JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030
Date: 2025-03-19
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU financing, EU investment, European arms policy, European defence policy, European security, Ukraine, arms industry, common security and defence policy, defence expenditure, military equipment

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY Brussels, 19.3.2025  JOIN(2025) 120 final   JOINT WHITE PAPER for European Defence Readiness 2030          
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 

Europe faces an acute and growing threat. The only way we can ensure peace is to have the 
readiness to deter those who would do us harm. We have many strong foundations such as our 
potential to unleash vast resources and latent technological and industrial power. But we are 
also starting from a position in which our defence readiness has been weakened by decades of 
under-investment.  

Our  continent  is  currently  being  affected  by  war,  aggression  and  other  hostile  acts.  The 
European Union has immense wealth and productive power and a deep faith in the importance 
of democratic values shared across all Member States. But it is being coerced by external actors 
who  are  mobilising  their  resources  and  using  technology  more  effectively  to  achieve  their 
objectives. They  are  directly  threatening  our  way  of  life  and  our  ability  to  choose  our  own 
future through democratic processes. They believe that we are politically unable to summon a 
meaningful and strategically enduring response. 

The  international  order  is  undergoing  changes  of  a  magnitude  not  seen  since  1945.  These 
changes are particularly profound in Europe because of its central role in the major geopolitical 
challenges  of  the  last  century.  The  political  equilibrium  that  emerged  from  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War  and  then  the  conclusion  of  the  Cold  War  has  been  severely  disrupted. 
However much we may be wistful about this old era, we need to accept the reality that it is not 
coming back. Upholding the international rules-based order will remain of utmost importance, 
both in our interest and as an expression of our values. But a new international order will be 
formed in the second half of this decade and beyond. Unless we shape this order – in both our 
region and beyond – we will be passive recipients of the outcome of this period of interstate 
competition with all the negative consequences that could flow from this, including the real 
prospect of full-scale war. History will not forgive us for inaction. 

Against this backdrop, Europe faces a fundamental  choice about  its  future. Does it want  to 
muddle through the years ahead, attempting to adapt to new challenges in an incremental and 
cautious way? Or, does it want to decide its own future, free from coercion and aggression, 
ensuring that the people of Europe are able to live in security, peace, democracy and prosperity? 
If we respond to this moment with determination, collective action and a clear strategy, we will 
strengthen our place in the world and renew our international alliances on a more sustainable 
basis. We will enable a renewal of the European project and improve the security, prosperity 
and  well-being  of  our  citizens.  If  we  continue  on  the  same  path,  however,  we  will  end  up 
diminished, divided and vulnerable.  

Our security has benefited immensely  from  both NATO and the European Union. In recent 
years, we have worked ever more closely to respond to the threats we face. But this is not going 
to be enough for the years ahead. Europe must do far more if it is to restore credible deterrence 
and deliver the security on which our prosperity depends. This requires all Member States to 
act in solidarity and to invest in our collective defence. 

The future of Ukraine is fundamental to the future of Europe as a whole. Since 2022, we have 
seen a full-scale high-intensity war on the borders of the European Union with hundreds of 
thousands  of  casualties,  mass  population  displacement,  huge  economic  costs  and  deliberate 
destruction of vital energy systems and cultural heritage. The outcome of that war will be a 
determinative factor in our collective future for decades ahead.  

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Europe faces other growing threats and security challenges, in its region and beyond. Strategic 
competition  is  increasing  in  our  wider  neighbourhood,  from  the Arctic  to  the  Baltic  to  the 
Middle East and North Africa. Transnational challenges such as rapid technological change, 
migration  and  climate  change  could  put  immense  stress  upon  our  political  and  economic 
system. Authoritarian states like China increasingly seek to assert their authority and control in 
our economy and society. Traditional allies and partners, such as the United States, are also 
changing their focus away from Europe to other regions of the world. This is something that 
we have been warned about many times but is now happening faster than many had anticipated. 

The moment has come for Europe to re-arm. To develop the necessary capabilities and military 
readiness to credibly deter armed aggression and secure our own future, a massive increase in 
European  defence  spending  is  needed.  This  needs  to  be  coordinated  and  directed  more 
effectively than ever between Member States, reflecting our collective strengths and addressing 
the weaknesses that come from uncoordinated action. 

We  need  a  stronger  and  more  resilient  defence  industrial  base.  We  need  an  ecosystem  of 
technological innovation for our defence industries to keep pace with changes in the character 
of war. We need to learn the lessons from it and extrapolate to a possible large-scale conflict in 
the near future. We need faster and more efficient procurement. We need to find new ways of 
working with allies and partners who share the same goals. 

Rebuilding  European  defence  requires,  as  a  starting  point,  a  massive  investment  over  a 
sustained  period.  Together  we  must  accelerate  work  on  all  strands  to  urgently  ramp  up 
European defence readiness to ensure that Europe has a strong and sufficient European defence 
posture by 2030 at the latest, thereby also increasing our contribution to Trans-Atlantic security.  

This White Paper provides a framework for the ReArm Europe plan, laying out the case for a 
once-in-a-generation surge in European defence investment. It sets out the necessary steps to 
rebuild  European  defence,  to  support  Ukraine,  address  critical  capability  shortfalls  and 
establish a strong and competitive defence industrial base.  

For the short term, this White Paper lays out concrete options for collaboration among Member 
States to urgently replenish their stocks of ammunition, weapons and military equipment. This 
is  also  essential  to  maintain  and  enhance  military  support  to  Ukraine. As  the  White  Paper 
outlines, support for Ukraine is the immediate and most pressing task for European defence. 
Ukraine is currently the frontline of European defence, resisting a war of aggression driven by 
the single greatest threat to our common security.  

For  the  medium-longer  term,  it  points  to  several  critical  capability  areas,  where  gaps  have 
already  been  identified  by  Member  States  in  the  EU  and  NATO’s  capability  priorities’ 
initiatives. It proposes that Member States  urgently pool  their efforts  to  address  these gaps, 
including through a set of Defence Projects of Common European Interest, to be defined by 
Member  States  and  that  would  benefit  from  EU  incentives.  EU  support  to  collaborative 
capability  development  will  thus  facilitate  EU  Member  States  in  NATO  to  deliver  on  their 
capability targets more quickly and economically and with enhanced interoperability from the 
outset.  Finally,  the White  Paper  suggests  directions  for  strengthening  the  European  defence 
technological  and  industrial  base,  stimulating  research  and  creating  an  EU-wide  market  for 
defence equipment.  

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2. A RAPIDLIY DETERIORATING STRATEGIC CONTEXT 

Threats to European security are proliferating in a way that poses an acute threat to our way of 
life. Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there was growing consciousness of 
just  how  dangerous  a  security  environment  we  operate  in.  This,  in  turn,  has  impacted  our 
political  system,  and  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  economic  growth  as  people  fear  the 
consequences of a break of the international order due to the behaviour of hostile actors. 

First, the European Union’s geography and indeed history make it vulnerable to certain types 
of challenges in the wider European neighbourhood. Proximity to North Africa and the Middle 
East makes Europe a receptacle for the spill-over of the wars, migration, and effects of climate 
change that have afflicted these regions. To the north, the Artic is becoming  a new arena of 
geopolitical competition. Across the Atlantic, the United States, traditionally a strong ally, is 
clear  that  it  believes  it  is  over-committed  in  Europe  and  needs  to  rebalance,  reducing  its 
historical role as a primary security guarantor.  

Second, there are a wide range of different types of security threats that are increasingly inter-
connected  and  increasing  in  prevalence.  These  include  instances  of  terrorism  and  violent 
extremism, hybrid attacks, the actions of international organised crime groups and networks of 
cyber  criminals.  Evidence  of  connections  between  these  groups  and  hostile  state  actors  is 
growing, enabled by new technologies which easily transcend borders.  

