JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0
Date: 2025-03-20
Institutions: European Commission, European External Action Service
Subjects: EU action, EU-NATO cooperation, European defence policy, European security, combined transport, dual-use technology, logistics, military cooperation, trans-European network, transport infrastructure

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 20.3.2025  JOIN(2025) 11 final  JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0  
 
 
JOINT REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 

on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0  

I – INTRODUCTION 

1.  Military  mobility  ensures  the  swift  and  seamless  movement  of  military  personnel  and 
materiel – within and beyond the EU. It is vital for the EU’s security and defence in both 
the short and long-term. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has continued to highlight the 
importance of military mobility in times of crisis. The Russian invasion also demonstrates 
how  crucial  it  is  to  simplify  and  harmonise  procedures  of  moving  military  assets  and 
equipment in order to respond quickly and at scale to crises erupting at the EU’s external 
borders  and  beyond.  Military  Mobility  is  one  of  the  priorities  of  the  updated  2023 
Capability Development Plan (CDP), as approved by Member States in November 2023. 
The  CDP  highlighted  the  urgent  need  to  substantially  improve  the  military  mobility  of 
Member  States  Armed  Forces,  within  and  beyond  the  EU,  inter  alia,  focusing  on 
strengthening where dual use transport infrastructure across the trans-European transport 
network.  

2.   The EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.01 provides a comprehensive framework to 
develop  a  well-connected  military  mobility  network,  with  shorter  reaction  times  and 
capable,  secure,  sustainable  and  resilient  transport  infrastructure  and  capabilities.  The 
European Defence Industrial Strategy from March 2024 indicates the need to address the 
remaining bottlenecks to a swift, efficient and unimpeded movement of military equipment 
and capabilities through further investments in military mobility.  

3.  The  second  ‘Military  Mobility  Pledge  2024’,  adopted  by  Member  States  through  the 
Council Conclusions on security and defence in May 20242 complements and reinforces 
the  Action  Plan  on  Military  Mobility  2.0.  Within  the  updated  Council  pledge,  Member 
States  will  implement  13  concrete  commitments,  before  the  end  of  2026,  inter  alia, 
prioritising  investments  in  transport  infrastructure  benefitting  military  movements,  
accelerating cross-border movement permissions and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.  

4.  This second progress report on the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 reflects the 
ongoing  work  of  the  different  Union  institutions,  bodies  and  agencies  to  implement  the 
identified actions across the main priority areas of the Action Plan. It also encompasses, 
where necessary, the progress made in the different areas since the last progress report from 
November 20233. 

5.  The Action Plan provides a strategic approach aimed to effectively involve a wide range of 
stakeholders,  including  Member  States.  It  thus  facilitates  the  consistent  and  linkages 
between the Member States’ activities – including through the relevant PESCO projects, 
notably on Military Mobility and Logistical Hubs4 – and EU-level work strands across the 
full range of topics. Annual events on military mobility continue to take place as set out in 

1 Action plan on military mobility 2.0.pdf (europa.eu) 
2 Council Conclusions on EU Security and Defence of 27 May 2024  
3 Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Action Plan on Military 
Mobility from November 2022 to October 2023 – JOIN(2023) 37 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0037 
4 Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the Action Plan. From 22 to 23 February 2024 the second annual event took place in Ghent 
under the auspices of the Belgian Presidency of the Council, bringing together experts from 
EU institutions and Member States, relevant PESCO projects and partners such as NATO.  

II – MULTI-MODAL CORRIDORS AND LOGISTICAL HUBS  

A.  Funding for dual-use transport infrastructure  

6.  Under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, a budget of approximately 
EUR 1.7 billion was allocated (75% less than the EUR 6.5 billion the Commission initially 
proposed)  to  co-fund  dual-use  transport  infrastructure  through  the  Connecting  Europe 
Facility (CEF). Initially it was planned that the Commission would launch yearly calls for 
project proposals under a dedicated CEF Military Mobility envelope with EUR 330 million 
indicative budgets.  

7.  The first (of three) call for proposals under this dedicated Military Mobility envelope was 
in 2021 and the third call for proposals was in May 2023. Under this call EU co-funding to 
of  EUR  807  million  was  allocated  to  38  projects  in  18  Member  States5.  The  dedicated 
military mobility envelope under the CEF has been exhausted. 

