COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism
Date: 2025-02-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission
Subjects: adaptation to climate change, administrative formalities, carbon, carbon neutrality, emission trading, greenhouse gas, import (EU), simplification of formalities, surveillance concerning imports, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.2.2025  SWD(2025) 58 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2023/956 as regards simplifying and strengthening the carbon border adjustment mechanism                  {COM(2025) 87 final}  
 
 
1.  Introduction  

The  European  Union  has  set  itself  the  legal  objective  of  becoming  a  climate-neutral  and 
climate  resilient  continent  by  2050  as  enshrined  in  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1119  on  the 
European  Climate  Law1.  These  binding  goals  were  specified  in  the  Communications  on 
the European Green Deal2 and on A Strong Social Europe for Just Transitions3, in which 
the Commission set the ambition to upgrade Europe’s social market economy to achieve a just 
transition to sustainability.  

In  his  report  on  ‘The  Future  of  European  Competitiveness’,  Mario  Draghi  emphasised  the 
need  for  Europe  to  create  a  regulatory  landscape  which  facilitates  competitiveness  and 
resilience.4  In  the  Budapest  Declaration  on  the  New  European  Competitiveness  Deal,  EU 
Heads  of  State  and  Government  called  for  ‘a  simplification  revolution,  ensuring  a  clear, 
simple and smart regulatory framework for businesses and drastically reducing administrative, 
regulatory  and  reporting  burdens,  in  particular  for  SMEs’.5  Multiple  companies  and 
stakeholders  have  voiced  their  concerns  about  the  administrative  burden  resulting  from  a 
number  of  EU  acts,  including  Regulation  (EU)  2023/956  establishing  a  Carbon  Border 
Adjustment Mechanism (‘CBAM Regulation’)6.  

In its Communication on the Competitive Compass for the EU, the Commission confirmed 
that  it  would  deliver  an  unprecedented  simplification  effort  to  achieve  the  agreed  policy 
objectives  in  the  simplest,  most  targeted,  most  effective  and  least  burdensome  way.  In  its 
Communication  entitled  ‘A  simpler  and  faster  Europe:  Communication  on  implementation 
and simplification’, the Commission set out an implementation and simplification agenda that 
delivers fast and visible improvements for people and business on the ground, requiring more 
than  an  incremental  approach  and  underlining  the  need  for  bold  action  to  streamline  and 
simplify EU, national and regional rules.7  

As  part  of  the  European  Green  Deal,  the  European  Union  introduced  the  Carbon  Border 
Adjustment  Mechanism  (CBAM)8.  CBAM  is  an  environmental  instrument  that  tackles 
carbon leakage by putting a carbon price on imports of CBAM goods. The CBAM applies to 
imports  of  certain  goods  and  selected  precursors:  cement,  iron  and  steel,  aluminium, 
fertilisers,  electricity  and  hydrogen.  CBAM  will  apply  with  financial  consequences  as  from 
2026,  while  the  current  transitional  phase  spans  between  2023  and  2025.  The  experience 
gained during the first year and a half of CBAM implementation during the transitional phase 
shows that there is scope to simplify the CBAM while preserving its environmental integrity. 
The need for simplification was actively raised by all stakeholders both in the EU and outside, 
public authorities and business. A broad set of mutually reinforcing amendments are proposed 

1 Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for 
achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’) 
(OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1). 
2 COM/2019/640 final 
3 COM/2020/14 final 
4 “The future of European competitiveness”, September 2024.  
5 Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal, 8 November 2024.  
6 Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border 
adjustment mechanism (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 52, ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/956/oj). 
7 https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/8556fc33-48a3-4a96-94e8-
8ecacef1ea18_en?filename=250201_Simplification_Communication_en.pdf 
8  Regulation  (EU) 2023/956 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  of 10 May 2023  establishing  a  carbon  border 
adjustment mechanism (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 52, http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/956/oj) (‘the CBAM Regulation). 

1 

 
 
to  facilitate  the  smooth  implementation  of  CBAM  and  minimise  its  administrative  burden 
while ensuring its environmental integrity.  

Simplifying  CBAM  is  part  of  an  unprecedented  simplification  effort  by  the  European 
Commission,  as  set  out  in  the  Competitiveness  Compass9.  To  ensure  sustained  and 
measurable efforts over the years ahead, the Commission has set ambitious quantified targets 
for reducing administrative burden: at least 25% for all companies and at least 35% for SMEs. 
One  central  element  of  the  CBAM  simplification  package  is  to  introduce  a  new  CBAM  de 
minimis  threshold,  which  will  allow  to  exempt  occasional  importers  of  small  quantities  of 
CBAM  goods.  For  exempted  importers,  administrative  costs  related  to  the  CBAM  –  that 
means  all  costs  related  to  the  compliance  with  CBAM  other  than  the  financial  CBAM 
obligation - will be cut by almost 100%. As the majority of the exempted importers are SMEs, 
the CBAM simplification will contribute substantially to the Commission targets.  

This simplification package in itself is of key importance for ensuring the functioning of 
the  CBAM.  It  is  a  crucial  first  step  towards  a  strengthened  and  more  effective  CBAM  that 
delivers  on  climate  objectives  without  putting  undue  burden  on  businesses.  Simplifying  the 
CBAM will be key to making the mechanism work on the ground and support EU industry in 
its  decarbonisation  efforts  by  avoiding  carbon  leakage  risks.  Simplifying  the  mechanism 
would  also  be  a  key  enabler  for  a  potential  future  scope  extension,  notably  to  downstream 
goods.  

The present document discusses the proposed simplifications of the CBAM Regulation for the 
Omnibus  legislative  package.  The  document  is  organised  in  two  main  sections.  Section  2 
focuses on the measures to simplify CBAM for small importers, outlining and assessing the 
proposal  for  a  new  de  minimis  threshold.  Section  3  covers  other  simplifications  that  will 
benefit larger importers of CBAM goods and also operators in third countries. 

2.  Simplifying CBAM for small CBAM importers: A new de minimis threshold 

2.1  Problem definition 

From the experience gathered during the ongoing transitional period, it has become clear that 
compliance  with  CBAM  entails  an  administrative  burden  for  EU  importers,  who  need  to 
obtain  an  authorisation  to  become  CBAM  declarants  prior  to  the  importation  of  CBAM 
goods,  submit  an  annual  declaration  (based  on  actual  emissions’  information  received  from 
their suppliers or on the use of default values with a markup), purchase and surrender CBAM 
certificates. To date, the experience from the reporting during the CBAM transitional period 
and from  exchanges  with  Member States, industry stakeholders, international  partners,  third 
country  operators,  and  NGOs  have  confirmed  that  the  compliance  burden  is  particularly 
onerous for occasional importers of small quantities of CBAM goods.  

The  problem  essentially  concerns  four  CBAM  industrial  sectors,  namely  iron  and  steel, 
aluminium, fertilisers and cement.10 For these, customs import data from the first year of the 

9 COM/2025/30 
10 In contrast, the problem of having a large number of occasional importers is not applicable to the other two CBAM sectors, 
electricity and hydrogen. In the case of electricity, the sector is instead characterised by imports of large volumes by a limited 
number  of  individual  importers.  The  hydrogen  sector  is  characterised  by  a  very  low  number  of  importers  overall.  The 
customs data analysed show that there are only 64 importers of hydrogen across the EU-27, which together account for 92% 

2 

 
 
 
 
transitional  period  of  the  CBAM  (Q4  2023  –  Q3  2024)  show  that  roughly  80%  of  CBAM 
importers accounted for only 0.1% of all imported emissions embedded in CBAM goods, and 
only 10% of importers accounted for more than 99% of the emissions (see Figure 1 below). 
Several  Member  States  submitted  similar  findings  based  on  the  analysis  of  their  national 
customs data. Moreover, the median value of CBAM goods imported per (small) importer per 
year (that is, importing for example less than 50 tonnes of mass per year) is only around EUR 
1,600  (see  Section  2.3.1  for  more  detail).  Therefore,  the  administrative  costs  for  small 
importers,  which  were  estimated,  in  the  2021  impact  assessment  accompanying  the 
Commission  proposal11,  to  range  from  EUR  5,440  to  EUR  6,900  per  year12,  are 
disproportionate  compared  to  the  value  of  goods  imported  into  the  EU  by  these  small 
importers.  

Figure 1. Distribution of importers and distribution of emissions13 

Source: Surveillance data (see footnote 20 for further details) analysed by the Commission for the four CBAM 
sectors included in the simplification: aluminium, cement, fertilisers, iron and steel.  

The current CBAM Regulation provides for a de minimis threshold based on the existing 
de  minimis  in  customs  legislation,  which  proves  not  to  be  fit  for  the  purpose  of 
maximising  the  CBAM’s  effectiveness  to  fight  carbon  leakage  while  minimising  its 
administrative  burden.  Article  2(3)(a)  of  the  CBAM  regulation  exempts  goods  listed  in 

of the overall emissions of the hydrogen sector. For these reasons, hydrogen and electricity are excluded from this proposal to 
exempt occasional importers of small CBAM quantities. 
11 See Impact Assessment Report of 14.7.2021 (SWD(2021) 643 final). Throughout the current Staff Working Document, the 
numbers taken from the 2021 Impact Assessment Report have not been adjusted for inflation. 
12 If default values are used for CBAM declarations (see Section 2.3.1). 
13  Based  on  customs  import  data  from  the  first  year  (Q4  2023  –  Q3  2024),  CBAM  goods  were  imported  in  the  EU  by 
approximately  200.000  importers.  Of  these,  close  to  58%  were  pure  iron  and  steel  importers,  about  20%  were  pure 
aluminium importers and another 20% importers of both iron and steel and aluminium goods. The remaining 2% consisted of 
fertilisers importers (1%), cement importers (0.4%), and importers of other different combinations of CBAM goods (0.6%). It 
is  estimated  that  the  total  yearly  number  of  importers  is  approximately  200,000.  The  missing  number  of  importers  is 
extrapolated with the 175,000 analysed so far, representing 89% of overall emissions for the four CBAM sectors included in 
the simplification. 

3 

 
 
 
 
Annex  I  to  the  CBAM  Regulation  from  its  scope  provided  that  the  intrinsic  value  of  such 
goods does not exceed, per consignment, the value specified for goods of negligible value as 
referred  to  in  Article  23  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1186/200914  -  currently  EUR  150. 
Based on the data collected during the  ongoing transitional period,  it  can be concluded that 
this  threshold  has  proven  insufficient  to  exclude  occasional  importers  of  small  CBAM 
quantities, responsible only for a very small fraction of GHG emissions and which are often 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs),  or  individuals,  from  the  scope  of  CBAM. 
Moreover, on 17 May 2023, the Commission put forward proposals for the reform of the EU 
Customs Union. If adopted, the proposed reform  will  abolish the current  threshold whereby 
goods  valued  at  less than  EUR  150 are  exempt  from  customs  duty,  because it is  prone to  a 
high  risk  of  circumvention  of  the  customs  rules  and  distorts  the  level  playing  field  for  EU 
businesses.15 

There  are  a  number  of  problematic  issues  in  the  design  of  the  current  CBAM  de  minimis 
threshold: 

1)  The current threshold is too low. While the Commission impact assessment estimated 
around  20,000  CBAM  importers  per  year,  the  analysis  of  customs  data  shows  that 
there are 10 times more importers in scope of the CBAM16 many of which SMEs (see 
box  2  in  section  2.3.1  for  more  detail).  As  described  above,  this  leads  to  a  higher 
administrative  burden  than  anticipated,  which  is  particularly  onerous  for  occasional 
importers of small quantities of CBAM goods. 

2)  The current threshold is expressed in monetary value. This is not a good indication for 
policy relevance,  since the  CBAM  is based on embedded emissions.  Analysis, using 
the Commission’s global default values at product level and Surveillance data, shows 
that  mass  is  a  better  proxy  for  embedded  emissions  of  importers  than  value  for  the 
current  product  scope,  in  line  with  the  environmental  objective  of  the  CBAM.  This 
will likely be even more the case, if and when the CBAM scope will be extended to 
downstream  products,  where  the  CBAM  goods  are  representing  only  parts  of  the 
imported  products.  While  the  decisions  on  the  future  scope  are  not  yet  taken,  it  is 
important  to  design  a  system  that  is  future-proof  to  provide  legal  and  planning 
certainty.  

3)  The current threshold is applied on a consignment-basis. This poses problems in terms 
of  circumvention  risks,  which  led  the  European  Union  to  abolish  the  EUR  22  VAT 
threshold17  and  the  European  Commission  to  propose  abolishing  the  EUR  150 
threshold for customs duties. Moreover, such an approach is insufficiently tailored to 
occasional  importers  of  small  CBAM  quantities:  Some  large  importers  would  also 
benefit from such an exemption, because some of their consignments would be below 
the  consignment-threshold  despite  having  over  the  year  material  CBAM  imports. 
Conversely,  a  significant  number  of  occasional  importers  of  small  quantities  –  as 
measured  by  estimated  annual  emissions  in  their  imports  -  would  not  be  exempted, 

14 This threshold is based on Council Regulation (EC) No 1186/2009 of 16 November 2009 setting up a Community system 
of reliefs from customs duty.  
15 The estimated savings from the proposed measures do not overlap with estimated savings from the UCC reform. While 
there are strong synergies between the Customs reform proposal, notably the strengthened EU customs risk management and 
the establishment of a central EU Customs Data Hub, which will facilitate enforcement of the CBAM, all savings estimated 
in this document are CBAM-specific. 
16 This assessment is based on Surveillance data.  
17 Council Directive (EU) 2017/2455 

4 

 
 
because  they  would  have  one  or  a  few  consignments  above  such  a  threshold  (See 
section  2.2.1  for  more  details).  From  a  policy  perspective,  what  matters  for  CBAM, 
and  its  environmental  objective,  are  annual  emissions  embedded  in  CBAM  goods 
imported into the Union.  

