P10_TA(2025)0033 – Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression – European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression (2025/2528(RSP))
Date: 2025-03-12
Institutions: European Parliament
Subjects: EU aid, EU restrictive measure, Russia, Russo-Ukrainian issue, Ukraine, economic sanctions, financial aid, military cooperation, territorial law, war








C_202503150EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/3150


20.6.2025






P10_TA(2025)0033

Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression


European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2025 on continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression (2025/2528(RSP))

(C/2025/3150)



The European Parliament,







—


having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and on Russia, in particular those adopted since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula on 19 February 2014,










—


having regard to the Helsinki Final Act of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of 1 August 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the OSCE of 21 November 1990 and the UN Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 5 December 1994 (the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances),










—


having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (1), and to the accompanying Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the European Union and Ukraine, signed in 2014,










—


having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC),










—


having regard to the European Council’s decision of 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with Ukraine, following the Commission’s positive recommendation of 8 November 2023 in this regard,










—


having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Ukraine Facility (2), and to other forms of EU support for Ukraine,










—


having regard to the joint statement by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the President of the European Parliament of 24 February 2025 on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,










—


having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-11/7 adopted on 24 February 2025 entitled ‘Advancing a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine’,










—


having regard to the Conclusions of the extraordinary European Council of 6 March 2025,










—


having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,










A.


whereas Russia has been waging an illegal, unprovoked and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022; whereas Russia’s war against Ukraine started in 2014 with the illegal occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula and the subsequent occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; whereas this war of aggression constitutes a blatant and flagrant violation of the UN Charter and of the fundamental principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as established by the Geneva Conventions of 1949;










B.


whereas Russia’s actions in Ukraine over the past three years continue to threaten peace and security in Europe and worldwide; whereas the Russian war of aggression is the largest military conflict on the European continent since the end of the Second World War and reflects the growing conflict between authoritarianism and democracy;










C.


whereas Ukraine and its citizens have shown unwavering determination in resisting Russia’s war of aggression, successfully defending their country, despite the high cost in civilian and military casualties, along with the attacks on residential areas, destruction of civilian and public infrastructure – particularly that providing water and energy – and of the natural environment and cultural heritage, forced deportations, disappearances and illegal adoptions of deported children, illegal imprisonments, mass killings, executions of civilians, soldiers and prisoners of war, torture and the use of sexual violence and mass rape as weapons of war and altering the ethnic composition of the occupied territories of Ukraine, all of which constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity; whereas millions of Ukrainians remain displaced both inside and outside their country; whereas the United Nations has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the Ukrainian authorities estimate that at least 20 000 Ukrainian children have been deported and forcibly displaced from their homes to Russia and Russian-occupied territories since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022; whereas the Russian Federation attempts to deny Ukraine and its people their ethnic, linguistic and historical identity by erasing signs of Ukrainian identity in occupied territories; whereas the brave people of Ukraine were awarded the 2022 Sakharov Prize as a tribute to their courage and resilience;










D.


whereas the UN General Assembly, in its resolution of 2 March 2022, immediately qualified the Russian war against Ukraine as an act of aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and, in its resolution of 14 November 2022, recognised the need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its war of aggression and legally and financially responsible for its internationally wrongful acts, including by making reparation for the injury and damage caused;










E.


whereas on 2 March 2022, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, focusing on war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed on Ukrainian territory from 21 November 2013 onwards and on 17 March 2023 issued arrest warrants for Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Maria Lvova-Belova, so-called Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, for the war crime of unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children, arrest warrants for Sergei Kuzhugetovich Shoigu and Valery Vasilyevich Gerasimov for crimes against humanity including the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects and the war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage to civilian objects; whereas the EU supports the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression;










F.


whereas a number of third countries, notably Iran, North Korea and Belarus, have provided Russia with substantial deliveries of weapons and ammunition, and Belarus has allowed Russia to use its territory to attack Ukraine which amounts to an act of aggression under international law; whereas North Korean troops have been deployed on the battlefield and are fighting alongside the Russian army; whereas Russia and China signed a ‘no-limits partnership’ on 4 February 2022, and subsequently, China has become a key enabler of the Russian war effort through its massive support for Russia’s economy and its defence industrial base, and by supplying dual-use equipment;










