuing the State guarantee beyond the six-month rescue period 
without  submitting  a  feasible,  coherent,  and  far-reaching  restructuring  plan,  Romania  has  unlawfully 
implemented the restructuring aid to Blue Air and should recover that aid with interest. 

On 29 April 2024, the Commission approved a EUR 95.3 million Romanian rescue and restructuring 
aid to TAROM, a Romanian airline facing financial difficulties because of accumulated losses476. The aid 
aims at allowing TAROM to sustain daily operations and avoid insolvency proceedings. It takes the form 
of a capital injection and a debt write-off. The decision follows the opening of a formal investigation in 
July 2021 regarding an initial restructuring plan for which the Commission’s raised doubts regarding the 
aid’s compatibility with the internal market. The Commission found that the clear package of measures 
including a fleet renewal, an optimised routes plan, and other operational efficiency measures as well as 
measures leading to a reduction of capacity and activity coupled with the firm commitments offered by 
Romania  significantly  improved  the  initial  restructuring  plan  and  alleviated  its  doubts  raised  in  the 
opening decision. 

On  28  June  2024,  the  Commission  approved  a  SEK  14.61  billion  (approximately  EUR  1.26  billion) 
restructuring  plan  by  Denmark  and  Sweden  to  SAS,  a  Scandinavian  network  airline  facing  liquidity 
concerns477. The aid takes the form of a write-off and/or partial conversion of debt, equity financing, and 
debt financing. The plan aims at addressing SAS’s financial difficulties, in particular liquidation risks, 
while securing air connectivity within Scandinavia and internationally. 

On  5  February  2024,  the  Commission  also  opened  a  formal  investigation  on  France’s  possible 
amendments to the restructuring plan approved by the Commission in December 2020 in favour of the 
French airline Corsair478. The investigated  amendments  concern the increase in  profits  and financial 
flows resulting from an increase in the fleet, the closure of loss-making routes and the substitution of 
these routes by new routes to Africa. The amendments also introduce new private and public financial 
support, with France’s intervention amounting to EUR 83.1 million in the form of financial contribution, 
a tax credit, a rescheduling of public debt and a debt write-off.  

Furthermore,  the  aviation  sector,  which  was  hit  very  hard  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  continued  to 
recover during 2024.  

475 Case SA.62829 – Romania – Restructuring aid to Blue Air. 
476 Case SA.59344 – Romania – Restructuring aid to Tarom. 
477 Case SA.110687 – Denmark and Sweden – Restructuring of SAS Group. 
478 Case SA.109662 – France – Modification de l’aide et du plan de restructuration de Corsair. See also case SA.58463 – 
France – Aide à la restructuration de Corsair. 

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In  11  decisions479,  the  Commission  approved  State  aid  either  under  Article  107(2)(b)  TFEU  as 
compensation for damages suffered due to the COVID-19 pandemic, or under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU 
in connection with the Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines (the 2014 Aviation Guidelines)480. 

In addition to those decisions, the Commission also dealt with a number of cases following judgments 
adopted by the EU Courts or following complaints. 

For instance, following a complaint on a number of measures implemented by Germany to support the 
Frankfurt Hahn Airport, the Commission adopted on 9 September 2024, a decision ordering the recovery 
of EUR 1.25 million from Frankfurt Hahn Airport (in relation to a land sale) and of at least EUR 13 
million from Ryanair DAC (in relation to two marketing agreements and a training aid)481. On the same 
day, the Commission also found that four further measures to Frankfurt Hahn Airport, Ryanair and an 
aircraft maintenance company did not constitute State aid482. 

Although the COVID Temporary Framework483 has been phased out gradually until 31 December 2023, 
the Commission had to apply it in three cases in 2024. The Commission adopted two decisions not to 
raise objections to aid measures granted by France and the Netherlands, to the Air France/KLM Group, 
finding  that  the  aid  met  all  the  relevant  conditions  of  the  COVID  Temporary  Framework484.  These 
decisions follow the annulment by the General court485 of two previous decisions of 2020 and 2021 on 
the same measures because the Commission did not consider that the measures benefitted the whole Air 
France-KLM Group but rather Air France for the French measures and KLM for the Dutch measures. 
The General Court considered on the contrary that all measures granted by France and the Netherlands 
benefitted the whole Air France KLM Group486.  