In  addition  to  the  administrative  costs  for  occasional  importers,  the  high  number  of  CBAM 
importers  currently  in  scope  by  consequence  implies  a  high  burden  on  authorities,  notably 
national  competent  authorities  (NCAs).  An  effective  CBAM  relies  on  effective  monitoring 
and enforcement. Under the current rules, NCAs would need to check and ensure compliance 
for a large population of importers. The overwhelming majority of them import goods with a 
very  limited  number  of  embedded  emissions.  This  would  absorb  resources  that  could 
otherwise  be  devoted  to  monitor  and  ensure  compliance  of  imports  with  material  levels  of 
emissions.  

2.2  Proposed way forward 

Based  on  the  data  collected  throughout  the  ongoing  transitional  period,  the  Commission 
proposes an informed amendment to the current de minimis threshold to reduce administrative 
costs for all actors involved, notably SMEs, while  preserving the environmental  integrity of 
the CBAM. This is achieved by amending the threshold and setting a target of at least 99% of 
emissions  to  remain  in  the  scope.  By  exempting  less  than  1%  of  emissions  the  amendment 
would preserve the environmental objective of the CBAM.   

Given  the  above,  this  proposal  consists  in  an  exemption  based  on  an  annual  cumulative 
mass  threshold  of  imports  in  the  four  industrial  CBAM  sectors  per  importer.  A  mass-
based  threshold  of  50  tonnes  is  proposed  to  ensure  that  more  than  99%  of  emissions  are 
maintained  in  the  scope.  The  mass-based  threshold  is  calculated  to  translate  the  emissions 
objective  of  maintaining  more  than  99%  emissions  in  scope  based  on  a  methodology  using 
customs import data and the Commission’s global default values (see Box 1 for more detail). 
The  threshold  would  be  updated  for  the  subsequent  year,  if  the  methodology  to  derive  the 
mass-based threshold ensuring that at least 99% emissions are in scope results in a threshold 
that deviates by more than 5 tonnes from the threshold chosen pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Annex of the CBAM regulation. 

Importers that are below this threshold will be exempted from the CBAM authorisation and 
declaration obligation and from the obligation to purchase CBAM certificates. They will need 
to self-identify as “occasional CBAM importers” when lodging their customs declarations and 
monitor that they do not exceed the  threshold  over the year. Compliance  with  the threshold 
will  be  monitored  by  Commission  and  national  authorities,  based  on  Customs  import  data. 
This will be paired with strong anti-abuse provisions and will be subject to regular reviews 
to assess the robustness of the threshold in 2027 and every two years thereafter. The proposed 
exemption will allow the Commission and national authorities to focus their monitoring and 
enforcement on importers representing a material share of imports of CBAM goods, therefore 
strengthening  the  effectiveness  of  the  CBAM,  increasing  the  protection  for  EU  industries 
against carbon leakage, and supporting decarbonisation efforts. By making the CBAM more 
administratively  manageable,  this  simplification  will  also  enable  a  potential  future  scope 
extension  of  the  CBAM  to  a  broader  range  of  sectors,  notably  for  downstream  products, 
which is also an important step to address certain circumvention practices. The proposed way 
forward would also alleviate CBAM related reporting burden on third country producers. 

5 

 
 
2.2.1  An easily implementable and environmentally robust threshold  

A simplification that maintains the environmental integrity of CBAM. Different levels of 
mass were assessed for the determination of the threshold, ranging from 10 to 500 tonnes (see 
Table 1).  

The choice of a threshold of 50 tonnes per year per importer is guided by two dimensions: 

1)  Preserve the environmental integrity of the CBAM  
2)  Conditional to one, maximise the benefit in terms of reduced administrative burden  

CBAM  is  an  environmental  measure.  The  proposed  simplifications  should  not  reduce  the 
effectiveness of the CBAM as a climate instrument. With this in mind, it is proposed to set out 
in the Regulation a target of emissions that need to be maintained in scope. Taking also into 
account  cost-benefit  considerations,  a  target  of  maintaining  at  least  99%  of  emissions  was 
chosen. Such a target would both maximise the benefits from simplification  and ensure that 
only a negligible  volume of emissions  is  exempted compared to  the total. It  also  allows for 
making the exemption future-proof (see section 2.2.1).   

Based  on  a  robust  methodology  (see  Box  1),  this  emissions-target  is  translated  into  a 
cumulative  mass-based  threshold  of  50  tonnes  per  importer  per  year.  Considering  the 
weighted  average  emission  intensity  across  all  four  sectors  (iron  and  steel,  aluminium, 
fertilisers and cement), the 50 tonnes mass-based threshold corresponds to approximately 80 
tonnes  of  CO2  equivalent  on  average  per  importer.18  Such  a  mass-based  threshold  would 
allow  for  exempting  an  estimated  182,000  importers  (91%  of  total  number  of  importers), 
representing  less  than  1%  (i.e.  0.73%)  of  the  total  emissions  of  the  imports  across  the  four 
CBAM sectors considered (iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers).  

Table 1. Distribution of exempted importers and emissions for different annual mass-
thresholds in tonnes19 

Annual thresholds 
in tonnes 

Percentage of 
importers 
exempted 

0 
10 
30 
50 
70 
150 
250 
500 

0% 
83% 
89% 
91% 
92% 
94.5% 
96% 
97% 

Percentage of 
emissions from 
exempted 
importers 
0% 
0.19% 
0.49% 
0.73% 
0.94% 
1.62% 
2.30% 
3.57% 

Estimated 
remaining 
number of 
importers 
200,000 
34,000 
22,000 
18,000 
16,000 
11,000 
8,000 
6,000 

Percentage of 
emissions from 
remaining 
importers 
100% 
99.81% 
99.51% 
99.27% 
99.06% 
98.38% 
97.70% 
96.43% 

Source: Commission’s analysis based on Surveillance data. 

18 For each importer, the corresponding emissions are calculated by multiplying the quantity imported  for each CN code by 
its corresponding emission intensity (see Box 1 for further details). The weighted average emission intensity of 1.55 tCO2/t 
across all four sectors (iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers and cement) is calculated by dividing the total emissions (that is 
the sum of emissions across all importers) by the total volume in tonnes imported by these importers.  
19 The table covers the four CBAM sectors included in the proposed simplification: aluminium, cement, fertilisers, iron and 
steel. Its interpretation should be as follows: 83% of all CBAM importers have imported less than 10 tonnes of these four 
CBAM goods from October 2023 to September 2024 and account for 0.02% of all emissions.  It is estimated that the total 
yearly  number  of  importers  is  approximately  200,000.  The  column  on  “estimated  remaining  number  of  importers” 
extrapolates the missing number of importers with the 175,000 analysed so far, representing 89% of overall emissions for the 
four CBAM sectors included in the simplification. 

6 

 
 
Box 1. Methodology to determine the mass threshold  
The mass-threshold is set to ensure that at least 99% of embedded emissions are covered by 
CBAM, which, in turn, preserves the environmental objectives of the mechanism.  

In order to do so, the emissions embedded in the quantities imported need to be estimated. For 
the  implementation  of  this  calculation,  customs  data  from  1  October  2023  to  30  September 
2024 were used. These  correspond to  the first  12 months of CBAM transitional regime and 
are provided to the Commission through the surveillance system.20,21    

For  each  customs  declaration,  the  amount  of  corresponding  CO2  emissions  is  calculated  by 
multiplying  the  volume  imported  for  each  CN  code  with  the  corresponding  Commission’s 
global default value (without mark-ups) for emissions published for the transitional period. As 
per the CBAM Regulation, for cement and fertilisers direct emissions and indirect emissions 
are considered, while for aluminium and iron and steel only direct emissions are considered. 
The  volumes  imported  and  corresponding  CO2  emissions  (see  Equation  1  below)  are  then 
aggregated at importer-level:  

Equation 1: 

𝐽𝑖

  𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑖, 𝐸𝑚𝑖 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗𝐸𝐼𝑗

𝑗=1

where:  
- 

𝑞𝑖,𝑗 is the imported volume in tonnes by importer 𝑖 of the CN code 𝑗,  

- 

𝐽𝑖  is  the number of  CN  codes  imported  by  importer  𝑖  among the  four  sectors  considered (aluminium, 
cement, fertilisers, iron and steel),  

-  𝐸𝐼𝑗 is the emission intensity for CN code 𝑗.22   

For  a  given  annual  threshold  in  tonnes  of  volume  imported,  importers  that  would  not  be 
exempted  are  identified  and  the  corresponding  proportion  of  overall  emissions  captured  is 
calculated (see Equation 2 below for a given mass-threshold of 𝑄̅ tonnes): 

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 − 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑄̅ 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠 =  

Equation 2: 

∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑖

× 1(𝑄𝑖 > 𝑄̅)

𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

where:  

-  𝑄̅ is the mass-threshold in tonnes allowing to capture a given target share of emissions (see paragraph 

below); 

20 The Commission surveillance system ("customs surveillance") records and centralises all trade data (import and  exports) 
directly from the national customs authorities on a daily basis. For each transaction, the stored data contain the information 
available on the Single Administrative Document (SAD), including the volume and origin of the consignment. According to 
Art.55(2) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447, the customs authorities shall provide the Commission at 
least once a week with data on customs declarations for the goods that have been made subject to surveillance at release for 
free circulation or at export. 
21  It  should  be  noted  that  for  some  Member  States,  customs  data  provided  in  the  surveillance  system  do  not  contain  the 
Economic Operators Registration and Identification (EORI) identifiers for the importers for the full period considered. For 
these  Member  States,  customs  data  from  the  surveillance  system  are  therefore  supplemented  by  customs  data  provided 
separately to the Commission. Overall, the customs data used in the simplification analysis include approximately 175,000 
importers, representing 89% of the emissions for the four CBAM sectors (aluminium, cement, fertilisers, iron and steel). 
22 For the purpose of defining the 50 tonnes mass-threshold, the emission intensities 𝐸𝑗 are based on default value (without 
mark-ups)  for  emissions  published  for  the  transitional  period.  As  per  the  CBAM  Regulation,  for CN  codes  in  cement  and 
fertilisers, direct emissions and indirect emissions are considered; for CN codes in aluminium and iron and steel, only direct 
emissions are considered. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-  𝑄𝑖 =   ∑

𝐽𝑖
𝑗=1

𝑞𝑖,𝑗

 : the total volume in tonnes of CBAM goods imported by importer 𝑖,  

- 

- 

1(𝑄𝑖 > 𝑄̅)  is  an  indicator  function  equal  to  1  when  𝑄𝑖 > 𝑄̅  (that  is,  when  an  importer  is  importing 
volumes higher than the mass-threshold 𝑄̅), 0 otherwise, 

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 : the total emissions in CO2 of the four CBAM sectors considered, that is the sum of 
corresponding  emissions  for  all  importers:  𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 =   ∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑖
  ,  where  𝑁 is  the  number  of 
importers.  

𝑁
𝑖=1

The proposed mass-threshold is set based on the following methodology:  

a)  At least 99% of emissions should be captured, in order to preserve the environmental 

integrity of the CBAM (see Equation 3);  

𝑄̅ 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 

𝑁
∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑖
𝑖=1

× 1_(𝑄𝑖 > 𝑄̅)

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

  ≥ 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 99% 

Equation 3: 

b)  To capture uncertainty over future trade patterns while maintaining the environmental 
objective, a margin of 0.25 percentage points is added to the 99% emissions target.  

c)  For simplicity, the mass-threshold is rounded to the nearest ten, e.g. if a value of 52 
tonnes  would  result  in  99.25%  emissions  captured  it  would  be  rounded  down  to  50 
tonnes, if a value of 57 tonnes would result in 99.25% emission captured, it would be 
rounded up to 60 tonnes.   

Based on a-c, the threshold is set at 50 tonnes mass per importer per year.  

To make this approach future-proof, a mechanism is introduced to ensure that the emissions 
target share is met, even if trade patterns evolve or default values are updated. By July of each 
calendar year, the Commission shall, based on data covering a reference period of 12 months 
preceding  the  month  of  this  assessment,  assess  whether  the  value  derived  from  the 
aforementioned methodology deviates by more than 5 tonnes from the threshold laid down in 
point 1 of Annex VII. Where this is the case, and in accordance with the empowerment laid 
out in Article 2(3a) of this Regulation, the Commission shall update the threshold. 

Figure 2 below also illustrates the environmental integrity of the CBAM (proxied by the red 
curve  illustrating  the  percentage  of  emission  from  non-exempted  importers)  against  the 
proportion of importers exempted (blue curve). 

8 

 
 
 
 
Figure  2.  Distributions  of  importers  exempted  against  emissions  of  non-exempted 
importers 

Source: Commission’s analysis based on Surveillance data. 
Note:  Line  A  corresponds  to  a  threshold  of  10  tonnes,  line  B  to  30  tonnes,  line  C  to  50  tonnes,  line  D  to  70 
tonnes, line E to 150 tonnes, line F to 250 tonnes, line G to 500 tonnes. 

