COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) Overview of Resilience Measures by Selected Global Players Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report
Date: 2025-01-29
Institutions: Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, European Commission
Subjects: EU energy policy, circular economy, competitiveness, digital transformation, economic growth, green economy, innovation, investment, research and development, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 29.1.2025  SWD(2025) 11 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)      Overview of Resilience Measures by Selected Global Players Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions The 2025 Annual Single Market and Competitiveness Report {COM(2025) 26 final} - {SWD(2025) 12 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

Annex 1 

Key performance indicators and External Vulnerability Index 

I.  Overview of key performance indicators on the Single Market and long-term 
competitiveness ......................................................................................................................... 5 

Summary of key performance indicators .............................................................................. 5 

1.  The state of European competitiveness ................................................................................... 7 

KPI 1: Labour productivity ......................................................................................................... 7 

2.  Completing the Single Market ................................................................................................. 9 

KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market ...................................................................................... 9 

KPI 3: Conformity deficit ......................................................................................................... 10 

KPI 4: Ease of regulatory compliance ...................................................................................... 11 

3.  Closing the innovation gap ..................................................................................................... 12 

3.1.  Research and innovation ....................................................................................................... 12 

KPI 5: R&D expenditure........................................................................................................... 12 

KPI 6: Patent applications ......................................................................................................... 13 

KPI 7: Venture capital investment ............................................................................................. 14 

3.2.  Digitalisation ........................................................................................................................ 15 

KPI 8: Digital intensity in SMEs .............................................................................................. 15 

KPI 9: Digital technology adoption by companies ................................................................... 16 

3.3.  Education and skills .............................................................................................................. 17 

KPI 10: Employment rate ......................................................................................................... 17 

KPI 11: Adult participation in education and training .............................................................. 18 

KPI 12: ICT specialists ............................................................................................................. 19 

KPI 13: PISA score ................................................................................................................... 20 

4.  Decarbonisation of industry ................................................................................................... 21 

4.1.  Access to private capital and investment .............................................................................. 21 

KPI 14: Private investment ....................................................................................................... 21 

KPI 15: Private savings invested in bonds, shares, investment funds and similar .................... 22 

4.2.  Public investment and infrastructure .................................................................................... 23 

KPI 16: Public investment ........................................................................................................ 23 

4.3.  Energy ................................................................................................................................... 24 

KPI 17: Electricity prices for non-households consumers ........................................................ 24 

KPI 18: Electrification .............................................................................................................. 25 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
KPI 19: Energy from renewable sources .................................................................................. 26 

4.4.  Circular Economy ................................................................................................................. 27 

KPI 20: Circular material use rate ............................................................................................. 27 

5. 

Increasing security and reducing dependencies ................................................................... 28 

5.1.  Trade and strategic dependencies ......................................................................................... 28 

KPI 21: Trade with the rest of the world ................................................................................... 28 

KPI 22: Exports of goods and services ..................................................................................... 29 

II.  External Vulnerability Index ...................................................................................... 30 

Annex 2 

Overview of resilience measures by selected global players 

Overview ................................................................................................................................. 35 

I. 

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 35 

II.  Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries ............................... 36 

1. Monitoring, gathering and forecasting of key supply chain information from public 
authorities and industry ................................................................................................................. 36 

1.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 36 

1.2 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 37 

1.3 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 38 

1.4 Australia .............................................................................................................................. 39 

1.5 Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 39 

1.6 Singapore ............................................................................................................................ 39 

1.7 India .................................................................................................................................... 40 

2. Financial and fiscal support to investments, R&D etc., in strategic sectors/values chains .. 40 

2.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 40 

2.2 Canada ................................................................................................................................. 41 

2.3 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 42 

2.4 Australia .............................................................................................................................. 43 

2.5 India .................................................................................................................................... 44 

2.6 China ................................................................................................................................... 45 

2.7 Taiwan ................................................................................................................................. 46 

2.8 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 47 

2.9 Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 48 

2.10 Singapore .......................................................................................................................... 50 

3. Prioritisation mechanism of domestic supply of goods and services ...................................... 50 

2 

 
 
 
3.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 50 

3.2 Canada ................................................................................................................................. 51 

3.3 India .................................................................................................................................... 51 

3.4 China ................................................................................................................................... 52 

3.5 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 52 

3.6 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 52 

3.7 Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 52 

3.8 Taiwan ................................................................................................................................. 53 

4. Stockpiling of critical inputs ...................................................................................................... 53 

4.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 53 

4.2 Australia .............................................................................................................................. 53 

4.3 China ................................................................................................................................... 54 

4.4 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 54 

4.5 Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 54 

4.6 Singapore ............................................................................................................................ 55 

4.7 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 55 

5. Trade, and investment measures: tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI 
control, etc. ...................................................................................................................................... 55 

5.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 55 

5.2 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 57 

5.3 Australia .............................................................................................................................. 57 

5.4 India .................................................................................................................................... 57 

5.5 China ................................................................................................................................... 58 

5.6 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 59 

5.7 Taiwan ................................................................................................................................. 59 

6. International partnerships ......................................................................................................... 59 

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS ...................................................................................................... 60 

6.1 United States ....................................................................................................................... 60 

6.2 Canada ................................................................................................................................. 61 

6.3 United Kingdom .................................................................................................................. 61 

6.4 Australia .............................................................................................................................. 63 

6.5 India .................................................................................................................................... 63 

6.6 Japan ................................................................................................................................... 63 

6.7 Republic of Korea ............................................................................................................... 64 

PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS ........................................................ 66 

3 

 
 
  
Annex 1 
Key performance indicators and External Vulnerability Index  

I.  Overview of key performance indicators on the Single Market and long-term 

competitiveness 

Summary of key performance indicators 

Table 1: Summary of key performance indicators (KPIs) 

KPI 

What it measures 

Target 

Latest EU value 

Productivity 

KPI 1: Labour 
productivity  
Single Market 
KPI 2: Integration in 
the Single Market 

KPI 3: Conformity 
deficit 

KPI 4: Ease of 
regulatory 
compliance  

GDP per hour worked in PPP terms  

At 77.8% of US levels (2023)  
At 74.2% of US levels (2022)  

23.8% for goods (2023)  
26.0% for goods (2022)  

7.6% for services (2023)  
7.8% for services (2022)  
0.9% (2024) 
1.1% (2023) 

3.87 (2023)  
3.80 (2022)  

Share of EU GDP represented by trade 
between EU Member States  

0.5%  

Share of EU Single Market Directives 
transposed by Member States for which 
infringement proceedings for incorrect 
transposition have been launched by the 
Commission  
Ease of regulatory compliance, based 
on survey data with companies 
responding to the question: “In your 
country, how easy is it for companies to 
comply with government regulation and 
administrative requirements (e.g. 
permits, reporting, legislation)? (1 = 
Extremely complex; 7 = Extremely 
easy)” in the survey for the Global 
Competitiveness Index of the World 
Economic Forum.  

Research and Innovation  

KPI 5: R&D 
expenditure  

KPI 6: Patent 
applications 
KPI 7: Venture 
capital investment  
Digitalisation 

KPI 8: Digital 
intensity in SMEs62 

Total private and public expenditure in 
research and development as share of 
GDP. 
Patent applications per million 
inhabitants. 
Venture capital investment (share of 
GDP)  

Share of EU enterprises with at least a 
basic level of digital intensity. A basic 
level entails the use of at least four of 
twelve selected digital technologies 
(such as using any AI technology; 
having e-commerce sales account for at 
least 1% of total turnover; etc.) as 
defined in the Digital Decade policy 
programme.  

>3% by 2030   2.22% (2023) 
2.21% (2022) 

152.8 (2023)  
151.8 (2022)  
0.05% (2023)  
0.09% (2022)  

90% by 2030 

57.7% (2023)  
54.8% (2021)  

4 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
KPI 9: Digital 
technologies adoption 
by companies 

Share of European enterprises that have 
taken up cloud computing services, data 
analytics and/or Artificial Intelligence. 
Target set in the Digital Decade policy 
programme.  

Education and skills  
KPI 10: Employment 
rate 
KPI 11: Adult 
participation in 
education and training 
KPI 12: ICT 
specialists  

 The share of working-age people 
employed.  
Share of adult population participating 
in education and/or training at least 
once per year.  
ICT specialists as a share of total 
employment  

KPI 13: PISA score  15-year-olds’ performance in the 

OECD’s PISA tests covering 
mathematics, reading and science. High 
scores indicate better performance.  

Access to private capital and investment  

KPI 14: Private 
investment  
KPI 15: Private 
savings invested in 
bonds, shares, 
investment funds and 
similar 

Private investment (share of GDP)  

Volumes of households’ savings in 
bonds; listed shares; and investment, 
insurance and pension funds, relative to 
the volumes of households’ cash 
holdings and bank deposits. It gives an 
idea of the share of savings directly 
feeding into investment in the real 
economy, easing companies’ access to 
finance. 

75% by 2030  Cloud computing services: 

38.9% (2023)  
34.0% (2021) 

Data analytics: 33.2% (2023)  
Big data: 14.2% (2020) 

Artificial intelligence:  
8.0% (2023) 
7.6% (2021) 

78% by 2030   75.3% (2023)  
74.6% (2022)  
39.5% (2022)  
37.4% (2016)  

60% by 2030 

20 million ICT 
specialists, ca 
10% of total 
employment 

9.8 million, 4.8% of 
employment (2023)  

9.4 million, 4.6% of 
employment (2022) 
Maths: 474 (2022)  
Maths: 492 (2018)  

Reading: 475 (2022)  
Reading: 488 (2018)  

Science: 484 (2022)  
Science: 488 (2018) 

18.5% (2023)  
19.3% (2022)  
43% (2023)  
42% (2022)  

Public investment (share of GDP)  

Public investment and infrastructure 
KPI 16: Public 
investment  
Energy  
KPI 17: Electricity 
prices for non-
household consumers  

Electricity prices for non-household 
consumers (EU ID price band, large 
commercial consumers) with 
recoverable taxes and levies excluded.  
Electricity as a share of the total energy 
consumption.  
Renewable energy generation as a share 
of the overall energy consumption. 

KPI 18: 
Electrification  
KPI 19: Share of 
energy from 
renewable sources  
Circular Economy  
KPI 20: Circular 
material use rate 

Material recovered and fed back into 
the economy, as a share of the overall 
use of material.  

3.49% (2023)  
3.24% (2022)  

EUR 0.16 per kWh (2024)  
EUR 0.20 per kWh (2023)  

45% in 2030 

21.3% (2022)  
20.8% (2021)  
24.5% (2023) 
23% (2022) 

23.4% by 2030  11.8% (2023)  
11.5% (2022)  

5 

 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
Trade and strategic dependencies  
KPI 21: Trade with 
the rest of the world 
as share of GDP  

The EU’s degree of economic 
integration with the rest of the world.  

KPI 22: Exports of 
goods and services as 
a share of worldwide 
imports 

The EU economy’s global weight and 
market share.  

1.  The state of European competitiveness 

KPI 1: Labour productivity  

14.8% for goods (2023) 
17.4% for goods (2022) 

7.4% for services (2023) 
7.8% for services (2022) 
20.4% for goods (2023) 
16.1% for goods (2022) 

31.9% for services (2023)  
33.5% for services (2022) 

Figure 1 shows the trend in labour productivity, meaning the economic output per hour worked 
in the economy. While EU-27 labour productivity has remained stable at around 77% of US 
levels over the past 30 years, there is a considerable drop in relative labour productivity among 
the EU’s early Member States (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, 
Austria,  Portugal,  Finland,  and  Greece),  compensated  by  increased  labour  productivity  in 
Member States that joined more recently.  

Figure 1: Labour productivity in the EU and other advanced economies 

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

EU

US

UK

JP

Source: annual macroeconomic (AMECO) database. GDP in purchasing power standards per hour worked. Values 
are indexed; EU-27 in 2023=100.  

6 

 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Completing the Single Market  

KPI 2: Integration in the Single Market 

Figure 2 shows the trend in cross-border trade flows in goods and services within the EU Single 
Market as a share of total EU GDP. Trade is measured by the average of imports and exports. 
The figure shows that in the past three decades, trade integration within the EU has more than 
doubled. 

Figure 2: Integration in the Single Market: Intra-EU trade (% of GDP) 

30%

% of GDP

Goods (intra-EU)

Services (intra-EU)

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Eurostat  

National data, intra-EU goods, % of GDP (2023) 

BG 
CZ  DK  DE 
19 
30.8 
55 
LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

LV 
BE 
42 
57 
LT 
EU 
37.8  21.8  55.3  15.9  43.3  31.9  32.9  24.8  24.2  56.3  68.2  17.8  20.4  23.8 

21.1  41.2  13.3  16.2  16.3  14.2 
SI 

FR  HR 
30 
SK 

IT 
15.5 
FI 

CY 
14 
SE 

RO 

EL 

EE 

PL 

PT 

ES 

IE 

National data, intra-EU services, % of GDP (2023) 

BE  BG 
3.8 
5.6 
LU 
LT 
21.9*  3.6 
3.4 

CZ  DK  DE  EE 
2.7 
6.4 
HU  MT  NL  AT 
3.1 

7 
* ES and LU numbers are from 2022. 

38.4 

6.6 

3.7 

IE 
49.5 
PL 
3.1 

ES 
EL 
3.5 
3.6* 
PT  RO 
2.6 
4.4 

FR  HR 
4.2 
SI 
3 

5 
SK 
1.5 

IT 
2.2 
FI 
4.3 

CY 
25.7 
SE 
7.8 

LV 
3.7 
EU 
7.6 

7 

 
 
 
  
 
KPI 3: Conformity deficit  

Transposing directives within the transposition deadline is just one aspect of implementation. 
They also need to be correctly transposed and applied on the ground to be considered as fully 
implemented. 

The conformity deficit measures the number of transposed Single Market directives for which 
the  Commission  has  launched  infringement  proceedings  for  incorrect  transposition.  It  is 
expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  number  of  Single  Market  directives  notified  to  the 
Commission as ‘transposed’ or ‘not requiring any further implementation measures’. Only the 
Court of Justice can rule definitively that a directive has not been transposed correctly, and the 
Commission  is  still  working  on  the  conformity  assessment  of  several  notified  national 
measures. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the conformity deficit statistics. 

There is still a high number of ongoing infringement cases that need to be resolved (192 cases 
on 80 different Single Market directives). Nevertheless, there has been progress compared to 
previous years (253 cases in 2023 and 292 cases in 2022). 

The  average  conformity  of  Single  Market  directives  has  fallen  below  the  symbolic  1% 
threshold, for the first time since December 2018. It however remains above the EU proposed 
0.5% target1. 

Figure  3:  Conformity  deficit  (incorrectly  transposed  directives,  %  share  of  total  number  of 
directives notified, by Member State) 

1   April 2011 “Single Market Act” and March 2023 Communication “The Single Market at 30”. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 4: Ease of regulatory compliance 

This indicator is measured by tracking the results of replies to the following survey question: 
‘In  your  country,  how  easy  is  it  for  companies  to  comply  with  government  regulation  and 
administrative  requirements  (e.g.  permits,  reporting,  legislation)  (1  =  Overly  complex;  7  = 
Extremely easy)?’ Higher values indicate a better performance, i.e.  having less burdensome 
regulation. 

In 2023, stakeholders’ perception of the regulatory burden in the EU was on average 3.87, up 
from 3.80 in 2021, indicating a slightly improving, but broadly stable trend. 

Figure 4: Ease of regulatory compliance (on a scale from 1= Overly complex to 7= 
Extremely easy) 

2019

2023

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Source: Survey for the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum (2019 and 2023 data). 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.  Closing the innovation gap 

3.1. Research and innovation 

KPI 5: R&D expenditure 

Figure  5  shows  the  trend  in  annual  research  and  development  (R&D)  expenditure  as  a 
percentage of GDP for the EU, China, Japan, the UK and the USA. 

EU R&D intensity grew from 2.12% of GDP in 2015 to 2.22% in 2023. However, it remains 
below  that  of  the  USA  (3.59%),  Japan  (3.41%)  and  China  (2.56%).  With  a  gap  of  0.78 
percentage points, the EU remains some distance from its ambition to raise R&D intensity to 
3% by 2030. 

Figure 5: R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 

5

4

3

2

1

0

EU

UK

USA

Japan

China

EU 2030 target

Source: Eurostat for EU; World bank for global peers. Note that data is missing from UK after 2019. 

National data (2022) 

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
HR 
EE 
3.35  0.75  1.89  2.87  3.13  1.78  2.17  1.49  1.44  2.22  1.4 
LT 
SK 
1.05  1.05  1.39  0.6 

IT 
LV 
CY 
1.39  0.75  0.76 
RO 
EU 
SE 
FI 
0.46  2.11  0.98  2.96  3.47  2.22 

PT 
2.18  3.18  1.45  1.7 

LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

FR 

EL 

PL 

ES 

IE 

SI 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 6: Patent applications 

Figure 6 shows i) the number of patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) by 
EU  applicants  per  million  population;  and  ii)  the  number  of  patents  filed  under  the  Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) per million population by applicants’ country of residence. 

A patent application to the EPO can provide protection in up to 44 countries, including all EU 
countries, whereas a PCT patent application can provide protection in the 157 contracting states 
to the PCT. The number of EPO patent applications and PCT patent applications should not be 
directly compared because each system provides a different geographical scope of protection. 

The number of PCT patent applications filed by EU applicants has remained relatively stable 
at around 105 per million inhabitants. This figure is significantly lower than the number of PCT 
patent applications filed by applicants residing in Japan (395 per million inhabitants in 2021) 
and the USA (174) but higher than in China (45) and the UK (87). 

Figure 6: Number of patent applications per million inhabitants 

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

EPO - EU

PCT - UK

PCT  - EU

PCT - Japan

PCT - China

PCT - USA

Source:  Eurostat  (EPO  patents),  OECD  (PCT  patents), World  Bank  (population).  Note  that  PCT  data  is  only 
available until 2021. 

National data (2023) 

BE 
217 
LT 
45 

22 

EE 
BG  CZ  DK  DE 
6 
52 
296 
438 
LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 
259 
109 
583 

395 

11 

IE 
201 
PL 
18 

ES 
EL 
15 
44 
PT  RO 
31 

2 

FR 
159 
SI 
72 

HR 
13 
SK 
10 

IT 
86 
FI 
420 

CY 
58 
SE 
488 

LV 
14 
EU 
153 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 7: Venture capital investment  

Venture capital is a form of equity financing that is particularly relevant for young companies 
with  innovation  and  growth  potential  but  untested  business  models  and  no  track  record.  It 
replaces and/or complements traditional bank financing. 

The indicator shows venture capital investment in a Member State as a percentage of its GDP 
in 2020 and 2023. 

Member  States  with  the  highest  values  are  more  effective  in  attracting  venture  capital 
investment. 

The  ratio  between  EU  average  venture  capital  investment  and  GDP  fell  slightly  in  2023 
compared with 2020. In comparison to the EU average, the corresponding figures for the US 
and China are about 10 and 8 times higher, respectively, while the UK’s figure is twice as high 
and Japan’s is somewhat lower, illustrating the scale of the EU’s venture capital investment 
gap. 

Figure 7: Venture capital % of GDP) 

Source: Invest Europe, Eurostat, OECD, Statista. 

National data, Venture capital investments, % of GDP in 2023. 

BE 
CZ 
BG 
0.045  0.033  0.02 
LT 
LU 
0.040  0.042  0.026  0.000  0.107  0.019  0.010  0.007  0.006  0.001  0.009  0.063  0.070  0.05 

DK 
0.144  0.059  0.145  0.041  0.009  0.051  0.058  0.006  0.026  0.019  0.007 
EU27 
RO 

HU  MT 

CY 

HR 

NL 

DE 

SK 

LV 

EE 

AT 

EL 

FR 

SE 

PL 

PT 

ES 

IT 

IE 

FI 

SI 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Digitalisation 

KPI 8: Digital intensity in SMEs 

This indicator measures the share of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with at least a 
basic level of digital intensity. 

The digital intensity score is based on counting how many out of 12 selected technologies are 
used by businesses. A basic level requires a business to use at least four technologies. The set 
of technologies considered by the indicator can vary between different survey years, depending 
on the questions included in the survey. 

In 2023, the share of SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity ranged between 27% 
and 86%, with an EU average of 58%. The current EU average is still far from the 2030 EU 
target of 90%, which is set in the Digital Decade policy programme. 

Figure 8: Digital intensity in SMEs: share (%) with at least a basic level of uptake of digital 
services 

Source: The Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI). 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 9: Digital technology adoption by companies  

This  indicator  measures  the  degree  of  companies’  adoption  of  digital  technologies:  data 
analytics, cloud and artificial intelligence (AI). 

