COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2024 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2024-07-24
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.7.2024  SWD(2024) 821 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2024 Rule of Law Report       Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland Accompanying the document COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 Rule of Law Report                The rule of law situation in the European Union {COM(2024) 800 final} - {SWD(2024) 801 final} - {SWD(2024) 802 final} - {SWD(2024) 803 final} - {SWD(2024) 804 final} - {SWD(2024) 805 final} - {SWD(2024) 806 final} - {SWD(2024) 807 final} - {SWD(2024) 808 final} - {SWD(2024) 809 final} - {SWD(2024) 810 final} - {SWD(2024) 811 final} - {SWD(2024) 812 final} - {SWD(2024) 813 final} - {SWD(2024) 814 final} - {SWD(2024) 815 final} - {SWD(2024) 816 final} - {SWD(2024) 817 final} - {SWD(2024) 818 final} - {SWD(2024) 819 final} - {SWD(2024) 820 final} - {SWD(2024) 822 final} - {SWD(2024) 823 final} - {SWD(2024) 824 final} - {SWD(2024) 825 final} - {SWD(2024) 826 final} - {SWD(2024) 827 final} - {SWD(2024) 828 final} - {SWD(2024) 829 final} - {SWD(2024) 830 final} - {SWD(2024) 831 final}  
 
 
ABSTRACT 

Poland  is  implementing  a  new  Action  Plan  on  the  Rule  of  Law  to  address  long-standing 
concerns  regarding  judicial  independence.  The  Sejm  adopted  a  law  to  address  the  concerns 
relating to the National Council for the Judiciary and is examining draft legislation to address 
the  serious  concerns  relating  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal.  The  Government  committed  to 
strengthen the independence of the Supreme Court. The disciplinary regime for judges was 
reformed.  Some  of  the  effects  of  the  contested  justice  reforms  of  2017  regarding  the 
functioning of the ordinary judiciary are being reversed. Additional steps have been taken to 
ensure  the  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the  Government  and  to 
separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General. The level of 
digitalisation of the justice system is advanced. The Commission concluded that there is no 
longer a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by Poland and withdrew its reasoned 
proposal of December 2017, thereby closing the Article 7(1) TEU procedure for Poland. 

The  government  has  engaged  in  preliminary  discussions  with  stakeholders  on  a  new  anti-
corruption  strategy.  While  previously  identified  institutional  and  practical  barriers  in  law 
remain, there are plans to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes, 
with  several  legislative  reforms  proposed  to  this  end.  Also,  the  investigation  of  fraud  and 
corruption  affecting  the  financial  interests  of  the  Union  is  expected  to  be  facilitated,  since 
Poland  joined  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office.  Although  risks  still  remain 
concerning  the  effective  enforcement  against  high-level  corruption,  including  the  threat  of 
selective  application  of  the  law  and  impunity  caused  by  the  disparity  in  the  treatment  of 
corruption cases for political purposes, steps have been taken to enable a robust track record 
of  high-level  corruption  cases,  with  several  investigations  ongoing.  No  further  steps  were 
taken to address the broad immunities of top executives or to strengthen lobbying rules, and 
concerns remain regarding political party donations and election campaigns. A whistleblower 
protection law was adopted  and instructions given to  prepare a law to  standardise the asset 
declaration system. 

The Constitution and the sector-specific legislation provide a framework for the protection of 
freedom of the press and freedom of expression. Despite existing safeguards, concerns persist 
regarding regulatory impartiality of the National Broadcasting Council. There has been some 
progress regarding safeguards for the granting of operating licences to media outlets as well 
as regarding the rules to enhance the independence of public service media. The management 
of public service media was changed following persisting concerns as to its independence and 
a  new  legal  framework  is  expected,  with  a  relevant  public  consultation  ongoing.  In  2021-
2022 some media were confirmed to have had privileged access to state advertising and some 
challenges persist with access to information. SLAPPs continue to be used against journalists. 

While  the  Government  committed  to  ensure  adequate  consultations  in  the  law-making 
process,  room  for  further  improvement  remains.  Findings  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  are 
being followed up and outstanding vacancies in its College have been filled. The framework 
in  which  the  Ombudsperson  operates  has  been  considerably  improved.  The  Sejm  has 
established parliamentary investigative committees to address three specific cases of concern 
in respect for the law by public authorities in the period 2015-2023. The Polish Government 
plans to prepare a draft law regarding implementation of judgments of the European Court of 
Human  Rights.  Steps  have  been  taken  to  improve  the  framework  in  which  civil  society 
operates. 

1 

 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Overall, concerning the recommendations in the 2023 Rule of Law Report, Poland has (made): 

•  Some progress on separating the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the  Prosecutor-
General  and  significant  progress  on continuing  efforts  to  ensure  functional independence  of  the 
prosecution service from the Government. 

•  No progress on strengthening the existing integrity rules by introducing lobbying rules and some 
progress on standardising online system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of 
Parliament. 

•  Some progress on ensuring independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, no progress 
on addressing the broad scope of immunities for top executives, and no progress yet on abstaining 
from introducing impunity clauses in legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-
level corruption cases. 

•  Some progress on ensuring that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures are adhered to 

for the granting of operating licences to media outlets. 

•  Some  progress  on  strengthening  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to  enhance  the  independent 
governance  and  editorial  independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into  account  European 
standards on public service media. 

•  Fully implemented the recommendation to ensure a more systematic follow-up to findings by the 
Supreme  Audit  Office  and  to  ensure,  as  a  matter  of  urgency,  the  appointment  of  the  College 
Members of the Supreme Audit Office in order to ensure its effective functioning. 

•  Significant  progress  on  improving  the  framework  in  which  civil  society  operates  and  fully 
implemented  the  recommendation  to  continue  such  efforts  regarding  the  Ombudsperson,  taking 
into account European standards on civil society and Ombudsinstitutions. 

On this basis, and considering other developments that took place in the period of reference including 
the closure of the Article 7(1) procedure by the European Commission and in view of the Action Plan 
on  the  Rule  of  Law  aimed  at  strengthening  judicial  independence,  and  in  addition  to  recalling  the 
obligation to comply with the rule of law related rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU and the rule 
of  law  related  infringement  procedures  referred  to  in  the  country  chapter  as  well  as  recalling  the 
relevant commitments made under the Recovery and Resilience Plan , it is recommended to Poland 
to: 

•  Continue  efforts  to separate  the  function  of  the Minister  of  Justice from  that  of  the  Prosecutor-
General and to ensure functional independence of the prosecution service from the Government. 
•  Strengthen  the  existing  integrity  rules  by  introducing  lobbying  rules  and  a  standardised  online 

system for asset declarations of public officials and Members of Parliament. 

•  Continue efforts to ensure independent and effective investigations and prosecutions, address the 
broad scope of immunities for top executives and remove previously introduced impunity clauses 
in legislation in order to enable a robust track record of high-level corruption cases. 

•  Pursue efforts to ensure that fair, transparent and non-discriminatory procedures, are adhered to 

for the granting of operating licences to media outlets. 

•  Pursue  efforts  to  ensure  an  effective  legislative  framework  for  the  independent  governance  and 
editorial independence of public service media, taking into account European standards on public 
service media. 

•  Continue the on-going process to improve the framework in which civil society operates, taking 

into account European standards on civil society organisations. 

2 

 
 
 
I. 

JUSTICE SYSTEM  

The  Polish  justice  system  is  separated  in  two  main  branches:  administrative  and  ordinary 
judiciary.  The  Supreme  Administrative  Court  and  16  administrative  courts  exercise  control 
over public administration, including the lawfulness of measures of local government bodies 
and of territorial organs of government administration. The ordinary judiciary, supervised by 
the  Supreme  Court1,  consists  of  three  levels:  11  appeal  courts,  47  regional  courts,  and  319 
district  courts.  Judges  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  at  the  request  of  the 
National Council for the Judiciary. The Constitutional Tribunal, which adjudicates notably on 
the  constitutionality  of  legislation,  is  composed  of  15  judges  chosen  by  the  Sejm  (lower 
chamber of the Parliament) for a term of office of nine years. The National Council for the 
Judiciary  is  tasked  by  the  Constitution  to  safeguard  judicial  independence.  A  particular 
characteristic of the prosecution system, which is not part of the independent judiciary, is that 
the  Prosecutor  General  and  the  Minister  of  Justice  are  the  same  person.  The  Constitution 
provides  that  advocates  and  legal  counsellors  can  self-regulate  their  practice.  Poland  has 
joined the European Public Prosecutor’s Office on 29 February 2024.  

Independence  

The level of perceived judicial independence in Poland continues to be very low among 
both the general public and companies, yet the decreasing trend has started to reverse. 
Overall,  28%  of  the  general  population  and  22%  of  companies  perceive  the  level  of 
independence of courts and judges to be ‘fairly or very good’ in 20242. The level of perceived 
judicial  independence  among  the  general  public  has  increased  in  comparison  with  2023 
(23%),  although  it  remains  lower  in  comparison  with  2020  (34%).  The  level  of  perceived 
judicial independence among companies has increased in comparison with 2023 (17%) but is 
still lower in comparison with 2020 (27%). The main reason cited by both the general public 
and companies for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges is the perception 
of interference or pressure from the Government and politicians3. 

Poland  is  implementing  a  new  Action  Plan  on  the  Rule  of  Law  to  address  the  long-
standing concerns regarding judicial independence. On 13 December 2023, the new Prime 
Minister4  appointed  an  Inter-Departmental  Team  for  restoring  the  Rule  of  Law  and 
constitutional order5. In February 2024, the Polish authorities adopted6 an Action Plan on the 

1   The Supreme Court also supervises military courts. 
2   Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, and Figures 50 and 52, 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. The 
level  of  perceived  judicial  independence  is  categorised  as  follows:  very  low  (below  30%  of  respondents 
perceive judicial independence as fairly good and very good); low (between 30-39%), average (between 40-
59%), high (between 60-75%), very high (above 75%). 

3   Figures 52 and 54, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. It is also noted that 33% of the companies in Poland are 
either fairly or very confident that their investments are protected by the law and courts in the Member State. 
33%  of  the  surveyed  companies  see  the  quality,  efficiency  or  independence  of  justice  as  one  of  the  main 
reasons  for  concern  about  investment  protection  in  the  country.  Figures  55  and  56,  2024  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard. 

4   A new Government was elected following the October 2023 parliamentary elections. 
5   It  is  noted  that  representatives  of  legal  professions,  associations  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  as  well  as 
members of the civil society can participate in meetings of the team in an advisory role. See the contribution 
of the Government to the Rule of Law Report, pp. 15 ff. A call was also made by the largest associations of 
judges for urgent actions to be taken by the Minister of Justice to pave the way for the restoration of the rule 

3 

 
 
 
Rule of Law. The Action Plan includes a clear affirmation by Poland to the primacy of EU 
law, to respect the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (Court of Justice) and underlines 
the  importance  of  the  requirements  of  judicial  independence.  The  Action  Plan  lays  out, 
institution  by  institution,  the  Government’s  intentions  about  how  judicial  independence 
would  be  restored  and  safeguarded.  It  was  presented  by  Poland  to  the  General  Affairs 
Council7  with  a  view  to  addressing  the  concerns  raised  in  the  Commission’s  reasoned 
proposal of December 2017 under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as 
well as in judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and of the Court of 
Justice.  The  Minister  of  Justice  formally  called  on  Polish  judges  to  fully respect  and  apply 
EU  law  and  legal  principles  stemming  from  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights8. 
The Minister of Justice also committed to engage with the Council of Europe and the Venice 
Commission9; first consultations on the new reforms took place in April 2024.  

The Commission decided to close the Article 7(1) TEU procedure for Poland. On 6 May 
2024,  the  Commission  finalised  its  analysis10  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Poland  in  the 
context of the Article 7(1) TEU procedure and concluded that there was no longer a clear risk 
of a serious breach of the rule of law by Poland. It highlighted the steps under way to address 
the concerns on the independence of the justice system, as well as the commitments Poland 
made  to  the  primacy  of  EU  law  and  to  the  implementation  of  judgments  of  the  Court  of 
Justice and of the ECtHR. These steps were also welcomed in a debate in the General Affairs 
Council  on  21  May  202411.  Following  this  discussion,  on  29  May  2024,  the  Commission 
decided to close the Article 7 procedure by withdrawing its reasoned proposal of 2017. The 
Commission confirmed that it will continue to monitor the measures under the Action Plan, 
as well  as other steps to promote the rule of law in  Poland, in  particular  under the Rule of 
Law Report process12. 

Reforms of the disciplinary regime applicable to judges were positively assessed by the 
Commission. Under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the Commission concluded 
that  Poland  had  satisfactorily  fulfilled  the  two  “super  milestones”  to  strengthen  important 
aspects of the independence of the Polish judiciary, following the measures taken with regard 
to the disciplinary regime for judges introduced between June 2022 and February 202413. In 
particular, the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court was abolished and replaced by an 

of  law  (See  the  Common  position  of  judges'  associations  on  necessary,  urgent  actions  of  the  Minister  of 
Justice signed by seven associations of judges of 29 January 2024). 

6   See the ordinance of the Prime Minister of 13 December 2023 (Official Journal “Monitor Polski” of 2023, 

7  

item 1384); see also the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 20 February 2024. 
 The Action  Plan  was  presented  by  Poland  to  the  General Affairs  Council  on  20  February  2024  and  was 
subsequently discussed on 19 March and 21 May 2024. 

8   Such a call is in itself not binding on judges. See the communication of the Minister of Justice of 7 February 

2024 as regards standards related to the right to a fair trial.  

9   Statement of the Minister of Justice of 15 March 2023 at the plenary session of the Venice Commission; see 

the press release of 15 March 2023 of the Ministry of Justice. 
10   See the Commission press release of 6 May 2024 IP/24/2461. 
11   See the Council press statement of 21 May 2024. 
12   See the Commission press release of 29 May 2024, MEX/24/2986. 
13   See  the  Commission’s  preliminary  assessment  of  Poland’s  first  payment  request  and  the  Commission 
Implementing Decision on the authorisation of the disbursement of the first instalment of the non-repayable 
support and the first instalment of the loan support for Poland, C(2024) 2369 final. Furthermore, Poland also 
satisfactorily fulfilled another “super milestone” committing Poland to use Arachne, an IT tool that supports 
Member States' audit and control systems and which contributes to ensuring the necessary safeguards against 
risks of fraud. 

4 

 
 
independent  and  impartial  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court;  the  disciplinary  regime  was 
reformed,  and  controversial  disciplinary  offences  were  removed;  all  judges  affected  by  the 
rulings  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  had  the  right  to  have  their  case  reviewed  by  the  new 
Chamber  within  a  clear  timeframe  and  on  the  basis  of  the  new  regime  and  all  judges 
suspended  in  office  by  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  were  reinstated.  In  addition,  the  Polish 
courts  can  initiate  verification  procedures  on  whether  a  judge  meets  the  requirements  of 
independence stemming from Article 19 TEU. The Commission also considered that Poland 
now fulfils the horizontal enabling condition related to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(‘the Charter’)14.  

Concerns  about  disciplinary  investigations  and  proceedings  against  judges  related  to 
the content of their judicial decisions are addressed. An area of previous concern was the 
risk that disciplinary investigations were being used to investigate and potentially prosecute 
judges  in  view  of  the  content  of  their  judicial  decisions15.  This  risk  was  confirmed  in  two 
rulings of the Court of Justice16. The Chamber of Professional Liability of the Supreme Court 
considered such practice to be unlawful17. In addition to the provisions in the Law of 9 June 
2022 which effectively determine that the content of judicial decisions is not classified as a 
disciplinary  offence,  and  in  line  with  the  RRP  commitments,  on  15  February  2024,  the 
Minister of Justice adopted an Order which establishes the framework on the use of ad hoc 
disciplinary  officers  and  which  provides  that  such  ad  hoc  disciplinary  officers  will  be 
appointed  in  disciplinary  cases  concerning  the  content  of  judicial  decisions.18  The 
appointment of an ad hoc officer by the Minister of Justice excludes any other such officer 
from dealing with a given case. The Minister of Justice already appointed ad hoc disciplinary 
officers19 to take over such disciplinary investigations and proceedings, and, if these officers 
consider  it  justified,  terminate  those  investigations  or  proceedings20.  Furthermore,  Poland’s 

14   See Commission press release IP/24/1222. 
15   These cases concerned instances where judges contested the regularity of the appointment of other judges or 
the legitimacy of constitutional bodies of State; see to that end the press release of the Disciplinary Officer 
for Ordinary Court judges of 7 December 2023 and the press release of the Deputy Disciplinary Officer at 
the Regional Court in Warsaw of 8 January 2024.  

16   See the judgment of 15 July 2021 in the case C-791/19, Commission v Poland and of 5 June 2023 in the case 

C-204/21, Commission v Poland. 

17   See case I ZSK 10/23. 
18   The  Order  stipulates  that  such  officers  are  to  be  independent  from  the  Minister  of  Justice  and  will  be 
appointed to handle investigations or disciplinary proceedings regarding: (1) the submission of a request for 
a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union; (2) the content of judicial decisions; (3) 
the examination by a judge whether the appointment of another judge is in compliance with the applicable 
law, whether another judge satisfies  the requirements of independence and impartiality in connection with 
the circumstances accompanying his appointment or whether the court bench is compliant with the law in 
connection with the circumstances accompanying the appointment of a judge who is a member of that bench. 
19   These  ‘ad  hoc’  disciplinary  officers  are  appointed  from  among  judges  (1)  with  10  years  of  experience  in 
criminal  cases;  (2)  appointed  at  the  request  of  the  NCJ  whose  independence  was  beyond  doubt;  (3) 
specialised in conducting disciplinary cases.  See the press release of the Ministry of Justice  of 29 January 
2024. See also the Order of the Minister of Justice referred to above.  

20   The appointment of ‘ad hoc’ disciplinary officers occurred for example on 29 January, 15 and 23 February, 
and on 12 March 2024. So far, over 15 proceedings have been closed. The Ministry of Justice is currently 
preparing amendments to the rules governing allowances and work-patterns of judges which would reduce 
the  allowances received by disciplinary officers and increase  their workload as regards the examination of 
regular cases. A similar solution as regards the workload will be applied to the judges-members of the NCJ. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, this would result in a significant increase of the number of cases being 
examined annually in Poland. See: Rzeczpospolita.pl of 2 March 2024 and Oko. press of 2 April 2024; and 
Prawo.pl of 4 April 2024. 

5 

 
 
commitment to the respect of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, includes the judgment 
of 5 June 2023 (case C-204/21) declaring certain provisions of the Polish law on disciplinary 
offences of judges to be in violation of EU law, which requires all national authorities, and in 
particular, all national courts, to disapply these provisions. As of November 2023, the NCJ no 
longer elects new disciplinary officers for ordinary court judges21. 

The  Court  of  Justice  and  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  further  clarified 
requirements on judicial independence in cases concerning Poland. On 6 July 2023, the 
ECtHR ruled that there had been multiple violations of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in a case concerning the disciplinary regime for judges22. On 23 November 2023, the 
ECtHR  issued  a  pilot  judgment23  concerning  judicial  independence  in  Poland,  requesting 
Poland  to  take  a  range  of  legislative  measures  to  comply  with  Article  6  §  1  requirements, 
including  the  principle  of  independence  of  the  judiciary24.  The  new  Minister  of  Justice 
announced25  that  Poland  would  not  contest  the  pilot  judgment  and  would  take  action  to 
implement it. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Council of Europe that the 
Polish  Government  is  committed  and  determined  to  fully  implement  the  rulings  of  the 
ECtHR,  in  particular  those  concerning  the  rule  of  law  and  judicial  independence26.  On  21 
December 2023, the Court of Justice ruled27 that a bench of three judges of the Chamber of 
Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court did not meet the requirements 
of  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  previously  established  by  law  as  required  under 
Article  19(1)  TEU.  Polish  courts  continue  to  submit  to  the  Court  of  Justice  referrals  for 
preliminary rulings on issues related to judicial independence. The Action Plan on the Rule of 
Law presented by the Polish Government envisages a full implementation of all the rulings 
concerning judicial independence issued so far by the Court of Justice and by the ECtHR28. 

21   See the contribution of the Supreme Court to the Rule of Law Report, p. 4. 
22   ECtHR judgment of 6 July 2023, Tuleya v. Poland, (Applications nos. 21181/19 and 51751/20). 
23   ECtHR judgment of 23 November 2023 in the case Wałęsa v. Poland. Over the past few years, the European 
Court of Human Rights has developed a new procedure known as the pilot-judgment procedure as a means 
of dealing with large groups of identical cases that derive from the same underlying problem.  

