REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2025-2029)
Date: 2024-06-26
Institutions: Directorate-General for Budget, European Commission
Subjects: EU budget, EU expenditure, Member States' contribution, budget policy, budgetary resources, long-term forecast, multiannual financial framework, own resources

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 26.6.2024  COM(2024) 276 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Long-term forecast of future inflows and outflows of the EU budget (2025-2029) {SWD(2024) 163 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 

2. FORECAST OF OUTFLOWS OF THE EU BUDGET 2025-2029 ............................................................................ 2 

2.1.Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF .................................................................................. 3 

2.2. Payments for the completion of outstanding commitments ................................................................................................ 5 

2.3. Decommitments ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 

2.4. NextGenerationEU ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 7 

2.5. Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments .................................................................................................................. 8 

3. FORECAST OF INFLOWS OF THE EU BUDGET 2025-2029 ................................................................................ 9 

4. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................................. 11 

ANNEX II – RESULTS OF THE FORECAST ................................................................................................................... 13 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2025-2029 for the MFF............................................................... 13 

Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF .................................................................... 14 

Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments ......................................................................................... 15 

Table 2 – Forecast decommitments 2025-2027........................................................................................................................................ 16 

Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU ................................................................................................... 16 

Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2025 to 2027 ...................................................................... 17 

Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 2025-2029 .......................................................... 18 

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1.  Introduction 

This  report  projects  the  inflows  and  outflows  of  the  EU  budget  for  the  next  five  years  in  accordance  with  Article 
247(1)(c) of the Financial Regulationi. This fourthii edition forecasts the revenue and expenditure stemming from the 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027iii and NextGenerationEUiv over the period 2025-2029v. For 2028-
2029,  the  forecast  only  includes  expenditures  related  to  the  MFF  2021-2027  as  the  next  MFF  has  not  yet  been 
established. 

Payments from the EU budget follow commitments. The estimates for payments presented in this report are based 
on the revised expenditure ceilings (technical adjustment of the MFF for 2025)vi and the commitment appropriations 
included  in  the  financial  programming  accompanying  the  draft  budget  for  2025vii,  which  incorporates  the 
programme-specific  adjustments  under  Article  5  of  the  MFF  Regulationviii  (MFFR)ix  as  well  as  re-use  of 
decommitments under Article 15(3)x of the Financial Regulation. 

The impact of the MFF mid-term revision is included. The agreement recognised the importance of the priorities set 
out by the Commission in its proposal, which led to a net reinforcement of the expenditure ceiling for commitments 
of  EUR 3.4 billion  (in  current  prices)xi,  together  with  changes  to  the  overall  allocations  under  Article  5  MFFR  and 
Article  15(3)  of  the  Financial  Regulationxii  as  well  as  reinforcements  to  special  instruments  over  and  above  the 
expenditure ceilings. 

Furthermore,  two  additional  special  instrumentsxiii  have  been  established:  the  Ukraine  Reserve,  outside  the 
expenditure ceilings, with non-repayable support up to EUR 17 billion, complemented by a budgetary cover for loans 
for  up  to  EUR 33 billion;  and  the  EURI  Instrument,  over  and  above  the  ceilings  of  the  MFF,  which  will  provide  a 
sustainable  solution  for  the  financing  of  the  NextGenerationEU  financing  costs.  Under  the  third  step  of  the  EURI 
Instrument, an amount equivalent to decommitments of appropriations, other than external assigned revenue, made 
since the beginning of the current MFF should be drawn on first. Amounts of decommitments made available again 
in accordance with existing relevant provisions should not be taken into account. 

In  addition,  the  Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform  (STEP)  Regulationxiv  provides  several  flexibilities  for 
priorities dedicated to STEP in the cohesion programmes. The STEP priorities can benefit from 100% EU co-financing 
and additional  pre-financing,  which  will  help  speed  up  project  implementation  in  the  current  programming  period. 
Following  the  adoption  of  the  STEP  Regulation,  an  exceptional  one-off  pre-financing  amounting  to  30%  of  the 
overall JTF allocation (EUR 5.9 billion) was paid to the Member States in March 2024. Furthermore, the deadline for 
the  submission  of  the  final  application  for  an  interim  payment  for  the  final  accounting  year  of  the  2014-2020 
period  has  been  extended  until  31  July  2025.  Amounts  from  resources  other  than  REACT-EU  reimbursed  by  the 
Commission as interim payments in 2025 to the 2014-2020 programmes shall not exceed 1 % of the total financial 
appropriations to the programme concerned by Fund, REACT-EU resources excluded. 

Furthermore, the mid-term revision included an increase in the maximum amount for the annual adjustment carried 
out in the framework of the Single Margin Instrument and referred to in Article 11(3) MFFR for the year 2026 by the 
amount equivalent to the unused portion of the maximum amount for year 2025. 

As  regards  revenue,  the  forecast  is  based  on  the  revenue  system  of  the  Own  Resources  Decisionxv.  The  revenue 
projections  also  consider  the  Agreement  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Communityxvi (‘Withdrawal Agreement’). 

Together with the MFF estimates, this forecast projects payments on all programmes under NextGenerationEU. This 
expenditure, additional to the spending under the MFF, is financed by revenue proceeds from borrowing operations 
on the capital markets. 

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This forecast estimates the outstanding payments resulting from commitments made in programmes from the MFF 
2021-2027  and  earlier,  while  payments  related  to  post-2027  MFF  programmes  are  outside  of  the  scope  of  this 
forecast. 

2.  Forecast of outflows of the EU budget 2025-

2029 

Over  the  period  2025-2029,  payments  are  estimated  at  EUR 947 billion,  including  EUR 799 billion  under  the  MFF 
payment ceiling and EUR 148 billion from NextGenerationEU non-repayable supportxvii. 

