COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union
Date: 2024-07-24
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU Member State, administrative transparency, corruption, democracy, independence of the judiciary, infringement of EU law, pluralism in the media, political rights, rule of law, whistleblowing

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.7.2024  COM(2024) 800 final/2  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 Rule of Law Report            The rule of law situation in the European Union {SWD(2024) 801 final} - {SWD(2024) 802 final} - {SWD(2024) 803 final} - {SWD(2024) 804 final} - {SWD(2024) 805 final} - {SWD(2024) 806 final} - {SWD(2024) 807 final} - {SWD(2024) 808 final} - {SWD(2024) 809 final} - {SWD(2024) 810 final} - {SWD(2024) 811 final} - {SWD(2024) 812 final} - {SWD(2024) 813 final} - {SWD(2024) 814 final} - {SWD(2024) 815 final} - {SWD(2024) 816 final} - {SWD(2024) 817 final} - {SWD(2024) 818 final} - {SWD(2024) 819 final} - {SWD(2024) 820 final} - {SWD(2024) 821 final} - {SWD(2024) 822 final} - {SWD(2024) 823 final} - {SWD(2024) 824 final} - {SWD(2024) 825 final} - {SWD(2024) 826 final} - {SWD(2024) 827 final} - {SWD(2024) 828 final} - {SWD(2024) 829 final} - {SWD(2024) 830 final} - {SWD(2024) 831 final}  
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  

The  rule  of  law  is  an  essential  safeguard  for  the  well-functioning  of  our  democracies,  the 
protection of individual rights, and hence for the vitality and prosperity of our societies and 
economies.  The  rule  of  law,  democracy  and  fundamental  rights  are  the  foundation  for  the 
European  Union’s  work  to  foster  peace,  prosperity,  competitiveness,  social  cohesion  and 
stability across the continent and around the world. These values, which are common to the 
Member States1,  often come under pressure, with the resilience of democratic societies and 
institutions  constantly  put  to  the  test.  In  the  face  of  great  change  –  whether  the  crises  of 
COVID-19 or the Russian  war of aggression against Ukraine, or the twin green  and digital 
transitions – the EU’s values are as central as ever to the confidence of citizens.  

The EU has increasingly recognised that a proactive approach to promote and defend the rule 
of  law  is  at  the  heart  of  its  success2.  This  is  overall  in  line  with  EU  citizens’  views  and 
expectations. In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74% of respondents think that the EU plays 
an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89% believe that it is important for all EU 
Member States to respect the EU’s core values3.  

Every year since 2020, the Rule of Law Report, by systematically and objectively examining 
rule  of  law  developments  in  all  Member  States,  has  shown  that  the  rule  of  law  matters  to 
citizens and businesses across the EU. Five years on, the preparedness of Member States, and 
of  the  EU  as  a  whole,  to  detect,  prevent  and  address  emerging  challenges  has  greatly 
improved. This  benefits  the resilience of our European democracies and  mutual  trust  in  the 
EU,  as  well  as  the  proper  functioning  of  the  EU’s  single  market,  promoting  a  business 
environment that fosters competitiveness and sustainable growth.  

The  EU  is  committed  to  promoting  the  rule  of  law  as  a  cornerstone  of  human  rights  and 
democracy  globally  and  in  its  neighbourhood4.  Beyond  the  clear  economic  and  security 
benefits of a larger Union a key goal of EU enlargement is to firmly anchor democracy, the 
rule  of  law,  respect  of  fundamental  rights  across  our  continent5.  The  inclusion  of  certain 
enlargement  countries6  in  the  2024  Rule  of  Law  Report,  alongside  Member  States,  will 
support these countries’ reform efforts to achieve irreversible progress on democracy and the 
rule  of  law  ahead  of  accession,  and  to  guarantee  that  high  standards  will  continue  after 
accession.  

1  Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. 
2  Rule of law toolbox at EU level. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/rule_of_law_factsheet_1.pdf. 
3  Special Eurobarometer 553 on Rule of Law (2024). 
4   See EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 JOIN(2020) 5 final. 
5  Commission Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews, COM(2024) 146 final. 
6   Albania,  Montenegro,  North-Macedonia  and  Serbia.  The  selection  reflects  the  progress  made  in  their 

respective accession process or advancement as regards their level of preparedness on rule of law. 

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2.  UPHOLDING  THE  RULE  OF  LAW  FOR  THE  BENEFIT  OF  CITIZENS  AND 

BUSINESSES 

Over the  past  five years, the Commission  has  worked to  build a rule of  law architecture to 
help counter the risk that falling short on the rule of law poses to individual Member States, 
and to the EU as a whole7.  

The  goal  of  this  work  has  been  to  promote  a  rule  of  law  culture,  to  prevent  rule  of  law 
problems from emerging or deepening, and to respond effectively at EU level to serious and 
persistent  challenges.  This  called for  a diversification of the  rule of law instruments that 
could be used at EU level, so that action can be calibrated to best effect8.  

The rule of law architecture  and improved knowledge that has emerged around the  Rule of 
Law Report, along with the reform momentum in Member States, has bolstered mutual trust 
and  shaped  a  better  shared  understanding  of  how  to  cultivate  an  environment  in  which  the 
rule of law can thrive. 

In  addition,  since  2020,  several  new  EU  initiatives  have  raised  common  standards  in  areas 
with  direct  relevance  for  the  rule  of  law,  drawing  on  the  results  of  the  monitoring  in  the 
context  of  this  report.  These  initiatives  will  boost  integrity9  and  step  up  the  fight  against 
corruption10, strengthen transparency and accountability in decision-making processes11, 
boost  capacity  and  the  quality  of  public  administrations  at  all  levels12,  protect  media 
freedom  and  media  pluralism13  both  online  and  offline,  strengthen  independent 
authorities such as national equality bodies14, and promote and protect an enabling civic 
space15  where  citizens  as  well  as  an  active  and  independent  civil  society  benefit  from  the 
right conditions and tools for meaningful participation and engagement.  

7   The 2019 Communication from the Commission on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union 
set out how “if the rule of law is not properly protected in all Member States, the Union’s foundation stone 
of  solidarity,  cohesion,  and  the  trust  necessary  for  mutual  recognition  of  national  decisions  and  the 
functioning of the internal market as a whole, is damaged” (COM (2019) 164). 

8   The European Court of Auditors called for a stronger overview of the different rule of law instruments (ECA 

review on the rule of law reporting). 

9   Agreement  establishing  an  interinstitutional  body  for  ethical  standards  for  members  of  institutions  and 

advisory bodies.  

10    A package on the fight against corruption (JOIN (2023) 12 final) included a proposal for a new Directive on 
combating  corruption  by  criminal  law  COM  (2023)  234  and  a  proposal  from  the  High  Representative  to 
expand the CFSP sanctions toolbox to cover serious acts of corruption (HR(2023)108). 

11   Proposal on Transparency of Interest Representation on behalf of Third Countries (COM(2023) 637). 
12  The  Communication on Enhancing the European Administrative Space (ComPAct)  (COM(2023) 667) sets 
out  a    framework  for  Member  States  to  upskill  public  experts  and  leverage  technology  to  tackle  good 
governance, justice efficiency and corruption challenges. 

13   Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and 
amending  Directive  2010/13/EU  (European  Media  Freedom  Act)  and  Directive  (EU)  2024/1069  on 
protecting  persons  who  engage  in  public  participation  from  manifestly  unfounded  claims  or  abusive  court 
proceedings 
the  2021 
Recommendation  on  the  safety  of  journalists  (C(2021)6650,  16  September  2021)  and  the  proposals 
protecting  journalists  and  human  rights  defenders  who  engage  in  public  participation  from  manifestly 
unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’, C(2022)2428, 27 
April 2022). 

lawsuits  against  public  participation’).  Work  continues  on 

(‘Strategic 

14   Directive  (EU)  2024/1500  on  standards  for  equality  bodies  and  Council  Directive  (EU)  2024/1499  on 

standards for equality bodies. 

15   Commission Recommendation on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil 

society organisations in public policy-making processes (C(2023) 8627). 

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The Rule of Law Report at the centre of the EU rule of law architecture  

In 2019, when setting up the new College of Commissioners, President von der Leyen placed 
the rule of law at the top of the political agenda and set the Rule of Law Report as one of the 
core political guidelines for the current mandate, a commitment she has vowed to strengthen 
further in the next five years.  

Designed as a yearly cycle, the report focuses on prevention by improving awareness of key 
rule  of  law  developments.  In  identifying  the  challenges,  it  seeks  to  help  Member  States  to 
find  solutions  that  protect  the  rule  of  law,  working  with  the  Commission,  other  Member 
States,  and  key  stakeholders  such  as  the  Venice  Commission16.  The  report  has  become  a 
central instrument in the EU rule of law toolbox, and a key reference point at EU and national 
level.  Its  dedicated  monitoring  has  brought  about  a  stronger  common  understanding  of 
developments in each Member State, helping to identify risks, develop possible solutions, and 
target support early on.  

Every year, the report takes stock of the rule of law situation in every Member State and 
the  EU  as  a  whole,  assessing  in  a  structured  and  rigorous  way  significant  national 
developments, both positive and negative, in four key areas: justice, anti-corruption, media 
pluralism  and  freedom;  and  institutional  checks  and  balances.  With  its  transparent  and 
objective methodology, based on recognised rule of law standards, the report ensures fair and 
equal  treatment  of  all  Member  States  while  also  taking  specific  national  contexts  and  legal 
traditions into account.  

Since  2022,  the  report  includes  specific  recommendations  to  Member  States  to  better 
support their efforts in taking forward reforms and to identify where improvements or follow-
up action may be needed. In 2023, almost 65% of the first set of specific recommendations, 
issued in 2022, had been followed up, reflecting a positive reform dynamic across the EU. In 
2024, this trend continued with 68% of the 2023 recommendations followed up17.  

This  shows  that  important  efforts  are  being  made  by  Member  States  to  address  the 
recommendations made in the report. At the same time, depending on their nature and subject 
matter, some recommendations can take longer to be addressed than the annual cycle of these 
reports.  For  example,  this  could  be  due  to  the  need  for  extensive  political  and  stakeholder 
consultations,  or  the  fact  that  electoral  cycles  can  interrupt  the  progress  of  legislation.  The 
report  and  its  recommendations  also  provide  a  focus  for  monitoring  the  situation  on  the 
ground, as well as the results of reforms.  

Dialogue and follow-up to the Rule of Law Report at national and EU level 

The  report  and  its  recommendations  are  the  keystone  for  continuous  dialogue  with  and 
among Member States.  This has included intensified contacts between the Commission and 
Member States, including  national  parliaments whose role as lawmakers and in  holding the 
executive  accountable  is  central  to  upholding  the  rule  of  law.  Regular  meetings  of  the  EU 

16   COM (2020) 580 final. 
17   There was found to be significant progress or full implementation on almost 20% of recommendations, and 

some progress on 50% of the recommendations. No progress was noted on the remainder. 

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Network of Rule of Law contact points serve as a forum for sharing experience on issues of 
common interest highlighted by the rule of law reports18.  

The report has  evolved into a centrepiece for  EU institutions’ work on the rule of law. The 
Annual  Rule  of  Law  dialogue  in  the  Council19  draws  on  the  Commission’s  rule  of  law 
report as its basis, recognised as creating a space for constructive political exchanges among 
Member  States  and  for  sharing  best  practice  and  lessons  learned.  In  2023,  the  Council 
positively  evaluated  its  dialogue  and  looked  to  increasing  its  frequency20.  In  addition,  the 
Justice  Council  continued  to  discuss  topical  rule  of  law  questions  during  each  six-month 
Council  Presidency21.  Rule  of  law  issues  are  also  relevant  to  the  work  of  other  Council 
formations, as shown in the May 2024 discussion on the promotion of a rule of law culture 
through education in the Education Council.  

The European Parliament’s depth of interest has been shown not only in annual debates on 
the Rule of Law Reports, but also in country-specific debates and dedicated public hearings 
on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights22. A new Democracy, Rule of Law and 
Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group offered an additional focus.  

The report also helped to stimulate the wider debate on the rule of law. Examples include the 
second High-level  conference of the Presidents  of the  highest  constitutional jurisdictions  of 
the EU in November 202323. In January 2024, the 13th Direct Dialogue between EU Capital 
Cities  and  the  Commission  was  dedicated  to  the  rule  of  law,  with  participating  mayors 
discussing  the  local  dimension  of  the  four  pillars  of  the  report24.  The  European  Court  of 
Auditors  has  contributed  to  the  further  reflection  on  the  report,  publishing  a  review  of  the 
Commission’s rule of law reporting in February 202425.  

The  report  has  also  acted  as  a  catalyst  for  a  stronger  involvement  of  civil  society  and 
stakeholders in rule of law matters. Civil society organisations and human rights’ defenders 
play an important role in both stimulating and  protecting the values and rights enshrined in 
the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, helping to foster the rule of law on the 
ground. Civil society organisations and professional associations representing groups such as 
judges,  prosecutors  or  journalists  submit  significant  contributions  to  the  report  each  year. 
Civil society organisations have also made valuable recommendations on how to improve the 

18   Network  of  national  contact  points  on  the  rule  of  law  (europa.eu).  Over  the  last  year,  exchanges  on  good 
practices included on Ombudspersons and National Human Rights Institutions, case allocation systems and 
technical support instruments for reforms in both the Member States and enlargement countries. 

19   In this context, the General Affairs Council held a horizontal discussion on general rule of law developments 

in September 2023, and country-specific discussions in October 2023 and January and May 2024. 

20   Evaluation  of  the  Council’s  rule  of  law  dialogue  –  Presidency  conclusions.  The  evaluation  formalised  the 

Rule of Law Report as the basis for the annual dialogue. 

21   In March 2024, the Justice Council discussed the resilience of the justice system when dealing with criminal 
organisations in a state governed by the rule of law. In October 2023, the discussion in the Justice Council 
focused reinforcing the efficiency and quality of national justice system.  

22  European Parliament resolution of 28 February 2024 report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report 
(2023/2113(INI)),  P9_TA(2024)0108,  as  well  as  dedicated  plenary  debates  on  Malta  (19  October  2023), 
Slovakia (17 January 2024), Greece (7 February 2024), and Hungary (24 April 2024). 

23   Participants included the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. 
24  Following the Dialogue, the EU Capital Cities shared a position paper as a contribution to the 2024 Rule of 
Law Report, including a call for more attention to be paid to the local dimension of the rule of law and for 
additional EU funding to be made available for local educational initiatives in this area. 

25   ECA 2024 review on the rule of law reporting. 

4 

 
 
 
preparation  process  for  the  reports,  leading  to  an  extension  of  the  stakeholder  consultation 
period and increased transparency26.  

The Commission has continued to organise national rule of law dialogues together with the 
Fundamental  Rights  Agency,  bringing  together  different  national  stakeholders  at  national 
level and seeking to include them more closely in the follow-up to the Rule of Law Reports. 
They offer valuable opportunities for the Commission and national authorities to gather civil 
society perspectives, convene diverse stakeholders, and explore collaborative approaches for 
implementing the recommendations27.  

Support for rule of law reforms  

Effective  justice  systems,  the  fight  against  corruption,  and  good  lawmaking  all  have  direct 
economic  relevance,  with  a  bearing  on  investment,  growth  and  jobs,  and  therefore  on  the 
well-functioning of the single market. The rule of law and good governance are cornerstones 
for  the  proper  functioning  of  the  internal  market,  as  well  as  for  a  healthy  business 
environment, for the sustainability of public finances, and for effective structural reforms. As 
such, they are part of the European Semester and its country-specific recommendations. 

