COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Fourth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union
Date: 2024-10-17
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, activity report, direct investment, financial control, foreign capital, foreign investment, investment policy, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 17.10.2024  SWD(2024) 234 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Screening of FDI into the Union and its Member States Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Fourth Annual Report on the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union {COM(2024) 464 final}  
 
 
Contents 

1. 

Foreign Direct Investments into the EU27 – 2023 overview ................................................................ 3 

A)  Main findings ........................................................................................................................................ 3 

B)  Weak global FDI, slowdown in both acquisitions and new greenfield investments in the EU27 ......... 3 

C)  Over half of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments originated in US and UK....................... 5 

D)  Manufacturing and ICT concentrated foreign investment activity ....................................................... 7 

E)  Top recipients of EU foreign investments ........................................................................................... 11 

F)  Russian public and private shareholding in the EU27 ......................................................................... 16 

G)  Chinese public and private shareholding in the EU27 ........................................................................ 18 

2.  Methodology and sources .................................................................................................................. 22 

3. 

EU Member States – legislative developments .................................................................................. 24 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 24 

Austria ..................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Belgium ................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Bulgaria ................................................................................................................................................... 25 

Croatia ..................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Cyprus ..................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Czechia .................................................................................................................................................... 26 

Denmark .................................................................................................................................................. 26 

Estonia ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 

Finland ..................................................................................................................................................... 27 

France...................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Germany .................................................................................................................................................. 28 

Greece ..................................................................................................................................................... 28 

Hungary ................................................................................................................................................... 29 

Ireland ..................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Italy ......................................................................................................................................................... 30 

Latvia ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 

Lithuania ................................................................................................................................................. 31 

Luxembourg ............................................................................................................................................ 31 

Malta ....................................................................................................................................................... 32 

Netherlands............................................................................................................................................. 32 

1 

 
 
 
 
Poland ..................................................................................................................................................... 32 

Portugal ................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Romania .................................................................................................................................................. 33 

Slovakia ................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Slovenia ................................................................................................................................................... 35 

Spain ........................................................................................................................................................ 35 

Sweden .................................................................................................................................................... 36 

2 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Foreign Direct Investments into the EU27 – 2023 overview 

A)  Main findings 

➢  Global  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  inflows  totaled  just  over  EUR  1  trillion  in 
2023, a decline of 15% compared to 2022. Inflows to the EU27 amounted to EUR -50 
billion in 2023.  

➢  A total of 3,800 new acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects were recorded 
in  the  EU27  in  2023,  a  figure  -25%  lower  than  2022  levels.  A  contraction  in  both 
M&As and minority investments (-13%), and greenfield investments (-33%) compared 
to 2022, accounted for the overall transaction decline. 

➢  The  US  was  the  main  foreign  investor  in  the  EU27  in  2023,  grouping  30%  of  all 

acquisitions of equity stakes and 36% of all greenfield investments. 

➢  Almost  60%  of  the  investments  in  the  EU27  targeted  the  information  and 

communication technology (ICT), retail, and manufacturing sectors. 

➢  The  main  destination  of  M&As  into  the  EU27  in  2023  was  Germany  (with  a  19% 
share,  compared  to  18%  in  2022).  In  terms  of  Greenfields,  the  main  destination  was 
Spain with a 24% share in 2023 (compared to 18% in 2022). 

B)  Weak global FDI, slowdown in both acquisitions and new greenfield investments in the 

EU27 

According to OECD data, net global FDI inflows experienced a year-on-year reduction in 2023, 
totalling  just  over  EUR  1  trillion,  down  for  second  year  in  a  row.  Global  inflows  in  2023 
declined  by  -15%  compared  to  the  values  reached  in  2022,  and  by  -30%  compared  to  2021 
values. The EU27 experienced an increase in 2023 FDI inflows compared to values observed in 
the  previous  year,  however  inflows  remained  negative  also  in  20231,  with  EUR  -50  billion 
inward FDI recorded2.  

1  Recall  the  drop  in  2022  FDI  inflows  to  the  EU27  was  due  to  sizeable  disinvestments  that  took  place  in 
Luxembourg (see https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-April-2023.pdf). In the same line, 
the drop observed in 2023 EU27 FDI inflows appears to be linked to further disinvestments recorded this time also 
in the Netherlands (https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-April-2024.pdf). 
2 See Figure 1 in the Annual Report 2024. 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Annual FDI inflow in the EU27 with breakdown by instrument (billion EUR) 

N
B
€

800

600

400

200

0

-200

-400

-600

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Equity Flows

Reinvestment earnings

Debt Flows

Rest

Source: OECD data, extracted on 07/05/2024. Data measures inward FDI flows. The details by instrument do not include inflows into Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania whose value is grouped under Rest. FDI values exclude investments from resident special purpose entities. 
“Debt flows” stands for “Intercompany debt flows”. 

The breakdown of FDI inflows by instrument3 (Figure 1) suggests that in 2023, reinvestment of 
earnings  accounted  for  most  of  the  flows  into  the  EU27,  reaching  EUR  172  billion,  a  figure 
below the record value of EUR 287 billion observed in 2022. This evidence points to the fact that 
high profits of multinational enterprises remain an important factor in explaining the contraction 
in FDI activity. However, the decline in FDI inflows in 2023 at the EU27 level was also driven 
by the level of intercompany equity flows4, which accounted for EUR -192 billion.    

As  in  2022  with  respect  to  2021,  investments  by  foreign  companies5  in  the  EU27  fell  in  2023 
compared to 2022. The number of foreign acquisitions  of equity stakes and greenfield projects 
declined from just over 5,000 in 2022 in to 3,800 new transactions of both types, corresponding 
to a reduction of 25%6. The decrease is explained by a contraction both in M&As and minority 
investments7,  and  in  greenfield  investments.  Acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  experienced  a  13% 

3  Financial  flows  consist  of  three  main  components:  equity  capital,  reinvestment  of  earnings  of  foreign  parents’ 
affiliates, and intracompany debt. 
4 The negative levels of FDI equity flows arose mainly in the Netherlands, where some multinationals relocated their 
conduit  activities  to  other  countries  in  2023  (https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/FDI-in-Figures-
April-2024.pdf). 
5  We  use  the  term  foreign  investor  to  identify  non-EU  entities  (companies  or  persons)  acquiring  equity  stakes  or 
initiating  greenfield  investment  projects  in  the  EU  (in  short  ‘greenfields’  or  ‘greenfield  investments’).  The  terms 
foreign  and  non-EU  are  used  interchangeably.  Throughout  the  text,  the  term  acquisitions  will  identify  the 
acquisitions of equity stakes in EU companies, be it M&A or stakes below 50% but above 10% of the capital, and 
the  term transactions will be referred to the sum of acquisitions and greenfield investments. Portfolio investments 
are excluded. For additional information see the section on methodology and sources. 
6  Figures  based  on  data  on  acquisitions  and  greenfield  projects  extracted  from  Orbis  M&A  and  CrossBorder 
Investment on March 11, 2024. See Annual Report 2023 for further details.  
7 We define minority investment as the acquisition of equity stakes for more than 10% (but less than 50%) of the 
capital of the target company.  

4 

 
 
 
 
 
decline in 2023 compared to 2022, while the number of greenfield investments accounted for a 
larger decline of 33% in the same time period. While restrictive monetary policies have brought 
inflation  under  control  in  2023,  they  increased  the  cost  of  capital  via  increases  in  effective 
interest  rates  contributing  to  a  reduction  in  foreign  EU27  investments.  The  Russian  war  of 
aggression  cumulated  with  other  geopolitical  tensions  around  the  world,  contributing  to  an 
increase  in  uncertainty  and  affecting  adversely  foreign  investments.  Furthermore,  GDP  growth 
was weakened in 2023, estimated at 0.5%, and expected to be below 1% in 2024 in the EU.8 

Activity based evolution of EU inward FDI 

The evolution of EU inward FDI based on value added and employment of foreign affiliates is 
presented  in  Figure  2.  In  the  2013-2021  period,  value  added  produced  by  foreign  controlled 
firms almost doubled from less than EUR 600 billion in 2013 to EUR 1,131 billion in 2021. The 
figure  corresponds  to  almost  8%  of  the  EU27  GDP  in  2021  (EUR  15  trillion).  The  number  of 
workers employed in foreign controlled companies grew by more than 44% between 2013 and 
2021, increasing from 6.7 million in 2013 to 9.6 million in 2021.  

Figure 2. Activity of foreign affiliates in the EU27  

Source:  Eurostat  data, extracted on  25/03/2024.  Data  from  Foreign controlled EU  enterprises  (FATS)  statistics.  A  foreign controlled  firm  is a 
company located in the EU27 with an ultimate owner not in the EU. Caveats: Data up to 2020 are obtained summing foreign companies from 
outside the EU28 (including the UK) and foreign companies from the UK in the EU27. Some values for years 2018 to 2020 were not available 
and have been estimated. 

C)  Over half of foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments originated in US and UK 

The  US  was  the  main  foreign  investor  in  the  EU27  in  2023,  accounting  for  30%  of  all 
acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  and  36%  of  all  greenfield  investments  (Table  1).  Foreign 
acquisition by the US declined in 2023 by -20%  compared to 2022, and by -22% compared to 
2021.  A  similar  year-on-year  evolution  is  observed  for  the  second  most  important  EU  foreign 
investor  in  2023, the  UK,  which  makes  up  for a  further  25%  of  M&A,  and  22%  of  greenfield 
investments.  In  this  case,  acquisitions  contracted  by  -17%  in  2023  compared  to  2022.  For  the 
top-two foreign investors, the annual contraction in greenfield projects was much larger than the 

8 As explained, for example in the winter 2024 forecast of the EC: https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/economic-
forecast-and-surveys/economic-forecasts/winter-2024-economic-forecast-delayed-rebound-growth-amid-faster-
easing-inflation_en 

5 

 
 
 
 
contraction in M&A, with an annual decline in 2023 of  -45% and -30% for greenfield projects 
originating in the US and the UK, respectively.  

