COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2023: own resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2023
Date: 2024-07-25
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, corruption, digitisation, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.7.2024  SWD(2024) 193 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2023: own resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure Accompanying the document REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2023 {COM(2024) 318 final} - {SWD(2024) 187 final} - {SWD(2024) 188 final} - {SWD(2024) 189 final} - {SWD(2024) 190 final} - {SWD(2024) 191 final} - {SWD(2024) 192 final}  
 
 
CONTENTS 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................. 3 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 4 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 11 

1.1.  Scope of the document .................................................................................... 11 
1.1.  Structure of the document ............................................................................... 11 

2.  TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES (TOR) ......................................................... 12 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 12 
2.1. 
2.2.  General analysis –trend analysis ..................................................................... 12 
2.2.1.  Reporting years 2019-2023 ............................................................... 12 
2.2.2.  OWNRES data vs TOR collection .................................................... 14 
2.2.3.  Recovery rates ................................................................................... 15 
2.3.  Specific analysis .............................................................................................. 16 
2.3.1.  Customs procedure ............................................................................ 16 
2.3.2.  Method of detection ........................................................................... 16 
2.3.3.  Type of infringement ......................................................................... 18 
2.3.4.  Type of goods, countries of origin .................................................... 18 
2.4.  Member States’ activities ................................................................................ 19 
2.5.  Commission’s monitoring ............................................................................... 20 
2.5.1.  Write-off reports ................................................................................ 20 
2.5.2.  Commission’s inspections ................................................................. 20 

3.  COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY ................................................................. 22 

3.1. 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 22 
3.2.  General trend ................................................................................................... 22 
3.3.  Modus operandi ............................................................................................... 25 
3.4.  Use of risk analysis and information from informants and media .................. 27 
3.5.  Duration of the irregularities ........................................................................... 28 
3.6.  Detection and reporting by Member State ...................................................... 28 
3.7.  Follow-up to suspected fraud .......................................................................... 33 

4.  COHESION AND FISHERIES POLICIES .............................................................. 36 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 36 
4.1. 
4.2.  General trend ................................................................................................... 36 
4.3.  Comparison programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 ...................... 39 
4.4.  Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by area of the cohesion policy .... 41 
4.5.  Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by type of violation ..................... 46 
4.6.  Risk analysis and spontaneous reporting......................................................... 47 
4.7.  Duration of irregularities ................................................................................. 48 
4.8.  Detection and reporting by Member State ...................................................... 49 
4.9.  Follow-up to suspected fraud .......................................................................... 55 

 
 
 
4.10.  Other internal policies ..................................................................................... 57 

5.  PRE-ACCESSION POLICY..................................................................................... 58 

5.1. 
5.2. 

Introduction ..................................................................................................... 58 
Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance ....................................................... 58 
5.2.1.  Before 2007: pre-accession Assistance (PAA) ................................. 58 
2007-2013: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA I) .... 59 
5.2.2. 
2014 – 2020: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) 59 
5.2.3. 
2021  –  2027:  The  Instrument  for  Pre-accession  Assistance  (IPA 
5.2.4. 
III) ...................................................................................................... 59 
5.3.  General trend ................................................................................................... 60 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I, 2007-2013) ........................ 62 
5.4. 
5.4.1.  Recent trends ..................................................................................... 62 
5.4.2.  Trends  since  the  start  of  IPA  I,  by  beneficiary  country  and 

5.5. 

component ......................................................................................... 63 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II 2014-2020) ..................... 65 
5.5.1.  Trends ................................................................................................ 65 
5.5.2.  Trends  since  the  start  of  IPA  II,  by  beneficiary  country  and 

component ......................................................................................... 67 

6.  DIRECT MANAGEMENT ....................................................................................... 68 

6.1. 
Introduction ..................................................................................................... 68 
6.2.  General overview ............................................................................................ 68 
6.3.  General 5-year analysis 2019-2023 ................................................................. 69 
6.4.  Specific analysis .............................................................................................. 70 
6.4.1.  Recoveries according to MFF headings ............................................ 70 
6.4.2.  Recoveries according to residence of legal entity ............................. 70 
6.4.3.  Method of detection ........................................................................... 71 
6.4.4.  Type of irregularity ........................................................................... 72 

COUNTRY FACTSHEETS .............................................................................................. 73 

Belgium - Belgique/België ........................................................................................ 75 
Bulgaria – България ................................................................................................. 77 
Czech Republic - Česká republika ............................................................................ 78 
Denmark – Danmark ................................................................................................. 80 
Germany – Deutschland ............................................................................................ 82 
Estonia – Eesti ........................................................................................................... 84 
Ireland – Éire ............................................................................................................. 86 
Greece – Ελλάδα ....................................................................................................... 88 
Spain – España .......................................................................................................... 90 
France ........................................................................................................................ 92 
Croatia – Hrvatska ..................................................................................................... 94 
Italy – Italia ............................................................................................................... 96 
Cyprus – Κύπρος ....................................................................................................... 98 
Latvia – Latvija ....................................................................................................... 100 
Lithuania – Lietuva ................................................................................................. 102 

 
 
Luxembourg ............................................................................................................ 103 
Hungary - Magyarország ......................................................................................... 105 
Malta 107 
Netherlands - Nederland .......................................................................................... 109 
Austria – Österreich ................................................................................................ 111 
Poland – Polska ....................................................................................................... 113 
Portugal ................................................................................................................... 115 
Romania – România ................................................................................................ 117 
Slovenia – Slovenija ................................................................................................ 119 
Slovakia – Slovensko .............................................................................................. 121 
Finland – Suomi-Finland ......................................................................................... 123 
Sweden – Sverige .................................................................................................... 125 

ANNEXES ...................................................................................................................... 127 

 
 
 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

AMIF 
CAP 
CARDS 
CBC 
CF 
DA 
EAFRD 
EAGF 
EAGGF 
EFF 
EGF 
EMFF 
ERDF 
ESF 
ESIF 
FAL 
FDR 
FEAD 
FFL 
GUID 
HRD 
IDR 
IMS 
IPA 
IPARD 
ISF 
ISPA 
MM 
PAA 
PHARE 
PP 
RD 
REGD 
SA 
SAPARD 
TAIB 
TIPAA 
TOR 
YEI 

Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 
Common Agricultural Policy 
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation 
Cross-Border Cooperation 
Cohesion Fund 
Direct payments to farmers 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
European Fisheries Fund 
European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 
European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
European Regional Development Fund 
European Social Fund 
European Structural and Investment Funds 
Fraud Amount Level 
Fraud Detection Rate 
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
Fraud Frequency Level 
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund – Section Guidance 
Pre-accession, Human Resources Development component 
Irregularities Detection Rate 
Irregularity Management System 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural Development 
Internal Security Fund 
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession 
Market Support Measures 
Pre-Accession Assistance 2000-2006 
Pre-accession assistance programme 
Programming period 
Rural Development 
Pre-accession, Regional Development component 
Direct Support to Agriculture 
Special Accession Programme for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 
Turkey Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
Traditional Own Resources 
Youth Employment Initiative 

3 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Revenue – traditional own resources (TOR) 

In  2023,  the  number  of  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  (5 118)  related  to 
TOR was  10% higher  than the  average number of irregularities  reported during the past  5 
years. However, the total estimated and established amount of TOR decreased by 12% to 
EUR 478 million. In comparison to the 5-year average for 2019-2023, in 2023 the number of 
fraudulent  irregularities  fell  by  27%,  while  the  number  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities 
increased  by  15%.  Compared  to  the  5-year  period,  the  related  estimated  and  established 
amounts  of  TOR  decreased  by  54%  for  fraudulent  cases  and  by  less  than  1%  for  non-
fraudulent cases.  

The overall recovery rate (RR) for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities is currently 
77% for the 2023 reporting year. Although the EU-27 recovered almost EUR 341 million in 
total  (out  of  EUR 443  million  of  the  established  amount  of  TOR),  the  recovery  rate  varies 
between  the  Member  States.  The  RR  for  non-fraudulent  cases  is  82%,  but  falls  to  25%  for 
fraudulent cases. 

of 

type 

infringement 

While  smuggling  remains  one  of  the  main  modus  operandi  for  fraudulent  cases,  the  most 
common 
incorrect 
classification/misdescription of goods. In monetary terms, most cases reported in 2023 relate 
to  the  incorrect  value  of  goods  (1 157  cases  amounting  to  EUR 165  million  of  TOR 
involved).  Textiles  and footwear  continue  to  be  the  most  affected  goods,  in  terms  of  both 
number  of  cases  and  value.  China,  the  United  States  and  Vietnam  remain  the  top  three 
countries of origin of goods affected by irregularities.  

non-fraudulent 

cases 

for 

is 

In  2023,  a  total  of  13  Member  States  reported  87  cases  of  smuggled  cigarettes  involving 
nearly  EUR 13 million  of  the  estimated  amount  of  TOR.  The  highest  number  of  cases  was 
reported  by  Lithuania  (23)  and  the  highest  amount  of  TOR  was  reported  by  Belgium 
(EUR 3.8 million in total). Compared to 2022, 11 Member States continue to have smuggling 
cases (Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania)  while  some  Member  States  reappear  in  the  statistics  after  a  break  (Slovakia, 
Finland).  This  might  indicate  a  potential  shift  of  fraud  or  of  cigarette  smuggling  routes  to 
other Member States. 

Release for free circulation remains the customs procedure most affected by irregularities 
(4 236  cases  with  an  overall  estimated  and  established  amount  of  EUR 397 million;  this 
translates into 83% of all cases and amounts reported for 2023, considering both fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent cases). 

In 2023,  inspections  by national  anti-fraud services (41% of  cases  and 61% of  amounts) 
together  with  customs  release  controls  and  post-release  controls  played  a  crucial  role  in 
detecting fraudulent cases. Non-fraudulent instances were primarily detected by post-release 
controls (44% of cases, with 34% of amounts), although other methods of detection, such as 
release controls and tax audits were also successful.   

In  2023,  the  Commission  focused  its  on-the-spot  inspections  in  the  Member  States  on  the 
control  strategy  for  end-use  procedure  and  keeping  of  the  separate  account  and  the 
corrections  of  the  normal  account.  Furthermore,  the  Commission  continued  its  close 
monitoring  of  Member  States’  actions  and  followed  up  on  previously  initiated  desk  audits 
and observations made during its inspections. 

Expenditure - common agricultural policy 

4 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

During  the  period  2019-2023,  fraudulent  irregularities  reported  for  rural  development 
increased,  mainly  due  to  the  rising  number  of  detections  for  the  programming  period 
2014-2020. However, the number of these fraudulent irregularities was lower than expected. 
This  should  be  monitored  to  ensure  focus  on  fraud  detection.  A  similar  trend  concerned 
non-fraudulent irregularities. It was less noticeable, but the gap is becoming significant. The 
fraudulent irregularities under support to agriculture peaked in 2022, when the number was 
influenced  by  one  Member  State,  reporting  many  small  inter-linked  cases.  The  irregular 
financial amounts involved in non-fraudulent irregularities fluctuated strongly, mainly due to 
the  reporting  in  some  years,  where  few  cases  relating  to  market  measures  involved 
exceptional  amounts.  Several  irregularities  covered  both  rural  development  and  direct 
payments to farmers. This was more frequent for fraudulent irregularities. 

During the period 2019-2023, the financial amounts involved in the irregularities reported as 
fraudulent came to about EUR 134 million. The total EU funding granted to the projects or 
operations affected by these irregularities was about  EUR 163 million.  This  meant  that  the 
irregular financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities accounted for about 82% of 
the  value  of  the  related  operations.  This  proportion  differs  depending  on  the  CAP  sector 
(being lower for market measures and higher for rural development and direct payments) and 
on the Member State.        

Detection  rates  for  rural  development  were  much  higher  than  for  support  to  agriculture. 
However,  one  part  of  support  to  agriculture,  market  measures,  accounted  for  the  highest 
detection  rates.  The  detection  of  irregularities,  especially  fraud,  was  concentrated  in  a  few 
Member States. 

During  the  period  2019-2023,  fraudulent  irregularities  often  concerned  falsification  of  the 
request  for  aid  or  of  documentary  proof.  For  market  measures  and  rural  development,  
infringements  concerning  the  implementation  of  the  action  were  also  frequently  reported. 
Risks and infringements depend on the type of measure.  

For example, applicants  for  direct payments may request  aid  for plots of land they do not 
have  the  right  to  use  on  the  basis  of  false  lease  agreements  or  may  artificially  create  the 
conditions for receiving financial support. Risks related to artificial splitting of an agricultural 
holding  may  increase,  as  far  as  the  Member  States  will  increase  payments  to  small  and 
medium-size  farms,  which  may  also  translate  in  reducing  payments  to  larger  farms,  also 
through  voluntary  capping  and  degressive  reduction.  Risks  related  to  respect  of  good 
agricultural and environmental conditions and support for environmental commitments may 
increase.  While  continuing  to  improve  checks  on  entitlements  related  to  the  main  direct 
payments,  agricultural  practices,  including  those  beneficial  for  the  climate  and  the 
environment, may also deserve increased attention from controlling authorities, with a view 
to identifying intentional infringements. The same may apply to payments schemes based on 
the number and type of  animals.  From 2025,  farmers  failing  to  respect  the  basic social and 
labour rights of farm workers may face administrative penalties by way of reduced payments. 
This will require effective cooperation between the paying agencies and the bodies entrusted 
with control on compliance with labour regulations. 

Infringements  related  to  market  measures  may  concern,  for  example,  the  withdrawal  of 
agricultural  products  from  the  market,  the  cost,  actual  implementation  or  actual  use  for  the 
intended purpose of investments by producer organisations - such as works for storage sites 
or  the  purchase  of  machinery  or  equipment.  Risks  related  to  the  funding  of  producer 
organisations  were  significant  and  they  may  increase  under  the  new  CAP,  as  this  type  of 
funding is extended beyond the fruit and vegetables sector to most agricultural sectors. Risks 

5 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

related to  environmental actions  could  potentially  also concern the fruit and vegetables  and 
the  wine  sectors.  OLAF  investigated  several  cases  related  to  the  promotion  of  agricultural 
products,  uncovering  complex  fraudulent  schemes  based  on  conflict  of  interests,  kickback 
payments,  manipulated  procurement  procedures,  price 
incomplete 
implementation of the actions. 

inflation,  and 

In  rural  development,  beneficiaries  may,  for  example,  use  false  invoices,  declarations  of 
equipment  as  new  when  it  is  in  fact  second-hand,  manipulated  bids  in  the  context  of 
procurement  and  false  information  on  compliance  with  conditions  for  receiving  aid. 
Infringements may concern information the applicant provides to get the project selected, to 
receive advance payments, or to fulfil criteria for access to a support scheme. The beneficiary 
may infringe the rules on procurement, may request reimbursement for inflated costs or even 
for inexistent transactions, or may ask for reimbursement for costs already funded in another 
context. The beneficiary may also fail to follow the business plan, fail to use the investment 
for the intended purpose or fail to use it at all. Area and animal-related spending may deserve 
more attention, with a view to identifying intentional infringements. 

During 2019-2023, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to detecting fraud in rural 
development and direct payments to farmers, while in market measures it seems it played a 
stronger  role  (but  only  if  scrutiny  activities  were  actually  based  on  risk  analysis). 
Furthermore, 
informants  and 
whistle-blowers  was  low,  with  the  exception  of  market  measures,  where  it  reached  11%. 
However,  this  figure  may  be  volatile  as  it  is  based  on  very  few  cases.  Fraud  was  never 
detected following information published in the media. 

the  share  of  fraud  detections  based  on  tips  from 

For  10%  of  the  irregularities  reported  during  2014-2023,  there  is  or  has  been  a 
suspicion of fraud (incidence of fraud). In 11% of such cases, this suspicion was not initially 
reported and the Member State reclassified the irregularity as fraudulent at a later stage.  

For  just  16%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed as established fraud, while for 11% the suspicion was dismissed. Most of the 
irregularities where there was a suspicion of fraud are still classified as suspected fraud, even 
if several years have elapsed since the initial reporting.  

Significant  differences  between  Member  States  can  be  found  in  the  above-mentioned 
percentages. In Member States with low incidence of fraud, the competent authorities should 
invest  in  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  when  discovering  irregularities,  should  carefully 
address the question of intentionality. Low incidence of fraud could also be due to reporting 
practices  delaying  classification  as  suspected  fraud.  These  reporting  practices  should  be 
reviewed or engagement with the judicial authorities should be improved. In many Member 
States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  still  classified  as  suspected  fraud  is  extremely  high. 
This  may  suggest  that  the  judicial  authorities  do  not  give  proper  follow-up  to  these 
suspicions, including because they may not have sufficient resources. Alternatively, it could 
be that there are no proper communication channels from judicial to reporting authorities. 

Expenditure - cohesion and fisheries policies 

Fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  the  programming  period  2007-2013  peaked  in  2015, 
before  gradually  decreasing  in  the  following  years.  In  2018  they  were  overtaken  by  those 
related to the programming period 2014-2020. These dynamics are in line with known trends 
and  patterns  linked  to  the  multiannual  implementation  cycles.  Since  2017,  reporting  of 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  the  programming  period  2014-2020  has  been 
increasing, but less than expected. The number and financial amounts of the non-fraudulent 

6 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

irregularities reported from 2014 to 2023 (10 years) for the programming period 2014-2020 
are much lower than those reported from 2007 to 2016 (10 years) for the programming 
period 2007-2013. It concerns all funds and most of the Member States. An analysis of this 
trend  has  been  published  with  past  years’  reports  on  the  protection  of  the  EU  financial 
interests (PIF reports). A gap has also recently been emerging for the number of irregularities 
reported as fraudulent, even if this gap is much smaller.  

During  the  period  2019-2023,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  irregularities  reported  as 
fraudulent  were  about  EUR 1.4 billion.  The  total  EU  funding  granted  to  the  projects  or 
operations  affected  by  these  irregularities  was  about  EUR  5  billion.  This  meant  that  the 
irregular financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities accounted from about 27% of 
the value of the related operations. This proportion differs depending on the Fund and on the 
Member State. It is very low for the ESF, which may  also be due to the type of operations 
financed by this Fund. In general, a low proportion means that there is fraud (or a suspicion 
of  fraud),  but  this  concerns  just  part  of  the  operation/project,  while  the  remaining  part  is 
considered  legal  and  regular  and  funding  is  confirmed.  While  it  depends  on  the  type  of 
operation/project  and  on  the  type  and  specific  circumstances  of  the  fraudulent  behaviour, 
careful assessment is required to confirm funding to an operation/project affected by fraud. 

For the cohesion policy, analysis suggests that a number of areas may be more affected 
by  fraud  than  others.  These  are  (i)  investments  in  the  green  transition,  including  the 
protection of the environment, adaptating to climate change and risk prevention, the transition 
to  a  low  carbon  economy.  In  the  ‘green  transition’  area,  the  management  and  provision  of 
water, waste management and energy efficiency seem to be the most  affected. Waste water 
treatment, renewable energy (solar) and funding for the development of natural assets seem to 
have  a  particular  potential  vulnerability  to  fraud;  (ii)  strengthening  research,  technological 
development and innovation (RTD&I), in particular assistance to RTD&I activities in firms, 
especially  SMEs;  (iii)  funding  to  promote  sustainable  transport;  (iv)  promotion  of 
employment, where adaptation to change of workers and enterprises and the modernisation of 
the labour market seem the most affected. Support to self-employment and business start-ups 
seems  to  have  a  particular  potential  vulnerability  to  fraud;  (v)  financing  to  enhance  the 
competitiveness  of  SMEs.  Other  areas  may  have  a  particular  potential  vulnerability  to 
fraud  because  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  This  includes  investments  for  digitalisation 
and for the promotion of social inclusion.  

Concerning  fraud,  the  most  frequent  type  of  infringements  concerned  supporting 
documents.  Financial  amounts  involved  were  large  in  fraudulent  irregularities  where  there 
were  infringements  of  contract  provisions/rules,  often  consisting  in  incomplete  or 
non-implementation of the funded action. Infringements of public procurement rules were 
the  most  reported  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  but  they  rarely  led  to  a  suspicion  of  fraud. 
This  suggests  a  need  for  improvement  either  in  fraud  detection  or  in  the  administrative 
capability of contracting authorities. Most of the fraudulent infringements concerning ethics 
and integrity were related to conflict of interests (about 70%), while about 23% concerned 
corruption/bribery. 

During  2019-2023,  risk  analysis  still  only marginally  contributed  to  detecting  fraud,  while 
civil  society  (including  tips  from  informants,  whistle-blowers  and  information  published  in 
the  media)  overall  played  a  larger  role  than  in  the  previous  5  years.  On  non-fraudulent 
irregularities, neither risk analysis nor information from civil society played a noticeable role 
in  detection.  The  low  share  of  irregularities  detected  following  risk  analysis  suggests  room 
for improvement in this domain, including through ex post risk analysis projects focusing on 

7 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

groups  of  past  transactions,  with  a  view  to  carrying  out  targeted  ex  post  controls.  National 
anti-fraud strategies should consider strengthening the national anti-fraud landscape through 
the systematic involvement of bodies that are: (i) external to management and control system 
specific to the use of EU funds; and (ii) endowed with the necessary powers, information and 
resources.      

With regard to the programming period 2014-2020, it took on average about 1 year and a half 
to come to a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and  nearly 2 years 
and a half to close the fraudulent case after reporting to the Commission.  

The fraud detection rate for the programming period 2014-2020 is 0.53%, which is similar 
to  the programming  period 2007-2013. The  irregularity detection rate  is 0.67%, which is 
much lower than the rate recorded for the programming period 2007-2013 (2.5%). Detection 
and reporting vary significantly between Member States. 

For  just  7%  of  the  irregularities  reported  during  2014-2023,  there  is  or  has  been  a 
suspicion  of  fraud  (incidence  of  fraud).  For  15%  of  such  irregularities,  this  suspicion  was 
not initially reported and the Member State reclassified the irregularity as fraudulent at a later 
stage.  

For  just  13%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed as established fraud, while for 14% the suspicion was dismissed. However, the 
dismissal ratio is getting quite high for years that are further in the past. On the one hand, a 
high  dismissal  ratio might  be due to  incorrect  assessments  by the administrative authorities 
when  they  reported  a  case  as  a  suspicion  of  fraud  to  the  competent  bodies  for  further 
investigation. On the other hand, this might be due to the resources these competent bodies 
can actually devote to investigating such suspicions. Most of the irregularities where there 
was a suspicion of fraud are still classified as suspected fraud, even if several years have 
elapsed since the initial reporting.  

Significant  differences  between  Member  States  can  be  found  in  the  above-mentioned 
percentages.  In  the  Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud,  the  competent  authorities 
should  invest  in  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  when  discovering  irregularities,  should 
carefully address the question of intentionality. Low incidence of fraud could also be due to 
reporting  practices  delaying  classification  as  suspected  fraud.  These  reporting  practices 
should be reviewed or engagement with the judicial authorities improved. In many Member 
States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  still  classified  as  suspected  fraud  is  extremely  high. 
This  may  suggest  that  the  judicial  authorities  do  not  give  proper  follow-up  to  these 
suspicions,  including  because  they  may  not  have  sufficient  resources.  Alternatively,  there 
may not be any proper communication channels from judicial to reporting authorities. 

Expenditure - pre-accession 

Under  pre-accession  programmes,  the  irregularities  reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries 
during  the  past  5  years  (2019-2023)  mainly  concerned  the  Instruments  for  Pre-accession 
Assistance  for  the  period  2007-2013  (IPA I)  and  for  the  period  2014-2020  (IPA II).  About 
8%  of  the  irregularities  were  reported  as  fraudulent.  In  2023,  the  financial  amounts 
involved in fraudulent irregularities jumped to about EUR 19 million, due to one irregularity 
reported  by  Türkiye,  in  relation  to  regional  development  (REGD).  The  number  of 
non-fraudulent irregularities experienced an exceptional increase in 2022 and remained 
high  in  2023.  This  was  mainly  due  to  irregularities  in  North  Macedonia  and  Türkiye 
related to IPA II over the component for rural development (IPARD). The majority of these 
irregularities involved less than EUR 10 000 (‘below-10 000’ irregularities). Overall, during 

8 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

2019-2023,  half  of  the  reported  irregularities  involved  less  than  EUR 10 000.  Concerning 
these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities,  about  72%  concerned  IPARD,  Türkiye  and  North 
Macedonia reported 70% of them and 64% of them were reported in 2022-2023 (contributing 
to the exceptional increase in non-fraudulent irregularities).   

Focusing  on  IPA I  during  the  past  5  years,  the  number  of  these  irregularities  and  the 
financial  amounts  involved  fell  markedly,  as  the  programmes  were  closed  years  ago. 
However, since 2007, 10 beneficiary countries have reported 871 irregularities related to five 
components.  The  highest  number  of  irregularities  concerned  IPARD.  About  88%  of  the 
irregularities  related  to  IPARD  were  detected  by  Türkiye.  A  broader  range  of  countries 
reported irregularities concerning cross-border cooperation (CBC) programmes, the second 
most  affected  component  of  IPA I.  The  majority  of  these  irregularities  were  reported  by 
Bulgaria.  In  addition  to  reporting  most  of  the  IPARD  irregularities,  Türkiye  also  reported 
76%  of  the  irregularities  related  to  human  resources  development  programmes,  the  third 
most affected component of IPA I. 

As for IPA II during the past 5 years, the number of irregularities increased markedly in 
2022  and  remained  high  2023,  due  in  part  to  the  high  number  of  ‘below-10 000’ 
irregularities. More than 70% of the non-fraudulent irregularities reported during 2022-2023 
concerned  IPARD.  About  55%  of  these  IPARD  irregularities  were  reported  by  Türkiye, 
followed by North Macedonia (24%) and Albania (18%). During 2019-2023, about 62% of 
fraudulent irregularities were reported by Türkiye and 29% by Serbia. About 71% of them 
concerned  IPARD  and  14%  were  related  to  CBC.  Overall,  the  740  irregularities  related  to 
IPA II  concerned  five  components  and  were  reported  by  eight  countries.  The  highest 
number of cases and the highest financial amounts concerned IPARD. The main contributor 
to  detection  was  Türkiye,  which  reported  about  48%  of  irregularities,  followed  by  North 
Macedonia (21%) and Albania (17%). However, 73% of the irregularities reported by North 
Macedonia and 55% of those reported by Türkiye were ‘below-10 000’. Most of the financial 
amounts  were  involved  in  irregularities  reported  by  Türkiye,  due  also  to  an  irregularity 
concerning REGD, which related to a figure of about EUR 18 million. Serbia recorded the 
highest  average  financial  amounts  involved  in  irregularities  (about  EUR 90 000).  In  the 
other  beneficiary  countries,  this  average  was  around  EUR 30 000  (excluding  the  outlier 
reported  by  Türkiye).  Looking  at  irregularities  since  2014,  the  overall  picture  does  not 
change significantly. This  is  because before 2019  the beneficiary countries reported just 18 
additional irregularities (of which 3 were fraudulent).  

Expenditure - direct management 

For  the  2023  financial  year,  a  total  of  EUR 42.34  billion  was  disbursed  under  the  ‘direct 
management’ mode (RRF not included). Overall, the spending (excluding RRF)  was higher 
than in the previous year. 

For  the  2023  financial  year,  the  Commission  registered  892  recovery  items  qualified  as 
irregularities,  for  a  total  financial  value  of  EUR 52.55  million  in  irregular  amounts. 
Among  these  recovery  items,  20  have  been  reported  as  fraudulent  irregularities,  involving 
EUR 1.87 million in irregular amounts. 

During 2019-2023, in relation to fraudulent irregularities, the ratio of irregular financial 
amounts to expenditure gradually decreased and remains close to zero (5-year average of 
0.02%).  During  the  same  period,  in  relation  to  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  the  ratio  of 
irregular financial amounts to expenditure was around 0.17%. 

9 

 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

In the 2023 financial year, the highest number of recovery items qualified as non-fraudulent 
irregularities  was  recorded  for  the  heading  ‘Single  market,  innovation  and  digital’ (517). 
The  same  area  is  responsible  for  the  highest  irregular  (non-fraudulent)  amounts  registered 
(EUR 34.48 million).  

For  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  during  2019-2023,  74.1%  of  the  total  number  of  recovery 
items  and  71.3%  of  the  related  recovery  amounts  concerned  legal  entities  resident  in  the 
EU-27. For fraudulent irregularities, these ratios are slightly lower: 72% of the total number 
of  recovery  items  and  70.7%  of  the  related  recovery  amounts  concerned  a  legal  entity 
resident in the EU-27. 

During  2019-2023,  OLAF  was  mentioned  as  the  source  of  detection  for  fraudulent 
irregularities in relation to 88.4% of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1% of total recovery 
amounts. Around 97.1% of non-fraudulent irregularities were detected through Commission 
controls (ex ante and ex post controls). 

‘Amount  ineligible’  was  the  most  frequent  type  of  irregularity  reported  during  the  past  5 
years, in relation to both fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities. 

10 

 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  

1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. Scope of the document 

This document1 presents a statistical evaluation of the irregularities and fraud detected by the 
Member States during 2023, in the context of past years and relevant programming periods 
(PP).  It  covers  both  the  revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  EU  budget.  This  analysis  is 
based  on  the  notifications  provided  by  national  authorities  of  cases  of  irregularities  and 
suspected or established fraud. Their reporting is performed in fulfilment of a legal obligation 
enshrined  in  sectoral  European  legislation.  The  document  accompanies  the  Annual  Report 
adopted  on  the  basis  of  Article 325(5)  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European 
Union  (TFEU),  according  to  which  “The  Commission,  in  cooperation  with  Member  States, 
shall  each  year  submit  to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  a  report  on  the 
measures  taken  for  the  implementation  of  this  article”.  Therefore,  this  document  should  be 
regarded as an analysis of the achievements of the Member States, in terms of detection and 
reporting. 