Third, one of the distinguishing factors of this new era is the  extent to which these security 
challenges  are  strategic  in  nature  and  therefore  require  a  strategic  response.  For  example, 
Russia poses a major strategic threat on the battlefield. It has forced Europe and our partners 
to confront the reality of major mechanised high-intensity war on the European continent on a 
scale not seen since 1945. Russia – already the most heavily armed European state by a huge 
distance – is now running a war economy, focused overwhelmingly on the prosecution of its 
war aims, based on industrial mobilisation and technological innovation.  

Meanwhile, the security implications of the rise of China are similarly strategic in nature. The 
challenge posed by China is systematic in that it is based on an entirely different – authoritarian 
and non-democratic – system of government to that of the EU. It is also systemic in that it is 
tied up with China’s approach to trade, investment and technology by which it seeks to achieve 
primacy and in some cases supremacy.  

In an era in which threats are proliferating and systemic competition is increasing, Europe must 
be strategic in its response. This requires us to harness the strengths of the European Union but 
also to address areas of comparative weakness, such as our ability to set clear central direction 
of travel. Otherwise, Europe will be less able to decide our own future and increasingly pushed 
around by large economic, technological and military blocs seeking to gain advantage over us. 

In  the  short  term,  the  future  of  Europe  is  being  determined  by  the  fight  in  Ukraine.  In  the 
medium to long-term, on the current trajectory some of the challenges we face will only become 
more  acute. The  rest  of  the  world  is  engaged  in  a  race  towards  military  modernisation  and 
technological and economic advantage. This race is intensifying, and Europe has yet to carve 
out a fully coherent response to meet the gravity of the current moment. 

Russia  will  continue  to  scale  up  its  war  economy,  supported  by  Belarus,  the  Democratic 
People’s  Republic  of  Korea  and  Iran.  Russia  has  been  massively  expanding  its  military-
industrial  production  capacity  with  an  estimated  spending  in  2024  of  40%  of  the  Russian 

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federal budget and up to 9% of its GDP (up from 6% in 2023) on defence. In 2025, Russia is 
expected to  surpass  Member States’  defence spending  in  purchasing  power parity terms.  In 
addition to that, Russia has made it clear that according to their understanding they remain at 
war with the West. If Russia is allowed to achieve its goals in Ukraine, its territorial ambition 
will  extend  beyond.  Russia  will  remain  a  fundamental  threat  to  Europe’s  security  for  the 
foreseeable future, including its more aggressive nuclear posture and the positioning of nuclear 
weapons in Belarus. Russia is exploiting a network of systemic instability, including through 
close  cooperation  with  other  authoritarian  powers.  It  is  persistently  fuelling  tensions  and 
instability in Europe’s neighbourhood, whether it is in the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova 
or Armenia and has a growing destabilising influence in Africa. 

While China is a key trading partner for the EU, it is increasing defence spending, with a lack 
of transparency around its military build-up. It now has the second highest military spending 
in the world, surpassing all other East Asian countries combined. It is rapidly expanding its 
military capabilities, including nuclear, space and cyber capabilities. This shift is significantly 
altering  the  strategic  balance  in  the  Indo-Pacific.  China’s  military  and  defence  industrial 
modernisation is both quantitative and qualitative. China is intensifying its political, economic, 
military, cyber and cognitive measures to coerce Taiwan, while remaining below the threshold 
of direct  confrontation. The shifting Taiwan status quo raises the risk of a major disruption 
which  would  have  profound  economic  and  strategic  consequences  for  Europe.  In  addition, 
China’s actions in the East and South China Seas are destabilising the region, while its growing 
military projection in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean is raising concerns among European 
partners.  

Geopolitical rivalries fuel more instability in several parts of the world. This not only affects 
European security, but it also puts our economy at risk. In the Middle East, both the ceasefire 
in  Gaza  and  the  fall  of  the Assad  regime  in  Syria  provide  opportunities  to  reduce  regional 
tensions  and  end  human  suffering.  This  could  also  reduce  economic  insecurity  and  avoid 
spillovers, including around the Red Sea. Iran’s direct link with Russia, its military ambitions, 
its  support  to  proxy  forces  and  its  role  in  destabilising  the  region  continue  to  be  a  serious 
concern for European security. The fragile situation in Israel/Palestine, Syria and Lebanon will 
have to be closely monitored, to avoid renewed tensions.  

Conflicts,  instability  and  growing  violent  extremism  across  Africa,  including  in  the  Sahel, 
Libya and Sudan, have direct security and economic implications for Europe and will continue 
to breed instability.  

The growing hybrid threats include cyber-attacks, sabotage, electronic interference in global 
navigation  and  satellite  systems,  disinformation  campaigns  and  political  and  industrial 
espionage,  as  well  as  weaponisation  of  migration.  Sabotage  activities  in  the  Baltic  and  the 
Black Seas are on the rise. Marine and maritime activities and associated traffic and critical 
undersea infrastructure are under threat. Europe’s freedom of action in air and space is also 
increasingly threatened. 

Geopolitical rivalries have not only led to a new arms race but have also provoked a global 
technology race. Technology will be the main feature of competition in the new geopolitical 
environment. A handful of  critical  and foundational  technologies like AI, quantum, biotech, 
robotics, and hypersonic are key inputs for both long term economic growth, and military pre-
eminence. Boosting innovation is key for this. As such, technology diffusion for commercial 
purposes  must  be  reconciled  with  more  rigid  technology  ecosystems  to  advance  national 
security objectives. The EU’s strategic competitors are heavily investing in this area. 

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The  same  applies  to  security  of  supply  of  critical  raw  materials,  fundamental  for  our 
economic  and  industrial  production,  defence  capabilities  and  competitiveness.  They  are 
increasingly  a  cause  for  competition  and  conflicts  and  part  of  power  politics,  as  excessive 
dependencies can be exploited. As an example, an escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait 
could cut the EU off from access to key materials, critical technologies and components. 

In a harsher world of hyper-competitive and transactional geopolitics, reaching across different 
theatres, the EU needs to be able to effectively counter any challenge and be ready, even for 
the most extreme military contingencies such as armed aggression.  

3. EUROPEAN READINESS 2030  

Given the changes in the strategic environment it is important for Europe to build-up sufficient 
deterrence capacity to prevent a potential war of aggression.  

Member  States  will  always  retain  responsibility  for  their  own  troops,  from  doctrine  to 
deployment, and for the definition needs of their armed forces. Furthermore, the EU will always 
act in a way that is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy 
of certain Member States and taking into consideration the security and defence interests of all 
Member States.  

However,  there  is  a  lot  the  EU  can  do  to  support  and  coordinate  Member  States’  efforts  to 
strengthen  the  defence  industrial  base  and  the  EU’s  overall  defence  readiness,  including 
European  contributions  to  NATO’s  deterrence  and  collective  defence.  By  creating  the 
necessary conditions to massively frontload investment in defence sector, providing necessary 
predictability to industry and reducing red-tape, the EU will support Member States to achieve 
full readiness in 2030.  

The  EU  complements  and  multiplies  Member  States’  individual  efforts.  Regardless  of  the 
format  chosen  by  Member  States,  undertaking  collaborative  projects  will  enhance 
coordination, thus  generating economies  of scale and improving delivery timelines. In turn, 
this will boost the production capacity of European defence industry. 

The EU is bringing value-added by:  

• 

• 

facilitating greater collaboration and efficient scale for the European defence industry 
in developing, producing and marketing weapons systems,  
facilitating  efficiencies,  interchangeability  and  interoperability,  lowering  costs  by 
avoiding competitive purchasing and improving purchasing power for Member States, 
while helping to generate stability and predictability with multi-year industrial demand, 
•  supporting  dual-use  infrastructure  for  mobility  and  space-based  communications, 

navigation, and observation,  

•  enabling partnerships. 

This White Paper will be followed by the Preparedness Union Strategy, which will set out an 
integrated all-hazards approach to preparedness for conflicts and crises, and the EU Internal 
Security  Strategy,  which  will  provide  a  comprehensive  and  unified  framework  to  prevent, 
detect and respond effectively to security threats.  

