Country guidance, Iran : common analysis and guidance note : January 2025.
Date: 2025-01-09
Institutions: European Union Agency for Asylum
Subjects: Iran, civil liability, ethnic discrimination, humanitarian aid, international protection, international security, political asylum, position of women, refugee, religious discrimination, sexual discrimination, violence, war

i

e
c
n
a
d
u
G
y
r
t
n
u
o
C

5
2
0
2
y
r
a
u
n
a
J

Country Guidance:
Iran

 
 
Country Guidance: Iran 

Common analysis and guidance note 

January 2025

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Manuscript completed in January 2025 

1st edition 

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the 
EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained within this 
publication. 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2025 

HTML 

ISBN: 978-92-9410-469-4 

doi: 10.2847/4606274  BZ-01-24-065-EN-Q 

PDF 

ISBN: 978-92-9410-470-0 

doi: 10.2847/9227341  BZ-01-24-065-EN-N 

© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2025 

Cover photo/illustration: © gettyimages, Maja Hitij / Staff, "Women Life Freedom Collective" 
Hold Iran Solidarity Protest. 

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction 
of photos or other material that is not under the EUAA copyright, permission must be sought 
directly from the copyright holders. 

Please cite the document as: EUAA, Country Guidance: Iran, January 2025, available at 
https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-iran-2025 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Contents 

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 6 

Guidance note ................................................................................................................................. 10 

Common analysis ............................................................................................................................ 13 

1.  General situation in Iran .......................................................................................................... 14 

2.  Actors of persecution or serious harm .................................................................................. 15 

2.1.  The Iranian authorities ............................................................................................................ 15 

2.2.  Other actors ............................................................................................................................... 16 

3.  Refugee status .......................................................................................................................... 18 

General remarks ................................................................................................................................ 19 

3.1.  Political dissent and opposition ........................................................................................... 20 

3.1.1.  Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements 
(perceived as) critical of the Iranian authorities .................................................... 22 

3.1.2.  Protesters ......................................................................................................... 24 

3.1.3.  Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers .................................... 26 

Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the 

3.1.4. 
Iranian authorities ......................................................................................................... 28 

3.2.  Desertion from armed forces ............................................................................................... 30 

3.3.  Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including 
converts and atheists ...................................................................................................................... 32 

3.4.  Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws .......................... 34 

3.5.  Ethnic minorities ...................................................................................................................... 36 

3.5.1.  Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds ...................................... 37 

3.5.2.  Baluches ........................................................................................................... 38 

3.6.  Religious minorities ................................................................................................................. 40 

3.6.1.  Christians .......................................................................................................... 40 

3.6.2.  Baha’is ............................................................................................................... 42 

3.7.  Women and girls ...................................................................................................................... 43 

3.8.  Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons) .................... 45 

4.  Subsidiary protection .............................................................................................................. 48 

4 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

4.1.  Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution ............................................................ 48 

4.2.  Article 15(b) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . 50 

4.2.1.  Healthcare and socio-economic conditions ............................................ 51 

4.2.2.  Arbitrary arrests and detentions, and prison conditions ...................... 51 

4.2.3.  Corporal punishments .................................................................................. 52 

4.2.4.  Criminal violence ............................................................................................ 52 

4.3.  Article 15(c) QD/QR: indiscriminate violence in situations of armed conflict ........... 53 

4.3.1.  Reference period ........................................................................................... 54 

4.3.2.  Assessment of indiscriminate violence in Iran ....................................... 54 

5.  Actors of protection ................................................................................................................ 56 

5.1.  The State ................................................................................................................................... 56 

5.2.  Parties or organisations ......................................................................................................... 58 

6.  Internal protection alternative ............................................................................................... 59 

Preliminary remarks ......................................................................................................................... 59 

6.1.  Part of the country ................................................................................................................... 59 

6.2.  Safety .......................................................................................................................................... 60 

6.2.1.  Absence of persecution or serious harm ................................................ 60 

6.2.2.  Availability of protection against persecution or serious harm .......... 61 

6.3.  Travel and admittance ............................................................................................................ 61 

6.4.  Reasonableness to settle ...................................................................................................... 63 

6.4.1.  General situation ............................................................................................ 63 

6.4.2. 

Individual circumstances .............................................................................. 64 

6.4.3.  Conclusion on reasonableness .................................................................. 65 

7.  Exclusion .................................................................................................................................... 67 

7.1.  Exclusion based on the commission of international crimes ...................................... 68 

7.2.  Exclusion based on the commission of a serious crime ............................................... 69 

7.3.  Exclusion based on acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations ................................................................................................................................................ 70 

7.4.  Exclusion based on constituting a danger to the community or to the security of 
the Member State .............................................................................................................................. 71 

Annex I: List of abbreviations and glossary ................................................................................ 72 

Annex II: Country of origin information references .................................................................... 75 

5 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Introduction 

The country guidance documents provide country-specific common analysis and guidance in 
relation to the assessment criteria established in the recast Qualification Directive (QD)(1)  and 
in the newly adopted Qualification Regulation (QR)(2) which will repeal the QD with its entry 
into application on 1 July 2026. They are developed by the EUAA together with a network of 
senior-level policy officials from EU+ countries and represent their joint assessment of the 
situation in main countries of origin, in accordance with current EU legislation and 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 

The aim of the country guidance documents is to assist decision-makers and policy-makers in 
their daily work and to foster convergence in the assessment of applications for international 
protection and the type of protection granted in the context of the Common European Asylum 
System.  

The development, review and update of country guidance is regulated under Article 11 of the 
EUAA Regulation. 

In accordance with Article 11(3) EUAA Regulation, Member States have the 
obligation to take into account the common analysis and guidance notes when 
examining applications for international protection, without prejudice to their 
competence to decide on individual applications.  

This common analysis is based on country of origin information (COI) covering the period 
1 January 2023 - 17 October 2024.  

The analysis and guidance in this document should be considered valid as long as current 
events and developments in the country fall within the trends and patterns described within 
the COI on which the assessment at hand is based on. 

The analysis and guidance provided in this document are not exhaustive. 

(1)   Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast). 

(2)   Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a 
uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and for the content of the 
protection granted, amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing Directive 2011/95/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. 

6 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Common analysis, guidance note and methodological 
approach 

The country guidance document consists of two important components: the guidance note 
and the common analysis. These two parts focus on the situation in the country of origin and 
provide analysis and guidance on the assessment of relevant international protection needs.  

Guidance note  

Common analysis 

The guidance note is the first part in 
the structure of the document. 

It outlines the key conclusions of the 
common analysis in a light user-
friendly format. 

The common analysis is the second, more 
detailed, part. It analyses the available COI and 
provides guidance in accordance with the 
applicable legislation, relevant jurisprudence 
and general guidance. 

They should be read in conjunction with the separate document ‘Country Guidance: 
explained’. 

This document outlines the general guidance relied upon in this 
analysis, as well as the methodological framework, approach and 
indicators used to assess the different elements of qualification 
for international protection. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Scope of this development 

This development focuses on the international protection needs of the most encountered 
profiles of applicants for international protection in the caseload of EU+ countries. It covers 
the situation of individuals perceived by the Iranian authorities as criticising them; deserters 
and those encouraging desertion; individuals considered as converts, apostates, 
blasphemers, atheists; individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws; 
ethnic and religious minorities; women and girls, and persons with diverse SOGIESC. 
Additionally, this development covers the international protection needs of Iranian applicants 
under the meaning of Article 15 QD/QR, as well as the potential availability of an internal 
protection alternative. The main actors in Iran are covered by the sections on actors of 
persecution or serious harm and actors of protection. Finally, general exclusion 
considerations to take into consideration when assessing international protection needs of 
Iranian applicants are also dealt with in the present development.  

This development is based on the following recent COI: 

Country Focus 2024 
EUAA COI Report: 
Iran - Country focus 
(June 2024) 

COI Update 2024 
EUAA COI Query: 
Iran – Major political, security, 
and humanitarian developments 
(7 October 2024) 

COI Human Rights 
EUAA COI Query: 
Iran – Human rights situation 
(17 October 2024) 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

COI Desertion 
EUAA COI Query: 
Iran - Desertion/draft evasion 
from the army and the Islamic  
Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) 

(February 2022) 

COI Atheists 
EUAA COI Query: 
Iran – Situation of atheists and 
non-religious individuals, 
including  
legislation, treatment by state 
actors and society, availability 
of  
state protection 

(November 2023) 

Annex II: Country of origin information references provides further details and links to all COI 
documents used as a basis for the analysis within this document. References within this 
document are to the respective sections of these COI documents. 

 To access EUAA COI reports, visit https://euaa.europa.eu/coi-publications 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Guidance note 

Last update: January 2025 

The guidance note on Iran is produced by the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) 
together with EU+ countries(3)  in accordance with Article 11 of the EUAA Regulation(4). It is 
based on and summarises the conclusions of the comprehensive common analysis. The aim 
of the guidance note and the common analysis is to assist EU+ countries in the examination of 
applications for international protection, thereby fostering convergence of asylum practices 
and decisions across the EU.  

The guidance note is part of the ‘Country Guidance: Iran’ and should be read in conjunction 
with the Common analysis. 

In light of the willingness and capabilities of the Iranian authorities to track and monitor 
activities of Iranian nationals abroad, the conclusions of the common analysis should also be 
considered generally applicable for sur place activities(5).  

The Iranian authorities are the main Actors of persecution or serious harm in the country. In 
addition, a number of  Other actors are also to be considered as actors of persecution or 
serious harm such as the society at large, communities, and family members. 

Among the most commonly encountered profiles of applicants for international protection, the 
following would be highly likely to qualify for refugee status:   

•  Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements seen by the Iranian 
authorities as advocating for a regime change, including monarchists and separatists 

•  Human rights defenders, activists and lawyers 
•  Journalists and other media workers dealing with anti-regime topics or perceived as 

such by the Iranian authorities 

•  Individuals perceived by the Iranian authorities as encouraging desertion 
•  Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including 

converts 

(3)   The assessment and guidance reflect the conclusions of the EUAA Country Guidance Network, which consists 

of EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland. The guidance note has been endorsed by the EUAA 
Management Board. 

(4)   Regulation (EU) 2021/2303 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2021 on the 

(5)  

European Union Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010. 
In this regard, the CJEU has recently ruled on the interpretation of Article 5(3) QD, clarifying that rejecting a 
subsequent application based on circumstances which the applicant has created sur place, constitutes an 
exception. See CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 
29 February 2024, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283282&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8663025 

10 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

•  Individuals perceived to have committed any of the acts punishable under hadd 

punishments 

•  Christians frequenting house churches and Christian proselytisers 
•  Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons) 

Further guidance is provided on the risk-impacting circumstances which may affect the 
probability of granting refugee status for the following profiles:  

•  Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements seen as critical by 
the Iranian authorities while respecting the foundations of the Islamic Republic 

•  Protesters and their family members 
•  Journalists and media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian authorities while 

respecting the foundations of the Islamic Republic 

•  Deserters from armed forces 
•  Atheists 
•  Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws when considered to 

have committed other acts than the ones punished under hadd punishments 

•  Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds 
•  Baluches 
•  Christians, other than those frequenting house churches and Christian proselytisers 
•  Baha’is 
•  Women and girls 

If an applicant is not considered eligible for refugee status, Member States should proceed 
to consider the granting of subsidiary protection.  

Article 15(a) QD/QR relating to the risk of death penalty or execution may be applicable when 
there is a reasonable degree of likelihood of death penalty or execution by the Iranian 
authorities or execution by other (non-state) actors, such as in the case of qesas punishment.  

Article 15(b) QD/QR relating to the risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment may be applicable, such as in the cases of deliberate denial of or unequal access 
to healthcare, certain socio-economic conditions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, life-
threatening prison conditions, corporal punishment and violent crimes.  

With regard to subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) QD/QR, it is concluded that, in the 
whole territory of Iran, there is no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected by 
indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

Please note that, while it is generally considered that a civilian would not be affected by 
indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in Iran, including Tehran, 
this does not imply that Iran, including Tehran, is considered a safe area for any applicant. All 
circumstances specific to the applicant’s individual case have to be thoroughly assessed. 

11 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The protection needs of certain individuals are further substantiated by the lack of State 
protection. State protection is generally not considered available for women facing domestic 
or honour-related violence, and gender-based violence, including harmful traditional 
practices; for Kurds, especially those who served the IRGC and Basij; for individuals perceived 
to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws and facing persecution by the society at large 
since the State is in itself an actor of persecution; for persons with diverse SOGIESC facing 
social discrimination and/or violence from their families, their communities and healthcare 
providers because of the legal constraints and the hate speech of the authorities against 
persons with diverse SOGIESC; for atheists and converts from Islam to another religion. 
Additionally, no other actors are deemed to meet the requirements under Article 7 QD/QR to 
be considered as an Actors of protection.  

Taking into account the reach of the Iranian authorities as the main actor of persecution,  
Internal protection alternative in accordance with Article 8 QD/QR in Tehran would be 
substantiated only in certain limited cases such as for single able-bodied men and married 
couples with or without children. 

Finally,  Exclusion considerations may be relevant in a number of cases concerning applicants 
from Iran. Examples include members of the Iranian government institutions, members of the 
Iranian military, members of armed groups, individuals involved in criminal activity and 
individuals having committed violence against women and children.  

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Common analysis 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

1. 

General situation in Iran 

Last update:  January 2025 

The information below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024.  
Please note that Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

The Iranian Revolution culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of 
an Islamic Republic in 1979. A growing secular sentiment amongst some religious officials and 
common Iranians advocating for the separation of the state and the religion in the country has 
been observed in the recent years.  

Iran has experienced numerous protests, both domestically and internationally. The ‘Women, 
Life, Freedom’ protests, which originated in Iran following the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022, 
have sparked a significant movement advocating for women's rights and broader social 
freedoms. Demonstrators in Iran demand an end to gender-based discrimination and 
systemic oppression, facing severe crackdowns by authorities. This movement has 
transcended borders, inspiring solidarity protests across Europe and beyond. 

Iran is among the leading practitioners of the death penalty, employing it against individuals 
convicted of crimes, including children, and under vaguely defined national security charges. 
The list of crimes punishable by death in Iran includes murder, rape, drug trafficking, armed 
robbery, kidnapping, terrorism, and crimes considered offences against the religion and the 
State. The death penalty is frequently used as a tool by Iranian authorities to instil fear and 
suppress opposition. 

Political dissent in Iran endures significant repression. The Islamic Republic has responded to 
various forms of dissent by employing extensive surveillance both domestically and 
internationally, monitoring online activities, and using intimidation, lethal violence, 
imprisonment, and censorship to silence critics. Opposition parties and activists face intense 
scrutiny, arbitrary arrests, and harsh sentences. 

