COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2024 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland
Date: 2024-06-19
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: Poland, budget policy, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, employment policy, energy policy, public procurement, social policy, stability pact

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.6.2024  SWD(2024) 621 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT 2024 Country Report - Poland Accompanying the document Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of Poland {COM(2024) 621 final} - {SWD(2024) 100 final}  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT SNAPSHOT 

the  following  years.  On  average,  prices  in 
Poland  increased  by  10.9%  in  2023,  well 
above  the  EU  average  of  6.4% (2),  putting  a 
strain  on  Poland’s  competitive  advantage.  In 
2024,  the  price  pressures  are  expected  to 
come  from  nominal  wage  growth  given  the 
20%  increase  in  minimum  wage  and  large 
public  sector  wage  hikes.  Gradual  withdrawal 
of  government  measures, 
the 
electricity  and gas price freezes and zero VAT 
on food, will also contribute to a slower fall of 
inflation.  

including 

Despite  the  economic  slowdown  in  2023, 
labour  market  developments  in  Poland 
are  broadly  positive,  although  labour 
shortages  persist.  A  decline  in  the  working-
age  population,  as  well  as  the  low  number  of 
people  working  or  looking  for  work  within 
some  population  groups,  particularly  women, 
people with a disability and older people, keep 
weighing on labour supply. Regional disparities 
are  also  substantial.  The  employment  rate  in 
Poland for people aged 20-64 reached 76.7% 
in 2022 (3), which is above the EU average of 
74.6%, and close to the 78% target set by the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  action  plan. 
However,  compared  to  other  Member  States, 
the  Polish  labour  market  was  among  those 
most affected by labour shortages. The share 
of  employers  reporting  that  labour  shortages 
are a factor limiting their production was 72% 
in  construction,  67%  in  industry  and  55%  in 
services  in  Q4-2023,  significantly  above  the 
in 
EU  averages  for  these  sectors 
in 
in 
construction,  22% 
services) (4).  Furthermore,  skills  mismatches 

(28% 
industry,  30% 

(2)  Eurostat HICP annual. 

(3)  Based on Eurostat’s Employment - annual statistics 

2022 https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=Employment_-
_annual_statistics#Employment_in_2022_compared_
with_the_EU_target.  

(4)  Based on the European Labour Authority’s 2024 EURES 
Report on labour shortages and surpluses in 2023, i.e. 

The Polish economy shows signs of 
recovery after recent headwinds 

The Polish economy slowed down in 2023 
but  is  projected  to  rebound  in  2024  and 
2025 (1). In 2023, GDP growth reached 0.2%, 
supported  by  investments  and  an  improved 
trade  balance,  as  imports  shrank  and  exports 
continued  to  increase.  Looking  ahead,  growth 
is  set  to  rebound  faster  than  in  most  EU 
countries boosted by private consumption and 
investment,  the  latter  being  strengthened  by 
Poland’s  acceleration 
implementing  the 
recovery and resilience plan (RRP). Risks to this 
economic  growth  outlook  relate  mainly  to 
possible  delays  in  implementing  EU-funded 
investments. 

in 

Graph 1.1: Poland – real GDP growth and 
contribution 

Source: AMECO 

Price  pressures  eased  in  the  second  half 
of 2023,  but inflation in  Poland is  set  to 
remain among the highest in the EU over 

(1)  The cut-off date for the data used to prepare the 27 

Country Reports was 15 May 2024. 

2 

-8-6-4-2024681016171819202122232425Net exportsInvestmentPriv. consumptionGov. consumptionInventoriesReal GDP (y-o-y%)forecastpps.  
 
   
 
 
 
growth, 

remained 

remain  a  pressing  challenge,  particularly  for 
younger workers and those with high levels of 
education.  The  horizontal  skills  mismatch (5) 
has  been  increasing  for  workers  with  at  least 
post-secondary  education:  in  2022,  34.7% 
were  employed  outside  their  field  of  study, 
above  the  EU  average  (28.3%).  Despite  the 
the 
economic 
slowdown 
in 
largely 
rate 
unemployment 
unchanged, as companies were reluctant to lay 
off workers in 2023 given the difficulties they 
face  in  hiring  and  reduced  working  hours. 
Displaced  persons  from  Ukraine  were  able  to 
join  the  Polish 
labour  market  and  help 
alleviate shortages. According to the estimates 
by  the  National  Bank  of  Poland (6),  around 
62%  of  displaced  persons  from  Ukraine living 
in Poland aged 18 and over were employed in 
July 2023.  However, without a comprehensive 
and  long-term  migration  policy  this  may  not 
be  sufficient to  address  the  significant labour 
shortages (7). 
the 
deterioration  in  basic  skills,  and  educational 
inequalities  risk  holding  back  productivity, 
competitiveness,  labour  supply  and  the  green 
and digital transitions (see Annex 15).  

shortages, 

Skills 

Public finances remain sound 
despite fiscal expansion 

Despite a large fiscal deficit in 2023, the 
ratio  of  public  debt  to  GDP  is  set  to 
remain below 60% until 2025. According to 
the  Commission’s  forecast,  the  budget  deficit 
is  expected  to  decrease  from  5.1%  of  GDP  in 
2023  to  5.4%  of  GDP  in  2024.  Increased 
spending on defence, which is mostly driven by 
cash payments for future deliveries of military 
equipment,  is  slowing  down  the  consolidation 

data submitted by the EURES national coordination 
offices. 

(5)  The discrepancy between a person’s current occupation 

and their field of education. 

(6)  NBP (2024) Sytuacja życiowa i ekonomiczna migrantów 
z Ukrainy w Polsce w 2023 roku. Raport z badania 
ankietowego raport_migranci_z-Ukrainy_2023.pdf 
(nbp.pl). 

(7)  Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy ‘Barometr 

of government finances. The government also 
added  new  fiscal  measures  reflecting 
its 
economic  programme, 
including  (i) a  30% 
salary increase for teachers; (ii) a 20% general 
salary  increase  in  the  public  administration; 
and  (iii) a  new  family  benefit  to  support 
working  parents.  Meanwhile  other  social 
policies  will  be  continued  (13th  and  14th 
pensions (8), 
Energy 
support  measures  are  assumed  to  be  fully 
phased out by mid-2025. 

allowances). 

family 

Challenges  persist  in  the  sustainability, 
efficiency  and  transparency  of  public 
finances.  Retaining  the  very  low  retirement 
age 
(for  women  and  some  professional 
groups)  amid  a  rapidly  ageing  population 
brings risks of either a future increase in old-
age  poverty  or  substantial  increases  in  future 
government spending on pensions, which could 
put  pressure  on 
sustainability  of 
the 
government  finances.  Based  on  the  projection 
of  the  2024  Ageing  Report,  the  pension 
remains  broadly 
ratio 
expenditure-to-GDP 
stable  in  the  long  term,  while  the  benefit 
ratio (9) decreases by around 20 pps of GDP to 
around  25%  in  2070.  Considerable  scope 
remains  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  public 
spending on social benefits, public investment 
and  public  procurement.  More  integrated  and 
coherent  planning  of  public  investment  can 
also  provide  much-needed  transparency  and 
predictability  for  private  sector  investments. 
This  can  be  achieved  through:  (i)  stronger 
coordination 
levels; 
(ii) alignment  with  long-term  strategic  goals; 
and  (iii) more  standardised  assessment  and 
selection  procedures  The  broadening  of  the 
coverage of fiscal rules to off-budget funds as 
implementation  of  the  RRP 
part  of  the 
increased  public  finance  transparency  and 
strengthened the fiscal framework. 

government 

across 

(8)  An extra yearly payment made in addition to the 

standard monthly pension payment. 

Zawodów 2024’.  

(9)  Average pensions as a share of average gross wage. 

3 

 
 
 
Box 1: 

Poland’s competitiveness in brief 

Poland’s  competitiveness  has  improved  in  recent  years.  Poland  ranks  43rd  (out  of  64 
countries) in the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2023, moving up seven places compared to 
2022. Poland has successfully integrated itself into global supply chains. The foreign content of 
Poland’s exports is estimated to have increased from 29.5% in 2008 to 30.2% in 2020 (above 
the OECD average of 27.6%). Since 2015, total factor productivity (11) has grown at an average 
rate of 2.2% (4.2% in 2022), against an average of 0.8% in the EU (see also Annex 12).  

However, competitiveness challenges remain: 

• 

Issues need to be addressed in relation to the investment climate, notably the 
instability  and  unpredictability  of  regulations  and  insufficient  long-term  strategic 
planning, which hold back the green and digital transitions. 

•  Effective management of public finances is needed to ensure targeted support to 
those  in  need,  reduce  administrative  burden  for  businesses,  increase  innovations,  as 
well as to continue with strategic investments.  

•  An ageing society, needs in healthcare and LTC, an insufficient quality of education 
and  labour  shortages  undermine  productivity  as  well  as  put  pressure  on  available 
resources. 

• 

The country’s high reliance on fossil fuels, which restrains Poland's ability to meet 
climate  targets  and  keep  its  economy  competitive,  requires  further  action  as  regards 
decarbonisation. 

Challenges persist in the area of 
social inclusion 

The  availability  of  long-term  care  (LTC) 
services  remains  insufficient  given  the 
increasing  old-age  dependency  ratio.  The 
share of the population aged 65 and over with 
LTC needs exceeds the EU average (34.8% vs 
26.6%  in  the  EU  in  2019;  Annex  14)  and 
population  ageing is  expected  to  increase  this 
need,  while  government  spending  on  LTC  is 
one  third  the  EU  average  (0.5%  vs  1.7%  of 
GDP 
in  2022).  Poland’s  LTC  governance 
system  is  underdeveloped  and  fragmented 
across  health  and  social  sectors.  Lack  of 
coordination  between 
two  sectors 
hinders  a  coherent  policy  approach  and 
negatively affects the delivery of LTC services 
in Poland. Public home care coverage (13% of 
those aged 65 and over in need of LTC vs 30% 
in EU in 2022) as well as publicly provided or 
funded  residential  care  coverage  rates  (10% 

these 

vs 18% in EU in 2022) (10) are well below the 
EU  average  and  unevenly  distributed  across 
the  country.  The  number  of  formal  LTC 
workers  is  low  and  so  are  their  wages. 
Therefore,  the  responsibility  for  care  often 
falls  on  the  family  members,  particularly 
women,  who  do  not  receive  adequate  support 
in their duties (see Annex 14). 

(19.4%),  workers  with 

There  is  insufficient  access  to  social 
protection  for  workers  on  non-standard 
contracts  and  the  self-employed.  The  at-
risk-of-poverty rate is much higher for people 
in  non-standard  forms  of  work  such  as  part-
timers 
temporary 
contracts 
the  self-employed 
(29.8%),  compared  to  people  with  permanent 
full-time  contracts  (4.2%).  Further  action  is 
needed to ensure adequate protection against 
life  risks  and  reduce  their  poverty  and 
deprivation  rates,  in  line  with  the  poverty 
reduction goal of the European Pillar of Social 
Rights action plan (see Annex 14).  

(7.8%)  and 

(10)  European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report. Economic 
and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States 
(2022-2070). 

4 

 
 
 
Box 2: 

UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 

Poland  is  making  progress  in  almost  all  SDGs.  The  exceptions  are  environmental 
sustainability indicators related to SDG 2 (Zero hunger, which includes indicators on sustainable 
agricultural  production  and  the  environmental  impacts  of  agriculture),  SDG 6  (Clean  water  and 
sanitation) and SDG 15 (Life on land). For these SDGs, Poland has moved away from the targets, 
due in particular to increased obesity rates, the lowered common farmland bird index, worsened 
inland water quality, and a significantly increased impact from drought on ecosystems. Poland is 
improving  on  SDG  indicators  related  to  macroeconomic  stability  (SDGs 8,  16,  17),  and 
productivity  (SDGs  4, 8  and  9).  Regarding  fairness,  Poland  is  improving  on  most  indicators 
(SDGs 1,  3,  4,  5, 7, 8,  10),  and on  SDG 1  (No  poverty), SDG  4  (Quality  education),  and SDG 10 
(Reduced inequalities) its result is above the EU average.  

Out  of  the  17  indicators,  10  SDGs  remain  below  the  EU  average.  These  relate  to 
environmental  sustainability  (SDGs 2,  6,  9,  11,  12,  13),  fairness  (SDGs  3,  5,  8),  productivity 
(SDGs 8 and 9), and macroeconomic stability (SDGs 8 and 16). 

(11)  A measure of productivity accounting for effects in total 
output not caused by traditionally measured inputs of 
labour and capital. 

5 

 
 
 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF KEY REFORMS AND 
INVESTMENTS USING EU INSTRUMENTS 

Funding from the Recovery and Resilience 
Facility  (RRF)  and  cohesion  policy  are 
mutually  reinforcing  Poland’s  efforts  to 
boost  its  competitiveness  and  stimulate 
In  addition  to  the 
sustainable  growth. 
EUR 59.8  billion  of  RRF  funding  described  in 
Annex  3,  cohesion  policy  funding  provides 
Poland  with  EUR 75.5  billion  for  the  2021-
2027  period.  Combined  support  from  these 
represents  approximately 
two 
18.02%  of  the  country’s  GDP 
in  2023, 
compared to the EU average of 5.38% of GDP 
(see Annex 4). 

instruments 

Under  its  recovery  and  resilience  plan 
(RRP),  Poland  has  launched  important 
policy  measures  that  are  expected  to 
improve  its  competitiveness.  In  particular, 
the RRP envisages major reforms in the areas 
of  judicial  independence,  renewable  energy 
(early 
sources,  clean  air, 
childhood  education  and 
(ECEC)), 
sustainable  transport,  public  spending,  and 
digital  transition.  Poland  has  also  started 
making  investments  in  the  agricultural  sector, 
ECEC  facilities  and  in  clean  air,  which  aim  to 
replace 
in 
residential housing. 

fossil-based  heating  systems 

labour  market 

care 

The  implementation  of  Poland’s  recovery 
and resilience plan is underway, however 
increased 
timely  completion  requires 
efforts.  Poland  has  submitted  one  payment 
request,  corresponding  to  38  milestones  and 
targets in the plan  and  resulting  in  an  overall 
disbursement  of  EUR  6.3  billion  on  15  April 
2024  (see  Annex  3).  The  size  and  complexity 
of 
to 
absorption  capacity,  call  for  accelerating 
investments  and  addressing  emerging  delays 
while  strengthening  administrative  capacities 
to  ensure  that  reforms  and  investments  can 
be  completed  on  time.  While  Poland  is  taking 
some  measures  to  address  the 
lack  of 
administrative  capacity,  challenges  remain  in 

the  plan,  and  challenges 

linked 

6 

particular  in  terms  of  finishing  the  largest 
investments within the lifetime of the RRF. 

focused 

Cohesion  policy  funding  helps  tackle 
Poland’s  growth  and  competitiveness 
challenges  and  reduce  the  country’s 
territorial and social disparities. Under the 
2014-2020  cohesion  programming  period, 
of 
on 
support 
entrepreneurship, 
green 
transition,  childcare,  and  education.  For  the 
current  2021-2027  programming  period, 
support  is  focused  on  strengthening  Poland’s 
competitiveness, 
the 
decarbonisation  of  the  economy,  increasing 
social  cohesion,  and  improving  the  overall 
living and working conditions for people.  

accelerating 

transport, 

areas 

the 

the 

Unlocking investments for the 
green and digital transitions  

A diverse set of funding sources can help 
Poland  tackle  the  challenges  associated 
with  the  green  transition.  This  transition 
lies  at the  heart  of  Poland’s  RRP,  with  almost 
half  of  its  total  allocation  geared  towards 
achieving  green  objectives  (EUR  27.8  billion). 
In  addition,  over  the  2021-2027  period, 
cohesion  policy  will  invest  more  than  EUR  20 
billion  in  the  green  transition.  Together,  these 
EU  funds  represent  significant  support  for 
transition, 
investments 
the 
green 
renewable 
in  green  mobility, 
particularly 
energy and transmission networks.  

in 

renewable 

The  combined  funding  provided  through 
cohesion  policy  and  the  RRP  will  support 
different 
source 
technologies.  These  include  onshore  and 
offshore  wind  energy  and  photovoltaics.  In 
particular, 
the  Polish  government  has 
introduced a reform enabling the construction 

energy 

 
 
subsidies  for  coal-fired  heat  sources  will  be 
discontinued.  