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4. CLOSING THE GAPS  

To credibly deter foreign armed aggression and address the fallout of instability and conflict, 
EU Member States need to have the capabilities necessary to conduct the entire spectrum of 
military  tasks.  Today,  Member  States  suffer  from  critical  capability  gaps  that  affect  the 
execution of complex military operations over a sustained period. Given the rapid deterioration 
of the geopolitical context and rising tensions, Europe needs to acquire the necessary assets in 
a reasonably short timescale.  

Rebuilding European defence requires action across several dimensions, in close coordination 
with NATO. Urgent action and investment are needed to replenish Member States’ depleted 
stocks  of  military  hardware  and  equipment.  Going  forward,  developing  large-scale,  pan-
European cooperation to address critical capability gaps in priority areas is a strategic necessity 
that will take several years to accomplish – so it is all the more urgent to intensify such efforts 
now.  

Critical Capability Gaps 

Closing critical capability gaps requires: 1) a shared understanding among Member States on 
the  most  urgent  capability  investment  priorities,  in  light  of  the  recent  guidance  from  the 
European Council; 2) a stable and long-term commitment to tackle them; 3) a clear agreement 
among Member States on the governance framework for each type of capability, which may 
vary from one to another; and 4) EU funding and incentives to help Member States mobilise 
the necessary budgetary resources and spend them in the most efficient and targeted way. 

The EU already: 

•  helps Member States to identify EU-level capability shortfalls and priorities, 

•  supports Member States in initiating new capability projects, starting with the harmonisation 

of requirements. The Multi-Role Transport Tanker Fleet is a successful example, 

•  supports the aggregation of demand through collaborative procurement, paving the way for 
the industrial phase, and undertaking joint procurement on Member States’ behalf and at 
their request (e.g. 155mm ammunition for Ukraine), 

•  enhances  cooperation  through  the  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  (PESCO)  to 

implement capability and operational defence projects. 

Defence capability domains 

Based on the defence capability gaps already identified by Member States, this White Paper 
sets out seven priority areas which are critical to build a robust European defence. The priority 
capability areas are the following: 

Air  and  missile  defence:  an  integrated,  multi-layered,  air  and  missile  defence  that  protects 
against a full spectrum of air threats (cruise missiles, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, aircraft 
and UAS). 

Artillery  systems:  advanced  fire  systems  including  modern  artillery  and  long-range  missile 
systems  designed  to  deliver  precise,  long-range  attacks  against  land  targets  (deep  precision 
strike).  

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Ammunition  and  missiles:  building  on  the  European  External  Action  Service  initiative 
“Ammunition Plan 2.0”, a strategic stockpile of ammunition, missiles and components along 
with sufficient defence industrial production capacity to ensure timely replenishment.  

Drones and counter-drone systems: unmanned systems, including aerial, ground, surface and 
underwater vehicles that can be controlled remotely or operate autonomously using advanced 
software and sensors and enhance the capabilities that these technologies enable (e.g. situation 
awareness, surveillance, …). 

Military  Mobility:  an  EU-wide  network  of  land  corridors,  airports,  seaports  and  support 
elements  and  services,  that  facilitate  the  seamless  and  fast  transport  of  troops  and  military 
equipment across the EU and partner countries.  

AI, Quantum, Cyber & Electronic Warfare: defence applications using military AI and quantum 
computing;  EU-wide  advanced  electronic  systems  designed  to  a)  protect  and  ensure  the 
unhindered  use  of  the  electromagnetic  spectrum  for  land,  air,  space  and  naval  forces  and 
operations;  b)  suppress,  disrupt  and  deny  the  use  of  the  electromagnetic  spectrum  by  an 
opponent; and c) protect the freedom to operate in cyber space and ensure unhindered access 
to cyber capabilities. Both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are needed to ensure the 
protection and freedom of manoeuvre in cyberspace. There is a need to develop together with 
Member  States  a  voluntary  support  scheme  for  offensive  cyber  capabilities  as  credible 
deterrence.  

Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection: including but not limited to Strategic 
Airlift  and  Air-to-Air  refuelling  aircraft,  intelligence  and  surveillance,  maritime  domain 
awareness, use and protection of space and other secure communications assets and military 
fuel infrastructure 

Reaping the “collaborative dividend” 

There is a strong case for closing these capability gaps in a collaborative manner.  

Both  the  Niinistö  and  the  Draghi  Reports  highlight  that  lack  of  collaboration  has  led  to 
inefficiencies in the development of defence capabilities and imposed additional costs on all 
Member States. As a result, opportunities are missed to leverage European economies of scale 
to  lower  unit  costs.  Low  and  fragmented  Member  States’  defence  spending  on  innovation 
negatively  impacts  emerging  disruptive  technologies  that  are  vital  for  future  defence 
capabilities. 

Capability gaps can be closed through the acquisition of capabilities for high-intensity warfare 
in line with EU and NATO capability processes. The scale, cost and complexity of most projects 
in  these  areas  go  beyond  Member  States’  individual  capacity. Thus,  coordinated  action 
benefiting from support of the whole EU toolbox would facilitate cost-effective procurement 
and  prompt  the  ramp-up  of  European  defence  industrial  capacity,  strengthening  our 
technological base including defence technology innovation. 

Collaborative  procurement  is  the  most  efficient  means  to  procure  large  numbers  of 
‘consumables’ such as ammunition, missiles and drones. But collaborative procurement is also 
key to deliver on more complex projects since aggregation of demand constrains costs, sends 
clearer demand signals to market participants, shortens lead times and ensures interoperability 
and interchangeability. Since 2007, in the framework of the European Defence Agency (EDA), 

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Member States have agreed a common target of 35% of total defence equipment procurement 
to be done collaboratively. This target has been mirrored in the commitments of the PESCO, 
launched in 2017. 

Different collaborative formats and frameworks are available to Member States. These formats 
include  but  are  not  limited  to:  ad-hoc  multinational  cooperation  such  as  a  ‘lead  nation’ 
framework; the European Defence Agency, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency or 
the Organisation for joint armaments cooperation (OCCAR). If so requested by Member States, 
the Commission could also act as central purchasing body on behalf of Member States. 

Military Mobility and Infrastructure  

Military mobility is an essential enabler for European security and defence and our support to 
Ukraine.  It enhances the ability of Member States and allies’  armed  forces to  swiftly  move 
troops and equipment across the EU in case of conflict or intensified hybrid warfare. This will 
demonstrate our readiness and deterrence. Strengthening the logistics of the armed forces also 
matches the need to make our economy more connected and competitive – a perfect fit in terms 
of  dual  use.  Although  significant  progress  has  been  made  in  recent  years,  there  remain 
considerable obstacles to moving troops and equipment unhindered across the EU.  

Military mobility is impeded by red tape, often requiring both diplomatic clearance specific to 
military  transports  and  compliance  with  regular  administrative  rules  and  processes.  Current 
non-harmonised procedures, including customs, often cause severe delays in the issuance of 
cross-border permissions. To accelerate Europe’s independent deterrence and our support to 
Ukraine, the EU and Member States need to immediately simplify and streamline regulations 
and procedures and ensure priority access for the armed forces to transport facilities, networks 
and assets, also in the context of maritime security. 

For their movements, the armed forces need access to critical transport infrastructure that is fit 
for  a  dual-use  purpose. They  need  both  the  availability  of  all  transport modes  and  multiple 
routings across the European Union and connections to partner countries. For this reason, the 
EU  has  identified  four  priority  multi-modal  corridors  (rail,  road,  sea  and  air)  for  military 
mobility for short-notice and large-scale movements of troops and equipment. These corridors 
need  substantial  and  urgent  investments  to  facilitate  the  movement  of  troops  and  military 
equipment.  Within  these  four  priority  corridors,  500  hot-spot  projects  have  already  been 
earmarked that need to be upgraded urgently (such as widening railway tunnels, reinforcing 
road and railway bridges, expanding port and airport terminals). Their security, maintenance 
and  repair  also  need  to  be  assured.  The  EU  and  Member  States  need  to  identify  possible 
immediate and future energy supply bottlenecks together with relevant partners, in particular 
NATO. 