The forecast includes the future programme-specific adjustments based on Article 5 of the MFF Regulation and the 
re-use of decommitments under Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation for the years 2026-2027. The programme-
specific  adjustments  are  expected  to  result  in  an  automatic  upward  adjustment  of  the  MFF  ceilings  for 
commitments  and  payments  of  EUR 11.6 billionxviii  in  the  period  2022-2027.  The  exact  annual  adjustment  will 
depend on the revenue from competition fines in the previous year for an overall amount of EUR 10 155 million (in 
2018 prices) by 2027. It also includes estimated payments under the Ukraine Reserve in 2025. 

Chart 1 - Payments forecast by category 

Payments from the EU budget are not uniformly distributed across the period 2025-2029. The forecast depends on 
the evolution of: 1) the payments from spending programmes financed by the MFF 2021-2027 (82% of the total 
payments),  2) the disbursements from NextGenerationEU (16% of the payments), and 3) the payments  stemming 
from  outstanding  commitments  of  the  MFF  2014-2020  and  earlier  (2%  of  the  payments).  The  estimated  annual 
average of the outflows of the EU budget is EUR 189 billion, with EUR 74 billion on average for 2025-26 financed by 
borrowing on the capital markets for NextGenerationEU programmes. The forecast for 2028-29 corresponds to the 
outstanding  payments  resulting  from  commitments  made  in  programmes  from  the  MFF  2021-2027  and  earlier, 
while payments related to post-2027 MFF programmes are outside of the scope of this forecast. 

Overall payments are expected to increase in 2025 and 2026 compared to 2024. The projections for the payments 
from  MFF  2021-2027  show  a  gradual  increase  in  years  2025-2026  as  programmes  reach  cruising  speed. 
NextGenerationEU  payments  are  expected  to  accelerate  as  well  in  2025  and  2026,  compared  to  2024.  With  the 
finalisation  of  NextGenerationEU  implementation  in  2026,  the  bulk  of  payments  in  2026-27  correspond  to  the 
2021-2027 MFF programmes. 

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In  relation  to  the  expenditure  under  the  MFF  2021-2027  and  its  predecessors,  the  average  annual  forecast  for 
payments is EUR 160 billion. In 2025, EUR 153 billion are estimated, followed by increases in subsequent years, with 
a slight peak in 2027. Albeit currently more accentuated due to significant implementation delays, this pattern was 
observed  in  previous  MFFs  as  well  due  to  the  progressive  reduction  of  payments  and  closure  of  the  previous 
programming period and the phase-in of new programmes reaching their cruising speed only from the second half 
of the MFF or after. 

The  forecast  for  the  unallocated  margin  under  the  payment  ceilings  for  2025-2027  defined  as  the  difference 
between  the  forecast  payments  under  the  MFF  ceiling  and  the  payment  ceiling  set  in  the  annual  technical 
adjustment is estimated at EUR 13 billion. The existence of positive or negative margins are the consequence of a 
stable payment ceiling in real terms and the variable path of the programmes under the EU budget, mainly driven by 
the  implementation  of  cohesion  policy.  Pursuant  to  the  automatic  adjustment  mechanism  carried  out  in  the 
framework of the Single Margin Instrument and referred to in Article 11(1)(b) MFFR, the unspent amounts in a year 
will increase the future annual ceilings. Therefore, the positive margins prior to 2025 increase the ceilings in 2025-
2027  within  the  limits  set  by  Article  11(3)  MFFR.  Furthermore,  as  per  Article  11(3a)  of  the  Multiannual  Financial 
Framework Regulation, the unused margin from 2025 is to be transferred to 2026. Considering these adjustments 
as well as the future programme-specific adjustment of Article 5 MFFR (which will increase the payment ceilings by 
an  additional  EUR 5 billion),  the  MFF  2021-2027  payment  ceiling  is  expected  to  cater  for  the  total  expected 
payments. Particularly as a result of the mid-term revision of the MFF, there appears to be no risk of an abnormal 
backlog during the remainder of the MFF at current implementation forecast. 

Chart 2 - Payments forecast vs. MFF payment ceiling for the period 2025-2027 

2.1.  Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

Cohesion and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) represent more than half of the  projected payments stemming 
from the 2021-2027 MFF. The implementation of these two policies largely drives the estimates of the long-term 
payment forecast. 

Heading 2a - Cohesion policy 

After  the  approval  of  all  the  cohesion  programmes  by  the  end  of  2022,  the  implementation  of  the  2021-2027 
programmes  started  in  this  year  with  the  disbursement  of  the  pre-financing  for  2021  and  2022,  as  well  as  the 
additional  pre-financing  for  FAST-CARE.  In  2023  and  2024,  further  pre-financing  and  interim  payments  are  being 

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disbursed, though at slower pace than in the previous programming period. The budget demand of the draft budget 
for  2025,  which  is  still  below  the  central  scenario  proposed  in  the  forecast  of  last  year,  shows  that  the 
implementation  of  cohesion  policy  is  delayed  compared  to  the  historic  benchmark  of  the  period  2014-2020.  The 
three  cohesion  funds  under  heading  2a  (the  European  Regional  Development  Fund,  the  Cohesion  Fund,  and  the 
European  Social  Fund  Plus)  accumulate  delays  compared  to  the  historical  profile  and  the  forecasts  proposed  last 
yearxix.  It  is  expected  that  by  the  end  of  2025  the  payments  stemming  from  cohesion  policy  would  be  below  the 
previous MFF (21% in the previous MFF compared to the current rate of 14%), which reflects the delayed approval 
of  the  plans,  national  authorities’  efforts  to  finalise  the  2014-2020  programmes,  and  the  implementation  of 
NextGenerationEU. 

