Trump, Harris and transatlantic uncertainties : what choices for Europe?
Date: 2024-12-02
Institutions: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Subjects: European Union, United States, foreign policy, international relations, presidential election, report, transatlantic relations

SPECIAL REPORT 

Oct 2024 

TRUMP,  
HARRIS AND 
TRANSATLANTIC 
UNCERTAINTIES 

What choices for Europe? 

by 
Giuseppe Spatafora 
Associate Analyst for Transatlantic Relations, EUISS 

© European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2024. 
The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the  
views of the European Union. 

CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-01-24-002-EN-N 
ISBN 978-92-9462-365-2 
DOI 10.2815/1954381 

Cover image: Rene Deanda/Unsplash 

 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 

TRUMP VS HARRIS 

RUSSIA’S WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE 

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND NATO 

EU-US RELATIONS 

CHINA AND INDO-PACIFIC 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

IRAN 

THE WESTERN BALKANS  

ENERGY AND CLIMATE 

DATA AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 

POLITICAL TENSIONS AND POLARISATION 

1 

2 

4 

5 

7 

9 

11 

12 

13 

15 

17 

On  5  November  2024,  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  will  elect  their  47th  president.  After 
President  Biden’s  decision  to  withdraw  his 

candidacy  this  summer,  the  two  candidates  are 

former President Donald Trump and sitting Vice-

President Kamala Harris. Their positions on many 

issues are radically different, including the United 

States’  role  in  the  world.  The  US  presidential 

election  will 

thus 

have 

far-reaching 

consequences for the EU’s own foreign policy. Its 

outcome  will  affect  the  course  of  Russia’s  war 

against Ukraine, the conflict in the Middle East, 

tensions in the Indo-Pacific, and the strength of 

transatlantic  ties.  Brussels  must  be  ready  for 

whatever is to come. This report explores how a 

Trump  or  a  Harris  presidency  would  affect  key 

flashpoints  around  the  world.  Each  issue  has 

strategic stakes for EU foreign policy and entails 

difficult  choices  that  the  Union  will  need  to 

make .  

TRUMP VS HARRIS 

Foreign policy divisions, similarities, 
and isolationist tendencies 

The  two  candidates,  former  President  Donald 

Trump  and  Vice-President  Kamala  Harris,  offer 

starkly different visions for the  United States in 

term would mark a return of the ‘America First’ 

and ‘Peace Through Strength’ approaches, which 

question  the  utility  of  international  institutions 

and  of  traditional  American  alliances.  On  the 

other hand, Harris would largely continue Biden’s 

foreign  policy,  which  places  emphasis  on 

strengthening the US-led alliance system against 

strategic  competitors.  Harris  could  also  tilt 

towards a more liberal agenda in foreign policy, 

with  issues  such  as  climate  change  and  human 

rights at the centre of her likely approach  . 

Despite  these  differences,  the  Republican  and 

Democratic  candidates  also  share  similarities  in 

foreign policy. For instance, both sides of the aisle 

see  China  as  the  main  strategic  threat  to  the 

United  States  –  far  surpassing  Russia 

in 

significance – and aim to expand tariff and non-

tariff  barriers  against  Beijing.  Both  candidates 

share  the  goal  of  reshoring  strategic  industries 

inside  the  United  States  and  to  shorten  supply 

chains, both to strengthen national security and 

to  stimulate  job  creation  within  the  country. 

However, the policies that they propose to achieve 

these  objectives  vary  significantly  (especially  in 

areas such as energy and artificial intelligence, as 

we will explore in detail below).   

Recent surveys show that domestic policy issues 

overshadow  foreign  policy  in  the  minds  of  US 

voters  when  making  electoral  decisions 

.  For 

instance, fewer than two out of ten voters say that 

foreign  issues  such  as  Ukraine  and  Gaza  will 

impact their decisions significantly. In particular, 

the  majority  of  Republican  voters  seem  to  have 

embraced isolationism, arguing that alliances do 

not benefit America  . Among Democratic voters, 

isolationism  is  less  prevalent  but  still  present. 

Given the low priority placed by voters on foreign 

policy,  neither  presidential  candidate  may  be 

inclined  to  invest  significant  political  capital  in 

international affairs. Joe Biden’s career has been 

focused  on 

foreign  policy,  especially  on 

transatlantic  affairs,  a  focus  that  has  continued 

throughout  his  presidency.  While  Harris  would 

represent continuity with Biden in many aspects, 

some elements of isolationism could re-emerge. 

In  a  second  Trump  term,  this  trend  would  be 

accelerated. The isolationist trend is particularly 

relevant  for  the  EU.  Is  Brussels  ready  to  take  a 

more proactive role if Washington turns inwards 

the  next  four  years.  This  is  especially  true  in 

and away from Europe? 

foreign policy. On the one hand, a second Trump 

1 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
RUSSIA’S WAR OF 
AGGRESSION AGAINST 
UKRAINE 

Under a Trump Presidency 

Former  President  Trump  provided  significant 

military  assistance  to  Ukraine  during  his  first 

term, which  enabled  the  country  to  hold  off  the 

Russian  assault  in  February  2022.  However, 

Trump does not have a good personal history with 

Ukrainian  President  Zelenskyy  .  This  may  have 

affected  his  stance  on  the  war,  for  which  he 

blames the weakness of the Biden administration, 

and which he has pledged to end. Trump claims 

to have a plan to ‘end the war in 24 hours’ once 

elected, or even during his transition period, but 

it is not fully clear how he would go about doing 

Under a Harris Presidency 

Vice-President  Harris  has  a  good  record  of 

relations  with  Ukraine:  she  has  met  Volodymyr 

Zelenskyy  several  times,  most  recently  in  June 

when  she  represented  the  United  States  at  the 

Peace  Summit  in  Switzerland 

.  Her  running 

mate, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, has signed 

an  agricultural  partnership  letter  of  agreement 

between  Minnesota  and  Chernihiv  oblast 

.  A 

Harris administration would most likely continue 

President  Biden’s  current  policy  of  military 

support for Ukraine. Harris would likely push to 

approve  new  support  packages,  but  she  would 

need the support of Congress. In a divided House, 

this could result in lengthy deadlocks, similar to 

what happened in 2023 and early 2024. It remains 

to  be  seen  how  much  political  capital  the  new 

administration would be willing to invest in this 

issue, given its relatively low salience.  

this. Versions of the plan circulated by aides close 

Harris  would  also  probably  maintain  Biden’s 

to  Trump  entail  a  ceasefire  near  the  current 

cautious policy of limiting Ukraine’s ability to use 

contact  lines,  amounting  to  de  facto  territorial 

weapons for deep strikes inside Russia, and would 

concessions to Russia, and a promise of Ukrainian 

continue  to  oppose  Ukrainian  membership  in 

neutrality  in  exchange  for  guarantees  of  its 

NATO  while 

the  war 

continues. 