The  RRP  and  cohesion  policy  funding  are 
driving  the  digital  transition.  Poland  has 
already implemented three reforms under the 
RRP  to  facilitate  the  development  and  access 
to wired and wireless communication. Funding 
under the RRP and cohesion policy is also used 
to support investments to expand coverage of 
ultra-fast  broadband  internet  for  households 
and  schools  in  areas  where  there  has  been 
market  failure.  Support  will  be  provided  for 
companies 
advanced 
(i) invest 
technologies,  cloud  technologies  and  artificial 
intelligence  in  manufacturing  and  business 
(ii) implement  smart  production 
processes; 
lines  and  construct  smart  factories;  and 
(iii) deploy  digital  technologies  to  reduce  the 
environmental impact of manufacturing. 

to: 

in 

The 
implementation  of  the  RRP  and 
cohesion  policy  will  help  increase  the 
efficiency  of  the  public  administration. 
in 
This  will 
interoperable  and  secure  e-services 
that 
individuals and businesses can access at local, 
regional, national and EU level.  

investing 

through 

occur 

Investing in people for economic 
growth and resilience  

Funding  under  the  RRF  and  cohesion 
policy  has  been  providing  support  for 
ECEC.  Under  the  RRP,  the  Polish  government 
introduced a reform that aims to improve  the 
for  parents  by 
labour  market  situation 
increasing access to ECEC for children up to 3 
years  of  age.  Under  the  2014-2020  cohesion 
policy  programme,  nearly 500 000  individuals 
renovation  of  ECEC 
benefited  from 
infrastructure  facilities.  Looking  ahead,  the 
RRP  and  cohesion  policy  for  2021-2027  will 
support  the  new  edition  of  the  ‘Toddler+’ 
programme  under  which  the  EU  will  provide 
funding  to  create  more  than  100 000  new 
childcare  places  (47 500  from  the  RRF)  in 
municipalities  across  Poland  between  2022 
and 2029.  

the 

of  wind  turbines  across  more  areas  of  the 
country,  while  ensuring  public  participation  in 
the  permitting  process.  Poland  has  already 
achieved 18GW of installed onshore wind and 
photovoltaic  capacity,  marking  progress  made 
towards  fulfilling  decarbonisation  objectives 
and  supporting  the  economy  with  a  sizeable 
volume of clean, affordable electricity. Looking 
ahead,  Poland  is  well  on  track  to  achieving 
30GW  capacity  by  mid-2026.  Cohesion  policy 
programmes  will 
in  other  energy 
invest 
transition aspects. This will create a synergy in 
supporting  a  wide  range  of  renewable  energy 
source  technologies.  In  the  area  of  electricity 
infrastructure, 
on 
transmission lines, while  distribution grids will 
benefit  from  cohesion  policy  funding  (with 
some  targeted  support  for  distribution  grids 
and  storage  under  the  RRP’s  REPowerEU 
chapter). This combined support is expected to 
help  expand  and  upgrade  the  national  grid 
network,  integrate  renewables  and  effectively 
decarbonise the electricity supply. 

focuses 

RRP 

the 

technologies  and 

Also  with  the  help  of  cohesion  funds, 
Poland  will  support  the  development  and 
application  of  innovations  in  the  field  of 
the 
environmental 
circular  economy.  This  is  in  line  with  the 
national  and  regional  smart  specialisation 
strategies.  The  RRP,  on  the  other  hand,  will 
focus  on  the  deployment  of  technologies 
supporting  the  environmental  transformation 
and circular economy measures in SMEs. 

for 

the 

Reforms  under  the  RRP  bolster  EU 
investments 
sustainable 
development  of  key  sectors  in  the  Polish 
economy.  The  reform  to  help  develop  and 
implement of sustainable urban mobility plans 
underpins  cohesion 
increase 
sustainable  public  transport  and  promote 
active mobility options within functional urban 
areas,  including  suburban  rail,  urban  public 
transport, cycling, and walking. 

initiatives  to 

As part of the RRP reform agenda, Poland 
also  adopted  its  updated  National  Air 
Protection  Programme.  This 
lays  down 
comprehensive  and  coordinated  measures  for 
public  authorities  at various  levels  to improve 
air  quality.  Under  the  programme,  public 

7 

 
Box 3: 

Combined action for more impactful EU funds 

To  boost  economic  growth  and  maximise  the  impact  of  EU  funding,  Poland’s  RRP  includes 
reforms that support investments under other EU instruments, creating significant synergies and 
complementarities between the various funds.  

For example, RRF funding will help create 47 500 new places in childcare facilities. This will be 
achieved by developing infrastructure in the field of ECEC for children up to 3 years of age: This 
will involve: (i) building or renovating nurseries and children’s clubs; and (ii) purchasing real estate 
and  infrastructure  (the  purchase  of  land  or  premises).  Complementary  to  the  RRP  support,  the 
cohesion policy will help provide an additional 55 077 new places either in existing facilities or in 
newly established premises, using resources for the European Social Fund Plus.  

processes; 

reforms aim to: (i) increase the role of impact 
assessments  and  involve  social  partners  and 
stakeholders  more  in  the  policy  and  law-
simplifying 
making 
administrative  and  legal  procedures,  i.e.  via 
digitisation: (iii) minimising legal  requirements 
for  businesses  and  entrepreneurs;  and 
(iv) speeding  up  administrative  decision-
making. 

(ii) 

business 

environment 

Poland  has  taken  measures  to  improve 
by 
the 
strengthening  important  aspects  of  the 
independence  and  impartiality  of  courts 
through  the  reform  of  the  disciplinary 
system  applicable  to  judges.  This  reform 
has remedied the situation for judges affected 
by  decisions  of 
the  now  dismantled 
Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court. 
Following  these  reforms,  Poland  now  also 
fulfils 
the  horizontal  enabling  conditions 
related  to  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental 
Rights  and  therefore  has  access  to  the 
Cohesion  Policy,  Maritime  and  Fisheries,  and 
Home  Affairs  funds.  Furthermore,  in  February 
2024, Poland presented an action plan on the 
‘rule of law’ to the General Affairs Council. This 
action plan aims to address concerns raised by 
the  Commission  under  the  Article  7(1)  TEU 
procedure (related to the independence of the 
Polish  judiciary).  Consequently,  on  29  May 
2024,  the  Commission  withdrew  its  reasoned 
proposal under the Article 7(1) TEU procedure.   

implementing  a 

In  addition  to 
legal 
framework  for  developing  the  social 
economy,  RRP 
funding  will  provide 
support  for  social  economy  entities  so 
they  can  make  investments.  The  funding 
will cover these entities’ investment costs and 
costs  of  modernising 
current  operating 
including  costs  for  expansion  of  the  scale  or 
industry 
policy  will 
complement  the  RRP  by  providing  repayable 
support  for  social  economy  entities  (including 
social  enterprises).  This  includes  support  for 
start-up  loans  and  development  loans,  for 
creating new jobs in social enterprises and for 
providing training support for social enterprise 
managers.  

Cohesion 

change. 

the 

Polish 

To  address  challenges  faced  by  the 
agricultural  sector,  particularly  due  to 
Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against 
Ukraine, 
government 
implemented a support scheme under the 
RRP.  Valued  at  EUR  1.4  billion,  this  initiative 
stands  as  one  of  the  largest  investments  in 
the  Polish  plan,  benefiting  farmers,  fishers, 
SMEs  in  the  agricultural  sector,  distribution 
and  storage  centres,  food  banks,  and  other 
NGOs  focused  on  food  distribution  and  waste 
reduction. 

Removing regulatory barriers to 
improve business environment  

The  RRP  includes  reforms  to  reduce  the 
administrative  and  regulatory  burden, 
improve  the  quality  of  law-making,  and 
revise  the  spatial  planning  law.  These 

8 

 
 
 
FURTHER PRIORITIES AHEAD 

climate, 

Although  many  challenges  are  to  be 
addressed  by  the  recovery  and  resilience 
plan  (RRP)  and  cohesion  funds,  Poland 
faces  further  challenges  related  to  the 
investment 
business 
environment,  effectiveness  of  public 
finance,  population  ageing  and  energy 
transition. Tackling these challenges will help 
increase  Poland’s  long-term  competitiveness 
and  ensure  the  resilience  of  the  economy.  It 
will  also  help  the  country  make  further 
progress in achieving the SDGs (12).  

is 

important  that  the 

It 
identified 
challenges  are  addressed  both  at 
national  and  regional  level.  This  will  help 
reduce  regional  disparities  and  improve  the 
administrative  and  absorption  capacity  in  a 
balanced  way  across  the  country.  To  improve 
productivity,  the  business  environment 
in 
Poland  would  benefit  from  further  action  to 
pursue  a  coherent  economic  strategy,  better 
social  dialogue  and  good  quality  law  making. 
Effective  public  finances  are  needed  for 
sound 
sustainable 
public 
governance 
the  effective 
management  of  state-owned  enterprises.  The 
ageing society puts pressure on the healthcare 
and long-term care sectors, which suffer from 
labour  shortages.  Furthermore,  the  green 
transition  remains  a  challenge  for  Poland 
despite  ambitious  plans  under  the  RRP  and 
cohesion  policy  funding  programmes,  as 
reflected in particular through the current high 
share of fossil fuels in the energy mix.  

growth,  and 
for 
is  critical 

Improving the business 
environment, investment climate 
and productivity 

to 

points 

funding) 

Poland’s 

long-term 

Higher  private  investment  rates  would 
boost 
growth 
potential  and  shift  the  production  to 
higher-value  goods  and  services.  Private 
investment as a percentage of GDP was low at 
12.7%  in  2022,  well  below  the  EU  average 
(19.6%)  and  that  of  regional  peers  such  as 
Czechia 
(22.8%). 
(22.1%)  and  Hungary 
Substantial  investment  needs  persist  across 
the  economy,  particularly  for 
the  green 
transition.  While  access  to  finance  is  not  an 
issue  -  more  than  half  (54%)  of  local  firms 
financed  at  least  some  of  their  investment 
through external funding (EU average: 43%) – 
the  prevalence  of  bank  funding  (80%  of  all 
external 
further 
development  needs  in  financing  through  the 
capital  market.  The  capital  market  remains 
essential  for financing modern and innovative 
companies  and  for  boosting  the  international 
expansion  of  well-established  firms.  Overall, 
in  high-
increasing 
productivity  sectors  (see  Annex  12)  will  be 
crucial for sustaining Poland’s strong economic 
performance  and  facilitating  the  green  and 
digital  transition.  Poland’s  performance  in  the 
area  of  digitalisation  of  business  is  lagging 
behind.  61%  of  Polish  SMEs  have  at  least  a 
basic level of digital intensity, which is slightly 
below  the  EU  average  of  69% (13).  The 
investment  performance  is  further  hampered 
by: (i) skills mismatches and labour shortages 
that drive up unit labour costs; (ii) low levels of 
science-business 
R&D 
cooperation;  (iii)  a  burdensome  regulatory 
in 
environment;  and  a 

(iv) deterioration 

investments 

expenditure 

capital 

and 

(12)  Sustainable Development Goals. 

Digital Decade. 

(13)  European Commission: 2023 Report on the state of the 

9 

 
 
 
 
Poland’s governance and public administration 
hat increases uncertainty for investors. 

Polish 

training 

productivity 

to 
propensity 
training 
in 

Despite  significant  progress  being  made 
in recent years, there is substantial scope 
to further improve the digital skills of the 
labour  force,  which  would  therefore 
improve 
and 
competitiveness.  Only  18%  of  companies 
their 
ICT 
provide  dedicated 
of 
low 
The 
employees. 
management 
for 
invest 
to 
employees results in them having low levels of 
digital  skills (14).  In  2023,  44.3%  of  people 
aged 16-74 had at least basic digital skills (vs 
56% in the EU). Poland has been implementing 
some  programmes  as  part  of  cohesion  policy 
funding  to 
increase  the  digital  skills  of 
managers (15).  However,  there  is  scope  for 
further  policy  action  to  improve  the  digital 
competences of employees in a more systemic 
way.    The  deteriorating  quality  of  basic  skills 
and  increased  educational  inequalities  (as 
demonstrated by the most recent survey under 
the  Programme  for 
International  Student 
Assessment 
(PISA) (see  Annex  15)  are  a 
further  source  of  concern  and  a  barrier  to 
Poland’s  competitiveness.  These  need  to  be 
addressed  by  improving  equity  and  ensuring 
access  to  high-quality  education  throughout 
the  population  in  the  long  term,  as  well  as 
improving its inclusiveness. Teacher shortages 
persist, 
the  quality  of 
education. Moreover, the decreasing proportion 
of  students  studying  in  the  fields  of  science, 
technology,  engineering  and  mathematics 
(STEM) as well as in IT, and the low proportion 
of  doctorate  students  (see  Annex  11  and  15) 
create  a  shortage  of  high-skilled  workers, 
which  can  further  hinder  Poland’s  innovation 
capacity.  Boosting  key  competences  in  school 
education,  inclusiveness,  ensuring  a  sufficient 
and well-qualified teaching workforce, as well 
as  increasing  the  attractiveness  of  STEM  and 
doctoral studies could help reverse this trend.  

likely  affecting 

Poland’s  R&I  performance  has  been 
faces 
steadily 

improving  but 

still 

(14)  Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI).  

(15)  PARP „Akademia Menadżera MMŚP – kompetencje w 
zakresie cyfryzacji – oferta dla przedsiębiorców”. 

10 

Public 

bottlenecks. 

R&D 
persisting 
expenditure  as  %  of  GDP  is  stagnating  below 
the EU average which is reflected in the weak 
quality  of  the  public  science  output  (scientific 
publications). Investments in innovation and its 
commercialisation 
(e.g.  as  measured  by 
spending on R&D or the number of patents per 
capita)  is  much  lower  than  in  the  rest  of  the 
EU  (see  Annex  11).  According  to  the  Business 
environment benchmarking framework, Poland 
ranks  third  lowest  in  the  EU  in  the  average 
score  for  innovation (16).  According  to  the 
European  Innovation  Scoreboard  2023,  the 
percentage  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs)  with  product  innovations 
was  43.5%  of  EU  average,  while  the  rate  of 
SMEs  with  business  process  innovation  was 
39.6%  of  EU  average.  Also,  firms  in  Poland 
have  one  of  the  lowest  average  shares  of 
investment  in  intangible  assets.  One  of  the 
links  between 
underlying  factors 
science  and  business,  which  limits  the  uptake 
of  research  output  in  the  economy.  The  level 
of  business  financing  for  public  R&D (17)  and 
the  share  of  public-private  scientific  co-
publications  as  a  share  of  all  scientific 
publications (18)  are  both  well  below  the  EU 
average.  Poland  is  trying  to  tackle  these 
challenges 
things, 
initiatives  like  the  ‘Key  National  Clusters’ (19), 
via  the  European  Funds  for  the  Modern 
for  Enterprise 
the  Agency 
Economy  of 
Development (20),  as  well  as  measures  under 
the  Polish  RRP  focused  on  strengthening: 
(i) cooperation  mechanisms  between  science 
and  industry;  and  (ii)  investments  in  the 
development  of  research  capacities.  Also,  the 
new  Unitary  Patent  (created  in  June  2023) 
could  help  stimulate  investment  in  innovation 
the  system  ends  complex  validation 
as 
litigation  costs. 
requirements  and  reduces 

through,  among  other 

is  poor 

(16)  Business environment benchmarking framework – 

European Semester 2024, p. 15.  

(17)  Source: Eurostat, (0.014% of GDP in Poland, 0.054% in 

the EU in 2021). 

(18)  Source: Eurostat, OECD (5.4% in Poland against 7.6% in 

the EU in 2022). 

(19)  Source: European Cluster Collaboration 

Platform. ECCPfactsheet_Poland_2022_final.pdf 
(clustercollaboration.eu).  

(20)  Source: STIP Compass, OECD. 

 
 
 
Further  action  may  be  needed  though  to 
further address to the challenge.   

the 

and 

governance 

Indicators (21). 

Poland’s 
public 
administration need further improvement 
as  regards  policy  making  and  the 
business  environment.  Since  2017,  Poland 
scores have deteriorated in all six governance 
dimensions  measured  by  the  World  Bank’s 
World  Governance 
Social 
dialogue  is  perceived  as  insufficient.  In  2023, 
Poland  did  not  take  any  measures  to  help 
strengthen  consultations  with  -  and  the 
involvement  of  -  social  partners 
in  the 
legislative  process,  nor  to  help  improve  the 
overall  quality  of  social  dialogue.  The  limited 
scope  and  duration  of  consultations  on 
legislative proposals has not changed yet, and 
collective bargaining coverage remains one of 
the  lowest  in  the  EU.    The  RRP  includes 
reforms to improve the quality of law making 
and  enhance 
involvement  of  social 
partners  in  the  legislative  process,  but  no 
concrete  steps  have  been  taken  so  far.  The 
time  for  companies  to prepare  for  changes  in 
the  law  was  reduced.  In  2022,  laws  dealing 
with  business  regulations  entered  into  force 
with a vacatio legis (i.e. the period between the 
announcement  of  a  legal  act  and  its  entering 
into  force)  lasting  on  average  31  days,  down 
from  53.2  in  2011.  While  Poland  already 
and 
strengthened 
impartiality of courts through a reform  of the 
disciplinary 
it  has 
committed to implementing further reforms in 
an Action Plan on the rule of law. In addition, a 
longer-term  perspective  and  stability  in  the 
governance  of  state-owned  enterprises  would 
ensure investments were better allocated and 
unrecoverable  costs  linked  to  fast-changing 
priorities were avoided (22). Moreover, Poland’s 
overall  performance  in  public  procurement  is 
below  the  EU  average:  it  attracts  too  few 
bidders, especially for a large country, and the 
procedures  can  be  lengthy  and  complex.  The 

independence 

judges, 

regime 

the 

for 

(21)  The six indicators are: (i) voice and accountability; 

(ii) political stability and absence of violence/terrorism; 
(iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; 
(v) rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption. World Bank, 
World Governance Indicators 2022. 

