Joint Employment Report 2025 : Commission proposal.
Date: 2025-01-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Subjects: EU Member State, EU employment policy, economic and social cohesion, labour market, poverty, report, social change, social integration, social security, sustainable development

Proposal for a Joint 
Employment Report 
2025
From the Commission and the Council 
17 December 2024

2025

Employment, Social Affairs  and InclusionThe Proposal for a Joint Employment Report 2025 and its Annex were prepared in the Directorate-General of Employment, 
Social  Affairs  and  Inclusion  under  the  supervision  of  Mario  Nava  (Director-General),  Andriana  Sukova  (Deputy  Director-
General, Funds, Fair Transition and Analysis), Barbara Kauffmann (Director, Employment and Social Governance, Analysis) 
and Katia Berti (Head of Unit, European Semester, EMCO). The main contributors were Boris Arnold, Moritz Bizer, Zsombor 
Cseres-Gergely, Ioana Petre and Lukas Westphal. Zsombor Cseres-Gergely was the coordinator of the report. 

The main contributors to the individual chapters were: Lukas Westphal, Sara Baiocco, Olivier Bontout for Chapter 1; Boris 
Arnold, Edouard Turkisch, Victor Ruiz Salgado, Anita Halász, Annachiara Tanzarella, Giuseppe Piroli, Alfonso Arpaia, Linda 
Kunertová, Endre György and Alessia Fulvimari for Section 2.1; Moritz Bizer, Bianka Debussche Valkovicova, Anita Halász, 
Szilvia  Kálmán,  Shui-Beam  Lam,  Giuseppe  Piroli,  Annachiara  Tanzarella,  Tim  Van  Rie,  Laura  Rosillo  Beneyto,  Carlo  Scatoli 
and  Eva  Schönwald  for  Section  2.2;  Ioana  Petre,  Krisztina  Boros,  Sigried  Caspar,  Lars  Engsted,  Polina  Mosheva,  Petra 
Pirklova  and  Victor  Ruiz  Salgado  for  Section  2.3;  Zsombor  Cseres-Gergely,  Sara  Baiocco,  Ragnar  Horn,  Olivier  Bontout, 
Stefan  Iszkowski,  Mathis  Porchez,  Grzegorz  Gajewski,  Valdis  Zagorskis,  Flaviana  Teodosiu  and  Fabiana  Pierini  for  Section 
2.4.  Policy  officers  of  Unit  EMPL.F1  and  of  geographical  units,  as  well  as  policy  units  from  DG  EMPL  contributed  to  the 
country fiches in Chapter 3. 

Further  contributions  were  provided  by  DG  EMPL  policy  Units  and  geographical  desks,  as  well  as  colleagues  in  DG  EAC, 
JUST, SANTE and TAXUD, as well as by Eurofound. 

The  report  has  benefited  from  comments  and  suggestions  from  colleagues  in  other  Departments  of  the  European 
Commission. 

Statistical assistance was provided by Aleksander Rutkowski and Ioanna Papadaki. The layout of the publication was done 
by Moritz Bizer. 

#JER2025 

The manuscript was completed in December 2024 

The official document on which this publication is based was adopted by the College of Commissioners on 17 December 
2024 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 

© European Union, 2025 

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KE-01-25-018-EN-N  

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 
2025 

Commission proposal 

European Commission 
Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion 
Directorate F 
Manuscript completed in December 2024 

 
 
 
Contents 

Key Messages ................................................................................................................. 5 

Chapter 1.  OVERVIEW OF LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL TRENDS, PRO-
GRESS ON 2030 TARGETS, AND KEY HORIZONTAL FINDINGS 
ON SOCIAL CONVERGENCE ............................................................... 21 

1.1.  Key labour market trends .................................................................................................. 21 

1.2.  Key social trends ................................................................................................................... 23 

1.3.  Progress on the 2030 EU headline and national targets ..................................... 25 

1.4.  Key horizontal findings from the first-stage country analysis on social 

convergence ............................................................................................................................ 29 

Chapter 2.  Employment and social reforms – Member States’ perfor-

mance and action ................................................................................ 35 

2.1.  Guideline 5 - Boosting the demand for labour ......................................................... 35 
2.1.1.  Key indicators .......................................................................................................................... 35 
2.1.2.  Measures taken by Member States ............................................................................... 44 

2.2.  Guideline 6 - Enhancing labour supply and improving access to employ-

ment, lifelong acquisition of skills and competences ........................................... 47 
2.2.1.  Key indicators .......................................................................................................................... 47 
2.2.2.  Measures taken by Member States ............................................................................... 66 

2.3.  Guideline 7 - Enhancing the functioning of labour markets and the ef-

fectiveness of social dialogue ......................................................................................... 72 
2.3.1.  Key indicators .......................................................................................................................... 72 
2.3.2.  Measures taken by Member States ............................................................................... 83 

1 

 
 
2.4.  Guideline 8 - Promoting equal opportunities for all, fostering social in-

clusion and fighting poverty ............................................................................................ 87 
2.4.1.  Key indicators .......................................................................................................................... 87 
2.4.2.  Measures taken by Member States ............................................................................ 107 

Chapter 3.  First-stage country analysis ......................................................... 112 

Belgium .................................................................................................................................................. 113 
Bulgaria .................................................................................................................................................. 114 
Czechia ................................................................................................................................................... 115 
Denmark ................................................................................................................................................ 116 
Germany................................................................................................................................................. 117 
Estonia .................................................................................................................................................... 118 
Ireland  .................................................................................................................................................... 119 
Greece  .................................................................................................................................................... 120 
Spain   .................................................................................................................................................... 121 
France  .................................................................................................................................................... 122 
Croatia .................................................................................................................................................... 123 
Italy 
 .................................................................................................................................................... 124 
Cyprus  .................................................................................................................................................... 125 
Latvia   .................................................................................................................................................... 126 
Lithuania ................................................................................................................................................ 127 
Luxembourg .......................................................................................................................................... 128 
Hungary .................................................................................................................................................. 129 
Malta   .................................................................................................................................................... 130 
The Netherlands ................................................................................................................................. 131 
Austria  .................................................................................................................................................... 132 
Poland  .................................................................................................................................................... 133 
Portugal .................................................................................................................................................. 134 
Romania ................................................................................................................................................. 135 
Slovenia.................................................................................................................................................. 136 
Slovakia .................................................................................................................................................. 137 
Finland .................................................................................................................................................... 138 
Sweden ................................................................................................................................................... 139 

Annexes ....................................................................................................................... 140 

2 

 
 
 
. 

Key Messages 

The Joint Employment Report (JER) by the Euro-
pean  Commission  and  the  Council  monitors  the 
employment situation in the Union and the imple-
mentation of the Employment Guidelines, in line 
with Article 148 of the TFEU. The report provides an 
annual overview of key employment and social devel-
opments in the Union and of Member States’ recent pol-
icy  measures,  in  line  with  the  Guidelines  for  the 
Employment Policies of the Member States1, and iden-
tifies related key priority areas for policy action. It main-
tains  a  strong  focus  on  the  implementation  of  the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  notably  via  thematic 
boxes related to different Pillar principles in light of the 
socio-economic  outlook  and  most  recent  policy  initia-
tives. Chapter 1 of the report presents an overview of 
key  employment  and  social  trends  and  of  progress 
made on the 2030 EU headline and national targets. It 
also  reports  horizontal  findings based  on  the  analysis 
of risks to upward social convergence. Chapter 2 anal-
yses  challenges  and  policy  responses  in  the  Member 
States  for  each  of  the  four  employment  guidelines. 
Chapter  3  provides  analysis  for  each  Member  State 
based  on  the  principles  of  the  Social  Convergence 
Framework  (SCF)2.  The  analysis  is  in  line  with  Article 
148 TFEU. It also responds to Article 3(3), point (b) of 
Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 on the effective coordina-
tion  of  economic  policies  and  multilateral  budgetary 
surveillance,  based  on  which  the  surveillance  by  the 

1 

2 

3 

The last update of the Employment Guidelines was adopted by 
the Council of the European Union in November 2024 OJ L 
2024/3134, 13.12.2024). 
Following discussions in the EPSCO Council in June 2023 on a 
Social Convergence Framework (SCF) and key messages by 
EMCO and SPC based on the work conducted by the devoted 
joint EMCO-SPC Working Group from October 2022 until May 
2023.  
In addition, Recital 8 of the same Regulation states that ‘As 
part of its integrated analysis of employment and social devel-
opments in the context of the European Semester, the Commis-
sion assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member 

Commission of the implementation of the employment 
guidelines in the European Semester includes a frame-
work to identify risks to social convergence3. Addressing 
the  challenges  identified  in  the  JER  will  contribute  to 
achieving  upward  social  convergence,  strengthen  the 
Union’s drive towards fair green and digital transitions 
and contribute to facing  demographic change, as well 
as  the  achievement  of  the  Sustainable  Development 
Goals and the implementation of the Union of Equality 
Strategies4.  Based  on  the  Commission’s  proposal,  and 
following  exchanges  in  the  relevant  Council  advisory 
committees, the final text of the report will be adopted 
by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer 
Affairs (EPSCO) Council. 

The  report  monitors  progress  towards  the  2030 
EU  headline  targets  on  employment,  skills,  and 
poverty  reduction,  which  were  welcomed  by  the  EU 
leaders  at  the  Porto  Social  Summit  and  by  the  June 
2021 European Council. The EU is on track to meet its 
headline employment rate target by 2030, despite the 
economic  slowdown,  while  significant  further  efforts 
are needed to reach the EU headline skills and poverty 
reduction targets:  

• 

The  EU  employment  rate  reached  75.3%  in 
2023, which is only 2.7 pps from the 78% tar-
get by 2030. Most Member States made fur-
national 
towards 
ther 

progress 

their 

States and monitors progress on the implementation of the 
principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights on the basis of 
the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Con-
vergence Framework’. 
The Gender Equality Strategy 2020-25, the EU Anti-racism Ac-
tion Plan 2020-25, the EU Roma strategic framework for 
equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-30, the LGBTIQ 
Equality Strategy, the Strategy for the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2021-30. 

4 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

• 

• 

employment  targets  in  2023,  while  five  al-
ready achieved or surpassed theirs. 

Regarding  skills,  the  adult  participation  in 
learning rate saw only  some limited progress 
in  the  EU,  from  37.4%  in  2016  to  39.5%  in 
2022,  which  remains  far  from  the  60%  EU 
headline target. Also, the majority of Member 
States  lost  ground  in  the  pursuit  of  their  na-
tional targets. This points to the need for sub-
stantial  further  efforts, 
line  with  the 
ambition for Europe to remain competitive, in-
novative  and  inclusive  in  the  context  of  the 
green and digital transformations and popula-
tion ageing. 

in 

The number of people at-risk-of poverty or so-
cial exclusion was around 1.6 million lower in 
the  EU  in  2023  than  in  2019,  despite  the 
COVID-19  crisis,  high  energy  costs  and  infla-
tion. This remains far from the EU headline tar-
get  of  at  least  15  million  by  2030.  In  nearly 
half of the Member States, the number of peo-
ple at risk increased, pointing to the opposite 
direction  compared  to  the  ambitions  embed-
ded in the national targets. In this light, efforts 
will need to be accelerated significantly in the 
remainder of the decade. 

Together  with  cohesion  policy  funds,  the  imple-
mentation  of  the  reforms  and  investments  in 
Member  States’  recovery  and  resilience  plans 
(RRPs)  supports  fair,  inclusive  and  sustainable 
growth. Alongside the support provided to policy inter-
ventions in the respective policy areas by the European 
Social Fund Plus (ESF+), the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (ERDF), the Just Transition Fund (JTF) and 
the  Technical  Support  Instrument  (TSI),  the  Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (RRF) promotes the Union’s eco-
nomic, social, and territorial cohesion by improving the 
competitiveness, resilience, crisis preparedness, adjust-
ment  capacity,  and  growth  potential  of  the  Member 
States, and fostering high quality job creation through 
relevant reforms and investment. In this way, the Facil-
ity also contributes to the implementation of the Euro-
pean Pillar of Social Rights5. A total of around EUR 162.5 
billion allocated to Member States contributes to social 
spending, which represents about 25% of the total es-
timated expenditure6. To date, the Commission has dis-
bursed  around  EUR 269  billion  under  the  RRF  in  both 
grants  and  loans  as  well  as  pre-financing.  Out  of  the 
7 129 milestones and targets included in the 27 RRPs, 
2 201  are  expected  to  contribute  to  social  policies 
(around 31%). Out of the 1742 milestones and targets 
fulfilled as of 14 November, 505 foster social policies 
(around 30%). As part of the policy response analysis, 
the JER also includes a selection of measures supported 
by EU funding, notably the RRF, ESF+, ERDF, JTF and the 

TSI.  All  these  support  growth  and  employment  pro-
spects as well as social and economic cohesion and re-
silience in the Union. 

The  2025  JER  delivers  country-specific  analysis 
based on the principles of the Social Convergence 
Framework (SCF), in line with Article 3(3), point (b) of 
Regulation  (EU)  2024/1263.  Relying  on  existing  tools 
(the Social Scoreboard and the agreed JER traffic-light 
methodology), Member States’ labour market, skills and 
social challenges are analysed in order to identify po-
tential risks to upward social convergence that require 
deeper analysis in a  second  stage. All  in all, the first-
stage analysis of the SCF points at the following: 

i. 

ii. 

iii. 

continued  upward  convergence  in  the  labour 
market in 2023, while employment outcomes 
of under-represented groups still need to im-
prove; 

 slight  improvements  at  EU  level  regarding 
skills, though risks to upward convergence per-
sist in this domain; 

 broad stability of the at-risk-of poverty or so-
cial exclusion rate at EU level, while some risks 
to  upward  convergence  remain  regarding  so-
cial outcomes. 

A  more  detailed  second-stage  analysis (using  a  wider 
set of quantitative and qualitative evidence) will be con-
ducted  by  the  Commission  services  in  relation  to  the 
countries for which potential risks to upward social con-
vergence are identified in the first stage. These are Bul-
garia, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania, 
which were in the second-stage last year too, as well as 
Greece,  Croatia  and  Luxembourg  that  enter  it  for  the 
first time this year. For Greece, this is due to some de-
teriorations or broad stability at levels that are still far 
from the EU average in the social domain (housing cost 
overburden;  self-reported  unmet  needs  for  medical 
care; AROPE – overall and for children; impact of social 
transfers  on  poverty  reduction;  income  inequalities); 
persisting labour market challenges for women and the 
youth;  and  a  low  and  deteriorating  participation  of 
adults in learning. For Croatia, the identification for the 
second-stage analysis relates to the area of skills (low 
and  deteriorating  adult  learning  participation;  signifi-
cant  deterioration in the share of adults with at least 
basic digital skills); an overall employment rate that re-
mains  lower  than  the  EU  average,  despite  improve-
ments,  and  a  still  difficult  employment  situation  of 
persons with disabilities; as well as some challenges in 
the social domain (impact of social transfers on poverty 
reduction;  income  inequalities).  For  Luxembourg,  the 
identification  for  the  second-stage  analysis  relates  to 
the recent significant worsening in some social indica-
tors (AROPE - overall and for children; impact of social 
transfers on poverty reduction) as well as a persistently 

5 

6 

Regulation (EU) 2021/241 establishing the Recovery and Resili-
ence Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. 

with the European Parliament and the Member States in the 
Delegated Regulation 2021/2105. 

Social spending categories are defined and applied based on 
the methodology adopted by the Commission in consultation 

4 

 
Employment, skills and social challenges across EU Member States by headline indicators of the 
Social Scoreboard 

Key Messages 

Note:  Data are missing for some indicators for some countries – see Table 1.4.1 in section 1.4. Explanation for legends is provided in Annex 6. 

high housing cost overburden rate; the recently deterio-
rating labour market trends (unemployment and long-
term unemployment rates; disability employment gap), 
as well as the decrease in the share of adults with at 
least  basic  digital  skills,  even  if  the  statistics remains 
well above the EU average. A more detailed analysis is 
presented in Chapter 3 of the report for each of the 27 
Member States. 

Despite the weak economic environment in 2023, 
labour market outcomes remained strong on av-
erage  in  the  EU,  with  still  robust  employment 
growth. The EU employment rate reached a new record 
high of 75.3% in 2023 (up by 0.7 pps from 2022), grow-
ing  further  to  75.8%  in  Q2-2024.  The  annual  growth 
rate of 1.1% marked a return to the pre-COVID-19 av-
erages  (2013-19),  following  the  rapid  post-pandemic 
recovery in 2022 (+2.3%). At the same time, the EU un-
employment rate decreased to the record low of 6.1% 
in 2023 and  reached  5.9% in September 2024. While 
decreasing  unemployment  was  the  main  driver  of 

A robust labour market despite slower economic growth 

75.8 % 
employment rate 
(20-64) in Q2-
2024 (+0.5 pps 
year on year) 

75.4% 
activity rate (15-
64) in Q2-2024 
(+0.4 pps year on 
year) 

6% 
unemployment 
rate (15-74) in 
Q2-2024 (un-
changed year on 
year)  

14.8% 
youth unemploy-
ment rate  
(15-24) in Q2-
2024 (+0.4 pps 
year on year) 

Key labour market indicators in the EU-27 (%, quarterly) 

Source :   Eurostat [lfsi_emp_q], [une_rt_q], [une_ltu_q] and [lfsi_neet_q]. Seasonally adjusted, 
not calendar adjusted data. 

5 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%Self-reported unmet need for medical careChildren aged less than 3 years in formal childcareHousing cost overburdenDisability employment gapImpact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reductionAt risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for childrenAt risk of poverty or social exclusion rateSOCIAL PROTECTION AND INCLUSIONGDHI per capita growthLong-term unemployment rateUnemployment rateEmployment rateFAIR WORKING CONDITIONSIncome quintile ratio (S80/S20)Gender employment gapYouth NEET rateShare of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skillsEarly leavers from education and trainingAdult participation in learningEQUAL OPPPORTUNITIESCritical situationsTo watchWeak but improvingOn averageGood but to monitorBetter than averageBest performers6065707580051015202019Q42020Q12020Q22020Q32020Q42021Q12021Q22021Q32021Q42022Q12022Q22022Q32022Q42023Q12023Q22023Q32023Q42024Q12024Q2Employment rate (20-64) (rhs)Labour force participation rate (15-64) (rhs)Unemployment rate (15-74) (lhs)Long-term unemployment rate (15-74) (lhs)Youth unemployment rate (15-24) (lhs)NEET rate (15-29) (lhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Labour shortages remain significant in the Union  

Job vacancy rates in the EU by economic activity (%, annual data) 

Vacancy rates at or 
above 3%  
in professional, sci-
entific, and tech-
nical activities, 
information and 
communication and 
construction in 2023 

20% higher labour 
shortages in 2023 
compared to 2019 

Note: NACE 2 activities, B-S (Industry, construction, and services (except activities of households as 
employers and extra-territorial organisations and bodies), C (manufacturing), F (construction), G-I 
(wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation, and food services), J (information and com-
munication), M-N (professional, scientific, and technical activities).  
Source: Eurostat [jvs_a_rate_r2] 

employment  growth  before  the  COVID  pandemic,  low 
unemployment levels have shifted the focus to labour 
force growth as the main source of employment gains. 
In 2023, around 90% of employment growth was ex-
plained by an expansion of the labour  force. This was 
largely driven by  prime-age (25-54)  workers with ter-
tiary education, with many of them being third-country 
nationals, as well as by older workers with secondary or 
tertiary  education.  Also,  employment  growth  was 
stronger  in  sectors  experiencing  significant  labour 
shortages, such as ICT and construction. This can be at-
tributed to both growing labour supply and a shift in job 
allocation towards these high-demand sectors. Overall, 
a  convergence  of  employment  rates  across  Member 
States was observed, although significant regional dis-
parities persist in many Member States. Recent Council 
Conclusions are addressing the issues of access to en-
abling and employment services to promote the social 
inclusion of people at risk of poverty including Roma, by 
reducing territorial inequalities7. 

Labour productivity growth in the EU is slow. While 
the labour productivity’s growth rate was around 1.4% 
annually  on  average  before  2007,  it  slowed  down  to 
0.8% between 2010 and 2019 and further declined to 
0.7% in 2023. It therefore remains structurally low, and 
risks undermining the EU’s global competitiveness and 
its performance in terms of future growth potential, job 
creation, and living standards. The main factor behind 
this low labour productivity growth is the weak growth 
of  total  factor productivity.  Among  the  root  causes  to 
this,  Mario  Draghi’s  report  on  The  Future  of  European 
Competitiveness highlights significant gaps in the EU’s 
high-tech  specialisation,  innovation,  and  investment, 

particularly  when  compared  to  the  United  States.  The 
fragmentation  of  the  Single  Market  and  regulatory 
complexity  are  also  referred  to  as  important  factors. 
Importantly, labour and skills shortages delay technol-
ogy  adoption  and  increase  costs,  further  reducing  la-
bour  demand.  As  emphasized  in  Draghi’s  report, 
adapting  education  and  training  systems  to  evolving 
skills needs, particularly for the twin transition, prioritiz-
ing adult learning and vocational education and training 
are  essential  for  boosting  competitiveness.  Reducing 
administrative  barriers,  regulatory  and  reporting  bur-
dens, fostering innovation, and supporting effective col-
lective  bargaining  can  help  ensure  productivity  gains, 
and sustain wage growth and competitiveness. 

Labour and skills shortages are on a  decreasing 
trend but remain significant in the EU; addressing 
them is crucial to boost the EU’s competitiveness, 
innovation capacity and inclusive and sustainable 
growth. Over the past decade, labour and skills short-
ages  have  increased  across  all  Member  States.  Alt-
hough the seasonally adjusted vacancy rate decreased 
from 2.9% in Q1-2023 to 2.4% in Q2-2024, reflecting 
weaker economic growth and more subdued hiring ex-
pectations,  it  remains  well  above  the  pre-pandemic 
(2013-19) average of 1.7%. These shortages are driven 
by  demographic  change,  the  demand  for  new  skills 
linked to technological developments and the twin tran-
sition (including engineering, technical, scientific, oper-
ational, and monitoring skills)8, as well as poor working 
conditions in certain sectors. They are reported by com-
panies of all sizes and sectors and are particularly per-
sistent  in  the  care  sector,  education,  STEM  fields 

7 

Approved by the EPSCO Council on 2 December 2024. 

8 

See UNIDO, What are green skills?, 2023.  

6 

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.04.55.020132014201520162017201820192020202120222023Industry, construction, services (B-S)Manufacturing (C)Construction (F)Trade, transport, HOCA (G-I)ICT (J) 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Messages 

Real wages are rebounding but did not recover  
from losses in previous years 

Real gross wages and salaries per employee 
(annual % change; 2022, 2023 and Q2-2024) 

Nominal compen-
sation per em-
ployee increased 
by 6.1% in 2023, 
and by 5% in 
Q2-2024  

Yet, real wages 
declined by 0.2% 
in 2023, and in-
creased by 2.4% 
in Q2-2024  

Source:  European Commission, AMECO database, Nominal gross wages and salaries per employee 
[hwwdw]; deflator: Harmonised index of consumer prices [prc_hicp_midx]. For Q2-2024: EMPL calcula-
tions based on Eurostat data, Wages and salaries [namq_10_gdp], Total employment (domestic con-
cept) [namq_10_a10_e] and Harmonised index of consumer prices [prc_hicp_midx]. 

(notably  ICT),  construction,  transport,  and  certain  ser-
vice-based occupations (e.g. cooks and waiters). While 
labour shortages can indicate a potentially strong econ-
omy,  empowering  workers  to  negotiate  better  wages 
and  working  conditions,  at  the  same  time,  especially 
when  protracted,  they  hinder  productivity  and  innova-
tive capacity, weakening the EU’s competitiveness, pose 
bottlenecks  to  growth  and  hamper  progress  on  the 
green and digital transitions. Concerted and reinforced 
action at the EU, Member States’ and regional level, also 
involving social partners and other relevant stakehold-
ers, is key to tackle these shortages. In March 2024, the 
Commission presented an Action Plan9 to tackle labour 
and skills shortages, prepared in close cooperation with 
the social partners. It builds on the numerous initiatives 
already taken and sets out new actions that the EU, the 
Member States, and social partners will or should take 
to  address  labour  and  skills  shortages.  These  include 
measures  relating  to  the  labour  market  activation  of 
under-represented groups; support to skills and educa-
tion; improving working conditions; enhancing fair intra-
EU mobility and complementing the latter by attracting 
talent from outside the EU. 

Q2-2024 as inflation eased. After a substantial decline 
(-3.7%) in 2022, real wages started to grow in the sec-
ond half of 2023, reaching 2.4% (year-on-year) in Q2-
2024. This rebound was driven by decreasing inflation 
and  continued  robust  nominal  wage  growth.  Despite 
these recent improvements, in 2024, real wages remain 
below pre-pandemic levels on average in the EU and in 
eight Member States (Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
France, Germany, Greece and Sweden). Statutory mini-
mum  wages’  increases  largely  offset  the  loss  of  pur-
chasing  power  for  minimum  wage  earners  in  most 
Member States. These were primarily the result of the 
routine  annual  updates  in  January  2023  and  2024, 
alongside  substantial  adjustments  throughout  both 
years.  The  transposition  of  the  Directive  on  adequate 
minimum wages10 will be essential for safeguarding the 
purchasing power of those with low wages as well as 
preventing  and  fighting  poverty  risks  among  the  em-
ployed,  while  reinforcing  incentives  to  work.  The  Di-
rective  also  includes  measures  aimed  at  encouraging 
collective bargaining as well as improving the mecha-
nisms  for  enforcement  and  oversight  across  Member 
States. 

Wage growth in the EU remained robust in 2023 
while varying significantly across Member States. 
Annual growth in nominal compensation per employee 
reached a record high of 6.1% (year-on-year) in the EU, 
after 4.9% in  2022, in a  context of still high inflation 
and tight labour markets. It then decreased to 5.0% in 

In-work  poverty  declined  slightly  in  the  EU  in 
2023,  but  still  affected  one  in  twelve  workers, 
and  was  significantly  higher  for  non-standard 
forms of work. Overall, the share decreased to 8.3% 
in 2023 from 8.5% in 2022, and was lower compared 
to  a  decade  earlier  and  to  just  before  the  COVID-19 

9 

See European Commission, Commission sets out actions to 
tackle labour and skills shortages, 2024. 

10  Directive 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in 
the European Union (OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33). 

7 

-15-10-5051015ROHRLVBEBGLULTPTNLIESIESPLCYELDEEADKEUATEEFISKFRSEHUITMTCZ202220232024-Q2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

There are large differences in the involuntary component of  
temporary work across Member States, with greater incidence 
among women  

Involuntary temporary employees as a percentage of the total number of employees 
(20-64) (in %, 2023)

12.3% 
of workers (20-64) 
on temporary 
contracts in 2023 
in the EU 

7.4% of women 
(20-64) on invol-
untary temporary 
contracts (vs 
6.2% for men) 

Source :  Eurostat [lfsa_etgar] and [lfsa_etgar], EU LFS. 

pandemic. In-work poverty was declining in almost half 
of the Member States in 2023, despite many of them 
facing high inflation and significant drops in real wages 
in 2022. This suggests that, in these countries, median 
incomes  fell  more  sharply  than  the  incomes  of  the 
working poor, which were supported by updates to min-
imum wages and social transfers. Early Eurostat esti-
mates suggest that in-work poverty will remain stable 
in  2024  (referring  to  2023  incomes).  As  in  previous 
years, in-work poverty across the EU was significantly 
higher among non-EU  citizens and those  born outside 
the EU (22.5% and 18.5% respectively), low-educated 
workers  (18.4%),  part-time  employees  and  temporary 
workers (12.6% for both) and households with depend-
ent  children  (10.0%).  In-work-poverty  was  higher  for 
people in non-standard forms of employment (tempo-
rary employees, part-timers, self-employed), even if so-
cial  protection  benefits  played  a  relatively  more 
important role in reducing their poverty risks. The cov-
erage by  social benefits  varied widely across  Member 
States and for different categories of workers. Self-em-
ployed  at  risk of  poverty  before  social  transfers  were 
the least likely to receive social benefits, with a cover-
age at 12.7% in 2023 in the EU. With regard to formal 
coverage11, in spring 2023 there remained gaps in fif-
teen  Member  States  for  at  least  one  group  of  non-
standard workers in at least one branch of social pro-
tection, which was most often unemployment, sickness 
and/or maternity benefits. 

While flexibility is highly valued by some workers, 
labour  market  segmentation  that  persists  over 
time  can  negatively  impact  social  fairness.  For 

some  groups,  especially  the  young  and  high-skilled, 
non-permanent jobs and part-time employment can fa-
cilitate labour market entry and skills development, as 
well as provide greater flexibility and work-life balance. 
However,  persistent  gaps  in  job  security  and  working 
conditions  between  workers  (often  with  consequences 
in  terms of  access to  social  protection)  create  divides 
that tend to increase inequalities. In particular, tempo-
rary employment is associated with higher job insecu-
rity when it does not act as a stepping-stone towards 
more permanent contracts. The precariousness that en-
sues from this also contributes to less favourable work-
ing  conditions  in  certain  sectors  and  occupations  with 
high  and  persistent  labour  shortages.  On  the  back-
ground  of  high  employment  in  the  EU,  the  share  of 
workers on temporary  contracts among all employees 
decreased  slightly  (from  12.9%  in  2022  to  12.3%  in 
2023), with substantial variation across Member States 
(from  above  15%  in  some  to  below  3%  in  others).  In 
particular, some Member States continue to experience 
high shares of temporary contracts alongside low tran-
sition  rates  to  permanent  jobs.  Temporary  contracts 
also continue to be more widespread among young peo-
ple and women. Moreover, in 2023  more than half of 
temporary workers were involuntarily on such contracts 
in the EU, with a slight decrease compared to 2022 (and 
again significant differences between Member States), 
as well as a greater incidence for women. At the same 
time,  the  share  of  part-time  employment  slightly  in-
creased  in  the  EU  in  2023.  Despite  improvement,  the 
latter still displays a significant involuntary component 
too in several Member States. Labour market segmen-
tation  can  be  addressed,  among  others,  by  tailored 

11 

Formal coverage of a group means that in a specific social pro-
tection branch (e.g. old age, sickness, unemployment, mater-
nity) the existing legislation or collective agreement states that 

the individuals in the group are entitled to participate in a so-
cial protection scheme covering a specific branch. 

8 

024681012141618PTESCYITELFISEFRHRPLEUMTCZLUSIBENLIEDEATSKBGDKHUROLVLTEETotal (20-64)Women (20-64) 
 
 
 
 
active labour market policies that encourage upward job 
transitions,  and  also  incentives  for  employers  to  hire 
and retain workers. 

Digital  labour  platforms  represent  an  increas-
ingly important part of the EU economy, providing 
job  opportunities  but  also  posing  specific  chal-
lenges,  notably  related  to  the  workers’  employ-
ment status. Between 2016 and 2020, revenues from 
the  EU  platform  economy  grew  almost  fivefold,  and 
more  than  28  million  people  were  estimated  to  work 
through digital labour platforms in 2020, with the num-
ber  deemed  to  be  steadily  growing12.  The  majority  of 
these  people  are  genuinely  self-employed,  while  5.5 
million  were  estimated  to  be  incorrectly  classified  as 
self-employed.  More  than  half  of  the  people  working 
through platforms earn less than the minimum wage13. 
Against  this  background,  the  Directive  on  improving 
conditions  in  platform  work14  aims,  among  others,  to 
address the issue of bogus self-employment on digital 
labour platforms by facilitating the correct determina-
tion  of  the  employment  status  through  a  legal  pre-
sumption of employment. Furthermore, it provides both 
employed  and  self-employed  platform  workers  with 
new  rights  ensuring  more  transparency,  fairness  and 
accountability  on  algorithmic  management.  The  Di-
rective also strengthens  social dialogue and collective 
bargaining. 

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) 
and other digital technologies, including data an-
alytics,  virtual  worlds,  cybersecurity,  quantum, 
cloud  and  edge  computing,  are  driving  profound 
transformations in the labour market that require 
close  monitoring  and  appropriate  policy  re-
sponses. This can be expected to impact on the quan-
tity and quality of jobs, and on workers’ quality of life. 
While recent studies15 confirm that in the short term the 
main net employment impact of AI adoption might be 
positive, increasing the demand for the skills needed for 
its  development  and  adoption,  the  employment  gains 
should be cautiously balanced against the potential of 
AI  to  replace  routine  jobs16.  Moreover,  unlike  previous 
waves of automation, generative AI could significantly 
impact  high-skilled  workers.  In  addition,  automation 

12 

13 

European Commission, Staff Working Document – Executive 
summary of the impact assessment report accompanying the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on improving working conditions in platform work, Pub-
lications Office of the European Union, 2021. 
European Commission, Study to gather evidence on the working 
conditions of platform workers, Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2024. 

15 

14  Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 October 2024 on improving working condi-
tions in platform work, OJ L, 2024/2831, 11.11.2024. 
See Albanesi, S., Da Silva, A., Jimeno, J., Lamo, A., & Wabitsch, 
A., New technologies and jobs in Europe, ECB Working Paper No. 
2023/2831, 2023, and Hayton, J., Rohenkohl, B., Christopher, P., 
Liu, HY, What drives UK firms to adopt AI and robotics, and 
what are the consequences for jobs?, University of Sussex, 
2023. 
European Commission, Artificial Intelligence: Economic Impact, 
Opportunities, Challenges, Implications for Policy (Discussion 
Paper 210), Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

16 

Key Messages 

through AI-powered advanced robotic technologies can 
heavily impact production processes and service deliv-
ery, while changing job profiles and increasing the need 
for digital, analytical and soft skills17. In this context, the 
EU’s AI Act18 (entered into force in August 2024) aims 
to ensure that AI is trustworthy, safe and in line with EU 
fundamental rights.  

Telework  offers  opportunities  like  more  auton-
omy  and  flexibility.  At  the  same  time,  the  new 
work model based on hybrid work arrangements 
may  also  foster  an  ‘always-on’  culture,  which 
may result in frequent additional and unpredicta-
ble  working  hours  that  can  be  detrimental  to 
workers’  work-life  balance,  health  and  well-be-
ing.  Evidence  suggests  that,  while  stressors  such  as 
work  intensity,  work-life  interference  and  working  in 
one’s  free  time  affect  all  workers,  their  effect  is 
stronger  for  employees  who  telework  than  for  those 
who work at their employer’s premises. Anxiety, emo-
tional fatigue, exhaustion due to prolonged exposure to 
virtual  meetings,  and  isolation  represent  some  of  the 
most  reported  mental  health  issues  among  telework-
ers19. To mitigate the risks of an ‘always-on' culture, the 
‘right to disconnect’ could help draw clearer boundaries 
between one’s professional and private life, hence con-
tributing  to  workers’  health,  safety  and  work-life  bal-
ance.  Against  this  background,  following  a  resolution 
from the European Parliament to present a legislative 
proposal on the right to disconnect and an EU legislative 
framework for telework20, the Commission launched a 
study to gather evidence and analyse the added value 
and impacts of  potential policy options of an initative 
on telework and the right to disconnect, and initiated a 
formal two-stage consultation. 

While youth unemployment rates are again on the 
rise  in  the  majority  of  Member  States  amid 
weaker economic growth, the share of young peo-
ple  neither  in  employment  nor  in  education  and 
training (NEET) continues to decline, yet with gen-
der  disparities  and  challenges  for  young  people 
with a migrant background. After steadily recovering 
since  the  peak  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  youth 
unemployment rate (15-24) stayed at 14.5% in 2023, 

17 

18 

19 

20 

Eurofound, Human–robot interaction: What changes in the 
workplace?, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
Regulation 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on arti-
ficial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, 
(EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 
2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, 
(EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), 
OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 
European Commission, Study exploring the social, economic 
and legal context and trend of telework and the right to discon-
nect, in the context of digitalisation and the future of work, dur-
ing and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2024. 
P9_TA (2021)0021 European Parliament resolution of 21 Janu-
ary 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on the 
right to disconnect (2019/2181(INL)). 

9 

 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Tailored support could strengthen the labour market participation of 
underrepresented groups in the EU  

Potential contribution of different population groups to the aggregate share of 
people in the EU labour force by 2030 (in million)  

If Member States with 
lower-than-EU 
average shares of 
people in the labour 
force for specific 
subgroups were to 
increase 
participation to the 
respective EU-
subgroup averages 
by 2030: 

•  an additional 3.6 
million women,  

•  2.9 million 
secondary-
educated people,  

•  and 2.2 million 
older workers, 

respectively, would be 
in the labour market. 

Note:  Simulation of 2030 EU share of people in the labour force if Member States with below-
average shares of people in the labour force per subgroup caught up to the EU subgroup average, 
while  similar  shares  for  the  other  subgroups  are  assumed  to  remain  constant.  This  calculation 
neglects overlaps and possible double-counting between groups and should not be confused with 
a forecast.  
Source :  DG-EMPL calculations, based on Eurostat data and EUROPOP2023 projections. 

showing no change compared to the previous year amid 
weaker economic growth. While rates continued to de-
cline  in  countries  with  very  high  levels,  confirming  a 
trend of convergence across  the EU over the last  five 
years, they started to rise again in many others. At the 
same time, the youth unemployment rate remains more 
than twice as high as the overall unemployment rate, 
and  is  particularly  prevalent  among  youth  with  low 
qualifications  and  those  born  outside  the  EU.  On  the 
positive side, the share of NEETs continues to decline, 
having reached 11.2% in 2023. This trend aligns  with 
increasing youth participation in the labour market, dis-
playing some signs of convergence across the EU. Still, 
youth NEET rates continues to be higher (by 2.4 pps) for 
women than for men and for the non-EU born compared 
to  the  native  born  (by  9.3 pps).  All  this underlines the 
need for continued action to tackle the structural chal-
lenges that hinder young people’s progress in the labour 
market,  particularly  in  light  of  the  green  and  digital 
transition, widespread labour and skills shortages, and 
the longer-term risks posed to their career prospects by 
delayed  labour  market  integration.  Against  this  back-
ground, the reinforced Youth Guarantee supports NEETs 
offering quality employment, further education, appren-
ticeships or traineeships within four months of becom-
ing unemployed or leaving formal education21. 

21 

Council Recommendation of 30 October 2020 on A Bridge to 
Jobs – Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee and replacing the 
Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a 
Youth Guarantee 2020/C 372/01, OJ C 372, 4.11.2020, p. 1. 

While employment rates of older people have in-
creased considerably since 2009, stark variation 
across Member States persists. Despite recent im-
provements, population ageing is expected to increase 
economic dependency in the EU and negatively impact 
long-term  competitiveness  and  economic  growth  po-
tential in absence of policy action. By 2045, for every 
10  retirees, there will be only 16 workers, down from 
22 in 2022, and this could further drop to 14 by 207022. 
Against the background of ageing societies, the labour 
market participation of older people and active ageing 
acquires particular importance, the more so in the light 
of the sizeable labour shortages. In 2023, the employ-
ment  rate  of  older  people  (55-64)  reached  63.9%, 
nearly 20 pps higher than in 2009, with women’s em-
ployment rate showing stronger gains. Even though the 
increase in older people’s employment was more than 
four  times  higher  than  for  the  prime-age  population 
(25-54), their employment rate remained 18 pps lower, 
highlighting  significant  room  for  further progress.  The 
growth recorded was  primarily attributed to increased 
job  retention  rather  than  new  hiring,  which  remained 
persistently  low  during  this  period.  In  particular,  older 
people with higher education levels tend to stay longer 
in the labour market, while those with lower education 
are more likely to exit early. Poor working conditions – 
both  physical  and  psychological  –  are  key  factors 

22 

European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report, Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2024. 

10 

1.7401.7103.6411.6452.8671.8652.2170.8250123456Age groupsEducation level (25-64)GenderYoung (20-29)PrimaryWomen (20-64)Prime age (30-54)SecondaryMen (20-64)Older people (55-64)Tertiary 
 
 
 
 
 
Basic skills of European students continue to deteriorate  

Share of students who are not able to reach the minimum competence benchmark 
PISA Level 2 (%) 

Key Messages 

Underachievement 
rates have largely 
increased in 
mathematics 
(+6.6 pps) and 
reading (+3.7 pps), 
and more 
moderately in 
science (+1.9 pps) 

The top 
performance rate 
declined: -3.1 pps 
in mathematics 
and -1.6 pps in 
reading, while 
having increased 
slightly in science 
(+0.6 pps) 

Note :  Caution is required when interpreting the 2022 EU value: one or more PISA sampling standards 
were not met by Denmark, Ireland, Latvia and the Netherlands (see OECD, PISA 2022 Results (Volume 1), 
A2 and A4). 2012 data is missing for Malta. 
Source :   OECD, PISA 2012, 2015, 2018, 2022, DG EAC calculations. 

driving early retirement and also hindering re-entry into 
the labour market23. Moreover, illness or disability are 
important  reasons  to  remain  outside  the  labour  force 
alongside  care  responsibilities,  workplace-related  fac-
tors  and  institutional  barriers,  such  as  social  security 
and pension regulations, which need to be tackled to al-
low greater labour market participation, in line with the 
demography toolbox. 

The gender employment and pay gaps contribute 
to  persistent  gender  inequalities  in  the  labour 
market with only modest signs of convergence. In 
2023,  the  gender  employment  gap  in  the  EU  was 
10.2 pps. This gap narrowed slightly in recent years, re-
flecting a stronger increase in employment for women, 
but  remains  substantial,  and  shows  large  disparities 
across  Member  States  and  regions.  Given  the  higher 
prevalence  of  part-time  work  among  women  (almost 
four times than for men), the gender employment gap 
widens  when  accounting  for  this  (to  15.7 pps  ‘in  full-
time  equivalent’).  Gender  employment  gaps  are  even 
wider for people with children, with parenthood impact-
ing  women’s  careers  more  than  men’s.  In  most  coun-
tries, this is evident in both lower female employment 
rates and higher part-time work among women. Finally, 
while the gender pay gap narrowed over the past dec-
ade, it  remains  substantial  in  most  Member  States.  It 
was at 12.7% on average for the EU in 2022. Pay gaps 
are driven, among other factors, by gender differences 
in  economic  activities  and  occupations,  under-

23 

24 

See: Eurofound, Keeping older workers engaged: Policies, prac-
tices and mechanisms, Eurofound Working Paper, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2024.  
Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on early child-
hood education and care: the Barcelona targets for 2030 

representation of women in senior positions, over-rep-
resentation  in  part-time  and  non-permanent  forms  of 
employment,  difficulties  in  reconciling  work  with  care 
responsibilities,  as  well  as  discrimination  and  non-
transparent  wage  structures.  Over  time,  the  aggrega-
tion  of  these  earning  gaps  (compounded  by  career 
breaks  for  care)  leads  to  substantial  gender  gaps  in 
pensions. There is therefore scope for sustained policy 
action  to  address  barriers  to  women’s  labour  market 
participation, including by improving the provision and 
accessibility  of  quality  and affordable  early  childhood 
education and care and long-term care, as well as the 
functioning  of  the  tax  system  to  create  better  incen-
tives, and in line with the objectives set out in the EU 
Gender Equality Strategy 2020-25, the Council Recom-
mendations on early childhood education and care (in-
cluding  the  new  Barcelona  targets)  and  on  access  to 
affordable high-quality long-term care24. 

The deterioration of basic skills among European 
pupils,  together  with  persistent  teacher  short-
ages risks to affect labour productivity, competi-
tiveness  and  social  cohesion.  Basic  skills  serve  as 
building blocks for enabling people to navigate the com-
plexities of life, continue learning later in life and con-
tribute meaningfully to society and the economy. They 
support labour productivity and the innovation pace re-
quired  by  the  digital  transition.  The  results  from  the 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) 2022 revealed that almost one in three 15-year-

2022/C 484/01 and Council Recommendation of 8 December 
2022 on access to affordable high-quality long-term care 
2022/C 476/01. 

11 

1013151820232528302012201520182022MathematicsReadingScienceEEA target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

olds  lack  basic  skills  and  fail  to  reach  the  minimum 
competence  level  in  mathematics,  and  one  in  four  in 
reading and science. Today, the EU is further away from 
its European Education Area target of at most 15% of 
15-year-olds underachieving by 2030. The decline has 
been the sharpest in maths (-6.6 pps since 2018). Top 
performance has also declined across the board and the 
worsening  trend  concerns  the  entire  socio-economic 
distribution, which points to overall major challenges in 
basic skills development. At the same time, as undera-
chievement  is  much  more  frequent  among  disadvan-
taged students, educational inequalities have widened 
further. Almost half (48%) of  disadvantaged students 
underperform  in  maths,  after  a  significant  increase 
from 38.2% in 2018. In this context, the persisting lack 
of qualified teachers across the EU, aggravated in the 
last  few  years  by,  among  others,  the  COVID-19  pan-
demic, threatens to compound the challenge of improv-
ing young people’s basic skills. At the same time, results 
from the International Computer and Information Liter-
acy Study (ICILS) 2023 show that 43% of 13-14-year-
olds possess none or only limited digital skills. These re-
cent  trends  highlight  the  need  for  renewed  and  en-
hanced  efforts  building  on  existing  initiatives  and 
further boosting the implementation of the Pathways to 
School Success Recommendation25. 

While  early  school  leaving,  higher  education 
attainment  and  labour  market  outcomes  of  VET 
graduates improved, challenges remain related to 
education and training systems, such as regional 
differences,  gender  gaps,  social  inequalities  and 
an  insufficient  supply  of  graduates  from  STEM 
fields. Early school leaving decreased slightly in the EU 
since 2022, affecting 9.5% of 18-24-year-olds in 2023 
(2.3 pps lower than 10 years ago). Yet, there is no sign 
of upward convergence among Member States. Young 
men are much more likely to be early leavers. While the 
positive trend of the past decade continues for girls, it 
seems to have stalled for boys. Moreover, young people 
born  outside  the  EU,  young  Roma  and  young  persons 
with disabilities are more likely to leave education and 
training  early.  The  EU  is  on  track  to  reach  its  tertiary 
educational attainment target, following increases in all 
but  three  Member  States  over  the  last  five  years.  In 
2023, 43.1% of 25-34-year-olds held a tertiary degree 
in  the  EU,  making  it  the  most  common  level  of 
attainment  among  young  adults  (with  however  young 
women much more likely to hold a tertiary degree than 
men). Gender differences in subject choices persist (e.g. 
with education and health being dominated by women, 
and ICT and engineering by men). As  access to higher 
education  for  young  people  from  disadvantaged 
backgrounds  remains  a  challenge,  already  existing 
socio-economic  disparities  risk  to  be  reinforced.  With 

25 

26 

Council Recommendation of 28 November 2022 on Pathways 
to School Success and replacing Council Recommendation of 
28 June 2011 on policies to reduce early school leaving 2022/C 
469/01. 
See European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 529 – Skills 
shortages, recruitment and retention strategies in small and 
medium-sized enterprises, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2023. 

12 

tertiary educational attainment growing, increasing the 
flexibility  and 
labour-market  relevance  of  higher 
education  is  important  to  address  skills  shortages,  in 
particular  in  STEM  fields.  Employment  outcomes  for 
recent  graduates  from  vocational  education  and 
training (VET) continued to improve across the EU. Four 
out  of  five  recent  VET  graduates  were  employed  and 
almost two-thirds gained experience at a workplace in 
2023, yielding them higher employment rates than their 
peers  without  such  experience  (84.8%  vs  71.5%). 
However,  large  differences  across  countries  remain, 
learning  and  the 
in  terms  of  work-based 
both 
employment prospects of VET graduates. 

is  essential 

Improving  adults’  skills 
for 
productivity, competitiveness and for preserving 
social  cohesion  and  enhancing  labour  market 
inclusion while supporting the twin transition; yet 
participation  in  adult  learning  varies  markedly 
across  Member  States  and  population  groups.  A 
May 2023 Eurobarometer survey of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)26 found that more than half of SMEs 
reported difficulties finding workers with the right skills 
and about a quarter of them (26%) indicated that this 
was  ‘moderately  difficult’.  Almost  two-thirds  are  held 
back by this in their general business activities. At the 
same time, recent results by the OECD Programme for 
the  International  Assessment  of  Adult  Competencies 
(PIAAC)27  show  that  literacy  proficiency  among  adults 
(15-64)  improved  in  five  of  the  twenty  participating 
Member States over the last decade, while it stagnated 
or  markedly  declined  in  a  majority  of  them  (twelve). 
Regarding  numeracy  proficiency,  the  results  paint  a 
somewhat  more  favourable  picture  as  ten  Member 
States saw increases in performance, while in only six 
of them did proficiency in the adult population stagnate 
or  markedly  decline.  Moreover,  in  2023,  ten  of  the 
participating  Member  States  significantly  exceeded  or 
were  around  the  average  with  regards  to  their 
proficiency in adaptive problem solving. In this context, 
and  faced  with    labour  and  skills  shortages,  and 
population ageing, fostering broad participation in adult 
learning  is  key  to  ensure  that  the  skills  of  the  EU 
workforce  are  kept  up  to  date.  Nevertheless,  recent 
figures from the Adult Education Survey (AES) indicate 
only a mild rise in participation rates in adult learning 
(excluding guided on-the-job training) over the previous 
12 months, from 37.4% in 2016 to 39.5% in 2022 for 
the EU, with wide disparities across Member States. Also 
progress on digital skills has been slow overall, and with 
significant disparities between countries. Despite more 
than 90% of people in the EU used the internet at least 
once per week in 202328, only 55.6% had at least basic 
digital  skills,  reflecting  only  a  modest  increase  from 
2021 (53.9%). At the current pace, only 59.8% of adults 

27  OECD, Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a 

Changing World?: Survey of Adult Skills 2023, OECD Skills Stud-
ies, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2024. Retrieved after the 10 De-
cember 2024 publication. 
See European Commission, Digitalisation in Europe – 2024 edi-
tion, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

28 

 
Participation in adult learning is characterised by strong  
variation across population groups  

Key Messages 

58.9% of high-
skilled adults 
participated in 
learning every 
year, against only 
18.4% of low-
skilled adults  

Only 26.8% of 
the unemployed 
participated in 
learning every year 
against 44.7% of 
the employed  

Almost every 
second young 
adult (25-34) 
participated in 
learning every year, 
vs less than a 
third among the 
55-64-year-olds  

Adult participation rate in learning during the past 12 months  
by subgroup (age 25-64, excluding guided on the job training, %) 

Note :   In October 2024, the Employment Committee Indicators Group agreed on the monitoring frame-
work for the skills target, using AES excluding guided on-the-job training for the time being. 
Source: Eurostat special extraction of the adults’ participation rate in learning during the past 12 months 
without guided on the job training (GOJT), from the Adult Education Survey. 

would have at least basic digital skills by the end of the 
decade, well below the EU target of 80%29. Participation 
in  lifelong  skills  development  is  especially  critical  for 
people who have low qualifications (i.e. at most lower-
secondary  education),  the  unemployed,  those  outside 
the  labour  force  and  the  older  population,  who  at  the 
same  time  would  need  it  the  most.  Against  this 
background, the 2020 European Skills Agenda called for 
a  radical  increase  in  up-  and  re-skilling.  Furthermore, 
the June 2022 Council Recommendation on individual 
learning  accounts  outlines  how  Member  States  can 
combine  financial  and  non-financial  support  in  an 
effective way to empower adults to develop their skills 
throughout their working life30. Based on the June 2022 
Council  Recommendation  on  a  European  approach  to 
micro-credentials, the latter have also an important role 
to  play  in  this  respect,  as  they  may  stimulate  the 
participation of workers and jobseekers in targeted up- 
and re-skilling31. 

Real  gross  disposable  household  income  (GDHI) 
resumed its growth in the EU in 2023 and 2024, 
which  helped  households  recover  purchasing 
power  and  prevent  increases  in  poverty.  Overall, 
real household incomes grew faster than GDP starting 
from  Q2-2023,  reversing  the  slowing  trend  of  the 

29 

30 

See Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions State of 
the Digital Decade 2024 (COM(2024) 260 final).  
See: COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 16 June 2022 on individ-
ual learning accounts 2022/C 243/03.  

previous two years. While the compensation of the self-
employed has been increasing at a moderate pace, the 
compensation of employees picked up more rapidly in 
Q4-2023  and  Q1-2024.  This  more  than  compensated 
the effect of taxes,  which started being a drag on in-
come growth at the end of 2023, after having contrib-
uted  positively  over  the  previous  year,  notably  as  a 
result of temporary inflation-related measures. Net so-
cial benefits provided some positive contribution in the 
first half of 2024.  

The  share  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social 
exclusion slightly declined in the EU in 2023, also 
thanks to decisive policy action taken to cushion 
the negative social effects of the high cost of liv-
ing,  but  challenges  remain  with  notable  differ-
ences across regions. Still, approximately one in five 
people remained at risk of  poverty or  social exclusion 
(AROPE) in 2023 in the EU, while the overall number de-
creased  by  around  1.6  million  compared  to  2019 
(against a 2030 target of at least 15 million). The het-
erogeneity between and within Member States as well 
as  disparities  between  population  groups  were  large, 
with higher poverty risks for children, older people, per-
sons with disabilities, non-EU born and Roma. Eurostat’s 
Flash estimates referring to 2023 incomes indicate that 

31 

See: COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 16 June 2022 on a Euro-
pean approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and 
employability 2022/C 243/02. 

13 

0102030405060LowMediumHigh25-3435-4445-5455-64EmployedUn-employedOutside thelabour forceEducational attainmentAgeLabour statusAES 2022 (excl. guided on-the-job training) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Poverty or social exclusion rates varies significantly across age groups, 
with children often most at risk, and also affects people in work 

At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rates – total and by age group  
below and above 18; in-work povertyrate (18+) (%) 

One in five 
people and one in 
four children at 
risk of poverty or 
social exclusion 
in the EU in 2023 

One in 12 
workers at risk 
of poverty in the 
EU in 2023  

Note: Break in series for 2020. Estimated values for 2015– 2019 for AROP Employed persons (18 or 
over) 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], [ilc_li02], [ilc_li04], EU-SILC. 

AROP rates remained stable in the EU on average and 
in  most  Member  States.  Joblessness  remained  a  key 
driver of poverty, while social benefits did not reach all 
households in need. The impact of social transfers (ex-
cluding  pensions)  on  poverty  reduction  decreased 
slightly in 2023, with some divergence among Member 
States, underlining the importance of further strength-
ening  efforts  to  ensure  adequate  income  support  and 
coverage.  Despite  improvements  in  recent  years,  in 
practically all Member States, minimum income support 
is generally not sufficient to lift people out of poverty. 
Implementing  the  Council  Recommendation  on  mini-
mum  income  ensuring  active  inclusion  in  all  Member 
States is key to address this challenge32. Energy poverty 
(as  measured  by  the  share  of  people  unable  to  keep 
their home adequately warm) increased for the second 
consecutive year in 2023 in  the EU. The fact that the 
increase was lower than in 2022, while the price shock 
was  significantly  higher  in  winter  2022  compared  to 
winter  2021,  suggests  that  the  exceptional  support 
measures adopted by the EU and its Member States ef-
fectively  cushioned  the  impact.  Distributional  impact 
assessments of reforms and investments are  particu-
larly important to factor in impacts on poverty risks and 
income inequality and inform policy-making ex-ante. 

The share of children at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in the EU remained broadly stable, while 
their  number  declined  marginally  in  2023,  while 
the  situation  of  persons  with  disabilities 
worsened further. In this year, for the first time since 
the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  number  of  children 
experiencing  poverty  or  social  exclusion  risks  declined 
slightly in the EU (19.9 million vs around 20 million in 

2022). Almost one in four children in the EU remained 
at  risk  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion,  with  the  total 
number  up  by  0.6  million  compared  to  2019,  having 
moved away from the 2030 EU goal of a reduction by 
at  least  5  million.  Lifting  children  out  of  poverty  and 
social  exclusion  is  instrumental  to  help  them  realise 
their full potential in society and in the labour market 
and  break  the  cycle  of  intergenerational  poverty. 
Implementing  the  European  Child  Guarantee33  in  all 
Member States is key in this respect. Poverty or social 
exclusion  risks  remain  elevated  also  for  persons  with 
disabilities. The AROPE rate for the latter (at 28.8% in 
2023)  was  10.8 pps  higher  than  for  the  rest  of  the 
population in 2023. A still wide gap in employment rates 
between persons with disability and those without and 
the  greater  likelihood  for  the  former  to  be  leaving 
education  early  is  closely  related  to  their  reported 
higher poverty risks. 

Access to social housing or housing assistance of 
good quality for those in need is a key EU priority. 
Access to housing is fundamental in protecting against 
poverty  or  social  exclusion  risks,  and  to  determine 
access  to  education  and  employment,  while  also 
impacting on work-related mobility within the Member 
States and in the EU Single Market. Housing costs weigh 
on  EU  households’  budgets,  hitting  particularly  hard 
those that already experience poverty risks. They were 
deemed to be a ‘financial burden’ by almost half of the 
EU households in 2023. At the same time, as many as 
8.9% of the EU population lived in a household where 
total housing costs represented more than 40% of their 
is 
household 
total 
overburdened  by  housing  costs.  This  rate  reached 

disposable 

income, 

that 

32 

Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensur-
ing active inclusion (2023/C 41/01). 

33 

Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 es-
tablishing a European Child Guarantee (OJ L 223, 22.62021, p. 
14-23). 

14 

51015202530201520162017201820192020202120222023AROPE TotalAROPE children (-17)AROPE (18+)In-work poverty (18+) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Messages 

Households experiencing poverty commit a significant share of their 
disposable incomes to housing expenses, with large variation across 
Member States  

Share of housing costs in disposable household income, 2023 (%) 

In 2023, in more 
than a third of 
Member States, 
households spend 
around or above 
a fifth of their 
disposable 
income on 
housing costs 

Households 
experiencing 
poverty risks 
were twice as 
much 
overburdened by 
housing costs in 
almost all Member 
States 

Source:  Eurostat [ilc_mded01]. 

33.5%  for  people  already  experiencing  poverty  risks. 
Increases of rents and property prices outpacing income 
growth deteriorated housing affordability, especially in 
major EU cities. Also, the provision of social housing in 
many countries is not sufficient to cover the needs, with 
a declining stock and long waiting lists. Most important 
barriers to investment in social housing relate to overall 
obstacles in the construction sector, such as permitting 
procedures and land use; budget constraints, access to 
finance and the availability of skilled workforce. Finally, 
as the most extreme challenge in relation to access to 
housing, homelessness was also further aggravated by 
the increased cost of living.  Renting difficulties during 
the  last  12  months  were  reported  by  more  than  a 
quarter of people aged 30-54 experiencing poverty or 
social exclusion risks. Member States have already put 
in place various regulatory and non-regulatory reforms 
and 
investment  programmes  to  support  housing 
affordability and increase their social housing stock. EU 
funds can support the implementation of these reforms 
and investments. 

The  modernisation  of  social  protection  systems 
can contribute to inclusive economic growth, with 
adequate  and  sustainable  social  protection  and 
social services. Despite some improvements over the 
last  few  years,  access  to  social  protection  remains 
diverse across Member States. The implementation of 

34 

Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to 
social protection for workers and the self-employed2019/C 
387/01. 

the 2019 Council Recommendation on access to social 
protection for workers and the self-employed should be 
strengthened  in  order  to  address  persisting  structural 
challenges34. In this context, ensuring transparency and 
simplification  in  the  access  to  social  protection  is 
important. Digital solutions can contribute to improving 
transparency,  efficiency  as  well  as  effectiveness  in 
access to social protection, yet there is a need to avert 
the  increased  risks  of  a  digital  divide.  In  an  ageing 
society, ensuring the adequacy and fiscal sustainability 
of pensions and long term-care (LTC) requires a broad 
policy  mix,  which  includes  investing  in  active  and 
healthy ageing, prolonging working lives, and supporting 
adapted  and  flexible  work  arrangements,  alongside 
effective and efficient pension and LTC systems. Socio-
economic  inequalities,  as well  as the  increase  in  non-
standard forms of work, also pose growing challenges 
with  the  rise  in  longevity.  While  pension  replacement 
rates35  are  projected  to  decrease  over  the  next  four 
decades, LTC needs are expected to increase. Adequate 
pensions will increasingly depend on longer careers. At 
the same time, lower pensions would also make it more 
difficult to cover out-of-pocket expenditure for LTC. The 
latter  can  be  very  high  for  people  with  severe  care 
needs, and great variation exists among  EU countries. 
In  the  longer  term,  demographic  developments  are 
projected  to  result  in  a  6.6  million  increase  of  people 
potentially  in  need  of  LTC  by  205036,  which  will 

35 

36 

Theoretical replacement rates measure how a hypothetical re-
tiree’s pension income in the first year after retirement would 
compare with their earnings immediately before retirement. 
According to the projections from the baseline scenario. See: 
European Commission DG ECFIN (2024), 2024 ageing report – 

15 

010203040506070ELDKLUSECZDENLHUATFISKBGEUFRBEPLROEEESIELVLTHRSIITPTMTCYTotalAROPNot AROP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Long-term care costs are projected to increase further, while pen-
sion replacement rates are expected to decrease  

Out-of pocket 
costs for LTC 
exceeded the 
median 
disposable 
income of 
persons in need 
of it in a fifth of 
EU Member 
States 

Expected 
decreaes in 
pension 
replacement 
rates are likely 
to aggravate the 
burden of high 
LTC costs 

Pension Net Theoretical Replacement Rates (TRR), 2022, 2062 (men, pps); Long-term 
homecare out-of-pocket costs as share of median disposable income (%) 

Note: TRRs are for a 40-year career ending at pensionable age, average-earner, 2022 and 2062. LTC out 
of pocket costs are for a person with severe needs, after public support. See notes for the graph in Pillar 
Box 7 for details on the methodology. 
Source: Commission’s own calculations, based on data from OECD and Member States. 2024 Pension 
Adequacy Report and OECD analysis based on the OECD long-term care social protection questionnaire, 
SHARE (wave 8, 2019, except PT, which refers to wave 6, 2015) and TILDA (wave 3, 2015). 

exacerbate 
the  current  structural  challenges  of 
availability,  affordability,  and  quality  of  LTC.  Against 
this  background,  the  Council  Recommendation  on 
access to affordable high-quality long-term care37 asks 
Member  States  to  ensure  adequate  long-term  care 
services,  as  well  as  quality  employment  and  fair 
working  conditions  in  the  care  sector,  addressing 
workers’  skills  needs,  while  also  supporting  informal 
carers.  The  Council  Conclusions  of  June  2024  on 
pension adequacy38 reaffirm the need to pursue further 
labour  market 
reforms 
to  social 
participation,  access  and  contributions 
protection schemes for all, and strengthening access to 
high-quality and affordable health and long-term care. 
Furthermore,  Council  Conclusions  on 
fiscal 
sustainability  challenges  arising  from  ageing  reaffirm 
the  need  to  further  address  the  economic  and 
budgetary  consequences  of  ageing, 
including  by 
adopting sound public finances, raising productivity as 
well  as  participation  and  employment  rates,  and 
adapting  pension,  health  care  and  long-term  care 
systems39. 

including  by 

improving 

the 

Well-functioning  social  dialogue  and  collective 
improving  working 
bargaining  are  key  to 
conditions and mitigating labour shortages. At the 
Val  Duchesse  Social  Partners  Summit  of  31  January 
2024, the Commission, the Belgian Presidency, and the 
cross-industry  social  partners  signed  a  ‘Tripartite 

Economic & budgetary projections for the EU Member States 
(2022-2070), Publications Office of the European Union. 
See 2022/C 476/01. 
See Council Conclusions on pension adequacy of 20 June 2024, 
11398/24. 

37 
38 

16 

Declaration  for  a  Thriving  Social  Dialogue’.  This 
represents a renewed commitment to strengthen social 
dialogue at EU level and to join forces in addressing the 
key challenges that our economies and labour markets 
are facing40. Regular dialogue and consultation with civil 
society organisations is also instrumental for delivering 
impactful  and  inclusive  policies.  As  acknowledged  by 
the  2024  La  Hulpe  Declaration  on  the  Future  of  the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, civil society plays a key 
role 
the  fight  against  social  exclusion  and 
inequalities,  and  with  regard  to  policies  that  concern 
under-represented  and  vulnerable  groups.  At  the  EU 
level, social partners and civil society organisations are 
actively involved in the European Semester, with regular 
exchanges of views and thematic discussions on areas 
of particular relevance. 

in 

Member States should take action to address the 
employment,  skills  and  social  policy  challenges 
identified  in  this  Joint  Employment  Report.  In 
particular – in line with the Employment Guidelines:  

• 

Enhance  the  up-  and  re-skilling  of  adults  to 
ensure  competitiveness,  address  labour  and 
skills  shortages,  adapt  to  the  changing  labour 
market  situation  and  outlook,  and  foster  the 
green  and  digital  transitions  –  including  by 

39 
40 

See Council Conclusions of 14 May 2024, 9159/24. 
See: Tripartite Declaration for a Thriving European Social Dia-
logue. 

05010015020025030405060708090100HRFRITLVSIESPTLTSKELDEATHUIESENLBELUMTDKPLEEFICZCYBGROLTC out-of-pocket cost share of median disposable income (%)Net TRRsLTC out-of-pocket costsTRR 2022TRR 2062 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  provision  of 

integrating  the  use  of  skills  intelligence  tools; 
strengthening 
individual 
training entitlements, such as individual learning 
accounts;  and  fostering  the  development, 
implementation  and  recognition  of  micro-
the  Council 
credentials  – 
learning 
recommendations  on 
accounts and on a European approach to micro-
credentials. 

line  with 

individual 

in 

Strengthen  active  labour  market  policies  and 
the  capacity  and  effectiveness  of  public 
employment services – including by investing in 
digital  infrastructure  and  services,  enhanced 
career  guidance,  counselling  services,  skills 
intelligence and staff training – with a view to 
supporting quality job creation and transitions. 

In line with national laws and/or practices and in 
full  respect  of  the  role  and  autonomy  of  the 
social  partners,  promote  wage  developments 
that  mitigate  the  loss  in  purchasing  power,  in 
particular 
low-wage  earners,  while 
promoting  upward  social  convergence,  taking 
into account productivity developments, quality 
job creation, and safeguarding competitiveness. 

for 

Ensure  the  availability  of  support  schemes 
designed  in  a  way  to  preserve  and  further 
develop human capital via associated upskilling 
and 
to  support  fair 
in  order 
restructuring processes where needed, ease job 
transitions  and  help  the  modernisation  of  the 
economy. 

reskilling, 

Provide  support  to  workers  and  households 
most  affected  by  the  economic  and  social 
impacts from the adaptation to climate change 
and  new  green  and  digital  technologies,  in 
particular to vulnerable workers and households 
– 
including  through  effective  employment 
services and training  measures;  well-designed, 
targeted 
employment 
programmes,  hiring  and  transition  incentives; 
adequate 
income  security  with  an  active 
inclusion  approach;  and  the  promotion  of 
entrepreneurship, 
line  with  the  Council 
Recommendation  on  ensuring  a  fair  transition 
towards climate neutrality. 

time-bound 

and 

in 

Promote  mobility  within  the  EU  and  consider 
attracting skilled third country national workers. 
In addition, ensure respect and enforcement of 
labour  and  social  rights  and  channel  third 
country nationals entering the EU through legal 
migration  pathways 
towards  occupations 
experiencing  shortages,  supported  by  an 
effective 
full 
complementarity  to  harnessing  talents  from 
within the Union.  

integration 

policy, 

in 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

•  Adapt  labour  market  regulations  and  tax  and 
benefit  systems  to  reduce  labour  market 
segmentation  and  gender  gaps  in  the  labour 

17 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Key Messages 

market and foster quality job creation, including 
a  possible reduction of the tax  wedge notably 
for low-earners without hindering the transition 
toward  higher-paying  jobs  and  a  shift  away 
from labour taxation to environmental taxes.  

Ensure healthy, safe and well-adapted working 
environments. 

in 

the 

Promote  collective  bargaining  and  social 
dialogue, 
Council 
line  with 
Recommendation  on  strengthening  social 
dialogue, together  with timely and meaningful 
social partners’ involvement in relevant policy-
making  at  EU  and  national  level,  including  in 
relation  to  the  implementation  of  Member 
States’ recovery and resilience plans and in the 
context of the European Semester. 

Enhance the labour market prospects of young 
people – including through inclusive and quality 
vocational  education  and  training  and  tertiary 
education; 
targeted  employment  services’ 
support  (comprising  mentoring,  guidance  and 
counselling);  and  quality  apprenticeships  and 
traineeships,  in  line  with  the  reinforced  Youth 
Guarantee. 

labour-market 
Support  equity,  quality  and 
relevance  of  higher  education,  as  well  as  the 
automatic  recognition  of  qualifications,  to 
address  skills  shortages  and  mismatches, 
including by increasing the number of graduates 
in some STEM disciplines, reducing gender gaps 
and empowering universities to become actors 
of change in the green and digital transitions. 

Ensure  non-discrimination,  promote  gender 
equality,  improve  equality  mainstreaming  and 
strengthen  the  labour  market  participation  of 
women and disadvantaged groups, by fostering 
equal  opportunities  and  career  progression, 
ensuring equal  pay  for equal work, or work of 
equal value, transparency in pay structures, and 
promoting the reconciliation of work, family and 
private  life  –  including  through  access  to 
affordable  and  high-quality 
(early 
childhood  education  and  care,  and  long-term 
care),  and  family-related  leave  and  flexible 
working  arrangements  for  parents  and  other 
informal carers, in line with the European Care 
Strategy. 

care 

Foster equal opportunities for children to tackle 
the  high  levels of  child  poverty  and  make  the 
best use of EU and national resources. Speed up 
the  implementation  of  the  European  Child 
Guarantee including by providing affordable and 
good quality early childhood education and care 
and  by  addressing  early  school  leaving  and 
teacher  shortages.  Support  access  to  quality 
education  of  children  and  young  people  from 
disadvantaged  groups  and  remote  areas, 

•  Assess  the  distributional  impacts  of  reforms 
and  investments  on  the  income  of  various 
groups  across  the  population,  in  line  with  the 
Communication  on  better  assessing 
the 
distributional impact of Member States’ policies. 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Provide all children at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion  with  free  and  effective  access  to 
healthcare, early childhood education and care, 
and  education,  training  and  school-based 
activities; as well as effective access to healthy 
nutrition and adequate housing; in line with the 
European  Child  Guarantee  and  the  related 
national action plans. 

Support  access  to  quality  and  affordable 
housing,  social  housing  or  housing  assistance, 
where  appropriate;  address  homelessness  as 
the most extreme form of poverty; promote the 
renovation of residential and social housing and 
integrated social services. 

Invest in the capacity of the healthcare system 
including  as  regards  prevention  and  primary 
care services, as well as public health capacity, 
coordination of care, healthcare staff and use of 
eHealth and AI; reduce out-of-pocket payments 
where  relevant;  improve  healthcare  coverage; 
and promote better working conditions as well 
as upskilling and reskilling of health workers. 

Strengthen the provision of  quality, affordable 
and sustainable long-term care services, in line 
with the Council Recommendation on access to 
high-quality affordable long-term care. 

inclusive  and  sustainable  pension 
Ensure 
systems that allow for adequate incomes in old 
age and inter-generational fairness. 

EU funding, including through the ESF+, the ERDF, the 
JTF,  the  TSI  and  the  RRF  for  eligible  investments  and 
reforms,  supports  Member  States  to  step  up  policy 
action in these domains. 

Joint Employment Report 2025 

improve  their  learning  outcomes  and  promote 
training at all qualification levels.  

•  Adopt  comprehensive  measures  to  improve 
basic skills, and more broadly the development 
of key competences (including transversal skills) 
of pupils and tackle structural challenges linked 
to  performance  and  equity  of  education  and 
training  systems,  including  through  effective 
teaching, learning and assessment approaches, 
the  professional  practice  of 
supporting 
leaders,  promoting 
educators  and  school 
supportive 
learning  environments,  offering 
targeted support to disadvantaged schools and 
learners, and by  addressing teacher shortages 
increasing  the  attractiveness  of  the 
and 
teaching profession (also by creating attractive 
frameworks,  supporting  educators 
career 
throughout 
their  careers,  and  adequately 
supporting teachers in disadvantaged, rural and 
remote areas).  

•  Boost  the  digital  skills  and  competences  of 
pupils  and  adults  of  all  ages,  enhance  critical 
thinking  and  media  literacy,    and  increase  the 
digital  talent  pool  in  the  labour  market  by 
developing  digital  education  and 
training 
ecosystems supported by key enablers, such as 
high-speed connectivity for schools, equipment, 
and  teacher  training;  and  support  institutions 
with know-how on digitalisation with a special 
focus  on  inclusion  and  on  reducing  the  digital 
divide. 

• 

Ensure  adequate  and  sustainable  social 
protection  for  all,  in  line  with  the  Council 
Recommendation on Access to Social Protection; 
improve  the  protection  of  those  who  are  not 
sufficiently  covered,  such  as  workers  in  non-
standard  forms  of  employment, 
including 
platform work, and the self-employed; improve 
the adequacy of benefits, the transferability of 
rights and the access to quality services while 
safeguarding 
the  sustainability  of  public 
finances;  and  effectively  support  the  labour 
market integration of those who can work.  

•  Develop  and  strengthen  minimum 

income 
schemes  that  provide  adequate  support  and 
pursue an active inclusion approach, in line with 
the  Council  Recommendation  on  adequate 
minimum income ensuring active inclusion; and 
foster  access  to  essential  services,  including 
low-income  and 
for 
energy,  especially 
vulnerable households. 

18 

. 

CHAPTER 1 

OVERVIEW OF LABOUR 
MARKET AND SOCIAL 
TRENDS, PROGRESS ON 
2030 TARGETS, AND KEY 
HORIZONTAL FINDINGS ON 
SOCIAL CONVERGENCE  

1.1. KEY LABOUR MARKET TRENDS 

Despite the challenging economic environment in 
2023,  employment  in  the  EU  continued  to  grow 
robustly in most sectors though slower than the 
remarkable  growth  experienced  in  the  previous 
year. Employment expanded by 2.4 million people over-
all to a total of 217.5 million. Against this background, 
the  employment  rate  (20-64  age  group41)  reached  a 
new record high of 75.3%, growing further to 75.8% in 
Q2-2024. The annual growth rate of 1.1% marks a re-
turn to the pre-COVID-19 averages (2013-19), follow-
ing the rapid post-pandemic recovery in 2022 (+2.3%). 
Employment  growth  was  relatively  balanced  across 
sectors, ranging from 0.9% to 1.7% for most, with a few 
exceptions. The ICT sector expanded by 4.3%, reflecting 
its strong long-term trend and the ongoing digital tran-
sition. In contrast, employment in industry broadly stag-
nated (+0.1%). The agricultural sector experienced the 
sharpest contraction, with a decline of 1.9%, in line with 
its long-term trend. After losing nearly 18% of its work-
ers during the COVID-19 crisis, the accommodation and 
food services sector grew by 5.6% in 2023 and thereby 
exceeded  its  pre-pandemic  employment  peak  for  the 
first time, while the construction sector has yet to fully 
recover  to  pre-financial  crisis  levels,  despite  the 

41 

42 

Chapter 1 always uses the 20-64 age group for the ‘employ-
ment rate’ indicator, unless stated otherwise. 
Based on the European Commission Autumn Forecast 2024 (15 
November 2024). 

increased  focus  on  housing  and  green  renovations. 
Looking ahead, employment growth is forecast at 0.8% 
in 2024, 0.6% in 2025 and 0.5% in 202642. 