In  a  judgement  of  May  2023  in  Condor487,  the  General  Court  annulled  the  decision  by  which  the 
Commission had approved, under the COVID Temporary Framework, a German aid measure in the form 
of a recapitalisation of Deutsche Lufthansa AG488. The General Court held that that decision had infringed 
several  provisions  of  the  COVID  Temporary  Framework.  Following  that  judgment,  the  Commission 
adopted a decision on 8 July 2024 in which it opened the formal investigation procedure and expressed 

479 Cases SA.113202 – Slovakia – State aid scheme to enhance air connectivity; SA.111720 – Italy – Start-up aid for the 
establishment  of  new  air  routes  to/from  airports  in  Sardinia;  SA.112780  –  France  –  Réintroduction  du  régime  d'aide  à 
l'exploitation des petits et moyens aéroports; SA.112782 – France – Réintroduction du régime d'aide à l'investissement des 
petits et moyens aéroports français; SA.112783 – France – Réintroduction du régime d'aide au démarrage des compagnies 
aériennes  au  départ  des  petits  et  moyens  aéroports  français;  SA.109677  –  Italy  –  COVID-19  –  Amendment  of  the 
compensation  scheme  for  airlines  with  an  EU  operating  license  delivered  by  Italy;  SA.109677  –  Italy  –  COVID-19  – 
Amendment of the compensation scheme for airlines with an EU operating license delivered by Italy; SA.62482 – Greece – 
COVID-19 – Damage compensation to Sky express; SA.108978 – Italy – Start-up aid for the establishment of new air routes 
from/to airports in Calabria. 
480 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014, p.3. 
481 Case SA.43260 – Germany  – Measures implemented by Germany in favour of Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH and 
Ryanair DAC. 
482 Case SA.115160 – Germany – Measures concerning Haitec AG, Flughafen Frankfurt Hahn GmbH, and Ryanair. 
483 See ft 111. 
484  Case  SA.57082  –  France  –  COVID-19  –  State  loan  guarantee  and  State  loan  for  Air  France;  Case  SA.57116  –  The 
Netherlands – COVID-19 – State loan guarantee and State loan for KLM.  
485 Judgment of the General Court of 20.10.2023, Ryanair and Air Malta v Commission, T-216/21, EU:T:2023:822; Judgment 
of the General Court of 19.5.2021, Ryanair v Commission, T-643/20, EU:T:2021:286.  
486 Cases SA.57082 – France – COVID-19 – Temporary Framework 107(3)(b) – Guarantee and shareholder loan for Air 
France and SA.57116 - The Netherlands – COVID-19 – State loan guarantee and State loan for KLM. 
487 Judgment of the General Court of 10.5.2023, Ryanair DAC and Condor Flugdienst GmbH v Commission, Joined Cases T-
34/21 and T-87/21, EU:T:2023:248. 
488 Case SA.57153 – Germany – COVID-19 – Aid to Lufthansa. 

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doubts  that  the  measure  satified  the  conditions  of  the  Temporary  Framework.  The  Commission  will 
assess the compatibility of the measure under the COVID Temporary Framework. 

8.2.1.2. Revision of the 2014 Aviation Guidelines ongoing 

Air  transport  is  one  of  the  fastest-growing  sources  of  greenhouse  gas  emissions  and  the  sector  faces 
increasing pressure to reduce its carbon footprint. The 2014 Aviation Guidelines489 offer guidance on the 
notion of aid in the aviation sector and set out the conditions under which State aid to airports and airlines 
can be deemed compatible with the internal market. In parallel, the aviation sector may also benefit from 
support under the CEEAG.  

Following the conclusions of the Fitness Check that the 2014 Aviation Guidelines should be amended in 
the medium term to ensure their full alignment with the Green Deal Objectives and the Sustainable and 
Smart Mobility Strategy490, the Commission launched their revision in August 2023.  

The revision will assess if there is a need for additional State aid tools to promote the decarbonisation of 
the aviation sector under revised Aviation Guidelines and if so, which gaps would need to be filled in. It 
will also look into whether a long-term solution is needed in relation to operating aid to regional airports 
and if it is the case, which solution would be appropriate. Although the transitional period for operating 
aid to regional airports under the 2014 Aviation Guidelines was extended until 2027, it is possible that at 
the end of that period some regional airports may still remain unprofitable.  

In order to  make the Aviation  Guidelines fit for  the future, the Commission  is  widely  consulting the 
public and stakeholders. A call for evidence was held between 27 August and 8 October 2024, followed 
by a detailed questionnaire sent as part of a public consultation491. At the same time, the Commission has 
commissioned a study to support the revision with the necessary data and quantitative analysis.  

8.2.1.3. Selected Court Judgments in aviation aid cases 

In  2024,  the  EU  Courts  rendered  several  judgements  on  decisions  approving,  under  the  COVID 
Temporary Framework and under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, State aid to support airlines affected by the 
COVID pandemic.  

