COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2024 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF REGIONS 2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy
Date: 2024-10-30
Institutions: Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission
Subjects: Türkiye, accession criteria, accession negotiations, pre-accession strategy, regional cooperation

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 30.10.2024  SWD(2024) 696 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Türkiye 2024 Report Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF REGIONS 2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy                         {COM(2024) 690 final} - {SWD(2024) 690 final} - {SWD(2024) 691 final} - {SWD(2024) 692 final} - {SWD(2024) 693 final} - {SWD(2024) 694 final} - {SWD(2024) 695 final} - {SWD(2024) 697 final} - {SWD(2024) 698 final} - {SWD(2024) 699 final}  
 
 
Contents 
1. 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1.   Context................................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.2. Main findings of the report .......................................................................................................................... 4 

2. Cluster 1: The fundamentals of the accession process ...................................................................................... 19 

2.1. Functioning of democratic institutions and Public Administration Reform .............................................. 19 

2.1.1 Democracy .......................................................................................................................................... 19 

2.1.2. Public administration reform ............................................................................................................. 23 

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights ..................................................................................... 25 

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security .......................................................................................... 35 

2.3. Economic criteria ...................................................................................................................................... 43 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy ............................................................................... 43 

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union ....................... 47 

2.4. Public procurement, statistics, financial control ........................................................................................ 49 

Chapter 5: Public procurement .................................................................................................................... 49 

Chapter 18: Statistics ................................................................................................................................... 50 

Chapter 32: Financial control ....................................................................................................................... 51 

3. Good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation ...................................................................................... 53 

4.  Ability to assume the obligations of membership ............................................................................................ 57 

Cluster 2: Internal Market ................................................................................................................................ 57 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods ............................................................................................................ 57 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers ............................................................................................ 58 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services ............................................................ 59 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital ........................................................................................................... 59 

Chapter 6: Company law ............................................................................................................................. 60 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law ............................................................................................................. 60 

Chapter 8: Competition policy ..................................................................................................................... 61 

Chapter 9: Financial services ....................................................................................................................... 62 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection ............................................................................................... 63 

Cluster 3: Competitiveness and inclusive growth ............................................................................................ 64 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media ............................................................................................. 64 

Chapter 16: Taxation.................................................................................................................................... 66 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy ................................................................................................ 67 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment ................................................................................................. 68 

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy ................................................................................................ 69 

Chapter 25: Science and research ................................................................................................................ 70 

Chapter 26: Education and culture ............................................................................................................... 71 

Chapter 29: Customs Union ......................................................................................................................... 72 

Cluster 4: The Green agenda and sustainable connectivity .............................................................................. 73 

Chapter 14: Transport policy ....................................................................................................................... 73 

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Chapter 15: Energy ...................................................................................................................................... 74 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks......................................................................................................... 75 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change ............................................................................................. 76 

Cluster 5: Resources, agriculture and cohesion ................................................................................................ 77 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development ........................................................................................... 78 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy ..................................................................... 78 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture ......................................................................................................... 79 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments ............................................... 79 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions .......................................................................................... 81 

Cluster 6: External relations ............................................................................................................................. 81 

Chapter 30: External relations...................................................................................................................... 81 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy ........................................................................................ 82 

Annex I – Relations between the EU and Türkiye ........................................................................................... 87 

Annex II – Statistical data ................................................................................................................................ 89 

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1. 

INTRODUCTION1  

1.1.   CONTEXT 

Türkiye is a key partner for the European Union and a candidate country. In April 2024, the European 
Council  reiterated  the  EU’s  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure  environment  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually  beneficial  relationship  with 
Türkiye.  In  this  regard,  the  European  Council  stressed  that  the  European  Union  attaches  particular 
importance  to  resumption  of  and  progress  in  the  Cyprus  settlement  talks  in  further  enhancing  EU-
Türkiye cooperation. Both the EU and Türkiye pursue re-engagement in areas of mutual interest, in 
line  with  the  recommendations  of  the  Joint  Communication  on  EU-Türkiye  relations  from 
23 November 20232  and  the  relevant  European  Council  Conclusions3.  The  EU  is  re-engaging 
constructively with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, subject to established 
conditionalities. High-level engagement continued in areas of joint interest4.  

Accession  negotiations  with  Türkiye  have  remained  at  a  standstill  since  2018,  in  line  with  the 
European  Council  Conclusions.  The  EU’s  serious  concerns  about  the  continued  deterioration  of 
democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental 
rights were not addressed.  

The  2016  EU-Turkey  Statement  continued  to  yield  results  and  remained  the  key  framework  for 
cooperation on migration. Türkiye sustained its remarkable efforts to host 3.6 million refugees from 
Syria  and  other  countries.  The  EU  has  mobilised  EUR 10  billion  to  support  refugees  and  host 
communities  since  2011.  The  Commission  continued  to  provide  assistance  in  areas  such  as  basic 
needs,  border  management,  education,  healthcare,  protection  and  socio-economic  support.  On  the 
economic side, Türkiye became the EU’s fifth largest trading partner in 2023, with trade exceeding 
EUR 206 billion.  

Since  2023,  bilateral  relations  between  Türkiye  and  Greece  have  improved,  with  Türkiye  not 
engaging in any unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean or in flights over Greek 
islands. Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and repeatedly advocated a 
two-state solution in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.  

1  The  2024  report  is  presented  in  a  renewed  format  and  structure.  Main  findings  of  the  report,  together  with  the 
recommendations (previously grey assessment boxes) are brought together at the beginning of the report. Furthermore, under 
the fundamentals cluster, for better readability and comparability across all reports, certain data is provided (also) in the form 
of graphs. 
2 JOIN(2023) 50 final 
3 During the reporting period the European Council adopted Conclusions regarding Türkiye on 30 June 2023 and on 17 April 
2024; 
4  EU-Türkiye  High  Level  Dialogue  on  Migration  and  Security  and  EU-Türkiye  High  Level  Dialogue on  Agriculture took 
place in November 2023 in Brussels; EU-Türkiye High Level Dialogue on Health and EU-Türkiye High Level Dialogue on 
Science,  Research,  Technology  and  Innovation  took  place  in  April  2024  in  Ankara;  EU-Türkiye  High  Level  Dialogue  on 
Trade took place in July 2024 in Brussels. 

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1.2. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE REPORT5 

CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS 

Democracy 

Despite certain shortcomings observed in the electoral campaign, local elections in Türkiye in March 
2024 were well organised overall and respected the will of the people. 

The  presidential  system  has  largely  weakened  the  Turkish  Parliament’s  legislative  and  oversight 
functions. It lacks the tools needed to hold the government to account. 

The institutions in charge of the  integration process are in place. The main responsible body is the 
Directorate for EU Affairs, under the responsibility of a Deputy Minister. 

The  presidential  system  continues  to  be  characterised  by  a  lack  of  checks  and  balances.  Most 
regulatory authorities remain directly linked to the Presidency, while public administration is highly 
politicised. The government’s pressure on mayors from opposition parties continued to weaken local 
democracy. 

Civil  society  organisations  (CSOs)  in  Türkiye  operate  in  a  difficult  environment  facing    shrinking 
space to operate and multiple constraints, including continuous pressure from the authorities. Despite 
that,  civil  society  continued  to  be  vocal  and  participate  actively  in  civic  life,  making  crucial 
contributions  in  several  areas.  Mechanisms  to  ensure  that  independent  CSOs  are  consulted  on  new 
legislation and policies need to be put in place. 

Public administration reform 

Türkiye  is  between  having  some  level  of  preparation  and  a  moderate  level  of  preparation  and 
made no progress in the reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were  not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  prepare  and  adopt  an  overarching  strategy  for  public  administration  and  public  financial 

management reform in line with the EU principles and after extensive consultations; 

→  introduce merit-based recruitment, appointments and promotions, notably to senior positions; 

→  review the policymaking process to achieve inclusive and evidence-based methods of preparing 

policy planning documents and legislative proposals. 

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

Türkiye  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  the  rule  of  law  and  fundamental 
rights.  No  progress  was  made  on  key  issues  identified  in  previous  reports  and  serious  concerns 
remain. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Türkiye  remains  at  an  early  stage  of  preparation  in  this  area  and  no  progress  has  been  made. 
Despite  the  adoption  of  new  judicial  reform  packages,  the  fundamental  shortcomings  in  the 
functioning of the judiciary remained unaddressed. Türkiye continued to refuse to implement certain 
judgments  of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR).  Undue  pressure  by  the authorities on 

5  This  report  covers  the  period  from  15 June 2023  to  1 September 2024.  It  is  based  on  input  from  a  variety  of  sources, 
including contributions from the government of Türkiye, EU Member States, European Parliament reports and information 
from various international and non-governmental organisations. It also includes the results of comparative assessments and 
indices produced by other stakeholders, in particular in the area of rule of law.  
The  report  uses  the  following  assessment  scale  to  describe  the  state  of  play:  early  stage,  some  level  of  preparation, 
moderately prepared, good level of preparation and well advanced. To describe progress made during the reporting period, it 
uses the following scale: backsliding, no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and very good progress. 
Where appropriate, interim steps have also been used. 

4 

 
 
 
 
judges  and  prosecutors  continued  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  independence  and  quality  of  the 
judiciary. Serious efforts are needed to significantly improve the functioning of the country’s judicial 
system.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  create a political and legal environment in line with European standards that allows the judiciary 
to  carry  out  its  duties  independently  and  impartially,  strengthen  the  separation  of  powers,  and 
ensure that lower courts respect judgments by the Constitutional Court, whose decisions should 
abide by ECtHR jurisprudence; 

→  amend  the  structure  and  process  of  selecting  the  members  of  the  Council  of  Judges  and 
Prosecutors  (HSK)  so  that  the  role  and  influence  of  the  executive  is  limited,  and  introduce 
safeguards against any interference by the HSK or high-level officials in judicial proceedings; 

→  ensure that all judicial proceedings respect fundamental rights including in particular, the rights of 
victims  of  crime  and  the  procedural  rights  for  suspects  and  accused  persons  in  criminal 
proceedings,  duly  guarantee  the  presumption of  innocence,  the  principles  of individual  criminal 
responsibility and legal certainty, the right of defence, and the right to a fair trial. 

Fight against corruption 

Türkiye is still at an early stage of preparation in the fight against corruption and no progress has 
been  made  in  the  reporting  period.  The  country  has  not  taken  steps  to  establish  a  framework  for 
prevention and control or to set up anti-corruption bodies in accordance with the Council of Europe’s 
Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) 
recommendations, and the UN Convention against Corruption. The legal framework and institutional 
structure  require  improvement  to  limit  undue  political  influence  in  prosecuting  and  adjudicating 
corruption cases. Public institutions need to improve their accountability and transparency. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  implement its international obligations in relation to the fight against corruption, in particular the 

UN Convention against Corruption and the relevant Council of Europe Conventions; 

→  ensure effective follow-up of the recommendations issued by GRECO, including by adopting the 

necessary legislation;  

→  develop  an  anti-corruption  strategy  that  reflects  a  clear  political  will  and  vision  to  effectively 

address corruption, underpinned by a credible and realistic action plan. 

Fundamental rights 

The overall human rights situation in the country has not improved and remains an issue of concern. 
The Turkish legal framework includes general guarantees for the respect of human and fundamental 
rights,  but  the  legislation  and  its  implementation  need  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR)  and  ECtHR  case  law.  Trials  and  convictions  of  journalists, 
writers, lawyers, academics, human rights defenders and other critical voices for alleged support for 
terrorism have continued. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align its anti-terror legislation and its implementation, as well as practices against terrorism with 
the  Venice  Commission’s 

the  ECHR,  ECtHR  case 

law,  and 

European  standards, 
recommendations, and the EU acquis and practices;  

→  improve the legislative framework and its implementation in order to effectively tackle all forms 

of violence against women;  

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→  effectively tackle all forms of racism and discrimination, including against LGBTIQ persons, and 

ensure the protection of minorities;  

→  implement  the  ECtHR  judgments  as  a  matter  of  priority,  including  in  the  case  of  Kavala  vs 

Türkiye. 

Freedom of expression 

Türkiye remains at an early stage of preparation in this area and no progress was made during the 
reporting period and serious concerns remain. The implementation of criminal laws related to national 
security and counter-terrorism continued to violate the ECHR and to diverge from the case law of the 
ECtHR, hindering freedom of expression.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not implemented and remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  release journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers, writers and academics being held in pre-trial 
detention  and  ensure that the  criminal  cases  against them are concluded  in accordance  with  the 
criteria set by the ECHR and the ECtHR;  

→  revise  its  criminal  legislation,  in  particular  the  anti-terror  law,  the  Criminal  Code,  the  data 
protection  law, the  internet  law,  the  new media  law  in  relation to the  definition  of  ‘fake  news’, 
and  the  Radio and  Television  Supreme  Council  law,  to  ensure  that they comply with  European 
standards  and  are  implemented  in  a  proportionate  manner  that  does  not  curtail  freedom  of 
expression; 

→  ensure  a  safe  and  pluralist  environment  that  enables  the  media  to  carry  out  their  work 

independently and without fear of reprisals or dismissals.  

Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  justice,  freedom  and  security.  Some  progress  was 
made  in relation  to the  further  strengthening  of  the  surveillance  and  protection capacity  of  the  land 
border  with  Iran.  Türkiye  continued  to  make  significant  efforts  to  host  and  support  3.6  million 
refugees.  

Most of last year’s recommendations still need to be addressed and remain valid. In the coming year, 
Türkiye should in particular: 

→  fully implement the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016, notably resume the returns from the 
Greek  islands,  and  implement  all  the  provisions  of  the  EU-Turkey  Readmission  Agreement 
towards all EU Member States; 

→  align legislation on personal data protection with the EU acquis, facilitating the conclusion of an 

international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and Türkiye; 

→  adopt and implement a strategy and action plan on border management to improve coordination 

between border services at national and international levels. 

Fight against organised crime 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in implementing the EU acquis in this area. Limited progress 
was made overall in alignment with the acquis and practices in certain fields. Progress was made in 
addressing  the  remaining  items  of  the  Financial  Action  Task  Force’s  (FATF)  Action  Plan,  and  the 
country was removed from the FATF’s ‘grey list’.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year mostly remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye 
should in particular: 

→ continue  to  improve  the  legal  framework  and  practices  on  counterterrorism  in  line  with  the  EU 
acquis, and strengthen its  regime on anti-money laundering, terrorist financing and financing of 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in line with the recommendations of the Venice 

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Commission; 

→  conclude  an  international  agreement  with  the  EU  on  cooperation  with  Eurojust,  and  further 
increase  its  operational  willingness  to  cooperate  and  exchange  information  with  EU  law 
enforcement partners and engage in adequate judicial cooperation with EU Member States; 

→ improve its legislation on witness protection and data protection. 

ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

The existence of a functioning market economy 

Türkiye  is  well  advanced  in  establishing  a  functioning  market  economy  and  made  some  progress 
over the reporting period. 

A  welcome  shift  to  a  much  tighter  monetary  policy  stance  helped  curb  external  imbalances  and 
domestic demand moderated. Inflationary pressures and inflation declined, although it remained very 
high. Employment increased, but the labour market still faces major structural challenges. The budget 
deficit  rose  partly  due  to  post-earthquake  reconstruction  spending,  despite  some  consolidation 
measures. While still facing significant challenges, the banking sector adapted relatively smoothly to 
the changing policy environment. The authorities took steps to improve the business environment, but 
transparency and predictability remained a concern. State aid transparency and control also remained 
weak. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2023  were  not  fully  implemented,  and  therefore  remain 
valid. To improve the functioning of the market economy, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  maintain a tight monetary policy stance until the disinflation process is firmly established; 

→  use  any  revenue  overperformance  as  well  as  fiscal  buffers  on  the  expenditure  side  to  further 

reduce the budget deficit; 

→  further  improve  the  business  environment  by  reducing  state  interference  in  price-setting 
mechanisms, preventing State aid that distorts competition, and increasing State aid transparency. 

The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  and  made  limited  progress  in  its  capacity  to  cope  with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. 

The  economy  is  diversified,  with  a  well-developed  service  sector  and  strong  manufacturing  and 
agriculture sectors. Efforts to improve human capital continued, but the skills mismatch remained a 
key  concern.  Investment  activity  increased  significantly  in  2023,  with  further  steps  to  advance 
digitalisation and the greening of the economy. Economic integration with the EU remains high. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  2023  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain  valid.  To  improve  competitiveness  and  support  long-term  growth,  Türkiye  should  in 
particular: 

→  further  tailor  education  and  training  to  labour  market  needs,  improve  the  quality  and  access  to 

vocational education and training (VET) and support the school-to-work transition; 

→  continue  efforts  to  diversify  energy  supplies  and  increase  the  share  of  renewables  in  the  energy 

mix;  

→ improve SMEs’ access to long-term finance. 

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of public procurement, with significant gaps remaining 
to align with the EU acquis. It made no progress in this area over the reporting period and the lack of 
transparency and discriminatory domestic price advantages continued.  

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The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  revise  its  public  procurement  legislation  to  further  align  it  with  the  2014  Directives  on  public 
procurement,  including  utilities,  concessions  and  public-private  partnerships,  and  increase 
transparency; 

→  reduce  the  excessive  use  of  the  negotiated  procedure  that  distorts  competition  and  limits 
transparency,  and  improve  instruments  to  evaluate  contract  performance  and  benchmark 
effectiveness of public procurement procedures and contract management; 

→  repeal  exemptions  that  are  incompatible  with  the  EU  acquis  and  refrain  from  the  use  of 

discriminatory domestic price advantages and offset practices. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on statistics and made some progress in the reporting period. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  set  transparent,  professional  criteria  for  the  appointment  of  the  President  of  TurkStat  and  any 
grounds  for  dismissal,  which  cannot  compromise  TurkStat’s  professional  or  scientific 
independence; 

→ continue aligning national accounts with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010) and 

the requirements of the ESA 2010 transmission programme; 

→ improve statistics on agriculture (including preparations for the agricultural census), migration and 
asylum,  and  continue  its  work  towards  full  alignment  with  the  new  requirements  on  short-term 
business statistics. 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

Türkiye  has  a  good level of  preparation  on  financial  control.  It  made  no  progress throughout  the 
reporting period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  organise  a  new  round  of  public  expenditure  and  financial  accountability  (PEFA)  to  assess  the 
performance  of  the  current  public  finance  management,  update  the  public  internal  financial 
control  policy  paper  and  the  related  action  plan,  and  help  prepare  a  comprehensive  public 
financial management strategy;  

→ adopt a national anti-fraud strategy; 

→  review the arrangements for including municipalities and state-owned enterprises in the treasury 

single account. 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on the free movement of goods. It made some progress in 
aligning  with  the  EU  harmonised  product  acquis  and  in  resolving  barriers  likely  to  affect  the  free 
movement  of  goods  in  the  internal  market  during  the  reporting  period.  The  Commission’s 
recommendations  from  last  year  were  partially  implemented  and  remain  valid.  In  the  coming  year, 
Türkiye should in particular: 

→  continue  to  eliminate  non-tariff  barriers  to  the  free  movement  of  goods  that  are  in  breach  of 
Customs Union obligations; in particular, address priority barriers as identified in the context of 
the High Level Dialogue on Trade; 

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→  increase the coverage and effectiveness of market surveillance measures. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Preparations  in  the  area  of  the  freedom  of  movement  for  workers  are  at  an  early  stage  and  no 
progress was made during the reporting period. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  prepare  legislation  and  administrative  practices  in  view  of  joining  the  European  Employment 

Services (EURES) network. 

Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

Preparations in the area of the right of establishment and freedom to provide services are at an  early 
stage.  There  was  no  progress  in  the  reporting  period  and  substantial  efforts  are  still  required  to 
achieve alignment in this area.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align  its  national  legislation  with  the  Services  Directive  and  set  up  a  point  of  single 

contact; 

→  continue  aligning  with  the  EU  postal  acquis,  including  the  regulation  on  cross-border  parcel 

delivery services; 

→  align  its  national  legislation  with  the  EU  acquis  on  mutual  recognition  of  professional 

qualifications, including the Proportionality Test Directive. 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on free movement of capital. Overall, there was some progress in 
this area in the reporting period, notably the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. 
The country made significant progress in addressing the remaining items of the Financial Action Task 
Force’s  (FATF)  Action  Plan,  leading  to its removal from  the  FATF’s  ‘grey  list’.  While some  steps 
have been taken, limitations on foreign ownership and capital movements persist in numerous sectors. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were implemented to some extent and therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  minimise limitations on foreign ownership and capital movements; 

→  continue alignment with the EU acquis by strengthening measures to combat money laundering 
and  the  financing  of  terrorism,  ensuring  that  lawyers  are  included  as  obliged  entities,  and 
addressing the concerns raised in the relevant Constitutional Court decision of April 2024. 

Chapter 6: Company law 

Türkiye is well advanced in the area of company law. Some progress was made during the reporting 
period by adopting the corporate sustainability reporting standards and introducing the use of digital 
tools and processes in company law.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  not  fully  met  and  remain  valid.  In  the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ further align national legislation with the EU acquis on encouragement of long-term shareholder 

engagement; 

→ align national legislation with the EU acquis on cross-border conversions, mergers and divisions; 

→ put arrangements in place for company reporting, including as regards the corporate sustainability 

reporting and the disclosure of income tax information (country by country reporting). 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

Türkiye  has  a  good  level  of  preparation  in  the  area  of  intellectual  property  law.  However,  no 

9 

 
 
progress  was  made  during  the  reporting  period.  Some  legislative  discrepancies  remain,  as  well  as 
outstanding  problems  with  implementation  and  enforcement,  notably  in  relation  with  judicial 
procedures.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  improve  enforcement  measures  to  efficiently  fight  IPR  infringements,  including  online  sales  of 
counterfeit  and  pirated  goods,  improve  the  level  of  IPR  specialisation  of  judges  and  resolve 
difficulties  in  the  judicial  procedures  to  obtain  search  and  seizure  warrants  for  criminal  law 
enforcement; 

→  improve  cooperation  with  IPR  rights  holders  for  efficient  implementation  and  effective 
enforcement,  in  particular  in  cases  of  accelerated  and  simplified  destruction  procedures  by  the 
judiciary and customs authorities; 

→  ensure the collection and processing of accurate statistical data, especially on the effective judicial 
enforcement of intellectual and industrial property rights, with a view to facilitating the analysis 
of systemic IPR shortcomings. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of competition policy. It made no progress in this 
area over the reporting period and concerns remain in the area of State aid.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid.  In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  ensure the independence and functionality of the State aid institutional framework in accordance 

with the EU acquis; 

→  implement the State aid law by adopting implementing legislation without further delay; 

→  make available a transparent and up-to-date inventory of all aid schemes. 

Chapter 9: Financial services 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation in the area of financial services. It made some progress in 
the reporting period by starting to unwind the disruptive macroprudential and regulatory measures in 
the financial sector. Türkiye took some steps to provide more flexibility in the private pension system 
as well as in the capital markets. Work is ongoing to promote sustainable and digital finance. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  continue efforts to align with revised CRR/CRD and BRRD frameworks; 

→  continue  phasing  out  the  distortive  macroprudential  and  regulatory  measures  and  improve  the 

transparency of the asset quality review; 

→  continue  efforts  in  EU  acquis  alignment  related  to  capital  markets  and  financial  market 

infrastructures. 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection 

Türkiye has a good level of preparation on consumer and health protection. Limited progress was 
made  in  strengthening  its  surveillance  system  for  health  services  and  tackling  serious  cross-border 
health threats, as well as on the de-institutionalisation of mental health services.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In  the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  strengthen consumer rights  enforcement and  further  improve  coordination  and  cooperation  with 
the consumer movement and with enforcement bodies; increase awareness raising activities, take 

10 

 
 
more  measures  on  infringements  in  the  digital  environment  and  introduce  more  measures  to 
support vulnerable consumers; 

→  strengthen its primary healthcare services by providing sufficient resources for the risk assessment 

of public health emergencies and risk management at central and provincial levels; 

→  boost  its  workforce  and  administrative  capacity  to  ensure  effective  multi-sectoral  preparedness 

and response to disasters within and across the relevant sectors. 

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in this area. Limited progress was made during the reporting 
period. Concerns persist over the lack of sufficient competition, the concentration of media ownership 
and the lack of financial and administrative independence of regulatory authorities.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  the  last  few  years  were  only  partially  implemented  and 
therefore remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align  the  universal  service,  authorisation  arrangements,  market  access  and  rights  of  way  in 

electronic communications with the EU acquis; 

→  strengthen  the  independence  of  the  regulatory  authority  and  its  board  members,  and  amend  the 

Internet Law in line with the Venice Commission’s recommendations to ensure media pluralism; 

→  take steps to strengthen the public broadcaster’s independence. 

Chapter 16: Taxation 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  taxation.  It  made  no  progress  over  the  reporting 
period.  

The Commission's recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  enable the automatic exchange of tax information with all EU Member States; 

→  continue to align its legislation on VAT and excise duties, notably the range of excisable energy 

products with the EU acquis; 

→  continue  the  fight  against  the  informal  economy  and  report  on  progress  transparently  by  using 

performance indicators. 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

Türkiye has some level of preparation and made good progress on economic and monetary policy. 
A  process  of  policy  normalisation  started  under  the  new  government  after  the  parliamentary  and 
presidential  elections  in  May  2023.  The  central  bank  significantly  tightened  the  monetary  policy 
stance, reinstating the policy rate as the primary instrument of monetary policy. Decisive steps were 
also taken to simplify the prudential and regulatory measures, which helped strengthen the monetary 
transmission  mechanism.  Türkiye  also  made  improvements  to  the  excessive  deficit  procedure,  data 
availability and timeliness. 

The  Commission’  recommendations  from  last  year  were  met  to  a  large  extent.  In  the  coming  year, 
Türkiye should in particular: 

→ further strengthen the functional independence of the central bank and maintain a tight monetary 

policy stance until the disinflation process firms up; 

→  continue  to  simplify  the  macroprudential  framework  under  a  transparent  monetary  policy 

framework and more effective communication. 

11 

 
 
 
Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on social policy and employment. It made no progress over 
the  reporting  period.  The  labour  market  situation  improved,  but  concerns  remain  over  trade  union 
rights,  persistent  levels  of  informal  employment,  the  gender  gap  in  the  labour  market  and  income 
inequalities. 

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  mostly 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  remove  obstacles  that  limit  the  exercise  of  trade  union  and  collective  bargaining  rights  through 

effective use of social dialogue mechanisms; 

→  tackle emerging challenges in health and safety at work, particularly in relation to fatal incidents 

in the construction and mining sectors, as well as plastic waste recycling; 

→  increase  the  employment  rate  of  women  and  young  people  by  adopting  effective  active  labour 

market policies and expanding affordable care services. 

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

Türkiye is moderately prepared on enterprise and industrial policy. It made some progress over the 
reporting  period  by  ending  localisation  and  prioritisation  requirements  for  pharmaceuticals,  and  by 
adopting new strategy documents and impact assessments. However, concerns persist that the public 
procurement practices are incompatible with EU industrial policy principles. There are also concerns 
over the lack of transparency in State aid for large investments and the large informal economy.  

The  Commission’s  recommendations  from  last  year  were  only  partially  implemented  and  therefore 
remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→ remove public procurement price premiums that are incompatible with industrial policy principles 

and substitute them with measures that encourage innovation in an effective way;  

→  publish  the  results  of  implementation  of  the  industry  strategy  from  2019  to  2021  as  well  as  the 

amounts distributed under the industry support programme;  

→ continue assessing the impact of the SME support framework and reduce gaps and overlaps.  

Chapter 25: Science and research 

Overall,  Türkiye’s  preparation  in  the  area  of  science and  research  is  well  advanced.  Türkiye  made 
some  progress  during  the  reporting  period,  notably  linked  to  participation  in  Horizon  Europe  and 
continued  actions  to  raise  awareness  of  and  capacity  for  the  programme.  There  is  good,  active  and 
expanding cooperation between the EU and Türkiye on research and innovation.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partly met and remain largely valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  step  up  efforts  to  increase  innovation  and  remedy  the  increasing  performance  gap  between 

Türkiye and the EU in the  European Innovation Scoreboard rankings. 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of education and culture. There was limited progress on 
education, notably in the vocational education and national qualification systems. There was limited 
progress  in  the  field  of  culture.  Türkiye  recognises  the  value  of  culture  in  national  development 
policies and encourages the promotion and protection of its cultural heritage. 

The Commission’s previous recommendations were not met and therefore remain valid. In the coming 
year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further  improve  inclusive  education,  with  a  particular  focus  on  girls  and  children  from 
disadvantaged groups, and closely monitor and continue work to reduce the proportion of school 
dropouts; 

12 

 
 
→  ensure  the  proper  functioning  of  the  Turkish  Qualifications  Framework  and  Turkish  Higher 

Education Quality Council; 

→  continue  taking  steps  to  implement  the  2005  UNESCO  Convention  on  the  Protection  and 

Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 

Chapter 29: Customs Union 

Türkiye maintains a good level of preparation for the Customs Union. It made some progress in the 
reporting period. Türkiye tackled a few long-standing trade barriers, partially removing some import 
and export restrictions. Duty relief, free zones and the surveillance scheme are still not fully aligned 
with the EU acquis, and are in breach of the Customs Union provisions. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully met and therefore remain valid. In 
the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  step  up  efforts  to  fully  align  new  legislation  with  the  EU  Customs  Code  and  bring  risk-based 

controls and simplified procedures in line with the EU acquis; 

→  Strengthen  the  controls  and  cooperate  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  (OLAF)  in 
administrative  investigations  in  cases  of  transhipment  or  simple  transformation  of  goods  in  the 
country leading to the false declaration of origin of goods at import into the EU  

→  continue to eliminate import and export restrictions as well as additional duties on goods in free 

circulation in the EU-Turkey Customs Union. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY 

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  transport  policy.  Some  progress  was  made  in  the  reporting 
period as Türkiye accelerated its efforts to decarbonise the transport sector by 2053. 

However, the subsidies to the incumbent railway operator and the  lack of financial independence of 
the  transport  operator  from  infrastructure  manager  TCDD  remain  major  issues.  Adoption  of  the 
railway framework law was further delayed. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not fully met and therefore remain valid. In 
the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ consider measures for proper monitoring combined with possible feasibility schemes for the uptake 

of new and green technologies for alternative fuels in Türkiye; 

→  consider  establishing  tools  and  capacity  building  at  private  and  public  level  for  transport 

decarbonisation starting with aviation and maritime transport, and set interim targets; 

→ finalise and publish its first white paper on sustainable urban mobility planning including disaster 
aspects  as  part  of  the  evolving  Sustainable  Urban  Mobility  Plans  (SUMPs),  while  improving 
policy dialogue and increasing coordination between local and central authorities. 

Chapter 15: Energy 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in the area of energy. Limited progress was made, with the roll-out 
of  renewable  energy  deployment  and  the  adoption  of  the  National  Energy  Efficiency  Strategy  and 
Roadmap. Nonetheless, local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector remained 
in  place.  Türkiye’s  legislative  changes  related  to  the  natural  gas  market  do  not  yet  ensure 
compatibility with the EU’s third energy package. Overall, energy dependence on Russia continued. 
Türkiye continued to make efforts on the legislative alignment of nuclear safety regulations. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were only partially implemented. In the coming 
year, Türkiye should in particular: 

13 

 
 
 
→  deepen  natural  gas  market  reform  by  setting  up  a  legally  binding  plan  and  timetable  for 
unbundling activities and updating the natural gas market law to ensure it is compatible with the 
EU’s third energy package; 

→  complete the legislative alignment of nuclear safety and stress tests on the Akkuyu nuclear power 

plant; 

→  discontinue local content requirement practices in the renewable energy sector, as such practices 

contradict WTO and EU-Turkey Customs Union rules. 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

Türkiye is well advanced on trans-European networks. It made limited progress during the reporting 
period. On transport networks, construction of the Halkali-Kapikule railway advanced.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should 
in particular: 

→  establish a transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory gas transit regime in line with the 

EU acquis; 

→  take concrete steps to prepare the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge railway connections;  

→  accelerate action to align with key pieces of the EU acquis to facilitate alignment in the TEN-T 

networks. 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

Türkiye has some level of preparation and made limited progress over the reporting period in this 
area.  In  the  area  of  environment,  Türkiye  took  some  steps  on  water  quality.  On  climate  change, 
Türkiye adopted both the renewed Climate Change Mitigation Strategy and Action Plan (2024-2030) 
and the renewed Climate Change Adaptation Strategy.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→ ensure that environmental standards are met when building back better in the earthquake-affected 
areas,  notably  through  full  implementation  of  the  Environmental  Impact  Assessment  Directive 
and other horizontal environmental legislation; 

→    complete  alignment  with  the  directives  on  industrial  pollution,  water  and  waste  as  well  as  on 
nature  protection  and  air  quality,  while  ensuring  that  protection  from  exposure  to  asbestos  in 
earthquake-affected areas is duly implemented; 

→ complete its alignment with the EU acquis on climate action, notably but not limited to emissions 
trading,  and  finalise  the  pending  contributions  required  under  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate 
change.  

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

Türkiye has some level of preparation on agriculture and rural development. Limited progress was 
made.  Türkiye’s  agricultural  support  policy  continued  to  move  away from  the principles  of  the  EU 
common  agricultural  policy.  Good  progress  was  made  on  the  implementation  of  IPARD,  with  its 
coverage extended to the whole country and a significant absorption of funds.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented. In the coming year, 
Türkiye should in particular: 

→  align legislation to the EU acquis notably on the agricultural support policy with the EU acquis;  

→  set up a farmer sustainability data network (FSDN) and the integrated administration and control 

14 

 
 
 
system (IACS); 

→  pursue the opening and transparent management of import quotas for beef and live bovine animals 

on a lasting basis. 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy. 
Overall, it achieved no progress in this area over the reporting period. On food safety, it has yet to 
upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards. Full implementation of the EU acquis in this area 
requires significant work. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid.  In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  upgrade food establishments to meet EU standards, notably for raw milk; 

→  meet EU maximum limits for pesticide residues, and effectively address recurrent shortcomings; 

→   integrate the EU’s One Health approach into the zoonosis control system. 

Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture 

Türkiye is moderately prepared in this area. It made some progress on resources conservation and 
fleet management by improving the legislative framework. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were partially implemented and therefore remain 
valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  step  up  efforts  to  align  fisheries  management  with  EU  law,  notably  data  collection  and  data 

sharing for scientific advice in support of sustainable fisheries management; 

→  step up efforts to align its market policy with EU rules, in particular on the criteria governing the 

recognition and roles of professional organisations; 

→  continue improving fisheries control and inspection at sea in line with the revised EU standards to 
ensure  a  good  level  of    compliance  in  the  Mediterranean  Sea,  and  make  a  significant  effort  to 
improve  and  address  the  fight  against  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  fishing  activities, 
including catch documentation schemes. 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  in  the  area  of  regional  policy  and  the  coordination  of  structural 
instruments. There was some progress in programming and financial management. 

The Commission’s recommendations from last year remain valid. In the coming year, Türkiye should 
in particular: 

→  address structural weaknesses in regional policy implementation; 

→  improve monitoring of the ongoing operations under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 

(IPA II) and accelerate programming under IPA III; 

→  ensure the proper functioning of local democracy and more balanced regional development. 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

Türkiye has some level of preparation in the area of financial and budgetary provisions. It made no 
progress over the reporting period.  