Several  Member  States  included  specific  rule  of  law  measures  and  related  milestones  and 
targets  in  their  national  recovery  and  resilience  plans  (RRPs),  which  aim  to  address 
relevant  country-specific  recommendations.  This  has  helped  to  galvanise  important  reforms 
in justice systems, the fight against corruption and the overall transparency and inclusiveness 
of  the  law-making  process28.  In  particular,  Member  States  have  adopted  measures  to 
strengthen  judicial  independence,  such  as  by  reforming  the  disciplinary  regime  for 
magistrates,  as  well  as  improving  the  efficiency  of  judicial  systems,  for  instance  through 
reforming  the  structure  of  courts.  In  line  with  commitments  in  their  plans,  some  Member 
States  have  also  stepped  up  the  fight  against  corruption,  for  example  by  strengthening  the 
institutions dedicated to combatting corruption. Member States have also been implementing 
measures  to  improve  the  quality  of  the  legislative  process,  for  instance  introducing  a 
mandatory  use  of  public  consultations  and  impact  assessments.  In  certain  cases,  these  RRP 
commitments were deemed indispensable in protecting the EU’s financial interests, with their 
satisfactory  fulfilment  conditioning  access  to  any  disbursement  under  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience Facility.  

Other  EU  funding  has  also  helped  to  build  the  capacity  of  the  judiciary,  media  and  civil 
society  in  upholding  the  rule  of  law,  alongside  technical  support  and  expertise  for  targeted 
reforms,  notably  through  the  Technical  Support  Instrument,  focusing  on  improving  the 
efficiency and quality of public administration and justice and addressing anti-corruption and 
media pluralism challenges29.  This  has also  been  supported in  Member States through their 
cooperation  with  international  expertise  through  the  Council  of  Europe  and  its  different 
bodies30, as well as through exchanges with practitioners from other Member States.  

An increased capacity to respond to rule of law problems 

26  Notably in advance of country visits 2024 Rule of Law Report - European Commission (europa.eu). 
27  For further information see: National rule of law dialogues - European Commission (europa.eu).  
28  See the Commission Report on the Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility: Moving forward 

(COM(2023) 545). 

29  Other programmes offering important support include the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme, 

and Creative Europe. 

30   Notably the Venice Commission and the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO). 

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As a complement to developing the rule of law toolbox on prevention and on creating rule of 
law  reform  incentives,  the  EU  has  also  increased  its  capacity  to  respond  to  rule  of  law 
problems.  
The  Commission  has  continued  to  exercise  its  role  as  guardian  of  the  EU  treaties31.  Where 
necessary, it has launched infringement procedures to address specific breaches of the rule 
of law. Judicial independence has been at the heart of an important body of case-law that the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (CJEU)  has  developed  in  cases  initiated  by  the 
Commission’s infringement procedures and by requests for preliminary rulings from national 
courts.  

The general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget came into force 
in  2021  to  protect  the  sound  financial  management  of  the  EU  budget  and  the  EU  financial 
interest from breaches of the principle of the rule of law32. The Commission closely monitors 
the situation in all Member States and takes action where needed. In 2022,  the Commission 
initiated a procedure to protect the EU budget from breaches of the principles of the rule of 
law  in  Hungary33.  On  a  proposal  by  the  Commission,  the  Council  decided  on  budgetary 
protective  measures  in  December  202234.  While  the  implementation  of  some  remedial 
measures  put  forward  in  response  to  the  conditionality  procedure  is  ongoing,  important 
shortcomings  remain  and  no  new  measures  were  adopted  by  Hungary  to  remedy  the 
outstanding concerns. Therefore, on 13 December 2023, the Commission concluded that the 
measures adopted by the Council a year earlier should remain in place.  The Commission is 
ready to continue engaging with Hungary to resolve the remaining concerns35.  

Another instrument that has encouraged reforms supporting Member States in the application 
of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  is  the  horizontal  enabling  condition  under  the 
Common Provisions Regulation (Charter HEC). Member States are required to put in place 
effective mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Charter at all stages when implementing 
EU  programmes36.  This  includes  compliance  with  the  Charter  right  to  an  effective  remedy 
and  fair  trial  by  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal.  This  tool  has  demonstrated  its 
effectiveness in practice, as so far, there have been two cases where the Commission released 
EU funding only after the Member States concerned had implemented the reforms considered 
necessary to fulfil the horizontal enabling condition as regards judicial independence.  

Finally,  the  Article  7(1)  TEU  procedure,  which  allows  the  Council  to  determine  the 
existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values and to follow up on such risks, 

31  The  2022  Communication  ‘Enforcing  EU  law  for  a  Europe  that  delivers’  underlined  that  the  EU  is  a 
community of law, based on common values shared by Member States, with applying and enforcing EU law 
and respect for the rule of law at its core (COM(2022) 518).  

32  In January 2024, the Commission reported on the operation of the regulation establishing the general regime 
of  conditionality  and  concluded  that  the  measures  adopted  until  that  moment  had  proved  effective  in 
protecting the EU financial interests (COM (2024) 17 final/2). 

33   On 27 April 2022, the Commission launched for the  first time the step of the procedure established under 

Article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation. 

34  Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022. 
35   Commission  Decision  C(2023)8999  final  of  13  December  2023.  Under  the  Conditionality  Regulation, 
Hungary may submit further remedial proposals and if the Commission considers that the issues have been 
remedied partly or in full, it submits to the Council a proposal to adapt or lift the adopted measures. 

36   The Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) governs three cohesion policy funds, one maritime, fisheries and 
aquaculture fund, and three home affairs funds all under shared management. The Charter HEC also requires 
that Member States have a strong complaints mechanism in place. 

6 

 
 
 
has continued in the Council. Article 7 TEU37 is an exceptional tool that the EU can use to 
address  the  most  serious  rule  of  law  failings  in  a  Member  State.  So  far,  the  procedure  has 
been triggered twice: first by the Commission in respect of Poland in December 201738, and 
then  by  the  European  Parliament  in  respect  of  Hungary  in  September  201839.  Under  both 
procedures,  the  Council  held  several  formal  hearings  and  state  of  play  sessions,  without 
however taking a decision to take either procedure to the next stage40. Following a series of 
positive developments in Poland, the Commission concluded in May 2024 that the conditions 
for  maintaining  the  procedure  no  longer  existed.  The  Polish  authorities  adopted  an  Action 
Plan  to  address  the  issues  of  judicial  independence  covered  in  the  Commission’s  reasoned 
proposal  of  December  2017,  and  which  the  Commission  will  use  in  its  monitoring41. 
Considering  that  there  is  no  longer  a  clear  risk  of  a  serious  breach  of  the  rule  of  law  by 
Poland, the Commission withdrew its reasoned proposal so that the procedure against Poland 
is now closed. Monitoring of the rule of law developments will continue as part of the Rule of 
Law Report.  

Additional  safeguards  exist  also  in  other  instruments.  Under  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility,  the  Commission  closely  monitors  compliance  with  the  milestones,  and  it  can 
suspend part of future payments if a  milestone or target that has  been previously  positively 
assessed  would  be  reversed42.  If  the  reversed  measure  is  relevant  for  the  protection  of  the 
EU’s financial interest, all future payments would be blocked, and could be unblocked only 
upon  re-fulfilment.  Under  the  Common  Provisions  Regulation,  horizontal  and  thematic 
enabling conditions must  be fulfilled throughout  the entire programming period.  If, at  any 
point, a Member State is no longer fulfilling an enabling condition that had been previously 
positively assessed, a new assessment could result in a blocking of EU payments.  

Rule of law at the core of the enlargement process and engagement with external partners 

Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and its people, now 
in its third year, is also a direct attack on EU values. The EU’s resolve to uphold the rule of 
law and the international rules-based order has only increased in the face of Russia’s war of 
aggression.  Safeguarding  and  upholding  our  democratic  institutions  and  values  is  a  shared 
responsibility of Member States and EU institutions. This is all the more important now that 
the EU and its  Member States  are threatened by hostile foreign  actors using disinformation 
and cyber-attacks trying to undermine our democracies and that there is increasing evidence 
of direct foreign interference in our democratic structures43. Countries in the neighbourhood 
and  the  Western  Balkans  are  also  targets  of  attempts  at  interference  by  Russia,  with 
disinformation and anti-democratic and anti-EU rhetoric being a particular concern. 

37  Article 7 TEU sets out the conditions under which the Council may determine that there is a clear risk of a 
serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2; the European Council may determine 
the existence of such a serious and persistent breach; and the Council may then determine the action to be 
taken in terms of suspension of the rights of a Member State under the Treaties. 

38   Proposal for a Council Decision (COM(2017) 835, 20.12.2017). 
39   European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 (2017/2131(INL)). 
40   Seven  formal  hearings  have  taken  place  so  far  as  regards  Hungary.  As  regards  Poland,  six  hearings  took 

place before the withdrawal of the Commission’s proposal. 

41   See also country chapter on Poland (SWD (2024) 821). 
42   Report  from  the  Commission  on  the  implementation  of  the  Recovery  and  Resiliency  Facility:  Moving 

forward (COM(2023) 545). 

43  Cases  include  lawmakers  hacked  ahead  of  elections,  covert  lobbying  via  proxies,  fake  research  issued  to 
whitewash human rights records, and websites purporting to be independent media platforms while covertly 
facilitating  political  interference  campaigns.  See  Communication  from  the  Commission  on  Defence  of 
Democracy, COM(2023)630. 

7 

 
 
 
Consolidating  democratic  structures,  upholding  the  rule  of  law  and  protecting  fundamental 
rights  is  at  the  heart  of  the  EU’s  engagement  with  enlargement  countries.  Credible  and 
sustainable  reforms  in  these  areas  are  crucial  for  progressing  towards  accession.  They  are 
defined  as  the  “fundamentals”  of  EU  enlargement  policy44.  The  revised  enlargement 
methodology  approved  by  the  Council  in  202045  reinforced  the  centrality  of  the 
fundamentals, as the first matters to be addressed in the accession negotiations and the last to 
be  closed,  with  progress  on  the  fundamentals  key  for  overall  progress  in  the  negotiations. 
This  means  they  are  monitored  throughout  the  overall  accession  process  and  determine  the 
momentum of countries on their path towards accession. 

The  Commission’s  annual  Enlargement  package  takes  stock  of  each  country’s  overall 
progress  on  their  path  towards  accession.  Based  on  the  principle  of  own  merits,  only  with 
tangible and continuous progress on the rule of law can the Commission recommend moving 
forward in the negotiations with each country. The rule of law is also an essential element of 
the new Western Balkans Reform and Growth Facility and the Ukraine Facility. To fully 
benefit  from  these  two  unprecedented  support  mechanisms,  countries  need  to  prepare  and 
implement an agreed reform agenda, including concrete steps on the fundamentals. 

As of 2024, as announced by President von der Leyen in the 2023 State of the Union address, 
the Commission decided to extend participation in the Rule of Law Report to complement 
the  work  under  accession  process,  which  remains  the  exclusive  setting  for  enlargement 
negotiations46. Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia now participate in the 
Rule  of  Law  Report  and  the  EU  Network  of  Rule  of  Law  contact  points,  reflecting  the 
progress made in their respective accession process or advancement as regards their level of 
preparedness  on  rule  of  law.  This  approach  will  enable  an  extension  to  other  enlargement 
countries  in  the  future.  The  inclusion  of  these  countries  alongside  Member  States  will 
strengthen  EU  support  for  rule  of  law  reforms,  support  their  accession  process  and  help 
maintain a sustainable pattern of high standards after accession. 

To  ensure  that  reforms  are  implemented  in  practice,  capacity  building  is  crucial.  The  EU 
provides financial support and technical assistance to ensure that reforms are aligned with 
European  standards.  It  encourages  best  practices,  including  consulting  important  legislation 
with the Venice Commission. Peer reviews, training of justice professionals, and  promoting 
institutional cooperation with public administrations in Member States (twinning) have been 
key forms of EU support in enlargement countries.  

The  EU  is  taking  a  strong  and  consistent  approach  in  its  entire  external  action,  at  bilateral, 
regional  and  international  level,  in  order  to  promote  the  rule  of  law  around  the  world. 
Upholding  the  rule  of  law  is  at  the  core  of  the  EU’s  external  engagement  and  one  of  the 
foundations of all EU agreements with international partners.  An independent evaluation of 
the  EU’s  support  to  the  rule  of  law  and  anti-corruption  in  partner  countries  (2010-2021)47 
concluded  that  the  EU  had  succeeded  in  advancing  the  rule  of  law  agenda,  including  in 

44   Together with economic criteria and public administration reform. 
45   Communication from the Commission on ‘Enhancing the accession process - A credible EU perspective for 

the Western Balkans’, COM(2020) 57.  

46   Synergies  between  the  enlargement  process  and  the  Rule of  Law  Report  will  be  ensured  and  there  are  no 
recommendations  issued  for  Enlargement  countries  in  the  Rule  of  Law  Report.  Recommendations  will 
continue to be issued in the annual Enlargement Package, as well as in the context of the other engagement 
foreseen  under  the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreements. The  Rule  of  Law  Report  will  support  the 
implementation of those recommendations. 

47   The  evaluation  was  published  in  December  2022.  This  strategic  evaluation  provides  an  independent  and 
evidence-based assessment of the performance of the EU support to the rule of law in Partner Countries. 

8 

 
 
 
restrictive contexts and in fragile and conflict-affected states. Building on this evaluation,  a 
Global  Team  Europe  Initiative  on  Democracy  has  been  launched  to  work  more  effectively 
and  strategically  on  rule  of  law  support  and  anti-corruption48.  The  EU  also  has  a  clear 
commitment to  tackle corruption at  the global level,  supporting  legal  and policy reforms  to 
build  anti-corruption  institutions  and  oversight  bodies,  and  to  strengthen  civil  society, 
whistleblowers,  human  rights  defenders  and  independent  media  as  watchdogs  against 
corruption. Rule of law related issues, including the right to a fair trial and to due process, the 
fight against corruption, and the independence of the judiciary are regularly raised in human 
rights  dialogues  with  partner  countries,  and  the  EU  targets  support  towards  key  actors 
advancing the rule of law.  

3.  KEY ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW SITUATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL 

As in previous years, this 2024 Rule of Law Report sets out significant common themes and 
trends,  specific  challenges,  and  positive  developments  under  the  four  pillars  of  justice 
systems,  anti-corruption  frameworks,  media  freedom  and  pluralism,  and  other  institutional 
issues related to checks and balances. The examples given draw from the assessments to be 
found  in  the  31  country  chapters,  which  are  an  integral  part  of  this  report  and  provide  the 
detailed context for each Member State and participating enlargement country49. The report 
also  includes  specific  recommendations  to  Member  States50  and  assesses  progress  in 
implementing the specific recommendations issued last year51.   

Methodology of the Rule of Law Report and its recommendations 

The  assessment  in  the  country  chapters  for  each  Member  State  and  enlargement  country 
covered  has  been  prepared  in  line  with  an  established  methodology  used  for  previous 
editions  of  the  report52.  The  country  chapters  rely  on  a  qualitative  assessment 
autonomously  carried  out  by  the  Commission,  focusing  on  a  synthesis  of  significant 
developments  since July  2023. In each country chapter, the analysis focuses in  particular 
on topics where there have been significant developments, or where significant challenges 
have  been  identified  in  the  previous  report  and  persist  during  this  reporting  period.  The 
analysis contains a qualitative assessment of the progress made by Member States towards 
implementing  the  2023  recommendations53.  The  objective  of  the  2024  recommendations 

48  The Team Europe Democracy (TED) is a global thematic Team Europe Initiative (TEI) involving 14 Member 
States launched to promote democracy and human rights worldwide. Accountability and rule of law are key 
priority themes. 