Military mobility can also be further strengthened by increased availability of specialised and 
dual-use transport assets in all transport modes. The EU can add value by facilitating the joint 
procurement,  pre-contracting  assets  and  using  uniform  design  standards  for  dual-use  and 
defence and security capabilities. Strengthened cooperation with EU industries would allow to 
increase  supply  of  such  critical  assets  and  maintain  lead  market  position  of  European 
companies offering dual use technologies.  

The Commission, in consultation with the High Representative, will review all  existing EU 
legislation  impacting  military  mobility,  including  stricter  rules  towards  the  ownership  and 
control of such critical transport infrastructure, will map and upgrade the necessary dual-use 

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and critical transport infrastructure and will consider appropriate actions to remove persistent 
obstacles  and  secure  access  of  military  to  specialised  transport  assets.  Long-term  dual-use 
infrastructure projects would also benefit from greater financial predictability.  

The  EU  will  adopt  a  Joint  Communication  on  Military  Mobility,  including  the  necessary 
legislative proposals, this year.  

Border protection 

The defence of all EU land, air and maritime borders is important, in particular as regards the 
EU  Eastern  border. The  project  for  an  Eastern  Border  Shield  is  a  noteworthy  exercise  by  a 
number of Member States to confront the growing challenges in that region. It would establish 
an integrated land border management system that is designed to strengthen the EU’s external 
land border with Russia and Belarus against military and hybrid threats. That would include a 
comprehensive mix of physical barriers, infrastructure development and modern surveillance 
systems. 

Defence Omnibus  

Regulatory simplification and harmonisation must focus both on rules and procedures that are 
specific to the defence sector, and on the impact on the defence industry of EU policies and 
regulations that are not defence-specific, but which impede the European defence technological 
and industrial base (EDTIB) from responding with maximum agility to the current heightened 
needs. 

The Commission will immediately launch a Strategic Dialogue with the defence industry to 
discuss  possible  measures  in  these  areas,  identify  regulatory  hurdles  and  address  defence 
industry challenges. In this context, the Commission will invite the EDA and the EU Military 
Staff  to  share  their  expertise,  as  appropriate.  Based  on  the  outcome  of  this  dialogue,  the 
Commission will present a dedicated Defence Omnibus Simplification proposal by June 2025. 
This will, in particular aim at: 

- 

increasing the cross certification of defence products and facilitating mutual recognition of 
certification where appropriate; 

-  enabling the rapid grant of construction and environmental permits for defence industrial 

projects as a matter of public-interest priority; 

-  ensuring the timely and lawful availability and usability of all necessary materials and other 
inputs in the supply chain of the EDTIB, in particular for essential uses for which adequate 
substitutes are not available; 

-  removing obstacles to the availability at relevant times and locations of military personnel  

-  removing obstacles related to access to finance, including ESG investment; 

-  facilitating  the  exchange  of  confidential  and  sensitive  information  under  conditions  that 

ensure both simplicity and security of handling; 

- 

the streamlining of EU defence industrial programmes to reduce the delivery time, simplify 
the management of EU-funded projects and simplify the treatment of Member States’ co-
funding. 

9 

 
In this context, the EU directives on defence and sensitive security procurement and on intra-
EU transfers of defence-related products will also be subject to regulatory simplification and 
harmonisation. Based on its mid-term review, the aim should also be to simplify and speed up 
the rules and procedures of the European Defence Fund.  

Strategic stockpiles and readiness pools  

The  EU  together  with  Member  States  can  support  the  creation  of  strategic  stockpiles  and 
defence  industrial  readiness  pools. The  European  Defence  Industry  Programme,  EDIP,  will 
support such efforts according to three action lines. First, by supporting industrial actions for 
the  development  of  cross-border  industrial  partnerships  to  coordinate  reserves  of  defence 
products, components and related raw materials. Second, by supporting procurement actions 
to build strategic reserves of relevant components and raw materials. Third, by supporting the 
creation of optimally located strategic reserves (or Defence Industrial Readiness pools) of EU-
made defence products.  

5. INCREASED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE (“Porcupine strategy”) 

Since February 2022, the EU and Member States have provided around EUR 50bn in military 
support  to  Ukraine,  including  through  the  European  Peace  Facility.  This  support  has  been 
critical  to  sustain  Ukraine’s  war  effort.  Ukraine’s  resistance  in  the  face  of  Russia’s  war  of 
aggression has been remarkable. Ukraine’s defence needs will continue to be high well beyond 
any short-term ceasefire or peace agreement. Ukraine will remain at the frontline of European 
defence and security and is the key theatre to define the new international order with its own 
security interlinked with that of the European Union. The EU and its Member States will need 
to enhance Ukraine’s defence and security capacity through a “Porcupine strategy”, so that it 
is able to deter any possible further attacks and ensure a lasting peace. It is thus imperative that 
the EU and its Member States urgently increase their military assistance to Ukraine.  

The  war  of  aggression  has  equally  highlighted  Ukraine’s  highly  innovative  and  thriving 
defence  industry  with  significant  expertise  in  sectors  like AI  and  drones  as  well  as  spare 
capacity in key domains. The can-do attitude and entrepreneurial spirit of young and dynamic 
Ukrainian companies can provide important impulses to Europe's competitiveness and to the 
development of enhanced European defence capabilities. 

EU military support to Ukraine should focus on two mutually reinforcing priorities: 

a. Step up EU military and other forms of assistance to Ukraine 

As  part  of  long-term  security  guarantees  and  in  line  with  the  initiative  by  the  High 
Representative on enhanced military support to Ukraine, the EU and its Member States should 
cover the following:  

-  The provision of large-calibre artillery ammunition with a minimum objective of 2 million 
rounds  per  year.  There  is  a  critical,  short-term  requirement  to  fully  fund  ammunition 

10 

 
 
 
 
deliveries  to  Ukraine  throughout  2025,  including  through  incentivised  donations  from 
stocks and procurement. Ensuring stable deliveries requires financial commitments now. 

-  The provision of air defence systems, missiles (including deep precision strike) and drones 
are  priorities  shared  by  Ukraine  and  Member  States.  Building  on  the  Letter  of  Intent  of 
November  2024,  where  18  Member  States  affirmed  their  willingness  to  collectively  fill 
urgent capability gaps in the short-term by procuring ground-based air defence systems and 
counter-unmanned aerial systems, a two-track ‘Air Defence Initiative’ should be launched 
with  Ukraine, encompassing collective procurement  and financial support to  Ukraine for 
accelerated production of interceptors for short- and medium-range air defence systems.  

-  Drones are an indispensable capability in redressing the asymmetry of military resources in 
the field. The EU and its Member States should continue to support Ukraine’s procurement 
of drones and further support the development  of its own production capacity, including 
through joint ventures between European and Ukrainian industries. 

-  EU and Member States’ efforts to train and equip Ukrainian brigades and actively support 
the regeneration of battalions must consolidate and continue to develop further and evolve 
into an essential element of the future military capacity development of Ukraine after any 
ceasefire.  EUMAM  Ukraine  will  continue  to  deliver  training  beyond  the  75,000 
beneficiaries to-date. Dedicated support and spare parts should also be provided, as close to 
operations as possible, for maintenance, repair and overhaul of battle-damaged equipment 
with a better adaption of military equipment sent to Ukraine to the realities on the ground. 
Equally, there will be significant benefits for European troops to learn from the frontline 
experience of Ukrainian forces.  

