COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders
Date: 2024-12-11
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU migration policy, European security, admission of aliens, border control, external border of the EU, illegal migration, information security, information warfare, third country, trafficking in human beings

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 11.12.2024  COM(2024) 570 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and strengthening security at the EU’s external borders  
 
 
Communication on countering hybrid threats from the weaponisation of migration and 
strengthening security at the EU’s external borders 

1. Challenges at the EU’s external land borders with Russia and Belarus and the threat 
to the Union’s security 

In  recent  times,  there  has  been  a  significant  increase  in  the  number  of  malicious  activities 
targeting  the  European  Union  and  exploiting  global  connectivity,  supply  chains,  economic 
dependencies, legal loopholes, and the openness of our democratic societies. These activities 
have taken sophisticated forms such as acts of sabotage or cyberattacks to disrupt economic, 
energy or transport networks as well as foreign information manipulation and interference in 
political processes showing an increasing audacity in these hybrid attacks. The EU is taking 
steps to build its preparedness and resilience and the Commission is ready to support Member 
States to act on the various fronts. 

In its conclusions of October 2024, the European Council emphasised that Russia and Belarus, 
or any other country, cannot be allowed to abuse our values, including the right to asylum, and 
to undermine our democracies. The European Council expressed solidarity with Poland and 
with other Member States  facing  these challenges  and it acknowledged  its determination to 
ensure effective control of the Union’s external borders through all available means, including 
with the support of the European Union, in line with EU and international law. The European 
Council made clear that exceptional situations require appropriate measures (1). In December 
2023,  the  European  Council  had  already  condemned  all  hybrid  attacks,  including  the 
instrumentalisation  of  migrants  by  third  countries  for  political  purposes,  and  expressed  the 
Union’s determination to counter any such attacks launched by Russia and Belarus (2). This 
Communication focuses on the EU’s external land borders with Russia and Belarus, but the 
considerations  set  out  in  it  may  be  applied  elsewhere  if  duly  justified  by  the  particular 
circumstances.  

Since  February  2022,  with  its  military  aggression  against  Ukraine,  Russia  has  been  grossly 
violating international law, including the United Nations Charter (3), undermining European 
and global security and stability. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is also an attack 
on  the  values  of  democracy,  rule  of  law  and  fundamental  rights.  Russia  is  not  alone  in  its 
actions. Belarus has often aided and provided decisive support to Russian activities. This is 
especially the case since the imposition of sanctions on Lukashenka’s regime, following the 
fraudulent presidential elections in 2020. At the time, Belarus supported by Russia launched 
an operation to create an artificial migration route through its land borders with Member States, 
notably Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, to other European countries. 

Not only have Russia’s actions brought war back to the European continent, but they have also 
created  a  sense  of  insecurity  and  instability.  This  is  reinforced  by  the  intensification  of 
provocations  and  the  use  of  hybrid  warfare  tactics,  such  as  the  weaponisation  of  migrants 

(1) European Council conclusions, 17.10.24, EUCO 24/25, para. 38. 
(2) European Council conclusions, 15.12.23, EUCO 20/23, para. 30. 
(3) United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1, 01.03.2022, n2227227.pdf. 

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whereby  Russia  and  Belarus  artificially  and  illegally (4)  facilitate  illegal  migration  flows 
towards the EU’s external borders. Russia and Belarus take advantage of people, using human 
beings in an act of hostility, disregarding their vulnerability. Russia and Belarus use this hybrid 
warfare as a political tool with the objective of destabilising our societies and undermining the 
unity of the European Union. This jeopardises not only the national security and sovereignty 
of Member States but also the safety and integrity of the Schengen area and the security of the 
Union as a whole. The use of violence by individuals, in particular when acting in a group, 
against border guards in the context of some illegal entries into the Union further aggravates 
the situation and has a serious impact on EU society. Ultimately, the activities orchestrated by 
Russia  and  Belarus  are  also  intended  to  weaken  the  support  that  the  Union  and  its  citizens 
provide to Ukraine in its legitimate self-defence efforts.  