The 

sovereignty 

.  That  might  entail  overtures  to 

administration might intensify calls for European 

President  Putin, 

reflecting 

the  personal 

countries  to  shoulder  a  greater  share  of  the 

diplomacy that characterised Trump’s first term. 

burden  in  supporting  Ukraine—especially  if  an 

Trump could start this process with a call to Putin 

additional support package becomes a contested. 

after his electoral victory. 

However,  according  to  former  National  Security 

Advisor Robert O’ Brien, Trump’s approach would 

not  be  to  end  assistance,  but  to  continue  to 

provide  lethal  aid  to  Ukraine,  financed  by 

European countries, while keeping the door open 

to diplomacy with Russia  . Significant variation 

among  Trump  supporters  on  what  to  do  with 

Ukraine  adds  to  the  uncertainty  about  what  to 

expect. Trump’s vice-presidential nominee, Ohio 

Senator  JD  Vance,  openly  opposes  continued 

assistance  to  Ukraine  .  At  the  other  end  of  the 

spectrum, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 

claims  that  Trump  would  lift  all  restrictions  on 

the type of weapons that Ukraine can use and on 

the targets it can strike within Russia, and create 

a land-lease programme for Ukraine  . Given the 

range of possible outcomes, the key characteristic 

of  Trump’s  foreign  policy  vis-à-vis  Ukraine  will 

be unpredictability.  

Nevertheless, under a Harris presidency, relations 

with  Moscow  are  likely  to  remain  strained, 

suggesting that a direct approach to the Kremlin 

is unlikely.  

What this means for the EU 

No foreign policy issue is more consequential for 

the  EU  than  Russia’s  war  against  Ukraine. 

Regardless of which candidate wins in November, 

Brussels  should  develop  strategies  to  persuade 

the United States to continue supporting Ukraine, 

while also preparing to assume a greater share of 

the  burden  of  support.  How  can  it  ensure  that 

Ukraine’s path to EU membership continues even 

if its accession to NATO does not progress? What 

strategies  can  the  EU  pursue  to  continue 

supporting Ukraine if US assistance falters, or if 

current  restrictions  on  Kyiv’s  use  of  Western 

weapons  remain  in  place?  One  possible  change 

that was already mentioned during Congressional 

debates  in  2023-24  is  a  shift  in  US  assistance 

from grants to loans, which would likely require 

2 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
guarantees  from  European  countries.  Following 

of  supporting  Ukraine  if  the  United  States 

the  model  of  the  G7  agreement  to  use  Russian 

suspends all assistance? What would the EU do if 

assets  as  loan  collateral,  the  EU  could  push  for 

Ukraine itself showed openness to the proposal? 

using all of the seized Russian assets to secure a 

On  this  topic,  there  will  be  divisions  between 

loan and as funding to cover additional assistance 

Member  States,  and  resistance  inside  –  and 

to Ukraine 

. 

The  EU  should  also  reflect  on  how  it  would 

position itself vis-à-vis a ceasefire proposal from 

the  United  States.  Should  Brussels  oppose 

Washington,  or  would  it  seek  to  find  common 

ground? Is the EU ready to assume the full burden 

outside  –  the  institutions.  It  would  be  essential 

for EU leaders to have a frank discussion early on, 

agree  on  a  unified  position,  and  mobilise  the 

necessary resources to implement it. 

3 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND 
NATO 

Under a Trump Presidency 

During his first term, Trump often clashed with 

European allies. He threatened multiple times to 

withdraw from the alliance if other states did not 

spend 2 % of GDP on defence 

. On the campaign 

trail,  Trump  raised  doubts  about  the  United 

States’ commitment to defending Europe, saying 

that he would encourage Russia to do ‘whatever 

the hell they want’ to any NATO country that does 

not  pay  enough.  While  Congress  passed 

bipartisan  legislation   in  2023  to  prevent  a 

president  from  withdrawing  from  the  alliance 

without  congressional  approval,  the  Trump 

campaign has expressed interest in the concept of 

a  ‘dormant  NATO’,  in  which  the  US  limits  its 

commitment  to  the  nuclear  umbrella  and 

withdraws  a  significant  portion  of  its  forward-

based assets 

.  

Therefore,  a  new  Trump  administration  could 

threaten  to  reduce  support,  including  in  areas 

such as intelligence sharing, or question Article 5, 

as  leverage  to  push  allies  to  spend  more  on 

defence  (possibly  2.5  or  3  %  of  GDP) 

.  Trump 

might  also  scrutinise  how  and  where  European 

allies allocate their defence expenditure. In 2019, 

the  Trump  administration  accused  the  EU  of 

damaging 

transatlantic 

cooperation 

and 

hindering  US  access  to  Europe’s  defence market 

through  the  rules  it  planned  to  set  for  the 

participation  of  third  states  in  the  European 

Defence  Fund  (EDF)  and  Permanent  Structured 

Cooperation  (PESCO) 

.  A  similar  set  of 

complaints could emerge if the European Defence 

Industrial Programme (EDIP) is also regarded as 

protectionist. Finally, Trump shares a preference 

for  bilateral  cooperation  with  allies  rather  than 

multilateralism.  This  could  entice  Eastern 

European allies – the most exposed to the Russian 

threat  –  to  secure  bilateral  security  deals  to 

ensure  American  presence  on  their  territory 

outside  of  NATO  (following  the  model  of  the 

proposed Fort Trump in Poland) 

. 

Under a Harris Presidency 

Harris 

is  expected  to  maintain  the  Biden 

administration’s  position  on  European  defence. 

Philip Gordon, Harris’s national security adviser 

and  the  likely  central  figure  of  a  Harris  foreign 

policy, boasts a strong pro-European curriculum, 

and was Assistant Secretary of State for European 

and  Eurasian  Affairs  during  the  Obama  years 

. 