49   The country chapters are available here. 
50   The recommendations are referenced in footnotes throughout this report, listed in the Annex by  order of the 

pillars in the country chapters and included in the individual country chapters.  

51   The assessments included in the country chapters do not prejudge any future assessment under the Recovery 
and  Resilience  Facility  (Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  12  February  2021),  under  the  Common  Provisions 
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24 June 2021) or under the general regime of conditionality for 
the protection of the Union budget (Regulation 2020/2092 of 22 December 2020). 

52   The methodology is available here.  
53   Depending  on  the  progress  made  on  the  various  subparts  of  each  recommendation,  and  whether  the 
recommendations were carried through from the 2022 report, the Commission concluded in each case using 
the  following  categories:  no  (further)  progress,  some  (further)  progress,  significant  progress,  and  full 
implementation.  Depending  on  the  stage  of  progress  and  the  results  achieved,  recommendations  from  the 
2023 Report are carried into this year’s report, with adaptations as necessary. 

9 

 
 
 
continues to be to support Member States in their efforts to take forward reforms54. There 
are  no  recommendations  for  enlargement  countries  in  this  report;  such  recommendations 
are issued in the context of the annual Enlargement Package. 

The  report  is  the  result  of  close  collaboration  with  national  authorities  and  relies  on  a 
variety of national, international and other sources55, as well as the Commission’s own data 
gathering56. Member States and enlargement countries were invited to contribute, provide 
written  input57  and  participate  in  dedicated  country  visits58.  A  targeted  stakeholder 
consultation also provided valuable cross-cutting and country-specific contributions59. The 
Council of Europe also provided an overview of its recent opinions and reports60. Prior to 
the adoption of this report, national authorities have been given the opportunity to provide 
factual updates  to  their country chapter.  In addition,  the Commission  - at political  and at 
technical  level  -  discusses  the  report,  once  published,  with  national  authorities  and 
governments, as well as with national Parliaments. 

3.1  

Justice systems  

Well-functioning,  efficient  and  fully  independent  justice  systems  are  crucial  for  the 
application and enforcement of EU and national law and upholding the rule of law. Judicial 
independence is integral to the task of judicial decision-making and stems from the principle 
of  effective  judicial  protection61.  Independent  judges  and  courts  guarantee  the  fairness  of 
judicial proceedings and the protection of individual rights and are crucial for ensuring that 
justice works to the benefit of citizens and of businesses. They are also essential for judicial 
cooperation  across  the  EU,  which  is  a  key  objective  in  the  area  of  freedom  security  and 
justice62.  Access  to  independent  courts  and  judicial  review  are  fundamental  to  the  rule  of 
law63. 

54  The  principles  on  the  basis  of  which  the  recommendations  were  prepared  are  the  same  as  last  year  (see 
COM(2022)  500,  p.3-4).  The  recommendations  are  without  prejudice  to  any  action  proceedings  the 
Commission may initiate under other legal instruments. 

55   The  sources  used  to  prepare  this  report  include  written  input  received  from  Member  States,  contributions 
received during  the  targeted  stakeholder  consultation,  information produced  by  international  organisations, 
and  the  input  provided  during  country  visits.  These  sources  inform  the  Commission’s  assessment,  but  the 
Commission’s conclusions remain its own responsibility. 

56   In particular, the EU Justice Scoreboard provides comparative and reliable data on the efficiency, quality and 
independence of  justice  systems  in  the  EU  Member  States.  Its  aim  is  to  assist  the  EU  and  Member  States 
improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems.  The Scoreboard also includes indicators for the 
judiciary’s independence relating to the effectiveness of investment protection. The Scoreboard is gradually 
extending to present new data: in 2024, it included data on salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff, 
on  the  length  of  proceedings  in  bribery  cases  and  asset  declaration  systems,  and  the  appointment  and 
dismissal  procedures  for  prosecutors.  The  Scoreboard  is  also  an  important  source  for  European  Semester 
country reports.  

57  Member States’ input can be found here. 
58   Information  on  the  country  visits  can  be  found  in  the  country  chapters.  During  these  country  visits,  held 
online,  the  Commission  spoke  to  Member  States’  national  authorities,  including  judicial  and  independent 
authorities, law enforcement, and other stakeholders, such as journalists’ associations and civil society. 

59  Stakeholder input can be found here. 
60  The Council of Europe input can be found here. 
61   See Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
62   Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union. 
63   On 18 June 2024, the EU announced its decision to adhere to the 2023 OECD Recommendation on Access 
to  Justice  and  people-centred  justice  systems.  The  Commission  joined  the  22  Member  States  that  are 
members of the OECD in drafting the Recommendation and continues to work to take it forward. 

10 

 
 
 
Member  States  must  fully  respect  the  requirements  set  by  EU  law  and  the  case-law  of  the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and should also take European standards into account in 
the  design  of  their  justice  systems.  European  judicial  networks  and  associations64  also  help 
promote and uphold the rule of law, as they work on further developing European standards 
and make important contributions to the preparation of the Rule of Law Report. 

Perceptions of judicial independence  

As  set  out  in  the  2024  EU  Justice  Scoreboard,  Eurobarometer  surveys  conducted  in  2024 
show that the perception of independence among the general  public  and among  companies, 
when  compared  to  2023,  improved  or  remained  stable  in  most  Member  States,  including 
among  countries  which  experienced  systemic  challenges65.  Well-functioning  and  fully 
independent  justice  systems  can  have  a  positive  impact  on  investment  and  are  key  for 
investment protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness. In Denmark, 
Finland,  Austria,  Sweden,  Luxembourg  and  Ireland,  the  level  of  perceived  independence 
continues to be particularly high among the general public or companies (above 75%), while 
it  remains  very  low  in  Croatia,  Poland  and  Bulgaria  (below  30%).  As  regards  enlargement 
countries, Eurobarometer results show relatively low levels of perceived independence.  

Councils for the Judiciary and procedures for the appointment and dismissal of judges as key 
safeguards for judicial independence 

Procedures for the appointment and dismissal of judges and  the powers and composition of 
Councils for the Judiciary are important in safeguarding judicial independence, based on the 
principles established by the CJEU. 

Where  established,  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  are  an  important  contributor  to  judicial 
independence66 and can act as a buffer between the judiciary and the other branches of power 
in  matters  such  as  the  appointment  and  career  of  judges  or  magistrates,  as  well  as  in  the 
management of the justice system67. European standards have been developed by the Council 
of Europe on how the Councils for the Judiciary should be  designed to best safeguard their 
independence, including as regards their composition68. To function effectively, Councils for 
the Judiciary need adequate resources and administrative independence.  

Several  Member  States  advanced  legislative  efforts  to  strengthen  the  independence  and 
the  2023 
effectiveness  of  Councils  for 
recommendations.  In  Luxembourg,  the  National  Council  for  Justice  was  appointed  and  is 
becoming fully operational. In Bulgaria, a constitutional reform changed the composition of 
the Supreme Judicial Council to align it with the European standards. In Hungary, following 

in  some  cases  following 

the  Judiciary, 

64  Such as the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the European Union, the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative 
Jurisdictions  of  the  European  Union,  the  Council  of  Bars  and  Law  Societies  of  Europe  and  Council  of 
Europe European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ). 

65   Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard. 
66   The  CJEU  has  recognised  that  where  a  Council  for  the  Judiciary  participates  in  an  appointment  process 
involving  political  bodies,  it  can  contribute  to  making  that  process  more  objective,  by  circumscribing  the 
discretion of political bodies, provided that it is sufficiently independent from the executive and legislative 
powers and from the body to which it is submitting an opinion. See for example judgment of 2 March 2021, 
AB and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions).  

67   Key  European  standards  have  been  developed  by  the  Council  of  Europe  on  how  the  Councils  for  the 
Judiciary should be established to best safeguard their independence, including on their composition, see in 
particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe.  

68   See in particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe.  

11 

 
 
 
legislative  reform  in  2023,  the  National  Judicial  Council’s  new  competences  allow  to 
effectively  counterbalance  the  powers  of  the  President  of  the  National  Office  for  the 
Judiciary, tasked with the central administration of courts. In other Member States, initiatives 
are  ongoing.  In  Poland,  the  Sejm  adopted  a  law  to  address  the  concerns  related  to  the 
independence  of  the  National  Council  for  the  Judiciary  (NCJ).  In  the  Netherlands,  the 
procedure  for  appointing  members  of  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  and  court  management 
boards is currently being reviewed. In Estonia, discussions are ongoing to reform the Council 
for  the  Administration  of  Courts  and  transfer  more  powers  from  the  executive  to  the 
judiciary.  In  Spain,  following  a  structured  dialogue  with  the  European  Commission  as 
facilitator, an agreement was reached to renew the Council for the Judiciary and to initiate, 
immediately after the renewal, a process in view of adapting the appointment of its judges-
members, taking into account European standards. On the other hand, concerns regarding the 
Council for the Judiciary remain in Slovakia, where no progress has been made to introduce 
safeguards for the dismissal of the members of the Judicial Council and three nominees were 
dismissed before the end of their term.  

As regards enlargement countries, following constitutional amendments in 2022 to strengthen 
judicial  independence  in  Serbia,  the  High  Judicial  Council  and  the  High  Prosecutorial 
Council  were  established  in  their  new  composition.  In  Montenegro,  the  legal  framework 
guaranteeing  the  independence  and  impartiality  of  the  judicial  system  has  been  revised.  In 
Albania,  accountability has been strengthened thanks to vetting of all judges and prosecutors 
but  shortcomings  remain  on  the  appointments  of  non-magistrate  members  of  the  High 
Judicial  Council  and  the  High  Prosecutorial  Council.  In  North  Macedonia  concerns  remain 
regarding the functioning and independence of the Judicial Council. 

The  method  used  for  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  judges  is  important  for  judicial 
independence  and  the  public  perception  of  it.  To  guarantee  judicial  independence,  rules 
governing judicial appointments need to prevent doubts as to the imperviousness of judges to 
external factors, and as to their neutrality as judges69. 

In  several  Member  States,  efforts  to  improve  judicial  appointment  procedures  are  ongoing, 
including  as  a  follow  up  to  the  2023  recommendations.  In  Greece,  legislative  steps  were 
taken to involve the judiciary in the appointments to the highest positions in the judiciary. In 
Ireland,  the  new  Judicial  Appointments  Commission  Act  introduced  a  number  of 
improvements  to  reduce  political  influence  in  the  appointment  and  promotion  of  judges.  In 
Finland, a working group follows up on the report on the assessment and future development 
trends of the court system,  including  the appointment process  for judges.  In  Austria,  recent 
reforms  of  the  appointment  systems  for  the  Supreme  Court  President  and  candidate  judges 
are  being  implemented.  In  Poland,  some  of  the  negative  effects  of  the  contested  justice 
reforms of 2017 regarding the functioning of the ordinary judiciary are being reversed. The 
Government  has  set  out  its  intention  to  involve  the  judiciary  in  all  decisions  related  to 
appointments  to  key  positions  within  the  ordinary  judiciary  and  to  organise  transparent 
appointment procedures based on open competitions: an approach already being implemented 
for  court  presidents  and  vice-presidents.  In  Germany,  discussions  are  ongoing  about  a 
possible  reform  to  enhance  the  resilience  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  In  Malta,  steps  have 
been  announced  to  involve  the  judiciary  in  the  procedure  for  appointment  of  the  Chief 
Justice, as the Government has endorsed a constitutional reform stipulating consultations with 

69   See judgments including those of 15 July 2021, C-791/19 Commission v Poland; of 20 April 2021, C-896/19 
Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru; and of 2 March 2021, C-824/18 AB and Others (Appointment of judges to 
the Supreme Court). 

12 

 
 
 
the incumbent Chief Justice prior to the appointment of a new Chief Justice. Some steps were 
taken  to  ensure  that  the  reform  of  judicial  appointments  in  Slovenia  contains  adequate 
safeguards  for  judicial  independence,  as  the  previously  envisaged  probationary  period 
without prescribed guarantees was abandoned. The 2022 constitutional reform to strengthen 
judicial independence in Serbia is being followed up, including through the application of the 
new appeal procedure to the Constitutional Court concerning judicial appointments.  

Challenges  remain  in  some Member States on  appointments to  high-level  judicial positions 
and for court president positions. In Latvia, a vacancy at the Supreme Court was filled, but no 
steps  were  taken  to  introduce  adequate  safeguards  against  undue  political  influence 
applicable to future appointments.  Similarly, in Austria, no steps have been taken to ensure 
judicial  involvement  in  the  appointments  of  administrative  court  (vice-)  presidents.  In 
Lithuania, there are calls to reinforce some more safeguards on the transparency of judicial 
appointments. In Sweden, while initial steps have been taken in relation to the independence 
of lay judges, no progress was made to ensure that their nomination system safeguards their 
independence. 

In Montenegro, significant  delays in  judicial appointments have had serious  impacts  on the 
judicial system, though  only  the Supreme Court President  now  remains  to  be  appointed.  In 
Serbia, a considerable number of vacancies for judges and prosecutors remains to be filled. In 
North  Macedonia,  appointment  decisions  for  public  prosecutors  and  judges  have  been 
criticised by civil society as lacking explanation and clear criteria. 

Different  aspects  of independence of judges and  courts are  being  addressed in  a number of 
Member  States.  In  Italy,  the  Department  of  Tax  Justice  has  been  established  in  order  to 
increase the independence of the newly established tax courts from the Ministry of Economy 
and  Finance.  In  the  Netherlands,  strengthened  security  measures  are  being  explored  to 
enhance  the  resilience  of  the  justice  system  against  organised  crime.  In  Malta,  work  has 
started  to  address  persistent  concerns  regarding  the  independence  of  specialised  tribunals. 
The  allocation  of  cases  in  courts  also  requires  safeguards  for  judicial  independence  and 
impartiality to prevent any undue interference, which can be ensured in different ways, such 
as the random allocation of cases via a computer algorithm or a pre-defined order. Portugal 
has strengthened transparency in the allocation of cases, as a new electronic system is being 
effectively implemented. In Hungary, the transparency of the case allocation at the Supreme 
Court has improved, while concerns remain regarding the transparency of case allocation in 
lower courts.  

In  a  few  Member  States,  concerns  exist  about  undue  pressure  on  the  judiciary  from 
politicians or the executive level, and there is also evidence of pressure originating from third 
countries. The risk that public statements from governments and politicians may affect public 
trust  in  judicial  independence  has  raised  concerns  in  Slovakia,  Italy  and  Spain.  There  are 
particular  concerns  about  intimidation  of  judges  in  Lithuania,  originating  from  Russian 
courts. As regards enlargement countries, concerns about attempted interference and pressure 
on the judicial system by public officials or politicians remains high in Albania, Serbia, and 
North Macedonia. 

Autonomy and independence of the prosecution service as important topics of reform  

The  organisation  of  national  prosecution  services  varies  across  the  EU  and  there  is  no 
uniform model for all Member States. However, institutional safeguards should guarantee the 
autonomy  of  the  prosecution  service,  ensuring  that  public  prosecutors  can  fulfil  their 

13 

 
 
professional duties without interference70. This is essential for national and EU criminal law, 
as well as for the protection of the financial interests of the EU.  

Reforms  to  strengthen  institutional  safeguards  for  the  prosecution  service,  some  of  them  in 
response  to  2023  recommendations,  have  continued.  In  Poland,  additional  steps  have  been 
taken  to  ensure  the  independence  of  the  prosecution  service  from  the  Government  and  to 
separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General. In Czechia, 
a  reform  of  the  prosecution  service  included  safeguards  for  the  dismissal  of  the  Prosecutor 
General  and  other  chief  prosecutors.  In  Denmark,  the  Government  submitted  a  proposal  to 
Parliament  to  strengthen  the  public  perceptions  of  independence  of  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions  by limiting the maximum mandate for the position.  