8.  In  total,  the  CEF  awarded  co-funding  worth  EUR  1.76bn  to  95  projects  in  21  Member 
States. Figures 1 and 2 give a full overview of the projects selected over the three calls, the 
distribution of funding by transport mode and location throughout the EU. 

Figure  1:  CEF  military  mobility  funding 
by transport mode 

Figure 2: Geographic spread of  CEF military 
mobility  projects 

5 Commission Implementing Decision of 7.3.2024 on the selection of Military Mobility projects following the 
2023  call  for  proposals  for  grants  under  the  Connecting  Europe  Facility  -  Transport  sector  pursuant  to 
Implementing Decision C(2023) 4886, { C(2024) 1421 final }; a full overview of selected projects is available 
under this link. 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.  In the current MFF period, transport infrastructure projects can receive funding through the 
CEF ‘General and Cohesion’ envelope. In the calls launched on 24 September 2024, dual-
use  projects  will  be  granted  priority  in  the  evaluation  phase.  In  line  with  the  renewed 
Military Mobility Pledge 2024, the Commission therefore actively encourages the Member 
States and project promotors to submit project proposals that would benefit not only civilian 
use, but also military mobility.  

10. Under  the  Military  mobility  project,  promotors  can  still  benefit  from  loans  under  the 
European Investment Bank’s “Strategic European Security Initiative PLUS” fund. In 2024, 
the Bank broadened its “dual use” requirements for loans, so that more security and defence 
investments are eligible for funding, including in the area of military mobility. The Bank 
has shown an interest in using the Commission’s priority military mobility corridors (see 
recital 16) as a sound basis for selecting and prioritising investments in military mobility 
transport infrastructure. 

B.  Revision of the Trans-European Transport Networks Regulation 

11. On 14 December 2021, the Commission presented its proposal to revise the trans-European 
transport networks (TEN-T) Regulation6. On 27 July 2022 the Commission presented an 
amended  proposal  reflecting  the  changed  geopolitical  situation.7  Following  negotiations 
between the Council and the European Parliament under the ordinary legislative procedure, 
the amended proposal was finally adopted on 13 June 2024 and the Regulation entered into 
force on 18 July 2024.8  

12. The Regulation contains four key elements to support military mobility within and beyond 
the  EU.  Firstly,  it  anchors  within  EU  law  the  notion  of  a  military  mobility  transport 
network;  secondly,  through  its  new  Article  48  on  military  mobility,  it  mandates  the 
Commission to identify priority military mobility corridors; thirdly,  it sets the TEN-T on 
the  path  of  becoming  a  largely  dual-use  transport  infrastructure  network,  notably  by 
requiring  the  Member  States  to  consider  military  mobility  needs  when  constructing  or 
upgrading  infrastructure  on  the  TEN-T;  and  fourthly,  it  strengthens  and  aligns  several 
transport infrastructure requirements with Military Requirements, especially for rail; and 
in  some  instances  the  updated  maps  also  reflect  the  military  needs,  most  notably  with 
extensions into neighbouring countries Ukraine and Moldova.  

C.  Long-term infrastructure planning for short-notice and large-scale movements of 

military forces 

13. As per the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0, the relevant Commission services and the 
EEAS, together with the Member States and upon consultation with NATO, carried out a 
‘study  to  identify  possibilities  for  short-notice,  large-scale  movements  to  improve  fuel 

6  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Union  guidelines  for  the 
development of the trans-European transport network (COM (2021) 812). 
7 Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Union guidelines for the 
development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 and Regulation (EU) 
No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) 1315/2013 (COM(2022) 384 final). 
8 Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines 
for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) 
No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 (Text with EEA relevance),  
OJ L, 2024/1679, 28.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1679/oj  

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resilience,  long-term  infrastructure  planning  and  optimal  use  of  this  infrastructure’  (the 
‘Study’).  This  call  for  action  was  based  on  the  lessons  learned  from  the  first  calls  for 
infrastructure  projects  under  the  CEF  Military  Mobility  envelope.  While  major 
improvements had been achieved by funding projects through the CEF (see paragraph 6 
and following), a more strategic approach would help build a better-structured and more 
coherent military mobility network. 