Harris  has  demonstrated  her 

transatlantic 

credentials  during  three  visits  to  the  Munich 

Security  Conference 

.  Therefore,  a  continued 

commitment to NATO should be taken for granted 

under a Harris presidency.  

However,  some  of  the  trends  pulling  the  United 

States  away  from  Europe  are  also  likely  to 

continue.  Biden,  widely  believed  to  be  the  last 

exponent  of  the  ‘Atlanticist’  school  of  American 

politicians, made the defence of Europe a central 

component  of  his  presidency  –  for  instance,  by 

increasing the number of troops in Europe from 

80,000  to  100,000 

.  Harris  belongs  to  a  new 

generation, who may not give as much weight to 

the  transatlantic  relationship  and  invest  less 

political  capital  in  it.  Moreover,  the  underlying 

trends leading the United States to shift its focus 

towards the Indo-Pacific will persist. Harris will 

likely continue to pressure Europeans to do more 

on  defence,  and  to  assume  a  stronger  stance 

against the threats posed by China. Some degree 

of ambivalence towards the EU’s development of 

autonomous capabilities will also continue, even 

if  it eases the burden-sharing debate, especially 

if fears about American companies losing access 

to European markets increase. 

What this means for the EU 

The  prospect  of  a  dwindling  American 

commitment to Europe, especially under a second 

Trump  term,  underlines  the  need  for  the  EU  to 

take a more active role in European defence. The 

Union  should  support  Member  States 

in 

increasing  defence  spending,  enhance 

the 

production  of  key  European  defence  capabilities 

(including  through  EDIP),  and  strengthen  the 

‘European pillar’ of NATO 

. Brussels should also 

enhance security ties with non-EU countries such 

as the United Kingdom, Norway and Türkiye, in 

addition to Ukraine. These actions will serve both 

to  bolster  European  countries’  ability  to  defend 

themselves, and to persuade the US that Europe 

4 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
is  increasingly  taking  a  larger  share  of  the 

new  administration  that  a  strong  transatlantic 

burden,  which  may  alleviate  Washington’s 

relationship is beneficial to the US, and that it will 

concerns. The EU and Member States should also 

actually  help  Washington  deal  with  strategic 

strengthen  protection  of  critical  infrastructure 

challenges such as those in the Indo-Pacific?   

and  intelligence  coordination  against  hybrid 

attacks  –  especially  in  the  event  of  reduced  US 

intelligence sharing. 

However,  there  are  some  uncertainties  that  the 

EU will have to contend with as it prepares for the 

outcome  of  the  November  election.  First,  can 

unity among EU Member States for the project of 

European defence be maintained? Some countries 

are  in  favour  of  giving  the  EU  a  bigger  role  in 

defence planning and investment, whereas many 

others  still  want  to  ensure  NATO,  and  the  US, 

remain  in  the  lead.  Second,  how  can  a  feasible 

European  defence  industrial  base  (EDTIB)  be 

developed,  reducing  its  dependencies  on  the 

American  market,  without  at  the  same  time 

increasing  US  concerns  and  provoking  a 

backlash? And third, how can the EU persuade the 

EU-US RELATIONS 

Under a Trump Presidency 

Relations  between  Trump  and  the  European 

Union  were  tense  during  his  first  term.  He 

perceives Europeans as competitors in America’s 

quest 

for 

re-industrialisation, 

seeing 

the 

American trade deficit with Europe as evidence of 

unfair competition. Trump engaged in a tariff war 

with the EU. A second Trump administration has 

promised to double down on this policy, imposing 

a  general  import  tariff  of  10%  on  European 

5 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
products 

.  Trump  also  has  plans  to  shield 

economic  interests,  and  cooperation  in  forums 

American companies from European tax rules for 

such  as  the  G7.  Harris’s  National  Security 

the digital economy. The Heritage Foundation, as 

Advisor,  Philip  Gordon,  has  long  supported 

part of the presidential transition booklet ‘Project 

European  integration  and  a  united  EU  foreign 

2025’,  has  called  for  the  United  States  to 

policy. At the same time, some degree of tensions 

challenge  the  European  Union  on  the  Privacy 

in the relationship will remain, especially in areas 

Shield  Framework  governing  cross-border  data 

of  industrial  policy,  as  evidenced  by  discussions 

transfers 

. 

In addition, Trump prefers dealing with European 

countries  on  a  bilateral  basis  than  working 

directly  with 

Brussels. 

By 

privileging 

governments  who  are  more  closely  aligned with 

him,  Trump  will  embolden  anti-European 

sentiment in the continent. At the same time, a 

new  Trump  administration  is  likely  to  pressure 

the  EU  to  take  a  tougher  stance  on  trade  with 

China, including by imposing more sanctions on 

Beijing and reducing dependencies.  

Under a Harris Presidency 

during  TTC  meetings.  As  Harris  is  even  more 

sceptical 

than  Biden  on 

free 

trade,  a 

comprehensive  EU-US  trade  agreement  remains 

unlikely 

. The Harris administration would also 

push  the  EU  to  take  a  stronger  position  against 

China, similarly to Trump. 

What this means for the EU 

The United States will remain among the EU’s top 

partners  for  trade,  security  and  other  issues. 

Brussels 

should 

preserve 

a 

functioning 

relationship with Washington, but it should also 

be  ready  for  heightened  tensions  if  a  more 

confrontational  administration  comes  to  power. 

In  the  latter  case,  the  EU  must  hold  its  ground. 

Vice-President  Harris  was  part 

of 

the 

During  the  first  Trump  administration,  the  EU 

administration that mended trade relations with 

strongly  retaliated  against 

the  US 

tariffs, 

the  EU,  establishing  the  Trade  and  Technology 

imposing  reciprocal  measures  and  targeting  US 

Council  (TTC)  as  a  central  vehicle  for  EU-US 

products.  European  Commission  president 

cooperation. However, that same administration 

Juncker  signalled  to  the  Trump  administration 

also  clashed  with  the  EU  on  the  Inflation 

that the European Union could impose reciprocal 

Reduction  Act  (IRA),  which  had  significant 

costs,  which  prevented  the  trade  war  from 

consequences  for  European  industry 

.  A  Harris 

escalating 

. Can the EU use the same template 

administration would likely entail a continuation 

to dial down tensions with Washington? The TTC 

of this relationship: EU-US ties would continue to 

was  utilised  in  2021  to  address  and  amend  the 

be  characterised  by  good  relations,  a  common 

divisions between the EU and the US. It serves as 

commitment 

to  de-risking 

from 

foreign 

competitors, growing integration of security and 

6 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
an  effective  forum  for  preventing  and  resolving 

case of a Harris presidency, as tensions will likely 

trade, technological and economic disputes.  

be  less  prominent  but,  in  certain  sectors,  could 

Many  EU  Member  States  already  prefer  dealing 

bilaterally with Washington rather than through 

the  EU.  Especially  in  the  case  of  a  Trump 

presidency,  this  tendency  would  be  amplified. 