A targeted and robust threshold, maximising benefits and limiting circumvention risks. 
The proposed approach changes the logic from a current  consignment-based threshold to an 
annual  cumulative  threshold  at  importer  level.  This  would  allow  for  a  more  targeted  and 
robust exemption than a consignment threshold. Differences in CBAM compliance burden are 
most pronounced at the margin between being part of the CBAM scope or not. This is because 
many compliance steps are either done once or on an annual or quarterly basis. For example, 
obtaining the status of authorisation CBAM declarant is done once. Complying with the rule 
to have a sufficient number of CBAM certificates on the account (See also Section 3.4.1) is a 
quarterly  obligation.  Complying  with  the  CBAM  declaration  and  financial  obligations  is  an 
annual  exercise.  This  means  that  the  measure  of  efficiency  for  the  threshold  is  not  to 
maximise the number of exempted consignments given a certain in-scope emission level, but 
to  maximise  the  number  of  exempted  importers.  Put  differently,  the  reduction  in 
administrative costs of having a consignment out of scope for importers that are otherwise in 
scope of the CBAM is negligible, as most of the administrative costs arise anyway.  

In  this  respect,  the  annual  cumulative  threshold  is  clearly  superior:  For  example,  with  the 
same emission target (e.g. 99.27% emissions in scope with an annual threshold of 50 tonnes) 
approximately 79% of importers would have been exempted under a consignment approach,23 
which is 12 percentage points less than under the annual threshold approach (i.e. an estimated 
24,000  fewer  companies  that  would  benefit  from  the  exemption).  Moreover,  amongst  the 
importers that import less than 50 tonnes per year, approximately 13% of these importers have 
consignments above the consignment-threshold and would therefore not be exempted under a 
consignment approach. Last, amongst the importers that import more than 50 tonnes per year, 

23 The analysis shows that a consignment threshold around 2.6 tonnes would allow to capture approximately 99.27% of the 
overall emissions. An importer is exempted if all its consignments are below the consignment-threshold. 

9 

 
 
 
 
almost  all  of  them  have  consignments  below  the  consignment-threshold,  and  25%  of 
consignments are in average below the consignment-threshold.  

In  addition,  a  consignment-based  threshold  is  prone  to  higher  circumvention  risks  (such  as 
from  artificial  splitting  of  consignments).  This  is  not  the  case  with  an  annual  cumulative 
threshold.  

A simple implementation with the use of a mass-based threshold for importers. In their 
analysis,  Commission  services  considered  as  an  alternative  a  threshold  expressed  in  CO2 
emissions instead of the mass-based threshold. However, this alternative was discarded with a 
view to simplifying application for importers. Various stakeholders (Industry representatives 
and  NGOs)  expressed  a  strong  preference  for  a  mass-based  approach,  among  others  at  a 
stakeholder  event  on  6  February.  Importers,  and  particularly  occasional  importers  of  small 
quantities,  are  unlikely  to  be  aware  of  the  levels  of  emissions  embedded  in  their  goods  – 
which  is  precisely  part  of  the  administrative  burden  that  this  proposal  aims  to  cut.  If  the 
threshold  was  expressed  in  emissions,  importers  would  have  to  self-monitor  their  import 
volumes for each of the CN codes that they import and multiply these with the default values 
on  emission  intensities  of  those  CN  codes.  In  contrast,  the  proposed  mass-based  threshold 
both ensures that the overall emission target is achieved (that is, more than 99% of emissions 
are captured by the remaining importers) and facilitates implementation, as importers can self-
monitor their compliance with the threshold entirely based on data provided for the customs 
declaration, thereby reducing the administrative costs to the lowest levels possible.  

This choice entails some trade-offs. CBAM products are characterised by divergent emission 
intensities, which cannot be captured individually by a mass-based threshold. This creates the 
theoretical possibility that importers, which would have been exempted under a hypothetical 
emissions-based threshold equivalent to the 50 tonnes mass-threshold, which is approximately 
80 tonnes of CO2 equivalent, would now not be exempted. This said, analysis suggests that 
such cases only materialise rarely in reality: based on the same methodology used to derive 
the  threshold,  less  than  0.05%  of  all  importers  would  not  be  exempted  based  on  the 
cumulative  mass-based  threshold  of  50  tonnes,  while  their  emissions  embedded  in  their 
imports would be below the hypothetical emissions-equivalent threshold of approximately 80 
tonnes  of  CO2  equivalent.  This  means  that  the  loss  of  accuracy  resulting  from  a  simpler 
design of the threshold affects less than 100 importers, while it benefits the more than 180,000 
other  importers  that  will  have  fewer  administrative  costs  related  to  the  monitoring  of  their 
compliance with the threshold. 

Another  alternative,  somewhat  in  between  an  emissions-based  threshold  and  a  single  mass-
based  threshold,  would  have  been  to  express  the  mass-based  threshold  per  sector  (i.e.,  four 
mass-based  thresholds),  aiming  to  capture  divergences  in  emission  intensities  between 
sectors. However, this  option was discarded as it would have introduced  the possibility that 
importers who import goods from more than one sector remain under the  respective sectoral 
mass-thresholds while importing up to four times more tonnes compared to importers who are 
only active in one CBAM sector.  

A future proof threshold. This approach set out in 2.2.1 and as detailed in Box 1 is  future 
proof. It is anchored around a clear and unambiguous emission-target share of at least 99% 
of  emissions,  fully  reflecting  the  environmental  objective  of  the  CBAM.  This  target  will 
remain valid over time,  and  would also  be appropriate, if and when there was a decision to 
extend  the  sector  to  other  EU  ETS  sectors  at  risk  of  carbon  leakage  or  to  downstream 
products. Moreover, the  methodology translating the 99%-target into practical application is 
designed  to  dynamically  align  to  changes  in  trade  patterns  and/or  the  level  of  emission 

10 

 
intensities,  ensuring  that  also  going  forward,  the  environmental  objective  of  the  CBAM  is 
fully preserved.   

2.2.2  What does the simplification mean for importers? 

A  simplified  operationalisation  for  importers.  Importers  that  expect  to  stay  below  the 
annual cumulative threshold, and thus qualify for the exemption, can, when lodging an import 
declaration for a CBAM good, self-identify as an occasional CBAM importer and thereby be 
granted a derogation from the authorisation obligation. These importers would not be required 
to take any additional administrative steps and would not have to access the CBAM Registry. 
At any time during the year, a self-identified occasional importer can decide to apply for the 
status of an authorised CBAM declarant in case it expects to exceed the de minimis threshold.  

Throughout  the  year,  importers  would  self-monitor  the  volume  of  their  imports  to  estimate 
and examine whether the mass-based threshold is reached. Defining the threshold in “mass” 
facilitates  the  monitoring  as  importers  would  be  able  to  check  their  compliance  with  the 
threshold  not based on  emission intensities  but on mass  of imports  only, which is data they 
already provided in the customs declaration and thus already available. The obligation is thus 
limited to the summation of the quantities of imported CBAM goods.  

Certainty  for  exempted  importers.  Importers  should  have  certainty  about  their  status  – 
whether  they  are  exempted  or  not.  This  is  not  a  concern  for  large  importers  whose  imports 
clearly exceed the threshold - these know that they are not exempted. It is also not a concern 
for  importers  that  are  importing  at  very  low  levels.  Therefore,  only  importers  with  import 
activities  around  the  selected  threshold  will  face  some  administrative  burden  in  terms  of 
projecting  whether  they  expect  their  imports  over  the  calendar  year  to  remain  below  the 
threshold. Estimates suggest that around 2700 importers are importing at levels +/-15% of 50 
tonnes of mass. These are only around 1.3% of the total number of importers, meaning that 
a  50  tonnes  mass-threshold  would  provide  reasonably  levels  of  planning  certainty  for  more 
than 98.5% of all importers of CBAM goods.  

Calculation of the CBAM financial adjustment for importers above the thresholds. The 
new CBAM de minimis will not affect the calculation of the CBAM financial adjustment for 
importers  above  the  threshold.  Importers  who  expect  to  exceed  the  threshold  during  the 
calendar  year  must  apply  for  authorisation.  If  they  indeed  exceed  the  threshold,  the  CBAM 
financial adjustment will be calculated against all imports of CBAM goods. 

An alternative design, which would provide for a deduction for importers above the threshold 
of emissions equivalent to the mass threshold was discarded for the following reasons: 

•  Allowing  for  the  deduction  of  the  embedded  emissions  below  the  50  tonnes  mass 
threshold also for large CBAM importers would almost triple the number of exempted 
emissions – from 0.73% of total emissions to 1.98% of total emissions. This is due to 
the fact that all large importers would get a rebate of the full emissions equivalent of 
the  50  tonnes  mass  threshold  (after  accounting  for  any  reporting  based  on  actual 
values and the deduction of the CBAM factor), whereas the vast majority of exempted 
importers imports quantities substantially below the threshold, thus benefiting less in 
absolute terms from the exemption to acquire CBAM certificates.  

•  Such  a  deduction  would  not  provide  any  added  value  in  terms  of  reduction  in 
administrative costs, as they only apply to importers that are in scope of CBAM and 
therefore have to comply with all reporting and financial obligations anyway.  

11 

 
2.2.3  Compliance and Circumvention risks 

The  proposed  simplification  will  allow  authorities  to  focus  their  efforts  on  ensuring 
compliance  by  large  importers,  instead  of  ensuring  compliance  of  a  large  number  of  small 
players.  

Monitoring,  detecting  circumvention  and  enforcement.  Monitoring  will  be  conducted  on 
the  basis  of  customs  data  obtained  in  the  Surveillance  system,  allowing  the  Commission  to 
have  an  EU-wide  approach  for  all  imports  into  the  Union.  The  CBAM  Regulation  will  be 
amended to specify that the Commission and NCAs for CBAM are jointly responsible for the 
monitoring of occasional importers and for detecting those who exceed the threshold.24 Where 
the Commission detects that an importer has exceeded the threshold, it shall inform the NCA 
and the NCA will establish whether the threshold has been exceeded.  

National  customs  authorities  who  receive  information  from  the  NCA  that  an  importer  has 
exceeded  the  threshold  must  not  allow  the  importation  of  further  CBAM  goods  by  this 
importer, in accordance with Article 25(1) of the CBAM Regulation. In addition, occasional 
importers  who  have  exceeded  the  threshold  without  previously  having  obtained  an 
authorisation will be liable for the payment of a penalty. If the importer wants to resume the 
import of CBAM goods once the threshold was exceeded, then it will have to obtain the status 
of  ‘authorised  CBAM  declarant’,  submit  a  CBAM  declaration  and  surrender  certificates 
corresponding to these additional imports.  

Limited  risks  of  circumvention  under  a  robust  monitoring  system.  While  an  annual 
threshold  is  not  prone  to  circumvention  risks  that  are  known  from  the  application  of 
consignment-based  de  minimis  thresholds  such  as  artificial  splitting  of  consignments,  one 
circumvention risk that may arise is that importers may artificially split their imports across 
different subsidiaries or related entities, each with a different EORI number (“artificial split of 
EORI numbers”). Such a scheme would enable each subsidiary to remain below the threshold 
while at group level, they would import in total a quantity exceeding the threshold. However, 
such a scheme may be costly and cumbersome to set up and it is not evident that the benefits 
would outweigh the costs: the proposed annual threshold of 50 tonnes would only represent 
around EUR 4000 CBAM financial obligation on average per importer per year.25 Moreover, 
Commission  services  and  other  authorities  will  be  able  to  track  changes  in  import  patterns 
and, analysing customs data combined with other data sources, will be able to detect material 
circumvention schemes.  

Strengthening  of  anti-abuse  provisions.  The  CBAM  Regulation  will  also  include 
strengthened  anti-abuse  provisions,  with  an  explicit  reference  to  cases  of  “artificial  split  of 
EORI numbers”, and will provide for extended empowerments for authorities to act upon 
non-compliance  and  circumvention  activities.  In  particular,  NCAs  will  be  able  to  apply 
penalties  where  companies  have  artificially  split  their  imports  over  separate  importers  with 
different EORI numbers for the main purpose of avoiding CBAM obligations. Lastly, thanks 
to  the  simplification,  CBAM  authorities  will  also  be  able  to  focus  resources  on  major 
circumvention risks. 

24  While  these  efforts  will  be  of  high  importance  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of  CBAM,  they  will  entail  much  lower 
administrative burden for authorities than what would be required without a new de minimis provision. 
25 This is based on the following calculations: (i) 50 tonnes multiplied by (weighted) average emission factor across the four 
CBAM sectors of 1.55 implied 77.5 tonnes CO2 eq., (ii) an effective carbon price (i.e., taking into account gradual phase in 
of CBAM) at EUR 50. 

12 

 
 
Continuous monitoring of the robustness of the threshold. Finally, it is proposed that the 
Commission  will  monitor  the  robustness  of  the  threshold  in  terms  of  circumvention  risks, 
including  through  the  biennial  report  reviewing  the  functioning  of  the  CBAM  as  set  out  in 
Article 30 (6) of the CBAM Regulation. 

2.3 

Impact and quantification of the savings 

As  mentioned  above,  introducing  a  de  minimis  threshold  of  50  tonnes  will  free  tens  of 
thousands  of  small  importers  from  any  administrative  burden  related  to  CBAM,  as  well  as 
alleviate  the  burden  on  public  authorities.  At  the  same  time,  there  will  be  some  loss  of 
revenues. This section discusses the cost-benefit analysis.  