Gender discrimination is institutionalised in Iran. Women face significant legal and social 
restrictions that deeply impact their lives, particularly in areas such as employment, education, 
and personal freedoms. Some women showed non-compliance in the streets and on social 
media to the State-imposed hijab. Women's rights activists often face severe persecution for 
their advocacy stance.  

Iranian authorities do not allow conversion from Islam to another religion. Most Iranians are 
considered Muslims, and conversion to Christianity is seen as apostasy and may be punished 
by death. The situation of ethnic and religious minorities in Iran, such as the Kurds, is marked 
by systemic discrimination and limited access to social, economic, and political rights. Other 
groups, such as Baha’is, have been increasingly targeted by the Islamic Republic.  

14 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

2.  Actors of persecution or serious harm 

Article 6 QD/QR 

The contents of this chapter include: 

2.1. The Iranian authorities  

2.2.  Other actors 

The following sections highlight the main actors of persecution or serious harm in Iran in a 
non-exhaustive manner.  

2.1.  The Iranian authorities 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 1; COI 
Human Rights, 1.1, 3.2. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

Iran is an Islamic Republic in which Shia Muslim clerics, Shia Muslim belief and a Persian-
dominated central government maintain control over every aspect of public life. Any threat 
against the State or its highest authority, the Supreme leader, is considered as an ‘enmity 
against God’ and punishable by death.  

The Iranian armed forces consist of: 

•  the army (artesh) tasked to secure territorial integrity;  
•  the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) mandated to preserve the Islamic 

Republic, guarding the Islamic Revolution and its achievements and backed by the 
Basij to maintain order;  

•  the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (farmandehi-ye 

entezami-ye jomhuri-ye eslami-ye iran - FARAJA) which includes the police forces, 
the anti-riot police, the Counter-Terror Special Forces (niroo-ye vizhe pasdar-e 
Velayat – NOPO), and the morality police whose tasks include enforcing and 
monitoring compliance with the hijab rules in public. 

Intelligence agencies are also part of the Iranian armed forces. They conduct domestic 
surveillance, including by the herasat offices in universities and public institutions, and foreign 
surveillance, the latter with agents based in Iranian embassies across Europe. They closely 
monitor social media platforms, collect information online, and remove critical content against 
the Islamic Republic for example by shutting down Instagram accounts. Authorities have the 

15 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

ability to track activities such as registering for a phone SIM card, vehicle registration, 
purchasing a phone, or booking a flight. They conduct interrogations and engage in 
wiretapping. They monitor and target internal political rivals, and carry-out activities abroad 
also by hiring criminal groups, arresting exiled dissidents, bringing them back to Iran and 
executing them.  

The Iranian authorities have committed a wide range of human rights violations against 
different categories of individuals. For example, they have engaged in harassment, arbitrary 
arrest, detention, ill-treatment, and torture. Affected groups include Members and 
sympathisers of opposition parties and movements (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities, as well as Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities, Protesters, Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers, with Women and girls 
often facing harsher treatment. Furthermore, individuals from Ethnic minorities and Religious 
minorities have faced arrests, prosecution, and harassment, including confiscation of personal 
belongings and properties. 

The EU sanctioned several individuals and entities as perpetrators of serious human rights 
violations including the involvement in Mahsa Amini's death and the violent suppression of 
protests in Iran, the broadcasting of forced confessions, and arbitrary arrests over online 
criticism. 

For further information on human rights violations committed by the Iranian 
authorities and related actors, and their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, 
see Exclusion. 

2.2. 

 Other actors  

Last update: January 2025 

Human rights violations are also committed by non-State actors, such as the society at large, 
communities, family members, armed groups, and criminals, etc. 

Some examples include domestic violence, ‘honour’ violence by family members, sexual 
violence, violence against persons with diverse SOGIESC, etc. See, for example, the profiles 
of Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts 
and atheists, Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws, Women and 
girls and Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons), etc. 

The reach of a specific non-State actor depends on the individual case. The 
assessment may include aspects such as their family, ethnic or other networks for 
tracing and targeting the applicant. The individual power positions of the applicant 
and the actor of persecution or serious harm should be assessed, taking into 
consideration their gender, social status, wealth, connections, home area and 
residence, etc. 

16 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Please note that an applicant may have been targeted by both State and non-State actors. 
Some examples include Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, 
including converts and atheists, and Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as 
LGBTIQ persons), etc. 

For further information on human rights violations committed by other actors and 
their relevance as potential exclusion grounds, see  Exclusion. 

17 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

3. 

Refugee status 

Article 2(d) QD / Article 
3(5) QR 

Article 9 QD/QR 

Article 10 QD/QR 

This chapter provides analysis and guidance on the potential international protection needs 
of selected profiles of applicants. These profiles were selected based on their relevance in 
the caseload of EU Member States. 

The list of profiles addressed in this chapter is non-exhaustive and the fact that a certain 
profile is included or not is without prejudice to the determination of their protection needs. 
Furthermore, the order of listed profiles does not reflect any ranking of the potential level of 
risk of persecution. 

The contents of this chapter include:  

General remarks 

3.1.1. Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements (perceived 
as) critical of the Iranian authorities 

3.1.2. Protesters 

3.1.3. Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers 

3.1.4. Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities 

3.2 Desertion from armed forces 

3.3. Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including 
converts and atheists 

3.4. Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic  

3.5.1. Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds 

3.5.2.  Baluches 

3.6.1. Christians 

3.6.2.Baha’is 

18 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

3.7. Women and girls  

3.8. Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons) 

General remarks 

Last update: January 2025 

While the conclusions under this common analysis provide general guidance, the protection 
needs of each applicant should be examined individually. The non-exhaustive lists of 
risk-impacting circumstances, which would increase or decrease the risk of persecution, are 
to be taken into account.  

The considerations under each profile should, furthermore, be viewed without prejudice to 
the credibility assessment of the applicant’s claims. This common analysis deals solely 
with issues of risk analysis and qualification. 

For each profile, the guidance responds to the following questions:  

Step 1: Do the reported acts qualify as persecution? 

This part provides examples of acts reported to be committed against individuals belonging 
to the profile as well as guidance on whether such acts would reach the level of 
persecution according to Article 9 QD/QR. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution? 

This part assesses how likely it is for applicants within the profile to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution. Further guidance is provided with regard to the circumstances which 
should be taken into account in the individual assessment, addressing also how they would 
impact the risk. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution? 

This part provides guidance on whether in case of established well-founded fear of 
persecution, this would be connected to a reason falling within the provision of Article 10 
QD/QR (nexus). 

Relevant COI is also included in the analysis to substantiate the guidance provided. Links to 
the relevant EUAA COI reports and/or queries are also added.  

19 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

For more guidance on how to read the following subsections, please refer ‘Country 
Guidance: explained: Refugee Status’. 

The conclusions of the common analysis should also be considered generally 
applicable for sur place activities. 

For assessing international protection needs related to sur place activities, please 
refer to EUAA Practical Guide on Political Opinion, 3.6. Political opinion expressed 
sur place, EUAA Practical Guide on Interviewing Applicants with Religion-based 
Asylum Claims, 4.1. Conversion to another religion.   

Also, the CJEU has ruled on the interpretation of Article 5(3) QD, notably(6): 

‘Article 5(3) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for 
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted 
must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which makes the recognition of 
the status of refugee following a subsequent application within the meaning of Article 
2(q) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, based 
on a risk of persecution arising from circumstances which the applicant has created by 
his or her own decision since leaving his or her country of origin, subject to the condition 
that those circumstances must constitute the expression and continuation of convictions 
held by the applicant in that country.’ 

3.1.  Political dissent and opposition 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 1.1.3, 3.8, 
3.9, 4.1, 4.2; COI Human Rights, 2.2. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of 
COI.  

Political dissent refers to the expression of disagreement or opposition to the policies, 
actions, or authority of a governing body or political system. It encompasses a wide range of 
activities, such as: political activism including protests and online and social media activities, 
advocating for human rights, publishing in media and publications, and artistic expression. 

(6)   CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 29 February 

2024, operative part (Court’s ruling), 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283282&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8663025  

20 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

The Iranian authorities are reported to view the activities of wide categories of individuals as 
political dissent. Intimidation and harassment of political activists, journalists, and opposition 
figures are prevalent, with threats and violence often extending to the families of dissidents. 
Political dissent in Iran encounters substantial governmental repression.  

The Islamic Republic employs a range of strategies to suppress dissent. A primary method is 
extensive surveillance, both domestically and internationally, utilising advanced technology to 
monitor communications and social media interactions. This enables the State to identify and 
target potential threats. A ‘cyber army’ monitors online opinions, leading to threats, physical 
attacks, kidnapping and killing of some of those who express dissent, even outside Iran. 
Arbitrary arrests and imprisonment are routine, with detainees frequently subjected to torture 
and denial of medical care. Trials are often conducted in secret and lack fundamental fairness 
including forced and public confessions, resulting in long sentences and, in some cases, 
executions. The death penalty is wielded by Iranian authorities as a tool of political repression 
against dissidents. 

Censorship is another tool, with the government exercising strict control over the media, 
banning independent outlets, and silencing journalists who report on abuses or opposition 
activities. Despite these oppressive measures at times leading to self-censorship, political 
dissent persists, driven by widespread dissatisfaction with economic conditions, corruption, 
and the lack of political freedom. 

High-profile activists, journalists, and human rights defenders may be monitored outside the 
country and arrested upon their return. Ordinary Iranians are generally not under systematic 
surveillance unless they share sensitive content on social media, which could draw State 
attention. Some Iranian activists have managed to enter the country without being identified 
or detained at the airport. However, posting on social media from within the country could 
attract State scrutiny.  

For practical information on the different ways of expressing one’s political 
opinion, please refer to the EUAA Practical Guide on Political Opinion, 1.3. 
Manifestations of political opinion. For assessing international protection needs 
related to activities on social media, please refer to EUAA Practical Guide on 
Political Opinion, 3.7. Political opinion expressed via social media. 

For assessing international protection needs related to sur place activities, please 
refer to EUAA Practical Guide on Political Opinion, 3.6. Political opinion expressed 
sur place. 

See also CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third 
Chamber, judgment of 29 February 2024(7). 

7   CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 29 February 

2024, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283282&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8663025 

21 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The contents of this section include:  

3.1.1. Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements (perceived 
as) critical of the Iranian authorities 

3.1.2. Protesters 

3.1.3. Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers 

3.1.4. Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities 

3.1.1.  Members and sympathisers of opposition parties and 

movements (perceived as) critical of the Iranian authorities  

Last update: January 2025 

This sub-profile covers the situation of dissenting political parties and movements perceived 
by the Iranian authorities as advocating for a regime change such as the monarchists, 
including the Constitutional Party of Iran (CPI), the New Iran Party (NIP), and the Workers 
Communist Party of Iran (WPI); for separatism, such as the Arab Struggle Movement for the 
Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA); and for reforms in the respect of the foundations of the Islamic 
Republic, such as the reformists. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 3.8, 3.9, 4.1; COI Update 2024, 1; COI Human Rights, 1.1. Country Guidance should not 
be referred to as source of COI.  

For practical information on the difference between being a member or a 
sympathiser of an organisation, please refer to the EUAA Practical Guide on 
Political Opinion, 1.3.1, Expressed political opinion.  

The Iranian Constitution allows political parties and associations to be established, but only if 
they align with State ideology and do not challenge Islam or State principles. This means only 
compliant organisations operate freely, while independent parties, opposition groups, civil 
society organisations, and trade unions are banned.  

For the situation of Kurdish opposition groups, please refer to Kurds, including Faili Kurds and 
Yarsan Kurds. For the situation of Baluches opposition groups, please refer to Baluches. 

22 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which members and sympathisers of opposition parties (perceived as) critical 
of the Iranian authorities could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. More specifically, activities of independent and opposition groups, 
including monarchists, are repressed through death penalty and execution, arbitrary arrest 
and detention, torture, and harsh penalties such as corporal punishments and long prison 
sentences. The political crimes law and other provisions in the Islamic Penal Code are used to 
suppress dissent. Vaguely defined charges like ‘spreading propaganda against the system’ 
and ‘gathering and colluding to commit crimes against security’ allow for broad interpretation 
and harsh penalties, including the death penalty. Critics of the government frequently face 
severe penalties, including execution. Reports indicate that numerous political prisoners have 
been executed for their association with opposition activities or protests, often following trials 
with significant due process violations and allegations of torture. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that individuals under this sub-profile could 
be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also 
be considered. For example, some members and sympathisers of opposition parties and 
movements have seen their freedom of movement being restricted.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

Punishment faced by members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements seen 
as critical of the foundations of the Islamic Republic, or, in other words, advocating for a 
regime change, is severe. Repression of opposition figures is historical and ongoing, resulting 
in leaders placed under house arrest without formal charges. Government critics in regions 
inhabited by ethnic minorities are labelled as separatists, facing death sentences and other 
severe punishments. Authorities charge perceived dissidents with broadly defined offences, 
often leading to severe penalties, including death. The judicial and prosecutorial system 
supports the regime's efforts to suppress dissent, with courts and the Public Prosecutor's 
Office determining political crimes broadly and harshly. 

Therefore, a well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for 
members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements seen by the Islamic 
Republic as advocating for a regime change, including perceived monarchists and 
separatists.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
members and sympathisers of oppositions parties and movements seen as critical by the 
Iranian authorities while respecting the foundations of the Islamic Republic to face 
persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Visibility, and nature of activities: visibility to the authorities is a critical factor 

impacting the risk of persecution. Due to their activities, some individuals under this 
sub-profile are more visible than others and, as such, face a higher risk. 

23 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Ethnic and religious background: due to their ethnic and/or religious background, 
some individuals under this sub-profile may be at higher risk. Please refer to Ethnic 
minorities and  Religious minorities. 

•  Gender: in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, female members and 

sympathisers of opposition parties and movements (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities are at higher risk than their male counterparts. Please refer to Women and 
girls.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where  well-founded  fear  of  persecution  is  substantiated  for  an  applicant  falling  under  this 
profile, this is highly  likely to be for reasons of  (imputed) political opinion and/or religion, as 
members and sympathisers of opposition parties and movements would be seen as critical of 
the Islamic Republic. 

3.1.2.  Protesters 

Last update: January 2025 

A protester is a person who publicly advocates for a given issue by standing in public spaces, 
taking part in demonstrations, shouting, carrying signs, etc.(8).  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 3.9, 4.2; COI Human Rights, 1.1. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source 
of COI. 

