Quarterly overview of asylum case law. Issue no 3, September 2024.
Date: 2024-09-16
Institutions: European Union Agency for Asylum
Subjects: Court of Justice of the European Union, EU Member State, European Court of Human Rights, asylum seeker, case-law (EU), family reunification, international court, international protection, migration policy, refugee facility, return migration, right of asylum, serial publication

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Manuscript completed in September 2024. 

Neither the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) nor any person acting on behalf of the 
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publication. EUAA is responsible for the use that might be made of the information contained 
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© European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), 2024 

Cover photo: Stock illustration ID: 1227193799, © iStock (photographer: limeart) 

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ISSN 2811-9606  DOI 10.2847/6000980 

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QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Contents 

Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 3 

Note ................................................................................................................................................. 5 

List of abbreviations....................................................................................................................... 6 

Main highlights ............................................................................................................................... 8 

Access to the asylum procedure ................................................................................................ 14 
Non-compliance with previous CJEU ruling............................................................................... 14 

Dublin procedure ......................................................................................................................... 14 
Scope of a judicial review ............................................................................................................... 14 
Dublin transfers to Croatia .............................................................................................................. 16 
Medical conditions ............................................................................................................................ 17 

First instance procedures ............................................................................................................ 18 
Possibility to extend the length of the asylum procedure ...................................................... 18 
Lack of investigation of special procedural guarantees ......................................................... 18 
Policy on failure to attend the personal interview ................................................................... 20 
Policy and burden of proof regarding Syrian applicants ....................................................... 20 
Presumption of a safe country of origin ...................................................................................... 21 
Reimbursement of procedural costs ........................................................................................... 22 
Subsequent applications ................................................................................................................ 22 
Length of the asylum procedure .................................................................................................. 23 

Assessment of applications ........................................................................................................23 
Persecution based on religious beliefs: Chinese and Iraqi applicants .............................. 23 
Persecution of Iranian applicants due to political activity ..................................................... 24 
Persecution based on political activities and military conscription: Russian  
applicants ........................................................................................................................................... 25 
Military conscription: Syria ............................................................................................................. 26 
Membership of a particular social group: LGBTIQ applicants from Burkina Faso  
and in Togo ........................................................................................................................................ 27 
Membership of a particular social group: Westernised women and minors .................... 27 
Membership of a particular social group: Afghan women and girls ................................... 28 
Gender-based persecution: Protection in the country of origin .......................................... 29 
Gender-based persecution: Trans women in Colombia ........................................................ 30 
Threshold to assess cessation of UNRWA assistance or protection .................................. 31 
Cessation of UNRWA assistance ................................................................................................. 32 
Individual threat to life or physical integrity in Afghanistan .................................................. 33 
Subsidiary protection: Assessment of individual circumstances in the context of 
indiscriminate violence ................................................................................................................... 33 
Subsidiary protection: South Sudan ............................................................................................ 34 
Subsidiary protection: Syria ........................................................................................................... 34 
Subsidiary protection: Ukraine ..................................................................................................... 36 
Exclusion from international protection.......................................................................................37 

3 

 
Applications by beneficiaries of international protection in another Member State ..... 39 
Humanitarian protection: Vulnerable persons ......................................................................... 40 

Reception ..................................................................................................................................... 42 
Appointment of a legal representative for unaccompanied minors ................................... 42 
Sanctions for breaking reception centre rules ......................................................................... 42 
Human rights concerns over lack of access to reception ..................................................... 43 

Detention ......................................................................................................................................44 
ECtHR judgments on detention .................................................................................................... 44 
Scope of a judicial review .............................................................................................................. 45 
Detention pending an appeal ....................................................................................................... 46 
Legal assistance to challenge detention ................................................................................... 46 
No prospects of a return .................................................................................................................47 

Content of protection ................................................................................................................. 48 
Extradition of a refugee status holder from another Member State ................................... 48 
Extradition pending the outcome of an application for international protection ............ 49 
Eligibility for permanent residence status when protection was acquired after  
lodging a subsequent application ............................................................................................... 49 
Refusal to grant a travel document to a refugee status holder ........................................... 50 
Right to private life ........................................................................................................................... 50 
Revocation of a residence permit due to false information ................................................... 51 
Family reunification .......................................................................................................................... 52 
Revocation of subsidiary protection ............................................................................................ 53 

Temporary protection ................................................................................................................. 53 
Eligibility for protection ................................................................................................................... 53 
Secondary movements of temporary protection beneficiaries ........................................... 55 
Suspension of return decisions .................................................................................................... 57 
Family unity ........................................................................................................................................ 57 

Return ........................................................................................................................................... 58 

Disclaimer: The summaries cover the main elements of the court’s decision. The full judgment 
is the only authoritative, original and accurate document. Please refer to the original source 
for the authentic text.  

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QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Note 

The “EUAA Quarterly Overview of Asylum Case Law” is based on a selection of cases from 
the EUAA Case Law Database, which contains summaries of decisions and judgments related 
to international protection pronounced by national courts of EU+ countries, the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The database 
presents more extensive summaries of the cases than what is published in this quarterly 
overview. 

The summaries are reviewed by the EUAA Information and Analysis Sector and are drafted in 
English with the support of translation software. 

The database serves as a centralised platform on jurisprudential developments related to 
asylum, and cases are available in the Latest updates (last ten cases by date of registration), 
Digest of cases (all registered cases presented chronologically by the date of 
pronouncement) and the Search page.  

To reproduce or translate all or part of this quarterly overview in print, online or in any other 
format, and for any other information, please contact: caselawdb@euaa.europa.eu 

Introductory sessions on the content and functionalities of the database can be offered for 
interested stakeholders and you may contact us at: caselawdb@euaa.europa.eu 

To subscribe to the quarterly overview, use this link: 
https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/subscribe.aspx  

5 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

List of abbreviations 

APD 

BAMF  

BFA 

CEAS 

CJEU 

COA 

COI 

CNDA 

Asylum Procedures Directive. Directive 2013/32/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international 
protection (recast) 

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany)  

Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum | Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl (Austria) 

Common European Asylum System 

Court of Justice of the European Union 

Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers  

country of origin information 

National Court of Asylum | Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile (France) 

Dublin III Regulation  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 

Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person 
(recast) 

ECHR 

ECtHR 

EASO 

EUAA 

EU 

European Convention on Human Rights  

European Court of Human Rights 

European Asylum Support Office (now the EUAA) 

European Union Agency for Asylum  

European Union 

EU Charter 

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union  

EU+ countries  

Member States of the European Union and associate countries 

FGM/C 

FAC 

HREC 

IPAC  

female genital mutilation/cutting 

Federal Administrative Court (Switzerland) 

Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission  

International Protection Administrative Court (Cyprus) 

6 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LGBTIQ 

NGO 

OFPRA 

OMCA 

ONA 

QD 

RCD 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, or queer 

non-governmental organisation 

Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons | Office 
Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides (France)  

Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (Latvia) 

National Reception Office (Luxemburg) 

Qualification Directive. Directive 2011/95/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for 
the content of the protection granted (recast) 

Reception Conditions Directive. Directive 2013/33/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying 
down standards for the reception of applicants for international 
protection (recast) 

Refugee Convention 

The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 
1967 Protocol 

RIC 

THB 

TPD 

UAM 

UN 

UNRWA  

Reception and Identification Centre (Greece) 

trafficking in human beings 

Temporary Protection Directive. Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 
20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection 
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving 
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof 

unaccompanied minor 

United Nations 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Registered Palestine 
Refugees  

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Main highlights 

The decisions and judgments presented in this edition of the “EUAA Quarterly Overview of 
Asylum Case Law, Issue No 3/2024” were pronounced from June to August 2024. 

Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 

In June 2024, the CJEU issued no less than five judgments interpreting provisions of the 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in cases concerning: Hungary’s non-compliance 
with a previous CJEU judgment on asylum, gender-based asylum claims with reference to 
westernised women, Palestinian applicants for international protection for whom UNRWA’s 
protection ceased, and lastly, the effects of a decision granting refugee protection in another 
EU Member State for a beneficiary of international protection and the binding effect of 
refugee status in an extradition procedure in another Member State.  

123/22), the CJEU imposed a lump sum fine of 

In European Commission v Hungary (C
EUR 200 million and a daily penalty of EUR 1 million for Hungary's non-compliance with its 
December 2020 judgment (C-808/18). The earlier ruling found Hungary in breach of EU law 
on international protection procedures and the return of illegally staying third-country 
nationals. Since Hungary had not addressed these issues, the CJEU determined that its failure 
to comply disrupted the EU's common policy and principles of solidarity. 

‑

The CJEU ruled in K and L v State Secretary for Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie en Veiligheid) (C-646/21) that “women, including minors, who share as a common 
characteristic the fact that they genuinely come to identify with the fundamental value of 
equality between women and men during their stay in a Member State may, depending on 
the circumstances in the country of origin, be regarded as belonging to a particular social 
group, constituting a reason for persecution capable of leading to the recognition of refugee 
status”. The court also ruled that: i) national authorities must conduct an individual 
assessment which considers the best interests of a minor applicant; and ii) when assessing an 
application for international protection based on persecution due to membership of a 
particular social group, a long stay in the Member State may be taken into consideration, 
especially when it coincides with a period when the minor was forming his/her identity. 

In LN, SN v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite (C-563/22), the 
CJEU ruled that UNRWA’s protection or assistance may be considered to have ceased when 
the agency finds itself unable to ensure dignified living conditions or minimum security 
conditions to any stateless person of Palestinian origin who registered with UNRWA’s area of 
operations. The court noted that both the living conditions in the Gaza Strip and UNRWA’s 
capacity to fulfil its mission have experienced an unprecedented deterioration due to the 
consequences of the events of 7 October 2023. The judgment provides additional guidelines 
for the recognition of international protection for persons from the Gaza Strip. 

The CJEU ruled in QY v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-753/22) that when an application is 
submitted by a beneficiary of international protection in another Member State, the Member 
State assessing the application on merits is not required to automatically recognise the status 
adopted in another Member State but has the discretion to do so. In addition, when an 

8 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

inadmissible decision is not possible, a new individual assessment must be carried out by fully 
examining the elements of case, up to date information and the previous decision through an 
exchange of information with the other Member State.  

In A. v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (C-352/22), the CJEU clarified the binding effect of 
refugee status in another Member State in an extradition procedure to the country of origin 
from which the person fled. The court held that since extradition would effectively end 
refugee protection, it must be refused if the refugee status has not been revoked or 
withdrawn by the other Member State where refugee status was recognised. In addition, if 
following contact with the competent authorities of the other Member State results in the 
revocation or withdrawal of refugee status, the Member State from which extradition is being 
requested must conclude that the person is no longer a refugee and there would be no 
serious risk, in the event of extradition, of being subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 

As in previous months, similar asylum-related topics were dealt with by the ECtHR in the 
current period covered by the Quarterly Overview. The ECtHR ruled on cases related to the 
detention of asylum seekers and family reunification. The judgments, however, concern 
situations which happened in 2018–2019 and 2021.  

With regard to detention, the ECtHR found a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR by 
Hungary in the case S.H. An Iranian woman was detained in the Tompa transit zone between 
January 2018–March 2019 in isolation and without providing adequate mental health care. In 
two cases against Cyprus, K.A. and B.A., the court found violations of Article 5 for the length 
of the judicial review and issues related to the grounds of detention based on national 
security without nexus with the asylum procedure. 

In Okubamichael Debru v Sweden, the ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR, 
ruling that refusing family reunification for the applicant's wife and children, based on the 
unmet ‘maintenance requirement’, did not breach his right to family life or constitute 
discrimination. The court determined that this decision struck a fair balance between the 
applicant's private interests and the country’s immigration control interests. 

National courts 

Judicial reviews of decisions on Dublin transfers concerned most prominently the risk of 
indirect refoulement. National courts also sought interpretations of EU asylum law by referring 
questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on extending successively the length of the 
asylum procedure beyond the 6 months and on the use of detention. Other landmark cases 
concerned LGBTIQ applicants, gender-based persecution and the level of indiscriminate 
violence in Syria and South Kordofan in Sudan. 

Dublin procedure 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

The Dublin procedure is a recurrent topic brought to national courts with regard to procedural 
aspects and conditions for implementing a transfer.  

As noted in the Asylum Report 2023, the Danish policy on applicants from Syria has been 
disputed in appeals concerning secondary movements of these beneficiaries of international 
protection from Denmark.1 In the context of appeals against Dublin transfers to Denmark, 
more recently courts in the Netherlands and Norway assessed the impact of policy changes 
and the risk of indirect refoulement. 

The Dutch Council of State ruled that an assessment of the risk of indirect refoulement 
resulting from a difference in protection policies between Member States falls outside the 
scope of a judicial review of a decision on a Dublin transfer. The judgment constitutes a 
change in the court’s approach to the assessment of the risk of indirect refoulement in an 
appeal concerning a decision on a Dublin transfer.  

In contrast, the Oslo District Court considered that a Syrian applicant cannot be transferred to 
Denmark under the Dublin procedure due to a risk of indirect refoulement because of the 
Danish policy to return Syrian applicants and the fact that Danish authorities already issued a 
deportation decision against the applicant. 

The Slovenian Supreme Court ruled in two cases on onward appeals against decisions on 
Dublin transfer to Croatia.  

First instance procedures 

In view of a high influx of asylum applicants in 2023 (see Asylum Report 2024) and backlogs 
in the processing of applications, the Dutch Council of State submitted additional questions to 
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the right of the Member State to extend the length of the 
asylum procedure beyond 6 months in situations of an increased number of asylum 
applications and backlogs, pursuant to the recast Asylum Procedures Directive (APD), 
Article 31(3), point b) of the third subparagraph. The questions were in addition to a referral 
submitted in November 2023, in case C-662/2023, and sought clarification on whether the 
determining authority can apply this provision in a repeated and consecutive manner and 
under which conditions. 

A new trend was noted related to safeguards for applicants with special needs. For example, 
national courts from the Netherlands and Cyprus ruled that a failure to identify and address 
vulnerabilities in the assessment and to provide adequate safeguards are grounds for a re-
examination of the asylum application.  

Regarding the possibility to reject a request for asylum due to the absence of the applicant 
from the personal interview, the Dutch Council of State ruled that legislative changes are 
necessary to completely implement Article 28(1) of the recast APD, which concerns the 
procedure in the event of an implicit withdrawal or abandonment of the application. These 
changes are needed if the State Secretary for Justice and Security is to implement a new 
working method which was initiated in October 2022 at the Budel asylum-seekers’ centre, 

1 See also EUAA Quarterly Overview of Asylum Case Law Issue 4/2023. 

10 

 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

whereby absence from the personal interview without a valid reason result in the application 
being rejected as unfounded or manifestly unfounded.  

Russian applicants  

As noted in the Asylum Report 2024, Russian nationals submitted applications for 
international protection in some EU+ countries on grounds of political opinion and a risk of 
being drafted into military.  

The District Administrative Court in Latvia found in two cases that applications submitted by 
Russian applicants lacked evidence on: i) political activities that would lead to a risk of 
persecution; and ii) a risk of mobilisation for the war in Ukraine. Specifically, one case 
concerned an applicant who had no political activities, whereas the second had social media 
posts while in Latvia. 2 

Membership of a particular social group  

As seen in previous editions of the Quarterly Overview and the Asylum Report 2024, courts 
continued to assess applications from specific profiles, in particular membership in a particular 
social group for LBGTIQ applicants and Afghan women. Building on the recent case from the 
CJEU, the trend continued to grant refugee status to Afghan women who oppose the Taliban 
regime. 

The National Court of Asylum (CNDA) in France recognised the existence of a social group of 
homosexual persons in Burkina Faso and in Togo, entitling them to refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA noted the stigmatisation, 
discrimination, social violence, mistreatment and humiliation of this group by security forces, 
police and society. While homosexuality is not currently criminalised in Burkina Faso, a bill 
aiming to prohibit and criminalise it was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 10 July 2024. 
In contrast, in Togo, there are already criminal provisions in force, prohibiting sexual relations 
between persons of the same sex, which puts applicants at risk of criminal prosecutions and 
arbitrary arrests by police, violence and discrimination by society. 

In addition, the CNDA ruled in a Grand Chamber formation that all Afghan women who refuse 
to be subjected to the measures taken against them by the Taliban are likely to be 
recognised as refugees because of their membership in the social group of Afghan women 
and girls. The court applied the CJEU judgment of WS v SAR, which stated that women as a 
whole may be regarded as belonging to a social group under the recast Qualification 
Directive (QD) if they are exposed, because of their gender, to physical or mental violence, 
including sexual violence and domestic violence, in their country of origin. 