The  Commission’s  recommendation  from  last  year was  not met and  therefore  remains  valid.  In  the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  further align the gross national income inventory with Eurostat’s GNI Inventory Guide. 

15 

 
 
CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS 

Chapter 30: External relations 

Türkiye  is  moderately  prepared  on  external  relations.  It  made  some  progress  over  the  reporting 
period.  

The Commission’s recommendations from last year were not met and therefore remain valid. In the 
coming year, Türkiye should in particular: 

→  fully realign the customs tariff with the Common Customs Tariff; 

→  complete  the  alignment  with  the  EU’s  Generalised  Scheme  of  Preferences  and  dual-use  export 

control regime; 

→  address priority barriers to trade, as identified in the context of the High-Level Dialogue on Trade. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Türkiye  has  some  level  of  preparation  in  the  area of  common  foreign  security  and  defence  policy 
(CFSP),  and made  no  progress  overall in the reporting  period.  Türkiye  is  an active  and  significant 
player  in  the  area  of  foreign  policy,  which  constitutes  a  pivotal  aspect  of  EU-Türkiye  relations. 
However, its foreign policy remained at odds with the EU’s priorities under the CFSP, notably due to 
the lack of alignment with EU sanctions against Russia and the labelling of Hamas, listed as a terrorist 
organisation by the EU. Under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), Türkiye continued to 
actively participate and substantially contribute to EU crisis management missions and operations.  

Türkiye’s foreign policy continued its ‘360-degree’ strategic outlook, without major shifting but with 
an  updated  vision.  While  claiming  that  it  remains  committed  to  EU  membership.    Türkiye  has 
embarked  on  a  comprehensive  vision  in  the  diplomatic,  economic,  security  and  defense  spheres, 
diversifying partnerships and asserting its strategic autonomy.  

Türkiye  intensified  relations  with  countries  in  Africa,  Asia,  the  Gulf  and  Latin  America,  while 
increasing  its  regional  normalisation  efforts  with  the  Arab  states  and  Armenia.  On  Russia’s  war  of 
aggression against Ukraine, Türkiye supported the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and 
engaged  politically,  economically  and  diplomatically  with  both  Russia  and  Ukraine.  Nevertheless, 
Türkiye  continued  to  refrain  from  aligning  with  the  EU’s  restrictive  measures  against  Russia,  and 
significantly intensified its trade, economic and energy ties with Russia. EU-Türkiye cooperation on 
countering the circumvention of sanctions against Russia via Turkish territory continued, delivering 
some results. 

Following the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, Türkiye did not condemn the 
terrorist  attack  and took  a stance  in support  of  Hamas,  which  is  in complete  disagreement  with the 
EU’s position. On the Middle East Peace Process, Türkiye aligns with the EU’s position on the need 
to relaunch the political process in order to implement the two-state solution.  

The recommendations from last year were only partially implemented and therefore remain valid. In 
the coming year, Türkiye should in particular:  

→  significantly  improve  alignment  with the  High  Representative’s statements on  behalf  of  the  EU 

and relevant Council decisions on CFSP;  

→  increase  its  efforts  on  preventing  and  detecting  the  circumvention  of  restrictive  measures,  in 

particular on advanced technology items used for military purposes by Russia; 

→  constructively engage in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign and security 
policy  with  the  EU  and  seek  collaboration  on  convergent  interests  while  working  on  reducing 
divergences. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 

17 

 
 
 
 
2. CLUSTER 1: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE ACCESSION PROCESS 

2.1. FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM  

2.1.1 Democracy 

The  functioning  of  democratic  institutions  in  Türkiye  continued  to  be  severely  hampered.  The 
structural shortcomings of the presidential system remained unaddressed.  

Elections 

According to the final electoral observation report of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities 
of the Council of Europe, the local elections held in March 2024 were well organised overall. Voters 
were  able  to  choose  between  many  alternative  options,  with  a  high  turnout  showing  the  strong 
commitment  of  citizens  to  democratic  processes,  but  certain  shortcomings  persisted.  The  elections 
took place in a starkly polarised environment and were only partially conducive to local democracy. 
The  logistical  organisation  made  it  possible  to  handle  the  large  number  of  voters  smoothly.  The 
election results showed that an alternation in power between political parties is possible through the 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  people  and  their  commitment  to  local  representative  democracy.  The 
public broadcast media did not meet its legal obligation to provide impartial coverage of the campaign 
and equal opportunities for all political parties. The turnout reached 78.11%, down by 6.56 percentage 
points  from  the  participation  rate  in  the  2019  local  elections.  The  main  opposition,  the  Republican 
People’s Party (CHP), won in terms of both the national vote share and the number of mayoral seats, 
while the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) came second. In June 2024, the mayor of 
the  Hakkari  province  was  dismissed  after  he  was  detained  by  police.  The  local  governor  was 
appointed  as  a  trustee  in  his  place.  The  practice  of  displacing  mayors  remains  a  source  of  serious 
concern as it undermines local democracy and denies voters their preferred representation. 

Parliament 

The  President’s  extensive powers  span  a  broad  spectrum  of  policy  areas,  which  limits  Parliament’s 
functions.  The  legislative  function  of  Parliament  was  curtailed  by  the  extensive  use  of  presidential 
decrees  and  decisions.  Opposition  parties  had  a  very  limited  ability  to  influence  the  agenda  of  the 
parliamentary debates.  

Parliamentary oversight of the executive remained very weak. Members of Parliament can submit 
written inquiries to the Vice-President and Ministers, but not to the President. Ordinary presidential 
decrees are not subject to parliamentary review. The supervision of public expenditures by Parliament 
must  be  strengthened  substantially,  as  recommended  by  the  European  Commission  for  Democracy 
through Law (Venice Commission).  

Political pluralism continued to be undermined by the judiciary’s targeting of opposition parties and 
Members  of  Parliament.  Approximately  8 000  People’s  Democratic  Party  (HDP)  members  and 
officials are currently imprisoned. In January 2024, the Court of Cassation defied two Constitutional 
Court rulings to release one of the detained defendants in the Gezi trial, who had been elected as a 
Member of Parliament. In May 2024, several former HDP legislators and two former co-chairs of the 
party  were  sentenced to  long  prison terms despite  a ECtHR  ruling for their immediate  release.  The 
HDP’s  closure  case  on  terrorism  charges,  including  the  banning  from  political  life  of  451  HDP 
members, remains pending before the Constitutional Court. 

The  legal  framework  for  elections  and  political  parties  remains  problematic.  Türkiye  has  yet  to 
implement the recommendations of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
and those of the Venice Commission.  

18 

 
 
politics 

The  level  of  participation 
in  decision-
of  women 
making, 
and 
employment 
improved, 
although  it  still  remained 
low. The March 2024 local 
saw 
elections 
a  90% 
increase 
in  women’s 
representation compared to 
in  2019. 
local  elections 
women’s 
The 
representation 
in 
Parliament is  at  its  highest 
ever,  but  women  are  still 
under-represented. 

EU integration 

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

Graph 1: Türkiye - Women in political life

1407

600

19,67

118

11,8

2

17

14,30

2

14

5,33

75

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Number of MPs

Number of
ministers

Number of party
leaders*

Mayors**

Women

Total

%

*Parliamentary represented
**Provincial and district 

Source: Grand National Assembly of Turkey,
2024 Local Administrations Elections data

Having  opened  accession 
negotiations  almost  20  years  ago,  Türkiye  established  the  structures  necessary  for  managing  the 
accession  process.  The  Directorate for  EU  Affairs and  its  correspondents in line ministries  are  well 
staffed. The national plan for the adoption of the EU acquis is being updated for 2024-2028 and also 
in line with Türkiye’s 12th Development Plan. The Directorate for EU Affairs has a Communication 
Department, which ensures nationwide communication on EU enlargement and EU-funded projects; it 
cooperates effectively with the EU Delegation. 

Governance 

The presidential system in place does not allow for the use of traditional instruments of oversight of 
the  executive  by  Parliament,  such  as  a  vote  of  confidence  and  the  ability  to  ask  the  executive  oral 
questions.  The  political  accountability  of  the  President  is  linked  to  elections.  Public  administration, 
courts and security forces are under the heavy influence of the executive. The President has the power 
to appoint the heads and board members of the vast majority of key institutions and regulatory bodies. 
The public sector remained politicised. In June 2024, the Constitutional Court struck down provisions 
in a decree law and required that the powers of the President to appoint university rectors and replace 
the Governor of the Central Bank, before the end of his term of office, be established by law. It gave 
Parliament 1 year to legislate on the matter. The recommendations of the 2017 Venice Commission’s 
opinion on the presidential system in Türkiye remain unaddressed.   

On  local  self-governance,  the  government  maintained  pressure  on  opposition  mayors,  including 
through administrative and judicial means. The cases against the Mayor of  Istanbul remain pending. 
Citizens’  assemblies,  which  seek  to  bring  together  local  stakeholders,  remained  inactive  in  most 
provinces. 

Civil society 

CSOs,  especially  those  dealing  with  women,  LGBTIQ  persons  and  human  rights,  face  pressure, 
including with the systematic use of judicial cases, also due to Türkiye’s broad definition of terrorism. 
Human rights defender Osman Kavala and his four co-defendants in the Gezi trial remained in prison, 
despite a ruling by the ECtHR for his immediate release.  In January  2024, the Constitutional Court 
annulled  the  authority  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  to  appoint  trustees  to  associations  and  to  suspend 
their  activities  within  the  law  on  preventing  the  financing  of  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction.  

Only  a  very  limited  number  of  CSOs  benefit  from  public  funds,  which  are  not  distributed  in  a 
transparent  manner.  Heavy  taxation  hampers  the  functioning  and  development  of  foundations  and 
associations. Stigmatisation, hate speech and discriminatory treatment against LGBTIQ persons and 
women’s rights remained very strong. CSOs receiving foreign funds have been subjected to frequent 
audits.  

19 

 
 
Mechanisms to ensure that independent CSOs are consulted on new legislation and policies need to be 
put in place. Overall, the political, legal, financial and administrative impediments that prevent civil 
society in Türkiye from operating effectively should be removed. 

Civilian oversight of the security forces 

The  executive  branch  maintained  significant  control  over  the  security  forces.  However,  civilian 
oversight of the security forces remained incomplete and lacked effective accountability mechanisms. 
Strengthening  the  parliamentary  oversight  of  security  institutions  remains  necessary.  A  culture  of 
impunity  persists  in  the  security  and  intelligence  sectors,  where  personnel  benefited  from  de  facto 
judicial  and  administrative  protection  in  cases  involving  alleged  human  rights  violations  and  the 
disproportionate  use  of  force.  Overall,  effective  civilian  oversight  of  the  security  forces  remains 
incomplete.   

Situation in the east and south-east regions 

The  south-east  region  remained  a  concern  due  to  the  lingering  effects  of  the  February  2023 
earthquakes. Türkiye continued domestic and cross-border military operations in northern Syria and 
Iraq against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist group by the EU. The 
security situation in border areas remained precarious with persistent PKK-led terrorist attacks. While 
the  government  has  the right  and  responsibility  to combat  terrorism,  it should  adhere to  the  rule  of 
law,  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms.  No  progress  was  made  toward  resuming  a  credible 
peace process for the Kurdish issue.  

Violations of human rights by security forces continued to be reported. Hate crimes and hate speech 
against Kurds continued. No judicial or administrative remedies were adopted in relation to property 
rights  cases  in  Diyarbakır’s  Sur  district.  In  March  2024,  Kurdish  Newroz  celebrations  took  place 
peacefully,  despite  heavy  police  presence.  Eastern  and  south-eastern  provincial  governors  imposed 
arbitrary  blanket  bans  on  meetings  and  events,  including  before  the  March  2024  local  elections.  A 
broad  interpretation  of  terrorism  and  judicial  and  administrative  pressure  on  journalists,  political 
opponents,  bar  associations  and  human  rights  defenders  working  on  the  Kurdish  issue  continued  to 
raise concerns. Kurdish-language media outlets and cultural rights institutions have remained closed 
since 2016.  

In  the  Kobane  trial,  in  May  2024  the  court  sentenced  24  Kurdish  politicians  from  the  former  pro-
Kurdish HDP party to prison terms on alleged charges of crimes against the State. In a separate trial, 
the  closure  case  against  the  HDP  continued  at  the  Constitutional  Court.  Former  HDP  co-chair 
Selahattin Demirtaş remained in prison despite two ECtHR rulings calling for his immediate release. 
In June 2024, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe urged the Turkish authorities to 
take all necessary measures to secure his immediate release. Many new detentions of members of the 
Peoples’  Equality  and  Democracy  Party  (DEM  Party),  mayors  and  other  DEM  representatives  on 
terrorism-related charges were reported. In the case related to the 2015 killing of then Diyarbakir Bar 
Association Chair Tahir Elci, the Court acquitted in June 2024 all three police defendants due to lack 
of evidence.  

During  the  March  2024  local  elections,  there  were  allegations  of  security  forces  being  deployed 
strategically  in  the  south-east  region  to  influence  voting  outcomes.  In  Van,  the  Supreme  Electoral 
Board  reinstated  the  elected  mayor  from  the  DEM  party  after  the  provincial  Electoral  Board 
disqualified  him.  The  mayors  ousted  and  replaced  by  state-appointed  trustees  in  the  last  two  local 
elections  remained  either  imprisoned  or  abroad.  The  March  2022  Recommendations  on  Türkiye  by 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe are yet to be implemented. 

Court  cases  continued  over  government-funded  construction  projects  on  cultural,  historical  and 
religious heritage sites damaged during the 2015 and 2016 military and security operations. There was 
no comprehensive approach for addressing missing persons, exhuming mass graves or independently 
investigating  alleged  extrajudicial  killings  by  security  forces.  Nearly  all  court  cases  of  enforced 
disappearances  from  the  1990s  have  been  dropped  due  to  the  statute  of  limitations,  with  only  two 
remaining active. 

20 

 
 
Concerns  remained  about  forced  returns  under  the  pretext  of  combating  terrorism  and  protecting 
national  security.  The  village  guard  system,  a  paramilitary  force  supporting  the  Turkish  security 
forces, continued to hinder the return of displaced villagers and represents an impediment towards a 
political resolution of the Kurdish issue. Some village guards were linked to human rights violations 
and excessive use of force against the Kurdish population.  

Refugees and internally displaced persons 

Graph TR 1 - Syrians in Türkiye*

Türkiye continues to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world. As of September 2024, 
according  to  official  data 
Türkiye  was 
hosting 
3 093 909  Syrian  refugees 
with  temporary  protection 
status,  and  some  54  751 
Syrians  with  short-term 
residence  status.  Around 
1.7  million  of  these  were 
being  hosted  in  the  11 
provinces  affected  by  the 
earthquakes. 

4500,0
4000,0
3500,0
3000,0
2500,0
2000,0
1500,0
1000,0
500,0
0,0

4035,2

3737,3

3860,8

3535,8

3531,1

3214,7

193,2

104,5

101,0

223,8

238,0

78,3

59,0

51,8

83,2

to 

Total

Residence
status

Temporary
protection
status

official 
According 
fewer  Syrians 
sources, 
received 
Turkish 
citizenship in 2023 than in 
2022,  while  the  pace  of 
voluntary returns of Syrian 
refugees accelerated. As of 
December  2023,  according  to  the  Presidency  for  Migration  Management,  in  addition  to  the  Syrian 
refugees,  Türkiye  hosted  262 638  asylum  seekers  from  other  countries.  Additionally,  there  were 
1 113 761  foreign  nationals  holding  residence  permits  in  Türkiye,  including  humanitarian  residence 
permit holders. 

*Data is expressed in thousands
For voluntary returns, the data cover 
2021 - cumulative until Nov 2021 
2022 - Nov 2021 - Sep 2022
2023 - Sep 2022 - Dec 2023

Syrians
refugees
which have
voluntarily
returned from
Türkiye

Syrians having
been granted
Turkish
citizenship

Source: Ministry of Interior

2021

2022

2023

885630

813590

909779

800000

600000

1000000

Graph TR2 - Support to refugees - schooling

Türkiye  made  significant  efforts  to 
support  refugees  and  ensure  wider 
access  to  healthcare  and  schooling, 
although  restrictions  to  registration 
hampered  access.  Refugees  (mainly 
Syrians  under  temporary  protection) 
continued  to  benefit  from  free-of-
charge healthcare services provided in 
179  migrant  health  centres,  14 
container  health  units  and  in  Turkish 
hospitals.  The  capacity  of  mental 
health 
support 
and  psychosocial 
services,  reproductive  health  services, 
mobile  health  services  and  health 
literacy 
improved. 
Furthermore,  the  health  infrastructure 
was  improved  by  the  completion  of  two  new  state  hospitals  in  Dörtyol  Hatay  and  Kilis  during  the 
reporting period. Effective access of refugees and asylum seekers to the labour market, in particular to 
formal employment, remained difficult. 

Refugees children not
enrolled in formal
education

Refugees children enrolled
in formal education

Source: Ministry of national education 

refugees 

200000

400000

447107

452276

405544

for 

2021

2022

2023

0

The  return  of  irregular  migrants  from  the  Greek  islands  has  not  resumed.  The  EU  has  repeatedly 
called on Türkiye to resume return operations in line with the commitments made under the 2016 EU-
Turkey Statement. Resettlement of Syrian refugees from Türkiye to EU Member States continued in 
the reporting period, totalling 43 019 by 31 August 2024. 

21 

 
 
There was no progress on the situation of internally displaced persons resulting from violence in the 
south-east region in the 1990s and in more recent years. Populations displaced after the February 2023 
earthquakes continue to face challenges. 

2.1.2. Public administration reform 

Strategic framework for public administration reform 

The strategic framework for public administration is not in place.  Türkiye still lacks an overarching 
strategy for public administration and public financial management reform. Management of public 
administration  remained  decentralised,  and  cooperation  between  key  stakeholders  at  administrative 
and  political  level  remained  insufficient.  The  absence  of  political  support  and  ownership  for 
reforming public administration continues. 

During  the  reporting  period,  the  government  published  the  Medium-Term  Economic  Programme 
(2024-2026) and the 12th Development Plan (2024–2028). The programme provides a link between 
sectoral  policy  priorities  and  government  priorities.  Sectoral  costs  are  also  reflected  in  the 
programme’s budgetary framework. 

At policy level, the Interministerial Economic Coordination Council monitors the implementation of 
public finance management plans as well as key sectoral policy planning documents and legislation. 
However,  there  is  no  effective  performance  measurement  and  monitoring  system  based  on 
performance indicators linked to specific targets. The representation of women in senior positions in 
public administration remained low. 

Policy development and coordination 

Policy development and coordination need to be improved. The centralisation of policymaking under 
the  presidential  system  continued,  further  preventing  an  inclusive,  participatory  and  evidence-based 
policymaking system. There are no detailed rules of procedure to regulate the policy preparation and 
decision-making processes within the Presidency.  

Evidence-based  policymaking  and  public  consultations  were  not  systematically  used  during  the 
reporting period. Administrative and political accountability needs to be improved. The link between 
policymaking  and  financial  planning  remains  weak.  Türkiye’s  state  institutions  do  not  carry  out 
systematic  ex  post  monitoring  and  public  reporting  on  the  implementation  of  key  government 
programmes. As a result, public scrutiny of the government’s work remains very limited. 

Public financial management 

Public financial management  is broadly in place but needs to be improved.  Despite the adoption of 
several  planning  and  sectoral  policy  documents  to  address  various  aspects  of  public  financial 
management,  these  documents  do  not  provide  for  a  strategic  and  broad  public  administration  and 
public financial management reform.  

The Medium-Term Economic Programme, which is presented by the government as the main central 
planning  document,  aims  to  demonstrate  the  government’s  commitment  to  sound  public  finance 
management.  The  annual  budget  is  prepared  within  the  medium-term  budgetary  framework.  The 
Presidency and the Ministry of Treasury and Finance published monthly budget outturns during the 
reporting period. A gender-responsive planning and budgeting policy still needs to be established. 

Annual  budget  figures  are  still  aggregated,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  analyse  the  budget  reports. 
Public  participation  in  the  budgetary  process  remains  low,  and  parliamentary  oversight  remains 
limited. 

On  public  procurement,  the  legislation  is  still  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  on  a  number  of 
important  aspects.  In  particular,  large  infrastructure  projects  implemented  through  public-private 
partnerships are often exempted from procurement rules. In the absence of public procurement rules 
and effective ex post monitoring, large public investment programmes lack transparency. 

On external audits, the ex post controls of the Turkish Court of Accounts (TCA) continued to form the 
basis of parliamentary oversight of the budget. As in previous years, the TCA submitted a number of 

22 

 
 
audit  reports  on  public  institutions  to  Parliament.  These  reports  were  factual  and  timely.  They 
provided  substantial  information  on  the  budgetary  expenditure  of  public  administrations.  The 
TCA’s audit findings on the misuse of public funds have also been reported in the media. However, 
Parliament does not engage in a full and comprehensive debate on the individual reports of the TCA. 
Shortcomings remained in the reporting and parliamentary and judicial follow-up of the TCA’s audits. 
Limited parliamentary oversight of the budget led to reduced budget transparency. The Turkish State 
Wealth  Fund  continued  to  lack  accountability  and  transparency.  The  budget  does  not  provide  an 
overview of the fund’s investments and borrowings. 

Public service and human resources management 

Public  service  and  human  resources  management  is  insufficient.  The  legal  framework  for  the  civil 
service  does  not  guarantee  neutrality,  continuity  or  merit-based  recruitment  and  promotion 
procedures,  which  impedes  efficient  public  services.  The  recruitment  procedure  for  senior  civil 
service posts lacks objective criteria, leaving appointments open to nepotism. Politicisation of the civil 
service continued.  

As of March 2024, the total number of public employees is 5 238 424, 16.4% of total employment. 
The proportion of women in public employment is only 35%. 

Accountability of administration 

The accountability of administration is insufficient.  

All crucial functions of central government are delegated to institutions and ministries affiliated with 
the  Presidency,  and  accountability  is  held  by  the  President.  Parliamentary  scrutiny  mechanisms  are 
weak, while oversight institutions like the Ombudsman have a limited role. 

Internal control and audit systems lack functional autonomy, independence and efficiency. There is a 
need  to  improve  the  public’s  right  to  good  administration  through  more  effective  internal  and 
external oversight arrangements. 

Accountability of civil servants in relation to the damage caused by the earthquakes in the 11 affected 
provinces remained very low. Any prosecution of civil servants for negligent or criminal behaviour 
needs to be approved by the Ministry of Interior. Authorisation often slowed down individual cases, 
and in a number of cases the Ministry refused to authorise any further investigation of civil servants 
by prosecutors.  

The  broad  scope  of  exemptions  in  the  rules  governing  access  to  information,  coupled  with  the 
absence of mechanisms for centrally coordinated proactive disclosure of public information, obstruct 
the implementation of the right to information. 

Service delivery to citizens and businesses 

The  service  delivery  to  citizens  and  businesses  needs  to  be  improved.  Public  services  are  widely 
accessible. Türkiye lacks a law on general administrative procedures, making it difficult to ensure that 
principles  of  good  administration  are  upheld.  There is  no central policy  or  coordination mechanism 
for improving the overall quality of public services. The country has made strides in developing and 
providing new e-services through the e-Government Gateway. 

2.2.1 Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights 

The  EU’s  founding  values  include  the  rule  of  law  and  respect  for  human  rights.  An  effective 
(independent, high-quality and efficient) judicial system and an effective fight against corruption are 
of paramount importance, as is respect of fundamental rights in law and in practice. 

Functioning of the judiciary 

Strategic documents 

Strategic  documents  are  in  place  but  are  not  sufficient  to  address  the  significant  shortcomings.  The 
2019-2023 Judicial Reform Strategy and the 2021 Human Rights Action Plan do not fully address the 
serious  shortcomings  of  Türkiye’s  judiciary  or  human  rights  situation,  as  highlighted  in  previous 

23 

 
 
reports.  The  8th  Judicial  Reform  Package  was  adopted  in  March  2024,  but  does  not  address  the 
structural  shortcomings  of  the  judiciary  system  adequately.  Implementation  of  strategic  documents 
needs to be improved across the board. 

Management bodies 

Management bodies are in place, but the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors lacks independence 
from the executive. The process for appointing its members remained under the strong influence of 
the executive.  

Independence and impartiality 

1

0

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2022

2023

2022

and 

related 

shortcomings 

to 
impartiality  of 

Graph 2: Türkiye - Requests for protection 
from undue influence

the 
The 
independence 
the 
judiciary  were  not  addressed.  The  principle 
of  separation  of  powers  and 
judicial 
independence is enshrined in the Constitution 
legislative  provisions,  but 
and  other 
increased.  Statements  from 
politicisation 
high-level  government  officials  on  ongoing 
cases,  public  attacks  against  defendants  and 
undue  pressure  on  judges  and  prosecutors 
prevent  members  of  the  judiciary  from 
carrying  out  their  duties  in  accordance  with 
EU  standards.  In  many  instances,  lower 
courts ignored or delayed the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s rulings. In October 2023, 
the Constitutional Court ruled in the Member of Parliament Atalay case that the right to vote and be 
elected  and  the  right  to  personal  security  and  liberty  had  been  violated.  However,  the  lower  court 
decided not to implement the decision, sending it instead to the Court of Cassation, which requested 
Parliament to strip Mr Atalay of his immunity and filed a criminal complaint against those members 
of the Constitutional Court who voted for Atalay’s release from jail.  

Requests received
Outcome of decisions Validation
Outcome of decisions Rejection
Outcome of decisions Pending

Institution X

Institution Y

n/a: not available

2023

The  selection,  recruitment  and  promotion  system  of  judges  and  prosecutors  is  not  transparent.  The 
Ministry  of  Justice  supervises  the  selection  boards  for  new  judges  and  prosecutors.  The  annual 
evaluation of judges and prosecutors is carried out by the HSK, none of the members of which are 
appointed by peer judges. No reforms have been undertaken to provide effective guarantees against 
the transfer of judges without their consent.   

Accountability  

The accountability of the judiciary needs to be improved. 
The  obligation  for  judges  and  prosecutors  to  declare 
their  assets  every  5  years  remained  in  force,  but  no 
information is available on whether sanctions have been 
imposed  for  failure  to  comply  with  this  procedure. 
Allegations of corruption in the judiciary emerged in the 
media during the reporting period, but no information is 
the 
the  allegations. 
investigation  of 
available  on 
judicial 
of 
Supervision 
services 
public 
and 
prosecutors  is  carried  by  the 
Ministry  of  Justice  through 
judiciary 
and 
internal auditors.  

inspectors 

Quality of justice 

Graph 3: Türkiye - Disciplinary 
procedures outcome of decisions -
2023

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Judges

Prosecutors

1

0

Initiated
Completed
Sanctions pronounced

n/a: not available

quality 

The 
decisions 

and 

of 

judicial 
indictments 

24 

 
 
remains  inadequate  due  to  a  lack  of  legal  reasoning  and  sufficient  factual  evidence  to  lead  to 
convictions. Access to case files for defence lawyers in political criminal cases remains problematic – 
frequent  use  of  the  confidentiality  of  decisions  in  political  cases  restricts  lawyers’  access  to  their 
clients’  files,  violating  the  right  of  defence  and  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  Concerns  remain  about  the 
independence  of  the  Judicial  Academy,  which  provides  pre-service  and  in-service  training  for 
candidate judges and prosecutors. Its management is entrusted to its President, who is appointed by 
the President of the Republic.  

In  terrorism-related  cases,  the  practice  of  presenting  evidence  obtained  from  secret  witnesses  who 
cannot  be  cross-examined,  or  from  a  single 
witness without corroborating evidence, remained 
a  concern  given  its  clear  interference  with  the 
right to a fair trial. These practices are not in line 
with ECtHR jurisprudence.  

In  September  2023,  the  ECtHR  Grand  Chamber 
ruled  in  the  case  of  Yüksel  Yalçınkaya  that  the 
applicant’s right to a fair trial, the principle of no 
crime or punishment without law, and the right to 
freedom  of  assembly  and  association  had  been 
violated.  The  court  also  found  that  violations  of 
applicants’  rights  were  systemic  in  Türkiye  and 
called  on  the  government  to  take  measures  to 

remedy the situation. There were no cases opened for retrial following the ruling.  

The non-implementation of the administrative courts’ decisions by the administration and the issuing 
of a new administration decision also remains an issue of concern. 

The budget for the justice system in 2024 increased to TRY 207 billion, up from TRY 42.2 billion in 
2023.  

Efficiency 

The efficiency of the judiciary system needs to be improved. The backlog of cases remains a problem. 
The number of hearings that have to be held due to a lack of information in the indictment contributes 
to the prolongation of cases, as does the frequent transfer of judges and prosecutors. 

Graph 6.1: Türkiye - Efficiency of courts 
(%) 

Graph 6.2: Türkiye - Efficiency of 
courts (days) 

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

9,7

9,7

7,2

7,2

5,3

5,3

0,4

0,5

500

400

300

200

100

0

408

372

278

264

239

223

265

264

1st instance

2nd
instance

1st instance

2nd
instance

1st
instance

2nd
instance

1st
instance

2nd
instance

Criminal cases

Non-criminal cases*

Criminal cases

Non-criminal cases*

Clearance rate in 2022 %
Clearance rate in 2023 %

Disposition time 2022 (days)
Disposition time 2023 (days)

*Civil cases

Source: Ministry of Justice (website)

*Civil cases

Source: Ministry of Justice (website)

Fight against corruption 

Track record 

25 

 
 
       
 
The  track  record  of  investigations,  prosecutions  and  convictions  in  corruption  cases  needs  to  be 
improved.  There  is  insufficient  collaboration  between  audit  and  inspection  units  and  prosecution 
offices. The prosecution has remained passive in pursuing the findings of public inspection bodies on 
alleged wrongdoings. The frequent exemptions in procurement procedures undermine the integrity of 
public  procurement.  Additionally,  political  party  financing,  judiciary  and  public  administration, 
municipalities, land administration, zoning and construction remain prone to corruption.  

Institutional framework 

Türkiye continued to lack a permanent, functionally independent anti-corruption prevention body. The 
level  of  coordination  between  various  preventive  bodies remains inadequate.  The  State  Supervisory 
Council,  responsible  for  leading  anti-corruption  efforts,  does  not  operate  as  an  independent  anti-
corruption agency as it lacks functional independence. The legal framework for combating corruption 
in the private sector remains weak. There is a lack of regular awareness campaigns on transparency 
and the fight against corruption. 

There  are  no  specialised  law  enforcement  authorities,  prosecution  services  and  courts  specifically 
dedicated  to  the  fight  against  corruption.  The  executive  retained  undue  political  influence  over  the 
judicial  police.  Inter-agency  cooperation  and  information  sharing  between  law  enforcement  and  the 
Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) need further development. 

Strategic documents  

Türkiye  does  not  have  a  national  strategy  or  action  plan  to  prevent  and  combat  corruption.  No 
progress was made in implementing outstanding GRECO recommendations. 

Legal framework 

Türkiye  is  a  party  to  all  international  anti-corruption  conventions,  including  the  UN  Convention 
against Corruption. It has not, however, introduced new anti-corruption legislation or reform measures 
to  implement  its  obligations.  The  legal  framework  for  whistle-blower  protection  and  public 
procurement is not aligned with the EU acquis. 

Shortcomings persist in the corruption-related provisions of the Penal Code. The definition of active 
bribery provided in the Criminal Code still does not comply with international standards, particularly 
on bribery in the private sector. Public procurement legislation is not in line with the EU acquis. Legal 
privileges  for  public  officials,  such  as  the  requirement  for  prior  authorisation  from  their  superiors 
before launching an investigation against them for alleged wrongdoing, still offer protection in anti-
corruption investigations, thus effectively hindering investigations. 

The legal framework for conflicts of interest and asset declaration as well as the financial oversight of 
political parties remain inadequate. Türkiye has no legislation to regulate lobbying. 

Fundamental rights 

General framework 

The general framework for fundamental rights remains an issue of concern.  

International human rights instruments  

26 

 
 
 
Türkiye  remains  a  party  to  most  international  human  rights  instruments,  but  its  legislation  and 
implementation need to be brought into line with the ECHR and ECtHR case law. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe continued its full monitoring procedure. 

European Court of Human Rights  

rights  and 

No  progress  was  made  on  aligning 
legislation  on  human 
its 
implementation  with  the  ECHR  and  ECtHR 
case  law,  which  raises  concerns.  Türkiye 
continued  to  not  implement  certain  ECtHR 
rulings and the related judgments of its own 
Constitutional Court.  

Graph 8: Türkiye - ECtHR judgments 

100000

13232

23851

24176

10000

1000

100

5533

637

83

66

73

10

1

Judgments Breaches

New
allocated
applications

During  the  reporting  period,  the  ECtHR 
found breaches of the ECHR related mainly 
to the right to respect for private and family 
life,  excessive  use  of  force  by  security 
forces,  unjustified  detention  the  right  to  a 
fair trial, the right to liberty and security and 
freedom of assembly and association. There 
are currently 185 cases against Türkiye under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers. 
Systematic  enforcement  of  ECtHR  judgements  and  addressing  structural  problems  raised  by  these 
cases  including  concerning  judicial  independence,  judicial  review  mechanism,  use  of  force  in  the 
context  of  assemblies,  defamation  and  conscientious objection is  of  utmost  importance.  Redress  for 
violations  needs  to  be ensured.  The  June  2024  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers  decision 
reiterated calls for the Turkish government to comply with ECtHR judgments and release former HDP 
co-chair  Demirtaş  and  human  rights  defender  Kavala.  In  April  2024,  the  ECtHR  granted  priority 
status to a second case lodged by Osman Kavala. 

Pending
applications

16.06.2022 - 15.06.2023

16.06.2023 - 01.09.2024

Source: ECtHR

Promotion and enforcement of human rights  

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

0

Graph 9: Türkiye - Promotion and enforcement of human rights 

17816

18094

19317

19289

1722

64,94

1972

77,51

2020

166

n/a

n/a

2830

31

n/a

n/a

2022

2023

2022

2023

Ombudsperson

Equality body (Human rights and Equality
Institution)

Complaints
Decisions
Recommendations to the authorities
Implementation of the recommendations by the authorities (% of the total)

law, 

of 
Enforcement 
rights 
human 
ineffective 
remains 
due 
to  significant 
shortcomings  in  the 
rule  of 
the 
implementation  of 
penal  provisions  in 
contravention  of  the 
ECHR  and  ECtHR 
and 
law, 
case 
continuous  pressure 
on  human 
rights 
defenders  and  civil 
society 
organisations.  

Source: Türkiye authorities 

n/a: not available

The  implementation 
of  the  March  2021 
Human  Rights  Action  Plan  continued,  but  the  plan  does  not  address  the  main  shortcomings  in  the 
human  rights  situation.  The  annual  reports  are  not  made  public.  The  effectiveness  of  the  Human 
Rights  and  Equality  Institution  of  Türkiye  (HREI)  and  the  Ombudsman  remained  limited.  HREI 
issued  significantly  fewer  decisions  in  2023  compared  with  the  previous  year.  The  operational, 
structural  and  financial  independence  of  both  institutions  and  the  appointment  of  their  members 
remained problematic. The prison visits carried out by HREI remained ineffective.  