This  year  irregular  arrivals  at  the  EU-Belarusian  borders  have  increased  significantly  (66% 
increase in 2024 compared to the same period in 2023), particularly at the Polish-Belarusian 
border. This is also due to the involvement of Belarusian authorities in facilitating crossings, 
i.e. authorising access to the border area and equipping migrants with ladders and other devices. 
Russian authorities are  facilitating these movements, given that more than 90% of migrants 
illegally crossing the Polish-Belarusian border have a Russian student or tourist visa. Similar 
elements were observed in 2023 at the Finnish-Russian border, where the majority of migrants 
were in possession of a valid Russian visa and had already previously tried to enter the EU 
through Belarus. A recent agreement between Belarus and Russia on the mutual recognition of 
visas (5)  could  further  facilitate  movements  of  third  country  nationals  between  Russia  and 
Belarus,  including  those  intending  to  illegally  cross  the  border  to  the  EU.  Moreover,  the 
situation at the other parts of the Union’s borders with Russia and Belarus remains of concern 
with persistent threats related to weaponisation of migrants.  

To  guarantee  the  security  of  the  Union  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Member  States,  it  is 
necessary  that  Member  States  bordering  Russia  and  Belarus  are  able  to  act  decisively  and 
firmly  to  effectively  control  the  Union’s  external  borders.  Member  States  have  the 
responsibility to maintain law and order and safeguard internal security within their national 
territories. They also have a duty to take all the measures necessary to efficiently control and 
manage the external borders in order to ensure a high level of security within  the Union as 
required under EU law.  

The right to asylum, the respect for human dignity and the principle of non-refoulement are 
important cornerstones. International law and EU law allow Member States to tackle situations 
decisively, where this is needed to uphold security and public order, while respecting the rights 
of any persons affected by the measures. In view of the serious nature of the threat, as well as 
its  persistence,  to  the  security  of  the  Union  and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Member  States, 
Member States may invoke Treaty provisions to exceptionally and under stringent conditions 
go further than what is currently provided for by EU secondary legislation, under the control 
of the Court of Justice.  

(4)  Protocol  against  the  Smuggling  of  Migrants  by  Land,  Sea  and  Air,  supplementing  the  United  Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 
(5) The  agreement between Russia and Belarus was ratified in February 2023 and set to enter into force on 8 
December 2024. It provides that foreigners who have received a visa from Russia or Belarus can cross the borders 
of the other country without having to obtain an additional visa. 

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2. EU policy response and operational support 

The  European  Union  took  a  number  of  steps  to  counter  the  instrumentalisation  of  migrants 
when this practice was used by Belarus at its borders with Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in 2021 
and by Russia at its border with Finland in particular. In addition to strong political support, 
the Union deployed financial, operational and diplomatic efforts, including with the countries 
of origin and transit, to respond effectively.  

Since the instrumentalisation of migrants by hostile State actors often conflates with the actions 
of criminal organisations and migrant smugglers, the issue was addressed in the renewed EU 
Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling (2021-2025) (6). Moreover, in the legislative proposal 
for a directive on migrant smuggling (7), the Commission proposed a new offence of public 
instigation in order to tackle the activities of smugglers that intentionally instigate migrants 
(including in the context of instrumentalisation) to enter, transit through or stay illegally in the 
EU. The instrumentalisation of migrants is considered an aggravating circumstance which may 
increase the level of penalties. The revised Schengen Borders Code explicitly recognises that 
instances  of  instrumentalisation  of  migrants  may  justify  the  temporary  closure  of  border 
crossing points at the external borders concerned. Member States may, where a large number 
of migrants attempt to cross their external borders in an unauthorised manner, en masse and 
using force, take the necessary measures to preserve security, law and order. The Regulation 
addressing situations of crisis and force majeure (8) allows Member States to derogate from 
certain  procedural  rules  of  EU  asylum  law,  in  order  to  deal  with  situations  of 
instrumentalisation (9).  

The Commission is now working with Member States to implement the rules contained in the 
Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum  including  the  Regulation  addressing  situations  of  crisis  and 
force majeure. It supports Member States to prepare their National Implementation Plans, to 
be submitted by 12 December 2024. These implementation plans must provide for appropriate 
measures for Member States to also be prepared to address the issue of instrumentalisation as 
set  out  in  the  Regulation  addressing  situations  of  crisis  and  force  majeure  and  could  be 
complemented with other instruments that take into account exceptional situations at the EU’s 
external borders, as described in this Communication, so as to guarantee the security of the 
Union and the territorial integrity of Member States.  