Gender-based persecution 

In the Netherlands, the Council of State ruled on applications by trans women from Colombia 
and confirmed that they are not systematically persecuted in their country of origin and that 
an individual assessment is necessary in conjunction with an examination of available country 

2 See also EUAA Quarterly Overview Asylum Case Law Issue 2/2024. 

11 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

information. The council acknowledged that, although access to justice and protection is not 
consistent and high levels of impunity persist, prosecutions and convictions do occur. 

Similarly, the Tribunal of Rome found that a woman from Tunisia, who had experienced 
severe violence and abuse, was eligible for refugee status since there were systemic 
deficiencies in the state protective mechanisms.  

Reopening cases at the national level following a CJEU judgment  

Following judgments pronounced by the CJEU on referrals for preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of CEAS, the duty was on national courts to reopen procedures and reassess 
the cases based on the CJEU interpretation. 

As such, the Council of State in France ruled following the CJEU judgment of 5 October 2023 
in French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) v SW that 
UNRWA assistance had ceased for the applicant since it could not provide sufficient access in 
Lebanon to medical treatment and the medicine on which her life was dependent.  

Following the CJEU judgment of 9 November 2023 in X, Y and their six children v 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid, the Dutch Council of State ruled that to assess an 
application under Article 15c of the recast Qualification Directive the determining authority 
must always examine individual circumstances of the applicant. 

Subsidiary protection for Syrian applicants  

National courts in Austria and Germany took different approaches when assessing the level of 
violence in Syria in a region controlled by the Kurdish forces. For example, the Higher 
Administrative Court of North Rhine-Westphalia ruled on 16 July 2024 that the situation in 
Syria no longer reached such a level of violence that there would be a serious, general 
danger to civilians. The German court departed from EUAA Country Guidance: Syria 
published in April 2024 and the Country of Origin Information Report Syria - Security Situation 
from October 2023. 

In contrast, the Austrian Federal Administrative Court, after referring to several EUAA COI and 
Country Guidance Reports on Syria, concluded on 10 June 2024 that a Syrian national was 
rightly granted subsidiary protection due to the high level of indiscriminate violence in a 
region controlled by Kurdish forces. Similarly, the Supreme Administrative Court in Austria 
annulled a refusal to grant subsidiary protection to a Syrian from Damascus, considering that 
the lower court failed to take into consideration the 2024 EUAA Country Guidance: Syria. 

Subsidiary protection for applicants from South Kordofan in Sudan 

The CNDA in France ruled that a return to South Kordofan in Sudan exposes a person to a 
real risk of suffering a serious threat to life or person, simply by mere presence as a civilian, 
without being able to obtain effective protection from the authorities. 

Reception conditions 

The Higher Administrative Court of Baden-Württemberg ruled on the direct application of the 
recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD) on the appointment of a legal representative for 
an unaccompanied minor, especially for the age assessment procedure. 

12 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

The Irish High Court held that the Irish state violated the human rights of unaccommodated 
international protection applicants by infringing on their right to human dignity under Article 1 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) due to its failure to provide adequate 
accommodation and related services between December 2023 and May 2024. It is the first 
case where the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission, the National Human Rights 
Institution3 and the National Equality Body exercised their authority under Section 41 of the 
Irish Human Rights and Equality Act to initiate proceedings about the rights of third parties, 
namely applicants without accommodation who entered Ireland after December 2023. 

Detention 

The Dutch Court of the Hague seated in Roermond referred a question to the CJEU on the 
scope of the judicial review of consecutive detention measures when the court finds that the 
first detention period had been or had become unlawful at any time during the continuous 
periods of detention. 

Content of protection 

In Finland, the Supreme Administrative Court ruled by a majority opinion that the date from 
which a beneficiary of international protection is eligible for a permanent residence permit is 
the date of entry into the country, even when the status itself was acquired following the 
lodging of a subsequent application. Two judges dissented, arguing that the national 
provision does not support this interpretation.  

The Hellenic Council of State held that the refusal to issue a travel document to a recognised 
refugee can only occur after an individualised assessment by the Asylum Service based on 
public order and security reasons, in line with the recast QD and CJEU jurisprudence. 

The Norwegian courts addressed the issue of revoking residence permits due to false 
information in two cases. The Borgarting Court of Appeal upheld the revocation of an Uzbek 
national's permit for providing false information during his asylum application. Meanwhile, the 
Oslo District Court annulled the revocation of an Ethiopian national's permit, finding that the 
authorities failed to account for her forced marriage as a minor and the duress under which 
she provided false information. 

Temporary protection 

The EUAA will publish a thematic report on “Jurisprudence on the Application of the 
Temporary Protection Directive” in September 2024. It will be available here. The report 
analyses judgments and decisions related to different aspects of the implementation of the 
Temporary Protection Directive, as pronounced by national courts and the CJEU between 
March 2022–September 2024. 

3 For an overview of National Human Rights Institutions and Ombudspersons across EU+ countries, please refer to 
Who is Who in International Protection in the EU+: The Role of National Human Rights Institutions, Ombudsperson 
Institutions and Ombudspersons for Children 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Access to the 
asylum procedure 

Non-compliance with previous 
CJEU ruling 

CJEU, European Commission v Hungary, 
C‑123/22, 13 June 2024. 

The CJEU ordered Hungary to pay a lump 
sum of EUR 200 million and a penalty 
payment of EUR 1 million per day of delay 
for failure to comply with the CJEU 
judgment in European Commission v 
Hungary (C-808/18) pronounced on 
17 December 2020.  

In December 2020, the CJEU held that 
Hungary failed to comply with EU law on 
procedures for granting international 
protection and returning illegally-staying 
third-country nationals. As Hungary did not 
comply with the 2020 judgment, the 
European Commission brought a new 
action for failure to comply with 
obligations, seeking the imposition of 
financial sanctions.  

The CJEU confirmed that Hungary had not 
taken the necessary measures to address 
issues related to access to procedure, the 
right to remain during an appeal, and the 
removal of irregular, third-country 
nationals. It held that Hungary deliberately 
evaded the EU's common policy on 
international protection and the rules on 
removing illegally-staying third-country 
nationals, disregarding the principle of 
sincere cooperation.  

14 

The court determined that Hungary's 
failure to meet its obligations effectively 
shifted its responsibilities, including 
financial ones, onto other Member States, 
thereby undermining the principles of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities 
within the EU. Consequently, the court 
imposed a fine and daily penalties until 
Hungary fully complies. 

Dublin procedure 

Scope of a judicial review  

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], State Secretary for Justice and 
Security (Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid) v Applicant, 202304791/1/V2, 
12 June 2024.  

The Council of State ruled that an 
assessment of the risk of indirect 
refoulement resulting from a difference in 
protection policies between Member 
States falls outside the scope of a judicial 
review of a decision on a Dublin transfer. 

The Dutch the State Secretary for Justice 
and Security did not examine the merits of 
a request for asylum lodged by a Pakistani 
applicant belonging to the Ahmadis, as it 
considered that Austria was the Member 
State responsible under the Dublin III 
Regulation. In an appeal, the applicant 
argued that a transfer to Austria could lead 
to indirect refoulement.  

 
 
 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Based on the CJEU judgment of 
30 November 2023 in Ministero 
dell'Interno and Others (joined cases 
C-228/21, C-254/21, C-297/21, C-315/21 and 
C-328/21), the Council of State changed its 
previous case law and held that a 
difference in protection policies between 
Member States does not constitute a 
fundamental systemic flaw leading to a risk 
of refoulement if an applicant is transferred 
to another Member State under the 
Dublin III Regulation. It noted the CJEU’s 
observation that, in line with the principle 
of mutual trust, the court must presume 
that the risk of refoulement is properly 
assessed and that an applicant has access 
to effective legal remedies to challenge a 
decision of the Member State. The Council 
concluded that, where no systemic flaws 
have been identified, an assessment of a 
risk of indirect refoulement falls outside of 
the scope of a judicial review of a Dublin 
transfer. 

Norway, District Court [Noreg Domstolar], 
Applicant v Directorate of Immigration 
(Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ UDI), TOSL-
2024-41013, 5 July 2024.  

The Oslo District Court ruled that the 
Norwegian authorities had a duty to 
consider a Syrian national’s application in 
its merit, as there was clear evidence that 
the applicant would be returned to Syria 
and a real doubt that the applicant will be 
protected from being returned if 
transferred to Denmark under the Dublin III 
Regulation. 

In a case concerning a Dublin transfer of a 
Syrian applicant from Norway to Denmark, 
the Oslo District Court assessed whether 
the applicant would be protected against 
refoulement if transferred to Denmark. In 
view of the Danish policy to return Syrian 
nationals, except for a temporary 
suspension, and taking into account the 

deportation decision against the applicant 
by the Danish authorities, the Oslo District 
Court considered that Norway can give 
greater protection to the applicant and 
that, since a return to Syria would result in 
a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR and 
Article 4 of the EU Charter, a transfer to 
Denmark was prohibited.  

The court concluded that the Norwegian 
authorities have the duty to assess the 
application on merits because there was a 
real doubt that the applicant will be 
protected from indirect refoulement if 
transferred to Denmark under the Dublin III 
Regulation. 

Dublin transfers to Cyprus  

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicant v State 
Secretary for Justice and Security 
(Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid), NL24.14231, 4 July 2024.  

The Court of the Hague seated in Arnhem 
ruled that the principle of mutual trust can 
be relied upon in Dublin transfers to 
Cyprus.  

The Court of The Hague seated in Arnhem 
reviewed a Dublin transfer decision to 
Cyprus for a Syrian national. The court 
assessed whether the applicant would face 
inhuman or degrading treatment in Cyprus 
and whether the State Secretary correctly 
applied the principles outlined in the CJEU 
judgment in X v State Secretary for Justice 
and Security (Case C-392/22).  

The court upheld the State Secretary's 
decision, affirming that the principle of 
mutual trust between EU Member States 
applies unless compelling evidence shows 
systemic flaws in the receiving state's 
asylum procedures or reception 
conditions. The court noted that, according 

15 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

to the CJEU judgment, Member States had 
a duty to consider relevant information on 
potential risks, even when not raised by 
the asylum applicant. The court concluded 
that the State Secretary had adequately 
considered both the applicant's submitted 
documents and additional relevant 
information, including recent reports on 
Cyprus.  

While acknowledging deficiencies in the 
Cypriot reception system, the court found 
that they did not meet the threshold to 
rebut mutual trust. The court also 
dismissed allegations related to 
pushbacks, legal aid and violence against 
migrants, concluding that the applicant did 
not prove a real risk of harm or inadequate 
protection by the Cypriot authorities. 
Therefore, the court upheld the State 
Secretary's decision to transfer the 
applicant to Cyprus. 

Dublin transfers to Croatia 

Slovenia, Supreme Court [Vrhovno 
sodišče], Ministry of the Interior 
(Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve‚ 
Slovenia) v Applicant, VS00076907, 
28 June 2024.   

The Supreme Court referred a case back 
for re-examination holding that the court of 
first instance used too high criteria for 
assessing the conditions for the reception 
of asylum applicants in Croatia in view of 
the principle of mutual trust, and that the 
mere fact that one of the plaintiffs was a 
baby did not in itself mean that the 
transfer to the Republic of Croatia would 
be contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter, 
nor did it negate the principle of mutual 
trust.   

A family with a 6-month-old child contested 
a decision on a Dublin transfer to Croatia 
on grounds of inadequate reception 

16 

conditions and an alleged violation of the 
principle of best interests of the child. The 
Administrative Court allowed the appeal 
and stated that the Ministry of the Interior 
incorrectly assessed the best interests of 
the child and individual guarantees were 
needed. 

In an onward appeal submitted by the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Supreme Court 
annulled the lower court decision and 
reiterated the scope of the principle of 
mutual trust between Member States. It 
stated that a breach of the recast RCD is 
not sufficient to rebut such a presumption. 
On the best interests of the child, it found it 
to be unproven that the child faced any 
exceptional situation, preventing the 
transfer and stated that the mere fact that 
one applicant is a baby does not imply that 
the Dublin transfer would be contrary to 
Article 4 of the EU Charter or contrary to 
the principle of mutual trust. The court 
underlined that the lower court requested 
too high standards when conditioning the 
transfer to an equivalent accommodation 
in Slovenia. 

The Supreme Court referred the case back 
for a re-examination and reiterated the 
importance of taking into account all 
subjective and objective elements of each 
case. 

Slovenia, Supreme Court [Vrhovno 
sodišče], Applicant v Ministry of the 
Interior (Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve‚ 
Slovenia), VS00077669, 10 July 2024.   

The Supreme Court confirmed the 
Administrative Court's decision that there 
is a distinction between the police 
treatment of those who illegally cross the 
border and the treatment of those 
transferred to Croatia under the Dublin III 
Regulation, concluding that there were no 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

systemic deficiencies in Croatia preventing 
the Dublin transfer. 

Medical conditions 

In an onward appeal against a Dublin 
transfer decision to Croatia, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the lower court’s decision 
which validated the transfer. The court 
clarified that the alleged mistreatment by 
the police cannot be claimed as there is a 
difference between foreigners who illegally 
enter and may face mistreatment, and 
those who are transferred under the 
Dublin III Regulation and have the status of 
applicants for international protection. 

The court reiterated the findings in the 
cases of MSS v Belgium and Greece from 
the ECtHR and X v State Secretary for 
Justice and Security from the CJEU to 
state that Member States have a duty, on 
their own initiative, to consider any 
information on possible systemic 
deficiencies which they are aware of or 
should be that can lead to a treatment 
contrary to Article 4 of the EU Charter. 
However, the court ruled that this 
obligation is not ex officio and without any 
procedural obligation for the applicant to 
adduce evidence, based on publicly 
available information, to shift the burden of 
proof to the Ministry of the Interior.  

Slovenia, Supreme Court [Vrhovno 
sodišče], Applicant v Ministry of the 
Interior (Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve‚ 
Slovenia), VS00076903, 17 June 2024.  

The Supreme Court confirmed a Dublin 
transfer decision to Spain for a Russian as 
it found that her alleged medical condition 
did not prevent the transfer. 

A Russian applicant appealed against a 
decision on a Dublin transfer to Spain and 
invoked a medical condition in the appeal 
which allegedly would prevent the transfer. 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal as 
it found that the applicant did not prove 
her allegations.  

Her medical report was 6 years old. 
Although she argued that she was unable 
to be in hot climates, she had travelled to 
Spain where she stayed longer than 
2 months. Because of the absence of a 
current medical report and the fact that 
she was not under treatment or follow up 
by a cardiologist, the court considered the 
claims unfounded. 

17 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

First instance 
procedures 

Possibility to extend the length 
of the asylum procedure  

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], State Secretary for Justice and 
Security (Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid) v Applicant, 202400194/1/V1, 
10 July 2024.  

The Council of State submitted additional 
questions before the CJEU on the 
interpretation of the recast APD, 
Article 31(3), point b) of the third 
subparagraph on extending the length of 
the asylum procedure beyond 6 months. 

The Council of State submitted additional 
questions to the CJEU to the previously 
submitted question on 8 November 2023 
in case C-662/2023 to seek clarification on 
the recast APD, Article 31(3), point b) of the 
third subparagraph on extending the 
length of the asylum procedure beyond 
6 months. The State Secretary extended 
the processing time to 9 months by 
WBV 2022/22 and WBV 2023/3, justified 
by an increased number of asylum 
applications and backlogs in the 
processing. 

The following questions were sent for a 
preliminary ruling, registered under C-
489/24: 

1. May the determining authority apply 
point b) of the third subparagraph of 

Article 31(3) of the recast APD repeatedly 
and consecutively? 

2. If Question 1 is answered in the 
affirmative: 

a. Under what conditions may the 
determining authority apply point b) of the 
third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of the 
recast APD repeatedly and consecutively, 
and is the total duration of the period over 
which the determining authority may apply 
that provision repeatedly and 
consecutively subject to any restrictions? 

b. In answering the question whether the 
determining authority was permitted to 
extend the time limit for making its 
decision following, and consecutive to, a 
previous decree extending that time limit, 
to what extent can or must the court take 
account of the increase in the number of 
asylum applications, including relative to 
the period preceding the previous decree 
extending the time limit, and the 
determining authority’s efforts (if any) to 
improve the shortfall in its decision-making 
capacity in order to ensure – against the 
backdrop of Article 4(1) of the recast APD – 
an adequate and complete examination of 
asylum applications? 

Lack of investigation of special 
procedural guarantees 

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechbank Den Haag], Applicant v the 
Minister for Asylum and Migration (de 
Minister van Asiel en Migratie), 
NL24.22954, NL24.22955, 5 July 2024.   

The Court of the Hague ruled that the 
Minister of Asylum and Migration failed to 
assess the need for special procedural 
safeguards in a case concerning a female 
applicant from Togo who had 
psychological issues. 

18 

 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

A Togolese national applied for asylum, 
claiming a fear of persecution due to her 
lesbian orientation. She reported 
experiencing sexual abuse by her uncle, 
threats from her stepbrother and ostracism 
by her community. Her asylum application 
was rejected as manifestly unfounded and 
she was issued a return decision to Togo 
along with a 2-year entry ban.  