In Malta, the transfer of prosecutions from the Police to the Office of the Attorney General is 
progressing71. In Cyprus, the Government is in the process of drafting legislation aiming to 
separate  the  advisory  and  prosecutorial  role  of  the  Law  Office,  which  is  a  positive  step 
towards  strengthening  the  independence  of  the  Prosecution  Service;  plans  have  also  been 
announced to introduce the possibility of review of the decisions of the Attorney General not 
to prosecute or to discontinue proceedings. In Spain, a reform of the statute of the Prosecutor 
General is foreseen, which will exclude persons having been in political office in recent years 
from the office of Prosecutor General  and prevent that the Prosecutor General  acts in  cases 
that affect her or him personally. In Serbia, the laws on the Public Prosecution Office and the 
High  Prosecutorial  Council  allow  prosecutors  to  file  complaints  against  mandatory 
instructions, thus aiming to strengthen prosecutorial autonomy. 

The  power  of  the  executive  to  give  instructions  to  prosecutors  in  individual  cases  has 
continued being a subject of particular attention. In the Netherlands, the debate continues on 
the removal of the executive’s power to give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases. 
In  Germany,  a  proposal  has  been  made  to  introduce  further  safeguards  for  the  use  of  the 
power  of  both  Federal  and  Länder-level  Ministers  of  Justice  to  issue  instructions  to 
prosecutors in individual cases.  

However,  a  number  of  challenges  remain  to  be  addressed,  including  those  covered  in  2023 
recommendations.  The  planned  reform  of  the  prosecution  service  in  Austria  has  not 
advanced, with no political agreement to take forward the proposal by the expert group made 
in 2022. In Slovakia, the power of the Prosecutor General to annul decisions of lower-ranking 
prosecutors  remains  a  concern.  In  2024,  despite  strong  concerns  raised  including  by  the 
European  Commission,  the  Slovak  Government  dissolved  the  Special  Prosecutor’s  Office, 
raising  concerns  both  about  the  immediate  impact  on  cases  and  the  long-term  structural 
impact, putting at risk the efficiency and autonomy of the prosecutions.  

Ensuring  accountability  and  safeguarding  independence  in  disciplinary  procedures  for 
judges and prosecutors 

The  CJEU  has  made  clear  that  disciplinary  procedures  must  not  be  used  as  a  manner  of 
political control on the judiciary72. Safeguards include clear rules that define the conduct that 
qualifies as a disciplinary offence, and the penalties to apply. Disciplinary proceedings need 

70   See Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports concerning prosecutors (CDL-PI(2022)023). 
71   This is also part of Malta’s RRP, milestone 6.3. 
72   The  Court  has  recalled  this  principle  in  cases  referring  to the  disciplinary  chamber of  the  Polish  Supreme 
Court  (Judgment  of  5  June  2023,  C-204/21,  Commission  v  Poland)  and  the  Romanian  Judicial  Inspection 
(Judgments of 11 May 2023, case 817/21 Inspecţia Judiciară, and of 18 May 2021,  C-83/19 etc Asociaţia 
'Forumul Judecătorilor din România' and Others v Inspecţia Judiciară and Others). 

14 

 
 
 
to  be carried out  through  an independent  body, following  procedures which fully safeguard 
the  rights  in  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights,  in  particular  the  rights  of  defence.  Rules 
must also ensure that disciplinary bodies’ decisions can be challenged in Court73.  

judicial 

independence  and  autonomy  of  prosecutors 

The  trend  observed  in  past  Rule  of  Law  reports  continued,  with  steps  towards  increased 
safeguards  for 
in  disciplinary 
proceedings in several Member States. In Slovenia, draft amendments to the Judicial Council 
Act  envisaging  the  overhaul  the  disciplinary  framework  for  judges  have  been  presented.  In 
Czechia, a reform of the disciplinary proceedings is discussed in Parliament. France adopted 
a new law reforming the status of magistrates, including the disciplinary regime. In Malta, a 
discussion on the renewal of the disciplinary regime for prosecutors is expected in the second 
half  of  2024.  In  Poland,  the  disciplinary  regime  applicable  to  judges  was  reformed,  in  line 
with the commitments under Poland’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. 

The  effective  protection  of  judicial  independence  also  requires  a  culture  of  integrity  and 
impartiality.  Several  Member  States  are  implementing  policies  and  practices  to  promote 
integrity within the judiciary. Examples include steps in Croatia and Sweden. In Belgium, the 
Government has decided not to  table a proposal to introduce regular security checks by the 
National Security Agency on all judges. In North Macedonia, Codes of ethics are in place for 
both prosecutors and judges.  

Efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of justice  

The efficiency of justice systems  is  a necessary  condition  for the protection  of rights,  legal 
certainty  and  public  confidence  in  the  rule  of  law.  An  efficient  justice  system  manages  its 
caseload  and  delivers  decisions  without  undue  delay.  Excessively  long  proceedings  and 
backlogs undermine the trust of citizens and businesses in national justice systems.  

In  several  Member  States,  new  measures  are  in  place  to  improve  efficiency.  Spain  has 
adopted new measures to enhance the efficiency of the justice system.  A trend in France to 
decrease  the  length  of  court  proceedings  will  be  further  supported  by  new  legislation 
promoting  the  amicable  settlement  of  disputes.  In  Czechia,  efficiency  has  continued  to 
improve,  in  particular  regarding  the  length  of  administrative  cases,  while  Serbia  has  seen  a 
positive trend as regards reducing the length of civil, commercial and criminal cases. 

Despite  some  steps,  some  Member  States  still  face  long-standing  challenges  as  regards  the 
efficiency of justice systems. Concerns remain in Malta,  Croatia and Greece, though they all 
took  new  measures  in  an  attempt  to  reduce  the  length  of  proceedings.  A  similar  pattern  in 
Portugal  is  compounded  by  concerns  that  general  criminal  procedure  legislation  is  not 
tailored to efficiently deal with complex criminal proceedings In Italy, the length of judicial 
proceedings  is  continuing  its  positive  trend  but  remains  a  serious  challenge.  Regarding 
enlargement  countries,  the  length  of  proceedings  for  different  kinds  of  cases  remains  a 
challenge in Albania and North Macedonia. 

An effective justice system needs adequate resources, including the necessary investments in 
infrastructure,  and  well  qualified,  trained  and  adequately  paid  staff.  A  number  of  Member 
States have recognised this through additional resources to strengthen the resilience of justice 
systems,  including  through  their  national  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plans.  In  Denmark, 
France, Sweden and Finland, resources for the justice system have been increased. In Croatia, 
significant  progress  was  achieved  to  step  up  remuneration  and  legislation  to  set  objective 
remuneration criteria is expected. In Romania, the High Court of Cassation and Justice took 

73   Judgment of 25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, para. 67. 

15 

 
 
 
measures  to  address  salary  inequalities  in  the  judiciary.  Latvia  saw  substantial  increases  in 
remuneration for judges and court employees, though turnover problems remain for judicial 
assistants.  

In other Member States, levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to 
shortages  and  vacancies  which  are  difficult  to  fill.  In  Slovenia,  some  steps  were  made  to 
increase  the  level  of  remuneration  of  judges  and  state  prosecutors,  largely  unchanged  since 
2012,  for  which  the  Government  proposed  a  partial  increase  and  the  Constitutional  Court 
prescribed  how  its  judgment  should  be  implemented.  In  Germany,  while  some  steps  have 
been taken to supplement the overall resources for the judiciary, the level of remuneration of 
judges  remains  a  challenge.  In  Czechia,  the  method  for  determining  judges’  salaries  was 
modified  to  reduce  salary  increases,  and  salaries  of  court  and  prosecution  assistant  staff 
remain an issue. In the Netherlands, specific recommendations to address staff shortages and 
workload concerns among the judiciary are being discussed. In Lithuania, a reform of judicial 
salaries  is  positively  assessed  by  judges,  while  concerns  remain  as  to  the  remuneration  of 
court staff and prosecutors. Cyprus, Portugal and Romania experience difficulties to recruit in 
different  areas  of  the  judicial  system.  In  Hungary,  the  level  of  remuneration  of  judges  and 
court  staff  has  further  deteriorated  due  to  high  inflation.  The  enlargement  countries  face 
similar resources constraints. Serbia is implementing a Strategy on Human Resources in the 
Judiciary  2022-2026,  but  the  low  attractiveness  of  judicial  careers  poses  a  challenge.  The 
same challenge has not been addressed by the amendments to the laws on salaries of judges 
and prosecutors in North Macedonia.  

As regards staff levels, in Spain, new posts for judges have been established, while in  Italy 
significant improvements were made in recruitment of magistrates and administrative staff. In 
Belgium providing adequate resources for the justice system has further progressed, as a tool 
measuring workload confirms structural  resource deficiencies. In Albania, overall shortages 
of resources of the justice system risk negatively affecting the quality of justice.  

Investing in the digitalisation can strengthen justice systems and make them more accessible, 
resilient and ready to  face current  and  future  challenges.  New digitalisation initiatives  have 
been put place in Spain, Croatia, Italy, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Malta and Romania. 
In  Bulgaria,  a  new  draft  law  envisages  changes  to  the  Judicial  System  Act  related  to  the 
digitalisation  of  justice.  North  Macedonia,  Serbia  and  Albania  are  taking  steps  in  the 
digitalisation of case management, although shortcomings remain. 

Access to justice and the role of lawyers in the justice system  

Lawyers and bar associations play a key role in guaranteeing access to justice, ensuring the 
protection of fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial. In several Member States, 
steps  are  being  taken  to  ensure  reliable  legal  aid  schemes  and  access  to  a  lawyer.  In 
Luxembourg,  a  reform  to  make  legal  aid  more  accessible  was  adopted.  In  Czechia  and  in 
Spain,  provisions  on  legal  aid  have  been  amended  to  broaden  access.  In  Ireland,  there  was 
some  progress  on  reducing  the  litigation  costs  and  a  general  review  of  the  Civil  Legal  Aid 
scheme is underway. In Lithuania, the reform of the legal aid system is progressing, and the 
conditions  for  the  participation  of  legal  aid  providers  have  been  improved.  In  Slovakia, 
amendments  to  increase  the  access  to  free  legal  aid  are  under  preparation.  In  Denmark,  a 
review  of  the  legal  aid  system  has  been  ongoing.  In  Finland,  a  National  Legal  Services 
Authority, which was established to provide more consistent and high-quality legal aid, will 
be  operational  in  2025.  Beyond  the  EU,  Albania  has  a  comprehensive  legal  framework  in 
place for legal aid and its number of beneficiaries has increased.  

16 

 
 
Some Member States still see challenges. In Bulgaria, the Constitutional Court declared that 
the law on mandatory judicial mediation, which was set to enter fully into force in July 2024, 
was unconstitutional.  In  Hungary,  concerns remain  as regards the effectiveness  of the legal 
aid scheme in both civil and criminal cases. Certain challenges have also been identified in 
Austria linked to high court fees and access to legal advice in administrative cases, with some 
steps taken to address the latter.  

An effective justice system requires that lawyers be free to pursue their activities of advising 
and representing their clients. In Czechia, an amendment enhancing the protection of attorney 
confidentiality  is  in  Parliament.  On  the  other  hand,  challenges  to  the  legal  professional 
privilege  have  been  expressed  from  the  legal  profession  in  Belgium  and  respect  for  their 
legally recognised rights and privileges  in Romania. In Lithuania, lawyers continue to raise 
concerns regarding the respect for professional secrecy. 

3.2   Anti-corruption framework  

Corruption damages the delivery of public services and, it corrodes citizens’ and businesses’ 
trust in public institutions, creating a sense of unfairness and injustice consequently damaging 
the rule of law. A comprehensive approach to fighting corruption relies on a combination of 
preventive  and  punitive  measures.  This  requires  a  robust  legal  and  institutional  framework, 
effective  investigations,  and  prosecutions  and  a  clear  political  will  to  enforce  the  anti-
corruption framework.  It also  needs  comprehensive and  effective measures to  minimise the 
space for corruption and foster integrity.  

Corruption perceptions across the EU 

The results of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)74 show that more than half of the 20 
countries ranking best internationally are EU Member States75. However, differences remain 
across  Member  States,  also  in  terms  of  the  trends  in  recent  years76.  Enlargement  countries 
score below the average77. 
The  2024  Eurobarometer  surveys  on  corruption78  shows  that  corruption  remains  a  serious 
concern for citizens and businesses in the EU. About 7 in 10 Europeans (68%) believe that 
corruption is widespread in their country and over 4 in 10 Europeans (41%) consider that the 
level  of  corruption  has  increased  in  their  country.  57%  of  citizens  think  that  their 
government’s  efforts  to  combat  corruption  are  not  effective.  In  addition,  most  European 
companies (65%) consider that the problem of corruption is widespread in their country and 
half (51%) think that it is unlikely that corrupt people or businesses in their country would be 
caught, or reported to the police or prosecutors. 

National anti-corruption strategies and their implementation 

74   Transparency International (2024) https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022  
75   11  Member  States  are  in  the  top  20,  two  more  than  the  previous  year.  Three  Member  States  (Denmark, 
Finland  and  Sweden)  score  80/100  or  above  on  the  index,  with  others  (the  Netherlands,  Germany, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Estonia, Belgium, Austria and France) score above 70/100. The EU average is (to be 
calculated)/100. 

76   Scores below 50 can be seen in Romania (46), Bulgaria (45), and Hungary (42). 
77   Scores below 50 can be seen in Montenegro (45), North Macedonia (40), Albania (36), and Serbia (36) 
78   Special  Eurobarometer  548  on  Corruption  (2024)  &  Flash  Eurobarometer  543  on  Businesses’  attitudes 
towards corruption in the EU (2024). The previous data sets are the Special Eurobarometer 534 (2023) and 
the Flash Eurobarometer 524 (2023).  

17 

 
 
 
The importance of maintaining effective anti-corruption policies is recognised in international 
law79. National  anti-corruption strategies can  ensure that countries follow  a comprehensive, 
coherent  and integrated approach, allowing action against corruption to be mainstreamed in 
all relevant policy sectors. Almost all Member States currently have national anti-corruption 
strategies  in  place,  although  with  varying  comprehensiveness.  Since  July  2023,  Hungary, 
Greece, Italy, Sweden and Austria have updated their national strategies and/or action plans80 
and  Portugal  adopted  an  anti-corruption  agenda.  France,  Finland  and  Bulgaria  have  started 
the  process  of  revising  their  existing  strategy,  and  preparatory  revision  processes  are 
advancing in Slovenia, while still pending in Germany. In Estonia, the implementation of the 
anti-corruption  action  plan  continues  in  an  efficient  and  timely  manner.  In  Malta,  the 
monitoring  of  the  implementation  of  the  national  anti-fraud  and  corruption  strategy 
encountered some delays.  

As regards enlargement countries, Montenegro has adopted and Serbia is currently finalising 
their  respective  anti-corruption  strategies.  In  North  Macedonia,  the  slow  implementation  of 
the  measures  committed  to  in  its  anti-corruption  strategy  points  to  a  lack  of  political 
commitment,  while  in  Albania,  implementation  of  the  current  strategy  is  on  track  but  with 
limited attention to high-risk sectors. 

