Opinion of the European Central Bank of 5 July 2024 on the potential appointment of the Governor or a Deputy Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank as a caretaker prime minister (CON/2024/23)
Date: 2024-07-05
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: institutional activity, legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 5 July 2024  

on the potential appointment of the Governor or a Deputy Governor of the Bulgarian National 

Bank as a caretaker prime minister 

(CON/2024/23) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On 29 May 2024 and 5 June 2024 the European Central Bank (ECB) received a request from Българска 

народна банка (Bulgarian National Bank (BNB)), acting on behalf of the Bulgarian Minister for Finance, for 

an opinion on a draft law amending the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) concerning the potential 

appointment of the Governor or a Deputy Governor of BNB as caretaker prime minister, which enters into 

force and repeals and replaces the previous Law on BNB as of the date stipulated in the Council Decision 

on the adoption by the Republic of Bulgaria of the euro, adopted in accordance with Article 140(2) of the 

Treaty, and in the Council Regulation adopted in accordance with Article 140(3) of the Treaty (hereinafter 

the ‘draft law amending the future Law on BNB’). 

Previously,  on  20  December  2023,  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  adopted  a  Law 

amending the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (hereinafter the ‘Law amending the Constitution’) 1, 

and on 2 April 2024, the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria adopted a Law amending the Law 

on BNB (hereinafter the ‘Law amending the current Law on BNB’) 2, concerning the potential appointment 

of, inter alia, the Governor or a Deputy Governor of BNB as caretaker prime minister. The ECB has decided 

to deliver an own initiative opinion on (1) the Law amending the Constitution and (2) the Law amending the 

current Law on BNB.  

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion on the draft law amending the future Law on BNB, the Law 

amending the Constitution and the Law amending the current Law on BNB (collectively, the ‘draft or adopted 

laws’) is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 

Article 2(1), third indent, of Council Decision 98/415/EC3, as the draft or adopted laws relate to BNB. In 

accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the 

Governing Council has adopted this opinion. 

1  
2  
3  

Закон за изменение и допълнение на Конституцията на Република България, ДВ. 106, 22.12.2023. 
Закон за изменение и допълнение на Закона за Българската народна банка, ДВ. 29, 2.4.2024. 
Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

 
 
 
  
 
ECB-PUBLIC 

1. 

Purpose of the draft or adopted laws  

1.1 

Law amending the Constitution 

The  Law  amending  the  Constitution  amended  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  that  concern  the 

formation  of  the  Bulgarian  government 4.  In  particular,  the  Constitution  provides  that  should  no 

agreement be reached on the formation of a government, the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, 

following consultations with the parliamentary groups and acting on a motion by the caretaker prime 

minister-designate, must appoint a caretaker government, and must schedule new elections within 

two  months.  A  caretaker  prime  minister  is  to  be  appointed  from  among  the  Chairperson  of  the 

National Assembly, the Governor or a Deputy Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, the President 

or a Vice-President of the Bulgarian National Audit Office, and the Ombudsman or a deputy thereof5. 

In accordance with the Constitution, the principal task of the caretaker government is to organise fair 

and free elections. Restrictions on the powers of the  caretaker  government may be provided in a 

law6. The ECB understands that the Law amending the Constitution is currently being reviewed by 

the Constitutional Court7. 

1.2   Law amending the current Law on BNB 

The Law amending the current Law on BNB amended the provisions of the Law on BNB currently in 

force8 to clarify that the Governor and the Deputy Governors must not engage in any activity, other 

than teaching, or as members of the bodies in companies where BNB participates, or in international 

organisations related to BNB’s activities, unless they are appointed as caretaker prime minister in 

accordance  with  the  Constitution.  They  may  perform  a  non-remunerative  activity  following  a 

unanimous decision of the BNB Governing Council insofar as there is no conflict of interest. In case 

of appointment of the Governor or a Deputy Governor as a caretaker prime minister, these persons 

interrupt  their  duties  as  Governor  or  Deputy  Governor  only  for  the  period  during  which  they  are 
appointed as caretaker prime minister, following which they continue the mandate as Governor or 

Deputy  Governor  for  which  they  were  appointed.  Moreover,  on  appointment  as  caretaker  prime 

minister, the Governor appoints a deputy from among the Deputy Governors, who will carry out the 

Governor’s duties after such appointment. When appointing a Deputy Governor as caretaker prime 

minister, the Law on BNB provides that, on a motion by a Deputy Governor, the Governing Council 

is to designate an alternate deputy governor to exercise his or her duties when he or she is absent9. 

1.3   Draft law amending the future Law on BNB 

The  draft  law  amending  the  future  Law  on  BNB 10  proposes  to  clarify  that  the  Governor  and  any 

Deputy Governor are entitled to refuse the appointment as caretaker prime minister and that in the 

event that the Governor or a Deputy Governor explicitly consents to  be appointed as a caretaker 

prime minister, he or she must submit their resignation as Governor or Deputy Governor. In such a 

4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  

See Article 99 of the Constitution. 