Even though the Constitution of Iran allows public demonstrations, they must adhere to 
Islamic principles and require government authorisation. This effectively bans gatherings 
critical of the government, leading to the suppression of unauthorised protests through 
detentions and use of lethal force. Since the foundation of the Islamic Republic, several large-
scale protests with respective agendas such as economic grievances, contestation of election 
results, and denunciation of human rights violations, were violently repressed by the Iranian 
authorities. Following the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, nationwide protests 
erupted highlighting discrimination against women and ethnic minorities. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which protesters could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. Notably, the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests were violently 
suppressed by the authorities, with sources reporting on mass arrests, killings of protesters 
and bystanders, and beatings. Security forces reportedly used excessive force, such as 
unlawful use of live ammunition, including handguns, and automatic weapons. The death 
penalty was wielded by the Iranian authorities as a tool of political repression against 
protesters. Mass arrests during major demonstrations, such as the 2019 fuel price protests 
and the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement, have resulted in high number of deaths, 

(8)   Adaptation based on Cambridge Dictionary. 

24 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

thousands of detentions, and numerous cases of torture. Expeditious trials and executions 
took place in response of the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests. Many protesters were 
charged with severe crimes carrying heavy penalties, including the death penalty. Others 
were charged with serious crimes like moharebeh (‘waging war against God’) and efsad fil-arz 
(spreading corruption on Earth), often leading to execution or long prison sentences. Use of 
torture, including to extract confessions and violations of due process were common. There 
were reports of arrests of children, with some subjected to torture, sexual assault, and denial 
of due process. Despite a general amnesty announced in February 2023, some protesters 
and activists remained at risk of re-arrest and severe punishment. Some family members of 
protesters, particularly those killed or detained during protests, are increasingly targeted by 
the authorities in an attempt to silence them. The government has resorted to harassing, 
threatening, and even detaining the families of protesters in an effort to suppress dissent. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that protesters could be subjected to and 
whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. For 
example, some protesters faced two separate trials for the same offence. Other protesters 
have seen their freedom of movement being restricted. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

The legal framework allows for discretionary punishments under ta’zīr, encompassing a wide 
range of offences such as insulting religious figures and spreading propaganda against the 
government. Protests critical of the regime are met with violent crackdowns by security 
forces, including live ammunition and mass arrests. The ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests in 
2022 highlighted widespread grievances and were violently suppressed, resulting in 
hundreds of deaths and reports of torture and arbitrary detention. Despite occasional 
amnesties, the government selectively excludes certain individuals from leniency, indicating 
ongoing targeting of dissenters. International observers consistently document these abuses, 
confirming the precarious and oppressive environment for protesters in Iran.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
protesters and their family members to face persecution should take into account risk-
impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Visibility, including being known to the authorities: visibility to the authorities is a 
critical factor impacting the risk of persecution. Protesters who use government-
controlled technologies, such as state-run internet service providers or social media 
platforms like Instagram, and particularly those with high numbers of followers, face a 
higher risk. Iranian authorities have ramped up their surveillance capabilities, 
particularly through the use of state-controlled technologies such as mobile data and 
internet services. The government's surveillance capabilities became more evident 
since the 2022 ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests, with many protesters being identified 
and later persecuted for their participation. Those with high numbers of followers on 
social media platforms have seen their mobile services cut off or social media 
accounts suspended.  

25 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Frequency of participation in demonstrations: the frequency with which an individual 

participates in protests directly influences the risk of persecution. While not all 
protesters are arrested, those who are involved in several demonstrations, especially 
large-scale or anti-regime protests, are often viewed as organisers or ringleaders, and 
face a higher risk of being identified and targeted.  

•  Political background: individuals with a known political stance against the regime, 
especially those with past affiliations with opposition movements like the Green 
Movement (2009) or anti-regime protests, face a higher risk. The government 
perceives anti-state protests as ‘riots’ and protesters can at times be considered as 
organisers, depending on their profile. 

•  Geographical area of activities: individuals having protested in areas affected by 

more extensive and long-lasting protests face a higher risk. Those areas include the 
capital Tehran, Kurdish regions, and Sistan and Baluchistan, and the cities of 
Divandareh, Garmsar, Hamedan, Kerman, Marivan, Mashhad, Mehrshahr, Rasht, 
Saghez, Sanandaj, and Shiraz. The highest numbers of deaths were reported in areas 
inhabited by ethnic minorities: Sistan and Baluchistan province, provinces of Kurdistan 
and Kermanshah, and parts of Western Azerbaijan. Past security threats, such as 
separatism, terrorism, and drug trafficking, had led to militarisation in minority-
populated provinces. It enables the government to respond swiftly and violently to any 
protest or dissent. 

•  Ethnic and religious background: protesters belonging to an ethnic and/or religious 
minority face a higher risk, as some protesters were targeted by the security forces 
based on discriminatory grounds, such as ethnicity.  

•  Gender: in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, and because specific 

protesters have been targeted by the security forces based on their gender, female 
protesters face a higher risk than their male counterparts. Women, especially those 
from ethnic and religious minorities, have been subjected to gender-based violence, 
including rape and torture. Iranian authorities have reportedly increased online 
surveillance of women involved in the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement and have 
charged some of them under national security laws for opposing the compulsory 
hijab. Please refer to Women and girls. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this sub-
profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion, as protesters would 
be seen as being critical of the authorities.  

3.1.3.  Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers 

A human rights defender is a person who, individually or in association with others, 
professionally acts to promote or protect human rights. Examples of human rights defenders 

Last update: January 2025 

26 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

include lawyers, members of human rights NGOs, academics, and trade unionists(9). A human 
rights activist is a person who believes strongly in political or social change based on the 
respect of human rights, such as the abolishment of the death penalty, and takes part in 
activities to try to make this happen(10). Such activities include protests, strikes, boycotts, 
online campaigns, civil disobedience, protest art, etc.(11). Human rights activism also covers, for 
example, ethnic and religious minorities rights, SOGIESC person’s rights and women’s rights 
activism. Human rights lawyers act to protect human rights, advocate for the rights of clients 
against ill-treatment by the authorities, etc. 

For assessing international protection needs related to activities on social media, 
please refer to EUAA Practical Guide on Political Opinion, 3.7. Political opinion 
expressed via social media. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and Queries: Country Focus 
2024, 4.3, 4.12; COI Human Rights, 1.2 1.6; COI Musicians. Country Guidance should not be 
referred to as source of COI. 

In Iran, human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers face increasing restrictions and 
pressure, especially following the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts reported to be committed against individuals under this sub-profile are of such 
severe nature that they amount to persecution. More specifically, human rights defenders, 
activists, and lawyers face arbitrary arrest, detention, criminal prosecution including on 
charges of committing crimes against the country’s national security, torture, flogging, and ill-
treatment in detention. Human rights defenders, who openly express solidarity with the 
protesters of the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement and defence lawyers representing 
persons implicated in protest-related cases face reprisals. Lawyers are targeted for their 
professional activities, including providing legal assistance to protesters and their families, 
advocating against torture and ill-treatment of their clients, as well as for expressing solidarity 
with the protests and speaking to the media. Lawyers defending converts to Christianity are 
similarly targeted, with several being convicted to various prison terms. Furthermore, the 
Iranian authorities have put increased pressure on women activists and human rights activists 
who advocate for the abolishment of the death penalty including by imposing criminal 
charges on them. Female lawyers in Iran face challenges such as mandatory hijab rules and 
harassment in the court room. Activists and lawyers advocating for SOGIESC person’s rights, 
too, face censorship, harassment, and arbitrary arrest by the Islamic Republic. Iranian 
authorities often refer to vague laws such as ‘morality’ or ‘national security’ to silence dissent 

(9)   European Union External Action Service, Human rights defenders, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/human-

rights-defenders_en  

(10)   Adaptation based on Cambridge Dictionary. 
(11)   Liberties, Democracy and Justice, What is Activism: Definition, Types, Role, Examples, Importance, 

https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/activism/44871  

27 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

and target individuals who promote SOGIESC person’s rights. Artists who publicly supported 
the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ movement risk imprisonment.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that human rights defenders, activists, and 
lawyers could be subjected to and whether they occur as an accumulation of various 
measures, should also be considered. For example, human rights defenders, activists, and 
lawyers have been subjected to harassment including judicial harassment, interrogations, 
threats, suspension from legal practice, travel bans, (internal) exile, prohibition on residing in 
Tehran, a ban on joining political and social groups, and disciplinary actions by bar 
associations because of pressure by the authorities. Artists whose art challenges political 
constraints, including musicians, face enhanced online monitoring, punishments or restrictions 
on their ability to work and travel.  

Please refer to Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws for the 
situation of artists challenging cultural constraints.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for human rights 
defenders, activists, and lawyers.   

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion, as human rights 
defenders, activists and lawyers would be perceived as being critical of the authorities. 

3.1.4.  Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the 

Iranian authorities 

Last update: January 2025 

This sub-profile refers to journalists and other media workers perceived by the Iranian 
authorities as dealing with anti-regime topics as well as those dealing with other sensitive 
topics while respecting the foundations of the Islamic Republic. 

A journalist is a professional who is involved in the process of gathering, assessing, creating, 
and broadcasting news and information in newspapers, magazines, on the internet, on the 
radio, or television. Other media workers include a wide range of roles such as producers, 
directors, technicians, and many others who are involved in the creation and dissemination of 
media content.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 4.4. 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

28 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

The Iranian Constitution guarantees the freedom of press if it does not violate the 
fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. However, censorship is imposed on 
newspapers, magazines, and online platforms and Iran is regarded as one of the world’s most 
repressive countries for journalists. The situation deteriorated notably after the 2022 protests. 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which journalists and other media workers, seen by the Iranian authorities as 
critical of them, could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would amount to 
persecution. More specifically, prominent dissident journalists have been executed. Other 
journalists critical of the authorities have faced arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and unfair trials 
conducted by Revolutionary Courts. A number of foreign-based journalists and media-activists 
have been convicted in absentia. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that journalists and other media workers 
could be subjected to, and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, 
should be also taken into account. Journalists and other media workers have been subjected 
to surveillance, intimidation and interrogations. Anti-defamation crimes included in the Penal 
Code are often used to threaten them. The Iranian authorities impose tight control over 
newspapers, magazines, and online platforms. A considerable number of Iranian journalists 
have faced legal proceedings, some sentenced to travel bans and suspension of work 
permits. Self-censorship is widely spread in Iran.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

Journalists generally rely on their visibility and accountability to ensure their credibility. Their 
visibility is even more important because of digital media. Journalists who engage in critical 
reporting on controversial political matters questioning the foundations of the regime or other 
sensitive topics (especially regarding the Mahsa Amini protests, women’s rights, and 
corruption) are particularly targeted in Iran.  

Therefore, for journalists and other media workers dealing with anti-regime topics or 
perceived as such by the Iranian authorities, well-founded fear of persecution would in 
general be substantiated. 

For journalists and media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian authorities while 
respecting the foundations of the Islamic Republic, the individual assessment of whether 
there is a reasonable degree of likelihood to face persecution should take into account 
risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Visibility, including being known to the authorities: visibility to the authorities is a 
critical factor impacting the risk of persecution. Due to their activities, some media 
workers are more visible than others. For example, a cameraman is more visible than 
a person working in post-production.  

29 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Links with Western countries: individuals who have links with Western countries, 
such as those media workers operating in Western countries or working for media 
companies based in Western countries, and those perceived as such by the Iranian 
authorities have a higher risk. Also, foreign based outlets in Persian may face 
increased scrutiny for alleged propaganda against the Iranian authorities. 

•  Ethnic and/or religious background: due to their ethnic and/or religious background, 
some media workers may be at higher risk. Please refer to Ethnic minorities and  
Religious minorities. 

•  Gender:  in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, female media workers 
are at higher risk than their male counterparts. Please refer to Women and girls.  

 Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this is highly likely to be for (imputed) political opinion, since such journalists or other 
media workers would be seen as critical of the authorities as they have been accused of 
spreading false information and propaganda against the State, including collaborating with 
foreign governments. 

3.2.  Desertion from armed forces 

Last update: January 2025 

This profile covers the situation of deserters from armed forces and the situation of individuals 
encouraging desertion. A deserter is a soldier serving within the armed forces and who left 
his military post or function without leave, or resists being called to fulfil military obligations(12). 

This profile addresses the issue of desertion from the regular army (artesh) or the IRGC 
(sepah). 

For assessing international protection needs related to desertion from armed 
forces or, more generally, to military service, please refer to the EUAA Practical 
Guide on Political Opinion, 3.1. Military service.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and Queries: Country Focus 
2024, 1.2.7, 4.6; COI Human Rights, 3.1; COI Desertion.  Country Guidance should not be 
referred to as source of COI. 

(12)   EUAA Practical Guide on Political Opinion, 3.1. Military service, p.54, 
https://euaa.europa.eu/publications/practical-guide-political-opinion  

30 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Prosecution and punishment for desertion in itself, when proportionate, is not considered 
persecution, except if Article 9(2)(e) QD/QR applies.  

In Iran, desertion is punished as a Hadd crime and deserters can be sentenced to 
imprisonment. Depending on individual circumstances, based on (imputed) political opinion, 
punishment can be harsher and prison conditions can amount to torture or ill-treatment, 
including prolonged and indefinite solitary confinement, sexual abuse and forced confessions. 

Encouraging someone to desert is considered as moharebeh (a crime of ‘waging war against 
God’) and can be punished by the death penalty.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for individuals 
perceived by the Iranian authorities as encouraging desertion.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a 
deserter from armed forces to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as: 

•  Force the applicant belongs to and rank/position: the targeting by the Iranian authorities 
could depend on the position and the rank of the applicant in the armed forces and the 
specific armed force they belonged to. 

•  Political affiliation: the targeting by the Iranian authorities could depend on the political 

opinion of the deserter as he could be seen as critical to the authorities. 

•  Ethnic and/or religious background: if Baluches or Kurds demonstrate opposition to the 
military institution, they could be suspected of being political opponents and thus can be 
treated severely by the State. Kurds could be punished harsher than Persians if they 
desert, because the Islamic Republic views their desertion as a sign of disloyalty and 
distrust to the State. 

•  Situation in which the desertion occurred: the specific situation in which the desertion 
occurred could have an impact on the level of risk. For example, the punishments for 
desertion in war time is harsher than the punishment during peace time.   

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for a deserter, this is highly likely to 
be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion, whereas it is highly likely to be for reasons of 
religion for those encouraging desertion.  

Exclusion considerations could be relevant to this profile, as persons involved in 
Iranian Armed Forces may have been involved in excludable acts (see Exclusion). 

31 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

3.3. 

