Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027
Date: 2024-11-20
Institutions: Commission for Territorial Cohesion Policy and EU Budget, European Committee of the Regions
Subjects: EU financial instrument, EU regional policy, budget policy, financial management, general budget (EU), multiannual financial framework, regional development








C_202500279EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/279


24.1.2025






Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027
(C/2025/279)














Rapporteur



:


Marie-Antoinette MAUPERTUIS, President of the Corsican Assembly









POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS (CoR),








1.


notes, in line with the Boc Cordeiro opinion (1), that the European Union is facing major structural and cyclical challenges that call for a review of the objectives, structure and delivery mechanisms of the post 2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);












2.


considers that action should be taken to tackle the challenges identified in the EU Strategic Agenda 2024-2029 and the 9th Cohesion Report (such as enlargement, defence and geopolitical instability, the need to re-industrialise Europe and increase its competitiveness, as well as the digital, demographic and ecological transitions), at the same time as strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion across all parts of the EU;












3.


agrees with the Political guidelines 2024–2029 of the European Commission President that, rather than adapting existing policies and programmes to new priorities, the building blocks of the new MFF should be based on a clear definition of EU objectives and policy goals. This approach would then call for a significant reorganisation of the EU budget, combined with re-evaluating the spending programmes of lesser priority;












4.


supports the advocacy of the Draghi report to refocus the work of the EU, prioritising policies and actions where the EU has the greatest added value, bearing in mind the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle; believes that this will lead to greater autonomy for Member States, regions and cities, allowing them to tailor European policies and goals to best fit their operational practices and the dynamics of their region in respecting the Partnership principle;












5.


agrees with the European Parliament that ‘a critical review of the Commission’s ad hoc initiatives and the thorough screening of new initiatives regarding their quality and quantity’ (2) are needed, as these initiatives have proliferated in response to unexpected crises and changing political priorities; reiterates the call by the Draghi report that before adopting new legislation, the Commission should conduct a systematic assessment and stress-testing of all existing EU laws and regulations at the start of each mandate;












6.


calls on the European Commission to reduce the fragmentation of funds in the post 2027 MFF and calls for all funds contributing to financing just transition strategies to be based on a common integrated and strategic approach. A place-based approach should be taken for all relevant funds, including those supporting the Union’s industrial competitiveness (3);












7.


suggests that, building on the proposals made in the Speich opinion (4), this restructuring of the MFF should be based on the principles of better law-making, active subsidiarity, partnership and multilevel governance;












8.


stresses that the next MFF must abide by the Treaty principles of conferral and respect for local and regional self-government, the rule of law and the principle of ‘do no harm to cohesion’ (5) as regards all policies and funds;












9.


considers, in line with the principle of better regulation, that no new European Commission initiative should be launched if the remit and budget of an existing programme could be expanded instead;












10.


strongly regrets the lack of structured dialogue with local and regional governments as well as with civil society and the growing centralisation of decisions at the European Council;












11.


stands ready to support the European Parliament’s recurrent efforts to make the negotiations more democratic through enhanced collaboration with the European Parliament on budgetary matters;





Do no harm to cohesion across the MFF









12.


believes that cohesion policy alone cannot deliver territorial cohesion and that the entire EU budget should strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion;












13.


highlights that the EU’s main competitors have recently adopted large scale place-based policies and shares the OECD’s views on the need to enhance the use of place-based policies since the manifestation of EU political challenges varies considerably at local and regional level, depending on the characteristics, capacities and vulnerabilities of each territory;












14.


reiterates its strong support for the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle and regrets that the European Commission has so far failed to operationalize it further to the publication of the 8th Cohesion report in February 2022;












15.


points out that the next MFF should explore how to support territories that are struggling the most to deliver on the green transition, taking into account the asymmetric impact of the transition at subnational level which has brought about new forms of economic and social disparity;












16.