The data analytics series shows the percentage of businesses using data analytics tools. The 
cloud series measures the percentage of businesses purchasing at least one of the  following 
cloud  computing  services:  database  hosting,  accounting  software  applications,  customer 
relationship management software, computing power. The AI series measures the percentage 
of businesses, – employing 10 or more people, – using at least one AI technology. The indicator 
is calculated for all businesses in manufacturing and service sectors, excluding the financial 
sector. 

The share of EU businesses that have adopted digital technologies in 2023 was 33% for data 
analytics, 39% for cloud and 8% for AI. 

Figure 9: Share (%) of companies using select digital technologies 

Source: Eurostat 

14 

 
 
 
 
3.3. Education and skills 

KPI 10: Employment rate  

This indicator shows the trends in employment rates of people aged 20 to 64 in the EU, the 
UK, Japan and the USA. 

Employment rates in the EU and the USA followed a broadly similar pattern, while rates in the 
UK and Japan remained higher. 

Figure 10: Employment rate (%) 

85

80

75

70

65

EU

UK

USA

Japan

EU 2030 target

Sources: EU: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey / Japan, UK, USA: OECD, Labour Force Survey. 

National data, employment rate (%), 2023 

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
72.1  76.2  81.7  79.8  81.1  82.1  79.1  67.4  70.5  74.4  70.8  66.3  79.5  77.5 
LT 
EU 
78.5  74.8  80.7  81.3  83.5  77.2  77.9  78.0  68.7  77.5  77.5  78.2  82.6  75.3 

LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

HR 

CY 

RO 

SK 

LV 

EE 

EL 

FR 

PL 

SE 

PT 

ES 

IE 

IT 

SI 

FI 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 11: Adult participation in education and training 

This  indicator  measures  the  share  of  adults  (aged  25-64  years)  who  had  taken  part  in  an 
organised  learning  activity  in  the  12  months  before  a  respective  survey.  These  learning 
activities can encompass formal and non-formal education and training (excluding guided on-
the-job training) in institutions or companies and training purchased on the market or provided 
by local authorities or other bodies. 

The indicator shows a large difference in the adult participation rate across the EU Member 
States, with 6 countries displaying a rate above 50%, while 4 a rate around or below 20%. The 
EU average, shown by the light blue bar was 39.5% in 2022, while the dotted line shows the 
60% EU2030 target rate, currently reached by only two Member States. 

Figure 11: Share (%) of adults participating in education and training 

Source: Eurostat, 2022 EU Adult Education Survey. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
KPI 12: ICT specialists 

This indicator measures  the share of employed ICT specialists  as a proportion of all people 
employed. The definition of ICT specialist’ is based on the International Standard Classification 
of  Occupations  (ISCO-08)  and  includes  ICT  service  managers,  ICT  professionals,  ICT 
technicians, and ICT installers and servicers. 

In recent years, the indicator has shown a positive trend with constant growth, having reached 
in 2023 a share of around 4.8% of ICT specialists out of the EU workforce. However, the target 
for ICT specialists to make up 10% of the workforce by 2030 (20 million ICT specialists in 
absolute terms) seems unlikely to be met on current trends. 

Figure 12: Proportion (%) of ICT specialists in EU workforce  

Source: Eurostat 

National data, 2023 

BE 
5.4 
LT 
4.9 

EE 
DK  DE 
BG  CZ 
4.3 
6.7 
4.9 
5.9 
4.3 
LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 
5.3 
4.7 
8.0 

4.2 

6.9 

IE 
6.2 
PL 
4.3 

EL 
2.4 
PT 
4.5 

ES 
4.4 
RO 
2.6 

FR  HR 
4.3 
4.7 
SK 
SI 
4.2 
3.8 

IT 
4.1 
FI 
7.6 

CY 
5.4 
SE 
8.7 

LV 
4.4 
EU 
4.8 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 13: PISA score 

This  PISA  score  stems  from  the  OECD’s  Programme  for  International  Student Assessment 
(PISA) and measures 15-year-olds’ ability in mathematics, reading and science. 

The figure below shows the PISA scores for 2022, 2018 and 2015 for the EU, China, UK, Japan 
and the USA. The data for the EU are the average scores of the 27 Member States, weighted 
by the number of 15-year-olds enrolled in education. 

Compared to 2015 and 2018, EU students performed worse in 2022 in all three disciplines, 
showing a declining performance trend. 

Figure 13: Average test scores of 15-years-olds (PISA) 

Source: OECD PISA database. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
4.  Decarbonisation of industry 

4.1. Access to private capital and investment 

KPI 14: Private investment  

Figure 14 shows the trend in private investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share of 
annual GDP for the EU, the UK and the USA. 

The  data  refer  to  the  increase  in  the  capital  stock  belonging  to  companies  and  individuals, 
including  equipment,  land,  houses  and  other  buildings,  and  intangibles  like  R&D.  In  2023, 
private investment in the EU was around 19% of GDP, broadly stable over the past years, at 
pair with US and well ahead of levels in the UK. 

Figure 14: Gross private investment (% of GDP) 

of GDP 

20%

18%

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

EU

UK

USA

Source: annual macroeconomic (AMECO) database 

National data (2023) 

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
LV 
21.6  14.9  22.5  19.4  18.7  21.3  20.9  11.3  16.8  18.8  16.9  19.3  18.1  19.3 
LT 
19.5  13.4  20.9  15.2  17.0  21.2  12.7  17.5  21.6  16.1  18.8  19.1  19.8  18.8 

LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

FR  HR 

RO 

CY 

SK 

EE 

EL 

PT 

ES 

PL 

SE 

IT 

IE 

SI 

FI 

EU27 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
KPI 15: Private savings invested in bonds, shares, investment funds and similar 

This indicator measures the share of households’ private savings that are invested in 1) bonds; 
2) listed shares; 3) investment funds, 4) life insurances, and 5) pension funds, relative to the 
volumes of households’ cash holdings and bank deposits. A value of 100% in figure 15 would 
indicate that the sum invested in such investment products is equal to the sum saved in bank 
accounts  or  held  in  cash.  The  indicator  gives  an  idea  of  the  share  of  savings  activated  to 
investments in the real economy, easing companies’ access to finance. 

As a benchmark, in the US, the ratio of private savings invested in such investment products 
to  cash  holdings  and  bank  deposits  is  above  70%,  which  not  even  the  best-performing  EU 
Member States reach. The EU average ratio is well below this and stands at 43%. 

Figure 15: Private savings invested in bonds, shares, investment funds and similar (%) relative 
to the sum of cash holdings and bank deposits. 

70 % of private savings

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

BG LT EE EL PT RO SI PL CY CZ LV MT HU ES LU SK AT HR FR FI

IT BE IE DE DK SE NL

Source: European Commission, DG FISMA. 

20 

 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Public investment and infrastructure 

KPI 16: Public investment 

Figure 16 shows the trend in public investment (gross fixed capital formation) as a share of 
annual GDP for the EU, the UK and the USA.  

Public investment is a measure of how much money a country spends to increase the value of 
fixed assets (for example, road infrastructure, buildings, equipment). It should be noted that it 
does  usually  not  cover  capital  transfers  to  public  enterprises  nor  household  spending  on 
equipment or vehicles, which are accounted for as durable consumption goods. 

In 2023, data indicate a public investment share in the EU of around 3.49% of GDP, having 
caught up to the US level. 

Figure 16: Gross public investment (%of GDP) 

5%

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%

EU

UK

USA

Source: European Commission, annual macroeconomic (AMECO) database. 

National data  

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
2.84  3.83  4.85  3.14  2.83  6.62  2.32  3.88  2.96  4.28  5.56  3.18  3.14  5.60 
LT 
EU 
4.22  4.72  5.13  3.45  3.15  3.68  5.06  2.60  5.38  5.23  3.56  4.05  5.24  3.49 

LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

HR 

CY 

RO 

SK 

LV 

EE 

FR 

EL 

PL 

SE 

PT 

ES 

IE 

IT 

SI 

FI 

21 

 
 
 
 
   
 
4.3. Energy 

KPI 17: Electricity prices for non-households consumers 

This indicator tracks non-household retail electricity prices in the EU, the UK, the USA and 
Japan. It gives an idea of energy costs and cost-competitiveness, especially for those industries 
where electricity prices make up a significant proportion of total energy costs. 

Non-household  retail electricity prices in  the EU are  calculated using Eurostat data, broken 
down  into  two  consumption  bands.  Prices  are  measured  in  EUR  per  kWh,  excluding  value 
added tax and other duties that companies can recover. 

The IC consumption band refers to medium-sized consumers with an annual consumption of 
between 500 MWh and 2 000 MWh, i.e. the vast majority of small-sized enterprises in services 
and manufacturing sectors, and gives an insight into affordability. 

The  ID  consumption  band  refers  to  large-sized  consumers  with  an  annual  consumption  of 
between 2 000 MWh and 20 000 MWh, such as in electricity-intensive manufacturing sectors, 
and gives an insight into international competitiveness. 

The chart shows that non-household retail prices in the EU since 2022 are higher than in Japan 
and have for long been significantly higher than in the USA, only surpassed by the UK. The 
national data table also reveals stark differences amongst EU Member States. 

Figure 17: Electricity prices for non-household consumers (EUR/kWh) 

EU IC band

EU ID band

UK

USA

Japan

€0,40

€0,35

€0,30

€0,25

€0,20

€0,15

€0,10

€0,05

€0,00

Source: Eurostat ‘Electricity prices for non-household consumers’; US Energy Information Administration; UK 
Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; International Energy Agency. 

National data (first half of 2024) in the EU ID price band 

BG 
0.10 
LU 

LV 
BE 
0.12 
0.13 
LT 
EU 
0.142  0.171  0.168  0.122  0.151  0.168  0.11  0.099  0.136  0.144  0.143  0.084  0.083  0.16 

DK 
CZ 
0.09 
0.15 
HU  MT 

IE 
EL 
0.21  0.11 
PL 

FR 
0.13 
SI 

CY 
0.17 
SE 

ES 
0.10 
RO 

HR 
0.18 
SK 

DE 
0.17 
NL 

EE 
0.12 
AT 

IT 
0.14 
FI 

PT 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 18: Electrification 

This indicator shows the share of gross final energy consumption made up by electricity. The 
past  decade  has  seen  negligible  improvement  in  this  regard,  with  the  degree  of  society’s 
electrification remaining stable at around 20% of all energy consumed. However, it is expected 
that  the  share  will  progressively  increase  in  view  of  increasingly  strict  emission  rules  and 
heavier carbon pricing, which will drive the electrification of industry, incentivise the use of 
heat pumps for heating and accelerate the uptake of electric vehicles. 

The  national  data  table  shows  significant  differences  amongst  EU  Member  States,  with  the 
electricity share ranging between 14.3% and 38.4%, compared to the EU share of 21.3% in 
2022. 

Figure 18: Electricity share (%) of gross final energy consumption 

40% % of gross final energy consumption 

30%

20%

10%

0%

Source: Eurostat 

National data (2022) 

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
18.1  25.1  18.6  19.6  19.5  21.5  23.2  26.3  23.4  25.1  20.2  22.0  25.1  14.3 
LT 
EU 
15.2  17.3  18.3  38.4  18.0  20.6  15.9  24.4  15.1  23.1  17.8  27.1  32.5  21.3 

LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 

CY 

HR 

RO 

SK 

LV 

EE 

EL 

FR 

PL 

PT 

SE 

ES 

IT 

IE 

SI 

FI 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
KPI 19: Energy from renewable sources 

This  indicator  measures  the  share  of  energy  from  renewable  sources  in  gross  final  energy 
consumption. The revised Renewable Energy Directive sets a binding EU-wide target of 42.5% 
in 2030, with an indicative top-up of 2.5%. Renewable energy deployment has been steadily 
increasing in recent years and the EU has historically surpassed other major economies in this 
field.  In  2022  energy  from  renewable  sources  represented  23%  in  gross  final  energy 
consumption, compared to shares of approximately 9-14% in China, the UK, USA and Japan.  

Figure 19: Share (%) of renewable energy 

50%

% of renewable energy 

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

EU

UK

USA

China

Japan

EU 2030 target

Source: values for the EU are taken from Eurostat, those for the UK, USA, China and Japan have been provided 
by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre. 

National data (2023) 

BG  CZ  DK  DE 

BE 
14.7  22.6  18.6  44.9  21.5  40.9  15.25  25.3  24.9  22.3  28.0  19.6  20.2  43.2 
PT 
LT 
EU 
LU  HU  MT  NL  AT 
SK 
35.2  25.8  25.0  16.9  50.6  66.4  24.5 
31.9  11.6  17.4  15.0  17.2  40.8  16.5 

FR  HR 

CY 

RO 

LV 

EE 

EL 

ES 

PL 

SE 

IT 

IE 

SI 

FI 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Circular Economy 

KPI 20: Circular material use rate  

This indicator measures the degree of the economy’s circularity by looking at the rate of use of 
secondary materials on overall material demand. Secondary raw materials, replacing primary 
materials in the economy, reduce pressures on primary resources and limit waste. A higher rate 
indicates a higher degree of circularity. 

Secondary raw materials accounted for only 11.8% of all materials used in the EU economy, 
slightly increasing between 2020 and 2023. This suggests that the linear model (no reuse of 
material) still prevails, and the EU is far from reaching the aspirational target of 23.4%, which 
requires doubling the circular material use rate by 2030. 

Figure 20: Rate (%) of use of secondary materials 

% in 2020

% in 2023

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Eurostat 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Increasing security and reducing dependencies 

5.1. Trade and strategic dependencies 

KPI 21: Trade with the rest of the world 

This indicator tracks the trends in the EU’s trade flows in goods and services with the rest of 
the world as a share of total EU GDP. Trade is measured by the average of imports and 
exports.  

The figure shows that EU trade in services with the rest of the world has more than doubled 
since 1993, while trade in goods has almost doubled.  

Figure 21: Trade with the rest of the world as a share (%) of GDP. 

20%

% of GDP

Services (extra-EU)

Goods (extra-EU)

15%

10%

5%

0%

Source: Eurostat  

26 

 
 
 
  
 
KPI 22: Exports of goods and services 

Figures 22a and 22b show the exports of goods and services of the EU, the UK, USA, Japan, 
and China as shares of the rest of the world’s imports from 2015 to 2023. This helps evaluate 
the relative size of exports from the EU and those four countries in the global market. A higher 
percentage indicates  a more significant role in  the global  economy, and a lower percentage 
suggests a smaller presence. 

In 2023, China had the lead in the exports of goods with a share of about 25%, ahead of the 
EU (20%), the USA (15%), Japan (5%), and the UK (3%). The EU had the lead for services 
with a share of 32%, ahead of the USA (20%), the UK (11%), China (6%) and Japan (4%).  

Figure 22a: Exports of goods as a share (%) of the rest of the world’s imports. 

of RoW's imports

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

EU

UK

USA

Japan

China

Sources: UN Comtrade, World Bank, Eurostat 

Figure 22b: Exports of services as a share (%) of the rest of the world’s imports. 

of RoW's imports

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

EU 

UK 

USA 

Japan

China 

Sources: UN Comtrade, World Bank, Eurostat. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
 
II. 

External Vulnerability Index  

In today's interconnected global economy, understanding  EU supply chains is  paramount to 
inform policies that enhance economic efficiency and resilience. As one of the world's most 
open  regions,  the  EU  has  reaped  the  benefits  of  global  market  access  and  well-integrated 
internal supply chains. However, this interconnectedness also exposes vulnerabilities that can 
significantly impact businesses, industries, and national economies, as evidenced by the far-
reaching  consequences  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  the  energy  crisis,  and  escalating 
geopolitical tensions. 

A  data-driven  approach  to  monitor  vulnerabilities  is  essential  to  support  the  effective  risk 
management  of  EU  supply  chains.  By  tracking  vulnerabilities,  policymakers  can  develop 
timely,  agile and responsive strategies,  and  navigate the  complexities of a rapidly changing 
global market.  

This Annex  introduces  the  External  Vulnerability  Index  (EXVI)2,  a  monitoring  tool  that 
leverages trade data to identify and measure external vulnerabilities across various segments 
of the EU economy. As a composite indicator, the EXVI evaluates the vulnerability of products, 
sectors,  and  economies  within  the  global  trade  system,  analyzing  trade  dependencies  and 
competitive positions, and quantifying economic susceptibility to external shocks. It provides 
a framework to monitor supply chain risks, enabling policymakers to make informed, targeted 
and timely decisions to strengthen resilience. 

Based on the latest available data, findings from the EXVI indicator reveal that the EU is more 
exposed to  external  trade vulnerabilities than China, but  less so than the United States.  See 
Figure 1. A closer examination of critical areas such as raw materials, semiconductors, and net-
zero technologies reveals that the EU is most vulnerable in  raw materials. Furthermore, the 
indicator shows that the EU is more vulnerable than China in all three areas, while being more 
vulnerable than the United States only in the semiconductor supply chain. 

Figure 23. External Vulnerability Index (EXVI) across strategic supply chains: EU, 
China and United States 

Semiconductors 

Net-Zero 

Raw materials 

All industrial 

Technologies 

products 

Note: EXVI scores: 0= low vulnerability, 1=high vulnerability 

Source: European Commission, based on the BACI database.  

0

2 More details on the EXVI methodology: Single Market Economic Papers - European Commission.  

28 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of time dynamics, over the past decade, the EXVI indicator for the EU shows a slight 
decline in the vulnerability of critical raw materials, while vulnerabilities in the semiconductor 
and  net-zero  technology  supply  chains  remained  relatively  stable.  During  the  same  period, 
China significantly improved its position in both the semiconductor and net-zero technology 
supply  chains,  except  for  raw  materials.  In  contrast,  the  US  strengthened  its  position  in 
semiconductors but saw a decline in net-zero technologies and remained mostly stable in raw 
materials.  

EXVI  is  based  on  two  key  pillars,  and  designed  to  evaluate  the  external  vulnerability  of 
products,  sectors,  and  countries  within  the  global  trade  framework.  It  quantifies  economic 
vulnerabilities  to  external  shocks  by  analysing  trade  dependencies  and  trade  competitive 
positions. High scores, with a maximum of 1, signal high risks of foreign vulnerability, while 
low scores, with a minimum of 0, indicate lower risks of external vulnerability.  

The first pillar focuses on understanding how much a country depends on foreign imports and 
how concentrated those imports are. Countries that rely  heavily on imports from  just a few 
trading  partners are more vulnerable to  risks  such as  supply  chain  disruptions or new  trade 
barriers. There are two key indicators used to measure this risk: 

•  A  measure  of  how  diversified  a  country’s  imports  are,  by  examining  the  number  of 
trading partners. This builds on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). A higher HHI 
means  that  the  country  depends  on  fewer  countries,  making  it  more  vulnerable  to 
external disruptions. 

•  The size of a country’s imports compared to its exports, as captured by the Trade Ratio 
(TR). A ratio higher than 1 means the country is importing more than it exports (it runs 
a  trade  deficit),  while  a  ratio  lower  than  1  means  the  country  exports  more  than  it 
imports (it has a trade surplus). 

The two  indicators  in  pillar 1 permit  to  classify  products  into four  categories, based on  the 
combination of the risk levels (higher or lower) of each indicator. See Figure 2 (left panel). The 
most concerning situation occurs when a country relies heavily on foreign markets for a product 
and has fewer options for diversifying its suppliers. Other categories show varying levels of 
risk,  from  products  with  potential  for  diversification  to  those  with  low  trade  dependence 
overall. 

The second pillar examines the risks that a country faces in global trade markets, drawing on 
two key indicators:  

•  How non-competitive a country is in exporting a specific product compared to others, 
as measured by its Revealed Comparative Disadvantage (RCD). A higher value means 
the country is less competitive, driven by a comparative disadvantage in that product. 
On the other hand, lower values show the country is more specialised in exporting that 
product. 

•  How the prices of a country’s exports compare to its imports, as measured through the 
Price Competitiveness Index (PCI). A higher price for exports compared to imports may 
point  towards  prices  disadvantage,  making  the  country  more  vulnerable  in  foreign 
markets. However, higher prices can also reflect higher quality, which is not necessarily 
a weakness. To assess risk, the PCI needs thus to be used in combination with the RCD 
indicator above.  

29 

 
 
The risk positions on these two indicators (higher, lower) are used to classify products into four 
groups based on vulnerability, due to a weak global position. The highest risk occurs when a 
country’s products are both more expensive and less competitive globally. See Figure 2 (right 
panel). Other categories indicate lower vulnerability, such as products that are competitively 
priced but lack strong export specialisation, products that have both strong export specialisation 
and competitive prices, or products with high prices but a strong global comparative advantage. 

