P10_TA(2024)0035 – UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29) – European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29) (2024/2718(RSP))
Date: 2024-11-14
Institutions: Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, European Parliament
Subjects: Azerbaijan, EU environmental policy, Paris Agreement on Climate Change, UN Conference, adaptation to climate change, climate change, energy policy, environmental cooperation, greenhouse gas, reduction of gas emissions








C_202500808EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/808


11.2.2025






P10_TA(2024)0035

UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)


European Parliament resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29) (2024/2718(RSP))

(C/2025/808)



The European Parliament,







—


having regard to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol thereto,










—


having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),










—


having regard to the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP28), the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP18) and the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA5), and to the Glasgow Climate Pact adopted at the 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP26) in Glasgow on 13 November 2021,










—


having regard to the agreement made at the 27th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP27) to create a specific fund for loss and damage (L&D), the establishment, at COP28, of a transitional committee on the operationalisation of the new funding arrangements for responding to L&D, and to the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage,










—


having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on the UN Climate Change Conference 2023 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (COP28) (1),










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having regard to its resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan, notably the repression of civil society and the cases of Dr Gubad Ibadoghlu and Ilhamiz Guliyev (2), and to all its other previous resolutions regarding Azerbaijan,










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having regard to the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals,










—


having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2023 on the implementation and delivery of the Sustainable Development Goals (3),










—


having regard to the 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on global warming of 1.5 oC, its special report on climate change and land, its special report on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate and its sixth assessment report (AR6),










—


having regard to the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change, its report of 18 January 2024 entitled ‘Towards EU climate neutrality: progress, policy gaps and opportunities’ and its report of 15 June 2023 entitled ‘Scientific advice for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050’,










—


having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) (4),










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having regard to the recently adopted EU legislation translating the EU’s targets of reducing net emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990 levels and towards reaching the binding EU climate neutrality target by 2050 (Fit for 55 package) into concrete policies across different sectors,










—


having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/591 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2030, (‘8th EAP’), as well as the 2023 monitoring report of the European Environment Agency on progress towards the 8th EAP’s objectives and the 8th EAP mid-term review by the Commission,










—


having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency (5),










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having regard to the Commission communication of 6 February 2024 entitled ‘Securing our future – Europe’s 2040 climate target and path to climate neutrality by 2050 building a sustainable, just and prosperous society’ (COM(2024)0063),










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having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Managing climate risks – protecting people and prosperity’ (COM(2024)0091),










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having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),










—


having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the EU strategy on adaptation to climate change (6),










—


having regard to the 2023 emissions gap report of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) of 20 November 2023 entitled ‘Broken Record – Temperatures hit new highs, yet world fails to cut emissions (again)’, its 2023 adaptation gap report of 2 November 2023 entitled ‘Underfinanced. Underprepared – Inadequate investment and planning on climate adaptation leaves world exposed’ and its 2023 production gap report of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘Phasing down or phasing up? Top fossil fuel producers plan even more extraction despite climate promises’,










—


having regard to the UNFCCC synthesis report of 14 November 2023 on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement,










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having regard to the summary of the second report of the Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance of November 2023 entitled ‘A climate finance framework: decisive action to deliver on the Paris Agreement’,










—


having regard to the UNEP report of 1 December 2023 entitled ‘An Eye on Methane: International Methane Emissions Observatory 2023 Report’ and the UNEP report of 6 May 2021 entitled ‘Global Methane Assessment: Benefits and Costs of Mitigating Methane Emissions’,










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having regard to the Global Methane Tracker 2024 report of March 2024 published by the International Energy Agency,










—


having regard to the Commission communication of 14 October 2020 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions (COM(2020)0663),










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having regard to the outcome report of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture, entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,










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having regard to its resolution of 21 October 2021 on an EU strategy to reduce methane emissions (7),










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having regard to the report of the World Meteorological Organization of 19 March 2024 on the state of the global climate in 2023,










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having regard to the Copernicus Climate Change Service and its 2023 Global Climate Highlights report,










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having regard to the Global Registry of Fossil Fuel Emissions and Reserves,










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having regard to the UNEP report of 18 February 2021 entitled ‘Making Peace with Nature: a scientific blueprint to tackle the climate, biodiversity and pollution emergencies’,










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having regard to the global assessment report of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services of 25 November 2019 on biodiversity and ecosystem services,










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having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed at the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15),










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having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),










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having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives (8),










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having regard to the report on the IPBES-IPCC co-sponsored workshop of 10 June 2021 on biodiversity and climate change,










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having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity (9),










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having regard to the agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement) adopted on 19 June 2023,










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having regard to its resolution of 28 April 2021 on soil protection (10),










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having regard to the European Environment Agency (EEA) report of 4 December 2019 entitled ‘The European Environment – State and Outlook 2020’, the EEA assessment of 8 September 2022 of the potential of European soils for stronger climate action, and the EEA’s first European Climate Risk Assessment of 11 March 2024,










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having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2020 on the EU’s role in protecting and restoring the world’s forests (11),










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having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the consequences of drought, fire, and other extreme weather phenomena: increasing the EU’s efforts to fight climate change (12),










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having regard to the UN World Water Development Report on Partnerships and cooperation for water of 9 May 2023 and the UN Water Conference held from 22 to 24 March 2023, the first major conference of the UN dedicated to water since 1977,










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having regard to the resolution of the UN Environmental Assembly of 1 March 2024 on effective and inclusive solutions for strengthening water policies to achieve sustainable development in the context of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution,










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having regard to its resolution of 5 October 2022 on access to water as a human right – the external dimension (13),










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having regard to the UN World Water Development Report 2019 entitled ‘Leaving No One Behind’,










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having regard to the UN World Water Development Report 2024 entitled ‘Water for prosperity and peace’,










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having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan for a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),










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having regard to its resolution of 10 February 2021 on the new Circular Economy Action Plan (14),










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having regard to the UNEP Global Framework on Chemicals – For a Planet Free of Harm from Chemicals and Waste, published in March 2024,










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having regard to the Commission report of 23 November 2020 entitled ‘Updated analysis of the non-CO2 climate impacts of aviation and potential policy measures pursuant to EU Emissions Trading System Directive Article 30(4)’ (COM(2020)0747),










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having regard to the report of the International Renewable Energy Agency of June 2023 entitled ‘World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023: 1.5°C Pathway’,










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having regard to the report of the International Energy Agency (IEA) of May 2021 entitled ‘Net Zero by 2050 – A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector’ and its update of September 2023 entitled ‘Net Zero Roadmap: A Global Pathway to Keep the 1.5 °C Goal in Reach’,










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having regard to the IEA special report of May 2024 entitled ‘Strategies for Affordable and Fair Clean Energy Transitions’ and its report of June 2024 entitled ‘COP28 Tripling Renewable Capacity Pledge. Tracking countries’ ambitions and identifying policies to bridge the gap’,










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having regard to the UN’s Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,










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having regard to the 2023 report of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) of the Midterm Review of the Implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,










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having regard to the UNDRR 2023 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction,










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having regard to the World Health Organization (WHO) report of 20 December 2023 on Climate Change and Health,










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having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2023 on a European Day for the victims of the global climate crisis (15),










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having regard to the Joint Research Centre report of 7 June 2023 entitled ‘Impacts of climate change on defence-related critical energy infrastructure’,










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having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence approved by the Council on 21 March 2022,










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having regard to the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap of the European External Action Service (EEAS) of November 2020,










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having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EEAS’s Climate Change and Defence Roadmap (16),










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having regard to the conclusions adopted at the 66th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women on 25 March 2022, entitled ‘Achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls in the context of climate change, environmental and disaster risk reduction policies and programmes’,










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having regard to the report of the Special Rapporteur of 26 July 2022 on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change,










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having regard to UN Human Rights Resolution 41/21 of 12 July 2019 entitled ‘Human Rights and Climate Change’,










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having regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, and to general comment No. 26 of 22 August 2023 from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on children’s rights and the environment with a special focus on climate change,










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having regard to the EU strategy on the rights of the child of 2021,










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having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples of 1 November 2017 on the impacts of climate change and climate finance on indigenous peoples’ rights and to the Stockholm +50 Indigenous Peoples Declaration,










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having regard to the second report of the UNFCCC of 29 January 2024 on the determination of needs of developing country Parties related to implementing the Convention and the Paris Agreement,










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having regard to the outcomes of the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact of June 2023,










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having regard to the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative,










—


having regard to European Court of Auditors special reports 04/2023 of 15 February 2023 entitled ‘The Global Climate Change Alliance(+) – Achievements fell short of ambitions’ and 18/2023 of 26 June 2023 entitled ‘EU climate and energy targets – 2020 targets achieved, but little indication that actions to reach the 2030 targets will be sufficient’,










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having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 October 2023 on the preparations for the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the UNFCCC (Dubai, 30 November – 12 December 2023),










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having regard to the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on preparations for the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) to the UNFCCC (Baku, 11-22 November 2024),










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having regard to the Council conclusions of 8 October 2024 on climate finance in view of the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference, COP29, on 11-22 November 2024,










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having regard to the questions to the Commission and to the Council on the 2024 UN Climate Change Conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29) (O-0010/2024 – B10-0104/2024 and O-0009/2024 – B10-0105/2024),










—


having regard to Rules 142(5) and 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,










—


having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety,










A.


whereas the European Parliament has declared a climate and environmental emergency and has committed to urgently fight and contain this threat;










B.


whereas the Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016; whereas to date, 193 states plus the EU have joined the agreement, representing over 98 % of global emissions;










C.