stresses that the next MFF should also explore how to tackle the demographic change of EU regions, including by incorporating appropriate demographic indicators, targets and support mechanisms for the most impacted territories;












17.


stresses that cohesion policy should be kept up in all regions (less developed, transition and more developed) to make sure that none of them are left behind;












18.


calls for local and regional authorities (LRAs) to be involved, particularly in issues within their competence, throughout the entire process of drawing up EU direct management programmes which may have a territorial dimension (for example Horizon Europe or the Connecting Europe Facility). Points out that regional authorities should also be involved throughout the preparation, programming, implementation, delivery and evaluation of all EU shared management programmes;












19.


believes that Territorial Impact Assessments (TIAs) provided for in the better regulation toolbox are the best available way to implement the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ and the ‘active subsidiarity’ principles (6), and to ensure that there is no undue proliferation of instruments and funds with a territorial dimension;












20.


proposes that the CoR be involved in the TIAs and rural proofing to be carried out by the European Commission as it shapes new EU multiannual programmes (7);












21.


considers that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, gender mainstreaming and the use of TIAs and better regulation tools to identify and amend existing funds and instruments and possibly create new ones should be embedded further in the post 2027 Interinstitutional Agreement on Budgetary Matters;












22.


insists that the European Commission rely on an enlarged emergency fund or on a general flexibility reserve rather than primarily reprogramming cohesion policy and common agricultural policy funds to finance emerging challenges;





The experience of LRAs in implementing the 2021-2027 MFF









23.


reiterates its views regarding the undue proliferation of EU instruments targeting territorial development. Emphasises its concerns over the continued existence of more than 50 multiannual programmes for funding in the 2021-2027 period and the structural increase in multiannual programmes which are managed centrally, reaching 40 % of the total under the 2021-2027 MFF;












24.


is vehemently opposed (8) to the increasing centralisation of EU funding programmes, even those under shared management such as cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy;












25.


emphasises that LRAs are key partners in delivering on the ground the EU’s political agenda because they are responsible for 54 to 58 % of the total volume of public investments carried out by governments;












26.


believes that new sui generis programmes under direct management created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), as well as incoming new funds such as the European Social Climate Fund, cannot automatically be considered the best model in terms of governance of EU multiannual programmes for the next MFF;












27.


agrees that the architecture of the current MFF does not always allow for an adequate response to emerging needs and new challenges and notes in particular the lack of LRA involvement in the preparation and implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans;












28.


underlines that most programmes under central (direct or indirect) management see LRAs as simple beneficiaries or recipients of funds rather than partners in the design of centrally managed EU programmes on EU policies directly affecting them;












29.


notes that, even if compared to the RFF, the Social Climate Fund has marginally better provisions for meaningful consultation with all stakeholders, including LRAs, this remains a far cry from the partnership principle that already exists under Cohesion policy funding (9);












30.


points out that repeated changes to policies, especially to cohesion policy, in response to the crises that have occurred since 2008 have undermined the policies’ implementation;












31.


believes that new priorities should be financed, with new sources of financing identified by the Own Resources Roadmap (10). Considers that the new MFF should identify the right means and incentives to attract private capital and develop public-private partnerships, in order to achieve the EU’s ambitions and objectives, leveraging the existing and future funds in place at EU, national and local level;





Making the European Partnership Pact a reality









32.


believes that the European Commission should build on the recent OECD-EU initiative ‘Place-Based Policies for the future’ to develop post 2027 EU guidelines on public investment across all levels of government, deliver effective decentralisation and devise guidelines for effective place-based funding;












33.


proposes that the principles of the European Partnership Pact (11) be applied across all funds with a territorial dimension, eliminating gaps, overlaps and inconsistencies between the priorities and eligible activities of the various multiannual programmes. This would ensure increased mutual reinforcement, above and beyond the Common Strategic Framework in place during the 2014-2020 period (12);












34.