The court noted that the medical report 
issued for the applicant recommended that 
she should only be asked simple questions 
due to her limited training, fluctuating and 
shortened concentration, and delayed 
understanding, and the case officer 
insufficiently considered it.    

Furthermore, the court highlighted that the 
determining authority was obliged to 
investigate even in a border procedure 
whether special procedural guarantees 
were necessary, such as additional 
medical advice, or to apply the general 
asylum procedure and to allow the 
interview to take place over several days. 

The court concluded that the failure to 
implement these safeguards resulted in an 
unfair and inadequately reasoned decision, 
justifying its annulment. The court ordered 
the determining authority to re-examine 
the applicant's asylum application by 
taking full account of her psychological 
condition and the need for special 
procedural safeguards. 

Cyprus, International Protection 
Administrative Court [Διοικητικό 
Δικαστήριο Διεθνούς 
Προστασίας], Applicant v Republic of 
Cyprus through the Asylum Service 
(Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και/ή μέσω 
Υπηρεσίας Ασύλου), No 6696/2021, 
10 June 2024.  

The International Protection Administrative 
Court (IPAC) annulled the Asylum Service’s 

19 

decision to reject international protection 
to a Cameroonian woman as it found 
substantial procedural shortcomings with 
the investigation of the possibility that the 
applicant was a victim of human 
trafficking. 

Following rejection of her asylum 
application, a Cameroonian applicant 
applied complained that the negative 
decision was based on several procedural 
shortcomings and adopted in the absence 
of a vulnerability assessment and an 
investigation of allegations of being a 
victim of trafficking in human beings.  

IPAC underlined the obligation deriving 
from Article 24 of the recast APD and 
Article 10A of the Refugee Law to examine 
the need for procedural safeguards, and if 
the applicant is found in need, to provide 
adequate reception and procedural 
support as well as adequate monitoring of 
the person’s situation. In view of indicators 
resulting from the records of the interview, 
the court made a thorough analysis of 
each statement by the applicant against 
the key elements of trafficking pursuant to 
the special national law on prevention and 
combatting human trafficking.  

IPAC found that the applicant disclosed a 
situation of coercion, exploitation and 
physical abuse or attempted physical 
abuse by her trafficker, indicators which 
the Asylum Service had failed to examine 
and consequently it failed to take the 
appropriate measures to protect the 
applicant, including to refer the matter for 
further investigation by the competent 
authorities.  

IPAC annulled the contested decision and 
gave instructions on the action to be taken 
by the determining authority to remedy the 
shortcomings. 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Policy on failure to attend the 
personal interview  

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], Applicant v State Secretary for 
Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie en Veiligheid), 
202303430/1/V2, 26 June 2024. 

The Council of State declared unlawful a 
new working method by the State 
Secretary for Justice and Security to reject 
an asylum application as unfounded or 
manifestly unfounded when the applicant 
does not attend the personal interview 
without providing prior notice. 

The Dutch State Secretary for Justice and 
Security initiated a trial for a new working 
method in October 2022 at the Budel 
asylum-seekers’ centre, informing asylum 
seekers that failure to attend interviews 
without a valid reason would result in their 
application being rejected as unfounded or 
manifestly unfounded. According to the 
State Secretary, the invitation was 
translated into the languages most used in 
asylum procedures (English, French, 
Spanish, Turkish, Tigrinya, Farsi, Russian 
and Arabic). This method aimed to address 
the frequent non-appearance of asylum 
applicants, which caused delays and 
inefficiencies. Based on this new method, 
the State Secretary rejected the applicant’s 
asylum request as manifestly unfounded 
under Articles 31(1) and 30b(1) of the Aliens 
Act 2000.  

In the onward appeal, the Council of State 
ruled that there was no legal basis for this 
rejection and that the provisions of the 
Aliens Act were not adequate as they do 
not fully implement Article 28 of the recast 
APD. It held that Articles 14 (personal 
interview), 31 (examination procedure) and 
32 (unfounded applications) of the recast 

APD require a personal interview to deem 
an application unfounded and, according 
to Article 28(1), the failure to appear at a 
further interview may be regarded as an 
implicit withdrawal, allowing the 
termination of the examination of the 
application or a rejection as unfounded if 
there is a sufficient examination of the 
application under Article 4 of the recast 
QD.  

The Council concluded that legislative 
changes are needed to fully implement 
Article 28 of the recast APD and support 
the State Secretary’s new working method. 

Policy and burden of proof 
regarding Syrian applicants  

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], 14 August 2024.  

- 

- 

 Applicant v The Minister for 
Asylum and Migration (de Minister 
van Asiel en Migratie), 
202305713/1/V2. 
 The Minister for Asylum and 
Migration (de Minister van Asiel 
en 
Migratie) v Applicant, 202300173/
1/V2. 

The Council of State ruled that the Dutch 
policy towards Syrians who returned to the 
country is in line with the usual 
assessment and burden of proof, but the 
Minister must adequately motivate 
whether an applicant has a real risk of 
serious harm after a thorough 
investigation of all elements and the 
updated situation in Syria. 

The Council of State ruled in two cases 
concerning Syrian applicants who had 
returned to Syria after seeking asylum. 
First, the council clarified that the policy on 
Syrian nationals who have travelled to and 
from that country after an earlier departure 

20 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

is correct because it makes no distinction 
between this category and other Syrian 
applicants and because the burden of 
proof applied in the assessment is the 
same for other asylum applicants. Namely, 
the current policy on Syrians is that the 
Minister no longer assumes that returning 
to Syria leads to serious harm for Syrians 
and this leads to a shift in the burden of 
proof from the authority to the applicant. 

Second, the council highlighted that the 
Minister has the duty to then assess, based 
on the individual circumstances of the 
applicant, all facts and elements of the 
case against updated country of origin 
information on the general security 
situation in Syria and the attitude of the 
Syrian authorities to determine and reason 
whether that person runs a real risk of 
serious harm upon return. 

The first case concerned a woman who 
returned several times to Syria without 
facing any difficulties, and the Council of 
State confirmed the negative decision 
since the applicant did not adduce any 
evidence on a real risk of serious harm. 

The second case concerned a Syrian 
woman who returned for a longer period to 
Syria after having obtained a travel permit 
in the Netherlands. The council referred 
the case back for re-examination of all 
facts and elements, including the stay in 
Syria after previously having left the 
country, along with updated country of 
origin information to determine whether 
the applicant would face a real risk of 
serious harm upon return. 

Presumption of a safe country of 
origin 

Italy, Civil Court [Tribunali], Applicant v 
Ministry of the Interior (Territorial 
Commission of Caserta), R.G. 15869, 
19 July 2024. 

The Tribunal of Naples granted a 
suspensive effect on enforcing a negative 
decision for an Egyptian national and ruled 
that Egypt could not be deemed a safe 
country for the applicant due to lack of 
investigation into the risks associated with 
evading military conscription. 

An Egyptian national requested a 
suspensive effect on enforcing a negative 
decision on asylum because his country of 
origin was designated as a safe country. 
He argued that the Territorial Commission 
failed to consider a document proving a 
custodial sentence for evading military 
service, which challenged the presumption 
of safety in Egypt. 

The Tribunal of Naples found substantial 
and well-founded reasons to suspend the 
enforcement of the negative decision. It 
concluded that the applicant’s refusal to 
participate in military service and the fear 
of penalties upon a return were sufficient 
to challenge the presumption of safety in 
Egypt. The tribunal referenced the EASO 
COI Query: Information on Military Service 
in Egypt (22 June 2018), which indicates 
that conscientious objection and the 
punishment of deserters are significant 
issues warranting further investigation, 
including the evaluation of the document 
submitted by the applicant.  

21 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Reimbursement of procedural 
costs  

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], Central Agency for the Reception 
of Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan 
opvang asielzoekers‚ COA) v Applicant, 
202204022/1/V1, 12 June 2024.   

The Council of State ruled that the Central 
Agency for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers (COA) was correct in its rejection 
of an application for reimbursement of 
extraordinary expenses incurred by an 
applicant for the services of a lawyer from 
his home country in relation to the 
assessment of the authenticity of a voting 
card submitted as evidence in the asylum 
procedure, on the ground that the services 
offered could not be considered as 
counter-expertise. 

An applicant from Congo requested to be 
reimbursed for the costs of a lawyer to 
authenticate a document (voting card) 
which was provided during the asylum 
procedure. Upon appeal against the 
refusal, the Court of the Hague considered 
that COA did not analyse whether the 
investigation of the lawyer contributed to 
the processing of the asylum procedure.  

In the onward appeal submitted by COA, 
the Council of State agreed that, although 
the lawyer is an expert in legal matters, he 
is not an expert in assessing the 
authenticity of documents and stated that 
COA has discretion in assessing whether 
such expertise falls under the counter-
expertise provided by Article 17 of the 
Regulation on Provisions for Asylum 
Seekers and other Categories of Foreign 
Nationals 2005 (Rva 2005).  

22 

Subsequent applications 

Lithuania, Supreme Administrative Court 
of Lithuania [Lietuvos vyriausiasis 
administracinis teismas], Migration 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior 
of the Republic of Lithuania v A.J.S, eA-
1910-624/2024, 3 July 2024.  

The Supreme Administrative Court 
confirmed the lower court’s decision that 
the subsequent application must be 
reassessed in view of new elements, 
namely conversion to Christianity and 
baptism. 

The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court 
(VAAT) ordered the Migration Department 
to re-examine the applicant’s subsequent 
application for international protection, 
citing Article 40(1) of the recast APD, as the 
applicant indicated new essential 
circumstances that he was baptised since 
coming to Lithuania. 

The VAAT determined the Migration 
Department should have conducted a 
thorough investigation into the applicant's 
conversion, the seriousness of his faith, 
how he expressed his Christian faith in 
Lithuania and how he intended to practise 
it in his home country, and the potential 
reaction in his home country upon return. 

The Migration Department filed an appeal 
with the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Lithuania (LVAT), which rejected the 
appeal and ruled that the new 
circumstances were not properly examined 
and the Migration Department had an 
obligation to adopt a new administrative 
decision in the presence of new and 
potentially important circumstances. 

 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Length of the asylum procedure 

Germany, Regional Administrative Court 
[Verwaltungsgericht], Applicant v Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees 
(Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge‚ BAMF), A 7 K 2324/24, 
10 July 2024.  

The Administrative Court of Stuttgart ruled 
that the 21-month processing period 
constitutes an absolute procedural 
deadline for rendering decisions on 
asylum applications under the Asylum 
Procedure Act (AsylG).  

A stateless Palestinian from Gaza was 
granted international protection in Greece, 
then he entered Germany and requested 
protection again. BAMF decided not to 
issue an inadmissibility decision due to a 
potential violation of Article 3 of the ECHR 
if returned to Greece. The applicant 
subsequently challenged BAMF’s failure to 
decide on his application within the 21-
month deadline prescribed by 
Section 24(7) of AsylG.   

The Administrative Court of Stuttgart ruled 
that the 21-month period constitutes a strict 
procedural deadline for deciding on 
asylum applications, in line with the recast 
APD. The court found that BAMF had 
exceeded this period, since at the time of 
the judgment it had not yet issued a 
decision. Therefore, it ordered BAMF to 
decide on the asylum application within 
3 months. The court also clarified that it 
would not rule on the merits of the asylum 
claim, as its role was to ensure BAMF’s 
compliance with procedural deadlines.  

Assessment of 
applications 

Persecution based on religious 
beliefs: Chinese and Iraqi 
applicants 

Austria, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG], 
Applicant v Federal Office for 
Immigration and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA), W233 
2285422-1/7E, 4 June 2024.  

The Federal Administrative Court granted 
refugee status to a Chinese applicant, 
member of a Christian minority, due to a 
well-founded fear of persecution by state 
authorities on grounds of religious beliefs.  

The Federal Office for Immigration and 
Asylum rejected an asylum application 
from a Chinese national fearing 
persecution due to her membership in the 
Church of the Almighty God. On appeal, 
the Federal Administrative Court noted 
severe restrictions on religious freedoms in 
China and targeted persecution of 
unregistered religious groups, including 
the Church of the Almighty God, which is 
labelled an 'evil cult' by the government. 
The court noted that this group faces 
repression, persecution and torture, 
destruction of places of worship, and strict 
surveillance, as part of the government's 
broader campaign against unregistered 
and minority religious groups. 

The court confirmed the applicant’s 
credible membership in the church, 
supported by her detailed statements and 

23 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

external evidence. It found that, if returned 
to China, she would face serious 
persecution, including torture, by state 
institutions, and that no internal protection 
alternative was available. Citing the CJEU 
judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v 
Y and Z (C-71/11 and C-99/11, 5 September 
2012), the court determined that the 
applicant could not publicly practice her 
religion in China without a significant risk 
of persecution. It concluded that she 
qualified as a refugee due to her well-
founded fear of persecution and the lack of 
an internal flight alternative in China. 

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicant v State 
Secretary for Justice and Security 
(Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid), NL23.24787, 9 July 2024.  

The District Court of the Hague seated in 
Zwolle ruled that the State Secretary for 
Justice and Security based its decision on 
incorrect grounds when rejecting an 
asylum application of an Iraqi national who 
claimed to have converted from Islam to 
Christianity. 

The State Secretary for Justice and 
Security rejected an Iraqi national’s 
subsequent asylum application based on 
his conversion from Islam to Christianity. 
On appeal, the Court of The Hague found 
that the State Secretary wrongly 
concentrated on the sincerity of the 
applicant’s conversion, under Dutch Work 
Instruction 2022/3. Instead, the focus 
should have been whether the applicant 
faced a well-founded fear of persecution 
due to his perceived or actual religious 
beliefs in Iraq. The court found this 
approach breached Article 3:46 of the 
General Administrative Law Act, which 
mandates decisions to be based on sound 
reasoning. 

The court annulled the decision but did not 
find a well-founded fear of persecution or 
evidence that the applicant would be seen 
as an apostate or face torture upon a 
return. It noted that recognised religious 
groups, including Christians, are not widely 
persecuted in Iraq. Additionally, concerns 
about the applicant's Christian wife and 
child were also deemed insufficient, as 
mixed-faith marriages are permitted there. 

Persecution of Iranian applicants 
due to political activity 

Norway, District Court [Noreg Domstolar], 
Applicant v Directorate of Immigration 
(Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ UDI), TOSL-
2023-194404, 17 June 2024.  

The Oslo District Court determined that an 
Iranian woman did not face persecution 
upon returning to her country of origin as a 
result of her political activity in Norway 
against the Iranian regime and did not 
qualify for refugee status or protection 
against a return. 

An Iranian woman claimed she was at risk 
of persecution because of her political 
activism against the Iranian authorities in 
Norway, which had intensified following 
the death of Mahsa Amini in 
September 2022 and she was a visible 
leader of the demonstrations. The 
applicant stated that if returned to Iran, she 
would continue to engage in protests and 
refuse to wear the hijab. 

The Oslo District Court determined that the 
applicant did not demonstrate that the 
Iranian authorities had been monitoring her 
activities and there was no evidence to 
suggest that her conduct in Norway would 
result in persecution in Iran. The court 
further found that the applicant was 
unlikely to continue her political activity if 
she was returned to Iran and refused to 

24 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

wear the hijab, and therefore did not delve 
into further depth or analysis of the 
potential consequences. 

Norway, District Court [Noreg Domstolar], 
Applicant v Directorate of Immigration 
(Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ UDI), TOSL-
2024-34954, 12 July 2024.  

The Oslo District Court determined that, if 
returned to Iran, the applicant was at real 
risk of persecution in view of his political 
activities, his brother's asylum claim and 
an uncertain reaction from the authorities 
towards the applicant during the 
procedure for a laissez-passer. 

An Iranian national was refused 
international protection in Norway in 2010 
and his requests for re-examination were 
rejected in 2013 and 2022 as unfounded 
with regard to a risk of persecution based 
on his political activities as an active 
member of the Hekmatist Party since 
moving to Norway. In 2023, his lawyer 
presented a letter from UNHCR stating that 
his brother’s claim for asylum in Türkiye 
was found credible and was based on 
persecution suffered in Iran, including 
arrest, torture and accusations of 
espionage.  

In January 2024, the Immigration Appeals 
Board (UNE) reconfirmed its negative 
decision and the applicant appealed 
before the Oslo District Court. The court 
annulled the negative decision on grounds 
of the brother’s successful asylum claim 
and country-of-origin information, as there 
were uncertainties on the possible 
reactions and risks from the Iranian 
authorities should the applicant be 
returned. The political activities of the 
applicant, although deemed to be 
relatively minimal in recent year, were 
assessed as being digitally monitored 
overseas. As such, if the applicant was to 

25 

be returned, he would need to be issued a 
laissez-passer by the Iranian Embassy in 
Norway and the authorities would become 
aware of his political activities in the host 
country.  