G.


whereas the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment report estimates that, as of December 2024, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine will be at least EUR 506 billion over the next decade, which is 2.8 times the estimated nominal gross domestic product of Ukraine for 2024; whereas a total financing gap of EUR 9,62 billion for recovery and reconstruction needs remains for 2025;










H.


whereas the EU has recently adopted its 16th sanctions package against Russia to weaken its economic base, deprive it of critical technologies and limit its ability to wage war; whereas the new sanctions target additional individuals and entities, including military firms, sanctions evaders, non-EU country supporters, Kremlin propagandists, shadow fleet networks, and individuals involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children; whereas the EU sanctions now apply to over 2 400 individuals and entities, subjecting them to asset freezes, funding bans and travel restrictions;










I.


whereas the EU and its Member States have provided the most substantial cumulative support for Ukraine in all areas since the start of the full-scale invasion, and have provided financial support amounting to close to EUR 140 billion, including over EUR 67 billion of support to Ukraine in the form of humanitarian and emergency assistance, budget support and macro-financial assistance and over EUR 48 billion of military aid; whereas approximately EUR 300 billion of Russian sovereign assets were frozen in different jurisdictions; whereas in May 2024, the EU Member States approved the use of financial proceeds generated by immobilised Russian sovereign assets held within the EU, estimated at around EUR 210 billion, to support Ukraine, with the aim of providing up to EUR 3 billion per year in support of Ukraine’s reconstruction and resilience efforts;










J.


whereas many EU Member States continue to purchase fossil fuels from Russia, including liquefied natural gas, imports of which are rising, as well as uranium, contributing to the Russian economy and bolstering its war chest; whereas sales of Russian fossil fuels to the EU since the outbreak of the full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine have exceeded EUR 200 billion;










K.


whereas the EU has welcomed more than four million refugees from Ukraine and has expressed its support for the people of Ukraine and their leadership by launching negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU;










L.


whereas the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine following the positive recommendation of the Commission; whereas the first intergovernmental conference took place on 25 June 2024, launching the negotiation process and adopting the negotiating framework;










M.


whereas, under the administration of US President Donald Trump, the United States has significantly changed its stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine; whereas President Trump is making demands towards Ukraine but has not expressed any demands towards the Russian side, moreover he has downplayed Moscow’s responsibility for starting the war and possibly envisages granting Russia sanctions relief in the short term; whereas between the time of the meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy on 28 February 2025 and 9 March 2025 alone, Russia carried out over 2 100 aerial assaults, including 1 200 guided bomb strikes and nearly 870 drone attacks;










N.


whereas recent US-Russia talks in Riyadh excluded Ukraine and the EU, and the United States did not consult its European allies before ending its part in the effort to isolate Russia; whereas the new US administration, alongside Russia and its allies, voted against a UN General Assembly resolution of 24 February 2025 condemning Russia’s aggression; whereas the American U-turn on the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine threatens Ukraine’s capacity to withstand Russia’s aggression, makes clear that Washington’s commitment to hold Russia accountable is no longer dependable and undermines international efforts to address the crisis;










O.


whereas on 3 March 2025 the United States suspended its military assistance to Ukraine, including that approved by the previous US administration, as well as intelligence sharing with Ukraine; whereas it then cut off Ukraine’s access to commercial satellite imagery collected by the US government system on 7 March 2025;










P.


whereas, according to widely recognised democratic principles and Ukraine’s constitution, elections cannot be held during wartime and under martial law, especially when millions of Ukrainians have been displaced; whereas martial law was declared and continues to be in effect in Ukraine solely because of Russia’s war of aggression; whereas the EU continues to recognise President Zelenskyy as the legitimate leader of Ukraine until democratic elections can be held;










Q.


whereas President Donald Trump ordered a sweeping freeze on US foreign aid, halting hundreds of critical projects in Ukraine, including demining activities, military veteran rehabilitation, humanitarian aid, independent media and anti-corruption initiatives, investigations into Russian war crimes, but also those bolstering Ukraine’s telecommunications networks against Russian cyberattacks;










R.