24   In this ruling, and in the light of previous judgments concerning the judicial reforms in Poland initiated in 
2017, the ECtHR held that the violations of the right to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 had originated in 
the interrelated systemic problems connected with the malfunctioning of domestic legislation and practice. 
These underlying problems are: (1) a defective procedure for judicial appointments involving the National 
Council of the Judiciary as established under the 2017 Amending Act; (2) the resulting lack of independence 
on  the  part  of  the  Chamber  of  Extraordinary  Review  and  Public  Affairs  of  the  Supreme  Court;  (3)  the 
exclusive competence of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court in 
matters  involving  a  plea  of  lack  of  independence  on  the  part  of  a  judge  or  a  court;  (4)  the  defects  of  the 
extraordinary  appeal  procedure  as  established  in  this  judgment;  (5)  the  exclusive  competence  of  the 
Chamber  of  Extraordinary  Review  and  Public  Affairs  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  deal  with  extraordinary 
appeals. See the ECtHR press release ECHR 322 (2023).  

25   Statement  made  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  at  the  session  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  of  14 

December 2023.  

26   See  the  letter  of  the  Minister  of  Foreign Affairs  of  15  December  2023  addressed  to  the  President  of  the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. See the  press 
release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the same date. 

27   Case  C-718/21,  Krajowa  Rada  Sądownictwa  (Maintien  en  fonctions  d’un  juge). A  similar  reasoning  was 
retained in the orders of the Court of Justice of 29 May 2024 in the case C-43/22, Prokurator Generalny, and 
in the case C-720/21, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich. 

28   See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 20 February 2024.  

6 

 
 
Poland has also started reviewing the positions taken by the previous Government in pending 
cases before those courts29.  

A  law  to  address  the  serious  concerns  related  to  the  independence  of  the  National 
Council for the Judiciary was adopted by the Sejm. The National Council for the Judiciary 
(NCJ) continued to make requests for judicial appointments to the President of the Republic 
despite the persisting serious doubts as to its independence30. In order to counter this practice, 
pending  the  implementation  of  a  structural  solution,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  announced  the 
freezing of publication of vacant posts in ordinary courts31. On 20 December 2023, the Sejm 
adopted a resolution on the NCJ, stating that it has been composed in violation of the Polish 
Constitution  and  thus  deprived  of  the  capacity  to  carry  out  its  constitutional  functions  and 
tasks32. On 20 February 2024, as set out in the Action Plan, the Government formally tabled a 
draft  law  in  the  Sejm33  aimed  at  restoring  the  independence  of  the  NCJ.  According  to  the 
draft  law,  judges,  instead  of  the  Sejm,  would  be  empowered  to  select  and  appoint  the  15 
judges-members of the NCJ34. The NCJ and the First President of the Supreme Court issued 
negative opinions, considering the draft law to be unconstitutional35. Associations of judges 
and representatives of civil society organisations welcomed the objectives of the draft law36. 
At the request of the Minister of Justice, the Venice Commission provided an urgent opinion 
on  the  draft  law37  that  was  subsequently  reflected  by  the  Senate  in  an  amended  legislative 
text.  On  12  July  2024,  the  Sejm  adopted  the  law,  while  rejecting  a  Senate’s  amendment 
allowing judges appointed or promoted at the request of the NCJ in its composition pursuant 

29   For example, Poland changed its position in cases C-521/21, Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich, joined cases C-

146/23 and C-374/23, Sąd Rejonowy w Białymstoku, and C-197/23 S. 

30   2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 5. The NCJ continued 
adopting  resolutions  contesting  activities  of  judges  aimed  at  promoting  and  upholding  the  rule of  law  and 
also challenged several measures adopted by the new Government;  See the resolution No. 728/2023 of the 
NCJ of 29 August 2023 as regards standards of independence and impartiality of judges and resolution No. 
113/2024  of  16  February  2024  requesting  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  to  declare  the  unconstitutionality  of 
provisions  allowing  the  Minister  of  Justice  to  dismiss  court  presidents  and  vice-presidents  without  the 
binding opinion of the NCJ. On statements of the NCJ criticising draft laws proposed and rulings issued by 
judges, see the contribution of five NGOs to the Rule of Law Report, p. 5. 

31   See the communication of the Minister of Justice of 7 February 2024. 
32   Resolution of the Sejm of 20 December 2023 as published in “Monitor Polski” of 22 December 2023, item 

1457. 

33   Governmental draft law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary, Sejm printout No. 219. 

The draft law was subject to prior consultation of stakeholders. 

34   According to the draft law, representatives of all levels of the judiciary in Poland would be included among 
the  new  judges-members.  The  NCJ  judges-members  appointed  thereto  by  the  Sejm  since  2018  as  well  as 
judges appointed to office at the NCJ’s request in its composition since 2018 would be barred from standing 
in elections but would be able to votes on other candidates. The mandates of the current judges-members of 
the NCJ elected by the Sejm on 12 May 2022 would expire on the day on which the results of the election 
for the new members-judges of the Council are announced. 

35   See  the  opinion  of  the  First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  as  regards  the  draft  law  on  the  NCJ  of  22 
January  2024  (BSA  III.021.1.2024)  and  the  opinion  of  the  NCJ  of  15  February  2024  on  the  draft 
governmental law amending the law on the National Council for the Judiciary (WP.420.1.2024). 

36   Full recording of the Committee for Justice and Human Rights of 26 March 2024 holding a public hearing 
on the draft law. See also the ENNHRI contribution to the Rule of Law Report, p. 8. See also the opinion on 
the  draft  law  by  the  ‘Iustitia’  association  of  judges  (which  nonetheless  indicates  that  the  draft  should  also 
address  a  number  of  further  issues);  opinion  of  31  January  2024  by  the  Helsinki  Foundation  for  Human 
Rights; and the urgent interim opinion of 8 April 2024 by OSCE/ODHIR (JUD-POL/500/2024 [NR/AlC]). 
37   See  CDL-PI(2024)009-e  Poland  -  Urgent  Joint  Opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  and  the  Directorate 
General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe on the draft law amending the Law on 
the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland issued on 8 May 2024. 

7 

 
 
to the Law of 8 December 2017  from standing  as candidates for membership of the NCJ38. 
The President of the Republic has 21 days, as of the transmission of the adopted law, to either 
sign, veto or refer the law to the Constitutional Tribunal39. 

Poland committed to strengthen the independence of the Supreme Court. In a number of 
rulings, the ECtHR and the Court of Justice held that the appointment process of a number of 
Supreme Court judges was vitiated by fundamental irregularities40. As mentioned in the 2023 
Rule  of  Law  Report41,  several  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  including  its  First  President, 
have  been  appointed  to  the  Court  in  conditions  considered  by  the  ECtHR  as  violating  the 
right to a court established by law. This continues to raise concerns, which meanwhile have 
led to dissention within the Supreme Court42. Poland pledged in its ‘Action Plan’ on Rule of 
Law  to  take  measures  aimed  at  implementing  all  the  relevant  judgments  of  the  Court  of 
Justice and the ECtHR relating to judicial independence.  The ‘independence test’ under the 
Law of 9 June 202243  and the regular recusal  procedures, remain  available to  the parties to 
proceedings as a means to remove judges who do not meet the requirements of independence 
stemming from Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter in specific cases. The First 
President  of  the  Supreme  Court  contested  the  actions  taken  to  address  deficiencies  in  the 

38   On  this  point,  the  law  as  adopted  by  the  Sejm  does  not  follow  the  recommendation  of  the  Venice 
Commission in its urgent opinion to review the  wholesale blanket exclusion from eligibility to the NCJ of 
such a large cohort (according to the Venice Commission ca. 2500-3500) of judges appointed or promoted at 
the  request  of  the  NCJ  in  its  composition  pursuant  to  the  Law  of  8  December  2017,  because  it  lacks 
individual assessment and thus raises questions as to its proportionality. According to the law, such judges 
would not be able to stand as candidates for membership of the NCJ, but would be only able to vote on other 
candidates (judges appointed to judicial office or promoted by the NCJ operating prior to the entry into force 
of the Law of 8 December 2017). 

39   On  11  July  2024,  the  Minister  of  Justice  while  supporting  the  rejection  of  the  Senate’s  amendment 
announced at the session of the Sejm’s Committee for Justice and Human Rights that if the law is not signed 
by the President of the Republic, it will be necessary to start a new legislative procedure on a new NCJ law 
and to address the Venice Commission’s recommendations while finding a compromise between the right of 
newly appointed judges to stand as candidates to the NCJ and the need to restore the rule of law. 

40   See notably ECtHR judgments of 8 November 2021, Dolińska - Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, 49868/19; of 3 
February 2022, Advance Pharma Sp. Z O.O v. Poland, 1469/20; and the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
21  December  2023  in  the  Case  C-718/21,  Krajowa  Rada Sądownictwa  (Maintien  en  fonctions  d’un  juge). 
See also the contributions to the Rule of Law Report by the ENNHRI, p. 8, and by the MEDEL, p. 15.  

41   The 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland, p. 7. 
42   A  group  of  37  Supreme  Court  judges  appointed  before  2018  issued  an  open  letter  calling  on  the  Polish 
authorities to prevent Supreme Court judges appointed in procedures affected by fundamental irregularities 
from adjudicating cases. The call is also addressed to the Presidents of the Supreme Court, requesting them 
to step down from their offices. The letter has been widely reproduced by the media, see e.g. Onet.pl of 30 
January  2024.  Furthermore,  lay  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court  adopted  resolutions  announcing  that  they 
would abstain from adjudicating cases in panels composed of Supreme Court judges appointed at the request 
of the NCJ in its composition as of March 2018; see Prawo.pl of 13 October 2023. The Civil Chamber of the 
Supreme  Court  adopted  a  resolution  whereby  they  consider  that  their  status  cannot  be  questioned;  see 
Resolution No. 2/2024 of the Assembly of Judges of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 12 January 
2024 on the status of Supreme Court judges,  which was adopted by a majority of judges appointed to the 
court  as  of  March  2018.  Three  judges  of  the  Chamber  of  the  Extraordinary  Control  and  Public  Affairs 
decided to abstain from adjudicating certain types of cases until rulings of the ECtHR and of the Court of 
Justice  concerning  their  status  have  been  fully  implemented.  It  is  noted  that  other  judges  of  the  same 
Chamber  continue  examining  such  cases,  see  e.g.  the  judgment  of  28  February  2024  in  the  case  I  NKRS 
87/23. 

43   Introduced by the Law of 9 June 2022 amending the Law on the Supreme Court and certain other laws. 

8 

 
 
functioning  of the justice system44. The President  of the Republic proposed amendments  to 
the internal rules of the Supreme Court, notably aiming to reduce the quorum necessary for 
Chambers  of  the  Supreme  Court  sitting  in  full  bench  –  from  two-thirds  to  half  45.  A  2021 
preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice concerning a judicial appointment to the Supreme 
Court still remains to be implemented46.  

The  Government  tabled  draft  legislation  to  address  the  remaining  serious  concerns 
related  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal.  On  14  December  2023,  the  ECtHR  pointed  to 
irregularities in the appointment of three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal who sat on the 
bench delivering a ruling47. On 6 March 2024, the Sejm adopted a resolution underlining the 
unconstitutional  character  of  the  appointment  of  these  judges  and  recalling  the  unlawful 
appointment of the current President of the Tribunal48. The resolution called on the judges of 
the Constitutional Tribunal to resign from office and to join the process of democratic change 
and called on public authorities to abstain from cooperating with the Constitutional Tribunal 
in  order to  preserve the principle of  legality  stemming from  the constitution49. On 6 March 
2024, the Government tabled two draft laws on the Constitutional Tribunal, prepared together 
with  civil  society  organisations50,  which  were  subject  to  their  first  reading  in  Parliament51. 

44   See  the  statement  of  the  First  President  as  regards  the  draft  amendments  to  the  rules  of  functioning  of 
ordinary courts of 17 December 2023; Declaration of the First President as regards the statements made by 
the Marshal of the Sejm of 5 January 2024; Declaration of the First President as regards unlawful actions of 
the President of the Labour Law and Social Security Chamber and of the Marshal of the Sejm of 8 January 
2024; Declarations of the First President as regards the unlawful attempt to depose the President of the Court 
of Appeal in Warsaw of 11 March 2024 and of 20 March 2024 (see also below).  

45   The amendments were published with final effect in the Journal of Laws of 5 December 2023, item 2635. 
On 22 December 2023, amendments proposed by the President of the Republic to the internal rules of the 
Supreme Administrative Court were published with final effect in the Journal of Laws of 22 December 2023, 
item 2754. These amendments changed the number of judicial posts in the Supreme Administrative Court. 
46   This  concerns  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  6  October  2021  in  the  case  C-487/19,  W.Ż.  On  20 
March 2024, the newly appointed President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court decided to reject 
a  motion  of  the  main  party  to  proceedings  to  recuse  from  the  case  four  judges  directly  affected  by  the 
judgments of the ECtHR contesting their judicial status. See the ruling of 20 March 2024 in the case I NWW 
468/23. Cf. the 2022 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland, p. 9. 

47   ECtHR judgment of 14 December 2023 in the  case M.L. v. Poland (application no. 40119/21), para. 173.: 
“next to judge M.M. the Court pointed that judges J. P and J.W. were elected in 2017 and 2018 respectively 
in  order  to  replace  two  other  judges  who  had  been  elected  together  with  Judge  M. M  by  the  eighth-
term Sejm in a procedure which the Court has already found to be in breach of Article 6 […]”. The judgment 
of the Constitutional Tribunal which was contested before the ECtHR concerned the unconstitutionality of 
the  Law  on  family  planning,  protection  of  the  human  foetus  and  conditions  permitting  the  termination  of 
pregnancy. 

48   As  of  13  December  2023,  the  new  Government  started  the  practice  of  publishing  rulings  of  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  with  an  additional  clarification  in  case  these  rulings  were  issued  in  an  irregular 
composition.  The  clarification  attached  to  the  rulings  concerned  referred  notably  to  the  case  law  of  the 
ECtHR in cases Xero Flor w Polsce Sp. z o.o. v. Poland of 7 May 2021, application no. 4907/18, Wałęsa v. 
Poland of 23 November 2023, application no. 50849/21; M.L. v. Poland of 14 December 2023, application 
no.  40119/21.  Following  the  adoption  of  the  Sejm’s  resolution  on  6  March  2024,  the  Polish  Government 
ceased publishing all rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal. 

49   Cf. The Resolution of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of 6 March 2024 as regards the removal of effects 
of the constitutional crisis of 2015-2023 in the context of activities of the Constitutional Tribunal, published 
in  the  “Monitor  Polski”  of  2024,  item  198.  The  resolution  is  not  legally  binding.  On  28  May  2024,  the 
Constitutional Tribunal held that this resolution is unconstitutional. 

50   See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 4 March 2024.  
51   The first reading took place on 26 April 2024. The draft laws on the Constitutional Tribunal (printouts nos. 
253  and  254)  entail  notably  the  following  changes:  rulings  of  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  issued  in  its 

9 

 
 
 
further 

important 

issued  a 

improvements 

ruling  declaring 

the  Constitutional  Tribunal 

the 
Meanwhile, 
unconstitutionality of EU Treaty provisions52. On 11 December 2023, it declared a new law 
aimed  at  bringing 
judiciary 
unconstitutional53. It also continued to reject requests for recusal of judges considered to have 
been  appointed  unlawfully54.  The  former  Prosecutor  General  as  well  as  Supreme  Court 
judges appointed after March 2018 continued seizing the Constitutional Tribunal in matters 
related to the constitutionality of EU law55, and the Constitutional Tribunal issued a number 
of  interim  measures  following  constitutional  complaints  lodged  by  persons  deposed  from 
their  offices56.  According  to  the  Polish  authorities,  these  interim  measures  were  issued 
without  any  legal  basis.  The  infringement  procedure  launched  by  the  Commission  against 
Poland  concerning  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  and  its  case  law  is  still  pending  before  the 

functioning  of 

the 

the 

to 

irregular composition would be invalidated (without the invalidation of other decisions issued on the basis of 
such rulings); the term of office of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal would be terminated and its 
duties would be taken over by the judge with the highest seniority in the judicial post; the appointment of 
three judges to already occupied posts would be invalidated; other judges would be given one month to retire 
(otherwise  they  would  continue  to  adjudicate  in  the  Constitutional Tribunal).  New  Constitutional Tribunal 
judges would be appointed by a 3/5 majority of the Sejm (instead of by absolute majority) and the catalogue 
of  authorities  empowered  to propose  candidates  would  be  significantly  extended.  Persons  who  in  the  past 
four years exercised a political office would not be allowed to become judges of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
In addition, the Government proposed a constitutional amendment changing i.a. the method of appointment 
of new Constitutional Tribunal judges to ensure that no large-scale appointments would materialize within 
the period of one term of office of the Sejm.  

52   The judgment of 11 December 2023 in the case K 8/21 as regards a (periodic) penalty payment or a lump-
sum payment imposed by the CJEU; in this ruling, the Constitutional Tribunal considered as unconstitutional 
Article 279 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 39 of the Statute of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. 

53   The judgment of 11 December 2023 in the case Kp 1/23 concerning the law of 13 January 2023 amending 
the Law on the Supreme Court and certain other laws; see the 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on 
the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 9-10. 

54   See e.g. the communication of the Sejm of 3 April 2024 issued in the context of the case K 27/23. 
55   See the legal questions of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court of 12 January 2024 in the case II CSKP 
426/22  contesting  the  constitutionality  of  Article  19(1)  TEU  read  in  connection  with  Article  47  of  the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  Article  267  TFEU.  See  also  the  motion  of  the  previous  Prosecutor-
General to the Constitutional Tribunal as regards specific measures adopted under the “Green Deal” package 
(see the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 20 October 2023) and the European Trading System (see 
the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 24 November 2023). Similar motions are being withdrawn. For 
example,  the  current  Prosecutor-General  withdrew  on  31  January  2024  the  motion  of  the  previous 
Prosecutor-General  as  regards  the  constitutionality  of  provisions  governing  the  functioning  of  the  self-
government  of  medical  doctors;  see.  DoRzeczy.pl  of  31  January  2024.  On  23  April  2024,  the  National 
Council  for  the  Judiciary  requested  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  to  declare  the  unconstitutionality  of 
provisions of the ECHR requiring Poland to implement ECtHR judgments on judicial independence and to 
pay damages to parties in such cases (See the Resolution of 23 April 2024 No. 233/2024). 

56   This  concerns  i.a.  interim  measures  in  the  case Ts  9/24,  aimed  at  preventing  the  Prosecutor-General  from 
carrying out the appointment of a new National Prosecutor (see also below) and in the case Ts 32/24 aimed 
at  withholding  the  dismissal  of  the  President  of  the  Court  of Appeal  in  Warsaw.  The  Minister  of  Justice 
considers these decisions as legally invalid, notably since they were issued in the context of constitutional 
complaints  which  can  be  lodged  with  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  only  after  the  exhaustion  of  all  legal 
remedies available before ordinary courts. See to this end the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 23 
January 2024.  

10 

 
 
Court of Justice57. Poland has meanwhile changed its position in this case, acknowledging the 
existence of a violation of EU law. 

The  effects  of  the  contested  justice  reforms  of  2017  regarding  the  functioning  of  the 
ordinary  judiciary  are  being  reversed.  The  new  Minister  of  Justice  publicly  pledged  to 
involve  the  judiciary  in  all  decisions  related  to  appointments  to  key  positions  within  the 
ordinary  judiciary  and  to  organise  transparent  appointment  procedures  based  on  open 
competitions58. This  new  approach was  already implemented as regards the appointment of 
court  presidents  and  vice-presidents  which,  since  2017,  did  not  ensure  the  involvement  of 
bodies of judicial self-government. The Minister of Justice dismissed59 or started the process 
of  dismissing60  several  court  presidents  and  vice-presidents  appointed  by  the  previous 
Minister  of  Justice  on  the  grounds  of  abuse  of  power61.  Some  of  these  decisions  were 
contested,  and  the  Constitutional  Tribunal62  issued  interim  measures  suspending  certain 
dismissals63. Internal rules on the functioning of ordinary courts were amended to ensure that 
the verification of compliance by judges with the requirements stemming from Article 19(1) 
TEU  are  not  conducted  by  judges  appointed  to  the  office  at  the  request  of  the  NCJ  in  its 
composition  as  of  March  201864.  The  President  of  the  Republic  and  the  NCJ  contested  the 
constitutionality of these amendments before the Constitutional Tribunal. A new head of the 
National  School  of  Judiciary  and  Prosecution  was  appointed65.  Several  secondments  of 
ordinary court judges to the Ministry of Justice, the NCJ and the National School of Judiciary 
and Prosecution were revoked by the Minister of Justice who considered that public officials 
could fill those positions and that courts would benefit from the return of the seconded judges 
66. The new Government also announced the creation of four specialised Committees tasked 

57   On 17 July 2023, the Commission brought an application pursuant to Article 258 TFEU against Poland to 
the  Court  of  Justice  for  violations  of  EU  law  by  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  and  its  two  rulings  issued  in 
2021; see case C-448/23. 

58   Press release of the Ministry of Justice of 22 January 2024.  
59   On  19  December  2023,  the  Minister  of  Justice  withdrew  decisions  of  the  previous  Minister  of  Justice 
concerning appointments to the office of court presidents that had not yet exerted legal effect; see the press 
release of the Ministry of Justice of 19 December 2023. 