Considering  the  latest  information  on  implementation,  it  is  assumed  that  Members  States  will  speed  up 
implementation in 2026 compared to 2025 to catch up and thus reduce the risk of decommitments. It is assumed 
that the submission of  payment claims  would reach the  historical profile  in 2027 and the cruising speed in 2028 
and 2029. This forecast also considers the impact of STEP equivalent to an uptake of 2.5%. EUR 2.7 billion (30% of 
the total STEP programmed amounts) in pre-financing is estimated to be paid in 2025. The forecast assumes that 
STEP  will  have  an  impact  on  ERDF,  ESF+  and  CF,  and  a  full  implementation  of  the  total  funding  programmed  for 
STEP in a shorter time-span of five years (from 2026 to 2030) compared to the historical profile for these funds. 

This  forecast  assumes  that  Member  States  will  use  all  the  available  possibilities  to  avoid  decommitments,  given 
protracted  delays  when  compared  to  last  year’s  report.  The  forecast  projects  that  Member  States  will  submit 
substantial payment claims by the end of the year to be processed in the following one. This submission of payment 
claims  would  reduce  the  risk  of  decommitments.  The  forecast  payments  for  the  2021-2027  cohesion  policy 
programmes under the scenario proposed in this forecast amount to EUR 278 billion for the period 2025-2029, 
while last year’s forecast for the period 2024-2028 was estimated at EUR 220 billion. Comparing the same period, 
i.e. for the years 2024-2028, this year’s forecast estimates payments amounting to EUR 216 billion, confirming the 
delay in implementation, despite the mitigating impact of STEP.  

The  current  forecast  implies  substantial  decommitments  as  of  2027,  unless  Member  States  undertake  additional 
efforts to catch up with the implementation gap see section 2.3 on decommitments also considering the  impact of 
STEP implementation. To avoid this risk, Member States need to implement in the next years at a much faster pace 
than in the period 2014-2020. 

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Just Transition Fund  

The  payments  forecast  for  the  Pillar  I  of  the  CAP,  market-related  expenditure  and  direct  payments,  amounts  to 
EUR 122 billion over 2025-2027, reflecting the most recent financial programming. 

Following the submission and approval of all the CAP Strategic Plans, the implementation of Pillar II – the European 
Agricultural  Fund  for  Rural  Development  (EAFRD)  –  under  the  2023-2027  CAP  started  on  time.  The  transitional 
provisions  extending  the  2014-2020  programmes  up  to  2022  allowed  the  continuation  of  their  implementation 
under the n+3 rule. 

The  forecast  of  payments  stemming  from  the  MFF  2021-2027  includes  the  payments  from  the  2023-2027  CAP 
Plans as well as those linked to the extension of the rural development programmes to 2021 and 2022 (see point 
2.2.  Payments  on  pre-2021  commitments)  that  will  be  completed  by  2026  with  limited  payments  expected  for 
2027. This forecast also considers the transfers between pillars of the Common Agricultural Policy communicated by 
Member Statesxx, which resulted in a net transfer of EUR 3.7 billion from Pillar I (EAGF) to  Pillar II (EAFRD) for the 
years 2025-2027. 

With the 2014-2022 rural development programmes approaching their closure and implementation of the new CAP 
plans running, the payments are projected to run steadily in the coming years, peaking in 2026. This is due to the 

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overlap  of  payments  on  outstanding  commitments  from  the  programmes  2014-2020  and  the  transitional  period 
years 2021-2022, both working under N+3 decommitment rule, together with the phasing-in of the 2023-2027 CAP 
Plans which follow a N+2 decommitment rule. 

No payments under the MFF ceilings, except for limited amounts for administrative expenditure, are planned for the 
Just  Transition  Fund  in  the  budget  2024  and  in  the  draft  budget  2025  as  priority  is  given  to  the  use  of 
NextGenerationEU  funding  available  until  2026.  The  payment  of  the  pre-financing  related  to  STEP  under 
NextGenerationEU  has  already  taken  place  in  2024  and  additional  payments  are  expected  for  2025  also  from 
NextGenerationEU  funding.  The  forecast  of  this  year  proposes  Member  States’  full  use  of  the  funding  under 
NextGeneration EU until 2026. From 2027 Member States will then focus on the use of MFF funding. 

Other programmes and headings 

The  payment  forecast  is  increased  compared  to  last  year,  notably  in  heading  1  –  Single  Market,  Innovation  and 
Digital and heading 5 – Security and Defence. Under heading 1, flagship programmes are catching up and expected 
to reach cruising speed. Under heading 5, the reinforcements stemming from the mid-term revision are expected to 
lead to additional payments. Catch-up is expected as of 2026-27. 

The  update  of  the  European  Recovery  Instrument  (EURI)  interest  line  reflects  the  draft  budget  for  2025.  The  line 
caters for the increased cost of funding to finance the corresponding borrowing and lending activities. The increased 
cost of funding is due to the substantially higher interest rates leading to cost overruns, which will mainly depend on 
the profile of disbursements. Hence, the forecast of the cost overrun for 2026 and 2027 is not stable enough to be 
included directly in the financial programming, and is not reflected in this report. 

The Ukraine Reserve is a thematic special instrument which serves to mobilise the support other than in the form of 
loans of the Ukraine Facility.  Such non-repayable support concerns all three pillars of  the Ukraine Facility and the 
support  expenditure  for  a  total  amount  of  up  to  EUR 17 billion  for  the  period  2024-2027.  The  commitment 
appropriations and corresponding payment appropriations from the Ukraine Reserve are mobilised annually by the 
European Parliament and the Council in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure, taking into consideration 
that the annual maximum amount for support other than in the form of loans is of EUR 5 billion. As the amounts for 
payments  are  subject  to  annual  decisions  by  Parliament  and  Council  in  the  context  of  the  annual  budgetary 
procedure, in line with the Ukraine Facility Regulationxxi, and there is insufficient information about implementation 
pattern of this recently adopted instrument, no forecast is provided for payments. 

2.2.  Payments for the completion of outstanding commitments 

The  payments  of  outstanding  commitments  (RAL  for  reste  à  liquider)  is  forecast  at  EUR 24 billion  for  the  period 
2025-2029. 

