COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up by Member States to the recommendations of the PIF Report 2022 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2023
Date: 2024-07-25
Institutions: European Anti-Fraud Office, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU budget, EU strategy, activity report, corruption, digitisation, fight against crime, financial control, fraud, fraud against the EU

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 25.7.2024  SWD(2024) 190 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Follow-up by Member States to the recommendations of the PIF Report 2022 Accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union's financial interests and the fight against fraud - 2023 {COM(2024) 318 final} - {SWD(2024) 187 final} - {SWD(2024) 188 final} - {SWD(2024) 189 final} - {SWD(2024) 191 final} - {SWD(2024) 192 final} - {SWD(2024) 193 final}  
 
 
Contents 
List of abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 3 

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4 

1.  Overview of Member States’ replies to the questionnaire ..................................................... 5 

1.1.  Recommendation 1: improving detection, reporting and follow-up of suspected fraud ........... 5 

1.1.1. 

Fraud risk analysis ......................................................................................................... 5 

1.1.2. 

Instruments / core principles ......................................................................................... 5 

1.1.3. 

Intentionality ................................................................................................................ 6 

1.1.4. 

Exchange of information: reporting and follow-up ......................................................... 7 

1.2.  Recommendation 2: digitalisation of the fight against fraud high on Member States’ agenda 8 

1.2.1. 

Implementation ............................................................................................................ 8 

1.2.2. 

Addressing gaps in digitalisation .................................................................................... 9 

1.3.  Recommendation 3: reinforcing anti-fraud governance in the Member States ...................... 10 

1.3.1. 

Staffing ....................................................................................................................... 11 

2.  Replies from the Member States ......................................................................................... 12 

Improving the detection, reporting and follow-up of suspected fraud ............................................. 12 

Q.1.1 Do you assess your Member State as having a low incidence of fraud? ............................ 12 

Q.1.2 Can you explain why? Which measures have been adopted to determine the incidence of 
fraud? ............................................................................................................................................ 12 

Q.1.3 If YES to Q.1.1. Have you invested in fraud risk analysis to assess the reason for low 
detection of suspected fraud in your operations? ....................................................................... 32 

Q.1.4 If YES to Q.1.3. Have you identified weaknesses in fraud detection? ................................. 33 

Q.1.5 If YES to Q.1.4. In which of the following detection areas have you identified weaknesses?
 ...................................................................................................................................................... 33 

Q.1.6 Usually the issue of intentionality related to an irregularity is investigated in the 
framework of penal proceedings, with the involvement of criminal law enforcement agencies 
and public prosecutors. Are there other types of proceedings where intentionality is assessed, 
in view for example of making a decision about sanctions? ........................................................ 33 

Q.1.7 If YES to Q.1.6., could you specify what these proceedings are?........................................ 34 

Q.1.8 In IMS, the Member States must specify the type of proceeding an irregularity is 
undergoing, choosing among the following options: AP (administrative proceedings), JP (judicial 
proceedings), PP (penal proceedings). The code PP should be used in relation to suspected 
fraud, whenever a criminal proceeding is initiated. However, it is possible that the code JP has 
been used by some Member States for proceedings in relation to suspected fraud, for example 
when the trial stage is reached. Sometimes, the indication of the code JP is not accompanied by 
the classification IRQ3. For such cases, to what type of judicial proceedings are you referring? 37 

Q.1.9 In your opinion, what are useful elements to formulate the hypothesis that an 
irregularities might be intentional and consequently suspected fraud worth being further 
investigated by the competent authorities? (for example, (i) beneficiary or contractor linked to 

 
 
other irregularities or with criminal records, (ii) certain links between beneficiary, contractors, 
subcontractors, suppliers, (iii) certain inaccuracies or specific elements in certain documents; 
(iv) certain shortcomings in the implementation of projects, such as the site of the operation 
cannot be easily found or is clearly inadequate, etc.) .................................................................. 40 

Q.1.10 Have the bodies in charge of detecting irregularities adequate access to information to 
assess these elements and consequently to assess the possibility of intentionality? ................. 53 

Q.1.11 Have you identified weaknesses in your reporting practices for a timely and exhaustive 
reporting in IMS of suspected fraud cases? .................................................................................. 53 

Q.1.12 Which measures have been adopted to correct the identified issues? ............................ 53 

Q.1.13 If YES to Q.1.11. Which of the following areas did you encounter difficulties in? ............ 55 

Q.1.14 For each marked answer in Q.1.13. Can you provide an explanation of the reason behind 
your difficulties? ........................................................................................................................... 55 

Q.1.15 Have you encountered any difficulties in providing follow-up for investigated fraud 
cases? ............................................................................................................................................ 57 

Q.1.16 If YES to Q.1.15. Has the information flow between judicial and reporting authorities 
improved? ..................................................................................................................................... 57 

Q.1.17 If YES to Q.1.16. What measures have been taken to increase the exchange of 
information? ................................................................................................................................. 57 

Digitalisation of the fight against fraud high on Member States’ agenda ....................................... 61 

Q.2.1. Are you ensuring the digitisation of the fight against fraud is part of your NAFS? ........... 61 

Q.2.2 Have you implemented measures to identify and address the threats posed by new 
technologies? ................................................................................................................................ 61 

Q.2.3 If YES to Q.2.2. Can you explain and give some examples? If possible, please make a 
distinction between measures in relation to expenditure and measures in relation to revenue.
 ...................................................................................................................................................... 62 

Q.2.4 Does your strategy ensure one of these approaches to develop the IT architecture? ....... 67 

Q.2.5 For any approach selected, can you provide explanations of its implementation? ........... 72 

Q.2.6 Have you taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitisation? ........................... 79 

Q.2.7 If YES to Q.2.6. What are the main gaps you have identified? How do you intend to 
address them? ............................................................................................................................... 79 

Reinforcing anti-fraud governance in the Member States ................................................................ 83 

Q.3.1 Do you have an anti-fraud cooperation network in place? ................................................ 83 

Q.3.2 If YES to Q.3.1, which authorities are part of this network? ............................................... 83 

Q.3.3 To what extent are (national) law enforcement and judicial authorities collaborating with 
the national anti-fraud network?.................................................................................................. 84 

Q.3.4 Is your national anti-fraud network actively including cooperation with one of the 
following EU judicial and law enforcement authorities? .............................................................. 85 

Q.3.5 Are the national structures coordinating the anti-fraud network properly staffed to 
effectively manage and oversee anti-fraud activities? ................................................................. 85 

Q.3.6 How do you ensure adequate staffing in your national structure? .................................... 86 

2 

 
 
List of abbreviations 

AFCOS   

Anti-Fraud Coordination Service 

AFIS 

CA 

CAP 

EPPO 

ERDF 

ESIF 

ESF 

EU 

IB 

IMS 

MA 

MCS 

MFF 

NAFS 

NRA 

OLAF 

PIF 

RRF 

RRP 

Anti-Fraud Information System 

Certifying authority 

Common agricultural policy 

European Public Prosecutor’s Office 

European Regional Development Fund 

European Structural Investment Funds 

European Social Fund 

European Union 

Intermediate body 

Irregularity management system 

Managing authority 

Management and control system 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

National anti-fraud strategy 

National risk assessment 

European Anti-Fraud Office 

Protection of the EU’s financial interests 

Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Recovery and resilience plan 

3 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In its 2022  Report on the Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests, the Commission made 
recommendations to Member States on: a) improving the detection, reporting and follow-
up  of  suspected  fraud;  b)  putting  the  digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  high  on 
Member States’ agenda; c) strengthening anti-fraud governance in the Member States. 

The Member States were sent a questionnaire to collect information about how they have 
implemented these recommendations. Their replies are analysed in this document, which is 
divided in two parts: the first provides an overview and analysis of their replies, while the 
second part details the specific replies given for each question in the survey. 

4 

 
 
 
 
1. Overview of Member States’ replies to the questionnaire 

1.1. Recommendation  1:  improving  detection,  reporting  and  follow-up  of 

suspected fraud 

In the Member States with low incidence of fraud, the competent authorities should invest 
in fraud risk analysis in order to assess the degree to which low detection is the result of 
low levels of actual fraud affecting their operations or the result of systemic weaknesses in 
detection or reporting systems. 

Member  States  should  focus  on  detecting  signals  of  fraud  and,  where  irregularities  are 
found, carefully addressing the question of intentionality. 

If  the  identified  issues  point  to  reporting  practices  (e.g.  Delaying  classification  as 
suspected fraud) Member States should review them also taking into account the need for 
a better information flow to and from judicial authorities. 

1.1.1.  Fraud risk analysis 

Most Member States1 assessed the incidence of fraud in their country as low. 

Several Member States2 indicated that they had conducted a fraud risk analysis to assess the 
reasons  for  low  detection  of  suspected  fraud  in  their  operations.  Half  of  those  identified 
weaknesses  in  fraud  detection.  Such  weaknesses  mostly  relate  to  ‘information  exchange 
with law enforcement and specialised agencies’, as shown in the overview below. 

d
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i

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Information exchange with law enforcement and…

Management and control system
Monitoring systems and detection software
Additional control on request by the Commission
Cooperation with EU investigation bodies
Other

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

N° of Member States having replied

It is hard to determine whether low levels of reported fraud  are the result of specific anti-
fraud  measures.  It  is  crucial  that  Member  States  continue  to  monitor  fraud,  while 
developing measures and tools to prevent it. 

1.1.2.  Instruments / core principles 

Member  States  link  success  in  preventing  fraud  to  a  a  multi-stakeholder  and  multi-level  approach 
that facilitates  cooperation between all  the relevant players, from national customs authorities 
to supranational institutions, as well as authorities in non-EU countries. They identify some 
key principles for cooperation, outlined below. : 

1 AT, BE (Wallonia), BG, CZ, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, IE, LV, LT, MT, NL, PT, SK. 
2 AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, LV, LT, MT, NL, PT, SI 

. 

5 

 
 
 
 
 
 
•  Responsibilities  between  audit  and  control  bodies  within  the  Member  States 

should be clearly distributed. 

•  Administrative  and  on-the-spot  checks  should  take  place  regularly  to  keep  the 

levels of incidence of fraud low. 

•  Data should be regularly sent to the Commission/European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
(via  the  IMS),  to  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  (EPPO)  and  to  national 
audit  and  control  bodies  in  the  Member  State  to  help  them  keep  track  of 
pressing  matters.  These  comparative  data  can  then  be  used  to  assess  the  level  of 
incidence of fraud. 

•  Some  Member  States3  reported  positive  results  from  initiatives  that  facilitate  the 
sharing  of  knowledge  and  best  practices  and  that  allow  benchmarking  the 
performance of Member States, while acknowledging variation in size, background, 
etc. 

•  All stakeholders recognised the importance of investing in: 

o  training courses 
o  compiling guidelines and 
o  organising  workshops,  to keep the performance and quality of  performance 

high. 

•  All  institutions  should  use  internal  mechanisms,  such  as  the  four-eyes  principle,  to 

prevent fraud. 

1.1.3.  Intentionality 

The intentionality of an irregularity is investigated as part of criminal prosecution, involving 
law  enforcement  agencies  and  public  prosecutors.  However,  various  Member  States4 
acknowledged  having  other  types  of  proceedings  to  assess  intentionality,  for  example  to 
decide about penalties. These include both criminal and administrative proceedings, such as 
tax inspection and checks to detect alterations to documents. 

Adequate  access  to  information  is  needed  to  assess  whether  the  bodies  in  charge  of 
detecting  irregularities  are  able  to  detect  intentionality.  In  the  survey,  nearly  all  Member 
States5  declared  that  those  bodies  have  adequate  access  to  information  to  assess  the 
possibility of intentionality. 

Useful  ways  to  assess  whether  an  irregularity  might  be  intentional  and  thus  constitute  a 
suspected fraud for the competent authorities to investigate further, include: 

•  using the risk-scoring tool ARACHNE; 
•  performing case-by-case analysis; 
•  analysing shortcomings in implementation; 
• 
Injecting data and analysing risk indicators; 
•  examining  links  between  the  players  involved,  e.g.  beneficiaries,  contractors, 

subcontractors and suppliers; 

•  examining the legality of conditions for allocating public funds; 
•  examining the possible manipulation or falsification of documents. 

3 EE, EL, IT. 
4 CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, HU, LV, PL, SI, SK. 
5 BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EL ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK. 

6 

 
 
 
Member  States  also  highlighted  the  importance  of  training  to  raise  staff  awareness  of 
certain  signs  of  possible  cases  of  suspected  fraud  and  of  having  more  experienced  staff 
share  their  knowledge  and  expertise  with  their  colleagues  and  provide  advice  and 
assistance in solving complex cases. 

1.1.4.  Exchange of information: reporting and follow-up 

It is important that reporting authorities provide full and prompt information about follow-
up of cases of suspected fraud. 

Most Member States6 have not experienced weaknesses in their reporting practices. Those 
that have identified issues report that most difficulties arise from lack of information and/or 
resources. They mentioned the following measures as helping to correct issues with follow-
up: 

•  provision of better guidelines / adequate information to managing authorities; 
•  continued monitoring of implementation and reporting: 

o  analysis of implementation; 
o  measures to ensure correct reporting; 

•  collaboration between involved authorities and stakeholders 

Some  Member  States7  also  encountered  difficulties  in  following  up  on  investigated  fraud 
cases. Most8 stated that the information flow between judicial and reporting authorities has 
(partly) improved. 

Cooperation  and  communication  agreements,  roundtables  or  working  groups,  and 
continued  monitoring  arrangements  have  been  set  up  to  improve  the  exchange  of 
information. 

6 AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK. 
7 BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, HR, HU, IT, LV, PL, SE, SI, SK. 
8 CZ, BG, DK, EL, HU, IT, LV, PL, SE, SK 
. 

7 

 
 
 
 
1.2. Recommendation  2:  digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  high  on 

Member States’ agenda 

Member States should ensure that digitalisation of the fight against fraud is part of their 
NAFS. That approach should define strategies to: 

i. 
ii. 

iii. 

identify existing and future threats arising from new technologies: 
develop the necessary IT architecture (inventorying existing tools, developing new 
ones, ensuring appropriate interoperability between them); and 
identify and address existing gaps, also in terms of the skills needed. 

Technological developments facilitate many aspects of our lives, including the fight against 
fraud.  However,  it  also  poses  potential  threats.  Therefore,  it  is  important  that  Member 
States  address  the  challenges  posed  by  these  technological  developments.  National  anti-
fraud  strategies  (NAFS)  should  include  measures  to  identify  existing  and  future  threats 
arising from new technologies. While most Member States9 have acknowledged this issue, 
several10 have not yet integrated digitalisation as part of their NAFS. 

While  a  few  Member  States11  have  already  fully  implemented  measures  to  identify  and 
address  the  threats  posed  by  new  technologies,  most12  have  implemented  only  some 
measures, so they need to continue investing in innovative measures. 

S t a g e   o f   i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f   m e a s u r e s  t o   i d e n t i f y  a n d  
a d d r e s s   t h e   t h r e a t s   p o s e d   b y   n e w   t e c h n o l o g i e s

Partly implemented some threat identification failures with room for
improvement

Fully implemented

Not yet started

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

N° of Member States having replied

1.2.1.  Implementation 

Most  Member  States  have  adopted  a  strategy  to  develop  their  IT  architecture  by  taking 
inventory  of  existing  tools,  developing  new  tools  and  ensuring  interoperability  between 
them  (see  next  table).  Many  Member  States  are  continuing  to  invest  in  updating  and 
developing existing IT tools, in particular Arachne.  

As several Member States have just started to implement their NAFS, it is important that the 
use of IT tools is integrated in it from an early stage on. 

9 AT, BE, BG, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, LU, LV, LT, MT, PT, SI, SK. 

10 CY, CZ, DE, FI, HR, NL, PL, RO, SE. 

11 DE, IT, PL, RO. 

12 AT, BE, BG, CZ, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, HU, LV, LT, PT, SE, SI. 

8 

 
 
 
 
Development of the IT architecture in the Member states 

Developing new tools for the IT architecture (examples)

Inventory of existing tools

None of the above

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

N° of Member States having replied

1.2.2.  Addressing gaps in digitalisation 

Over  half  of  the  Member  States13  indicated  that  they  have  taken  steps  to  identify  and 
address  skills  gaps  in  digitalisation,  most  of  which  referring  to  gaps  due  to  a  lack  of 
information  and/or  access  to  data  on digitalisation.  Measures to  address  these  gaps  often 
revolve around knowledge sharing, training, broadening know-how and skills, and continued 
development of existing systems. 

13 AT, BG, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, IE, IT, MT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK. 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Recommendation  3:  reinforcing  anti-fraud  governance  in  the  Member 

States 

National  anti-fraud  networks  have  been  developing  in  several  Member  States,  with  the 
national  anti-fraud  coordination  services  (AFCOSs)  playing  a  key  role.  The  Commission 
supports and encourages this process, which should be extended to all actors concerned, 
involving the relevant law enforcement and judicial authorities at national and European 
level.  Member  States  should  also  ensure  that  the  national  structures  coordinating  this 
process are properly staffed. 
Anti-fraud  networks  provide  the  ideal  structure  for  the  development  and  updating  of 
NAFS. 
The commission reiterates its recommendation that the  Members States which have not 
yet adopted a NAFS should do so. 

Most Member States14 either have an anti-fraud cooperation network linking many different 
bodies  or  are  developing  one.  According  to  the  survey,  the  following  agencies  are  most 
commonly represented in the national anti-fraud networks: EU fund managing authorities, 
tax  administration  authorities,  custom  authorities,  national  audit  authorities  and  law 
enforcement authorities. 

The  table  below  shows  the  various  types  of  agency  that  are  part  of  national  anti-fraud 
networks  and  how  many  national  networks  contain  an  agency  of  that  type.  Additionally, 
almost all Member States actively cooperate with EU-level judicial and investigative bodies, 
in particular with OLAF and the EPPO. 

Regarding  the  degree  of  involvement,  most  Member  States15  say  their  national  law 
enforcement and judicial authorities are actively involved in and cooperate in their national 
anti-fraud network. Several other Member States16 report only moderate cooperation here, 
with room for improvement. 

14 AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, DI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, MT, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK 

In development: BE, NL, IE, LT. 

15 BG, CY, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, MT, PL, RO, SE, SI, SK. 
16 BE, DK, EE, EL, LV, NL, PT. 

10 

 
 
 
Mapping the network

21

20

19

18

18

13

12

12

8

7

7

6

9

4

4

2

25

20

15

10

5

0

1.3.1.  Staffing 

Most  Member  States17  have  sufficient  staff  in  their  national  anti-fraud  coordinating 
structure.  Most  also note  a  need  to  improve  their  staff’s  expertise  level,  through training, 
new  guidance  on  procedures,  and  by  bringing  staff  from  the  various  executive  and 
investigative bodies together. 

(In)sufficient staffing 

NO, insufficient 
staffed but 
working towards 
improvement
8%

YES, partly, 
staffing needs 
improvement
54%

NO, severely 
understaffed 
requires 
immediate 
attention
4%

YES, adequately 
staffed with 
necessary 
expertise
34%

17 Adequately staffed with necessary expertise: AT, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EL, HU, IT, SI  

Staffing needs improvement: CY, EE, ES, FI, FR, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK. 

11 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Replies from the Member States 
Improving the detection, reporting and follow-up of suspected fraud 

Q.1.1 Do you assess your Member State as having a low incidence of fraud? 
Most (63%) of the Member States who participated in the survey assessed their country as 
having a low incidence of fraud for the reasons outlined in the table below (Q1.2). 

Yes 

No 

Member State 
AT, BE18, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, IE, LV, LT, 
MT, NL, PT, SK 
BE19, CY, EE, FR, IT, LU, PL, RO, SE, SK 

TOTAL 
17 

10 

Q.1.2 Can you explain why? Which measures have been adopted to determine the incidence 
of fraud? 
MS 
AT 

Input 

-  Strengthening international networking and cooperation 
-  Developing digital processes 
-  Simplifying legislation (taxation + customs) 

BE 

ERDF Wallonia: 

-  Prevention and detection measures in place 
-  Extensive administrative and on-the-spot-checks on every operation 
-  Efficiency  of  systems,  as  confirmed  by  the  error  rates  calculated  by 
national and Commission auditors in relation to the ERDF programme 

ERDF Brussels Capital Region (BCR): 

-  Checks on payment claims before they are sent to the European 

Commission 

-  Beneficiaries are well informed in advance of the applicable regulation 

and the verifications done by authorities. 

Federal  Public  Service  (FPS)  FINANCE  Customs  and  Excise  (Administration 
Générale Douanes et Accises - AGD&A): 

-  Measures  taken  based  on  the  irregularities  and  fraud  cases  reported  in 

OwnRes. 

-  Cases  of  irregularities  are  classed  as  suspected  fraud  at  the  stage 
where  the  Bulgarian  Prosecutor’s  Office  or  the  European  Public 
initiates  pre-trial  proceedings  for  a  criminal 
Prosecutor’s  Office 
offence of a general nature. 

-  When the behaviour at issue is also classed as fraud as part of the pre-
trial proceedings, evidence is collected to establish whether fraud has 
been committed. 
In  a  few  cases,  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  and  EPPO  do  not  provide  the 
information  promptly  when  pre-trial 
managing  authorities  with 

- 

BG 

18 ERDF Wallonia, ERDF RBC. 
19 FPS FINANCE AGD&A. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CY 

CZ 

proceedings  have  been  initiated.  This  should  not  automatically  be 
considered  a  weakness  as  the  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  a  variety  of 
reasons  and  grounds  for  not  providing  information  during  pre-trial 
proceedings. 

-  All audit and control bodies are instructed to report cases of 

suspected fraud to the Cypriot AFCOS where those cases involve EU 
funds (expenditure side). All such cases are reported to OLAF 
through the IMS. 

-  The  audit  and  control  authorities  report  cases  of  suspected  fraud 
for  further  investigation  either  to  OLAF,  the EPPO,  the  national  anti-
corruption  authority  or  the  public  prosecutor’s  office  (to  be 
investigated by the police and subsequent penal proceedings). 

-  Anti-fraud  measures 
law  enforcement; 
cooperation  among 
legal 
the 
environment;  the  implementation  of  experience  and  good  practices 
of other European countries. 

include 
law  enforcement  authorities; 

level  of 

the 

-  The  low  incidence  of  fraud  in  the  implementation  of  the  ESIF  can  be 
attributed to a robust methodological and control system that includes 
elements to combat corruption and fraud. 

- 

 The  administrative  verification  of  payment  applications  and  project 
implementation reports, supplemented by on-the-spot checks (both at 
the  time  of  project  implementation  and  during  the  sustainability 
period) have proved to be effective measures. A risk analysis for on-site 
controls,  which  includes  screening  in  Arachne,  indicates  projects  with 
potentially higher risks. 

-  Other  good  practices  include  a  four-eyes  check  and  having  external 
bodies (audit authority, supreme audit office) involved in the audit. 

- 

- 

- 

- 

If prosecuted, suspected criminal offences such as fraud are reported 
as irregularities via IMS MS2014+ (IRQ3). This ensures that other 
relevant bodies (such as the paying authority and audit authority) are 
informed. 

In case of fraud, cooperation with the Czech police is built up gradually 
(through written, electronic or telephone communication). 

 Checks are run in the Arachne system in particular before any decision 
on  granting  a  subsidy  or  in  other  activities.  The  CRIBIS  system,  the 
register of beneficial owners, etc. are also used. 

Increased emphasis on identifying the beneficial owners of companies 
and avoiding conflicts of interest. 

-  Continued  efforts  to  update  the  measures  needed  to  adequately 

respond to increasingly sophisticated attempted fraud.  

13 

 
 
DE 

-  Regular  information  exchanges  with  managing  and  audit  authorities, 
based  on  IMS  data  and  the  associated  explanatory  notes  from  the 
reporting units. 

Examples 

ERDF managing authority for Baden-Württemberg 

-  The scope and depth of auditing by the authorising body (L-Bank), which 
must comply with the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority's strict 
requirements on banking supervision. 

Federal State of North Rhine-Westphalia 

-  Standardised  processes  and  procedures  and  organisational  security 
features such as functional separation or the 6-eyes principle ensure that 
errors and irregularities occur far less frequently. 

-  Chapter X.2 of the ‘Guidelines on fraud risk assessment and on effective 

and proportionate anti-fraud measures’ explains how to notify 
irregularities and fraud cases. The German prosecutor’s office and, where 
appropriate, the EPPO are also notified in fraud cases). 

Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate 

-  The  Land  analyses  and  evaluates  the  annual  reports  of  the  Rhineland-
Palatinate  Court  of  Auditors,  the  European  Court  of  Auditors  and  the 
ERDF  audit  authority.  Any  new  risks  identified  are  integrated  into  the 
Rhineland-Palatinate fraud prevention tool. 

Federal State of Schleswig-Holstein 

-  Schleswig-Holstein follows the recommendations for 2021-2027 set out in 
the European Commission guideline ‘Fraud risk assessment and effective 
and proportionate anti-fraud measures’ and takes a proactive, 
structured and targeted approach to dealing with fraud risks.  

-  The Danish Business Authority has numerous registers for running digital 
checks and comparisons. These produce awareness lists used for manual 
checks e.g. on payment of wages and double funding. 

-  The Danish Fisheries Agency states that every case involving a request for 
payment  has  two  case  handlers  who  check  each  other’s  work.  The 
Agency  reported  thorough  controls,  approved  by  the  Auditing  Body 
several  times,  most  recently  in  2023.  In  addition,  there  is  legal  support 
when necessary. 

-  The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  reported  a  ‘No’  in  Q.1.1,  [i.e.  high 
incidence of fraud] as Danish fraud detection rate (FDR) for the common 
agricultural police (CAP) is significantly above the EU average. 