60   It  is  noted  that  some  court  presidents  and  vice-presidents  decided  to  resign  on  their  own  from  the  offices 

occupied; see the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 2 April 2024.  

61   Often  the  dismissal  decisions  are  preceded  by  the  suspension  of  the  court  president  or  vice-president  in 
office.  See  e.g.  two  press  releases  of  the  Ministry  of  Justice  of  11  March  2023. As  of  5  July  2024,  108 
dismissal procedures have been launched each time suspending the president/vice president from duty.  
62   It is also noted that the Constitutional Tribunal has been seized by the NCJ as regards the constitutionality of 
provisions allowing the Minister of Justice to dismiss court presidents without a prior binding opinion of the 
NCJ to that end – see above.  

63   Wyborcza.pl of 22 February 2024 describing a declaration made by the President of the Court of Appeal in 
Warsaw who is, at the same time, the Main Disciplinary Officer for Ordinary Court judges, of 22 February 
2024. As regards the involvement of the Constitutional Tribunal, see the interim measure order issued in the 
case Ts 32/24. 

64   See the Regulation of the Minister  of Justice of 6 February 2024 amending the Regulation  – Internal rules 
governing the functioning of ordinary courts published in the Official Journal of 7 February 2024, item 149.  
65   The  appointment  was  organised  as  an  open  competition;  the  new  Minister  of  Justice  dismissed  from  the 
office  the  previous  head  of  the  School  appointed  by  the  previous  Government  just  before  the  new 
Government took office. See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 2 February 2024 and of 14 March 
2024.  

66   See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 12 January 2024.  

11 

 
 
with proposing improvements to the legislation in the areas of civil law, criminal law, family 
law, and legislation governing the functioning of the judiciary and the prosecution system67.  

Significant  progress  has  been  made  to  ensure  the  functional  independence  of  the 
prosecution service from the Government and some progress has been made to separate 
the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General. The 2023 Rule 
of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘[s]eparate the function of the Minister of Justice 
from that of the Prosecutor General and continue efforts to ensure functional independence of 
the  prosecution  service  from  the  Government’68.  Following  his  appointment,  the  new 
Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  formally  called  on 
to  act 
independently,  pending  a  full  separation  from  the  two  offices69.  The  Ministry  of  Justice 
presented a broad description of the forthcoming reform to separate the office of the Minister 
of  Justice  from  that  of  the  Prosecutor-General  and  enhance  the  functional  independence  of 
prosecutors70.  On  12  January  2024,  the  Minister  of  Justice  formally  ascertained  that  the 
National  Prosecutor  had  returned  to  active  service  without  a  valid  legal  basis  and, 
consequently, cannot occupy the office71. This decision was contested, among others, by the 
President of the Republic who seized the Constitutional Tribunal72. On 14 March 2024, the 
Prime  Minister  appointed  a  new  National  Prosecutor73,  which  was  also  contested  by  the 
President of the Republic74. Developments concerning the National Prosecutor are also raised 
in a case before the Supreme Court75. Changes were made to the composition of the National 

the  prosecutors 

67   See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 5 March 2024.  
68   2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 11. The Commission 
had  assessed  that  no  progress  had  been  made  on  the  recommendation  in  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  to 
separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and that some progress 
had been made on the recommendation to ensure  functional independence of the prosecution service from 
the Government.  

69   See the letter of the Prosecutor-General of 15 January 2024 addressed to prosecutors, assistant prosecutors, 

assistants, officials and clerks working at public prosecutor’s offices. 

70   According  to  the  announced  reform,  the  new  Prosecutor-General  would  be  appointed  by  the  absolute 
majority  of  votes  in  the  Sejm  with  the  binding  consent  of  the  Senate  to  a  6-year  term  of  office  (not 
renewable). The appointment of a new Prosecutor-General would be preceded by an open competition and 
public hearings and his dismissal would be  possible exclusively in situations provided for by law. See the 
press release of the Ministry of Justice of 19 January 2024.  

71   Appointed  to  the  post  on  18  March  2022.  The  current  Prosecutor-General  considered  that  the  former 
Prosecutor-General had brought back to active service the prosecutor later nominated National Prosecutor on 
the basis of provisions which, at the relevant time, had ceased to apply. Therefore, the Minister of Justice 
considered  that  the  National  Prosecutor  was  not  formally  dismissed  from  the  office  –  which  would  have 
required  a  formal  consent  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  –  but  was  considered  as  never  validly  having 
exercised the office supposedly held. See the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 12 January 2024.  
72   The former National Prosecutor lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Tribunal which, on 
that  basis,  on  15  January  2024  issued  an  interim  measures  order  in  the  case  Ts  9/24,  prohibiting  the 
Prosecutor-General  from  preventing  the  hitherto  National  Prosecutor  form  carrying  out  his  duties.  The 
Prosecutor-General denied the legal validity of this decision (see above). On 15 January 2024, the President 
of the Republic lodged with the Constitutional Tribunal a request to settle the dispute over authority and to 
determine whether the Prosecutor-General can decide de facto on the personal composition of the National 
Prosecutor’s Office in circumvention of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic; see the case 
Kpt 1/24 (pending).  

73   This was done following an open and transparent procedure. See the press release of the Ministry of Justice 

of 9 February 2024. 

74   See  the  letter  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  addressed  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  19  March  2024 
(BPU.0701.8.2024) where he considers that the office continues to be occupied by the previous holder. 

75   Following a legal question submitted by an ordinary court; see Prawo.pl of 7 March 2024.  

12 

 
 
Council  of  Prosecutors76.  Prosecutors  degraded  or  seconded  by  the  previous  Prosecutor-
General  were  returned  to  their  former  posts77.  Following  the  request  of  Poland,  the 
Commission  confirmed  Poland’s  participation  in  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office 
(EPPO).  The  EPPO  will  be  competent  to  investigate  and  prosecute  crimes  affecting  the 
Union’s  financial  interests  committed  in  Poland  after  1  June  202178.  In  view  of  the 
developments set out above, there has been significant progress on the 2023 recommendation 
to  continue  efforts  to  ensure  functional  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the 
Government  and  some  progress  on  the  recommendation  to  separate  the  function  of  the 
Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General.  

Quality  

The  level  of  digitalisation  is  advanced,  although  gaps  still  remain  regarding  online 
access to judgments. Digital tools are broadly used in courts, and digital solutions to initiate 
and  follow  proceedings  in  civil,  commercial,  and  administrative  cases  are  in  place79.  Gaps 
still  remain  in  particular  in  online  access  to  published  judgments  or  in  the  availability  of 
electronic communication tools in the prosecution service80. As regards salaries of judges, the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  ruled  on  the  unconstitutionality  of  provisions  governing  their 
determination81. Meanwhile, the Government  adjusted the budgetary law for 2024 applying 
regular statutory rules to the judicial salaries82. 

Efficiency 

The  overall  performance  of  ordinary  and  administrative  courts  continues  to  be 
relatively  stable.  As  regards  ordinary  courts,  while  the  estimated  time  needed  to  resolve 
civil, commercial, administrative, and other cases in 2022 further decreased (from 107 days 
in  2021  to  100  days  in  2022)83,  an  opposite  trend  is  seen  in  litigious  civil  and  commercial 
cases  in  first  instance  courts  (an  increase  from  330  in  2021  to  362  in  2022)84.  The  rate  of 

76   On  21  December  2023,  the  Prosecutor-General  dismissed  five  members  of  the  Council  representing  his 
office, appointed thereto by the previous Prosecutor-General. This gave rise to controversy and the dismissed 
members contested the decision, arguing that the office held in the Council is of four years and cannot be 
rescinded unless in cases specified by law. See: the press release of the Ministry of Justice of 21 December 
2023 and Prawo.pl of 29 December 2023. 

77   See the press releases of the Minister of Justice-Prosecutor-General of 4 January 2024 on the termination of 
secondments of prosecutors to the National Prosecutor’s Office and of 29 January 2024 on the termination of 
secondments  of  10  prosecutors  of  the  Regional  and  Provincial  Prosecutor’s  Offices.  See  also  the  press 
releases of the National Prosecutor of 11 and 29 March 2024.  

78   See the Commission Decision (EU) 2024/807 of 29 February 2024 confirming the participation of Poland in 
the  enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Procedures for 
the appointment of the European Prosecutor from Poland and European Delegated Prosecutors are ongoing.  

79   Figures 44 and 43, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
80   Figures 45 and 49, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
81   Following up on a request lodged by the First President of the Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme 
Administrative Court and the NCJ; see the judgment of 8 November 2023 in the case K 1/23; for additional 
background see the 2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 14. 
82   See  the  amendment  of  the  Government  to  the  governmental  draft  law  on  specific  solutions  for  the 
implementation of the budgetary law for 2024 (amendment No 128-A). See also LIBERTIES contribution to 
the Rule of Law Report, p. 12. 

83   Figure 5, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
84   Figure 6, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

13 

 
 
solving civil, commercial, administrative, and other cases continues to increase85. As regards 
administrative  courts,  the  estimated  time  to  solve  administrative  cases  in  first  instance 
increased slightly (from 151 in 2021 to 163 in 2022)86. 

II. 

ANTI-CORRUPTION FRAMEWORK  

Several  authorities  are  responsible  for  anti-corruption  in  Poland,  including  the  Prosecutor 
General87,  and  the  Minister  of  Internal  Affairs  and  Administration  who  is  in  charge  of 
prevention  aspects,  such  as  the  lobby  register  for  public  officials.  The  Central  Anti-
Corruption Bureau is the law enforcement body set-up to combat corruption in the public and 
the private sector88 alongside the Central Police Investigation Bureau and the regular police, 
the  Internal  Security  Agency,  and  the  Prosecution  Service89.  The  Supreme  Audit  Office 
(NIK)  has  a  preventive  role,  monitoring  the  public  spending  of  the  government 
administration bodies, including the National Bank of Poland and state legal persons90. 

The perception among experts and business executives is that the level of corruption in 
the  public  sector  remains  relatively  high.  In  the  2023  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  by 
Transparency International, Poland scores 54/100 and ranks 19th in the European Union and 
47th globally91. This perception has deteriorated over the past five years.92 The 2024 Special 
Eurobarometer on Corruption shows that 52% of respondents consider corruption widespread 
in  their  country  (EU  average  68%)  and  45%  of  respondents  feel  personally  affected  by 
corruption in their daily lives (EU average 27%)93. As regards businesses, 43% of companies 
consider that corruption is widespread (EU average 65%) and 27% consider that corruption is 

85   Figure 10, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
86   Figure 12, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard.  
87   See also Pillar I on progress to separate the Prosecutor General from the position of Minister of Justice. 
88   The Bureau is also competent in matters related to corruption prevention, particularly in health care bodies 
and policy coordination. The Supreme Audit Office audit questioned the appropriateness of also entrusting 
the  Central-Anticorruption  Bureau  with  corruption  prevention  and  policy  coordination  tasks,  as  it  would 
neither  have  the  competence  (i.e.  legislative  initiative)  as  a  law  enforcement  body  nor  the  resources  to 
coordinate public policy. Supreme Audit Office (2022), Post-audit presentation of the audit Implementation 
of the Government Anti-Corruption Programme for 2018-2020. 

89   Cf. Law of 9 June 2006 on the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau. The Law of 24 May 2002 on the Internal 
Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency. The Law of 28 January 2016 on the Prosecution Service. 
Law  of  6 April  1990  on  the  police.  Within  the  police,  the  Police  Internal Affairs  Bureau  is  appointed  to 
combat and reduce corruption within the police itself. According to input from Poland for the 2024 Rule of 
Law Report, p. 25, at the regional level, there are also specialised corruption departments in the Provincial 
Police  Headquarters,  while  in  the  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office,  the  most  serious  cases  of  corruption  are 
prosecuted  by  eleven  local  departments  that  are  institutionally  part  of  the  National  Public  Prosecutors 
Office’s Department for Organised Crime and Corruption. 
90   Law of 23 December 1994 on the Supreme Audit Office. 
91   Transparency International (2024), Corruption Perceptions Index 2023. The level of perceived corruption is 
categorised  as  follows:  low  (the  perception  among  experts  and  business  executives  of  public  sector 
corruption scores above 79); relatively low (scores between 79-60), relatively high (scores between 59-50), 
high (scores below 50). 

92   In 2019, the score was 58, while, in 2023, the score is 54. The score significantly increases/decreases when it 
changes more than five points; improves/deteriorates (changes between 4-5 points) and is relatively stable 
(changes from 1-3 points) in the last five years. 

93   Special Eurobarometer 548 on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024). The Eurobarometer 
data  on  citizens’  corruption  perception  and  experience  is  updated  every  year.  The  previous  data  set  is  the 
Special Eurobarometer 534 (2023). 

14 

 
 
a problem when doing business (EU average 36%)94. Furthermore, 42% of respondents find 
that  there  are  enough  successful  prosecutions  to  deter  people  from  corrupt  practices  (EU 
average  32%)95,  while  22%  of  companies  believe  that  people  and  businesses  caught  for 
bribing a senior official are appropriately punished (EU average 31%)96.  

The  Government  has  engaged  in  preliminary  discussions  with  stakeholders  on  a  new 
anti-corruption strategy to address prevailing corruption risks for the years to come97. 
As reported last year, the Supreme Audit Office recommended in its December 2022 report to 
prepare and adopt  an anti-corruption programme98. Preliminary exchanges have taken place 
between  the  Government  and  civil  society  on  the  benefits  of  developing  a  comprehensive 
anti-corruption  policy,  which  could  include  a  new  strategy  and  action  plan,  to  support  an 
overall strategic policy approach which for now is still missing99. 

The  Government  committed  to  strengthening  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
corruption  crimes.  To  address  some  of  the  systemic  weaknesses  identified  in  previous 
reports, the Government plans to increase the independence of the anti-corruption institutions 
in charge of investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes100, including through legislative 
amendments to separate the position of Prosecutor General from the position of Minister of 
Justice101. The Association of Prosecutors is calling for a comprehensive legislative reform of 
the prosecution service to address  risks of politicisation  and the selective application of the 
law  in  corruption  cases  for  political  purposes102.  In  addition,  the  Government  Coalition 
Agreement  contains  a  commitment  to  dismantle  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau, 
transferring its resources and competences, including to fight corruption, among others to the 
Police’s  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation103,  as  previous  reports  raised  concerns  about  the 

94   Flash Eurobarometer 543 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024). The Eurobarometer 
data  on  business  attitudes  towards  corruption  as  is  updated  every  year. The  previous  data  set  is  the  Flash 
Eurobarometer 524 (2023). 

95  Special Eurobarometer 548 on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024).  
96   Flash Eurobarometer 543 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024).  
97   Poland’s last anti-corruption strategy and action plan was in place from 2018-2020. 
98   Supreme  Audit  Office,  Implementation  of  the  Government  Programme  Counteracting  Corruption  for  the 
Years 2018-2020 (December 2022). See the 2023 and 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule 
of law situation in Poland, pp. 13-14; see also Supreme Audit Office (2022), Post-audit presentation of the 
audit Implementation of the Government Anti-Corruption Programme for 2018-2020. 

99   Information received from Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in the context of the 

country visit to Poland. 

100  See  Government  Coalition  Agreement  (2023);  Gazeta  Wyborcza  (10  November  2023),  The  first  open 
coalition agreement in the history of Poland. For more details on related reforms on the independence, see 
pillar I. 

101  Written contribution from Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Poland, pp. 1-2. See also 

for more details pillar I above. 

102  This was raised as a concern in previous Rule of Law Reports; instead of amendments to the existing law on 
the prosecution service, Lex Super Omnia proposed a comprehensive draft bill to inform the Government on 
26  December  2023,  see  Draft  new  law  on  the  system  of  the  public  prosecutor’s  office.  See  also  in  this 
context  Lex  Super  Omnia  (9 February 2024),  Prosecutors  will  not  be  intimidated  by  politicians,  reporting 
intimidation efforts by Law and Justice politicians of prosecutors who support the reform.  

103  According to the Spokesperson for the Minister of Special Services, plans include the establishment of a new 
unit within the police with regular police powers (rather than special intelligence powers of the Central Anti-
Corruption  Bureau)  and  competences  to  investigate  high-level  corruption  cases.  Competences  for  petty 
corruption cases are envisaged to be shifted to the Police’s Central Bureau of Fighting Corruption, which is 
to be created on the basis of a new law and where the staff of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau would be 
transferred. Competences of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau related to public procurement are envisaged 

15 

 
 
 
subordination of the Bureau to  the executive104. A draft act  is  envisaged to  be submitted to 
the  Sejm  before  the  summer105.  Poland’s  participation  in  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office  is  also  expected  to  facilitate  the  investigation  of  fraud  and  corruption  affecting  the 
financial interests of the Union106.  

The  reform  of  the  Criminal  Code  to  increase  the  level  of  penalties  for  corruption 
entered into force. Corruption is broadly criminalised under Polish law107. The reform of the 
Act  of  July  2022,  initially  due  on  14  March  2023,  was  adopted  on  1  October  2023108.  The 
reform was passed through an accelerated procedure in Parliament, which gave rise to some 
criticism  from  a  wide  range  of  stakeholders109.  In  practice,  corruption  crimes  committed 

to  be  shifted  to  the  National  Revenue Administration,  and  those  related  to  the  control  and  verification  of 
asset declarations to the National Revenue Administration see Polsat News (29 March 2024), referring to a 
statement  delivered  to  the  media  by  the  spokesperson  of  the  Minister  for  Interior  and Administration;  see 
also  the  Polish  Press  Agency  (22  April  2024)  presenting  statements  of  the  Minister  for  Interior  and 
Administration on this issue. See also the draft law of 28 May 2024 on the Enhancing the Coordination of 
Anti-Corruption Actions, Dismantlement of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and amending certain other 
laws. 

104  See Government Coalition Agreement (2023), para. 19, p. 7,  and concerns raised in the 2023 Rule of Law 
Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. See also Bertelsmann Stiftung (2024), 
Transformation Index (BTI) – Country Report: Poland, p. 11, highlighting that the Central Anti-Corruption 
Bureau  is  closely  linked  to  the  former  government  lacking  independence.  Similarly,  information  received 
from  Batory  Foundation  and Helsinki  Foundation  for  Human  Rights  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to 
Poland, stressing the need for an ex-anti impact assessment before the dissolution and embedding in a larger 
anti-corruption policy approach, including a new strategy. 

105  See the draft governmental Act on Enhancing coordination of anti-corruption activities, dismantling of the 
Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  and  the  amendment  of  other  acts,  which  was  entered  in  the  List  of 
legislative 
see 
https://legislacja.gov.pl/projekt/12385657.  It  envisages  the  establishment  of  the  Central  Corruption 
Combatting Bureau within  the  police structures, with country-wide competence to detect, analyse, prevent 
and combat corruption. According to the publicly available information, the Council of Ministers is expected 
to adopt this draft law by the second quarter of 2024. 

of  Ministers 

Council 

number 

UD46, 

works 

under 

the 

of 

106  See  Pillar  I.  Input  from  Poland  for  the  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  p.  20.  This  initiative  is  welcomed  by 
practitioners,  such  as  the  Association  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  Iustitia,  Themis  and  Lex  Super  Omnia, 
reporting  about  evidence  especially  for  political  cases  having  been  controlled  by  the  central  prosecutors 
office previously and not been shared with the EPPO, according to information received in the context of the 
country visit to Poland. 

107  The  key  offence  penalised  by  the  Criminal  Code  is  bribery  of  public  officials  in  its  passive  (accepting  a 
bribe) and active (offering a bribe) forms. The term ‘person holding a public position’ as defined by law has 
a  broad  scope,  including  among  others  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  Poland,  members  of  Parliament, 
judges, notaries, officers of a public authority, members of local authorities. 

108  The delay in enforcement was introduced by the amendment of provision on the effective date of the act by 
the Act of 26 January 2023 amending the Code of Civil Procedure and some other acts and justified by the 
Vice-Minister of Justice as necessary to address inconsistencies with the new Executive Penal Code (that did 
not  exist  at  the  time  of  adoption  of  the  amendments  to  the  Criminal  Code)  and  the Act  on  Support  and 
Rehabilitation of Juveniles. See also Gazeta Prawna (30 January 2023). The reform introduces stricter levels 
of  criminal  responsibility,  higher  sanctions  and  new  types  of  offences  to  capture  certain  aggravating 
circumstances for corruption crimes.  

109  See  for  instance,  Krakowski  Instytut  Prawa  Karnego  (2023),  p.  29;  Dogmaty  Karnisty  (1  October  2023). 
Lawyers’  associations  have  complained  about  the  procedure,  the  government  justification  and  lack  of 
consultation, as they see the problem not in the level of sanctions but in the effectiveness of the proceedings, 
and therefore issued a resolution and an open letter questioning the impact of the amendments. Information 
received from National Chamber of Legal Councillors/ Supreme Bar Council/ Free Courts Initiative in the 
context of the country visit to Poland. See in this context also the press release of the Ombudsperson  of 18 
July 2022; the Opinion of the Ombudsperson of 15 July 2022 (II.510.1043.2021.PZ); resolution No. 82/2022 
of the National Bar Council of 19 November 2022.  