14. In  a  non-paper  of  June  2023,  initially  presented  to  both  the  European  Union  Military 
Committee  and  the  Politico-Military  Group  in  2023  and  to  the  Political  and  Security 
Committee in February 2024, the Commission services and the EEAS set out a three-step 
approach  to  complete  the  Study;  (i)  the  first  step  was  to  identify  the main  corridors  for 
short-notice and large-scale movements of military personnel and materiel in the event of 
a  crisis  or  conflict  or  for  military  exercises;  (ii)  the  second  step  to  identify  gaps  in  the 
infrastructure on the main corridors identified as priority for military movements and: (iii) 
the third step to identify the actions to close the gaps and ensure that military personnel and 
materiel can move smoothly for military purposes. 

15. The  Commission,  together  with  the  EU  Military Staff  representing  the  EEAS,  held  two 
meetings  with  Member  States,  in  October  2023  and  July  2024,  each  time  followed  by 
consultations with NATO, in particular with the Joint Support and Enabling Command in 
Ulm,  Germany.  On  this  basis,  the  Commission  services  and  the  EEAS  finalised  the 
identification of priority military mobility corridors (the first step of the Study) and have 
started to work on the identification of the gaps in the infrastructure (the second step of the 
Study) and the calculation of the investment needs to mitigate those gaps (third step of the 
Study).  

16. The four priority military mobility corridors9 identified were presented to and subsequently 
endorsed  by  the  EU  Military  Committee  in  October  2024.  These  new  priority  corridors 
were included in the revised Annex II of the Military Requirements, which were adopted 
by  the  Council  on  17  March.  The  corridors  can  better  guide  and  prioritise  future 
investments in the military mobility network at both EU and national levels. The study will 
also serve as a basis for the European Investment Bank to identify (in close cooperation 
with the Commission) dual-use projects with high added value for defence. The ongoing 
assessment of investment needs will serve as a key reference for the discussions on the next 
MFF. 

D.  Military Requirements 

17. To  further  align  standards  of  the  TEN-T  and  the  EU  military  transport  network,  on  23 
October 2023 the Council adopted the revised military requirements including Annex II 
“Multi-Modal  Transport  Corridors”.  The  revision  process  included  consultations  with 
NATO. The enlarged scope of military requirements encompasses: (i) logistics hubs; (ii) 
the  supply-chain  infrastructure  for  fuel;  (iii)  lessons  identified  from  Russia’s  war  of 
aggression  against  Ukraine;  and  (iv)  military  criteria  for  the  evaluation  of  dual-use 
infrastructural project proposals. 

18. The Study on priority military mobility corridors referred to in paragraph 13 resulted in the 
need to further update Annex II of the Military Requirements for Military Mobility for two 

9 Northern, Central Northern, Central Southern and Eastern Corridors. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reasons: to include the priority military mobility corridors identified by the Study, and to 
ensure the transport infrastructure along these identified corridors had dual-use (TEN-T & 
military) status, where necessary. The new revision of Annex II was launched in October 
2024 and adopted by the Council on 17 March 2025. 

19. Meeting in the Oil Coordination Group, the Commission services, the EU Military Staff, 
and Member States, discussed how on oil infrastructure could support military mobility. 
Member States exchanged national practices and identified possible bottlenecks in military 
fuel logistics along the military corridors. The Commission services gave Member States a 
questionnaire  on  the  topic.  Its  analysis  of  the  replies  will  be  used  as  a  basis  for  further 
discussions on how existing oil infrastructure (e.g. strategic oil stocks) can support military 
mobility.  

20. The  specifications  for  Fuel-Supply  Chain  Infrastructure  for  fuel  set  out  in  the  Military 
Requirements for Military Mobility, within and beyond the EU, also identify future-proof 
alternative fuel concepts. In the context of the global energy transition, these alternative-
fuel  concepts  would  reduce  external  dependencies  for  EU  armed  forces  on  fossil  fuel 
suppliers. These concepts were discussed in military mobility staff-to-staff meetings which 
the Commission services and the EU Military Staff held with NATO. The subject was also 
discussed in an EU-NATO climate and security workshop on the energy transition. These 
discussions pointed to the importance of developing secure Europe-based alternative-fuel 
supply chains and the corresponding technological and industrial base required by these 
alternative fuels.  