The methodology (including the definition of terms and indicators), the data sources and the 
data  capture  systems  are  explained  in  detail  in  the  Commission  Staff  Working  Document  – 
Methodology for the Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities accompanying the Annual Report 
on the Protection of the EU financial interests (the ‘PIF report’) for the year 20152. 

1.1. 

Structure of the document 

The  present  document  is  divided  in  five  parts.  The  first  part  includes  an  analysis  of  the 
irregularities reported in the area of traditional own resources (revenue). The four subsequent 
parts of the document are dedicated to irregularities reported in the area of expenditure (i) for 
the common agricultural policy; (ii) for cohesion policy, fisheries and other internal policies; 
(iii) for pre-accession policy and (iv) under direct management. 

The  document  is  completed  by  27  country  factsheets,  which,  for  each  Member  State,  (i) 
summarise  the  main  indicators  and  information  on  the  detection  of  irregularities  and  fraud; 
and (ii) provide a picture of the anti-fraud landscape. 

Several  annexes  complement  the  information  and  data,  providing  a  global  overview  of  the 
irregularities reported according to the relevant sector regulations. Annexes 1 to 12 concern 
traditional  own  resources.  Annex  13  cover  all  the  expenditure  sectors  for  which  Member 
States and beneficiary countries have a reporting obligation. 

1 This document does not represent an official position of the Commission. 
2 SWD(2016)237final 
 http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/methodology_statistical_evaluation_2015_en.pdf 

11 

 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

2.  TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES (TOR) 

2.1. 

Introduction 

Section  2  presents  a  statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  and  fraud  detected  by  the  Member 
States  during  2023  in  revenue  under  the  traditional  own  resources  (TOR).  It  places  these 
detections  in  the  context  of  past  years  together  with  their  financial  impact.  These  statistics  are 
based  on  the  total  estimated  and  established  amounts  of  TOR  as  reported  in  the  OWNRES 
application3. Figures on recovery are based solely on established amounts.  

The following analysis is based on the data extracted on the cut-off date (15 March 2024). The 
same applies for the conversion from national currencies into EUR which has been made based 
on the InforEuro exchange rate applicable on 15 March 2024.  

For  comparability  reasons  with  previous  years,  the  analysis  is  carried  out  based  on  the  figures 
obtained for the European Union of 27 Member States (EU-27). The United Kingdom’s figures 
can nevertheless be found in the annexes. 

2.2.  General analysis –trend analysis 

2.2.1.  Reporting years 2019-2023 

In 2023, the total number of cases reported via OWNRES (5 118) is about 10% higher than the 
average  number  of  cases  reported  for  the  5-year  period  2019-2023  (4 638).  However,  the  total 
estimated  and  established  amount  of  TOR  involved  (EUR 478 million)  is  about  12%  lower 
than  the  average  estimated  and  established  amount  for  years  2019-2023  (EUR 545 million).4 
Chart TOR1 shows that the number of cases has been steadily increasing since 2020, while the 
amount fell in 2023.  

CHART TOR1: Total number of OWNRES cases and the related estimated and established amount (2019-2023) 

s
e
s
a
c

f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0

R
U
E

n
o

i
l
l
i

m
n

i

s
t
n
u
o
m
A

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

  Estimated and established amount

   Number of cases

3 The OWNRES application enables the Member States to report cases of fraud or irregularity involving traditional 
own  resources  of  more  than  EUR  10 000,  as  required  by  Article 5(1)  of  Regulation  No 2021/768  laying  down 
implementing measures for the system of own resources. 
4 See Annex 1. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

This drop is due to the fact that the 2022 amount was significantly affected by five major cases5 
of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  reported  by  Belgium  (EUR  368  million)  and  two  major  cases 
reported by the Netherlands (EUR 23 million). The figures for 2023 have not been affected by 
any case exceeding EUR 10 million.  

In  2023,  the  average  amount  per  case  was  EUR 93 476,  whereas  the  5-year  average  stood  at 
EUR 117 406.  The  highest  number  of  cases  and  amounts  were  by  far  reported  in  Germany 
(2 081  cases  with  EUR 197 million).  Spain,  which  came  second,  reported  480  cases  totalling 
EUR 63 million.  

2.2.1.1.Irregularities reported as fraudulent 

The  number  of  cases  reported  as  fraudulent  (340)  is  currently  27%  lower  than  the  average 
number  of  cases  reported  as  fraudulent  for  the  5-year  period  2019-2023  (468).  Moreover,  the 
total estimated and established amount of TOR decreased by 54% in 2023 (EUR 53 million) 
compared to the average amount for years 2019-2023 (EUR 116 million)6. 

CHART TOR2: OWNRES cases reported as fraudulent and the related estimated and established amount (2019-2023) 

s
e
s
a
c

f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0

R
U
E

n
o

i
l
l
i

m
n

i

s
t
n
u
o
m
A

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

  Estimated and established amount

   Number of cases

The average  amount per fraudulent case therefore decreased to  EUR 155 661, compared to  the 
5-year  average  of  EUR 247 607.  In  general,  the  share  of  fraudulent  cases  has  been  declining. 
Only about 7% of all cases detected in 2023 were classified as fraudulent, representing 11% 
of the total amount of TOR involved. 

In 2023, seven Member States did not report any fraudulent case exceeding EUR 10 000, namely 
Czechia,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden.  In  addition, 
Luxembourg and Malta have reported zero fraudulent cases during the past 5 years.  

2.2.1.2. Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 

Nearly 93% of cases were not classified as fraudulent in 2023 (4 778). This gives an almost 
15% increase on the average number of cases communicated for the 2019-2023 period (4 170). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  estimated  and  established  amount  of  TOR  remains  rather  stable 

5 Cases with an amount of TOR exceeding EUR 10 million.  
6 See Annex 2. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

(EUR 425 million)  with  a 
(EUR 428 million). This figure represents 89% of the total amount of TOR reported in 2023.7  

less  than  1%  decrease  compared 

the  5-year  average 

to 

CHART TOR3: OWNRES cases reported as non-fraudulent and the related estimated and established amount (2019-2023) 

s
e
s
a
c

f
o
r
e
b
m
u
N

6.000

5.000

4.000

3.000

2.000

1.000

0

R
U
E

n
o

i
l
l
i

m
n

i

s
t
n
u
o
m
A

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

  Estimated and established amount

   Number of cases

Estonia  and  Luxembourg  did  not  report  any  case  of  non-fraudulent  irregularity  exceeding 
EUR 10 000  for  2023.  The  average  amount  per  case  was  EUR 89 051,  which  is  significantly 
lower  than  for  fraudulent  cases.  The  5-year  average  for  the  2019-2023  period  stands  at 
EUR 102 792 per non-fraudulent case. 

2.2.2.  OWNRES data vs TOR collection  

According to OWNRES data, about EUR 478 million has been established or estimated by the 
Member States in connection with reported fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities where the 
amount  exceeds  EUR 10 000.  In  2023,  the  total  established  amount  of  TOR  was  about 
EUR 28.7 billion  (gross)  and  more  than  98%  was  duly  recovered  and  made  available  to  the 
Commission via the A-account.8   

OWNRES  cases  represent  1.69%  of  the  total  collected  TOR  (gross)  amount  in  2023.  This 
‘detection  rate’  decreased  compared  to  2022,  when  it  was  2.33%.9  A  percentage  of  1.69% 
indicates  that  out  of  every  EUR 100  of  TOR  (gross)  established  and  collected,  an  amount  of 
EUR 1.69 is registered in OWNRES as irregular (fraudulent or non-fraudulent).  

There are differences  among  the Member States;  the percentage is  above average in  Germany, 
Spain,  Lithuania,  Romania,  Finland  and  Sweden.  Differentiation  should  also  be  made  between 
the financial impact of  fraudulent cases where the average  detection rate  is  much lower,  i.e. 
0.19%, and of non-fraudulent cases, where it is 1.51%.10 

7 See Annex 3. 
8 These are provisional figures for EU-27 available as of 15 March 2024 and might be changed in the final financial 
accounts. In the period 2021-2027, Member States retain 25% of the collected customs duties. This not only covers 
collection costs but also serves as an incentive to ensure diligent collection of the amounts due. 
9 On the cut-off date for the 2022 PIF report, i.e. 15 March 2023. 
10 See Annex 4. 

14 

 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

2.2.3.  Recovery rates 

The  fraud  and  irregularity  cases  detected  in  2023  correspond  to  an  established  amount  of 
EUR 443 million. In total, almost EUR 341 million was recovered by 27 Member States. The 
recovery rate for all cases reported in 2023 is currently 77%, which is a very positive result. 
It should be stressed that recovery results usually entail a lengthy process and evolve over time. 
To get an accurate comparison between 2023 and 2022 outcomes, the recovery rate of 77% for 
revenue for the year 2023 should be compared against the recovery rate of 48% for revenue for 
the year 2022 (as reported in past year’s statistical evaluation11).  

The updated recovery rate for all cases reported in 2022 is currently 49% (as of 15 March 2024), 
i.e. it went up by one percentage point per year. It can be expected that the recovery rate for 2023 
will  go  up  in  the  future  as  well.  Chart  TOR4  shows  that  the  annual  recovery  rate  has  varied 
between 49% and 80% over the past 5 years.  

CHART TOR4: Annual recovery rate (2019-2023) 

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

The  recovery  rate  for  2023  varies  between  the  Member  States.  In  absolute  figures,  Germany 
maintained  its  position  and  recovered  the  highest  amount  (EUR 172 million).  Two  Member 
States  (Portugal  and  Slovenia)  recovered  100%,  i.e.  the  entire  established  amount  has  already 
been recovered. In seven other Member States, the recovery rate is equal or above 90% (Czechia 
98%, Denmark 96%, Latvia 96%, Austria 96%, Poland 90%, Slovakia 97%, Finland 99%).12  

Trends  in  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  diverged  in  2023.  For  non-fraudulent 
cases,  there  was  an  increase  in  the  total  recovered  amount  (EUR 331 million,  out  of  the 
EUR 404 million established) as well as in the percentage (82%) compared to the previous year’s 
statistics. For fraudulent cases, the total recovered amount (almost EUR 10 million, out of the 
EUR 39 million established) decreased but the percentage remains the same (25%).13    

The  Member  States  are  more  successful  in  recovering  non-fraudulent  amounts;  this  is  a 
continuous  trend.  OWNRES  data  confirm  that  the  recovery  rate  for  fraudulent  cases  is  overall 
much  lower  than  for  non-fraudulent  cases,  as  shown  in  Table  TOR1  below.  The  historical 
recovery rate (HRR) is 85%.  

11 Section 2.2.3 of ‘Statistical evaluation of irregularities reported for 2022’, SWD(2023) 275 final 
12 See Annex 5. The estimated amounts are excluded. 
13 See Annex 10. The estimated amounts are excluded. 

15 

 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

Table TOR1: Historical recovery rate (HRR) 

The  historical  recovery  rate  expresses  the  recovery  result  for  both  complex  and  easy  cases. 
Therefore,  cases  from  2021  onwards  are  excluded  because  these  are  predominantly  easy  cases 
(complex cases can generally not be closed within 3 years). 

2.3. 

Specific analysis 

2.3.1.  Customs procedure 

The statistical evaluation contains the following customs procedures: release for free circulation, 
transit,  customs  warehousing,  inward  processing  and  other.14  The  customs  procedure  ‘release 
for free circulation’ is undoubtedly the most affected by all irregularities (4 236 cases with an 
overall amount of EUR 397 million; this translates into 83% of all cases and amounts  reported 
for 2023, considering both fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases).  

For  fraudulent  cases,  ‘release  for  free  circulation’  covers  81%  of  the  total  estimated  and 
established  amount  registered  in  OWNRES  for  all  customs  procedures.  Compared  to  the  2022 
statistics,  the  share  of  fraudulent  ‘transit’  cases  increased,  while  the  number  of  ‘customs 
warehousing’  cases  decreased.  The  registered  amounts  of  TOR  went  down  for  all  customs 
procedures except for ‘inward processing’, which went up.  

Similarly  for  non-fraudulent  cases,  83%  of  their  estimated  and  established  amount  for  all 
customs  procedures  is  linked  to  ‘release  for  free  circulation’.  Compared  to  the  2022,  the 
number  of  cases  under  ‘release  for  free  circulation’  increased,  although  the  total  amount  is 
significantly lower due to the above-mentioned major cases. In monetary terms, the second most 
affected  customs  procedure  in  2023  was  ‘customs  warehousing’.  For  the  remaining  customs 
procedures,  the  estimated  and  established  amount  of  TOR  decreased,  apart  from  the  category 
‘other’.  

2.3.2.   Method of detection 

The 2023 data confirms the following trend.15 As shown in Chart TOR5, most fraudulent cases 
are discovered during inspections by anti-fraud services (41%). Customs controls carried out 
at the time of release of the goods were the second most successful method of detecting fraud 
(31%), followed by post-release controls (22%). 

14 See Annex 6 and 7. 
15 See Annex 8 and 9. 

16 

IrregularitiesHRR 1989-2020Reported as fraudulent68.20 %Reported as non-fraudulent92,09 %Total85,21 % 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

CHART TOR5: Method of detection 2023 – Cases reported as fraudulent (by number of cases) 

these 

terms, 

In  monetary 
three  detection  methods  combined  represent  around 
EUR 51 million  (97%)  of  the  estimated  and  established  amounts  of  TOR  in  fraudulent  cases. 
Compared to the 2022 statistics, the total amount per inspections by anti-fraud services increased 
by 17 percentage points, while the amount per post-release controls decreased by 16 pps in 2023. 
Chart TOR6 illustrates that the remaining methods of detection have only marginal impact.  

CHART TOR6: Method of detection 2023 – Cases reported as fraudulent (by estimated and established amount) 

In  2023,  most  non-fraudulent  cases  were  revealed  during  post-release  controls  (44%),  as 
shown in Chart TOR7. Other frequent methods of detection of non-fraudulent cases are release 
controls  (24%),  tax  audit  (13%),  and  voluntary  admission  (12%).  Compared  to  2022,  these 
figures remain rather stable. 

CHART TOR7: Method of detection 2023 – Cases not reported as fraudulent (by number of cases) 

17 

 
 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

Regarding  the  estimated  and  established  amounts  of  TOR  in  non-fraudulent  cases,  the  most 
effective  methods  of  detection  were  post-release  controls  (34%)  and  tax  audit  (28%), 
amounting to EUR 262 million (see Chart TOR8). Tax audit experienced a big increase for the 
second year in  a row (both  in  terms  of number  of cases and  in  terms  of total  amount), mainly 
attributable  to  Germany,  which  reported  486  non-fraudulent  cases  totalling  EUR 97 million. 
Unlike in 2022, the category ‘other’ did not play a significant role in the 2023 statistics. 

CHART TOR8: Method of detection 2023 – Cases not reported as fraudulent (by estimated and established amounts) 

2.3.3.  Type of infringement 

For  fraudulent  cases,  the  most  common  type  of  fraud  is  smuggling  –  seized  and  confiscated 
goods. In 2023, the Member States reported 87 such cases, totalling more than EUR 11 million. 
Nevertheless,  the  second  most  frequent  type  of  fraud  -  incorrect  origin  or  country  of 
dispatching - has the highest amount of TOR involved (57 cases, with almost EUR 21 million).   

For  non-fraudulent  cases,  the  most  common  types  of  infringement  remain  incorrect 
classification/misdescription (1 697 cases and EUR 110 million) and incorrect value (1 105 cases 
and EUR 153 million). Together they represent nearly 59% of non-fraudulent cases and 62% of 
the total non-fraudulent amount of TOR.  

In  monetary  terms,  the  number  one  type  of  infringement  for  all  cases  combined  is  incorrect 
value (1 157 cases, with an overall amount EUR 165 million). Analysis shows that 55% of cases 
of incorrect  value (representing 50% of this amount) are  related to  goods with  origin  in  China 
(see below). 

2.3.4.  Type of goods, countries of origin 

In  2023,  the  most  vulnerable  goods  were  footwear  and  textiles  (articles  of  apparel  such  as 
T-shirts,  clothing  accessories  and  other  made-up  articles),  followed  by  vehicles  (mainly 
motorcycles and cars), electrical machinery and equipment (for example electric accumulators), 
and articles of iron or steel. 

Similar  to  last  year,  the  most  frequently  reported  countries  of  origin  of  goods  affected  by 
irregularities  are  China,  the  United  States  and  Vietnam.  These  countries  are  also  associated 
with the highest volume of TOR. Since 2021, cases reported with declared origin in the United 
Kingdom  are on the rise. The number of such cases increased from 37 in 2021 to  96 in  2023. 
Between  2022  and  2023,  the  amount  of  TOR  involved  grew  massively,  by  almost  157%,  to 
EUR 11 million. 

18 

 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

2.3.4.1.Smuggled cigarettes 

There were 87 cases of smuggled cigarettes16 registered in OWNRES in 2023. Only cases with 
smuggling as the selected type of fraud were taken into account. The estimated amount of TOR 
involved  is  around  EUR 12.6 million  although  the  5-year  overview  for  2019-2023  is  much 
higher,  with  127  cases  and  EUR 24.8 million  on  average.  Altogether,  the  Member  States 
reported  635  cases  of  smuggled  cigarettes  during  the  last  5  years,  for  a  total  amount  of 
EUR 124 million. During the entire period 2019-2023, Lithuania reported the highest number of 
cases (155), and Belgium reported the highest amounts (EUR 44.7 million in total). 

In  2023,  the  highest  numbers  of  cases  were  reported  by  Lithuania  (23),  Spain  (17)  and 
Bulgaria  (10).  The  highest  amount  was  reported  by  Belgium  (EUR  3.8  million  in  total).  The 
second highest amount was reported by Spain (EUR 2.9 million in total), followed by Lithuania 
(EUR 2.6  million  in  total).  Some  14  Member  States  have  not  reported  any  case  of  cigarette 
smuggling.17  

Table TOR2: Cases of smuggled cigarettes in 2023 

Compared  to  2022,  11  Member  States  continued  to  have  smuggling  cases  in  2023  (Belgium, 
Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Greece,  Spain,  France,  Croatia,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania).  Some 
Member States disappeared from the 2023 statistics (Germany, Austria, Portugal), while others 
(Slovakia and Finland) reappeared after a break. This might indicate a potential shift of fraud 
or of cigarette smuggling routes. 

2.4.  Member States’ activities 

In 2023, the Member States reported 340 cases as fraudulent and 4 778 cases as non-fraudulent. 
This indicates a fraud frequency level (FFL) of 6.6%. Most Member States follow an overall 
pattern  where  the  majority  of  cases  involve  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  but  certain  Member 

16 CN code 2402 2090. 
17  Czechia,  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Cyprus,  Luxembourg,  Hungary,  Malta,  the  Netherlands,  Austria, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden.  

19 

CasesEstimated and established amountNEURBE53 805 468BG10661 595EE9279 506EL71 472 096ES172 858 558FR3365 406HR180 260LV116 839LT232 621 436PL5322 649RO478 382SK112 442FI111 926EU-278712 586 564MS 
 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

States  registered  more  than  50%  of  cases  as  fraudulent  (Bulgaria  80%,  Estonia  100%,  Greece 
87%,  Cyprus  67%  and  Lithuania  54%).  On  the  other  hand,  six  Member  States  reported  only 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  and  zero  cases  of  fraud  (Czechia,  Denmark,  Ireland,  Malta,  the 
Netherlands and Sweden). Luxembourg did not register any case of fraudulent or non-fraudulent 
irregularity exceeding EUR 10 000 in OWNRES.  

Such  large  differences  between  Member  States’  classifications  of  cases  as  fraudulent  and 
non-fraudulent  may  partly  depend  on  their  classification  practices.  This  can  influence  the 
comparison of the amounts involved in cases reported as fraudulent and as non-fraudulent by the 
Member States. Moreover, individual larger cases detected in a specific year may affect annual 
rates  significantly.  The  rates  can  also  be  significantly  affected  by  factors  such  as  the  type  of 
traffic, type of trade, the economic operators’ level of compliance and Member State’s location. 
Bearing in mind these variable factors, the rates of incidence can also be affected by the way a 
Member  State’s  customs  control  strategy  is  set  up  to  target  risky  imports  and  to  detect  TOR-
related fraud and irregularities. 

2.5. 

 Commission’s monitoring  

2.5.1.  Write-off reports 

The Member States are required by Article 13(3) of Council Regulation No 609/2014 to provide 
the  Commission  with  information  on  cases  in  which  amounts  of  traditional  own  resources 
exceeding  EUR 100 000  have  been  written  off  from  the  separate  account  (and  thus  not  made 
available to the EU budget) because they have been declared or deemed irrecoverable. 

In 2023, 17 Member States submitted  120 write-off reports totalling EUR 175 million  to  the 
Commission  for  assessment.18  For  five  new  write-off  reports,  the  Commission  considered  that 
they satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR was lost for reasons not imputable to the Member 
States,  which  were  not  financially  responsible  for  the  loss.  In  81  cases  amounting  to  almost 
EUR 69 million,  the  Commission  considered  that  the  Member  States  did  not  satisfactorily 
demonstrate  that  TOR  was  lost  for  reasons  not  imputable  to  them  and  they  were  financially 
responsible for the loss. Therefore, the examination of write-off cases continues to play a very 
effective role that encourages national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery.    

2.5.2.  Commission’s inspections 

The Commission19 scrutinises the way in which the Member States discharge their responsibility 
for collecting traditional own resources. The inspections carried out for this purpose are based on 
Council  Regulation  2021/768  and  have  these  main  objectives:  (i)  to  protect  the  financial 
interests of the EU and ensure that the burden of financing the EU expenditure is fairly shared 
among the Member States; (ii) to maintain a level playing field for economic operators; and (iii) 
to keep the budgetary authority and the European Court of Auditors properly informed.  

The TOR inspections take place either as regular inspections on the spot in the Member States 
(or  remotely  if  necessary)  or  as  desk  audits.  In  2023,  the  Commission  focused  its  regular 
on-the-spot  inspections  in  the  Member  States  on:  (i)  the  control  strategy  for  end-use 
procedure;  and (ii) the  keeping of the separate account and the corrections of the normal 

18 See Annex 11. 
19 Specifically, the Directorate-General for Budget. While DG Budget has the operational responsibility within the 
Commission for implementing inspections covering the collection of TOR, other Commission departments (e.g. DG 
TAXUD and OLAF) are regularly invited to take part in these inspections to provide specific technical expertise. 

20 

 
 
TRADITIONAL OWN RESOURCES 

account (as a second topic in all inspected Member States). The Commission also continued its 
close monitoring of Member States’ actions and followed up on previously initiated desk audits 
and observations made during its inspections. 

Where  systematic  shortcomings  have  been  identified,  the  national  authorities  have  been 
requested  to  take  appropriate  action  to  strengthen  their  national  systems.  One  general 
conclusion  drawn  by  the  Commission  from  its  inspections  in  Member  States  in  recent  years 
remains  that  a  timely  and  proactive  approach  in  assessing  and  monitoring  risks  is 
indispensable  for  effective  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial  interests.  This  includes  using  all 
available  sources  of  information,  exchanging  information  among  services  involved  and  giving 
prompt  feedback  on  actions  taken.  Such  permanent  assessment,  exchange  of  information  and 
monitoring  of  risks,  fraud  trends  and  feedbacks  is  required  for  fine-tuning  the  measures  to  be 
taken and thus for better protection of the EU’s financial interests. 

21 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

3.  COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY  

3.1. 

Introduction 

Section 3 presents a statistical evaluation of irregularities and fraud reported by the Member 
States  in  2023  in  expenditure  under  the  common  agricultural  policy  (CAP).  It  provides 
context to these detections by looking at past years and relevant programming periods (PP). 

Nearly  all  expenditure  under  the  CAP  is  disbursed  by  the  Member  States  under  shared 
management.  The  Member  States  must  report  irregularities  and  fraud  to  the  Commission 
through the Irregularity Management System (IMS).  

In  this  section,  when  reference  is  made  to  fraud,  this  includes  both  suspected  fraud  and 
established fraud20. Non-fraudulent irregularities must be reported in IMS only when they are 
detected  after  the  expenditure  has  been  introduced  in  a  statement  submitted  to  the 
Commission.  Both  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  must  be  reported  when 
involving  financial amounts  above EUR 10 000. Several Member  States  also  reported  some 
irregularities  under  this  threshold.  These  irregularities  might  be  inter-linked,  bringing  the 
total financial amounts involved above the threshold. 

For the purpose of communicating the following findings, CAP is split into two main parts: 
(i) support to agriculture, which includes direct aid to farmers and market measures; (ii) 
rural development. In general, the following findings refer to EU-27.21   

3.2.  General trend 

Graph  NR1  below  provides  an  overview  of  the  number  of  irregularities  reported  as 
fraudulent, broken down by year and type of support, for the period 2019-2023. Graph NR2 
shows the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in these irregularities.  

20  ‘Suspected  fraud’  means  an  irregularity  that  gives  rise  to  the  initiation  of  administrative  or  judicial 
proceedings at national level in order to establish the presence of intentional behaviour, in particular fraud, as 
referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. Regardless of the approach adopted 
by  each  Member  State,  ratification  of  the  1995  Convention  has  equipped  every  country  with  a  basis  for 
prosecuting and possibly imposing penalties for specific conducts. If this happens,  i.e. a guilty verdict is issued 
and is not appealed against, the case can be considered ‘established fraud’. More recently, the Directive (EU) 
2017/1371 (so-called PIF Directive) defines what the Member States are requested to regard as fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests. 
21 For the methodology to identify the irregularities related to direct payments to farmers, market measures and 
rural development, please see Annex 12 to the  ‘Statistical evaluation of  irregularities reported for 2021: own 
resources, agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307. 

22 

168129109241129931271531512211410128727526627440035705010015020025030035040045020192020202120222023Graph NR1: CAP -number of irregularities reported as fraudulent by type of support (EU27)Support to agriculture (SA)Rural development (RD)SA/RDTotal CAP EU27 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

During  the  period  2019-2023,  fraudulent  irregularities  reported  for  rural  development 
increased, mainly due to rising number of detections for PP 2014-2020. However, the number 
of these rural development fraudulent irregularities was much lower than during the previous 
PP 2007-2013,  despite  the  fact  that  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  considers  that  rural 
development has a higher risk of error than direct payments to farmers. This situation should 
be monitored to  ensure focus on fraud detection.  The irregularities found under  support to 
agriculture decreased for two consecutive years (2020 and 2021) and then peaked in 2022, 
when  the  number  of  these  irregularities  was  influenced  by  France,  reporting  many 
inter-linked ‘below-threshold’ cases.22 In 2023, the number of these irregularities was back to 
the level of 2020.  

In general, funding from the EU budget to a project or operation is accompanied by funding 
from  the  national  budget  (co-financing).  The  financial  amounts  mentioned  above  are  the 
EU-share directly involved in the reported irregularities. Available data provide information 
also  on  the  total  financial  amounts  directly  involved  in  the  irregularities  (EU-share  plus 
national share = public contribution share). Irregularities affect projects or operations that are 
not necessarily considered totally irregular. Part of the funding to these projects might still be 
considered regular. Available data provide information also on the EU-share and total value 
of the public contribution granted to the projects or operations affected by the irregularities. 
As  shown  by  Graph  NR3,  for  the  period  2019-2023,  the  funding  (EU-share)  granted  to 
projects or operations affected by irregularities reported as fraudulent was EUR 163 million, 
of which EUR 134 million were  the irregular  financial amounts (EU-share) involved in 
these projects or operations (82%). In terms of total public contribution, the funding granted 
fraudulent  was 
to  projects  or  operations  affected  by 
EUR 199 million,  of  which  EUR  166  million  were  the  irregular  financial  amounts 
involved in these projects or operations (83%).23       

irregularities 

reported  as 

22 For an analysis of these irregularities reported by France in 2022, see Section 2.1 of ‘Analysis of irregularities 
reported by the Member States – Common Agricultural Policy (July 2023)’, Ares(2023)6053727 on 6/9/2023. 
23 A project/operation can be affected by more than one irregularity. So while summing up the funding to the 
operations associated to each relevant irregularity, there is a risk of considering the same operation more than 
once. To reduce this risk, an analysis has been carried out to identify the operations/projects affected by more 
than one irregularity. As a first step, through the automatic Excel function ‘remove duplicates’, the exact match 
of operational programme, project name, project number and funding (EU-share and total public contribution) 
has been considered as pointing to the same  project/operation. However, for a significant share of the relevant 
irregularities,  CCI,  project  name  and  number  are  blank.  This  means  that  it  is  enough  that  the  values  of  the 
contribution (EU-share and total public) and the Member State are the same to consider that the irregularities are 
referring  to  the  same  project/operation.  However,  this  could  be  wrong  and  might  be  due  to  support  schemes 
resulting  in  some  sort  of  standardised  contribution  to  beneficiaries.  This  would  mean  that  the  values  of 

23 

13.77.113.57.96.011.619.217.712.818.32.21.90.71.50.227.628.231.922.124.60510152025303520192020202120222023EUR MillionsGraph NR2: CAP -amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities reported as fraudulent by type of support (EU27) Support to agriculture (SA)Rural development (RD)SA/RDTotal CAP EU27 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Graph NR4  shows the number of non-fraudulent irregularities detected and reported by the 
Member States, in relation to CAP. Graph NR5 focuses on the financial amounts (EU-share) 
involved.  During  the  period  2019-2023,  the  number  of  these  rural  development 
irregularities  constantly  increased,  in  line  with  the  implementation  of  the  programmes.  The 
decrease of reporting related to PP 2014-2020 in comparison with the previous PP 2007-2013 
was  less  noticeable  than  for  fraudulent  irregulaties,  but  it  is  becoming  significant.  The 
number  of  irregularities  related  to  support  to  agriculture  were  more  stable,  but  started 
decreasing from 2022. The irregular financial amounts fluctuated strongly, mainly due to the 
reporting in  some years, where  few  cases  relating to  market  measures  involved  exceptional 
amounts. 

operations  in  Graph  NR3  have  been  excessively  reduced.  However,  at  EU-27  level,  this  reduction  represents 
about 1.5% of the total values, so the findings of the analysis are still valid. 