16 

 
 
before  1  October  2023  will  continue  to  be  prosecuted  and  adjudicated  under  a  less  severe 
regime (lex mitior). Stakeholders took the view that the challenges of fighting corruption do 
not  relate  to  the  level  of  penalties,  which  the  reform  increased110,  but  to  shortcomings 
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  corruption  proceedings111.  Whilst  the  effectiveness  of 
combatting  foreign  bribery  in  practice  currently  remains  rather  low112,  the  new  Prosecutor 
General  encouraged  prosecutors  to  make  full  use  of  sources  of  information  and  to  increase 
judicial  cooperation  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  foreign  bribery  detection113.  Moreover, 
the Ministry of Justice is continuing the work to amend the Act on the liability of collective 
entities for criminal offences114. As previously reported, the amendments aim to remove the 
rule according to  which private companies can be held  criminally liable for foreign  bribery 
only  after  the  final  instance  court  sentence  convicting  the  natural  person(s)  involved  in  the 
foreign bribery case or after the termination of the proceedings for other reasons115.  

Some  progress  has  been  made  towards  enabling  a  robust  track  record  of  high-level 
corruption cases and several large-scale cases are now being investigated. The 2023 Rule 
of Law Reports recommended to Poland to “ensure independent and effective investigations 
and  prosecutions,  […]  in  order  to  enable  a  robust  track  record  of  high-level  corruption 
cases”116.  Some  large-scale  corruption  cases  involving  public  officials  are  now  being 
investigated117, including in relation to the visa corruption scandal118 and the bribery scheme 
for  university  diplomas119.  The  levels  of  specialisation  within  the  police  and  prosecution 
service, cooperation among relevant entities in charge of combatting corruption, and access to 

110  The underlying rationale of the amendments was the strengthening of the protection of citizens’ security. 
111  As reported last year, 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland p. 
16. See also pillar I regarding the progress on the functional independence of prosecutors (pp. 13-14) and in 
pillar II on calls for a comprehensive prosecution service reform to depoliticise the prosecution (pp. 17 and 
19). 

112  See  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Poland  p.  16. The  OECD 
reports one single conviction of an individual as the only successful prosecution to date. OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention,  Phase  4  Report  –  Poland  (8  December  2022),  p.  4.  See  also  Transparency  International, 
Exporting Corruption (2022), pp. 99-100, reporting little or no enforcement, with one investigation having 
been opened in the period of 2018-2021, while no cases were commenced or concluded with sanctions. 
113  Information received from General Prosecutor’s Office/ Office of the National Prosecutor in the context of 

the country visit to Poland.  

114  Input from Poland for the 2024 Rule of Law report, p. 15. 
115  2023 Rule of Law  Report,  Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 16. See also OECD, 
Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention  - Phase 4 Report: Poland, p. 63 and the justification of 
the bill 2022, pp. 5-6; an indicative legislative timeline is not yet available. 

116  No progress was made in this regard in the previous year, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on 

the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 

117  For example, the prosecution of the findings of misuse of per diem allowances of a member of the European 
Parliament  has  been  started  after  more  than  three  years.  See  the  press  release  of  the  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office  in  Lublin  of  26  February  2024.  See  in  this  context  also  Helsinki  Foundation  (2022),  A  state  of 
accusation: Polish prosecution service 2015-2022. 

118  A total of 9 individuals have already been charged, see Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (17 January 2024), 
Former deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs detained. In September  2023, the Commission wrote a letter to 
Polish  Government  requesting  detailed  information  about  the  concerning  allegations  (see  Commission 
statement  on  3  October  2023).  In  Poland,  a  Resolution  was  passed  on  19  December  2023  to  set  up  an 
investigative committee in the Parliament to investigate.  

119  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (13  March  2024),  Collegium  Humanum  scandal  –  further  detainees. 
Academic MBA titles were allegedly issued for bribes after a short time of study, sometimes only weeks or a 
few months, followed by nominations to state-owned enterprises, according to information received from the 
Civil Development Forum in the context of the country visit to Poland. 

17 

 
 
relevant registries, are found to be overall sufficient for investigation and prosecution work to 
be  carried  out  effectively120,  although  prosecution  faces  some  practical  challenges121.  In 
addition, risks of a selective application of the law and disparity in the treatment of corruption 
cases  for  political  purposes,  as  previously  reported,  still  remain122  but  are  envisaged  to  be 
addressed through reforms related to the prosecution service123. In some high-level corruption 
cases, presidential pardons were issued in relation to former politicians124. In response to the 
discovery  of  hidden  prosecution  files  concerning  corruption  cases  involving  high-level 
politicians in the previous legislature, action was taken now with several prosecutors having 
been dismissed and an internal control of all cases handled by a regional prosecution office 
been launched. This  has resulted in  the re-examination of several  high-level  proceedings of 
this  office125.  Following  the  Supreme  Audit  Office’s  report  of  the  control  of  the  National 
Centre  for  Research  and  Development’s  spending126  which  pointed  to  irregularities, 
corruption and the abuse of public officials’ powers in this executive agency127, the Central 
Anti-Corruption  Bureau 
initial 
developments,  interlocutors  and  stakeholders  expect  an  increase  of  corruption  cases  to  be 

investigation128.  Overall,  due 

launched  an 

these 

to 

120  Information  received  by  the  General  Prosecutor’s  Office/  Office  of  the  National  Prosecutor/  Central Anti-
Corruption  Bureau  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Poland.  Notably,  the  Representatives  of  lawyers 
expressed  a  different  view,  highlighting  the  need  for  additional  financial  resources  and  for  enhanced 
expertise  for  complex  corruption  cases  within  the  police  and  the  prosecution  service,  as  well  as  clients’ 
access to files. 

121 Notably as regards complex evidence gathering in the context of encrypted criminal communication devices 
and  the  use  of  cryptocurrencies.  Information  received  from  the  General  Prosecutor’s  Office/  Office  of  the 
National Prosecutor/ Representatives of lawyers in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

122  Information  received  by  the  Association  of  Judges  and  Prosecutors  (Iustitia,  Themis,  and  Lex  Super 
Omnia),/  representatives  of  lawyers  (Bar  and  Legal  Councillors),  and  NGOs  (Helsinki  Foundation  for 
Human Rights, Batory Foundation) and representatives of journalists and media associations met in in the 
context of the country visit to Poland. See 2023 and 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule 
of law situation in Poland, p. 17 (for 2023) and p. 16 (for 2022). Following the elections, the  prosecution 
service has by now withdrawn the request to the Senate to lift the immunity of a Senator, see Polish Press 
Agency (22 February 2024): The decision of the prosecutor’s office has been made, other corruption cases 
against  political  opponents  of  the  previous  Government  are  still  pending  in  2023,  for  example  the 
investigations  against  Roman  Giertych,  see  Onet.pl  (20  November  2023):  the  prosecution  is  considering a 
request for waiver of immunity; Polish Press Agency (8 September 2023). 

123  See pillar I above regarding the progress on the functional independence of prosecutors (pp. 13-14) and in 
pillar  II  above  on  the  Government’s  commitment  to  strengthen  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
corruption crimes and calls for a comprehensive prosecution service reform to depoliticise the prosecution(p. 
17). 

124  See the press release of the President of the Republic of 23 January 2024; see also Pillar IV for additional 
details  of  the  context  of  the  pardon  concerned;  the  Polish  President  says  he  has  pardoned  two  jailed 
opposition politicians, including a former minister and former deputy minister convicted in 2015 for abuse 
of office while working at the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau who lost an appeal against the court verdict 
including a sentence to two years imprisonment in December 2023. 

125  Ministry  of  Justice  (29  January  2024),  Dismissal  of  10  District  and  Regional  Prosecutors.  See  also 

Wyborcza.pl (9 February 2024). Radio Szczecin (29 January 2024). 

126  As  previously  reported,  this  is  a  case  where  no  effective  follow  up  was  undertaken  by  the  police  and 
prosecution service  despite the suspicion of a  large-scale corruption and fraud involving EU fund.  Instead 
the police questioned the reporting authorities and other stakeholders flagging the suspicion, see 2023 Rule 
of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 17. 

127  Supreme Audit  Office  (16  November  2023),  NCBR  –  billions  spent  with  no  effect  for  innovation,  filing 

reports to the prosecutor’s office and a notification to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
128  Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, CBA control at the National Centre for Research and Development. 

18 

 
 
brought to the courts in the coming years129. In light of this, there has been some progress on 
the recommendation made in the previous years.  

There has been no progress yet to address the broad immunities of top executives and 
the impunity clauses in legislation, which remain in place. The 2023 Rule of Law Report 
recommended  to  Poland  to  “[…]  address  the  broad  scope  of  immunities  for  top  executives 
and  to  abstain  from  introducing  impunity  clauses  in  legislation  in  order  to  enable  a  robust 
track record of high-level corruption”130. Concerns regarding the broad scope of immunities 
of persons exercising top executive functions, who are also members of Parliament, have not 
yet  been  addressed,  with  GRECO  reiterating  its  recommendation  to  exclude  corruption 
crimes  from  the  scope  of  immunities131.  As  reported  last  year,  such  immunities  act  as  an 
obstacle  to  criminal  accountability  for  corruption  crimes  committed  outside  the  official 
capacity of top executives132. An amendment to the Criminal Code, adopted in July 2023 by 
the  Sejm  and  in  force  since  1  October  2023,  introduced  a  new  impunity  provision  for 
accomplices  of  corruption  in  public  tenders,  if  they  report  the  crime  to  police,  effectively 
excluding  prosecution133.  In  addition,  previously  introduced  impunity  clauses  remain  to  a 
large extent unchanged and in force134. As underlined in last year’s report, such exemptions 
from  criminal  responsibility  increase  the  risk  of  corruption  and  may  foster  the  abuse  of 
political  and  administrative  power,  given  the  lack  of  deterrence  and  the  perception  of 
impunity.  In  practice,  the  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  in  its  supervisory  capacity, 
continues  to  monitor  the  use  of  impunity  clauses,  providing  opinions  and  threat 
assessments135.  However,  impunity  provisions  have  been  applied  in  a  starkly  increasing 
number of cases, from 10 cases (in 2023) to 163 cases (from January to mid-March 2024), as 
reported  by  the  prosecution  service136.  However,  the  fact  that  a  dedicated  investigative 

129  Information received from Association of judges (Iustitia, Themis), representatives of lawyers (the Bar and 
Legal  Councillors),  and  NGOs  (Helsinki  Foundation  for  Human  Rights,  Batory  Foundation)  and 
representatives of journalists and media associations met in in the context of the country visit to Poland (see 
the annex). 

130  No progress was made in this regard in the previous year, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on 

the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 

131  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report, paragraph 54. 
132  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Poland,  p.  18.  GRECO  Fifth 
Evaluation  Round  –  Compliance  Report,  paragraphs  54-63;  and  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  – 
Evaluation Report, paragraphs 82-91, reiterating its recommendation that in respect of persons exercising top 
executive functions, an in-depth reform of the system of immunities be carried out with a view to facilitating 
the prosecution of corruption offences by excluding these from the scope of immunities and by ensuring that 
the  procedure  for  the  lifting  of  the  immunity  is  transparent  and  based  on  objective  and  fair  criteria  used 
effectively in practice (see paragraph 87).  

133  The reform introduced to Article 305 of the Criminal Code a new paragraph (6), according to which a person 
who  commits  offence  avoids  the  penalty  if  they  report  the  offence  to  the  competent  law  enforcement  or 
antitrust  authorities,  disclosing  all  relevant  circumstances  of  the  case.  For  more  details  on  the  reform,  see 
Dentons  Law  Firm  (31  October  2023),  Amendment  to  the  criminal  code:  Significant  changes  to  the 
provisions on disrupting public procurement. 

134  2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, pp. 18-19. 
135  According  to  information  received  from  the  Central Anti-Corruption  Bureau  in  the  context  of  the  country 
visit  to  Poland,  its  monitoring  activities  focused  in  particular  on  the  use  of  impunity  clauses  in  public 
procurements, including regarding the construction of the Polish-Belarusian border, the Government's ‘anti-
corruption shield’ to prevent irregularities in privatisation of key enterprises, and the strategic reserve fund. 
In this context, see also Gazeta Wyborcza (8 December 2023). See also Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (10 
April 2024), Information on the results of the CBA’s activities in 2023. 

136  Information received from the General Prosecutor’s Office/Office of the National Prosecutor in the context 

of the country visit to Poland. 

19 

 
 
commission  has  been  set  up  in  the  Parliament  to  investigate  activities  of  high-level  public 
officials, including members of Parliament, provides an opportunity to address parliamentary 
immunities  and  to  assess  broad  impunity  legislation  from  the  past137.  Since  no  steps  have 
been  taken  to  address  the  broad  scope  of  immunities  for  top  executives  and  to  amend  the 
existing impunity provisions in force, there has been no progress yet on the implementation 
of those parts of the recommendation made in the previous years. 

There  has  been  no  progress  yet  to  strengthen  lobbying  rules.  The  2023  Rule  of  Law 
Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “strengthen  the  existing  integrity  rules  by  introducing 
lobbying  rules  […]”138.  The  2018-2020  anti-corruption  programme139  had  included  the 
revision  of  the  lobbying  regulation140.  This  has,  however,  not  materialised  so  far  and  no 
information  is  available  on  whether  the  preparatory  activities  previously  carried  out  by  the 
Ministry of Interior will provide a basis for future work. Poland has regulated some aspects of 
lobbying141 but does not have lobbying rules in place which would oblige persons exercising 
top  executive  functions  to  disclose  their  contacts  with  interest  representatives142.  Such  a 
system  would  contribute  to  transparency  in  the  law-making  process143.  The  Government 
however  carries  out  awareness-raising  activities  on  integrity144.  A  sound  framework  for 
lobbying  transparency,  preventing  undue  influence  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  for 

137  Information  received  from  the  Government  in  the  context  of  the  country  visit  to  Poland.  See  also  further 

below in pillar IV. 

138  2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 2. 
139  The  resolution  No.  207  of  19  December  2017  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  –  the  Governmental  Anti-
Corruption Programme for years 2018-2020, (M.P. z 2018 r. item 12). See also above in the paragraph on the 
Anti-Corruption Programme. 

140  Law of 7 July 2005 on Lobbying. The applicable law defines lobbying, establishes a public register as well 
as determines obligations and sanctions for unregistered lobbyists. While most of the objectives to provide 
educational  material  and  trainings  have  been  met,  the  implementation  of  important  legislative  initiatives 
specified in the programme has not been completed. These include, in particular, the draft law on Liability of 
Collective Entities, the reform of the asset declaration system, and the revision of the lobbying legislation, as 
previously reported in the 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, 
p. 20. 

141  See  Act  of  7  July  2005  on  lobbying  activities  in  the  lawmaking  process  and  implementing  regulations, 
including  principles  on  transparency  and  a  register  (on  the  latter  see  also  next  footnote).  Since  2019,  the 
Commission  of  the  Prime  Minister's  Office  considers  also  applications  for  approval  of  new  employment 
outside the public service of persons who have held public functions, particularly including those that were 
involved  in  issuing  decisions  on  matters  concerning  the  new  employer,  before  the  expiration  of  one  year 
after ceasing public office. 

142  See  GRECO  Fifth  Evaluation  Round  -  Compliance  Report,  paragraphs  32-36  and  GRECO  Fourth 
Evaluation Round – Second Interim Compliance Report, pp. 3-4, recommendations of which have not been 
implemented.  In  practice,  there  are  three  lobby  registers  in  place,  one  for  the  Government  (based  on  the 
lobbying regulation), one for the lower chamber of Parliament (Sejm), and one covering its higher chamber 
(Senate). For lobbying activities towards the government, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration 
is  the  supervisory  body  maintaining  the  register.  For  members  of  Parliament,  the  two  chambers  have 
supervisory tasks over lobbying activities. 

143  This also includes specific cases. For example, the draft law amending laws to support recipients’ electricity, 
gaseous  fuels  and  heat  and  certain  other  laws.  See  Polish  Press  Agency  (1  December  2023);  RMF24  (7 
December 2023). The prosecution service initiated investigations in the case, according to the tweet of  the 
former  Minister  for  Education  and  Science  (12  December  2023).  In  turn,  civil  society  called  for  public 
consultations  on  the  law  in  compliance  with  the  legislative  standards,  see,  for  example,  Greenpeace  (6 
December 2023), Appeal of civil society organisations on wind energy, which the Government announcing 
to  amend,  resubmit  and  provide  for  public  consultations  on  the  bill,  see  Politico  (1  December  2023), 
Poland’s new parliamentary majority hits its first legislative snag over wind power rules. 

144  See GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report, paragraphs 31. 

20 

 
 
decision-makers to obtain technical expert advice and supporting data, is essential to inform 
the public of the decision making-process145. Concerns also persist as to the effectiveness of 
the registers for lobbyists currently in place, with continuing low registration rates and even 
some  deregistration  as  well  as  insufficient  oversight  and  enforcement  in  practice146. 
Therefore, there has been no further progress  on the recommendation made in  the previous 
years.  

 Some  progress  has  been  made  towards  standardising  Poland’s  asset  declarations 
system.  The  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to  Poland  to  “strengthen  the  existing 
integrity  rules  by  introducing  […]  a  standardised  online  system  for  asset  declarations  of 
public officials and Members of Parliament147.” On 21 November 2023, a legislative proposal 
was  introduced148  to  broaden  Poland’s  asset  declaration  rules149.  The  draft  proposal  would 
extend  the  personal  scope  of  the  asset  declarations  of  high-level  public  officials  at  the 
national,  regional,  and  local  level150  to  also  cover  their  spouses’  separate  property151. 
Presidents,  vice-presidents,  and  board  members  of  state-owned  companies  would  also  be 

145  The current discourse on lobbying among politicians from the different political groups and parties appears 
to focus primarily on negative connotations of lobbying and aspects of undue influence, while it carries also 
the potential to better inform policymakers of technically complex issues. See examples of tweets published 
by 
Justice), 
https://twitter.com/MorawieckiM/status/1730226558114156717,  Paulina  Hening-Kloska  (The  Third  Way), 
https://x.com/hennigkloska/status/1731558994555097324?s=20. 

example  Mateusz  Morawiecki, 

politicians, 

including 

(Law 

and 

for 

146  According  to  the  Register  of  Entities,  which  currently  includes  approximately  580  entities,  only  25  new 
entities are  reported to have performed professional lobbying activities since the beginning of 2023, while 
some other entities have deregistered. See the Register of Entities engaged in professional lobbying activities 
of the Minister for the Interior and Administration. Notably, there is only a legal obligation to keep a register. 
Oversight  is  not  systematic,  and  no  information  is  available  on  whether  sanctions  have  been  applied  to 
unregistered lobbyists, as previously reported in 2023  Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of 
law situation in Poland, p. 20. Registrations of professional lobbyists in the  Sejm is even lower and most of 
the  registered  lobbyists  remain  inactive,  with  only  4  out  of  the  16  registered  individuals  having  reported 
lobbying the Parliament in 2022, see the website of the Sejm with none of the activities having reportedly 
influenced  the  work  of  the  Sejm,  see  Information  on  actions  taken  towards  the  Sejm  of  the  Republic  of 
Poland in 2022 by entities performing professional lobbying activities, pp. 11-12. 

147  No progress was made in the previous year, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of 

law situation in Poland, p. 2. 

148  The bill was initiated by the Members of Parliament of the Civic Coalition, as the current ruling party. Since 
22 February 2024, readings in the respective Parliamentary committees have commenced regarding the Bill 
of  Act  amending  the  Act  on  Restrictions  on  the  Conduct  of  Business  by  Persons  Performing  Public 
Functions and certain other acts, which would entail amendments also to the Act on exercising the mandate 
of a deputy and senator; the Act of 8 March 1990 on municipal-level local government; and Act of 5 June 
1998 on district-level local government. 

149  According to information received from the Ministry of Justice in the context of the country visit to Poland, 
a similar draft was submitted on 29 December 2023 by the current opposition (Law and Justice), which is 
also at the stage of parliamentary readings in the relevant committees since 6 March 2024 (Print No. 156). 
150  This would relate to the asset declarations of the  President of Poland, Marshal of the Sejm, Marshal of the 
Senate, Prime Minister, deputy Marshal of the Sejm, deputy Marshall of the Senate, deputy Prime Minister 
of the Council of Ministers, minister, as well as deputies and senators. 

151  Currently, there is no obligation to disclose the property registered under the spouses’ names. Notably, this 
obligation  would  only  cover  married  spouses,  while  informal  relationships,  which  may  be  quite  common, 
would not fall under the disclosure requirement.  See in this context also the GRECO recommendations ix 
(on family members and publication) and recommendation xix (on the introduction of a robust and effective 
verification system) for high-level public officials, Fifth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report (20 
July 2023); and for members of Parliament GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round - Second Interim Compliance 
Report, pp. 4-5 (20 July 2023). 