whereas, according to UNEP’s 2023 emissions gap report, fully implementing unconditional NDCs made under the Paris Agreement for 2030 would put the world on course to limit the temperature rise to 2.9 °C this century; whereas fully implementing conditional NDCs would lower the temperature rise to 2.5 °C;










D.


whereas the 2023 UNFCCC synthesis report on NDCs states that the total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions level in 2030 is projected to be 2 % below the 2019 level; whereas the first global stocktake (GST) completed in 2023 at COP28 highlights the critical need to limit global warming to 1,5 oC to significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change; whereas the window for staying below 1,5 °C is closing at an alarming rate; whereas emissions are still rising and the emissions gap is widening; whereas the IPCC concludes that in scenarios limiting warming to 1,5 °C, GHG emissions need to be 43 % below their 2019 level by 2030;










E.


whereas six out of nine planetary boundaries analysed by the Stockholm Resilience Centre have been exceeded;










F.


whereas Commission communication COM(2024)0063 lays down a 2040 climate target; whereas as president-elect Ursula von der Leyen made a commitment to propose a 2040 climate target in her political guidelines for the new Commission;










G.


whereas on 16 October 2023, the EU and its Member States submitted their updated NDC committing to reduce their net GHG emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 compared to 1990, thereby continuing to be one of the global leaders in climate action;










H.


whereas the United States accounts for 24,1 % of global cumulative CO2 emissions, the EU27 account for 16,7 %, China for 14,7 %, Russia for 6,7 % and the UK for 4,5 %;










I.


whereas a collective effort is needed by all parties to achieve global climate targets; whereas EU emissions represent around 6,1 % of worldwide emissions, while the EU population represents 5,7 % of the global total (17), (18), (19); whereas decarbonisation in the EU alone will not be enough;










J.


whereas the community GHG database of the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) shows that in 2023, the largest emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil increased their emissions, while all sectors in the EU27 experienced a decrease in their GHG emissions compared to 2022;










K.


whereas the first global stocktake (GST) completed in 2023 at COP28 underlined the urgent need to address the interlinked global crises of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance, for sustainable climate action, of protecting, conserving, restoring and sustainably using nature and ecosystems;










L.


whereas water is a fundamental resource for human life, economic activities including agriculture, and ecosystems; whereas water-related challenges, including water pollution and water scarcity, are increasing; whereas water is a primary medium through which climate change impacts societies and ecosystems, and vice versa, including through droughts, floods, water scarcity and changing precipitation patterns that become stronger and occur more often; whereas this exacerbates the impact of climate change and the risks it poses to biodiversity, ecosystem resilience, agriculture, food and energy security, and basic human needs, while threatening hard-won development gains and the green transition as well as human rights and peace; whereas 1.42 billion people live in areas of high or extremely high water vulnerability; whereas climate-resilient water and sanitation management is a fundamental part of climate change mitigation and adaptation; whereas the multiple ecosystem services provided by water should be ensured, inter alia through water planning, management, investment in water-related innovation, including energy and water efficiency, reuse, and restoration and protection of freshwater ecosystems; whereas water management has strong links to other policies, which calls for policy coherence and for action to be taken at the scale of whole river basins, deploying nature-based solutions;










M.


whereas soils are the largest terrestrial carbon pool and ensuring healthy soils strengthens resilience and reduces vulnerability to climate change;










N.


whereas forests play an essential role in climate change adaptation and mitigation; whereas the halting of deforestation, the stepping up of forest protection, afforestation and reforestation, and responsible sourcing are among the key mitigation actions;










O.


whereas the effects of heat may be exacerbated in cities, home to more than half of the global population, due to the urban heat island effect; whereas heatwaves lead to soaring energy use, reduced labour productivity and increased health risks, leading to a rise in heatwave deaths; whereas natural solutions, the incorporation of green infrastructure and the installation of natural shading contribute to reducing temperatures in cities;










P.


whereas the IPCC sixth assessment report and the scientific advice of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change for the determination of an EU-wide 2040 climate target and a greenhouse gas budget for 2030-2050 clearly state that achieving the climate targets under the Paris Agreement and reaching net zero GHG emissions primarily requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in CO2, methane, and other GHG emissions, as well as both land-based and technological carbon removals at scale;










Q.


whereas only 14 countries have endorsed the fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty, none of which is an EU Member State;










R.


whereas according to the IEA report entitled Tripling Renewable Capacity Pledge: Tracking countries’ ambitions’, commitments for renewable energy deployment by 2030 included in the NDCs would only lead to the achievement of 12 % of the tripling renewable energy objective;










S.


whereas the ocean is the planet’s greatest carbon sink and absorbs excess heat and energy released from rising greenhouse gas emissions; whereas marine biodiversity is seriously endangered, despite the ocean playing a unique and vital role as a climate regulator; whereas the degradation of marine ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds weakens the ocean’s ability to sequester carbon and adapt to climate change, exacerbating climate impacts;










T.


whereas methane has been responsible for around 30 % of the rise in global temperatures since the industrial revolution; whereas rapid and sustained reductions in methane emissions are crucial to limiting near-term global warming;










U.


whereas the IEA has estimated that, to stay below 1,5 °C, methane emissions from fossil fuels would need to be cut by 75 % by 2030, and has pointed out that pledges made by countries and companies to date would lead to a cut of only 50 % and that most pledges are not yet backed up by plans for implementation;










V.


whereas the OECD’s seventh assessment of progress towards the UNFCCC climate finance goal found that in 2022, developed countries provided a total of USD 115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries, a figure still well below the actual needs;










W.


whereas the UNFCCC’s first report on the determination of the needs of developing country Parties states that national reports submitted by developing country Parties demonstrate that the costs to meet their needs related to implementing the Framework Convention and the Paris Agreement cumulatively amount to USD 5.8-5.9 trillion up to 2030;










X.


whereas the UNEP’s 2023 adaptation gap report highlights that the current adaptation finance gap is estimated at USD 194 billion to USD 366 billion per year, a gap that will increase as climate impacts intensify;










Y.


whereas the current climate finance goal of USD 100 billion per year until 2025 is financed by Parties classified as industrialised when the UNFCCC was signed in 1992; whereas this classification no longer adequately reflects the countries’ respective financial capabilities and their cumulative historical emissions, which have substantially evolved since then;










Z.


whereas making global financial flows consistent with a pathway towards a net zero and climate resilient economy is an essential goal for the green transition in accordance with Article 2 of the Paris Agreement;










AA.


whereas the first EU Climate Risk Assessment Report (EUCRA) found that some climate risks in Europe are already at critical levels now, while many other risks may reach critical or even catastrophic levels during this century, causing damage to the competitiveness of economies and companies, the geopolitical landscape, the workforce and social cohesion; whereas the EUCRA report recommends mainstreaming current and future climate risks in virtually all policy areas, with action both at EU and national levels;










AB.


whereas the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change highlights the need to urgently and fully phase out harmful fossil fuel subsidies across the EU; whereas the 8th EAP requires setting a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C; whereas the European Environment Agency’s 2023 monitoring report on progress towards the 8th EAP’s objectives highlights that most Member States do not have concrete plans for how and by when they intend to phase out fossil fuel subsidies; whereas this is critical to accelerating the transition to renewable energy, ensuring a fair allocation of resources and meeting the EU’s climate targets under the Paris Agreement;










AC.


whereas there are scientifically proven interlinkages between health and the environmental and climate crises; whereas the most vulnerable populations are disproportionately impacted by the effects of climate change, facing greater risks of food and water insecurity, health threats, displacement and loss of livelihood;










AD.


whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine not only grossly violates international law and is causing massive loss of life and harm to citizens, but is also delaying much-needed action on climate change and leading to immediate and long-term environmental degradation;










AE.


whereas climate change is increasingly becoming a major driver of migration and displacement, with millions of people forced to flee their homes due to rising sea levels, extreme weather events, droughts and resource scarcity; whereas by 2050, as many as 216 million people could be internal climate migrants across the regions of Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific and Eastern Europe (20);







The global stocktake and COP29 in Baku








1.


Welcomes the outcome of the first GST at COP28, which recognises that pathways limiting global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot and to 2°C requires a peaking of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 and that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global GHG emissions of 43 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035 relative to the 2019 level, reaching net zero GHG emissions by 2050;










2.


Welcomes the key commitments and actions announced by the EU at COP28 to substantially scale up global climate ambition; urges all Parties to follow up through ambitious implementation and the scaling up of nationally determined action; underlines the particular responsibility of all major emitters and the G20 countries to take the lead; stresses that a collective effort and further actions from all countries are required, especially from all major and emerging economies; calls for the EU and like-minded partners to work with all parties to secure a successful outcome at COP29;










3.


Supports the COP28 call on the Parties to the UNFCCC to contribute to the global effort towards tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; urges all Parties to adopt concrete targets and policies to achieve these goals and to reflect them in their NDCs; underlines the importance of the EU and Member States playing a leading role by accelerating deployment and enhancing investment in renewable energy infrastructure and by promoting innovation in energy storage technologies;










4.


Supports the COP28 call on the Parties to accelerate efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power, and to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in a just, orderly and equitable manner; with a view to accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050, in keeping with the science; regrets that global energy-related CO2 emissions reached a new record high in 2023; calls for the UNFCCC’s global stocktake dialogue to include a session dedicated to challenges countries face in ending the expansion of fossil fuels; reiterates its call on all Parties to work on developing a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty;










5.