As regards the cost savings from a new de minimis, two categories are considered.  

The  first  category  corresponds  to  cost  savings  for  exempted  importers  since  no 
administrative costs  will apply  to  them.  As explained below, this  amounts  to  approximately 
EUR 1,123 million per year. The analysis of the profile of exempted importers also shows that 
mostly SMEs benefit from these cost-savings, as they make up at least 74% of the companies 
affected  by  the  exemption.  Cost  savings  for  SMEs  would  therefore  amount  to  at  least  EUR 
831 million.26 

The second category corresponds to cost savings for public authorities in Member States, 
due to lower implementation and enforcement costs with the exemption applying to 91% of 
importers of CBAM goods. This amounts to approximately EUR 87.5 million. 

The aggregated costs savings (i.e., across importers and public authorities) are then compared 
to the loss of revenue from the new de minimis, estimated at 1% of expected CBAM revenues. 
As explained below, the cost-benefit analysis shows that the new de minimis of 50 tonnes 
of mass would lead to an overall net benefit of EUR 1,189 million. Nevertheless, it should 
be recalled that the collection of revenues is not the primary objective of CBAM.  

This  section  focuses  on  impacts  that  are  quantifiable  with  the  available  data.  As  set  out  in 
section 2.1 and 2.2, there will be also other entities that indirectly benefit from this exemption. 
For  example,  narrowing  down  the  number  of  importers  in  the  EU  to  those  importing  large 
quantities,  inevitably  narrows  the  scope  of  the  supply  chain  affected  upstream.  The  new 
CBAM  de  minimis  will  thus  also  benefit  third-country  operators  in  the  form  of  reduced 
administrative costs. 

2.3.1  Estimated cost savings for small importers 

A 50 tonnes mass threshold would lead to the exemption of 91% of importers for the CBAM 
sectors considered in the simplification, namely aluminium, cement, fertilisers, iron and steel. 
This  represents  an  estimated  182,000  exempted  importers,  who  are  the  main  target  of  the 
simplification.27 

26 See Better Regulation toolbox (https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-
regulation/better-regulation-guidelines-and-toolbox/better-regulation-toolbox_en), Chapter 22. 
27 Without the proposed new de minimis threshold of 50 tonnes of mass, some of the importers of CBAM goods could change 
their behaviour and no longer import. For the purposes of this analysis, such behavioural change  is not considered. This is 

13 

 
 
 
 
The  2021  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  Commission  proposal  estimated  that 
administrative costs for importers would be in the range of EUR 5,440 to EUR 6,900 per year, 
under  the  situation  where  CBAM  declarants  use  default  values  for  emissions.  Under  the 
situation  where  CBAM  declarants  would  report  actual  emission  values,  the  yearly 
administrative costs would be in the range of EUR 30,800 to EUR 45,300 per year.28  

Since exempted importers under this proposal would largely be small importers, the analysis 
assumes  that  they  would  choose  to  report  emissions  based  on  default  values.  Since  an 
estimated  182,000  importers  would  be  exempted  under  the  proposed  new  de  minimis 
threshold,  the  administrative  cost  savings  for  importers  would  be  in  the  range  of  EUR 
990,080,000 to EUR 1,255,800,000 per year. Moreover, these estimated cost savings do not 
consider that relying on default values would  imply accepting increased levels of embedded 
emissions  due  to  the  proportionally  increased  mark-ups  added  to  the  average  emissions 
intensities of a given country, resulting in higher administrative costs.  

It should be noted that such administrative costs, i.e. in the range of EUR 5,440 to EUR 6,900 
per year per importer, seem already disproportionately high compared to the value of goods 
imported into the EU by exempted importers (i.e., with yearly imports less than 50 tonnes of 
mass), where the median value per importer is around EUR 1,600 per year.29 This would be 
even  more  the  case  if  small  importers  were  reporting  actual  emission  values,  with 
administrative costs estimated in the range of EUR 30,800 to EUR 45,300 per year. Under the 
proposed  new  de  minimis  threshold  of  50  tonnes  of  mass,  these  small  importers  could 
continue to import without being impacted by the CBAM.  

To  sum  up,  the  administrative  cost  savings  for  all  the  exempted  importers  are  estimated  at 
approximately  EUR  1.12  billion  per  year,  which  is  the  average  of  the  range  of  EUR 
990,080,000 to EUR 1,255,800,000 per year.  

Costs  savings  for  SMEs.  The  profile  of  importers  exempted  under  the  proposed  new  de 
minimis  threshold  was  also  analysed,  on  the  basis  of  data  from  the  ORBIS  database  and 
customs.  

In  customs  data,  the  importers  are  identified  with  their  EORI  numbers,  except  for  natural 
persons  and  some  occasional  importers  who  are  not  required  to  have  an  EORI  number.  In 
contrast,  companies  are  identified  in  ORBIS  based  on  other  identifiers.  The  Commission 
services  carried  out  an  exercise  to  reconcile  the  EORI  numbers  in  customs  data  with  the 
different identifiers available in ORBIS.  

Box  2  below  details  the  analysis  that  shows  that  at  least  74%  of  the  exempted  companies 
under  the  proposed  simplification  would  be  SMEs.  In  other  words,  among  the  EUR  1.12 
billion per year of costs savings due to lower administrative costs, at least EUR  831 million 
would  benefit  SMEs.  SMEs  are  therefore  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  new  de  minimis 
threshold. 

justified, because even if some importers were no longer importing CBAM goods in such a scenario, this would lead to non-
negligible costs for them (e.g. higher prices, changes in supply chains etc.) which are difficult to monetise.  
28 See Impact Assessment Report of 14.7.2021 (SWD(2021) 643 final), Part 2/2, Table 6.3.  
29 This figure is based on customs data for the period October 2023 to September 2024, for imports of CBAM goods.  

14 

 
 
 
Box 2. Methodology to identify SMEs  
The Commission services extracted from ORBIS several variables to define the type of companies: (i) number of 
employees, (ii) turnover, (iii) the size classification, which is a measure for the type of companies developed by 
ORBIS.  In  case  of  missing  data  in  ORBIS  for  number  of  employees  and  turnover,  the  Commission  services 
relied on the size classification variable provided by ORBIS that is a composite indicator of other variables. 
Overall,  among  the  175,000  importers  available  in  customs  data  for  EU  imports  of  aluminium,  cement, 
fertilisers, iron and steel, approximately 71,000 of the importers matched in ORBIS have information on the type 
of  companies  (i.e.,  size  classification  variable  in  ORBIS).  Table  2  below  provides  the  definition  of  small, 
medium, large, and very large, according to the size classification from ORBIS.  
Table 2. Size classification variable defined in ORBIS 

Amounts in EUR 
Operating revenue 
Total assets 
Employee number 

Very large 
>= 100 million 
>= 200 million 
>= 1,000 

Large 
>= 10 million 
>= 20 million 
>=150 

Medium 
>= 1 million 
>= 2 million 
>=15 

Source: Orbis URLSize Classifications: Guide - Orbis User Guide  
Note: for Very Large companies, being Listed is also a criteria 

Small 
Companies 
in  Orbis 
are  considered  to  be 
small  when  they  are 
not included in another 
category. 

The analysis of the profile of importers exempted is based on a sample of approximately 71,000 importers. The 
Commission services consider that this sample of 71,000 importers is still representative of the whole population 
of  importers,  since  these  71,000  importers  represent  approximately  72%  of  the  overall  emissions  for  the  four 
CBAM sectors included in the simplification. 
The following elements should also be considered for the interpretation of the results. 

- 

- 

First,  the  matching  of  customs  data  with  ORBIS  is  biased  toward  large  companies.  This  is  because 
ORBIS is unlikely to include information on natural persons or occasional importers, which also import 
CBAM goods.  
Second, some identifiers are missing in customs data since (i) natural persons and occasional importers 
are not required to have an EORI identifier.  

-  Third,  the  definition  of  small  and  medium  companies  is  more  restrictive  in  ORBIS  compared  to  the 
commonly 
(https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/smes/sme-
fundamentals/sme-definition_en): (i) some companies defined as medium in ORBIS are actually small 
companies (that is, with staff headcounts lower than 50), and (ii) some companies defined  as large in 
ORBIS are actually medium companies (with staff headcount lower than 250).  

definition 

accepted 

Based  on  the  considerations  above,  the  analysis  therefore  underestimates  the  proportion  of  SMEs  positively 
affected by the new de minis threshold. 
The analysis shows that among these 71,000 importers: 

-  Approximately  63,000  of  those  71,000  importers  would  be  exempted  since  their  volumes  imported 
would be below the new  mass-based de minimis of 50 tonnes per year. Approximately 8,000 of those 
71,000 importers import more than 50 tonnes of mass per year and would therefore not be exempted.  
-  Among  the  63,000  importers  exempted,  74%  of  these  importers  are  small  or  medium  companies  as 

defined by ORBIS: 40% are small companies, 34% are medium companies. 

2.3.2  Estimated cost savings for public authorities in Member States 

In terms of implementation and enforcement, CBAM affects both the NCAs for CBAM (e.g., 
authorisation  of  declarants,  review  of  CBAM  declarations,  sale  and  repurchase  of  CBAM 
certificates) and Customs Authorities (e.g., review of customs declarations, border controls). 

The  2021  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  Commission  proposal  estimated  that 
implementation and enforcement costs for public authorities would be EUR 481 per year per 
importer under the situation where default value for emissions are used, and EUR 7,985 per 
year per importer under the situation with actual values for emissions.30 

30 See Impact Assessment Report of 14.7.2021 (SWD(2021) 643 final), Part 2, Table 6-5. 

15 

 
 
 
Since exempted importers under the simplification proposal  are largely  small  importers, the 
Commission  assumes  that  they  would  choose  to  report  emissions  based  on  default  values. 
Therefore, the implementation and enforcement cost savings for public authorities would be 
approximately EUR 87,542,000 per year31. 

2.3.3  Estimated revenue losses due to the new de minimis threshold 

The  2021  impact  assessment  accompanying  the  Commission  proposal  estimated  that  the 
revenue from CBAM would be approximately EUR 2.1 billion in 2030.32 Since less than 1% 
of  emissions  would  not  be  captured  under  the  new  de  minimis  threshold  (see  Table  1),  the 
foregone  implied  revenue  for  the  year  2030  due  to  emissions  not  captured  is  estimated  at 
approximately EUR 21,000,000. 

2.3.4  Estimated net benefits from the reduction of administrative burden 

Table 3 below provides the aggregated costs savings and loss of revenue due to the proposed 
new de minimis threshold of an annual 50 tonnes of mass per importer. Overall, the proposed 
new  de  minimis  annual  threshold  would  lead  to  cumulative  cost  savings  of  EUR  1,210 
million, a limited loss of revenue (EUR 21 million), and an overall net benefit of EUR 1,189 
million. 

Table 3. Result of the cost-benefit analysis for the proposed new de minimis threshold of 
50 tonnes of mass per importer per year 

Cost savings 

Importers: reduction in administrative costs 

EUR 1,123 million 

of which Corresponding to SMEs  At least EUR 831 million 

Public Authorities: reduction in implementation and enforcement costs 
Total cost savings 

EUR 87.5 million 
EUR 1,210 million 

Loss of revenue due to foregone emissions for exempted importers 

EUR 21 million 

Net benefit of the proposed new de minimis 

Loss of revenue 

Net benefit 
Source: Commission’s analysis. 

EUR 1,189 million 

31 182,000 exempted importers multiplied by EUR 481. 
32 See Impact Assessment Report of 14.7.2021 (SWD(2021) 643 final).  

16 

 
 
 
 
3.  Simplifying CBAM for large CBAM importers 

In addition to the de minimis exemption, a number of simplifications will be introduced that 
will  benefit  importers  that  will  remain  within  the  scope  of  CBAM,  or  operators  in  third 
countries. These measures can be grouped in four categories depending on whether they aim 
at  simplifying  (i)  authorisation  of  declarants,  (ii)  emission  calculation,  (iii)  reporting 
requirements, or (iv) financial liability. 

It should be noted that due to limited data availability, it is difficult to quantify the impact of 
the measures presented in this section in terms of reduction of administrative costs.33 Where 
possible, Commission services attempted to provide an illustration of the order of magnitude, 
or  else  describe  qualitatively,  how  the  measure  will  contribute  to  simplifying  and 
strengthening the CBAM, while safeguarding its environmental objective. 

Separate  from  this  simplification  proposal,  the  Commission  clarified,  in  a  letter  to 
stakeholders on 19 December 2024, that CBAM does not apply to electricity generated in the 
exclusive  economic  zone  of  Member  States  and  imported  into  the  customs  territory  of  the 
Union.34  This  means  that  there  is  no  obligation  for  importers,  regarding  such  electricity 
imports, to apply for the status of authorised CBAM declarant, to access the CBAM Registry, 
or to pay a CBAM adjustment. 

3.1  Measures to simplify the authorisation of declarants 

3.1.1  Authorisation procedure 

3.1.1.1  Problem definition 
Member States and stakeholders have expressed concerns about the administrative burden in 
relation to the procedure to grant importers the status of authorised CBAM declarant, which 
may consequently hinder the importation of CBAM goods. Concerns are raised in particular 
with respect to the mandatory consultation procedure.  

