Summary of Commission Decision of 3 July 2024 declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case M.11071 – DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA / MEF / ITA) (notified under document number C(2024) 4729)
Date: 2024-07-03
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: Italy, air transport, economic concentration, holding company, merger control, ministry, public sector








C_202501343EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2025/1343


27.2.2025






Summary of Commission Decision
of 3 July 2024
         
declaring a concentration compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement
(Case M.11071 – DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA / MEF / ITA)


(notified under document number C(2024) 4729)


(only the English version is authentic)
(C/2025/1343)


On 3 July 2024, the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (1), and in particular Article 8(2) of that Regulation. A non- confidential version of the full Decision can be found in the authentic language of the case on the website of the Directorate- General for Competition, at the following address: https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/cases/M.11071.

1.   THE PARTIES









(1)


Deutsche Lufthansa (‘Lufthansa’) is the holding company of the Lufthansa Group which is headquartered in Cologne, Germany. Its air transport business includes, inter alia, Lufthansa Passenger Airlines, Swiss International Air Lines Ltd. (‘SWISS’), Brussels Airlines S.A./N.V. (‘Brussels Airlines’), Austrian Airlines AG (‘Austrian Airlines’), Air Dolomiti L.A.R.E. S.p.A. (‘Air Dolomiti’), Eurowings GmbH (‘Eurowings’), EW Discover GmbH (‘EW Discover’), and Edelweiss Air AG (‘Edelweiss’). Lufthansa operates hubs in Frankfurt, Munich, Brussels, Zurich and Vienna. Lufthansa is a member of the global airline alliance Star Alliance. Furthermore, Lufthansa has, among others, joint ventures with United Airlines and Air Canada for transatlantic routes (‘A++ JV’) as well as with All Nippon Airways (‘ANA’) for routes to Japan (‘J+ JV’). The JV partners coordinate on price, capacity and scheduling and share revenues. Lufthansa is active worldwide.












(2)


The Ministry of Economy and Finance of Italy (‘MEF’) carries out the tasks and responsibilities of the Italian Government in the fields of economic policy, financial policy, budgeting, and tax policies. The MEF holds shareholdings in public and strategic companies in Italy, among others in the transport sector (ENAV S.p.A., Ferrovie dello Stato) and is the sole shareholder in ITA. The undertakings in which the MEF has shareholdings are active worldwide.












(3)


Italia Trasporto Aereo S.p.A. (‘ITA’) is an Italian airline company, created by the Italian State on 9 October 2020, which is active worldwide. It is headquartered in Rome. ITA is wholly owned by the MEF before the Transaction and is a member of the global airline alliance Sky Team.




2.   THE OPERATION AND UNION DIMENSION









(4)


On 30 November 2023, the Commission received notification of a concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the ‘Merger Regulation’) by which Lufthansa and the MEF (together ‘the Parties’) acquire joint control over ITA (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Transaction’). The entity resulting from the Transaction is designated hereinafter as the ‘Merged Entity’.












(5)


The Parties have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million. Each of them has a Union-wide turnover of more than EUR 250 million, while they do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Union-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. The Transaction therefore has a Union dimension under Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation.




3.   THE PROCEDURE









(6)


By decision of 23 January 2024, the Commission raised serious doubts as to the compatibility of the Transaction with the internal market and adopted a decision to initiate proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. The in-depth investigation did not allow dispelling the competition concerns preliminarily identified. On 25 March 2023, a Statement of Objections (‘SO’) was sent to the Parties by the Commission pursuant to Article 18 of the Merger Regulation.












(7)


On 11 April 2024 and 6 May 2024, the Parties submitted commitments pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation, in order to address the competition concerns identified in the SO. On 18 June 2024, the Notifying Parties submitted revised commitments (the ‘Final Commitments’).




4.   THE RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS









(8)


In the decision, the Commission considers that, for the assessment of the Transactions, the main relevant markets are:






(a)


the supply of scheduled passenger air transport services on the basis of the ‘point of origin/ point of destination’ (‘O&D’) approach; and










(b)


the market for airport infrastructure services in Milan-Linate airport under the airport-by-airport approach.