Notes that global surface air temperature has already increased by close to 1,3 °C compared to pre-industrial levels, and that 2023 and summer 2024 were the world’s and Europe’s warmest year and summer on record (21); underlines that record heatwaves, drought and forest fires caused global gross domestic product loss of around 0,6 % in 2023, and that weather and climate-related extreme events caused losses of EUR 650 billion in Europe over the period 1980-2022; emphasises that climate risks will be magnified by any delay in implementing effective measures to mitigate and adapt to climate change, therefore resulting in increasing loss and damage;










6.


Expresses concern at the findings of the UNEP’s 2023 emissions gap report that fully implementing current unconditional NDCs would put the world on track for 2.9 °C global warming while the additional implementation and continuation of conditional NDCs would lead to 2.5 °C global warming this century; draws attention to the fact that this trajectory is far from the 1.5 °C target agreed to by all Parties in the GST at COP28, putting the world on a path toward irreversible climate change and the crossing of critical tipping points;










7.


Notes that the current NDCs of the Parties collectively fall far short of what is needed to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement; calls on all Parties to adhere to the COP26 decision regarding common time frames and to communicate, in 2025, an NDC for 2035, and to submit this NDC by the deadline laid down in the Paris Agreement; recalls that all Parties should urgently scale up their climate targets and accompanying policies to achieve a swift and just transition to climate neutral economies and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C in line with the Paris Agreement and the outcome of the first GST; welcomes the ‘Roadmap to Mission 1.5 °C’, aimed at stimulating ambition in the next round of NDCs, launched by the COP Presidencies Troika; calls for the global stocktake dialogue to support the Parties’ update of their NDCs through the identification of tools, methodologies and sector-specific guidance; stresses the importance of the comprehensive and timely delivery of the seventh assessment cycle for the next GST;










8.


Urges all Parties to come forward in their next NDCs for 2035 with ambitious, quantified economy-wide absolute, as opposed to relative, emissions reduction targets covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C, as informed by the latest science, and in the light of different national circumstances; stresses that these revised NDCs should include transparent mechanisms for monitoring and accountability to ensure progress is tracked effectively on national climate commitments and sectoral targets; underlines the need for all climate targets to be clear and transparent and calls on the Commission to propose separate sub-targets for gross emissions reductions, land-based removals and technological removals as part of the 2040 target; calls on all other Parties to also provide similar clarity in their NDCs;










9.


Urges all Parties to engage constructively at COP29 in order to come to an agreement on robust and rigorous rules for cooperative mechanisms under Article 6 that contributes to the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement, fosters private sector involvement and increases the mobilisation of financial and non-financial resources for climate action, including voluntary carbon market action and non-market approaches; calls for the EU and its Member States to strictly defend a high level of climate integrity in the negotiations, based on the best available science; stresses that cooperative mechanisms should set the highest level of accountability, monitoring and transparency, and prevent double counting and loopholes that could undermine climate ambition, while achieving real and verifiable emissions reductions and supporting the transition to renewable energy, particularly in developing countries; stresses that the provision of finance and other non market-based support for the implementation of NDCs, should be redistributive, sustained and predictable over long time frames;










10.


Insists that rules under Article 6 related to carbon removals must ensure environmental integrity by setting strict criteria for quantification, additionality and baselines, liability, permanence and sustainability as well as respect for human rights, and that these must be implemented using independent certification and verification, similar to the EU’s recently adopted certification framework; underlines that a strict separation of temporary and permanent removals must be made in line with the EU framework; welcomes the agreement that emissions avoidance will not be eligible to generate credits under Article 6 and insists that this rule must be strictly upheld;






International climate finance and sustainable finance








11.


Acknowledges that the EU, its Member States and the EIB are together the largest providers of public climate finance, providing roughly one third of global public climate finance, with European climate finance reaching an all-time high in 2022 of EUR 28.5 billion from public sources – half of it through grants and half of it through non-grant instruments, particularly loans – and mobilising an additional EUR 11.9 billion of private finance in total;










12.


Notes that developed countries provided and mobilised a total of USD 115.9 billion in climate finance for developing countries in 2022, of which 69 % was extended as loans and 28 % as grants, exceeding the UNFCC annual USD 100 billion climate finance goal for the first time (22); urges countries to ensure that the USD 100 billion goal continues to be met through to 2025; recalls the COP26 outcome urging developed nations to at least double their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2019 levels by 2025, in order to achieve balance between adaptation and mitigation in line with the Paris Agreement;










13.


Calls on all Parties to agree on a post-2025 new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance at COP29, which should be based on a global effort and a variety of sources, instruments and channels, including public, private and innovative sources of finance; calls on all Parties to ensure that the NCQG addresses mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage in a balanced way, which could include exploring stand-alone targets;










14.


Recalls that many developing countries’ NDCs are conditional on international climate finance; highlights, therefore, that the provision of adequate climate finance is key to achieving the goal of the Paris Agreement; notes that climate finance needs are increasing substantially, with estimates of the costed needs identified by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance consistently well above the current USD 100 billion goal, and reaching on average over USD 1 trillion annually up to 2030, with estimates varying by type of needs and subset of developing countries; underlines, therefore, that the NCQG should clearly reflect the increased need for climate finance globally, in particular of small island developing states and least developed countries, should be set in a science-based manner, and should be new and additional to official development assistance;










15.


Believes that the responsibility to deliver on the post-2025 NCQG should encompass a broadened contributor base reflecting Parties’ evolving financial capabilities and historical emission levels; insists that emerging economies with high emissions and high GDP should contribute to the new goal;










16.


Stresses the importance for the NCQG differentiating funding levels in a way that better reflects the needs and priorities of countries most vulnerable to global warming and with limited capabilities, notably the least developed countries and small island developing states;










17.


Reiterates its call for a predictable EU finance mechanism that provides additional and adequate support and ensures that the EU delivers its fair share towards the international climate finance goals; calls on the EU Member State climate finance negotiators to get clear mandates from their respective finance ministries to make meaningful financial contributions to the NCQG;










18.


Believes that the core goal of the NCQG should clearly prioritise grants-based finance; highlights the need to identify new and innovative sources of finance; stresses that such sources should be socially fair and aligned with the polluter pays principle, ensuring that the costs of climate change are borne by those with the greatest capacity to pay as well as the greatest responsibility for causing it; points to potential financial contributions from the fossil fuel supply chain; calls for the NCQG to have a structure that responds to lessons learned from the annual USD 100 billion goal and to be equipped with solid transparency and accountability mechanisms to track the delivery of the agreed quantum by the agreed deadlines, and to avoid double counting and greenwashing;










19.


Notes with concern that many climate-vulnerable countries are in or at risk of debt distress, experiencing a dual crisis of a growing debt burden and escalating climate change impacts; also notes with concern that mitigation and adaptation costs and needs are rising, leading to a widening finance gap, while developing countries are under particular fiscal constraints; underlines therefore the need to jointly tackle the climate and debt crises; calls for international climate finance to prioritise grant-based and non-debt inducing instruments and measures to ensure that these countries are able to implement necessary mitigation and adaptation measures without increasing their debt burden, including in the design of the NCQG; calls, moreover, for an effective debt workout mechanism, including the principle of comparable treatment for creditors, as well as for the inclusion of climate resilience debt clauses in the future lending of multilateral development banks;










20.


Recalls the conclusions of COP27, which stated that delivering the necessary funding for the climate transition will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors; considers that facilitating climate transition efforts globally will require the involvement of domestic and international financial systems in removing barriers to access to finance for clean technologies and shifting public and private finance flows away from emission-intense activities;










21.


Considers it essential to advance the Bridgetown Initiative without delay; believes that the NCQG represents a pivotal opportunity to accelerate reform of the international financial architecture by incorporating the principles of the Bridgetown Initiative; calls on all the major international financial institutions and multilateral development banks to align their portfolios and lending policies with the Paris Agreement;










22.


Recalls the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) as the EU’s climate bank and its Climate Bank Roadmap and updated energy lending policy, as well as the additional efforts of the European Investment Fund to spearhead climate investments; welcomes the fact that the European Central Bank has committed to integrating climate change considerations into its monetary policy framework;










23.


Notes that the high risk profile of many countries impedes their capacity to attract and mobilise private investments in mitigation and adaptation to climate change; calls on the international financial institutions, multilateral development banks and governments to coordinate and propose adequate financial de-risking plans for climate mitigation and adaptation projects in the context of COP29; calls on countries and multilateral development banks, including the EIB, to adopt climate resilience debt clauses in future lending;










24.


Recalls that fossil fuels are responsible for over 75 % of all GHGs and are therefore the largest contributor to climate change, with their emissions still growing; notes that fossil fuels are still used to meet over 80 % of the world’s energy needs; stresses that the phase-out of fossil fuels is both necessary and technologically feasible; notes that the pathway under the IEA’s Net Zero by 2050 Roadmap to keep the global temperature increase below 1.5 °C requires no new oil, gas or coal developments;










25.


Stresses that one of the aims of COP29 should be to coordinate an unambiguous signal that follows up on the outcome of the first global stocktake at COP28 to transition away from fossil fuels and towards renewables and energy efficiency in a just, orderly, equitable manner; highlights the importance of introducing clarifying quantifications and timelines to accelerate action in this decade; calls on all Parties, including the EU, to adopt plans to phase out fossil fuels in keeping with the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement; calls on all the Parties to explore options to increase fossil fuel companies’ contributions to the Paris goals;










26.


Stresses the importance of phasing out fossil fuels as soon as possible; notes that in meeting this objective, the EU should aim to maximise its energy security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare by reducing energy bills, and to build an energy-efficient and a renewables-based economy; notes in particular the urgent need to end EU imports of Russian fossil fuels, including natural gas, which subsidise Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls on the G7 countries to lead the energy transition by example, and on all Parties to decarbonise their energy system and to halt all new investments in fossil fuel extraction; welcomes all initiatives to reduce the EU’s dependency on fossil fuels and to increase the diversity of its energy suppliers; notes the ongoing work of the EU with international partners to diversify energy supplies;










27.