Secondly,  importers  have  complained  about  the  need  to  seek  technical  expertise  for  the 
submission of CBAM declarations and the assessment of CBAM obligations. Currently, only 
indirect customs representatives can assume legal liability for the CBAM declaration covering 
goods of an importer, but these representatives may not have the necessary expertise to carry 
out this task. Further, costs for contracting indirect customs representatives  can be high and 
their capacity limited. 

33 None of the costs and benefits of the measures presented in Section 3 are included in the estimates presented in section 2.3, 
meaning  that  the  additional  administrative  cost  savings  of  measures  presented  in  Section  3  will  come  on  top.  While  a 
quantitative assessment of their impact was not possible at this stage, Commission Services will strive to assess their impact 
in the future, including where possible also quantitatively, for example in the biennial CBAM review reports as per Article 30 
of the CBAM regulation.  
34 This is due to the fact that, in line with Articles 59 and 60 of the Union Customs Code (UCC), and by analogy to Article 
31(h) of the UCC–Delegated Act, electricity generated by installations in the EEZ of the costal Member State has an “EU 
origin”, meaning that such electricity is not “originating in a third country” (as required by Art. 2 of the CBAM Regulation). 
Hence, it is not in the scope of the CBAM rules. 

17 

 
 
 
3.1.1.2  Proposed way forward  
It  is  important  to  simplify  the  processing  of  applications  for  authorisation  and  reduce  the 
associated administrative burden for Member States and the Commission. 

Optional consultation procedure  
As the CBAM authorisation is valid in all MS and importers may have cross-border activity, 
the consultation procedure should still be part of the CBAM authorisation procedure: it will 
provide  NCAs  the  possibility  to  monitor  and  control  the  information  submitted  to  other 
NCAs. However, it should be for the NCA taking the authorisation decision to decide whether 
there is a need to launch a targeted consultation with other NCAs and/or the Commission. In 
light  of  the  unnecessary  obligation  imposed  on  NCAs  that  would  result  in  an  excessive 
administrative  burden,  it  is  proposed  to  make  the  consultation  procedure  optional  and  no 
longer compulsory. 

Introduction of a CBAM representative  
Since authorised CBAM declarants may not be qualified or have the  operational capacity to 
fulfil the obligations related to the submission of a correct CBAM declaration, including the 
calculation of the embedded emissions, they could delegate the access and the right to submit 
a  CBAM  declaration  to  a  third  party  e.g.  consultants  and/or  environmental  experts.  The 
representative  would  not  apply  for  authorisation;  however  the  representative  shall  fulfil 
certain  criteria  to  obtain  access  to  the  CBAM  registry,  (e.g.  be  holder  of  an  EORI  number, 
established in a Member State), and shall follow procedures, which will be established in an 
implementing act. Authorised CBAM declarants will remain liable for all CBAM obligations 
including  the  purchase  and  surrender  of  the  correct  number  of  CBAM  certificates,  however 
the  basis  of  the  calculation  will  be  done  by  the  trusted  third  party.  To  implement  this,  the 
Commission  will  need  an  empowerment  to  set  up  the  technical  solutions  for  the  access 
management in the CBAM registry.  

3.1.1.3  Impact and simplification 
While the new CBAM de minimis will reduce administrative costs related to the authorisation 
procedures drastically, by decreasing the number of requests from around 200,000 to around 
20,000, the proposed measures will further simplify the authorisation process. This will allow 
for a more efficient authorisation process, and reduce administrative costs for both NCAs and 
the  Commission.  The  dedicated  and  targeted  process  provides  the  possibility  to  focus  and 
control on those applicants which have a higher risk profile. In turn, this will allow declarants 
to obtain the status of ‘authorised CBAM declarants’ in due time and start importing CBAM 
goods as soon as possible.  

In  addition,  the  simplified  authorisation  procedure  will  –  in  particular  for  the  SMEs  that 
remain in scope even after the introduction of a new de minimis – smoothen the application 
process. Finally, creating a formal role of ‘CBAM representative’ to support the submission 
of  CBAM  declaration  is  expected  to  reduce  the  associated  administrative  burden  for 
importers.  

18 

 
 
3.2  Measures to simplify emissions calculation  

3.2.1  Exclusion of non-calcined clay  

3.2.1.1  Problem definition 
The CBAM scope includes ‘Other kaolinic clays’ (CN code 2507 00 80) in the list of cement 
goods.  While  calcined  clays  are  carbon-intensive  products,  this  is  not  the  case  for  non-
calcined  clays.  However,  both  types  of  clays  are  in,  as  the  CN  code  does  not  differentiate 
between  these  two  types  of  clays.  Calcined  clays  can  be  used  to  (partly)  replace  clinker  in 
cement,  while  non-calcined  clays  are  one  of  the  main  raw  materials  used  for  the 
manufacturing  of  ceramics,  an  industry  sector  that  is  currently  not  covered  by  the  CBAM 
scope. 

3.2.1.2  Proposed way forward 
The  inclusion  of  non-calcined  clays  in  scope  of  CBAM  is  neither  in  line  with  the  CBAM 
objective to target emission-intensive goods nor in line with the scope of the EU ETS.  

During  the  CBAM  transitional  period,  the  reporting  obligation  also  applies  to  non-calcined 
clays,  which  represents  an  unnecessary  administrative  burden.  As  a  partial  relief, 
Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2023/177335  already  provides  simplification,  as  embedded 
emissions  for  non-calcined  clays  have  been  set  to  zero  without  the  need  to  calculate  the 
embedded emissions.  

Based on the above it is proposed to remove the non-calcined kaolinic clays from the CBAM 
scope.  

3.2.1.3  Impact and simplification  
The exclusion of non-calcined clays from the CBAM scope would reduce the administrative 
burden from importers of this low-emission good, while having a very limited revenue impact 
as non-calcined  clays  are not  carbon-intensive and  are thus less relevant for  carbon leakage 
risks.  Based  on  available  customs  data,  approximately  385  EU  importers  imported  “other 
kaolinic  clays”  (under  CN  code  2507  00  80)  in  the  period  Oct  2023-Sept  2024.  Given  that 
currently  CN  code  2507  00  80  on  ‘Other  kaolinic  clays’  does  not  distinguish  between 
calcinated  and  non-calcinated  clays,  there  exist  no  data  on  trade  volumes  that  differentiate 
between the two types of those clays, which would allow us to make a confident estimate of 
the  number  of  importers  affected  by  this  simplification.  Cost  savings  from  those  exempted 
from CBAM that imported non-calcined clays cannot be further quantified at this stage.  

3.2.2  Default values 

3.2.2.1  Conditions to use default values 
3.2.2.1.1  Problem definition 
Art.  7(7)(a)  empowers  the  Commission  to  adopt  implementing  acts  on  the  methodology  to 
“specify the conditions under which it is deemed that actual emissions cannot be adequately 
determined”.  This  means  that  the  Commission  would  need  to  set  conditions,  consequently 
importers  would  need  to  provide  evidence  why  actual  emissions  cannot  be  determined,  and 

35  Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2023/1773  of 17  August 2023 laying  down  the  rules  for  the  application of 
Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards reporting obligations for the purposes of 
the carbon border adjustment mechanism during the transitional period 

19 

 
 
the Commission (and potentially also MS) would have to assess this evidence. However, this 
would  run  counter  to  the  simplification  objective.  Moreover,  CBAM  implementation  so  far 
has relied on the assumption that importers would be able to choose freely between reporting 
actual emission data or default values made available by the Commission. This is for example 
evidenced by the fact that the current provisions on the content of CBAM declarations do not 
require a justification why actual emissions cannot be determined. 

3.2.2.1.2  Proposed way forward 
The cycle of conditions, evidence and Commission/NCA assessment should be avoided.  

It is therefore proposed to remove the requirement in Art. 7(7)(a) to “specify conditions when 
actual emissions cannot be adequately determined.” 

3.2.2.1.3  Impact and simplification 
Declarants would be allowed to freely choose between actual embedded emissions and default 
values with a mark-up. This avoids a cycle where the Commission would have to set criteria 
when  actual  emissions  cannot  be  determined,  where  declarants  would  have  to  provide 
evidence (potentially requiring the participation of operators in third countries) and where the 
Commission and MS NCAs would have to assess the evidence. 

This does not weaken the protection against the risk of carbon leakage, which will be ensured 
by  setting  default  values  and  proportionately  designed  mark-ups  at  appropriate  levels  to 
safeguard the environmental integrity of the CBAM, as required by the CBAM Regulation. 

3.2.2.2  Data collection challenges  
3.2.2.2.1  Problem definition  
Annex IV, Section 4 specifies that “The Commission shall publish guidance for the approach 
taken to correct for waste gases or greenhouse gases used as process input, before collecting 
the  data  required  to  determine  the  relevant  default  values  for  each  type  of  goods  listed  in 
Annex I. …”. The approach that has been taken so far is to use publicly available databases of 
international  institutions  (such  as  the  International  Energy  Agency)  and  of  international 
industry sector associations (such as the World Steel Association or the Global Cement and 
Concrete Association). These databases are publicly available (although sometimes behind a 
paywall),  rely  on  a  consistent  approach  across  installations/countries,  are  often  based  on 
actual data and are peer-reviewed. Collecting actual values from individual installations poses 
several challenges:  

-  Contrary  to  the  EU  ETS,  there  is  no  obligation  on  operators  in  third  countries  to 

provide such information, which is often considered business-sensitive.  

-  Even  if  individual  installations  provide  actual  data,  there  is  currently  no  verification 

mechanism in place.  

-  Such data may differ in terms of the underlying methodology.  

Therefore, the Commission has not embarked on an exercise to collect data from individual 
installations and consequently no guidance has been published. 

3.2.2.2.2  Proposed way forward 
It  is  proposed  to  revise  the  Annex IV,  Section 4  concerning  the  determination  of  default 
values to  match an approach that is  technically feasible. The core principles of using actual 
and best available data should be kept.  

20 

 
 
3.2.2.2.3  Impact and simplification  
As  there  would  be  no  data  collection  from  individual  installations  in  third  countries,  the 
publication of a Commission guidance document on how to collect data would no longer be 
necessary.  The  Commission  will  instead  rely  on  best  available  data  (i.e.  reliable  data  from 
publicly available sources), as specified in the CBAM Regulation. 

3.2.2.3  Alternative default values based on worst EU ETS installations 
3.2.2.3.1  Problem definition  
Annex  IV,  Section 4.1  specifies  that  default  values  shall  be  set  at  the  average  emission 
intensity  of  each  exporting  country  and  for  each  of  the  goods  under  the  CBAM  scope, 
increased  by  a  proportionately  designed  mark-up.  When  reliable  data  for  the  exporting 
country  cannot  be  applied  for  a  type  of  goods,  then  Section  4.1  provides  for  an  alternative 
approach of setting default values which is based on the average emission intensity of the X% 
worst performing EU ETS installations for that type of goods.  

The problem with this alternative approach is that even though the most relevant processes are 
covered by the EU-ETS,  and emissions intensity data are available for those, this is  not  the 
case for some processes and goods. 

3.2.2.3.2  Proposed way forward 
The EU ETS products benchmarks cover only 11 products that are relevant for CBAM, while 
the CBAM scope encompasses 569 different CN codes. The ETS benchmarks cover the most 
greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  intensive  production  steps,  but  not  the  downstream  processes,  so 
estimations  would  be  necessary  for  the  latter.  Some  CBAM  goods  are  not  covered  by  any 
product benchmark (e.g. ferro-alloys, aluminous cement). Moreover, some CBAM goods are 
produced by very few installations in the EU, which would make it impossible to  determine 
for  example  the  worst  1%  or  10%.  Finally,  in  some  cases  the  worst  EU  producers  are  still 
more  GHG-efficient  than  most  of  their  competitors  in  third  countries  (e.g.  for  nitric  acid). 
Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  define  a  simpler  approach  to  determining  default  values  when 
reliable data for the exporting country cannot be applied for a type of goods. 

It is proposed to set the alternative default value at the level of the average emission intensity 
of the ten countries with the highest emission intensities for which reliable data are available. 
This would provide a strong carbon leakage risk protection, while not being overly punitive. It 
would  also  ensure  that  the  absence  of  data  does  not  result  in  a  more  favourable  treatment 
compared  to  countries  where  data  are  available.  The  possibility  also  exists  for  declarants  to 
demonstrate that default values based on region-specific features should be lower, pursuant to 
point 7 of Annex IV to the CBAM Regulation. 

3.2.2.3.3  Simplification and impact 
In the absence of data for some countries, the derivation of alternative default values based on 
the  worst  EU  installations  can  be  simplified  by  just  using  the  average  of  the  ten  highest 
default values of those countries for which reliable data are available. This is a much simpler, 
more  practical  and  understandable  approach  for  importers.  It  strengthens  the  protection 
against the risk of carbon leakage when importers use default values, while not being overly 
punitive in cases where importers are not able to obtain actual emission data. 

3.2.3  Emission calculation for downstream processing 

3.2.3.1  Problem definition 
The embedded emissions of some aluminium and steel goods currently in the scope of CBAM 
are primarily determined by the embedded emissions of input materials. In other words, most 

21 

 
embedded  emissions  are  stemming  from  the  production  of  their  precursors  while  the 
emissions  arising  during the production steps of  these goods  are typically relatively low.  In 
addition, these production processes are largely not covered by the EU ETS36. They consist of 
finishing processes that are carried out by separate installations not covered by  the EU ETS 
(except  in  the  case  of  integrated  facilities).  At  the  moment,  the  CBAM  reporting  requires 
monitoring  and  reporting  of  the  emissions  of  these  finishing  processes,  as  well  as  those 
stemming from the production of their precursors.  

