Opinion of the European Central Bank of 30 August 2024 on the term of office of the members of the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank, oversight and operation competences in respect of payment systems, and the right of deposit in basic business accounts (CON/2024/28)
Date: 2024-08-30
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis, money

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 30 August 2024  

on the term of office of the members of the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank, 

oversight and operation competences in respect of payment systems, and the right of 

deposit in basic business accounts 

(CON/2024/28) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  7  August  2024  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Danish  Financial 

Supervisory Authority (FSA) for an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on payment accounts, the Law 

on financial services, the Law on capital markets, the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank and various other 

laws (hereinafter the ‘draft law’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  and  Article 2(1),  first,  third  and  fifth  indents,  of  Council  Decision 

98/415/EC1,  as  the  draft  law  relates  to  currency  matters,  Danmarks  Nationalbank  and  payment  and 

settlement  systems.  In  accordance  with  Article 17.5,  first  sentence,  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the 

European Central Bank, the Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft law 

1.1  The draft law amends a number of different laws. However, for the purpose of this opinion it is the 

proposed amendments to the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank 2, the Law on payments3 and the Law 

on payment accounts4, which are addressed. 

1.2  First, the draft law introduces a fixed term of office for the three members of the Board of Governors 

of Danmarks Nationalbank by amending the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank. The existing Law on 

Danmarks Nationalbank provides that the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank consists 

of three members5. One of  the Governors is appointed by the King, and the other Governors are 

appointed  by  the  Board  of  Directors  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Committee  of  Directors 6.  The 

interpretative notes to the draft law (hereinafter the ‘interpretative notes’) clarify that in practice the 

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Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national 
authorities regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 
Lov om Danmarks Nationalbank, Lov nr. 116 af 7.4.1936. 
Lov on betalinger, Lov nr. 53 af 18.1.2023.  
Lov om betalingskonti, Lov nr. 407 af 29.3.2022.  
See Article 6(1), first sentence, of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank.  
See Article 6(1), second sentence, of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank. 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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appointment of the Governor performed by the King is undertaken by the Government on behalf of 

the King7. The said Governor is the chair of the Board of Governors 8. 

1.3  The existing Law on Danmarks Nationalbank contains no term limits for the members of the Board 

of Governors, but simply provides that they must resign before the expiration of the month in which 

they reach the age of 709. The draft law repeals this obligation and replaces it by laying down that 

the governors are to be appointed for a term of 6 years, with the possibility of one extension of 6 

additional years 10. The interpretative notes state that the maximum term of office of 12 years does 

not apply where a Governor appointed by the Board of Directors has undertaken his or her office for, 

for example, almost 12 years, and is subsequently appointed by the King as chair of the Board of 

Governors with the possibility of reappointment for an additional period of 6 years 11. 

1.4  The draft law clarifies that the new tenure regime does not apply to Governors appointed before 1 

January  2025,  unless  a  Governor  who  was  originally  appointed  by  the  Board  of  Directors,  is 

subsequently  appointed  by  the  King12.  Thus,  according  to  the  interpretative  notes,  a  Governor 

appointed by the Board of Directors before the entry into force of the draft law, will in this scenario 

be subject to a fixed term of office 13. Moreover, the interpretative notes further clarify that the current 

members of the Board of Governors do not need to be reappointed upon the entry into force of the 

new  tenure  regime  and,  thus,  that  their  existing  terms  of  employment  continue  to  apply 14.  In  this 

manner, new members of the Board of Governors will not be appointed collectively, but at the time 

when their predecessors resign.  

1.5  The interpretative  notes state that the appointment  of members of the Board of  Governors  for an 

indefinite  period  is  atypical  compared  generally  to  other  tenure  rules  in  the  Danish  governmental 

administration, where fixed term contracts are the rule15. Likewise, the current regime is considered 

atypical compared to the setup in other national central banks (NCBs) in the European System of 

Central  Banks  (ESCB),  which  generally  have  terms  of  office  of  5  to  8  years,  in  some  cases 

supplemented by an option for one reappointment. The interpretative notes also refer to Article 14.2 

of  the  Statute  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  and  of  the  European  Central  Bank 

(hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’). This provision applies to the governors of all Member State 

NCBs and provides, in order to safeguard their personal independence, that the term of office of an 

NCB Governor is to be no less than five years. The suggested new regime is considered to ensure 

a good balance between continuity and continuous replacement of the Board of Governors.  