5.   ASSESSMENT: MARKETS WHERE THE TRANSACTION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPEDE FFECTIVE COMPETITION

5.1.   Common considerations









(9)


In assessing the competitive effects of a concentration, the Commission compares the competitive conditions that would result from the notified merger with the conditions that would have prevailed absent the merger. The decision makes two findings in this respect: First, ITA is likely to be financially sustainable in the short- to medium term, but ITA’s long-term competitiveness as a stand-alone carrier is highly uncertain. ITA’s current business model has similarities with the one operated by its predecessor Alitalia, and Alitalia had a long-standing history of financial difficulties, was continually loss making since 2008 and entered into extraordinary administration in 2017. Second, ITA is on a significant growth trajectory, investing in additional aircraft and expanding capacity on new and existing routes.












(10)


The Commission also collected evidence on the likely effects of the Transaction. First, internal documents of Lufthansa show that Lufthansa is expecting price increases on the overlapping routes after the Transaction. Second, the results of the Commission’s regression analysis to assess the relationship between the competitive landscape and ticket prices charged by Lufthansa clearly point to a finding that increased competition on a route is associated with lower fares from Lufthansa. Third, although the results of the Commission’s market investigation were mixed overall, several market participants expressed concerns about the strong market position of the Parties and the potential negative effects on competition of the Transaction.




5.2.   Unilateral effects – Short Haul









(11)


The Parties’ activities overlap on 12 short-haul routes where both Lufthansa and ITA offer (or intend to offer) direct services. The decision identifies competition concerns on 10 of those routes, partially on a seasonal basis only. Additionally, the parties overlap on many routes where either Lufthansa or ITA offer (or intend to offer) direct services, and the other merging party offers indirect services. The decision identifies competition concerns on 8 such routes, partially on a seasonal basis only.




5.2.1.   Common considerations: Closeness of competition on short-haul routes









(12)


The Commission considers that the Parties are close competitors on the short-haul routes of concern and, on many such routes, even each other’s closest competitors for the following reasons.












(13)


First, evidence in the Commission’s file suggests that the Parties compete more closely on prices and frequencies with one another than with their competitors on each route. Second, evidence in the Commission’s file suggests that the different airport choices made by Lufthansa and ITA on the one hand and their competitors on the other hand has a significant impact on customer choice for flights from one catchment area to another. Third, most competitors, corporate customers, travel agents and tour operators responding to the market investigation consider Lufthansa and ITA to be each other’s closest competitor.




5.2.2.   Common considerations: Entry and expansion on the relevant routes









(14)


The Commission’s market investigation identified several barriers to entry and expansion that reduce the likelihood of existing competitors and new entrants expanding their services or starting new services on the O&D routes assessed in the decision. In particular, the availability of slots in Milan Linate airport, the large slot portfolio of the Parties in certain airports and the Parties’ aggressive practices made possible by those slot portfolios, the airport charges at certain of Lufthansa’s hubs and the network effects of network carriers.




5.2.3.   Direct-direct route overlaps of concern (current)









(15)


First, the Parties would have very high combined market shares, indicating a near-monopoly or very strong position, including on alternative market definitions, on all of the eight short-haul routes of concern where Lufthansa and ITA are currently active. Second, the increment brought about by the Transaction would be large or sizeable on all of the routes. The large level and increment in the Parties’ joint market position is a clear indicator that the Transaction would create or strengthen a dominant position by removing a close competitor. Third, the markets are highly concentrated as indicated by the HHI numbers and increments and the limited number of alternative airlines active on the routes. Fourth, the constraint from the remaining competitors on each route would be insufficient to constrain the Merged Entity, including to the frequency advantages of the Merged Entity. Fifth, there are several barriers to entry and expansion on the routes, and no further, likely, timely and sufficient entry or expansion of competitors is expected on the routes. Sixth, there is specific evidence showing that the transaction is likely to result in negative effects on each of the routes, including market feedback, the Commission’s regression analysis and internal documents by Lufthansa predicting price increases.




