Case T-579/24: Action brought on 13 November 2024 – Kantor v Council
Date: 2024-11-13
Institutions: General Court
Subjects: EU restrictive measure, Russo-Ukrainian issue, economic sanctions, entrepreneur, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, international sanctions, natural person, principle of legal certainty, principle of proportionality, right to property








C_202500398EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/398


27.1.2025






Action brought on 13 November 2024 – Kantor v Council


(Case T-579/24)

(C/2025/398)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Applicant: Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor (Herzliya, Israel) (represented by: T. Bontinck, M. Brésart and F. Patuelli, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the General Court should:






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annul Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/2456 of 12 September 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine in so far as it extends the applicant’s listing as entry No 896 in the Annex to Decision 2014/145/CFSP as amended by Decision (CFSP) 2022/582 of 8 April 2022, for the same reasons as those stated in the latter;










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annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2455 of 12 September 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine in so far as it extends the applicant’s listing as entry No 896 in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2014/269 as amended by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/581 of 8 April 2022, for the same reasons as those stated in the latter;










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in the alternative, declare as unlawful the criterion referred to in Article 1(1)(g) and Article 2(1)(g) of amended Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and in Article 3(1)(g) of amended Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, relating to leading businesspersons or businesspersons involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation;










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order the Council to pay the costs.





Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.






1.


First plea in law, alleging an error of assessment.






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The applicant submits that the Council made errors of assessment in applying criterion (g) and the criterion referred to in Article 1(1)(d) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(d) of Regulation 269/2014, relating to persons supporting or benefitting from Russian decision-makers, to him. The applicant further submits that the Council did not rely on current, precise and consistent indicia, in view of the evidence adduced by the applicant.














2.


Second plea in law, alleging failure to observe the principle of proportionality and infringement of fundamental rights.






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The applicant submits that the contested acts constitute a disproportionate infringement of his right to property and freedom of assembly and association. According to the applicant, the contested acts are neither necessary nor appropriate for attaining the objective pursued by the restrictive measures and are not consistent with that objective. The applicant further submits that the contested acts do not have the temporary nature essential to their proportionality. Lastly, the applicant submits that the contested acts have excessive negative externalities vis-à-vis third parties.














3.


In the alternative, the applicant relies on a plea of illegality raised against criterion (g).






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The applicant submits that the first limb of criterion (g) is unlawful since it introduces an irrebuttable presumption, is unfounded and is not based on common experience. The second limb of that criterion is also unlawful because it is contrary to the principles of legal certainty, legality and proportionality and to the objectives of restrictive measures.










ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/398/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)