1.6  Second, the draft law amends the Law on payments with a view to transposing into Danish legislation 

the  amendments  enacted  by  Regulation  (EU)  2024/886  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 

Council16,  which  amends,  inter  alia,  Directive  98/26/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 

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See page 42 of the general comments to the interpretative notes.  
See Article 6(1), third sentence, of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank. 
See Article 6(2), third sentence, of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank.  
See Article 15(1) of the draft law (amending Article 6(2), third sentence, of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank). 
See page 43 of the general comments to the interpretative notes. 
See Article 16(6) of the draft law. 
See page 324 of the specific comments to the interpretative notes. 
See page 324 of the specific comments to the interpretative notes. 
See pages 42 and 43 of the general comments to the interpretative notes. 
Regulation (EU) 2024/886 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 amending Regulations 
(EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit 
transfers in euro (OJ L, 2024/886, 19.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/886/oj). 

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Council17 (hereinafter the ‘SFD’) and Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of 

the  Council  (hereinafter  the  ‘PSD2’) 18.  The  existing  Law  on  payments  requires  payment  service 

providers to lay down access conditions for payment systems which are objective, non-discriminatory 

and proportionate and do not prevent access to the system to a greater extent than is necessary to 

protect against specific risks such as settlement, operational and commercial risks and to ensure the 

financial and operational stability of the payment system19, which is in line with Article 35 of the PSD2.  

1.7  However, there are two exceptions to this requirement20, as it applies neither to payment systems 

designated  under  the  SFD,  such  as  KRONOS2  (Danmarks  Nationalbank’s  system  settling  for 

transactions in Danish kroner) and TARGET-Danmark (which settles transactions in euro as part of 

TARGET) 21, nor to payment systems consisting exclusively of payment service providers belonging 

to the same group. The Law on payments does not apply to payment transactions carried out within 

the  framework  of  a  system  for  settlement  of  payments  or  securities  between  settlement  agents, 

central  counterparties,  clearing  houses,  central  banks  or  other  participants  in  the  system  and 

payment service providers, without prejudice to the abovementioned rules on access conditions 22.  

1.8  Regulation  (EU)  2024/886  amends  Article  35  of  the  PSD223,  with  the  consequence  that  the 

exemption  in  the  Law  on  payments  for  payment  systems  designated  under  the  SFD,  related  to 

access conditions for authorised or registered payment service providers which are objective, non-

discriminatory and proportionate, is repealed24. Thus, SFD-designated systems like KRONOS2 and 

TARGET-Danmark must, from the entry into force of the draft law, have access conditions based on 

the requirements of the Law on payments. The existing Law on payments 25 allocates the competence 

to ensure compliance with its provisions to the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority.  

1.9  Third, the draft law amends the Law on payment accounts with a view to establishing a regime for 

‘basic business accounts’ in line with Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the 

Council26 (hereinafter the ‘Payment Accounts Directive’) with certain modifications 27. The draft law 

accordingly changes the title of the Law on payment accounts to the Law on payment accounts and 

basic business accounts 28. The interpretative notes 29 state that there may currently be substantial 

challenges for private entrepreneurs and associations to open bank accounts in Denmark, for which 

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Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment 
and securities settlement systems (OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45). 
Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services 
in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 
1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (OJ L 337, 23.12.2015, p. 35). 
See Article 64(1), first sentence, of the Law on payments.  
See Article 64(2) of the Law on payments. 
See Article 3(1) of Guideline (EU) 2022/912 of the European Central Bank of 24 February 2022 on a new-generation 
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) and repealing 
Guideline ECB/2012/27 (ECB/2022/8) (OJ L 163, 17.6.2022, p. 84). Under Article 4 of Guideline (EU) 2022/912 
(ECB/2022/8) NCBs of Member States whose currency is not the euro may only connect to TARGET if they 
conclude an agreement with the Eurosystem central banks. TARGET-Danmark is Danmarks Nationalbank’s national 
TARGET component system. 
See Article 5(1), point 8, of the Law on payments. 
See Article 35(2) of the PSD2 (as amended by Article 3(2), point (a), of Regulation (EU) 2024/886). 
See Article 5(5) of the draft law, amending Article 64(2) of the Law on payments.  
See Article 145(1) of the Law on payments. 
Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees 
related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features (OJ L 
257, 28.8.2014, p. 214). 
See page 38 of the general comments to the interpretative notes. 
See Article 1(1) of the draft law, establishing a new title of the Law on payment accounts. 
See page 38 of the general comments to the interpretative notes. 

