International cooperation on carbon pricing : can country coalitions leadthe way?
Date: 2024-11-19
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: Paris Agreement on Climate Change, carbon neutrality, climate change policy, emission trading, environmental tax, international cooperation, price of energy

International cooperation on carbon 
pricing: Can country coalitions lead 
the way?

Policy highlights

•  The brief emphasises the need to translate climate commitments 
into effective policies, focusing on carbon pricing mechanisms like 
emissions trading, carbon taxes, and crediting mechanisms led by 
public authorities.

•  Carbon  pricing  cooperation  is  essential  for  increasing  climate 
ambition, particularly under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. This 
cooperation helps bridge the gap between climate ambition and 
concrete actions.

•  There is slower progress on domestic carbon pricing in emerging 
markets  and  developing  economies  (EMDEs)  compared  to 
advanced economies (AEs). It calls for capacity building and in-
ternational support to address this gap.

•  Numerous public international initiatives for carbon pricing exist, led 
by international organisations, countries or groups of countries. All 
of them have their own justified raison d’etre, and they collaborate. 
Despite this, progress has been slow, with overlapping efforts and 
a need for better coordination to ensure these initiatives all deliver 
and align with shared goals.

•  The G20 commitment to carbon pricing could be a driving force in 
connecting AEs and EMDEs in favour of international cooperation 
on carbon pricing.

Authors

Albert Ferrari, EUI; Simone Borghesi, EUI.

Issue 2024/30

POLICY BRIEFIntroduction

With  2023  being  the  hottest  year  documented 
and  global  emissions  remaining  at  record-high 
levels,  we  are  reminded  about  the  importance 
of translating climate commitments into effective 
policies – across both developed and developing 
economies. Carbon pricing is the policy in focus – 
to reduce emissions, expand removals and raise 
revenues  for  further  action  on  climate  change. 
The term carbon pricing, as employed in this brief, 
refers to market-based instruments putting a price 
on greenhouse gas emissions. It includes emissions 
trading systems (ETSs), carbon taxes and crediting 
mechanisms to the extent they are created by juris-
dictions or made to fit under the framework of Article 
6  of  the  Paris  Agreement.  New  initiatives  have 
been  launched  to  rally  engagement  on  carbon 
pricing, which may present synergy and comple-
mentarity opportunities to fill any action gaps.

At  COP21  in  Paris  (2015),  New  Zealand  led 
a Ministerial Declaration on Carbon Markets that 21 
countries endorsed, including advanced economies 
(AEs)  and  emerging  markets  and  developing 
economies  (EMDEs),1  to  send  a  clear  signal  that 
“cooperation  through  international  carbon  markets 
has an important role in allowing for higher ambition 
by Parties to the Paris Agreement.”2 The Declaration 
stated 
interested  countries  should  work 
together  to  ensure  the  development  of  standards 
and guidelines for using market mechanisms.

that 

This cooperation has yet to materialise despite the 
many  initiatives  led  by  different  governments  and 
international  organisations.  Nearly  a  decade  later, 
sustaining a cooperative, high-integrity momentum 
on  carbon  pricing  remains  crucial,  also  given 
the  concerns  of  EMDEs  over  the  deployment  of 
carbon  border  adjustment  mechanism(s)  by  some 
AEs.  However,  the  development  of  standards 
and  guidelines  needs  to  be matched  by  improved 
readiness and capacity to set and implement carbon 
pricing  instruments.  More  and  more  initiatives  are 
being launched to support EMDEs in this respect. 
The present publication focuses on the development 
of  carbon  pricing  globally,  with  an  emphasis  on 
domestic  carbon  pricing  and  country-led  interna-
tional cooperation mechanisms.