On  the  other  hand,  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  originating  in  Offshore  Financial  Centres9 
(OFCs),  the  third  most  important  jurisdictions  in  2023  with  a  7.9%  share  of  total  acquisitions, 
experienced a year-on-year increase in  2023 (+26%). More modest  annual  increases of foreign 
deal making originating in India (+6.1%) and in Japan (+5.1%) were also observed. For the case 
of  greenfield  investments  in  2023,  only  projects  originating  in  South  Africa  increased  by  42% 
compared to 2022 (however they represent only 2.7% of the total). 

China  and  Hong  Kong  accounted  for  a  larger  share  of  greenfield  projects  (6%)  than  of 
acquisitions of equity stakes (2.7%), with the latter experiencing a larger year-on-year decline (-
9.1%) in 2023. Investments from Russia10 remained low in 2023, and did not make it to the top-
ten jurisdictions ranking11. 

Table  1.  Number  of  foreign  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments:  share  over  total  for 
2023,  and  percentage  change  with  respect  to  2022  and  2021.  Detail  by  jurisdiction  of  the 
ultimate investor (for top-ten jurisdictions in 2023) 

Table 1a. Acquisitions of equity stakes 

Table 1b. Greenfield investments 

  Share (%)  Year-on-year (% change) 

  Share (%)  Year-on-year (% change) 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

US 

UK 

OFCs 

Switzerland 

Canada 

Japan 

Norway 

China 

India 

Australia 

RoW 

30 

25 

7.9 

7.1 

5.3 

4.4 

3.3 

2.7 

1.9 

1.5 

12 

-20 

-17 

26 

-19 

0.0 

5.1 

-6.1 

-9.1 

6.1 

-9.7 

-11 

-22 

-21 

-26 

-24 

-26 

55 

-30 

-11 

133 

-20 

3.2 

US 

UK 

Switzerland 

OFCs 

China 

Japan 

South Africa 

Norway 

Canada 

India 

RoW 

36 

21 

6.8 

6.1 

6.0 

4.2 

2.7 

2.2 

2.1 

1.5 

11 

-45 

-29 

-21 

-31 

-0.9 

-13 

42 

-39 

-24 

-18 

-29 

-36 

-28 

-20 

-21 

-23 

-20 

200 

-21 

-13 

-15 

-36 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). OFCs: Offshore Financial Centres. RoW: Rest of the World. China includes Hong Kong. 

9  The  main  offshores  by  number  of  transactions  in  2023  are  (in  alphabetical  order):  Cayman  Islands,  Bermuda, 
British Virgins Islands, Liechtenstein and Monaco. For the full list of Offshore Financial Centres see: Commission 
Staff Working Document - Following up on the Commission Communication “Welcoming Foreign Direct Investment 
while Protecting Essential Interests” – SWD(2019) 108 final – 13 March 2019. 
10 For more details, see section below entitled “Russian shareholding in Europe”. 
11 Only four investments in equity stakes in EU companies and one greenfield project originated in Russia in 2023 
(down from 10 investments in equity stakes and 13 greenfield projects in 2022). 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investors,  especially  large  conglomerates  with  multiple  activities,  often  use  subsidiaries 
registered  in  other  countries  (e.g.,  the  group’s  financial  branch)  to  conduct  investments12.  In 
2023,  foreign  non-EU  investors  performed  investments  using  their  EU  subsidiaries  in  36%  of 
transactions  recorded  this  year,  on  average13.  Looking  at  the  geographical  breakdown  by  the 
origin  jurisdiction  of  the  investor  (Figure  3a),  the  use  of  EU  subsidiaries  ranges  from  18%  of 
acquisitions  by  investors  originating  in  Canada  to  65%  by  investors  originating  in  OFCs14.  A 
high share of acquisitions by investors originating in India and Switzerland (over 40%) also took 
place  through  EU  subsidiaries.  The  use  of  EU  subsidiaries  ranges  from  16%  of  greenfield 
investments  by  investors  originating  in  the  US  to  64%  by  investors  originating  in  China  and 
Hong Kong (Figure 3b). 

Figure 3. Location of the direct investor. Detail by origin of the controlling parent and type 
of investment in 2023 (acquisition of equity stakes and greenfield investments)  

Figure 3a 

Figure 3b 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). OFCs: Offshore Financial  Centres. RoW: Rest of the World. China includes Hong Kong. Equity stake 
refers both to M&As and the acquisition of non-controlling stakes in EU companies. 

D)  Manufacturing and ICT concentrated foreign investment activity 

Three  sectors  concentrated  over  half  of  total  transactions  in  the  EU:  retail,  manufacturing  and 
information  and  communication  technology  (ICT).  The  top  sector  by  foreign  acquisitions  of 
equity  stakes  (26%)  in  2023  was  manufacturing,  with  almost  500  acquisitions  (Table  2). 
Manufacturing  ranked  second  for  greenfield  projects  (13%),  accounting  for  242  projects,  after 
retail  (33%).  However,  the  year-on-year  comparison  of  number  of  transactions  indicates  that 
Manufacturing  experienced  declines  for  both  types  of  FDI  (-6.8%  for  acquisitions  of  equity 
stakes,  and  by  -10%  for  greenfield  investments).  In  2023,  breaking  down  manufacturing 
greenfield  projects  reveals  that  it  involved  mainly  openings  (or  expansions)  of  manufacturing 

12  These  are  fully  operating  companies,  not  special  financial  vehicles  set  in  place  for  the  purpose  of  a  specific 
investment. 
13 When using an established EU company – which carries out an economic activity in a Member State – to invest 
into another EU company, the investment becomes an “intra-EU” one, and hence falls outside the scope of the FDI 
Screening Regulation.  
14 In many instances these are funds with offices in the EU that acquire minority stakes in EU companies. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
plants for different types of electronic components (7.9% share), pharmaceutical products (7.5% 
share), or medical instruments (5% share). 

ICT accounted for 23% of all new foreign acquisitions, placing second, and 12% of greenfield 
investments in 2023, placing third (Table 2). A decline was observed in both acquisitions (-25%) 
and greenfield projects (-59%) in 2023 compared to 2022. A large share of ICT related foreign 
greenfield  projects  in  2023  (almost  80%)  were  related  to  computer  programming  (mainly 
opening  of  new  software  development  and  R&D  centres)  and  data  processing  and  hosting 
activities (such as opening of new data centres and sales offices).  

Investments  in  equity  stakes  grew  in  2023  compared  to  2022  only  for  two  of  the  aggregate 
sectors, professional,  scientific and  technical  activities (PST) (+12%), the third most important 
sector,  and  transport  (+2.7%).  For  greenfield  investments,  a  positive  year-on-year  performance 
was observed in the real estate (+47%) and construction (+14%) sectors (Table 2). 

Table  2.  Number  of  foreign  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments:  share  over  total  for 
2023, and percentage change with respect to 2022 and 2021. Detail by target sector (NACE 
Rev. 2) 

Table 2a. Acquisitions of equity stakes 

Table 2b. Greenfield investments 

Share (%)  Year-on-year (% change) 

Share (%)  Year-on-year (% change) 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

Manufacturing 

ICT 

PST 

Finance, insurance 

Retail 

Electricity 

Transport 

Construction 

Admin. Support 

Accommodation 

Real estate 

Arts, entert. 

Mining 

Health 

Agriculture 

Water supply 

Remaining sections 

26 

23 

12 

8.5 

7.7 

4.2 

4.0 

2.5 

2.3 

2.1 

1.8 

1.8 

1.0 

1.0 

0.8 

0.8 

0.6 

-6.8 

-25 

12 

-3.0 

-8.2 

-19 

2.7 

-21 

-29 

-7.0 

-34 

-8.3 

-5.0 

-50 

33 

-21 

-25 

-12 

-33 

14 

3.2 

-9.3 

-19 

43 

-40 

-19 

-20 

-54 

14 

-14 

-62 

-20 

-6.3 

-56 

Retail  

Manufacturing 

ICT 

Finance, insurance 

PST 

Accommodation 

Transport 

Real estate 

Electricity 

Admin. Support 

Water supply 

Education 

Construction 

Mining 

Agriculture 

Arts, entert. 

Remaining sections 

33 

13 

12 

10 

10 

8.4 

6.8 

2.8 

1.2 

1.0 

0.5 

0.5 

0.4 

0.3 

0.2 

0.2 

0.2 

-33 

-10 

-59 

-31 

-35 

-10 

-17 

47 

-18 

-76 

-41 

-10 

14 

400 

N/A 

-67 

-64 

-23 

-19 

-47 

-6.6 

-18 

-34 

-48 

43 

-8.0 

-72 

11 

13 

-43 

67 

33 

-91 

-56 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). PST = professional, scientific and technical activities (section M of NACE Rev. 2 sector classification). 
ICT stands for information and communication (NACE Rev. 2, section J). Due to the rounding up of numbers to the first decimal, the total of 
some percentages might reach 100,1%. N/A indicates lack of sufficient data to perform the calculations displayed.  

8 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Table 3 provides additional information on the top investors presented in  Table 1, specifically 
detailing the sectoral breakdown by investor origin. Just over 550 acquisition deals and almost 
690  greenfield  projects  originated  from  the  US.  In  2023,  US  acquisitions  mostly  targeted 
manufacturing firms,  with  this sector grouping  a  28% share of all US  acquisitions into the EU 
(Table  3a)  that  year.  However,  the  number  of  US  acquisitions  in  manufacturing  declined 
annually by 20%, compared to 2022. ICT grouped 15% of US greenfield projects into the EU in 
2023 (the second largest share after retail), with the number of greenfield projects experiencing a 
-61% year-on-year decline (Table 3b). The UK was the second most important foreign investor 
in  the  EU  in  2023  (Table  1),  with  465  and  407  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  and  greenfield 
projects,  respectively.  In  2023,  UK  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  mainly  targeted  ICT  and 
manufacturing  firms,  with  these  two  sectors  grouping  24%  and  19%  of  all  UK  acquisitions, 
respectively (Table 3a).  