whereas Russia’s war of aggression shows its imperialistic attitude towards its neighbours; whereas as long as Russia remains a state pursuing revisionist policies, it remains a threat to security on the European continent; whereas the Russian war of aggression is part of a broader set of objectives against the West and its interests and values, the international rules-based order, democracy and security, as openly declared by Vladimir Putin in the weeks preceding the full-scale invasion; whereas numerous international actors have recognised Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism and a state that uses means of terrorism;










S.


whereas Ukraine’s defeat would be widely viewed as a strategic defeat for Europe, the United States and the entire NATO alliance and as a reward for Russia as the aggressor, with far-reaching security consequences, the extent of which cannot be overstated; whereas depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it will likely have a ripple effects in other parts of the world, notably the Indo-Pacific, and could encourage other revisionist powers to pursue their own hegemonic ambitions;










T.


whereas a Special European Council took place on 6 March 2025 dedicated to the situation in Ukraine and the need to strengthen European defence; whereas the European Council endorsed the defence package put forward by the Commission on strengthening European Defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, which could potentially mobilise as much as EUR 800 billion, and reiterated its support for Ukraine, highlighting in particular that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that there can be no negotiations that affect European security without Europe’s involvement, and furthermore that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;










U.


whereas since the outbreak of the war, undersea cables in the Baltic Sea and key infrastructure have been targeted, presumably by Russian and Chinese-linked actors;











1.


Pays tribute, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, to the thousands who have sacrificed their lives for a free and democratic Ukraine; reiterates its unwavering solidarity with the people of Ukraine and its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognised borders; strongly underlines Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter;










2.


Reiterates its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as of the involvement of Belarus, North Korea and Iran; demands that Russia and its proxy forces immediately completely and unconditionally cease all attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure, terminate all military action in Ukraine and withdraw all military forces, proxies and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine; reiterates its policy of non-recognition of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine by Russia, including but not limited to Crimea; demands that the Russian Federation permanently cease violating or threatening the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine; condemns the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population by the Russian invading force and the indiscriminate destruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure; demands the end of forced deportations of Ukrainian civilians, and the release and return of all detained Ukrainians, especially children;










3.


Reiterates its condemnation of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine as an existential threat to European security and stability; emphasises that the crime of aggression against Ukraine is a grave violation of international law and the UN Charter; underlines that the Russian war of aggression has fundamentally changed the geopolitical situation in Europe and beyond, and threatens its security architecture, and that in response this calls for bold, brave and comprehensive political, security and financial decisions by the EU; believes that a Ukraine that is capable of defending itself effectively is an integral part of a stable and predictable European security landscape;










4.


Believes that the outcome of the war and the stance taken by the international community will play a crucial role in influencing future action by other authoritarian regimes, which are closely observing the course of the war and assessing how much space there is for them to exert aggressive foreign policies, including by military means;










5.


Expresses deep concern over the apparent shift in the United States’ stance on Russia’s war of aggression, which has included openly blaming Ukraine for the ongoing war, suspending US military aid, and attempting to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its legitimate right to self-defence and into making territorial concessions; stresses that, in light of this change, the EU and its Member States are now Ukraine’s primary strategic allies and must maintain their role as the largest donor to Ukraine and significantly increase the much-needed assistance they provide to uphold Ukraine’s right to self-defence and step in, as far as possible, to replace suspended USAID funding, while ensuring long-term aid for reconstruction and recovery;










6.


Reiterates its call on the Member States to substantially increase and accelerate their military support, in particular the provision of weapons and ammunition, as well as training, in response to pressing needs (inter alia long range weapons systems, air defence systems, artillery systems, electronic warfare systems, anti-drone capabilities and engineering equipment); urges Member States and their defence industries to invest in and partner with the Ukrainian defence industry in order to maximise the full potential of its production capabilities to produce critical equipment in the most efficient manner following the Danish and Dutch examples; reiterates its position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily, with no less than 0,25 % of their GDP annually; calls on the EU and its Member States to utilise their satellite imagery infrastructure for Ukraine; recalls that the military support to Ukraine must be sufficient to ultimately stop Russia’s war of aggression and allow Ukraine to liberate all its people, re-establish full control over its entire territory within its internationally recognised borders and deter any further aggression by Russia; notes in this context that a number of EU Member States are non-aligned and urges them to increase their support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;










7.