E.  Access to airspace and airspace navigation services and other modes of transport  

21. Commitment No 5 of the Military Mobility Pledge 2024 is to “[e]nsure a prioritised access 
of the armed forces to relevant transport modes, networks and assets, including required 
airspace, also through the EU regulatory framework, in support of national efforts, most 
notably  in  times  of  crisis  and  conflict  and  where  possible  already  in  peacetime,  in  full 
respect of the sovereignty of EU Member States over their national territory and national 
decision-making  processes  regarding  military  movements.”  The  EU  institutions  have 
worked to facilitate the implementation of this commitment. 

22. Firstly, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the relevant Commission services have 
continued their cooperation to ensure access to airspace and air navigation services for civil 
and military aviation as part of the Single European Sky (SES) and the related project to 
modernise the management of air traffic (SESAR), in coordination with the SESAR Joint 
Undertaking and the SESAR Deployment Manager. Any lack of interoperability between 
military and civil systems threatens the military’s access to airspace and use of navigation 
services. This could also be a challenge, in cases when the military is providing services to 
civilian users. Growing issues with jamming and spoofing have also highlighted the need 
for  a  resilient  Minimum  Operational  Network  of  Communication,  Navigation  and 
Surveillance (CNS) ground systems as backup systems in the event of disruptive events, to 
guarantee military mobility by air 24/7. Aviation and air traffic management were included 
in  the  Military  Mobility  initiative  (as  reflected  in  the  previous  update  of  the  Military 
Requirements10) in recognition  of their importance  for overcoming interoperability gaps 

10 Revised Annex II of the Military Requirements for Military Mobility within and beyond the EU (ST 11373/19) 
of 27 March 2023. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and  to  ensure  resilience  of  the  air  traffic  management/CNS  services.  The  Implementing 
Regulation on dual-use requirements11 allowed the military aviation community to take part 
in  CEF  military  mobility  calls  for  proposals  (two  airport-related  projects  were  awarded 
funding in 2024).  

23. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has also advanced work to improve 
the interchangeability of (spare) parts between the civil and military aviation industry. The 
development of a Certification Memorandum will clarify the conditions and facilitate the 
future  dual-use  certification  of  maintenance  of  aircraft  parts  and  equipment.  However, 
certification  authority  on  defence  matters  is  a  Member  States’  prerogative  and  Member 
States’ national authorities oversee the respective certification requirements. Civil-military 
cooperation is focused on the integration of air traffic management. From a certification 
perspective, the EDA chairs the Military Airworthiness Authorities Forum, which produces 
the  European  Military  Airworthiness  Requirements  (EMARs).  The  Member  States 
National Military Airworthiness Authorities use these EMARs for their regulations. The 
development  of  EMARs  tailored  for  Military  Airworthiness,  based  on  the  Cooperation 
Arrangement and subsequent continuing work programme between the EDA and EASA, 
are in line with the most recent EASA regulations. The same principle will be applied to 
Military Airworthiness and the certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems where relevant, 
to minimise the national regulatory differences between Member States and the differences 
between European programmes. 

24. Lastly, in July 2023, DG MOVE tabled a revision of the Rail Capacity Regulation12, which 
harmonises EU rules for rail infrastructure capacity and traffic management, considering 
the  needs  of  Ministries  of  Defence  received  through  the  EDA.  The  proposed  revision 
contains  a  new  provision  allowing  for  the  cancellation  of  railroad  track  access  rights 
without  compensation,  in  the  case  of  a  last-minute  crisis  request  by  the  armed  forces. 
Similar exceptions are provided for exercises simulating  crisis  situations. Following the 
adoption by the European Parliament of its report on 12 March 2024, and the adoption by 
the Council of its General Approach on 18 June 2024, the first Trilogue meeting was held  
on 19 November 2024. 