-  The  revenue  department  assesses  the  incidence  of  fraud  as  low,  due  to 
the risk-detection activities and identification of possible customs duties. 
-  However, the actual incidence is probably significantly higher due to the 
hidden  nature  of  fraud, which  makes  it  hard  to  identify,  detect  and 
prove. 
-  Estonia 

risk  assessment,  analysis,  and 
cooperation  between  concerned  authorities  by  organising  training 
courses and workshops, compiling guidelines, etc. 

is  currently 

improving 

DK 

EE 

EL 

Financial  Audit  Committee:  All  bodies  of  the  Greek  management  and  control 

14 

 
 
and 

examining 

complaints 

concerning 

co-financed 

system,  including  EDEL,  contribute  to  the  implementation  of  the  national  anti-
fraud  strategy  and  as  part  of  their  audit  activities  include  a  set  of  fraud 
prevention  and  response  actions.  Procedures  have  been  included  in  the  Greek 
management and control system (MCS) concerning: 
(a)  an  assessment  of  fraud  risks,  in  the  context  of  the  prevention  and 
implementation of effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures in structural 
actions; 
(b)  examination  of  signs  of  fraud  and  reporting  suspicions  of  fraud  by  the 
managing authorities (MA) / intermediate bodies (IB) / certifying authority (CA), 
in the context of the application of the MCS procedures and the exercise of their 
responsibilities; 
(c) 
receiving 
programmes/projects; and 
(D)  assessing  and  addressing  risks  that  may  affect  the  smooth  implementation 
and  achievement  of  objectives  of 
the  operational  programmes.  The 
implementation  of  the  above  MCS  procedures  ensures,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
prevention  of  fraud/suspicion  of  fraud  and  their  timely  detection  by  the 
competent national audit bodies. 
In particular, EDEL, as the audit authority for co-financed programmes and as the 
supreme national audit body, checks, through system audits, the existence of the 
necessary  procedures  and  measures  to  prevent  and  deal  with  fraud  by  the 
managing bodies (assessment of Key Requirement 7 ‘Effective implementation of 
proportionate  anti-fraud  measures’),  and  through  audits  of  operations,  the 
existence  of  a possible  suspicion of fraud  in  the implementation  of  the  audited 
operations. If suspected fraud is detected by system and operations audits, EDEL 
informs  OLAF,  as  well  as  the  competent  national  authorities  (AFCOS,  etc.)  via 
IMS,  about  the  launch  of  the  necessary  procedures  to  detect  fraud  or  not. 
Similarly,  the  MAs,  IBs,  CA,  from  their  audits/verifications  and  applying  the 
above-mentioned  MCS  procedures,  inform  OLAF  and  the  competent  national 
authorities,  in  case  of  detection  of  suspicions  of  fraud.  All  the  relevant  MCS 
bodies cooperate closely and systematically with the NTA, which has the role of 
coordinator (AFCOS) in the fight against fraud in Greece. 
In view of the above and considering that MCS bodies, including EDEL, can only 
detect suspected fraud, while fraud is established by other control bodies as well 
as the judicial authorities, the low incidence of suspected fraud is due to the low 
levels of cases of fraud detected by MCS bodies during their audits. 
Special  Service  for  Institutional  Support  and  Information  Systems:  For  actions 
financed  by  the  NSRF,  the  MCS  provides,  in  the  procedures  and  forms,  for 
measures which have also reduced risks of fraud in  PP 2014-2020 and PP 2021-
2027. For example, the establishment of the obligation to declare no conflict of 
interest  and  beyond  for  all  staff  of  the  Managing  Authorities  and  Intermediate 
Bodies,  measures  in  the  NSRF  Integrated  Information  System  for  non-double 
funding, the operation  of  an  Internal Anti-Fraud Network with  the  participation 
of  all  Managing  Authorities  and  cooperation  with  AFCOS  in  the  handling  of 
complaints relating to co-financed operations. 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  Coordination  Agency:  All  projects  financed  by 
the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Fund  are  subject  to  ex-ante  or  ex-post  control 

15 

 
 
ES 

FI 

procedures,  which  form a  coherent  management  framework which, on  the  one 
hand,  acts  as  a  deterrent  to  the  recipient  of  funding,  and  on  the  other  hand 
allows irregularities to be detected in a timely manner, including those that may 
involve fraud. 

-  The number of cases of suspected fraud reported in the IMS is very low. 
This  could  be  because  proper  management  and  control  systems  are  in 
place, although there is room for improvement. 

-  As  a  result  of  the  implementation  of  the  recovery,  rransformation  and 
resilience  plan,  all  Spanish  public  administrations  that  manage  these 
funds – at state, regional and local level – have adopted anti-fraud plans 
containing  numerous  measures  for  protecting  financial  interests  at 
different  stages  of  the  anti-fraud  cycle.  These 
include:  having 
institutional  anti-fraud  statements  for  each  entity;  approving  codes  of 
ethics and public integrity; setting up anti-fraud committees and internal 
control units; assessing the risks of fraud, corruption,  conflicts of interest 
and  double  funding;  planning  and  performing  anti- fraud  controls  based 
on  red  flags,  implementing  procedures  to  prevent  and  address  conflicts 
of interest; and creating internal whistleblowing channels. 

-  Only  a  few  suspected  cases  of  fraud  are  found  during  controls  and 
audits of EU-funded programmes.  Controls are carried out regularly 
on  the  basis  of  anti-fraud  strategies  or  anti-fraud  plans  and  risk 
assessments  drawn  up  by  the  authorities  in  charge  of  the  different 
programmes.  The  EU  programmes  managed  by  Finland  are  audited 
regularly, not only by national authorities but also by EU institutions 
such as the Commission and the European Court of Auditors. In light 
of  the  audit  results,  there  is  no  reason  to  suspect  that  there  are  in 
reality  many  more  cases  of  fraud  involving  EU  funds  or  that  the 
authorities fail to detect a substantial number of such cases. 
-  Finnish Customs consider the risk of fraud to be generally low in 
Finland, which has a low level of corruption, as evidenced also by 
international comparisons. However, Finnish Customs do detect cases 
of fraud that are similar to those identified by law enforcement 
authorities in other Member States. This can be explained by the EU’s 
common customs code and customs duties. Finland is smaller than 
many of the other EU Member States, making it difficult to compare 
countries. 
In  addition,  Finnish  Customs’  analysis  and  intelligence  unit,  in 
particular  the  unit  for  checking  marketing  risks,  focuses  on  fraud 
prevention and risk analysis, among other issues. Anti-fraud analyses 
always include a fiscal risk analysis. For example, all anti-dumping tax 
issues and analyses in this area are well modelled and allow possible 
cases of fraud to be detected under Customs’ supervision. 

- 

FR 

Suspicions  of  fraud  exist  and  are  found  during  the  concomitant  checks  carried 
out  by  the  paying  agencies,  as  well  as  during  ex post  controls  carried  out  by 
Customs  and  the  ‘COSA’  team  responsible  for  controls  on  operations  in  the 

16 

 
 
HR 

agricultural sector. Depending on its degree and severity, fraud may be classified 
as  administrative  and  subject  to  a  fine  or  classified  as  criminal  and  reported  to 
the  public  prosecutor  in  accordance  with  Article 40  of  the  Code  of  Criminal 
Proceedings. It is up to the public prosecutor to investigate compliance with the 
law or launch criminal proceedings for fraud. 
Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture: 

−  Functioning of the management and control system 
−  Risk analysis for irregularities and/or fraud 
−  Staff  training  on  spotting  red  flags,  reporting  suspected  irregularities 
and taking timely action 

Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture - Directorate of Fisheries 

-  We  believe  that  fraud  in  connection  with  the  European  Maritime  and 
Fisheries  Fund  (2014-2020)  and  the  European  Maritime,  Fisheries  and 
Aquaculture Fund (2021-2027) is infrequent, given that  (a) just one  case 
of  irregularity  with  elements  of  suspected  fraud  has  been  recorded  in 
Croatia  since  the  start  of  implementation  of  both  funds,  and  (b)  DG 
MARE’s  audit  of  key  requirement  No 7  of  the  management  and  control 
system  for  the  2014-2020  period,  i.e.  ‘Effective  implementation  of 
proportionate  anti-fraud  measures’.  found  no  deficiencies 
in  the 
management  and  control  system, which was  classified  under  Category 1 
(Works well. No or only minor improvement(s) needed.). 
Contribution from the Customs Administration (Ministry of Finance) 

-  For risk analysis, the low incidence of fraud could be attributed to the risk 
analysis system being overwhelmed by the incorrect activation  or non-
activation of risk rules (based on both national and EU rules). This often 
results  from  incorrectly  completed  customs  declarations  (e.g.  incorrect 
recording  of  non-structured  data  such  as  the  trade  name,  goods 
description  or  address),  since  entering  some  data  is  optional.  This  is 
prevented  through  detection  of  permutations  of  a  targeted  risk 
indicator, which inevitably results in the system becoming overwhelmed. 
-  The measures taken include cooperation with the customs authorities of 
other  Member  States,  continuous  monitoring  of  the  quality  of  data  in 
customs declarations submitted, implementation of risk analysis for every 
change made to a declaration, as well as cooperation in customs matters 
with  the  EU  Member  States,  non-EU  countries,  the  World  Customs 
Organization,  Europol, and  OLAF  for the exchange  of  useful  operational 
information. 

-  The measures taken as part of ex post checks planning include improving 
the  efficiency  of  searches  in  our  own  databases  and  the  databases  of 
other bodies. Public source data and information on persons and events 
that  could be  of  interest  are  also  collected.  An  additional  risk  analysis  is 
carried  out  to  select  bodies  for  ex post  checks.  This  look  at  any 
irregularities  detected  (in  relation  to  value,  tariff,  origin,  anti-dumping 
violations, etc.) 

Contribution from the Tax Administration (Ministry of Finance): 

-  Performing risk management operations relating to non-compliance with 

17 

 
 
 
HU 

IE 

tax  obligations,  using  the  compliance  and  risk  management  system 
(CRMS) owned by the tax administration 

-  Conducting risk analysis 
-  Developing and improving digital transformation 

-  The  number  of  criminal  proceedings  initiated  by  the  institutions 

managing EU funds has been low. 

-  Thematic  training  has  been  provided  and  anti-fraud  information 
materials  have  been  produced  for  staff  working  in  the  field  of 
development policy. 

Cases  of  fraud  and  irregularities  in  cohesion  funding  for  Ireland  decreased  in 
2014-2020  period.  Government  policy  is  implemented  and  public  services  are 
delivered  at  multiple  levels  across  the  Irish  public  service.  Therefore,  there  is  a 
well-established  framework  for  accountability,  responsibility  and  control  in 
operation. This framework encompasses the role of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, the public financial procedures (PFPs) and requirements for governance, 
and  the  institutional  and  financial  relationships  between  parliament  and  the 
executive.  The  PFP  published  by  the  Department  of  Public  Expenditure,  NDP 
Delivery and Reform, sets out the main principles of government accounting and 
the  primary  ways  they  are  applied  in  the  day-to-day  operations  of  government 
departments  and  offices.  They  are  a  practical  guide  to  assist  officials  in 
understanding  the  financial  framework  and  the  need  to  promote  good  practice 
and high standards of propriety in all financial matters. The 1997 Public Service 
Management  Act  provides  the  central  accountability framework  setting  out the 
formal  structure  for  assigning  authority  and  accountability  within  the  civil 
service. 
The  Accounting  Officer 
is  personally  accountable  to  the  Parliamentary 
Committee  of  Public  Accounts  (PAC)  for  regularity  and  propriety  in  relation  to 
public resources and value for money. This is provided by means of rigorous post 
factum examination and independent audit and examinations by the Comptroller 
and  Auditor  General  and  scrutiny  by  the  PAC.  As  the  systems  in  place  may  not 
have  general  application,  some  specific  examples  are  included  below.  All  the 
projects  included  in  Ireland’s  national  recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP)  are 
covered  by  the  above  which  provides  assurance  in  relation  to  the  measures  to 
protect the EU’s financial interests. 
There are specific requirements in place for the RRF. The governance structures 
here  include  a  delivery  committee  and  the  Project  Leads  Network  to  ensure 
compliance. There is also a memorandum of understanding with the accountable 
departments which includes obligations in relation to the protection of the  EU’s 
financial interests. The accountable department must ensure adequate controls 
are  in  place  for  preventing,  detecting  and  correcting  fraud,  corruption  and 
conflicts of interest. RRF projects in Ireland are pre-funded by the Exchequer.  If 
an irregularity is identified in an RRF-funded project, the financial correction will 
generally  not  be  recovered  directly  from  the  final  beneficiary  (unless  for 
example,  it  is  due  to  fraud  or  corruption),  but  will  be  addressed  either  by  an 
adjustment  to  the  RRF  payment  instalment  or  through  a  refund  to  the  EU. 
Training  on  this  has  been  provided  to  the  accountable  departments.  Work  is 

18 

 
 
ongoing to enhance the audit and control systems in fraud risk assessment and 
reporting skills 
With  respect  to  the  ERDF  co-funded  regional  programmes  for  2014-2020, 
expenditure  was  checked  extensively  at  intermediate  body  and/or  managing 
authority  level  before  being  submitted  to  the  certifying  authority.  While 
management  verifications  did  result  in  financial  corrections,  none  of  these 
related to suspected fraud. The expenditure included in payment claims and the 
management  and  control  systems  for  the  two  2014-2020  ERDF  regional 
programmes  have  also  been  extensively  audited  by  national  and  Commission 
auditors.  While  the  audit  work  did  identify  irregularities,  there  have  been  no 
findings  in  respect  of  fraud  or  suspected  fraud.  The  ERDF  managing  authority 
staff completed training on fraud risk and made early, if limited, use of ARACHNE, 
the  Commission’s  data-mining  tool.  Irregularities  were  reported  using  the  AFIS-
IMS.  Likewise,  for  the  ESF,  there  are  well-established  and  mature  reporting 
structures.  The  type  of  expenditure  declared  for  this  (payroll  related) 
retrospective declaration mitigates risk of fraud.  
The  assessment  in  reply  to  question  Q.1.1.  is  based  on  general  data  from  the 
2022  PIF  report  on  overall  irregularities/fraud  relating  to  own  resources, 
cohesion policy and fisheries and common agricultural policy. 
Specifically, at EU level, out of 11 431 reported cases, 10 338 were irregularities 
(90.44%), and 1 093 related to fraud (9.56%). 

IT 

In  Italy,  out  of  514  cases,  461  were  irregularities  (89.69%),  and  53  related  to 
fraud (10.31%). 

Thus, in terms of fraud detection, Italy’s figure is fully in line with the EU average 
and only slightly higher. 
Determining  the  incidence  of  fraud,  strictly  in  terms  of  numbers,  is  part  of  the 
daily work carried out at the various levels by the national and local authorities 
engaged  in  protecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  (managing  authorities,  audit 
bodies, intermediate bodies, paying agencies, law enforcement agencies, control 
authorities,  etc.),  through  comprehensive  analysis  and  control  models.  These 
models  are  based  on  the  directives  issued  from  time  to  time  as  part  of  the 
national  anti-fraud  strategy,  by  the  Committee  for  the  Prevention  of  Fraud 
against the EU (which are periodically updated in light of new developments) and 
the  daily  monitoring  activities  carried  out  by  the  network  of  national  liaison 

19 

 
 
 
 
officers to control, support and improve the quality, consistency and correctness 
of the data in IMS. 
To cover the eventuality that the question may be broader and  cover measures 
to  detect  and  discover  fraud,  below  we  provide  clear  and  comprehensive 
information  on  the  overall  structure  of  the  fraud  prevention  and  response 
system  currently  in  place  in  Italy,  with  reference  to  major  regulatory  and 
organisational  measures  taken  by  the  EU  institutions,  so  as  to  highlight  its 
effective potential in terms of both deterrence and response. 
In particular, the key strengths of the Italian system are set out below. 
Full  and  effective  implementation  of  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371  on  the  fight 
against  fraud  to  the  Union’s  financial  interests  by  means  of  criminal  law,  also 
known  as  the  PIF  Directive.  This  was  first  transposed  into  the  national  legal 
system by Legislative Decree No 75 of 14 July 2020, which broadened the scope 
of  several  offences  to  strengthen  the  criminal  law  response  to  fraud  and  other 
offences  against  the  EU.  This  was  complemented  in  2022,  first  by  Decree-Law 
No 13  of  25 February  2022  (later  repealed  by  Law  No 25  of  28 March  2022, 
which,  however,  reproduced  the  part  relating  to  the  PIF  Directive  regulations), 
and then by Legislative Decree No 156 of 4 October 2022. 
The main contents of the legislative amendments can be summarised as follows: 
the  categories  of  payments  that  may  be  exposed  to  criminal  conduct 
affecting the EU budget have been expanded; 
the  offence  of  international  bribery/conspiracy  under  Article 322-bis  of 
the Criminal Code has been strengthened; 
criminal  liability  has  been  introduced  for  the  attempt  to  commit  certain 
tax  offences,  if  cross-border  in  scope  and  causing  a  total  loss  of 
EUR 10 million or more; 
the  administrative  liability  of  entities  for  tax  offences  has  been  aligned 
with  the  description  of  the  EU  cross-border  dimension  relevant  for  PIF 
purposes; 
the  scope  of  asset  seizure  measures  against  fraudsters  has  been 
expanded, by introducing the confiscation of ‘disproportionate assets’ in 
cases  of  aggravated  fraud  affecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests  and 
aggravated  fraud  to  obtain  public  funding,  confiscation  of  equivalent 
assets  in  smuggling  offences,  and  confiscation  of  equivalent  assets  and 
the  offence  of 
assets 
confiscation  of  disproportionate 
misappropriation of agricultural aid payments. 

for 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

Consequently,  a  strong  and  comprehensive  framework  of  penalties  has  been 
put  in  place,  able  to  effectively  target  all  types  of  offences  against  the  EU’s 
financial interests, on both the revenue and expenditure sides, as well as related 
corruption and money laundering and involvement of criminal organisations. 
Comprehensive  legislative  measures  have  established  effective  tools  for  seizing 
the assets of fraudsters, such as direct confiscation, confiscation of equivalent 
assets  and  disproportionate  assets,  and  are  applicable  (in  the  form  of  seizure) 
even  during  investigations.  Furthermore,  the  interim  asset  seizure  measures 
under the anti-mafia legislation have been made applicable (even before a final 
guilty verdict is delivered) not only against suspected organised crime members 
but also against individuals having unjustified wealth who are found to habitually 

20 

 
 
engage in economic and financial crime (hence including crimes against the EU’s 
financial interests); 
The  legislation  on  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  has  been  fully 
implemented. This legislation was transposed in Italy by Legislative Decree No 9 
of 21 February  2021  and by a  series  of  agreements  and initiatives  between the 
Italian  Ministry  of  Justice  and  other  national  institutions  that  have  enabled  the 
European Delegated Prosecutors in Italy to fully perform their functions. 
The data in the 2022 EPPO Annual Report show that, among EU countries, Italy 
proves  the  strongest  cooperation  with  the  EPPO,  in  terms  of  resources  and 
investigative capacity. 
The  report  shows  that  at  the  end  of  2022  Italy  had  16  active  European 
delegated prosecutors, the highest number in the EU. 
Italy  also  had  the  highest  number  (45)  of  national  European  delegated 
prosecutors’ assistants. 
This  (in  conjunction  with  point  (e)  below)  explains  why,  as  stated  in  the  2022 
EPPO Report, Italy had the highest number of active investigations by European 
Delegated Prosecutors (285, of which 275 were opened in 2022). 
A  comprehensive  institutional  mechanism  has  been  established  to  ensure  full 
and  widespread  monitoring  of  all  the  areas  requiring  protection  of  the  EU 
budget (own resources, common agricultural policy, cohesion policy), made up of 
agencies,  ministerial  departments,  managing  and  audit  authorities,  paying 
agencies,  police  forces  and  the  judiciary.  The  Committee  for  combating  fraud 
against  the  European  Union  (COLAF),  operating  as  the  Italian  anti-fraud 
coordination service, offers those bodies a permanent forum for discussing issues 
and exchanging information. 
The  COLAF  was  established  by  Law  No 142  of  19 February  1992  (later  updated 
and  supplemented  with  further  functions).  This  means  that  Italy  has  a  track 
record  of  over  30 years  of  interinstitutional  cooperation  to  protect  the  EU’s 
financial interests. 
The 
legislation  gives  the  Financial  Police  (Guardia  di  Finanza)  specific 
competences,  control  powers  and  specialised  human  resources  for  economic 
and  financial  policing,  including  for  the  protection  of  the  EU’s  financial 
resources. To cover this area, the Financial Police has specialised units, including 
the  central  Public  Expenditure  and  Anti-EU  Fraud  Unit  (Nucleo  Speciale  Spesa 
Pubblica  e  Repressione  Frodi  Comunitarie)  and  a  local  network  of  public 
expenditure  protection  groups  belonging  to  Economic  and  Financial  Police 
Units. 
During  the  presentation  of  the  EPPO  2022  Report  to  the  joint  meeting  of  the 
CONT  and  LIBE  Committees  in  March  2023,  the  European  Chief  Prosecutor, 
Laura Codruța Kövesi, voiced her appreciation for the Italian model stating, ‘if we 
can replicate Guardia di Finanza in all the Member States I would be happy to do 
this thing, because they have a lot of professional investigators dedicated to the 
EPPO cases and this is why we have these good results’; 
Very  broad  judicial  police  powers and  administrative  powers,  including  access 
and  inspection  authority  have  been  put  in  place.  In  this  context,  national 
legislation provides, among other things, that the Financial Police may use all the 
investigative powers given to them – including access, inspection, search and the 

21 

 
 
legislation)  and  money 

sending  of  questionnaires  –  to  prevent  and  prosecute  infringements  in  tax 
matters and to prevent and combat infringements in the fields of custom duties, 
border charges and other own resources and expenditure from the EU budget. 
A  specific  branch  of  the  Financial  Police,  the  Public  Expenditure  and  Anti-EU 
Fraud  Unit,  was  granted  additional  powers  by  Law  No 161  of  30 October  2014, 
which  added  paragraph  1-bis  to  Article 25  of  Decree-Law  No 83/2012.  This 
provision states that in order to carry out ‘analyses, inspections and controls on 
the use of resources from the budget of the State, regions, local authorities and 
the European Union’, the Unit may consult the Financial Relationship Archive and 
exercise  the  powers  conferred  on  it  by  currency  law  (including  the  power  to 
request  from  banks  and  financial  intermediaries  documentation  on  the  parties 
concerned,  access  public,  business  and  commercial  premises  to  carry  out 
inspections, checks and searches, and delegate the above checks on expenditure 
flows  to  the  local  units  of  the  Financial  Police,  by  granting  them  the  latter 
powers). 
An effective regulatory framework governs the administrative liability of entities 
for criminal offences, and is also fully applicable to criminal conduct affecting the 
EU’s financial interests. 
Comprehensive prevention systems are in place against corruption (including the 
functions  of  the  National  Anti-Corruption  Authority,  the  three-year  anti-
laundering 
corruption  plans  and  whistleblowing 
(especially through the reporting of suspicious transactions). 
The fraud risk analysis and assessment systems and procedures set up by the EU 
institutions  have  been  fully  implemented  and  are  served  by  independent  and 
innovative information systems. 
In  the  field  of  fraud  risk  analysis  and  assessment,  the  national  framework  fully 
meets  the  need  to  prevent  and  combat  fraud  against  the  EU.  Over  time,  every 
institution and agency responsible for managing EU resources for any reason has 
set up a number of systems, applications and databases, together with methods 
and  procedures,  for  the  appropriate  prior  assessment  of  the  risks  of  fraud, 
corruption,  conflict  of  interests  and double  funding  linked with  implementation 
of the EU budget. 
With  regard  to  cohesion  policy,  risk  assessment  is  one  of  the  main  control 
functions  of  the  various  managing  authorities.  For  this  purpose,  they  follow 
closely the Commission’s EGESIF Guidance Note No 14-0021-00 of 16 June 2014 
on 
‘Fraud  Risk  Assessment  and  Effective  and  Proportionate  Anti-Fraud 
Measures’.  They  also  rely  extensively  on  the  ARACHNE  system,  in  accordance 
with the ‘National Guidelines’ produced by a dedicated national working group 
set  up  within  the  State  General  Accounting  Department  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Economy and Finance. 
Also at national level, the Inspectorate General for Financial Relations with the 
European Union in the State General Accounting Department, which coordinates 
audit authorities and their functions, has issued a ‘Manual of Audit Procedures’ 
(Version 7 of 21 July 2021), which includes a section on risk assessment. 
To increase the effectiveness of measures  to prevent and combat fraud against 
in  2022  the  Financial  Police  directed  the  evolutionary 
the  EU  budget, 
Information  System),  an  application 
maintenance  of  SIAF 

(Anti-Fraud 

22 

 
 
implemented under a project financed with resources from the ‘Governance and 
Technical  Assistance  2007-2013’  national  operational  programme.  SIAF  is  a 
business  intelligence platform that  supports  operational  analyses  in  the field of 
public expenditure. Uploading the data acquired from the other databases used 
by  the  Financial  Police to this  system  makes it  possible  to  extract  lists  of  public 
funding  beneficiaries  potentially  at  risk  of  irregularities.  This  resource,  initially 
only available to the Financial Police Units located in the convergence objective 
regions  of  the  2007/2013  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (Puglia,  Campania, 
Calabria and Sicily), was extended to the whole country in 2021. 
An  important  addition  to  the  toolbox  of  measures  Italy  put  in  place  to  step  up 
risk  analysis  in  EU  fund  management  is  the  Integrated  Anti-Fraud  Platform 
(PIAF-IT). Created by the State General Accounting Department  in collaboration 
with  the  COLAF,  using  resources  from  the  EU’s  Hercule  III  Programme,  the 
platform  extracts  useful  information  from  the  massive  data  banks  held  by 
national and local authorities. Specifically, PIAF-IT is an integration platform that 
extracts, aggregates and reconciles data from national sources (Revenue Agency, 
the  Chamber  of  Commerce  Information  System  -  Infocamere,  Italian  Court  of 
Auditors)  and  European  sources  (IMS  and  the  Financial  Transparency  System  - 
FTS)  to  generate  fact  sheets  on  natural  or  legal  persons,  supporting  the 
assessment of possible frauds, so as to: 

- 

- 

intensify  the  exchange  of  information  and  thus  maximise  the  fraud 
prevention phase; 
centralise  and  make  visible  all  key  information  on  beneficiaries  of  EU 
public funding; 

-  develop specific analysis outputs of said information via comparison with 
data  in  other  databases  by  querying  a  single  information  system,  in  an 
aggregated manner, without having to make several separate queries. 

The platform  can  also be  an  effective  support tool  for  ARACHNE  to  consolidate 
and  strengthen  the  fight  against  irregularities  and  fraud  and  other  illegal 
activities against the EU budget both before expenditure certification and in the 
ex post  control  phase,  as  well  as  during  administrative  controls  on 
implementation of the national RRP. 
The  technical  context  of  PIAF-IT,  which  includes  a  microservices  architecture 
enabling it to store big data, has the following additional functionalities: 

- 

- 

it can be used to make online searches (ordinary and historical views of a 
natural  or  legal  person)  and  generate  and  display  detailed  information 
sheets; 
it  can  be  extended  to  other  data  sources  in  future  for  an  even  better 
analysis  of  the  subjective  and  objective  elements  of  the  position  to  be 
examined.  (Examples  of  these  sources  include  the  Ministry  of  Justice’s 
Criminal Records Information System on past convictions for fraud against 
the  national  and  EU  budget,  and  the  Kohesio  database  managed  by the 
Commission’s  DG  for  Regional  and  Urban  Policy  (DG  REGIO),  which  has 
up-to-date  information  on  projects  and  beneficiaries  co-financed  by  the 
EU cohesion policy.) 

The risk analysis framework described above is at least partly responsible for the 
low  incidence  of  fraud  in  the  cohesion  policy  sector  in  Italy,  even  though  in 

23 

 
 
general  terms,  as  we  have  seen,  the  overall  incidence  of  fraud  against  the  EU 
budget in Italy cannot be said to be low. 
Since  2015,  significant  progress  has  been  made  following  the  Commission’s 
issuing of EGESIF guidance and its application in Italy, together with the extensive 
use  of  Arachne,  supported  by  best  use  procedures  developed  by  a  dedicated 
national  working  group.  These  objective  factors  may  have  contributed  to  the 
decrease in fraud in this sector compared to previous periods. 
Moreover, the low incidence of cohesion policy fraud out of the total number of 
irregularities  detected  in  European  Structural  and  Investment  Funds  (ESIF)  is  a 
feature  that  Italy  has  in  common  with  a  number  of  other  Member  States,  as 
shown  by  the  breakdown  tables  in  the  34th  PIF  Report  2022.  The  report  shows 
that, in the year in question, with regard to fraud against cohesion policies, Italy 
and  8  other  Member  States  (Belgium,  Ireland,  Spain,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg, 
Malta,  Austria  and  Finland)  had  no  fraud  cases,  while  5  countries  (Slovenia, 
Cyprus, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands) reported only 1 case of fraud. 
This  incidence  was  largely  similar  across  the  past  5 years,  as  shown  by  the 
annexes to the PIF reports for the period 2018-2022; specifically: 

- 

- 

- 

- 

in  2018,  Italy  reported  (in  the  areas  of  cohesion  policies  and  fisheries) 
only  1  case  of  fraud,  as  did  6 other  Member  States  (Austria,  Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Sweden), while 5 countries (Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Slovenia) reported no cases of fraud; 
in  2019,  Italy  reported  no  cases  of  fraud  (in  cohesion  policies  and 
fisheries),  as  did  10 other  Member  States  (Belgium,  Cyprus,  Croatia, 
Denmark,  France,  Greece,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Sweden),  while 
1 country (Bulgaria) reported only 1 case of fraud; 
in 2020, Italy (in cohesion policies and fisheries) reported 3 cases of fraud 
as did 6 other Member States (Croatia, Estonia, Greece, France, Slovenia, 
Sweden), while 1 country (Bulgaria) reported 2 cases, 2 countries (Cyprus 
and the Netherlands) reported 1 case and 7 countries (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Lithuania, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta) reported none; 
in 2021, in relation to cohesion policies, Italy reported no cases, as did 11 
other  Member  States  (Austria,  Cyprus,  Croatia,  Denmark,  Finland, 
Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden),  while  1 Member 
State (Belgium) reported only 1 case of fraud. 