24 

48,256,43479,612,8996,495,194134,364,52759,084,83196,628,1437,383,356163,096,32954,386,886104,403,4937,300,977166,091,35665,665,544124,918,1768,270,354198,854,074050,000,000100,000,000150,000,000200,000,000250,000,000SARDMIXTotal CAPGraph NR3: Irregularities reported as fraudulentFinancial amounts involved in irregularitiesand total value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Value operations (EU-share)Irregularity (public contrib.)Value operations (public contrib.)8488579858676941,5391,9592,2462,6303,03645253238772,4322,8413,2633,5353,80705001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,00020192020202120222023Graph NR4: CAP -number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent by type of support (EU27)Support to agriculture (SA)Rural development (RD)SA/RDTotal EU2791.360.1103.784.243.258.990.687.092.4176.64.82.31.64.93.4155.0152.9192.3181.5223.105010015020025020192020202120222023EUR MillionsGraph NR5: CAP -amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent by type of support (EU27) Support to agriculture (SA)Rural development (RD)SA/RDTotal EU27 
 
 
  
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Several irregularities cover both rural development and direct payments to farmers. This 
is more frequent for fraudulent irregularities (see SA/RD in the graphs above). 

Different  CAP  areas  cannot  be  simply  compared  on  the  basis  of  the  financial  amounts 
involved in irregularities, because this metric is influenced by the total amount of payments 
received by the Member States. For example, these payments are much higher for direct aid 
than  rural  development.  A  better  comparison  can  be  based  on  the  fraud  (FDR)  and 
irregularity (IDR) detection rates. These are ratios between the financial amounts involved in 
the relevant irregularities (fraudulent for FDR and non-fraudulent for IDR) during 2019-2023 
and the relevant payments received by the Member States during the same period. These rates 
are shown in Table NR1. 

Detection rates for support to agriculture were much lower than for rural development. 
However, one part of support to agriculture, interventions in agricultural markets (market 
measures),  accounted  for  the  highest  FDR  and  IDR.  It  could  be  argued  that  this 
comparison is biased by a few cases related to market measures (four non-fraudulent cases) 
involving exceptionally high financial amounts (more than EUR 15 million each). However, 
this does not influence the FDR and concerning the IDR, even excluding these irregularities 
from the calculation, the IDR for market measures was still the highest, at 1.53%.  

3.3.  Modus operandi 

Direct payments to farmers 

During  the  period  2019-2023,  for  direct  payments  to  farmers,  the  fraudulent  irregularities 
often  concerned  falsification  of  the  request  for  aid  or  of  the  documentary  proof.  For 
example, applicants may request payments for plots of land they do not have the right to use, 
while  providing  evidence  through  false  lease  agreements  (with  the  signature  of  unaware 
counterparts,  with  dead  counterparts,  concerning  unavailable  public  land,  etc.).  Many 
reported irregularities concerned the artificial splitting of agricultural holdings to unduly get 
higher payments, for example avoiding ceilings or regressive aid rates. Under the new CAP, 
risks related to artificial splitting may increase, as far as the Member States will increase 
payments to small and medium-size farms, which may also translate in reducing payments to 
larger farms, also through voluntary capping and degressive reduction.  

While for many of the reported irregularities the description of the modus operandi is unclear, 
it  seems  that  most  of  the  reported  irregularities  concern  the  a  priori  conditions  for 
receiving  the  aid,  such  as  having  the  right  to  use  the  land  declared  in  the  application  or 
actually  using  the  land.  While  continuing  to  improve  checks  on  entitlements  related  to  the 
main  direct  payments,  agricultural  practices,  including  those  beneficial  for  the  climate 
and  the  environment, may  also  deserve  increased  attention  from  controlling  authorities, 
with  a  view  to  identifying  intentional  infringements.  The  same  may  apply  to  payments 
schemes based on the number and type of animals. Under the new CAP, risks related to 
respect  of  good  agricultural  and  environmental  conditions  and  support  for  environmental 
commitments may increase. Certain conditions are more stringent and apply to all payments 
while  there  is  also  increased  support  for  voluntary  environmental  commitments.    In 

25 

FDR IDRDirect payments0.02%0.05%Intervention in agricultural markets0.13%2.30%Support to agriculture0.02%0.19%Rural development0.11%0.71%Total CAP0.05%0.33%Table NR1: FDR and IDR by type of CAP expenditure - EU27Type of expenditureIrregularities detected and reported 2019-2023 / Payments 2019-2023Total2.43%0.38%0.82%0.07%0.21% 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

particular, 25% of the direct payments must be allocated to eco-schemes, providing stronger 
incentives for climate and environment friendly farming practices. 

Increased  reliance  on  the  Area  Monitoring  System  (AMS)  for  monitoring  compliance 
may  lead  to  a  reduction  of  the  on-farm  visits.  Impact  on  risks  depends  on  the 
effectiveness of the combination of these remote controls and residual on-farm visits in 
checking compliance with all conditions, including good agricultural and environmental 
conditions  (GAEC)  and  statutory  management  requirements  (SRM).  The  current  CAP 
makes  the  use  of  an  AMS  mandatory,  where  this  allows  to  monitor  compliance  with 
eligibility conditions remotely.24 The findings of the AMS shall be used to inform farmers of 
detected non-compliance prior to the latest deadline for the finalisation of the aid claims, thus 
allowing  for  amendments  without  the  risk  of  incurring  penalties.25  Where  all  eligibility 
conditions of an intervention are monitored via the AMS, Member States may decide that this 
fulfils their obligation to set up a control system for that intervention. In that case, Member 
States  may  decide  that  on-farm  visits  are  not  needed  for  that  intervention,  since  the  entire 
population  was  controlled  remotely.  On  the  other  hand,  where  only  some  eligibility 
conditions  of  an  intervention  are  monitored  by  the  AMS,  Member  States  must  ensure  that 
adequate controls are performed on a sample of beneficiaries. 26 

From 2025, farmers failing to respect the basic social and labour rights of farm workers 
may  face administrative penalties by way of  reduced payments.  The new approach will 
become mandatory only in 2025, but may already be adopted by Member States from 2023. 
This will require effective cooperation between the paying agencies and the bodies entrusted 
with control on compliance with labour regulations. 

Market measures 

Infringements related to the falsification of documentary proof or requests were the most 
frequent in relation to market measures. Infringements concerning the implementation of the 
action were also relatively frequent. For example, infringements related to market measures 
may  concern  the  withdrawal  of  agricultural  products  from  the  market,  the  cost,  actual 
implementation  or  actual  use  for  the  intended  purpose  of  investments  by  producer 
organisations  -  such  as  works  for  storage  sites  or  the  purchase  of  machinery  or  equipment. 
OLAF  investigated  several  cases  related  to  the  promotion  of  agricultural  products, 
uncovering complex fraudulent schemes, based  on conflict  of interests, kickback payments, 
manipulated procurement  procedures, price inflation,  and incomplete implementation  of the 
actions. 

Risks  related  to  the  funding  of  producer  organisations  were  significant  and  they  may 
increase  under  the  new  CAP,  as  this  type  of  funding  is  extended  beyond  the  fruit  and 
vegetables sector to most agricultural sectors.  

Risks  related  to  environmental  actions  could  potentially  also  concern  the  fruit  and 
vegetables  and  the  wine  sectors  for  which  interventions  linked  to  the  climate  and 

24 Such as on the basis of the Copernicus Sentinel satellites. This means, for example, monitoring of crops and 
cultivation of agricultural parcels to determine whether farmers are fulfilling the commitments they made when 
requesting subsidies. 
25 The AMS may also be used to alert farmers ahead of important deadlines to perform  activities – required by 
the  intervention  claimed  –  on  those  parcels  where  the  AMS  found  them  lacking,  thus  avoiding  any 
non-compliances. 
26  In  addition,  to  ensure  the  reliability  of  the  AMS,  Member  States  are  required  to  perform  an  annual  quality 
assessment.  Where deficiencies are detected by the quality assessment,  remedial actions have to be proposed. 
This assessment should consider also potential vulnerabilities to fraudsters’ attempts to hide non-compliance in 
the context of remote checks. 

26 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

environmental  objectives  have  been  reinforced  and  a  minimum  percentage  of  spending  for 
such actions has been set. 

Rural development 

For rural development, there were mainly cases of falsification of the documentary proof 
or  requests  for  aid.  Falsification  may  concern,  for  example,  invoices,  declarations  of 
equipment  as  new  when  it  is  in  fact  second-hand,  bids  in  the  context  of  procurement  or 
information  on  compliance  with  conditions  for  receiving  aid.  A  significant  number  of 
irregularities were related to the implementation of the action.  

While for many of the reported irregularities the description of the modus operandi is unclear, 
it  seems  that  most  of  the  fraudulent  irregularities  concerned  grants  to  projects.  While 
keeping the focus on such reimbursement-based funding, area and animal-related spending 
may also deserve more attention, with a view to identifying intentional infringements. 

Support  under  rural  development  may  cover  a  wide  range  of  different  measures,  which 
may  imply  different  risks.  For  example,  support  may  be  granted  on  the  basis  of  specific 
criteria.  Infringements  may  concern  the  artificial  creation  of  the  conditions  to  comply  with 
these criteria or information the applicant provides in view of this assessment, at the granting 
stage or at the moment of the implementation of the operation (about the actual fulfillment of 
certain  criteria).  As  part  of  the  approved  project,  beneficiaries  may  need  to  procure  goods 
(including equipment and machinery), works or services. Beneficiaries may infringe the rules 
on procurement, including rules that may require beneficiaries to choose the contractor on the 
basis  of  a  minimum  number  of  independent  offers.  In  general,  beneficiaries  may  hide  that 
they  bought  assets  from  entities  to  which  they  are  linked.  Beneficiary  may  request 
reimbursement for inflated costs or even for costs for inexistent transactions/activities or may 
ask for reimbursement for costs already funded in another context. The inflation of costs may 
be instrumental to avoiding investing own resources in the project (co-financing). Projects are 
usually selected or advance payments are made only if the beneficiary has sufficient financial 
capacity  or  provides  sufficient  guarantees.  The  applicant  may  provide  inaccurate  or  false 
information about that. The beneficiary may also fail to follow the business plan, fail to use 
the  investment  for  the  intended  purpose  or  fail  to  use  it  at  all.  Access  to  a  subsidy  scheme 
may  be  subject  to  respect  of  certain  requirements,  which  may  be  disregarded  by  the 
beneficiary.  Artificial  splitting  of  an  agricultural  holding  may  be  used  to  avoid  ceilings  to 
support or to unduly profit from measures or increased payments targeted to smaller farms. 
Finally, staff in national authorities managing the funds may collude with the fraudsters. 

3.4.  Use of risk analysis and information from informants and media 

In the antifraud cycle, the capability of detecting fraud and irregularities is a key feature that 
helps making the system effective and efficient in protecting the EU budget. In the 2017 PIF 
Report, to boost the capability to detect irregularities, the Commission recommended to the 
Member  States  to  improve  risk  analysis  and  the  use  of  spontaneous  reporting  of  potential 
irregularities and strengthening the protection of whistle blowers that are also a crucial source 
for investigative journalism27. 

During 2019-2023, risk analysis still only marginally contributed to detecting fraud in rural 
development and direct payments to farmers, while in market measures it seems it played a 

27 Section 4.3 of the ‘29th Annual Report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests – Fight against fraud 
–  2017’,  COM(2018)553  final  and  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2017:  own  resources, 
agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2018)386 final.  

27 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

stronger  role  (but  only  if  scrutiny  activities  were  actually  based  on  risk  analysis). 
Furthermore,  the  share  of  fraud  detections  based  on  tips  from  informants  and 
whistle-blowers  was  low,  with  the  exception  of  market  measures,  where  it  reached  11%. 
However,    this  figure  may  be  volatile  as  it  is  based  on  very  few  cases.  Fraud  was  never 
detected following information published in the media. 

3.5.  Duration of the irregularities 

During 2019-2023, it took on average nearly 4 years from the start of the irregularity to 
come  to  a  suspicion  that  a  fraudulent  irregularity  had  been  or  was  being  committed  and 
about 3 years to close the case after reporting to the Commission. These average durations 
were  shorter  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  The  intentional  nature  of  fraudulent 
irregularities  may  contribute  to  explain  the  longer  duration  from  perpetration  to  suspicion. 
Fraudsters  may  go  to  great  lenghts  to  hide  their  behaviour.  The  longer  delay  in  closing 
fraudulent cases is consistent with the need to rely on specialised, more limited resources to 
investigate fraud and the longer duration of criminal proceedings. 

3.6.  Detection and reporting by Member State 

The  tables  included  in  this  section  show,  for  each  CAP  sector,  the  fraudulent  and 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  reported  by  each  Member  State,  together  with  the  financial 
amounts  (EU-share)  involved,  the  payments  received  during  the  same  period  and  the 
calculation of the FDR and IDR. These tables are accompanied by graphs with the financial 
amounts directly involved in the irregularities (EU-share and total public contribution share) 
and also the EU-share and the total value of the public contribution that had been granted to 
the projects or operations affected by the reported irregularities. 

Table NR2 concerns irregularities related to rural development.    

28 

0.020.040.060.080.0100.0120.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph NR6: Average times from  irregularity to case closure 2014-2023; irregularities reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months47months8 months9 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 3 122From suspicionto detection: 3 009From detection to reporting: 3 215From reporting to case closure: 4550.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.080.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph NR7: Average times from  irregularity to case closure 2014-2023; irregularities not reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months29 months29 months7 months6 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 29 869From suspicionto detection: 30 651From detection to reporting: 31 781From reporting to case closure:9 64039 months 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

For rural development, following the same logic of Graph NR1, Graph NR8 shows that the 
ratio between the amounts  involved in  the irregularities and the related  contributions  to  the 
affected operations is often quite high. The ratio for EU-27 is more than 80%, meaning that 
on  average  the  amounts  involved  in  the  irregularity  tend  to  match  with  the  related 
contribution to the affected operation.28 

28  See  footnote  23  about  the  methodology  to  identify  irregularities  related  to  the  same  project/operation.  For 
rural development,  basically all  of  these  irregularities  have  been  identified  on  the  basis  of  the  exact  match  of 
operational  programme  and  values  of  the  funding,  because  project  name  and  project  number  were  blank. 
However,  this  might  be  due  to  support  schemes  resulting  in  some  sort  of  standardised  contribution  to 
beneficiaries.  This  would  mean  that  the  values  of  operations  in  Graph  NR8  have  been  excessively  reduced. 
However, at EU-27 level, this reduction is just about 2% and it does not significantly affect the findings of the 
analysis. For certain Member States, the weight of this reduction is higher, but it never significantly affects the 
proportions between bars in Graph NR8. In a few Member States, this reduction results in a total value of the 
irregularities higher than the total value of the funding (see Graph NR8), however for all these Member States 
the ratio of the two values would be higher  than 95% also without the reduction (with the exception of Malta, 
where it would be about 87%, which is still higher than the EU-27 ratio).    

29 

Financial amounts involved (EU-share)Financial amounts involved (EU-share)PaymentsFDR  (2)IDR (2)NEUREUR%%AT0011588,5222,958,566,8810.000.02BE00741,802,420477,161,5480.000.38BG151,721,14776351,589,1931,474,187,2120.123.50CY0000107,205,7900.000.00CZ181,513,7422445,017,8951,899,454,0860.080.26DE261,625,2852227,856,4157,242,658,9100.020.11DK696,465,696352,545,539531,694,3061.220.48EE9210,941,1161214,852,980557,066,6561.960.87ES103,027,8971,16581,531,3676,228,658,6770.051.31FI274,920692,481,9841,754,729,3970.000.14FR501,400,66058612,875,9819,860,694,1960.010.13GR11,019,3791,20016,807,4733,344,505,3130.030.50HR71,494,75233816,710,0331,757,216,7250.090.95HU17391,2861,03330,194,2803,170,135,4040.010.95IE005137,9621,679,800,3710.000.01IT509,946,00247740,823,7207,908,545,3020.130.52LT572,153,36935510,405,1811,041,017,1450.211.00LU00119,22082,514,8800.000.02LV212,278,434742,060,862742,179,7020.310.28MT3241,601251,729,29676,323,5910.322.27NL19,69812754,639673,446,9220.000.11PL341,682,4241,35533,607,0146,643,134,5880.030.51PT181,133,5751,20041,887,1102,700,470,8170.041.55RO23227,896,9241,743114,144,5575,572,381,6670.502.05SE112,947341,302,0581,455,327,0910.000.09SI2116,502401,204,806641,643,8280.020.19SK194,465,54222822,545,207846,556,9920.532.66TOTAL EU2774579,612,89811,410505,475,71471,427,277,9970.110.71UK (1)21439,21335110,632,503Table NR2: Rural development 2019-2023: number of irregularities, financial amounts (EU-share) involved and detection rates by Member StateMember StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent 2019-23Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 2019-232019-2023(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU (2) FDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities reported as fraudulent (third column). IDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities not reported as fraudulent (fifth column).    
 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

Table NR3 focuses on irregularities related to market measures. 

30 

0.020.040.060.080.0100.0120.0140.0BGCZDEDKEEESFIFRGRHRHUITLTLVMTNLPLPTROSESISKEU27EUR millionGraph NR8: Irregularities reported as fraudulent-Rural development -period 2019-2023Financial amounts involved in irregularities and contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Value operations (EU-share)Irregularity(public contrib.)Value operations (public contrib.)Financial amounts involved (EU-share)Financial amounts involved (EU-share)PaymentsFDR (1)IDR (1)NEUREUR%%AT51,293,663151,162,953126,612,4541.020.92BE005453,910303,159,9320.000.15BG41,097,947266,797,802132,903,2020.835.11CY000029,289,7790.000.00CZ23,953,6968276,55595,954,0744.120.29DE2573,311202,846,254659,274,6240.090.43DK002310,90169,537,2000.000.45EE00009,447,1000.000.00ES1688,54245724,691,5913,025,225,2050.020.82FI00236,79845,401,5190.000.08FR12715,09634423,324,5162,804,706,5660.030.83GR12,543,01722776,910308,081,6610.830.25HR0061,469,17166,755,5380.002.20HU00525,358,324202,007,9410.002.65IE129,8360097,115,9050.030.00IT295,22424913,044,5663,232,816,8860.000.40LT007811,64231,871,3300.002.55LU00003,149,2150.000.00LV000017,495,7860.000.00MT00001,123,5260.000.00NL0013182,346206,209,5650.000.09PL74,954,610146195,834,885278,111,8521.7870.42PT4517,1111295,676,917532,362,8920.101.07RO3244,6848410,255,041308,049,6840.083.33SE00140,44774,870,1020.000.05SI147,5096175,78735,784,0280.130.49SK002103,37462,460,7720.000.17TOTAL EU274516,754,2461,596293,630,69012,759,778,3380.132.30Table NR3: Market measures 2019-2023: number of irregularities, financial amounts (EU-share) involved and detection rates by Member StateMember StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent 2019-23Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 2019-23(1) FDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities reported as fraudulent (third column). IDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities not reported as fraudulent (fifth column).  2019-2023 
 
  
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

For market measures, Graph NR9 above shows that the ratio between the amounts involved 
in the irregularities and the related contributions to the affected operations is often quite high. 
For  EU-27,  this  ratio  (about  65%)  is  lower  than  the  ratio  related  to  rural  development  (see 
above), but this is due to specific situations. 

Table NR4 concerns irregularities related to direct payments to farmers. 

31 

0.05.010.015.020.025.030.035.0ATBGCZDEESFRGRIEITPLPTROSIEU-27EUR millionGraph NR9: Irregularities reported as fraudulent-Market measures -period 2019-2023Financial amounts involved in irregularities and contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Value operations (EU-share)Irregularity(public contrib.)Value operations (public contrib.) 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

For direct payments, Graph NR10 below shows that the ratio between the amounts involved 
in the irregularities and the related contributions to the affected operations is often quite high. 
For EU-27, this ratio (more than 90%) is the highest within the CAP (see above). 

32 

Financial amounts involved (EU-share)Financial amounts involved (EU-share)PaymentsFDR  (2)IDR (2)NEURN%%AT00233,2593,431,893,0130.000.00BE0037890,8922,444,336,8110.000.04BG0012184,3714,002,996,4170.000.00CY0000239,507,6490.000.00CZ4429,16032629,0334,261,399,2470.010.01DE11517,2361483,091,92523,345,426,9730.000.01DK00541,432,7244,053,034,8760.000.04EE0000825,713,7960.000.00ES11452,25357513,602,83925,406,039,4150.000.05FI0010313,1322,604,368,3260.000.01FR1503,072,9338230,72634,409,177,5570.010.00GR5128,1614287,216,7139,868,385,2540.000.07HR0035772,4461,707,930,9310.000.05HU0016372,3626,370,341,2750.000.01IE129,836005,947,029,1710.000.00IT16714,184,40674044,285,96817,901,180,9180.080.25LT477,6281022,210,9892,610,928,0970.000.08LU0000165,746,7130.000.00LV009181,4311,456,915,7250.000.01MT000025,353,7170.000.00NL17455,180551,134,0113,275,975,7450.010.03PL291,447,4591205,601,00816,811,970,5490.010.03PT11,64545900,9913,649,804,0240.000.02RO36513,933,98325715,771,5269,476,820,2120.150.17SE118,7117111,1233,418,139,4910.000.00SI00237,435664,784,0310.000.01SK112,114,8481233,775,9232,087,568,2230.100.18TOTAL EU2777736,863,4392,817102,780,827190,462,768,1560.020.05UK (1)8309,2951012,378,635Table NR4: Direct payments to farmers 2019-2023: number of irregularities, financial amounts (EU-share) involved and detection rates by Member StateMember StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent 2019-23Irregularities not reported as fraudulent 2019-232019-2023(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU (2) FDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities reported as fraudulent (third column). IDR are calculated based on the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irrregularities not reported as fraudulent (fifth column).    
  
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

The  detection  of  irregularities  was  concentrated  in  a  few  Member  States.  A  deeper 
analysis of concentration was included in the 2018 PIF Report.29 That analysis found that the 
concentration  of  detections  went  beyond  what  could  be  expected  given  the  level  of 
concentration of payments. This could be due to many different factors, including different 
underlying  levels  of  irregularities  and  fraud,  differences  in  the  quality  of  the  prevention  or 
detection  work.  The  concentration  of  detections  was  more  accentuated  for  fraudulent 
rather than for non-fraudulent irregularities. This suggests that different approaches to 
criminal investigation and prosecution could be an additional and significant factor giving 
rise  to  these  different  levels  of  detection  across  the  Member  States.  Different  practices 
concerning the stage of the procedure when potentially fraudulent irregularities are reported 
may also play a role. 

3.7. 

Follow-up to suspected fraud 

The  Member  States  may  report  irregularities  as  non-fraudulent  (just  administrative 
irregularities)  or  as  fraudulent  (suspected  or  established  fraud)  and  they  may  change  this 
classification during the lifetime of the irregularities. 

For 10% of the irregularities reported during 2014-2023, there is or has been a suspicion of 
fraud.  This  percentage  does  not  significantly  change  in  the  different  years  of  the  timespan 
considered  in  the  analysis  (irregularities  are  associated  to  the  year  of  first  reporting).  For 

29  Section  3.4.3  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2018:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2019)365 final. 

33 

0.05.010.015.020.025.030.035.040.045.0CZDEESFRGRIEITLTNLPLPTROSESKEU-27Graph NR10: Irregularities reported as fraudulent-Direct payments -period 2019-2023Financial amounts involved in irregularities and contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Value operations (EU-share)Irregularity(public contrib.)Value operations (public contrib.) 
 
 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

11% of the irregularities where there is or has been a suspicion of fraud, this suspicion was 
not  initially  detected  or  reported  and  the  Member  State  reclassified  the  irregularity  as 
fraudulent at a later stage.  

For  just  16%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed  as  established  fraud  (see  Graph  NR11  below).  This  does  not  significantly 
change year on year. It could have been expected to be higher for years that are further in the 
past, because more time was available to finalise the case.  

For  just  11%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
dismissed  (see  Graph  NR11  below).  This  percentage  tend  to  be  higher  for  the  period 
2014-2017 than for the more recent period 2018-2023, in line with expectations. 

Most  of  the  irregularities  where  there  was  a  suspicion  of  fraud  are  still  classified  as 
suspected  fraud,  even  if  several  years  have  elapsed  since  the  initial  reporting  (see  Graph 
NR11 above). This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for years that are 
further in the past. In addition, 12% of these irregularities that are still pending as suspected 
fraud are already closed, so no changes can be expected.  

Focusing  on  the  irregularities  that  were  initially  reported  during  2014-2018,  significant 
differences between Member States can be found (see Table NR5 below). Focusing on this 
period means focusing on irregularities that have been reported between 5 and 10 years ago. 
In the Member States with low incidence of fraud, the competent authorities should invest in 
detecting signals  of  fraud and, when discovering irregularities, should carefully address  the 
question  of  intentionality.  Low  incidence  of  fraud  could  also  be  due  to  reporting  practices 
delaying  classification  as  suspected  fraud.  Considering  that  the  most  recent  irregularities  in 

34 

 
 
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 

this analysis have been reported 5 years ago, these reporting practices should be reviewed or 
engagement with the judicial authorities should be improved. 

In  many  Member  States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  still  classified  as  suspected 
fraud  is  extremely  high.  This  may  suggest  that  the  judicial  authorities  do  not  give  proper 
follow-up  to  these  suspicions,  including  because  they  may  not  have  sufficient  resources. 
Alternatively,  it could  be that there  are no proper communication channels  from  judicial to 
reporting  authorities.  In  addition,  many  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as  suspected 
fraud are closed. This may due to persistent suspicions of the paying agencies, while criminal 
proceedings were not started, were prevented by the statute of limitations or did not lead to 
enough evidence about fraud. It could also be that in some Member States cases were closed 
because  the  competent  bodies  had  finalised  administrative  actions  (for  example,  full 
recovery), even if the penal proceedings were still ongoing. This reporting practice would not 
be correct, as irregularities should be closed only once all proceedings have been finalised. 

35 

N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00.000%3%133%00%267%50%BE00.000%2%00%1100%00%NABG80.029%18%3035%67%5058%100%CY00.000%21%00%00%6100%0%CZ30.028%18%38%3793%00%NADE30.019%9%2061%824%515%60%DK10.017%15%427%533%640%50%EE40.0314%16%13%1138%1759%12%ES20.005%3%3170%00%1330%77%FI00.00NA0%0NA0NA0NANAFR00.000%7%1422%711%4267%57%GR50.0129%3%00%00%17100%76%HR20.0213%14%425%744%531%100%HU180.028%20%3113%188%18179%72%IE10.003%12%13%39%3189%97%IT910.0436%10%3313%73%21584%86%LT10.003%5%00%00%40100%95%LU00.000%50%00%00%1100%100%LV50.0516%24%39%722%2269%77%MT00.000%4%00%00%1100%100%NL20.009%5%14%1670%626%33%PL80.012%31%10226%4612%24963%80%PT100.0134%2%13%310%2586%96%RO340.017%14%224%15131%31665%100%SE00.000%3%00%00%2100%100%SI00.000%11%00%19%1091%70%SK70.0421%18%412%13%2985%100%EU-272050.0111%11%30616%33517%1,29167%85%(3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified are fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reportedTable NR5: CAP: follow-up to suspected fraud by Member State - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified. (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) Member StateReclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2) %DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraudIncidence of fraud (3) 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.  COHESION AND FISHERIES POLICIES  

4.1. 

Introduction 

Section 4 presents a statistical evaluation of irregularities and fraud reported by the Member 
States  during  2023,  with  reference  to  the  cohesion  and  fishery  policies.  It  places  these 
detections in the context of past years and relevant programming periods (PP). 

Expenditure  under  the  cohesion  and  fisheries  policies  is  disbursed  by  the  Member  States 
under  shared  management.  The  Member  States  must  report  irregularities  and    fraud  to  the 
Commission  through  the  Irregularity  Management  System  (IMS).  Non-fraudulent 
irregularities must be reported in IMS only when they are detected after the expenditure has 
been  introduced  in  a  statement  submitted  to  the  Commission.  Both  fraudulent  and 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  must  be  reported  when  involving  financial  amounts  above 
EUR 10 000. Several  Member  States  also  reported  some  irregularities  under  this  threshold. 
These irregularities might be inter-linked, bringing the total financial amounts involved above 
the threshold. In this section, when reference is made to fraud, this includes both suspected 
fraud and established fraud30.  

4.2.  General trend 

Fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  PP  2007-2013  peaked  in  2015,  before  gradually 
decreasing in the following years. In 2018 they were overtaken by those related to PP 2014-
2020 (see Table CP1 below). These dynamics are in line with known trends and patterns in 
the detection and reporting of irregularities and are linked to the implementation cycles. 

30  ‘Suspected  fraud’  means  an  irregularity  that  gives  rise  to  the  initiation  of  administrative  or  judicial 
proceedings at national level in order to establish the presence of intentional behaviour, in particular fraud, as 
referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. Regardless of the approach adopted 
by  each  Member  State,  ratification  of  the  1995  Convention  has  equipped  every  country  with  a  basis  for 
prosecuting and possibly imposing penalties for specific conducts. If this happens,  i.e. a guilty verdict is issued 
and is not appealed against, the case can be considered ‘established fraud’. More recently, the Directive (EU) 
2017/1371 (so-called PIF Directive) defines what the Member States are requested to regard as fraud affecting 
the EU’s financial interests. 