Individuals perceived to have committed 
blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts and 
atheists 

Last update: January 2025 

This profile covers persons who are considered to have abandoned or renounced the 
religious belief or principles of Islam (apostasy), as well as persons considered to have 
spoken sacrilegiously about God or sacred things (blasphemy). It includes individuals who 
have converted from Islam to a new faith, based on their genuine inner belief (e.g. converts to 
Christianity), as well as those who disbelieve or lack belief in the existence of God (atheists). 

For the situation of Christians by birth, please refer to Christians. 

For practical guidance on interviewing applicants claiming having converted to 
another religion than Islam, including sur place claims, please refer to the EUAA 
Practical Guide on Interviewing Applicants with Religion-based Asylum Claims, 4.1. 
Conversion to another religion. 

See also and CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third 
Chamber, judgment of 29 February 2024(13).  

For practical guidance on interviewing applicants claiming to be considered as 
apostates, blasphemers, and/or atheists, including sur place claims, please refer to 
the EUAA Practical Guide on Interviewing Applicants with Religion-based Asylum 
Claims, 4.2. Leaving one’s religion to adhere to an atheistic, agnostic or non-
religious system of belief, and 4.3. Religious minorities.  

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and Queries: Country Focus 
2024, 4.10.2, 4.10.4; COI Atheists; COI Musicians. Country Guidance should not be referred to 
as source of COI. 

In Iran, it is illegal or unrecognised to self-identify as ‘non-religious’. Although apostasy is not 
codified as a crime in the Penal Code, Iranian law, including the Penal Code, is used to 
prosecute persons based on their religious affiliation and views deemed critical or derogatory 
towards Islam. Iranian authorities do not allow conversion from Islam to another religion. 
Apostasy, including conversion to another religion than Islam, and blasphemy are seen as 
offences against the religion. Most Iranians are considered Muslims. Numerous individuals in 
younger generations consider themselves atheists or agnostics. 

(13)   CJEU, Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl v JF, C-222/22, Third Chamber, judgment of 29 February 

2024, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=283282&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=8663025  

32 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which individuals considered to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, 
including converts and atheists, could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. More specifically, blasphemy is punished by death under 
Iranian law. Apostates might face prosecution for insulting Islam and promoting atheism. In 
2023, two individuals accused on these grounds were executed by hanging. Individuals 
under this profile furthermore face arbitrary detention and torture. Converts from Islam are 
subjected to arrest, imprisonment and prosecution. At times converts are targeted by their 
families and their extended family members and society at large (ill-treatment, disinheritance). 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that individuals considered to have committed 
blasphemy and/or apostasy could be subjected to and whether they occur as an 
accumulation of various measures, should be also taken into account. Individuals considered 
to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts and atheists, might be 
confronted with severe social stigma, hatred and violence from society. Iranian authorities 
openly marginalise, harass or incite hatred or violence against non-religious individuals. They 
also face confiscation of property. Apostates must either lie with respect to their conviction to 
receive a national identification card or be denied access to services, such as insurance, 
education, banking, and, most recently, public transportation. Unrecognised religious minority 
groups face barriers accessing education and employment in government jobs. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

A well-founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated for individuals 
considered by the Iranian authorities to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, 
including converts. 

Please refer to Christians for the risk-assessment for Christians by birth.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
atheists to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such 
as: 

•  Nature and visibility: atheists publicly adopting non-religious behaviours, such as not 

going to the mosque, face a higher risk. The nature, the repetitiveness and the 
visibility of the non-religious practice, be it in Iran or abroad, should be taken into 
account.   

•  Home  area  and  residence:  atheists  originating  or  residing  in  an  area  where  Islamic 

norms and laws are traditionally respected face a higher risk. 

•  Perception of Islamic codes in the family: atheists belonging to a family where Islamic 

norms and laws are traditionally respected face a higher risk. 

•  Political background: atheists with a (perceived) political profile face a higher risk. 
•  Ethnic background: atheists belonging to an ethnic minority face a higher risk. Please 

refer to Ethnic minorities.  

33 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Gender: in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, female atheists face a 

higher risk than their male counterparts. Please refer to Women and girls. 

It should be highlighted that no applicant under this profile can reasonably be expected to 
abstain from their religious practice in order to avoid persecution(14).  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this is highly likely to be for reasons of religion, as individuals considered to have 
committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts and atheists, would be seen as 
insulting Islam. 

3.4. 

Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic 
norms or laws 

Last update: January 2025 

This profile includes individuals whose actions, behaviours, or practices are seen as 
transgressing Islamic norms or laws and, as such, irrespective of whether the perceived 
transgression of norms or laws occurred in Iran or abroad. Practices perceived as a 
transgression of these norms or laws depend on several factors, such as local context, actors 
involved and their interpretation of these norms or laws. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and Queries: Country Focus 
2024, 3.2.1, 3.9.1, 4.10, 4.11.8; COI Human Rights, 1.6; COI Musicians. Country Guidance should 
not be referred to as source of COI. 

A wide range of behaviours may be considered to be transgressive of Islamic norms and laws: 
non-respect of Islamic obligations, art challenging Islamic constraints, consumption of alcohol, 
interfaith relationships, extra-marital relations, theft and stealing of others property, listening 
to or producing heavy metal and foreign music, etc.  

This profile may overlap with Individuals perceived to have committed blasphemy and/or 
apostasy, including converts and atheists, Women and girls, Persons with diverse SOGIESC 
(also referred to as LGBTIQ persons). 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts reported to be committed against individuals under this profile are of such severe 
nature that they amount to persecution. More specifically, Hadd punishments include the 

(14)   CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 

2012, para. 80, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en 

34 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

death penalty and other severe punishments, such as limb amputation for theft and robbery, 
flogging for drinking alcohol, stoning for adultery.  

Furthermore, insulting ‘Islamic sanctities or the Supreme Leader’ and offences against public 
morals and decency, such as illicit relationships between men and women, dress code 
deemed un-Islamic by the Iranian authorities, and consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling, 
and vagrancy may result in ta’zir punishments, including imprisonment, flogging, fines, and 
other penalties. As the offences and the punishments are classified into eight degrees, with 
the severity decreasing from the harshest in the first degree to the mildest in the eighth, 
whether the acts would amount to persecution would depend on the specific offence.  

Artists challenging Islamic constraints, including musicians, face enhanced online monitoring, 
punishments or restrictions on their ability to work and travel.   

Apart from persecution by the authorities, individuals under this profile, including women and 
girls who refused forced marriages, who were victim of rape, who got divorced, who had 
sexual relationships before marriage, or were engaged in adultery, may face honour-related 
violence that could amount to persecution from non-State actors such as their family 
members.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

For individuals accused to have committed any of the acts punishable under hadd 
punishment, a category of crimes under Islamic Law, such as sexual intercourse outside 
marriage/adultery (zina), sodomy and homosexual acts between men (livat), lesbian 
relationship, false accusation of fornication/sodomy, defamation of the Prophet, ‘waging war 
against God’ (moharebeh ba khoda), corruption on Earth (efsad fil-arz), a well-founded fear of 
persecution would in general be substantiated.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
individuals perceived to have transgressed other Islamic norms and laws to face 
persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Nature and visibility of the transgression: the nature, the repetitiveness and the 

visibility of the transgression, be it in Iran or abroad, impact the risk. Artists whose art 
challenges Islamic constraints and especially high-profile artists face a higher risk. 
Please also refer to Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers for the situation of 
artists challenging the political constraints imposed by the Iranian authorities.  

•  Gender:  in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, female individuals under 

this profile may be at higher risk. Please refer to Women and girls.  

•  Ethnic and/or religious background: being a member of some ethnic or religious 

minorities could impact the risk to face persecution. Please refer to Ethnic minorities 
and Religious minorities.  

•  Family and social environment: belonging to a more conservative environment could 
increase the risk of a transgression being perceived as a violation of Islamic norms or 
laws. 

35 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, 
both when individuals are targeted by the Iranian authorities, and their family or other non-
State actors, persecution may be for reasons of religion and/or for reasons of membership of 
a particular social group, based on their common background which cannot be changed 
(perceived past behaviour) and/or a shared characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to 
identity or conscience that they should not be forced to renounce it (opposition to cultural, 
social or religious norms and the unwillingness to comply with them). They may also be 
considered to have a distinct identity in the context of Iran, because they may be perceived 
as being different by the surrounding society.  

In the case of targeting by the Iranian authorities, persecution may (also) be for reasons of 
(imputed) political opinion as some transgressing behaviours such as ‘war against God’ are 
seen as offences against the State. 

3.5.  Ethnic minorities 

This section covers the international protection needs of Kurds and Baluches.  

There is no commonly agreed definition of ethnic group, but it is generally viewed as a 
community (including a minority and/or an indigenous people) with common characteristics 
such as language, religion, common history, culture, customs and mores, way of life or place 
of residence [EASO Practical Guide: Qualification for international protection, p.22]. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 2, 3.9, 4.7; COI Human Rights, 1.3. Country Guidance should not be referred to as 
source of COI. 

Ethnic minorities in Iran continued to be targeted by the authorities, in particular Kurds and 
Baluches.  

Article 19 of the Iranian Constitution ensures equal rights for all ethnic groups, but in practice, 
ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Kurds, Baluches, and Arabs, face targeting and 
discrimination by authorities, including stigmatising and defamatory narratives disseminated 
by state-sponsored media, which sometimes include incitement to violence. Kurds, Baluches 
and Arabs who claim political rights are perceived as threats against the national security and 
territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic. Separatists groups are particularly targeted by the 
Iranian authorities. The UN Special Rapporteur and USIP reported in 2023 that these 
minorities are often imprisoned on vague charges and face unfair trials. The UN OHCHR 
expressed concern over the high number of executions, including those of minority members. 
In 2023, Human Rights Activists in Iran documented 324 arrests of ethnic minorities members, 
with 156 occurring without a warrant.  

The death penalty has been wielded by the Iranian authorities as a tool of political repression 
against ethnic minorities.  

36 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

3.5.1.  Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 2.2, 4. 
Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

As of 2016, Kurds constituted more or less 10% of the total Iranian population of 83.5 million 
individuals. Iranian Kurds live mostly in the mountainous regions on the border with Türkiye 
and Iraq. Kurds are predominantly Sunni and partly Shia. Faili Kurds are a cross-border ethnic 
group residing mainly at the Iran and Iraq border and are Shia Muslims. Yarsan Kurds primarily 
inhabit the Kurdish provinces in the western part of Iran, comprising a community of 
approximately three million individuals.  

Kurds constitute a specific ethnic group. They speak a different language, have political 
claims, and have armed groups in Iraq. Kurds continued to be perceived by the Islamic 
Republic ‘as a threat to the foundation of the country’(15). The suppression of the Republic of 
Mahabad in 1946 and the denial of Kurdish autonomy following the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
reflect a long history of denying Kurdish autonomy and at times independence. The conflict 
post-1979 led to the destruction of Kurdish villages and the death of approximately 10 000 
Kurds. 

For activities seen as political dissent by the Iranian authorities, please refer to Political 
dissent and opposition.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which Kurds could be exposed to could, by their severity and/or 
repetitiveness or because they occur as an accumulation of various measures, amount to 
persecution. Notably, Kurds face significant political and cultural restrictions. They have 
limited access to high political positions, and Kurdish language education is prohibited, such 
as in the city of Saqqez in 2010. In addition, Kurdish regions are economically deprived, 
forcing Kurds to seek work in other cities where they face ethnic screening and 
discrimination. Kurdish defendants have been subjected to harsher sentences when they 
were detained in cities such as Tehran, Urmia, or Isfahan.  

Some acts to which Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds could be exposed are of such severe 
nature that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Faili Kurds faced forced 
displacement from Iraq to Iran. They have neither gained Iranian nor regained Iraqi 
citizenship. Due to their statelessness, they have been subjected to discrimination. Yarsan 
Kurds have experienced difficulties such as systematic discrimination, restrictions on religious 
practices, arbitrary arrests, and legal harassment aimed at suppressing the Yarsan 
community's religious identity and activities.  

(15)   Expert on Kurdish population and regions in Iran, interview 20 March 2024, and email communication, 27 

March 2024. 

37 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for Kurds 
to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Political profile: Kurds with a political profile face a higher risk. Kurds undergo security 

screenings (gozinesh) that probe their political affiliations and views on Kurdish 
independence, creating an atmosphere of constant surveillance and harassment. 
Kurdish political prisoners face executions on charges such as ‘taking up arms against 
the State’. The specific targeting and execution of Kurds during protests and regular 
legal actions against them (e.g., executions for ‘deliberate murder’ and ‘narcotic 
drugs’) further exemplify persecution. The crackdown on Kurdish protestors has led to 
many fleeing to Iraq. Members or sympathisers of opposition groups such as the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) are automatically targeted and detained. 
•  Ethnic and/or religious background: Yarsan Kurds are particularly at risk since the 

Iranian authorities aim at suppressing their religious identity and activities. Being Sunni 
or Sufi also exposes Kurds to a higher risk since the regime is Shia-dominated. Being 
Faili also enhances the risk since Faili Kurds have been subjected to discrimination.   
•  Occupation: Kurds working as kolbars face severe and targeted violence including 
shootings from Iranian border forces who consider them as smugglers. Also, Kurds 
having served in the IRGC or Basij face a backlash from their community, including 
being labelled as traitors, which can lead to targeted violence from Kurdish armed 
groups. 

•  Gender: Kurdish women face several layers of oppression, including ethnic, religious, 
and gender discrimination, increasing their vulnerability. Also, in regard of the general 
situation of women in Iran, Kurdish women are at higher risk. Please refer to Women 
and girls.  

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of race, religion (Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan belong to a  
distinct ethno-religious group) and/or nationality.  

3.5.2.  Baluches 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 2.1, 
4.7.5. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

As of 2016, Baluches constituted 2% of the total Iranian population of 83.5 million individuals. 
The Baluch region is spread between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and within Iran it 
comprises the provinces of eastern Hormozgan, southern Kerman, southern Khorasan, and 
Sistan and Baluchistan, where the majority of Baluches live. The Baluch community is based 
on a tribal and clan system. Baluches are predominantly Sunni Muslims.  

38 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which Baluches could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. More specifically, the Baluch population has continued to be 
targeted by the Islamic Republic since 1979, suggesting a long-standing pattern of 
discrimination and persecution. They have been subjected to executions, of women included. 
Baluch defendants faced harsher sentences when they were detained in cities such as 
Tehran, Urmia, or Isfahan.  