In  addition  to  the  framework  described  above,  measures  were  introduced 
specifically  to  detect  fraud  against  the  national  RRP  and  related  corruption, 
conflicts of interests and double funding. 
Under Article 6 of Decree-Law No 77 of 2021, converted by Law No 108 of 2021, 
as amended by Decree-Law No 13 of 2023, converted by Law No 41 of 2023, the 
protection of the EU’s financial interests in implementing the national RRP under 
Article 22  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 2021/241  is  entrusted  to  the  Inspectorate 
General for the national RRP at the State General Accounting Department. 
The Ministry of the Economy and Finance issued guidelines on the control and 
reporting of national RRP measures (circular No 30 of 11 August 2022) and later 
supplemented the guidelines (circular No 16 of 14 April 2023). The guidelines are 
addressed  to  the  central  administrations  and  implementing  entities,  and  cover 

24 

 
 
 
the administrative management and implementation of the RRP. 
With  regard  more  specifically  to  preventing  and  combating  outright  fraud,  the 
Decision of the State General Accounting Department of 9 March 2022 set up a 
network  of  national  RRP  anti-fraud  contact  points,  to  coordinate  the  periodic 
assessment of fraud risks, conflicts of interests and double funding, and to plan 
effective and proportionate measures. 
The  network  is  chaired  by  a  senior  official  of  the  national  RRP  General 
Inspectorate and is composed of representatives of the Inspectorate and of the 
Financial  Police,  plus  an  anti-fraud  contact  person  designated  by  each  central 
administration in charge of NRRP measures. The network works in close contact 
with  the  competent  national  institutions  with  regard  to  anti-corruption,  anti-
money  laundering  and  public  expenditure  control,  such  as  the  National  Anti-
Corruption  Authority,  the  Bank  of  Italy’s  Financial  Intelligence  Unit  and  the 
Italian Court of Auditors. 
Depending  on  the  issues  on  the  agenda,  the  Network’s  meetings  are  also 
attended  by  experts  and  representatives  of  the  COLAF,  other  State  and  EU 
bodies,  other  national  public  administrations  and  bodies,  offices  of  the  State 
General  Accounting  Department  or  other  departments  in  the  Ministry  of  the 
Economy  and  Finance,  as  well  as  public  and  private  companies,  trade 
associations, and other bodies and organisations concerned. 
implements  cooperation  under  the  Memorandum  of 
The  network  also 
Understanding  signed  on  17 December  2021  between  the  State  General 
Accounting Department and the General Command of the Financial Police. This 
cooperation is outlined below. 

-  The national RRP General Inspectorate forwards the Public Expenditure 
and Anti-EU Fraud Unit of the Financial Police detailed information and 
findings  regarding  irregularities,  frauds  and  abuses  it  has  detected while 
performing  its  monitoring  and  control  functions.  It  flags  the  actions  and 
their implementing or executing entities deemed to be particularly at risk, 
for  independent  analysis  and  control  by  the  Unit,  providing  any  useful 
information and details; 

-  The Public Expenditure and Anti-EU Fraud Unit relays the information to 
the other special units and to the operational units of the Financial Police 
with  territorial  jurisdiction  for  any  activities  under  their  remit.  In 
compliance with the rules on secrecy, the Anti-EU Fraud Unit then reports 
the  findings  of  the  checks  to  the  national  RRP  General  Inspectorate  for 
any further action. 

-  Central administrations wishing to conclude an agreement with the State 
General  Accounting  Department  and  the  Financial  Police  may  do  so  by 
signing a unilateral act joining the aforementioned MoU, after appointing 
an  anti-fraud  contact  person,  and  undertaking  to:  (i)  participate  in  the 
work of the Network; (ii) provide the General Inspectorate and the Anti-
Fraud  Unit  with  all  the 
in  their  possession  on  the 
implementers  and  executors  of  the  measures  financed  by  the  Plan;  and 
(iii)  provide  the  Inspectorate  and  the  Unit  with  detailed  information 
considered  relevant  for  the  prevention  and  combating  of  irregularities, 
frauds and abuses. 

information 

25 

 
 
Furthermore,  the  above-mentioned  Circular  No 16  of  14 April  2023  announced 
the full release (on the ReGiS platform) of the functionalities enabling the public 
administrations  in  charge  of  national  RRP  measures  and  the  implementing 
entities  to  directly  issue  the  certifications  proving  performance  of  the  relevant 
checks  (in  particular  on  the  project  selection  procedure,  the  tender  procedure 
and  project  reports).  The  circular  also  announced  that  ReGiS  had  been 
connected  to  the  ORBIS  world  bank  and  to  the  ARACHNE  and  PIAF  –  IT  anti-
fraud  platforms,  and  provided  specific  indications  on  their  usefulness  for  risk 
analysis and for identifying beneficial owners. 
Additionally, over the past few months, the Network of Anti-Fraud Contact Points 
has  organised  a  number  of  training  sessions  for  the  staff  of  central  and  local 
administrations and implementing bodies, to fine-tune knowledge and to enable 
them to use the full range of fraud analysis and prevention systems. 
During  the  training  sessions,  the  Public  Expenditure  and  Anti-EU  Fraud  Unit  of 
the  Financial  Police,  with  the  support  of  the  Financial  Police  Unit  at  the 
Department  for  European  Affairs  of  the  Presidency  of  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
acting  as  Technical  Secretariat  of  the  COLAF,  prepared  and  presented  detailed 
checklists  with  specific  risk  indicators  applicable  to  either  the  payment  of 
funding  or  the  execution  of  public  works.  The  checklists  were  made  available 
through  the  ReGiS  system  to  all  central  and  local  administrations  and  bodies 
implementing the plan, to help them improve their independent ability to detect 
anomalous situations for further investigation. 
This  comprehensive  anti-fraud  framework  –  accompanied  by  other  tools  and 
recommendations  useful  for  assessing  the  main  risks  of  national  RRP-related 
fraud,  detect  vulnerabilities  in  the  existing  control  systems  and  engage  all 
stakeholders  in  stepping  up  prevention  and  response  levels  –  is  detailed  in  the 
National RRP Anti-Fraud Strategy, drawn up in October 2022 by the Inspectorate 
General  for  the  national  RRP  with  the  support  of  the  Network  of  Anti-Fraud 
Contact Points and updated in December 2023. 
Italy’s  RRP  Strategy  describes  the  key  principles  and  general  measures  for 
ensuring compliance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241, consistent with Article 11 of 
the Funding Agreement between the European Commission and Italy, in line with 
the general principle of sound financial management. It aims to guide the actions 
and measures taken by individual administrations tasked with implementing the 
measures,  so  as  to  ensure  harmonised  and  effective  anti-fraud  solutions  and 
practices,  in  particular  in  detecting  and  responding  to  any  anomalous  or  illegal 
phenomena  and  conduct  during  the  plan’s  implementation,  as  well  as  in  the 
processes/activities along the life cycle of the various projects. 
The new RRP Strategy adopted by  ReGiS Circular 200465 of 22 December 2023 
incorporates  the  previous  version  and  updates  it  with  the  main  intervening 
regulatory  changes,  the  lessons  learned  in  the  first  year  of  implementing  the 
Strategy,  and  fruitful  ongoing  discussions  with  the  competent  national  and  EU 
control bodies. 
All  the  administrations  in  charge  of  RRP  measures  were  asked  to  promptly 
implement  the  contents  of  the  new  document  in  their  ‘sectoral  anti-fraud 
strategies’ covering the activities under their competence, and in the operational 
manuals for each measure. 

26 

 
 
Another document linked to the RRP strategy is the Thematic Appendix adopted 
by  RGS  Circular  No 27  of  15 September  2023,  entitled  ‘Identification  of 
beneficial  owners  under  Article 22(2)(d)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  and 
notification  to  the  financial  intelligence  unit  of  suspicious  transactions  by  the 
public administration under Article 10 of Legislative Decree No 231/2007’. This 
aims to: improve ex ante controls aimed at identifying any conflicts of interest of 
beneficial owners; strengthen information flows, for example via notifications of 
suspicious  transactions  in  line  with  anti-money  laundering  legislation;  and 
establish  the  procedural  steps  to  be  implemented  by  the  implementing  bodies 
and  the  administrations  concerned  via  all  the  functionalities  of  the  ReGiS 
information system. 
In this context, a major step forward has been the adoption of the national RRP 
fraud risk assessment tool, designed to standardise the self-assessment of fraud 
risk  in  RRP  measures  and  related  management  processes  falling  within  each 
authority’s remit. 
The  tool  is  part  of  the  comprehensive  set  of  anti-fraud  capabilities  that  help 
ensure  the  correct,  efficient  and  effective  functioning  of  each  authority’s 
management and internal control system. It also provides the information base 
for  drawing  up  possible  action  plans  setting  out  the  new  control  steps  and/or 
additional  and  proportionate  measures  to  be  implemented  to  mitigate  the 
identified risks. 

the  Financial  Police’s 

Article 1(4)(f)(3)  of  Decree-Law  No 13  of  24 February  2023  has  further 
the  national  RRP 
strengthened 
implementation,  by  extending  the  possibility  of  concluding  specific  agreements 
with  the  Financial  Police  –  already  available  to  the  central  administrations  in 
charge of the plan –to the regions, Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano, 
local authorities and other public entities involved in implementing the RRP. 

in  overseeing 

The  new  legislation  is  intended  to  strengthen  control  activities  aimed  at 
preventing and combating fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and the risk of 
double  funding,  by  leveraging  the  general  economic  and  financial  police 
functions and professional skills of the Financial Police and the inspection powers 
conferred  on  it  also  for  the  protection  of  EU  financial  resources,  as  mentioned 
above. 

All the prevention measures aimed at identifying the possible risks of infiltration 
by  organised  crime  available  under  current  anti-mafia  legislation  and  falling 
under  the  competence  of  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  and  the  local  Prefectures 
also  apply to  the  various  investments  and  projects  connected with the  national 
RRP. 
Good  cooperation  between  administrative  agencies,  active  work  on  preventing 
double funding. 
The  national  anti-fraud  strategy  is  not  yet  finalised.  However,  viewed  in  the 
overall  context  of  the  Luxembourg  economy  and  financial  sector,  the  amounts 
involved point to a low incidence of fraud. This is probably due in part to the fast 

LT 

LU 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
LV 

MT 

and  effective  exchange  of  information  amongst  the  relevant  authorities,  which 
are physically located in close proximity to each other. 

One possible explanation is an effective internal control system which includes a 
set  of  preventive  measures  to  reduce  or  eliminate  the  risk  of  fraudulent 
activities.  A  transparent  and  efficient  management  and  control  system  of  EU 
funds  has  been  created  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  safe  financial 
management and with zero tolerance for fraud. 

Responsible  institutions  also  carry  out  fraud  risk  assessments  regularly  and 
define  measures  to  prevent  or  reduce  the  risks  of  fraud.  Each  institution  takes 
fraud  prevention  and  detection  measures  based  on  its  remit.  It  is  important  to 
detect  cases  of  fraud  and  bring  fraudsters  to  justice.  ‘Red  flags’  help  to  draw 
attention to suspicious cases. 

The  institutions  use  a  methodology  known  as  ‘Criminal  offences  against  EU 
financial  interests:  definitions,  typologies,  signs  and  examples  of  practice’ 
developed  by  the  AFCOS  and  a  crime  typology  filtering  IT  tool  to  detect 
suspicious  cases.  If  one  or  more  signs  are  detected  or  there  are  suspicions  of 
signs  mentioned  in  this  methodology,  the  relevant  employee  consults  with  the 
management regarding further action. 

The number of cases has been increasing in recent years. 

- The  Manual  of  Procedures  stipulates  that,  if  anyone  involved  in  the 
implementation of EU funds  becomes  aware  of  an  irregularity  (individual 
or systemic) at any point during implementation or a control procedure, 
they  must  immediately  report  the  irregularity  to  the  managing 
authority. 
- One  tool  used  to  determine  the  incidence  of  fraud  is  a  risk  assessment 
aimed  at  pinpointing, assessing,  and  minimising  potential  dangers  that 
could  arise  from  deceitful  actions.  The  Maltese  managing  authorities  for 
EU  funds  have  carried  out  a  fraud  risk  assessment  which  resulted  in  the 
updating  of the fraud risk register.  Apart from the topics provided in the 
Commission  memo  on  fraud  indicators,  namely  ‘selection  of  applicants’, 
‘implementation  and  verification  of  operations’, 
‘certification  and 
payments’  and  ‘direct  procurement  by  managing  authorities’,  other 
pertinent  topics  were  also  tackled.  The topics  included  in  the  Fraud  Risk 
Register  include  (i)  the  avoidance,  detection  and  mitigation  of  conflict of 
interest,  (ii)  whistleblowing,  (iii)  double  funding,  and  (iv)  rules  on  part-
time and ancillary employment. 
- The  anti-fraud  strategy  has  been  revamped  to  comprehensively  and 
clearly  delineate the  stages  in  the  anti-fraud  cycle,  namely  prevention, 
detection, investigation and correction. 
- A  standard  operating  procedure  has  been  developed  for  checks  and 
verifications  to  be  carried  out  by  managing  authorities  on  conflicts  of 
interest and ultimate beneficiary owners for EU-funded contracts. 
- In  August  2023,  the  Permanent  Secretary  responsible  for  EU  funding 
sent  the  Permanent  Secretaries  a  circular  on  conflicts  of  interest  and 
action  against  fraud  and  corruption.  The  aim  of  this  circular  was  to 

28 

 
 
enhance  the  accountability,  transparency  and  effectiveness  of  the 
measures put in place to protect the EU’s and Malta’s financial interests 
regarding  the  implementation  of  EU- funded  projects.  Ministries  were 
reminded  of  their  obligations  to  strengthen  and  carry  out  checks 
against  conflict  of 
the 
implementation of projects. Ministries were also asked to draw up fraud 
risk  registers  based  on  those  aspects  of  operations  identified  as  most 
prone to fraud and corruption. 

the  design  and 

throughout 

interest 

NL 

PL 

Fraud  risks  and  the  lawful  use  of  funds  (including  EU  funds)  are  important 
areas of focus within the Netherlands. 

In recent years the Dutch internal audit department has paid special attention 
to  mitigating fraud risks  and  included  a  separate  assessment  of  fraud  risks  in 
the  audit  report  accompanying  the  justification  of  the  ministries’  annual 
reports.  Overall,  it  concluded  that  the  ministries’  fraud  risk  management  is 
adequate.  Furthermore,  the  ministries  have  a  responsibility  to  manage  and 
mitigate  fraud  risks  and  take  measures  to  prevent,  detect  and  correct 
instances of fraud. 

The  2022  PIF  report  acknowledges  the  low  incidence  of  fraud  in  the 
Netherlands.  It  points  to  the  very  small  number  of  fraudulent  transactions 
reported  affecting  the  EU  budget  (5 expenditure  transactions  and  2  revenue 
transactions).  These  transactions  had  a  total  value  of  just  EUR 40 800  for 
expenditure and EUR 295 800 for revenue. Hence the incidence of fraud in the 
Netherlands is deemed very low and is expected to remain so. 
The statistical data from the European Commission provided in the annual PIF 
reports are a reliable indicator for an objective assessment of the incidence of 
fraud. However, these data relate only to cases reported to the Commission 
in line with the notification obligation (and not to all cases of suspected and 
confirmed  fraud,  some  of  which  were  not  reported,  as  the  amounts 
concerned  did  not  exceed  the  EUR 10 000  threshold).  When  compared  with 
data from other Member States, which may serve as a benchmark, the fraud 
data  from  Poland  clearly  shows  that  Poland  reports  one  of  the  highest 
number  of  fraud  cases  to  the  Commission  each  year,  involving  one  of  the 
highest the financial values. 

In  Poland,  cases  are  classified  as  suspected  fraud  (IRQ3)  for  notification  to 
the  Commission  via  the  IMS  system  at  a  relatively  late  stage  of  the 
investigation process (when an indictment is issued by a public prosecutor). 
This is relevant for the Commission’s fraud rate calculation and data analysis. 
Moreover, in Poland the reporting institutions are required to monitor cases 
of  irregularities  that  do not have to be  reported  to notify  the  Commission. 
Where 
the 
investigation, these are also reported via the IMS system. 
This  procedure  is  in  line  with  the  principles  set  out  in  the  sectoral 
regulations and in the 2017 Commission manual ‘Reporting of irregularities 
require 
in  shared  management’. 

indicators  of  suspected 

In  Poland’s  view, 

identified  during 

it  does  not 

fraud  are 

29 

 
 
 
 
improvements. 

PT 

Preventive anti-fraud policies have been adopted, including: 

- technical  and  legal  analysis  of  cases  indicating  signs  of  fraud  and  their 
notification to the competent bodies for verification; 
- a  specific  information  system  on  the  suitability,  reliability  and  debt  of 
EU funding beneficiaries; 
- cooperation with  various  bodies  involved  in  the  management,  control, 
auditing  and  investigation  of  complaints  and  cases  indicating  signs  of 
fraud; 
- monitoring  and  analysis  of  systematic  risk,  focusing  on  declarations  for 
release  into  free  circulation  and  on  the  behaviour  of  economic  operators, 
following the entry into force of legislation on EU trade policy. 

RO 

Efficient fraud monitoring; development, consolidation and implementation of 
control and investigation systems. The Paying Agency for Rural Investments (AFIR) 
and the Payments and Intervention Agency for Agriculture (APIA) have 
implemented their own anti-fraud strategy for the period 2023-2027. 

Legislative acts have been adopted: 
- creating the national regulatory framework for the new 2021-2027 
programming period 
- strengthening the legal framework governing conflict-of-interest situations, in 
light of Article 61 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 (the Financial 
Regulation) 
- approving the national anti-fraud strategy for the protection of the EU’s 
financial interests in Romania, 2023-2027 (Government Decision 
No 1259/2023). 
Other measures adopted to lower the incidence of fraud were: 
- developing operational procedures detailing the measures taken to prevent, 
detect and penalise fraud, and to recover the damage caused by fraud; 
- using risk prevention tools (e.g. the Arachne and PREVENT IT tools, and 
cooperation agreements/protocols with the National Intelligence Agency, the 
Department for the Fight Against Fraud, the National Trade Register Office, etc.) 
- developing and implementing a robust internal management and control 
system; 
- establishing clear reporting mechanisms; 
- developing an ethical and anti-fraud environment through the adoption of the 
code of conduct, which applies to all staff in the management structures and to 
the beneficiaries; 
- strengthening the ability of staff in the management and control system to 
verify the expenditure claimed for reimbursement (e.g. through 
instruction/training) 
- assessing and monitoring major risks and fraud risks, etc. 
- implementing the fraud risk assessment tool to assess the impact and 
likelihood of fraud risks occurring within key work processes; 
- monitoring fraud risks and the action plan, in line with the rules of the 
programmes; 

30 

 
 
 
SE 

SI 

- having management structure staff participate in information and training 
events related to: fraud prevention, conflicts of interest, incompatible offices, 
and integrity; 
- implementing the ‘whistleblowing’ system at institutional level; 
enhancing beneficiaries’ capacity to prepare mature projects and to claim eligible 
expenditure (e.g. helpdesk, training/guidance). 

The  incidence  of  identified  fraud  is  low.  In  a  status  report  on  identified 
irregularities in 2019, approved in 2021, the Council for the Protection of the 
EU’s  Financial  Interests  in  Sweden  noted  that  errors  that  could  also 
potentially  constitute  fraud  are  most  likely  under-reported  and  are  not 
notified to the public prosecutor’s office. 

Given the above, the Council for the Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests 
has carried out training initiatives aimed at authorities managing EU funds in 
Sweden and has developed a notification policy under which authorities are 
required  to  report  all 
irregularities  that  could  objectively  constitute 
attempted  fraud.  In  2023,  the number  of  reported  cases of  suspected  fraud 
concerning  EU  funds  received  by  the  Swedish  Economic  Crime  Authority 
(Ekobrottsmyndigheten) increased significantly. 

investigation 

launched  an 

The  government  has  also 
into  the  effective 
management of EU funds in Sweden. Amongst other things, the investigation was 
tasked  specifically  with  examining  whether  there  is  a  need  to  introduce  a 
statutory reporting obligation for the authorities managing EU funds in Sweden 
regarding  suspected  fraud.  The  investigation  report  is  due  to  be  presented  in 
March 2024. 
Reply  from  the  Ministry  of  Cohesion  and  Regional  Development  (MKRR)  to 
question 1.2: 
Appropriate  control  system  –  both  administrative  controls  and  on-the-spot 
checks. The managing authority’s anti-fraud strategy. 
Reply to question 1.3: risk analysis in the context of controls or management 
verifications and, in this context, fraud risk analysis. 

Reply from the police to question 1.1: For many years, the police have placed a 
strong emphasis on investigating crimes involving fraud to the detriment of the 
EU and Slovenia. Otherwise, the police do not have a specific fraud risk analysis 
for assessing to what extent the low detection rate is due to low levels of actual 
fraud.  In  2016,  the  police  started  to  monitor  and  analyse  complaints  to  the 
prosecution services relating to fraud offences to the detriment of the EU more 
actively.  We  estimate  that  the  police  dealt  with  a  relatively  small  number  of 
such  fraud  offences  between  2010  and  2023.  The  monitoring  of  police 
complaints made to the prosecution services shows that the relevant supervisory 
authorities report relatively few instances of abuse to the detriment of the EU’s 
financial  interests,  but  we  consider  that,  given  the  amount  of  European  funds 
allocated,  the  problem  in  this  area  is  significantly  higher  than  perceived.  The 
police do not have any information as to why this is the case, but would like to 

31 

 
 
 
 
 
SK 

see  more  effective  detection  and  reporting  of  such  crimes  by  the  supervisory 
authorities. To this end, it carries out a number of activities, such as training and 
cooperation with supervisory authorities and the EPPO. 

Reply from the Financial Administration (FURS) to question 1.2: 
The Slovenian Financial Administration estimates that the incidence of fraud 
in  the  customs  area  is  low,  mainly  due  to  effective  risk  analysis,  including 
for  the  protection  of  EU  funds.  When  released  for  free  circulation,  both 
national and EU guidance is properly and timely implemented, which has a 
preventive  impact  on  reducing  the  incidence  of  fraud.  In  addition,  a  risk 
analysis  selects  companies  to  undergo  post-release  controls.  No  additional 
measures were taken to determine the incidence of fraud. 
To  judge  by  the  numbers  of  fraudulent  irregularities  concerning  EU  budget 
expenditure  reported  by  the  Member  States  from  2020  to  2022  (see  PIF 
reports  2020-2022),  Slovakia  does  not  have  a  very  low  incidence  of  fraud. 
Relatively  high 
level  of  detections  can  be  attributed  to  the  effective 
functioning of the audit and control systems, to fraud risk assessments and to 
follow-up on media reports on the possible misuse of EU funds. 

As regards the revenue side of the EU budget, the identification of VAT fraud 
is  based  on  the  comparison  of  data  from  control  statements  and  other 
available data. Risk profiles are used to identify customs fraud and are based 
partly  on  risk  identified  risk  through  data  analysis  methods.  However, 
insufficient  capacity  does  not  allow  to  deal  with  the  entire  volume  of  tax 
fraud.  Prioritising  the  highest  tax  risks  distributes  the  risk  among  multiple 
entities  in  lower  amounts.  Even  in  cases  of  identified  fraud,  effective 
resolution  is  not  always  possible  because  of  ineffective  penalty  systems  and 
insufficient enforcement of both additional tax and financial penalties. Other 
problems include limited cooperation between administrative authorities and 
law  enforcement  authorities  and  inadequate  legislation  on  personal  data 
processing, restricting the powers of administrative authorities. 

Q.1.3 If YES to Q.1.1. Have you invested in fraud risk analysis to assess the reason for low 
detection of suspected fraud in your operations? 
Among Member States that assess their incidence of fraud as low, almost all (94%) indicate 
that  they  have  invested  in  fraud  risk  analysis  to  assess  the  reasons  for  low  detection  of 
suspected fraud in their operations. 

Among those Member States that responded to this question, 59% indicate that they have 
conducted/invested  in  fraud  risk  analysis  to  assess  the  reason  for  low  detection  of 
suspected fraud in their operations. 

Yes 
No 
n/a 

Member State 
AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FI, HR, HU, LT, LV, MT, NL, PT, SI 
DK 
CY, EE, FR, IE, IT, LU, PL, RO, SE, SK 

TOTAL 
16 
1 
10 

32 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Q.1.4 If YES to Q.1.3. Have you identified weaknesses in fraud detection? 
The results from those Member States that have invested in this fraud risk analysis show an 
equal distribution of cases where weaknesses in fraud was identified. 

Yes 
No 
n/a 

Member State 
BG, CZ, ES, FI, HR, HU, LT, SI 
AT, BE, DE, EL, LV, MT, NL, PT 
CY, DK, EE, FR, IE, IT, LU, PL, RO, SE, SK 

Total 
8 
8 
11 

Q.1.5  If  YES  to  Q.1.4.  In  which  of  the  following  detection  areas  have  you  identified 
weaknesses? 
Most  weaknesses  identified  relate  to  ‘information  exchange  with  law  enforcement  and 
specialised agencies’. 

Areas of identified weakness 
Management and control system 
Additional control requested by the Commission 
Monitoring systems and detection software 
Information  exchange  with  law  enforcement  and 
specialised agencies 
Cooperation with EU investigation bodies 
Other controls (please specify)  

Member State 
CZ, ES, FI,LT 
ES 
ES, HR 
BG, CZ, ES, HU, IE, SI 

SI 
FI 

Total 
4 
1 
2 
6  

1 
1 

Information exchange with law enforcement and…

Management and control system
Monitoring systems and detection software
Additional control requested by the Commission
Cooperation with EU investigation bodies
Other

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

N° of Member States having replied

Q.1.6  Usually  the  issue  of  intentionality  related  to  an  irregularity  is  investigated  in  the 
framework  of  penal  proceedings,  with  the  involvement  of  criminal  law  enforcement 
agencies and public prosecutors. Are there other types of proceedings where intentionality 
is assessed, in view for example of making a decision about sanctions? 
Most  Member  States  (59%)  state  that  there  are  no  other  types  of  proceedings  where 
intentionality was assessed. These instances are detailed in the question below. 