3.2.3.2  Proposed way forward 
To  reduce  the  burden  on  operators  in  third  countries  from  the  additional  monitoring  of 
emissions  of  the  final  production  steps  –  the  latter  typically  not  covered  by  EU  ETS  –  it is 
proposed to exclude those manufacturing processes from the boundaries of the calculation of 
emissions for these aluminium and steel goods.  

Such  an  exclusion  would  simplify  substantially  the  monitoring  and  calculation  efforts  for 
those products. The simplification would improve the application of the CBAM methodology 
notably for complex goods, which is a precondition for the future potential expansion of the 
scope of CBAM to more downstream goods. Moreover, the simplification will have a positive 
impact on the manufacturers of those goods as they will be exempted from the obligation to 
monitor  and  report  emissions  happening  at  their  own  installation.  The  only  data  needed  to 
calculate the embedded emissions of the final CBAM good would be the embedded emissions 
in the precursors purchased from external providers and the quantity of precursors needed per 
tonne of final CBAM good produced. 

3.2.3.3  Impact and simplification 
The exclusion better focuses the CBAM methodology  and its boundaries on GHG-intensive 
processes and better aligns the CBAM and ETS scopes, since the final processes of the metal 
manufacturing  sectors  are  not  under  the  EU  ETS.  Furthermore,  the  excluded  emissions 
represent a very small share of total emissions.  

Internationally available data constrain the possibility to derive robust estimates of the impact, 
since  publicly  available  data  are  not  consistent  in  the  attribution  of  emissions  in  different 
processes.  Nevertheless,  based  on  JRC  IDEES  data,  in  the  EU  such  finalization  processes 
would correspond to about 6% of embedded energy consumption in the case of an integrated 
route. This range is of a similar dimension to the range observed for a very specific CBAM 
product (using international available data). Specifically for CN Code 73181600, the share of 
embedded  emissions  corresponding  to  finalization  processes  varies  around  4%  when 
produced  by  the  integrated  route  –  although  differences  can  be  high  between  countries 
(depending on how they report emissions) and production routes.  

3.2.4  Exemption of precursors produced in the EU 

3.2.4.1  Problem definition 
At the moment, precursors (i.e. CBAM goods used as input materials into the  production of 
other  CBAM  goods)  produced  in  the  EU,  which  are  exported  to  third  countries  for  the 
production  of  CBAM  goods,  must  be  accounted  for  in  the  determination  of  the  embedded 

36  One  example  of  this  problem  relates  to  the  production of  CN  codes  under  HS 7318  (screws,  bolts,  nuts,  etc.),  whereby 
input materials into these products (e.g. steel rod wires) undergo manufacturing processes to produce the final goods. In the 
EU, these processes (e.g. cutting and forging etc.) are usually carried out by installations outside the scope of EU ETS and 
typically account for a very small share of the emissions. 

22 

 
 
emissions  of  CBAM  goods  when  imported  into  the  EU.  Under  the  current  rules,  these 
emissions  have  to  be  reported,  the  ETS  carbon  price  has  to  be  paid  by  EU  producers,  and 
these amounts have to be fully deducted from the CBAM financial adjustment.  

For example, under the current systems, a third-country producer that exports mixed fertilisers 
to the EU and sources their input materials (ammonia and urea) from an EU-based installation 
covered under the EU ETS, would need to obtain information on embedded emissions of the 
ammonia  and  urea  to  add  them  to  their  overall  calculation  of  embedded  emissions  of  the 
mixed fertilisers. Then, the corresponding ETS carbon price, which had already been paid the 
EU  producer,  would  be  fully  deducted  from  the  calculation  of  their  CBAM  obligations  to 
avoid double-counting. 

3.2.4.2  Proposed way forward 
The inclusion of precursors adds a reporting and compliance burden without any added value 
from an environmental (as emissions embedded in precursors are covered by the EU ETS and 
the ETS carbon price deducted from the CBAM financial adjustment).  

It  is  therefore  proposed  to  attribute  zero  embedded  emissions  to  the  precursors  produced  in 
the  EU  (or  in  countries  or  territories  excluded  from  CBAM  pursuant  to  Annex  III  of  the 
CBAM Regulation) which are already covered by the EU ETS and for which a carbon price 
has thus already paid under the EU ETS in the calculation of specific embedded emissions of 
CBAM  goods.  The  volumes  and  origins  of  those  precursors  would  remain  part  of  the 
monitoring of the installation for verification purposes. 

3.2.4.3  Impact and simplification 
The  solution  would  include  less  precursors  for  which  data  collection  is  needed  thus 
eliminating  an  administrative  burden  for  EU  importers  and  operators  in  third  countries, 
without  affecting  the  number  of  CBAM  certificates  to  be  surrendered.  This  simplification 
would  therefore  not  reduce  the  environmental  effectiveness  of  the  CBAM  or  subsequent 
CBAM  revenue  while  eliminating  transaction  costs  along  the  value  chain.  The  proposed 
solution is not expected to generate new or additional circumvention risks. As indicated above 
the  volumes  and  origins  of  the  precursors  continue  to  be  monitored  by  the  operator  for 
verification purposes. 

3.2.5  Emission verification 

3.2.5.1  Problem definition 
CBAM  declarants  must  submit  an  annual  CBAM  declaration  containing  the  calculation  of 
embedded  emissions  on  the  basis  of  either  default  values  provided  by  the  Commission  or 
actual values calculated by third-country installations.  

Currently,  the  CBAM  Regulation  requires  verification  of  all  embedded  emissions,  even  if 
they are based on default values provided by the Commission. This is impractical and costly. 
There  is  no  added  value  to  ask  CBAM  declarants  to  ensure  that  these  default  values  are 
verified by an accredited verifier. 

3.2.5.2  Proposed way forward 
It  is  proposed  to  remove  the  verification  of  embedded  emissions  based  on  default  values 
provided by the Commission for the reasons highlighted below: 

•  Such  verification  does  not  provide  a  clear  added  value  if  default  values  are  used. 
Embedded  emissions  based  on  default  values  will  be  calculated  automatically  in  the 

23 

 
CBAM Registry on the basis of the quantities of imported CBAM goods declared (and 
cross-checked with national customs data).  

the 

installation  and  provides  reasonable  assurance 

•  Verification of default values is redundant. For actual values, the accredited verifier, in 
principle,  visits 
the 
methodology  for  the  calculation  of  emissions  (and  its  underlying  assumptions)  is 
correct.  For  default  values,  no  visit  to  the  premises  of  the  installation  would  be 
relevant. The accredited verifier could verify the content of the CBAM declaration but 
there would be no added value in doing this (see point above). This would come at a 
cost for the declarant, and the lack of readily available accredited verifiers could make 
the verification difficult to obtain in practice. 

that 

3.2.5.3  Impact and simplification 
Removing this requirement (i.e. requirement to verify the emissions when they are based on 
default values) comes with no disadvantage.  It  would facilitate the use of default values for 
importers  and  reduce  their  cost,  including  the  associated  administrative  constraints.  This 
would also help third country producers, particularly SMEs, who could rely on using default 
values.  

3.2.6  Exclusion of indirect emissions of electricity 

3.2.6.1  Problem definition  
Annex II to the Regulation lists the  goods for which only direct  emissions have to be taken 
into  account  for  the  purpose  of  CBAM.  The  Annex  includes  goods  in  the  iron  and  steel, 
aluminium, and chemical sectors. For goods not listed in this Annex, both direct and indirect37 
emissions have to be taken into account for CBAM purposes. This is thus the case for goods 
in  the  cement  and  fertilisers  sectors38,  but  also  electricity  based  on  the  current  text  of 
Annex II.  While  the  Regulation  does  not  explicitly  mention  that  indirect  emissions  of 
electricity are not relevant for CBAM, it is implied.  

This emerges from the following elements.  

Recital 19 of the Regulation appears to imply that when the Regulation was drafted the goods 
listed  in  Annex  II  were  intended  to  be  only  those  which  are  eligible  for  indirect  cost 
compensation: “… Indirect emissions should, however, not be taken into account initially for 
the  goods  in  respect  of  which  financial  measures  apply  in  the  Union  that  compensate  for 
indirect emissions costs incurred from greenhouse gas emission costs passed on in electricity 
prices. Those goods are identified in Annex II to this Regulation….” Electricity production is 
not eligible for indirect cost compensation39. 

Annex III, Section D.2 of the Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1773 laying 
down  “Rules  for  determining  the  emission  factor  of  electricity  as  imported  goods”  reads: 
“For  determining  the  specific  actual  embedded  emissions  of  electricity  as  imported  goods, 

37  “Indirect  emissions”  are  defined  as  the  emissions  from  the  production  of  electricity  which  is  consumed  during  the 
production processes of goods.  
38 Agglomerated iron ores (CN 2601 12 00) constitute an exception. These goods are refined products from mining activities 
that  are  used  as  input  for  iron  and  steel  manufacturing.  In  CBAM,  they  are  listed under  the  iron  and  steel  sector heading. 
However, these products are not eligible for indirect cost compensation and both direct and indirect emissions are taken into 
account for CBAM. 
39  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Guidelines  on  certain  State  aid  measures  in  the  context  of  the  system  for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading post-2021 (2020/C 317/04). OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 5-19. 

24 

 
 
 
only  direct  emissions  shall  be  applicable  in  accordance  with  Section  2  of  Annex  IV  to 
Regulation  (EU)  2023/956”.  The  fact  that  only  direct  emissions  of  electricity  are  to  be 
considered  under  CBAM  has  therefore  been  made  clear  since  August  2023,  when  the 
Implementing Regulation was adopted.  

On substance, indirect emissions are not really relevant for electricity as a CBAM good, as in 
this case the CBAM concerns installations producing electricity, not consuming it. The auto-
consumption of electricity by power plants (e.g. electricity consumed by auxiliary equipment 
such as fans, pumps, flue-gas treatment systems, air conditioning, and lighting) can be taken 
into  account  by  subtracting  it  from  the  gross  electricity  generation  to  result  in  the  net 
electricity  generation.  Indeed,  Annex III,  Section D.3  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2023/1773 addresses the auto-consumption of electricity in installations producing electricity: 
“For  the  production  of  electricity,  the  activity  level  shall  refer  to  net  electricity  leaving  the 
system  boundaries  of  the  power  plant  or  cogeneration  unit,  after  subtraction  of  internally 
consumed electricity.”  

However,  as  long  as  this  is  not  clarified  expressly  in  the  basic  act,  some  confusion  may 
remain  as  to  whether  only  direct  emissions  of  electricity  have  to  be  accounted  for  under 
CBAM  may  remain,  unless  both  the  Regulation  and  its  implementing  act(s)  are  considered 
simultaneously.  

3.2.6.2  Proposed way forward 
It is proposed to amend Annex II of the Regulation.  

3.2.6.3  Simplification  
The proposed amendment, by making the CBAM rules easier to understand, reduces the time 
and  thus  costs  incurred  by  importers  and  operators  when  familiarising  with  the  system. 
Moreover, it avoids any ambiguity as to what would otherwise constitute an additional layer 
of complexity of the system, i.e. reporting of indirect emissions of electricity in addition to the 
direct emissions,  

3.3  Measures to simplify CBAM reporting requirements  

3.3.1  Change of the deadline to submit annual CBAM declarations  

3.3.1.1  Problem definition 
The annual deadline for declarants to both submit their annual CBAM declaration (including a 
verification  report  if  actual  values  are  used)  and  surrender  the  corresponding  number  of 
certificates is set on 31 May. However, this deadline may prove to be challenging for many 
declarants, especially for the first reporting years. It might constrain recourse to actual values. 

In addition,  the  corresponding  ETS  annual  deadlines have been shifted  from  30 April to  30 
September.  

3.3.1.2  Proposed way forward 
Moving  the  annual  deadline  for  declarants  to  submit  their  declaration  and  surrender 
certificates  to  a  later  date  each  year  would  match  the  recent  postponement  of  the  EU  ETS 
annual deadlines. It would in turn require changes to the two other CBAM annual deadlines 
which  inherently  follow  the  declaration  and  certificate  surrender:  certificate  repurchase  1 
month later than certificate surrender and certificate cancellation on the day after the last day 
of the repurchase period. It is proposed to set the annual deadline for declaration submission 

25 

 
 
and certificate surrender on 31 August, with the repurchase deadline moved to 30 September 
and the certificate cancellation precise date on 1 October.40 Once the Own Resources proposal 
is adopted, the Commission will evaluate a potential review of the calendar for declarations in 
the CBAM cycle. 

3.3.1.3  Impact and simplification 
This would give each year (i) non-EU operators more time to verify their emissions and (ii) 
declarants  to  submit  their  annual  CBAM  declaration  buy  and  surrender  the  corresponding 
certificates. No detrimental effects are expected.  

3.3.2  CBAM Registry access for operators and verifiers 

Two  possible  simplifications  were  identified.  One  relates  to  improving  access  for  third-
country operators to the CBAM Registry and the second one relates to creating an access to 
the CBAM Registry to accredited verifiers.  