1. Can international cooperation 
bridge the gap between climate 
ambitionand action?

International  cooperation  on  carbon  pricing  can 
contribute  to  reducing  the  gap  between  ambition 
and  actions.  Recent  modelling  studies  on  interna-
tional carbon markets align with the conclusions of 
the OECD (2021) about this potential. Piris-Cabe-
zas  et  al.  (2023)  estimate  that  the  global  use  of 
carbon  markets  could  allow  the  world  to  nearly 
double  climate  ambition  relative  to  current  NDCs 
over 2020–2035. Similarly, IETA and the University 
of Maryland (2023) calculate that if the savings from 
cooperative  implementation  of  NDCs  using Article 
6 were reinvested in increased ambition, emissions 
mitigation could be more than doubled.

Nevertheless, the Summary of High-level Events 
of the first Global Stocktake, adopted at COP28, 
identifies  the  priority  pathways  to  increase  the 
ambition  of  the  Nationally  Determined  Contri-
butions  (NDCs)  without  much  emphasis  on  the 
opportunities  that  international  cooperation  on 
carbon pricing can play. A paper by Victor et al. 
(2022)  finds  that  the  most  ambitious  pledges 
are often considered the most  credible  because 
countries with a successful track record commit 
to  them  and  question  the  capacity  of  the  UN 
Processes to enhance ambition. Formal and in-
stitutional 
intergovernmental  decision-making 
of  the  UNFCCC  that  works  by  consensus  may 
be  too  lengthy  and  not  equipped  to  assess  the 
pledges under the pledge-and-review framework 
of  the  Paris Agreement.  Victor  et  al.  (2022)  call 
for  other  kinds  of  international  institutions  (e.g., 
created by groups of committed first movers on 
climate policy) to address this ambition challenge.

Cooperation on carbon pricing would be desirable 
not only because lessons or insights from well-es-
tablished  carbon  prices  could  be  helpful  to  new 
followers  in  EMDEs  (Verde  et  al.,  2021)  but  also 
because it may provide relative compatibility of the 
different systems. When it comes to emission trading, 
for instance, member jurisdictions of a coalition of 
carbon markets would take advantage of numerous 
benefits,  including  assurance  that  other  jurisdic-
tions will apply similar stringency, confidence in the 

1   See Country composition of WEO Groups by IMF https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo- database/2023/April/
groups-and-aggregates (Accessed on 30 October 2024)

2   See https://environment.govt.nz/what-government-is-doing/international-action/about-the-paris-agreement/new-zea-
land-and-international-carbon-markets/ministerial-declaration-carbon-markets/ (Accessed on 30 October 2024).

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environmental  integrity,  transparency,  information 
exchange, institutional capacity-building, and policy 
coordination  but  also  reputational  benefits  and 
flexibility  to  consider  closer  cooperation  (Keohane 
et al., 2017). Even when fewer countries participate 
in  cooperative  mitigation,  modelling  suggests  that 
benefits always remain for those countries pursuing 
such  cooperation  (e.g.,  OECD,  2021;  IETA  and 
University of Maryland, 2023).

2. State-of-play  of  carbon pricing 
and  cooperation  initiatives

Domestically, carbon pricing keeps on developing. 
Of  the  120  domestic  compliance  carbon  prices 
handled by public authorities, 75 are in force, and 
45 are being developed and considered, according 
to  the  World  Bank  (2024).  The  picture  is  similar 
regarding the 46 institutional crediting mechanisms: 
35 are in force, and 11 are under development or 
consideration.  Most  carbon  prices  in  force  are 
located in AEs (over 60%).

Although Table 1 outlines an imbalance of carbon 
prices between AEs and EMDEs in favour of the 
first  ones,  it  must  be  compared  to  the  absolute 
number of carbon prices per country. For instance, 
the Member States of the EU, the US, and Canada 
account for 74% of the total number of compliance 
carbon  prices  in  force  in  AEs,  also  because  of 

the 
juxtaposition  between  regional,  national, 
and  federal  ETSs  and  taxes  that  are  all  counted. 
Besides,  the relative size of each country group 
in terms of the number of countries (ratio of 1:4 
between AEs and EMDEs), population, emissions 
and  GDP  should  also  be  considered.  Unsurpris-
ingly,  most  comparisons  show  a  clear  gap  in 
compliance carbon prices in EMDEs compared to 
AEs. This is even more evident when we look at 
the relative share that EMDEs account for in terms 
of  numbers  of  countries,  population  and  global 
GHG emissions.