In addition, the Commission continues to work in a number of areas to increase the Union’s 
overall resilience and capacity to react to various kinds of hybrid threats. In this context, it has 
proposed new rules for the EU to be able to adopt measures against transport operators (air, 
sea, inland waterways, rail and road) that facilitate or engage in trafficking in human beings or 
smuggling of migrants. The Commission urges the European Parliament  and the Council to 

(6) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  A  renewed  EU  action  plan  against  migrant  smuggling 
(2021-2025), 29.9.2021, COM(2021) 591 final. 
(7) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent 
and counter the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 
2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946 JHA, COM/2023/755 final. 
(8)  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1359  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  May  2024  addressing 
situations  of  crisis  and  force  majeure  in  the  field  of  migration  and  asylum  and  amending  Regulation  (EU) 
2021/1147, PE/19/2024/REV/1, OJ L, 2024/1359, 22.5.2024. 
(9)  For  example,  by  increasing  the duration  of  border  procedures  and  extending  its  scope  to  all  applicants  for 
international protection, and by lengthening time limits to register asylum applications. 

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make  swift  progress  on  this  proposal.  To  address  the  growing  use  of  commercial  means  of 
transport  by  smugglers,  including  for  the  purpose  of  the  instrumentalisation  of  migrants,  in 
2023  the  Commission  adopted,  and  is  implementing,  a  Toolbox  on  transport  operators  to 
strengthen  situational  awareness  and  the  exchange  of  information,  both  between  Member 
States  and  EU  Agencies,  and  with  international  partners,  industry  stakeholders,  national 
authorities and international organisations.  

The  Commission  is  determined  to  address  the  online  dimension  of  instrumentalisation  to 
counter  the  dissemination  of  harmful  content  and  foreign  information  manipulation  and 
interference that polarises our societies and leads to radicalisation and violence. It will do so 
through the implementation of new legislation such as the Digital Services Act and cooperation 
with  the  tech  industry.  The  EU  is  undertaking  a  broad  range  of  actions  across  policy  areas 
(including critical  infrastructure and cybersecurity challenges) to  counter hybrid threats  and 
has a hybrid toolbox in place since 2022 as part of the EU’s Strategic Compass for a Stronger 
EU security and defence (10). 

EU  Agencies  are  currently  providing  operational  support  at  the  EU’s  Eastern  land  border 
regions and are ready to step it up to help Member States counter security threats at our external 
borders.  Frontex  can  support  via  Joint  Operations,  Rapid  Border  Interventions  and  by 
facilitating the exchange of information, technical support, capacity building and training, as 
well  as  by  sending  liaison  officers.  Europol  guest  officers  can  also  be  deployed  to  assist 
secondary security checks. The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) is available to 
provide support with technical experts at the request of Member States, to strengthen reception 
and asylum services as necessary. Eurojust stands ready to support criminal investigations and 
prosecutions and joint investigation teams led by prosecutors to the affected Member States. 
In addition, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism is an effective tool used already in 2021 to 
support  Lithuania  confronted  with  instrumentalisation  of  migrants  and  which  all  concerned 
Member States can use to prepare for threats stemming from the weaponisation of migrants 
and provide effective support, including to people in need. 

The Commission also increased financial support. In 2021, the Commission initiated a dialogue 
with  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Poland  to  provide  them  with  financial  support  for  border 
management, in addition to the amounts already allocated via national programmes under the 
Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument (BMVI) for the 2021-2027 period (EUR 360 
million) (11). Since then, the Commission has launched other specific actions under the BMVI 
Thematic Facility to increase Member States’ border surveillance capabilities and address new 
challenges at external borders, including a call for EUR 150 million to support the countries 
neighbouring Belarus and Russia in facing new security threats.  

In addition to the above, the Council has also established a framework for restrictive measures 
in response to Russia’s destabilising actions abroad (12). This new framework allows the EU to 
target individuals and entities engaged in actions and policies, including the instrumentalisation 
of migrants by the government of Russia, which undermine the fundamental values of the EU 

(10)  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-
security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/. 
(11) Additional support, for a total amount of EUR 200 million, was granted in 2022 through a specific action 
under the BMVI Thematic Facility (and Emergency assistance (EMAS) for Lithuania). 
(12) Council Regulation (EU) 2024/2642 of 8 October 2024 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s 
destabilizing activities, ST/8744/2024/INIT, OJ L, 2024/2642, 9.10.2024. 