3.3.2a Registration of third-country operators in the CBAM Registry 

3.3.2.1  Problem definition – part a 

Problem 1: 

Articles 10 and 14 of the CBAM Regulation, containing provisions on the Operators’ Portal, 
are  currently  unclear  in  several  aspects,  including  the  scope  of  the  information  to  be  made 
available to the public or the possibility to upload information on the carbon price effectively 
paid. Further, it is unclear whether the controlling entity of operator of the installation in the 
third  country,  including  the  parent  company,  falls  under  the  definition  of  “operator”.  Such 
uncertainty complicates implementation. 

Problem 2:  

Initial  data  submissions  in  EU  Access  (through  which  operators  can  access  the  CBAM 
registry)  have  revealed  substantial  data  quality  challenges  in  the  registration  of  non-EU 
established companies, especially in relation with their basic identity verification. Initial data 
submissions have proven to contain a substantial share (up to 50%) of low-quality input data 
with  erroneous  company  names,  dummy  or  incorrect  identifiers  or/and  missing  sources  of 
cross-check information. For these cases, Commission staff needs to either reject the request 
or/and follow up bilaterally. Rejection of requests creates additional work for the operator as 
well as for the Commission services who need to re-evaluate at a later stage. The problem is 
expected to grow as circa 55.000 registrations are expected. 

3.3.2.2  Proposed way forward and simplification – part a 

Problem 1: 

It should be clarified that controlling entities are covered by the definition of operator. Those 
entities  would  be  allowed  to  access  the  operators’  portal  and  to  upload  the  calculation  of 
emissions  and verification reports of the installations of all its subsidiaries and entities they 
control at once. This will simplify implementation for operators. 

40 As part of the biennal review reports from 2027 onwards, Commission services will asssess if the deadline can 
be advanced to an earlier date of the year, once the system is more mature and operators are fully familiar with 
all procedures. 

26 

 
 
Relatedly,  it  should  be  required  for  a  company  to  provide  information  on  its  ultimate 
controlling entity, if applicable. This will facilitate the review of CBAM declarations and the 
risk assessment operations by the Commission.  

Further,  it  should  be  clearly  stated  that  the  operator  who  chooses  to  share  data  with  the 
declarant can also indicate – in the operators’ portal - the carbon price paid in a third country. 
This will simplify reporting obligations. 

Lastly, Article 14 should be complemented by clarifying that the operator can also choose to 
keep the location of installations confidential.  

Problem 2:  

It  should  be  made  mandatory  to  submit  a  corporate  identifier  upon  registration  of  a  third 
country  operator  in  the  CBAM  registry.  This  will  allow  to  transfer  the  corporate  identifier 
used  in  EU  Access  to  the  CBAM  registry.  The  choice  of  a  specific  identifier  could  be 
determined through an amendment of the Implementing Regulation on the CBAM registry.  

3.3.2b Granting access to accredited verifiers to the CBAM Registry  

3.3.2.3  Problem definition – part b 
Currently,  the  CBAM  Regulation  does  not  provide  for  the  possibility  to  grant  access  to 
accredited verifiers to the CBAM registry. This creates complications relating to the process 
of submitting and reviewing CBAM verification report. 

3.3.2.4  Proposed way forward – part b 
It  is  proposed  to  amend  the  CBAM  Regulation  to  provide  for  the  registration  of  accredited 
verifiers in the CBAM registry.  

3.3.2.5  Impact and simplification – part b 
The proposal to grant access to verifiers to the CBAM Registry would align with the practice 
under the EU ETS1, provide simplifications and alleviate the burden for several constituencies 
of stakeholders. It would facilitate the declarant’s compliance with reporting obligations since 
the reliability of emissions data will increase significantly. However, this comes at a cost for 
the  Commission  and  NCAs  relating  to  the  expansion  of  the  operator’s  portal  and  the 
registration of verifiers in the CBAM Registry. 

In more details, the advantages and impacts of simplifications are described below: 

•  It  would  create  a  more  secure  system  for  CBAM  declarants,  thus  avoiding  the 
potential  application  of  penalties.  Granting  accredited  verifiers  access  to  the  CBAM 
Registry  would  eliminate  the  risk  that  the  operator  submits  an  invalid  verification 
report  e.g.  because  the  verifier  was  not  accredited  for  the  correct  scope  of 
accreditation,  or  the  verification  report  is  not  based  on  the  latest  calculation  of 
embedded emissions.  

•  It  would  simplify  the  review  of  verification  reports  for  Commission  and  NCAs 
because  the  integrity  and  authenticity  of  the  data  would  not  need  to  be  checked 
manually.  If  the  verification  report  is  not  uploaded  by  the  accredited  verifier,  then 
these  checks  would  likely  need  to  be  carried  out  manually  by  the  Commission  and 
NCAs.  

•  It  would  allow  verifiers  to  update  information  on  accreditation  directly  in  the 
CBAM Registry, rather than having the NCAs do this update manually each time 

27 

 
an  accredited  verifier  renews  or  updates  the  accreditation  certificate,  or  an 
administrative sanction is taken by the national accreditation body.  

•  It  would  simplify  the  verification  of  embedded  emissions  for  third-country 
operators.  Operators  could  simply  select  the  accredited  verifier  in  the  CBAM 
Registry to  ‘request  verification’ instead of sharing sensitive information outside  the 
CBAM  Registry  by  way  of  electronically  signed  and  encrypted  emails  exchanges 
containing  the  calculation  of  embedded  emissions,  request  for  information  and 
preliminary assessments from the verifier, etc. In case of an issue with the verification 
report,  the  Commission  or  NCAs  would  otherwise  need  to  ask  for  a  copy  of  the 
relevant  exchanges  to  find  evidence  on  whether  a  mistake  emanates  from  the 
accredited verifier or the operator.  

On the other hand, the integration of accredited verifiers in  the CBAM registry also  creates 
constraints for the Commission and NCA: 

-  A new population of users would be added to the CBAM registry, specifically to the 

portal for third-country operators. Some IT development is required. 

-  The  IT  registration  of  accredited  verifiers  would  need  to  be  managed  by  the 
Commission through EU Access, then the management of the registration information 
would be managed by NCAs, in coordination with national accreditation bodies. 

3.4  Measures to simplify the CBAM financial liability 

3.4.1  CBAM certificate management  

3.4.1.1  Problem definition 
Under the current CBAM regulation, declarants will face two obligations:  

- 

- 

they will have to buy CBAM certificates to ensure that, at the end of each quarter, they 
own a number of certificates which corresponds to at least 80%, calculated based on 
default values, of the emissions embedded in the goods they have imported since the 
start of the year (hereafter the “80% rule”);  
the number of certificates eligible for repurchase by NCAs will be limited to one third 
of  the  total  number  of  CBAM  certificates  purchased  by  the  authorised  CBAM 
declarant during the previous calendar year (even if the purchase year is different).  

The “80% rule” prevents risks and fraudulent patterns, by ensuring that the CBAM financial 
obligation is partly applied shortly after the import takes place, on a quarterly basis, instead of 
waiting  until  the  time  of  the  declaration  during  the  following  year  for  the  surrendering  of 
CBAM  certificates.  However,  the  combination  of  these  two  rules  will  likely  lead  many 
declarants to buy many more certificates than what they will need to surrender, resulting in a 
disproportionate financial burden, potentially without the possibility to have them repurchased 
by NCAs.  

3.4.1.2  Proposed way forward 
In defining the best way forward, it is important to strike a balance between the initial policy 
objective of this rule and the burden it entails for importers. Based on the problem description, 
and  as  assessed  in  the  examples  below,  notably  the  assessment  on  liquidity,  it  has  become 
apparent  that  the  imposed  financial  burden  is  unnecessarily  high.  At  the  same  time,  to 
maintain effectiveness of the rule, it should still represent a relevant security compared to the 
ultimate financial obligation.  

28 

 
 
More specifically, it is proposed to lower the percentage from 80% to 50% to become a better 
proxy  to  declarants’  expected  financial  liability,  while  keeping  the  way  the  calculation  is 
made every quarter based on information received from customs authorities on the quantity of 
goods imported by declarants since the beginning of the year. The level of 50% is chosen to 
reduce  the  burden  on  declarants,  while  maintaining  effectiveness  of  the  as  a  control  and 
safeguard  measure  against  compliance  risks.  Therefore,  moving  to  50%  appears  to  be  a 
balanced choice between the two objectives. 

Second,  the  calculation  base  would  be  changed,  and  declarants  would  be  given  the  choice 
between 2 options on which the calculation will be made: 

-  Option  1:  Use  public  default  values  with  a  deduction  of  the  mark-up41  and  of  the 

corresponding free allocation42.  

-  Option 2: Use the number of CBAM certificates that they surrendered in the previous 

year for the same goods.  

For  both  methods,  the  Commission  will  make  all  information  and  calculations  available  to 
declarants in the CBAM registry to facilitate both compliance by declarants and enforcement 
by  NCAs.  In  practice,  it  means  that  declarants  will  access  the  registry  and  manage  their 
financial liability directly in the registry, at least every quarter. They will also be made aware 
if they must purchase certificates.  

Third, the one-third repurchase limit would:  

(i) 

(ii) 

be replaced by the number of certificates that declarants will be required to buy as 
a result of the rule (i.e. all certificates which the Regulation forced a declarant to 
buy can be sold back), and  
apply  to  the  same  year  as  the  year  of  purchase  (instead  of  the  year  before  as 
currently provided for).  

3.4.1.3  Impact and simplification 
The measure will greatly simplify the way declarants manage their CBAM liability and ease 
the financial and administrative burden. In addition, it would avoid over-purchase of CBAM 
certificates  which,  in  some  cases,  cannot  be  sold  back  and  would  be  lost  even  if  declarants 
were  legally  forced  to  buy  them.  It  will  therefore  also  avoid  legal  challenges  and  disputes 
which would otherwise result from the current repurchase limit. 

Illustrative example of the impact on an individual importer 

The below calculations are primarily based on Option 1. Suppose that on 1 January 2030, an 
importer  buys  600t  of  steel  from  a  foreign  supplier  which  (using  default  values)  has  an 
embedded 1000t CO2 equivalent. Suppose that in 2030 the full CBAM price is EUR 85/t CO2 
and  the  effective  price  (i.e.,  considering  the  corresponding  CBAM  factor)  of  CBAM 
certificates is EUR 50/t CO2 and the carbon price paid abroad for this steel is EUR 40/t CO2. 
This importer does not import any other CBAM goods during 2030. 

41 To incentivise reporting of actual values, Commission default values apply a mark-up. An implementing act will further 
define the level of the mark-up. 
42 The CBAM is implemented gradually in parallel to the phase-out of free allowances under the EU ETS. 

29 

 
 
The actual CBAM obligation at the end of the year (2030) is EUR 10,000 (1000 times [EUR 
50- EUR40]). This should be compared to the financial obligations throughout the year using 
the 80% rule and the 50% rule.  

Under the 80% rule, currently in place, before 31 March 2030, the importer needs to purchase 
800 CBAM certificates (80% of 1000) at the full CBAM price of EUR 85/t CO2, and hence 
set aside, until then end of 2030, EUR 68,000. At the end of the year, 200 CBAM certificates 
need  to  be  surrendered  (10,000  EUR  divided  by  the  effective  carbon  price  of  EUR  50  per 
tonne CO2 eq.), and one third of 600 certificates can be repurchased, while 400 certificates 
can be carried over to 2031. If the importer does not import CBAM goods in 2031, then it can 
only repurchase 134 (one third of the 400 certificates carried over from 2030) and hence loses 
the  value  of  266  CBAM  certificates  (at  EUR  85  each),  corresponding  to  a  value  of  EUR 
22,610. 

Under  the  proposed  50%  rule,  before  31  March  2030,  the  importer  would  need  to  purchase 
500 CBAM certificates (50% of 1000) at the effective price of per certificate, and hence set 
aside,  until  then  end  of  2030,  EUR  25,000.  At  the  end  of  the  year,  200  CBAM  certificates 
need  to  be  surrendered  and  the  rest,  300,  can  be  repurchased.  There  is  no  longer  a  risk  of 
losing the value of a purchased CBAM certificate. 

The risk of excess purchase of CBAM certificates that cannot be repurchased by NCAs will 
be  exacerbated  for  imports  from  countries  with  comparable  levels  of  carbon  pricing  (e.g. 
imports  from  the  UK)  and  for  low-carbon  goods  (e.g.  which  are  substantially  lower  than 
default values). This will be addressed by Option 2. 

Estimated freed-up Liquidity 

Under  the  50%  rule  importers  will  need  to  front-load  the  purchase  of  fewer  CBAM 
certificates  throughout  the  year,  compared  to  the  80%  rule.  This  will  free  up  financial 
resources  for  these  companies  during  the  year.  The  2021  impact  assessment  accompanying 
the  Commission  proposal  estimated  that  the  revenue  from  CBAM  would  be  approximately 
EUR 2,100 million in 2030.43  

Example based on Option 1: Under the 80% rule this means setting aside EUR 714 million by 
the end of Q1 and similarly for Q2, Q3 and Q4, assuming that imports are distributed equally 
over all quarters. 

Under the 50% rule this means setting aside EUR  262.5 million by the end of each quarter. 
Hence, on a quarterly basis 451.5 million in liquidity is freed up under the 50% rule compared 
with the 80% rule (1,806 million in total), with positive liquidity effects for importers. 

The effect will even be starker when taking account of importers  sourcing their goods  from 
the UK or other countries with a high carbon price, choosing Option 2. 