In a context of historically low unemployment and 
a shrinking working-age population, employment 
growth was primarily driven by a growing labour 
force, with strong contributions from third-coun-
try nationals and older workers. Following a record 
low in 2022, the EU unemployment rate43 fell by 0.1 pps 
to 6.1% in 2023 in annual terms, and reached 5.9% in 
September 2024. While decreasing unemployment was 
the  main  driver  of  employment  growth  before  the 
COVID pandemic (2015-19), low unemployment levels 
have  shifted  the  focus  to  labour  force  growth  as  the 
main source of current and future employment gains. In 
2023, around 92% of employment growth in the 15-64 
age group was explained by an expansion of the labour 
force  (vs  less than  8%  by  lower unemployment).  This 
expansion  was  largely  driven  by  workers  aged  25-54 
with tertiary education, with many of them being third-
country nationals, as well as by older  workers  (55-64 
years  old)  with  secondary  or  tertiary  education  –  see 
Figure  1.1.1.  This  is  in  line  with  an  increasing  profes-
sionalisation and gradual reallocation of employment to 
high-skilled occupations. At the same time, significant 

43 

Chapter 1 always uses the 15-74 age group for the ‘unemploy-
ment rate’ indicator, unless stated otherwise. 

19 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 1.1.1: Employment growth in 2023 was driven by a labour force expansion led by highly- 
educated and older workers 

Employment growth (aged 15-64) broken down by labour force growth and unemployment reduction as well as by a cross-section of age 
groups and educational attainment levels 

Source:  Own calculations based on Eurostat [lfsa_agan], [lfsa_ugan], [lfsa_egaed]. 

regional disparities persist within Member States, with 
consistently lower employment rates in outermost  re-
gions and many rural areas. 

Labour  market  outcomes  of  under-represented 
groups have steadily improved, but there remains 
considerable room for improvement. Older workers, 
young  people  and  the  low-skilled  as  well  as  women, 
third-country nationals and persons with disabilities con-
tinue to have employment and labour force participation 
rates  (aged  15-64)  well  below  the  respective  EU  aver-
ages (75.3% and 75.0% in 2023). Moreover, the unem-
ployment  rates  of  young  people,  the  low-skilled  and 
third-country nationals are around twice the EU average. 
However,  improvements  are  visible  across  nearly  all 
groups.  The  population  aged  55-64,  which  expanded 
faster than any other age group during the past two dec-
ades,  saw  a  rapid  rise  in  labour  market  participation, 
reaching 67.0% in 2023, partly driven by increased life 
expectancy, improved healthcare and higher retirement 
ages. Their employment rate also increased to 63.9% in 
2023, with their share in total employment nearly dou-
bling (from 10% in 2003 to close to 20% in 2023). Young 
people’s (aged 15-24) labour force participation (41.2%) 
and employment rates (35.2%) returned to pre-2008 fi-
nancial crisis levels in 2023, and the rate of young people 
neither  in  employment  nor  in  education  and  training 
(NEETs, 15-29) reached a new record low of 11.2%. Fur-
thermore,  gender  participation  and  employment  gaps 
continued their long-term downward trend in 2023, now 
at 10.4 and 10.2 pps overall, but still are more than twice 
as large for third-country nationals and the low-skilled. 
People  with  tertiary  education  have  by  far  the  highest 
employment rate (86.3% in 2023) and continue to con-
tribute significantly to employment growth44, supported 
by their growing population share. Nevertheless, employ-
ment  rates  increased  across  all  educational  levels  in 
2023,  with  the  gap  between  the  employment  rates  of 

44 

A +3.1% employment growth for the high skilled vs -0.5% for 
the medium-skilled and -0.4% for the low-skilled in 2023. 
‘Low-skilled’ refers to persons with less than primary and lower 
secondary education (ISCED 0-2). ‘Medium-skilled’ refers to up-
per secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education 
(ISCED 3-4). 

20 

persons (aged 25-64) with high and low educational out-
comes decreasing to a still sizeable 28.0 pps. The last two 
years have witnessed an unusually large increase in the 
number of third-country nationals in the EU labour force, 
with almost three quarters of them being Ukrainian45 and 
40% highly educated. This accounted for more than half 
of  the  increase  in  the  labour force  in  2022  and 2023, 
even though third-country nationals  represent still  only 
6.7%  of  the  working-age  population  (up  from  5.7%  in 
2021).  Their  labour  force  participation  rate  rose  to 
68.5%,  and  their  employment  rate  reached  63.0%. 
Meanwhile,  the  disability  employment  gap  was  slightly 
up  by  0.1 pp  in  2023  (4.1 pps  larger  for  men  than  for 
women), following a record low of 21.4 pps in 2022.  

The shares of temporary and part-time workers re-
main well below pre-pandemic levels, but so do the 
hours worked per person. In 2023, total hours worked 
increased by 0.9%, slightly below the 1.1% rise in total 
employment, continuing the long-term decline of hours 
worked  per employed person (with the agriculture, for-
estry and fishing sector being the main exception). This 
trend is primarily driven by a decreasing number of hours 
worked  in  full-time  jobs.  While  the  share  of  part-time 
employment (aged 20-64) edged up to 17.1% in 2023, it 
remains at historically low levels. In 2023, 15.2% of part-
time  workers  expressed  a  desire  to  work  more  hours, 
down from 16.0% in 2022 and 22.5% a decade before. 
Part-time contracts also remained 3.6 times more prev-
alent for women than for men, though they are less likely 
to be involuntary for women (13.3% vs 20.8% for men in 
2023). At the same time, the share of temporary employ-
ment fell to its lowest level on record in 2023 (10.6%), 
predominantly affecting low-skilled manual workers, in-
dividuals with lower or non-vocational (upper) secondary 
educational  attainments  and  third-country  nationals.  A 
majority (54.9%) of all temporary employees held such 

45 

According to estimates, see Box 1 in European Commission, La-
bour market and wage developments in Europe 2024, Publica-
tions Office of the European Union, 2024. 

-5-4-3-2-101234201520162017201820192020202120222023Employment growth (15-64, million persons) by age groups and educational attainment levels15-24y, ISCED 0-215-24y, ISCED 3-415-24y, ISCED 5-825-54y, ISCED 0-225-54y, ISCED 3-425-54y, ISCED 5-855-64y, ISCED 0-255-64y, ISCED 3-455-64y, ISCED 5-8-5-4-3-2-101234201520162017201820192020202120222023MillionsContributions of labour force and unemployment to employment growth (15-64, million persons)Reduction of unemploymentGrowth of the labour forceTotal employment growth 
 
 
 
1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

Figure 1.1.2: Labour market outcomes improved across most under-represented groups 

Employment outcomes in the EU-27 by gender, age group, educational attainment level and citizenship  

Source:   Eurostat [lfsa_ergaedn], [lfsa_egaed], [lfsa_egan]. 

contracts because they were unable to secure a perma-
nent position.  

Labour and skills shortages remain elevated, ham-
pering  productivity  growth  and  competitiveness, 
although the economic slowdown, improved skills 
matching  and  increased  immigration  of  working-
age third-country nationals have contributed to re-
ducing  them  to  some  extent.  At  the  peak  in  2022, 
more than one third of companies across the EU reported 
labour shortages as a factor limiting their production46. 
While this share declined in 2023, it remained at 18% in 
October  2024  and  therefore  continues  to  represent  a 
challenge to European competitiveness. The job vacancy 
rate peaked at 3.0% in 2022, then fell to 2.8% in 2023 
and further to 2.4% in Q2-2024, reflecting weaker eco-
nomic growth and more subdued hiring expectations. The 
rate remains almost twice as high as a decade ago, but 
some factors driving labour shortages appear to be sub-
siding. Falling vacancies at stable unemployment might 
suggest higher matching efficiency, supported by reduc-
tions  in  both  education-related  mismatches  (as  meas-
ured  by  macroeconomic  skills  mismatches47  and 
overqualification  rates)  and  sectoral  mismatches  (as 
measured by the variance of the sectoral vacancy rates), 
but it could also be a cyclical development as vacancies 
usually react to economic developments faster than un-
employment.  In  2023,  sectors  with  above-average  va-
cancy  rates  (accommodation  and  food  services,  ICT, 
construction,  administrative  support  as  well  as  profes-
sional,  scientific  and  technical  activities)  registered  the 
largest  decreases  in  these  rates,  while  the  mining  and 
energy provision sectors continued to have the lowest va-
cancy  rates.  The  inflow  of  working-age  third-country 

nationals  also  contributed  to  the  easing  of  labour  and 
skills shortages in 2023. However, many of these labour 
and  skills shortages are  of  structural  nature,  driven  by 
shifting labour demand in view of the twin transition and 
population ageing, and need to be tackled through tar-
geted skills, activation, labour mobility and migration pol-
icies48. 

Wage growth remained robust in 2023, also fuelled 
by labour shortages, but was still outpaced by in-
flation. In a tight labour market, nominal compensation 
per employee grew by 4.9% in 2022 and 6.1% in 2023. 
Yet, it  failed  to  keep  up  with  inflation,  resulting  in  real 
wage losses of 3.7% in 2022 and 0.2% in 202349. Look-
ing ahead, real wages are expected to increase by 2.1% 
in 202450 on the back of continued disinflation and (grad-
ually falling but still solid) nominal wage growth. Never-
theless, they would remain 1.1% below their 2019 levels 
on average in 2024 (vs 3.3% in 2023). Over the past two 
years,  minimum  wage  increases  outpaced  inflation  in 
nearly all Member States, which reduced in-work poverty 
(18-64) slightly to 8.3% in 2023 (referring to 2022 in-
comes). Yet, this does not seem to have translated into 
lower  deprivation, since  material and  social deprivation 
rates of employed people (18-64) increased from 7.2% 
in 2021 to 9.1% in 2023. 

1.2. KEY SOCIAL TRENDS 

Real  gross  disposable  household  income  (GDHI) 
resumed its growth in the EU in 2023, and accel-
erated further in 2024. Overall, household incomes 
grew faster than GDP starting from Q2-2023, reversing 
trend  of  2021  and  2022.  While 
the  slowing 

46 
47 

European Business and Consumer Survey October 2024. 
See European Commission, Analytical web note – Measuring 
skills mismatch – 7/2015, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2015. 

48 

See the Action Plan on Labour and Skills Shortages put forward 
by the European Commission in March 2024.  

49  Using HICP as deflator. 
50 

According to the European Commission Autumn Forecast 2024. 

21 

75.3%80.4%70.2%35.2%82.2%63.9%58.7%77.8%87.6%63.0%1.0%0.7%1.3%2.3%0.1%3.7%-0.4%-0.5%3.1%11.3%-2%0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%20%22%-140%-120%-100%-80%-60%-40%-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%TotalMenWomen15-2425-5455-64LowMediumHighnon-EU(20-64)Gender (20-64)Age groupsEducation level (25-64)Citizenship201320192023Average employment growth 2013-19 (%)Employment growth 2023 (%)Employment rate (%)Average annual employment growth -pre-crisis average vs 2023 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 1.2.1: Real gross disposable household income (GDHI) growth resumed in 2023, and acceler-
ated in early 2024 

Growth in real gross disposable household income (GDHI) and its main components and real GDP growth (EU 27, year-on-year quarterly 
growth rates)  

Note: DG EMPL calculations. Nominal GDHI is deflated using the price index of household final consumption expenditure. The real GDHI 

growth rate for the EU is estimated as a weighted average of Member States’ values for those with available quarterly data based 
on the ESA2010 (overall 95% of EU GDHI). 

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts [nasq_10_nf_tr] and [namq_10_gdp]. Not seasonally adjusted. 

compensation  of  the  self-employed  continued  to  in-
crease at a moderate pace, compensation of employees 
picked up more rapidly in  Q4-2023 and  Q1-2024, re-
maining robust in Q2-2024. After contributing positively 
to income growth in the first three quarters of 2023, in 
Q4-2023 and Q1-2024 taxes exerted a negative effect, 
while net social benefits provided a slight positive con-
tribution.  

Poverty decreased slightly in the EU in 2023. The 
at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate stood 
at  21.3%,  down  from  21.6%  and  21.7%  in  2022  and 
2021 respectively, continuing its broadly declining trend 
since  2015.  This further improvement  reflects  the  ef-
fectiveness of decisive policy actions at EU and national 
level aimed at mitigating the social impact of high en-
ergy prices and living costs. In 2023, two of the three 
AROPE sub-components displayed declines for the  EU. 
The at-risk-of poverty (AROP) rate decreased by 0.3 pps, 
to 16.2% (based on 2022 incomes), while Eurostat flash 
estimates referring to 2023 incomes indicated overall 
stability51. Also, the share of people living in (quasi-)job-
less  households  dropped  by  0.3 pps  in  2023,  to  8.0% 
(based on 2022 activity). On the contrary, the share of 
people experiencing severe material and social depriva-
tion  remained  broadly  stable,  at  6.8%,  compared  to 
6.7%  in  2022.  Finally,  the  impact  of  social  transfers 
(other than pensions) on poverty reduction slightly de-
creased  in  the  EU  in  2023,  yet  at  34.7%  it  was  still 
higher  than  pre-pandemic  levels,  though  presenting 
large variation across Member States. There is also con-
tinued  wide  divergence  in  poverty  within  Member 
States, with certain regions having consistently higher 
AROPE rates than national or EU averages. 

Child  poverty  remained  broadly  stable,  but  still 
higher than the rate for the overall population. In 
2023,  the  AROPE  rate  for  children  was  24.8%,  only 

51 

Flash estimates of income inequalities and poverty indicators 
for 2023 (FE 2023). 

22 

slightly up from 24.7% in 2022. This broad stability ef-
fectively interrupted the rise in child poverty registered 
since 2020 in the EU, corresponding to a decline in the 
absolute  number.  All  three  AROPE  sub-components 
stayed broadly stable. The AROP rate for children stood 
at 19.4% (referring to 2022 incomes), following a mar-
ginal increase from 2022 (+0.1 pps), with Eurostat flash 
estimates  referring  to  2023  incomes  also  suggesting 
continued stability. Similarly, the share of children ex-
periencing  severe  material  and  social  deprivation  re-
mained  at  8.4%,  while  the  share  of  children  living  in 
(quasi-)jobless  households  was stable  at  7.5%  (refer-
ring to activity in 2022).  

In-work  poverty  declined  slightly  for  the  second 
consecutive year, but still affected one in twelve 
employed people,  with certain groups dispropor-
tionately  affected.  The  share  of  workers  at  risk  of 
poverty decreased by 0.2 pps to 8.3% in 2023 (referring 
to 2022 incomes). This was lower than ten years earlier 
and than pre-COVID-19 levels (9.1% in 2013 and 9.0% 
in 2019, referring to 2012 and 2018 incomes, respec-
tively). However, in-work poverty affects some groups 
of  workers  more  than  others.  In  2023,  it  was  signifi-
cantly  higher  among  the  low-educated  (18.4%),  part-
time employees (12.6%), those on temporary contracts 
(12.6%), people born outside the EU (18.6%) and non-
EU  citizens  (22.5%).  Households  with  dependent  chil-
dren were also more likely to face in-work poverty risks 
(10.0%) compared to those without (6.8%). 

Certain  groups  continued  to  face  significantly 
higher  risks  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion  than 
the  overall  population.  The  AROPE  rate  remained 
very high for people born outside the EU (39.2%) and 
persons with disabilities (28.8%), well above the EU av-
erage  (21.3%).  Roma  also  tend  to  experience  much 

-15-13-11-9-7-5-3-113579111315Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q2Q3Q4Q1Q22018201920202021202220232024Compensation ofemployeesCompensation ofself-employedNet propertyincomeNet other currenttransfersNet socialbenefitsTaxes on income,wealth (negative)Real GDHIReal GDP 
 
 
 
1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

higher poverty risks52. On the other hand, the share of 
older people (65+) at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
slightly decreased at EU level in 2023, to 19.7%. This 
improvement  was  driven  by  a  reduction  in  the  rate 
among older women, which is nonetheless significantly 
higher than the one for men (22.1% vs 16.6%). 

Income  inequality  remained  largely  stable,  but 
energy poverty increased for the second consec-
utive year. The income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) 
was broadly stable at 4.72 in 2023 (based on 2022 in-
comes), and is expected to remain unchanged in 2024 
(on the basis of 2023 incomes)53. While inflation dispro-
portionately  affected  low  and  lower  middle-income 
households,  who  spend  relatively  more  on  essentials 
such  as  energy  and  food,  targeted  income  support 
measures and adjustments in social benefits and taxes 
in  the  Member  States  have  mitigated  potential  in-
creases in income inequality and poverty risks. On the 
other  hand,  the  share  of  people  unable  to  keep  their 
homes  adequately  warm  rose  by  1.3 pps  in  2023,  to 
10.6% (+3.7 pps compared to 2021), remaining signifi-
cantly  higher  for  those  at  risk  of  poverty,  at  22.2% 
(+2.1 pps since 2022). 

Housing affordability remains a challenge in the 
EU. In 2023, 8.8% of the EU population lived in house-
holds where total housing costs exceeded 40% of total 
disposable income, an increase of 0.1 pps from the pre-
vious year and a 2.8 pps decrease from a decade ago. 
The share of people overburdened by housing costs is 
more than twice as high for working-age single house-
holds  (24.4%)  and  more  than  three  times  higher  for 
people at risk of poverty (33.5% in 2023). Significantly 
affected are also foreign EU nationals (twice as high) 
and  third-country  nationals  (2.5  times  as  high).  While 
overall the housing overcrowding rate remained stable 
in the EU, at 16.8% in 2023, it increased to 29.6% in 
the same year for people at risk of poverty. 

1.3. PROGRESS ON THE 2030 EU 
HEADLINE AND NATIONAL TARGETS 

Employment, skills, and poverty reduction targets 
are driving policy actions across the relevant pol-
icy domains at EU level and in the Member States. 
These  three  EU  headline  targets  were  put  forward  by 
the Commission in March 2021 as part of the European 
Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan:  

i)  an  employment  rate  of  at  least  78%  of  the 

working-age population; 

ii)  an adult learning participation rate of at least 

60% every year; and 

iii)  a reduction of at least 15 million in the number 
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
compared to 2019, out of which at least 5 mil-
lion children54. 

Member States welcomed these targets at the Porto So-
cial Summit in May 2021, as did the European Council 
in its conclusions of June 2021. All Member States put 
forward their national targets in the three domains that 
contribute to the respective EU headline targets. The Pil-
lar Action  Plan  also  provided  complementary  EU-level 
targets  on  reducing  the  gender  employment  gap,  in-
creasing the provision of formal early childhood educa-
tion  and  care,  decreasing  the  rate  of  young  NEETs, 
raising  the  share  of  adults  with  at  least  basic  digital 
skills, cutting early leaving from education and training 
and reducing child poverty. Most Member States set fur-
ther complementary national targets in (some of) these 
areas and/or in additional ones, as deemed. This section 
monitors  progress  towards the  three  EU  headline  and 
national targets by 2030. 

Despite  an  economic  slowdown,  employment 
growth was robust in 2023 and the EU remains on 
track to meet its headline employment rate tar-
get by 2030. After having increased to 75.3% in 2023, 
the EU employment rate is only 2.7 pps from the 78% 
target by 2030, and grew further to 75.8% in Q2-2024. 
Given  the  level  reached  in  2023,  and  factoring  in  the 
latest  demographic  projections  by  Eurostat,  the  EU 
would  only  require  an  average  annual  employment 
growth  rate of 0.4% to reach its current  2030 target, 
against  the  significantly  higher  pre-pandemic  (2013-
19)  average  of  1.1%  per  year  (see  Figures  1.3.1  and 
1.3.3). According to the Commission Autumn 2024 Fore-
cast, employment is also projected to expand more than 
the required 0.4% in the EU over the next three years, 
i.e. by 0.8%, 0.6% and 0.5% in 2024, 2025 and 2026, 
respectively. The EU is therefore currrently progressing 
well towards its 2030 employment rate target. 

Most  Member  States  made  further  progress  to-
wards their national employment rate targets in 
202355.  For  five  countries,  the  employment  rate 
reached in 2023 was already higher than the respective 
2030 national target (see Figure 1.3.2). These are Slo-
vakia (+1 pp compared to its national target), the Neth-
erlands  (+1 pp),  Ireland  (+0.9 pps),  Estonia  (+0.8 pps) 
and  Sweden  (+0.6 pps),  while  Denmark  fell  back  to 
slightly below its 2030 target. Among the 22 countries 
still facing gaps to their 2030 national targets, 18 man-
aged to reduce these gaps in 2023. The largest efforts 
still needed are for Belgium (with a gap of 7.9 pps to its 

52 

53 

54 

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Roma in 10 
European countries – Main results – Roma survey 2021, Publi-
cations Office of the European Union, 2023. 
Flash estimates experimental results referring to 2023 income 
year. 
See: European Commission, The European pillar of social rights 
action plan, Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 

55 

In October 2022, the Indicators Group of the Employment Com-
mittee agreed on a methodological approach for the monitoring 
of progress towards the national targets on employment in the 
context of the European Semester. This section has been pre-
pared on the basis of the agreed methodology. See the Em-
ployment Committee’s Annual Employment Performance 
Report 2023 and the Employment Performance Monitor 2023. 

23 

 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 1.3.1: The EU is on track to reach its headline employment rate target by 2030 

Employment rate in the EU-27 and the related 2030 EU headline target (20-64 year olds, % of population)  

Note:  Values for 2024, 2025 and 2026 based on Commission Autumn 2024 employment growth forecasts as well as projected population 

and working-age population growth from Eurostat’s 2023 population projections. 

Source:  Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a]; employment growth forecast, European Commission Autumn Forecast 2024; Eurostat population projections, 

Europop 2023. 

Figure 1.3.2: Most Member States made further progress towards their national employment rate 
targets in 2023  

Employment rate (2020 and 2023, 20-64 year olds, % of population); national and EU 2030 targets  

Source:   Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a] and table on 2030 national targets in Annex 1. 

Italy 

(6.7 pps),  Romania 
ambitious  2030  target), 
(6.0 pps)  and  Spain  (5.5 pps).  More  than  half  of  the 
Member States experienced employment growth below 
the pre-pandemic (2013-19) average rate (see Figure 
1.3.3.)56,  against  a  background  of  higher  employment 
rates  and  a  shrinking  working-age  population.  Never-
theless,  for  a  large  number  of  countries  (20),  annual 
employment growth  remains at or above the average 
annual rate needed to reach the national employment 
target57. Only Czechia, Romania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Hun-
gary and Finland saw 2023 employment growth lag be-
hind  both  the  pre-pandemic  average  and  the  average 
annual  rate  needed  to  reach  their  ambitious  targets, 
though Finland is very close to both and Czechia already 
almost reached its target.  

There  was  some  limited  progress  towards  the 
headline  target  on  adult  learning  and  therefore 
substantial and accelerated efforts are required to 
reach it by 2030. New data from the Adult Education 
Survey (AES) shows an increase in the participation rate 
of adults in learning over the past 12 months (excluding 
guided on-the-job training) in the EU from 37.4% in 2016 
to 39.5% in 2022 (see Figure 1.3.4)58. This very mild up-
ward  trend will  need  to  be  substantially  accelerated  in 
order to reach the EU skills target of 60% by 2030. This 
is crucial in light of the need for Europe to have a work-
force that adapts to the changing skills needs, to reduce 
skills and labour shortages and remain competitive, inno-
vative and inclusive in the context of the green and digital 
transitions and demographic change. 

56  Due to population decline, the majority of Member States are 

found to need lower minimum annual employment growth than 
in the pre-crisis period to reach their national targets. See the 
Employment Committee’s Annual Employment Performance 
Report 2024. 
For some Member States, such minimum required employment 
growth is negative, reflecting a projected decline in working-

57 

58 

age population and/or the fact that their national targets have 
already been reached. 
In September 2024, the Indicators Group of the Employment 
Committee reached a provisional agreement on the monitoring 
framework for the skills target, using AES data excluding 
guided on-the-job training. See also the Annual Employment 
Performance Report 2024. 

24 

6062646668707274767880201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027202820292030LevelLevel (forecast)Linear path to targetTarget55606570758085EUITELROESHRBEFRLUBGATSKLVSIPLPTFILTCYIEDKHUDEMTCZEESENLLevel in 2020Level in 20232030 national target2030 EU headline target 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

Figure 1.3.3: In two thirds of the Member States, the employment growth in 2023 was on track to 
reach the 2030 national target  

Employment growth in 2023 versus average annual employment growth over 2013-19 and minimum annual employment growth needed to 
reach the 2030 national employment rate target  

Note:   Breaks in series for DK and CY in 2023 (indicated by shaded columns). 
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], Europop 2023, based on Employment Performance Monitor 2024 methodology. 

Figure 1.3.4: While more adults participate in learning, reaching the 2030 EU headline target re-
quires renewed efforts  

Adult participation rate in learning during the past 12 months in the EU-27 and the 2030 EU headline target (25 64 year olds, %)  

Note:   The 2007 AES survey was a large sample pilot exercise carried out on a voluntary basis in all Member States, except Ireland and Lux-
embourg, between 2005 and 2008. On this basis, adjustments were implemented in the next wave. As from 2011, the AES is under-
pinned by a European legal act and thus carried out in all Member States on a mandatory basis59. Breaks in series in 2011 for EU, FR, 
HU, in 2016 for IE, LU, SE and in 2022 for FR, IT, RO. 

Source: Eurostat special extraction of the adults’ participation rate in learning during the past 12 months without guided on the job training 

(GOJT), from the Adult Education Survey. 

The majority of Member States lost ground in the 
pursuit of their 2030 national adult learning tar-
gets. In 2022, Sweden, Hungary and Romania had al-
ready surpassed their respective national targets, with 
Slovakia  coming  close  but  still  remaining  below  (see 
Figure  1.3.5).  Starting  from  the  EU’s  lowest  level  of 
adult  learning  participation,  Romania  had  set  a  rela-
tively low yet ambitious target for 2030 and exceeded 
it in 2022, marking the largest increase in the EU from 
2016  (+229%,  though  this  might  also  be  due  to  the 
break in series). Conversely, for 24 countries, the share 
of adults participating in learning remained below their 
2030 targets, with Slovenia, Cyprus, Croatia, Poland and 
Italy  facing  the  largest  gaps  (greater  than  31 pps). 
Among these 24 countries, only 10 made progress to-
wards their targets (compared to 2016), most notably 
Estonia  (+23%),  Malta  (+22%),  Slovakia  (+16%), 

Germany (+16%) and Spain (+12%). Moreover, partici-
pation rates in education and training are often also sig-
nificantly lower in outermost, remote and rural regions. 

Poverty declined despite a challenging socio-eco-
nomic  context,  marked  by  the  COVID-19  crisis, 
high energy costs and inflation. In 2023, the num-
ber  of  those  experiencing  poverty  or  social  exclusion 
risks had decreased by 703 000 compared to 2022, and 
by 1 571 000 relative to the base year 2019 (see Figure 
1.3.6). This last reading of the data represents the sec-
ond consecutive year of  decline, following a  period of 
stability  over  2018-21.  Nevertheless,  achieving  the 
2030 EU headline poverty reduction target of at least 
15 million will require a significant acceleration during 
the remainder of the decade.  

59 

Commission Regulation (EU) 823/2010 sets out the implement-
ing measures of the basic legal act (Regulation (EC) No 

452/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council) for 
the 2011 AES. 

25 

-3%-2%-1%0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%EU27LTLVSKPTEEDEHRNLCYELSIDKATIEPLFISEROHUCZBGFRESITMTBELUEmployment growth 2023Minimum (annual) employment growth required to reach the national employment rate target 2023-2030Average annual employment growth during "pre-crisis" period (from 2013 to 2019)010203040506070200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027202820292030LevelLinear path to targetTarget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 1.3.5: Substantial efforts are needed at Member State level to reach the national adult learn-
ing targets by 2030 

Adult participation rate in learning during the past 12 months in the EU-27 and national 2030 targets for Member States (25-64 year olds, %) 

 Breaks in series in 2016 for IE, LU, SE and in 2022 for FR, IT, RO. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat special extraction of the Adults participation in learning during the past 12 months without guided on the job training (GOJT) 

from the Adult Education Survey and table on 2030 national targets in Annex 1. 

Figure 1.3.6: The number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU has declined since 
2019, but significant efforts are still needed to achieve the 2030 EU target  

Change in EU-27 AROPE level with regard to the 2019 base year and related 2030 EU headline target (total population, thousand persons) 

Note:    Calculations based on break-free series, with estimated value for 2019 and re-calculations based on the values for Metropolitan 

France rather than the values for France in 2022 and 2023, to be in line with the 2019 baseline.  

Source: SPC annual report 2024. 

Progress towards the national targets varies sig-
nificantly among Member States. Since 2019, only 
about half of the Member States have registered pro-
gress towards their 2030 national targets. One third of 
them (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Italy, 
Latvia,  Poland  and  Romania)  are  broadly  on  track  to 
reach their national targets, having achieved a progress 
rate of one third or more. On the other hand, nearly half 
of  them  (Austria,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France, 
Germany,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) experienced a dete-
rioration and moved in the opposite direction (see Figure 
1.3.7)60. In addition, the number of children experiencing 
poverty or social exclusion risks increased by 583 000 

60 

61 

For the monitoring of the EU and national poverty reduction 
targets, as well as an explanation of the breaks in series and 
related adjustments to the data, see also the 2024 Annual Re-
port of the Social Protection Committee. 
A target on child poverty reduction was set by Belgium, Bul-
garia, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, 

26 

in  the  EU  between  2019  and  2023.  Positive  develop-
ments were nonetheless observed in 13 countries (Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Malta,  Portugal,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Finland  and  Swe-
den), among the 21 that set complementary targets on 
child poverty reduction61. An opposite trend was regis-
tered for Austria, Czechia, France, Germany, Luxemburg, 
Poland, Slovakia and Spain. 

Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. See the 2024 
Annual Report of the Social Protection Committee for the moni-
toring of these targets. 

010203040506070EUBGELROPLCZHRSILTCYITPTESLVBEMTEELUDKIEFRSKFIATDENLHUSELevel in 2016Level in 20222030 national target2030 EU headline target-15 000-12 500-10 000-7 500-5 000-2 50002 5005 0007 50010 0002015201620172018201920202021202220232024202520262027202820292030Change with respect to base valueLinear path to targetBase valueTarget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

Figure 1.3.7: Only about half of the Member States showed some progress towards their national 
targets, with more efforts needed 

Changes in AROPE levels over 2019-23 and national 2030 targets (total population, thousand persons)  

Note:    Note: Break in series in 2020 for FR, IE, DK, LU, in 2021 for LU, in 2022 for FR and LU. DK and DE express their national poverty re-

duction targets as a reduction in number of people living in (quasi-)jobless households (i.e. households with very low work intensity), 
[that is expected to translate into declines in the numbers of people AROPE over the decade]. DE expresses its national target com-
pared to 2020 as the reference year. FR set its national target in reference to metropolitan France and the monitoring is aligned to 
this geographical scope. HU expresses its national poverty reduction target as a reduction of the material and social deprivation rate 
for families with children [that can be translated into AROPE reduction if current circumstances prevail]. MT expresses its national 
poverty reduction target as a reduction of the AROPE rate, in terms of percentage points (i.e. -3.1 pps).  

Source: Eurostat [ilc_pecs01] and table on 2030 national targets in Annex 1. 

1.4. KEY HORIZONTAL FINDINGS FROM 
THE FIRST-STAGE COUNTRY ANALYSIS ON 
SOCIAL CONVERGENCE 

The first-stage country analysis examines labour 
market,  skills  and  social  developments  in  each 
Member State to detect potential risks to upward 
social convergence that warrant further analysis 
in  a  second  stage.  The  2025  edition  of  the 
Commission  proposal  for  a  Joint  Employment  Report 
(JER)  incorporates  such  a  country-specific  first-stage 
analysis  based  on  the  principles  of  the  Social 
Convergence Framework (SCF), following the pilot run in 
the JER 202462. The analysis is in line with Article 148 
TFEU.  It  also  responds  to  Article  3(3),  point  (b)  of 
Regulation 
the  effective 
coordination  of  economic  policies  and  multilateral 
budgetary surveillance, which indicates that the yearly 
surveillance by the Commission of the implementation 
of the employment guidelines, as part of the European 
Semester,  includes  the  progress  in  implementing  the 
principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights and its 
headline  targets,  via  the  social  scoreboard  and  a 
framework to identify risks to social convergence63. The 
first-stage analysis of the framework  is based on the 
Social  Scoreboard  headline  indicators  and  identifies 
potential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence  (see 
methodological box at the end of this section for further 

(EU)  2024/1263  on 

details). To determine the existence of actual challenges 
to  upward  social  convergence  and  the  key  factors 
driving  such  challenges,  a  second-stage  analysis  will 
follow  that  relies  on  a  wider  set  of  quantitative  and 
qualitative  evidence  and  accounts  for  the  measures 
taken or planned by the Member States to address the 
challenges.  This  section  presents  the  key  horizontal 
findings from the first-stage country analysis of the SCF 
(see  Chapter  3),  indicating  which  countries  require 
further analysis in the second stage. 

to 

areas 

registered  more 

The  first-stage  country  analysis  highlights 
overall  robust  labour  market  performance  with 
upward  convergence,  while  the  skills  and  social 
policy 
limited 
improvements  as  well  as  risks  to  upward 
convergence.  The  application  of  the  JER  traffic-light 
methodology 
the  Social  Scoreboard  headline 
indicators  helps  pinpoint  challenges  of  particular 
relevance for the implementation of the European Pillar 
of  Social  Rights  (see  Annexes  6  and  2,  respectively). 
Aggregating  the  signals  from  the  Social  Scoreboard 
indicators on a country-by-country basis (see the box at 
the  end  of  this  section  for  further  methodological 
explanations)  allows  for  an  overall  evaluation  of 
potential risks to upward social convergence faced by 
the  EU  and  its  Member  States.  A  summary  of  key 
horizontal  findings  is  outlined  below  (see  also  Table 
1.4.1 and Figure 1.5.1). 

62 

Following discussions in the EPSCO Council in June 2023 on a 
Social Convergence Framework (SCF) and key messages by 
EMCO and SPC based on the work conducted by the dedicated 
joint EMCO-SPC Working Group from October 2022 until May 
2023. The EPSCO Council of February 2024 called upon EMCO 
and SPC to examine the impact of the aforementioned pilot 
analysis on their activities and on the 2024 European Semester 
cycle. 

63 

In addition, in Recital 8 of the Regulation, it is clarified that ‘As 
part of its integrated analysis of employment and social devel-
opments in the context of the European Semester, the Commis-
sion assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member 
States and monitors progress on the implementation of the 
principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights on the basis of 
the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Con-
vergence Framework’. 

27 

-3,500-2,500-1,500-5005001,5002,5003,500DEFRESPTBGELPLROITChange from 2019 to 2023-300-200-1000100200300NLATSKFILTCZHUHRBE2030 national target-100-80-60-40-20020406080100DKSELUEESIMTCYIELV 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

in 

of 
Overall, 

•  Upward convergence in the labour market 
persisted 
overall  with 
2023 
improvements  still  needed  in  terms  of 
under-
outcomes 
employment 
represented 
the 
groups. 
employment  rate  increased  for  the  EU,  but 
growth was slower and uneven across Member 
States, with declines observed in five average 
to  well-performing  countries.  Some  of  the 
countries  with  below-average  performance 
also  fell  further  behind,  leading  to  some 
divergence  in  employment  outcomes.  This  is 
evidenced by eight ‘critical’ (red) or ‘to watch’ 
(orange)  situations  identified  across  Member 
States (based on the agreed JER methodology). 
Unemployment  and  its  long-term  component 
showed  slight  improvements  on  average,  as 
well as a convergence trend driven by gains in 
the worst-performing  countries.  Nevertheless, 
unemployment  increased  in  twelve  Member 
States  in  2023,  and  a  total  of  eight  are  ‘to 
watch’.  Despite  improvements,  labour  market 
outcomes for persons with disabilities, women 
and young people continued to lag behind. Six 
Member States face ‘critical situations’ for the 
disability  employment  gap  and  five  for  the 
gender  employment  gap,  respectively,  while 
another three and one countries, respectively, 
are  in  ‘to  watch’  situations,  with  little  to  no 
apparent 
both 
indicators.  The  share  of  young  people  (aged 
15-29) neither in employment nor in education 
and  training  improved,  while  remaining  high, 
with  limited  convergence  in  2023  as  best 
performers  worsened  marginally  while  worst 
performers made modest progress. 

convergence 

regarding 

related 

indicators  of 

•  Despite slight improvements at EU level, 
risks  to  upward  convergence  persist 
regarding  skills,  which  may  exacerbate 
to  employability, 
challenges 
labour productivity,  competitiveness  and 
labour and skills shortages unless policy 
efforts  are  considerably  intensified.  The 
the  Social 
four  headline 
Scoreboard  related  to  skills  (participation  of 
children  aged  less  than  three  in  formal 
childcare;  early  leavers  from  education  and 
learning; 
training;  adult  participation 
individuals  with  at  least  basic  digital  skills) 
recorded  modest overall improvements at EU 
level. 
disparities 
remained  between  Member  States.  The  gap 
between  the  best  and  worst  performing 
countries on adult learning and on digital skills 
exceeded  55 pps, 
instance,  while 
participation in early childhood education and 
care  saw  a  gap  greater 
than  70 pps. 
Furthermore,  there  have  been  no  signs  of 
convergence,  with  well-performing  countries 
improving  faster  and  worse-performing  ones 
falling further behind. These developments are 

substantial 

However, 

for 

in 

reflected  in  the  large  number  of  countries 
facing ‘critical’ and ‘to watch’ situations (9-10) 
for each of the aforementioned four indicators. 
This  underscores  the  scale  of  the  challenge 
faced  by  the  Member  States,  from  early 
education  to  life-long  learning  and  adapting 
the  workforce  to  the  evolving  skills  needs  of 
the  labour  market  in  the  context  of  the  twin 
transition as well as for ensuring productivity, 
competitiveness and inclusive growth. 

facing 

‘critical’  or 

•  While  poverty  decreased  slightly  at  EU 
level  in  2023,  it  remained  above  pre-
COVID  levels,  with  some  poverty-related 
indicators  showing  growing  divergence 
among  Member  States.  Gross  disposable 
household income per capita grew on average 
in  2023,  though  Member  States  mostly 
continued to diverge and ten of them were ‘to 
watch’  or  ‘critical’.  The  impact  of  social 
transfers  (other  than  pensions)  on  poverty 
reduction  declined  slightly  in  2023,  though 
remaining  higher  than  in  2019,  with  nine 
‘to  watch’ 
countries 
situations in this respect. The share of children 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion remained 
broadly stable but, for the overall population, 
the  rate  did  not  yet  return  to  pre-pandemic 
levels.  Moreover,  while  overall  AROPE  rates 
continued  to  converge,  rates  for  children 
continued  to  display  different  developments 
across Member States. Seven and six countries 
face  ‘critical’  or  ‘to  watch’  situations  for  the 
AROPE  rate  and  the  AROPE  rate  for  children, 
respectively.  As 
inequality 
for 
(measured by the income quintile share ratio) 
some  convergence  took  place,  driven  by 
improvements  in  worst-performing  countries. 
Nevertheless,  it  remains  elevated  in  some 
Member  States,  and 
several  average 
performers saw a worsening in 2023, leading 
to  eleven  countries  in  ‘critical’  or  ‘to  watch’ 
situations  under  this  dimension.  Lastly,  the 
housing  cost  overburden  and  self-reported 
unmet  needs  for  medical  care  increased 
slightly,  with  significant  divergence,  and  five 
Member  States  in  ‘critical’  or  ‘to  watch’ 
situations for both. 

income 

The  first-stage  country  analysis  identifies  ten 
Member  States  as  requiring  a  deeper  second-
stage analysis in light of the challenges indicated 
by  the  Social  Scoreboard  headline  indicators, 
signalling  potential  risks  to  upward  social 
convergence. These risks, highlighted in Chapter 3 of 
this report, are assessed using the SCF methodology as 
outlined in the related EMCO-SPC Key Messages and the 
underlying Working Group report (see the Box at the end 
of  this  section).  The  Member  States  concerned  are 
Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Spain,  Italy,  Lithuania,  Hungary, 
Romania, Greece, Croatia and Luxemburg. Of these, the 
former seven Member States were in the second-stage 
also in the previous year, while the latter three are in it 

28 

1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

for  the  first  time  this  year64  (see  Chapter  3  for  the 
underlying analysis). For all of these countries, potential 
risks  to  upward  social  convergence  were  identified  in 
relation to challenging situations in a large number of 
policy areas, while for Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania 
and Luxemburg also deteriorations over time played a 
key  role  for  a  smaller  number  of  policy  areas.  The 
indicators  signalling  potential  risks  to  upward  social 
convergence for most of the aforementioned countries 
include the share of young NEETs, the income quintile  

share ratio, the overall AROPE rate, the AROPE rate for 
children and the disability employment gap, followed by 
adult  participation  in  training,  the  share  of  the 
population  with  at  least  basic  digital  skills  and  the 
impact  of  social  transfers  (other  than  pensions)  on 
poverty  reduction.  For  these  ten  Member  States,  a 
deeper second-stage analysis will be conducted by the 
Commission services. 

64 

For Greece, this is due to some deteriorations or broad stability 
at levels that are still far from the EU average in the social 
domain (housing cost overburden; self-reported unmet needs 
for medical care; AROPE – overall and for children; impact of 
social transfers on poverty reduction; income inequalities); 
persisting labour market challenges for women and the youth; 
and a low and deteriorating participation of adults in learning. 
For Croatia, the identification for the second-stage analysis 
relates to the area of skills (low and deteriorating adult 
learning participation; significant deterioration in the share of 
adults with at least basic digital skills); an overall employment 
rate that remains lower than the EU average, despite 
improvements, and a still difficult employment situation of 
persons with disabilities; as well as some challenges in the 

social domain (impact of social transfers on poverty reduction; 
income inequalities). For Luxembourg, the identification for the 
second-stage analysis relates to the recent significant 
worsening in some social indicators (AROPE - overall and for 
children; impact of social transfers on poverty reduction) as 
well as a persistently high housing cost overburden rate; the 
recently deteriorating labour market trends (unemployment and 
long-term unemployment rates; disability employment gap), as 
well as the decrease in the share of adults with at least basic 
digital skills, even if the statistics remains well above the EU 
average. A more detailed analysis is presented in Chapter 3 of 
the report for each of the 27 Member States. 

29 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Table 1.4.1: Social Scoreboard: overview of challenges across Member States by headline indicator 

s
e
i
t
i
n
u
t
r
o
p
p
o

l
a
u
q
E

s
n
o
i
t
i
d
n
o
c

g
n
i
k
r
o
w
r
i
a
F

n
o
i
s
u
l
c
n

i

d
n
a

n
o
i
t
c
e
t
o
r
p

l
a
i
c
o
S

Adult participation in learning 
(during the last 12 months, excl. 
guided on the job training, % of 
the population aged 25-64) 
Early leavers from education 
and training 
(% of population aged 18-24) 
Share of individuals who have 
basic or above basic overall 
digital skills 
(% of population aged 16-74) 
Youth NEET rate  
(% of total population aged 
15-29) 

Best 
performers 

Better than 
average 

Good but 
to monitor 

On average 

Weak but 
improving 

To watch 

Critical 
situations 

2022 

DE, HU, NL, 
SE 

DK, EE, IE, FR, LU, 
MT, AT, SK, FI 

BE, ES, LV, PT 

RO 

HR, IT, CY, 
LT, SI 

BG, CZ, EL, 
PL 

2023 

EL, HR, IE, 
PL 

BE, BG, CZ, EE, LU, 
NL, SE, SK 

LT, SI 

AT, FR, LV 

IT 

2023  FI, IE, NL 

AT, BE, CZ, DK, EE, 
ES, HU, SE 

2023  NL, SE 

DE, DK, IE, MT, PL, 
PT, SI 

DE, EL, FR, LT, 
MT, PT 

AT, BE, CZ, EE, 
FI, HR, HU, LV, 
SK 
AT, BE, BG, DE, 
ES, HU, LU, NL, 
SI, SK 

LU 

LT 

Gender employment gap  
(percentage points) 

2023  EE, FI, LV 

CY, DK, FR, HR, IE, 
PT, SE 

Income quintile ratio (S80/S20)  2023 BE, CZ, FI, SI  DK, IE, NL, PL 

SK 

AT, CY, DE, FR, 
LU 

BG, IT 

Employment rate  
(% of population aged 20-64) 

2023 

CZ, EE, NL, 
SE 

CY, DE, HU, MT, PL 

DK 

BG, IE, LU, LV, 
PT, SK 

EL, ES, IT 

Unemployment rate  
(% of labour force aged 15-74) 

2023 

CZ, DE, MT, 
PL 

BG, CY, HR, HU, IE, 
NL, SI 

AT, BE, LV, PT, 
RO, SK 

EL, ES 

CY, DK, FI, 
MT, PT 

DE, ES, HU, 
RO 

CY, HR, IT, 
LU, LV, SI, 
SK 

BG, PL, RO 

IT 

BG, ES, FR, 
LT 

CY, EL, RO 

PL 

CZ, EL, IT, 
MT, RO 

LT, LV, RO 

BE, HR, RO 

EE, EL, ES, 
HR, HU, MT, 
PT, SE 

AT, FI, FR, 
LT, SI 

DK, EE, FI, 
FR, IT, LT, 
LU, SE 

Long-term unemployment rate  
(% labour force aged 15-74) 

2023  DK, NL 

AT, DE, EE, IE, MT, 
PL 

CZ 

GDHI per capita growth  
(2008=100) 

2023 

HU, LT, MT, 
PL, RO 

HR 

At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate  
(% of total population) 

At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate for children  
(% of population aged 0-17) 

2023 CZ, FI, NL, SI  AT, CY, DK, IT, PL 

SK 

2023 

CZ, DK, FI, 
NL, SI 

BE, CY, EE, HR, PL 

BE, BG, CY, FI, 
FR, HR, LT, LV, 
PT, RO, SE, SI 

EL, ES 

HU, LU 

IT, SK 

CY, DE, DK, IE, 
LU, LV, PT, SI 

EL, ES 

BE, DE, FR, HR, 
IE, MT, PT, SE 

BG, RO 

BE, CZ, EE, 
FI, FR, NL, 
SE, SK 

EE, HU, LT, 
LU 

AT, IT 

EL, ES, LV 

AT, DE, IE, LT, 
LV, MT, PT, SE, 
SK 

IT, RO 

EL, FR, HU, 
LU 

BG, ES 

Impact of social transfers (other 
than pensions) on poverty 
reduction (% reduction of AROP) 

2023 BE, DK, FI, IE 

AT, CZ, DE, FR, IT, 
NL, SK 

CY, HU, LT, PL, 
SE, SI 

BG 

EE, LU, LV, 
MT 

EL, ES, HR, 
PT, RO 

Disability employment gap 
(percentage points) 

2023 ES, IT, PT, SI  EE, FI, FR, LV, MT 

Housing cost overburden (% of 
total population) 

2023 

CY 

AT, BG, FI, HR, IE, 
IT, LT, PL, PT, SI 

2023 

FR, LU, NL, 
SE 

BE, CY, ES, MT, PT, 
SI 

AT, CY, CZ, DE, 
EL, NL, SE, SK 
BE, CZ, EE, ES, 
FR, HU, LV, NL, 
RO, SE 

HU, LU, RO 

BE, BG, HR, 
IE, LT, PL 

DE, MT  DK, EL, LU 

EE, EL, FI, HR, IT, 
LV 

HU 

AT, BG, DE, 
IE, LT 

CZ, PL, RO, 
SK 

SK 

DK 

2023 

AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, 
DE, HR, HU, LU, 
MT, NL 

DK, ES, FR, IE, IT, 
LT, PL, PT, SE, SI, 
SK 

RO 

EE, EL, FI, 
LV 

Note:  Update of November 2024. The penultimate value for the indicator on adult participation in learning refers to 2016 and the categorisation 

relies on the change from that to 2022. As data for the indicator on the share of individuals who have at least basic overall digital skills 
are collected every other year, the categorisation relies on the change from 2021 to 2023. GDHI per capita growth data are not available 
for Bulgaria. Breaks in series and other flags are reported in Annexes 3 and 4.  

30 

Children aged less than 3 years 
in formal childcare (% of 
population under 3-years-old) 
Self-reported unmet need for 
medical care (% of population 
16+) 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Overview of labour market and social trends, progress on 2030 targets, and key horizontal findings on social convergence 

Figure 1.4.1:  Overview of employment, skills and social trends and challenges by Social Scoreboard 
headline indicators 

The EU average, trends and distribution of Member States with a specific JER categorisation among all for each headline indicator, also ag-
gregated for the three Pillar chapters 

31 

YearEQUAL OPPPORTUNITIESSOCIAL PROTECTION AND INCLUSIONAdult participation in learning202239.5Early leavers from education and training20239.52023Employment rateIncome quintile ratio (S80/S20)20232023Long-term unemployment rate2023Unemployment rateShare of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills2023Youth NEET rate2023Gender employment gap2023EU average                  value           trend2.155.611.210.275.34.72At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate202321.3Notes: Data is missing for some countries in some indicators - see Note for Table 1.4.1.37.5Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reductionDisability employment gap202321.5202334.720236.1Headline indicatorFAIR WORKING CONDITIONSSelf-reported unmet need for medical care20232.4111.12023GDHI per capita growthHousing cost overburden20238.8Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcareAt risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children202324.8Critical situationsTo watchWeak but improvingOn averageGood but to monitorBetter than averageBest performers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Methodological  approach  for  identifying  potential  risks  to  upward  social  
convergence in the first-stage country analysis on social convergence 

The  analysis  relies  on  existing  tools  that  have  been  developed  with  the Member  States  over  the 
recent years, based in particular on the Social Scoreboard and the so-called JER (traffic-light) meth-
odology65. The first-stage country analysis is based on the full set of Social Scoreboard headline indicators. 
Each of the indicators is scrutinised based on the JER methodology, which determines the relative standing of 
Member States, expressed in terms of  standard deviations from the mean of both the absolute level of the 
indicator values and its change compared to the year before (see Annex 4 for technical details). Results are 
summarised into one of seven possible categories for each indicator for the country in question (‘best performer’, 
‘better than average’, ‘good but to monitor’, ‘on average’,  ‘weak but improving’, ‘to watch’, ‘critical situation’). 
This corresponds with the scale of colours, from green to red. 

Each of the Social Scoreboard headline indicators is assessed to identify whether they lead to po-
tential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence,  and  hence  if  further  analysis  is  needed  in  a  second 
stage.79 The qualification ‘critical situation’ refers to Member States which score much worse than the EU av-
erage on a specific indicator and in which the situation is deteriorating or not improving sufficiently compared 
to the year before. A situation is marked as ‘to watch’ in two cases: a) when the Member State scores worse 
than the EU average on a specific indicator and the situation in the country is deteriorating or not improving 
sufficiently fast, and b) when the score in terms of levels is in line with the  EU average but the situation is 
deteriorating much faster than the EU average. Further analysis in a second stage is considered warranted for 
Member States for which six or more Social Scoreboard headline indicators are flagging red (‘critical situation’) 
or orange (‘to watch’) in the latest JER edition. An additional reason for considering that the situation requires 
further analysis occurs when an indicator flagging red or orange (as explained before) also presents two  con-
secutive deteriorations in its JER categorisation. An example of this is a change from ‘on average’ to ‘weak but 
improving’ in the  2024 JER  edition, followed  by a further deterioration to ‘critical situation’ in the 2025 JER 
edition. This would be counted as an additional ‘flag’ towards the minimum threshold of six flags overall. For 
example, if in the 2025 JER edition a country has 5 headline indicators of the Social Scoreboard flagged as red 
or orange, and one of them presents two consecutive deteriorations in the 2024 and 2025 JER editions, the 
country is considered as having overall 6 flags in the 2025 JER edition (5 red/orange signals from the indicators 
in the 2025 edition + 1 of them with two consecutive deteriorations). As a result, it would require further analysis 
in a second stage as well. Any break in series and issues in relation to data quality and interpretation are con-
sidered in the evaluation of the total number of flags towards the threshold. 

The Social Scoreboard headline indicators and their evaluation rely on the most recent data that 
are available at the data cutoff date66. When relevant data for assessing the JER categorisation is missing 
for a given country, the corresponding JER categorisation from the previous JER edition (if available) is used to 
fill the missing information. If the indicator has missing values for the latest JER edition and the preceding one, 
the JER categorisations are not counted towards the indicative threshold of 6 flags for the second-stage anal-
ysis. 

65 

See EMCO-SPC Key Messages, based on the Report of the 
EMCO-SPC Working Group on the introduction of a Social Con-
vergence Framework in the European Semester. 

66 

The data cutoff date is 4 November 2024 for the 2025 JER. 

32 

 
. 

CHAPTER 2 

Employment and social re-
forms – Member States’ 
performance and action 

2.1. GUIDELINE 5 - BOOSTING THE DE-
MAND FOR LABOUR 

This section looks at the implementation of the employ-
ment  guideline  no.  5,  which  recommends  Member 
States to provide the conditions that promote labour de-
mand  and  job  creation,  in  line  with  Pillar  principles  4 
(active support to employment) and 6 (wages). Section 
2.1.1 focuses on key labour market developments, also 
reflecting the impact of high inflation and cost of living. 
Section 2.1.2 reports on the measures implemented by 
the Member States in these areas, with a special em-
phasis on policies aimed at increasing employment and 
supporting job creation in a context of labour and skills 
shortages. 

2.1.1.  Key indicators 

The  EU  labour  market  remained  strong  in  2023, 
with  moderating  but  still  robust  employment 
growth  despite  the  recent  economic  slowdown. 
Over two and a half million additional workers were em-
ployed compared to 2022,  bringing the total to 217.5 
million.  The  employment  rate  (20-64  age  group) 
reached  75.3%  in  2023  (up  by  0.7  pps  compared  to 
2022), and a record high of 76.0% in Q2-2024, with the 
EU headline target of at least 78.0% in employment by 
2030 within reach67. Overall, employment growth decel-
erated  (from  2.0%  in  2022  to  1.2%  in  2023)  but  re-
mained  robust,  withstanding  weak  economic  activity. 
The employment rate increased in most Member States, 
and particularly strongly in Cyprus,  Malta, Italy, Spain, 
Poland  and  Greece  (Figure  2.1.1).  Decreases  were,  on 
the contrary, recorded in Austria, Finland, Denmark, Slo-
venia and Lithuania. Romania, Belgium, and Croatia are 
in ‘critical situations’, with employment rates remaining 

67 

68 

See European Commission, Porto Declaration and targets, 
2021. 
See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

at  relatively  low  levels  (below  72.5%)  and  increases 
compared to last year that are particularly low for the 
first two. France, Austria, Finland, Slovenia and Lithua-
nia are ‘to  watch’, following  either below-average im-
provements  from  relatively  low  levels  (for  France)  or 
declines from above-average levels (for the other four 
countries). On the other hand, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Estonia, and Czechia are ‘best performers’, with employ-
ment  rates  exceeding  80%.  Overall, a  convergence  of 
employment  rates  across  Member  States  can  be  ob-
served.  Nevertheless,  significant  regional  disparities 
persist in many Member States (see Figure 5 in Annex 
5), including outermost regions. 

Employment growth was supported by an expand-
ing labour force and was stronger in sectors ex-
periencing relatively high labour shortages. After 
the COVID-19 pandemic, since 2020, employment has 
increased by 9 million people thanks to a simultaneous 
labour force expansion of 6.9 million and a reduction in 
unemployment of 2.1 million. In 2023, job creation was 
concentrated in sectors such as trade, transport, accom-
modation and food services68. Employment growth was 
overall higher in sectors facing significant labour short-
ages. This can be attributed to both growing labour sup-
ply  and  a  shift  in  job  allocation  towards  these  high-
demand sectors. Additionally, the persistence of labour 
shortages  in  sectors  with  strong  employment  growth 
suggests  continued  potential  for  job  creation.  Labour 
demand remained resilient to the economic slowdown, 
contributing to sustained labour market tightness. The 
vacancy rate decreased from 2.9% in Q1-2023 to 2.4% 
in  Q2-2024  (seasonally  adjusted  data),  which  is  still 
well above the pre-pandemic average of 1.7% recorded 
between 2013 and 201969. 

69 

Eurostat [jvs_q_nace2]. The job vacancy rate is the total num-
ber of job vacancies (i.e., paid posts that are newly created, un-
occupied, or about to become vacant) as a percentage of the 
occupied and vacant posts. 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.1.1: The employment rate increased in most Member States in 2023 though at a slower pace 
Employment rate (age 20-64), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note:  Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Definition differs for ES and FR. Break in the 

series for CY and DK.  
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], EU LFS. 

In  the  majority  of  Member  States,  both  employ-
ment and total hours worked grew, showcasing a 
robust EU labour market. Employment now exceeds 
pre-COVID-19  levels  in  all  Member  States  except  for 
Latvia, Romania and Slovakia. Total hours worked rose 
by 0.9% in 2023 and in Q2-2024 were higher than pre-
pandemic levels in most Member States expect for Bul-
garia, Czechia, Germany,  Latvia, Austria, and Slovakia. 
In  2023,  the  increase  in  employment  outpaced  the 
growth of total hours worked, resulting in a decline of 
0.2% in the average number of hours worked per em-
ployee. The average hours worked per employee in the 
EU  remain  below  pre-COVID-19  levels.  The  slower 
growth in total hours worked relative to employment re-
flects a long-term downward trend of decreasing aver-
age hours per worker. This may be partly due to stronger 
employment growth in services and other sectors where 
workers typically work fewer hours70 but also to chang-
ing preferences of workers.  

Short-time  work  schemes  have  proven  to  be  an 
effective  policy  tool  for  mitigating  temporary 
economic shocks. During the COVID-19 crisis, well-de-
signed  short-time  work  and  similar  job  retention 
schemes successfully protected jobs and incomes in the 
EU.  Their  widespread  use  was  facilitated  by  the 

availability of funding through the European instrument 
for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks 
in an Emergency (SURE). According to empirical analysis 
by  Eurofound,  job  retention  schemes  preserved  24.8 
million jobs in 2020 and 2.1 million in 2021, which is 
the equivalent of 13.3% and 1.1% of total employment, 
respectively71. The number of jobs saved was particu-
larly large in France, Italy and Germany, where the use 
of  job  retention  schemes  during  the  first  year  of  the 
pandemic  is  estimated  to  have  preserved  6.6  million 
jobs (25.0% of total employment), 4.7 million (21.8%) 
and 4.7 million (12.2%), respectively. In relative terms, 
job retention schemes contributed to saving a substan-
tial number of jobs also in many countries with smaller 
labour markets (for example, more than 14.5% of jobs 
in 2020 in Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and the 
Netherlands). 

Self-employment has been on a declining trend in 
the EU, with some variation across countries and 
sectors.  The  share  of  self-employed  workers  in  total 
employment fell from 14.8% in 2010 to 13.3% in 2023. 
During this period, the largest reductions were seen in 
agriculture  and  commerce,  while  significant  increases 
occurred in the public and near-public sectors (including 
public  administration,  education  and  health)  and  ICT. 

70 

See European Commission, Labour market and wage develop-
ments in Europe 2023, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2023. 

71 

Eurofound, Weathering the crisis: How job retention schemes 
preserved employment and incomes during the pandemic, Pub-
lications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

34 

DKCZEENLSECYDEHUMTPLATFIFRLTSIBEHRROBGIELULVPTSKELESITy = -0.0243x + 2.3792R² = 0.0414-0.8-0.30.20.71.21.76567697173757779818385Employment rate (% of population aged 20-64) -changeEmployment rate (% of population aged 20-64)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
The skills profile of the self-employed also shifted, with 
39% of them having tertiary education in 2023, com-
pared to only 28.0% in 2010. At-risk-of-poverty rates 
among the self-employed (18 to 64 years) are higher 
than those of employees (22.1% vs 9.6%). In 2023, the 
share  of  self-employed  workers  varied  significantly 
across Member States, approaching or exceeding 20% 
in Italy and Greece and remaining below 8% in Germany 
and  Denmark  (see  also  section  2.3.1).  Own-account 
workers made up the largest portion of self-employed 
in  the  EU  (approximately  70%)  and  in  most  Member 
States. Between 2013 and 2023, the share of own-ac-
count workers in total employment declined from 10.3% 
to 9.0%, as fewer younger people entered self-employ-
ment, not compensating for older workers that left it. 

Medium-term  challenges  related  to  low  produc-
tivity  growth  in  the  EU  persist.  While  productivity 
growth averaged around 1.4% annually before 2007, it 
dropped to 0.8% between 2010 and 2019 and further 
declined to 0.7% in 202372. Despite forecasts predicting 
slight 
improvements,  productivity  growth  remains 
structurally low, undermining the EU’s global competi-
tiveness.  Employment  growth  now  drives  GDP  growth 
more than productivity in most Member States, except 
Denmark, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. Per-
sistently low labour productivity, worsened by an ageing 
competitiveness,  economic 
population, 
growth,  job  creation,  and  living  standards.  Mario 
Draghi’s report on The Future of European Competitive-
ness  highlights  significant  gaps  in  the  EU’s  high-tech 
specialisation,  innovation,  and  investment,  particularly 
when compared to the United States73. Weak Total Fac-
tor Productivity growth has been the main factor behind 
the  disappointing  labour  productivity  growth  and  is 
linked to  notably a decline in technological innovation 
and adoption, insufficient reallocation of capital and la-
bour across firms, the ageing workforce that reduces  

threatens 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

risk-taking,  and  weaker  human  capital  accumulation 
also play a role. Labour and skills shortages delay tech-
nology adoption, increase costs, and reduce further la-
bour  demand.  In  the  short  term,  shortages  can  force 
firms  to  retain  workers,  hindering  labour  reallocation, 
and compel employees to work longer hours, potentially 
lowering  productivity  and  worsening  job  mismatches, 
leading to higher structural unemployment. As empha-
sized in Draghi’s report, adapting education and training 
systems  to  evolving  skills  needs,  particularly  for  the 
twin transition, and prioritizing adult learning and voca-
tional education and training are essential for boosting 
competitiveness. Reducing administrative barriers, fos-
tering  innovation,  and  supporting  effective  collective 
bargaining can help ensure productivity gains, and sus-
tain wage growth and competitiveness.  

Labour  and  skills  shortages  remain  significant 
and widespread in the EU, but are declining from 
their  peaks.  Over  the  past  decade,  labour  and  skills 
shortages  have  increased  across  all  Member  States. 
With the recent economic downturn, the share of man-
agers indicating a shortage of labour force as a limiting 
factor to production slightly decreased (18.0% in Octo-
ber 2024 vs 22.4% in October 2023 and 25.9% in Oc-
tober  2022),  but  remains  relatively  high74.  Shortages 
were prevalent in STEM sectors (notably ICT), construc-
tion, healthcare and long-term care, transport, tourism 
and other sectors that are relevant for the  green and 
digital  transitions.  According  to  the  2023  EURES  re-
port75, the most acute shortages were seen in occupa-
tions such as heavy truck drivers, nursing professionals 
(including  specialists),  doctors,  electricians,  roofers, 
waiters and construction workers. Pillar box 1 provides 
a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the  important  challenges 
faced in this respect. 

Pillar Box 1:  Tackling labour and skills shortages in the EU  

Addressing labour and skills shortages is crucial to boost the EU’s competitiveness, innovation ca-
pacity  and  inclusive and  sustainable  growth. For almost a decade, labour and  skills shortages have in-
creased  in  all  Member  States  and  are  expected  to  continue  rising  in  the  context  of  the  digital  and  green 
transformation. Labour shortages did not significantly recede even in the face of the recent economic slowdown. 
These shortages are driven by demographic change, the demand for new skills linked to technological develop-
ments and the twin transition, as well as poor working conditions in certain sectors. They are reported by com-
panies  of  all  sizes  and  sectors,  and  are  particularly  persistent  in  healthcare,  STEM  fields  (notably  ICT), 
construction, transport, and certain service-based occupations (e.g. cooks and waiters)76. While labour shortages 
can indicate a strong economy, empowering workers to negotiate better wages and working conditions, they can 
at the same time hinder productivity and innovative capacity, weaken the EU’s competitiveness, pose bottlenecks 
to growth, and hamper progress on the green and digital transitions. Implementing the European Pillar of Social 
Rights, notably on education, training, and lifelong learning (principle 1), active support to employment (principle 
4), and secure and adaptable employment (principle 5) will also contribute to tackling labour and skills shortages. 

72 

European Commission, Labour market and wage developments 
in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2024. 

75 

76 

73  Draghi, M. (2024a), Draghi, M. (2024b). 
74 

European Commission, Business and consumer survey.  

European Labour Authority, Labour shortages and surpluses in 
Europe 2023, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.  
Eurofound, European Company Survey 2019, and European 
Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2023: Addressing labour shortages and skills gaps in the EU, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Labour shortages  vary  substantially  across  Member  States,  and  they  are  not  equally  distributed 
across sectors and occupations. In Q2-2024, the job vacancy rate (seasonally adjusted) was the highest in 
Belgium (4.4%), the Netherlands (4.3%), Austria (at 4.0%), Czechia (3.4%), Germany (3.2%), and Malta (3.0%). 
Conversely, Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, and Poland had the lowest rates (all below 1%) – see Figure below. Labour 
shortages  in  the  manufacturing  sector  are  particularly  high  and  continued  to  grow  over  2022  and  2023  in 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria. In the construction sector, Slovenia, Greece, and Croatia have the greatest prob-
lems recruiting workers, while in services, labour shortages are most acute in Malta, the Netherlands and Ger-
many.  Recently,  the  Commission  identified  42  occupations  considered  as  EU-wide  shortage  occupations77. 
Sector-specific shortages include administrative and support service activities, accommodation and food ser-
vices, ICT, and construction. Moreover, in surveys firms increasingly report that they cannot find the specific skills 
needed to fill their vacancies78 79. 

Labour shortages are still higher in most Member States than in 2019 

Job vacancy rate, Q4-2019 vs Q2-2024 

Note: NACE 2 activities, B-S (Industry, construction, and services). 
Source: Eurostat [ei_lmjv_q_r2], seasonally adjusted, not calendar adjusted data. 

Concerted and reinforced action at the EU, Member States’ and regional level, also involving social 
partners and other relevant stakeholders, is key to tackle labour and skills shortages. In March 2024, 
the Commission presented an Action Plan to tackle labour and skills shortages, prepared in close cooperation 
with the social partners80. It builds on the numerous initiatives already taken and sets out 87 new actions that 
the EU, the Member States, and social partners will or should take to address labour and skills shortages. These 
measures fall within five policy domains: (i) activation of under-represented people in the labour market, (ii) 
support for skills, training, and education, (iii) improving working conditions, (iv) enhancing fair intra-EU mobility 
and (v) attracting talent from outside the EU. The Commission is making good progress in the implementation 
of its commitments. On the basis of the updates received, out of the 30 new commitments that were taken by 
the Commission in the Action Plan, 6 have been fully implemented (20%), and 22 are ongoing (73%). Similarly, 
social partners have committed to a total of 34 actions and based on the information collected by the Commis-
sion, the implementation of one third of these commitments (11 actions, 32% of their total commitments) is 
underway. The Commission will continue monitoring progress in implementing this action plan in the framework 
of the European Semester. In addition, the Commission will invite Member States in the Employment Committee 
(EMCO) and the Social Protection Committee (SPC) to have tripartite exchanges on this issue, with the participa-
tion of the European and national social partners. Implementing this action plan is also key for achieving the EU 
headline and national targets on employment and skills by 203081. 

77 

78 

Communication: Action Plan on labour and skills shortages in 
the EU (2024) - Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion - Euro-
pean Commission. 
European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer FL529: European 
Year of Skills - Skills shortages, recruitment and retention 
strategies in small and medium-sized enterprises, 2023. 

79 
80 

81 

EIB, EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS) 2023.   
Communication: Action Plan on labour and skills shortages in 
the EU (2024) - Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion - Euro-
pean Commission. 
See European Commission, Porto Declaration and targets, 
2021. 

36 

01234567BENLATCZDEMTCYFRLVEU27SIELHUSEITLTFIHREELUPTSKIEESPLBGRODKQ2-2024Q4-2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Several Member States have adopted measures to tackle labour and skills shortages, including by 
attracting third-country nationals. In March 2024, the Skilled Workers Immigration Act entered into force in 
Germany, revising and expanding regulations for tertiary-educated skilled workers, and relying on the expanded 
list of occupations facing labour shortages (see Section 2.2.2). In December 2023, France reformed its Public 
Employment Service (now called ‘France Travail’) to enhance support for jobseekers and better address short-
ages (see Section 2.3.2). In 2023, Austria implemented an ‘Action Plan against the shortage of skilled workers’, 
allocating EUR 75 million to active labour market policies for 2024 and 2025. The Plan also includes actions 
supporting the labour market integration of asylum seekers and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. In Febru-
ary 2024, Slovenia adopted provisions to determine supplement payment/ bonuses for extra workload in certain 
shortage  occupations  in  the  health  sector  (i.e.,  family  medicine).  Malta  extended  the  ‘Skills  Development 
Scheme’ in December 2023 to promote skills acquisition by the workforce. In October 2023, Italy updated its 
legislations and scaled-up investments in up- and re-skilling programmes to facilitate access for highly skilled 
professionals to its labour market and better respond to labour and skill shortages, also as part of the RRP. In 
August 2023, Luxembourg amended legislation to simplify the recruitment process for third-country nationals 
and improve talent attraction and retention. 

Figure 2.1.2: The unemployment rate decreased in almost half of the Member States in 2023 
Unemployment rate (age 15-74), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note:   Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Definition differs for ES and FR. Break in the 

series for CY and DK.  
Source: Eurostat [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

The EU unemployment rate reached record lows in 
2023 and early 2024 despite the economic slow-
down. The average unemployment rate in the EU (15-
74 age group) decreased to 6.1% (from 6.2% in 2022), 
marking  the  lowest  level  on  record  (Figure  2.1.2). 
Greece, Cyprus and Spain saw the largest decreases, by 
1.4 pps,  1.0 pps  and  0.8 pps,  respectively.  Conversely, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Luxembourg and Hungary 
recorded increases at or above 0.5 pps. The situation in 
Italy, France, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Denmark, Es-
tonia and Luxembourg is ‘to watch’, either because of 

37 

relatively  high  unemployment  or  below-average  im-
provements.  While  Spain  and  Greece  have  by  far  the 
highest unemployment rates, at 12.2% and 11.1%, re-
spectively, they are in a ‘weak but improving’ situation, 
as both countries experienced declines well above the 
EU  average.  Czechia,  Poland,  Germany  and  Malta  are 
‘best  performers’,  with  unemployment  rates  between 
2.6%  and  3.1%.  By  September  2024,  the  EU  average 
unemployment  rate  decreased  further  to  5.9%.  High, 

CZDEMTPLBGCYHRHUIENLSIDKEEFIFRITLTLUSEATBELVPTROSKELESy = -0.0989x + 0.5479R² = 0.1705-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.02468101214Unemployment rate (% of active population aged 15-74) -changeUnemployment rate (% of active population aged 15-74)2023 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

albeit decreasing82, labour shortages have led firms to 
retain  employees  despite  weaker  demand  for  their 
products and services, helping maintain the unemploy-
ment rate low83. Additionally, labour and skills shortages 
may  have  contributed  to  the  low  transition  rate  from 
employment to unemployment. Unemployment rate dif-
ferences between EU countries have decreased steadily 
after peaking in 2013 and are nearly as low as before 
the  2008-09  financial  crisis.  However,  significant  re-
gional disparities persist in many countries (see Figure 
6 in Annex 5), including outermost regions. 

The  green  transition  is  reshaping  the  economy, 
leading to demand for new tasks and skills in ex-
isting sectors, labour reallocation across sectors, 
and new jobs in the ’green economy’ that can re-
sult  in  net  job  creation  with  appropriate  policy 
support. The transition towards a circular and low-car-
bon economy is generating shifts of workers across sec-
in  energy,  mining,  construction, 
tors,  especially 
manufacturing, transport and waste management. Re-
cent  analysis  shows  that,  on  average,  1.8  to  3.9%  of 
workers in the EU switch sector every year. This figure 
has remained stable over time, with a slight increase in 
some countries, around the level of 201684. At the same 
time, the share of workers in the green economy grew 
from  2.2%  in  2015  to  2.5%  in  2021  in  the  EU,  with 
marked differences across Member States (from 0.9% 
in Hungary and 1.4% in Malta to 4.9% in Estonia and 
5.4%  in  Luxembourg  in  2021)85.  Alternative  measure-
ments suggest that the green economy could be larger, 
potentially  representing  up  to  11.3%  of  the  EU  work-
force (vs 10.8% in 2015) 86. Meanwhile, emission-inten-
sive sectors87 continue to employ a significant share of 
workers (3.5% in the EU in 2023), with differences rang-
ing from 0.8% in Cyprus and 0.9% in Ireland to 7.4% in 
Czechia. Evidence suggests that, in addition to address-
ing labour shortages in professions essential to a net-
zero  economy  and  ensuring  a  fair  transition,  well-de-
signed policies supporting workers in the changing na-
ture  of  their job or their transitions  to  new  sectors  or 
jobs – especially those most affected by the shift to cli-
mate neutrality – can lead to net job creation in the Un-
ion88. 

82 

83 

84 

85 
86 

87 

See European Commission: Autumn 2024 Economic Forecas - A 
gradual rebound in an adverse environment. 
See European Commission, Labour market and wage develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 
Fulvimari A. et al., Estimating labour market transition costs 
and social investment needs of the green transition – a new 
approach, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024 
(forthcoming). 
Based on Eurostat [env_ac_egss1] and [nama_10_a10_e]. 
Based on calculations of the Joint Research Centre done under 
the GreenJobs project, following the operationalisation of the 
ONET task-based approach proposed by Gili, Verdolini and Vona 
(2020) to measure green jobs employment in the EU. 
Emission-intensive industries include mining and quarrying, 
manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, manufacture 
of other non-metallic mineral products, manufacture of basic 
metals, and manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers. 

The digital transformation is supporting job crea-
tion in certain sectors. The number of ICT specialists 
in  the  EU  has  been  steadily  rising  since  2013  (by 
59.3%), reaching over 9.5 million in 2023. By 2030, at 
the  current  pace,  the  number  of  ICT  specialists  will 
reach just 12 million, well below the 20 million target 
and amid  growing competition for  digitally skilled tal-
ent89.  Women  remain  nonetheless  significantly  under-
represented,  with  only  19%  of  ICT  specialists  being 
women in 2023. In addition, technological advances in 
areas like Artificial Intelligence (AI), data analytics, vir-
tual  worlds,  cybersecurity,  quantum,  cloud  and  edge 
computing are further transforming economies and la-
bour markets. This will make digital  skills increasingly 
essential, while currently 4 in 10 adults and one-third 
of workers in Europe lack even basic digital skills (see 
section 2.2.1). The biggest shortages are reported in ar-
eas like digital content creation and computer program-
ming,  particularly  in  Latvia,  Denmark,  Poland  and 
Spain90. 

Wage growth in the EU remained robust in 2023 
but  varied  significantly  across  Member  States. 
Annual growth in nominal compensation per employee 
reached  a  record  high  of  6.1%  (year-on-year),  after 
4.9% in 2022, in a context of still high inflation91 and 
tight labour markets. It then decreased to 5.0% in Q2-
2024  as  inflation  eased.  Wage  growth  varied  signifi-
cantly across Member States (Figure 2.1.3). In Q2-2024, 
nominal wage growth (year-on-year) exceeded 11% in 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania, 
and ranged between 6% and 10% in Estonia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Austria and Portugal. It was below 3.2% in Bel-
gium,  Finland,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and 
Malta. 

Negotiated  wages  also  displayed  strong  growth, 
driven by increasing demands to offset losses in 
purchasing power. Negotiated wages in the euro area 
rose  by  3.6%  (year-on-year)  in  Q2-2024,  reflecting  a 
deceleration from the 4.4% to 4.7% growth  rates ob-
served  since  Q1-202392.  Nevertheless,  the  latest  in-
crease 
those 
registered over 2022, ranging between 2.6% and 3.1%. 
Several  labour  disputes  occurred  in  2023,  fuelled  by 

remains  significantly  higher 

than 

88 

89 

European Commission, SWD(2020) 176 final. Projections based 
on EQUEST using a ‘lower taxation low-skilled labour’ scenario, 
2020. 
European Commission, Europe’s Digital Decade: digital targets 
for 2030, 2023. 