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and its Member States, their security, independence and integrity. Under this newly established 
framework, those targeted will be subject  to  an asset freeze and EU citizens and companies 
will be forbidden from making funds available to them. In addition, natural persons may also 
be subject to a travel ban. 

3. Legal context 

Under the Schengen Borders Code, Member States are required to protect the EU’s external 
border. They have an obligation to preserve the integrity of the Schengen area by preventing 
unauthorised border crossings, countering cross-border criminality and taking measures against 
persons who have crossed the border illegally (13). It is the Member States that have, as a matter 
of principle, the right to control the entry, residence, and removal of aliens (14).  

At  the  same  time,  while  managing  the  EU’s  external  borders,  Member  States  must  respect 
fundamental rights and the principle of non-refoulement. This principle is established in the 
1951  Convention  relating  to  the  Status  of  Refugees  and  its  1967  Protocol  (“the  Geneva 
Convention”), the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as in the Schengen Borders Code. It 
is  part  of  customary  law  that  is  binding  on  all  States,  and  it  is  enshrined  in  a  series  of 
international  agreements,  such  as  the  Convention  against  Torture (15)  and  the  International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16). The principle of non-refoulement protects persons 
for whom there are substantial grounds for believing that they would otherwise face a real risk 
of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  

The  Geneva  Convention  expressly  provides  for  an  exception  to  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement (17) within the meaning of that Convention, outlining certain exceptional situations 
in  which  said  principle  cannot  apply.  The  exception  relates  to  persons  for  whom  there  are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country or that have been 
convicted of a particularly serious crime and constitute a danger to the community (18). 

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is based on the full and inclusive application 
of the Geneva Convention (19). The Charter of Fundamental Rights (20) enshrines the right to 
asylum building on the norms laid down by the Geneva Convention (21) and the principle of 

(13) Article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a 
Union  Code  on  the  rules  governing  the  movement  of  persons  across  borders  (Schengen  Borders  Code) 
(codification), OJ L 77, 23/03/2016, p. 1–52. 
(14) See ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom, 28.05.85, para. 67 and ECtHR, Grand 
Chamber, N.D and N.T. v Spain, 13.02.2020, para. 167. 
(15)  Article  3,  Convention  against  Torture  and  Other  Cruel, Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Punishment, 
10.12.1984, General Assembly Resolution 39/46. 
(16)  Article  7  in  conjunction  with  Article  2,  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political Rights,  16.12.1966, 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI). 
(17) Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”. 
(18) Article 33(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: “The benefit of the present provision 
may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious 
crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country”. 
(19) Article 78(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
(20) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 
(21) Article 18 of the Charter. 

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non-refoulement (22), which builds on Article 4 of the 4th Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), Article 3 ECHR and Article 15 ECHR. Fundamental 
rights in the Charter have the same legal value as the Treaties (23) and must be respected when 
applying EU law.  

At this moment in time, and at the EU’s external border with Russia and Belarus, it is clear that 
Member States are being subjected to a hybrid attack by hostile States that intend to destabilise 
a region via a war of aggression against Ukraine, whilst simultaneously weaponising migration 
to  undermine  the  security  of  the  Union.  The  Commission  is  committed  to  support  Member 
States to prevent Russia and Belarus from attaining their objectives by using our principles and 
values against us. The persistent threat at these external borders and the effects that it has on 
the security of the Union and on the Member States in question, constitutes an exceptional and 
very serious situation. In fact, the security environment of the European Union has changed 
dramatically compared to the time when relevant international law instruments were enacted, 
and this may need to be taken into account in their application.  

Guaranteeing national security is the responsibility of each Member State,  as recognised by 
Article  4(2)  TEU.  This  should  be  understood  as  comprising  the  integrity  of  essential  State 
functions and the fundamental interests of society (24), the safeguarding of territorial integrity 
and  the  maintenance  of  law  and  order.  Article  72  TFEU  recognises  that,  in  exceptional 
circumstances, Member States may need to take measures for reasons of law and order or public 
security derogating from EU secondary legislation as confirmed by the Court of Justice of the 
European  Union.  Any  such  derogations  should  be  exceptional  and  applied  only  in  clearly 
defined cases (25).  