5.2.4.   Direct-direct route overlaps of concern (future)









(16)


Concerning Rome-Hamburg and Milan-Vienna routes, there is a significant likelihood that ITA would grow into an effective competitive force on each of the routes. First, ITA has concrete plans to enter the routes. Second, Lufthansa currently holds high to very high market shares on the routes. Third, the markets are concentrated. Fourth, the constraint from the remaining competitors on each route would be insufficient to constrain the Merged Entity. Fifth, ITA would be likely to achieve a sizeable market share on each route after entering the market and would likely become a close, or even the closest, competitor to Lufthansa on each route. Sixth, there is no sufficient number of other potential competitors which could maintain sufficient competitive pressure post-Transaction.




5.2.5.   Routes of concern where one of the Parties operates a direct and the other an indirect service









(17)


The decision finds that the Transaction leads to a significant impediment to effective competition as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on 8 direct-indirect short-haul overlap routes, partially only on a seasonal basis. On those routes, the Transaction would result in a high combined share held by the Parties post-Transaction (>85 % for most seasons of concern). Furthermore, the increment brought by the Transaction would be sizeable (>5 % for most seasons), and the passengers choosing indirect flights represent a significant amount in relation to the overall market size in many of the seasons (>10 %), indicating the importance of indirect connections. Moreover, while the increment brought by the Transaction can be relatively small on many of those routes, the Transaction would in essence remove the only remaining competitive constraint on Lufthansa’s direct flights.




5.3.   Unilateral effects – Long Haul

5.3.1.   Common considerations: Treatment of Lufthansa’s metal-neutral JV partners









(18)


In line with the Commission’s past decisional practice, the activities of the JV partners of the merging parties (i.e., United and Air Canada in the A++ JV and ANA in the J+ joint venture) are aggregated for the purposes of the assessment of the long-haul overlapping routes of concern in the SO and are therefore treated as a single entity for the following reasons.












(19)


First, ITA, controlled by Lufthansa and tied to its strategic management, would cease to have incentives to compete with its parent company Lufthansa and therefore, by extension, with the JV partners. Any strategy or action by ITA that would result in revenue loss for the JV partners on the overlapping routes (among which could be strategies such as lowering prices; opening new routes in competition with the JV; or cooperating with a JV’s competitor) would result in harm to Lufthansa’s revenues, as the JV will distribute less revenues to its partners. Second, the Commission’s investigation clearly shows that ITA’s integration in the JVs is central to the Parties’ deal rationale and an objective of the Transaction to be pursued immediately.




5.3.2.   Common considerations: Relevance of feeder traffic for long-haul operations









(20)


Access to feed traffic plays an important role in long-haul operations. In order to reach a profitable load-factor, long-haul routes generally connect larger metropolitan areas, since more regional destinations do not have sufficiently high demand for profitable operations. Therefore, a pure point-to-point business model which does not rely on feeder traffic for the sustainable operation of long-haul flights, is rarely used for long-haul operations.




5.3.3.   Common considerations: Relevance of indirect connections for the assessment of closeness of competition on long-haul routes









(21)


Based on the results of the market investigation as well as based on passengers’ actual ticket purchasing behaviour (i.e., their revealed preferences), the decision finds that airline passengers prefer direct flights over indirect flights on long-haul routes. Therefore, the decision finds that on routes where two or more airlines offer a direct connection, the airlines offering a direct connection compete more closely with each other than with airlines that only offer indirect connections on the route.




5.3.4.   Common considerations: Barriers to entry and expansion









(22)


The decision identifies several barriers to entry and expansion on the relevant long-haul routes, including: (i) access to feeder traffic; (ii) availability of traffic rights, (iii) availability of slots and existing large slot portfolio of the Parties; (iv) profitability of the route; (v) the strong competitive position of the Parties; and (vi) availability of aircrafts and crews.




5.3.5.   Direct-direct route overlaps of concern









(23)


For the following reasons, the decision finds that the Transaction leads to a significant impediment to effective competition as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position on the following three direct long-haul routes where both parties offer direct services, partially on a seasonal basis: Rome-Washington, Rome-San Francisco, and Rome-Toronto.