-  Direct support to Ukraine’s defence industry is the most effective and cost-efficient way to 
support  Ukraine’s  military  efforts,  notably  through  direct  procurement  orders  from  its 
defence  industry  by  Member  States  for  donation  to  Ukraine.  The  Ukrainian  defence 
industry’s estimated productive capacity will reach approximately EUR 35bn in 2025. To 
this end, Ukraine could use the EU loan which is part of the G7-led Extraordinary Revenue 
Acceleration  (ERA)  initiative.  The  Commission  will  take  all  necessary  measures  to 
frontload financing under this instrument, as well as under the Ukraine Facility, to maximise 
Ukraine’s  macro-economic  margin  for  manoeuvre.  The  ERA  frontloading  will  allow 
Ukraine to boost spending on military needs and to prioritise procurement in Ukrainian and 
European  defence  industries.  In  addition,  the  new  Security  Action  for  Europe  SAFE 
instrument  would  allow  the  Ukrainian  defence  industry  to  participate  in  collaborative 
procurements on the same footing as EU industry. 

-  Enhanced Military mobility is needed to ensure smoother deliveries of military assistance. 
The  EU’s  military  mobility  corridors  should  extend  into  Ukraine,  which  would  enhance 
interoperability and serve as additional security guarantee to deter against future aggression. 

-  Enhanced  access  to  EU  space  assets  and  services  could  be  a  key  enabler  to  enhance 
Ukraine’s defence capacities. The EU should proceed with Ukraine’s request to participate 
to the EU Space Programme including access to space-based governmental services in the 
field of positioning, navigation, and timing, communications, and in Earth observation. The 
EU  should  also  fund  Ukrainian  access  to  services  that  can  be  provided  by  EU-based 
commercial providers, including start-ups and scale-ups, in support of and upon demand of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This will help Ukraine to enhance its resilience by diversifying 
its sources of space-based services. In addition, the EU and its Member States should closely 
cooperate  with  Ukraine  on  the  protection  of  strategic  assets  (e.g.  cyber  threats  targeting 

11 

 
space assets) and invite Ukraine to participate to the EU Space Information Sharing Analysis 
Centre (ISAC).  

The EU Military Staff Clearing House Cell already contributes to coordination of the Member 
States’ military support to Ukraine, in conjunction with the Ukraine Defence Contact Group 
and  NATO’s  Security Assistance  and Training  for  Ukraine. To  reinforce  such  work,  and  to 
enhance  it  with  greater  industrial  cooperation  between  EDTIB  and  the  Ukrainian  defence 
industry, the EU will propose to Ukraine to establish a cross-cutting Task Force. 

b.  Associate  Ukraine  to  EU  initiatives  to  develop  defence  capabilities  and  integrate  the 
respective defence industries  

The past three years have stimulated Ukraine to rapidly develop its military capacity. Ukraine 
is today using its experience from the frontline to continuously adapt and upgrade equipment 
to the point that Ukraine has become the world’s leading defence and technology innovation 
laboratory.  Closer  cooperation  between  the  Ukrainian  and  European  defence  industries  will 
enable  first-hand  knowledge  transfer  on  how  to  best  use  innovation  to  achieve  military 
superiority on the battlefield, including on rapidly scaling up production and updating existing 
capabilities.  

The EDTIB remains however at the forefront of the development of more advanced large-scale 
defence systems and technologies. The integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the 
EDTIB  will  help  it  to  scale  up,  modernise,  consolidate,  and  provide  cost-efficient  defence 
products to the global market.  

The rapid adoption of the EDIP draft Regulation is therefore a top priority. Once agreed, it will 
pave the way for Ukraine’s integration in the European defence equipment market through a 
dedicated  Ukraine  Support  Instrument  (USI)  and  by  opening  the  programme’s  activities  to 
Ukraine’s participation – consistent with what is now proposed for SAFE, under the different 
modalities of that instrument. In this context, the EU Defence Innovation Office in Kyiv could 
be scaled up to expand defence industrial collaboration, allowing the EU to support and profit 
from  Ukraine’s  war  experience  and  to  further  incentivise  the  direct  investment  by  EU 
companies in the Ukrainian defence industrial market. Furthermore, the Commission and the 
High  Representative  recommend  Member  States  to  mandate  the  EDA  to  expand  Ukraine’s 
participation  in  its  activities,  including  the  Hub  for  EU  Defence  Innovation.  Ukrainian 
participation  in  PESCO  projects  and  in  collaborative  opportunities  stemming  from  the 
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) should also be encouraged.  

The  ensuing  staff-to-staff  interaction  and  cooperation  between  the  EU,  Member  States  and 
Ukraine would allow Ukraine to transfer some of its experiences with high-intensity warfare 
to the EU. The lessons would in turn inform and support the identification of future defence 
needs by Member States. 

6. A STRONG & INNOVATIVE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN EUROPE  

The European defence industrial sector is an indispensable prerequisite of defence readiness 
and credible deterrence. Whereas several EU defence companies are globally competitive, the 
EU defence industrial base still has structural weaknesses. At present, the European defence 
industry is not able to produce defence systems and equipment in the quantities and speed that 

12 

 
 
 
 
Member States need. It remains too fragmented with dominant national players catering mostly 
to domestic markets. It has also suffered from under-investment and there is a need to increase 
our investment in and sourcing from the EU industrial sector. To support the defence industry 
to  overcome  these  weaknesses,  the  revision  process  of  the  EU  directive  on  defence  and 
sensitive security procurement scheduled for 2026 will take into account the Competitiveness 
Compass recommendation to introduce a European preference.  

Investing in European defence readiness not only guarantees us the peace of tomorrow; it is 
also an enabler of our competitiveness ambition for European manufacturing. Existing value 
chains or manufacturing capacities in our traditional industries – automotive, steel, aluminium 
or chemicals – can find new opportunities in repurposing and supplying a growing footprint of 
a defence industrial base, while new ecosystems and value chains for cutting-edge technologies 
– like AI or advanced electronics – can feed into both civilian and military applications.  

Through  targeted  policies  the  EU  should  support  the  European  defence  industry  across  six 
strategic directions: a) supporting, reinforcing and promoting industrial capacities across the 
EU; b) securing the supply of critical industry inputs and reducing dependencies; c) building a 
true EU-wide Market for Defence equipment; d) simplifying existing rules and cutting red tape; 
e) boosting  research  and  development  to  foster  innovation;  and  f)  keeping,  attracting  and 
developing talent, enhancing skills and expertise in the defence sector. 

Aggregate demand to ramp up defence industrial production capacity 

A massive ramp-up of European defence industrial production capacity is a prerequisite for 
Member States to be able to acquire the critical capabilities they currently lack. In addition to 
resolving  supply-chain  issues  and  logistic  bottlenecks,  scaling  up  production  capacities 
depends on companies having a steady stream of solid, multi-year orders to steer investment in 
additional production lines.  

Long-term orders are the best way to increase predictability for the European defence industry 
and provide the necessary long-term investment signals, as shown by the European defence 
industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) programme. To support 
this need, the EU can on the one hand foster more systematic aggregation of Member States 
demand in the EDA framework to prepare and structure joint procurement on a large scale and 
based  on  multi-year  contracts  supported  by  EU  instruments.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Commission and the EDA can, in cooperation with the Member States, strengthen the dialogue 
with industry to provide them with predictability and better anticipate their aggregated needs, 
which would allow each industrial player to engage in output planning that would contribute 
to meeting those overall needs. This dynamic sharing of information on prospective demand 
and  output  ramp-up  would  also  in  turn  allow  the  EU  to  better  tailor  support  measures,  to 
incentivise collaborative procurement and industrial ramp-up.  

Additionally, availability of European defence equipment in time and volume is a pre-requisite 
for  enhanced  security,  reduction  of  dependencies  and  increased  competitiveness  of  the 
European Defence Industrial base. In line with the EDIP proposal, the EU intends to launch a 
pilot  to  gradually  set  up  a  European  Military  Sales  Mechanism  with  the  view  to  increase 
availability and delivery time for defence products from Europe.  