As expressed by the European Council, the Commission acknowledges that  Member States 
must be capable of doing what is necessary to defend themselves against hybrid attacks carried 
out  by  Russia  and  Belarus,  and  safeguard  their  national  security,  public  order,  and 
sovereignty (26). It is up to Member States to define their essential security interests and adopt 
the appropriate measures to protect them, whilst ensuring that they are in line  with EU and 
international law (27).  

When counteracting hybrid attacks from Russia and Belarus, Member States are confronted 
with actions that, by their nature and significance, put national security at risk. Member States 
may need to adopt measures that could entail serious interferences with fundamental rights, 
such as the right to asylum and related guarantees, subject to the requirements laid down in 
Article 52(1) of the Charter (28). In particular, the exercise of fundamental rights of the Charter 
can  be  limited (29)  if  provided  by  law  and  only  in  so  far  as  the  essence  of  the  rights  is 

(22) Article 19 of the Charter. 
(23) Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union. 
(24) Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, para. 135. 
(25)  Joined  Cases  C‑715/17,  C‑718/17  and  C‑719/17  Commission  v  Poland,  Commission  v  Hungary  and 
Commission v Czechia, ECLI:EU:C:2020:257, para. 143. 
(26) European Council conclusions, 17.10.24, EUCO 24/25, para. 38. 
(27)  Joined  Cases  C‑715/17,  C‑718/17  and  C‑719/17  Commission  v  Poland,  Commission  v  Hungary  and 
Commission v Czechia, ECLI:EU:C:2020:257, para. 143. 
(28) Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, para. 136. 
(29) Except those rights of a non-derogable nature, including the principle of non-refoulement. 

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guaranteed,  due  regard  is  given  to  the  principles  of  proportionality  and  necessity,  and  the 
restrictions meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others (30).  

The European Union has already faced a situation in which the limitation of fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Charter was necessary to counter hybrid threats posed by Russia. In March 
2022,  the  Union  temporarily  prohibited  certain  state-controlled  Russian  operators  from 
broadcasting on EU territory due to propaganda and disinformation targeted at civil society in 
the  Union (31).  The  threat  posed  a  serious  risk  to  public  order  and  security.  Although  the 
decision impacted the fundamental right to freedom of expression and information, as well as 
the freedom to conduct business, the General Court upheld its lawfulness, since it complied 
with  the  requirements  laid  down  by  the  Charter (32)  and  the  aim  of  the  measure,  namely 
safeguarding  the  Union’s  values,  notably  security  and  public  order,  justified  such  a 
limitation (33). Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the freedom of expression and 
the  right  to  asylum,  this  precedent  provides  relevant  guidance  on  the  lawful  conditions  for 
restricting Charter rights. 

The European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has also recognised that certain exceptional 
situations  impact  the  interpretation  of  the  rights  under  the  ECHR.  In  particular,  it  has 
determined that the conduct of migrants using force in large groups to storm a border fence (34) 
or  relying  on  large  numbers  to  cross  illegally (35),  while  not  making  use  of  official  entry 
procedures, can justify State action that would not be considered as violating the prohibition of 
collective expulsion. 

4. Cooperation with the Union and other Member States 

The Commission recognises that, in view of hybrid threats posed by hostile States, putting at 
risk the security and territorial integrity of the Member States, and the maintenance of law and 
order, Member States may adopt exceptional measures to defend themselves against external 
threats.  

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and, in this context, the general hostility that both 
Russia, with the complicity of Belarus, have been maintaining towards the European Union 
have created insecurity for the Union. One of the  most serious manifestations of this  is  the 
weaponisation of migration by continuously facilitating and encouraging migrants to reach the 
external Eastern land borders of the Union with the intention to put pressure on Member States 
and the Union.  