Heading 2a – Cohesion policy 

Most  payments  on  pre-2021  commitments  relate  to  the  cohesion  policy  programmes,  which  are  close  to  their 
closure. The payment projections are based on the latest Member States’ forecast (January 2024) and information 
on the implementation on the ground.  

Following the changes proposed in STEP, the deadline for submitting the final application for an interim payment for 
the final accounting year was extended by 12 months to 31 July 2025. Nevertheless, limited payments are expected 
in 2025 and afterwards, considering the retention rate and pre-financing clearance.  

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Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy  

As  in  the  previous  forecast,  the  completion  of  the  2014-2022  operational  rural  development  programmes  is 
expected for 2026 with very limited payments for 2027. Most of the interim payments are to be paid in 2025, and a 
larger amount of payments in 2026 is expected due to the EAFRD’s expected payments at closure. 

Other programmes and headings 

Most  of  the  outstanding  payments  for  the  rest  of  the  budget  are  divided  between  Heading  1  –  Single  Market, 
Innovation  and  Digital  –  and  Heading  6  –  Neighbourhood  and  the  World.  Completion  under  Heading  1  is  now 
expected earlier than in previous estimations, based on the latest information about implementation on the ground. 

2.3.  Decommitments 

The  de-commitments’  forecast  stemming  from  the  programmes  of  the  current  and  prior  MFFs  over  2025-2027 
stands  at  EUR 8.8 billion,  increasing  compared  to  last  year’s  forecast  projections  for  the  years  2024-2027.  The 
increase  is  mostly  driven  by  the  cohesion  programmes  under  the  current  MFF  and  the  EAFRD.  Most  of  these 
decommitmentsxxii are eligible for the EURI Instrument to cover the cost overruns above the budget availabilities. 

Heading 2a – Cohesion policy 

The amounts at risk of de-commitments for the completion of the programmes 2014-2020 is increased compared 
to the previous report following the forecasts provided by Member States. 

Cohesion  programmes  for  the  period  2021-2027  are  forecast  to  face  important  risks  from  2027  when  the 
decommitment  targets  for  the  commitments  made  in  2023  apply.  It  is  estimated  that  the  rate  of  submission  of 
payment claims will still trail behind that of 2014-2020 due to the delay in the approval of the programmes and the 
low  uptake  in  the  budgets  2023,  2024,  and  draft  budget  2025.  The  de-commitment  risk  could  only  decrease  if 
implementation  accelerates  in  2026  and  2027  beyond  the  scenario  proposed  in  this  forecast.  However,  if  this 
acceleration  does  not  materialise  and  the  implementation  pace  remains  relatively  flat,  the  amounts  at  risk  of 
decommitment would be substantially larger even after considering the expected impact of STEP on cohesion policy. 

Heading 3 - Common Agricultural Policy and Just Transition Fund  

The  forecast  for  decommitments  of  the  programmes  2014-2022  of  the  EAFRD  increases  compared  with  the 
forecasts of last year, reaching the historical profile of the period 2007-13 and these are expected at closure of the 
programmes  in  2026.  The  increase  in  the  expected  amount  of  decommitments  results  from  the  recent 
implementation  and  the  forecast  from  Member  States.  If  any,  decommitments  for  the  2023-2027  CAP  Strategic 
Plans would be assumed at closure (i.e. in 2030), and are hence outside the scope of this report.  

As for the Just Transition Fund, payments from NextGeneration EU funding were made in 2024 including exceptional 
STEP  pre-financing,  the  regular  annual  pre-financing  and  limited  interim  payments  while  additional  payments  are 
planned for 2024 and 2025 further minimising the decommitment risk.  

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Other programmes and headings 

For the programmes directly managed by the Commission, the decommitment forecast is built on the most recent 
project-level information. As in the previous report, the projections for the decommitments related to the MFF 2021-
2027 programmes are based on the decommitment rates of the predecessor programmes. This year, the forecast 
includes  information  from  the  implementation  profile  for  the  MFF  2021-27  thus  far.  The  exact  year  of 
decommitment  would  depend  on  the  closure  of  individual  projects  and  actions  that  cannot  be  forecast  with 
precision. 

2.4.    NextGenerationEU 

NextGenerationEUxxiii  is  a  temporary  emergency  instrument  for  crisis  response,  recovery,  and  resilience  measures 
following  the  COVID-19  crisis.  The  non-repayable  support  component  of  NextGenerationEU  constitutes  external 
assigned  revenue  to  fund  reform  and  investment  priorities  –  in  particular  through  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility  (RRF)  –  and  through  reinforcing  a  number  of  key  programmes  for  the  recovery.  To  present  the  impact  of 
NextGenerationEU in a transparent manner, the estimates of the expected implementation of the external assigned 
revenue are drawn separately for each programme (see Table 3). The forecast is established based on the annual 
commitment instalments provided in the financial programming accompanying the draft budget 2025. 

The centrepiece of NextGenerationEU is the  Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which accounts for  80% of the 
non-repayable allocationsxxiv. NextGenerationEU outflows are largely  determined by the  pace of  disbursements for 
the RRF. The RRF is halfway through its implementation phase, and progresses commensurate to the achievement of 
milestones and targets linked to reforms and investments by the Member States. 