In addition to the United Nations efforts led primarily 
by the UNFCCC, UNDP and UNEP-CCC, several in-
ternational initiatives were set up to help fill this gap 
regarding ambition and carbon pricing development. 
Multilateral  institutions  lead  essential  programmes 
and  initiatives.  The  World  Bank’s  Partnership  for 
Market  Implementation  (PMI),  OECD’s  Inclusive 
Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFCMA), 
UNDP’s Carbon Payments for Development (CP4D) 
Facility and UNDP’s High-Integrity Carbon Markets 
Initiative are among the primary ones shaping the 
development of future carbon pricing. Furthermore, 
regional development banks, in particular the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development 
Bank  (ADB),  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD) and the Inter-Amer-
ican  Development  Bank  (IADB)  play  crucial  roles 

Table 1. Number of carbon pricing mechanisms in advanced economies and emerging markets and 
developing economies in 2024

Sources: authors’ elaboration, based on World Bank (2024), IMF WEO and Climate Change Dashboard
*The EU ETS and EU ETS 2 were added to the column AEs, although not all EU countries are in the AEs group of the IMF WEO.
**The row of the total number of compliance prices under development or consideration (45) includes two EMDE jurisdictions, 
namely Brunei and the Philippines, that did not appear to have chosen the most appropriate instrument between a tax or ETS. 

International cooperation on carbon pricing: Can country coalitions lead the way?broad  interest  and  promising  enthusiasm  towards 
cooperation on carbon markets. However, concrete 
action  has  been  relatively  slow  over  the  years. 
Moreover,  the  apparent  scattered  landscape 
of 
-  some  partially  overlapping, 
others  isolated  -  could  hamper  the  desirable 
convergence towards shared goals and actions.

initiatives 

3. Gaps and convergence for enabling 
action on domestic and international 
carbon pricing

International  cooperation  on  carbon  pricing  can 
contribute to closing the ambition gap of the Paris 
Agreement at much lower costs than solely relying 
on  domestic  actions.  Reducing  emissions  domes-
tically will be more costly as low-hanging fruits for 
decarbonisation are limited, leading jurisdictions to 
consider alternative pathways to reduce emissions 
while keeping carbon prices bearable for companies 
and households. For instance, at a time when the 
most  advanced  ETSs  may  approach  a  so-called 
ETS  endgame  in  the  next  two  decades  where 
allowances  are,  if  not  rare,  unaffordable,  markets 
for  credits  supplied  by  crediting  mechanisms 
may  represent  a  promising  pool  for  markets  for 
allowances  (Figure  1).  This  can  only  succeed  if 
credits  maintain  comparable  levels  of  integrity, 
ambition, and transparency as compliance markets. 
Credits need to overcome many challenges to prove 
their credibility. To address these challenges in the 
short  run,  further  research  and  dialogue  on  the 
connection  between  markets  for  allowances  and 
credits are needed, and in the long term, a common 
minimal  regulation  to  ensure  high  standards  may 
have to be considered.

in  advocating  for  carbon  pricing  in  the  countries 
they support. Besides, specific tools and method-
ologies  exist,  such  as  the  IMF’s  Climate  Policy 
Diagnostic  &  IMF  and  World  Bank’s  Climate 
Policy Assessment Tool, to accompany countries 
in  building  capacity  for  enhancing  their  climate 
policies  and  complementing  a  plethora  of  publi-
cations monitoring annually the trends of carbon 
pricing, including those cited here.