21 

 
 
subject  to  asset disclosure obligations once it is  adopted152. Furthermore, the draft proposal 
contains requirements to publish asset declarations in public information bulletins. However, 
the  creation  of  a  uniform,  centralised  submission  and  monitoring  system  for  asset 
declarations  is  not  envisaged  under  the  new  proposal153.  On  19  June,  the  Minister 
Coordinator for Special Services instructed the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau to develop a 
draft legal act to regulate the unification, digitisation and control of asset declarations154. In 
practice,  the  level  of  digitalisation  of  politicians’  asset  declaration  continues  to  be  low155. 
Most declarations are still filled out by hand and in a variety of formats156. The large majority 
of  controls  proceedings  and  pre-control  analysis  of  asset  declarations  conducted  by  the 
Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  focused  on  those  submitted  by  public  officials  and  other 
employees of local,  municipal  governments157. Stakeholders therefore continue to  call for a 
comprehensive  reform  of  Poland’s  conflict  of  interest  and  asset  declaration  system158. 
Against  this  background,  the  existing  rules  are  not  yet  strengthened,  but  ministerial 
instructions are given to take legislative steps to broaden the asset declarations rules. Some 
progress has therefore been made towards the recommendation made in the previous years.  

A  new  law  on  whistleblower  protection  was  adopted.  On  11  January  2024,  a  new  draft 
law159  was  published  by  the  Government  and  subsequently  submitted  to  the  Sejm  for 
accelerated  legislative  procedure160.  The  draft  is  a  political  priority  for  the  Government161. 
While it is largely based on the previous draft Government proposal162, a number of issues of 
concern have been addressed: for example, the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
is now again envisaged as the dedicated entity to receive whistleblower reports163, including 

152  This obligation would only extend to companies with a share of over 50% of the State Treasury share. 
153  As previously reported, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau had prepared a draft regulation, however, it has 
not  been  made  public,  while  the  technical  work  towards  a  more  standardised,  electronic  system  was 
suspended until appropriate legislative steps were to be taken. Access to document requests by stakeholders 
regarding the regulation were declined, see 2022 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law 
situation in Poland, p. 18. 

154  According  to  information  received  from  the  Government  during  the  Member  State  consultation,  the 

instructions include to develop a central, integrated, electronic submission system. 

155  GRECO Fifth Evaluation Round – Evaluation Report, recommendations x and xi, paragraphs 72 and 78.  
156  Ibid. 2023, 2022 and 2021 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 21 
(for 2023), p. 18 (for 2022) and p. 19 (for 2021), where it was reported that, at least, 16 different forms are in 
use. Provisions on asset declarations are scattered among several legislative acts.  

157  See the report of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, Information on the results of activities of the Central 

Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2022. 

158  Information received from Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in the context of the 

country visit to Poland. 

159  Draft Act on the Protection of Whistleblowers (UC101), aiming to implement Directive (EU) 2019/1937. 
160  Due to the transposition delay since 17 December 2021, the European Commission decided to refer Poland 
to  the  Court  of  Justice  for  failure  to  transpose  the  Directive  on  time,  see  Press  release,  The  European 
Commission  decides  to  refer  8  Member  States  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  over  the 
protection of whistleblowers (IP 23/703 of 15 February 2023) upon which financial penalties were imposed 
on  Poland.  For  more  information  on  the  steps  taken  by  Poland  to  transpose  the  directive  see 
Eurocadres/Whistleblowing  International  Network/Transparency  International-EU,  EU  Whistleblowing 
Monitor https://www.whistleblowingmonitor.eu/?country=poland. 

161  Ius Laboris (25 January 2024), New Polish government makes whistleblowing directive a priority. 
162  Previous draft law on the protection of whistleblowers, https://legislacja.gov.pl/projekt/12352401. 
163  Instead  of  the  National  Labour  Inspectorate,  as  previously  reported,  which  had  raised  concerns  among 
stakeholders, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 21. 

22 

 
 
on  corruption,  vested  with  the  mandate  to  refer  disclosures  to  the  competent  authorities164. 
However, to carry out its new tasks effectively, the Office highlighted the need for additional 
human,  financial  and  technical  resources  to  create  a  new  department  within  its  structure165. 
Stakeholders called for a broader material scope of the bill166. The deadline for the entry into 
force  of  the  draft  law  after  adoption  has  been  shortened  to  one  month  to  speed  up  the 
transposition  of  EU  law167.  The  law  was  adopted  by  the  Parliament  on  14  June  2024  and, 
after  being  signed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  will  enter  into  force  on  24  September 
2024168.  Prosecutors  underline  that  whistleblower  disclosures  are  an  important  source  of 
information  to  detect  crimes,  including  corruption,  and  that  an  effective  whistleblower 
protection system is instrumental in the fight against corruption169. 

Transparency  of  political  party  financing  remains  a  challenge  in  practice,  while  party 
donations and undue influence in election campaigns remained an issue in 2023. Political 
party finance is regulated in the Political Parties Act. As reported last year, challenges persist 
in  the  practical  application  of  the  2022  legislation170.  Publication  practices  still  vary 
significantly,  calling  for  more  standardisation171.  Some  good  practices  exist,  where  filter 
functionalities  are  embedded  on  parties’  websites,  facilitating  the  search  for  specific  party 
finance  data172.  The  OSCE  Office  for  Democratic  Institutions  and  Human  Rights  (ODIHR) 

164  Information received from the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the context of the country 

visit to Poland.  

165  Information received from the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the context of the country 

visit to Poland. 

166  The bill covers breaches of the law relating to consumer protection, financial regulation, public procurement 
or environmental protection. Stakeholders called for an all-encompassing approach, covering breaches of all 
laws  and  internal  regulations,  such  as  Codes  of  Conducts  and  bylaws.  For  more  details,  see  the  proposal 
prepared by civil society organisations: Batory Foundation/ Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights/ Institute 
of  Public  Affairs  Foundation/  Anti-Corruption  Academy  Foundation/  Civic  Network  Watchdog  Poland 
Association/  Solidarity  '80  Trade  Union  (18  January  2024),  Social  bill  on  protection  of  whistleblowers. 
These proposals go beyond the requirements of the EU Directive.  

167  Until  the  new  law  enters  into  force  the  current  whistleblowers’  protection  framework  is  provided  for  in 
different legal provisions: whistleblowers are benefiting from protection on the basis of general principles of 
labour law and provisions protecting whistleblowers from retaliation, such as anti-discrimination provisions 
and  the  provisions  that  prohibit  mobbing  in  the  place  of  employment,  while  reviews  found  that  the 
effectiveness  of  the  labour  code  provisions  in  practice  is  low  and  only  covering  part  of  the  working 
population.  See  UN  Conference  of  the  State  Parties  to  the  UN  Convention  against  Corruption  (2015), 
Implementation Review Group – Poland, p. 5, and OECD (2015), Poland: Follow up to the Phase 3 Report 
and Recommendations (2015), pp. 5 and 29. 

168  The law was published in the Official Journal on 24 June 2024 (item 928). 
169  Information received from the General Prosecutor’s Office/ Office of the National Prosecutor in the context 

of the country visit to Poland. See also further below in pillar IV. 

170 This is with a view to Article 25(6)-(13) of the Political Parties Act, requiring political parties to publish up-
to-date  information  of  the  register  of  donations  and,  according  to  Article  27(a)-(c),  of  the  register  of 
contracts. 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 21 and 22. 
Stakeholders  consider  the  public  availability  of  this  information  as  a  significant  step  toward  more 
transparency in political party finance, noting however that the reliability of the published data still needs to 
be tested. 

171  As  previously  reported,  the  information  is  published  on  the  party’s  website  partly  in  downloadable  pdf-
format  (see  website  of  the  Civic  Platform  party  at  http://bip.platforma.org/rejestr_umow_i_wplat/,  or  the 
Left Together party at https://partiarazem.pl/informacje/bip); partly as embedded tables (see websites of the 
Law 
at 
Justice 
https://bip.lewica.org.pl/rejestr-wplat. 

http://bip.pis.org.pl/rejestr-wpat, 

the  New  Left 

party, 

party 

and 

and 

172  See, for instance, the website of the New Left party, https://bip.lewica.org.pl/rejestr-wplat. 

23 

 
 
highlighted undue influence over the use of state resources and public media as an issue173. 
Risks of systemic challenges relating  to  clientelist  networks around state-owned enterprises 
contributing to inequality in the election process, as previously reported, have materialised in 
practice, including payments of state-owned enterprise executives to individual politicians174, 
which the parliamentary bill of 29 February 2024 aims to address by a ban on such payments 
and further transparency requirements for state-owned companies175. Also the engagement of 
state-owned enterprises in the referendum campaign, that took place in parallel to the election 
campaign, has been found to circumvent campaign finance rules. They were found to thereby 
undermine  spending  limits  and  the  separation  of  the  state  and  parties,  while  also  raising 
questions  as  to  conflicts  of  interest176.  Moreover,  there  are  no  explicit  regulations  for 
effective oversight and transparency of campaign online advertising, including for third-party 
campaigning177.  The  government  at  the  time  did  not  follow  recommendations  made  by 
ODIHR  to  abstain  from  introducing  amendments  to  fundamental  elements  of  the  electoral 
legal framework shortly before the parliamentary elections and to still consult the public178. 

173  OSCE/ODIHR  (27  March  2024),  Parliamentary  Elections  15  October  2023:  ODIHR  Limited  Election 
Observation Mission – Final Report, p. 1, noting also that the absence of a requirement for reporting prior to 
election  day,  and  unregulated  third-party  campaigning,  combined  with  insufficient  campaign  finance 
regulation for the referendum, negatively affected the transparency and accountability of political party and 
campaign finance. 

174  Two former heads of state-owned enterprises recently confirmed to have gotten their positions only against 
payments, see TVN24 (3 October 2023). Art. 25 of the Act of 27 June 1997 on political parties prohibits the 
acceptance of donations from legal entities. Reportedly, the payments were not made voluntarily and when 
they were too low, there were demands to increase donations, at times in cash, circumventing the law. See 
also, as previously reported, the contribution from Citizens Network Watchdog Poland, Civil Development 
Forum, Free Courts Foundation, Institute of Public Affairs, Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Polish 
Federation of Non-governmental Organisations, Stefan Batory Foundation for the 2023 Rule of Law Report, 
p. 18. Previously, stakeholders had highlighted the practice of simultaneous donations by a large number of 
individuals of the same state-owned enterprise to individual politicians, as these donations were just below 
the  annual  ceiling  for  donations  from  natural  persons,  raising  questions  as  to  conflicts  of  interest  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  ban  of  donations  from  legal  entities  to  political  parties  and  of  political  party  finance 
transparency  in  practice.  See  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report,  Country  chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in 
Poland, p. 22. 

175  See  Sejm,  Deputies'  bill  amending  certain  acts  to  improve  corporate  governance  in  companies  with  State 

Treasury shareholding, Paper no. 261. 

176  OSCE/ODIHR  (27  March  2024),  Parliamentary  Elections  15  October  2023:  ODIHR  Limited  Election 
Observation Mission – Final Report, pp. 1, 2-3. While the National Election Commission is mandated with 
campaign finance oversight, it is not explicitly mandated to monitor campaign finance prior to election day. 
177  An explanatory note of the National Election Commission of March 2023 on the activities of third parties 
campaigning on behalf of political parties on the internet highlights that the activities are subject to the same 
rules as the provision of services to political parties by commercial entities. There are ODIHR estimates that 
at least PLN 7.5 million in third-party spending on the internet (in addition to formal internet spending) was 
not formally accounted for. 

178  The  electoral  reform  that  took  place  only  a  few  months  before  the  elections,  without  meaningful 
consultation,  decreased,  among  others,  the  minimum  number  of  inhabitants  per  precinct;  changed  the 
qualifications  for  membership  in  the  Constituency  Election  Commissions;  introduced  organised  public 
transport for voters in rural areas, etc., see ODIHR (15 October 2023), Poland: Limited Election Observation 
Mission Final Report,  p. 6. See 2023 Rule of Law  Report, Country chapter on the rule of law situation in 
Poland,  pp.  22-23. The  Draft  Law  of  26  January  2023  amending  the  Election  Code and  certain  other  acts 
combined several draft laws introduced to the lower chamber of Parliament on 22 December 2022, many of 
which were adopted in the second and third, final reading on the same day of 26 January 2023. The draft law 
proposed  to  introduce  extensive  amendments  to  the  2011  Election  Code,  and  some  changes  to  selected 
provisions  of  the  1997  Act  on  Political  Parties,  the  1997  Law  on  Restrictions  on  Conduct  of  Business 
Activities  by  Persons  Performing  Public  Functions,  the  2000  Law  on  the  National  Criminal  Register,  the 

24 

 
 
 
While amendments to criminal liability in public procurement procedures entered into 
force,  corruption  in  public  procurements  remains  in  focus.  On  1  October  2023, 
amendments to the Criminal Code introduced a broader range of criminalised behaviour and 
law enforcement measures with the aim to facilitate the detection and prosecution of crime as 
well  as  stricter  penalties  for  undue  interference  in  public  tendering179.  Businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU show that 24% of companies in Poland (EU average 27%) think 
that  corruption  has  prevented  them  from  winning  a  public  tender  or  a  public  procurement 
contract  in  practice  in  the  last  three  years180.  Similarly,  stakeholders  qualify  public 
procurement  and  the  construction  sector  as  the  main  corruption  risk  sectors  in  Poland181. 
Investigations of the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau into suspicions of irregularities in a call 
for  proposals  issued  by  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and  Development  relating  to  EU 
structural  funds  are  ongoing182.  As  reported  above,  in  November  2023,  the  Supreme  Audit 
Office’s control  of the case found a large scale  of irregularities both  in  the process  and the 
organisation  of  the  call  for  proposals,  confirming  the  existence  of  corruption  risks  in  the 
National Centre for Research and Development183.  

III.  MEDIA PLURALISM AND MEDIA FREEDOM 

The  Constitution  provides  a  framework  for  the  protection  of  freedom  of  the  press  and 
freedom of expression. It also gives a role to the media regulator, the National Broadcasting 
Council (KRRiT), to safeguard public interest in the radio and television broadcasting. Sector 
specific  legislation  is  based  on  the  Law  on  Broadcasting  and  the  Press  Law.  Those 
instruments provide detailed provisions on the competences of the media regulator, as well as 
safeguards  and  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  the  journalistic  profession.  Poland  has  three 
public service media outlets - Polish Television, Polish Radio and Polish Press Agency - and 
is  currently  working  on  a  new  legislative  framework  on  public  service  media,  media 
pluralism and independence.  

2000 Law on Local Referendum, the 2003 Law on Nationwide Referendums, and several other legislative 
acts.  See  OSCE/ODIHR,  Opinion  on  the  Draft  Act  amending  the  Election  Code  and  certain  other  Acts 
(Senate paper No. 911) – Poland (20 February 2023), p. 2. 

179  For  more  details,  see  the  explanatory  memorandum  submitted  by  the  authors  of  the  amendment 
(Parliamentary  Paper  No.  2024).  It  is  to  be  noted  that  amendments  to Article  305  of  the  Criminal  Code 
introduced  by  the  reform  also  introduced  a  new  impunity  provision  in  the  new  paragraph  (6),  effectively 
protecting certain categories of offenders from prosecution. For more details see above in this pillar. 

180  Flash Eurobarometer 543 on Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024). This is 3 percentage 

points below the EU average. 

181  Information  received  from  representatives  of  lawyers  (Bar  and  Legal  Councillors),  and  NGO  (Batory 

Foundation), in the context of the country visit to Poland.  

182  The ongoing investigations have already led to arrests. CBA inspection at the National Centre for Research 

and Development (2023); see also TVN24.pl (7 March 2024). 

183  The Office has informed the prosecution services of potential violations of the Act of 11 July 2014 on the 
rules  for  implementing  cohesion  policy  programmes  financed  under  the  financial  perspective  2014-2020. 
See Supreme Audit Office (16 November 2023), NCBR – billions spent with no effect for innovations; see 
also  Science  Business  (18  October  2023),  Audit  uncovers  ‘corruption  mechanisms’  at  Polish  research 
funding  agency.  See,  in  turn,  the  Statement  of  the  National  Center  for  Research  and  Development  (12 
October  2023),  emphasising  transparent  operations  in  the  case  in  compliance  with  applicable  regulations. 
The  large  scale  of  irregularities  and  significant  issues  relating  to  the  reliability  of  the  EU  funds  spending 
triggered also investigations by the EU Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). As previously reported, members of the 
Parliament had requested such an audit control, see 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country chapter on the rule of 
law situation in Poland, p. 24. 

25 

 
 
Concerns  persist  regarding  the  regulatory  impartiality  of  the  media  regulator184.  The 
2024  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  reports  high  risks  in  relation  to  the  independence  and 
effectiveness of the media regulator, in comparison to the medium risks reported in 2023. The 
Media  Pluralism  Monitor  states  that  such  a  change  results  from  a  lack  of  regulatory 
impartiality  and  transparency185.  Representatives  of  the  media  community  pointed  out  to 
cases  of  severe  financial  penalties  imposed  by  KRRiT  against  independent  broadcasters, 
which may be seen as attempts to induce self-censorship in newsrooms186. Examples include 
the KRRiT’s decision to sanction radio TOK FM for comments made by one of its journalists 
regarding the new school handbook for the alleged demeaning of the Polish President187 or a 
fine imposed on Radio ZET in relation to its reporting on the visit of the Ukrainian President 
to  Poland, considered by KRRiT as contrary to the Polish  reasons  of state188. Concerns are 
also raised with regard to the lack of transparency and clear process for managing complaints 
and  investigations  led  by  KRRiT189.  Representatives  of  KRRiT  pointed  out  that  the  new 
budget will only partially cover the needs of the regulator related to human resources190. The 
Ministry of Culture has started its work on a new regulatory framework on media pluralism 
and  independence,  which  is  expected  to  address  issues  related  to  the  regulator’s  set  up  and 
competences191. 

There  has  been  some  progress  regarding  safeguards  for  the  granting  of  operating 
licences to media outlets. The 2023 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to “ensure 
that  fair,  transparent  and  non-discriminatory  procedures  are  adhered  to  for  the  granting  of 
operating licences to media outlets”. Stakeholders reported cases of prolonged procedure for 
granting licences192. For instance, news radio TOK FM waited seven months for a decision 
by KRRiT on the extension of its licence (the decision was issued only two months before it 
was  set  to  expire)193  and  TVN  Style  –  a  channel  belonging  to  TVN  group  and  targeting 
female  audience  –  waited 11 months194  (the decision was issued only  on 12 June when the 
previous licence was set to expire on 28 July 2024195 ). Some progress has been made on the 
recommendation made in the previous years, as the Ministry of Culture has started its work 
on a new regulatory framework on media pluralism and independence which is expected to 
modernise the system of granting licences196. 

184  Contribution from the Consortium of five NGOs for the 2024 Rule of Law Report, p.23. 
185  2024 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 12. 
186  Mission  Report  on  Media  Capture  and  Vexatious  Lawsuits  in  Poland  by  the  Media  Freedom  Rapid 

Response. 

187  The  sanction  was  imposed  on  24  January  2024.  The  head  of  the  National  Broadcasting  Council  punishes 

TOK FM again, see: Wirtualnemedia.pl (25 January 2024). 

188  The sanction was imposed on 11 August 2023. Liberties 2024 Rule of Law Report – Poland, p. 50. 
189  Mission Report on Media Capture and Vexatious Lawsuits in Poland by the Media Freedom Rapid Response 

p. 9. 

190  Information received KRRiT in the context of the country visit. 
191  See  the  announcement  by  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage:  “We  begin  consultations  on  the 

main tenets of the media law” of 24 June 2024. 
192  Liberties 2024 Rule of Law Report – Poland, p. 499. 
193  The licence was granted on 5 July 2023.See Wyborcza.pl (5 July 2023). 
194  TVN style applied for the licence in July 2022. Wirtualnemedia.pl (25 April 2024). Delays had occurred in 

the past for TVN24 and TVN7 as reported in the 2022 Rule of Law Report.  

195  TVN Style z koncesją na kolejne 10 lat - Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji - Portal Gov.pl (www.gov.pl). 
196  See  the  announcement  by  the  Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage:  “We  begin  consultations  on  the 

main tenets of the media law” of 24 June 2024. 

26 

 
 
The framework for media  ownership transparency is  in place. The 2021 amendment  of 
the  Law  on  Broadcasting  continues  to  provide  a  framework  for  media  ownership 
transparency,  obliging  broadcasters,  video-on-demand  providers,  and  video-sharing 
platforms, to make available information on partners, shareholders, and beneficial owners of 
their  companies  to  the  Central  Register  of  Beneficial  Owners  and  on  their  websites,  and  to 
disclose  information  on  all  the  media  services  they  offer,  or  which  belong  to  the  same 
company. Since this legislative change, the 2024 Media Pluralism Monitor has reported some 
progress  as  regards  media  ownership  transparency,  with  risks  being  assessed  at  medium 
level197. However, research published by the Media Forum Foundation shows a low level of 
knowledge  regarding  the  media  ownership  at  the  local  level.  Readers  are  often  unable  to 
distinguish between local media that are privately owned and those that are owned by local 
governments198. 