(22)  OECD ‘Improving the business regulatory environment in 

Poland’, 10 July 2023. 

public procurement law that entered into force 
in  January  2021 did  not  immediately  address 
the  key  weaknesses  in  public  procurement  in 
Poland. One way to improve the situation may 
be  to  strengthen  the  digitisation  of  the  public 
procurement  process  and  to  develop  the 
the  SME  sector (23). 
for 
training  offer 
Furthermore, 
government 
perceived 
effectiveness  in  Poland  scores  significantly 
below  the  EU  average  and  continues  to 
decrease 
is  no 
comprehensive  approach  to  modernising  civil 
service management and there also continued 
to  be  a  decline  in  gender parity in  senior  civil 
service positions in 2023. 

(see  Annex  13).  There 

Ensuring effective public spending 
and fiscal institutions 

Improving 
the  efficiency  of  public 
spending  and  the  targeting  of  social 
benefits  remains  a  challenge.  The  Polish 
government decided to expand universal social 
programmes  such  as  the  family  allowance 
‘500+’ (increasing it and renaming ‘800+’), and 
maintain the so-called 13th pension (an extra 
payment  made  in  addition  to  the  standard 
monthly  pension  payment).  There  is  scope  to 
prioritise  the  efficiency  of  public  spending  by 
focusing  new  social  programmes  on  lower-
income  and  at-risk  groups 
to  avoid 
unnecessary  spending  on  high-income  groups 
and putting additional inflationary pressure on 
the  economy.  The  role  of  spending  reviews  in 
the budget remains limited. 

The efficiency of public investment could 
be  strengthened  across  the  investment 
cycle.  The  planning  of  public  investment 
integrated  and 
would  benefit 
from  an 
including 
comprehensive 
investments  by 
state-owned  enterprises, 
anchored  into  the  long-term  strategy  and 
aligned  with  the  medium-term  fiscal  plan. 
Such  a  document,  when  made  public  and 
offer 
maintained 

up-to-date, 

document, 

could 

(23)  ‘Report of the President of the Public Procurement 

Office on the functioning of the public procurement 
system in 2022’, June 2023. 

11 

 
 
 
if 

It  would  help 

transparency  and  predictability  to  the  private 
sector. 
standardised 
methodologies  for  project  assessments  were 
extended beyond EU co-financed projects, and 
if  standard  procedures  for  project  selection 
were developed at the central level (see Annex 
13).  The  public  investment  system  can  also 
benefit  from  stronger  monitoring  oversight 
over  large  infrastructure  projects,  including 
those involving public corporations and public-
private  partnerships,  more  systematic  ex  post 
reviews  and  enhanced  IT  systems  in  Public 
Investment Management (24). More generally, a 
longer-term  perspective  and  stability  in  the 
governance  of  state-owned  enterprises  would 
ensure  investments  are  better  allocated  and 
fast-changing priorities are avoided.  

fiscal 

institution 

introduce  a 

The  implementation of government plans 
to 
fiscal  council  will 
strengthen  independent  fiscal  oversight. 
fully-fledged 
Poland  does  not  have  a 
independent 
(IFI),  and 
activities  related  to  the  monitoring  of  fiscal 
rules are scattered among several bodies, with 
the Supreme Audit Office (NIK) taking a central 
role. Compliance with fiscal rules can currently 
be  assessed  by  three  public  institutions,  each 
of  which  use  different  methodologies  with 
conflicting  conclusions  and  communications. 
The  NIK’s  mandate 
cover 
macroeconomic  or  budgetary  forecasting,  and 
there is no independent institution tasked with 
assessing  the 
long-term  sustainability  of 
public  finances  or  with  providing  costing 
estimates  to  the  parliament.    Establishing  an 
IFI  will  be  important,  fulfilling  all  the  tasks 
required  by  the  amended  National  Budgetary 
Framework  Directive,  with  a  strong  set  of 
independence  safeguards  and  with  sufficient 
resources.  Government  plans  to  establish  a 
fiscal 
assess 
council 
macroeconomic 
the  draft 
budget act are a step in the right direction.  

forecasts  and 

2026 

does 

not 

to 

in 

the 

ruling  coalition 

Instead, 
numerous 

at local level is effective.  According  to  the 
Self-Government Index, Poland fell from 73.58 
points  in  2014  to  56.68  in  2021 (25).  The 
largest hit to local government revenues came 
with  the  Polish  Deal,  which  decreased  income 
tax rates – a main source of financing for local 
government 
governments. 
introduced 
extra-budgetary 
financial  support  programmes  run  by  the 
Chancellery  of  the  Prime Minister,  which  were 
highly  prone  to  being  distributed  without 
reflecting  actual  financial  needs.  According  to 
the  Institute  of  Public  Finance  (2024) (26), 
during 2019-2023, municipalities governed by 
the 
(United  Right)  were 
receiving  2.35  times  more  funds  per  capita 
than those governed by the opposition (Senate 
Pact).  The  indicators  measuring  government 
effectiveness  in  Poland  continue  to  decrease, 
as evidenced by the Government effectiveness 
index  by  the  World  Bank,  which  captures 
elements  such  as  the  quality  of  public 
services, 
and 
implementation. The percentile rank of Poland 
declined  from  74th  in  2015  to  61st  in 
2022 (27).  As  such,  the  ability  of  the  local 
government  to  pursue  sound  policies  and 
services  and 
implement  quality  public 
investments  has  deteriorated.    Reversing  the 
centralising trend and building an independent 
and  highly  qualified  civil  service  at  both 
national  and  regional  levels  would  ensure 
effective 
public 
investments,  and  quick  absorption  of  the  EU 
funds. 

policymaking, 

formulation 

efficient 

policy 

Demographic  projections  put  pressure  on 
the  future  sustainability  of  the  pension 
system.  The  statutory  retirement  age  in  the 
Polish  system  is  60  years  for  women  and  65 
years  for  men.  Despite  measures  under  the 
RRP  to  incentivise  the  postponement  of  the 
effective  retirement  age (28),  recent  legislative 

The  centralisation  of  policymaking  at 
national  level  in  recent  years  has  raised 
concerns  over  whether  investment  policy 

(25)  https://www.batory.org.pl/publikacja/indeks-

samorzadnosci-1/.  

(26)  https://www.ifp.org.pl/dlaswoich/.  

(24)  International Monetary Fund (2022) Poland: Technical 
assistance report – Public Investment Management 
Assessment. 

(27)  https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-

governance-indicators. 

(28)  As of 1 January 2022, women who reach 60 years of 

age and men who reach 65 years of age can befit from 
tax allowance up to PLN 85.5 thousand of taxable 

12 

 
 
 
 
If 

on 

the 

decline 

benefits 

working-age 

the  current  benefit 

pensions 
initiatives 
(‘emerytury  stażowe’)  allowing  men  and 
women  to  retire  after  40 years  and  35 years 
of  work,  respectively,  and  on  significantly 
increasing  benefits  for  widows  by  introducing 
the ‘widow’s pension’ are likely to decrease the 
incentive to stay longer on the labour market. 
This  may  have  a  negative  impact  on  the 
sustainability  of  the  pension  system,  which  is 
characterised  by  a  broadly  stable  pension 
expenditure-to-GDP  ratio  in  the  long  term. 
However,  the  baseline  projections  for  Poland 
imply  a  sharp  worsening  in  pension  adequacy 
since  the  sustainability  factor  embedded  in 
Poland’s pension system automatically adjusts 
pension 
in 
for 
contributions  due  to  a  shrinking  working-age 
population. 
ratio 
(average  pension  benefit  vs  average  wage)  is 
maintained  and  with  worsening  demographic 
projections  that  indicate  a  larger  group  of 
pensioners  in  the  future,  pension  expenditure 
would 
increase  by  an  additional  2.5 
percentage  points  of  GDP  by  2045.  The 
recently introduced  13th  and  14th  pension 
benefits (29) that aim to mitigate the declining 
replacement  rate,  increased  annual  old-age 
pension  spending  by  0.5%  of  GDP  and  0.6% 
GDP  in  2023,  respectively.  Benefits  from 
voluntary  saving  schemes (30)  under  the  so-
called third pension pillar are likely insufficient 
to compensate for the loss of old-age income, 
especially for low-income groups given the low 
contributions  made  to  these  voluntary  saving 
schemes.  Overall,  Poland  would  benefit  from 
the  increase  of  the  effective  retirement  age, 
especially  for  women,  which  remains  lower 
than the OECD average (61.2 vs 63.1 in 2022). 
Pension  benefits  for  farmers  are 
largely 
subsidized by the state, amounting to 0.6% of 
GDP  in  2023,  and  the  method  of  calculating 
collected  insurance  contributions  does  not 

income if they decide to continue their professional 
activity and do not receive an old-age pension.  

(29)  Since 2019, the 13th month pension payment has been 
paid to all pensioners at the level of the minimum 
pension. Since 2021, a 14th month pension has also 
been paid at the level of the minimum pension, with 
higher-income pensioners receiving a reduced amount. 

(30)  Savings schemes include: PPE – pracownicze programy 
emerytalne; IKE – indywidualne konto emerytalne; IKZE 
– indywidualne konto zabezpieczenia emerytalnego.  

encourage  them  to  move  to  the  general 
pension  system.  A  reform  of  the  special 
scheme  for  farmers,  combined  with  an  active 
employment  policy,  could  increase  the  shift 
in  more 
to  employment 
from 
profitable sectors of the economy.  

inactivity 

Addressing challenges linked to 
the ageing society, healthcare, 
long-term care and labour 
shortages 

The  ageing  society  poses  challenges  in 
many policy areas. Poland is affected by an 
increasing  old-age  dependency  ratio  (ratio  of 
the  number  of  people  aged  65  and  over 
compared to the number of people of working 
age). The country is projected to have an old-
age  dependency  ratio  (65+/20-64)  of  almost 
64% by 2070 (above the EU average of 59%). 
An  ageing  and  shrinking  population  require 
appropriate  measures 
the 
availability of workers as well as to strengthen 
the healthcare and long-term care services.  

increase 

to 

The  Polish  labour market  is one  of  those 
most affected by shortages in the EU. The 
share  of  employers  who  report  that  labour 
shortages are a factor limiting their production 
was 72% in construction, 67% in industry and 
55% in services in Q4-2023. A large decrease 
of  the  working-age  population  (18-59/64)  is 
expected.  Statistics  Poland  projects  that  by 
2030  their  number  will  decrease  by  800 000 
compared to 2022 (31). In a labour market with 
high  employment  already,  as  is  the  case  in 
Poland,  there  is  a  strong need  to  tap  into the 
potential of groups still not present enough in 
the labour market, particularly women, people 
with  a  disability  and  older  people.  The  Polish 
migration policy focuses on the current needs 
of  employers,  as  reported  to  the 
labour 
offices. Poland is working on a comprehensive 
strategy  for  its  migration  policy,  including  the 
currently 
integration 

aspect,  which 

is 

(31)  Resident population projection for Poland 2023-2060, 

Statistics Poland, 2023.  

13 

 
 
 
neglected. However, the details of this strategy 
are still in the making.  

eight 

the  EU (32).  The  Polish 

Poland  is  struggling  with  a  shortage  of 
medical  and  long-term  care  staff.  Poland 
has  among  the  lowest  numbers  of  health 
professionals  in  Europe  with  3.4  doctors  per 
1 000  population  compared  to  4.1  per  1 000 
across the EU. The number of nurses in Poland 
is also one of the lowest in the EU, at 5.7 per 
1 000  population  compared  to  8.5  per  1 000 
across 
‘Barometr 
Zawodów’  survey  lists  nurses  and  midwives 
among 
understaffed 
permanently 
professions  in  Poland (33).  For  the  academic 
years  2022/2023  and  2023/2024,  19  new 
medical  faculties  were  approved  by  the  then 
Minister  of  Education  and  Science.  However, 
12  of  them  were  opened,  although they  were 
the subject of a negative opinion of the Polish 
Accreditation  Commission  (PKA).  Currently,  all 
14 medical study programmes launched in the 
academic  year  2023/2024  are  undergoing  a 
re-evaluation  process  of  PKA (34).  Poland’s 
level  of  staffing  for  long-term  care  (LTC)  is 
low.  The  number  of  LTC  patients  per  nurse 
working  in  LTC  inpatient  or  home  care  in 
Poland  is  relatively  low  compared  to  other 
European  countries.  Due  to  the  insufficient 
provision  of  residential  and  non-residential 
services, the care for older people and people 
is  mostly  carried  out 
with  a  disability 
informally  and  falls  on  family  members, 
especially women.  

Public  expenditures  on  healthcare  and 
LTC  are  low.  General  health  spending  has 
been  gradually  increasing  in  Poland,  but  it 
stands  at  6.4%  of  GDP,  among  the  lowest  in 
the  EU,  where  the  average  spending  amounts 
to  10.9%  of  GDP  (2021  data) (35).  Both 
preventable  and  treatable  mortality  rates  in 

(32)  Country Health Profile Poland 2023 p. 10, OECD.  

(33)  Barometr Zawodów 2024. Ministry of Family, Labour 

and Social Policy,  

(34)  https://www.rynekzdrowia.pl/Nauka/9-uczelni-z-

negatywna-ocena-PKA-ksztalci-lekarzy-Trzy-kolejne-
dostaly-zgode-na-uruchomienie-
nowych,255502,9.html.  

the 

Poland  are  higher  than  in  the  EU  overall. 
Despite  this,  Poland  has  decreased  the  share 
of  spending  on  preventive  care  in  current 
last  years, 
health  expenditure  over 
in  most 
contrary  to  the  trend  observed 
Member States (2022 data). The share of out-
of-pocket  payments  for  healthcare  is  high  at 
19.9%, above the EU average of 14.5%. Public 
spending  on  LTC  is  more  than  three  times 
lower  than  the  EU  average  (0.5%  vs  1.7%  of 
GDP  in  2022).  LTC  services  are  severely 
underfunded,  and  many  people  with  needs 
cannot  access  them  (see  Annex  14).  The 
coverage of publicly funded home care is one 
of the lowest in the EU (used by 13% of those 
aged 65 and over in need of LTC vs 30% in EU 
in  2022) (36).  Coverage  of  publicly provided  or 
funded  residential  care  fares  equally  badly 
(10%  vs  18%  in  EU  in  2022) (37).  Ensuring 
stable and adequate public financing of health 
and  care  services  is  crucial  given  the  rapid 
demographic changes Poland is facing. 

Green transition 

down 

weighing 

Poland  is  accelerating  its  deployment  of 
renewables,  but  the  country  remains 
heavily reliant on coal and lignite. In 2022, 
coal  accounted  for  70.7%  of  the  electricity 
the 
generation, 
competitiveness  and  sustainability  of  the 
the  share  of 
Polish  economy.  However, 
in  electricity 
renewable  energy  sources 
generation  is  increasing,  reaching  20.6%  in 
2022  thanks  to  investments  in  solar,  onshore 
wind  and  biomass.  Recent  reforms,  also  as 
part  of  the  RRP,  are  expected  to  further 
accelerate the investment in renewable energy 
sources, and planned reforms and investments 
in  energy  infrastructure  should  help  address 
the 
the 
to 
decarbonisation  of 
electricity  mix, 
especially  if  they  are  coupled  with  measures 

grid-related 

bottlenecks 

the 

(36)  European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report. Economic 
and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States 
(2022-2070)  

(35)  Eurostat, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-

explained/index.php?title=Healthcare_expenditure_stati
stics_-_overview.  