In  particular,  the  Court  of  Justice  upheld  in  May492,  July  2024493  and  November  2024494  three 
Commission decisions approving respectively a 540 million EUR State guarantee on a loan granted by 
Finland  to  the  airline  Finnair  (under  the  COVID  Temporary  Framework),  a  150  million  EUR  loan 
granted by Austria to Austrian Airlines under Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, and a further 500 million EUR 
recapitalisation granted by Finland to Finnair under the COVID Temporary Framework (Finnair II). The 
Court  of  Justice  considered  in  those  cases  that  the  Commission  correctly  assessed  the  necessity, 
proportionality  and  appropriateness  of  the  measures  granted  to  those  airlines  in  the  context  of  the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  In  the  Finnair  II  judgment,  the  Court  of  Justice  endorsed  the  Commission’s 
approach according to  which it was entitled to depart from certain  aspects of the COVID Temporary 
Framework,  in  view  of  the  exceptional  context  in  which  that  framework  was  adopted  and  the  very 

https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13915-State-aid-in-the-aviation-sector-

489 Comunication from the Commission, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ C 99, 4.4.2014. 
490 Communication from the Commission – Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European transport on track 
for the future, SWD(2020) 331 final  
491  See: 
Commission-guidelines-on-airports-and-airlines-revision-_en  
492 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 30.5.2024 in case C-353/21 P, Ryanair/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:437. 
493  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  29.7.2024  in  Case  C-591/21  P,  Ryanair  and  Laudamotion  v  Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2024:635. 
494 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 7.11.2024 in Case C-588/22 P, Ryanair v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2024:935. 

98 

 
 
particular characteristics of the measure in question. The Court of Justice also found that the Commission 
used the correct methodology to assess that Finnair did not hold significant market power in the relevant 
markets in which it operated.  

8.2.2. 

 Merger enforcement in the aviation sector  

On 3 July 2024, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of joint control over the previously 
100% state-owned Italian network carrier Italia Trasporto Aereo (ITA) by the German network carrier 
Deutsche  Lufthansa  AG  and  the  Italian  government,  subject  to  conditions495.  Following  an  in  depth 
investigation, the Commission had concerns that the transaction would have reduced competition on a 
certain number of short-haul routes connecting Italy with countries in Central Europe as well as on a 
limited number of long-haul routes between Italy and the US and Canada. The Commission also had 
concerns that the transaction would have created or strengthened ITA's dominant position at the Milan-
Linate airport. Lufthansa and the MEF submitted a remedy package to address those concerns, and, on 
29 November 2024, the Commission approved IAG, Air France KLM and easyJet as suitable remedy 
takers.  

Following  a  notification  at  the  end  of  2023,  in  2024  the  Commission  also  took  a  closer  look  at  the 
proposed acquition by International Airlines Group (IAG) which includes the Spanish network carrier 
Iberia, of its Spanish network carrier rival Air Europa496. That notification followed an earlier assessment 
of the same deal by the Commission in 2021 which resulted in an abandonment of the concentration in 
the light of the competition concerns raised by the Commission and the lack of suitable remedies. The 
second in-depth assessment again indicated that the merger would have negatively affected competition 
on a large number of routes and adversely affected passengers in terms of increased prices or decreased 
quality  of  services.  The  remedies  offered  were  deemed  insufficient  and  IAG  decided  to  abandon  the 
transaction. 

In the first quarter of 2024, the Commission also completed its review of the  proposed acquisition of 
Asiana Airlines (Asiana) by Korean Air Lines (Korean Air)497. The Commission found that Korean Air 
and Asiana compete head-to-head in carrying cargo and passengers between the EEA and South Korea. 
On 13 February 2024, the transaction was conditionally approved after Korean Air offered commitments 
that fully addressed the competition concerns identified by the Commission. 

8.2.3.  Antitrust enforcement in the aviation sector 

The Commission actively and closely monitored throughout 2024 the evolution of the market conditions 
at European hubs used by the joint ventures (JVs) between EU and North American airlines for their 
transatlantic flights.  

In particular, these monitoring activities concerned the degree of congestion of Amsterdam airport and 
the  operations  of  the  Blue  Skies  JV  between  Air  France-KLM  Group,  Delta  and  Virgin  Atlantic,  to 
identify any risk of serious and irreparable damage to competition for transatlantic traffic, in particular 
on the Amsterdam-New York route where the US carrier JetBlue had recently entered498.  