Reducing dependencies and ensuring security of supply 

Enhancing the resilience of EU defence value-chains is also key for defence readiness. The 
Commission  set  up  the  Observatory  of  Critical  Technologies  for  space  and  defence  value-

13 

 
chains to build knowledge of respective criticalities and systematically monitor them, and to 
develop relevant technology road maps. 

In defence, industry access to critical inputs is a key factor. When the European market relies 
only on one or a handful of suppliers of key goods, services or other inputs, EU policies and 
investments should strengthen European economic security by minimising the potential for the 
weaponisation of dependencies or economic coercion. Thus, with the Strategic Dialogue with 
the European defence industry, the Commission, supported by the EDA, will aim to clearly 
identify the critical raw materials and key components (e.g. chips) that are most critical and the 
possible measures to ensure a diversification of supply sources with EU support.  

In parallel, the planned creation of a platform for the joint purchase of critical raw materials 
will contribute to cost-effective and secure supplies. The EU will also support the development 
of home-grown alternatives for technologies, components and processes that it needs to control 
(e.g. through EDF projects  or dual-use frameworks). It could  seek  and promote technology 
transfers if needed, to benefit from cutting edge technologies and state-of-the-art research, and 
initiate a long-term effort to address the issue of restrictions that are imposed on third-country 
technologies.  

Building a true EU-wide Market for Defence equipment, simplifying and harmonising rules 

As demonstrated in the Letta Report, the case for an EU-wide Market for Defence equipment 
has  become  much  stronger  and  far  more  urgent.  Member  States  are  buying,  compared  to  a 
decade  ago,  up  to  four  times  more  equipment,  often  from  non-EU  suppliers.  However,  no 
European national defence market has the size required to sufficiently scale up the European 
defence industry.  

Member States need to be able to fully rely on the EDTIB and European defence supply chains, 
especially in times of crisis and conflict. This means guaranteed access to defence products, 
components, and spare parts through a comprehensive security of supply regime.  

A  truly  functioning  EU-wide  Market  for  Defence  equipment  would  be  one  of  the  largest 
domestic defence markets in the world. Such a market would help achieve key objectives such 
as global competitiveness, readiness and greater industrial scale. EDTIB firms could have a 
larger defence industrial footprint throughout the EU, including in those Member States that 
are close to the most pressing security threat. It would also boost market opportunities across 
Member  States  through  cross-border  industrial  collaborations,  mergers  and  acquisitions  or 
start-ups, thereby prompting more EU-made defence products. 

Regulatory simplification and harmonisation must focus on rules and procedures for defence 
procurement,  intra-EU  transfers  of  defence-related  products,  mutual  recognition  of  national 
certification permits and permit granting. In addition, the impact on the defence industry of EU 
policies and regulations that are not defence-specific needs to be reviewed. 

Transforming defence through disruptive innovation 

The potential of some technologies for defence superiority is an important lever that needs to 
be urgently strengthened at European level. New technologies are fundamentally changing the 
nature of warfare in several domains. AI, cloud and quantum computing, advanced and secure 
connectivity, autonomous systems and alternative energy sources have indeed the capacity to 
disrupt and transform traditional approaches to warfare. Innovations in drone technology are 

14 

 
already dictating the way battles are fought, and the role of robotics is poised to grow, with 
autonomous  ground  vehicles  taking  the  lead  in  early  combat  operations.  These  machines, 
capable of reconnaissance, direct assaults, and logistical support, are already having an impact 
on battlefields. AI powered military robots are still in early stages of development and there is 
ample opportunity for Europe to excel in robot weapons and the software required to power 
them. However, the window of opportunity is very narrow as strategic competitors and rivals 
are heavily investing in these areas, as well as in new technologically complex segments such 
as hyper-sonic missiles, directed-energy weapons, seabed and space warfare.  

Member States need the European defence industry to be able to design, develop, manufacture 
and deliver these products and technologies faster and at scale. In the context of substantially 
increased  defence  expenditure,  a  higher  share  needs  to  be  invested  in  defence  research  and 
development  and  technology,  concentrating  efforts  and  resources  on  common  European 
projects. The EU should support the development of new and innovative industrial processes 
such as distributed design and manufacturing, additive manufacturing and the use of AI. To this 
end,  the  EU’s  Defence  Innovation  Scheme  (EUDIS)  and  the  Hub  for  European  Defence 
Innovation (HEDI) could be leveraged. For example, EUDIS, developed under the EDF with 
a  EUR  2  billion  budget,  proposes  innovation  support  services  for  single  entities,  including 
through matchmaking with investors, partners and end-users, and supports innovative product 
and technology testing and validation. With increased funding, the EDA could use HEDI to run 
simultaneous experimentation campaigns to quickly promote the most innovative solutions and 
integrate  them  into  existing  or  new  capabilities  through  accelerated  development  loops.  In 
parallel, Commission funds the EIF’s Defence Equity Facility, which supports venture capital 
and  private  equity  funds  that  are  investing  in  European  companies developing  innovative 
defence technologies with dual use potential. 

In the realm of deep tech, the distinction between civilian and defence is blurred. As a result, 
innovative  civilian  startups  and  relevant  R&I  results  can  play  a  crucial  role  in  developing 
cutting-edge  solutions  that  can  significantly  enhance  military  capabilities  and  improve 
operational  readiness.  Although  Europe  is  a  technological  powerhouse,  this  does  not  yet 
translate into a capacity to fully leverage the potential of technology to gain military superiority. 
There is therefore urgency for the EU to mobilise its overall innovation  capacity and direct 
significant investments to regaining edge and prevent being technologically dependent.  

The EU will come forward with a European Armament Technological Roadmap, leveraging 
investment into dual use advanced technological capabilities at EU, national and private level. 
In an initial phase the EU will focus on AI and quantum. The Commission will also ensure that 
the European Innovation Council and the planned TechEU Scale-up Fund will invest in dual-
use technologies. 

SMEs  play  an  ever  more  important  role  as  agile  providers  of  disruptive  technologies  and 
innovation in the defence community. The Commission has therefore taken action to support a 
more active contribution of SMEs to EU defence R&I, notably by providing dedicated EDF 
calls targeted at SMEs whilst encouraging their participation in all other projects. Cross-border 
cooperation involving SMEs is one of the award criteria of the EDF programme, and financial 
bonuses apply based on the level of involvement of SMEs for development actions. In the 2023 
EDF calls, the participation of SMEs represented around 50% of the total number of entities, 
requesting 30% of total requested grant amount. For the period 2023-2027 it is estimated that 
EDF should fund SMEs with up to EUR 840 million. In addition, EDIP would provide for the 
creation  of  a  Fund  to Accelerate  Defence  Supply  Chain  Transformation  (FAST).  This  new 

15 

 
financial instrument could generate a multiple of the budget allocated to the initiative by EDIP 
in loans or equity investments. 

The EU needs to mobilise its overall innovation capacity and direct significant investment to 
regain  its  edge,  avoid  becoming  more  technologically  dependent  and  reap  the  benefits  of 
spillover  effects  in  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  Europe  is  already  home  to  some  new 
innovative defence technological actors. To accelerate the emergence of European defence tech 
players,  the  regulatory  environment  needs  to  be  more  conducive  towards  risk-taking.  The 
Commission  will  intensify  the  dialogue  with  new  defence  players  and  private  investors  to 
propose regulatory simplification measures as well as greater availability of risk capital and 
business opportunities. 

Skills and talent to innovate 

Closing the capability gaps includes covering the complete capability development cycle in the 
defence sector, from research to acquisition to operation and maintenance. The success of this 
approach  relies  on  the  availability  of  technological  skills  and  innovative  talent  within  the 
defence industry, including supply chain players from SMEs to prime contractors. Although 
the  European  defence  sector  has  skilled  and  specialised  employees,  a  large-scale  defence 
industrial ramp-up will require industry to attract, train, employ, up- and reskill far more talent, 
from technicians to engineers and specialised experts. The  Union of Skills foresees a Skills 
Guarantee for workers in sectors undergoing restructuring or at the risk of unemployment to 
have the opportunity  to  develop  their careers in  other sectors, including  defence. Advanced 
STEM  (Science, Technology,  Engineering  and  Mathematics)  skills  are  essential  to  develop 
next-generation capabilities, as also underlined in the Union of Skills, including notably the 
area of security and defence.  