(37)  European Commission, 2024 Ageing Report. Economic 
and Budgetary Projections for the EU Member States 
(2022-2070) 

14 

 
 
 
transport. Between 2016 and 2021, the share 
of  buses  and  trains 
in  total  passenger 
transport in Poland decreased to 13.7%, which 
is the EU average. There is scope to accelerate 
the  development  of  the  network  of  charging 
stations  for  electric  vehicles  to  promote  their 
use in individual and public transport. 

adaptation 

and  water  management 
objectives 

Poland  is  vulnerable  to  events  linked  to 
the  impacts  of  climate  change,  facing  in 
particular increased risks of drought and 
flooding. While the RRP includes measures to 
improve  water  retention  in  rural  areas,  other 
national  policies  and  practices  in  agriculture, 
still 
forestry 
undermine 
and 
exacerbate  the  risk  of  drought  and  flooding, 
such  as 
conversion  of  peatlands  and 
grasslands  into  arable  land,  intensive  logging 
in  water-protecting  forests  or  unsustainable 
maintenance  works  on  rivers.  More  climate 
change-resilient  water  management  could  be 
achieved through closer co-ordination between 
the different institutions in charge of relevant 
policies, more mainstreamed understanding of 
how 
solutions 
provide  benefits  to  the  economy  as  well  as 
implementation of sustainable water retention 
policies  such  as  those  formulated  in  the 
Programme  for  the  Prevention  of  Water 
Scarcity. 

nature-based 

adaptation 

to improve the flexibility of demand to ensure 
the  grids  are  used  more  effectively.  There  is 
nonetheless  room  for  further  action  to  meet 
climate  and  energy  objectives,  particularly  in 
the  buildings,  transport  and  industry  sectors. 
This  action  would  benefit  from  being  guided 
by  long-term  policy  planning  aligned  with  the 
EU  objectives.  Given  the  high  needs  for  green 
skills  and  competences,  Poland  would  also 
benefit from a national green skills strategy to 
boost  policy  focus  and  monitor  the  progress 
made. 

a 

on 

is  yet 

coal  while 

Targeted  efforts  are  needed  to  reduce 
carbon  emissions  from  buildings,  with  a 
particular focus on decarbonising district 
heating. District heating systems provide heat 
to  42%  of  the  population  but  remain  heavily 
clear 
dependent 
to  be 
decarbonisation  pathway 
proposed.  Poland  has  started  work  on  a 
Heating  Strategy,  which  offers  an  opportunity 
to address the sector’s challenges: (i) the need 
for a robust financial model; and (ii) new, more 
diversified business models for district heating 
companies  that  encompass  energy  efficiency 
improvements,  heat 
storage  and  grid-
balancing  services.  While  current  policies 
assume  a  shift  to  natural  gas  and  biomass, 
the  new  strategy  presents  an  opportunity  to 
outline  a  decarbonisation  pathway 
that 
sustainable 
prioritises  energy  efficiency, 
renewable heat sources and the use of waste 
implemented  a  set  of 
heat.  Poland  has 
national  policies 
residential 
to  promote 
building  renovations,  including  major  subsidy 
schemes  financed  under  the  RRP.  However, 
these policies need to be further strengthened 
and  aligned  with  the  EU  2030  climate 
objectives.  

greenhouse-gas 

in  decarbonising 

Further  steps 
the 
transport  sector  will  be  essential  to 
emissions. 
reduce 
Emissions from road transport almost doubled 
in  2022  compared  to  2005 
levels  and 
currently account for 34.4% of all emissions in 
the  effort-sharing  sectors  (road  transport, 
buildings,  agriculture,  waste  and 
small 
industries).  The  uptake  of  electric  vehicles  is 
still  at  an  early  stage  with  a  share  of  only 
0.1%  in  2022  accompanied  by  delays  in  the 
investments  in  zero  and  low-emission  public 

15 

 
 
 
Box 4: 

The mid-term review of cohesion policy funds for Poland 

The mid-term review of the cohesion policy funds is an opportunity to assess cohesion 
policy  programmes  and  tackle  emerging  needs  and  challenges  in  EU  Member  States 
and their regions. Member States are reviewing each programme taking into account,  among 
other things, the challenges identified in the European Semester, including in the 2024  country-
specific recommendations. This review forms the basis for a proposal by the Member State for 
the definitive allocation of 15% of EU funding included in each programme.   

Poland has made progress in implementing cohesion policy programmes and the European Pillar 
of Social Rights, but challenges remain as outlined in this report, including in Annexes 14 and 17. 
In particular, regional disparities in Poland in terms of GDP per capita have continuously widened 
for the past decade as disparities between eastern regions and the rest of the country, as well 
intra-regional  disparities,  persist.  Against  this  background,  it  is  still  important  to  continue 
implementing  planned  priorities,  paying  particular attention  to: (i)  investment  in  innovative  and 
smart  economic  transformation,  based  on  R&D  activities,  implementation  of  new  technologies 
and  strengthened  cooperation  between  science  and  business;  (ii)  shifting  away  from  coal, 
speeding  up  the  green  transition,  clean  energy  production  as  well  as  net-zero  technologies 
manufacturing  and  reducing  energy  consumption  and  air  pollution;  (iii)  investments  in  skills,  
particularly in adult learning, and digital and green skills, based on a comprehensive strategy and 
Strengthening  measures  that  help  women  and  people  with  a  disability  find  work',  including 
through tapping into  the full potential of the social economy; (iv)  closing territorial gaps in the 
access to quality and affordable childcare, including investments in  increasing the workforce in 
childcare,  as  well  as  boosting  their  qualifications  and  improving  their  working  conditions; 
(v) increasing access to high-quality, affordable and accessible community-based long-term care 
services, while improving working conditions and the work-life balance for carers.  

Given  the  unprecedented  inflow  of  refugees  from  Ukraine,  the  support  system  for  non-EU 
country  nationals  and  opportunities  for  their  comprehensive 
integration  merit  specific 
consideration  as  Poland  prepares  for  the  mid-term  review.  Poland  could  also  benefit  from  the 
opportunities provided by the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform initiative (STEP) (38) to 
support the transformation of the economy, especially in terms of clean and resource  efficient 
technologies.  

(38)  Regulation (EU) 2024/795. 

16 

 
 
 
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 

With its wide policy scope and substantial 
financial envelope, Poland’s recovery and 
resilience  plan  (RRP)  includes  measures 
to  address  a  series  of  structural 
challenges,  in  synergy  with  other  EU 
funds by:  

of  Poland’s  recovery  and  resilience  plan  by 
August 2026.   

Beyond  the  reforms  and  investments  in 
the RRP and cohesion-policy programmes, 
Poland would benefit from:   

•  Ensuring  sustainability  of  government 
(i) addressing  challenges 
finances  by: 
linked  to  an  ageing  population,  including 
the  pension  system; 
the 
functioning  of  healthcare  and  long-term 
care;  and  (iii) addressing  labour  shortages, 
e.g.,  by  attracting  skilled  workers  and 
unlocking 
inactive 
population;  

(ii) improving 

potential 

the 

of 

•  Ensuring  government  finances  are 
effective  by:  (i) better  targeting  social 
benefits  and  ensuring  stable  financing  for 
local  government to pursue efficient public 
investments;  and 
the 
governance  of  state-own  enterprises  to 
ensure  their  efficient  performance  in  the 
longer term; 

improving 

(ii) 

private 

investment 

•  Improving  the  investment  climate  to 
by: 
increase 
(i) ensuring  a  stable  legal  environment; 
(ii) developing 
capital  market; 
(iii) facilitating innovations; (iv) speeding up 
businesses; 
the 
(v) strengthening  the  social  dialogue;  and 
(vi) taking  further  steps  to  tackle  skills 
mismatches;  

digitisation 

its 

of 

•  Strengthening 

planning 

and 
the 
selection  of  public  investments  by: 
(i) supporting the annual and medium-term 
planning process with a comprehensive and 
reliable  overview  of  investment  spending 
and 
by 
(ii) improving 
the 
assessment  and  selection  of  projects  and 
the public procurement electronic means; 

the  procedures 

government 

central 

the 

for 

•  Supporting  the  green  transition  by 
significantly  accelerating  investments  in 
decarbonisation,  energy 
transformation, 
and sustainable transport; 

•  Accelerating  the  digital  transition  by 
improving  the  digitalisation  of  schools, 
businesses,  and  public  administration,  e.g., 
by developing appropriate infrastructure; 

•  Improving 

the 

labour  market  by 
increasing  access 
to  early  childhood 
education  and  care  for  children  up  to  3 
public 
years 
employment  services  and  fostering  quality 
education;  

strengthening 

of  age, 

•  Supporting 

social 

protection 

by 
providing  investment  support  for  social 
economy 
reforming 
fragmented long-term care systems;  

entities 

and 

cooperation 

•  Improving the business environment by 
strengthening 
between 
researchers  and  businesses,  as  well  as 
ensuring  effective  public  consultations  and 
involving  social  partners  in  the  policy-
making process; 

•  Strengthening  the  independence  and 
impartiality of courts through the reform 
of  the  disciplinary  system  that  applies  to 
judges. 

The  implementation  of  Poland’s  recovery 
and  resilience  plan  is  facing  increasing 
challenges.  Renewed  efforts  are  key  for  a 
successful implementation of all the measures 

17 

 
 
•  Accelerating  the  green  transition  by: 
(i) better  policy  planning,  taking  further 
measures to reduce reliance on fossil fuels: 
(ii) improving energy efficiency, including in 
(iii) further 
the  district  heating  sector: 
developing 
transport;  and 
(iv) increasing  efforts  to  improve  water 
management policy to address the growing 
risk of drought and floods.    

sustainable 

18 

 
ANNEXES 

 
 
 
 
LIST OF ANNEXES 

Cross-cutting indicators 

A1.  Sustainable Development Goals 

A2.  Progress in the implementation of country-specific recommendations 

A3.  Recovery and resilience plan – implementation 

A4.  Other EU instruments for recovery and growth 

A5.  Resilience 

Environmental sustainability 

A6.  European Green Deal 

A7.  Energy transition and competitiveness 

A8.  Fair transition to climate neutrality 

Productivity 

A9.  Resource productivity, efficiency and circularity 

A10.  Digital transformation 

A11.  Innovation 

A12.  Industry and single market 

A13.  Public administration 

Fairness 

A14.  Employment, skills and social policy challenges in light of the European Pillar of Social Rights 

A15.  Education and training 

A16.  Health and health systems 

A17.  Economic and social performance at regional level 

Macroeconomic stability 

A18.  Key financial sector developments 

A19.  Taxation 

A20.  Table with economic and financial indicators 

A21.  Debt sustainability analysis 

LIST OF TABLES 

A2.1. 
A3.1. 

Summary table on 2019-2023 CSRs 
Key facts of the Polish RRP 

21 

24 

24 

27 

32 

34 

37 

39 

39 

44 

50 

53 

53 

55 

57 

59 

64 

66 

66 

69 

72 

74 

79 

79 

82 

85 

86 

28 
32 

 
 
 
Support from EU instruments in Poland 
Resilience indices across dimensions for Poland and the EU-27 
Indicators tracking progress on the European Green Deal from a macroeconomic perspective 
Key Energy Indicators 
Key indicators for a fair transition in Poland 
Circularity indicators 

A3.2.  Measures in Poland's RRP 
A4.1. 
A5.1. 
A6.1. 
A7.1. 
A8.1. 
A9.1. 
A10.1.  Key Digital Decade targets monitored by the Digital Economy and Society Index indicators 
A11.1.  Key innovation indicators 
A12.1. 
Industry and the Single Market 
A13.1.  Public administration indicators 
A14.1.  Social Scoreboard for Poland 
A14.2.  Situation of Poland on 2030 employment, skills and poverty reduction targets 
A15.1.  EU-level targets and other contextual indicators under the European Education Area strategic framework 
A16.1.  Key health indicators 
A17.1.  Selected indicators at regional level in Poland 
A18.1.  Financial Soundness Indicators 
A19.1.  Taxation indicators 
A20.1.  Key economic and financial indicators 
A21.1.  Debt sustainability analysis - Poland 
A21.2.  Heat map of fiscal sustainability risks - Poland 

LIST OF GRAPHS 

Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 
Poland’s progress on the 2019-2023 CSRs (2024 European Semester) 
Total grants disbursed under the RRF 
Total loans disbursed under the RRF 
Distribution of cohesion policy funding across policy objectives in Poland 
Distribution of RRF funding by pillar in Poland 
Greenhouse gas emissions from the effort sharing sectors in Mt CO2eq, 2005-2022 
Changes in livestock density and organic farming 
Environmental investment gap, annual average 
Poland´s energy retail prices for households and industry & service 
Trends in electricity prices for non-household consumers (EU and foreign partners) 
Poland's installed renewable capacity (left) and electricity generation mix (right) 
Fair transition challenges in Poland 
Job vacancy rate in transforming sectors and mining and quarrying 
ETS emissions by sector since 2013 
Treatment of municipal waste 

A1.1. 
A2.1. 
A3.1. 
A3.2. 
A4.1. 
A4.2. 
A6.1. 
A6.2. 
A6.3. 
A7.1. 
A7.2. 
A7.3. 
A8.1. 
A8.2. 
A9.1. 
A9.2. 
A11.1.  R&D expenditure as % of GDP, 2010-2022 
A12.1.  Nominal labour productivity per hour worked (EU=100) 
A12.2. 
Investment, % GDP 
A13.1.  Government effectiveness 
A13.2.  a) Use of public authorities’ websites or apps (left side); b) e-government maturity (centre); c) share of individuals with 

basic or above basic overall digital skills (right side) 
A15.1.  Underachievement rates by field, PISA 2012, 2018 and 2022 
A16.1.  Life expectancy at birth, years 
A16.2.  Projected increase in public expenditure on healthcare over 2024-2070 
A18.1.  Credit growth 
A18.2.  House price index and mortgages 
A19.1.  Tax revenues from different tax types, % of total revenue 
A19.2.  Tax wedge for single and second earners, % of total labour costs, 2023 

33 
36 
37 
43 
49 
52 
54 
56 
58 
63 
65 
66 
67 
70 
73 
76 
80 
82 
85 
88 
88 

24 
27 
33 
33 
35 
35 
39 
41 
42 
44 
45 
46 
50 
52 
53 
54 
57 
59 
60 
64 

65 
69 
72 
72 
79 
81 
83 
83 

22 

 
 
 
LIST OF MAPS 

A17.1.  GDP per capita (PPS) in Poland, by NUTS-2 region 
A17.2.  Poland, Regional Competitiveness Index, 2022 edition 
A17.3.  Share of RES in electricity production in 2022 

74 
75 
75 

23 

 
 
CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS 
ANNEX 1: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS 

of 

four 

dimensions 

This Annex assesses Poland’s progress on the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) along 
the 
competitive 
sustainability.  The  17  SDGs  and  their  related 
indicators  provide  a  policy  framework  under  the 
UN’s  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development. 
The  aim  is  to  end  all  forms  of  poverty,  fight 
inequalities  and  tackle  climate  change  and  the 
environmental crisis, while ensuring that no one is 
left  behind.  The  EU  and  its  Member  States  are 
committed  to  this  historic  global  framework 
agreement  and  to  playing  an  active  role  in 
maximising  progress  on  the  SDGs.  The  graph 
below  is  based  on  the  EU  SDG  indicator  set 
developed  to monitor progress  on  the  SDGs  in  an 
EU context. 

While  Poland  is  improving  on  some  of  the 
indicators  related  to  environmental 
SDG 
sustainability (SDGs 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14), it is 
moving  away  from  the  targets  for  SDG 2 
(Zero  hunger),  which  includes  indicators  on 
sustainable  agricultural  production  and  the 

Graph A1.1: Progress towards the SDGs in Poland 

environmental impacts of agriculture), SDG 6 
(Clean  water  and  sanitation)  and  SDG 15 
(Life  on  land).  Under  SDG 2,  the  area  under 
organic  farming  in  Poland  (3.8%  of  the  utilised 
agricultural area in 2021) is below the EU average 
(9.9%  in  2021),  while  government  support  to 
agricultural  R&D  was  only  EUR  0.1  per  inhabitant 
in Poland in 2022, compared to the EU average of 
EUR 8.  As  for  SDG 6,  the  percentage  of  inland 
water bathing sites with excellent water quality in 
Poland decreased from 83.3% in 2017 to 57.7% in 
2022 and was below the EU average of 79.3% in 
2022. Poland has made some progress on energy 
consumption  indicators  including  the  share  of 
energy 
renewable 
consumption  (SDG 7;  from  11.1%  in  2017  to 
16.9%  in  2022;  EU  average  23.0%  in  2022). 
However, it needs to catch up with the EU average 
on per capita net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(SDG  13;  9.3 
in2022;  EU  average: 
7.3 tonnes  in  2022).  Moreover,  Poland  is  rapidly 
losing  carbon  sinks,  with  the  net  GHG  emissions 
from  land  use  and  forestry  (LULUCF)  increasing 

in  gross 

energy 

tonnes 

final 

For detailed datasets on the various SDGs, see the annual Eurostat report ‘Sustainable development in the European Union’; for 
details on extensive country-specific data on the short-term progress of Member States: Key findings – Sustainable development 
indicators - Eurostat (europa.eu). A high status does not mean that a country is close to reaching a specific SDG, but signals that it 
is doing better than the EU on average. The progress score is an absolute measure based on the indicator trends over the past 5 
years. The calculation does not take into account any target values as most EU policy targets are only valid for the aggregate EU 
level. Depending on data availability for each goal, not all 17 SDGs are shown for each country. 
Source: Eurostat, latest update of 25 April 2024. Data refer mainly to the period 2017-2022 or 2018-2023. Data on SDGs may 
vary across the report and its annexes due to different cut-off dates. 