27 

 
 
4 059  applications  were  submitted  to  the  Turkish  Parliament’s  Human  Rights  Inquiry  Committee 
between January 2023 and 22 April 2024. 

Right to life 

No steps were taken to improve the situation on the right to life and to abolish the impunity of the 
security services.  

Prevention of torture and ill treatment 

Torture  and/or  ill  treatment  continued  to  occur  in  detention  centres,  prisons,  informal  places  of 
detention,  removal  centres  and  transport  vehicles, 
as well as during demonstrations. Disproportionate 
use  of  force  by  security  forces  continued.  In  a 
limited  number  of  cases,  administrative  measures 
were taken against the accused officers. HREI does 
not  meet  the  key  requirements  of  the  Optional 
Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture and 
Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or 
Punishment,  and  does  not  deal  effectively  with 
cases referred to it. Türkiye is encouraged to allow 
publication  of all  pending reports of the  European 
Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Torture  and 
introduce  an  automatic  publication  procedure  for 
such reports. 

Execution of criminal sanctions  

98

80

60

117

140

120

100

conditional 

Graph 11: Türkiye - Prisons

Overcrowding remains a major problem in prisons. Allegations of human rights violations continued 
to  be  reported,  aggravated  by  widespread  impunity  for  prison  officials.  The  different  treatment  of 
political  inmates  as  regards  the  enforcement 
regime  also  raises  concerns.  The  Prison 
Administration and Observation Boards tend to 
delay 
inmates 
arbitrarily.  Pre-trial  detention  remains  widely 
used,  including  for  alleged  offences  related  to 
freedom  of 
are 
increasingly  held 
in  prisons  or  detention 
centres  far  from  where  the  alleged  crime 
occurred,  which  strains  family  ties.  Increasing 
isolation  of  inmates  remained  an  issue  as 
communal  activities  remained  limited  and 
arbitrary.  Education,  access 
to  healthcare, 
rehabilitation  and  resocialisation  programmes 
and the probation system need to be improved. 
PKK’s  leader  Öcalan  and  the  other  three 
inmates in Imrali prison were prevented from any contact with their lawyers and their relatives for the 
last 43 months. 

Average duration of pre-
trial detention (months)

expression.  Defendants 

Source: Ministry of Justice (website)

Occupancy rate (%)

releases 

n/a:  not available

2022

2023

of 

20

40

n/a

n/a

0

Protection of personal data  

data 

The 8th Judicial Reform Package, adopted in March 2024, changed the conditions for the processing 
of  special  categories  of 
personal 
and 
transfers  of  personal 
data  to  third  countries 
(see  Chapter  10).  The 
2016  Personal  Data 
Act, 
Protection 

Graph 12: Türkiye - Data protection

10000

8548

6000

9396

7784

8000

9059

4000

2000

0

n/a

n/a

28 

n/a

n/a

332

307

Inspections

n/a:  not available

Complaints
received

Decisions

2022

2023

Administrative
sanctions

Declarations of
data breaches
Source: Data protection 

 
 
however,  is  not  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis.  Türkiye  has  in  place  the  Personal  Data  Protection 
Authority, but its functioning is not fully aligned with EU standards. Rights of individuals when their 
personal data are processed for law enforcement purposes are not in line with EU standards. 

Freedom of religion or belief 

Freedom  of  worship  is  generally  respected  in  Türkiye,  but  the  situation  of  freedom  of  thought, 
conscience and religion needs to be improved. The lack of legal personality for the  non-Muslim and 
Alevi  communities  remained  a  problem,  notably  in  relation  to  the  lack  of  legal  status  for  places  of 
worship. The Venice Commission’s recommendations on the legal status of non-Muslim religions and 
on  the  right  of  the  Greek  Orthodox  Ecumenical  Patriarchate  to  use  the  title  ‘Ecumenical’  were  not 
implemented. The lack of legal provisions on the conscientious objection to army service remained an 
issue,  despite  several  ECtHR  judgments  and  a  decision  by  the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee.  No 
steps were taken to re-open the Halki (Heybeliada) Greek Orthodox Seminary, which has been closed 
since 1971. 

The  Turkish  education  system  does  not  guarantee  neutrality  and  impartiality  towards  various 
religions,  denominations  and  beliefs.  No  measures  were  taken  by  the  authorities  to  address  the 
shortcomings identified by the ECtHR in compulsory religious culture and ethics classes.  The recent 
inclusion of the doctrine of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) in Turkish school textbooks is a cause for 
concern. 

The government is in dialogue with UNESCO on the World Heritage Committee’s concerns about the 
Hagia Sophia museum being turned back into a mosque. In May 2024, the Turkish authorities opened 
the Monastery of Chora in Istanbul, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, which the authorities converted 
into a mosque.  

Hate crimes against religious minorities need to be thoroughly investigated. Acts of vandalism and the 
destruction  of  minority  places  of  worship  and  cemeteries  occurred.  Aggressive  anti-Semitic 
statements  were  made  in  the  media  and  by  high-level  officials  following  the  7  October  Hamas 
terrorist  attacks  against  Israel  and  the outbreak  of the  Israel-Hamas conflict.  Türkiye  is  an  observer 
country to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance.   

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------- 

Freedom of expression 

Protection of journalists 

The  activities  of  journalists,  writers,  lawyers,  academics,  human  rights  defenders,  opposition 
politicians and critical voices continued to be restricted through arrests, detentions, prosecutions and 
convictions.  These  practices  continued  to  hinder  the  exercise  of  their  freedoms  and  led  to  self-
censorship.  As  of  June  2024,  54  journalists  and  media  workers  (59  in  2023)  were  in  prison,  either 
awaiting trial or serving sentences.  

Legislative environment 

Several  articles  of  criminal  legislation  restrict  the  freedom  of  expression  and  media  on  grounds  of 
national  security,  public  order  and  protection  of  public  morals  and  deviate  from  international  and 
European standards. Access to information is frequently limited on the grounds of national security. 
In August 2024, the Constitutional Court annulled the Presidential Decree giving the Directorate of 
Communications the task of combating disinformation on the grounds that it ‘interferes with freedom 
of the press and freedom of expression’ as enshrined in the Constitution. The ruling was immediately 
taken down from the Court’s website and the Centre continues to function as before the ruling. 

Implementation of legislation/institutions 

The  selective and  arbitrary  application  of legislation continued.  The  Radio  and Television  Supreme 
Council imposed 570 fines on broadcasters in 2023. Independent television and radio stations critical 
of the government were the most frequently fined, on the grounds that their content was ‘contrary to 
the national and moral values of society, general morality and the principle of the protection of the 

29 

 
 
family’.  Authorities  targeted  media  and  websites  following  accusations  of  ‘propagating  terrorism’, 
while others were accused of ‘obscenity’ or for being deemed ‘defamatory of Islam', for insulting the 
President, and endangering national security.  

Public service broadcasters 

The  public  broadcaster  TRT  did  not  provide  an  even  playing  field  during  the  elections,  giving 
unbalanced  and  preferential  coverage  to  ruling  parties.  There  are  concerns  that  the  licensing 
requirement for internet distribution aims to enable censorship.  

Economic factors 

The  broadcasting  law  does  not  prevent  the  concentration  of  media,  resulting  in  a  high  degree  of 
concentration of the media ownership by a few companies. This maintains a biased media landscape. 
The  distribution  of  printed  media,  which  is  used  to  allocate  public  advertising  funds  and  deliver 
newspapers to retail outlets, is owned by a single company. 

Internet 

Current  legislation  and  its  implementation  do  not  guarantee  an  open  and  free  internet.  Frequent 
closures  of  websites  and  social  media  accounts  that  express  views  critical  of  the  government 
continued.  Some  authors  of  critical  websites  faced  prosecution.  In  August  2024,  after  a  9-day  ban, 
access to Instagram was restored. Online game platform Roblox remains banned.  

Freedom of artistic expression 

The  existing  legislation  includes  vague  provisions  such  as  morality  that  are  often  used  to  restrict 
freedom of artistic expression. A number of artistic events and performances were banned, and artists 
critical of government policies were subject to insulting remarks by high-ranking officials and media. 

Professional organisations and working conditions 

Journalism  in  Türkiye  remains  a  precarious  and  risky  profession,  with  low  wages,  a  high  risk  of 
prosecution,  limited  trade  union  rights  and  no  job  security  (see  also  Chapter  10  –  Digital 
transformation and media). 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------- 

Freedom of assembly and association  

The  legislation  and  its  implementation  are  not  in  line  with  the  European  standards  and  the 
international conventions that  Türkiye is party to. Türkiye needs to urgently apply ECtHR case law 
and  revise  relevant  national  laws.  The  legislation  allowed  authorities  to  prohibit  meetings  and 
demonstrations based on vague, discretionary and arbitrary criteria. Bans on peaceful gatherings were 
widely imposed  and  public  events  were  often  dispersed  with  a  disproportionate  use  of  force  by  the 
police. A positive development was the lifting by the Minister of Interior in November 2023 of the 
2018  ban  on  Saturday  Mothers  to  protest  in  Istanbul’s  Galatasaray  Square.  However,  court  cases 
against human rights defenders continued.  

Property rights  

The  legal  framework  in  this  area  is  in  place.  However,  the  legislation  has  shortcomings,  and  its 
implementation is often selective and discriminatory. Specifically, there is an urgent need to revise the 
relevant  legislation  on  the  issue  of  property  rights  for  non-Muslim  minorities.  In  the  case  of 
ownership  of  the  Taksim  Gezi  Park,  the  court  decided  to  return  the  property  to  the  Istanbul 
Metropolitan  Municipality  in  March  2024.  The  Mor  Gabriel  Syriac  Orthodox  Monastery  property 
issues and court cases continued. Court cases regarding the 2016 expropriations in Diyarbakir’s Sur 
district  continued.  Council  of  Europe  Resolution  1625  of  2008  on  property  rights  on  the  islands  of 
Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos) still needs to be fully implemented.  

Non-discrimination  

30 

 
 
There was no progress on non-discrimination legislation and its implementation to ensure alignment 
with European standards or towards ratification of Protocol 12 of the ECHR, which provides for the 
general prohibition of discrimination. Legislation on hate crimes, including hate speech, is still not in 
line with international standards and does not cover hate crimes based on sexual orientation, gender 
identity  and  gender  expression,  ethnicity,  or  age.  Cases  of  discrimination  and  hate  crimes  based  on 
ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation continued to be reported. 

Gender equality  

The  legislation  and  the  institutional  framework  in  Türkiye  is  not  aligned  with  EU  legislation  and 
international  standards.  Türkiye  has 
no longer been party to the Council of 
Europe’s  Istanbul  Convention  since 
2021 and its legislation is not aligned 
with  the  EU  Directive  on  combating 
violence against women and domestic 
violence.  Strategies  and  action  plans 
in  this  area  –  the  12th  National 
Development  Plan  (2024-2028),  the 
Women’s  Empowerment  Strategy 
Document  and  Action  Plan  (2024-
2028),  and  the  Vision  Document  and 
Action  Plan  for  the  Protection  and 
Strengthening  of  the  Family  (2024-
2028),  still  need  to  bear  credible 
results.  Violence  against  women 
remains  prevalent  due  to  the  lack  of  effective  and  deterrent  sentences,  weak  implementation  of 
legislation and the low quality of available support services. The number of femicides – where women 
are killed because of their gender – continued to be high, with at least 315 in 2023 and at least 32 in 
April 2024 alone. There is no comprehensive data collection system in this area. Deep-rooted cultural 
norms and persisting gender stereotypes continue to hinder progress towards gender equality. 

Rights of the child  

The implementation of the legislation in this area is not in line with the international standards and the 
EU  acquis,  and  protection  of  the  rights  of  the  child  remained  weak.  While  national  legislation  and 
policies  are  in  place  to  ensure  the  full  realisation  of  child  rights  in  Türkiye,  its  implementation  is 
insufficient, also due to the lack of adequate resources and budgetary allocation. The principle of the 
‘best interests of the child’ is recognised in legal documents, but implementation relies on subjective 
assessments. Concerns remained about juveniles arrested and detained on charges of membership in 
terrorist  organisations.  There  is  an  urgent  need  to  establish  an  integrated  child  protection  system. 
Services  specifically  tailored  to  the  needs  of  child  victims  of  various  crimes  are  limited.  Türkiye 
stepped up efforts to develop an emergency foster care system, but no progress was made in the field 
of  deinstitutionalisation  and  independent  living.  Efforts  to  incorporate  large  number  of  migrant 
children  into  education  system  continued.  However,  very  high  inflation  increased  risks  of  children 
being removed from school of the most vulnerable families. A comprehensive training programme for 
all professionals working with children in contact with the law, including a certification mechanism 
and incentives, should be developed. 

Persons with disabilities  

Türkiye has ratified the UN Convention for the Protection of the  Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and  its  Optional  Protocol,  but  shortcomings  persist  in  its  transposition  and  implementation. 
Discriminatory  legislation  against  persons  with  disabilities  accessing  employment  as  judges  and 
prosecutors still exists. In response to the ‘2030 Barrier-Free Vision’ strategic policy document, the 
2023-2025  National  Action  Plan  for  the  Rights  of  the  Disabled  is  being  implemented.  The  plan 
largely  reflects  the  EU  strategy  in  this  field.  Additionally,  the  dedicated  National  Action  Plan  on 
Persons  with  Autism  Spectrum  Disorder  covering  2023-2030  is  in  force.  It  helps  implement  the 

31 

 
 
aforementioned  UN  Convention,  but  shortcomings  persist.  The  knowledge  base  on  accessibility  of 
public services should also be expanded. Disability-inclusive infrastructure, services, programmes and 
coordination platforms need further investment. 

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) persons  

The lack of protection for the fundamental rights of LGBTIQ persons continued. Hate speech and hate 
crimes based on sexual orientation gender identity and gender expression, negative stereotyping in the 
media  and  discriminatory  rhetoric  by  high-ranking  government  officials  continued.  Anti-LGBTIQ 
rallies  were  organised  with  the  permission  of  the  authorities.  Activities  and  gatherings  against 
homophobia were banned. Police intervened in the Istanbul Pride march in June 2023, and arrested 
more than 100 people. The main 2024 Pride march in İstanbul was banned, while dozens of people 
were detained in June 2024 at a gathering to mark Pride Day.  

Procedural rights and victims’ rights  

The legislation and its implementation are not in line with the EU  acquis  or European standards as 
basic  minimum  procedural  rights  standards  are  missing.  (see  also  Quality  of  Justice  above).  The 
ECtHR  continued  to  issue  judgments  against  Türkiye  for  violating  the  right  to  a  fair  trial  and  the 
presumption of innocence by failing to respect basic procedural guarantees for suspects and accused 
persons. Steps need to be taken to align national legislation with the EU Directive on Victims’ Rights 
and the Directive relating to compensation to crime victims. 

Protection of minorities 

Legislation  on  hate  crimes,  including  hate  speech,  is  still  not  in  line  with  international  standards, 
which remained a serious issue. Hate speech and hate crimes continued, with the main targets being 
Syrians  (often  refugees),  Greeks,  Armenians,  Jews  and  Alevis.  Persons  belonging  to  minorities 
continued to face difficulties, such as the lack of legal status for religious institutions, protection for 
minority  languages,  schooling  support,  clergy  training,  access  to  media  in  minority  languages  and 
complications in enjoying property rights. No steps were taken to revise school textbooks to remove 
discriminatory and derogatory references. Minority schools received no public funds. After a gap of a 
year,  limited  subsidies  to  the  newspapers  run  by  members  of  the  Armenian,  Greek  and  Jewish 
communities  were  granted  by  the  Press  Advertising  Agency.  Outside  activities  for  the  “Armenian 
Genocide Commemoration Day” were banned in April 2024. No mechanisms exist to include persons 
belonging to minorities in decision-making and ensure that they are adequately represented in public 
administration. Minorities remain under-represented in political life.   

Cultural rights 

Optional courses in Kurdish and Circassian are provided in public state schools, but the requirement 
of  a  minimum  of  10  students  for  these  courses  and  the  insufficient  number  of  teachers  appointed 
continued to be an impediment. The state-appointed trustee mayors in the south-east region continued 
to  change  the  original  names  of  streets  and  cultural  centres  and  ban  cultural  activities  in  Kurdish. 
Numerous concerts, festivals and cultural events were banned by governorates and municipalities on 
the grounds of ‘security and public order’. Kurdish cultural and language institutions, media outlets 
and numerous art spaces have remained mostly closed since 2016 (see also Chapter 26 – Education 
and culture). 

Roma6  

The 2023-2030 National Roma Strategy and its action plan were implemented. Local action plans for 
Roma  were  prepared  for  the  first  time.  However,  the  strategy  needs  to  be  improved  as  regards 
initiatives  and  concrete  actions  to  address  direct  discrimination  and  prejudices.  Concrete  measures 
should be taken to prevent the increase of antigypsyism and to combat prejudice and discrimination 
against Roma. Türkiye needs to publish data on the situation and living conditions of Roma. Issues of 
underrepresentation,  marginalisation  and  socio-economic  inequalities  continue  to  affect  Roma 

6  In  line  with  the  terminology  of  European  institutions,  the  umbrella  term  ‘Roma’  is  used  here  to  refer  to  a  number  of 
different groups, without denying the specificities of these groups. 

32 

 
 
 
communities. Wide disparities in housing, employment and education perpetuate marginalisation and 
social exclusion. Better integration of Roma children into the education system would help eliminate 
child labour and early marriages. The problem of incorrect diagnosis of Roma children with mental 
disabilities or learning difficulties was not addressed.   

2.2.2 Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security 

The EU has common rules for border control, visas, residence and work permits, external migration 
and asylum. Schengen cooperation entails the lifting of border controls within the EU. There is also 
cooperation in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and customs 
matters, all with the support of the EU justice and home affairs agencies. 

Fight against organised crime 

Türkiye continued to align its legal framework on organised crime with the EU acquis. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

Türkiye has in place the legal and institutional structures to fight organised crime, but further progress 
is needed. The Gendarmerie General Command and the Turkish National Police under the Ministry of 
Interior  are  in  charge  of  the  fight  against  organised  crime.  The  Coast  Guard  Command  plays  an 
important role in preventing migrant smuggling and human trafficking,  along with the Gendarmerie 
and Police. The Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) attached to the Ministry of Treasury 
and Finance is the Turkish financial intelligence unit.  

The legal framework for the fight against organised crime and police cooperation is partially aligned 
with the EU acquis. On 28 June 2024, Türkiye was removed from FATF’s ‘grey list’ as a result of the 
country’s significant progress in addressing the deficiencies previously identified. A national strategy 
(2022-2027)  and  an  action  plan  (2022-2024)  against  organised  crime  are  in  force.  The  Ministry  of 
Interior’s  Department  of  Smuggling  Intelligence,  Operations  and  Data  Collection  is  responsible  for 
coordinating their implementation. 

The legal framework on human trafficking is largely in line with international conventions and the EU 
acquis.  

Turkish  data  protection  legislation  is  still  not  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  completion  of  an 
international agreement between the EU and Türkiye on the exchange of personal data with Europol is 
therefore pending. Cooperation with Europol continues to be guided by the Strategic Agreement on 
Cooperation.  Türkiye  is  connected  to  and  configured  for  the  full  use  of  the  Secure  Information 
Exchange Network Application. 

Türkiye has a witness protection system in place but it needs to be expanded to include all  types of 
serious crimes, and procedural rules need improvement. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

to 

capacity 
Operational 
continued 
be 
strengthened  through  new 
training 
recruitment  and 
programmes.  

On firearms trafficking, 712 
light  weapons 
small  and 
the 
by 
were 
gendarmerie  and  5 803  by 
the  Turkish  National  Police 
during the reporting period.  

seized 

14  EU  Member  States  have 
liaison  officers  in  Türkiye. 
A  cooperation  agreement 

33 

 
 
with  the  European  Union Agency for  Law  Enforcement  Training is  in  place,  but  participation from 
Türkiye in training activities significantly decreased compared to the previous year. 

The  track  record  on  combating  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing  showed  a  gradual 
improvement.  Turkish  judicial  statistics  showed  a  consistent  upward  trend.  There  were  19  files,  49 
separate  offences  and  47  convictions  in  2020,  while  there  were  39  criminal  files  and  118  offences 
resulted  in  116  convictions  in  2022.  However,  there  are  indications  that  Türkiye  still  remains  an 
attractive country for money laundering activities. 

Between July 2023 and April 2024, the Turkish National Police conducted 2 026 operations resulting 
in  the  arrests  of  1  429  people  for  organised  crime.  Between  April  2023  and  April  2024,  the 
Gendarmerie  General  Command  conducted  83  operations  resulting  in  the  arrests  of  381  people  for 
organised  crime.  Regarding  the  confiscation  of  criminal  assets  in  corruption  and  organised  crime 
cases,  the  Gendarmerie  took  action  against  423  suspects  involved  in  93  incidents  between  1  April 
2023 and 1 April 2024. 

Türkiye  remains  an  important  transit  and  destination  country  for  human  trafficking.  In  2023,  the 
number  of  victims  identified  by  the  Turkish  authorities  was  223  (compared  to  343  in  2022).  As  of 
27 June 2024, 81 victims had been identified. Most victims are of Syrian origin.  

There is a need to increase the capacity to host and provide services to victims of human trafficking.  

In  2023, 5 473  suspects  were  detected  in  12 963 cases  of cybercrime,  resulting  in  the conviction  of 
231  people.  In  the  reporting  period,  there  was  no  national  strategy  and  action  plan  in  place  against 
cybercrime. 

Cooperation in the field of drugs 

Cooperation in the field of drugs needs to be improved. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The national strategy and action plan (2018-2023) were concluded, and a new one has not yet been 
adopted.  An  action  plan  on  the  fight  against  methamphetamine  (2022-2024)  is  currently  in  effect 
under the coordination of the Ministry of Interior.  

The Turkish Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction continued to act as the national focal 
point  of  the  European  Monitoring  Centre  for  Drugs  and  Drug  Addiction  (European  Union  Drugs 
Agency  as  of  2 July 2024)  and  is  the  national  drug  observatory.  It  collects  data,  makes  risk 
assessments,  and  provides  recommendations  on  the  national  early  warning  system  on  new 
psychoactive substances. A total of 1 045 new psychoactive substances have been included in national 
legislation, and 39 of these were put on the list in 2023.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

need 

partners 

Türkiye  remains  a  transit  route  for  drugs 
between  Asia  and  Europe.  Information 
exchange  and  collaboration  with  EU  law 
enforcement 
be 
strengthened,  particularly  for  heroin.  In 
2023,  Turkish  law  enforcement  services 
conducted  operations  that  resulted  in  the 
increased  seizure  of  cannabis,  cocaine, 
methamphetamine  and  ecstasy 
tablets, 
while  the  seizure  of  heroin  and  captagon 
tablets. 

to 

1

0

Graph 15: Türkiye - Cases related to production 
and trafficking of drugs

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

2021

2022

2023

Number of individuals / legal entities under Investigation
Individuals / legal entities indicted
Final court decision

Fight against terrorism 

n/a: non-available

The fight against terrorism needs to be improved. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

34 

 
 
The country continued to face threats from various terrorist groups. Türkiye has in place legislation to 
fight  terrorism  and  strong  institutional  structures  to  deal  with  terrorism  threats.  However,  its 
legislation  needs  to  be  brought  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis  and  standards,  notably  regarding  the 
definition  of  terrorism.  It  should  align  with  the  EU’s  definition  as  outlined  in  the  EU  Directive  on 
combating terrorism and remains an essential outstanding reform. Counterterrorism practices should 
also respect the rule of law and fundamental rights and freedoms.  

Türkiye  prioritised  the  fight  against  the  Kurdistan  Workers’  Party  (PKK)  and  Daesh  and  the 
dismantling of the Gülen movement at home. The PKK remains on the EU list of persons, groups and 
entities involved in terrorist acts. Türkiye has a legitimate right to fight terrorism.  

Türkiye  regularly  contributes  to  the  bi-annual  reviews  of  terrorist  listings  under  Council  Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP (EU CP 931). The PKK, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C), 
the  Revolutionary  Peoples’  Liberation  Party  (DHKP/C)  and  Teyrebazen  Azadiya  Kurdistan  (TAK) 
are currently on the EU list of designated organisations. Türkiye does not classify Hamas as a terrorist 
organisation, whereas the EU does.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye’s  continuing  efforts  to  tackle  terrorism  reduced  terrorist  activity  and  improved  the  security 
situation. The EU has condemned all acts of terrorist violence in Türkiye. 

Türkiye has bolstered the resources of MASAK and improved its use of the financial intelligence it 
generates.  This  was  reflected  in  an  improved  track  record  in  anti-money  laundering/combating  the 
financing  of  terrorism  (AML/CFT)  investigations  and  prosecutions.  The  number  of  suspicious 
transaction reports received by MASAK increased from 425 322 in 2022 to 651 555 in 2023. In 2023, 
MASAK filed criminal complaints against 421 people on the grounds of economic crimes, of whom 
152 were charged with money laundering. In 2022, it filed criminal complaints against 496 people, of 
whom 101 were charged with money laundering. 

In AML/CFT cases, domestic asset freezes and confiscation tools have been used in a more effective 
manner. So far, 30 natural persons and three legal entities have had their assets frozen in accordance 
with  UN  Sanctions  Committee  Resolutions.  In  2023,  the  assets  of  94  domestic  people  and  24 
corporate identities were frozen through five inter-ministerial decisions.  

Police and judicial cooperation with EU Member States and EU agencies in the fight against terrorism 
remained limited due to the absence of a law on the protection of personal data in line with the EU 
acquis, as well as differences in the definition of terrorism. 

MASAK and the Ministry of Interior increased outreach to a wide range of civil society organisations 
to  ensure  that  supervision  is  based  on  risk.  However,  some  of  them  remained  concerned  about  the 
excessive  number  of 
inspections 
audits  and 
performed 
the 
by 
Ministry.  

Graph 16: Türkiye - Requests for mutual assistance in civil and 
criminal matters

Judicial  cooperation  in 
civil 
criminal 
matters 

and 

14000

12000

10000

8000

8626

8805

7413

12011

12202

10795

10848

10525

9469

4256

4289

6000

4039

2000

4337

4000

4549

3374

and 

Judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal 
civil 
matters  needs 
to  be 
improved.  Türkiye  still 
needs  to  accede  to  the 
Hague  Convention  of 
30 June 2005  on  Choice 
of  Court  Agreements. 
Türkiye  has  not  yet 
ratified the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. 

Civil
Incoming requests

Outgoing requests

Total

2021

1056

2022

1216

2023

2021

0

2022

Criminal

1354

2023

Source: Ministry of Justice

35 

 
 
New  legislation  has  been  put  in  place  to  speed  up  international  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal 
matters. A circular was adopted in 2024 to establish international judicial cooperation liaison offices 
in criminal matters at seven prosecution offices in Türkiye. The aim is to accelerate and coordinate 
judicial cooperation between the Central Authority and local courts. 

Türkiye  should  establish  a  central monitoring  system  for  collecting  and  processing  full  information 
about incoming and outgoing requests for international judicial cooperation. 

Five  contact  points  have  been  designated  by  Türkiye  to  coordinate  and  follow  up  on  judicial 
cooperation on criminal matters with Eurojust. Between April 2023 and February 2024, Türkiye was 
involved in 8 Eurojust cases mostly related to drug trafficking and  organised crime (compared to 13 
in 2022) without participating in any coordination meeting. Türkiye has not formally communicated 
whether it  would  start  negotiations  for  an  international agreement  with the  EU on  cooperation  with 
Eurojust. 

Cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has yet to be established. 

Legal and irregular migration 

The  management  of  legal  migration  needs  to  be  improved.  Cooperation  on  combating  irregular 
migration is productive and delivers results.  

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

The  Presidency  for  Migration  Management  (PMM)  remained  the  institution  in  charge  of  migration 
management. In the past year, it recruited 12 auditors and 77 migration experts for its headquarters 
and  provincial  administration.  The  need  for  lawyers,  social  workers,  psychologists  and  interpreters 
continues. The Migration Board chaired by the Minister of Interior held its first meeting since June 
2022 on 29 January 2024.   

Following  the  introduction  of  alternatives to  detention,  methods  such  as  return  counselling, family-
based  return  and  bail  have  been  rolled  out,  except  for  alternatives  to  detention  that  require  an 
electronic infrastructure (such as voice recognition software and electronic bracelets). Monitoring and 
tracking  working  groups  have  been  set  up  in  Provincial  Directorates  of  Migration  Management  to 
ensure the effective implementation of alternatives to detention.  

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The  EU-Turkey  Statement  remained  the  main  framework  for  cooperation  between  the  EU  and 
Türkiye. 

Türkiye continued not to fully implement the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. It also maintained 
its  position  that  it  would  not  implement  the  provisions  on  third-country  nationals  until  the  visa 
requirement for its citizens travelling to the Schengen Area is lifted. No readmission took place under 
the bilateral Readmission Protocol between Greece and Türkiye, and no third-country nationals were 
readmitted from Bulgaria to Türkiye. 

In the reporting period, PMM continued to employ a limited number of psychologists, social workers, 
interpreters and lawyers, some of whom are financed by the EU. 

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 171 migrants lost their lives in the 
Eastern Mediterranean in 2023 (383 in 2022). Up to May 2024, 64 migrants had lost their lives (59 in 
the same period in 2023). 

The sea route to Italy saw a decline of 58%, while arrivals in Greece increased by 172%, particularly 
on the sea route. The number of irregular arrivals in Cyprus via the Green Line (UN buffer zone) fell 
by 60%. 

Starting in Istanbul in July 2023, the Ministry of Interior introduced Mobile Migration Points in major 
cities as part of intensified efforts to detect and process foreigners residing illegally in Türkiye. As of 
June  2024,  the  practice  covered  30  metropolitan  municipalities  with  162  mobile  units.  81 000 
irregular  migrants  have  been  detected  by  these  units  since  July  2023,  of  which  73 436  in  Istanbul 
alone. 

36 

 
 
Türkiye’s unilateral suspension of the return of irregular migrants from the Greek islands on public 
health  grounds,  which  began  in  March  2020,  continues.  Between  2016  and  2020,  2 140  people 
(including  412  Syrian  nationals)  were  readmitted  to  Türkiye  from  Greece  under  the  ‘One-for-One’ 
scheme. As regards resettlement from Türkiye to the EU under the same scheme, the total number of 
Syrian  refugees  resettled  from  Türkiye  was  43 019  by  the  end  of  August  2024.  At  the  same  time, 
625 000 Syrian refugees were voluntarily repatriated from Türkiye to Syria between 2016 and 2024 
according to government data. 

Türkiye adopted the Strategy Plan on Assisted Voluntary Return and Readmission (AVR-R) for 2023-
25  to  ensure  the  effective  implementation  of  the  national  AVR-R  system.  Voluntary  returns  of 
irregular migrants financed  through  national  as  well  as  EU  funds  continued.  So far,  1 877  irregular 
migrants have been returned through the national voluntary return scheme, while 2 259 were returned 
with the assistance of the IOM and EU financing in 2023 and 2024. 

60000

70237

80000

40000

68687

45909

23468

140000

120000

100000

115775

incidents 

Graph 17: Türkiye - Number of irregular movements

The  number  of  removal 
centres stands at 32, with a 
total  capacity  of  18 630. 
of 
Reported 
alleged 
rights 
human 
violations  continued,  as 
significant 
well 
as 
to 
challenges 
access 
and 
to 
removal 
services 
centres, 
particularly 
to 
regarding 
information  and  legal  aid. 
limited  number  of 
A 
irregular  migrants 
in 
(956) 
removal 
benefited  from  free  legal 
aid  in  2023  (939  in  2022, 
1 059 in 2021). In addition to the free legal aid scheme, 24 148 migrants were able to have access to 
and meet their lawyers in removal centres in the same period. 

Source: Presidency for migration management

relating 
rights 

n
a
t
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g
f
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a
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s
i
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centres 

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access 

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n
i
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a
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21295

14270

33444

58621

18113

53320

20000

4819

2021

2022

2023

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S

a
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y
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in 

0

l

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l

1 107 032 foreigners were legal residents in Türkiye in 2023 (1 345 488 in 2022, 1 275 741 in 2021). 
As of June 2024, there were 1 102 698 resident permit holders in Türkiye. Nationals of Turkmenistan, 
the Russian Federation and Iraq were the most common holders of residence permits.  

Asylum 

The management of asylum system needs to be improved. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

PMM  is  the  main  institution  responsible  for  all  asylum-related  procedures.  Decisions  on  refugee 
status determination are subject to administrative and judicial appeal procedures. 

Legislation  in  this  area  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  foreigners  and 
international protection maintains the reservation (geographical limitation) expressed in the New York 
Protocol  to  the  1951  Geneva  Convention.  As  a  result  of  this,  the  vast  majority  of  persons  seeking 
international protection in Türkiye cannot apply for fully-fledged refugee status, only for ‘conditional 
refugee’ status and subsidiary protection.  

PMM  and  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Asylum  continued  their  cooperation  with  the 
implementation of the 2022-2023 Cooperation Roadmap. It offers capacity-building support and peer-
to-peer exchanges on best practices in the fields of asylum, reception, resettlement and organisational 
change. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

37 

 
 
Türkiye continued to host one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with 3 096 157 Syrians 
under temporary protection (as of August 2024). According to Turkish authorities, there are also over 
259 000 non-Syrians. The number of asylum seekers significantly declined over the reporting period.  

to 

33747

19400

29734

21926

Graph 18: Türkiye - Asylum applications 

40000
35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0

In  2023,  Türkiye  granted 
international 
protection 
(refugee  status,  conditional 
refugee  status  or  subsidiary 
11 094 
protection) 
applicants,  a  slight  decrease 
in 
compared  with  12 883 
2022. 
authorities 
The 
rejected  14 760  applications 
(11 415  in  2022).  In  2023, 
the 
total  of 
pending 
international 
protection  applications  stood 
at  224 065 
in 
2022).  There  is  a  significant 
backlog  that  has  not  been 
reduced  over  the  years.  There  is  no  publicly  accessible  data  on  international  protection  with  a 
breakdown by category of decisions and pending cases at the end of the year. 

Source: Presidency for Migration Management

cumulative 

2776 1416

(272 336 

n
a
t
s
i
n
a
h
g
f
A

n
a
t
s
i
n
a
h
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f
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n
a
t
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i
n
a
h
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n
a
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U

19141

13068

7131

4961

1032

4083

2021

2022

2023

a
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I

n
a
r
I

k
a
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I

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a
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I

k
a
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I

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i

l

l

There  are  challenges  to  access  to  registration  and  asylum  procedures  across  the  country.  Concerns 
remained about the quality of decisions on asylum, their reasoned notification and challenges with the 
awareness of and access to legal aid for appeals as well as on return cases to Syria.  

Overall, the number of Syrians in Türkiye has declined by more than 600 000 since 2021. A variety of 
factors,  including  voluntary  returns  as  announced  by  Turkish  authorities  and  the  deactivation  of 
temporary protection IDs as a result of the address verification exercise, may have contributed to this 
decline.  

Visa policy 

The national visa regime is not aligned with that of the EU. Türkiye made no progress in meeting the 
six unfulfilled benchmarks of the visa liberalisation roadmap. 