(24)


First, the Parties would have high or very high combined market shares the routes Rome-Washington and Rome-San Francisco, indicating a near-monopoly or very strong position. Second, Lufthansa’s A++ JV holds very high market shares, indicating a near-monopoly or very strong position, on the route rome-Toronto where ITA has recently started operations. Third, the increment brought about by the Transaction from ITA would be sizeable to particularly large on the routes: Rome-Washington DC and Rome-San Francisco. Furthermore, ITA’s entry on the route Rome-Toronto in April 2024 will significantly increase the Parties’ combined market share on that route. Fourth, the markets are highly concentrated as indicated by the HHI figures and the limited number of competitors offering direct flights. Fifth, the investigation has shown that the constraint from the remaining competitors (i.e., primarily the Blue Skies JV and the AA-IAG JV) for the abovementioned routes is insufficient to eliminate the significant impediment to effective competition caused by the Transaction. Sixth, the investigation provided evidence that the Parties compete closely on the routes as they are identified as close competitors by market participants, as they operate direct flights and as they operate from the same airport pairs, among other elements.




5.4.   Airport infrastructure services at Milan Linate









(25)


The Commission determined that after the Transaction, the Merged Entity through its slot holding at Milan Linate airport (‘LIN’), would have the ability and incentive to prevent other carriers from getting access to airport infrastructure in LIN and therefore to the markets for the provision of passenger air transport services from LIN.












(26)


Concerning the ability to foreclose, the decision finds that the Parties, in the last four seasons have enjoyed very high slot holdings at LIN, representing more than half of the available slots and that the Transaction has a material impact on the Merged Entity’s slot holding at the airport, in particular at peak times. The high slot holding in combination with the high congestion levels at LIN, leads the Commission to conclude that the Transaction is likely to create or strengthen a dominant slot holding position for the Merged Entity in LIN.












(27)


Concerning the incentive to foreclose, the Commission determined that because of its strong, if not dominant market shares in the relevant passenger air transport markets and the relative capacity constraints faced by the Merged Entity and its competitors, the Merged Entity would also have the incentive post-Transaction to foreclose access of its competitors to the markets for the provision of passenger air transport services at LIN.




6.   ASSESSMENT: MARKETS WHERE THE TRANSACTION WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY IMPEDE EFFECTIVE COMPETITION









(28)


The draft decision finds that the Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition on the following markets:






(a)


Horizontal overlaps in air passenger transport on 2 affected direct/direct short-haul overlap routes (Milan-Stuttgart and Rome-Vienna) and on 45 affected direct/indirect short-haul overlap routes










(b)


Horizontal overlaps in air passenger transport on 2 affected direct/direct long-haul overlap routes (Rome-New York and Rome-Chicago), on 12 affected direct/indirect long-haul overlap routes and on 38 affected indirect/indirect long-haul overlap routes










(c)


Horizontal overlaps in air cargo transport on intra-European routes and on intercontinental routes from Europe to North America, North America to Europe, Europe to Japan and Japan to Europe










(d)


Vertical links between (i) maintenance, repair and overhaul services upstream and air passenger and cargo services downstream; (ii) ground handling service upstream and air passenger services downstream; (iii) cargo handling services upstream and air cargo services downstream; and (iv) flight training services upstream and air passenger services downstream










(e)


Horizontal overlaps in selling tickets to flight ticket distributors










(f)


Non-horizontal links between feeder traffic and air passenger services








7.   COMMITMENTS

7.1.   Description of the Commitments of 11 April 2024
                        









(29)


On 11 April 2024, the Parties submitted commitments intended to remedy the competition concerns identified by the Commission. These included (i) a divestment of slots and entering into an agreement with one or more remedy takers for the short-haul routes; (ii) divesting slots at LIN airport; and (iii) a commitment to fly minimum weekly frequencies during the summer and/or winter seasons for the long-haul routes.












(30)


The Commission decided not to market test the Initial Commitments as it considered that they suffered from several deficiencies affecting their comprehensiveness and/or effectiveness.