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reason the draft law aims to facilitate this within the wider framework of facilitating the establishment 

and running of private businesses and the receipt of public subsidies by associations. The draft law 

accordingly  proposes  to  add  to  the  Law  on  payment  accounts  a  new  Chapter  4a  regulating  the 

requirements for a basic business account in Danish kroner. More specifically, it is proposed, inter 

alia, to insert a new provision defining the ‘services that a trader or an association should be able to 

use  to  an  unlimited  extent’  in  relation  to  a  basic  business  account 30.  This  includes,  inter  alia,  the 

possibility to deposit funds in the account and withdraw funds from it, albeit that cash deposits are in 

fact limited to in total DKK 20 000 (approximately EUR 2 700) per month31. The interpretative notes 

indicate that the limitation on making cash deposits does not, however, restrict the credit institutions 

from  either  generally  or  via  individual  agreements  with  account  holders  allow  entrepreneurs  and 

associations to deposit cash to a larger extent32.  

2. 

General observations  

2.1 

In view of the notice given to the Council by the Danish Government on 3 November 1993, Denmark 

has an exemption from participating in the third stage of economic and monetary union. The effect 

of  this  exemption  is  that  all  articles  and  provisions  of  the  Treaties  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB 

referring  to  a  derogation  are  applicable  to  Denmark.  As  for  the  abrogation  of  the  exemption,  the 

procedure referred to in Article 140 of the Treaty on the abrogation of derogations of the Member 

States fulfilling the necessary conditions regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union 

are only to be initiated at the request of Denmark 33. 

2.2 

In accordance with Article 42.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, Danmarks Nationalbank retains its powers 

in the field of monetary policy according to national law. However, Article 131 of the Treaty and Article 

14.1 of the Statute of the ESCB, in accordance with Article 139(2) of the Treaty and Article 42.1 of 

the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  also  apply  to  Denmark,  so  that  Denmark  is  required  to  ensure  that  its 

national legislation, including the NCB’s statutes, is compatible with the Treaties and the Statute of 

the ESCB. Furthermore, as Article 130 of the Treaty and Article 7 and Article 14.2 of the Statute of 

the ESCB, in accordance with Article 139(2) of the Treaty and Articles 42.1 and 42.4 of the Statute 

of the ESCB, also apply to Denmark, Danish legislation must also comply with the requirements of 

central  bank  independence34.  Hence,  with  regard  to  compliance  issues  relating  to  central  bank 

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See Article 1(10) of the draft law, establishing a new Article 13a(1) of the Law on payment accounts. 
See Article 1(10) of the draft law, establishing a new Article 13a(1), point 3, of the Law on payment accounts. 
See page 127 of the specific comments to the interpretative notes. 
See Protocol (No 16) to the Treaty on certain provisions relating to Denmark, paragraphs 1 and 2. Furthermore, as 
elaborated in a Decision of the Heads of State and Government (Decision of Heads of State and Governments, 
Edinburgh Summit meeting on 11-12 December 1992), the consequence of Denmark having notified that it will not 
participate in the third stage of economic and monetary union is that it is not bound by the rules concerning 
economic policy, which apply only to the Member States participating in the third stage of economic and monetary 
union, and will retain its existing powers in the field of monetary policy according to its national laws and regulations, 
including Danmarks Nationalbank’s powers in the field of monetary policy. Moreover, Denmark participates fully in 
the second stage of economic and monetary union and continues to participate in exchange-rate cooperation within 
the European Monetary System. 
See ECB Convergence Report (June 2022), p. 17, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 

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independence, this opinion is based on the current legal understanding of the related requirements 35. 

Otherwise, this opinion refrains from commenting on matters relating to the possible legal integration 

of Danmarks Nationalbank into the Eurosystem, which would only be relevant if Denmark requests 

that the procedure for the abrogation of its exemption is initiated.  