Finally, to ensure consistency, the methodology normalises the indicators within the 0-1 range. 
It permits to aggregate the indicators under each pillar, treating them equally and ensuring that 
both  are  important  in  measuring  risk. This  also  allows  to  aggregate  the  two  pillars  into  the 
EXVI.  Figure  3  provides  an  example  of  Pillar  1  and  2  scores  and  the  EXVI  for  selected 
products. Both individual products and product groups can be compared across the EU, US, 
and China, as well as over time.  

Figure 24. Examples of product scores in Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 

Pillar 1 

Pillar 2 

Source: European Commission, based on the BACI database.  

Figure 25. Selected products: EXVI scores for the two pillars, and absolute scores  

Source: European Commission, based on the BACI database.  

30 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 

Overview of resilience measures by selected global players 

 Overview 

I. 

Introduction  

Recent crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine 
have  highlighted  the  increasing  vulnerability  of  global  value  chains  to  a  diverse  number  of 
disruptions,  drawing  attention  to  the  importance  of  strengthening  the  resilience  of  strategic 
supply  chains  and  reducing  dependencies. To  this  end,  governments  all  over  the  world  are 
increasingly adopting measures to secure their supply chains and preserve the competitiveness 
of their industries. 

To increase our understanding of today’s emerging context of ‘geopolitics of supply chains’, 
this Annex aims to give a non-exhaustive picture[2] of the main measures taken by some of 
the  EU’s  main  international  partners  to  reduce  their  strategic  dependencies,  particularly  on 
critical raw materials, and make their supply chains more resilient, especially in view of the 
digital and green transitions.  

Gaining a better understanding of the means employed by these selected international players 
to strengthen their supply chains can help the EU to safeguard its critical supply chains and 
strengthen its open strategic autonomy as well as bolster the competitiveness of its industries 
in strategic areas. Moreover, it sheds light on measures that could also potentially expose EU 
supply chains  to  risks by, for example,  encouraging delocalisation and future disinvestment 
decisions.  

With a strong focus on measures adopted since the COVID-19 pandemic (mostly since 2020) 
– considered as a pivotal shift for countries’ efforts in this direction – the inventory below lists 
the main resilience measures undertaken by some of the EU’s main trading partners (the US, 
the UK, Canada, Japan, China, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, India, Australia, and 
Taiwan)  that  the  Commission  is  aware  of  at  the  time  of  adoption  of  this  document  and 
depending  on  the  level  of  information  for  each  country.  Therefore,  the  actual  number  of 
resilience measures adopted by international partners could be far greater. 

After examining the collected data, the measures taken by these non-EU countries have been 
classified into six specific categories and a more detailed description is provided for the most 
recently adopted measures. Within each category and for each international partner, measures 
have been listed and grouped thematically whenever possible – from broader, usually cross-
sectoral measures to sector- or product-specific ones. 

1.  Monitoring,  gathering  and  forecasting  of  key  supply  chain  information  from  public 

authorities and industry. 

2.  Financial and fiscal support for investment, R&D, etc. in strategic sectors / value chains. 
3.  Prioritisation mechanisms of domestic supply of goods and services in strategic sectors.  
4.  Stockpiling of critical inputs. 
5.  Trade and investment measures: tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, foreign 

direct investment control, etc. 

6.  International partnerships.  
These categories have been chosen as they mirror policy instruments that have been employed 
internally and externally by the EU to make supply chains more resilient and diverse and to 

31 

 
 
anticipate, prepare for and respond to disruptions. Their scope is deliberately granular to easily 
classify and regroup together non-EU countries’ measures according to each policy’s rationale 
and objectives.  

 Overview of resilience measures by category and by countries 

II. 
1. Monitoring, gathering and forecasting of key supply chain information from public 
authorities and industry 

1.1 United States 

•  On 14 June 2024, President Biden issued an Executive Order on White House Council on 
Supply  Chain  Resilience,  to  bolster  US  supply  chain  resilience  and  foster  ‘resilient, 
diverse,  and  secure  supply  chains.  The  Order  encourages  collaboration  with  allies  and 
partners to promote collectively economic and national security, encourage innovation and 
strengthen  the  capacity  to  respond  to  and  recover  from  international  disasters  and 
emergencies.  It  supplements  Executive  Order  14017  on America’s  Supply  Chains  dated 
24 February 2021 by formalising the White House Council on Supply Chain Resilience, 
which  consists  of  30  Cabinet-level  members  and  senior  administration  officials.  Its 
objectives  include:  (i)  recommending  procedures  and  best  practices  for  inter-agency 
cooperation and data collection and analysis; (ii) identifying budgetary and other resources 
necessary to support supply chain resilience and mitigate risks, shocks and disruptions; (iii) 
recommending administrative actions to further supply chain resilience; (iv) coordinating 
with  other  inter-agency  bodies  managing  policy  areas  that  affect  the  integrity  of  supply 
chains; and (v) ensuring that operations related to building critical supply chain resilience 
promote a fair, open and competitive marketplace. The Order also requires the White House 
Council  on  Supply  Chain  Resilience  to  conduct  a  quadrennial  supply  chain  review  of 
industries critical to national or economy security.  

•  In 2023, the Department of Commerce created a Supply Chain Center (SCC), which is: 
(i) integrating industry expertise and data analytics to develop innovative supply chain risk 
assessment tools; (ii) coordinating case studies on selected critical supply chains; and (iii) 
collaborating with  international  partners on mutual  supply chain  priorities. The SCC has 
developed  a  diagnostic  supply  chain  risk  assessment  tool  (SCALE)  to  improve  the  US 
government’s  analytical  capacity  to  understand  and  address  structural  supply  chain  risks 
across  the  US  economy.  It  compares  risks  across  industries  and  provides  an  in-depth 
assessment  of  these  risks’  drivers.  In  addition  to  this,  the  Department  of  Commerce 
announced  that  the  US  government  will  engage  in  different  ways  with  industry  and 
stakeholders to discuss supply chains risks linked to sectors such as artificial-intelligence 
data centres, the chemicals industry and emerging technology. 

•  Executive Orders 13953 (Addressing the Threat to the Domestic Supply Chain from 
Reliance on Critical Minerals From Foreign Adversaries and Supporting the Domestic 
Mining and Processing Industries) of 30 September 2020 and 13817 (A Federal Strategy 
to  Ensure  Secure  and  Reliable  Supplies  of  Critical  Minerals)  of  20 December 2017. 
EO13953 entrusted the Secretary of the Interior with the task of producing every 180 days 
a  report  on  critical  mineral  supplies  and  potential  risks  from  foreign  powers.  EO13817 
launched an in-depth review of critical mineral supply chains necessary for the US economy 
and national defence and investigated expanding mining production in the US. 

32 

 
 
 
•  The Trade  Expansion Act  of  1962,  as  amended,  gives  the  Department  of  Commerce  the 
authority to conduct Section 232 investigations. These investigations aim to determine the 
potential impact of imports on the national  security of the  US.  Under the first Trump 
Administration,  ‘Section  232  investigations’  served  to  collect  market  information  from 
companies and stakeholders on aluminium and steel, on the dominant role of China in the 
supply  chain,  and  on  the  risks  associated  with  the  US’s  import  dependency  on  China, 
especially for sintered magnets (100%).  

•  The  Defense  Production  Act  (DPA)  (1950)  allows  the  US  government  to  obtain 
information  from  industry  for  national  security  purposes.  Since  1950,  it  has  been 
reauthorised over 50 times by the US Congress, but the majority of its authorities will expire 
on 30 September 2025, unless reauthorised. Under Section 705 of the DPA, agency heads 
with delegated authority are empowered to obtain information from industry as needed to 
effectively administer the DPA. This includes two primary mechanisms: (i) industry studies 
– agency heads can conduct industry studies to evaluate the capabilities of the US industrial 
base in supporting national defence; and (b) subpoenas – agency heads can issue subpoenas 
to obtain necessary information from industry. 

1.2 United Kingdom 

•  The UK Critical Imports and Supply Chains Strategy, adopted in January 2024, sets out 
how the UK government intends to help businesses build secure and reliable supply chains 
in areas that are vital to the UK’s economic prosperity, national security, and the delivery of 
essential  services.  It  supplements  the  Advanced  Manufacturing  Plan,  adopted  in 
November 2023 (see Section 2), and it builds on and expands the existing sectoral strategies, 
namely the Critical Minerals Strategy (2022) and the Semiconductor Strategy (2022). It 
aims to ensure the resilience and security of the UK’s supply chains for a wider range of 
critical  imports,  including  medicines,  minerals,  and  semiconductors.  The  critical  sectors 
identified  are  chemicals,  civil  nuclear,  communications,  defence,  emergency  services, 
energy, finance, food, government, health, space, transport, and water. Moreover, the growth 
sectors  identified  are  digital  technology,  green  industries,  life  sciences,  advanced 
manufacturing and creative industries. In order to reduce dependency on single sources for 
critical  imports,  the  strategy  promotes  diversifying  supply  chains  by  establishing  new 
trade partnerships and investing in domestic production capabilities. This approach is 
supplemented by the creation of strategic reserves of critical materials, providing a buffer 
against potential supply chain disruptions (see Section 4). Transparency and traceability are 
also  key  components  of  the  strategy.  Additionally,  it  supports  innovation,  R&D  and 
international cooperation. Following the July 2024 election, on 14 October 2024, the new 
UK government published a green paper setting out new plans to deliver ‘Invest 2035: The 
UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy’. 

•  Building  on  the  2021  Integrated  Review,  which  included  a  supply  chain  resilience 
framework based on five areas (i.e. diversification, international partnerships, stockpiling 
and  surge  capacity,  onshoring,  and  demand  management),  the  2023  Integrated  Review 
Refresh  outlines  how  the  UK  government  needs  to  respond  to  the  deteriorating  global 
security environment. It identifies energy security, economic security, and democratic and 
wider  societal  resilience  as  priority  areas  to  address  the  UK’s  vulnerabilities.  The  2023 
Refresh emphasises economic security, whereas the 2021 Review aimed to identify whether 
it may be beneficial to manage the demand for components or goods considering substitutes 
and alternatives, innovation, and circularity.  

33 

 
 
 
•  In  October  2024,  the  UK  government  introduced  an  interim Advisory  Council,  ahead  of 
setting up the Industrial Strategy Council (announced in the King’s Speech – July 2024) 
on a statutory footing, hence permanently and independently. The council will inform the 
development of the UK’s industrial policy through its expertise and latest evidence, working 
with  business,  trade  unions,  devolved  governments,  local  leaders,  academia  and 
stakeholders. 

•  In October 2024, the UK government announced the set-up of a new supply chain task 
force that will work to assess where supply chains critical to the UK’s economic security 
and resilience –could be vulnerable to disruption. The task force will ensure that government 
works with business to address these risks, building the conditions required to deliver secure 
growth. 

•  In its 2023 Integrated Review, the UK announced the set-up of a Task and Finish Group 
on  Critical  Minerals  Resilience  for  UK  industry,  to  investigate  vulnerabilities  and 
resilience opportunities across value chains. In December 2023, the group issued a report 
containing an analysis of critical minerals’ sector risks and recommendations for the UK’s 
supply  chain  resilience.  The  report  identifies  as  a  key  area  of  strength  for  the  UK  the 
midstream  of  critical  raw  material  value  chains,  as  well  as  the  opportunity  to  increase 
material circularity. It also identifies three areas that can further improve the UK’s resilience: 
research and innovation, supply chain transparency, and applying circularity principles. 
•  In July 2022, the UK set up its first Critical Minerals Intelligence Centre, which provides 
continuous intelligence on the supply of and demand for critical minerals. The centre advises 
the  government  on  economic,  environmental,  ethical,  and  geopolitical  issues  linked  to 
supplies of critical mineral resources. The centre has already published reports on the UK’s 
future  demand  for  critical  raw  materials  for  electric-vehicle  batteries,  and  on  the  UK’s 
dependency on 26 critical materials. 

1.3 Japan 

•  The five chapters of Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA), an umbrella instrument 
adopted in May 2022, and intended for full implementation within the following 2 years, 
are: (I) General Provisions Including the Formulation of a Basic Policy; (II) Systems for 
Ensuring Stable Supply of Critical Products; (III) Systems for ensuring Stable Provision of 
Essential  Infrastructure  Services;  (IV)  System  for  Enhancing  Development  of  Specified 
Critical Technologies; (V) System for Non-Disclosure of Selected Patent Application. As 
part  of  the  ESPA,  the  Japanese  government  selected  11  materials  as  ‘specified  critical 
materials (SCMs)’ which are strategically important for the country. Measures to ensure a 
stable  supply  of  these  products  were  included  in  the  comprehensive  economic  stimulus 
package in 2022. The list covers 11 sectors and 4 ministries (list below). For each of these 
critical products, the ministries have published sectoral policy guidelines that: (i) analyse 
their importance for Japan’s economic security, external dependencies and supply chains; 
(ii) lists all existing sectoral policies and measures; and (iii) explains why supplementary 
measures are necessary on economic security grounds. In November 2023, the government 
announced  its  intention  to  designate  additional  critical  commodities.  The  list  of  critical 
products is evolving with the upcoming decisions to designate new critical products such 
as uranium (as one of the critical minerals) and multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) 
by the end of 2023.  

34 

 
 
 
•  Ministry  of  Economy,  Trade  and  Industry  (METI)  (8):  semiconductors,  cloud 
computing, storage batteries, permanent magnets, critical minerals, machine tools and 
industrial robots, aircraft part materials and LNG.  

•  Ministry  of  Land,  Infrastructure,  Transport  and  Tourism  (MLIT)  (1):  maritime 
transport / shipping equipment (engines, propellers, navigational equipment (sonar) etc.); to 
support maritime transport.  

•  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) (1): fertiliser raw materials. 
The establishment of a stockpiling system and state support on storage fees for fertilisers 
held by private companies (e.g. fertiliser manufacturers) will be considered. 

•  Ministry of Healthy, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) (1): antimicrobials. 
•  Under  the  Economic  Security  Promotion Act  (ESPA)  (2022),  when  business  operators 
(including  foreign  operators)  engaged  in  the  production,  import  or  sale  of  ‘designated 
critical commodities’ apply to the governmental support programme (including for financial 
support),  the  operators  are  required  to  report  data  on  the  production,  import,  sale, 
procurement or storage of such commodities or related raw materials, and may be subject 
to on-site inspections. Additionally, the government will screen ‘critical equipment’ owned 
by  ‘designated  core  infrastructure  operators’  in  14  ‘core  infrastructure  sectors’:  (i) 
electricity; (ii) gas, ; (iii) oil; (iv) wate; (v) telecoms; (vi) broadcasting ; (vii) post; (viii) 
finance; (ix) credit cards; (x) railways; (xi) land freight; (xii) sea freight; (xiii) aviation; and 
(xiv) airports. 

•  In June 2024, following a reorganisation, METI created a new  Economic Security and 
Cooperation  Bureau,  which  will  be  responsible  for  the  overall  coordination  of 
economic  security  work  within  the  Ministry. The  new  structure  will  work  closely  with 
other offices across METI, including the Manufacturing Industries Bureau which covers a 
number of strategic industrial sectors including semiconductors, digital, automotive or space 
& defence. 

•  In October 2022, METI (the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) launched a new 
Resource Autonomous  Economy  Strategy  Planning  Office  and  new  study  group  to 
design  a  pro-growth  economy  with  circular  economy  and  resource  autonomy. The  study 
group  will  explore  ways  to  encourage  industries  to  use  circular  resources  against  the 
backdrop  of  limited  domestic  resources,  increasing  global  demand  for  critical  raw 
materials,  unexpected  supply  disruptions  and  economic  fallout  from  the  weakening 
yen.  

1.4 Australia 

•  The 2022 Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure Protection) Act amends 
the 2018 Security of Critical Infrastructure Act (the ‘SOCI Act’) to build on the existing 
framework and uplift the security and resilience of Australia’s critical infrastructure. The 
SOCI Act  contains  definitions  that  outline  each  of  the  11  critical  infrastructure  sectors. 
Definitions were developed in consultation with industry to ensure clear articulation of what 
constitutes a critical infrastructure asset within each sector. 

•  In 2021, the Australian government created the Office of Supply Chain Resilience under the 
Prime Minister. The office is dedicated to monitoring Australian supply chains’ resilience. 
Its  tasks  cover  health,  safety  and  wellbeing,  economic  stability  and  viability,  national 
security, and international partners. The office advises the Australian government on supply 
chain risks and potential measures to improve resilience. 

35 

 
 
 
1.5 Republic of Korea 

•  The  Republic  of  Korea’s  Framework Act  on  Supply  Chain  Stabilization  Support  for 
Economic Security took effect on 27 June 2024. The Act focuses on institutionalising the 
entire supply chain process, including risk detection, prevention, and management. The Act 
requires:  (i)  the  set-up  of  a  national  basic  scheme  for  supply  chain  management  and  an 
integrated early warning system; (ii) the creation of a state fund for business support; and 
(iii) the set-up of a pan-governmental Supply Chain Stabilization Committee that will ensure 
policy  coordination  on  critical  industrial  supply.  Furthermore,  the  Act  requires  the 
government  and  the  Bank  of  Korea  to  create  a  Supply  Chain  Stabilization  Fund  to  be 
managed by KEXIM Bank. 

•  Since 2022, advance warnings on supply chain and economic security issues are provided 
by: (i) the Economic Security Centre managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (ii) 
the Global Supply Chain Analysis Center managed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy; and (iii) the Office of Economic Security managed by the Office of the President. 
Since 2021, the Republic of Korea has had an early warning system in place to monitor 20 
key raw materials to ensure stable supplies. 

1.6 Singapore  

•  To  oversee  the  longer-term  work  of  responding  to  the  structural  shifts  in  Singapore’s 
economy,  the  Emerging  Stronger Taskforce  (EST)  was  set  up  in  May  2020  under  the 
Future  Economy  Council.  Chaired  by  the  Minister  for  National  Development,  the  EST 
comprised business leaders with experience in areas such as digitalisation and connectivity, 
and with perspectives on the global economy. Under the EST, nine industry-led coalitions 
(‘Alliances  for  Action’)  were  formed  to  work  in  partnership  with  the  government  to 
prototype ideas in areas of opportunity for Singapore and to address common challenges. 
•  In 2009, the Centre for Strategic Futures was set up within the Prime Minister’s Office as 
a foresight department whose mission is to position the Singaporean government so that it 
can navigate emerging strategic challenges and harness potential opportunities. In March 
2023, the Future Economy Planning Office was instead set up within the Ministry of Trade 
and  Industry. The  office’s  key  roles  include  developing  industry  transformation  maps  to 
secure Singapore’s economy resilience. 

1.7 India 

•  In  June  2023,  the  Ministry  of  Mines  published  a  report  on  the  identification  of  critical 
minerals. It identified a comprehensive list of 30 critical minerals, taking into account the 
needs of sectors such as defence, agriculture, energy, pharmaceuticals and telecoms. The 
report recommended the creation of a Centre of Excellence for Critical Minerals (CECM) 
in the Ministry of Mines, charged with the tasks of updating every three years the list of 
critical minerals for India as well as identifying more efficient ways for discovering next 
generation critical mineral deposits. The identification of minerals that are critical for India’s 
telecoms,  white  goods,  solar, 
manufacturing 
automobiles, batteries) is relevant for the ongoing implementation of the production-linked 

industries  (electronics, 

technology, 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
incentives  (PLI)  scheme  (see  section  2  below)  that  supports  the  Aatmanirbhar  Bharat 
Abhiyan (“Self-sufficient India”) initiative. 

2. Financial and fiscal support to investments, R&D etc., in strategic sectors/values 
chains 

2.1 United States 

•  The Biden Administration passed three major laws that all aim to provide strategic sectors 

with funding/subsidies, tax incentives, support for investment, R&D, etc. 

o  Inflation Reduction Act (IRA): approx. USD 818 billion (EUR 777 billion). 
The IRA directs nearly USD 400 billion (EUR 378 billion) in federal funding to 
clean  energy,  with  the  goal  of  substantially  lowering  the  nation’s  carbon 
emissions by the end of this decade. The funds will be delivered through a mix 
of tax incentives, grants, and loan guarantees. Clean electricity and transmission 
command the biggest slice, followed by clean transportation, including electric-
vehicle  incentives.  Under  the  IRA,  energy  projects  that  meet  the  domestic 
content requirements may be eligible for bonus points on their production tax 
credit (PTC) or investment tax credit (ITC).. This results in a 2-10% increase in 
their PTC/ITC, depending on the specific project. The additional tax credits can 
be  substantial,  potentially  amounting  to  tens  of  millions  of  dollars. The  IRA 
stipulates  that  a  10%  bonus  credit  is  available  for  a  ‘qualified  facility’  if  the 
taxpayer  can  provide  certification  that  any  steel,  iron,  or  manufactured 
components  of  the  facility  were  produced  in  the  US.  The  IRA  significantly 
revised the existing Section 30D credit for consumers purchasing clean energy 
vehicles. The credit bonus can be worth up to USD 7 500 (EUR 7 091). 

o  Bipartisan Infrastructure Law: approx. USD 1.2 trillion (EUR 1.13 trillion) 
over  10 years.  This  includes  USD 550 billion  (EUR 520 billion)  in  new 
spending during the next 5 years to improve the surface-transportation network 
infrastructure 
(USD 284 billion 
(USD 266 billion (EUR 251 billion)). 