7.2.   Description of the Second Commitments of 6 May 2024
                        









(31)


On 6 May 2024, the Parties submitted commitments intended to remedy the competition concerns identified by the European Commission.




7.2.1.   Short-Haul









(32)


The Second Commitments aimed to address the competition concerns on eight short-haul overlaps by requiring the Parties to enter into an agreement with one or more remedy takers and by making available slots and possibly other necessary elements to those remedy takers (‘New Entrant Remedy’). That ‘Entry Commitment Agreement’, to be entered into within a certain period after the Commission clearance decision, would impose the obligation on the remedy taker(s) to enter the routes and operate them until the end of the Minimum Period, that is to say for six consecutive IATA seasons (three years: three summer and three winter seasons)












(33)


During the Minimum Period, the slots shall only be used for scheduled passenger air transport services on the routes and cannot be transferred or assigned. If the remedy takers(s) cease operations on the routes during the first or second year of the three-year period, all slots will automatically fall back to the Parties. The Parties will subsequently commit to procure the divestment to a new taker through the conclusion of a new Entry Commitment Agreement.












(34)


The Second Commitments also aim to address the competition concerns on the eight direct/indirect short-haul overlaps, by entering into a Special Prorate Agreement (‘SPA Commitment’) with the same remedy taker(s). The SPA would connect the remedy taker(s) with all intra-Italian routes served by ITA from Milan Linate airport and Rome Fiumicino airport, enabling the remedy taker(s) to offer indirect connections on the relevant direct/indirect routes and allowing it to replicate ITA’s activities pre-merger.




7.2.2.   LIN airport









(35)


In order to address the competition concerns at LIN airport, the Parties offered to divest slots equal in number to the increment in LIN slots in the following ways. First, the Parties would transfer slots to the remedy taker(s) on the four routes to/from Milan pursuant to the Entry Commitment Agreement. Second, if any of the LIN increment remains, the Parties would transfer additional slots to the remedy taker(s). Third, if any of the LIN increment remains after those transfers, the Parties would transfer all remaining slots of the LIN increment to the slot coordinator. If requested by the remedy taker(s), the total number of slots to be divested could reach 162 weekly slots, equalling 81 weekly frequencies in the summer; and 150 weekly slots, equalling 75 weekly frequencies in the winter.




7.2.3.   Long-Haul









(36)


In order to address the competition concerns for the long-haul overlaps, the Parties offered the following remedies.












(37)


First, the Parties committed to separate ITA’s Long-Haul North Atlantic Business from the rest of Lufthansa’s organisation and by implementing ringfencing measures (‘Hold-Separate and Ringfencing Commitment’) from the closing of the Transaction until the approval of ITA joining the JV (‘ATI immunity’) from the US Department of Transportation (‘DOT’).












(38)


Second, the Parties committed to fly minimum weekly frequencies for the summer and/or the winter seasons, the first such season being from the beginning of the season in which the Parties have received ATI immunity from the DoT.












(39)


Third, the Parties committed to offer agreements to other airlines on flights to/from Rome Fiumicino to other European airports with respect to the long-haul overlaps. If taken up, such agreements would have allowed the remedy taker(s) to exercise competitive pressure on the Merged Entity by getting access to feeder traffic between Rome and their own respective hubs.




7.3.   Description of the Commitments of 18 June 2024
                        









(40)


On 18 June 2024, the Parties submitted a final set of commitments intended to remedy the competition concerns identified by the European Commission pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation (the ‘Final Commitments’). These include:






(a)


Commitments to address the competition concerns on the ten direct/direct short-haul overlaps by entering into an agreement with one or two remedy takers and by making available slots and possibly other necessary elements to those remedy takers (‘New Entrant Remedy’);










(b)


Commitments to address the competition concerns on the eight direct/indirect short-haul overlaps by entering into a Special Prorate Agreement (‘SPA’) or an agreement of similar kind to enable connectivity in relation to ITA’s domestic network (‘SPA Commitment’);










(c)


Commitments to address the competition concerns at LIN airport by divesting slots (‘LIN Slots Remedy’); and










(d)


Commitments to address the long-haul overlaps by entering into an agreement with a suitable purchaser for one of three alternative remedy options (‘Long Haul Commitments’).