Türkiye needs to further harmonise its visa policy with the EU’s visa policy. This would include (i) 
further aligning Turkish visa requirements with the EU lists of visa-free and visa-required countries; 
(ii) phasing out the issuing of visas at borders and electronic visas; and (iii) ensuring that the issuing 
of visas at its diplomatic missions is carried out in line with the conditions and procedures set out in 
the  EU  Visa  Code.  Türkiye  continues  to  apply  a  discriminatory  visa  regime  against  nationals  of 
Cyprus. 

Schengen and external borders 

The legislative framework for the management of external borders needs to be improved. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

In  September  2023,  the  coordination  of  border  management  matters  was  transferred  by  ministerial 
decision  to  PMM  under  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  from  the  Directorate-General  of  Provincial 
Administration within the same Ministry. The transfer entailed comprehensive organisational revision 
and  realignment  of  the  previous  department  into  a  Directorate-General  (DG),  the  DG  for  Border 
Management, with five new departments: Integrated Border Management; the National Coordination 
and Joint Risk Analysis Centre (NACORAC); Capacity Building on Border Security; Cooperation on 
Border Management; and Border Gates. The Border Management Implementation Board did not meet 
in the reporting period. Its supervising body, the Integrated Border Management Coordination Board, 
has not yet met at all since its creation. Additionally, relevant interinstitutional meetings were held at 
technical levels on specific topics. 

38 

 
 
NACORAC  is  still  not  fully  operational.  Following  the  conclusion  of  the  staff  assignment  process 
from the Land Forces Command (Ministry of National Defence) with its responsibilities for Türkiye’s 
green  border,  staff  detachments  from  all  relevant  institutions  have  been  completed.  The  legislative 
framework  governing  NACORAC’s  mandate  does  not  grant  NACORAC  sufficient  authority  over 
other  institutions  on  data  sharing  and  risk  analysis.  In  the  absence  of  comprehensive  data  sharing 
protocols, NACORAC has started collecting data from central and local institutions at a basic level 
only.  Correspondingly,  the  risk  analysis  process  also  remains  limited,  while  negotiations  with  all 
relevant institutions for enhanced data sharing are ongoing.  

Until  now,  eight  heads  have  been  appointed  for  border  gate  management  –  six  at  airports  (among 
which Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Antalya) and two at land borders. This reform seeks to streamline 
the coordination of border management matters at central level. 

Türkiye  still  lacks  a  national  integrated  border  management  strategy  and  an  updated  action  plan. 
These are the main policy documents that enable national and international efforts and initiatives in 
this area to be coordinated under a single framework. 

Similar to last year’s recommendations, in order to bring the country’s border management system in 
line with the EU acquis, Türkiye should step up its efforts to improve interservice and international 
cooperation, in particular by accelerating the adoption of an integrated border management strategy 
and updating its 2006 national implementation action plan. It would also need  to take steps to enact 
new legislation in order to set up a non-military border management body in charge of all aspects of 
border  management,  including  border  surveillance  at  the  ‘green’  border,  which  is  under  the 
responsibility of the Turkish Land Forces. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

Türkiye continued to invest significant efforts and financial means in modernising border security at 
the  land  border,  especially  in  the  south  and  south-east  of  the  country.  After  the  construction  of  a 
security wall and a panel/barbed wire fence, patrol roads, lighting, sensors and thermal cameras along 
the  Syrian  border,  the  installation  of  modern  electro-optical  communication  and  surveillance  masts 
continued at the border with Iran. Communication and surveillance masts were also being erected at 
the western land border. The EU provides substantial support to Türkiye for modernising its border 
surveillance infrastructure. 

Relations with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) are based on a memorandum 
of  understanding  from  2012.  The  authorities  continued  to  provide  monthly  reports  on  irregular 
migration  flows  at  the  country’s  western  land  and  sea  borders.  PMM  is  now  the  national  Frontex 
contact  point.  All  work  and  transactions  within  the  scope  of  Frontex  activities  are  coordinated  by 
PMM.  Focal  points  within  the  relevant  authorities,  i.e.  the  Turkish  Coast  Guard  and  the  Turkish 
National  Police  (Combating  Migrant  Smuggling and Border  Gates  Department),  ensure cooperation 
and communication with Frontex and its Liaison Officer in Ankara. Türkiye takes part in the Global 
Alliance against Migrant Smuggling, launched in November 2023. 

Cooperation  with  neighbouring  Greece  and  Bulgaria  as  part  of  a  trilateral  Police  and  Customs 
Cooperation  Centre  at  the  Bulgarian-Turkish  border  crossing  point  Kapitan  Andreevo/Kapıkule 
continued  through  data  sharing  together  with  regular  and  ad  hoc  meetings  between  the  countries’ 
respective authorities as part of existing agreements. 

Türkiye  continued  contributing  to  INTERPOL’s  databases,  albeit  only  on  the  basis  of  manual 
inquiries in case of need. INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents database is not integrated 
into  Türkiye’s  local  database  and  there  is  no  access  to  other  international  police  databases.  Local 
database  connections  are  used  by  authorised  officers  of  the  Turkish  National  Police  in  all  81 
provinces.  

39 

 
 
 
2.3. ECONOMIC CRITERIA 

2.3.1. The existence of a functioning market economy 

Economic governance 

There has been a welcome shift towards more conventional and tighter economic policies since 
mid-2023. The central bank raised its key policy rate substantially and has taken important steps to 
strengthen monetary transmission and reinstate the policy rate as the primary instrument of monetary 
policy.  Corrective  measures  have  also  helped  contain  the  2023  budget  deficit,  and  the  2024  central 
government  budget  deficit  is  likely  to  be  significantly  below  the  target  due  to  better  revenue 
performance and underspending on the expenditure side. The implementation of the policy guidance 
set  out  in  the  conclusions  of  the  Economic  and  Financial  Dialogue  of  May  2023  was  limited. 
Monetary and fiscal policy tightened after the May 2023 elections and the authorities have taken steps 
to gradually exit the FX-protected deposit scheme. The government continued providing subsidies to 
state-owned  enterprises  in  the  energy  sector  and  took  measures  to  support  citizens  and  businesses 
affected by the earthquakes. Contrary to policy commitments, there are still many tax exemptions and 
tax  reduction  schemes  in  place.  While  there  is  a  public  commitment  to  a  3  percent  medium-term 
budget deficit target, there was no progress on the adoption of a fiscal rule and the establishment of an 
independent body to monitor its implementation. 

Macroeconomic stability 

Türkiye’s 
demand 
domestic 
moderated,  but  economic  growth 
remained  robust.  Although  domestic 
demand  has  been  declining  since  mid-
2023, 
to  economic 
growth  remained  upbeat  until  early 
tightening  of 
the 
2024,  despite 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  Real  GDP 
grew  by  5.1%  in  2023,  lower  than  the 

its  contribution 

40 

 
 
 
5.5%  expansion  recorded  in  2022  but  close  to  the  5-year  average  (2018-2022).  Economic  growth 
picked  up  in  the  first  quarter  of  2024  to  5.3%  year-on‑year  but  decelerated  to  2.5%  in  the  second 
quarter as household consumption and investment activity moderated strongly. On the other hand, the 
contribution of net exports to economic growth turned positive since the beginning of 2024. Türkiye 
continued catching up with the EU and its per capita GDP in purchasing power standards increased 
further to 73% of the EU average in 2023, its highest level on record. 

in 

Tighter  economic  policies  helped  curb  external  imbalances  and  capital  inflows  trickled  back. 
The  current  account  deficit  fell  to 
4.1%  of  GDP  in  2023  and  declined 
further  in  the  first  half  of  2024. 
Access  to  foreign  finance  has  been 
times  of 
uninterrupted  even 
economic  stress.  Türkiye’s  5-year 
credit  default  swap  spread  has 
declined  since  May  2023,  from 
above 700 basis points to around 280 
in  September  2024,  back  to  its  pre-
2018 level. Attracted by the ongoing 
normalisation, 
policy 
economic 
investment 
and  other 
portfolio 
inflows increased, making it possible 
to  replenish  foreign  exchange  reserves,  while  net  reserves  turned  positive  although  still  remaining 
low.  Foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  inflows  remained  low  (1%  of  GDP  in  2023).  External  debt 
declined to around 45% of GDP in 2023, decreasing from the peak of 60% of GDP reached during 
COVID-19.  The  open  net  foreign  exchange  position  of  non-financial  companies  increased  in  early 
2024, while their short-term position remained in surplus. 

Decisive  monetary  policy  action  lowered  inflationary  pressures  and  inflation,  although  it 
remained  very  high.  The  central  bank  gradually  raised  its  key  policy  rate  between  June  2023  and 
March  2024  from  8.5%  to  50%  and  used  sectoral  credit  growth  limits  to  further  dampen  domestic 
demand.  It  also  unwound  some  of  the  distortive  macroprudential  measures  that  were  introduced  to 
sustain the previous policy regime of deeply negative real interest rates, while taking steps to sterilise 
excessive  lira  liquidity.  Monthly  inflation  decelerated  and,  after  peaking  at  75.4%  in  May  2024, 
annual  inflation  also  fell  steeply  to  52.0%  in  August  due  to  strong  base  effects  and  moderated 
demand.  The  central  bank  has  strengthened  its  communication,  signalling  a  commitment  to  keep  a 
tight monetary policy stance until a sustained decline in the underlying trend of monthly inflation is 
observed and inflation expectations converge to the projected target range. It also announced that it is 
ready to further tighten its monetary policy stance if there is a significant and persistent deterioration 
in  the  inflation  outlook.  After  a  bout  of  large  depreciation  in  mid-2023  as  foreign  exchange 
interventions to prop up the lira stopped, the new policies were instrumental in reining in exchange 
rate volatility. 

Consolidation measures lowered the very high budget deficit and kept government indebtedness 
moderate.  Corrective  measures  adopted  in  summer  2023  kept  the  2023  central  government  budget 
deficit to 5.2% of GDP, compared to the planned of 6.4% of GDP. The deficit was, however, much 
higher  than  in  the  previous  year 
due  to  large  earthquake  related 
costs  and  pre-election  spending. 
The  2024  central  government 
budget targets a deficit of 6.4% of 
GDP,  of  which  close  to  3%  of 
GDP  is  due  to  post-earthquake 
is 
reconstruction.  The  budget 
largely  an  extension  of  previous 
fiscal  planning 
policies, 

and 

41 

 
 
remains marred by ad hoc measures. The authorities announced new consolidation measures in mid-
2024  with  the goal  of supporting  disinflation  and  further reducing  the budget deficit.  The measures 
contained  some  spending  cuts  and  broadened  the  of  tax  bases.  In  2023,  the  government  debt  ratio 
declined slightly to 29.3% of GDP compared to the previous year, helped by the strong denominator 
effect from very  high inflation and the better budget deficit outturn. However, net government debt 
increased  to  20.9%  of  GDP  from  16.8%  in  2022  due  to  lower  net  assets  of  the  central  bank.  The 
medium-term  budget  framework  is  subject  to  frequent  changes  and  is  not  sufficiently  credible  and 
binding.  

The  macroeconomic  policy  mix  focused  on  lowering  inflation.  Monetary  policy  tightened 
substantially,  supporting  macroeconomic  stabilisation.  In  addition,  the  macroprudential  framework 
was simplified, normalising financial markets and helping the central bank’s disinflation drive. Fiscal 
targets  were  outperformed,  and  the  authorities  took  steps  to  control  the  large  budget  deficit  in  line 
with the main policy goal of reducing inflationary pressures. 

Functioning of product markets 

Business environment 

The  authorities  took  some  steps  to  improve  the  business  environment,  but  transparency  and 
predictability, as well as a large informal economy, remained a concern. The normalisation and 
simplification  of  economic  policy  was  a  major  factor  in  improving  the  business  environment.  In 
addition, stakeholder consultations between the authorities, the private sector and financial institutions 
increased.  In  March  2024,  the  Coordination  Council  for  the  Improvement  of  the  Investment 
Environment  (YOIKK)  adopted  a  new  action  plan  on  the  business  and  investment  environment  for 
2024 and 2025. The plan covers a wide range of actions in the field of public administration, State aid 
and  investments,  labour  market,  climate  and  energy,  finance  and  taxation,  industry,  trade,  logistics 
and telecommunication. The Government also adopted a new FDI strategy for 2024‑2028, keeping its 
target  of  increasing  the  Türkiye’s  share  in  global  FDIs  to  1.5%  (from  0.8%  in  2023).  While 
stakeholder  consultation  was  added  as  a  cross-cutting  issue  to  the  plan,  Türkiye  still  lacks  a 
mechanism  for  systematically  consulting  business  organisations  and  social  partners  when  preparing 
new  legislation.  Even  though  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms  have  been  promoted, 
commercial  judicial  processes  are  slow,  and  a  large  backlog  of  commercial  court  cases  remains. 
Intellectual property right enforcement remains very weak. Although declining in the last 5 years, the 
informal sector’s share in the economy remains structurally high and well above the OECD and EU 
averages.  The  government  continued  to  implement  its  action  plan  to  fight  against  the  informal 
economy  (2023-2025),  but  the  lack  of  performance  indicators  hinders  the  monitoring  of 
implementation progress. 

State influence on product markets 

Price-setting interventions declined, but State aid transparency and control remained weak. The 
25% cap on rent increases was abolished in July 2024. As part of the efforts to contain the impact of 
high  energy  prices,  25  cubic  metres  of  natural  gas  per  month  were  provided  free  of  charge  to 
households between June 2023 and May 2024. Regulatory authorities continued to carry out extensive 
price  audits  to  investigate  allegations  of  unfair  pricing  and  stockpiling.  The  fines  were  increased 
considerably in May 2024. The State Aid Law cannot be enforced due to the lack of implementing 
legislation  and  operational  institutional  framework.  Türkiye  has  not  formally  established  a 
comprehensive State aid inventory or implemented an action plan to align all State aid schemes with 
the EU acquis. 

Privatisation and restructuring 

The scope of privatisation remained limited. This is partly because Türkiye has already privatised 
many  of  its  state-owned  enterprises.  The  Turkish  Wealth  Fund  (TWF)  has  a  portfolio  of  assets 
consisting  of  31  companies  from  the  financial  (including  state-owned  banks,  Borsa  Istanbul  and 
consolidated  public  insurance  companies),  telecommunications,  petrochemicals,  real  estate,  mining, 
agriculture and transport sectors. In February 2024, the TWF successfully issued a EUR 500 million 
Eurobond, and completed its first international Islamic finance transaction in March 2024. 

42 

 
 
Functioning of the financial market 

The banking sector has adapted relatively smoothly to the changing policy environment, even if 
it still  faces  significant challenges.  Since mid-2023, the central  bank  has introduced  new  selective 
tightening  measures  to  suppress  consumer  lending  and  support  lending  for  exports,  investment  and 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). As a result of these measures and the significant rise in 
the  policy  rate,  real  lending  has  declined.  The  quality  of  the  loan  portfolio  held  by  Turkish  banks 
remained satisfactory. The non‑performing loan ratio fell to 1.5% in 2023 and remained low by July 
2024  (although  this  percentage  was  still  affected  by  forbearance  measures  introduced  during  the 
pandemic). Commercial banks remained stable and well capitalised, although capitalisation remained 
lower  in  state  banks  in  comparison  to  private  banks.  However,  net  interest  margins  and  returns  on 
both assets and equity declined, affected by financial repression measures. The authorities increased 
reserve requirements on FX-protected deposits and lowered their remuneration. As a result, their share 
in total deposits fell from a peak of 26% in August 2023 to close to 9% at the end of August 2024. 
Very high inflation suppressed real assets growth, and the total assets of the banking sector declined 
further from 96% in 2022 to 89% of GDP in 2023. The share of foreign-owned banks in total banking 
sector assets remained broadly unchanged at 25%. 

Functioning of the labour market 

and 

male 

Employment increased, but the labour market continued to face structural challenges. Türkiye’s 
labour  market  remained  strong  in  2023  and  improved  further  in  the  first  half  of  2024.  The 
employment  rate  increased  to  48.3%  last  year,  while  unemployment  rate  fell  to  9.4%.  The 
unemployment rate for women fell to 
12.6%.  However, 
the  composite 
measure  of  labour  underutilisation 
increased to 22.8% in 2023 (31% for 
women).  Despite  overall 
strong 
economic growth, the significant gap 
female 
between 
employment  rate  persisted  (65.7% 
for  men  against  31.3%  for  women). 
in  certain  occupations, 
Barriers 
limited 
roles, 
traditional  gender 
childcare  facilities  and  a  lack  of 
skills  continue 
to  restrict  female 
labour  force  participation.  Despite  a 
downward trend in recent years, both the youth unemployment rate and the share of young people not 
in employment, education, or training increased and remained high at 17.4% and 22.5% respectively 
in  2022  and  2023.  Regional labour market  disparities  declined  further,  reaching  one  of  their  lowest 
levels  ever  with  unemployment rates  across  different  regions ranging  from  4.9% to 17.2% in 2023. 
Following  two  large  increases  in  2023,  the  net  minimum  wage  was  raised  again  by  49.1%  at  the 
beginning  of  2024.  However,  the  authorities  reverted  to  annual  minimum  wage  adjustments,  which 
should help reduce inflation inertia.  

2.3.2. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union 

Education and innovation 

Efforts to improve human capital continued, but the skills mismatch remained a key concern. 
General government expenditure on education spending was 2.9% of GDP in 2023, increasing by 0.4 
percentage points (pps) compared to 2022. The share of expenditure on primary and lower secondary 
education  remained  below  the  OECD  averages  and  in  the  OECD's  Programme  for  International 
Student Assessment (PISA) 2022 Türkiye scored below the OECD average in all three (mathematics, 
reading, and science) assessed subjects. In the 2022-2023 school year, net enrolment rates increased 
throughout  all  stages  of  the  education  system,  but  only  marginally  for  primary  and  pre‑school 
education.  Despite  continuous  improvement  in  school  enrolment,  addressing  skills  mismatches  in 

43 

 
 
Türkiye  remains  a  key  challenge  for  strengthening  the  competitiveness  of  the  economy.  Türkiye 
continues to score poorly in educational attainment in the Global Gender Gap Index calculated by the 
World Economic Forum, ranking only 129 out of 146 countries in 2023. The implementation of the 
National  Youth  Employment  Strategy and  Action  Plan  (2021-2023), including activities to  promote 
career guidance and vocational training, was completed. The labour market uptake is better for VET-
trained  students  than  for  students  with  traditional  tertiary-level  education,  notably  for  the  VET-
students in dual education. In the secondary, technical and vocational schools, and in the vocational 
training  centres,  curricula  are  being  updated.  The  share  of  students  in  vocational  and  technical 
secondary education fell by 1.9 pps to 26.1% in 2023. After a gradual increase from 0.8% to 1.4% 
between 2013 and 2021, the share of R&D expenditure in GDP fell for the first time to 1.3% in 2022, 
with the gap from the EU average remaining large at 2.2%. Almost 40% of adults report no computer 
experience. 

Physical capital and quality of infrastructure 

Investment activity  increased significantly with further steps to advance digitalisation and the 
greening of the economy. Total investment accounted for 31.9% of GDP in 2023, up by 2.7 pps from 
its 2022 level. The share of construction in total investment rebounded to 42.8% in 2023, mostly due 
to  reconstruction  efforts  in  the  aftermath  of  the  February  2023  earthquakes.  Türkiye  retains  its 
ambition  of  becoming  a  regional  energy  hub,  which  is  why  it  is  investing  heavily  in  expanding  its 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and natural gas storage capacity. The share of renewable energy 
continued  to  increase,  reaching  56%  of  installed  power  and  42%  of  energy  generation  in  2023. 
Moreover, the Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (YEKDEM) was updated, allowing 
for  power  plants  operational  by  the  end  of  2030  to  benefit  from  updated  feed-in  tariffs,  mostly  to 
compensate for depreciation in the Turkish lira. While the ICT sector’s share in GDP remained low at 
2.5%  in  2023,  Türkiye  is  pursuing  efforts  to  accelerate  the  digitalisation  process  by  extending  the 
scope of e-government services, regulating and monitoring e-commerce markets, and supporting SME 
digitalisation.  Türkiye  ranks  10  out  of  35  countries  with  an  overall  score  of  81%  in  e-government 
maturity, which is above the EU average (70%). Digitalisation efforts in businesses continued, with 
96% of companies having internet access in 2023. 

Sectoral and enterprise structure 

The economy is diversified, with a well-developed service sector and strong manufacturing and 
agriculture sectors. Services recovered from COVID-19, and their share in GDP increased to 54.1% 
in 2023, up by 2.4 pps from 2022. The industry’s share fell to 22.9% of GDP in 2023. Boosted by 
earthquake  recovery  works,  the  construction  sector  increased  its  economic  weight  with  its  share  in 
GDP increasing from 4.9% in 2022 to 5.5% in 2023. However, the sector remained far below its very 
high pre-2019 levels. The agriculture sector’s share fell slightly to 6.2% in 2023, broadly unchanged 
relative to its medium-term average. SMEs are the backbone of the economy, accounting for 70.6% of 
employment  in  2022,  but  only  36.4%  of  the  total  value  added.  Around  56%  of  SMEs  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  operate  in  low  technology  sectors.  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  various 
economic support schemes that target SMEs. The share of total loans provided to SMEs increased to 
around 28% in 2023, up from 24% in the previous 5 years, yet access to and the cost of long-term 
finance remained a problem. 

Economic integration with the EU and price competitiveness  

Economic integration with the EU is high, rebounding from the strong decline in 2022. Türkiye 
is the EU’s fifth largest trading partner, representing 4.1% of the EU’s total trade in goods with the 
world in 2023, compared to 3.3% in 2022, while the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner. The EU’s 
share of Turkish goods exports increased slightly to 40.8% in 2023 from 40.5% in 2022  – halting a 
downward  trend  since  2018.  The  share  of  Turkish  imports  originating  in  the  EU  increased 
significantly from 25.6% in 2022 to 29.3% in 2023, albeit still below its long-term average. Although 
reaching  a  historic  high  of  4.3%  in  2023,  the  share  of  exports  of  goods  to  Russia  remained  rather 
small, and declined by nearly a quarter in the first 7 months of 2024. The nominal value of imports of 
goods  from  Russia  also  declined  both  in  2023  and  in  early  2024,  largely  influenced  by  lower 
international energy prices. 

44 

 
 
The EU’s share of FDI inflows into Türkiye was 53% in 2023, slightly below its long‑term average, 
while the  EU’s  share  in  the  overall  stock  of  FDI  stood  at  around  62%.  Trade  openness  declined  to 
66% in 2023 due to markedly lower deflators of both exports and imports of goods and services. By 
August 2024, the consumer price index-based real exchange rate had appreciated by 28% since July 
2023. Türkiye took steps to address some of the trade barriers with the EU, reducing its number from 
26 in early 2021 to 15 in 2024. 

2.4. PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, STATISTICS, FINANCIAL CONTROL  

Chapter 5: Public procurement 

EU  rules  ensure  that  the  public  procurement  of  goods  and  services  in  any  Member  State  is 
transparent and open to all EU companies on the basis of non-discrimination and equal treatment. 

Institutional set-up and legal alignment 

In terms of the legal framework, Türkiye's national public procurement legislation is partially in line 
with  the  EU  acquis  and  there  has  been  no  further  alignment  during  the  reporting  period.  The 
legislation broadly reflects the principles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union but 
includes discriminatory practices. In this regard, compulsory domestic price advantages and offsets, 
that allow authorities to demand compensatory measures if goods are not produced domestically, are 
incompatible with the EU acquis. The increasing number of exclusions that are not in line with the 
EU acquis narrows the scope of public procurement rules, which are partially aligned with the 2014 
Directives on public procurement. In addition, many sector-specific laws restrict transparency.  

The  country  continues  to  lack  a  unified  framework  for  coordinating,  supervising  and  monitoring 
public-private partnership operations. 

Türkiye’s  12th  Development  Plan  (2024-2028)  and  Medium-Term  Economic  Programme  (2024-
2026) aim to use public procurement tools to increase domestic production and reduce foreign trade 
deficit. For this purpose, public purchase guarantees are planned to be provided for high added value 
domestic products and domestic price advantage and offset practices will be maintained. In 2023, the 
implementation  of  the  domestic  price  advantage  in  international  tenders  was  continued  at  a  rate  of 
40% in number and 48% in value. 

The institutional framework needs further strengthening to secure the operational independence of 
the Public Procurement Board (PPB) within the Public Procurement Authority (PPA), which remains 
potentially  impaired  since  the  President  is  authorised  to  directly  appoint  the  chair  and  members 
without specific regard to candidates' education or sector experience. 

Implementation and enforcement capacity 

The size of Türkiye's public procurement market has increased in recent years, from 4.8% in 2022 to 
6.1% of GDP in 2023, owing primarily to high inflation and earthquake-related expenditures. 

The implementation capacity of the PPB remains stable with  316 staff.  The level of monitoring of 
contract  awards  and  implementation  is  satisfactory.  The  capacity  of  contracting  authorities  to 
manage public procurement processes continued to improve. Mechanisms are in place to identify and 

45 

 
 
 
tackle corrupt and fraudulent practices, including rules on integrity and conflict of interest. 

However, in 2023, excessive use of the negotiated procedure, which corresponds to 30% and 43% of 
the total tenders, respectively, in  terms  of  value and number  of  tenders,  continued.  The  widespread 
use of this practice results in the allegations of political influence over public tenders. A risk indicator 
system is also required to detect potential integrity issues in the procurement process. 

Efficient remedy system 

The  right  to  a  legal  remedy  is  secured  in  the  Constitution,  and  the  public  procurement  law  sets  an 
institutional framework and a mechanism for handling complaints. However, the system needs to be 
further  aligned  with  the  Remedies  Directive.  To  that  end,  establishing  a  fully  independent 
procurement review board, separate from the PPA and ensuring the independence of board members, 
remains pending as a priority.  

The  PPB  received  1  626  complaints  in  2023,  corresponding  to  2.2%  of  contracts  that  allow  for 
complaints, a decline from 1 773 complaints but a rise from 2.08% in 2022. The appointment policy 
and the PPB’s position as part of the PPA remained a source of concern. 

Chapter 18: Statistics 

European statistics are developed, produced and disseminated by EU Member States, guided by the 
principles  and  quality  criteria  elaborated  in  the  Regulation  on  European  statistics,  such  as 
professional  independence,  impartiality,  reliability,  accessibility  and  statistical  confidentiality. 
Common  rules  are  provided  for  the  methodology,  production  and  dissemination  of  statistical 
information,  which  are  further  specified  in  sectoral  legislation  that  constitute  the  EU  acquis  on 
statistics. 

On statistical infrastructure, Türkiye’s statistics legislation is based on European standards and on 
the  principles  of  the  European  Statistics  Code  of  Practice.  Concerns  persist  on  the  credibility  of 
TurkStat and of key macroeconomic statistics. The institution still lacks transparent appointment and 
dismissal  procedures,  including  professional  criteria  for  the  appointment  of  TurkStat’s  President. 
Türkiye  further  improved  the  use  of  public  institutions'  administrative  records  and  strengthened 
cooperation between TurkStat and other data providers.  

As regards registers and classifications, registers in the statistical office are updated regularly. The 
main classifications are aligned with the EU acquis. 

On macroeconomic statistics, Türkiye improved the level of compliance of its national and regional 
accounts in terms of timeliness and provision of the data, but there are still data gaps. Gross National 
Income (GNI) calculations are not yet fully in line with the ESA 2010, and the GNI inventory is not 
fully  aligned  with  the  latest  Eurostat  GNI  Inventory  Guide.    The  excessive  deficit  procedure  data 
availability  and  timeliness  for  TurkStat  improved  after  the  signature  of  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding in March 2023. However, further progress is still needed on the coverage and quality 
of excessive deficit procedure notifications and government finance statistics reporting. Türkiye made 
progress  in  non-financial  sector  accounts  and  transmitted  to  Eurostat  data  for  2009-2022.  Despite 
some issues with timeliness, Türkiye produces good quality statistics on international trade in goods. 
Improvements are needed on international trade in services statistics. It continued reporting quarterly 
balance  of  payments  and  international  investment  position  data.  Eurostat  receives  and  disseminates 
monthly data for the harmonised indices of consumer prices from Türkiye. 

As  regards  business  statistics,  TurkStat  made  good  progress  in  aligning  its  statistical  business 
registers with the European Business Statistics Regulation requirements. It should continue efforts to 
fully meet the new short-term business statistics requirements. Research and development statistics, as 
well as railway, maritime and regional transport statistics have a high level of compliance, while work 
is still ongoing for air transport and road freight transport statistics. The annual surveys on the use of 
information  and  communication  technologies  largely  meet  EU  standards.  The  country  has  still  not 
transmitted data to Eurostat on foreign affiliates statistics. 

46 

 
 
Social  statistics  are  highly  compliant  with  EU  standards.  TurkStat  improved  the  regularity  and 
timeliness  of monthly unemployment data. A major revision was made in the area of social protection 
statistics,  obtaining  detailed  administrative  record  data,  access  to  additional  data  sources  and 
methodological improvements. Türkiye also produces statistics on immigration and emigration, but it 
does not yet collect statistics on asylum and managed migration in line with EU requirements. 

On  agricultural statistics,  the  preparation  of  the  agricultural census started.  Türkiye  is  to  adopt  its 
‘Strategy to improve the Turkish Agricultural Statistics System (2024-2028)’. It made changes in the 
legislative  framework  to  improve  the  quality  of  administrative  registers.  Statistics  for  most  of  the 
crops and critical animal production, milk and dairy are available and sent to Eurostat. Cereals and oil 
seed crop balances are also transmitted to Eurostat. The economic accounts for agriculture are still not 
fully in line with the EU acquis. Monthly and annual energy statistics and data on energy prices are 
sent  regularly.  TurkStat  published  the  outcomes  of  its  first  survey  on  energy  consumption  in 
households  for  the  reference  year  2022.  Türkiye  produces  most  of  the  environmental  statistics. 
Further progress is still needed on water resources, water abstraction and waste generation statistics. 
Physical energy flow accounts were disseminated for the first time for the reference years 2017-2021. 

Chapter 32: Financial control 

The EU promotes the reform of national governance systems to improve managerial accountability, 
sound  financial  management  of  income  and  expenditure,  and  external  audit  of  public  funds.  The 
financial control rules further protect the EU’s financial interests against fraud in the management of 
EU funds and the euro against counterfeiting. 

Public internal financial control 

The strategic framework is partially in place. The public internal financial control policy paper has 
not  been  updated  since  2013.  Türkiye  still  lacks  a  comprehensive  strategic  framework  for  public 
administration reform and for public finance management. The credibility of both the public finance 
management framework and the measures in the policy documents is undermined by inconsistencies 
in  the  various  planning  documents  and  strategies,  as  well  as  a  lack  of  coordination  on  regular 
monitoring and reporting. 

Türkiye has a uniform administrative management structure that incorporates elements of managerial 
accountability  and  delegation  with  a  results-oriented  performance  management  system.  The  Public 
Financial  Management  and  Control  Law  (PFMC)  regulates  all  public  institutions  and  specifies  the 
elements  of  financial  control.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  harmonise  legislation,  managerial 
accountability,  including  reporting  structures,  decision-making  delegation  and  internal  control 
operations.  

The PFMC regulates internal control, which is largely in line with international standards. However, 
capacity  and  ownership  problems  continue  to  undermine  the  implementation  of  internal  control 
systems. The Ministry of Treasury and Finance prepared the Internal Control System Monitoring and 
Evaluation Guide and the Public Institutional Risk Management Guide in April 2024. However, risk 
management  practice,  as  well  as  monitoring  and  reporting  of  irregularities  need  to  be  improved 
further. The inclusion of local administrations and state-owned enterprises in Türkiye’s treasury single 
account raises concerns. 

The PFMC regulates internal audit  practices in compliance with international standards. However, 
the  purpose,  authority  and  responsibility  of  internal  audit  are  undermined  by  the  lack  of  a  legal 
requirement  to  have  internal  audit  units  in  ministries.  Furthermore,  the  status  of  internal  audit  unit 
heads must be legalised; the number of internal auditors needs to be increased; and related manuals 
are required to be updated. There is no systematic follow-up to the implementation of internal audit 
recommendations. The lack of clarity in the legislation and in practice between the internal audit and 
inspection organisations jeopardises the internal audit function’s effectiveness. 

The  Internal  Audit  Coordination  Board  is  the  central  harmonisation  unit  for  internal  audit.  Further 
action is needed to ensure its independence and strengthen its capacity, organisational structure and 
resources to fulfil its mandate. 

47 

 
 
External audit 

The  constitutional  and  legal  framework  provide  for  the  independence  of  the  Turkish  Court  of 
Accounts  (TCA).  There  are  concerns  about  the  fiscal  discipline,  transparency  and  accountability  of 
the  Türkiye  Wealth  Fund  (TWF),  chaired  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  not  fully  subject  to 
direct audit by the TCA. The TWF is audited by an independent audit firm and by auditors appointed 
by the President. Not all companies in the TWF portfolio are audited by the TCA. The audit reports 
on the TWF operations are not publicly available. The Disaster Reconstruction Fund, created in 2023 
to  manage  the  funds  allocated to  disaster  recovery  work,  is  not  yet  operational,  is  exempt  from  the 
general budget and the TCA audit scope. 

Turkish  Court  of  Accounts  Law  complies  with  International  Organisation  of  Supreme  Audit 
Institutions  standards.  It  establishes  an  almost  exhaustive  audit  mandate  and  allows  the  TCA  full 
discretion in performing its responsibilities. The TCA submits four audit reports a year to Parliament 
in  addition  to  a  statement  of  general  conformity.  However,  the  TCA  reports  are  only  evaluated  by 
Parliament during its budget deliberations. 

On  the  impact  of  audit  work,  TCA  reports  are  published  online  every  year,  with  the  exception  of 
those  on  state-owned  economic  enterprises.  More  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  TCA  audit  findings, 
recommendations and the performance of public institutions is needed. The audited institutions should 
systematically and swiftly implement the TCA recommendations and a follow-up mechanism needs to 
be established. There is a need to separate the discussion of budget and audit issues. 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

Although  Türkiye  has  achieved  a  good  level  of  alignment  with  the  EU  acquis,  its  legislation  still 
needs  to  be  fully  aligned  with  the  EU  Directive  on  the  fight  against  fraud  to  the  EU’s  financial 
interests by means of criminal law. The State Supervisory Council was designated as the anti-fraud 
coordination service (AFCOS). There is no national anti-fraud strategy. In the previous year Türkiye 
reported  139  cases  to  the  Commission  via  the  online  Irregularity  Management  System.  Türkiye 
cooperates  well  with  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office  and  should  continue  building  up  the  track 
record of cooperation on investigations as well as on reporting of irregularities.   

Protection of the euro against counterfeiting 

Türkiye has reached a high level of alignment with the EU acquis in this area. A dedicated department 
in the central bank carries out technical analysis of counterfeit money, including euro banknotes. In 
addition,  the  Turkish  State  Mint  carries  out  technical  analyses  of  counterfeit  coins,  including  euro 
coins.  Financial  penalties  are  imposed  on  credit  institutions  that  fail  to  withdraw  counterfeits  from 
circulation. 

3. GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION  

Cyprus  

Türkiye continued to refuse to recognise and cooperate with the Republic of Cyprus. Despite repeated 
calls by the European Council and the Commission, Türkiye has yet to fulfil its obligations as outlined 
in the Declaration of the European Community and its Member States of 21 September 2005 and in 
Council Conclusions, including those of December 2006 and December 2015. Türkiye did not fulfil 
its obligation to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to 
the Association Agreement and did not remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including 
restrictions on direct transport links with the Republic of Cyprus. Türkiye also refused to cooperate 
with the Republic of Cyprus on security-related issues, including terrorism. Türkiye continued to veto 
applications  by  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  to  join  several  international  organisations,  including  the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 

There  were  no  unauthorised  drilling  activities  by  Türkiye  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  in  the 
reporting  period.  Türkiye  issued  several  navigational  telexes  for  conducting  seismic  surveys  and 
scientific research activities, but none in areas that include parts of the exclusive economic zone of 

48 

 
 
 
Cyprus. The EU remains committed to defending its interests and those of its Member States as well 
as  to  upholding  regional  stability.  In  November  2023,  following  the  fourth  annual  review  of  the 
framework  for  restrictive  measures  in  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised  drilling  activities  in  the 
Eastern  Mediterranean,  the  European  Council  extended  the  regime  for  a  further  year,  until 
30 November 2024. Currently, two individuals are subject to sanctions. 

Türkiye’s  military  exercises  in  the  maritime  zones  of  Cyprus  continued.  The  flights  of  Turkish 
unmanned  aerial  vehicles  in  the  Flight  Information  Region  (FIR)  and  national  airspace  of  the 
Republic of Cyprus also continued unabated. Türkiye continued to increase the militarisation of the 
occupied  area  by  upgrading  its  military  drone  base  in  Lefkoniko  and  naval  base  in  Bogazi.  The 
harassment of Cypriot fishing vessels by Türkiye also continued. 

In the reporting period, Türkiye criticised the decision of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to renew 
the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) without the consent of 
the Turkish Cypriot community. Türkiye also accused UNFICYP of partiality. UNFICYP’s mandated 
authority  extends throughout the  island of  Cyprus, and  the restrictions  on its freedom  of movement 
can pose serious risks to the safety and security of UN personnel serving in peacekeeping operations. 

Despite international condemnations, and the inadmissibility of the settlement of any parts of Varosha 
by  people  other  than  its  inhabitants  as  stipulated  in  UNSC  resolution  550  (1984),  Türkiye  did  not 
reverse its actions undertaken to open the entire fenced-off area of Varosha, which created a new fait 
accompli on the ground.  The restrictions imposed in 2022 on the activities of UNFICYP within the 
fenced-off area of Varosha remained in effect – challenging UNFICYP’s ability to execute its tasks in 
accordance with its mandate, and violating UNSC Resolution 789 (1992). 

Türkiye gave its consent to the appointment of the Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on 
Cyprus,  while  indicating  that  it  considered  the  length  and  content  of  the  mandate  to  be  limited. 
Türkiye’s  authorities  repeatedly  stated  that  any  process  seeking  a  bi-zonal,  bi-communal  federation 
would not be successful. 

Türkiye  persistently  advocated  for  a  ‘two-state  solution’  in  Cyprus,  contrary  to  relevant  UNSC 
Resolutions.  The  so-called,  internationally  not  recognised,  ‘Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus’, 
has  been  an  observer  in  the  Organization  of  Turkic  States  (OTS)  since  2022.  This  violates  the 
principle of territorial integrity and the UN Charter. The EU recognises only the Republic of Cyprus 
as a subject of international law in accordance with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and has stressed 
that any action to facilitate or assist in any way the international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot 
secessionist  entity  severely  damages  efforts  to  create  an  environment  conducive  to  resuming 
settlement talks under the auspices of the UN. 

The EU remains fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue within the UN 
framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UNSC  Resolutions  and  in  line  with  the  principles  on 
which the EU is founded and its acquis. The EU has expressed, most recently in the European Council 
Conclusions of April 2024, its readiness to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led 
process, with all the appropriate means at its disposal. In April 2024, the EU welcomed UN Secretary-
General’s  appointment  of  his  Personal  Envoy  on  Cyprus.  The  European  Union  attaches  particular 
importance to the resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-
Türkiye cooperation. 

As  emphasised  in  the  Negotiating  Framework  and  Council  declarations,  Türkiye  is  expected  to 
actively support the negotiations on a fair, comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue 
within  the  UN  framework,  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  UNSC  Resolutions  and  in  line  with  the 
principles on which the EU is founded and the EU  acquis. It is important that Türkiye reaffirms its 
commitment to the UN-led settlement talks on Cyprus in line with the relevant UNSC Resolutions, 
including their external aspects. No unilateral actions should be taken that could raise tensions on the 
island  and  prevent  the  resumption  of  talks.  On  Varosha,  Türkiye  must  immediately  reverse  the 
unilateral actions announced on 20 July 2021 and all steps taken since October 2020 that run contrary 
to  the relevant  UNSC  Resolutions.  The  EU  underlines  the importance  of  the  status  of  Varosha  and 
calls for full respect of UNSC Resolutions (particularly Resolutions 550, 789 and 1251). 

49 

 
 
Peaceful settlement of border disputes 

The  positive  climate  and  re-engagement  between  Türkiye  and  Greece  after  the  February  2023 
earthquakes  gained  strength.  In  addition  to  a  number  of  ministerial  meetings,  the  Greek  Prime 
Minister  and  the  Turkish  President  met  in  September  2023  in  New  York  during  the  UN  General 
Assembly, and in December 2023 in Athens, where they signed the Athens Declaration of Friendship 
and Good Neighbourliness. The two leaders also met twice in 2024, in Ankara on 13 May and on the 
sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington on 11 July. 

Turkish  and  Greek  delegations  met  several  times  to  discuss  military  confidence-building  measures, 
and Greece implemented a scheme of short-stay tourist visits for Turkish nationals to visit 10 Greek 
islands  in  order  to  promote  people-to-people  contacts  between  Greece  and  Türkiye,  which  the 
Commission welcomed, as set out in the EU Action Plan for the Eastern Mediterranean route, noting 
the  specific  conditions  set  out  for  implementation  and  monitoring.  Despite  the  positive  atmosphere 
and  the  meetings,  the  issue  of  the  Aegean  Sea  continental  shelf  and  exclusive  economic  zones 
continued  to  affect  bilateral  relations.  Since  January  2024,  Türkiye  has  issued,  on  the  pretext  of 
aeronautical  exercises,  a  series  of  general  navigational  warnings  calling  for  the  demilitarisation  of 
twenty three islands granted to Greece by treaties, implicitly raising claims over Greek sovereignty of 
these  islands.  Türkiye  also  objected  to  Greece’s  announcement  to  establish  a  marine  park  within 
Greek territorial waters.  

The possible extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea under Article 
3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) continued to weigh on Greece-
Türkiye relations. The 1995 declaration of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that any unilateral 
action by Greece to extend its territorial waters would be considered a casus belli still holds. 

Since February 2023, Turkish violations of Greek airspace have decreased drastically, with no flights 
over Greek inhabited areas reported. Violations of Greek territorial waters continued to be reported in 
2024, and rose compared to 2023. In July 2024, Türkiye attempted to impede survey activities for the 
Great  Sea  Interconnector,  an  EU  project  of  Common  Interest.  Türkiye  insists  on  its  plans  for  an 
electricity  interconnector  with  the  so  called,  internationally  non-recognised,  “Turkish  Republic  of 
Northern Cyprus” in the non-government controlled areas of the Republic of Cyprus.   

As  highlighted  by  the  Council  Conclusions  in  December  2022  and  the  European  Council’s 
Conclusions of June 2022 and stemming from obligations under the Negotiating Framework, Türkiye 
is  expected  to  make  an  unequivocal  commitment  to  good  neighbourly  relations,  international 
agreements and the peaceful settlement of disputes having recourse, if necessary, to the International 
Court  of  Justice.  Türkiye  must  avoid  threats  and  actions  that  damage  good  neighbourly  relations, 
normalise  its  relations  with  the  Republic  of  Cyprus  and  respect  the  sovereignty  of  all  EU  Member 
States over their territorial sea and airspace as well as all their sovereign rights, including  inter alia 
the  right  to  explore  and  exploit  natural  resources  in  accordance  with  EU  and  international  law,  in 
particular the UNCLOS. 

The  2019  memorandum  of  understanding  (MoU)  on  the  delimitation  of  maritime  jurisdiction  areas 
between Türkiye and the Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) infringes the sovereign rights 
of third states, does not comply with UNCLOS and cannot produce any legal consequences for third 
states. 

The  October  2022  MoU  between  Türkiye  and  Libya’s  GNU  for  the  development  of  bilateral 
scientific,  technical,  technological,  legal,  administrative  and  commercial  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
hydrocarbons on land and at sea has still not been ratified by Türkiye.  

Regional cooperation 

Good  neighbourly  relations  are  an  essential  part  of  Türkiye’s  accession  process.  Bilateral  relations 
with other enlargement countries were good overall. However, they remained challenging with some 
neighbouring  EU  Member  States,  particularly  Greece  and  Cyprus.  Tensions  in  the  Aegean  and 
Eastern  Mediterranean  were  markedly  reduced  after  the  February  2023  earthquakes,  and  this 

50 

 
 
continued  during  the  reporting  period.  Actions  that  could  undermine  regional  stability  should  be 
avoided. 

Türkiye’s  policy  in  the  Western  Balkans  remained  aligned  with  the  EU’s  strategic  objectives  of 
regional stability, Euro-Atlantic integration and economic development. Türkiye portrayed itself as an 
EU  partner  in  the  region,  while  leveraging  its  distinctive  cultural  and  economic  ties.  Türkiye 
continued to ask for action against alleged members of the Gülen movement in the region, calling for 
their extradition and the closure of all affiliated schools and businesses. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Albania  are  at  the  level  of  strategic  partnership,  with  regular  high-level 
contacts  and  further  strengthened.  Türkiye  provided  continued  support  for  the  modernisation  of  the 
Albanian  Armed  Forces  as  a  NATO  member  and  strategic  partner.  The  Albanian  Prime  Minister 
visited Türkiye in February 2024 and co-chaired  with the Turkish President the first meeting of the 
High-Level  Cooperation  Council.  Six  bilateral  agreements  were  also  signed,  including  on 
environment  and  protected  areas,  defence,  urban  planning,  media  and  communications.  Türkiye 
continued  to  exert  pressure  on  Albania  to  deliver  on  dismantling  the  ‘Gülen’  movement  in  the 
country.  

Türkiye  remained  a  close  partner  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  supported  its  political  unity, 
territorial  integrity  and  sovereignty,  maintaining  regular  contacts  with  all  members  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina’s  tripartite  Presidency.  High-level  exchanges  were  frequent.  The  two  countries 
reaffirmed their commitment to the construction of the Sarajevo-Belgrade motorway, which Türkiye 
committed to finance.  

Türkiye has good relations with Serbia. The two Presidents maintained frequent contacts. In March 
2024,  the  Serbian  Deputy  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  took  part  in  the  Antalya 
Diplomatic Forum and met with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Türkiye sees Serbia as an 
important  country  for  regional  stability.  There  were  disagreements  over  Türkiye’s  support  to 
Kosovo’s  membership  in  the  Council  of  Europe  and  to  the  UNGA  Resolution  on  the  Srebrenica 
genocide. 

Türkiye maintained strong cultural and economic ties with Kosovo* and continued to advocate for its 
international  recognition.  Türkiye  and  Kosovo  signed  a  military  cooperation  agreement  in  January 
2024,  and  explored  cooperation  opportunities  in  the  economic,  commercial,  security  and  defence 
fields. In March 2024, Kosovo’s President participated in the Antalya Diplomatic Forum and met with 
the Turkish President. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Montenegro  remained  stable,  with  stated  intentions  to  further  develop 
bilateral cooperation. Some tensions arose in January 2024 after Montenegro’s refusal to extradite a 
Turkish national, reportedly involved in organised crimes, to the Turkish authorities. The issue was 
resolved in August when the national was extradited. Following the government reshuffle, the newly 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro visited Türkiye as his first official visit abroad. 

Türkiye  and  North  Macedonia  have  a  Strategic  Partnership  Agreement  and  continued  to  engage 
actively.  In  September  2024,  the  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  visited  Skopje  and  met  his 
counterpart. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Georgia  are  at  the  level  of  strategic  partnership,  with  regular  high-level 
contacts,  including  in  the  framework  of  a  High-Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council.  Türkiye 
welcomed the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Georgia. 

Türkiye’s  relations  with  the  Republic  of  Moldova  remained  stable  and  at  the  level  of  strategic 
cooperation. High-level exchanges focused on trade, energy, cooperation in the Black Sea region, as 
well as Turkish support for projects in Gagauzia. Türkiye continued to support Moldova’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Türkiye welcomed the EU’s decision to grant candidate status to Moldova. In 
March 2024, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova attended the Antalya Diplomatic Forum. 

 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of independence. 

51 

 
 
 
Türkiye’s  relations  with  Ukraine  are  of  strategic  significance.  Türkiye  consistently  supported 
Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and engaged politically and diplomatically, including 
in the facilitation of the export of the Ukrainian grain and of the prisoners’ exchange.  Nevertheless, 
Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia in the context of the latter’s full-scale war 
of aggression against Ukraine.  Türkiye and Ukraine developed solid cooperation in the defence sector 
and  dialogue  on  Ukraine’s  recovery  and  reconstruction  by  establishing  the  Turkish-Ukrainian 
Reconstruction Task Force. Türkiye welcomed the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with 
Ukraine.  In  March  2024,  the  Ukrainian  President  paid  an  official  visit to  Türkiye  and met  with  the 
President.   

4.  ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP 

CLUSTER 2: INTERNAL MARKET 

This cluster covers: free movement of goods (Chapter 1), freedom of movement for workers (Chapter 
2),  right  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  (Chapter  3),  free  movement  of  capital 
(Chapter  4),  company  law  (Chapter  6),  intellectual  property  law  (Chapter  7),  competition  policy 
(Chapter  8),  financial  services  (Chapter  9),  and  health  and  consumer  protection  (Chapter  28).  This 
cluster is  key  to  the good functioning  of the  EU-Turkey  Customs  Union  and to  integrating  Türkiye 
into the EU’s internal market. 

Chapter 1: Free movement of goods 

The free movement of goods ensures that many products can be traded freely across the EU based on 
common rules and procedures. Where products are governed by national rules, the  principle of the 
free movement of goods prevents these from creating unjustified barriers to  trade. 

General principles 

The EU framework for the free movement of goods is largely in place.  

Türkiye resolved, during the reporting period, a number of barriers liable to affect the free moment of 
goods  in  the  internal  market  and  the  alignment  with  the  EU  Common  Commercial  Policy. 
Specifically, Türkiye resolved the significant issue of the localisation and prioritisation measures for 
pharmaceutical  products,  which  violated  both  the  Customs  Union  and  WTO  provisions.  Türkiye 
phased  out  the  discriminatory  treatment  of  EU  tractors,  and  resolved  the  remaining  barriers  on 
cosmetics by largely aligning its legislation on cosmetics with the relevant EU  acquis. However, so 
far  Türkiye  has  fully  removed  only  one  barrier  in  the  context  of  intensified  engagement  on  the 
implementation of the Customs Union: burdensome export registration requirements for copper scrap. 
In addition, the Commission removed from its market access database six more barriers, which were 
considered obsolete.  

The  High-Level  Dialogue  on  Trade  on  8  July  8  2024,  led  by  Executive  Vice-President  and 
Commissioner for Trade and the Minister of Trade of Türkiye, reviewed the progress in resolving the 
priority barriers identified to date: elimination of export taxes on hides, skins, and wet-blue leather; 
opening and transparent administration of the preferential quotas for live bovine and beef meat for EU 
operators;  addressing  the  difficulties  faced  by  the  EU  operators  in  the  implementation  of  the  risk 
based TAREKS system; working on a prioritised list of EU products that can be exempted from the 
scope  of  the  import  surveillance  regime.  The  High-Level  Dialogue  also  identified  new  priority 
barriers  and  mapped  out  the  path  for  their  resolution.  These  newly  identified  priority  barriers  are: 
import surveillance by registration of textile products, import licences for re-treaded tyres, as well as 
difficulties faced by EU operators in obtaining alcohol banderols. 

However, Türkiye still applies artificial exchange rate on pharmaceutical products and does not accept 
the EU’s Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) certificates. It has retained local content requirements 
in  renewable  energy  and  tobacco  products,  which  create  de  facto  market  access  barriers  for  EU 
products in contravention of the Customs Union. Türkiye’s product safety controls on imported EU 

52 

 
 
 
goods  processed  through  its  electronic  TAREKS  system,  which  it  extended  in  2024,  may  require 
additional documentation and information, which is also contrary to the Customs Union provisions.  

Türkiye  needs  to  resolve all  outstanding  trade  barriers  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye as listed in the 
Access2Market database. 

Non-harmonised areas 

Türkiye’s mutual recognition  legislation  in  the non-harmonised  areas is in  line with  the  EU  acquis. 
However, Türkiye has notified only one product legal act in the non-harmonised areas in 2023 and no 
notification was made in 2024 until now. This is not sufficient, given the size of Türkiye’s economy 
and legislative activity and its close ties with the European Union’s economy via the Customs Union. 

Harmonised areas: quality infrastructure 

Türkiye  is  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on  standards,  technical  regulations,  conformity  assessment, 
accreditation, metrology and market surveillance. The national  Standards Institute is a full member 
of the European standards bodies. By the end of the reporting period, it had adopted 24 314 national 
standards aligned with European standards. The rate of harmonisation with both CEN and CENELEC 
standards is 99.77%. 

Türkiye has 60 notified bodies, six recognised third-party organisations, and two technical approval 
bodies  in  place.  The  Turkish  Accreditation  Agency  (TÜRKAK)  went  through  a  successful  peer 
evaluation process in March 2024. Türkiye implements market surveillance in compliance with the 
EU acquis and submits its annual programme to the European Commission. However, the coverage 
and effectiveness of market surveillance measures should be strengthened, and there is limited market 
surveillance on e-commerce activities. According to the market surveillance report for 2023, a total of 
207  988  products  were  checked  by  market  surveillance  authorities  in  2023  representing  a  11  % 
decline as compared to 2022. 

Harmonised area: sectoral legislation 

On the EU ‘new and global approach’ product acquis, Türkiye adopted legislation to align with the 
latest  acquis  on  medical  devices,  in  vitro  medical  devices  and  reclassification  of  certain  active 
products  without  an  intended  medical  purpose.  It  also  adopted  legislation  aiming  to  align  with  the 
acquis on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. Türkiye does not accept 
EU good manufacturing practice certificates on medicines for human use, in breach of Customs Union 
rules.  Türkiye  has  in  place  a  regulatory  data  protection  regime  since  2005.  However,  the  scope  is 
limited  and  excludes  biologics  and  combination  products.  Inadequate  protection  of  undisclosed  test 
and other data generated to obtain marketing licensing for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products 
do  not  converge  with  the  acquis.  On  the  EU  ‘old  approach’  product  acquis,  although  Türkiye 
amended  its  legislation  in  December  2023,  it  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  Regulation  on 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). 

On  procedural  measures,  Türkiye  has  specific  licensing  and  regulation  systems  for  economic 
operators dealing with drug precursors, with a strict follow-up and monitoring system in cooperation 
with the police and customs. It is aligned with the EU  acquis on licensing procedures for firearms. 
However, it made no progress on alignment with the acquis on cultural goods. 

Chapter 2: Freedom of movement for workers 

Citizens of one Member State have the right to work in another Member State and must be given the 
same working and social conditions as other workers. 

Türkiye  made  no  progress  on  access  to  the  labour  market  or  future  participation  in  the  European 
Employment Services (EURES) network. Türkiye has six labour force agreements with EU Member 
States, but has made no developments in preparations for joining the European Labour Authority.  

There  was  no  progress  on  the  coordination  of  social  security  systems.  Türkiye  is  a  party  to  the 
European Convention on Social Security. The number of bilateral social security agreements with EU 
Member States remains the same, with 15 agreements concluded.  

53 

 
 
Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 

EU  natural  and  legal  persons  have  the  right  to  establish  themselves  in  any  Member  State  and  to 
provide  cross-border  services.  For  certain  regulated  professions,  there  are  rules  on  mutual 
recognition of qualifications. EU rules on postal services focus on improving the quality of universal 
service, gradual market opening to competition, and the establishment of an independent regulator. 

There  was  no  progress  on  the  right  of  establishment,  which  remains  restricted  by  several 
requirements in Türkiye. 

On the freedom to provide cross-border services, service providers registered in the EU still face 
requirements on registration, licensing and authorisation. The point of single contact has not yet been 
created. There is no specific regulation or practice governing the temporary or occasional provision of 
services. 

As regards postal services, Türkiye still needs to align its national legislation with the Postal Services 
Directive. A reserved area in the letter mail market is maintained for the universal service provider. 
There  are  currently  52  other  postal  operators  active  in  the  postal  market.  The  national  regulatory 
authority  (the  Information  and  Communication  Technologies  Authority)  monitors  postal  market 
development. National legislation also needs to be aligned with the regulation on cross-border parcel 
delivery services. 

On the  mutual recognition of professional qualifications, the Vocational Qualifications Authority 
continued to implement the national qualification framework. The number of occupations that require 
compulsory certifications remains the same, with 204 occupations in total requiring certifications. The 
number  of  national  occupational  standards  reached  909  and  the  number  of  national  qualifications 
prepared  in  line  with  occupational  standards  totalled  663.  The  Turkish  Referencing  Report  to  the 
European Qualifications Framework is not updated. It is possible to make an online application for the 
recognition and equivalence of higher education qualifications. However, some regulated professions 
still require mutual recognition,  and  nationality  and language  requirements  have  not  been  removed. 
Continuous and significant  steps  are  needed  to  align national  legislation  with the  EU  acquis  in this 
area. 

Chapter 4: Free movement of capital 

In the EU, capital and investments must be able to move without restrictions, with common rules for 
cross-border payments. Banks and other economic operators apply certain rules to support the fight 
against money laundering and terrorist financing. 

On  capital  movements  and  payments,  restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  are  still in  place in many 
sectors.  Türkiye’s  legislation  on  real  estate  acquisition  by  foreigners  does  not  apply  to  all  EU 
nationals  in  a  non-discriminatory  way.  The  ability  for  citizens  of  neighbouring  countries  in  border 
provinces to buy real estate continued to be restricted for national security reasons. Türkiye maintains 
its restrictions on capital movements and foreign exchange-denominated transactions. The obligation 
of exporters to sell 40% of their foreign exchange earnings to the central bank was eased to 30% in 
June 2024. 

Türkiye  made  some  progress  in  payment  systems,  adding  to  the  good  level  of  preparation  already 
achieved.  The central  bank  adopted  new  implementing  legislation  on payment  services,  introducing 
the digital wallet as a payment instrument. Some amendments were made in the rules on data sharing 
of  payment  services,  particularly  for  data  transfer  to  relevant  third  parties  abroad  and  remote 
communication  tools.  The  central  bank  improved  the  payment  system  infrastructure  with  new 
technological  developments.  It  made  further  progress  in  the  implementation  of  the  Instant  and 
Continuous Transfer of Funds (FAST) system. Regarding the fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing, Türkiye was removed from the FATF’s list of jurisdictions subject to increased 
monitoring (‘grey list’) in June 2024. Türkiye must continue to work with the FATF to strengthen its 
anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. 

54 

 
 
Türkiye  strengthened  the  resources  of  its  financial  intelligence  unit,  the  Financial  Crimes 
Investigation Board (MASAK), and improved its utilisation of the financial intelligence it generates. 
This improved capacity is evident in the country’s track record on AML/CFT-related investigations 
and prosecutions. The number of suspicious transaction reports received by MASAK increased from 
425 322 in 2022 to 651 555 in 2023, continuing a positive trend over the last few years. The country 
also enhanced its asset confiscation system. Türkiye took steps to ensure that sanctions for AML/CFT 
violations and beneficial ownership requirements are dissuasive. 

In April 2024, the Constitutional Court abolished certain AML/CFT-related provisions of law on the 
prevention  of  financing  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  in  particular,  those  that 
granted  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  extensive  powers  over  civil  society  organisations  whose 
executives are prosecuted for AML/CFT offences. It also annulled certain parts of the AML/CFT law, 
removing  lawyers  as  obliged  entities  due  to  professional  secrecy  concerns  related  to  suspicious 
transaction reports. Türkiye should address these concerns. 

Chapter 6: Company law 

The EU has common rules on the formation, registration and disclosure requirements of a company, 
with complementary rules for accounting and financial reporting, and statutory audit. 

On  company  law  and  corporate  governance,  Türkiye  took  limited  legislative  action  over  the 
reporting  period.  On  domestic  mergers  and  divisions,  takeovers  (Directive  2004/25),  and  rules  on 
shareholder rights and long-term shareholder engagement (Directive 2017/828 - SRDII) there are still 
provisions  that  need  to  be  fully  aligned.  Alignment  with  Directive  2019/2121  on  cross-border 
operations  is  also  required.  On  the  disclosure  of  company  documents  in  the  business  register,  the 
country still lacks provisions requiring all limited liability companies to publish annual accounts.  

On  company  reporting,  in  December  2023,  the  Public  Oversight,  Accounting,  and  Auditing 
Standards  Authority  (POA)  published  Türkiye  Sustainability  Reporting  Standards  (TSRS)  and 
Climate Related Disclosures Standards. According to the TSRS, companies that meet at least two of 
the following conditions are obliged to provide sustainability reporting starting from 1 January 2024: 
total  assets exceeding  TRY  500  million,  annual  net sales  revenue  exceeding  TRY  1  billion and the 
number  of  employees  exceeding  250  people,  which  is  partially  in  line  with  the  applicable  acquis. 
Banks are obliged to report regardless of the stated conditions. The POA continued to reflect changes 
in  the  international  standards  to  the  national  standards  in  various  areas,  including  auditing.  The 
alignment  of  non-financial  information  and  government  payment  reports  remains  unclear,  namely 
concerning EU sustainability reporting standards and Directive 2013/34/EU.  

In  terms  of  listed  company  transparency  requirements,  the  capital  markets  law  governs  issuers' 
general responsibilities, and the Capital Markets Board publishes implementing rules to align with the 
EU  acquis  in  this  area.  The  Turkish  Commercial  Code  was  amended  to  increase  transparency  and 
disclose the identity of bearer shareholders. 

Chapter 7: Intellectual property law 

The EU has to a large extent harmonised rules for the legal protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR), covering notably patents, trade mark and designs, biotechnological inventions 
and  pharmaceuticals,  trade  secrets,  (craft  and  industrial)  geographical  indications,  supplementary 
protection certificates, copyright and related rights. 

On copyright and related rights, the Law on copyright and related rights is not fully modernised to 
provide sufficient protection, in line with technological developments. Türkiye needs to align with the 
Directive  on  copyright  and  related  rights  in  the  Digital  Single  Market.  Several  issues  remain 
unresolved,  particularly  the  lack  of  distribution  of  private  copy  levies,  licensing  difficulties, 
uncertainties in online education exceptions, public performance right problems, unauthorised use of 
copyrighted  material  via  online  platforms  and  well-known  e-commerce  websites  remain  to  be 
resolved. 

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On  industrial  property  rights,  the  lack  of  a  precise  definition  of  bad  faith  applications  as  regards 
trademarks  renders  the  invalidation  procedure  ineffective.  A  draft  amending  regulation  on 
administrative  procedures  for  the  revocation  of  trademarks  is  yet  to  be  enacted  following  the  entry 
into  force  of  a  legal  provision  on  the  revocation  of  trademarks  in  the  industrial  property  law  in 
January  2024.  There is  a  need for  overhauling  expensive  and  lengthy  procedures  to  revoke,  oppose 
and invalidate trademarks. There are currently no legal provisions for the protection of supplementary 
protection certificates. Türkiye has in place a regulatory data protection regime since 2005. However, 
the  scope  is  limited  and  excludes  biologics  and  combination  products.  Inadequate  protection  of 
undisclosed  test  and  other  data  generated  to  obtain  marketing  licensing  for  pharmaceutical  and 
agrochemical products do not converge with the EU acquis.  

On judicial enforcement, criminal courts rarely order deterrent fines for commercial scale industrial 
property  infringements,  even  though  legal  provisions  may  provide  for  higher  penalties.  Inefficient 
litigation  procedures,  including  at  courts  of  appeal,  remain  to  be  resolved.  Difficulties  and 
inconsistencies persist in deciding preliminary injunctions and monetary compensation claims, storage 
and  destruction  problems  and  financial  burdens  related  to  the  storage  of  counterfeit  goods,  and  the 
overuse of expert witness statements. 

Difficulties  with  the  issue  of  search  and  seizure  warrants  continue  even  though  strong  evidence  is 
provided  by  right  holders  about  counterfeiting.  Enforcement  authorities,  need  to  increase  the 
efficiency of action against industrial property infringements.   

The customs enforcement legislation is yet to be fully harmonised with the EU acquis. The number 
of  customs  applications  for  seizures  increased  from  2  637  in  2022  to  2  869  in  2023.  Improving 
customs  enforcement  is  necessary  to  combat  counterfeit  goods,  particularly  those  in  transit  and 
exports.  Although  the  Customs  authorities    received  an  increased  number  of  applications  by  rights 
holders  and  slightly increased  the  number  of  seizures,  no  substantial  progress  was  made  during the 
reporting period on the protection and enforcement of IPR. According to the 2023 report on the EU 
enforcement  of  IPR,  Türkiye  remained  the  second  major  country  of  provenance  by  number  of 
counterfeit articles entering the EU, of which clothing prevailed as the most detained article followed 
by foodstuff, other beverages, cosmetics, perfumes and textile products. 

Türkiye  needs  more  public  awareness  campaigns  on  the  dangers  of  counterfeiting  and  piracy  to 
health, safety, rule of law, and the labour market, as well as the economic benefits of IPR-intensive 
sectors.  Stronger  political  commitment  is  needed  to  enforce  IPR  and  stop  the  flow  of  counterfeit 
goods to the EU. 

Chapter 8: Competition policy 

EU rules enable free competition. They include antitrust rules against restrictive agreements between 
companies and the abuse of a dominant position, and also include rules on concentrations between 
companies which would significantly impede effective competition. EU rules also set out a system of 
State aid control. Governments are only allowed to grant State aid if strict conditions are met, with a 
view to prevent distortion of competition. 

Antitrust and mergers 

The  legal  framework  is  broadly  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis.  The  Law  on  the  protection  of 
competition broadly reflects Articles  101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Implementing legislation in this field is largely in place. The relevant legislation still 
needs to be aligned to ensure full compliance with the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation. 

The institutional framework is in place. The Law on the protection of competition is enforced by the 
Turkish Competition Authority (TCA). The TCA maintains its financial and administrative autonomy. 
The  TCA’s  enforcement  capacity  is  adequate.  In  2023,  overall  implementation  was  effective. 
Decisions  were  taken  in  the  areas  of  antitrust  (145  compared  to  78  in  2022),  exemption/negative 
clearance  decisions  (8  compared  to  19  in  2022)  and  merger/acquisition/joint  venture/privatisation 
(217  compared  to  245  in  2022).  In  2023,  the  total  amount  of  fines  imposed  by  the  TCA  for 
infringements  of  competition  law  (fines  related  to  substance)  slightly  increased  to  TRY  1.9  billion 

56 

 
 
compared to TRY 1.7 billion in 2022. The TCA no longer transparently discloses the number of ex-
officio  investigations.  In  2023,  Turkish  courts  upheld  87%  of  the  73  judgements  concluded  in 
response to appeals against the TCA decisions. 

State aid 

No progress was made on legislative framework. Türkiye’s Law on the monitoring and supervision 
of  State  aid  (State  aid  Law)  is  broadly  in  line  with  Articles  107  and  108  TFEU.  However,  the 
implementation  of  the  State  aid  Law  remains  indefinitely  postponed,  which  has  made  Türkiye’s 
legislative framework de facto ineffective.  

There is no functioning institutional framework and the administrative structure in place since 2022 
clearly deviates from the EU acquis. Accordingly, Türkiye still needs to align its legislation with the 
EU acquis. 

Türkiye continued the implementation of the project-based investment programme, where the transfer 
of  state  resources  is  provided  on  a  selective  basis.  As  of  May  2024,  it  reached  69  projects  with  an 
investment amount of TRY 528 billion. The lack of a transparent State aid inventory covering all aid 
schemes, including the amount or budgeted amount of the state support granted, remains a source of 
concern. 

Liberalisation 

State-owned enterprises are subject to competition and State aid rules.     

Chapter 9: Financial services 

EU  rules  aim  to  ensure  fair  competition  among,  and  the  stability  of,  financial  institutions,  namely 
banking, insurance, supplementary pensions, investment services and securities markets. They include 
rules on authorisation, operation and supervision of these institutions. 

On  banking  and  financial  conglomerates,  Türkiye  completed  the  legislative  work  on  compliance 
with the final elements of Basel III regulations (but not taking into account the Basel III Finalisation 
of  2017)  according to the Basel  Committee.  The  implementing regulation  on the  Istanbul  Financial 
Center (IFC) was published in July 2023, setting the principals and procedures for the management, 
operations, issuance of participant certificates, as well as on the functioning of the one-stop office for 
the IFC. The banking sector has remained resilient, with the indicators tracking asset quality further 
improving.  The  capital  adequacy  ratio  of  the  banking  sector  remained  above  the  legal  thresholds. 
Some progress was made in terms of simplifying the macroprudential measures, thus contributing to 
the  improvement  of  the  predictability  of  the  financial  sector  regulatory  framework.  This  should 
further be strengthened and supported by conducting transparent asset quality reviews.  

Türkiye  made  some  progress  on  insurances  and  occupational  pensions.  In  September  2023,  the 
Insurance and Private Pension Regulation and Supervision Agency (SEDDK) published a regulation 
on the right to exercise partial payment in the private pension system. Participants who meet certain 
conditions  may  be  entitled  to  receive  partial  payment  of  up  to  50%  of  their  savings  under  specific 
circumstances.  It  also  allowed  participants  who  suffered  losses  in  regions  affected  by  disasters  to 
apply  for  a  partial  payment  within  six  months  following  the  natural  disaster.  In  October  2023,  the 
Nuclear  Regulatory  Authority  and  SEDDK  jointly  published  two  regulations  on  liability  insurance, 
coverage for nuclear risks, and the operating procedures and principles of the nuclear insurance pool. 
The Special Risks Management Centre has been assigned to provide protection to operators of nuclear 
installations. As part of the efforts to improve the traffic insurance system, the SEDDK established an 
insurance  intermediaries  offer  platform  to  help  drivers,  particularly  with  high-risk  level,  to  find  a 
traffic  insurance  offer  within  a  short  period  of  time,  while  providing  support  to  insurance 
intermediaries. 

As  regards  financial  market  infrastructure,  legislation  is  partially  aligned  with  the  EU  acquis  on 
settlement finality, on Central Securities Depositories and on OTC derivatives, central counterparties 
and trade repositories (EMIR).  

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On securities markets and investment services, Türkiye introduced monthly quota applications in 
the import transaction of unprocessed gold carried out by precious metals intermediary institutions to 
contain  its  negative  impact  on  foreign  trade  balance.  On  investment  funds,  Türkiye  has  made  no 
further progress in the reporting period, and it should undertake further steps to ensure full alignment 
with  the  EU  acquis  on  alternative  investment  fund  managers  and  undertakings  for  collective 
investment in transferable securities. 