Yes 
No 

n/a 

Member State 
CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, HU, LV, PL, SI, SK 
AT, BE, BG, CY, DE, DK, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LU MT, NL, RO, 
SE 
PT 

Total 
10 
16  

1 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EE 

EL 

Q.1.7 If YES to Q.1.6., could you specify what these proceedings are? 
MS 
CZ 

Input 
Proceedings in respect of criminal offences under to the Czech Act on Liability for 
Offences  and  Procedure  thereon  (Act  No 250/2016  Coll.).  Administrative 
proceedings  initiated  by  tax  administrators  or  administrative  authorities  for  tax 
or administrative offences. 
Estonia uses criminal proceedings and administrative proceedings to investigate 
intentional violations. For example, the normal administrative procedure is used 
to investigate cases like agricultural projects where the support conditions were 
falsified  or  documents  forged,  etc.  A  lack  of  resources  (people,  time,  finances, 
etc.)  means  that  these  cases  are  often  not  prosecuted,  though  the  funds  are 
generally  recovered  from  the  applicants  or  the  support  is  cancelled.  These 
administrative  measures  are  an  easier  and  quicker  way  to  protect  the  EU’s 
financial interests. 
- Penal and misdemeanour proceedings regulated in the Estonian Penal Code are 
used to assess intent regarding revenue. 
Special Service for Institutional Support and Information Systems: 
The  management  and  control  system  (PROCEDURE  ΔVIII_2)  provides  that  in  an 
examination of indications of fraud and reporting suspicions of  fraud where the 
outcome  of  the  investigation  confirms  the  suspicion/indication  of  fraud,  then 
administrative or judicial proceedings must be initiated at national level and the 
case constitutes a suspicion of fraud. 
The  managing  authority  then,  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Head  of  Service, 
takes the following actions: 

- 

- 

sends the investigation team’s report and documentation to the National 
Transparency Authority (NTA)/AFCOS; 
sends  the  investigation  team  report  and  the  relevant  documentation  to 
the Special Service for Institutional Support, the Certifying Authority and 
EDEL (but not to the beneficiary); 
reports the suspected fraud to the EU; 

- 
-  decides on the corrective actions to take (e.g. checks on the beneficiary’s 
other  operations,  suspension  of  funding,  etc.),  based  on  the  type  and 
extent of the suspected fraud; 
takes  action  to  prevent  such  incidents  and/or  sends  proposals  for 
measures  of  general  application  to  be  taken  at  the  level  of  the 
management and control system; 
informs  the 
authority’s representative (person responsible for fraud matters). 

Internal  Anti-Fraud  Network  through  the  managing 

- 

- 

Recovery and Resilience Facility Coordination Agency: 
Irregularities detected in the verifications/controls carried out in accordance with 
the  management  and  control  system  of  the  Greek  RRP  give  rise  to  penalties. 
These  may  be  administrative  (recommendations  from  the  RRP  implementing 
bodies) or financial (recovery of the irregular funds spent). 

ES 

The  tax  inspection  procedure,  on  the  revenue  side.  And  in  general,  all 

34 

 
 
 
 
 
HR 

HU 

LV 

PL 

administrative  penalty  procedures.  Intentionality  is  assessed  to  determine  the 
corresponding penalties. 
Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture: 
Proceedings  under  the  Misdemeanour  Act  (Official  Gazette  of  the  Republic  of 
Croatia)  Nos 107/2007,  39/2013,  157/2013,  110/2015,  70/2017,  118/2018, 
114/2022);  enquiries  and  criminal  investigations  to  ascertain  the  existence  of 
elements necessary for indictment and launch of criminal proceedings. 
Contribution from the Customs Administration (Ministry of Finance): 
In the absence of suspicion of a criminal offence, misdemeanour proceedings are 
conducted  and  a  fine  is  imposed,  the  amount  of  which  depends  on  the 
seriousness of the offence. 
Prior  to  and  in  parallel  with  criminal  proceedings  conducted  by  the  institutions 
managing  EU  funds  for  the  offence  of  fiscal  fraud  as  defined  in  Section 396  of 
Act C  of  2012  on  the  Criminal  Code,  typically  in  connection  with  the  use  of  EU 
funds,  the  managing  authority  concerned  acts  on  the  basis  of  an  irregularity 
decision,  subject  to  the  proceedings  of  the  other  parties,  and  is  entitled  to  the 
rights of other parties in the respective criminal proceedings. 
Information  provided  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  the  Rural  Support 
Service:  When  applying  an  administrative  penalty,  an  assessment  is  done  to 
evaluate  whether  non-compliance  was  intentional.Intentional  non-compliance 
can result in exclusion (exclusion from the opportunity to receive EU funding for 
up  to  3  years).  The  beneficiary  is  excluded  if  it  is  found that:  1)  the beneficiary 
knowingly  provided  false  information;  2)  during  the  implementation  of  the 
project,  the  beneficiary  knowingly  provided  false  information  to  the  Rural 
Support  Service  or  otherwise  behaved  maliciously  in  connection  with  the 
implementation of the project. 

Information  provided  by  the  Central  Finance  and  Contracting  Agency:  For 
violations of procurement norms and other violations not classified under fraud 
and suspected fraud. Intent and deliberateness are always assessed, including in 
order to apply proportionate sanctions. 
-  Intentionality  is  assessed  in  proceedings  before  the  Chief  Spokesperson  for 
Public  Finance  Discipline.  ‘Public  finance  discipline’  refers  to  a  specific, 
desirable situation which is achieved through compliance with established legal 
financial  economy.  An 
standards  relating  to  the  broadly  understood 
infringement of financial economy rules may result in certain individuals being 
held  liable.  This  issue  is  regulated  in  the  Act  on  liability  for  breach  of  public 
finance  discipline  [Ustawa  o  odpowiedzialności  za  naruszenie  dyscypliny 
finansów publicznych]. 

-  The  rules  on 

liability  apply  to  persons  who  manage  public 

funds 
inappropriately,  e.g.  persons  who  perform  functions  in  entities  implementing 
the  budgets  or  financial  plans  of  entities  in  the  public  finance  sector,  the 
managers of such entities (e.g. mayors of urban and rural municipalities, chairs 
of district executive boards, treasurers, heads of schools) or persons required to 
implement  projects  co-financed  by  the  EU  to  whom  public  funds  have  been 
allocated for this purpose or persons who use such funds (in Poland, EU funds 
are  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  national  public  funds).  Penalties  for  being 

35 

 
 
 
SI  

SK 

found liable include a formal admonition, a reprimand, a financial penalty, and 
a temporary ban on exercising functions involving management of public funds. 

Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development (MKRR) 
The managing authority’s ‘instructions for carrying out management verifications 
and  verifications  of  the  performance  of  delegated  tasks’  (referred  to  below  by 
their Slovenian abbreviation, NPO) set out a system to deal with ineligible costs 
and irregularities. 
A  distinction  is  made  between  action  taken  in  the  case  of  management 
verifications  under  the  responsibility  of  the  body  carrying  out  management 
verifications and action taken in cases where the body carrying out management 
verifications  reports  suspicions  of  fraud  to  the  competent  authority  on  its  own 
initiative. 
Fraud  is  distinguished  from  the  more  general  concept  of  ‘irregularity’  by 
intentionality.  ‘Suspected  fraud’  means  an  irregularity  which  requires  the 
appropriate procedure to be launched at national level to determine whether the 
act was intentional and, in particular, whether there was fraud. 
- When  an  irregularity is detected,  a  correction  is  imposed  if  suspected  fraud  is 
also  detected  and  a  separate  declaration  is  made.  If  the  competent  authorities 
confirm the fraud, they must impose measures and the intermediate body must 
act in accordance with the provisions of the call or co-financing contract, which 
require  zero  tolerance  for  fraud.  A  suspicion  may  also  arise  if  irregularities 
resulting in the imposition of a correction are not detected. 
‘Suspected  fraud’  is  defined  in  the  NPO  as  an  irregularity  giving  rise  to  the 
initiation  of  administrative  and/or  judicial  proceedings  at  national  level  to 
it 
establish  whether  the  act  was  intentional  and,  in  particular,  whether 
constitutes fraud as defined in Article 1(1)(a) of the Convention on the protection 
of the European Communities’ financial interests. 
Financial Administration (FURS): 
This  is  an  offence  procedure.  Under  Article 9  of  the  Minor  Offences  Act  (ZP-1), 
anyone who commits an offence, whether through negligence or intent, is liable 
for the offence. 
In  Slovakia,  intentionality  is  assessed  also  in  minor  offence  proceedings  (Act. 
No 372/1 990  Coll.  on  Minor  Offences  as  amended)  as  well  as  in  penal 
proceedings. 
the  administrative 
authorities  assess  the  gravity  of  conduct.  This  can  have  an  impact  on  the 
penalty  imposed  (e.g.  in  proceedings  conducted  by  the  Public  Procurement 
Office or by the Slovak Anti-Monopoly Office). 

In  certain  administrative  proceedings 

36 

 
 
 
Q.1.8  In  IMS,  the  Member  States  must  specify  the  type  of  proceeding  an  irregularity  is 
undergoing,  choosing  among  the  following  options:  AP  (administrative  proceedings),  JP 
(judicial  proceedings),  PP  (penal  proceedings).  The  code  PP  should  be  used  in  relation  to 
suspected fraud, whenever a criminal proceeding is initiated. However, it is possible that the 
code  JP  has  been  used  by  some  Member  States  for  proceedings  in  relation  to  suspected 
fraud, for example when the trial stage is reached. Sometimes, the indication of the code JP 
is  not  accompanied  by  the  classification  IRQ3.  For  such  cases,  to  what  type  of  judicial 
proceedings are you referring? 
MS 
BE 

Input 
ERDF Wallonia: 

To judicial proceedings to recover the irregular amounts. 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

DK 

- Specified  and  strictly  applied,  that  ‘PP  penal  proceedings’  should  always  be 
selected from the ‘Type of procedure’ field, either singly or in combination with 
any of the other options. 
- The option of ‘JP judicial proceedings’ is not used for suspected fraud. It is used 
only where  administrative  cases  have  been  initiated  to  challenge decisions by 
heads of managing authorities determining financial corrections or establishing 
public state receivables. 
- The ‘JP’ option is also used to identify judicial cases initiated to appeal against 
enforced  recovery  of  irregular  amounts  by  the  authorities  of  the  National 
Revenue  Agency,  to  identify  insolvency  proceedings  and  to  identify  appeals 
against decisions refusing verification. 
- To  ‘JP  judicial  proceedings’  concerning  civil  cases  for  the  recovery  of  unduly 
spent amounts. 
- The use of the code JP (judicial proceedings) is usually accompanied by an IRQ3 
or IRQ5 classification. Some managing authorities use only the option PP (penal 
proceedings). The code JP (legal proceedings) combined with the classification 
IRQ2 would be used when the beneficiary is pursuing in court an unpaid amount 
which, in their opinion, was not an irregularity. 
- Federal  State  of  Baden-Württemberg:  no  cases  of  suspected  fraud  to  date, 
irregularities identified using AP 
- Hanseatic City of Bremen: not relevant 
- Federal State of Rhineland-Palatinate (RLP): no such cases in RLP 
- Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt: action brought by the beneficiary following the 
granting authority’s notice of withdrawal 
- The  Danish  Business  Authority  replied  that  in  general,  they  make  few  reports 
about  irregularities  or  suspected  fraud.  However,  over  the  years  they  have 
made  use  of  both  AP,  JP  and  PP  depending  on  the  case  and  if  it  required 
further investigations by the police or if it resulted in a conviction. 
- The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  uses  code  JP 
administrative decision regarding an irregularity is challenged in court. 
- The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency  reported  the  following: 
‘When  we  report 
irregularities,  we  usually  choose  ‘Administrative  Procedure  (AP)’  rather  than 
legal procedure (JP). In relation to what code we use, we almost always use: If 
fraud  is  suspected:  (ATBC)  Amount  must  be  calculated,  After  calculation  /  in 

legal  basis  of  an 

if  the 

37 

 
 
case  of  irregularity:  (RUNW)  Recovery  procedure  initiated.  =  Repayment  claim 
has  been  sent  to  the  beneficiary  (FULR)  Full  Recovery  =  Beneficiary  has  paid 
(AIRR)  The  amount  is  irrecoverable  (bankruptcy)  =  Beneficiary  is  bankrupt  (in 
dividend) We do not use the code IRQ3.’ 
- In Estonia we use codes IRQ3 and AP for administrative but intentional cases. 
Financial Audit Committee: 
The  option  used  by  management  and  control  system  bodies  is  AP,  as  financial 
audits  reveal  cases  of  suspected  fraud,  which  are  then  forwarded  to  the 
competent authorities for further investigation. 

Ministry of Rural Development and Food: 
In court proceedings in which the person concerned uses the legal remedies and 
remedies  provided  for  in  the  Code  of  Administrative  Procedure  to  bring  an 
appeal  to  the  national  administrative  courts  (and,  where  appropriate,  to  the 
Council  of  State)  against  administrative  acts  adversely  affecting  them,  such  as 
decisions to attribute undue payments to him or her. 

of 

the 

from 

Ministry 

Recovery and Resilience Facility Coordination Agency: 
Regulation  241/2021  does  not  require  Member  States  to  use  the  Irregularities 
Management  System  to  report  irregularities  to  the  EU.  However,  an  update  is 
emailed to  OLAF.  To date,  no  irregularities  have been  identified that  fall within 
the category of judicial proceedings (JP). 
- This  refers  to  cases  where  the  beneficiary  appeals  against  an  administrative 
decision, leading to court proceedings before an administrative court. 
- The  JP  (judicial  proceedings)  code  is  indicated  in  the  IMS  forms  when  an 
administrative  procedure  is  brought  before  the  administrative  and/or  criminal 
courts. 
Agriculture:  
Contribution 
The  Paying  Agency  for  Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Rural  Development  records 
cases of suspected fraud in the IMS under Chapter 1.15 using the code JP (judicial 
proceedings)  where  an  indictment  has  been  issued  as  part  of  criminal 
proceedings. The code used for confirmed fraud under Chapter 1.15 is PP (penal 
procedure),  whereas  the  code  used  for  irregularities  is  AP  (administrative 
procedure). 
- Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture – Directorate of Fisheries: Hitherto, 
no procedure other than the administrative procedure (AP) has been used under 
the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Fund. 
- The guidelines which the AFCOS developed and made available to the reporting 
organisations  and  the  material  covered  in  the  training  courses  it  regularly 
organised  clearly  emphasise  that  the  code  PP  applies  when  criminal 
proceedings have been initiated. Code JP may also be added when other judicial 
proceedings are ongoing at the same time. 
n/a 
As  regards  the  use  of  the  code  PP  (‘penal  proceedings’)  or  JP  (‘judicial 
proceedings’) in field 1.15 of the IMS form relating to the data to be entered in 
field 6.12, classification IRQ3 - suspected fraud (and likewise classification IRQ5 - 

EE 
EL 

FI 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 
IT 

38 

 
 
 
 
established fraud) in field 6.12 must be used only in conjunction with the  code 
PP,  while  the  code  JP  (and  the  code  AP)  can  only  be  used  in  conjunction  with 
classification IRQ2 - non-fraudulent irregularity for irregularities to be recovered 
via administrative proceedings (Regional Administrative Courts - TAR), accounting 
proceedings (accounting courts) or civil proceedings (civil courts). 
In the initial phase of penal proceedings,  the IRQ2 classification  may be used in 
conjunction with the code PP. The managing authority will, however, monitor the 
status  of  the  proceedings.  If  the  party  under  investigation  is  indicted,  the  IRQ2 
classification will be changed to IRQ3. Conversely, the code JP  may not be used 
with the IRQ3 classification. 

The code JP (if not accompanied by classification IRQ3) is used for administrative 
proceedings, which are carried out in Court (for example, when the beneficiary 
appeals  the  intermediate  body’s  decision  on  irregularity  and  the  Court  has  not 
yet adopted a final decision). 
n/a 
Information  provided  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  the  Rural  Support 
Service: All cases of irregularities are coded AP (administrative proceedings). If an 
appeal  against  the  decision  on  the  recovery  of  unreasonably  paid  funding  is 
brought before the court - then the code JP (judicial proceedings) is used. Code 
PP (penal proceedings) is used in cases where a criminal case has been initiated. 
These  codes  are  not  changed  even  if  court  proceedings  have  ended,  so  they 
show whether a case has had an appeal, a criminal trial, etc. If these codes were 
removed after the end of the court proceedings, then when reviewing the case 
nothing (except the description of irregularities) would indicate that there was a 
criminal  trial  or  an  appeal.  Such  a  case  would  not  be  found  when  entering  the 
code PP (penal proceedings) in the search engine. 
Not  applicable.  The  Netherlands  has  not  implemented  the  IMS  but  instead 
applies specific national anti-fraud IT tools. 
The use of the ‘JP’ code in notifications sent by Poland means that proceedings 
are  pending  before  an  administrative  court,  and  the  case  is  classified  as  an 
irregularity (IRQ2). 
As  a  rule,  the  code  JP  is  also  used  for  situations  where  the  beneficiary  has 
initiated legal proceedings because they disagree with the demand to return the 
amounts  resulting  from  the  detected  irregularity.  In  such  cases,  there  are  no 
indications of fraud. 
The  beneficiary  appealing  to  the  administrative  court,  challenging  the  debt 
settlement decision. 
n/a - There are no judicial proceedings in this context. 

Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development (MKRR) 
A reference is used in cases where (different) proceedings are brought within the 
jurisdiction of the courts, namely: 
- in cases of an irregularity already reported, an update is subsequently reported 
due  to the  opening  of bankruptcy or  other  insolvency proceedings  against the 
beneficiary; these procedures fall within the jurisdiction of the courts; 
- in  cases  where  the  State  initiates  judicial  recovery  of  funds  against  the 

39 

LT 

LU 
LV 

NL 

PL 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

 
 
 
 
beneficiary because the beneficiary does not wish to repay them; and 
- in  cases  where  legal  proceedings  are  brought  by  the  beneficiary  against  the 
State for disagreement with the financial correction imposed. 

SK 

In Slovakia, the code PP is used for all stages of criminal proceedings, including 
trial stage. The code JP is used only in relation to irregularities with classification 
IRQ2.  The  code  JP  is  used  if  civil/administrative court  proceedings  have  been 
initiated  for  the  recovery  of  any  undue  amounts  (including  enforcement  and 
insolvency proceedings). 

Q.1.9  In  your  opinion,  what  are  useful  elements  to  formulate  the  hypothesis  that  an 
irregularities  might  be  intentional  and  consequently  suspected  fraud  worth  being  further 
investigated by the competent authorities? (for example, (i) beneficiary or contractor linked 
to  other  irregularities  or  with  criminal  records,  (ii)  certain  links  between  beneficiary, 
contractors,  subcontractors,  suppliers,  (iii)  certain  inaccuracies  or  specific  elements  in 
certain documents; (iv) certain shortcomings in the implementation of projects, such as the 
site of the operation cannot be easily found or is clearly inadequate, etc.) 
MS 
AT 

Input 
- Advantages  (e.g.  economic)  for  the  beneficiary  --->  NB  Case-by-case  analysis 
essential 
- ERDF  Wallonia:  Data  injection  and  analysis  of  risk  indicators  provided  by 
ARACHNE,  recourse  to  law  firms,  consultation  of  national,  regional,  European 
registers at our disposal, UBO (ultimate beneficial owner) registry… 
The  useful  aspects  to  take  into  account  when  assessing  whether  an  irregularity 
might be intentional can be: 
- certain shortcomings in the implementation of projects, for example, the site 
of the operation cannot be easily found or is clearly inadequate. We have had 
cases  in  which  the  beneficiary  or  the  assets  cannot  be  found  at  the  project 
implementation  address,  so  further  investigation  is  needed  and  they  are 
sometimes classified as suspected fraud; 
- examination  of  links  between  beneficiary,  contractors,  subcontractors  and 
suppliers; 
- beneficiary or contractor linked to other irregularities; 
- definition of intent; 
- analysis of how the irregularity arose; 
- certain shortcomings in the implementation of projects; 
- users claim partial or complete lack of the provided services, but the documents 
submitted certify full and high quality service provision; 
- reasonable suspicions of agreements, decisions or concerted practices between 
participants, e.g. complementary bidding, participation on a rotating basis, 
awarding contracts just below the thresholds, etc. 
- all of the elements mentioned in the example could be useful to formulate the 
hypothesis of intentionality  
The irregularity should be considered in the wider context of the whole project: 
has  there  been  a  one-off  breach  of  conditions  and  rules  or  is  there  repeated 
misconduct.  Another  important  factor  is  whether  or  not  the  beneficiary 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

40 

 
 
 
 
DE 

communicates, tries to correct the misconduct or avoids the reported control by 
providing relevant explanations, etc. 

Conflicts  of  interest  in  public  procurement,  gross  misrepresentation  and  false 
data/documents  (falsified  contracts,  rigged  or  non-transparent  tenders  and 
artificial creation of conditions for obtaining subsidies) should also be taken into 
account. 
Key is the intention/motive to enrich oneself or someone else together with the 
intention/motive to obtain a financial or material benefit in violation of an 
obligations laid down by law legal requirements. 
- In  the  case  of  ERDF  funding  in  Baden-Württemberg,  for  example,  the  original 
project documents can be used to determine the legality of the conditions for 
allocating  public  funds  to  the  funding  case.  In  addition,  the  supporting 
documents  can  be  checked  for  authenticity.  Moreover,  payments  are 
corroborated  with  copies  of  proofs  of  payment,  which  are  checked  for 
consistency against the original during the on-the-spot inspection. If documents 
have  been  forged  or  falsified,  these  activities  are  covered  by  the  above-
mentioned  legislation  on  fraud,  subsidy  fraud  and  forgery.  To  date,  no 
falsification of supporting documents has been found in the cases examined. 
- By  concentrating  all  cases  supported  by  the  European  Regional  Development 
Fund  with  L-Bank,  and  through  the  unified  customer  database  in  L-Bank’s 
overall database, along with the sufficient array of additional  Land and federal 
funding  for  L-Bank,  systematic  cross-checks  ensure  a  clear  overview  of  the 
beneficiaries. Unreliable beneficiaries can then be excluded from funding where 
such cases are found. 

Hanseatic City of Bremen (ERDF): 
- Training to raise staff awareness of signs of a possible case of suspected fraud. 
The  professional  experience  of  staff  is  also  a  key  aspect  when  assessing 
irregularities. 

Federal  State  of  Rhineland-Palatinate:  A  case-by-case  examination  is  carried 
out. 

Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt (ERDF): 
- links to other irregularities 
- links between beneficiaries (e.g. affiliated undertakings), conflicting information 
- Danish  Business  Authority:  elements  in  certain documents that  raise  suspicion 
e.g.. use of the same words/phrases/spelling mistakes etc. 
- Danish Agricultural Agency: cases with red flags indicating that documents may 
have been manipulated. 
- The  Danish  Fisheries  Agency:  whether  the  beneficiary  has  already  been 
reported in other cases; whether the beneficiary is admissible; the process as a 
whole  (i.e.  if  the  vessel  is  sold  immediately  after  payment).  A  post-check  of 
admissibility is also carried out. 
Any details  that  are  in  doubt  should  be  investigated, not just those listed in the 
question.  We  use  a  system  of  red  flags  and  have  produced  appropriate 

DK 

EE 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
guidance.  This  helps  the  authorities  to  detect  intentional  infringements  and 
prove  them  in  administrative  proceedings.  Also,  more  experienced  colleagues 
advise and help the officials conducting the grant application procedure to solve 
complex cases. 

EL 

Special Service for Institutional Support and Information Systems: 

a.  beneficiary  or  contractor  linked  to  other  irregularities  or  to  criminal 

ES 

FI 

FR 

HR 

records; 

b.  certain  links  between  beneficiaries,  contractors,  subcontractors  and 

- 

- 

suppliers 
a  history  of  administrative  or  criminal  infringements  committed  in  the 
past by a beneficiary or by a contractor; 
certain  links  between  beneficiaries,  contractors,  subcontractors  and 
suppliers; 

-  whether  the  beneficiary  has recently  worked  in  a  management  position 

- 
- 
- 

in a company applying for EU funding; 
inaccuracies or specific items in certain documents; 
falsification of documents; 
similarity  in  the  format  and  content  of  documents provided  by  different 
contractors  for  the  same  public  procurement  procedure,  or  by  several 
beneficiaries for the same call for competitive grants; 

-  procedural  irregularities  in  the  processing  of  the file concerned; 
- 

irregularities  in  the supporting documents  provided  by  the  recipients  of 
the funds; 
certain  deficiencies 
inappropriateness  of  the  location  of  the  operation,  or  difficulty 
identifying the location of the operation; 

implementation  of  projects;  obvious 
in 

the 

in 

- 

-  disappearance of the investment; 
- 
-  non-existence  of  the  project  after  verification  during  the  on-the-spot 

verification of a change or diversion of the subsidised activity; 

check; 

-  projects with  very significant amendments that prevent  the  fulfilment  of 

the project’s purposes; 
the  existence  of  a 
family 
friendship,  personal 
relationship  between a  contractor  or  beneficiary  and  a  public  employee 
involved  in  the  administrative  procedure  and  who  has  not  abstained 
from that involvement; 
creation of artificial conditions for obtaining the aid, etc. 

relationship  or 

- 

- 

The  pre-trial  investigation  authorities  in  charge  of  the  criminal  investigation 
assess  the  intentional  nature  of  the  act  and  the  constituent  elements  of  the 
criminal offence. 
Links between the aid beneficiary and the suppliers; 
Forgery of documents (undated contracts, forged invoice dates) to ensure that 
the application artificially meets the conditions for access to aid with fraudulent 
intent. 
Contribution from the Ministry of Regional Development and EU funds: 
All of the examples  given in the question could prove useful with regard to the 

42 

 
 
 
European cohesion policy. 

Physical  aspect:  if  a  document  is  physically  altered,  e.g.  by  striking 

Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture: 
Forged paperwork 
- 
through points or instructions or adding information manually 
- 
Substantive  aspect:  if  the  content  of  a  document  is  at  odds  with  the 
actual situation, e.g. a false description of a service rendered, fictitious content, 
forged signatures, etc. 

Links  (personal,  property,  economic)  between  suppliers  under  the  same 

Division of a business entity or partitioning of a project, i.e. a functional, 

Artificial creation of conditions 
- 
financial and technological whole, into two or more parts 
- 
project 
- 
Links  (technical,  technological  or  economic)  between  two  or  more 
business  entities  or  holdings,  in  terms  of  partnership  and  capital,  agricultural 
activity per entity 
- 
blood. 

Owners/managers  in  associated  companies  related  through  marriage  or 

Conflict of interest 
- 

Links between the beneficiary, contractor, subcontractor and supplier. 

Contribution from the Ministry of Agriculture – Directorate of Fisheries: 
Examples  (i)  and  (ii)  should  definitely  be  taken  into  account  when  assessing 
whether  an  irregularity  is  intentional,  i.e.  whether  it  contains  elements  of 
suspected  intentional  conduct.  Implementation  of  the  contract  must  also  be 
considered;  this  is  verified  through  an  on-the-spot  check  at  the  beneficiary’s 
facility  (e.g.  obvious  tampering  with  the  serial  number  on  newly  purchased 
equipment, or with construction log books, etc.). 

Contribution from the Croatian AFCOS: 
Purchase of second-hand rather than new equipment, such as: 

- 

- 

components of a plant incorporating items that were manufactured long 
before  the  date  of  the  equipment  purchase  contract  between  the 
beneficiary  and  the  supplier  (checked  by  running  manufacturer  serial 
numbers  through  publicly  available  search  engines,  comparing  serial 
numbers  with  those  referenced  on  invoices,  checking  identification 
markings on machinery/equipment components); 
visible  damage 
to 
machinery/equipment (ashes, corrosion). 

and  usage  marks  on 

components  of 

The  beneficiary’s  founder  and  procurator  convicted  of  a  crime  by  a  final 
judgment in another country. 