III – REGULATORY SUPPORT MEASURES 

A.  Permissions for cross-border movement  

25. The  EDA  Category  A-Programme  on  “Optimising  Cross-Border  Movement  Permission 
Procedures  in  Europe”  is  progressing  well  to  simplify  and  harmonise  military  mobility 
procedures  across  Europe.  To  date,  27  contributing  Member  States,  including  Norway, 
have  signed  the  Programme  Arrangement  for  cross-border  movement  permissions.  The 
Technical  Arrangements  (TAs)  for  Surface  and  Air  have  been  signed  by  26  and  25 
contributing  Member States respectively  (including  Norway). Recent  updates to  the  TA 
Surface  forms  have  further  streamlined  the  process  for  obtaining  annual  diplomatic 

11  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1328  of  10  August  2021  specifying  the  infrastructure 
requirements  applicable  to  certain  categories  of  dual-use  infrastructure  actions  pursuant  to  Regulation  (EU) 
2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council, C(2021) 5859, OJ L 288, 11.8.2021. 
12 COM(2023) 443/2; Proposal for a Regulation of the  European Parliament and of the Council on the use of 
railway infrastructure capacity in the single European railway area, amending Directive 2012/34/EU and repealing 
Regulation (EU) No 913/2010; available here. 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
clearances. The ‘TA Sea’ for the maritime domain is in an advanced state of negotiation. It 
will also trigger an amendment of the Programme Arrangement. 

26. To  support  the  implementation  of  the  signed  TAs,  the  EDA  has  developed  an 
Implementation  Monitoring  Matrix  which  allows  to  monitor  the  progress  of  the 
implementation of the various activities under the TAs. Moreover, the network of national 
point-of-contacts for military mobility will provide valuable feedback from the Member 
States  for  future  amendments.  The  EDA  will  work  together  with  the  Member  States  to 
facilitate the full implementation of the TAs and to test the Surface TAs template developed 
for annual permissions. 

27. On  the  cross-border  permission  TA  utilisation,  Member  States  are  coordinating  their 
national efforts on a strategic level through the PESCO project on Military Mobility. This 
has led to the establishment of a National Point of Contact Network which is expected to 
be the primary user of the EDAs Cross Border Movement Permission TAs.  

28. Based  on  first  consultations  with  the  coordinating  Member  States  of  the  two  PESCO 
projects, “Military Mobility” and “Network of Logistic Hubs”, in late 2023 the EDA, along 
with the Commission, developed a concept to create synergies between both projects. This 
concept uses the TENtec viewer to highlight the gaps in - and needs of - Logistics Hubs 
along military corridors in Europe. Based on these results, the PESCO project “Network of 
Logistic Hubs” should provide additional - potentially temporary - Logistic Hubs to support 
military movement on these corridors. Both PESCO projects  are considering the EDA’s 
suggestion. 

29. In January 2024, three13 Member States signed a Letter of Intent for a common Enablement 
and  Sustainment  (ESN)  corridor,  in  close  cooperation  with  NATO.  The  objective  is  to 
facilitate the more effective movement of military personnel and equipment from  North 
Sea  Ports  to  NATO’s  Eastern  Flank.  The  Deutsch-Netherlands-Office  is  identifying, 
including  through  live  exercises,  obstacles  to  the  fast  movement  of  troops  and  military 
materiel across this ESN corridor, and proposing solutions for addressing these obstacles, 
including simplification and harmonisation of rules and mutual recognition of cross-border 
procedures. This ‘military mobility areas’  will serve as a model for similar solutions on 
other ESN corridors.  Another two military mobility areas  agreements were signed14 at the 
NATO summit in Washington in July 2024, while three more have also now been signed15,. 
All  these  initiatives,  ideas  and  progress  came  from  the  various  EU  and  Member  State 
military mobility stakeholder meetings and events. 

B. Digitalisation of logistical processes 

30. Work continues on the European Defence Fund (EDF) project for a Secure Digital Military 
Mobility System (SDMMS) for exchanging information related to military mobility. The 
project is receiving EUR 9 million in funding from the EDF. The Netherlands joined the 
Estonian-led  project  in  2024,  which  already  consisted  of  companies  from  nine  Member 

13 Poland – Netherlands – Germany  
14 Italy – Albania - North Macedonia - Bulgaria – Romania and Greece -  Bulgaria - Romania 
15 Iceland - Norway - Sweden – Finland – Denmark and Italy – Slovenia – Croatia – Hungary and Romania – 
Bulgaria - Türkiye 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
States16 plus Norway. Slovakia is in talks on potentially joining, while Estonia is prepared 
to bring more countries into the project, which would be very beneficial to the SDMMS.  