By referring to the ECtHR case S.F. and 
others v Sweden (15 May 2012), the court 
assumed that returned Iranians are 
screened upon a return. The court ruled 
that the applicant was eligible for 
protection due to a real risk of persecution. 

Persecution based on political 
activities and military 
conscription: Russian applicants  

Latvia, District Administrative Court 
[Administratīvā rajona tiesa], A. v Office 
of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of 
the Republic of Latvia (Pilsonības un 
migrācijas lietu pārvalde), No A42-01432-
24, 22 July 2024.  

The District Administrative Court dismissed 
a Russian applicant’s request for 
international protection, concluding that 
his minimal political activity did not 
substantiate a well-founded fear of 
persecution. 

A Russian applicant appealed against the 
negative decision on his application for 
international protection and argued that he 
was at a risk of persecution because of his 
anti-government activities and at risk of 
mobilisation for military service. 

The District Administrative Court 
considered that the applicant had a low 
political profile because his activities were 
mainly social media posts while in Latvia 
and there was no evidence of being in the 
negative attention of the Russian 
authorities.  

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

On the risk of military conscription, the 
court found that the applicant’s soldier 
certificate had a mention of limited fitness 
and exemption from conscription, thus in 
the absence of other evidence, the risk 
was assessed as inexistent.  

Latvia, District Administrative Court 
[Administratīvā rajona tiesa], A. v Office 
of Citizenship and Migration Affairs of 
the Republic of Latvia (Pilsonības un 
migrācijas lietu pārvalde), No A42-01578-
24/18, 4 July 2024. 

The District Administrative Court upheld 
the negative decision on a Russian 
applicant's asylum application, finding 
insufficient evidence of alleged political 
persecution, military conscription fears and 
unjust criminal charges. 

A Russian applicant appealed a negative 
decision on his asylum application. The 
District Administrative Court found that the 
applicant had a criminal file in Russia for 
failing to pay wages when he was the 
director of a company and clarified that a 
criminal charge can constitute persecution 
if it involves disproportionate or 
discriminatory penalties. In the absence of 
such evidence, the applicant’s claim was 
rejected on this aspect.  

On political activities, the court referenced 
the EUAA Country of Origin Information 
Report: The Russian Federation – Political 
Opposition (December 2022) and 
assessed the facts as not substantiating 
any political activities, since the applicant 
was not following the news, was not 
making any public statements and did not 
use social media. 

Regarding a risk of military conscription in 
view of the war in Ukraine, the court 
acknowledged a potential risk but found 
that there was no evidence that Russian 
citizens in the military reserve had been 

26 

forcibly mobilised, and the applicant did 
not receive any summon in this regard. The 
court concluded that the fear of 
persecution due to opposition to the 
conflict was only hypothetical. 

Military conscription: Syria  

Germany, Higher Administrative Court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht/Verwaltungsger
ichtshöf), Federal Office for Immigration 
and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA) v 
Applicant, 2 LB 40/24, 3 June 2024. 

The Higher Administrative Court of Lower 
Saxony allowed the appeal submitted by 
the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees (BAMF) and found that the 
applicant was not eligible for refugee 
status on grounds of military conscription 
or religious affiliation. 

A Syrian national of Kurdish ethnicity and 
Yazidis religious affiliation, who had been 
granted subsidiary protection, appealed 
the decision to request refugee protection. 
The lower administrative court considered 
that, since the applicant is a reservist and 
subject to military service, his departure 
and stay abroad can be considered 
evasion from conscription in Syria. BAMF 
appealed this judgment. 

The Higher Administrative Court clarified 
that the assumption of an imminent threat 
of prosecution or punishment for refusing 
military service within the meaning of the 
AsylG, para 3a(2)(5) and Article 4(4) of the 
recast QD, upon departure can only be 
considered if, from the point of view of the 
Syrian state, a man of military-service age 
clearly withdrew from military service 
before the moment of his departure and he 
was, precisely for that reason, subject to 
the remarkably probable risk of suffering 
persecution measures. In the absence of 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

such conditions in the case of the 
applicant, he was not eligible for refugee 
protection. 

The Higher Administrative Court stated 
that case law from the majority of Higher 
Administrative Courts in Germany is that 
military service evaders in Syria are not 
threatened with political persecution. The 
court also stated that Yazidis in Syria are 
not regularly threatened with religious 
persecution by the Syrian authorities 

Membership of a particular 
social group: LGBTIQ applicants 
from Burkina Faso and in Togo 

The CNDA recognised the existence of a 
social group of homosexual persons in 
Burkina Faso and in Togo, entitling them 
to refugee status in accordance with the 
1951 Refugee Convention. 

France, CNDA, M.G. v French Office for 
the Protection of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons (Office Français de Protection 
des Réfugiés et Apatrides‚ OFPRA), 
No 24009761 C, 17 July 2024. 

The court highlighted the stigmatisation, 
discrimination, social violence, 
mistreatment and humiliation that 
LGBTIQ people suffer in Burkina Faso, 
from members of the security forces, 
police and society. It relied on public 
sources (a report by the US Department of 
State, a note by the Canadian Ministry of 
Immigration, an article by Prison Insider, a 
report by an American NGO FHI360, the 
database of ILGA and media sources) and 
also noted that, while homosexuality is not 
currently criminalised in Burkina Faso, a bill 
aimed to prohibit and criminalise it was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers on 
10 July 2024. 

Thus, the court ruled that homosexual 
people who are subjected to a climate of 
strong hostility towards them in Burkina 
Faso and without assistance from national 
authorities are at risk of persecution. 

France, CNDA, M.N. v French Office for 
the Protection of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons (Office Français de Protection 
des Réfugiés et Apatrides‚ OFPRA), 
No 24008057 C, 17 July 2024. 

The court highlighted criminal law which 
prohibits sexual relations between persons 
of the same sex that could be used against 
members of the LGBTIQ community in 
Togo and arbitrary arrests, violence and 
harassment that they are subjected to by 
the police and discrimination from the 
society. It relied on public sources (a 2023 
report by the US Department of State, a 
report by Freedom House entitled 
Freedom in the Word 2024, UN reports, 
and a 2023 report by the Belgian 
Commissioner General for Refugees and 
Stateless Persons). 

Thus, the court ruled that, in the absence 
of assistance from national authorities, 
homosexual people who are subjected to 
violence, discrimination and harassment 
and at risk of criminal prosecution in Togo 
are at risk of persecution. 

Membership of a particular 
social group: Westernised 
women and minors  

CJEU, K and L v State Secretary for 
Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie en Veiligheid), C-646/21, 
11 June 2024. 

The CJEU ruled on the assessment of the 
ground of persecution based on 
membership of a particular social group in 
a case concerning minor girls from Iraq 
who claimed to have been westernised 

27 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

considering their long residence in the 
Netherlands. 

Two Iraqi teenagers who have been 
residing in the Netherlands since 2015 
claimed that they have adopted western 
norms and would be unable to conform to 
the norms of society in Iraq, which does 
not afford equality between women and 
men. They claimed a risk of persecution 
based on the identity which they have 
formed in the Netherlands. 

The CJEU ruled that “women, including 
minors, who share as a common 
characteristic the fact that they genuinely 
come to identify with the fundamental 
value of equality between women and men 
during their stay in a Member State may, 
depending on the circumstances in the 
country of origin, be regarded as 
belonging to a 'particular social group', 
constituting a 'reason for persecution' 
capable of leading to the recognition of 
refugee status”. 

The court also determined that 
“Article 24(2) of the EU Charter must be 
interpreted as precluding the competent 
national authority from deciding upon an 
application for international protection 
submitted by a minor without having 
concretely determined the best interests of 
that minor in the context of an individual 
assessment”. 

Also, for the purpose of assessing an 
application for international protection, a 
long stay in a Member State, especially 
when it coincides with a period during 
which an applicant who is a minor has 
formed his/her identity, may be taken into 
account under Article 4(3) of the recast QD, 
read in light of Article 24(2) of the Charter. 

Membership of a particular 
social group: Afghan women 
and girls 

France, National Court of Asylum [Cour 
Nationale du Droit d'Asile (CNDA)], O., 
O. v French Office for the Protection of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office 
Français de Protection des Réfugiés et 
Apatrides‚ OFPRA), No 24014128 R, 
11 July 2024.  

The CNDA ruled in a Grand Chamber 
formation that all Afghan women who 
refuse to be subjected to the measures 
taken against them by the Taliban are 
likely to be recognised as refugees 
because of their membership in the social 
group of Afghan women and girls. 

OFPRA rejected an Afghan woman and her 
three children’s asylum application. On 
appeal, the CNDA found that, based on a 
set of decrees, declarations, instructions 
and social norms, Afghan women and girls 
are treated differently by Afghan society 
and must be recognised as members of a 
particular social group eligible for refugee 
protection. The CNDA determined that the 
Taliban's significant discriminatory tactics 
constitute acts of persecution under 
Article 1A of the Refugee Convention and 
Afghan women and girls who refuse to be 
subjected to discriminatory measures that 
violate their fundamental rights and 
freedoms simply because they are female 
are likely to be eligible for refugee status. 

In its decision, the CNDA cited the CJEU’s 
decision in WS v SAR, which stated that 
women as a whole may be regarded as 
belonging to a social group under the 
recast QD and may qualify for refugee 
status if they are exposed, because of their 
gender, to physical or mental violence, 
including sexual violence and domestic 
violence, in their country of origin. In 

28 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

addition, the CNDA used EUAA COI 
reports on Targeting Individuals
(August 2022), Afghanistan Country Focus 
(December 2023) and Country Guidance 
Afghanistan (May 2024) to conclude that, 
since the Taliban took power, they have 
undermined the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of Afghan woman and girls. 

Membership of a particular social group: 
HIV-positive individuals in Nigeria  

The tribunal deemed that persecution was 
perpetrated by non-state actors, such as 
the applicant’s family or community, and 
that state protection was ineffective. Given 
the applicant’s vulnerability and medical 
condition, it determined that there was a 
reasonable likelihood she would face 
discrimination and marginalisation upon a 
return due to her membership of a 
particular social group. Consequently, the 
tribunal recognised her as a refugee.  

Italy, Civil Court [Tribunali], Applicant v 
Ministry of the Interior (Territorial 
Commission of Monza), R.G.29929/2023, 
3 July 2024.  

Gender-based persecution: 
Protection in the country of 
origin  

The Tribunal of Milan granted refugee 
status to a Nigerian woman based on her 
well-founded fear of persecution by non-
state actors due to her membership in the 
particular social group of HIV-positive 
individuals in Nigeria.  

An HIV-positive Nigerian woman whose 
application for international protection was 
initially rejected appealed upward to the 
Court of Cassation which remanded the 
case to the Tribunal of Milan for a re-
examination.  

The tribunal, based on relevant country of 
origin information, observed that in Nigeria, 
HIV is often viewed as a consequence of 
immoral behaviour, particularly linked to 
homosexuality. It also found that in Nigeria 
HIV is heavily stigmatised, leading to 
widespread discrimination, including 
workplace bias, job loss and a denial of 
medical treatment. Since there is no 
explicit legal prohibition against such 
discrimination and existing sanctions are 
ineffective, the tribunal held that this 
systemic mistreatment constitutes severe 
persecution, establishing a well-founded 
fear of harm for HIV-positive individuals if 
returned to Nigeria.   

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicants v 
State Secretary for Justice and Security 
(Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid), NL23.35597 and 23.35599, 
11 June 2024. 

The District Court of the Hague seated in 
Zwolle granted international protection to 
two Turkish nationals, holding that 
temporary protection measures provided 
by the country of origin were not effective 
against persecution based on gender 
identity and sexual orientation. 

Two Turkish applicants contested the 
rejection of their asylum applications 
submitted on grounds of gender-based 
violence by their family due to sexual 
orientation and gender identity. After 
facing multiple episodes of violence, abuse 
and threats, they left Istanbul. The State 
Secretary rejected the application on 
accounts of temporary protection 
measures which were provided by the 
Turkish authorities in 2020 and some 
support from several organisations.  

The Court of the Hague seated in Zwolle 
upheld the appeal and considered that the 
State Secretary wrongly relied on previous 

29 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

temporary and limited protective measures 
as it underlined that there should be strong 
reasons to demonstrate that acts of 
persecution or serious harm will not 
happen again or at all. On the contrary, the 
court considered that since the statements 
were found credible, the risk of 
persecution from non-state actors, 
especially in view of credible previous acts 
of persecution, should be presumed to 
persist upon a return unless proven 
otherwise. The court ruled that the two 
applicants would run a real risk of serious 
harm if returned to Türkiye and ordered 
the State Secretary to grant temporary 
asylum residence. 

Italy, Civil Court 
[Tribunali], Applicant v Ministry of the 
Interior (Territorial Commission of Rome), 
R.G. No 54397/2023, 9 July 2024.  

The Tribunal of Rome granted refugee 
status to a woman from Tunisia who was 
subjected to domestic violence, citing the 
ineffective implementation of protective 
laws on gender-based violence and 
inadequate state protection.  

The Territorial Commission of Rome 
rejected a Tunisian woman’s application 
for international protection as manifestly 
unfounded. In appeal, she argued that 
Tunisia was unsafe for her due to her 
experiences of domestic violence by her 
stepfather and inadequate protection 
despite her attempts to seek help from the 
authorities.  

The court reviewed relevant COI, which 
highlighted systemic issues in Tunisia for 
women's protection. Despite existing legal 
provisions, the court observed significant 
gaps in implementation, including 
inadequate police response, lack of trained 
personnel, insufficient funding and societal 
stigma. Thus, the court considered that this 

indicated that Tunisia's protective laws 
were undermined by systemic failures.  

While considering the applicant’s claims 
and the broader context in Tunisia, the 
court found that her experiences of severe 
abuse were credible and reflected 
systemic failures in protective mechanisms. 
Ultimately, the court found the applicant’s 
fear of returning to Tunisia to be well-
founded, meeting the criteria for 
membership in a particular social group 
and granted her refugee status.  

Gender-based persecution: 
Trans women in Colombia 

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], Applicant v State Secretary for 
Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie en Veiligheid), 
202106747/1/V2, 5 June 2024. 

The Council of State ruled that, although 
they face difficulties, trans women in 
Colombia are not systematically 
persecuted and an individual assessment 
of each case is necessary in conjunction 
with an examination of country 
information. 

The Council of State reviewed the situation 
of trans people in Colombia, 
acknowledging both progressive legal 
protection and significant violence against 
the LGBTIQ community, particularly by the 
police. However, the council found that the 
number of violent incidents relative to the 
size of the trans community does not 
indicate systematic persecution.  

The Council argued that the incidents, 
while serious, vary in severity and do not 
always meet the threshold for persecution 
or serious harm. The judgment also 
addressed discrimination faced by trans 
women in Colombia, who, according to 

30 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

international protection in Bulgaria. After 
their first application was rejected, they 
lodged a subsequent application asserting 
their registration with UNRWA and the 
de facto cessation of their protection by 
UNRWA. 

The CJEU held that UNRWA’s protection or 
assistance must be considered to have 
ceased when the organisation isunable, for 
whatever reason, to ensure dignified living 
conditions or minimum-security conditions 
to stateless persons of Palestinian origin 
who are registered with UNRWA and have 
a habitual residence in its area of 
operations. The court noted that both the 
living conditions in the Gaza Strip and 
UNRWA’s capacity to fulfil its mission have 
experienced an unprecedented 
deterioration due to the consequences of 
the events of 7 October 2023. The court 
further elaborated that the condition 
relating to the personal state of serious 
insecurity implies that that applicant must 
be personally confronted with serious 
insecurity in UNRWA’s area of operations. 
However, it is not required that that state 
of serious personal insecurity presents 
particular characteristics specific to that 
applicant or is caused due to the particular 
situation of the latter. The reasoning was in 
line with its previous case law in 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v XT (C-
507/19, 13 January 2021). The court also 
highlighted that the assessment of these 
conditions must take into account the 
applicant’s specific situation and degree of 
vulnerability. 

country of origin information, struggle to 
access public services, formal 
employment, healthcare and education. 
Despite these challenges, the council 
argued that the discrimination does not 
alone qualify trans women for international 
protection. 

Although it acknowledged that access to 
justice and protection is not consistent and 
high levels of impunity persist, the council 
noted that trans individuals can access 
national protection mechanisms which are 
available to all Colombians and report 
crimes, and that prosecutions and 
convictions do occur. 

The council concluded that the general 
security situation for trans woman in 
Colombia was not such that being an 
openly trans woman automatically leads to 
persecution or serious harm, and 
therefore, a thorough individual 
assessment is necessary in combination 
with the country of origin information. 

Threshold to assess cessation of 
UNRWA assistance or protection 

CJEU, LN, SN v Zamestnik-predsedatel 
na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite, 
C-563/22, 13 June 2024. 