36 

201920202021202220232019-2023NNNNNNProgramming Period 2014-20107227172166230902CF119861650ERDF6614011996132553ESF3164415580271EMFF9449228Programming Period 2007-136546452640222CF6450116ERDF4037271832154ESF18490334EFF1148418Programming Period 2000-06000101ERDF000101ESFGUIDTOTAL EU271722732171932701,125UK(1)34119PROGRAMMING PERIOD / FUNDIrregularities reported as fraudulentTable CP1: Number of fraudulent irregularities by programming period and Fund - Cohesion and Fisheries Policies(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU  
    
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

For  PP  2014-2020,  the  financial  amounts  (EU-share)  involved  in  fraudulent  irregularities 
(Table  CP2  below)  experienced  two  extreme  peaks  at  EUR 530 million,  in  2021  and  at 
EUR 460 million, in 2023.31  

In general, funding from the EU budget to a project or operation is accompanied by funding 
from  the  national  budget  (co-financing).  The  financial  amounts  mentioned  above  are  the 
EU-share of the financial amounts directly involved in the reported irregularities.  Available 
data  provide  information  also  on  the  total  financial  amounts  directly  involved  in  the 
irregularities (EU-share plus national share = public contribution share). Irregularities affect 
projects or operations that are not necessarily considered totally irregular. Part of the funding 
to  these  projects  or  operations  might  still  be  considered  regular.  Available  data  provide 
information  also  on  the  EU-share  and  total  value  of  the  public  contribution  granted  to  the 
projects or operations affected by the reported irregularities. As shown by Graph CP1, for the 
period  2019-2023,  the  funding  (EU-share)  granted  to  projects  or  operations  affected  by 
irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent  was  about  EUR  5  billion,  of  which  about 
EUR 1.4 billion (27%) were the irregular financial amounts (EU-share) involved in these 
projects or operations. In terms of total public contribution, the funding granted to projects or 
operations  affected  by  irregularities  reported  as  fraudulent  was  about  EUR 6 billion,  of 
which  about  EUR  1.6  billion  were  the  irregular  financial  amounts  involved  in  these 
projects or operations. 32 

31  In  2021,  the  peak  was  mainly  due  to  one  ERDF  irregularity  reported  by  Romania,  accounting  for  about 
EUR 280 million and one CF irregularity reported by Slovakia, accounting for about EUR 120 million. In 2023, 
the  peak  was  mainly  due  to  two  CF  irregularities  reported  by  Romania,  each  accounting  for  about 
EUR 168 million. 
32 A project/operation can be affected by more than one irregularity. So while summing up the funding to the 
operations associated to each relevant irregularity, there is a risk of considering the same operation more than 
once. To reduce this risk, an analysis has been carried out to identify the operations/projects affected by more 
than one irregularity. As a first step, through the automatic Excel function ‘remove duplicates’, the exact match 
of  operational  programme,  project  number  and  funding  (EU-share  and  total  public  contribution)  has  been 
considered as pointing to the same project/operation. Then a number of other hypotheses have been formulated 
about other irregularities that could be related to the same projects/operations, despite the absence of the exact 
match. These hypotheses have been checked with the Member States. This brought to the values in Graph CP1. 

37 

201920202021202220232019-2023EUREUREUREUREUREURProgramming Period 2014-2021,348,39579,159,892528,953,749117,192,204459,254,0231,205,908,263CF1,041,15135,487,841153,029,13228,762,628356,634,713574,955,465ERDF16,926,60934,669,535364,754,21081,619,57791,598,914589,568,846ESF2,977,5076,287,73810,680,8135,822,63910,956,34136,725,038EMFF403,1282,714,778489,594987,36064,0554,658,916Programming Period 2007-1321,127,59843,471,44427,045,37732,850,51127,437,186151,932,116CF2,580,0641,902,89210,235,8940156,73214,875,582ERDF17,994,17437,303,38614,138,97914,227,26623,931,384107,595,189ESF293,1104,212,3881,669,7290252,2936,427,521EFF260,25052,7781,000,77518,623,2453,096,77723,033,824Programming Period 2000-06000455,6750455,675ERDF000455,6750455,675ESFGUIDTOTAL EU2742,475,993122,631,336555,999,126150,498,390486,691,2091,358,296,054UK(1)1,193,812250,8940133,3271,578,033PROGRAMMING PERIOD / FUNDFinancial amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities reported as fraudulentTable CP2: Financial amounts (EU-share) related to fraudulent irregularities by programming period and Fund - Cohesion and fisheries policies 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

The difference between the financial amounts directly involved in the irregularities and 
the  public  contribution  to  the  affected  operations  is  maximum  for  the  ESF  (see  Graph 
CP1). This may also be due to the type of operations funded by the ESF, where the discovery 
that  a  transaction  is  fraudulent  does  not  automatically  put  into  question  other  transactions 
under  the  same  operation.33  However,  a  high  difference  between  the  financial  amounts 
involved in the irregularities and the public contribution to the affected operations could also 
be  due  to  insufficient  control  of  the  behaviour  of  other  final  recipients  once  the  detected 
irregularities led to identify risks and vulnerabilities that could apply also to them (under the 
same operation). 

Turning to the non-fraudulent irregularities, the decrease in the number and financial 
amounts related to PP 2007-2013 was significant (see Tables CP3 and CP4). As mentioned, 
this  is  in  line  with  the  multiannual  nature  of  structural  programmes,  which  were  closed 
already  in  2015.  In  2020  and  2021,  the  financial  amounts  increased,  just  because  of  single 
cases  with  very  high  financial  amounts  involved.  Then,  in  2022  and  2023,  they  fell  to  the 
lowest level since 2010. 

In practice, reporting  of non-fraudulent irregularities  related to PP 2014-2020 began in 
2016. Since then, these  detections and irregular  financial amounts have  been increasing  for 
all funds, but less than expected when compared to the previous programming period. 

33 For example, there may be projects where the beneficiary is the Ministry of Labour, which redistributed the 
funds  to  the  final  recipients. In  such  a  case,  the  fraudulent  irregularities  related  to  one final  recipient  may  be 
isolated and negligible when compared to the value of the overall operation managed by the Ministry of Labour. 

38 

590698431,358694849521,6321,5612,2961,0784,9631,8292,7951,2695,93001,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000CFERDFESFTot Cohesion andFisheriesEUR millionGraph CP1: Irregularities reported as fraudulentFinancial amounts involved in irregularities and value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Irregularity (public contr.)Value operations (EU-share)Value operations (pub. contr.) 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.3.  Comparison programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 

The  PP  2014-2020  started  10  years  ago.  To  put  the  trend  concerning  PP  2014-2020  into 
perspective, it can be compared with the number and financial amounts of the irregularities 
that were recorded during the first 10 years of the PP 2007-2013.  

Until the ninth year from the start of the programming periods, the number of irregularities 
reported as fraudulent was similar for PP 2014-2020 and PP 2007-2013. At the end of tenth 
year, the cumulative number of irregularities for PP 2014-2020 has become 14% lower 
than for PP 2007-2013 (see Graph CP2 below). This is influenced by reporting from Spain 
for ERDF.34 The strongest decrease concerned the ESF, partly compensated by the increase 

34  During  PP  2007-2013,  at  the  end  of  2015  Spain  reported  in  IMS  about  100  fraudulent  irregularities,  for 
specific reasons (see sudden increased in the blue curve in Graph CP2). During PP 2014-2020, Spain has instead 
reported just a few fraudulent irregularities related to ERDF in IMS, also because of a reporting backlog, which 
has not been solved yet.  

39 

201920202021202220232019-2023NNNNNNProgramming Period 2014-201,2731,9232,0792,4252,54810,248CF141122117175240795ERDF76012761306162416636,629ESF3374915935295422,492EMFF35346397103332Programming Period 2007-1338330518596701,039CF3432251811120ERDF2982221366349768ESF2836138691EFF2315117460Programming Period 2000-0612952432CF000011ERDF11330219ESF012115GUID150107TOTAL EU271,6682,2372,2692,5232,62211,319UK(1)1933043502955931(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU Table CP3: Number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent by programming period and Fund - Cohesion and Fisheries PoliciesPROGRAMMING PERIOD/ FUNDIrregularities not reported as fraudulent201920202021202220232019-2023EUREUREUREUREUREURProgramming Period 2014-20275,248,844333,148,360451,058,346478,813,660536,613,7462,074,882,956CF106,178,56998,226,95146,473,915136,759,682148,111,912535,751,029ERDF122,279,768196,963,252208,645,558294,826,612305,678,1381,128,393,328ESF43,037,77335,161,882188,606,12437,695,47776,237,829380,739,085EMFF3,752,7342,796,2757,332,7499,531,8896,585,86729,999,514Programming Period 2007-1381,702,975122,375,603160,429,99822,379,96530,624,885417,513,426CF13,797,87244,181,28692,396,1665,271,8693,195,757158,842,950ERDF58,155,16064,357,19562,989,16015,557,57426,037,501227,096,590ESF4,420,79110,891,6224,014,145776,602143,94320,247,103EFF5,329,1522,945,5001,030,527773,9201,247,68411,326,783Programming Period 2000-0615,716,114521,7001,209,531588,6984,870,64722,906,690CF00004,268,1254,268,125ERDF15,443,614281,600178,5960564,48816,468,298ESF065,8221,030,935498,73438,0341,633,525GUID272,500174,278089,9640536,742TOTAL EU27372,667,933456,045,663612,697,875501,782,323572,109,2782,515,303,072UK(1)2,000,26520,782,28610,581,6351,605,5594,785,35339,755,098(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EU Table CP4: Financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent by programming period and fund- Cohesion and Fisheries PoliciesFUND / PROGRAMMING PERIODFinancial amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent 
 
     
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

related  to  Cohesion  Fund.  The  cumulative  financial  amounts  involved  were  instead 
higher  for  PP  2014-2020  than  for  PP  2007-2013.  However,  excluding  outliers 
(irregularities where more than EUR 100 million were involved) also  the  financial amounts 
involved in the fraudulent irregularities reported for PP 2014-2020 were about 25% lower 
than those for PP 2007-2013. Cases with extremely high financial amounts involved have a 
bigger role to play in PP 2014-2020. 

Focusing instead on the non-fraudulent irregularities, the fall in the number of cases and 
the  financial  amounts  reported  after  10  years  from  the  start  of  the  programming  periods  is 
striking (see Graph CP3 below). It concerns all funds and most of the Member States. 

A specific analysis has been carried out on the strong decline in non-fraudulent irregularities. 
This analysis identified a number of potential explanations that may cover part of this strong 

40 

 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

decrease. These hypotheses have been mentioned in the 2021 report on the protection of the 
EU financial interests. 35 

4.4. 

Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by area of the cohesion policy 

The operational  programmes financed under the EU cohesion policy are implemented 
along  identified  intervention  fields.  Table  CP5  below  shows  the  14  areas  in  which  the 
intervention fields have been grouped, for the purpose of this analysis.36  

Figures 1 and 2 below show how irregularities reported for PP 2014-2020 impacted on 
these  areas,  focusing  on  fraudulent  and non-fraudulent  cases,  respectively.  The  size  of 
the  squares  is  proportional  to  the  number  of  fraudulent  (Figure  1)  or  non-fraudulent 
(Figure 2) irregularities reported by the Member States. The darker the colour of the squares, 
the higher the financial amounts (EU-share) involved. 

35  Section  4.2.3  of  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2021:  own  resources,  agriculture, 
cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307 final 
36  The  methodology  for  this  analysis  is  explained  in  the  detail  at  Section  4.3.1  and  Annex  14  of  ‘Statistical 
evaluation of irregularities reported for 2021’, SWD(2022) 307 final, on 23/9/2022. 

41 

Table CP5AreasShort descriptionStrengthening research, technological development and innovationRTD&IDigital transitionEnhancing accessibility to and use and quality of information and communication technologiesInfo&CommSupporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all LowCarbonPromoting climate change adaptation, risk prevention and managementClimate&RiskPreserving and protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiencyEnvironmentPromoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key network infrastructuresTransportPromoting sustainable and quality employment and supporting labour mobilityEmployPromoting social inclusion, combating poverty and any discriminationInclusionInvestment in education, training and vocational training for skills and lifelong learningEducationEnhancing competitiveness of small and medium sized enterprisesCompSMECulture and tourismCultTourEnhancing institutional capacity of public authorities and stakeholders and an efficient public administrationPubbAmmTechnical AssistanceTechAssOutermost RegionsOutermostGreen transition 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

42 

 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

43 

 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

The  share  of  total  expenditure  declared  (EU-share)  for  the  different  areas  of  the 
cohesion  policy  may  influence  the  frequency  of  irregularities  and  the  total  financial 
amounts involved in these irregularities. To take this factor into consideration, Graphs CP4 
(for  fraudulent  irregularities)  and  CP5  (for  non-fraudulent  irregularities)  propose  a 
comparison among areas of the cohesion policy based on: 

•  The  percentage  of  irregularities  related  to  a  specific  area  over  the  total  number  of 

irregularities related to the cohesion policy; 

•  The percentage of the financial amounts involved in the irregularities related to a specific 
area over the total financial amounts involved in all irregularities related to the cohesion 
policy; 

•  The  percentage  of  expenditure  declared  (EU-share)  for  the  operations  belonging  to  a 
specific  area  over  the  expenditure  declared  (EU  share)  for  all  operation  under  the 
cohesion policy (all intervention fields). 

44 

0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%Climate&RiskCompSMECultTourEducationEmployEnvironmentInclusionInfo&CommLowCarbonPubbAmmRTD&ITechnical AssistanceTransportGraph CP4: Comparison among areas based on their weight on totals (outliers excluded > EUR 100 million)Irregularities reported as fraudulent -PP 2014-2020 Number of irregularities (%)Financial amounts involved (EU-share) (%)Exp declared (EU-share) (%) 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Based on the above, analysis suggests that a number of areas may be more  affected by 
fraud than others37: 

•  Investments  in  the  green  transition.  In  investments  for  the  protection  of  the 
environment,  for  adaptating  to  climate  change  and  for  risk  prevention  and 
management,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  fraud  are  high.  For  the  funding  of  the 
transition to a low carbon economy, the number of fraud cases is high. In the framework 
of  these  areas,  there  are  a  number  of  sub-areas  that  come  notice  as  affected  by  fraud, 
including  water  management  and  the  provision  of  water  for  human  consumption,  waste 

37 For the purpose of this analysis: (i) fraudulent irregularities directly point to the existence of fraud risks; (ii) 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  may  be  considered  as  pointing  instead  to  potential  vulnerabilities  that  may  be 
exploited  by  fraudsters.  Based  on  this  assumption,  in  the  text,  areas  are  qualified  as  ‘particularly  affected  by 
fraud’ (or similar wording) based on the analysis of fraudulent irregularities and having a ‘particular potential 
vulnerability  to  fraud’  (or  similar  wording)  based  on  the  analysis  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  In  the 
narrative,  a  number  of  sub-areas  are  referred  to  as  ‘coming  to  notice’.  This  is  the  result  of  applying  the 
methodology  (of  comparing  number  of  irregularities,  financial  amounts  involved  and  expenditure  declared) 
within a specific area. So the comparison is not with all the other sub-areas of the cohesion policy. For example, 
once the green transition is spotted as an area particularly affected by fraud, the analysis zooms in to find out 
about  the  most  problematic  sub-areas  within  the  green  transition.  This  means  that  the finding  concerning, for 
example,  energy  efficiency  is  not  absolute  (with  reference  to  the  whole  cohesion  policy)  but  relative  to  the 
spending for the green transition.   

45 

0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%Climate&RiskCompSMECultTourEducationEmployEnvironmentInclusionInfo&CommLowCarbonOutermost RegionsPubbAmmRTD&ITechnical AssistanceTransportGraph CP5: Comparison among areas based on their weight on totals (outlier excluded > EUR 100 million)Irregularities not reported as fraudulent -PP 2014-2020 Number of irregularities (%)Financial amounts involved (EU-share) (%)Exp declared (EU-share) (%) 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

management  and  funding  to  improve  energy  efficiency.  The  sub-areas  of  waste  water 
treatment,  renewable  energy  (solar)  and  funding  for  the  development  of  natural  assets 
come to notice for their potential vulnerability to fraud. 

•  Strengthening  research,  technological  development  and  innovation  (RTD&I).  In  this 
context, assistance to RTD&I activities in firms, especially SMEs, seems to be particulary 
affected. 

•  Funding  to  promote  sustainable  transport.  In  this  framework,  for  investments  in 
motorways,  roads  and  railways  that  are  part  of  the  TEN-T  infrastructure,  the  financial 
amounts  involved  in  fraud  are  high.  In  addition,  for  transport,  the  financial  amounts 
involved  in  non-fraudulent  irregularities  are  also  high,  pointing  to  significant  potential 
vulnerabilities. The sub-areas of motorways and roads  and electricity networks that are not 
part  of  the  TEN-T  and  TEN-E  infrastructure,  respectively,  come  to  notice  for  their 
potential  vulnerability  to  fraud,  in  particular  because  of  the  number  of  non-fraudulent 
irregularities. 

•  Promotion  of  employment.  For  this  funding,  the  number  of  fraud  cases  is  high.  In  the 
framework of promotion to employment, there are a number of sub-areas that come notice 
as  affected  by  fraud,  including  adaptation  to  change  of  workers  and  enterprises  and  the 
modernisation  of  the  labour  market.  The  sub-area  of  support  to  self-employment  and 
business start-ups comes to notice for its potential vulnerability to fraud. 

•  Financing  to  enhance  the  competitiveness  of  SMEs.  For  this  funding,  the  number  of 

fraud cases is high. 

Analysis  suggests  that  other  areas  may  have  a  particular  potential  vulnerability  to 
fraud, because of non-fraudulent irregularities: 

•  Investments  for  the  digitalisation.  For  this  funding,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in 
non-fraudulent  irregularities  are  high.  In  the  context  of  this  area,  investments  to  develop 
services  and  applications  for  citizens  (e-government)  and  SMEs  and  the  funding  to 
improve cooperation between SMEs and large enterprises come to notice. 

•  Promotion  of  social  inclusion,  combating  poverty  and  discrimination.  In  this 
framework,  a  number  of  sub-areas  come  to  notice,  including  active  inclusion,  social 
enterprises,  community-led  development,  child  and  housing  infrastructure,  access  to 
services (including healthcare and social services).  

4.5. 

Specific analysis – irregularities and fraud by type of violation 

With regard to fraudulent irregularities, the most frequent infringements concerned the 
supporting  documents.  One  out  of  four  infringements  and  nearly  one  out  of  two  Euro 
related to supporting documents were fraudulent (see FFL and FAL38 in Table CP6 below39). 
Most of the times, false or falsified documents were used.  

38 FFL  (Fraud Frequency Level)  is the ratio between the  number of fraudulent irregularities reported during a 
certain  period  and  the  total  number  of  irregularities  (fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent)  reported  during  the  same 
period. FAL (Fraud Amount Level) is a similar indicator, but based on the financial amounts involved. 
39 For further details about the content of the categories of irregularities listed in Table CP6, please see Annex 
13  to  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2021:  own  resources,  agriculture,  cohesion  and 
fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2022)307 final 

46 

 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Financial amounts were large in fraudulent irregularities where there were infringements of 
contract provisions/rules. This was influenced by two irregularities, accounting together for 
EUR 590 million. Fraud often consisted in incomplete or non-implementation of the funded 
action. The frequency of fraud was rather low (see FFL in Table CP6 above).  

Infringements  of  public  procurement  rules  were  the  most  reported  non-fraudulent 
irregularities, but they rarely led to a suspicion of fraud. Despite in only 4% of the public 
procurement  infringements  fraud  was  suspected,  these  cases  represent  14%  of  the  financial 
amounts  involved  in  public  procurement  infringements.  Where  the  suspicion  of  fraud  was 
specified,  it  was  for  example  about  (i)  bid-rigging;  (ii)  lack  of  transparency,  lack  of  equal 
treatment;  (iii)  modification  of  a  tender  during  evaluation  or  negotation  during  award 
procedure,  modification  or  incorrect  application  of  the  selection  criteria;  (iii)  conflict  of 
interests or irregular prior involvement of tenderers towards the contracting authority; (iv) use 
of restrictive technical specifications; (v) use of discriminatory, unrelated or disproportionate 
selection criteria. The low frequency of fraudulent cases against the background of so many  
infringements  suggests  a  need  for  improvement  either  in  fraud  detection  or  in  the 
administrative  capability  of  contracting  authorities.  While  no  assessment  can  be  made  on 
single  cases,  there  were  irregularities  not  reported  as  suspected  fraud  where  reference  is 
made,  for  example,  to  bid  rigging,  conflict  of  interests,  unjustified  direct  award, 
modifications of tenders during evaluation, etc.     

Most  of  fraudulent  infringements  concerning  ethics  and  integrity  were  related  to 
conflict  of  interests.  Ethichs  and  integrity  is  the  category  of  infringement  with  the  highest 
FFL and FAL. One out of two infringements and eight out of ten Euro concerning ethics and 
integrity  were  fraudulent  (see  Table  CP6  above).  About  70%  of  the  fradulent  irregularities 
related  to  ethichs  and  integrity  concerned  conflict  of  interests.  About  23%  concerned 
corruption/bribery. Focusing instead on the irregularities not reported as fraudulent, 80% of 
irregularities  related  to  ethichs  and  integrity  concerned  conflict  of  interests.  Three 
irregularities concerning corruption/bribery have been reported as non-fraudulent. This might 
suggest  reporting  mistakes,  pending  penal  proceedings  that  are  still  at  an  early  stage  or 
shortcomings in addressing serious ethics and integrity issues. 

4.6.  Risk analysis and spontaneous reporting 

In  the  antifraud  cycle,  the  capacity  of  a  system  to  detect  fraud  and  irregularities  is  a  key 
feature that helps making the system effective and  efficient in protecting the EU budget.  In 

47 

Financial amounts (EU-share)Financial amounts (EU-share)NEUREUR/avgFFL (%)FAL (%)NEUREUR/avgIncorrect, missing, false or falsified supporting documents431191,043,696443,25723481,416204,782,920144,621Infringement of contract provisions/rules218675,962,5143,100,7456583,272495,085,539151,310Infringement of public procurement rules143168,811,3451,180,4994143,9171,054,511,513269,214Ethics and integrity13696,804,124711,795538112322,986,756186,884Eligibility / Legitimacy of expenditure/measure7748,375,089628,248926801138,251,863172,599Infringements concerning the request98141,049,5201,439,281346819065,160,307342,949Violations/breaches by the operator6122,903,263375,463152434074,435,881218,929Incorrect, absent, falsified accounts5716,357,536286,974102150261,489,475122,489Product, species and/or land285,971,789213,278111522832,821,586143,954Multiple financing158,441,707562,7803883251,726,61469,065Bankruptcy93,521,896391,32211217413,574,474183,439State aid71,626,185232,3124816919,643,396116,233Movement14,6124,6126116841,60452,600Other108246,780,8862,285,0089381,124410,972,745365,634blank17468,438,38927,555,19969524523,982,72097,889Total number of irregularities EU 27 (1)1,0391,872,414,1701,802,13194510,9332,328,318,699212,962(1) This is not the sum of the figures above, because one irregularity can refer to more than one categoryIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTable CP6: Categories of irregularity - Cohesion policy (PP 2014-2020) Categories of irregularitiesIrregularities reported as fraudulent 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

the  2017  PIF  Report,  to  boost  the  capability  to  detect  irregularities,  the  Commission 
recommended  to  the  Member  States  to  improve  risk  analysis  and  the  use  of  spontaneous 
reporting  of  potential  irregularities  and  to  strengthen  the  protection  of  whistle-blowers  that 
are also a crucial source for investigative journalism40. 

Risk  analysis  still  only  marginally  contributes  to  detecting  fraud,  while  information 
from  civil  society  plays  a  larger  role  than  before.  The  percentage  of  fraudulent 
irregularities detected following risk analysis during the past 5 years was still very low with 
no improvement from the previous period 2014-2018. This situation is different for tips from 
informants,  whistle-blowers  and  information  published  in  the  media  (civil  society).  During 
the past 5 years, about one out of four irregularities has been detected following information 
from  civil  society.  During  the  previous  5  years,  just  about  one  out  of  eight  fraudulent 
irregularities  were  detected  because  of  it.  On  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  neither  risk 
analysis nor information from civil society play a noticeable role in detection yet. 

The  low  share  of  irregularities  detected  following  risk  analysis  suggests  room  for 
improvement in this domain. It is true that risk analysis might have had a more important 
role in detecting irregularities before expenditure is introduced in a request for reimbursement 
to the Commission. These detections, where referring to non-fraudulent irregularities, do not 
have  to  be  reported  in  IMS.  However,  this  is  valid  only  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities. 
Fraudulent  irregularities  must  always  be  reported  in  IMS  (where  above  the  EUR  10 000 
threshold).  Detection  of  fraud  and  irregularities  could  improve  by  adding  to  existing 
preventive  checks  and  audits  of  operations  also  ex post  thematic  risk  analysis  projects 
focusing  on  groups  of  past  transactions,  with  a  view  to  carrying  out  targeted  ex post 
controls.  

During  the  programming  period  2021-2027,  management  verifications  are  risk-based 
and  proportionate  to  the  risks  identified.  Until  PP  2014-2020  included,  administrative 
verifications  covered  instead  100%  of  the  payment  applications  for  reimbursement  by 
beneficiaries.  In  this  new  context,  it  is  even  more  important  that  the  new  approach  to 
management verifications includes an adequate policy about ex post checks.  

National  anti-fraud  strategies  should  consider  strengthening  the  national  anti-fraud 
landscape through the systematic involvement of bodies that are (i) external to management 
and  control  system  specific  to  the  use  of  EU  funds  and  (ii)  endowed  with  the  necessary 
powers, information and resources.  

4.7.  Duration of irregularities 

With regard to PP 2014-2020, it took on average about 1 year and a half from the start of 
the  irregularity  to  come  to  a  suspicion  that  a  fraudulent  irregularity  had  been  committed 
(see  Graph  CP6).  For  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  this  duration  was  similar  (see  Graph 
CP7),  which  would  not  be  expected,  as  fraudsters  may  go  to  great  lenghts  to  hide  their 
behaviour. On average,  with  regard to  PP 2014-2020, it took  nearly  2 years  and a half  to 
close the case after reporting to the Commission (see Graph CP4). This average duration is 
shorter  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities.  The  longer  delay  in  closing  fraudulent  cases  is 
consistent  with  the  need  to  rely  on  specialised,  more  limited  resources  to  investigate  fraud 
and the longer duration of criminal proceedings.  

40 Section 4.3 of the ‘29th Annual Report on the Protection of the EU’s financial interests – Fight against fraud 
–  2017’,  COM(2018)553  final  and  ‘Statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  reported  for  2017:  own  resources, 
agriculture, cohesion and fisheries policies, pre-accession and direct expenditure’, SWD(2018)386 final.  

48 

 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.8.  Detection and reporting by Member State 

Table CP7 below shows data on fraud detection in the Member States for PP 2014-2020, in 
terms of number of reported irregularities.  

49 

0.010.020.030.040.050.060.070.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph CP6: Average times from  irregularity to case closure Cohesion and Fisheries policies; PP 2014-2020; irregularities reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months21 months4 months9 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 1 027From suspicionto detection: 1 021From detection to reporting: 1 040From reporting to case closure: 610.010.020.030.040.050.060.0Reporting to case closureDetection to reportingSuspicion to detectionIrregularity to suspicionGraph CP7: Average times from  irregularity to case closure Cohesion and Fisheries policies; PP 2014-2020; irregularities not reported as fraudulentAvg. duration in months20 months23 months3 months6 monthsNumber of irregularities at the basis of these averagetimes From irregularityto suspicion: 10 700From suspicionto detection: 10 662From detection to reporting: 10 872From reporting to case closure:3 50128 months 
 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Table CP8 below shows the financial amounts (EU-share) involved in these irregularities and 
the fraud detection rates (the ratio between these amounts and the payments received by the 
Member  States  -  FDR).  For  EU27,  the  FDR  is  0.53%,  which  is  similar  to  the  FDR 
recorded for the PP 2007-2013. While PP 2007-2013 has already gone through the whole 
implementation  cycle,  data  for  PP  2014-2020  are  expected  to  change  as  implementation 
progresses. Many fraudulent irregularities are still to be detected and the expected increase in 
the  financial  amounts  involved  in  irregularities  will  only  be  marginally  counterbalanced  by 
the  increase  in  the  payments  to  the  Member  States,  because  most  of  payments  for 
PP 2014-2020 have already been made. The highest FDRs were recorded by Romania (about 
3.6%)  and  Slovakia  (about  6%).  These  FDRs  are  influenced  by  single  irregularities  that 
involved  extremely  high  financial  amounts,  which  also  have  a  strong  impact  on  the  EU-27 
FDR. 

50 

CFERDFESFEMFFCF, ERDF, ESF, EMFFNNNNNAT02305BE03407BG0318021CY02002CZ065590124DE01744061DK041712EE22221036ES03104FI00000FR0154120GR33107HR1100011HU116270170IE00000IT0110011LT016310LU00000LV5559473MT10001NL00314PL759733142PT02631259RO20142280190SE014510SI364013SK313714082TOTAL EU2774649316361075UK (2)029011Table CP7: Number of fraudulent irregularities by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EUMember StateIrregularities reported as fraudulent PP 2014-20 
 
 
  
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Graphs  CP8-CP11  show  tha  same  information  of  Graph  CP1,  but  focusing  on  the  whole 
PP 2014-2020 and providing the details at Member State level.  

Graph  CP8  and  CP9  focus  on  CF  and  ERDF,  respectively,  and  show  that  the 
proportion  between  financial  amounts  involved  in  the  irregularities  and  value  of  the 
affected  operations  is  about  40%  (both  for  CF  and  for  ERDF),  with  significant 
differences across Member States.   