On sustainable and digital finance, Türkiye continues to take steps to support the green transition 
and  digital  transformation  of  the  banking  sector.  It  has  made  progress  in  digital  finance  by  legally 
recognising the digital wallet  as a payment instrument  (see Chapter 4  – Free movement of capital). 
Following  a  decision  of the  Public  Oversight,  Accounting  and  Auditing  Standards  Authority on the 
implementation of the Turkish Sustainability Reporting Standard in December 2023, some financial 
and capital market institutions are required to report on sustainability (see Chapter 6 – Company law). 

Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection 

EU  rules  protect  consumers’  economic interests  and also ensure  product safety,  prevent  dangerous 
imitations and establish liability for defective products. The EU also ensures high common standards 
for  tobacco  control,  blood,  tissues,  cells  and  organs,  and  medicines  for  human  and  veterinary  use. 
The  EU  also  guarantees  a  high  level  of  protection  of  public  health  and  in  particular  has  rules  for 
upholding patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare and in preparing for and responding to cross-
border health threats, including communicable diseases. 

Consumer protection 

On  horizontal  aspects,  Türkiye’s  national  legislation  remains  mostly  aligned  with  the  acquis  on 
consumer  protection  in  non-safety-related  issues.  The  alignment  with  the  representative  actions’ 
directive  remains  at  an  early  stage  and  significant  work  is  needed.  Challenges  remain  with  the 
application of consumer rights and no significant progress was registered in the reporting period. 

On enforcement and redress  and on product safety,  consumers’ awareness of the national unsafe 
products  information  system  remains low.  Regular monitoring  and more  robust regulatory  tools  are 
required to combat online sales of counterfeit goods that endanger consumer and public health  (see 
Chapter  7  -  Intellectual  property  law).  Moreover,  although  the  volume  of  online  shopping  has 
increased (see Chapter 1 - Free movement of goods), the market surveillance of e-commerce remains 
limited. 

Public health 

Türkiye  has  been  addressing  the  significant  challenges  affecting  public  health,  raised  and 
exacerbated by the February 2023 earthquakes. A comprehensive ‘One Health’ approach is crucial to 
address these issues, balancing the health of people, animals, and ecosystems. On eHealth, the country 
is  strengthening its  surveillance system  for  health services  and  to  tackle  serious  cross-border  health 
threats. The second EU-Türkiye High-Level Dialogue on Health took place in April 2024 in Ankara. 
It underlined strengthening EU-Türkiye cooperation in health with an emphasis on cross-border health 
threats,  cancer  prevention,  treatment  and  care,  as  well  as  on  mental  health,  and  climate  change 
impacts on public health. 

Türkiye  continued  to  make  good  progress  on  serious  cross-border  health  threats  including 
communicable diseases, especially in workforce development and building institutional capacity for 
central and provincial public health professionals, as well as its surveillance system. Anti-microbial 
resistance  (AMR)  remains  dangerously  high  in  Türkiye  with  the  increase  in  total  antibiotic 
consumption in humans. The National AMR Prevention Strategic plan is not yet in action. On blood, 
tissues, cells and organs, Türkiye did not meet the blood and blood component needs of the country 
(targeted  amount  of  3 040 000  units  of  blood for  2023).  The  country  holds  the highest  living  organ 
donation  rate  with  56  per  million  population  in  the  European  region.  The  actual  deceased  organ 
donors’ rate per million population remains low. 

There was no progress on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare. 

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On mental health, Türkiye continued to implement a de-institutionalisation policy, with a total of 182 
community mental health centres established across the country and actively using quality standards. 
The  full  integration  of  mental  health  services  into  primary  healthcare  was  hampered  by  the  2023 
earthquakes.  

On  health  inequalities,  the  current  health  policies  and  patriarchal  structure  continues  to  lead  to 
accessibility  and  availability  problems  in  meeting  the  sexual  and  reproductive  healthcare  needs  of 
women.  

CLUSTER 3: COMPETITIVENESS AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
This cluster covers: digital transformation and media (Chapter 10), taxation (Chapter 16), economic 
and  monetary  policy  (Chapter  17),  social  policy  and  employment  (Chapter  19),  industrial  policy 
(Chapter  20),  science  and  research  (Chapter  25),  education  and  culture  (Chapter  26),  and  Customs 
Union (Chapter 29). 

Chapter 10: Digital transformation and media 

The  EU  supports  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  internal  market  for  electronic  communications, 
electronic commerce and audiovisual services. The rules protect consumers and support the universal 
availability of modern services. 

On  electronic  communications,  concerns  remain  over  the  lack  of  financial  and  administrative 
independence  of  the  regulatory  authorities.  More  transparency  in  spending  is  needed.  Further 
regulatory  and  administrative  steps  are  required  to  establish  a  competitive  and  consumer-friendly 
market in telecommunications. 

On digital services, the Ministry of Trade upgraded its electronic complaint platform for e-commerce 
in  the  second  half  of  2023.  The  Turkish  Competition  Authority  was  active  in  conducting  market 
investigations and imposing measures and fines in the reporting period. Türkiye’s e-commerce market 
expanded further by recording an increase of 115% in terms of financial volume in Turkish lira and by 
22%  in  terms  of  number  of  transactions.  Türkiye  joined  the  Digital  Europe  programme  in  2023. 
Authorities  need  to  further  ensure  and  facilitate  equal  access  to  online  services  for  all  citizens  and 
increase efforts to fully align with the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. 

Some  of  Türkiye’s  existing  legislation for  digital  services  and its  enforcement, including the  Social 
Media  Regulations  Law  and  the  Disinformation  Law,  are  incompatible  with  key  principles  of  EU 
acquis  for  digital  services  and  incompatible  with  international  human  rights  law  and  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights, inter alia because they constitute disproportionate interference with the 
freedom of expression, and therefore require review. 

The number of services offered by the e-Government Gateway increased from 7 229 in 2023, to 8 360 
as of August 2024. The number of integrated institutions  increased from 994 in 2023 to 1 061. The 
number of citizens using e-government increased from 64.2 million in 2023 to 66.1 million in August 
2024. Türkiye should align with both the European Interoperability Framework and the Interoperable 
Europe Act. 

Regarding  digital  television  broadcasting,  Cyprus  is  still  facing  an  objection  from  Türkiye  to  the 
recording  at  the  International  Telecommunications  Union  (ITU)  of  a  new  unified  Cypriot  digital 
television broadcasting plan below 700 MHz under the ITU Geneva06 plan. This continues to deprive 
Cyprus from the necessary regulatory protection against interferences from neighbouring countries. 

The lack of sufficient competition on the broadband market remains a concern. The number of fixed 
broadband  subscribers  increased  to  23%  in  2023,  against  the  OECD  average  of  35.8%.  The  total 
number  of  mobile  broadband  users  was  73.7  million,  which  corresponds  to  a  penetration  rate  of 
86.4%  of  the  population  at  the  end  of  2023, against  the  OECD  average  of  134.1%.  The  number  of 
LTE subscribers rose to 85.6 million in the first quarter of 2024 compared to 82.9 million at the end of 
2022.  There  was  no  progress  reported  in  the  procurement  of  5G.  Türkiye  still  needs  to  allocate 
additional frequencies for the development and predictability of the sector. 

59 

 
 
 
On artificial intelligence, Türkiye adopted an action plan for 2024-2025 as a follow-up on its strategy 
on artificial intelligence published in 2021. 

On data, the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency published a study on Data Governance 
Framework in preparation for the country’s national Data Strategy in April 2024.  

On  digital  trust  and  cybersecurity,  the  level  of  enforcement  of  consumer  rights  in  the 
telecommunication  sector  remained  weak.  Compliance  with  the  eIDAS  regulation  is  still  pending. 
Türkiye revised its Data Protection Law in March 2024 in relation to processing of sensitive personal 
data,  easing  the  cross-border  transfer  of  personal  data  and  administrative  fines,  and  adopted  an 
implementing  regulation  on  cross-border  transfer  of  data  in  July  2024.  However,  Türkiye  needs  to 
continue the implementation of the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox measures, including assessing the risk 
profile  of  suppliers  and  putting  in  place  appropriate  restrictions  and/or  exclusions  for  high-risk 
suppliers.  As  of  April  2024,  there  are  14  sectoral  Cyber  Emergency  Response  Teams  (CERTs)  for 
critical infrastructures and more than 2 200 institutional CERTs.  

On media, the legislation on the rules of radio, television and on-demand media services lacks clarity 
in  terms  of  its  scope,  definitions,  licensing  criteria,  and  has  controversial  rules  on  jurisdiction  and 
restricting access to online content. Concerns over the impartiality and independence of RTÜK were 
not addressed.  

Chapter 16: Taxation 

EU  rules  on  taxation  cover  value  added  tax,  excise  duties  and  aspects  of  corporate  taxation.  They 
also cover cooperation between tax administrations, including the exchange of information to prevent 
tax evasion. 

In the area of indirect taxation, Türkiye continues to have a wide range of products that are subject to 
1%  VAT,  which  is  contrary  to  the  EU  acquis.  As  part  of  its  response  to  the  2023  earthquakes,  a 
comprehensive  set  of  tax  hikes  was  introduced.  Accordingly,  the  general  VAT  rate  was  increased 
from  18% to  20% in  July  2023.  The  reduced  VAT  rate  of  8%  (applicable to  deliveries  of  cleaning 
products,  land  and  houses)  was  increased  to  10%;  subject  to  further  precisions,  the  scope  of  the 
reduced rate is possibly not in line with the EU acquis. The VAT legislation governing the structure, 
exemptions, special schemes and the scope of reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

On excise duties, further alignment is needed regarding alcohol and alcoholic beverages, tobacco and 
energy  products,  and  general  rules  for  the  production,  keeping,  storage,  movement  and  controls  on 
products that are subject to excise duties according to the EU acquis. 

Although  the  overall  level  of  taxation  (ad  valorem)  on  cigarettes  is  comparable  to  EU  levels, 
Türkiye’s cigarette excise duty legislation differs from the EU acquis in terms of mixed excise duty 
structure (ad valorem and specific), which is mandatory under the EU acquis. Excise duty legislation 
on alcohol and alcoholic drinks also differs from the EU acquis. Excise duties on some of the energy 
products are lower than the EU’s minimum rates. Contrary to the EU acquis, coal, coke and electricity 
are  not  subject  to  excise  duties.  Kerosene  is  subject  to  excise  duty,  but  it  is  zero  rated.  Türkiye 
doubled the motor vehicles tax once for 2023 and tripled the special consumption tax for fuel within 
the scope of July 2023 tax hikes. 

On direct taxation, the corporate income tax was increased by 5 percentage points in July 2023. As a 
result, the general corporate income tax was hiked to 25%, while the financial sector’s rate was raised 
to  30%.  The  corporate  income  taxpayer  companies  engaged  in  export  activities,  on  the  other  hand, 
will  benefit  from  a  5  percentage  point  reduction  in  their  corporate  income  tax  rate,  instead  of  the 
previous 1 percent. 

The implementation of the corporate income tax exemption introduced to promote the FX-protected 
TRY  time  deposit  account  scheme  was  extended  to  the  end  of  2024.  The  implementation  of  the 
postponed  inflation  accounting  (adjustment)  practice  started  as  of  2024.  Such  a  practice  has  the 
potential to broaden the tax base of businesses with low balance sheet equity and with greater non-
monetary assets than non-monetary liabilities. 

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The income tax exemption implemented since 2022 for the minimum wage, including the tax on all 
wages corresponding to the minimum wage, continued. In 2023, TRY 10.3 billion was collected as a 
7.5% digital services tax (on digital advertising, content, and intermediary services) which has been in 
effect since March 2020. 

On administrative cooperation and mutual assistance, the OECD Global Forum on Transparency 
and  Exchange  of  Information  for  Tax  Purposes  (Global  Forum)  qualified  Türkiye  as  'largely 
compliant' on the exchange of information on request. However, the country remains on Annex II to 
the Council Conclusions on the EU list of non-cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes for criterion 
1.1  (automatic  exchange  of  tax  information  on  financial  accounts),  as  it  is  still  not  fully  compliant 
with  the  relevant  requirements.  As  a  result,  in  February  2024,  the  Council  concluded  that  Türkiye 
should continue the technical work and ensure that tax information is exchanged effectively with all 
EU Member States in order to meet criterion 1.1 of the EU list. 

In  terms  of  operational  capacity  and  digitalisation,  the  Turkish  Revenue  Administration  uses  an 
electronic document management system. On the other hand, Türkiye failed to finalise its efforts to 
develop an integrated public finance management information system. The action plan to combat the 
informal economy (2023-2025) still lacks performance indicators and a publicly accessible system for 
monitoring the implementation. 

Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy 

EU  rules  require  the  independence  of  central  banks  and  prohibit  them  from  directly  financing  the 
public sector. Member States coordinate their economic policies and are subject to fiscal, economic 
and financial surveillance. 

On monetary policy, the central bank deviated from the official inflation target over the last decade, 
which has been set jointly with the government at 5%. Despite a strong policy shift, concerns over the 
institutional  underpinning  of  central  bank  independence  persist,  with  the  President  of  the  Republic 
having extensive powers in the appointment and dismissal of the Central Bank Governor and Board 
members.  In  June  2024,  the  Constitutional  Court  annulled  the  President's  powers  to  dismiss  the 
Central Bank Governor before the end of the Governor’s term, on the ground that this authority was 
granted with a presidential decree and not by law. However, the Court’s decision will enter into force 
in a year, giving Parliament 1 year to adopt legislation to replace the relevant annulled articles, while 
the President continues to exercise existing powers.  

After  the  presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  in  May  2023,  the  central  bank  significantly 
tightened  its  monetary  policy  stance  to  rein  in  the  very  high  inflation  and  anchor  inflation 
expectations. It reinstated the policy rate as the primary instrument of monetary policy and raised it 
gradually  from  8.5%  to  50%  between  June  2023  and  March  2024.  The  monetary  tightening  and 
strengthening  of  monetary  transmission  created  space  for  the  gradual  unwinding  of  some  of  the 
distortive  macroprudential  measures  that  were  introduced  to  sustain  the  previous  policy  regime  of 
extremely low real interest rates. However, certain macroprudential regulations that limit and direct 
credit, constrain market-based risk pricing and capital allocation remain in place. 

Despite  the  prohibition  of  monetary  financing  and  privilege  access  of  the  public  sector  to  financial 
institutions,  the  central  bank  became  the  sole  authority  assuming  the  costs  of  the  foreign  exchange 
(FX)  and  gold-protected  time  lira  deposit  scheme,  as  the  ones  borne  previously  by  the  Ministry  of 
Treasury and Finance were fully transferred to the central bank. As part of the policy normalisation 
efforts,  the  Turkish  authorities  also  adopted  measures  for  the  gradual  exit  from  the  FX-protected 
deposit scheme.  

As regards economic policy, Türkiye adopted the Twelfth Development Plan (2024-2028), outlining 
an  optimistic  macroeconomic  framework  with  very ambitious  but  partly  inconsistent targets.  Yet,  it 
presented  to  some  extent  a  more  credible  macroeconomic  forecasts  with  its  Medium-Term 
Programme (2024-2026), although the fiscal framework remained weak. Main policy documents do 
not  present  alternative  macroeconomic  and  fiscal  scenarios.  The  budget  framework  is  subject  to 
frequent changes throughout the year, thus significantly undermining the credibility of the country’s 

61 

 
 
budgetary  planning.  Türkiye  is  still  not  aligned  with  the  Directive  on  Requirements  for  Budgetary 
Frameworks and lacks numerical fiscal rules and an independent fiscal body to monitor compliance 
with these rules. Türkiye made some progress on the improvement in the excessive deficit procedure 
data availability and timeliness, but further efforts are required (see Chapter 18 - Statistics).  

Türkiye  submitted  its  2024-2026  Economic  Reform  Programme  (ERP)  on  time.  Türkiye  did  not 
carry out a separate consultation with external stakeholders on the ERP draft. Implementation of the 
policy guidance set out in the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue of May 2023 was 
limited, but with a higher rate of implementation than in the previous year. 

Chapter 19: Social policy and employment 

EU rules in the social field include minimum standards for labour law, equality, health and safety at 
work and non-discrimination. They also promote social dialogue at European level. 

No  progress  was  made  in  the  area  of  labour  law.  Enforcement  is  limited,  particularly  for  smaller 
enterprises  and  in  rural  areas,  since  numerous  sectors  lack  various  protective  measures  afforded  by 
labour laws. The high prevalence of undeclared work is a significant factor hindering the labour law 
enforcement. Regulatory frameworks for emerging sectors, like platform workers, are lacking. Child 
labour  practices  continue  to  be  observed  among  all  age  groups  and  genders,  particularly  affecting 
migrant  and  adolescent  boys.  Labour  force  participation  of  children  aged  15-17  rose  to  22.1%  in 
2023. 

While Türkiye has no dedicated strategy on occupational health and safety, the government persisted 
in raising awareness to foster a culture of occupational health and safety with a particular focus on 
high-risk  sectors  such  as mining.  The informal  economy  remains  a risk  factor,  with  most  accidents 
occurring in sectors where undeclared work is prevalent.  

Türkiye  made  no  progress  on  social  dialogue.  Only  the  tripartite  consultation  board  and  labour 
assembly  convened  in  the  reporting  period.  Further  efforts  are  needed  to  increase  the  systematic 
functioning of the existing tripartite social dialogue mechanisms, particularly the economic and social 
council. The coverage of collective bargaining in the private sector remained low. The unionisation 
rate was 15.22% for private sector employees and 74.54% for civil servants. Barriers to unionisation 
in  the  private  sector  remain,  including  protracted  legal  appeal  procedures  suspending  bargaining 
certification of trade unions. Türkiye has yet to recognise the right to strike for civil servants and the 
right to join unions for certain public sector employees, including locum workers.  

On  employment  policy,  no  significant  change  occurred  in  the  number  of  job  and  vocational 
counsellors in the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR). The substantial decrease continued for the 
active labour market programmes, including the number of courses for vocational training and on-the-
job training and the number of people registered in these programmes.   

On labour force participation and unemployment rate see the statistical annex and the section on 
the functioning of the labour market under 2.3 Economic criteria. 

The  informal  economy  has  a  detrimental  impact  on  social  security  and  welfare  systems,  with  the 
Roma  community  particularly  affected.  While  efforts  to  grant  Syrian  migrants  access  to  the  formal 
labour  market  continued,  the  number  of  issued  work  permits  fell  slightly  to  108 520  in  2023,  from 
113 208 in 2022. This remains low given the large working age population among Syrian migrants. 

For the European Social Fund, the good level of preparation was maintained. 

On  social  inclusion  and  protection,  Türkiye  has  no  comprehensive  poverty  reduction  strategy, 
except certain measures under the 2024 Presidential Programme. Income inequalities have increased 
since  2022.  The  risk  of  poverty  and  social  exclusion  is  the  highest  among  children  and  sharply 
increased  among  older  people.  Implementation  of  the  National  Strategy  on  Roma  (2023-2030)  is 
lacking. Special attention is needed to ensure well-being of persons with disabilities in the temporary 
settlements  in  the  earthquake  region.  Recently  adopted  national  strategies  on  the  rights  of  persons 
with disabilities and on ageing are not yet having a visible effect. 

Türkiye  is  taking  steps  towards  the  de-institutionalisation  of  children  in  care,  focusing  on  family-

62 

 
 
based  care  services  and  strengthening  its  foster  care  system  (see  Chapter  23  -  Judiciary  and 
fundamental rights).  

Türkiye does not have a comprehensive strategy to enforce non-discrimination in employment and 
social  policies.  The  existing  laws  do  not  offer  protection  against  discrimination  based  on  sexual 
orientation  and  gender  identity.  Discriminatory  legislation  and  practices  hindering  access  to 
employment for individuals with disabilities remain.  

On  equality  between 
women  and  men,  the 
gender  gap  in  the  labour 
market 
remained  very 
high  despite  a  slight 
progress.  In  the  Global 
Gender  Gap  Report  for 
the  year  2023,  Türkiye 
was  ranked  129th  among 
countries, 
146 
experiencing  a  decline 
compared to the previous 
year.  Women 
face  a 
higher  risk  of  poverty 
than  men.  A 
new 
employment 
subsidy 
project has been initiated 
to  promote  women's  employment  however,  given  the  large  working  age  population  of  women,  the 
outreach is limited, and its impact needs to be monitored. There is partial alignment with the work-life 
balance Directive. The gender pay gap for earnings is 6.2%. Insufficient availability of affordable care 
services for both children and older people, the gender bias in caring responsibilities and a lack of a 
decisive political action continued to hinder a higher women’s employment rate. Policies addressing 
the  work-life  balance  of  careers,  benefits  and  social  assistance  are  limited.  The  share  of  women  in 
decision-making  positions  remained  very  low  including  on  boards  of  directors  (see  Chapter  23  - 
Judiciary and fundamental rights).  

Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy 

EU  industrial  policy  strengthens  competitiveness,  facilitates  structural  change  and  encourages  a 
business-friendly environment that stimulates small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 

the 

innovation  performance.  The 

On enterprise and industrial policy principles, Türkiye kept the scope of the 15% domestic price 
advantage in public procurement, now compulsory for medium and high-tech goods (see Chapter 5 – 
Public procurement), even  though this is against EU industry policy principles and ineffective over 
for 
improving 
pharmaceuticals  were  ended  in  the  reporting  period.  The  12th  National  Development  Plan  was 
adopted  in  November  2023  with  a  strong  focus  on  green  and  digital  transitions.  Industrial  policy 
perspective  of  the  Plan  focuses  on  supporting  domestic  production  and  reducing  dependency  on 
imports, as well as on structural transformation in the manufacturing industry through innovation. The 
government  adopted  a  new  Action  Plan  for  the  Coordination  Council  for  the  Improvement  of 
Investment  Environment  for  2024-2025  that  covers  a  wide  range  of  actions.  The  evaluation  of  the 
industrial strategy adopted in 2019-2021 is still pending.  

localisation  and  prioritisation  schemes 

On  enterprise  and  industrial  policy  instruments,  Turkish  legislation  is  still  not  fully  harmonised 
with  the  Late  Payment  Directive.  Türkiye  continued  to  implement  various  schemes  supporting 
companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones. Smart specialisation strategies were formulated 
in some regions, but limited information is available on their implementation.  Türkiye continued to 
implement the Small Business Act framework. 

63 

 
 
The  SME  support  administration  (KOSGEB)  continued  to  run  a  range  of  technical  assistance  and 
financing schemes. The Ministry of Industry and Technology published impact assessment studies of 
19  support  schemes  on  its  website  including  schemes  of  KOSGEB  and  the  Turkish  Scientific  and 
Technological  Research  Institution  (TÜBITAK).  Legal  dispositions  for  Organised  Industrial  Zones 
(OIZ) were amended, introducing inter alia Green OIZ.  

Türkiye  participates  in  the  SME  pillar  of  the  Single  Market  Programme  and  signed  an  Association 
Agreement in March 2023. Country data compiled in February 2024 confirms that Türkiye has been 
reasonably active in the submission of project proposals for the SME pillar, and has achieved a good 
success – just under 50%: 8 SME Pillar project proposals involving Turkish organisations have been 
accepted, in response to different calls and there are 11 proposals on the reserve list involving partners 
from Türkiye.  

On sectoral strategies, the Ministry of Industry and Technology published decarbonisation roadmaps 
for  steel,  cement  and  aluminium  sectors.  A  separate  roadmap  entitled  Green  Growth  Technology 
Roadmap was prepared by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye (TÜBİTAK) 
for iron and steel, cement, aluminium, fertilisers, plastics and chemicals. A new strategy on Foreign 
Direct Investments was adopted in July 2024. The breakdown of State aid for investments made under 
the industry support programmes was not disclosed, contrary to the commitments made under the EU-
Turkey Customs Union (see Chapter 8 – Competition policy). 

Chapter 25: Science and research 

The EU provides significant support for research and innovation. All Member States can participate 
in  the  EU’s  research  and  innovation  programmes  and  benefit  from  them,  especially  where  there  is 
scientific excellence and solid investment in research and innovation. 

On  research  and  innovation,  the  positive  trend  of  Türkiye’s  performance  in  Horizon  Europe 
continued in 2023 – significantly outperforming numbers from the previous Framework Programme. 
Three national programmes were certified for the European Innovation Council Plug-In scheme. The 
participation  of  Turkish  innovators  in  the  European  Institute  of  Technology  and  Innovation  (EIT) 
schemes  has  been  steadily  growing  and  joint  work  to  establish  an  EIT  Community  Regional 
Innovation Scheme (RIS) Hub in Türkiye has intensified.  

The good and active cooperation between the EU and Türkiye on research and innovation continues. 
The second EU-Türkiye High Level Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation took place in 
April  2024  in  Istanbul,  gathering  important  stakeholders  from  the  Turkish  and  European  research 
areas. It underlined strengthening EU-Türkiye cooperation in science, technology and innovation with 
an  emphasis  on  the  green  and  digital  transformation  of  industries,  as  well  as  building  thriving 
innovation ecosystems. 

After a gradual increase from 0.8% to 1.4% between 2013 and 2021, the share of R&D expenditure in 
GDP decreased for the first time to 1.32% in 2022. The gap with the EU average of 2.24% remains 
large. 

In parallel, the total number of full-time equivalent R&D personnel increased by 23%, from 221 811 
in  2021  to  272  638  in  2022.  The  share  of  female  personnel  in  research  also  increased  and  reached 
34.1%  in  2022  from  32%  in  2021.  On  smart  specialisation,  Türkiye  launched  an  action  to  advance 
smart  specialisation  strategy  development  and  implementation  capacity  of  its  national  and  regional 
institutions. 

According  to  2024  European  Innovation  Scoreboard,  Türkiye  remains  an  Emerging  Innovator, 
performing  at  51.7%  of  the  EU  average.  Türkiye’s  performance  is  above  average  of  the  Emerging 
Innovators  (485%).  However,  the  performance  gap  to  the  EU  is  becoming  larger.  Türkiye  provides 
data for all indicators of the Innovation Scoreboard. 

Chapter 26: Education and culture 

The  EU  supports  cooperation  in  education  and  culture  through  funding  programmes  and  the 
coordination  of  Member  State  policy  through  the  ‘open  method  of  coordination’.  The  EU  and  the 

64 

 
 
Member States must also prevent discrimination and ensure quality education for children of migrant 
workers, including those from disadvantaged backgrounds. 

On  education,  the  share  of  the  total  education  budget  in  the  consolidated  government  budget 
decreased  for  7  consecutive  years,  reaching  12.75%  in  2023.  The  proportion  of  the  total  education 
budget in GDP is 3.06%. Türkiye achieved an increase in net school enrolment rates for pre-primary 
and for secondary education levels.  

Net  enrolment  rate  for  preschool  education  (age  4-5)  increased  to  63.55%  in  2022-2023.  Despite 
progress, enrolment rate in early childhood education remains low, particularly for children aged 3. 
Alternative  education  service  models,  including  community-based  services,  need  to  be  explored  for 
further  convergence  with  the  EU  targets  on  access  and  quality  of  early  childhood  education. 
Enrolment rates for higher education also increased from 44.66% to 46.02%. 

Following the positive trend in recent years, the share of early school leavers fell below 20% for the 
first  time.  However,  significant  regional  differences  exist  in  secondary  schooling  rates  between 
Eastern Anatolia and the rest of the country. 

The  number  of  students  with  special  needs  attending  schools  reached  507 804  in  2022-2023, 
increasing  by  7.4% from  the  previous  school  year.  There is  still insufficient  data  on  the  attendance 
and educational achievement of boys and girls with different disabilities. 

According to the results of the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2022, 
students’ performance in Türkiye scored lower compared to OECD average in reading, mathematics, 
and science. However, Türkiye is one of the few countries where PISA results have been improving 
consistency  in  most  subjects  over  more  than  10  years.  The  proportion  of  students  of  15-year-olds 
failing to  demonstrate  basic  proficiency  (level  2)  in  reading (29 %), in maths  (39%)  and in  science 
(25%) are close to the OECD average. However, the latest Progress in International Reading Literacy 
Study (PIRLS 2021) shows that Türkiye’s performance in reading is below the international median. 
Gender gap is small in mathematics. 

In  the  field  of  higher  education,  Türkiye  is  a  member  of  the  European  Higher  Education  Area. 
Türkiye  remains  advanced  in  the  implementation  of  the  Bologna  Process,  although  considerable 
quality differences remain among the 208 higher education institutions across the country.   

Violations of academic freedoms and excessive government control over universities continue to be 
an area of significant concern. 

On technical and vocational education and training (TVET), Türkiye continues to implement the 
National  Vocational  Qualifications  System.  The  number  of  national occupational  standards  in force 
saw a minor increase, as well as the number of approved qualifications.  275 authorised certification 
bodies issued 2 716 259 Vocational Qualifications Certificates for individuals so far (8.3% increase). 
Vocational Qualifications Authority vocational certificates became mandatory for 204 occupations in 
heavy and dangerous works. 

Although  the  Turkish  Qualifications  Framework  is  operational,  the  vocational  training  provided  by 
VET institutions does not match the needs of national qualification candidates. For better functioning 
of the framework, continuous education centres of universities should also be encouraged to develop 
modular VET for specific occupational levels in cooperation with the authorised certification bodies. 
Türkiye continues to be an active member of the European Alliance for Apprenticeships.  

Boosting  students’  digital  skills  is  one  of  the  country’s  priorities  in  education  and  training.  Further 
efforts are  needed  to  strengthen  and  expand  digital  education  and  digital  skills,  in  line  with the  EU 
Digital Education Action Plan 2021-2027. 

Türkiye  is  fully  associated  to  Erasmus+.  There  continues  to  be  high  interest  in  the  programme:  in 
2023,  Turkish  organisations  participated  as  applicant  or  partner  in  2  894  Erasmus+  (and  also 
European  Solidarity  Corps)  projects  for  a  total  contracted  grant  of  EUR  129.49  million.  Türkiye 
continues to participate in all the European Education Area working groups 2021-2025. Five Turkish 
universities are partners in European Universities alliances. 

65 

 
 
In  the  area  of  youth  policy,  Türkiye  continues  to  lack  a  national  youth  strategy.  There  is  an 
independent  national  youth  council,  which  was  granted  observer  member  status  by  the  European 
Youth Forum in 2019, however it is not recognised by the government.  

On sports, after the earthquakes of February 2023 many youth centres and sports grounds had to be 
turned into temporary accommodation spaces. Play and recreation spaces for young people need to be 
considered during the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. Türkiye continued to participate in the 
European Week of Sport. 

In the area of culture, although significant resources are allocated to cultural activities by both central 
and local governments, there is a lack of clear normative frameworks, institutional management, and 
long-term planning necessary for the development of systematic, consistent, and sustainable cultural 
policies. In the central government’s 2023 budget, the amount allocated to the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism  constitutes  the  12th  lowest  budget  among  the  32  central  government  agencies  (less  than 
0.004%). 

On the implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions, one project ‘Kreşendo’ was selected as a grantee of the International Fund 
for  Cultural  Diversity.  This  is  the  second  time  an  organisation  from  Türkiye  is  benefiting  from  the 
fund. 

Political interventions and arbitrary bans of cultural events continued in the reporting period.  

In  the  reporting  period,  there  were  no  active  negotiations  on  Türkiye’s  association  to  the  Creative 
Europe programme. 

Chapter 29: Customs Union 

All  Member  States  are  part  of  the  EU  Customs  Union  and  follow  the  same  customs  rules  and 
procedures. This requires legislative alignment as well as adequate implementation and enforcement 
capacity, and access to the common computerised customs systems. 

Türkiye made limited progress on customs legislation. Türkiye maintained large scope of additional 
duties applied on imports of a long list of products originating in non-EU countries, which are in free 
circulation in the EU or imported from third countries. 

Turkish customs authorities need to streamline some of its practices relying on risk-based controls and 
simplified procedures. Türkiye's implementation of value-based import surveillance measures and the 
lack of a legal remedy to recover overpaid amounts remain not aligned with the EU  acquis. Türkiye 
needs  to  ensure  application  of  transparent,  objective  and  verifiable  customs  valuation  procedures. 
Türkiye  is  yet  to  eliminate  export  tax  measures  on  hides,  skins  and  wet-blue  leathers.  Türkiye 
removed administrative requirements hindering an automatic export licensing regime on a number of 
products notably on copper scrap, feldspar and clays. A draft Turkish Customs Law fully harmonised 
with the EU Customs Code based on the main principles of legitimate trade facilitation and security is 
yet to be finalised. Rules on free zones and duty relief are yet to be fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

In  line  with  the  provisions  on  mutual  administrative  assistance  in  customs  matters  under  the 
Association  Agreement  (AA),  Türkiye  should  cooperate  with  the  EU  to  ensure  that  customs 
legislation  is  correctly  applied,  in  particular  by  the  prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of 
operations  in  breach  of  AA.  As  part  of  the  anti-fraud  efforts,  it  is  recommended  that  Türkiye 
strengthens combating customs fraud, in particular smuggling of tobacco products and by cooperating 
with  OLAF,  and  implements  the  WHO  Framework  Convention  on  tobacco  control  protocol  to 
eliminate  illicit  trade  in  tobacco  products.  It  has  been  reported  that  this  implementation  process  is 
ongoing.  

On administrative and operational capacity, efforts continued to strengthen customs enforcement 
capacity for border controls, particularly on anti-smuggling operations. However, full alignment with 
the EU acquis on the customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and in particular on export 
and  in-transit  operations  is  yet  to  be  completed.  Risk-based  controls  to  enforce  safety  and  security 
measures  need  to  be  improved  and  brought  in  line  with  Customs  Union  provisions.  Türkiye 

66 

 
 
implements  the  New  Computerised  Transit  System  (NCTS)  as  part  of  its  membership  in  the 
Convention on a Common Transit Procedure. The implementation of the NCTS phase 5 by Türkiye 
was delayed multiple times but it remains a realistic objective for the last quarter of 2024. However, 
tariff  IT  systems  remain  to  be  operational  in  line  with  the  EU  tariff  IT  systems.  Türkiye  needs  to 
implement  the  IT  strategy  in  line  with  business  initiatives  and  update  the  documented  customs 
business processes in line with the legal basis. 

CLUSTER 4: THE GREEN AGENDA AND SUSTAINABLE CONNECTIVITY 

This  cluster  covers:  transport  policy  (Chapter  14),  energy  (Chapter  15),  trans-European  networks 
(Chapter 21) and environment and climate change (Chapter 27). 

Chapter 14: Transport policy 

The EU has common rules for technical and safety standards, security, social standards, and market 
liberalisation  in  road  transport,  railways,  inland  waterways,  multimodal  transport,  aviation  and 
maritime transport. 

Regarding the EU acquis on general transport, Türkiye’s online electronic legislation inventory tool 
entered  into  force  during  the  reporting  period.  It  provides  an  inventory  of  Türkiye’s  transport 
legislation in English, creating a continuous monitoring system with the EU acquis.  

On  road  transport,  the  road  transport  regulation  was  revised  to  introduce  flexibility incentives for 
operators using electric vehicles for passenger buses. The responsibility for operating and investing in 
roadside weight and dimension inspection stations was transferred to DG Highways. The scope of the 
transport electronic tracking and inspection system was enlarged to include the dangerous goods. The 
Road  Safety  Action  Plan  covering  the  period  2024-2027  was  adopted  in  line  with  the  Vision  Zero 
targets.  Institutional  capacity  remains  insufficient  to  meet  Türkiye’s  national  Intelligent  Transport 
Systems targets. 