31. The overall duration of the project was initially for 30 months, from 1 January 2023 to 31 
May 2025. Due to a delay in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, the system 
will  not  be  available  by  mid-2025  as  initially  planned.  The  project  is  expected  to  be 
finalised  by  the  end  of  2025,  and  it  will  facilitate  the  direct  and  secure  exchange  of 
information  between  participating  governments  requesting  and  approving  any  military 
movement. 

C. Customs 

32. In March 2024 the “Assessment of the Needs, Gains, and Risks for the Development of a 
Military Customs System” was developed by the EDA and the contributing Member States, 
with  advisory  input  from  the  Commission.    As  a  second  phase  of  the  related  EDA 
Programme Arrangement on Harmonising Military Requirements related to Customs, the 
EDA  has  launched  a    study  aimed  at  determining  the  technical  specifications  and 
requirements  for  the  digitalisation  of  military  customs  processes.  The  study  includes  a 
discussion on using electronic data processing to facilitate efficient information exchange 
between military forces and customs authorities. The findings of this study, combined with 
the  results  of  the  SDMMS  project,  will  be  assessed  by  the  EDA  and  the  contributing 
Members  States.  Additionally,  the  EDA  is  also  working  with  NATO  to  assess  the 
possibility of digitising NATO Form 302 and incorporating it into the Military Customs 
System.  The Commission is expecting the first tangible results in relation to such a system. 
The Commission will then assess the need to prepare legal amendments to EU Customs 
Legislation which would set out a legal framework for Member States’ use of a digitalised 
EU Form 302. 

D. Enhanced logistics 

33. In September 2024, the second study was presented, proposing how to connect the various 
Member State IT applications for military logistics to a federated logistic communication 
network,  to  enable  the  exchange  and  sharing  of  logistics  data  between  participants.  A 
follow-on study, scheduled to commence in 2025, will draw up a comprehensive list of IT 
applications used by commercial logistics operators and will identify how to embed their 
IT applications in a wider common secure network. The Logistics IT Systems project does 
not aim to replace the various IT applications in use. Its strategic objective is to provide an 
architecture  to  connect  various  applications  and  make  it  possible  to  embed  future 
applications within this architecture.   

34. On  the  use  of  Additive  Manufacturing  (AM)  –  commonly  known  as  3D  printing  in  the 
context of military logistics – the EDA Category B Project “Additive Manufacturing for 
Logistic support” established in November 2023 aims to draw up and determine common 
standards  to  enable  interchangeability  of  AM  manufactured  parts.  To  support  these 
activities, the EDA has conducted various studies on legal issues related to the AM and 
AM data management, which were presented in the course of 2024. In 2025, the EDA will 
conduct  another  study  providing  a  harmonised  AM  training  concept  to  ensure 
interoperability in the provision of services and logistics support. 

16 Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Bulgaria, Poland, Luxembourg, Romania, Czech Republic, Latvia. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV – RESILIENCE AND PREPAREDNESS 

A.  Strategic lift capabilities 

35. The  EDA  has  continued  work  to  develop  the  necessary  sea  and  air  transport/air  lift 
capabilities, in line with the 2020 Report on the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence 
and in association with relevant PESCO projects. The PESCO project on Future Mid-size 
Tactical Cargo has produced two documents to guide industrial development and a study 
funded under the 2022 EDF Work Programme. The Strategic Air Transport Outsized Cargo 
PESCO  project  has  developed  the  high-level  common  requirements  while  the  call  for  a 
study in this domain under the 2023 EDF Work Programme will be launched in December 
2024. The Next Generation Medium Helicopter PESCO project started in June 2023 and is 
currently analysing Member States’ inputs for their future plans for helicopters, for both 
upgrading existing fleets and developing new platforms. 

36. In 2025 the EDA will launch two studies; (i) a study to assess the current availability of 
national and commercial rail assets used by the military and identify potential needs for 
specialised  rail  transport  and  infrastructure,  while  also  evaluating  national  and  EU 
legislation against military needs and; (ii) a study to evaluate key infrastructure on inland 
waterway transport and the capacity for military movement. 