Several delegations from Europe have already met 

bilaterally with representatives of both the Harris 

still  emerge.  Finally,  the  EU  should  maintain 

close ties with many groups in the United States 

beyond  the  administration,  by  reaching  out  to 

domestic constituencies and political parties that 

benefit  from  close  relations  with  Europe  (for 

instance, producers of arms and products that are 

sold  in  Europe)  and  would  be  hurt  by  reciprocal 

sanctions.  This  approach  could  help  generate 

and Trump campaigns. Notably, Hungarian Prime 

political pressure.  

Minister  Victor  Orbán  has  visited  Trump  twice. 

While these bilateral visits reduce the chances of 

forging a united European position, they can also 

be an opportunity. Can the EU harness the power 

CHINA AND INDO-PACIFIC 

of bilateral ties to develop a unified message that 

each  capital  could  repeat  in  their  bilateral 

meetings  with  the  United  States?  A  cohesive 

Under a Trump Presidency 

European  playbook,  reinforced  through  bilateral 

Trump emphasised the threat posed by China to 

channels, could be very useful in relations with a 

the  American  economy  during  his  first  mandate 

new  Trump  administration.  Brussels  should 

and  presidential  campaign.  The  first  Trump 

prepare a clear and unified message even in the 

administration imposed tariffs amounting to 350 

7 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
billion  USD  on  Chinese  imports  and  introduced 

restrictions on exports of  advanced technologies 

to  China 

.  If  re-elected,  Trump  promises  to 

‘completely eliminate dependence on China in all 

critical  areas,’  including  electronics,  steel  and 

pharmaceuticals,  imposing  a  60  %  tariff  on  all 

Chinese goods. JD Vance has argued that China is 

the 

biggest 

threat 

to 

America’s 

re-

industrialisation.  There is near consensus within 

the Trump campaign on the need to prioritise the 

Indo-Pacific  over  the  Euro-Atlantic  theatre. 

According to Elbridge Corby, the penholder of the 

2018 National Security Strategy, the United States 

does not have the capacity for a two-theatre war, 

and  China  represents  a  bigger  threat  to  US 

interests than Russia does. Hence, the US should 

redirect  scarce  resources  from  Europe  to  the 

Pacific,  and  prioritise  weapons  sales  to  Taiwan 

over Ukraine 

.  

However,  Trump’s  long-standing  reservations 

about  American  alliances  are  relevant  to  the 

Indo-Pacific  as  much  as  to  Europe.  Former 

national  security  advisor  Robert  O’Brien  argues 

that  American  allies  in  the  region  must  spend 

more for their defence 

. And Trump has argued 

the following about Taiwan: ‘They did take about 

100 % of our chip business. I think Taiwan should 

pay us for defense. You know, we're no different 

than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give 

us  anything’ 

.    If  Trump  wins  the  presidency 

again,  traditional  US  allies  will  likely  ramp  up 

their defence spending. However, they may also 

seek  to  develop  domestic  defence  capabilities  as 

insurance.  For  instance,  South  Korea  could  be 

incentivised to start its own nuclear programme 

–  especially  if  a  second  Trump  administration 

seeks  a  second  attempt  at  bilateral  negotiations 

with North Korea 

. 

Under a Harris Presidency 

If  elected,  Vice-President  Harris  is  likely  to 

continue  the  Biden  administration’s  policy  on 

China.  The  2022  National  Security  Strategy  sees 

China  as  the  only  systemic  challenger  to  the 

United States 

. A Harris presidency would see a 

continuation  of  the  policy  of  de-risking  from 

China,  relying  on  non-tariff  measures,  export 

controls and on restrictions on Chinese access to 

US  technology  and  markets.  The  administration 

would also continue pressing US partners in the 

EU and elsewhere to increase their restrictions on 

Chinese  technology  and  to  reduce  trade  with 

Beijing. A Harris presidency would also continue 

to prioritise its bilateral alliances, AUKUS and the 

Quad, and the trilateral military cooperation with 

South Korea and Japan. 

Harris  will 

also  uphold 

the  American 

commitment  to  Taiwan.  President  Biden  has 

shifted  away  from  the  long-standing  “strategic 

ambiguity”  policy,  arguing  that  the  US  would 

defend Taiwan if attacked 

. Harris would likely 

continue  to  demonstrate  support  for  Taipei  in 

order to deter Beijing. Both Harris and Walz (who 

has  lived  in  China  and  speaks  Mandarin)  place 

significant  emphasis  on  human  rights  and 

international  law  as  part  of  their  foreign  policy 

8 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
discourse. As a result, we may expect additional 

The EU should also foster closer cooperation with 

criticism  of  China’s  human  rights  record  in 

partners in East Asia, especially those who share 

Xinjiang and Hong Kong, of Beijing’s activities in 

the concern about US abandonment. One way to 

the  South  and  East  China  Seas,  and  of  North 

do so is to increase the security and resilience of 

Korea.  Finally,  while  a  Harris  presidency  would 

supply chains for semiconductors and critical raw 

pay attention to both the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-

materials,  which  are  essential  for  the  European 

Pacific theatres, in the event of a major crisis in 

economy  as  well  as  key  exports  for  East  Asian 

East Asia we can expect a significant reduction in 

countries.  How  can  the  EU  improve  cooperation 

the US footprint in Europe.  