Strengthening the capacity of institutions and the legal framework to combat corruption  

A  robust  legal  and  administrative  anti-corruption  framework81  and  strong  and  independent 
institutions to enforce the rules are necessary to effectively combat corruption. In general, all 
Member  States  and  enlargement  countries  included  in  this  report  have  strong  legal 
frameworks  in  place,  although  some  specific  gaps  remain.  In  line  with  the  2023 
recommendations,  several  Member  States  have  taken  forward  criminal  law  reforms  to 
strengthen the fight against corruption. Austria extended bribery offences to cover candidates 
for  public  office,  and  included  additional  sanctions  for  corruption  offences,  including  the 
prohibition  to  hold  public  office.  Greece  reinforced  provisions  on  criminal  liability  for 
bribery and Croatia strengthened the legislation on bribery of public officials, extending the 
scope  of  liability  of  legal  persons,  and  raising  sanction  levels  for  legal  persons.  Germany 
adopted  a  law  strengthening  provisions  on  trading  in  influence  involving  members  of 
Parliament. In other Member States some gaps remain, notably as regards foreign bribery. In 
Sweden, the legal definitions of foreign bribery, which remain limited, are being analysed by 
a committee of inquiry, and revision of the foreign bribery offence is still pending in Finland. 

In  some  Member  States,  however,  certain  criminal  law  reforms  risk  undermining  the  fight 
against  corruption.  In  Slovakia,  a  recent  criminal  law  reform  raises  a  number  of  serious 
concerns  and  has  recently  been  subject  to  further  amendment.  Lowering  the  sanctions  for 

79   The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires State Parties, in accordance with the 
fundamental principles of their legal systems, to develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated 
anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, 
proper  management  of  public  affairs  and  public  property,  integrity,  transparency  and  accountability.  All 
Member States and the EU are parties to the  Convention. See also The Kuala  Lumpur  Statement on Anti-
Corruption Strategies. 

80   Currently 20 Member States have dedicated anti-corruption strategies or programmes; almost all others have 

anti-corruption components in other national strategies and action plans. 

81   International  standards  are  primarily  the  UNCAC;  the  Council  of  Europe’s  Criminal  Law  Convention  on 
Corruption and its Civil Law Convention on Corruption; and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery 
of  Foreign  Public  Officials  in  International  Business  Transactions.  At  EU  level,  on  3  May  2023,  the 
Commission  proposed  a  Directive  on  combating  corruption,  COM  (2023)  234  final  which  aims  to  update 
and strengthen the EU criminal justice framework. 

18 

 
 
 
corruption  and  corruption-related  crimes,  shortening  time  limitation  periods  applying  to 
corruption crimes, and abolishing the Special Prosecution Office all risk to weaken the fight 
against corruption.  In  Italy, a new law repealing the offence of abuse of office and limiting 
the scope of the offence of trading in influence could have implications for the detection and 
investigation  of  fraud  and  corruption.  As  regards  the  enlargement  countries,  in  North 
Macedonia,  recent  criminal  code  amendments  weakened  the  legal  framework,  negatively 
affecting the prosecution of corruption, especially in high-level corruption- cases. 

Important developments  took place to improve the anti-corruption institutional landscape in 
some Member States. In Bulgaria, the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal 
Assets Forfeiture was divided into two separate bodies (the Anti-Corruption Commission and 
the  Commission  for  Illegal  Assets  Forfeiture)  in  view  of  advancing  anti-corruption 
institutional framework, as envisaged in Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. Poland is 
planning  to  dismantle  its  Central  Anti-Corruption  Bureau  and  transfer  its  resources  and 
competences  to  the  Police’s  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation,  with  a  view  to  addressing 
previous concerns about interference.  

The  capacity  of  law  enforcement  services,  prosecution  authorities,  and  the  judiciary  more 
generally, to enforce anti-corruption criminal law provisions is essential to effectively combat 
corruption.  Specialisation,  expertise  and  adequate  staffing  all  need  to  keep  up  with  the 
growing  complexity  of  corruption  crimes.  In  Cyprus,  Malta  and  Portugal,  steps  have  been 
taken to increase resources of investigative authorities while Luxembourg is planning to do 
so. On the other hand, concerns about both the overall level of resources, and the degree of 
specialisation,  have  been  voiced  in  respect  of  Slovakia  and  Ireland.  Similar  shortfalls  for 
specialised  anti-corruption  prosecution  services  have  been  highlighted  in  Montenegro  and 
Serbia.  

Cooperation  between  law  enforcement  authorities  and  other  agencies,  such  as  financial 
intelligence units and tax, audit, competition and other administrative authorities, as well as 
access to information and the interconnection of databases  and registries is key for fighting 
corruption. Cooperation is being strengthened in Spain, with a dedicated agreement between 
the prosecution anti-fraud agencies. In Italy, cooperation between the various national police 
and  prosecution  services,  the  tax  authorities  and  the  national  anti-corruption  authority  is 
effective, and important investments in IT tools and interoperability benefit law enforcement 
authorities.  In  Ireland,  a  forum  of  senior  representatives  meets  regularly  to  facilitate  inter-
agency  coordination  and  information  sharing  among  police  and  prosecution  services,  and 
other national services active in preventing and fighting corruption. In other Member States, 
challenges have been noted. The Audit Office in Cyprus reports that some public authorities 
under  audit  (including  the  police  in  some  cases)  do  not  provide  relevant  information.  In 
Hungary, the new Integrity Authority faces some obstacles in practice, particularly where it 
needs to rely on cooperation with other public bodies. 

The  cooperation  between  national  authorities  and  the  European  Public  Prosecutor’s  Office 
(EPPO) is reported to be overall good in the participating Member States. Poland and Sweden 
joined  the  EPPO  in  202482.  Preparations  for  the  EPPO  to  become  operational  in  both 
countries  will  be  concluded  before  the  end  of  2024.  Beyond  the  EU,  Albania,  Montenegro 
and North Macedonia have concluded working arrangements with the EPPO, while working 
arrangements with the EPPO are yet to be concluded with Serbia.  

82   Poland joined on 29 February and Sweden on 17 July. 

19 

 
 
 
Removing  obstacles  to  criminal  investigations  and  prosecution  and  improving  the  track 
record for high-level corruption  

According to the Special Eurobarometer on citizens’ attitudes towards corruption, around two 
thirds  of  Europeans  (65%)  think  that  high-level  corruption  cases  are  not  pursued 
sufficiently83.  Effective  investigation  and  prosecution  of  corruption  cases  can  be  obstructed 
by  shortcomings  in  law,  such  as  excessively  cumbersome  or  unclear  procedures  to  lift 
immunities or short time limitation periods. These obstacles can be particularly harmful for 
complex corruption cases where time is often needed to build a case. In Romania, a delayed 
legislative  response  on  issues  regarding  the  statute  of  limitations  continued  to  result  in  the 
closing  of  many  corruption  cases  and  the  annulment  of  convictions.  In  Italy,  the  proposed 
changes  to  the  statute  of  limitations  could  reduce  the  time  available  to  conduct  judicial 
proceedings  for  criminal  offences,  including  in  corruption  cases.  In  Slovenia,  recent 
amendments  to  the  Criminal  Procedural  Code  limit  the  possibilities  to  use  certain 
investigative  measures  and  could  possibly  make  effective  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
corruption more difficult.  

The 2023 Rule of Law report noted that some Member States needed reforms to reduce the 
length of criminal  proceedings to  improve the track record of final  judgments,  in  particular 
for  high-level  corruption  cases.  In  Croatia,  steps  were  taken  to  make  the  investigation  and 
prosecution of corruption offences more efficient, while a revision of the Criminal Procedure 
Code and the Law on the specialised anti-corruption prosecution office remain outstanding. 
In Czechia, high-level corruption cases also remain a point of attention due to delays in some 
proceedings.  In Spain, a reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which could also increase 
efficiency in handling high-level corruption cases, is still pending.  

Some Member States continue to consolidate their track record of investigating, prosecuting 
and  sanctioning  corruption,  including  in  high-level  cases84.  Austria,  Latvia,  and  Romania, 
saw  continued  effective  investigation  of  high-level  corruption.  New  impetus  was  given  to 
investigating high-level corruption cases in Poland, with several large-scale corruption cases 
now open. Significant results continue to be achieved in prosecuting and adjudicating high-
level corruption offences in France. Greece made efforts to improve its track record, also by 
addressing  challenges  identified  in  collecting  corruption  statistics,  including  on  high-level 
corruption.  In  Slovenia,  first  instance  court  judgments  in  corruption  cases  increased 
considerably  and  the  number  of  convictions  almost  doubled,  while  investigations  into 
possible high-level political influence in police decision-making are ongoing. 

In  other  Member  States,  a  robust  track  record  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  high-
level  corruption  cases,  with  dissuasive  sanctions  and  final  judgments,  remains  to  be 
established. This is the case, for example, in Bulgaria and Malta. In Slovakia, a robust track 
record against high-level corruption is hampered by a continued lack of coordination among 
corruption  investigators  and  prosecutors  as  well  as  the  Prosecutor  General’s  recourse  to 
powers  to  annul  corruption  investigations  and  prosecutions.  In  Hungary,  some  high-level 
corruption cases have reached the indictment stage, but convictions remain rare in such cases 
and  the  lack  of  a  robust  track  record  of  investigations  and  prosecutions  of  corruption 
allegations  concerning  high-level  officials  and  their  immediate  circle  remains  a  serious 
concern.  

83  Special Eurobarometer 548 on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024). 
84   As noted in the 2020 Rule of Law report, the lack of uniform, up to date and consolidated statistics across all 
Member  States  makes  it  difficult  to  track  the  comparative  success  of  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of 
corruption offences. The assessment is based on the data provided by Member States. 

20 

 
 
 
In  Montenegro,  the  track  record  of  investigations  and  prosecutions  in  cases  of  high-level 
corruption  is  stable,  but  the  lack  of  trials  and  final  decisions  contributes  to  a  perception  of 
impunity.  In  North  Macedonia  resource  constraints  and  a  lack  of  cooperation  between 
national  authorities  hamper  the  effective  prosecution  of  corruption  and  hinder  the 
establishment of a robust track-record of high-level corruption cases. In Albania, the number 
of persons investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for corruption has been increasing, but a 
recent amnesty law raises concerns. In Serbia, the number of final convictions in high-level 
corruption cases increased in the past year, but further improvements are needed to establish 
a solid track record on investigations, indictments and final convictions.  

Fighting corruption as an enabler of organised crime 

Corruption  facilitates  criminal  activity  and  targets  both  the  private  and  public  sectors. 
Addressing  corruption  risks  related  to  infiltration  and  undue  influence  by  organised  crime 
into  the  public  service,  law  enforcement  and  the  judiciary  is  an  increasing  priority  for  the 
authorities in several Member States. In the Netherlands, preventing infiltration of organised 
crime  groups  in  the  civil  service  and  police  through  corruption  is  a  strategic  priority.  A 
programme  is  ongoing  since  2020  on  combating  subversive  organised  crime,  with  risk 
assessments initiated in several sectors (including ports and local authorities) and measures to 
address vulnerabilities. Sweden is targeting work on the risk areas and enablers of organised 
crime  infiltration.  Belgium  is  taking  a  variety  of  measures  to  address  corruption  linked  to 
drugs  trafficking  and  organised  crime  groups,  which  is  recognised  as  an  important 
phenomenon. 

Fostering integrity in the public sector and preventing conflicts of interests 

Transparent  and  accountable  governance  and  integrity  frameworks  are  the  best  protection 
against corruption. This is why effective anti-corruption approaches often build on measures 
to enhance transparency, ethics and integrity, as well as regulating areas such as conflict of 
interest, lobbying and ‘revolving doors’85. 

Conflicts  of  interest  arise  when  a  public  official  has  a  private  or  professional  interest  that 
could interfere with the impartial and objective performance of their duties86. Some Member 
States  have  taken  further  steps  to  regulate  conflicts  of  interests,  also  following  the  2023 
recommendations.  In  Czechia,  legislation  was  adopted  to  broaden  the  conflict  of  interest 
system, including a total ban on media ownership for elected officials, though online media 
remains  outside  the  scope  of  this  legislation.  In  Slovenia,  legislation  on  supervision  of 
conflict  of  interest  and  incompatibility  of  office  is  being  reviewed.  Challenges  remain  in 
other Member States. In Italy, comprehensive legislation on conflict of interest for political 
office holders is still pending.  In Spain, no further steps have been taken to improve rules on 
conflicts  of  interest  for  civil  servants,  despite  ongoing  work  since  2021.  Regarding 
enlargement  countries,  in  Albania  rules  on  conflict  of  interest  for  public  officials  are 
incomplete  and  not  aligned  with  European  standards  and  North  Macedonia  would  need  to 
strengthen the system for violations of the rules on conflicts of interest.  

Senior government officials and Members of Parliament are often subject to specific integrity 
rules  and  many  Member  States  have  codes  of  conduct  in  place.  It  is  important  that  the 
practical  implementation  of  these  rules  is  subject  to  regular  verification  and  evaluation.  In 
Belgium, the ministerial Code of Conduct for federal public office holders was extended to 

85   JOIN (2023) 12 final, p. 4. 
86   See Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2000)10 on codes of conduct for public officials. 

21 

 
 
 
cover all members of ministerial private offices. In Estonia, digital tools are being developed 
and deployed to ensure a better implementation of the existing rules on integrity.  In Greece, 
work  on  developing  codes  of  conduct  for  members  of  Parliament  and  members  of 
Government continued.  

In  Portugal,  a  new  Code  of  Conduct  applicable  to  the  Government  and  high-level  officials 
was also adopted, which explicitly refers to the possibility of dismissal in case of violation of 
the  Code  and  foresees  the  creation  of  a  corruption  risk  prevention  plan.  In  other  Member 
States, gaps remain. In Bulgaria, a working group was established to draft a code of conduct 
for  top  executive  functions,  given  the  serious  gaps  identified.  In  Finland,  there  is  still  no 
dedicated Code of Conduct for Ministers. In Montenegro, while numerous institutions have 
specific codes of conduct, the Government’s Code is ineffective, with the adoption of a law 
with disciplinary penalties pending.  

Ensuring transparent lobbying and regulating ‘revolving doors’ 

To be a legitimate act of political participation, lobbying needs to be accompanied by strong 
requirements  for  transparency  and  integrity  to  support  accountability  and  inclusiveness  in 
decision-making and restrict undue and covert influence87. Poorly regulated lobbying can also 
open doors for foreign interference. 

Some Member States have revised their lobbying transparency rules,  also in line with 2023 
recommendations.  Stricter  rules  for  Germany’s  lobbying  register  came  into  force,  with 
extended  transparency  requirements  and  some  steps  were  taken  to  introduce  a  legislative 
footprint.  In  Croatia,  a  new  law  introduced  an  electronic  lobby  register,  restrictions  on 
lobbying  activities  and  a  set  of  rules  on  the  verification,  enforcement  and  penalties.  In 
Finland,  new  legal  provisions  require  the  registration  of  lobbying  activities  with  a  new 
transparency  register.  In  Cyprus,  Ireland,  Lithuania  and  Latvia,  new  lobbying  provisions 
entered into force or are being implemented, while discussions on new legislation continued 
in Belgium,  Czechia and Portugal.  Czechia and Portugal.  

Further improvements are necessary in other Member States. In France, while guidelines on a 
lobbyists’ register have entered into force and further drafts are before Parliament, concerns 
remain  on  the  disclosure  of  lobbying  meetings  by  top-ranking  officials.    Luxembourg  has 
revised the code of conduct for parliamentarians to increase transparency, but the register still 
provides  limited  details.  Dedicated  regulation  on  lobbying  is  still  missing  in  Slovakia  and 
Italy,  and  existing  legislation  could  be  improved  in  Austria,  Poland,  Hungary  and  the 
Netherlands.  In  Romania,  rules  on  lobbying  for  members  of  Parliament  are  still  missing, 
while there have been some developments on the enforcement of lobbying rules for Members 
of Government.  