Reaffirms its commitment to supporting Ukraine’s desire for a just and lasting peace and to the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan presented by Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; believes that it is a comprehensive plan to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity and includes the building blocks of a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine based on the principles of the UN Charter and international law, which requires the full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, accountability for war crimes and the crime of aggression, Russian reparations for the massive damage caused in Ukraine, full accountability for those responsible, and exclusion of any future aggressions by Russia; urges the EU and its Member States to work with like-minded partners to ensure that peace negotiations take place in a way that respects the above mentioned principles;










8.


Underlines that any genuine peace negotiations must be conducted in good faith and include Ukraine; recalls that any settlement that excludes Ukraine or undermines its legitimate aspirations, such as its right to choose its own security arrangements, or which lacks credible security guarantees for Ukraine that contribute to deterring future Russian aggression, will be neither just nor viable;










9.


Insists that the EU must contribute to robust security guarantees for Ukraine in order to deter further Russian aggression; underlines that Ukraine must be empowered to resist and prevent further Russian attacks and reject hasty deals that weaken its security in the mid to long term and risk subjecting Ukraine and other European countries to renewed Russian aggression; underlines that Russia’s war economy is not sustainable and coupling orchestrated economic pressure with accelerated military support to Ukraine would enable Ukrainian forces to improve their positions while simultaneously harming Russia’s economy to ensure Ukraine has a stronger negotiating position for Ukraine when it agrees to engage in peace talks;










10.


Strongly deplores any attempts at blackmailing Ukraine’s leadership into surrender to the Russian aggressor for the sole purpose of announcing a so-called ‘peace deal’; considers that the current attempts by the US administration to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement with Russia over the heads of Ukraine and other European states, in which the latter are confronted with the outcome without their meaningful participation, as counterproductive and dangerous, as it leads to empowering the belligerent state, thus showing that an aggressive policy is not punished but rewarded; concludes that, taking into account the history of Russia’s violations of previous agreements and fundamental principles of international law, such a peace can only be reached through strength, including effective security guarantees;










11.


Highlights that the financial support provided by the EU and its Member States to Ukraine exceeds that of any other country, reflecting the Union’s unparalleled commitment to Ukraine and consequently to the security of Europe; underscores that the EU’s role in any negotiations impacting the security of Europe must be commensurate with its political and economic weight; reaffirms that there can be no negotiations touching on European security without the European Union at the table; welcomes efforts by France’s President Macron and the UK’s Prime Minister Starmer to host European emergency summits in Paris and London; welcomes the launch of a ‘coalition of the willing’ to enable a European-led enforcement of an eventual peace agreement;










12.


Expresses dismay concerning the policy of the US administration of appeasing Russia and targeting its allies; warns that this policy undermines the trust of traditional US allies around the world and can have devastating consequences for the transatlantic bond, peace and stability in Europe and beyond;










13.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to take the latest developments in the US-Ukraine relations as the final wakeup call for them to step in as Ukraine’s leading partner and actively work towards maintaining the broadest possible international support for Ukraine, including through building a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ with like-minded partners globally to support Ukraine and increase pressure on Russia;










14.


Welcomes the joint statement by Ukraine and the United States following their meeting in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 11 March 2025, including the resumption of US military assistance and intelligence sharing as well as a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire agreement; recalls that a ceasefire can be an effective tool for suspension of hostilities, only if the aggressor fully adheres to it; expects therefore Russia to agree to it and follow it by ceasing all attacks on Ukraine, its military positions, civilian population, infrastructure and territory;










15.


Expresses concern about the increased tensions in the Baltic Sea with actions of hybrid warfare against critical infrastructure and considers closer cooperation between the Nordic states, Baltic states, Poland and Germany crucial;










16.


Welcomes the conclusions of the Special European Council of 6 March 2025 and its support for a rapid strengthening of European defence through the ‘ReArm Europe’ plan and reiterating its support for Ukraine following the ‘peace through strength’ approach, highlighting in particular that Ukraine’s security and European, transatlantic and global security are intertwined;










17.


Reiterates that Russia’s deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Ukraine, destruction of civilian infrastructure, use of sexual violence and rape as a weapon of war, deportation of thousands of Ukrainian citizens to the territory of the Russian Federation, forced transfer and adoption of Ukrainian children, and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law all constitute war crimes for which all perpetrators must be held accountable;










18.