What this means for the EU 

Whatever  the  outcome  of  the  2024  presidential 

race,  the  underlying  trends  show  a  steady 

increase  in  American  attention  to  the  Indo-

Pacific.  However,  the  speed  at  which  this 

rebalancing  takes  place  could  vary  significantly: 

with  partners  in  this  context?  Finally,  the  EU 

should rethink its relationship with China. Is the 

characterisation  of  Beijing  as 

‘partner  for 

cooperation,  an  economic  competitor  and  a 

systemic  rival’  still  apt?  Will  this  ambiguity 

damage  its  relationship  with  Washington  and 

with  partners  in  East  Asia?  Does  it  sufficiently 

deter  Beijing  from  supporting  Russia  and 

upending  the  status  quo  around  Taiwan,  in  the 

in  a  second  Trump  administration,  it  could  be 

East and South China Seas? 

faster than in under a Harris presidency. A crisis 

around  Taiwan  or  in  the  South  China  Sea  could 

prompt a sudden shift of  resources under either 

presidency 

.  To  effectively  respond  to  these 

scenarios,  the  EU  and  its  Member  States  should 

craft a coordinated approach to the Indo-Pacific. 

Can Brussels develop an autonomous contribution 

to  deterrence  in  East  Asia,  which  makes  a  crisis 

ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR 

Under a Trump Presidency 

in the region (and its repercussions for European 

On  the  2024  campaign  trail,  Trump  has  argued 

prosperity  and  security)  less  likely  ?  If  the  EU 

that Israel must be allowed to ‘finish the job’ in 

can  present  itself  as  a  reliable  partner  to  the 

Gaza,  supporting  the  Netanyahu  government’s 

United States in East Asia, Washington might also 

efforts  to  eradicate  Hamas  from  the  Strip.  This 

be less prone to abandon Europe.  

stance would represent continuity with the policy 

9 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
of strong support for Israel that Trump followed 

presumptive  Democratic  nominee,  she  did  not 

during  his  first  term  in  power.  He  broke  with 

attend  Prime  Minister  Netanyahu’s  speech  to 

long-standing bipartisan  consensus by  rejecting 

Congress,  which  as  president  of  the  Senate  she 

a  separate  Palestinian  state  and  recognising 

would  normally  attend.  Harris  did  meet  with 

Jerusalem  as  the  capital  of  Israel.  Trump’s 

Netanyahu 

later,  but  then  gave  a  forceful 

flagship Middle East initiative was the Abraham 

speech about the humanitarian situation in Gaza 

Accords  between  Israel  and  several  Arab  states, 

.  However,  the  Harris  campaign  does  not 

which de facto bypassed the Palestinian issue 

. A 

support an arms embargo on Israel, maintaining 

second  Trump  presidency  would  likely  push  to 

continuity with the traditional US  foreign policy 

end the war quickly, and to resume the Abraham 

position 

. A Harris administration could instead 

Accords. It is unclear, however, how easily Trump 

make  the  transfer  of  specific  weapons  systems 

would be able to bring Israel and the Arab states 

conditional on Israeli war conduct, protection of 

back  to  the  negotiating  table,  especially  if  a 

civilians,  and  a  path  towards  a  two-state 

Palestinian state is not part of the arrangement. 

solution.  Harris  would  continue  to  push  for  the 

A second Trump presidency could also reduce the 

implementation  of  the  Biden  ceasefire  plan  or  a 

US  presence  in  the  Middle  East,  through  the 

similar  version,  but  would  likely  face  similar 

withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Syria that was 

challenges  as  the  current  administration  in 

initiated  during  his  first  term.  Questions  arise 

getting all sides to agree. 

over  whether  the  US  would  terminate  Operation 

Prosperity  Guardian  in  the  Red  Sea,  leaving  the 

responsibility  to  European  allies,  or  if  it  would 

continue  it  as  part  of  a  renewed  policy  of 

maximum  pressure  on  Iran  and  its  proxies  (see 

section on Iran).  

Under a Harris Presidency 

If  there  is  one  foreign  policy  area  where  Harris 

might  diverge  from  the  Biden  administration’s 

position, it is the war in Gaza. During her tenure, 

she has taken a more sympathetic stance towards 

the  Palestinians,  and  has  expressed  criticism  of 

Israel’s  conduct  of  the  war.  After  becoming  the 

What this means for the EU 

The EU has a stake in stabilising the Middle East 

and  resuming  the  path  towards  a  two-state 

solution. However, its current role in the region 

is quite limited. Can Brussels assume a stronger 

role  in  pressuring  for  a  ceasefire  between  Israel 

and  Hamas,  while  avoiding  an  expansion  of  the 

conflict to all-out war with Hezbollah? If the EU 

assumed  a  more  active  position, 

it  would 

complement  the  efforts  of  a  Harris  presidency, 

while  also  preserving  the  viability  of  the  two-

state  solution  in  the  event  of  a  Trump  victory. 

10 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
full enforcement of US sanctions on Iran’s energy 

sector  and  on  governments  and  organisations 

that  buy  Iranian  oil  and  gas.  The  US  would  also 

seek to rally allies in the region around the threat 

posed  by  Iran  and  its  proxies  –  as  a  way  of 

reviving 

the  Abraham  Accords.  The  new 

administration could also  consider direct  strikes 

on the Iranian nuclear programme and on high-

ranking  officials,  following  the  precedent  of  the 

attack  on  General  Qasem  Soleimani  in  2020 

. 

Iran is concerned about a new Trump presidency, 

and has reportedly targeted the Trump campaign 

with  cyber  attacks 

.  Tensions  between  Tehran 

and Washington are poised to grow significantly 

in a second Trump term. 

Under a Harris Presidency 

Harris’s national security advisor, Gordon, was a 

key architect of the Joint and Comprehensive Plan 

of  Action  (JCPOA),  the 

Iran  nuclear  deal 

negotiated during the Obama administration, and 

has  written  a  book  criticising  regime  change 

pursued by the United States in the region 

. With 

Gordon expected to play a major role in a Harris 

administration,  the  US  approach  to  Iran  would 

veer away from any attempt at regime change in 

Iran. Harris has also expressed support for the US 

return  to  the  2015  agreement  limiting  Iran’s 

nuclear  programme  in  exchange  for  lifting 

sanctions which Trump abandoned in 2018 

. If 

the  approach  is  seen  as  too  accommodating,  it 

may lead to tensions with US allies in the region 

such as Israel and Saudi Arabia.  

What this means for the EU 

While Iran’s support to proxy groups encourages 

regional instability and affects European security, 

Tehran’s main threat to the EU emerges arguably 

from its supplies of drones and missiles to Russia 

for the latter’s war of aggression against Ukraine 

Moreover,  the  EU  could  position  itself  as  a 

dialogue  partner  between  the  United  States  and 

Israel on the one hand and Arab countries on the 

other.  Such  a  role  could  prevent  spillovers  from 

the  war,  ensure  the  delivery  of  aid  to  the 

Palestinians,  and  facilitate  the  re-opening  of 

negotiations.  Given  the  uncertainty  about  the 

continuation  of  Operation  Prosperity  Guardian, 

the  EU  should  reinforce  Operation  Aspides. 