Notes with concerns that fossil energy subsidies in the EU remained stable between 2010 and 2020, at around EUR 50 billion per year, and even increased to EUR 123 billion in 2022; stresses the need for the Commission and the Member States to implement the requirement in the 8th EAP to ‘set a deadline for the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies consistent with the ambition of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C’; calls on the Commission and all Member States to improve their national reporting of all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies and plan for their phase-out without delay through concrete policies, timelines and measures in a way that supports the Union’s energy and food security, industrial competitiveness and citizens’ welfare, and reduces energy bills; calls on the Commission to develop a framework in this regard in line with this requirement of the 8th EAP;










28.


Is concerned that governments worldwide spent more than USD 620 billion on fossil fuel subsidies in 2023, significantly more than the USD 70 billion spent to support clean energy; encourages all Parties to phase out all direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies as soon as possible and to reallocate these harmful subsidies to climate action, including international climate finance for the most vulnerable developing countries; calls on all Parties to ensure transparent reporting of their fossil fuels subsidies and to adopt concrete plans for their phase-out as soon as possible;










29.


Reiterates its support for the work of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action and encourages all governments to adopt the coalition’s commitments to align all policies and practices in the remit of finance ministries with the goals of the Paris Agreement and to adopt effective carbon pricing;






Adaptation








30.


Underlines the need to step up adaptation action within the EU and globally to minimise the negative effects of climate change and biodiversity loss; points out that while mitigation finance and implementation have progressed, adaptation efforts continue to lag behind, with a widening gap in both funding and concrete action; stresses that adaptation finance flows have declined since 2020, and that the gap is widening; recognises that without immediate action, the costs of adaptation will continue to rise due to severe weather and climate-related extreme events;










31.


Welcomes the first EUCRA (23) and the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 on managing climate risks, which highlights the need for resilience in the face of escalating climate risks; calls on the Commission, therefore, to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example; stresses the importance of the development, implementation and regular updating of national adaptation plans, including with a focus on financial and technical assistance; calls on Parties that have not yet done so to put in place their national adaptation plans by 2025, and to have progressed in implementing them by 2030;










32.


Advocates the integration of nature-based solutions in urban areas to improve air quality to rein in rising temperatures, address the urban heat island effect and improve air quality to protect the public and reduce energy costs;










33.


Welcomes the agreement on the framework for the global goal on adaptation at COP28, namely the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience; highlights the need to translate the framework into measurable outcomes with robust tracking systems in place to monitor progress towards achieving the targets; encourages all Parties to swiftly agree on indicators for measuring progress towards the targets as part of the two-year UAE–Belém work programme established at COP28; highlights the importance of inclusive indicators in ensuring adaptation takes place in a socially just manner;










34.


Stresses that early warning systems are critical to effective adaptation and calls for the rapid implementation of both the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative, which focuses on vulnerable countries such as least developed countries and small island developing states, and the Early Warnings for All initiative, which seeks to ensure global access to early warning systems by 2027;










35.


Expresses deep concern about the increasing intensity and frequency of extreme weather events in the EU and globally, including wildfires, droughts, heatwaves and floods, their impact on human health and the increasing loss of life they cause, as was expressed in the findings of the first EUCRA; stresses the urgent need to strengthen the collective global response to climate change in this critical decade through ambitious mitigation and adaptation action taken by all Parties with a view to protecting people, their livelihoods, the economy and our ecosystems; recalls the need to account for future climate conditions when investing in infrastructure and assets;






Loss and damage








36.


Welcomes the decision at COP28 to establish the loss and damage fund to address and respond to the economic and non-economic impacts of climate change for particularly vulnerable developing countries; appreciates the progress made in operationalising the fund since COP28, including through the acceptance of the offer of the Government of the Philippines to host the fund; stresses the need for the fund to receive funding from a variety of sources in a coordinated manner, including from new and innovative sources; strongly believes that loss and damage funding should prioritise grants and be additional to and distinct from official development assistance;










37.


Calls on the loss and damage (L&D) fund Board to agree on all the necessary arrangements so that the fund can provide funding to affected communities, if not in 2024, then at least at the beginning of 2025; calls for the preparation of an initial capitalisation effort as well as a long-term fundraising and replenishment strategy by COP29; calls for representatives of affected local communities to be able to contribute to the design of the fund and calls for the Fund to deliver support to local communities in a fast and targeted manner;










38.


Urges all major emitters to contribute their fair share to the fund to ensure global climate justice; welcomes the pledges of the EU and its Member States for the initial capitalisation of the fund of more than EUR 400 million, which covers over half of the initial total funding pledges;










39.


Reiterates its call for L&D to be a standing agenda item at COPs, in order to monitor and make progress on this issue, and for the full use of the Santiago Network in order to effectively catalyse technical assistance for adequately addressing L&D;










40.


Calls on all Parties to assess and quantify their L&D related vulnerabilities and needs in order to respond to the most severe impacts of climate change in the next round of NDCs; calls on all Parties to establish and implement rules on the transparency of spending within the L&D framework to ensure the impact and effectiveness of the financial support;






Participation of stakeholders at COP29








41.


Recalls the importance of the full involvement of all Parties in the UNFCCC decision-making processes; calls on the COP29 presidency and future presidencies to better enable the participation of developing countries and delegates from the least developed countries and to allocate additional resources to this; encourages Parties to include young people in their delegations to ensure that future generations have an active role in shaping decisions concerning their future; calls for the increased use of virtual platforms at COPs to enhance global inclusiveness and participation of delegates and civil society representatives;










42.


Stresses that climate goals cannot be achieved without the support and involvement of the public; calls on all Parties to raise awareness and public understanding of climate change and related issues, combat both misinformation and disinformation and work with public representatives to gain public support for mitigation and adaptation measures;










43.


Recalls its resolution of 25 April 2024 on Azerbaijan; stresses its profound concern regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan; calls on Azerbaijan to respect the rights of and immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners, human rights defenders and journalists and insists on making partnership agreements conditional on this and the improvement of the overall human rights situation in the country; considers that the ongoing human rights violations in Azerbaijan are incompatible with the country’s role as COP29 host; urges the EU to use COP29 as an occasion for the international community to remind Azerbaijan of its international obligations and to condemn and meaningfully address Azerbaijan’s human rights violations in all interactions with the Azerbaijani authorities when in Baku for COP29;










44.


Demands that the organisers ensure that human rights, fundamental freedoms, full and unrestricted participation for citizens and civil society organisations, and equitable access to this and future COPs are fully enshrined and guaranteed in the Host Country Agreement, which should be made public as soon as possible after signing; calls on the UNFCCC secretariat to monitor compliance and to take action in the event of breaches of such human rights criteria;






Conflict of interest, transparency and integrity








45.


Welcomes the preparation of the first biennial transparency reports under the Paris Agreement; stresses the importance of granular and transparent reporting to assess progress on the NDCs; takes note of the launching of the Baku Global Platform for Climate Transparency;










46.


Expresses concern that more than 2 400 fossil fuel lobbyists were accredited attendees at COP28; calls for the UNFCCC and the Parties to ensure that the decision-making process is protected from interests that run counter to the goal of the Paris Agreement; urges the UNFCCC to take the lead in proposing an ambitious accountability framework that would protect the UNFCCC’s work from undue influence from actors with proven vested interests, based on the model contained in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control with regard to the tobacco industry;










47.


Expresses strong concern that Azerbaijan’s Minister of Ecology and Natural Resources, Mukhtar Babayev, who, prior to becoming minister, spent 26 years working for the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (Socar), has been appointed as the president of COP29; expresses deep concern at the declaration of Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev that he would defend the interests of countries rich in fossil fuels to continue their investments and production; considers that this constitutes a serious risk of conflict of interest; urges the Commission and the Member States to take all necessary actions to ensure that upcoming COP presidencies are free of conflicts of interest;






EU climate policy aligned with the Paris Agreement








48.


Takes note of the EU’s updated NDC, which is the Union’s response to the request in the Glasgow Climate Pact to revisit and strengthen Parties’ NDCs for 2030; highlights that the EU’s current climate legislation is expected to reduce the EU’s net GHG emissions by around 57 % compared to 1990 by 2030, when fully implemented; stresses, therefore, the need to implement the existing legal framework for 2030 in the coming years in a simple, fair and cost-efficient way, while continuing to support citizens and economic sectors throughout this transition; stresses the importance of a stable and predictable policy framework to provide clarity for investors, businesses and citizens; notes that any additional efforts above 55 % would considerably decrease the Union’s cumulative emissions by 2050; strongly urges the Member States, therefore, as well as the private sector, to take all necessary actions to ensure that the target is reached; expresses concern, in this regard, at the gap in ambition in the current national energy and climate plans submitted by the Member States and calls on all Member States to step up their climate action; calls on the Member States and the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that the national energy and climate plans and long-term strategies of the Member States include sufficient action and financial means to achieve the EU’s 2030 targets and long-term objectives;










49.


Stresses the importance of the NDCs for 2035 being proposed in the preparatory phase of COP30, in accordance with the UNFCCC’s five-year common time frames and in keeping with the submission deadline laid down by the Paris Agreement; calls on the Commission to propose an NDC for 2035 in due time, firmly keeping the EU on a pathway to 2040 and to net-zero in 2050 and based on a proper assessment;










50.