In addition, on 7 August 2024, the Commission initiated proceedings to investigate a potential restriction 
of competition by the A++ JV between Lufthansa, United and Air Canada on transatlantic routes to/from 

495 Case M.11071, Deutsche Lufthansa/MEF/ITA. 
496 Case M.11109, IAG/AIR EUROPA. 
497 Case M.10149, Korean Air Lines/Asiana Airlines. 
498 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_623 

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several  EEA  airports.  On  the  same  day,  the  Commission  sent  a  statement  of  objections  to  Lufthansa 
where it preliminarily concluded that interim measures might be required to ensure the effectiveness of 
any final decision taken by the Commission in the future499. 

8.2.4.  State aid enforcement in the maritime transport sector 

On 24 May 2024, the Commission adopted a decision in which it concluded that the tonnage tax scheme 
of the province of Gipuzkoa, Spain, complies with the Maritime Guidelines and is therefore compatible 
with the internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU500. 

Moreover, on 8 July 2024, the Commission closed a formal investigation procedure concerning the grant 
of  several  public  service  compensations  to  Caremar,  an  Italian  ferry  operator501.  The  procedure 
concerned  inter  alia  the  grant  of  public  service  compensation  for  the  operation  of  ferry  services 
connecting mainland Italy with: i) the islands of the Gulf of Naples from 1 January 2009 to 31 July 2012 
and from 16 July 2015 to 15 July 2024; and ii) the islands of the Pontino Archipelago from 1 January 
2009 to 31 May 2011. As regards the period 2009 – 2012, the Commission considered that the measure 
was  aid  compatible  with  the  internal  market,  as  it  addressed  a  real  public  service  need  by  ensuring 
connections on a regular basis throughout the year, and the aid granted did not result in overcompensation 
for Caremar. For the period 2015-2024, the Commission concluded that the public service contract did 
not entail State aid. Other measures granted to Caremar (the possibility to use certain funds earmarked 
to upgrade ships to meet safety requirements for liquidity purposes; fiscal exemptions granted to Caremar 
in the context of its privatisation; privatisation of Caremar; possibility to use resources from a national 
fund to meet the liquidity needs) did not constitute State aid.  

On 25 July 2024, the Commission approved an amendment to the Swedish tonnage tax scheme, on the 
basis  of  its  compatibility  with  the  internal  market  under  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU  and  the  Maritime 
Guidelines502.  

On  6  November  2024,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  amending  the  2015  appropriate  measures 
decision regarding the Greek tonnage tax scheme503. Following the adoption of the 2015 decision, the 
Commission  services  and  the  Greek  authorities  entered  into  continuous  discussions  with  a  view  to 
resolving all 16 issues identified. With its decision of 6 November 2024, the Commission amended three 
of  the  appropriate  measures  proposed  in  the  2015  decision.  On  25  November  2024,  following  the 
acceptance of the appropriate measures  by the  Greek authorities, the Commission  adopted a decision 
recording the agreement of Greece to implement the appropriate measures.  

On 26 November 2024, the Commission approved the award of five public service contracts by France 
to  the maritime operators Corsica Linea and La Méridionale for  the provision of  maritime transport 
services of freight and passengers between the port of Marseille and the island of Corsica between 2023 
and 2030504. The total  amount  of compensation granted  amounts approximately  to  EUR  850 million. 
Following an in depth investigation, the Commission closed its formal investigation opened in February 
2024. It concluded, that the five public service contracts were compatible with EU State aid rules on the 
financing of services of general economic interest (SGEI). In particular, the Commission found that the 

499 Case AT.40940, A++ transatlantic joint venture. 
500 Case SA.106028 – Spain – Gipuzkoa Tonnage tax scheme.   
501  Case  SA.32014  –  Italy  –  measures  implemented  by  Italy  and  the  Region  of  Campania  for  Caremar  and  its  acquier 
SNAV/Rifim. 
502 Case SA.114303 – Sweden – Amendment to the Swedish tonnage tax scheme. 
503 Case SA.33828 – Greece – Greek tonnage tax scheme and other State measures in favour of shipping companies.   
504 Case SA.101557 – France – Desserte maritime de la Corse (2023-2030). 

100 

 
 
five  public  service  contracts  corresponded  to  a  genuine  public  service  need  not  addressed  by  market 
forces alone and that the compensation granted to the public service operators did not exceed what was 
necessary to cover the net costs of the public services. It also concluded that the measures did not infringe 
any provision of EU law on public procurements and on internal market in the field of maritime services.  

On 13 December 2024, the Commission approved a prolongation of a Belgian seafarers scheme under 
Article 107(3)(c) TFEU and the Maritime Guidelines. The scheme, which will apply from 1 July 2025 
until  30  June  2035,  provides  for  tax  benefits  in  favour  of  seafarers  active  in  the  merchant  shipping, 
dredging and towing sectors505. That same day, the Commission concluded that the Italian tonnage tax 
scheme complies with the conditions of the Maritime Guidelines and is therefore compatible with the 
internal market on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU506. 