The CJEU clarified that stateless persons 
of Palestinian origin who are registered 
with UNRWA should be granted refugee 
status if UNRWA’s protection or assistance 
has ceased, meaning when UNRWA is 
unable, for whatever reason, to ensure 
dignified living conditions or minimum-
security conditions. 

The CJEU was requested by the 
Administrative Court of Sofia City to 
interpret the recast QD in the case of a 
mother and her minor daughter, both 
stateless persons of Palestinian origin, who 
left the city of Gaza and requested 

31 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Cessation of UNRWA assistance  

France, Council of State [Conseil d'État], 
French Office for the Protection of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons (Office 
Français de Protection des Réfugiés et 
Apatrides‚ OFPRA) v Applicant, 449551, 
11 July 2024. 

The Council of State confirmed the CNDA 
assessment that UNRWA assistance or 
protection has ceased, in a judgment 
following up on the CJEU ruling of 
5 October 2023. 

The case concerned the reopening at the 
national level of the case which triggered 
the submission of questions before the 
CJEU by the Council of State in a judgment 
of 22 March 2022, Office for the Protection 
of Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(OFPRA) v AB. The CJEU answered the 
question in the ruling of 5 October 2023, 
French Office for the Protection of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons v SW, and 
the Council of State reiterated the findings. 

The Council of State concluded that 
UNRWA could not provide sufficient 
access to medical treatment for the 
applicant and the medicine on which her 
life was dependent on and UNRWA could 
not ensure living conditions in line with its 
mandate of assistance, placing the 
applicant in a personal state of serious 
insecurity which could force her to leave 
Lebanon.  

The CNDA had thus correctly assessed 
that UNRWA’s protection or assistance in 
the sense of the recast QD, Article 12(1a), 
second sentence must be regarded as 
having ceased. The circumstance that the 
departure of the applicant from the 
UNRWA area of operation was not 
motivated by threats on her security and 
the required medical treatment which 

32 

exceeds the general medical treatment 
provided have no impact in the overall 
assessment of the case. 

Austria, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG], BF v 
Federal Office for Immigration and 
Asylum (Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen 
und Asyl‚ BFA), L512 2276189-1, 2 August 
2024.  

The Federal Administrative Court granted 
refugee protection to a Palestinian 
stateless person from Syria on the basis of 
the Refugee Convention, Article 1D, 
second sentence after finding that UNRWA 
cannot provide assistance or protection in 
areas of operations in Syria. 

A stateless Palestinian from Syria was 
rejected asylum but granted subsidiary 
protection by the BFA. In appeal, the court 
found that the applicant failed to 
substantiate his claim of individual fear of 
persecution since he provided 
contradictory statements. However, the 
court noted that the applicant was 
registered as a refugee with UNRWA in 
Syria, thus he falls under Article 1D of the 
Refugee Convention which provides for 
exclusion from asylum unless UNRWA is 
unable to provide assistance or protection 
according to its mandate, resulting into 
ipso facto refugee status. 

The court stated that, although the 
applicant has received UNRWA assistance 
in the past, currently UNRWA protection 
was unavailable for "reasons beyond his 
control and independent of his will" and 
ruled that since he cannot receive 
assistance in other areas of operation, he 
is entitled to refugee protection ispo facto. 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Individual threat to life or 
physical integrity in Afghanistan 

Austria, Constitutional Court 
[Verfassungsgerichtshof 
Österreich], Applicant v Federal Office for 
Immigration and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA), E 
746/2024-16, 13 June 2024.  

The Constitutional Court confirmed based 
on an individual assessment and COI that 
there was no risk of individual threat for a 
rejected asylum applicant to return to 
Afghanistan. It assessed that the applicant 
would be able to rely on a wide family 
network in Afghanistan and on the good 
economic situation of his family. 

The applicant challenged the refusal of his 
request for asylum and complained before 
the Constitutional Court that, contrary to 
the findings of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, Afghanistan's security and supply 
situation remained poor and had only 
slightly improved since the Taliban took 
power. The Constitutional Court dismissed 
the complaint, noting that the Federal 
Administrative Court made no errors in its 
proceedings and performed a reasonable 
case-by-case examination.  

Based on COI, the court determined that 
there was no substantial individual threat 
to the applicant's life or physical integrity, 
under the ECHR, Article 2. Moreover, 
according to the EUAA COI Report 
Afghanistan-Country Focus 
(December 2023) and Country Guidance: 
Afghanistan (January 2023), the applicant 
would be in a good economic situation, as 
he was of working age, had spent most of 
his life in Afghanistan, had attended school 
for 12 years, had professional experience 
in building materials and typing, and his 
family owned a house, a farm and several 
cultivated properties. 

However, the court also ruled that, upon 
implementation of the return measure, 
competent authorities
assess the risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment under Article 3 of the ECHR, 
particularly regarding the current security 
and supply situation. 

are obliged to 

Subsidiary protection: 
Assessment of individual 
circumstances in the context of 
indiscriminate violence  

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], Applicants v The Minister for 
Asylum and Migration (de Minister van 
Asiel en Migratie), 202400387/1/V2, 
17 July 2024.  

The Council of State ruled that the Minister 
for Asylum and Migration must always 
take into consideration the individual 
circumstances of an applicant when 
assessing the risk of indiscriminate 
violence.  

The Minister for Asylum and Migration 
rejected the asylum applications of a 
Libyan family, deeming their claims of 
threats and injury to be implausible. The 
case was referred to the CJEU which 
delivered a preliminary ruling on 
9 November 2023 in X, Y and their six 
children v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid (Case C- 125/22) and clarified 
that both general and individual 
circumstances must be considered when 
assessing claims under Article 15(c) of the 
recast QD.   

Following the CJEU's ruling, the Court of 
the Hague ordered the Minister to 
reassess the case, but the Minister 
appealed, arguing that the level of 
indiscriminate violence in Tripoli was not 

33 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

severe enough to justify consideration of 
the family’s personal circumstances.  

The Council of State upheld the Minister's 
decision, concluding that the family had 
not demonstrated a real risk of serious 
harm in Libya. However, referring directly 
to the CJEU’s ruling, the court concluded 
that, even if the degree of indiscriminate 
violence in Tripoli was not extreme, the 
specific individual circumstances of the 
family must still be considered under 
Article 15(c). The court highlighted that the 
CJEU’s ruling in case C-542/22 clarified 
that when there is some level of 
indiscriminate violence in an armed 
conflict, the risks faced by individuals, due 
to their unique personal circumstances, 
must be assessed.  

Subsidiary protection: South 
Sudan 

France, National Court of Asylum [Cour 
Nationale du Droit d’Asile], M.J. v French 
Office for the Protection of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons (Office Français de 
Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides‚ 
OFPRA), 24009379 C+, 17 July 2024.  

The National Court of Asylum (CNDA) 
ruled that South Kordofan in Sudan is 
experiencing a situation of indiscriminate 
violence of exceptional intensity. 

A national of Sudan of Nuba ethnicity from 
Abu Kershola in South Kordofan, whose 
request for asylum was rejected by 
OFPRA, appealed against the negative 
decision. 

The CNDA concluded that while the 
applicant did not meet the conditions for 
refugee status, he should be granted 
subsidiary protection. It noted that if the 
applicant was to return to South Kordofan, 
Sudan, he would run a real risk of suffering 

a serious threat to his life or person, simply 
by mere presence there as a civilian, 
without being able to obtain effective 
protection from the authorities of his 
country. The court noted that this threat 
was the consequence of a situation of 
violence of exceptional intensity, resulting 
from an internal armed conflict, which 
could extend indiscriminately to civilians. 
The court relied on a vast range of publicly 
available sources, in particular the EUAA 
Country of Origin Information Report 
Sudan - Country Focus: Security situation 
in selected areas and selected profiles 
affected by the conflict. 

Subsidiary protection: Syria 

Germany, Higher Administrative Court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht/Verwaltungsger
ichtshöf), Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge‚ BAMF) v Applicant, 
14 A 2847/19.A, 16 July 2024.  

The Higher Administrative Court of North 
Rhine-Westphalia ruled that there is no 
serious general danger to life and limb of 
the civilian population in Syria due to the 
civil war. The judgment may be appealed 
with the Federal Administrative Court. 

A Syrian national’s request for refugee or 
subsidiary protection was rejected as 
manifestly unfounded by BAMF and the 
Higher Administrative Court of North 
Rhine-Westphalia. The court ruled that the 
applicant did not meet the requirements 
for being granted refugee status, as he 
was not threatened with political 
persecution in Syria, and he was excluded 
from protection due to the criminal 
offences he committed before entering 
Germany. 

With regard to subsidiary protection, the 
court departed from the EUAA’s Country of 

34 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

A Syrian national challenged the rejection 
of his asylum application first before the 
Federal Administrative Court and then the 
Supreme Administrative Court.  

The Supreme Administrative Court cited 
the CJEU judgment in PG v Bevándorlási 
és Menekültügyi Hivatal (C-406/18, 
19 March 2020), emphasising the 
importance of conducting an individual 
assessment, including considering relevant 
sources such as the EUAA Country 
Guidance and UNHCR guidelines. The 
court determined that the lower court 
failed to address personal security 
concerns when assessing the applicant’s 
eligibility for subsidiary protection. It 
emphasised the widespread human rights 
violations in Syria and the lack of reliable 
protection for returnees, particularly in 
regime-controlled areas like Damascus. It 
also noted that most EU Member States 
and UNHCR consider Syria unsafe for a 
return.  

The court found that the lower court did 
not adequately incorporate the EUAA 
Country Guidance - Syria (April 2024) but 
merely quoted some excerpts of the EUAA 
Country of Origin Information – Country 
Focus Syria (October 2023). Additionally, it 
noted that the lower court judgment 
overlooked individual risk factors, such as 
the applicant’s participation in 
demonstrations and having relatives who 
were granted asylum in Austria. 
Consequently, the decision to deny 
subsidiary protection was annulled for 
procedural errors. 

Origin Information Report Syria-Security 
situation (October 2023) and Country 
Guidance: Syria (April 2024). The court 
held that the requirements to grant 
subsidiary protection, namely the serious, 
individual threat to the life or physical 
integrity of civilians because of arbitrary 
violence in the context of an internal 
conflict, in the province of Hasaka and in 
Syria, were no longer met. It noted that in 
the province of Hasaka there were still 
armed conflicts between Türkiye and allied 
militias against the Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG). It added that the 
Islamic State also occasionally carries out 
attacks on Kurdish self-government 
facilities there.  

However, the court concluded that the 
armed conflicts and attacks no longer 
reach such a level that there would be a 
serious general danger to life and limb of 
civilians, so they would not be generally at 
risk of being killed or injured in these 
conflicts and attacks in Syria. The court 
further added that the applicant was also 
excluded from subsidiary protection due to 
the crimes he committed before entering 
Germany. 

The judgment is not final, as an appeal can 
be lodged with the Federal Administrative 
Court.  

Austria, Supreme Administrative Court 
[Verwaltungsgerichtshof - VwGH], 
Applicant v Federal Office for 
Immigration and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA), Ra 
2024/18/0151-13, 25 June 2024.  

The Supreme Administrative Court 
annulled the refusal to grant subsidiary 
protection to a Syrian applicant due to 
deficiencies in the lower court's reasoning, 
including failure to consider relevant EUAA 
Country Guidance. 

35 

 
Subsidiary protection: Ukraine 

Cyprus, International Protection 
Administrative Court [Διοκητικο 
Δικαστηριο Διεθνους Προστασιας], D.K. v 
Republic of Cyprus through the Asylum 
Service (Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και/ή 
μέσω Υπηρεσίας Ασύλου), 6697/2021, 
7 June 2024. 

The International Protection Administrative 
Court (IPAC) granted subsidiary protection 
to a Ukrainian citizen who was habitually 
residing in Mariupol, Donetsk. 

IPAC concluded that the situation in the 
entire territory of Ukraine, and especially in 
the region where the applicant came from, 
is a situation of generalised violence, 
characterised by continuous, generally and 
prolonged levels of indiscriminate violence 
due to armed conflict of such a high 
degree that it would constitute a threat to 
the life of a citizen by mere presence in the 
respective area, within the meaning of the 
recast QD, Article 15(c). To motivate the 
decision and to elaborate on the concepts 
of armed conflict and indiscriminate 
violence, IPAC referred to extensive 
national jurisprudence from the Supreme 
Court of Cyprus, the CJEU, and the EASO 
Judicial Analysis on Article 15(c) of the 
Qualification Directive 2011/95/EU. 

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Austria, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - BVwG], 
Applicant v Federal Office for 
Immigration and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA), 
I411 2283115-1, 10 June 2024. 

The Federal Administrative Court found 
that a Syrian applicant from the Al Hasaka 
region controlled by Kurdish forces was 
not likely to be subjected to persecution 
based on alleged military desertion but 
ruled that subsidiary protection must be 
granted. 

The court found that the applicant, a 
Kurdish Muslim from the Al Hasaka 
Governorate (controlled by Kurdish forces), 
would not likely face persecution from the 
Syrian regime in his home region for 
deserting the military, as the regime has 
limited access to areas controlled by 
Kurdish forces. It also determined that, 
even if he had deserted the Syrian military, 
this alone does not qualify for refugee 
status unless connected to a convention 
ground. The court noted that he could 
safely return to his region through routes 
not controlled by the Syrian government 
and found no evidence of potential 
persecution by Kurdish forces. 

However, the court stated that the 
information on the security situation in the 
applicant’s home province showed that the 
level of indiscriminate violence in the 
Al Hasaka Governorate was so high that 
there are serious reasons to believe that a 
civilian returning there would face a real 
risk of being subjected to a serious threat 
merely by his/her presence. The court 
therefore granted subsidiary protection to 
the applicant. 

36 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Exclusion from international 
protection  

Belgium, Council of State [Raad van 
State - Conseil d'État], Applicant v 
Commissioner General for Refugees and 
Stateless Persons (le Commissaire 
Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides; 
de Commissaris-generaal voor de 
vluchtelingen en de staatlozen; CGRS; 
CGRA; CGVS), No 260.165, 18 June 
2024.  

The Council of State upheld the CALL 
decision to exclude an applicant by ruling 
that the key question was the legal 
qualification of the crimes under the Rome 
Statute and that ruling on exclusion does 
not affect the presumption of innocence of 
the applicant. 

An applicant from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo appealed against his 
exclusion from international protection and 
argued that CALL wrongly confirmed the 
CGRS decision, in violation of the EU 
Charter, the ECHR, the recast APD and the 
Refugee Convention because: i) the acts 
committed took place more than 20 years 
ago and the procedure leading to 
exclusion lasted 16 years; and ii) the 
principle of presumption of innocence was 
not respected. 

The Council of State stated that the legal 
qualification of the acts under the Rome 
Statue had key importance in assessing 
exclusion and that it was demonstrated 
that the constitutive elements of the 
crimes, namely war crimes and armed 
conflict, were present, irrespective of 
whether the applicant was aware then or 
now of the legal qualification of the acts 
committed.  

The Council of State clarified that exclusion 
from international protection does not 

affect the principle of presumption of 
innocence because the procedure is 
different from a criminal case and CALL 
only decided on whether there were 
serious reasons to believe that the 
applicant was guilty of war crimes, but it 
did not rule on criminal liability or charge. 

Belgium, Council of State [Raad van 
State - Conseil d'État], Belgian State 
represented by the State Secretary for 
Asylum and Migration (de Belgische 
staat‚ vertegenwoordigd door de 
Staatssecretaris voor Asiel en Migratie) v 
Lawyer of the applicant, No 260.059, 7 
July 2024.  

The Council of State annulled a CALL 
decision on exclusion and clarified the 
national provision on exclusion criteria 
from subsidiary protection. 

The Council of State clarified the criteria to 
exclude an asylum applicant from 
subsidiary protection as being differently 
provided under national law. By 
interpreting Article 9ter or Article 55/4 of 
the Aliens Act, the council stated that the 
requirement for exclusion is the existence 
of serious reasons to consider that a 
person committed the acts, and 
Article 55/4 concerns only the acts that 
could lead to exclusion without any of the 
provisions adding a condition on an actual 
danger to the host country when assessing 
exclusion from subsidiary protection. 

Norway, Court of Appeal 
[Lagmannsrettane], Directorate of 
Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ 
UDI) v Applicant, LB-2024-5105, 6 June 
2024. 

The Borgarting Court of Appeal ruled that 
a Syrian applicant's participation in an 
armed rebel force against the Assad 
regime did not amount to serious non-
political crimes and that the requirements 

37 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

for exclusion from refugee status had not 
been met. 

The UDI and UNE determined that a Syrian 
applicant, who was a member of a rebel 
group in Syria and had engaged in fighting 
and fired weapons, had committed a 
serious non-political crime and was 
therefore not eligible for international 
protection. 