Inconsistency between invoices. For example: 

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HU 

IE 

- 

- 

the invoice and delivery dates on the invoices supplied with the payment 
claims differ from the ones discovered on the invoice recovered from the 
beneficiary during an on-the-spot check; 
late  delivery  of  paperwork  that  had  previously  been  declared  as  non-
existent or was not found at the beneficiary’s premises; 

-  warranty certificate has the same date as the invoice, yet the equipment 

model listed in the warranty certificate is not the same. 

The organisations that identify irregularities use a wide range of criteria to assess 
cases of suspected fraud. The specific set of criteria relevant to a particular case 
is  also  influenced  by  the  objectives  of  the  project  and  the  nature  of  the 
irregularity  in  question.  In  some  areas,  due  to  the  use  of  the  ARACHNE  risk 
management system, some elements of suspected fraud can be detected at the 
first level of control. 

conflicting beneficiary declarations; 
inconsistencies in the supporting documents; 
inaccurate invoices; 
false data; 

In  addition  to  the  examples  given  in  the  question,  the  criteria  considered  may 
include: 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-  ownership problems; 
- 
- 
-  problems with suppliers (e.g. newly established company). 

feasibility of performance; 
links with other projects (e.g. double funding); 

As  a  general  rule,  if the elements  constituting  the  relevant  criminal  offences  as 
defined in the Criminal Code are suspected, the case is referred to the competent 
investigating authorities to establish the existence of fraud. 

•  Beneficiary or contractor linked to other irregularities 
•  Links between beneficiaries/contractors/suppliers 
•  Gaps in processes such as permissions around spend approval 
•  Undisclosed conflicts of interest 
•  Changes in procurement mid-process 
•  Splitting of works into below threshold calls for tender 
•  Leaking bid data 
•  Phantom tenderers 

IT 

In  the  Italian  legal  system,  only  the  judicial  authority  can  assess  whether  an 
irregularity is intentional. 

Successive EU regulations have established that the obligation to report a case in 
the  IMS  system  is  linked  to  ‘the  primary  administrative  or  judicial  finding, 
understood  as  the 
first  written  assessment  made  by  a  competent 
administrative  or  judicial  authority’,  on  the  basis  of  a  full  investigation  which, 
relying  on  ‘actual’  or  ‘specific’ facts,  concludes that  an  irregularity  or fraud  has 
been  committed.  This  conclusion  may  subsequently  have  to  be  adjusted  or 
withdrawn  as  a  result  of  developments  in  the  course  of  the  administrative  or 
judicial procedure. 

44 

 
 
 
 
 
As  provided  by  the  OLAF  Handbook  on  ‘Reporting  of  Irregularities  in  Shared 
Management’, 2017 edition, paragraph 6.2.,  ‘[t]he final decision on whether an 
irregularity  actually  constitutes  fraud  is  the  responsibility  of  the  relevant 
authorities  of  the  Member  State  involved’.  Paragraph  6.3.  of  the  Handbook 
states that, ‘[i]f […] a guilty verdict is pronounced and is not appealed against, the 
case can be considered ‘established fraud’. 

With regard to the precise identification, according to national legislation, of the 
‘primary  judicial  finding’  classifying  an  irregularity  as  fraud  or,  at  least,  as 
suspected fraud, the Committee for combating fraud against the European Union 
had  requested  a  qualified  opinion  from  the  Ministry  of  Justice  which,  in 
summary, replied as follows: 
‘…the  definition  of  judicial  finding  is  highly  conventional,  since  EU  legislation, 
albeit  of  immediate  applicability  and  direct  effect,  does  not  aim  to  harmonise 
national legislations and is intended to be implemented in States with profoundly 
different legal traditions. Thus, this definition must be adapted to the domestic 
regulatory context.’ 

Having said that, it is necessary to steer away from two extreme positions: 
‘On the one hand, the obligation to report cannot certainly arise at the time of 
the initial record of irregularity, even if drawn up by judicial police officers under 
Article 13  of  Law  No 689  of  1981’  (which  is  a  mere  record  of  initial  findings) 
inasmuch as such record has ‘a merely fact-finding value and does not imply any 
assessment by an authority having decision-making powers (even provisional) in 
the context of that procedure.’ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  primary  judicial  finding  cannot  be  a  finding  ‘having  the 
force  of  res  judicata,  which  comes  at  the  final  conclusion  of  the  judicial 
proceedings, if only because [the EU regulations themselves refer to] even mere 
suspicions of fraud.’ 

Consequently, the ‘primary judicial finding’ giving rise to the obligation to report 
a  ‘suspected  fraud’  must  be  identified  as  that  occurring  ‘at  the  time  when  the 
prosecuting  judicial  authority,  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  closing  the  case  and 
deciding  instead  to  launch  a  criminal  action,  formulates  the  charge  and  thus 
makes the first written assessment of irregularity having some form of stability’. 
Hence,  this  primary  finding  takes  the  form,  ‘in  ordinary  proceedings,  of  the 
request for committal for trial or alternative proceedings under Article 405 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure’, and ‘in proceedings before a single-judge court, in 
which  the  public  prosecutor  issues  the  direct  summons  to  trial,  the  decree  for 
summons under Articles 550 and 552 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.’ 

This  is  because  the  option  under  point  (c)  ‘allows  the  necessary  appropriate 
preliminary  examination  of  the  actual  criminal  relevance  of  the  conduct  and 
safeguards the confidentiality of the investigation’ and, moreover, ‘it appears to 
be  correct  also  in  a  systemic  sense,  as  it  establishes  a  similar  mechanism  to 

45 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 129(3) of the Rules Implementing the Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
governs the  management of  information  on  criminal prosecution  in  the  case  of 
offences  that  have  caused  damage  to  the  Treasury,  which  can  include  actions 
against the EU budget.’ 

However, if the misappropriation or wrongful retention of EU subsidies involves 
persons  holding  public  office,  ‘it  is  appropriate  to  consider  as  primary  judicial 
finding any arrest, detention or precautionary detention measures issued against 
such persons, given the grave impact of the unlawful conduct on the system of 
public  offices  in  charge  of  managing  administrative  control  procedures,  in 
accordance  with  the  applicable  provisions’  of  the  national  legislation  on  the 
disclosure to be made to the authority for which the public employee works. 

The  Ministry’s  guidance  was  subsequently  included  in  the  Guidelines  on 
reporting  to the  European  Commission irregularities  and  fraud  against the  EU 
budget, approved by a resolution of the Committee for combating fraud against 
the  European  Union  on  8 October  2019.  As  is  known,  the  Guidelines  currently 
provide that irregular conduct may be classified as: 

- 

- 

‘suspected  fraud’  (code  IRQ3),  in  the  cases  referred  to  in  points  (c)  and 
(e) above; or 
‘established fraud’ (code IRQ5) if a criminal court delivers a guilty verdict 
against a beneficiary and the decision is not appealed (or cannot be 
appealed further).Code IRQ3 is retained in cases of appeals against a first 
instance judgment or appeal judgment. 

In  this  context,  when an  authority enters  in the IMS  system  an  irregularity that 
has been reported to the criminal judiciary - even just via a complaint or a notitia 
criminis - it must (a) report the existence of penal proceedings by inputting the 
code PP in the form to be submitted on the IMS (unless confidentiality demands 
otherwise) and (b) constantly monitor how the competent judicial office’s penal 
proceedings  are  progressing,  so  that  the  main  code  can  be  promptly  changed 
from  ‘irregularity’  to  ‘suspected  fraud’  as  soon  as  the  investigated  parties  are 
indicted or the other above-mentioned conditions occur. 

The Committee regularly highlights these requirements as part of the continuing 
guidance  and  support  it  provides  to  all  managing  authorities  in  Italy.  The 
Committee  stresses the need  to  keep  carefully monitoring  cases  entered  in  the 
IMS  that  are  known  to  have  been  reported  to  the  judicial  authority,  including 
those closed due to decertification or total recovery. 

This monitoring activity could also be facilitated by the full entry into operation 
of  the  EPPO,  which  has  competence  over  all  investigations  into  any  type  of 
offence  concerning  EU  funds  above  EUR 10 000  committed  after  20 November 
2017 (largely coinciding with all the cases of fraud against the EU budget, to be 
entered  in  the  IMS).Concentrating  these  investigations  in  a  few  judicial  offices, 
i.e.  those  involving  European  Delegated  Prosecutors,  could  streamline  the 
judicial 
communication  flow  between  the  managing  authorities  and  the 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
authorities. 

In any event, the national  orientation whereby fraud is  classified as such at the 
time  of  committal  for  trial  seems  to  be  firmly  established  at  present.  It  is  fully 
consistent  with  the  applicable  EU  rules  and  makes  it  possible  to  describe  the 
fraud  on  the  basis  of  actual  and  specific  facts,  as  required  by  the  regulations, 
while  avoiding  ascribing  criminal  liability  to  individuals  without  proper  judicial 
review. Furthermore, the competent national authority considers this criterion to 
be systematically coordinated with other procedural rules governing the external 
reporting of facts that give rise to an offence. 

The  Financial  Police  have  found  that,  when  assessing  whether  an  irregularity 
might  be  intentional  and  so  constitute  suspected  fraud  requiring  further 
investigation,  previous  administrative  inspections  provide  can  provide  useful 
indications  of  fraud  in  thefields  of  taxation  and  public  expenditure  among 
others. 

The  discovery  of  invoices  or  other  documents  relating  to  objectively  or 
subjectively  non-existent  transactions  is  an  aspect  that  can  objectively  justify 
the sending of a notitia criminis to the competent judicial authority. 

Other aspects to be taken into account in assessing whether an irregularity may 
be intentional are: 
in procurement: 

- 

tenders with blatantly unjustified limitations to access, or poor quality of 
tender documentation and specifications, as well as lack of transparency 
in the assessment process and deficiencies in execution; 

-  existence  of  personal  relationships  between  tender  officials  and 
economic  operators  which  can  be  easily  exploited  for  fraudulent 
purposes, taking into account the actual ownership of the relationships; 
-  existence  of  business  networks,  corporations,  possible  shell  companies 
for  submitting  multiple  funding  applications,  controlling  the  project 
supply  chain,  concealing  beneficial  ownership  or  building  artificially  long 
supply chains; 

in applications for incentives/funding/contributions: 

- 
- 
- 

incomplete information or missing or inaccurate supporting documents; 
ineligible expenditure due to failure to comply with requirements; 
incorrect application of reporting rules, failure to meet deadlines; 

with regard to traditional own resources: 

-  evidence of under-invoicing on imports; 
- 
- 

false documentation attesting the release for consumption of products; 
incorrect classification of goods, especially as regards their origin; 

with regard to the area-related aid schemes in the agricultural sector: 

-  evidence that the titles attesting to the ownership or tenure of the land 

benefiting from the premium are false. 

LT 

When assessing whether the violation could be intentional, one must look at all 

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  actual  circumstances  that  could  testify  to  it,  including  the  circumstances 
exemplified  in  the  question,  as  well  as,  for  example:  the  creation  of  artificial 
conditions;  actions  performed  in  a  conflict-of-interest  situation;  deliberate 
actions  of the  funding beneficiary in  continuing to  implement  the  projects  with 
potential infringements of or non-compliance with project implementation rules; 
the  fact  that  beneficiary  has  previously  been  penalised  for  infringements  in  a 
specific field or industry. The guidelines developed by AFCOS  ‘Criminal offences 
against  the  EU’s  financial  interests:  definitions,  typologies,  characteristics  and 
examples of practice’ are applied. 
n/a 
Mainly  beneficiary  or  contractor  having  links  to  other  irregularities  or  having  criminal 
records, or certain links between beneficiary, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers 
Having a thorough understanding of the project and experience in EU funding 
are  considered  two  key aspects  when  assessing  whether  irregularities  warrant 
further investigation. A comprehensive grasp of the project’s intricacies and the 
progress  of  the  project  activities  can  help  in  determining  if  anomalies  or 
irregularities observed demand a more in-depth examination. 

The standard operating procedure on checks and verifications to be carried out 
by managing authorities on conflict of interest and ultimate beneficial owners 
for EU-funded contracts includes a risk assessment checklist. Contracts that 
exceed a certain score will be subject to a detailed check. The risk factors 
covered in this checklist include situations where: the same contractor is 
granted multiple contracts by the same beneficiary; a single bid is received for a 
procurement process; a contract is awarded by a direct award, and a contract 
with a long term duration is awarded. 

The  Public  Procurement  Directives  also  contain  measures  directly  enhancing 
transparency  and  tackling  corruption.  For  instance,  as  the  post-award  period  is 
particularly  vulnerable  to corruption,  the  rules  for  changing  contracts  during 
their term have been clarified to remove any doubts. 

To  gain insight  into the intention  of  a  suspected  fraudster,  it  is  useful to  assess 
whether  the  fraud  triangle factors  (pressure,  opportunity  and  rationalisation) 
are  present  (along  with  capability).  For  example,  a  suspect  living  beyond  their 
means  would  be  an  indicator  that  their  actions  potentially  constituted  not 
merely an irregularity but fraud. 
In  evaluating  the  intentionality  behind  irregularities,  the  Netherlands  applies 
the  EU  definition 
indications 
considered intentional are: falsification  of  documents,  identity fraud,  duplicate 
payment  requests,  claimed  construction  activities  which cannot  be  traced 
during  on-site  visits,  clearly  intentional  omission  of  information,  links  with 
criminal  organisations,  indications  of  collusion  between  organisations  or 
natural persons. 
Article 304(2)  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  requires  national  and  local 
government  institutions  in  Poland  to  report  an  offence  prosecuted  ex  officio 
(where the institution has become aware of such an offence in connection with 

in  Directive  (EU)  2017/1371.  Examples  of 

LU 
LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
its  activities)  to  a  law  enforcement  authority  (public  prosecutor,  the  police  or 
another  body  authorised  to  conduct  investigations).  Based  on  the  offence 
reported, the competent authorities who have received the report may decide to 
initiate an investigation. When reporting an offence, an institution must provide 
evidence  to  substantiate 
indeed  been 
committed.  To  do  so,  an  institution  may  conduct  its  own  investigation,  taking 
into  account  various  aspects,  such  as  personal 
links  with  the  project, 
implementation or involvement in the implementation of a significant number 
of  contracts  and  projects,  previously  detected  irregularities  involving  specific 
entities/persons,  ongoing  proceedings  in  respect  of  the  projects/entities 
concerned. 

its  suspicion  that  an  offence  has 

In  the  field  of  agriculture,  the  paying  agency  now  has  a  list of  signs  of  fraud to 
raise  awareness  among  its  employees  at  all  stages  of  the  administrative  and 
control  cycle  of  anomalies  (signs)  that  could  warrant  suspicion  of  fraud  and  to 
increase the effectiveness of fraud prevention and detection. 
The  list  of  signs  of  fraud  is  non-exhaustive  and  serves  as  a  basis  for  further 
analysis of the applicants’ possible fraudulent conduct. It is updated based on the 
results  of  the  fraud  analysis  carried  out,  the  results  of  audits  and  checks 
conducted  at  the  agency  and  findings  of  the  reports  and  analyses  sent  by  the 
Commission. 

Where there are signs of fraud, checks are performed in order to unequivocally 
confirm  or  dismiss  the  possibility  of  fraud.  The  activities  performed  as  part  of 
such  checks  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  warning  sign  and  may  include,  for 
example, 
issuer’s  data, 
enquiries/telephone  interviews  with  the  issuers  of  the  contested  documents, 
on-the-spot visits/inspections 

cross-checks,  verification  of 

the  document 

PT 

RO 

- 
- 
- 

links between the beneficiary, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers; 
incomplete documents or documents with crossings out; 
supporting  documents  for  expenditure  (invoices)  that  are  not  recorded 
for accounting purposes or not declared to the Tax Authority; 

-  a vague description of the invoiced goods and/or services; 
- 
the same supplier is repeatedly awarded the tender; 
- 
the beneficiary has a history of irregularities and/or debts; 
- 
the  expenditure  presented  does  not  tally  with  the  expenditure  actually 
incurred. 

In accordance with Annex 1 to Government Decision No 875/2011 approving the 
Implementing  Rules 
for  Government  Emergency  Order  No 66/2011  on 
preventing,  detecting  and  sanctioning  irregularities  in  obtaining  and  using 
European funds and/or related national public funds, the aspects (factors) to be 
taken  into  account  when  assessing  whether  an  irregularity  could  be  intentional 
are  the  relevant  fraud  indicators  (warning  signs)  for  public  contracts  and 
procurement, relating to 16 common and recurrent fraud schemes. 

Other aspects mentioned by the managing authorities are: 

- 

the  documentation  submitted  by  the  beneficiary  at  all  stages  of  the 

49 

 
 
 
 
 
- 

- 

- 

including 

implementation, 

regarding  aspects 

(for  example:  self-declaration, 

project’s 
financial statements and other supporting documents); 
the  audit  bodies’ 
involved 
findings 
implementation of the projects carried out by the beneficiaries; 
checks  carried  out  on  the  basis  of  cooperation  protocols  concluded  by 
MIPE with other institutions/relevant bodies (checks using the ARACHNE 
and PREVENT IT systems); 
correspondence  between  the  activities  carried  out  and  the  supporting 
documents  that  the  beneficiary  submits  at  all  stages  of  the  project’s 
implementation,  such  as  self-declaration,  financial  statements  and  the 
documents included in procurement procedure files. 

the 

in 

SE 

SI 

regarding 

For  the  RRF,  checks  are  carried  out  under  Government  Emergency  Order 
the  prevention,  verification  and  detection  of 
No 70/2022, 
irregularities/double  funding,  and  serious  irregularities  found  in  obtaining  and 
using  external  grants  and  loans  allocated  to  Romania  through  the  RRF.  These 
checks address all aspects that may give rise to suspected fraud, such as: 

- 

certain  links  between  the  beneficiary,  contractors,  subcontractors  and 
suppliers; 

-  beneficiaries or contractors linked to other irregularities or with criminal 

records; 
certain inaccuracies or specific elements in certain documents. 

- 

It  is  not  possible  to  give  a  brief  answer  to  this  question.  Each  individual 
notification must be assessed and evaluated on the basis of what can be proven 
in  the  individual  case.  It  is  a  complex  and  qualified  assessment  that  cannot  be 
described in this context. 
The  ERDF  managing  authority  may  serve  as  an  example.  The  authority  can  see 
whether  the  beneficiary  has  been  the  subject  of  any  recoveries  in  current  or 
previous  cases,  and  the  reasons  for  the  recoveries  of  the  respective  aid 
processed  by  the  authority  in  their  administration  system.  This  can  be  an 
indication  of  fraud.  Conflicts  of  interest  and  other  links  between  beneficiaries, 
suppliers  and  subcontractors  can  also  be  an  indication  of  fraud.  Furthermore, 
circumstances that come to light surrounding irregularities can be an indication 
of fraud. Finally, shortcomings in implementation can be an indication of fraud. 
The assessment of intent is ultimately a matter for the police and/or the public 
prosecutor’s office. 
Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development (MKRR)  
Those doing management verifications must pay attention in their work to the 
‘fraud warning signs’ or ‘fraud flags’, that indicate potential fraud, corruption, 
etc. The managing authority’s ‘instructions for carrying out management 
verifications and verifications of the performance of delegated tasks’ contains a 
list of fraud red flags and a reference to additional, extended checking or cross-
checking where there is deviation from normal practice. (Detailed in Chapter 6.4 
‘Fraud indicators’ of the Slovenian managing authority’s instructions for the 
implementation of management verifications for the programming period). 

Slovenian police  

50 

 
 
 
 
Factors that should be taken into account when assessing whether an irregularity 
could constitute a suspicion of fraud and should be further investigated are, for 
example: 
- 
-  missing  supporting  documents  or  certificates  relating  to  eligibility 

insufficient or unclear description of goods or services; 

requirements; 

-  non-disclosure of certain evidence; 
- 

long  response  to  a  request  for  additional  information  or  completion  of 
the application; 
freshly painted machinery or other equipment for an on-site visit; 

- 
-  a recently established company; 
- 

the legal entity is not registered in the commercial register, does not carry 
out the required activity or has recently registered it, does not advertise 
its activity, does not have its own website, has no references; 
family-linked  enterprises;  family  or  business  links  between  civil  servants 
(members  of  the  evaluation  committees)  and  of  the  call  participants, 
subcontractors or suppliers; 

- 

SK 

-  a rapid increase in turnover in a very short period of time  soon after the 

- 
- 

- 
- 

business starts operating; 
the company’s head office is at a residential address; 
the beneficiary, external contractor or subcontractor is established at the 
same address; 
similar signatures on attendance lists and others. 
certain  links  between  beneficiary,  contractors  and  subcontractors; 
undisclosed conflict of interest; 

-  unusual  bidding  patterns  (e.g.  the  bids  are  an  exact  percentage  apart, 
winning  bid  just  under  threshold  of  acceptable  prices  or  exactly  at 
budget  price,  incomplete  bids,  the  same  shortcomings  in  different  bids, 
etc.); 

-  other  apparent  connections  between  bidders,  e.g.  same  time  and  place 

of submission of the bids, etc.; 

-  potential  qualified  contractors  fail  to  bid  and  become  subcontractors  or 

- 
- 
- 

- 

low bidder withdraws and becomes a subcontractor; 
fictitious bidders; 
some items for bids different from the actual contract, etc.; 
certain  links  between  beneficiaries  with  similar  projects  activities  under 
the same call for proposal; 
in  certain  documents;  e.g. 
certain 
inappropriately  reported  accounts,  multiple  invoices  with  the  same 
amount, invoice number, date; 

inaccuracies  or  specific 

items 

- 

-  undocumented  changes  in  contracts,  apparent  irregularities  in  time 
sheets (e.g. time taken to move from one place to another is unrealistic), 
incomplete time sheets, etc.; 
certain  shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of  projects:  excessive 
quantity  of  purchases;  purchases  not  consistent  with  the  goals  of  the 
project;  acceptance  of 
low  quality  of  goods  and  services;  service 
provider cannot be found in any directories or online etc.; 

51 

 
 
-  overpaying for purchases – unwarrantedly high prices; 
- 

the  recipient/project  has  already  been  sanctioned  in  the  past  or  is 
subject of proceedings by law enforcement authorities; 

as  regards  VAT  fraud: previous circumvention  of  legal  regulations,  various  links 
between tax entities, no real business activity, etc. 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
Q.1.10 Have the bodies in charge of detecting irregularities adequate access to information 
to assess these elements and consequently to assess the possibility of intentionality? 
Nearly all Member States (85%) declared that the bodies in charge of detecting irregularities 
have adequate access to information to assess these elements and consequently  to assess 
the possibility of intentionality. 

Yes 

No 
n/a 

Member State 
BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK20,EL21 ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE22, IT, 
LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK 
AT, EE, LV  
SE 

TOTAL 
23  

3 
1 

Q.1.11  Have  you  identified  weaknesses  in  your  reporting  practices  for  a  timely  and 
exhaustive reporting in IMS of suspected fraud cases? 
Most Member States (70.4%) have not experienced weaknesses in their reporting practices 
for a timely and exhaustive reporting in IMS of suspected fraud cases. 

Yes 
No 

Member State 
BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, IT, LV, SI 
AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, FI, FR, HR, HU, IE, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SE, SK 

TOTAL 
8 
19 

Q.1.12 Which measures have been adopted to correct the identified issues? 
MS 
BG 

Input 
The  AFCOS  Directorate  has  issued  Methodological  guidelines  for  irregularity 
management procedures; The AFCOS Directorate  gives comments and  opinions 
by telephone or email regarding the correct managing of the irregularities; 
The AFCOS Directorate checks the information reported in the IMS; 
The  AFCOS  Directorate  conducts  administrative  control  checks  within  the 
managing authorities to identify infringements against procedures for irregularity 
management. Recommendations are made in case of detection of omission. 

20 Yes, enough to handle administrative proceedings. However, administrative proceedings have their 
limitations, and it is therefore essential that, when for further judicial investigations are deemed necessary, 
the police have access to other means. 
The Danish Agricultural Agency: The paying agencies in Denmark do not have the authority, competences and 
resources to investigate and question the parties in suspected fraud cases. 
The Danish Fisheries Agency: No. It is the police who investigate and assess whether there is intent in 
connection with irregularities. 
21 Financial Audit Committee: Yes, the management and control system bodies, including the audit authority 
for co-financed programmes and the supreme national audit body (EDEL), have access to information that 
could trigger suspicions of fraud. As mentioned above, from their audits the MCS bodies can only establish a 
suspicion of fraud. 

Special Service for Institutional Support and Information Systems: The managing authorities responsible for 
detecting irregularities in co-financed projects exchange relevant information through the the DIAVLOS 
internal anti-fraud network platform, to which the anti-fraud officer in each MA has access. 

22 Specific training for intermediate bodies planned. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in  reporting  suspected 

The  AFCOS  Directorate  sends  the  AFCOS  Council  its  analysis  of  the  findings  of 
the administrative control checks, which includes proposals for taking adequate 
measures to eliminate the identified weaknesses in the functioning of the system 
and prevent those weaknesses recurring in the future. 
A permanent working group has been formed for discussing problems and cases 
related to the managing of the irregularities. 
The  AFCOS  Directorate  organises  training  for  irregularity  officers  on  the  topics 
related to the IMS usage and on managing irregularities. 
On the revenue side, the level and platform of communication between the tax 
administration  and  law  enforcement  authorities  now  takes  place  at  a  higher 
level. 
Delays 
fraud  are  generally  related  to  criminal 
investigations when  the EPPO  or  other prosecutors are not permitted to report 
the  case.  We  still  hope  that  OLAF  will  make it possible for the  EPPO to share 
investigation information with Member States’ authorities. 
Financial  Audit  Committee:  The  large  number  of  fields  to  be  filled  in  per 
irregularity/suspected  fraud  case 
IMS,  their  complexity  and  the  dual 
in  reporting 
interpretation  of  some 
irregularity/suspected  fraud  cases  to  OLAF.  However,  despite  these  difficulties, 
the  MCS  bodies  notify  OLAF,  via  IMS,  of  all  cases  of  irregularities/suspicions  of 
fraud detected during their audits. The Greek authorities have often reported the 
difficulties mentioned above – in meetings with OLAF on reporting analysis issues 
and at annual coordination meetings of the audit authority (EDEL) with OLAF and 
other  EU  services  and  in  connection  with  evaluations  of  the  IMS  system.  The 
main concern of the EDEL and the other MCS bodies is to address the difficulties. 
Their hope is that OLAF’s requirements for registration in IMS will be simplified 
as far as possible. 

leads  to  difficulties 

fields,  often 

in 

The  shortcomings  identified  are  not  general,  they  are  limited  to  the  reporting 
by  some  specific  operational programmes/authorities  and  concern  reporting  of 
all  kind  of  irregularities,  not  only  those  relating  to  suspected  fraud.  Steps  are 
being taken to ensure that all outstanding notifications can be submitted. 
According  to  information  provided  by  one  of  the  authorities  concerned,  the 
exchange file for uploading irregularities  for  2014-2020  to  IMS  is  in  production, 
pending  testing  to  ensure  that  the  notifications are  correct,  complete  and 
reliable. Ten cases of suspected fraud were reported in the third quarter of 2023. 

See Italy’s reply to question 1.9. regarding the need for the reporting authorities 
in  criminal  proceedings  and  the 
to  continuously  monitor  developments 
initiatives taken in this regard. 

If necessary, but not less than once a year, letters are sent to  law enforcement 
authorities  with  a  request  to  provide  information  on  the  progress  of  criminal 
proceedings. 

Ongoing  dialogue  between  notifying  authorities  and  the  public  prosecutor’s 
office when notifications are received. 