(EUR 268 billion))  and  society’s  core 

o  CHIPS  and  Science  Act:  approx.  USD 280 billion  (EUR 265 billion)  until 
2032.  The  majority  –  USD 200 billion  (EUR 189 billion)  –  is  for  scientific 
R&D  and  commercialisation.  Some  USD 52.7 billion  (EUR 50 billion)  is  for 
semiconductor manufacturing, R&D, and workforce development, with another 
USD 24 billion (EUR 23 billion) worth of tax credits for chip production. There 
is  USD 3 billion  (EUR 2.8 billion)  slated  for  programmes  aimed  at  leading-
edge technology and wireless supply chains. 

•  Together, the IRA, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, and the CHIPS and Science Act are 

projected to inject more than USD 2 trillion (EUR 1.9 trillion) into the US economy. 

•  In  April  2022,  the  US  Export-Import  Bank  launched  the  Make  More  in  America 
Initiative  to  support  ‘export-oriented  domestic  manufacturing  projects’,  following  the 
White House recommendations contained in one of the reports per Executive Order 14017 
‘America’s Supply Chains’ – now replaced by the Executive Order on White House Council 

37 

 
 
  
  
 
on Supply Chain Resilience (see Section 1). Under the initiative, the Export-Import Bank is 
to make medium- and long-term loans, loan guarantees and insurance available for export-
oriented  domestic  manufacturing  projects,  with  a  particular  focus  on  sectors  such  as 
semiconductors, biotech and biomedical products, renewable energy, and energy storage. 
•  In March 2024, the US Department of Agriculture released a plan that will boost biomass 
supply  chain  resiliency  for  domestic  biobased  product  manufacturing,  while  also 
advancing environmental sustainability and market opportunities for small and mid-sized 
producers. This plan is one of the key deliverables of Executive Order 14081, issued in 
2022,  setting  goals  and  priorities  to  catalyse  action  inside  and  outside  of  government  to 
advance America’s domestic bioeconomy. 

2.2 Canada 

•  The  2023  federal  budget  presented 

in  March  2023  earmarks  CAD 80 billion 
(EUR 54 billion) worth of tax credits and infrastructural investment over 11 years to 
encourage investment in low-carbon electricity, manufacturing, and other green industrial 
activity (the ‘Made in Canada plan’). The combined value of the tax credits, which are set 
out below, is CAD 65 billion (EUR 44 billion). 
o  The  clean  electricity 

investment  tax  credit,  with  a 

total  cost  of 
CAD 25.7 billion  (EUR 17.4 billion)  over  11  years.  This  15%  credit  targets 
investment in non-emitting electricity generation systems (including large-scale 
hydro-  and  nuclear  facilities),  abated  natural  gas-fired  electricity  generation, 
stationary, fossil fuel-free storage systems,  as well as electricity transmission 
equipment. 

o  The  clean  technology  investment  tax  credit.  Announced  in  the  2022  Fall 
Economic Statement, this 30% tax credit will promote investment in areas like 
wind, solar, small modular nuclear reactors, and geothermal energy. Its 5-year 
cost is estimated at CAD 6.7 billion (EUR 4.3 billion). Companies cannot draw 
on  both  the  clean  electricity  investment  tax  credit  and  the  clean  technology 
investment tax credit for the same project.  

o  The investment tax credit for clean hydrogen. Announced in the 2022 Fall 
Economic  Statement,  the  credit  will  vary  between  15%  and  40%  of  project 
capital  costs,  depending  on  the  lifecycle  carbon  intensity  of  the  produced 
hydrogen.  This  credit  is  expected  to  cost  CAD 5.6 billion  (EUR 3.8 billion) 
over the next 5 years, and another CAD 12.1 billion (EUR 8.2 billion) between 
2028-2029 and 2034-2035. 

o  The carbon capture, utilisation and storage investment tax credit has been 
extended. Announced in the 2022 budget, this update will add CAD 516 million 
(EUR 349 million) to the credit’s CAD 4.1 billion (EUR 2.8 billion) total over 
the next 5 years. 

•  The tax credits are supplemented by a CAD 15 billion (EUR 10.1 billion) Canada Growth 
Fund. To de-risk private investment, the fund uses ‘contracts for difference’, which provide 
a governmental guarantee for the future price of, for example, carbon or hydrogen. The fund 
started investing in October 2023. 
•  In addition, the budget launches: 

o  an  extension  of  the  reduced  tax  rates  for  zero-emission  technology 

manufacturers; and 

38 

 
 
 
 
o  a CAD 500 million (EUR 338 million) top-up for the Strategic Innovation 
Fund  to  support  the  development  and  application  of  clean  technologies  in 
Canada.  

•  On 24 March 2023, Canada presented the Critical Minerals Infrastructure Fund – a new 
fund announced in the 2022 budget that will allocate CAD 1.5 billion (EUR 1 billion) for 
energy and transportation projects needed to unlock priority mineral deposits. The new fund 
will supplement other clean energy and transportation support initiatives, such as the Canada 
Infrastructure  Bank  and  the  National  Trade  Corridors  Fund,  as  well  as  other  federal 
programmes that invest in critical mineral projects, such as the Strategic Innovation Fund. 

2.3 United Kingdom  

•  As anticipated in the consultation/green paper ‘Invest 2035’ published in October 2024, the 
UK’s Modern Industrial Strategy to be launched in spring 2025 will focus on stimulating 
investment and activity in eight key sectors, which ‘offer the highest growth opportunity for 
the economy and business’ (i.e. advanced manufacturing, clean energy industries, creative 
industries,  defence,  digital  and  technologies,  financial  services,  life  sciences,  and 
professional  and business services). These will get bespoke sector plans, which will also 
identify key subsectors and cross-cutting enablers.  

•  At the international summit held on 14 October 2024, the creation of a National Wealth 
Fund was announced, building on the existing UK Infrastructure Bank to spur investment 
in the UK’s green and growth industries. It will manage GBP 27.8 billion (EUR 33.4 billion) 
in public investment in total. 

•  As part of the UK government’s commitment to decarbonising the power sector by 2030, 
the Great British Energy Bill (2024) is to enable the Secretary of State for Energy Security 
and Net Zero to designate a company as Great British Energy (GBE). According to the 
explanatory notes to the Bill, the Secretary of State will provide GBE with GBP 8.3 billion 
(EUR 10.0 billion) over the course of this Parliament (2024-2029); this will be funded from 
an  increased  windfall  tax  on  oil  and  gas  companies  for  up  to  GBP 1.2 billion 
(EUR 1.4 billion) and through borrowing. GBE will be a company wholly  owned by the 
government  whose  objects  will  be  to  facilitate,  encourage  and  participate  in:  (i)  the 
production,  distribution,  storage,  and  supply  of  clean  energy;  (ii)  the  reduction  of 
greenhouse gas emissions from  energy produced  from  fossil fuels; (iii) improvements in 
energy efficiency; and (iv) measures for ensuring energy security. GBE would achieve these 
objectives by partnering and co-investing with the private sector, e.g. in mature technologies 
such as wind, solar and nuclear energy. 

•  As part of the Autumn Statement of 2023, the Advanced Manufacturing Plan was adopted 
in November 2023. It is based on three priorities: (i) investing in the long-term future of 
manufacturing; (ii) cooperating internationally and building supply chain resilience; and (iii) 
reducing costs and removing barriers to boost competitiveness. The UK government made 
available  GBP 2 billion  (EUR 2.4 billion)  of  new  capital  and  R&D  funding  for  the 
the  Automotive 
automotive  sector  via 
Transformation Fund and the Advanced Propulsion Centre R&D programme. To deliver net 
zero,  the  UK  estimates  that  additional  capital  investment  averaging  GBP 50-60 billion 
(EUR 60-72 billion)  per  year  is  needed  through  the  late-2020s  and  the  2030s  across  the 
economy. The majority of this investment will come from the private sector.  

the  Auto2030  programme,  building  on 

39 

 
 
 
•  On 26 November 2023, the UK published its first-ever Battery Strategy, which recognises 
that the UK is heavily dependent on imports for batteries and their materials. The strategy 
is based on a ‘design-build-sustain’ approach. The GBP 60 million (EUR 72 million) of new 
funding is being allocated to support a three-pronged strategy covering: (i) designing new 
technologies; (ii) building out supply chains and manufacturing capacity; and (iii) sustaining 
future growth through skills planning and collaboration. According to the strategy, the UK 
government expects to leverage GBP 5 of private investment for every GBP 1 of spending 
from public sources. The strategy announced changes to the tax relief system for research-
intensive SMEs that entered into force on 1 April 2024. SMEs can claim a higher rate of 
relief, even if they allocate only 30% of their investment to R&D.  

•  In May 2023, the UK unveiled its national semiconductor strategy, which includes a plan 
to  redouble  efforts  in  design,  research,  and  advanced  chip  leadership.  To  do  this,  the 
government will invest up to GBP 1 billion (EUR 1.2 billion) in the next decade to improve 
access to infrastructure, power more R&D, and facilitate greater international cooperation, 
with up to GBP 200 million (EUR 240 million) over the years 2023-2025.  

•  In March 2023, the UK reformed the  UK Infrastructure Bank and its governance. The 
bank  was  created  in  2021  with  a  capital  of  GBP 22 billion  (EUR 26 billion)  to  mobilise 
investment,  including  in  climate-related  technologies,  to  ensure  the  UK  reaches  its  2050 
climate targets. 

•  In February 2023, the UK government launched ‘CleanTech for UK’, a coalition of leading 
clean  tech  entrepreneurs,  investors  and  venture  builders  with  combined  funds  of  over 
GBP 4 billion (EUR 4.8 billion), focusing on the UK’s green economy and innovation for a 
net-zero emissions future.  

•  The British Industry Supercharger, announced in February 2023 and launched in April 
2024,  is  designed  to  reduce  industrial  electricity  prices  for  eligible  energy-intensive 
industries in Great Britain. It aims, among other things, to bring the energy costs for Britain’s 
key  strategic  energy-intensive  industries  in  line  with  other  major  economies  around  the 
world. The  annual  value of the scheme is  estimated between around  GBP 320 million to 
GBP 410 million  per  year,  from  which  about  300  businesses  in  sectors  including  steel, 
metals, chemicals, and paper will benefit. 
The Critical Minerals Strategy, adopted in July 2022, sets out the government’s plans for 
improving the resilience of critical mineral supply chains and increasing the UK’s security 
of supply. Through this strategy, the UK intends to accelerate growth of the UK’s domestic 
capabilities, collaborate with international partners, and strengthen international markets to 
make them more responsive, transparent, and responsible. 

2.4 Australia 

•  Launched  in  2021,  Australia’s  Supply  Chain  Resilience  Initiative  (SCRI)  provides 
businesses up to AUD 2 million (EUR 1.2 million) to develop or scale up a manufacturing 
capability or a related activity to address supply chain vulnerabilities for a critical product 
or input identified in the Sovereign Manufacturing Capability Plan. The main new policy 
tool is the SCRI grant (AUD 50 million (EUR 30.7 million)) to improve access to critical 
products in times of crisis. 

•  In 2020, the Australian government launched its Modern Manufacturing strategy with a 
budget of AUD 1.5 billion (EUR 0.9 billion). The strategy is a key feature of the plan to 
harness Australian manufacturing capability and to drive Australia’s economic recovery and 

40 

 
 
 
future  resilience.  The  strategy  is  implemented  by  the  National  Manufacturing  Priority 
Roadmaps,  developed  with  industry  through  task  forces,  in  six  areas  identified  as  of 
comparative  advantage  and  strategic  imperative:  medical  products;  space;  resources 
technology and critical mineral processing; food and beverage; defence; and recycling and 
clean energy. 

•  The Australian government is incentivising investment in critical mineral projects through 
a range of programmes, including the USD 4 billion (EUR 3.8 billion) Critical Minerals 
Facility and the recently announced (July 2024) USD 7 billion (EUR 6.6 billion) Critical 
Minerals  Production  Tax  Incentive. Already  on  25 October 2023, Australia  announced  a 
AUD 2 billion (EUR 1.2 billion) expansion in critical mineral financing, with the aim, 
among  other  things,  of  solidifying Australia’s  position  as  a  world-leading  provider  and 
helping the transition to net zero. This significant commitment doubles the capacity of the 
Critical  Minerals  Facility  to  finance  Australian  critical  mineral  mining  and  processing 
projects  and  takes  the  government’s  value-adding  investment  in Australian  resources  to 
AUD 6 billion (EUR 3.7 billion).  

•  On  5 September 2024,  the  Australian  government  launched  a  new  digital  Australian 
Critical Minerals Prospectus, displaying through an interactive online map more than 55 
investment-ready projects to potential investors and buyers from around the world. This new 
online tool can be customised to navigate Australia’s rich and diverse mineral endowment, 
including critical minerals needed to build essential components for products like electric 
vehicles, solar panels, hydrogen technology and batteries. 

2.5 India 

•  The  Production  Linked  Incentive  (PLI)  scheme  (2020),  managed  by  the  Ministry  of 
Heavy  Industries,  is  designed  to  help  develop  local  supply  chains. The  scheme  not  only 
invites  foreign  companies  to  set  up  units  in  India,  but  it  also  aims  to  encourage  local 
companies  to  set  up  or  expand  existing  manufacturing  units  and  reduce  the  country’s 
reliance on imports from other countries. Benefiting industries include the battery ecosystem 
(under  the  national  programme  on  advanced  chemistry  cell  battery  storage),  with 
USD 2.49 billion (EUR 2.36 billion) in subsidies over 5 years to develop 50 GWh of battery 
capacity in India. Beneficiaries must ensure a 60% increase in domestic value added within 
5 years. An additional PLI scheme was launched to boost solar panel production in India, 
with  a  budget  of  USD 600 million  (EUR 568 million)  and  the  goal  of  attracting 
USD 2.30 billion  (EUR 2.18 billion)  in  private  financing  and  reaching  an  additional 
10 000 MW  of  solar  electricity  production  capacity  in  India.  Other  schemes  have  been 
designed, including the Scheme for Promotion of Manufacturing of Electronic Components 
and Semiconductors (SPECS), and more recently, in 2023, the PLI IT Hardware, which aims 
to promote the localisation of components and sub-assemblies of semiconductor design, ICT 
manufacturing, laptops, tablets and packaging. From its inception until November 2023, the 
PLI  scheme  resulted  in  INR 1.03 trillion  (EUR 10  billion)  of  investments,  more  than 
INR 3.20 trillion  (EUR 40  billion)  of  exports  and  INR 8.61 trillion  (EUR 100  trillion)  of 
production  spend,  generating  also  direct  and  indirect  employment.  Of  the  14  sectors  in 
which  PLI  was  introduced,  the  most  successful  ones  are  electronics  manufacturing, 
pharmaceuticals, and medical devices. 

•  The  2024  Union  budget  introduced  a  range  of  policy  measures,  including  the  Critical 
Minerals Mission, to promote domestic mineral exploration, mining and production. The 
mission focuses on developing domestic mining capabilities and fostering circularity and 

41 

 
 
 
innovation.  The  Indian  government  is  also  designing  a  PLI  scheme  to  encourage  the 
recycling  of  critical  minerals  in  the  country  through  targeting  e-waste  recycling, 
incentivising  the  production  of  recycled  critical  minerals,  and  promoting  investment  in 
advanced recycling technologies. 

•  In May 2023, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology launched an ‘India 
Semiconductor Mission’ to act as the central entity coordinating all semiconductor-related 
policies of the Indian government and ensure their smooth implementation. Some initiatives 
in  place  include  the  Semicon  India  programme,  which  provides  USD 10 billion 
(EUR 9.5 billion)  to  100  Indian  companies  in  the  field  of  electronics.  Since  2022,  the 
amended  programme  for  semiconductors  and  display  fab  ecosystems  provides  fiscal 
support  of  50%  of  project  cost  for  all  technology  nodes  for  semiconductor  fabs,  fiscal 
support  of  50%  of  project  cost  for  display  fabs,  and  fiscal  support  of  50%  of  capital 
expenditure for compound semiconductors, silicon photonics, sensor fab and semiconductor 
facilities. The Digital India campaign also aims to develop the electronics sector by making 
it  worth  USD 300 billion  (EUR 384 billion)  by  2026,  particularly  in  semiconductor  and 
design,  smartphones,  IT  hardware,  and  components.  In  September  2024,  India  hosted  a 
major conference Semicon India 2024 with the aim of positioning India as a leading partner 
in the global semiconductor supply chain.  

•  In  August  2021,  the  Ministry  of  New  and  Renewable  Energy  launched  the  National 
Hydrogen Mission as a blueprint for India’s transition to a hydrogen-based economy, with 
the goal of reaching a production of 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen by 2030. As part of 
the  mission,  the  Indian  government  is  offering  special  manufacturing  zones  to  produce 
hydrogen, with  free  energy transmission across state lines  and priority connection to  the 
grid.  In  February  2023,  the  Indian  government  also  announced  a  INR 350 billion 
(EUR 4 billion) fund to invest in energy security and green transition (with a focus on solar 
power and green hydrogen production) with the aim of reaching net-zero emissions by 2070. 
At state level, green hydrogen production targets exceed federal goals. Uttar Pradesh has 
pledged up to 40% capital subsidy for green hydrogen projects, while Gujarat aims for 3 
million  tonnes  of  production,  over  40%  of  the  cumulative  state  target.  Together,  these 
initiatives aim to help India exceed its 2030 target, with state projections amounting to 7 
million tonnes – well beyond the federal goal of 5 million tonnes.  

2.6 China 

•  The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021) included an entire chapter devoted to boosting the digital 
sector’s added value to 10% of GDP by 2025. This notably includes targeted investment in 
6G  and 
the  2015  Classified  Catalogue  of 
Telecommunications Services Law, which was updated in 2019, only Chinese companies 
can be licensed to operate cloud services for security reasons and guaranteeing a protected 
market for Chinese companies. 

in  cloud  services.  According 

to 

•  The government directly or indirectly funnels credits and investment into ‘strategic sectors’, 
e.g. through ‘government guidance funds’ that combine public and private investment and 
through lending by state-owned banks. These funds include the National Integrated Circuit 
Industry  Investment  Fund  (the  ‘Big  Fund’,  set  up  in  2014  to  bolster  the  Chinese 
semiconductor industry), the National Manufacturing Transformation and Upgrading Fund, 
the  National  SME  Development  Fund,  the  National  Emerging  Industry  Venture  Capital 
Fund  and  the  National  Science  and  Technology Achievement  Transformation  Guidance 
Fund. As of 2021, the established industry funds mainly focused on ‘Made in China 2025’ 

42 

 
 
 
and seven strategic emerging industries, including energy conservation and environmental 
protection, information technology, biological industry, new energy, new-energy vehicles, 
high-end equipment manufacturing industry, and new materials.  

•  In June 2024, the Ministry of  Industry and Information Technology  and  the Ministry of 
Finance issued a circular to further support ‘Little Giants’ in advancing new technologies 
and making China’s  industrial supply chains  more resilient. The central  government  will 
allocate funds to more than 1 000 SMEs and start-ups for 2024-2026, essentially in the form 
of direct grants. The additional subsidy will be up to CNY 6 million per business, i.e. over 
CNY 6 billion (some EUR 800 million) in total, on top of the existing support for ‘Little 
Giants’ (CNY 10 billion in grants (EUR 1.3 billion), plus preferential access to finance and 
other measures). The focus of this new scheme is on strategic emerging industries and future 
industries, as part of China’s broader efforts to develop ‘new quality productive forces’. 
•  The dual circulation strategy (2020) includes tax breaks, lower utility rates, low-interest 
loans and free or discounted land for chipmakers to: (i) meet higher technical standards; 
(ii) advance technology  development; and (iii) incentivise reshoring  and  development  of 
local capacity. Even though foreign investing companies are in principle eligible for these 
breaks, the goal is to achieve self-reliant economic development to have complete supply 
chains under Chinese control. 