When the acts in question are restrictions on the exercise of certain rights of less severe 
nature or (solely) discriminatory measures, the individual assessment of whether they could 
amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts 
or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures. Over 100,000 Baluch people 
in the Sistan and Baluchistan province lack official documents and are considered stateless, 
which denies them basic rights and services. Statelessness, in itself, does not amount to 
persecution, however when it prevents access to public services, this may reach the 
threshold for persecution. Baluch-inhabited provinces are economically disadvantaged. As a 
consequence, some Baluches rely on smuggling activities to ensure their basic needs 
(sokhtbars). Sokhtbars (fuel carriers) have been shot dead or injured by the Iranian security 
forces who consider them as smugglers. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
Baluches to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such 
as: 

•  Political profile: Baluch protesters were particularly targeted during protests. 

Affiliation to Jaish Al-Adl, an extremist Sunni Muslim militant group, or to Ansar al-
Furqan, another Sunni Baluch militia group, increases the risk. 

•  Religious affiliation: being Sunni exposes Baluches to a higher risk since the regime 

is Shia-dominated. 

•  Occupation: Baluches working as sokhtbar (fuel carriers) face severe and targeted 
violence including shootings from Iranian border forces who consider them as 
smugglers. The reported deaths of dozens of sokhtbars due to shootings highlight 
severe and targeted violence against the Baluch community. Iranian authorities have 
executed numerous Baluch individuals, including women, often on charges related to 
drug crimes. The executions are reported to be frequent and sometimes carried out 
secretly. 

•  Gender: in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, Baluch women are at 

higher risk. Please refer to Women and girls.  

39 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant under this profile, 
this may be for reasons of race, religion (Baluches are a distinct ethno-religious group) and/or 
nationality. 

Exclusion considerations could be relevant to Baluches members of Jaish Al-Adl 
and Ansar al-Furqan (see Exclusion). 

3.6.  Religious minorities 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 4.8; COI Human Rights, 1.4. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of 
COI. 

According to Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution of 1979, ‘Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian 
Iranians are the only recognised religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free 
to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in 
matters of personal affairs and religious education’. Religious freedom continues to be 
restricted, even for these groups.  

Proselytising in Iran is considered as a crime against the internal and external security of the 
State and is ‘punishable by death’. 

This chapter on religious minorities should be read in conjunction with Individuals perceived 
to have committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts and atheists.  

3.6.1.  Christians 

Last update: January 2025 

This sub-profile covers the situation of individuals belonging to the Christian community that 
was existing before the establishment of the Islamic Republic (referred to in this section as 
‘Christians by birth’). It includes ‘ethnic Christians’ (Armenians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians) and 
‘non-ethnic Christians’ (protestants).  

For the situation of converts to Christianity, please refer to Individuals perceived to have 
committed blasphemy and/or apostasy, including converts and atheists. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI reports: Country Focus 2024, 4.8.2.  
Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

According to Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution of 1979, Christians by birth are a recognised 
religious minority, who, within the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and 
ceremonies, and to act according to their own canon in matters of personal affairs and 
religious education.  

40 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Proselytising in Iran is considered as a crime against the internal and external security of the 
State and is ‘punishable by death’. 

In Iran, Christians by birth who wish to worship in the national language (Persian) meet in 
private places, which are known as house-churches.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which Christians by birth could be exposed are of such severe nature that 
they would amount to persecution. More specifically, Christian beliefs perceived as insulting 
Islam and some practices (such as practising in Persian, possessing religious material in 
Persian, preaching to other Iranians, inviting them to their churches, and inviting converts) are 
considered as crimes by the Iranian authorities and are punishable by death under ta’zir. 
Christians who proselytise or visit house churches are subjected to arrest, imprisonment and 
prosecution.  

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Christians could be subjected to and 
whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should also be considered. 
Depending on the Christian group and the expression of their religious belief, Christians by 
birth have been subjected to confiscation of property, monitoring and discrimination.  

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

For Christians by birth frequenting house churches and Christian proselytisers, a well-
founded fear of persecution would in general be substantiated.  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for other 
Christians by birth to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as: 

•  Visibility of the applicant: applicants with a specific profile in a Christian community 
such as being a leader of the community in Iran or abroad, or appearing in the media, 
in Iran or abroad, as a representative of the community would impact the risk since 
those elements substantiate the public expression of the faith.  

•  Being known to the authorities: applicants already known to the authorities such as 
those who were already arrested, whether in relation to their faith or other reasons, 
face a higher risk.  

•  Link to foreign actors: in the context of Iran, an individual with links to a Western actor 
(such as a Western country, a non-governmental organisation or an international 
organisation settled in a Western country) faces a higher risk.  

•  Gender: in regard of the general situation of women in Iran, Christian women by birth 

are at higher risk. Please refer to Women and girls.   

41 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

It should be highlighted that no applicant under this profile can reasonably be expected to 
abstain from their religious practice in order to avoid persecution(16). 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
sub-profile, this persecution is highly likely to be for reasons of religion, as Christians would 
be seen as insulting Islam and/or promoting atheism. As Christianity is categorised under 
‘political-security crimes’ and is seen by the Islamic Republic ‘as a Western religion’, where 
well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated, this persecution may also be for reasons of 
(imputed) political opinion. 

3.6.2. Baha’is 

Last update: January 2025 

This sub-profile includes persons who believe in and practice the Baha’i religion and/or are 
part of the Baha’i community in Iran. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 4.8.3; COI Human Rights, 1.4. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of 
COI. 

The Baha’i religion is not recognised in Iran and its followers are perceived by the Islamic 
Republic as a non-Muslim group. The Baha’is have historically faced systematic ideological, 
political, educational, and economic pressure in Iran and have been increasingly targeted by 
the Islamic Republic. Followers of the Baha’i faith are banned from publicly practicing their 
religion, including the establishment of their places of worship.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which Baha’is could be exposed are of such severe nature that they would 
amount to persecution. More specifically, Baha’is face arrests, raids on their homes, and 
imprisonment. Such acts have increased as Iranian authorities have accused the Baha’is of 
instigating the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement, and hate speech increased. Furthermore, 
arbitrary detentions of Baha’i women surged during the September 2022 protests, as part of 
the State's ongoing targeting of the community. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that Baha’is could be subjected to and 
whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also taken into 
account. Baha’is face harassment, confiscation of their personal belongings and properties, 
refusal to access universities or obtain work permits, and destruction of their cemeteries. 
Baha’is must either lie about their faith to receive a national identification card or be denied 
access to services, such as insurance, education, banking, and, most recently, public 

(16)   CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 

2012, para. 80, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en 

42 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

transportation. Unrecognised religious minority groups face barriers accessing education and 
employment in government jobs. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for a 
Baha’i to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: 

•  Political profile: Baha’is with a political profile, such as taking part to demonstrations, 
face a higher risk since the Baha’is are accused by the Iranian authorities of initiating 
the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement.  

•  Visibility of the applicant: applicants with a specific profile in the community such as 

being a leader of the community in Iran or abroad, or appearing in the media, in Iran or 
abroad, as a representative of the community would impact the risk since those 
elements substantiate the public expression of the faith.  

•  Being known to the authorities: applicants already known to the authorities such as 

those who were already arrested, be it in relation to their faith or other reasons, face a 
higher risk.  

•  Gender: Baha’i women face a higher risk than Baha’i men in regard of the general 

situation of women in Iran and also because Baha’i women were increasingly targeted 
during protests, especially during the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests. Please also 
refer to Women and girls.  

It should be highlighted no applicant under this profile can reasonably be expected to abstain 
from their religious practice in order to avoid persecution(17). 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this persecution is highly likely to be for reasons of religion, as Baha’is are seen by the 
Islamic Republic as a deviant sect of Islam.  

3.7.  Women and girls 

This profile refers to women and girls and the different forms of violence and discrimination to 
which they are subjected. Please note that women and girls may be targeted by both The 
Iranian authorities and non-State actors, such as their family or community. 

Last update: January 2025 

(17)   CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 

2012, para. 80, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en 

43 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 3, 4.3, 4.7.2, 4.11; COI Human Rights, 1.5, 1.7. Country Guidance should not be referred 
to as source of COI. 

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has imposed significant restrictions 
on the rights of women and girls, which have deeply impacted their lives.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Some acts to which women and girls could be exposed are of such severe nature that they 
would amount to persecution. In particular, women and girls in Iran have been subjected to 
the death penalty, torture, corporal punishments, domestic violence including domestic 
servitude, forced and child marriage, honour killings and FGM practices, trafficking in human 
beings and related executions in case of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation. Forced marriage amounts to persecution. Child marriage is considered forced 
marriage, therefore, persecution. 

The severity and/or repetitiveness of other acts that women and girls could be subjected to 
and whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures, should be also considered. 
Women face institutionalised legal, judicial, social, and economic discrimination. They have 
been facing restrictions and discrimination, including the lowering of the marriage age for 
girls, limitations on divorce, child custody, inheritance, and dress code. Women are also 
prohibited from entering the workplace without wearing a hijab, dancing in public, riding 
bicycles, joining the army, participating in public sports, and becoming president. Women's 
mobility and autonomy are further restricted by the requirement of a male relative’s 
permission or consent. Their court testimony and inheritance are deemed worth half that of 
men. The Chastity and Mandatory Hijab Bill approved by the Guardian Council in September 
2024 further intensified the State's control over women’s bodies and movements, and 
escalated penalties for unveiled women, including social service restrictions, and property 
confiscation. The enforcement of this bill, despite promises to halt the morality police, signals 
increased repression. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for 
women and girls to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting 
circumstances, such as: 

•  Political profile: Women have been subjected to severe restrictions on freedom of 
expression and assembly, with harsh penalties for dissent, including death or 
imprisonment. Women activists and protesters are at higher risk of physical, 
psychological, and sexual violence, including State-sanctioned torture and inhumane 
and degrading treatment in detention. Please refer to Political dissent and opposition.  
•  Ethnic and/or religious background: Women and girls of ethnic and religious minorities 
face several layers of discrimination which make them more at risk than other women. 
Please refer to Ethnic minorities and Religious minorities.  

44 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

•  Perception of traditional gender norms in the family: The risk of honour-based 

violence as well as of domestic violence is dependent on how the (extended) family, 
including the husband, perceive the traditional gender norms. 

•  Home area and residence: Women and girls originating from (more) conservative areas 
are  at  higher  risk.  In  rural  areas,  control  over  women  is  stricter  due  to  close-knit 
community  surveillance,  while  in  larger  cities  like  Mashhad,  Isfahan,  and  Tehran,  the 
higher  education  levels  and  open-minded  attitudes  afford  women  more  freedom, 
including the dress-code.  

•  Socio-economic  situation:  Poor  socioeconomic  situation  could  render  the  applicant 
more vulnerable to abuses, such as sexual exploitation, trafficking in human beings and 
trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation.   

•  Family  status:  Alone  women  are  at  higher  risk  of  sexual  exploitation,  trafficking  in 
human beings for the purpose of sexual exploitation and trafficking in human beings.  

Links to persecution under other profiles may also be relevant, in particular Individuals 
perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws. 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this is likely to be for reasons of membership of a particular social group(18). This may 
apply for instance to women victims of trafficking in human beings for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation. Such women may be stigmatised by the surrounding society because of their 
common background which cannot be changed (sex outside marriage). Other grounds such 
as religion and (imputed) political opinion may also be substantiated.  

3.8.  Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as 

LGBTIQ persons) 

Last update: January 2025 

This profile refers to persons who are perceived as not conforming to religious and/or social 
norms because of their sexual orientation (SO) and/or gender identity and expression (GIE), 
and sex characteristics (SC), including the treatment of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual or trans-gender, 
intersex and queer, also commonly referred to as (LGBTIQ) individuals. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 3.2.1., 
3.9.1., 4.12. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

(18)   CJEU, Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet v WS, case C-621/21, 

judgment of 16 January 2024, para. 81, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=281302&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=r
eq&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1717409  

45 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

In Iran, same-sex relationships face severe social, religious, and legal prohibitions. The 
government labels homosexuality as 'faggotry' (hamjensbazi) and often refers to LGBTIQ 
individuals as 'deviant' and 'sick.' The Iranian legal system criminalizes same-sex acts under 
Islamic hadd crimes. Despite the legal acceptance of gender-affirming surgeries, transgender 
individuals face discrimination, lack of mental health support, and social stigma. They 
encounter physical and psychological abuse, with recent arrests highlighting ongoing 
persecution.  

Persecution could be by the Iranian authorities or other actors, as well as by the family and/or 
the society in general, as there is a low societal tolerance in Iran for individuals with sexual 
orientation, gender identities or gender expression perceived as deviating from the ‘norm’. 

Please also refer to Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers for the general situation of 
human rights activists, and to Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or 
laws.  

Step 1: Do the reported acts amount to persecution? 

Acts to which persons with diverse SOGIESC could be exposed are of such severe nature 
that they would amount to persecution. More specifically, The Penal Code stipulates the 
death penalty for certain same-sex acts. Same-sex relations between men (livat) and women 
(mosahaqa) can result in death or corporal punishment. Reports indicate that LGBTIQ 
individuals often suffer mistreatment and sexual violence in detention facilities. Also, LGBTIQ 
persons in Iran frequently endure stigma, discrimination, and violence from various societal 
sectors such as their families, communities and even health care providers.  

Activists advocating for LGBTIQ rights further experience censorship, harassment, arbitrary 
arrests, and can be accused of promoting homosexuality. 

Step 2: What is the level of risk of persecution?  

Given the criminalisation of same-sex acts with severe punishments including the death 
penalty, the widespread discrimination and social stigma reinforced by the authorities’ hate 
speech, the (sexual) violence faced by LGBTIQ persons including in detention, the lack of 
mental health support and arbitrary arrests, it can be concluded that, a well-founded fear of 
persecution would in general be substantiated for both persons with (perceived) SOGIESC  
and for activists and lawyers advocating for LGBTIQ rights, since they may be perceived as 
promoting anti-Islamic behaviour.  

It has to be noted that an applicant cannot be expected to conceal their sexual orientation or 
gender identity to avoid persecution(19).  

(19)   CJEU, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z, joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 

November 2013, X and Y and Z, paras. 70-76, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7670158   

46 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Step 3: Is there a ground for persecution?  

Where well-founded fear of persecution is substantiated for an applicant falling under this 
profile, this is  highly likely to be for reasons of membership of a particular social group, based 
on a shared characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to the identity of the applicant, that 
they should not be forced to renounce it, and based on their distinct identity in Iran, because 
they are perceived as being different by the surrounding society(20). Persecution of individuals 
under this profile may also be for reasons of religion, since the Iranian legal system 
criminalizes same-sex acts under Islamic hadd crimes. 

(20)   CJEU, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z, joined cases C-199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 

November 2013, X and Y and Z, paras. 45-49, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7670158 

47 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

4.  Subsidiary protection 

This chapter addresses the EU-regulated status of subsidiary protection. Where the applicant 
has not been found to qualify as a refugee, they may be eligible for subsidiary protection in 
accordance with Article 15 QD/QR. 