On  rail  transport,  the  regulation  on  railway  infrastructure  access  and  capacity  allocation  was 
published  in  November 2023.  However, the  railway framework  law  is  not  yet  adopted  and  Türkiye 
remains not aligned with the EU’s fourth railway package. The railway safety and the interoperability 
regulations are not yet aligned with the EU acquis. Further training on railway safety is needed. The 
independence of the  National Safety Authority, currently assigned to the DG for Railway Transport 
Services,  has  yet  to  be achieved.  The subsidies to the  incumbent railway  operator  and  the  financial 
independence of the transport operator from infrastructure manager remain major issues. 

On  maritime  transport,  Türkiye  published  a  regulation  on  green  certification  of  ports  and  a 
regulation on prevention of collision at sea. National legislation implementing the EU Port Services 
Regulation is yet to be developed. The continued prohibition of the docking of vessels flying Cypriot 
flag calling at Turkish ports as well as the ban on all vessels with cargo bound for or coming from 
Cyprus  from  calling  at  Turkish  ports  remain  highly  problematic.  Alignment  on  inland  waterway 
remains limited and no progress was made during the reporting period. 

On aviation Türkiye continued efforts to further align with the EU aviation safety acquis. The lack of 
adequate  communication  between  air  traffic  control  centres  in  Türkiye  and  Cyprus  continued  to 
compromise  air  safety  in  the  Nicosia  flight  information  region,  requiring  an  operational  solution. 
Türkiye  has  thus  far  refused  to  accept  the  principle  of  EU  carrier  designation  in  its  air  services 
agreements with Member States, which is a cornerstone of the EU internal market in aviation. 

As regards multimodal transport, the implementing legislation on multimodal freight transport was 
revised  in  June  2023  to  include  rail  freight  and  intermodal  transport  services  in  its  scope.  The 
regulation  brings  a  new  green  logistics  certificate  in  case  the  operators  comply  with  certain 
conditions.  

No progress was reported regarding  EU passenger rights regulations. 

67 

 
 
 
As long as restrictions remain in place on vessels and aircrafts registered in Cyprus, related to Cyprus, 
or  whose  last  port of call was  Cyprus,  Türkiye  will not  be  in  a position to fully  implement  the  EU 
acquis relating to this chapter. 

Chapter 15: Energy 

EU  energy  policy  covers  energy  supply,  infrastructure,  the  internal  energy  market,  consumers, 
renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency,  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety,  radiation  protection  and 
nuclear safeguards. 

On security of supply,  Türkiye became the seventh largest country in the world in terms of LNG 
import  capacity  in  operation  with  its  37.2  million  metric  tonnes  of  capacity  in  2023.  Türkiye 
continued to invest in enhancing its regional natural gas trading role capitalising on its geographical 
location and increased natural gas infrastructure capacity. The second phase of construction works at 
the country’s biggest underground storage facility at Tuz Golu (Salt Lake) continued with a target of 
5.4  bcm  of  gas  storage  capacity  and  the  second  underground  gas  storage  facility  at  Silivri  was 
expanded, reaching 4.6 bcm of gas storage capacity. The total length of the natural gas transmission 
network in the country in 2023 amounted to 16 810 km, with 9 compressor stations, 6 entry points 
and 2 interconnection points. Overall, energy dependence on Russia continued. 

On the internal energy market, Türkiye suspended yet again the unbundling of the state-owned gas 
company  BOTAŞ,  which  dominates  the  country’s  natural  gas  market  and  trade.  The  natural  gas 
market  law  remained  incompatible  with  the  EU's  third  energy  package  and  the  pricing  is  not  yet 
transparent, cost-reflective and non-discriminatory.  

On the wholesale electricity market, subsidised tariffs remained in place with some concessions to 
vulnerable  consumers.  The  free  consumer  lower  limit  of  1 000  kWh  determined  for  2023  was 
reduced  to  950  kWh  by  an  Energy  Market  Regulatory  Authority  decision  as  of  January  2024. 
Türkiye became a net electricity importer for the first time in 7 years. 

On hydrocarbons, the Directive on the safety of offshore oil and gas operations is yet to be aligned, 
also regarding the transit of hydrocarbons. Türkiye allocated 75.7 billion Turkish Liras to the energy 
sector  in  2024  under  its  latest  investment  programme,  which  meant  a  70%  increase  compared  to 
2023.    

On coal, Türkiye continued to provide incentives for domestic production of lignite coal and the share 
of  coal  imported  from  Russia  doubled  in  2023  compared  to  2022.  In  2023,  73%  of  Türkiye’s  coal 
imports originated in Russia. Coal remained to be the energy source with the highest volume of the 
country’s electricity generation  (117.6 TWh), which inevitably yielded record high CO2 and related 
gas emissions. Türkiye has yet to set a specific date in the Turkish National Plan for a coal phase-out 
and  decrease  in  the  envisaged  capacity  for  the  coal-fired  power  generation  in  Türkiye  for  the  next 
decade.  

On renewable energy, in the reporting period, nearly all (99.5%) of the added electricity generation 
capacity in the country (2 845 MW) was in renewable installations. The share of renewable sources in 
installed  power  was  56%  and  in  production,  their  share  reached  42%  in  2023.  Out  of  59.2  GW  of 
electricity generated from renewable sources in Türkiye in 2023, 32 GW came from hydropower, 11.8 
GW from wind, 11.3 GW from photovoltaics and the rest from geothermal and bioenergy. In 2023, a 
new Renewable Energy Resources Support Mechanism (YEKDEM) was adopted. The local content 
requirement  practices  in  Türkiye  continue  raising  concerns  as  they  contradict  WTO  and  the  EU-
Turkey  Customs  Union  rules  and  undermine  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU  and  other  international 
companies on the Turkish energy market. 

As  regards  energy  efficiency,  Türkiye’s  National  Energy  Efficiency  Strategy  and  Roadmap  2024–
2030  was  adopted.  A  target  of  Turkish  lira  equivalent  of  approximately  EUR  20  billion  of  energy 
efficiency investments by 2030 was announced, which would be achieved through the collaboration 
between the public and the private sectors. The new energy efficiency plan intends to boost energy 
supply security and to reduce the country’s dependence on foreign energy resources.  

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On  nuclear  energy,  nuclear  safety  and  radiation  protection,  the  first  reactor  of  Türkiye’s  new 
nuclear power plant at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean Sea (a 99.2% investment by Russia’s Rosatom) 
is expected  to  be  operational  by  the end  of  2024.  The  construction  of  the  second,  third  and  fourth 
reactors at the Akkuyu nuclear power plant continued.  

Following its voluntary commitment to conduct EU methodology post-Fukushima stress tests on the 
Akkuyu power plant, Türkiye hosted in May 2024, the second visit of the peer review team in view 
of  finalisation  of  the  peer  review  report.  Türkiye  is  not  yet  member  of  the  European  Community 
Urgent Radiological Information Exchange (ECURIE). Türkiye acceded to the Joint Convention on 
the  Safety  of  Agent  Fuel  Management  and  on  the  Safety  of  Radioactive  Waste  Management  but 
declared its refusal to accept its obligations vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus as a Contracting Party 
to the said Convention. 

Chapter 21: Trans-European networks 

The EU promotes trans-European networks (TENs) in the areas of transport, telecommunications and 
energy to strengthen the internal market and contribute to growth and employment. 

On  transport  networks,  following  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine,  the  Trans-Caspian 
Transport  Corridor  between  Europe  and  Asia  that  traverses  Türkiye  has  significantly  gained 
importance. Türkiye continued to progress on Halkali - Kapikule railway line in all of its stages. The 
project reached 78% physical progress under Cerkezkoy – Kapikule section. The progress under other 
two sections are lagging behind. The project preparation for missing rail links over the Yavuz Sultan 
Selim Bridge remains a critical concern. Developing high and reliable rail capacity on this crucial rail 
corridor is an essential element of the TEN-T. Rail capacity on the eastern side of the Halkali to Kars 
corridor is very limited and requires improvement of infrastructure. 

On electricity transmission networks, the integration of increased amounts of intermittent renewable 
energy remains a major challenge in modernising the country’s electricity network. A target to invest 
the Turkish Lira equivalent of approximately EUR 10 billion in the electricity grid by 2030 is part of 
the  2024–2030  energy  efficiency  action  plan.  Türkiye  has  observer  membership  of  the  European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) until 2026. The total length of 
the electricity transmission lines in the country in 2023 amounted to 73 806 km, with 789 transformer 
centres and 15 interconnection lines with neighbouring countries, including with EU market through 
Bulgaria and Greece. 

Chapter 27: Environment and climate change 

The EU promotes strong climate action, sustainable development and protection of the environment. 
EU  rules  contain  provisions  addressing  climate  change,  water  and  air  quality,  waste  management, 
nature protection, industrial pollution, chemicals, noise and civil protection. 

Environment 

Türkiye made no progress in the area of horizontal legislation. Türkiye is still not party to the Espoo 
Convention and non-alignment with Environmental Impact Assessment and Strategic Environmental 
Assessment  Directives  persists.  Türkiye  is  not  yet  party  to  the  Aarhus  Convention  and  difficulties 
accessing  public information,  justice  in  environmental matters,  and  public  participation in  decision-
making persist. The Environmental Liability Directive and the Environmental Crime Directive are yet 
to be harmonised.  

Türkiye  made  no  progress  on  air  quality  and  has  yet  to  adopt  national  legislation  in  line  with  EU 
Directives on Ambient Air Quality and National Emission Ceilings. Reports on severe air pollution in 
some  cities  continued.  Measurement  results  for  PM  2.5  are  not  yet  publicly  available  and  the 
threshold values for most parameters remain higher than the EU limit values.  

Türkiye made no progress on waste management. While Türkiye’s recycling rate increased to 30% 
in  the  reporting  period,  the  Deposit  Management  System  is  not  yet  in  place  and  the  level  of 
implementation of waste management plans at local and regional level is insufficient. While Türkiye 
has not adopted the legislation on ship recycling to mirror the requirements of the EU Ship Recycling 

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Regulation, two Turkish shipyards were added the EU list of ship recycling facilities in 2024, making 
a total of 11 shipyards in the list as of 2024. Türkiye has not yet adopted a national circular economy 
action plan, and the management of construction debris remains a major environmental problem.  

Türkiye made some progress on water quality.  Türkiye made some progress on preparations of all 
flood  risk  management  plans,  drought  management  plans  and  groundwater  management  plans. 
Türkiye  has  adopted  12  out  of  25  basins  plans  in  line  with  the  Water  Framework  Directive.  No 
progress was made on aligning with the revised EU Directive on drinking water and the coverage of 
wastewater treatment plants remains at 89% of the municipal population. While aligning with the EU 
marine strategy remains  pending,  Türkiye  updated  its  national  action  plan  on  protection  of national 
seas from land-based sources covering the 2023-2028 period.  

Türkiye made no progress on nature protection. Türkiye has not yet set national targets to implement 
the  Kunming-Montreal  Global  Biodiversity  Framework,  and  has  not  yet  adopted  the  framework 
legislation,  the  national  biodiversity  strategy  or  an  action  plan.  Türkiye  did  not  sign  the  Agreement 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law on the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use 
of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement). Planning and 
construction in wetlands, forests and natural sites are still not in line with the EU acquis. The revised 
mining  regulation  allowing  mining  in  agricultural  areas,  protected  areas,  national  parks  and  coastal 
areas, remains a concern among NGOs and the general public. 

Türkiye made no progress on aligning the EU acquis on industrial pollution and risk management.  

On chemicals, Türkiye postponed the transitional period of enforcement of the national legislation on 
the  registration,  evaluation  authorisation  and  restriction  of  chemicals,  and  introduced  a  stratified 
approach  by  tonnage  to  be  fully  in  force  by  end  of  2030.  Alignment  with  the  EU  legislation  on 
registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction of chemicals (REACH) is yet to be achieved. 

No progress was made on noise, where the level of alignment and implementation remains moderate.  

On  civil  protection,  Türkiye  as  a  Participating  State  of  the  Union  Civil  Protection  Mechanism 
(UCPM)  participates  in the  relevant activities  under the  UCPM.  Türkiye  also  contributes  to the  EU 
Civil  protection  pool  with  its  capacities  for  response  to  earthquakes  and  medical  emergencies,  thus 
contributing to the collective capacity of the UCPM. The establishment of a Secure Trans-European 
Services  for  Telematics  between  Administration,  not  yet  in  place,  remains  a  precondition  for 
connecting to the Common Emergency Communication and Information System. 

Climate change 

Türkiye  made  limited  progress  over  the  reporting  period  by  renewing  in  March  2024  its  national 
Climate  Change  Adaptation  Strategy  and  Action  Plan  as  well  as  its Mitigation  Strategy  and  Action 
Plan 2024-2030. However, Türkiye is yet to adopt a climate law, the provisions for the establishment 
of a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy under the 
Partis Agreement to substantiate its objective of reaching climate-neutrality by 2053. Its overall level 
of  climate  change  mitigation  ambition  remains  critically  insufficient;  its  Nationally  Determined 
Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement still falls short of a concrete commitment to reduce 
emissions  in  line  with  science,  in  particular  over  the  short-  and  medium-term.  The  preparation  and 
submission  of  a  new  NDC  well  ahead  of  UNFCCC  COP30  with  a  drastically  enhanced  level  of 
ambition,  especially  an  absolute  emission  reduction  target,  is  crucial.  Türkiye  still  does  not  fully 
implement the Fuel Quality Directive, nor does it align with EU emissions standards for new light and 
heavy-duty vehicles. Türkiye is not aligned with the new regulations on ozone-depleting substances 
and  on  fluorinated  greenhouse  gasses  and  it  needs  to  draw  up  an  alignment  plan  for  the  Carbon 
Capture and  Storage  Directive.  Consideration ought to  be  given  to  aligning  with  major upgrades  of 
the EU climate policy as a result of the Fit for 55 package. 

CLUSTER 5: RESOURCES, AGRICULTURE AND COHESION 

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This  cluster  covers:  agriculture  and  rural  development  (Chapter  11),  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy  (Chapter  12),  fisheries  and  aquaculture  (Chapter  13),  regional  policy  and 
coordination of structural instruments (Chapter 22), and financial and budgetary provisions (Chapter 
33). 

Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development 

The EU’s common agricultural policy supports farmers and ensures Europe’s food security. It helps 
tackle climate change and the sustainable management of national resources; maintains rural areas 
and landscapes across the EU; and keeps the rural economy alive by promoting jobs in farming, agri-
food industries and associated sectors. This requires strong management and control systems. There 
are also common EU rules for marketing standards, quality policy and organic farming. 

On horizontal issues, Türkiye took no significant steps to advance on sustainable agriculture under 
the Turkish Green Deal action plan. Türkiye continued to move away from the principles governing 
support  under  the  EU’s  common  agricultural  policy.  There  was  no  progress  as  regards  the 
establishment  of  the  integrated  administration  and  control  system  (IACS).  Türkiye  made  progress 
with the draft strategy for agricultural statistics. Its adoption and subsequent implementation are key. 
There  was  no  progress  on  the  common  market  organisation  (CMO).  The  effective  opening  and 
filling of the preferential quotas for beef and live bovine animals under the trade agreement with the 
EU remains untransparent and no import licenses was issued. 

On  rural  development,  the  sectoral  and  the  financing  agreements  for  the  EU  Instrument  for  Pre-
accession  Assistance  for  Rural  Development  (IPARD  III)  were  adopted  and  three  calls  for 
applications were launched. The geographical coverage of the programme was extended from 42 to all 
81 provinces of the country. Implementation of IPARD II continued steadily with a very significant 
absorption of funds. 

On quality policy, alignment with the EU acquis needs to continue. On organic farming, there was 
no progress in aligning with the EU acquis. 

Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy 

The EU food acquis including hygiene rules for foodstuff production ensure a high level of food and 
feed safety and a high level of protection of consumers’ interests. Animal health and welfare and the 
safety  of  food  of  animal  origin  are  safeguarded  together  with  quality  of  seeds,  plant  protection 
material, protection against harmful organisms and animal nutrition. 

On  general  food  safety,  the  number of  notifications  to  the  rapid alert system  for  food  and feed on 
pesticide residues in fruits and vegetables imported from Türkiye into the EU remains high. 

Türkiye continued its work to fully align its veterinary policy with the EU acquis. Implementation of 
bovines,  small  ruminants,  pets  and  equine  animals  continued,  yet  no  progress  reported  on 
identification and registration of other species, including swine animals, and on herd tagging or small 
ruminants.  Türkiye  made  no  progress  in  animal  welfare.  The  provisions  on  slaughterhouses,  long 
journeys and on the transition to enriched cage systems are not yet implemented, resulting on lack of 
enforcement. 

On the placing of food, feed and animal by-products on the market, there are still problems on raw 
milk  quality  as there  has been  no  progress  on the  preparation  of  a  strategy  on  raw  milk  and  on  the 
entry into force of general rules to be implemented by raw milk producers. Raw milk specifications 
and rules on the use of milk that does not meet the somatic cell criteria have not yet been adopted. 
Türkiye’s provisions on funding inspections are not yet aligned with the EU system.  

Türkiye  continued  its  work  to  fully  align  of  its  food  safety  rules  and  its  specific  rules  for  feed. 
Türkiye made no progress on phytosanitary policy and has yet to align its legislation on novel food 
and on genetically modified organisms. 

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Chapter 13: Fisheries and aquaculture 

The  common  fisheries  policy lays  down  rules  on  fisheries  management,  protects  living resources of 
the sea and limits the environmental impact of fisheries. This includes setting catch quotas, managing 
fleet capacity, rules on markets and aquaculture and support for fisheries and coastal communities. 
Further, it promotes a sustainable aquaculture. 

Türkiye  made  some  progress  on  resources  and  fleet  management.  Regulation  on  planning  of 
agricultural  production  including  fisheries  and  aquaculture  was  published.  The  Communiqués 
regulating  commercial  and  recreational  fisheries,  which  cover  the  September  2024  to  August  2028 
period, were published. Türkiye implemented projects for the exploitation of invasive non-indigenous 
species, such as pufferfish, and commercialisation of lionfish, gathering significant knowledge. The 
country  is  hosting  the  General  Fisheries  Commission  for  the  Mediterranean  (GFCM)’s  NIS 
observatory  for  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  The  amended  Fisheries  Law  also  provided  for  some 
structural action, such as a stronger conservation regime. Structural measures are in place to support 
traditional coastal fisheries. 

On  inspections  and  control,  Türkiye  continued  to  make  progress  on  legislative  alignment  and  on 
implementing  the  recommendations  for  control  measures  by  the  International  Commission  for  the 
Conservation  of  Atlantic  Tunas  (ICCAT)  and  the  GFCM.  In  line  with  ICCAT  rules  Türkiye 
implemented the annual circular in April 2024 that regulates Bluefin tuna (BFT) fisheries. On market 
policy, IT tools were set up to support the development and control of professional organisations in 
line with EU market policy. Türkiye provides State aid for aquaculture and to improve data quality 
on marine and inland artisanal fishing vessels for sustainable management of fisheries. 

On  international  agreements,  Türkiye  continued  cooperating  with  the  EU  in  regional  and 
international  platforms.  As  the  EU implements  the  provisions  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  on 
the Law of the Sea, including in the common fisheries policy, Türkiye’s ratification of the Convention 
would  improve  cooperation  with  the  EU  on  fisheries  and  maritime  policy.  Türkiye  participated  at 
regional  level  with  an  active  and  supportive  stance  in  the  works  of  the  GFCM  and  the  Common 
Maritime Agenda. 

Chapter 22: Regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments 

Regional policy  is the  EU’s  main  investment  policy  for  sustainable  and  inclusive  economic  growth. 
Member States bear responsibility for its implementation, requiring adequate administrative capacity 
and sound financial management of project design and execution. 

No progress was made on the legislative framework. Mechanisms for evidence-based policymaking, 
policy and programme evaluations, and impact assessment are not yet in place. 

Formulation of a general framework and appropriate statistical tools for monitoring and evaluation of 
the  National  Strategy  for  Regional  Development  (NSRD)  and  Regional  Development  Agencies’ 
(RDAs) performance needs to be improved. The implementation of the NSRD has limited impact on 
national policymaking, and regional level considerations continue not to be fully reflected at central 
level. The new NSRD covering the period of 2024-2028 needs to reflect the principle of aligning the 
national,  regional  and  local  levels.  The  implementation  tools,  such  as  the  Growth  Poles  Support 
Programme or Social Development Support Programme, as well  as the RDAs project support are in 
place, but functionality of these tools needs to be boosted. 

The  Twelfth  Development  Plan  (2024-2028)  was  published  in  November  2023.  The  constitutional 
architecture keeps power centralised at the level of the Presidency and does not ensure separation of 
powers.  The  government's  pressure  on  mayors  from  opposition  parties  continued  to  weaken  local 
democracy.  The  financial  autonomy  of  the  local  authorities  remains  limited  by  state  overregulation 
and  interventionism  in  the  planning  decisions  of  local  authorities,  lack  of  consultation,  limited 
capacity of local authorities to determine the rate of local taxes, and the fact that more than a half of 
local revenues still come from the State budget. 

On  the  institutional  framework,  there  was  no  progress  in  the  reporting  period.  The  presidential 

72 

 
 
system has introduced strictly centralised lines of accountability to the Presidency. Overall, there is a 
lack  of  functional  division  of  roles  and  responsibilities  between  different  governmental  institutions, 
leading to the over-centralisation and inefficiency of public administration. 

On  the  functioning  of  the  Indirect  Management  by  Beneficiary  Country  (IMBC)  authorities,  the 
Financial  Cooperation  Committee,  gathering  all  IMBC  authorities, met regularly.  Some  weaknesses 
have been observed in the supervision and intervention capacity of the National Authorising Officer 
(NAO) in contracting and implementation. The role of the National IPA Coordinator office (NIPAC) 
needs to be further strengthened to ensure effective coordination amongst ministries, prioritisation of 
interventions under IPA III and monitoring of results.  

No progress was made in the administrative capacities of the IPA structures. The implementation 
of the action plan established by the NIPAC and NAO continued to deliver results. However, there is 
no  clear  staff  retention  policy  and  strategy.  The  civil  service  legal  framework  fails  to  guarantee 
neutrality  or facilitate merit-based  recruitment  and  promotion  procedures.  There  was some progress 
on  programming,  in  line  with  the  coordination  framework  set  up  under  IPA  II.  A  Presidential 
Circular published in June 2023 aims to reorganise the structure of the administration of EU funds in 
Türkiye in line with the requirements of the 2021-2027 financial assistance. Türkiye continues to gain 
experience in regional policy in programming and implementing Interreg cooperation programmes. 

On monitoring and evaluation, NIPAC has continued to perform monitoring activities at programme 
and  project  level.  Along  with  the  evaluation  of  annual  programmes,  relevant  Operating  Structures 
planned the evaluation of Multi-Annual Action Programmes under IPA II, despite delays in 2023. The 
main weaknesses are observed in the systems operated by the NIPAC and the NAO. To address this 
issue,  the  re-customisation  of  the  existing  Management  Information  Systems  (MIS)  of  NIPAC  is 
ongoing.  MIS  functions  should  be  significantly  improved  to  make  it  easier  to  track  project  and 
programme progress through output and result indicators and facilitate the application of result-based 
management. 

On financial management, control and audit, the Operating Structures need to improve the use of 
performance  indicators  to  track  implementation  progress  and  apply  sound  financial  management. 
Türkiye  has  developed  a  sound  capacity  in  managing  projects  albeit  there  is  a  need  for  further 
improvement.  

The  number  of  reported  and  investigated  irregularities  considerably  dropped.  The  country  has  an 
advanced  legal  framework  for  the  functioning  of  internal  control  at  all  levels  of  government  and  a 
countrywide management information system for risk management. The audit work is carried out in 
accordance  with  international  audit  standards  as  indicated  in  the  Financial  Framework  Partnership 
Agreement and Framework Agreements (see Chapter 32 – Financial control). 

Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions 

This  chapter  covers  the  rules  governing  the  funding  of  the  EU  budget  (‘own  resources’).  These 
resources  mainly  consist  of:  (i)  contributions  based  on  the  gross  national  income  of  each  Member 
State; (ii) customs duties; (iii) the non-recycled plastic resource and (iv) a resource based on value 
added  tax.  Member  States  must  have  the  appropriate  administrative  capacity  to  adequately 
coordinate and ensure the correct calculation, collection, payment and control of own resources. 

Türkiye  has  already established the  fundamental  principles  and  institutions  in  the  underlying  policy 
areas  related  to  the  implementation  of the  own  resources  system (see  Chapters  16  -  Taxation,  18 – 
Statistics, 29 – Customs Union and 32 – Financial control). However, in due course, it will need to 
set  up  solid  coordination  structures,  strengthen  management  capacity  and  adopt  implementing  rules 
for  the  effective  administration  of  the  own  resources  system.  The  Customs  Union  with  the  EU  on 
processed  agricultural  goods  and  industrial  goods  (with  the  exception  of  coal  and  steel  products) 
continues  to  ensure  considerable  alignment  of  Türkiye’s  customs  legislation  with  the  acquis  on 
customs. Türkiye has yet to adopt a draft customs law aligned with the Union Customs  Code. This 
will facilitate preparation in traditional own resources (mainly customs duties). 

Systems to accurately calculate the VAT base and the weighted average rate for the value added tax-

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based resource are not in place yet. VAT and customs duties fraud remains an issue as does the size 
of  the  informal  economy.  Legislation  on  structure,  exemptions,  special  schemes  and  the  scope  of 
reduced rates is not fully aligned with the EU acquis. 

On  the  gross  national income-based  resource,  Türkiye  has made  efforts  to  fully  align  its national 
accounts and GNI calculations with the European System of Accounts (ESA  2010). It also needs to 
improve the estimates’ exhaustiveness to ensure that they take account of the non-observed economy. 
The GNI inventory is not fully  aligned with the Eurostat’s Inventory Guide and the transmission of 
data does not always occur in a timely manner. 

In  terms  of  the  administrative  infrastructure,  Türkiye  needs  to  establish  a  fully  operational 
coordination structure, with sufficient administrative capacity and the implementing rules needed to 
ensure  that  it  can  correctly  calculate,  forecast,  account  for,  collect,  pay,  monitor  and  report  own 
resources to the EU in line with the EU acquis. 

CLUSTER 6: EXTERNAL RELATIONS 

There  are  two  chapters  in  this  cluster:  external  relations  (Chapter  30),  and  foreign,  security  and 
defence policy (Chapter 31). 

Chapter 30: External relations 

The EU has a common trade and commercial policy towards third countries, based on multilateral 
and bilateral agreements, and autonomous measures. There are also EU rules on humanitarian aid 
and development policy. 

On  the  common  commercial  policy  there  was  some  progress  during  the  reporting  period.  Türkiye 
made no progress in eliminating the additional duties and in the alignment with the EU’s Generalised 
Scheme of Preferences in terms of beneficiary countries and products. However, Türkiye resolved the 
significant issue of the localisation and prioritisation measures for pharmaceutical products. Türkiye 
initiated  four  new  safeguard  investigations,  completed  two  of  them  with  a  definitive  measure  and 
extended  two  safeguard  measures.  Türkiye  initiated  two  anti-circumvention  investigations  against 
exports from the EU.  

There  is  a  need  for  closer  coordination  between  the  EU  and  Türkiye  within  the  World  Trade 
Organization, in particular on the Doha Development Agenda, in the OECD and in the G20.  At the 
WTO, after actively participating in the negotiations, Türkiye has so far declined to add its support to 
the  negotiated  text  on  an  Agreement  on  Electronic  Commerce  or  the  related  statement  by  the  co-
conveners of the Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce (WTO INF/ECOM/87). 

Technical update of the bridging legislation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union (Decision 1/2006) is 
needed  to  align  it  with  the  new  provisions  of  the  revised  Pan-Euro-Mediterranean  Convention.  On 
export controls of military equipment and technology, and dual-use goods, Türkiye did not align with 
the EU position on certain multilateral export control arrangements. Türkiye’s non-alignment with EU 
restrictive  measures  against  Russia  remains  a  source  of  concern,  while  it  has  taken  some  practical 
measures to avoid the circumvention of the EU sanctions against Russia in relation to dual-use goods.   

On  bilateral  trade  and  investment  agreements  with  third  countries,  Türkiye  has  89  bilateral 
investment treaties in force, 24 of which are with EU Member States, and 23 Free Trade Agreements. 
Türkiye adopted its foreign direct investment strategy for the period between 2024 and 2028. Türkiye 
continued  to  implement  its  free  trade  agreements  with  Malaysia,  Venezuela  and  the  United  Arab 
Emirates, diverging from the common commercial policy under the EU-Turkey Customs Union since 
the EU has no such  agreements with those countries. In addition, Türkiye implemented preferential 
trade agreements with Iran, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Azerbaijan. 

As for development policy and humanitarian aid, Türkiye granted official development assistance 
in 2023 of  EUR 6.19 billion, which is equivalent to 0,6% of its gross national income. It was below 

74 

 
 
 
the 0.7% target enshrined in Sustainable Development Goal 17. The assistance was largely directed 
towards humanitarian support for projects related to Syria but carried out in Türkiye. 

Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defence policy 

Member  States  must  be  able  to  conduct  political  dialogue  under  EU  foreign,  security  and  defence 
policy, align with EU statements, take part in EU actions, and apply agreed sanctions and restrictive 
measures. 

The political dialogue between the EU and Türkiye on foreign and security policy issues continued 
through contacts at senior official level. The EU-Türkiye consultations on the Middle East and North 
Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Western Balkans took place in the reporting period, and 
both the EU Special Representative for the Gulf and for Central Asia visited Ankara. Moreover, there 
were regular contacts between the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, who participated in the lunch of the informal meeting 
of  the  EU  Ministers  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  Brussels  in  August  2024.  The  President  of  the  European 
Commission and the President of the European Council met with the Turkish President in the margins 
of the NATO summits. The President of the European Council also met the Turkish President on the 
margins  of  the  G20  in  September  2023.  Türkiye  attended  the  Brussels  VIII  Syria  Conference,  the 
Schuman  Security  and  Defence  Forum,  the  Global  Gateway  Investors  Forum  for  EU-Central  Asia 
Transport Connectivity and the Global Gateway summit.  

The  institutional  framework  enabling  Türkiye’s  participation  in  the  EU’s  common  foreign  and 
security  policy  (CFSP) and  common  security  and  defence  policy (CSDP) remained  in  place,  but 
regrettably  Türkiye  maintained  a  very  low  alignment  rate  of  5%  with  relevant  High  Representative 
statements on behalf of the EU and relevant Council decisions as of 30 September 2024, compared to 
9% in 2023.  

Türkiye  maintained  its  position  of  not  supporting  sanctions  adopted  outside  the  UN  framework.  It 
refrained from aligning with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia in relation to the Russia’s 
aggression  on  Ukraine,  while  emphasising  that  it  did  not  want  to  become  a  platform  for  the 
circumvention of EU sanctions. In November 2023, Türkiye took some measures to prevent the re-
export  of  sensitive  EU-origin  sensitive  items  to  Russia  that  could  be  used  for  military  purposes. 
Türkiye  should  consider  extending  this  mechanism  to  cover  sensitive  items  originating  from  other 
Sanctions  Coalitions  partners.  The  EU  and  Türkiye  continued  to  work  together  to  find  mutually 
agreeable  solutions  regarding  sanctions  circumvention.  In  this  regard,  Türkiye  should  step  up  its 
efforts to find ways to prevent the “false transit” of Common high priority items, which are declared 
as  exports  to  Central  Asia  or  the  Caucasus  but  ultimately  reach  Russia.  In  the  14th  package  of 
sanctions  adopted  in  June  2024,  nine  entities  based  in  Türkiye  were  subject  to  specific  export 
restrictions. Türkiye should also cooperate more actively with EU investigative authorities on cases of 
falsification of origin of sanctioned goods originating from Russia that are entering the Single Market 
illegally. 

Türkiye continued to operate flights to/from Russia. Ten companies registered in Türkiye have been 
listed under the EU sanctions against Russia. 

Türkiye  actively  engaged  with  international  organisations,  while  continuing  to  systematically 
obstruct  the  accession  of  EU  Member  States,  notably  the  Republic  of  Cyprus,  in  a  number  of 
organisations  and  arrangements.  The  Turkish  President  repeatedly  stated  that  Türkiye’s  strategic 
direction remains to join the EU. Türkiye applied for membership in BRICS+  and expressed interest 
in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), attended the BRICS+ summit in Moscow in 
June  2024,  and the  SCO  summit  in  Astana in  July  2024.  Türkiye is  not  a  State  Party to major  UN 
treaties, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  

As regards disarmament and non-proliferation, Türkiye is a party to most international treaties and 
conventions  and  participates  in  export  control  regimes  and  other  politically  binding  arrangements, 
complying with its legally binding obligations and political commitments. However, it continued to 

75 

 
 
prevent the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the Conference on Disarmament, and in other 
Arrangements and Committees. It is still to ratify the Arms Trade Treaty, to which it is signatory. 

In terms of  security measures, Türkiye has no Security of Information Agreement with the EU on 
procedures  for  the  exchanges  and  protection  of  EU  classified  information  (EUCI).  Since  2006,  a 
framework agreement allows Türkiye’s participation, including reception of EUCI, in the context of 
CSDP missions.  

Under  the  CSDP,  Türkiye  continued  to  actively  participate  and  substantially  contribute  to  the  EU 
crisis management missions  and  operations.  Türkiye  continued  being  the biggest  non-EU troops’ 
contributor  to  the  EU  Force  Operation  Althea  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Türkiye  remained  an 
important contributor to the NATO KFOR peacekeeping force in Kosovo, of which Türkiye took over 
the  command  in  October  2023.  Türkiye  continued  to  seek  involvement  in  CSDP  and  EU  defence 
initiatives,  while  at  the  same  time  continuing  to  exclude  a  Member  State  from  cooperation  with 
NATO. Türkiye’s narrow interpretation of the EU-NATO cooperation framework continued to pose 
an  obstacle 
to  enhancing  a  genuine  organisation-to-organisation  relation.  After  protracted 
negotiations, the Turkish Parliament ratified Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024. 

On  counterterrorism,  Türkiye  is  an  active member of the  Global  Coalition against  Daesh,  and  the 
EU  is  supporting  Türkiye’s  efforts  to  improve  the  exchange  of  information  and  cross-border 
investigations, in particular on foreign terrorist fighters and individuals suspected of terrorism. At the 
same  time,  the  broad  definition  of  terrorism  in  domestic  legislation  remains  fundamentally  at  odds 
with European standards and contravenes the European Convention of Human Rights. 

On hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities, including the 
circulation  of  false  information  and  propaganda  on  social  and  traditional  media,  were  observed  in 
Türkiye.  Türkiye  did  not  restrict  the  operations  of  Russian  state-controlled  media  outlets  in  the 
context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.  

Türkiye  continued  to  develop  intense  relations  and  strategic  partnerships  with  countries 
worldwide, while also enhancing its regional normalisation efforts. 