European forces in the Middle East (especially in 

Iraq)  might  also  become  more  vulnerable  if  the 

United  States  further  reduces 

its  regional 

footprint.  However,  for  all  these  efforts  to  be 

achieved, EU Member States must first agree on a 

common  position.  Can  they  manage  to  do  this 

before the next US president takes power? 

IRAN 

Under a Trump Presidency 

Trump’s  policy  on  Iran  was  one  of  ‘maximum 

.  In  shaping  its  approach to  the  United  States’ 

pressure.’ According to him, the relaxation of this 

future  Iran  policy,  the  EU  should  highlight  this 

policy under Biden emboldened Tehran to attack 

issue to forge a united front with Washington. A 

Israel,  both  through  Hamas  and  Hezbollah,  and 

Harris  administration  would  likely  be  open  to 

directly,  through  drone  and  missile  strikes. 

disrupting the cooperation between Moscow and 

Trump  also  believes  that  Iran  has  amassed 

Tehran.  A  Trump  presidency  would  want  to 

enough  uranium  to  build  a  nuclear  bomb  in  a 

incorporate  this  element  into  its  maximum 

matter 

of  months. 

A 

second 

Trump 

pressure  campaign.  This  could  also  facilitate 

administration  would  likely  return  to  the  policy 

cooperation  with  Arab  countries  and  Israel  who 

of maximum pressure against Iran, including the 

see Iran as a significant threat. At the same time, 

11 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
the EU should continue efforts to prevent regional 

Pristina  was  a  key  initiative.  A  new  Trump 

escalation  from  conflicts  involving  Iran  and  its 

administration  would  push  for  its  revival.  This 

proxies on the one hand and the US and its allies 

exclusive  focus  on  Belgrade-Pristina  relations 

on  the  other.  Will  Brussels  be  able  to  take  on  a 

could  undermine  the  broader,  more  complex 

more  prominent  diplomatic  role  in  the  region? 

political  dynamics  in  the  region.  Additionally, 

Can  it  disrupt  the  Moscow-Tehran  cooperation 

there  is  a  significant  risk  of  reviving  the 

and  Iran’s  support  for  its  proxies  without 

controversial  ‘land  swap’  or  ‘border  correction’ 

contributing to regional escalation? 

proposal. This approach, not necessarily excluded 

THE WESTERN BALKANS   

Under a Trump Presidency 

A  second  Trump  term  is  expected  to  exacerbate 

authoritarian 

and 

nationalist 

tendencies, 

deepening  ethno-nationalist  divisions  both 

within  and  between  countries  in  the  region. 

Trump's personalistic diplomatic style is likely to 

become  even  more  pronounced.  Ivanka  Trump 

and Jared Kushner have secured deals in Albania 

and  Serbia  to  develop  luxury  complexes  worth 

over  EUR  924  million 

.  During  Trump's  first 

term, the 2020 Washington Agreement aimed at 

economic  normalisation  between  Belgrade  and 

during Trump's first term, marked a significant 

departure from the policies of the Obama era 

. 

Finally,  a  ‘dormant  NATO’  policy  would  see  the 

US taking a back seat in Europe, and could have 

significant spillover effects in the region, where 

US  presence  is  crucial,  especially  within  the 

framework of KFOR. 

Under a Harris Presidency 

Vice-President  Harris  has  yet  to  clarify  the 

direction  of  US  foreign  policy  concerning  the 

Western Balkans. Her administration is likely to 

maintain  the  core  principles  of  the  Biden 

administration,  focusing  on  the  Euro-Atlantic 

agenda, upholding democratic principles and the 

rule  of  law,  and  addressing  security  challenges 

12 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
posed  by  Russian  and  Chinese  malign  influence 

operations.  Harris  is  expected  to  adopt  a  firm 

stance  on  organised  crime  and  its  connections 

with political and business elites. When accepting 

the  presidential  nomination,  Kamala  Harris 

ENERGY AND CLIMATE 

Under a Trump Presidency 

stated that she would ‘never waver in defence of 

Trump  is  an  outspoken  critic  of  the  energy 

America’s security and ideals’, hinting at Donald 

transition and is sceptical of climate change. On 

Trump’s  admiration  for  dictators  and  autocrats. 

his  first  day  in  office  in  2017  he  withdrew  the 

In  June  2024,  President  Biden  extended  the 

United  States  from  the  Paris  Agreement,  and  he 

Executive  Order  on  National  Emergency  With 

may do so again if re-elected. The United States’ 

Respect to the Western Balkans for another year, 

leadership  in  international  climate  agreements 

citing ongoing violence, obstructionist activities, 

would  once  again  be  upended.  The  Republican 

and the region’s continued threat to US national 

platform  pledges  to  ‘unleash  American  energy’, 

making  the  United  States  energy  independent 

thanks to fossil fuels 

. Trump also plans to press 

Congress  to  repeal  the IRA,  while  slowing  down 

the  implementation  of  subsidies  for  electric 

vehicles and clean energy products. The Supreme 

Court’s  recent  decision  to  end  the  ‘Chevron 

deference’ will facilitate Trump’s efforts 

. Since 

federal 

judges  can  now 

rule  whether  a 

government 

agency 

is 

overstepping 

its 

interpretative 

powers, 

many 

project 

authorisations  stemming  from  the  IRA  will  be 

challenged,  and  permits  will  be  issued  more 

slowly. However, the Trump administration may 

also  face  challenges  to  its  plans  since  many 

Republican-leaning states are beneficiaries of tax 

cuts under the IRA.   

security and foreign policy 

.  

What this means for the EU 

While the Western Balkans may not be a central 

focus of the presidential campaign, the outcome 

of the election will affect the region significantly. 