54 

CZ 

EE 

EL 

ES 

IT 

LV 

SE 

 
 
SI 

Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development 

Persons  carrying  out  management  verifications  have  access  to  the  information 
system  of  the  managing  authority  containing  payment  claims  with  supporting 
documents  from  the  beneficiary  and  other  documentation  relating  to  the 
operation  checked.  They  can  also  check  the  information  using  the  internet,  the 
public  procurement  portal,  Arachne,  GVIN,  AJPES  or  other  data-mining  tools 
adopted at national level. 

Measures to correct weaknesses: Improving administrative checks and updating 
checklists with cross-checks. 

Q.1.13 If YES to Q.1.11. Which of the following areas did you encounter difficulties in? 
Member  States  which  have  experienced  difficulties  in  reporting  practices  for  a  timely  and 
exhaustive  reporting  in  IMS  of  suspected  fraud  cases,  predominantly  struggle  with  the 
following issues. Providing high-quality, complete data in fraud reporting is considered the 
biggest challenge. 

in  a 

fraud 

Difficulties  in  reporting 
practices 
Reporting 
timely manner 
Reporting  all  cases  of 
suspected fraud 
Providing  quality  and 
completeness  of  data  in 
fraud reporting  
Other (specify) 

Member State 

CZ, ES, LV, SI 

LV, SI 

BG, EL, IT,LV, LT 

BG, LV, NL 

Total  

4 

2 

5 

3 

Q.1.14  For  each  marked  answer  in  Q.1.13.  Can  you  provide  an  explanation  of  the  reason 
behind your difficulties? 
Input 
MS 
Some of the difficulties identified are due to a lack of information on the status 
BG 
of  judicial  proceedings  initiated  in  relation  to  the  cases  of  irregularities 
concerned. 
There  are  no  clear  guidelines  for  the  Member  States  on  which  stage  the 
irregularity  should  be  reported as  suspected fraud  at  –the  stage  of the primary 
administrative  or  judicial  finding,  pre-trial  proceedings,  criminal  proceedings  or 
once  an  indictment  is  filed.  This  leads  to  different  practices  and  affects  the 
number of reported cases. Practices need to be aligned in order to obtain reliable 
information  on  suspected  fraud  cases.  Joint  meetings  and  training  sessions  are 
also needed. The national competent authorities have not identified weaknesses 
specifically for suspected fraud, but for irregularities generally. 

Some of the weaknesses identified are explained below: 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
-  The  method  of  entering  financial  information  about  irregularities  in  IMS  does 
not  comply  with  Article 4  of  Regulation  (EU)  2015/1974  under  which  amounts 
reported by Member States must be denominated in euro. Financial information 
about irregularities being investigated is entered in IMS in Bulgarian lev (BGN). 
- A discrepancy was found in the information entered in UMIS and IMS. 
-  The  IMS  irregularity  reports  do  not  include  information  about  financial 
operators  who, 
their  actions  or  omissions,  have  committed 
through 
infringements of EU law or related national law. 
-  The  IMS  irregularity  reports  do  not  include  information  about  judicial  cases 
initiated in relation to cases of irregularities being examined. 
- Information about the full recovery of irregular amounts is not included in the 
IMS irregularity report, but is reported only at national level in UMIS. 
-  Information  about  enforcement  proceedings  initiated  in  relation  to  cases  of 
irregularities being examined is not included in the IMS irregularity report. 
-  The  changed  legal  classification  of  the  infringement  identified  is  not  reported 
either at national level in UMIS or to OLAF in IMS. 
Seeking to end tax proceedings first at the expense of timeliness of notification of 
active infringements. 
Financial Audit Committee: As mentioned in our reply to question1.12, the large 
number of fields to be filled in per irregularity/suspected fraud case in IMS, their 
complexity and the dual interpretation of some fields, often lead to difficulties in 
the  complete  and  qualitative  reporting  of  irregularity/suspected  fraud  cases  to 
OLAF. 
According  to  the  information  provided  by  the  managing  authority  for  the 
2014-2020  ERDF  operational  programmes,  the  main  difficulty  they  have 
faced  is  that  resources  are  scarce  and  had  to  be  devoted  to  implementing 
other developments (arising from regulatory amendments) and to developing 
the Funds 21-27 application. This delay does not entail a problem in the fraud 
detection  capacity  of  the  management  and  control  systems,  as  the 
irregularities detected are in the computerised management system for these 
operational programmes, Funds 2020. 
See Italy’s reply to question 1.17. 
Not all information about criminal cases not initiated by the EU funds authority 
is always initially available. Sometimes there are problems with receiving 
updated information from law enforcement authorities, as information in 
criminal proceedings cannot be openly shared. There can be a failure to provide 
information, due to long deadlines for criminal proceedings. When a large 
number of irregularities are reported, quarterly contact with the specific 
investigator is required to clarify progress. This takes away lot of the institution’s 
capacity to perform its basic functions. Also the purpose and meaning of IMS is 
not fully understood, except for the statistical function. Data entry is very time-
consuming, and adds no value in return (in terms of results or further action). 
Statistics could be provided by linking IT systems without physical data entry. 

CZ 

EL 

ES 

IT 
LV 

SI 

Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development 
Human  factors,  different  understanding/interpretation  of  which  stage  to  report 

56 

 
 
 
suspected fraud at. 

Q.1.15  Have  you  encountered  any difficulties  in  providing  follow-up for investigated fraud 
cases? 
There is a relatively even distribution among the Member States participating in the survey 
that  indicated  that  they  encountered  difficulties  in  providing  follow-up  for  investigated 
fraud cases. 

Yes 
No 

Member State 
BG, CY, CZ, DK, EL, HR, HU, IT, LV, PL, SE, SI, SK 
AT, BE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, LU, LT, MT, NL, PT, RO 

Total 
13 
14 

Q.1.16 If YES to Q.1.15. Has the information flow between judicial and reporting authorities 
improved? 
From  the  Member  States  who  experienced  difficulties 
in  providing  follow-up  for 
investigated fraud cases, the majority (69%) state that the information flow between judicial 
and reporting authorities has partly improved, while the remaining Member States believe 
that this is not the case. 

Improvement information flow   Member State 
Yes, fully  
Yes, partly  
No 
n/a 

CZ 
BG, DK, EL, HU, IT, LV, PL, SE, SK 
CY, HR, SI 
AT, BE, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, IE, LU, LT, MT, NL, 
PT, RO 

Total 
1 
9 
3 
14 

irregularities.  The 

information  on  the  progress  of 

Q.1.17  If  YES  to  Q.1.16.  What  measures  have  been  taken  to  increase  the  exchange  of 
information? 
Input 
MS 
In  case  of  judicial  proceedings,  the  methodological  guidelines  for  managing 
BG 
irregularities  under  the  EU  funds  issued  by  the  AFCOS  in  November  2023  give 
irregularity  officers  may  ask  the 
grounds  for  closing 
inspections  and 
Prosecutor’s  Office  for 
investigations in pre-trial proceedings. 
The  AFCOS  Directorate  organises  round  tables  and  working  groups  with 
representatives  of  the  Bulgarian  competent  authorities,  the  Ministry  of  Interior 
and the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office. 
Within the Bulgarian Prosecutor’s Office, a specialised department at the highest 
level  –  the  Supreme  Prosecutor’s  Office  –  has  been  set  up  and  works  in  close 
cooperation  with  the  AFCOS  Directorate.  There  is  a  constant  and  effective 
electronic exchange of information, which ensures immediate responses in case 
of emergencies 
On the revenue side: Systemic use of the Tax Cobra method of work (a joint team 
of relevant authorities, in which there is an operational exchange of information 
and  coordination  of  individual  proceedings).The  primary  objective  is  protecting 

CZ 

57 

 
 
 
 
 
 
the national budget.  
Most of the contributions to the survey answered ‘No’ to Q.1.15. 

DK 

EL 

The  Danish  Agricultural  Agency  answered  ‘Yes’  to  Q.1.15.  It  reported  that 
communication  between  the  two  authorities  has  improved  through  meetings 
and clearer instructions when handing over cases. 

that 

National Transparency Authority (NTA)/AFCOS: 
The  Management  and  Control  System  of  the  National  Strategic  Reference 
Framework 2021-2027 and, in particular, paragraph 4.5 (‘Follow-up of progress in 
investigation  of  complaints’)  of  Procedure  ΔVIII_3  (‘Reception  and 
the 
examination of complaints’) provides as follows: 
‘The  bodies  responsible  for 
investigating  complaints  (NTA/AFCOS,  EDEL, 
managing  authority)  must  ensure  that  the  investigative  work  is  completed  as 
the  Financial  Management  and  Control 
soon  as  possible  and 
authority/AFCOS is informed, with a copy to the Special Service for Institutional 
Support, the certifying authority and EDEL of the outcome of the investigation.’ 
‘As  the  national  reception  point  for  all  complaints  relating  to  co-financed 
projects,  the  NTA/AFCOS 
is  responsible  for  recording  the  progress  of 
investigating complaints in a single file (complaints table). It uploads this file with 
the  information  communicated  to  it  by  the  investigating  bodies  on  the  NTA 
networking  platform.  Users  can  be  accredited  for  this  platform  by  EDEL,  the 
Special  Service  for  Institutional  Support  and  the  Certifying  Authority,  with  the 
necessary  safeguard  clauses  containing  sensitive  personal  data.  Once  the  NTA 
has posted the complaints table, the EDEL adds the data on the investigation of 
complaints  by  its  services  and  the  CA  then  adds  data  on  expenditure  and 
exceptions for projects. This table is kept as a supporting element for submitting 
the assurance package to the EU.’ 
‘On the basis of the data in the table and in order to determine the amounts of 
expenditure to be declared to the Commission, the CA may send requests to the 
bodies investigating complaints (NTA, EDEL, MA) for information and speeding up 
the investigation procedures throughout the year. 
‘In order to form an informed view and take decisions within the Accounts by CA 
and EDEL, all the updated data relating to the investigation of complaints should 
be available.’ 
In this context, the NTA/AFCOS asks the judicial authorities for an update on the 
progress of the complaints at regular intervals (approximately every 6 months). 
The judicial authorities’ replies are used to  update the AFCOS complaints table, 
from  which  the  audit  authority,  the  certifying  authority  and  the  Special  Service 
for Institutional Support are informed of the progress of all complaints. 

HU 

IT 

Cooperation  agreements  have  been  concluded  between  the  Directorate  of 
Internal Audit and Integrity and the investigating authorities to improve the flow 
of information. 
A  tracking  system  has  been  set  up  to  follow  up  on  investigations  initiated 
following complaints. 
As already illustrated in Italian replies to previous questions, COLAF, in the framework of 
the guidance and orientation action constantly carried out in respect to all the Managing 

58 

 
 
for 

the 

subject 

improving 

"Guidelines 

Authorities  on  the  national  territory,  periodically  provides  specific  directives  which  are 
elaborated on the basis of the innovations that have happened in the matter or of the 
criticalities detected over time on the basis of the experience gained in the field; most 
recently, last January, a specific circular was issued to all the competent Authorities with 
the 
the 
compilation/implementation of the irregularity/fraud reporting forms in the IMS system" 
aimed  precisely  at  overcoming  certain  criticalities  detected  at  the  central  level,  also 
following the continuous and profitable information exchange with the European Offices. 
M.S." aimed precisely at overcoming certain critical issues detected at the central level, 
also as a result of the continuous and fruitful exchange of information with the European 
Offices. 
Specifically,  in  order  to  have  a  better  guide  and  support  the  managing  authorities  in 
adopting  correct,  complete  and  consistent  input  and  update  procedures,  the criticality 
profiles  under  examination and the relevant  indications have  been distinctly examined 
according to whether they are: 
a.  general aspects, namely: 

procedures 

for 

(1)  how to create, save and finalise the report case; 
(2)  timing of case updates due to new developments; 
(3)  cases relating to previous programming; 
(4)  drafting of the Special Notice in cases of irrecoverability of sums to be brought 

to the charge of the European Union; 
(5)  updating  of  cases  already  closed 

for  which 
judicial/administrative/accounting proceedings are still ongoing; 

IMS 

in 

the 

relevant 

(6)  timely monitoring of all cases  in the system for which the Judicial Authority is 

known to be involved; 

b.  correct,  complete  and  consistent  implementation  of  the  fields  on  the  form,  with 

specific regard to the following aspects: 
(1)  incorrect selection procedure when closing an IMS case; 
(2)  incorrect allocation of codes in case of decertification of the EU amount and full 

recovery of the national share; 

(3)  excessive  use  of  generic  codes  in  field  6.8  and  correct  and  consistent 

implementation of field 6.9; 

(4)  excessive use of generic codes in fields 7.2 and 7.3; 
(5)  failing to indicate amounts for statutory interest in field 9.12; 
(6)  omitted/incomplete/incorrect completion of Section 10; 
(7)  incorrect  representation  of  events  in  the  "Comments"  field  -  point  11.1  and 

omitted/incomplete/inconsistent entry of fields 11.3 and 11.4. 

As already pointed out on several occasions, among the issues subject to more in-depth 
analysis and more incisive awareness-raising with respect to the managing authorities to 
which the aforementioned note is addressed, there is undoubtedly that relating to the 
need to constantly and carefully monitor the judicial developments of the cases entered 
into  the  system,  when  the  involvement  of  the  Judicial  Authority  is  known,  including 
those closed for decertification or total recovery. 
On  this  matter,  the  possibility  was  reiterated  that,  in  the  event  that  a  managing 
authority encounters difficulties in interacting with the judiciary, it may contact the Unit 
of the Guardia di Finanza for the repression of frauds against the European Union, as the 
Technical  Secretariat  of  COLAF,  which,  also  thanks  to  the  specialised  or  territorial 
branches of the Guardia di Finanza, they will be able to seek proper solutions to facilitate 
the monitoring in question.  
If necessary, but not less than once a year, letters are sent to law enforcement 
authorities with a request to provide information on the progress of criminal 

LV 

59 

 
 
proceedings.  Since  the  EPPO  started  its  operations  ,  we  have  a  certain 
procedure for communication, determined by the guidelines developed by the 
AFCOS’s ‘Criminal offences against the financial interests of the EU: definitions, 
typologies,  signs  and  examples  of  practice’.  Likewise,  we  hold  informal 
consultations  with  investigators,  prosecutors  and  communication  through  the 
AFCOS.  We 
through 
communication with  employees  from  law  enforcement  institutions,  explaining 
the  details  and  nuances  of  our  institution’s  needs  and  rationale,  but  systemic 
improvements have not been made so far. 

to  create  an  understanding 

independently 

try 

PL 

SK 

Regarding  anti-fraud measures  in  the  field of  cohesion  policy,  the  management 
and control system institutions have established  cooperation links with external 
institutions.  For  example,  the  National  Public  Prosecutor  and  the  minister 
responsible for regional development  have concluded a cooperation agreement 
on providing information on ongoing and closed proceedings concerning projects 
co-financed by the EU. Under that agreement, there is a regular exchange of data 
on  beneficiaries  of  EU  funds  who  are  under  investigation.  In  addition,  some 
institutions  make  use  of  the  possibility  put  questions  to  the  staff  of  the  Public 
Prosecutor’s  Office  when  they  need 
information  promptly  on  ongoing 
proceedings. 
In accordance with existing sectoral procedures in the field of agriculture,  when 
an institution refers a case to law enforcement authorities, it is obliged to keep 
the  data on  criminal  proceedings in the  relevant  register  of  irregularities  up-to-
date until the proceedings come to an end. In the absence of information about 
the  current  stage  of  criminal  proceedings,  the  competent  institution  must 
request up-to-date information from the law enforcement authorities conducting 
the investigation, and use it to update the data in the register. The verification of 
pending cases is carried out on a quarterly basis until the case is closed. 
Due  to  data  confidentiality,  it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  obtain  information  from 
law  enforcement  authorities  concerning  ongoing  cases,  especially  where  the 
institution asking for information is not the entity that reported the case. 
Relevant  authorities  are  obliged  to  communicate  with  the  competent 
authorities  and  ask  for  updates  on  the current  state  of  proceedings  on  a 
regular basis. 

60 

 
 
 
 
 
Digitalisation of the fight against fraud high on Member States’ agenda 

Q.2.1. Are you ensuring the digitisation of the fight against fraud is part of your NAFS? 
Most Member States (63%) have incorporated digitalisation of their fight against fraud into 
their  NAFS.  Since  considering  and  implementing  digitalisation  is  relevant  to  identifying 
existing  and  future  threats  arising  from  new  technologies,  it  remains  an  area  of  concern. 
Several  Member  States  have  not  yet  integrated  digitalisation  as  part  of  their  NAFS.  These 
Member States may need to be better prepared for the threat posed by digitalisation in the 
fights against fraud. 

Digitalisation   Member State 
Yes 

No 
n/a 

AT, BE, BG, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, LV, LU, LT, MT, PT, SI, 
SK 
CY, CZ, DE, FI, HR, NL, PL, RO, SE 
IE23 

Total 
17 

9 
1 

Q.2.2  Have  you  implemented  measures  to  identify  and  address  the  threats  posed  by new 
technologies? 
While  a  few  Member  States  (145%)  have  already  fully  implemented  measures  to  identify 
and address the threats posed by new technologies, most  Member States (54%) have only 
partly implemented some measures. 

In other words, while most Member States have made a good start with the implementation 
of measures to identify and address the threats posed by new technologies, it is  important 
that  they  continue  investing  in  innovative  measures  to  adequately  address  the  future  of 
technological developments in the fight against fraud. 

Stage of implementation of measures to identify and address the threats posed 
by new technologies

Not yet started
Partly implemented with room for improvement
Fully implemented

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

N° of Member States having replied

23 Ireland does not have an overarching national anti-fraud strategy. Relevant agencies and departments 
within the national system have operational expertise and engagement in EU fraud matters. Irish anti-fraud 
stakeholders include representatives from the shared management expenditure areas of the EU budget, 
Revenue Commissioners, individuals involved in reporting irregularities and others, such as the national police 
and security service (An Garda Siochana), auditors and public prosecutors. Each stakeholder is responsible for 
ensuring that efficient strategies and systems are in place to counter fraud and irregularities, and for ongoing 
monitoring and reporting. 

61 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage of implementation  
Fully implemented 
Partly  implemented  some  threat 
identification  failures  with  room 
for improvement 
Not yet started 
n/a 

Member State 
DE, IT, PL, RO 
AT,  BE24,  BG,  CZ,  DK,  EE,  ES,  FI,  FR,  HU,  LV, 
LT, PT, SE, SI 

Total 
4 
14.5 

BE25, CY, EL, HR, MT, NL, LU, SK 
IE 

7.5 
1 

Q.2.3 If YES to Q.2.2. Can you explain and give some examples? If possible, please make a 
distinction  between  measures  in  relation  to  expenditure  and  measures  in  relation  to 
revenue. 
MS 
AT 

Input 
Revenue-related: 

-  automate information exchanges between authorities at national level 
-  push  to  digitalise  processes  on  financial  management  services  for 

- 

individuals and businesses; 
future  use  of  artificial 
technologies to identify certain patterns and for monitoring 

intelligence,  digitalisation  and 

innovative 

-  more data-based anti-fraud measures; 
-  gradual replacement of analogue procedures by electronic processes; 
-  use  of  predictive  analytics  should  already  be  taken  into  account  when 

designing processes or IT procedures 

-  extension  of  no-stop  shops  –  i.e.  application-free  systems  –  or  one-stop 

shops so necessary information needs to be provided only once. 

BE 

BG 

CY 
CZ 

The human factor is still included in all processes. 
ERDF RBC 
Expenditure 
- new, improved database for the collection of data on ERDF 
-  access  to  the  UBO  register  of  ‘ultimate  beneficial  owners’  for  RRF  for  ex ante 
and ex post verifications  
An  analysis of the  threats  posed by new technologies  used  in  the  management 
and  control  system  of  the  EU  funds  and  programmes  is  planned,  along  with 
recommendations  and  an  action  plan  for  addressing  the  identified  risks  and 
threats. The documents necessary for the implementation of a tender procedure 
are under preparation. 
n/a 
REVENUE – electronic method of requesting tax information by law enforcement 
agencies;  identification of  the  legitimacy  and  legality  of  requesting this  type  of 
information for criminal proceedings. 
EXPENDITURE  –  partial  updates  and  new  versions  of  monitoring  systems 
IS MS 2014 and MS 2021; 
Under CAP: AMS – area monitoring system; increased protection for the external 

24 ERDF RBC, AGENSTSCHAP LANDBOUW EN ZEEVISSERIJ. 
25 ERDF Wallonia, AGENSTSCHAP LANDBOUW EN ZEEVISSERIJ. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
DE 

DK 

EE 

and  internal  perimeter  of  the  information  system  of  the  State  Agricultural 
Intervention Fund (SZIF); ARM – implementation of Active Risk Manager software 
(overview of fraud and irregularity risks); linking to state registers. 
General remarks: Germany, as a federal state, does not have a national anti-fraud 
strategy. In this context, however, we refer to  p. 51 et seq. of Germany’s Digital 
Strategy 
(https://digitalstrategie-
deutschland.de/static/fcf23bbf9736d543d02b79ccad34b729/Digitalstrategie_Akt
ualisierung_25.04.2023.pdf) 

2022-2025, 

Measures reported here have been taken at  Land level. Replies from the Länder 
(ERDF) range from: ‘Yes, fully implemented’ via ‘Yes, partly implemented’ to ‘No, 
not yet started’. 

Hanseatic City of Bremen: no NAFS, but Transparency Register used. 
Federal  State  of  Lower  Saxony:  risk  description  and  risk  assessment  within  the 
self-assessment tool, including unauthorised access to IT equipment, IT systems 
and bank accounts, as well as hacking where it affects the intermediate body and 
the managing authority. 
Denmark  does  not  have  a  NAFS  covering  all  sectors.  Denmark  has  four  sectoral 
national strategies for: i) cohesion policy funds; ii) agricultural funds; iii) fisheries 
funds; iv) the Recovery and Resilience Facility. 
The Danish audit body has started implementing the anti-fraud IT tool, Arachne. It 
is  expected  that  Arachne  will  be  able  to  identify  and  address  threats  posed  by 
new technologies. The audit body continuously monitors whether there are new 
risks, including risk from new technologies, that need to be addressed. If threats 
from  new  technologies  arise,  the  audit  body  and  the  implementing  bodies  will 
design controls to mitigate the specific risks. 
An important technological innovation is introduction of the surface monitoring 
system  for  agricultural  area  subsidies,  which  is  based  on  satellite  monitoring 
technology, and can be used to detect and penalise falsified claims. Its use will be 
mandatory  from  2023.  An  AI-based  system  to  verify  claims  from  geotagged 
photos will be developed later and also made mandatory. 
Other  examples  of  the  use  of  technology  and  data  in  anti-fraud  activities  in 
agriculture: 

•  cross-use  of  data  in  ePRIA,  the  application  acceptance  service  and 
application  processing  system  of  the  Estonian  Agricultural  Registers  and 
Information Board (PRIA),  advance notification system, and implementation 
of automatic checks; 
risk  management 
assessment; 
integrating  risk-based  administrative  control  into  the  procedural  system 
with the risk feedback system. 

information  system,  automation  of  risk 

in  the 

• 

• 

The  revenue  area  explains  that  there  are  general  issues  with  data  and  data 
quality.  Therefore, they have launched  a data management  project  –  describing 
all  data  based  on  the  systems,  so  that  it  is  in  a  standard  format.  They  plan  to 
create a data warehouse. 

63 

 
 
 
 
 
ES 

On the revenue side, according to information from the State Tax Administration 
Agency,  specific  controls  have  been  designed  for  e-commerce.  Work  is  also 
underway  with  a  view  to  using  information  on  a  massive  scale  to  detect  risk 
transactions. 

On  the  expenditure  side,  the  utilities  of  the  fund  management  software 
applications  have  been  improved  to  allow  more  checks  to  be  carried  out 
through  them  (e.g.  underlying  procurement  of  contracting  authorities  and 
applications for the identification of SMEs in ApliFEMP, the monitoring software 
application  used  by  FEMP,  the  Spanish  Federation  of  Municipalities  and 
Provinces). 

The  Central  Register  of  Beneficial  Ownership  has  been  created.  Serving  as  a 
single central register for the whole of Spain, the register will collect and publish 
current  beneficial  ownership  information  relating  to  all Spanish  legal  persons, 
trusts,  and  similar  unincorporated  entities  or  structures  operating  in Spain.  The 
information  in  the  register  will  be  accessible,  free  of  charge  and  without 
restriction, to the authorities  responsible for  preventing, detecting, investigating 
and  prosecuting  terrorist  financing,  money  laundering  and  predicate  offences, 
both  national  and  from  other  EU  Member  States.  It  will  also  be  accessible  to 
national authorities and bodies managing, verifying, paying or auditing European 
funds. 

In  relation  to  the  Recovery,  Transformation  and  Resilience  Plan,  a  ‘data-mining’ 
software  tool  (MINERVA)  has been  created  at  the  State  Tax  Administration 
Agency.  It  is  used  by  all  managers  of  funds  from  the Recovery,  Transformation 
and  Resilience  Plan  to  carry  out  a  systematic  analysis  to  prevent  conflicts  of 
interest in procurement and grant award procedures 
The  authorities  responsible  for  the  different  EU-funded  programmes  are 
digitising their operations in line with their own assessments and resources. 
For example, technical tools (infrastructure security tool, software code security 
tool,  code  dependency  security  tool,  software  vulnerability  analysis  tool)  have 
been  introduced  and  practical  measures  (security  audit,  including  hacking  and 
penetration  testing  conducted  by  external  security  experts)  have  been  taken 
when implementing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). 
The  Finance  Act  2024,  adopted  on  29/12/2023,  contains  measures  to  combat 
fraud related to the use of new technologies. The Act: 
– granted a two-year extension of the experiment allowing tax and customs 
administrations to detect tax fraud through the collection and use of certain 
platform data 
online, and broadened the scope of the experiment; 
– allowed public finance officers to use pseudonyms to carry out active 
investigations on websites, social networks and messaging applications. 
These  measures  will  help  to  combat  revenue  fraud  and  thus  protect  the  EU’s 
financial interests. 
Security  and  protection  measures  related  to  the  monitoring  and  information 
system  for  managing  EU  funds  (such  as  the  implementation  and  operation  of  a 

FI 

FR 

HU 

64 

 
 
 
 
 
IT 

two-factor authentication system). 
The Italian anti-fraud system comprises a comprehensive framework of agencies 
and police forces. All these bodies have internal structures dedicated to analysing 
crime and threats arising from new technologies. 

With  specific  reference  to  cybersecurity  aspects,  Decree-Law  No 82  of  14 June 
2021 established the Agency for National Cybersecurity (ACN) to protect security 
and resilience in cyberspace. In particular, the Agency has the following tasks: 

-  prevent and mitigate cyberattacks, on national public and private entities 

that provide essential functions and services; 
facilitate strategic technological autonomy in the digital sector; 

- 
-  evaluate  IT  products  and  services  and  carry  out  regulatory  compliance 

inspections and audits in the field of cybersecurity; 

-  deliver training to improve professional skills in the relevant professional 
sector and organise cybersecurity awareness and information campaigns. 

PL 

Poland  has not adopted  a  national  anti-fraud  strategy  (NAFS)  and  the  European 
Commission does not oblige Member States to do so. There are direct possibilities 
for  the  digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  and  the  use  of  modern 
technologies  in  Poland  by  the  relevant  investigation  services.  The  institutions 
involved in  implementing  EU  funds  are  aware  of  the  increase  in  the use  of new 
technologies  to  commit  criminal  offences.  They  can  engage  indirectly  in  the 
digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  by  using  IT  systems  that  support  the 
processing of applications and grant agreements, and control of EU funds. 