•  The Eastern Data, Western Computing plan (2022) aims to develop the digital industry 
in China by constructing eight computing hubs and 10 data centre clusters in key areas in 
eastern  and  western  China. The  plan  is  led  by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  Information 
Technology with the goal of creating the required infrastructure to enable the development 
of Chinese industries in the fields of internet of things, artificial intelligence, big data, and 
cloud computing while relying on Chinese infrastructure. 

•  The  implementation  plan  for  the  development  of  new  energy  storage  technologies 
during  the  14th  Five-Year  Plan  period  contains  several  investment  measures  to  develop 
energy  production  and  storage  in  emerging  fields  such  as  compressed  air,  hydrogen, 
batteries, and thermal energy, with the goal of reaching self-reliance in these fields. More 
specifically, the goal is to reach 100 GW of battery storage capacity by 2030; by mid-2024, 
China had installed 44 GW of capacity. 

•  In  May  2024,  China’s  Ministry  of  Commerce  and  SINOSURE,  an  export  credit  and 
investment insurer with a portfolio of nearly USD 1 trillion (EUR 0.95 trillion) (fully state-
owned  entity),  issued  a  joint  notice  entitled  ‘Maximizing  the  Role  of  Export  Credit 
Insurance in Steadily Promoting the High-Quality Development of Trade to Accelerate the 
Construction  of  a  Strong  Trading  Nation’.  The  notice  aims  to  guide  local  authorities 
responsible for commerce and the branches of SINOSURE so they can fully and effectively 
use the policy tools  of export credit insurance. Compared to  similar previous documents 
published  in  2020-2022,  more  emphasis  is  placed  on,  among  other  things,  overseas 
investment insurance (particularly in the green, digital, new energy, and automotive sectors) 
and domestic trade credit insurance. Explicit references are made to supply chain resilience, 
in particular as regards imports of advanced equipment, critical components and resources, 
including minerals. Particularly, SINOSURE supports China’s trade and investment policy 
by offering export credit and investment insurance on below-market terms. 

•  China temporarily exempts new-energy vehicles (NEVs) from purchase tax (10%). In 2024-
2025,  the  tax  exemption  is  capped  at  CNY 30 000  (EUR 3 900).  This  will  decrease  to 
CNY 15 000  (EUR 1 950)  in  2026-2027;  during  these  last  2 years,  purchase  tax  will  be 
levied  at  half  the  normal  rate.  All  products  are  eligible  for  purchase  tax  exemption, 
regardless  of  whether  they  are  imported  or  manufactured  locally.  From  2024,  models 

43 

 
 
applying for inclusion in the catalogue of NEV models with vehicle purchase tax reduction 
of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology need to meet new technical 
requirements: for pure electric models, the 30-minute maximum speed needs to be no less 
than 100 km/h, the range no less than 200 kilometres, and the battery energy density no less 
than 125 Wh/kg. Furthermore, as part of the economic stimulus measures, China currently 
provides  additional  subsidies  to  consumers  who  trade  in  their  old  NEV  or  internal 
combustion engine cars for a new NEV. 

•  China’s  New  Infrastructure  Plan  (2020)  aims  to  make  available  USD 1.4 trillion 
(EUR 1.3 trillion) through a digital infrastructure public spending programme in the sectors 
of 5G networks, industrial internet, intercity transportation and rail systems, data centres, 
artificial intelligence, ultra-high  voltage power transmission, and NEV  charging  stations. 
The goal is to stimulate the development of strategic sectors for the Chinese economy and 
help the rise of Chinese ‘champions’ in these industries. This effort has been supplemented 
by similar infrastructure plans developed by 25 of China’s provinces. 

•  In 2020, the central government made available up to CNY 1.7 billion (EUR 230 million) 
of funding  for  fuel-cell  vehicles (FCVs) to local governments that meet  specific targets. 
Local governments will also promote the roll-out of FCVs, with the provinces of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong each aiming to have 10 000 FCVs on their 
streets by 2025. 

•  In  2022,  the  government  called  on  public  and  private  institutions  to  work  towards 
technological  innovation  in  strategic  areas.  State  funds  support  public  universities  and 
research  institutes  to  conduct  research,  while  state-owned  and  private  enterprises  pursue 
R&D in high-priority areas. This is often done through national key R&D programmes 
(NKPs). Since 2016, the government has announced 66 NKP projects focusing on hydrogen 
technologies,  with  a  total  estimated  value  of  between  CNY 1.75  and  5 billion  (between 
EUR 240 and 680 million). Of these, 14 NKPs have an explicit focus on green hydrogen, 
with  a  combined  estimated  value  of  between  CNY 400 million  and  CNY 1.25 billion 
(between EUR 54 and 170 million). 

2.7 Taiwan 

•  The Five Trusted Industry Sectors Plan (2024) aims to strengthen Taiwan’s position as a 
trusted global tech partner while strengthening national security and resilience, focusing on 
semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), military self-reliance, data security, and next-
generation communication technologies such as 6G as pivotal future growth industries. The 
Ministry  of  Economic Affairs,  the  National  Science  and  Technology  Council,  and  other 
relevant agencies are intensifying collaboration with industries in semiconductors, AI, and 
drone technology. Their objectives include advancing sovereign AI capabilities, finalising 
pertinent  legislation,  and  boosting  R&D  in  drone  technology,  alongside  strengthening 
technology transfer processes. 

•  Last amended in June 2023, the Statute of Industrial Innovation, representing Taiwan’s 
largest investment tax reduction incentive in history, states that companies with a critical 
position  in  the  global  supply  chain  (including  those  with  technological  innovations  in 
semiconductors, electric vehicles and 5G) may claim an investment tax credit (‘ITC’) of 
25% on R&D expenditure and 5% on procurement of machinery/equipment for advanced 
processes.  The  applicable  period  for  utilising  such  ITCs  spans  7  years,  running  from 
1 January 2023 to 31 December 2029 (the expiry date of the Statute). 

44 

 
 
 
•  To tackle the outflow of Taiwanese semiconductor talent to China, the Ministry of Labour 
implemented two distinct rules in 2021 prohibiting advisory and intermediary services 
for recruitment of Taiwanese individuals to work in China. The rules are not exclusive 
to engineers but apply to all sectors. The first announcement, in April 2021, prohibits labour 
agencies  from  assisting  in  advertising  recruitment  or  acting  as  an  intermediary  helping 
personnel to go work in China. Violations of this rule can result in fines. The Ministry of 
Labour  further  specified  regulations,  prohibiting  domestic  advertising  of  recruitment  or 
acting as an intermediary helping personnel to go to work in mainland China unless this is 
done by a Taiwanese company permitted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs to invest in 
mainland China and with actual business operations there. Different penalty amounts exist 
for first-time and repeated offences.  

2.8 Japan 

•  Under  the  Economic  Security  Promotion Act  (ESPA)  (May  2022),  specific  companies 
supplying designated critical commodities can receive financial and fiscal support over the 
medium to long term. Subsidies under the ESPA aim to reduce the risk for private operators 
and encourage them to enter currently low-margin/high-risk businesses and R&D. Examples 
of measures under the ESPA are set out below. 

o  A  package  worth  approx.  JPY 800 billion  (EUR 6.15 billion)  to  support  the 
domestic semiconductor industry, including the construction of a chip plant in 
the  Kumamoto  prefecture  by  a  joint  venture  of  Taiwan  Semiconductor 
Manufacturing Co., Sony and Denso. Already in 2022, a corporation in which 
Japan’s major chips manufacturers are participating was set up to develop mass 
production of next-generation semiconductors (i.e. RAPIDUS). 

o  A new economic stimulus package to support the development of production 
infrastructure, diversification of supply sources and development of alternative 
commodities.  In April/August  2023,  the  Japanese  government  designated  20 
(maritime,  aerospace,  cyberspace, 
critical  and  emerging 
biotechnology, 
and  quantum,  hypersonic, 
cybersecurity  utilising  artificial  intelligence,  drones  and  unmanned  aerial 
vehicles,  next-generation  furnaces  and  fusion  furnaces).  Under  this  package, 
already  JPY 500 billion  (EUR 3.2 billion)  has  been  allocated  to  the  key 
technologies for economic security.  

semiconductors, 

technologies 

robotics 

o  Re-introduction  of  secret  patents.  The  recent  Basic  Policy  Guidelines 
identified  25  technologies  to  be  covered,  including  technologies  related  to 
aircraft,  unmanned  aerial  vehicles,  guided  weapons,  jet  engines,  solid  fuel 
rocket  engines,  weapons  with  electromagnetic  launchers,  laser  weapons, 
electromagnetic pulse munitions, defence against aircraft and guided missiles, 
telecommunications  jamming,  uranium  and  plutonium  isotope  separation, 
decomposition  and  reprocessing  of  nuclear  fuel,  nuclear  devices,  etc. 
Implementation started in May 2024. 

•  The green transformation (GX) basic policy (May 2023) is an investment roadmap for 
JPY 150 trillion (EUR 0.9 trillion) of public-private financing over the next 10 years. It is 
comprised  of  two  main  parts:  (i)  measures  for  stable  energy  supply  (energy  efficiency, 
renewables, nuclear, other energy sources like hydrogen, ammonia, liquefied natural gas, 
batteries,  carbon  recycling);  and  (ii)  ‘growth-oriented’  carbon  pricing  schemes.  It  will 
introduce  a  carbon  tax  by  2028,  starting  with  a  voluntary  emissions  trading  scheme 

45 

 
 
 
introduced  in  2026.  The  GX  plan  will  drive  forward  investment  in  renewables,  grid 
flexibility, energy efficiency and the circular economy, supported by an upcoming sovereign 
bond to stimulate private-sector investment. This GX Promotion Strategy will be revised by 
the GX 2040 vision, the new national strategy to be formulated by March 2025, which aims 
to  encourage  investment  and  strengthen  industrial  competitiveness  by  combining 
decarbonisation, stable supply of energy, and economic growth.  

•  In response to the global acceleration of decarbonisation efforts towards achieving the 2050 
carbon-neutrality target, and in line with the decision taken at COP28 to double the global 
average  energy  efficiency  improvement  rate  by  2030,  Japan  formulated  the  Energy 
Conservation  and  Non-Fossil  Energy  Conversion  Technology  Strategy  2024 
recognising the need for discontinuous technological innovation and social implementation 
through innovation, in  addition  to  the energy-saving  efforts  accumulated thus  far. It thus 
identifies key areas  that need focused efforts  to  effectively  promote the dissemination  of 
technology development. This serves as a guideline for support through the New Energy 
and Industrial Technology Development Organization’s grant projects and for planning and 
proposing  R&D  projects  by  companies  and  other  entities,  which  should  help  promote 
technology development and its practical application. 

•  Entered into force on 23rd October 2024, the Hydrogen Society Promotion Act promote 
the supply and utilisation of low-carbon hydrogen and its derivatives. The Act stipulates 
special measures involving the following: formulating basic policies, setting up a scheme 
for  approving  business  plans  from  both  the  demand  and  supply  sides,  providing  support 
measures  for  businesses  that  have  received  approval  for  their  business  plans,  granting 
special  regulatory  exemptions,  and  setting  out  the  conduct  standards  to  be  addressed  by 
hydrogen  suppliers. The Act  also  provide  subsidies  to  finance  the  supply  of  low-carbon 
hydrogen as well as for the development of hubs for low-carbon hydrogen. 

•  The  state-owned  Japan  Organization  for  Metals  and  Energy  Security  (JOGMEC) 
supports exploration and technological development by Japanese companies through equity 
capital and liability guarantees. JOGMEC invests in rare-earth overseas projects to diversify 
supply involving Japanese companies. Its purpose, scope, structure and obligations are set 
out in the JOGMEC Act. Under the planned revision of the Act, JOGMEC is to strengthen 
financial  support  for  Japanese  businesses’  rare-earth  exploration  and  refining  operations. 
The  revised  legislation  is  reported  to:  (i)  increase  the  ceiling  of  JOGMEC’s  loan  and 
investment ratio by expanding government support through JOGMEC from the current level 
of  50%  to  75%  of  investment  in  projects;  (ii)  allow  JOGMEC  to  invest in  or  grant  debt 
guarantees to domestic mineral-refining operations (at present, JOGMEC can only support 
refining  operations  overseas,  in  practice  in  China);  and  (iii)  allow  JOGMEC  to  actively 
support overseas mining and projects involving Japanese companies (risk-money support). 
•  Japan has set  a target for its automakers to sell 12 million  next-generation software-
defined vehicles (SDVs) at home and abroad by 2030, as part of a national strategy that 
will  include  collaboration  among  Japan’s  top  automakers.  The  Ministry  of  Economy, 
Trade and Industry announced a draft of its strategy for digital transformation in the 
auto  industry  on  20 May 2024.  It  focuses  on  three  pillars:  (i)  SDVs  (standardising  a 
platform linking software and systems); (ii) new means of transportation, such as driverless 
taxis and trucks; and (iii) utilisation of vehicle data from the fiscal year of 2025. The aim is 
to strengthen production of SDVs with the purpose of securing a 30% share of the global 
SDV market and increasing SDV sales to 19 million units by 2035.  

46 

 
 
 
 
2.9 Republic of Korea 

•  In  June  2024,  the  government  launched  a  KRW 5 trillion  (EUR 3.37 billion)  fund  for 
supply chain management to support leading companies in developing a robust and secure 
supply chain for essential raw materials and products for which Korea heavily depends 
on  imports.  The  projects  eligible  for  tax  credits  also  include  R&D  projects  focused  on 
technologies that are crucial for maintaining a stable supply chain. The fund will provide 
loans at below-market rates to businesses that demonstrate significant progress in reducing 
their reliance on overseas sources for critical materials. The government will add 100 new 
items  to  the  current  list  of  200  ‘economic  security-related  items’  from  industries  closely 
intertwined with the daily lives of people in Korea. The targeted industries currently include 
manufacturing and defence. This will be expanded to include logistics and cybersecurity. 
•  In  December  2023,  the  Republic  of  Korea  unveiled  a  KRW 38 trillion  (EUR 26 billion) 
financial package for 2024-2029 to help local electric-vehicle battery makers diversify 
their  supply  chains  in  view  of  the  government’s  aim  to  boost  the  competitiveness  of  the 
nation’s battery industry, from mining to recycling. The financial aid will take the form of 
loans, credit guarantees, lower borrowing rates and insurance premiums for investment in 
manufacturing  facilities  in  North America  in  order  to  help  companies  receive  tax  breaks 
under the US Inflation Reduction Act. The Republic of Korea’s government also plans to 
set up a KRW 1.5 trillion (EUR 1.0 billion) fund to help firms secure minerals and expand 
their production overseas. The government will also relax rules on the handling of second-
hand batteries to speed up the recycling ecosystem in the country, and lay down new safety 
rules on removing, storing and shipping spent cells. Already in April 2023, the government 
announced  its  aim  to  invest  KRW 20 trillion  (EUR 13.5 billion)  in  the  electric-vehicle 
battery industry by 2030 to turn it into a key component of the country’s national security 
and strategic assets, along with semiconductors, and to secure a significant lead over rivals.  
•  In  May  2024,  the  Republic  of  Korea  announced  a  financial  aid  package  worth 
KRW 9.7 trillion (EUR 6.5 billion), including tax credits and loans, after the US changed 
its rules on imports of critical battery minerals, including graphite, from countries such as 
China.  The  Republic  of  Korea’s  officials  will  thus  help  companies  improve  their 
communications with countries that have free-trade agreements with the US for securing 
critical battery minerals, whose imports are allowed under new US rules. Korean officials 
will also help companies to: (i) meet new requirements, such as submitting plans on how to 
diversify graphite supplies from  2027 onwards; and (ii) accurately calculate the value of 
battery minerals to receive the benefits.  

•  In August 2023, the Korean Financial Services Commission announced a set of measures 
to boost support for the export industry by providing KRW 23 trillion (EUR 16.4 billion). 
These export credits will be focused on strategic export sectors such as secondary batteries, 
electric  vehicles,  high-value-added  shipbuilding,  green  industries,  edu-tech,  agricultural 
products, fishery products, smart farming, ICT services, creative contents, pharmaceuticals 
/ medical devices, and cosmetics chips, displays, steel, machinery, petro-chemicals, nuclear 
power plants, national defence, overseas construction, environmental industry).  

•  In  May  2024,  the  Republic  of  Korea  prepared  a  package  worth  over  KRW 10 trillion 
(EUR 6.74 billion)  to  support  the  chip  industry  as  part  of  efforts  to  boost  the 
competitiveness  of  the  critical  industry  and  to  prop  up  economic  growth.  The  planned 
assistance  programme  aims  to  support  facility  investment  and  R&D  programmes  for  all 
sectors  of  the  chip  industry  from  chip  materials  to  manufacturing  equipment  and 
components. Already on 30 March 2023, the Republic of Korea passed its own ‘K-Chips 

47 

 
 
Act’, which gives specific advantages to Korean chipmakers, with tax breaks to increase 
production in Korea. The goal is to encourage chipmakers to spend a total of approximately 
combined  EUR 379 billion  by  2030  to  help  the  Republic  of  Korea  become  a  global 
powerhouse  in  memory  and  non-memory  chips.  In  addition  to  giving  tax  breaks  to 
semiconductor companies (15% for large companies and 25% for  capital expenditure by 
SMEs),  the  Act  streamlines  administrative  procedures  for  chipmakers.  Moreover,  any 
additional  investment  in  chipmaking  in  2023  received  an  additional  10%  tax  break, 
increasing year-on-year. Already in 2022, the government started to apply a higher tax credit 
rate  of  15%  to  facility  investment  in  the  chip  industry  for  conglomerates,  up  from  8%, 
while the rate for SMEs rose from  16% to  25%. In 2024, the government  announced an 
extension  of  the  tax  credit  programme  for  chip  investments  while  Korean  chipmakers 
Samsung  and  SK  Hynix  announced  a  combined  KRW 622 trillion  (EUR 419 million) 
investment to build a semiconductor cluster in the region of southern Gyeonggi by 2047, 
following investment plans already announced in 2023 (i.e. to build a massive chip cluster 
with  five  advanced  chip  manufacturing  plants  around  Yongin  by  2042,  for  some 
EUR 212 billion,  and  to  develop  a  semiconductor  cluster  in  the  same  city,  for  some 
EUR 85 billion).  

•  As  part  of  its  efforts  to  ensure  supply  chain  resilience  and  reduce  the  country’s  import 
dependence on specific items, including advanced materials, the Korean government has 
been promoting tech acquisition through overseas mergers and acquisitions in areas where 
it is difficult to secure ‘core tech’ in the domestic value chain. In 2022, the government made 
available acquisition funds of over EUR 2 billion for advisory, consulting, and follow-up 
integrated management services. 

•  In  February  2022,  the  Republic  of  Korea  issued  the  Special Act  on  Strengthening  and 
Protecting  Competitiveness  of  National  High-Tech  Strategic  Industries  to  reduce  the 
administrative  burden,  speed  up  relevant  licensing  processes,  and  subsidise  training 
programmes in the semiconductors sector and beyond. 

•  In February 2022, the national government adopted a new technology protection strategy to 
harmonise the different protection measures taken by various national ministries to avoid 
leakage of core technologies. To give special funding to the technologies that are considered 
strategic  by  the  government,  a  Special  Taxation  Act  has  been  in  effect  since 
1 January 2023. The Act sets out a precise list of 150 strategic technologies for which Korea-
based  manufacturing  companies  could  receive  tax  credits,  amounting  to  a  total  of 
KRW 937.6 billion (EUR 631.1 million) in  2023. In April 2023, the Ministry of Industry 
announced that the list would be updated to include 50 extra technologies, bringing the list 
to 200 items. 

•  In June 2024, the government and 12 financial institutions committed to providing a total of 
EUR 10 billion (approximately KRW 15 trillion) in ‘refund guarantees’ (RGs) to improve 
the competitiveness of domestic shipbuilding orders and expand exports. This marks the 
first time that policy banks and regional banks have jointly participated in issuing RGs for 
medium-sized  shipbuilders.  Through  this  agreement,  a  total  of  EUR 673 million 
(approximately KRW 1 trillion) in RGs will be supplied to medium-sized shipbuilders. 

2.10 Singapore 

48 

 
 
 
•  The  Enterprise  Innovation  Scheme  (2023)  increases  tax  deductions  for  businesses  on 
activities  that  boost  innovation,  such  as  R&D  conducted  in  Singapore,  registration  of 
intellectual property, and innovation carried out with institutes of technical education. 
•  Singapore’s research priorities and funding have been detailed in the Research, Innovation 
and  Enterprise  2025  Plan  (2021),  which  gives  priority  to  health,  sustainability,  digital 
economy,  advanced  manufacturing,  and  security.  The  plan’s  strategies  respond  to  new 
technological and societal driving forces.  