The applicant filed an appeal before the 
Court of Appeal, and the majority of the 
panel concluded that the applicant’s 
participation in armed rebel forces with the 
aim of overthrowing the Assad regime in 
Syria did not amount to a serious non-
political crime, even if it was assumed that 
attempted murder and complicity to 
murder had occurred during the fighting.  

The court ruled by a majority opinion that it 
would not be against the principles guiding 
the rules on exclusion from asylum to grant 
asylum to combatants from non-
international armed conflicts who are at the 
time of decision reasonably afraid of facing 
serious persecution in their home country. 
The majority opinion extensively relied on 
the reasoning in UNHCR's Background 
Note on the Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees.  

They also pointed out that the application 
of humanitarian law is a critical factor in 
determining proportionality, and the 
asylum seeker should be granted 
international amnesty for the offences he 
committed. The court concluded, in the 
majority opinion, that there were no 
reasons to consider that the applicant 
committed serious non-political crimes. 

Norway, District Court [Noreg 
Domstolar], Applicant v Directorate of 
Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ 
UDI), TOSL-2023-189595, 12 June 2024. 

The Oslo District Court determined that the 
decision to exclude the applicant from 
being granted refugee status was lawful 
since he committed serious non-political 
crimes in his home country. 

An ethnic Kurd from Türkiye joined the PKK 
youth organisation in 2014 and took part in 
18-19 acts for them. Based on the use of 
false identity documents, he was granted 
international protection in Norway in 
June 2015. The authorities revoked the 
residence permit after a police inquiry 
revealed his true identity. The decision 
noted that, although he qualified for 
refugee protection, he was excluded due 
to having committed serious non-political 
crimes in his home country. 

The Oslo District Court rejected his appeal 
and noted, based on his statements, that 
he had explained that he hated the Turkish 
authorities and wanted to avenge 
discrimination and violence in the military. 
However, the court considered that several 
acts against civilians were qualified as 
serious non-political crimes, for example 
the episode where a teacher was shot in 
the foot. Also, the court found that the 
applicant’s attack on drug dealers and the 
acts against the police were deemed non-
political crimes. 

The applicant’s exclusion was not 
considered disproportionate because he 
was protected from a return under 
Section 74 of the Immigration Act, and he 
was granted a limited residence permit. 
The court further confirmed the UNE's 
decision not to grant a residence permit on 
humanitarian grounds. 

38 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Sweden, Migration Court of Appeal 
[Migrationsöverdomstolen], Applicant v 
Swedish Migration Agency 
(Migrationsverket‚ SMA), UM 10975-23, 
14 June 2024. 

The Migration Court of Appeal held that an 
Eritrean applicant must be excluded from 
international protection due to his 
involvement in acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the UN, as he 
illegally contributed to the collection of a 
diaspora tax while he worked at an 
Eritrean embassy abroad, as confirmed by 
a UN Security Council Resolution in force 
from 5 December 2011 to 14 November 
2018. 

An Eritrean national who had worked for 
an Eritrean embassy abroad and who was 
involved in the application of a diaspora 
tax by the state, was denied asylum in 
Sweden in June 2023, as it was 
considered that these acts were contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN.  

On appeal, the court held that by reserving 
the right to consular services with the 
payment of a diaspora tax and the 
submission of a letter of repentance, the 
applicant had actively contributed to 
collecting the tax from Eritreans living 
abroad on behalf of the Eritrean state. It 
also added that his activities were related 
to international cooperation, so they had 
an international dimension as requested in 
order to apply this exclusion ground. The 
court also considered that the eventual 
annulment of the UN resolution did not 
lead to a different assessment, especially 
considering that the resolution was not 
cancelled because the information on 
unlawful recovery was incorrect or 
because the violations at Eritrean missions 
ceased. 

The court further added that there was no 
evidence that Mr A tried to limit the 

damage or ensure that illegal methods 
were not used in the collection of the 
diaspora tax, or that he tried to change his 
duties or leave his post, but it was only 
when he was called home to Eritrea that he 
chose to leave his employment. 

On the applicant’s argument that he risked 
the death penalty if he refused orders or 
had not carried out his duties, the court 
held that there was no evidence that there 
would have been an imminent threat to his 
life or danger of serious bodily harm for 
this reason. 

Applications by beneficiaries of 
international protection in 
another Member State 

CJEU, QY v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 
C-753/22, 18 June 2024. 

The CJEU ruled that Member States are 
not required to automatically recognise 
refugee status granted in another Member 
State. 

A Syrian national who was a beneficiary of 
refugee status in Greece requested asylum 
in Germany. It was determined that she 
could not be returned to Greece due to the 
poor living condition of refugees there and 
was granted subsidiary protection by the 
Germany determining authorities. The 
applicant appealed this decision, and the 
German Federal Administrative Court 
requested a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU.  

The CJEU ruled that Member States are 
not required to recognise automatically 
decisions granting refugee status adopted 
by another Member State, however it is at 
their discretion to do so. The court noted 
that when the competent authority cannot 
reject as inadmissible the asylum request 
of an applicant to whom another Member 
State granted protection, it must carry out 

39 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

a new individual, full and up-to-date 
examination of the case, taking into 
account the elements of the previous 
decision and participating in an exchange 
of information with the other Member 
State. 

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], State Secretary 
for Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie en Veiligheid) v Applicant, 
NL23.5666, 3 June 2024.  

The District Court of the Hague seated in 
Arnhem ruled that the State Secretary was 
incorrect to consider Denmark a third 
country when declaring inadmissible an 
application of a Syrian applicant who is a 
beneficiary of international protection in 
Denmark and ruled that the principle of 
mutual trust can be relied upon. 

A Syrian national applied for asylum in the 
Netherlands, and her application was 
deemed inadmissible as she was a 
beneficiary of international protection in 
Denmark.  

In the appeal, the court cited the CJEU 
judgment in SI, TL, ND, VH, YT, HN v 
Bundesrepublik Deutchland (C-497/21) and 
found that Denmark should be considered 
the responsible Member State to assess 
the application’s admissibility, even though 
it is not bound by the recast APD. 
Moreover, the court noted that the concept 
of international protection under the Aliens 
Act 2000, Article 30a(1a) includes any 
protection status granted by a Member 
State, not just those assessed under the 
recast APD or recast QD. It found that the 
applicant’s status in Denmark qualified as 
international protection under 
Article 30a(1a). The court concluded that 
the State Secretary should have based the 
grounds of inadmissibility on Article 30a(1a) 
rather than Article 30a(1b) of the Aliens Act 
2000.  

Regarding mutual trust and indirect 
refoulement, the court referred to the 
CJEU judgment in Ministero dell'Interno 
and Others (Cases C‑228/21, C‑254/21, 
C‑297/21, C‑315/21, and C‑328/21). It ruled 
that it was unnecessary to assess these 
risks further and that the principle of 
mutual trust applied, as the applicant did 
not provide concrete evidence against 
Denmark’s protection standards. 

The court concluded that, while the State 
Secretary correctly declared the 
application inadmissible, it was based on 
incorrect grounds. Hence it upheld the 
decision’s legal effects and instructed the 
applicant to return to Denmark. 

Humanitarian protection: 
Vulnerable persons 

Spain, Supreme Court, Applicant v 
Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del 
Interior), 3385/2024, 17 June 2024. 

The Supreme Court annulled the decision 
of Audiencia Nacional rejecting 
humanitarian protection to the applicants 
and fixed the interpretational doctrine of 
Articles 37 and 46 of the Spanish Asylum 
Law. 

A Colombian single mother and her three 
children received rejections to their 
applications for international protection 
from first and second instance courts. In 
the rejected decisions there was no 
reference to the fact that the applicants are 
legally defined as vulnerable, nor to the 
possibility of the applicants to reside in 
Spain for humanitarian reasons.  

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that 
there was ‘cassational interest’ to 
determine the nature and effects of the 
differential treatment that must be given to 
international protection applicants who are 
in a situation of vulnerability, and the 

40 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

situation of the applicant and the 
conditions in the country of origin. 

The Supreme Court considered that the 
reiterated extortion experienced by the 
applicant in Colombia was sufficiently 
meaningful to entail a real risk to herself 
and her children. 

significance of such treatment as to the 
possibility of granting them an 
authorisation to reside based on 
humanitarian reasons.  

The court highlighted that the Spanish 
Asylum Law envisages two regimes to 
grant humanitarian protection, a general 
one and a more specific one. It noted that 
the Audiencia Nacional had erred in 
considering that the applicants had failed 
in not providing specific reasons to justify 
their stay based on humanitarian reasons, 
for the specific regime of Article 46(1) and 
(2) of the Asylum Law applies to them. In 
that respect, the applicants are by law 
already defined as vulnerable persons. 
Thus, there is not an additional 
requirement to claim different reasons 
from those raised in the initial claim for 
international protection. 

The Supreme Court clarified that to assess 
the granting of humanitarian protection, it 
is not necessary to assert the individual 
persecution of the applicant. It is rather the 
social conflict and how the social conflict in 
the country of origin affects the specific 
person, which can be corroborated by 
country of origin information or any other 
submitted evidence. In addition, the court 
highlighted that protection based on 
humanitarian reasons does not relate to 
any type of general humanitarian reasons. 
Instead, the claimed humanitarian reasons 
must be related to a real, tangible risk of a 
lack of protection due to conflict or serious 
political, ethnic or religious clashes.  

To this end, it is crucial to evaluate 
whether there are reasons or 
circumstances that would affect the 
fundamental rights of the applicant upon a 
return to the country of origin. The alleged 
humanitarian reasons must be sufficiently 
specific with respect to the personal 

41 

 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Reception 

Appointment of a legal 
representative for 
unaccompanied minors 

Germany, Higher Administrative Court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht/Verwaltungsger
ichtshöf), Jugendamt v Applicant, 
12S 1700/23, 11 July 2024.   

The Higher Administrative Court of Baden-
Württemberg found a procedural error in 
not appointing a legal representative in 
the age determination procedure for an 
unaccompanied minor. It stated that the 
recast RCD must be applied directly and 
reiterated the requirements for 
representation. 

In a case where an unaccompanied minor 
was not appointed a legal guardian or 
legal representative for the age 
assessment procedure, the Higher 
Administrative Court reaffirmed its 
previous case law4 that failure to appoint a 
representative pursuant to the recast RCD, 
Article 24(1)(1) resulted in a significant 
procedural error which was neither 
remedied pursuant to Section 41 SGB X 
nor irrelevant pursuant to Section 42(1)(1), 
sentence 1 of the Social Welfare Law 
VIII (SGB). The court highlighted that Social 
Welfare has a legal obligation derived from 
the recast RCD to appoint a legal 
representative for the age determination 
procedure, due to direct application of this 
requirement from the recast RCD since it 

4 A similar judgment was issued in April 2024, see 
Quarterly Overview of Asylum Case Law, Issue 
No 2/2024.  

42 

has not been implemented into national 
law. 

The court explained that the legal 
representative, within the meaning of the 
recast RCD, is a person who ensures that 
an unaccompanied minor benefit of the 
measures enshrined in the recast RCD. 
Thus, the legal representative should have 
sound knowledge of the procedural law 
but also of protection needs, such the 
overall development of a minor.   

The court referred to the EASO/IARMJ-
Europe, Judicial Analysis, Need for 
Protection in the Context of Applications 
for International Protection, 2021 and the 
ECtHR judgment in Darboe and Camara v 
Italy (Case 5797/17, 21 July 2022).  

Sanctions for breaking reception 
centre rules  

Austria, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - 
BVwG], Applicant v Federal Office for 
Immigration and Asylum (Bundesamt für 
Fremdenwesen und Asyl‚ BFA), 
W117 2278420-3, 17 June 2024.  

The Federal Administrative Court upheld 
the suspension of material reception 
conditions in cash as a sanction against a 
Syrian minor applicant for serious and 
repeated breaches of house rules, 
considering that the measure was 
proportionate and aligned with the best 
interests of the child. 

A Syrian minor applicant for international 
protection was accommodated in a care 
facility for unaccompanied minor asylum 
seekers. Due to serious and repetitive 
beaches of the house rules and following 
discussions between the applicant and the 
Federal Office for Immigration and 

 
 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

power under Section 41 of the Irish Human 
Rights and Equality Act to initiate 
proceedings before the High Court 
concerning the human rights of a class of 
persons, namely international protection 
applicants who arrived in Ireland after 
December 2023 and were left 
unaccommodated. The state questioned 
whether the HREC could exercise this 
power under Section 41, but the High Court 
confirmed its competence to file judicial 
action over the rights of third parties.  

Moreover, the High Court ruled that the 
Irish state’s approach breached the human 
rights of unaccommodated international 
protection applicants, in particular, the 
right to human dignity enshrined in Article 1 
of the EU Charter, and referred to the 
relevant CJEU ruling in Federaal 
agentschap voor de opvang van 
asielzoekers (Belgium, Fedasil) v S. Saciri 
and Others, where the court drew a direct 
connection between the recast RCD and 
the requirements of Article 1 of the Charter.  

The High Court granted the HREC 
declaratory relief but denied the 
mandatory orders sought, as it determined 
that there were sufficient grounds to 
conclude that the state would not ignore 
its obligations, given the latter had made 
significant efforts to improve the situation 
for unaccommodated international 
protection applicants in response to the 
High Court’s rulings in 2023.  

Asylum (BFA), the office suspended his 
pocket money for the remaining time in the 
centre. 

In appeal, the Federal Administrative Court 
confirmed the decision based on the fact 
that the applicant’s misconduct was 
repetitive and consisted of severe 
violations of the house rules during a short 
period of time. The court underlined the 
need to ensure respect for the best 
interests of the child and of the 
proportionality principle, referring to the 
CJEU judgment, Zubair Haqbin v Belgium 
(C-233/18, 12 November 2019). However, it 
rejected the appeal as it found the 
measure legally correct and proportionate. 
It ruled that the suspension of pocket 
money did not affect the applicant’s ability 
to meet his essential needs or impact his 
overall development or standard of living.  

Human rights concerns over lack 
of access to reception   

Ireland, High Court, Irish Human Rights 
and Equality Commission v Minister for 
Children, Equality, Disability, Integration 
and Youth & Ors, [2024] IEHC 493, 
1 August 2024. 

The High Court ruled that the state 
breached the right to human dignity of 
unaccommodated international protection 
applicants, in violation of their rights 
guaranteed by Article 1 of the EU Charter. 

The case concerned the Irish state’s 
inability to provide accommodation and 
related services to international protection 
applicants between December 2023 and 
May 2024.  

The Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission (HREC), the National Human 
Rights Institution and the National Equality 
Body, for the first time exercised their 

43 

 
Article 3 by failing to provide appropriate 
mental health care. 

The applicant also complained under 
Article 5(1) and (4) of the ECHR about her 
13-month confinement in the transit zone. 
The court found that this situation was 
similar to the case examined in R.R. and 
Others, where a stay of nearly 4 months 
was deemed a de facto deprivation of 
liberty. The same conclusion was reached 
in this case, leading to a finding of a 
violation of Article 5(1) and (4). 

ECtHR, K.A. v Cyprus, No 63076/19, 
2 July 2024.  

The ECtHR found a violation of Article 5(4) 
of the ECHR due to the length of the 
appeal procedure against the lawfulness 
of the detention measure applied for an 
asylum applicant from Morocco after 
arrival in Cyprus. 

The court ruled on the legality of the 
detention of a Moroccan national upon his 
arrival in Cyprus based on national security 
concerns and the lengthy nature of the 
domestic legal proceedings. The applicant 
argued that his detention from 10 January 
2019 to 24 February 2020, and again from 
3 April 2020 to June 2020, was unlawful. 
The court concluded that there was a 
violation of Article 5(4) of the ECHR which 
pertains to the right to a speedy judicial 
procedure to assess the lawfulness of 
detention. 

EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Detention 

ECtHR judgments on detention  

ECtHR, S.H. v Hungary, 47321/19, 
20 June 2024. 

The ECtHR ruled that Hungary violated 
Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR for the 
detention of an Iranian woman in the 
Tompa transit zone from 18 January 2018 
to 4 March 2019, which included a period 
of isolation due to her risk of committing 
suicide, without providing adequate 
mental health care. 

An Iranian applicant entered the Tompa 
transit zone at the Serbian-Hungarian and 
requested asylum in Hungary. Her 
application was rejected and she appealed 
the decision. The administrative and labour 
court suspended the examination of her 
appeal and submitted a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU.  

Under Article 3 of the ECHR, the applicant 
claimed that the conditions in which she 
was held in the transit zone were inhuman 
and degrading and that there was a lack of 
an effective remedy. The court noted that 
she was placed in an isolation sector due 
to a risk of suicide, but there was no 
psychiatric evaluation, or medical records 
provided. It referred to its previous 
judgment in R.R. and Others, where it 
found that conditions in the isolation sector 
were more restrictive than in other sectors. 
Although isolation reduced harassment 
risks, it deteriorated her mental health due 
to inadequate medical care. The court 
concluded that the authorities violated 

44 

 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

ECtHR, B.A. v Cyprus, No 24607/20, 
2 July 2024. 