51 

CFERDFESFEMFFEUREUREUREUREUREU payments (1)FDR %AT02,392,31988,43202,480,7511,122,122,7930.22BE067,55693,9070161,4631,856,422,4980.01BG0184,066749,9550934,0216,999,556,3970.01CY0363,86000363,860878,447,5460.04CZ027,991,8972,273,496030,265,39322,264,709,1910.14DE03,081,0476,088,87209,169,91918,331,493,7870.05DK0245,6554,455311,113561,223651,341,4900.09EE610,9904,427,75274,970493,5895,607,3013,797,228,8830.15ES0100,71446,4550147,16931,380,388,8890.00FI000001,489,832,1500.00FR09,942,790222,09556,25010,221,13515,344,882,3440.07GR6,117,703484,32441,40006,643,42718,060,726,5530.04HR16,984,3562,223,3220019,207,6787,990,039,9940.24HU1,288,80844,136,9091,219,845046,645,56222,354,789,5130.21IE000001,010,827,6900.00IT04,448,339004,448,33935,961,872,4040.01LT01,500,000430,84998,6182,029,4677,008,967,2450.03LU00000174,466,2510.00LV3,824,08530,011,600829,695654,87935,320,2594,328,720,5040.82MT214,695000214,695739,445,3700.03NL00233,0219,000242,0211,274,709,3990.02PL4,176,63441,090,82915,291,178709,81861,268,45978,244,058,6450.08PT039,035,5726,746,950129,44845,911,97022,767,803,4570.20RO427,055,716367,465,5534,373,7690798,895,03822,379,503,8483.57SE021,659437,1342,863,8453,322,6381,781,460,0650.19SI177,2052,117,561699,95502,994,7213,256,875,4280.09SK132,279,841652,730,3825,673,9990790,684,22212,827,768,7326.16EU27592,730,0331,234,063,70645,620,4325,326,5601,877,740,731352,835,761,4800.53UK (2)0133,3271,811,02801,944,3559,635,451,8120.02Table CP8: Financial amounts (EU-share) involved in fraudulent irregularities and fraud detection rate by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF(1) Net payments until 2023 from CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF. Total includes payments related to cross border cooperation(2) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EUMember StateFinancial amounts (EU-share) involved in Irregularities reported as fraudulent PP 2014-2020 
 
 
  
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Graph CP10 focuses on ESF and shows that the proportion between financial amounts 
involved in the irregularities and the value of the affected operations is about 7%. This 
is extremely low and different from the other Funds. As already mentioned, this may be due 
to the type of operations funded by the ESF.  

52 

592.7696.01,466.21,711.60.0200.0400.0600.0800.01,000.01,200.01,400.01,600.01,800.0EEGRHRHULVMTPLROSISKGrand TotalEUR millionGraph CP8: Irregularities reported as fraudulent -Cohesion FundFinancial amounts involved in irregularities and value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Irregularity (public contr.)Value operations (EU-share)Value operations (pub. contr.)1,234.11,374.93,191.63,706.40.0500.01,000.01,500.02,000.02,500.03,000.03,500.04,000.0ATBEBGCYCZDEDKEEESFRGRHRHUITLTLVPLPTROSESISKEU-27EUR millionGraph CP9: Irregularities reported as fraudulent -ERDFFinancial amounts involved in irregularities and value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Irregularity (public contr.)Value operations (pubb.contrib.)Value operations (pubb. contrib.) 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

Graph  CP11  focuses  on  EMFF  and  shows  that  the  proportion  between  financial 
amounts involved in the irregularities and the value of the affected operations is about 
99%.  This  is  extremely  high  and  different  from  the  other  Funds.  The  only  Member  State 
where this proportion is below 90% is Portugal (about 70%). 

In general, low proportion between the financial amounts involved in the irregularities 
and  the  value  of  the  operation/project  may  imply  risks  of  persistent  funding  to 
fraudsters.  A  low  proportion  means  that  there  is  fraud  (or  a  suspicion  of  fraud),  but  this 
concerns just part of the operation/project, while the remaining part is  considered legal and 
regular and funding  is  confirmed.  While it  depends on the type of operation/project  and on 

53 

45.653.8662.7781.30.0100.0200.0300.0400.0500.0600.0700.0800.0900.0ATBEBGCZDEDKEEESFRGRHULTLVNLPLPTROSESISKEU27EUR millionGraph CP10: Irregularities reported as fraudulent -ESFFinancial amounts involved in irregularities and value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Irregularity (public contr.)Value operations (EU-share)Value operations (pub. contr.)5.48.35.58.40.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.0DKEEFRITLTLVNLPLPTSEEU27EUR millionGraph CP11: Irregularities reported as fraudulent -EMFFFinancial amounts involved in irregularities and value of public contribution in affected operationsIrregularity (EU-share)Irregularity (public contr.)Value operations (EU-share)Value operations (pub. contr.) 
 
 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

the  type  and  specific  circumstances  of  the  fraudulent  behaviour,  careful  assessment  is 
required to confirm funding to an operation/project affected by fraud. 

Tables  CP9  and  CP10  below  show  data  on  detection  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  in  the 
Member States for PP 2014-2020. For EU27, the IDR is 0.67%, which is much lower than 
the IDR recorded for the PP 2007-2013 (2.5%). This is not surprising, given to the striking 
drop in the number of non-fraudulent irregularities reported by the Member States.   

54 

CFERDFESFEMFFCF, ERDF, ESF, EMFFNNNNNAT094181113BE06127088BG913726130554CY555318CZ145739178201,082DE03381197464DK0951933EE68279282377ES022715139417FI03914861FR033412031485GR231241097263HR24677426191HU4159818910838IE01545060IT0435961532LT97380321510LU01001LV1772149112MT295218NL1382243PL1631,993949133,118PT181349555302RO11240035039901SE031312082SI53117053SK118367775567TOTAL EU279307,1922,81135011,283UK (1)077363161,410(1) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EUTable CP9: Number of irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20Member StateIrregularities  not reported as fraudulent PP 2014-20 
  
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

4.9. 

Follow-up to suspected fraud 

The  Member  States  may  report  irregularities  as  non-fraudulent  (just  administrative 
irregularities)  or  as  fraudulent  (suspected  or  established  fraud)  and  may  change  this 
classification during the lifetime of the irregularities.  
For  just  7%  of  the  irregularities  reported  during  2014-202341,  there  is  or  has  been  a 
suspicion of fraud. This percentage does not significantly change  between the years of the 
timespan considered in the analysis. For 15% of the irregularities where there is or has been 
a suspicion of fraud, this suspicion was not initially detected or reported and the Member 
State reclassified the irregularity as fraudulent at a later stage.  

For  just  13%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then 
confirmed as established fraud (see Graph CP12 below). This percentage is very low and 
does not significantly change year on year. It could have been expected to be higher for years 
that are further in the past, because more time has been available to finalise the case.  

41 Considering the programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. 

55 

CFERDFESFEMFFEUREUREUREUREUREU payments (1)IDR %AT08,533,961813,44681,9439,429,3501,122,122,7930.84BE03,879,9271,901,66505,781,5921,856,422,4980.31BG109,443,77757,541,7453,613,9302,993,106173,592,5586,999,556,3972.48CY771,248395,364339,292243,8571,749,761878,447,5460.20CZ48,246,03474,297,1606,186,0731,295,978130,025,24522,264,709,1910.58DE035,027,4916,855,983195,51142,078,98518,331,493,7870.23DK0406,304520,223856,3351,782,862651,341,4900.27EE26,855,22628,094,7692,813,48769,76957,833,2513,797,228,8831.52ES042,472,46546,952,7623,188,30892,613,53531,380,388,8890.30FI02,526,472360,455310,0263,196,9531,489,832,1500.21FR042,213,8639,616,4444,309,80756,140,11415,344,882,3440.37GR22,068,59364,826,613153,484,793554,087240,934,08618,060,726,5531.33HR9,343,67314,429,01815,192,7372,321,22641,286,6547,990,039,9940.52HU15,430,44480,548,50929,879,8931,590,234127,449,08022,354,789,5130.57IE0394,5432,802,94603,197,4891,010,827,6900.32IT080,058,92910,652,37938,13690,749,44435,961,872,4040.25LT11,150,27032,140,4742,168,79119,54245,479,0777,008,967,2450.65LU014,2590014,259174,466,2510.01LV6,712,6247,958,403732,942186,48515,590,4544,328,720,5040.36MT913,518286,718555,93743,1621,799,335739,445,3700.24NL42,2751,097,443187,19031,4261,358,3341,274,709,3990.11PL30,890,643373,343,55973,460,354989,243478,683,79978,244,058,6450.61PT2,215,59815,421,6096,474,5485,065,78629,177,54122,767,803,4570.13RO80,957,847141,933,62619,845,3354,516,831247,253,63922,379,503,8481.10SE01,107,5971,307,8892,328,3934,743,8791,781,460,0650.27SI1,888,1562,370,8061,097,65505,356,6173,256,875,4280.16SK236,111,392185,594,83130,543,777258,653452,508,65312,827,768,7323.53TOTAL EU27603,041,3181,296,916,458428,360,92631,487,8442,359,806,546352,835,761,4800.67UK (2)018,920,39521,912,039261,56441,093,9989,635,451,8120.43(2) As of 1 February 2020, the UK is no longer part of the EUTable CP10: Financial amounts (EU-share) involved in irregularities not reported as fraudulent and irregularity detection rate by Member State - Cohesion and Fisheries policies - Programming period 2014-20Member StateIrregularities  not reported as fraudulent PP 2014-20CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF(1) Net payments until 2023 from CF, ERDF, ESF, EMFF. Total includes payments related to cross border cooperation 
 
 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

For  14%  of  the  irregularities  with  a  suspicion  of  fraud,  the  suspicion  was  then  
dismissed  (see  Graph  CP12  above).  However,  the  dismissal  ratio  is  getting  quite  high  for 
years that are further in the past. A high dismissal ratio may point to potential shortcomings. 
On the one hand, this might be due to incorrect assessments by the administrative authorities 
when  they  reported  a  case  as  a  suspicion  of  fraud  to  the  competent  bodies  for  further 
investigation. On the other hand, this might be due to the resources these competent bodies 
can actually devote to investigating such suspicions. 

Most  of  the  irregularities  where  there  was  a  suspicion  of  fraud  are  still  classified  as 
suspected  fraud,  even  if  several  years  have  elapsed  since  the  initial  reporting  (see  Graph 
CP12 above). This percentage changes year on year, but is very high also for years that are 
further in the past. In addition, 13% of these irregularities that are still pending as suspected 
fraud are already closed, so no changes are expected.  

Focusing  on  the  irregularities  that  were  initially  reported  during  2014-2018,  significant 
differences  between  Member  States  can  be  found  (see  Table  CP11  below).  Focusing  on 
this period means focusing on irregularities that have been reported from 5 to 10 years ago. In 
the  Member  States  with  low  incidence  of  fraud,  the  competent  authorities  should  invest  in 
detecting signals  of  fraud and, when discovering irregularities, should carefully address  the 
question of intentionality. This could also be due to reporting practices delaying classification 
as suspected fraud. Considering that the most recent irregularities in this analysis have been 
reported  5  years  ago,  these  reporting  practices  should  be  reviewed  or  engagement  with  the 
judicial authorities should be improved. 

In  many  Member  States,  the  percentage  of  irregularities  still  classified  as  suspected 
fraud  or  the  dismissal  ratio  are  high.  The  potential  shortcomings  suggested  by  a  high 
dismissal ratio have already been discussed above. A high percentage of irregularities that are 
still classified as suspected fraud after many years may suggest that the judicial authorities do 

56 

 
 
COHESION AND FISHERIES 

not give proper follow-up to these suspicions, including because they may not have sufficient 
resources. Alternatively, there may not be any proper communication channels from judicial 
to  reporting  authorities.  Many  irregularities  that  are  still  classified  as  suspected  fraud  are 
closed. This may due to persistent suspicions of the administrative authorities, while criminal 
proceedings were not started, were prevented by the statute of limitations or did not lead to 
enough evidence about fraud. It could also be that in some Member States cases were closed 
in IMS because the competent bodies had finalised administrative actions (for example, full 
recovery),  even  if  the  penal  proceedings  were  still  ongoing.  This  reporting  practice  in  IMS 
would  not  be  correct.  Irregularities  should  be  closed  only  once  all  proceedings  have  been 
finalised. 

4.10.  Other internal policies 

Other  funds  are  used  under  shared  management  to  finance  other  internal  policies.  Tables 
CP12  and  CP13  show  the  number  of  and  financial  amounts  involved  in  fraudulent  and 
non-fraudulent irregularities concerning AMIF, FEAD, YEI, ISF and EGF.  

57 

N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00.000%1%133%00%267%50%BE00.000%2%00%00%6100%50%BG00.000%3%646%18%646%100%CY00.000%9%00%120%480%100%CZ460.0230%7%3825%4630%6845%100%DE80.015%14%5638%2517%6846%85%DK100.3371%32%321%17%1071%90%EE30.0213%12%00%1042%1458%29%ES1020.0174%1%2518%00%11282%6%FI00.000%6%125%00%375%33%FR00.000%3%00%00%12100%67%GR90.0118%3%714%12%4384%65%HR00.000%9%117%117%467%75%HU10.001%8%00%00%137100%99%IE00.00NANA0NA0NA0NANAIT230.0248%4%1531%510%2858%82%LT30.0138%3%00%450%450%50%LU0NANANA0NA0NANANANALV50.0113%11%923%1025%2153%52%MT00.000%3%00%00%2100%100%NL20.0113%5%17%747%747%71%PL450.0114%9%7524%4113%20163%96%PT10.002%5%00%00%48100%42%RO110.016%10%6332%63%13166%97%SE00.000%5%120%00%480%0%SI00.000%11%741%318%741%100%SK130.019%12%1711%2617%10771%100%EU-272820.0118%6%32621%18812%1,04967%79%(1)Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified. (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reportedTable CP11: Cohesion and Fisheries policies (programming periods 2007-2013 and 2014-2020) Follow-up to suspected fraud by Member State - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018Member StateReclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraudNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAMIF000000142,4552120,149003162,604FEAD0034,701,01933,166,046248,16000315,808117,931,033YEI143,55800472,77100001422,82219139,151TOTAL EU27143,55834,701,01973,238,817390,6152120,1491738,630338,232,788Table CP12: Number of irregularities and financial amounts (EU-share) reported as fraudulent by the Member States -  AMIF, FEAD, EGF, ISF and YEIFUNDREPORTING YEARTOTAL201720182019202020222023NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAMIF00111,951221,676,99019536,449321,069,7196183,76113437,037251,549953,967,456EGF00000000147,124000000147,124FEAD3463,9215813,205101,097,3934873,764141,269,110251,901,646193,201,108157,797,0439517,417,190ISF1178,812003419,0001223,018381,1828462,535288,3772100,210201,553,134YEI003234,49093,559,27883,153,2286403,50171,748,415119,899411,538,1783820,656,989TOTAL EU274642,73391,059,646446,752,661324,786,459562,870,636464,296,357353,746,4212319,486,98024943,641,89320222023Table CP13: Number of irregularities and financial amounts (EU-share)  not reported as fraudulent by the Member States -  AMIF, FEAD, EGF, ISF and YEIFUNDREPORTING YEARTOTAL201620172018201920202021 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.  PRE-ACCESSION POLICY  

5.1. 

Introduction 

Section  5  presents  a  statistical  evaluation  of  irregularities  and  fraud  reported  by  the 
beneficiary countries during 2023 with reference to the pre-accession policy. It places these 
detections in the context of past years and relevant programming periods. 

The  beneficiary  countries  must  report  fraudulent  and  non-fraudulent  irregularities  to  the 
Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS). When reference is made 
to fraud or fraudulent, this includes both suspected and established fraud.42 Differently from 
the  common  agricultural  policy  and  the  cohesion  and  fisheries  policies,  there  are  no 
exceptions to reporting in IMS. Irregularities must always be reported in IMS, (i) also when 
they are detected and corrected before the expenditure is introduced in a statement submitted 
to  the  Commission;  (ii)  also  when  the  financial  amounts  are  below  EUR 10 000. In  this 
section,  when  reference  is  made  to  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  irregularities,  it  is 
always the EU-share of these financial amounts. 

Before  2007,  the  EU  has  been  providing  pre-accession  assistance  through  a  number  of 
separate  instruments  (see  Section  5.2.1).  As  from  2007,  the  EU  provides  pre-accession 
assistance through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). IPA aims to support 
candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  for  EU  membership  in  meeting  the  accession 
criteria  and  to  bring  their  institutions  and  standards  in  line  with  the  EU  acquis 43.  For  the 
period 2007-2013, IPA had a budget of EUR 11.5 billion. Its successor, IPA II, was allocated 
EUR 12.8 billion for the period 2014-2020. For the multiannual financial framework period 
2021-2027, the IPA III budgetary envelope is EUR 14.2 billion. The current beneficiaries are: 
Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Kosovo44,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia,  Serbia,  and 
Türkiye. Assistance is also provided through multi-country/regional programmes.45  

5.2. 

Instruments for Pre-accession Assistance  

5.2.1.  Before 2007: pre-accession Assistance (PAA)  

Before  2007,  the  EU  has  been  providing  pre-accession  assistance  to  candidate  countries 
through  a  number  of  separate  instruments.  The  PHARE  programme  provided  support  for 
institution-building  measures  and  associated  investment,  as  well  as  funding  measures  to 
promote economic and social cohesion and cross border cooperation. The ISPA programme 
dealt  with  large-scale  environmental  and  transport  infrastructure  projects,  while  the 
SAPARD  programme  supported  agricultural  and  rural  development.  For  the  programme 
years  2002-2006,  Türkiye  received  assistance  under  the  specific  pre-accession-oriented 
framework  of  the  Pre-accession  Financial  Assistance  for  Türkiye  (TIPAA).  The  CARDS 
programme  was  the  main  financial  instrument  to  promote  stability  in  the  Western  Balkans 

42  ‘Suspected  fraud’  means  an  irregularity  that  gives  rise  to  the  initiation  of  administrative  or  judicial 
proceedings at national level in order to establish the presence of intentional behaviour, in particular fraud, as 
referred to in Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union, on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests. If a guilty verdict is issued and is not 
appealed against, the case can be considered ‘established fraud’. 
43 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/preaccession-assistance_en 
44 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.  
45 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance_en 

58 

 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

and facilitate the region’s closer association with the EU. The countries that joined the EU in 
2004 46  received  a  Transition  Facility  (TF)  in  2004-2006,  as  did  Bulgaria  and  Romania  in 
2007-2010. All pre-2007 programmes and projects have been completed. 

5.2.2.  2007-2013: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA I) 

For the period 2007-2013, the EU supported reforms in the ‘enlargement countries’ (i.e. the 
candidate  countries  Albania,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia,  Serbia,  and  Türkiye  and 
potential candidates Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo), providing financial and technical 
help via IPA I. 47  

IPA I consisted of five components: (i) transition assistance and institution building (TAIB); 
(ii) cross border cooperation (CBC); (iii) regional development  (transport, environment  and 
economic  development)  (REGD);  (iv)  human  resource  development  (strengthening  human 
capital and combatting exclusion) (HRD); and (v) rural development (IPARD).48 Candidate 
countries were eligible for all five components; potential candidates were eligible only for the 
first two. 

5.2.3.  2014 – 2020: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II)  

For  the  period  2014-2020,  IPA  II  built  on  the  results  achieved  under  IPA  I  and  set  a  new 
framework for providing pre-accession assistance. The primary innovation of IPA II was its 
strategic focus on specific objectives.49  

The  IPA  II  Regulation  limits  financial  assistance  to  five  policy  areas:  (i)  reforms  in 
preparation  for  EU  membership  and  related  institution-  and  capacity-building;  (ii) 
socio-economic  and  regional  development;  (iii)  employment,  social  policies,  education, 
promotion  of  gender  equality,  and  human  resources  development;  (iv) agriculture  and  rural 
development; and (v) regional and territorial cooperation. 

The  bulk  of  IPA  II  assistance  is  channelled  through  the  country  action  programmes. 
Additionally,  IPA  II  funded  multi-country  action  programmes  to  enhance  regional 
cooperation,  particularly  in  the  Western  Balkans.  Financial  assistance  is  also  provided  via 
cross  border  cooperation  programmes  to  encourage  territorial  cooperation  between  IPA  II 
beneficiaries and via rural development programmes for the development of rural areas. 

In  accordance  with  the  Financial  Regulation,  IPA  II-funded  activities  are  managed  either 
directly (meaning that the Commission implements them directly until the relevant national 
authorities are accredited to  manage the funds) or indirectly (meaning  that the Commission 
delegates the management of certain actions to external entities, while still retaining overall 
final responsibility for the general budget execution). Cross border cooperation programmes 
with Member States are administered via shared management, meaning that implementation 
tasks are delegated to the Member States. 

5.2.4.  2021 – 2027: The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III)  

The  general  objective  of  the  new  IPA  III  instrument  is  to  support  the  beneficiaries  in 
adopting  and  implementing  the  political,  institutional,  legal,  administrative,  social  and 
economic  reforms  required  by  those  beneficiaries  to  comply  with  Union  values  and  to 

46 Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
47 See Council Regulation (EC) 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006, p. 82-93. 
48 Source: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en. 
49 See Regulation (EU) 231/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing 
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II), OJ L 77, 15.3.2014, p. 11–26 and  
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en.  

59 

 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

progressively  align  to  Union  rules,  standards,  policies  and  practices  with  a  view  to  Union 
membership. 

The new programming  framework 2021-2027  reflects  the specific objectives  of the  IPA  III 
Regulation  and  focuses  on  the  priorities  of  the  enlargement  process  according  to  five 
thematic  windows,  which  mirror  the  clusters  of  negotiating  chapters  as  per  the  revised 
enlargement methodology. 50 

5.3.  General trend 

Table PA1 below  (and  related graph) shows  all  fraudulent  and non-fraudulent irregularities 
reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries  during  the  past  5  years  under  pre-accession 
programmes.51  These  irregularities  occurred  in  connection  with  funds  distributed  under  the 
2000-2006  PAA  (to  a  limited  extent 52)  and  under  IPA I  and  IPA II.53  There  was  just  one 
irregularity under  IPA  III, reported in  2023 by Montenegro (no financial  amounts  specified 
yet). 

(about  20%).54  However, 

For half of these irregularities the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000. 
This  percentage  is  higher  for  non-fraudulent  irregularities  (about  52%)  than  for  fraudulent 
these 
the 
irregularities 
‘below-10 000’  irregularities  represented  just  2%  of  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  all 
pre-accession  irregularities  reported  during  2019-2023.  Concerning  these  ‘below-10 000’ 
irregularities:  (i)  about  72%  of  them  concerned  IPARD.  The  second  ranking  fund,  TAIB, 
accounted for much less (14%); (ii) Türkiye and North Macedonia reported 70% of them; (iii) 
64%  of  them  were  reported  in  2022-2023,  contributing  to  the  exceptional  increase  in 
non-fraudulent irregularities (see below).   

financial  amounts 

involved 

in 

From  2021  to  2022,  the  number  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  experienced  an 
exceptional increase and remained high in 2023 (see Table PA1). This was mainly due to 
irregularities related to IPA II in relation to IPARD in North Macedonia and Türkiye. For the 
majority of these irregularities, the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000 (see 
above). 

About  8%  of  the  irregularities  were  reported  as  fraudulent.  This  percentage  (the  fraud 
frequency  level  –  FFL)  changed  over  time,  increasing  significantly  in  2020  (15%)  and 
peaking in 2021 at 19%. In 2023, the financial amounts involved in fraudulent irregularities 

50 https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance_en   
51 Data for this analysis have been download from IMS on 4/3/2024.   
52 Just 10 non-fraudulent irregularities (with about EUR 2 million involved) that concerned ISPA (5), TIPAA (4) 
and PHARE (1). 
53 To provide the complete picture, 12 additional irregularities (with about EUR 0.7 million involved) must be 
mentioned.  These  irregularities,  reported  as  fraudulent  by  Romania  in  2020  (1)  and  2023  (4),  and  as 
non-fraudulent  by  Estonia  in  2021  (1)  and  2022  (1),  Poland  in  2023  (4)  and  Romania  in  2021  (1),  concern 
cross-border cooperation under the European Neighbourhood Instrument. These irregularities are not included in 
the following analysis, as they do not relate to pre-accession. As part of EU policy towards its neighbours, this 
cross-border  cooperation  supports  sustainable  development  along  the  EU’s  external  borders,  helps  reduce 
differences in living standards and addresses common challenges across these borders.  
54 Considering irregularities where the financial amounts were below EUR 10 000 and irregularities where the 
financial  amounts  were  still  zero  and  the  irregularity  was  already  closed.  The  open  irregularities  where  the 
financial  amounts  involved  were  still  zero  are  not  included.  If  these  irregularities  were  included  in  the 
calculation, the percentage of ‘below-10 000’ irregularities would increase to 52% (54% for non-fraudulent and 
27% for fraudulent irregularities).  

60 

 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

jumped  to  about  EUR  19  million,  due  to  one  irregularities  reported  by  Türkiye  concerning 
regional development (REGD). 

As the irregularities reported during the past 5 years mostly refer to IPA I and IPA II, this is 
separately analysed in the following sections.  

61 

NEURNEURNEUR2019141,404,96719610,498,75321011,903,7202020153,105,247885,531,0661038,636,3132021231,172,764974,693,6781205,866,4422022101,087,80528310,677,88829311,765,69320231919,355,1922306,544,13924925,899,331TOTAL8126,125,97589437,945,52397564,071,499Table PA1 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities, 2019-2023YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTAL 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.4. 

Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA I, 2007-2013) 

5.4.1.  Recent trends 

Table PA2 below  (and  related graph) shows  all  fraudulent  and non-fraudulent irregularities 
reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries  during  the  past  5  years  under  IPA  I. The  number  of 
these irregularities and the financial amounts involved fell markedly in the past 4 years, as the 
programmes were closed years ago. The FFL was 8% during the past 5 years, although it 
was higher in 2020 (13%) and peaked at 25% in 2023, but based on just one fraudulent case.  

Tables PA3 and PA4 below show that the 224 irregularities related to IPA I during the past 5 
years  (i)  concerned  five  components  (by  far,  the  highest  number  of  cases  and  the  highest 
financial  amounts  concerned  IPARD);  (ii)  were  reported  by  seven  countries  (the  leading 
contributor to detection was Türkiye, which reported about 71% of irregularities and 74% of 
the financial amounts). 

62 

NEURNEURNEUR201981,054,4231208,071,8911289,126,314202072,736,354463,935,737536,672,0912021283,651322,396,706342,480,3572022005182,4925182,49220231600,6593243,2274843,887TOTAL184,475,08720614,830,05322419,305,141YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTALTable PA2 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA I), 2019-2023 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.4.2.  Trends since the start of IPA I, by beneficiary country and component 

Table PA5 below (and related graph) shows the number of irregularities and related financial 
amounts concerning IPA I since 2007, by beneficiary country and component. 
In 37% of these irregularities the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000.55 
However,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities  represented 
just  1%  of  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  all  pre-accession  irregularities  reported  for 
IPA I.  Concerning  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities:  (i)  about  52%  of  them  concerned 
cross-border  cooperation  programmes  (CBC-IPA).  The  second  ranking  fund,  IPARD, 
accounted for 22%; (ii) Bulgaria (33%), Croatia (24%) and Türkiye (22%) reported most of 
the ‘below-10 000’ irregularities.   

Since  2007,  10  beneficiary  countries  have  reported  871  irregularities  related  to  five 
components.  The  highest  number  of  irregularities  concerned  IPARD.  About  88%  of  the 
irregularities related to IPARD were detected by Türkiye. Only two other countries, Croatia 
and  North  Macedonia,  reported  IPARD  cases.  A  broader  range  of  countries  reported 
irregularities concerning cross-border cooperation programmes (CBC-IPA), the second most 
affected component of IPA I. The majority of these irregularities were reported by Bulgaria 
(see also above, about the frequency of ‘below-10 000’ irregularities). The only non-Member 
State  that  reported  irregularities  relating  to  CBC  was  Serbia  (apart  from  one  irregularity 
reported by Türkiye). In addition to reporting most of the IPARD irregularities, Türkiye also 
reported  76%  of  the  irregularities  related  to  human  resources  development  (HRD) 
programmes, the third most affected component of IPA I (see Table PA5 and related graph). 

55  Considering  irregularities  where  the  financial  amounts  were  below  EUR  10 000  (but  excluding  open 
irregularities where the financial amounts were still zero). 

63 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR2019126,53226205,119817,392,9421047,194101,454,527202000151,346433,904,1200092,716,62520210000181,644,1580016836,19920220000181,139004101,3532023000000004843,887TOTAL126,53227256,46514313,022,3591047,194435,952,591Table PA3 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA I) by component, 2019-2023YearCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR201910126,53229,0812770,418126,18381,197,073887,797,02720201871,49200000061,848,260348,219433,904,12020210000163,19600666,429214,771252,335,961202200000000336,816002145,6762023000000001600,6591121,9492121,278TOTAL2871,492126,532372,2772770,418172,578,347141,382,01216014,304,063Table PA4 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA I) by country, 2019-2023YearALGRHRMEMKRSTR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

64 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAL000000003871,492BG114432,49200000000GR4216,57600000000HR51228,97211423,444311,872,5035503,09391,061,787IT3553,93500000000ME002125,871002081,19400MK003267,13915215,03200192,528,767RO4720,83200000000RS21169,326000000161,691,481TR112,5331115,615,54431640,951,274185,968,4247510,601,784TOTAL1982,334,6661466,331,99836243,038,809436,552,71112216,755,311Table PA5 - Pre-accession: irregularities reported under IPA I components since 2007CBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIB 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.5. 

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance II (IPA II 2014-2020) 

5.5.1.  Trends 

Table PA6 below  (and  related graph) shows  all  fraudulent  and non-fraudulent irregularities 
reported  by  the  beneficiary  countries  during  the  past  5  years  under  IPA II. The  number  of 
irregularities  increased  markedly  in  2022  and  remained  high  2023,  due  in  part  to  the  high 
number of ‘below-10 000’ irregularities.  
In 57% of these irregularities, the financial amounts involved were below EUR 10 000.56 
However,  the  financial  amounts  involved  in  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities  represented 
just 2.5% of the financial amounts involved in the IPA II pre-accession irregularities reported 
during  2019-2023.  Concerning  these  ‘below-10 000’  irregularities:  (i)  about  77%  of  them 
concerned IPARD; (ii) Türkiye and North Macedonia reported 73% of them; (iii) about 73% 
of them were reported in 2022-2023.   