Faced with this situation, the Member States affected must be able to defend themselves, to 
ensure  their  territorial  integrity,  to  maintain  law  and  order  and  to  safeguard  their  national 
security, as recognised by Articles 4(2) TEU and 72 TFEU, as well as the security of the Union 
as a whole. At the same time, actions by Russia and Belarus take advantage of people, some of 

(30) Article 52(1) of the Charter. 
(31)  Council  Decision  (CFSP)  2022/351  of  1  March  2022  amending  Decision  2014/512/CFSP  concerning 
restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, OJ L 65, 2.3.2022, p. 5–7. 
(32) T-125/22, RT France v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2022:483, para. 145. 
(33) T-125/22, RT France v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2022:483, para. 202. 
(34) ECtHR, Grand Chamber, N.D and N.T. v Spain, 13.02.2020, para. 231. 
(35) ECtHR, A.A. and Others v North Macedonia, 05.04.2022, para. 123. 

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whom are in a vulnerable position, and their fundamental rights, dignity and special needs must 
be preserved in accordance with EU and international law. 

Actions taken by Member States to preserve national security in accordance with the Treaties 
must comply with the limits and conditions of EU law. The case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union provides useful guidance as regards the conditions and limits that must be 
taken into account.  

Any measure must be proportionate and suitable to address the threat posed by Russia and 
Belarus, and it must be limited to what is strictly necessary (36). Member States must explain 
the necessity and provide justifications when adopting any measures that have as an objective 
to protect national security, in accordance with the Treaties (37). Merely invoking the protection 
of interests, however fundamental, is not sufficient to satisfy the required reasoning (38). The 
need  to  argue  the  suitability  and  necessity  of  the  measures  also  requires  Member  States  to 
explain why flexibility provisions already available under the acquis are not suitable to address 
the particular circumstances (39). 

Furthermore, measures which may result in limiting certain fundamental rights must be of a 
temporary  nature.  The  fact  that  the  measures  would  be  limited  in  time  is  important  when 
assessing whether the essence of the right at stake is respected (40), as exceptional measures 
must  be  targeted,  adapted  to  the  specific  circumstances  and  be  limited  only  for  as  long  as 
necessary. 

The Commission encourages Member States to carefully weigh all the interests at stake and 
make use of all the possibilities afforded by the Union’s legal order when taking exceptional 
measures to tackle hybrid attacks as outlined in this Communication. Given that these measures 
protect the common external border, as well as the internal and external security of the Union 
itself, and in light  of the principle of sincere cooperation (41), Member States  are invited  to 
cooperate closely with the Union and other Member States. The Commission is ready to play 
its institutional role and ensure the protection of the general interest of the Union. Coordination 
among neighbouring Member States is necessary to ensure the consistency and effectiveness 
of any action. 

In this context, it is important that Member States consult the Commission and inform the other 
Member States about exceptional measures that they intend to take and take to tackle the hybrid 
attacks carried out by Russia and Belarus. It would be important for Member States to inform 
of the measures to be taken, their duration and scope, legal basis and how they intend to comply 

(36) Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La Quadrature du Net and Others v Premier ministre and 
Others, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, para. 147; Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029, para. 
216 and 261; Joined Cases C‑715/17, C‑718/17 and C‑719/17 Commission v Poland, Commission v Hungary and 
Commission v Czechia, ECLI:EU:C:2020:257, para. 152. 
(37)  C-72/22  PPU  M.A,  ECLI:EU:C:2022:505,  para.  70;  Case  C-808/18  Commission  v  Hungary, 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029, para. 214. 
(38)  Joined  Cases  C‑715/17,  C‑718/17  and  C‑719/17  Commission  v  Poland,  Commission  v  Hungary  and 
Commission v Czechia, ECLI:EU:C:2020:257, para. 145. 
(39) Case C-808/18 Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029, para. 217 to 218. 
(40) T-125/22, RT France v Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:T:2022:483, para. 154.  
(41) Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union. 

8 

 
 
 
with the principles and limits arising from EU and international law, including in respect of 
fundamental rights.  

The  Commission  stands  ready  to  engage  with  Member  States  taking  such  exceptional 
measures,  to  help  ensure  that  all  relevant  considerations  are  taken  into  account.  The 
Commission will always stand by Member States in their efforts to ensure a safe and secure 
Union with  a fully functioning  Schengen area, for the benefit of  all EU citizens and in  full 
respect of fundamental rights. The Union will not allow any hostile State to abuse European 
values. 

9