The ECtHR found violations of Article 5(1) 
and (4) of the ECHR concerning the 
detention of a Syrian asylum seeker on 
grounds of national security. 

A Syrian national entered Cyprus in 
January 2019 and sought asylum. After 
being flagged as a potential national 
security threat, he was detained from 
February 2019 until November 2021. The 
applicant challenged his detention before 
the Cypriot courts, but his appeals were 
rejected. 

Before the ECtHR, he claimed that his 
detention violated Article 5(1) of the ECHR, 
and the court found that, while the 
applicant’s detention may have been 
lawful under domestic law, it was not 
sufficiently linked to preventing 
unauthorised entry into the country, as 
required under Article 5(1). The court noted 
that his detention was based solely on 
national security grounds, without a clear 
connection to the examination of his 
asylum claim. Additionally, the prolonged 
detention of over 2 years and 9 months 
was deemed arbitrary, especially in the 
absence of a time limit under the Refugee 
Law. 

The court also found a violation of 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR due to the lengthy 
appeal proceedings, which lasted 
over2 years and were not conducted 
promptly, even considering the difficulties 
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Therefore, the court concluded that the 
applicant's detention was both arbitrary 
and unlawfully prolonged, constituting 
violations of Article 5(1) and (4) of the 
ECHR. 

Scope of a judicial review 

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicant v State 
Secretary for Justice and Security 
(Staatssecretaris van Justitie en 
Veiligheid), NL24.20258m NL24.21272 
and NL24.21362, 4 June 2024. 

The Court of the Hague seated in 
Roermond referred a question to the CJEU 
on the scope of the judicial review of 
consecutive detention measures. 

The Court of the Hague seated in 
Roermond submitted a question to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the impact 
of a judicial review of consecutive 
detention measures when the judicial body 
finds that one period of detention has 
been or has become unlawful. In fact, an 
applicant was detained continuously based 
on two detention measures, and the court 
found that the first one, regarding the 
implementation of a Dublin transfer to 
Spain, was unlawful. He was kept in 
custody and a second measure was 
imposed, aiming at ensuring the removal to 
the country of origin. 

The question addressed in the case C-
387/24 is: 

Should Article 15(2), introductory 
phrase and (b) of Directive 2008/115, 
Article 9(3) of Directive 2013/33 and 
Article 28(4) of Regulation 
No 604/2013 3 , read in conjunction 
with Articles 6 and 47 of the EU 
Charter, be interpreted as meaning 
that the judicial authority is always 
obliged to release the person 
detained immediately if the 
detention has been or has become 
unlawful at any time during the 
uninterrupted execution of a series 
of successive detention measures? 

45 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Detention pending an appeal 

Netherlands, Council of State [Afdeling 
Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State], Applicant v State Secretary for 
Justice and Security (Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie en Veiligheid), 
202307746/1/V3, 28 June 2024.  

The Council of State ruled that a measure 
of deprivation of liberty which was 
prolonged for 5 weeks until the scheduled 
hearing of an appeal against an asylum 
decision was lawful in light of the recast 
RCD, Article 9(1).  

The State Secretary for Justice and 
Security detained an Indian national at 
Schiphol International Airport. The 
application for international protection was 
denied, and the Court of the Hague ruled 
that the restriction of liberty must be lifted 
as the appeal hearing was scheduled in 
5 weeks, which exceeded the 4-week time 
limit to rule on an appeal, thus the 
detention measure was no longer 
justifiable.  

The State Secretary appealed before the 
Council of State, which referred to the 
CJEU judgement in C, B and X v State 
Secretary for Justice and Security, to rule 
that detention is only permissible in 
compliance with the rules laid down in the 
recast RCD, Article 9(1).  

The council ruled that there was no delay 
in the administrative procedure relevant to 
the grounds for deprivation of liberty 
mentioned in the recast RCD, Articles 8(3) 
and 9(1) and the District Court determined 
that the delay was caused by legal rather 
than administrative actions. The council 
stated that the State Secretary had made a 
timely judgement on the asylum 
application and the appeal was to be 
heard in the near future. The council noted 

that the applicant had been in border 
custody for 6.5 weeks at the time of the 
scheduled hearing, and the court 
determined that the deprivation of liberty 
had not been extended unnecessarily, 
contrary to Article 9(1).  

Legal assistance to challenge 
detention 

Cyprus, International Protection 
Administrative Court [Διοικητικό 
Δικαστήριο Διεθνούς Προστασίας], 
Applicant v Lawyer of the Republic, 
No 103/2024, 7 July 2024. 

An asylum applicant detained on grounds 
of national security or public order was 
granted legal aid to challenge his 
detention as the conditions provided by 
the Legal Aid law were met. 

An applicant from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo who was detained on 
grounds of national security or public order 
requested legal aid to lodge an appeal 
against the decision ordering his 
detention. 

The judge determined that Article 6B(7a) of 
the Legal Aid Law of 2002 was satisfied, 
as the legal aid concerned proceedings at 
first instance and not before the Supreme 
Court. According to Article 7 of the same 
law, the applicant was eligible for legal aid 
due to his lack of economic resources and 
the seriousness of the case. In the 
absence of a Social Welfare Services 
report, the judge evaluated the applicant’s 
socio-economic status based on his 
application form and statements made 
during the hearing. The applicant was 
found to be unemployed, unmarried, 
childless and without significant assets.  

Given these circumstances and the serious 
nature of the case, the judge concluded 

46 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

that legal aid was crucial to ensure justice. 
Consequently, the judge ordered the 
registry office to appoint a lawyer to 
represent the applicant. 

Procedural deadlines for detention 
pending a return  

Italy, Supreme Court of Cassation - Civil 
section [Corte Supreme di Cassazione], 
Applicant v Ministry of the Interior 
(Ministero dell'Interno), No 16707/2024, 
17 June 2024.  

The Court of Cassation annulled the 
extension of the detention of a foreigner 
pending a return, deeming it invalid due to 
a violation of procedural deadlines.  

Following the applicant’s detention at a 
pre-repatriation centre for an initial 
30 days, the Justice of Peace extended it 
for another 30 days. In an onward appeal, 
the Court of Cassation annulled the 
extension due to a breach of procedural 
deadlines. Under Article 14(5) of Legislative 
Decree No 286/1998, detention can be 
extended by 30 days, with a further 
30 days for nationals from countries with 
return agreements.  

In this case, the extension hearing 
occurred after the permissible deadline 
expired. The court emphasised that any 
deprivation of liberty must strictly follow 
legal deadlines and procedures and a 
failure to adhere to these timelines 
invalidates the detention order.  

No prospects of a return  

Greece, Administrative Court [Διοικητικό 
Πρωτοδικείο], Applicant v Greek State 
(represented by Minister for Citizen 
Protection), No Π2087/2024, 21 June 
2024.  

The First Instance Administrative Court of 
Corinth ordered the release from detention 
of an Afghan asylum applicant ruling that 
there was no real prospect of returning 
him to Türkiye and Afghanistan. However, 
it imposed the duty to report once a week 
to the police pending the outcome of his 
asylum application.  

An Afghan national was arrested on 
2 March 2024 in Patras for irregular entry 
and stay in Greece and provisionally 
detained because he was suspected of 
absconding. Additionally, a return decision 
to his country of origin was adopted and 
his detention extended for a period that 
could not exceed 6 months.  

While in detention, the applicant lodged 
his application for international protection 
on 10 June 2024. Subsequently, the 
director of the Corinth Police Directorate 
decided to detain the applicant for a 
period of 50 days from 10 June since the 
elements of his asylum applications were 
to be determined.  

In an appeal against the last detention 
order, the court noted, based on 
documents submitted by the Director and 
the Deputy Director of the Migration 
Management Directorate of the Hellenic 
Police Headquarters, that procedures for 
returns to Afghanistan has been 
suspended since 8 July 2021, and 
readmission of third-country nationals to 
Türkiye have been suspended since March 
2020. The court ruled that there was no 
evidence to suggest that this suspension 

47 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

will be lifted immediately or at a time which 
would not exceed the time limits contained 
in Article 30(5) and (6) of Law 
No 3907/2011 (transposing Article 15(4) of 
the Return Directive).  

Since the police had not taken any action 
leading to the readmission of the applicant 
to Türkiye or the return to his country of 
origin, the court considered that the 
detention lacked a legal basis because 
there was no reasonable prospect of 
removal. The court cited the CJEU 
judgment Kadzoev (C-357/09, 
30 November 2009) in its reasoning. 

The court ordered the release of the 
applicant but  imposed an obligation of the 
applicant to appear once a week before 
the police authority of his place of 
residence, on a day and time to be 
determined by the police authority. 

Content of 
protection 

Extradition of a refugee status 
holder from another Member 
State  

CJEU, A. v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Hamm, C-352/22, 18 June 2024. 

The CJEU held that a third-country 
national cannot be extradited to the 
country of origin if that person is 
recognised as refugee in another Member 
State. The competent authority must 
contact the authority that granted 
protection and cannot extradite the person 
as long as protection has not been 
revoked or withdrawn. 

A Turkish national of Kurdish origin who 
was recognised as a refugee in Italy in 
2010 on the ground that he was at risk of 
political persecution by the Turkish 
authorities because of his support for the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was 
suspected of murder. For this reason, 
Türkiye requested Germany, his country of 
residency, to extradite him. The German 
court hearing the case requested a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU. 

The CJEU replied that refugee status 
granted in Italy precludes the extradition of 
the person to the country of origin which 
he fled, and if refugee status has not been 
revoked or withdrawn by the Italian 
authorities, extradition must be refused, as 
extradition would end that status. 

48 

 
 
QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

The CJEU also added that the competent 
German authority must contact the Italian 
authority that granted refugee status, and if 
the Italian authority revokes or withdraws 
refugee status, the German authority must 
conclude that the person is no longer a 
refugee and there is no serious risk that, in 
the event of that person’s extradition, he 
would be subjected to the death penalty, 
torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in Türkiye. 

Extradition pending the outcome 
of an application for 
international protection  

Greece, Hellenic Council of State, 
Applicant v Hellenic Ministry of Justice, 
1129/2024, 15 July 2024.  

The Council of State ruled that the Ministry 
of Justice is not precluded to issue an 
extradition decision until a final decision 
on the request for international protection 
is adopted and that the execution of the 
extradition is automatically suspended 
pending the outcome on international 
protection. 

A citizen of Türkiye sought the annulment 
of the decision of the Deputy Minister of 
Justice to extradite him to his country of 
origin.  

The Council of State concluded that the 
relevant national laws do not preclude the 
Minister of Justice from issuing an 
extradition decision before the decision on 
the request for international protection 
becomes final. It noted that the fact that 
the extradition decision precedes the final 
decision on the request for international 
protection does not demonstrate an abuse 
of power. The Council of State highlighted 
that an extradition decision may be issued, 
but its execution is automatically 
suspended until the decision on his 

49 

request for international protection 
becomes final.  

It was noted that the formulation of finality 
of the decision on an application for 
international protection as envisaged in 
national law is in accordance with the 
CEAS, Article 47 of the EU Charter and the 
Greek Constitution. 

Eligibility for permanent 
residence status when 
protection was acquired after 
lodging a subsequent 
application 

Finland, Supreme Administrative Court 
[Korkein hallinto-oikeus], Applicant v 
Finnish Immigration Service 
(Maahanmuuttovirasto‚ FIS), 
KHO:2024:87, 11 June 2024. 

The Supreme Administrative Court ruled 
that the date from which a beneficiary of 
international protection is eligible for a 
permanent residence permit is the date of 
entry, even when the status was acquired 
following the lodging of a subsequent 
application. 

A beneficiary of asylum was granted 
protection after lodging a third subsequent 
application for international protection and 
requested permanent residence permit in 
Finland. The Supreme Administrative Court 
ruled that according to the Aliens Act, 
Section 56(4) if a residence permit has 
been obtained based on refugee status or 
subsidiary protection, the 4-year period is 
calculated from the date of entry. The court 
held that this provision places beneficiaries 
of international protection in a different 
position from other foreigners for the 
conditions to be fulfilled for acquiring a 
permanent residence permit.  

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

In a dissenting opinion, two judges held 
that the preparatory work for the Aliens Act 
did not consider explicitly a situation where 
a person applied for international 
protection for the second time after 
receiving a negative decision. 

facts constitute an imperative reason of 
national security or public order that 
prevents the granting of the requested 
travel document is in accordance with the 
provisions of the recast QD and with the 
relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU. 

Right to private life 

Switzerland, Federal Court 
[Bundesgericht - Tribunal 
fédéral], Applicant v Service de la 
population et des migrants du canton de 
Fribourg, 2C_157/2023, 23 July 2024.  

The Federal Tribunal clarified the right to a 
residence permit for a young Syrian 
applicant who was placed on a 
disadvantageous situation due to her 
status under provisional admission.  

The Federal Tribunal allowed an onward 
appeal submitted by a young Syrian girl, 
aged 15, against the refusal to be granted 
the right to a residence permit. The 
applicant had a residence status under 
provisional admission, after rejection of her 
asylum application. The tribunal 
considered that the applicant was placed 
in a disadvantageous situation due to her 
residence status and ruled that the refusal 
to grant a residence permit constituted an 
interference with the applicant’s right to 
private life, as protected under Article 8 of 
the ECHR. The tribunal found that 
approaching the age of majority implies a 
higher need to travel abroad for scholastic 
exchanges and the applicant showed that 
she integrated very well and had excellent 
results in school and in the French 
language. Also, the tribunal mentioned that 
there were no prospects of a return to 
Syria in the foreseeable future.  

Refusal to grant a travel 
document to a refugee status 
holder   

Greece, Hellenic Council of State, 
Applicant v Greek Asylum Service 
(Υπηρεσία Ασύλου), 1107/2024, 18 July 
2024. 

The Council of State ruled that refusing to 
grant a travel document to a recognised 
refugee is possible only after an 
individualised assessment is performed by 
the Asylum Service on reasons of public 
order and security. 

The Council of State clarified the wording 
of Article 1(2) of KYA 10302/29.5.2020. It 
ruled that the article, which does not leave 
room for an individualised assessment by 
the administrative authority establishing an 
automatic rejection of the issuance of a 
travel document to a recognised refugee if 
convicted for certain offences, is in breach 
of its enabling provision Article 25 (2) of 
Law 4636/2019. It highlighted that the 
reading of the provision demands that the 
authority issues an individualised decision 
on the request for a travel document after 
assessing the personal circumstances of 
the refugee, the specific facts of the case, 
the seriousness of the offense committed, 
the criminal conviction, the time elapsed 
since the conviction and any other relevant 
element. 

The Council of State ruled that the choice 
of the legislature to assign to an 
administrative body, the Asylum Service, 
the competence to decide which specific 

50 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

Revocation of a residence 
permit due to false information 

Norway, Court of Appeal 
[Lagmannsrettane], Applicant v 
Directorate of Immigration 
(Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ UDI), LB-2023-
190064, 17 June 2024.  

The Borgarting Court of Appeal ruled that 
the decision to revoke an Uzbek national's 
residence permit and not renew his 
residence permit for refugee status was 
valid as he had provided false information 
during his asylum application. 

The applicant stated that he had not been 
in Uzbekistan following the rejection of his 
first application for international protection. 
However, his passport showed that the 
applicant had been in Uzbekistan, which 
resulted in his residence permit being 
revoked because he had provided false 
information.  

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision 
to revoke the applicant’s residence permit, 
ruling that the information was important to 
the asylum determination and that the 
applicant's claim that he did not disclose 
the correct information because he did not 
trust the Norwegian authorities was not 
credible. The court further ruled that the 
applicant had no well-founded fear of 
persecution upon a return or because of 
his claimed conversion to Islam, and that 
neither the general security situation nor 
the applicant's individual circumstances 
justified protection.  

Norway, District Court [Noreg 
Domstolar], Applicant v Directorate of 
Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ 
UDI), TOSL-2024-58046, 12 July 2024. 

The Oslo District Court ruled that the 
revocation of a residence permit given to 
an Ethiopian national was unlawful since 
the UNE failed to properly assess key 
elements, specifically that the applicant 
was a minor subject to a forced marriage 
at the time. 

The UNE validated in the appeal the 
revocation of the residence permit of A, an 
Ethiopian national who was granted family 
reunification with B, her husband, a 
recognised refugee. In fact, when A 
applied for humanitarian residence on her 
own behalf after separating from B, the 
UDI learnt that she provided false 
information on her identity and revealed 
that she was forced to marry B and given a 
new identity after marriage. Consequently, 
the request for humanitarian residence 
was rejected and her residence permit 
revoked. 