2.3 

In addition, it is recalled that Danmarks Nationalbank retains its powers in the field of monetary policy 

according to national law. Given that oversight of clearing and payment systems is a task closely 

linked  to  its  monetary  policy  tasks,  the  Treaty  provisions  awarding  the  Eurosystem  oversight  on 

clearing and payment systems as part of its mandate pursuant to Article 127(2), fourth indent, of the 

Treaty, as mirrored in Article 3.1, fourth indent, and Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB, subject to 

which one of the basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB is to promote the smooth operation 

of payment systems, including the competence to provide facilities, make regulations and ensuring 

efficient and sound systems, does not apply to Member States with a derogation36. Consequently, 

according to Article 4 of Guideline (EU) 2022/912 (ECB/2022/8), the NCBs of Member States whose 

currency  is  not  the  euro  may  only  connect  to  TARGET  if  they  conclude  an  agreement  with  the 

Eurosystem central banks. Danmarks Nationalbank has concluded such an agreement, on the basis 

of  which  TARGET-Danmark  has  been  established  as  Danmarks  Nationalbank’s  TARGET 

component system. 

2.4  The ECB takes due account of the legal culture and legislative technique in Denmark, according to 

which  legislative  proposals  on  draft  laws  are  accompanied  by  interpretative  notes.  The  ECB 

understands  that  once  a  draft  law  has  been  adopted,  the  interpretative  notes  are  of  essential 

importance for the practical application of the adopted law, representing a very important tool for the 

courts to understand the intention of the legislator with respect to the adopted law, allowing the courts 

to apply the law in accordance therewith37.  

3. 

Term of office of the members of the Board of Governors of Danmarks Nationalbank 

3.1  Article  14.2,  first  subparagraph,  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB  requires  that  the  term  of  office  of  a 

Governor of an NCB must be no less than five years. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of 

Danmarks Nationalbank, is considered to be the Governor of Danmarks Nationalbank in the sense 

of  the  Treaty  and  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB.  Against  this  background,  the  ECB  welcomes  the 

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In March 1998 the former European Monetary Institute (EMI) established a list of features of central bank 
independence which were the basis for assessing the compatibility of Member States’ national legislation, in 
particular the NCBs’ statutes, with central bank independence requirements at that time. The concept of central bank 
independence articulated by the EMI included various types of independence that must be assessed separately, 
namely institutional, personal and financial independence. The EMI concluded that Danmarks Nationalbank’s statute 
did not contain incompatibilities in the area of central bank independence (See EMI Convergence Report: Report 
required by Article 109j of the Treaty establishing the European Community (March 1998), pp. 15 and 299, available 
on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu). There has been no assessment of the compliance of Danmarks 
Nationalbank’s statutes with central bank independence requirements since 1998 due to Denmark’s special status 
(See ECB Convergence Report (June 2022), p. 12, available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu). Over the 
years there have been further refinements of the analysis of the different aspects of central bank independence in 
the opinions adopted by the ECB, including functional independence (See paragraph 2.1 of Opinion CON/2019/12. 
All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex.), as well as jurisprudential developments regarding the concept of 
central bank independence at the Court of Justice of the European Union (see, e.g., Judgment of the Court of 10 
July 2003, Commission v ECB, Case C-11/00, EU:C:2003:395, paragraphs 130 to 145).  
See Article 42.1 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
See Justitsministeriets vejledning om lovkvalitet (Guide on Law Quality), p. 130, by the Ministry of Justice, available 
at www.lovkvalitet.dk (in Danish only). 

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introduction of a six-year fixed term of office for the members of the Board of Governors, with the 

option of one reappointment for an additional 6 years.  

3.2  Article  130  of  the  Treaty  and  Article  7  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  concerning  central  bank 

independence, both refer to ‘members of the decision-making bodies’ of NCBs. Applying the same 

rules for the security of tenure and the minimum term of office as applicable to the Governor to the 

other members of the decision-making bodies of NCBs involved in the performance of ESCB-related 

tasks safeguards their personal independence. Hence, the ECB also welcomes the introduction of a 

six-year fixed term of office, with the option of one reappointment for an additional period of six years, 

also with a view to the other members of the Board of Governors38. 

3.3  Furthermore, the ECB welcomes the clarification in the draft law that the proposed new tenure rule 

applies as from the point in time where the draft law has been enacted and enters into force on 1 

January 2025. This implies that the members of the Board of Governors appointed in accordance 

with the currently applicable rules will continue to remain subject to these rules. This ensures that 

the  current  members  of  Danmarks  Nationalbank’s  decision-making  bodies  undertaking  ESCB-

related matters are allowed to complete their current terms39.  

4. 