During  the past  5  years, the  fraud frequency level  was  8.5%,  close to  the FFL  for  IPA  I. 
However, it was very high in 2020-2021 (16% and 25%) and very low in 2022 (3.5%), also 
because the strong increase of non-fraudulent irregularities in this year, when ‘below-10 000’ 
reporting was sustained.  

More than 70% of the non-fraudulent irregularities reported during 2022-2023 concerned 
IPARD.  About  55%  of  these  IPARD  irregularities  were  reported  by  Türkiye,  followed  by 
North Macedonia (24%) and Albania (18%). 

The  number  of  fraudulent  irregularities  peaked  in  2021  and  was  high  also  in  2023. 
Mostly this was due to reporting by Türkiye and, with specific reference to 2022 only, Serbia. 
Considering  fraudulent  irregularities  during  the  past  5  years  (i)  62%  were  reported  by 
Türkiye and 29% by Serbia; (ii) 71% concerned IPARD and 14% were related to CBC. 

56  Considering  irregularities  where  the  financial  amounts  were  below  EUR  10 000  (but  excluding  open 
irregularities where the financial amounts were still zero).  

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

Table  PA7  shows  that  the  740  irregularities  related  to  IPA  II  concerned  five  components. 
The highest number of cases and the highest financial amounts concerned IPARD. Table PA8 
shows  that  irregularities  related  to  IPA  II  were  reported  by  eight  countries.  The  main 
contributor to detection was Türkiye, which reported about 48% of irregularities, followed by 
North Macedonia (21%) and Albania (17%). However, 73% of the irregularities reported by 
North  Macedonia  and  55%  of  those  reported  by  Türkiye  were  ‘below-10 000’.  Most  of  the 
financial  amounts  were  involved  in  irregularities  reported  by  Türkiye,  due  also  to  the 
aforementioned  irregularity  concerning  REGD,  which  related  to  a  figure  of  about 
EUR 18 million.  Serbia  recorded  the  highest  average  financial  amounts  involved  in 
irregularities (about EUR 90 000). In the other beneficiary countries, this average was around 
EUR 30 000 (excluding the aforementioned REGD irregularity reported by Türkiye)57. 

57 The average financial amounts involved in irregularities reported by Romania were around EUR 40 000, but 
this average is based on just two irregularities. 

66 

NEURNEURNEUR20196350,54471787,049771,137,59320208368,893421,595,328501,964,2222021211,089,113641,840,072852,929,1842022101,087,80527410,378,60328411,466,40920231818,754,5332266,300,91124425,055,444TOTAL6321,650,88867720,901,96374042,552,852YearIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentTOTALTable PA6 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA II), 2019-2023 
 
 
 
PRE-ACCESSION 

5.5.2.  Trends since the start of IPA II, by beneficiary country and component 

Table  PA9  (and  related  graph)  shows  the  number  of  irregularities  and  related  financial 
amounts concerning IPA II since 2014, by beneficiary country and component. With respect 
to data presented under Section 5.5.1, Table PA9 is based on just 18 additional irregularities 
(of  which  three  were  fraudulent)  reported  before  2019  (all  but  one  reported  in  2018). 

67 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR2019266,18600721,071,407300020200020401,248,128206716,094202112450,83700562,091,37768,99811377,9722022131,044,5771255,0002159,443,85625225,74630497,2292023331,315,45314175,8921634,584,474618,018,42928961,195TOTAL602,877,05317430,89254618,439,2424218,253,173752,552,490Table PA7 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA II) by component, 2019-2023TAIBYearCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURNEUR201900266,186000049323,459001025747,9482020459,0430000650,98410112,06800126,242291,715,8852021842,811246,865006324,5481338,468163,90214731,132411,681,4582022582,894,847386,058005324,838822,732,297123,355142,044,0711213,360,9432023531,282,46217606,272111,53911199,657357,70200221,959,53113720,938,281TOTAL1234,279,16224805,381111,53928900,0281573,263,994287,257524,760,97535328,444,515Table PA8 - Pre-accession: reported irregularities (IPA II) by country, 2019-2023RSTRYearALBGMEMKROITNEURNEURNEURNEURNEURAL132,25600693,878,8910053368,015BG29856,79000000000IT111,53900000000ME212,1514256,02021626,9570024,900MK00001493,259,58971,09323,312RO287,25700000000RS331,928,47000121,456,33500101,376,171TR0013174,8723049,664,5663518,252,0809800,092TOTAL682,928,46317430,89255518,886,3384218,253,173762,552,490Table PA9 - Pre-accession:  irregularities reported under IPA II components since 2014CBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIB 
  
 
 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6.  DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6.1. 

Introduction 

Section  6  contains  a  descriptive  analysis  of  the  data  on  recovery  orders  issued  by  the 
Commission in relation to expenditure managed under the ‘direct management’ mode, one of 
the three modes the Commission uses to implement the budget. 

According  to  the  Financial  Regulation,  the  Commission  implements  the  budget  directly 
(‘direct management’) as set out in Articles 125 to 153, through its services, including staff in 
the Union delegations under the authority of the respective Head of delegation, in accordance 
with Article 60(2), or through executive agencies as referred to in Article 6958. 

A different methodology has been used in comparison to previous reports on the protection of 
the EU financial interests (PIF reports): 

•  The recovery items include cancellations. 

•  Policy  areas  are  replaced  with  the  EU  multiannual  financial  framework  (MFF) 

heading descriptions (Tables DM1 and DM4). 

With  those  two  elements  taken  into  account,  the  PIF  report  data  are  aligned59  with  data 
published  in  other  Commission  documents,  such  as  the  Commission’s  annual  management 
and performance report (AMPR) and the annual activity reports (AARs) of its services. 

This new methodological approach is primarily intended for use in reporting starting with the 
2023  financial  year  and  onwards.  The  2019-2022  figures  are  not  fully  comparable  (as 
cancellations in those previous 4 years were not included) and this difference should be taken 
into account.  

6.2.  General overview 

For  the  2023  financial  year,  a  total  of  EUR 42.34  billion60  was  disbursed  under  ‘direct 
management’ mode (RRF not included61). 

Table DM1 presents the actual payments by MFF heading. Actual payments are higher than 
in previous years. 

58    Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the    
financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) 
No 1301/2013,  (EU)  No 1303/2013,  (EU)  No 1304/2013,  (EU)  No 1309/2013,  (EU)  No 1316/2013,  (EU) 
No 223/2014,  (EU)  No 283/2014,  and  Decision  No 541/2014/EU  and  repealing  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom) 
No 966/2012PE/13/2018/REV/1, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1–222. 
59 The existing difference has been highlighted in paragraph 70 of Special Report No 07/2024 of the European 
Court  of  Auditors,  ‘The  Commission’s  systems  for  recovering  irregular  EU  expenditure.  Potential  to  recover 
more and faster’, published on 7 May 2024.  
60 Own calculation based on ABAC data. 
61 By the end of 2023, no recovery orders in ABAC concerned the RRF. In addition, there is no obligation for 
the Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via IMS. 

68 

 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6.3.  General 5-year analysis 2019-2023 

For  the  2023  financial  year,  the  Commission  registered  892  recovery  items62  in  the  ABAC 
system63 
irregular  amount  of 
irregularities, 
EUR 52.55 million. Among these recovery items, 20 were reported as fraudulent, involving a 
total irregular amount of EUR 1.87 million. 

that  were  qualified  as 

for  a 

total 

The  following  analysis  gives  an  overview  of  recovery  data  recorded  by  the  European 
Commission  in  ABAC  in  the  last  5  years.  Between  2019  and  2023,  on  average  there  were 
approximately  38  recovery  items  each  year  qualified  as  fraudulent  irregularities64.  Since 
2021, there has been a substantial decline in the number of reported fraudulent irregularities 
in  direct  management.  In  relation  to  fraudulent  irregularities, the ratio  of irregular financial 
amounts  to  total  expenditure  under  direct  management  during  2019-2023  is  close  to  zero 
(0.02%)65  and  has  gradually  decreased  over  the  years.  The  figures  are  presented  in  Table 
DM2. 

With  regard  to  recovery  items  qualified  as  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  on  average 
approximately  1 100  items  per  year  were  registered  between  2019  and  2023.  Since  2019, 
there has been a noticeable decline in the number of cases. The figures are presented in Table 
DM3 below. 

62 Recovery items mean ‘recovery context’ elements in ABAC. There can be more recovery context elements 
associated with one recovery order issued. As of 2023, they also contain cancelations. 
63  ABAC  is a  transversal,  transactional  information  system  allowing  for  the  execution  and  monitoring  of  all 
budgetary and accounting operations by the Commission, an agency or institution. 
64 Fraudulent irregularities - recovery items qualified in ABAC as ‘OLAF notified’. 
65 For 2023 it was particularly small – 0.0044% 

69 

EUR million%1. Single market, innovation and digital21 66251.22. Cohesion, resilience and values2 3395.53. Natural resources and environment312           0.74. Migration and border management224           0.55. Security and defence345           0.86. Neighbourhood and the world8 59720.37. European public administration8 86220.9Total DM excluding RRF42 340100.0Table DM1 - Payments made in 2023 financial year by MFF headingMFF headingPayments 2023EUR millionNEUR million%201920 6303710.570.05202026 579419.150.03202121 711547.040.03202232 892375.670.02202342 340201.870.00Total144 15218934.300.02Table DM2 - Irregularities reported as fraudulent and related amounts, 2019-2023Fraudulent amounts/ PaymentsYearPaymentsIrregularities reported as fraudulent 
 
 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

Between 2019 and 2023, in total, there were 5 493 recovery items registered and qualified as  
non-fraudulent  irregularities,  with  a  total  recovery  amount  of  EUR 250.71 million.  During 
2019-2023, in relation to non-fraudulent irregularities, the ratio of irregular financial amounts 
to payments is around 0.17% (see Table DM3). This ratio has been steadily declining from 
0.5-0.6% in year 2015 to 0.12% in 2023. 

6.4. 

Specific analysis 

6.4.1.  Recoveries according to MFF headings 

In 2023, the highest numbers of recovery items qualified as non-fraudulent irregularities were 
recorded in the MFF area ‘Single market, innovation and digital’ (517). The same area also 
featured the highest irregular amounts registered (EUR 34.48 million).  

During the same year, 20 recovery items were registered as fraudulent irregularities. The two 
MFF headings for which the highest number of fraudulent irregularities were reported were 
‘Neighbourhood  and  the  world’  and  ‘Single  market,  innovation  and  digital’,  with  9  items 
each.  These  irregularities  involved  EUR 1.87 million,  59%  of  which  (EUR 1.11 million) 
related to the MFF heading ‘Neighbourhood and the world’. 

Table DM4 provides an overview of irregularity statistics by MFF heading for 2023. 

6.4.2.  Recoveries according to residence of legal entity 

Between  2019  and  2023,  74.1%  of  non-fraudulent  irregularities  and  71.3%  of  the  related 
recovery  amounts  concerned  legal  entities  resident  in  the  EU-2766.  For  fraudulent 
irregularities, these ratios are slightly lower: 72% of the total number of recovery items and 
70.7% of the related recovery amounts concerned a legal entity residing in the EU-27.  

Table DM5 below summarises the total recoveries made during the past 5 years according to 
the country of residence of the legal entity, to which the payment was unduly made. 

66 The residence of the legal entity and the residence of the beneficiary are not necessarily the same. 

70 

EUR millionNEUR million%201920 6301 77855.350.27202026 5791 28553.220.20202121 71182535.850.17202232 89273355.610.17202342 34087250.680.12Total144 1525 493250.710.17Table DM3 - Irregularities not reported as fraudulent and related amounts, 2019-2023YearPaymentsIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregular amounts/ PaymentsEUR millionEUR millionNEUR millionN1. Single market, innovation and digital21 66234.485170.5292. Cohesion, resilience and values2 3392.291050.0113. Natural resources and environment312                0.0830.2414. Migration and border management224                1.13120.0005. Security and defence345                0.0000.0006. Neighbourhood and the world8 59711.912211.1197. European public administration8 8620.80140.000Total DM excluding RRF42 34050.688721.8720Table DM4 - Irregularities reported by MFF heading and related amounts, 2023MFF headingPayments 2023Irregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported as fraudulent 
 
 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

6.4.3.  Method of detection 

Table  DM6  provides  a  breakdown  of  the  recoveries  by  source  of  detection  and  by 
qualification. 

Between 2019 and 2023, with reference to fraudulent irregularities, OLAF was mentioned as 
the  source  of  detection  in  relation  to  88.4%  of  recovery  items,  corresponding  to  92.1%  of 
total recovery amounts. Meanwhile ‘ex post controls’ were the source of detection of another 
6.3%  of  this  type  of  recovery  item,  corresponding  to  4.8%  of  the  recovery  amounts.  The 
‘ex ante  controls’  were  source  of  detection  for  3.7%  of  the  fraudulent  items,  which 
correspond to 2.5% of the recovery amounts. 

71 

NEUR millionNEUR millionAustria1118.6100.00Belgium37011.69106.85Bulgaria280.9900.00Croatia324.1200.00Cyprus380.3760.22Czechia291.0920.05Denmark1693.5400.00Estonia191.1370.67Finland729.0230.66France47415.85234.28Germany51421.1871.52Greece14215.2830.32Hungary331.8610.24Ireland923.2910.09Italy32120.28375.07Latvia150.6700.00Lithuania250.4210.11Luxembourg130.3210.11Malta410.6800.00Netherlands33015.6791.62Poland845.2930.17Portugal832.48101.48Romania464.8710.01Slovakia205.2100.00Slovenia1091.5210.04Spain73517.47100.75Sweden1285.8700.00Total EU 274 073178.7813624.25United Kingdom60428.37223.67Total other countries81643.56316.39Grand Total5 493250.7118934.30Table DM5 - Recoveries per country of residence of the legal entity, 2019-2023LE Country nameIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported as fraudulentNEUR millionNEUR millionex ante controls 35562.0070.87ex post controls 4 976169.99121.64Other controls (ECA)7011.9810.09Other controls (Member States)121.1920.12Other controls (OLAF)40.9416731.58Other controls (To identify) and n.a.764.6100.00Total5 493250.7118934.30Table DM6 - Irregularities reported by source of detection and by qualification, 2019-2023Irregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported as fraudulentSource of detection 2019-2023 
 
 
 
DIRECT MANAGEMENT 

Around  97.1%  of  recovery  items  qualified  as  non-fraudulent  irregularities  were  detected 
through  Commission  controls  (‘ex  ante’  and  ‘ex  post’  controls).  The  share  of  ‘ex ante 
controls’ has been steadily declining, from 30% in 2015 to 6.5% in 2023.  

6.4.4.  Type of irregularity 

For fraudulent irregularities, ‘Amount ineligible’ was the most frequent type during the past 5 
years.  In  relation  to  non-fraudulent  irregularities,  ‘Amount  ineligible’  remains  the  most 
frequent 
then  by 
‘Under-performance/non-performance’.  

‘Documents  missing’ 

followed  by 

irregularity 

type, 

and 

Table DM7 provides a full picture of the frequency of each type during the past 5 years. 

72 

NumberAmountNumberAmountAmount ineligible88.455.876.264.8Beneficiary1.31.80.512.4Calculation error3.03.80.00.0Documents missing8.99.711.117.5Double funding0.52.95.82.0Ethics and integrity0.21.26.912.3Profit0.30.63.74.4Public procurement rules not respected0.83.65.86.8Under-performance / non-performance4.123.87.44.4(blank)0.10.20.00.0Table DM7 - Types of irregularity, 2019-2023Type of irregularity 2019-2023Irregularities not reported as fraudulent(frequency %)Irregularities reported as fraudulent(frequency %) 
 
COUNTRY FACTSHEETS 

Introduction and disclaimer 

The following factsheets include a quantitative part and a list of authorities. 

Quantitative part 

For TOR, the factsheet shows the number of (and the estimated and established amounts involved in) 
fraudulent and not fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to 2023. The estimated and established 
amounts  are compared  with  the amount  of  gross  TOR  collected in relation  to  2023  (‘estimated  and 
established amounts’ / ‘gross TOR’). 

For  the  common  agricultural  policy,  the  factsheet  shows  the  number  of  (and  the  EU-share  of  the 
financial amounts involved in) fraudulent and not fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to 2023 
and the past 5 years. Data is separately shown for support to agriculture (direct payments to farmers 
and  market  measures)  and  rural  development.  The  financial  amounts  (EU-share)  involved  are 
compared with the payments received, through the indicators FDR and IDR. 

For the cohesion and fisheries policies, the factsheet shows the number of (and the  EU-share of the 
financial amounts involved in) fraudulent and not fraudulent irregularities reported in relation to the 
programming  period  2014-2020  (in  relation  to  2023  and  cumulative  since  the  start  of  the 
programming  period).  The  financial  amounts  (EU-share)  involved  are  compared  with  the  payments 
received, through the indicators FDR and IDR. 

Finally,  the  factsheet  includes  data  and  indicators  on  the  follow-up  the  Member  States  give  to 
suspected fraud. For an explanation of these data and indicators, please make reference to the relevant 
sections in this Statistical Evaluation attached to the 2023 PIF Report. 

List of authorities  

The following factsheets include lists of Bodies, which are ‘external’ to the standard management and 
control system for EU funds, but that can play a (significant) role in detecting or investigating fraud or 
irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests. 

Legal systems and organisational set-ups are different and have different levels of complexity in the 
different Member States. Further consultation with the competent authorities in the Member States is 
needed to ensure the completeness, accuracy and consistency among Member States of the content of 
these  factsheets.  However,  these  initial  lists  can  be  the  starting  point  for  an  exploration  of  the 
differences in the anti-fraud landscape among the Member States.  

These lists of authorities do not cover the revenue side of EU budget. 

73 

 
 
 
74 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILLING IN THE FACTSHEETS The management and control system for EU funds is the same in each Member State, basically based on Managing Authorities and Audit Authorities (for ESIF) and Paying Agencies and Certification Bodies (for expenditure in agriculture). These factsheets concern instead bodies that (i) are external and additional to this ‘standard’ management and control system and (ii) are (also) competent for the detection or investigation of fraud or irregularities affecting the EU’s financial interests. These factsheets focus on irregularities and fraud in expenditure. 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes In each Member State, there are law enforcement agencies with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes (usually, the Police, but in some Member States there may be (also) other law enforcement agencies, such as ‘Carabinieri’ in Italy or ‘Guardia Civil’ in Spain). Please reply YES in case in your Country these law enforcement agencies are also competent for detecting and investigating crimes related to the EU financial interests (see PIF Directive). If the answer is YES, please (i) report the name of the agency; (ii) specify whether there is a specific Department/Unit specialised in detecting and investigating these crimes (see also 2) and 4)) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes In some Member States, there may be a specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence in detecting and investigating economic and financial crimes, which include crimes related to the EU financial interests (see PIF Directive). For example, this is the case for Italy, where ‘Guardia di Finanza’ has such a competence. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised law enforcement agency (and report the name of the agency).  In case in your Country detection and investigation of economic and financial crimes is entrusted to a special Department/Unit within a law enforcement agency with general competence, please reply YES to 1) and specify it there.   3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Please reply YES, only if the AFCOS is entrusted with detecting or empowered to investigating irregularities or fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests.   4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency In some Member States, there may be a specialised agency with general competence in detecting or investigating corruption. As corruption may be instrumental to commit fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, this agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised agency (and report the name of the agency). In case in your Country detection or investigation of corruption are entrusted to a special Department/Unit within a law enforcement agency with general competence, please reply YES to 1) and specify it there (diffused competence in many Departments/Units is not enough to reply YES under to 1)). Under 1), please reply NO if this special Department/Unit is competent for corruption just within a specific organisation (for example, an anti-corruption Department of the Police, with specific competent only over employees of the Ministry of Interior).      5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency In some Member States, there may be a specialised agency with specific competence in detecting and investigating organised crime. This is the case in Italy, where the ‘Direzione Investigativa Anti-mafia’ (DIA – Anti-mafia Investigative Directorate) has such competence. As organised crime may be involved in committing fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, this agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case in your Country there is such a specialised agency, which is separate from the law enforcement agencies with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes. Please reply NO in case these is a Department/Unit with such a competence within a law enforcement agency with a general competence in detecting and investigating crimes. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency. 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency In some Member States, there may be an agency that is in charge of detecting or investigating irregularities to the detriment of the public budget. The activities of such an agency may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such an agency strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget. Where the irregularity is not just administrative, but there is a suspicion of crime, such an agency may have the power to investigate also the crime or may be requested to forward the information to another agency (e.g. see points 1 and 2). This is the case in Italy, where ‘Guardia di Finanza’ has such a competence in detecting and investigating administrative irregularities and has also the power to investigate suspicions of fraud. If the answer is YES; please (i) report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant); (ii) specify whether this agency can also investigate a suspicion of fraud or it is requested to hand it over to other bodies (please specify which ones, with specific reference to suspicions concerning EU’s financial interests). In case such an agency is qualified as an audit authority, please reply NO in this point and report this agency under 10) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures In some Member States, there may be an agency that is specifically in charge of detecting or investigating irregularities in relation to public procurement. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant). Please reply NO in case this specific competence is with an agency mentioned under other points and specify there that that agency is competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures. 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest In some Member States, there may be an agency that is specifically in charge of detecting or investigating conflict of interests. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency (also a significant Department embedded in an agency with a broader competence may be relevant). Please reply NO in case this competence is with an agency mentioned under other points (for example, point 4) and specify there that that agency has a general competence in relation to conflict of interests. 9) Competition authority In each Member State, there is a national competition authority. Violations of the competition law may be related to irregularities and fraud to the detriment of the EU’s financial interests, for example because of the impact on public procurement procedures. Please reply YES only if (i) the competition authority is competent to detect or investigate specific cases; (ii) there are agreements/arrangements so that the findings of the competition authority are systematically considered for their impact on the EU funding. If the answer is YES, please report the name of the agency.   10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) In some Member States, there may be an audit authority with general competence over public budgets. Please reply YES in case this authority exists in your Country and it has the competence to detect or investigate specific irregularities to the detriment of public budgets. These activities may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such an authority strengthens the architecture protecting the EU budget.  11) National security agency/Intelligence Body In each Member State, there are security/intelligence services. Their activities may lead to detect irregularities that have (also) an impact on the EU budget, so such agencies strengthen the architecture protecting the EU budget. Please reply YES in case (i) these services are also in charge of collecting information on financial/economic criminal activities, including to the detriment of the EU budget; (ii) there are agreements/arrangements about their potential role in detecting crimes to the detriment of the public budget (for example, participation in relevant networks, committees, flows of information, etc.).    In each Member State, there is a Financial Intelligence Unit for anti-money laundering purposes. Please reply YES in case there are agreements/arrangements about their potential role in detecting crimes to the detriment of the public budget.    
 
 
 
Belgium - Belgique/België 

75 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated389,970,06733936,436,6591.53%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0015402,3100.000.08Rural Development (RD)0016401,4810.000.33TOTAL0031803,7910.000.12FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00411,347,7500.000.05Rural Development (RD)00741,802,4200.000.38SA/RD00224,556TOTAL001173,174,7260.000.10Irregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported in 20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023128,444232,021,138ERDF128,444141,665,789ESF009355,349Cumulative from start of the programming period 7161,462885,781,5920.010.31ERDF367,556613,879,9270.010.45ESF493,907271,901,6650.010.203. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENBE00.000%2%00%1100%00%NAN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENBE00.000%2%00%00%6100%50%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) 4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 

BELGIUM 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes National Police 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Belgian Competition Authority 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Belgian Court of Audit 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
 
Bulgaria – България 

77 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated16922,4164528,9050.85%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0073,117,0750.000.37Rural Development (RD)4545,239919,732,5280.203.51TOTAL4545,2399812,849,6030.051.15FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)41,097,947367,081,6450.030.17Rural Development (RD)151,721,14776351,589,1930.123.50SA/RD00444,642TOTAL192,819,09480358,715,4800.051.05Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20233184,06614954,241,701CF003638,062,882ERDF3184,0668314,698,181ESF0019800,951EMFF0011679,687Cumulative from start of the programming period 21934,021554173,592,5590.012.48CF0091109,443,7770.006.33ERDF3184,06637257,541,7450.011.63ESF18749,955613,613,9300.040.21EMFF00302,993,1060.005.53Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENBG80.029%18%3035%67%5058%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENBG00.000%3%646%18%646%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Czech Republic - Česká republika 

78 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated001036,630,3421.27%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)111,6184180,7270.000.02Rural Development (RD)0043933,7470.000.25TOTAL111,618471,114,4740.000.09FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)64,382,85640905,5880.100.02Rural Development (RD)181,513,7422445,017,8950.080.26TOTAL245,896,5982845,923,4840.090.09Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023558,595,74726422,501,839CF00311,215,659ERDF317,556,19319719,669,547ESF241,039,554321,153,951EMFF004462,682Cumulative from start of the programming period 12430,265,3931,082130,025,2440.140.58CF0014548,246,0340.000.79ERDF6527,991,89773974,297,1600.230.60ESF592,273,4961786,186,0730.060.17EMFF00201,295,9780.004.363. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENCZ30.028%18%38%3793%00%NAN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENCZ460.0230%7%3825%4630%6845%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 

CZECHIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Policie České republiky (Police of the Czech Republic) Policie České republiky, Národní centrála proti organizovanému zločinu (Police of the Czech Republic, National Organized Crime Agency) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Finanční správa České republiky (Financial Administration of the Czech Republic) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Úřad pro ochranu hospodářské soutěže (Office for the Protection of Competition) (competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad (Supreme Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Finanční analytický úřad (Financial Analytical Office)   
 
 
Denmark – Danmark 

80 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated001576,566,2391.31%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00401,420,8960.000.17Rural Development (RD)11478,05017423,0290.410.36TOTAL11478,050571,843,9250.050.20FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00561,743,6250.000.04Rural Development (RD)696,465,696352,545,5391.220.48TOTAL696,465,696914,289,1640.140.09FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202300237,726ESF00126,762EMFF00110,964Cumulative from start of the programming period 12561,223331,782,8620.090.27ERDF4245,6559406,3040.100.17ESF14,4555520,2230.000.22EMFF7311,11319856,3350.180.503. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENDK10.017%15%427%533%640%50%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENDK100.3371%32%321%17%1071%90%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 

DENMARK 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Politiet i Danmark – National enhed for Særlig Kriminalitet (Danish Police - Special Crime Unit with specific competence over economic/financial crimes (department of the Danish Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Konkurrence- og Forbrugerstyrelsen (Danish Competition and Consumer Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Rigsrevisionen (Danish National Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Germany – Deutschland 

82 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated181,898,0132,063195,260,5463.30%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1152,35334800,1800.000.02Rural Development (RD)12881,923431,130,7600.050.07TOTAL131,034,276771,930,9400.020.03FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)131,090,5461635,660,4520.000.02Rural Development (RD)261,625,2852227,856,4150.020.11SA/RD005277,727TOTAL392,715,83139013,794,5940.010.04FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023183,168,7211069,959,622ERDF32,222,229959,668,397ESF15946,4939232,960EMFF00258,264Cumulative from start of the programming period 619,169,92046442,078,9850.050.23ERDF173,081,04733835,027,4910.030.34ESF446,088,8721196,855,9830.080.09EMFF007195,5110.000.103. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENDE30.019%9%2061%824%515%60%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENDE80.015%14%5638%2517%6846%85%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  principle  there  are  police,  audit  authorities  and  country  supreme  audit  institutions  in  all  Länder.  You  can  find 
examples below in the factsheet. 