These  efforts  led  by  international  organisations 
mentioned above are complemented by numerous 
country-  or  region-led  initiatives,  further  reviewed 
below and in Annex 1, that could initiate a coalition 
of  ambition  and  possibly  climate  clubs.3  The 
initiatives  by  active  groups  of  countries  include 
the 
International  Carbon  Action  Partnership 
ICAP),  Canada’s  Global  Carbon 
(hereafter 
Pricing  Challenge  (GCPC),  G7’s  Principles  of 
High  Integrity  Carbon  Markets  and  the  Paris 
Agreement Article 6 Implementation Partnership 
(A6IP)  and  the  EU’s  Florence  Process  and  Call 
to  Action  for  Paris-aligned  Carbon  Markets. 
Some  of  these  “coalitions  of  will”  are  regional,  for 
instance,  Carbon  Pricing  in  the  Americas  (CPA), 
the  Asia-Pacific  Carbon  Markets  Roundtable 
(APCMR),  the  West  African  Alliance  on  Carbon 
Markets  and  Climate  Finance  (WAA),  Eastern 
Africa Alliance  on  Carbon  Markets  and  Climate 
Finance  (EAA).  Other  coalitions,  such  as  the 
Carbon Market Platform (CMP) initiated by the G7, 
whose  secretariat  is  handled  by  the  OECD,  and 
the  Carbon  Pricing  Leadership  Coalition  (CLPC), 
supported by the World Bank, have this hybrid form 
of  a  programme  of  an  international  organisation 
and a country-led initiative.

In  2024,  these  initiatives  were  complemented  by 
the creation of two operational task forces: the In-
ternational  Task  Force  on  Global  Carbon  Pricing 
of the World Bank, IMF, WTO and OECD, and the 
EU’s  Task  Force  on  International  Carbon  Pricing 
and Markets Diplomacy.

The numerous initiatives described above amplify the 
message that international cooperation is needed, 
and  they  deliberately  partner  and  cooperate  with 
each other. At the same time, one size cannot fit all. 
PMI  and  GCPC  occupy  an  important  coordinating 
position  in  the  carbon  pricing  initiative  landscape. 
The high number of these initiatives contributes to 
capacity  building  on  carbon  pricing  and  shows  a 

3   Annex 1 of this paper provides a brief description of the main initiatives on international cooperation on carbon pricing initiat-
ed by countries or groups of countries and an overview of the number of jurisdictions taking part in the initiative as members.

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  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2024

Figure 1. Overview of carbon market-related concepts

Source: LIFE COASE (2024)

Markets for credits and allowances  should remain 
is  also  why  carbon  pricing 
compatible.  This 
cooperation is crucial to encompass two dimensions: 
1) relations between AEs and EMDEs countries on 
domestic  and  international  carbon  pricing,  and  2) 
connections between compliance carbon price and 
crediting  schemes.  Both  dimensions  are  related. 
On the one hand, EMDEs, which could be expected 
to be host countries of crediting schemes, may be 
drawn  towards  international  carbon  pricing  since 
they  lack  the  capacity  to  pursue  domestic  carbon 
pricing.  On  the  other  hand,  AEs  with  advanced 
ETSs  may  want  to  access  international  credits  as 
domestic emission reduction may prove too difficult. 
AEs  should  contribute  to  ensuring  high  integrity 
and environmental ambition are embedded in those 
carbon credits so that they do not merely displace 
necessary emission reductions.

Regarding  international  initiatives  on  carbon 
pricing  listed in Annex 1, their  increasing  number 
demonstrates  the  readiness  to  act.  However,  it 
also shows the need to ensure relative comple-
mentarity and coordination to remain aligned with 
the overarching objectives of the Paris Agreement 

the  context  of 

in 
governance.

international  coordinated 

The  review  of  country-led  international  carbon 
pricing initiatives in Table 2 reveals three trends. 
First,  the  diverse  scope  of  these  initiatives 
covers  carbon  pricing  and  emissions  trading, 
emphasising 
international  cooperation  and 
crediting  mechanisms,  and  relatively  less  on 
compliance carbon pricing. Second, the primary 
means  to  foster  the  development  of  carbon 
pricing in these diverse shapes consist generally 
of policy dialogue and information exchange, and, 
to a lesser extent, technical assistance (TA) and 
capacity  building  and  stakeholder  engagement. 
Third, many declarations or commitments are still 
to be converted into concrete actions.