8.2.5.  Merger enforcement in the maritime sector  

On  3  October  2024,  the  Commission  unconditionally  cleared  the  acquisition  of  joint  control  over 
Hamburger  Hafen  und  Logistik  Aktiengesellschaft,  a  port  and  transport  logistics  company  based  in 
Hamburg,  by  a  shipping  company,  MSC,  and  HGV  Hamburger  Gesellschaft  für  Vermögens-  und 
Beteiligungsmanagement  mbH  (HGV),  which  manages  the  commercial  activities  of  the  City  of 
Hamburg507. The Commission concluded that the transaction did not give rise to competition concerns 
due to the presence of sufficient competitors to ensure access to the services concerned and to the North 
European ports. 

8.2.6.  Antitrust enforcement in the maritime sector  

The EU legal framework which exempted liner shipping consortia from EU antitrust rules  (Consortia 
Block  Exemption  Regulation  -  CBER)508  expired  on  25  April  2024.  The  Commission  continued  to 
closely monitor the sector, which, in 2024, was impacted by the Red Sea crisis. 

8.2.7.  State aid enforcement in the rail and intermodal transport sector  

8.2.7.1 Commission’s decisional practice 

In 2024, the Commission continued to enforce State aid rules in the rail and intermodal transport sector.  

The Commission adopted 16 decisions approving aid measures for the coordination of transport for an 
amount of approximately EUR 2.7 billion. In ten cases509 the Commission approved the measures on the 
basis of the 2008 State aid Railway Guidelines510, in four cases, the Commission approved the measures 

505 Case SA.113920 – Belgium – Prolongation of Belgian seafarers scheme.   
506 Case SA.109641 – Italy – Reintroduction of Italian tonnage tax scheme.  
507 Case M.11302, MSC/HGV/HHLA.  
508 Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), OJ L 256, 
29.9.2009, p. 31. 
509  Cases  SA.110055  –  Germany  –  Amendment  of  the  CHP  and  Offshore  electricity  surcharges  reductions  for  railway 
undertakings; SA.104413 – Denmark – Reintroduction of a State aid scheme for rail freight transport; SA.108800 – Germany 
– Support for rail freight transport (single wagon load and wagon group transport trains); SA.112932 – Italy – Reintroduction 
of an aid scheme in support of integrated transport in the province of Trento; SA.107166 – Portugal – Scheme to support rail 
freight  transport;  SA.106980  –  Spain  –  Spanish  aid  scheme  to  support  rail  freight  undertakings  affected  by  network 
disruptions;  SA.110308  –  Italy  –  Amendment  of  a  State  aid  scheme  in  support  of  combined  transport  in  the  Province  of 
Bolzano; SA.111020 – Belgique – Régime d’aides au transport ferroviaire de marchandises par wagons isolés; SA.103323 
– Italy – Réintroduction de l’aide au service transitoire d’autoroute ferroviaire alpine; SA.114259 – Poland – RRF Support 
for the installation of ERTMS on rolling stock under the national recovery and resilience plan. 
510 Communication from the Commission, Community guidelines on State aid for railway undertakings, OJ C 184, 22.7.2008, 
p. 13. 

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directly under Article 93 TFEU511 and in two cases, the Commission approved the measures both under 
Article  93  TFEU  and  the  2008  Railway  Guidelines512.  Those  decisions  covered  aid  for  the  rail 
infrastructure, aid for the reduction of external costs or aid for interoperability, in particular to support 
the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) as well as aid to promote 
the renewal of freight rolling stock.  

All these measures support the modal shift from road to rail, inland waterways or short sea shipping as 
safer and more environmentally-friendly transport modes. Modal shift constitutes a priority to implement 
the European Green Deal and is in line with the Commission’s Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy. 

Furthermore, on 29 November 2024, the Commission  approved under the R&R Guidelines, EUR 1.9 
million  State  aid  for  DB  Cargo513.  DB  Cargo is  the  biggest  EU  rail  freight  operator  by  size  and 
turnover and a fully-owned subsidiary of State-owned Deutsche Bahn (DB). The case concerned mainly 
intra-group transactions between DB and DB Cargo, including an open-ended profit and loss transfer 
agreement, the provision by DB to DB Cargo of intra-group services at favorable prices and advantageous 
group  financing  conditions  for  loans.  The  Commission  found  that,  among  the  intra-group  measures 
investigated, only the profit and loss transfer agreement eventually involved State aid at the end of the 
period investigated and at present. In addition to discontinuation of the agreement on 1 January 2025, the 
approval of the aid is conditional on implementation of various commitments that reduce market presence 
of DB Cargo, improve its efficiency and profitability and open opportunities for competition available to 
railway freight operators in the internal market. 