Underlines the need to adopt a science-based EU climate target for 2040 in accordance with the European Climate Law and in keeping with the conclusions of the first global stocktake and recalls the recommendations of the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change; welcomes the commitment of the Commission to propose a 2040 climate target, accompanied by enabling policies;










51.


Considers it important for the EU to remain a leader in international climate negotiations and calls on the EU to step up its green diplomacy in order to encourage other Parties to step up their climate action towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement goals, which will also help create an international level playing field, avoid carbon leakage and increase public support for climate action;










52.


Reiterates the need to mainstream climate ambition into all EU policies and the measures transposing them, and underlines that Article 6(4) of the European Climate Law obliges the Commission to assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the EU’s climate targets; urges the Commission to fully implement this provision in the way it conducts impact assessments in all EU policy areas;










53.


Reiterates the principle of policy coherence for development, to which the EU and its Member States have committed and which aims to minimise contradictions and build synergies between different EU policies; insists on a coherent approach to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in both internal and external policies;










54.


Stresses that the current geopolitical situation further highlights the urgent need to end the EU’s dependence on fossil fuels and the need to transition away from a fossil fuel-based economy and boost the deployment of renewable and low carbon energy sources; stresses that the EU must avoid being energy dependent on non-EU countries; welcomes the progress made since the launch of RePowerEU on both of these aspects; calls for the EU and its Member States to accelerate the transition; underlines that this will require increasing the targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency as part of the post-2030 framework; calls on the Commission to address the recommendation by the EU Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change to ensure the consistency of EU policies with the need to transition away from a fossil fuel-based economy, avoiding carbon lock-ins and stranded assets;










55.


Recalls that it gave its consent on 24 April 2024 to the Council Decision on the approval of the withdrawal of the European Atomic Energy Community from the Energy Charter Treaty (24);






The triple planetary crisis: climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss








56.


Underscores that the crises of climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss are all interlinked and that the responses to these crises need to be aligned; points to their serious consequences, such as desertification, water scarcity, ocean degradation and drought; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems and of managing natural resources sustainably in order to enhance nature-based climate change mitigation and adaptation, avoid extreme weather phenomena and build resilience;










57.


Highlights the need to increase investment and to invest more efficiently in innovative and nature-based solutions, such as afforestation, reforestation and natural sponge landscapes, wetland restoration and regenerative agricultural practices, in order to strengthen climate adaption, particularly to limit floods and droughts; emphasises that such approaches should have a positive impact on biodiversity where possible, and should reduce carbon emissions from soils and off-site effects on water bodies, reduce soil compaction and facilitate the adaptation of forests to climate change; takes note of the role of the Commission’s proposals on forest governance and forest monitoring in this regard; expresses concern about the significant gap between the 2030 carbon sink enhancement target set by the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry Regulation (25) and the measures to deliver on the targets included in national energy and climate plans; urges Member States to increase their ambitions;










58.


Recognises that healthy ecosystems and rich biodiversity provide life-critical services, and highlights the fact that climate change is one of the direct drivers of biodiversity loss; points to how climate change has already altered terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems all around the world, causing species losses and declines in key ecosystem services;










59.


Underlines that a wide range of mitigation and adaptation benefits are offered by the conservation and restoration of high-carbon ecosystems such as peatlands, wetlands, forests (including primary forests), traditional agroforestry systems, rangelands and blue carbon ecosystems such as salt marshes, seagrasses and mangroves, as well as the species that enable these ecosystems to function; calls on the Commission to develop the mapping of these ecosystems and to develop methodologies for the accurate, robust and transparent accounting of carbon removals and emissions from those ecosystems in a manner that does not undermine biodiversity objectives, and underlines that the quality of protected areas should be respected; warns that contradictory investments and incentives, such as financing the drainage of wetlands yet subsequently funding the restoration of the same areas, undermine the effectiveness of EU financial resources and create uncertainty for farmers and the agricultural sector;










60.


Urges all parties, when taking action to address climate change, to commit to protecting, respecting, promoting and fulfilling their obligations on human rights, including the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the rights of indigenous peoples as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the rights of local communities; stresses the need to support and protect environmental defenders and to hold accountable those who threaten them; emphasises the importance of gender equality and intergenerational fairness in addressing the climate crisis; calls on all parties to uphold these values and ensure meaningful public participation, access to information, and free, prior and informed consent;










61.


Calls on all parties to make progress at COP29 towards decision-making that strikes a balance between the social, environmental and economic pillars;










62.


Stresses the importance of implementing the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework to the Convention on Biological Diversity, including the need to maximise the ability of nature to help mitigate and adapt to climate change and to minimise the negative impacts of climate action on biodiversity; recalls that conserving highly biodiverse, intact ecosystems on land and in the ocean is the most cost-effective nature-based action to tackle climate change; calls on all parties to step up their efforts to meet their international obligations on biodiversity, recalling the failure to achieve the Aichi targets; welcomes the submission of EU targets under this Framework;










63.


Emphasises that soil is the largest terrestrial carbon sink, playing an indispensable role in the global climate cycle; underlines the transboundary impacts of soil degradation; welcomes all efforts by governments and non-governmental actors to maximise the potential of soils to mitigate climate change and to improve water availability; takes note of the role of the EU proposal on the Soil Monitoring and Resilience Directive;










64.


Highlights the devastating environmental, social, economic and agricultural impacts of desertification, water pollution droughts, floods and forest fires intensified by climate change; emphasises the importance of protecting, conserving and restoring water and water-related ecosystems as vital components of climate resilience and biodiversity conservation; affirms the need for water management that avoids water scarcity and pollution, where water and resource loops are largely closed to foster a circular economy and optimal resource efficiency and recovery;










65.


Welcomes the spotlight placed on water-related challenges by the COP29 presidency, providing a global platform during COP29 for parties to collaborate and deliver solutions on water; welcomes the launch of the first UN system-wide strategy on water and sanitation as a key tool to foster community resilience to climate change;










66.


Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement nature-based solutions; calls on all parties to adopt water strategies in line with their climate policy, in order to achieve water security, water sustainability and water resilience, while ensuring universal access to water and sanitation, as well as ensuring no one is left behind and prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities;










67.


Welcomes the announcement of a European water resilience strategy and calls on the Commission to swiftly deliver this strategy to ensure sources are properly managed and scarcity is addressed, and also to ensure that we enhance the competitive innovative edge of our water industry and technology; urges the EU to lead efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems, in line with the Water Framework Directive, the EU biodiversity strategy, and the European Green Deal;










68.


Acknowledges the universality of water as a resource for all sectors, including those responsible for energy, food security and critical digital services; recognises the role of digital tools in all climate-mitigating activity, as a part of a water-resilient society;










69.


Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure effective water infrastructure, as a tool to combat climate change and enhance resilience;










70.


Welcomes the adoption of the UN High Seas Treaty (Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement); calls on the parties to continue work on the UN Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue; stresses that climate mechanisms depend on the health of the ocean and marine ecosystems currently affected by global warming, pollution, overexploitation of marine biodiversity, acidification, deoxygenation and coastal erosion; calls on all parties to enhance the resilience and protection of oceanic carbon sinks, including the safeguarding of marine ecosystems such as mangroves, seagrass beds and coral reefs; welcomes European Commission President von der Leyen’s commitment to the launch of a European oceans pact;










71.


Stresses that all sectors must contribute to the reduction of emissions;










72.


Stresses the urgent need to combat plastic pollution globally, as it poses a severe threat to marine ecosystems, biodiversity and human health, and an estimated 8 million tons of plastic enter the ocean each year; stresses the importance of tackling microplastics, especially in ocean and freshwater ecosystems; welcomes the ongoing work on the global plastics treaty; urges the EU to lead in advocating for a treaty that achieves sustainable levels of plastic production, phases out harmful single-use plastics, fosters innovation in sustainable alternatives and promotes circular economy principles, as well as promoting extended producer responsibility, to ensure that the full life cycle of plastics is addressed, and prioritising the communities most affected by plastic pollution; calls for a global goal to eliminate plastic pollution in the environment by 2040;










73.


Stresses the need to combat chemical pollution; calls for accelerated action to achieve the comprehensive plan set out in the Global Framework on Chemicals towards ‘a planet free of harm from chemicals and waste’;










74.


Stresses the need to protect the health and well-being of people and communities affected by the adverse impacts of climate change; stresses the need to ensure equitable access to a sustainable, resilient and healthy environment for future generations;










75.


Believes that environmental policies should be designed in full alignment with the One Health approach; recalls the importance of featuring a Health Day during COP29 to work towards solutions for common health challenges;










76.


Stresses the close link between air pollution and climate change; welcomes international efforts to address both climate change and air quality through initiatives like the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition; calls on all parties to enhance cooperation on this matter and align air quality policies with climate action to protect public health and the environment globally;










77.


Stresses that climate change will contribute to increased antibiotic resistance; in this regard, stresses the need for urgent action against antimicrobial resistance and calls for a global agreement by the parties to reduce the use of antimicrobials and combat the risk of resistance;










78.


Recalls that, globally, cities are responsible for 70 % of global CO2 emissions (26); stresses that local and regional governments are key actors in climate action; stresses, therefore, the need to facilitate their access to financial mechanisms and the need for enhanced cooperation with local and regional governments in the process of preparing, financing, and implementing NDCs ahead of COP30, as well as national adaptation plans, national biodiversity strategies and action plans, and long-term strategies;






Efforts across all sectors








79.