See Article 99(5) of the Constitution. 
See Article 99(7) of the Constitution. 

Case 1/2024 and Case 2/2024 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Bulgaria. 
See Articles 12(5) to (6) of the Law on BNB. 
See Article 19(4) of the Law on BNB. 

The draft law amending the future Law on BNB amends Article 13 of the future Law on BNB. 

2 

 
ECB-PUBLIC 

case, their successor Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case may be, must be appointed no later 

than  one  month after the  termination of the  duties of  the outgoing Governor or  Deputy Governor. 

Where the Governor is appointed as a caretaker prime minister, the duties of Governor are to be 

exercised by a Deputy Governor designated by the outgoing Governor, until the appointment of a 

successor Governor. Where a Deputy Governor is appointed as a caretaker prime minister, the BNB 

Governing Council, on a motion by a Deputy Governor, must designate an alternate Deputy Governor 

to exercise the duties of Deputy Governor until a successor Deputy Governor is appointed. The draft 

law amending the future Law on BNB also provides that when the Governor or Deputy Governor is 

appointed as a caretaker prime minister, their duties as Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case 

may be, are terminated on their appointment as a caretaker prime minister 11. 

2. 

Observations 

2.1  Tenure and reappointment as caretaker prime minister 

2.1.1  While the period of time between the appointment of a caretaker prime minister and the holding of 

new elections may not be more than two months, the Constitution is silent on the overall duration of 

the tenure of the caretaker prime minister. The ECB understands that, given the time necessary to 

form a regular government after elections have been held, which is not limited by the Constitution, 

the possibility cannot be excluded that the duration of the caretaker government could exceed two 

months. 

2.1.2  Moreover,  the  Constitution  does  not  specify  whether  the  caretaker  prime  minister  may  be 

reappointed in the case where, following the holding of elections, no agreement can be reached on 

the formation of a regular government. In this regard, the ECB understands that, should it not be 

possible to form a regular government following the holding of elections, new elections may have to 

be scheduled, and, in accordance with the Constitution, the President would be required to appoint 

a  new  caretaker  prime  minister.  Furthermore,  the  ECB  understands  that  in  such  a  case  the  new 

caretaker prime minister is to be determined at that point in time, and that nothing in the Constitution 

prevents the same caretaker prime minister from being reappointed as caretaker prime minister. 

2.2 

Institutional independence 

2.2.1  Pursuant to Article 130 of the Treaty, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 

duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 

and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter the ‘Statute of the ESCB’), members of the decision-

making bodies of the national central banks (NCBs) must not seek or take instructions from Union 

institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other 

body. Furthermore, the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and 

not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the NCBs in the performance 

of their tasks. 

2.2.2  It follows from Article 130 of the Treaty that a member of an NCB’s decision-making body cannot at 

the same time assume the function of a member of a national government, in particular not as prime 

minister. Otherwise, the independent exercise of the powers and carrying out of the tasks and duties, 

11  

See Article 13(8) of the draft law amending the future Law on BNB. 

3 

 
 
ECB-PUBLIC 

in which the member of an NCB’s decision-making body can take an independent stance, which may 

be different to that of the government, is not conceivable. In this regard, it is imperative that, once 

appointed, the Governor or Deputy Governor, as caretaker prime minister, is required to fully respect 

the institutional independence of BNB and its decision-making bodies in compliance with Article 130 

of the Treaty 12. 

2.2.3  Most importantly, the possible appointment of a Governor or a Deputy Governor of an NCB in the 

European System of Central Banks as a caretaker prime minister, entailing the interruption of his or 

her  term  of  office,  risks  in  principle  compromising  the  independent  exercise  of  the  powers  and 

carrying out of the tasks and duties conferred upon the NCB13. An NCB Governor or Deputy Governor 

who  is  appointed  as  a  caretaker  prime  minister  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  and  resigns  from  his  or  her 

position  as NCB Governor  or Deputy Governor when  accepting this position does not  run such a 

risk14.  However,  the  Law  amending  the  Constitution  seems  to  be  unprecedented  insofar  as  it 

establishes  a  permanent  regime  that  envisages  the  temporary  appointment  of  a  Governor  or  a 

Deputy Governor as a caretaker prime minister. Such regime may expose the Governor or Deputy 

Governor  to  political  leverage  and  influence  involving  serious  conflicts  of  interest.  In  particular,  in 

case of a temporary interruption of the term of office, the risk may arise that the Governor or Deputy 
Governor  takes  stances  as  caretaker  prime  minister  that  are  incompatible  with  the  stance  of  the 

NCB, before going back to their position as Governor or Deputy Governor, following which conflicts 

arise with previous stances that they may have taken as caretaker prime minister. 

2.2.4  In the light of the requirement to independently exercise the powers and carrying out the tasks and 

duties conferred upon the NCB by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB, as laid down in Article 
130 of the Treaty, the risk that the Governor or Deputy Governor takes stances as caretaker prime 

minister that are incompatible with the stance of the NCB would not be sufficiently mitigated by only 

requiring  the  temporary  interruption  of  the  term  of  office  of  the  Governor  or  a  Deputy  Governor. 