3.4.2  Certificate sales start date in 2027 

3.4.2.1  Problem definition 
Member  States  should  start  selling  CBAM  certificates  to  their  declarants  on  the  common 
central  platform  (CCP)  from  1  January  2026  onwards.  In  addition,  as  discussed  above,  the 

43 See Impact Assessment Report of 14.7.2021 (SWD(2021) 643 final).  

30 

 
 
CBAM Regulation obliges declarants as from 2026 to have a number of CBAM certificates 
on their account in the CBAM registry which currently corresponds at the end of each quarter 
to  at  least  80%  of  the  embedded  emissions  embedded  in  the  goods  they  import  since  1 
January of the year.  

However, 2026 will be the first year of the CBAM financial adjustment with limited insight 
on key factors determining the number of certificates that many declarants will have to buy in 
2026 and surrender in 2027 for the year 2026, mainly the level of carbon intensity of imported 
goods, the carbon prices which will be paid abroad and how they will be deducted. Besides, it 
is  proposed to  revise the “80% rule”. As a result, CBAM importers could  be forced to  start 
purchasing  CBAM  certificates  already  in  Q1  2026  while  this  rule  is  being  simplified  by  a 
legislative proposal.  

3.4.2.2  Proposed way forward 
It  is  proposed  to  provide  for  a  specific  treatment  for  the  first  year  of  the  CBAM  financial 
adjustment.  Declarants  will  be  able  to  purchase  CBAM  certificates  from  February  2027  to 
cover the emissions embedded in the CBAM goods they will have imported during 2026. The 
calculation method for the certificate prices will not be affected, and certificates bought in a 
given week in 2027 to cover for 2026 emissions will reflect the applicable weekly ETS price 
as calculated by the Commission.  

The sale start date should be postponed to February 1st (instead of January 1st) to give more 
time for declarants to collect data and customs systems to feed relevant data on latest imports 
in  2026  into  the  CBAM  registry.  While  shortening  the  time  declarants  will  have  to  buy 
certificates covering all their imports since 1 January 2026, they would still have two months 
to buy certificates before the first application of the “50% rule” (currently “80% rule”) on Q1 
2027  e.g.  from  1.1.2027  to  31.3.2027.  As  CBAM  declarants  cannot  acquire  CBAM 
certificates in 2026, there is a need to determine the applicable EU ETS price for purchases of 
CBAM  certificates  in  2027  pertaining  to  emissions  embedded  in  CBAM  goods  imported  in 
2026. For this purpose, the Commission will calculate the price of CBAM certificates based 
on  the  quarterly  average  of  the  closing  prices  of  the  EU  ETS  allowances  of  the  quarter  of 
importation o the CBAM goods to which those emissions correspond.   

3.4.2.3  Impact and simplification 
This  solution  would greatly simplify how declarants  have to  manage their financial liability 
during the first year of the CBAM definitive regime. Combined with the revision of the “80% 
rule” (now 50% rule), it would address major concerns raised by stakeholders about financial 
risks resulting from the legal uncertainty related to how the CBAM financial adjustment will 
be  calculated  and  applied  already  in  2026,  as  declarants  will  be  required  to  start  buying 
CBAM  certificates  for  2026  imports  only  at  a  time  when  they  have  enough  clarity  on  the 
number of certificates they will have to surrender by 31 August 2027. 

3.4.3  Default values for carbon prices paid in third countries 

3.4.3.1  Problem definition 
Under  the  CBAM  regulation,  the  deduction  of  a  carbon  price  effectively  paid  in  a  third 
country  was  designed  to  avoid  double  charging  thereby  promoting  the  uptake  of  carbon 
pricing in third countries.  

However, the CBAM regulation sets a comparatively high burden on the CBAM declarant for 
allowing  a  deduction  of  a  carbon  price  paid  in  a  third  country.  The  CBAM  declarant 
essentially will need to: 

31 

 
a)  obtain (on time) documentary evidence of an effective payment of a carbon price; 
b)  demonstrate that the carbon price was paid on the emissions embedded in the CBAM 

goods and; 

c)  have  this  evidence  certified  by  a  person  that  is  independent  from  the  declarant  and 

from the authorities of the country of origin (hereafter: certifier).  

The Commission will set the rules regarding these steps in an implementing act planned for 
adoption  before  the  end  of  2025,  allowing  for  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  certificates  to 
surrender.  Applying  the  rules  defined  in  the  CBAM  Regulation  is  expected  to  lead  to  a 
significant  administrative  burden  for  declarants,  third-country  installation  operators,  and  the 
review  authorities  (European  Commission  and  National  Competent  Authorities).  In  specific 
cases,  such  as  electricity  and  indirect  emissions,  it  is  not  clear  whether  claiming  a  carbon 
pricing  deduction  altogether  would  be  feasible.  It  can  also  be  expected  that,  due  to  the 
generally low effective carbon prices in third countries compared to the EU ETS prices, the 
calculation and certification  costs  associated with  obtaining  the deduction  will outweigh the 
benefit of a lower CBAM financial adjustment44. 

3.4.3.2  Proposed way forward 
It  is  proposed  that  the  Commission  may  determine,  where  applicable,  default  carbon  prices 
per country for the carbon price paid on average over a year (in EUR/tCO2e). In such a case, 
any rebate or other form of compensation available in that country that would have resulted in 
a reduction of that default carbon price shall be taken into account. The possibility to claim a 
reduction based on certified evidence of an actual payment is maintained.  

The  default  carbon  prices  would  function  similarly  to  default  values  for  the  calculation  of 
embedded emissions: declarants would be given the possibility to choose either to rely on the 
Commission  default  carbon  price,  or  to  claim  the  deduction  of  the  carbon  price  effectively 
paid (where no changes are made compared to the current CBAM Regulation).  

The  ‘best  available  information’  would  evolve  over  consecutive  compliance  periods,  on  the 
basis  of  cooperation  with  the  third  country.  Therefore,  the  default  values  for  carbon  prices 
paid  in  third  countries  would  be  periodically  revised.  Where  insufficient  information  is 
available in a specific country, the Commission would set more conservative default values to 
incentivise  the  provision  of  reliable  data,  while  taking  into  account  the  need  to  reasonably 
reflect the carbon price paid. 

This option provides additional flexibility for the producer and declarant, while ensuring that 
the European Commission can develop a workable approach to the carbon price deduction.  

3.4.3.3  Impact and simplification 
The  proposed  simplification  primarily  reduces  the  administrative  burden  on  third-country 
operators to prove that a carbon price was effectively paid. Considering that the costs for this 
calculation and certification are largely fixed, many more small installations and installations 
that only export a small share of their production to the EU would become able to declare a 

44  The  marginal  carbon  prices  reported  by  carbon  pricing  data  sources  are  in  most  cases  much  lower  than  the  EU  ETS. 
Specifically, as at 1 April 2024, the EU ETS price was EUR 57 per tonne of CO2e, whereas it was EUR 7 on average across 
the  Chinese  pilot  emission  trading  systems  and  EUR  6  in  Korea  (World  Bank  Carbon  Pricing  Dashboard, 
https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/).  In  addition,  many  systems  allocate  a  large  share  of  emission  allowances 
(permits)  for  free.  For  instance,  84%  of  industrial  emission  allowances  under  the  emissions  trading  systems  that  were 
operational in 2021 were allocated free of charge (OECD, Effective Carbon Rates 2023,  https://doi.org/10.1787/b84d5b36-
en). As a result, the effective carbon price paid in CBAM sectors of third countries will often be very low. 

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carbon  price  insofar  as  they  are  located  in  a  country  where  an  effective  carbon  pricing 
instrument applies with respect to CBAM goods. In turn, the deduction of the carbon price by 
CBAM declarants would become more widely accessible.  

It  would  also  reduce  the  administrative  burden  on  Commission  and  NCAs  to  check 
compliance  of  CBAM  declarations  with  evidence  of  the  price  effectively  paid  and 
certification requirements. However, significant analytical work would need to be carried out 
by the Commission to determine the values.  

3.4.4  Information exchanges on CBAM certificate cancellation 

3.4.4.1  Problem definition 
Pursuant to Article 20(3) of the CBAM regulation, the information on the sale, repurchase and 
cancellation  of  CBAM  certificates  in  the  common  central  platform  (CCP)  should  be 
transferred to the CBAM registry at the end of each working day.  

However, in  practice this non-reciprocal  information exchange from  the  CCP to the CBAM 
registry  at  the  end  of  the  day  will  not  concern  cancellation  of  certificates.  This  is  because 
certificate  cancellation  is  a  task  to  be  automatically  performed  by  the  Commission  in  the 
CBAM registry, and certificates are to be cancelled without any compensation to declarants. 
Additionally,  since  the  cancellation  does  not  relate  to  any  payments  made  on  the  CCP,  the 
platform will not hold information on cancellation of certificates and will not be able to send 
it to the CBAM registry.  

3.4.4.2  Proposed way forward 
It  is  proposed  to  remove  the  reference  to  certificates  cancellation  from  the  reference  to 
information exchange from the CCP to the CBAM registry. 

3.4.4.3  Simplification 
This measure simplifies the information exchanges between the 2 platforms (CBAM registry 
and CCP). 

4.  Stakeholder positions 
Throughout the transitional period, the Commission engaged with stakeholders, notably with 
industry and with national authorities as well as international partners and  operators in third 
countries, with a view to getting their feedback and suggestions to improve the functioning of 
the  mechanism.  Several  of  the  proposed  simplifications  are  based  on  the  input  received. 
Moreover, on 6 February 2025 a Simplification Roundtable was held by the Commission with 
industry stakeholders to present the simplification package and collect feedback. EU industry 
participating was broadly supportive of the proposed simplifications.  

Specifically, stakeholders expressed views on the following simplifications:  

New CBAM De minimis: National authorities and businesses largely agree on the need for a 
new CBAM de minimis, which would be more effective in exempting occasional imports of 
small  CBAM  quantities.  There  is  a  broad  consensus  on  the  merit  of  alleviating  the  large 
majority occasional importers of small quantities of CBAM goods from a costly compliance 
burden.  At  least  four  Member  States  performed  data  analysis  similar  to  the  one  by  the 
Commission  services.  The  distributions  of  importers  of  small  quantities  of  CBAM  goods 

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based  on  national  customs  data  confirmed  the  results  of  the  analysis  carried  out  by  the 
Commission services.  

While  there  was  agreement  that  embedded  emissions  are  the  most  accurate  metric  to 
determine  occasional  importers  of  small  CBAM  quantities,  many  stakeholders  (including 
Member States, industry representatives and NGOs/Think Tanks) called for the threshold to 
be expressed in mass, to facilitate application by importers. Such an approach is reflected in 
the  proposed  exemption.  Some  stakeholders  (including  Member  States  and  industry 
representatives)  expressed  a  preference  for  an  annual  threshold  over  a  consignment-based 
threshold,  given  the  inherent  circumvention  risks  of  a  consignment-based  threshold. 
Moreover, some stakeholders (including Member States and industry representatives) shared 
the  assessment  that  an  annual  threshold  is  a  more  targeted  solution,  as  it  allows  to  exempt 
more  importers  with  less  foregone  emissions.  As  it  concerns  the  level  of  the  threshold, 
opinions  vary:  Some  stakeholders  call  for  a  higher  threshold,  some  for  a  lower  threshold, 
some agree with the level chosen. 

Many stakeholders have emphasised the importance of the introduction of a new de minimis 
threshold to be supplemented with anti-circumvention measures. 

Measures to simplify the CBAM reporting requirements 

Many stakeholders, (including Member States and industry representatives, in particular in the 
aluminium  sector) requested changes of the rules pertaining to  CBAM precursors for which 
an  EU  ETS  carbon  price  had  already  been  paid.  Equally,  many  stakeholders  called  for 
changes  of  the  CBAM  scope  to  mirror  more  precisely  the  EU  ETS  scope,  by  exempting 
marginal emissions of downstream processes. Stakeholders in the ceramics industry requested 
to exempt non-calcined kaolinic clays from the CBAM scope. 

Measures to simplify CBAM financial liability 

Many  stakeholders  (including  Member  States  and  industry  representatives)  suggested 
modifying the 80% rule, notably to take account of the deduction of free allowances and find 
a better proxy to expected financial liability with a view to avoiding forced excess purchases 
by importers. There is broad consensus that this rule needs to be adapted. Some stakeholders 
suggested that rather than lowering the 80% rule, it may be better to work on limitations to 
selling back certificates. 

Conditions to use default values 
Many stakeholders (including Member States and industry representatives) have emphasised 
that  in  order  to  avoid  excessive  bureaucratic  burden  for  importers,  the  possibility  for 
declarants  to  use  default  values  is  indispensable.  Some  stakeholders  have  even  suggested 
eliminating  the  possibility  to  report  actual  emissions  and  rely  exclusively  on  CN-code  and 
country-specific default values for reporting specific embedded emissions under CBAM. 

Emission verification of default values 

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Stakeholders  have  pointed  out  that  in  case  default  values  for  reporting  specific  embedded 
emissions  in  the CBAM declaration, verification of the specific embedded emissions would 
not be required. 

Default carbon prices in third countries  
Some stakeholders expressed concern at the difficulties that deduction of carbon price paid in 
third  countries  would  entail  in  the  case  of  electricity  imported  from  countries  where  it  is 
traded anonymously. Introducing default values would address these concerns and avoid the 
risk of double carbon pricing.  

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