The regulation and enforcement on ‘revolving doors’ between public and private functions to 
address  potential  conflicts  of  interest  continues  to  be  an  area  of  attention.  There  are  now 
stricter  post-employment  rules  for  high-level  officials  and  higher  transparency  standards  in 
place  in  Germany.  In  Portugal,  new  legislation  on  revolving  doors  introduced  harsher 
sanctions.  In  Sweden,  the  post-employment  rules  for  top  executive  functions  in  the 
government  were  evaluated,  with  suggested  improvements.  Discussions  on  introducing  or 
revising existing rules on revolving doors are progressing in Finland and the Netherlands, and 

87   OECD (2021) Lobbying in the 21st century.  OECD (2010), Recommendation of the Council on Principles 
for  Transparency  and  Integrity  in  Lobbying;  Council  of  Europe  standards  on  lobbying  transparency, 
Recommendation  CM/Rec(2017)2,  OECD  (2024)  Recommendation  on  transparency  and  integrity  in 
lobbying and influence. 

22 

 
 
 
guidelines are being developed in Italy. In other Member States, progress has been slower. In 
Hungary, post-employment restrictions and cooling-off periods are fragmented and limited in 
scope, but  there are plans  to  legislate in  this  area in  2025. In Denmark, no steps have been 
taken to  introduce rules on revolving doors for ministers.  In Estonia, specific guidelines on 
revolving  doors  together  with  possible  instructions  on  how  to  mitigate  the  risks  currently 
being developed by the Public Ethical Council are expected in 2024. 

In North Macedonia, while the legal framework and lobbying registers are in place, there are 
no registered lobbyists yet. In Montenegro, new legislation on lobbying was recently adopted.  

Asset and interest disclosure 

Asset  and  interest  declarations  by  public  officials  support  public  sector  transparency  and 
accountability  and  are  important  tools  to  promote  integrity  and  prevent  corruption.  Most 
Member  States  have  rules  to  ensure  that  such  disclosures  apply  to  those  with  political  and 
executive  power.  However,  there  are  wide  variations  in  the  scope,  transparency  and 
accessibility  of  disclosed  information,  as  well  as  in  the  effectiveness  of  verification  and 
enforcement.  

Positive developments  are noted in  some Member States,  also  addressing issues covered in 
the 2023 recommendations. In Greece, implementation of the new law on asset declarations 
is on track with a significant percentage of verifications completed, also thanks to an upgrade 
of  the  dedicated  electronic  platform.  In  Cyprus,  the  judiciary  introduced  its  own  regulatory 
framework  on  asset  disclosure,  and  all  judges  now  file  their  asset  declarations  with  the 
Constitutional  Court.  In  Portugal, the reform  to entrust  monitoring and verification of  asset 
declarations of political and senior public officials to the Transparency Entity established in 
2019 entered into force.  

In  other  Member  States,  challenges  remain.  In  Belgium,  the  system  for  asset  declarations 
does  not  ensure  adequate  verification  and  transparency,  with  checks  only  in  the  context  of 
criminal  investigations.  In  Denmark,  no  progress  has  been  made  on  asset  declarations 
submitted  by  those  with  top  executive  functions,  and  there  is  a  lack  of  verification  and 
monitoring. In Luxembourg, there is still no formal verification system to check the accuracy 
of asset declarations. Hungary has yet to take further steps to improve the asset declaration 
system, including as regards oversight. In Ireland, the digitalisation of asset declarations has 
not progressed.  In the enlargement countries, while in Albania and Serbia asset declaration 
rules  cover  a  relatively  broad  range  of  officials,  there  are  shortcomings  in  effective 
verification and enforcement. 

Whistleblower protection 

The  protection  of  whistleblowers  plays  an  essential  role  in  the  detection  and  prevention  of 
corruption. The transposition of the EU Directive on whistleblower protection88 has resulted 
in revised or new legislation in many Member States, as noted in last year’s report. Since July 
2023, progress on laws on the protection of whistleblowers has been made in several Member 
States89.  

However,  there  are  still  major  obstacles  to  reporting  corruption  cases  in  practice  with  just 
43%  of  Europeans  knowing  where  to  report  a  case  of  corruption  and  28%  of  Europeans 

88   Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019).  
89   A recent report on the implementation and application of the whistleblower Directive assesses the measures 
notified by Member States declaring complete transposition by 17 December 2023 (COM(2024) 269 final). 

23 

 
 
 
believing  that  cases  of  corruption  are  not  reported  because  reporting  would  be  pointless  as 
those responsible would not be punished90. To overcome reluctance, many Member States are 
putting  in  place  tools  to  provide  guidance  and  raise  awareness.  For  example,  in  the 
Netherlands, a campaign promotes awareness and encourages whistleblowers to use the new 
reporting channels. Italy and Cyprus have developed new guidelines and information tools to 
support  whistleblowers.  In  France,  a  consortium  of  NGOs  was  created  to  advise  potential 
whistleblowers.  In  Malta,  work  is  ongoing  to  develop  a  database  and  tools  to  process 
whistleblowing reports.  

Enlargement  countries  are  working  on  aligning  their  laws  with  the  EU  acquis.  In 
Montenegro,  legal  provisions  on  the  protection  of  whistleblowers  have  been  amended  with 
the aim to align with the EU acquis, and the government in North Macedonia is working on 
updating the law on the protection of whistleblowers to the same end.  

Addressing areas at high risk of corruption 

No  sector  or  area  of  activity  is  safe  from  corruption  risks,  but  common  high-risk  areas 
deserve particular attention – usually those involving management of significant public funds, 
such as public procurement, or access to a critical service. Sectors such as healthcare, energy, 
urban planning and regional and local government have been identified as vulnerable. Other 
high-risk areas for corruption include focal points for organised crime, such as ports. Other 
areas  of  risk  relate  to  political  party  financing  and  investor  citizenship91  and  residence 
schemes92.  

Risk  assessment exercises are important  tools for informing  anti-corruption policy. Czechia 
developed a corruption risk assessment and risk measurement methodology to inform future 
action.  The  Netherlands  have  launched  a  national  risk  assessment  to  identify  the  biggest 
corruption  threats  at  national,  provincial  and  local  level,  with  targeted  awareness-raising 
campaigns  for  high-risk  sectors.  In  Latvia,  authorities  are  planning  to  develop  its 
methodology for risk assessment. In Estonia, an electronic tool was developed to assess the 
risks of corruption in the private sector. 

Several Member States have adopted or are considering reforms to increase transparency and 
oversight for political party financing, also with a view to support democratic accountability 
and  prevent  undue  foreign  influence93.  In  the  Netherlands,  new  draft  legislation  aims  to 
increase transparency and prohibit political parties when they pose a clear and real danger of 
undermining  or  abolishing  the  democratic  rule  of  law.  Germany  has  adopted  new  political 
party  financing  rules,  regulating  party  sponsoring  and  hidden  party  campaign  finance  by 
other persons. In Denmark, a new law on public financing of political parties has entered into 
force,  and  a  proposal  for  increased  transparency  for  private  financing  of  political  parties  is 
still  pending.  In  Slovenia,  new  rules  should  lead  to  more  frequent  audits  of  the  largest 

90   Special Eurobarometer 548 on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024). 
91   The  Commission  has  taken  steps  against  investor  citizenship  schemes  in  the  EU,  since  the  grant  of  EU 
citizenship in return for pre-determined payments or investments, without any genuine link to the Member 
State concerned, undermines the essence of EU citizenship and is in breach of EU law. This has included 
referring one Member State to the Court of Justice. 

92   Joint Communication on the fight against corruption on the fight against corruption, JOIN(2023)12, 3 May 

2023. 

93   In  December  2023,  the  Commission  presented  a  Recommendation  on  inclusive  and  resilient  electoral 
processes in the Union (C(2023) 8626). One of the points encouraged Member States to identify and address 
possible  gaps  in  their  legislation  relating  to  donations  and  other  funding  from  third  countries  to  national 
political parties. 

24 

 
 
 
political parties and of a larger proportion of state funding. In Czechia, a reform strengthened 
the office supervising political parties financing. 

Challenges continue to  exist in other Member States.  In Belgium, a long-awaited reform of 
political party financing was stalled due to a lack of agreement between political parties. In 
Cyprus, the audits on funding of political candidates and parties pointed at flaws which have 
not yet been followed up in legislation. In Italy, the practice of channelling donations through 
political  foundations  and associations remains  unchanged  and there is  no  single register for 
party and campaign information, with several draft laws still under discussion in Parliament.  

Member  States  are  taking  different  measures  to  mitigate  corruption  risks  in  other  high-risk 
areas. In France, following concerns raised on large public contracts, a draft law on the use of 
consulting  companies  for  public  policies  was  presented  in  Parliament  and  the  Government 
established  an  agency  to  advise  the  public  and  tabled  a  law  on  the  use  of  consulting 
companies  for  public  policies.  In  Italy,  the  digitalisation  of  the  entire  lifecycle  of  all 
procurement  or  concession  contracts  will  ensure  more  transparency  of  public  contracts.  In 
Lithuania,  inspections  targeted  high-risk  areas  such  as  public  procurement,  supervision  of 
construction and territorial planning. Corruption prevention authorities in Slovenia concluded 
a  review  of  procurement  procedures 
the  health  care  sector,  making  specific 
recommendations to remedy weaknesses.  

in 

Such  sectors  also  present  intensified  risks  in  enlargement  countries.  In  Albania  an  overly 
complex  legal  framework  has  also  been  identified  as  an  obstacle  to  progress,  and  there  are 
several exemptions from the law on public procurement in Serbia which are not in line with 
EU  acquis  and  are  widely  used  to  circumvent  the  application  of  the  existing  procurement 
rules. 

3.3 Media pluralism and media freedom  

A  free  and  pluralistic  media  environment  is  essential  for  the  rule  of  law,  with  free  and 
independent media playing an important role as watchdogs of democracy and holding power 
to account. Pressure or control over the media from politicians or the state undermines media 
freedom,  as  well  as  people’s  freedom  to  seek,  receive  and  impart  information.  Conflicts  of 
interest  and  a  highly  concentrated  market  dominated  by  only  a  few  players  can  also 
undermine  media  pluralism,  in  particular  in  the  absence  of  strong  safeguards  for  editorial 
independence.  

The EU has put in place rules and standards in several key areas covered by the rule of law 
reports,  starting  with  the  safety  and  protection  of  journalists  and  measures  to  address  the 
phenomenon  of  strategic  litigation  against  public  participation  (SLAPP).  The  European 
Media  Freedom  Act  (EMFA)  introduces,  among  others,  specific  provisions  on  media 
ownership  transparency,  the  transparent  and  fair  allocation  of  state  advertising,  and  the 
independent functioning of public service media and availability of financial resources for the 
fulfilment of their public service remit94. Given the relevance of those provisions in fostering 
media  freedom  and  media  pluralism,  it  is  important  that  Member  States  start  putting  them 
into  practice  as  soon  as  possible,  including  by  addressing  the  relevant  rule  of  law  reports’ 
recommendations, especially in cases where concerns on the matters covered by the EMFA 
signalled in the rule of law reports have persisted for several years or where deterioration of 
the situation has been reported. 

94   The relevant provisions shall apply from 8 August 2025. 

25 

 
 
 
The  Media  Pluralism  Monitor  assesses  the  risks  to  media  freedom  and  pluralism  in  all 
Member States and the majority of accession countries, focusing on four areas – fundamental 
protection  of  media  freedom,  market  plurality,  political  independence,  and  the  social 
inclusiveness  of  media.  This  year’s  Monitor’s  results  (MPM  2024)  show  no  major  change 
across these areas, though there has been some variance in specific indicators. The indicator 
relating  to  the  journalistic  profession,  standards  and  protection  of  journalists  registers  the 
same medium risk score as the previous year with a higher risk score registered in terms of 
journalists’  digital  safety.  Journalists’  working  conditions  and  the  lack  of  independence  of 
public  service  media  governance  in  several  countries  remain  issues  of  concern.  This  year’s 
overall ranking divides countries into five risk bands with seven Member States registering in 
the  ‘high  medium  risk’  band  while  two  Member  States  and  three  enlargement  countries 
covered by this report register in the ‘high risk’ band.  

Strengthening the independent functioning of media regulators  

National media regulators play an essential role in upholding media pluralism when they are 
functionally  and  effectively  independent  and  exercise  their  powers  in  an  impartial  and 
transparent way, with sufficient resources. All Member States have legislation in place setting 
out the competences and independence safeguards of media regulators. Both the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) include 
a  set  of  requirements  for  media  regulators:  independence  from  government,  impartiality, 
transparency, accountability,  adequate resources,  appointment and dismissal  procedures and 
effective appeal mechanisms95.  

Since  the  2023  Rule  of  Law  report,  the  tasks  and  competences  of  several  national  media 
regulators have been expanded and extended, not least due to the adoption of the EU Digital 
Services  Act96.  Positive  developments  are  noted  in  Spain,  with  a  strengthening  of  the 
supervisory function of the  audiovisual  media regulatory authority.  In Sweden, the national 
regulatory authority was restructured, merging a range of tasks with the aim to provide more 
effective services. As regards enlargement countries, Montenegro has put a legal framework 
equipping  the  media  regulator  with  comprehensive  sanctioning  instruments,  including  the 
power to impose fines in case of violations of the law.  

Continued  concerns  about  the  independence  or  impartiality  of  regulators  exist  in  several 
Member  States,  including  insufficient  safeguards  against  undue  political  influence  over  the 
nomination process or in the functioning of regulators, as is the case in Hungary, Slovenia, 
Croatia,  Bulgaria  and  Poland.  In  Greece,  additional  measures  were  taken  to  strengthen 
resources, however their adequacy for the authority to carry out its tasks remains to be fully 
addressed. Enlargement countries also face challenges in ensuring the independence of media 
regulators.  In  Serbia,  the  media  regulator  fails  to  fully  exercise  its  mandate  to  safeguard 
media  pluralism  and  professional  standards  and  there  are  serious  concerns  about  its 
independence, while in Albania questions arise due to the political affiliation and perceived 
conflicts of interest of the regulator.  

Increasing the transparency of media ownership  

Transparency  of  media  ownership  is  directly  linked  to  media  freedom  and  pluralism  as  it 
allows users to make better informed judgements, as media owners can directly or indirectly 
control  or  influence  the  editorial  decisions  and  the  news  content  provided.  European 

95  Directive 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of 11 April 2024 
96   Regulation 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022 

26 

 
 
 
standards97 define key measures, and there are specific requirements in EU law98. Since the 
last report, there have been positive developments in Ireland, Greece and Spain, establishing 
or  extending  online  ownership  registries.  In  North  Macedonia,  print  and  broadcast  media 
must  disclose  ownership  information  to  the  audiovisual  media  regulatory  body,  while  self-
regulation governs the ownership registry for digital national media. In Montenegro, the new 
Law  on  Audiovisual  Media  Services  obliges  providers  of  audiovisual  services  to  provide 
ownership information to the media regulator. 

Previously  highlighted  challenges  regarding  transparency  of  media  ownership  persist  in 
Bulgaria,  Czechia,  France,  the  Netherlands  and  Cyprus.  In  Portugal,  a  high-profile  case 
triggered  discussions  regarding  the  legislative  framework.  In  Albania,  the  transparency  of 
ownership of media is limited, and in Serbia, measures aimed at increasing transparency of 
media ownership are not yet fully implemented, and political and economic influence on the 
media remains a source of concern. political and economic influence on the media remains a 
source of concern.  

Safeguarding media from political pressure and undue influence 

Media independence can be undermined by political pressure and undue influence. This calls 
in  particular  for  strong  safeguards  against  the  politicisation  of  public  service  media  and 
transparent  rules  on  fair  allocation  of  state  advertising.  The  European  Media  Freedom  Act 
(EMFA)  includes  provisions  to  ensure  the  independent  functioning  of  public  service  media 
and availability of financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service remit. It also 
requires  that  Member  States  respect  the  effective  editorial  freedom  and  independence  of 
media service providers in the exercise of their professional activities and should not interfere 
in or try to influence the editorial policies and decisions of media service providers. 