International cooperation on carbon pricing: Can country coalitions lead the way?Table 2. Primary focus and activities of the listed international initiatives in Annex 1

The  task  forces  will  contribute  to  implementing 
climate ambition. At the same time, more must be 
done to bridge the ambition gap. Financial support 
for  building  capacity,  for  instance,  using  carbon 
revenues,  would  be  instrumental  in  supporting 
carbon  pricing  implementation.4  Another  way  to 
incentivise  EMDEs  to  develop  carbon  pricing  at 
the  international  level  could  be  for  AEs  to  create 
a  strong  demand  for  high  environmental  integrity 
credits.  Furthermore,  these  initiatives  could  play 
an  influential  role  in  contributing  to  finalising  the 
rulebook  of  the  Paris Agreement.  Lastly,  strength-
ening  the  interinstitutional  coordination  or  collab-
oration,  if  not  integration,  between  international 
initiatives would be desirable.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the international initiatives 
that  gather  the  most  countries  are  A6IP,  ICAP, 
CPLC and the EU Call to Action. These are also the 
most  integrated  ones,  as  they  have  many  shared 
members.  There  is  a  limited  number  of  countries 
participating  in  several  initiatives.  EMDEs  are 
often less engaged in such initiatives. Conversely, 
smaller initiatives with fewer members are well-inte-
grated with other initiatives (CPA, APCMR, GCPC, 
CMP, the Florence Process). The African alliances 
(EAA and WAA) remain outsiders.

Figure 2: Size and connections between country-led 
international initiatives in terms of country member-
ships

Type

Hybrid(countriues and international  
organisations)

Multinational

Regional

Source: Authors’ own elaboration – created with Flourish App. 
The size of the circles illustrates the number of members in 
each initiative, and the thickness of the links the number of 
shared members between the two initiatives.

4   See “No more business as usual: the case for carbon pricing”, Opinion of Kristalina Georgieva (IMF), Ursula von der Leyen 
(European Commission) and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (WTO), Financial Times, December 2023 (Accessed on 30 October 2024).

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  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2024

Figure 3: Membership of listed international carbon pricing initiatives per country

Source: Authors’ own elaboration – created with Flourish App. This figure does not include the participation of the European 
Commission on behalf of the EU27 in 6 initiatives, nor the participation of cities, provinces, and States in CPA, ICAP, the Flor-
ence Process or CPLC.

Figure 3  indicates  that the vast range of countries 
that support these international initiatives comprises 
AEs, such as Canada, Germany, Sweden and the 
EU27,  but  also  many  EMDEs  that  show  interest 
in  benefitting  from  these  international  cooperation 
schemes (e.g., Chile and Mexico). The positioning 
of the G20 in the next COPs as a link between AEs 
and  EMDEs  would  be  instrumental  for  the  future 
of carbon pricing, and the fact that many members 
already  implemented  or  are  developing  carbon 
pricing is encouraging. 

4. Recommendations

In its proposal for 2040 Climate Targets presented in 
February 2024, the European Commission proposes 
the  deployment  of  an  active  global  carbon  pricing 
diplomacy.  It  reflects the strategic importance of 
international cooperation and the development of 
carbon  pricing  beyond  the  current  geographical 
scope for many countries. This raises two main 
types of recommendations.