B.  Protection against security risks  

37. At the Council request17, the Commission services, the Network and Information Systems 
Cooperation  Group  and  the  EEAS  are  developing  cybersecurity  risk  scenarios.  In  July 
2024,  the  group  published  a  risk  assessment  report  on  the  cyber  resilience  of  the  EU’s 
telecommunications and electricity sectors18. Other critical sectors, such as transport, will 
be assessed in future editions. A resilient and robust data-sharing network with a high level 
of cybersecurity is necessary to support effective sharing of digital data among relevant 
civilian and military stakeholders and operators. Such a network could make the most of 
EU infrastructure such as the EU Secure Connectivity Programme (IRIS²). 

38. In January 2024, the Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) Regulation19, to better protect EU security and public order by proposing improved 
screening of foreign investment into the EU. In a changing geopolitical context, it is in the 
shared  interest  of  all  Member  States  to  promote  the  effective  screening  of  foreign 
investments in EU firms that provide critical technologies, infrastructure or inputs, or hold 
sensitive information, and whose activities are critical for security or public order at EU 
level. From a military mobility perspective, it is important that the proposed revision of the 
FDI Regulation includes a clear reference to the TEN-T as a “project or programme of EU 
interest” that requires Member States or the Commission to consider whether  associated 
foreign direct investments are likely to negatively affect the TEN-T on grounds of security 

17 Council Conclusions on the development of the European Union's Cyber Posture; ST09364/22, 23 May 2022. 
18  NIS  Cooperation  Group:  EU  cybersecurity  risk  evaluation  and  scenarios  for  the  telecommunications  and 
electricity sectors. https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/107357 
19 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the screening of foreign investments 
in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2024) 
23 final); available here.  

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or  public  order.  This  will  allow  the  Commission  and  Member  States  to  better  identify, 
assess  and  mitigate  potential  risks to  security  or public  order  resulting  from  a  proposed 
foreign direct investment into key EU transport infrastructure. 

39. In  the  context  of  the  Consultation  Forum  for  Sustainable  Energy  in  the  Defence  and 
Security Sector (CF SEDSS), work has continued to explore how to increase the use of 
renewable energy sources in transportation. This work also addresses the aims of the Joint 
Communication on a New Outlook on the Climate and Security Nexus, adopted in June 
202320, which tasked the  EEAS, Commission  services  and the EDA to  analyse ways to 
reduce  reliance  on  fossil  fuels  in  military  transportation  by  promoting  the  adoption  of 
renewable energy sources and associated technologies. Four examples of this analysis work 
are set out in the bullet points below: 

•  Several CF SEDSS Phase III deliverables (research studies, defence energy-related 
project  ideas  and  the  guidance  document  on  advancing  sustainable  energy) 
published in 2024 explored a range of topics. These included alternatives to fossil 
fuels and successful decarbonisation practices for transport, military requirements 
for hydrogen-based solutions for heavy military logistic vehicles and the impact of 
climate  change  and  the  transition  to  green  energy  on  the  resilience  and  energy 
security  of  defence-related  critical  energy  infrastructure,  including  military 
transport infrastructure. 

•  The CF SEDSS Phase III Study on Decarbonising the Defence Sector – Challenges 
and Opportunities investigated alternatives to fossil fuels developed for short and 
medium-range  road  transportation.  It  also  looked  into  data  collection  and 
monitoring for all energy use, including transport (e.g. for calculating the rate of 
renewable energy consumption), and funding sources for upgraded mobility and the 
related challenges. 

•  The  ‘Study  on  Defining  the  Key  Requirements  for  an  Energy  Storage  Selection 
Decision Support  Tool for Homeland Defence  Installations’ offered solutions  on 
ways to match appropriate energy storage technologies with various applications, 
including  transport  (both  light  use  -  vehicles  under  3  tonnes  -  and  heavy  use  - 
vehicles over 3 tonnes).  

•  Phase III of CF SEDSS finished on 30 September 2024, but these considerations 
will continue to be explored in Phase IV (1 October 2024 to 30 September 2028). 