State advertising includes all use of the budget, by public authorities or entities at all levels, 
for the purposes of advertising and campaigns. If this is not allocated transparently and fairly, 
it  can  be  used  as  a  means  of  political  influence  and  to  favour  certain  media  outlets.  In  this 
regard  the  EMFA  sets  out  requirements  in  relation  to  allocation  criteria  and  procedures  as 
well  as  annual  publication  of  information  by  public  authorities  or  entities  on  the  amounts 
spent with which Member States will need to comply with once the relevant provisions start 
applying. In some Member States – namely Austria, Bulgaria and Slovenia – some positive 
steps have been taken, also following the recommendations addressed in the 2023 and 2022 
reports, though challenges remain. No steps have been taken to increase the transparency and 
fairness in the allocation of state advertising in Hungary, Croatia, Malta and Spain. Albania 
lacks a transparent  distribution  system  for  state advertising.  In  Montenegro, information  on 
all  public  sector  payments  made  to  media  outlets,  including  institutional  advertising,  is 
limited.    In  North  Macedonia,  certain  elements  of  a  new  law  covering  state-funded 
advertising have raised concerns among stakeholders.  

While  the  funding  granted  to  public  service  media  is  the  responsibility  of  each  Member 
State99, European standards and guiding principles exist on independence, the regulatory and 

97   Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on media pluralism and 

transparency of media ownership 

98   EU  legislation  contains  relevant  provisions:  Directive  2010/13/EU,  as  amended  by  Directive  2018/1808 
(AVMSD);  General  (non-sectoral)  obligations  of  transparency  of  beneficial  ownership  in  the  Anti-Money 
Laundering Directives (Directives 2018/843 and 2015/849). The EMFA obliges all media service providers 
to disclose their direct, indirect and beneficial owners. 

99   As long as EU trade and competition rules are respected. See Protocol to the Treaties (No 29) on the system 

of public broadcasting in the Member States. 

27 

 
 
 
policy  framework,  funding,  appointments,  accountability,  management,  transparency,  and 
openness100.  Provisions  to  ensure  the  independent  functioning  of  public  service  media, 
notably by requiring safeguards for adequate, sustainable and predictable financial resources 
and fostering transparency in the appointments and dismissals of management will need to be 
complied with once EMFA enters into application.  

Reforms  aimed  at  strengthening  the  independence  of  national  public  service  broadcasters 
have  been  agreed  or  are  under  way  in  several  Member  States.  Legislation  or  other  positive 
steps  have  been  applied  in  Germany,  Sweden  and  Czechia  while  reform  discussions  are 
ongoing  or  in  preparation  in  Austria,  Cyprus,  Estonia,  Finland,  Denmark,  Bulgaria,  the 
Netherlands  and  Poland.  Previously  voiced  concerns  with  regard  to  the  independent 
governance and editorial independence of public service media have not yet been addressed 
in  Romania,  Malta,  and  Hungary.  In  Slovakia,  a  law  was  adopted  in  July  2024  which 
dissolves the current public broadcaster and establishes a new one, leading to concerns on the 
future  independence  of  the  broadcaster.  In  Italy,  though  there  are  rules  in  place  aimed  at 
ensuring that public service media provide independent and pluralistic information, there are 
persisting challenges related to the effectiveness of its governance and funding system.  

As regards enlargement  countries, while  the  legal  frameworks regulating  the governance of 
public  service  media  are  in  place  in  Albania  and  North  Macedonia,  they  have  not  shielded 
public  service  media  in  practice  against  politicisation.  Funding  is  unstable  in  North 
Macedonia.  In  Serbia,  while  a  revision  is  planned  for  the  end  of  2024  to  ensure  stable 
funding,  issues  of  editorial  autonomy  and  pluralism  of  public  service  media  need  to  be 
addressed. A recent legal reform of public service media in Montenegro is expected to bring 
positive developments both in terms of governance as well as funding.  

Access to information  

The right to access information held by public authorities is one of the main transparency and 
accountability  tools  for  civil  society and  citizens  and it is  fundamental  for journalists to  do 
their  work.  Several  Member  States,  such  as  Estonia,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  Bulgaria  and 
Finland  have  made  further  tangible  progress  in  this  respect.  In  Austria,  for  example,  a 
Freedom  of  Information  Act  was  adopted  and  enshrined  in  the  Constitution,  which  for  the 
first time provides a right to information from public authorities and state-owned enterprises. 
However,  limited  progress  has  been  seen  in  several  other  Member  States  where  problems 
were previously identified, such as Spain, Poland, Germany, Greece, Romania and Malta. In 
Italy  the rules regulating the disclosure of judicial information in criminal proceedings raise 
concerns, while in Croatia although journalists are exempt from the offence of disclosure of 
such information, there is still strong criticism from stakeholders, and efforts continue to be 
made to address it.  

The right to access information is legally guaranteed in all the enlargement countries included 
in  this  report,  but  journalists’  ability  to  exercise  this  right  is  often  significantly  limited  in 
practice.  In  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  journalists  face  frequent  refusals  by  public  bodies  to 
release information.  

Improving the safety and protection of journalists and addressing legal threats and abusive 
court proceedings against public participation  

100  Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 on public service media governance. 

28 

 
 
 
Journalists  continue  to  face  physical  and  legal  threats,  with  online  smear  campaigns  and 
censorship both also compromising their safety. Several measures recommended in the 2021 
Commission Recommendation on the safety of journalists101 are in need of improvement  in 
several  Member  States,  as  highlighted  by  an  independent  study  published  in  May  2024102. 
They  include  effective  and  impartial  investigation  and  prosecution  of  crimes,  dedicated 
training, addressing online threats and attacks and ensuring the safety of female journalists, 
journalists belonging to  minority groups and those reporting on  equality  issues.  Regarding 
positive  developments,  several  Member  States  (and  enlargement  countries)103  have  adopted 
dedicated Action Plans, and taken steps to set up dedicated support structures promoting the 
safety of journalists.  

Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are a particular form of harassment 
used against journalists and human rights defenders engaged with matters of public interest. 
Defamation  is  one  of  the  most  common  grounds  on  which  SLAPPs  are  brought  against 
journalists.  Such  harassment  usually  aims  at  silencing  journalists  and  creating  a  chilling 
effect  on  media  freedom  and  freedom  of  expression.  New  EU  law  provisions  are  in  place 
since  May  2024  to  curb  SLAPPs104  and  Member  States  have  been  encouraged  to  take 
additional  action105.  Moreover,  the  EMFA  has  put  in  place  requirements  for  the  effective 
protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications and safeguards against the 
deployment of intrusive surveillance software. 

Following positive developments acknowledged in the 2023 report in some Member States, 
others have also followed up on the recommendations issued in the 2023 and 2022 reports. In 
Croatia, awareness raising efforts continue on SLAPPs targeting journalists, though progress 
is limited. In Lithuania, the Government adopted an action plan on the safety and protection 
of  journalists  and  continues  to  strengthen  their  protection  against  abusive  lawsuits.  In 
Luxembourg, the Government has committed to reinforce the safety of journalists and a new 
draft  law  is  expected  to  introduce  safeguards  for  the  protection  of  journalists  in  Slovenia. 
However,  reform  processes  have  stalled  in  Cyprus  and  Malta.  In  Slovakia,  despite  some 
progress  with  regard  to  mechanisms  aimed  at  improving  the  safety  of  journalists,  there  are 
increasing concerns in relation to reported worsening of their working environment. In both 
Montenegro  and  North  Macedonia,  legislative  amendments  provide  for  harsher  penalties  in 
case of violent acts or intimidation against journalists.  

Specifically  on  the  threat  of  SLAPPs  and  responding  to  2023  and  2022  recommendations,  
Greece  and  Ireland  have  progressed  with  legislative  work  to  introduce  specific  procedural 
safeguards and/or revising their defamation laws, while reform of  the defamation  regime is 
stalled  in  Italy  and  also  in  Slovakia.  North  Macedonia  introduced  legislative  amendments 

101  2021 Recommendation on the safety of journalists (C(2021) 6650, 16 September 2021) 
102  European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Study 
on putting in practice by Member States of the recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment 
of journalists – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024. 

103  While  the  Recommendation  is  addressed  to  EU  Member  States,  it  also  encourages  candidate  countries  to 

follow its provisions. 

104  Directive  2024/1069  on  protecting  persons  who  engage  in public  participation  from manifestly  unfounded 

claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). 

105  The 2022 Commission Recommendation (C(2022) 2428, 27 April 2022) includes measures related covering 
defamation, training, awareness raising, support mechanisms, data collection, reporting and monitoring. The 
Commission is in contact with Member States to prepare a report on their follow-up to the Recommendation. 
The Council of Europe also adopted a  Recommendation on countering the use of strategic lawsuits against 
public participation (SLAPPs) in April 2024. 

29 

 
 
 
which restrict the margin to initiate SLAPP cases against media organisations and journalists 
and decrease the fines applied in cases of defamation.  

3.4 Other institutional issues linked to checks and balances  

A  well-functioning  system  of  institutional  checks  and  balances  is  central  to  the  rule  of  law 
and provides a system of mutual control, whereby the power exercised by one state authority 
is subject to the scrutiny of others, even if how this is organised varies according to different 
national  legal  and  constitutional  traditions.  An  open  legislative  process  and  attention  to  the 
quality  of  lawmaking  has  a  long-term  effect  on  the  ability  to  ensure  the  rule  of  law.  The 
stability  and  quality  of  the  law-making  process  are  also  key  indicators  for  confidence  in 
investment  protection.  Civil  society  organisations  and  independent  authorities,  such  as 
National  Human  Rights  Institutions,  equality  bodies  and  Ombudspersons,  are  an 
indispensable element in such checks and balances in a healthy democracy, so their freedom 
to operate is directly relevant to rule of law. 

The inclusiveness, quality and transparency of the law-making process 

Efforts to improve the quality, inclusiveness and transparency of the legislative process have 
continued, including on issues covered in the 2023 recommendations. In Czechia, the use of 
accelerated legislative procedures decreased and a new public digital platform for accessing 
legislation free of charge was launched. Similarly,  in  Ireland, the use of motions to shorten 
the debate time for legislative proposals decreased considerably. In France, several tools have 
been  put  in  place  to  increase  the  participation  of  citizens  in  the  law-making  process.  In 
Portugal,  new  measures  were  taken  to  improve  the  transparency  of  law-making,  while  the 
regulation of impact assessment is still pending.  

Some Member States  have initiated efforts to  improve the quality  of the legislative process 
that  are  still  at  an  early  stage.  In  Croatia,  a  new  Law  on  Better  Regulation  introduced  a 
comprehensive overhaul of impact assessments and evaluations, and additional standards for 
public consultations.  In Cyprus, a new e-consultation platform is  a step towards  facilitating 
stakeholder input in the legislative process, while further measures are needed for meaningful 
public consultation. In Luxembourg, the legislative process is more inclusive, in particular as 
regards  Government-initiated  legislation,  while  shortcomings  remain  concerning  draft  laws 
tabled  by  members  of  Parliament.  In  Poland,  the  Government  has  started  to  involve  civil 
society  more  effectively  in  consultations  on  legislation,  though  this  approach  needs  to  be 
consolidated.  In  North  Macedonia,  a  national  electronic  consultation  system  allowing 
stakeholders  to  participate  in  public  consultations  is  in  place,  but  not  all  draft  laws  are 
published on the platform. 

In  a  number  of  Member  States,  challenges  persist  in  areas  such  as  the  excessive  use  of 
accelerated  procedures  or  the  overall  quality  of  law-making,  as  well  as  in  consultation  of 
stakeholders.  In  Spain,  the  “Organic  Law  on  Amnesty  for  the  Institutional,  Political  and 
Social  Normalisation  of  Catalonia”  sparked  controversy  and  was  subject  to  a  Venice 
Commission Opinion, which addressed a number of issues related to the rule of law. It was 
taken  forward  under  an  urgent  procedure,  allowing  only  for  a  limited  consultation  of  the 
public.  In  Bulgaria  challenges  continue  regarding  the  quality  of  the  legislative  process.  In 
Hungary,  the  quality  of  law-making  and  the  frequent  changes  in  legislation  remain  a 
significant  cause  for  concern.  Legal  uncertainty  adds  to  concerns  about  arbitrary  decisions 
from the government and public authorities seen as obstacles for the operation of businesses 
in  the  single  market.  In  France,  Estonia  and  Italy,  concerns  have  been  raised  about  the 
considerable  use  of  accelerated  legislative  procedures  or  emergency  decrees.  In  Slovakia, 

30 

 
 
major reforms have taken place without effective stakeholder involvement, frequently using 
fast-track  legislative  procedures.  In  Finland,  stakeholders  have  reported  a  change  in  the 
practice  of  public  consultations,  reducing  the  opportunity  to  comment.  In  Malta,  a  formal 
framework  regarding  public  engagement  in  the  drafting  of  legislation  is  still  lacking.  In 
Romania,  efforts  are  still  needed  to  ensure  effective  public  consultations  as  shortcomings 
persist.  

In  Albania  and  North  Macedonia,  deep  political  polarisation  has  a  negative  impact  on  the 
legislative  process,  which  in  the  latter  case  has  caused  delays  in  its  work  and  led  to  the 
excessive  and  sometimes  inappropriate  use  of  accelerated  legislative  procedures.  In 
Montenegro, despite an establised framework for an inclusive legislative process, challenges 
remain  concerning  inadquate  public  consultation.  In  Serbia,  Parliament’s  ability  to  provide 
checks  and  balances  is  constrained  by  issues  of  effectiveness,  autonomy  and  transparency, 
and the process of public consultation needs further strengthening. 

Constitutional reforms and debates impacting on institutional checks and balances  

In  several  Member  States,  constitutional  reform  processes  have  been  undertaken  or  are 
subject  of  important  public  debates.  In  Bulgaria,  the  constitutional  reform  changed  the 
procedure for appointment of the interim government by limiting the powers of the President. 
In Sweden, the Government is examining the follow up to an all-party committee report on a 
possible  amendment  of  the  constitution  to  deal  with  serious  peacetime  crises.  In  the 
Netherlands,  further  steps  have  been  taken  by  all  state  powers  to  strengthen  the  legal 
protection of citizens and a State Commission on the Rule of Law issued recommendations. 
In Italy, the Government has submitted to Parliament a draft constitutional reform, with the 
objective of ensuring greater stability of government. 

Significant developments on Supreme and Constitutional Courts in the checks and balances 

Constitutional courts play a key role in the effective application of EU law and in ensuring 
the integrity of the EU legal  order and are key elements  of checks and balances. While the 
establishment,  composition  and  functioning  of  constitutional  jurisdictions  are  within  the 
competence of Member States, when exercising that competence, Member States are required 
to comply with EU law and EU values106.  

In  some  Member  States,  the  scope  of  constitutional  review  is  expanding.  In  Bulgaria,  the 
constitutional  reform  made  constitutional  checks  more  accessible  by  allowing  all  courts  to 
submit requests on constitutionality. In Lithuania, the Judicial Council is preparing a proposal 
to amend the constitution in order to be granted the right of constitutional appeal regarding 
legislation  affecting  the  judiciary.  Concerns  persist  regarding  other  aspects  of  the  work  of 
Constitutional  Courts  in  some  Member  States.  In  Hungary,  the  Constitutional  Court  still 
reviews the merits of final rulings of ordinary courts, although as previously reported public 
authorities can no longer challenge final judicial decisions before the Constitutional Court. In 
Slovenia,  following  concerns  raised  for  years  by  the  Constitutional  Court  regarding  its 
considerable  workload,  which  prevents  the  Court  from  dedicating  more  attention  to  the 
constitutionally  most  far-reaching  cases,  discussions  have  continued  on  constitutional 
amendments  to  reduce  the  Constitutional  Court’s  caseload  by  transferring  certain  types  of 
cases to administrative courts.  

