Case C-161/25, Captrain Italia and Others: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 24 February 2025 – Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti v Captrain Italia and Others
Date: 2025-02-24
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: carriage of goods, cross-border transport, freight rate, penalty, principle of proportionality, rail transport, transit, transport company








C_202502648EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/2648


19.5.2025






Request for a preliminary ruling from the Consiglio di Stato (Italy) lodged on 24 February 2025 – Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti v Captrain Italia and Others


(Case C-161/25, Captrain Italia and Others)

(C/2025/2648)
Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Consiglio di Stato

Parties to the main proceedings


Appellant: Autorità di regolazione dei trasporti

Respondents: Captrain Italia, Rail Cargo Carrier Italy Srl, Fuorimuro Inpresa Ferroviaria Srl, Inrail SpA, SBB Cargo Italia Srl, Oceanogate Italia SpA, GTS Rail SpA, Adriafer Srl with sole shareholder, DB Cargo Italia Srl, Sangritana SpA

Questions referred







1.


May a penalty scheme be imposed other than that provided for in Article 35 of Directive 2012/34/EU? (1)











2.


Does Article 35 permit the combination of more than one penalty scheme, in other words, does it permit, in relation to the same incident – a delay at a border station –, the railway undertaking to be subject both to the penalty provided for in the general scheme which applies to the entire network and to a penalty that is specific to the border station?










3.


If the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, does Article 35 require the regulatory authority, when it introduces or, in any event, ‘validates’ a penalty scheme for border stations imposed on rail freight undertakings, to ensure at all times compliance with the provisions of that article, guaranteeing the neutrality of the measure, so that: (i) bonuses must be given to diligent railway undertakings, (ii) compensation is to be provided to undertakings suffering loss or damage and (iii) the penalties must also be imposed on the manager where the manager itself is the cause of the delay, where it is considered that the neutrality of the measure implies that each penalty is such as to affect both sides?










4.


If the answer to [Question 2] is in the affirmative, does Article 35 require the regulatory authority to coordinate, and if so to what extent, the penalty scheme incorporated in the ‘performance [scheme]’ and the scheme of border penalties, so that both schemes pursue the objective of network efficiency in a coordinated manner, without being excessively onerous for railway undertakings affected by border penalties?










5.


If the answer to [Question 2] is in the affirmative, does Article 35 require coordination of the ceilings laid down by the two penalty schemes and an assessment of their economic impact on railway undertakings, so that the principle of efficiency is weighed against the principle of proportionality and reasonableness and the profitability of rail services is not jeopardised?










6.


If the answer to [Question 2] is in the affirmative, must Article 97 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that the charges or duties, which may be received by the carrier, are to be understood as the charges or duties incurred by the railway undertaking in transit, which must correspond to the concrete costs actually incurred by the manager of the railway infrastructure used for transit, ‘in addition to the transport rates’, that is, irrespective of the revenues which the carrier has or may obtain to cover those transit costs?






(1)  Directive 2012/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 establishing a single European railway area (OJ 2012 L 343, p. 32).


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/2648/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)