In  Poland,  the  CST2021  (Centralny  System  Teleinformatyczny  2021;  ‘Central  IT 
System’)  applications are  covered  by  a  development  and  maintenance 
agreement with a contractor for systems forming part of CST2021. Maintenance 
services  include,  but  are  not  limited  to,  administrator-level  support  ensuring 
correct  functioning,  high  performance,  security, availability  and  reliability  of  the 
systems and security of the systems and of the data stored and processed in them 
by  the  contractor.  These  services  are  intended  to  prevent  any  unauthorised 
access (including intrusion) and disruption or interruption of operation. 

Steps are continuously being taken to identify possible gaps in digital skills, and a 
preventive  approach  has  been  adopted.  In  the  case  of  staff  involved  in  the 
implementation and development of IT systems, employees have the opportunity 
to  acquire  new  skills  through  various  types  of  training,  courses  and  study 
programmes in the field of information technologies. 

In  addition,  technical  support 
is  provided  by  the  contractor  under  the 
development  and  maintenance  agreement  for  those  systems.  For  system  users, 
manuals for the different applications are available in various forms (descriptive 
instructions, multimedia tutorials). Continuous interactive training is provided on 
how to use the systems, along with ongoing support from teams responsible for 
specific  applications.  Dedicated  databases  at  the  paying  agency  enable  the 
recording  of  suspected and  confirmed  cases  of fraud.  These databases are  used 

65 

 
 
 
 
 
 
by  all  of  the  agency’s  organisational  units  (i.e.  district  offices,  regional  branches 
and  the  relevant  departments  at  the  head  office)  and  entities  carrying  out 
delegated tasks that are involved in the detection of irregularities and fraud 
Revenue-related measures: 
–  Development  of  an  IT  project  linking  up  the  reporting  systems  that  are 
important for the logistics chain. In this way, the risk analysis performed early in 
the logistics chain (pre-loading or pre-arrival) can be taken into account, in terms 
of the level of risk, the area of risk, the type of check and time for the check, so 
that  the  risk  analysis  takes  place  at  the  most  appropriate  time  in  the  logistics 
chain, thus ensuring more effective and efficient risk mitigation. 
–  Given the amendments  to  VAT  legislation  on  the  fight  against  VAT  fraud  in  e-
commerce in the EU (Central electronic system of payment information – CESOP), 
draft  legislation  was  presented  transposing  Directive  (EU)  2020/284 
into 
Portuguese  law.  This  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  Law  No 81/2023,  which  is  still 
being implemented. 
– Through participation in EU-level working groups, we have been able to bring 
our practices into line with those of tax authorities in the other Member States, in 
particular  on  the  definition  of  data  structures  and  on  the  rules  and 
communication mechanisms to be implemented in 2024. 
Expenditure-related measures: 
– Information security certification (ISO 27001) of the Institute for the Financing 
of Agriculture and Fisheries (Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas – 
IFAP, I.P.) 
–  Certification  of  the  Information  Security  Management  System  (Sistema  de 
Gestão  de  Segurança  da  Informação  –  SGSI)  maintained  in  accordance  with 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (confirmed during the second follow-up audit). The SGSI has 
a  systematic  approach  involving  a  series  of  policies,  procedures,  records, 
resources  and  related  activities,  which  are  managed  collectively  to  protect  the 
information assets. This approach is based on risk assessment and risk processing 
with  a  corresponding  risk  acceptance  level.  It  is  designed  to  manage  risks 
effectively and implement the appropriate checks to ensure that the information 
assets are protected. 
– Development of application systems with densification at validation level. 
– Awareness-raising and training activities carried out by trainers and specialist 
IT  (cybersecurity)  bodies,  and  measures  to  raise  awareness  and  deepen 
knowledge  of  the  use  of  tools  (e.g.  Arachne)  carried  out  by  bodies  using  the 
management and control systems for EU funds. 
Implementation of  the National  Anti-Fraud  Strategy  (NAFS) has  only  just  begun. 
The measures will be discussed in working groups, after which the decisions will 
be disseminated. 
This  is  a  work  in  progress  in  terms  of  both  analytical  tools  and  tools  for  data 
collection, etc. 
For example, the Swedish ESF Council’s 2024 action plan on anti-fraud measures 
includes training initiatives to combat organised financial crime. In this context, 
AI is an area in which the authority is planning to develop skills. 
Given  the  material  competence  of  the  Financial  Administration,  we  focus 
primarily  on  revenue-related  measures.  For  anti-fraud  measures,  we  use  the 

PT 

RO 

SE 

SI 

66 

 
 
QlikView  (QV)  analytical  platform  and  its  updated  successor  QlikSense  (QS). 
Within  these platforms, we  are developing  new applications  for  specific aspects 
of customs (such as customs value, CP42 customs procedure, import, transit and 
export  procedures,  prohibitions  and  restrictions,  including  sanctions,  excise 
duties,  etc.)  and  taxes  (type  of  tax,  e.g.  risk  analysis  in  the  field  of  corporate 
income tax). The purpose of the applications is to  identify the situation, trends, 
suspicious  patterns,  transactions  and  suspicious  economic  operators  and, 
consequently, to carry out risk analysis and identify the most risky debtors. The 
QlikSense platform also allows the use of machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
predictive analytics and questioning in natural language. This tool helps us take a 
more  systematic  approach  to  managing  tax  and  customs  risks  by  segment  of 
taxable  persons,  key  activities  and  risk  groups,  thereby  helping  the  financial 
administration to achieve its objectives faster. 

In the fight against fraud, we also use the  KNIME software tool with the Rando 
Tree scientific model. 
Based  on  reported  data  and  the  history  of  controls  carried  out,  liable  entities 
constitute  the  highest  risk.  We  currently  use the  model for  selecting  controls  in 
the  field  of  corporate  income  tax.  This  method  of  selecting  control  entities 
complements traditional selection methods. 

Another software tool, Fraud Management, supports risk management using risk 
indicators (methods) that are key to identifying an individual risk. It allows for a 
quicker  identification  of  risks  on  a  large  body  of  data  and  a  simpler,  centralised 
and  more  efficient  allocation  of  cases  to  control  bodies.  The  tool  also  requires 
control bodies to provide feedback to evaluate the suitability of the selected risk 
for control and, on this basis, the possibility of making ‘pre-qualification analyses’. 

We also use the SAP Business Objects Business Intelligence suite, which enables 
data to be processed quickly and makes it possible to perform complex analysis of 
business data in real time, as well as to report and visualise it. 
The Financial Administration has identified the need to capture data from open 
source  intelligence  for  controlling  the  growing  trade  through  online  shops  and 
social  networks  (market  place).  For  these  purposes,  we  are  planning  to  procure 
appropriate tools to obtain structured data at system level, which will be further 
analysed with the above-mentioned tools 

Q.2.4 Does your strategy ensure one of these approaches to develop the IT architecture? 
Most  Member  States  have  adopted  a  strategy  that  ensures  various  approaches  to 
developing  the  IT  architecture,  in  particular  inventory  of  existing  tools,  maintenance  of 
interoperability  between  these  tools  and  the  development  of  new  tools  for  the  IT 
architecture, see table below. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Inventory of existing tools
Maintaining interoperability between these tools
Developing new tools for the IT architecture (examples)
None of the above
Other

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

N° of Member States having replied

AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, IT, LV, MT, PL, RO, SI

AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, ES, MT, SI   

IT architecture   Member State 
of 
Inventory 
existing tools 
Developing  new 
tools  for  the  IT 
architecture 
(examples) 
Maintaining 
interoperability 
between 
tools 
None  of 
above 
Other 

HR, LU 

these 

the 

CZ, FR, HU, IT, NL, SK 

AT, DE, DK, CZ, EE, ES, FI, IE, IT, LV, LT, MT, PL, SI 

Total 
17 

8 

14 

2 

6 

OTHER: 

FR:  One  of  the  objectives  of  the  French  NAFS  is  to  detect  fraud  by  strengthening  the 
collection  of  sharing  and  exploitation  of  data.  Data  collection  involves,  for  example,  the 
setting up by some administrations of an alert collection platform. As regards data sharing, 
managing  authorities  have  started  to  consider  setting  up  a  single  database  to  cross-check 
relevant information and avoid duplication financing. Data is analysed using European-level 
tools (such as Arachne or transaction network analysis (TNA)). National analytical tools have 
been  developed  to  better  target  fraud  (such  as  a  tool  for  targeting  flows  customs).  Also 
under  discussion:  the  use  of  artificial  intelligence  in  investigations  to  detect  fraudulent 
entities as early as possible. 

IT: On this point, Italy has established a comprehensive system that fully meets the need to 
prevent and combat fraud against the EU. Each institution, agency and body responsible for 
managing  European  resources  in  various  capacities  and  according  to  its  competences  has 
over time set up a number of systems, applications, databases, methods and procedures to 
ensure  effective  prior  assessment  of  the  risk  of  fraud,  corruption,  conflict  of  interest  and 
double funding in connection with EU budget implementation. 

With regard to budget revenue, in particular traditional own resources,, in 2022 and 2023 
the  Customs  and  Monopolies  Agency  mainly  used  three  methods  to  select  and  analyse 
customs declarations to detect fraud against the EU budget, particularly via under-invoicing. 

68 

 
 
 
 
 
 
-  The first method is based on the value thresholds taken from the Theseus database 
operated  by  the  Commission’s  Joint  Research  Centre.  This 
is  a  statistical 
methodology  to  select  declarations  with  a  value  below  a  fair  price  calculated  at 
European  level,  hence  at  high  risk  of  under-invoicing  of  imports,  by  identifying 
correct value ranges for goods. 

-  The  second  method,  dubbed  ‘credibility’,  is  another  statistical  approach  which  is 
used  to  select,  at  the  time  of  customs  clearance,  import  declarations  that  show 
statistical  anomalies  giving  rise  to  a  strong  suspicion  of  under-invoicing  of  the 
declared import value. 

-  The  third  method  uses  a  Python  algorithm  to  detect  all  items  having  unit  values 
(EUR/kg)  considered  to be  abnormal, among declarations with  an  intrinsic  value  of 
less  than  EUR 150,  hence  benefiting  from  customs  relief  under  Regulation  (EC) 
No 1186/2009, and submitted by the main declarants,. 

More generally, as part of its cooperation with EU bodies and with OLAF, the Customs and 
Monopolies  Agency  systematically  analyses  the  entire  information  flow  originating  from 
those bodies, and on this basis prepares risk profiles and updates/amends existing profiles. 

Similarly,  as  part  of  cooperation  with  the  Commission  and  the  other  Member  States’ 
customs administrations, risk information forms from other Member States, competent EU 
bodies  and  Italian  customs  offices,  are  analysed  with  a  view  to  entering  or  amending  risk 
profiles. 

In the area of investigations relevant to relations with the EPPO, a large number of analyses 
to detect fraud against the EU budget have been carried out, in particular: 

-  bimonthly review of national penal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the EPPO, 
to  monitor  the  effectiveness  of  investigations  into  illegal  conduct  affecting  the  EU 
budget and to constantly assess the greater entitlements established by the Agency; 
-  use of the anti-fraud/AIDA database to examine the types of fraud recorded there so 

as to identify new criminal offences; 

-  analysis of imports from the UK by domestic operators, after Brexit, to verify correct 
use of the preferential origin of the goods and thus ensure that the goods would not 
be imported duty-free; 

-  analysis of alerts about administrative investigations conducted by OLAF and  about 
possible evasion of customs duties, for the aspects under the specific jurisdiction of 
the European Public Prosecutor. 

One of the databases most often used by the Customs and Monopolies Agency is COGNOS, 
which collects information on goods imported into the EU. For each product it provides the 
permitted value range within which the declared value of the goods may vary. 

This  database  is  fed  with  national  and  international  data  from  customs  declarations  and 
recapitulative statements of intra-Community purchases and supplies. As a result, it possible 
to identify, with the greatest precision, for each tariff heading, the raw material used, the 
name of the importing company, the more or less well-known brands of the imported goods 
and hence the value and quality of products similar to the one being checked. 

69 

 
 
Other systems widely used for risk analysis in this sector include: 

- 

InDEx  VIES,  to  consult  intra-EU  transactions  and  then  compare  them  with  the  tax 
data on the SerPICo application (acronym for Servizio Per i Contribuenti, a taxpayer 
service developed by the Revenue Agency and containing data from tax returns and 
other communications submitted by taxpayers); 

-  ORBIS which provides detailed information on corporate structures on a global scale; 
OWNRES,  which  collects  cases  of  fraud  relating  to  traditional  own  resources  for 
amounts exceeding EUR 10 000; and 

-  Theseus,  which  provides  the  correct  market  price  by  type  of  goods,  in  order  to 

identify under-invoicing offences. 

As  regards  budget  revenue,  in  particular  VAT,  the  Italian  Revenue  Agency  uses  the 
computerised TNA (transaction network analysis) tool developed by the Commission within 
EUROFISC.  TNA  enables  the  acquisition  and  joint  analysis  of  the  information  contained  in 
the  VIES  system  for  all  EU  Member  States.  The  tool  is  particularly  useful  in  identifying 
parties involved in intra-EU VAT fraud schemes. 

The intention for the coming years is to enhance risk analysis, for example through the use 
of new artificial intelligence and machine learning tools. 

In terms  of  technological  capabilities,  a new  anti-fraud  analysis tool,  TAXNET,  has become 
fully  operational.  This  tool  makes  a  number  of  different  databases  (electronic  invoices, 
master  data,  payments,  VIES  database,  etc.)  interoperable,  so  that  it  is  possible  to 
automatically reconstruct the entire fraud chain and rapidly map the links and recurrences 
between the various entities. 

With regard to budget expenditure, risk assessment on cohesion policy funding is covered 
by the main control functions of the various managing authorities. These closely follow the 
Commission’s  ‘EGESIF  Guidance  Note  No 14-0021-00  of  16 June  2014  on  Fraud  Risk 
Assessment  and  Effective  and  Proportionate  Anti-Fraud  Measures’  and  use  the  Arachne 
system  extensively  in  accordance  with  the  ‘National  Guidelines’  drawn  up  by  a  dedicated 
national working group within the State General Accounting Department of the Ministry of 
the Economy and Finance. 

At central level, the Inspectorate General for Financial Relations with the European Union 
(IGRUE),  also  embedded  in  the  State  General  Accounting  Department  is  responsible  for 
coordinating  audit  authorities  and  functions  and  has  issued  its  own  ‘Manual  of  Audit 
Procedures’ (Version 7 of 21 July 2021), which has a specific paragraph on risk assessment. 

In this context, the IGRUE has developed a national risk assessment methodology, available 
on  the  MyAudit  information  system,  which  has  a  greater  level  of  detail  and  some 
differences  compared  with  the  methodology  in  the  EGESIF  Guidance  Note,  especially 
regarding the risk score calculation. 

The  Financial  Police,  whose  economic  and  financial  police  functions  also  encompass  all 
types  of  infringements  against  the  national  and  EU  budgets,  develops  its  risk  analysis  and 
assessment activities on both the revenue and expenditure sides. 

70 

 
 
To  combat  VAT  fraud,  the  Special  Revenue  Protection  and  Anti-Tax  Fraud  Unit  (Nucleo 
Speciale  Tutela  Entrate  e  Repressione  Frodi  Fiscali)  performs  permanent  risk  analysis  to 
identify  the  companies  suspected  of  involvement  in  fraud  circuits,  and  delegates  further 
investigations to the local units. 

This  analysis  involves  examining  data  from  the  Eurofisc  network,  which,  since  2021,  has 
been using the TNA system, an advanced analysis tool for identifying potential cases of EU 
VAT fraud rapidly and efficiently. 

This  information  is  cross-referenced  with  data  from  the  many  databases  used  by  the 
Financial Police, including: 

-  STAF (Strumento AntiFrode - Anti-Fraud Tool), an application for effective monitoring 
of VAT-registered  taxpayers  to  enabling those involved  in  tax  fraud  to be promptly 
identified and and risk score to be assigned to them; 
the  Fatture  e  Corrispettivi  (Invoices  and  Payments)  portal  and  the  @-Fattura  (@-
Invoice)  application,  which  allow  detailed  and  integrated  analysis  of  electronic 
invoice data; 

- 

-  EMCS-eAD Dogane (Customs) and COGNOS - Dogane e Accise (Customs and Excise), 
two  applications  that  are  used  to  monitor  the  movement  of  products  subject  to 
excise  duty  and  of  sector  operators,  and  are  especially  useful  for  combating  VAT 
fraud in the fuel sector; 

-  COGNOS  -  area  Analisi  libera  Italia  (Italy  free  analysis  area),  a  partition  of  the 
‘Dichiarazioni  doganali’  (customs  declarations)  area  of  the  COGNOS  business 
intelligence  platform,  which  enables  multidimensional  processing  using  historical 
customs  declaration  data  from  the  month  preceding  the  query.  This  application  is 
especially  useful  for  selecting  entities  for  post-clearance  customs  controls  and 
conducting subsequent in-depth investigations where appropriate, and for any other 
investigative  activities  requiring  the  reconstruction  of  international  trade  flows, 
including from past periods. 

Further specific analyses have been carried out by the Public Expenditure and Anti-Tax 
Fraud Unit to combat undue offsetting and fraud in the transfer of building and energy tax 
credits, including the 110% Superbonus scheme, a measure co-financed by the national RRP. 

Some of the main applications used to this end are: 

-  PRisMA  -  Portale  Riscossioni  Monitoraggi  e  Applicazioni  (Portal  on  Collections, 
Monitoring  and  Applications)  –  which  allows  precise  consultation  of  taxpayers’ 
subsidised tax credits and data on credit assignments; 

-  Moni.C.  -  Monitoraggio  delle  Compensazioni  (monitoring  of  offsetting)  –  which 
allows  both  individual  and  massive  searches,  by  processing  the  data  from  F24  tax 
payment forms, to detect undue offsetting of tax credits. 

To improve effectiveness in preventing and detecting fraud against the EU budget, in 2022 
the  Public  Expenditure  and  Anti-EU  Fraud  Unit  handled  the  evolutionary  maintenance  of 
the  SIAF  (Anti-Fraud  Information  System),  an  application  implemented  under  a  project 

71 

 
 
financed  with  resources  from  the  national  operational  programme  ‘Governance  and 
Technical Assistance 2007-2013’. 

The SIAF is a business intelligence platform that supports operational analyses in the field of 
public expenditure. 

By  collating  the  elements  acquired,  including  those  from  the  other  databases  used  by the 
Financial  Police,  it  is  possible  to  extract  lists  of  public  funding  beneficiaries  at  risk  of 
irregularities. 

This resource, initially only available to the Financial Police Units located in the ‘convergence 
objective’  regions  of  the  2007/2013  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (Puglia,  Campania, 
Calabria and Sicily), was extended to the whole of Italy in 2021. 

With  specific  regard  to  the  RRP,  the  Public  Expenditure  and  Anti-EU  Fraud  Unit  of  the 
Financial Police - with the support of the unit at the Department for European Affairs of the 
Presidency  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  that  acts  as  the  technical  secretariat  of  the 
Committee  for  combating  fraud  against  the  European  Union  -  has  prepared  detailed 
checklists  with  specific  risk  indicators  separately  applicable  to  the  disbursement  of 
incentives or the execution of public works in the provision of services. Through the  ReGiS 
system, developed by the State General Accounting Department, these checklists are made 
available to  all  central  and  local  administrations  and to  the bodies  implementing the  RRP, 
enabling  them to  improve  their  independent  capacity  for  identifying anomalous  situations 
warranting further investigation. 

An  important  recent  addition  to  the  Italy’s  toolbox  of  measures  for  strengthening  risk 
analysis in EU fund management is the ‘Integrated Anti-Fraud Platform (PIAF-IT)’, created 
by  the  State  General  Accounting  Department  in  collaboration  with  the  Committee  for 
combating fraud against the European Union and co-financed by the European Commission 
(OLAF) with resources from the EU’s ‘Hercule III’ programme. The platform fully responds to 
specific  EU  regulatory  requirements  and  several  Commission  recommendations  that 
emphasise  the  need  to  design  and  target  audit  and  control  activities  on  the  basis  of  risk 
analysis  and  to  develop  IT  tools  capable  of  exploiting  the  enormous  amount  of  data 
available to national and local authorities. 

Q.2.5 For any approach selected, can you provide explanations of its implementation? 
MS 
AT 
BE 

Input  
See 2.3 
ERDF RBC and Wallonia ERDF and RRF: 
- new, improved database for the collection of data on ERDF 
-  access  (and  for  Wallonia  Interoperability)  to  the  UBO  register  of  ultimate 
beneficial owners for the RRF (and the ERDF 21-27 for Wallonia) for ex ante and 
ex post verifications 

AGENSTSCHAP LANDBOUW EN ZEEVISSERIJ: 
We  are  looking to  rewrite  existing tools  so we can  easily  access  all  the data  to 
put it in to fraud detection tools like Arachne. 

72 

 
 
 
BG 

The current strategy includes taking inventory of existing tools. Arachne and the 
Unified Information Systems (UMIS) are the basic instruments in the fight against 
frauds.  UMIS  contains  complete  financial  and  physical  data  at  project  level  and 
almost  all  of  it  is  structured  data.  Therefore,  it  allows  all  types  of  cross-checks 
and subsequent use and processing of the information. At the moment there are 
some  operational  interfaces  between  UMIS  and  several  other  systems  and 
national  databases  such  as  Regix  (enabling  exchange  of  information  between 
introduced  and  supported  by  the  Bulgarian  E-Government 
registries  and 
Ministry), Monitorstat (National Statistical Institute Information System), and the 
National  Registry  Agency  database.  Interconnections  with  some  other  public 
registers and systems are also planned. These will further expand the scope for 
checks  and  analysis  and  reduce  the  risk  of  false 
information,  fraud  or 
unintentional mistakes and irregularities. 

CZ 

- 

Innovation of the main IT system, possibilities of sophisticated analyses – 
data  mining.  Implementation  of  an  interconnection  to  public  and  non-
public registers. 

-  Certified systems such as CRIBIS, ARACHNE, Register of Beneficial Owners 

used to detect fraud, corruption and conflict of interest. 

-  Annual  assessment  of  the  development  of  the  State  Agricultural 
Intervention  Fund  (SZIF)’s  information  system,  an  integral  part  of  the 
SZIF’s Information ‘Concept’(i.e. it is a legal requirement).  

CY 

1.  Introduction of a new e-procurement system 

Cyprus’s  General  Accounting  Office 
implementing  a  contract  for  the 
is 
introduction  of  a  new  electronic  procurement  system  and  statistical  reporting 
and analysis of public procurement data tool. This is designed to: 
–  provide  a  holistic  solution  based  on  emerging  and  modern  technologies, 
supporting the once-only principle with benefits for all users, 
– support its interconnection with other services (e.g. Tax Department, Registrar 
of Companies, etc.), 
–  allow  for  better  management of  framework  agreements  and  dynamic  market 
systems, 
– support the operation of an online shop for the management of products and 
the placing of electronic orders, 
–  publish  various  statistics  and  information  (both  overall  and  at  competition 
level),  which  the  public  and  interested  parties  can  process  and  analyse, 
enhancing transparency. 
The  aim  is  for  the  system  to  cover  the  whole  lifecycle  of  a  public  contract, 
enabling users to have the information they need to draw useful conclusions on 
public  procurement  and  identify  recurrent  patterns  of  awards/overruns  of 
budget/changes and requirements, etc. 

2. Introducing professionalism in public procurement 
On  the  basis  of  a  decision  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  creation  of  the 
professional  framework  for  public  contracts  to  be  implemented  by  the  Cypriot 
General  Accounting  Office,  which  will  cover  the  introduction  of  the  role  of 
professional buyer. The objectives of the project include exploring international 
best  practices  and  adapting  them  to  Cypriot  data,  creating  a  scientific  learning 

73 

 
 
 
plan  for  professional  buyers  and  a  plan  to  assess  their  ability  to  convert 
theoretical  background  knowledge  into  practical  competence  in  their  field  of 
action. The project also contains  measures relating to the use of tools provided 
for in the European Directives, such as competitive dialogue, dynamic purchasing 
systems, e-shopping, etc. 
Through the reform, it provides for: 
–  the  establishment  of  a  service  centre  for  contracting  authorities  where  it  is 
planned that a large proportion of public procurement procedures will be carried 
out  by  professionals  trained  in  theory  and  on  a  practical  level,  drastically 
reducing  the  procedures  to  be  carried  out  by  staff  from  small  contracting 
authorities who are insufficiently trained and trained.   
—  The  extension  of  the  Framework  Agreements,  covering  a  larger  range  of 
services,  supplies  and  works  used  horizontally,  relieving  contracting  authorities 
of  the  administrative  burden  and  reducing  the  legal  risks  arising,  since  the 
Framework Agreements will be taken over by Professional Buyers. 

3. Creator of tender documents  
The  tool  is  in  an  implementation  process  and  aims  to  standardise  tender 
documents  and  help  bidders  prepare  tender  documents  and  select  criteria  in  a 
way that avoids any attempts to change conditions that undermine competition. 
Hanseatic City of Bremen (ERDF): Use of the Transparency Register 

Lower  Saxony  (ERDF):  Within  the  self-assessment  tool,  the  operation  of  a  web 
application  firewall,  a  virus  scanner  at  the  intermediate  body,  the  assigning  of 
permissions  according  to  user  privileges,  and  the  storing  of  an  access  matrix  in 
the  intermediate  body’s  data  centre.  In  addition,  all  IT  systems  are  password-
protected.  IT  security  is  described  in  the  IT  implementation  concept  within  the 
management  and  control  system  and  is  continuously  ensured  by  the  service 
provider,  IT-Niedersachsen.  Access  to  all  of  the  Land  government’s  online 
services is protected by VPN. 
The  Danish  Business  Authority  report  that  they  have  numerous  registers  that 
they run checks on and compare in digital processes resulting in awareness lists 
used in manual checks. 
The Danish audit body report that they have started the implementation of the 
anti-fraud IT tool Arachne. When implemented it will be the primary IT tool used 
in the fight against fraud. 
In  2023  we  actively  tested  Arachne  and  want  to  move  forward  with  testing  to 
determine whether it may be used as a fraud risk detection IT tool in the future. 
Special Service for Institutional Support and Information Systems: The technical 
infrastructure  has  been  implemented  in  the  Integrated  Information  System  in 
order to connect to the Central Register of Beneficial Owners.  

The general approach of the strategy is based on 
(1) carrying  out a specific analysis  of data sources  and data analysis tools to 
enhance  detection  and  developing  guidelines  to  facilitate  the  use  of  these 
data sources and tools, 
(2)  studying  the  main  mechanisms  used  in  practice  to  detect  fraud  in 

74 

DE 

DK 

EE 

EL 

ES 

 
 
 
 
European funds to identify problems and best practices, as well as proposals 
for improvement, and implementing the conclusions reached, and 
(3)  improving  fraud  detection  measures  by  generalising  the  use  of  data 
analysis tools, and promoting other proactive detection methods. 

According  to  the  information  provided  by  the  EMFF  managing  authority,  the 
main  objective  of  the  Spanish  e- Cohesion  Network  (RedeCo)  is  to  coordinate 
the  different  participants  in  Spain  to  meet  the  requirements  of the  applicable 
law on electronic relations between the different participants and authorities in 
order  to  optimise  the  design,  implementation  and  normal  operation  of  the 
different  IT  systems,  thus  favouring  more  agile,  transparent  and  efficient 
operations in favour of the full effectiveness of cohesion policy. 