Current US foreign policy in the Western Balkans 

aligns  closely  with  EU  efforts  to  advance  the 

region's  path  toward  EU  membership.  This 

includes  strong  support  for  the  EU-facilitated 

dialogue  between  Belgrade 

and  Pristina, 

upholding  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina's  territorial 

integrity  and  sovereignty  under  the  Dayton 

Agreement,  and  promoting  full  Euro-Atlantic 

integration  for  Albania,  Montenegro  and  North 

Macedonia.  A  Democratic  victory  would  likely 

reassure  the  EU  by  maintaining  a  supportive  US 

approach 

and 

consistent 

engagement 

in 

addressing these challenges. The US presence in 

KFOR  and  support  to  EUFOR  Althea  would  be 

essential  in  maintaining  security  and  stability, 

especially during the transition period under the 

new  EU  leadership.  A  second  Trump  term, 

however,  would  likely  amplify  populist  and 

nationalist  rhetoric,  undermining  the  critical 

reforms needed in these countries. This includes 

efforts to combat organised crime and corruption, 

strengthen  the  rule  of  law,  and  ensure  media 

freedom. Such a shift could set back the region’s 

EU  enlargement  prospects,  slowing  progress 

toward  membership.  Additionally,  this  scenario 

might undermine the region's resilience against 

foreign interference.   

13 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
climate change, but the transatlantic competition 

for  clean-energy  resources  and  industry  could 

intensify.  Regardless  of  the  outcome,  the  EU 

should  also  seek  to  protect  its  domestic  energy 

market  from  both  American  (and  Chinese) 

competition.  It  should  strengthen  European 

countries’  abilities  to  produce  and  procure 

affordable and clean energy.  One way to do so is 

Under a Harris Presidency 

If  Vice-President  Harris  were  to  be  elected,  her 

presidency  would  expand  her  predecessor’s 

climate 

and 

energy  policy.  The  Biden 

administration  has  pursued  one  of  the  most 

ambitious  climate  policies  in  American  history, 

passing legislation such as the IRA. However, oil 

and  gas  production  has  grown  to  historic  highs 

under  Biden.  Harris  would  likely  continue  to 

further develop the US  renewable energy sector. 

When she ran for president in 2020, her climate 

plan  called  for  a  10  trillion  USD  increase  in 

spending over a decade as well as a carbon pricing 

mechanism,  and  favoured  a  ban  on  fracking, 

which  she  has  now  disavowed 

.  As  Vice-

President,  Harris  incorporated  climate  change 

into  foreign  relations,  holding  a  round  table  in 

Bangkok  to connect environmental activists with 

clean energy experts and starting a   partnership 

with  Caribbean  countries   to  address  climate 

change 

.  Therefore,  a  Harris  presidency  would 

likely make climate diplomacy a central feature in 

international relations.  

What this means for the EU 

Under a Trump presidency, the EU would lose the 

US as an important ally in climate diplomacy, but 

it would have the opportunity to resume a global 

leadership  role  in  the  field.  Trump’s  proposed 

increases 

in 

energy 

production  would 

significantly affect the European energy market. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  Harris-led  United  States 

would be closely aligned with the EU in fighting 

14 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
to  strengthen  partnerships  focused  on  critical 

minerals  and  supply  security  with  like-minded 

nations,  who  are  also 

concerned  about 

developments in the United States. On the climate 

diplomacy  front,  the  EU  should  strengthen  its 

position  at  the  centre  of  multilateral  efforts  to 

address  climate  change,  and 

intensify 

its 

DATA AND ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 

Under a Trump Presidency 

partnership with countries across the globe who 

Trump  has  received  the  endorsement  of  several 

see  it  as  existential  threat.  This  would  either 

Silicon  Valley  executives 

for  his  platform 

make the EU a valued ally to the United States, or 

supporting  deregulation  in  the  field  of  data  and 

limit the impact of a U-turn in American climate 

artificial intelligence (AI) 

. Trump and Vance – 

and energy policy. 

himself a venture capital investor – see an arms 

race  with  China  in  the  field  of  AI  and  emerging 

technologies 

. The Trump campaign has pledged 

to  repeal  the  Biden  administration’s  2023 

executive  order  on  the  safe  development  of  AI, 

which  it  says  overly  restricts  innovation 

. 

Trump  may  launch  a  series  of  ‘Manhattan 

15 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
Projects’  to  spur  AI  research  and  develop  dual-

use  applications,  using  the  abundant  electricity 

that  will  be  generated  domestically  to  meet  the 

high  energy  demands  of  AI  research  and 

development 

. A second Trump presidency may 

also  ease  regulations  on  data  transfers.  The 

presidential  transition  booklet  ‘Project  2025’ 

advocates for repealing Executive Order 14086 to 

remove  obstacles  to  signal  intelligence 

.  This 

would  impact  one  of  the  building  blocks  of  the 

EU–US  Data  Privacy  Framework.  Trump  is  also 

willing  to  protect  US  tech  giants  such  as  Apple, 

Meta and X against EU privacy legislation 

. 

Under a Harris Presidency 

What this means for the EU 

The  EU  seeks  to  support  the  responsible 

development  of  AI  and  a  common  regulatory 

approach  to  emerging  technologies.  This  would 

be  consistent  with  a  Harris  presidency’s 

emphasis  on  responsible  innovation  but  could 

create  significant  challenges  vis-à-vis  Trump’s 

deregulation plans. The EU’s ability to enforce the 

Digital Markets Act (DMA) may also be weakened. 

The risk of harmful uses of AI and disinformation 

spreading  in  a  deregulated  environment  would 

increase.  Additionally,  the  EU  should  work  to 

avoid  a  repetition  of  the  situation  that  occurred 

with 

the 

IRA,  when  European 

industry 

unintentionally  became  collateral  damage  of  US 

Harris  launched  her  political  career  in  Silicon 

legislation,  whose  primary  goals  were 

to 

Valley,  and  some  of  her  former  top  staffers  are 

strengthen the clean energy industry and counter 

now  big  names  in  the  tech  industry.  She  has 

China.  Either  a  Trump  or  Harris  administration 

supported the Biden administration’s regulations 

could enact new laws in this field with a similarly 

on  AI  and  other  critical  technologies,  including 

harmful impact on Europe. 

the  CHIPS  and  Science  Act  and  the  Executive 

Order on AI. However, the primary focus of these 

regulations  was  to  restrict  China  and  Russia’s 

access  to  the  technology.  Regulation  was  left  to 

voluntary 

industry-led  standard-setting.  A 

Harris  presidency  would 

likely  be  more 

outspoken  in  calling  for  regulations  to  address 

the  dangers  posed  by  AI,  including  deepfakes, 

algorithmic bias and disinformation. In July 2023, 

Harris  led  a  meeting  among  civil  rights,  labour 

and  consumer  protection  groups  where  she 

rejected  the  ‘false  choice’  between  promoting 

innovation and protecting the public 

.  