In terms of greenfields, retail accounted for 35% of the investments originating in the UK (Table 
3b),  followed  in  importance  by  projects  targeting  the  professional  and  scientific  (PST)  and 
finance sectors (with 14% and 13% shares respectively). All these top three sectors that grouped 
UK greenfield projects into the EU experienced year-on-year declines in 2023 (by -33%, -31% 
and -7.3%, respectively). 

Table 3. Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by origin of the investor and 
target sector (for top investors and sectors) 

Table 3a. Acquisitions of equity stakes 

Origin 

NACE sector 

Manufacturing – Detail 

Manufacturing 

ICT 

PST 

Finance  Retail  Others  High techn. 

Low techn.  

US 

2023 shares 

y/y 

UK 

2023 shares 

y/y 

OFCs 

2023 shares 

y/y 

Switzerland 

2023 shares 

28 

-20% 

19 

1.1% 

13 

33% 

31 

26 

15 

7.7 

6.3 

17 

58 

42 

-35% 

31% 

-8.5% 

-15% 

-24% 

-29% 

-4.5% 

24 

12 

14 

6.9 

23 

63 

-18% 

3.6% 

12% 

-35% 

-38% 

30% 

23 

17 

11 

9.4 

27 

50 

-19% 

400% 

-11% 

40% 

43% 

43% 

23 

9.7 

3.0 

10 

23 

46 

37 

-27% 

50 

25% 

54 

y/y 

7.9% 

15% 

-32% 

-56% 

-42% 

-37% 

36% 

-8.3% 

Canada 

2023 shares 

y/y 

Japan 

2023 shares 

25 

14% 

32 

29 

5.0 

4.0 

8.0 

29 

24 

-33% 

-17% 

0.0% 

167% 

32% 

-50% 

17 

9.8 

1.2 

11 

29 

69 

y/y 

-19% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

80% 

33% 

-18% 

RoW 

2023 shares 

35 

15 

6.8 

6.8 

8.5 

27 

53 

y/y 

-2.1% 

-29% 

-29% 

-3.6% 

26% 

-4.4% 

-8.6% 

76 

90% 

31 

-20% 

47 

6.3% 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Table 3b. Greenfield investments 

Origin 

NACE sector 

Manufacturing - Detail 

Retail  Manufacturing 

ICT 

Finance 

PST 

Others  High techn.  Low techn.  

US 

2023 shares 

30 

10 

15 

9 

10 

26 

54 

46 

y/y 

-46% 

-27% 

-61% 

-52% 

-47% 

-31% 

-38% 

-8.6% 

UK 

2023 shares 

35 

7.9 

7.4 

13 

14 

23 

38 

y/y 

-33% 

-5.9% 

-63% 

-7.3% 

-31% 

-15% 

-37% 

Switzerland 

2023 shares 

43 

16 

10 

7.8 

11 

13 

70 

63 

33% 

30 

y/y 

-24% 

-9.1% 

-48% 

-23% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

177% 

-40% 

OFCs 

2023 shares 

41 

5.2 

9.5 

27 

2.6 

15 

17 

83 

y/y 

-44% 

-14% 

-65% 

82% 

-25% 

-29% 

-80% 

150% 

China 

2023 shares 

27 

22 

2.6 

5.2 

19 

24 

96 

4.0 

y/y 

-23% 

-19% 

-77% 

0.0% 

29% 

250% 

-17% 

-50% 

Japan 

2023 shares 

11 

33 

22 

15 

5.1 

14 

62 

y/y 

50% 

-10% 

-19% 

-14% 

-56% 

-8.3% 

-24% 

RoW 

2023 shares 

34 

y/y 

0.0% 

17 

24% 

12 

7.3 

7.3 

22 

60 

-56% 

-53% 

-41% 

-23% 

15% 

39 

25% 

40 

39% 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). A breakdown displaying the technological content of foreign investments in  manufacturing, by high vs 
low  technology,  is  also  provided.  RoW:  Rest  of  the  world,  OFCs:  Offshore  Financial  Centres.  China  includes  Hong  Kong.  PST  stands  for 
professional,  scientific  and  technical  services  (NACE  Rev.  2,  section  M),  it  contains  among  other  things  R&D  facilities.  ICT  stands  for 
information and communication (NACE Rev. 2, section J). “Others” category aggregates the remaining NACE sections. The 2023 shares for the 
NACE sector breakdown are computed as the proportion of transactions in each sector category over the total number of transactions originating 
in each jurisdiction (rows sum up to 100%). The 2023 shares for the High vs Low tech manufacturing breakdown are computed as the proportion 
of transactions in each category of manufacturing activity over the total number of transactions originating in each jurisdiction (rows sum up to 
100%). y/y stands for year-on-year and is the percentage change of the number of transactions between 2023 and 2022. 

Almost  a  quarter  (23%)  of  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  originating  in  OFCs  in  2023  targeted 
EU27 firms operating in the ICT sector (Table 3a). While acquisitions by OFCs investors in this 
sector experienced a year-on-year decline (-19%), acquisitions in the professional and scientific 
activities  sector  (which  grouped  a  17%  share)  experienced  a  large  increase  of  400%  in  2023 
compared to 202215. Greenfield investments originating in OFCs in 2023 targeted predominantly 
the retail sector (41% share), followed by investments in financial services (27% share) (Table 
3b). Greenfields with OFCs origin targeting the latter sector experienced a large increase (+82%) 
in 2023 compared to 2022. 

Two sectors, retail and manufacturing, attracted almost half of Chinese greenfield projects into 
the  EU27  in  2023  (Table  3b).  Despite  the  importance  of  these  sectors,  both  retail  (-23%)  and 

15 The large increase for professional and scientific activities was partly due to the fact that a Spanish company with 
global  ultimate  owner  in  the  Cayman  Islands  completed  several  transactions  in  Spain  to  acquire  small  chains  of 
veterinary clinics. Furthermore, the number of deals in 2022 was relatively low in this sector (only 5 transactions). 

10 

 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
manufacturing  (-19%)  experienced  year-on-year  declines  in  the  number  of  Chinese  projects  in 
2023.  On  the  other  hand,  the  third  largest  sector  category  grouping  Chinese  greenfield 
investments  into  the  EU,  professional  and  scientific  activities  (19%  share)  experienced  a  year-
on-year increase in the number of projects (+29%). 

Given  the  heterogeneity  of  the  activities  of  the  manufacturing  sector  category,  a  further 
breakdown  is  also  provided.  Following  the  Eurostat  definition,  foreign  transactions  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  were  reclassified  by  technological  intensity  in  two  categories,  high-  and 
low-tech  manufacturing16.  Overall,  in  2023  foreign  M&A  and  greenfield  projects  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  related  to  high  tech  manufacturing  (with  55%  and  59%  shares, 
respectively). 

In 2023, foreign M&A in high tech manufacturing originating in the main investor into the EU, 
the US, grouped 58% of the total number of deals from this jurisdiction related to manufacturing 
activities.  A  slightly  smaller  share  (54%)  of  the  total  foreign  greenfield  investments  in  the 
manufacturing  sector  originating  in  the  US  corresponded  to  high  tech  manufacturing  activities 
(Table  3a  and  3b).  US  investments  in  high-tech  manufacturing  for  both  types  of  transactions 
experienced larger annual declines in 2023 (by -29% for acquisitions, and by -38% for greenfield 
projects),  compared  to  US  investments  in  low-tech  manufacturing  (by  -4.5%  for  acquisitions, 
and by -8.6% for greenfield projects). 

For  the  case  of  greenfield  projects  in  the  manufacturing  sector,  the  overall  annual  declines 
observed  in  2023  (regardless  of  the  origin  jurisdiction)  mask  some  variation  when  these 
investments  are  split  by  type  of  manufacturing  activity.  Greenfield  manufacturing  projects 
originating  in  Switzerland  increased  (+17%)  for  high-tech  manufacturing  activities,  while 
manufacturing  projects  originating  in  the  UK  (+33%),  Japan  (+25%)  and  the  OFCs  (+150%) 
increased for low-tech manufacturing activities. 

E)  Top recipients of EU foreign investments  

The  top  Member  State  recipient  of  foreign  acquisitions  of  equity  stakes  (with  a  19%  share)  in 
2023  was  Germany,  grouping  almost  350  acquisitions  (Table  4a).  Spain  followed  closely  in 
second  place,  with  a  17%  share,  representing  323  acquisitions.  These  two  Member  States 
experienced  in  2023  a  reduction  of  roughly  9%  each  in  the  number  of  acquisitions  received 
compared to 2022. France concentrated 13% of deal making activity in 2023, and received 0.4% 
more acquisitions in this year compared to 2022. The 2023 acquisition figures also represent  a 
decline in numbers compared to 2021 acquisitions in all top-three Member States. The remaining 
Member States in the top-ten recipients ranking experienced a mixed year-on-year evolution in 
the  number  of  acquisitions,  with  declines  recorded  in  Italy  (-29%),  the  Netherlands  (-40%), 
Sweden (-9.9%)  and Denmark (-23%); and improvements recorded in  Ireland (+4.4%), Poland 
(+70%) and Finland (+33%).   

16 High tech includes high tech and medium-high tech firms, and low tech includes medium-low and low tech ones 
(NACE-Rev.2, 
classification: 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/htec_esms_an3.pdf.  

Eurostat 

details, 

digits). 

further 

For 

see 

2 

11 

 
 
 
 
The same three Member States are the top-three recipients of foreign greenfield projects in 2023, 
albeit in a different order (Table 4b). Spain received the largest share (24%) of projects this year, 
totaling  455,  while  France  (11%  share)  and  Germany  (11%  share),  grouped  217  and  208 
projects,  respectively.  For  the  case  of  greenfield  investments,  all  destination  Member  States 
recorded declines in the number of projects received in 2023, compared to both 2022 and also to 
2021.  The  year-on-year  declines  between  2023  and  2022  ranged  from  -55%  for  the  case  of 
Sweden to -9.9% for Spain.  