•  In February 2021, Singapore announced the creation of the Southeast Asia Manufacturing 
Alliance, a tripartite (public-private) alliance to secure supply chain resilience in the region. 
Grants  of  up  to  SGD 1.5 million  (EUR 1.0 million)  are  provided  by  the  Economic 
Development  Board  of  Singapore  (the  Ministry  of  Trade  and  Industry’s  economic 
development  body),  while  Enterprise  Singapore  (the  government  agency  for  business 
development)  provides  matching  events  and  a  platform.  A  network  of  private-sector 
‘strategic  partners’  offers  preferential  services  (reduced  leasing  and  logistics  costs)  for 
businesses that join the alliance.  

3. Prioritisation mechanism of domestic supply of goods and services  

3.1 United States 

•  (Priorities and Allocations) of the Defense Production Act (DPA) (1950) empowers the 
President  to  require  individuals  and  businesses,  including  corporations,  to  prioritise  and 
accept  contracts  for  materials  and  services  as  needed  to  support  national  defence.  This 
authority enables the government to mobilise the domestic industrial base in times of crisis. 
Under  Title III  (Expansion  of  Productive  Capacity  and  Supply),  the  President  is 
authorised to incentivise the domestic industrial base to increase production and supply of 
critical  materials  and  goods.  Title VII  (General  Provisions)  outlines  key  definitions, 
authorities  and  provisions  for  the  DPA,  including:  (i)  voluntary  agreements  with  private 
industry – the ability to establish partnerships with private companies to support national 
defence efforts; and (ii) blocking foreign corporate transactions – the authority to prevent 
proposed or pending mergers, acquisitions or takeovers by foreign entities that pose a threat 
to national security. 

•  ‘Buy American’  rules  for  procurement  (2021  revision  of  the  Buy American Act)  not 
covered under the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: these rules apply to all 
US federal government agency purchases or federally financed purchases of goods valued 
over the micro-purchase threshold (USD 10 000 (EUR 9 500)). To be considered as being 
produced in the US, goods must be manufactured in the US and at least 55% of the cost of 
their components must come from the US. Waivers can be granted for the public interest, 
for non-availability or if the cost of US products is unreasonable compared to equivalent 
foreign products. IT and ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ products are exempted.  

•  The  Build  America,  Buy  America  Act  (BABA)  stipulates  that  federal  funds  cannot  be 
allocated  for  an  infrastructure  project  unless  all  iron,  steel,  manufactured  products,  and 
construction materials are produced in the US. This domestic content preference, commonly 
referred  to  as  ‘Buy  America’,  applies  to  all  federally  funded  infrastructure  projects, 
including  those  not  directly  funded  by  the  Infrastructure  Investment  and  Jobs Act.  The 

49 

 
 
  
 
BABA  specifies  the  criteria  for  determining  when  materials  are  considered  ‘produced  in 
America’ and defines the term ‘infrastructure’. 

•  On  4 May 2023,  the  White  House  introduced  a  standards  strategy  for  critical  and 
emerging  technologies  (CET),  supplementing  the  2021  national  standards  strategy. The 
CET  includes  eight  strategic  technologies:  (i)  communication  &  networking;  (ii) 
semiconductors  &  microelectronics;  (iii)  artificial  intelligence  &  machine  learning;  (iv) 
biotechnologies;  (v)  positioning,  navigation  &  timing  services;  (vi)  digital  identity 
infrastructure &  distributed ledger technologies;  (vii) clean energy generation  &  storage; 
and  (viii)  quantum  information  technologies.  The  strategy  outlines  eight  measures  to 
strengthen US  standard  development organisations through 2024 federal  budget  funding, 
public-private  partnerships,  workforce  upskilling,  and  collaboration  with  international 
partners. 

3.2 Canada 

•  In  the  2023  federal  budget,  the  Canadian  government  announced  that  it  intended  to 
introduce  new  reciprocity  requirements  in  federal  public  procurement;  these  would 
give  foreign  companies  the  same  access  to  Canadian  federal  public  procurement  as 
Canadian companies have in the respective third countries. Similar reciprocity conditions 
will apply to foreign companies’ access to Canadian tax credits. 

3.3 India 

•  India’s 2017 ‘Preference to Make in India’ Order gives preference to local production of 
goods and services for a wide range of products on public procurement markets. The Order 
introduces classes of suppliers (Class I, Class II and non-local suppliers) depending on how 
much  local  content  these  suppliers  use  (50%  or  more,  below  50%  and  below  20%, 
respectively). Sensitive sectors such as railways or defence require the supplier to be Class 
I or II for a bid to be eligible. Greatest procurement priority is given to tender submissions 
with the highest percentage of local content, and the government may mandate technology 
transfers. In July 2024, the government revised public procurement rules to push the ‘Make 
in  India’  initiative  forward,  by  excluding  imported  inputs  from  the  calculation  of  local 
content  in  its  purchase  orders.  In  a  revision  to  the  2017  public  procurement  order,  the 
government clarified that procurement and supply of repackaged, refurbished or rebranded 
imported products must be treated as selling imported products. The most visible impact 
will be seen in government purchases of IT and other technology products.  

•  The  Department  of  Science  and  Technology  has  launched  a  ‘grand  challenge’  on  the 
development  of  standards  for  electric-vehicle  charging  infrastructure  to  help  develop  the 
local industry. In September 2024, the government announced a new revenue-sharing model 
between the government and the private sector, intended to make the installation of charging 
stations more financially viable. 

•  In January 2019, the Ministry of New & Renewable Energy issued the Approved Models 
and  Manufacturers  of  Solar  Photovoltaic  Modules  (Requirements  for  Compulsory 
Registration)  Order  and,  at  the  same  time,  it  published  a  list  of  approved  models  and 
manufacturers complying with the Bureau of Indian Standards. The list of manufacturers 
was updated in 2023, with a stated capacity of 22 389 MW and more than 70 manufacturers. 
The module models on the list  are only  eligible for use in  open access  and net  metering 

50 

 
 
 
 
projects along with government projects, government-assisted projects, and projects under 
various government schemes and programmes. In September 2024, an updated list of solar 
photovoltaic  modules  was  issued,  extending  the  list  of  models  eligible  for  government-
supported projects, and limiting non-listed imports, particularly from China. 

3.4 China 

•  China  applies  a  ‘buy  national’  policy,  with  a  few  exceptions.  Under  its  Government 
Procurement  Law,  China  applies  de  facto  market  access  barriers,  including  the  ‘buy 
national’ policy and ‘indigenous innovation’, which give preferential treatment to goods and 
services developed locally. In theory, foreign companies investing in China are to be treated 
like domestic companies, but in practice, domestic companies are preferred.  

•  The dual circulation strategy (2020) calls for relying principally on China’s large domestic 
market  and  leveraging/building  its  strengths,  including  comprehensive  and  deep  supply 
chains. Economic exchanges with the rest of the world are also encouraged, not discouraged, 
but ‘domestic circulation’ must be able to function autonomously in case of problems with 
foreign supplies. 

•  The Medium- and Long-term Science, Technology and Innovation Development Plan 
(2006-2020)  directs  government  agencies  to  buy  products  listed  in  certain  procurement 
catalogues, which include only ‘indigenous innovation’ products (with few exceptions). The 
MLP (2021-2035 was announced, but it has not been released or implemented yet. 

•  The government promotes the consolidation of Chinese rare-earth and metal companies into 
a handful of big groups per sector, often state-owned or state-led. The stated purpose of this 
policy  is  to  increase  these  companies’  bargaining  power  on  international  markets  and  to 
modernise the sector. 

3.5 Japan 

•  Under the Economic Security Promotion Act (ESPA) (2022), the government designates 
critical, core and sensitive infrastructure in 14 sectors including aviation, railways, gas, oil, 
etc. If a business operator owning designated infrastructure is selected as a core/important 
operator  by  the  ministers  in  charge  (not  all  operators),  the  government  has  the  right  to 
pre-screen  any  projects  in  these  sectors,  recommend  remedies  and  potentially  order 
operators to change suppliers or abandon transactions.  

3.6 United Kingdom 

•  The UK has recently updated its public procurement rules with the introduction of the 2023 
Procurement Act. This Act received Royal Assent in October 2023 and is set to come into 
effect  on  24 February 2025.  It  envisages  new  economic  security  powers  that  make  it 
possible  to  bar/exclude  companies  from  procurement  competitions  on  national  security 
grounds. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Republic of Korea 

•  On  27 February 2023,  the  government  announced  its  renewed  strategy  on  critical 
minerals for businesses. The aim is to help mitigate Korea’s reliance on imports from a 
few selected countries and maximise utilisation of domestic mineral resources, helping 
to stabilise the supply chain. Under the new strategy, 33 critical minerals with a bearing 
on  economic  security  are  to  be  selected  and,  out  of  the  33,  10  strategic critical  minerals 
needed for stabilising the supply chain of chips and secondary batteries will be prioritised 
for intensive management. For the 10 strategic critical minerals, the government plans to 
cut,  by  2030,  its  dependency  on  imports  from  the  current  80%  to  50%  and  to  increase 
recycling  from  the  current  2%  to  20%.  Moreover,  to  provide  strategic  minerals  for  the 
industry,  Korea  Mine  Rehabilitation  and  Mineral  Resources  Corporation  is  currently 
carrying out 18 overseas projects in different stages of development, which include projects 
relating to copper, cobalt, manganese, and zinc. 

3.8 Taiwan 

•  In  October  2024,  the  Industrial  Development  Administration  under  the  Ministry  of 
Economic Affairs  issued  ‘Guidelines  for  Determining  the  Localization  Supply  Chain 
Cooperation  Value  Ratio  for  Mainland  China  Vehicle  Models’,  further  tightening 
localisation  requirements  for  domestic  cars  with  components  imported  from  China.  By 
2026, locally manufactured vehicles with Chinese components will be required to achieve 
a  35%  localisation  ratio.  From  1 August 2024  onwards,  the  localisation  rate  must  reach 
20%, increasing to 30% by 1 August 2025, and exceeding 35% by 1 August 2026. Under 
Taiwan’s  regulations,  complete  vehicles  made  in  China  cannot  be  directly  imported. 
Currently, Chinese cars allowed for import must be assembled or produced by Taiwanese 
manufacturers. 

•  Since 2013, Taiwan has developed its offshore wind generation capability through public 
auctions. Since 2018, local content requirements have been obligatory for successful bids. 
Starting from November 2024, Taiwan is committing to introduce greater flexibility in the 
way winning projects in the latest auction are taken forward. 

4. Stockpiling of critical inputs 

4.1 United States 

•  In February 2022, the US Department of Energy, the US Department of Defense and the US 
Department  of  State  signed  a  memorandum  of  agreement  that  sets  the  foundation  for  a 
critical  mineral  stockpile  to  support  the  US’s  transition  to  clean  energy  and  national 
security needs. The Department of Defense, which manages the national defence stockpile, 
currently stockpiles critical minerals for national security purposes. The memorandum of 
agreement  creates  a  new,  inter-agency  process  for  stockpiling  minerals  that  enable  vital 
clean energy technologies. 

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4.2 Australia 

•  The Australian  government  committed  more  than AUD 8 million  (EUR 5 million)  in  the 
2023-2024  federal  budget  to  creating  a  national  emergency  management  stockpile 
(NEMS) to provide rapid access to critical emergency management goods and services to 
augment  state  and  territory  emergency  response  and  immediate  relief  capabilities.  The 
NEMS is comprised of three parts: (i) a national stockpile of Australian government-owned 
disaster goods and services, and a seasonal strategic reserve of single-use consumables; (ii) 
a standing offer panel to facilitate the procurement, management and deployment of critical 
goods and services in a crisis; and (iii) memoranda of understanding with other Australian 
government humanitarian and crisis response capabilities. The panel, launched in May 2024, 
will  run  for  3  years,  with  options  for  two  1-year  extensions.  The  panel  will  ensure  a 
continuous and reliable national stockpile of essential goods and services like emergency 
shelters, generators, and water purification systems, to assist state and territory emergency 
responses to communities impacted by disasters. 

•  Since  2021,  Australia  has  been  maintaining  a  national  medicine  stockpile  storing 
medications, vaccines, antidotes, and personal protective equipment to be used in case of 
supply chain disruptions in the health sector. 

4.3 China 

•  Through its National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, China stockpiles critical 
minerals,  including  aluminium,  cobalt,  copper,  rare-earth  elements,  and  zinc.  China 
stockpiles  minerals  to  safeguard  against  external  supply  disruptions,  procuring  these 
minerals from domestic producers and providing them with financial support. It is estimated 
that China stockpiles 1.5 million to 2 million tonnes of copper, 800 000-900 000 tonnes of 
aluminium,  and  250 000-400 000  tonnes  of  zinc.  China  is  also  believed  to  have  around 
7 000 tonnes of cobalt, a key metal used in battery manufacturing. The revised ‘Rare Earth 
Management  Regulations’  that  entered  into  force  in  October  2024  impose  ‘total  (state) 
quantity control over rare-earth mining and rare-earth smelting and separation’ (Article 10) 
as  well  as  over  exports  and  imports.  Furthermore,  the  state  is  to  improve  the  rare-earth 
reserve  system  by  combining  physical  reserves  with  reserves  at  mineral  deposits,  and 
combining government reserves with enterprise reserves (Article 14). 

4.4 Japan 

•  The  Japanese  Organization  for  Metals  and  Energy  Security  (JOGMEC)  operates  a 
national  stockpiling  system  of  rare  metals  to  secure  long-term  raw  material  supply. 
Stockpiles are sufficient to meet 60 to 180 days’ demand. In addition, under the planned 
revision  of  the  Mining Act,  Japan  is  to  restrict  access  to  rare-earth  resources  in  Japan’s 
exclusive  economic  zone  (offshore  deposits).  JOGMEC  emphasised  the  importance  of 
confidentiality in its stockpiling policy since it is a matter of national/economic/resource 
security. This acts also as a deterrent against potential coercive practices by third countries, 
especially in  the case of critical  raw material  (CRM) over-dependencies  on concentrated 
sources / limited suppliers. The less public the information is, the more difficult potential 
economic  coercion  becomes.  JOGMEC’s  stockpiling  plan  is  classified  as  it  includes 
information on selection of CRM, actual quantities required for each CRM, how/when to 

53 

 
 
 
 
purchase, release CRMs and conduct tests, the exact location of stockpiling facilities, how 
stocks  are  managed,  etc. The  JOGMEC Act  also  includes  confidentiality  obligations  for 
companies participating in the stockpiling. 

•  As  part  of  its  Economic  Security  Promotion  Act  (ESPA),  the  Japanese  government 
announced,  in  2023,  the  creation  of  a  ‘strategic  surplus  LNG’  system  to  ensure  that 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) is secured on a sustainable basis by utilising the procurement 
capabilities of companies. The surplus LNG secured will be sold on overseas markets in 
normal times and to domestic operators in times of emergency. 

4.5 Republic of Korea 

•  The Republic of Korea has a state-run reserve management and stockpiling of critical raw 
materials at  national  level.  Under the Ministry of Trade,  Industry and Energy, the state-
owned KOMIR (Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation), launched 
in September 2021, implements the government’s strategies and policies pertinent to raw 
materials. It also promotes foreign investment in overseas resource development. Moreover, 
under the strategy on critical minerals released in February 2023, the stockpile of critical 
minerals has been increased in order to suffice for 100 days, up from 54 days. Furthermore, 
the  government  has  allocated  KRW 28.3 billion  (EUR 20 million)  for  the  stockpiling  of 
cobalt in 2023. 

4.6 Singapore 

•  Since 1990, particularly in the field of food, the government can use its discretionary power 
to  ensure  a  minimum  quantity  of  private  stockpiles,  which  need  to  be  maintained  for  a 
stipulated period (such as under the Rice Stockpile Scheme). Given its exposure to imports 
from Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore has stockpiles of food to prevent crises. To affect 
negotiations with overseas suppliers, the presence of the stockpiles is known, but not the 
actual  numbers.  Singapore  maintains  a  national  stockpile  of  two  other  essential  items: 
granite used in  construction,  and personal  protective equipment,  including masks, drugs, 
and medical supplies, following outbreaks of SARS in 2003 and H1N1 in 2009. 

4.7 United Kingdom 

•  As part of the Critical Imports and Supply Chains Strategy launched in January 2024, 
the  UK  government  has  committed  to  ensuring  the  reliable  supply  of  essential  goods. 
Stockpiling  critical  goods  is  among  the  key  measures  outlined  in  the  strategy  to  ensure 
resilient supply chains and safeguard critical import figures. In order to mitigate the impact 
of global supply chain  disruptions,  the government  is  thus  working  to  maintain  strategic 
reserves of critical goods. 

•  The  UK  has  been  creating  strategic  reserves  of  water  treatment  chemicals,  monitoring 

stockpiles of chemicals and exploring stockpile requirements (2023). 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
5. Trade, and investment measures: tariffs, export restrictions, anti-coercion measures, FDI 
control, etc. 

5.1 United States 

•  In October 2024, the US Department of Commerce announced anti-subsidy countervailing 
duties on solar cells imported from Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Thailand. This 
announcement marked the first of two preliminary decisions expected from the Department 
of Commerce in 2024 in a trade case relating to solar cell imports from Southeast Asia. The 
case  started  with  an  anti-dumping/countervailing  duty  petition  filed  by  the  American 
Alliance for Solar Manufacturing Trade Committee. The Department of Commerce noted 
that  imports  of  solar  cells,  whether  or  not  assembled  into  solar  panels,  from  these  four 
countries have increased because of unfair foreign subsidies, thus warranting the need for a 
countervailing duty. The preliminary countervailing duty ranges from less than 1% to nearly 
300%. 

•  In September 2024, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
published  a  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  (NPRM)  that  would  prohibit  the  sale  or 
import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those 
components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to China and Russia, hence designed, 
developed, manufactured or supplied by entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the 
jurisdiction or direction  of China or Russia. This  rule  focuses  on hardware and software 
integrated into vehicle connectivity systems and software integrated into automated driving 
systems,  both  being  the  critical  systems  enabling  external  connectivity  and  autonomous 
driving capabilities in connected vehicles. The proposed rule would apply to all wheeled on-
road vehicles, but not to those used on public roads; its prohibitions on software would take 
effect for model year 2027 and those on hardware for model year 2030 (or January 2029 for 
units without a model year). The proposed rule is implemented under the information and 
communications technology and services authorities of the Bureau of Industry and Security, 
as provided by Executive Order 13873 ‘Securing the Information and Communications 
Technology and Services Supply Chain’ (issued in May 2019).  

•  In September 2024, the US House of Representatives passed the bipartisan BIOSECURE 
Act  preventing  executive  agencies  from  entering  into  contracts  with  entities  using 
biotechnologies  equipment  or  services  from  a  ‘biotechnology  company  of  concern’, 
referring  to  companies  headquartered  in  or  controlled  by  the  government  of  a  foreign 
adversary,  which  poses  a  national  security  risk.  The  ‘foreign  adversaries’  include  North 
Korea, China, Russia and Iran. Indeed, the identified companies include specific Chinese 
biotech contractors. The Act, introduced in January 2024, contains an amendment allowing 
existing  contracts  to  continue  until  January  2032,  providing  some  leeway  for  ongoing 
operations. 

•  In June 2024, the Treasury Department issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) 
to implement Executive Order 14105 (‘Addressing United States Investments in Certain 
National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern’ of August 2023, also 
known as the ‘Outbound Order’). The Outbound Order sets out a process for setting up a 
new  national  security  programme  to  address  threats  posed  by  certain  US  outbound 
investments in countries of concern (including China). The proposed rule prohibits covered 
transactions in quantum information, computers and components and some transactions in 
semiconductors,  microelectronics,  and  artificial-intelligence  systems  (while  other 
transactions in these areas are subject only to a notification requirement). An exemption is 

55 

 
 
adopted  for  transactions  involving  people  in  third  countries  that  have  similar  measures 
aimed at outbound investment, so this is a sort of equivalency programme. 

•  In May 2024, following the statutory review of the tariff actions (initiated in 2022) in the 
‘Section  301  investigation’  of  China’s  acts,  policies  and  practices  related  to  technology 
transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, the US President announced to increase tariffs 
on  an  additional  USD 18 billion  (EUR 17 billion)  in  Chinese  goods  imposing  certain 
modifications, some of which effective starting from 2024 while others from 2025 and 2026 
to  give  importers  time  to  identify  alternative  suppliers.  In  September  2024,  issuing  the 
corresponding  notice,  the  United  States  Trade  Representative  announced  the  final 
adjustments  to  Section  301,  largely  upholding  the  proposed  changes  but  making  several 
adjustments  regarding  rates  and  implementation  timelines,  as  well  as  introducing  new 
exclusions.  