As of May 2024, all 27 Member States have updated their national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) to take the 
update of the RRF allocation into account. Almost all Member States have included dedicated REPowerEU Chapters 
to their national RRPs, following the Commission’s REPowerEU plan to become more energy independent and foster 
the  energy  transition  towards  sustainable  renewable  energy  sources.  In  addition  to  that,  REPowerEU  chapters 
submitted by Ireland and Germany are currently under the Commission’s assessment  with a view to be adopted in 
the  following  months.  In  total,  EUR 232 billion  was  disbursed  (EUR 148 billion  in  non-repayable  support  and 
EUR 84 billion in the form of loans) out of around EUR 648 billion in committed RRF non-repayable and loan support 
for both the RRF and REPowerEU. This includes EUR 56.5 billion in pre-financing for RRF and EUR 10.5 billion in pre-
financing  for  REPowerEU  (both  for  repayable  and  non-repayable  support).  The  present  forecast  is  based  on  the 
disbursement planning of the individual RRPs, including amendments already approved. Depending on the progress 
in  implementation  of  the  national  RRPs,  RRF  annual  non-repayable  support  is  expected  to  reach  a  level  of 
EUR 65 billion  in  2025,  and  around  EUR 70 billion  in  2026xxv.  Compared  to  last  year’s  forecast,  the  profile  for 
disbursements  is  somewhat  backloaded  based  on  the  updated  RRPs.  Based  on  the  current  Member  State  plans, 
there are no decommitments estimated in this forecast. 

Member States by far and large prioritised using non-repayable support to finance investments and reforms rather 
than  loan  support.  In  line  with  Article  14(6)  of  the  amended  RRF  Regulation,  in  total  13  Member  States  have 
requested loans and additional loan support is committed for a total of EUR 291 billion. 

REACT-EU  is  the  second  largest  instrument  of  NextGenerationEU,  representing  12%  of  the  non-repayable  support 
and distributing additional resources in 2021 and 2022 through some of the existing cohesion policy funds (ERDF, 
ESF, and FEAD). REACT-EU commitments took place over 2021-2022. Member States can use funding under REACT-
EU to address refugee flows following the Russian  war of aggression against Ukraine. To alleviate the pressure on 
national budgets and allow faster and easier implementation of measures related to the integration of third country 
nationals, the Commission proposed increased pre-financing and simplified cost options in 2022xxvi. Interim and final 
payments in the current  forecast are concentrated over 2022-2024, in line with REACT-EU objectives to speed up 

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the  delivery  by  using  already  existing  programmes  and  providing  full  flexibility  of  the  implementation  rules. 
Compared to last year’s forecast, REACT-EU payments are expected to increase in 2024 in view of the extension of 
the deadline to submit payment requests as agreed in the STEP Regulation. Some final closure payments under both 
the ESF and ERDF are expected by the end of 2025. 

The other five  programmes  supported through  NextGenerationEU take up the remaining  8% of the non-repayable 
allocation. The forecast of payments considers the experience with predecessor programmes, taking into account the 
shorter cycle of commitments and the focus on immediate recovery needs. The Just Transition Fund (JTF) has been 
affected by the delays in the adoption of the MFF and the programme-specific legislation. All JTF programmes were 
adopted  by end of 2022, except for  the one for Bulgaria, which was adopted in 2023.  The implementation phase 
started  directly  after  the  adoption  of  the  programmes,  with  all  disbursements  projected  over  2023-2026.  For 
InvestEU, the forecast reflects the expected provisioning schedule of the budgetary guarantee, expenditure for the 
advisory hub and support expenses. 

2.5.    Evolution of the level of outstanding commitments 

The  total  RAL  from  the  2021-2027  and  previous  MFFs  is  expected  to  decrease  gradually  over  the  period  2025-
2027, from EUR 474 billion to EUR 365 billion. Compared to last year’s forecast (EUR 322 billion), this represents an 
increase of EUR 43 billion. This year, the RAL also includes the Ukraine Facility. With cohesion accounting for a large 
share, the implementation of this policy under the N+3 decommitment rule will determine the overall evolution in 
the stock of outstanding commitments, with the backload of payments towards the end of the MFF and after (see 
point  2.1).  As  for  NextGenerationEU,  the  RAL  will  be  progressively  settled  until  the  end  of  2026  when  all  the 
payments will need to be completed, except for very small amounts linked to administrative expenditure. 

The  forecast  for  the  evolution  of  RAL  stemming  from  the  2021-2027  and  previous  MFFs  (excluding 
NextGenerationEU) as a share of the EU-27 GNI would decline from 2.4% to 1.85% in 2027, which is explained by 
the  increase  in  the  RAL  that  it  is  compensated  by  the  growth  of  the  EU-27  GNI.  The  RAL  reflects  the  state  of 
implementation of the  budget to-date, including delays in cohesion policy and agriculture, which are estimated to 
persist until the end of the programming period. 

The  projections  for  the  post-2027  MFF  are  not  considered.  Since  the  MFF  2021-27  will  conclude  in  2027,  the 
forecast data for 2028-29 only refers to commitments made in the period 2021-27. The rate of absorption of the 
RAL would be influenced by the successor MFF. Hence, the RAL forecast is only done until the end of 2027. 

Chart  3  –  Evolution  of  the  level  of  outstanding  commitments  (RAL)  over  2025-2027,  measured  in 
percentage of the Union’s Gross National Income 

8 

 
 
3.  Forecast of inflows of the EU budget  

2025-2029 

The EU budget is financed by own resources and other revenue. In addition, the Union is empowered to borrow funds 
to  finance  NextGenerationEU,  which  are  channelled  into  the  budget  through  external  assigned  revenue.  The 
Commission mobilises the funds through operations on international capital markets, in line with the financing needs 
of  NextGenerationEU’s  spending  programmes  (see  point  2.4).  To  this  end,  the  Commission  follows  a  diversified 
funding  strategyxxvii  and,  as  part  of  this  strategy,  publishes  annual  borrowing  decisions  and  six-monthly  funding 
plans.  The  present  forecast  focuses  on  the  revenue  necessary  to  finance  the  budget  expenditure  within  the  MFF 
(excluding the non-repayable support from NextGenerationEU). 

The own resources needed to finance the budget is determined by total expenditure less ‘other revenue’. Accordingly, 
the forecast of the EU budget revenue for 2025-2029 is based on the principle that expenditure must be matched 
by revenue; therefore, total revenue equals total expenditure. 