Table  4.  Number  of  foreign  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments:  share  over  total  for 
2023 and percentage change with respect to 2022 and 2021. Detail by destination Member 
State (for top-ten destinations in 2023) 

Table 4a. Acquisitions of equity stakes 

Table 4b. Greenfield investments 

Share 
(%) 

Year-on-year (% 
change) 

Share 
(%) 

Year-on-year (% 
change) 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

2023 

22/23 

21/23 

Germany 

Spain 

France 

Italy 

Ireland 

The Netherlands 

Poland 

Sweden 

Denmark 

Finland 

RoEU 

19 

17 

13 

7.9 

7.6 

6.1 

4.5 

4.4 

4.0 

3.2 

14 

-8.9 

-9.3 

0.4 

-29 

4.4 

-40 

70 

-9.9 

-23 

33 

-26 

-3.6 

-4.4 

-5.2 

-27 

3.6 

-51 

6.3 

-6.8 

-12 

-25 

-37 

Spain 

France 

Germany  

Poland 

Ireland 

Portugal 

Italy 

The Netherlands 

Romania 

Sweden 

RoEU 

24 

11 

11 

8.3 

7.3 

6.9 

6.9 

5.8 

3.0 

2.6 

13 

-9.9 

-29 

-48 

-40 

-42 

-13 

-23 

-36 

-21 

-55 

-48 

-15 

-33 

-31 

-16 

-25 

-2.2 

-12 

-44 

-32 

-53 

-47 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). RoEU: Rest of the EU27.  

Overall, the largest share of foreign acquisitions of equity stakes originated in the US and in the 
UK in  2023. These two investors dominated acquisitions regardless  of the destination Member 
States  considered,  ranging  from  concentrating  a  combined  78%  of  acquisitions  destined  to 
Ireland in 2023, to 49% in Spain (Table 5a). In 2023, the largest share of acquisitions targeting 
Germany  (32%),  Spain  (28%)  and  France  (41%)  originated  in  the  US,  while  acquisitions 
originating in the UK grouped the largest shares in Ireland (48%), Poland (31%), and Italy and 
Denmark (29% each). In 2023, acquisitions originating in the UK experienced generalized year-
on-year  declines  in  all  destination  Member  States  (with  the  exception  of  Poland,  where  they 
increased by 63%) (Table 5a). Acquisitions originating in the US also declined annually in most 
top target Member States, except in France (+24%), Poland (+18%) and Sweden (+35%). 

12 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Greenfield  projects  are  even  more  concentrated  in  these  two  origin  jurisdictions  in  the  main 
destination  Member  States,  with  the  largest  combined  share  in  2023  observed  also  in  Ireland 
(83%),  and  the  lowest  in  Sweden  (54%)  (Table  5b).  As  in  the  case  of  acquisitions,  the  largest 
share  of  greenfield  projects  destined  to  Germany  (53%),  Spain  (44%)  and  France  (58%) 
originated in the US in 2023. The year-on-year change in number of greenfield projects indicates 
that the concentration of projects originating in the US in 2023 compared to 2022 appears to be 
increasing  in  most  destination  Member  States  (Table  5b).  Besides  a  drop  in  Romania  (-27%), 
projects by US investors only experienced small annual declines in the Netherlands (-6.7%) and 
Italy (-2.6%), while they increased in the rest of top 10 Member States.  

Acquisitions of equity stakes from investors originating in the OFCs represented the third largest 
share  in  several  destination  Member  States.  For  the  case  of  Spain  and  France,  acquisitions  by 
investors in OFCs represented 16% and 5.1%, respectively, of the total number of acquisitions 
they  received  in  2023,  also  experiencing  a  significant  year-on-year  increase  in  both  Member 
States.  Grouping  an  8.2%  share,  acquisitions  by  OFCs  investors  in  Poland  also  increased 
significantly  by  250%  in  2023  compared  to  2022  (Table  5a).  For  greenfield  investments, 
projects originating in OFCs mainly ranged between 5.5% and 6% shares in Germany, Spain, the 
Netherlands, constituting the third most important origin jurisdiction of greenfield investments in 
these three Member States in 2023, albeit with  a more mixed pattern of year-on-year evolution 
(Table 5b).   

Chinese  FDI  into  the  EU27  predominantly  took  the  form  of  greenfield  investments  in  2023 
(Table 5). Chinese greenfield projects accounted for the third largest share of projects destined 
to  Sweden  (15%),  Italy  (6.6%)  and  France  (3.8%)  in  2023.  With  the  exception  of  Sweden 
(+46%)  and  Ireland  (+50%),  Chinese  greenfields  experienced  year-on-year  declines  in  2023  in 
all top destination Member States (Table 5b). 

Table 5. Foreign investments (number of deals and projects) by MS destination and origin 
of the investor (top receiving MS and investors) 