The fast and complex evolution of technologies is creating opportunities for new types of jobs 
and is demanding a renewal in skill sets. Defence industry employees will need to effectively 
process, exploit and disseminate data and exploit novel technologies in new capability areas 
such as autonomous systems, cybersecurity systems, intelligent information systems or high-
performance computing systems. The European defence industry will need to compete with 
other sectors for similar skills while, at the same time, its expansion will create opportunities 
for reskilling / upskilling for redundant jobs from other industrial sectors. 

7. A SURGE IN DEFENCE SPENDING 

Member States’s defence spending has grown by more than 31% since 2021, reaching 1.9% of 
the EU’s combined GDP or EUR 326bn in 2024. Specifically, defence investment reached an 
unprecedented  EUR  102bn  in  2024,  almost  doubling  the  amount  spent  in  2021.  Yet,  on 
aggregate,  European  defence  spending  remains  far  lower  than  that  of  the  US  and,  more 
worryingly, below that of Russia or China. Rebuilding European defence will require massive 
investment over a sustained period, both public and private.  

With  the  ReArm  Europe  Plan,  the  Commission  has  identified  five  pillars  to  urgently  and 
significantly step up European defence spending. 

The 5 pillars will help address the most immediate needs and help mitigate the consequences 
of past under-investment.  

16 

 
 
(1) A new, dedicated financial instrument to support Member States’ defence investments 

Given the urgency, the Commission proposes a new EU regulation under Article 122 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to provide Member States with loans backed 
by  the  EU  budget.  With  up  to  EUR  150bn,  the  Security  and  Action  for  Europe  (SAFE) 
instrument  will  strongly  support  a  significant  increase  in  Member  States’  investments  in 
Europe’s defence capabilities, now and over this decade.  

SAFE will support the European defence industry through common procurements involving at 
least  two  countries,  out  of  which  one  shall  be  a  Member  State  receiving  SAFE  financial 
assistance and the other may be another Member State, an EFTA State, member of the EEA or 
Ukraine.  These  common  procurements  would  cover  the  priority  capabilities  and  enablers 
identified by the special European Council of 6 March 2025. The simpler and most urgent of 
these  capabilities,  such  as  ammunition  or  military  mobility,  would  be  subject  to  eligibility 
conditions akin to those of the EDIRPA programme. More complex and high-tech systems, like 
AI or air defence, would be subject to stricter conditions inspired by the legislative discussions 
on EDIP, in light of the higher requirements for strategic autonomy.  

Allocations are available to all Member States. They will be demand-based and underpinned 
by  national  defence  industrial  plans.  Once  the  respective  plans  are  approved  and  the  loan 
agreement signed, pre-financing will be available.  

The instrument includes provisions to further incentivise and facilitate common procurement, 
such  as  the  possibility  of  opening  existing  framework  agreements  and  contracts  for  new 
partners  and  a  VAT  waiver  for  purchases  financed  by  SAFE.  It  also  promotes  the  use  of 
common standards.  

Other partner countries’ entities and products can be eligible for common procurements subject 
to an agreement with the Union on financial conditions and security of supply. 

(2) The coordinated activation of the National Escape Clause of the Stability and Growth Pact 

The Commission Communication on ‘Accommodating increased defence expenditure within 
the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact’  proposes  the  coordinated  activation  of  the  National  Escape 
Clause by all Member States to unlock additional flexibility for higher defence expenditure.  

The flexibility will allow for a deviation from the agreed expenditure path equivalent to the 
increase  in  defence  expenditure  (including  both  investment  and  current  expenditure)  since 
2021. A period of four years (extendable) is considered. Thanks to this flexibility, Member 
States  could  mobilise  additional  defence  expenditure  of  up  to  1.5%  of  GDP.  Based  on 
projections of gradual take-up, defence investment could reach at least EUR 800bn over the 
next four years, including the expenditure financed by the EUR 150bn from SAFE, which will 
be automatically eligible under the national escape clauses.  

(3) Making existing EU instruments more flexible to allow greater defence investment 

In the short term, the EU can do more to support the urgent need to increase European defence 
investments with the EU budget.  

Cohesion policy already contributes to defence and security capabilities. It funds security and 
defence-related investments that contribute to regional development as defence industries often 

17 

 
create research and development and industrial ecosystems which benefit Europe’s regions and 
communities.  

National, regional and local authorities can voluntarily use the mid-term review of cohesion 
policies  to  allocate  funds  within  their  current  programmes  towards  emerging  priorities, 
including strengthening defence and security capabilities.  

In  the  context  of  the  mid-term  review  of  the  2021-2027  programmes,  the  Commission  will 
propose next week a package of measures to provide flexibility and incentives towards this. 

The development of a strong and resilient European defence industry will support European 
competitiveness and promote regional development and economic growth. 

(4) Contributions from the European Investment Bank 

The European investment Bank has a clear and decisive role to play in the funding of European 
defence. The EIB Group’s Security and Defence Action Plan was an important first step and 
its implementation should accelerate. 

In addition, the EIB intends to introduce changes to further widen the scope of its defence-
related  funding.  It  will  double  its  annual  investment  to  EUR  2bn,  to  fund  projects  such  as 
drones, space, cybersecurity, quantum technologies, military facilities, and civil protection. It 
proposes  a  further  adjustment  of  the  Group’s  eligibility  criteria,  to  ensure  that  excluded 
activities are more precisely defined and as limited as possible in scope in order to align with 
the  new  policy  priorities  of  the  EU.  Finally,  it  will  propose  a  revision  of  its  operational 
framework  and  replace  the  ad-hoc  Strategic  European  Security  Initiative  with  a  dedicated 
transversal public policy goal to contribute to Europe’s peace and security, with an ambitious 
financial and capital allocation. These are further steps in the right direction.  

(5) Mobilising private capital  

Boosting public investment in defence is indispensable, but it will not be sufficient. European 
companies including Small and Medium Enterprises and Mid-Caps must have better access to 
capital, including guarantee instruments for de-risking investments, to bring their solutions to 
industrial scale and to drive the industrial ramp-up that Europe needs.  

The financial sector shows a growing interest in defence. Yet, the defence sector remains an 
under-served market due to limitations in investment policies of public and private financial 
institutions. Access to finance remains a major concern for 44% of defence SMEs, which is 
much higher than for civilian SMEs. They have fewer opportunities than in the US or in the 
UK, and US investors represent 60% of the total.  

The Savings and Investment Union should help channel additional private investment towards 
EU  priorities,  including  the  defence  sector.  It  could,  alone,  attract  hundreds  of  billions  of 
additional investments per year in the European economy, boosting its competitiveness. To this 
end the Commission is putting forward a Communication on a Savings and Investments Union. 

The EU’s Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation (SFDR) does not prevent the financing 
of  the  defence  sector.  However,  both  the  finance  and  defence  sector  may  benefit  from 
additional  clarification  on  the  application  of  the  SFDR.  The  Commission  will  provide  the 
necessary clarification in the context of the review of the SFDR, on the relationship of defence 
with the investment goals of the sustainability framework. 

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(6) Financial predictability 

The Commission will continue to explore additional funding sources for defence at EU level 
and further elements and options to substantially boost financing for European defence and to 
strengthen the EDTIB. 

Should demand by Member States for loan-based financing supported by the EU budget under 
SAFE outstrip supply, the Commission will continue to explore innovative instruments, such 
as in relation to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 

Given the urgency and priority for Europe to rebuild its defence, underpinned by a competitive 
defence industrial base, the next MFF should provide a comprehensive and robust framework 
in support of EU defence. 