24 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to  SDG 11 

recovery  and 

resilience  plan 

import  dependency 

from  -133.6  tonnes  CO2  eq.  per  km²  in  2017 
to -114.3 in 2022; EU average: -56.0). In addition, 
Poland’s  energy 
(SDG  7) 
increased  from  38.3%  in 2017  to  46.0% in  2022 
(EU  average:  62.5%  in  2022).  As  for  affordable 
energy,  the  percentage  of  the  Polish  population 
unable to keep their homes adequately warm was 
lower (4.9% in 2022) than the EU average (9.3%). 
Poland’s 
(RRP) 
includes measures to address some of the energy-
related  challenges,  namely  the  energy  renovation 
of buildings, energy efficiency of business and the 
decarbonisation  of  energy  production.  While 
Poland  is  improving  on  several  SDG  indicators 
related 
(Sustainable  cities  and 
communities), its share of buses and trains in total 
passenger transport has decreased (from 20.7% in 
2016  to  13.7%  in  2021; EU  average  also  13.7%) 
and the country needs to reduce premature deaths 
due to exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) 
(125  per  100 000  in  2021;  EU  average:  57).  On 
SDG 14,  Poland  is  progressing  on  the  share  of 
coastal  water  bathing  sites  with  excellent  water 
quality  (50.8%  in  2022,  vs  48.5  in  2017),  but  is 
below  the  EU  average  (88.9%)  and  does  not 
provide  data  for  half  of  the  SDG 14  sub-themes. 
Poland  is  moving  away  from  the  targets  for 
SDG 15  (Life  on  land),  due  to  the  significant 
increase  in  the  drought  impact  on  ecosystems 
(from  1.2%  of  country  area  in  2017  to  8.8%  in 
2022).  However,  it  falls below  the  EU  average  on 
this (15.7% in 2022). 

Poland  is  improving  on  most  SDG  indicators 
related to fairness (SDGs 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10). 
It performs well on the indicators for: (i) people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion (SDG 1; 15.9% in 
2022,  vs  18.7%  in  2017  and  the  EU  average  of 
21.6% in 2022); (ii) the severe material and social 
deprivation rate (SDG 1; 2.8% of the population in 
2022, vs 5.3% in 2017 and the 6.7% EU average 
in 2022); and (iii) income distribution (SDG 10; 3.9 
in 2022, vs 4.6 in 2017 and the EU average of 4.7 
in 2022). In addition, the long-term unemployment 
rate  fell  (SDG 8;  0.8%  in  2023  vs  1.0%  in  2018 
and the EU average of 2.1% in 2023). Poland also 
improved  and  performed  better  than  the  EU 
average  on  early  leavers  from  education  and 
training (SDG 4; 3.7% in 2023; EU average: 9.5%). 
However,  Poland  needs  to  take  measures  to 
significantly  reduce  avoidable  mortality  (SDG 3; 
481.7  deaths  per  100 000  in  2021;  EU  average: 
294.1). Poland also needs to catch up with the EU 
average  on  gender  equality  in  employment,  in 
particular  on  positions  held  by  women  in  senior 

25 

management (SDG 5; 27.2% of positions in senior 
management  were  held  by  women  in  2023;  EU 
average:  33.8%).  On  SDG 4  (Quality  education), 
the  percentage  of  low-achieving  15-year-olds  in 
reading increased (from 14.7% in 2018 to 23% in 
2022), though it is still lower than the EU average 
(29.5% in 2022).  

Poland  is  improving  on  SDGs  on  productivity 
(SDGs  4,  8  and  9).  Poland  performs  well  on  its 
employment  rate  (SDG 8;  77.9%  in  2023,  vs 
71.4%  in  2018  and  the  EU  average  of  75.3%  in 
2023).  On  the  negative  side,  the  share  of  adults 
with  at  least  basic  digital  skills  (SDG 4)  remains 
low (44.3% in 2023; EU average: 55.6%). Poland is 
also  moving  away  from  the  EU  average  on  the 
indicator for the investment share of GDP (SDG 8; 
16.8%  in  2022,  vs  17.6%  in  2017  and  the  EU 
average  of  22.7%  in  2023).  The  Polish  RRP 
includes  several  measures 
the 
investment  climate.  Poland  is  improving,  but  still 
performs  far  below  the  EU  average  on  indicators 
for  R&D  and  innovation,  and  sustainable  industry 
(SDG 9),  including  gross  domestic  expenditure  on 
R&D (1.46% of GDP in 2022, vs 1.04% of GDP in 
2017 and the EU average of 2.24% in 2022). The 
same  is  true  of  air  emissions  intensity  of  fine 
particulate  matter  (PM2.5)  from  industry  (0.16 g 
per euro in 2021; EU average: 0.06 g).  

improve 

to 

is 

increased 

its  general  government 

Poland 
indicators 
improving  on  SDG 
related  to  macroeconomic  stability  (SDGs 8, 
16,  17)  but  still  needs  to  catch  up  a  bit 
compared  to  the  EU.  It  has  improved  on  SDG 8 
(Decent work and economic growth), although real 
GDP  per  capita  (EUR 14 750  in  2023)  remains 
below  the  EU  average  (EUR 28 940  in  2023).  On 
justice  and  strong  institutions  (SDG 16),  Poland 
has 
total 
expenditure  on  the  law  courts  (SDG 16;  EUR 86.2 
per capita in 2022) but needs to catch up with the 
EU average of EUR 113.7. However, perceptions of 
the  independence  of  the  justice  system  have 
become  more  negative,  with  the  percentage  of 
people  who consider  it to be  fairly  good  and very 
good declining steeply from 42% in 2018 to 23% 
in  2023  (the  EU  average  in  2023  was  53%). 
Poland’s  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  has  also 
deteriorated  (from  60 in 2017  to  54  in  2023;  EU 
average:  64  in  2023).  The  Polish  RRP  includes 
measures  on  the  independence  of  the  justice 
system.  On  the  share  of  households  with  a  high-
speed  internet  connection  (SDG 17),  Poland  has 
made considerable progress (from 21.3% in 2017 

 
to 70.7% in 2022) and is close to the EU average 
of (73.4% in 2022). 

As the SDGs form an overarching framework, any 
links  to  relevant  SDGs  are  either  explained  or 
depicted with icons in the other annexes. 

26 

 
ANNEX 2: PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY-SPECIFIC 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Graph A2.1: Poland’s progress on the 2019-2023 
CSRs (2024 European Semester) 

Source: European Commission 

The Commission has assessed the 2019-2023 
country-specific  recommendations  (CSRs) (39) 
addressed to Poland as part of the European 
Semester.  These  recommendations  concern  a 
wide  range  of  policy  areas  that  are  related  to  15 
of  the  17  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (see 
Annexes  1  and  3). The  assessment  considers  the 
policy  action  taken  by  Poland  to  date (40)  and  the 
commitments  in  its  recovery  and  resilience  plan 
(RRP) (41).  At  this  stage  of  RRP  implementation, 
46%  of  the  CSRs  focusing  on  structural  issues 
from  2019-2023  have  recorded  at  least  ‘some 
progress’,  while  47%  recorded  ‘limited  progress’ 
(see  Graph  A2.1).  As  the  RRP  is  implemented 
further,  considerable  progress 
in  addressing 
structural CSRs is expected in the years to come. 

(39)  2023 CSRs :EUR-Lex - 32023H0901(21) - EN - EUR-Lex 

(europa.eu) 
2022 CSRs: EUR-Lex - 32022H0901(21) - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 
2021 CSRs: EUR-Lex - 32021H0729(21) - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 
2020 CSRs: EUR-Lex - 32020H0826(21) - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 
2019 CSRs: EUR-Lex - 32019H0905(21) - EN - EUR-Lex 
(europa.eu) 

(40)  Including policy action reported in the national reform 

programme and in Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) 
reporting (twice a year reporting on progress in implementing 
milestones and targets and resulting from the payment 
requests assessment). 

(41)  Member States were asked to effectively address in their 
RRPs all or a significant subset of the relevant country-
specific recommendations issued by the Council. The CSR 
assessment presented here considers the degree of 
implementation of the measures included in the RRP and of 
those carried out outside of the RRP at the time of 
assessment. Measures laid down in the Annex of the 
adopted Council Implementing Decision on approving the 
assessment of the RRP, which are not yet adopted or 
implemented but considered credibly announced, in line with 
the CSR assessment methodology, warrant ‘limited progress’. 
Once implemented, these measures can lead to 
‘some/substantial progress or full implementation’, 
depending on their relevance. 

27 

No Progress7%Limited Progress47%Some Progress31%Substantial Progress9%Full Implementation6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Table A2.1:  Summary table on 2019-2023 CSRs 

(Continued on the next page) 

28 

PolandAssessment in May 2024RRP coverage of CSRs until 2026Relevant SDGs2019 CSR 1Some progressEnsure that the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure does not exceed 4.4% in 2020, corresponding to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of GDP. Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 16Take further steps to improve the efficiency of public spending, including by improving the budgetary process.Some progressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8, 162019 CSR 2Limited ProgressEnsure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the preferential pension schemes. Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8Take steps to increase labour market participation, including by improving access to childcare and long-term care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of employment. Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025, and 2026.SDG 3, 4, 5, 8Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult learning.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, and 2026.SDG 42019 CSR 3Some ProgressStrengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research institutions and their closer collaboration with business. Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 9Focus investment-related economic policy on innovationSome ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025, and 2026.SDG 9, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on transport, notably on its sustainabilitySome ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on digital infrastructureSubstantial ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 9, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on energy infrastructureLimited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13Focus investment-related economic policy on healthcareSome ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 3, 10, 11Focus investment-related economic policy on cleaner energy, taking into account regional disparitiesSome ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of  2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13Improve the regulatory environment, in particular by strengthening the role of consultations of social partners and public consultations in the legislative process.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, and 2023.SDG 162020 CSR 1Limited progressTake all necessary measures, in line with the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact, to effectively address the COVID-19 pandemic, sustain the economy and support the ensuing recovery. When economic conditions allow, pursue fiscal policies aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions and ensuring debt sustainability, while enhancing investment. Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 16Improveresilience,accessibilityandeffectivenessofthehealthsystem,includingbyprovidingsufficientresourcesandacceleratingthe deployment of e-health services. Limited progressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 32020 CSR 2Limited ProgressMitigatetheemploymentimpactofthecrisis,inparticularbyenhancing flexible and short time working arrangements. Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2023.SDG 8Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.No ProgressSDG 1, 2, 10Improve digital skills. Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 4 
 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

29 

Further promote the digital transformation of companies and public administration. Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of  2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 9, 162020 CSR 3Limited ProgressContinue efforts to secure access to finance and liquidity for companies. Full ImplementationSDG 8, 9Front-load mature public investment projectsLimited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8, 16and promote private investment to foster the economic recovery. Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8, 9Focusinvestmentonthegreenanddigitaltransition,inparticularondigital infrastructure, Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 9, 10, 11clean and efficient production and use of energy, Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 10, 11, 13and sustainable transport, Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 10, 11contributingtoaprogressivedecarbonisationoftheeconomy,including in the coal regions.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 6, 10, 11, 12, 152020 CSR 4Some ProgressEnhancetheinvestmentclimate,inparticularbysafeguardingjudicial independence. Substantial ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024,  2025 and 2026.SDG 16Ensureeffectivepublicconsultationsandinvolvementofsocialpartners in the policymaking process.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, and 2023.SDG 162021 CSR 1Not relevant anymoreIn2022,pursueasupportivefiscalstance,includingtheimpulseprovidedbytheRecoveryandResilienceFacility,andpreservenationally financed investment.Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 16Wheneconomicconditionsallow,pursueafiscalpolicyaimedatachievingprudentmedium-termfiscalpositionsandensuringfiscalsustainability in the medium term.Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 16Atthesametime,enhanceinvestmenttoboostgrowthpotential.Payparticularattentiontothecompositionofpublicfinances,onboththerevenueandexpendituresidesofthebudget,andtothequalityofbudgetarymeasuresinordertoensureasustainableandinclusiverecovery.Prioritisesustainableandgrowth-enhancinginvestment,inparticular investment supporting the green and digital transition.Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 16Giveprioritytofiscalstructuralreformsthatwillhelpprovidefinancingforpublicpolicyprioritiesandcontributetothelong-termsustainabilityofpublicfinances,including,whererelevant,bystrengtheningthecoverage,adequacyandsustainabilityofhealthand social protection systems for all.Not relevant anymoreNot applicableSDG 8, 162022 CSR 1Some ProgressIn 2023, ensure that the growth of nationally financed primary current expenditure is in line with an overall neutral policy stance, taking into account continued temporary and targeted support to households and firms most vulnerable to energy price hikes and to people fleeing Ukraine. Stand ready to adjust current spending to the evolving situation.Substantial ProgressNot applicableSDG 8, 16Expand public investment for the green and digital transitions, and for energy security taking into account the REPowerEU initiative, including by making use of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other Union funds.Full ImplementationNot applicableSDG 8, 16For the period beyond 2023, pursue a fiscal policy aimed at achieving prudent medium-term fiscal positions.Some ProgressNot applicableSDG 8, 16Improvetheefficiencyofpublicspending,includingbycontinuingthereform of the budget system.Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8, 16Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and by reforming the preferential pension schemes.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 82022 CSR 2Swiftly finalise the negotiations with the Commission of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy programming documents with a view to starting their implementation.Progress on the cohesion policy programming documents is monitored under the EU cohesion policy. 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

(Continued on the next page) 

30 

2022 CSR 3Limited ProgressIncrease labour market participation, including by improving access to childcare and longterm care, and remove remaining obstacles to more permanent types of employment.Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025, and 2026.SDG 3, 4, 5, 8Foster quality education and skills relevant to the labour market, especially through adult learning and improving digital skills.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 4Better target social benefits and ensure access to those in need.No ProgressSDG 1, 2, 102022 CSR 4Limited ProgressImprove the resilience, accessibility and effectiveness of the health system, including by providing sufficient resources to reverse the pyramid of care and accelerating the deployment of e-health services.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 3Strengthen the innovative capacity of the economy, including by supporting research institutions and their closer collaboration with business.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025, and 2026.SDG 9Enhancefurtherdigitalisationofbusinessesandpublicadministration, including through development of infrastructure.Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of  2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 9, 162022 CSR 5Some ProgressEnhance the investment climate, in particular by safeguarding judicial independence.Substantial ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024,  2025 and 2026.SDG 16Ensure effective public consultations and involvement of social partners in the policymaking process.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, and 2023.SDG 162022 CSR 6Limited ProgressReduce overall reliance on fossil fuelsLimited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 13by removing regulatory, administrative and infrastructural barriers to accelerate permitting procedures and deployment of renewable energy sources.Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 8, 9, 13Reformbuildingrenovationpoliciesandsupportschemestoincentivisedeeperenergyefficiency,promoteenergysavingsandfasterphase-outoffossilfuelsinheatingandaccelerateddeployment of heat pumps.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, and 2026.SDG 7Accelerate modal shift towards public transport and active mobility and promote faster uptake of electric vehicles with incentives and investment in charging infrastructure.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 11Improve long- and medium-term strategic planning of the green transition by updating national energy policies in line with the European Green Deal objectives and the REPowerEU Communication to provide certainty to the business community and use funding effectively with a view to accelerating clean energy investments.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 11, 132023 CSR 1Limited ProgressWind down the emergency energy support measures in force, using the related savings to reduce the government deficit, as soon as possible in 2023 and 2024. Should renewed energy price increases necessitate new or continued support measures, ensure that these are targeted at protecting vulnerable households and firms, fiscally affordable, and preserve incentives for energy savings.Some ProgressNot applicableSDG 8, 16Ensure prudent fiscal policy, in particular by limiting the nominal increase in nationally financed net primary expenditure in 2024 to not more than 7.8%.No ProgressNot applicableSDG 8, 16PreservenationallyfinancedpublicinvestmentandensuretheeffectiveabsorptionofRRFgrantsandotherEUfunds,inparticularto foster the green and digital transitions.Full ImplementationNot applicableSDG 8, 16For the period beyond 2024, continue to pursue a medium-term fiscal strategy of gradual and sustainable consolidation, combined with investments and reforms conducive to higher sustainable growth, to achieve a prudent medium-term fiscal position.Some ProgressNot applicableSDG 8, 16Improve the efficiency of public spending, including through better targeting of social benefits.No ProgressSDG 1, 2, 8, 10, 16Ensure the adequacy of future pension benefits and the sustainability of the pension system by taking measures to increase the effective retirement age and reforming preferential pension schemes.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8 
 
 
  
 
Table (continued) 

Note:            
* See footnote (42). 
** RRP measures included in this table contribute to the implementation of CSRs. Nevertheless, additional measures outside the 
RRP are necessary to fully implement CSRs and address their underlying challenges. Measures indicated as 'being implemented' 
are only those included in the RRF payment requests submitted and positively assessed by the European Commission.  
Source: European Commission 

31 

2023 CSR 2Urgently fulfil the required milestones and targets related to the protection of the financial interests of the Union with a view to allow for a swift and steady implementation of its recovery and resilience plan. Swiftly finalise the REPowerEU chapter with a view to rapidly starting its implementation. Proceed with the speedy implementation of cohesion policy programmes, in close complementarity and synergy with the recovery and resilience plan.2023 CSR 3Substantial ProgressEnhance the investment climate, including by safeguarding judicial independence.Substantial ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 8, 9, 162023 CSR 4Limited ProgressAccelerate the phase-out of fossil fuelsLimited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 9, 13and (accelerate) the deployment of renewable energy. Reform the legal framework for grid connection permitting and for renewable energy sources, including energy communities, biomethane and renewable hydrogen.Some ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 7, 8, 9, 13Implement measures to promote energy savings and gas demand reductions. Scale up investment in energy efficiency for buildings and decarbonise the heat supply in district heating to address energy poverty.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 1, 2, 7, 10Further promote sustainable public transport modes.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures being implemented as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 11Step up policy efforts aimed at the provision and acquisition of skills and competences needed for the green transition, including for building renovation.Limited ProgressRelevant RRP measures planned as of 2024, 2025 and 2026.SDG 4RRP implementation is monitored through the assessment of RRP payment requests and analysis of the bi-annual reporting on the achievement of the milestones and targets, to be reflected in the country reports. Progress with the cohesion policy is monitored in the context of the Cohesion Policy of the European Union. 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX 3: RECOVERY AND RESILIENCE PLAN – IMPLEMENTATION 

This  Annex  provides  a  snapshot  of  Poland’s 
implementation of its recovery and resilience 
plan  (RRP),  past  the  mid-way  point  of  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility’s 
(RRF) 
lifetime.  The  RRF  has  proven  central  to  the  EU’s 
recovery  from  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  helping 
speed  up  the  twin  green  and  digital  transition, 
while  adapting  to  geopolitical  and  economic 
resilience 
developments, 
against  future  shocks.  The  RRF  is  also  helping 
implement the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
and 
country-specific 
recommendations (see Annex 2). 

strengthening 

address 

and 

the 

The  RRP  paves  the  way  for  disbursing  up  to 
EUR 25.3  billion  in  grants  and  EUR  34.5 
billion in loans under the RRF over the 2021-
2026  period,  representing  8%  of  Poland’s 
GDP (42).  As  of  mid-May  2024,  EUR  11.39  billion 
has  been  disbursed  to  Poland  under  the  RRF, 
comprising EUR 3.25 billion in grants and EUR 8.14 
billion in loans. 