90  OECD, Skills for Job 2022, 2022. 
91 

Inflation still stood at 4.9% year-on-year in September 2023, 
before dropping more markedly in the fourth quarter and 
reaching 3.1% in December. 

92  Negotiated wages’ growth represents the direct outcome of the 
wage bargaining between social partners. It includes both 
newly negotiated and previously agreed wages. As a general 
rule, it excludes bonuses, overtime and other individual com-
pensations that are not linked to collective bargaining. Com-
pared with wages paid, negotiated wages are also not sensitive 
to the number of hours worked (as they are set on a full-time 
basis) and represent a wage floor in some sectors. 

38 

 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.1.3:  Wages continued rising in 2023 
amid still high inflation and labour market tight-
ness 

Nominal compensation per employee, annual percentage change 

Figure 2.1.4:  Real wages are rebounding, but did 
not yet recover from losses in previous years 

Real gross wages and salaries per employee, annual percentage 
change 

Note:  EA-20, the 20 countries that have adopted the euro. Nomi-
nal compensation per employee is calculated as the total 
compensation of employees divided by the total number of 
employees. Nominal compensation includes, in addition to 
gross wages, employer contributions. 

Note:  EA refers to EA-20, the 20 countries that have adopted the 
euro. Real wages were computed using the harmonised in-
dex of consumer prices as a deflator. 

Source: Ameco [5000 HWWDW, 5000 ZCPIH] and Eurostat 
[namq_10_gdp, namq_10_a10_e, prc_hicp_midx]. 

Source: AMECO database and Eurostat, National accounts 

[namq_10_gdp], [namq_10_a10_e]. 

concerns that wages were not keeping pace with the in-
creasing cost of living93. 

After  a  substantial  decline  in  2022,  real  wages 
started to grow from Q3-2023, largely driven by 
easing  inflation.  Real  wages  in  the  EU  dropped  by 
3.7% in 2022, and continued their decline in early 2023, 
translating into an annual fall by 0.2%94. However, real 
wage  growth  resumed  from  the  second  half  of  2023 
and  reached  2.4%  (year-on-year)  in  Q2-2024  –  see 

Figure 2.1.4. This rebound was driven by decreasing in-
flation and continued  robust  nominal wage  growth. In 
Q2-2024, real wage growth exceeded 4.0% in Austria, 
Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Portugal, 
Hungary and Romania. By contrast, it was below 1.0% 
in Finland, France and Spain, and declined by 1.4% in 
Luxembourg  and  2.1%  in  Belgium,  following  strong 
gains in 2023 in the latter two. Despite these recent im-
provements, real wages in the EU and in most Member 
States remain below pre-pandemic levels. Real wages 

93 

Eurofound, Labour disputes across Europe in 2023: Ongoing 
struggle for higher wages as cost of living rises, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2024. 

94 

Real wages are calculated using the harmonised index of con-
sumer prices as a deflator. 

39 

-505101520ROHRLVHUBGPLLTSKSIPTEEBELUIECZATNLEU27DEESSEEA19CYFRFIELDKITMT-20020ROAT202220232013-2019 EU27 average2024-Q2-15-10-5051015ROHRLVBEBGLULTPTNLIESIESPLCYELDEEA19DKEU27ATEEFISKFRSEHUITMTCZ-50050ROLTPLEU27SE202220232024-Q2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

are expected to reach 2019 levels in 2025 in the EU and 
in 2026 in the euro area95.  

Statutory minimum wage increases largely offset 
the loss of purchasing power for minimum wage 
earners  in  most  Member  States.  Between  January 
2022  and  January  2024,  statutory  minimum  wages 
grew by more than 7% in nominal terms in all Member 
States where such wages are in place96. They rose by 
more than 40% in Poland, Bulgaria and Latvia, and by 
more than 20% in Croatia, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, 
Ireland, Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands and Roma-
nia97. These increases were primarily the result of the 
routine  annual  updates  in  January  2023  and  January 
2024,  alongside  substantial  adjustments  throughout 
2022  and  2023.  In  real  terms,  statutory  minimum 
wages  increased  by  more  than  10%  in  Belgium,  Bul-
garia,  Croatia,  Germany,  Latvia  and  Poland,  and  be-
tween 5% and 10% in Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, 
the Netherlands and Romania (Figure 2.1.6). In Estonia, 
France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, real 
statutory  minimum  wages  increased  by  less  than  5% 
between January 2022 and January 2024. By contrast, 
real wages fell  by more than 3% in Czechia, Slovakia 
and Slovenia.  

In-work  poverty  declined  slightly  in  the  EU  in 
2023, but still affected one in twelve workers. The 
share  of  employed  people  aged  18  or  over  at  risk  of 
poverty decreased to 8.3% in 2023, down from 8.5% in 
2022  (referring  to  2022  and  2021  incomes,  respec-
tively)98. This share was also lower compared to a dec-
ade earlier and to just before the COVID-19 pandemic 
(9.1% in 2013 and 9% in 2019, referring to 2012 and 
2018  incomes,  respectively).  In  2023,  twelve  Member 
States saw a decline in in-work poverty, despite many 
of  them  facing  high  inflation  and  significant  drops  in 
real wages in 2022. This suggests that, in these coun-
tries,  median  incomes  fell  more  sharply  than  the  in-
comes  of  the  working  poor,  which  were  supported  by 
updates to minimum wages and social transfers99. Italy 
and  Greece  experienced  the  strongest  reductions 
(-1.6 pps  and  -0.7 pps,  respectively,  to  9.9%),  though 
both still exceeded the EU average (8.3%). In contrast, 
in-work poverty increased by 1 pp or more in Luxem-
bourg, Bulgaria, Croatia and Slovakia. Romania, Luxem-
bourg and Bulgaria recorded the highest levels (15.3%, 
14.8%  and  11.4%,  respectively),  while  Spain,  Estonia 
and Portugal had also rates at or above 10%. Early Eu-
rostat  

95 

96 

European Commission, Autumn 2024 Economic Forecast: A 
gradual rebound in an adverse environment, November 2024. 
22 Member States have statutory minimum wages: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain. The 5 Member States that do not have statutory mini-
mum wages are: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden. 
97  Minimum wages are often updated annually, at the beginning 
of the year. Between January 2022 and January 2024, the 

Figure 2.1.5:  Increases in statutory minimum 
wages supported offsetting the purchasing 
power losses of minimum wage earners  

Minimum wages developments in Member States with statutory 
minimum wages, (% change) 

Note: 

 Cyprus was excluded as the statutory minimum wage was 
introduced in 2023. 

Source: Eurofound and Eurostat [earn_mw_cur, prc_hicp_midx]. 

estimates suggest that in-work poverty will remain sta-
ble in 2024 (referring to 2023 incomes)100. As in previ-
ous  years,  in-work  poverty  across  the  EU  was  higher 
among non-EU citizens (22.5%), those born outside the 
EU  (18.5%),  low-educated  workers  (18.4%),  part-time 
employees  (12.6%),  temporary  workers  (12.6%)  and 
households with dependent children (10.0%). 

largest increases were registered in Poland (49%), Bulgaria 
(44%), Latvia (40%), and Croatia (34%). They increased be-
tween 20% and 30% in Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Hungary, the Netherlands and Romania. 
Eurostat [ilc_iw01], EU-SILC, break in series for Croatia. 
See European Commission, Labour market and wage develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

98 
99 

100  Latest developments in income dynamics and poverty - Statis-

tics Explained, June 2024.  

40 

-1001020304050BGPLHRLVDEBEIENLROELLTMTLUPTESHUEEFRSKCZSI-1000100BGDEROLUEESINominal growth (Jan 2022 - Jan 2024)Real growth (Jan 2022 - Jan 2024) 
 
 
 
 
Labour taxation has a significant impact on work 
and  hiring  incentives.  The  tax wedge measures the 
difference  between  employers’  labour  costs  and  em-
ployees’ net pay, expressed as a percentage of the total 
labour costs. A high tax wedge on labour can dampen 
incentives for work and hiring, in particular for specific 
groups, such as second earners, whose labour supply is 
more responsive to such incentives. Since 2013, the tax 
wedge  for  a  single  person  earning  the  average  wage 
has decreased by 2.2 pps in the EU, reaching 40.2% in 
2023 (Figure 2.1.6). This is nonetheless still above the 
OECD average of 34.8%. Over the same period, thirteen 
Member States recorded notable declines (by more than 
1 pp) in their tax wedges for average earners, with the 
strongest reductions in Hungary (-7.9 pps), the Nether-
lands  (-5.5 pps),  Romania  (-3.7 pps)  and  Belgium 
(-2.9 pps).  Conversely,  significant  increases  (by  more 
than 1 pp) occurred in six countries, with the largest in 
Cyprus  (8.0 pps),  Luxembourg  (3.1 pps)  and  Malta 
(2.2 pps). For lower-income earners (50% of average in-
come), the tax wedge for a single person stood at 31.7% 
in 2023, marking a decline of 3.1 pps since 2013 and 
of 0.1 pps from 2022. 

Personal 
income  tax  systems  tend  to  be 
progressive,  with  lower  tax  wedges  for  those 
earning less. Progressivity is especially pronounced in 
like  France,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg, 
countries 
whereas  flat-rate  taxation  systems  are  applied  in 
Bulgaria and Hungary (Figure 2.1.7). Lower tax burdens 
on low-income earners reduce distortions in both labour 
demand  and  supply,  and  facilitate  the  hiring  of  low-
skilled workers. While lower tax burdens on low-income 
earners are beneficial in reducing hiring obstacles, they 
should  be  designed  to  avoid  creating  disincentives  to 
transitions into higher-paying jobs. 

Inflation  can  cause  distortions  in  tax  systems, 
affecting  both  progressivity  and  fairness.  Tax 
system distortions often arise from nominally defined 
thresholds  like  tax  brackets,  credits,  deductions  or 
exemptions.  In  progressive  tax  systems,  inflation 
typically leads to ‘bracket creep’, where  fixed nominal 
thresholds  push  more  taxpayers 
into  higher  tax 
brackets,  increasing  their  tax  burden.  This,  along  with 
the  erosion  of  tax  credits  and  benefits,  can  increase 
poverty  risks  if  inflation  adjustments  or  other  policy 
measures are not implemented. When tax brackets (and 
other fixed parameters of the tax system) are adapted 
to  reflect  inflation,  whether  automatically  through 
indexation or via discretionary measures, bracket creep 
and  other 
inflation-induced  distortions  can  be 
mitigated.  In  2023  and  early  2024,  many  Member 
States made such adjustments to their personal income 
tax  systems  to  address  such  distortions  (see  section 
2.1.2). 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.1.6:   In 2023, the tax wedge for a sin-
gle person earning the average wage was lower 
than a decade earlier in most Member States 
Tax wedge for a single person earning the average wage, 2023 

Note:  2013 data for Cyprus replaced with 2014 because 2013 is 

not available. 

Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, Tax and benefits data-

base, based on OECD tax/benefit model (updated April 
2024). 

labour  market 

Shifting the tax burden from labour to other tax 
bases  in  line  with  environmental  objectives  can 
incentives,  promote 
enhance 
fairness  and  support  climate  neutrality  at  the 
same  time.  The  proposed  changes  to  the  Energy 
Taxation Directive101, currently under negotiation by co-
legislators, align with these goals by setting prices that 
lower  fossil  fuel  consumption  and  encouraging 
investment 
clean  energy. 
sustainable  and 
Additionally,  the  Council  recommendation  for  a  fair 
transition  towards  climate  neutrality102  advocates 
decreasing  the  tax  burden  on  labour,  particularly  for 
low-  and  middle-income  groups,  and  shifting  towards 

in 

101  COM(2021)563 – Revision of the Energy Taxation Directive.  

102  Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards 

climate neutrality 2022/C 243/04. 

41 

-10-8-6-4-202468102025303540455055BEDEATFRITFISIPTSESKLUHULVHRESCZEUEELTELRODKNLIEBGPLMTCY-200202070BEFRSISKLVCZLTDKBGCY2023 (lhs)Percentage point difference to 2013 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.1.7: The tax wedge on labour is lower for workers on low wages 

Tax wedge for a single low-wage earner (50% & 67% of average wage) compared to average wage in 2023 

Note: 

 Member States are ranked in descending order by the level of progressivity (tax wedge average wage-tax wedge 50% of the aver-
age wage). 

Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, Tax and benefits database, based on OECD tax/benefit model (updated April 2024). 

that 

sources 

promote 

revenue 
environmental 
sustainability. While carbon taxes can have regressive 
effects,  these  can  be  mitigated  through  carefully 
designed  compensatory  measures.  Support  measures 
ensuring  affordable  energy  for  vulnerable  groups,  or 
taxation measures that incentivise energy savings and 
reduce  fossil  fuel  consumption,  particularly  in  the 
context  of  still  high  energy  prices,  align  with  these 
climate and fairness objectives.  

2.1.2.  Measures taken by Member States 

Several Member States have introduced hiring in-
centives and subsidies for job creation, with a fo-
cus on promoting employment in key sectors and 
supporting  disadvantaged  groups.  With  support 
from the RRF, Greece makes use of hiring subsidies al-
lowing  for  the  recruitment  full-time  of  67 000  unem-
ployed  people  with  a  focus  on  the  most  vulnerable 
(long-term unemployed, persons with disabilities, refu-
gees, Roma). In Malta, the A2E Scheme, co-financed by 
ESF+ and Malta's Government, will run until 2029. It of-
fers financial support to employers for hiring disadvan-
taged individuals and thereby promoting a diverse and 
inclusive workforce. Finland introduced in 2023 a wage 
subsidy  reform  for  employers  hiring  unemployed 
jobseekers.  Employers  can  receive  financial  support 
covering 50% of wage costs, or 70% for hiring workers 
with reduced work abilities. In 2024, Czechia continued 
a pilot project that combines wage subsidies for hiring 
disadvantaged  groups  with  integration  activities,  such 
as training, social work, job assistance, and comprehen-
sive guidance and counselling, to support personal de-
velopment  during  subsidised  employment. 
Italy 
introduced through the Decree Law n. 60 of 7 May 2024 
incentives for self-employment in strategic sectors for 
the development of new technologies and the twin tran-
sition. The incentives include an exemption of up to EUR 
800  per  month  from  social  security  contributions  for 
unemployed individuals under 35 who start a business 
in these sectors and hire permanent workers between 1 

42 

July 2024 and 31 December 2025. Additionally, bene-
ficiaries can request a tax-free monthly contribution of 
EUR  500  per  worker from  INPS  (National  Institute  for 
Social Security) for up to 3 years. Supported by the RRF, 
Portugal  established  the  Sustainable  Employment 
Commitment program, offering financial subsidies and 
social security reductions to  employers to  support the 
creation of 30 000 permanent jobs, reduce labour mar-
ket  segmentation,  and  promote  gender  equality  while 
facilitating youth integration into the labour market. 

Also drawing on the experience from the COVID-
19 crisis, a number of countries have introduced 
or adjusted short-time work schemes. In May 2024, 
Estonia  adopted  the  ‘work  ability  prevention’  legisla-
tion to provide flexible working conditions for employ-
ees returning to work after long-term sick leave and to 
support the labour market integration of persons with 
chronic illnesses. Under this system, employers cover at 
least 50% of the full salary, while the national Health 
Insurance  Fund  covers  the  remainder.  In  July  2023, 
Spain, passed provisions that further developed the le-
gal regime of the RED Mechanism to enhance employ-
ment  flexibility  and  stabilisation,  detailing  limits  on 
overtime, rules for job hiring and retention, and condi-
tions for job outsourcing. In December 2023, Italy ex-
tended its short-time work scheme (‘Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni’)  to  include  cases  of  reduced  working  hours 
due to extreme climate conditions. The extension, appli-
cable  between  July  and  December  2023,  specifically 
targets  sectors  such  as  agriculture,  construction  and 
mining.   

Several Member States have amended or plan to 
amend their minimum wage frameworks.  Cyprus 
introduced a universal statutory minimum wage in Jan-
uary  2023,  aimed  at  safeguarding  the  purchasing 
power  of  low-wage  earners.  Starting  from  January 
2024, the minimum wage will be readjusted every two 
years based on specific criteria, including the purchas-
ing power of minimum wage earners in relation to the 

152025303540455055FRNLCYIEMTLUESLTEEPLGREUDKFIITHRLVBEBGROCZPTATSISKSEDEHU50% of average67% of averageAverage wage100% EU average 
 
 
 
 
cost of living. A first revision already took place as of 
January 2024, with the minimum wage increasing from 
EUR 940 to EUR 1000 a month. In 2024, in Latvia and 
Greece, the government and social partners discussed 
reforms to amend the minimum wage setting mecha-
nism, referencing values outlined in the Directive on ad-
equate  minimum  wages103.  In  Latvia,  the  minimum 
wage will be EUR 740 as of 2025, which will mark the 
beginning of establishing the level against the median 
wage.  Bulgaria  and  Lithuania  have  redefined  their 
process of setting minimum wages to include an indic-
ative reference value notably relative to actual wages, 
while  the  Netherlands  has  amended  its  minimum 
wage definition from a monthly to an hourly rate. In Ro-
mania, as part of its RRP, a new Law was adopted in 
November 2024 to establish a new mechanism and for-
mula for systematically setting and updating the mini-
mum  wage  level  in  consultation  with  social  partners, 
aligning  with  the  Directive  on  adequate  minimum 
wages. These changes are part of the broader transpo-
sition of the Directive in Member States, due by 15 Nov 
2024.  In  Croatia, under  the  RRP, the  Minimum  Wage 
Act has been amended to mandate minimum increases 
for overtime, night work, Sundays and public holidays, 
as  well  as  prohibiting  the  possibility  of  renouncing  to 
the  minimum  wage.  It  further  plans  to  increase  mini-
mum wage to 50% of the average wage from the pre-
vious year.  

Various measures related to public sector wages 
have  been  adopted  or  are  being  considered.  In 
Croatia, as part of the RPP, the Act on Salaries, entered 
into  force  in  2024,  aims  to  standardise  wage  setting 
criteria and harmonise salaries across the state admin-
istration and public services, in consultation with social 
partners. In Italy, the Budget Law allocated EUR 3 bil-
lion for 2024 and EUR 5 billion annually from 2025 on-
wards 
labour 
agreement  (CCNL)  for  state  employees.  Greece  plans 
to increase public sector wages in 2025, following the 
adoption of a new Single Payroll. In Slovenia, the Act 
on the common foundations of the salary system in the 
public sector was adopted in October 2024, as part of 
the RRP, and will enter into force in January 2025. The 
reform  abolished  the  brackets  below  minimum  wage 
and  increased  remunerations  for  all  officials  and  civil 
servants of the Slovenian public sector.  

the  national  collective 

renew 

to 

Other revisions to wage setting systems, particu-
larly  in  relation  to  collective  bargaining,  have 
also  been  undertaken.  In  Poland,  a  proposed  bill 
aims  to  update  rules  for  establishing  and  registering 
collective  agreements,  expanding  negotiation  topics, 

103  Directive 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in 
the European Union (OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 33). 

104  Eurofound, France: Developments in working life 2023, Working 
paper, WPEF24045, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2024. 

105  Eurofound (2024), Portugal: Developments in working life 

2023, Working paper, WPEF24057, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2024. 

43 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

simplifying the registration process in the National Reg-
ister of Collective Labour Agreements, easing the exten-
sion  of  agreements,  and  allowing  businesses  to 
withdraw  from  multi-company  agreements  for  com-
mercial reasons. In France, a new decree has been is-
sued to expedite the extension of collective agreements 
to all workers and companies in a branch, ensuring that 
sectoral  minimum  wages  do  not  fall  below  the  legal 
minimum  wage  (SMIC)104.  Additionally,  a  new  High 
Council on Remuneration, Employment and Productivity 
was established in March 2024 to better align produc-
tivity, value creation and wages, while monitoring wage 
determinants. In Portugal, a recent update of the La-
bour Code addresses collective agreement termination 
procedures, making it more difficult to terminate agree-
ments and introducing a new arbitration modality105. In 
Belgium, social partners did not find an agreement on 
wages, upon which the federal government decided not 
to increase the wage norm for 2023 and 2024, limiting 
wage  increases  to  the  usual  indexation  for  inflation. 
However, social partners can negotiate a one-off bonus 
per employee of up to EUR 500, or EUR 750 when com-
panies achieve exceptionally high profits. 

Member States are taking steps to strengthen the 
social  economy,  leveraging  the  momentum  cre-
ated by the Social Economy Action Plan106 and the 
Council  recommendation  on  developing  social 
economy  framework  conditions107. 
In  February 
2024,  nineteen  Member  States  signed  the  Liège 
Roadmap for the Social Economy in the European Un-
ion108, which proposes priorities and guiding reflections 
for  the  social  economy  in  the  next  European  social 
agenda. Member States are currently developing or up-
dating their social economy strategies, which is essen-
tial for establishing favourable framework conditions. In 
July 2024, Ireland launched its National Social Enter-
prise  Policy  2024-2027.  In  August  2023,  Slovakia 
adopted an action plan to support the social economy 
and  social  enterprises  until  2030.  Slovenia  has  pre-
pared a social economy development strategy, currently 
awaiting  government  approval.  In  Belgium,  the  Ger-
man-speaking Community passed its own first  decree 
on the recognition and promotion of social economy en-
terprises  in  January  2024,  and  Flanders  followed  in 
April 2024 with a decree promoting the social economy 
and corporate social responsibility. In Cyprus, amend-
ments to the Social Enterprises Law of 2020 and a reg-
ulation  creating  a  registry  for  social  enterprises  were 
approved in December 2023, with the registry now open 
for applications.  In  Czechia, a draft law on the social 
economy is due to be submitted to parliament in 2024. 
This legislation aims to support social economy entities 

106  Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Commit-
tee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Building an economy 
that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ 
(COM (2021) 778 final). 

107  Council recommendation of 27 November 2023 on developing 

social economy framework conditions (C/2023/1344). 

108  See the declaration online. 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

by providing a framework that enhances their role in the 
economy, including through facilitating access to fund-
ing, improving regulatory conditions and promoting sus-
tainable social business models. Portugal has launched 
the ‘Portugal Social Innovation 2030’ initiative, to foster 
entrepreneurship, social innovation and impact invest-
ment in the country. The main beneficiaries are public 
and private entities, including  social economy entities, 
that develop, train, promote or support social innovation 
projects.  In  Germany,  a  new  support  programme,  co-
funded by ESF+, will invest EUR 110 billion by 2028 to 
strengthen  public  interest  enterprises,  supporting  co-
working  spaces,  universities  or  business  incubators, 
which in turn provide advice and skills training to social 
enterprises.  

Several  Member  States  have 
implemented 
measures to enhance tax  fairness and boost la-
bour market participation. In Italy, the reduction in 
the  tax  wedge  for  employees,  originally  introduced  in 
2022  and  extended  in  2023,  has  been  confirmed  for 
2024109. In addition, businesses and professionals hiring 
additional  personnel  under  open-ended  contracts  are 
eligible for a 120% deduction on labour costs for the 
2024 tax period. Latvia will implement a workforce tax 
reform  as  of  2025,  through  reducing  tax  burden  on 
lower and medium income workers. Portugal included 
in the 2025 State Budget proposal a modification to the 
young individual tax regime applicable as of 2025. This 
will expand eligibility to include individuals up to 35  

years of age regardless of their education level and ex-
tend the duration of exemptions to up to 10 years (pre-
viously  5  years).  As  another  example,  in  Finland,  the 
government  has  reduced  taxation  of  work  income  by 
doubling the credit for work income for those aged over 
65, while removing it from those aged 60-64. This re-
targeting  aims  to  improve  work  incentives  for  people 
over 65. 

Personal income tax systems have also been ad-
justed  to  alleviate  the  impact  of  inflation  on 
workers110.  When  thresholds  of  the  tax  schedule  are 
kept  unchanged,  inflation  can  push  households  into 
higher tax  brackets, resulting in the  so-called  ‘bracket 
creep’.  While  most  countries  adjust  tax  brackets  on  a 
discretionary  basis,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Lithuania, 
the  Netherlands,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Sweden and 
more  recently  Austria  have  automatic  adjustment 
mechanisms in place111. Germany, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg,  Ireland  and  Portugal  discretionally  adjusted 
their tax brackets in 2023 and/or 2024, with Portugal 
also  reducing  the  marginal  tax  rate  for  the  second 
bracket.  Italy  merged  the  two  lowest  (of  four)  tax 
brackets in 2024, applying a tax rate of 23% to reduce 
the burden on  middle incomes. Finally,  Spain indexed 
the social security contribution bases and rates in both 
2023 and 2024. Alongside these personal income tax 
adjustments, additional fiscal measures aimed at coun-
tering inflation have been introduced by Member States. 

109  The exemption rate remains at 6% for monthly taxable wages 
up to EUR 2 692 and 7% for those up to EUR 1 923. The al-
ready introduced reduction in the tax wedge equal to 15% of 
the gross remuneration paid for night work and overtime per-
formed on public holidays was also confirmed for the first six 
months of 2024. 

110  See: European Commission, Annual Report on Taxation 2024, 

Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

111  For a detailed description of different approaches to indexation 

across the EU, see Table 3 in Annual Report on Taxation 2023 
(on measures enacted in 2022). 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

2.2. GUIDELINE 6 - ENHANCING LABOUR 
SUPPLY AND IMPROVING ACCESS TO EM-
PLOYMENT, LIFELONG ACQUISITION OF 
SKILLS AND COMPETENCES 

Figure 2.2.1: Participation in ECEC shows slow 
progress at EU level but with large variation 
across countries  

Participation in ECEC of children between 3 and the age of starting 
compulsory primary education (%) 

This section looks at the implementation of the employ-
ment  guideline  no.  6,  which  recommends  Member 
States to create the conditions to enhance labour sup-
ply, promote the acquisition of skills and competences 
throughout people’s lives, foster equal opportunities for 
all, remove barriers to and provide incentives for partic-
ipation in the labour market, in line with principles 1 (ed-
ucation,  training  and  life-long  learning),  2  (gender 
equality),  3  (equal  opportunities),  4  (active  support  to 
employment),  9  (work-life  balance),  11  (childcare  and 
support to  children) and 17 (inclusion of persons  with 
disabilities) of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Sec-
tion 2.2.1 reports on key  developments in the area of 
education, training and skills, as well as on the labour 
market  situation  of  vulnerable  and  under-represented 
groups. Section 2.2.2 reports on policy measures under-
taken by Member States in these policy areas. 

2.2.1.  Key indicators 

Participation  in  early  childhood  education  and 
care at EU level has shown slow progress in the 
past  decade,  with  considerable  variation  among 
Member States. In 2022, 93.1% of children between 
the age of 3 and the start of compulsory primary edu-
cation  were  enrolled  in  early  childhood  education  and 
care (ECEC), reflecting an increase of 0.6 pps since 2021 
and 1.9 pps since 2014. However, this EU-wide average 
masks  substantial  disparities  among  countries.  Seven 
Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Spain, Lith-
uania, Portugal, Sweden) have already reached the EU 
level  target  of  a  participation  rate  of  96%  by  2030, 
while  rates  remain  below  85%  in  five  countries  (Bul-
garia, Croatia, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia, with the 
latter two below 80%). Some Member States made re-
markable  progress  in  the  past  years,  with  Portugal 
(5.8 pps), Lithuania (4.6 pps), Croatia (2.8 pps) and Po-
land  (2 pps)  recording  the  largest  increases  between 
2021 and 2022. Conversely, six Member States saw a 
decline, particularly Cyprus (-1.4 pps), Finland (-1.6 pps), 
and Ireland (-3.2 pps). Affordability and capacity short-
ages, including of staff, remain important barriers to ac-
cess,  notably  for  younger  children  and  those  from 
disadvantaged socio-economic background. The partic-
ipation of Roma children in ECEC remains a significant 
challenge, being at about half of the EU average (42-
44%  in  2021),  and  well  below  the  2030  target  of  at 
least  70%  under  the  new  EU  strategic  framework  on 
Roma equality, inclusion and participation112. 

Note:  2013: definition differs for EL and PT. 2021: definition dif-
fers for the EU and PT. Data provisional for FR. 2022: defi-
nition differs for the EU and PT. Data provisional for FR, MT, 
PL and PT. The latest available data for EL is from 2019.  

Source: Eurostat, [educ_uoe_enra21]. 

Early leaving from education and training is de-
clining  across  the  EU  but  remains  a  challenge, 
particularly among young men. In 2023, 9.5% of 18-
24-year-olds  left  education  or  training  prematurely,  
down by 0.2 pps from 2022. This is 2.3 pps lower than 
a decade earlier, with five countries (Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Malta and Portugal) achieving reductions of more than 
5 pps  over  this  period.  Yet,  around  3.1  million  young 
people left education or training early with at most a  

112  Based on the latest Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) Roma 

Survey 2021, published 2022. For more information see EU 

Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participa-
tion for 2020-2030.  

45 

6065707580859095100ELROSKBGHRCYCZMTFILUATEENLPLHUITSIEUDEIELVSEPTESLTDKBEFR60E…202120222030 EU target2013 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.2: The share of early leavers from education and training continues to decrease slowly, 
with considerable differences across Member States 

Early leavers from education and training (age 18-24), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note: 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in series for SK and CY. Low reliability 
data for HR and LU. 

Source: Eurostat [edat_lfse_14], EU LFS. 

lower secondary qualification in the EU in 2023. Sixteen 
Member States have already reached the European Ed-
ucation  Area  (EEA)  target  of  reducing  early  leaving  to 
below 9% by 2030. However, in Romania, Spain, Ger-
many  and  Hungary,  rates  continue  to  be  above  or 
around 12%, reflecting a ‘critical situation’ with only mi-
nor improvements or even increases over the previous 
year – see Figure 2.2.2. Cyprus recorded the largest rise 
in 2023 (by 2.3 pps), followed by Finland, Slovenia, Por-
tugal  and  Lithuania,  where  the  share  of  early  leavers 
from education and training grew by more than 1 pp. At 
the  same  time,  Croatia  (2.0%),  Greece  (3.7%),  Poland 
(3.7%) and Ireland (4.0%) were ‘best performers’. Despite 
a slightly positive trend overall, there is no sign of upward 
convergence among Member States. Moreover, the gen 

der  gap  remains  significant,  with  young  women  being 
much  less  likely  to  leave  education  or  training  early 
(7.7%) than young men (11.3%). Young people born out-
side the EU remain nearly three times more likely (21.6%) 
to leave early compared to those born in a EU Member 
State (8.2%). The situation is particularly concerning for 
young Roma (18-24), with more than two-thirds (71%) 
leaving education  before  reaching the upper  secondary 
level between 2020 and 2021113. Additionally, the situa-
tion for young persons with disabilities of the same age 
group is also concerning, with a rate of early leaving of 
22.2% in 2022114. Regional disparities are also significant 
in Member States such as Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Por-
tugal,  and  Spain  (see  Figure  1  in  Annex  5),  including 
outermost regions.  

113  See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Roma in 
10 European Countries – Main Results, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2023 

114  See EDE, European comparative data on persons with disabili-
ties, 2022. The higher rate of early school leaving among 

persons with disabilities may be due, among others, to accessi-
bility issues (e.g. physical and architectural barriers) and the 
absence of adapted programmes. 

46 

LTSIELHRIEPLBEBGCZEELUNLSESKCYDKFIMTPTDEESHUROATFRLVITy = 0.0331x -0.1828R² = 0.0115-1.8-1.3-0.8-0.30.20.71.21.72.21357911131517Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24) -changeEarly leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Pillar Box 2: Improving basic skills 

Basic skills are the foundation for young people’s personal and professional development, and for 
the  EU’s  future competitiveness  and  social  cohesion. Basic skills serve as building blocks for enabling 
people to navigate the complexities of life, engage with their communities, continue learning later in life and 
contribute meaningfully to society and the economy. They support labour productivity and the innovation pace 
required by the digital transition and an increasingly knowledge-based economy115. Better-skilled young people 
have better employment prospects, are less at risk of leaving education with low qualifications and more likely 
to participate in adult learning116. In the context of the European Education Area (EEA), the EU set targets on 
basic skills (as measured by the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA), whereby the 
underachievement  rates in  reading, mathematics and  science  should  be  below  15%  by  2030.  Recent  trends 
highlight the need for renewed and enhanced efforts at the European level. These efforts should build on existing 
initiatives  and  further  boost  the  implementation  of  the  Pathways  to  School  Success  Recommendation  from 
November  2022,  which  outlines a  policy  framework  for  a  systemic  and  multifaceted  approach  to  improving 
educational outcomes117. Furthermore, under the new mandate, the Commission will put forward a dedicated 
Action Plan on basic skills. Complementary to it, a STEM Education strategic Plan will address the specific and 
persistent challenges in STEM education. 

Recent data confirms a longer-term decline in basic skills performance, posing a major risk to the 
EU’s future labour productivity and competitiveness, and challenging the equity and excellence di-
mensions of EU education systems. Since 2012, underachievement rates across all three PISA dimensions 
have consistently been increasing at EU level, with the PISA 2022 results documenting the most dramatic decline 
in basic skills performance over this period. The most recent findings indicate that underachievement rates have 
largely increased in mathematics (6.6 pps) and reading (3.7 pps), and more moderately in science (1.9 pps) – a 
trend also reflected in the individual performances of most Member States118. At EU level, the underachievement 
rate now reaches 29.5% in mathematics, 26.2% in reading and 24.2% in science (vs 22.9%, 22.5% and 22.3%, 
respectively, in 2018), with 18 Member States reporting underachievement rates above 25% in mathematics, 
and 14 showing similarly high rates in reading. As a result, the EU has moved further away from its EEA target 
of reducing underachievement to 15%, with the current gap being wider than it was 10 years before. At the 
same time, the recent PISA data also shows a decline in the top performance rate,  i.e. the share of students 
reaching  a  high  level  of  competence,  across  all  socio-economic  groups119.  The  rate  has  decreased  markedly 
across the board in mathematics and reading, while in science it has remained broadly stable in most countries. 
In 2022, only 7.9% of EU students reached a high level of competence in mathematics, 6.5% in reading and 
6.9% in science (vs 11%, 8.1% and 6.3%, respectively, in 2018). While the COVID-19 crisis can be assumed to 
have played a role in the performance drop, several countries were already experiencing declining performance 
trends already before the pandemic.  

115  See: OECD (2014), A New Macroeconomic Measure of Human 

Capital Exploiting PISA and PIAAC: Linking Education Policies to 
Productivity, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 
1709, 2022; European Commission, Investing in People’s Com-
petences – A Cornerstone for Growth and Wellbeing in the EU, 
European Economy Discussion Papers, 139, 2021; Woessmann L., 
The Economic Case for Education, EENEE Analytical Report No 
20, 2014. 

116  European Commission, Investing in education in a post-Covid 

EU, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022. 

117  Council Recommendation of 28 November 2022 on Pathways 
to School Success and replacing the Council Recommendation 

of 28 June 2011 on policies to reduce early school leaving 
(Text with EEA relevance) 2022/C 469/01.  

118  European Commission, The twin challenge of equity and excel-

119 

lence in basic skills in the EU, Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2024. 
In PISA, this is captured by the index of economic, social, and 
cultural status (ESCS). The advantaged socio-economic back-
ground category comprises 25% of all students with the high-
est ESCS scores in the given country, whereas the 
disadvantaged socio-economic background category comprises 
25% of all students with the lowest ESCS scores. 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Underachievement rates have largely increased in mathematics and reading, and more moderately 
in science 
Share of students who are not able to reach the minimum competence benchmark PISA Level 2 (%) 

Note:  Caution is required when interpreting the 2022 EU value: one or more PISA sampling standards were not met by Denmark, Ireland, 

Latvia and the Netherlands (see OECD, PISA 2022 Results (Volume 1), A2 and A4). 2012 data is missing for Malta. 

Source: OECD, PISA 2012, 2015, 2018, 2022, DG EAC calculations. 

Several countries have launched or consider new measures in reaction to the worrying PISA results. 
In Poland, some immediate corrective measures have been implemented and a competence-based curricular 
reform, benefitting from peer-counselling under the EEA strategic framework, at pre-primary and primary levels 
is planned from 2026. Finland will increase the minimum number of compulsory lessons for reading, writing 
and numeracy at primary level. The reform will be introduced from August 2025, and basic education funding 
will increase by EUR 200 million. A multi-country project financed by the EU Technical Support Instrument (TSI) 
aims  to  support  Bulgaria  and  Romania  to  strengthen  their  capacity  to  design  and  deliver  their  curriculum 
reforms by reviewing priority needs and formulating recommendations for improving design, implementation, 
monitoring, and evaluation of the curriculum. Malta adopted in May 2024 a new National Education Strategy 
(2024-30), which proposes a gradual shift away from knowledge delivery to a competence-based system. It 
also  envisages  a  Mathematical  Literacy  Strategy  and  a  commitment  to  strengthening  literacy  skills.  In  the 
Netherlands, the Master Plan on basic skills promotes evidence-informed education, under which participating 
schools receive EUR 500 per student to improve basic skills, conditional to using methods that proved to be 
effective, such as smaller class sizes, with an around 50% increase in budget in its extension. Reflecting a move 
away from digital to more analogue methods of teaching and learning, Sweden is focussing on free access to 
textbooks, the promotion of libraries and analogue learning resources to improve basic skills. With ESF+ support, 
Romania is setting up a national programme to prevent and reduce functional illiteracy. 

Underachievement in basic skills has significantly 
worsened  across  most  Member  States,  posing  a 
major risk to the future EU’s labour productivity 
and competitiveness. The results from the OECD Pro-
gramme  for  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA) 
2022 indicate that nearly one in three 15-year-olds lack 
basic skills in mathematics, and one in four in reading 
and science. The EU has moved further away from its 
EEA target of reducing underachievement to 15%, with 
the current gap being wider than it was 10 years before. 
The worsening since the last data available in 2018 has 
been the sharpest in mathematics (+6.6 pps) – see Fig-
ure 2.2.3. Only Estonia meets the target across all three 
domains, and Ireland in reading. Of particular concern is 
that  18  countries  now  report  underachievement  rates 
above  25%  in  mathematics,  and  14  countries  show 
similarly high rates in reading. In mathematics, the sit-
uation is especially concerning in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ro-
mania,  and  Greece,  where  underachievement  exceeds 
45%. Furthermore, the share of students achieving high 
levels  of  competence  has  declined  across  all  socio-

economic groups, underscoring the breadth of the chal-
lenge. These developments point to major obstacles in 
developing basic skills across the EU, threatening labour 
productivity and competitiveness in the medium term.  

Educational  inequalities  have  deepened,  further 
exacerbating the vulnerabilities of students from 
disadvantaged  and  migrant  backgrounds.  Almost 
half (48%) of disadvantaged students underperformed 
in mathematics in 2022, following a substantial rise from 
2018 (38.2%). Underachievement among advantaged stu-
dents also increased, even if much more moderately (from 
8.6% to 10.9%), further widening the existing socio-eco-
nomic  gap.  In all  Member States, except  Malta, this  gap 
increased (although this is not always statistically signifi-
cant). Disadvantaged students also experienced a dispro-
portionate rise in severe underachievement (i.e. the share 
of students who underachieve in all three domains), which 
grew from 23.3% to 28.8%. The sharpest increases were 
recorded in Cyprus (16.2 pps), the Netherlands (13.8 pps), 
Slovakia (11.5 pps), and Bulgaria (10 pps). 

48 

1013151820232528302012201520182022MathematicsReadingScienceEEA target 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.2.3: Underachievement rates in mathe-
matics have increased strongly 

Share of students who are not able to reach the minimum compe-
tence benchmark PISA Level 2 (%) 

research  on  the  impact  of  COVID-19  on  learning  out-
comes, which show that socio-economically disadvan-
taged  students  suffered,  on  average,  larger  learning 
losses  than  their  advantaged  peers  during  the  pan-
demic.  

the 

and 

2023, 

Council 

Second, 

adopted 

education 

training120. 

Delivering  high-quality  digital  education  and 
training, including by ensuring that education sys-
tems keep pace with technological advancements 
such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), is key to sup-
port a fair digital transition. In this respect, in No-
vember 
two 
Recommendations to guide and support Member States 
in providing high-quality, inclusive and accessible digital 
education and training and develop digital skills for all. 
These Recommendations, adopted as part of the imple-
mentation  of  the  EU’s  Digital  Education  Action  Plan 
(2021-27),  are  a  step  towards achieving  the  EEA  and 
Europe’s Digital Decade targets. First, the Recommen-
dation on the key enabling factors for successful digital 
education  and training  calls  on  Member States to  en-
sure universal access to inclusive and high-quality digi-
tal 
the 
Recommendation on improving the provision of digital 
skills and competences in education and training calls 
on Member States to provide digital skills in a coherent 
way across all sectors of education and training121. To-
gether, the two recommendations address the need to 
make  education  fit  for  the  digital  transformation  and 
able to keep the pace with ongoing technological devel-
opments,  including  AI.  In  the  recommendations,  the 
Council  identifies  AI  as  a  topic  of  key  strategic  im-
portance, requiring a coordinated approach at EU level. 
This  complements  Commission  initiatives  under  the 
Digital Education Action Plan aiming to support Member 
States’  education  and  training  systems  in  addressing 
the AI disruption, such as the Ethical guidelines on the 
use  of  Artificial  Intelligence  (AI)  and  data  in  teaching 
and learning for Educators, the updated Digital Compe-
tence  framework  for  citizens  (‘DigComp  2.2’)  and  the 
contribution  of  Erasmus+  for  developing  innovative 
pedagogical practices and skills related to the use of AI. 
Moreover,  it  accompanies  the  support  provided  under 
the  Digital  Europe  Programme  to  promote  the  use  of 
advanced technologies in the education sector as well 
as  the  development  of  higher  education  programmes 
and short-term training courses covering a broad spec-
trum  of  key  digital  areas.  Across  Member  States,  the 
RRF supports investments in infrastructure, training, and 
curriculum reforms to enhance digital competences, en-
suring  inclusivity,  innovation,  and  alignment  with  the 
Digital Education Action Plan and Europe’s Digital Dec-
ade  targets.  Most  recently,  the  Commission  has 
launched  a  study  on  the  implications  of  seven  digital 
acquis, including the AI Act,  on education and training 
practices,  aiming  to  further  enhance  preparedness 
across public and private education and training actors. 
Furthermore, under the new mandate, the Commission 
will put forward a review of the Digital Education Action 

Note:  Caution is required when interpreting 2022 data for Den-
mark, Ireland, Latvia and the Netherlands because one or 
more PISA sampling standards were not met. 2012 data is 
missing for Malta. 

Source: OECD, PISA 2012, 2018, 2022, DG EAC calculations. 

By  contrast,  advantaged  students  saw  their  perfor-
mance  decrease  by  only  0.5 pps  between  2018  and 
2022. The  difference in  severe underachievement  be-
tween  students  from  advantaged  and  disadvantaged 
socio-economic backgrounds is most pronounced in Ro-
mania,  Slovakia,  Bulgaria,  and  Hungary.  Foreign  born 
students  also  underperform  significantly  relative  to 
their  local  born  peers  with  parents  without  a  migrant 
background  in  most  countries,  while  native  students 
with parents born abroad are partially catching up. Only 
in a few Member States (Croatia, Malta, Ireland, and Cy-
prus)  are  the  differences  among  all  student  groups 
found to be small. These findings are in line with recent 

120  See Council Recommendation of 23 November 2023 on the key 
enabling factors for successful digital education and training 
(C/2024/1115). 

121  See Council Recommendation of 23 November 2023 on im-

proving the provision of digital skills and competences in edu-
cation and training (C/2024/1030). 

49 

0510152025303540455055EEIEDKLVPLSIATFIBECZSEESNLLTFRHUDEEUITPTMTHRSKELROCYBG05101520253035404550552018202220122030 target 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Plan together with the adoption of a Roadmap on the 
future of digital education and training. 

Figure 2.2.4. Tertiary educational attainment is 
higher among women 

Employment outcomes for recent graduates from 
vocational education and training (VET) continue 
to improve across the EU. VET aims to equip young 
people and adults with the knowledge, skills and com-
petences  required  for  specific  occupations  and,  more 
broadly,  the  labour  market.  In  2022,  more  than  half 
(52.8%) of students and pupils with upper secondary or 
post-secondary  non-tertiary  education  (medium-level 
education) were enrolled in vocational programmes122. 
In 2023, 81.0% of recent VET graduates (20-34) were 
employed  in  the  EU,  reflecting  an  increase  of  1.2 pps 
from the previous year123. This positive trend suggests 
that the EU may reach its target of having at least 82% 
of recent VET graduates in employment by 2025124, af-
ter having already surpassed the target of 60% of VET 
graduates  being  exposed  to  work-based  learning125, 
with 64.5% having gained experience at the workplace 
in 2023126 as part of their VET curriculum127. Those who 
participated  in  work-based  learning  have  higher  em-
ployment rates (84.8% in 2023) than those who did not 
(71.5%). At the same time, significant disparities persist 
across Member States: employment rates of VET grad-
uates range from less than 70% in Italy, Spain, Romania 
and Greece to more than 90% in the Netherlands, Ger-
many  and  Malta128.  Exposure  to  work-based  learning 
varies significantly as well, from below 20% in Romania 
and Czechia to over 90% in Austria, Germany, the Neth-
erlands and Spain. Under the new mandate, the Com-
mission will develop a European Strategy for Vocational 
Education and Training, including boosting the number 
of  people  with  a  secondary  VET  degree  including  ap-
prenticeships.  

The EU is on track to reach its tertiary educational 
attainment  target,  but  the  gender  gap  remains 
significant  and  there  are  little  signs  of  conver-
gence. In 2023, 43.1% of young people (25-34) held a 
tertiary degree in the EU. All but three Member States 
(Finland,  Hungary,  Romania)  saw  increases  over  the 
past five years, yet significant differences across Mem-
ber States remain. With 22.5%, Romania registered the 
lowest  tertiary  educational  attainment  rate  in  the  EU, 
while Ireland reported the highest, at 62.7%. 13 Mem-
ber States have already surpassed the 2030 EEA target 
of 45%, with eight exceeding 50%129, while eight coun-
tries  remain  below  40%.  At  the  same  time,  young 
women are much more likely to hold a tertiary degree 
(48.8%) than men (37.6%) – see Figure 2.2.4. Gender  

Proportion of people (age 25-34) with tertiary educational attain-
ment (ISCED 5-8, %, 2023) 

Source:  Eurostat, [edat_lfse_03]. 

disparities  are  significant  in  all  countries,  with  a  gap 
above 20 pps in five Member States (Croatia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia, Latvia and Estonia). Moreover, gender differ-
ences persist by subject areas, as women dominate the 
education  and  health  fields  and  men  are  over-repre-
sented  in  ICT  and  engineering.  Furthermore,  as  ade-
quate access to higher education remains a challenge 
for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, al-
ready  existing  socio-economic  disparities  in  education 

122  Eurostat, based on the UNESCO-OECD-Eurostat data collection 
[educ_uoe_enra16]. Medium-level education refers to upper 
secondary (ISCED level 3) or post-secondary non-tertiary edu-
cation (ISCED levels 4). 

123  Eurostat, [edat_lfse_24]. 
124  See Council Recommendation of 24 November 2020 on voca-

tional education and training (VET) for sustainable competitive-
ness, social fairness and resilience. 

125  See Council Recommendation of 24 November 2020 on voca-

tional education and training (VET) for sustainable competitive-
ness, social fairness and resilience 2020/C 417/01 and Council 

Resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation 
in education and training towards the European Education Area 
and beyond (2021-2030) 2021/C 66/01. 

126  Beyond or in addition to school-based learning or practical ex-

ercises at a training centre. 

127  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey [tps00215]. 
128  European Commission own calculation, see European Commis-
sion, Education and Training Monitor 2024, Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2024. 

129  For details, see European Commission Communication on Har-
nessing talent in Europe’s regions (COM(2023) 32 final). 

50 

01020304050607080ROHUITDECZBGFIPTATSKEUHRELSIMTFREEPLBELVDKESNLSELUIELTCY0100MenWomen2030 EU target 
 
 
 
 
risk  to  be  reinforced.  Tertiary  educational  attainment 
rates are also found to be lower (38%) for people born 
in a foreign country. Overall, national disparities in ter-
tiary  educational  attainment  rates  remain  wide  and 
show  little  signs  of  upward  convergence130.  Moreover, 
strong regional differences persist, having steadily in-
creased since 2015, with some regions at risk of falling 
behind more dynamic areas as talent and economic di-
vides  widen131,  as  also  outlined  in  the  Commission’s 
Communication  on  Harnessing  Talent  in  Europe’s  Re-
gions132. 

Boosting learning mobility in higher education re-
mains  a  key  priority  to  enhance  students’  skills 
and  expand  their  horizons  abroad.  In  2022,  only 
4.3%  of  tertiary  graduates  in  the  EU  completed  their 
degrees in a country different from where they received 
their upper secondary school diplomas (degree  mobil-
ity),  while  6.7%  had  a  temporary  experience  abroad 
(credit mobility). Overall, the share of tertiary graduates 
in the EU with some form of learning mobility abroad, 
at 11.0%, was 12 pps below the 2030 target of 23%133. 
The majority of short-term study stays abroad were fi-
nanced by EU programmes such as Erasmus+ (54.6%). 
At  the  same  time,  the  proportion  of  foreign  tertiary 
graduates  varied  substantially  between  countries,  in-
cluding  in  terms  of  continent  of  origin,  depending 
among others on historical ties, geographical proximity 
and  language  commonalities.  In  2022,  nearly  a  third 
(30%)  of  inward  mobility  in  EU  countries  originated 
from other Member States, with intra-EU degree mobil-
ity accounting for more than half of all inward degree 
mobility in one-third of the countries.  

Effective  measures  to  foster  the  skills  of  the 
workforce  are  essential  to  support  competitive-
ness,  promote  quality  employment  and  preserve 
the EU social model, also in light of the green and 
digital transitions and demographic change. A May 
2023 Eurobarometer survey of small and medium en-
terprises (SMEs)134 found that 95% of respondents con-
sider having skilled workers to be ‘moderately’ or ‘very 
important’. Against this background, and in the face of 
the widespread labour and skills shortages, more than 
half of SMEs (52%) reported difficulties finding workers 
with  the  right  skills,  and  almost  two-thirds  (63%)  are 
held back in their general business activities due to skills 
shortages. In this context, well-functioning and effective 

130  Eurofound, The role of human capital for cohesion and conver-
gence, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
131  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-

ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

132  European Commission, Harnessing Talent in Europe: a new 

boost for EU Regions, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2023. 

133  This share refers to degree and credit mobility. The EU average 

and country performance are likely to be underestimated due 
to several limitations affecting learning mobility data. For more 
information, please see: European Commission, Education and 
Training Monitor 2024  – Comparative report, Publications Of-
fice of the European Union, 2024.   

134  See European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 529 – Skills 
shortages, recruitment and retention strategies in small and 

51 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

education  and  training  systems  are  thus  crucial  for 
equipping young people and adults with labour market-
relevant  skills for  quality  jobs, also  in  view  of  the  big 
transformations that the EU is facing. EU cohesion pol-
icy funds135 support Member States in this effort, with 
EUR  44  billion  allocated  for  skills development  during 
the 2021-27 programming period136. In several Member 
States, RRF funds support the development of accessi-
ble, labour market-relevant training programs, inter alia 
aimed  at  enhancing  digital  skills  and  green  compe-
tences, that help address critical labour shortages. In to-
tal, EUR 17.8 billion are allocated to measures related 
to adult learning, including continuous vocational edu-
cation  and training  as well  as for  the  recognition  and 
validation of skills. The call in the 2020 European Skills 
Agenda for a radical increase in up- and re-skilling will 
be further pursued through the Union of Skills already 
announced in the new Political Guidelines. Furthermore, 
the June 2022 Council Recommendation on individual 
learning  accounts  outlines  how  Member  States  can 
combine  financial  and  non-financial  support  in  an  ef-
fective  way  to  empower  adults  to  develop  their  skills 
throughout  their  working  life137.  Based  on  the  June 
2022  Council  Recommendation  on  a  European  ap-
proach to micro-credentials, the latter also have an im-
portant  role  to  play  in  this  respect,  in  order  to  offer 
flexible, quality and targeted up- and re-skilling oppor-
tunities to workers and jobseekers138. 

Skills  mismatches  at  the  macroeconomic  level 
have been on a declining path in the EU over the 
last decade. The macroeconomic skills mismatch indi-
cator  (which measures  the  relative  dispersion  of  em-
ployment  rates  among  workers  aged  20-64  with 
different educational attainment levels  - low, medium 
and high) reflects the degree of misalignment between 
the demand and supply of skills across the workforce – 
see Figure 2.2.5. The indicator highlights the relatively 
greater difficulty of the low- and medium-qualified in 
entering the labour market compared to the high-qual-
ified.  Since  2013,  macroeconomic  skills  mismatches 
have been falling across most EU countries, except for 
Portugal,  Romania,  Luxembourg  and  Slovenia  where 
mismatches have increased, and Germany where they 
have remained stable. This overall decline is mainly due 
to improvements in educational attainment and a grow-
ing number of jobs requiring at least secondary  

medium-sized enterprises, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2023. 

135  European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), European Regional Develop-

ment Fund (ERDF), Just Transition Fund (JTF). 

136  For more information on the EU investment allocated to sup-

port for skills, see European Commission, An in-depth overview 
of the EU cohesion funds’ investments in skills in the context of 
the European Year of Skills, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2024. 

137  For details, see: COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 16 June 2022 

on individual learning accounts 2022/C 243/03.  

138  For details, see: COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION of 16 June 2022 
on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learn-
ing and employability 2022/C 243/02. 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.5: Skills mismatches at the macroeco-
nomic level have been decreasing in the EU over 
the past decade 

Relative dispersion of employment rates of workers with different 
educational attainment levels, weighted by the share of each group 
in the total working-age population (age 20-64) 

Note:  This indicator highlights the relatively higher difficulty of 

the low- and medium-qualified in entering the labour mar-
ket, as compared to the high-qualified.  

Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data [lfsg_egaed; 

lfsq_pgaed; lfsq_agaed], EU LFS. 

education. To a lesser extent, the improvement also re-
flects narrowing employment gaps between population 
groups with different education levels. However, coun-
tries like Italy, Belgium and Croatia continue to exhibit 
high  levels  of  skills  mismatch.  In  these  countries,  en-
hancing  educational  outcomes  and  upskilling  through 
adult  learning  could  help  better align  the  skills of  the 
workforce with the labour market needs. 

Despite  minor  increases,  participation  in  adult 
learning remains well below the 2030 EU headline 
target of 60% and large variation persists across 
Member  States,  underscoring  the  importance  of 
decisive policy action. Recent figures from the Adult 
Education Survey (AES) indicate a mild rise in the share 
of adults participating in learning in the EU (excluding 
guided  on-the-job  training),  from  37.4%  in  2016  to 
39.5%  in  2022,  with  wide  disparities  across  Member 
States139. The highest participation rates were reported 
in Sweden (66.5%), Hungary (62.2%), the Netherlands 
(56.1%) and Germany (53.7%), making them ‘best per-
formers’ – see Figure 2.2.6. All these countries recorded 
increases exceeding 7 pps since 2016, except the Neth-
erlands where participation fell by 1 pp. In turn, partic-
ularly  low  and  worsening  levels  of  participation, 
reflecting  a  somewhat  diverging  trend  across  the  EU, 
were observed in Bulgaria (9.5%), Greece (15.1%), Po-
land (20.3%) and Czechia (21.2%), all experiencing ‘crit-
ical situations’. In these countries, participation in adult 
learning  has  declined  since  2016,  with  Bulgaria  (-
2.3 pps)  and  Czechia  (-1.6 pps)  facing  the  steepest 
drops. Romania, while having still low overall participa-
tion,  saw  the  largest  increase  in  the  EU  (13.3 pps, 
though this may also be due to the break in series), and 
is ‘weak but improving’. While the 2030 headline target 
calls for at least 60% of adults participating in learning 
every year, in 2022 as many as 24 countries remained 
below their national targets, with only 13 reporting in-
creases  in  participation  (see  Section  1.3).  Coordinated 
policy efforts and renewed ambition are required in or-
der to adapt the workforce to changing skills needs, ad-
dress shortages and remain competitive, innovative and 
inclusive in the context of the twin transition and demo-
graphic change 140.  

People with low qualifications, those outside the 
labour force and older people participate in train-
ing  less  frequently,  calling  for  targeted  policy 
measures. While lifelong skills development is neces-
sary for all in today’s rapidly evolving labour market and 
society, it is especially critical for certain groups, notably 
people  with  low  qualifications (i.e.  at  most  lower  sec-
ondary education) and those outside the labour market, 
as well as older people. These groups are particularly at 
risk of falling behind in a workplace with changing skills 
demands. The latest AES data (2022) reveal significant 
differences in participation rates across educational at-
tainment  levels,  labour  status  and  age  –  see  Figure 
2.2.7. The high-qualified, at 58.9% (compared to 58.1% 
in 2016), continue to be more than three times as likely 
to  participate  in  learning  than  the  low-qualified,  at 
18.4% (compared to 17.9% in 2016), further widening 
the skills gap following initial education. While partici-
pation among the employed and those outside the  

139 

In September 2024, the Indicators Group of the Employment 
Committee reached a provisional agreement on the monitoring 
framework for the skills target, using AES data excluding 
guided on-the-job training. See also the Annual Employment 
Performance Report 2024.  

140  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-

ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

52 

05101520253035ITBEHRLUESFRROPLMTSKLTELPTSIBGEU27IECYHUFILVCZSEEEDKATNLDE-1535ITBG20132023 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.6: Adult participation in learning has increased only slightly since 2016, with large varia-
tion across Member States 

Adult participation rate in learning during the past 12 months in the EU-27 (age 25-64), 2022 levels and changes from 2016 (%, Social 
Scoreboard headline indicator) 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Note: 

In September 2024, the Indicators Group of the Employment Committee reached a provisional agreement on the monitoring frame-
work for the skills target, using AES data excluding guided on-the-job training. See also the Annual Employment Performance Report 
2024. The change to 2022 is computed with respect to the 2016 value, the last one available before 2022. Break in time series in 
2022 for FR, IT and RO. 

Source: Eurostat special extraction of the adults’ participation rate in learning during the past 12 months without guided on-the-job training 

(GOJT), from the Adult Education Survey 

labour  force  increased  to  44.7%  and  23.7%,  respec-
tively  (up  by  1.4 pps  and  2.4 pps  compared  to  2016),  
participation among the unemployed remained largely 
unchanged at 26.8% (26.0% in 2016). Age-related dis-
parities also persist: nearly every second young adult  aged 
25-34 (49.5%) participated in learning activities in  2022, 
while less than a third did so among the 55-64-year-
olds  (29.9%).  Participation  has  increased  markedly 
since 2016 for both groups, yet, at a more rapid pace 
for young adults than for older people (by 3.7 pps and 
2.5 pps,  respectively).  As  highlighted  in  the  evaluation 
of  the  Upskilling  Pathways initiative,141  further efforts 
are  needed  to  boost  the  participation  in  learning  of 
these groups. Initiatives such as the individual learning 
accounts can make learning opportunities more acces-
sible to all, including underperforming groups that can 
be  further  supported  through  top-ups,  suitable  career 
guidance and targeted outreach and awareness raising 
activities. Across Member States, the RRF and ESF+ sup-
port the implementation of targeted measures aimed at 

ensuring inclusive access to reskilling opportunities, pre-
pare vulnerable groups to adapt to the green and digital 
transitions, and improve their employability. 

Progress  on  digital  skills  has  been  slow  overall, 
with  significant  disparities  between  Member 
States. In a digitally transformed Europe, basic digital 
skills are a precondition for employment and social in-
clusion,  which  is  reflected  in  the  target  set  at  the  EU 
level  of  at  least  80%  of  adults  (16-74)  with  at  least 
basic  digital  skills  by  2030142.  In  2023,  despite  more 
than 90% of people in the EU using the internet at least 
once per week143, only 55.6% had at least basic digital 
skills,  a  modest  increase  from  2021  (53.9%).  At  this 
pace, only  59.8%  of  adults  would  have  at  least  basic 
digital skills by the end of the decade144. Gaps in perfor-
mance between Member States are large and have wid-
ened  further.  Romania,  the  country  with  the  lowest 
share of adults with at least basic digital skills (27.7%  

141  European Commission, SWD(2023) 460 final – Evaluation of 

143  See European Commission, Digitalisation in Europe – 2024 edi-

the Council Recommendation of 19 December 2016 on Up-
skilling Pathways: New Opportunities for adults, Publications 
Office of the European Union. 

142  Target defined in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action 
Plan and the Digital Compass for the Digital Decade.  

tion, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

144  For the trajectory towards the 2030 target, see European Com-
mission, State of the Digital Decade 2024 report, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2024. 

53 

DEHUNLSEATDKEEFIFRIELUMTSKCYHRITLTSIBGCZELPLBEESLVPTROy = 0.1541x -5.666R² = 0.1231-18.0-13.0-8.0-3.02.07.012.09192939495969Adult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the job training, % of the population aged 25-64) -changeAdult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the job training, % of the population aged 25-64)2022 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.7: Participation in adult learning is characterised by large variation across population 
groups 

Adult participation rate in learning during the past 12 months by subgroup (age 25-64, %), 2022 

Note: 

In September 2024, the Indicators Group of the Employment Committee reached a provisional agreement on the monitoring frame-
work for the skills target, using AES data excluding guided on-the-job training. See also the Annual Employment Performance Report 
2024.  

Source: Eurostat special extraction of the adults’ participation rate in learning during the past 12 months without guided on the job training 

(GOJT), from the Adult Education Survey. 

Figure 2.2.8: Large cross-country differences are observed in digital skills of adults  

Share of population with basic overall digital skills or above (age 16-74, 2023 levels vs changes from 2021, %, Social Scoreboard headline 
indicator) 

Note:  Overall digital skills refer to five areas: information and data literacy skills, communication and collaboration skills, digital content 

creation skills, safety skills and problem-solving skills. To have at least basic overall digital skills, people must know how to perform 
at least one activity related to each area. For more information, see Eurostat. 

Source: Eurostat, [tepsr_sp410]. 

in 2023), showed no progress between 2021 and 2023. 
Bulgaria (35.5%) and Poland (44.3%), where the preva-
lence  of  digital  skills  among  adults  is  also  low,  saw 
some  improvement  (by  4.3 pps  and  1.4 pps,  respec-
tively).  Nonetheless,  for  all  three  countries  a  ‘critical 

situation’ is highlighted by the Social Scoreboard meth-
odology. By contrast, the Netherlands (82.7%) and Fin-
land (82.0%) have both exceeded the 2030 EU target, 
and  are,  together  with  Ireland  (at  72.9%),  which  also 
recorded an increase,  considered as ‘best  performers’. 

54 

0102030405060LowMediumHigh25-3435-4445-5455-64EmployedEducational attainmentAgeLabour statusAES 2022 (excl. guided on-the-job training)FIIENLATBECZDKEEESHUSECYHRITLULVSISKBGPLRODEELFRLTMTPTy = 0.0881x -3.7453R² = 0.0846-6.5-4.5-2.5-0.51.53.55.57.59.525303540455055606570758085Share of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills (% of population aged 16-74) -changeShare of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills (% of population aged 16-74)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.2.9: Youth unemployment rates in-
creased in a majority of Member States  

Youth unemployment rate (age 15-24, % of active population) for 
2019 (pre-crisis), 2020 (height of the crisis), 2022 and 2023  

Note:  Break in time series for BG, HR, NL and PL in 2019. Break in 
time series for all Member States in 2021. Definition differs 
for FR in 2021. Definition differs for ES and FR in 2022. 
Break in time series for DK, SI and CY in 2023. Definition 
differs for ES and FR in 2023. 
Source: Eurostat [lfsa_urgaed], EU LFS. 

significantly contributing to labour force growth145. Yet, 
marked  heterogeneity  is  observed  across  Member 
States,  with  Romania  (19.3%),  Italy  (16.1%),  Greece 
(15.9%) and Cyprus (13.9%) recording the highest NEET 
rates in 2023 – see Figure 2.2.10. The rate declined only 
slightly in Romania and in Cyprus (both by -0.5 pps), and 
even increased in Greece (0.6 pps), with ‘critical situa-
tions’ in those cases. Lithuania and France, where NEET 
rates have risen, and Cyprus, Bulgaria and Spain, which 
saw  some  declines,  are  ‘to  watch’.  Italy  recorded  the 
strongest improvement (-2.9 pps), reflecting a ‘weak  

Trends  among  countries  around  the  EU  average  vary, 
with  improvements  in  some  countries  and  deteriora-
tions in others – see Figure 2.2.8. Overall, a majority of 
Member States (17) made progress in improving digital 
skills. The latest data, however, show a slight decline in 
basic  digital  skills  among  young  people  aged  16-24 
(from  71.2%  in  2021  to  70.0%  in  2023),  belying  the 
idea  that  all  young  people  are  ‘digital  natives’.  More 
generally, digital skills are particularly low among peo-
ple  with  no  or  low  formal  qualifications  (33.6%  in 
2023),  the  older  population  (37.1%  at  age  55-74), 
those living in rural areas (47.5%) and the unemployed 
(47.7%). At the same time, the number of ICT specialists 
is far below the projected need. In 2023, nearly 9.8 mil-
lion people worked as ICT specialists, representing 4.8% 
of all those employed, with a substantial and persisting 
gender gap (only 19.4% of ICT specialists were women). 
At the current pace, amid growing competition for digi-
tally  skilled  talent,  the  number  of  ICT  specialists  will 
reach just 12 million by 2030, well below the EU digital 
decade  target  of  20  million,  with  potentially  negative 
implications for the future EU’s competitiveness and in-
novation. 

While at EU level youth unemployment continues 
to decrease, rates are again on the rise in the ma-
jority of Member  States.  Following the peak of the 
COVID-19  crisis (16.8% in the EU in  2020), the youth 
unemployment  rate  (15-24)  had  steadily  decreased, 
reaching 14.5% in 2023, down from 15.1% in 2019. In 
2023, the rate stabilised, showing no further improve-
ment amid weaker economic growth, while the trend re-
versed  in  15  Member  States.  While  the  increase  was 
below 1 pp in seven Member States, it was between 1 
and 2 pps in six countries and even 2 pps in Finland and 
2.2 pps  in  Hungary.  Meanwhile,  youth  unemployment 
rates  continued  to  decline  in  countries  with  very  high 
levels, such as Greece (-4.7 pps), Spain, Italy and Roma-
nia (-1.0 pp each), confirming a converging trend across 
the EU over the last five years – see Figure 2.2.9. The 
youth  unemployment  rate  remains  nonetheless  more 
than twice as high as the unemployment rate for people 
aged 15-74 (6.1%). Unemployment is particularly prev-
alent among youth with low qualifications (19.3%) and 
those born outside the EU (20.5%). These developments 
underline the need for continued action to tackle struc-
tural challenges that hinder young people’s labour mar-
ket integration, particularly in light of widespread labour 
and skills shortages and the longer-term risks for the 
youth career prospects.  

On  the  positive  side,  the  share  of  young  people 
neither in employment nor in education and train-
ing (NEET) continues to decline, with some signs 
of  convergence  across  the  EU.  After  peaking  at 
13.9% in 2020, the NEET rate (15-29) consistently de-
creased in the EU, to 11.2% in 2023. This trend aligns 
with increasing youth participation in the labour market,  

145  See European Commission, Labour market and wage develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

55 

051015202530354045ESELITSEROPTSKHRLUEEFRCYFIBEEU27LTHULVBGDKPLIEATSIMTCZNLDE0502022202320192020 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.10: Differences in NEET rates are declining but remain significant 

NEET rate (age 15-29), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note: 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Definition differs for ES and FR. Break in se-
ries for DK and CY.  

Source: Eurostat [lfsi_neet_a], EU LFS.  

but  improving’  situation.  The  Netherlands  (4.7%)  and 
Sweden  (5.7%)  were  ‘best  performers’.  Those  actively 
seeking and available to work, i.e. the unemployed NEET 
rate, remained stable at 4.3% in 2023146. The rate was 
the highest in Greece (8.6%) and Spain (6.8%), though 
both  showed  improvements  from  2022  levels  (9.2% 
and 7.1% respectively). The share of NEETs outside the 
labour force improved slightly (7.0% in 2023 vs 7.4% in 
2022) but remained high in Romania (14.3%) and Bul-
garia (10.8%). When looking at the share of discouraged 
NEETs, a decreasing trend is observed at EU level (from 
4.9% in the peak of the pandemic in 2020 to 4.2% in 
2023).  Regional  disparities  in  NEET  rates  persist  (see 
Figure 2 in Annex 5), including outermost regions, but, 
overall,  national  and  regional  differences  have  been 
narrowing, indicating increasing convergence across the 
EU147.  Against  this  background,  the  reinforced  Youth 
Guarantee  supports  NEETs  offering  quality  employ-
ment, further education, apprenticeships or traineeships 
within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving 
formal  education148,  and  the  Aim,  Learn,  Master, 
Achieve  (ALMA)  initiative  helps  disadvantaged  NEETs 
gain professional experience abroad149. 

The  NEET  rate  continues  to  be  higher  among 
women and for people with a migrant background. 
In 2023, the share of female NEETs (12.5%) remained 
on a declining path (from 13.0% in 2022 and 15.4% in 
2020). However, it was still 2.4 pps higher than for men 
(10.1%) – see Figure 2.2.11. While the difference was 
less than 1 pp in some Member States (Belgium, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain  and  Sweden),  it  exceeded  10 pps  in  others 
(Czechia  and Romania),  pointing  to  significant  hurdles 
for young women in these countries. Despite this, con-
siderable convergence in NEET rates between men and 
women has been observed since 2007. Among female 
NEETs, being outside the labour force is more than twice 
as frequent than  being unemployed  (8.7% vs 3.8% in 
2023, compared to 5.4% vs 4.7% for men). The NEET 
rate  for  non-EU  born  young  people  is  also  markedly 
above that for the native-born (19.6% vs 10.3%), also 
exhibiting substantial variation along the gender dimen-
sion: the rate for women born outside the EU (25.2%) is  

146  Eurostat [edat_lfse_20], LFS.  
147  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-

ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

148  See Council Recommendation of 30 October 2020 on A Bridge 

to Jobs – Reinforcing the Youth Guarantee and replacing the 

Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a 
Youth Guarantee 2020/C 372/01, OJ C 372, 4.11.2020, p. 1. 
149  Further information available at: ALMA (Aim, Learn, Master, 

Achieve) - Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion - European 
Commission (europa.eu). 

56 

LUNLSEDEDKIEMTPLPTSIBGESFRLTCYELROATBECZEEFIHRHULVSKITy = -0.0729x + 0.5495R² = 0.046-3.5-2.5-1.5-0.50.51.52.535791113151719Young people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-29) -changeYoung people not in employment, education or training (% of total population aged 15-29)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.11: In nearly all Member States, the 
NEET rate is higher among women 
NEET rates for men and women (age 15-29, %, 2023) 

Note:  Definition differs for ES and FR.  
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_neet_a], EU LFS.  

more than  14 pps higher than for native-born women 
(11.1%), and almost 11 pps higher than for non-EU born 
young men. Additionally, there are disparities between 
continental and outermost regions and there is a clear 
urban-rural divide, with young people from rural areas 
being more likely to be NEET150.  

While employment rates of older people have in-
creased considerably since 2009, stark variation 
across Member States persists151, indicating fur-
ther  room  for  improvement.  In  2023,  the  employ-
ment rate for older people (55-64) reached 63.9%,  

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

nearly 20 pps higher than in 2009, with women’s em-
ployment  rate  showing  stronger  gains  (4.9 pps  more 
than for men).  Despite this overall improvement,  sub-
stantial  differences  persist  across  the  EU:  whereas  in 
Sweden,  Finland,  Estonia,  the  Netherlands,  Germany, 
Czechia and Latvia, employment rates of older people 
were  above  70%,  Luxembourg,  Romania,  Croatia, 
Greece and Slovenia had rates below 55%. Even though 
the  increase  in  older  people’s  employment  was  more 
than four times higher than for the prime-age popula-
tion  (25-54),  their  employment  rate  remained  18 pps 
lower (63.9% vs 82.2%). This is primarily attributed to 
increased job retention rather than new hiring, which re-
mained persistently low during this period. In particular, 
older people with higher education levels tend to stay 
longer in the labour market, while those with lower ed-
ucation are more likely to exit early. Poor working con-
ditions  –  both  physical  and  psychological  –  were  key 
factors driving early retirement, and also hindering re-
entry into the labour market for many older workers152. 

Gender inequalities in the labour market persist, 
with employment gaps between men and women 
showing  only  modest  signs  of  convergence153.  In 
2023, the employment rate for men was 80.4%, com-
pared to 70.2% for women, resulting in a gender em-
ployment  gap  of  10.2 pps.  This  gap  has  narrowed 
slightly  in  recent  years  (from  10.9 pps  in  2021  and 
10.7 pps in 2022), reflecting a stronger increase in em-
ployment for women (1 pp) than for men (0.5 pps) also 
in 2023. Yet, significant disparities persist, particularly 
in  Greece  and  Italy  (19.8 pps  and  19.5 pps,  respec-
tively),  where  just  over  half  of  the  women  were  em-
ployed  (57.6%  and  56.5%)  –  see  Figure  2.2.12.  In 
Romania,  where  the  gap  was  also  large  (19.1 pps),  it 
even widened further. Malta and Czechia also exhibited 
notable gender gaps (14.1 pps and 13.9 pps). In all five 
countries, the gender disparities in employment reflect 
a ‘critical situation’. On the other side of the spectrum, 
the  gender  employment  gap  was  relatively  narrow  in 
the Baltic countries (1.5 pps in Lithuania, 2.4 pps in Es-
tonia and 3.1 pps in Latvia) and nearly non-existent in 
Finland (0.2 pps). These countries, except for Lithuania 
where the gap has recently widened, were among the 
‘best  performers’  in  light  of  their  small  and  stable  or 
narrowing gaps. Moreover, significant regional variation 
in gender employment gaps was observed in some Mem-
ber  States,  including  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Ger-
many  and  Spain  (see  Figure  3  in  Annex  5),  including 
outermost regions. Sustained policy action can help ad-
dress barriers to women’s participation in the labour mar-
ket, in line with the objectives set out in the EU Gender 

150  See: Eurofound, Becoming adults: Young people in a post-pan-
demic world, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
151  For a detailed analysis of the labour market situation of older 
workers see: European Commission, Labour market and wage 
developments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2024.  

152  See: Eurofound, Keeping older workers engaged: Policies, prac-
tices and mechanisms, Eurofound Working Paper, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2024.  

153  For a longer-term perspective, see European Commission, Em-

ployment and Social developments in Europe 2024, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

57 

051015202530ROITELCZBGCYLTHUHREUFRSKESPLLVDELUATBEFISIDKPTEEIEMTSENL050MenWomen 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.12: The gender employment gap has narrowed in most countries but remains significant 
and shows no signs of upward convergence across Member States 

Gender employment gap (age 20-64), 2023 level and change from previous year (pps, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note:  Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Definition differs for ES and FR. Break in se-

ries for DK and CY. 
Source: Eurostat [tesem060], EU LFS. 

Equality Strategy 2020-25154. Such measures can also 
contribute to achieving the target of halving the gender 
employment gap by 2030 set out in the European Pillar 
of Social Rights Action Plan.  