Welcomes the fact that 158 countries have become signatories to the Global Methane Pledge to date; calls on the signatories to the Global Methane Pledge to accelerate action to reduce and abate methane emissions by 2030 and to enhance governance on methane by drawing up an overarching framework aimed at making progress towards the collective commitment; urges, in particular, the large methane-emitting Parties that have not joined the pledge to do so as soon as possible; calls for a quantified, science-based assessment of the progress made since the pledge’s adoption at COP26;










80.


Calls on all Parties to also include specific methane reduction targets in their NDCs;










81.


Recalls the EU regulation on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector (27), which, from 1 January 2027, will also apply to EU importers of crude oil, natural gas and coal; stresses the need to reduce methane emissions in all sectors in the EU;










82.


Highlights the fact that the transport sector is the only sector in which emissions have risen at EU level since 1990, and that this is not compatible with the EU’s climate goals; stresses that achieving the EU’s climate goals will require greater and faster emissions reductions from all transport subsectors, including the aviation and maritime subsectors; welcomes the inclusion of maritime emissions in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS); stresses the importance of supporting the modal shift and intermodal transport and making clean transport options more attractive through improved internalisation of externalities, while ensuring the availability of adequate alternatives, taking demand management measures and laying down requirements regarding efficiency and circularity;










83.


Calls on the Commission to ensure the social fairness of transport decarbonisation measures, including by incorporating emissions from superyachts, private jets and business planes into EU climate policies;










84.


Calls on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to adopt measures to reduce maritime emissions in line with the science-based targets and the 1.5 °C limit set by the Paris Agreement; is concerned at the slow progress made by the IMO in addressing emissions from international shipping; calls for the EU to advocate for the adoption of stricter global targets and timelines; recalls that, in line with the provisions of the ETS Directive (28), the EU should revise the scope of EU ETS maritime legislation if IMO negotiations fail to achieve action in line with the Paris Agreement; calls on the Commission and the Member States to restart UNFCCC negotiations on attributing international shipping emissions to national inventories, mirroring the scope of the EU ETS and the FuelEU Maritime Regulation (29);










85.


Stresses the urgent need for the aviation sector to align with global climate goals, particularly the 1.5 °C target set by the Paris Agreement; is concerned at the slow progress achieved by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in addressing emissions from international aviation; calls on the ICAO to adopt more ambitious measures, under its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation, to reduce these emissions; recalls that if the ICAO does not deliver emissions reductions in line with the Paris Agreement, the Commission has an obligation to examine expanding the scope of the EU ETS to flights to aerodromes located outside the European Economic Area, in line with the provisions of the ETS Directive;










86.


Recalls that the non-CO2 climate impact of aviation activities is estimated to be twice as high (30) as the impact of CO2 alone; highlights the importance of gathering knowledge on the non-CO2 impact of both intra-EU flights and flights from and to non-EU destinations, and of assessing the need for measures to reduce this impact in accordance with the rules and timelines established in the EU ETS;










87.


Calls for the accelerated development and deployment of sustainable fuels in in the aviation and maritime sectors;










88.


Reiterates its call on all Parties, including the EU Member States, to take measures to discourage the use of private jets; highlights the disproportionate climate impact of private jets, which are up to 14 times more polluting per passenger than commercial flights; underlines the importance of leading by example and urges all participants attending COP29, including those from the EU institutions, to refrain from using private jets and to choose the least polluting transport option possible to reach their destination;










89.


Notes that the agricultural sector accounted for 10-12 % of global anthropogenic emissions and 11 % of total EU emissions in 2020 (31); notes that agricultural emissions at EU level have decreased by 25 % since 1990 (32), but have remained relatively stable over the last two decades;










90.


Stresses, however, that farmers and the agricultural sector are, at the same time, under increasing pressure from the effects of climate change, including rising temperatures, droughts, erratic rainfall and floods, and recognises that they are indispensable partners in ensuring food security, maintaining vibrant rural areas and achieving climate neutrality goals; underlines, in this regard, the need to continue to work towards sustainable and resilient food systems, and acknowledges both the potential for GHG emissions reductions in the agricultural sector and the potential contribution by farmers and foresters to natural carbon removal and storage in soils and forests; stresses the importance of providing farmers with an opportunity to actively contribute to and participate in the development of climate mitigation, adaptation and ecosystem conservation policies; welcomes, in this regard, the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s commitment to present a vision for agriculture and food in the first 100 days of the new Commission’s term with a view to ensuring the long-term competitiveness and sustainability of the EU farming sector within the planetary boundaries;










91.


Stresses that a transition towards more sustainable agricultural practices and shorter supply chains, and shifts towards healthier foods, diets and lifestyles and food waste reduction, will significantly reduce food chain emissions, enhance mitigation and adaptation, relieve pressure on biodiversity and land, reduce air and water pollution and help restore soil quality and ecosystems; reiterates that the overconsumption of ultra-processed products needs to be addressed;










92.


Stresses the need for policy frameworks that support farmers, with a particular focus on small-scale farmers, in the transition to sustainable agricultural practices by providing tools, mechanisms, techniques, opportunities, training and financial incentives for the adoption of climate-smart agricultural practices that improve productivity while contributing to climate change adaptation and mitigation, and that reward farmers and foresters who help to decarbonise the economy and work with nature, preserving biodiversity and natural ecosystems; underlines the importance of providing the agricultural sector with comprehensive methodologies to establish a GHG emission accounting system that would cover different types of agriculture; calls for the EU to increase investment in green technologies and innovations in the agricultural sector, such as precision agriculture, sustainable irrigation systems, climate-smart agricultural practices and agro-ecological practices that enable the more efficient use of resources such as water and energy; underlines, furthermore, the importance of policies that facilitate access to such innovative solutions and digital tools; emphasises the importance of developing more sustainable agriculture by providing farmers with alternatives in order to reduce the use and corresponding production of synthetic fertilisers and pesticides; notes that this, together with an increase in natural carbon sequestration in soils and soil organic matter, can offer multiple benefits by increasing soil fertility, restoring biodiversity and providing substantial mitigation potential; stresses the need to better target resilience by supporting the management of the risk of prolonged droughts, promoting crops that are less water-intensive, and fostering sustainable practices that enhance ecosystem resilience;










93.


Calls on all Parties to continue working towards the implementation of the COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action;










94.


Stresses the importance of ensuring a global level playing field for agricultural production that is based on high standards for environmental protection, animal welfare and compliance monitoring;










95.


Stresses that the defence sector must contribute to the reduction of emissions while maintaining operational effectiveness, and that the development of decarbonisation technologies and strategies in the defence sector should be accelerated; notes that the inclusion of disaggregated military emissions in UNFCCC submissions is voluntary, and that it is not currently possible to identify reported military GHG emissions from the submitted UNFCCC data; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission and the Council to formulate a proposal for the transparent accounting of military emissions to the UNFCCC that acknowledges the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, and in order to fully implement the Climate Change and Defence Roadmap;










96.


Highlights the fact that the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is an essential tool for effectively pricing emissions from products imported into the EU, reducing the emissions from these products and addressing carbon leakage while supporting the adoption of carbon pricing worldwide with accompanying measures for industrial decarbonisation in least developed countries; calls on the Commission to work on expanding the scope of CBAM in line with the provisions of the CBAM Regulation (33), while engaging with non-EU countries to facilitate the correct implementation of the mechanism and encourage the introduction of carbon pricing;










97.


Welcomes the fact that according to the World Bank, 24 % of global emissions are now covered by carbon pricing (34); regrets, nevertheless, that both the coverage and the pricing levels remain far too low to meet the goals set in the Paris Agreement; welcomes the fact that several EU trading partners have introduced carbon trading or other carbon pricing mechanisms; invites the Commission to further encourage and support other Parties in introducing or improving similar carbon pricing mechanisms, and to explore links and other forms of cooperation with existing carbon pricing mechanisms outside the EU; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to put in place safeguards to ensure that any links with the EU ETS will continue to deliver additional and permanent mitigation contributions and will not undermine the EU’s domestic GHG emissions commitments; welcomes the creation of the Commission Task Force for International Carbon Pricing and Markets Diplomacy and calls on the Commission to ensure that this task force is fully operational in a timely manner;










98.


Notes that the GST highlights the importance of transitioning to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production in efforts to address climate change, including through circular economy approaches, and that this underscores the need to continue to develop the circular economy in the EU, including by supporting innovation and investment in circular solutions and business models and markets for secondary raw materials, and highlights the importance of waste reduction and increased recycling; recalls the commitment made in the 8th EAP to significantly decrease the EU’s material and consumption footprints so as to bring them within the planetary boundaries as soon as possible; calls on the Commission to develop measures to accelerate the shift to a circular economy and sustainable resource use, while ensuring a just and inclusive transition;










99.


Stresses the need to address the climate and environmental impact of the textile sector, which is responsible for around 8-10 % of global GHG emissions and substantial consumption of resources, particularly water and energy (35); recognises that the textile industry needs to play an important role in the shift to a circular economy and tackle challenges related to issues including waste prevention, waste management, microplastic shedding, water usage, overproduction, the overall durability and non-toxicity of the production process and the recyclability of textile products, including by ensuring that textiles are designed to be long-lasting and recyclable; stresses that it is imperative to work towards establishing global standards for when brands can make green claims about a product;










100.


Stresses the need to fight greenwashing by working towards establishing consistent and transparent global standards for green claims to help consumers make informed choices and prevent greenwashing by ensuring that sustainability claims are backed by verifiable evidence;










101.


Stresses that climate change, water scarcity and environmental degradation lead to scarcity of natural resources, can exacerbate conflicts and tensions, as well as food shortages and natural catastrophes, and are major drivers of human displacement and threat multipliers;










102.