The management of public service media, heavily criticised for its lack of independence, 
was  dismissed,  and  a  new  framework  to  strengthen  the  rules  and  mechanisms  to 
enhance the independence of public service media is expected. The 2022 and 2023 Rule of 
Law  Reports  set  forth  concerns  related  to  the  independent  reporting  by  public  broadcasters 
and highlighted the absence of progress to enhance the independent governance and editorial 
independence  of  public  service  media.  The  Commission  recommended  to  Poland  to 
“strengthen the rules  and mechanisms to enhance the independent governance and  editorial 
independence  of  public  service  media  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  public 
service  media.”  In  December  2023,  the  Sejm  adopted  a  resolution  calling  for  appropriate 
actions by state authorities to  restore legal  order  as  well as the impartiality  and integrity of 
public  service  media199.  The  Minister  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage,  as  the  body 
exercising the ownership rights  of the State Treasury,  dismissed the management bodies of 
public  service  media  on  the  basis  of  the  Commercial  Companies  Code.  Some  stakeholders 
raised concerns in this regard200, highlighting in particular that appointments and dismissals 
of  members  of  public  media  management  bodies  should  be  based  on  the  Broadcasting  Act 
and  the  Polish  Press  Agency  Act  and  not  on  the  Commercial  Companies  Code201.  The 
Constitutional  Tribunal  held202  that  implementing  changes  in  the  management  of  public 
service media or liquidating them on the basis of the provisions of Commercial Companies 
Code  is  unconstitutional.  However,  the  lawfulness  of  this  ruling  has  been  questioned  given 
the  irregular  composition  of  the  panel  delivering  it203.  Also,  in  2023,  the  Supreme  Audit 
Office (NIK), in its audit of the public television’s finances, pointed to numerous violations 

197  2024 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 19. 
198  According to research carried out by the Media Forum Foundation, a significant proportion of readers make 

very little distinction between private local media and local government-owned media. 

199  Resolution of 19 December 2023. 
200  For example the Ombudsperson, see the ENNHRI contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report as regards 

Poland (p. 10). 

201  Position of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights on changes in public media | Helsinki Foundation for 

Human Rights (hfhr.pl). 

202  Judgment K 29/23. 
203  The  panel  consisted  of  i.a.  a  judge  appointed  to  an  already  occupied  post  –  see  Pillar  I.  The  ruling  was 
published  with  an  additional  clarification  that  it  had  been  issued  by  an  irregular  composition  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal (see Pillar I). See also a statement of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage 
of 18 January 2024 published on the X platform. 

27 

 
 
in the management of the public funds204. The Polish authorities are currently working on a 
legislative proposal that would provide a new regulatory framework for public service media, 
and  the  relevant  open  public  consultation  was  launched205.  The  aim  is  to  ensure  full 
alignment of the Polish framework for public service media with provisions of the European 
Media Freedom Act. The new law is expected to be adopted by the end of 2024206. Therefore, 
some progress has been made in addressing the 2023 recommendation.  

Some media were confirmed to have had privileged access to state advertising and some 
challenges persist with access to information. According to the finding of the audit carried 
out  by  the  NIK,  public  media  and  certain  pro-government  media  have  been  main 
beneficiaries  of  the  state  advertising  within  the  analysed  period  (2021-2022)207.  The  Polish 
authorities  are  currently  working  on  a  legislative  proposal  that  would  provide  a  new 
framework concerning the access to state advertising, and relevant open public consultation 
was launched208. Private pro-government media appeared to have been favoured with respect 
to  access  to  information  by the government  at  the time209.Stakeholders also reported a  case 
where  funding  had  been  withdrawn  because  of  the  media  outlet’s  reluctance  to  follow  the 
reporting line advocated by the government at the time210. Challenges are also reported with 
regard to the right of access to information and public officials by journalists211. According to 
stakeholders, the operation of journalists may also be affected by long  response times from 
the side of public authorities and laconic answers to questions212. 

Journalists  continue  to  face  difficulties  in  their  activities,  in  particular  in  relation  to 
SLAPPs. SLAPPs remain a tool used against journalists and media outlets213. Media freedom 
organisations refer to  the  practices of  filing several  lawsuits  concerning the same issue  and 
underline that media, and especially  those operating  at  the local  level,  are also  increasingly 
served with pre-litigation requests for corrections214. Since July 2023, the Council of Europe 
Platform  to  promote  the  protection  of  journalism  and  safety  of  journalists  registered  seven 
alerts  concerning  Poland215  and  the  Mapping  Media  Freedom  platform  registered  26 
alerts216.The  journalistic  community  continues  to  be  affected  by  a  lack  of  self-regulatory 
measures that could contribute to the strengthening of the status of journalists. As pointed out 
by the Media Pluralism Monitor, the existing polarisation within the journalistic community 

204  NIK considered that the principles of legality, reliability or purposefulness were violated in the context of the 
expenses of the Polish public television; summary of the press conference of the Supreme Audit Office of 6 
October 2023. 

205  See the announcement by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of 24 June 2024.  
206  Bogdan Zdrojewski: ustawa medialna wejdzie w życie w 2024 roku | Polska Agencja Prasowa SA (pap.pl). 
207  Summary of the press conference of the Supreme Audit Office of 6 October 2023. 
208  See the announcement by the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage of 24 June 2024. 
209  Mission Report on Media Capture and Vexatious Lawsuits in Poland by the Media Freedom Rapid Response 

p. 13. 
210  Ibidem. 
211 Raport o stanie jawności w Polsce (Report on the state of transparency in Poland) 2023, p. 31-32. 
212  Contribution from the Reporters Without Borders for the 2024 Rule of Law Report, p.22. 
213  SLAPP  (wirtualnemedia.pl).  See  also  the  Coalition  Against  SLAPPS  in  Europe  2023  report  update: 

“SLAPPS: A Threat to Democracy Continues to Grow”. 

214  Ibidem. 
215 The alerts concerned mainly threats to the operation of journalists, including harassment and intimidation of 

journalists. Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists (coe.int). 

216  In  particular,  out  of  26  alerts  nine  related  to  cases  of  verbal  attacks,  nine  related  to  legal  incidents,  four 
related to cases of attacks to property, and 1 related to the case of a physical attack. The other five related to 
five cases of censorship. Mapping Media Freedom, Poland country profile. 

28 

 
 
could  be  seen  as  the  main  impediment  in  fostering  widely  recognised  self-regulatory 
mechanisms217. 

IV.  OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO CHECKS AND BALANCES 

Poland is a representative democratic republic with a directly elected President, a bicameral 
Parliament  (Sejm  and  Senate)  and  a  Constitutional  Tribunal  in  charge  of  the  constitutional 
review  of  laws.  The  Sejm  has  the  final  decision-making  power  when  adopting  laws.  Their 
entry into force is subject to the signature of the President of the Republic. The President of 
the Republic, the Senate, a group of 15 Members of the Sejm, the Council of Ministers, and a 
group of at least 100 000 citizens have the right to propose new legislation. The independent 
Ombudsperson  is  tasked  with  safeguarding  the  freedoms  and  rights  of  persons  and  citizens 
specified in the Constitution and other normative acts and functions as the equality body. The 
Supreme  Audit  Office  is  the  chief  organ  of  state  audit,  subordinate  to  the  Sejm,  acting  in 
accordance with the principles of collegiality.  

While the Government committed to  ensure adequate consultations in the law-making 
process,  room  for  further  improvement  remains.  The  quality  of  law-making  and  the 
frequent changes in legislation remain a significant cause for concern about the effectiveness 
of investment protection among companies in Poland218. However, according to information 
available,  the  new  Government  is  not  seeking  to  pass  laws  through  excessively  hasty 
procedures219.  Moreover,  Polish  authorities  committed  to  ensure  adequate  consultations  of 
stakeholders  in  the  context  of  the  law-making  process  and  are  seeking  to  provide  relevant 
information  related  to  ongoing  legislative  processes220.  As  from  2024,  civil  society 
organisations are being more involved in the consultation process of draft legislation221. The 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan  includes  reforms  to  improve  the  quality  of  law-making  and 
enhance  the  involvement  of  social  partners  in  the  legislative  process,  in  view  of  which  the 
Polish  authorities  are  working  on  amendments  to  the  rules  of  procedure  of  the  Senate,  the 
Sejm, and the Council of Ministers222. 

On 1 January 2024, Poland had 46 leading judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights pending implementation, to the same number as the previous year. At that time, 
Poland’s rate of leading judgments from the past 10 years that remained pending was at 51% 

217  2024 Media Pluralism Monitor, p. 19. 
218  In  Poland,  37%  of  the  surveyed  investors  perceive  the  frequent  changes  in  legislation  or  concerns  about 
quality of law-making process as a reason for the lack of confidence in investment protection (compared to 
50% in 2023). Figure 56, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

219  In the fourth year of the Sejm of the previous term of office, it would take on average three days to adopt 
laws within three readings; see the contribution of five NGOs, p. 29. As reported by the Ombudsperson, the 
previous Sejm continued excessively hasty processing of laws in particular in the area of the justice system; 
written contribution from ENNHRI for the 2024 Rule of Law  Report (p. 15). See the data  concerning the 
procedure of adoption for each legislative draft available under https://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/proces.xsp.  

220  See the contribution of the Polish Government to the 2024 Rule of Law Report, pp. 41-42. 
221  This includes notably the organisation of public hearings over draft laws where also CSOs are invited. While 
in the last year of the Sejm of the IX term of office (2023), from among over 127 Government submissions, 
at least 28% of them were not consulted at all or were consulted for less than 14 days; see the contribution of 
five NGOs (p. 29) and the contribution of the ILGA Europe CSO (p. 7). 

222  The  legislative  work  on  the  draft  resolution  on  the  amendments  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Sejm  is 
planned  by  the  end  of  the  second  quarter  of  2024.  The  legislative  work  on  the  draft  resolution  on  the 
amendments  to  the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  is  planned  by  the  end  of  the  second 
quarter of 2024. See also the Resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 13 December 2023. 

29 

 
 
(compared  to  56%  in  2023),  and  the  average  time  that  the  judgments  had  been  pending 
implementation  was  5  years  and  5  months  (compared  to  5  years  and  6  months  in  2023)223. 
The  oldest  leading  judgment,  pending  implementation  for  almost  19  years,  concerns  the 
excessive  length  of  proceedings  before  administrative  bodies  and  courts  and  absence  of  an 
effective remedy224. As regards the respect of payment deadlines, on 31 December 2023 there 
were 18 cases in total awaiting confirmation of payments (compared to 24 in 2022)225. On 1 
July 2024, the number of leading judgments pending implementation had increased to 50226. 
The Ministry of Justice, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plans to prepare 
a draft law on the implementation of ECtHR judgments. 

The  recommendation  regarding  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  (SAO)  has  been  fully 
implemented  by  ensuring  the  appointment  of  its  College  members  and  an  adequate 
follow-up to its findings. The 2023 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘[e]nsure 
a more systematic follow-up to findings by the Supreme Audit Office and ensure, as a matter 
of urgency, the appointment of the College Members of the Supreme Audit Office in order to 
ensure  its  effective  functioning’227.  On  29  February  2024,  acting  upon  a  motion  of  the 
President of the Supreme Audit Office (SAO), the new Marshal of the Sejm appointed eight 
members  of  the  College,  thereby  ensuring  its  effective  functioning228.  The  prosecution 
service,  under  the  new  Prosecutor  General  and  the  National  Prosecutor,  opened  several 
criminal  investigations,  thereby  following  up  on  reports  of  the  SAO  in  sensitive  cases 
concerning  possible  large-scale  money  embezzlement229.  Given  that  new  members  of  the 
College have now been appointed, and a more systemic follow up to SAO findings is being 

223  All figures are calculated by the European Implementation Network and are based on the number of cases 
that  are  considered  pending  at  the  annual  cut-off  date  of  1  January  2024.  See  the  Contribution  from  the 
European Implementation Network for the 2024 Rule of Law Report, p. 6. 

224  Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 1 February 2005, Beller v. Poland, 51837/99. 
225  Council  of  Europe  (2024),  Supervision  of  the  execution  of  judgments  decisions  of  the  European  Court  of 

Human Rights – 17th Annual Report of the Committee of Ministers – 2023, p. 138.  

226  Data according to the online database of the Council of Europe (HUDOC). 
227 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 29. The Commission 
had  assessed  that  no  progress  had  been  made  on  the  recommendation  in  the  2022  Rule  of  Law  Report  to 
ensure  a  more  systematic  follow-up  to  findings  by  the  Supreme Audit  Office  and  ensure,  as  a  matter  of 
urgency,  the  appointment  of  the  College  Members  of  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  in  order  to  ensure  its 
effective functioning. 

228  Two more College members received their nominations soon thereafter; see the press release of the Sejm of 
29 February 2024 “and the press release of the SAO of 1 March 2024. Furthermore, on 5 December 2023, 
after  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Marshal  of  the  Sejm,  the  President  of  the  SAO  appointed  the  Director 
General of the SAO and on 22 December 2023, the Marshal of the Sejm, also at the request of the President 
of the SAO, appointed three new Vice-Presidents of the SAO as well as two new members of the College. As 
of 29 February 2024, the SAO College consists of a total of 18 out of 19 persons (with one representative of 
employees still remaining to be appointed). 

229  For example, the prosecution service followed up on the findings of the SAO as regards the functioning of 
the “Justice Fund” run by the Ministry of Justice, where the SAO determined in 2021 a possible large-scale 
embezzlement of funds that should have been used for supporting victims of crimes, whereas large amounts 
were allegedly used to gain political support for the political party of the previous Minister of Justice. See 
the  press  release  of  the  National  Prosecution  of  26  March  2024.  Furthermore,  the  prosecution  service 
followed up on the findings of the SAO of October 2023 as regards the alleged number of irregularities, both 
at  the  stage  of  preparation  and  organisation  of  the  competition,  as  well  as  in  the  process  of  accepting 
applications and selecting projects for co-financing by the National Center for Research and Development; 
see the Polish Press Agency press report of 28 March 2024. See also the written input of the Supreme Audit 
Office submitted in the context of the 2024 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland preparation. 

30 

 
 
ensured,  the  recommendation  made  in  the  previous  years  concerning  the  Supreme  Audit 
Office is fully implemented. 

The  Sejm  established  parliamentary  investigative  committees  to  assess  three  specific 
cases of concern in respect for the law by public authorities in the period 2015-2023. The 
Sejm  appointed  an  investigative  committee  to  examine  possible  breaches  of  law  by  the 
organisers  of  the  “postal”  Presidential  elections  in  2020230,  an  investigative  committee  to 
examine  alleged  irregularities  in  the  issuance  of  Polish  visas  to  foreigners231,  and  an 
investigative  committee  for  the  use  of  “Pegasus”  software232.  The  new  Prosecutor  General 
decided  to  formally  notify  persons  targeted  by  “Pegasus”  software  and  appointed  a  special 
team  to  carry  out  investigations  on  the  legality  of  the  use  of  this  software233.  The  State 
Committee  for  the  examination  of  Russian  influence  on  the  internal  security  of  Poland 
between 2007 and 2022 was rendered inoperative by the new Sejm234; a law repealing the law 
establishing  that  Committee  is  now  being  examined  by  the  Sejm235.  Furthermore,  on  26 
March  2024,  members  of  the  Government  tabled  in  the  Sejm  a  motion  to  subject  the 
President of the National Bank to proceedings before the Tribunal of State236. The President 
of the Republic has raised doubts as to whether the Sejm is correctly composed and, as of 31 
January  2024,  has  referred  laws  adopted  by  the  Sejm  to  the  Constitutional  Tribunal, 

230  See  the  resolution  of  the  Sejm  of  7  December 2023  on  the  appointment  of  an  Investigative  Committee  to 
investigate the legality, regularity and purposefulness of actions taken to prepare and carry out the elections 
of the President of the Republic of Poland in 2020 in the form of postal voting. See also the 2020 Rule of 
Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland (p. 16).  

231  See the resolution of the Sejm of 19 December 2023 on the appointment of an Investigative Committee to 
examine  the  legality,  regularity  and  purposefulness  of  actions,  as  well  as  the  occurrence  of  abuses, 
negligence  and  omissions  in  the  legalisation  of  the  stay  of  foreigners  in  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of 
Poland in the period from 12 January 2019 to 20 November 2023. 

232  See  the  resolution  of  the  Sejm  of  17  January  2024  on  the  appointment  of  an  Investigative  Committee  to 
examine the legality, regularity and purposefulness of operational and reconnaissance activities undertaken, 
among others, by means of Pegasus software  by members of the Council of Ministers, secret services,  the 
Police,  fiscal  and  customs-fiscal  control  authorities,  bodies  responsible  for  prosecuting  crimes  and  the 
prosecutor's office in the period from 16 November 2015 to 20 November 2023. See also the 2023 Rule of 
Law Report: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland (pp. 32-33). It is noted that on 28 May 
2024, the ECtHR held that there had been three violations of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life  and  correspondence)  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  in  respect  of  the  complaints 
concerning  the  operational-control  regime,  the  retention  of  communications  data  for  potential  use  by  the 
relevant  national  authorities,  and  the  secret-surveillance  regime  under  the  Anti-Terrorism  Act  (see,  the 
ECtHR  judgment  of  29  May  2024  in  the  case  Pietrzak  and  Bychawska-Siniarska  and  Others  v.  Poland 
(applications nos. 72038/17 and 25237/18). 

233  See  the  press  release  of  the  National  Prosecution  of  23  February  2024.  See  also  CyberDefence24.pl  of  5 

April 2024. 

234  2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland p. 30). On 8 June 2023 the Commission opened an 

infringement procedure against the law concerning this Committee.  

235  See the draft law of 11 April 2024 on the repeal of the Law on the State Committee for the examination of 

Russian influence on the internal security of Poland between 2007 and 2022 (print No. 351). 

236  The motion is based on eight main accusations concerning, in essence, the alleged lack of independence of 
the  President of the National Bank of Poland as well as his acting on the basis of political considerations. 
There is no time frame established as yet as regards the follow up to be given to the motion. See the Polish 
Press Agency press release of 26 March 2024 “. It is noted that on 11 January 2024, acting upon a motion of 
the representatives of the parliamentary opposition, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that provisions in force 
allowing to subject the President of the National Bank by means of only an absolute majority of votes of the 
Sejm and simultaneously to suspend him in office if proceedings before the Tribunal of State are initiated  - 
are  unconstitutional. Prior to the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, the contested provision had been in 
force for over 20 years. See the ruling of 11 January 2023 in the case K 23/23. 

31 

 
 
requesting  it  to  examine  their  constitutionality237.  On  19  June  2024,  the  Constitutional 
Tribunal held that a law was unconstitutional as it was adopted by the Sejm in an irregular 
composition238. 

The  2023  recommendation  to  improve  the  framework  in  which  the  Ombudsperson 
operates  has  been  fully  implemented.  The  2023  Rule  of  Law  Report  recommended  to 
Poland to ‘continue efforts to improve the framework in which the Ombudsperson operates, 
taking into account European standards on Ombudsinstitutions’239. In 2024, the Government 
increased  the  annual  budget  allocated  to  the  Ombudsperson’s  Office240.  Given  the  new 
competences to be assigned to the Ombudsperson241 regarding the implementation of the EU 
directive  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers242,  further  budgetary  increases  may  however 
still  be  needed.  The  Ombudsperson  welcomed  the  Polish  Government’s  commitment  to 
address concerns related to the rule of law and proposed additional recommendations in that 
respect243  and  also  pointed  to  shortcomings  in  the  area  of  public  service  media244.  The 
Ombudsperson  continues  enjoying  an  ‘A’  status  by  the  UN  Global  Alliance  of  National 
Human  Rights  Institutions  (GANHRI)245.  In  light  of  the  improved  framework  in  which  the 
Ombudsperson operates, the 2023 recommendation has been fully implemented. 

Significant  progress  has  been  made  to  improve  the  framework  in  which  civil  society 
operates. The 2023 Rule of Law Report recommended to Poland to ‘improve the framework 
in  which  civil  society  operates  […]  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  civil 

237  This  is  related  to  a  final  ruling  of  20  December  2023 of  a  criminal  court  holding  two  MPs  of  the  current 
opposition criminally liable for actions taken when leading the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2007. In 
2015,  the  President  of  the  Republic  pardoned  the  two  individuals  before  the  criminal  ruling  in  their  cases 
became final. This pardon was deemed ineffective by the Supreme Court which referred the case to ordinary 
courts for re-examination. Following their conviction, the Marshal of the Sejm ascertained that the two MPs 
had  lost  their  right  of  being  elected.  The  President  of  the  Republic  considered,  however,  that  the  initial 
pardon remained valid and, as these MPs are prevented from participating in the works of the Sejm, the Sejm 
itself  was  inappropriately  composed.  See  the  press  release  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  of  31  January 
2024. It is noted that in spite of the above, the President of the Republic decided to grant another pardon to 
the two former MPs on 23 January 2024; see the press release of the President of the Republic of 23 January 
2024.  So  far,  the  Constitutional  Tribunal  has  not  ruled  in  any  of  these  motions  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic. 