Article 15 QD/QR 

The contents of this chapter include: 

Under the section Article 15(a) QD/QR, the analysis focuses on the applicable EU 
legal framework and the factual circumstances surrounding the ‘death penalty or 
execution’ in Iran. 

The section on Article 15(b) QD/QR looks into the risk of ‘torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment’ in relation to particular circumstances in Iran. 

Under the section Article 15(c) QD/QR, the analysis covers the different elements of 
the provision, looking into: ‘armed conflict’, ‘qualification of a person as a ‘civilian’, 
‘indiscriminate violence’, ‘serious and individual threat’ (where further 
individualisation elements are discussed), ‘qualification of the harm as ‘threat to life 
or person’, and the interpretation of the nexus ‘by reasons of’. 

4.1.  Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 15(a) QD/QR 

As noted in the chapter Refugee status, some profiles of applicants from Iran may be at risk of 
death penalty or execution. In such cases, there would often be a nexus to a reason for 
persecution falling under the definition of a refugee (for example, Members and sympathisers 
of opposition parties and movements (perceived as) critical of the Iranian authorities, 
Protesters, Journalists and other media workers (perceived as) critical of the Iranian 
authorities, Individuals perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws, Ethnic 
minorities, and Persons with diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons), and 
those individuals would qualify for refugee status.  

48 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

In cases where there is no nexus to a Convention ground, the need for subsidiary protection 
under Article 15(a) QD/QR should be examined. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 3.4, 3.7, 
3.9. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

Iran is among the leading practitioners of the death penalty globally. Cruel and inhumane 
practices were reported among the methods employed in executions, such as hanging by 
cranes. 

Death penalty is envisaged under the Iranian Penal code and can be imposed for offences, 
such as drug trafficking, financial corruption, vandalism, and peaceful exercise of freedom of 
expression. Offences punished by death-penalty are categorised under hadd, qesas 
(intentional or unintentional homicide) or ta’zir (drug-related offences). In the case of qesas 
punishments, members of the victim’s family were encouraged to carry out executions 
themselves. Under hadd, a wide series of offences can lead to a death penalty sentence: 
sexual offences, such as incest, rape, sexual intercourse outside marriage/adultery (zina), 
sodomy or consensual homosexual penetrative sex (livat), and intercrural sex where the 
‘active party’ is a non-Muslim and the ‘passive party’ is a Muslim (tafkhiz); offences against the 
State, such as ‘war against God’, (moharebeh ba khoda), corruption on Earth (efsad fil-arz) 
and rebellion (baghy), and offences against the religion such as insulting the prophet (sabol-
nabi) and apostasy (ertedad); repeated offences on the fourth occasion including theft, 
adultery, sodomy, lesbian sex (mosahegheh), intercrural sex, pimping, alcohol consumption, 
false accusation of sodomy or adultery (qadf) and the crimes of moharebeh, efsad-filarz and 
baghy.  

Execution of minors is permissible beginning at 9 years old for girls and 13 for boys.  

Since 2010, the Revolutionary Courts have handed down death sentences resulting in at least 
4 541 executions. These courts, established in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, hold the 
power to adjudicate all matters pertaining to national security, which encompasses political 
and press crimes. They also deal with crimes involving drugs and psychotropic substances, 
cases involving financial crimes, trafficking or counterfeiting of goods, economic offences, 
smuggling of cultural heritage or national assets abroad, illegal reproduction of audio-visual 
works, crimes related to public and private health institutions, bribery, embezzlement, fraud 
and gambling, etc. Cases potentially involving death penalty were generally assigned to 
judges executing the wishes of the security and intelligence agencies. Death sentences were 
pronounced despite confessions having been physically coerced. Complaints about torture 
were disregarded. Rights to a fair trial and due process were violated.  

Other Criminal Courts handle criminal charges that carry the death penalty, such as murder 
and rape, as well as cases related to adultery and LGBTIQ persons. 

More than 800 persons were executed in Iran in 2023, constituting a sharp increase in 
comparison with the previous years, partially due to the rise of executions linked to drug-
related offences. Ethnic minorities, and especially the Baluches, were overrepresented in the 
total number of executions. Geographical disparities reportedly impact court sentences with 

49 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

persons in areas such as Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchistan potentially facing death 
penalty while persons in Tehran would face imprisonment for the exact same offence.  

If there is a reasonable degree of likelihood of death penalty or execution, subsidiary 
protection under Article 15(a) QD/QR shall be granted, unless the applicant is to be excluded 
in accordance with Article 17/QR QD. 

In some cases, the death penalty would have been imposed for a serious crime 
committed by the applicant, or for other acts falling within the exclusion grounds 
(Article 17 QD/QR). Therefore, although the criteria of Article 15(a) QD would be met, 
exclusion considerations should be examined (see  Exclusion). 

4.2.  Article 15(b) QD/QR: torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment 

Article 15(b) QD 

As noted in the chapter on Refugee status, some profiles of applicants from Iran may be at 
risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see for example Protesters, 
Human rights defenders, activists, and lawyers, Desertion from armed forces, Individuals 
perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms or laws, Women and girls, and Persons with 
diverse SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons)). In such cases, there would often be a 
nexus to a reason for persecution falling under the definition of a refugee, and those 
individuals would qualify for refugee status. However, with reference to cases where there is 
no nexus to a Convention ground, the need for subsidiary protection under Article 15(b) 
QD/QR should be examined. 

The contents of this section include: 

4.2.1. Healthcare and socio-economic conditions 

4.2.2. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, and prison conditions 

4.2.3. Corporal punishments 

4.2.4. Criminal violence 

50 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

4.2.1.  Healthcare and socio-economic conditions 

Last update: January 2025 

It is important to note that serious harm must take the form of conduct of an actor 
(Article 6 QD/QR). In themselves, the general unavailability of healthcare, education 
or other socio-economic elements (e.g. difficulties in finding livelihood 
opportunities, housing) are not considered serious harm meeting the requirements 
of inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 15(b) QD/QR in relation to Article 6 
QD/QR, unless there is intentional conduct of an actor, such as the intentional 
deprivation of the applicant of appropriate healthcare. 

4.2.2.  Arbitrary arrests and detentions, and prison conditions 

Last update: January 2025 

Special attention should be paid to the phenomena of arbitrary arrests and illegal detention, 
as well as to prison conditions.  

Arbitrary arrests, judgements and detentions along with violations of fair trial and due 
process, and sentences based on vague laws were reported [Country Focus 2024, 3.1, 3.7, 
4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.11.2, 4.12] 

Despite legal safeguards prohibiting and punishing their use to obtain confessions, torture 
and ill-treatment, including sexual assault and rape, as well as denial of medical care were 
reported to be used in detention. Torture and ill-treatment were particularly reported in 
relation to treatment of persons involved in the ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ protests, including 
children, and in particular during arrests and interrogations. Detainees faced physical and 
psychological abuse, including verbal abuse of a sexual nature or based on ethnicity and 
religion and threats of death, rape and harm to family members. Sexual and gender-based 
violence was used against women, men, and children, including LGBTIQ persons. Dozens of 
deaths in prison under ‘suspicious circumstances’ were recorded since 2010. [Country Focus 
2024, 3.8] 

When assessing the conditions of detention, the following elements may be taken into 
consideration, cumulatively: number of detained persons in a limited space, adequacy of 
sanitation facilities, heating, lighting, sleeping arrangements, food, recreation or contact with 
the outside world. In Iran, prison conditions are characterised by overcrowding, lack of 
sanitation and ventilation, inadequate provision of food and insect infestation. Detainees 
suffered from hunger and insufficient medical help. Conditions of persons arrested in 
connection with the 2022 protests, including women and children, have been qualified by the 
UN Human Rights Council as ‘inhuman, cruel, or degrading treatment, and in certain 

51 

 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

instances, constituted torture’. Political prisoners were detained with potentially violent and 
dangerous criminals. [Country Focus 2024, 3.8] 

In cases where the prosecution or punishment is grossly unfair or disproportionate, 
or where a person is subjected to prison conditions which are not compatible with 
respect for human dignity, a situation of serious harm under Article 15(b) QD/QR 
can occur.  

It should be highlighted that in some cases of individuals facing the risk of arrest or 
detention in Iran, there would be a nexus to a reason for persecution falling under 
the definition of a refugee, and those individuals would qualify for refugee status. If 
nexus to a reason for persecution is not substantiated, Article 15(b) QD/QR would 
apply. 

Exclusion considerations may be relevant. 

4.2.3.  Corporal punishments 

Last update: January 2025 

The Iranian Penal Code stipulates corporal punishments for a wide range of offences, 
including death penalty, crucifixion, limb amputation, blinding, stoning, retributive ‘eye for an 
eye’ punishments, flogging, etc. Flogging could be used as a punishment for at least 148 
offences, while the punishment of amputation was used for 20 offences. In some cases, the 
punishment is at the discretion of the judge [Country Focus 2024, 3.2.]. 

Please also refer to Article 15(a) QD/QR: death penalty or execution. 

Corporal punishments, such as those described above, would meet the 
requirements of serious harm under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

Where there is no nexus to a reason for persecution under the refugee definition, 
and there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the individual to be subjected to 
corporal punishment, this risk would qualify under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

Exclusion considerations may be relevant. 

4.2.4.  Criminal violence  

Criminal gangs are involved in trafficking in human beings that take various forms such as 
forced labour, domestic servitude, forced marriage, trafficking for the purpose of sexual 

Last update: January 2025 

52 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

exploitation within Iran as well as to Iraq. Also, trafficking of human organs and blood in 
criminal markets takes place in major cities like Tehran, Shiraz and Tabriz. Efforts have been 
made by the Iranian authorities to combat trafficking in human beings that led to organ 
removal. [COI Human Rights, 1.7] 

A real risk of violent crime, such as violence related to trafficking in human beings, 
trafficking of human organs, and drug trafficking, would meet the requirements 
under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

Where there is no nexus to a reason for persecution under the refugee definition, 
and there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the individual to face violent 
crime, this risk would qualify under Article 15(b) QD/QR. 

Please also refer to  Other actors under Actors of persecution or serious harm, and Women 
and girls for violence linked to trafficking in women and girls. 

Exclusion considerations may be relevant to this profile, as some criminals may 
have been involved in excludable acts (see  Exclusion). 

4.3.  Article 15(c) QD/QR: indiscriminate violence in 

situations of armed conflict 

Article 15(c) QD/QR 

This section focuses on the application of the provision of Article 15(c) QD/QR. Under Article 
2(f) QD/3(6) QR in conjunction with Article 15(c) QD/QR, subsidiary protection is granted where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm defined as serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person 
by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed 
conflict.  

As mentioned in 'Country Guidance: Explained', all of these elements have to be fulfilled in 
order to grant subsidiary protection under Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

53 

 
 
  
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

4.3.1.  Reference period 

The following assessment is based on the EUAA Country Focus 2024, published in June 
2024 and concerning the reference period 1 January 2023–17 April 2024, with some limited 
information added during the finalisation of the report until 21 May 2024, and on the COI 
Update 2024, concerning the reference period 18 April 2024–7 October 2024, unless 
differently specified.  

Last update: January 2025 

This guidance should be considered valid as long as current events and 
developments fall within the trends and patterns of violence observed within the 
reference period of the mentioned COI report. New events and developments that 
cause substantial changes, new trends or geographical shifts in the violence, may 
lead to a different assessment. The security situation in a given territory should 
always be assessed in light of the most up-to-date COI available. 

4.3.2.  Assessment of indiscriminate violence in Iran 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report and query: Country Focus 
2024, 2; COI Update 2024, 2. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

Please refer to The Iranian authorities to know more about Iranian authorities as an actor of 
persecution or serious harm.  

Deliberate targeting of Kurds at Iran and Iraq border areas by the Iranian security forces 
occurred. See Kurds, including Faili Kurds and Yarsan Kurds. Deliberate targeting of Baluches 
also occurred. See Baluches. 

Security challenges leading to clashes occurred in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan 
(bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan) between Iranian security forces and Sunni militants as 
well as drug traffickers. Different anti-government groups including Baluch, Kurdish and Arab 
groups were active, none of them having territorial control.  

Clashes with, and attacks by, Baluch armed groups led to deaths in Iranian border forces, 
police forces, IRGC, and security personnel. Kurdish armed groups, several of whom have 
camps and bases in Kurdistan region of Iraq, were attacked by the Iranian authorities, both in 
Iran and Iraq. Arab groups mainly operate in Khuzestan province (bordering Iraq). A direct 
confrontation between Iran and Israel also occurred during the reference period.  

Out of the security incidents recorded by ACLED, 66 of the 96 battles and 11 of the 33 
explosions occurred in Sistan and Baluchistan province, while 8 of the 96 battles and 11 of the 
33 explosions occurred in Kurdistan. One battle occurred in West Azerbaijan.  

54 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

  No real risk 

  Nonetheless, taking into consideration the generally stable security situation in Iran, the 

territorial control of the Iranian State over the whole territory, the low numbers of security 
incidents, the majority of them being battles between armed actors with no impact on 
civilians, it is assessed that, in the whole territory of Iran, there is no real risk for a civilian 
to be personally affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) 
QD/QR.   

Since it is assessed that no indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
internal armed conflict is taking place in the whole territory of Iran, it is not 
necessary to assess the other elements (serious and individual threat, qualification 
of the harm as a ‘threat to (a civilian’s) life or person’, ‘nexus’/by reason of’) of the 
definition of serious harm under Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

Please note that while it is generally considered that a civilian would not be 
affected by indiscriminate violence within the meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR in 
Iran, including Tehran, this does not imply that Iran, including Tehran, is considered 
a safe area for any applicant. All circumstances specific to the applicant’s individual 
case have to be thoroughly assessed. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

5.  Actors of protection 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 7 QD/QR 

The contents of this chapter include: 

The State: outlining and analysing the capacity of the Iranian authorities to provide 
protection in accordance with Article 7 QD/QR. 

Parties or organisations, including international organisations: analysing whether 
other parties or organisations could qualify as actors of protection under Article 7 
QD/QR. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 1.1, 3, 
4.2, 4.7.2, 4.11.9, 4.12; COI Human Rights, 1.4. Country Guidance should not be referred to as 
source of COI. 

5.1.  The State 

The term ‘State’ (Article 7(1)(a) QD/QR) encompasses any organ exercising legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions and acting at any level, be it central, federal, 
regional, provincial or local. Sometimes, private entities may also be given State powers and 
be made responsible for providing protection under the control of the State. In order to 
qualify as an actor of protection, the State has to be able and willing to protect persons under 
its jurisdiction. 

The protection in the country of origin has to be effective, non-temporary and accessible to 
the applicant. 