7.3.1.   Short-Haul









(41)


The Final Commitments concerning the short-haul routes of concern substantially incorporate the short-haul remedies as set out in the Second Commitments. In the Final Commitments, the Parties extended the scope of the New Entrant Remedy to include two additional routes: (i) Rome – Hamburg, and (ii) Milan (MXP or LIN) – Vienna. Moreover, the Final Commitments (i) further clarify that the terms of the SPA or similar kind shall be the better of those of any SPA between ITA and Lufthansa or those of a comparable SPA agreement that ITA has entered with its alliance partners, (ii) extend the duration of the SPA or similar agreement to five years (as opposed to three years), and (iii) modifies the deadline to sign the agreement.




7.3.2.   LIN airport









(42)


With regard to LIN airport, the Final Commitments largely incorporates the remedy as set out in the Second Commitments.




7.3.3.   Long-Haul









(43)


The Final Commitments concerning the long-haul overlaps removed all previous remedies. The Final Commitments instead introduced a remedy which can be implemented in one of three ways and that has as its objective to enhance frequencies of direct or one-stop connections on the long-haul routes of concern (the ‘Long-Haul Remedy Routes’). The duration of the long-haul remedy is three years (which can be extended to five years under option 2).




7.3.3.1.   Option 1: Increase of direct frequencies by a competitor









(44)


Under the first Option, the Parties would have to enter into an agreement with at least one suitable remedy taker, in order to establish on the Long-Haul Remedy Routes a frequency increase as set out in Schedule 1 to the Final Commitments.




7.3.3.2.   Option 2: Increased Connectivity through interlining agreements, slot swaps or retimings









(45)


Under the second Option, the Parties ensure that there is an increase in competitive indirect flights options on each of the Long-Haul Remedy Routes. This would be achieved by entering into cooperation tools (such as interlining agreements, slot swaps and slot re-timings) with remedy takers on flights to and from Rome FCO to other airport hub(s) located in Europe or in North America. Specifically, the Parties will create 10 additional competitive indirect connections per week on each of the routes, with the exception of the Rome-San Francisco route in the winter season where the Parties will create 3 per week.












(46)


The remedy taker(s) must be two competitors that are independent of and unconnected to the Parties or their A++ JV partners. Furthermore, one of the Long-Haul Remedy Takers must rely on its own operations or interlining with independent third parties, whereas the second Long-Haul Remedy Taker may rely on cooperation agreements (interlining or other) with the Parties.




7.3.3.3.   Option 3: Increased Connectivity through (i) direct frequencies and (ii) interlining agreements, slot swaps or retimings









(47)


The third option involves a combination of Option 1 (frequency increase of direct connections) and Option 2 (additional one-stop connections). The Parties would have to enter into agreement(s) with suitable remedy takers, in order to establish a combination of additional direct and indirect connections.




8.   ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITMENTS SUBMITTED









(48)


The decision concludes that, on balance, the Final Commitments address the competition issues raised by the Transaction in their entirety, mainly because (i) the short-haul commitments will ensure market entry by a suitable remedy taker on each of the routes of concern, (ii) the LIN remedy will ensure the divestment of more than the increment in slots at LIN airport to a suitable remedy taker and (iii) the long-haul remedy will increase sufficiently the direct frequencies and/or indirect options on the long-haul routes. This assessment takes into account the extraordinary and case-specific factors of the Transaction – notably (i) that ITA’s long-term competitiveness as a standalone carrier is highly uncertain, also having regard to the past negative performance that Alitalia registered both as stand-alone carrier and as partner of a network carrier, (ii) and that, following the Transaction, ITA will retain some ability and incentive to compete against Lufthansa’s A++ joint venture partners, in particular due to the presence of MEF as a controlling shareholder




9.   CONCLUSION









(49)


The decision concludes that, subject to full compliance with the commitments given by the Parties, the proposed concentration will not significantly impede effective competition in the internal market or in a substantial part of it.












(50)


Consequently, the concentration is declared compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, in accordance with Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement.






(1)  
            OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/1343/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)