106  CJEU, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C-430/21.  

31 

 
 
 
As  regards  the  enlargement  countries,  in  Albania  the  Constitutional  Court  is  effective  in 
upholding  institutional  checks  and  balances,  though  Parliament  has  failed  to  comply  with 
some of its rulings. In Serbia, several vacancies at the Constitutional Court need to be filled.  

Ombudspersons, National Human Rights Institutions, equality bodies and other independent 
authorities  

National human rights institutions (NHRIs)107, Ombudspersons108, equality bodies and other 
independent  authorities  have  an  important  role  in  national  checks  and  balances.  In  some 
Member States, the status of these bodies has been further strengthened or reforms are under 
way.  In  Bulgaria  and  Cyprus,  the  Ombudspersons  have  been  given  new  tasks,  and  in 
Lithuania  and  Poland  there  was  an  increase  of  financial  resources  for  Ombudspersons’ 
Offices.  In  Sweden,  the  National  Human  Rights  Institution  has  secured  funding  for  its 
activities and continues working towards an A-status accreditation. In Estonia, Luxembourg, 
and  Finland  reforms  are  being  discussed  to  strengthen  the  autonomy  of  independent 
institutions.  

However,  in  other  Member  States,  NHRIs  and  Ombudsperson  institutions  continue  to  face 
challenges.  In  Hungary,  concerns  remain  regarding  the  independence  and  effective 
functioning of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. In Croatia, some further steps were 
made on the follow-up to the People’s Ombudsperson’s recommendations, but challenges on 
access to information remain. The Netherlands Institute for Human Rights continues to face 
governance  issues.  In  Slovenia,  the  Human  Rights  Ombudsperson  has  raised  concerns 
regarding proposed amendments to the act on its functioning.  

improve  decision  quality,  but 

In Montenegro, the  Ombudsperson’s Office  has  improved  its  capacity to  handle complaints 
and 
its 
recommendations  undermines  the  efficiency  of  its  work.  In  Serbia,  there  is  no  systematic 
follow-up on the recommendations of the independent bodies. 

the  absence  of  systematic 

follow-up 

to 

Procedures for the appointment of heads of independent authorities have emerged as offering 
particular challenges. Delays in appointments have continued in Bulgaria and Austria while 
in  Slovakia  legislative  amendments  have  widened  the  power  of  the  Government  to  appoint 
and  dismiss  heads  of  certain  independent  bodies.  In  Greece,  while  measures  were  taken  to 
improve the salary regime, independent authorities face challenges that could undermine their 
status  and  ability  to  carry  out  their  tasks  effectively.  In  contrast,  in  Poland,  the 
recommendation  regarding  the  Supreme  Audit  Office  has  been  fully  implemented  by 
ensuring the appointment of its College members and an adequate follow-up to its findings. 

As regards the four Member States who do not yet have established an NHRI in line with the 
UN  Paris  Principles,  in  Czechia,  an  amendment  to  entrust  the  Ombudsperson  with  the 
function  of  an  NHRI,  and  there  has  been  some  progress  on  obtaining  accreditation  for  the 
Ombudsman  and  the  NHRI  in  Romania.  However,  Italy  and  Malta  have  made  no  progress 
towards establishing an NHRI.  

107  The  UN  Paris  Principles,  endorsed  by  the  UN  General  Assembly  in 1993  (Resolution  A/RES/48/134),  set 
out  the  main  criteria  that  NHRIs  are  required  to  meet.  NHRIs  are  periodically  accredited  before  the 
Subcommittee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.  

108  See the Venice Commission Principles for Ombudspersons. 

32 

 
 
 
 
Implementation of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and national courts 

Since 2022, the country chapters include figures on the implementation of leading judgments 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an important indicator for the functioning 
of the rule of law in a country. Results vary between Member States. Across the EU, around 
44% of leading judgments of the ECtHR relating to the Member States from the last ten years 
are yet to be implemented, a slight increase on last year109.  

In  Belgium  non-compliance  with  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  and  domestic  court 
judgments,  including  a  final  judgment  of  a  court  of  last  instance,  raises  serious  concerns. 
Romania  remains  under  enhanced  supervision  from  the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the 
Council of Europe for a long-standing structural problem of non-implementation or delayed 
implementation  of  final  domestic  court  decisions  delivered  against  the  State.  In  Croatia,  a 
new  Law  on  Administrative  Disputes 
the  swift 
implementation of administrative courts’ judgments.  

includes  measures 

to  encourage 

Civil society organisations as essential actors for the rule of law  

Civil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights’ defenders are key actors in the system 
of  checks  and  balances.  They  act  as  watchdogs  against  breaches  of  the  rule  of  law  and 
actively contribute to promoting and protecting EU values and fundamental rights. This was 
recognised  in  a  Commission  Recommendation  on  civic  engagement  in  December  2023110, 
calling on Member States to create and maintain a safe and enabling environment for CSOs 
and  human  rights’  defenders,  to  enhance  their  opportunities  for  effective  participation  in 
policy-making. In parallel, the Commission’ proposal on European cross-border associations 
aims to remove regulatory and administrative barriers for non-profit associations in the single 
market111.  

In  the  majority  of  Member  States,  an  enabling  and  supportive  framework  for  civil  society 
exists, and the civil society space continues to be considered as ‘open’112. Initiatives to further 
improve their operating space have continued, such as through a reform of the tax framework 
in Austria. In Sweden, further steps were taken in the ongoing reforms of the legal framework 
for the funding and operation of civil society. In Ireland, some further progress was made to 
tackle  legal  obstacles  to  accessing  funding,  with  an  Electoral  Commission  review  of  the 
current legislation. In Croatia, there has been a gradual shift towards multiannual funding for 
civil  society  organisations,  though  a  broader  plan  still  remains  outstanding.  In  Poland, 
creating the office of the Minister for the Civil Society is seen as a first step to new initiatives 
to improve the legal framework for CSOs.  

However, continuing the trend noted in previous Reports, CSOs and human rights defenders 
have  increasingly  faced  challenges,  with  new  legal  restrictions,  lack  of  funding  or  physical 
and verbal attacks. No concrete steps have been taken yet to address the uncertainty regarding 
the  tax-exempt  status  of  non-profit  organisations  in  Germany.  In  Greece,  the  ongoing 
implementation  of  the  interoperability  of  the  existing  registries  for  CSOs  is  a  positive 

109  Last year it was 40%.  Contribution from the Contribution from the European Implementation Network for 

the 2024 Rule of Law Report.  

110  Recommendation  on  promoting  the  engagement  and  effective  participation  of  citizens  and  civil  society 

organisation in public policy-making processes (C(2023) 8627, 12 December 2024). 

111  COM/2023/516 final of 5 September 2023. 
112  According  to  the  rating  given  by  CIVICUS  (non-governmental  organisation).  Ratings  use  a  five-category 
scale:  open,  narrowed,  obstructed,  repressed  and  closed.  Compared  to  2023,  one  Member  State  has  been 
downgraded from ‘open’ to ‘narrowed’.  

33 

 
 
 
development,  while  the  registration  framework  still  needs  to  be  evaluated  and  concerns 
remain  about  the  space  for  civil  society.  In  Cyprus,  plans  for  regular  dialogue  between  the 
authorities  and  civil  society  are  encouraging,  but  questions  remain  over  the  administrative 
requirements imposed on CSOs. In Italy, challenges remain as regards the civic space, also in 
light  of  reported  verbal  attacks  on  CSOs  involved  in  humanitarian  activities.  In  Spain,  a 
reform of the Citizen Security Law was announced in Parliament to address concerns about 
its impact on the civic space is still pending.  

In  North  Macedonia,  CSOs  operate  in  an  overall  enabling  environment,  but  challenges 
remain  to  ensure  their  sustainable  engagement  in  policymaking.  In  Serbia,  CSOs  lack  an 
enabling environment for establishment, operations and financing, and smear campaigns are 
conducted against several of them.  

In  certain  Member  States,  civil  society  is  faced  with  serious  challenges  or  systemic  undue 
restrictions to their operations. In Hungary, there has been no progress in removing existing 
obstacles for CSOs, with smear campaigns and the vilification of independent CSOs remain a 
current practice. There are also concerns related to the State’s role in financing civil society. 
In  Slovakia,  the  environment  for  CSOs  has  deteriorated,  particularly  those  with  the  role  of 
overseeing state activities, and in the area of human rights.  

National checks and balances in the use of intrusive surveillance software (“spyware”) 

Even where the use of spyware is linked to national security, and in instances where it falls 
outside the scope of EU law, national checks and balances need to ensure that safeguards are 
in place. Fundamental rights such as the protection of personal data, the freedom to receive 
and impart information, the freedom of expression, as well as the right to an effective remedy 
and a fair trial, need to  be respected. EU data protection legislation offers a comprehensive 
mechanism of oversight and safeguards and is applicable in situations where spyware is used 
for law enforcement purposes. The Venice Commission is working on developing principles 
and good practices applicable to targeted surveillance by means of spyware.  

The 2024 Report follows up on developments concerning the alleged illegal use of spyware 
(such  as  ‘Pegasus’  or  equivalent  intrusive  surveillance  software)  referred  to  in  previous 
reports, in particular as regards the functioning of national checks and balances in response to 
such allegations. In Poland, the Sejm established a parliamentary investigative committee to 
assess  the  use  of  ‘Pegasus’  software  by  members  of  the  Government,  secret  services,  the 
police,  and  other  state  bodies  between  2015  and  2023.  The  new  Prosecutor-General  also 
decided to formally notify persons targeted by Pegasus software and appointed a special team 
to  carry  out  investigations  on  the  legality  of  its  use.  In  other  Member  States,  the  situation 
remains  unchanged.  In  Greece,  judicial  investigations  into  the  use  of  spyware  are  ongoing. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Hungary,  concerns  persist  due  to  the  absence  of  effective  judicial  or 
other  oversight  as  regards  the  use  of  secret  surveillance  measures  outside  criminal 
proceedings. 

Safeguards in addressing foreign influence 

Interference  by  foreign  governments seeking  to  manipulate  public  opinion  and  distort  the 
democratic  debate  poses  a  threat  to  the  EU’s  democracies113.  Efforts  to  preserve  the  public 
interest  and  shed  light  on  foreign  influence  on  EU  democracies  must  be  proportionate  and 
fully  respect  fundamental  rights  and  democratic  values.  Drawing  on  both  the  Court  of 

113     Communication on Defence of Democracy (C(2023)630). 

34 

 
 
 
Justice114  and  the  Venice  Commission115,  in  December  2023  the  Commission  proposed  to 
regulate the transparency of interest representation from third countries in the EU, focusing 
on  transparency  and  democratic  accountability,  introducing  targeted  rules  accompanied  by 
strong safeguards.  

In some Member States, measures proposed or adopted and citing the need to address foreign 
influence  have  raised  serious  concerns,  notably  because  they  stigmatise  the  organisations 
concerned.  Under  a  new  law  to  protect  national  sovereignty,  Hungary  established  a  new 
office with broadly defined competences tasked with reporting on any person or organisation 
suspected of serving foreign  interests and/or receiving foreign  funding,  which has  launched 
investigations116.  This  is  currently  subject  to  infringement  proceedings  launched  by  the 
Commission.  In  Slovakia,  draft  amendments  tabled  in  Parliament  would  introduce  a 
mandatory  labelling  of  organisations  receiving  funding  from  abroad  beyond  a  certain 
threshold as ‘organisations with foreign support’.  

Initiatives to foster a rule of law culture 

Promoting a strong rule of law culture is essential for the long-term resilience of democratic 
societies. A variety of actors actively contribute to this, for example by organising debates or 
educational initiatives.  

In Czechia, public authorities have launched initiatives to foster the rule of law culture, with 
several events organised in both chambers of Parliament and high-level events organised by 
the  Government  and  the  Public  Defender  of  Rights.  In  Spain,  several  initiatives  aimed  at 
fostering a rule of law culture have been taken. In Slovakia, the Slovak National Centre for 
Human  Rights,  mandated  as  National  Human  Rights  Institution  and  equality  body, 
contributes with projects to strengthen the rule of law culture.  

4.  CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS  

The five successive years of Commission  reporting on the  rule of law have illustrated how 
respect for the rule of law can never be taken for granted. Changing circumstances, whether 
political change or societal and technological developments, can bring new challenges to the 
rule of law. The nature and degree of challenges vary from one Member State to another, as 
reflected in the recommendations addressed in the Rule of Law Report.  

At the same time, the reports have also shown how dialogue can help to make progress. Over 
the  past  five  years,  the  EU  has  significantly  enhanced  its  capacity  to  address  rule  of  law 
challenges  and  support  reforms.  Member  States  can  increasingly  draw  upon  a  common 
understanding of how policies, institutions and laws can best be shaped to protect the rule of 
law. While rule of law-related problems still exist and will continue to emerge, the EU is now 
better  equipped  to  approach  these  in  an  objective  and  sound  way,  and  to  bring  different 

114   Judgment  of  18  June  2020,  Commission  v  Hungary  (Transparency  of  associations),  C-78/18, 

EU:C:2020:476. 

115   Venice Commission Report on Funding of Associations CDL-AD(2019)002. See also Venice Commission 
Urgent Opinion on on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence (CDL PI(2024)013) and 
Opinion on Act LXXXVII of 2023 on the Protection of National Sovereignty (CDL(2024)001). 

116     In June 2024, the Sovereignty Protection Office launched investigations into the activities and funding of    

an anti-corruption CSO and an investigative media outlet.  

35 

 
 
 
 
 
instruments to bear in finding solutions. Member States remain free to design solutions in line 
with their specific national context, but such solutions should draw on a consolidating body 
of rule of law standards and requirements.  

The Political Guidelines for the Commission 2024-2029 cement the rule of law at the heart of 
a successful EU. This is also underlined in the European Council Strategic Agenda adopted in 
June 2024. This consensus shows the importance of continuing to deepen the EU’s work on 
the  rule  of  law,  building  common  understanding,  broadening  the  impact  of  the  EU’s  work, 
and deepening the toolbox at our disposal to promote the rule of law. 

The Rule of Law Report will continue to spearhead this work. This will include a broadening 
of  reporting  to  embrace  key  issues  such  as  the  Single  Market  dimension,  looking  at  issues 
affecting companies, especially SMEs, operating across borders. It will also include building 
a closer link between the Rule of Law Report and its recommendations and funding under the 
EU  budget:  this  will  be  an  important  consideration  as  we  seek  to  ensure  that  the  next 
Multiannual Financial Framework offers the maximum to European citizens. EU funding can 
be  further  focused  on  helping  national  efforts  to  fight  corruption  and  to  protect  the  EU 
financial interest, investing in upholding the rule of law. Further enlargement countries will 
be included in  the Rule  of Law  report  as and  when they are  ready. Enforcement will be of 
particular  importance:  tracking  implementation  of  the  Report’s  recommendations  will  be 
developed as a way to consolidate progress.  

The core principles underlying the Rule of Law Report  – equal treatment between Member 
States,  the  rigorous  application  of  EU  standards,  and  a  process  embedded  in  dialogue  and 
mutual  understanding  –  have  stood  the  test  of  time.  The  Commission  looks  forward  to 
working with Member States, the European Parliament and the Council to ensure that the rule 
of law can continue to provide the foundation stone for Europe’s democracies. 

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