Women  work  part-time  more  frequently  than 
men, resulting in a wider gender employment gap 
when  considering  full-time  equivalent  (FTE)  em-
ployment. In 2023, 27.9% of women (20-64) in the EU 
worked part-time, more than three times the share of 
men (7.7%), leading to a gender gap in part-time em-
ployment of 20.2 pps, unchanged from 2022. The larg-
est  gaps  in  part-time  work  were  recorded  in  the 
Netherlands  (41.8 pps),  Austria  (38.6 pps),  Germany 
(36.9 pps) and Belgium (27.4 pps), while the narrowest 
gaps  were  seen  in  Bulgaria  (0.2 pps)  and  Croatia 
(1.5 pps). Notably, Romania was the only country where 
men were slightly more frequently employed part-time 
than women (-0.7 pps). Given the higher prevalence of 
part-time work among women, the gender employment 
gap  in  terms  of  FTE  employment155  was  15.7  pps  in 

2023,  more  than  50%  (5.5 pps)  wider  than  when  ex-
cluding differences in part-time work. The largest FTE-
adjusted  gender  employment  gaps  were  in  Italy 
(24.1 pps),  Greece  (21.5 pps)  and  Austria  (19 pps),  re-
flecting  much  larger  disparities  than  when  part-time 
work was not factored in, while the smallest gaps were 
in Lithuania and Finland (2.5 pps). 

Gender employment gaps are even wider for peo-
ple  with  children,  with  parenthood  impacting 
women’s  careers  more  than  men’s.  In  2023,  the 
employment rate for women aged 25-54 with children 
was 74.9%, compared to 91.9% for men, resulting in a 
gender  employment  gap  of  17 pps  among  parents, 
against  4 pps  among  those  without  children.  Among 
employed  women  with  children,  31.8%  worked  part-
time, compared to just 5.0 % of men. In most countries, 
including  Germany,  Austria  and  Italy,  the  impact  of 
parenthood is evident in both lower female employment 
rates and higher part-time work among women. Infor-
mal long-term care (LTC) responsibilities also contribute 

154  For further information, see European Commission, 2023 report 
on gender equality in the EU, Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2023.  

155  The FTE employment rate compares differences between 

groups in average hours worked. The FTE employment rate is 
calculated by dividing total hours worked in the economy (first 

58 

job, second job, etc.) by the average number of hours in a full-
time schedule (around 40) and by the number of people aged 
20-64. Source: Joint Assessment Framework (JAF), computation 
based on Eurostat data. 

LTEEFILVCYDKFRHRIEPTSEPLCZELITMTROATBEBGDEESHULUNLSISKy = -0.0071x -0.4356R² = 0.0019-3.4-2.9-2.4-1.9-1.4-0.9-0.40.10.602468101214161820Gender employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64) -changeGender employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.13: Participation in early childhood education and care remains low in most Member 
States 

Children less than 3 years in formal childcare and yearly change, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline 
indicator) 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for DK.  

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_sp210], EU-SILC. 

to the gender employment gap, with 19.1% of women 
in the EU providing informal care compared to 14.8% of 
men. Women are more likely to devote significant time 
to  caregiving156,  possibly  because  male  caregivers 
(73%) receive more support from formal LTC services 
than  female  caregivers  (61%)157.  To  support  informal 
carers,  the  Council  Recommendation  on  access  to  af-
fordable  high-quality  long-term  care  emphasises  the 
need  for  adequate  training,  counselling,  psychological 
support,  respite  care,  work-life  balance  measures,  ac-
cess to social protection and/or adequate financial sup-
port.  At  the  same  time,  Member  States  should  also 
strive  to  align  the  offer  of  LTC  services  with  care 
needs158. 

The gender pay gap narrowed over the past dec-
ade  but  remains  substantial  in  most  Member 
States. In 2021 and 2022, the gender pay gap stood 
at 12.7% in the EU, exceeding 15% in Estonia, Austria, 
Czechia,  Slovakia,  Germany,  Hungary,  Latvia  and  Fin-
land159.  Pay  gaps  are,  among  other  factors,  driven  by 

156  See European Health Interview Survey (EHIS wave 3), 2019.  
157  EIGE: 2022 Survey of gender gaps in unpaid care, individual 

and social activities (CARE). 

158  For details, see Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 

on access to affordable high-quality long-term care (2022/C 
476/01).  

gender differences in economic activities and occupa-
tions,  under-representation  of  women  in  senior  posi-
tions,  over-representation 
in  part-time  and  non-
permanent forms of employment, difficulties in recon-
ciling work with care responsibilities, as well as discrim-
ination and non-transparent wage structures160. Gender 
pay gaps significantly influence family decision-making, 
particularly affecting mothers, who experience cumula-
tive  disadvantages  that  further  hinder  their  employ-
ment opportunities. Over time, the aggregation of these 
earning gaps – compounded by career breaks for child-
care – leads to substantial gender gaps in pensions. Alt-
hough slightly narrowing, in 2023 women aged 65-79 
received gross pensions that were, on average, 25.4% 
lower than those of men in the same age  group. This 
pension gap varies considerably across countries, rang-
ing from as high as 43.9% in Malta, 39.9% in the Neth-
erlands and 36.4% in Luxembourg to as low as 4% in 
Slovenia, 4.6% in Denmark and 5.8% in Estonia.  

159  The unadjusted gender pay gap is used here. The unadjusted 
gender pay gap is defined as the difference between the aver-
age gross hourly earnings of men and women expressed as a 
percentage of the average gross hourly earnings of men.  

160  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2024. 

59 

DKFRLUNLSEBECYESMTPTSIATBGDEIELTCZPLROSKEEELFIHRITLVHUy = 0.0615x + 0.1328R² = 0.0928-6.0-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.08.010.012.014.0010203040506070Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of the under 3-years-old population) -changeChildren aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of the under 3-years-old population)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Improving the provision and accessibility of qual-
ity and affordable early childhood education and 
care can support work-life balance, gender equal-
ity  and  children  development,  yet  participation 
rates remain low. In 2023, the share of children below 
the age of 3 in formal childcare stood at 37.5% in the 
EU, reflecting an increase of 1.7 pps compared to 2022, 
but still below the 2021 level of 37.9% and well short 
of  the  revised  Barcelona  target  of  45%161.  Only  ten 
Member  States  have  exceeded  50%  and  stark  differ-
ences persist across Member States – see Figure 2.2.13. 
At 1% and 4.4% respectively, Slovakia and Czechia re-
ported the lowest participation rates and significant de-
clines  from  the  previous  year  (-1.3 pps  and  -2.4 pps, 
respectively).  The  low  and  deteriorating  levels  in  both 
countries,  as  well  as  in  Romania  (12.3%)  and  Poland 
(12.6%), constitute a ‘critical situation’ and warrant par-
ticular attention. While reporting somewhat higher lev-
els,  participation  in  ECEC  was  also  low  in  Bulgaria 
(17.4%),  Ireland  (22.1%)  and  Austria  (24.1%).  In  all 
these  countries,  rates  remained  stable  or  increased  – 
contrary  to  Lithuania  (19.9%)  and  Germany  (23.3%), 
where participation  declined  in 2023. In all five coun-
tries, the situation is considered ‘to watch’. By contrast, 
Sweden  (56.9%),  France  (57.4%),  Luxembourg  (60%) 
and the Netherlands (71.5%) are ‘best performers’, with 
high and growing participation rates. Several obstacles 
may  impede  participation  in  ECEC,  including  financial, 
cultural and language barriers, as well as differences in 
regional  and  national  policies  in  relation  to  parental 
leave  and  allowances  or  legal  rights  to  childcare.  The 
RRF is financing targeted reforms and investments sup-
porting  the  expansion  of  ECEC  services,  infrastructure 
development, and workforce  training. The low  pace of 
improvement calls for reinforced efforts in line with the 
European Child Guarantee, the European Care Strategy 
and  the  Council  Recommendation  on  early  childhood 
education and care.  

Taxation structures in  most Member States cre-
ate disincentives for second earners, particularly 
women, to participate fully in the labour market, 
thus contributing to gender inequality in employ-
ment. Joint taxation systems, which allow families to 
file  combined  income  for  potentially  lower  taxes,  in-
crease the marginal tax rate for second earners, typi-
cally  women  (in  2022  78%  of  second  earners  were 
women162), who are thus more likely to face reduced in-
centives to  work or extend working hours163. Addition-
ally, tax reliefs contingent on joint filing, or those aimed 
at only one spouse, further discourage women’s labour 
market participation164. In 2023, the highest ‘inactivity  

Figure 2.2.14: Taxation contributes significantly 
to the inactivity trap for second earners 

Inactivity trap for second earners (%, 2023) 

Note:  The data are for a second earner on 67% of the average 

wage in a two-earner family with two children; the principal 
earner is on the average wage. ‘Contribution of taxation’ re-
fers to the percentage of additional gross income that is 
taxed away due to taxation and SSCs (other elements con-
tributing to the inactivity wage trap are withdrawn unem-
ployment benefits, social assistance and housing benefits). 

Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, Tax and benefits data-

base, based on OECD tax/benefit model (updated April 
2024). 

161  See Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on early 

childhood education and care: the Barcelona targets for 2030 
(2022/C 484/01). The recommendation sets out new targets on 
early childhood education and care, mirroring the targets set in 
the European Education Area initiative. By 2030, at least 45% 
of children be-low the age of 3 and 96% of children between 
the age of 3 and the starting age for compulsory primary edu-
cation should be in ECEC. Those Member States whose average 
participation in the period 2017-21 was below 20% will have 
to increase by 90%, while Member States whose average 

participation was 20-33% will have to increase by 45%, with a 
limit of 45%.  

162  See European Commission, 2023 report on gender equality in 
the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 
163  See Coelho, M. et al., Gendered Taxes: The Interaction of Tax 

Policy with Gender Equality. International Monetary Fund, 2022. 
164  For an extensive discussion on labour taxation, see also Section 
3.2 and Section 4.2.3 European Commission, Annual Report on 
Taxation 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2024. 

60 

010203040506070LTSIDKLUBEDEROPLFRHRHUPTCZEULVESIEBGSKFIMTELNLSEATITEECY0LTSIDKLUBEDEROPLFRHRHUPTCZEULVESIEBGSKFIMTELNLSEATITEECYInactivity trap - second earner - 67% averagewageContribution of taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2.15: In many Member States, taxation 
provides disincentives for low-wage earners to 
work more hours 
Low-wage trap for second earners (%, 2023) 

Note:  Low-wage trap when the second earner’s wage increases 
from 33% to 66% and the principal earner is on 100% of 
the average wage, with two children. 

Source: European Commission, DG ECFIN, Tax and benefits data-

base, based on OECD tax-benefit model (updated April 
2024). 

traps’  (where  tax  and  benefit  withdrawal  significantly 
discourages  second  earners  from  entering  the  labour 
market) were seen in Lithuania, Slovenia, Denmark, Lux-
emburg, Belgium and Germany  – see Graph 2.2.14. In 
these  countries,  second  earners  entering  the  labour 
market may lose about or over 50% of earnings due to 
taxes  and  withdrawn  benefits.  In  contrast,  countries 
with lower inactivity traps, where that loss may be less 
than 20%, include Austria, Italy, Estonia and Cyprus. Ad-
dressing these structural disincentives could reduce the 
gender employment gap and increase GDP, with World 

165  Pennings, S. M., A Gender Employment Gap Index (GEGI): A Sim-

ple Measure of the Economic Gains from Closing Gender Em-
ployment Gaps, with an Application to the Pacific Islands. World 
Bank Group, Development Economics Research Group. Wash-
ington: World Bank, 2022. 

61 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Bank estimates suggesting a potential 10% economic 
gain  for  Europe  if  gender  gaps  in  employment  were 
closed165. 

Women  are  disproportionately  impacted  by  the 
‘low-wage  trap’,  where  steep  increases  in  taxes 
and  reductions  in  benefits  diminish  their  incre-
mental incomes as their earnings increase. In most 
Member  States,  as  with  the  inactivity  trap,  taxation 
plays  a  key  role  in  determining  the  level  of  the  low-
wage trap for second earners, of which a large majority 
are women166. However, this situation differs from the 
inactivity  trap,  where  individuals  are  out  of  the  labour 
force. As illustrated in Figure 2.2.15, the proportion of ad-
ditional income that is effectively ‘taxed away’ when sec-
ond  earners  increase  earnings  from  one-third  to  two-
thirds of the average wage by increasing working hours 
can be substantial – around a third (36.6%) of their in-
cremental earnings on average in the EU, with this loss 
exceeding  105%  in  Lithuania  due  to  housing  benefit 
withdrawal.  The  impact  may  also  be  significant  in  Bel-
gium (60.3%) and Luxemburg (53%), while it appears the 
lowest  in  Cyprus  (14.6%).  Availability  of  and  access  to 
affordable,  high-quality  care  services,  along  with  well-
designed  work-life  balance  policies,  is  essential  in  en-
couraging individuals to increase their working hours. 

The labour market inclusion of persons with disa-
bilities stagnated, with a divergent trend across 
Member  States.  The  disability  employment  gap  (i.e. 
the  difference  in  employment  rates  between  persons 
with  and  without  disabilities)  remained  nearly  un-
changed in 2023, at 21.5 pps (21.4 pps in 2022), halting 
a prior two-year positive trend. While the gap decreased 
in 15 Member States, including notable improvements 
in  Estonia  (-6.0  pps)  and  Malta  (-4.3  pps),  it  widened 
significantly in others, such as Luxembourg (15.2 pps) 
and  Bulgaria  (10.0  pps).  The  smallest  gaps  were  re-
ported in Spain (13.8 pps), Portugal (14.0 pps) and Italy 
(15.9 pps),  partly  explained  by  relatively  lower  overall 
employment rates, as well as in Slovenia (17.3 pps), all 
of which were ‘best performers’. On the contrary, a ‘crit-
ical situation’ was observed in Lithuania, Belgium, Po-
land  and  Ireland,  where  the  gap  exceeded  30 pps,  as 
well as in Croatia and Bulgaria, where the gap neared 
40 pps.  Persons  with  disabilities  also  experience  high 
shares of inactivity: in 2022, in 20 Member States, over 
40%  of  the  working-age  population  with  disabilities 
(15-64) was outside the labour force, with the rate ex-
ceeding  60%  in  Bulgaria,  Greece,  Romania,  Hungary, 
Croatia and Poland167. Lack of adequate labour market 
inclusion and retention measures for persons with dis-
abilities, the lack of adequate skills, as well as overall 
lack  of  awareness  about  legal  obligations  and  policy 
support  measures  amongst  employers  remain  likely 
factors behind these high rates of non-participation.  

166  See European Commission, 2023 report on gender equality in 
the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 

167  Eurostat, [lfsa_argaeddl]. 

020406080100LTBELURODKDESIESITIEEUPTFINLLVHUFRELHRPLSKSEMTATCZBGEECY0LTBELURODKDESIESITIEEUPTFINLLVHUFRELHRPLSKSEMTATCZBGEECYLow-wage trap, wage increase from 33% to66% AWContribution of taxation (incl. SSC) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.2.16: The disability employment gap remains wide, with a pronounced divergent trend 
among Member States  

Employment gap between persons with disabilities and those without (age 20-64), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social 
Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note:  Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for HR. Estimated value for 

DE. Low reliability for PL. Missing categorisation for DK. 

Source: Eurostat [tepsr_sp200], EU-SILC. 

The  labour  market  integration  of  third-country 
nationals continued to improve, but a significant 
mismatch has remained between their qualifica-
tion  levels  and  employment  status.  The  employ-
ment  rate  of  third-country  nationals  reached  63%  in 
2023, well below the rate for EU-born people, and with 
no  signs  of  closing  the  gap.  Following  the  COVID-19 
pandemic,  third-country  nationals accounted  for  more 
than two-thirds (70%) of the increase in the EU labour 
force in 2022168, though they continued to face high lev-
els of unemployment (12.2% in 2023 vs 5.4% for na-
tionals)  and  over-qualification 
(39.4%  vs 
20.8%)169. Women born outside the EU were in a partic-
ularly vulnerable situation, with a gender employment 
gap of 24 pps and 44% of them being overqualified170. 
A general trend towards more stable employment could 
be observed for all groups, yet third-country nationals 
were  more  frequently  employed  on  fixed-term  con-
tracts  than  people  born  in  the  EU  (including  nationals 

rates 

and  EU  movers).  In  2024,  the  EU  continued  to  imple-
ment its 2021-27 Action Plan on Integration and Inclu-
sion,  which  provides  a  common  policy  framework  to 
support Member States in developing national migrant 
integration policies171. 

Employment rates for the beneficiaries of tempo-
rary  protection  from  Ukraine  have  increased 
across  most  Member  States,  indicating  a  faster 
integration  into  the  labour  market  compared  to 
other  refugee  groups172.  By  May  2024,  around  4.3 
million people held temporary protection status in the 
EU, with 2.5 million aged between 18 and 64. Ukraini-
ans are considered to have high integration prospects, 
given their comparatively high levels of education, es-
tablished social networks and immediate access to em-
ployment.  As  of  Q3-2023,  over  40%  of  those  of 
working-age (18-64) under temporary protection were 
employed, but with stark differences across countries, 

168  See European Commission, Labour market and wage develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2024. 

169  European Commission, EMN study 2023: Annual Report on Mi-

gration and Asylum, 2023. 

170  OECD/European Commission, Indicators of Immigrant Integra-

tion 2023: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2023.  

62 

171  See European Commission, Action plan on Integration and In-

clusion 2021-2027.  

172  European Migration Network (EMN), ‘Labour market integration 
of beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine: Joint 
EMN-OECD inform' 2024. 

ESITPTSIEEFIFRLVMTHULUROBEBGHRIELTPLATCYCZDEELNLSESKy = 0.1368x -3.2412R² = 0.0545-8.0-3.02.07.012.017.01015202530354045Disability employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64) -changeDisability employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

ranging  from around  two-thirds (66%)  in  Lithuania  to 
less than 20% in Belgium and Croatia. Ukrainians under 
temporary  protection  that  remain  outside  the  labour 
force often cite care duties,  while those in unemploy-
ment identify language as a primary barrier. Nonethe 

less, displaced persons from Ukraine contribute mark-
edly to the EU labour force growth, as indicated by dif-
ferent  estimates173.  Although  many  are  young  and 
highly  educated,  job  opportunities  that  match  their 
qualifications remain limited174. 

Pillar Box 3: Tackling barriers to labour market participation in the EU 

In a context of persisting labour shortages and ageing population, activating persons outside the 
labour force is a major challenge that calls for policy action. High shares of people outside the labour 
force  can  restrict  economic  growth  as  they  exacerbate  existing  labour  and  skills  shortages  and  thus  hinder 
productivity and competitiveness. They also put at risk the fiscal sustainability and adequacy of the social pro-
tection  systems  in  the  face  of  population  ageing.  Despite  improvements  in  the  EU  employment  rate,  people 
outside the labour force (neither employed nor unemployed) still constitute 20% of today’s EU population in the 
age group 20-64, with considerable variation among Member States. At the same time, the working-age popu-
lation is projected to shrink over the coming decades in the EU. By 2045, it is expected to have 16 employed for 
every ten people above 65 outside the labour force, and only 14 by 2070, down from 22 in 2022 175. This pro-
jected increasing imbalance calls for policy solutions. Estimates suggest that increasing the labour market par-
ticipation in the EU will be key for reaching the employment rate target of 78% by 2030. Stronger activation 
and labour market integration are essential for making progress on principle 4 (on active support to employment) 
of the European Pillar of Social Rights. In line with this, the Commission has put in place a range of initiatives to 
tackle the high share of people outside the labour force, such as the Reinforced Youth Guarantee, the Work-
Life-Balance Directive, and most recently the Action Plan on labour and skills shortages (see also Pillar Box in 
section 2.1.), which sets out new actions for the EU, Member States and the social partners to, inter alia, support 
the activation of under-represented groups 176. 

Significant number of people could enter the EU labour market through targeted and tailored sup-
port for the largest under-represented groups 

Potential contribution of different population groups to the aggregate share of people in the EU labour force by 2030 

Note:  Simulation of 2030 EU share of people in the labour force if Member States with below-average shares of people in the labour force 
per subgroup caught up to the EU subgroup average, while shares of people in the labour force for the other subgroups is assumed 
to remain constant. This calculation neglects overlaps and possible double-counting between groups and should not be confused 
with a forecast.  

Source: DG-EMPL calculations, based on Eurostat data and EUROPOP2023 projections. 

173  For more detailed analysis on the labour market outcomes of 

175  European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report, Publications Office 

people fleeing the war in Ukraine to the EU, see European Com-
mission, Labour market and wage developments in Europe 
2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
174  PES Network Annual Report 2023 European Network of Public 

Employment Services (PES).  

63 

of the European Union, 2024. 

176  European Commission, Labour and skills shortages in the EU: 

an action plan. COM(2024) 131 final. 

73.487.567.074.885.265.978.989.876.888.670.677.486.469.181.090.60.670.60.91.40.70.71.10.300.511.522.533.5-120-100-80-60-40-20020406080100Young (20-29)Prime age (30-54)Older people (55-64)Women (20-64)Men (20-64)PrimarySecondaryTertiaryAge groupsGenderEducation level (25-64)Share of persons in the labour force by subgroup in 2023 (%)Simulated share of persons in the EU labour force by subgroup in 2030 when below-average Member States catch up to EU average (%)Potential contribution of subgroup to overall 2030 EU share of persons in the labour force  (pps and in thousands)Share of persons in the labour force Potential contribution of subgroups3,6411,8668251,7102,8661,6442,2171,740 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Despite improvements, several population groups are still significantly under-represented in the EU 
labour market. These include women, older people, the low- and medium-qualified, persons with disabilities 
(PwDs) and people with a migrant or minority background, depending on the country-specific context. Of these, 
women, secondary educated and older people constitute overall the largest groups outside the EU workforce 
that could potentially be brought into employment through adequate activation measures177. Commission esti-
mates show that if Member States with lower-than-average shares of people in the labour force for each of the 
above subgroups were to increase participation to the respective EU-subgroup averages by 2030, an additional 
3.6 million women, 2.9 million secondary-educated people and 2.2 million older workers, respectively, would be 
in the labour market (neglecting overlaps and possible double-counting between the groups) – see the Figure178. 
To this aim, creating a more equitable distribution of unpaid domestic work and caring responsibilities as well 
as improving access, affordability and quality of early childhood education and care (ECEC) contribute to reduc-
ing barriers to women’s labour market participation. For older people, illness or disability are the main reasons 
to remain outside the labour force alongside care responsibilities, workplace-related factors and institutional 
barriers, such as social security and pension regulations, which need to be tackled to allow greater labour market 
participation. People with secondary or lower education often face difficulties in accessing the labour market, 
which calls for adequate skilling policies as well as targeted and individualised support. People with migrant or 
minority backgrounds can significantly benefit from targeted measures in order to address skills mismatches, 
improve language proficiency, combat discrimination, and receive tailored and integrated support services. Im-
proving access to high-quality employment opportunities while ensuring disability related entitlements can re-
duce the factors potentially disincentivising PwDs from entering the workforce.  

In recent years, several Member States have taken dedicated actions to remove barriers to labour 
market  participation  for  under-represented  groups.  In  September  2023,  as  part  of  its  RRP,  Croatia 
adopted a model for co-financing the operating costs of ECEC facilities for municipalities with lower financial 
capacity, in order to ensure the sustainability of investments in the renovation of existing ECEC facilities or the 
construction of new ones. Thereby, local and regional governments are enabled to increase the availability and 
improve the  sustainability and affordability of ECEC. In  Ireland, as of March 2024, carers have the right to 
request flexible working, including reduced and compressed hours. Under the Employment Programme 2024-
29, people at retirement age in Estonia get, among others, access to training and support to acquire qualifica-
tions. In Malta, the National Strategy for Lifelong Learning 2023-30 targets in particular low-skilled and low-
qualified adults with the aim to address basic skills gaps and deficits. In  Austria, the ‘Intensivprogramm Ar-
beitsmarktintegration’ is intended to promote the rapid integration of people with a migrant background through 
German language courses, recognition of qualifications and career orientation throughout 2024 and 2025. In 
2023, Germany increased the ceiling for income from work for persons with disabilities receiving a reduced 
earning capacity pension. 

2.2.2.  Measures taken by Member States 

Member States are taking steps to increase par-
ticipation in early childhood education and care, 
focusing on affordability and capacity expansion. 
In  Lithuania,  from  September  2024,  all  3-year-olds, 
and  by  September  2025,  all  2-year-old  children  will 
have the right to access ECEC. The expansion of ECEC 
facilities continues across the EU with the support of EU 
funds. In Croatia, 343 projects with a total budget of 
EUR 214 million are included in the RRP, which will pro-
vide  at  least  22 500  additional  places,  with  a  view  to 
increasing  participation  to  90%  by  2026.  Under  the 
2022-2029  ‘Active  Toddler’  programme  and  with  the 
support of EU funds (ESF+ and RRF), Poland will create 
over 100 000 new childcare places, primarily in under-
served areas, and aims to establish a sustainable fund-
ing model. With support of the RRF, the country is also 
adopting new quality standards for providers, and with 
the  ESF+  it  aims  to  train  9 000  childcare  and  2 500 
managerial  staff  as  well  as  1 400  representatives  of 

municipalities, while simultaneously transforming child-
care employees into public officials. In Romania, with 
support  of  the  RRF,  a  large-scale  continuous  training 
programme for ECEC staff is under development to sup-
port the implementation of a new curriculum and mon-
itoring of quality and ECEC facilities are constructed and 
renovated to address capacity shortages, particularly in 
underserved areas. Slovakia is currently developing a 
system of inclusive education support through continu-
ing education programmes for teaching and specialist 
staff, including in ECEC. Italy increased the bonus asilo 
nido.  The  bonus  granted  for  the  payment  of  nursery 
school fees has been increased to up to EUR 3 600 for 
children born on or after 1 January 2024, whose fami-
lies  have  an  Equivalent  Economic  Situation  Indicator 
(ISEE) of up to EUR 40 000 and who already have a child 
under the age of 10. Bulgaria published its 2024 Ac-
tion Plan for Promotion of Early Childhood Development 
to  develop  a  holistic  policy  approach, including  with  a 
strong focus on early childhood education and care. Cy-
prus,  in  line  with  a  reform  included  in  its  RRP,  is 

177  32 million women (25.2%), 20 million older people (33%) and 
25 million people with secondary education (21.1%) were not 
part of the EU labour market in 2023. 

178  As the subgroups are overlapping, figures on the additional 
number of people in the labour force are not additive across 
subgroups.  

64 

 
 
 
gradually  reducing  the  compulsory  ECEC  age  from  4 
years  and  8  months  to  4  years;  by  the  school  year 
2024-2025,  it  will  be  reduced  by  2  months  and  by 
2025-2026 by another month.  

Major  reforms  and  investments  to  boost  basic 
skills,  including  comprehensive  curricular  revi-
sions, have been undertaken, yet further efforts 
are  needed  across  the  EU  to  reverse  declining 
trends. Cyprus has implemented a decade-long edu-
cation and training reform, including the revision of cur-
ricula  (included  in  its  RRP),  a  shift  to  formative 
assessment for students, a governance framework ad-
dressing  student  disengagement  and  early  school 
learning, and all-day schooling in lower secondary edu-
cation. In September 2024, Spain launched the Mathe-
matics  and  Reading  Comprehension  Reinforcement 
Plan,  benefiting  over  five  million  students  in  publicly 
funded  schools  with  increased  teacher  support,  addi-
tional  school  resources  and  extracurricular  lessons. 
Moreover, under the RRP, Spain’s Programme for Orien-
tation,  Progress,  and  Educational  Enrichment  (PROA+) 
aims  to  improve  educational  outcomes  for  students 
facing the greatest difficulties in at least 2 700 schools, 
with  funding  provided  until  2024.  Between  2025  and 
2028, the ESF+ will help mobilise an additional financ-
ing of EUR 105 million each year. In Lithuania, the im-
plementation  of  a  new,  competence-based  curriculum 
was rolled out in two phases over 2023 and 2024, but 
its impact is yet to be seen. Starting in 2025, the Minis-
try of Education in Romania is developing an interven-
tion mechanism for functional literacy in pre-university 
education, in views of addressing the worrying levels of 
basic  skills  among  Romanian  primary  and  secondary 
education students.  

Several  Member  States  are  also  strengthening 
the teaching profession in response to the decline 
in basic skills. In Poland, new legislation adopted in 
February 2024 raised teacher salaries by 30%, and by 
33% for new teachers from January 2024. In Romania, 
new  legislative  measures  were  introduced  to  align 
teachers' wages with the national average gross salary, 
constituting  salary  increases  of  on  average  25%  in 
2023 with further increases at the beginning of 2024. 
In Slovakia, teacher pay was increased twice in 2023: 
by 10% in January and  by an additional 12% in Sep-
tember.  Estonia  raised  teacher  salaries  by  23.9%  in 
2023 to address high inflation, and the government has 
outlined plans to bring teacher salaries to 120% of the 
average  wage  by  2027.  In  December  2023,  Hungary 
introduced a major salary increase for teachers, co-fi-
nanced by the ESF+ also included in the RRP, as part of 
a  programme  to  enhance  the  attractiveness  of  the 
teaching profession. As a first step, a 32% average in-
crease was implemented in January 2024. The govern-
ment committed to increase teacher salaries to 80% of 
those  of  other  tertiary  graduated  professionals  by 
2025,  and  to  sustain  this  level  at  least  until  2030. 
Czechia  has  reached  important  milestones  in  the  re-
form of initial teacher education with the publication of 
a  new  graduate  competence  framework  in  2023,  its 

65 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

incorporation into the accreditation of teacher training 
programmes in 2024; and it has reinforced the practice 
orientation  of  teacher  training.  In  the  academic  year 
2023/2024,  the  implementation  of  new  programmes 
for initial teacher training started in the French Commu-
nity of Belgium, after nearly two decades of prepara-
tion. The reform extends the training period from 3 to 4 
years (‘Masterisation’) and introduces a diagnostic test 
to reinforce the French language competences of future 
teachers.  

Initiatives to address early school leaving and ed-
ucational  inequalities  are  underway,  with  sub-
stantial  support  from  EU  funds.  In  Bulgaria,  the 
ESF+-cofinanced ‘Success for You’ project (2023-2027) 
targets  more  than  96 000  students  from  vulnerable 
groups facing educational difficulties and learning gaps 
who  will  benefit  from  additional  training  in  Bulgarian 
language, mathematics and other subjects. It will also 
provide training for over 4 500 educators. In Romania, 
the implementation of the national programme to  re-
duce school dropout is well  underway with support of 
the RRF and the ESF+. Under the programme, at least 
2 500 schools with higher risks of early school leaving 
are  first  identified  through  an  early  warning  mecha-
nism, and eligible schools then receive grants to imple-
ment  plans  with  measures  tailored  to  their  specific 
the  new  10-year  federal 
needs. 
‘Startchancen’  programme  targeting  up  to  4 000 
schools (about 10% of all German schools) is starting 
in  the  school  year  2024-2025,  providing  educational 
support to all children and young people regardless of 
their parents’ social situation. The Federal Government 
will invest EUR 1 billion annually (fully matched by the 
Laender). With RRF support,  the French Community of 
Belgium adopted a comprehensive action plan to com-
bat early school leaving and absenteeism in 2024, in-
cluding through individualised guidance for pupils with 
a high number of unjustified absences, involving their 
families and a pedagogical intervention team, as  well 
as an IT system to monitor absences.  

In  Germany, 

Member States are taking first steps to integrate 
artificial  intelligence  (AI)  into  education  and 
training, responding to its growing role in national 
policy discussions. While no country has yet adopted 
a related national strategy, several Member States have 
launched initiatives focused on integrating AI into vari-
ous aspects of education. In Sweden, as of 2024-2025, 
AI will become a new subject in upper-secondary edu-
cation and in adult municipal education for students in 
science and technology and a possible add-on for stu-
dents in other tracks. In the Flemish Community of Bel-
gium,  the  Digisprong  Knowledge  Centre  has,  since 
2023,  provided  guidelines  and  additional  training  to 
support digitisation in compulsory education. Croatia’s 
Digital Croatia Strategy 2023 targets the development 
of  AI  and  digital  competences  and  encompasses  the 
digital transition as support for the development of the 
educational  and  research  system.  In  Germany,  the 
Deutches Schulportal offers a platform to assist users 
in familiarising themselves with AI. In Luxembourg, the 

 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Computational  Law  and  Machine  Ethics  (CLAiM)  re-
search group at the University of Luxembourg a univer-
sity working  group has been tasked with  studying the 
ethical and scientific dimensions of AI since 2021, with 
plans to establish a centre for digital ethics in the fu-
ture.  In  Poland,  several  universities  have  set  internal 
guidelines and standards to  regulate the use of AI by 
students. Greece is planning a seminar for 800 teach-
ers to be accompanied by guidelines for teachers. Aus-
tria will equip 100 pilot schools with AI software and 
prepare digital learning materials. In the Netherlands, 
projects will be developed together with schools, com-
panies, and scientists, to gain knowledge about AI in ed-
ucation,  with  funds  partially  provided  by  the  RRF.  In 
Romania,  the  RRF  is  allocating  funds  to  support  the 
participation  of  university  students  in  training  pro-
grammes for advanced digital skills, investing in smart 
labs which enable students’ digital and technological lit-
eracy needed in the labour market or training civil serv-
ants in advanced digital skills. 

Modernising and improving the attractiveness of 
vocational education and training (VET) systems 
are high on the policy agenda of numerous Mem-
ber States. Estonia has launched a reform to increase 
the attractiveness of the VET system, including the de-
velopment  of  new  curricula  prioritising  competencies 
and stronger integration of VET with other educational 
pathways  (bridging  formal  education  and  non-formal 
learning, as well as connecting general, vocational and 
applied higher education). New services such as career 
counselling  and  flexible  study  arrangements  to  retain 
students  and  reduce  dropout  rates  with  stakeholders’ 
engagements were launched in 2023. In January 2024, 
Greece implemented new legislation to expand cooper-
ation within its VET system and create synergies across 
the  different  levels  of  the  National  Qualifications 
Framework (NQF). With support from the RRF, the au-
thorities  are  further  putting  in  place  a  quality  control 
system  for  vocational  education  and  training  (VET)  to 
assess  its  output  and  improve  its  labour  market  rele-
vance.  Spain,  through  a  series  of  regulatory  changes 
from mid-2023 to 2024, has enhanced flexibility in VET 
management,  incorporated  digital  skills,  regulated  or-
ganisational aspects of the curriculum for basic, inter-
mediate  and  high-level  training  cycles  as  well  as  the 
components of the Vocational Training System, such as 
the development of National Catalogue of Professional 
Qualifications  and  registers,  updated  and  harmonised 
the Rules of Operation of the General Council for Voca-
tional Training, and established higher vocational train-
ing  qualifications  and  related  minimum  teaching 
requirements. Since June 2024, Cyprus, with RRF sup-
port,  has  been  updating  VET  curricula  to  reduce  skills 
mismatches  with 
labour  market.  Germany 
amended its Education  and  Training Act in July 2023, 
introducing  subsidised  career  orientation  internships, 
mobility grants, more inclusive vocational training entry 
qualifications  for  persons  with  disabilities,  while  ex-
panding state-funded vocational training opportunities, 
especially in areas with limited options.  

the 

Some countries are also investing significantly in 
their VET systems. As part of its RRP, Cyprus is up-
grading its VET infrastructure through initiatives such as 
the construction of a new technical school in Limassol, 
to be completed by June 2026, and an upgrade of 20 
laboratories since to address skills mismatches with the 
labour market. Sweden’s 2024 budget added SEK 1.36 
billion (EUR 15.2 billion) for regional adult VET, with ap-
proximately 16 500 additional full-year places in adult 
vocational education and approximately 3 000 in higher 
vocational education. In addition, Sweden’s RRP is sup-
porting an additional 16 900 full-year study places in 
regional  adult  vocational  education  and  14 900  in 
higher vocational education. As part of its RRP, Poland 
has been working on the establishment of sectoral skills 
centres, in the spirit of centres of vocational excellence, 
serving  the  needs  of  several  groups,  e.g.  adults,  stu-
dents, young people, vocational education teachers and 
employees. The main partners in this endeavour will, in-
ter alia, be vocational schools, higher education institu-
tions,  enterprises  and  employers’  organisations,  local 
authorities as well as research and  development cen-
tres. Spain, leveraging support from the ESF+ and as 
part  of  its  RRP,  is  investing  in  the  digital  and  green 
transformation  of  vocational  training,  focusing  on 
teacher  training,  modernised  classrooms  simulating 
technological  workplaces,  as  well  as  a  network  of  50 
centres of excellence to drive research and innovation. 
Under the RRP, Portugal aims to implement a reform 
aimed at strengthening the overall policy coordination 
of education and training, update the National Qualifi-
cations  Catalogue  to  incorporate  emerging  skills  and 
professions, promote targeted adult literacy programs 
for low-skilled individuals, and address socio-economic 
inequalities through  the  redistribution  of  the  VET  net-
work. This reform is being complemented with sizable 
investments in the establishment and refurbishment of 
365 Specialised Technology Centres in schools and vo-
cational institutions, alongside the investments in 111 
public  vocational  training  centres  by  building  new  or 
renovating  existing  centres,  and  by  purchasing  ad-
vanced technological equipment in areas such as digi-
talisation, renewable energy, and Industry 4.0. 

Work-based learning and apprenticeships are be-
ing  promoted  in  a  number  of  Member  States.  In 
March 2024, as a part of its RRP, Bulgaria amended its 
VET regulatory framework to expand cooperation with 
employers,  notably  through  work-based  learning  and 
dual  VET.  In  July  2023,  France  passed  a  new  law  to 
promote  the  international  mobility  of  apprentices 
through  an  ‘Erasmus  for  apprentices’.  In  May  2023, 
Germany’s  Alliance  for  Initial  and  Further  Education 
and Training presented its priorities for 2023-2026, in-
cluding strengthening dual training by the federal gov-
ernment, the federal states, industry and trade unions. 
In December 2023, in order to align VET with societal 
needs, Estonia prolonged its VET and higher education 
development programme PRÕM+ until 2027. Under the 
programme, new training places will be created in sec-
tors of national priority and economic growth, based on 
employer  needs  and  readiness,  with  at  least  30%  of 

66 

 
 
places allocated to young people under 26 without pro-
fessional qualifications. Co-financed by the ESF+ and as 
part of its RRP, Greece plans to re-establish the appren-
ticeship  vocational  schools  of  the  public  employment 
service (DYPA EPAS) by the end of 2024, as an integral 
part  of  the  government’s  strategy  for  VET  and  youth 
employment. 

Member States continue to support higher educa-
tion  modernisation  through  governance  reforms 
and measures to boost internationalisation. Under 
its RRP, Romania has allocated digitalisation grants to 
around 70% of its universities (61 institutions) to en-
hance  the  digital  ecosystem,  and  at  least  100  000 
teachers  will  receive  training  to  improve  digital  peda-
gogy  skills.  With  ESF+  support,  the  country  also 
launched the programme ‘First Student in the Family’ in 
September 2024 to increase access to higher education 
for  disadvantaged  and  underrepresented  groups  and 
reduce  university  dropout.  Governance  reforms  aimed 
at  boosting  excellence,  research  and  internationalisa-
tion are being rolled out in several Member States.  In 
Bulgaria, the new Act on scientific research and inno-
vation, adopted in April 2024 as part of a reform of its 
RRP, aims to create a dynamic, result-oriented and ef-
fective research and innovation environment. The Ben-
elux and Baltic States have implemented a diploma 
recognition treaty as from May 2024, enabling mutual 
recognition  of  higher  education  qualifications.  Some 
Member States are  also  undertaking  measures  to  en-
hance access for disadvantaged groups. In Lithuania, 
approximately 1300 study places, or around 10% of the 
total  state-funded  places,  are  set  aside  for  students 
from vulnerable socioeconomic backgrounds. As of Sep-
tember 2024, qualifying students can apply through a 
separate  admission  queue,  under  the  same  academic 
requirements  for  entry.  Portugal  is  also  introducing 
quotas for economically disadvantaged students, while 
broadening access for the Portuguese diaspora and in-
creasing  quotas for  mature  students over 23.  Largely 
supported by ongoing investments under the RRP, stu-
dent  accommodation  capacity  is  expected  to  increase 
by 78% between 2021 and 2026. Spain is expanding 
scholarships to vulnerable students, with funding reach-
ing  EUR  1  billion  in  2023-2024,  benefitting  300 000 
students,  or  around  25%  of  bachelor’s  and  master’s 
students in public universities. The increase in scholar-
ships is also supported by the Spanish RRP as part of a 
broader  reform  of  the  university  system  planning  to, 
among other things,  promote access to higher educa-
tion. In parallel, the average scholarship amount has in-
creased  by  29%  in  the  past  five  years.  To  improve 
access  of  students  with  disabilities,  France  has 
awarded six universities with EUR 10 million of funding 
to develop and share best practices for inclusive educa-
tion and accessible teaching in 2024. 

New forecasting systems are being implemented 
to anticipate skills needs in the labour market. In 
December 2023, Finland launched the ‘Good Work Pro-
gramme’ to address personnel needs in healthcare, so-
cial  welfare  and  rescue  services  by  enhancing 

67 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

knowledge  base  and  the  capacity  to  anticipate  future 
staffing  and  training  requirements.  Under  their  RRPs, 
Spain and Sweden are identifying skills needs, aiming 
to align training and reskilling efforts with labour mar-
ket demands, including skills critical to the digital and 
green  transitions.  Spain  will  do  this  by  conducting  re-
search  programmes,  based  on  surveys  across  various 
sectors. 

Member  States  have  launched  measures  to  fur-
ther develop the digital skills of the population to 
meet  the  demands  of  the  digital  transition.  In 
March  2024,  Bulgaria  amended  its  VET  regulatory 
framework as a part of its RRP to consider evolving pro-
fessional needs, including in the green and digital sec-
tors. In June 2024, the country created an ICT module 
for testing and self-certifying digital skills without for-
mal training, available as part of its RRP. Portugal ini-
tiated the second phase of the ‘Employment  + Digital 
2025’ vocational programme in January 2024. In 2024, 
Hungary started projects designing and implementing 
digital skills training as part of the Digital Renewal Op-
erational Programme Plus 2021-2027, co-financed by 
the ESF+. In July 2023, Spain regulated the procedure 
for recognising digital competences in teaching and, in 
the context of its RRP, aims  to train at least 825 000 
people  in  digital,  ecological  and  productive  transfor-
mation skills by the end of 2025. As part of the RRP, in 
July  2023,  Latvia  established  a  common  framework 
based on the European Digital Competence Framework 
for Citizens (DigComp) to assess and plan learning out-
comes for digital skills, including in non-formal educa-
tion. Luxembourg presented a White Paper on the new 
curriculum for basic education in October 2023, which 
includes digital skills related to cybersecurity and media 
literacy as one of its four main thematic pillars. Member 
States have also introduced strategies to support digital 
skills.  In  Romania,  the  National  Strategy  for  Adult 
Training 2023-2027, adopted in  December 2023, and 
the  National  Strategy  for  the  Lifelong  Learning  of 
Adults  2024-2030,  adopted  in  May  2024,  emphasise 
the  development  of  green  and digital  skills.  In  August 
2023, in the  context of the  RRP,  Latvia  launched the 
Digital Health Strategy which covers different aspects 
such  as  cross-border  data  exchange  and  digital  skills. 
Ireland’s  Digital  Inclusion  Roadmap  was  released  in 
August 2023 to ensure that everyone can benefit from 
digital opportunities, including through digital skills and 
literacy. Czechia has created a public database of up-
skilling and reskilling courses as part of the RRP, and at 
least 65 000 people shall receive upskilling or reskilling 
in digital skills by the end of 2025.  

Regulatory and investment initiatives are under-
way  to  promote  the  skills  and  competences 
needed for the green transition. In September 2023, 
Malta  introduced  financial  incentives to  support  local 
employers  and  employees  in  upskilling,  including  for 
green competences. Cyprus  has focused on green in-
frastructure investments for VET schools and is review-
ing construction plans for a green VET school in Larnaca 
funded by the Just Transition Fund since July 2023. In 

 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Portugal, the Public Employment Service and the Re-
newable Energies Association established a protocol in 
June 2023 to create a Training Centre for Energy Tran-
sition (CTE), which will provide energy transition and cli-
mate action training, including in renewable and green 
hydrogen energy, for both workers and the unemployed. 
Around  25  000  persons  will  be  trained  in  green  skills 
under the RRF-supported programmes. Several Member 
States, including Spain and Czechia, are also investing 
in skills for the green transition in the context of their 
RRPs. In September 2024, the Public Employment Ser-
vice in Greece launched a new programme for the ac-
quisition  and  upgrading  of  green  skills  for  50 000 
employees with support of the RRF.  

Increasing participation of adults in learning  re-
mains  a  key  policy  objective  across  Member 
States, with a particular focus on the low-skilled, 
and  many  countries  are  developing  individual 
learning accounts and micro-credentials. Under its 
RRP and supported by the ESF+, Spain has established 
a reference framework to assess and certify basic com-
petences  acquired  by  adults  through  work  experience, 
non-formal  training  and  informal  learning,  to  help 
adults with a low level of basic skills engage in training. 
In November 2023, Malta launched a National Strategy 
for Lifelong Learning 2023-2030, which is targeting the 
most vulnerable through a diverse range of high-quality 
lifelong learning opportunities. Several Member States 
are also developing schemes for individual learning ac-
counts,  to  enable  adults  to  engage  in  personalised 
learning pathways. Belgium’s RRP includes a reform to 
establish an individual right to four days of training for 
every employee working full time as of 2023, increasing 
to five days from 2024, and administered through the 
Federal  Learning  Account  (FLA)  platform  launched  in 
April 2024. Slovakia plans to introduce a new funding 
scheme  for  adult  learning  through  individual  learning 
accounts and address inter-ministerial coordination of 
lifelong learning, supported by the development of the 
Electronic  Platform  for  Individual  Learning  Accounts 
(EPIVU) using EU funds. Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and 
Croatia  are  also  developing  individual  learning  ac-
counts with RRF+ and/or ESF+ support, expanding adult 
learning  access  through  personalised,  accessible  plat-
forms. In addition, Member States are advancing micro-
credentials systems to boost lifelong learning. In 2023, 
Estonia amended its Adult Education Act to extend the 
micro-qualifications  system  to  vocational  education 
and  adult  training,  introducing  definitions  of  micro-
qualifications, programme volume requirements, provi-
sion principles and a quality assurance mechanism. Un-
der  its  RRP,  Spain  aims  to  release  an  action  plan  for 
developing a micro-credentials framework, which is to 
be elaborated by the Ministry of Universities, following 
consultations with stakeholders. This includes, inter alia, 
the promotion of micro-credentials to increase demand 
among adults and employers, promote their quality and 
relevance and support equity of access.  

The reinforced Youth Guarantee, along other ini-
tiatives,  continues  to  drive  structural  reforms 
and  measures  that  support  youth  employability. 
Under the reinforced Youth Guarantee, Member States 
have  committed  to  ensuring  that  all  people  under  30 
receive a quality offer of employment, continued edu-
cation,  an  apprenticeship  or  a  traineeship  within  four 
months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal ed-
ucation. Hungary provides wage subsidies and training 
to NEETs aged 15-29 between 2024-2029 through its 
national Youth  Guarantee Plus Programme, co-funded 
by the ESF+ in the Economic Development and Innova-
tion Operational Programme Plus. In Portugal, the pro-
file  of  young  NEETs  in  the  Youth  Guarantee  National 
Plan is being revised through an ILO-supported study, 
with a focus on mapping unregistered unemployed and 
inactive youth. In the context of the RRP, Spain has in-
troduced  its  National  ‘Youth  Guarantee  Plan  Plus’, 
aimed at improving the qualifications of young NEETs 
to  gain  the  skills  required  to  enter  the  labour  market 
registration  process  for  young  NEETs.  In  Italy,  as  of 
September  2024,  the  ‘Bonus  Youth  Cohesion  Decree’ 
has introduced exemptions from social security contri-
butions for hiring workers under 35 on permanent con-
tracts,  provided  they  have  never  previously  held  a 
permanent  contract.  In  Belgium,  the  ‘Coup  de  Boost’ 
project, which supports young people aged 18-29 who 
are distant from the labour market in gaining qualifica-
tions, starting studies or finding a job, was scaled up in 
April 2024 with support of the ESF+ and the RRF.  

Some Member States are implementing measures 
to manage demographic change by supporting ex-
tended employment for older workers. In Finland, 
persons aged 55 who face job displacement have been 
eligible  for  ‘transition  security  allowance’  since  2023, 
which provides access to training opportunities and an 
extended  paid  re-employment  leave  during  the  notice 
period. Estonia’s Employment Programme 2024-2029 
offers  labour  market  services  to  retirees  seeking  em-
ployment, including training  and support for  qualifica-
tions and entrepreneurship. These initiatives to promote 
later  retirement  should  be  viewed  in  conjunction  with 
pension  measures  (see  Section  2.4.2).  Under  its  RRP, 
Luxembourg  launched  the  FutureSkills  training  pro-
gramme  with  a  specific  focus  on  jobseekers  aged  45 
year and more to provide soft, digital and managerial 
skills to facilitate their short-term re-integration in the 
labour market. 

Measures  are  being  taken  to  support  women’s 
employment  and  tackle  the  gender  pay  gap,  in-
cluding  efforts  to  reduce  gender  segregation  in 
employment and to improve pay transparency. As 
of January 2025, Malta will legally enshrine the princi-
ple  of  equal  pay  for  work  of  equal  value,  mandating 
equal pay for all employees including temporary agency 
and  outsourced  workers.  Malta  has  also  launched  an 
Equal Pay Tool pilot project to facilitate the application 
of  equal  pay  and  identify  and  address  potential  non-
justified pay inequalities within organisations employ-
ing  at  least  50  employees  and  certified  with  the 

68 

 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

medical  care  and  extends  the  current  entitlement  to 
breastfeeding/lactation breaks from six months to two 
years. A new law in France, adopted in April 2024, will 
allow  employees  to  take  at  least  four  weeks  of  paid 
leave annually, regardless of any periods spent on sick 
leaves. 

Efforts to strengthen the labour market inclusion 
of persons with disabilities are underway. In Ire-
land, a wage subsidy launched in September 2023 pro-
vides  financial  support  to  employers  who  employ 
persons with disabilities; from April 2024, the minimum 
weekly hours threshold for eligibility under this scheme 
was reduced from 21 to 15 hours. Moreover, with sup-
port  of  the  ESF+,  Ireland  introduced  the  ‘WorkAbility’ 
programme in August 2024 that will, inter alia, support 
organisations  that  can  provide  progressive  pathways 
into education, training and employment (including self-
employment) for participants. Austria allocated an ad-
ditional EUR 30  million in 2023 and  2024 to improve 
the labour market participation of persons with disabil-
ities, includng to cushion the impact of high inflation. In 
Sweden, the public employment service (PES) regula-
tion  letter  for  2024  mandates  faster  identification  of 
disabilities  affecting  job  seekers’  work  capacity,  ena-
bling  more  relevant  interventions  and  increasing  the 
number of participants receiving wage subsidies to pro-
mote greater employment among persons with disabil-
ities.  

Several  initiatives  have  been  introduced  to  en-
hance  integration  of  third-country  nationals.  In 
January 2024, a new law on interculturality entered in 
force in Luxembourg, paving the way for smoother in-
tegration  of  persons  with  a  migrant  background. 
Greece will support third-country nationals to facilitate 
their integration into the labour market under the ESF+. 
Moreover, with support from the RRF, 8 000 refugees in 
the country  participate in traineeship programs in pri-
vate sector firms allowing them to integrate into the la-
bour  market.  Austria  provides  beneficiaries  of 
temporary protection with a ‘EU Blue Card’ easing ac-
cess to various benefits, care and services. In addition, 
Blue Card holders are supported in their integration into 
the  labour  market  with  needs-based  offers  such  as 
multilingual  information  materials,  qualifications  as 
well as advice on the recognition of qualifications, Ger-
man courses, competence assessments and active job 
placement. As  of  November  2023, people  with  recog-
nised  qualifications  in  Germany  can  access  qualified 
employment in non-regulated professions, and ‘EU Blue 
Card’ requirements have been eased by lowering salary 
thresholds  and  streamlining  entry  for  IT  specialists. 
Starting  in  March  2024,  foreign  workers  with  at  least 
two years of experience and a job offer can work in non-
regulated  occupations  without  formal  qualification 
recognition. 

Equality mark. In Ireland, the Gender Pay Gap Reporting 
requirements  will  be  expanded  to  include  employers 
with more than 150 employees in 2024 and those with 
50 or more employees in 2025. As part of its RRP Ire-
land has an investment in a reskilling and upskilling pro-
gramme,  with  targets  for  the  share  of  female 
participants. In April 2024, as part of its RRP,  Estonia 
has launched a new digital instrument, the so called Pay 
Mirror, to support employers to analyse and reduce the 
gender pay gap. In Italy, under the Budget Law 2024, 
private sector employers hiring unemployed women vic-
tims  of  violence  and  beneficiaries  of  the  ‘reddito  di 
libertà’ are exempt from paying part of social security 
contributions up to 100% and EUR 8 000. Moreover, the 
country increased funding for the ‘Fondo per il reddito 
di  libertà’  to  help  women  victims  of  violence  living  in 
poverty achieving economic independence and emanci-
pation.  Financial  allocations  are  increased  by  EUR 10 
million annually between 2024 and 2026, and by EUR 6 
million annually starting from 2027. By the end of 2025 
Spain, as part of its RRP, is setting up a new social and 
employment  guidance  service  to  support  women  vic-
tims  of  violence,  including  victims  of  trafficking  and 
sexual exploitation, through job placement assistance, 
legal advice and psychological and emotional support. 
Austria’s Intensive Programme for Labour Market Inte-
gration  2024-2025,  under  the  Strategic  Action  Plan 
against  the  Shortage  of  Skilled  Workers,  provides  tai-
lored support for refugee women, offering German lan-
guage courses, recognition of qualifications and career 
orientation.  France  adopted  legislation  in  July  2023 
which  provides,  among  others,  sickness  benefits  to 
women experiencing miscarriage, as well as a 10-week 
protection against dismissal, psychological care and im-
proved medical assistance starting from 2024.  

Member  States  have  adopted  measures  to  im-
prove work-life balance, particularly through the 
transposition  of  the  Work-Life  Balance  Di-
rective,179  including  enhancement  to  family  leave.  As 
of  July  2023,  Luxembourg  grants  paternity  leave  to 
the person recognised as the second parent under na-
tional law. From March 2024, Denmark’s amended Ma-
ternity  Leave  Act  ensures  that  parental  leave  (48 
weeks)  is  divided  equally  between  both  parents  (24 
weeks each), while single-parent families may transfer 
several weeks of leave to a close family member. Under 
the  Budget  Law  2024,  parental  leave  in  Italy  is  now 
remunerated as follows: 80% of the worker’s wage for 
the first month, 60% (80% only for 2024) for the sec-
ond month and 30% for subsequent months. In terms 
of  flexible  working  arrangements,  Ireland  has  inte-
grated the Right to Request Remote Work Bill into the 
Work-Life  Balance  and  Miscellaneous  Provisions  Act 
2023,  which,  effective  March  2024,  establishes  the 
right  to  request  remote  work  and  flexible  working  for 
carers, including compressed or reduced hours. This Act 
also  allows  for  five  days  of  annual  leave  for  serious 

179  See Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and 

of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for par-
ents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU. 

69 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

2.3. GUIDELINE 7 - ENHANCING THE 
FUNCTIONING OF LABOUR MARKETS AND 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL DIA-
LOGUE 

Figure 2.3.1: The share of temporary employ-
ment is on a decreasing trend, while still show-
ing substantial variation across Member States 

Share of temporary employees among all employees (20-64, %, an-
nual data)  

This section looks at the implementation of the employ-
ment guideline no. 7, which recommends that Member 
States enhance the functioning of labour markets and 
the  effectiveness  of  social  dialogue.  It  covers,  among 
others, balancing flexibility and security in labour mar-
ket  policies,  preventing  labour  market  segmentation, 
adapting to new working methods, as well as ensuring 
the effectiveness of active labour market policies and 
fighting undeclared  work. These goals are in line with 
principles 4 (on active support to employment), 5 (se-
cure and adaptable employment), 7 (information about 
employment  conditions  and  protection  in  case  of  dis-
missals),  8  (social  dialogue  and involvement  of  work-
ers),  10 
(healthy,  safe,  and  well-adapted  work 
environment)  and  13  (unemployment  benefits)  of  the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. Building on existing na-
tional  practices,  the  promotion  of  social  dialogue  and 
the engagement with civil society organisations are also 
discussed. Section 2.3.2 reports on policy measures of 
Member States in these areas. 

2.3.1.  Key indicators 

While flexibility is highly valued by some workers, 
labour  market  segmentation  that  persists  over 
time  can  negatively  impact  social  fairness.  For 
some  groups,  especially  the  young  and  high-skilled, 
non-permanent jobs and part-time employment can fa-
cilitate labour market entry and skills development, as 
well as provide greater flexibility and work-life balance. 
However,  persistent  gaps  in  job  security  and  working 
conditions  between  workers  (often  with  consequences 
in  terms of  access to  social  protection)  create  divides 
that  are  not  perceived  as socially  fair and tend to  in-
crease inequalities180. In particular, temporary employ-
ment  is  associated  with  higher  job  insecurity  when  it 
does not act as a stepping-stone towards more perma-
nent  contracts.  The  precariousness  that  ensues  from 
this also contributes to less favourable working condi-
tions  in  certain  sectors  and  occupations  characterised 
by high and persistent labour shortages181. Labour mar-
ket segmentation can be addressed, among others, by 
tailored  active  labour  market  policies  that  encourage 
upward job transitions, and also incentives for employ-
ers to hire and retain workers. 

Note:  Definition differs for ES and FR in 2022 and 2023 (see 
metadata). Break in the series for CY and DK. 

Source: Eurostat, [lfsi_pt_a], EU LFS. 

Against the background of high employment rates 
in the EU, the share of temporary workers contin-
ued  to  display  a  moderately  downward  trend182. 
Among all employees aged 20-64, the share decreased 
from 12.9% in 2022 to 12.3% in 2023, which is 2 pps 
below  the  pre-pandemic  level.  The  variation  across 
Member  States  remains  substantial  though,  with  a 
21.7 pps  gap  between  the  highest  and  the  lowest 
shares. While the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
recorded shares of temporary employment above 15% 

180  Eurofound, Labour market segmentation, European Industrial 

182  Employees on temporary contracts are defined as employees 

Relations Dictionary, 2019. 

181  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-
ments in Europe 2024, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2024. 

with a limited duration contract, whose main job will terminate 
either after a period fixed in advance, or after a period not 
known in advance, but nevertheless defined by objective crite-
ria, such as the completion of an assignment or the period of 
absence of an employee temporarily replaced (Eurostat indica-
tor [lfsi_pt_a]).  

70 

051015202530NLPTESITPLFRFICYEU27SEELHRSIDEDKMTBELUIEATCZHUSKBGEELVROLT050NLPTESITPLFRFICYEU27SEELHRSIDEDKMTBELUIEATCZHUSKBGEELVROLT202320222019 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2: There is heterogeneity among Member States as regards the share of temporary con-
tracts and their transition rates to permanent jobs 

Share of temporary employees among all employees (20-64) in 2023 and transition rate to permanent jobs (15-64) (average value for 
2021, 2022 and 2023) 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Note: 

 The broader 15-64 age cohort is considered for transition rates between temporary to permanent contracts. Labour transition rate 
for DE, FR, LV, refers to 2023 and the value for LU refers to 2022. The 20-64 age cohort is used for temporary employment, in line 
with the Social Scoreboard Headline indicator on employment and related analysis in the section. Definition differs for ES and FR. 
Break in the series for CY, DK and FR. 

Source: Eurostat, [lfsi_pt_a], EU LFS and [ilc_lvhl32], EU-SILC. 

in 2023, the figures were below 3% in Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Romania and Lithuania - see Figure 2.3.1. 

Some Member States continue to experience high 
shares  of  temporary  contracts  alongside  low 
transition  rates  to  permanent  jobs.  In  2023, Italy 
and Spain registered high rates of temporary contracts 
(above 15%) combined with low transition rates (below 
and around 30%, respectively, see Figure 2.3.2). Finland, 
Poland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Cyprus had tem-
porary  employment  rates  above  the  EU  average,  but 
their transition rates to permanent contracts were rela-
tively high (between 40% and 51%), pointing to flexible 
yet  relatively  dynamic  labour  markets.  On  the  other 
hand, Latvia, Romania and Lithuania displayed a com-
bination  of  low  shares  of  temporary  contracts  (under 
3%) and high transition rates (between 50% and 64%), 
suggesting a great degree of job stability. 

Involuntary  temporary  employment  also  shows 
significant  variation  across  EU  Member  States 
and tends to affect relatively more women. Among 
all temporary workers, the proportion of those that are 
involuntarily in such a situation is an important indica-
tion  of  employees’  difficulties  in  finding  a  permanent 
job183. The percentage of those employees (aged 20-64) 
was 6.7% in 2023 in the EU, which is 0.7 pps lower than 
the  year  before.  However,  significant  differences  re-
main across Member States, with figures spanning from 
above 10% in Portugal, Spain, Cyprus, Italy and Greece 
to below 2% in Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and 
temporary 
Estonia.  The 

involuntary 

share  of 

employment  is  generally  higher  among  employed 
women (with some exceptions such as Romania, Malta, 
Bulgaria, and  Hungary)  – see Figure  2.3.3, though the 
gap continues to be relatively narrow overall (1.2 pps), 
except  for  Greece,  Cyprus,  Spain,  Finland  and  Croatia 
(where it is larger than 3 pps). 

Temporary  contracts  continue  to  be  more  wide-
spread among young people and women. The tem-
porary  employment  share  among  young  people  (aged 
15-24) in the EU decreased  by 1.5 pps as of  2022 to 
reach 48.1% in 2023. However, this figure is 37.1 pps 
higher  than  for  employees  aged  25-54.  In  2023,  the 
highest shares of young people on temporary contracts 
were reported in the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Portugal 
and Slovenia (ranging from 55% to 60%), while the low-
est were recorded in Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and 
Latvia (below 10%) – see Figure 2.3.4. The share of em-
ployed  women  (aged  20-64)  on  temporary  contracts 
slightly  decreased  in  the  EU  from  13.9%  in  2022  to 
13.2% in  2023.  The  largest  shares  were  registered  in 
the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Italy (above 17%), 
while the lowest were observed in Romania, Lithuania, 
Latvia,  Estonia  and  Bulgaria  (below  3%).  Overall,  the 
gender gap in temporary employment remained stable 
at around 2 pps in the EU. In 2023 (based on 2022 in-
comes),  workers  in  temporary  employment  were  at  a 
significantly  higher  risk  of  in-work  poverty  (12.6%) 
compared to those on permanent contracts (5.2%)184. 

183 

Involuntary temporary employment is defined as employment 
occurring in the two following situations: no permanent job was 
found [lfsa_etgar] and job was only available with a temporary 
contract [lfsa_etgar]. 

184  Eurostat [ilc_iw05], EU-SILC. 

71 

NLPTESITPLFIFRCYSEELHRSIDEDKMTBELUIEATCZHUSKBGEELVROLT051015202520304050607080Proportion of temporary employees (2023)Transition rate (average 2021-2023) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.3.3: Involuntary temporary employment 
tends to be more widespread among women 

Share of involuntary temporary employees among all employees 
(20-64) in 2023 

Figure 2.3.4: The temporary employment shares 
for young people and women differ significantly 
across Member States 

Share of temporary employees among all young (15-24 year-olds) 
employees (%, 2023) and share of temporary employees among all 
employed women (%, 2023) 

Note:  Definition differs for ES and FR. Data with low reliability for 
BG, EE, HR, LV, LT, LU, MT, AT, SI, SK. Data for Total only ‘Job 
only available with a temporary contract’ for EE, LV. Data 
for Women and Men only for ‘Job only available with a tem-
porary contract’ for LU, AT. Data for Women and Men only 
for ‘No permanent job found’ for SK. Data for Women only 
for ‘No permanent job found’ for RO. Data for Women and 
Men only for ‘Job only available with a temporary contract’ 
MT. 

Source: [lfsa_etgar] and [lfsa_etgar]. 

 Definition differs for ES and FR (see metadata).  

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_pt_a] – young people and [lfsi_pt_a] - women, 

EU LFS. 

The  share  of  part-time  employment  has  slightly 
increased, after a slow but steady decline in the 
past  eight  years  and  continues  to  display  a  sig-
nificant  involuntary  component  in  several  Mem-
ber  States.  Against  a  background  of  a  record  high 
employment rate, the share of employed persons (aged 
20-64)  working  part-time  in  the  EU  increased  from 
16.9% in 2022 to 17.1% in 2023. Five Member States 
(the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Belgium and Den-
mark) continued to report figures above 20%, while five 
(Bulgaria,  Slovakia,  Romania,  Croatia  and 
others 

Hungary) remained below 5% (Figure 2.3.5). The share 
of  involuntary  part-time  employment  out  of  the  total 
further decreased by 1.6 pps to 20% in 2023 in the EU, 
still remaining at a relatively high level. Romania, Italy 
and  Spain  recorded  the  highest  shares,  above  50%, 
while the shares in the Netherlands, Malta and Germany 
were around or below 5%. 

The share of self-employed workers without em-
ployees remained relatively stable in the EU, with 
significant differences across Member States. In  

72 

024681012141618PTESCYITELFISEFRHRPLEUMTCZLUSIBENLIEDEATSKBGDKHUROLVLTEE020Total (20-64)Women (20-64)010203040506070NLPLITPTSIFRSEBEDEESEUFIHRLUATDKIECZSKELCYMTEEHUROBGLTLV0100Young (15-24)Women (20-64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.5: The share of part-time employment 
has slightly increased, while differences in its 
involuntary component remain strong across 
Member States 

Share of part-time employment in total employment (20-64) and 
involuntary part-time employment as percentage of the total part-
time employment (20-64) (%, annual data) 

Note:  Definition differs for ES and FR (see metadata). Low relia-

bility in involuntary time series for MT and SI. 
Source: Eurostat, [lfsi_pt_a] and [lfsa_eppgai], EU LFS. 

2023, there were approximately 17.8 million self-em-
ployed  workers  without  employees  in  the  Union,  ac-
counting for 9.1% of total employment for the 20-64 
age  group185.  While  solo  self-employment  could  point 
towards entrepreneurial initiative, it could also be used 
as a proxy for ‘bogus’ self-employment, which conceals 

185  Eurostat, [lfsa_egaps] and [lfsi_emp_a], EU LFS. Definition dif-

fers for ES and FR (see metadata). 

186  See European Commission, Employment and Social develop-

ments in Europe 2023, Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2023. 

187  European Commission, Staff Working Document – Executive 

summary of the impact assessment report accompanying the 
proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on improving working conditions in platform work, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. 

73 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

dependent  employment  relationships186.  In  2023,  the 
highest shares of self-employed workers without em-
ployees (above 13%) were recorded in Greece, Poland, 
Czechia  and  Italy  and  the  lowest  (below  6%)  in  Ger-
many, Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden. 

Digital  labour  platforms  represent  an  increas-
ingly important part of the EU economy, providing 
job  opportunities  but  also  posing  specific  chal-
lenges,  notably  related  to  the  workers’  employ-
ment status. Between 2016 and 2020, revenues from 
the  EU  platform  economy  grew  almost  fivefold,  from 
roughly  EUR  3  billion  to  around  14  billion.  More  than 
500  digital  labour  platforms  operating  within  the  EU 
were  identified  in  2021.  According  to  a  Commission 
study187,  more  than  28  million  people  in  the  EU  were 
estimated  to  work  through  digital  labour  platforms  in 
2020, with this number deemed to be steadily growing. 
While the majority of these people are genuinely self-
employed, 5.5 million were estimated to be incorrectly 
classified as self-employed. More than half of the peo-
ple working through platforms earn less than the mini-
mum wage188. Against this background, the EU Directive 
on  improving  conditions  in  platform  work189  aims, 
among others, to address the issue of bogus self-em-
ployment on digital labour platforms by facilitating the 
correct  determination  of  the  employment  status 
through  a  legal  presumption  of  employment.  Further-
more,  it  provides  both  employed  and  self-employed 
platform workers with new rights ensuring more trans-
parency,  fairness  and  accountability  on  algorithmic 
management. It also creates the framework for national 
authorities  and  worker  representatives  to  have  better 
access to information from digital labour platforms and 
it strengthens social dialogue and collective bargaining. 

Overall,  rapid  advancements  in  artificial  intelli-
gence  (AI)  and  other  digital  technologies  can  be 
expected  to  drive  profound  transformations  in 
the labour market. This can be expected to impact on 
the quantity and quality of jobs, and on workers’ quality 
of life. The IMF estimates that the rollout of AI applica-
tions may affect up to 60% of employees in advanced 
economies, half of  whom may be adversely impacted 
by it190. More than 75% of companies worldwide are en-
visaging  to  adopt  AI-powered  applications  between 
2023  and  2027,  and  around  70%  of  them  consider 
technological  literacy  as  rising  in  importance  in  this 
timeframe191. Yet, employers are facing obstacles in hir-
ing people with the necessary skills. Based on the Digital 
Economy and Society Index,  3 out of 4 EU companies 
(particularly SMEs) report difficulties in finding workers  

188  European Commission, Study to gather evidence on the working 
conditions of platform workers, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2020. 

189  Directive (EU) 2024/2831 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 October 2024 on improving working condi-
tions in platform work, OJ L, 2024/2831, 11.11.2024. 
International Monetary Fund (2024), World Economic Outlook. 

190 
191  World Economic Forum, Future of Jobs Report 2023, 2023. 

010203040506070800510152025303540NLATDEBEDKSEIELUITEUFRFIEEESMTSICYELPTCZLVLTPLHUHRROSKBG-20800NLATDEBEDKSEIELUITEUFRFIEEESMTSICYELPTCZLVLTPLHUHRROSKBGPart-time employment (2023) (lhs)Involuntary part-time employment (2023)(rhs) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

with the required skills192. While recent studies193 con-
firm  that  in  the  short  term  the  main  net  employment 
impact of AI adoption might be positive, increasing the 
demand for the skills needed for its development and 
adoption,  the  employment  gains  should  be  cautiously 
balanced against the potential of AI to replace routine 
jobs194. Moreover, unlike previous waves of automation, 
generative  AI  could  significantly  impact  high-skilled 
workers. According to the ILO, over 5% of employment 
in  high-income  countries is potentially  exposed  to  the 
automating effects of generative AI195. In addition, au-
tomation through AI-powered advanced robotic tech- 

nologies can  heavily  impact  production  processes and 
service delivery, while changing job profiles and increas-
ing the need for digital, analytical and soft skills196. In 
this  context,  the  EU’s  AI  Act  (entered  into  force  since 
August 2024) aims to ensure that AI is trustworthy, safe 
and in  line  with  EU  fundamental  rights.  While  the  Act 
provides  a  general  regulatory  framework,  it  also  con-
tains some references to AI’s use in the workplace (like 
the prohibition of placing on the market or putting into 
service the use of AI systems to infer a person’s emo-
tions in the workplace)197. 

Pillar Box 4: New working methods and the right to disconnect  

Telework brings many opportunities to the world of work. The COVID-19 pandemic has had an important 
impact on working patterns. Supported by increased digitalisation, the prevalence of working from home in the 
EU rose from 11.1% in 2019 to 19.8% in 2023198. Results from a Eurofound survey show that telework in Europe 
is by now a permanent feature of our working practices, with over 60% of workers indicating that they would 
prefer to work from home at least several times per month. Telework offers opportunities in terms of autonomy, 
flexibility, inclusivity, as well as potential cost savings for both workers and employers. Those who can, still make 
use of their offices too. As a result, hybrid work arrangements combining working from the employer’s premises 
and telework in different ways emerge as a prominent work organisation model 199. However, the possibility to 
work anytime could also lead to an extended availability of workers, thereby fostering an ‘always-on’ culture.  

The ‘always-on’ culture, resulting often in additional and unpredictable working hours, could be det-
rimental to workers’ work-life balance, health and well-being. Based on a 2022 company-level survey 
carried out by Eurofound in four countries (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain), over 80% of respondents reported 
being contacted for work-related purposes outside their contractual working hours, with nine out of ten respond-
ing to such contacts. The main reasons reported for this were: feeling responsible for one’s assignments (82%), 
wishing to stay ‘on top of things’ (75%), because it was expected (75%), fear of a negative impact if no response 
was provided (61%) and the expectation of better career progression (50%)200. Over-connection, facilitated by 
the digitalisation of the world of work, is frequently perceived by workers as having a negative impact on work-
life  balance,  health  and well-being  (see  Figure  below).  Evidence  suggests that,  while  stressors  such  as work 
intensity, work-life interference and working in one’s free time (as an aspect of unsocial working hours) affect 
all workers, their effect is stronger for employees who telework than for those who work at their employer’s 
premises. Anxiety, emotional fatigue, exhaustion due to prolonged exposure to virtual meetings, and isolation 
represent  some  of  the  most  reported  mental  health  issues  among  teleworkers201.  To  mitigate  the  risks  and 
stressors of an ‘always-on' culture, the ‘right to disconnect’ could help draw clearer boundaries between one’s 
professional and private life, hence contributing to workers’ health, safety and work-life balance. Data indicate 
that, at company level, there is a positive association between the implementation of the right to disconnect 
and employees’ work-life balance, health, well-being, as well as overall job satisfaction202. 

192  The European Commission’s Digital Economy and Society Index 

(DESI) is available here.  

193  See Albanesi, S., Da Silva, A., Jimeno, J., Lamo, A., & Wabitsch, 
A. (2023), New technologies and jobs in Europe, ECB Working 
Paper No. 2023/2831 and Hayton, J., Rohenkohl, B., Christopher, 
P., Liu, HY (2024). What drives UK firms to adopt AI and robot-
ics, and what are the consequences for jobs?, University of Sus-
sex. Report.  

194  European Commission, Artificial Intelligence: Economic Impact, 

195 

Opportunities, Challenges, Implications for Policy, (Discussion 
Paper 210), Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
International Labour Organisation, Generative AI and jobs: A 
global analysis of potential effects on job quantity and quality, 
2023. 

196  Eurofound, Human–robot interaction: What changes in the 

workplace?, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
197  Regulation 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on arti-
ficial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, 
(EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 

74 

2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, 
(EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act), 
OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024. 

198  Eurostat [lfsa_ehomp], share of employees aged 15-74 report-

ing working from home sometimes and usually. 

199  Eurofound, Fifth round of the Living, working and COVID-19 e-

survey: Living in a new era of uncertainty, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2022. 

200  Eurofound, Right to disconnect: Implementation and impact at 
company level, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2023. 

201  European Commission, Study exploring the social, economic 

and legal context and trend of telework and the right to discon-
nect, in the context of digitalisation and the future of work, dur-
ing and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2024. 

202  Eurofound, Right to disconnect: Implementation and impact at 
company level, Publications Office of the European Union, 
2023. 

 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Over-connection is frequently perceived as having a negative impact on work-life balance, health 
and well-being 

Perceived impact of over-connection on health and well-being (%) 

Source:  Eurofound calculations, based on the Right to disconnect survey 2022. 

Against this background, in 2021 the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the Commission to 
present a legislative proposal on the right to disconnect and an EU legislative framework for telework203. As part 
of the follow-up to the resolution, the Commission published a study exploring the social, economic and legal 
context and trends of telework and the right to disconnect204. While no agreement was reached by the social 
partners on the review of the Framework Agreement on telework, the Commission initiated a formal two-stage 
consultation on a potential EU initiative on telework and the right to disconnect. The first stage of this consulta-
tion205 ran between 30 April and 25 July 2024. In addition, in July 2024 the Commission launched a study to 
gather evidence and analyse the added value and impacts of potential policy options of an initative on telework 
and the right to disconnect. Furthermore, the introduction of a right to disconnect is mentioned in the mission 
letter of Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness Roxana Mînzatu 206. 