Poland  still  has  EUR  48.4  billion  available  in 
grants  and  loans  from  the  RRF.    This  will  be 
disbursed  after  the  assessment  of  the  future 
fulfilment  of  the  remaining  276  milestones  and 
targets (43)  included  in  the  Council  Implementing 
Decision (44)  (CID),  ahead  of  the  2026  deadline 
established for the RRF.  

Poland’s progress in implementing its plan is 
recorded  in  the  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Scoreboard (45).  The 
scoreboard  gives  an 
overview  of  the  progress  made  in  implementing 
the  RRF  as  a  whole.  Graphs  A3.1  and  A3.2  show 
the  current  state  of  play  as  reflected  in  the 
scoreboard. 

(42)  GDP information is based on 2023 data. Source: 

https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-
resilience-scoreboard/index.html?lang=en 

(43)  A milestone or target is satisfactorily fulfilled once a Member 
State has provided evidence to the Commission that it has 
reached the milestone or target and the Commission has 
assessed it positively in an implementing decision. 

(44)  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9728-

2022-ADD-1/en/pdf  

(45)  https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-

resilience-scoreboard/country_overview.html 

Poland’s  RRP  includes  a  REPowerEU  chapter 
to phase out its dependency on Russian fossil 
fuels,  diversify 
its  energy  supplies  and 
produce  more  clean  energy  in  the  coming 
years.  To  kick-start  the  REPowerEU  chapter’s 
implementation,  EUR  5.1  billion  was  disbursed  as 
pre-financing  on  28  December  2023.  This  helped 
launch  relevant  reforms  like  streamlining  the 
permitting  process  for  renewable  energy  sources 
and  to  accelerate  home  renovations,  thereby 
accelerating  the  deployment  of  renewable  energy 
and boosting energy efficiency in buildings. 

Table A3.1:  Key facts of the Polish RRP 

Source: RRF Scoreboard 

The  plan  has  a  strong  focus  on  the  green 
transition, dedicating 46.6% of the available 
funds  to  measures  that  support  climate 
objectives  and  21.3%  of  its  total  allocation 
to support the digital transition. It also retains 
a  strong  social  dimension  with  social  protection 
measures,  especially  related  to  employment  and 
skills.   

complete  payment 

With  one 
request 
completed,  Poland’s  implementation  of  its 
RRP is underway. However, timely completion 
requires  increased  efforts.  The  Commission 
gave  a  positive  assessment  of  Poland’s  payment 
request on 29 February 2024, taking into account 
the  opinion  of  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Committee.  This  led  to  EUR  6.3  billion  being 
disbursed in financial support on 15 April 2024 (46). 
The  related  38  milestones  and  targets  covered 

(46)  When requested payments are disbursed, the pre-financing 
is cleared proportionally. The net amounts are quoted here. 

32 

Initial plan CID adoption date17 June 2022Scope Revised plan with REPowerEU chapterLast major revision8 December 2023Total allocation EUR 25.3 billion in grants and EUR 34.5 billion in loans (8% of 2021 GDP)Investments and reforms 56 investments and 55 reforms Total number of milestones and targets314Fulfilled milestones and targets38 (12% of total) 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
reforms and investments aiming at improving the 
country's  investment  climate,  the  resilience  and 
competitiveness of the economy, agriculture, green 
energy,  digital  transformation,  health  and  clean 
mobility. 

Graph A3.1: Total grants disbursed under the RRF 

As  of  15  May  2024,  Poland  is  working 
towards  its  second  payment  request.  Table 
A3.2  highlights  some  relevant  measures  achieved 
so far, and some that will be implemented before 
2026  to  keep  making  Poland’s  economy  greener, 
more digital, inclusive, and resilient.  

Table A3.2:  Measures in Poland's RRP 

Note: This graph displays the amount of grants, including pre-
financing, disbursed so far under the RRF. Grants are non-
repayable financial contributions. The total amount of grants 
given to each Member State is determined by an allocation 
key and the total estimated cost of the respective RRP. 
Source: RRF Scoreboard 

Source: FENIX 

Graph A3.2: Total loans disbursed under the RRF 

Source: RRF Scoreboard 

33 

EUR 3.25billion (12.9%)Total allocation: EUR 25.277billionEUR 8.14billion (23.6%)Total allocation: EUR 34.541billionReforms and investments implemented• Reforms to strengthen the independence and impartiality of courts• Investments to diversify and shorten the supply chain of agricultural and food products and build the resilience of the entities in the chain• Reform on clean air and energy efficiency Upcoming reforms and investments• Development of offshore wind energy plants• Digitalisation of public administration• Investments in modern vocational training, higher education and lifelong learning  
     
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
ANNEX 4: OTHER EU INSTRUMENTS FOR RECOVERY AND GROWTH 

EU funding instruments provide considerable 
resources for the recovery and growth of the 
EU  Member  States.  In  addition  to  the  EUR  59.8 
billion  of  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF) 
funding  described  in  Annex  3,  EU  cohesion  policy 
funds (47)  provide  EUR  75.5  billion  to  Poland  for 
the 2021-2027 period (48). Support from these two 
instruments  combined  represents  around  18.02% 
of  the  country’s  2023  GDP,  compared  to  the  EU 
average  of  5.38%  of  GDP (49).  Cohesion  policy 
supports  regional  development,  economic,  social 
and  territorial  convergence  and  competitiveness 
through  long-term  investment  in  line  with  EU 
priorities and with national and regional strategies. 

in 

support 

provided 

transport, 

During  the  2014-2020  programming  period, 
cohesion  policy  funds  boosted  Poland's 
competitiveness, with  tangible achievements 
notably 
for 
the  green 
entrepreneurship, 
transition, childcare and education. By the end 
of  the  eligibility  period  in  December  2023,  2014-
2020  cohesion  policy  funds (50)  had  made  EUR 
78.8 billion available to Poland (51) to improve the 
living  and  working  conditions  of  Polish  people,  of 
which  EUR  45.2  billion  has  been  disbursed  since 
March  2020,  when  the  COVID-19  pandemic 
began (52).  The  achievements  of  cohesion  policy 
funds  over  the  programming  period 
included 
providing  support  to  over  100 000  businesses  in 
Poland,  enabling  over  450 000  households  to 
access  broadband  so  far, with  a view  of  reaching 
over  1.8  million  households,  improving  research 
than 
infrastructure  and 

reconstructing  more 

(47)  In 2021-2027, cohesion policy funds include the Cohesion 
Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund Plus and the Just Transition Fund. 

(48)  European territorial cooperation (ETC) programmes are 
excluded from the figure. In 2021-2027, the total 
investment, including national financing, amounts to EUR 92 
billion.  

(49)  RRF funding includes both grants and loans, where 

applicable. The EU average is calculated for cohesion policy 
funds excluding ETC programmes. GDP figures are based on 
Eurostat data for 2022. 

(50)  In 2014-2020, cohesion policy funds included the Cohesion 

Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund and the Youth Employment Initiative. 
REACT-EU allocations are included but ETC programmes are 
excluded. 

(51)  In 2014-2020, the total investment, including national 

financing, amounted to EUR 92.6 billion.  

(52) Cut-off date: 14 May 2024. 

34 

than  230 000 

2 000 km of roads. Support to businesses resulted 
in  new  products  being  introduced  by  over  11 000 
companies, over 2 400 new jobs and 20 000 new 
companies  being  created,  and  over  4 500 
companies  cooperating  with  research  institutions. 
The  reconstruction  of  up  to  2 000 km  of  railway 
lines  is  ongoing  and  is  expected  to  be  completed 
soon.  An  additional  waste  recycling  capacity  of 
more 
tonnes/year  has  been 
developed and continues to expand. The number of 
households  with  improved  energy  consumption 
classification 
is  expected  to  exceed  50 000. 
Approximatively  6  million  people  benefited  from 
flood  protection  measures  and  over  4  million 
benefited  from  measures  on  protection  from 
forest  fires.  Childcare  and  education  facilities  for 
close  to  500 000  people  have  been  renovated. 
During  the  same  period  and  under  the  European 
Social  Fund  (ESF),  almost  1  million  participants, 
including  nearly  34 000  young  people  with 
disabilities,  benefited  from  Youth  Employment 
Initiative  measures.  As  a  result,  almost  128 000 
people  gained  new  skills  and  qualifications,  and 
over  547 000  people  who  were  previously 
unemployed found work. 

capacity 

transition.  The 

In  the  current  programming  period  (2021-
2027),  cohesion  policy will  provide a  further 
boost  to  Poland’s  competitiveness,  to  the 
green  transition  and  to  social  cohesion, 
improving  the  living  and  working  conditions 
of  Poland’s  people.  In  2021-2027,  cohesion 
policy  funds  will  invest  more  than  EUR  20  billion 
into  the  green  transition  as  part  of  the  country’s 
total  allocation.  These  measures  will  help  people 
better  overcome  the  challenges  related  to  the 
green 
to  produce 
renewable energy will increase by 601 MW or even 
more if the potential for onshore wind is unblocked 
as  a  result  of  reforms  under  the  recovery  and 
resilience  plan  (RRP).  The  energy  performance  of 
over 259 470 dwellings will be improved. Cohesion 
policy 
in  sustainable 
transport by building 840 km of railway lines and 
an  additional  1 685 km  of 
roads. 
Furthermore,  cohesion  policy  is  helping  provide 
equal  access  to  the  internet,  and  access  to  ultra-
than  832 000 
for  more 
fast  broadband 
households and businesses. 17% of the allocation 
of  EUR  13  billon  will  be  used  to  make  the  Polish 
economy  smarter  by 
i)  the  R&D 
expenditure  relative  to  GDP  from  1.32%  in  2019 
to  2.5  %  in  2030;  ii)  the  proportion  of  innovative 
companies  in  industry,  from  18.9%  in  2019  to 
35%  in  2030;  and  iii)  the  proportion  of  high-tech 

is  enabling 

investment 

increasing: 

cycling 

 
 
 
 
 
exports  in  total  exports  to  15%  by  2030.  The 
newly  created  Just  Transition  Fund  (JTF)  will  help 
workers  and  businesses  in  five  (post)  coal-mining 
regions find new jobs and activities. In Silesia, the 
EU’s largest coal region, the JTF will support 1 940 
businesses and create 27 000 new jobs. It will also 
help  improve  the  energy  performance  of  21 380 
dwellings  in  Lower  Silesia.  EU  funds  will  support 
over  100 000  new  childcare  places,  especially  in 
the  white  spots,  as  part  of  a  national  Toddler+ 
programme. With a total budget of EUR 1.2 billion, 
88%  of  the  programme  will  be  financed  by  the 
European  Social  Fund  Plus  (ESF+)  (EUR  704.3 
million)  and  the  EU’s  RRF  (EUR  425  million).  The 
ESF+ investments in skills, totalling EUR 1.9 billion, 
are  aligned  with  the  European  Skills  Agenda.  The 
ESF+ will also help counteract material deprivation 
with funding of around EUR 525 million. With this 
work,  cohesion  policy  substantially  contributes  to 
achieving  the  UN  Sustainable  Development  Goals 
(SDGs)  in  Poland,  in  particular  SDG  9  (Industry, 
innovation,  infrastructure),  SDG  7  (Affordable  and 
clean  energy)  and  SDG  8  (Decent  work  and 
economic growth). 

Through combined action, cohesion policy and 
the  RRP  have  a  mutually  reinforcing  impact 
in Poland. For instance, while the RRP funding will 
be  used  for  investments  in  offshore  wind  energy, 
cohesion  policy  programmes  will invest  into  other 
renewable  energy  sources.  This  will  create  a 
synergy  in  supporting  a  wide  range  of  renewable 
energy  source  technologies,  as  one  source  alone 
could  not  cover  the  growing  needs.  In  the  same 
spirit  of  complementarity,  under  the  RRP,  reform 
measures  were  introduced  to  help  develop  and 
implement  sustainable  urban  transport  plans 
(SUMPs).  Based  on  those,  cohesion  policy  is 
providing  for  the  development  of  sustainable 
public  transport  and  active  forms  of  mobility  in 
functional  urban  areas  (e.g.  agglomeration  rail, 
public  urban 
transport,  cycling  and  walking 
mobility).  Furthermore,  on  the  one  hand,  cohesion 
policy  will  help  develop  and  apply  innovations  in 
environmental 
the  circular 
technologies  and 
economy,  in  line  with  the  national  and  regional 
smart  specialisation  strategies.  On  the  other,  the 
RRP  will  focus  on  deploying  technologies  to 
support  the  environmental  transformation  and 
circular  economy  measures 
in  SMEs.  The 
contribution of cohesion policy and RRP funding by 
policy  objective  is  illustrated  by  Graphs  A4.1  and 
A4.2. 

Graph A4.1: Distribution of cohesion policy funding 
across policy objectives in Poland 

Source: European Commission 

The Technical Support Instrument (TSI) helps 
Poland invest in its public administration and 
create a better enabling environment for EU 
and  national  investment.  The  TSI  has  funded 
projects  in  Poland  to  design  and  implement 
reforms  since  2016.  The 
growth-enhancing 
support  provided  in  2023  included  optimalisation 
of  strategic  plans  for  further  development  of  e-
health  and  improved  capacities  to  better  assess 
and counteract the ‘grey economy’. The TSI is also 
helping  Poland  to  boost  its  overall  capacity  to 
integrate the ‘do no significant harm’ principle into 
the investments of the national RRP. 

Graph A4.2: Distribution of RRF funding by pillar in 
Poland 

(1) Each RRP measure helps achieve the aims of two of the 
six policy pillars of the RRF. The primary contribution is shown 
in the outer circle while the secondary contribution is shown in 
the inner circle. Each contribution represents 100% of the RRF 
funds. Therefore, the total contribution to all pillars displayed 
on this chart amounts to 200% of the RRF funds allocated to 
Poland. 
Source: European Commission 

Poland  also  receives  funding  under  several 
other  EU  instruments,  including  those  listed 
in Table A4.1. 

