Case C-760/24 P: Appeal brought on 4 November 2024 by Ammar Sharif against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 4 September 2024 in Case T-503/23, Sharif v Council
Date: 2024-11-04
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EU restrictive measure, Syria, economic sanctions, equal treatment, family, international sanctions, natural person, protection of privacy, rights of the defence








C_202500053EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/53


6.1.2025






Appeal brought on 4 November 2024 by Ammar Sharif against the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 4 September 2024 in Case T-503/23, Sharif v Council


(Case C-760/24 P)

(C/2025/53)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Appellant: Ammar Sharif (represented by: G. Karouni, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 4 September 2024, Sharif v Council (T-503/23; EU:T:2024:582; ‘the judgment under appeal’), including in so far as it ordered the appellant to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union;










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refer to the substance of the action and set aside the contested decisions in so far as they maintain the appellant on the lists annexed to those acts, namely Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1035 of 25 May 2023, amending Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2023 L 139, p. 49) and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1027 of 25 May 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria (OJ 2023 L 139, p. 1);










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order the payment of compensation in respect of the harm he suffered;










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order the Council to pay the entirety of the costs incurred by the appellant before both the General Court and the Court of Justice.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of his appeal, the appellant relies on four grounds of appeal.






1.


In his first ground of appeal, the appellant is of the view that, by claiming that the scope of its judicial review is limited so far as concerns the inclusion of his name based on the family criterion, the General Court disregarded the scope of its powers and infringed Article 277 and 263 TFEU so that the principle of equality was not respected. Contrary to what was held in the judgment under appeal, the inclusion of individuals expressly designated by their name or family tie creates an irrebuttable presumption of association with the Syrian regime against them, since it is solely because of that name or those family circumstances, which they cannot change or abolish – except possibly by harming in an entirely excessive way their private and family life by forcing them into unreasonably disowning family members – that they are, consequently, included on the lists at issue. That irrebuttable presumption, which the other general criteria for inclusion on those lists does not entail, creates a breach of the principle of equality between the categories of persons included on the sanctions lists. By disregarding that breach of the principle of equality, the General Court infringed Articles 263, 275 and 277 TFEU.










2.


In his second ground of appeal, the appellant is of the opinion that the General Court’s refusal to examine the pleas set out in his reply is an additional indication of the difficulty for a person listed because of a family tie to escape the irrebuttable presumption created by the family membership criterion. By expanding on the aspects relating to family membership, the reply did nothing other than highlight the disproportionate and discriminatory nature of such a criterion in relation to other criteria – on which the persons concerned by those other criteria and listed due to those other criteria could personally attempt to rely to their advantage.










3.


In his third ground of appeal, the appellant submits that access to the EU Courts requires the latter to verify, where an applicant included on a sanctions list, on the basis of a family tie with a named person, disputes his or her association with the Syrian regime, whether the person associated with the applicant is still legitimately included on the lists, or whether the applicant has demonstrated that there is no longer – against the person in his family to whom he is connected and the Syrian regime – evidence justifying the maintenance of his inclusion on the sanctions lists. By denying Mr Ammar Sharif any possibility of criticising the decisions concerning Mr Rami Makhlouf and their justified maintenance, even though Mr Sharif’s listing was merely the consequence of his family relationship with Mr Makhlouf, the General Court disregarded the scope of its powers, created an irrebuttable presumption of association with the Syrian regime, and infringed the rights of the defence and Articles 26, 27 and 28 TEU, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’).










4.


In his fourth ground of appeal, the appellant emphasises that it follows from the judgment under appeal that he should have demonstrated ‘the non-existence or disappearance of a real risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures’. That requirement is separate from the question whether the maintenance of an association ‘of any nature whatsoever’ with Mr Makhlouf has been proven, since the only links that could be held against Mr Sharif are those relating to a ‘risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures’. By requiring proof of the absence of any link ‘of any kind’ with Mr Makhlouf and, by failing, on the basis of that erroneous reason, to examine all the evidence submitted by Mr Sharif and which is capable of demonstrating his independence from his brother-in-law, the General Court infringed the appellant’s rights of defence and Articles 26, 27, 28 and 29 TEU, Article 215 TFEU, read in conjunction with Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and Article 6 of the ECHR.






ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/53/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)