Several  Member  States  have  already  implemented  measures  targeting  telework  and  the  right  to 
disconnect. Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, some Member States adopted or amended legisla-
tion  concerning  the  statutory  definition  of  telework.  Currently, relevant  legislation  on  the  right  to  disconnect 
exists in 13 Member States but with variations in terms of scope, definition, implementation and enforcement. 
France, Spain, Belgium and Italy were the first four countries with national legislation on the right to discon-
nect, with the other nine, namely Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Croatia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slo-
venia, Slovakia, introducing new legislation, an amendment to existing national laws, or national guidance to 
establish this right. 

Labour inspectorates play a key role in detecting 
and  preventing  poor  working  conditions  and 
fighting undeclared work. The increased use of infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) and the 
development  of  the  platform  economy  have  brought 
about new  challenges for labour inspectorates in per-
forming their tasks. AI tools can significantly improve  

fraud  detection  and  risk  assessment,  while  it  remains 
important to ensure transparency, and that the tools are 
developed with all the necessary guarantees for busi-
nesses and citizens. Compliance with EU data protection 
and transparency rules is crucial in this respect. At the 
same  time,  labour  inspectorates  need  to  be  endowed 
with appropriate resources to perform their tasks207. The  

203  P9_TA (2021)0021 European Parliament resolution of 21 Janu-
ary 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on the 
right to disconnect (2019/2181(INL)). 

204  European Commission, Study exploring the social, economic 

and legal context and trend of telework and the right to discon-
nect, in the context of digitalisation and the future of work, dur-
ing and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, Publications Office of 
the European Union, 2024. 

205  European Commission, Consultation document: First-phase con-
sultation of social partners under Article 154 TFEU on possible 

EU action in the area of telework and workers’ right to discon-
nect, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 
206  Mission letter of European Commission Executive Vice-Presi-

dent for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness 
Roxana Mînzatu. 

207  For details, see the European Labour Authority (ELA) website: 

www.ela.europa.eu; European Labour Authority, The rise of tele-
working: improvements in legislation and challenges for tack-
ling undeclared work, Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2023; European Labour Authority, Methods and 

75 

05101520253035404550It has a negative impact onmy work during mycontractual working dayIt has a negative impact onmy relationship with mycolleaguesIt has a negative impact onmy health and well-beingIt has a negative impact onmy family lifeIt is not an issue for me  Agree  Neither agree nor disagree  Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.3.6: Long-term unemployment rates continued to decline in the large majority of Member 
States 

Long-term unemployment rate, 2023 levels and changes from 2022 (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note: 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Definition differs for ES and FR. Break in the 
series for CY and DK. 
Source: Eurostat [tesem130], EU LFS. 

ILO’s indicators on labour inspectorates show that ca-
pacity and resources are very different in this respect 
across EU countries. The ILO indicator on the number of 
inspectors per 10 000 employed persons ranged from 
0.18 in Malta to 1.8 in Romania in 2021. Between 2009 
and 2021, the number of inspectors increased signifi-
cantly  in  Czechia  (+58.1%)  and  Portugal  (+36.8%), 
while  it  decreased  in  Lithuania  (-38%),  Romania 
(-28.8%), Ireland (-25.4%) and Croatia (-22.6%). Over-
all, there  is a  declining  trend in  the  number of  labour 
inspections208.  The  European  Platform  tackling  unde-
clared  work,  coordinated  by  the  European  Labour  Au-
thority  (ELA),  continues  to  support  Member  States’ 
efforts  to  develop  comprehensive  approaches  in  ad-
dressing the challenge. 

Long-term unemployment continued to decline in 
the  EU,  in  particular  in  Member  States  with  the 
highest  levels.  The  long-term  unemployment  rate 
stood at 2.1% in the EU in 2023, which is 0.3 pps below 
the 2022 level. The difference between the highest and 
lowest  rates  across  the  Member  States  further  de-
creased from 7.2 pps in 2022 to 5.7 pps in 2023 (Figure 
2.3.6).  A  significant  decrease  was  recorded  in  Greece 
(-1.5 pps  to  6.2%)  and  Spain  (-0.8 pps  to  4.3%).  With 

the third largest rate in the EU (4.2%), Italy is in a ‘crit-
ical  situation’,  together  with  Slovakia.  Having  experi-
enced  increasing  rates,  Hungary  and  Luxembourg  are 
now ‘to watch’, while Czechia is ‘good but to monitor’. 
On the other hand, Denmark and the  Netherlands are 
‘best performers’, with overall very low rates in 2023. 
The gender gap in long-term unemployment rates was 
low  (below  0.5 pps)  in  2023  in  most  Member  States, 
with the exception of Greece, Spain and Italy (4.5 pps, 
1.5 pps,  and  1 pp,  respectively).  Large  regional  differ-
ences  can  be  observed  in  several  Member  States,  in-
cluding  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Slovakia  and 
France  (see  Figure  7  in  Annex  5),  including  outermost 
regions. 

Against the background of a tight labour market, 
participation  rates  in  active  labour  market  poli-
cies continue to vary significantly across Member 
States. In 2022, the share of unemployed persons will-
ing  to  work,  who  participated  in  active  labour  market 
policy  measures  remained  relatively  stable  in  most 
Member  States  compared  to  2021,  while  sharp  de-
creases  were  registered  in  some  cases  (Figure  2.3.7). 
The  lowest  participation  rates  (below  10%)  were  ob-
served in 2022 in Romania, Latvia, Greece, Croatia and 

instruments to gather evidence of undeclared work, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. 

208  Eurofound, Minimum wages: Non-compliance and enforcement 

across EU Member States – Comparative report, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2023. 

76 

CZDKNLATDEEEIEMTPLHULUITSKBEBGCYFIFRHRLTLVPTROSESIELESy = -0.1955x + 0.1918R² = 0.5144-2.0-1.5-1.0-0.50.00.51.0-2-1012345678Long-term unemployment rate (% active population aged 15-74) -changeLong-term unemployment rate (% active population aged 15-74)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Cyprus. On the other hand, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Spain  and  Ireland  recorded  figures  above  70%.  Com-
pared  to  2021,  the  participation  rate  nearly  halved  in 
Hungary  (from  72.5%  to  37.3%)  and  Bulgaria  (from 
51.9% to 27.3%), while Portugal’s rate also fell signifi-
cantly,  from  62.0%  to  42.5%.  A  notable  increase  by 
16.7 pps was recorded in Italy. From a longer-term per-
spective, the share of the unemployed participating in 
active labour market polices has been increasing stead-
ily in the EU by more than 50% since 2013. 

There is still heterogeneity across Member States 
in the implementation of actions in favour of the 
long-term  unemployed. The 2022 data  collection in 
the context of the monitoring of the Council Recommen-
dation on long-term unemployment209 shows that just 
over half of the Member States (15) achieved at least 
90% coverage in delivering Job Integration Agreements 
(JIA) to all long-term unemployed registered for at least 
18 months. In six Member States, at least one in three 
of them did not have a JIA. On the contrary, in 13 other 
Member States, more than 95% of all long-term unem-
ployed  received  a  JIA  or  equivalent,  with  the  overall 
share  having  increased  compared  to  2021.  The  pro-
spects of JIA users of finding employment deteriorated 
slightly in 2022. Available data for 23 Member States 
show  that  a  total  of  just  under  3.7  million  JIA  users 
ended their unemployment spell, of which 1.7 million (or 
47.6%) were known to have taken up employment (vs 
49.1% in 2021). More importantly, the figures consist-
ently show that the group of Member States providing 
Individual Action Plans with in-depth assessment record 
significantly better results when it comes to the labour 
market integration of the long-term unemployed210. 

Effective and efficient active labour market poli-
cies are important to support good labour market 
outcomes. Member States’  spending on active labour 
market  policies  shows  marked  differences.  In  2022, 
Greece,  Italy,  Slovakia  and  Portugal  registered  long-
term  unemployment  rates  above  the  EU  average  of 
2.4%, while spending on active labour market interven-
tions less than the EU average of 0.6% of GDP (Figure 
2.3.8).  On  the  other  hand,  Ireland,  Denmark,  Finland, 
Sweden and Austria, which have long-term unemploy-
ment rates below 2%, allocated the highest GDP shares 
to active labour market policies (ranging from approxi-
mately 0.5% to 1.2%). Spain continued to spend more, 
relative to GDP, in active labour market measures, while 
experiencing  high  long-term  unemployment  (following 
a decrease from 6.2% to 5.1% though). Finally, Croatia, 
Belgium and France showed  values relatively close to 
the  EU  average  as  regards  both  ALMP  spending  and 
long-term unemployment. 

209  Council recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integra-
tion of the long-term unemployed into the labour market 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.3.7: Participation rates in active labour 
market policies were stagnant or declined in 
most Member States 

Participants in regular labour market policy (LMP) interventions (cat-
egories 2-7) per 100 unemployed persons wanting to work, total 
age class 

Note:  Time series not available for CZ. Latest available data for 

EU and RO (2020) and CY, EL, HR, IE (2021). Time series are 
estimated for DK, NL and SE. Data have low reliability for 
EL and LT. Data not available for PL (2021). Figures above 
100% would indicate that people register more than once in 
the Active Labour Market Policy dataset as part of their par-
ticipation in different categories of measures or due to par-
ticipants who are not registered as jobseekers. 

Source: Eurostat [lmp_ind_actsup]. 

In 2023, public employment services (PES) oper-
ated  in  an  environment  of  labour  shortages  ac-
companied  by  low  levels  of  unemployment  and 
thus a decline in the number of registered unem-
ployed  people  in  the  majority  of  the  Member 
States.  To  respond  to  the  labour  shortages,  the  PES 
Network211 has adapted the PES institutional excellence 

210  European Commission, Data collection for monitoring of the 

LTU Recommendation: 2022 results, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2024. 

211  See: European Network of Public Employment Services. 

77 

020406080100120ROLVELHRCYLTSIDESKMTSEBGATFIHUFRPTEUPLEELUBEITDKNLESIE0200RO20222021 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

reference framework, putting more emphasis on activa-
tion and multi-actor partnerships212. PES in 26 Member 
States have set strategies and targets to ease labour 
market access for the most vulnerable groups. Also, in 
2023  PES  worked  on  fostering  fair  green  and  digital 
transitions, with a strong focus on skills and on support-
ing workers facing job transitions. More specifically, PES 
from 18 Member States cooperated with employers to 
identify  skills  needs  for  green  jobs,  support  industrial 
restructuring,  and  help  implement  employment  subsi-
dies for green jobs. PES from 17  Member States pro-
vided up- and re-skilling for workers. In order to support 
SMEs find workers with the right skills, PES have taken 
steps in shifting from occupation-based approaches to-
wards  skills-based  approaches  in  their  profiling  and 
matching activities. Cooperation between public and pri-
vate employment services has also been evolving over 
the past years, with several PES broadening and rein-
forcing their cooperations with private job portals and 
private employment agencies or planning to do so213. 

The share of short-term  unemployed covered by 
unemployment  benefits  increased  slightly  in  the 
EU in 2023, albeit with variation across Member 
States. It rose from 35.8% in 2022 to 36.6% in 2023 
(Figure  2.3.9)214.  While  Slovenia  (-5.9 pps),  Ireland  (-
5 pps) and Belgium (-4 pps) experienced the biggest de-
clines, high increases in coverage were observed in Es-
tonia  (5.9 pps)  and  Bulgaria  (5.3 pps).  In  2023,  the 
highest coverage rates were recorded in Germany, Fin-
land  and  Austria  (over  50%),  followed  by  Estonia, 
France and Lithuania (above 40%). Conversely, the low-
est coverage was observed in Romania and Poland (be-
low  15%).  Compared  to  2022,  the  share  of  the 
unemployed registered for less than one year that re-
ceived benefits or assistance remained relatively stable 
in the EU in 2023, at around 35%. The share of short-
term unemployed covered by unemployment benefits is 
positively correlated with higher transitions from short-
term  unemployment  to  employment  and  lower  in-
stances of long-term unemployment. Overall, the rules 
concerning the qualifying period remained stable in al-
most  all  Member  States,  with  great  variation  among 
them, ranging from 13 weeks of insurance contributions 
in Italy, 51 weeks in Hungary, Portugal or Spain, to 104 
weeks in Slovakia215. The maximum duration of unem-
ployment benefits for those with a one-year work rec-
ord remained also unchanged in most Member States. 
Overall, in 16 EU countries the unemployed with a one-
year work history are eligible for benefits for at most 6 
months. Income replacement is also closely associated 
to the duration of the unemployment spell. Net replace-
ment rates for low-wage earners with short work record 
vary significantly across Member States. In the second 
month, the net replacement rates range from 6.9% of  

Figure 2.3.8: Spending on active labour market 
policy measures differs significantly between 
Member States 

Spending on active labour market policy interventions (categories 2-
7, in percentage of GDP, 2022) and long-term unemployment rate 
(aged 15-74) (%, 2022) 

Note:  Latest available data for labour market policy (LMP) ex-

penditure for EU, IT, CY and RO (2020) and HR and IE 
(2021). Data on LMP expenditure estimated for DE, NL and 
SE. Provisional LMP data for FR. Definition of long-term un-
employment differs for ES and FR.  

Source: Eurostat [lmp_expsumm], Labour market policy (LMP) data-

base and [tesem130], EU LFS. 

the previous (net) earnings in Hungary to 90% in Bel-
gium (Figure 2.3.10). In Luxembourg, Denmark, France 
and Finland the  replacement  rate  (all  exceeding  60%, 
and in some cases significantly higher) is the same at 
the 2nd as at the 12th month of unemployment.  

212  European Commission, PES Network Benchlearning manual, 

214  Short-term unemployed are those unemployed for less than 12 

Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

months. 

213  European Commission, Trends in PES: Assessment report on 

215  The analysis refers to unemployment benefits generally given 

PES capacity, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023, 
data adjusted to represent the EU only. 

to those registering after becoming unemployed through no 
fault of their own, without including schemes of a temporary 
nature. 

78 

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.21.40123456789ELESITSKPTEUHRBECYLTBGROFRLVSESIFIEEIELUATHUMTDEPLNLCZDK0.02.0010ELESITSKPTEUHRBECYLTBGROFRLVSESIFIEEIELUATHUMTDEPLNLCZDKLong-term unemployment rate (2022) (lhs)LMP expenditure (% GDP, 2022) (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.3.9: There were limited changes in the 
coverage of unemployment benefits for short-
term jobseekers, with persistent differences 
across Member States 

Unemployment benefit coverage rates for the short-term unem-
ployed (less than 12 months, 15-64 year olds, %) 

Figure 2.3.10: Significant differences exist in re-
placement rates across Member States for both 
short- and long-term unemployment 

Net replacement rate of unemployment benefits at 67% of the av-
erage wage, at the 2nd and 12th month of unemployment (2023 
and 2022) 

Note: 

 Data are not available for MT. Definition differs for ES and 
FR (see metadata). Break in the series for DK and CY. Low 
reliability for LU and SI. 
Source: Eurostat [lfsa_ugadra], EU LFS. 

Note:  The indicator is calculated for the case of a single person 

without children with a short work history (1 year) and aged 
20. Different income components, unemployment benefits 
and other benefits (such as social assistance and housing 
benefits) are included. All data are for 2023, except for BE, 
CY, DK, FI, and PT, for which data are for 2022. 
Source: European Commission calculations, based on OECD Tax-

Benefit Model. 

The labour market outcomes for EU movers216 con-
tinue to improve. The total number and employment 
rate  of  working-age  EU  movers  have  remained  on  an 
upward trend, reaching 10.1 million and an employment 
rate of 78% (vs 76% for nationals) in 2023. In the same 
year,  the  total  number of  cross-border workers  in  the 
EU was 1.8 million (up by 3% compared to 2022) and 
1.5  million  EU  citizens  changed  the  country  in  which 

they worked. Most mobile workers return to their coun-
try of origin, with an increase in their number by 6% for 
the EU in 2023, and significant variation between Mem-
ber States217. In 2024, the Commission published a re-
view  of  cooperation  practices  and 
challenges 
concerning posted workers in the EU, focussing on their 
rights, particularly as regards accommodation and ac-
cess to information on the conditions of employment218. 

216  EU and EFTA movers are EU or EFTA citizens who reside in an 
EU or EFTA country other than their country of citizenship (See 
Annual reports on intra-EU labour mobility). 

217  European Commission (forthcoming), Annual report on intra EU-

labour mobility 2024.  

218  See Commission Staff Working Document available here. 

79 

0102030405060ROPLSIHRCYBGHULUSKNLSEPTLVELITIEDKESEUCZBELTFREEATFIDE0100R…PLSIH…CYB…H…LUSKNLSEPTLVELITIEDKESEUCZBELTFREEATFIDE202320220.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91.0HUSKROPLIEMTLTELATDECYFILVCZEEFRNLSIITHRPTBGESDKSELUBE0.00.51.0HUPLLTDELVFRITBGSE2023 replacement rate 2 months2023 replacement rate 12 months2022 replacement rate 2 months2022 replacement rate 12 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.3.11: The degree of involvement of social partners varies by policy context 
Social partners’ involvement in the design of national policies by policy context 

Note: 

 The figure includes 2 290 policies tagged with the respective context (some double counting due to the possibility that one policy 
may relate to more than one contexts), collected between April 2020 and July 2024. Policies only include legislation or other statu-
tory regulations and tripartite agreements. Social partners involvement presented as average of employers and trade unions involve-
ment in each category by context. Differences in the degree of employers’ versus unions’ involvement are minor. 

Source: Eurofound’s EU PolicyWatch Database. 

Well-functioning  social  dialogue  and  collective 
bargaining  are  key  to  improving  working  condi-
tions and mitigating labour shortages, yet social 
partner  involvement  varies  across  policy  areas. 
Between April 2020 and July 2024, the greatest degree 
of involvement of social partners was reported with re-
gard to COVID-19 related policies, with nearly 37% of 
these  being  agreed  or  consulted  with  the  social  part-
ners. This was followed by measures to cushion the im-
pact of the higher cost of living (31%), those related to 
the green transition (27%), restructuring support instru-
ments  (26%)  and  measures  related  to  the  war  in 
Ukraine (25%). The lowest degree of involvement was 
recorded for policy measures in the context of the digi-
tal transformation (22%) or related to extreme weather 
events (13%). This reflects the fact that social partners 
tend to be involved to the largest extent in policy areas 
concerning  the  workplace  (affecting  businesses  and 
workers) (Figure 2.3.11). The Employment Committee’s 
(EMCO) annual multilateral surveillance review on social 
dialogue  of  November  2023  highlighted  that  limited 
progress had been made in achieving more effective so-
cial dialogue and social partners’ involvement in policy-
making. Also, the national social partners’ assessment 
of the quality of their involvement in the implementa-
tion of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in 2023 was 
uneven. For the implementation of their Recovery and 
Resilience Plan (RRP), each Member State has chosen a 
governance  structure  adapted  to  their  respective  na-
tional  social  dialogue  frameworks.  The  institutional 
frameworks for involving the social partners are there-
fore  diverse,  since  some  Member  States  have  estab-
lished specific settings and procedures, and others have 
used existing social dialogue channels. In a few coun-
tries,  the  social  partners  have  been  involved  through 
new  bodies  or  specific  working  groups  created  in  the 

context of the European Semester or to monitor the im-
plementation of the RRPs219. 

At the Val Duchesse Social Partners Summit of 31 
January 2024, the Commission, the Belgian Pres-
idency,  and  the  cross-industry  social  partners 
signed a ‘Tripartite Declaration for a Thriving So-
cial Dialogue’. This represents a renewed commitment 
to  strengthen  social  dialogue  at  EU  level  and  to  join 
forces in addressing the key challenges that our econo-
mies and labour markets are facing220. The Declaration 
announced  the  appointment  by  the  Commission  of  a 
new European Social Dialogue Envoy and the launch of 
a process towards a Pact for Social Dialogue to be con-
cluded at the beginning of 2025. The Envoy will support 
and coordinate the implementation of the 2023 Com-
munication on strengthening social dialogue in the EU, 
as well  as the  Commission’s  response  to  the  joint  re-
ports from the European social partners on social dia-
logue  at  EU  level.  As  regards  the  Pact  for  European 
Social Dialogue, a series of tripartite and bipartite meet-
ings  with  the  European  social  partners  will  be  under-
taken to identify new proposals to reinforce  European 
social  dialogue.  These  meetings  will  address,  among 
others, the EU institutional and financial support for Eu-
ropean social dialogue at all levels, capacity building of 
social partners (including through ESF+), an agreed bi-
partite approach on the negotiation, promotion and im-
plementation of social partners agreements. 

Regular dialogue and consultation with civil soci-
ety  organisations  is  instrumental  for  delivering 
impactful  and  inclusive  policies.  As  acknowledged 
by the 2024 La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights, civil society plays a key 
the  fight  against  social  exclusion  and 
role 

in 

219  Eurofound, Social governance of the Recovery and Resilience 

220  Tripartite Declaration for a Thriving European Social Dialogue. 

Facility: Involvement of the national social partners, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

80 

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%COVID-19Cost of LivingGreen TransitionRestructuringSupport InstrumentsWar in UkraineDigitalTransformationExtreme WeatherEventsAgreed (outcome) incl. social partner initiativeConsultedInformedNo involvement/not in domainUnknown 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

increasing  digitalisation  and  automation  of  business 
processes. 

Several  Member  States  have  adopted  measures 
aiming to reinforce their employment protection 
frameworks. In April 2024, Slovenia introduced regu-
latory  measures  strengthening  workers’  information 
and consultation rights, as well as co-determination in 
the management or supervisory bodies of the company 
in case of a cross-border merger, division or conversion 
of the company. In  May 2024, work ability prevention 
legislation entered into force in Estonia, allowing a per-
son  on  long-term  sick  leave  to  work  in  conditions 
adapted to his or her health status, after two months 
during  the  sick  leave.  This  reform  should  support  the 
healing process of employees with a chronic illness dur-
ing their long-term  sick leave, while reducing  depend-
ency and risks of job loss and/or permanent incapacity. 
In July 2024, changes related to the collective dismis-
sals legislation entered into force in  Spain. Undertak-
ings intending to close one or more workplaces resulting 
in the definitive cessation of activity and the dismissal 
of  fifty  or  more  workers  have  an  obligation  of  six 
months prior notification. In September 2024, Greece 
launched  the  pilot  implementation  of  the  digital  work 
card in the catering and tourism sectors, aiming to com-
bat undeclared overtime and excess working time. The 
pilot is already applied to employees in banks, large su-
permarkets,  insurance  companies,  security  companies 
and public enterprises.  

Some Member States have taken further steps to 
improve  their  occupational  health  and  safety 
frameworks.  In  June  2023,  the  law  on  urgent 
measures to protect workers in case of climate emer-
gency entered into force in Italy. One of its provisions 
refers to the role of the Ministry of Labour in promoting 
social dialogue to reach  sectoral agreements that en-
sure occupational safety and health in case of climate 
emergencies, including heat waves. In addition, in Octo-
ber  2023,  Italy  ratified  ILO  fundamental  conventions 
C155 (Occupational Safety and Health Convention) and 
C187 (Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety 
and Health Convention). In December 2023, the  Swe-
dish government tasked the Work Environment Agency 
with  the  submission  of  proposals  for  initiatives  that 
could  lead  to  more  workers  expressing  interest  in  the 
role of safety representative. The Agency submitted a 
report to the Ministry of Labour in April 2024. In Decem-
ber 2023, Denmark amended the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act to  strengthen the work compensation  system 
(e.g., through a new training allowance, reviewing case 
processing times, increasing the level of compensation 
introducing  a  workplace  injury  insurance  scheme  in 
cases of violence for caregivers). Furthermore, the law 
introduced d a dependency loss compensation for chil-
dren  and  young  people.  In  September  2024,  Spain 
passed  a  regulation  concerning  safety  and  health 

inequalities, and with regard to policies that concern un-
der-represented and vulnerable groups. At the EU level, 
civil  society  organisations  are  actively  involved  in  the 
European  Semester,  with  regular  exchanges  of  views 
and  thematic  discussions  on  areas  of  particular  rele-
vance.  Recent  Eurofound  research  examines  the  in-
volvement  of  civil  society  organisations  in  the  early 
implementation of the Territorial Just Transition Plans 
(TJTPs) in some Member States. First empirical research 
suggests that a meaningful dialogue with civil society 
on policy measures and support to vulnerable workers, 
communities and industries still requires reducing hur-
dles to participation, creating opportunities for joint as-
sessment  of  needs,  supporting  capacity  building  and 
facilitating knowledge sharing221. 

2.3.2.  Measures taken by Member States 

Efforts  to  address  the  causes  of  labour  market 
segmentation  continue  in  some  Member  States. 
Following a public consultation launched in July 2023, 
the  Netherlands  is  preparing  a  bill  focussed  on  in-
creasing the security of workers under flexible employ-
ment  contracts  by  abolishing  zero-hours  contracts, 
replacing on-call contracts with a new type of contract 
providing  more  income  security  for  workers,  and  im-
proving the job security of temporary agency workers. 
In addition, the Netherlands launched a public consul-
tation in October 2023 on a bill clarifying the concept 
of employment relationship and introducing a legal pre-
sumption of employment for the self-employed without 
employees  (working  for  a  tariff  below  EUR  36).  In 
Czechia, an amendment to the Employment Act came 
into  force  in  January  2024,  which  aims  to  clarify  and 
streamline the conditions for the provision of services 
by  employment  agencies.  The  legislation  has  been 
tightened in the areas of illegal and disguised employ-
ment and it now includes fines. Finland announced in 
its  2023  government  programme  a  reform  of  fixed-
term  employment  contracts.  While  employment  con-
tracts could be concluded for a fixed term of one year 
without a special reason, the legislation will ensure that 
they will not lead to an unjustified use  of consecutive 
fixed-term contracts. Spain is preparing an amendment 
of the regulatory development of training contracts, de-
veloping the procedure for linking students with compa-
nies. This amendment focuses on the training aspects 
of the alternating training contract, where the goal is to 
make  paid  work  compatible  with  training  processes 
within the scope of the Catalogue of Training Speciali-
ties of the National Employment System. As part of its 
RRP, Slovenia is preparing an act establishing a perma-
nent short-time work scheme including also for severe 
economic  downturns,  building  on  the  experience  ac-
quired during the COVID-19 crisis. The act shall include 
education  and  training  obligations  during  part-time 
work to strengthen the competences and increase the 
employability  of  affected  workers  in  light  of  the 

221  Eurofound, Creating a new social contract for the just transi-
tion: Is partnership working?, Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2024. 

81 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

protection in the context of domestic work. The regula-
tion specifies the list of rights of domestic workers and 
the duties of employers, providing the necessary legal 
certainty for their effectiveness. In April 2024, Bulgaria 
ratified fundamental ILO  conventions C155 and C187 
and, in October 2024, the Netherlands ratified C187 
pertaining to occupational health and safety. 

New  working  arrangements,  such  as  flexible 
working,  telework  and  remote  work,  are  on  the 
agenda of several Member States. Amendments to 
the Czech Labour Code entered into force in September 
2023, with one of the key changes being the regulation 
of  remote  work.  Also,  parents  of  young  children  and 
caregivers  have  enhanced  support  to  combine  family 
life with work. Another novelty is the possibility to pro-
vide  remote  workers  with  compensation  for  the  most 
common costs related to their home office in the form 
of a flat rate. In Ireland, the Right to Request Remote 
Work Bill was integrated into the Work Life Balance and 
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, and the changes entered 
into force in March 2024. The Act includes workers’ right 
to request remote work and carers’ right to request flex-
ible  working,  including  the  right  to  compressed  or  re-
duced  hours  for  breastfeeding  mothers.  As part  of  its 
RRP,  Cyprus  introduced  in  March  2024  a  scheme  to 
provide  incentives  for  the  employment  of  people  that 
are  unemployed  by  providing  flexible  forms  of  work 
through  teleworking.  In  March  2024,  Bulgaria  imple-
mented a reform included in its RRP through which the 
rules on distance work established by the Labour Code 
were amended to facilitate access to remote work by 
providing  legal  certainty  for  workers  and  employers 
alike, clarifying the rules on health and safety and on 
monitoring and reporting of working time. 

Some  Member  States  have  taken  legislative  ac-
tion  to  improve  working  conditions  in  platform 
work and tackle challenges resulting from the use 
of  algorithmic  management  in  the  workspace. 
Changes to the Croatian Labour Act, which took effect 
on 1 January 2024 and are part of the RRP, specify that 
digital labour platforms and aggregators (intermediar-
ies connecting such platforms with workers) are jointly 
liable  for  salary  payment  to  platform  workers.  They 
must inform platform workers of the work organization 
and  decision-making  processes  and  ensure  the  trans-
parency of data. As part of its RRP, Cyprus is reforming 
its  social  insurance  to  cover  the  self-employed,  and 
those  in  non-standard  forms  of  employment,  such  as 
platform workers. In Germany, the government is cur-
rently working on a specific  employee data protection 
law  which  will,  among  others,  deal  with  typical  situa-
tions that arise in the context of algorithmic manage-
ment in the workplace, such as video surveillance and 
the  use  of  AI  systems.  Portugal  recently  introduced 
regulation  on  algorithmic  management  at  work  under 
the  2023  decent  work  agenda.  The  law  stipulates, 
among  others,  that  collective  bargaining  agreements 
can regulate the use of algorithms and artificial intelli-
gence. 

82 

Some Member States have been taking measures 
to reduce the incidence of undeclared work. As part 
of its RRP, Greece is preparing the implementation of 
an IT system for labour market monitoring (ARIADNE), 
which will ensure the digital recording of working time 
and act as a single gateway for employment and social 
insurance  administrative  data.  As  of  December  2023, 
the Italian Revenue Agency and the National Social Se-
curity Institute are set to achieve full interoperability of 
their respective databases so as to tackle tax evasion in 
the domestic work sector. As of April 2024, as part of 
its RRP, Italy strengthened labour inspection activities 
and introduced deterrent and incentivising measure to 
reduce  the  incidence  of  undeclared  work.  In  2024,  in 
Lithuania, changes to the rules on mandatory debt col-
lection entered into force, with the aim of incentivising 
more  unemployed  to  return  to  the  labour market  and 
thus reduce the shadow economy Upon registering with 
the  Public  Employment  Service,  indebted  unemployed 
can benefit of a period of 6 months (available no more 
than twice during 5 years) during which no mandatory 
debt collection action is taken against them. 

Member States continue to address long-term un-
employment through various targeted measures. 
In  Austria,  the  Springboard  programme  (launched  in 
2021 with the aim of combatting long-term unemploy-
ment  through  subsidised  employment  either  in  social 
enterprises  or  through  particularly  favourable  condi-
tions  for  integration  assistance)  became  part  of  the 
public employment service’s regular budget as of 2023. 
In  the  same  year,  Portugal  created  an  exceptional 
measure that allows the partial accumulation of unem-
ployment benefits with income from work, aiming to en-
courage  the  long-term  unemployed  to  return  to  the 
labour market. In April 2024, Slovakia launched the na-
tional project Financial Incentives for Employment in or-
der  to  support  the  unemployed  in  a  disadvantaged 
position  due  to  age,  complicated  family  situation,  low 
education, loss of work habits, disability and other rea-
sons.  Between  April  and  September  2024,  Hungary 
launched a call for the Job Trial Pilot Programme aimed 
to address the labour needs of enterprises by increasing 
the domestic labour supply and promoting the employ-
ment  of  the  long-term  unemployed.  The  participating 
SMEs  receive  support  not  only  for  wages  (for up  to  9 
months) but also to provide personalised development 
and mentoring to the long-term unemployed based on 
the  assessment  of  their  competences.  The  long-term 
unemployed receive an additional allowance (on top of 
their wages) as incentive to remain in employment, for 
up to 9 months. In 2023, Croatia launched a targeted 
active labour market policy programme (‘Job plus’) for 
the long-term unemployed and vulnerable groups. De-
pending on the distance from the labour market, it of-
fers  long-term  unemployed  people  a  set  of  2-3 
measures  (activation  programme,  work  integration 
or/and  upskilling/training)  to  support  their  integration 
into the labour market. 

 
 
 
Several Member States have taken steps to rein-
force their active labour market policies and as-
sistance  provided  to  different  groups.  Finland  is 
preparing  a  reform  of  the  employment  and  economic 
development services. The responsibility for organising 
these  services  will  be  transferred  to  municipalities  or 
municipal co-management areas, to be established on 
1  January  2025.  A  funding  model  will  be  created  for 
municipalities to develop their employment  promotion 
activities. The Slovenian Ministry of Labour, Family, So-
cial Affairs and Equal Opportunities is reviewing and up-
dating  the  enforcing  documents  of  the  Guidelines  for 
the  implementation  of  active  labour  market  policy 
2021-2025, with a special focus on the Active Employ-
ment Policy Plan and the Catalogue of Active Employ-
ment  Policy  Measures. 
In  Belgium,  the  federal 
government adopted a package of measures to support 
the  progressive  return  of  workers following  long-term 
sick leave. In November 2023, a communication cam-
paign was launched to inform these workers about all 
the  available  re-entry  pathways.  A  Royal  Decree  of 
March  2024  introduced  three  compulsory  guidance 
meetings  for  improved  activation.  As  of  April  2025, 
vouchers of EUR 1800 will be available for tailored ca-
reer guidance for workers who have been on sick leave 
for at least a year. In order to reintegrate in the labour 
market unemployed people over 50, Austria is making 
use of a range of services and funding instruments, in-
cluding  the  combined  wage  subsidy  (in  2023,  around 
EUR  286.3  million  in  subsidy  expenditure  was  allo-
cated).  In  Malta,  the  Access  to  Employment  scheme, 
running  between  2023  and  2029  and  co-financed  by 
ESF+,  provides  financial  assistance  to  employers  and 
work opportunities for individuals distanced from gain-
ful employment. In Portugal, the programme ‘Qualifica 
On’, established in 2024, aims to support the (re-)qual-
ification of workers from companies that are at a stand-
still  in  production  due  to  restructuring.  In  its  annual 
national  employment  action  plan  for  2024,  Bulgaria 
aims to up/re-skill 9 000 persons and provide  support 
for employment to almost 10 000. In addition, between 
2023 and 2026, Bulgaria is investing EUR 153 million, 
with support from ESF+, in a holistic approach to inte-
grate  inactive  people  in  the  labour  market  through 
stronger  activation,  training  and awareness  raising.  In 
Slovakia, the new national project ‘Skills for the Labour 
Market’, co-financed by ESF+ until 2026, aims to sup-
port jobseekers in their efforts to find a job through re-
training. The target group are disadvantaged jobseekers 
under the Employment Service Act (e.g., young people 
below 26; citizens over 50; long-term unemployed; low-
skilled). 

Several Member States are taking measures with 
the objective of reinforcing the capacity and per-
formance  of  their  public  employment  services 
(PES),  in  light  of  existing  labour  shortages  and 
skills  needs.  Between 2021 and 2023, the  RRF sup-
ported a set of continuing training actions for the PES 
employees  in  Spain.  As  part  of  its  RRP,  Spain  com-
pleted in 2023 an investment aimed at revamping the 
PES  by  improving  internal  management  systems, 

83 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

modernising jobs and the digitalisation of the Citizens’ 
Support Service. In 2023, Croatia proceeded to the dig-
italisation of the Croatian Employment Services. This in-
vestment set up a digital identity management system 
and  a  human  resources  management  system.  As  of 
2024, Cyprus has introduced mobile units of the PES, 
which will make tours in all districts in rural and urban 
areas  until  the  end  of  2029.  Mobile  units  are  co-fi-
nanced by the RRF until the first half of 2026 and by 
ESF+  form  the  second  half  of  2026  until  the  end  of 
2029. In January 2024, as part of the Full Employment 
Act  of  December  2023,  the  French  PES  system  ‘Pôle 
Emploi’  has  been  progressively  replaced  by  ‘France 
Travail’. This new system is expected to enhance the co-
ordination of PES actors, the reorganisation of the sup-
port and monitoring of the unemployed and strengthen 
measures  for  the  integration  of  workers  with  disabili-
ties. 

Some Member States strengthened the coopera-
tion  between  public  employment  and  social  ser-
vices to increase the impact of their active labour 
market policies. In April 2024, as part of its RRP, Ro-
mania  inaugurated  a  digital  platform  for  managing 
vouchers for domestic workers. Among others, the plat-
form is expected to be interoperable with other relevant 
databases, such as those of the PES, the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Protection, and the Ministry of Finance. 
In May 2024, in Italy new rules entered into force with 
the aim of enhancing the digital platform that collects 
information  from  social  services  and  public  employ-
ment services. The overall objective is to better match 
the demand and supply of labour.  

Measures to attract foreign talent and ease the 
tight labour market were pursued in several Mem-
ber  States.  In  November  2024,  Spain  introduced  a 
comprehensive reform aiming at modernizing migration 
policies  to  address  demographic  and  labour  market 
challenges. The reform focuses on simplifying adminis-
trative  procedures  and  strengthening  integration  by 
promoting access to employment, training, and family 
reunification as key pillars, while also preventing situa-
tions of irregular status. France adopted a law in Jan-
uary  2024  to  better  control  immigration,  including  a 
measure to facilitate access to permits for third country 
nationals  working  in  shortage  occupations  or  in  geo-
graphical areas struggling to recruit workers. In March 
2024, Sweden enhanced the cooperation between the 
Public Employment Services and 10 other governmental 
bodies  (e.g.,  Social  Insurance  Agency,  Tax  Agency,  Mi-
gration Agency) to better coordinate measures attract-
international 
ing  and 
workforce.  In  addition,  as  of  December  2023,  third 
country nationals participating in the job and develop-
ment guarantee in Sweden have easier access to lan-
guage learning and further adult learning. In July 2024, 
Czechia  introduced  a  work  permit  waiver  for  highly 
qualified workers from ten non-EU countries. In Novem-
ber  2023,  Malta  updated  the  Employment  Agencies 
Regulation  and  thus  took  important  steps  to  regulate 
the  operations  of  recruitment,  temporary  work,  and 

retaining  highly  qualified 

 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

outsourcing  agencies  with  the  aim  of  protecting  third 
country nationals from exploitation.  

Several  Member  States  have  implemented  re-
forms  to  align  their  unemployment  benefit  sys-
tems with prevailing socio-economic conditions. In 
July  2023,  Germany  implemented  temporary  provi-
sions under the Citizen’s Allowance Act, raising financial 
support  for  single  individuals  (from  EUR  502  to  EUR 
563)  and  fostering  training  provision.  These  changes 
will remain valid until 31 December 2024. Sweden re-
formed  its  unemployment  insurance  in  June  2024  to 
enhance coverage for those without employment, while 
better  aligning  social  benefits  with  the  compensation 
period  (i.e.,  a  reduction  by  5 pps  in  the  compensation 
every 100 days). The minimum level of activity support 
is also set to rise. The amended legislation is expected 
to take effect on 1 October 2025. In Finland, a reform 
of  the  housing  allowance,  adopted  in  April  2024,  re-
moved the deduction for general earned income worth 
EUR 300. However, this change is partly offset by other 
increases in the allowance. In January 2024, Malta re-
formed  its  unemployment  benefits  system  to  better 
align benefit rates with the recipient’s last salary, taking 
into account the national minimum wage. For the first 
six weeks, benefits will constitute 60% of the previous 
salary, reducing to 55% for the following 10 weeks and 
to 50% for the last 10 weeks. In addition, in the frame-
work of the RRP, Malta is carrying out a monitoring pro-
cess on policy measures related to unemployment  

benefits. The first report is tentatively due by the end of 
2024 and will be followed up by a new one in five years. 
As part of its RRP, Spain reformed the system of non-
contributory  unemployment  benefits.  The  law  extends 
these  benefits  to  individuals  under  45  years  of  age 
without family responsibilities and agricultural workers, 
it adjusts the progressivity scale and makes the bene-
fits  compatible  with  employment.  In  November  2023, 
Portugal expanded unemployment benefits to include 
victims of domestic violence, aligning with the Decent 
Work  Agenda  and  recent  amendments  to  the  Labour 
Code.  

Some  Member  States  took  measures  to  improve 
the  representativeness  of  employees’  organisa-
tions and support capacity building of social part-
ners.  In  July  2023,  Luxembourg  adapted  the  rules 
regarding the membership and electoral lists of profes-
sional  chambers  in  order  to  include  apprentices, 
jobseekers in special employment relationship, as well 
as employees and apprentices on parental leave. In May 
2024,  Spain  adopted  a  reform,  as  part  of  its  RRP, 
through which it reduced the seniority required to vote 
and run in elections for employee representation bodies 
in  companies  for  workers  in  the  cultural  and  creative 
sectors. In April 2024, Hungary launched an ESF+ co-
funded measure supporting the capacity building of so-
cial  partners,  by  offering  financing  opportunities  for 
wages of new employees, training, event organisation, 
study visits or participation in international events. 

84 

 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1: Growth in gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita increased slightly for 
the EU and varied across Member States in 2023 

Real gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (2008=100, Social Score-
board headline indicator) 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend presented in the Annex. Data not available for BG. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_wc310], European sector accounts. 

2.4. GUIDELINE 8 - PROMOTING EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL, FOSTERING SO-
CIAL INCLUSION AND FIGHTING POVERTY 

This section looks at the implementation of the employ-
ment guideline no. 8, which recommends that Member 
States promote equal opportunities for all, foster social 
inclusion and fight poverty, in line with Pillar principles 
2  (on  gender  equality),  3  (on  equal  opportunities),  11 
(on childcare and support to children), 12 (on social pro-
tection),  14  (on  minimum income),  15  (on  old-age  in-
come and pensions), 16 (on healthcare), 17 (on inclusion 
of persons with disabilities), 18 (on long-term care), 19 
(on  housing  and assistance  for the  homeless)  and 20 
(on access to essential services). Section 2.4.1 provides 
an analysis of key indicators, while section 2.4.2 reports 
on policy measures undertaken by Member States. 

2.4.1.  Key indicators 

The growth in real gross disposable household in-
come  (GDHI)  per  capita  increased  slightly  at  EU 
level in 2023. It stood at 111.1 (level in 2008=100) in 
2023, 0.6 points higher than in 2022. The greatest in-
crease  was  observed  in  Malta,  while  smaller  but  still 
substantial  ones  were  reported  in  Croatia,  Spain  and 
Greece (see Figure 2.4.1). Romania, Hungary, Malta, Po-
land, and Lithuania were ‘best performers’ in 2023, due 

85 

to high levels (more than 140% relative to 2008). Esto-
nia, on the contrary, witnessed the largest decrease, fol-
lowed  by  Slovakia  and  Czechia,  still  remaining  at 
relatively  high  levels.  In  light  of  their  performance  in 
2023, Italy and Austria were found to be in ‘critical sit-
uations’ due to low levels, also following a deterioration. 
The  situation  was  ‘to  watch’  in  2023  in  Estonia,  Slo-
vakia, Czechia and Sweden (where levels were close to 
the EU average but after deteriorations from the previ-
ous year), as well as in Finland, the Netherlands, France 
and Belgium (where levels were below the EU average 
despite broad stability or small improvements from the 
year before).  

The  share  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social 
exclusion  (AROPE)  slightly  declined  in  the  EU  in 
2023,  also  thanks  to  decisive  policy  action  to 
cushion  the  negative  social  effects  of  the  high 
cost of living. The situation in 2023 was nonetheless 
‘critical’ in Spain, Greece and Latvia, for which the rela-
tively high levels (at 26.5%, 26.1% and 25.6%, respec-
tively)  did  not  improve  significantly,  or  even  slightly 
increased (by 0.5 pps in Spain) – see Figure 2.4.2. Hun-
gary,  Luxembourg,  Estonia  and  Lithuania  were  ‘to 
watch’,  either  because  of  the  relatively  high  level 
(24.3%  and  24.2%  for  Lithuania  and  Estonia,  respec-
tively) or the significant increase (+2 and +1.3 pps for 
Luxembourg  and  Hungary,  respectively).  At  the  same 
time,  Romania  and  Bulgaria  experienced  ‘weak  but 

HULTMTPLROHRBECZEEFIFRNLSESKATITCYDEDKIELULVPTSIELESy = 0.0002x -0.0101R² = 0.0199-0.05-0.03-0.010.010.030.050.07708090100110120130140150160170Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth (index, 2008=100) -changeGross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth (index, 2008=100)2023 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.2: The at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion rate slightly decreased in 2023 in the EU, with 
some convergence across Member States  

Share of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline 
indicator) 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for HR. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

improving’ situations, recording the highest levels in the 
EU (32.0% and 30.0%, respectively) but also the largest 
declines (-2.4 pps and -2.2 pps, respectively). On the op-
posite side of the spectrum, Czechia, Slovenia, the Neth-
erlands and Finland were ‘best performers’ (with AROPE 
rates at 12.0%, 13.7%, and 15.8% for the last two, re-
spectively). Some signs of convergence were apparent 
across EU Member States. The variation was nonethe-
less also large across EU regions, including within Mem-
ber States, especially in Italy, France, Poland, Germany, 
Portugal, Spain and Belgium (see Figure 8 in Annex 5), 
including in outermost regions. In this respect, the as-
sessment  of  the  distributional  impact  of  reforms  and 
investments  remains  particularly  important  to  ensure 
their contribution to the EU headline target of lifting at 
least 15 million people out of poverty by 2030222. 

Monetary poverty and the share of people living 
in  (quasi)-jobless  households  slightly  decreased, 
while severe material and social deprivation  re-
mained stable. Despite the higher cost of living, this 
broad stability reflects the mitigation effects of the pol-
icy responses taken at the EU and Member States’ level. 
In 2023 (referring to 2022 incomes), Czechia, followed 
by  Denmark,  Ireland,  Finland  and  Belgium,  had  the 

increasing 

lowest at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) rates (at 9.8%, 11.8%, 
12.0%,  12.2%  and  12.3%,  respectively),  after  experi-
encing decreases – see the top panel of Figure 2.4.3. On 
the  contrary,  Latvia,  Estonia,  Romania,  Lithuania,  Bul-
garia  and  Spain  had  the  highest  shares  (at  22.5%, 
22.5%, 21.1%, 20.6%, 20.6% and 20.2%, respectively), 
despite the fact that decreases were recorded (except 
for Latvia that remained stable). Eurostat’s Flash esti-
mates  referring  to  2023  incomes  indicate  that  AROP 
rates  were  stable  in  the  EU  on  average  and  in  most 
in  Luxembourg, 
Member  States,  while 
Greece, Austria and France, and decreasing in Portugal, 
Spain,  Germany,  Finland,  Estonia  and  the  Nether-
lands223. The share of people in severe material and so-
cial deprivation remained broadly stable in the EU, but 
varied  considerably  across  Member  States,  ranging 
from  2%  in  Slovenia  to  19.8%  in  Romania  –  see  the 
middle  panel of Figure 2.4.3. It increased, however, in 
several Member States (Austria, Denmark, Hungary and 
Spain, with increases above 1 pp), while it decreased in 
Romania, Latvia, Croatia and France. Reflecting the con-
tinuation of positive labour market developments on the 
back of sustained economic growth in 2022, the share 
of people living in (quasi-)jobless households decreased 
in 2023 (based on 2022 activity). This was the case in 

222  See Commission’s Communication on Better assessing the dis-
tributional impact of Member States’ policies (COM(2022) 494 
final). 

223  See Income inequalities and poverty indicators 2023 flash esti-
mates - Experimental results at the related Eurostat webpage. 

86 

SKCZFINLSIATCYDKITPLEEHULTLUELESLVBEDEFRHRIEMTPTSEBGROy = -0.1051x + 2.059R² = 0.2648-2.8-1.8-0.80.21.22.2101520253035At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of total population) -changeAt risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of total population)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.3: The at-risk-of poverty rate and the share of people living in (quasi-)jobless households 
declined, while severe material and social deprivation remained stable 
Components of the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate headline indicator (%, 2015, 2022, 2023) 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Note: 

 Indicators are ranked by AROPE rates in 2023. Break in series for Croatia for the at-risk-of poverty rate and for France for the severe 
material and social deprivation rate. 

Source: Eurostat [tessi010], [tepsr_lm420], [tepsr_lm430], EU-SILC. 

most Member States, with lowest levels in Malta, Slo-
venia, Luxembourg and Poland, and highest ones in Bel-
gium, Germany, Denmark, France and Ireland – see the 
middle  panel  of  Figure  2.4.3.  Large  price  increases  in 
recent years, especially of food and energy, as well as 
their disproportionate effect on lower incomes, contrib-
uted to an increase in AROP rates anchored at 2019224. 
Between  2022  and  2023,  this  figure  increased  by 
1.3 pps in the EU, to 15.1%. Despite this first increase 
after a few years of decline, the rate remains below the 
2019  value  (of  16.5%).  Anchored  AROP  rates also  in-
creased  in  the  large  majority  of  Member  States,  with 
the exception of Bulgaria, Austria, Spain and Poland. The 
largest  ones  were  registered  in  Estonia  (+6.2 pps,  to 
20.5%),  followed  by  the  Netherlands  and  Malta  (+3.3 
and +3.1 pps, respectively, to 13% for both). 

Child poverty in the EU remained broadly stable, 
even if the number of children affected declined 
marginally  in  2023.  In  this  year,  for  the  first  time 
since the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of children 
AROPE  declined  slightly  in  the  EU  (19.9  million  vs 
around 20 million in 2022). This reduction in headcount 
did  not  translate  into  a  lower rate  though, due  to  the 
decrease in the total number of children. The rate was 
therefore stable at 24.8% against 24.7% in 2022, re-
maining 3.5 pps higher than for the overall population. 
the 
Slovenia,  Finland,  Czechia,  Denmark  and 

Netherlands  were  among  the  ‘best  performers’,  with 
AROPE rates for children below 16%. Spain and Bulgaria 
were, on the other hand, in ‘critical situations’, with an 
increase (by more than 2 pps, to 34.5%) for the former 
and rates above 33% with no significant improvement 
for the latter compared to the previous year. Hungary, 
where the largest increase took place (+6.3 pps) was ‘to 
watch’  in  2023,  alongside  Luxembourg,  Greece  and 
France,  all  with  relatively  large  rates.  The  largest  de-
creases  were  recorded in Romania and Italy (by more 
than 1 pp), both in ‘weak but improving’ situations, the 
former  registering  one  of  the  highest  values  (39%). 
Overall, both the number and the share of children at 
risk of  poverty  or  social  exclusion  rose  in  15  Member 
States. 

The  components  of  the  risk  of  poverty  or  social 
exclusion rate for children remained stable at EU 
level,  but  with  significant  changes  recorded  in 
some Member States. The at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) 
rate remained  broadly stable for  children at 19.4% in 
2023 (from 19.3% in 2022, referring to 2022 and 2021 
incomes,  respectively).  The  largest  increase  was  rec-
orded  in  Hungary  (+7.1 pps),  while  the  largest  decline 
was  in  Germany  (-1 pp).  As  in  2022,  the  AROP  rates 
were the highest for Romania, Spain and Bulgaria, and  

224  People at-risk-of poverty anchored at 2019 are those with an 

equivalised disposable income below the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold calculated in 2019, adjusted with the harmonised 

price index (HICP) between 2019 and 2023. Data available at 
[ilc_li22]. 

87 

0102030ROBGESELLVLTEEITEU27LUDEHRFRPTMTHUIEBESEDKATSKNLCYPLFISICZAt-risk-of-poverty rate01020ROBGESELLVLTEEITEU27LUDEHRFRPTMTHUIEBESEDKATSKNLCYPLFISICZPersons living in households with very low work intensity (% of population aged 0 to 64)202320222015010203040ROBGESELLVLTEEITEU27LUDEHRFRPTMTHUIEBESEDKATSKNLCYPLFISICZSevere social and material deprivation rate 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.4: The at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion rate for children remained broadly stable, at a 
higher level than for the overall population in most Member States 
Share of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator)  

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for Croatia. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_lm412], EU-SILC. 

the  lowest  for  Finland,  Denmark  and  Slovenia.  Euro-
stat’s  flash  estimates  for  2023  incomes  indicate  an 
overall stability in child poverty in the EU as a whole and 
in most Member States, with decreases in Germany, Es-
tonia,  Spain,  Finland,  Portugal,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia 
and  increases  in  Czechia,  Greece,  Latvia,  Poland  and 
Sweden225. The incidence of severe material and social 
deprivation among children also remained broadly un-
changed, at 8.4% in the EU in 2023, but with a sizeable  

drop in Romania (-8.2 pps). Lastly, the share of children 
living in (quasi)-jobless households remained stable at 
7.5%  in  2023  in  the  EU  and  in  most  Member  States. 
Lifting children out of poverty and social exclusion is in-
strumental to help them realise their full potential and 
break  the  cycle  of  intergenerational  poverty.  Imple-
menting  the  European  Child  Guarantee  in  all  Member 
States is key in this respect226. 

Pillar Box 5: Childcare in EU countries 

Quality early childhood education and care (ECEC) has been shown to have a positive impact on the 
prospects of children and through them on economic and societal developments. Participation at an 
early age in quality ECEC enhances social and cognitive development, especially for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. This contributes to better educational and employment outcomes later in life and mitigates the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty. Moreover, by enabling parents to balance family lives with work as-
pirations, quality ECEC also contributes to greater gender equality, stronger labour market participation and  

225  See Income inequalities and poverty indicators 2023 flash esti-

mates - Experimental results and the table with all indicators 
at the related Eurostat webpage. 

226  Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 es-
tablishing a European Child Guarantee (OJ L 223, 22.6.2021, p. 
14–23). 

88 

CZDKFINLSIBECYEEHRPLELFRHULUBGESATDEIELTLVMTPTSESKITROy = -0.0158x + 1.0406R² = 0.0037-4.0-2.00.02.04.06.0510152025303540At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children (% of population aged 0-17) -changeAt risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children (% of population aged 0-17)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

economic growth, as well as poverty reduction227. The Council Recommendation on early childhood education 
and  care:  the  Barcelona  targets  for  2030  raises  the  ECEC  participation  target  for  2030  to  at  least  45%  for 
children under the age of 3 (with exceptions for Member States lagging behind)228. It also calls upon the Member 
States to close the ECEC participation gap between children at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) and 
the overall population. In line with the Council Recommendation on the European Child Guarantee (ECG)229, ac-
cess to high-quality ECEC should be effective and free for children experiencing poverty risks. 

On average, in the EU, the ECEC participation of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion grew 
much less over the past decade compared to that of other children. After four years of a gradual increase 
in participation for children not experiencing poverty risks over 2015-18 and a sudden rise for those that did 
experience poverty in 2019, the gap between the participation rates for the two groups was broadly at the 2015 
level around 12 pps in 2019. The gap reached its largest level in 2021 due to sharply increasing participation of 
children not experiencing poverty and broadly stagnating participation of those that did. In 2023, the gap be-
tween the two groups, at 15.8 pps, was significantly wider than in 2015 (only 25.2% of children at risk of poverty 
participated against 41.0% of those not at risk). 

Progress on ECEC participation has been much slower among disadvantaged children 

Children in early childhood education and care by poverty risk (for 1 hour or more per week, % of children -3 

Note:  2020 figures are estimated. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_caindform25b]. 

Low affordability and availability of ECEC constitute barriers to access, notably for children expe-
riencing poverty risks, which Member States address in their ECG action plans, with support from EU 
funding. For instance, while ECEC is already free of cost for children from the least affluent families in some 
Member States (e.g. Denmark and Slovenia), Portugal is implementing a reform to make access to ECEC free 
for all children, and Poland, as part of its RRP, has introduced benefits for parents of children below 3 years of 
age receiving formal care to cover or reduce costs associated to childcare services’ fees. In many countries, the 
ECEC sector also suffers from a lack of facilities and staff shortages. While  Bulgaria pledges to expand the 
network of services for ECEC, Germany committed, as part of its RRP, to create 90 thousand additional childcare 
places by building new facilities in their action plan Investments on ECEC are supported by the ESF+. In 2022, 
increased childcare capacities was part of 22 ESF+ Operational Programmes across six Member States, amount-
ing to EUR 60.7 million. Moreover, the majority of EU Member States included in their RRPs measures expanding 
capacities, inclusiveness, and/or quality of ECEC. Respective investments amount to more than EUR 8 billion.  

227  See among others Darvas, Z. M., Welslau, L., & Zettelmeyer, J., 
Incorporating the impact of social investments and reforms in 
the European Union’s new fiscal framework, Bruegel Working 
Paper, 2024, and Rossin-Slater, M., & Wüst, M., What is the 
added value of preschool for poor children? Long-term and in-
tergenerational impacts and interactions with an infant health 

intervention, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 
12(3), 2020. 

228  See 2022/C 484/01. Exceptions from the target of ‘at least 

45%’ are set out in paragraph 3(a). 

229  Council Recommendation (EU) 2021/1004 of 14 June 2021 es-

tablishing a European Child Guarantee. 

89 

20.821.925.232.942.941.030.037.937.415202530354045201520162017201820192020202120222023Children AROPEChildren not AROPEAll children 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

The depth of poverty for the overall population as 
well as for children remained stable in the EU but 
increased  considerably  in  some  Member  States. 
The depth of poverty is measured as the gap between 
the income level of those at risk of poverty and the pov-
erty threshold230. It declined slightly to 23.0% in 2023 
in the EU (referring to 2022 incomes) – see Figure 2.4.5. 
It was the widest in Romania (37.4%), followed by Slo-
vakia and Hungary (29.9% and 29.5% respectively), af-
ter  substantial  increases  (by  5.4,  11.5  and  10.1 pps 
respectively). The sharpest decline was recorded in Bel-
gium  (-4.2 pps),  reaching  the  lowest  level  in  the  EU 
(14.0%).  Poverty  is  deeper  among  people  living  in 
(quasi)-jobless households, at around 63.0% in the EU 
in 2023 (referring to 2022 incomes)231. For children the 
depth of poverty remained unchanged on average in the 
EU and is at a higher level than for the overall popula-
tion  (24.4%).  In  this  regard,  rates were  the  highest  in 
Hungary (64.3%), after a very substantial increase (by 
49.8 pps,  more  than  tripling  from  one  of  the  lowest 
rates in 2022), followed by Romania (39.4%) and Slo-
vakia  (37.7%),  experiencing  increases  of  6.3  and 
12.7 pps respectively. The sharpest declines were regis-
tered in Bulgaria (-10.9 pps), remaining nevertheless at 
a  high  level  (31.9%),  and  in  Italy  (-8 pps),  reaching  a 
level  below  the  EU  average  (19.9%).  Finland and  Bel-
gium recorded the lowest rates (15.4% and 15.2%, re-
spectively). 

Poverty or social exclusion risks remain elevated 
for persons with disabilities. Their AROPE rate stood 
at 28.8% in the EU in 2023, 10 pps higher than for the 
rest of the population. It also varied significantly across 
Member States – see Figure 2.4.6. Despite slightly de-
creased compared to last year, the highest rates were 
observed  in  Lithuania,  Bulgaria  and  Estonia  (42.7%, 
42.4% and 41% respectively), while the lowest one was 
in  Slovakia  (18.6%).  Romania  and  Bulgaria  had  the 
highest levels of material and social deprivation among 
persons  with  disabilities  (28.4%  and  28.1%,  respec-
tively). Overall, persons with disabilities of working age 
were at the highest risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
followed by young persons with disabilities (33.6% and 
33.5% respectively). Also, women with disabilities were 
at  higher risk than  men  with  disabilities (29.8%  com-
pared to 27.6%). 

The risk of poverty or social exclusion for persons 
born  outside  the  EU  slightly  decreased  but  re-
mained  much  higher  than  for  EU  natives.  The 
AROPE rate for people born outside of the EU was more 
than  double  that  of  EU-born  people,  at  39.2%  and 
18.4%,  respectively.  The  gap  between  the  two  groups 
was the widest in Austria (42.7% vs 11.4%), Belgium  

230  This indicator, also known as relative median at-risk-of-poverty 
gap, is calculated as the difference between the median 
equivalised disposable income of people below the at-risk-of-
poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. 
This threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalised 
disposable income of all people in a country and not for the EU 
as a whole. 

90 

Figure 2.4.5: The depth of poverty was broadly 
stable in the EU but was often greater for chil-
dren  

The relative at risk of poverty gap by poverty threshold, total popu-
lation and children (0-17, %) 

Note:  Break in series for France and Luxembourg in 2022 and 

Croatia in 2023. 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_li11], EU-SILC. 

 (42.1%  vs  14.6%)  and  Spain  (46.7%  vs  21.1%).  In 
Greece, this gap decreased quite considerably in 2023  
(by  5.1 pps  to  23 pps),  although  the  AROPE  rate  for 
those  born  outside  of  the  EU  was  one  of  the  highest 
among all Member States in 2023 (47.1%). The gap de-
creased considerably in Spain (-4.7 pps) and Bulgaria (-
11.9 pps),  while  it  increased  the  most  in  Malta 
(+8.7 pps)232. 

231  Eurostat [ilc_li06]. 
232  As shown by the Eurostat indicator [ilc_peps06n], comparing 
those born in non-EU countries to those born in the reporting 
country; persons aged 18 years or more. Data for the former 
are not available for Romania. 

010203040506070ROSKHUHRLVESPTLTSEMTITEUELBGEEDEDKATPLFRCZSINLLUIEFICYBE050100RO2023 Total2023 Children2022 Total2022 Children 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.4.6: The risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion remains higher for persons with disabilities 
in all Member States 

Figure 2.4.7: Energy poverty has been rising in 
the EU with significant variation across Member 
States 

Shares of persons with and without disabilities at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion (16 years and older, %) 

Persons unable to keep home adequately warm, total and at-risk-of 
poverty population, 2022 and 2023 (%) 

Note:  Break in time series for Croatia and estimated data for Ger-

many in 2023. 

Source: Eurostat [hlth_dpe010], EU-SILC. 

Note:  Break in time series for LT in 2023. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_mdes01], EU-SILC. 

A significant number of Roma in the EU continue to 
face poverty or social exclusion risks. According to 
the latest survey data, on average, 80% of Roma in the 
survey countries were at risk of poverty (AROP)233, with 
no progress recorded between 2016 and 2021. On aver-
age, as many as 83% of Roma children (below 18) lived 
in households at risk of poverty. Also, a higher share of 
Roma (48%) faced severe material deprivation compared 
to  the  general  population,  especially  the  younger  and 
older  cohorts.  The  2020-30  EU  Roma  strategic  frame-
work  for  equality,  inclusion  and  participation  calls  on 
Member States to reduce the poverty gap between Roma  

233  EU FRA Roma Survey 2021. The survey countries were: BG, CZ, 

EL, ES, HR, HU, PT, RO, SK. 

234  See: The new EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclu-

sion and participation (full package). 

91 

and the general population, including children, by at least 
half and to ensure that by 2030 the majority of Roma 
escape poverty234. With the Council Recommendation for 
Roma  equality,  inclusion  and  participation,  Member 
States committed to combatting the extremely high at-
risk-of-poverty rate and material and social deprivation 
among the Roma, in order to  provide effective support 
for Roma equality, inclusion and participation235. The as-
sessment  of  renewed  national  Roma  strategic  frame-
works calls on Member States to address the areas for 
improvement identified as well as to renew and amend 
their  frameworks,  including  to  make  them  more  ambi-
tious236. The Council Conclusions on ensuring equal access 
for Roma to adequate and desegregated housing, and to 

235  See: OJ C 93, 19.3.2021, p. 1–14. 
236  For the assessment see: COM/2023/7 final in the full package. 

0102030405060LTBGEEROLVHRMTIEHUBEESELDECYSEEULUFRITPTDKNLPLSIFIATCZSK050100LTSE2023 with no disability2023 with disability2022 with no disability2022 with disability0102030405060PTESBGLTELCYROFREUITDESKIEHUNLDKMTLVHRCZBESEBEPLEEATSIFILU050100PT2023 Total2023 AROP2022 Total2022 AROP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.8: Income inequality remained broadly stable on average in the EU in 2023, with some 
convergence across Member States 

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20), 2023 levels and changes from previous year (Social Scoreboard headline indicator) 

Note:  Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for Croatia. 
Source: Eurostat [tessi180], EU-SILC. 

address segregated settlements,237 invite Member States 
to identify and use all funding available for this purpose.  

Energy poverty increased in 2023 in the EU for the 
second  consecutive  year,  reflecting  the  impact  of 
the high energy costs, with significant differences 
across Member States. Energy poverty, as measured by 
the share of people unable to keep their home adequately 
warm, increased by 1.3 pps in the EU, reaching 10.6% in 
2023238. This is the second consecutive year of increase, 
after  a  constant  decline  over  2015-21  (from  9.6%  to 
6.9%) – see Figure 2.4.7. This reflects the impact of the 
spike in energy prices that started in the second half of 
2021 and escalated in 2022. The fact that the increase in 
energy poverty in 2023 is lower than in 2022, while the 
price shock was significantly higher in winter 2022 com-
pared to winter 2021, suggests that the exceptional sup-
port measures adopted by the EU and its Member States 
effectively cushioned the impact239. Energy poverty varied 
greatly across Member States in 2023, ranging from 2.1% 
in Luxembourg to 20.8% in Spain and Portugal. Denmark, 
Netherlands,  Spain,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Portugal  and 
Sweden experienced the largest increases, while Bulgaria, 

237  Council Conclusions on Measures to ensure equal access for 

Roma to adequate and desegregated housing, and to address 
segregated settlements. 

238  The share of people unable to keep their home adequately 
warm is one of the main indicators used to monitor energy 
poverty in the EU. See the SPC-ISG Fiche for more information 
on energy poverty indicators at EU level. 

239  The most recent available data on energy poverty are from EU-
SILC 2023. Surveys for these issues are generally conducted in 

92 

Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Romania recorded de-
creases. The increase was more significant for people at 
risk of poverty than for the general population in 2023 
(+2.1 pps). For the latter, energy poverty was more than 
twice the average (22.2% in 2023), ranging from 3.8% in 
Finland to 43.6% in Cyprus. Denmark, Spain, Italy, Lithua-
nia, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia had 
the  largest  increases  among  people  at  risk  of  poverty, 
while  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Cyprus  and  Latvia  saw  energy 
poverty decreases. 

Income inequality remained broadly stable on av-
erage  in  the  EU  in  2023,  with  some  convergence 
across Member States. The income quintile share ratio 
(S80/S20)  remained  largely  stable  in  2023  at  4.72  (vs 
4.73 in 2022, referring to incomes in 2022 and 2021, re-
spectively)240. ‘Critical situations’ were recorded in Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Romania, with levels of income inequality 
that were among the highest in the Union, despite rela-
tively  small  declines  in  2023  –  see  Figure  2.4.8.  High 
levels of inequality were also recorded in Spain, Estonia 
and Greece, as well as in Portugal and Malta (the latter 
two after relatively large increases). Similarly large in-
creases led to levels around the EU average in Hungary, 

the first half of the year, in the period from January to June of 
the relevant year, so data from 2023 reflect the impact of the 
spike in energy prices of winter 2022.  

240  The indicator is defined as the ratio of total (equivalised dis-
posable) income received by the 20% of the population with 
the highest income to that received by the 20% with the lowest 
income. 

SKBECZFISIDKIENLPLEEELESHRHUMTPTSELTLVROATCYDEFRLUBGITy = -0.0832x + 0.4558R² = 0.0782-0.8-0.6-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.60.834567Income quintile ratio (S80/S20) -changeIncome quintile ratio (S80/S20)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.9: Income inequalities in the EU-27 fluctuated over the last fifteen years, while declining 
most recently 
Quantile share ratios S80/S20, S80/S50 and S50/S20, 2010-2022  

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

 For breaks in series see the data tables. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tessi180], [ilc_di11d], [ilc_di11e], EU-SILC. 

Sweden and Croatia. The situation in all of these eight 
Member  States  was  ‘to  watch’  in  2023.  On  the  other 
hand, the decrease in income inequality was the largest 
in Bulgaria (-0.69), which nonetheless still had one of 
the highest levels in 2023 (6.61) in a ‘weak but improv-
ing’ situation, like for Italy, which showed a smaller de-
cline (-0.35) but from a lower level, both contributing to 
upward  convergence.  Belgium,  Czechia,  Slovenia  and 
Finland were ‘best performers’ in 2023. In some Mem-
ber States, for example in Germany, Hungary, Italy, Por-
tugal and Sweden, the level  of income inequality also 
varied significantly by regions (see Figure 4 in Annex 5), 
including  outermost  regions.  According  to  Eurostat’s 
flash estimates for the income year 2023, the trend in 
income inequalities, as measured by the income quintile 
share ratio, was rather stable in all countries except for 
Latvia  where  a  significant  increase  was  estimated241. 
Distributional  impact  assessments  of  reforms  and  in-
vestments  are  particularly  important  to  factor  in  im-
pacts  on  income  inequality  and  inform  policy  making 
ex-ante. 

In  a  longer-term  perspective,  income  inequality 
experienced  a  decline  after  its  2014-15  peak, 
with  fluctuations  and  some  differences  across 
Member States. Income inequalities (as measured by 
the  S80/S20)  sharply  increased  during  the  double-dip 
recession in the EU-27, and then declined back to levels 
known before the financial crisis, with a further slight 
decline in most recent years – see Figure 2.4.9. Income 
inequality at the bottom of the income distribution (i.e. 
measured by the S50/S20) was broadly back to its level 
in 2010 by 2023, while it slightly declined below that at 
the top of the distribution (i.e. S80/S50). This highlights 

the impact of swift and effective policy responses in the 
EU in recent years, especially in relation to the COVID-
19 crisis and the high cost-of-living. At the same time, 
it  points to  the  lack  of  significant  long-term  improve-
ments on average at the lower end of the income dis-
tribution.  While  in  many  Member  States,  the  income 
shares improved for lower quintiles between 2007 and 
2022, there was evidence of polarisation in other Mem-
ber States (namely  Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hun-
gary,  Malta,  Denmark  and  Sweden)242.  Overall,  the 
second, third and fourth income quintiles (as a possible 
proxy  of  the  middle  class)  slightly  increased  their  in-
come share over the period in several Member States 
with few important exceptions (namely Bulgaria, Cyprus 
and Finland). 

Social protection benefit expenditure increased in 
nominal  terms  but  decreased  in  real  terms  in 
2023, with large variation across Member States 
and  across  branches243.  The  share  relative  to  GDP 
was 26.8% in the EU in 2023 (vs 26.9% in 2022), which 
is 3.2 pps lower than the peak during the COVID-19 cri-
sis in 2020 (at 30%, due to the exceptional policy re-
sponse to it). Despite some convergence in this respect 
since 2018 (in particular in 2020-21), variation across 
Member States remained large, with six Member States 
having shares above 28% and other six below 17%244. 
While  in  nominal  terms  social  protection  benefits  ex-
penditure in the EU increased by 6.1% in 2023, in real 
terms it slightly decreased (-0.2%)245, reflecting the still 
high inflation context. Changes in real terms vary from 
increases of more than 5% in seven Member States to 
decreases  by  more  than  2%  in  four  other  Member 
States246. At EU level, the slight decline in real terms in 

241  See Flash estimates 2023 experimental results, p. 13. 
242  Based on break-neutralised data. The full analysis is available 
in Economic inequalities in the EU – key trends and policies. 

243  Eurostat, Social protection (spr_exp_func, extracted on 

07/11/2024). 2023 data are estimates covering all Member 
States except Greece. 

244  They are FR, FI, AT, DE, BE and IT and IE, MT, EE, RO, LT and HU, 

respectively. 

245  The changes in real terms are estimated by deflating expendi-

tures in nominal terms in EUR [spr_exp_func] by the harmo-
nised index of consumer prices (HICP) – see more details here.  

246  They are SK, PL, CY, BE, BG, LU and NL and EE, LV, IT and LT, 

respectively.  

93 

2.12.22.32.44.74.84.95.05.15.25.320102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023S80/S20 (lhs)S80/S50 (rhs)S50/S20 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.10: The impact of social transfers (excluding pensions) on poverty reduction slightly de-
creased in 2023, with some signs of divergence  

Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard 
headline indicator) 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in the series for Croatia. 

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tespm050], EU-SILC. 

2023 was driven by a drop of almost 8% of social ex-
clusion benefits and almost 5% for unemployment ben-
efits, and a reduction by around 1% in expenditures in 
sickness and healthcare benefits. On the other hand, ex-
penditure  related  to  old-age  and  survivor  benefits  in-
creased in real terms by 0.7%. 

Spending  on  old-age  and  survivor  benefits  still 
make up for almost  half  of all social protection 
benefit expenditure in the EU. This share was 46.7% 
in  2023  (vs  46.2%  in  2022).  Healthcare  and  sickness 
benefits  still  represented  the  second  largest  share 
(29.9% vs 30.2% in 2022), while family benefits were 
at 8.6% (as in 2022), and disability benefits made up to 
7.1% (vs 7% in 2022). The share of unemployment ben-
efits continued to decline, along with unemployment, to 
3.9% in 2023 (a record low since 2008, the first year of 
the time series), compared to 4.1% in 2022, after drop-
ping  from  the  record  high  reached  in  2020  (7.4%).  In 
parallel,  the  share  of  expenditures  in  social  exclusion 
benefits declined from 2.6% in 2022 to 2.4% in 2023. 
On  the  contrary,  the  share  of  expenditure  on  housing 
benefits (at 1.4%) slightly increased compared to 2022 
(1.3%). The share of old-age and survivor benefits in-
creased year-on-year in the majority of Member States 

(16  out  of  26),  while  that  of  categories  such  as 
healthcare and sickness, unemployment, or social exclu-
sion benefits decreased in the majority of them. 

The  impact  of  social  transfers  (excluding  pen-
sions) on poverty reduction slightly decreased in 
2023, with some signs of divergence across Mem-
ber  States.  This  decrease  applies  to  both  the  EU  on 
average (-0.3 pps, still remaining higher than before the 
COVID-19 pandemic) and to the large majority of Mem-
ber  States  –  see  Figure  2.4.10.  The  differences  re-
mained  nonetheless  large  across  countries.  In  2023 
(referring  to  2022  incomes),  ‘critical  situations’  were 
recorded  in  Romania,  Greece,  Portugal,  Croatia  and 
Spain, which all had very low impacts of social transfers 
(between 15.6% and 22.9%), and all but Croatia regis-
tered a decrease. Four Member States were ‘to watch’. 
Among  them,  Luxembourg  registered  the  largest  de-
crease  in  impact,  while  Estonia, Malta  and  Latvia  had 
smaller ones, all being below EU-average levels. On the 
opposite  side,  Ireland,  Denmark,  Belgium  and  Finland 
were  ‘best  performers’  (with  figures  between  48.7% 
and 57.7%). The impact of social transfers on the risk 
of monetary poverty slightly declined in 2023 on aver-
age in the EU also for children (-0.3 pps247), reflecting  

247  This is based on the Benchmarking framework on childcare and 

support to children established by the Indicators’ Subgroup of 
the Social Protection Committee. The indicator can be 

94 

calculated from the AROP rate for children after and before 
transfers (excluding pensions). Social transfers in kind, 

BEDKFIIEATCZDEFRITNLSKEELULVMTELESHRPTROCYHULTPLSESIBGy = 0.0709x -2.9956R² = 0.0875-7.0-5.0-3.0-1.01.03.05.01015202530354045505560Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction (% reduction of AROP) -changeImpact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction (% reduction of AROP)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

drops  in  20  Member  States  (up  to  -18.6 pps  in  Hun-
gary, -8.8 pps in Luxembourg and -7.3 pps in Sweden), 
not outweighed by increases in a minority of  Member 
States (up to +8.2 pps in Italy, +3.2 pps in Slovakia, and 
+2.5 pps in Croatia). Differences in the impact of social 
transfers on poverty reduction for the overall population 
were large also across EU regions, especially in Belgium, 
Germany,  Italy,  Hungary,  Poland,  Portugal  and  Spain 
(see Figure 9 in Annex 5), including outermost regions. 