It should support more and better collaborative investment, from research to development of 
complex  systems,  through  commercialisation  to  procurement,  with  a  view  to  increasing 
Europe’s technological sovereignty. 

8. ENHANCED SECURITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS 

Security  challenges  often  have  global  implications,  requiring  international  cooperation. 
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has a wide-scale impact beyond Europe. Hybrid threats 
and cyber-attacks do not respect borders. Nor does security in space or at sea. The EU must 
therefore  work  closely  together  with  international  organisations  and  partner  countries  to 
address these threats effectively 

Cooperation  with  partners  is  also  key  to  tackle  the  challenges  of  European  defence  and 
European  defence  industry,  including  for  diversifying  suppliers  and  reducing  dependencies. 
The EU’s wide partnerships on peace, security and defence are a key source of strength and 
resilience.  The  EU  remains  fully  committed  to  promoting  international  cooperation  and 
strengthening  effective  multilateralism  at  all  levels.  We  will  further  expand  and  refine  our 
tailored  partnerships  with  bilateral,  regional  and  multilateral  partners  across  the  globe  in  a 
mutually beneficial way to address a wide range of security challenges, including in the field 
of capability development and innovation.  

The EU will promote an open architecture combined with variable geometry allowing for the 
participation of like-minded partners in cooperative defence projects and initiatives, such as 
PESCO  projects  which  will  be  encouraged  on  a  case-by-case  basis. This  will  contribute  to 
reducing excessive dependencies due to relying only on one or a handful of suppliers of key 
goods,  services  or  other  inputs,  and  enhance  European  economic  security  and  develop  and 
promote European defence capabilities and the competitiveness of the EU’s defence equipment 
market. 

NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defence of its members in  Europe. EU-NATO 
cooperation is an indispensable pillar for the development of the EU’s security and defence 
dimension. The EU’s unique tools of regulatory power and financial instruments help the 23 
EU Member States in NATO to achieve their capability targets.  

A strong transatlantic bond remains crucial for Europe’s defence. The United States demands 
that Europe takes more responsibility for its own defence. These efforts shall continue to build 

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on the deep and extensive transatlantic supply chain, which should be mutually beneficial. The 
bilateral dialogue on Security and Defence can be enhanced to further strengthen cooperation 
in fields such as cyber, maritime security and space, discuss procurement issues and tackle any 
other matters of mutual concern. 

The United Kingdom is an essential European ally with which cooperation on security and 
defence should be enhanced in mutual interest, starting with a potential Security and Defence 
partnership. Building  on the set  of solid agreements  in  place, bilateral  security and defence 
cooperation  can  expand,  ranging  from  external  crisis  management  to  defence  industrial 
policies.  

Norway is a full partner in EU defence programmes through its contribution to the EU budget. 
The  recently  launched  Security  and  Defence  Partnership  provides  a  comprehensive  and 
structured political framework for strengthening further dialogue and cooperation. 

Our  cooperation  with  Canada  has  intensified  and  should  be  further  enhanced,  also  to 
strengthen transatlantic security. The bilateral  Security and  Defence dialogue as  well as the 
upcoming  Security  and  Defence  partnership  provide  the  basis  for  enhanced  security  and 
defence cooperation, including on respective initiatives to boost defence industry production. 

The  EU  should  continue  mutually  beneficial  engagement  and  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
security  and  defence  with  all  like-minded  European,  enlargement  and  neighbouring 
countries  (including  Albania,  Iceland,  Montenegro,  the  Republic  of  Moldova,  North 
Macedonia  and  Switzerland)  to  promote  peace,  security  and  stability  on  our  continent  and 
beyond. 

Türkiye is a candidate country for accession to the EU and a longstanding partner in the field 
of Common Security and Defence Policy. The EU will continue to engage constructively to 
develop a mutually beneficial partnership in all areas of common interest based on an equal 
commitment on Türkiye’s side to advance on a path of cooperation on all issues of importance 
to the EU, in line with the European Council conclusions of April 2024. 

The EU should also explore opportunities for defence industrial cooperation with Indo-Pacific 
partners,  notably  Japan,  and  the  Republic  of  Korea  with  which  Security and  Defence 
Partnerships were concluded last November, as well as Australia and New Zealand.  

Security  and  defence  cooperation  with  India  has  developed  over  the  past  years,  including 
through regular Security and Defence Consultations. The EU and India will further explore a 
Security and Defence Partnership. The EU remains committed to upholding peace and security 
in  the  Indo-pacific  region,  including  maritime  security  and  by  tackling  traditional  and  non-
traditional  security  threats  and  safeguarding  sea  lanes  of  communication  and  upholding 
freedom of navigation. 

9. THE WAY FORWARD FOR EUROPEAN DEFENCE 

The geopolitical  context and  Europe’s threat  landscape are changing  dramatically and at  an 
unprecedented speed. Since the Versailles Summit in March 2022, Member States have agreed 
on the need to shoulder a greater responsibility for defence. Several steps have already been 
taken towards more intense cooperation on defence. Still, the aggravation of threats looming 

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over Europe requires the EU to stand firm, be united and act with decisiveness, ambition and 
speed.  

This White Paper sets out a comprehensive plan to rearm Europe and build up its defence to 
tackle these threats, notable as immediate actions:  

•  Member States are invited to request the activation of the National Escape Clause by  the 

end of April. 

•  The Council is invited to adopt the proposed draft Regulation on Security and Action for 

Europe (SAFE) as a matter of urgency.  

•  The co-legislators are invited to adopt the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) 

before Summer, including its Ukraine Support Instrument (USI). 

•  The co-legislators are invited to consider with priority the changes to the European Regional 
Development Fund that will by proposed by the end of March 2025. Following the mid-
term  review  of  cohesion  policies,  national,  regional  and  local  authorities  will  be  able  to 
voluntarily  allocate  funds  within  their  current  programmes  towards  emerging  priorities 
including strengthening defence and security capabilities. 

•  Member States are invited to swiftly step up collaborative defence procurement in line with 
the  target  of  at  least  40%  proposed  by  the  European  Defence  Industry  Strategy  (EDIS), 
including under the aegis of the SAFE instrument. 

•  Member States are invited to swiftly agree on an ambitious new military support initiative for 

Ukraine, including artillery ammunition, air defence and ‘train and equip’. 

•  The Commission will promote the integration of Ukrainian defence industry into the Single 
Market,  support  the  extension  of  military  mobility  corridors  into  Ukraine  and  explore 
Ukraine’s access to EU space-based governmental services.  

•  The  Commission  calls  on  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  European  Investment  Bank  to 
urgently step up support to the European defence industry, notably by further narrowing the 
list of excluded activities and increasing the volume of available funding.  

•  The Commission will immediately launch a Strategic Dialogue with the defence industry, 

also calling on the expertise of the EDA or the EU Military Staff as appropriate.  

•  The Commission will present, by June 2025, a Defence Omnibus Simplification proposal. 

•  The  EU  will  present  a  European Armament  Technological  Roadmap  on  investment  into 

dual-use advanced technological capabilities in 2025. 

•  The Commission and the HR will adopt, by end of 2025, a Joint communication on Military 

Mobility, accompanied by the necessary legislative proposals. 

The EU is and remains a peace project. It must be able to protect its citizens, defend its interests 
and the values it stands for. Ukraine deserves continued military support to defend itself against 
continued military aggression and to ensure that it can defend itself in the future. A surge in 
defence investment would have positive spillover effects across the economy, contributing to 
competitiveness, job creation and innovation in many sectors, from aeronautics to shipbuilding, 
from  steel  to  space,  transport  to AI.  Harnessed  correctly,  this  could  lead  to  a  major  leap  in 
European resilience in a world where threats are proliferating. 

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Europe must make bold choices and build a Defence Union that ensures peace on our continent 
through unity and strength. It owes it to its NATO allies, to Ukraine and primarily to itself, 
European citizens and to the values it stands for. The EU and its Member States must rise to 
this historic challenge. 

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