8.2.7.2 Work on State aid Guidelines for land and multimodal transport and Transport 
Block-Exemption Regulation ongoing 

On 18 June 2024, the Commission published for consultation the draft Land and Multimodal Transport 
Guidelines  (LMTG)  and  Transport  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (TBER)514.The  consultation  period 
ended on 20 September 2024. The review process of these two instruments is ongoing.  

The TBER intends to exempt from prior notification certain categories of aid in the rail, inland waterways 
and multimodal transport sector. It will complement the LMTG, which will replace the 2008 Railway 
Guidelines,  and  set  out  the  conditions  to  assess  the  compatibility  with  the  Single  Market  of  aid  to 
sustainable land transport that is not block-exempted. These two sets of rules will form a comprehensive 
and up-to-date rulebook for aid to sustainable land transport. 

The proposals follow the conclusions of the Fitness Check on the existing State aid rules in the field of 
land transport sector that showed that adjustments were needed to reflect market developments and the 
current EU's strategic priorities, including the Green Deal.  

511  Cases  SA.109124  –  Poland  –  RRF  –  Investment  aid  to  intermodal  transport  facilities,  equipment  and  rolling  stocks; 
SA.63990 – France – Aide à un terminal d’autoroute ferroviaire à Calais; SA.104936 – France – Aide à l'investissement pour 
la création d'une plateforme multimodale au Port de Sète; SA.114260 – Poland – Aid for intermodal transport projects under 
the European Funds for Infrastructure, Climate, Environment 2021-2027 programme. 
512 Cases SA.110676 – Sweden – Eco-invest for rail, short sea shipping and inland waterways and SA.108613 – France – 
Aide à l'exploitation de services réguliers de transport combiné de marchandises alternatifs au mode tout routier pour la 
période 2024-2028. 
513 Case SA.50952 – Germany – Alleged State aid measures in favour of DB Cargo. 
514 
https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2024-lmtg-and-
tber_en#:~:text=The%20Commission%20is%20publishing%20for%20consultation%20the%20draft,the%20rail%2C%20inl
and%20waterways%20and%20multimodal%20transport%20sector 

See: 

102 

 
 
8.2.7.3 Selected Court judgments in rail cases 

In the field of land transport, on 24 January 2024 the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in response 
to a reference for a preliminary ruling from a regional Court in Bulgaria515. The Court of Justice clarified 
that,  under  Regulation  1370/2007516  Member  States  must  ensure  that  the  compensation  put  in  place 
enables  the  public  service  operator  concerned  to  determine  with  all  the  necessary  precision,  when 
concluding  the  public  service  contract,  the  compensation  which  it  is  entitled  to  receive  from  the 
competent authority in return for the discharge of its public service obligations. A national legislation 
which does not  define,  ex ante  and precisely,  the calculation of the  compensation and the amount of 
compensation  to  be  paid  (for  example,  a  national  legislation  making  the  grant  of  compensation 
conditional upon the availability of funds provided for by the law on the budget of the Member State) 
would fail to meet the criteria of that regulation. 

8.2.8.  Antitrust enforcement in the rail sector 

On  17  January  2024,  the  Commission  adopted  a  decision  in  which  it  made  legally  binding  the 
commitments  by  Renfe-Operadora,  E.P.E.  and  its  subsidiary  Renfe  Viajeros,  S.M.E.,  S.A.  (together 
‘Renfe’),  the  Spanish  state-owned  rail  incumbent  operator517.  The  Commission  concluded  that  the 
commitments addressed its preliminary concerns that Renfe may have infringed Article 102 TFEU by 
refusing to supply all its content and real-time data (RTD) to third-party ticketing platforms (TPTPs)518. 
Renfe’s  commitments  open  up  competition  in  online  rail  ticketing  in  Spain,  contributing  to  more 
affordable rail services and promoting environmentally-friendly means of transport. 

On  24  October  2024,  the  Commission  fined  České  dráhy  (ČD)  and  Österreichische  Bundesbahnen 
(ÖBB), the Czech and Austrian rail incumbents, a total of EUR 48.7 million for infringing EU antitrust 
rules519. (See also I. legislation and Policy developments, section 1.4 above).  

8.2.9.  State aid enforcement in the road transport sector 

By enforcing State aid rules in the road transport sector, the Commission ensures that the compensation 
granted  to  companies  entrusted  with  public  passenger  transport  services  does  not  go  beyond  what  is 
necessary for the performance of these obligations.  