While  there  have  been  improvements  in  recent 
years, in practically all Member States, minimum 
income support is generally not sufficient to lift 
people out of poverty. Minimum income schemes act 
as a social safety net of last resort248. Adequacy of sup-
port can be assessed by comparing the disposable in-
come  of  households  that  rely  on  minimum  income 
solely (and have no income from work) with the at-risk-
of-poverty (AROP) threshold - see Figure 2.4.11249. For 
a  single  adult  household,  the  level  of  support  is  the 
most  generous  in  the  Netherlands,  where  it  almost 
reaches  the  at-risk-of-poverty  threshold  (of  60%  of 
median equivalised disposable income), while it is at or 
above 50% of median income in Ireland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, and between 30% and 50% of median in-
come in the majority of the other countries. Support is 
the  lowest  for  a  single  adult  household  in  Romania, 
Hungary and Bulgaria, where it is around or below 10% 
of  median  income.  Compared  to  2022,  adequacy  of 
support has improved in Estonia (+4 pps), the Nether-
lands and Luxembourg (+3 pps), Ireland, Belgium, Spain, 
Lithuania and Czechia (+2 pps), while it has decreased 
in  Italy,  Austria,  Cyprus,  Poland  (-3 pps),  Greece  and 
Hungary  (-2 pps).  When  the  situation  of  a  household 
composed of two adults and two children is considered, 
in a majority of Member States the adequacy of support 
is similar or higher, mainly due to the increased role of 
family benefits. Still only in Lithuania the level of sup-
port for this type of household is sufficient to lift them 
out of poverty. Compared to  2022, for this household 
type, strong improvements in adequacy (of more than 
+5 pps)  were  observed  in  Estonia,  Spain,  Czechia  and 
Slovakia,  while  a  strong  decrease  (-6 pps)  was  regis-
tered in Poland. Finally, in all Member States the net in-
come  earned  by  a  person  working  full-time  at  the 
minimum  wage  (or  at  a  corresponding  low  wage  in 
those  countries  that  do  not  have  statutory  minimum 
wages)  is  systematically  higher than  the  income  sup-
port  received  through  social  assistance  when  out  of 
work. 

Joblessness remains a key driver of poverty risks, 
while social benefits on average do not reach all 
households in need. In the EU, 60.7% of the house-
holds in which working-age individuals were either out  

249 

In addition to minimum income benefits, households may be 
entitled to receive housing and family benefits. 

Figure 2.4.11: Adequacy of social assistance to 
jobless households remains relatively low 

Net equivalised disposable income of households (single person, 
and two adults with two children under 14 years of age) receiving 
social assistance, as a percentage of median equivalised disposable 
income, 2023 (%) 

Note:  Adult members of the household not employed and not re-
ceiving unemployment benefits. Net incomes including so-
cial assistance, family and housing benefits, after taxes and 
social security contributions. Net income of a single person 
working full-time at the statutory minimum wage (or at 
45% of the average wage for the countries that do not 
have a statutory minimum wage: Denmark, Italy, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden). 

Source: Own calculations based on output from the OECD tax-bene-

fit model, model version 2.6.3, and Eurostat [ilc_di03], EU-
SILC. 

including, among others, free early childhood education and 
care, education and healthcare, are not considered in this anal-
ysis. 

248  Council Recommendation on adequate minimum income ensur-

ing active inclusion (2023/C 41/01). 

95 

0.00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.9NLIEBELUDKITESFILTDEATMTCYFRSESICZELEELVPTHRPLSKBGHURO-0.10.40.9NLITATSIPTHUSingle personCouple with 2 childrenAt-risk-of-poverty thresholdMinimum/low wage (single person) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.12: Poverty rates remain high among 
(quasi-)jobless households 

At-risk-of-poverty rate of persons living in (quasi-)jobless house-
holds (%) 

Figure 2.4.13: The share of people at risk of pov-
erty who are covered by social benefits shows 
important variation across Member States 

Benefit recipient rate for persons at-risk-of poverty aged 18-64 and 
living in (quasi-)jobless households (%) 

Note:  Break in series in 2023 for Croatia. (Quasi-)jobless house-
holds [with very low work intensity] are households where 
the members of working age worked a working time equal 
or less than 20% of their total work-time potential during 
the previous year. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_li06], EU SILC. 

Note:  Break in series in 2023 for France. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_li70], EU SILC. 

of work or worked very little (i.e. worked for 20% or less 
of their total potential working time) were at risk of pov-
erty in 2023250 – see Figure 2.4.12. This share is stable 
compared to the previous year, but important differences 
can be observed among Member States. The at-risk-of-
poverty rate of (quasi-)jobless households (i.e. with very 
low work intensity) ranged from 80% in Romania (-9 pps 
vs 2022) to less than 40% in Ireland (-6 pps). Very strong 
increases  were  observed  in  Austria  (+14 pps),  Cyprus 
(+10 pps) and Portugal (+9 pps) – albeit from much lower 

starting levels – as well as Slovenia and Sweden (+7 pps). 
Sizable decreases were registered in Hungary (-14 pps), 
Belgium (-9 pps) and Denmark (-8 pps). At the same time, 
the share of people at risk of poverty and living in (quasi-
)jobless  households  who  receive  social  benefits  was 
83.5% in the EU in 2023, up from 81.1% the year before 
–  see Figure 2.4.13251. There are important  differences 
between Member States, with this rate ranging from (al-
most) 100% in Denmark, Austria and France to less than 
60% in Croatia. Coverage either increased or  remained 

250  Also, on average in the EU, the at-risk-of-poverty rate for the 
unemployed was 47.5% in 2023, with rates exceeding 50% in 
eight countries, and being around or above 60% in Lithuania, 
the Netherlands and Romania. Poverty risks among the 

unemployed were higher today than in the pre-COVID period 
(referring to 2019 incomes) in 12 Member States. 

251  This includes any type of social benefits, and not only minimum 

income schemes. 

96 

020406080100ROSILTLVSEHREESKBGMTPTFINLELATITPLCZESEUFRCYDEHULUBEDKIE02040608010020232022020406080100HRELMTPTESROLUCYPLBGLTDELVEUITSENLHUSKEESICZIEFIBEFRATDK02040608010020232022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
broadly stable (with changes of less than 2 pps) in most 
Member States between 2022 and 2023 (income years 
2021 and 2022, respectively). Significant increases were 
observed in Austria (+15.8 pp), Hungary (+12.8 pps), Italy 
(+12.2 pps) and Latvia (+8.3 pps), while a sizable decline 
was registered in Malta (-23.7 pps). In about two thirds of 
Member States, minimum income benefits can be com-
bined  (at  least  partly)  with  income  from  work,  creating 
positive incentives for labour market participation. 

Monetary poverty remains higher for people in non-
standard  forms  of  employment  than  for  other 
workers, although social protection benefits play a 
relatively  more  important  role  in  reducing  their 
poverty  risks.  While  the  impact  of  social  transfers  on 
poverty reduction in 2023 (referring to 2022 incomes) in 
the EU was significantly higher for workers in non-stand-
ard forms of employment, such as employees on tempo-
rary contracts (22.2%), and part-timers (24.2%), as well 
as for the self-employed (26.2%), compared to the aver-
age employee (12.0%)252, monetary poverty was greater 
among these groups in most Member States. At EU level, 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate was 12.8% among temporary 
contract workers (compared to 5.3% among permanent 
contract workers), 14.3% among part-timers (compared 
to 7.1% among full-timers) and 20.7% among the self-
employed, against 6.4% among all employees on aver-
age253. Monetary poverty for workers on temporary con-
tracts  was  higher  than  15%  in  eight  Member  States254, 
and even above 20% in three of them (Bulgaria, Cyprus 
and Sweden). Moreover, it increased in ten Member States 
compared to the pre-COVID period (based on the refer-
ence year 2019). Among the self-employed, the poverty 
rate  was  higher  than  the  EU  average  in  eight  Member 
States255, close to 30% in Poland and Estonia, and as high 
as 68% in Romania. Moreover, it was higher than in 2019 
in 16 Member States. 

The  coverage  by  social  benefits  varies  widely 
across  Member  States,  different  categories  of 
workers, as well as by employment status. On aver-
age in the EU in 2023 (referring to 2022 incomes), the 
share  of  working-age  people  (16-64)  at  risk  of  poverty 
(before social transfers) receiving social benefits256 was 
higher  among  those  with  temporary  contracts  (39.2%) 
than those with permanent contracts (27.3%) and higher 
among  part-timers  (33.3%)  than  for  full-time  workers 
(25.7%).  However,  there  were  six  Member  States  (Swe-
den,  Slovenia,  Estonia,  Bulgaria,  Denmark  and  Cyprus) 
where temporary contract employees were less likely to 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

receive  benefits  than  those  under  permanent  contracts, 
and again in six Member States (Estonia, Italy, Portugal, 
Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovenia) part-time workers were less 
likely to receive benefits than full-time ones. Similarly to 
2022,  in  5  countries  (Croatia,  Greece,  Luxembourg,  Po-
land, and Romania), less than 10% of those in employ-
ment and at risk of poverty (before social transfers) were 
receiving social benefits in 2023. Self-employed at risk of 
poverty (before social transfers) were the least likely to 
receive social benefits, with a coverage at 12.7% in 2023 
in the EU-27, closer to the pre-COVID period level (10.8% 
in 2019), down from 29.0% in 2021, reflecting the phas-
ing out of exceptional support measures in response to 
the COVID-19 crisis. In 2023, this share remained below 
5% in seven Member States (Portugal, Slovakia, Luxem-
bourg, Poland, Croatia, Greece and Romania). Only slightly 
more than half (52.4%) of the unemployed at risk of pov-
erty was receiving social benefits on average in the EU in 
2023. This share was much lower, around 15% or lower, 
in six Member States (Greece, Romania, Poland, Croatia, 
Slovakia and the Netherlands).  

Overall,  access  to  adequate  social  protection  re-
mains diverse across Member States, despite some 
improvements over the last few years257. With regard 
to  formal  coverage258,  in  spring  2023  there  remained 
gaps in fifteen Member States for at least one group of 
non-standard workers in at least one branch of social pro-
tection,  which  was  most  often  unemployment,  sickness 
and/or maternity benefits. Moreover, in thirteen Member 
States access to at least one social protection branch was 
voluntary for at least one group of non-standard workers, 
most often in relation to old-age and unemployment ben-
efits, followed by invalidity, sickness and maternity bene-
fits. As for the self-employed, they faced formal coverage 
gaps in one branch of social protection or more in eight-
een Member States, most often in relation to unemploy-
ment  benefits  and  benefits  for  accidents  at  work  and 
occupational  diseases.  Moreover,  in  eighteen  Member 
States their coverage was voluntary, most often as regard 
to sickness, old-age and maternity benefits. Available es-
timates at national level point to low take-up rates by the 
self-employed of most voluntary schemes. 

Housing affordability is an increasing challenge in 
the EU. In 2023, the share of the EU population facing 
housing  cost  overburden  remained  broadly  stable  (at 
8.8%, from 8.7% in 2021-22), showing signs of  

252  Special extraction by Eurostat from EU-SILC based on the ma-
jor breakdowns of the key indicator on adequacy in the moni-
toring framework on access to social protection. See: Access to 
social protection for workers and the self-employed. (Partial) 
Update of the monitoring framework – 2023. 

253  However, assessing income for the self-employed is difficult 

and the indicator of material and social deprivation rate points 
rather to a slightly lower level for the self-employed compared 
to employees (respectively 8.0% and 8.9% in the EU in 2023). 

254  These are BG, CY, SE, LU, HU, PT, IT and AT. 
255  These are FR, SI, LV, PT, ES, PL, EE and RO. 
256  Special extraction by Eurostat of the recipient rate indicator for 
‘effective access’ in the monitoring framework on access to so-
cial protection: Access to social protection for workers and the 

self-employed. (Partial) Update of the monitoring framework – 
2023. The target population is that at risk of poverty before social 
transfers. Social benefits covered in the indicator are those received 
at individual level, excluding old-age and survivors’ pensions. 
257  See Commission report on the implementation of the Council 

Recommendation on access to social protection for workers 
and the self-employed, COM/2023/43 final and Monitoring 
framework endorsed in 2020 and update (2023) published in 
May 2024. 

258  Formal coverage of a group means that in a specific social pro-
tection branch (e.g. old age, sickness, unemployment, mater-
nity) the existing legislation or collective agreement states that 
the individuals in the group are entitled to participate in a so-
cial protection scheme covering a specific branch. 

97 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2.4.14: The housing cost overburden rate remained broadly stable at EU level with some signs 
of divergence across Member States 

Share of persons living in households with housing cost overburden, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard 
headline indicator) 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in series for Germany and Malta.  

Note: 
Source: Eurostat [tespm140], EU-SILC. 

divergence – see Figure 2.4.14. In 2023, Greece and Lux-
embourg were in ‘critical situations’, together with Den-
mark. Greece registered the highest rate among Member 
States (28.5%) with an increase by 1.8 pps, while Luxem-
bourg had the second highest, at 22.7%, with an increase 
by 7.5 pps. Denmark followed at 15.4%, with an increase 
of 0.7 pps compared to 2022. Both Germany and Malta 
were ‘to watch’, due to a relatively high indicator value for 
the first (13.0%) and a high increase for the second (by 
3.1 pps to 6.0%). Cyprus (at 2.6%) was the only ‘best per-
former’ in 2023. Among people at risk of poverty, the rate 
of housing  cost overburden was significantly higher than 
for the rest of the population in the EU, at 33.5% against  

4.1%. The highest cost overburden rates for the at-risk-of-
poverty population in 2023 were in Greece (86.3%, up by 
1.8 pps), Denmark (72.3%, up by 1.6 pps) and Luxembourg 
(62.2%,up by 26.5 pps), while the lowest (below 20%) was 
in Cyprus (8.9%). Variability across countries may be due 
to different housing price levels, national policies for social 
housing and/or public subsidies and benefits provided by 
governments  for  housing  –  see  Section  2.4.2.  Overall, 
across Member States, tenants in the private rental market 
tended to be much more affected by housing cost over-
burden (20.3%) than tenants on reduced price or free rents 
(11.3%), and owners with outstanding mortgages or loans 
(5.3%).  

Pillar Box 6: Access to housing and social housing in the EU – challenges and devel-
opments 

Access to social housing or housing assistance of good quality for those in need is a key priority for 
the EU, in line with principle 19 of the European Pillar of Social Rights. Access to housing is fundamental in pro-
tecting individuals against poverty or social exclusion risks and contributes to a decent quality of life. It determines 
access to education and employment opportunities and impacts work-related mobility within the Member States 
and in the EU Single Market. Against this background, social housing can serve as the last resort for those in need 
when housing affordability on the market poses challenges. In this respect, the ministerial Liège Declaration called 
for a European New Deal on affordable and social housing259. The development of a first ever European Affordable 
Housing Plan has been announced as part of the Political Guidelines for the new Commission260. 

259  See the Liège Declaration: Towards affordable, decent, and 

260  See: Europe’s Choice: Political Guidelines for the next European 

sustainable housing for all.  

Commission.  

98 

SKCYATBGFIHRIEITLTPLPTSIDEMTDKELLUBECZEEESFRHULVNLROSEy = 0.1391x -0.3893R² = 0.1523-5.0-3.0-1.01.03.05.07.005101520253035Housing cost overburden (% of total population) -changeHousing cost overburden (% of total population)2023 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Housing costs weigh on EU households’ budgets, particularly for those that already experience pov-
erty risks. According to the latest available Eurostat data for 2023, 46.2% and 31.8% of the European house-
holds, respectively, consider total housing costs as a financial burden and as a heavy financial burden 261. In the 
EU, in 2023, 8.8% of the population lived in a household where total housing costs (net of housing allowances) 
represented more than 40% of the total disposable household income. This so called ‘overburden rate’ was as 
high as 33.5% for people already experiencing poverty risks. Overall, the share of total housing costs in dispos-
able household income averaged 19.7% but was 38.2% for people at risk of poverty (AROP) – see the Figure. 
Housing costs as a share of disposable income also varied widely across Member states, amounting to more 
than half of the household budget in Greece and Denmark to somewhat less than a third in Italy, Portugal, Malta 
and Cyprus. Moreover, in spring 2022, 28% of the EU population and 33% among social tenants anticipated 
likely difficulties in paying utility bills, which can ultimately lead to evictions. Increases of rents and property 
prices outpacing income growth deteriorated housing affordability, especially in major EU cities. At the same 
time, social housing waiting lists can be long (more than 7 years in 25% of municipalities in the Netherlands, and 
decades in  Denmark)262,  and  the  number of  people  waiting  can  be  large  (for instance, 136 156  households in 
Poland, 61 880 in Ireland and 257 271 in Belgium). People on waiting lists are younger, and often non-EU migrants 
(37%). Applications are more frequent from single-person households (50-65% in Finland and Malta, for instance). 

The share of the EU’s social housing in the total housing stock has been declining since the 1990s. 
Only 12% of the total housing stock in the EU is currently dedicated to social purposes and the volume of the 
social  rental  housing  stock  varies considerably  across  Member  States263.  The  proportion  of  social  housing  is 
largest in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, reaching low- and medium-income households264. In 2018, the 
report of the High-Level Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe estimated a total investment 
gap of at least EUR 1.5 trillion in social infrastructure for the period between 2018 and 2030 and EUR 57 billion 
related to affordable and social housing265. To deliver on the Green Deal goals for 2030, EUR 275 billion are 
deemed needed for energy-efficiency renovations, most of it for residential buildings, including social and af-
fordable housing266. Integrating energy efficiency and sustainability measures into social housing policies can 
help ensure that vulnerable groups benefit from the opportunities of the green transition. Most important barri-
ers to investments in social housing relate to: i) overall obstacles in the construction sector, such as the availa-
bility of skilled workforce; ii) permitting procedures and land use; iii) budget constraints and access to finance. 

Around 40% of the disposable income of households at risk of poverty is devoted to housing ex-
penses, with large variation across Member States 

Share of housing costs in disposable household income (%, 2023) 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_mded01], EU-SILC 

261  See Eurostat [ilc_mded04]. 
262  See Eurofund, Unaffordable and inadequate housing in Europe, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2023. Waiting lists 
figures are hard to compare cross-nationally and over time, 
thus need to be interpreted with care. 

264  OECD, Social housing: A key part of past and future housing 

policy, Employment,2020. 

265  Fransen, L., del Bufalo, G. and Reviglio, E., Boosting Investment 
in Social Infrastructure in Europe – Report of the High-Level 
Task Force on Investing in Social Infrastructure in Europe, 2018. 

263  Housing Europe, The State of Housing in the EU, 2020.Housing 

266  See A Renovation Wave for Europe - greening our buildings, 

Europe  

creating jobs, improving lives, COM/2020/662 final. 

99 

010203040506070ELDKLUSECZDENLHUATFISKBGEUFRBEPLROEEESIELVLTHRSIITPTMTCYAROPNot AROPTotal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Member States have already put in place a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory reforms and 
investment programmes to increase their social housing stock and support housing affordability. In 
Czechia, as part of its RRP, the government proposed a new legislation on affordable housing as well as subsi-
dised lending programs. Ireland introduced a Mortgage Interest Tax Relief and the Vacant Homes Tax. The RRP 
of Greece includes a social housing renovation programme to support most vulnerable groups threatened by or 
facing homelessness. In Spain, a loan facility was set up to support the supply of 20 000 new social and af-
fordable dwellings by public and private companies. In France, a new legal framework is under examination by 
the Parliament to strengthen the role of mayors in the allocation of social housing and to streamline the regu-
lation tools of short-term rental accommodations. A new law was adopted to simplify housing renovation and 
supply. Latvia developed a strategy to promote access to housing for households at different income levels. 
Luxembourg adopted a law on affordable housing, including for low-income households. A set of fiscal and 
non-fiscal  measures  are  available  to  support  access  to  affordable  ownership  and  rent.  Additionally,  Luxem-
bourg’s RRP introduced the ‘Housing Pact 2.0’ reform that puts in place a new reference framework for govern-
mental  support  to  municipalities  for  the  creation  of  new  housing  projects,  through  the  construction  of  new 
buildings or the renovation of the existing building stock.  Portugal developed a set of measures to promote 
affordable  and  social  housing  supply  with  reduced  VAT  and simplified  procedures  to  boost  construction  and 
implemented housing tax incentives for young people. EU funds can offer an important support for the imple-
mentation of these reforms and investments. The Operational toolkit on the use of EU funds for investments in 
social housing and associated services provides information on the funding opportunities and examples of op-
erations that can be realised with grants and with repayable finance267. 

Poor housing amenities and overcrowding affect 
a considerable share of households in the EU. In 
2023,  14.5%  of  the  EU  population  experienced  some 
form  of  housing  deprivation268,  reporting  at  least  one 
deprivation  item,  namely  a  leaking  roof,  lack  of 
bath/shower, lack of indoor toilet, or a dwelling consid-
ered  too  dark.  Even  more,  16.8%  lived  in  an  over-
crowded household, not having the minimum number of 
rooms according to the household composition. Housing 
deprivation tends to be linked to the type of household, 
income and tenure status. In 2023, in the EU, 20.6% of 
single person households with one dependent children 
and 19% of households at risk of poverty faced housing 
deprivation,  while  29.6%  of  the  latter  were  living  in 
overcrowded dwellings. 

Housing allowances are often used as an instru-
ment  of  housing  support,  varying  widely  across 
Member  States  in  design  and  size. Housing allow-
ances are means- and/or income-tested transfers gen-
erally provided to low-income households who meet the 
relevant  eligibility  criteria  in  order  to  help  them  meet 
rental as well as other housing costs, temporarily or on 
a  long-term  basis.  According  to  data  published  under 
the OECD’s Affordable Housing Database, total govern-
ment spending on housing allowances (expressed as a 
percentage of GDP), targeting both tenants and home-
owners,  is  the  lowest  in  Poland  and  Luxembourg  (at 
0.2%),  while  the  highest  in  Finland  (0.9%),  Denmark 
(0.7%) and France (0.7%) among EU Member States – 
see Figure 2.4.15. 

Housing difficulties and homelessness have been 
aggravated by the higher housing and living costs. 
In 2023, data were collected for the EU for the first time 
under the EU-SILC ad-hoc module on housing difficul-
ties269. Out of the surveyed  population, 4.9%  reported 
to  have  experienced  housing  difficulties  in  their  life, 
having  to  stay  with  relatives  or  friends  (76.2%),  in 
emergency  accommodation  (13%),  in  a  place  not  in-
tended as permanent accommodation (6.6%) or in pub-
lic spaces (4.2%). Available evidence suggests primary 
causes of housing difficulties to be of family and per-
sonal  nature  (30%)  and  linked  to  financial  resources 
(25.9%).  EU  countries  reporting  the  highest  rates  of 
housing difficulties experienced in the past among peo-
ple who are currently at risk of poverty or social exclu-
sion  were  Denmark  (18.4%),  Finland  (17.5%)  and 
France (17.1%). In contrast, the lowest rates were ob-
served  in  Poland  (1.9%),  Italy  (2.0%)  and  Hungary 
(2.1%).  This  pattern  also  changes  with  age270.  Among 
people experiencing poverty or social exclusion, renting 
difficulties during the last 12 months were reported by 
27.7% of those aged 30-54, 24.0% for the age group 
55 to 64 and 22.1% for those between 16 and 29. In 
the age group 65+, only 12.9% of people at risk of pov-
erty  or  social  exclusion  reported  renting  difficulties. 
Quantifying homelessness at EU level is difficult, due to 
significant  differences  in  statistical  definitions  and 
measurement approaches that hamper the production 
of robust and comparable data across Member States. 
Recent estimations in the 9th Annual Overview on Home-
lessness and Housing Exclusion in the EU by FEANTSA 
and FAP point to approximately 1.3 million people  

267  See Social Housing and Beyond. 
268  This paragraph relies on the Eurostat indicators [ilc_mddd04a], 

[ilc_lvho05a] and [ilc_mddd04a]. 

269  This paragraph, among others, relies on the Eurostat indicators 

[ilc_lvhd02] and [ilc_lvhd01]. 

270  Eurostat [ilc_lvhd08]. 

100 

 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Figure 2.4.15: Wide variations is observed in the 
use of housing allowance schemes to support 
households meet housing costs across Member 
States 

Figure 2.4.16: The length of retirement com-
pared to working life varies substantially across 
Member States 

Average duration of retirement and of working life, 2022 (years) 

Public spending on housing allowances in selected EU Member 
States in 2022 or latest year available (% of GDP) 

Note:  Data refer to the responses to the 2023 OECD Question-

Notes: Working life is counted from first employment and ends when 

naire on Affordable and Social Housing except for Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slove-
nia 

Source: OECD Affordable Housing Database [PH3.1] 

sleeping rough in the EU, i.e. in night shelters or tempo-
rary accommodation, of which 400 000 are children271. 
According to recently published OECD data272, the total 
number of people experiencing homelessness in the EU 
is estimated to be around one million. Since 2022, fol-
lowing the COVID-19 pandemic, homelessness has in-
creased  in  several  EU  Member  States  with  available 
data, notably Ireland and the Netherlands273. 

last employment ends. 

Source: Data from the 2024 Pension Adequacy Report 

The share of older people (65+) at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion slightly declined at EU level in 
2023. This decrease, to  19.8%,  was  driven by an im-
provement in the AROPE rate for women, although the 
latter remained substantially higher than for men in the 
same age group (22.2% and 16.7%, respectively). The 
situation was also very diverse across Member States, 
with AROPE rates for older people ranging from 11% in 
Luxembourg to 47% in Estonia. In absolute terms, how-
ever, the number of older people at risk of poverty or 
linked  to 
social  exclusion  continued  to 

increase, 

271  9th Overview of Housing Exclusion in Europe, FAP/FEANTSA, 

273 

2024. 

272  As part of the OECD Affordable Housing Database. 

Indicator HC3.1. Population experiencing homelessness in the 
OECD Affordable Housing Database. 

101 

0.0%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.7%0.8%0.9%1.0%PLLUCYLTSILVEEPTIECZELDENLFRDKFI0.0%1.0%PLCYSIEEIEELNLDKExpenditure share of housing allowances in20220.00.51.01.52.02.53.005101520253035404550LVLTHUNLBGDKEEDEHRSEROIECYELPLSKEUPTFIMTATESCZITSIBEFRLU0.05.0050LVEECYFISIAverage duration of retirement (years)Average duration of working life (years)Ratio working life to retired life 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

population  ageing,  approaching  18.6  million.  At  the 
same time, in 2023 income inequality (as measured by 
the  income  quintile  share  ratio,  S80/S20)  increased 
slightly in the 65+ age group, reaching 4.12, against the 
decreasing trend for the working-age population. Still, it 
remained lower than for the total population (4.72), also 
reflecting the redistributive impact of pension and tax 
systems. 

Monetary  poverty  of  older  people  decreased  in 
the EU, while their severe material or social dep-
rivation rate was stable. The at-risk-of-poverty rate 
for the 65+ receded to 16.8% in 2023 in the EU (refer-
ring  to  2022  incomes),  reaffirming  the  trend  that  the 
relative income of older people tends to hold up well in 
an  adverse  economic  context.  Nevertheless,  the  AROP 
rate for older people remained slightly higher than for 
the younger population on average in the EU (16.8% for 
65+ vs 16.1% for 0-65). Across Member States, the sit-
uation  was  diverse.  While  in  several  countries  people 
aged 65 and above were less exposed to monetary pov-
erty than the younger cohorts, in others the poverty risk 
in old age was even three times higher. The severe ma-
terial and social deprivation rate for older people was  

5.5% in the EU in 2023, having remained stagnant since 
2020,  following  a  decade  of  improvements.  The  rate 
ranged from below 1% to above 20% across Member 
States. 

The aggregate replacement ratio for pensions re-
mained stable at EU level. This measure, comparing 
pension benefits of people aged 65-74 to the work in-
come of those aged 50-59, was 0.58 in 2023. It ranged 
from 0.35 in Croatia to 0.78 in Greece274. The ratio was 
slightly  lower  for  women  than  for  men,  at  0.57  and 
0.60, respectively. This implies that women, whose work 
incomes are on average lower to start with, suffer a fur-
ther deterioration in their income situation compared to 
men when they retire (see also section 2.2.1). On aver-
age, people in the EU can expect to spend 21 years of 
their lives in retirement. While the duration of working 
life is 41.3 years, and that of retirement is 21 years in 
the EU on average, the relation between the two shows 
differences  across  Member  States  –  see  Figure 
2.4.16275.  The  average  duration  of  pension  payments, 
which may differ from that of retirement, is also around 
21  years,  ranging  from  15  to  25  years  across  coun-
tries276.  

Pillar Box 7: Integrated policy response to longevity – ensuring adequacy and fiscal 
sustainability of pensions and long-term care 

As longevity increases in the EU, supporting living standards in old age is crucial for the well-being 
of Europe’s population. By 2070, the EU population is expected to both decline (by 4%) and witness a large 
increase in the share of older cohorts, by at least 30% for those above 80 years of age 277. In an ageing society, 
ensuring the adequacy and fiscal sustainability of pensions and long term-care (LTC) requires a broad policy 
mix, which includes investing in active and healthy ageing, prolonging working lives, and supporting adapted and 
flexible work arrangements, alongside effective and efficient pension and LTC systems. Socio-economic inequal-
ities,  as  well  as  the  increase  in  non-standard  forms  of  work,  also  pose  growing  challenges  with  the  rise  in 
longevity and may have different effects on certain demographic groups. Against this background, the Council 
Recommendation on access to affordable high-quality long-term care278 asks Member States to ensure ade-
quate long-term care services, as well as quality employment and fair working conditions in the care sector, 
addressing workers’ skills needs, while also supporting informal carers. Council Conclusions of June 2024 on 
pension adequacy279 reaffirm the need to pursue further reforms including by improving labour market partici-
pation, access and contributions to social protection schemes for all, and strengthening access to high-quality 
and affordable health and long-term care. The European  Care Strategy280 includes a wide range of EU-level 
actions to support Member States’ efforts. 

274  Luxembourg had the highest aggregate replacement ratio in 

2022 (0.97); the value for 2023 is not yet available. 

275  Average duration of retirement from end of last employment, 

2022. 2024 Pension Adequacy Report calculations based on 
Eurostat (demo_mlexpec) and Ageing Report assumptions. 
276  Life expectancy at the average age at which people receive 

their first old-age pension, 2022. 2024 Pension Adequacy Re-
port calculations based on Eurostat (demo_mlexpec) and na-
tional data on first pension receipt. The duration of pension 
payment and retirement may differ as some people start re-
ceiving pension payments before they completely leave the la-
bour market; or vice versa. 

277  See European Commission, 2024 ageing report – Economic & 
budgetary projections for the EU Member States (2022-2070), 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

278  See Council Recommendation of 8 December 2022 on access 
to affordable high-quality long-term care 2022/C 476/01. 
279  See Council Conclusions on pension adequacy of 20 June 2024, 

10550/24. 

280  See the European Care Strategy, Communication on the Euro-

pean Care strategy, SWD(2022) 440 final. 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

In the ageing society of the EU, pension replacement rates are projected to decrease over the next four 
decades, while LTC needs are already high and increasing. While risks of poverty or social exclusion for older 
people have been broadly stable in recent years281, pension replacement rates282 for a 40-year standard career are 
set to decline, for both women and men, in most EU countries (by more than 20 pps in some cases). Compared to 
2022, the 2062 values are expected to be higher only in seven countries – see the Figure. Large falls are projected 
in the Netherlands and Hungary (albeit from high levels), Poland, Sweden, Latvia and, to a lesser extent, Romania 
and Bulgaria. Moderate increases are projected in Denmark, Lithuania, Malta and Greece, and a stronger one in 
Estonia (but from a low level). This implies that adequate pensions will increasingly depend on longer careers283. At 
the same time, lower pensions would also make it more difficult to cover out-of-pocket expenditure for LTC. As 
shown in the Figure, out-of-pocket costs for LTC (homecare) can be very high for people on severe care needs, and 
great variation exists among EU countries. In 11 Members States  (Croatia, Czechia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain) such out-of-pocket costs are estimated to represent more than 
half  of  the  median  disposable  income  after  public  support.  Data  also  show  that  people with a  low-income  and 
moderate care needs would have to spend more than half of their incomes on home care in ten EU countries. For 
those with severe needs, the average out-of-pocket costs would be around 80% of their disposable income284. 

Pension replacement rates are projected to decrease while LTC costs represent a significant share 
of the income of older people and are expected to increase  
Pension Net Theoretical Replacement Rates, 40-year career ending at pensionable age, average-earner, 2022 and 2062 (men, pps, EU-27) 
and Long-term care (homecare) out-of-pocket costs for severe needs as share of median disposable income after public support (both 
genders, EU-27 Member States and OECD) 

Note: The share is averaged across respondents. Estimates are computed using typical cases matched to survey data. Severe needs correspond to 
around 41.25 hours of care per week. Values of out-of-pocket costs in CZ are very high (477%) compared with other estimates, and thus they are 
not shown to facilitate comparison of other estimates. The following data relate to sub-national areas: BE (Flanders), EE (Tallinn), IT (South Tyrol) and 
AT (Vienna). Data are not available for BG, CY and RO (not members of OECD). 
Source: Commission’s own calculations, based on data from OECD and Member States. 2024 Pension Adequacy Report and OECD analysis based on 
the OECD long-term care social protection questionnaire, SHARE (wave 8, 2019, except PT, which refers to wave 6, 2015) and TILDA (wave 3, 2015).  

Member States continue to take steps to ensure the adequacy and fiscal sustainability of pensions, 
while  also  reforming  and  investing  in  long-term  care.  Czechia  and  Slovakia  limited  early  retirement 
options and adjusted pension rates in such a way to increase  the incentives for older people to work longer. 
Ireland introduced incentives to defer retirement. Croatia increased the incentives to enrol in occupation pen-
sions. To support low-income pensioners, Spain increased the non-contributory pension by 6.9%, and Portugal 
increased the solidarity supplement for older people by 23.0%285. The Estonian LTC reform aims to reduce out-
of-pocket payments, improve care staff conditions, and enhance home-based care services, with additional fi-
nancial support for municipalities based on their old-age population. The Slovenian LTC reform introduced a 
comprehensive range of services, including e-care and independence-maintaining services, to ensure a balanced  

281  See Chapter 1 in PAR 2024, European Commission, The 2024 

283  See Pension Adequacy Report 2024, section 3.1, ‘Theoretical re-

pension adequacy report – Current and future income adequacy 
in old age in the EU. Volume I, Publications Office of the Euro-
pean Union, 2024. 

282  Theoretical replacement rates (simulated) measure how a hy-

pothetical retiree’s pension income in the first year after retire-
ment would compare with their earnings immediately before 
retirement. 

placement rates and pensions in the future’. 

284  See Pension Adequacy Report 2024, section 1.5 ‘Quality of life 
in the ‘fourth age’: the role of pensions and care services’. 
285  The EU supports national efforts to ensure adequate pensions 
and old-age income through mutual learning and analytical 
guidance in the triennial Pension Adequacy Reports of the Com-
mission and the Social Protection Committee. 

103 

05010015020025030405060708090100EELTHRLVFICZCYSISESKMTDEDKBGPLIEBEFRITROELATPTHUESLUNLLTC out-of-pocket cost share of median disposable income (%)Net TRRsTRR 2022TRR 2062LTC out-of-pocket costs 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

mix  of  care  options  for  older  people.  Greece  is developing  a  LTC  strategy, including  reforms to  ensure  that 
services are affordable, sustainable, and accessible. The  French ‘Ageing well’ Strategy includes measures to 
delay  dependence,  adapt  social  housing  for  ageing  tenants,  support  home  care  workers,  and  hire  additional 
professionals in LTC facilities for older people. Romania has implemented pension reforms to enhance fiscal 
sustainability and adequacy. A new pension law introduced a new calculation formula, removing distortions such 
as correction indices and unequal contribution periods, while also promoting longer working lives by incentivizing 
voluntary increases in the retirement age and limiting early retirement. 

Current structural challenges of availability, af-
fordability,  and  quality  of  long-term  care  (LTC) 
are expected to increase with population ageing. 
The number of people potentially in need of LTC in the 
EU is projected to rise from 31.2 million in 2022 to 33.2 
million in 2030 and 37.8 million in 2050286. According 
to 2019 data, 26.6% of people aged 65 or above living 
in private households were in need of LTC in the EU, with 
marked  differences  by  gender  (32.1%  of  women  vs 
19.2% of  men)287.  Persons  in  need  of  LTC  often  have 
limited access to formal services, which leads to unmet 
care needs or excessive burden on informal carers.  In 
2019,  46.6%  of  people  aged  65  or  more  with  severe 
difficulties in personal care or household activities in the 
EU reported an unmet need for help in such activities. 
This  was  significantly  more  pronounced  for  people  in 
the lowest income quintile (51.2%) compared to those 
in the highest (39.9%). 

Challenges  in  access  to  LTC  are  exacerbated  by 
labour  and  skills  shortages.  In  2023,  3.1  million 
workers  were  employed  in  the  LTC  sector  in  the  EU, 
around  1.5%  of  the  whole  workforce.  The  size  of  the 
LTC sector may in  practice  be bigger, as the numbers 
above  do  not  fully  reflect  domestic  workers  active  in 
LTC and the sector also has a significant incidence of 
undeclared work. While the population 65+ will grow by 
23%  until  2035,  the  projected  employment  growth  in 
the  care  sector is only  7%.  Significant  shortages may 
therefore be expected for health professionals, health 
associate  professionals,  and  personal  care  workers288. 
Based on the latest LFS data, on average in the EU there 
were  3.2  LTC  workers  for  every  100  individuals  aged 
65+  in  2023.  There  was,  however,  high  variability 
among  Member States, ranging from 0.2 in Greece to 
10.4 in Sweden – see Figure 2.4.17. The sector suffers 
from  low  attractiveness,  which  is  driven  by  difficult 
working conditions and relatively low wages, as well as 
a higher share of temporary contracts (16.6% vs 13.5% 
for  all  workers)289.  The  high  prevalence  of  involuntary 
part-time work is also contributing to the relatively low 
attractiveness in several Member States, such as in Cro-
atia (with 55.8% for LTC workers vs 22.6% for all) and 
in Bulgaria (with 52.4% for LTC workers vs 38.0% for  

Figure 2.4.17: There is wide variation in availa-
bility of LTC workers across Member States 
LTC workers per 100 individuals aged 65+, 2023  

Note:  LTC workers are selected by crossing sector (NACE) codes 

87.1, 87.3, 88.1 and occupations (ISCO) codes 2221, 2264, 
2266, 2634, 2635, 3221, 3255, 5321, 5322. 

Source: Eurostat, special extraction from EU LFS. 

286  According to the projections from the baseline scenario. See 

288  Cedefop, Handling change with care: skills for the EU care sec-

European Commission, 2024 ageing report – Economic & budg-
etary projections for the EU Member States (2022-2070), Pub-
lications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

287  Eurostat [hlth_ehis_tadle], EHIS. This survey-based measure 

only captures people in private households but not those in res-
idential care. 

104 

tor, Publications Office of the European Un-ion, 2023. 

289  Eurostat, EU LFS 2023. 

024681012ELPLCYROLVHUIELTHREEITSICZBGATESFREUPTSKLUBEDEFIMTNLDKSE020LTC workers per 100 65+ persons 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.18: The prevalence of unmet needs for medical care increased, moderately for most and to 
a large extent for a few Member States 
Self-reported unmet needs for medical care, 2023 levels and changes from previous year (%, Social Scoreboard headline indicator)  

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

Note: 

 Axes are centred on the unweighted EU average. The legend is presented in the Annex. Break in series for HR. Estimated value for 
DE. 

Source: Eurostat [tespm110], EU-SILC. 

all). Domestic and live-in carers, who are often mobile 
EU or third-country workers, may face particularly diffi-
cult working conditions and more difficult access to so-
cial  protection.  This is  in  particular the  case  for  those 
performing undeclared care work. 

23.0% vs 11.6% in Greece, 13.9% vs 7.8% in Latvia and 
9.3%  vs  5.2%  in  Romania).  Also,  regional  differences 
were recorded within Member States, with the strongest 
ones in Italy, Romania, and Germany (see Figure 10 in 
Annex 5). 

The  share  of  people  reporting  unmet  needs  for 
medical  care  slightly  increased  on  average, 
largely driven by sizeable increases in a few Mem-
ber States. In 2023, the share of those reporting un-
met needs for medical care was 2.4% in the EU, which 
is  0.2 pps  more  than  in  2022.  While  an  increase  was 
registered  in  most  Member  States,  the  extent  of  the 
overall  change  was  driven  by  a  few,  which  registered 
the largest shares and experienced strong rises (namely 
Estonia, Greece, Latvia and Finland) – see Figure 2.4.18. 
With increases between 1.4 pps and 3.8 pps and levels 
between 7.8% and 12.9%, these four countries were all 
in ‘critical situations’, due to  high costs in Greece and 
long waiting lists in the other three countries. While ex-
periencing an increase below the EU average, Romania 
also  recorded  a  relatively  high  share  of  5.2%  (mostly 
due  to  financial  reasons),  in  a  situation  that  was  ‘to 
watch’ in 2023. The lowest figures were recorded in Cy-
prus, Malta, Germany, the Netherlands and Czechia, all 
below 0.5%. Unmet needs for medical care tended to be 
twice as large within the poorest fifth of the population 
than for the general population in some countries (e.g., 

2.4.2.  Measures taken by Member States 

Several Member States took measures to improve 
the adequacy of minimum income support. While in 
most countries minimum income benefits are updated 
every year to reflect developments in the cost of living, 
this is not the case for some Member States, where in-
creases  remain  discretionary.  For  example,  in  2024, 
Greece increased the level of its guaranteed minimum 
income  benefit  (by  8%)  for  the  first  time  since  the 
scheme was introduced in November 2018. Following a 
major reform in 2023, Latvia will further increase the 
level  of  its  guaranteed  minimum  income  benefit  to 
comply  with  a  Constitutional  Court  ruling  that  had 
judged the previous amounts not sufficient to ensure a 
life in dignity.  

Some Member States adopted broader reforms of 
their minimum income schemes. Under its Recovery 
and Resilience Plan (RRP), in  2024  Romania replaced 
its  minimum  income  benefit  with  a  scheme  (Venitul 
Minim de Incluziune)  with improved adequacy, regular 

105 

ATBEBGCYCZDEHRHULUMTNLROEEELFILVDKESFRIEITLTPLPTSESISKy = 0.2664x -0.2742R² = 0.8386-1.0-0.50.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.002468101214Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of population 16+) -changeSelf-reported unmet need for medical care (% of population 16+)2023 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

indexation of benefits and enhanced support for bene-
ficiaries to (re-)enter the labour market. Italy also re-
placed  as  of  2024  its  pre-existing  minimum  income 
scheme  (Reddito  di  Cittadinanza,  introduced  in  2019) 
with a more restrictive scheme (Assegno di Inclusione) 
which  excludes  individuals  of  working  age  considered 
employable. These have now access to a new separate 
scheme (Supporto per la Formazione e il Lavoro) that 
provides  temporary  income  support  (12  months,  non-
renewable) combined with support for training and em-
ployment. France has strengthened the incentives for 
labour  market  reintegration  too,  stipulating  under  its 
Law for full employment that beneficiaries of minimum 
income (Revenu de solidarité active) will have to be au-
tomatically enrolled with the public employment service 
(France Travail) by 1 January 2025. 

Member States continued efforts to improve ac-
cess  to,  and  quality  of,  social  services. In August 
2024,  as  part  of  the  RRP,  Bulgaria  adopted  the  Na-
tional Map of Social Services to identify gaps in the pro-
vision  and  determine  investment  needs.  In  Latvia, 
amendments  to  the  law  on  social  services  and  social 
protection to establish a minimum basket of social ser-
vices to be provided at local level are pending adoption. 
Romania adopted in April 2024 a new law reforming 
the social services system to strengthen quality stand-
ards for care and reinforce the role of inspectors. Slo-
vakia introduced a temporary measure, in place until 1 
December 2025, to increase the financial contribution 
for  the  provision  of  social  services  to  improve  their 
availability and pay conditions in the sector.  

Member States adopted measures to support ac-
cess to energy, and in many cases extended exist-
ing temporary measures. For example, Luxembourg 
introduced  in  July  2023  a  package  of  measures  de-
signed, among other things, to stabilise electricity bills 
of  private  households  with  a  government  subsidy  for 
the period January-December 2023, later extended to 
2024. Other laws were adopted to help reduce house-
holds’  dependence  on  fossil  fuels  and  promote  their 
conversion to renewable energies. Spain  prolonged in 
2024 the measures regulating energy markets and gas 
tariffs and the energy and water supply guarantee for 
vulnerable  or  socially  excluded  consumers.  Malta  ex-
tended  its  package  of  energy  support  measures  and 
subsidies  (adopted  in  2022)  to  2026.  Romania  pro-
longed to Spring 2024 the validity of its energy voucher 
granted to vulnerable people in order to reimburse the 
energy  prices.  Some  Member  States  also  introduced 
structural measures to address energy poverty. For ex-
ample,  in  November  2023,  Bulgaria  adopted  a  legal 
definition  of  energy  poverty  and  energy  vulnerability 
and introduced the prohibition to cut-off electricity sup-
ply for energy vulnerable individuals. In January 2024, 
Portugal adopted its National Long-Term Strategy for 
Combating  Energy  Poverty  2023-2050,  as  well  as 
measures to address the digital divide and territorial in-
equalities in accessing digital communications, such as 
advancing plans for a full coverage of fiber optic net-
works.  Italy  is  designing  a  financial  instrument  to 

106 

improve the energy efficiency of public houses, as part 
of the REPowerEU chapter of its RRP. 

In  2023-24,  measures  taken  by  some  Member 
States aimed to strengthen access to social pro-
tection, notably unemployment benefits, for spe-
cific  groups  like  the  self-employed.  Italy  made 
permanent, from 2024, the scheme to protect freelance 
professionals against large drops in labour income IS-
CRO  (Indennità  straordinaria  di  continuità  reddituale  e 
operative), which had been introduced on a temporary 
basis  in  2021-2023.  Poland  extended  by  12  months 
(from  August  2023)  the  social  security  exemption  for 
self-employed starting their activity. While this reduces 
their financial burden, it also limits their future entitle-
ments to social insurance benefits in old age and in case 
of invalidity. In Greece, the extra maternity protection 
allowance  was  expanded  to  include  self-employed 
women, freelancers, and farmers who gave birth since 
September  2023.  Moreover,  the  means-tested  unem-
ployment benefit provided to self-employed people and 
freelancers was increased. Lithuania tabled in 2023 a 
proposal to amend the law on unemployment insurance 
in order to reduce the length of the minimum required 
contributions  (from  12  to  9  months  in  the  last  30 
months), as well as to extend the insurance to all groups 
of self-employed. In Cyprus, the RRP includes a revised 
social insurance law submitted to the Parliament aims 
at extending social security to the self-employed, in par-
ticular  as  regards  accidents  at  work  and  occupational 
diseases and parental leave. In Estonia, a law was pro-
posed in order to replace the current two-tier system of 
unemployment  allowance  and  unemployment  insur-
ance  with  a  single  unemployment  insurance  scheme 
from 2026 and make this latter accessible to workers 
with limited employment history. Estonia also intends to 
propose by May 2025 options to expand unemployment 
insurance coverage to the self-employed. 

People  in  non-standard  employment  were  tar-
geted  as  well  by  policy  measures  to  reinforce 
their access to social protection. In Romania, the 
law formalising employment of domestic workers and 
giving access to pensions and health insurance took ef-
fect in January 2024, with domestic workers receiving 
payment in the form of vouchers, paying social security 
contributions and being provided health insurance cov-
erage (i.e. free access to a basic package of health ser-
vices).  In  May  2024,  Spain  simplified  and  improved 
unemployment  assistance  to  make  it  accessible  to 
those who have exhausted their contributory benefits or 
have  not  contributed  long  enough  to  qualify  and  was 
also extended to agricultural workers. The country also 
strengthened incentives for labour contracting and im-
proving social protection for artists, and as of January 
2024 regulated the social security coverage for train-
ees,  both  for  paid  and  unpaid  trainees.  Finally,  Spain 
took measures in March 2023 to guarantee the level of 
social security contributions for domestic employees. In 
Slovenia, the 2023 amendments to the Healthcare and 
Health Insurance Act (1992), as part of an RRP reform, 
revoked voluntary health insurance for all categories of 

 
 
insured people and increased the statutory health insur-
ance  contribution  (including  for  the  self-employed) 
starting in 2024. Czechia modified the legislation ap-
plicable  to  ‘agreements  to  perform  work’  by  requiring 
their registration from July 2024 and extending social 
insurance coverage to this type of contracts from 2025 
on, under the same conditions as for standard employ-
ees. In Cyprus, a law was adopted in 2023 to improve 
the rights of employees, including those in non-stand-
ard forms of employment and on-call workers. 

Child  and  family  allowances  were  increased  in 
several Member States, especially for single-par-
ent families. In Bulgaria, the benefit for single moth-
ers who raise children younger than 3 years old grew by 
83% per month. In parallel, income thresholds for gen-
eral child benefits were increased and households who 
received them between December 2023 and February 
2024  received  a  one-off  payment  to  help  cover 
transport costs. In Portugal, the child benefit increased 
for most beneficiaries, but in a stronger way for single-
parent families. As of 2024, the Portuguese family al-
lowance is EUR 100 per month, with an additional ‘child-
hood guarantee’ benefit targeted at children in extreme 
poverty and amounting to EUR 122 per month. In Ro-
mania, the amount of child allowance increased by the 
inflation rate of the previous year as of 1 January 2024. 
Meanwhile,  the  child-rearing  allowance  for  parents  of 
twins, triplets and multiples increased by 50%. Two of 
the  national  one-off  childbirth  grants  were  also  in-
creased.  In  Bulgaria,  family  allowances  rose  by  as 
much  as  50%.  Also,  Greece  increased  the  grant  de-
pending on the number of children with retroactive ef-
fect from 2023. 

Support  for  early  childhood  education  and  care 
(ECEC)  saw  increased  spending  in  some  Member 
States, while various other measures were taken 
to address the challenge of poverty risks for chil-
dren.  In  Ireland, the  subsidy  to  defer childcare  costs 
was  increased  by  51%,  while  in  Italy,  it  rose  to  EUR 
3 600 per year for children born on or after 1 January 
2024 under certain conditions. In the context of the RRP, 
Italy is also increasing available places in ECEC struc-
tures  and  is  expected  to  create  more  than  150 000 
places for 0 to 6 year-old children by mid-2026. Also in 
Bulgaria,  ECEC  will  benefit  from  additional  invest-
ments (ESF+ and national budget), targeted at increas-
ing its inclusiveness. Croatia adopted, under its RRP, a 
new model for the financing of early childhood educa-
tion and care facilities, aiming to increase their availa-
bility and affordability.  Spain is planning to set up at 
least  1000  support  units  for  vulnerable  students  in 
school districts under its RRP, and a programme to offer 
food and other basic products to families with minors. 
Malta expanded the scheme providing free IT devices 
for  pupils.  Romania  delivers  a  daily  meal  to  around 
650 000 disadvantaged children from 2200 schools. 

Some countries focused on improving overall dis-
ability  policies,  while  others  strengthened  their 

107 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

disability benefits. For example, Greece updated the 
National Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disa-
bilities focusing on the years 2024-2030. The country 
also completed the pilot programme on personal assis-
tance and disability assessment process to be rolled out 
in  2025.  Bulgaria  improved  the  adequacy  of  the 
monthly benefit for children with disabilities. Malta in-
creased  the  grant  for  parents caring  for  children  with 
severe disabilities. In Italy, in the framework of the RRP, 
a reform to support autonomy of persons with disabili-
ties was fully implemented in 2024, improving the as-
sessment and access to personalised support services. 
Consistently with the reform, an investment in the RRP 
supports individualised projects, providing persons with 
disability with housing and ICT solutions. 

Member States put in place regulatory and non-
regulatory measures offering or extending rental 
support in order to strengthen access to afforda-
ble housing, for low-income households and vulnera-
ble  groups  such  as  young  people.  In  August  2023, 
Luxembourg  introduced  legal  amendments  on  the 
housing assistance framework to prioritise support for 
less well-off households, having already introduced an 
increase in the rent subsidy for households with children 
and a rent bonus for young employees in May 2023. In 
2024, Malta reformed its private rent housing benefit 
scheme to reach a maximum amount of EUR 6 000 per 
year, while also implementing an integrated care plan 
for tenants facing significant rent arrears. In May 2024, 
Portugal  approved  the  Construir  Portugal  housing 
package,  which  includes  housing  incentives  for  young 
people such as extended access to rent subsidies.  

Against the background of the high cost of living, 
Member  States continued to  take action to sup-
port  the  living  standards  of  retirees,  especially 
those on minimum or low pensions. In Bulgaria, a 
decision  was  taken  to  increase  all  pensions,  including 
the social pension, by 11% in July 2024 to account for 
high inflation. Similarly, an exceptional revalorization of 
pension benefits was decided in Slovakia. In Portugal, 
the  reference  value  of  the  solidarity  supplement  for 
older people was increased by 23%, and in Malta the 
Senior Citizen grant for those who reach the age of 80 
was increased from EUR 50 to EUR 450 per year. In Ro-
mania, the Pensions Law of December 2023 introduced 
a mechanism of indexation of social benefits for those 
on  small  old-age  pensions.  Finally,  contributory  pen-
sions were increased by 3.8% in  Spain, with a cap of 
EUR 3 175, while non-contributory pensions and mini-
mum incomes were increased by 6.9%. 

To strengthen adequacy and fiscal sustainability 
of their pension systems, Member States contin-
ued to take measures to increase the labour mar-
ket  participation  of  older  people,  and  also 
introduced some parametric reforms. Ireland put 
in  place  measures  empowering  individuals  with  the 
choice to continue working up to and beyond the state 
pension  age.  Conditions  for  early  retirement  were 

 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

tightened in Slovakia through changes in the calcula-
tion of the required length of work and of the percent-
age  reduction  in  the  pension  amount.  Czechia  also 
limited early retirement. In Finland, a tax reform was 
enacted in January 2024, providing higher incentives to 
work for retirees over 65 who are on pension. Starting 
from 2024, Italy raised to 63 years and 5 months from 
63 the age requirement for accessing the Social Pension 
Advance  (APE  Sociale)  early  retirement  scheme,  and 
also  to  61  from  60  years  of  age  that  of  the  ‘Option 
Women’ scheme. In Germany, the ‘Pension Package II’ 
introduced a new component in the financing of statu-
tory  pension  insurance  -  the  so-called  ‘generational 
capital’ - consisting in a capital stock built up by means 
of  loans  from  the  federal  budget  and  the  transfer  of 
own funds from the federal government. The related re-
turns are used to stabilize pension insurance contribu-
tion  rates  that  are  thus  expected  to  remain  stable  at 
18.6% until 2027 and then increase to 22.3% by 2035. 
Some  countries took  steps  to  facilitate  flexible  retire-
ment  pathways.  For  instance,  Spain  temporarily  ex-
tended the possibility of partial retirement with a relief 
contract  (contrato  de  relevo)  in  the  manufacturing  in-
dustry, allowing people to access a portion of their pen-
sion at the age of 61, and to reduce working hours by 
up to 80%. Comprehensive reforms in its RRPs are also 
planned in Czechia to preserve pension adequacy and 
fiscal sustainability. 

Some countries took steps to enhance the take-
up of supplementary pensions. Croatia introduced 
new  rules  giving  companies  that  manage  mandatory 
and  voluntary  pension  funds  and  pension  insurance 
companies the necessary flexibility to preserve the real 
value of the insured person’s assets. A one-time pay-
ment of up to 20% of the total capitalized funds in the 
occupational pension funds is now possible. In Ireland, 
an Automatic Enrolment Retirement Savings System Bill 
has been  presented,  with  the  possibility  of  opting  out 
after 6 months. 

Member  States  introduced  different  actions  to 
improve access to healthcare services and quality 
of care. Ireland expanded the eligibility for the means-
tested GP visit card scheme, granting free GP care to an 
additional  half  a  million  people  in  2023  (while  it  re-
mains the only Member State without universal primary 
healthcare coverage). In the context of its RRP, Italy is 
investing in new healthcare facilities (such as the Com-
munity Hospitals and Community Health Houses) and in 
telemedicine, with the aim to bring healthcare services 
closer to patients. As of 2023, the RRP is also supporting 
in  small  municipalities  to  strengthen 
pharmacies 
healthcare access in rural and remote areas. Moreover, 
Italy adopted Law 107 of July 2024, introducing a mon-
itoring and control system to reduce waiting lists in the 
National Health Service. Each Region will appoint a Re-
gional  Health  Assistance  Manager  (RUAS)  to  address 
identified issues. In April 2024, Bulgaria’s National As-
sembly adopted the National Health Strategy 2030, as 
a reform in their RRP, which is expected to improve ac-
cess to health services across the country. 

108 

Steps have also been taken to strengthen patient 
centred primary care, integrated care and digital 
healthcare.  Lithuania,  for  instance,  launched  a  new 
pilot shuttle service for patients who cannot use individ-
ual  or  public  transport  for  health,  social  or  economic 
reasons, to strengthen the patient centredness and to 
increase access to healthcare services. In order to drive 
forward  the  digitalisation  of  the  health  system,  Ger-
many  has  passed  the  ‘Digital  Act’,  which  came  into 
force in March 2024. Through measures in the national 
RRP, Portugal also adopted legal acts in 2023 revising 
the  organisation  and  functioning  of  primary  care  ser-
vices to strengthen their role in the National Health Sys-
tem. In August 2023, Latvia approved a Digital Health 
Strategy,  which  aims  to  enhance  data  availability,  in-
teroperability,  and  digital  services.  In  Austria,  the 
healthcare  reform  2024-2028  includes  measures  to 
strengthen primary care and expand digital health ser-
vices.  

Member  States  also  took  measures  to  address 
healthcare  workforce  shortages  and  improve 
staff retention. In July 2023, a legislation regulating 
the professional title of nursing assistants, included in 
the RRP, entered into force in Sweden. From September 
2023, in France, general practice students must com-
plete an additional year of postgraduate training in am-
bulatory  care,  preferably  in  underserved  areas.  In 
December  2023,  as  part  of  their  RRPs,  Estonia 
amended legislation to incentivize nurses to work in re-
mote  areas,  while  Lithuania  introduced  amendments 
to  legal  acts  aimed  at  improving  the  career  develop-
ment  of  healthcare  professionals.  In  January  2024, 
Denmark enacted a new law on shifting several spe-
cific tasks from doctors to nurses. In March 2024, Bel-
gium approved two laws defining the role of advanced 
practice  nurses  and  specifying  their  clinical  activities 
and conditions. New legislation in Greece in May 2024 
allows private doctors to collaborate with public hospi-
tals,  perform  medical  procedures,  and  participate  in 
outpatient clinics and surgeries outside regular hours. In 
Italy, over 2021-26 the RRP is supporting the award of 
2700  additional  scholarships  in  general  medicine  to 
contribute to the availability of medical staff. 

Measures were taken to improve public health by 
emphasizing  disease  prevention,  health  promo-
tion,  in  particular  for  mental  health.  In  Luxem-
bourg, the new National Mental Health Plan 2024-28 
was published in July 2023. In Portugal, a new mental 
health law, as part of the RRP, was adopted regulating 
the rights of persons with a mental illness and regulat-
ing also compulsory hospitalisation or treatment. Esto-
nia is developing a suicide prevention plan, expected by 
the end of 2024. In August 2023, Romania established 
the National Cancer Registry under the administration 
of the National Institute of Public Health. Romania also 
adopted the National Vaccination Strategy 2023–2030 
in  October  2023.  In  Spain,  the  Interterritorial  Council 
approved the 2024–2027 Plan for Smoking Prevention 
and Control in April 2024. 

 
 
A number of Member States aimed to strengthen 
the affordability, availability and quality of long-
term  care  services  and  address  the  challenges 
that formal and informal carers face. In December 
2023, Slovenia adopted a new Long-term care act de-
fining the sources and methods of stable public financ-
ing of long-term care, including a new mandatory social 
insurance contribution for long-term care as of 1 Janu-
ary 2025. The Act also sets conditions for the provision 
of quality and safe long-term care services In Estonia, 
the Care reform entered into force on 1 July 2023, de-
fining the way long-term care services are funded, re-
ducing out-of-pocket payments, and ensuring that care 
recipients with low income are helped to cover their care 
costs. The country also adopted more detailed minimum 
quality  requirements  for  general  care  and  home  care 
and, as part of its RRP, in February 2024, amended its 
Action  plan  on  an  integrated  care  model, laying  down 
the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved and 
defining the future financing of the system. Since 2023, 
Finland  has  been  using  the  Resident  Assessment  In-
strument  (RAI)  for  assessing  older  persons’  service 
needs and functional capacity. Additionally, Finnish law 
requires  social  welfare  workers  to  assess  urgent  help 
needs immediately, starting within seven working days 
of contact from the client or their representatives. Italy, 
in the framework of its RRP, fully implemented a reform 
to  improve  the  living  conditions  of  non-self-sufficient 
elderly people by simplifying access to health and social 
services, providing a multidimensional assessment, and 
defining individualized projects that promote de-institu- 

2. Employment and social reforms – Member States’ performance and action 

tionalization. In March 2024, Bulgaria adopted a Strat-
egy  for  human  resource  development  in  the  social 
sphere (until 2030) to improve working conditions in the 
social  sector,  skills  and  competencies,  attract  more 
workers,  better  align  education  pathways  and  provide 
more  motivation  and  support.  Sweden  introduced  a 
Protected  Professional  Title  for  Nursing  Assistants  in 
July  2023  to  ensure  care  quality  and  safety,  issuing 
73 196  certificates  so  far.  Effective  as  of  April  2024, 
France  introduced  several  measures  for  home  care 
professionals, including a professional card, annual mo-
bility support aid, and a lump-sum allowance for travel 
time.  In  2023,  Portugal  amended  its  labour  code  to 
better protect domestic workers and in 2023 and 2024 
its legislation on informal caregivers, including financial 
aid and connection with formal carers, as well as estab-
lishing conditions for caregiver rest. Since 2024, Malta 
has been expanding its Carer at Home Scheme, which 
provides financial support to older citizens with low de-
pendency who employ a carer with a recognised quali-
fication to assist them in their daily needs. France has 
been  implementing  the  ‘Ageing  well’  strategy  since 
2023,  which  includes  50  measures  to  delay  depend-
ence,  adapt  social  housing  for  ageing  tenants,  hire 
50 000 professionals for care facilities for older people, 
and prevent senior social isolation while promoting in-
tergenerational solidarity. Greece is developing a long-
term  care  strategy  to  ensure  sustainability  of  care 
structures, a more cohesive regulatory framework, and 
standardized operational processes. 

109 

 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

110 

 
 
 
 
. 

CHAPTER 3 

First-stage country 
analysis 

This  chapter  presents  country  fiches  as  part  of 
the  first-stage  country  analysis,  based  on  the 
principles  of  the  Social  Convergence  Framework 
(SCF) as described  in the  related EMCO-SPC Key 
Messages and the underlying Report of the EMCO-
SPC  Working  Group290,  also  supporting  key  hori-
zontal findings presented in section 1.4 of Chap-
ter  1.  While  all  fiches  rely  on  the  Social  Scoreboard 
readings and the JER categorisations as described in the 
Box  in  section  1.4  and  in  Annex  6,  their  structure  de-
pends on the country-specific situation: the order of the 
three policy areas covered in the fiches (employment; 
education and skills; social protection and inclusion) is 
guided by the developments in the country concerned, 
as emerging from the Social Scoreboard tables in Annex 
9. Similarly, the graph for each country illustrates the 
most pertinent issue or a key development for the coun-
try in question. 

The first-stage country analysis is based on the 
full set of Social Scoreboard headline indicators. 
Each of the indicators291 is scrutinised based on the JER 
methodology, which determines the relative standing of 
Member  States.  This  relative  standing  is  expressed  in 
terms of standard deviations from the mean of both the 
absolute  level  of  the  indicator  value  and  its  change 
compared  to  the  year  before  (see  Annex  6  for  more 
technical details). Results are summarised into one of 
seven  possible  categories  for  each  indicator  for  the 
country in question (‘best performer’, ‘better than aver-
age’, ‘good but to monitor’, ‘on average’, ‘weak but im-
proving’, ‘to watch’, ‘critical situation’). This corresponds 
with  the  scale  of  colours,  from  green  to  red.  A  short 
overview  of  the  indicators  and  their  rating  for  each 
Member State can be found in the tables in Annex 9.  

Each headline indicator of the Social Scoreboard 
is  assessed  with  the  methodology  explained 
above, in order to identify whether further anal-
ysis is needed in a second stage.  The qualification 

‘critical  situation’  refers  to  Member  States  that  score 
much worse than the EU average on a specific indicator 
and in which the situation is deteriorating or not improv-
ing sufficiently compared to the year before. A situation 
is marked as ‘to watch’ in two cases: a) when the Mem-
ber State scores worse than the EU average on a spe-
cific  indicator  and  the  situation  in  the  country  is 
deteriorating or not improvingly sufficiently fast and b) 
when the score in terms of levels is in line with the EU 
average but the situation is deteriorating much faster 
than the EU average or not improving (nearly as fast) 
while the EU average does.  

Further analysis in a second stage is considered 
warranted  for  Member  States  for  which  six  or 
more  Social  Scoreboard  headline  indicators  are 
flagging  red  (‘critical  situation’)  or  orange  (‘to 
watch’). An additional reason for considering that the 
situation requires further analysis in a second stage oc-
curs when an indicator flagging red or orange presents 
two consecutive deteriorations in its JER categorisation. 
An example is a change from ‘on average’ to ‘weak but 
improving’ in the 2024 JER edition, followed by a further 
deterioration to ‘critical situation’ in the 2025 edition). 
This would be counted as an additional ‘flag’ towards 
the minimum threshold of six flags overall. For example, 
if in a given year n a country has 5 headline indicators 
of the Social Scoreboard flagged as red or orange, and 
one of them presents two consecutive years of deterio-
rations in years n and n-1, the country is considered as 
having overall 6 flags in that year n (5 red/orange sig-
nals from the indicators in the given year + 1 of them 
with  two  consecutive  deteriorations).  As  a  result,  it 
would require further analysis as well. Any break in se-
ries and issues in relation to data quality and interpre-
tation  are  taken  into  account  in  the  evaluation  of  the 
total number of flags towards the threshold. 

290  A dedicated joint EMCO-SPC Working Group was set up to 

discuss the initiative and conducted work from October 2022 
until May 2023. This fed into EMCO and SPC that prepared the 
ministerial discussion in the June 2023 EPSCO meeting. The 
work and its outcomes are documented in the EMCO-SPC Key 
Messages on the introduction of a Social Convergence 

Framework in the European Semester and the related Report of 
the EMCO-SPC joint Working Group. 

291  For technical details on the Scoreboard headline indicators, in-
cluding the disability employment gap based on the GALI con-
cept, see Annex 2. 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Belgium 

In 2023, supported by economic growth, the labour 
market continued its upward trend in a context of 
sizeable  labour  shortages.  Despite  improvements  in 
the last decade, the employment rate, at 72.1% in 2023, 
still lags behind the EU average in level and change, dis-
playing a ‘critical situation’, with strong regional differ-
ences  and  some  groups  such  as  the  low-skilled,  those 
born outside the EU and older people trailing further be-
hind. This is largely due to Belgium’s activity rate being 
lower than the EU average. The unemployment and long-
term  unemployment  rates  are  ‘on  average’,  at  respec-
tively 5.5% and 2.2%, which is also the case for the gen-
der  employment  gap 
The  disability 
employment gap rose steadily between 2018 and 2021 
(from 32 to 38 pps) and, despite declining to 33.6 pps in 
2023,  continues  to  be  among  the  highest  in  the  EU 
(against an EU average of 21.5 pps) and in a ‘critical sit-
uation’ for three years in a row. Finally, despite the real 
wage increase in 2023, the gross disposable household 
income  per  capita  has  still  not  caught  up  with  the  EU 
average and remains ‘to watch’. 

(7.6 pps). 

Note: Break in the BE time series in 2017. 
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], EU LFS and [tepsr_sp200], EU-
SILC 

Belgium fares better than average in the area of 
education and skills. The proportion of adults participating in learning is ‘on average’, at 34.9% (vs 39.5%in 
the EU), as is the share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET), at 9.6%. 
With  56.3%  of  all  children  aged  less  than  3  years  in  formal  childcare,  and  a  share  of  6.2%  of  early  school 
leavers, Belgium is performing ‘better than average’ (although with important regional variation). This is also the 
case for the proportion of the adult population with at least basic digital skills (at 59.4%), which can help support 
the green and digital transitions. At the  same time, the proficiency in reading, mathematics and science has 
decreased over the past years and significant inequalities exist by socio-economic and migrant background.  

Social policies are generally effective in preventing and mitigating poverty and social exclusion risks 
as well as income inequalities. When it comes to the  impact of  social transfers (other than pensions) on 
poverty reduction, which is well above the EU average (50.8% vs 34.7% in 2023), and income inequality, as 
measured by the income quintile share ratio (3.4 vs 4.7 at EU level), Belgium is a ‘best performer’. Although in 
2023 the overall AROPE rate (18.6% vs 21.3% in the EU) is still recorded as ‘on average’, the shares of the total 
population and of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion have been declining since 2017, improving to 
‘better than average’ for children (19.0% vs 24.8% in the EU). Self-reported unmet needs for medical care, at 
only 1.1% in 2023, are ‘better than average’, while housing cost overburden, which affects 7.7% of the popula-
tion, is recorded ‘on average’ (8.8% at EU level). 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 3 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Belgium does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4).  

112 

202224262830323436384060626466687072747678802014201520162017201820192020202120222023Employment rate (%) and disability employment gap (pps)BE disability employment gap (rhs)EU-27 disability employment gap (rhs)BE employment rate (lhs)EU-27 employment rate (lhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Bulgaria 

Bulgaria  faces  challenges  related  to  skills  for-
mation,  which  weigh  on  the employability  of  some 
groups and hinders productivity growth and compet-
itiveness.  The  participation  of  adults  in  learning  de-
creased between 2016 and 2022, and at 9.5% in 2022 (vs 
39.5% in the EU) is among the lowest in the EU, represent-
ing a ‘critical situation’. Addressing this issue will require 
significant further efforts. Despite a recent improvement, 
the share of the adult population with at least basic digital 
skills also remains among the lowest in the EU, at 35.5% 
vs 55.6% at EU level in 2023, which is another ‘critical sit-
uation’. Strengthening adults’ skills acquisition, including in 
the digital domain, is key to support the green and digital 
transitions. The share of children aged less than 3 years in 
formal childcare is still low (17.4% vs 37.5% in the EU in 
2023). This is ‘to watch’ as it may impact on the long-term 
prospects  of  children  in  learning.  The  level  of  basic  and 
digital  skills  among  young  people  is  low  and  there  are 
large inequalities in educational outcomes. 

Note:  The  definition of  the  digital  skills  indicator changed  from 
2021  but  covers  a  concept  that  is  broadly  similar  to  previous 
years. 
Source: Eurostat [special extraction from the AES], [tepsr_sp410], 
[isoc_sk_dskl_i], ESS ICT Survey. 

Bulgaria  experienced  improvements  regarding  so-
cial  inclusion  and  protection  but  important  chal-
lenges  remain.  Although  the  AROPE  rate  declined  by 
2.2 pps in 2023 alongside positive labour market developments, as well as wage and pension growth, it is still 
among the highest in the EU (30.0% vs 21.3%, ‘weak but improving’). In addition, a sizeable decrease in the total 
number of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, of 34 000 (or 8.3%), compared to 2022 was registered. 
However, at 33.9% in 2023 the rate remains among the highest in the EU (24.8%) and ‘critical’. Despite im-
provements, vulnerable groups such as Roma (81%), persons with disabilities (42.4%) and those living in rural 
areas (39.3%) were more exposed to poverty or social exclusion risks than others. Overall, both the impact of 
social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction and income inequality improved in 2023 (from 24.4% 
to 27.7% and from 7.3 to 6.6 respectively, both ‘weak but improving’). 

Bulgaria’s labour market continued to perform strongly against a shrinking population, though with 
significant regional differences. While the country has reached a historically high employment rate (76.2% 
in 2023), which is ‘on average’ compared to the EU (75.3%), differences across regions range from 85.5% for 
the best performing region to 67.2% for the worst performing one. There are also substantial differences be-
tween population groups. The disability employment gap was still considerably above the EU average in 2023 
(39.5 vs 21.5 pps), having registered a 10.0 pps increase compared to 2022, and deteriorated over two consec-
utive years, reaching a ‘critical situation’. Although decreasing over the last few years, the share of young people 
neither in employment nor in education and training (NEETs), at 13.8% in 2023 was still above the EU average 
(11.2%), and is now ‘to watch’. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, including one that deteriorated over time, Bulgaria is identified as facing potential risks to upward 
social convergence that require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

113 

5152535455565201520162017201820192020202120222023Basic digital skills and adult learning (%) BG Basic digital skillsEU-27 Basic digital skillsBG Adult learningEU-27 Adult learning 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Czechia 

Overall positive labour market outcomes are cou-
pled  with  labour  shortages  and  relatively  more 
difficult conditions for certain population groups. 
In 2023, Czechia was among the ‘best performers’ in the 
EU with respect to high employment and low unemploy-
ment  rates  (81.7%  and  2.6%  respectively)  despite 
slightly  negative  economic  growth.  The  low  long-term 
unemployment rate (0.8% in 2023) was also ‘good but 
to monitor’, following an increase by 0.2 pps compared 
to 2022. However, the gender employment gap stood at 
13.9 pps in 2023, which is among the widest in the EU, 
and shows a ‘critical situation’. Moreover, the participa-
tion  rate  of  children  aged  less  than  3  years  in  formal 
childcare (4.5% in 2023) decreased by 2.3 pps compared 
to 2022, and remains far below the EU average (37.5%), 
also a ‘critical situation’. This, combined with challenges 
in terms of quality of childcare provision, may impact on 
children’s long-term learning prospects and women’s la-
bour market participation. The share of young people nei-
ther in employment nor in education and training (NEET) 
fell by 1.3 pps to 10.1% in 2023, and like the disability employment gap (at 22.2 pps in 2023), is ‘on average’. 
Strengthening  the  labour  market  participation  of  women,  young  people  and  disadvantaged  groups,  such  as 
Ukrainian citizens under temporary protection and Roma, could help mitigate labour shortages.  

Source: Eurostat [lfsa_ergan], EU LFS. 

Czechia’s  performance  in  relation  to  skills  is  improving,  but  adult  participation  in  learning  faces 
challenges.  The  latter  was  among  the  lowest  across  Member  States  (21.2%  in  2022  vs  39.5%  in  the  EU), 
indicating a ‘critical situation’. At the same time, between 2021 and 2023, the share of adults with at least basic 
digital skills increased from 59.7% to 69.1%, which is now ‘better than average’. Further promoting adult learning 
and skills development can help foster innovation capacity and facilitate the green and digital transitions. 