is convinced that EU place-based policies are an asset to reinforce the adherence to the European project because they aim to improve economic development and well-being outcomes for people-in-places by understanding geographical context; leveraging local assets, knowledge and networks; and improving (multi-level) governance mechanisms:












35.


suggests that a revised European Code of Conduct on Partnership be applied to and made binding across all shared and centrally managed funds with a territorial dimension;












36.


believes that the principle of competence-based management and funds delivery (13) must be embedded in the legislative acts setting up funds with a territorial dimension. This means that the EU and national authorities cannot run programmes which have an impact on regional or local policies without the agreement of LRAs, which must be fully involved in the programming of these funds at both national and EU level;












37.


argues that full enforcement of the partnership principle entails three dimensional, parallel implementation: at horizontal level (partners of a given programme), at vertical level (multilevel governance) and across all EU programmes (new or existing ones), particularly those based on Article 174 TFEU, which are delivered in the same area;












38.


takes note of the proposal included in the Political guidelines 2024–2029 of the European Commission President to have ‘one Plan per Member State’ for the post 2027 period in order to extend the partnership principle to all EU programmes with a territorial dimension. Points out that at present, the Partnership Agreement under cohesion policy, the CAP Strategic Plans, the National Climate and Energy Plans, the Just Transition plans and the National Reform Programmes under the European Semester are all developed in silos, with much overlapping and in most cases without the involvement of the competent LRAs;












39.


maintains that in order to extend the partnership principle to all EU programmes, the European and National Partnership Pacts, and where applicable the Regional Partnership Pacts, should be a legally binding framework. This framework should include multilevel governance and monitoring arrangements across funds under shared management and, where applicable, centrally managed funds and programmes whose priorities and delivery mechanisms are clearly identified and mutually reinforcing;












40.


underlines in particular that the new CAP delivery mode based on a single Strategic Plan at national level for the European agricultural guarantee fund (EAGF) and the European agricultural fund for rural development (EAFRD) has led to an increase in the administrative burden for regional managing authorities, a lack of flexibility to adapt the CAP Strategic Plan to regional needs, a growing disconnect with similar investment under the Partnership Agreements and some delays in implementation;












41.


stresses the need for these new national plans proposed in the Guidelines to be designed, decided and delivered under the binding principles of the European Partnership Pact as described above and to fully respect the principles of multi-level governance and partnership;





Achieving synergies between EU multiannual programmes and initiatives









42.


notes that the myriad of EU funds and instruments under the 2021-2027 MFF can be classified in five major policy objective categories: green transition, digital transition, human capital, investment and strategic autonomy;












43.


takes note of the proliferation of new budgetary initiatives created in response to successive crises or new political needs over the last 15 years. This includes the Youth Employment Initiative, the Just Transition Fund, EFSI and instruments created in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, such as SURE, CRII, CRII+, REACT-EU, RRF, CARE, the European Social Climate Fund and STEP;












44.


underlines that a case in point on these asymmetries within the MFF is the fact that more funds are devoted to rural development beyond farming in cohesion policy (EUR 45,6 billion) (14) than in rural development policy itself (EUR 24,6 billion) (15); the very high overlap in eligible activities in RRF and Cohesion Policy (16) or Cohesion investments in digital and green transitions far exceeds the financial allocations for policy specific funds, indicating the need for simplification;












45.


considers therefore that there is ample space to create synergies and consolidate the MFF with fewer, more multifunctional funds managed across various European Commission directorates-general, when there are demonstrable synergies and overlaps, with a single set of rules for each type of management;












46.


considers that the next MFF must be built on a consolidated set of instruments, grounded in the better regulation guidelines and toolbox. It must define the strategic and territorial level most suited to deliver on EU policy objectives. It must also deliver fit-for-purpose crisis response instruments that can provide an initial, meaningful budgetary response to unforeseen needs and emergencies, rather than relying on repeated redeployment and reprograming from existing funds such as cohesion policy (17);












47.