Türkiye maintained a position it described as a 'balanced’ one as regards Russia’s war of aggression 
against  Ukraine,  nurturing  economic  and  trade  relations  with  both  Russian  and  Ukrainian 
counterparts, engaging politically and diplomatically, and maintaining regular contacts at presidential 
and  high  officials’  level.  After  the  termination  of  the  Black  Sea  Grain  Initiative  by  Russia  in  July 
2023, Türkiye made repeated efforts to revive it, so far without success. Together with Romania and 
Bulgaria,  Türkiye  stepped  up  demining  efforts  in  the  Black  Sea.  While  remaining  a  partner  of 
strategic  importance  for  Ukraine  in  the  defence  sector,  Türkiye  continued  to  develop  its  trade  and 
economic relations with Russia. In particular, its energy dependency on Russia increased, including in 
non-fossil fuels, since Russia built and is operating Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant. In June 2024, 
Türkiye  participated  in  the  Ukraine  Peace  Summit  in  Switzerland  and  endorsed  the  Joint 
Communiqué.  Türkiye  remained  vocal  about  bringing  Russia  to  the  negotiating  table  with  Ukraine 
and it seeks to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.  

Türkiye  remained  both  an  important  and  a  challenging  partner  for  the  United  States.  Türkiye’s 
ratification of Sweden’s NATO accession protocol and the US approval of the F-16 sale to Türkiye in 
February 2024 brought a positive momentum in bilateral relations. A number of high-level meetings 
took place, including the US-Türkiye Strategic Mechanism, also reinstating high-level consultations 
on counterterrorism. Türkiye and the US continued engaging on regional issues, including Ukraine, 
the Middle East Peace Process, Afghanistan, and humanitarian access to Syria.  

Türkiye’s rapprochement with the Gulf region continued both at bilateral and regional level, focused 
on trade and economic cooperation, investments and defence. Türkiye further strengthened relations 
with  Saudi  Arabia  (KSA),  the  United  Arab  Emirates  (UAE)  and  Qatar,  as  well  as  with  the  Gulf 
Cooperation  Council.  Turkish-Egyptian  normalisation  efforts  culminated  in  the  official  visit  of  the 
Turkish  President  to  Cairo  in  February  2024,  the  first  in  over  a  decade.  This  revived  cooperation 
mechanisms  and  targeted  an  increase  of  bilateral  trade,  driven  by  the  export  of  Egyptian  LNG  to 
Türkiye, biggest country of destination. In September 2024, the Egyptian and Turkish Presidents held 

76 

 
 
In  Ankara  the  first  meeting  of  the  High-Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council.  The  two  countries 
signed 17 MoUs in areas such as industry, defence, health, environment and energy. 

Türkiye relations with Israel markedly deteriorated following the Hamas terrorist attack against Israel 
on 7 October 2023, leading up to Türkiye’s embargo on all trade with Israel in May 2024. Türkiye did 
not condemn the 7 October terrorist attack, and took a stance in support of Hamas, listed as a terrorist 
organisation by the EU, which is in complete disagreement with the EU’s position. Turkish President 
met  with  the  Hamas  political  leader  Haniyeh  in  Istanbul  in  April  2024.  Türkiye  supported  all  UN 
resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire and joined the genocide case against Israel before the 
International  Court  of  Justice.  Türkiye  remains  an  influential  player  in  the  region,  providing 
considerable  humanitarian  assistance  to  Palestinians,  and  is  also  a  member  of  the  Ad  Hoc  Liaison 
Committee. On the Middle East Peace Process, Türkiye aligns with the EU’s position on the need to 
relaunch the political process with the aim of implementing the two-state solution.  

Türkiye remained a critically important player in the Syrian crisis and shares with the EU the same 
objective  of  achieving  a  stable  and  prosperous  Syria  through the  implementation  of  UNSCR  2254. 
However, Türkiye is at odds with the EU policy on Syria, due to the rapprochement with the Syrian 
regime and the Turkish military presence in parts of northern Syria, extended for 2 years in October 
2023,  and  to  the  significant  military  cross-border  operations  along  its  borders  with  Syria  and  Iraq. 
Türkiye’s  relations  with  Iraq  significantly  improved  with  the  Turkish  President’s  visit  to  both 
Baghdad and Erbil in April 2024, the first in 12 years. It advanced discussions on issues ranging from 
trade  and  water  to  energy  and  counterterrorism,  especially  the  fight  against  the  PKK  and  Iraq’s 
decision  to  list  it  as  a  security  threat  to  both  countries.  During  the  visit,  a  memorandum  of 
understanding  (MoU)  was  signed  between  Türkiye,  Iraq,  Qatar  and  the  UAE  on  the  ‘Development 
Road’ project, to link the Iraqi Al-Faw port in the Gulf to Europe via Türkiye. Türkiye and Iran have 
a multi-faceted relation and maintained a high-level dialogue. In January 2024, on the occasion of the 
8th Türkiye-Iran High-Level Cooperation Council, the then Iranian President travelled to Ankara. Ten 
cooperation agreements were signed, and the aim to steadily  increase bilateral trade was announced. 

Türkiye  remained  a  pivotal  and  active  player  in  Libya,  supporting  the  efforts  of  the  UN  Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General to hold national elections in Libya in 2023. Ankara continued 
to advocate for stability. The MoU on the demarcation of maritime zones, signed in 2019 with Tripoli, 
followed by a 2022 MoU for research and drilling in the delineated areas, is considered by the EU an 
infringement upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and 
cannot produce any legal consequences for third States. Türkiye maintained high-level contacts with 
the representatives of the Government of National Unity, but also opened channels of dialogue with 
East-based  actors  and  participated  in  the  reconstruction  efforts  following  the  Derna  floods  in 
September 2023. At the end of 2023, Türkiye extended the military deployment in Libya till January 
2026. Türkiye’s lack of cooperation continued to hamper EU’s efforts to implement the UN embargo 
on Libya effectively. In September 2024, Türkiye, as a flag state,  withheld its consent to Operation 
IRINI’s request to inspect a vessel, the 12th such incident since Operation IRINI started.  

The  Türkiye-Armenia  normalisation  process  continued  with  contacts  between  the  two  Special 
Envoys,  although  Türkiye  links  progress  with  developments  in  the  Armenia-Azerbaijan  peace 
negotiations. The Foreign Ministers met twice, and leaders of both countries have held several phone 
calls.  The  Türkiye-Armenia  border  remained  closed.  Türkiye  continued  maintaining  very  close 
relations  with  Azerbaijan  holding  regular  high-level  visits  and  consultations,  and  joint  military 
exercises.  Türkiye  unequivocally  supported  the  military  actions  undertaken  by  Azerbaijan,  all  its 
actions  on  Nagorno-Karabakh,  and  its  stance  towards  Armenia  in  general.  Türkiye  is  supporting 
prospects  for  connectivity  as  means  to  ensure  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  region.  Türkiye’s  small 
military  contingent  to  monitor the  ceasefire in the  Nagorno-Karabakh  conflict  zone  was maintained 
until  April  2024,  when  the  Russian-Turkish  Joint  Monitoring  Centre  in  Aghdam  closed.  Türkiye, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia cooperate through a trilateral platform, with the latest edition held in March 
2024 at the level of Foreign Ministers. 

Türkiye  has  a  growing  presence  and  geopolitical  ambition  in  Central  Asia,  attaching  great 
importance  to  connectivity  and  enhancing  relations  with  the  countries  in  the  region.  In  particular, 

77 

 
 
Türkiye  further  developed  cooperation  in  the  defence  industry  with  Kazakhstan  and  focused  on 
energy cooperation with Turkmenistan. Türkiye continued to push for stronger political role for the 
Organization  of  Turkic  States  (OTS),  while  also  promoting  efforts  to  legitimise  the  so-called, 
internationally  not  recognised  ‘Turkish  Republic  of  Northern  Cyprus’  through  participation,  as 
observer  in  the  OTS,  which    undermines  efforts  to  create  an  environment  conducive  to  resume 
settlement talks under the auspices of the United Nations.  

Türkiye’s  relations  with  Pakistan  remained  strong.  Türkiye  maintained  a  pragmatic  approach  on 
Afghanistan,  holding  regular  talks  with  the  Taliban  de  facto  authorities,  though  Ankara  has  not 
recognised  the  Taliban  regime,  but  is  hosting  Afghan  political  opponents  without  facilitating  the 
formation  of  a  joint  opposition  or  armed  resistance,  and  increasing  trade.  Türkiye,  which  has  an 
embassy in Afghanistan, continued sending humanitarian aid and kept operating the Maarif schools. 

Türkiye  systematically  focused  on  development  opportunities  in  Asia  through  its  Asia  Anew 
Initiative,  aspiring  at  becoming  the  axis  connecting  Asia  to  Europe,  and  sought  opportunities  to 
strengthen its cooperation with ASEAN. Türkiye is part of the multilateral Middle Corridor Initiative. 
Türkiye continued to strengthen trade ties with China, its second biggest trading partner after the EU. 
The Presidents of two countries met in July 2024 on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Kazakhstan, 
and  the  Turkish  Foreign  Minister  visited  China  in  June  2024,  including  the  Xinjiang  Uyghur 
autonomous  region.  Türkiye  and  Indonesia agreed  to  strengthen  bilateral relations  through  a  High-
Level  Strategic  Cooperation  Council.  The  Turkish  President  and  the  Prime  Minister  of  India 
discussed ways to deepen the bilateral relation, economic and trade cooperation. 

In Africa, Türkiye pursued stepping up its presence and active involvement, further strengthening its 
ties in sub-Saharan Africa, notably in the Horn and West Africa. In particular in Somalia, which hosts 
the largest Turkish military base oversea, Türkiye emerged both as a mediator, supporting the Somalia 
peace process and facilitating the mediation talks with Ethiopia, and as a partner. Recent agreements 
include  Türkiye’s  support  for  local  maritime  capacities  and  joint  ventures  for  onshore  and  offshore 
natural resources exploitation. Türkiye maintained a balanced position between the warring parties in 
the Sudanese conflict, seeking for a mediation role.  

Türkiye  maintained  its  diplomatic  engagement  with  countries  of  Latin  America,  aiming  to  expand 
and  strengthen the  political  and  trade  relations.  The Turkish-Venezuelan relations  remained  strong, 
marked by frequent bilateral visits and a free trade agreement since 2018.  

78 

 
 
 
 
ANNEX I – RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TÜRKIYE  

In  April  2024,  the  European  Council  reiterated  the  EU’s  strategic  interest  in  a  stable  and  secure 
environment  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  in  the  development  of  a  cooperative  and  mutually 
beneficial relationship with Türkiye. EU leaders tasked the Coreper, respecting the competencies of 
the  relevant  institutions,  to  advance  work  on  the  recommendations  of  the  November  2023  Joint 
Communication by the High Representative and the Commission on the state of play of EU-Türkiye 
political,  economic  and  trade  relations.  The  recommendations  cover  a  broad  range  of  issues  of 
common interest. Work began immediately after the European Council conclusions of April 2024 to 
re-engage constructively with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner, subject to the 
established  conditionalities.  The  European  Council  stressed  that  Türkiye’s  own  constructive 
engagement will be instrumental in advancing the various areas of cooperation identified in the Joint 
Communication. 

Türkiye continues to refuse to recognise the Republic of Cyprus and advocates for a two-state solution 
in Cyprus, contrary to relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. In April 2024, the European 
Council reconfirmed its commitment to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within 
the UN framework, in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the principles 
on which the EU is founded and the EU acquis. It welcomed the appointment of the UN Secretary-
General’s Personal Envoy on Cyprus. The European Council reiterated that the EU is ready to play an 
active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal.  

The  Council  conclusions  of  July  2019,  adopted  as  a  response  to  Türkiye’s  unauthorised  drilling 
activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, remain in place. In November 2023, following a review of the 
framework for restrictive measures in response to the unauthorised drilling activities, the European 
Council  extended  the  regime  for  a  further  year,  until  30 November 2024.  Two  individuals  are 
currently subject to sanctions. Türkiye has not engaged in any unauthorised drilling activities in the 
Eastern Mediterranean since the beginning of 2021. 

In December 2023, the Council noted with regret that Türkiye continues to move further away from 
the EU and that accession negotiations with the country have therefore come to a standstill and no 
further  chapters  can  be  considered  for  opening  or  closing.  As  part  of  accession  negotiations,  16 
chapters had been opened and one of these had been provisionally closed.  

Reforms  and  developments  in  Türkiye  continued  to  be  monitored  by  the  bodies  set  up  under  the 
Association Agreement, with subcommittees in place throughout the reporting period. The meetings 
of the Association Council remain suspended in line with the 2019 Council conclusions.   

The  Commission  continued  intensified  engagement  with  Türkiye  to  discuss  the  functioning  of  the 
Customs Union, including a High-Level Dialogue on Trade in July 2024. Türkiye made progress on 
trade  barriers  and  took  measures  to  prevent  the  circumvention  of  EU  restrictive  measures  against 
Russia imposed in reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Commission recommended opening 
negotiations with Türkiye on the modernisation of the Customs Union in December 2016. In the Joint 
Communication  of  November  2023,  the  High  Representative  and  the  Commission  recommended to 
resume discussions on the draft negotiating framework for the modernisation of the Customs Union. 
This  was  on  the  understanding  that  Türkiye  rapidly  addresses  the  circumvention  of  EU  restrictive 
measures against Russia via its territory and continues to resolve trade irritants in an efficient way.   

Türkiye  became  the  EU’s  fifth  largest  trading  partner  in  2023,  while  the  EU  continued  to  be 
Türkiye’s largest partner. Türkiye’s exports to the EU amounted to EUR 95.5 billion in 2023, while 
imports from the EU amounted to EUR 111 billion.  

In  the  area  of  visa,  migration  and  asylum,  the  implementation  of  the  March  2016  EU-Turkey 
Statement has continued to deliver concrete results in reducing irregular and dangerous crossings on 
the  Eastern Mediterranean route to  Europe and in  saving lives  at sea.  Türkiye  continued  significant 
efforts  to  provide  support  to  3.6  million  refugees,  of  which  3.1  million  Syrians  (as  of  September 
2024),  while  it  continued  working  to  prevent  irregular  migration.  In  the  context  of  the  EU-Türkiye 
visa  liberalisation  dialogue,  no  outstanding  visa  liberalisation  benchmarks  were  fulfilled.  An 

79 

 
 
international agreement on the exchange of personal data between Europol and the Turkish authorities 
responsible  for  fighting  serious  crime  and  terrorism  is  yet  to  be  concluded.  High-level  engagement 
continued in the area of migration, with a High- Level Dialogue held in November 2023.   

Türkiye  and  the  EU  continued  to  cooperate  effectively  in  supporting  refugees  and  host 
communities  in  Türkiye.  Almost  EUR  10  billion  has  been  allocated  for  that  purpose  since  2011, 
including  EUR  6  billion  under  the  Facility  for  Refugees  in  Turkey.  Support  continued  to  focus  on 
humanitarian assistance, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socio-economic development 
and  migration  management.  Over  1.5  million  refugees,  including  the  most  vulnerable,  continue  to 
receive  basic  needs  support,  and  close  to  870 000  refugee  children  are  enrolled  in  schools.  Other 
achievements include the construction of two major hospitals, 170 new schools (out of a target of 348) 
and delivering over 33.4 million primary healthcare consultations. For 2024, the Commission pledged 
EUR 1 billion to support refugees, host communities and migration management in Türkiye.  

On bilateral financial assistance, projects under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
for  Türkiye  continued  to  be  implemented,  in  compliance  with  the  political  guidance  of  the  EU 
budgetary authority. Financial assistance under IPA III focuses on priorities linked to the fundamental 
pillars  of  the  enlargement  strategy  and  sectors  of  common  strategic  interest,  mainly  related  to  the 
green  and  digital  transition,  connectivity  as  well  as  to  building  more  resilient  and  more  sustainable 
economies and societies.  

Implementation of the EU pledge of EUR 1 billion for the people in Türkiye continued following the 
February 2023 earthquakes, and an International Donors’ Conference for the people in Türkiye and 
Syria on 20 March 2023.  

Türkiye  continues  to  participate  in  a  number  of  EU  programmes.  Association  agreements  are  in 
place for its participation in Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, the European Solidarity Corps programme, 
the  Customs  programme,  the  Single  Market  Programme  (SME  component)  and  the  Digital  Europe 
Programme. Türkiye participates in the European Environmental Agency, the European Union Drugs 
Agency and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. The Turkey Investment Platform (TIP) under the 
European  Fund  for  Sustainable  Development  Plus  (EFSD+)  enables  stronger  EU  support  to 
investments  through  guarantee  programmes  in  the  three  overarching  policy  priorities,  namely  the 
Green Deal, global gateways as well as jobs and growth. It is expected to mobilise close to EUR 2.4 
billion of investments in Türkiye on the back of up to EUR 400 million in EU budget guarantees. To 
strengthen capacities in modelling the macro-economic effects of green policies and investments and 
to  support  municipalities  with  their  long-term  inclusion  strategies,  Türkiye  is  participating  as  an 
observer in two pilot projects under the Technical Support Instrument. 

80 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II – STATISTICAL DATA 

STATISTICAL DATA (as of 5/09/2024) 
Türkiye 

Basic data 
Population (thousand) 
Total area of the country (km²) 

National accounts 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million national currency) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) (million euro) 
GDP (euro per capita) 
GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards (PPS)) 
GDP per capita (in PPS), relative to the EU average (EU-27 = 100) 
Real GDP growth rate: change on previous year of GDP volume (%) 
Employment growth (national accounts data), relative to the previous year (%) 
Labour productivity growth: growth in GDP (in volume) per person employed, relative to the 
previous year (%) 
Unit labour cost growth, relative to the previous year (%) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the nominal unit labour cost growth index (2015 = 100) 
Labour productivity per person employed: GDP (in PPS) per person employed relative to EU 
average (EU-27 = 100) 
Gross value added by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
Final consumption expenditure, as a share of GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation, as a share of GDP (%) 
Exports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Imports of goods and services, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross fixed capital formation by the general government sector, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Note 

1) 

Note 

2011 
73 723 i 
785 347 w 

2018 
80 811 i 
779 972 w 

2019 
82 004 bi 
779 972 w 

2020 
83 155 i 
779 972 w 

2021 
83 614 i 
779 972 w 

2022 
84 680 i 
779 972 w 

2011 
1 404 928 
600 961 
8 100 
14 596 
56.8 
11.2 
: 
: 

2018 
3 761 166 
658 963 
8 090 
19 188 
63.2 
3.0 
: 
: 

2019 
4 317 810 
679 136 
8 220 
18 507 
59.0 
0.8 
: 
: 

2020 
5 048 568 
626 785 
7 520 
18 320 
60.7 
1.9 
: 
: 

2021 
7 256 142 
690 246 
8 200 
19 950 
60.8 
11.4 
: 
: 

2022 
15 011 776 
862 310 
10 150 
23 802 
66.8 
5.5 
: 
: 

: 
: 
: 

9.3 
22.4 
8.1 
60.3 i 
76.3 
27.7 
23.0 
30.3 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.5 
24.9 
7.9 
60.7 i 
70.7 
29.8 
31.2 
31.4 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.1 
24.4 
6.0 
62.7 i 
72.2 
26.0 
33.1 
30.1 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.5 
25.6 
5.9 
60.9 i 
71.8 
27.5 
29.1 
32.2 
: 

: 
: 
: 

6.2 
29.2 
5.7 
59.0 i 
68.2 
28.2 
35.7 
35.3 
: 

: 
: 
: 

7.2 
29.5 
5.5 
57.7 i 
69.0 
29.2 
38.6 
42.6 
: 

Business 
Industrial production volume index (2015 = 100) 
Number of active enterprises (number) 
Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 

Note 

2011 
80.1 w 
2 737 278 w 
14.6 

2018 
114.2 w 
3 160 371 w 
13.3 

2019 
113.6 w 
3 228 421 w 
12.9 

2020 
115.4 w 
3 304 088 w 
14.7 

2021 
135.6 w 
3 578 931 w 
16.3 w 

2022 
143.3 w 
3 784 464 w 
: 

81 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of 
enterprises active in t (%) 
People employed in SMEs as a share of all persons employed (within the non-financial 
business economy) (%) 
Value added by SMEs (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 
Total value added (in the non-financial business economy) (EUR million) 

12.5 

11.5 

12.2 w 

: 

: 

: 

77.0 iw 

74.4 iw 

73.8 iw 

73.9 iw 

74.0 iw 

73.3 piw 

89 453 iw 
163 339 w 

106 199 iw 
202 005 w 

110 591 iw 
208 171 w 

95 660 iw 
181 250 w 

88 925 piw 
178 072 w 

164 943 piw 
170 469 w 

Inflation rate 
Consumer price index (CPI), change relative to the previous year (%) 

Balance of payments 
Balance of payments: current account total (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: trade balance (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net services (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for primary income (million euro) 
Balance of payments current account: net balance for secondary income (million euro) 
Net balance for primary and secondary income: of which government transfers (million euro) 
**3 year backward moving average of the current account balance relative to GDP (%) 
**Five year change in share of world exports of goods and services (%) 
Net balance (inward - outward) of foreign direct investment (FDI) (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) abroad (million euro) 
of which FDI of the reporting economy in the EU-27 countries (million euro) 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in the reporting economy (million euro) 
of which FDI of the EU-27 countries in the reporting economy (million euro) 
**Net international investment position, relative to GDP (%) 
Year on year rate of change in gross inflow of remittances (in national currency) from migrant 
workers (%) 

Public finance 
General government deficit / surplus, relative to GDP (%) 
General government gross debt relative to GDP (%) 
Total  government revenues, as a percentage of GDP (%) 
Total government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP (%) 

Financial indicators 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to GDP (%) 
Gross external debt of the whole economy, relative to total exports (%) 
Money supply: M1 (banknotes, coins, overnight deposits, million euro) 
Total credit by monetary financial institutions to residents (consolidated) (million euro) 
**Annual change in financial sector liabilities (%) 

Note 

Note 

2) 
2) 
2) 
2) 
2) 

Note 

Note 

2011 
6.5 d 

2018 
16.3 d 

2019 
15.2 d 

2020 
12.3 d 

2021 
19.6 d 

2022 
72.3 d 

2011 
- 53 827.6 
- 63 906.5 
14 370.2 
- 5 651.2 
1 360.0 
577.7 
: 
: 
9 922.4 w 
1 702.6 w 
1 016.3 w 
11 625.0 w 
6 328.0 w 
-  37.7 w 
0.2 iw 

2011 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2018 
- 17 585.8 
- 33 861.9 
25 774.4 
- 10 144.2 
651.9 
223.5 
-  3.5 
5.5 
7 805.3 i 
3 049.7 
1 716.7 
10 855.0 
3 094.7 
-  42.1 w 
0.1 iw 

2018 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2019 
9 696.1 
- 15 027.1 
34 541.0 
- 10 590.5 
781.2 
547.5 
-  2.0 
8.7 
5 978.0 i 
2 653.2 
1 266.9 
8 631.2 
1 174.7 
-  40.6 w 
0.0 iw 

2019 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2020 
- 27 400.0 
- 33 199.4 
13 201.6 
- 7 564.3 
153.5 
90.9 
-  1.9 
-  1.6 
3 883.8 i 
2 833.7 
1 069.1 
6 717.5 
1 201.1 
-  53.3 w 
0.0 iw 

2020 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2021 
- 5 292.5 
- 24 850.1 
27 783.2 
- 9 013.3 
795.6 
355.2 
-  1.2 
7.2 
5 417.4 i 
4 262.9 
1 807.0 
9 680.3 
2 170.5 
-  30.9 w 
0.0 iw 

2021 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2022 
- 42 938.4 
- 85 472.1 
51 156.5 
- 8 311.6 
-  311.3 
-  583.1 
-  3.4 
14.3 
8 007.4 i 
4 474.0 
2 268.2 
12 481.4 
4 980.1 
-  34.9 w 
0.0 iw 

2022 
: 
: 
: 
: 

2011 
38.3 iw 
175.2 w 
65 555.0 w 
281 348.1 
22.9 

2018 
54.8 iw 
179.1 w 
84 551.5 w 
350 398.4 
18.0 

2019 
54.6 iw 
166.3 w 
108 083.1 w 
409 716.3 
11.6 

2020 
60.4 iw 
207.8 w 
135 348.7 w 
408 386.7 
39.1 

2021 
54.2 iw 
153.0 w 
143 842.8 w 
397 220.1 
51.1 

2022 
48.7 iw 
134.2 w 
156 740.1 w 
511 439.7 
66.4 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
**Private debt, consolidated, relative to GDP (%) 
Interest rates: day-to-day money rate, per annum (%) 
Euro exchange rates: average of period (1 euro = … national currency) 
Trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries (2015 = 100) 
**3 year change (T/T-3) in the trade-weighted effective exchange rate index, 42 countries 
(2015 = 100) 
Value of reserve assets (including gold) (million euro) 

61 
7.28 
2.338 
131.1 
- 0.2 i 

82 
17.76 
5.708 
56.5 
- 0.4 i 

79 
20.52 
6.358 
49.6 
- 0.5 i 

89 
10.85 
8.055 
40.3 
- 0.5 i 

89 
17.87 
10.512 
31.1 
- 0.5 i 

66 
13.16 
17.409 
17.8 
- 0.6 i 

0.0 

- 8 640.9 

5 661.0 

- 29 004.1 

19 405.7 

13 110.7 

External trade in goods 
Value of imports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Value of exports: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Trade balance: all goods, all partners (million euro) 
Terms of trade (export price index / import price index * 100) (number) 
Share of exports to EU-27 countries in value of total exports (%) 
Share of imports from EU-27 countries in value of total imports (%) 

Demography 
Crude rate of natural change of population (natural growth rate): number of births minus 
deaths (per thousand inhabitants) 
Infant mortality rate deaths of children under one year of age (per thousand live births) 
Life expectancy at birth: male (years) 
Life expectancy at birth: female (years) 

Labour market 
Economic activity rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that 
is economically active (%) 
*Employment rate for persons aged 20–64: proportion of the population aged 20–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Male employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Female employment rate for persons aged 20–64 (%) 
Employment rate for persons aged 55–64: proportion of the population aged 55–64 that are 
in employment (%) 
Employment by main sectors 
Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (%) 
Industry (%) 
Construction (%) 
Services (%) 
People employed in the public sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 
People employed in the private sector as a share of total employment, persons aged 20–64 
(%) 

83 

Note 

Note 

Note 

3) 4) 

2011 
173 099 
96 973 
- 76 126 
: 
40.3 iw 
35.5 iw 

2011 
11.4 

11.7 
74.4 
79.8 

2011 
57.2 

52.2 

75.1 
29.7 
31.4 

24.2 i 
19.5 i 
6.9 i 
49.4 i 
13.3 w 

2018 
188 337 
142 290 
- 46 047 
94.4 iw 
43.3 iw 
32.9 iw 

2018 
10.1 be 

9.3 
76.2 
81.6 

2018 
62.3 

55.6 

76.0 
35.2 
35.3 

18.4 i 
19.7 i 
6.9 i 
54.9 i 
15.4 w 

2019 
181 038 
153 201 
- 27 836 
94.5 iw 
42.2 iw 
31.6 iw 

2019 
9.1 be 

9.1 
76.4 
81.8 

2019 
62.2 

53.8 

73.2 
34.4 
33.6 

18.1 i 
19.8 i 
5.5 i 
56.6 i 
16.8 w 

2020 
182 328 
140 035 
- 42 293 
98.5 iw 
41.1 iw 
33.1 iw 

2020 
: 

: 
: 
: 

2020 
58.7 

51.0 

70.1 
32.0 
31.1 

17.6 i 
20.5 i 
5.7 i 
56.2 i 
17.7 w 

2021 
219 224 
180 299 
- 38 925 
85.9 iw 
41.1 iw 
31.1 iw 

2021 
: 

9.3 
: 
: 

2021 
61.2 b 

53.9 b 

73.6 b 
34.2 b 
33.6 b 

17.2 bi 
21.4 bi 
6.1 bi 
55.3 bi 
16.9 bw 

2022 
324 441 
223 777 
- 100 663 
75.7 iw 
40.4 iw 
25.5 iw 

2022 
6.2 

9.2 
74.3 
78.4 

2022 
63.1 

56.5 

75.9 
37.0 
34.9 

15.7 i 
21.7 i 
6.0 i 
56.6 i 
: 

3) 4) 

86.7 w 

84.6 w 

83.2 w 

82.3 w 

83.1 bw 

: 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that is unemployed (%) 
Male unemployment rate (%) 
Female unemployment rate (%) 
Youth unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force aged 15–24 that is unemployed (%) 
Long-term unemployment rate: proportion of the labour force that has been unemployed for 
12 months or more (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed at most lower secondary 
education (ISCED levels 0-2) (%) 
Unemployment rate for persons (aged 25–64) having completed tertiary education (ISCED 
levels 5-8) (%) 

Social cohesion 
Average nominal monthly wages and salaries (national currency) 
Index of real wages and salaries (index of nominal wages and salaries divided by the 
inflation index) (2016 = 100) 
GINI coefficient 
Poverty gap 
*Early leavers from education and training: proportion of the population aged 18–24 with at 
most lower secondary education who are not in further education or training (%) 

Standard of living 
Number of passenger cars relative to population size (number per thousand population) 
Number of mobile phone subscriptions relative to population size (number per thousand 
population) 
Mobile broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 
Fixed broadband penetration (per 100 inhabitants) 

Infrastructure 
Density of railway network (lines in operation per thousand km²) 

Length of motorways (kilometres) 

Education, innovation and research 
Public expenditure on education relative to GDP (%) 
*Gross domestic expenditure on R&D relative to GDP (%) 
Government budget appropriations or outlays on R&D (GBAORD), as a percentage of GDP 
(%) 
Percentage of households who have internet access at home (%) 

Note 
5) 

Note 

Note 

Note 

8.8 
8.3 
10.1 
16.7 
2.1 

7.4 

6.8 

2011 
1 242 w 
: 

: 
31.9 
41.9 

2011 
109.0 
874.0 w 

19.7 w 
10 w 

2011 
12.3 i 

2 119 

2011 
4.2 iw 
0.79 
0.35 

: 

10.9 
9.6 
13.8 
20.2 
2.4 

9.1 

9.8 

2018 
2 509 w 
: 

: 
25.8 
31.0 

2018 
151.0 be 
977.0 w 

74.5 w 
16 w 

2018 
13.2 i 

2 842 

2018 
4.3 
1.27 
0.44 

83.8 

13.7 
12.4 
16.5 
25.2 
3.2 

12.3 

10.6 

2019 
2 857 w 
: 

: 
27.4 
28.7 

2019 
150.0 
972.0 w 

75.0 w 
17 w 

2019 
13.3 i 

3 060 

2019 
4.4 
1.32 
0.45 

88.3 

13.2 
12.4 
14.9 
25.1 
3.3 

11.8 

10.0 

2020 
3 501 w 
: 

: 
27.5 
26.7 

2020 
157.0 
982.0 w 

78.5 w 
20 w 

2020 
13.3 i 

3 523 

2020 
4.0 
1.37 
0.41 

90.7 

12.0 b 
10.7 b 
14.7 b 
22.7 b 
3.7 b 

10.4 b 

10.0 b 

2021 
3 904 w 
: 

: 
27.0 
23.1 b 

10.5 
9.0 
13.5 
19.5 
2.5 

8.6 

9.4 

2022 
4 742 w 
: 

: 
24.8 
21.2 

2021 
162.0 
1 019.0 w 

2022 
167.0 
1 058.8 w 

82.7 w 
21 w 

2021 
13.5 i 

3 532 

2021 
3.5 iw 
1.40 
0.38 

92.0 

84.0 w 
22 w 

2022 
13.7 i 

3 633 

2022 
: 
1.32 
0.36 

94.2 

2022 
: 

Environment 
*Index of greenhouse gas emissions,  CO2 equivalent (1990 = 100) 

Note 

2011 
195.2 ew 

2018 
238.3 ew 

2019 
231.7 ew 

2020 
238.7 ew 

2021 
257.1 ew 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy intensity of the economy (kg of oil equivalent per 1 000 euro GDP at 2015 constant 
prices) 
Electricity generated from renewable sources relative to gross electricity consumption (%) 
Road share of inland freight transport (based on tonne-km) (%) 

Energy 
Primary production of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of crude oil (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of solid fuels (thousand TOE) 
Primary production of gas (thousand TOE) 
Net imports of all energy products (thousand TOE) 
Gross inland energy consumption (thousand TOE) 
Gross electricity generation (GWh) 

Agriculture 
Agricultural production volume index of goods and services (at producer prices) (2015 = 100) 
Utilised agricultural area (thousand hectares) 
Livestock numbers: live bovine animals (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live swine (thousand heads, end of period) 
Livestock numbers: live sheep and live goats (thousand heads, end of period) 
Raw milk available on farms (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: cereals (including rice) (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: sugar beet (thousand tonnes) 
Harvested crop production: vegetables (thousand tonnes) 

Source: Eurostat and/or the statistical authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina 

Note 

Note 

184.0 

167.6 

168.5 

162.8 

159.6 

157.8 

25.2 w 
94.6 w 

2011 
30 816 
2 342 
16 620 
625 
80 352 i 
112 842 
229 395 

2011 
: 
38 226.0 
: 
: 
: 
: 
35 202.0 
16 126.0 
40 603.0 

32.2 w 
94.8 w 

43.6 w 
94.8 w 

41.9 w 
94.6 w 

35.6 w 
95.6 w 

41.6 w 
95.7 w 

2018 
39 909 
3 010 
16 547 
351 
109 980 i 
148 120 
304 802 

2018 
: 
38 239.0 
17 220.9 p 
: 
46 117.4 i 
: 
34 705.8 
18 900.0 
29 987.0 

2019 
45 134 
3 102 
17 429 
390 
105 649 i 
150 123 
303 898 

2019 
: 
37 712.0 
17 872.3 
: 
48 481.5 i 
: 
35 202.1 
18 055.0 
31 041.0 

2020 
43 636 
3 274 
15 006 
363 
104 983 i 
148 064 
306 703 

2020 
: 
37 747.0 
18 158.0 
: 
54 112.6 i 
: 
38 050.8 
23 026.0 
31 120.0 

2021 
46 208 
3 518 
17 151 
324 
115 096 i 
161 774 
334 723 

2021 
: 
38 038.0 
18 036.1 
: 
57 519.2 i 
: 
32 602.0 
18 250.0 
31 691.0 

2022 
59 508 
3 663 
27 859 
312 
113 989 i 
168 838 
328 379 

2022 
: 
38 450.0 
17 023.8 
1.7 e 
56 265.8 i 
: 
39 562.1 
19 000.0 
31 525.0 

: = not available 
b = break in series 
d =  definition differs 
e = estimated value 
p = provisional 
i = Eurostat estimate 

w= data supplied by and under the responsibility of the national statistical authority and published on an "as is" basis and 
without any assurance as regards their quality and adherence to EU statistical methodology 
* = Europe 2020 indicator 
** = Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator 

Footnotes: 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1)  Areas calculated by reference to Corine classification and adapted to LUCAS. The Corine data production period is 6 years. 

2)  Based on BPM6. 
3)  Annual LFS results. 
4)  Adjustments in the definition, scope and design of the HLFS have been implemented from 2021. Data from 2021 on are not 

comparable to previous years. 

5)  Source: Income and Living Conditions Survey. 

86 

 
 
 
87