How can the EU be ready for developments in this 

field  following  the  election?  The  EU  should 

leverage the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) 

and  other  forums  for  EU-US  dialogue,  for  early 

warning  and  consultations  to  prevent  disputes, 

and 

to 

ensure 

transatlantic 

regulatory 

convergence.  The  EU  should  also  harness  the 

necessary resources that would allow it to enforce 

the  DMA  and  threaten  retaliatory  measures  in 

response  to  any  harmful  actions  by  the  United 

States.  

16 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
POLITICAL TENSIONS AND 
POLARISATION 

Another key theme of the next presidency will be 

the  robustness  of  the  system  of  checks  and 

balances. Two recent decisions by the US Supreme 

Court will make the next US president particularly 

powerful: the decision in July granting presidents 

sweeping  immunity  from  criminal  prosecution 

A  key  feature  of  American  politics  in  2024  is 

after  leaving  office,  and  the  decision  to  end  the 

political polarisation. According to most surveys, 

‘Chevron deference’ – whereby federal judges can 

US  citizens  are  divided  into  two  political  camps 

now  rule  whether  a  government  agency  is 

because  of  two  very  different  worldviews 

overstepping  its  interpretative  powers.  Through 

competing  for  dominance 

.  Most  respondents 

these 

two 

rulings, 

experts 

argue, 

the 

find it very hard to agree with representatives of 

the  opposite  party  on  most 

issues.  And 

commander-in-chief  will  be  able  to  run  an 
‘Imperial presidency’ 

. Trump could use them to 

importantly,  partisan  support  for  the  violent 

continue  his  first  administration’s  practice  of 

removal of adversaries is much more widespread 

expanding the power of the White House vis-à-vis 

than previously thought: in a PBS poll from April 

federal  agencies 

.  A  Harris  presidency  would 

2024,  20%  of  respondents  (and  28%  of 

likely  push  back  against  the  recent  Supreme 

Republicans)  agreed  that  ‘Americans  have  to 

Court  decisions.  Harris  has  endorsed  President 

resort  to  violence  to  get  the  country  back  on 

Biden’s  proposals  for  changes  to  the  Court  such 

track’ 

. 

The 2024 election is already featuring high levels 

of political tension. Trump was the victim of an 

assassination attempt on 13 July and opinion polls 

consistently  point  to  a  high  degree  of  political 

polarisation and an erosion of trust in US political 

institutions. Against this background, a contested 

election outcome could unleash a significant wave 

of  political  violence  across  the  country 

.  The 

Trump  campaign  is  already  questioning  the 

validity of the electoral process, such as Biden’s 

replacement  on  the  ballot.  On  6  January  2021, 

pro-Trump protestors stormed the US Capitol in 

an attempt to prevent the certification of electoral 

results.  Trump  and  other  Republicans  have 

threatened that a repeat of the insurrection could 

take place if Trump is not elected again 

.  

as term limits for Supreme Court justices. Harris 

may  push  the  proposal  forward  if  she  is  elected 

president.  While  these  are  strictly  domestic 

issues, 

they 

do  have 

implications 

for 

international  affairs,  as  they  could,  over  time, 

reduce  the  legislature  and  the  judiciary’s  ability 

to  counterbalance  the  executive  power.  This 

would  weaken  democratic  countries  worldwide 

and embolden authoritarian actors. 

What this means for the EU 

The EU has a stake in a stable and peaceful United 

States, and on the peaceful transfer of power, for 

both  value-based  and  strategic  considerations. 

Widespread political violence in the US would not 

only  weaken  the  transatlantic  relationship  but 

17 

PREVENTING WAR IN EAST ASIA 

 
 
could  also  embolden  strategic  competitors  to 

election  on  5  November.  Can  the  EU  coordinate 

undertake  more  aggressive  actions  that  could 

with  Member  States  to  address  contested 

compromise European security. Therefore, the EU 

electoral results and potential violence in the US? 

should do what it can to support the democratic 

How can Brussels effectively curb the likely wave 

transfer of power in Washington. This would be 

of disinformation around election day? And can it 

particularly complex in the event that one of the 

step up to uphold the principles of democracy, the 

two parties refuses to accept the electoral results, 

rule of law, and human rights if a crisis emerges 

if  there  is  no  clear  winner,  like  in  the  2000 

in the US political system?  

election,  and 

if  political  violence  becomes 

widespread.  The  uncertainty  might  cause 

divisions  among  Member  States  and  might  be 

exploited  by  malign  actors  such  as  Russia. 

Disinformation is also likely to be a key issue for 

the EU in the run-up to, and in the wake of, the 

 This report is an extension of the interactive map 
‘The US Election: What choices for Europe?’, 
produced by Giuseppe Spatafora and Christian 
Dietrich and available on the EUISS website 
(https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/us-elections-
what-choices-europe). The author would like to 
thank Bojana Zorić, Associate Analyst for the 
Western Balkans at the EUISS, for contributing the 
section on the Western Balkans. 

 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The 2024 candidates 
on foreign policy’ 
(https://www.cfr.org/election2024/candidate-
tracker).  

 Smeltz, D., and El Baz, L., ‘Domestic issues 
overshadow foreign conflicts in 2024 voting 
decisions’, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 
2024 (https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-
opinion-survey/domestic-issues-overshadow-
foreign-conflicts-2024-voting-decisions).  

 Lindsay, J.M., ‘Election 2024: Are Republicans 
turning isolationist?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 
29 March 2024 (https://www.cfr.org/blog/election-
2024-are-republicans-turning-isolationist).  

 Melkozerova, V., ‘Why Donald Trump “hates 
Ukraine’’’, Politico, 18 April 2024 
(https://www.politico.eu/article/why-donald-
trump-hates-ukraine-us-congress-kyiv-war/).   

 Arnsdorf, I., Dawsey, J., and Birnbaum, M., ‘Inside 
Donald Trump’s secret, long-shot plan to end the 
war in Ukraine’, The Washington Post, 7 April 2024 
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/04/
05/trump-ukraine-secret-plan/). Slattery, G., and 
Lewis, S., ‘Exclusive: Trump handed plan to halt US 
military aid to Kyiv unless it talks peace with 
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19 

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