On 4 April 2024, the Commission approved the re-introduction of an aid scheme to the benefit of local 
public transport in Germany under Article 93 TFEU520. The objective of the scheme is to support the 
coordination of local public transport, and to further improve the distribution of transport over different 
transport modes towards a sustainable mobility transition. 

In  2024,  the  Commission  also  adopted  a  number  of  decisions  concerning  support  to  road  transport 
operators under the TCTF. On 22 January 2024, the Commission approved an Italian scheme to support 

515 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 25.1.2024 in Case C-390/22, Obshtina Pomorie v ‘Anhialo auto’, ECLI:EU:C:2024:75. 
516 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger 
transport services by rail and by road repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70, OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, 
p. 1. 
517 Case AT.40735, Online rail ticket distribution in Spain. 
518 TPTPs are companies that display offers from different rail carriers and provide online ticketing services to customers (for 
example, searching, comparison, booking and payment services) through apps or websites. To provide their services in a 
competitive manner, TPTPs need to have access to Renfe’s full content (tickets, discounts and features) and RTD (pre-journey, 
on-journey, and post-journey). 
519 Case AT.40401, Second-hand Rolling Stock. 
520 Case SA.108418 – Germany – Support scheme for model projects that strengthen local public transport.   

103 

 
 
road haulage transport operators521, as well as an Italian scheme to support undertakings performing 
own-account road haulage transport of goods522. The Commission approved an amendment to the latter 
scheme on 12 September 2024523. Moreover, on 26 March 2024, the Commission approved a Bulgarian 
scheme to support undertakings active in the road freight transport sector 524. 

On 13 June 2024, the Commission initiated a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 108(2) 
TFEU  regarding  financing  provided  to  WestVerkehr,  a  regional  public  bus  operator  in  the  district  of 
Heinsberg, Germany525.  

8.2.10. Merger in the logistics sector 

In February 2024, the Commission conditionally approved the proposed acquisition of Bolloré Logistics 
by CMA CGM526. Both companies play substantial roles within the global logistics and transport sectors. 
The parties offered to divest all of Bolloré Logistics' activities in Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin, 
and French Guiana, as well as a number of assets in metropolitan France linked to the divested activities. 
These remedies were designed to address competition concerns primarily related to the logistics market 
in the French overseas territories and metropolitan France. 

8.2.11. State aid enforcement in the postal services sector  

The exercise of State aid control in the postal services sector ensures that incumbent service providers 
compete fairly with other market participants, that State aid beneficiaries are not shielded from market 
developments, and that incentives exist to foster innovation, productivity, and efficiency.  

On 24 May 2024, the Commission approved Belgium’s plans to compensate bpost for the provision of 
postal services of general economic interest relating to the transport and distribution of newspapers and 
periodicals in 2023 and the first half of 2024527. 

On 2 July 2024, the Commission approved a Bulgarian restructuring aid in favour of Bulgarian Posts, 
the national postal operator, which consists of the conversion into equity of a previously approved rescue 
aid loan of approximately BGN 50 million (EUR 25.51 million)528. The measure aims at preventing that 
the company files for bankruptcy, while ensuring the provision of Universal Postal Services (UPS) in 
Bulgaria. 

On 19 July 2024, the Commission concluded that Czechia’s plans to compensate postal operator Czech 
Post for the operation of the DBIS529 in the Czech Republic during the 2023-2027 period were compatible 

521 Case SA.110609 – Italy – TCTF – Emergency Support Scheme for Haulage Operators (re-introduction of SA.103480, as 
amended by SA.103966, SA.105007, and SA.108572).    
522 Case SA.110570 – Italy – TCTF – Aid to undertakings performing own-account road haulage transport of goods (re-
introduction of SA.108573).   
523  Case  SA.114811  –  Italy  –  TCTF  –  Aid  to  undertakings  performing  own-account  road  haulage  transport  of  goods 
(amendment to SA.110570).   
524 Case SA.112501 – Bulgaria – TCTF – Aid to road freight transport operators.    
525 Case SA.55744 – Germany – Alleged aid to WestVerkehr.   
526 Case M.11143, Bolloré Logistics/CMA CGM. 
527 Case SA.105349 – Belgium – Compensation to bpost for the distribution of newspapers and periodicals over 2023 and 
the first six months of 2024. 
528 Case SA.109026 – Bulgaria – Restructuring aid for Bulgarian Posts EAD. See also Case SA.106972, Bulgaria- Rescue aid 
to Bulgarian Posts EAD. 
529 The DBIS is an advanced electronic channel for internal communication within the public administration and for secured 
communication between the public administration and citizens and companies. 