Notes that the Mediterranean is one of the regions most affected by climate change, warming 20 % faster than the global average, with projections suggesting that 250 million people will face water scarcity within 20 years (36) and experience increasingly frequent forest fires, with severe consequences for the livelihoods of coastal communities, economic sectors and biodiversity; calls on the Commission and the Member States to act urgently, cooperating with Mediterranean partners to implement ambitious adaptation measures and lead mitigation action, focusing on water management, ecosystem restoration and sustainable economic transitions;










103.


Highlights that climate change has been affecting cultural heritage at an unprecedented speed and scale; stresses the need to strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage, with a focus on enhancing risk preparedness and on strengthening resilience to climate change;










104.


Stresses the need to step up EU action on climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness by strengthening the EU Civil Protection Mechanism in order to enhance the EU’s capacity to prevent and manage increasingly frequent large-scale and cross-border natural disasters;










105.


Notes that there is growing scientific and political interest in solar radiation modification (SRM), a proposed set of climate engineering approaches, such as stratospheric aerosol injection, to artificially reflect sunlight and cool the planet; stresses that SRM does nothing to address the root cause of climate change, that there is no scientific certainty regarding its effects and that it endangers climactic and geopolitical stability, potentially in a catastrophic fashion; recalls that a UN resolution on global governance has been blocked; calls on the Commission to take action on SRM by initiating a non-use agreement to stop its deployment, restrict its development and object to the future institutionalisation of SRM in international institutions, in line with the precautionary principle and in the absence of evidence of its safety and a full global consensus on its acceptability;






Climate change and gender








106.


Underscores the importance of inclusive approaches in the UNFCCC process, including the Just Transition Work Programme; calls for all Parties, including the EU and its Member States, to increase efforts to integrate gender equality into their revised NDCs and national adaptation plans and into their climate and environmental policies, in particular those related to mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage; emphasises the need for more concrete actions by all Parties to deliver on the commitments of the Gender Action Plan agreed at COP25, and to agree on a new Gender Work Programme and associated Action Plan for the post-2024 period; urges the Member States and the Commission to increase efforts to achieve the goals set out in the EU Gender Action Plan III;










107.


Considers that women’s access to inclusive climate finance must be increased and facilitated, noting that women receive disproportionately less access to financial resources for climate adaptation and mitigation projects; urges the EU and the Member States to report on the gender responsiveness of their climate finance contributions and to enhance coherence between gender and climate support through external action instruments and the EIB;










108.


Highlights the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in the climate diplomacy context, including in COP delegations and in leadership at all levels of climate action; calls on all Parties to aim for gender parity in their delegations and at all levels of climate change decision-making and negotiations; urges all Parties to nominate a national gender and climate change focal point and to increase the associated resources, training and support, including within the EU;










109.


Stresses that adaptive capacity and vulnerability differ across gender, age, ability, racial and occupational lines; calls, therefore, on all Parties to assess, respond to and prioritise the needs of vulnerable populations in their national adaptation plans, adaptation communications and NDCs;










110.


Stresses the need to accelerate action for gender-responsive disaster risk reduction and, therefore, for gender-responsive implementation of the Sendai Framework; calls for further efforts to be made to prioritise and account for gender in disaster preparedness, particularly through the use of disaggregated disaster risk reduction data sets;






Industry, small and medium-sized enterprises and competitiveness








111.


Considers COP29 an important step since the signature of the Paris Agreement in 2015; highlights that efforts to combat climate change should aim to reduce energy poverty, increase the resilience and competitiveness of EU industry and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and provide opportunities for EU industry and SMEs that can be materialised if legislators commit to timely, tailor-made, solidarity-based and adequate policy responses and to a stable and predictable transition framework; calls on all Parties to the UNFCCC to commit and implement these adequate policies and measures;










112.


Stresses that well-designed enabling policies can ensure that climate action, innovation, decarbonisation, job creation and competitiveness all go hand in hand; recalls that by investing in innovative, sustainable industries and technologies, in line with the clean and just transition, our climate, economy, quality employment and social well-being will all prosper;










113.


Deems it of the utmost importance for the EU to ensure a just, swift and fair transition to maintain public support for climate action and to lead by example, and to ensure a first-mover advantage while shielding the internal market from unfair competition from non-EU countries and safeguarding a level playing field for European industries at international level – notably by addressing high energy prices currently hampering their competitiveness;










114.


Considers that becoming the first climate-neutral continent by 2050 at the latest, while increasing our competitiveness will require deep industrial transformation and adaptation in most sectors; believes that massive investment will be needed to support the energy system transformation, taking into account the diverse starting points of the Member States; calls for the EU to consider better aligning the financial framework with the Paris Agreement;










115.


Stresses that the EU should do its utmost to maintain the leading position and global competitiveness of its industries and SMEs in the transition towards a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions economy; highlights the need for innovative policies to regain, maintain and expand the areas of EU leadership;










116.


Emphasises that industries and SMEs are experiencing substantial transformation towards a net-zero economy; underlines the need to provide appropriate tools and support for the transition phase, while fostering innovation and ensuring competitiveness; recalls that SMEs must be supported and incentivised in this transition by legislators, in particular by ensuring access to finance for sustainable technologies, services and processes, by simplifying administrative procedures and by providing equal opportunities in public procurement;










117.


Underlines the need to swiftly decarbonise the European industry further, while strengthening its competitiveness, and to maintain EU support for this endeavour; recalls, in this regard, the adoption of the Net-Zero Industry Act and notes the announcement of a future Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act and a new Clean Industrial Deal, aimed at channelling investments in infrastructure and industry, in particular for energy-intensive sectors, and supporting lead markets in the development, production and diffusion of clean tech in industry; believes that the EU Innovation Fund should further support the scaling-up of clean and innovative technologies and their supply chains;










118.


Emphasises that carbon management can play a role in mitigating process emissions in hard-to-abate industries and in reducing unavoidable emissions; notes, in this context, the recent industrial carbon management strategy, which seeks to develop an EU action plan to increase the capture, storage, transport and use of CO2 emissions from industrial and energy production facilities, and to remove CO2 from the atmosphere;










119.


Highlights the need for adequate financial resources to support the transition under the next multiannual financial framework, including through specific funding instruments that effectively address the financing needs of European industries;










120.


Recognises the essential role of SMEs, in particular micro-enterprises and start-ups, in driving and delivering on innovation, employment and growth, and in leading the way on the digital and green transitions through innovation and cutting-edge technological solutions; stresses that SMEs need clear, consistent and predictable legislation in order to grow and create jobs; highlights the specific barriers that such companies have to face to access financial instruments and public and private capital;










121.


Emphasises the need to promote competitive markets of commodities and rare metals that are essential for the green transition; highlights that continued dependency on a few suppliers affects the EU’s industry negatively and calls for a diversification of suppliers; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the Critical Raw Materials Act and the intention of the Commission to propose a new Circular Economy Act; highlights the crucial importance of a circular economy to achieve the highest resource efficiency and independency regarding critical raw materials; points to the need to improve international supplies, including via the upcoming Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships, while ensuring that the same social, environmental and human rights standards as those in the EU are applied;










122.


Highlights the need for specific qualification programmes, including reskilling and upskilling programmes that are essential to reinforce the workforce and meet the increasing demand of labour in clean and innovative technologies, energy efficiency, renewables, building renovations and energy storage; notes, in this regard, the importance of the Net-Zero Academies; emphasises the need to invest in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education in order to meet the requirements of the job market, and to foster the EU’s innovation potential; highlights the importance of consulting all social partners in mapping skills shortages and designing the policy toolbox to address them;






Energy policy








123.


Notes, with concern, that fossil fuel subsidies have skyrocketed globally in recent years (37); regrets the fact that fossil fuel subsidies in the EU have remained stable since 2008, at around EUR 55-58 billion per year, and increased to EUR 123 billion in 2022; notes, in this respect, that current investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary for the world to achieve the goals agreed at COP28 to triple renewable capacity and to double the rate of improvements in energy efficiency, and that a doubling of current annual spending on renewable power generation, grids and storage in 2030 is necessary (38);










124.


Underlines the unused potential of geothermal energy to make a significant contribution to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement and of the EU’s energy policy; encourages Parties to share best practices, technological know-how and results of research and innovation on geothermal technologies;










125.


Recalls the energy aspects of the outcome of the first global stocktake under the UAE Consensus, in particular the transition away from fossil fuels so as to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, in keeping with the science, tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030, and the call to accelerate implementation and investments in clean, sustainable, safe and energy-efficient technologies and systems; calls for continuous assessment of the progress made in reaching these targets;










126.


Notes the desirability of establishing a complementary global goal of a six-fold increase in energy storage in the power sector to 1 500 GW and more broadly increasing system flexibility by 2030, in line with the targets agreed by G7 energy ministers in April 2024; emphasises the need to pay more attention to technological solutions aimed at reducing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere;










127.


Highlights the importance of a global reduction in methane emissions in the fossil fuel supply chains during the transition to clean energy systems in order to achieve the global reduction level of 75 %in methane emissions by 2030, as reflected in the IEA’s Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 scenario; calls on the Global Methane Pledge signatories to accelerate action to abate methane emissions by 2030; notes that the Methane Regulation (39) introduces global monitoring tools to increase the transparency of methane emissions from imports of oil, gas and coal into the EU and to ensure a level playing field across EU and non-EU operators, while taking into account security of supply;










128.


Highlights that climate change and extreme weather events are having an increasingly serious impact on our energy systems, including the production of hydropower, bioenergy yields, the efficiency of thermal power plants, and heating and cooling demands; notes that renewable energies may often have variable production levels, emphasising the need to develop storage capacities;










129.