35 

PO1 Smarter EuropePO2 Greener EuropePO3 Connected EuropePO4 Social EuropePO5 Europe closer to citizensPO8 JTF specific objectiveGreen transitionDigital transformationSmart, sustainable and inclusivegrowthSocial & territorial cohesionHealth & resilienceNext generation 
   
   
Table A4.1:  Support from EU instruments in Poland 

(1) RRF implementation period is 2021-2026. 
(2) The public sector loan facility’s programming period is 2021-2025 and the amount reflects the national share in its grant 
component reserved until the end of the period.   
(3) Common agricultural policy programming periods are 2014-2022 and 2023-2027.   
(4) EMFF – European Maritime and Fisheries Fund, EMFAF – European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund. 
(5) Data on the Connecting Europe Facility covers transport and energy and has a cut-off date of 15 May 2024. 
(6) Data on Horizon Europe (2021-2027) has a cut-off date of 13 May 2024. 
(7) 2021-2027 data on the LIFE programme has a cut-off date of 15 May 2024. 
(8) The amount of the EU guarantee signed under the EFSI Infrastructure and Innovation Window was derived based on the 
signed amount of the operations and the average internal multiplier, as reported by the EIB (cut-off date is 31 December 2023). 
(9) The amount of the EU guarantee and of the volume of operations signed under InvestEU includes the EU compartment as well 
as the Member State compartments (cut-off date is 31 December 2023).   
(10) SURE - European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency. 
Source: European Commission 

36 

Amount 2021-2027 (EUR million)Cohesion policy75 460.1RRF grants (1)25 276.9Public sector loan facility (grant component) (2)291.9Common agricultural policy (3)22 099.0EMFF/EMFAF (4)512.4Connecting Europe Facility (5)2 499.0Horizon 2020 / Horizon Europe (6) 436.9LIFE programme (7) 122.4Volume of operations (EUR million)European Fund for Strategic Investment 2015-2020 (8)3 156.1InvestEU 2021-2027 (9) 697.1PeriodTotal amount available (EUR million)Disbursed amount (EUR million)SURE (10)2020-202211 236.711 236.7RRF 2021-202634 5418 140.042 000.0EU grantsAmount 2014-2020 (EUR million)78 797.3--1 155.8 136.5EU loans531.25 153.2 742.8 82.0EU guaranteesEU Guarantee (EUR million) 
 
   
 
ANNEX 5: RESILIENCE 

Table A5.1:  Resilience indices across dimensions for Poland and the EU-27 

(1)  The synthetic indices aggregate the relative resilience situation of countries across all considered indicators. For an indicator, 
each country’s relative situation in the latest available year is compared with the collection of values of that indicator for all 
Member States and all years in the reference period. 
Source: Resilience Dashboards - version spring 2024, data up to 2022 

resilience 

This  Annex  uses  the  Commission’s  resilience 
(RDB) (53)  to  show  Poland’s 
dashboards 
relative 
and 
vulnerabilities (54)  that  may  be  of  relevance 
for  societal,  economic,  digital  and  green 
transformations, and for dealing with future 
shocks and geopolitical challenges (55). 

capacities 

According  to  the  RDB’s  set  of  resilience 
indicators,  Poland  has  medium  overall 
vulnerabilities  and  capacities,  both  of  which 
have  remained  stable  with  respect  to  last 
year.  This  is  reflected  in  the  distribution  of 
indicators  across  different  resilience  categories. 
Under 40% of Poland’s vulnerability indicators are 
high or medium-high, over 20% are medium, and 
under  40%  are  medium-low  or  low.  Of  capacity 
indicators, less than 40% fall into the medium-low 

(53)  Https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/strategic-

planning/strategic-foresight/2020-strategic-foresight-
report/resilience-dashboards_en. Resilience is defined as the 
ability not only to withstand and cope with challenges but 
also to undergo transitions, in a sustainable, fair, and 
democratic manner. 2020 Strategic Foresight Report: 
Charting the course towards a more resilient Europe 
(COM(2020) 493). 

(54)  Vulnerabilities describe features that can exacerbate the 

negative impact of crises and transitions, or obstacles that 
may hinder the achievement of long-term strategic goals, 
while capacities refer to enablers or abilities to cope with 
crises and structural changes and to manage transitions. 

(55)  This Annex is linked to Annex 1 on SDGs, Annex 6 on the 
green deal, Annex 8 on the fair transition to climate 
neutrality, Annex 9 on resource productivity, efficiency and 
circularity, Annex 10 on the digital transition and Annex 14 
on the European pillar of social rights. 

or  low  category,  while  around  30%  of  them  fall 
into  the  medium  and  medium-high  or  high 
categories each. In terms of vulnerabilities, Poland 
is  on  a  par  with  the  EU  average,  but  below  the 
average in terms of its capacities. 

With  respect  to  the  2023  RDB,  Polish 
vulnerabilities  and  capacities  in  the  social 
and  economic  dimension  have  remained 
stable at the medium level. Poland has reduced 
the  proportion  of  its  population  at  risk  of  poverty 
and  social  exclusion,  but  employment  in  energy-
intensive  sectors  and  regional  household  income 
dispersion remain high (third worst in the EU). On 
the capacity side, Poland has improved the impact 
of social transfers on poverty reduction. 

in 

In  the  green  dimension,  Poland  has  also 
maintained  its  medium  vulnerabilities  and 
capacities.  Energy  use 
information  and 
communication (ICT)  remains high (it ranks fourth 
in  the  EU),  while  the  electric  and  hydrogen 
passenger fleet and environmental patents are the 
second  lowest  in  the  EU.  Matters  have  improved 
somewhat  in  the  inland  use  of  trains,  buses  and 
trolleybuses.  

Poland’s digital vulnerabilities and capacities 
are  also  stable  compared  to  last  year’s 
dashboard:  vulnerabilities  are  medium-high, 
while  capacities  are  medium.  Poland  is  the 
worst  EU  performer  for  5G  readiness  and  its 
second worst performer for the broadband access 
gap  by  company  size.  Adults’  advanced  digital 
competences and use of online courses are below 
the  EU  average,  and  the  proportion  of  young 

37 

PLPLEU-272023 RDB2024 RDB2024 RDBHighMedium-highMediumMedium-lowLowHighMedium-highMediumMedium-lowLowDimensionDistribution of indicators by vulnerabilities and capacitiesOverall resilienceVulnerabilities0.540.540.50Capacities0.470.510.67VulnerabilitiesSocial and economicVulnerabilities0.540.580.47Capacities0.480.420.670.410.460.65GreenVulnerabilities0.500.460.44Capacities0.430.550.70CapacitiesGeopoliticalVulnerabilities0.640.690.41Capacities0.530.590.65DigitalVulnerabilities0.360.340.52Capacities0%20%40%60%80%100%Vulnerabilities(59 indicators)Capacities(64 indicators) 
 
 
 
   
 
 
people  doing  any  online  learning  activity  has 
decreased markedly both with respect to last year 
and the EU average.   

has  medium-low 

Poland 
geopolitical 
vulnerabilities  and  medium  geopolitical 
capacities.  Both  have  remained  stable  with 
respect  to  the  2023  RDB.  The  reasons  for  its 
medium-low  vulnerabilities  are  low  employment 
gap  versus  non-EU  nationals  and  low  supplier 
concentration in energy carriers (the lowest in the 
EU).  However,  Poland  could  improve  its  financial 
integration (second worst in the EU). On a positive 
note, it has improved its military spending position. 

38 

 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
ANNEX 6: EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL 

Poland  has  made  progress  in  the  green 
transition,  with  more  action  needed  on 
specifying  the  policies  needed  to  attain  its  2030 
effort  sharing  target,  addressing  emissions  from 
road  transport  and  buildings,  addressing  potential 
losses  from  climate  hazards,  pollution  prevention 
and control, and other areas. This Annex provides a 
snapshot  of  climate,  energy,  and  environmental 
aspects of the transition in Poland (56). 

In  its  draft  updated  national  energy  and 
climate  plan  (NECP)  Poland  has  not  yet 
consistently  mapped  its  investment  needs 
and sources to achieve its 2030 climate and 
energy  targets.  The  plan  occasionally  outlines 
when EU sources are or will be used to finance the 
planned  measures.  However,  this  is  not  done 
consistently, and there is no consolidated overview 
at  NECP  level.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  to 
identify  potential  gaps  in  funding,  also  because  a 
quantitative  assessment  of  investment  needs  is 
lacking.  The  draft  updated  plan  mentions  the  use 
of public funds and the contribution required from 
private investment, particularly in R&I and in self-
consumption installations, but it does not quantify 
them  or  distinguish  public  and  private  funding 
sources. It also fails to specify the duration of the 
measures and the share of funding that will come 
from  the  EU  budget.  Cohesion  policy  support  is 
almost  completely  neglected.  For  the  smooth 
implementation  of  the  policies  and  measures  to 
reach the 2030 targets, specifying the investment 
needs and sources for implementation consistently 
and with complete and detailed coverage is key. 

With  the  policies  and  measures  currently 
planned,  Poland  is  set  to  fall  short  of  its 
2030  effort  sharing  target (57). 
In  2022, 

(56)  This Annex is complemented by Annex 7 on energy transition 

and competitiveness, Annex 8 on the fair transition to 
climate neutrality, Annex 9 on resource efficiency, circularity, 
and productivity, and relevant topics in other annexes to this 
country report. 

(57)  The national greenhouse gas emission reduction target is 
laid down in Regulation (EU) 2023/857 (the Effort Sharing 
Regulation). The aim is to align action in the sectors 
concerned with the objective to reach the EU-level economy-
wide target of greenhouse gas reductions of at least 55% 
compared to 1990 levels. The target also applies to the 
sectors outside the current EU Emissions Trading System, 
notably buildings (heating and cooling), road transport, 
agriculture, waste, and small industry (known as the effort 
sharing sectors).  

Poland’s greenhouse gas emissions from its effort 
sharing  sectors  are  expected  to  be  4%  above 
2005  levels.  With  current  policies,  Poland  is 
projected to reduce its effort sharing emissions by 
14%  compared  to  2005  levels  by  2030.  The 
additional  policies 
in  Poland’s  draft 
included 
updated  NECP  are  projected  to  reduce  these 
emissions  by  7%  compared  to  2005  levels (58). 
This  leaves  a  gap  of  11  percentage  points  below 
Poland’s  effort  sharing  target  to  achieve  a  18% 
reduction compared to 2005 levels. This highlights 
the importance for Poland to plan more ambitious 
policies  and  measures  in  its  final  updated  NECP, 
due on 30 June 2024. 

Graph A6.1: Greenhouse gas emissions from the 
effort sharing sectors in Mt CO2eq, 2005-2022 

Source: European Environment Agency 

from 

road 
Greenhouse  gas  emissions 
transport  and  buildings  are  a  particular 
concern  for  Poland.  In  2022,  greenhouse  gas 
emissions  from  road  transport  almost  doubled 
compared  to  2005  levels,  and  their  share  in  the 
effort  sharing  emissions  rose  to  34.4%,  from 
19.8% in 2005. Between 2005 and 2022, Poland’s 
effort sharing emissions from buildings decreased 
by  15.2%,  far  below  the  EU  average  of  27.6%. 
Designing  policies  and  measures 
curb 
greenhouse  gas  emissions  in  these  sectors  is 
crucial if Poland is to bridge its gap with its 2030 
effort  sharing 
the  upcoming 
target.  Given 
emissions  trading  system  for  the  road  transport 
and  buildings  sectors  due  to  be  introduced  in 
2027,  measures  targeting  vulnerable  consumers 
seem particularly important. 

to 

(58)  The effort sharing emissions for 2022 are based on 
approximated inventory data. The final data will be 
established in 2027 after a comprehensive review. 
Projections on the impact of current policies (‘with existing 
measures’, WEM) as per Poland’s draft updated NECP. 

39 

05010015020025020052022MtCO2eWasteSmall industryAgricultureBuildings (under ESR)Domestic transport (excl. aviation) 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
There is scope for increasing Poland’s target 
for  renewable  energy  in  its  final  updated 
NECP.  The  renewable  energy  contribution  set  out 
in  the  draft  updated  NECP  (21%)  is  significantly 
below the share of 25% in 2030 that results from 
the  formula  of  Annex  II  of  the  Governance 
Regulation.  The  level  of  the  energy  efficiency 
contribution  set  out  in  the  draft  updated  plan,  23 
%  reduction  of  primary  energy  consumption 
compared  to  2007  reference  projections,  appears 
modest  considering  the  level  of  effort  needed  to 
reach  the  EU’s  energy  efficiency  target  for 
2030 (59).  

from 

Poland  still  has  far  to  go  in  curbing  rising 
greenhouse  gas  emissions 
road 
transport, and its uptake of electric vehicles 
is  still  at  an  early  stage (60).  At  just  0.1%  in 
2022,  the  share  of  battery  electric  vehicles  in 
Poland’s  passenger  car  fleet  is  still  very  low. 
However,  in  2023,  its  5 070  publicly  accessible 
charging points provided a charging point for every 
10  electric  vehicles,  in  line  with  the  EU  average. 
Rail travel has decreased in the past decade, both 
for  passengers  (reaching  6%,  in  line  with  the  EU 
average)  and  for  freight  (21%),  making  the  split 
between  road  and  rail  transport  more  balanced 
than the EU average. 63% of Poland’s rail network 
is electrified (EU average: 56%).  

Poland is currently unlikely to meet its 2030 
target  for  additional  removals  of  carbon 
from the atmosphere through land use, land use 
change  and  forestry  (LULUCF).  The  recent  decline 
in Poland's net carbon removals through land use 
is  primarily  attributed  to  its  forest  management 
practices.  To  reach  its  2030  LULUCF  target, 
additional carbon removals of 3 278 kt CO2eq are 
needed (61). 

affecting 

agriculture 

A wide climate protection gap (62) could pose 
challenges to Poland’s public finances. Poland 
is  vulnerable  to  events  linked  to  climate  change, 
notably  facing  an  increased  risk  of  drought  and 
and  water 
flooding 
management.  Only  5-20%  of  climate-related 
economic  losses  in  Poland  in  1980-2020  were 
insured. Poland’s protection gap for climate events 
remains  significant,  particularly  for  flooding. 
Poland  has  taken  steps  to  update  its  national 
adaptation  strategy,  develop 
its  vulnerability 
assessment  and  implement  actions  to  counteract 
institutional 
risks.  Appropriate 
water-related 
mechanisms  are  crucial  for  climate  adaptation.  In 
this regard, Poland shows institutional weaknesses 
that  hamper  effective  central 
coordination. 
Likewise, a legal framework with regularly updated 
is  missing. 
targets  and  strategic  objectives 
Moreover, 
for 
integrating  climate  adaptation  and  public  funding 
considerations  into  sectoral  policies,  for  policy 
monitoring and for predicting climate risks (63). 

is  considerable  scope 

there 

Poland  would  benefit  from  managing  water 
resources more sustainably. In 2018, only 31% 
of  all  surface  water  bodies 
reached  good 
ecological status and 59% reached good chemical 
status (64). Poland’s marine waters are not yet in a 
good  environmental  status,  as  tracked  by  the 
descriptors used in the Marine Strategy Framework 
Directive (65).  The  efficient  use  of  water  resources 
can  be  measured  by  water  productivity (66).  In 
2021, Poland generated EUR 72 per cubic metre of 
water abstracted, placing it below the EU average. 

Air  quality  in  Poland  is  a  serious  concern  as 
Polish  cities  are  among  the  most polluted in 
Europe.  According  to  the  latest  estimates  (for 
2021)  by  the  European  Environmental  Agency, 
Poland  faces  around  1 372  years  of  life  lost  for 
every  100 000  inhabitants  due  to  exposure  to 
particulate matter (PM2.5) and 121 years lost due 

(59)  The EU target set out in the revised Renewable Energy 

Directive is to have 42.5% of gross final energy consumption 
coming from renewable energy sources by 2030, with the 
aspiration to reach 45%. The formula in Annex I to Directive 
(EU) 2023/1791 sets the indicative national contribution for 
Poland at 74.9 Mtoe for primary energy consumption and 
56.3 Mtoe for final energy consumption.  

(60)  Unless otherwise indicated, data in this section refer to 
2021. See European Commission, 2023, EU transport in 
figures, transport.ec.europa.eu. 

(62)  On the climate protection gap, see the annotations to Table 

A6.1. 

(63)  See the Commission’s 2023 assessment and 

recommendation on Poland’s progress on climate adaptation.  

(64)  Data from the third river basin management plan is not yet 

available.  

(65)  The next reporting on the state of the marine environment is 
due in October 2024. See also Poland — Marine (europa.eu). 

(61)  National LULUCF targets of the Member States in line with 

(66)  Measured as GDP over total fresh surface water abstracted 

Regulation (EU) 2023/839. 

in cubic meters.  

40 

 
 
 
to 

dioxide 

nitrogen 

exposure 

to 
(NO2). 
Furthermore,  although  the  indicator  for  smog-
precursor  emission  intensity  to  GDP  decreased  by 
57%  between  2008  and  2021,  reaching  1.87 
tonne/EUR  10,  it  remained  among  the  highest  in 
Europe. The main causes of harmful emissions are 
poor-quality  coal  burned  in  substandard  boilers 
used  to  heat  individual  houses,  and  the  large 
volume of road traffic. 

There  is  still  room  for  improvement  on 
biodiversity  and  nature  protection  and 
restoration.  At  the  end  of  2021,  Poland  was 
protecting 39.6% of its land and only 21.9% of its 
marine  area.  However,  not  all  these  areas  serve 
the  purpose  of  biodiversity  protection.  Some 
designations  are  intended  for  the  protection  of 
landscape or geological/cultural heritage only, with 
no conservation objectives and measures in place. 
The  biodiversity  strategy  for  2030  requires  that 
Member States effectively protect at least 30% of 
their 
to  strict 
protection.  According  to  the  latest  estimates,  only 
21.9% of Poland’s territory is effectively protected 
and 
conservation 
by 
measures (67) and only 1.4% is strictly protected.  

territory,  with  10%  subject 

objectives 

relevant 

Intensive  agriculture  has  a  major  impact  on 
Poland’s  ecosystems,  biodiversity  and  air 
quality.  In  2023,  the  value  of  the  agricultural 
sector’s  annual  output  remained  approximately 
stable  at  EUR  25.6  billion (68).  The  country  has 
been one of the slowest to adopt organic farming 
practices.  The 
share  of  Poland’s  utilised 
agricultural  area  (UAA)  under  organic  farming 
in  2021  (EU  average: 
hovered  around  3.8% 
9.1%) (69). There is still space to grow to contribute 
to the goal of at least 25% of the EU’s agricultural 
land  under  organic  farming  by  2030.  Poland’s 
livestock  intensity  index  stagnated  between  2010 
and  2020.  In  parallel,  the  share  of  extensive 
animal  farming (70)  over  the  UAA  decreased  from 
25.8%  in  2013  to  11.2%  in  2016,  below  the  EU 
average  of  23.8%.  Some  regions  reported  an 
increasing  number  of  livestock  units,  such  as  the 
Podlaskie  region.  Intensive  rearing  of  poultry  and 
pigs is one of the industrial activities that puts the 

(67)  https://koalicja10.pl/ 

(68)  Production value at basic price (2015=100).  