Table 5a. Acquisitions of equity stakes 

Destination MS 

US 

UK 

OFCs 

CH 

CA 

Germany 

2023 shares 

32 

20 

4.6 

14 

4.9 

JP 

4.0 

NO 

CN 

IN 

RoW 

2.6 

5.2 

4.3 

8.6 

Origin 

y/y 

-19% 

-1.4% 

-27% 

35% 

55% 

-30% 

0.0% 

-22% 

36% 

-32% 

Spain 

2023 shares 

28 

21 

16 

5.0 

4.6 

4.6 

2.5 

2.8 

1.2 

14 

y/y 

-22% 

-30% 

225% 

-27% 

-40% 

-6.3% 

300% 

-18% 

300% 

-9.8% 

France 

2023 shares 

41 

24 

5.1 

3.8 

3.4 

4.7 

0.4 

2.5 

3.0 

12 

y/y 

24% 

-21% 

140% 

-67% 

-53% 

83% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

250% 

32% 

Italy 

2023 shares 

25 

29 

6.0 

7.4 

4.7 

4.0 

0.7 

2.0 

1.3 

20 

y/y 

-45% 

-31% 

-25% 

-39% 

40% 

-50% 

0.0% 

-25% 

0.0% 

15% 

Ireland 

2023 shares 

31 

48 

4.9 

1.4 

4.2 

4.9 

2.1 

N/A 

0.7 

3.5 

13 

 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
y/y 

-20% 

33% 

-22% 

-33% 

20% 

40% 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

-44% 

The Netherlands 

2023 shares 

32 

22 

8.7 

2.6 

9.6 

5.2 

N/A 

3.5 

3.5 

13 

y/y 

-45% 

-39% 

43% 

-81% 

-21% 

0.0% 

N/A 

33% 

33% 

-53% 

Poland 

2023 shares 

24 

31 

8.2 

8.2 

1.2 

4.7 

2.4 

N/A 

N/A 

21 

y/y 

18% 

63% 

250% 

17% 

0.0% 

100% 

100%  N/A 

N/A 

260% 

Sweden 

2023 shares 

28 

28 

2.4 

8.5 

6.1 

2.4 

15 

2.4 

N/A 

7.3 

y/y 

35% 

-36% 

-50% 

600% 

25% 

0.0% 

-29% 

100%  N/A 

-25% 

Denmark 

2023 shares 

25 

29 

9.2 

2.6 

3.9 

1.3 

21 

1.3 

N/A 

6.6 

y/y 

-39% 

-19% 

0.0% 

-33% 

-25% 

0.0% 

-5.9% 

0.0% 

N/A 

-29% 

RoEU 

2023 shares 

25 

20 

8.3 

8.3 

8.3 

4.9 

3.1 

2.1 

0.6 

21 

y/y 

-30% 

-30% 

-21% 

-18% 

93% 

100% 

-33% 

17% 

-83% 

-13% 

Total EU share 

2023 shares 

30 

25 

7.9 

7.1 

5.3 

4.4 

3.3 

2.7 

1.9 

13 

Table 5b. Greenfield investments 

Destination MS 

Origin 

US 

UK 

CH  OFCs 

CN 

Spain 

2023 shares 

35 

20 

6.2 

9.2 

2.6 

JP 

4.8 

ZA 

NO 

CA 

RoW 

4.4 

2.0 

2.0 

13 

y/y 

-24% 

1.1% 

-15% 

-2.3% 

-40% 

120% 

186% 

-10% 

125% 

-20% 

France 

2023 shares 

38 

23 

11 

5.5 

10 

3.7 

N/A 

0.5 

1.4 

7.4 

y/y 

-48% 

-11% 

44% 

20% 

83% 

100% 

N/A 

-83% 

-50% 

-56% 

Germany 

2023 shares 

36 

15.9 

8.2 

4.8 

8.7 

4.8 

2.9 

3.4 

2.4 

14 

y/y 

-62% 

-49% 

-19% 

-57% 

0.0% 

-9.1%  N/A 

-13% 

-50% 

-39% 

Poland 

2023 shares 

32 

32.3 

1.3 

1.9 

5.1 

2.5 

11.4 

1.3 

1.9 

11 

y/y 

-46% 

-35% 

-83% 

-40% 

100% 

-50% 

0.0% 

100% 

-25% 

-56% 

Ireland 

2023 shares 

48 

35 

0.7 

5.0 

2.2 

2.9 

0.7 

0.7 

0.7 

3.6 

y/y 

-45% 

-38% 

-89% 

40% 

0.0% 

-43% 

N/A 

0.0% 

-67% 

-55% 

Portugal 

2023 shares 

37 

15 

9.1 

2.3 

6.1 

6.1 

0.8 

N/A 

0.8 

23 

y/y 

-13% 

-26% 

20% 

-73% 

0.0% 

0.0% 

N/A 

N/A 

-86% 

50% 

Italy 

2023 shares 

31 

28 

9.2 

7.6 

3.8 

1.5 

0.8 

N/A 

2.3 

16 

y/y 

-47% 

-10% 

140% 

0.0% 

-44% 

-50% 

-88% 

N/A 

50% 

40% 

The Netherlands 

2023 shares 

50 

16 

3.6 

1.8 

4.5 

4.5 

0.9 

N/A 

4.5 

15 

y/y 

-27% 

-47% 

-50% 

-80% 

0.0% 

-44% 

N/A 

N/A 

17% 

-41% 

Romania 

2023 shares 

32 

18 

12.3 

5.3 

3.5 

3.5 

1.8 

1.8 

1.8 

21 

y/y 

-36% 

-23% 

17% 

-50% 

0.0% 

N/A 

0.0% 

0.0% 

-67% 

0.0% 

Sweden 

2023 shares 

22 

12 

6.0 

2.0 

12 

6.0 

N/A 

34 

4.0 

2.0 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
y/y 

-77% 

-40% 

-80% 

-75% 

-60% 

200% 

N/A 

21% 

N/A 

-75% 

RoEU 

2023 shares 

32 

18 

8.2 

9.4 

11 

4.5 

0.8 

1.6 

2.4 

13 

y/y 

-59% 

-48% 

-29% 

-45% 

30% 

-62% 

0.0% 

-83% 

0.0% 

-30% 

Total EU share 

2023 shares 

36 

21 

6.8 

6.1 

6.0 

4.2 

2.7 

2.2 

2.1 

13 

Source:  JRC  elaboration  based  on  Bureau  van  Dijk  data,  extracted  on  11/03/2024  for  equity  stakes  (Orbis  M&A  dataset)  and  for  greenfields 
(Orbis Crossborder Investment dataset). RoEU Rest of the EU27, RoW: Rest of the world. List of origin: CH = Switzerland, OFCs = Offshore 
Financial Centres, CA = Canada, JP = Japan, NO = Norway, CN = China and Hong Kong, IN = India, ZA = South Africa. The 2023 shares for 
the  destination  MS  breakdown  are  computed  as  the  number  of  transactions  originating  in  each  jurisdiction  in  a  MS  over  the  total  number  of 
transactions (rows sum up to 100%). y/y stands for year-on-year and is the percentage change of the number of transactions between 2023 and 
2022. N/A indicates lack of sufficient data to perform the calculations displayed.  

15 

 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
F)  Russian public and private shareholding in the EU27 

This  box  reports  on  Russian  investments  in  EU  firms  as  of  202217  (investment  stake).  We 
detail both controlling and non-controlling (influence) stakes held by investors from Russia18. 
Companies  with  multiple  Russian  shareholders,  each  holding  a  stake  below  50%,  but  all  of 
them summing up to more than 50% of the capital of the EU business, are considered as cases 
of potential control(*). 

investors  exert 
Russian 
influence  or  control 
in 
almost  30,300  companies 
in  the  EU  (0.1%  of  EU 
companies19).  They  control 
about 
EU 
17,000 
companies, have potentially 
controlling  stakes  in  other 
roughly  7,000  companies 
in 
and  minority 
4,100 
companies.  We 
observe  an additional 2,200 
companies  with  a  reported 
Russian 
non-controlling 
shareholder,  for  which  the 
amount  of  stake 
is  not 
known.  The  breakdown  for 
the 
top-seven  Member 
States is reported in Figure 
F.1. 

stakes 

The top-five EU Member States by number of Russian-controlled companies are Czechia 
(with 23% of the total number of EU companies controlled by Russian investors; it was 28% in 
the  previous  report),  Latvia  (14%;  it  was  14%  in  the  previous  report),  Bulgaria  (14%,  it  was 
8.3% in  the previous report),  Germany (10%;  it  was 12% in  the previous report),  and Cyprus 
(8.6%;  it  was  7.1%  in  the  previous  report).  Czechia,  Germany,  and  Latvia  are  the  top-three 
countries  by  number  of  companies  with  Russian  influence  (with  29%,  11%  and  10% 
respectively; 32%, 13%  and 11% in the previous report), followed by  Italy  (7.6%;  previously 
7.7%) and Bulgaria (6.7%; previously 6%).  

17 It covers the stock of companies as of 2022 as it is based on balance sheet information, which is available only up 
to 2022. 2023 balance sheets are still incomplete at the time of drafting this document. 
18  Note  that  since  2022  the  EU  adopted  a  series  of  sanctions  against  Russia  (see  for  example:  https:// 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#sanctions), which 
targeted  energy,  transport,  technology  and  financial  sectors,  as  well  as  imposing  restrictive  measures  on  selected 
individuals. This has significantly decreased Russian FDI activities into the EU. 
19 EU27 companies are approximately 32 million in 2022 (Eurostat enterprise demography). 

16 

 
 
 
 
The  sectors  with  the  largest  presence  of  Russian 
investors  remain  the  same  as  in  the  previous  report: 
retail  (with  4,129  and  3,331  companies  under  control  and 
influence, respectively), real estate (3,013 and 2,242), PST 
(1,642 and 1,192). Russia also controls 1,092 companies in 
finance and insurance and in 813 manufacturing firms. 

In 59% of the EU companies under Russian control or 
influence, the ultimate owner is a natural person (it was 
58%  in  the  previous  report),  in  7.6%  a  company  and  in 
1.2%  a  public  authority/State  (it  was  8.9%  and  1.4% 
previously). The Russian government controls companies 
mainly  in  Cyprus  (31%  over  the  total  amount  of  firms 
controlled by the Russian government; up from 18% in the 
previous  report),  Ireland  (19%,  up  from  14%  in  the 
previous  report)  and  the  Netherlands  (8.2%,  down  from  11%  previously)  (see  Table  F.1). 
Almost 15% of these EU27 companies are banks or other financial institutions (up from 11% in 
the previous year). 

The Russian government directly controls 23 EU companies in the Oil & Gas sector and 
32 in Electricity, this represents a non-negligible decline compared to 2021 from 38 and 36 
respectively. Six of the controlled Oil & Gas firms are in the Netherlands. Minority stakes are 
found  in  five  additional  Oil  &  Gas  companies  across  Eastern  and  North  Europe.  As  for 
Electricity, five controlled companies are in Germany and four in Lithuania. Minority stakes are 
present in 32 additional firms, mainly in Latvia and Italy.  

Source: JRC calculations based on historical ownership Bureau van Dijk data extracted in November 2023. (*) Potential control refers to direct 
shareholding only. 

17 

 
 
 
 
 
G)  Chinese public and private shareholding in the EU27 

This  box  reports  on  Chinese  investments  in  EU  firms  as  of  202220  (investment  stock).  We 
detail  both  controlling  and non-controlling (influence)  stakes  held  by investors  from  China21. 
Companies with multiple Chinese shareholders, each holding a stake below 50%, but all of them 
summing  up  to  more  than  50%  of  the  capital  of  the  EU  business,  are  considered  as  cases  of 
potential control(*). 

Chinese  investors  exert 
influence  or  control  in 
almost 
49,300 
companies  in  the  EU 
EU 
(0.2% 
of 
companies22). 
They 
control about 31,900 EU 
companies, 
have 
potentially 
controlling 
stakes  in  other  roughly 
9,000  companies  and 
minority  stakes  in  4,700 
companies.  We  observe 
3,700 
an 
companies 
a 
reported  non-controlling 
Chinese  shareholder,  for 
which 
the  amount  of 
stake  is  not  known.  The 
breakdown  for  the  top-
seven  Member  States  is 
reported in Figure G.1. 

additional 

with 

The top-five EU Member States by number of Chinese-controlled companies are Italy (with 
23%  of  the  total  number  of  EU  companies  controlled  by  Chinese  investors),  Germany  (21%), 
France (17%), Romania  (11%) and Poland (4.2%). France,  Italy  and Germany  are  also  the top 
countries by number of companies with Chinese influence (29%, 20% and 12% respectively), 
followed by Romania (7%) and Luxembourg (2.7%).  

The sectors with the largest presence of Chinese investors are: retail (with 12,624 and 5,111 
companies  under  control  and  influence,  respectively),  accommodation  (2,132  and  2,711)  and 
manufacturing (2,841 and 1,054). China also controls 1,960 companies in finance and insurance 
and 1,953 in PST activities. 

20 See footnote 17. 
21 China includes investors from both China and Hong Kong.  
22 See footnote 18. 

18 

 
 
 
 
In 51% of the EU companies under Chinese control 
or influence, the ultimate owner is a natural person, 
in  18%  a  company  and 
in  4.6%  a  public 
authority/State.  The  Chinese  government  controls 
companies  mainly  in  France  (19%  over  the  total 
amount  of 
the  Chinese 
firms  controlled  by 
government),  Ireland  (17%)  Germany  (13%)  (see 
Table  G.1).  About  7%  of  these  EU27  companies  are 
banks or other financial institutions. 

The  Chinese  government  does  not  directly  control 
any EU company in the Oil & Gas sector, however 
it  has  minority  stakes  in  six  Oil  &  Gas  companies 
mainly in Western Europe. The Chinese government 
controls  336  EU  companies  in  Electricity.  In  this 
sector,  125  controlled  companies  are  in  Italy,  72  in  Spain  and  47  in  Germany.  It  has  minority 
stakes  in  additional  112  firms,  mainly  in  Spain,  France,  Germany  and  Poland.  The  Chinese 
government  directly  controls  84  EU  companies  in  the  Semiconductors  sector,  and  it  has 
minority stakes in 34 companies in this sector, mainly in Western Europe. Out of the controlled 
companies, 55 companies are in Germany, 6 in the Netherlands and 5 in France. 