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a hybrid governing system with theocratic authority and 
republican elements, under the Constitution of which separation of power exists between the 
executive, legislative and judiciary bodies. However, all State institutions are controlled by the 
Supreme Leader. 

Iran’s judicial system is based on Sharia (Islamic law). The judiciary in Iran consists of a 
Supreme Court, a Supreme Judicial Council, and lower courts and is defined as an 
independent power. However, the independence of the judiciary is constrained by the role of 
the Supreme Leader. The security apparatus is said to have gained more influence over the 
courts in recent year. Non effectiveness of appeals, issues to access independent legal aid, 
and violations of due process have extensively been reported.  

56 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

The Iranian police force is part of the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (FARAJA), and it operates as a national armed force organisation. The FARAJA was 
drawn from the urban police, the judicial police, the Gendarmerie, and the Islamic committee. 
More specifically, both the anti-riot police (yegan-e vizhe) and plain-clothed security agents 
were deployed in large numbers during protests, during which the Special Units of Iran's Law 
Enforcement Forces (LEF Special Units) used excessive and lethal force against unarmed 
protesters. 

The Iranian Islamic Penal Code does not explicitly criminalise violence against women. Iranian 
law lacks the means to provide adequate protection for victims of domestic violence. 
Intentional homicide cases, including honour killings and murder for adultery, may be 
punishable with retribution in kind (qesas) and, in case of forgiveness by the next of kin, may 
lead to a prison sentence of less than 10 years.  

Furthermore, killings related to the protection of honour are addressed according to sharia 
and often entail reduced sentences for the perpetrators. 

Effective protection is presumed not to be available when the State or agents of the 
State are the main actors of persecution or serious harm (Recital 27 QD/QR). 

When assessing the availability of State protection against other (non-State) actors, 
individual circumstances, such as home area, ethnicity, gender, social status, 
wealth, personal connections, actor of persecution and type of human rights 
violation must be taken into account. 

State protection is generally not considered available in situations where the 
applicant faces persecution or serious harm at the hands of society at large for 
reasons related to the prevalent social norms in Iran. This includes: 

•  In light of the climate of impunity for acts of violence against women, it is 

considered that State protection is generally not considered available for 
women facing domestic or honour-related violence, and gender-based 
violence, including harmful traditional practices.   

•  Some Kurds who served the IRGC or the Basij denounced their community 
members if they were involved in activism. As a consequence, Kurds that 
served the IRGC and Basij were perceived by their community as collaborators 
and/or ‘traitors’ and targeted by Kurdish armed groups. State protection is 
generally not considered available for Kurds, especially for those who served 
the IRGC and Basij. 

•  State protection is generally not considered available for individuals 

perceived to have transgressed Islamic norms of laws and facing persecution 
by the society at large since the State is in itself an actor of persecution. 
•  State protection is generally not considered available for atheists and 

converts from Islam to another religion.   

57 

 
 
  
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Because of the legal constraints and the hate speech of the authorities against 
persons with diverse SOGIESC, State protection is generally not considered 
available for persons with diverse SOGIESC facing social discrimination, 
violence from their families, their communities and healthcare providers. 

5.2.  Parties or organisations 

In the context of Article 7 QD/QR, it is necessary that those parties or organisations control 
the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State. In order to consider that parties or 
organisations control a region or a larger area within the territory of the State, it should be 
established that they exercise governmental functions. Furthermore, those parties or 
organisations have to be willing and able to provide protection against persecution or serious 
harm as defined in Article 7(2) QD/QR. 

No parties or organisations that control a region or larger area within the State and 
are able to provide protection were identified in Iran. 

In case protection needs have been established in the home area, and in the absence of an 
actor who can provide protection in the meaning of Article 7 QD/QR, the examination may 
continue with consideration of any internal protection alternative (IPA), if applicable in 
accordance with national legislation and practice. 

58 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

6.  Internal protection alternative 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 8 QD/QR 

The contents of this chapter include: 

Preliminary remarks 

6.1. Part of the country 

6.2. Safety 

6.3. Travel and admittance  

6.4. Reasonableness to settle 

Preliminary remarks 

This chapter looks into the topic of internal protection alternative. It analyses the situation in 
Tehran in relation to the requirements of Article 8 QD/QR. 

In order to determine that internal protection alternative is available in a particular part of the 
applicant’s country of origin, three cumulative criteria have to be met, namely: ‘safety’, ‘travel 
and admittance’ and ‘reasonableness to settle’. 

In relation to these elements, when assessing the applicability of IPA, the case officer should 
consider the general situation in Tehran, as well as the individual circumstances of the 
applicant. 

6.1.  Part of the country 

The first step in the analysis of IPA is to identify a particular part of the country with regard to 
which the criteria of Article 8 QD/QR would be examined in the individual case. 

The example of Tehran has been selected as the capital, biggest city, and economic centre of 
Iran.  

Last update: January 2025 

59 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The selection of Tehran for this common analysis and guidance note does not prevent case 
officers from considering the application of IPA for other parts of Iran, provided that all criteria 
described hereunder are met. 

6.2.  Safety 

Last update: January 2025 

6.2.1.  Absence of persecution or serious harm 

When examining the element ‘absence of persecution or serious harm’, the decision-maker 
should refer to chapters 2 to 5 of this document. 

When assessing the requirement of safety with regard to the applicability of IPA in individual 
cases of applicants from Iran, the following elements should be taken into account: 

General security situation in relation to indiscriminate violence 

The general security situation in the particular part of the country that is being examined as an 
alternative for internal protection in the individual case should be assessed in accordance 
with the analysis under the section on Article 15(c) QD/QR. 

The conclusion with regard to Tehran, is as follows: 

In Tehran, there is, in general, no real risk for a civilian to be personally affected within the 
meaning of Article 15(c) QD/QR.  

Actor of persecution or serious harm and their reach 

In case where the person fears persecution or serious harm by State actors (e.g. political 
dissidents, ethnic and religious minorities), there is a presumption that IPA would not be 
available (Recital 27 QD/QR). 

In some cases, where the applicant faces persecution or serious harm for reasons related to 
the prevalent social norms in Iran, especially for women and girls, and the actor of 
persecution or serious harm is the Iranian society at large (e.g. for Individuals perceived to 
have transgressed Islamic norms or laws, Women and girls and Persons with diverse 
SOGIESC (also referred to as LGBTIQ persons), taking into account the reach of the actor of 
persecution or serious harm, the general lack of State protection for such applicants and their 
vulnerability to potential new forms of persecution or serious harm, the safety criterion would 
in general not be met.  

Whether the profile of the applicant is considered a priority target and/or a threat by the 
actor of persecution or serious harm 

60 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

The profile of the applicant could make him or her a priority target, increasing the likelihood 
that the actor of persecution or serious harm would attempt to trace the applicant in the 
potential IPA location (e.g. honour-related violence, etc.) 

Behaviour of the applicant 

It is recalled that an applicant cannot be reasonably expected to abstain from practices 
fundamental to his or her identity, such as those related to religion or sexual orientation, in 
order to avoid the risk of persecution or serious harm(21). 

Other risk-enhancing circumstances 

The information under the chapter Refugee status should be used to assist in this 
assessment. 

6.2.2. Availability of protection against persecution or serious harm 

Alternatively, case officers may determine that the requirement of safety is satisfied if the 
applicant would have access to protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in 
Article 7 QD/QR in the area where IPA is considered. In the case of persecution by the State, 
a presumption of non-availability of State protection applies. 

See the chapter on Actors of protection. 

The requirement of safety may be satisfied in Tehran, depending on the profile and 
the individual circumstances of the applicant. For those who have a well-founded 
fear of persecution by the Iranian authorities and/or by society at large, the criterion 
of safety would generally not be met in Tehran.  

6.3.  Travel and admittance 

Last update: January 2025 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 4.6, 5.1; 
COI Update 2024, 3; COI Human Rights, 1.5, 2.1. Country Guidance should not be referred to 
as source of COI. 

In case the criterion of ‘safety’ is satisfied, as a next step, it has to be established whether an 
applicant can safely and legally travel and gain admittance to Tehran. 

(21)   CJEU, Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel v X and Y and Z v Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, joined cases C-

199/12 to C-201/12 judgment of 7 November 2013, X and Y and Z, paras. 70-76, 
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144215&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=l
st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7670158 
CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y and Z, joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, judgment of 5 September 
2012, para. 80, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=126364&doclang=en 

61 

 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The general situation and the individual circumstances of the applicant should be taken into 
account in this assessment. 

Safe travel: there should be a safe route, through which the applicant can practically travel 
without undue difficulty, so that he or she can access the area of IPA without serious risks. In 
this regard, the assessment of the travel route from the airport to the city is part of the ‘safe 
travel’ criterion and has to be assessed carefully based on relevant COI. 

Taking into consideration the generally stable security situation in Iran, the territorial control of 
the Iranian State over the whole territory, the low numbers of security incidents, and the 
availability of an international airport, the requirement of safety of travel would in general be 
considered met with regard to Tehran. 

Legal travel: there should be no legal obstacles that prevent the applicant from travelling to 
the safe area. 

Iranian law guarantees freedom on internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation and these rights are generally respected by the authorities, albeit with certain 
exceptions concerning released prisoners, women, and migrants. Leaving the country without 
completing the military service may stop individuals from returning to the country. Freedom of 
movement of a woman may also be restricted by her husband. A married woman requires her 
husband’s written consent to secure a passport or travel abroad. Single women over 18 could 
obtain a passport without permission, however, they still require their guardian’s consent to 
travel abroad. Furthermore, administrative bodies deny women access to public institutions, 
including airports, if they do not cover their hair. 

Travel bans may be imposed on persons perceived as a threat to national security, such as 
former political prisoners, human rights defenders, and journalists. 

Apart from the abovementioned groups, it is concluded that there are in principle no legal 
restrictions to travel to and within Iran, including Tehran. 

Gain admittance: the applicant should be allowed to access the safe area by the actor(s) who 
control it. 

Every Iranian citizen has the right to return to the country, even without a passport. Iranians 
residing abroad who, for some reason, do not possess a valid passport and wish to return to 
the country, provided they left Iran legally, can re-enter the Islamic Republic of Iran using a 
barg-e oboor (travel permit). These permits are being issued by the Iranian embassies abroad. 

According to the law, Iranian nationals are required to register their address within 20 days of 
changing the place of residence to access administrative and government services. 

For those applicants who meet the ‘safety’ criterion, the assessment of the 
availability of IPA should proceed with an assessment of the requirements of safety 
and legality of travel and of gaining admittance. 

62 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Based on available COI, it is concluded that there are, in principle, no legal 
restrictions to travel or gain admittance to Tehran, albeit with certain exceptions for 
women and persons perceived as a threat to national security. 

6.4.  Reasonableness to settle 

Last update: January 2025 

According to Article 8(1) QD/QR, IPA can only apply if the applicant ‘can reasonably be 
expected to settle’ in the proposed area of internal protection. In case the criteria of safety 
and travel and admittance are met, the assessment of the availability of IPA in Tehran should 
proceed with an analysis of its reasonableness in light of the general situation in the city and 
the individual circumstances of the applicant. 

The analysis below is based on the following EUAA COI report: Country Focus 2024, 5.2; COI 
Update 2024, 3. Country Guidance should not be referred to as source of COI. 

6.4.1.   General situation 

Last update: January 2025 

Due to increased climate change challenges, Iran’s food security is threatened by water 
shortages. At the same time, economic downturn, depreciation of the Iranian rial and trade 
restrictions have negatively impacted the availability of food. As of September 2024, 
approximately 30 % of Iran's population lived below the poverty line and suffered from 
absolute poverty due to inadequate incomes to meet their basic needs. Furthermore, about 
6 % of the population endured extreme poverty and struggled to obtain even the most basic 
food items. Poverty is seen disproportionately in certain regions, such as Sistan and 
Baluchistan. 

Housing is largely a privatised sector, with market dynamics regulating purchase and rental 
prices. As a result of the persistently high cost of housing, in Tehran, and the decline in 
people’s purchasing power, some people are unable to obtain housing in Tehran and 
relocate to smaller towns surrounding the capital to avoid high rental costs.  

The existence of shanty settlements was reported in all 22 districts of Tehran, with nearly four 
million people living in informal settlements and impoverished areas in Tehran province. 
These settlements suffered from poor sanitary conditions and irregular access to water and 
heating. Generally, the situation with water supply and sanitation in Iran has improved, 
particularly in regard to accessibility to water supply in urban areas. The country is grappling 
with a severe energy crisis, resulting in power outages lasting up to eight hours. 

Primary healthcare is free of charge in Iran, provided in Tehran mainly by the nationwide 
Iranian Primary Health Care (PHC) network. Although there have been some safety incidents 

63 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

in recent years, in general, sources report good results, such as vaccination coverage and 
reduction of child mortality. 

Although employment saw a moderate growth in recent years, the labour market could not 
reach its pre-pandemic level, with labour participation showing a significant gender gap. 
Unemployment in Iran varies among subgroups, being the lowest among men and much 
higher among university graduates, women and the youth. Due to the prolonged economic 
downturn, scarce job opportunities, and limited access to employment, vulnerable Iranians 
are finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil their basic needs. 

The general circumstances prevailing in Tehran, assessed in relation to the factors 
above, do not preclude the reasonableness to settle in the city. However, a careful 
examination should take place, taking into account the individual circumstances of 
the applicant. 

6.4.2. Individual circumstances 

Last update: January 2025 

In addition to the general situation in the area of potential IPA, the assessment of whether it is 
reasonable to settle in that part of the country should take into account the individual 
circumstances of the applicant. 

The individual considerations could relate to certain vulnerabilities of the applicant as well as 
to available coping mechanisms, which would have an impact in determining to what extent it 
would be reasonable for the applicant to settle in a particular area. 

Please note that this is a non-exhaustive list: 

•  Gender: women and girls in Iran are generally subjected to discriminatory restrictions 
and may need the support of a male family member in order to access different 
services and to exercise certain rights. Women and girls encounter additional 
difficulties in relation to education, work, housing, etc. A husband can determine 
where the couple lives and can prevent his wife from taking certain jobs that he 
considered contrary to ‘family values’. Therefore, the gender of the applicant should 
be taken into account when considering reasonableness in conjunction with their 
family status and available support. 

•  Family status/support network: single people, and in particular single women, may 
face difficulties when resettling without a support network. Additional obstacles may 
be related to the family status of the woman, such as being a single mother or a 
widow. 

•  Age: young age as well as elderly age could significantly limit the applicant’s access to 
means of subsistence such as through employment, making him or her dependent on 
other providers. Therefore, this element should be seen in conjunction with the 

64 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

available support by family or a broader support network. In the case of children, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration, for example, with regard to 
access to basic education. 