Oversight and operation competences of the Eurosystem and Danmarks Nationalbank 

4.1  The Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB provide for the Eurosystem to conduct oversight of clearing 

and payment systems as part of its mandate. Pursuant to Article 127(2), fourth indent, of the Treaty, 

as  mirrored  in  Article  3.1,  fourth  indent,  of  the  Statute  of  the  ESCB,  one  of  the  basic  tasks  to  be 

carried  out  through  the  ESCB  is  to  promote  the  smooth  operation  of  payment  systems.  In  the 

performance of this basic task, the members of the ESCB may provide facilities, and the ECB may 

make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems within the Union and 

with other countries 40.   

4.2  Pursuant to its oversight role, the ECB has adopted Regulation of the European Central Bank (EU) 

No 795/2014 (ECB/2014/28)41 (hereinafter the ‘SIPS Regulation’), which governs both large-value 

payment  systems  and  retail  payment  systems  of  systemic  importance,  operated  either  by  a 

Eurosystem central bank or a private entity. The SIPS Regulation includes, inter alia, provisions on 

the  establishment  and  disclosure  of  non-discriminatory  access  and  participation  criteria  for  the 

payment systems 42. In addition, non-systemic payment systems are overseen based on an oversight 

framework  for  retail  payment  systems 43,  which  also  contains  relevant  provisions  on  access  and 

participation criteria44.  

4.3  To date, the role of primary overseer of the payment systems that are in scope of the Eurosystem is 

assigned  by  reference  to  the  national  anchor  of  the  respective  payment  system  and  the  legal 

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See ECB Convergence Report (June 2024), available on the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See paragraph 3.3.3 of Opinion CON/2018/17 and paragraph 2.2.2 of Opinion CON/2019/36. 
See Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB.  
Regulation of the European Central Bank (EU) No 795/2014 of 3 July 2014 on oversight requirements for 
systemically important payment systems (ECB 2014/28) (OJ L 217, 23.7.2014, p. 16). 
See Article 16 of the SIPS Regulation. 
Eurosystem, ‘Revised oversight framework for retail payment systems’, February 2016, available on the ECB’s 
website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
In view of its mandate, the ECB may make further regulations, and carries out frequent reviews to check whether the 
scope of oversight covers all relevant functions and entities in the payment ecosystem. 

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incorporation  of  its  governance  body.  For  pan-European  payment  systems,  such  as  TARGET, 

including  TARGET-Danmark,  the  ECB  has  as  a  rule  the  primary  oversight  role,  unless  otherwise 

decided by the Governing Council45. 

4.4  Deciding whether to grant access to payment systems operated by Eurosystem central banks is an 

integral part of the Eurosystem’s basic task of promoting the smooth operation of payment systems 46, 

which  is  also  related  to  its  role  as  operator  of  payment  systems.  In  this  respect,  it  is  for  the 

Eurosystem  to  adopt  the  access  criteria  in  respect  of  payment  systems  in  euro  operated  by  the 

Eurosystem, such as TARGET, including the TARGET-Danmark national component.  

4.5  The Eurosystem has competence for, inter alia, the operation of payment systems by Eurosystem 

central banks as defined by the Treaty. Consequently, in order for TARGET-Danmark to continue 

settling euro payments in TARGET, Danmarks Nationalbank must be able to abide at all times by 

the  access  criteria  defined  by  the  Eurosystem  and  must  also  honour  its  obligations  under  the 

agreement  between  Danmarks  Nationalbank  and  the  ECB  on  the  establishment  of  Danmarks 

Nationalbank’s  TARGET  component  system,  without  any  interference  by  the  Danish  Competition 

and Consumer Authority. 

4.6  Danmarks Nationalbank’s oversight competence in respect of national payment systems is based on 

the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank 47, according to which Danmarks Nationalbank must maintain a 

safe and secure currency system and facilitate and regulate the traffic in money. In 2005, Danmarks 

Nationalbank  received  explicit  authorisation  for  supervision/oversight  in  the  Law  on  securities 

trading48,  which  is  now  contained  in  the  Law  on  capital  markets 49. Danmarks  Nationalbank  is  the 

only authority that oversees Danish payment systems, a task which includes ensuring that there is 

fair and open access to such systems. Danmarks Nationalbank performs the oversight task based 

on the international standards set out in the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures50. Thus, 

Danmarks  Nationalbank  ensures  objective,  non-discriminatory  and  proportionate  access  to 

KRONOS2  and  the  other  payment  systems  established  in  Denmark,  such  as  the  retail  payment 

system  operated  by  Finans  Danmark,  the  Danish  Bankers’  Association. In  accordance  with 

international best practice 51, to ensure consistency and equal treatment in the oversight of Danmarks 

Nationalbank’s  own  systems  and  other  systems,  Danmarks  Nationalbank’s  oversight  function  is 

distinct from its development and operation of payment systems function. The ECB notes that as the 

oversight  of  payment  systems  is  typically  a  central  bank  task,  Danmarks  Nationalbank  should  be 

able to continue exercising this task in an independent manner.  