Hence,  the  Law  amending  the  current  Law  on  BNB  should  require  the  Governor  or  a  Deputy 

Governor to resign from that position on appointment as caretaker prime minister in order to exclude 
the materialisation of this risk15. In this vein, the ECB welcomes the express stipulation in the draft 

law  amending  the  future  Law  on  BNB  that  in  the  event  that  the  Governor  or  a  Deputy  Governor 

explicitly  consents  to  be  appointed  as  a  caretaker  prime  minister,  he  or  she  must  submit  their 

resignation as Governor or Deputy Governor. The ECB also welcomes the provision in the draft law 

amending the future Law on BNB that where the Governor or a Deputy Governor is appointed as a 

caretaker  prime  minister,  their  duties  as  Governor  or  Deputy  Governor,  as  the  case  may  be,  are 

terminated with their appointment as a caretaker prime minister since this increases legal certainty 

and enhances clarity as to the point in time at which the resignation becomes legally effective. 

2.2.5  The ECB notes that the Law amending the Constitution and the Law amending the current Law on 

BNB  include  several  factors  which  could  be  regarded  as  mitigating  the  risk  that  the  Governor  or 
Deputy Governor takes stances as caretaker prime minister that are incompatible with the stance of 

12  
13  
14  
15  

See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.1. 
See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.1. 
See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.1. 

See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.1. 

4 

 
ECB-PUBLIC 

the NCB. First, the appointment as caretaker prime minister is meant to be short and new elections 
must be scheduled within two months of appointment. Second, the principal task of the caretaker 

government is to organise fair and free elections. Third, possible restrictions on the powers of the 

caretaker prime minister can be provided in a law as provided in the Constitution. However, despite 

these potentially mitigating factors, in the case of a temporary interruption of the term of office, the 

risk cannot be excluded that the Governor or a Deputy Governor takes stances as caretaker prime 

minister that are incompatible with the stance of the NCB, before going back to his or her position as 

Governor or a Deputy Governor, as a result of which conflicts arise with previous stances taken as 

caretaker prime minister 16. 

2.3  Personal independence 

2.3.1  Pursuant to Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, a Governor may be relieved from office only if 

he or she no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties or if he or 

she has been guilty of serious misconduct. Consequently, the appointment of a BNB Governor as 

caretaker prime minister may not amount to a relieving from office without the existence of such a 

ground. 

2.3.2  The ECB understands that the appointment of a BNB Governor as caretaker prime minister is subject 

to that BNB Governor’s agreement to take up the appointment. The draft law amending the future 

Law on BNB makes this explicit. On this basis, there is no need for the protection of the personal 

independence of the BNB Governor by the mechanism of Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB17. 

The appointment of the BNB Governor as caretaker prime minister in such a case could not amount 

to a relieving from office without the existence of a ground laid down in Article 14.2 of the Statute of 

the ESCB 18. The ECB welcomes the explicit clarification in the draft law amending the future Law on 

BNB that the  appointment  of a BNB Governor  as caretaker prime minister is subject to that BNB 

Governor’s acceptance. 

2.3.3  In this context, it is noted that any provision on a replacement of a BNB Governor introduced into the 

Law on BNB cannot amount to the appointment of another person as Governor for only two months. 

In accordance with Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB, first subparagraph, the term of office of a 

Governor of an NCB must be no less than five years19. In these relatively short periods contemplated 

by the Law amending the current law on BNB and the draft law amending the future Law on BNB, 

the  BNB  Governor  would  also  not  have  the  possibility  of  making  use  of  Article  10.2,  second 

subparagraph, of the Statute of the ESCB and Article 4.4 of the ECB Rules of Procedure and could 

not appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing Council. Making use of this provision would 

16  
17  
18  

19  

See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.1. 
See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.2. 
In the light of the requirements flowing from Article 130 TFEU as to the independence of members of decision-making 
bodies  of  NCBs  other  than  the  Governor,  it  is  understood  that  the  appointment  of  a  Deputy  Governor  of  BNB  as 
caretaker prime minister is also subject to the acceptance of the appointment by the relevant Deputy Governor. 

See the ECB’s Convergence Report 2024, paragraph 7.1.2.2, footnote 198. 

5 

 
presuppose  that  there  is  a  Governor  in  office  who  may  act  as  Governor  but  is  prevented  from 

attending meetings of the Governing Council for a prolonged period (i.e. more than one month) 20. 

ECB-PUBLIC 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 5 July 2024. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

20  

Nevertheless, a representative of BNB, in particular a Deputy Governor, could, pursuant to Article 3.5 of the ECB Rules 
of Procedure, be invited by the Governing Council to attend its meetings, if it deems it appropriate to do so. Under 
certain conditions, such a representative could also vote on shareholder issues under Article 10.3 of the Statute of the 
ESCB. 

6