This main objective is complemented by a number of specific objectives: 

- 
- 

- 

to make an inventory of applications involved in ‘e-cohesion’ in Spain; 
to  share  the  concepts  and  solutions  used  in  the  construction  of  the 
information systems; and 
coordinated 
to  disseminate 
implementation  of  the  different  milestones  in  the management of each 
of the Funds. 

roadmaps 

ensure 

the 

the 

to 

FI 

HU 

IE 

IT 

For  the  RRF,  inventory  of  existing  tools  and  dependencies  and  continuous 
technical analysis of existing tools. 
In  2023,  there  were  examples  of  developing  new  tools  and  maintaining 
interoperability  between  them,  but  these  were  outside  the  strategy  for  the 
development of the IT architecture. 
The examples include the introduction of the obligation to declare any conflict of 
interest  in  the  ‘EUPR’  monitoring  and  information  system,  the  extension  of  the 
anti-fraud function and certain developments related to the  submission of data 
to Arachne. 
In  response  to  the  issues  raised,  Hungary  has  assessed  the  potential  for 
improvement  and  taken  action  accordingly  after  appropriate  planning  and 
testing. 
For example, in relation to the Just Transition fund, the Enterprise Project Portfolio 
Management  system  allows  for  data  to  be  extracted  for  upload  to  the  Arachne 
system.  At  a  future  date  this  may  be  accomplished  by  an  API  (application 
programming interface). 
Inventory of existing tools 

The Italian AFCOS has long been active in this regard. Starting from the two-year 
period 2015-2016 it has designed and implemented projects  for the preliminary 
benchmarking  of  the  best  administrative  and  police  databases  used  by  the 
central  and  local  authorities to  monitor  and  control  EU funding,  strengthen  the 
fight  against  illegal  practices  and  strengthen  risk  analysis,  and  provide Financial 
Police Units with guidance on controlling EU public expenditure (‘National Anti-
Fraud  Database  –  DNA’  project).  Subsequently,  the  AFCOS  devised  the 
‘Integrated Anti-Fraud Platform (PIAF-IT)’, a unique business intelligence tool that 
collects data from a variety of external sources at national and European level to 

75 

 
 
 
 
prevent and combat fraud and irregularities against the EU budget. 

Maintaining interoperability between the tools 

An  important  innovation  in  the  digitalisation  landscape  to  strengthen  risk 
analysis  in  EU  fund  management  is  the  aforementioned  ‘Integrated  Anti-Fraud 
Platform (PIAF-IT)’. 

PIAF-IT  is  an  innovative  business  intelligence  tool  made  available  to  the  central 
and local public administrations engaged in controlling and/or implementing EU 
funds. The tool is used to collect and organise into specific reports (by means of a 
single  -  even  ‘massive’ -  query,  and by applying multiple  search  parameters)  all 
the key information that can be extracted from a specific dataset and that relates 
to the beneficiaries of European public funding and the RRF. 

The data are collected from a variety of external national and European sources 
to  consolidate  and  strengthen the  fight  against  fraud  and other  illegal  activities 
affecting the EU budget. PIAF-IT thus complements and supports the European IT 
system  Arachne,  and,  in  general,  any other tool  used  in  the fight  against  fraud, 
including at police force level. 

The  platform  can  be  used  to  make  online  queries  and  generate  a  ‘reputation 
factsheet’;  it  helps  all  national  administrations  managing  EU  funds  to  exchange 
information and, hence, optimise the sensitive but fundamental fraud prevention 
phase. Its aim is to centralise and display all key information on the beneficiaries 
of  EU  public  funding  and  allow  users  to  generate  specific  analysis  outputs  by 
querying a single computer system in an aggregated manner, without having to 
make several separate queries. 

Continuous interoperability with the data sources integrated into PIAF-IT boosts 
the accuracy of the data exchanged and the continuous process of updating the 
information  acquired.  At  present,  the  platform  connects  with  the  databases 
managed by the following entities: 

-  Revenue Agency (Tax Register Information System), which plays a key role 
in  conducting  tax  assessments  and  financial  controls  to  combat  tax 
evasion; 

- 

- 

InfoCamere (Companies Register), to verify the actual legal existence of a 
company and its partners/shareholders, as well as its financial soundness; 

Italian  Court  of  Auditors  (GIUDICO  -  Giustizia  Contabile  Digitale  -  Digital 
Accounting  Justice  and  SIDIF  -  Sistema  Informativo  Irregolarità  e  Frodi  - 
Information System on Irregularities and Fraud), to obtain information on 
administrative  court  judgments  in  fiscal  damage  cases,  thus  providing  a 
valuable tool for assessing a company’s risk and likelihood of fraud; 

-  Ministry  of  the  Economy  and  Finance,  to  verify  whether  the  parties 
concerned  received  shared  management  funds,  retrieve  information  on 
the checks carried out by the audit authorities on funded projects  (single 
data  bank  -  BDU),  and  check  any  fund payments  for  public works  (public 
administrations’ database - Banca Dati delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche - 
BDAP); 

76 

 
 
-  State  General  Accounting  Department  (Italian  RRP  monitoring  and 
reporting  system  -  ReGiS),  developed  to  support  the  management, 
monitoring,  reporting  and  control  of  the  RRP  and  ensure  the  electronic 
exchange of data between the various players involved in the governance 
of the national RRP; 

-  Ministry  of  Enterprises  and  Made  in  Italy  (National  State  Aid  Register  - 
RNA),  which  can  be  consulted  to  find  out  whether  beneficiaries  have 
received previous State aid; 

-  European  Commission,  by  interacting  with  European  external  sources, 
such  as  the  IMS,  which  contains  information  on  irregularities  and  fraud 
affecting  the  EU’s  financial  interests,  detected  and  reported  by  the 
Member  States,  and  the  Financial  Transparency  System,  which  provides 
information on the recipients of directly managed funds, so as to prevent 
and combat double funding; 

-  Bureau  van  Dijk  (ORBIS),  which  contains  comparable  data  on  private 

companies worldwide. 

The  application,  developed  within  an  innovative  technical  framework  that 
includes a technology based on microservices that can also store big data, offers 
a solution that is highly extensible in the future through actions to: 

1.  implement  the  platform’s  functionality  by  providing  access  to  managing 
authorities  and,  with  a  supervisory  role,  to  all  public  administrations  in 
charge  of  controlling  and  monitoring  funding,  such  as  audit  authorities 
and the Financial Police; 

2.  use  additional  data  sources  to  acquire  further  subjective/objective  data 

- 

- 

- 

on the position to be examined and assessed, such as, for example, 
the  ‘Sistema  Informativo  del  Casellario  Giudiziale’  (criminal  records 
information system) of the Ministry of Justice concerning convictions for 
specific  fraud  offences  against  the  national  and  EU  budget  (PIF  offences 
or other types of offences); 
‘Kohesio’  database  managed  by  the  European  Commission’s 
the 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) for up-to-
date  data  on  projects  and  beneficiaries  co-financed  by  the  EU  cohesion 
policy; 
the  ‘national  public  contracts  database’  of  the  National  Anticorruption 
Authority  to  check  the  documentation  proving  that  economic  operators 
meet  the  general,  technical-organisational  and  economic-financial 
requirements for participation in public tenders, supplies and services; 
the  Antitrust  Authority-AGCM’s  ‘legality  rating’  tool,  which  provides  an 
indicator of companies’ compliance with high standards of legality). 
Hence,  the  PIAF-IT  anti-fraud  IT  platform  is  a  model  of  interoperability  at  legal 
level (enabling actors operating in different legal environments to cooperate with 
each  other),  at  organisational 
level  (through  the  exchange  of  relevant 
information), at semantic level (as it ensures that the format and meaning of the 
exchanged data and information are preserved and understood during exchanges 
(including  specifications,  data 
between  parties),  and  at  technical 

level 

- 

77 

 
 
LV 

MT 

interconnection and integration services, and secure communication protocols). 

Existing data bases, information systems and IT tools are constantly reviewed to 
determine how to use them more effectively, which authorities need additional 
access  to  them,  and  which  tools  could  be  interconnected  to  perform  checks 
automatically.  For  example,  right  now  there  is  a  project  to  interconnect  the 
national  e-procurement 
IT  system  on  taxpayers  to 
automatically check if there are any conflicts of interest. 
The  Maltese  National  Anti-Fraud  and  Corruption  Strategy  (NAFCS)  requires  that 
the  systems  already 
in  place  must  be  examined  and,  where  necessary, 
bolstered. It also supports the procurement of additional software tools, where 
necessary, to enable a more professional approach with respect to analysis and 
investigations. 

IT  system  with  the 

A  new  application  called  ‘Auditor’s  Toolkit’  was  developed  in  2023  by  the 
Malta Information Technology Agency to enable the audit authority for EU funds 
to  download  documents  related  to  any  operation  within  the  Structural  Funds 
database at the click of a button. The system is currently at the testing stage. 

In  line  with  action  points  13  and  14  of  the  NAFCS  and  with  Malta’s  RRP 
commitments,  a  central  documentary  repository  system  will  be  designed  and 
created  by  Q4/2024 to  strengthen  collaboration  between  national  authorities 
forming  part  of  the  coordinating  committee,  set  up  under  the  Internal  Audit 
and Financial Investigations Act (Cap. 461 of the Laws of Malta). The system will 
(i)  store  electronic  documents,  (ii)  offer  centralised  access  to  documents  that 
can  be  easily retrieved by  national  institutions forming  part  of  the  coordinating 
committee, and (iii) provide the necessary security for sensitive information. 

NL 

PT 

is  still 

included 

in  progress 

In  addition,  the  managing  authorities  for  EU  funds  maintain  interoperability 
between  the  Structural  Funds database,  the  RRF  database,  the  funding  entities 
database, national databases (natural persons) and the CION Arachne database. 
in  the  new  programming  period’s 
Additional  features  will  be 
management control system. 
Please  see  the  questionnaire  on  the  2023  PIF  report  submitted  by  the 
in  the 
Netherlands.  The  development  of  the  NAFS 
Netherlands. As the NAFS is currently not implemented, this does not cover the 
digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  or  other  aspects  of  the  anti-fraud 
strategy.  Therefore  the  questions  in this  section  are  answered  ‘no’  as  they  are 
not applicable. 
Promoting  the  linking  up  of  the  reporting  systems  that  are  important  for  the 
logistics chain. In this way, the risk analysis performed early in the logistics chain 
(pre-loading or pre-arrival) can be taken into account, in terms of the level of risk, 
area of risk, type of check and time for the check, so that the risk analysis takes 
place  at  the  most  appropriate  time  in  the  logistics  chain,  thus  ensuring  more 
effective and efficient risk mitigation. 
On  the  expenditure  side,  as  regards  the  management  of  EU  funds,  steps  have 
been taken to link up the various national authorities responsible, with a view 
to  ensuring  the  interoperability  of  the  information  systems  to  avoid  double 

78 

 
 
 
 
 
RO 

SI 

SK 

funding. 
Implementation  of  the  National  Anti-Fraud  Strategy  has  only  just  begun  The 
topics  will  be  discussed  in  working  groups,  after  which  the  decisions  will  be 
disseminated. 
Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development: 
In  our  sectoral  anti-fraud  strategy,  we  have  a  set  of  existing  IT  support 
mechanisms in Slovenia, which helps to verify and prevent fraud, including some 
nationally-funded  applications  that  are  suitable  for  data  mining  and  the 
managing  authority’s  information  system  through  which  cohesion  policy  is 
implemented  (declarations,  checks,  controls,  disbursement  of  funds).  The 
managing  authority's  IT  system  is  closely  linked  to  the  national  accounting 
system. This facilitates checks on similar entries in the system. 

Reply from the financial administration to question 2.5: 
Inventory of existing tools: 

-  QlikView  (QV)  analytical  platform  and  its  updated  successor  QlikSense 

(QS); 

-  ENIME software tool with Random Tree scientific model; 
- 
-  SAP Business Objects Business Intelligence suite. 

fraud management (FM); 

Within  the  existing  tools,  the  financial  administration  is  developing  new 
applications 
for  customs  risk  analysis  and  management.  All  existing 
applications are developed in such a way that they are interoperable. Their use 
will  also  provide  an  audit  trail  and  data  protection,  thereby  ensuring  data 
security requirements are met.  
The  Slovak  NAFS  emphasises  the  need  to  use  all  available  IT  tools  (including 
Arachne)  in  the  fight against  fraud  and  calls  on  the  relevant  authorities  to 
employ these tools in their activities to the prevention and detection of cases of 
fraud  and  other  irregularities.  Nowadays, the  relevant  authorities implementing 
EU  funds  in  Slovakia  actively  use  Arachne  to  identify  projects  which  present 
high risk of fraud, conflict of interest and other irregularities. 

Q.2.6 Have you taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitisation? 
A little over half of the Member States (56%) have indicated that they have taken steps to 
identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation. 

Steps taken  
Yes 
No 

Member State 
AT, BG, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, IE, IT, MT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK 
BE, CY, EE, EL, FR, HR, HU, LT, LU, LV, NL, RO 

TOTAL 
15 
12 

Q.2.7  If  YES to  Q.2.6.  What  are the  main  gaps  you  have  identified? How  do  you  intend to 
address them? 
Input 
MS 
Deficit: lack of know-how among users 
AT 
Measures: necessary upskilling and training in the field of digitalisation. 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
 
BE 
BG 

CY 
CZ 

DE 

DK 

ES 

FI 

IE 

IT 

the 

Information  Security  Management  System 

n/a 
An  analysis  of  the  skills  gaps  in  digitalisation  is  planned  as  part  of  a  more 
comprehensive  analysis of  the  skills  and  competence  of  the  staff  working  with 
EU  funds  and  programmes.  The  aim  is  to  develop  an  effective  and  tailor-made 
training  programme  for  2021-2027  and  deliver  relevant  training  on  a  regular 
basis or on demand. 
n/a 
Lack  of  knowledge  of  the  human  resources  involved  -  training,  integration  of 
resources  into  work  activities.  Regular  audit  is  conducted  by  an  external  body 
within 
(ISO 27001:2013). 
Recommendations  from  audit  findings  are  subsequently  addressed.  The 
information concept of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund is reviewed on a 
regular annual basis. 
Federal State of Lower Saxony (ERDF): Continuous development of digitalisation 
and IT systems. Required under banking supervision law. 
The  Danish  Business  Authority  report  that  they  have  not  identified  any  at  this 
point.  If  or when  a  gap  is  identified  and  the  expertise  is not  available  in  house, 
external expertise will be hired. 
While  efforts  are  being  made  to  improve  the  use  of  data  for  both  prevention 
and  detection,  as  well  as  coordination,  some  of  the  problems  that  have  been 
identified are: 

- 

- 

- 

- 
- 

limitations  in  access  to  some  databases,  for  example  from  the  Tax 
Agency or the Social Security; 
regularity  and  ease  of  exchange  of  data and  information,  due  to  privacy 
and data protection issues; 
lack  of  analysis  and  tools  to  analyse  data  as  part  of  financial 
investigations; 
limited access to information for investigation and asset tracing; 
limited 
databases; 

interoperability  between  public 

interoperability  or 

lack  of 

-  need for improved coordination between different entities. 

All  approaches  to  address  the  identified  gaps  include  improved  access  to 
databases through different  legal instruments, improvements in the use of data 
and  analysis  tools  that  can  identify  red  flags  and  help  detect cases of fraud,  as 
well as interoperability of databases, including data quality. 
For  example,  by  taking  into  account  developments  in  data  science,  including 
artificial intelligence. 
For  example,  an  anti-fraud  policy  has  been  developed  for  the  Eastern  and 
Midland  Regional  Assembly  which  specifically  deals  with  the  EU  Just  Transition 
Fund.  Arachne  training  has  been  received  and  anti-fraud  training  for  delivery 
partners will follow. 
All central administrations and police forces play a key role in strengthening the 
digital  architecture  by  disseminating  shared 
for 
interconnecting national and European databases. 

tools  and  strategies 

In addition to establishing objectives, procedures and priorities for implementing 

80 

 
 
 
the  digital  transformation,  the  main  gaps  in  basic  digital  skills  have  also  been 
identified. These include, in particular, the need for more resources specialising 
in the technical management and use of digital media and services. 

To meet this need, providing ad hoc training is one of the initiatives included in 
the National Strategy (NAFS). The goal is to pursue key objectives and measures 
in  a  joint  and  coordinated  manner,  with  a  view  to  accelerating  the  spread  of 
digital  culture  in  Italy  so  as  to  prevent  and  combat  irregularities  and  fraud 
affecting the EU’s financial interests. 

In  this  regard,  among  the  projects  developed  in  partnership  with  Italian  and 
other  EU  Member  States’  universities,  two  initiatives  should  be  mentioned,  as 
they address the anti-fraud coordination tasks of the Italian AFCOS. 

-  Participation  in  the  still  ongoing  project  ‘Fraud  Repression  through 
Education  (FRED  2)’,  developed  via  institutional  collaboration  with  ‘La 
Sapienza’ University of Rome and based the cooperation between several 
Italian  universities,  European  universities  (Belgium-Leuven,  Finland-
Rovaniemi, Greece-Athens) and the AFCOS of the respective participating 
countries. The initiative is being developed through a number of meetings 
and  workshops  aimed  at  setting  up  a  European  task  force  composed  of 
academics  and  professionals  that  will  produce  a  pilot  study  for  the 
analysis  of  risk  profiles  for  illegal  behaviour  or  the  improper  use  of  EU 
funds,  also  linked  to  the  use  of new technologies.  In parallel,  a  standing 
observatory  is  being  set  up  to  collect  knowledge  and  experience  in  the 
development  of 
improve  the 
prevention  of  and  responses  to  irregularities  and  fraud  against  the  EU. 
This includes greater use of digitalisation and technology to increase the 
efficiency and quality of controls and audits. 

information  systems  to 

innovative 

representatives 

-  Participation  in  an  ad  hoc  working  group,  composed  of  national  experts 
and 
from  OLAF,  AFCOS  and  other  Commission 
departments, and tasked, under the aegis of the ‘Advisory Committee for 
(COCOLAF),  with  drawing  up  a 
Fraud  Prevention  Coordination’ 
compendium  of  the  IT  tools  for  managing  and  controlling  planned 
reforms and investments, mainly those planned under the RRF. 

The managing authorities of EU funds identified awareness as a gap. An 
external information security specialist delivered training sessions for internal 
staff to address this issue. 
Further  training  is  planned  to  ensure  that  the  members  of  the  coordinating 
committee  have  the  necessary  skills  to  make  proper  use  of  the  central 
documentary repository system.  
n/a  –  Please  see  the  questionnaire  on  the  2023  PIF  report  submitted  by  the 
Netherlands.  The  development  of  the  NAFS 
in  the 
Netherlands. As the NAFS is currently not implemented, this does not cover the 
digitalisation  of  the  fight  against  fraud  or  other  aspects  of  the  anti-fraud 
strategy.  Therefore  the  questions  in this  section  are  answered  ‘no’  as  they  are 
not applicable. 
Register  of  existing  tools  –  all  CST2021  systems  are  subject  to  registration  and 
review as regards their changing usefulness and the current needs of the users; 

in  progress 

is  still 

81 

MT 

NL 

PL 

 
 
PT 

SI 

full 

these 

‘cooperation’  as 

IT  tool 
all  substantiated  business  needs  are  addressed  as  part  of  the 
development  services  provided  by  the  contractor.  With  respect  to  maintaining 
interoperability  between 
regards 
tools, 
computerisation is maintained and developed between the CST2021 systems. At 
present, the different systems are fully interoperable, making it possible for the 
data collected in one system to be used in another system (where necessary and 
in line with the developments in this regard). In addition, in one of the systems 
where the primary objective is to present data from both internal databases and 
external  public  registers,  work  on  adding  further  data  sources  is  ongoing  (the 
system  has  been  built  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  relatively  simple  to  connect  new 
databases to it and to link data from those databases to the data that are already 
in the system). 
The conceptualisation of the development of existing IT tools – digitalisation in 
the  area  of  implementation,  management  and  control  of  cohesion  policy 
programmes  and  the  National  Recovery  Programme  (including  in  the  area  of 
anti-fraud measures) is currently at a relatively advanced stage in Poland. For this 
reason,  current  activities  in  the  area  of  digitalisation  focus  mainly  on  further 
development  of  existing  IT  tools,  including  the  introduction  of  new,  and 
improvement of existing, functions. 
The Ministry of Agriculture’s digital transformation programme is made up of six 
initiatives  or  projects,  including  structural  project  No 5  Fraud  and  Inspection, 
which provides for a fraud control system and an inspection system. 
Ministry of Cohesion and Regional Development (MKRR) 
We  have  made  a  commitment  to  properly  linking  the  national  IS OU  database 
used  for  the  implementation  of  cohesion  policy  with  the  Arachne  application, 
which will serve as a data-mining tool for all levels in the country (and beyond) 
and when reviewing links (related companies, related persons, etc.) 

Financial Administration (FURS) 
With regard to digitalisation, we estimate that the gaps in the protection of the 
EU’s  financial  interests  are  minimal.  We  close  the  gaps  by  using  predictive 
analytics,  targeted  selections  of  economic  operators,  equal  treatment  of  all 
economic operators and the application of all other deterrent measures. 

82 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinforcing anti-fraud governance in the Member States 

Q.3.1 Do you have an anti-fraud cooperation network in place? 
The  survey  shows  that  most  Member  States  have  an  anti-fraud  cooperation  network  in 
place (81.5%) or one in development (15%). 

Anti-fraud 
cooperation 
network 
Yes 

Yes, 
development 
No 

Member States 

AT, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, DI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, MT, 
PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK 
BE, NL, IE26, LT 

in 

LU 

Total 

22 

4 

1 

Q.3.2 If YES to Q.3.1, which authorities are part of this network? 
Most  Member  States  work  together  with  various  authorities.  The  following  agencies  are 
best  represented  in  the  national  networks  of  anti-fraud  cooperation:  EU  fund  managing 
authorities,  tax  administration  authorities,  customs  authorities,  national  audit  authorities, 
and  law  enforcement  authorities.  The  table  below  shows  the  various  agencies  that  are 
represented (and how often) within the network. 

Mapping the network

18

18

19

20

21

12

12

13

9

4

4

2

6

7

7

8

Authorities involved   Member States  
Custom authority 

AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, LT, 
NL, RO, SI, SK 

Total  
19 

26 A network for anti-fraud cooperation with cross sector involvement was established in 2014 but 
engagement was limited in recent years by the consequences of a changed work environment during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. It is intended to re-engage and develop this network further. 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
audit 

enforcement 

administration 

fund  managing 

EU 
authority 
Law 
authority 
Tax 
authority  
Judicial authority 
National 
authority  
Anti-counterfeit 
authority  
Food/health 
authority 
Public  procurement 
authority  
Border 
authority 
Competition 
authority 
Dedicated 
corruption agency 
Dedicated 
organised 
agency 
Conflict  of 
agency 
National 
security 
agency  /  intelligence 
body  
Other, 
specify) 

anti-
crime 

interest 

(please 

control 

anti-

BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, LT, 
PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK 
BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, LT, PL, RO, 
SE, SI, SK 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, EL, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, LT, 
NL, PL, RO, SI, SK 
BG, CY, CZ, DK, EE, FR, HR, HU, IT, PL, RO, SI, SK  
BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FR, HR, HU, IT, LV, PL, PT, RO, 
SE, SI, SK 
BG, FR, HR, IT 

BG, IT 

BG, CY, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, LV, NL, RO, SE, SK 

BG, EE, ES, FR, HR, IT 

BG, EE, FR, IT, LV, RO, SE, SK 

BG, DE, EE, ES, FR, IT, LV, LT,PL, PT, RO, SI 

BG, FR, IT, LT, PL, RO, SE 

BG, HU, IT, RO 

AT, BG, EE, FR, PL, SE, SK 

BG, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, MT, RO, SK 

21 

18 

20 

13 
18 

4 

2 

12 

6 

8 

12 

7 

4 

7 

9 

Q.3.3  To  what  extent  are  (national)  law  enforcement  and  judicial  authorities  collaborating 
with the national anti-fraud network? 
Most  Member  States  (59%)  indicate  that  their  national  law  enforcement  and  judicial 
authorities  are  actively  involved  and  collaborate  within  their  national  anti-fraud  network. 
Several  remaining  Member  States  (26%)  report  that  the  collaboration  is  moderate,  with 
room for improvement. 

Degree of involvement  
Actively involved 

Moderately  involved  with  room 
for improvement 
In the early stages of involvement  LT 
Not involved at the moment 

- 

Member State 
BG, CY, CZ, DE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, MT, 
PL, RO, SE, SI, SK 
BE, DK, EE, EL, LV, NL, PT 

Total  
16  

7 

1 

84 

 
 
 
 
Not applicable 

AT, IE, LU 

3 

Q.3.4  Is  your  national  anti-fraud  network  actively  including  cooperation  with  one  of  the 
following EU judicial and law enforcement authorities? 
Almost  all  Member  States  actively  cooperate  with  EU-level  authorities,  in  particular  with 
OLAF and EPPO, as can be seen in the overview below. 

In  collaboration  with  EU 
judicial and law enforcement 
authorities 
Eurojust 
Europol,  via  national  liaison 
office 
EPPO,  European  delegated 
persecutor 
OLAF 

None of the above 

Member State 

total 

CY,CZ, DE, HR, MT, RO 
AT, CY, CZ, DE, ES, FI, HR, IT, LT,MT, NL 

AT,  BE,  CY,  CZ, DE,  EE,  EL,  ES,  FI,  FR,  HR, IT,  LV, 
MT, NL, PT, RO, SI, SK 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, 
IT, LV, LT, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK 
LU, SE 

6 
11 

19 

23 

2 

Q.3.5  Are  the  national  structures  coordinating  the  anti-fraud  network  properly  staffed  to 
effectively manage and oversee anti-fraud activities? 
Most Member States (85%) have sufficient staff to manage and oversee anti-fraud activities 
within  their  national  structures.  However,  among  the  majority  of  the  Member  States  that 
indicate  that  they  have  enough  staff,  over  half  point  out  that  there  is  a  need  to  improve 
staff expertise. 

(In)sufficient staffing 

NO, insufficient 
staffed but 
working towards 
improvement
8%

YES, partly, 
staffing needs 
improvement
54%

NO, severely 
understaffed 
requires 
immediate 
attention
4%

YES, adequately 
staffed with 
necessary 
expertise
34%

Staff 
YES,  adequately  staffed 
with necessary expertise 
staffing 
partly, 
YES, 
needs improvement 
NO, 

insufficient  staffed  BE, LT 

Member State 
AT, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EL, HU, IT, SI 

Total 
9 

CY, EE, ES, FI, FR, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK 

14 

2 

85 

 
 
 
 
 
 
towards 

but  working 
improvement 
NO, 
understaffed 
immediate attention 

severely 
requires 

HR 

1 

Q.3.6 How do you ensure adequate staffing in your national structure? 
In  general,  the  various  methods  listed  below  are  considered  effective,  ensuring  adequate 
staffing  at  the  national  level,  particularly  those  bringing  staff  from  various  executive  and 
investigative body together, implementing cooperation. 

Methods 
Capacity-building 
training 
Giving  new  guidance  on 
applying 
procedures 
properly  
Bringing 
from 
various  executive  and 
investigative 
body 
implementing 
together, 
cooperation  
Other (specify) 

staff 

Member State 
BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, IT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK 

Total  
13 

BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EE, EL, ES, HU, IT, PL, PT, RO 

13 

BE,  BG,  CY,  CZ,  DE,  DK,  EE,  EL,  ES,  FR,  IT,  LT,  LU, 
LV,NL, PL, RO, SI, SK 

19 

AT, BE, FI, HR, MT, RO 

6 

86