Emphasises that all those responsible for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine must be held accountable and stresses that no peace will be sustainable without justice; reiterates its call on the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to work together with Ukraine and the international community on setting up a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by Russia and its allies and underlines the need for the jurisdiction of this tribunal to cover the entire leadership of Russia and Belarus responsible for the aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the establishment of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression in Ukraine in The Hague;










19.


Emphasises its full support for the ongoing investigation by the Prosecutor of the ICC into the situation in Ukraine based on alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; welcomes Ukraine’s ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allowed it to become a state party to it as of January 2025; in this context, expresses its utmost concern about the US sanctions against the ICC, its prosecutors, judges and staff, which constitute a serious attack on the international justice system; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the Blocking Statute and on the Member States to urgently increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;










20.


Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine once the Commission’s recommendations are met; reaffirms that Ukraine’s future lies in the EU; welcomes progress on accession-related reforms despite wartime conditions; calls for the acceleration of accession talks, recognising Ukraine’s EU integration as a strategic priority; underscores the importance of continued EU financial assistance, linked to concrete reform, as a key instrument to sustain and accelerate Ukraine’s transformation in line with European standards; underlines that the Copenhagen criteria and the required reforms, in particular concerning the rule of law, democracy, fundamental freedoms and human rights, are fundamental to the merit-based process of accession; believes that Ukraine’s membership of the EU represents a geostrategic investment in a united and strong Europe and that it equates to showing leadership, resolve and vision;










21.


Recalls NATO’s commitments to admit Ukraine to the Alliance; notes in this regard NATO’s consistent open door policy, in accordance with which NATO remains open to all European democracies that share the values of the Alliance, and in accordance with which decisions on membership have to be taken only by NATO allies, with no third party having a say in this process;










22.


Calls on the Ukrainian authorities to strengthen internal political unity in Ukraine, uphold parliamentary pluralism and engage in constructive cooperation with the political parties in the Verkhovna Rada; calls on Ukrainian political stakeholders to continue strengthening political unity and parliamentary pluralism and to engage in constructive cooperation within the Verkhovna Rada; calls for due regard to be given to the powers and rights of local self-governing bodies; calls for media pluralism to be guaranteed in line with the democratic principles and values that Ukrainians are so resolutely and bravely defending; suggests in light of the EU accession process to end all limitations of foreign travel of members of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;










23.


Commends Ukrainian, European and international civil society organisations for supporting families of abducted Ukrainian children, prisoners of war, and illegally detained civilians; calls for the EU, its Member States and the international community to assist their efforts and intensify pressure on Russia to return all abducted and detained Ukrainians;










24.


Points to the estimate of the latest Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment that at least EUR 506 billion will be required over the next decade for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction; welcomes the EU’s Ukraine Facility, which has a budget of almost EUR 50 billion, and the EU’s Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, which, in cooperation with the G7, offers loans to Ukraine of up to EUR 45 billion; nevertheless, urges the EU to prepare for Ukraine’s reconstruction by dedicating and securing new resources; calls for the EU, the Member States and like-minded partners to provide comprehensive and coordinated political, economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to support the sustainable and inclusive post-war reconstruction and recovery of Ukraine; reaffirms the EU’s commitment to sustainable and long-term financial and economic support to Ukraine, including macro-financial assistance, support for reconstruction and economic and social recovery and measures to ensure the resilience of Ukraine’s economy and critical infrastructure; reiterates its firm conviction that Russia must pay for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and therefore calls for the Russian sovereign assets immobilised under EU sanctions to be confiscated for the purpose of supporting Ukraine’s defence and reconstruction;










25.


Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to increase the effectiveness and impact of sanctions on Russia in order to definitively undermine Russia’s ability to continue waging its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and threatening the security of other European countries; calls for a ban or targeted tariffs on Russian imports to the EU with the aim of fully closing the flow of grain, potash and fertilisers as well as raw materials including steel, uranium, titanium, nickel, wood and wood products, and all types of oil and gas; calls on the Council to maintain, mirror where possible and extend its sanctions policy against Russia, and all the enabling states, such as Belarus, Iran, North Korea, and to sanction Chinese entities suppling dual-use goods and military items, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing the policy’s effectiveness and impact; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the swift implementation and strict enforcement of all packages of sanctions and to strengthen cooperation among Member States; asks the Commission for an impact assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions in hindering the Russian war effort and on the effectiveness of measures to prevent the circumvention of sanctions; calls on the Council to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention by EU-based companies, third parties and non-EU countries, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and providing the Russian military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;










26.