238  Ruling of 19 June 2024 in the case K 7/24. 
239 2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 11. The Commission 
concluded that Poland had made some progress on improving the framework in which the Ombudsperson 
operates, taking into account European standards on Ombudsinstitutions, and no progress on improving the 
framework in which civil society operates, taking into account European standards on civil society. 

240  According  to  information  available,  the  budget  allocated  for  2024  is  higher  than  the  amount  initially 
requested by the Ombudsperson; see the ENNHRI contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report as regards 
Poland (p. 6). 

241  See the ENNHRI contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report as regards Poland (p. 3).  
242  Directive  (EU)  2019/1937  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  23  October  2019  on  the 

protection of persons who report breaches of Union law.  

243  See the opinion of the Ombudsperson on the draft law amending the law on the NCJ of 29 January 2024 and 
the open letter to the Ministry of Justice as regards the need to amend provisions governing the extraordinary 
appeal procedure of 5 March 2024.  

244 This concerns decisions affecting the management and supervisory boards of the three main public service 
media outlets; see the ENNHRI contribution for the 2024 Rule of Law Report as regards Poland (p. 10). See 
also Pillar III above. 

245  Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI), Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA), 

Accreditation Status as of 26 April 2023.  

32 

 
 
society’246.  Poland  continues  to  have  a  broad  and  vibrant  civil  society,  consisting  of  more 
than 120 000 CSOs, which engage in various activities related to the promotion of the rule of 
law247.  According  to  CIVICUS,  the  civic  space  continues  to  be  rated  as  obstructed248.  The 
Government has started engaging with CSOs in the context of the law-making process249 and 
created the office of the Minister for the Civil Society250. CSOs had raised concerns about a 
significant  worsening  of  the  distribution  of  public  funds  notably  before  the  October  2023 
parliamentary  elections251.  New  initiatives  are  expected  regarding  the  legal  framework  in 
which  civil  society  operates252.  Significant  positive253  changes  relate  to  organisations 
defending the rights of the LGBTIQ community254, and to Government proposals to amend 
the  criminal  code  to  include  among  others  bias  against  sexual  orientation  as  one  of  the 
grounds for hate crimes255. In view of these developments, there has been significant progress 
on the recommendation made in the previous years. 

246  2023 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Poland, p. 33. The Commission 
had assessed that overall no progress had been made on the recommendation in the 2022 Rule of Law Report 
to separate the function of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor-General and that some progress 
improve  the  framework  in  which  civil  society  operates,  taking  into  account  European  standards  on  civil 
society. 

247  In 2023, the activities were primarily focused on educating the public about electoral integrity principles and 
the importance of scrutinizing election campaign conduct; see the contribution of five NGOs submitted in 
the context of the 2024 Rule of Law Report preparation (pp. 37-38) where also other initiatives are listed. 
248  Rating  given  by  CIVICUS.  Ratings  are  on  a  five-category  scale  defined  as:  open,  narrowed,  obstructed, 

repressed and closed.  

249  See above.  
250  The Minister is also the Head of the Committee for Public Benefit Matters.  
251  Reportedly, public funds were directed towards Government-dependent organisations; see the contribution of 

five NGOs submitted in the context of the 2024 Rule of Law Report preparation (p. 36). 

252  See the contribution of the Polish Government to the 2024 Rule of Law Report preparation (p. 53).  
253  Nevertheless,  certain  criminal  cases  concerning  notably  the  authors  of  the  so-called  “Hate-Atlas”  remain 
pending  before  courts  (these  cases  were  initiated  by  local  governments  against  persons  who  informed  the 
public that  these local governments had adopted the so-called “LGBTI ideology-free zones”; see the 2023 
Rule  of  Law  Report:  Country  Chapter  on  the  rule  of  law  situation  in  Poland,  p.  34.  On  positive 
developments, see in particular the joined contribution of the Center for Reproductive Rights, ILGA Europe 
and IPPF European Network to the 2024 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter for Poland preparation (p. 7 
ff.). 

254  On 12 December 2023, in the judgment Przybyszewska and Others v. Poland (Applications nos. 1454/19 and 
9  others),  the  ECtHR  ruled  that  the  lack  of  any  form  of  legal  recognition  and  proception  for  same-sex 
couples in Poland breached the ECHR. On 27 February 2024, the Ombudsperson published a Handbook on 
legal  rules  governing  the  gender  recognition;  see  the  press  release  of  the  Ombudsperson  of  27  February 
2024.  

255  The draft law is included in the legislative work of the government (draft no. UD29) with the tentative date 
of  tabling  in  the  parliament  set  to  the  second  quarter  of  2024.  The  Minister  of  Justice  also  officially 
apologised  to  the  LGBTI  community  for  any  harm  caused  by  the  Polish  State  in  the  recent  past.  Similar 
apologies  were  made  by  the  Polish  State  Television  on  13  February  2024;  see  the  press  release  of  the 
Ministry of Justice of 1 February 2024 and WirtualneMedia.pl “Przeprosiny w TVP Info dla osób LGBT+”.  

33 

 
 
Annex I: List of sources in alphabetical order* 

* The list of contributions received in the context of the consultation for the 2024 Rule of Law report 
can 
https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-targeted-
stakeholder-consultation_en. 

found 

be 

at 

sprawie  niezbędnych,  pilnych  działań  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości,  29 

Associations of Polish judges and prosecutors (2024), Wspólne stanowisko stowarzyszeń sędziowskich 
w 
January  2024 
https://iustitia.pl/wspolne-stanowisko-stowarzyszen-sedziowskich-w-sprawie-niezbednych-pilnych-
dzialan-ministra-sprawiedliwosci/. 

Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2023), Kontrola CBA w Narodowym Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, 23 
February  2023  https://www.cba.gov.pl/pl/kontrole/4979,Kontrola-CBA-w-Narodowym-Centrum-
Badan-i-Rozwoju.html?search=738317815. 

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2024),  CBA  control  at  the  National  Centre  for  Research  and 
Development 
https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1019,CBA-control-at-the-National-Centre-for-
Research-and-Development.html. 

Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (2024), Collegium Humanum scandal – further detainees, 13 March 
2024 https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1095,Collegium-Humanum-scandal-further-detainees.html  

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2024),  Former  deputy  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  detained,  17 
https://www.cba.gov.pl/en/news/1084,Former-deputy-Minister-of-Foreign-Affairs-
January 
detained.html. 

2024 

Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  (2024),  Informacja  o  wynikach  działalności  Centralnego  Biura 
roku,  10  April  2024  https://cba.gov.pl/pl/o-nas/informacja-o-
Antykorupcyjnego  w  2023 
wynikach/5095,Informacja-o-wynikach-dzialalnosci-Centralnego-Biura-Antykorupcyjnego-w-2023-
rok.html. 

Communication  of  the  Minister  of  Justice  (2024),  Komunikat  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości  w  sprawie 
2024 
standardów 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/komunikat-ministra-sprawiedliwosci-w-sprawie-standardow-
w-zakresie-prawa-do-rzetelnego-procesu. 

rzetelnego 

February 

procesu, 

zakresie 

prawa 

do 

w 

7 

Council of Europe (2024), Safety of Journalists Platform – Alerts https://fom.coe.int/en/alerte. 

Council press statement (2024), General Affaris Council, 21 May 2024 – Main results – Rule of Law 
in Poland, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2024/05/21/. 

CyberDefence24.pl  (2024),  Afera  Pegasusa.  Zawiadomienie  do  30  podsłuchiwanych  osób,  5  April 
2024 
https://cyberdefence24.pl/polityka-i-prawo/afera-pegasusa-zawiadomienie-do-30-
podsluchiwanych-osob. 

Dentos Law Firm (2023), Amendment to the criminal code: Significant changes to the provisions on 
2023 
disrupting 
https://www.dentons.com/en/insights/articles/2023/october/31/amendment-to-the-criminal-code-
significant-changes-to-the-provisions-on-disrupting. 

procurement, 

October 

public 

31 

Deputy  Disciplinary  Officer  for  Ordinary  Court  Judges  (2024),  Press  release  of  8  January  2024 
http://rzecznik.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Komunikat-Zastepcy-Rzecznika-Dyscyplinarnego-
przy-SO-w-Warszawie-z-8.01.24.jpg. 

Disciplinary  Officer  for  Ordinary  Court  Judges  (2023),  Press  release  of  7  December  2023 
http://rzecznik.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Komunikat-Rzecznika-Dyscyplinarnego-z-7-
grudnia-2023.pdf. 

DogmatyKarnisty.pl (2023), Nowelizacja Kodeksu karnego nie weszła w życie 1 października 2023. 
2023 
Trzeba 
https://www.dogmatykarnisty.pl/2023/10/nowelizacja-kk-nie-weszla-w-zycie/. 

stosować 

przepisy, 

October 

stare 

1 

34 

 
DoRzeczy.pl (2024), Bodnar wycofał wniosek Ziobry do TK. Chodzi o samorząd lekarski, 31 January 
2024 
https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/544524/bodnar-wycofal-wniosek-ziobry-do-trybunalu-
konstytucyjnego.html. 

European  Commission  (2024),  Positive  preliminary  assessment  of  the  satisfactory  fulfilment  of 
milestones  and  targets  related  to  the  first  payment  request  submitted  by  Poland  on  15  December 
2023,  transmitted  to  the  Economic  and  Financial  Committee  by  the  European  Commission,  29 
February 
https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/52bd45c7-da37-4ba0-b623-
95da8cdad7f9_en?filename=C_2024_1438_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_nlw_part1_v1.pdf. 

2024 

European Commission (2022), 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

European Commission (2024), 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 

First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  (2023),  Stanowisko  Pierwszego  Prezesa  SN  wobec 
projektowanych  zmian  Regulaminu  urzędowania  sądów  powszechnych,  17  December  2023 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=959-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2023. 

First President of the Supreme Court (2024), Opinia dotycząca projektu ustawy o zmianie ustawy o 
Krajowej 
2024 
January 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/AllItems/Opinia-KRS.pdf. 

Sądownictwa, 

Radzie 

22 

First President of the Supreme Court (2024), Oświadczenie Pierwszego Prezesa Sądu Najwyższego w 
związku 
2024 
Marszałka 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=964-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024. 

wypowiedziami 

January 

Sejmu, 

5 

z 

First President of the Supreme Court (2024), Oświadczenie Pierwszego Prezesa Sądu Najwyższego w 
związku  z  bezprawnymi  działaniami  Prezesa  Izby  Pracy  i  Ubezpieczeń  Społecznych  SN  oraz 
Marszałka 
2024 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=965-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024. 

January 

Sejmu, 

8 

First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  (2024),  Oświadczenie  Pierwszego  Prezesa  SN  w  związku  z 
bezprawną 
2024 
SA 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=979-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024. 

w  Warszawie, 

11  March 

usunięcia 

Prezesa 

próbą 

First President of the Supreme Court (2024), Oświadczenie Pierwszego Prezesa Sądu Najwyższego dr 
hab.  Małgorzaty  Manowskiej  w  związku  z  nieprawdziwymi  lub  nieścisłymi  informacjami 
publikowanymi 
2024 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=981-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024. 

Sądu  Apelacyjnego  w  Warszawie, 

20  March 

stronie 

na 

First  President  of  the  Supreme  Court  (2024),  Oświadczenie  Pierwszego  Prezesa  SN  w  związku  z 
bezprawną 
2024 
SA 
https://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SitePages/Wydarzenia.aspx?ItemSID=979-0dc69815-3ade-42fa-bbb8-
549c3c6969c5&ListName=Wydarzenia&rok=2024. 

w  Warszawie, 

11  March 

usunięcia 

Prezesa 

próbą 

GazetaPrawna.pl (2023), Sejm zdecydował o odroczeniu reformy kodeksu karnego, 30 January 2023 
https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/orzeczenia/artykuly/8648190,reforma-kodeksu-karnego-odroczenie-
sejm.html. 

Greenpeace (2023), Apel organizacji społecznych w sprawie energetyki wiatrowej, 6 December 2023 
https://www.greenpeace.org/poland/aktualnosci/33976/apel-organizacji-spolecznych-w-sprawie-
energetyki-wiatrowej/. 

35 

 
Helsinki  Foundation  of  Human  Rights  (2023),  Stanowisko  Helsińskiej  Fundacji  Praw  Człowieka  w 
sprawie  zmian  w  mediach  publicznych,  22  December  2023  https://hfhr.pl/aktualnosci/stanowisko-
hfpc-ws-zmian-w-mediach-publicznych. 

International Federation of Journalists (2024), Poland: Persistent obstruction of Ukrainian journalists’ 
work,  14  March  2024  https://www.ifj.org/media-centre/news/detail/category/europe/article/poland-
persistent-obstruction-of-ukrainian-journalists-work. 

Ius Laboris (Global HR Lawyers) (2024), New Polish government makes whistleblowing directive a 
https://iuslaboris.com/insights/new-polish-government-makes-
2024 
priority, 
whistleblowing-directive-a-priority/. 

January 

25 

Krakowski 
https://kipk.pl/ksiazki/niezmieniony-kodeks-karny/. 

Karnego 

Instytut 

Prawa 

(2023), 

Niezmieniony 

Kodeks 

Karny 

Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (2024), TVN Style z koncesją na kolejne 10 lat, 12 June 2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/krrit/tvn-style-z-koncesja-na-kolejne-10-lat. 

Lex Super Omnia (2024), PROKURATORZY NIE DADZĄ SIĘ ZASTRASZYĆ POLITYKOM, 12 
February 2024 https://lexso.org.pl/2024/02/prokuratorzy-nie-dadza-sie-zastraszyc-politykom/. 

Minister  for  the  Foreign  Affairs  (2023),  Listy  Ministra  Radosława  Sikorskiego  do  Przewodniczącej 
Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka oraz do Komitetu Ministrów Rady Europy, 15 December 
2023  https://www.gov.pl/web/dyplomacja/listy-ministra-radoslawa-sikorskiego-do-przewodniczacej-
europejskiego-trybunalu-praw-czlowieka-oraz-do-komitetu-ministrow-rady-europy. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2023),  Decyzja  o  cofnięciu  powołań  na  stanowiska  prezesów  sądów,  19 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/komunikat-prasowy-ministra-
December 
sprawiedliwosci. 

2023 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Komunikat  Ministerstwa  Sprawiedliwości  o  wszczęciu  procedury 
odwołania  ze  stanowisk  Prezesa  i  Wiceprezesa  Sądu  Rejonowego  w  Olsztynie,  Prezesów  Sądów 
Rejonowych  w  Bartoszycach,  Biskupcu  i  Kętrzynie  oraz  ich  zawieszenia  z  dniem  dzisiejszym  w 
pełnieniu 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-
2024 
sprawiedliwosci-wszczal-procedure-odwolania-ze-stanowisk-prezesa-i-wiceprezesow-sadu-
rejonowego-w-olsztynie-oraz-prezesow-sadow-rejonowych-z-obszaru-wlasciwosci-so-w-olsztynie. 

11  March 

czynności, 

Ministry of Justice (2024), Minister Sprawiedliwości na sesji plenarnej Komisji Weneckiej, 15 March 
2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-na-sesji-plenarnej-komisji-
weneckiej. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Minister  Sprawiedliwości  odwołał  z  delegacji  do  MS,  KRS  i  KSSiP  16 
sędziów,  12 
January  2024  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-
odwolal-z-delegacji-do-ms-krs-i-kssip-16-sedziow. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Minister  Sprawiedliwości  przedstawił  Plan  Działań  Polski  ws. 
przywracania  praworządności,  20  February  2024  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-
sprawiedliwosci-przedstawil-plan-dzialan-polski-ws-przywracania-praworzadnosci. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Minister  Sprawiedliwości  wszczął  procedurę  odwołania  ze  stanowisk 
2024 
Prezesa 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-wszczal-procedure-odwolania-ze-
stanowisk-prezesa-i-wiceprezesow-sadu-okregowego-w-olsztynie. 

Sądu  Okręgowego  w  Olsztynie, 

i  Wiceprezesów 

11  March 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Minister  Sprawiedliwości  wyznaczył  Rzeczników  Dyscyplinarnych 
Ministra  Sprawiedliwości,  29  January  2024  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-
sprawiedliwosci-wyznaczyl-rzecznikow-dyscyplinarnych-ministra-sprawiedliwosci. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Odwołanie  Dyrektora  KSSiP  -  sędziego  Kamila  Zaradkiewicza,  2 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/odwolanie-dyrektora-kssip---sedziego-
February 
kamila-zaradkiewicza. 

2024 

36 

 
Ministry of Justice (2024), Pakiet rozwiązań uzdrawiających Trybunał Konstytucyjny, 4 March 2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/pakiet-rozwiazan-uzdrawiajacych-trybunal-konstytucyjny. 

Ministry 
Powstają 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/rzad-przyjal-projekty-ministra-sprawiedliwosci. 

kodyfikacyjne, 

komisje 

(2024), 

Justice 

of 

5  March 

2024 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Rezygnacja  Prezesa  i  Wiceprezesa  SO  w  Elblągu  oraz  Wiceprezesa  SO 
Warszawa-Praga,  2  April  2024  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/rezygnacja-prezesa-i-
wiceprezesa-so-w-elblagu-oraz-wiceprezesa-so-warszawa-praga. 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Wojciech  Postulski  wygrał  konkurs  na  stanowisko  dyrektora  KSSiP,  14 
March 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/wojciech-postulski-wygral-konkurs-na-
2024 
stanowisko-dyrektora-kssip. 

Ministry of Justice (2024), Współpraca Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości z samorządem sędziowskim w 
zakresie 
2024 
stanowisk 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/wspolpraca-ministerstwa-sprawiedliwosci-z-samorzadem-
sedziowskim-w-zakresie-obsady-kluczowych-stanowisk-w-sadach. 

kluczowych 

22January 

sądach, 

obsady 

w 

Ministry  of  Justice  (2024),  Założenia  nowelizacji  ustawy  dotyczące  rozdzielenia  funkcji  Ministra 
Sprawiedliwości 
2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/zalozenia-nowelizacji-ustawy-dotyczace-rozdzielenia-
funkcji-ministra-sprawiedliwosci-i-prokuratora-generalnego2. 

Generalnego, 

Prokuratora 

January 

19 

i 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2023),  Odwołania  członków  Krajowej  Rady  Prokuratorów 
przy  Prokuratorze  Generalnym  –  stanowisko  Ministerstwa  Sprawiedliwości,  21  December  2023 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/odwolania-czlonkow-krajowej-rady-prokuratorow-przy-
prokuratorze-generalnym--stanowisko-ministerstwa-sprawiedliwosci. 

Minister of  Justice-Prosecutor  General (2023),  Prokurator  Generalny  przeciwko unijnemu  zakazowi 
samochodów spalinowych – wniosek do TK w obronie praw konstytucyjnych Polaków, 20 October 
2023  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/prokurator-generalny-przeciwko-unijnemu-zakazowi-
samochodow-spalinowych--wniosek-do-tk-w-obronie-praw-konstytucyjnych-polakow. 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2023),  Tańszy  prąd  dla  Polaków  –  wniosek  do  Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego,  24  November  2023,  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/tanszy-prad-dla-
polakow--wniosek-do-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego. 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Decyzja  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości  Prokuratora 
Generalnego  o  zakończeniu  delegacji  prokuratorów  do  Prokuratury  Krajowej,  4  January  2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/decyzja-ministra-sprawiedliwosci-prokuratora-generalnego-
o-zakonczeniu-delegacji-prokuratorow-do-prokuratury-krajowej. 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Informacja  o  uznaniu  przywrócenia  prokuratora 
Dariusza  Barskiego  do  służby  czynnej  za akt  dokonany  z  naruszeniem przepisów,  12  January  2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/informacja-o-uznaniu-przywrocenia-prokuratora-dariusza-
barskiego-do-sluzby-czynnej-za-akt-dokonany-z-naruszeniem-przepisow. 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Minister  Sprawiedliwości  Prokurator  Generalny 
ogłosił konkurs na stanowisko Prokuratora Krajowego i powołał Zespół, który oceni kandydatów, 9 
February 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/minister-sprawiedliwosci-prokurator-
generalny-oglosil-konkurs-na-stanowisko-prokuratora-krajowego-i-powolal-zespol-ktory-oceni-
kandydatow. 

2024 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Odwołanie  10  Prokuratorów  Okręgowych  i 
Regionalnych, 29 January 2024 https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/odwolanie-10-prokuratorow-
okregowych-i-regionalnych. 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Pismo  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości  Prokuratora 
2024 
Generalnego  Adama  Bodnara 

pracowników 

prokuratury, 

January 

do 

15 

37 

 
https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/pismo-ministra-sprawiedliwosci-prokuratora-generalnego-
adama-bodnara-do-pracownikow-prokuratury. 

Justice-Prosecutor  General 

Minister  of 
zdegradowanych 
krajowa/informacja-o-powolaniu-na-wyzsze-stanowiska-prokuratorskie. 