maintains that the number of programmes under all forms of management should not be artificially predetermined up-front but rather be developed according to the appropriate policy context and optimal territorial level;





Territorialised European Semester









48.


considers that the European Semester must fully embed and enforce the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle by providing detailed evidence of how national and EU policies and funds contribute to territorial cohesion;












49.


believes that the existing system of National Contact Points (NCPs) that exist under various denominations in direct management programmes should be embedded into the programming at national and regional level of cohesion and rural development programmes so as to ensure that there are synergies in capacity building between central and shared management programmes operating in the same territory and on the same policy;












50.


stresses that, in line with the longstanding work of the CoR’s ECON commission (18), the European Code of Conduct on Partnership should be applied to the European Semester. This would enable the competent LRAs and their representatives to be involved on a structural basis in designing structural reforms and enabling conditions in issues within their remit. These reforms and conditions could then be reflected in the National Reform Programmes;












51.


asserts that TIAs are a key instrument to ensure that the European Semester includes the territorial governance, and local and regional capacity implications of structural reforms proposed by the Country-Specific Recommendations;












52.


believes that this semester TIA should also assess whether enabling conditions for the disbursement of EU funds penalise local and regional authorities for non-compliance on reforms that are not of their competence;












53.


believes that structural reforms not directly relevant to the delivery of EU cohesion policies, including rural development, are being addressed by a dedicated but separate and sufficiently funded EU structural reform programme involving LRAs in issues within their remit;












54.


maintains that administrative capacity must be seen as more than just an enabling factor for the delivery of EU funds, particularly those under shared management, thereby stressing that; capacity building support to LRAs must be embedded in the programming and delivery of EU funds, including through a dedicated thematic objective;





A more flexible MFF









55.


proposes that the MFF should be adequately flexible, enabling it to provide the initial response to unexpected shocks and crises;












56.


proposes therefore that a much bigger emergency fund and general flexibility reserve package needs to be built into the MFF structure from the outset. to provide the initial response to a sudden shock such as the war in Ukraine or a health or environmental crisis, thereby turning the reprogramming of existing programmes as a last resort alternative; urges moreover the Commission to take the approach of REACT-EU as a good crisis-response example where an existing fund is topped-up and delivered with the full involvement of local and regional authorities;












57.


believes that, as this new general flexibility reserve to respond to unforeseen shocks and emerging challenges is embedded in the MFF Regulation, it would avoid relying on existing policies and funds such as cohesion and agriculture as an adjustment variable as is currently the case, which in turn undermines the achievement of their objectives as set out in the Treaties and undermines the regulatory stability, to the detriment of managing authorities and beneficiaries;












58.


underlines that this new flexibility reserve would have no impact in the short term on the level of national contributions of the various Member States;












59.


believes that the eligibility rules and State aid criteria for investments directed to the same policy goal should be consistent across EU programmes implemented in the same place, especially with regard to the application of State aid rules. Shared management programmes should be exempt from State aid rules in much the same way as direct management programmes, such as Horizon Europe or the Connecting Europe Facility;












60.


considers that, in line with the Letta Report, the State aid rules should be consolidated further and calls for a more proactive approach in order to support investment in strategic sectors and in places facing clearly defined challenges, instead of exclusively relying on the present restrictive approach based on national population coverage;





Consolidating integrated territorial development instruments









61.


believes that there is an expanding plethora of integrated territorial development instruments both within and beyond regional policy and rural development programmes. Many of them are intended to deliver on EU priorities but they are often not connected to specific funding commitments under the Structural Funds (such as the Covenant of Mayors, the Reference Framework for Sustainable Cities, Mission Cities and Harnessing Talent regions), and this limits their ability to go beyond pilot or ambition-setting stages (19);












62.


welcomes initiatives such as the recently launched European Rural Toolkit that try to help beneficiaries get to grips with the programmes most suited to their area;












63.


points out that the very fact that such one-stop-shop initiatives had to be created proves that the current structures are too complicated to be usable for most beneficiaries, such as small public authorities;