The adoption of carbon pricing in EMDEs

•  The  actual  needs  of  EMDEs  in  enhancing 
their  capacity  to  develop  carbon  pricing 

(e.g.,  financial  support,  capacity  building, 
technical  assistance,  demand)  should  drive 
the  cooperation  between  AEs  and  EMDEs. 
Beyond  knowledge  sharing  and  policy 
dialogue,  there  is  a  strong  need  to  build 
capacity and finance carbon markets' adminis-
trative and digital infrastructure. Open-source 
solutions could be a way forward. 

•  EMDEs shall also consider domestic carbon 
pricing through ETS or carbon tax in addition 
to developing crediting mechanisms.

•  A  minimal  level  of  compatibility  between 
markets  for  allowances  and  markets  for 
credits should be preserved, and regulation is 
justified in that prospect.

The coordination between international initiatives

•  Although 

the  coordination  among 

the 
different  initiatives  appears  to  work  well, 
further 
integration  and  operationalisation 
should be facilitated. 

•  The  G20,  as  a  bridge  between  AEs  and 
EMDEs,  should  play  an  active  role  in  this 
international collaboration framework.

International cooperation on carbon pricing: Can country coalitions lead the way?Development Economics, 26(3), 302–320. https://
doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X20000595

Victor,  D.G.,  Lumkowsky,  M.  &  Dannenberg,  A. 
(2022). Determining the credibility of commitments 
in  international  climate  policy.  Nature  Climate 
Change,  12,  793–800.  https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41558-022-01454-x

World Bank (2024). World Bank Carbon Pricing 
Dashboard.  October  2024.  https://carbon-
pricingdashboard.worldbank.org/ (Accessed on 
1  October 2024)

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ANNEX 1

Name

Description

International 
Carbon Action 
Partnership 
(ICAP) – [link]

Since 2007, ICAP facilitates cooperation between countries, 
sub-national jurisdictions, and supranational institutions that 
have established or are pursuing carbon markets through 
mandatory cap-and-trade systems. Its activities consist 
of 1) a technical dialogue to exchange knowledge on and 
discuss ETS design and implementation, 2) a repository of 
information on emissions trading promoting it as an essen-
tial policy instrument to address climate change, 3) capacity 
building on the design,
implementation, and operation of ETSs around the world

Carbon  
Market  
Platform 
(CMP) – [link]

The Carbon Market Platform, launched in 2015 under 
Germany's G7 presidency, brings together diverse countries 
and organisations to strengthen international cooperation 
in developing effective, sustainable and ambitious carbon 
pricing approaches. Facilitating open and informed policy 
dialogue serves as a strategic exchange for further devel-
oping the global carbon market. This policy dialogue fosters 
a better understanding of the differing national and region-
al carbon pricing approaches involved and encourages 
exchange on related drivers, obstacles, and experiences 
gained to date. The CMP organises an annual Strategic 
Dialogue. The OECD manages its secretariat.  Two co-chairs 
lead the work. The co-chairs rotate so that this is always the 
current and previous G7 Presidency.

Carbon  
Pricing  
Leadership  
Coalition 
(CPLC) – 
[link]

CPLC was created in 2015 and catalyses action towards 
the successful  implementation of carbon pricing world-
wide. The CPLC brings together leaders from government, 
business, civil society and academia to support carbon 
pricing, share experiences, and enhance the global, re-
gional, national and sub-national understanding of carbon 
pricing implementation. The World Bank handles its secre-
tariat.

West African 
Alliance on 
Carbon  
Markets and 
Climate  
Finance 
(WAA) – [link]

The West African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate 
Finance was officially constituted by resolution of the first 
meeting of founding members in June 2017. The Alliance 
aims to enhance the position of West African countries to 
participate in international carbon markets, benefit from 
technology transfer and access result-based climate fi-
nance for NDC implementation.

Members or  
beneficiaries

ICAP has 34 full mem-
bers and 9 observers 
from supranational, 
national, and provincial 
governments.