(2024),  Przywracanie  na 

prokuratorów, 

11  March 

2024 

służbowe 
stanowiska 
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-

Justice-Prosecutor  General 

Minister  of 
zdegradowanych 
krajowa/przywracanie-na-stanowiska-sluzbowe-zdegradowanych-prokuratorow. 

(2024),  Przywracanie  na 

prokuratorów, 

29  March 

służbowe 
stanowiska 
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-

2024 

Minister  of  Justice-Prosecutor  General  (2024),  Stanowisko  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości  –  Prokuratora 
Generalnego w sprawie postanowienia tymczasowego TK z dnia 15 stycznia 2024 r. o sygn. Ts 9/24, 
23  January  2024  https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/stanowisko-ministra-sprawiedliwosci--
prokuratora-generalnego-w-sprawie-postanowienia-tymczasowego-tk-z-dnia-15-stycznia-2024-r-o-
sygn-ts-924. 

Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage  (2024),  Communication  regarding  a  ruling  of  the 
Constitutional Tribunal, 18 January 2024 https://x.com/kultura_gov_pl/status/1747946310840295760. 

Ministry  of  Culture  and  National  Heritage  (2024),  Rozpoczynamy  konsultacje  założeń  ustawy 
medialnej 
2024 
https://www.gov.pl/web/kultura/rozpoczynamy-konsultacje-zalozen-ustawy-medialnej. 

i  Dziedzictwa  Narodowego, 

-  Ministerstwo  Kultury 

June 

24 

National  Center  for  Research  and  Development  (2023),  Komunikat  Narodowego  Centrum  Badań  i 
Rozwoju,  12  October  2023  https://www.gov.pl/web/ncbr/komunikat-narodowego-centrum-badan-i-
rozwoju2. 

National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (2023),  Stanowisko  Krajowej  Rady  Sądownictwa  z  dnia  13 
października  2023  r.  w  przedmiocie  projektu  ustawy  o  szczególnych  rozwiązaniach  służących 
realizacji 
2023 
https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/opinie-stanowiska-uchwaly/2219-stanowisko-krajowej-rady-
sadownictwa-z-dnia-z-dnia-13-pazdziernika-2023-r-w-przedmiocie-projektu-ustawy-o-szczegolnych-
rozwiazaniach-sluzacych-realizacji-ustawy-budzetowej-na-rok-2024-ud487.html. 

budżetowej 

(UD487), 

October 

ustawy 

2024 

rok 

na 

13 

National Council for the Judiciary (2024), Opinia Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa z dnia 15 lutego 2024 
r.  w  sprawie  rządowego  projektu  ustawy  o  zmianie  ustawy  o  Krajowej  Radzie  Sądownictwa 
(WP.420.1.2024),  15  February  2024  https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/opinie-stanowiska-uchwaly/2403-
opinia-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-dnia-15-lutego-2024-r-w-sprawie-rzadowego-projektu-ustawy-
o-zmianie-ustawy-o-krajowej-radzie-sadownictwa-wp-420-1-2024.html. 

National  Council  for 
the  Judiciary  (2024),  UCHWAŁA  NR  234/2024  KRAJOWEJ  RADY 
SĄDOWNICTWA  z  dnia  23  kwietnia  2024  r.  w  sprawie  skierowania  wniosku  do  Trybunału 
Konstytucyjnego  o  zbadanie  zgodności  z  Konstytucją  Rzeczypospolitej  Polskiej  przepisów  ustawy  z 
dnia 27 lipca 2001 r. Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych (t.j. Dz. U. z 2023 r. poz. 217 z późn. zm.) 
i  zarządzenia  Ministra  Sprawiedliwości  z  dnia  19  czerwca  2019  r.  w  sprawie  organizacji  i  zakresu 
działania sekretariatów sądowych oraz innych działów administracji sądowej (Dz. Urz. MS z 2019 r. 
poz. 
2024 
z  wnioskiem 
https://krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/wnioski-do-tk/2481-uchwala-nr-234-2024-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-
dnia-23-kwietnia-2024-r-w-sprawie-skierowania-wniosku-do-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-o-zbadanie-
zgodnosci-z-konstytucja-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej-przepisow-ustawy-z-dnia-27-lipca-2001-r-prawo-
o-ustroju-sadow-powszechnych-t-j-dz-u-z-2023-r-poz-217-z-pozn-zm-i-zarzadzenia-ministra-
sprawiedliwosci-z-dnia-19-czerwca-2019-r-w-sprawie-organizacji-i-zakresu-d.html. 

zabezpieczenie. 

zm.)  wraz 

23  April 

późn. 

138 

o 

z 

National  Prosecutor’s  Office  (2024),  Informacja  o  czynnościach  w  śledztwie  dotyczącym 
nieprawidłowości w Funduszu Sprawiedliwości, 26 March 2024 https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-
krajowa/informacja-o-czynnosciach-w-sledztwie-dotyczacym-nieprawidlowosci-w-funduszu-
sprawiedliwosci. 

38 

 
National Prosecutor’s Office (2024), Informacja o powołaniu zespołu prokuratorów z Mazowieckiego 
pionu  PZ  PK  do  prowadzenia  spraw  dotyczących  wykorzystania  oprogramowania  „Pegasus”,  23 
February 
https://www.gov.pl/web/prokuratura-krajowa/informacja-o-powolaniu-zespolu-
prokuratorow-z-mazowieckiego-pionu-pz-pk-do-prowadzenia-spraw-dotyczacych-wykorzystania-
oprogramowania-pegasus. 

2024 

Oko.press (2024), Bodnar wygasi działania „egzekutorów” Ziobry. Obniży im pensje, da więcej pracy 
sędziowskiej,  2  April  2024,  https://oko.press/bodnar-wygasi-egzekutorow-ziobry-obnizy-im-pensje-
zagoni-do-pracy-sedziowskiej-i-konczy-represje. 

Ombudsperson’s  Office  (2024),  Instytucja  skargi  nadzwyczajnej  -  co  należałoby  zmienić.  Marcin 
Wiącek  pisze  do  MS,  5  March  2024  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-skarga-nadzwyczajna-
zmiany-propozycje-ms. 

Ombudsperson’s Office (2024), Projekt nowelizacji ustawy o Krajowej Rady Sądownictwa - krokiem 
w  dobrym  kierunku,  29  January  2024  https://bip.brpo.gov.pl/pl/content/rpo-krs-nowelizacja-projekt-
ms. 

Onet.pl  (2023),  Polowanie  na  Romana  Giertycha.  Prokuratura  zastanawia  się  nad  wnioskiem  o 
uchylenie  immunitetu,  20  November  2023  https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/lublin/polowanie-na-romana-
giertycha-co-dalej-ze-sledztwem-w-sprawie-spolki-
polnord/3f4k4k2?utm_source=wiadomosci.onet.pl_viasg_wiadomosci&utm_medium=referal&utm_c
ampaign=leo_automatic&srcc=undefined&utm_v=2. 

Onet.pl  (2024),  Apel  37  sędziów  Sądu  Najwyższego.  Chodzi  o  przywrócenie  praworządności,  30 
January 
https://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kraj/apel-37-sedziow-sadu-najwyzszego-chodzi-o-
przywrocenie-praworzadnosci/cnc9051. 

2024 

Polish Press Agency (2023), Premier: "ustawa wiatrakowa" to efekt wielkiego lobbingu, 1 December 
2023 https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/premier-ustawa-wiatrakowa-efekt-wielkiego-lobbingu  

Polish Press Agency (2023), Sprawa Sławomira Nowaka. Obrona chciała zawieszenia sprawy. Sąd się 
nie  zgodził,  9  September  2023  https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/sprawa-slawomira-nowaka-obrona-
chciala-zawieszenia-sprawy-sad-sie-nie-zgodzil-0. 

Polish  Press  Agency  (2024),  Do  Sejmu  trafił  wstępny  wniosek  o  postawienie  prezesa  NBP  przed 
Trybunałem Stanu, 26 March 2024 https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/do-sejmu-trafil-wstepny-wniosek-
o-postawienie-prezesa-nbp-przed-trybunalem-stanu. 

Polish  Press  Agency  (2024),  Immunitet  Tomasza  Grodzkiego.  Zapadła  decyzja  prokuratury,  22 
https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/immunitet-tomasza-grodzkiego-zapadla-decyzja-
February 
prokuratury. 

2024 

Polish Press Agency (2024), Kiedy nowa ustawa medialna? Zdrojewski zdradza szczegóły, 4 January 
2024 https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/kiedy-nowa-ustawa-medialna-zdrojewski-zdradza-szczegoly. 

Polish  Press  Agency  (2024),  Prokurator  Krajowy:  jest  decyzja,  że  będzie  toczyło  się  śledztwo  w 
sprawie  NCBiR,  28  March  2024  https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/prokurator-krajowy-jest-decyzja-ze-
bedzie-toczylo-sie-sledztwo-w-sprawie-ncbir. 

Polish Press Agency (2024), To koniec CBA.  Będzie nowa formacja do walki z korupcją, 22 April 
2024 https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/koniec-cba-bedzie-nowa-formacja-do-walki-z-korupcja. 

PolsatNews.pl  (2024),  Likwidacja  CBA.  Projekt  ustawy  gotowy.  Rzecznik  ministra  zdradza 
szczegóły, 29 March 2024 https://www.polsatnews.pl/wiadomosc/2024-03-29/likwidacja-cba-projekt-
ustawy-gotowy-rzecznik-ministra-zdradza-szczegoly/. 

Polska2050 
https://polska2050.pl/assets/uploads/2023/11/69273236-dd1a-6c16-30eb-3751c06dcb20.pdf. 

Government 

Coalition 

(2023), 

Agreement, 

39 

 
Prawo.pl  (2023),  Ławnicy  SN:  Trzeba  wstrzymać  się  od  orzekania,  13  October  2023 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/uchwaly-rady-lawniczej-sn-nie-orzekac,523523.html. 

Prawo.pl (2023), Minister Bodnar: Zmiany pięciu członków Krajowej Rady Prokuratorów zgodnie z 
prawem, 29 December 2023  https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/powolanie-prokuratorow-z-lso-do-
krajowej-rady-prokuratorow-stanowisko-adama-bodnara,524676.html. 

Prawo.pl (2024), Sędziowscy rzecznicy dyscyplinarni dostaną po kieszeni - mają mieć niższe dodatki, 
4 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/zmiany-w-dodatkach-dla-rzecznika-
dyscyplinarnego-sedziow-i-jego-zastepcow,526296.html. 

April 

2024 

Prawo.pl,  Decyzje  prokuratora  Barskiego  ważne, czy  nie?  Prokuratorzy liczą na  SN,  7  March  2024 
https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/sn-ma-rozstrzygnac-czy-barski-jest-prokuratorem-
krajowym,525832.html. 

President  of  the  Republic  (2024),  Decyzja  Prezydenta  ws.  ustawy  budżetowej,  31  January  2024 
https://www.prezydent.pl/prawo/wnioski-do-tk/decyzja-prezydenta-ws-ustawy-budzetowej,80550. 

President of the Republic (2024), Pismo Prezydenta Andrzeja Dudy do Prezesa Rady Ministrów, 19 
March  2024  https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/pismo-prezydenta-andrzeja-dudy-do-
prezesa-rady-ministrow,82940. 

President of the Republic (2024), Prezydent zastosował prawo łaski wobec dwóch osób, 23 January 
https://www.prezydent.pl/aktualnosci/prawo-laski/2024/prezydent-zastosowal-prawo-laski-
2023 
wobec-dwoch-osob,80300  

Public Prosecutor’s Office in Lublin (2024), Komunikat prasowy w sprawie skierowania wniosku o 
immunitetu  posła  Parlamentu  Europejskiego  Ryszarda  Cz.,  26  February  2024 
uchyleniu 
https://www.gov.pl/web/pr-lublin/komunikat-prasowy-w-sprawie-skierowania-wniosku-o-uchyleniu-
immunitetu-posla-parlamentu-europejskiego-ryszarda-cz. 

Radio  Szczecin  (2024),  Prokuratorzy  regionalni  i  okręgowi.  Są  odwołania,  29  January  2024 
https://radioszczecin.pl/1,467165,prokuratorzy-regionalni-i-okregowi-sa-odwolania. 

Rmf24.pl (2023), Pełczyńska-Nałęcz o ustawie wiatrakowej: Nie został dowiedziony żaden lobbing, 7 
December 
https://www.rmf24.pl/tylko-w-rmf24/popoludniowa-rozmowa/news-pelczynska-
nalecz-o-ustawie-wiatrakowej-nie-zostal-dowiedzio,nId,7195437#naglowek-pelczynskanalecz-nie-
dowiedziono-lobbingu-przy-pracach-nad-p&crp_state=1. 

2023 

Rzeczpospolita.pl  (2024),  Specjalni  rzecznicy  Bodnara  zamykają  sprawy  sędziów  ściganych  przez 
ludzi  Ziobry,  2  March  2024  https://www.rp.pl/sady-i-trybunaly/art39932671-specjalni-rzecznicy-
bodnara-zamykaja-sprawy-sedziow-sciganych-przez-ludzi-ziobry. 

ScienceBusiness.net  (2023),  Audit  uncovers  ‘corruption  mechanisms’  at  Polish  research  funding 
agency,  18  October  2023  https://sciencebusiness.net/news/international-news/audit-uncovers-
corruption-mechanisms-polish-research-funding-agency. 

Sieć  Obywatelska  (2023),  Raport  o  stanie  jawności  w  Polsce  –  2023  https://siecobywatelska.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2023/12/raport_2023.pdf. 

Sejm  (2023),  Informacja  o  działaniach  podejmowanych  wobec  Sejmu  Rzeczypospolitej  Polskiej  w 
2022  roku  przez  podmioty  wykonujące  zawodową  działalność  lobbingową,  24  January  2023 
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/lobbing/informacja_roczna_2022.pdf   

Sejm (2024), Deputies' bill amending certain acts to improve corporate governance in companies with 
State Treasury shareholding, Paper no. 261, https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm10.nsf/PrzebiegProc.xsp?nr=261. 

Sejm (2024), Trybunał Konstytucyjny oddalił wnioski Sejmu o wyłączenie sędziów TK K. Pawłowicz 
i  S.  Piotrowicza  ze  sprawy  K  27/23  dot.  oceny  konstytucyjności  przepisów  związanych  z  tzw. 
2024 
wyborami 

kopertowymi, 

April 

3 

40 

 
https://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=ECC1C82D9CAA2E06C1258AF400401
EC5. 

Sejm (2024), W Sejmie wręczono nominacje nowym członkom Kolegium Najwyższej Izby Kontroli, 
29 
2024 
February 
https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm10.nsf/komunikat.xsp?documentId=D22EBAB0683591F4C1258AD20
03F742A.Supreme  Audit  Office  (2023),  NCBR  –  billions  spent  with  no  effect  for  innovations,  16 
November 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/en/news/ncbr-billions-spent-with-no-effect-for-
innovations.html. 

2023 

Supreme  Audit  Office  (2023),  Summary  of  a  Press  Conference  -  TVP  –  Bizancjum  za  publiczne 
pieniądze, 6 October 2023 https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/funkcjonowanie-i-finanse-tvp.html. 

Supreme Audit Office (2024), Nowi członkowie Kolegium Najwyższej Izby Kontroli, 1 March 2024 
https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/nowi-czlonkowie-kolegium-nik-022024.html. 

TVN24.pl  (2023),  Dariusz  Kubik:  osoba  pod  imieniem  i  nazwiskiem  przyznaje  się  wprost  do 
nielegalnego finansowania kampanii PiS, 3 October 2024 https://tvn24.pl/polska/kampania-wyborcza-
pis-nielegalnie-finansowana-piotr-fraszczak-i-kazimierz-szczech-ujawniaja-szczegoly-st7372332. 

TVN24.pl  (2024),  Były  prezes  NCBR  Investment  Fund  Krzysztof  B.  w  areszcie,  7  March  2024 
https://tvn24.pl/polska/byly-prezes-ncbr-investment-fund-krzysztof-b-zatrzymany-i-aresztowany-
st7809239. 

Venice  Commission  (2024),  CDL-PI(2024)009-e  Poland  -  Urgent  Joint  Opinion  of  the  Venice 
Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe 
on the draft law amending the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary of Poland, 8 May 2024 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2024)009-e. 

Whistleblowingmonitor.eu (2024), Poland https://www.whistleblowingmonitor.eu/?country=poland  

Wirtualnemedia.pl (2023), 250 pozwów SLAPP rocznie w Europie. Polska niechlubnym liderem, 24 
August 2023, https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/slapp. 

WirtualneMedia.pl  (2024),  Przeprosiny  w  TVP  Info  dla  osób  LGBT+.  „To  nie  ideologia”,  13 
February 2024, https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/tvp-przeprasza-osoby-lgbt-geje. 

Wirtualnemedia.pl  (2024),  Szef  KRRiT  znów  karze  TOK  FM.  Za  obrażanie  prezydenta  i 
zooinwektywy,  25  January  2024  https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/radio-tok-fm-kara-krrit-
prezydent-andrzej-duda-zoo. 

Wirtualnemedia.pl  (2024),  TVN  Style  nadal  bez  nowej  koncesji.  Pismo  prawników  TVN  trafiło  do 
KRRiT, 25 April 2024, https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/tvn-style-koniec-koncesja. 

Wyborcza.pl  (2023),  "Pierwsza  jawna  umowa  koalicyjna  w  historii  Polski".  Tak  doszło  do  jej 
podpisania,  10  November  2023  https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,30388711,w-samo-poludnie-koalicjanci-
podpisza-umowe-co-sie-w-niej-znajdzie.html. 

Wyborcza.pl (2023), CBA wkroczyło do Rządowej Agencji Rezerw Strategicznych. Na miejscu był 
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Wyborcza.pl 
lat,  5 
https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,29941473,tok-fm-dostal-koncesje-na-kolejne-10-lat.html.  

(2023),  TOK  FM  dostał  koncesję  na  kolejne  10 

July  2023 

Wyborcza.pl (2024), Audit of Ziarkiewicz investigations begins. Giertych, Police Chief Szymczyk’s 
brother, Wojtunik, Kramek…, 9 February 2024  
https://lublin.wyborcza.pl/lublin/7,48724,30681345,w-prokuraturze-regionalnej-w-lublinie-zaczal-sie-
audyt-wszystkich.html.  

41 

 
Wyborcza.pl  (2024),  Piotr  Schab  nie  uznaje  decyzji  ministra  Bodnara  o  swoim  odwołaniu,  22 
February 
https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,30727029,oswiadczenia-piotra-
schaba-nie-zostalem-odwolany-z-funkcji.html. 

2024 

42 

 
 
 
Annex II: Country visit to Poland 

The Commission services held virtual meetings in March 2024 with: 

•  Amnesty International 
•  Association of Judges ‘Iustitia’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Iustitia) 
•  Association of Judges ‘Themis’ (Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Polskich Themis) 
•  Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich)  
•  Association  of  Prosecutors  ‘Lex  Super  Omnia’  (Stowarzyszenie  Prorkuratorów  Lex 

Super Omnia)  

•  Batory Foundation (Fundacja Batorego) 
•  Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne) 
•  Chamber of Press Publishers (Izba Wydawców Prasy) 
•  Civic Development Forum (Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju) 
•  Free Courts (Wolne Sądy) 
•  Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Helsinska Fundacja Praw Człowieka) 
•  Lewiatan Confederation (Konfederacja Lewiatan) 
•  Ministry of Culture (Minsiterstwo Kultury) 
•  Ministry of Justice (Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości) 
•  National Chamber of Legal Councillors (Krajowa Izba Radców Prawnych) 
•  National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa) 
•  National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych) 
•  National  Television  and  Radio  Broadcasting  Council  (Krajowa  Rada  Radiofonii  i 

Telewizji) 

•  Office of the Minister of European Affairs (Urząd Ministra ds. Europejskich) 
•  Ombudsperson’s Office (Biuro Rzecznika Praw Obywatelskich) 
•  Polish Media Association (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Mediów)  
•  Prosecutor General’s Office (Prokuratura Generalna) 
•  Society of Journalists (Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie)  
•  Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny)  
•  Supreme Audit Office (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli)  
•  Supreme Bar Council (Naczelna Rada Adwokacka)  
•  Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy)  
•  Watchdog Polska 

* The Commission also met the following organisations in a number of horizontal meetings:  

•  Amnesty International EU 
•  Centre for Democracy and Technology Europe  
•  Centre for European Volunteering 
•  Civil Liberties Union for Europe 
•  Civil Rights Defenders 
•  Civil Society Europe 
•  Culture Action Europe 
•  Democracy Reporting International 

43 

 
 
International Federation for Human Rights 
International Planned Parenthood Federation 
International Press Institute  
Irish Council for Civil Liberties 

•  European Centre for Non-Profit Law 
•  European Civic Forum 
•  European Federation of Journalists  
•  European Partnership for Democracy 
•  European Youth Forum 
•  Free Press Unlimited 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•  JEF Europe 
•  Open Society Foundations 
•  Philanthropy Europe Association 
•  PICUM 
•  Reporters Without Borders 
•  SOLIDAR 
•  Transparency International EU 

44