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See Articles 1(2) and 2(5) of the SIPS Regulation, as well as paragraph 2.1.2 of Opinion CON/2024/13. 
See section 3 (‘Access to central bank-operated payment systems’) of Policy on access by non-bank payment 
service providers to central bank-operated payment systems and to central bank accounts, July 2024, available on 
the ECB’s website at www.ecb.europa.eu. 
See Article 1 of the Law on Danmarks Nationalbank.  
Lov on værdipapirhandel, Lov nr. 251 af 21/3/2017 (repealed). 
See Article 212(3) of the Law on capital markets (Lov om kapitalmarkeder, Lov. nr. 198 af 26/2/2024).  
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, April 2012, available on the Bank for International Settlements’ 
website at www.bis.org. 
See Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, paragraph 3.2.7. 

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5. 

Right of deposit in basic business accounts  

5.1  The  ECB  welcomes  the  proposed  facilitation  of  both  the  establishment  and  running  of  private 

businesses and associations by means of the proposed new regime for basic business accounts. 

The ECB understands that whilst the new regime is in principle based on the model for consumers’ 

access  to  basic  payment  accounts,  in  accordance  with  the  Payment  Accounts  Directive,  the 

proposed  law  introduces  a  new  requirement  that  holders  of  a  basic  business  account  may  only 

deposit a total of DKK 20 000 in cash per month.  

5.2  The ECB has in recent years opined on a number of reductions of the cash limit under the Danish 

money  laundering  regime52.  On  those  occasions  it  was  acknowledged  that  the  proposed 

amendments to the Law on money laundering had neither the objective nor the effect of amending 

the legal rules governing the status of legal tender. Furthermore, they did not lead, either in law or in 

effect, to the abolition of banknotes in Denmark. Likewise, it was welcomed that the draft measures 

did  not  apply  to  consumers  but  only  to  specific  groups  of  business-to-business  and  customer-to-

business payments 53. However, it was also noted that ‘no substantiation has been provided in the 

explanatory notes on the effect of the previous 2013 and 2020 reductions of the cash limitations. If 

such measures have not  produced the desired  effects, it is hard  to understand  why lowering that 

threshold to 15 000 DKK would be considered more appropriate and more effective54. In the same 

vein, whilst recognising that the current draft law is not related to combating money laundering, the 

ECB questions the need to limit monthly deposits of cash in basic business payment accounts to 

DKK 20 000, as this is a measure that has negative effects on the use of legal tender in payments in 

the future and  is likely to discredit cash. Whilst the  ECB understands that commercial banks that 

offer such basic payment accounts may set higher ceilings for monthly cash deposits, it is not clear 

which criteria the banks will apply if a business or association wants to open such an account with a 

higher ceiling or wants to lift this ceiling for an existing basic business account. While an analogy to 

the  Payment  Accounts  Directive  has  been  drawn,  which  has  inspired  this  new  type  of  payment 

account, the ECB notes that the Payment Accounts Directive requires Member States to ensure that 

a  payment  account  with  basic  features  allows  consumers  to  execute  an  unlimited  number  of 

operations in relation to services considered to be in the scope of the payment account with basic 

features,  including  enabling  cash  withdrawals 55.  Furthermore,  the  proposed  limitation  of  cash 

deposits  in  basic  business  accounts  would  constitute  a  disadvantage  for  certain  categories  of 

payment service users, which could be considered to contradict the very idea of the introduction of 

basic business accounts.  

52  
53  
54  
55  

Lov om hvidvask, nr. 807 af 21.6.2024. 
See Opinions CON/2013/9, CON/2020/33 and CON/2024/2.  
See paragraph 3.19 of Opinion CON/2024/2.  
See Article 17 of the Payment Accounts Directive. 

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5.3  As  a  possible  alternative  to  the  establishment  of  a  DKK  20 000  ceiling  for  cash  deposits  in  basic 

business accounts, it may be expected that the application of existing money laundering rules will 

provide for sufficient safeguards to identify and report suspicious transactions, including deposits of 

cash in basic business accounts, to the FSA.  

ECB-PUBLIC 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 30 August 2024. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

9