The initiative is led by 
the G7, and around 15 
jurisdictions take part 
in its activities. The 
co-chairs can invite 
additional countries to 
partake in CMP activi-
ties each year. In 2024, 
these additional coun-
tries included Brazil, 
Spain, Singapore, Swit-
zerland, Sweden and 
Belgium. In addition, 
the Strategic Dialogue 
usually gathers 15-20 
countries and several 
key IGOs working on 
carbon pricing.

36 national and sub-na-
tional governments, 181 
private sector organisa-
tions, and 104 strategic 
partners.

ECOWAS countries 
(Benin, Cape Verde, 
Côte d’Ivoire, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guin-
ea, Guinea- Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Liberia, Burkina Faso, 
Sierra Leone, Senegal, 
and Togo) plus
Mauritania.

International cooperation on carbon pricing: Can country coalitions lead the way?Eastern Africa 
Alliance on  
Carbon Markets 
and Climate
Finance (EAA)

– [link]

Canada’s Global 
Carbon Pric-
ing Challenge 
(GCPC) – [link]

G7's Principles 
of High Integrity 
Carbon Markets 
and the
“Paris Agree-
ment Article 6 
Implementation 
Partnership (A6IP) 
– [link]

EU Call to Action 
for Paris-aligned 
Carbon Markets 
– [link]

The  Eastern  Africa  Alliance  on  Carbon  Mar-
kets and Climate Finance is a coalition of sev-
en  member  countries  launched  in  2019.  The 
Alliance  was  born  out  of  the  need  to  partici-
pate,  shape  and  enhance  the  regional  readi-
ness for the new generation of market mech-
anisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

Launched in 2021 at COP26, GCPC calls for a 
partnership of carbon pricing champions from 
around the world to expand carbon pricing by 
strengthening existing systems and supporting 
emerging ones with an emphasis on developing 
economies.
The Challenge also creates a forum for dialogue 
and coordination to understand policy design 
choices and to support other countries in adopt-
ing carbon pricing.

Through this declaration of April 2023, the G7 
underscored the role that high-integrity carbon 
markets can play in achieving net-zero emis-
sions by 2050.  It aims to 1) facilitate the imple-
mentation of carbon credit markets, including 
by sharing experiences through discussions 
of the Carbon Market Platform; 2) strengthen 
capacity building for robust and ambitious 
implementation of Article 6, including through 
the UNFCCC Secretariat’s role and targeting in 
particular host countries; 3) collaborate to pro-
mote international coordination among various 
initiatives related to capacity building, including 
through the “Paris Agreement Article 6 Imple-
mentation Partnership” (A6IP). The objectives 
of the A6IP are to 1) promote international 
coordination of Article 6 capacity building; 2) 
develop an information platform for
Article 6 implementation; and 3) support piloting 
and knowledge products.

The Call launched in June 2023 includes: 1) 
commitment to expanding and deepening 
domestic carbon pricing and carbon market in-
struments; 2) Support to host countries for full 
implementation of the agreed rulebook for in-
ternational compliance markets; and 3) ensur-
ing high integrity in voluntary carbon markets. 
It builds upon the GCPC, the G7 High Integrity 
Principles, and Article 6. In 2024, the European 
Commission created a Task Force on Interna-
tional carbon pricing and markets diplomacy to 
accompany countries in developing domestic 
and international carbon pricing mechanisms.

Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwan-
da, Tanzania, Uganda and Sudan

Countries joining Canada as 
partners include Chile, South 
Korea, New Zealand, the UK, 
France, Kazakhstan, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Germany and 
the EU. Côte d’Ivoire, Guin-
ea and Panama are friends of 
GCPC.

The principles were adopted by 
the G7, including Japan, Canada, 
the EU, France,  Germany, Italy, 
the UK, and the US.
A6IP partners are 76 countries, 
including the G7, UN agencies, 
MDBs, regional alliances and 
other stakeholders.