Since  2021,  in  line  with  the  Withdrawal  Agreement  (part  V),  the  United  Kingdom  contributes  to  the  EU  budget  in 
relation to outstanding commitments of previous financial frameworks. This includes the RAL at the end of 2020, as 
well  as  pensions  and  other  liabilities  laid  down  in  the  financial  settlement.  The  United  Kingdom’s  contribution 
constitutes ‘other revenue’ of the EU budget and is not part of the Union’s own resources. It will progressively phase-
out as the outstanding commitments will be settled. 

Other  miscellaneous  revenue  not  forming  part  of  the  Union’s  own  resources  are  assumed  to  remain  nominally 
constant at the level of the 2025 draft budget. 

Own  resources  –  national  contributions  and customs duties  –  account  for  most  of  the  revenue  needed  to  finance 
budget expenditure. The projections are based on the Own Resources Decision in forcexxviii. They do not consider the 
Commission’s  proposals  on  new  own  resources  of  20  June  2023xxix.  Mainly  the  spending  cycle  determines  the 
development  of  national  contributions  over  the  forecast  period.  After  the  slow  start  of  important  spending 
programmes, increasing expenditure due to accelerated programme implementation will lead to increasing national 
contributions  in  2025-2027.  On  average  for  the  period  2025-2027,  national  contributions  are  projected  at 
EUR 153 billion per year or 0.80% of the EU’s Gross National Income. 

For  2028  and  2029,  the  forecast  is  limited  to  expenditure  resulting  from  the  current  MFF  and  does  not  include 
expenditure for the next MFF. Therefore, the corresponding forecast of revenue needs, in particular the GNI-based 
own resource, is incomplete. 

9 

 
 
 
Chart 4 - Revenue forecast for financing the MFF 2025-2029 

In any given year, the total own resources collected by the Union may not exceed the own resources ceiling set in 
the  Own  Resources  Decision  of  1.4%  of  Gross  National  Income  of  the  EU  Member  States,  with  an  additional 
temporary  increase  of  0.6%  of  EU  GNI  for  covering  all  liabilities  of  the  Union  from  the  borrowing  on  the  capital 
markets  to  fund  NextGenerationEU.  While  own  resources  are  projected  to  grow  in  2026  and  2027,  the  available 
margin under the own resources celling (so-called headroom) is expected to decline as payments and revenues are 
expected to increase in 2025 and 2026 compared to 2024, while the Union’s Gross National Income is expected to 
only increase gradually over the same yearsxxx. The margin under the permanent ceiling is set to decline from around 
EUR 115 billion  in  2025  to  around  EUR 88 billion  in  2027;  the  margin  under  the  temporary  ceiling  for 
NextGenerationEU is increasing from EUR 105.4 billion to EUR 113.3 billion, based on the amounts programmed for 
NGEU borrowing costs. The uncertainties surrounding this forecast remain large, as the actual amounts depend on 
both the pace of NGEU disbursements and related borrowing operations, as well as interest rate developments. 

4.  Conclusions 

The  present  forecast  is  drawn  up  in  a  context  of  high  uncertainty.  The  initiatives  put  forward  to  support  Member 
States,  third  countries  and  specific  sectors  accelerated  payments  for  the  outstanding  and  new  programmes. 
Following  the  historic  mid-term  revision,  the  MFF  and  external  financing  instruments  are  making  more  funding 
available for Ukraine and the neighbouring partner countries as well as for migration and competitiveness.  

The delayed implementation of 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes increases the risks of decommitments. The 
national  authorities’  focus  on  finalising  programmes  from  the  previous  MFF  and  NextGenerationEU,  given  their 
shorter timeframes, could have also contributed to the accumulation of delays, together with the late adoption of 
the  relevant  legal  basic  acts.  To  avoid  the  materialisation  of  these  decommitments,  Member  States  need  to 
accelerate  the  implementation  in  2026  and  2027  to  avoid  the  loss  of  funds  due  to  decommitment  rules.  For the 
completion  of  the  programmes  2014-2020  of  cohesion  funds  and  2014-2022  of  EAFRD,  the  amounts  at  risk  of 
decommitment increased compared to the previous forecast following the analysis of the implementation and the 
latest Member States’ forecast. 

The MFF payment ceiling remains sufficient to cover the projected payments until the end of the MFF. Payments are 
expected to run well below the MFF payment ceiling in 2024 and 2025, allowing to transfer unused amounts within 
certain  limits  towards  the  end  of  the  period  when  credit  needs  will  be  higher.  In  particular,  the  amended  Article 
11(3a) MFFR will allow the transfer of the 2025 margin to 2026. Overall, the net margin over 2025-2027 including 
programme-specific  adjustments  is estimated  at  EUR 17.6 billion.  Hence,  there  is  space  for  increased  acceleration 

10 

 
 
under the payment ceilings. If the acceleration does not materialise, substantial amounts of margins risk remaining 
unused at the end of the period. 

NextGenerationEU’s targeting investments and reforms continues supporting the EU economy and the transition to 
clean, green energy. For the years ahead, Member States will need to implement NextGenerationEU funds respecting 
the deadline for disbursements in 2026 and at the same time accelerate the implementation of cohesion funds to 
reduce decommitment risks. 

While the RAL nominally increases at the end of the MFF compared to  last year, when measured as a share of the 
EU Gross National Income the RAL is reduced, which shows that the nominal growth of the EU economy outweights 
the accumulation of outstanding commitments from the EU budget. NextGenerationEU produces a temporary effect 
on the level of the EU outstanding commitments. As previously reported, the level of outstanding commitments has 
peaked  at  the  end  of  2023,  with  an  overall  value  of  EUR 543 billion,  mainly  driven  by  the  impact  of 
NextGenerationEU. This effect is shown to gradually decrease and return to levels comparable with the start of the 
MFF period by the end of 2027. Nevertheless, it reflects the state of implementation of the budget to-date, including 
delays in cohesion policy and agriculture, which are estimated to persist until the end of the programming period. 