•  In July 2024, the US re-imposed Section 232 duties on any steel products or derivatives 
from Mexico that are melted and poured in a country other than Mexico, the US or Canada, 
as part of the measures taken by US and Mexico to strengthen the North American steel and 
aluminium  supply  chains  (Mexico,  US,  Canada)  and  protect  it  from  unfair  trade.  On 
aluminium,  the  new  smelt/cast  requirement  is  more  flexible,  in  that  the  US  will  reapply 
Section 232 duties only where the ‘reported primary country of smelt, secondary country of 
smelt, or country of most recent cast’ is China, Russia, Belarus or Iran. At the moment, any 
article containing aluminium smelted or cast in Russia is already subject to a 200% tariff; 
this higher duty rate continues to apply to anything produced in Mexico that has Russian 
origin. 

•  The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 allows the US government to enact controls on 
exports, re-exports and transfers of emerging and foundational technologies if they could be 
used  to  threaten  the  national  security  of  the  US  or  if  they  give  a  qualitative  military  or 
intelligence advantage to the US. Some 14 emerging technologies are identified, including 
biotech, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors. 

•  The Defense Production Act (DPA) (1950) sets up the Committee on Foreign Investment 
in  the  United  States.  The  committee  can  review  foreign  investments  and  real  estate 
transactions by foreign persons in the US if these investments could present a risk to national 
security. It can also impose conditions on such acquisitions or refer the case to the President 
for decision. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK are exempted from review by the 
committee, but the EU is not. 

5.2 United Kingdom 

•  On  March  2024,  the  UK  government  issued  new  amending  regulations,  i.e.  the  Export 
Control (Amendment) Regulations 2024, which update the Export Control Order 2008 
and  the  retained  EU-Dual  Use  Regulation,  and  introduce  new  export  controls  related  to 
emerging technologies, including quantum, cryogenic and semiconductor technologies as 
well as additive manufacturing equipment and advanced materials. These came into force 
in April 2024. 

•  In  March  2023,  the  UK  launched  a  new  economic  deterrence  initiative  to  boost  its 
diplomatic  and  economic  tools  to  respond  to  and  deter  hostile  acts.  With  up  to 
GBP 50 million  (EUR 60 million)  of  funding  over  2 years,  the  initiative  is  intended  to 
improve sanction implementation and enforcement. On outbound investments, the UK is 
working to develop the evidence base to enable it to assess the potential national security 

56 

 
 
 
risks posed by outward direct investment and best calibrate its action to respond effectively 
to them. 

•  The  National  Security  and  Investment  Act  (2021)  sets  up  a  foreign  direct  investment 
screening  regime  with  mandatory  notifications  to  the  government  for  acquisitions  in  17 
‘most  sensitive’  economic  sectors,  including  defence,  communications,  and  energy.  The 
government can review and potentially block acquisitions if they risk undermining the UK’s 
national security. 

5.3 Australia 

•  Reforms  of  the  Foreign  Investment  Review  Board  (FIRB)  in  2020  introduced  a 
mandatory notification procedure for acquisitions connected to ‘national security business’ 
or  ‘national  security  land’  or  linked  to  critical  infrastructure  (i.e.  15  sectors  including 
electricity,  gas,  water,  ports,  healthcare,  and  cloud  services).  The  government  can  order 
divestment or prohibit the acquisition if it finds that it could present risks to national security. 
Since January 2021, with the implementation of an updated foreign investment regime, the 
government’s focus has firmly been on national security and compliance. The FIRB may 
require businesses to take action, including in matters relating to governance, location of 
senior  management,  listing  requirements,  market  competition  and  pricing  of  goods  and 
services  (e.g.  that  all  offtake  arrangements  must  be  on  arm’s-length  terms)  and  other 
industry-specific matters.  

5.4 India 

•  In  July  2024,  the  Indian  government  proposed  to  fully  exempt  25  critical  minerals 
(including rare-earth metals) from customs duties and reduce the basic custom duty on two 
of them. Zero duty was proposed for copper, gallium, germanium, hafnium, indium, lithium, 
molybdenum, niobium, nickel, potash, rare earths, rhenium, strontium, tantalum, tellurium, 
tin, tungsten, vanadium, zirconium, selenium, cadmium, silicon other than quartz and silicon 
dioxide. Currently, the customs duty for these 25 minerals varies between 5% and 7.5%. 
•  In October 2023, India launched a new online authorisation system for imports of laptops, 
tablets,  and  personal  computers  to  monitor  the  quantity  of  imports  and  where  they 
originate  from.  The  government  may  ask  importers  of  laptops,  servers,  and  other  IT 
hardware to provide an international certification attesting that their product is from a trusted 
source before allowing a licence-free import of it. In response to US concerns raised at the 
WTO Committee on Import Licensing, India stated that the import monitoring system aimed 
to  ensure  supply  chain  resilience  and  address  national  security  concerns.  India  also 
announced that it had no intention of expanding the applicable list of items. In September 
2024, the Indian government announced that companies would need to seek fresh approvals 
for the import of laptops and tablets starting from 1 January 2025. 

•  With effect from April 2022, the Indian government imposed a basic customs duty on the 
import  of  solar  photovoltaic  cells  and  solar  photovoltaic  modules  of  25%  and  40%, 
respectively. The aim is to reduce the influx of imported photovoltaic cells and modules and 
increase  the  domestic  manufacturing.  The  Indian  government  temporarily  relaxed  these 
rules,  but  then  reintroduced  strict  restrictions  on  solar  panel  imports,  effective  from 
1 April 2024. Since 1 April 2024, projects commissioned in India can only use panels from 
suppliers on an ‘approved list’, which currently excludes all overseas manufacturers. 

57 

 
 
 
 
•  India revised its foreign direct investment policy in 2020 to make foreign acquisitions of 
Indian companies more difficult. In particular, companies from countries that share a border 
with India must undergo a security analysis before an acquisition can go through. However, 
the  Indian  government  may  decide  to  scrutinise  acquisitions  by  any  foreign  entity.  The 
Indian government has published for guidance a list of sensitive sectors in which it is likely 
to  scrutinise  acquisitions, 
telecommunication,  satellites  – 
establishment and operation, private security agencies, defence, civil aviation and mining 
and mineral separation of titanium-bearing minerals and ores. 

including  broadcasting, 

5.5 China 

•  The  Export  Control  Law  (2020)  is  China’s  primary  piece  of  legislation  for  restricting 
exports of goods and technology for reasons of national security and public policy. Export 
controls of concern are numerous, but include those on antimony, rare earths (including their 
processing technologies), urea, gallium and germanium, drones and graphite.  

•  The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted and Prohibited for Export (2002), which does 
not fall under the Export Control Law, but instead under the Foreign Trade Law, additionally 
restricts the export of technologies. The legal basis for adding technology to the catalogue 
is  broad,  ranging  from  national  security  to  compliance  with  any  Chinese  legislation.  It 
includes, in particular, technologies for processing rare earths, including the production of 
rare-earth magnets, a key input to the green and digital transitions used in electric vehicles, 
robotics and wind turbines. A revised version of the catalogue was issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology in December 2023, resulting in 134 
controlled items to date. 

•  The  Foreign  Investment  Information  Reporting  System  centralises  information 
submitted by all foreign companies investing in China, collected at province level, to enable 
the Ministry of Commerce to have a clear picture of overall foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in  China.  Moreover,  the  Foreign  Investment  Law  (2020)  gives  discretion  to  local 
authorities  to  block  any FDI.  It  also  includes  a  negative  list  of  sectors  published  by  the 
Ministry of Commerce in which FDI is prohibited or severely restricted, though the list is 
regularly revised and generally shortened. The revised negative list for foreign investment 
was  released  in  September  2024,  to  enter  into  force  on  1 November.  The  Ministry  of 
Commerce pointed to a reduction in the number of sectors with FDI restrictions from 31 to 
29, as well as  to  the fact that  there are  zero  restrictions for manufacturing. The law also 
includes  an  Encouraged  Activities  List  of  sectors  in  which  incentives  are  provided. 
Additionally,  the  law  includes  a  national  security  review  for  any  FDI  that  may  affect 
national  security.  The  review  is  triggered  by  any  acquisition  in  sectors  such  as  major 
agricultural  products,  major  energy  and  resource  products,  infrastructure,  transportation 
services, key technologies, and key equipment manufacturing.  

•  In November 2023, China added rare earths to the Catalogue of Energy and Resource 
Products Subject to Export Reporting requiring exporters to report information such as 
the  place  of  origin,  contract  date,  quality,  loading  and  arrival  information,  and  customs 
arrival  port. At  the  same  time,  crude  oil,  iron  ore,  copper  concentrate  and  potassium 
fertiliser were also added to the Catalogue of Energy and Resource Products Subject 
to Import Reporting. The China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Minerals 
and  Chemicals  is  responsible  for  collecting,  organising,  summarising,  analysing  and 
verifying the reported information. 

58 

 
 
 
•  Data protection rules such as the Data Security Law, the Personal Information Protection 
Law (2021) and the Measures for Security Assessment for Cross-Border Data Transfers 
(2022) restrict the flow of data out of China. 

5.6 Japan 

•  On 24 April 2024, Japan published an update of its Economic Security Action Plan with a 
number  of  policy  measures  strengthening  its  conventional  export  control  regime, 
introducing a novel technology transfer catch-all control system for specific cutting-edge 
technologies. This will be based on increased engagement and information sharing with the 
industry  and  strengthening  of  the  government’s  analytical  capabilities  in  the  area  of 
economic  security.  According  to  the  revised  action  plan,  Japan  also  aims  to  take  a 
technology-based  approach  to  risk  analysis  and  management  in  the  area  of  economic 
security,  and  to  strengthen  its  strategic  engagement  with  the  industry.  The  Ministry  of 
Economy, Trade  and  Industry  has  thus  categorised  ‘key  materials  and  technologies’  into 
three categories:  

(1) areas of ‘disruptive technological innovation’ (that should be a priority for R&D 

support);  

(2) areas where Japan has technological superiority (where technologies need to be 

protected); and  

(3) areas of increased dependence on foreign countries (commoditised technologies 
like  electric  vehicles,  legacy  chips,  to  manage  interdependencies  and  protect 
markets). 

•  In June 2023, the government of Japan expanded the sectoral coverage of its inbound foreign 
direct  investment  screening  to  cover  all  11  materials  designated  as  ‘specified  critical 
materials’ under the Economic Security Promotion Act. 

5.7 Taiwan 

•  The National Security Act (amended in June 2022) aims to prevent the leakage of national 
key technologies. The Act imposes fines of up to TWD 100 million (approx. EUR 3 million) 
and imprisonment for up to 12 years for the illegal transfer of national key technologies. In 
December 2023, Taiwanese authorities issued the critical technologies list (implemented 
as part of the National Security Act) that designates 22 technologies believed to be Taiwan’s 
leading  technologies  requiring  immediate  protection.  On  1 November 2024,  Taiwan 
announced  its  plan  to  add  10  new  technology  items  and  their  respective  regulatory 
authorities, covering the fields of space, quantum technology, semiconductors, and energy.  
•  In  June  2022,  authorities  amended  the  Regulations  Governing  the  Approval  of 
Investment or Technical Cooperation in Mainland China, which now require Taiwanese 
firms to obtain approval if they plan to sell their local assets and factories or transfer their 
equities in China, to avoid the risk of technology leakage. 

•  Stricter administrative rules issued in 2022 on foreign direct investment screening aim to 
prevent circumvention by firms from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These rules 
follow changes made in 2021 to tighten the definition of a ‘PRC investor’ so that a third-
area company can also be defined as such. 

•  The  Foreign  Trade Act  (2019)  provides  the  legal  basis  for  managing  Taiwan’s  export 
control  regime  and  the  trade  in  strategic  high-tech  commodities. The  strategic  high-tech 

59 

 
 
 
 
commodity entity list currently includes over 7 000 items, for which Taiwanese exporters 
must obtain an export licence from the International Trade Administration of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs of Taiwan. 

6. International partnerships 

BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS  

6.1 United States 

•  US-Norway: On 30 September 2024, the US Secretary of State and the Norwegian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs signed the Memorandum of Cooperation on High-standard, Market-
Oriented Trade of Critical Minerals, which aims to secure the critical mineral and clean 
energy  supply  chains  of  the  US  and  Norway.  The  memorandum  thus  formalises  the 
countries’ intent to advance high labour and environmental standards while maintaining and 
identifying appropriate responses to non-market policies and practices in third countries. 
•  US-Argentina: On 23 August 2024, as part of the US-Argentina Energy Security Dialogue, 
the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and 
the  Argentine  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  signed  a  memorandum  of  understanding  to 
strengthen  cooperation  between  the  US  and Argentina  on  critical  minerals.  It  aims  to 
promote trade in critical minerals and investment in critical mineral resource exploration, 
extraction,  processing,  refining,  recycling  and  recovery,  in  line  with  the counties’  shared 
interest in energy transition and deploying clean energy technologies. It sets the direction 
for further collaboration on sector governance, investment, and global supply chain security 
in the area of critical mineral resources. 

•  US-Peru:  On  29 August 2024,  the  US  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Economic  Growth, 
Energy,  and  the  Environment  and  the  Peruvian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  signed  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  to  strengthen  cooperation  between  the  US  and  Peru  on 
critical  minerals.  In  line  with  the  two  countries’  common  interest  in  diversifying  and 
securing  global  critical  mineral  supply  chains,  this  memorandum  sets  the  direction  for 
further collaboration on sector governance, investment, and global supply chain security in 
the area of critical mineral resources. 

•  US-India: During the Trade Policy Forum held in New Delhi from 12 to 14 January 2024, 
both parties committed to launch future joint initiatives in areas including critical minerals, 
customs and trade facilitation, supply chains and trade in high-tech products. The parties 
agreed to set up a Joint Facilitative Mechanism to mitigate non-tariff barriers and enter 
into mutual recognition agreements on a bilateral basis wherever possible. 

•  US-India: On 3 October 2024, the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry and the US 
Secretary  of  Commerce  signed  a  memorandum  of  understanding  on  critical  raw 
materials  aiming  to  keep  supply  chains  open  and  foster  collaboration  between  India’s 
Ministry  of  Mines  and  the  US  government.  During  its  visit  to  Washington,  the  Indian 
Minister of Commerce also co-chaired the sixth meeting of the India-US CEO Forum. The 
two countries discussed opportunities for American investment in 20 of India’s upcoming 
industrial cities to foster mutual growth besides prospects to collaborate in critical sectors 
such as defence, space, semiconductors, telecoms, artificial intelligence, and clean energy. 

60 

 
 
  
  
•  US-UK: On 8 June 2023, the two countries announced the intention to negotiate a bilateral 
critical  minerals  agreement.  President  Biden  and  Prime  Minister  Sunak  said  that  this 
targeted agreement will ensure that five critical minerals necessary for batteries  – cobalt, 
graphite, lithium, manganese and nickel – that are extracted or processed in the UK count 
towards  the  sourcing  requirements  for  clean  vehicles  eligible  for  the  Section  30D  clean 
vehicle tax credit of the Inflation Reduction Act. In May 2024, senior officials representing 
the US and the UK governments met at the White House to discuss progress and next steps 
since  the  June  2023 Atlantic  Declaration  for  a  Twenty-First  Century  US-UK  Economic 
Partnership. Officials discussed how to advance efforts to build resilient clean energy supply 
chains, including how to advance negotiations towards a critical minerals agreement. 

•  US-Australia: In May 2023, Australia and the US signed the Compact on Critical Minerals 
and  Clean  Energy.  The  inaugural  meeting  of  the  Australia-US  Taskforce  on  Critical 
Minerals that arose from the compact took place on 2 October 2023. The task force aims to 
expand reliable, responsible and secure global access to critical minerals. 

•  US-Canada: In March 2023, the US and Canada announced the Energy Transformation 
Task Force to coordinate the countries’ efforts on critical clean energy technologies and the 
related supply chains, including critical raw materials. The task force’s stated function is to 
‘accelerate cooperation on critical clean energy opportunities and supply chains, including 
but not limited to, securing and strengthening renewable energy and electric-vehicle supply 
chains,  critical  minerals  and  rare  earths,  grid  integration  and  resilience,  advanced  and 
conventional  nuclear  energy  and  other  areas’. The  task  force  is  to  be  chaired  by  the  US 
Special  Presidential  Coordinator  for  Global  Infrastructure  and  Canada’s  Deputy  Prime 
Minister.  

•  US-India: In March 2023, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on 
setting up a semiconductor supply chain and innovation partnership. This will seek to 
create  a  collaborative  mechanism  on  semiconductor  supply  chain  resilience  and 
diversification, in  line with the US’s  CHIPS and Science Act  and India’s  Semiconductor 
Mission.  The  memorandum  also  aims  to  leverage  the  complementary  strengths  of  both 
countries  and  facilitate  commercial  opportunities  and  development  of  semiconductor 
innovation  ecosystems.  It  also  envisages  mutually  beneficial  R&D,  talent,  and  skill 
development. 

•  US-Japan: On 28 March 2023, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement on critical 
minerals. The  agreement  is  expected  to  make  Japanese  companies  eligible  for  Inflation 
Reduction Act subsidies. It covers five critical raw materials used in electric-vehicle supply 
chains (cobalt, graphite, lithium, manganese and nickel), and aims to maintain the current 
practices of not imposing import and export limitations while safeguarding environmental 
and labour rights. It will be revised every 2 years. 

industrial  cooperation  dialogue  platform.  Under 

•  US-Republic  of  Korea:  In  May  2022,  the  two  countries  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding on setting up a ‘Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue’ and upgrading 
their  existing  working-level 
the 
memorandum, the two countries plan to hold an economic security dialogue between their 
respective national security councils once a year and discuss a wide range of industry and 
economic issues, including resilient supply chains of semiconductors and other high-tech 
items, the digital economy, healthcare technologies and exports control. They also agreed to 
boost  cooperation  on  R&D,  and  create  more  business  opportunities.  On  the  occasion  of 
President Yoon’s attendance at the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San 
Francisco,  US  companies  GM,  DuPont,  IMC  and  Ecolab  committed  to  invest  in  the 
Republic of Korea. 

61 

 
 
6.2 Canada 

•  Canada-Republic of Korea: Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 
has facilitated the signing of memoranda of understanding between LG Energy and several 
Canadian companies to strengthen cooperation on critical mineral supply chains. These 
memoranda will help Korean companies to develop new supply chains in North America 
for  secondary  batteries  and  electric  vehicles,  particularly  in  conjunction  with  the  US 
Inflation Reduction Act.  

•  Canada-Republic  of  Korea:  In  July  2024,  both  countries  agreed  to  an  action  plan  to 
deepen  their  bilateral  relationship  and  implement  the  Canada-Korea  Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership (CSP). The action plan joins together the CSP with the Indo-Pacific 
strategies to build towards a stronger friendship. It builds on the achievements of the CSP 
since September 2022 and expands on each of its thematic areas (such as regional security, 
economy, technology, supply chains, health and climate change) with aspirational initiatives 
to  work  together  as  partners  in  the  Indo-Pacific  and  North  Pacific. A  bilateral  strategic 
dialogue between senior officials will review the implementation of the action plan on an 
annual basis. 

6.3 United Kingdom 

•  UK-Indonesia:  In  September  2024,  the  UK  signed  a  strategic  partnership  on  critical 
minerals with the Indonesian Ministry for Energy and Mineral Resources. Recognising the 
pivotal  role  that  critical  minerals  play  in  the  global  energy  transition,  both  countries 
committed to setting up a cooperative framework that strengthens collaboration on critical 
minerals  as  well  as  a  robust  policy  framework  that  promotes  environmental,  social  and 
governance practices in the sector. The partnership intends to facilitate policy dialogues and 
the sharing of technical knowledge, skills and expertise, encompassing key areas such as 
supply chain resilience and security, sustainable upstream and downstream processing, and 
mineral criticality.  

•  UK-Republic of Korea: On 22 November 2023, the UK and the Republic of Korea signed 
the Downing Street Accord to broaden the scope of their bilateral economic cooperation to 
areas such as science and technology, supply chain security, and energy solidarity – focusing 
on high-tech industries. In February 2022, the two countries signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding on Critical Supply Chain Resilience, calling for holding both senior-level 
and  working-level  talks  on  a  regular  basis  to  exchange  policy  measures  and  information 
regarding supply chain issues, and to promote two-way investment and trade.  