64.


argues that a concentration of multipurpose territorial development instruments (the Swiss knife approach), including being eligible for financing from direct and shared management funds, is a better alternative to the proliferation of instruments, particularly at very local level;












65.


argues that before creating a new EU territorial development instrument, the European Commission should carry out a necessity check whereby a new instrument could only be created if sufficiently robust evidence is provided by the Commission that its aims cannot be delivered by expanding the remit, funding and beneficiaries of existing programmes (e.g. enlarging ERDF with an additional just transition allocation for regions that need it instead of creating the Just Transition Fund, or enlarging ESF instead of creating a Youth Employment Initiative) (20);












66.


considers that it is necessary for the post 2027 period to proceed in line with the Better Regulation principles in order to consolidate or at least better coordinate EU territorial instruments and redesign them under a beneficiary-centred approach (21);












67.


considers therefore that the programmes and national strategic plans of the various funds need to conform to the principle of comply or explain (22), whereby the Managing Authority and the Member State must provide detailed explanations as to why territorial development instruments have not been used;












68.


notes that there is a significant degree of variability in the use of territorial development instruments as it is left entirely to the discretion of the managing authority to decide to use them, even in the face of requests from local and subregional authorities to use them;












69.


believes that the comply or explain rule must be based on the preliminary assessment carried out by the European Commission at the start of the programming negotiation process, during which place-, demographic- or transitory-based challenges below the regional level or across NUTS2 boundaries are identified;





Results-based financial management and simplification









70.


proposes that competent local and regional authorities be explicitly recognised in the Financial Regulation as failure to do so hampers their ability to contribute effectively to the Union’s objectives;












71.


acknowledges the role of the Financial Regulation as a single rule book to implement EU funds and welcomes the recent progress in simplifying the use of EU funds for final beneficiaries;












72.


welcomes the fact that the present Financial Regulation (23) provides a good basis for further decreasing the administrative burden on local and regional authorities (Articles 127 and 128), further empower then particularly via more flexible and simpler delivery mechanisms such as lump sums and unit costs (Articles 63, 126 and 181) and diversify the sources of financing (Articles 62, 124 and 208);












73.


notes however that there remains in the Financial Regulation significant risk averseness such as provisions on record keeping and that there are too many opportunities for increased administrative burden and gold-plating from national authorities (Articles 132, 183, 184);












74.


calls on the legislative authority to avoid as much as possible derogating from the Financial Regulation or adding new rules in the legislative acts creating the various multiannual programmes;












75.


strongly insists that Member State authorities refrain from gold plating adding national rules to European ones; calls on a new culture of trust between the different layers of government of the EU;












76.


proposes that the lead fund approach be applied to all EU funds operating in the same area. In this way, the competent national, regional and local authorities apply the rules and co-financing rates of just one of these funds, which will be particularly helpful for functional areas or areas straddling administrative boundaries such as mountainous regions. In order to promote this approach, the rules that apply to different funds, such as control levels, should be harmonised. All competent authorities (management and audit authorities, paying agencies, etc.) should promote this approach;












77.


maintains that while there is no doubt about the added value of Community Led Local Development the concerns raised by the European Court of Auditors (24) need to be addressed if CLLD is to thrive;












78.


believes that to do so, and in particular the key issue of excessive bureaucratic costs compared to the overall size of Local Action Groups (LAG) budget can be addressed by mirroring the much less bureaucratic financial arrangements (advance payment, limited certification of expenditure in pluriannual reporting periods) that are already in place for Horizon Europe projects for rural and territorial development, bearing in mind that Horizon projects of such type and the average LAG have an equivalent average financial size of EUR 5 million (25);












79.


notes the legal framework for the Finance Not Linked to Costs (FNLC) methodology results in less red tape and faster expenditure for SMEs. However, simplification is more than simplified costs and should include a rationalised process for supplying data when applying for funding.












