Case C-863/24 P: Appeal brought on 11 December 2024 by Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo e Casse Rurali (Federcasse), Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Ancona e Falconara marittima CC SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Alba Langhe Roero e Canavese, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Castiglione Messer Raimondo e Pianella SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Milano, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Pontassieve, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Roma, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Sarsina, Banca di Credito Cooperativo Prealpi San Biagio, Banca di Credito Cooperativo 360 Credito Cooperativo FVG – SC, Banca per il Trentino Alto Adige – Bank für Trentino-Südtirol – Credito Cooperativo Italiano già Banca di Credito Cooperativo Cassa di Trento, BCC Veneta – Credito Cooperativo – Società cooperativa già Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Verona e Vicenza C.C. against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 1 October 2024 in Case T-1070/23 Federcasse and Others v Commission
Date: 2024-12-11
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EU aid, EU banking union, Italy, bank deposit, banking supervision, banking system, cooperative bank, credit institution








C_202500897EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/897


17.2.2025






Appeal brought on 11 December 2024 by Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo e Casse Rurali (Federcasse), Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Ancona e Falconara marittima CC SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Alba Langhe Roero e Canavese, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Castiglione Messer Raimondo e Pianella SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Milano, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Pontassieve, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Roma, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Sarsina, Banca di Credito Cooperativo Prealpi San Biagio, Banca di Credito Cooperativo 360 Credito Cooperativo FVG – SC, Banca per il Trentino Alto Adige – Bank für Trentino-Südtirol – Credito Cooperativo Italiano già Banca di Credito Cooperativo Cassa di Trento, BCC Veneta – Credito Cooperativo – Società cooperativa già Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Verona e Vicenza C.C. against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 1 October 2024 in Case T-1070/23 Federcasse and Others v Commission


(Case C-863/24 P)

(C/2025/897)
Language of the case: Italian

Parties


Appellants: Federazione Italiana delle Banche di Credito Cooperativo e Casse Rurali (Federcasse), Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Ancona e Falconara marittima CC SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Alba Langhe Roero e Canavese, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Castiglione Messer Raimondo e Pianella SC, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Milano, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Pontassieve, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Roma, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Sarsina, Banca di Credito Cooperativo Prealpi San Biagio, Banca di Credito Cooperativo 360 Credito Cooperativo FVG – SC, Banca per il Trentino Alto Adige – Bank für Trentino-Südtirol – Credito Cooperativo Italiano già Banca di Credito Cooperativo Cassa di Trento, BCC Veneta – Credito Cooperativo – Società cooperativa già Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Verona e Vicenza C.C. (represented by: A. Pera, F. Salerno, U. Di Francia, avvocati)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Napoli

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:






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set aside the order under appeal, and










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order the Commission to pay the costs of the proceedings.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments







1.



The first ground of appeal alleges that the General Court made an error of law in its application of Article 263 TFEU in so far as the order under appeal rules out the possibility of the measure at issue being capable of producing binding legal effects. That first ground of appeal is made up of three parts.






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In the first part of the first ground of appeal, the appellants criticise paragraphs 31-38 of the order under appeal, reviewing the analysis carried out therein on the content and context of the measure at issue as well as on the powers of the Commission (the same factors that the order under appeal cites in paragraph 30 as being the determining factors for concluding whether or not the measure at issue produces binding legal effects). In particular, the appellants observe that:






i.


In paragraphs 31-33 of the order under appeal, the General Court undertakes an incomplete and incorrect analysis of the contents of the measure at issue, since it does not analyse the substance of the measure and thus omits decisive factors. In fact, clear wording of refusal, amounting to true dispositive wording, was not analysed. Moreover, despite recognising, in paragraph 49, that at issue was a ‘clear’ measure with a ‘clear result’, the order under appeal does not draw the appropriate conclusions.










ii.


The analysis of the context in which the measure was adopted (paragraphs 35 and 36 of the order under appeal, read in conjunction with the statements to the same effect in paragraphs 32, 33 and 49 of that order) is incorrect in that it presupposes that a preliminary stage precedes the decision, disregarding the fact that Article 10(6) of the directive does not provide for any discussion phase and, moreover, does not prescribe a period within which such discussions must be completed. In the absence of legal time limits within which the interlocutory phase must be concluded, that phase may remain incomplete in the event of inaction on the part of the national authorities and the applicants would consequently be deprived of their right to effective legal protection. The appellants add that, even if the measure was an ‘initiating’ act (which it was not), that does not take away from the fact that it has binding legal effects. Wrongly, therefore, in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the order under appeal, read in conjunction with the statements to the same effect in paragraphs 32, 33 and 49, the General Court based its findings on the assumption that the measure at issue could be a mere initiation of the procedure.










iii.


Although the General Court itself lists (in paragraph 30 of the order under appeal) the analysis of the powers of the institution that adopted the act among the objective factors that are decisive as regards the assessment of the legal effects, there is no trace in the order under appeal of any such analysis being carried out. That shortcoming is relevant given that, pursuant to Article 10(6) of the directive, the Commission enjoys an exclusive power in respect of whether or not to approve the request to lower the target level. Therefore, it would have been appropriate to take into consideration the fact that the refusal of such a request came from the authority with exclusive power in that regard. In conclusion, if it had considered the Commission’s powers, the General Court would not have been able to conclude that the ‘content and substance’ of the measure at issue suggest that it is a preparatory act.














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The second part of the first ground of appeal criticises paragraphs 43 and 44 of the order under appeal in so far as the General Court could not conclude, relying on the formal aspects derived from the measure at issue, that those aspects confirm that that measure was preparatory in nature. Other formal aspects referred to in paragraphs 34 and 47 of the order under appeal are likewise criticised as irrelevant or wrongly analysed.










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The third part of the first ground of appeal criticises paragraph 51 of the order under appeal, in that the General Court wrongly concluded that the intention of the author of the measure was to provide information.














2.



The second ground of appeal alleges that, in paragraph 50 of the order under appeal, the General Court distorted document 11 annexed to the application at first instance, namely the letter of 31 August 2023 from the Ministry, in so far as it considers that the Ministry was a mere ‘third party’, whereas it is the national competent authority under Article 10(6) of the directive and, therefore, the legal consequences that the Ministry comprehensively drew from the measure at issue (considering it to be preclusive and, therefore, having the character of a decision) should have constituted an integral part of the assessment of the legal effects of that measure.










3.



The third ground of appeal criticises the inadequate and contradictory nature of the statement of reasons, setting out the numerous shortcoming and contradictions in the order under appeal, namely the failure to analyse the content of the measure at issue in so far as it contains a clear stance on the result of the analysis undertaken by the Commission services, the lack of an analysis of the Commission’s powers as well as the contradiction between paragraph 49 and what is stated in paragraph 38, and the shortcomings in the statement of reasons in paragraph 51.






ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/897/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)