Underlines the in-depth revision of the EU’s energy legislation under the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which has aligned it to the EU’s increased GHG emissions reduction target of at least 55 % by 2030 in order to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest; emphasises that achieving our climate and energy targets depends on the effective implementation of the ‘Fit for 55’ package; considers that other parties should undertake similar and relevant efforts with the encouragement of and in cooperation with the EU;










130.


Calls for the announced Clean Industrial Deal to ensure the competitiveness of industries and enhance quality jobs with sector-specific and cross-sector measures by delivering on simplifying, investing in and ensuring access to affordable, sustainable and secure energy supplies and raw materials, in partnership with industry, social partners, financial institutions and all stakeholders, in order to support our industries on their journey towards a climate-neutral future with a business case;










131.


Highlights the central role of energy efficiency, renewables, a diversified energy system and low-carbon energy sources in the transition towards a climate-neutral economy; acknowledges however the importance, as the EU has done under the ‘Fit for 55’ package, of aligning renewable energy and energy efficiency policies and measures in order to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to comply with the Paris Agreement, seizing the opportunity of the current decline in the cost of renewable energy and energy storage technologies; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the urgent and targeted reform of the electricity market design that aims to contribute, inter alia, to boosting renewables generation, to empower and protect consumers, and to make the energy bills of consumers and businesses less dependent on short-term price fluctuations;










132.


Recalls the Union’s commitment to the energy efficiency first principle, which takes into account cost efficiency, system efficiency, storage capacity, demand-side flexibility and security of supply;










133.


Stresses the need for significant public and private investments in the EU’s energy grid and related infrastructure to allow for their modernisation and expansion and the further flexible integration of renewable energy sources, efficiency measures and storage solutions to provide clean, sufficient, secure and affordable energy for our citizens and industry; underlines, in particular, the need to upgrade the EU’s electricity network to accommodate substantial increases in renewable capacity, variability in generation, changing electricity flow patterns across Europe and new demands; recalls the importance of removing barriers, including complexities in permitting processes for electricity infrastructure, to further integrate the energy systems of Member States, which will increase the Union’s potential for clean energy production, and of driving the roll-out of interconnections; underlines the need for Member States to meet the 15 % electricity interconnection target by 2030;










134.


Stresses that achieving global net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 at the latest will require coordinated global actions and that developing countries will require international assistance in order to achieve their green transitions; stresses the importance of enhancing close cross-border cooperation and the sharing of best practices with international partners in the fields of policymaking and science and technology transfer;










135.


Stresses that partnerships with non-EU countries on external dimensions of energy policies must be fostered; notes the EU’s efforts to build energy alliances with a sustainable development perspective;










136.


Notes the declaration launched at COP28 (40), by more than 20 countries, including 12 EU Member States and Ukraine, to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050;










137.


Highlights the central role that citizens and local communities have to play in a successful global energy transition and the specific barriers that they have to face to access financial instruments and public and private capital; underlines the importance of EU legislation, which sets the framework for them to produce, self-consume, store and sell their renewable energy and offer demand-response and energy efficiency services to citizens, among other entities; stresses that EU legislative acquis is a transferable good practice for international partners seeking to speed up their ecological transition in a socially fair and democratic way;






Research, innovation, digital technologies and space policy








138.


Welcomes the role of the Copernicus programme and the new EU Knowledge Centre on Earth Observation in land, atmosphere and marine environmental monitoring; underlines the importance of satellite observation capacities to monitor, model, predict and support policymaking on climate change, including monitoring methane emissions, super-emitting events and carbon sinks; stresses the need to promote joint research programmes to develop technologies and infrastructure that address both space and climate protection; highlights the importance of public-private partnerships to promote cooperation between government and commercial space agencies; underlines the need to achieve true EU strategic autonomy in the satellite domain, and to further invest in the space economy;










139.


Recalls the importance of the contribution of research and innovation to achieving the goals set out in the Paris Agreement and the objectives of the European Green Deal; underlines that the vast majority of research and innovation needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 still lies ahead of us; regrets the fact that the EU has still not delivered on its long-standing objective of annually investing 3 % of GDP in research and development,and calls for new approaches to boosting industrial research and development spending;










140.


Welcomes, particularly in this regard, the role that Horizon Europe and its partnerships, such as the Joint Undertakings and the Knowledge and Innovation Communities of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, play in fostering collaboration between the public and private sectors, with the goal of contributing to achieving climate neutrality and the green transition, while ensuring that innovations are sustainable, available, accessible and affordable to all;










141.


Highlights the need to attract more investment, both public and private, in research, innovation and the deployment of new sustainable technologies, including in labour-intensive industries, and in the upgrade of existing and, where necessary, new infrastructure networks and projects that contribute to the goals of the European Green Deal and the Paris Agreement;










142.


Underlines the importance of ensuring the coherence and consistency of incentives to foster clean and innovative technologies to achieve the 2030 and 2050 targets, addressing the deployment of already mature technologies and investments in new technologies that may need to be developed to reach the Union’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest;










143.


Stresses that the EU must collaborate on research on technology, industry and innovative science to help make important contributions to the Paris Agreement; calls for the announced strategy for European Life Sciences to be implemented; calls on the Commission to foster strategic research partnerships to enable a level playing field in Europe;










144.


Underlines that digitalisation is one of the key factors driving energy system integration as it can enable dynamic and interlinked flows of energy carriers, allow for more diverse markets to be interconnected and provide the necessary data to match supply and demand and optimise network management; highlights the potential of digital technologies in increasing energy efficiency and thus reducing overall GHG emissions, while acknowledging the urgent need to adopt sustainable practices to minimise the increasingly high carbon and resource footprint of digitalisation and of the information and communications technology sector, in particular data centres and other computing infrastructure; recalls the EU’s objective to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by no later than 2030, in line with its digital strategy;






Role of the European Parliament at COP29








145.


Believes that Parliament should be an integral part of the EU delegation at COP29, given that it must give its consent to international agreements and plays a central role in the domestic implementation of the Paris Agreement as one of the EU’s co-legislators; expects, therefore, to be allowed to attend EU coordination meetings at COP29 in Baku and to be guaranteed access to all preparatory documents; commits to acting independently and free from conflicts of interest;
°
° °










146.


Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with the request that it be circulated to all non-EU Parties to the Convention.






(1)  
            OJ C, C/2024/4210, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4210/oj.

(2)  Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0369.

(3)  
            OJ C, C/2024/493, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/493/oj.

(4)  
            OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.

(5)  
            OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.

(6)  
            OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 156.

(7)  
            OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 105.

(8)  
            OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 25.

(9)  
            OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.

(10)  
            OJ C 506, 15.12.2021, p. 38.

(11)  
            OJ C 385, 22.9.2021, p. 10.

(12)  
            OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 135.

(13)  
            OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.

(14)  
            OJ C 465, 17.11.2021, p. 11.

(15)  
            OJ C, C/2024/488, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/488/oj.

(16)  
            OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 19.

(17)  Communication from the Commission of 31 October 2024 entitled ‘EU Climate Action Progress Report 2024’ (COM(2024)0498).

(18)  UN Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2024.

(19)  European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), GHG emissions of all world countries – 2024.

(20)  World Bank, Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration, Washington, DC, 2021.

(21)  European Environment Agency, Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe, October 2023.

(22)  OECD, Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2022, 29 May 2024.

(23)  European Environment Agency Report No 1/2024, European Climate Risk Assessment, 11 March 2024.

(24)  Council Decision (EU) 2024/1677 of 30 May 2024 on the approval of the withdrawal of the European Atomic Energy Community from the Energy Charter Treaty (OJ L, 2024/1677, 13.6.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1677/oj).

(25)  Regulation (EU) 2018/841, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 on the inclusion of greenhouse gas emissions and removals from land use, land use change and forestry in the 2030 climate and energy framework, and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 and Decision No 529/2013/EU (OJ L 156, 19.6.2018, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2018/841/oj).

(26)  Shukla, P. R. and Skea, J. (eds), Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change – Working Group III Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022.

(27)  Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942 (OJ L, 2024/1787, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj).

(28)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/87/oj).

(29)  Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 on the use of renewable and low-carbon fuels in maritime transport, and amending Directive 2009/16/EC (OJ L 234, 22.09.2023, p. 48, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1805/oj).

(30)  Transport & Environment, Murphy, A. and Simon, V., ‘Private jets: can the super rich supercharge zero-emission aviation?’
            , European Federation for Transport and Environment, Brussels, 2021.

(31)  European Environment Agency, ‘Progress and prospects for decarbonisation in the agriculture sector and beyond’, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2022.

(32)  European Environment Agency, ‘EEA greenhouse gases – data viewer’, 13 August 2024.

(33)  Regulation (EU) 2023/956 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 52, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/956/oj).

(34)  World Bank, ‘State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024’, World Bank, Washington DC, 21 May 2024.

(35)  International Finance Corporation, ‘Strengthening sustainability in the textile industry’, International Finance Corporation, Washington DC, 2023.

(36)  Mediterranean Experts on Climate and environmental Change (MedECC),‘Risks associated to climate and environmental changes in the Mediterranean region. A preliminary assessment by the MedECC Network Science-policy interface – 2019’, 2019.

(37)  IEA, Fossil Fuels Consumption Subsidies 2022, February 2023.

(38)  IEA, World Energy Investment 2024: Overview and key findings, June 2024.

(39)  Regulation (EU) 2024/1787 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on the reduction of methane emissions in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942, OJ L, 2024/1787, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1787/oj.

(40)  Ministerial Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy, signed on 2 December 2023.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)