Source: JRC calculations based on historical ownership Bureau van Dijk data extracted in November 2023. (*) Potential control refers to direct 
shareholding only. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
H) Semiconductors 

Improving  the  EU  strategic  autonomy,  as  a  way  to  address  risks  arising  from  global 
dependencies in  strategic sectors and build resilience to  prevent  or resist future shocks, has 
become a key priority for the Commission. For instance, the European Chips Act entered into 
force  in  2023,  signaling  the  importance  of  improving  EU  competitiveness  in  the 
semiconductors  sector.  In  addition,  since  mid-2023  the  Commission  and  the  High 
Representative have also placed increased focus  on  the Joint  Economic Security Strategy23, 
aimed  at  reducing  security  risks  across  supply  chains,  critical  infrastructure,  and  digital 
technologies.  It  is  therefore  important  to  monitor  and  understand  foreign  (i.e.  extra-EU) 
investments  in  EU  companies  in  this  important  industry.  Foreign  investors  carried  out  68 
investments  in  EU  semiconductors  companies  in  2023,  a  figure  comparable  to  2022 

Figure H.1. Number of foreign transactions in 
semi-conductors producing firms: share over total 
(2023), by type of deal 

Figure H.2. Number of foreign transactions in semi-
conductors producing firms: share over total (2023), 
by Pitchbook industry code 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Pitchbook data extracted on 13/05/2024. 

transaction numbers (albeit with a -1.4% decline)24. 

In 2023 foreign investments into the EU semiconductors sector predominantly took the form 
of  Venture  Capital  (VC)  (Figure  H.1)25.  A  total  of  32  VC  investments  took  place  in  2023 
(experiencing  a  -14%  decline  compared  to  2022  VC  transaction  numbers),  representing  a 
combined 47% share of total 2023 foreign transactions. The relative importance of different 
types  of  VC  also  experienced  some  changes  in  2023  compared  to  2022.  In  2022,  VC 
investments were quite evenly distributed between later stage VC financing, typically used to 

23 For example, see JOIN/2023/20. 
24  Raw  data  on  investments  relating  to  semiconductor  activities  comes  from  the  Pitchbook  dataset.  The 
companies are classified in the semiconductors sector if Pitchbook reports them as part of the semiconductors 
industry or if their description contains the keyword semiconductor. The data reported includes completed and 
announced  foreign  investment  transactions  targeting  EU27  firms  in  the  semiconductor  industry  in  the  period 
between January and December 2023. Figures include only foreign (non-EU27) investors, classified according 
to the headquarter location of the direct investor (except when the global ultimate owner (GUO) of the investor 
is found in the Orbis-BvD dataset, then the country of origin of the GUO is assigned, in around 46% of cases). 
The figures in this section report shares based on number of transactions. 
25  Venture  Capital  includes  Early  Stage  VC,  Seed  investments,  Later  Stage  VC  and  other  early  stage 
investments such as equity crowdfunding, accelerators, incubators and angel investors. The total share of these 
investments is 47%. 

20 

36.8%16.2%7.4%10.3%13.2%5.9%2.9%7.4%M&ALater stage, VCEarly stage, VCSeed VCOther early stage (VC)Joint VentureGrantOther21%19%16%15%10%8.8%8.8%1.5%Electronics+EquipmentApplic.Specif.Semic.General Purpose Semic.Electr.equip.+EnergyOther SemiconductorsServices for Semic.Industrial SuppliesSoftware 
 
 
 
 
 
bring products to the market, and early stage VC financing26. The first type represented just 
below  half  (46%)  of  all  VC  deals  in  2022,  while  the  latter  represented  54%.  In  2023,  the 
relative predominance of early stage VC financing became more marked (accounting for 66% 
of all VC deals this year). The second most important type of foreign transaction in the EU 
semiconductor  sector  were  M&As,  which  represented  37%  of  the  total  amount  of 
transactions.  The  number  of  M&As  decreased  compared  to  2022  (-7%).  Finally,  joint 
ventures accounted for less than 6% of foreign transactions in EU semiconductors. 

Looking  at  foreign  transactions  by  primary  industry  code  of  the  target  company  (Figure 
H.2),  21%  of  deals  belonged  to  the  “Electronics  and  equipment”  category  in  202327. 
Application  specific  semiconductors  (19%)  and  general  purpose  semiconductors  (16%) 
grouped  the  second  and  third  largest 
transactions  (these 
share  of  foreign 
include 
or 
manufacturing 
development of semiconductors).  

Figure H.3. Number of foreign transactions: share over 
total (2023), by foreign investor jurisdiction 

the 

in 

The  US  remained  the  main  foreign 
investor 
the  EU  semiconductors 
sector  in  2023  in  terms  of  number  of 
transactions  (Figure  H.3),  increasing 
importance  compared  to  the  previous 
year.  The  US  grouped  a  49%  share  of 
total  investments  in  2023  (up  from  the 
33%  share  US  investments  represented 
in  2022).  Investments  from  the  UK 
ranked  second  with  a  10%  share  (down 
from  the  17%  share  observed  in  2022). 
Investments  originating  in  developed  Asian  countries  (i.e.  Japan,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and 
South  Korea)  accounted  for  18%  of  transactions  in  2023  (slightly  up  from  a  17%  share  in 
2022). Finally, only 3.6% of foreign investments in EU semiconductors originated in China 
in 2023 (a smaller share than the 5.2% grouped in 2022). 

Source: JRC elaboration based on Pitchbook data extracted on 
13/05/2024. RoW: Rest of the World. 

26 This includes early stage VC, seed and other early stage investments such as equity crowdfunding and angel 
investors. 
27 A broad set of companies is included in this group, producing machinery and equipment for chips production. 

21 

 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2. Methodology and sources 

Raw data on acquisitions of equity stakes and greenfield projects comes from Bureau van Dijk 
datasets  (Orbis  M&A  and  Orbis  Crossborder,  respectively).  Data  has  been  retrieved  in  March 
2024  (11/03/2024  for  both  the  Orbis  M&A,  and  the  Orbis  Crossborder  data);  and  has  been 
further elaborated by the Joint Research Centre (JRC).  

The term “foreign investor” is used whenever the investor is ultimately controlled by a non-EU 
entity (either a company or an individual). When the ultimate owner cannot be established, the 
location  of  the  investor  applies.  This  definition  differs  from  the  one  of  the  FDI  Screening 
Regulation28.  Throughout  the  text  the  term  acquisition  will  identify  the  acquisition  of  equity 
stakes in EU companies, be it M&As or stakes below 50% but above 10% of the capital, and the 
term  transactions  will  be  referred  to  the  sum  of  acquisitions  and  greenfield  investments.  Raw 
data  (including  old  deals  and  projects)  are  regularly  updated  by  the  data  provider,  but  data 
extraction  for  the  same  time  window,  done  at  different  points  in  time,  could  lead  to  different 
figures due to update lags.  

The  section  only  reports  the  deals’  number  of  transactions.  Values  are  only  available  for  a 
fraction of the acquisitions since companies are not obliged to report the deals’ financial details. 
For  greenfield  investment  projects,  the  expected  investment  and  the  job  creation  is  always 
available but not reported in the text for consistency reasons.  

All types of greenfield projects are accounted for in this document, including the construction of 
new sites, the relocation of a foreign presence, and the expansion of existing sites. All tables and 
figures  are  based  on  announced  and  completed  transactions,  but  report  them  with  their 
announced  date.  Rumours  and  postponed  deals/projects  are  excluded.  A  multi-deal,  i.e.,  a  deal 
where there are multiple targets and/or multiple investors is considered a sum of multiple deals. 
For  example,  if  a  foreign  investor  acquires  two  companies,  this  is  recorded  as  two  deals. 
Conversely,  if  a  foreign  investor  acquires  a  company  with  multiple  subsidiaries  (in  different 
countries), the deal remains unique and is attributed to the parent company’s country. Deals with 
multiple  targets  and  multiple  investors  (a  negligible  amount)  are  disregarded,  as  it  is  very 
difficult  to  devise  a  general  rule  to  attribute  the  transaction.  This  classification  rule  is  also 
applied  to  greenfield  investments  in  case  of  multi-purpose  projects  in  which  several  sites  are 
built and/or the projects with multiple investors are announced.  

In the analysis of public shareholding, for each investor, the ownership information available at 
the  time  of  the  deal/project  is  used.  Where  not  available  for  2022,  the  ownership  information 
used is  that of 2021, the latest  information  available. Data on the size of EU target  companies 
acquired by a foreign investor is based on raw data from Bureau van Dijk Orbis-Global. Where 
not available for 2022, the information on balance sheet used is that of 2021. 

28 See Article 2(2) of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (the FDI Regulation). 

22 

 
 
 
Note  that  very  small  firms  (and  to  some  extent  small  companies)  are  poorly  covered  in  the 
Bureau van Dijk Orbis database (see OECD, 202029 for additional insights). 

Finally,  the  classification  of  companies  working  in  high  tech  manufacturing  can  be  found  on 
Eurostat webpage. Under high-tech we included companies falling under Eurostat sections high 
tech and medium-high tech firms. All remaining companies accounted for under low-tech. 

29 See: https://www.oecd.org/economy/coverage-and-representativeness-of-orbis-data-c7bdaa03-en.htm  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
3. EU Member States – legislative developments  

Introduction 

This part of the Staff Working Document reflects the information provided by the EU Member 
States, pursuant to their annual reporting obligation set out in Article 5 of the EU FDI Screening 
Regulation. 

The section reflects for each Member State whether: 

-  The relevant Member State had a national investment screening mechanism in place as of 

31 December 2023; 

-  Developments  occurred  in  the  field  of  FDI  screening  during  the  reporting  period 
(01/01/2023  –  31/12/2023),  e.g.,  amendments  to  an  existing  screening  mechanism 
occurred,  or  ongoing  initiative  expected  to  result  in  the  introduction  of  a  national 
screening mechanism; 

-  The  relevant  Member  State  publishes,  or  intends  to  publish,  a  national  report  on  FDI 

screening. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
Austria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT:  Yes.  The  Austrian  government  publishes  an  annual  report  in  German.  The  latest 
following  website: 
available  but  will  be 
version 
https://www.bmaw.gv.at/Themen/Investitionskontrolle/Taetigkeitsberichte-der-
Investitionskontrollbehoerde.html   

is  not  yet 

found  on 

the 

Belgium 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The Belgian FDI screening mechanism adopted on 30 November 2022 became operational on 1 
July  2023.  The  Federal  Public  Service  Economy  operates  as  the  national  contact  point  for  the 
implementation of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and for the participation in the EU cooperation 
mechanism. 