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with the internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU and the framework for State aid in the form of public 
service compensation (the SGEI Framework530) 531.  

On  23  July  2024,  the  Commission  concluded  that  the  compensation  to  Post  Danmark  A/S  for  the 
provision of  the universal postal  service obligation in  2021, 2022 and 2023 was compatible with  the 
internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU and the SGEI Framework532. 

Furthermore, on 15 November 2024, the Commission concluded that Poland’s envisaged compensation 
to Polish Post for the net cost incurred in providing the universal postal service across the entire Polish 
territory for the period 2021-2025 complied with the internal market under Article 106(2) TFEU, as it 
fulfilled all the criteria set out in the SGEI Framework 533. 

Similarly, on 18 December 2024, the Commission concluded that the compensation to Poste Italiane for 
the provision of the press distribution mission was compatible with the internal market on the basis of 
Article 106(2) TFEU and the SGEI Framework 534. 

8.2.12.  State aid enforcement in the housing sector  

The Commission exercises State aid control in the housing sector to prevent distortions of competition, 
ensuring that State support does not unduly favour certain market players and that private investment is 
not deterred, while taking into account the particular characteristics of the sector in Member States. As 
highlighted in the Letta report, access to affordable housing has become a significant problem in many 
Member States.   

On 8 April 2024, the Commission approved, on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, a EUR 476 million 
Czech scheme to support the construction, reconstruction, and acquisition of affordable rental flats535. 
On  12  December  2024,  the  Commission  approved,  on  the  basis  of  Article  107(3)(c)  TFEU,  an 
amendment to the existing Irish Croí Cónaithe scheme for residential housing in cities536. 

8.2.13.  State aid enforcement in the cultural sector  

By enforcing State aid control in the cultural sector, the Commission ensures fair competition between 
private and public service providers, while  allowing  Member States to  support the establishment and 
development of institutions throughout their territory and to enhance the level of services provided. 

On  21  October  2024,  the  Commission  approved  an  amendment  to  an  aid  measure  in  favour  of  the 
Museum of Polish History for the construction and design of its permanent headquarters in Warsaw537.  

8.2.14.  State aid enforcement in the gambling sector 

By enforcing State aid control in the gambling sector, the Commission ensures that competition between 
operators active in that sector is not distorted by State support measures.  

530  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  European  Union  framework  for  State  aid  in  the  form  of  public  service 
compensation (2011), OJ C 8, 11.1.2012, p. 15. 
531 Case SA.109072 – Czechia – Czech Post 2023-2027 DBIS Compensation. 
532 Case SA.111272 – Denmark – Compensation to Post Danmark A/S for Universal Service Obligations in 2021, 2022 and 
2023.  
533 Case SA.105121 – Poland – Polish Post USO (2021-2025). 
534 Case SA.108766 – Italy – Poste Italiane press distribution 2020-2026. 
535 Case SA.106249 – Czechia – RRF - Aid for the construction, reconstruction and acquisition of affordable rental flats.   
536 Case SA.114554 – Ireland – Amendment to the aid scheme SA.102927 for  residential housing in cities (Croí Cónaithe 
(Cities) Scheme).   
537 Case SA.113458 – Poland – Aid to Museum of Polish History.  

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On 31 July 2024, the Commission extended the formal investigation procedure launched on 2 September 
2020  regarding  potential  State  aid  in  favour  of  Ladbrokes538,  in  view  of  changes  in  certain  factual 
circumstances  that  took  place  after  the  opening  decision.  In  particular,  following  the  retroactive 
annulment  of  the  Belgian  Royal  Decree  of  4  May  2018,  which  regulated  offline  virtual  betting,  the 
Commission adjusted the duration of the alleged aid under investigation. 

On 31 October 2024, following a formal investigation, the Commission adopted a decision finding that 
the  granting  of  exclusive  rights  between  2019  and  2044  to  Française  des  Jeux  by  France  does  not 
constitute aid in the sense of Article 107(1) TFEU, following the increased remuneration to be paid by 
the company to the French State539. 

On 22 November 2024, the Commission adopted a decision finding that the loss compensation payments 
granted by the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) to WestSpiel GmbH, a casino operator active in 
the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, did not constitute State aid in the sense of Article 107(1) 
TFEU, while a capital injection made to the same company did constitute State aid and was incompatible 
with the internal market540. 

538 Case SA.53630 – Belgium – Alleged illegal state aid related to virtual betting.   
539 Case SA.56399 – France – Octroi supposé d’aides d’Etat illégales à la Française des jeux.   
540 Case SA.48580 – Germany – Casinos - Alleged State aid to WestSpiel.   

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