Czechia has a well-functioning social protection system but faces challenges in the area of social 
housing. The share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) was 12.0% overall and 15.0% among 
children in 2023, making Czechia a ‘best performer’ (vs EU averages of 21.3% and 24.8%, respectively). Both 
indicators slightly increased from 2022 in a context of above EU average inflation. The real gross disposable 
household income per capita (GDHI) decreased from 123.9 in 2022 to 121.6 in 2023 and is ‘to watch’. Housing 
affordability in Czech cities requires close monitoring with a signficantly higher (13.2%) housing cost overburden 
rate recorded in 2023 compared to rural areas (6.0%) (9.1% overall, ‘on average’). Finally, Czechia is still ‘better 
than average’ concerning self-reported unmet needs for medical care.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 4 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Czechia does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

114 

02040608010020-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-64Employment rates by sex and age, 2023 (%)MenWomen 
 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Denmark 

The  labour  market  tightness  of  recent  years  is 
slightly  easing,  while  unemployment  has  in-
creased.  After  years  of  record  employment  growth, 
2023 saw a marginal decrease in the employment rate, 
to  79.8%  (-0.3 pps  compared  to  2022),  generating  a 
shift  from  ‘better  than  average’  to  ‘good  but  to  moni-
tor’292. As economic growth was less job-rich than in the 
post-pandemic period, the unemployment rate increased 
by 0.6 pps to 5.1% already in 2023, resulting in a situa-
tion that is ‘to watch’. While pressure on the labour mar-
ket  eases293,  the  country  continues  to  face  labour 
shortages in certain sectors, particularly those related to 
the  green  and  digital  transitions.  Regional  differences 
also exist regarding difficulties with recruiting new work-
ers294.  The situation of young  people neither in employ-
ment nor in education and training (NEET) is still ‘better 
than average’, despite an increase by 0.7 pps to 8.6% in 
2023. Similarly, Denmark also performs ‘better than aver-
age’  regarding  the  gender  employment  gap,  which  now 
stands at 5.6 pps compared to the EU average of 10.2 pps.  

Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

The share of early leavers from education and training has increased since 2020. The indicator rose 
from 10.0% in 2022 to 10.4% in 2023 (0.9 pps above the EU average) and is ‘to watch’. This warrants attention 
also in light of the overall shortages of skilled  workers experienced  by the country. The participation rate of 
adults in learning at 47.1% in 2022 is ‘better than average’ (EU 39.5%), even after a small decrease from 2016, 
and the share of adults who have at least basic digital skills is also  ‘better than average’ (at 69.6% in 2023). 
Denmark is among the countries with the highest share of children under 3 years in formal childcare (69.9% in 
2023, ‘good but to monitor’ following a 4.8 pps drop from 2022). 

The social protection system functions very well, but housing costs continue to weigh on vulnerable 
groups. The situation in relation to the risk of poverty or social exclusion overall is ‘better than average’ and 
Denmark is a ‘best performer’ in relation to child poverty and the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) 
on poverty reduction. However, at 15.4%, the share of households overburdened by housing costs remains large. 
For the third year in a row, the situation is considered ‘critical’, reflecting the limited supply of affordable housing 
in larger cities.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 3 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Denmark does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

292  There is a break in time series for the 2023 value of the em-
ployment, unemployment, long-term unemployment, labour 
force participation and NEET rates as well as the gender em-
ployment gap, reflected in the figure. 

293  European Commission, European Economic Forecast Autumn 

2024. 

294  The Danish Agency for Labour Market and Recruitment (March 

2024), Recruitment Survey Report. 

115 

01234567876777879808182838420192020202120222023Labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates (%)Employment rate 20-64 (lhs)Labour force participation rate 20-64 (lhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Germany 

In the area of education and skills, the situation 
regarding  early  school  leavers  is  challenging, 
while Germany performs well on adult learning. 
The share of early leavers from education and training 
is high, and increased to 12.8% in 2023 (vs 9.5% in the 
EU), indicating a  ‘critical situation’. At the same time, 
the share of 15-year-olds lacking basic skills in math-
ematics and science (29.5% and 22.9% respectively in 
2022)  has  nearly  doubled  since  2012  (PISA,  2022), 
with a further increased socio-economic impact on ed-
ucation outcomes. This requires attention also in light 
of the skills needed by the labour market and the green 
and digital transitions. On the other hand, the share of 
the adult population with at least basic digital skills in-
creased by 3.3 pps to 52.2% in 2023 (vs 55.6% in the 
EU) and is now ‘on average’, while the overall adult par-
ticipation in learning, at 53.7% in 2022, makes Ger-
many one of the ‘best performers’ in the EU. 

Source: Eurostat [tessi163], EU-SILC. 

The German labour market performs well overall, but there are persistent labour and skills short-
ages and women are not sufficiently integrated in the labour market. Despite the economic slowdown, 
the employment rate is high and increased to 81.1% in 2023 (‘better than average’), while the unemployment 
rate  and  its  long-term  component  stayed  at  very  low  levels  (respectively  3.1%  (‘best  performer’)  and  1.0% 
(‘better than average’) in a context of labour shortages. On the other hand, while the gender employment gap is 
‘on average’, at 7.7 pps in 2023, the gender gap in part-time employment remained one of the highest in the EU 
(at 36.9 pps vs 20.2 pps in the EU). The current marital tax-splitting system is estimated to keep up to 185 000 
full-time equivalents out of the labour market. The share of children under 3 years in formal childcare (23.3% 
in 2023 vs 37.5% in the EU) is ‘to watch’. 

On the social side, housing affordability continues to pose significant challenges due to limited sup-
ply. The housing cost overburden rate has increased at a significantly faster pace in Germany compared to the 
EU (1.1 pps vs 0.1 pps), reaching a higher-than-average 13.0% in 2023, and remains thus ‘to watch’295. Although 
ongoing and planned policy initiatives are aiming at supporting more affordable housing, this situation is partic-
ularly difficult for people at risk of poverty, for which this rate rose to 43.2% (vs 33.6% in the EU). In a context 
of high inflation in 2022 and 2023, purchasing power of households was reduced and the shares of the popu-
lation and of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, respectively at 21.3% and 23.9% in 2023, increased 
since 2020 (respectively +0.9 pps and +1.6 pps) and is ‘on average’. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 3 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Germany does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

295  There is a break in time series for the indicator in 2023. 

116 

05101520253035404550TotalAbove the risk ofpoverty thresholdBelow the risk ofpoverty thresholdHousing cost overburden by poverty status, 2023 (%)DEEU 
 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Estonia 

Estonia faces challenges in the area of social pro-
tection  and  inclusion.  The  share  of  people  at  risk of 
poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) decreased by 1.0 pp 
to  24.2%.  However,  it  is  still  above  the  EU  average  of 
21.3%, and is ‘to watch’ in 2023. The risk of poverty or 
social exclusion among children is ‘better than average’, 
although  with  an  increase  by  1.7 pps.  For  older  people 
and persons with disabilities these risks remain among 
the highest in the EU (at 47% and 41% vs 19.8% and 
28.8% in the EU, respectively). In this context, it is note-
worthy  that  the  impact  of  social  transfers  (other  than 
pensions) on poverty reduction decreased from 28.1% in 
2022 to 27.7% in 2023, remaining below the EU average 
of 34.7% and is therefore ‘to watch’. Inequality, meas-
ured by the income quintile share ratio, rose from 5.0 in 
2021 to 5.4 in 2023 (also ‘to watch’) against an EU av-
erage of 4.7 in 2023. Estonia has one of the highest lev-
els of self-reported unmet needs for medical care in the 
EU (12.9% vs 2.4% in 2023), which is a ‘critical situa-
tion’. Access to healthcare remains a challenge in a con-
text of rising shortages of healthcare staff, high out-of-
pocket payments, and fast population ageing. 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

Employment continued to expand in 2023, with improvement notably on the disability employment 
gap. The employment rate reached 82.1%, being one of the ‘best performers’ in the EU while the long-term 
unemployment rate, at 1.3%, remained ‘better than average’. However, in the context of a contraction in real 
GDP in 2023, the unemployment rate increased from 5.6% in 2022 to 6.4% in 2023 and is therefore ‘to watch’. 
Regional differences in unemployment are considerable, with much higher figures in the North-Eastern part of 
Estonia (10.1% in 2023)296, characterised by the predominance of the industrial sector. Estonia has one of the 
lowest gender employment gaps in the EU, being among the ‘best performers’ over the last three years. At the 
same time, the  disability employment gap  decreased significantly (by 6.0 pps) compared to  2022 (20.2% vs 
21.5% in the EU), and is thus now ‘better than average’. Gross disposable household income decreased for the 
second year in a row (from 130.5 in 2022 to 125.9 in 2023) and is now ‘to watch’. 

In the education and skills domain, Estonia registered positive developments. It made substantial pro-
gress in relation to participation in adult learning, which increased from 33.9% in 2016 to 41.8% in 2022 (‘better 
than average’, compared to the EU average of 39.5% in 2022). In addition, the share of the population with at 
least basic digital skills improved in 2023 and is now also ‘better than average’, as is the share of early leavers 
from education and training, following one of the largest improvements from ‘to watch’ previously. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, including one that deteriorated over time, Estonia is identified as facing potential risks to upward 
social convergence that require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

296  Statistics Estonia: Unemployment rate | Statistikaamet. 

117 

51015202530354045505520162017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (%)TotalChildren (<18)Older (65+) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Ireland 

Employment expanded further in 2023 though dis-
advantaged  groups  still  face significant  barriers 
in accessing employment. In 2023, in spite of strongly 
decelerating economic growh, the employment rate, at 
79.1%, reached another record high (‘on average’) due 
to both migration and higher participation in the labour 
force.  The  unemployment  rate  at  a  historical  low  of 
4.3% (‘better than average’) reflects a still tight labour 
market. The gender employment gap decreased signifi-
cantly, from 11.4 pps in 2022 to 9.9 pps in 2023, and is 
now ‘better than average’, with greater flexible work op-
portunities  and  increasing  childcare  subsidies  having 
contributed to it. At the same time, despite a slight im-
provement over recent years, the disability employment 
gap  remains  much  wider  than  the  EU  average,  at 
36.7 pps against 21.5 pps, still displaying a ‘critical situ-
ation’.  Thus,  strengthening  the  employability  of  un-
derrepresented  and  disadvantaged  groups,  such  as 
persons with disabilities, single parents, the low-skilled, 
Roma and Traveller minorities, can help respond to ex-
isting and future labour and skills shortages. New out-
reach and activation measures, also supported by the ESF+, aim at reducing this gap. Finally, Ireland had a gross 
disposable household income per capita growth in 2023 that was ‘on average’. 

Note: Break in the IE time series in 2019. 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_sp200], EU-SILC 

Ireland performs well on education and skills. The country is still among the ‘best performers’ regarding 
the early school leaving rate, at 4.0% in 2023, despite an increase (from 3.7% in 2022). Irish adults are also 
more likely to participate in learning than the EU average, with 48.3% vs 39.5% in the EU in 2022 (‘better than 
average’). Moreover, the share of adults with at least basic digital skills is one of the highest in the EU, at 72.9% 
in 2023 vs 55.6% in the EU, putting the country again among the ‘best performers’. 

The  Irish  social  protection  system  effectively  alleviates  poverty  though  some  groups  still  face 
greater risks and challenges are still reported on early childhood education and care. Risks of poverty 
or social exclusion overall and for children are ‘on average’. Single parents, Travellers and persons with disabili-
ties are considerably more at risk. As regards the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty 
reduction, Ireland remains among the ‘best performers’ (at 57.8% vs 34.7% in the EU). Though the participation 
of children under 3 years in formal childcare increased from 18.3% in 2022 to 22.1% in 2023, it remains ‘to 
watch’ as it is still well below the EU average of 37.5%. Despite improvements some financial and non-financial 
barriers (availability, complexity of the system) persist. The availability of housing deteriorated, with long waiting 
lists  for  social  housing  and  record  high  homelessness,  partly  due  to  weak  tenants’  rights.  Homelessness  in-
creased sharpest among children and single parent families. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 2 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Ireland does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

118 

202530354045502014201520162017201820192020202120222023Disability employment gap (pps)IEEU-27 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Greece 

In  a  context  of  high  inflation  and  reduced  social 
spending relative to GDP, Greece faces significant 
challenges in the area of social protection and so-
cial  inclusion,  with  most  indicators  pointing  to  a 
‘critical situation’. More specifically, the reduction of 
poverty  through  social  transfers  (other  than  pensions) 
decreased by 2.1 pps to only 18.2%, which is 16.5 pps 
below the EU average. Although the share of people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) remained rel-
atively  stable  at  26.1%,  after  slow  improvement  over 
the past six years, it is still well above the EU average of 
21.3%. Furthermore, the share of households overbur-
dened by housing costs rose to 28.5% in 2023, which is 
one of the highest in the EU (8.8% on average). At the 
same time, the self-reported unmet needs for medical 
care further increased, reaching one of the highest levels 
(11.6% in 2023, from 9.0% in 2022, vs 2.4% in the EU). 
At 28.1%, the AROPE rate for children remained stable 
but  continues  to  be  above  the  EU  average  of  24.8%, 
indicating  a  situation  that  is  ‘to  watch’.  Inequality, as 
measured by the income quintile share ratio, has mar-
ginally increased to 5.3 (vs 4.7 in the EU) and is also ‘to 
watch’ due to its high level. 

Source:  Eurostat 
[tespm030], EU-SILC. 

[ilc_peps01n], 

[tepsr_lm430], 

[ilc_li02], 

The Greek labour market presents significant challenges, notably for women and young people. In 
2023, the employment rate rose by 1.1 pps on the back of still robust economic growth. However, only 67.4% 
of the working-age population was employed, remaining significantly below the EU average of 75.3%. Employ-
ment rates present a ‘critical situation’ particularly among women and young people. Despite its limited increase 
by 1.7 pps to 57.6% in 2023, the employment rate of women is one of the lowest in the EU and leads to one of 
the widest employment gaps (19.8 pps). The share of young people neither in employment, nor in education and 
training increased  by 0.6 pps to 15.9% in 2023, which is  significantly higher than the EU average of 11.2%. 
Furthermore, gross disposable household income per capita, at 81.6% in 2023, remains among the lowest, de-
spite  an  increase  from  2022  (vs  an  EU  average  of  111.1%),  moving  from  a  ‘critical  situation’  to  ‘weak  but 
improving’. On the other hand, the disability employment gap for Greece is ‘on average’. 

Skills development is a priority for Greece in view of the digital and green transitions and on the 
background of increased labour shortages in key sectors. The share of adults participating in learning 
during the last 12 months decreased from 16.0% in 2016 to 15.1% in 2022, which is among the lowest levels 
in the EU and represents a ‘critical situation’. At the same time, in 2023, 52.4% of adults (vs 55.6% in the EU) 
had at least basic digital skills, which is ‘on average’. Basic skills are among the lowest in the EU, also following 
one of the sharpest declines. On the other hand, the share of early leavers from education and training decreased 
by 0.4 pps from 2022 to 2023 and remained well below the EU average (3.7% vs 9.5% in the EU), putting Greece 
among the ‘best performers’. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 9 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Greece is identified as facing potential risks to upward social convergence that require fur-
ther analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

119 

05101520253035402017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate and its components (AROP, LWI, SMSD; %)EL AROPEEL AROPE for childrenEL AROPEL People living in low work intensity householdsEL Severe material and social deprivationEU-27 AROPEEU-27 AROPE for children 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Spain 

Spain experiences challenges in relation to social 
protection and inclusion. In 2023, the shares of the 
population at risk of poverty or social exclusion overall 
and among children increased to 26.5% and 34.5%, re-
spectively,  significantly  above  their  EU  averages  (of 
21.3% and 24.8%) and representing ‘critical situations’. 
This can be partly attributed to adequacy and coverage 
challenges within the social protection system, regional 
disparities in access to public services and persistently 
high  in-work  poverty.  Despite  some  improvement,  in-
come  inequality,  as  measured  by  the  income  quintile 
share ratio, remains high in 2023 (5.5 vs 4.7 in the EU) 
and is ‘to watch’. The impact of social transfers (other 
than pensions) on poverty reduction decreased to 22.9% 
in 2023 (vs 34.7% in the EU), deteriorating over two con-
secutive  years  and  moving  to  a  ‘critical  situation’.  The 
effectiveness of social transfers is particularly low in re-
ducing child poverty risks (17.0% vs 41.4% in the EU). 
On the other hand, the share of children below 3 years 
in formal childcare is ‘better than average’ in Spain. 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

The Spanish labour market has significantly improved but still faces challenges. The employment rate 
increased substantially to 70.5% in 2023 (vs 75.3% in the EU), moving from a ‘critical situation’ to ‘weak but 
improving’297. This was driven by robust economic growth, strong employment expansion of people born outside 
the EU, and an increase of employment in trade, technical and scientific occupations and public sector job crea-
tion. The unemployment rate (12.2%) and its long-term component (4.3%) are also ‘weak but improving’ in light 
of still very high levels despite large declines, especially for older workers and in the Canary Islands. While the 
share of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) continued to decrease (to 
12.3% in 2023), it remains large and ‘to watch’. The disability employment gap, among the lowest in the EU and 
decreasing, places Spain among the ‘best performers’. Finally, the real gross disposable household income per 
capita was ‘weak but improving’ in 2023 due to a strong increase. 

Spain faces challenges in relation to early leaving from education and training, while performing 
well on digital skills. The share of early leavers from education and training slightly decreased in 2023, to 
13.7% (vs  9.5% in the EU),  but remains high and in a  ‘critical situation’.  Related regional disparities are still 
significant despite shrinking in 2023, with particularly high levels in the south and east and worsening trends in 
the south and Canary Islands. Overall, adult participation in learning was ‘on average’ in 2022, at 34.1% (vs 
39.5% in the EU), following a 3.7 pps increase compared to 2016. On the other hand, Spain’s ‘better than aver-
age’ performance on digital skills supports well the green and digital transitions.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, including one that deteriorated over time, Spain is identified as facing potential risks to upward 
social convergence that require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

297  The definition of Spain’s labour market indicators differ from 

the usual ones in 2022 and 2023 (see Eurostat Metadata). 

120 

20222426283032342017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of poverty or social exclusion (%)ES AROPEEU-27 AROPEES AROPE childrenEU-27 AROPE children 
 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

France 

The labour market remained dynamic in 2023 de-
spite  a  slowdown  of  the  economy  in  the  second 
half  of  the  year  and  increasing  supply  bottle-
necks.  In  2023,  the  employment  rate  rose  to  74.4%, 
while  the  unemployment  rate  remained  at  7.3%,  the 
lowest  level  since  2008,  with  the  outermost  regions 
scoring  considerably  worse.  Both  indicators  are  ‘to 
watch’, as the relative performance has somewhat de-
teriorated298. The youth unemployment rate slightly re-
ceded  (-0.1 pps  to  17.2%),  but  the  share  of  young 
people neither in employment nor in education and train-
ing (NEETs) increased to 12.3% and is now also ‘to watch’. 
The labour market integration of some vulnerable groups 
continues to be challenging, in particular those born out-
side the EU and people with low educational attainment. 
The  gender  employment  gap  is  ‘better  than  average’ 
(5.5 pps in 2023 vs 10.2 pps in the EU) and further nar-
rowing. The disability employment gap has been decreas-
ing since 2020, reaching 19.9 pps in 2023 (vs 21.5 pps in 
the EU), and is now also ‘better than average’. 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

Despite comparatively high investments in social protection, poverty risks are higher over the past 
few years, in a context of growing inequalities. Overall, France ranks ‘better than average’ in relation to 
the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction (41.9% in 2023 vs 34.7% in the EU). 
After a considerable increase in 2022, the share of the population at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) 
decreased in 2023 by 0.3 pps, to 20.4%, below the EU average of 21.3% (‘on average’)299. The AROPE rate of 
children also fell (by 0.5 pps) to 26.6% in 2023, but remains above the EU average of 24.8%, and continues to 
be ‘to watch’. The growth of gross domestic household income per capita remained below the EU  average in 
2023 and is ‘to watch’. Inequality, as measured by the income quintile share ratio, is ‘on average’, though in-
creasing since 2018. The outermost regions fare considerably worse than metropolitan France across all do-
mains of the Social Scoreboard. 

France performs overall well regarding indicators on equal opportunities. The share of adults with at 
least basic digital skills as well as early leavers from education and training are ‘on average’ (at 59.7% and 7.6% 
in 2023, respectively). France is a  ‘best performer’ regarding the share of children aged less than 3 years in 
formal childcare. Nevertheless, the education system is marked by a significant share of low achievers and high 
inequalities, also reflected in the 2022 PISA results. The shortage of skilled workers is one of the main obstacles 
to recruitment and could hamper the green and digital transitions. 

In  light  of  the  findings  from  the  above  first-stage  analysis,  and  notably  5  indicators  flagging  as  ‘to  watch’, 
France does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will not require 
further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

298  The definition of France’s labour market indicators differ from 
the usual ones in 2022 and 2023 (see Eurostat Metadata). 

299  There is a break in time series in 2020 and 2022: the FR-SILC 

survey includes in 2022 for the first time 4 overseas depart-
ments (French Guiana, Réunion, Martinique and Guadeloupe). 

121 

1012141618202224262820162017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (%)TotalChildren (<18) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Croatia 

The labour market is continuing its upward trend, 
but  vulnerable  groups  face  substantial  chal-
lenges.  Despite  continuous  improvement  since  2021, 
the  employment  rate  remains  significantly  lower than 
the EU average (70.8% vs 75.3% in 2023) and in ‘criti-
cal  situation’  for  the  third  consecutive  year.  In  2023, 
supported by still relatively strong economic growth, the 
unemployment and long-term unemployment rates de-
creased and reached 6.1% and 2.1% (‘better than aver-
age’ and ‘on average’ respectively). After a substantial 
improvement, real gross disposable household income 
(GDHI)  per  capita  was  ‘better  than  average’  at  130.6 
(111.1  in  the  EU).  However,  some  vulnerable  groups, 
such as older and low-skilled workers, continue to have 
difficulties to find good quality jobs. The disability em-
ployment gap indicates a ‘critical situation’ in 2023 (at 
39.2 pps vs EU 21.5 pps), after widening for the second 
time. The gender employment gap, on the other hand, 
was ‘better than average’ 7.7 pps (10.2 pps in the EU). 
The share of young people neither in employment nor 
in education and training (NEET) improved and ‘on av-
erage’ in 2023 (11.8% vs EU 11.2%), even if more than 
half are inactive.  

Note: Break in the HR time series in 2023. 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_sp200], EU-SILC. 

Croatia faces some challenges regarding life-long learning and skills acquisition. The country remains 
a ‘best performer’ regarding the share of early leavers from education and training, which stood at 2.0% in 2023 
compared to an EU average of 9.5%. At the same time, the share of children aged less than 3 years in formal 
childcare increased to  29.6% in 2023 (from 27.5% in 2022) and now  performs ‘on average’, even though it 
remains 7.9 pps below the EU average. Despite persistent skills mismatches in the labour market, only 23.3% of 
Croatian adults participated in learning in the previous 12 months in 2022, against 39.5% in the EU and after a 
decrease from 26.9% in 2016. This is putting at risk the potential to increase future competitiveness including 
the green and digital transitions and is ‘to watch’. While the share of adults with at least basic digital skills was 
59.0% in 2023 (55.6% in the EU), it is now also ‘to watch’ due to the significant deterioration (by 4.4 pps) since 
2021. 

Croatia  faces  some challenges  in  the social  protection  and  social  inclusion  domain. The at-risk-of-
poverty or social exclusion rate (AROPE) remains ‘on average’ for the total population (20.7% vs EU 21.3%) and 
‘better than average’ for children (17.3% vs EU 24.8%), yet higher than the EU average for persons with disa-
bilities (37.5%  vs 28.8%). The impact of  social transfers  (other than pensions) in reducing  poverty has been 
‘critical’ since 2020 and was significantly lower than the EU average in 2023 (20.9% vs 34.7%). This requires 
close monitoring also in relation to the high cost of living.  Moreover, inequality (as measured by the income 
quintile share ratio) reached its highest level since 2018 at 4.91 in 2023 (vs 4.7 in the EU) and is now ‘to watch’. 
The situation regarding the housing cost overburden rate and the self-reported unmet needs for medical care is 
‘better than average’.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Croatia is identified as facing potential risks to upward social convergence that require fur-
ther analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

122 

 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Italy 

Despite a sustained recovery in employment, Italy 
faces  important  labour  market  challenges.  While 
the employment rate reached a record 66.3% in 2023, 
despite a slowdown in economic growth, it is still 9.0 pps 
below the EU average and ‘weak but improving’. It par-
ticularly  lags  behind  in  the  south  (52.5%)  and  on  the 
islands  (51.5%).  Although  the  unemployment  rate 
(7.7%) and its long-term component (4.2%) declined in 
2023, they remain among the highest in the EU, in a ‘to 
watch’ and ‘critical situation’, respectively. Also, the gen-
der  employment  gap  presents  a  ‘critical  situation’,  at 
19.5 pps in 2023, more than twice the EU average, and 
without significant improvements over the past decade. 
The  low  labour  market  participation,  in  particular  of 
women and youth, remains a challenge in light of the 
pressing demographic challenge. On the other hand, It-
aly remains among the ‘best performers’ regarding the 
disability employment gap. Finally, the gross disposable 
household  income  per  capita  further  decreased  to 
94.0% in Italy in 2023 compared to 2008 (vs an EU av-
erage of 111.1%), pointing to a ‘critical situation’. 

Note: Break in time series in 2018. 
Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

The  situation  for  young  people  shows  signs  of  improvement,  but  Italy  faces  challenges  on  adult 
learning. The share of adults participating in learning at 29.0% in 2022 (vs EU 39.5% and 33.9% in 2016) was 
‘to watch’300. Moreover, in 2023 only 45.8% of Italian adults had at least basic digital skills, thus also remaining 
‘to watch’, particularly in light of the green and digital transitions. Conversely, the situation of early leavers from 
education and training as well as of young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) 
improved, decreasing by 1.0 pps and 2.9 pps respectively, and are now ‘weak but improving’. Early school leaving, 
however, is considerably higher among non-EU citizens (29.5%) than among nationals (9.0%). At 16.1%, Italy 
still has one of the highest NEET rates in the EU (11.2%) (‘weak but improving’) and pupils’ weak basic skills 
remain a challenge. 

In the social area, advances have been registered but there is scope for further improvements. In 
2023, the share of both the general population and of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) 
decreased, respectively by 1.6 pps and 1.4 pps (‘better than average’ and ‘weak but improving’, respectively), 
driven by a reduction of people at risk of monetary poverty and of those living in households with very low work 
intensity. At 22.8% and 27.1%, both rates remain above the EU averages. Social transfers other than pensions, 
such as the universal child allowance, reduced monetary poverty by 30.5% (‘better than average’). Yet, regional 
differences are large and the share of those affected by severe material and social deprivation increased, in line 
with the high and stagnant  share of people living in absolute poverty, at 9.8% in 2023 (pre-pandemic level: 
7.6%). 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Italy is identified as facing potential risks to upward social convergence that require further 
analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

300  There is a break in time series for the indicator in 2023. 

123 

051015202530354550556065707580201820192020202120222023Key labour market indicators (%)Employment rate 20-64 (lhs)Employment rate 20-64 men (lhs)Employment rate 20-64 women (lhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (rhs)Youth unemployment rate 15-24 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Cyprus 

Skills  development  shows  deteriorations  and 
new  challenges  arise.  The  share  of  early  leavers 
from  education  and  training  increased  steeply,  from 
8.1%  in  2022  to  10.4%  in  2023,  which  is  now  ‘to 
watch’. At the same time, skills mismatches are strong: 
in 2022, 31.8% of employed people were over-quali-
fied for their job, i.e. 9.6 pps more than the EU average. 
Digital  literacy  has  declined  and  is  particularly  low, 
with only 49.5% of adults having at least basic digital 
skills in 2023 (vs EU 55.6%), and the situation remains 
‘to  watch’.  Moreover,  more  than  half  of  all  students 
lack basic skills in mathematics (53.2%) and reading 
(60.6%),  among  the  highest  shares  in  the  EU.  Only 
11.2% of all graduates in 2021 were STEM students, 
which is one of the lowest in the EU (average is 25.4%), 
while  demand  for  STEM  jobs  is  forecast  to  be  50% 
higher  by  2032  than  the  2021  supply.  The  share  of 
adults  participating  in  learning  in  the  previous  12 
months is low at 28.3% in 2022 (vs 39.5% in the EU), 
after a large drop from 44.8% in 2016, which is a sit-
uation ‘to watch’. On the other hand, the share of chil-
dren aged less than 3 years in formal childcare was 36.9% in Cyprus in 2023, (vs EU 37.5%), after a substantial 
increase from the previous year, a ‘better than average’ overall performance. 

Source: Eurostat [isoc_dskl_i2l], ESS ICT Survey. 

The  Cypriot labour market is overall performing  well but some population groups still face chal-
lenges. On the back of still relatively robust economic growth in 2023, the employment rate increased further 
to 79.5% in 2023 (vs EU 75.3%), and the unemployment rate and its long-term component fell to 5.8% and 
1.8%, respectively, (‘better than average’, ‘better than average’ and ‘on average’, respectively). The gender and 
disability employment gaps are ‘better than average’ and ‘on average’, respectively. At the same time, the share 
of young people neither in employment, nor in education and training (NEETs) remains high, at 13.9% vs 11.2% 
in the EU, even after a decrease of 0.8 pps, in a ‘critical situation’. Finally, real gross disposable household income 
per capita remains low, even if above its 2008 level, after a slight deterioration from 2021, ‘on average’.  

The social protection system appears effective in supporting good social outcomes in Cyprus.  The 
risk of poverty or social exclusion, overall and for children, stood at 16.7% in 2023 (vs 21.3% overall and 24.8% 
for children in the EU), the country performing ‘better than average’ under both dimensions. This is closely related 
to a stable level and distribution of real income in 2022, also reflecting that price increases were initially muted 
in 2022. It is also reflecting, among others, the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on reducing 
poverty, which is ‘on average’ (30.5% vs 34.7% in the EU), and the low housing cost overburden, for which Cyprus 
is a ‘best performer’. The self-reported unmet needs for medical care are, at 0.1%, among the lowest in the EU 
and ‘better than average’.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 4 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Cyprus does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

124 

0102030405060CYAll individualsCYIndividuals with noor low formaleducationEUAll individualsEUIndividuals with noor low formaleducationIndividuals with basic or above basic overall digital skills by education (%)20212023 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Latvia 

Challenges  in  the  social  domain  are  significant, 
especially  for  older  people.  In  the  context  of  an 
economy which contracted, the share of people at risk 
of  poverty  or  social  exclusion  (AROPE)  remained  in  a 
‘critical situation’ in 2023, at 25.6% (vs an EU average 
of 21.3%), despite a decrease by 0.4 pps from 2022. 
For children, the share increased to 20.3%, from 19.8% 
in  2022,  and  was  ‘on  average’.  On  the  other hand, it 
was particularly high for older people, at 41.6%, which 
is  more  than  double  the  EU  average  (19.8%).  At  the 
same time, the impact of social transfers (other than 
pensions) on poverty reduction decreased from 25.0% 
in 2022 to 23.5% in 2023 (vs 34.7% in the EU), and is 
‘to watch’.  Income inequality, as measured  by the in-
come quintile share ratio, has been persistently ‘critical’ 
over the past three years, with one of the highest val-
ues, at 6.2 in 2023 vs 4.7 in the EU. The recent mini-
mum income reform and the minimum wage increase 
to EUR 700 in 2024 aim to address challenges of high 
poverty risks and inequality, but the results are yet to 
be  seen.  Finally,  the  self-reported  unmet  needs  for 
medical care continue to indicate a ‘critical situation’, affecting 7.8% of the population in 2023 (vs 2.4% in the 
EU), and having nearly doubled since 2021. 

Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

The performance on education and skills remains ‘on average’, but with deteriorations. The participa-
tion of adults in learning (over the past 12 months) decreased in 2022 (34.1% vs 39.5% in the EU), just as the 
share of adults with at least basic digital skills from 50.8% in 2021 to 45.3% in 2023 (vs 55.6% in the EU). The 
latter is now ‘to watch’, which might negatively impact the digital transition in Latvia. The share of early leavers 
from education and training slightly increased in 2023, to 7.7% (vs 9.5% in the EU), despite improvements in 
previous years. The impact of the recent measures addressing the vocational education and training reform on 
this area is being monitored. 

The labour market stabilised following the post-pandemic recovery. In 2023, the employment rate rose 
further to 77.5% (from 77.0% in 2022), performing ‘on average’ for the second year in a row. Latvia remains 
amongst the ‘best performers’ on the gender employment gap and ‘on average’ in relation to young NEETs. It 
performs ‘better than average’ on the disability employment gap, following an improvement to 18.5 pps in 2023 
(vs 21.5 pps in the EU), from 20.8 pps in 2022.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 5 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Latvia does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

125 

152025303540455055201520162017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (%)TotalChildren (<18)Working age (18-64)Older  (65+) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Lithuania 

The  labour  market  situation  in  Lithuania  has 
slightly worsened in 2023, in the wake of the eco-
nomic  slowdown.  The  unemployment  rate  increased 
by 0.9 pps to  6.9% in  2023,  and is now above the EU 
average  of  6.1%;  this  represents  a  worsening  perfor-
mance in relative terms for two consecutive years (from 
‘better than average’ in 2021 to ‘on average’ in 2022, 
and  ‘to  watch’  in  2023).  At  the  same  time,  inflows  of 
people  fleeing  the  war  in  Ukraine,  for  whom  employ-
ment dynamics differ, are also reflected in this increase. 
This  could  affect  labour  market  figures  temporarily. 
Nevertheless, the long-term unemployment rate stayed 
‘on average’. The situation is ‘to watch’ with regard to 
the employment rate; while it rose in most EU Member 
States, it declined to 78.5% in Lithuania in 2023 (from 
79.0% in 2022), even though it is still well above the EU 
average  (75.3%  in  2023).  Furthermore,  the  rate  of 
young  people  neither  in  employment  nor  in  education 
and  training  (NEET)  increased  by  2.8 pps  to  13.5%  in 
2023 (vs 11.2% in the EU) and is also  ‘to watch’. The 
employment  situation  of  persons  with  disabilities has 
been improving, as evidenced by the decrease in the gap from 35.0 pps in 2022 to 32.4 pps in 2023 (vs 21.5 pps 
in the EU) but it remains  ‘critical’ in relative terms based on the Social Scoreboard headline indicator on the 
disability employment gap.  

Source: Eurostat [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

While the record-high 2022 inflation abated in 2023, Lithuania continues to face challenges related 
to social inclusion and social protection. Although the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on 
poverty reduction is ‘on average’, the adequacy and coverage of social benefits and pensions remain low. The 
share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) decreased by only 0.3 pps to 24.3% in 2023 (above 
the EU average of 21.3%), and remains ‘to watch’. The rate is among the highest in the EU for persons with 
disabilities, at 42.7%. Inequality, as measured by the income quintile share ratio, is among the highest in the EU 
(6.3 vs 4.7), indicating a continuing ‘critical situation’ for the third year in a row. On the other hand, the housing 
cost overburden rate is ‘better than average’ and the share of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion is 
‘on average’. 

In a context of fast green and digital transitions, challenges persist in relation to skills development. 
Adult participation in learning over the past 12 months was significantly below the EU average in 2022, at 27.4% 
vs 39.5%, and is thus ‘to watch’. On the other hand, the share of adults with at least basic digital skills increased 
to 52.9% in 2023 (from 48.8% in 2022) vs 55.6% in the EU (now ‘on average’). The share of children below 3 
years in formal childcare decreased to 19.9% in 2023 (from 22.8% in 2022), thus breaking the positive trend 
observed in 2021-22, and remaining ‘to watch’. At the same time, despite a 1.6 pps increase, the share of early 
leavers from education and training, at 6.4% in 2023, was still below the EU average of 9.5%, and thus  ‘good 
but to monitor’. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 8 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, including one that deteriorated over time, Lithuania is identified as facing potential risks to up-
ward social convergence that require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

126 

4567891011201520162017201820192020202120222023Unemployment rate (%)LTEU-27 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Luxembourg 

The social situation deteriorated in Luxembourg in 
2023 and challenges related to housing costs re-
main. The share of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (AROPE) overall (at 21.4%, vs 21.3 in the EU) 
and especially for children (26.1% vs 24.8% in the EU) 
recorded a large deterioration in 2023, in absolute and 
relative terms. This can be attributed to increased infla-
tion  negatively  impacting  on  severe  material  or  social 
deprivation as well as persistently high in-work poverty. 
Also, the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) 
on poverty reduction decreased by more than 6 pps to 
27.4% (vs 34.7% in the EU). All three indicators are ‘to 
watch’. Housing costs continue weighing on households’ 
budgets: the high and increasing  share of those over-
burdened  by these costs, indicates a ‘critical situation’ 
for  the  second  year  after  one  of  the  largest  hikes,  at 
22.7% against 8.8% for the EU. This is mainly driven by 
population growth, in the face of limited housing supply, 
and high-income disparities in Luxembourg city impact-
ing on access. On the other hand, Luxembourg has one 
of the highest shares of children aged less than 3 years 
in  formal  childcare,  with  an  increase  from  54.7%  in 
2022 to 60.0% in 2023 (vs 37.5% in the EU). Moreover, self-reported unmet needs for medical care are ‘better 
than average’. 

Note: Break in time series in 2020, 2021, 2022. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], EU-SILC. 

Recent trends point to a slowdown in labour market performance.  In 2023, in a context of economic 
slowdown accompanied by persisting labour shortages, the employment rate stagnated at 74.8%, slightly below 
the EU average. The unemployment rate increased to 5.2% and is now ‘to watch’, having worsened in relative 
terms over two consecutive years (from ‘better than average’ and ‘on average’ in the previous two years). More-
over, long-term unemployment rose significantly by 0.4 pps to 1.7% in 2023, after having previously recovered 
to  its  low  pre-pandemic  level;  it  is  now  also  ‘to  watch’,  as  is  the  disability  employment  gap  (at  23.7 pps  vs 
21.5 pps in the EU) after a rise by 15.2 pps in 2023. As for the share of young people neither in employment nor 
in education or training (NEET), it rose to 8.5% in 2023, becoming ‘good but to monitor’. 

Luxembourg  performs  well  on  education  and  skills  overall  but  faces  challenges  regarding  digital 
skills, which are instrumental for the twin transition. The country is mostly ‘better than average’ in this 
policy domain. In particular, the share of early leavers from education and training decreased again in 2023 
(reaching 6.8% vs an EU average of 9.5%), and the share of adults participating in learning during the last 12 
months reached 45.2% in 2022 (vs 39.5% in the EU). However, in 2023, the share of adults with at least basic 
digital skills (60.1%) experienced a large deterioration while most EU Member States recorded increases. There-
fore, even if this figure is still well above the EU average of 55.6%, the indicator is now ‘to watch’.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 8 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, including one that deteriorated over time,  Luxembourg is identified as facing potential  risks to 
upward social convergence that require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

127 

1517192123252729312017201820192020202120222023At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate (%)LU AROPEEU-27 AROPELU AROPE childrenEU-27 AROPE children 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Hungary 

Poverty  and  social  exclusion  increased,  espe-
cially among children. In 2023, while still being close 
to the EU average, both rates worsened (by 1.3 pps to 
19.7% and by 6.3 pps to 24.4% respectively), moving 
from ‘on average’ overall and from ‘better than aver-
age’ for children to ‘to watch’. Monetary poverty (AROP) 
of children increased substantially and severe material 
and social deprivation rates were among the highest in 
the EU (10.4% overall, 15.1% for children and 17.9% 
for persons with disabilities, vs 6.8%, 8.4% and 11.0% 
in the EU). Following a 12% increase in 2023, income 
inequality is also ‘to watch’, even if still slightly below 
the EU average (4.5 vs 4.7). The impact of social trans-
fers  (other  than  pensions)  on  reducing  poverty  im-
proved from ‘to watch’ to ‘on average’ in 2023 (34.5%), 
reflecting  a  much  lower  rate  of  decrease  overall  but 
with a large drop for children. The falling effectiveness 
of social transfers reflects the fact that while prices 
and nominal wages grew rapidly in recent years, social 
benefits such as minimum income and family benefits 
remained nominally unchanged. 

Note: The impact of social transfer on child poverty reduction is 
calculated using pre-transfer and post-transfer AROP rates. Break 
in time series in 2022. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps01n], [ilc_li10], [ilc_li02], EU-SILC. 

Hungary faces challenges in  most sectors of education while performing above average on adult 
learning. The rate of early leavers from education and training remained high and in a ‘critical situation’ despite 
a  decrease  from  12.4%  in  2022  to  11.6%  in  2023. For  Roma,  this  rate  was  six  times  higher  as  a  result  of 
systemic issues, pointing to significant challenges in providing them with access to appropriate education and 
skills for the labour market. Basic skills of pupils remain low with a significant impact of the socio-economic 
background. On the other hand, following past years’ efforts to increase childcare capacities, the participation 
of children under 3 in formal childcare increased from 12.9% in 2022 to 20.3% in 2023 and is now ‘weak but 
improving’. Hungary performed ‘better than average’ on digital skills and was a ‘best performer’ on adult learning 
in 2023 (58.9% and 62.2%, respectively, vs 55.6% and 39.5% in the EU). However, rates for people with low-
skills, the unemployed and 55+ are lower than for the total population.  

The Hungarian labour market keeps performing well overall; however, long-term unemployment has 
increased and outcomes for some vulnerable groups still lag behind. The employment and unemploy-
ment rates continued to be ‘better than average’ in 2023 and Hungary remains among the ‘best performers’ for 
real gross disposable household income per capita. While long-term unemployment remains lower than the EU 
average, it increased slightly in 2023, against a decreasing trend in the EU, which is ‘to watch’. Vulnerable groups 
continue to face significant barriers on the labour market. The disability employment gap decreased by 2.8 pps 
in 2023 and is now ‘to watch’ due to its persistingly high level (29.6 pps vs 21.5 pps in the EU). The employment 
rates (15-64) for the low-skilled (38.7%) and the Roma (47.3%) were well below the Hungarian average (74.4%) 
in 2022.  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 6 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’,  Hungary  is  identified  as  facing  potential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence  that  require 
further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

128 

010203040506070201520162017201820192020202120222023Children AROPE and AROP and the impact of social transfers (%)Impact of ST on child povertyChildren AROPEChildren AROP 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Malta 

The social situation in Malta is showing increasing 
challenges. Against the background of solid economic 
growth, poverty or social exclusion risks, both overall and 
for children, are ‘on average’ (at 19.8% and 25.2%, re-
spectively, vs 21.3% and 24.8% in the EU). Nonetheless, 
three social indicators are flagged as ‘to watch’. Income 
inequality, as measured by the income quintile share ra-
tio,  increased  from  4.8  in  2022  to  5.3  in  2023  (vs  EU 
4.7). The impact of social transfers (other than pensions) 
on  poverty  reduction  is  persistently  low,  at  25.6%  in 
2023, well below the EU average of 34.7%, and decreas-
ing over the years. Finally, the housing cost overburden 
rate increased substantially, to 6.0% in 2023 from 2.9% 
in 2022, while remaining below the EU average. On the 
other  hand,  unmeet  needs  for  medical  care  were  re-
ported  by  only  0.1%  of  the  population  (vs  2.4% in  the 
EU), indicating a ‘better than average’ performance. 

Note: Break in time series for the impact of social transfers in 2022 
(disconnected lines). 
Source: Eurostat [tespm050], [tessi180], EU SILC. 

Early leaving from education and training remains 
a challenge, whereas participation of adults in life-
long learning has increased. Despite a further small 
reduction, the share of early leavers from education and 
training, at 10.2% in 2023 vs 9.5% in the EU, remains ‘to watch’. Also, about one third of Maltese students lack 
basic skills in mathematics (32.6%) and reading (36.3%), well above the EU averages. Yet, the share of young 
people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEETs) at 7.6% was low in 2023 (11.2% in the EU). 
The share of children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare was quite high at 51.0% in 2023 (37.5% in the 
EU). Also, adult participation in learning in the past 12 months increased from 32.8% in 2016 to 39.9% in 2022. 
In all these three aspects, Malta performs ‘better than average’. Among adults, 63.0% had at least basic digital 
skills (vs 55.6% in the EU, ‘on average’), although large differences between skills levels remain. 

The labour market performs strongly overall, yet challenges persist in relation to the gender em-
ployment gap. The employment rate in Malta was among the highest in the EU in 2023, at 81.3%, and the 
unemployment rate was at a historically low level of 3.5% (‘better than average’ and ‘best performer’ respec-
tively). Also, the disability employment gap narrowed from 30.1 pps in 2022 to 25.8 pps in 2023 (vs 21.5 pps in 
the  EU)  and  is  now  ‘better  than  average’.  While  employment  rates  increased  for  both  men  and  women,  the 
gender employment gap widened to 14.1 pps in 2023, indicating a ‘critical situation’. This significantly exceeds 
the EU average (10.2 pps) and represents one of the largest deteriorations since 2022. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 5 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Malta does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

129 

3.53.73.94.14.34.54.74.95.15.35.51520253035402014201520162017201820192020202120222023Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction (%) and Income quintile share ratio (S20/S80)MT S80/S20 (rhs)EU-27 S80/S20 (rhs)MT Impact of ST on poverty reduction (lhs)EU-27 Impact of ST on poverty reduction (lhs) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

The Netherlands 

The  Dutch  economy  continues  to  perform  rela-
tively well on all Social Scoreboard indicators re-
lated  to  the  labour  market.  Despite  a  marked 
economic  slowdown  in  2023,  the  labour  market  re-
mained tight. The employment rate in the Netherlands 
rose to 83.5% in 2023 (‘best performer’), well above the 
EU  average  (75.3%),  and  unemployment  remains  low 
despite a slight increase in 2023 (to 3.6%, ‘better than 
average’). The share of young people neither in employ-
ment nor in education and training remains among the 
lowest  in  the  EU,  despite  having  increased  further  in 
2023  (by 0.5 pps to  4.7%),  making the country a ‘best 
performer’. However, the risk of a highly segmented la-
bour market remains one of the biggest structural chal-
lenges in the Netherlands. While the gender employment 
gap  is  ‘on  average’  (7.8 pps  vs  10.2 pps  in  the  EU  in 
2023), part-time employment is widespread, in particu-
lar for women. This results in one of the widest gender 
gaps  in  part-time  employment  in  the  EU  (41.8 pps 
against an EU average of 20.2 pps in 2023) and a sub-
stantial gender pension gap (39.9% vs 25.3% in the EU 
in  2023).  Finally,  the  growth  of  gross  disposable  household  income  per  capita  has  not  kept  up  with  the  EU 
average (109.4 and 111.1, respectively) and remains ‘to watch’. 

Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

The Netherlands continues to show overall a strong performance in relation to skills formation De-
spite a slight increase compared to the previous year (0.6 pps), the rate of early leavers from education and 
training is still ‘better than average’ (6.2% in 2023). In 2023, 82.7% of the adult population had at least basic 
digital skills, which is among the highest shares in the EU (‘best performer’). However, according to the 2022 
PISA results general basic skills of students have deteriorated, posing a risk for skills development and compet-
itiveness. While in 2012 the share of underachieving students was well below the EU average in all domains, by 
2022 it had almost doubled in mathematics and science, and it was 2.5 times higher in reading. Since 2018, 
underachievement has increased especially among disadvantaged students. Effective outreach for up- and re-
skilling  of  those  in  an  unfavourable  labour  market  situation  (such  as  the  low-skilled,  people  with  flexible  or 
temporary contracts, and people with a migrant background and persons with disabilities) remains important. In 
particular, as a consequence of its decentralised implementation, vulnerable groups may not always be equally 
or adequately supported. 

The  share  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social  exclusion  in  the  Netherlands  remains  relatively 
stable and well below the EU average. Challenges persist for specific groups, such as persons with disabili-
ties or people with a migrant background, especially children. The housing cost overburden rate rose from 8.3% 
in 2020 to 9.3% in 2023 (vs 8.8% in the EU, ‘on average’). People at risk of poverty are particularly affected, 
with a housing cost overburden rate of 34.5% (vs 33.5 % in the EU).  

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 1 indicator flagging as ‘to watch’, the 
Netherlands does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

130 

23456789107677787980818283842014201520162017201820192020202120222023Employment and unemployment rate (%)Employment rate 20-64 (lhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

3. First-stage Country Analysis 

In  2023,  the  recovery  of  the  labour  market 
showed  some  signs  of  slowing  down.  Following  a 
significant  increase  in  the  previous  year,  the  employ-
ment rate slightly declined to 77.2% in 2023, in the con-
text  of  a  contracting  economy  accompanied  by 
widespread  labour  shortages  as  well  as  mismatches, 
and is now ‘to watch’. The unemployment rate moder-
ately increased to 5.1% in 2023 and is performing ‘on 
average’ (from ‘better than average’ the previous year). 
Conversely,  the  long-term  unemployment  rate  further 
decreased and remains ‘better than average’. And even 
though the gender employment gap remained ‘on aver-
age’ (7.8 pps in 2023), Austria recorded one of the high-
est  female  part-time  em-ployment  rates  (61.4%)  and 
widest gender gap (38.6 pps) in this respect. When con-
sidering full-time equivalent employment, this leads to 
a considerably wider gender employment gap of 19 pps. 
The share of children less than 3 years in formal child-
care only improved slightly by 1.1 pps in a year, to a still 
low  level  of  24.1%  in  2023  (vs  37.5%  in  the  EU)  and 
therefore remains ‘to watch’. This low rate and the limited 
supply  of  affordable  high-quality  childcare  significantly 
contribute to the high rate of female part-time work. Finally, real gross disposable household income (GDHI) per 
capita stood below its 2008 level (at 98.5% in 2023), despite steadily recovering since the COVID crisis, and 
represents a ‘critical situation’. 

Note: Break in time series for NEET rate in 2021. 
[une_rt_a], 
Source: 
[edat_lfse_20], EU LFS. 

[fsi_emp_a], 

[une_ltu_a], 

Eurostat 

In the area of skills, Austria continues to show a good performance, but some challenges persist. 
The share of adults with at least basic digital skills is high (64.7% in 2023) and ‘better than average’. The share 
of those participating in learning, though declining by 3.1 pps since 2016, was well above the EU average in 
2022 (52.2% vs 39.5%,  ‘better than average’). Strengthening adults’ skills acquisition, including in the digital 
and green domains, appears important to support the green and digital transitions and address related short-
ages. The share of early leavers from education and training was ‘on average’ at 8.6% in 2023. Simultaneously, 
only 30.5% of the unemployed (15-64) had at most lower secondary education, making them particularly vul-
nerable. Improving the basic skills for all can unlock their potential and improve employment outcomes.  

Austria performs relatively well in the area of social protection and inclusion. While the share of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) is ‘better than average’, at 17.7% in 2023, the AROPE rate for 
children increased to 22.7% (‘on average’). In particular, severe material and social deprivation increased (by 
1.2 pps)  in  2023, although  remaining  well  below  the  EU  average.  The  housing  cost  overburden  rate, in  turn, 
decreased and is now ‘better than average’. Also, the strong impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on 
poverty reduction (39.2% in 2023 vs 34.7% in the EU) and the low level of self-reported unmet needs for medical 
care continue to depict a situation that is ‘better than average’. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 3 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Austria does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

131 

7072747678808202468101214201820192020202120222023Key labour market indicators (%)Employment rate 20-64 (rhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)Long-term unemployment rate 15-74 (lhs)Youth unemployment rate 15-24 (lhs)NEET rate 15-29 (lhs) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Poland 

The labour market is robust, but women and per-
sons with disabilities continue to face significant 
challenges.  In  2023,  the  employment  rate  was  the 
highest  in  three  decades  (77.9%  vs  75.3%  in  the  EU, 
‘better than average’). Moreover, Poland has one of the 
lowest unemployment rates, at 2.8%, being among the 
‘best performers’ in the EU. However, labour shortages 
remain prominent, also due to the decline in the working-
age  population  and  lower  labour  force  participation 
among  certain  population  groups.  In  2023,  the  gender 
employment  gap  recorded  a  higher-than-average  drop 
but is still ‘to watch’, at 11.8 pps vs 10.2 pps in the EU. 
The  labour  force  participation  rate  is  relatively  low  as 
women tend to have more care responsibilities for chil-
dren and people in need of long-term care. The share of 
children aged less than 3 years participating in formal 
childcare  deteriorated  significantly  in  2023,  to  12.6% 
(from 15.9% in 2022), and remains far below the EU av-
erage  (37.5%),  which  represents  a  ‘critical  situation’. 
This low rate combined with quality challenges may im-
pact on children’s long-term learning prospects and the 
participation  of  women  in  the  labour market.  With  an  increase  of  2.6 pps to  33.9 pps  in  2023,  the  disability 
employment gap was among the widest in the EU (EU 21.5 pps) and indicates a ‘critical situation’301. 

Source: Eurostat [eq_dskl07], ESS ICT Survey. 

Poland shows some good developments regarding young people, but basic skills, digital skills levels 
and adult participation in learning remain very low. The share of adults participating in learning (over the 
past 12 months) was, at 20.3% in 2022, far below the EU average of 39.5%, representing a ‘critical situation’. 
This results mainly from a low participation in non-formal education. In addition, despite an increase by 1.4 pps, 
the share of those with at least basic digital skills (44.3%) remained significantly below the EU average in 2023 
(55.6%) and is also a ‘critical situation’. Strengthening digital skills acquisition can support the green and digital 
transitions. In the 2022 OECD PISA survey, the share of 15-year-old students not meeting minimum levels in 
basic skills increased to 23% in mathematics, 22.2% in reading and 18.6% in science, among the highest in-
creases in the EU compared to 2018. On the other hand, Poland is a ‘best performer’ regarding early leavers 
from education and training (3.7% vs 9.5% in the EU in 2023). 

The social situation is relatively stable in Poland. In 2023, the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate 
(16.3% overall, and  16.9%  for children)  and  income  inequality  (income  quintile  share  ratio  at  4.1)  remained 
‘better than average’ (compared to 21.3%, 24.8% and 4.7, respectively, in the EU). In particular, the share of 
children living in (quasi-) jobless households is noticeably lower than the EU average (3.1% vs 7.5%). 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 5 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Poland does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

301  Low reliability is flagged for the disability employment gap in-

dicator in 2023. 

132 

0102030405060708065-7455-6425-5416-24AllIndividuals with basic or above basic overall digital skills by age, 2023 (%)PLEU 
 
 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Portugal 

The effectiveness of the Portuguese social protec-
tion system in alleviating poverty risks and reduc-
ing income inequalities has deteriorated. In 2023, 
the impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on 
reducing poverty declined by 3.9 pps and at 19.8% (vs 
34.7% in the EU), indicates a ‘critical situation’. The fall-
ing  effectiveness  of  social  benefits  reflects  that  while 
prices and nominal wages grew rapidly in recent years, 
social benefits did not increase at the same pace. More-
over,  inequality,  as  measured  by  the  income  quintile 
share ratio, also deteriorated in 2023, to 5.6 (vs 4.7 in 
the EU, ‘to watch’). At the same time, the share of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) remained 
stable in 2023, at 20.1%, and is ‘on average’. However, 
the AROPE rate increased by 1.9 pps (to 22.6%) for chil-
dren from 2022 (‘on average’), which is one of the most 
severe deteriorations in the EU . The share of people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion is also particularly high 
in the outermost regions of Azores and Madeira (31.4% 
and  28.1%  respectively).  The  indicator  values  wors-
ened in the Lisbon Metropolitian Area and in the Azores 
(by 3.8 pps and 1.1 pps respectively), pointing to per-
sistent challenges in regional cohesion. 

Note: Break in time series in 2022. 
Source: Eurostat [tespm050], EU-SILC. 

While Portugal is performing on average in the area of skills, the rise in early leaving from education 
and training poses challenges. The share of early leavers increased from 6.3% in 2022 to 8.1% in 2023, and 
is now ‘to watch’, after deteriorating from ‘better than average’ in the previous two years, and thus reverting 
past improvements. Morevoer, there are significant regional disparites, with much higher rates for instance for 
the Algarve region (16%) and in particular the Autonomous region of Azores (21.7%). Basic skills of pupils have 
deteriorated significantly since 2018. The country performs ‘on average’ for the share of adults with at least 
basic digital skills and that of adults participating in learning (in the previous 12 months). However, the latter 
decreased from 38.0% in 2016 to 33.4% in 2022, despite a need for up- and re-skilling also in light of the 
digital and green transitions.  

The Portuguese labour market remains resilient. In a context of above EU-average economic growth, the 
employment rate improved from 77.1% in 2022 to 78.0% in 2023 supported by net migration and remains ‘on 
average’. On the  contrary, the unemployment  rate increased  by 0.3 pps in  2023, to 6.5% (‘on average’). The 
long-term unemployment rate has been improving since 2021, though it is still above the EU average in 2023 
(2.5% vs 2.1%). Portugal also continues to perform ‘better than average’ on the share of youth not in employ-
ment neither in education and training (NEET), except in the Azores, and the gender employment gap, and is 
among the ‘best performers’ on the disability employment gap. On the other hand, labour market segmentation, 
as reflected by high shares of young people on temporary contracts (42.9% vs 34.3% in the EU in 2023), persists. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 3 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Portugal does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

133 

152025303540201520162017201820192020202120222023Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction (%)PTEU-27 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Romania 

Despite  some  progress,  poverty  risks  in  Romania 
remain high, especially for vulnerable groups and 
in rural areas. The share of people at risk of poverty or 
social  exclusion  (AROPE)  steadily  declined  since  2016, 
from 46.0% to 34.4% in 2022 and 32.0% in 2023 (vs 
21.3% in the EU), which is a sign of ‘catching up’, despite 
inflation remaining high in recent years. The AROPE rate 
for  children,  at  39.0%,  also  declined  in  2023  (from 
41.5%  in  2022),  while  remaining  one  of  the  highest 
(24.8% in the EU). This points to a ‘weak but improving’ 
situation for both indicators this year compared to a ‘crit-
ical situation’ last year. The social protection system con-
tinues to show low effectiveness in reducing poverty, as 
social transfers (other than pensions) reduce it by only 
15.6% (vs 34.7% in the EU), which is ‘critical’. While in-
come  inequality  (as  measured  by  the  income  quintile 
share ratio) slightly declined in 2023 (from 6.0 to 5.8), it 
remains  among  the  highest  in  the  EU  and  also  consti-
tutes a ‘critical situation’. Self-reported unmet needs for 
medical care increased (5.2% in 2023 vs 4.9% in 2022) 
in line with the trend observed in the EU and remains ‘to 
watch’.  Vulnerable  groups,  people  living  in  rural  areas, 
and  marginalised  communities  like  Roma  face  greater 
difficulties accessing essential and social services. 

Note: Break in RO time series in 2021. 
Source: Eurostat [edat_lfse_30], EU LFS. 

The labour market is improving, but still faces substantial challenges.  In 2023, the employment rate 
was still well below the EU average (68.7% vs 75.3%) and has improved only marginally since 2022 (68.5%) 
despite above EU average economic growth. This is a ‘critical situation’, partly reflecting the under-representation 
of some population groups including women and the Roma. The long-term unemployment rate was stable (‘on 
average’ at 2.2%), against an improving EU trend. At the same time, the gender employment gap increased by 
0.5 pps to 19.1 pps in 2023, being one of the widest in the EU, also in a ‘critical situation’. This was also the case 
for the share of young people not in employment neither in education and training (NEET), which declined by 
0.5 pps to 19.3% in 2023, but is still one of the highest in the EU. While the disability employment gap decreased 
by 2.8 pps in 2023, it is still wide and ‘to watch’.  

Persisting  challenges  in  education  and  skills  development  put  at  risk  sustainable  socio-economic 
convergence. Adult participation in learning is ‘weak but improving’ (at 19.1% vs 39.5% in the EU in 2022). Yet, 
other areas of skills development display persistently ‘critical situations’. This holds for the share of adults with 
at least basic digital skills (at 27.7% in 2023 vs 55.6% in the EU). Moreover, the share of early  leavers from 
education and training is also one of the highest (16.6% vs 9.5% in the EU in 2023), having worsened further 
against a decreasing EU trend, and is thus in a ‘critical situation’, as is the share of children under 3 years in 
formal childcare that remains very low (12.3% vs 37.5% in the EU). These trends, alongside the poor basic skills 
levels from the 2022 PISA results, emphasise that there is room to strengthen education and training in terms 
of quality, accessibility and labour market relevance. 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 10 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’,  Romania  is  identified  as  facing  potential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence  that  require 
further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

134 

05101520253020162017201820192020202120222023Early leavers from education and training by degree of urbanisation (%)RO - TotalEU-27 - TotalRO - CitiesRO - Towns and suburbs 
 
 
 
3. First-stage Country Analysis 

Slovenia 

Slovenia experiences challenges related to its ed-
ucation and training system. In 2022, only 26.5% of 
all adults participated in education and training. This is 
significantly below the EU average of 39.5% and repre-
sents a decrease of 13.8 pps compared to 2016, being 
therefore ‘to watch’. Furthermore, only 46.7% of adults 
had at least basic digital skills in 2023, well below the 
EU average (55.6%), and reflecting a decline of 3.0 pps 
compared to 2021. This situation is ‘to watch’, especially 
in light of the green and digital transitions. The share of 
early  leavers  from  education  and  training  further  in-
creased by 1.4 pps to 5.4% in 2023, and remains ‘good 
but  to  monitor’,  although  Slovenia  still  has  one  of  the 
lowest  shares  in  the  EU302.  In  turn,  the  share  of  young 
people neither in employment nor in education and train-
ing (NEET) declined by 0.6 pps to 7.8% in 2023, which is 
‘better than average’.  

Source: Eurostat [isoc_sk_dskl_i21], ESS ICT Survey. 

Slovenia’s labour market is performing well over-
all in a context of continued economic growth, alt-
hough the employment rate decreased in 2023. The 
unemployment and long-term unemployment rates continued their downward trends in 2023 and stood at 3.7% 
(‘better than average’) and 1.4% (‘on average’) respectively. The employment rate, at 77.5%, is above the EU 
average of 75.3% but recorded a slight decline (0.4 pps) despite an increase in total employment of 1.6% at the 
same  time.  Against  a  background of  increases  in  employment  rates in  most  Member  States this indicates a 
situation that is ‘to watch’. However, structural factors such as rapid population ageing and skills mismatches 
risk exacerbating already existing labour shortages. 

Slovenia has overall a well-functioning social protection system. As in previous years, the shares of the 
population and in particular of children at risk of poverty or social exclusion were one of the lowest in 2023, at 
13.7% and 10.7% respectively (both ‘best performers’), also in light of well targeted support measures helping 
vulnerable households alleviate the impacts of energy-price inflation. However, some vulnerable groups, includ-
ing the low-educated, unemployed and elderly women, still experience much higher poverty risks, thus warrant-
ing  further  policy  efforts  targeted  at  these  groups.  The  impact  of  social  transfers  (other  than  pensions)  on 
poverty reduction is now ‘on average’ at 35.5%, but still less effective for the elderly (65+). Income inequality, 
at 3.3, as measured by the income quintile share ratio, remained one of the lowest in the EU in 2023 (‘best 
performer’). 

In  light  of  the  findings  from  the  above  first-stage  analysis,  and  notably  3  indicators  flagging  as  ‘to  watch’, 
Slovenia  does  not  appear  to  face potential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence and  thus  will  not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

302  There is a break in time series in 2023 for the early leavers 

from education and training indicator. 

135 

0102030405060708065-7455-6425-5416-24AllIndividuals with basic or above basic overall digital skills by age, 2023 (%)SLEU 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Slovakia 

Participation in early childhood education and care 
is very low and deterioration can be observed on 
digital  skills,  while  the  country  performs  overall 
well on adult learning. In 2023, Slovakia had one of 
the lowest participation rates of children below 3 years 
in formal childcare (with 1.0%, and a gap relative to the 
EU participation rate of 37.5%), and therefore remains a 
‘critical situation’. Participation in early childhood educa-
tion and care of children above 3 also continues to be 
one of the lowest (78.6% vs 93.1% in the EU in 2022), 
with a share of only 33% of Roma children in 2021 (alt-
hough improved from 27% in 2016). Also, one third of 
15 year-olds lack basic skills in mathematics and read-
ing. The share of adults with at least basic digital skills 
dropped from 55.2% in 2021 to 51.3% in 2023, and is 
‘to  watch’.  However,  early  leaving  from  education  and 
training and adult learning participation (over the previ-
ous 12 months) in Slovakia is ‘better than average’. 

Source: Eurostat [une_ltu_a], EU LFS. 

The  labour  market  in  Slovakia  performs  well  in 
general, but long-term unemployment is a persis-
tent challenge. In 2023, the employment rate reached a record high of 77.5%, and the unemployment rate 
was at a record low of 5.8% (EU averages are 75.3% and 6.1% respectively). The share of young people neither 
in employment nor in education and training (NEET) also further improved, falling from 12.3% in 2022 to 11.2% 
in 2023 (‘on average’). Yet, the long-term unemployment rate is still in a ‘critical situation’, as only little improve-
ment  took  place  in  2023,  to  3.8%  from  4.1%  in  2022,  and it  continues to  be  among  the  highest  in  the  EU. 
Regional disparities also remain large. Gross disposable household income decreased from 126.4 in 2022 to 
123.2 in 2023 and is now ‘to watch’. 

Slovakia has low overall risks of poverty, but there are still challenges for some regions and popu-
lation groups.  The at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate is ‘good  but to  monitor’ at 17.6% (vs 
21.3% in the EU), after it increased by 1.1 pps in 2023, against a decrease in many other Member States. Income 
inequality, as measured by the income quintile share ratio, is also ‘good but to monitor’. The AROPE rate for 
children increased to 25.3% in 2023 (from 24.7% in 2022), being ‘on average’. At the same time, the impact of 
social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction improved significantly, from 33.8% in 2022 to 36.4% 
in 2023, and is now ‘better than average’. Nonetheless, Slovakia faces large regional disparities, with the eastern 
part of the country experiencing deeper levels of poverty and social exclusion. The country also has one of the 
largest Roma populations in the EU, with thousands of people living in isolated areas with no access to essential 
services.  After a  significant  increase  from  2.5%  to  5.9%  in  2023,  the  share  of  households overburdened  by 
housing costs is now ‘good but to monitor’. 

In the light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 4 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or 
‘to watch’, Slovakia does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus 
will not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

136 

012345672017201820192020202120222023Long-term unemployment rate (%)SKEU-27 
 
 
 
 
Finland 

3. First-stage Country Analysis 

The Finnish labour market is overall functioning 
well, although with some deterioration recorded 
in  2023.  The  employment  rate  declined  slightly  in 
2023,  while  remaining  well  above  the  EU  average 
(78.2% vs 75.3%). Still, the situation is ‘to watch’ com-
pared to the improving trends recorded for other Mem-
ber States, and in the context of economic recession 
and persistent labour shortages. Also, the unemploy-
ment  rate  is  ‘to  watch’  after  having  worsened  from 
6.8% to 7.2%, above the EU average of 6.1%. Growth 
in  gross  disposable  household  income  per  capita  is 
also ‘to watch’, at 107.9 in 2023, below the EU average 
of 111.1. On the other hand, the long-term unemploy-
ment rate and the situation of young people neither in 
employment nor in education and training (NEET) are 
‘on average.’ Regarding the  gender employment  gap, 
Finland is still a ‘best performer’ in 2023, after a fur-
ther improvement from 1.2 pps to only 0.2 pps in 2023 
(vs an EU average of 10.2 pps). This is due to, for ex-
ample  the  fact  that  female-dominant  sectors  have 
been  less  affected  by  economic  cycles.  However, 
women are more likely to have temporary or part-time 
jobs which is not reflected in their overall employment rate. 

Source: Eurostat [lfsi_emp_a], [une_rt_a], EU LFS. 

Finland continues to perform well in relation to skills, though the share of early leavers from edu-
cation and training increased. In 2023, 82.0% of the adult population had at least basic digital skills, placing 
Finland among the ‘best performers’. Also, the share of adult participation in learning in the past 12 months was 
‘better than average’, at 51.8% in 2022. However, the  share of early leavers from education and training in-
creased considerably in 2023 (by 1.2 pps), to 9.6% (vs 9.5% in the EU) and is therefore now ‘to watch’, while the 
share  of  pupils  underachieving  in  basic  skills  steadily  increased  in  the  past  decade.  Preventing  early  school 
leaving and promoting skills acquisition especially for young people can help addressing challenges of population 
ageing and shortages of skilled labour.  

Overall, Finland has an effective and inclusive social protection system that provides adequate cov-
erage, but also faces some challenges. In particular, self-reported unmet needs for medical care continue 
to be ‘critical’, with the share of people reporting those having further increased (by 1.4 pps) to 7.9% in 2023. 
This  is  now  more  than  three  times  the  EU  average  (of  2.4%)  and,  in  light  of  announced  additional  saving 
measures, may increase further. Long waiting times for primary and specialised care are reported due to the 
shortages of care and medical personnel. On the other hand, the share of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (AROPE) decreased in 2023 to 15.8%, and 13.8% among children, and is well below the respective EU 
averages (21.4% and 24.8%), making the country a ‘best performer’ for both. This is the case also for the impact 
of social transfers (other than pensions) on reducing poverty, which remains high (at 48.7% vs 34.7% in the EU). 

In light of the findings from the above first-stage analysis, and notably 5 indicators flagging as ‘critical’ or ‘to 
watch’, Finland does not appear to face potential risks to upward social convergence and thus will 
not require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

137 

02468101214707274767880828420162017201820192020202120222023Labour force participation, employment and unemployment rates (%)Employment rate 20-64 (lhs)Labour force participation rate 20-64 (lhs)Unemployment rate 15-74 (rhs) 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Sweden 

The labour force is expected to gain traction in the 
context  of  a  recovery  in  2025  and  2026,  despite 
persisting shortages and some groups still facing 
barriers  to  labour  market  integration.  Sweden  is 
among  the  ‘best  performers’  on  the  employment  rate, 
which hit a new record of 82.6% in 2023, and the share 
of young people neither in employment nor in education 
and  training  (NEETs),  which  remained  stable  at  5.7%. 
Women are well integrated in the labour market: the gen-
der employment gap was ‘better than average’ in 2023 
(4.7 pps), also thanks to the high share of children below 
3 years in formal childcare (56.9% vs 37.5%in the EU, 
‘best performer’). However, at 7.7% in 2023 (vs 6.1% in 
the EU), the unemployment rate remains ‘to watch’ and 
hides large  differences  between  population  groups  de-
pending on the country of birth. While the unemployment 
rate of people born in Sweden stood at 5.1%, those born 
outside of the EU had a rate of 17.8%, along with a gen-
der employment gap of 13.8 pps (vs overall 4.7 pps). Fi-
nally,  gross  disposable  household  income  per  capita 
declined from 121.2 in 2022 to 119.5 in 2023 and is 
now ‘to watch’. 

Note: Break in time series for the impact of social transfers indi-
cator in 2022. 
Source: Eurostat [tespm050] [tessi180], EU-SILC. 

Most social indicators perform ‘on average’ although there was some deterioration. In 2023, income 
inequality registered one of the largest annual increases among Member States (by 0.4 to 4.7), and is now ‘to 
watch’. In 2023, the incidence of severe material and social deprivation increased by 0.2 pps, mirroring a marked 
decrease in real wages. The 20% of the population with the highest incomes earned 4.7 times as much as the 
20% of the population with the lowest incomes (up from 4.0 in 2021 and the highest level since 2008). Moreover, 
social transfers (other than pensions) reduced poverty risks by 36.9%, down from 39.9% in 2022, now ‘on av-
erage’ from ‘better than average’ last year. Other social indicators are also showing some negative develop-
ments, while being ‘on average’. In particular, the at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children 
increased to 21.6% (still below the EU average of 24.8%) while that for people born outside of the EU increased 
to 38.3% (vs 12.8% for people born in Sweden). Housing cost overburden increased to 10.9% (vs 8.8% in the 
EU), and self-reported unmet needs for medical care to 2.1% (vs 2.4% in the EU).  

Sweden performs well regarding skills, but inequalities in the education system persist. The country 
is a ‘best performer’ on adult participation in learning, which increased substantially between 2016 and 2022 
from 58.8% to 66.5%. The share of adults with at least basic digital skills has consistently been ‘better than 
average’, supporting the green and digital transitions. Also, the share of early leavers from education and training 
markedly decreased in 2023, to 7.4% (also ‘better than average’). Still, this share is almost twice as high (12.2%) 
among people born outside the EU compared to those born in Sweden (6.4%), and the country had one of the 
largest declines in basic skills of 15 year-olds. 

In  light  of  the  findings  from  the  above  first-stage  analysis,  and  notably  3  indicators  flagging  as  ‘to  watch’, 
Sweden  does  not  appear  to  face  potential  risks  to  upward  social  convergence  and  thus  will  not 
require further analysis in a second stage (see box in section 1.4). 

138 

2.503.003.504.004.505.0020253035404550556020082010201220142016201820202022Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction (%) and Income quintile share ratio (S20/S80) Impact of ST on poverty reduction (lhs)S80/S20 (rhs) 
 
 
 
. 

Annexes 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 1: 2030 EU headline and national targets by Member State 

Employment (%) 

Adult learning (%) 

  EU headline 
  All MS together 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

78.0 
78.5 

80.0 
79.0 
82.2 
80.0 
83.0 
81.3 
78.2 
71.1 
76.0 
78.0 
75.0 
73.0 
80.0 
80.0 
80.7 
77.6 
85.0 
84.6 
82.5 
79.9 
78.3 
80.0 
74.7 
79.5 
76.5 
80.0 
82.0 

60.0 
57.6 

60.9 
35.4 
45.0 
60.0 
65.0 
52.3 
64.2 
40.0 
60.0 
65.0 
55.0 
60.0 
61.0 
60.0 
53.7 
62.5 
60.0 
57.6 
62.0 
62.0 
51.7 
60.0 
17.4 
60.0 
50.0 
60.0 
60.0 

Poverty reduction 
(AROPE, thousand) 
-15 000 
-15 600* 

-279 
-787 
-120 
-30(1) 
-1 200(2) 
-39 
-90 
-860 
-2 815 
-1 100 
-298 
-3 200 
-10 
-95 
-223 
-4 
-292(3) 
(4) 
-163 
-204 
-1 500 
-765 
-2 532 
-9 
-70 
-100 
-15 

Note: (*) The aggregate of the poverty reduction target for all Member States equals at least 15.6 million excluding Member States which do 
not express their target in terms of AROPE levels. (1) Denmark expresses its national poverty reduction target as a reduction in the number of 
persons living in households with very low work intensity (VLWI) by 30 000. (2) Germany expresses its national poverty reduction target as a 
reduction in the number of persons living in households with very low work intensity (VLWI) by 1.2 million, using 2020 as a baseline instead of 
2019. (3) Hungary expresses its national poverty reduction target as a reduction of the material and social deprivation rate of families with children 
to 13%, and thereby a reduction of the number of people AROPE by 292 000. (4) Malta expresses its national poverty reduction target as a reduction 
of the AROPE rate by 3.1 percentage points. 