Links: 

-  https://economie.fgov.be/nl/themas/handelsbeleid/interfederale 
-  https://dermagne.belgium.be/fr/filtrage-des-investissements-%C3%A9trangers  

REPORT: Yes. The annual report covering the period between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024 
should be made available in September 2024. 

Bulgaria 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

A  national  screening  mechanism  was  proposed  in  Parliament  on  22  June  2023,  adopted  on  22 
February 2024 and promulgated on 6 March 2024. The screening mechanism is introduced as a 
new  chapter  in  the  Investment  Promotion  Act.  This  mechanism  establishes  screening  for 
investments over EUR 2 million in sensitive sectors (as per art. 4 of the Regulation) from non-
EU high-risk countries. The screening body is the Intergovernmental Council under the authority 
of the Council of Ministers. 

Link: https://www.parliament.bg/en/bills/ID/164917 

REPORT: No. 

25 

 
 
  
  
 
  
Croatia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

As  of  31  December  2023,  Croatia  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However,  on  30  October  2023,  Croatia  has  formed  a  Working  Party  charged  with  drafting  a 
legislative proposal. 

REPORT: No. 

Cyprus 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

As  of  31  December  2023,  Cyprus  had  not  established  a  national  FDI  screening  mechanism. 
However, in 2022, Cyprus drafted a new law for the establishment of a national FDI screening 
framework. In 2023, certain provisions of the draft law have been finalised and legally vetted by 
the Law Service of the Republic. The revised draft law is currently under review by the House of 
Representatives. 

REPORT: No. 

Czechia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT: Yes. The Czech annual report for 2023 should be released during the Autumn 2024. 
The  report  will  be  accessible  via  this  link:  https://www.mpo.cz/en/foreign-trade/investment-
screening/  

Denmark 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The FDI screening mechanism was amended in June 2023 and the new provisions apply since 1 
July  2023.  The  revision  introduces  a  new  case  handling  process  with  two  distinct  phases,  and 

26 

 
 
  
  
  
 
  
expands  the  scope  of  the  Act  to  enable  the  Danish  Business  Authority  to  screen  tenders  that 
specifically relate to the Energy Island project in the Baltic Sea.  

Link: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2023/1256 

REPORT: No. 

Estonia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The  Foreign  Investment  Reliability  Assessment  Act  adopted  on  25  January  2023  entered  into 
force  on  1  September  2023  and  was  notified  to  the  EU  on  13  September.  As  of  1  September 
2023, a company or a natural person from outside the European Union investing in an economic 
sector that is important for Estonia’s security or public order will require an authorisation from 
the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority. The authorisation can be granted 
after an assessment of the impact of the foreign investment on the security and public order of 
Estonia or another Member State of the EU. 

The completion of a foreign investment subject to an authorisation obligation on the basis of the 
Foreign  Investment  Reliability  Assessment  Act  is  prohibited  before  the  foreign  investment 
authorisation  is  obtained.  In  assessing  the  impact  of  a  foreign  investment  on  the  security  and 
public  order  of  Estonia  or  another  Member  State  of  the  European  Union,  the  Consumer 
Protection  and  Technical  Regulatory  Authority  and  the  Foreign  Investment  Committee  will 
consider  the  circumstances  relating  to  the  foreign  investor,  the  economic  activities  and  the 
relevant economic sector of the target. 

Link: https://ttja.ee/en/business-client/entrepreneurship/foreign-direct-investment-screening  

REPORT: No. 

Finland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT: The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment has prepared the Annual Report 
of  2023  which  will  be  publicly  available  in  June  or  July  2024  on  the  Ministry’s  website: 
https://tem.fi/acquisitions (in Finnish, Swedish and English). 

27 

 
 
  
  
 
France 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

Entering into force in 2023, France has prolonged the obligation for foreign investors to notify 
investments  when  acquiring  at  least  10%  of  the  voting  rights  of  listed  companies  (Décret  n° 
2021-1758). It is the second time France prolonged this disposition since its first implementation 
in  July  2020,  when  the  French  government  lowered  the  threshold  from  25%  to  10%  of  voting 
rights  for  listed  companies.  This  measure  was  taken  in  a  context  of  economic  uncertainties, 
notably related to the energy crisis. 

Link: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000046792223 

REPORT: Yes. France publishes an annual report of its FDI screening activities, accessible via 
this 
https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/institutionnel/services-aux-
entreprises/investissements-etrangers-en-france  

link: 

Germany 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

On 15 September 2023, Germany introduced fees for FDI screenings, calculated on the basis of 
the  duration  and  degree  of  difficulty  of  each  case  (Special  Fees  Ordinance  for  War  Weapons 
Control, export control and investment screening). In accordance with a transitional provision in 
the ordinance, fees for FDI screening have now been charged since 1 January 2024. 

The online investment screening application form has been available on the Federal Government 
portal  since  1  December  2023.  After  a  transitional  period,  applications  and  notifications  must 
now be submitted via the Federal Government Portal. Since 1 January 2024 the use of the online 
form is obligatory for applications and notifications. 

REPORT: Germany publishes annual key facts and figures on investment screening, available 
in German and English:  

https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/investment-screening-in-
germany-facts-figures.pdf 

Greece 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: No. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

28 

 
 
  
 
  
  
In  2023,  the  competent  Departments  of  the  Hellenic  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  have  updated 
the  draft  legislation  for  the  establishment  of  the  national  FDI  screening  mechanism  on  the 
grounds of public order and security, drawing from the experiences of other Member States and 
in light of the amendment to Regulation (EU) 2019/452.  

The main amendments to the draft bill introduced during the reporting period were the following: 

▪  Different  thresholds  triggering  a  screening  procedure  depending  on  the  sector  of  the 

target company.  

▪  Mandatory notification from the investor along with an ex-officio procedure. 
▪  Adoption of a two-stage screening process. 
▪  Creation  of  an  advisory  Interministerial  FDI  Screening  Committee  in  support  of  the 

decision-making by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

REPORT: No. 

Hungary 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The Government  Decree 129/2023  on the rules of asset sales for the purposes of  continuity of 
Debtor’s business operations in a state of emergency entered into force on 18 April 2023. 

The  liquidator  may  also  sell  the  debtor's  share  in  a  business  association  established  for  the 
purpose of carrying out its economic activity in a public procedure pursuant to the Government 
Decree. 

If the sale procedure is aimed at the sale of shares in a company established in Hungary carrying 
out  the  activities  referred  to  in  Section  2  (4)  of  Act  LVII  of  2018  on  the  Control  of  Foreign 
Investments  Detrimental  to  the  Security  Interests  of  Hungary  (hereinafter:  Act  LVII  of  2018) 
which exceeds the amount specified in Section 2 (1) and (2) of Act LVII of 2018, the liquidator 
shall indicate this circumstance in the invitation to participate. The liquidator shall forward the 
relevant  data  of  foreign  investors  who  have  submitted  valid  applications  to  the  Minister 
responsible for the management of civilian national security services (hereinafter referred to as 
"the Minister"). 

In  order  to  protect  the  security  interests  of  Hungary,  the  Minister  shall  conduct  a  national 
security  prequalification  procedure 
the  national  security 
prequalification  procedure).  During  the  procedure,  the  rules  under  Act  LVII  of  2018  and 
Government  Decree  246/2018  (XII.17.)  shall  be  applied  with  the  derogations  set  out  in  the 
decree. 

(hereinafter 

referred 

to  as 

Furthermore, the Minister shall inform the liquidator thereof if, as a result of the investigation, 
the participation of the foreign investor in the target harms the security interests of Hungary. 

Link: https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2023-129-20-22.7#CI  

29 

 
 
  
REPORT: No. 

Ireland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

The  Screening  of  Third  Country  Transactions  Act  was  enacted  on  31  October  2023  and  will 
become operational during quarter 3 of 2024. 

The Act defines the nature, scale and type of investments that will undergo screening. It also sets 
out the main considerations throughout the screening review process. Under the Act, the Minister 
for Enterprise, Trade and Employment is empowered to assess, investigate, authorise, condition, 
or  prohibit  foreign  investments  based  on  a  range  of  security  and  public  order  criteria.  This 
screening  mechanism  has  been  developed  in  line  with  the  principles  outlined  in  the  EU  FDI 
Screening  Regulation  and  ensures  Ireland  can  fulfil  its  obligations  under  the  Regulation’s 
cooperation mechanism. 

Link: 
2023.html  

https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/legislation/screening-of-third-country-transactions-act-

REPORT: No. Once the mechanism will be in place, a report will be published annually. 

Italy 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

Two amendments to the Decree-Law No. 21/2012 were adopted in 2023. Decree-Law 104 of 10 
August  2023  -  which  was  converted  into  Law  136  of  9  October  2023  -  introduced  “urgent 
provisions  to  protect  users,  regarding  economic  and  financial  activities  and  strategic 
investments”, and changed the screening procedure concerning critical technologies. In detail, its 
Art. 7 amended Art. 2 of Decree-Law No. 21/2012.  

Links: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/08/10/23G00119/sg, 

https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2023/10/09/23G00148/SG  

REPORT:  Yes.  The  report  on  national  FDI  screening  activities  will  be  transmitted  by  the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers to the Parliament by 30 June 2024 

30 

 
 
  
 
  
Latvia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

On 20 June 2023, Latvia adopted Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 311 “Procedure for 
prevention of threat  to  commercial companies,  associations, and  foundations of significance to 
national security”. The regulation set up an institution responsible for the screening mechanism 
and  further  developed  the  screening  procedures  (information  to  be  submitted  in  applications, 
notification to the European Commission and Member States etc.). 