•  Ethnic and/or religious background: members of ethnic and religious minorities 
would face difficulties relocating and assimilating into the community in an area 
dominated by another ethnic or religious group if they would be without familial, tribal, 
or political networks. 

•  Professional and educational background and financial means: the professional 
background of the applicant, their level of education and available financial means 
should be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of IPA, and in 
particular the access of the applicant to means of basic subsistence. 

It should be noted that these factors would often intersect in the case of the particular 
applicant, leading to different conclusions on the reasonableness of IPA. In some cases, more 
than one element of vulnerability would indicate that IPA is not reasonable for the particular 
applicant, while in other cases, they would balance each other. 

The assessment whether it is reasonable to settle in Tehran should take into 
account the individual circumstances of the applicant, especially gender, family 
status, and ethno-religious background. Single women especially could face 
difficulties settling in Tehran, as women and girls in Iran are generally subjected to 
discriminatory restrictions.  

6.4.3.  Conclusion on reasonableness 

The general conclusions on the reasonableness of IPA for particular profiles of applicants are 
based on an assessment of the general situation in Tehran and the individual circumstances 
of such applicants, as outlined in the sections above. 

Last update: January 2025 

Taking into account the gender, family status and ethnic and/or religious 
background of the applicant, it could be substantiated that IPA in Tehran would be 
reasonable for single able-bodied men and married couples without children, 
including when they do not have a support network. In the case of families with 
children, internal protection alternative may be reasonable, including without a 
support network, where the best interests of the child have been duly assessed. In 
the case of couples, basic subsistence in Tehran has to be ensured for both 
spouses. In order to ensure their basic needs, other profiles of applicants would in 
general need a support network in the area of potential IPA. 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Although the situation related to settling in Tehran could entail certain hardship, it 
can still be concluded that such applicants would be able to ensure their basic 
subsistence, housing, shelter and hygiene, and access to basic healthcare. 

It should be highlighted that these conclusions are without prejudice to the criteria 
of safety, travel and admittance and that the individual circumstances in the case at 

hand should be fully examined.  

66 

 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

7.  Exclusion 

Article 12(2) QD/QR 

Article 17 QD/QR 

The contents of this chapter include: 

7.1.  Exclusion based on the commission of international crimes  

7.2.  Exclusion based on the commission of a serious crime  

7.3. Exclusion based on acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations  

7.4. Exclusion based on constituting a danger to the community or to the security of 
the Member State 

For general guidance on Exclusion, see EUAA Practical Guide: Exclusion and EUAA 
Practical Guide on Exclusion for Serious (Non-Political) Crimes. 

Given the serious consequences that exclusion may have for the individual, the 
exclusion grounds should be interpreted restrictively and applied with caution.  

The examples mentioned in this chapter are non-exhaustive and non-conclusive. 
Each case should be examined on its own merits. 

In the context of Iran, various circumstances may require consideration of the potential 
applicability of exclusion grounds. The Qualification Directive does not set a time limit for the 
application of the grounds for exclusion. Applicants may be excluded in relation to events 
occurring in the recent and more distant past. 

More specifically, the need to examine possible exclusion issues in the context of Iran may 
arise, for example, in cases of applicants being former or current members of the groups cited 
below. This list is non-exhaustive:  

•  Members of the Iranian government institutions, such as government officials and 
members of political or administrative institutions, of a certain rank or level.  

•  Members of the Iranian military, security and police forces, including the IRGC, Basij, 

morality police, Quds forces and intelligence services.  

•  Judicial officials, prosecution authorities, prison officials and detention personnel. 

67 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

•  Members of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known as 

Mojahedin-eKhalq (MEK) or Mojahedin-eKhalq Organization (MKO). 

•  Arab militant groups, including the armed wing of the separatist Arab Struggle for 
Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz (ASMLA) (Harakat al-Nida in Arabic). 

•  Baluch militant groups such as the Jaish Al-Adl and the Ansar al-Furqan. 
•  Persons who participated in or provided support to activities of Iranian proxies or 

non-state actors in regional conflicts, such as those in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Syria.   

•  Other individuals who committed serious crimes in or outside Iran, such as drug 

trafficking and trafficking in human beings. 

In relation to potential exclusion considerations, see also the chapters Actors of persecution 
or serious harm and Refugee status. 

7.1.  Exclusion based on the commission of international 

crimes 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 12(2)(a) QD/QR 

Article 17(1)(a) QD/QR 

It can be noted that the ground ‘crime against peace’ is not likely to be of relevance in the 
cases of applicants from Iran. 

Acts reported to be committed in the context of the following past and current confrontations 
in Iran could be also relevant for Article 12(2)(a) QD/QR and Article 17(1)(a) QD/QR, as they 
may, depending on the circumstances, amount to ‘war crimes’ and/or ‘crimes against 
humanity’, if the legal requirements in this regard are fulfilled:  

•  Kurdish rebellion in Iran (1979).  
•  Khuzestan insurgency (1979). 
•  Iraq - Iran war (international armed conflict, 1980 - 1988). 
•  KDPI–Komala conflict (1984−1991). 
•  KDPI insurgency (1989–1996). 
•  Arab civil unrest and insurgency on Khuzestan (1999-2020). 
•  Sistan and Baluchestan insurgency (2004–present). 
•  Iran–PJAK Conflict (2004–present). 
•  Western Iran clashes between Kurdish insurgent parties and Iranian security forces 

(2016–present). 

•  Iran–Israel confrontations (2024). 

68 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

[Country Focus 2024, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 4.7.2; COI Human Rights, 3.2] 

Moreover, reported crimes such as murder, extrajudicial executions, unlawful killings, torture, 
enforced disappearances, rape, political or religious persecution and other inhumane acts by 
the Iran authorities, including members of the military, security and police forces, judicial and 
administrative institutions, prison officials etc. could amount to crimes against humanity when 
committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population.  

Namely, in 1988, Iranian authorities, summarily and extrajudicially executed thousands of 
political prisoners across the country with many implicated individuals still currently enjoying 
impunity and holding prominent positions within the government [Country Focus 2024, 3.11]. 
More recently, mass arrests, extrajudicial executions and other unlawful killings, torture, 
enforced disappearances, and other grave human rights violations were reported during and 
following the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ protests that erupted in Iran in September 2022 
[Country Focus 2024, 4.2]. Security forces reportedly used live ammunition, including 
handguns and automatic weapons against protesters and bystanders [Country Focus 2024, 
4.2]. Sexual and gender-based violence was used against women, men, and children, 
including LGBTIQ persons detained in relation to the 2022 protests [Country Focus 2024, 
3.8]. The use of the death penalty and systematic corporal punishments such as floggings 
against critics of the authorities were also reported [Country Focus 2024, 3.9.3; 4.1].  

Crimes in the context of past events, such as the Kurdish opposition groups’ insurgencies and 
uprisings could also trigger the consideration of exclusion in relation to ‘crimes against 
humanity’.  

See more information on human rights violations committed by different actors under Actors 
of persecution or serious harm. 

7.2.  Exclusion based on the commission of a serious 

crime 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 12(2)(b) QD/QR 

Article 17(1)(b) QD/QR 

Criminal activity in Iran, including drug trafficking and trafficking in human beings, women and 
girls is reported in Iran [Country Focus 2024, 4.11.7]. Such serious (non-political) crimes would 
trigger the application of Article 12(2)(b)/Article 17(1)(b) QD/QR.  

Violence against women and children (for example, in relation to domestic violence, sexual 
violence, honour-based violence, including honour killings, forced and child marriage) is also 

69 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

widely reported in Iran and could also potentially amount to a serious (non-political) crime. 
[Country Focus 2024, 4.11.4; 4.11.6; 4.11.8] 

Some serious (non-political) crimes could be linked to an armed conflict (e.g. if they are 
committed in order to finance the activities of an armed group) or could amount to crime 
against humanity committed as a part of a systematic or widespread attack against a civilian 
population, in which case they should instead be examined under Article 12(2)(a)/Article 
17(1)(a) QD/QR. 

In relation to exclusion from refugee status, a crime could fall under this ground if committed 
in Iran or any third country (for example, while the applicant resided in countries of transit, 
etc.) prior to the admission of the applicant as a refugee, which means the time of issuing a 
residence permit based on the granting of refugee status. In relation to subsidiary protection, 
serious crimes committed by Iran applicants in the host country, would also lead to exclusion. 

7.3.  Exclusion based on acts contrary to the purposes 

and principles of the United Nations 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 12(2)(c) QD/QR 

Article 17(1)(c) QD/QR 

(Former) membership in groups such as the IRGC or PMOI/MEK/MKO could trigger relevant 
considerations and require an examination of the applicant’s activities under Article 
12(2)(c)/Article 17(1)(c) QD/QR, in addition to the considerations under Article 12(2)(b)/Article 
17(1)(b) QD/QR.  

The application of exclusion should be based on an individual assessment of the specific 
facts in the context of the applicant’s activities within that organisation. The position of the 
applicant within the organisation would constitute a relevant consideration and a high-ranking 
position could justify a (rebuttable) presumption of individual responsibility. Nevertheless, it 
remains necessary to examine all relevant circumstances before an exclusion decision can be 
made. 

Where the available information indicates possible involvement in crimes against peace, war 
crimes or crimes against humanity, the assessment would need to be made in light of the 
exclusion grounds under Article 12(2)(a)/Article 17(1)(a) QD/QR. 

70 

 
 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

7.4.  Exclusion based on constituting a danger to the 

community or to the security of the Member State 

Last update: January 2025 

Article 17(1)(d) QD/QR 

In the examination of the application for international protection, the exclusion ground under 
Article 17(1)(d) QD/QR (danger to the community or the security of the Member State) is only 
applicable to persons otherwise eligible for subsidiary protection. 

Unlike the other exclusion grounds, the application of this provision is based on a 
forward-looking assessment of risk. Nevertheless, the examination takes into account the past 
and/or current activities of the applicant, such as association with certain groups considered 
to represent a danger to the security of the Member States or criminal activities of the 
applicant.

71 

 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Annex I: List of abbreviations and glossary 

Term 

Artesh  

ASMLA 

Definition 

Regular army 

Arab Struggle for Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz 

Asylum Procedures 
Directive 

Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection. 

Basij 

CJEU 

COI 

Diyeh 

Mobilisation 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

Country of origin information 

Blood money paid to the victim or their closest relative 

Efsad fil-arz 

A crime of ‘corruption on Earth’, punishable by death 

EU 

EU+ 

European Union 

Member States of the European Union plus Norway and 
Switzerland 

EUAA 

European Union Agency for Asylum 

FARAJA 

Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran 

hadd (plural: 
hudud) 

A category of crime under Islamic Law. Punishment for 
crimes against God prescribed in the Quran, sometimes 
punishable by death. 

Herasat office 

A security service of the ministry of Intelligence  

IPA 

IRGC 

KDPI 

Kolbar 

Internal protection alternative 

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 

Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran 

Worker who transports goods on his/her back across the 
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Türkiye borders (mainly referring to 
Kurds) 

72 

 
 
 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Term 

LGBTIQ 

Definition 

LGBTIQ persons are persons: 

-  who are attracted to others of their own gender 

(lesbian, gay) or any gender (bisexual); 

-  whose gender identity and/or expression does not 
correspond to the sex they were assigned at birth 
(trans, non-binary); 

-  who are born with sex characteristics that do not fit 
the typical definition of male or female (intersex); or 

-  whose identity does not fit into a binary 

classification of sexuality and/or gender (queer). 

Moharebeh 

A crime of ‘waging war against God’, punishable by death 

NGO 

Non-governmental organisation 

PMOI/MEK/MKO 

People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), also known 
as Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or Mojahedin-e-Khalq 
Organization (MKO) 

QD (Qualification 
Directive) 

Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted. 

QR (Qualification 
Regulation) 

Qesas 

Sharia 

Regulation (EU) 2024/1347 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for the 
qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons 
as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection and for the content of the protection granted, 
amending Council Directive 2003/109/EC and repealing 
Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 

Retributive punishment for murder and other violent crimes 

The religious law of Islam; Islamic canonical law. 

73 

 
 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Term 

SOGIESC 

Definition 

Persons who are perceived as not conforming to religious 
and/or social norms because of their sexual orientation (SO) 
and/or gender identity and expression (GIE), and sex 
characteristics (SC), including the treatment of lesbian, gay, 
bi-sexual or trans-gender, intersex and queer individuals. 

Sokhtbar 

Fuel carrier (mainly refers to Baluches) 

Ta’zir 

UN 

Crimes punished at the discretion of the judge 

United Nations 

UNHCR 

UN High Commissioner for Refugees 

UNICEF 

United Nations Children's Fund 

US 

United States of America 

USDOS 

US Department of State 

zina 

A criminal offence in Islamic law referring to unlawful sexual intercourse, 
fornication or adultery. 

74 

 
COUNTRY GUIDANCE: IRAN | JANUARY 2025 

Annex II: Country of origin information 
references 

The main COI sources used in the common analysis are the following (listed 
alphabetically by reference used in the text) 
COI Atheists 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Iran - Situation of atheists 
and non-religious individuals, including legislation, treatment by state 
actors and society, availability of state protection 

(November 2023) 

Available at: 
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2023_11_EUAA_COI
_Query_Response_Q61_Iran_atheists.pdf 

COI Desertion  EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Iran - Desertion/draft 

evasion from the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) 

(February 2022) 

Available at: 
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2022_01_Q6_EUAA
_COI_Query_Response_IRAN_Desertion_Army_IRGC.pdf 

COI Musicians  EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Iran - Treatment of 
musicians and their family members, including those who are 
considered critics of the government or dissidents, by authorities and 
pro-government groups, including the Basij and Sepah; treatment 
upon return 

(July 2024) 

Available at: 
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2024_07_EUAA_CO
I_Query_Response_Q45_Iran_treatment_musicians.pdf 

COI Human 
Rights 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Iran – Human rights 
situation (January 2023 – 7 October 2024) 

(17 October 2024) 

Available at: 
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2024_10_EUAA_COI
_Query_Response_Q72_Iran_Human_Rights_Situation.pdf 

75 

 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

COI Update 
2024 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Query: Iran - Major political, 
security, and humanitarian developments (18 April 2024 – 7 October 
2024) 

(7 October 2024) 

Available at: 
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2024_10_EUAA_COI
_Query_Response_Q67_Iran_Major_political_human_rights_security_an
d_humanitarian_developments.pdf 

Country Focus 
2024 

EUAA Country of Origin Information Report: Iran - Country Focus 

(June 2024) 

Available at:  
https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2024_06_EUAA_CO
I_Report_Iran_Country_Focus.pdf  

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77