140 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Annex 2. Social scoreboard headline indicators 

The analysis in the 2025 Joint Employment Report relies on the Social Scoreboard headline indicators 
endorsed by the Council.1 Headline indicators respond to principles of parsimony, availability, comparability, and 
statistical robustness. The indicators, linked to each of the three Pillar chapters, are as follows: 

• 

Equal opportunities 

o  Adults’ participation in learning during the last 12 months (age 25-64) 

o  Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18-24) 

o  Share of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills (% of population aged 

16-74) 

o  Young people neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) rate (% of population 

aged 15-29)  

o  Gender employment gap (pps, population aged 20-64) 

o 

Income quintile ratio (S80/S20) 

• 

Fair working conditions 

o  Employment rate (% of population aged 20-64)  

o  Unemployment rate (% of active population aged 15-74) 

o  Long-term unemployment rate (% active population aged 15-74) 

o  Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth (2008=100)2 

• 

Social protection and inclusion 

o  At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of total population)3  

o  At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children (% of population aged 0-17)4 

o 

Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction (% reduction of AROP)5 

o  Disability employment gap (pps, age 20-64)6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

The opinion by EMCO and SPC reporting on the agreement reached on the headline indicators of the revised Social Scoreboard was en-
dorsed by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 14 June 2021.  
GDHI is measured in real terms. As demanded by the Social Protection Committee, this indicator uses ‘unadjusted income’ (i.e. without 
including social transfers in kind) and dropping reference to the use of purchasing power standards (PPS) units, used in the original ver-
sion of the Social Scoreboard, for consistency with the indicators based on EU-SILC. 
Together with its three components: at risk of poverty, total population (AROP 0+), severe material and social deprivation, total popula-
tion (SMSD 0+) and share of people living in households with very low work intensity (quasi-jobless households), age 0-64 (QJ 0-64). In 
2021, the AROPE indicator was modified in view of the new EU 2030 headline target on reducing the number of persons at risk of pov-
erty of social exclusion. In this context, two of its components were revised (the deprivation and the quasi-jobless households). The Se-
vere material and social deprivation component replaces the component Severe Material Deprivation. The reference age group for quasi-
jobless household changed from 0-59 to 0-64. For all the indicators that depend on income in EU-SILC, the income reference period is 
defined as a 12-month period. Therefore, income variables involved in the computation of the AROP and QJ indicators refer to the calen-
dar year prior to the survey year except for Ireland (12 months preceding the survey response). The Severe material and social depriva-
tion indicator does not have any income variable in its calculations; therefore, all the EU-SILC variables used to compute it refer to the 
survey year. 
Together with its three sub-indicators: at risk of poverty, children (AROP 0-17), severe material and social deprivation, children (SMSD 0-
17), and share of people living in households with very low work intensity (quasi jobless households), children (QJ 0-17). SMSD for chil-
dren is a modified version of SMSD for the whole population, giving lower weight to adult items, in order to avoid making the indicator of 
children too sensitive to adult deprivations. Reference years are identical to those of indicators for the full population. 
This is measured as the percentage reduction, for the total population, of the at-risk-of poverty (AROP) rate after compared to that be-
fore monetary social transfers (other than pensions). It does not include in-kind transfers related to healthcare for instance. 
The disability employment gap indicator is currently computed from the EU-SILC and based on the disability status as given by the 
Global Activity Limitation Index (GALI). Survey respondents answer the following questions: 1) ‘Are you limited because of a health prob-
lem in activities people usually do? Would you say you are … severely limited; limited, but not severely; or not limited at all?’ Is answer to 
question 1) is ‘severely limited’ or ‘limited but not severely’, respondents answer the question 2) ‘Have you been limited for at least for 
the past 6 months? Yes or No?’. A person is considered disabled if the answer is ‘Yes’ to the second question. As computed from EU-SILC, 

141 

 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

o  Housing cost overburden (% of total population)7 

o  Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of population aged 0-3) 

o  Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of population 16+)8 

The EMCO-SPC opinion indicates further steps for the full implementation of the revised Social Score-
board.9 The ‘Disability employment gap’ headline indicator temporarily uses EU-SILC as the statistical source, but 
is set to switch to the EU LFS for improved accuracy. Commission services including Eurostat analysed data col-
lected from the EU-LFS in 2022 and decided to continue monitoring its quality and review the indicator as 2024 
LFS-based data are available. Eurostat will support further steps to improve cross-country comparability and ex-
plore the development of additional indicators in this area. The headline indicator ‘Adult participation in learning 
during the past 12 months’ is also set to use the EU-LFS later, after having been collected only through the Adult 
Education Survey before 2022. Following thorough quality and comparability checks of 2022 data from the AES 
and EU LFS by Eurostat10, in September 2024, the Indicators Group of the Employment Committee reached agree-
ment on using AES data excluding guided on-the-job training for this headline indicator for the time being. 

one observes a correlation between the prevalence of disability based on the GALI concept and the disability employment gap based on 
it in year 2023 across Member States of the EU (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.4). 
The indicator measures the share of the population living in households where the total housing costs represent more than 40% of dis-
posable income (both ‘net’ of housing allowances). The Methodological Guidelines and Description of EU-SILC variables (version April 
2020) describes allowances (only means-tested ones included) as including rent benefits and benefits to owner-occupiers, but excluding 
tax benefits and capital transfers. The document defines housing costs as monthly and actually paid, connected with the household’s 
right to live in the accommodation. They include structural insurance (for tenants: if paid), services and charges (sewage removal, refuse 
removal, etc.; mandatory for owners, for tenants: if paid), regular maintenance and repairs, taxes (for tenant: on the dwelling, if applica-
ble) and the cost of utilities (water, electricity, gas and heating). For owners paying a mortgage, related interest payments are included 
(any tax relief deduced, but housing benefits not deduced). For tenants at market price or at reduced price, also rental payment is in-
cluded. For rent free tenants, housing benefits should not be deduced from the total housing cost. 
Self-reported unmet needs for medical care concern a person’s subjective assessment of whether he or she needed examination or 
treatment for a specific type of health care but did not have it or did not seek it because of the following three reasons: ‘financial rea-
sons’, ‘waiting list’ and ‘too far to travel’. Medical care refers to individual healthcare services (medical examination or treatment exclud-
ing dental care) provided by or under direct supervision of medical doctors or equivalent professions according to national healthcare 
systems (Eurostat definition). The problems that people report in obtaining care when they are ill can reflect barriers to care. 
See Opinion of the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee for a revised Social Scoreboard. 
See Eurostat’s Information Note. 

7 

8 

9 
10 

142 

 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Annex 3. Social scoreboard headline indicators, levels 

Equal opportunities 

Adult 
participation in 
learning (during 
the last 12 
months, excl. 
guided on the job 
training, % of 
the population 
aged 25-64) 

Early leavers from 
education and training 
(% of population aged 
18-24) 

Share of 
individuals who 
have basic or 
above basic 
overall digital 
skills  
(% of population 
aged 16-74) 

Youth NEET rate 
(% of total population  
aged 15-29) 

Gender employment 
gap 
 (percentage points) 

Income quintile ratio 
 (S80/S20) 

Year 

2016 

2022 

2021  2022 

2023 

2021 

2023 

2021 

2022  2023  2021  2022  2023  2021  2022  2023 

EU27  37.4 
EA20 
: 
EUnw  37.6 
EAnw  40.2 
BE  39.4 
BG  11.8 
CZ  22.8 
DK  50.4 
DE  46.4 
EE 
33.9 
IE 
46.0 b 
EL 
16.0 
ES  30.4 
FR 
48.4 
HR  26.9 
IT 
33.9 
CY  44.8 
LV  39.0 
LT 
25.0 
LU  42.6 b 
HU  54.8 
MT  32.8 
NL  57.1 
AT  55.3 
PL 
20.9 
PT 
38.0 
RO 
5.8 
SI 
40.3 
SK  42.6 
FI 
51.4 
SE  58.8 b 

6.4 b 
9.8 b 

7.8 b 
2.4 bu 

9.8 b 
3.3 b 
3.2 b 

9.7 
 9.8 b 
9.8 
9.9 b 
8.1 
 8.3 b 
7.8 
 8.0 b 
 6.7 b 
6.4 
12.0 b  10.3 
6.2 
10.0 
12.5 b  12.7 
10.8 
3.7 
4.1 
13.3 b  13.9 
7.6 
2.1 u 

39.5 
: 
37.8 
39.5 
34.9 
9.5 
21.2 
47.1 
53.7 
41.8 
48.3 
15.1 
34.1 
49.2 b 
23.3 
29.0 b  12.7 b  11.5 
8.1 
10.2 b 
28.3 
6.7 
7.3 b 
34.1 
4.8 
5.3 b 
27.4 
45.2 
8.2 
9.3 b 
12.0 b  12.4 
62.2 
10.9 b  10.3 
39.9 
5.6 
56.1 
8.4 
52.2 
4.7 
20.3 
33.4 
6.3 
19.1 b  15.3 b  15.6 
4.0 
26.5 
7.4 b 
49.5 
8.4 
51.8 
8.8 
66.5 

3.1 bu 
7.8 b 
8.2 b 
8.4 b 

5.1 b 
8.0 b 
5.8 b 
6.4 b 

9.5 
9.8 
8.2 
8.1 
6.2 
9.3 
6.4 
10.4 
12.8 
9.7 
4.0 
3.7 
13.7 
7.6 
2.0 u 

10.5 
10.4 b 
7.7 
6.4 
6.8 u 

11.6 
10.2 
6.2 
8.6 
3.7 
8.1 
16.6 

5.4 b 
6.4 
9.6 
7.4 

53.9 
: 
56.3 
58.5 
54.2 
31.2 
59.7 
68.7 
48.9 
56.4 
70.5 
52.5 
64.2 
62.0 
63.4 
45.6 
50.2 
50.8 
48.8 
63.8 
49.1 
61.2 
78.9 
63.3 
42.9 
55.3 
27.8 
49.7 
55.2 
79.2 
66.6 

55.6 
: 
57.6 
59.2 
59.4 
35.5 
69.1 
69.6 
52.2 
62.6 
72.9 
52.4 
66.2 
59.7 
59.0 
45.8 
49.5 
45.3 
52.9 
60.1 
58.9 
63.0 
82.7 
64.7 
44.3 
56.0 
27.7 
46.7 
51.3 
82.0 
66.4 

6.2 d 

8.6 b 
8.8 
9.6 
8.5 
15.9 

11.2 
11.3 
10.6 
10.4 
9.6 
13.8 
10.1 

5.4  5.6 b 
7.7  7.7 
2.9  2.4 
11.4  9.9 
21.0  19.8 

10.7  10.2 
10.2  9.9 
9.1  8.6 
8.5  8.0 
7.6  7.6 
7.5   7.3 
14.9  13.9 

10.9 
10.2 
9.6 
8.8 
7.7 
8.4 
15.4 
6.9 
7.4 
3.7 
10.1 b 
19.8 

13.1  11.7 
13.1 b  11.7 
12.0  10.9 
11.6  10.5 
10.1 b  9.2 
17.4  14.8 
10.9  11.4 
7.9 
8.4 
9.5 
8.8 
11.2  10.6 
9.7 b  8.6 
17.2  15.3 
14.2 b  12.7 d  12.3 d  10.8 b  11.2 d 10.3 d 
5.8 d  5.5 d 
12.8 d  12.0 d  12.3 d 
10.4 
11.8 
9.4  7.7 
14.9  13.1 
16.1 
19.2 
19.7  19.5 
23.1  19.0 
13.9 b  12.2 
12.1  9.0 b 
15.4  14.7 
4.8 
10.0 
3.1  3.1 
12.1  11.3 
1.4 
13.5 
0.8  1.5 
12.7  10.7 
7.4 
8.5 
6.5  6.8 
  8.8 
6.8 
10.6 
10.9 
9.8  9.2 
11.7  10.8 
17.6 
7.6 
13.3  14.1 
7.6 
10.5 
8.2 
4.7 
7.9  7.8 
4.2 
3.9 
8.6 
9.4 
7.8  7.8 
9.4 
9.1 
12.9  11.8 
13.9 
9.1 
13.2  10.7 
5.8  5.5 
5.7 
9.7 
8.9 
8.5 
18.6  19.1 
20.1 
16.6  20.3 b  19.8 
6.9  6.1 
6.7 
8.4 
7.3 b 
9.2 
8.1  7.7 
8.5 
15.2  14.2 b  12.3 
1.2  0.2 
2.0 
9.5 
9.3 b 
10.3 
5.7  4.7 
5.4 
5.7 
6.0 b 
7.2 

4.7 
4.7 
5.0 
4.8  
4.8  
5.0 
4.7 
4.7 
4.8 
4.7 
4.6 
4.7 
3.4 
3.6 
3.4 
6.6 
7.3 
7.5 
3.4 
3.5 
3.4 
4.2 
4.0 
3.9 
4.4 
4.4 
5.0 
5.4 
5.4 
5.0 
3.9 
3.8 
3.8 
5.3 
5.2 
5.8 
5.6 
5.5 
6.2 
4.6 b  4.6 
4.4 
4.9 b 
4.6 
4.8 
5.3 
5.6 
5.9 
4.3 
4.3 
4.2 
6.2 
6.3 
6.6 
6.3 
6.4 
6.1 
4.6 b  4.5 b  4.8 
4.5 
4.0 
4.2 
5.3 
4.8 
5.0 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
4.3 
4.3 
4.0 
4.1 
3.9 
4.0 
5.6 
5.1 
5.7 
5.8 
6.0 
7.1 
3.3 
3.3 
3.2 
3.6 
3.1 
3.2 
3.8 
3.8 
3.6 
4.7 
4.3 
4.0 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat. 

143 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 3 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, levels 

Fair working conditions 

Employment rate  
(% population aged 20-64) 

Unemployment rate 
(% of active population aged 
15-74) 

Long-term unemployment 
rate 
(% active population aged 
15-74) 

GDHI per capita growth 
(2008=100) 

Year  2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

EU27  73.0 
EA20  72.4 
EUnw  74.6 
Eanw  74.3 
BE  70.6 
BG  73.3 
CZ 
80.0 
DK  79.0 
DE  79.4 
EE 
79.3 
IE 
74.9 b 
EL 
62.6 
ES 
67.5 b 
FR 
73.2 d 
HR  68.6 
IT 
62.7 
CY  75.9 
LV 
75.3 
LT 
77.4 
LU  74.1 
HU  78.8 
MT  77.8 
NL  81.7 
AT 
75.6 
PL 
75.5 
PT 
75.5 
RO  67.1 
SI 
76.1 
SK  74.6 
FI 
76.8 
SE 
80.4 

74.6 
74.0 
76.3 
76.1 
71.9 
75.9 
81.3 
80.1 
80.6 
81.9 
78.2 
66.3 
69.3 d 
74.0 d 
70.2 
64.8 
77.9 
77.0 
79.0 
74.8 
80.2 
80.1 
82.9 
77.3 
76.7 
77.1 
68.5 
77.9 
76.7 
78.4 
82.0 

14.7 

7.1 
7.8 
6.7 
7.2 
6.3 
5.2 
2.8 
5.1 
3.7 
6.2 
6.2 b 

75.3 
74.7 
76.8 
76.7 
72.1 
76.2 
81.7 
79.8 b 
81.1 
82.1 
79.1 
67.4 
70.5 d  14.9 b 
7.9 d 
74.4 d 
7.5 
70.8 
9.5 
66.3 
7.5 
79.5 b 
7.6 
77.5 
7.1 
78.5 
5.3 
74.8 
4.1 
80.7 
3.8 
81.3 
4.2 
83.5 
6.2 
77.2 
3.4 
77.9 
6.7 
78.0 
5.6 
68.7 
4.8 
77.5 
6.8 
77.5 
7.7 
78.2 
8.9 
82.6 

6.2 
6.8 
5.8 
6.3 
5.6 
4.2 
2.2 
4.5 
3.2 
5.6 
4.5 
12.5 
13.0 d 
7.3 d 
6.8 
8.1 
6.8 
6.9 
6.0 
4.6 
3.6 
3.5 
3.5 
4.8 
2.9 
6.2 
5.6 
4.0 
6.1 
6.8 
7.5 

6.1 
6.6 
5.8 
6.2 
5.5 
4.3 
2.6 
5.1 b 
3.1 
6.4 
4.3 
11.1 
12.2 d 
7.3 d 
6.1 
7.7 
5.8 b 
6.5 
6.9 
5.2 
4.1 
3.5 
3.6 
5.1 
2.8 
6.5 
5.6 
3.7 
5.8 
7.2 
7.7 

2.4 
2.8 
2.7 
3.2 
2.2 
2.5 
2.4 
2.8 
2.3 
2.6 
2.2 
2.6 
0.6 
0.8 
0.5 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
1.6 
1.3 
1.8 b  1.3 
9.2 
7.7 
6.2 b  5.1 d 
2.3 d  2.0 d 
2.7 
5.4 
2.6 
2.3 
2.6 
1.8 
1.3 
1.0 
0.8 
2.0 
0.9 
2.9 
2.0 
1.9 
3.9 
1.8 
1.8 

2.4 
4.6 
2.3 
2.0 
2.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
0.7 
1.2 
0.9 
2.8 
2.2 
1.6 
4.1 
1.5 
1.9 

2.1 
2.4 
2.0 
2.2 
2.2 
2.3 
0.8 
0.5 b 
1.0 
1.3 
1.1 
6.2 
4.3 d 
1.8 d 
2.1 
4.2 
1.9 
1.8 b 
2.3 
1.7 
1.4 
0.8 
0.5 
1.1 
0.8 
2.5 
2.2 
1.4 
3.8 
1.6 
1.6 

110.4 
106.0 
119.7 
113.9 
106.6 
: 
127.8 
119.7 
112.3 
135.1 
112.2 
78.0 
99.5 
110.0 
121.9 
94.1 
109.5 
126.5 
146.6 
111.2 
145.4 
145.6 
109.4 
98.6 
152.2 
109.2 
158.9 
119.8 
129.9 
109.9 
122.1 

110.5 
106.1 
119.2 
113.0 
104.6 
: 
123.9 
120.8 
113.4 
130.5 
111.4 
78.7 
97.5 
110.1 
124.9 
94.1 
115.0 
123.1 
139.7 
111.2 
151.2 
144.6 
109.1 
99.7 
150.1 
110.7 
159.9 
120.2 
126.4 
107.7 
121.2 

111.1 
106.7 
120.2 
113.9 
106.1 
: 
121.6 
122.6 
112.9 
126.0 
111.8 
81.6 
101.1 
110.7 
130.6 
94.0 
114.6 
126.1 
140.6 
113.3 
154.6 
152.8 
109.4 
98.5 
152.0 
112.8 
161.0 
120.7 
123.2 
107.9 
119.5 

Note: Eunw and Eanw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. Real GDHI per capita is measured using ‘unadjusted income’ 
(i.e. without including social transfers in kind) and without correction for purchasing power standards. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

144 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 3 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, levels 

Social protection and inclusion 

Annexes 

At risk of poverty or 
social exclusion rate  
(% of total population) 

At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate for children 
(% of population aged 0-17) 

Impact of social transfers 
(other than pensions) on 
poverty reduction 
(% reduction of AROP) 

Disability employment 
gap 
(percentage points) 

Year 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021  2022 

2023 

EU27  21.7 
EA20 
21.9 
Eunw  20.7 
Eanw  20.5 
18.8 
31.7 
10.7 
17.3 
21.0 
22.2 
19.6 
28.3 
27.8 

BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 

FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

19.0 
20.9 
25.2 
17.3 
26.1 
23.5 
21.1 b 
19.4 
20.3 
16.6 
17.3 
16.8 
22.4 
34.4 
13.2 
15.6 
14.2 
17.2 

21.6 
21.8 
20.6 
20.5 
18.7 
32.2 
11.8 
17.1 
21.1 
25.2 
19.6 
26.3 
26.0 

21.3 
21.6 
20.5 
20.4 
18.6 
30.0 
12.0 
17.9 
21.3 
24.2 
19.2 
26.1 
26.5 

20.7 b  20.4 
19.9 
20.7 b 
24.4 
22.8 
16.7 
16.7 
26.0 
25.6 
24.3 
24.6 
19.4 b  21.4 
19.7 
18.4 
19.8 
20.1 
15.8 
16.5 
17.7 
17.5 
16.3 
15.9 
20.1 
20.1 
32.0 
34.4 
13.7 
13.3 
16.5 
17.6 
16.3 b  15.8 
18.4 
18.6 

24.4 
24.8 
22.2 
22.1 
20.5 
33.0 
13.3 
14.0 
23.7 
17.4 
23.5 
32.0 
33.4 

22.5 
18.6 
29.7 
19.2 
20.1 
21.6 
29.4 b 
23.3 
23.2 
14.9 
22.8 
16.5 
22.9 
41.5 
11.0 
19.7 
13.2 
19.7 

24.7 
25.4 
21.8 
21.7 
19.6 
33.9 
13.4 
13.8 
24.4 
16.6 
22.3 
28.1 
32.2 

27.1 b 
18.1 
28.5 
18.1 
19.8 
22.4 
24.0 b 
18.1 
23.1 
13.9 
21.6 
16.7 
20.7 
41.5 
10.3 
24.7 
14.9 b 
19.9 

24.8 
25.3 
22.5 
22.3 
19.0 
33.9 
15.0 
15.3 
23.9 
18.3 
24.3 
28.1 
34.5 

26.6 
17.3 b 
27.1 
16.7 
20.3 
21.7 
26.1 
24.4 
25.2 
15.9 
22.7 
16.9 
22.6 
39.0 
10.7 
25.3 
13.8 
21.6 

37.1 
37.7 
37.6 
37.6 
53.3 
29.8 
46.6 
53.9 
40.3 
30.6 
60.3 
20.7 
30.5 

46.4 
20.7 
29.5 
37.6 
23.5 
35.3 
34.2 b 
50.6 
26.2 
36.6 
44.1 
35.7 
20.0 
17.9 
44.8 
43.1 
57.7 
44.5 

35.0 
35.6 
34.3 b 
34.7 b 
48.8 b 
24.4 b 
40.0 b 
50.4 b 
42.2 b 
28.1 b 
57.2 b 
20.3 b 
27.4 b 

42.0 b 
20.4 b 
25.8 b 
30.9 b 
25.0 b 
30.3 b 
33.7 b 
36.7 b 
26.4 b 
33.8 b 
42.0 b 
38.6 b 
23.7 b 
16.5 b 
37.3 b 
33.8 b 
49.8 
39.9 b 

34.7 
35.4 
33.7 
34.0 
50.8 
27.7 
39.5 
51.4 
41.7 
27.7 
57.8 
18.2 
22.9 

41.9 
20.9 b 
30.5 
30.5 
23.5 
29.9 
27.4 
34.5 
25.6 
38.4 
39.2 
36.1 
19.8 
15.6 
35.5 
36.4 
48.7 
36.9 

23.1 
22.2 
24.8 
23.8 
38.0 
22.1 
25.9 
: 
30.5 
18.7 
40.1 
23.8 
15.9 

21.4 
20.3 
24.9 
23.1 
35.3 
29.5 
22.7 
: 
24.2 
26.2 
36.6 
25.9 
14.6 
20.8 
24.1 
b 
28.7 
36.0 
14.9 
14.0 
27.0 
25.7 
16.6 
20.8 
35.0 
23.9 
15.4 b  8.5 b 
32.4 
28.8 
30.1 
27.0 
25.2 
25.8 
23.8 
26.3 
31.3 
34.2 
13.1 
16.2 
32.0 
32.6 
18.8 
21.1 
21.0 
25.3 
19.0 
22.2 
25.7 
19.9 

21.5 
20.2 
25.0 
23.0 
33.6 
39.5 
22.2 
20.4 
22.6 e 
20.2 
36.7 
26.0 
13.8 

19.9 
39.2 b 
15.9 
24.7 
18.5 
32.4 
23.7 
29.6 
25.8 
23.8 
26.1 
33.9 u 
14.0 
29.2 
17.3 
22.1 
19.4 
23.2 

Note: Eunw and Eanw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat. 

145 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 3 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, levels 

Social protection and inclusion (continued) 

Housing cost overburden 
(% of total population) 

Children aged less than 3 years 
in formal childcare 
(% of population under 3-years-
old) 

Self-reported unmet need 
for medical care 
(% of population 16+) 

Year 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

2021 

2022 

2023 

EU27 
EA20 
EUnw 
EAnw 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

8.7 
9.3 
7.2 
7.0 
7.5 
11.6 
6.2 
15.5 
11.0 
4.4 
2.6 
28.8 
9.9 
 : 
4.5 
7.2 
2.5 
4.9 
2.7 
5.1 b 
2.4 
2.7 
8.3 
6.1 
5.7 
5.9 
7.5 
4.1 
7.1 
4.3 
8.5 

8.7 
8.8 
7.9 
7.4 
7.7 
15.1 
6.9 
14.7 
11.9 
4.9 
3.7 
26.7 
9.2 
6.5 b 
3.8 
6.6 
2.5 
5.4 
3.5 
15.2 b 
8.1 
2.9 
10.0 
7.4 
5.6 
5.0 
8.5 
4.1 
2.5 
5.4 
9.1 

8.8 
8.9 
8.7 
8.5 
7.7 
11.1 
9.1 
15.4 
13.0 b 
7.6 
4.7 
28.5 
8.2 
6.5 
4.0 
5.7 
2.6 
7.2 
5.2 
22.7 
8.7 
6.0 b 
9.3 
6.0 
5.9 
4.9 
9.1 
3.7 
5.9 
5.5 
10.9 

37.9 
43.3 
34.2 
36.9 
51.7 
18.7 
4.9 
69.1 
31.4 
25.7 
14.8 
32.3 
55.3 
57.1 
33.3 
33.4 
27.4 
29.2 
21.4 
62.0 
13.8 
24.0 
74.2 
28.5 
17.2 
43.3 
9.5 
47.5 
2.3 
39.1 
55.8 

35.8 
40.1 
34.5 
37.3 
52.7 
17.4 
6.8 
74.7 
24.6 
33.7 
18.3 
29.1 
48.6 
56.2 b 
27.5 
30.9 
24.4 
32.7 
22.8 
54.7 b 
12.9 
43.1 
72.3 
23.0 
15.9 
47.2 
12.3 
52.3 
2.3 
40.0 
54.4 

37.5 
42.2 
36.9 
40.6 
56.3 
17.4 
4.4 
69.9 b 
23.3 
37.9 
22.1 
29.6 
55.8 
57.4 
29.6 
34.5 
36.9 
34.9 
19.9 
60.0 
20.3 
51.0 
71.5 
24.1 
12.6 
55.5 
12.3 
56.6 
1.0 
43.9 
56.9 

2.0 
1.9 
2.2 
2.5 
1.7 
1.0 
0.3 
1.3 
0.1 
8.1 
2.1 
6.4 
1.1 
2.8 
1.7 
1.8 
0.1 
4.0 
2.4 
1.0 b 
1.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
2.7 
2.3 
4.4 
4.8 
2.9 
4.4 
1.3 

2.2 
2.1 
2.6 
2.8 
1.0 
1.0 
0.2 
2.1 
0.3 
9.1 
2.7 
9.0 
1.2 
3.2 b 
1.3 
1.8 
0.1 
5.4 
2.9 
0.5 b 
1.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.5 
2.3 
2.9 
4.9 
3.7 
2.8 
6.5 
1.8 

2.4 
2.2 
3.1 
3.5 
1.1 
1.1 
0.4 
2.7 
0.2 e 
12.9 
2.7 
11.6 
1.8 
3.7 
1.0 b 
1.8 
0.1 
7.8 
3.8 
0.8 
1.0 
0.1 
0.3 
0.6 
3.6 
2.8 
5.2 
3.8 
3.2 
7.9 
2.1 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

146 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Annex 4. Social scoreboard headline indicators, changes and distance to EU 

Adult participation in 
learning (during the 
last 12 months, excl. 
guided on the job 
training, % of the 
population aged 25-
64) 

Early leavers from 
education and training  
(% of poulation aged 
18-24) 

Share of individuals 
who have basic or 
above basic overall 
digital skills 
(% of population 
aged 16-74) 

Equal opportunities 

Youth NEET rate 
(% of total population 
aged 15-29) 

Gender employment 
gap 
(percentage points) 

Income quintile ratio 
(S80/S20) 

Year 

2022 

2023 

2023 

2023 

2023 

2023 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

EU27  2.1 
1.7 
EA20 
: 
: 
EUnw  0.2 
0.0 
EAnw  -0.7 
1.7 
-2.9 
-4.5 
-28.3 
-2.3 
-16.6 
-1.6 
9.3 
-3.3 
15.9 
7.3 
7.9 
4.0 
2.3 b  10.5 
-22.7 
-0.9 
3.7 
-3.7 
0.8 b  11.4 b 
-14.5 
-3.6 
-8.8 b 
-4.9 b 

BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 

-16.5 
-4.9 
2.4 
2.6 b 
7.4 
7.1 
-1.0 
-3.1 
-0.6 
-4.6 

CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO  13.3 b  -18.7 b 

-9.5 
-3.7 
-10.4 
7.4 
24.4 
2.1 
18.3 
14.4 
-17.5 
-4.4 

SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

-11.3 
-13.8 
11.7 
6.9 
0.4 
14.0 
7.7 b  28.7 

1.9  -0.2 
:  0.0 
0.0  0.1 
-0.8  0.3 
-4.7  -0.2 
-2.5  -1.0 
-1.8     0.2 
-3.5  0.4 
7.1  0.1 
7.7  -1.1 
2.1  0.3 
-1.1  -0.4 
3.5  -0.2 
0.6  0.0 
-3.8  -0.1 u 
-5.1   -1.0 

-

1.3 
1.7 
0.0 
-0.1 
-2.0 
1.1 
-1.8 
2.2 
4.6 
1.5 
-4.2 
-4.5 
5.5 
-0.6 
-6.2 u 
2.3 

16.7  2.3 b  2.2 b 
-5.1  1.0 
2.2  1.6 
2.4  -1.4 u 
7.2  -0.8 
6.9  -0.1 
-1.2  0.6 
-3.3  0.2 
-0.8  -1.0 
-4.8  1.8 
13.1  1.0 

-0.5 
-1.8 
-1.4 u 
3.4 
2.0 
-2.0 
0.4 
-4.5 
-0.1 
8.4 

-

14.0  1.4 b 
6.7  -1.0 b 
0.2  1.2 
7.5  -1.4 

-2.8 b 
-1.8 
1.4 
-0.8 

-0.3  1.6 
-0.1 
: 
0.0  1.3 
0.2  0.8 
-0.3  5.2 
-1.1  4.3 
0.1  9.4 
0.3  1.0 
0.0  3.3 
-1.2  6.2 
0.2  2.4 
-0.5  -0.1 
-0.3  2.0 
-0.1  -2.3 
-0.2  -4.4 
-1.1  0.2 

2.2  -0.8 
0.9  -5.5 
1.5  4.1 
-1.5  -3.7 
-0.9  9.8 
-0.2  1.8 
0.5  3.8 
0.1  1.4 
-1.1  1.4 
1.7  0.7 
0.9  -0.1 

1.3  -3.0 
-1.1  -3.9 
1.1  2.8 
-1.5  -0.2 

-2.1 
: 
0.0 
1.6 
1.8 
-22.1 
11.5 
12.0 
-5.4 
5.0 
15.3 
-5.2 
8.6 
2.0 
1.3 
-11.9 

-8.2 
-12.3 
-4.7 
2.5 
1.3 
5.4 
25.1 
7.1 
-13.3 
-1.7 
-29.9 

-10.9 
-6.3 
24.4 
8.8 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

0.3 
: 
0.0 
-0.6 
3.8 
3.0 
8.1 
-0.4 
2.0 
4.9 
1.1 
-1.4 
0.7 
-3.6 
-5.7 
-1.2 

-2.1 
-6.8 
2.7 
-5.0 
8.5 
0.5 
2.4 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.7 
-1.4 

-4.3 
-5.2 
1.5 
-1.5 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

-0.5 
-0.4 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.4 
-1.0 
-1.3 
0.7 
0.0 b 
-1.0 
-0.1 
0.6 
-0.4 
0.3 d 
-1.3 d 
-2.9 

-0.8 
-1.3 b 
2.8 
1.7 
0.1 
-0.0 
0.5 
0.3 
-1.6 
0.4 
-0.5 

-0.6 
-1.1 
-0.1 
0.1 

0.6 
0.9 
0.0 
-0.2 
-1.0 
3.2 
-0.5 
-2.0 
-1.8 b 
-1.0 
-2.1 
5.3 
1.7 
1.7 d 
1.2 d 
5.5 

3.3 
-0.6 b 
2.9 
-2.1 
0.3 
-3.0 
-5.9 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-1.7 
8.7 

-2.8 
0.6 
-1.4 
-4.9 

-0.3  -0.5 
-0.2  -0.3 
0.0  -0.5 
0.2  -0.4 
0.6  0.0 
-0.8  -0.2 
-1.1  -1.0 
0.9  0.2 
0.2  0.0 b 
-0.8  -0.5 
0.1  -1.5 
0.8  -1.2 
-0.2  -0.9 
0.5  -0.3 d 
-1.1  -1.7 d 
-2.7  -0.2 

-0.6  -3.1 
-1.1  0.0 b 
3.0  0.7 
1.9  0.3 
0.3  -0.6 
0.2  0.8 
0.7  -0.1 
0.5  0.0 
-1.4  -1.1 
0.6  -0.3 
-0.3  0.5 

1.6 
1.9 
0.0 
-0.6 
-1.0 
-1.3 
5.3 
-3.0 
-0.9 b 
-6.2 
1.3 
11.2 
1.7 
-3.1 d 
-0.9 d 
10.9 

0.4 
-5.5 b 
-7.1 
-1.8 
0.6 
5.5 
-0.8 
-0.8 
3.2 
-3.1 
10.5 

-0.4  -0.8 
-0.9  -0.4 
0.1  -1.0 
0.3  -1.0 

-2.5 
-0.9 
-8.4 
-3.9 

  0.0  0.0 
  0.2  0.0 
  0.0  0.1 
  0.0  0.1 
  0.5  -0.2 
  0.3  -0.7 
 -0.5  -0.1 
  0.7  0.1 
  0.5  0.1 
  0.0  0.0 
 -1.0  0.1 
 -0.7  0.1 
 -0.4  -0.1 
  0.2  0.0 
 -1.2  0.3 b 
  0.3  -0.4 b 

 -2.6  0.0 
  0.5  -0.1 
  1.2  -0.1 
  0.8  0.3 
 -0.1  0.5 b 
 1.3 
 0.4 
 0.5 
-0.6 
 0.2 
 1.0 

0.6 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.5 
-0.2 

-0.3 
 0.1 
-0.5 
-0.5 

0.1 
0.5 
0.0 
0.4 

0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.3 
1.9 
-1.3 
-0.6 
-0.3 
0.7 
-0.9 
0.6 
0.8 
-0.1 
0.2 
0.6 b 

-0.4 
1.5 
1.6 
0.1 
-0.2 
0.6 
-0.8 
-0.4 
-0.7 
0.9 
1.1 

-1.4 
-1.1 
-0.9 
0.0 

Y-Y 
for 
MS 
to  
Y-Y 
for 
EU 

-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.8 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.3 
-0.4 

-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.4 
-0.2 

0.0 
0.4 
0.0 
0.3 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. The distance to the EU average is computed on the non-
weighted average. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

147 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 4 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, changes and distance to EU 

Fair working conditions 

Employment rate  
(% population aged 20-64) 

Unemployment rate  
(% of active population aged 
15-74)  

Long-term unemployment 
rate 
(% active population aged 15-
74) 

GDHI per capita growth 
(2008=100) 

Year 

2023 

2023 

2023 

2023 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to  
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to  
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to  
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to  
Y-Y for 
EU 

EU27 
EA20 
EUnw 
EAnw 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

0.7 
0.7 
0.5 
0.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
-0.3 
0.5 b 
0.2 
0.9 
1.1 
1.2 
0.4 d 
0.6 d 
1.5 
1.6 
0.5 b 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.5 
1.2 
0.6 
-0.1 
1.2 
0.9 
0.2 
-0.4 
0.8 
-0.2 
0.6 

-1.5 
-2.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
-4.7 
-0.6 
4.9 
3.0 
4.3 b 
5.3 
2.3 
-9.4 
-6.3 
-2.4 d 
-6.0 d 
-10.5 
2.7 
0.7 b 
1.7 
-2.0 
3.9 
4.5 
6.7 
0.4 
1.1 
1.2 
-8.1 
0.7 
0.7 
1.4 
5.8 

0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.8 
0.0 
-0.3 
0.4 
0.6 
0.7 
-0.1 
0.1 
1.0 
1.1 
0.0 
-1.0 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.7 
0.1 
-0.6 
0.7 
0.4 
-0.3 
-0.9 
0.3 
-0.7 
0.1 

-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
-0.1 b 
0.8 
-0.2 
-1.4 
-0.8 
0.0 d 
-0.7 d 
-0.4 
-1.0 
-0.4 b 
0.9 
0.6 
0.5 
0.0 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.1 
0.3 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.3 
0.4 
0.2 

0.3 
0.4 
0.0 
0.4 
-0.3 
-1.5 
-3.2 
-0.7 
-2.7 b 
0.6 
-1.5 
5.3 
6.4 
1.5 d 
0.3 d 
1.9 
0.0 
0.7 b 
1.1 
-0.6 
-1.7 
-2.3 
-2.2 
-0.7 
-3.0 
0.7 
-0.2 
-2.1 
0.0 
1.4 
1.9 

-0.1 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.4 
0.6 
-0.1 
0.8 
-0.2 
-1.4 
-0.8 
0.0 
-0.7 
-0.4 
-1.0 
-0.4 
0.9 
0.6 
0.5 
0.0 
0.1 
0.3 
-0.1 
0.3 
0.0 
-0.3 
-0.3 
0.4 
0.2 

-0.3 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.3 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 b 
0.0 
-0.2 
-1.5 
-0.8 
-0.2 d 
-0.3 d 
-0.4 
-0.5 
-0.2 b  
0.0 
0.4 
0.2 
-0.4 
-0.2  
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.3 
0.0 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.1 
-0.3 

0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
-1.2 
-1.5 

-1 b 

-0.7 
-0.9 
4.2 
2.3 
-0.2 d 
0.1 d 
2.2 
-0.2 
-0.2 b 
0.3 
-0.3 
-0.6 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-0.9 
-1.2 
0.5 
0.2 
-0.6 
1.8 
-0.4 
-0.4 

-0.1 
-0.1 
0.0 
-0.1 
0.1 
0.3 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
-1.3 
-0.6 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.2 
0.6 
0.4 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.1 
0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
0.3 
-0.1 

0.5 
0.6 
0.8 
0.8 
1.5 
: 
-1.8 
1.5 
-0.5 
-3.5 
0.4 
3.6 
3.7 
0.5 
4.6 
-0.1 
-0.4 
2.5 
0.7 
1.9 
2.2 
5.7 
0.2 
-1.2 
1.3 
1.9 
0.7 
0.4 
-2.5 
0.2 
-1.4 

-9.1 
-7.2 
0.0 
-6.3 
-14.1 
: 
1.4 
2.3 
-7.3 
5.7 
-8.4 
-38.6 
-19.1 
-9.5 
10.4 
-26.2 
-5.6 
5.9 
20.4 
-6.9 
34.4 
32.6 
-10.9 
-21.7 
31.8 
-7.5 
40.7 
0.4 
3.0 
-12.3 
-0.7 

-0.3 
-0.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
0.6 
: 
-2.7 
0.6 
-1.3 
-4.3 
-0.5 
2.8 
2.9 
-0.3 
3.7 
-0.9 
-1.2 
1.6 
-0.2 
1.0 
1.4 
4.8 
-0.6 
-2.0 
0.5 
1.0 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-3.4 
-0.7 
-2.2 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. The distance to the EU average is computed on the non-
weighted average.  Real  GDHI  per capita  is  measured  using  ‘unadjusted  income’  (i.e.  without  including  social  transfers in  kind) and  without 
correction for purchasing power standards. 
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

148 

 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Annex 4 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, changes and distance to EU 

Social protection and inclusion 

At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate 
(% of total population) 

At risk of poverty or social 
exclusion rate for children 
(% of population aged 0-17) 

Impact of social transfers 
(other than pensions) on 
poverty reduction 
(% reduction of AROP) 

Disability employment gap 
(percentage points) 

Year 

2023 

2023 

2023 

2023 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

EU27 
EA20 
EUnw 
EAnw 
BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-2.2 
0.2 
0.8 
0.2 
-1.0 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0.5 
-0.3 
0.8 b 
-1.6 b 
0.0 
-0.4 
-0.3 
2.0 
1.3 b 
-0.3 
-0.7 
0.2 
0.4 
0.0 
-2.4 
0.4 
1.1 
-0.5 
-0.2 b 

0.8 
1.2 
0.0 
-0.1 
-1.9 
9.5 
-8.5 
-2.6 
0.8 
3.7 
-1.3 
5.6 
6.0 
-0.1 
0.2 
2.3 b 
-3.8 
5.1 
3.8 
0.9 
-0.8 
-0.7 
-4.7 
-2.8 
-4.2 
-0.4 
11.5 
-6.8 
-2.9 
-4.7 
-2.1 

-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-2.1 
0.3 
0.9 
0.3 
-0.9 
-0.3 
-0.1 
0.6 
-0.2 
0.9 
-1.5 
0.1 
-0.3 
-0.2 
2.1 
1.4 
-0.2 
-0.6 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
-2.3 
0.5 
1.2 
-0.4 
-0.1 

0.1 
-0.1 
0.7 
0.6 
-0.6 
0.0 
1.6 
1.5 
-0.5 
1.7 
2.0 
0.0 
2.3 
-0.5 
-0.8 b 
-1.4 b 
-1.4 
0.5 
-0.7 
2.1 
6.3 b 
2.1 
2.0 
1.1 
0.2 
1.9 
-2.5 
0.4 
0.6 
-1.1 
1.7 b 

2.3 
3.0 
0.0 
-0.2 
-3.5 
11.4 
-7.5 
-7.2 
1.4 
-4.2 
1.8 
5.6 
12.0 
4.1 
-5.2 
4.6 b 
-5.8 
-2.2 
-0.8 
3.6 
1.9 
2.7 
-6.6 
0.2 
-5.6 
0.1 
16.5 
-11.8 
2.8 
-8.7 
-0.0 

-0.6 
-0.8 
0.0 
-0.1 
-1.3 
-0.7 
0.9 
0.8 
-1.2 
1.0 
1.3 
-0.7 
1.6 
-1.2 
-1.5 
-2.1 
-2.1 
-0.2 
-1.4 
1.4 
5.6 
1.4 
1.3 
0.4 
-0.5 
1.2 
-3.2 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-1.8 
1.0 

-0.4 
-0.2 
-0.6 
-0.6 b 
2 b 
3.3 b 
-0.5 b 
1 b 
-0.5 b 
-0.4 b 
0.6 b 
-2.2 b 
-4.5 b 
-0.1 b 
0.6 b 
4.7 b 
-0.4 b 
-1.5 b 
-0.4 b 
-6.3 b 
-2.2 b 
-0.9 b 
4.6 b 
-2.8 b 
-2.5 b 
-3.9 b 
-0.9 b 
-1.8 b 
2.6 b 
-1.1 b 
-3.0 

1.0 
1.4 
0.0 
0.4 
17.1 
-5.9 
5.8 
17.8 
8.0 
-6.0 
24.1 
-15.5 
-10.8 
8.2 
-12.8 
-3.2 b 
-3.2 
-10.2 
-3.7 
-6.3 
0.8 
-8.1 
4.7 
5.5 
2.4 
-13.9 
-18.1 
1.9 
2.8 
15.1 
3.2 

0.2 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
2.6 
3.9 
0.1 
1.6 
0.1 
0.2 
1.2 
-1.6 
-3.9 
0.5 
1.2 
5.3 
0.3 
-0.9 
0.2 
-5.7 
-1.5 
-0.3 
5.2 
-2.2 
-1.9 
-3.3 
-0.3 
-1.2 
3.2 
-0.5 
-2.4 

0.1 
-0.1 
0.2 
-0.1 
-1.7 
10.0 
-0.5 
: 
-1.6 

-6 e 
0.1 
0.1 
-0.8 
-0.9 
3.2 b 
1.9 b 
-1.0 
-2.3 
-2.6 
15.2 
-2.8 b 
-4.3 
-1.4 
2.3 
2.6 
0.9 u 
-2.8 
-1.5 
1.1 
0.4 
-2.5 

-3.5 
-2.8 
0.0 
-2.0 
8.6 
14.5 
-2.8 
-4.6 
-2.4 
-4.8 e 
11.7 
1.0 
-11.2 
-5.1 
14.2 
-9.1 b 
-0.3 
-6.5 
7.4 
-1.3 
4.6 
0.8 
-1.2 
1.1 
8.9 
-11.0 u 
4.2 
-7.7 
-2.9 
-5.6 
-1.8 

-0.1 
-0.3 
0.0 
-0.3 
-1.9 
9.8 
-0.7 
: 
-1.8 
-6.2 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-1.0 
-1.1 
3.0 
1.7 
-1.2 
-2.5 
-2.8 
15.0 
-3.0 
-4.5 
-1.6 
2.1 
2.4 
0.7 
-3.0 
-1.7 
0.9 
0.2 
-2.7 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. The distance to the EU average is computed on the non-
weighted average.  
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

149 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 4 (continued). Social scoreboard headline indicators, changes and distance to EU 

Social protection and inclusion (continued) 

Housing cost overburden 
(% of total population) 

Children aged less than 3 
years in formal childcare 
(% of population under 3-
years-old) 

Self-reported unmet need 
for medical care 
(% of population 16+) 

Year 

2023 

2023 

2023 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
change 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

Y-Y 
chang
e 

Distance 
to EU 
average 

Y-Y for 
MS to 
Y-Y for 
EU 

EU27  0.1 
EA20 
0.1 
EUnw  0.8 
EAnw  1.0 
0.0 
-4.0 
2.2 
0.7 
1.1 
2.7 b 
1.0 
1.8 
-1.0 
0.0 
0.2 b 
-0.9 
0.1 
1.8 
1.7 
7.5 
0.6 b 
3.1 
-0.7 b 
-1.4 
0.3 
-0.1 
0.6 
-0.4 
3.4 
0.1 
1.8 

BE 
BG 
CZ 
DK 
DE 
EE 
IE 
EL 
ES 
FR 
HR 
IT 
CY 
LV 
LT 
LU 
HU 
MT 
NL 
AT 
PL 
PT 
RO 
SI 
SK 
FI 
SE 

0.1 
0.4 
0.0 
-0.2 
-1.0 
2.4 
0.4 
6.7 
4.3 
-1.1 b 
-4.0 
19.8 
-0.5 
-2.2 
-4.7 
-3.0 
-6.1 
-1.5 
-3.5 
14.0 
0.0 
-2.7 
0.6 b 
-2.7 
-2.8 
-3.8 
0.4 
-5.0 
-2.8 
-3.2 
2.2 

-0.7 
-0.7 
0.0 
0.2 
-0.8 
-4.8 
1.4 
-0.1 
0.3 
1.9 
0.2 
1.0 
-1.8 
-0.8 
-0.6 
-1.7 
-0.7 
1.0 
0.9 
6.7 
-0.2 
2.3 
-1.5 
-2.2 
-0.5 
-0.9 
-0.2 
-1.2 
2.6 
-0.7 
1.0 

1.7 
2.1 
2.4 
3.3 
3.6 
0.0 
-2.4 
-4.8 
-1.3 b 
4.2 
3.8 
0.5 
7.2 
1.2 
2.1 b 
3.6 
12.5 
2.2 
-2.9 
5.3 
7.4 b 
7.9 
-0.8 
1.1 
-3.3 
8.3 
0.0 
4.3 
-1.3 
3.9 
2.5 

0.6 
1.6 
0.0 
3.8 
19.4 
-19.5 
-32.5 
33.0 
-13.6 b 
1.0 
-14.8 
-7.3 
18.9 
20.5 
-7.3 
-2.4 
0.0 
-2.0 
-17.0 
23.1 
-16.6 
14.1 
34.6 
-12.8 
-24.3 
18.6 
-24.6 
19.7 
-35.9 
7.0 
20.0 

-0.7 
-0.3 
0.0 
0.9 
1.2 
-2.4 
-4.8 
-7.2 
-3.7 
1.8 
1.4 
-1.9 
4.8 
-1.2 
-0.3 
1.2 
10.1 
-0.2 
-5.3 
2.9 
5.0 
5.5 
-3.2 
-1.3 
-5.7 
5.9 
-2.4 
1.9 
-3.7 
1.5 
0.1 

0.2 
0.1 
0.6 
0.7 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.6 
-0.1 
3.8 e 
0.0 
2.6 
0.6 
0.5 
-0.3 b 
0 b 

0.0 
2.4 
0.9 
0.3 
-0.4 b 
-0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
1.3 
-0.1 
0.3 
0.1 
0.4 
1.4 
0.3 

-0.7 
-1.3 
0.0 
0.4 
-2.0 
-2.0 
-2.7 
-0.4 
-2.9 
9.8 e 
-0.4 
8.5 
-1.3 
0.6 
-2.1 
-1.3 b 
-3.0 
4.7 
0.7 
-2.3 
-2.1 
-3.0 
-2.8 
-2.5 
0.5 
-0.3 
2.1 
0.7 
0.1 
4.8 
-1.0 

-0.4 
-0.5 
0.0 
0.1 
-0.5 
-0.5 
-0.4 
0.0 
-0.7 
3.2 
-0.6 
2.0 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.9 
-0.6 
-0.6 
1.8 
0.3 
-0.3 
-1.0 
-0.8 
-0.5 
-0.5 
0.7 
-0.7 
-0.3 
-0.5 
-0.2 
0.8 
-0.3 

Note: EUnw and EAnw refer to the non-weighted averages for EU and the euro area. The distance to the EU average is computed on the non-
weighted average.  
Flags – b: break in time series; d: definition differs; e: estimated; p: provisional; u: low reliability (small number of observations). 
Source: Eurostat.  

150 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5. Regional breakdown of selected social scoreboard headline indicators11 

Figure 1: Early leavers from education and training, 2023 

(%, share of people aged 18-24 years, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 9.5%) 

Annexes 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. National data for Finland, Germany, Poland and Portugal. 
NUTS1-level data for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. Low-reliability data in 
Croatia (Hrvatska); Czechia (Praha); France (Corse); Hungary (Nyugat-Dunántúl); Lithuania (Sostinės regionas); Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Neth-
erlands (Zeeland); Slovenia (Vzhodna Slovenija and Zahodna Slovenija) and Spain (Cantabria, Ciudad de Ceuta, Ciudad de Melilla, Comunidad 
Foral de Navarra and La Rioja). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Slovenia. 
Source: Eurostat [edat_lfse_16], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

11  Note: Breakdowns at the regional (NUTS 2) level. If the regional (NUTS 2) breakdown is not available, the NUTS 1 or the national level is 

presented in the maps.  

151 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 2: Young people neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET), 2023 

(%, share of people aged 15-29 years, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 11.2%) 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. National data for Finland. NUTS1-level data for France, 
Germany and Slovakia. Low-reliability data in Austria (Burgenland); Belgium (Prov. Luxembourg (BE)); Croatia (Grad Zagreb); France (Corse); 
Germany  (Bremen,  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  and  Saarland);  Italy  (Valle  d’Aosta/Vallée  d’Aoste);  Poland  (Lubuskie,  Opolskie,  Podlaskie  and 
Zachodniopomorskie); Portugal (Algarve, Região Autónoma da Madeira and Região Autónoma dos Açores); Spain (Ciudad de Ceuta and Ciudad 
de Melilla) and Sweden (Mellersta Norrland, Småland med öarna and Övre Norrland). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Slovenia. 
Source: Eurostat [edat_lfse_22], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

152 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Gender employment gap, 2023 

(percentage points difference, male employment rate minus female employment rate, based on people aged 20-64 years, by NUTS 2 regions; 
EU average: 10.2 pps) 

Annexes 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. Data from 2022 used (due to data missing at all levels 
in 2023) for France. National data for France. Low-reliability data in Finland (Åland). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Denmark. 
Source: Eurostat [tepsr_lm220], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

153 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 4: Income inequality measured as quintile share ratio - S80/S20, 2023 

(index, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 4.7) 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. National data for Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Malta. NUTS1-level data for Belgium. Break in the time-series for Croatia. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_di11_r], EU-SILC. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

154 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Employment rate, 2023 

(%, share of people aged 20-64 years, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 75.3%) 

Annexes 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. NUTS1-level data for France. Low-reliability data in 
France (Corse). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Denmark. 
Source: Eurostat [lfst_r_lfe2emprt], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

155 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 6: Unemployment rate, 2023 

(%, share of labour force aged 15-74 years, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 6.1%) 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. National data for Finland. NUTS1-level data for France, 
Germany and Poland. Low-reliability data in France (Corse); Germany (Bremen and Saarland); Italy (Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste) and Portugal 
(Região Autónoma da Madeira and Região Autónoma dos Açores). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Denmark. 
Source: Eurostat [lfst_r_lfu3rt], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

156 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Long-term unemployment rate (12 months or more), 2023 

(%, share of active population, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 2.1%) 

Annexes 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. National data for Finland, France and Germany. NUTS1-
level data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden. Low-reliability data in Croatia (Grad Zagreb, Jadranska 
Hrvatska and Sjeverna Hrvatska); Czechia (Praha and Střední Čechy); Greece (Notio Aigaio); Hungary (Közép-Dunántúl and Nyugat-Dunántúl); 
Ireland  (Northern  and  Western);  Malta  (Malta);  Poland  (Makroregion  centralny,  Makroregion  południowo-zachodni,  Makroregion  północno-
zachodni, Makroregion północny and Makroregion województwo mazowieckie); Portugal (Alentejo, Algarve, Região Autónoma da Madeira and 
Região Autónoma dos Açores); Romania (Nord-Vest) and Spain (La Rioja). Break in the time-series for Croatia and Denmark. 
Source: Eurostat [lfst_r_lfu2ltu], EU LFS. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

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Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 8: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 2023 

(%, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 21.3%) 

Note: Some administrative units on islands and outermost regions are not represented. Data from 2022 used (due to data missing at all levels 
in 2023) for Slovakia. National data for Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta. NUTS1-level data for France. Break in the time-
series for Croatia. 
Source: Eurostat [ilc_peps11n], EU-SILC. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

158 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction, 2023 

(%, by NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 34.7%) 

Annexes 

Note:  Some  administrative  units  on  islands  and  outermost  regions  are  not  represented.  National  data  for  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Finland,  Latvia, 
Luxembourg and Malta. NUTS1-level data for Belgium. Break in the time-series for Croatia. 
Source: Eurostat [tespm050_r], EU-SILC. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

159 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Figure 10: Self-reported unmet needs for medical examination, 2023 

(%, self-reported unmet needs because of ‘Financial reasons’, ‘Waiting list’ or ‘Too far to travel’, NUTS 2 regions; EU average: 2.4%) 

Note:  Some administrative  units  on  islands and  outermost  regions  are  not  represented.  National  data  for  Austria,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Finland, 
France, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands and Portugal. NUTS1-level data for Belgium. 
Source: Eurostat [hlth_silc_08_r], EU-SILC. © EuroGeographics for the administrative boundaries. 

160 

 
 
 
 
 
Annexes 

Annex 6. Methodological note on the classification of Member States based on the Social Score-
board 

In mid-2015 the European Commission, the Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee agreed 
on a methodology for assessing Member States’ performance on the scoreboard of key employment and social 
indicators. As part of the agreement, the methodology aimed at providing, for each indicator, a classification along 
with a colour code through a measure of the relative standing of each Member State. The related methodology is 
applied both to year-levels (levels) as well as to one-year changes (changes), thus enabling a comprehensive as-
sessment of Member States’ performance. 

In  2017  the  Commission,  in  agreement  with  the  Employment  Committee  and the  Social  Protection  Committee, 
decided to apply the methodology to the headline indicators of the Social Scoreboard accompanying the European 
Pillar of Social Rights. 

To capture the relative position of Member States, for each indicator, levels (I) and changes of these from one year 
to the other (D) are converted to standard scores (also known as z-scores) to apply the same metric to all the 
indicators. This is achieved by standardising indicator  values of both levels and  changes (I and D, respectively) 
according to the formulas: 

𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆 =  

[𝐼𝑀𝑆 −average (𝐼𝑀𝑆)]
standard deviation (𝐼𝑀𝑆)

   and    𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑆 =  

[𝐷𝑀𝑆 −average (𝐷𝑀𝑆)]
standard deviation (𝐷𝑀𝑆)

where 𝐼𝑀𝑆 is the value of the indicator in a given year and 𝐷𝑀𝑆 is its change from the previous year for Member 
State MS, while 𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆 and 𝐼𝑆𝑀𝑆 are the respective z-scores.12 This approach enables expressing for each Member 
State its indicator value in terms of how many standard deviations it deviates from the (unweighted) average. 

The performance of each MS is assessed and classified based on the resulting z-scores against a set of pre-defined 
thresholds. After the analysis of the headline indicators of the Scoreboard, it was agreed to define five intervals of 
the z-scores by setting four symmetric thresholds at -1, -0.5, 0.5 and 1, both for levels and changes.13 Performance 
assessments relative to the EU-average were assigned to these as follows: 

Value of the z-score 

Relative performance 

If high value = good 

If low values = good 

z-score < -1 

-1 ≤ z-score < -0.5 

-0.5 ≤ z-score ≤ 0.5 

0.5 < z-score ≤ 1 

1 < z-score 

Very low 

Low 

Neutral 

High 

Very high 

Very high 

High 

Neutral 

Low 

Very low 

Combining the relative performance in terms of levels and changes it is possible to classify the overall relative 
performance of a country, as  described on the following pages. To the definition of these seven categories are 
based on z-scores, while further conditions were added over time in terms of indicator values, to better classify 
cases with poor relative (z-score) but good absolute (improved or unchanged indicator value) performance in terms 
of changes. The corresponding colour coding is reflected in the overview in Chapter 1 and in the headline scatter-
plots in Chapter 2 of the report. The classification also supports the first-stage country analysis in Chapter 3 based 
on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework (SCF), as described in the related EMCO-SPC Key Messages 
and the underlying Report of the EMCO-SPC joint Working Group. 

12 
13 

Calculation of the standard deviation does not use a small-sample correction. 
Both normality and t-shaped distribution tests were carried out resulting in the rejection of the hypothesis of similarity to these distribu-
tions, thus no parametric assumption could be made about the distribution of the observed indicator values. Therefore, the approach 
taken to setting these thresholds is a common one using a ‘rule of thumb’. In case of a standard normal distribution, the chosen cut-off 
points would roughly correspond to values of the cumulative distribution function at 15%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 85%. 

161 

 
 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

The tables below provide the overall classification based on relative performance in terms levels and changes 

Very high 

High 

Performance: change 
On average 

Low 

Very low 
D↓ 
D↓ 
D↓ 

D↑ 
D↑ 
D↑ 

Performance: 
level 

Very high 
High 
On average 
Low 
Very low 

Note: the areas split in two-colours (dark-green - blue, light-green - blue and white - orange) in the last column 
(‘Very low’) indicate the effect of conditions on changes in (absolute) indicator values (D) as explained below. 

Best  
performers 

Level:  very  high  performance;  Change: 
low  performance.  OR 
very  high  to 
Level:  very  high  performance;  Change: 
very low performance with improving in-
dicator value (↑) 

Member States with indicator levels much better than 
the EU average and with the situation improving or not 
deteriorating much faster than the EU average, while 
the indicator value is not deteriorating 

Better than 
average 

to 

low 

Level:  high  performance;  Change:  very 
high 
performance  OR 
Level:  high  performance;  Change:  very 
low performance with improving indica-
tor 
OR 
Level:  average  performance;  Change: 
very high performance 

value 

(↑). 

Member States with levels better than the EU average 
and with the situation improving or not  deteriorating 
much faster than the EU average, or much faster de-
teriorating  than  the  EU  average  while  the  indicator 
value is not deteriorating 

Good but to 
monitor 

Level:  high  or  very  high  performance; 
Change: very low performance with de-
teriorating or unchanged indicator value 
(↓) 

Member States with levels better or much better than 
the  EU  average  but  with  the  situation  deteriorating 
much  faster  than  the  EU  average,  also  the  indicator 
value deteriorating 

On average / 
neutral 

to 

low 

Level:  average  performance;  Change: 
high 
performance  OR 
Level:  average  performance;  Change: 
very low performance with improving (↑) 
indicator value 

Member  States  with  levels  on  average  and  with  the 
situation  neither  improving  nor  deteriorating  much 
faster than the EU average 

Weak but 
improving 

Level:  low  performance;  Change:  very 
high 
OR 
performance 
Level:  very  low  performance;  Change: 
very high performance. 

Member States with levels worse or much worse than 
the EU average but with the situation improving much 
faster than the EU average 

To watch 

Level:  average  performance;  Change: 
very low performance with deteriorating 
or  unchanged  indicator  value  (↓)  OR 
Level: low performance; Change: high to 
very low performance  

Critical  
situations 

Level: 
Change: high to very low performance 

performance 

very 

low 

This category groups two different cases when the in-
dicator value deteriorates: i) Member States with levels 
in line with the EU average but with the situation de-
teriorating much faster than the EU average; ii) Mem-
ber States with levels worse than the EU average and 
with the situation deteriorating or not improving suffi-
ciently fast 

Member  States  with  levels  much  worse  than  the  EU 
average and with the situation deteriorating or not im-
proving sufficiently fast 

Note: deterioration implies decreasing values for indicators for which a high value indicates high (e.g. employment 
rate) and increasing values for those for which it indicates low performance (e.g. AROPE). 

162 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cut-off points translated to indicator values 

Adult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the 
job training, % of the population aged 25-64) 

Early leavers from education and training  
(% of poulation aged 18-24) 

Individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills (% of population 
aged 16-74) 

Youth NEET (% of total population aged 15-29) 

Gender employment gap (percentage points) 

Income quintile ratio (S80/S20) 

Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)  

Unemployment rate (% active population aged 15-74)  

Long-term unemployment rate (% active population aged 15-74) 

Real GDHI per capita (2008 = 100) 

At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate (% of total population) 

At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children (% of total population 
aged 0-17) 

Impact  of  social  transfers  (other  than  pensions)  on  poverty  reduction  (% 
reduction of AROP) 

Disability employment rate gap (percentage points) 

Housing cost overburden rate (% of total population) 

Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of population under 3-
years-old) 

Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of population 16+) 

Very low 

Low 

On average 

High 

Very high 

. 

less than 5.0% 

less than 45.2% 

less than 23.0% 

between 6.6% and 9.8% 

between 45.1% and 52.5% 

Levels 
between 30.4% and 45.1% 
between 23.0% and 30.4% 
Changes  less than -6.3 pps  between -6.3 pps and -3.1 pps  between -3.1 pps and 3.4 pps 
Levels 
between 5.0% and 6.6% 
Changes  less than -0.9 pps  between -0.9 pps and -0.4 pps  between -0.4 pps and 0.6 pps 
Levels 
between 51.4% and 63.8% 
between 45.2% and 51.4% 
Changes  less than -2.4 pps  between -2.4 pps and -0.6 pps  between -0.6 pps and 3.2 pps 
Levels 
between 7.4% and 9.0% 
Changes  less than -1.3 pps  between -1.3 pps and -0.8 pps  between -0.8 pps and 0.3 pps 
Levels 
between 3.6 pps and 6.1 pps 
between 6.1 pps and 11.1 pps  between 11.1 pps and 13.6 pps  more than 13.6 pps 
Changes  less than -1.3 pps  between -1.3 pps and -0.9 pps  between -0.9 pps and -0.1 pps  between -0.1 pps and 0.3 pps  more than 0.3 pps 
Levels 

between 0.6 pps and 1.1 pps  more than 1.1 pps 
more than 70.0% 
between 63.8% and 70.0% 

between 3.4 pps and 6.6 pps  more than 6.6 pps 

between 3.2 pps and 5.1 pps  more than 5.1 pps 

between 0.3 pps and 0.9 pps  more than 0.9 pps 

between 12.2% and 13.8% 

between 9.0% and 12.2% 

between 9.8% and 11.4% 

more than 52.5% 

more than 11.4% 

more than 13.8% 

less than 3.6 pps 

less than 7.4% 

between 4.3 and 5.2 

between 3.8 and 4.3 

between 5.2 and 5.6 

more than 5.6 

less than 3.8 

Changes 

Levels 

Changes 

less than -0.2 

between -0.2 and -0.1 

between -0.1 and 0.2 

between 0.2 and 0.3 

more than 0.3 

less than 72.2% 

between 72.2% and 74.5% 

between 74.5% and 79.2% 

between 79.2% and 81.5% 

more than 81.5% 

less than 0.0 pps 

between 0.0 pps and 0.2 pps 

between 0.2 pps and 0.8 pps 

between 0.8 pps and 1.1 pps  more than 1.1 pps 

less than 3.5% 

Levels 
between 3.5% and 4.7% 
Changes  less than -0.6 pps  between -0.6 pps and -0.3 pps  between -0.3 pps and 0.2 pps 
Levels 
between 0.7% and 1.3% 
Changes  less than -0.5 pps  between -0.5 pps and -0.4 pps  between -0.4 pps and 0.0 pps 
Levels 
between 101.3 and 110.7 

between 110.7 and 129.7 

between 4.7% and 6.9% 

between 1.3% and 2.6% 

less than 101.3 

less than 0.7% 

between 6.9% and 8.0% 

more than 8.0% 

between 0.2 pps and 0.5 pps  more than 0.5 pps 
more than 3.3% 

between 2.6% and 3.3% 

between 0.0 pps and 0.2 pps  more than 0.2 pps 

between 129.7 and 139.2 

more than 139.2 

Changes 

less than -1.2% 

between -1.2% and 0.2% 

between 0.2% and 1.9% 

between 1.9% and 2.9% 

more than 2.9% 

less than 15.9% 

less than 15.9% 

less than 23.1% 

Levels 
between 18.2% and 22.9% 
between 15.9% and 18.2% 
Changes  less than -1.0 pps  between -1.0 pps and -0.6 pps  between -0.6 pps and 0.4 pps 
Levels 
between 19.2% and 25.7% 
between 15.9% and 19.2% 
Changes  less than -1.0 pps  between -1.0 pps and -0.2 pps  between -0.2 pps and 1.5 pps 
Levels 
between 28.4% and 38.9% 
between 23.1% and 28.4% 
Changes  less than -3.1 pps  between -3.1 pps and -1.9 pps  between -1.9 pps and 0.7 pps 
Levels 
Changes  less than -4.0 pps  between -4.0 pps and -1.9 pps  between -1.9 pps and 2.3 pps 
Levels 
between 3.1% and 5.9% 
Changes  less than -1.2 pps  between -1.2 pps and -0.2 pps  between -0.2 pps and 1.8 pps 
Levels 
between 27.0% and 46.7% 
between 17.1% and 27.0% 
Changes  less than -1.6 pps  between -1.6 pps and 0.4 pps 
Levels 
Changes  less than -0.4 pps  between -0.4 pps and 0.1 pps 

between 0.4 pps and 4.4 pps 

between 0.1 pps and 1.0 pps 

between 5.9% and 11.5% 

between -0.2% and 1.5% 

between 1.5% and 4.8% 

less than 17.1% 

less than -0.2% 

less than 3.1% 

between 22.9% and 25.2% 

more than 25.2% 

between 0.4 pps and 0.8 pps  more than 0.8 pps 
more than 29.0% 
between 25.7% and 29.0% 

between 1.5 pps and 2.4 pps  more than 2.4 pps 

between 38.9% and 44.2% 

more than 44.2% 

between 0.7 pps and 1.9 pps  more than 1.9 pps 

between 2.3 pps and 4.4 pps  more than 4.4 pps 
more than 14.3% 
between 11.5% and 14.3% 

between 1.8 pps and 2.8 pps  more than 2.8 pps 

between 46.7% and 56.6% 

more than 56.6% 

between 4.4 pps and 6.4 pps  more than 6.4 pps 

between 4.8% and 6.4% 

more than 6.4% 

between 1.0 pps and 1.5 pps  more than 1.5 pps 

less than 17.9 pps  between 17.9 pps and 21.4 pps  between 21.4 pps and 28.5 pps  between 28.5 pps and 32.0 pps  more than 32.0 pps 

163 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 7: Summary overview of the ‘employment trends to watch’ and number of Member States 
with deterioration or improvement as identified by the 2024 Employment Performance Monitor 
(EPM) 

. 

Note: 2022-2023 changes, except 2021-2022 for at-risk-of poverty rate of unemployed and gender pay gap, job vacancy rate (average over 
3 years). The indicator used for life long learning is ‘Participation rate in education and training (last 4 weeks)’. 
Source: Employment Performance Monitor 2024. 

164 

9111425141074162146616350050121101077010103425263020100102030Employment rate (% population aged 20-64)Youth NEET (% of total population aged 15-29)Employment rate older people (% population aged 55-64)Employment rate (% Non-EU27 nationals aged 20-64)Involuntary temp empl as % total employeesNewly employed in %Long-term unemployment rate (in %)At-risk-of-poverty rate of unemployedUnemployment trap tax rate on low wage earnersInactivity and part-time work due to personal and family responsibilitiesTotal employment (ths)Job vacancy rate (average over 3 years)Gender employment gapGender pay gapAdults with medium or high educationLife long learning-% of adult population (25-64) participating in education and trainingEarly school leavers (in %)Completion of tertiary or equivalent education (aged 30-34)Nominal unit labour cost (index 2010=100)DeteriorationImprovementNumber of Member States 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 8: Summary overview of the number of Member States with deterioration (‘social trends 
to watch’) or improvement over 2022-2023 (or latest year available) as identified by the Octo-
ber 2024 update of the Social Protection Performance Monitor 

Annexes 

Note: Changes generally refer to the period 2022-2023 (although for income and household work intensity indicators the changes actually refer 
to 2021-2022). At-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP), severe material and social deprivation rate (SMSD) and the share of the population in (quasi-
)jobless households indicators are components of the AROPE indicator. Figures for healthy life years at 65 and real change in gross household 
disposable income refer to 2021-2022 as no 2023 figures available. For HR, large break in series in 2023 for income-related indicators (and 
also AROPE), so latest year changes for HR for these not reflected. 
Source: Social Protection Performance Monitor 2024. 

165 

781015776177819121111101188710610136461014871122125868549444410111063842520151050510152025Real change in gross household disposable incomeAt risk of poverty or social excl. for persons with disabilities (16+)Self-reported unmet need for medical careHousing cost overburden rateAggregate replacement ratioMedian relative income ratio of elderly peopleAt risk of poverty or social exclusion 65+Employment rate for older workersNEETs (15-24)Youth unemployment ratioEarly school leaversLong-term unemployment rateIn-work at-risk-of-poverty rateAROP for the quasi-jobless householdsImpact of social transfers on poverty reductionRelative median at-risk-of-poverty gap for children (<18) (%)Material and social deprivation rate for children (<18) (%)Children at risk of poverty or social exclusionIncome inequalities (S80/S20)Material and social deprivation ratePersistent at-risk-of-poverty rateRelative median poverty risk gapShare of the population  in quasi-jobless householdsSevere material and social deprivation rateAt-risk-of-poverty threshold for a single person household (real change)At-risk-of-poverty rateAt risk of poverty or social exclusionNumber of Member StatesDeterioration                         Improvement 
 
 
 
 
Annex 9: Potential risks identified through the Social Scoreboard in various JER editions and counts of ‘critical’/’to watch’ situations for Member States in 
the first-stage country analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework 

. 

Note: Following agreement in the EMCO-SPC Working Group, JER categorisations are computed using the Social Scoreboard as appearing in the  respective JER editions with data available at the data cutoff date for the current 
edition of the JER. If this was not possible due to missing categorisations but a former one was available within the JER editions considered, that is used to fill in the missing catgorisation (marked with red in top right corner of the 
cell). Shaded cells indicate JER categorisations that could be neither computed nor filled in as just indicated. 

166 

202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  50  11  11  60  70Early leavers from education and training56601360666052211111Individuals' level of digital skills55601111556077602250Youth NEET rate55501321525066606660Gender employment gap55505550111166605550Income quintile ratio77703130777066605650Employment rate22115650777066406660Unemployment rate25506660777066217770Long-term unemployment rate55505550674067706660GDHI per capita2221   0522155505550At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate65503130777066605550At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children65603111777077705550Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction77703230666077705660Disability employment gap111162125550   02650Housing cost overburden55503160555011112221Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare46602221111177406221Self-reported unmet need for medical care56606660666055507660Total Counts37433202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  60  60  11  50  60Early leavers from education and training22607770747031115550Individuals' level of digital skills55607770555066605550Youth NEET rate55506660111132215521Gender employment gap77706260111155506660Income quintile ratio52216660232113215550Employment rate67706650333011305521Unemployment rate55215660333013305221Long-term unemployment rate56605660333013305550GDHI per capita64225550313011302521At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate52215550131113115250At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children66605550132111116221Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction22217770111132126660Disability employment gap62601111555077705660Housing cost overburden6650666033112550  50Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare56501221655074607770Self-reported unmet need for medical care31115550111166505550Total Counts72975Social Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsEEIEELESFRSocial Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsBEBGCZDKDE 
 
 
Annex 9 (continued): Potential risks identified through the Social Scoreboard in various JER editions and counts of ‘critical’/’to watch’ situations for Member 
States in the first-stage country analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework (SCF) 

Annexes 

Note: Following agreement in the EMCO-SPC Working Group, JER categorisations are computed using the Social Scoreboard as appearing in the respective JER editions with data available at the data cutoff date for the current 
edition of the JER. If this was not possible due to missing categorisations but a former one was available within the JER editions considered, that is used to fill in the missing catgorisation (marked with red in top right corner of the 
cell). Shaded cells indicate JER categorisations that could be neither computed nor filled in as just indicated. 

167 

202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  21  21  21  50  21Early leavers from education and training77701330262155506740Individuals' level of digital skills66212221222155212250Youth NEET rate22501330211155505521Gender employment gap55601111226047707740Income quintile ratio55212230555011111111Employment rate11111130556025506621Unemployment rate55601321556055506522Long-term unemployment rate55501311555055505550GDHI per capita66601111365052507470At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate55502260666011113221At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children66601230566055506550Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction11113260555013215550Disability employment gap21117770255076605111Housing cost overburden66605560677055506660Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare6250 550626055502221Self-reported unmet need for medical care5660 550776031115550Total Counts66459202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  60  70  60  70  60Early leavers from education and training26601111322166605550Individuals' level of digital skills66212260555077706660Youth NEET rate47405550266074706550Gender employment gap56505550331155505550Income quintile ratio65506621252166606250Employment rate55506660666077705521Unemployment rate65226660767066605650Long-term unemployment rate56216621646066705660GDHI per capita25507770777022211111At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate26215521555066706660At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children16215621555077705550Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction25217250222155606660Disability employment gap77212121526055502550Housing cost overburden61116250662155505560Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare74701130266077705221Self-reported unmet need for medical care66606560766076606660Total Counts96513Social Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsLUHUMTNLATSocial Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsHRITCYLVLT 
 
 
 
Joint Employment Report 2025 

Annex 9 (continued): Potential risks identified through the Social Scoreboard in various JER editions and counts of ‘critical’/’to watch’ situations for Member 
States in the first-stage country analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework (SCF) 

Note: Following agreement in the EMCO-SPC Working Group, JER categorisations are computed using the Social Scoreboard as appearing in the respective JER editions with data available at the data cutoff date for the current edition 
of the JER. If this was not possible due to missing categorisations but a former one was available within the JER editions considered, that is used to fill in the missing catgorisation (marked with red in top right corner of the cell). Shaded 
cells indicate JER categorisations that could be neither computed nor filled in as just indicated.  

168 

202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  11  50  30  21  60Early leavers from education and training67706621111174405560Individuals' level of digital skills11115550111122215521Youth NEET rate26606660111174602550Gender employment gap22216660111145502550Income quintile ratio66602621131177707740Employment rate65605550111155215550Unemployment rate77705550555066605550Long-term unemployment rate66605550525055502111GDHI per capita47702550777055506221At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate66602650313077704640At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children66605550113077705250Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction56501311111162505260Disability employment gap12117770122166705650Housing cost overburden55602660555066602740Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare22115660111166601111Self-reported unmet need for medical care55505550122116505550Total Counts531034202320242025Counts202320242025CountsAdults' participation in learning (past 12 months)  60  70Early leavers from education and training55215560Individuals' level of digital skills77706660Youth NEET rate62507770Gender employment gap77706660Income quintile ratio66706221Employment rate55217770Unemployment rate55212321Long-term unemployment rate55502250GDHI per capita22215521At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate74706250At risk of poverty or social exclusion rate for children77705550Impact of social transfers on poverty reduction74706650Disability employment gap56606250Housing cost overburden65605550Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare55507770Self-reported unmet need for medical care11115550Total Counts53Social Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsFISESocial Scoreboard Headline IndicatorsPLPTROSISK 
 
 
. 

169 

 
 
 
 
ISSN: 2600-0717ISBN 978-92-68-23990-2 KE-01-25-018-EN-N