The own resources necessary to finance the budget  alongside other revenue will follow the MFF expenditure cycle. 
Yet, the size of the available margin under the own resources ceiling will remain relatively stable as the increasing 
revenue needs match the projected nominal growth of the EU economy. 

11 

 
Annex II – Results of the forecast 

All values are in billions of EUR, current prices, unless otherwise specified. Some totals may not tally due 
to rounding. 

Table 1.1 – Long-term forecast of future outflows over 2025-2029 for the MFF 

Year 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

Total 

Commitment Ceiling 

190.5 

180.5 

186.2 

Payment Ceiling 

175.4 

180.6 

184.2 

In addition, adjustment for MFFR 
Article 5 (estimate for future 
years) 

1.8 

3.2 

Commitments (programmed)* 

199.8 

188.5 

195.3 

557.2 

540.2 

4.9 

583.7 

Forecast Payments** 

152.7 

185.6 

197.7 

144.7 

123.3 

804.1 

Of which Special Instruments*** 

8.3 

0.2 

0.0 

8.5 

* In line with the draft budget for 2025, including the Ukraine Reserve allocation and appropriations stemming from Article 5 of the MFF 
Regulation and Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation and Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation. Unallocated margins are not included. 

** Includes the estimated level of payments for the Ukraine Reserve in 2025 only. 

*** The amounts for special instruments cover the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, the Brexit 
Adjustment Reserve, the Ukraine Reserve, the EURI Instrument, and the Flexibility Instrument. In the subsequent tables, the payments related to 
the mobilisations of the Flexibility Instrument and the EURI Instrument are included within the respective headings. 

12 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 – Payments in relation to the commitments of the 2021-2027 MFF 

MFF Heading 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation 
and Digital 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and 
Values 

2.1 Economic, Social and 
territorial cohesion 

17.7 

23.7 

23.3 

22.4 

16.9 

104.0 

40.9 

56.8 

70.9 

79.4 

74.6 

322.6 

29.6 

45.9 

58.2 

71.8 

72.2 

277.8 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

11.3 

10.9 

12.6 

7.6 

2.4 

44.8 

3 Natural Resources and 
Environment 

3.1 Market related 
expenditure and direct 
payments 

3.2 Other programmes of 
Natural Resources and 
Environment 

4 Migration and Border 
Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the 
World 

7 European Public 
Administration 

52.5 

55.7 

59.5 

17.5 

14.5 

199.7 

40.6 

40.5 

40.5 

121.7 

11.9 

15.1 

19.0 

17.5 

14.5 

78.1 

3.0 

2.0 

3.5 

2.7 

4.0 

2.5 

4.3 

2.5 

3.5 

18.2 

1.8 

11.5 

12.7 

17.6 

19.8 

17.3 

11.6 

79.0 

12.6 

13.1 

13.5 

Special Instruments 

5.6 

39.3 

5.6 

Total 

146.9 

173.2 

193.4 

143.4 

122.9 

779.9 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3 – Payments for the completion of pre-2021 commitments 

MFF Heading 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and 
Digital 

2.7 

2.2 

1.2 

0.6 

0.2 

7.0 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

0.7 

1.7 

0.7 

0.0 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial 
cohesion 

0.7 

1.7 

0.7 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

3 Natural Resources and 
Environment 

3.1 Market related expenditure and 
direct payments 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural 
Resources and Environment 

0.2 

6.0 

0.3 

0.1 

0.1 

0.2 

6.0 

0.3 

0.1 

0.1 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

0.3 

0.2 

1.7 

0.2 

0.1 

2.1 

0.1 

0.1 

2.0 

0.0 

0.6 

0.1 

3.1 

3.0 

0.1 

6.7 

6.7 

0.5 

0.4 

6.5 

Total 

5.7 

12.4 

4.4 

1.3 

0.4 

24.3 

14 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Forecast decommitments 2025-2027 

MFF Heading 

Completion 

MFF 

Total 

1 Single Market, Innovation and Digital 

2 Cohesion, Resilience and Values 

2.1 Economic, Social and territorial cohesion 

2.2 Resilience and Values 

3 Natural Resources and Environment 

3.2 Other programmes of Natural Resources and 
Environment 

4 Migration and Border Management 

5 Security and Defence 

6 Neighbourhood and the World 

Total 

0.5 

1.2 

1.0 

0.2 

2.7 

2.7 

0.3 

0.1 

4.7 

0.7 

3.1 

2.7 

0.4 

0.1 

0.1 

0.1 

0.0 

0.1 

4.1 

1.1 

4.3 

3.7 

0.5 

2.7 

2.7 

0.4 

0.0 

0.2 

8.8 

Table 3 – Long-term forecast of outflows for NextGenerationEU 

Programme 

2025 

2026 

2027 

Total 

Horizon Europe 

InvestEU  

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 

European Social Fund (ESF) 

0.7 

1.0 

2.0 

0.4 

0.2 

1.2 

0.0 

0.0 

European Recovery and Resilience Facility 

64.9 

70.1 

Union Civil Protection Mechanism (RescEU) 

European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) 

Just Transition Fund 

Total 

0.2 

1.8 

1.3 

0.5 

1.3 

2.6 

72.4 

75.8 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.9 

2.2 

2.0 

0.4 

135.0 

0.7 

3.1 

3.9 

148.1 

15 

 
 
 
Table 4 – Change in the total outstanding commitments from 2025 to 2027 

Source  RAL start-2025 

(estimate)* 

Commitments 
2025-2027 

Payments 
2025-2027 

Decommitments 
2025-2027 

RAL end-
2027 

MFF  

NGEU  

Total 

325.8 

148.0 

473.9 

583.3 

0.1 

583.4 

535.6 

148.1 

683.8 

8.8 

364.7 

8.8 

364.7 

* The RAL at the start of 2025 includes EUR 19.7 billion generated from external assigned revenues (excluding NextGenerationEU), which is not 
included in the table. 