80.


calls for further development of performance-based mechanisms into suitable programmes in the post 2027 MFF and is pleased that the Structural Funds are making increased use of the method whereby payment is triggered once milestones have been reached;












81.


points out however, that steps must be taken to address the concerns regarding FNLC and the milestones raised by the European Court of Auditors (26) as regards the RRF;












82.


recalls that performance budgeting is challenging for many LRAs as it requires improved data collection, analysis and evaluation at European, national and regional levels, as well as the integration of strategic foresight in programming;












83.


underlines that the implementation of a more performance-based approach can only succeed if targets and milestones can be built on reliable indicators that reflect spatial diversity;












84.


stresses that FNLC can be used more extensively than is currently the case in cohesion policy and in other shared management funds only when milestones and targets are measurable and progress can be linked to the EU investment made.






Brussels, 20 November 2024.


The President


of the European Committee of the Regions

Vasco ALVES CORDEIRO
               





(1)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The future of Cohesion Policy post-2027 (OJ C, C/2024/1041, 9.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1041/oj).

(2)  
            Report on cohesion policy 2014-2020 - implementation and outcomes in the Member States | A9-0049/2024 | European Parliament.


(3)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – A Just Transition for all EU regions (OJ C, C/2024/7058, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7058/oj).

(4)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – Active subsidiarity: a fundamental principle of the EU better regulation agenda (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/5366, 17.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5366/oj).

(5)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions on ‘Do no harm to cohesion – A cross-cutting principle contributing towards cohesion as an overall objective and value of the EU’ (OJ C 257, 21.7.2023, p. 1).

(6)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – Active subsidiarity: a fundamental principle of the EU better regulation agenda (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/5366, 17.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5366/oj).

(7)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – Active subsidiarity: a fundamental principle of the EU better regulation agenda (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/5366, 17.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5366/oj).

(8)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The future of Cohesion Policy post-2027 (OJ C, C/2024/1041, 9.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1041/oj); Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions on a renewed cohesion policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind. Responses of the CoR on the Report of the High-Level Group on the future of cohesion policy and on the 9th Cohesion report (OJ C, C/2024/3661, 26.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3661/oj).

(9)  Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 1), articles 4 and 5.

(10)  Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28).

(11)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — The future of Cohesion Policy post-2027 (OJ C, C/2024/1041, 9.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1041/oj).

(12)  
            https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/93c4192d-aa07-43f6-b78e-f1d236b54cb8.

(13)  Article 4(2) and 5(1) of the Treaty of the European Union.

(14)  Kah S, Georgieva N & Fonseca, L (2020), Research for REGI Committee – EU Cohesion Policy in non-urban areas, European Parliament, Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies.

(15)  European Commission (2024) The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions {SWD(2024) 450 final} - {SWD(2024) 451 final} Brussels, 27.3.2024 COM(2024) 450 final.

(16)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – The Future of the Common Agricultural Policy (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C, C/2024/5363, 17.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5363/oj).

(17)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Review and proposal for the revision of the MFF 2021–2027 (OJ C, C/2023/1331, 22.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1331/oj).

(18)  Most recently, Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Reform of the EU economic governance framework (OJ C, C/2023/1329, 22.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1329/oj).

(19)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Fostering the potential and synergies of the EU Green Deal initiatives for regions and cities (OJ C, C/2023/249, 26.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/249/oj).

(20)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – A Just Transition for all EU regions (OJ C, C/2024/7058, 4.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7058/oj).

(21)  SMART ERA (2024) Guidelines for Policy Analysis.

(22)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Fostering the potential and synergies of the EU Green Deal initiatives for regions and cities (OJ C, C/2023/249, 26.10.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/249/oj).

(23)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).

(24)  
            European Court of Auditors, Special Report 10/2022 and SWD(2024)171.

(25)  
            European Court of Auditors, Special Report 10/2022.

(26)  
            European Court of Auditors, Special report 26/2023.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)