V – PARTNERSHIPS 

A.  EU-NATO 

40. The EU-NATO Structured Dialogue on Military Mobility convened in November 2023 and 
June 2024, brought together the relevant staff from both organisations. It is an effective 
framework to present and update on the latest developments, while also an opportunity to 
exploring  areas  of  further  cooperation,  with  a  view  to  ensuring  coherence  and  mutual 
reinforcement. NATO participated at the EDAs Military Mobility Symposium in January 

20 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: a new outlook on the climate and security 
nexus: addressing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on peace, security and defence 
{JOIN(2023) 19 final}. 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2024 and NATO staff attended an EDA meeting on the digitalisation of military customs 
process  related  to  the  EU/NATO  Customs  Form  302.  NATO  representatives  also 
participated in the second annual Military Mobility event in June 2024 and NATO’s Joint 
Support Enablement Command attends relevant meetings of the PESCO project on Military 
Mobility on an informal basis.  

41. The participation of non-EU NATO allies in relevant PESCO projects continues to provide 
added value, including from a transatlantic and EU-NATO perspective. In addition to the 
United States, Canada, Norway and the UK, the Council is considering adopting a decision 
to authorise inviting Switzerland to participate in the PESCO project on Military Mobility. 
Although  the  Administrative  Arrangement  between  the  project  and  the  UK  is  pending 
conclusion, the UK does attend all relevant project meetings as an “incoming third state 
partner”.  The  Administrative  Arrangement  for  Canada’s  participation  in  the  Network 
Logistical Hubs PESCO Project was concluded in May 2024.  

B.  Connecting to other partners 

42. Following its revision, the TEN-T Regulation now extends the European transport corridors 
to  Ukraine  and  Moldova.  The  extension  of  the  corridors  builds  on  the  EU’s  efforts  to 
strengthen  these  countries’  transport  connectivity  with  the  EU,  such  as  the  ‘Solidarity 
Lanes’  initiative  the  Commission  launched  in  May  2022  to  help  Ukraine  keep  its  trade 
routes open following Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian ports. 

43. On 30 January 2024, the EDA, in cooperation with the Belgian Presidency of the Council 
of  the  EU,  held  a  High-level  Symposium  on  Military  Mobility  in  Brussels.  The  event 
brought  together  senior  officials,  including  the  EU’s  High  Representative  for  Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  and  several  EU  defence  ministers.  Representatives  from 
NATO and the United States also participated, underscoring the importance of transatlantic 
cooperation  in  improving  military  mobility.  The  discussions  focused  on  the  challenges 
posed by the changing security environment, highlighting the need for greater collaboration 
among EU Member States and international partners.  

VI – CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD 

44. The Draghi Report21 of September 2024 on the future of EU competitiveness reiterates the 
arguments that were previously detailed in the Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0 and 
the commitments made by Member States in the Military Mobility Pledge 2024. The most 
notable  of  these  arguments  is  transport  infrastructure  is  a  strategic  consideration  for 
Member States’ armed forces to respond quickly and at scale to crises, within and beyond 
the EU’s borders. The Niinistö Report22 of October 2024 on strengthening Europe’s civil 
and military preparedness and readiness (“Safer together: Strengthening Europe’s civilian 
and  military  preparedness  and  readiness”)  identifies  Military  Mobility  as  a  model  for 
improved EU dual-use policy, and it recommends to develop this capability further.  

45. Two years into the implementation of the Action Plan on Military 2.0, relevant actions have 
been launched across the four main priority areas, demonstrating continued progress and 

21 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en.  
22 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/5bb2881f-9e29-42f2-8b77-
8739b19d047c_en?filename=2024_Niinisto-report_Book_VF.pdf  

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflecting the shared sense of urgency in light of regional and global security crises and 
challenges.  To  achieve  the  common  objective  of  a  well-functioning  military  mobility 
network,  all  relevant  stakeholders  must  continue  their  respective  actions  as  part  of  a 
coordinated whole-of-government approach. The updated Military Mobility Pledge 2024 
by  Member  States,  will  further  contribute  to  this  aim,  building  on  the  work  of  relevant 
PESCO projects within the wider scope of the Action Plan. 

46. The High Representative and the Commission will present the next Progress Report by the 

end of 2025. 

12