GERMANY 

1) Law enforcement agency with general 

competence on crimes 

2) Specialised law enforcement agency 

with specific competence on 
economic/financial crimes 

3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 

(AFCOS) 

4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency 

5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency 

6) Agency with general competence on 
checks on public expenditure / Public 
finances inspection agency 

7)  Agency specialised in ex-post checks of 

public procurement procedures 
8)  Agency specialised in checks on 

conflict of interest 
9)  Competition authority 

10) National audit authorities (not part of 
the management and control system) 

11) National security agency/National 

intelligence service 

Polizei  (Federal  States  of  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Saxony,  Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia, Berlin) 

Spezialisierte  Strafverfolgungsbehörde  (Federal  States  of  Saxony-Anhalt, 
Thuringia, Lower Saxony, Berlin, Bremen) 

Nationale  Prüfbehörden  (Federal  States  of  North  Rhine-Westphalia,  Saxony,  
Thuringia, Berlin) 

Landesrechnungshof (Federal State of Rhine-Palatinate) 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia – Eesti 

84 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated9279,506000.60%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)343,527,72418854,1162.820.68TOTAL343,527,72418854,1161.100.27FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)9210,941,1161214,852,9801.960.87TOTAL9210,941,1161214,852,9800.790.35Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202361,097,9039423,568,414CF120,7911415,641,143ERDF51,077,112807,927,271Cumulative from start of the programming period 365,607,30137757,833,2500.151.52CF2610,9906826,855,2260.062.53ERDF224,427,75227928,094,7690.221.37ESF274,970282,813,4870.010.48EMFF10493,589269,7690.520.07Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENEE40.0314%16%13%1138%1759%12%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENEE30.0213%12%00%1042%1458%29%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 

ESTONIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Estonian Police and Border Guard (regional prefectures and different departments)  2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Economic Crime Bureau) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Corruption Crime Bureau) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Keskkriminaalpolitsei (National Criminal Police, Organised Crime Bureau) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ministry of Finance (Public Procurement and State Aid Department) (only administrative investigations) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Estonian Competition Authority 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) National Audit Office of Estonia 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Internal Security Service (corruption crimes and conflict of interest of high officials)   
 
 
 
Ireland – Éire 

86 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00598,092,9061.36%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)005137,9620.000.01SA/RD129,83600TOTAL129,8365137,9620.000.00Irregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Cumulative from start of the programming period 00603,197,4890.000.32ERDF0015394,5430.000.08ESF00452,802,9460.000.653. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENIE10.003%12%13%39%3189%97%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENIE00.00NANA0NA0NA0NANAFor further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
87 

IRELAND 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes An Garda Síochána : - Garda National Economic Crime Bureau - Garda National Economic Crime Bureau – Anti-Corruption Unit 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General 11) National security agency/National intelligence service An Garda Síochána - Garda National Crime & Security Intelligence Service – Interpol National Central Bureau and Europol National Unit   
 
 
Greece – Ελλάδα 

88 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated135,186,997240,1591.69%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)5128,1617148,5340.010.01Rural Development (RD)11,019,3792433,818,3740.110.42TOTAL61,147,5402503,966,9080.040.13FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)62,671,1784507,993,6230.030.08Rural Development (RD)11,019,3791,20016,807,4730.030.50TOTAL73,690,5571,65024,801,0960.030.18FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023151,1467832,112,740CF0056,473,728ERDF151,1465616,260,212ESF00159,298,993EMFF00279,808Cumulative from start of the programming period 76,643,426263240,934,0870.041.33CF36,117,7032322,068,5930.220.80ERDF3484,32412464,826,6130.000.59ESF141,400109153,484,7930.003.86EMFF007554,0870.000.173. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENGR50.0129%3%00%00%17100%76%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENGR90.0118%3%714%12%4384%65%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
89 

GREECE 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Ελληνική Αστυνομία (Hellenic Police) - Διεύθυνση Οικονομικής Αστυνομίας (Financial Police Directorate) (with competence on economic/financial crime) Γενική Διεύθυνση Σώματος Δίωξης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος (General Directorate of Financial Crime Unit) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Εθνική Αρχή Διαφάνειας (National Transparency Authority) (The Inspections & Audits Unit of NTA/AFCOS is competent for detecting irregularities, fraud and corruption)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Εθνική Αρχή Διαφάνειας (National Transparency Authority)  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Επιτροπή Δημοσιονομικού Ελέγχου (Financial Audit Committee) (also checks on conflict of interest) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ενιαία Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή Δημοσίων Συμβάσεων (Hellenic Single Public Procurement Authority) (with also competence on conflict of interest) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού (Hellenic Competition Commission) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο (Hellenic Court Of Audit) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Εθνική Υπηρεσία Πληροφοριών (National Intelligence Service)   
 
 
Spain – España 

90 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated334,506,53344758,650,3532.41%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)451,76422710,959,0350.000.19Rural Development (RD)71,764,28431855,656,5340.134.02TOTAL111,816,04854566,615,5690.030.95FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)132,239,1511,03238,331,1270.010.13Rural Development (RD)103,027,8971,16581,531,3670.051.31SA/RD00111,111TOTAL235,267,0482,198119,873,6050.020.35Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023008139,551,161ERDF00397,287,614ESF001330,881,498EMFF00291,382,050Cumulative from start of the programming period 4147,16941792,613,5350.000.30ERDF3100,71422742,472,4650.000.19ESF146,45515146,952,7620.000.55EMFF00393,188,3080.000.42Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENES20.005%3%3170%00%1330%77%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENES1020.0174%1%2518%00%11282%6%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
91 

SPAIN 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Jefatura de Policía Judicial de la Guardia Civil (Guardia Civil Judicial Police Headquarters )/ Departamento de Delincuencia Económica y Anticorrupción de la Unidad Central Operativa de la Guardia Civil (Department of Economic Crime and Anti-Corruption of the Central Operational Unit of the Guardia Civil) Comisaría General de Policía Judicial de la Policía Nacional (General Commissariat of Judicial Police of the National Police)/ Unidad Central de Delincuencia Económica y Fiscal de la Policía judicial (Policía Nacional) Central Economic and Fiscal Crime Unit of the Judicial Police (National Police) Policía autonómica del País Vaco ( Ertzaintza), de Catalunya ( Mossos d'Esquadra) y de otras Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Police of the Basque Country (Ertzaintza), of Catalonia (Mossos d'Esquadra) and of other police forces of Autonomous Communities) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) National Anti-fraud Co-ordination Service, General Intervention of the State Administration, Ministry of Finance and Public Function 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Oficina Antifraude de Cataluña (Anti-Fraud Office of Catalonia) Agencia de Prevención y Lucha contra el Fraude y la Corrupción de la Comunidad Valenciana (Agency for the Prevention and Fight against Fraud and Corruption of the Autonomous Community of Valencia) Oficina de Prevención y Lucha contra la Corrupción en las Islas Baleares (Office for the Prevention and Fight against Corruption of the Balearic Islands) Oficina Andaluza de Lucha contra el fraude (Anti-Fraud Office of Andalusia) Oficina de Buenas Prácticas y Anticorrupción de la Comunidad Foral de Navarra (Office of Good Practices and Anti-Corruption of the Autonomous Community of Navarre). 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado - CITCO (Intelligence Center against Terrorism and Organised Crime) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal (Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility) (AIReF) Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (General Intervention of the State Administration) (IGAE) (independent department of a body with broader competences) Intervenciones Generales de las Comunidades Autónomas (General Interventions of the Autonomous Communities) (independent departments of bodies with broader regional competences) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Oficina Independiente de Regulación y Supervisión de la Contratación (The Independent Office of Regulation and Supervision of Contracting) (Oirescon) (independent department of a body with broader competences) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Oficina de Conflictos de Intereses (Conflict of Interest Office) (independent department of agency with broader competences) 9) Competition authority Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (National Markets and Competition Commission) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Tribunal de Cuentas (Spanish Court of Audit) Órganos de control externo de las Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Regions' external control bodies) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Centre (CNI)   
 
France 

92 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated682,663,08236232,977,4131.33%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)101,114,503535,360,6920.010.07Rural Development (RD)14341,7921002,997,0090.020.15TOTAL241,456,2951538,357,7010.020.09FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1623,788,02935325,116,3530.010.07Rural Development (RD)501,400,66058612,875,9810.010.13TOTAL2125,188,68893937,992,3340.010.08FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023333,135528,042,892ERDF19,239447,618,910ESF223,8966339,258EMFF00284,724Cumulative from start of the programming period 2010,221,13548556,140,1140.070.37ERDF159,942,79033442,213,8630.110.45ESF4222,0951209,616,4440.000.17EMFF156,250314,309,8070.010.893. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENFR00.000%7%1422%711%4267%57%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENFR00.000%3%00%00%12100%67%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 

FRANCE 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Specialised investigation services of the Police Nationale and of the Gendarmerie Nationale (such as the Office central de lutte contre la corruption et les infractions financières ou fiscales) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Service d'Enquêtes Judiciaires des Finances (SEJF) (specialised service in common with Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects – DGDDI and Direction générale des finances publiques - DGFIP) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Agence française anti-corruption (AFA) Haute Autoritè pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP) (competent also for conflict of interests)  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Haute Autoritè pour la transparence de la vie publique (HATVP) (see also 4)) 9) Competition authority Autorité de la Concurrence  Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des Fraudes (DGCCRF) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system)  11) National security agency/National intelligence service Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières (DNRED) Service du Traitement du Renseignement et Action contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins (TRACFIN)   
 
 
 
Croatia – Hrvatska 

94 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated6557,22010657,7411.54%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0012189,4850.000.05Rural Development (RD)2473,15419411,994,1220.143.52TOTAL2473,15420612,183,6070.061.62FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00412,241,6170.000.13Rural Development (RD)71,494,75233816,710,0330.090.95TOTAL71,494,75237918,951,6500.040.54Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20235594,966445,969,877CF002141,049ERDF5594,96611473,790ESF00315,355,038Cumulative from start of the programming period 1119,207,67819141,286,6530.240.52CF116,984,356249,343,6730.950.53ERDF102,223,3226714,429,0180.050.35ESF007415,192,7370.000.78EMFF00262,321,2260.001.21Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENHR20.0213%14%425%744%531%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENHR00.000%9%117%117%467%75%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
95 

CROATIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova: Ravnateljstvo policije - Uprava kriminalističke policije (Ministry of Interior - The General Police Directorate - the Criminal Police Directorate) Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova: Ravnateljstvo policije - Uprava kriminalističke policije - Policijski nacionalni ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta - Služba gospodarskog kriminaliteta i korupcije (Ministry of Interior: The General Police Directorate - the Criminal Police Directorate - Police National Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime – Service for Economic Crime and Corruption) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Ministarstvo financija: Sektor za financijski i proračunski nadzor (Ministry of Finance: Sector for Financial and Budget Supervision) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Ministarstvo gospodarstva i održivog razvoja: Uprava za trgovinu i politiku javne nabave – Sektor za politiku javne nabave (Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development: Directorate for Trade and Public Procurement Policy - Sector for Public Procurement Policy) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Agencija za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja (The Agency for the Protection of Market Competition) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Državni ured za reviziju (State Audit Office) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Ministarstvo financija: Ured za sprječavanje pranja novca (Ministry of Finance: Anti-Money Laundering Office)    
 
 
 
Italy – Italia 

96 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated5716,759,78310910,115,6690.88%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)12794,9751427,831,9730.020.19Rural Development (RD)7714,44711411,429,8770.040.66SA/RD291,804161,848,418TOTAL211,601,22727221,110,2680.030.36FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)13310,075,89688343,885,6540.050.21Rural Development (RD)509,946,00247740,823,7200.130.52SA/RD364,203,73310513,206,335TOTAL21924,225,6321,46597,915,7090.080.34FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20233100,57514815,557,960ERDF3100,57513314,887,305ESF0015670,655Cumulative from start of the programming period 114,448,33953290,749,4440.010.25ERDF114,448,33943580,058,9290.020.36ESF009610,652,3790.000.08EMFF00138,1360.000.013. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENIT910.0436%10%3313%73%21584%86%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENIT230.0248%4%1531%510%2858%82%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023Pending suspected fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 

ITALY 1) Law enforcement agency  with general competence on crimes Carabinieri Polizia di Stato Guardia di Finanza 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Guardia di Finanza 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Autorità Nazionale Anti-Corruzione ANAC (National Anti-Corruption Authority) (It is also responsible for ex-post controls of procurement procedures) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency Direzione Investigativa Anti-mafia (Anti-mafia Investigative Directorate) 6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Guardia di Finanza 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato AGCM (Italian Competition Authority) (It is also responsible for controls on conflict of interest) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Corte dei Conti (general/overall control with judicial functions) Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (RGS) – Ispettorato Generale Vigilanza e Controllo di Finanza Pubblica- (State General Accounting) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Cyprus – Κύπρος 

98 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated4225,747225,6680.42%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023003270,953CF001239,717EMFF00231,235Cumulative from start of the programming period 2363,860181,749,7610.040.20CF005771,2480.000.30ERDF2363,8605395,3640.100.11ESF005339,2920.000.16EMFF003243,8570.000.703. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENCY00.000%21%00%00%6100%0%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENCY00.000%9%00%120%480%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Law enforcement agency with general 

competence on crimes 

Αστυνομία Κύπρου (Cyprus Police) 

CYPRUS 

Υποδιεύθυνση Δίωξης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος, Αστυνομία Κύπρου (Economic Crime 
Investigation Sub directorate, Cyprus Police) 

2) Specialised law enforcement agency with 

specific competence on economic/financial 
crimes 

3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) 

YES 

4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency 

5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency 

6) Agency with general competence on checks 
on public expenditure / Public finances 
inspection agency 

7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of 

public procurement procedures 

8)  Agency specialised in checks on conflict of 

interest 

9)  Competition authority 

10) National audit authorities (not part of the 

management and control system) 

11) National security agency/National 

intelligence service 

Ανεξάρτητη Αρχή κατά της Διαφθοράς (Independent Authority against Corruption) (this 
agency is competent also for checks on conflict of interests) 

Αρμόδια  Αρχή  Δημόσιων  Συμβάσεων-  Γενικό  Λογιστήριο  της  Δημοκρατίας  (Public 
procurement Directorate-Treasury of the Republic of Cyprus) 

Διεύθυνση  Χρηματοοικονομικού  Ελέγχου  Ευρωπαϊκών  Πόρων-Γενικό  Λογιστήριο 
της Δημοκρατίας (Directorate of Financial Control of European Funds-Treasury of the 
Republic of Cyprus) 

Επιτροπή  Προστασίας  του  Ανταγωνισμού  (Commission  for  the  protection  of 
competition). However, there are no agreements/arrangements so that the findings of the Commission for the 
protection of competition are considered systematically for their impact on the EU funding  

Ελεγκτική  Υπηρεσία  της  Δημοκρατίας  (Audit  office  of  the  Republic  of  Cyprus) 
(competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 

Κυπριακή Υπηρεσία πληροφοριών (Cyprus Intelligence Service) 

The financial intelligence Unit is the Unit for combating money laundering (MOKAS) 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latvia – Latvija 

100 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated116,83915856,6691.57%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00340,9730.000.01Rural Development (RD)41,570,99813272,9221.050.18TOTAL41,570,99816313,8950.330.07FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)009181,4310.000.01Rural Development (RD)212,278,434742,060,8620.310.28TOTAL212,278,434832,242,2930.100.10FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023155,747,174282,857,556CF32,694,39251,101,467ERDF113,024,255171,484,504ESF128,5274214,074EMFF00257,511Cumulative from start of the programming period 7335,320,25911215,590,4530.820.36CF53,824,085176,712,6240.360.64ERDF5530,011,600727,958,4031.190.32ESF9829,69514732,9420.130.11EMFF4654,8799186,4850.600.173. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLV50.0516%24%39%722%2269%77%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLV50.0113%11%923%1025%2153%52%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
101 

LATVIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Valsts policijas Ekonomisko noziegumu apkarošanas pārvalde (Administration for Combating Economic Crimes -part of the State Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs (Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau) (body competent also for checks on conflict of interests) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Iepirkumu uzraudzības birojs (Procurement Monitoring Bureau) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Latvijas Republikas Konkurences padome (Competition Council of the Republic of Latvia) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Latvijas Republikas Valsts kontrole (The State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Lithuania – Lietuva 

102 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated296,078,87925547,0775.21%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0023893,7360.000.15Rural Development (RD)26661,716871,934,5720.280.81TOTAL26661,7161102,828,3080.080.34FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)477,6281243,309,4210.000.13Rural Development (RD)572,153,36935510,405,1810.211.00TOTAL612,230,99747913,714,6020.060.37Irregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023264,05515914,125,813CF00263,017,543ERDF0012110,510,439ESF0011578,290EMFF264,055119,542Cumulative from start of the programming period 102,029,46851045,479,0770.030.65CF009711,150,2700.000.55ERDF11,500,00038032,140,4740.040.87ESF6430,849322,168,7910.030.18EMFF398,618119,5420.190.043. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported Irregularities not reported N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLT10.003%5%00%00%40100%95%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLT30.0138%3%00%450%450%50%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Luxembourg 

103 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated00000.00%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)00119,2200.000.02TOTAL00119,2200.000.01Irregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Cumulative from start of the programming period 00114,2590.000.01ERDF00114,2590.000.02Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLU00.000%50%00%00%1100%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENLU0NANANA0NA0NANANANAFor further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 

LUXEMBOURG 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Police Judiciaire/Département criminalité économique et financière (Judiciary Police/Economic and Financial Crimes Unit) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Direction du Contrôle financier (Ministère des Finances) (Directorate of Financial Control (Ministry of Finance)) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Direction des Marchés publics (Ministère de la Mobilité et des Travaux publics) (Directorate of Public Procurement (Ministry of Mobility and Public Works)) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Autorité de la concurrence (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Cour des comptes du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (Court of Auditors of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Cellule de renseignement financier (Financial Intelligence Unit)   
 
 
 
Hungary - Magyarország 

105 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated110,040252,032,8620.55%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)005121,0730.000.01Rural Development (RD)0055214,421,6910.001.67TOTAL0055714,542,7640.000.67FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)00685,730,6860.000.09Rural Development (RD)17391,2861,03330,194,2800.010.95TOTAL17391,286110135,924,9660.000.37Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023235,991,38520125,789,130CF11,288,8084279,315ERDF204,546,74014619,622,723ESF2155,837515,887,092Cumulative from start of the programming period 17046,645,561838127,449,0790.210.57CF11,288,8084115,430,4440.020.26ERDF16244,136,90959880,548,5090.390.71ESF71,219,84518929,879,8930.020.60EMFF00101,590,2340.005.29Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENHU180.028%20%3113%188%18179%72%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENHU10.001%8%00%00%137100%99%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 2023(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 

HUNGARY 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes Rendőrség (Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Bűnügyi Főigazgatósága (Directorate-General for Criminal Matters of the National Tax and Customs Agency) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Nemzeti Védelmi Szolgálat (National Defence Service, department of a body with a broader competence) Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Kormányzati Ellenőrzési Hivatal (Government Control Office) Állami Számvevőszék (State Audit Office) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Közbeszerzési Hatóság (Public Procurement Authority) Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Integritás Hatóság (Integrity Authority) (corruption, conflict of Interests, public procurement) Miniszterelnökség Belső Ellenőrzési és Integritási Igazgatósága (Directorate for Internal Audit and Integrity of the Prime Minister’s Office (audit of conflicts of Interests))  9) Competition authority Gazdasági Versenyhivatal (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system)  11) National security agency/National intelligence service Alkotmányvédelmi Hivatal (Constitution Protection Bureau) Nemzetbiztonsági Szakszolgálat (Special Service for National Security)   
 
Malta 

107 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated002110,246-0.29%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)1109,60115880,6240.796.37TOTAL1109,60115880,6240.584.66FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Rural Development (RD)3241,601251,729,2960.322.27TOTAL3241,601251,729,2960.241.68FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 20231214,695577,477CF1214,69500ERDF00338,519ESF00238,958Cumulative from start of the programming period 1214,695181,799,3350.030.24CF1214,6952913,5180.120.51ERDF009286,7180.000.09ESF005555,9370.000.25EMFF00243,1620.000.22Irregularities reported as Irregularities not reported 3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENMT00.000%4%00%00%1100%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENMT00.000%3%00%00%2100%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 

MALTA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Malta Police Force Financial Crimes Investigations Department within the Malta Police Force 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Internal Audit and Investigations Department 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Permanent Commission Against Corruption in respect of cases falling within their remit in terms of Cap. 326 of the Laws of Malta 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Financial Investigations Directorate within Internal Audit and Investigations Department   7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Internal Audit and Investigations Department (this Department has a general competence also we reference to conflict of interests)  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) National Audit Office 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit Malta Security Service   
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands - Nederland 

109 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated0040021,725,3230.49%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)318,57616688,4830.000.10Rural Development (RD)004201,3910.000.12TOTAL318,57620889,8740.000.11FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)17455,180681,316,3570.010.04Rural Development (RD)19,69812754,6390.000.11TOTAL18464,878802,070,9960.010.05FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023008266,274ERDF008266,274Cumulative from start of the programming period 4242,021431,358,3340.020.11CF00142,275ERDF00381,097,4430.000.19ESF3233,0212187,1900.040.03EMFF19,000231,4260.010.043. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENNL20.009%5%14%1670%626%33%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENNL20.0113%5%17%747%747%71%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 

THE NETHERLANDS 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Politie 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes FIOD (Fiscale inlichtingen- en opsporingsdienst (part of the Ministry of Finance) (it works also as anti-corruption agency) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Organisational Unit of the Ministry of Finance 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Rijksrecherche (it is competent for investigating criminal offences that affect the integrity of public administration, including corruption) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Several bodies have the task of checking the legal and regular use of public funds. Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend (RVO) (part of the Ministery of  Economic Affairs & Climate) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Committee of procurement experts established by the Minister for Economic Affairs 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Authority for Consumers & Markets (ACM) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Auditdienst Rijk (National audit authority) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Financial Intelligence Unit   
 
 
 
Austria – Österreich 

111 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated5215,150674,113,8021.30%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)004550,7230.000.08Rural Development (RD)003147,2970.000.02TOTAL007698,0190.000.05FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)51,293,663171,196,2110.040.03Rural Development (RD)0011588,5220.000.02TOTAL51,293,663281,784,7340.020.03FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202322,392,319161,723,987ERDF22,392,319151,704,737ESF00119,251Cumulative from start of the programming period 52,480,7511139,429,3500.220.84ERDF22,392,319948,533,9610.401.43ESF388,43218813,4460.020.16EMFF00181,9430.001.183. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00.000%3%133%00%267%50%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENAT00.000%1%133%00%267%50%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Law enforcement agency with general competence 

on crimes 

Bundesministerium  für  Inneres,  Bundeskriminalamt  (Federal  Ministry  of 
Interior, Criminal Intelligence Service Austria) 

AUSTRIA 

Bundesministerium 
7 
Wirtschaftskriminalität  (Federal  Ministry  of  Interior,  Criminal  Intelligence 
Service Austria, Department 7 Economic crime) 

Inneres,  Bundeskriminalamt,  Abteilung 

für 

2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific 

Anti Fraud Office 

competence on economic/financial crimes 

3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) 

4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency 

5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency 

6) Agency with general competence on checks on 
public expenditure / Public finances inspection 
agency 

7)  Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public 

procurement procedures 

8)  Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest 

9)  Competition authority 

10) National audit authorities (not part of the 

management and control system) 

11) National security agency/National intelligence 

service 

Bundesministerium  für  Inneres,  Bundesamt  für  Korruptionsprävention  und 
Korruptionsbekämpfung  (Federal  Ministry  of  Interior,  Federal  Bureau  of 
Anti Corruption) 

Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde (BWB) (Federal Competition Authority) 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland – Polska 

113 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated232,348,21911312,192,2331.11%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)4265,595217,400,9620.010.21Rural Development (RD)9397,9983696,726,7580.030.43SA/RD296,660151,752TOTAL15760,25339114,179,4720.020.28FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)336,259,806265201,586,7810.041.18Rural Development (RD)341,682,4241,35533,607,0140.030.51SA/RD3142,2632209,112TOTAL708,084,4931,622235,402,9070.030.99Irregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023127,615,81661585,949,772CF1147,001365,838,128ERDF24,492,39237866,187,477ESF92,976,42319613,545,523EMFF005378,644Cumulative from start of the programming period 14261,268,4583,118478,683,7990.080.61CF74,176,63416330,890,6430.020.13ERDF5941,090,8291,993373,343,5590.100.89ESF7315,291,17894973,460,3540.120.58EMFF3709,81813989,2430.160.223. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENPL80.012%31%10226%4612%24963%80%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENPL450.0114%9%7524%4113%20163%96%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 

POLAND There could be other Authorities in Poland that could fit into this factsheet. The factsheet will be updated on the basis of further consultation.  1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Policja 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Centralne Biuro Śledcze Policji (Central Bureau of Investigation of the Police) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne (Central Anti-corruption Bureau) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (Supreme Chamber of Control) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Agency)   
 
 
Portugal 

115 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated1332,03137929,8070.40%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)1150,86639879,2240.020.10Rural Development (RD)3391,1731995,720,2130.060.93TOTAL4542,0392386,599,4370.040.44FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)5518,7551746,577,9080.010.16Rural Development (RD)181,133,5751,20041,887,1100.041.55TOTAL231,652,3311,37448,465,0190.020.70Irregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023275,588,981704,258,305CF00485,700ERDF132,088,460372,771,048ESF143,500,52119947,604EMFF0010453,952Cumulative from start of the programming period 5945,911,97130229,177,5410.200.13CF00182,215,5980.000.08ERDF2639,035,57213415,421,6090.310.12ESF316,746,950956,474,5480.090.09EMFF2129,448555,065,7860.031.373. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENPT100.0134%2%13%310%2586%96%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENPT10.002%5%00%00%48100%42%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 

PORTUGAL 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Polícia Judiciária (Judicial Police) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes UIF – Unidade de Informação Financeira (Judicial Police) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency Mecanismo Nacional anticorrupção (National anti-corruption mechanism) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency   7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Entidade para a Transparência (Authority for Transparency) 9) Competition authority Autoridade da Concorrência (Competition Authority) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Tribunal de Contas (this body is competent also for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) Inspeção-Geral de Finanças  - Autoridade de Auditoria - IGF (this body is competent also for ex-post checks on public procurement procedures) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Serviço de Informações de Segurança (Informaiton Security Service) (for financial/economic criminal activities) Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa (Information Service of the Republic of Portugal) (for financial/economic criminal activities) Grupo do Ação Financeira (GAFI), do Banco de Portugal (Financial Action Group of the Bank of Portugal) (for anti-money laundering purposes) Agência de Gestão da Tesouraria e da Dívida Pública (Agency for Treasury Management and Public Debt) (for anti-money laundering purposes)   
 
 
 
Romania – România 

117 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated8145,823576,997,7292.05%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)873,357,501161,626,3680.170.08Rural Development (RD)722,664,59842935,107,1970.222.91TOTAL1596,022,09944536,733,5650.191.15FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)36814,178,66734426,143,4280.140.27Rural Development (RD)23227,896,9241,743114,144,5570.502.05SA/RD137,96700TOTAL60142,113,5582087140,287,9850.270.91Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202330413,285,999270124,856,471CF4351,897,6026369,707,163ERDF1559,530,7689748,498,416ESF111,857,628934,770,668EMFF00171,880,225Cumulative from start of the programming period 190798,895,038901247,253,6393.571.10CF20427,055,71611280,957,8476.531.24ERDF142367,465,553400141,933,6263.261.26ESF284,373,76935019,845,3350.100.44EMFF00394,516,8310.004.69Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENRO340.017%14%224%15131%31665%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENRO110.016%10%6332%63%13166%97%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 

ROMANIA 1) Law enforcement agency (police force, Ministry of Interior) with general competence on crimes Poliția Română (Romanian Police) Poliția Română - Direcţia de Investigare a Criminalității Economice (Romanian Police - Economic Crimes Investigation Directorate) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency (police force) with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Departamentul pentru lupta antifraudă – DLAF (Fight against Fraud Department) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest Agenția Națională de Integritate (National Integrity Agency) 9) Competition authority Consiliul Concurenței (Competition Council) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Curtea de conturi a României (Romanian Court of Accounts) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Oficiul Naţional de Prevenire și Combatere a Spălării Banilor (National Office for Prevention and Control of Money Laundering)   
 
 
Slovenia – Slovenija 

119 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated4694,52324667,0190.62%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0.000.00Rural Development (RD)0012198,9120.000.14TOTAL0012198,9120.000.07FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)147,5098213,2220.010.03Rural Development (RD)2116,502401,204,8060.020.19TOTAL3164,011481,418,0280.010.11Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202371,924,10210726,979CF3177,205120,492ERDF41,746,8975255,305ESF004451,182Cumulative from start of the programming period 132,994,721535,356,6170.090.16CF3177,20551,888,1560.020.22ERDF62,117,561312,370,8060.130.14ESF4699,955171,097,6550.100.15Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSI00.000%11%00%19%1091%70%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSI00.000%11%741%318%741%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 

SLOVENIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Generalna policijska uprava (General Police Directorate) Uprava kriminalistične policije (Criminal Police Directorate): Sektor za gospodarsko kriminaliteto (Oddelek za poslovni in javni sektor, Oddelek za korupcijo) (Economic Crime Division (Business and Public Sector Section, Corruption Section)) and Nacionalni preiskovalni urad (National Bureau of Investigation) In eight regional Police Directorates (Celje, Koper, Kranj, Ljubljana,  Maribor,  Murska Sobota, Nova Gorica, Novo mesto) there is a Criminal Police Division with an Economic Crime Section 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Urad Republike Slovenije za nadzor proračuna (Budget Supervision Office of the Republic of Slovenia (body within the Ministry of Finance)) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency V  Upravi kriminalistične policije je Sektor za gospodarsko kriminaliteto, v katerem je Oddelek za korupcijo (within the Criminal Police Directorate, Economic Crime Division, there is the Corruption Section) Komisija za preprečevanje korupcije (Commission for the Prevention of Corruption) (competent also for conflict of interests) 5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Finančna uprava Republike Slovenije (Financial Administration of the Republic of Slovenia)  Sektor proračunske inšpekcije v Uradu RS za nadzor proračuna (the Budget Inspection) (an inspection body within Budget Supervision Office of the Republic of Slovenia) 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Državna revizijska komisija za revizijo postopkov oddaje javnih naročil (National Review Commission for Reviewing Public Procurement Award Procedures) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Javna agencija Republike Slovenije za varstvo konkurence (Slovenian Competition Protection Agency) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije (Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija (Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency)   
 
 
 
 
Slovakia – Slovensko 

121 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated212,44211264,5360.18%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0019387,5800.000.10Rural Development (RD)132,751,75412410,613,2021.746.70SA/RD00601,506,736TOTAL132,751,75420312,507,5180.492.22FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)460,91130698,0690.000.03Rural Development (RD)194,465,54222822,545,2070.532.66SA/RD72,053,937953,181,228TOTAL306,580,39035326,424,5040.220.88FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-20232. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 2023162,574,7958559,736,840CF2194,219126,287,925ERDF121,953,1146452,836,584ESF2427,4629612,331Cumulative from start of the programming period 82790,684,222567452,508,6536.163.53CF31132,279,841118236,111,3923.746.68ERDF37652,730,382367185,594,83110.292.93ESF145,673,9997730,543,7770.191.04EMFF005258,6530.007.203. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSK70.0421%18%412%13%2985%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSK130.019%12%1711%2617%10771%100%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 

SLOVAKIA 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Národná kriminálna agentúra – Prezídium Policajného zboru Slovenskej republiky (National Crime Agency – Police Presidium of the Slovak Republic 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) YES 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures Úrad pre verejné obstarávanie (Public Procurement Office) 8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Protimonopolný úrad Slovenskej republiky (Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Najvyšší kontrolný úrad Slovenskej republiky (Supreme Audit Office of the Slovak Republic) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Slovenská informačná služba (Slovak Information Service) Finančná spravodajská jednotka – Prezídium Policajného zboru Slovenskej republiky – Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (Financial Intelligence Unit – Police Presidium of the Slovak Republic – Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic)   
 