* Internal assigned revenues are not counted. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – Long-term forecast of future inflows of the EU budget over 2025-
2029 

INFLOWS 

2025 

2026 

2027 

2028 

2029 

Total 

Own Resources ceiling in % 
of EU Gross National 
Income 

of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Own Resources ceiling 
expressed in EUR billion* 

of which temporary increase 
for NGEU 

Net amount of traditional own 
resources** 

National contributions 

of which  

VAT-based own resource 

2,00% 

2,00% 

2,00% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

0,60% 

a 

368,5 

381,4 

394,2 

a’ 

110,5 

114,4 

118,3 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

n/a 

b 

c 

21,1 

21,8 

22,6 

23,4 

24,1 

113,0 

127,3 

159,8 

171,4 

118,2 

96,4 

673,0 

c’ 

24,4 

25,2 

26,1 

26,9 

27,8 

130,4 

Plastic-based own resource 

7,1 

7,1 

7,1 

7,0 

7,0 

35,3 

GNI-based own resource*** 

95,8 

127,4 

138,2 

84,2 

61,6 

507,2 

Total own resources 

d=
b+c 

148,4 

181,6 

194,0 

141,5 

120,5 

786,0 

of which own resources to 
finance NGEU liabilities**** 

Other revenue (incl. 
provisional UK contribution) 

d’ 

5,2 

3,8 

5,0 

13,9 

e 

4,3 

4,0 

3,8 

3,2 

2,9 

18,1 

TOTAL REVENUE 

d+
e 

152,7 

185,6 

197,7 

144,7 

123,3 

804,1 

Available margin under the  
Own Resources ceiling  

a-d 

220,1 

199,8 

200,2 

of which margin under the 
temporary increase for NGEU 

a’-
d’ 

105,4 

110,7 

113,3 

n/a 

n/a 

* Own Resources ceiling – calculated based on the Spring 2024 economic forecast for the Gross National Income of the EU27  

** Traditional own resources are estimated on the basis of 25% retention rate for collection costs.  

17 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** The amounts for the GNI-based own resource for 2028 and 2029 are underestimated as the forecast does not include expenditure for the next 
MFF. The additional expenditure for the next MFF would need to be covered by additional GNI-based contributions to ensure a balanced budget. 

**** For 2026 and 2027 based on current financial programming. 

i  Regulation  (EU,  Euratom)  2018/1046  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  18  July  2018  on  the 
financial  rules  applicable  to  the  general  budget  of  the  Union,  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1296/2013,  (EU)  No 
1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No  1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, 
(EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012,  OJ L 193, 
30.7.2018, p. 1. 

ii COM(2021)343, 30.6.2021. This is the first edition of this report for the 2021-27 MFF period. 

iii Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 
to 2027, OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11. 

iv Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in 
the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis, OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020, p. 23 (‘NextGenerationEU’). 

v Unless otherwise specified, all amounts in the report are expressed in current prices. 

vi Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Technical adjustment of the 
multiannual financial framework for 2025 in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 
2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027. COM(2024) 120 final 

vii Statement of estimates of the European Commission for the financial year 2025. SEC(2024) 250. 

viii Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 
laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027, OJ L, 2024/765, 29.02.2024. 

ix Article 5 of the MFF Regulation provides for the additional allocation in commitment and payment appropriations 
for a pre-defined list of programmes, for an amount equivalent to certain types of fines. 

x Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation provides that commitment appropriations corresponding to the amount of 
de-commitments made in relation to research projects may be made available again. 

xi The impact of the mid-term revision is detailed in the draft budget for 2025. 

xii Joint declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the re-use of decommitted 
funds in relation to the research programme (C/2024/1972), OJ C, C/2024/1972, 29.02.2024. 

18 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xiii Additional information about these instruments is available in the draft budget for 2025 and in the technical 
adjustment of the MFF for 2025. 

xiv Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the 
Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 
2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 
2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241, OJ L, 2024/795, 29.02.2024. 

xv  Council  Decision  (EU,  Euratom)  2020/2053  of  14  December  2020  on  the  system  of  own  resources  of  the 
European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom, OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1. 

xvi OJ C66 I, 19.2.2019, p.1. 

xvii The amount is complemented by EUR 20 billion REPowerEU grants financed under the Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) and EUR 2.1 billion in transfers from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve (BAR). 

xviii The amount includes the reduction of EUR 1 billion included in the revised MFFR following the mid-term revision 
of the MFF. 

xix Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Long-term forecast of future inflows 
and outflows of the EU budget (2024-2028). COM(2023) 390 final. 

xx Member States decided to transfer funds between direct payments and rural development. The result was set out 
in Commission Delegated Regulation 2023/813 of 8 February 2023. 

xxi Regulation (EU) 2024/792 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the 
Ukraine Facility, OJ L, 2024/792, 29.2.2024. 

xxii Except for those re-used for the programmes of origin, as per applicable legislation (e.g. Horizon, NDICI). Potential 
decommitments stemming from programmes with automatic re-use provisions have been excluded from this 
amount. 

xxiii The cut-off date for NextGenerationEU figures is 16 May 2024. 

xxiv Given its demand-driven delivery mechanism, no forecast is available for the loan component of the Recovery 
and Resilience Facility (similarly to other loan-based instruments implemented outside the budget). 

xxv RRF non-repayable support financed through NGEU credits, excluding ETS and BAR. Including REPowerEU ETS and 
BAR financed additional grants, disbursements are expected to reach EUR 69.4 billion in 2025 and EUR 74.6 billion in 
2026. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxvi COM(2022) 145 final, 23.3.2022. 

xxvii COM(2021) 250 final, 14.4.2021. 

xxviii Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020, OJ L 424/1, 15.12.2020 

xxix COM(2023) 330 final, 20.06.2023. 

xxx European Commission, European Economic Forecast Spring 2024 

20