•  UK-Taiwan: On 14 November 2023, the UK and Taiwan announced an enhanced trade 
partnership  focused  on  three  priority  areas:  (i)  investment;  (ii)  digital  trade;  and  (iii) 
renewable energy and net zero. The two partners agreed to cooperate on green trade by 
developing energy infrastructure, supporting offshore wind deployment in Taiwan through 
the development of port capacity and financing models, and improving health and safety 
implementation. Additionally, they agreed to collaborate in emerging energy technologies, 
to  seek  to  remove  barriers  to  trade  in  environmental  goods  and  services,  and  to  work 
bilaterally to build a circular economy, develop skills and share best practice. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
•  UK-Japan:  At  the  G7  Trade  Ministers’  Meeting  in  Osaka  (28 October 2023),  the  UK 
Secretary of State for Business and Trade and the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry signed a memorandum of cooperation setting up a new partnership on critical 
minerals. The  memorandum  delivers  on  a  specific  commitment  made  by  leaders  in  the 
Hiroshima Accord. It will provide a framework for deepening critical mineral cooperation 
between the two countries and promote dialogue on a range of areas including: research and 
innovation, critical mineral data and traceability, industry partnerships and public-private 
cooperation,  infrastructure  projects  in  third  countries,  cooperation  to  support  developing 
producer countries, and cooperation on technical standards and environmental, social and 
governance standards.  

•  UK-India: Both sides launched the Technology Security Initiative, which sets out a new 
approach  to  collaboration  in  critical  and  emerging  technologies  across  priority  sectors 
including  telecoms,  critical  materials,  semiconductors,  artificial  intelligence,  quantum, 
biotech and advanced materials. The initiative seeks to build upon the ambitious cooperation 
agenda set out in the India-UK Roadmap for 2030. 

•  UK-South Africa: In November 2022, the two countries announced a new partnership on 
minerals for future clean energy technologies to promote increased responsible exploration, 
production and processing of minerals in South Africa and southern Africa. 

•  UK-Canada: In March 2023, the two countries announced a new partnership to increase 
their cooperation on the supply of critical raw materials. This new UK-Canada Critical 
Minerals Supply Chains Dialogue has the stated objective of integrating the critical raw 
material  supply  chains  of  Canada  and  the  UK,  driving  higher  environment,  social  and 
governance standards, and boosting R&D in the field.  

•  UK-developing  countries:  In  November  2022,  the  government  announced  over 
GBP 65 million (EUR 78 million) of investment to help speed up the development of 
new  green  technologies.  This  pledge  will  go  towards  a  large-scale  industry  transition 
programme, managed by the Climate Investment Funds (to which the UK has committed up 
to  GBP 1 billion  (EUR 1.2 billion)  through  the  Ayrton  Fund),  to  help  energy-intensive 
industries  in  developing  economies  –  including  India  and  Indonesia  –  to  go  green. This 
comes  on  top  of  a  further  GBP 65.5 million  (EUR 78.7 million)  for  the  Clean  Energy 
Innovation  Facility,  which  provides  grants  to  researchers  and  scientists  to  accelerate  the 
development of innovative clean energy technologies in developing countries. 

•  UK-Australia:  In  February  2022,  the  UK  and  Australia  set  up  a  capability  building 
initiative for supply chain resilience to help develop shared understanding of and insight 
about common dependencies and critical supply chain risks. Its aim is to engage interested 
countries in developing and improving public-sector approaches to managing critical supply 
chain risks. The initiative will begin with a pilot project to further determine its scope.  
•  UK-Australia: A working group on critical minerals was set up in 2021. Australia and the 
UK are continuing to identify investment opportunities that would bolster Australia’s critical 
mineral sector and the UK’s manufacturing and energy ambitions. 

6.4 Australia 

•  Australia-India:  In  June  2022,  the  two  countries  concluded  a  bilateral  commercial 
cooperation agreement on rare-earth elements to strengthen supply chains between the two 
countries in the related sectors.  

63 

 
 
 
•  Australia-Republic of Korea: In December 2021, the two countries signed a memorandum 
of understanding on cooperation on critical mineral supply chains to further strengthen 
cooperation on resources and energy. This builds on previous commitments outlined in their 
2019 memorandum of understanding on cooperation on energy and mineral resources. 
•  Australia-Singapore: The two countries launched the Australia-Asia Sun Cable project in 
2022. The goal is to develop physical interconnections between Singapore and Australia’s 
electric grids, and to increase Singapore’s access to green electricity via massive investment 
in solar farms in Australia. 

6.5 India 

•  India-United  Arab  Emirates:  In  September  2024,  India  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  with  the  United  Arab  Emirates  on  cooperation  on  critical  minerals 
exploration in third countries. Work will focus on project identification, conducting joint 
due diligence, collaborating on risk management strategies, and develop a long-term offtake 
strategy.  

•  India-Singapore:  In  September  2024,  the  two  countries  signed  a  new  memorandum  of 

understanding on cooperation on semiconductors. 

•  India-US: In September 2024, the Indian Prime Minister signed a partnership on the global 

semiconductor ecosystem with the US Department of State. 

•  India-Japan: In September 2023, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding 
on semiconductor design, manufacturing,  equipment research, and talent  development  to 
bring resilience to the semiconductors supply chain. 

6.6 Japan 

•  Japan-Peru:  In  November  2024,  in  the  margins  of  the  2024  Asia-Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation summit, the two countries signed a joint statement accompanied by a 10-year 
roadmap  and  an  updated  memorandum  of  cooperation  between  Japan’s  Ministry  of 
Economy,  Trade  and  Industry,  the  Japan  Organization  for  Metals  and  Energy  Security 
(JOGMEC) and the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM). This memorandum 
is intended to intensify cooperation on energy transition and mining technology between the 
two countries. As specified in the text of the roadmap, it entails joint promotion by JOGMEC 
and MINEM of information exchange and technical cooperation, and special emphasis is 
placed on opportunities related to critical minerals. 

•  Japan–New  Zealand:  In  June  2024,  Japan  and  New  Zealand  agreed  in  principle  on  an 
Information Security Agreement  (ISA). Under  the ISA framework, both countries will 
share classified information on Chinese cyberattacks and their military movements in the 
region. Japan and New Zealand will also intensify joint military training to deter China’s 
maritime  expansion.  They  will  strengthen  cooperation  in  economic  security,  addressing 
economic coercion and increasing supply chain resilience. 

•  Japan-Malaysia: In May 2024, Japan and Malaysia agreed to collaborate in several areas, 
including decarbonisation, digitalisation, cybersecurity capabilities, and economic security 
to strengthen supply chains. Moreover, both countries will cooperate in addressing issues 
such as the situation in the East and South China Seas, and North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
development.  

64 

 
 
 
 
•  Japan-United Arab  Emirates:  On  17 July 2023,  on  the  margins  of  a  state  visit  by  the 
Japanese Prime Minister, leading to 23 bilateral agreements on strategic technologies and 
critical  raw  materials,  Japan  and  the  United Arab  Emirates  signed  a  memorandum  of 
understanding for the supply of clean iron and steel, entailing the development ofa joint 
framework  for  collaboration  on  logistics  and  digital  supply  chain  requirements  and 
information  and  expertise  sharing  on  industry  best  practice.  Abu  Dhabi  Ports  will  be 
responsible for providing the land for a new plant, in the KEZAD Musaffah economic zone. 
It will also offer maritime and logistics services for the supply of iron ore to the plant, and 
the export of the materials around the world. Emirates Steel Arkan will provide ‘extensive 
decarbonisation  expertise’  and  use  clean  and  green  energy  sources,  including  solar  and 
hydrogen, to power the plant. 

•  Japan-Brazil: In May 2024, the two countries endorsed a joint statement entitled ‘Further 
Strengthening  the  Brazil-Japan  Strategic  and  Global  Partnership’,  which,  among  other 
things,  stressed  the  need  to  work  together  in  building  transparent,  diverse,  secure, 
sustainable  and  reliable  supply  chains  to  reduce  vulnerabilities  in  strategic  areas  and  to 
ensure  stable  production  activities.  The  statement  also  welcomed  the  signing  of  the 
memorandum  of  cooperation  between  the  Brazilian  Ministry  of  Development,  Industry, 
Trade  and  Services  and  the  Japanese  Ministry  of  Economy,  Trade  and  Industry  on  the 
Initiative for Brazil-Japan Industry Co-Creation. Moreover, the two countries endorsed an 
‘Initiative  on  Environment  Climate,  Sustainable  Developments  and  Resilient 
Economies’,  which,  in  particular:  (i)  stressed  their  commitment  to  achieve  net-zero 
emissions by 2050 and the need to  scale up investment  to  decarbonise automotive value 
chains, promote recycling and increase energy efficiency; (ii) expressed further support for 
utilising Japanese and Brazilian start-ups in the field of environmental cooperation; and (iii) 
recognised the importance of stimulating cooperation and investment in clean energy supply 
chains,  including  critical  raw  materials,  sustainable  aviation  fuel  and  low-emission 
hydrogen. 

•  Japan-Norway: In their Green Strategic Partnership Joint Communiqué of December 
2023,  Japan  and  Norway  reaffirmed  their  commitment  to  accelerate  the  clean  energy 
transition to achieve climate neutrality at the latest by 2050, and recognised the importance 
of promoting an efficient diversification of supply sources to improve energy security and 
affordability.  The  strategic  partnership  aims  to  ensure  well-functioning  and  resilient 
industrial  value  chains,  and  to  boost  trade  and  investment,  energy  security,  and  business 
cooperation,  including  on  innovation  and  R&D.  It  will  encompass  hydrogen,  ammonia, 
offshore wind, batteries, carbon capture, carbon utilisation and storage, carbon recycling, 
green transportation, raw and processed materials, and manufacturing. Japan and Norway 
will  also  exchange  information,  share  best  practice  on  standards,  regulations  and 
certification to expand demand and supply of low- and zero-emission goods and services, 
and cooperate in developing resilient value chains.  

6.7 Republic of Korea 

•  Republic of Korea-Peru: In November 2024, the two countries signed a memorandum of 
understanding  on  critical  minerals  to  strengthen  information  exchange,  joint  geological 
surveys and technological cooperation. 

•  Republic of Korea-Africa: On 4 June 2024, the President of the Republic of Korea hosted 
the Korea-Africa Summit attended by delegations from 48 African nations. The leaders 

65 

 
 
 
adopted a joint declaration on fostering mutually beneficial trade and investment, supporting 
Africa’s  industrialisation  and  the  creation  of  a  single  market,  strengthening  economic 
cooperation frameworks, developing and collaborating on smart, sustainable and resilient 
infrastructure  projects,  increasing  digital  technology  integration  across  sectors,  and 
developing  green  technologies.  The  Republic  of  Korea  signed  12  agreements  and  34 
memoranda of understanding, in particular: 

o  agreements with Madagascar and Tanzania to cooperate on critical minerals 
essential for industries like batteries – this includes a commitment to set up a 
high-level dialogue to ensure a stable supply chain for these minerals; and 
o  agreements  to  expand  the  Economic  Development  Cooperation  Fund, 

through which Korea offers low-interest loans and grants. 

o  Korea  pledged  to  double  its  current  official  development  aid  to  Africa  to 

USD 10 billion (EUR 9.5 billion) by 2030. 

o  Korea will also provide USD 14 billion (EUR 13 billion) in export financing by 
2030 to help Korean companies expand trade and investment across Africa. 

•  Republic  of  Korea-central Asia:  In  June  2024,  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Korea 
announced the launch of the ‘K-Silk Road Cooperation’ Initiative, which seeks to create 
a  new  cooperation  model  linking  Korea’s  innovation  capabilities  with  the  development 
potential and abundant resources of five countries in central Asia, including Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan.  The  initiative  has  four  main 
partnership pillars: resources, official development assistance, cultural and people-to-people 
exchange, and government- and private-level networking. Based on these pillars, Korea will 
focus on tailored cooperation with each of the five nations in the respective areas.  

o  Republic  of  Korea-Turkmenistan:  Both  countries  agreed 

to  expand 
cooperation  in  large-scale  energy  and  infrastructure  projects,  as  well  as 
shipbuilding, public health and climate change. Eight cooperation documents 
were signed, including the Trade and Investment Promotion Framework, to pave 
the  way  for  comprehensive  economic  cooperation  between  the  two  nations. 
Additionally, several memoranda of understanding were signed between the two 
nations’  governments,  financial  institutions  and  hospitals,  in  the  fields  of 
infrastructure and urban development cooperation. 

o  Republic  of  Korea-Kazakhstan:  Both  countries  signed  more  than  30 
agreements  to  cooperate  in  the  field  of  critical  minerals,  energy  and  climate 
change responses. One key agreement is a memorandum of understanding on a 
critical  mineral  supply  chain  partnership,  which  will  pave  the  way  for 
comprehensive  cooperation  on  the  extraction  and  development  of  critical 
minerals,  including  lithium,  chromium,  manganese  and  uranium.  Other 
agreements cover joint lithium mine exploration and development, technology 
cooperation for the commercialisation of rare metals, such as lithium, tungsten 
and titanium,  and renovation and modernisation  of power plants and thermal 
facilities. 

•  Republic  of  Korea-the  Philippines:  In  October  2022,  during  their  annual  economic 
cooperation committee, the two countries agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding 
on  the  supply  of  critical  minerals  and  other  raw  materials  for  industry  purposes,  and  to 
launch  working-level  talks  on  the  details.  Under  the  memorandum,  a  new  director-level 
entity on supply chains is expected to be set up.  

•  Republic  of  Korea-Chile:  In  October  2022,  on  the  occasion  of  the  bilateral  dialogue  at 
prime-ministerial level, the Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation 

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signed  a  memorandum  of  understanding  with  its  Chilean  counterpart  on  the  supply  of 
mineral resources. 

•  Republic  of  Korea-Indonesia:  In  February  2022,  the  Republic  of  Korea  and  Indonesia 
signed  a  total  of  five  memoranda  of  understanding  to  boost  bilateral  cooperation  in  the 
supply chains of key minerals and the electric car sector. The memorandum on key minerals, 
in particular, called for information sharing between the two ministries of trade and industry 
and supporting related joint projects to help ensure that the countries have a stable supply 
of major industry items.  

•  Republic of Korea-Uzbekistan: In December 2021, the two countries signed memoranda 
of understanding to create a communication channel for energy, cooperate in producing rare 
metals, and join efforts to develop industrial technology for electric vehicles. 

PLURILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS 

•  UK-US-Australia:  In  September  2024,  the  UK,  the  US  and  Australia  signed  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  setting  up  a  new  trilateral  collaboration  to  strengthen 
strategic cooperation and address risks to critical supply chains. It envisages to  set up an 
Australia-UK-US  Supply  Chain  Resilience  Cooperation  Group  to  cooperate  on  data 
sharing and to take joint action to build resilience in priority supply chains, improving the 
mutual ability to identify and address risks, threats and disruption to critical supply chains. 
The group will develop an early warning pilot focused on the telecommunications supply 
chain. 

•  Biopharmaceutical Alliance (Republic of Korea, US, Japan, India, EU): In June 2024, 
the Republic of Korea, the US, Japan, India and the EU launched an alliance to jointly build 
a  resilient  supply  chain  in  the  biopharmaceutical  sector,  in  response  to  the  drug  supply 
shortages experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

•  Japan-US-Republic  of  Korea:  In  June  2024,  Japan,  the  US  and  the  Republic  of  Korea 
agreed to identify potential supply chain vulnerabilities for strategic goods resulting from a 
wide range of non-market  policies and practices, as well to  strengthen supply  chains  for 
critical minerals and clean energy, semiconductors and electric cars. The trio also agreed to 
deepen  cooperation  on  artificial 
intelligence,  cybersecurity  and  other  advanced 
technologies,  including  those  associated  with  export  controls,  research,  and  developing 
international standards. 

•  The  Indo-Pacific  Economic  Framework  for  Prosperity  (IPEF)  involves  14  partners 
(including the US, the Republic of Korea, Japan, India, Australia and members of the 
Association  of  Southeast Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)).  The  Supply  Chain Agreement,  the 
Clean Economy Agreement, and the Fair Economy Agreement have entered into force and 
aim to further deepen economic cooperation and to deliver concrete benefits.  

o  The IPEF Supply Chain Agreement was signed in 2023 to set up a framework 
for  deeper  collaboration  to  prevent,  mitigate  and  prepare  for  supply  chain 
disruptions, such as those experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. Three 
supply chain bodies – the Supply Chain Council, the Crisis Response Network, 
and  the  Labor  Rights  Advisory  Board  –  were  set  up  to  implement  this 
agreement.  

o  The IPEF Clean Economy Agreement aims to create an economic framework 
to support the IPEF partners’ efforts towards achieving their respective climate 
goals  by  accelerating  the  deployment  of  clean  technologies  and  facilitating 

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investment.  It  also  outlines  incentives  to  support  the  implementation  of  the 
agreement, such as financing and technical assistance and capacity building, and 
to advance cooperation on developing and deploying clean energy and climate-
friendly  technologies,  facilitating  investment  in  climate-related  projects, 
connecting  markets  through  policies  and  standards,  and  promoting  low-  and 
zero-emission goods  and services. To support this agreement, the first  Clean 
Economy  Investor  Forum  gathered  the  region’s  largest  investors  and 
innovative project proponents, companies, and multilateral development banks 
to  exchange  market  insights,  explore  business  opportunities,  and  develop  a 
pipeline  of  investment  opportunities.  The  Investor  Forum  identified  priority 
infrastructure  projects  for  consideration  worth  over  USD 23 billion,  and 
launched the IPEF Catalytic Capital Fund to deploy concessional financing, 
technical  assistance,  and  capacity-building  support  to  expand  the  pipeline  of 
quality,  resilient  and  inclusive  clean  economy  infrastructure  projects  in 
emerging  and  upper-middle  income  economies  party  to  the  IPEF  Clean 
Economy Agreement. The fund’s founding supporters include Australia, Japan, 
the  Republic  of  Korea,  and  the  US,  which  plan  to  provide  USD 33 million 
(EUR 31 million)  in  initial  grant  funding  to  attract  up  to  USD 3.3 billion 
(EUR 3.1 billion) in private investment. 

•  The Asia Zero Emission Community (AZEC) is a framework for decarbonisation in Asia 
founded by Japan in January 2023. It aims to develop technologies and rules to meet the 
increased electricity demand and to reduce CO2 emissions. It entails the participation of 11 
partners  countries,  namely  nine  ASEAN  members  (all  except  Myanmar),  Japan  and 
Australia. The  Action Plan for the Next Decade, agreed  at  the second leaders’ summit, 
held in Laos in October 2024, has the following main points: (i) promoting ‘AZEC solutions’ 
(including visualisation of greenhouse gas emissions throughout the supply chain, transition 
financing, decarbonisation of all industrial sectors); (ii) launching sectoral initiatives; and 
(iii)  promoting  tangible  projects  led  by  Japan  and  Australia.  Among  other  things,  it 
envisages to introduce perovskite solar cells and common rules for calculating and reporting 
greenhouse gas emissions in Japan and ASEAN countries. 

•  Chip 4 Alliance (US, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan): Announced in March 2022, 
the  Chip  4 Alliance  is  a  US-led  cooperation  forum  for  governments  and  companies  to 
discuss and coordinate policies on semiconductor supply chains, workforce development, 
R&D, and subsidies.  

•  The  Quad  (US,  Australia,  India  and  Japan)  has  set  up  a  Critical  and  Emerging 
Technology Working Group (2021) to monitor and improve the security of supply chains 
for  critical  technologies.  The  working  group  promotes  global  technology  markets  and 
standards  based  on  openness,  diversity,  trust  and  resilience.  It  cooperates  on  technical 
standards, 5G, horizon scanning, and technology supply chains. 

•  Australia-India-Japan: In 2021, the three countries set up the Supply Chain Resilience 
Initiative to cooperate on supply chain resilience in the Indo-Pacific region. Cooperation 
consists  of  sharing  best  practice  on  supply  chain  resilience  and  holding  an  investment 
promotion / buyer-seller matching event. 

•  US-Mexico-Canada: The US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (July 2020) includes provisions 
to  promote  transparency  and  accountability  in  supply  chains,  particularly  in  relation  to 
labour  and  environmental  standards.  These  provisions  require  companies  to  disclose 
information  about  their  supply  chains,  investigate  allegations  of  forced  labour  or  human 
trafficking, and take corrective action in response to findings. The agreement also sets up a 

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framework  for  implementing  and  enforcing  these  provisions,  aiming  to  prevent  forced 
labour  and  human  trafficking,  protect  workers’  rights,  and  promote  environmental 
sustainability. 

[1] This document is a non-exhaustive list of resilience measures to date taken by the EU’s key 
international partners. 
[2] The  data  used  in  this  inventory  is  publicly  available  and  has  been  collected  through  the 
knowledge  and  intelligence  of  Commission  services  and  EU  delegations,  notably  in  media 
articles, press releases, official governmental documentation, as well as from interactions with 
respective public authorities. 
[3] 300052290.pdf (jogmec.go.jp) 

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