Calls for further sanctions against sectors of special importance for the Russian economy, in particular banking, the metallurgy, nuclear, chemical and agriculture sectors, raw materials such as aluminium, steel, uranium, titanium and nickel, as well as for anti-circumvention measures against all countries and entities that provide Russia with military and dual-use goods and technologies; calls for further actions against the Russian ‘shadow fleet’, in the light of sanctions circumvention, sabotage of critical infrastructure and environmental risks; calls on the Commission to jointly engage with flag and port states outside of the EU and take action against owners, operators and insurance operators in third countries that enable Russia’s shadow fleet; urges the Member States to further coordinate operational cooperation between coast guard agencies in order to increase the overall capacity for maritime surveillance; highlights that Russia is increasing its reliance on gas-derived fertilisers, which provide a growing source of revenue, while simultaneously compromising EU economies and threatening food security; expects the EU to keep its sanctions against Russia in place as long as needed to secure a just and lasting peace and until accountability is achieved;










27.


Calls for the next EU sanctions package to sanction all known shadow fleet tankers and their owners, while also introducing sanctions on any oil tanker breaching the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and enforcing strict implementation by all Member States of the measures prohibiting vessels, irrespective of flag, from sailing in European waters or into any EU Member State port if they have not followed the international rules regarding ship-to-ship transfers (STS) at sea or have illegally turned off their automatic identification system; urges the Commission and the Member States to ban ship-to-ship transfers of Russian oil in EU waters;










28.


Calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop broader sanctions on Russian and Belarusian wood, including specifically prohibiting the import or purchase of wood products processed in non-EU countries that incorporate wood, particularly birch plywood, originating in Russia or Belarus, to support the enforcement of current sanctions;










29.


Strongly condemns the Hungarian Government for threatening to block the renewal of the EU’s sanctions framework as well as to limit an appropriate EU response commensurate with the gravity of the situation; calls on the Member States to use all available tools to prevent the Hungarian Government from further blocking;










30.


Calls for further limitations on Russian and Belarusian citizens entering the EU, especially through more stringent security screenings, including the submission of military service records during the Schengen visa application process, notwithstanding the need to issue humanitarian visas;










31.


Strongly condemns the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russian forces; calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to increase pressure on Russia to comply with its international obligations, particularly the Geneva Convention, and allow international organisations access to prisoners;










32.


Condemns the devastating impact of Russia’s war on children; calls for increased EU support for children’s education, healthcare, mental health services, and for child protection, including trauma recovery and safe learning environments; urges the EU and Ukraine to prioritise children’s needs in aid and reconstruction efforts, in clearing landmines, and in integrating child welfare into the EU accession process;










33.


Reiterates its concern about the situation at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is illegally controlled by Russia; supports efforts to maintain a continued International Atomic Energy Agency presence at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant; reiterates its deep concern about the broader long-term environmental impact of the war;










34.


Calls for the EU and its Member States to strengthen EU strategic communication, particularly to publicly set the record straight about the EU’s leading support to Ukraine – especially in light of claims that seek to diminish its contribution – to counter hybrid threats and grey zone activities, and to prevent Russian interference in political, electoral, and other democratic processes in Ukraine and Europe; urges proactive communication on EU enlargement benefits to enhance public understanding and support for Ukraine’s accession in both Ukraine and the Member States; underlines that Ukraine’s EU integration is an opportunity for the development of both bordering regions and the Member States; calls strongly for the EU and the Member States to combat Russian disinformation about the war, by strengthening digital literacy, promoting fact-based narratives and holding social media platforms accountable for spreading harmful content by strictly enforcing the Digital Services Act (3);










35.


Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.






(1)  
            OJ L 161, 29.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/295/oj.

(2)  
            OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/792/oj.

(3)  Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/3150/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)