31  countries  signed  the  call 
for  action  (the  27  EU  Member 
States,  Barbados,  Canada, 
Cook Islands and Ethiopia)

10  

  Robert Schuman Centre | November 2024

Carbon Pricing 
in the Americas 
(CPA) – [link]

The Asia-Pacif-
ic Carbon Mar-
kets Roundta-
ble (APCMR)

The Florence 
Process  

The Carbon Pricing in the Americas (CPA) is a Pan-Ameri-
can collaborative and networking forum focused on carbon 
pricing, gathering national and subnational governments. It 
originated from the Paris Declaration on Carbon Pricing in 
the Americas, endorsed in 2017 by various governments. 
Launched in 2018 under the leadership of Canada and 
Mexico, CPA was updated at COP26 in 2021 through the 
Glasgow Declaration on Carbon Pricing in the Americas. 
The declaration commits members to implementing car-
bon pricing as a critical tool for climate action, enhancing 
regional cooperation, aligning carbon markets, and foster-
ing coordination among carbon pricing initiatives across the 
Americas.

The Asia-Pacific Carbon Markets Roundtable was initiated 
by New Zealand in 2011 to foster regional cooperation and 
information exchange on carbon markets. The main goal is 
to support the development and capacity building of effective 
regional carbon markets, with participation from Pacific Rim 
countries. The key objectives are cooperation and knowl-
edge sharing among senior officials from regional countries 
to discuss carbon market design and harmonisation, building 
confidence in establishing environmental integrity, and aligning 
domestic carbon markets across the region.

The so-called Florence Process, hosted at the European 
University Institute in Florence and led by the European 
Commission, brings together representatives of ETS regula-
tors to address issues of common concern and interest. It was 
established in 2017. The participants provide an update on the 
most recent developments in their respective carbon markets 
and discuss future perspectives of carbon market cooperation. 
ICAP is playing an active role in feeding into this process. 

British Columbia, Cali-
fornia, Canada, Chile, 
Dominican Republic, 
Federal District of 
Brazil, Jalisco, Mexico, 
Nova Scotia, Panama, 
Paraguay, Pernambuco, 
Québec, Querétaro, Rio 
de Janeiro State, Sono-
ra, Yucatan

APCMR is a non-ex-
clusive network where 
countries such as Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Chile, 
New Zealand, Singa-
pore, China, Australia, 
Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia meet yearly. 

It is a non-exclusive 
network where the 
EU27, Switzerland, 
China, Canada, Cal-
ifornia, Québec and 
New Zealand are active 
participants. In recent 
years, other jurisdic-
tions, including France, 
Germany, Brazil, the 
United Kingdom, and 
the World Bank, have 
participated. 

International cooperation on carbon pricing: Can country coalitions lead the way?The Florence School of Regulation
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partner-
ship between the Council of the European Energy Regulators (CEER) and 
the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely with the Europe-
an Commission. The Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main 
network industries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory topics 
and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discussion of regulatory practices and 
policies.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at: fsr.eui.eu

www.eui/rsc

LIFE COASE is a project of the European University Institute co-financed 
by the EU LIFE Programme. This brief is a revised version of a note prepared 
by the authors upon invitation of the European Commission for distribution in 
the context of the Florence Process in May 2024. The views expressed are 
purely those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as 
stating an official position of the European Commission.

© European University Institute, 2024
Editorial matter and selection © Albert Ferrari, Simone Borghesi, 2024

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0) 
International license which governs the terms of access and reuse for this work. 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), 
editor(s), the title, the series and number, the year and the publisher.

Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and 
not those of the European University Institute.

Published by
European University Institute (EUI)
Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014
San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy

12  

  RSC | Policy Brief | Issue 2024/30 | November 2024v

doi:10.2870/6396127
ISBN:978-92-9466-618-5
ISSN:2467-4540
QM-01-24-132-EN-N

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced StudiesThe Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Erik Jones, aims to develop inter-discipli-nary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is or-ganised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.