 
Finland – Suomi-Finland 

123 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated4101,359626,237,3572.94%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)107175,4250.000.03Rural Development (RD)133,62420714,1580.020.35SA/RD327,45800TOTAL561,08227889,5830.010.12FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)10421,075,6340.000.04Rural Development (RD)274,920692,481,9840.000.14SA/RD327,458225,609TOTAL6102,3791133,583,2270.000.08Irregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent2. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202300161,236,127ERDF00121,137,849ESF00257,442EMFF00240,836Cumulative from start of the programming period 00613,196,9530.000.21ERDF00392,526,4720.000.29ESF0014360,4550.000.07EMFF008310,0260.000.42Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulent3. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENFI00.00NA0%0NA0NA0NANAN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENFI00.000%6%125%00%375%33%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 

FINLAND 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Poliisi / keskusrikospoliisi (Finnish Police / National Bureau of Investigation) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes  3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS)  4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency  7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority  10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Valtiontalouden tarkastusvirasto (National Audit Office of Finland) 11) National security agency/National intelligence service    
 
 
 
Sweden – Sverige 

125 

OWNRES / gross TORNEURNEUR%Established and estimated0028312,829,6261.79%1. Traditional Own ResourcesReporting Year 2023Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)0.000.00Rural Development (RD)0012240,2100.000.09TOTAL0012240,2100.000.02FDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Support to agriculture (SA)118,7117129,3670.000.00Rural Development (RD)112,947341,302,0580.000.09SA/RD00122,203TOTAL231,658421,453,6280.000.032. Natural ResourcesIrregularities reported in 2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities reported 2019-2023FundIrregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentPeriod / FundFDRIDRNEURNEUR%%Year 202300211,172,990ERDF008207,248EMFF0013965,742Cumulative from start of the programming period 103,322,638824,743,8790.190.27ERDF121,659311,107,5970.000.12ESF4437,134311,307,8890.060.17EMFF52,863,845202,328,3932.922.373. Cohesion and Fisheries Policy - Programming period 2014-2020Irregularities reported as fraudulentIrregularities not reported as fraudulentN.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSE00.000%3%00%00%2100%100%N.ratioN.%N.%N.%of which OPENSE00.000%5%120%00%480%0%For further explanations about these data, please see the PIF Report 20234: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Common Agricultural Policy)Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud(1) Number of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the number of administrative irregularities that have never been reclassified.  (2) Percentage of irregularities that have been reclassified from administrative to fraudulent over the total number of fraudulent irregularities (including the reclassified and the ones that have been classified as fraudulent since the beginning) (3) Percentage of irregularities that, at any moment in their lifetime, were classified as fraudulent over the total number of irregularities reported4: Follow-up to suspected fraud - Irregularities initially reported during 2014-2018 (Cohesion and Fisheries Policy)PP 2007-2013 PP 2014-2020Reclassification (1)Incidence of riclassification (2)Incidence of fraud (3)DismissalEstablished fraudPending suspected fraud 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 

SWEDEN 1) Law enforcement agency with general competence on crimes Swedish Police Authority (Polismyndigheten) Nationella Anti-korruptionsgruppen NKG (National Anti-Corruption Police Unit NACPU) 2) Specialised law enforcement agency with specific competence on economic/financial crimes Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) 3) Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) 4) Dedicated anti-corruption agency  5) Dedicated anti-organised crime agency  6) Agency with general competence on checks on public expenditure / Public finances inspection agency Swedish National Financial Management Authority 7) Agency specialised in ex-post checks of public procurement procedures  8) Agency specialised in checks on conflict of interest  9) Competition authority Swedish Competition Authority (this body is competent of for ex-post checks of public procurement procedures) 10) National audit authorities (not part of the management and control system) Swedish National Audit Office 11) National security agency/National intelligence service Ekobrottsmyndigheten (Swedish Economic Crime Authority) Säkerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Service)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEXES 

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Annex 1 

128 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE396                      46,408,456        450                      61,655,907        581                      114,622,167      527                      447,692,574      377                      46,406,726        BG2                          653,686              7                          3,882,557           29                        2,638,947           12                        2,106,300           20                        1,451,321           CZ51                        4,308,505           60                        4,861,216           65                        2,967,780           84                        7,338,906           103                      6,630,342           DK66                        3,389,700           68                        5,365,858           102                      4,369,058           100                      3,829,609           157                      6,566,239           DE1,792                  135,534,489      1,699                  167,456,835      1,572                  84,688,252        1,933                  141,354,825      2,081                  197,158,559      EE7                          605,861              8                          1,120,169           9                          1,053,524           4                          314,252              9                          279,506              IE22                        1,459,809           20                        2,917,657           27                        1,446,990           22                        2,445,636           59                        8,092,906           EL54                        3,507,217           74                        7,123,068           33                        12,675,637        53                        9,515,303           15                        5,227,156           ES321                      23,159,864        379                      43,673,299        491                      60,938,014        532                      42,189,164        480                      63,156,886        FR313                      26,876,483        254                      41,963,481        358                      59,667,143        381                      36,703,418        430                      35,640,495        HR8                          516,117              23                        1,698,077           8                          944,363              24                        3,860,549           16                        1,214,961           IT156                      13,501,825        103                      8,327,323           100                      19,597,147        106                      17,757,818        166                      26,875,452        CY1                          10,463                1                          13,590                5                          160,662              6                          251,416              LV25                        1,018,410           28                        1,494,637           44                        3,858,643           39                        3,850,914           16                        873,508              LT27                        3,426,512           66                        5,145,936           68                        5,157,425           55                        3,630,208           54                        6,625,956           LU1                          111,376              1                          15,690                1                          43,171                HU55                        2,696,609           71                        10,690,193        31                        1,962,932           25                        2,388,228           26                        2,042,901           MT1                          27,024                2                          328,525              2                          44,438                2                          110,246              NL408                      71,734,030        432                      30,869,976        494                      170,608,090      601                      72,853,312        400                      21,725,323        AT47                        4,943,359           47                        1,977,807           61                        6,642,690           76                        3,570,430           72                        4,328,952           PL144                      11,542,031        128                      12,260,504        131                      9,705,835           146                      15,078,777        136                      14,540,452        PT36                        2,026,480           14                        469,667              24                        2,962,603           41                        3,362,891           38                        1,261,838           RO55                        3,204,182           44                        2,968,307           44                        2,788,338           42                        3,934,386           65                        7,143,552           SI10                        442,197              28                        5,730,470           13                        1,135,392           18                        465,159              28                        1,361,542           SK7                          423,202              9                          165,408              8                          884,116              6                          435,742              13                        276,978              FI57                        4,848,619           42                        2,417,663           49                        12,706,833        36                        3,274,488           66                        6,338,716           SE176                      10,523,222        169                      10,877,900        193                      9,671,259           200                      9,843,706           283                      12,829,626        EU-274,237376,872,7044,225435,156,6304,539594,078,4665,070838,001,6955,118478,411,557UK908100,706,80471193,164,05842647,602,20633742,889,5539210,603,225Total5,145477,579,5074,936528,320,6884,965641,680,6715,407880,891,2485,210489,014,782* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount (2019 - 2023)                                                                      MS20192020202120222023 
Annex 2 

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NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE12734,692,31911949,760,49818399,315,255        12153,332,995389,970,067BG2653,68673,882,557282,546,064           102,007,72516922,416CZ115,890                DK2146,2954137,0106350,568              3113,925DE8327,689,363999,752,184604,295,590           494,608,917181,898,013EE5505,28461,032,34681,033,810           3267,8059279,506IE6333,0315360,3281100,366              EL162,393,069293,721,6591310,706,085        458,677,543135,186,997ES302,561,6073714,234,3713719,109,996        252,864,020334,506,533FR536,431,5214525,892,6248427,845,375        8213,194,209682,663,082HR2389,444131,216,726228,514                113,521,0166557,220IT282,155,560182,572,2371813,385,674        297,011,2555716,759,783CY113,590                2112,6024225,747LV15735,10112773,63591,043,536           398,255116,839LT172,458,400414,275,529463,837,216           332,812,294296,078,879LUHU122,8796150,1721126,322              4190,148110,040MTNL71,249,46691,333,377514,406,943        2295,846AT61,049,2333139,13344,203,383           459,7195215,150PL272,733,371332,646,471251,478,693           434,952,124232,348,219PT61,065,7653120,50241,065,612           152,148,4611332,031RO5306,9329234,16110606,329              62,213,1308145,823SI264,99471,358,8071565,821              4694,523SK115,500340,680337,131                136,241212,442FI4226,2603153,3804101,359SE172,676299,814EU-2744687,951,756513123,888,202550206,117,763491108,518,23034052,924,670UK29972,009715,982,05224,536,405Total47588,923,764520139,870,255552210,654,169491108,518,23034052,924,670* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount (2019 - 2023)                                              MS20192020202120222023 
Annex 3 

130 

NEURNEURNEURNEURNEURBE26911,716,13733111,895,40939815,306,912406394,359,57933936,436,659BG192,883298,5754528,905CZ514,308,505604,861,216642,951,890847,338,9061036,630,342DK643,243,405645,228,847964,018,489973,715,6841576,566,239DE1,709107,845,1261,600157,704,6511,51280,392,6621,884136,745,9092,063195,260,546EE2100,577287,823119,714146,447IE161,126,778152,557,329261,346,624222,445,636598,092,906EL381,114,148453,401,409201,969,5528837,761240,159ES29120,598,25734229,438,92845441,828,01850739,325,14444758,650,353FR26020,444,96220916,070,85727431,821,76829923,509,20936232,977,413HR6126,67310481,3516915,85013339,53310657,741IT12811,346,265855,755,086826,211,4737710,746,56310910,115,669CY110,463348,060225,668LV10283,30916721,002352,815,108363,752,65915856,669LT10968,11225870,407221,320,20922817,91425547,077LU1111,376115,690143,171HU542,673,7306510,540,021301,836,610212,198,080252,032,862MT127,0242328,525244,4382110,246NL40170,484,56442329,536,599489156,201,14759972,557,46640021,725,323AT413,894,126441,838,674572,439,307723,510,711674,113,802PL1178,808,660959,614,0331068,227,14210310,126,65311312,192,233PT30960,71611349,165201,896,991261,214,43037929,807RO502,897,250352,734,146342,182,010361,721,255576,997,729SI8377,203214,371,66312569,57118465,15924667,019SK6407,7026124,7295846,9855399,50111264,536FI534,622,359392,264,2834912,706,833363,274,488626,237,357SE17510,450,54616710,778,0861939,671,2592009,843,70628312,829,626EU-273,791288,920,9483,712311,268,4273,989387,960,7024,579729,483,4644,778425,486,887UK87999,734,79570477,182,00642443,065,80033742,889,5539210,603,225Total4,670388,655,7434,416388,450,4334,413431,026,5034,916772,373,0184,870436,090,112* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Total number of non-fraudulent cases with the related estimated and established amount (2019 - 2023)                                                MS20192020202120222023 
Annex 4 

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OWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedOWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedOWNRES established and estimated amountOWNRES established and estimated amount as a % in amount gross TOR collectedEUR%EUR%EUR%BE46,406,726                            1.53%9,970,0670.33%36,436,6591.20%BG1,451,321                              0.85%922,4160.54%528,9050.31%CZ6,630,342                              1.27%6,630,3421.27%DK6,566,239                              1.31%6,566,2391.31%DE197,158,559                         3.30%1,898,0130.03%195,260,5463.26%EE279,506                                 0.60%279,5060.60%IE8,092,906                              1.36%8,092,9061.36%EL5,227,156                              1.69%5,186,9971.68%40,1590.01%ES63,156,886                            2.41%4,506,5330.17%58,650,3532.23%FR35,640,495                            1.33%2,663,0820.10%32,977,4131.23%HR1,214,961                              1.54%557,2200.71%657,7410.83%IT26,875,452                            0.88%16,759,7830.55%10,115,6690.33%CY251,416                                 0.42%225,7470.38%25,6680.04%LV873,508                                 1.57%16,8390.03%856,6691.54%LT6,625,956                              5.21%6,078,8794.78%547,0770.43%LUHU2,042,901                              0.55%10,0400.00%2,032,8620.54%MT110,246                                 -0.29%110,246-0.29%NL21,725,323                            0.49%21,725,3230.49%AT4,328,952                              1.30%215,1500.06%4,113,8021.23%PL14,540,452                            1.11%2,348,2190.18%12,192,2330.93%PT1,261,838                              0.40%332,0310.10%929,8070.29%RO7,143,552                              2.05%145,8230.04%6,997,7292.01%SI1,361,542                              0.62%694,5230.31%667,0190.30%SK276,978                                 0.18%12,4420.01%264,5360.17%FI6,338,716                              2.94%101,3590.05%6,237,3572.89%SE12,829,626                            1.79%12,829,6261.79%EU-27478,411,5571.69%52,924,6700.19%425,486,8871.51%UK10,603,2250.89%0.00%10,603,2250.89%Total489,014,7821.66%52,924,6700.18%436,090,1121.48%* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are rounded    TOR: Percentage of the financial impact of OWNRES cases to the collected and made available TOR (gross) in 2023 per Member StateMSAllFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
Annex 5 

132 

Established amountRecovered amountRREstablished amountRecovered amountRREUREUR%EUREUR%BE417,794,702100,787,00424%34,329,68322,617,62066%BG2,095,85044,1302%789,72635,2604%CZ7,338,9066,666,63191%6,630,3426,526,20198%DK3,829,6093,600,90994%6,566,2396,286,32596%DE141,354,825134,609,05795%197,158,559172,215,17187%EE210,474210,474100%IE2,445,6362,240,07192%8,092,9064,920,52761%EL1,600,688384,52324%3,668,89625,7091%ES40,114,69234,328,83586%60,298,32850,930,82884%FR36,000,04818,131,43450%35,275,08926,162,66074%HR633,722506,52180%765,299657,74186%IT17,662,12011,114,91763%25,379,9748,840,41035%CY160,66265,48641%251,416174,12569%LV3,768,6373,768,637100%873,508838,93196%LT1,890,649730,86939%4,004,520329,3928%LUHU2,388,2281,062,83245%2,042,901897,49444%MT44,43844,438100%110,24666,75861%NL56,482,54129,779,36953%20,187,5379,195,08246%AT3,547,8303,495,38999%4,328,9524,162,20296%PL8,396,2257,502,36689%3,055,7112,747,66190%PT2,504,9371,891,39176%1,261,8381,261,838100%RO3,934,3863,711,93594%7,115,0462,527,96336%SI465,159465,159100%1,361,5421,361,542100%SK435,742399,50192%264,536256,06897%FI3,274,4883,260,888100%6,338,7166,299,49199%SE9,843,7069,203,98294%12,829,62611,195,38587%EU-27768,218,900378,006,74649%442,981,137340,532,38677%UK42,889,55316,557,15739%10,603,2253,748,73335%Total811,108,454394,563,90349%453,584,362344,281,11876%* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Recovery rates (RR) per cut-off date MS20222023 
Annex 6 

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Release for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherRelease for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherBE9,848,433121,634              17,801,3826,602,284           11,086,153503,068443,772BG246,948675,468528,905CZ6,593,88724,36712,088DK5,881,04410,808                10,907651,74011,740DE1,898,013176,050,370561,162              16,989,181994,946664,888EE279,506              IE4,868,5071,863,4701,348,69312,236EL3,714,9011,472,096           40,159ES1,647,9752,858,558           41,066,83890,710                129,47417,363,331FR1,884,976377,410400,696              31,129,989124,663              263,2221,009,416450,123HR305,82680,260171,134657,741IT16,410,038349,74510,095,07520,594                CY225,74725,668LV16,839831,36925,300LT3,457,4431,671,335950,101              503,32631,557                12,194LUHU10,0402,032,862MT110,246NL14,254,9243,811,764           2,315,110788,967554,558AT193,99921,1513,751,580142,096              48,391171,735PL1,630,793717,42712,033,051159,183PT332,031929,807RO145,8236,761,851235,877SI694,523667,019SK12,442264,536FI101,3595,743,152474,49719,708SE11,976,062770,85729,78552,921EU-2742,765,7071,835,3411,863,620377,4106,082,592354,489,10611,395,63733,428,37423,742,5072,431,263UK9,014,9341,588,291Total42,765,7071,835,3411,863,620377,4106,082,592363,504,04011,395,63733,428,37425,330,7982,431,263* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Estimated and established amount per customs procedure per Member State (2023)MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
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Release for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherRelease for free circulationTransitCustoms warehousingInward processingOtherBE344231811746                          BG5114CZ10111                          DK1461181                          DE181,839331621811                        EE9IE421151                          EL672ES16174066332FR402263338489                          HR31210IT5611081CY42LV1141                          LT612112041                          LUHU125MT2NL10924918186                          AT4157514                          PL71511112PT137RO71561SI424SK1111FI450111                          SE280111                          EU-2721830152754,01838820712243UK8012Total21830152754,09838820713443* Cut-off date 15/03/2024TOR: Customs procedure by number of cases per Member State (2023)MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
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AllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherAllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherBE3773816713233918611411523BG201610644CZ1031035350DK15715744222854DE2,0811831412,0639411173448628250EE9981IE595911722694EL1513822122ES48033412084471729729106412FR43068312510236214610479321HR16631210451IT16657313391110936441982CY642222LV161115114LT542942525322LUHU261125223MT2211NL40040026312314AT7251211673381313PL1362314621113996242PT38113724112RO65811657552SI284424186SK1321111191FI6642262133118SE283283127140142EU-275,118340104761409384,7781,1332,095244618585103UK92926329Total5,210340104761409384,8701,1332,158244618614103* Cut-off date 15/03/2024TOR: Method of detection by number of cases per Member State (2023)MSNFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
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AllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherAllRelease controlsPost-release controlsInspections by anti-fraud servicesTax auditVoluntary admissionOtherBE46,406,7269,970,0671,219,791        234,608           8,104,408        411,261           36,436,6597,592,5603,828,4393,247,9615,700,98016,066,718BG1,451,321922,416661,595           260,821           528,905528,905CZ6,630,3426,630,3424,250,9762,379,366DK6,566,2396,566,2391,941,741882,851351,2201,962,6231,427,805DE197,158,5591,898,013117,780           1,750,947        29,286             195,260,5465,955,40567,263,1401,323,29597,465,89320,225,8773,026,936EE279,506279,506268,327           11,179             IE8,092,9068,092,90610,3392,552,751234,1483,698,7581,383,804213,106EL5,227,1565,186,9971,504,067        3,596,766        28,273             57,891             40,15940,159ES63,156,8864,506,533842,587           58,030             3,044,226        561,690           58,650,35325,008,9125,657,1296,364,64817,338,0604,270,89210,712FR35,640,4952,663,082694,680           1,044,713        846,503           77,186             32,977,4136,546,7919,019,87115,908,3411,489,22513,185HR1,214,961557,220319,395           66,691             171,134           657,74194,012449,585114,144IT26,875,45216,759,783607,064           1,889,815        14,150,726      112,178           10,115,6692,182,4354,210,0191,837,017784,1361,102,062CY251,416225,747125,291           100,457           25,66825,668LV873,50816,83916,839             856,669606,665250,004LT6,625,9566,078,879472,874           5,606,005        547,07740,145506,932LUHU2,042,90110,04010,040             2,032,86247,5611,985,300MT110,246110,24643,48866,758NL21,725,32321,725,3234,312,61516,900,232512,476AT4,328,952215,15021,151             145,512           23,808             24,680             4,113,802167,6803,043,013270,209632,900PL14,540,4522,348,219579,819           1,209,292        421,500           137,607           12,192,2331,170,39310,136,95339,657217,247627,983PT1,261,838332,031332,031           929,807582,87920,542326,386RO7,143,552145,82310,996             134,827           6,997,729227,6026,770,127SI1,361,542694,523694,523           667,019434,352232,667SK276,97812,44212,442             264,53626,654223,70014,182FI6,338,716101,35925,827             75,532             6,237,357475,6421,831,0023,930,714SE12,829,62612,829,6263,150,2189,179,212468,82431,372EU-27478,411,55752,924,6706,893,0329,216,23935,232,486590,976189,364802,573425,486,88759,415,298143,805,92736,531,127118,502,71144,079,04423,152,779UK10,603,22510,603,2258,036,4722,566,753Total489,014,78252,924,6706,893,0329,216,23935,232,486590,976189,364802,573436,090,11259,415,298151,842,39936,531,127118,502,71146,645,79723,152,779* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Method of detection by established and estimated amounts per Member State (2023)MSTotalFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
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Established amount, EURRecovered amount, EURRR, %Established amount, EURRecovered amount, EURRR, %BE7,602,5621,529,64220%26,727,12121,087,97879%BG260,82113,8735%528,90521,3874%CZ6,630,3426,526,20198%DK6,566,2396,286,32596%DE1,898,0131,157,39561%195,260,546171,057,77688%EEIE8,092,9064,920,52761%EL3,628,7370%40,15925,70964%ES1,647,9751,174,76871%58,650,35349,756,06085%FR2,297,6761,835,83080%32,977,41324,326,83174%HR107,5580%657,741657,741100%IT15,275,0871,883,51712%10,104,8876,956,89269%CY225,747148,45766%25,66825,668100%LV16,8390%856,669838,93198%LT3,457,44340,4161%547,077288,97653%LUHU10,0400%2,032,862897,49444%MT110,24666,75861%NL20,187,5379,195,08246%AT215,150118,10555%4,113,8024,044,09798%PL630,968458,43073%2,424,7432,289,23194%PT332,031332,031100%929,807929,807100%RO117,31753,44146%6,997,7292,474,52235%SI694,523694,523100%667,019667,019100%SK264,536256,06897%FI101,35979,21778%6,237,3576,220,273100%SE12,829,62611,195,38587%EU-2738,519,8469,519,64625%404,461,291331,012,74082%UK10,603,2253,748,73335%Total38,519,8469,519,64625%415,064,516334,761,47381%* Cut-off date 15/03/2024** Amounts are roundedTOR: Recovery rates (RR) per Member State in 2023MSFraudulentNon-fraudulent 
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Total cases** Cases assessed twice (AI)  Total (amounts not counted twice) N*EURNEURNEURNEURNNEURCZ 1                          450,790              1                          450,790              DK 1                          132,560              1                          132,560              DE1                          112,310              7                          12,406,618        2                          3,871,601           10                        1                          16,390,529        EL3                          2,067,955           2                          10,264,667        5                          2                          12,332,622        ES4                          1,431,507           4                          775,861              8                          1                          2,207,368           FR3                          733,555              580                      3                          3                          734,134              IT7                          7,700,614           5                          70,580,887        12                        3                          78,281,501        LV1                          128,350              1                          128,350              LT2                          1,382,251           2                          1                          1,382,251           HU2                          1,460,158           1                          245,886              3                          1                          1,706,044           NL1                          104,209              12                        22,718,903        11                        15,226,992        24                        2                          38,050,105        AT1                          125,822              7                          5,450,099           8                          3                          5,575,922           PL2                          632,457              1                          1,440,313           3                          1                          2,072,770           PT27                        9,552,222           5                          1,711,851           32                        11,264,074        RO1                          122,463              2                          1,157,987           1                          143,037              4                          1,423,487           SK1                          676,551              1                          452,602              2                          1,129,152           SE1                          1,659,463           1                          1,659,463           EU-2751,141,355 8168,934,742 29103,132,594 51,712,431 12018174,921,122 UK1198,873343,086,3469751,99213144,037,210Total61,340,228 84112,021,087 38103,884,586 51,712,431 13319218,958,332 * Number of cases** Cases assessed twice are not includedTOR: Examination of write-off cases in 2023MS Acceptance  Reference to Article 13.2 considered not justified  Additional information request (AI)  Not appropriate  
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CasesEstimated and established amountNEURBE53,805,468BG10661,595EE9279,506EL71,472,096ES172,858,558FR3365,406HR180,260LV116,839LT232,621,436PL5322,649RO478,382SK112,442FI111,926EU-278712,586,564* CN code 2402 2090** Cut-off date 15/03/2024TOR: Cases of smuggled cigarettes* in 2023MS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 13 

List of abbreviations 

SA: Support to Agriculture 

RD: Rural Development 

SA/RD: Support to Agriculture/ Rural Development 

GUID: European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund – Section Guidance 

EFF: European Fisheries Fund 

EMFF: European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 

CF: Cohesion Fund 

ERDF: European Regional and Development Fund 

ESF: European Social Fund 

AMIF: Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 

FEAD: Fund for European Aid to the most Deprived 

ISF: Internal Security Fund 

CBC: pre-accession, Cross-Border Cooperation component 

IPA: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 

HRD: pre-accession, Human Resources Development component 

IPARD: Instrument for Pre-Accession for Rural Development 

REGD: pre-accession, Regional Development component 

TAIB: Transition Assistance and Institution Building 

ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument 

TIPAA: Turkey Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 

140 

 
 
141 

COUNTRIESSARDSA/RDEFFEMFFCFERDFESFYEIFEADCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBCBC-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 OF EXPENDITUREThe number of irregularities reported measures the results of Member States’ work to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. Therefore, the figures should not be interpreted as indicating the level of fraud in the Countries’ territories.Annex to the Statistical Evaluation -Irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2023 (1)(1) Based on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 4/3/2024 
 
 
142 

COUNTRIESSARDSA/RDEFFEMFFCFERDFESFYEIFEADCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBCBC-ENIAT0000002,413,919000000000BE00000028,444000000000BG0545,2390000184,06617,73200000000CZ11,6180000156,73220,376,9881,039,55422,8220000000DE152,353881,92300002,222,229946,49300000000DK0478,05000000000000000EE03,527,72400020,7911,077,112000000000ES51,7641,764,28400006,580,429000000000FI033,62427,4580000000000000FR1,114,503341,79200009,23923,89600000000GR128,1611,019,3790000753,237000000000HR0473,1540000594,966000000000HU000001,288,8085,137,966155,83700000000IT794,975714,44791,80420,00000850,176000000000LT0661,7160064,05500000000000LV01,570,9980002,694,3923,024,25528,527015,808000000MT0109,601000214,6950000000000NL18,576000000000000000PL265,595397,99896,6603,076,7770147,0014,492,3922,976,42300000000PT150,866391,17300004,292,2323,500,52100000000RO3,357,5012,664,598000351,897,60259,530,7681,857,6280000000105,548SI00000177,2052,008,765000000000SK02,751,754000194,2191,953,114662,02300000000UK073,5640000133,327000000000ME0000000000000000MK00000000000000600,6590RS000000000041,6180415,745000TR000000000000333,93217,963,23800TOTAL6,045,91218,401,018215,9223,096,77764,055356,791,445115,663,62411,208,63422,82215,80841,6180749,67717,963,238600,659105,548Annex to the Statistical Evaluation - Irregular amounts related to irregularities reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2023 (1)FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE(1) Based on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 4/3/2024 
 
 
 
143 

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nnex to the Statistical Evaluation -Irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2023  (1)The number of irregularities reported measures the results of Member States’ work to counter fraud and other illegal activities affecting the EU’s financial interests. Therefore, the figures should not be interpreted as indicating the level of fraud in the Countries’ territories.(1) Based on data in the Management System(IMS) as of 4/3/2024FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
 
 
 
 
144 

COUNTRIESSARDSA/RDEFFEMFFCFERDFESFYEIFEADAMIFISFCBC-IPAHRDIPARDREGDTAIBIPAIIICBC-ENIAT550,723147,29700001,704,73719,25100000000000BE402,310401,48100001,665,789355,34900000000000BG3,117,0759,732,52800679,68738,062,88214,759,463800,9510000606,272000000CY012031,235239,7170000000000000CZ180,727933,74700462,6824,050,52819,724,5541,153,95100042,4870000000DE800,1801,130,760022,40858,264013,134,150270,994044,27833,02400000000DK1,420,896423,0290010,9640026,76200000000000EE0854,11600015,641,1437,927,27100018,52500000000ES10,959,03555,656,534001,382,0504,268,12512,934,59730,881,49800000000000FI175,425714,1580040,83601,137,84957,44200000000000FR5,360,6922,997,0090084,72407,618,910339,25812,2930000000000GR148,5343,818,3740079,8086,473,72816,260,2129,298,99311,525,8854,471,373000000000HR189,48511,994,122000141,049473,7905,355,03800000000000HU121,07314,421,691000279,31519,622,7235,887,09201,646,504000000000IT7,831,97311,429,8771,848,41800014,969,097670,655000011,539000000LT893,7361,934,5720019,5423,017,54310,510,439578,2900486,029000000000LV40,973272,9220057,5111,101,4671,484,504214,07400000000000MT0880,624000038,51938,95800057,7230000000NL688,483201,3910000266,274000000000000PL7,400,9626,726,75851,7520378,6445,838,12868,612,18713,545,5230000000000523,177PT879,2245,720,21300453,95285,7002,771,048947,6040306,700000000000RO1,626,36835,107,19701,225,2761,880,22569,707,16348,850,4494,914,610027,349000000000SE0240,21000965,7420207,248000000000000SI0198,91200020,492255,305451,1820814,810000000000SK387,58010,613,2021,506,736006,648,81467,351,015612,33100000000000UK01,895,7250000507,1514,278,20200181,22200000000AL000000000000001,190,643091,81900ME00000000000001,020193,73704,90000MK0000000000000057,7020000RS000000000000656,025013,7270954,36500TR0000000000000174,8722,378,98755,191153,33800TOTAL43,175,454178,446,4503,406,9081,247,6846,585,866155,575,794332,787,28180,698,00811,538,1787,797,043232,771100,2101,273,836175,8923,834,79655,1911,204,4220523,177(1) Based on data in the Irregularity Management System(IMS) as of 4/3/2024Annex to the Statistical Evaluation - Irregular amounts related to irregularities not reported as fraudulent by Member States and Beneficiary Countries in 2023  (1)FUNDS/TYPE OF EXPENDITURE