In an onward appeal, the Oslo District 
Court stated that the UNE failed to 
properly assess that she was forced to 
marry as a minor and provided with false 
identity documents, as well as the fact that 
her initial erroneous information was 
provided under duress. Since the error 
affected both decisions on revocation and 
humanitarian residence, the court annulled 
them and ordered a suspensive effect on 
the implementation of a return. 

51 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Family reunification  

ECtHR, Okubamichael Debru v Sweden, 
49755/18, 25 July 2024.  

The ECtHR found no violation of Article 8 
concerning an application for family 
reunification submitted by an applicant 
from Ethiopia in Sweden. 

An Ethiopian applicant argued that the 
refusal of family reunification in Sweden 
was contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR. The 
court noted that the refusal was justified 
because the maintenance requirement 
was not fulfilled and the applicant applied 
outside the three months exemption 
period, thus the national authorities duly 
assessed the circumstances of the case. 
The applicant was able to keep contact 
with family members who were residing in 
Uganda as asylum seekers and there were 
no exceptional reasons to be exempted 
from the financial requirement. 

Thus, the court found that national 
authorities struck a fair balance between 
the private interest of the applicant and the 
state interest to control immigration and 
found no breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.  

Ireland, Court of Appeal , Sibanda v The 
Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors, 
[2024] IECA 206, 30 July 2024.  

The Court of Appeal determined that adult 
children are not eligible family members 
for family reunification, unless there is 
more than an emotional dependency 
between the applicant and an adult child. 

An applicant from Zimbabwe applied for 
family reunification with her three children 
after having been granted asylum. The 
request was rejected for her eldest 
daughter who was an adult at the time of 
the submission of the application.  

In the appeal, the applicant argued that 
there was an infringement of the right to 
equality, because the processing of her 
own asylum application was delayed, time 
lapsed and her daughter reached the age 
of majority when the application for family 
reunification was submitted.  

While acknowledging the human 
dimension, the court reiterated that family 
reunification with an adult child is possible 
in cases where the dependency between 
the parent and the adult child surpasses 
the normal emotional bond. The court also 
mentioned that the age of the children at 
the time of the parent’s asylum application 
or prior to the application for family 
reunification is not assessed. 

Norway, District Court [Noreg 
Domstolar], Applicants v Directorate of 
Immigration (Utlendingsdirektoratet‚ 
UDI), TOSL-2023-173165, 8 July 2024.  

The Oslo District Court ruled that the 
family members of a recognised refugee 
did not meet the requirement to produce 
documents for family reunification and the 
negative decision did not violate Article 8 
of the ECHR. 

An Eritrean family was rejected family 
reunification due to a lack of passports. In 
an onward appeal, the District Court of 
Oslo confirmed the negative decision and 
stated that the UDI correctly assessed that 
the applicants did not meet the passport 
requirements as provided by national 
legislation. It stated that there were no 
reasons to allow an exemption from this 
requirement since Eritrea has a functional 
administration and documents could be 
also acquired from embassies in Sudan or 
Ethiopia, and the applicants did not prove 
any impediments or that the Eritrean 
authorities would react adversely to such 

52 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

request. The court also found that there 
was not violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.  

Revocation of subsidiary 
protection 

Germany, Regional Administrative Court 
[Verwaltungsgericht], Applicant v Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees 
(Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge‚ BAMF), A 12 K 2656/23, 
3 June 2024.  

The Administrative Court of Karlsruhe 
upheld BAMF’s decision to revoke 
subsidiary protection for a Syrian 
applicant, ruling that the conduct of the 
applicant and the gravity of the rape 
constitute a serious crime and grounds for 
exclusion.  

After having been granted subsidiary 
protection, a Syrian national committed 
multiple offenses in Germany, culminating 
in a rape conviction. Subsequently, BAMF 
revoked his protection status, and the 
applicant appealed before the 
Administrative Court of Karlsruhe.   

The court upheld BAMF's decision, finding 
that the conviction for rape met the criteria 
for a serious crime warranting revocation 
of subsidiary protection. It emphasised the 
severe nature of the crime, noting that the 
brutality and coercive elements of the rape 
highlighted its gravity. The court also took 
into account the applicant's prior history of 
violent offenses and the continuous 
suffering of the victim.  

Temporary 
protection 

Eligibility for protection  

Germany, Higher Administrative Court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht/Verwaltungsger
ichtshöf), Applicant v Federal Office for 
Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge‚ BAMF), 
11 S1425/23, 18 June 2024.  

The Higher Administrative Court of Baden-
Württemberg confirmed that a Russian 
national was not eligible for temporary 
protection as she could safely return to her 
country of origin and her Ukrainian partner 
was still residing in Ukraine. 

A Russian national was rejected temporary 
protection in Germany on grounds that she 
was able to return safely to her country 
after the war in Ukraine started. The 
Higher Administrative Court of Baden-
Württemberg confirmed that the applicant 
did not belong to any of the eligible 
categories for temporary protection. Based 
on country-of-origin information and her 
individual situation, the court found that 
she could undertake a safe and durable 
return to her country, where she can 
secure her livelihood and medical 
treatment. Also, the applicant was not 
eligible as a family member of a Ukrainian 
national because her partner remained in 
Ukraine and was not displaced.  

53 

 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
E-3859/2024, 28 June 2024.   

The Federal Administrative Court referred 
a case back for a re-assessment of the 
eligibility of a Ukrainian national for 
temporary protection. 

A Ukrainian national was rejected 
temporary protection in Switzerland on 
grounds of holding a tourist visa for the 
USA and a refugee visa for Canada, 
converted into a tourist visa which was 
valid until 31 March 2024. FAC considered 
that SEM had insufficiently investigated 
whether the USA or Canada would be valid 
alternatives to protection that can be given 
by Switzerland, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity of protection.  

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicant v The 
Minister for Asylum and Migration (de 
Minister van Asiel en Migratie), 
NL23.9121, 4 July 2024. 

The Court of the Hague seated in Arnhem 
confirmed that a Ukrainian national who 
was not residing in Ukraine after 
27 November 2021 was not eligible for 
temporary protection despite a short visit 
to Ukraine after the war broke. 

A Ukrainian national contested the 
negative decision on his request for 
temporary protection. The Court of the 
Hague seated in Arnhem noted that the 
applicant left Ukraine on 21 November 
2021 to join his Belarussian daughter and 
wife in Belarus and came back to Ukraine 
in March 2022 for a one-day visit to collect 
documents. As such, the court agreed with 
the State Secretary that the applicant did 
not have residence in Ukraine when the 
war broke out, thus he was not eligible for 
temporary protection.  

54 

Luxembourg, Administrative Tribunal 
[Tribunal administratif], Applicant v 
Ministry of Immigration and Asylum, 
No 49121, 8 July 2024.  

The Administrative Tribunal rejected the 
appeal against an application for 
temporary protection from an applicant 
from Eritrea because he did not 
demonstrate to be a resident in Ukraine on 
24 February 2022 

An Eritrean applicant contested the refusal 
to be granted temporary protection. The 
Administrative Tribunal confirmed that the 
person was not eligible because the 
cumulative requirements for third-country 
nationals were not met.  

The applicant was found to have been a 
temporary resident in Ukraine for studies, 
but the last exit stamp was dated 
September 2022. As such, the applicant 
was not a resident in Ukraine when the war 
broke out and thus was ineligible.  

The court decided it was not necessary to 
assess whether the applicant can return 
under safe and durable conditions to the 
country of origin. 

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
D-2175/2024, 9 July 2024.  

FAC confirmed a negative decision on 
temporary protection and stated that the 
applicant was excluded because he was 
not present nor resident in Ukraine on 
24 February 2022. 

FAC rejected the appeal of a Ukrainian 
national with a valid Polish residence 
permit against the negative decision on 
temporary protection. FAC recalled that 

QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

the applicant had already been living and 
working in Poland for 2 years on 
24 February 2022, thus it can be assumed 
that his main place of residence was in 
Poland on the day the war broke out in 
Ukraine.  

The court considered it irrelevant whether 
he intended to stay in Poland long term or 
even for life and explained that, since the 
Federal Council specified a cut-off date in 
the decision of 11 March 2022, the Federal 
Council expressed that Ukrainian nationals 
who were not living in Ukraine on 
24 February 2022 are to be excluded from 
the scope of temporary protection.  

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
E-3535/2024, 17 June 2024. 

FAC rejected the appeal against a SEM 
decision not to allow a re-examination of a 
third request for temporary protection 
since the applicant did not adduce 
elements to change the assessment. 

FAC noted that the facts which were newly 
cited to justify a request for 
reconsideration were not legally relevant, 
since they were not suitable to establish a 
claim for temporary protection.   

The court highlighted that the procedure 
for granting temporary protection is not 
intended to circumvent the asylum 
procedure and that allegations of 
persecution which relate to the situation in 
the country of origin must be made in the 
context of an asylum application. The court 
also stated that the fear of being drafted 
into the Azerbaijani military, linked to the 
escalation of the conflict, does not in itself 
constitute a threat because such a draft is 
in any case only hypothetical, if not 

improbable, particularly since the applicant 
is older than the age for military 
conscription since only men between the 
ages of 18 and 35 are subject to 
compulsory military service in Azerbaijan.  

The court concluded that the new facts 
alleged by the applicant were not relevant 
to grant temporary protection and upheld 
the former rejecting decisions.  

Secondary movements of 
temporary protection 
beneficiaries 

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
E-3788/2024, 27 June 2024. 

FAC rejected the appeal against a 
negative decision on temporary protection 
because the applicant had alternative 
protection in Romania. 

A Ukrainian national requested temporary 
protection in Switzerland. SEM rejected the 
request as it considered the applicant was 
not eligible because he had a valid 
residence permit in Romania.  

FAC rejected the appeal of the applicant 
and stated that, based on the subsidiarity 
principle, since temporary protection was 
valid in Romania, the granting of it in 
Switzerland was not necessary. The court 
stated that the applicant failed to provide 
any convincing argument to the contrary, 
since he merely stated his unwillingness to 
obtain protection in Romania without 
providing any evidence that his protection 
status in Romania had been revoked or 
had expired.  

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 

55 

 
EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

administratif fédéral - FAC], A v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
E-3310/2024, 7 June 2024. 

FAC confirmed a negative decision on 
temporary protection which was submitted 
by a Ukrainian national who had been 
previously granted protection in Poland. 

A Ukrainian national who had received 
temporary protection in Poland travelled to 
Switzerland and requested the same type 
of protection, as her husband and her 
cousin were in Switzerland too. SEM 
rejected the request and ordered the 
removal of the applicant.  

In the appeal, FAC reiterated the 
subsidiarity principle and ruled that a 
Ukrainian citizen is not dependent on the 
protection of Switzerland when he has 
valid alternative protection outside 
Ukraine, namely temporary protection in 
Poland. The applicant held a Polish PESEL, 
which is a document specifically issued to 
Ukrainian nationals who entered Poland 
through the Ukrainian border after 
24 February 2022. 

Although the applicant alleged that leaving 
Poland and staying outside Poland 
equates with an end of her status, FAC 
considered that Ukrainian citizens can re-
obtain a PESEL number if they re-apply by 
following the same procedure as the first 
time. A renewal of the PESEL number 
allows a stay in Poland for 18 months. The 
applicant did not demonstrate to have re-
applied for the PESEL number and to have 
been rejected. Furthermore, the applicant 
did not provide a credible explanation of 
the reasons for which the Polish authorities 
would reject his application for a new 
PESEL and considered that the applicant 
can freely return to Poland and reapply for 
temporary protection. 

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A,B,C v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
E-3824/2024, 3 July 2024.  

FAC ruled that Ukrainian nationals who 
were previously granted protection in 
another EU country are excluded from 
S protection status in Switzerland. 

A Ukrainian national, along with his wife 
and son, applied for temporary protection 
in Switzerland after previously living in 
Belgium with a temporary protection status 
for 1 year. SEM requested Belgium to 
readmit the family. Belgium approved the 
request and noted that, while their 
residence permits had been cancelled 
upon departure, they would be eligible for 
re-registration under Belgium’s temporary 
protection scheme if they returned. SEM 
rejected the request for temporary 
protection as requested by the Ukrainian 
family and ordered their expulsion. 

FAC upheld SEM’s decision, stating that 
the applicants had voluntarily left Belgium 
despite having protection there and were 
therefore not eligible for protection in 
Switzerland. The court confirmed that 
Belgium could still grant them temporary 
protection, as it had explicitly agreed to 
readmit and accept them as a family.  

The court emphasised that under the 
Temporary Protection Directive, 
Switzerland is not required to provide 
protection to individuals who already have 
such status in another EU country, in 
accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity. The court noted that the 
expiration of their Belgian residence 
permits did not change this principle, 
especially since Belgium had agreed to 
continue their protection. The court also 

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QUARTERLY OVERVIEW OF ASYLUM CASE LAW, ISSUE NO 3/2024 

found that the applicant’s pregnancy did 
not prevent their return and acknowledged 
Belgium's well-functioning health system. 

Suspension of return decisions  

Netherlands, Court of The Hague 
[Rechtbank Den Haag], Applicant v The 
Minister for Asylum and Migration (de 
Minister van Asiel en Migratie), 
NL24.20123, 30 July 2024. 

The Court of the Hague seated in s-
Hertogenbosch allowed an interim request 
against a return decision for a third-
country national, beneficiary of temporary 
protection, under the optional provision, 
pending the outcome before the CJEU. 

An applicant from Bangladesh with a 
temporary residence in Ukraine was 
granted temporary protection under 
Article 2(3) of the Implementing Decision 
2022/382. He contested the return 
decision issued by the State Secretary on 
the basis of the end of protection as of 4 
March 2024.  

The Court of the Hague seated in 
Hertogenbosch allowed an interim relief 
against the return decision, pending the 
outcome on merits of the appeal and the 
ruling of the CJEU on the referrals 
submitted by the Council of State on 
25 April 2024 and by the Court of the 
Hague seated in Amsterdam on 29 March 
2024.  

The court also found that the State 
Secretary adopted a Freezing Decision to 
specify the conditions to receive temporary 
protection pending the outcome of the 
preliminary rulings before the CJEU. The 
court noted that the applicant could not re-
register due to the Freezing Decision and 
stated that he was unjustifiably excluded 
from benefit due to a groundless 

distinction in this group of third-country 
nationals. The court noticed that the policy 
towards this category has been 
ambiguous, unclear and involved many 
changes of legal aspects, thus the 
applicant could be excluded since he left 
the reception shelter based on correct 
information, which the State Secretary 
subsequently changed.  

Family unity 

Switzerland, Federal Administrative Court 
[Bundesverwaltungsgericht - Tribunal 
administratif fédéral - FAC], A, B v State 
Secretariat for Migration 
(Staatssekretariat für Migration‚ SEM),  
F-55/2024, 19 July 2024. 

FAC allowed a request to change cantons 
for a beneficiary of temporary protection 
and recognised that the applicant and her 
partner, who were in a relationship for 
6 months, justified the right to family unity. 

A Ukrainian national, A, and her son, 
beneficiaries of temporary protection in 
Switzerland, requested to move from 
canton C to canton D to live with A's 
partner, E. SEM and cantonal authorities 
denied the request, citing that A's 
relationship with E did not meet the 
requirement of a 1-year duration for 
changing cantons. 

FAC reviewed the case, noting that while A 
and E had only been together for 
6 months, their relationship was serious, 
involving shared childcare, a commitment 
to marriage and future plans. The court 
ruled that despite the short duration, the 
relationship qualified as a premarital family 
relationship protected under the ECHR, 
Article 8(1), which includes the right to 
family unity. FAC concluded that SEM's 
refusal was incorrect, and A's request to 
change cantons was justified. 

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EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR ASYLUM 

Return 

Suspension of return decision 
due to procedural errors  

Germany, Regional Administrative Court 
[Verwaltungsgericht], Applicant v Federal 
Office for Migration and Refugees 
(Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge‚ BAMF), 4 L 1954/24.GI. A, 
27 June 2024. 

The Administrative Court of Giessen 
ordered the suspension of the deportation 
of a Turkish applicant due to BAMF’s 
procedural errors in rejecting the asylum 
claim as manifestly unfounded on grounds 
of alleged deliberate destruction of 
documents. 

A national of Türkiye was rejected 
international protection by BAMF as 
manifestly unfounded on the basis of 
allegedly deliberately destroying identity 
documents. The applicant challenged the 
negative decision, the deportation order 
and requested the suspension of the 
implementation of the return through an 
urgent procedure.  

The Administrative Court of Giessen 
granted the applicant's request for a 
suspensive effect, citing significant doubts 
about the lawfulness of BAMF's rejection of 
the asylum application. The court found 
that the applicant’s claim of losing 
documents when entrusted to a lorry driver 
did not meet the threshold for intentional 
destruction under AsylG, para 30(1). 
Additionally, it noted that the applicant's 
political persecution claims were not 
adequately addressed and BAMF had to 
thoroughly reassess the case.  

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