Link:  https://likumi.lv/ta/id/343004-nacionalajai-drosibai-nozimigu-komercsabiedribu-biedribu-
un-nodibinajumuapdraudejuma-noversanas-kartiba  

REPORT: Yes. A report on national FDI screening activities is being prepared.  

Lithuania 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT: No. 

Luxembourg 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The  law  of  14  July  2023  established  a  mechanism  for  the  national  screening  of  foreign  direct 
investment  likely  to  undermine  security  or  public  order  for  the  purposes  of  implementing 
Regulation  (EU)  2019/452.  The  screening  mechanism  created  by  this  legislation  entered  into 
force on 1 September 2023. 

https://guichet.public.lu/fr/entreprises/actualites/2023/aout/28-filtrage-invests-

Link: 
etrangers.html  

REPORT: No. 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Malta 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT: Malta intends to prepare a report covering the three-year period of implementation. 
This  report  would  be  made  public  and  made  available  on 
the  Office’s  website: 
https://www.nfdismalta.com/  

Netherlands 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

In 2023, the Netherlands established a new FDI screening mechanism. The Investments, Mergers 
and Acquisitions Security Screening Act (VIFO Act) adopted in 2022 was implemented in 2023 
via several decisions:  

Implementation Act of the FDI Screening Regulation 

- 
-  Regulation on the Screening of Investments, Mergers and Acquisitions 
-  Decree of 4 May 2023 determining the time of entry into force of the VIFO Act 
-  Decree on Screening of Investment 
-  Decree on the scope of application of sensitive technology 
-  Decree appointing regulators under the VIFO Act 

The Netherlands also launched a process to implement the Regulation on Offshore Wind. 

https://www.bureautoetsinginvesteringen.nl/het-stelsel-van-toetsen/wet-veiligheidstoets-

Link: 
investeringen-fusies-en-overnames  

REPORT: The Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy is preparing an annual report 
for  2023,  which  will  be  made  available  in  April  2024.  The  report  covers  the  screening 
mechanism put in place by the VIFO Act, but also activities under various sectoral laws. 

Poland 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

The  Regulation  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  27  December  2023  amended  the  list  of  entities 
subject to protection (addition of two new entities) and the corresponding authorities competent 
for their control. 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Link: https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=WDU20230002812  

REPORT: No. 

Portugal 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): No. 

REPORT: No. 

Romania 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

In 2023, Romania adopted Law no. 164/2023 approving the Government Emergency Ordinance 
No. 46/2022 on the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 and amending the Competition 
Law  No.  21/1996.  Romania  also  adopted  the  Government  Emergency  Ordinance  108/2023 
amending and completing Competition Law no. 21/1996, as well as other normative acts.  

Those developments have led to the creation of a filing fee for all investors (non-EU and EU) of 
EUR 10,000, and introduced the screening of intra-EU investments. 

Links: 

-  https://monitoruloficial.ro/Monitorul-Oficial--PI--495--2023.html, 

-  https://monitoruloficial.ro/Monitorul-Oficial--PI--1100--2023.html  

REPORT: No. 

Slovakia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes. 

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

On  1  March  2023  the  new  foreign  investment  screening  mechanism  entered  into  force  and 
replaced the previous partial mechanism focusing on critical infrastructure in energy and industry 
sectors. 

The new mechanism consists of the following normative acts: 

▪  Act No. 497/2022 Coll. on the screening of foreign investments and on amendments 

to certain acts (“the Act”); 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
▪  Regulation of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 61/2023 Coll. laying down 

the critical foreign investments, and 

▪  Decree of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic No. 64/2023 Coll. laying 
down the application for authorisation of a foreign investment, the foreign investment 
screening form, request for modification of a decision on conditional authorisation of 
a  foreign  investment,  the  report  on  the  execution  of  a  foreign  investment  and  the 
monitoring report. 

The  Act  establishes  the  competences  of  the  various  authorities  involved  in  the  screening 
mechanism  with  the  Ministry  of  Economy  of  the  Slovak  Republic  as  the  national  screening 
authority,  and  details  the  screening  procedure  (upon  request  for  authorisation  and  ex  officio 
proceeding).  A  special  category  of  foreign  investments  –  “critical  foreign  investments”  –  is 
identified  by  the  legislation.  Those  investments  must  be  screened  before  completion.  The  Act 
also establishes the rights and obligations of the investor and the target entity before, during and 
after the screening procedure. Inspection mechanisms have been introduced by the Act, allowing 
authorities  to  inspect  compliance  with  obligations,  review  administrative  offences  and  issue 
penalties. 

The Act has been amended on 29 March 2023 by Act No. 95/2023 Coll. as follows: 

-  § 7 (1) d) with the change of the reference from § 65 to § 63,  
-  § 9 (a), § 16 (1) b) and c), § 58 (2) a), § 63 (5) with the deletion of the words “for safety 

and public order of the Slovak republic” 

The amendment also introduced § 12 (4), which concerns domestic transfers and transitions of 
elements of critical infrastructure. This addition covers only domestic or intra-EU transfers and 
transitions and does not in any way affect or concern the screening of foreign investments or the 
EU cooperation mechanism. 

Links:  

1.  The Act - https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2022/497/20230329.html  
https://www.mhsr.sk/uploads/files/fFIleULT.pdf?csrt=6556964531480844445 (ENG) 
2.  The  Regulation  of  the  Government  of  the  Slovak  Republic  No.  61/2023  Coll. 

https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2023/61/20230301 
https://www.mhsr.sk/uploads/files/FGMaN8KG.pdf?csrt=13639608170496409976 
(ENG) 

3.  Decree of the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic No. 64/2023 Coll. 

https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2023/64/20230301 
https://www.mhsr.sk/uploads/files/lzjPdm1E.pdf?csrt=13639608170496409976 (ENG) 

REPORT: Yes. The first report is expected to be published in June 2024 on the website of the 
Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic.  

34 

 
 
 
 
Slovenia 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

The  temporary  screening  mechanism  established  in  2020  by  the  Intervention  Measures  to 
Mitigate  and  Eliminate  the  Consequences  of  the  COVID-19  Epidemic  Act  (ZIUOOPE)  was 
replaced on 1 July 2023 by a new mechanism. This new permanent mechanism was included in 
the Investment Promotion Act via legislative amendments. 

The new legislation further formalises the screening procedure, defines new penalties for cases 
of non-declaration of investment, provides new definitions of foreign director investors and third 
parties,  modifies  the  scope  of  investments  subject  to  an  obligation  of  declaration,  and  defines 
new factor risks and critical areas. 

Link: http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO7634  

REPORT: No. 

Spain 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes.  

On 4 July 2023, Spain approved the Royal Decree 571/2023 on foreign investments developing 
Law 19/2003 on the legal framework for capital movement and foreign  economic transactions, 
and repealing Royal Decree 664/99 on foreign investments. This new FDI screening mechanism 
entered into force on 1 September 2023. 

The  Decree  has  completed  the  existing  legal  framework  by  establishing  a  specific  procedure, 
clarifying the content of the screening mechanism, shortening the resolution period from 6 to 3 
months,  establishing  qualitative  and  quantitative  exemptions  to  the  prior  authorisation  regime, 
and  regulating  the  possibility  of  voluntary  consultation  on  the  authorisation  requirement  in 
specific operations. 

Furthermore, it amends the procedures on the existing FDI mechanisms on specific sectors. 

Link: https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2023-15549  

REPORT:  Yes.  The  report  is  being  prepared  by  Spain  and  will  be  published  on  this  website: 
https://comercio.gob.es/InversionesExteriores/Publicaciones/Paginas/default.aspx  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweden 

NATIONAL SCREENING MECHANISM IN PLACE: Yes.  

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD (2023): Yes. 

The bill setting up a mechanism for the screening of FDI entered into force on 1 December 2023. 

The new law covers investments in a number of protected activities and specific sectors, which 
are  conducted  either  by  a  limited  liability  company,  a  European  company,  a  partnership,  an 
economic  association  or  a  foundation  with  a  registered  office  in  Sweden.  Investments  in 
protected  activities  carried  out  in  a  simple  partnership  or  as  a  sole  trader  in  Sweden  are  also 
covered. 

A party who intends to invest in protected activities, whether directly or indirectly, must notify 
the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) of the investment if the investment gives the investor 
a certain influence in the activities. The investor's obligation to notify the ISP arises if, after the 
investment, the investor would, directly or indirectly, come to possess votes that correspond to or 
exceed any of the thresholds specified in the Act. For limited liability companies the threshold is 
10  per  cent  of  the  voting  rights.  The  ISP  shall  also  be  able  to  initiate  screening  on  its  own 
initiative,  which  means  that  investments  in  protected  activities  that  are  not  subject  to  the 
notification obligation may also be screened. An investment subject to the notification obligation 
may  only  be  carried  out  if  no  action  has  been  taken  in  response  to  the  notification  of  the 
investment or the investment has been authorised in the course of screening. If the ISP initiates 
screening  on  its  own  initiative,  the  investment  may  only  be  carried  out  if  the  investment  is 
authorised as part of the screening. 

The ISP shall prohibit a foreign direct investment if it is necessary to prevent harmful effects on 
Sweden's security or on public order or public safety in Sweden. 

To ensure that foreign direct investments are not hindered to a greater extent than is necessary, 
the ISP shall also be able to attach conditions to the authorisation of an investment. If the risks 
associated with an individual foreign direct investment can be reduced to an acceptable level by 
attaching certain conditions to it, it is not necessary to prohibit the investment. The ISP also has 
the power to impose sanctions in case of violations of the law. 

Link:  

1.  Press release: https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2023/11/nu-stoppas-

utlandska-foretagskop-som-kan-skada-sverige/   

2.  Act (2023:560) on the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments, Translation of the 

Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Act - ISP 

3.  Ordinance (2023:624) on the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments, Translation of the 

Ordinance on Screening of Foreign Direct Investments - ISP 

REPORT: No. 

36