(69)  In 2020. Data for 2021 are not yet available.  

(70)  Share of UAA with livestock density below 1 livestock unit per 

hectare.  

highest  burden  on  the  environment  in  terms  of 
ammonia  emissions  into  the  air.  The  agricultural 
sector was responsible for generating 96.2% of all 
ammonia emissions, against the EU-27 average of 
90.7%  in  2021.  The  country  produced  113 kg  of 
food waste per person in 2021. Most of this waste 
was  due  to  household  activities.  Composting  and 
digestion  of  municipal  waste  increased  to  48 kg 
per person in 2021, accounting for 13.3% of total 
municipal waste.  

Intensive  agriculture  is  also  a  major  source 
of  pollution.  The  latest  figures  for  the  gross 
nitrogen  balance  on  agricultural  land  in  Poland 
show  a  consistent  nitrogen  surplus,  with  an 
average  of  47.4 kg  of  nitrogen  per  hectare  per 
in  2019.  The  country  also  shows  a 
year 
phosphorous surplus, with an average of 3.6 kg/ha. 
Based  on  the  impact  assessment  for  the  Soil 
Monitoring  Law,  48%  of  Poland’s  soil  could  be 
considered  as  unhealthy (71).  The  loss  of  organic 
carbon  affects  58%  of  Poland’s  cropland  and 
grassland  area,  while  soil  erosion  affects  36%  of 
its cropland area. Furthermore, conservation tillage 
practices,  which increase soil  organic  carbon,  only 
covered 3% of Poland’s tillable area in 2016.  The 
net  stock  change  of  organic  soils  in  cropland  and 
grassland areas decreased over time but remained 
the highest in the EU at –7 726 kt in 2021. 

Graph A6.2: Changes in livestock density and 
organic farming 

Livestock unit (LSU)/ha of UAA: it measures the stock of 
animals (cattle, sheep, goats, equidae, pigs, poultry and 
rabbits) converted in LSUs per hectare of UAA. 
Source: Eurostat 

(71)  However, not all soil degradation processes could be 

quantified for all land uses. This number simply indicates an 
order of magnitude.  

41 

012024681020162020% LSU per hectare% of total utilised agricultural areaLivestock density index Poland (% LSU per ha)Livestock density index EU-27 (% LSU per ha)Organic farming Poland (% of total utilised agricultural area)Organic farming EU-27 (% of total utilised agricultural area) 
 
       
 
and 

control, 

prevention 

Poland would benefit from investing more in 
in 
pollution 
protecting  biodiversity  and  ecosystems,  and 
in  sustainable  water  management.  In  2014-
2020, Poland’s environmental investment gap was 
estimated at EUR 9.1 billion per year, equivalent to 
1.9% of GDP (above the EU average of 0.8%). For 
2021-2027, the gap is estimated to reach EUR 7.6 
billion  per  year.  There  remains  an  opportunity  to 
increase  funding, 
in  particular  for  pollution 
prevention  and  control  (a  gap  of  EUR  2.4  billion), 
sustainable  water  management  (EUR  1.7  billion), 
and  for  circular  economy  and  waste  (EUR  1.3 
billion)  where  the  gap  has  increased.  The  gap  for 
biodiversity  and  ecosystems  (EUR  2.3  billion)  has 
decreased but remains excessive.  

Graph A6.3: Environmental investment gap, annual 
average 

The numbers are computed by the European Commission 
based on the latest internal reports, Eurostat, EIB and national 
data sources. 
Source: European Commission 

42 

4,1371,0927623,0572,3811,6821,2512,26301,0002,0003,0004,000Pollution prevention &controlWater managementCircular economy andwasteBiodiversity andecosystemsmillion EUR2014-20202021-2027 
       
 
Table A6.1:  Indicators tracking progress on the European Green Deal from a macroeconomic perspective 

Sources:  (1)  Member  States’  emission  data  for  2019  and  2020  are  in  global  warming  potential  (GWP)  values  from  the  4th 
Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Member States’ 2005 base year emissions 
under  Regulation  (EU)  2018/842,  emissions  data  for  2021  and  2022,  and  2030  projections  are  in  GWP  values  from  the  5th 
Assessment Report (AR5) of the IPCC. 2021 data are based on the final inventory reports, 2022 data are based on approximated 
inventory reports and European Environmental Agency’s calculation of effort sharing emissions. The final data for 2021 and 2022 
will  be  established  after  a  comprehensive  review  in  2027.  The  2030  target  is  in  percentage  change  of  the  2005  base  year 
emissions. Distance to target is the gap between the 2030 target and projected effort sharing emissions with existing measures 
(WEM) and with additional measures (WAM), in percentage change from the 2005 base year emissions. The measures included 
for  the  2030  emission  projections  reflect  the  state  of  play  as  reported  in  Member  States'  draft  updated  national  energy  and 
climate plans or, if unavailable, as reported by 15 March 2023 as per Regulation 2018/1999. (2) Net removals are expressed in 
negative figures, net emissions in positive figures. Reported data are from the 2024 greenhouse gas inventory submission. 2030 
value  of  net  greenhouse  gas  removals  as  in  Regulation  (EU)  2023/839  –  Annex  IIa.  (3)  The  2030  national  objectives  for 
renewable  energy  and  energy  efficiency  are  indicative  national  contributions,  in  line  with  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1999  (the 
Governance  Regulation),  the  EU-level  2030  renewable  energy  target  set  out  in  Directive  EU/2018/2001  amended  by  Directive 
EU/2023/2413 (the revised Renewable Energy Directive) – 42.5% of gross final energy consumption with the aspiration to reach 
45% –, and the formula in Annex I to Directive (EU) 2023/1791 (the Energy Efficiency Directive). (4) Passenger battery electric 
vehicles (BEV) and fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEV). (5) The climate protection gap refers to the share of non-insured economic 
losses caused by climate-related disasters, based on modelling of the risk from floods, wildfires, windstorms, and the insurance 
penetration rate. Scale: 0 (no protection gap) –4 (very high gap) (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, 2022). 
(6) Total water consumption in renewable freshwater resources available for a territory and period. (7) Material extractions  for 
consumption and investment. (8) Years of potential life lost through premature death due to exposure to particulate matter with a 
diameter  of  less  than  2.5  micrometres.  (9)  Share  of  habitats  in  good  conservation  status  according  to  the  records  submitted 
under  Art.  17  of  the  Habitats  Directive  (Directive  92/43/EEC)  for  2013-2018.  (10)  Multi-species  index  measuring  changes  in 
population abundances of farmland bird species. (11) Source: annex 12 of the Commission’s proposal for a soil monitoring law, 
SWD (2023) 417 final. (12) Estimates of organic carbon content in arable land. 

43 

Target200520192020202120222030WEMWAMProgress to climate and energy policy targetsGreenhouse gas emission reductions in effort sharing sectors (1)Mt CO2eq, %, pp192,472.316%14%8%4%-18%-22-11Net greenhouse gas removals from LULUCF (2)Kt CO2eq-50 575-22 561-23 330-23 917-35 644-38,098n/an/aShare of energy from renewable sources (1) (3)%7%15%16%16%17%0.32--Energy efficiency: primary energy consumption (3)Mtoe88.0100.296.8104.098.677.2Energy efficiency: final energy consumption (3)Mtoe58.573.771.175.272.458.5Projected20182019202020212022202120222030Green transition: mobility         Greenhouse gas emissions: road transportMt CO2e---67.469.1769.0786.665.1Share of zero-emission vehicles in new registrations (4)% 0.10.30.91.62.7912.1n/aNumber of publicly accessible AC/DC charging points --164024993387299178446956n/aShare of electrified railways%61.8%61.9%62.5%62.7%-56.1%-n/aGreen transition: buildings         Greenhouse gas emissions: buildingsMt CO2e---54.350.5537.0486.738.0Final energy consumption in buildings2015=100113.4%107.2%106.7%113.6%107.7%104.0%97.2% Climate adaptation         Climate protection gap (5)score 1-4--1.61.51.81.51.5n/a20182019202020212022202020212022State of the environmentWater | Water exploitation index (WEI+) (1) (6)% of renewable freshwater5.88.7---3.6--Circular economy | Material footprint (7)tonnes per person17.817.116.816.718.114.214.814.9Pollution | Years of life lost due to air pollution by PM2.5 (8)per 100.000 inhabitants1,5371,1911,0951,372-545584-Biodiversity | Habitats in good conservation status (9)%20.014.7                       Common farmland bird index (10)2000=100-----78--Green transition: agri-food sectorOrganic farming% of total utilised agricultural area3.333.493.453.78-9.1--Nitrates in groundwatermg NO3/litre21.9321.8921--20.42--Food waste per capitaKg per capita112113-130131-Share of soil in poor health (11)%4841Soil organic matter in agricultural land (12)Mt per ha705----7,904--DistanceEU-27 
 
     
 
ANNEX 7: ENERGY TRANSITION AND COMPETITIVENESS 

Households decreasing their consumption by 10% 
received  a  bonus  of  a  10%  discount  on  their 
electricity  bill.  Gas  prices  for  consumers  were 
capped  at  EUR  43/MWh.  From  1  October  2022 
until  31  December  2023,  the  increase  in  district 
heating  prices  was  capped  at  40%  compared  to 
prices applicable on 30 September 2022.  

provided 

support  was 

Targeted 
to 
approximately 300 000 of the lowest income 
households in 2023 through a VAT refund on 
their gas bills for heating. A one-time shielding 
ranging  from  PLN  400  –  1500 
allowance 
(depending  on  the  heating  source)  to  offset 
energy, gas and food prices was offered to about 
a half of all households in Poland.  

Graph A7.1: Poland´s energy retail prices for 
households and industry & service 

(1) For industry, consumption bands are I3 for gas and IC for 
electricity, which refer to medium-sized consumers and 
provide an insight into affordability 
(2) For households, the consumption bands are D2 for gas 
and DC for electricity 
(3) Industry prices are shown without VAT and other 
recoverable taxes/levies/fees as non-household consumers 
are usually able to recover VAT and some other taxes 
Source: Eurostat 

consumers 

In  relative  terms,  electricity  prices  for  non-
household 
increased 
significantly  compared  to  the  US  and  Japan, 
thus  potentially  affecting  the  international 
energy-intensive 
of 
competitiveness 
industries in Poland. 

have 

This Annex (72) sets out Poland’s progress and 
in  accelerating  the  net-zero 
challenges 
energy  transition  while  bolstering  the  EU’s 
competitiveness 
energy 
sector (73). It considers measures and targets put 
forward in the draft updated National Energy and 
Climate Plans (NECP) for 2030. 

clean 

the 

in 

Poland has shown considerable progresses in 
the  roll  out  of  solar  PVs  and  is  reducing  is 
reliance  on  coal  in  the  power  sector,  thus 
boosting  the  competitiveness  of  its  energy 
system.  However,  a  rapid  development  and 
modernisation of the transmission and distribution 
grids,  together  with  increased  flexibility  on  the 
demand  and  supply  sides  are  necessary  to  keep 
the  momentum.  The  sector  of  clean  technologies 
manufacturing  shows  interesting  developments, 
but  additional  electricity  demand  will  put  further 
pressure on the electricity grid.  

increase 

Polish  households  experience  lower  gas  and 
electricity  prices  than  the  EU  average  and 
have  been  largely  shielded  from  the  price 
increases  of  the  last  year  due  to  regulatory 
and  fiscal 
in 
interventions.  The 
electricity  bills  for  households  was  limited  to  less 
than  2%  YoY  in  the  second  half  2022  vs  almost 
20%  EU  avg.  In  2023,  the  restoration  of  VAT  on 
electricity 
fees 
increased 
generated a 21% upward adjustment, higher than 
the  EU  average  14%  increase.  Energy  prices  for 
industry are closer to the EU average. However, in 
2023 prices continued to increase for households, 
while  average  EU  prices  were  on  a  declining 
trajectory.   

distribution 

and 

Most  of  the  direct  energy  support  to  final 
energy  consumers  implemented  since  the 
outset of the energy crisis was not targeted 
at  the  most  vulnerable  households  or  firms. 
A cap on electricity, gas and district heating prices 
at  2022  levels  is  available  for  households,  public 
interest  organisations,  small  and  medium-sized 
firms  and  local  authorities.  The  cap  has  been 
extended until 30 June 2024.  

(72)  It is complemented by Annex 6 as the European Green Deal 

focuses on the clean energy transition and by Annex 8 on the 
action taken to protect the most vulnerable groups, 
complementing ongoing efforts under the European Green 
Deal, REPowerEU and European Green Deal Industrial Plan. 

(73)  In line with the Green Deal Industrial Plan and the Net-Zero 

Industry Act. 

44 

0.000.050.100.150.200.250.300.35€/KWhGas (industry & service) - PLGas (industry & service) - EUGas (households) - PLGas (households) - EUElectricity (industry & service) - PLElectricity (industry & service) - EUElectricity (households) - PLElectricity (households) - EU 
 
 
   
 
Graph A7.2: Trends in electricity prices for non-
household consumers (EU and foreign partners) 

(1) For Eurostat data (EU and PL), the band consumption is ID 
referring to large-sized consumers with an annual 
consumption of between 2 000 MWh and 20 000 MWh, such 
as in electricity intensive manufacturing sectors, and gives an 
insight into international competitiveness  
(2) JP = Japan 
Source: Eurostat, IEA 

Consumer  empowerment  in  the  electricity 
and  gas  markets  is  progressing  slowly.  The 
deployment  of  smart  meters 
is  behind 
schedule  and  the  current  legal  framework 
does  not  provide  enough  incentives  for  the 
establishment  of  energy  communities (74). 
Switching  rates  in  gas  are  very  low  (around  1%) 
and were decreasing between 2021 and 2022. The 
average of 26 days needed to switch gas provider 
is the longest in the EU. The situation in electricity 
is  more  positive.  Legal  switching  procedures  are 
set  as  short  (16  days)  but  in  practice  they  even 
long).  Only  18.7%  of 
shorter  (only  half  as 
households  had 
in  2022, 
significantly  lower  than  the  80%  objective.  In 
2023 Poland has introduced a legal framework for 
Energy Communities.  

smart  meters 

to 

and 

that 

projects 

The security of Poland’s gas supply is strong, 
infrastructure 
thanks 
strategic 
investments 
have 
significantly  diversified  its  supply  routes. 
Poland has access to Norwegian gas via the Baltic 
Pipe  pipeline  operational  since  September  2022, 
the  LNG  terminal,  the  Klaipedia  LNG  terminal  in 
Lithuania and in 2022 gained access to gas flows 
from  Slovakia  thanks  to  the  set  up  of  an 
interconnector. 
and 
regasification  unit  (FSRU)  in  Gdansk,  with  a  total 

Floating 

storage 

The 

small 

selected 

capacity  of  6.1  bcm/y,  will  further  diversify 
In  January,  Poland’s 
Poland’s  gas  supplies. 
transmission 
the 
system  operator 
company  that  will  deliver  and  operate  the  FSRU. 
The REPowerEU Chapter of Poland’s Recovery and 
Resilience plan (RRP) supports the construction and 
commissioning  of  the  250  km  long  onshore  gas 
pipeline 
connecting  Gdansk  and  Gustorzyn. 
Poland’s  total  storage  capacity  (3.79  bcm)  is 
its  annual 
compared 
relatively 
consumption of almost 20 bcm/year in 2022. GSP, 
the  owner  and  operator  of  Poland’s  seven  gas 
storage  facilities, is  considering  further  expanding 
the  total  capacity.  Poland  fulfilled  its  gas  storage 
obligations  last  winter,  reaching  99.5%  by  1 
November  2023,  and  ended  the  winter  season 
with  a  storage  filled  at  43.67%  by  1  April  2024. 
Poland  managed  to  reduce 
its  gas  demand 
between August 2022 and December 2023 by 9%, 
in  comparison  with  the  average  of  the  previous 
five years, less than the 18% EU average. 

to 

Gas  plays  a  relatively  small  but  increasing 
role  in  the  energy  mix.    Since  2016,  Poland’s 
total installed gas capacity has more than tripled, 
reaching  4GW  in  2023.  A  new  1.4GW  CCGT 
(combined  cycle)  power  plant  is  expected  to 
replace the old Dolna Odra coal-fired power plant 
in 2024.  

Poland  has  confirmed  2049  as  the  date  for 
the closure of all coal mines and coal phase-
out in its draft updated NECP. This would be by 
far  the  latest  coal  phase  out  in  the  EU.  The  coal 
mining  sector  is  highly  dependent  on  public 
the 
subsidies  and  weights  negatively  on 
competitiveness  and  sustainability  of  the  Polish 
economy.  While  2023  saw  a  strong  jump  in 
renewable  electricity  generation,  pushing  coal 
down  to  a  record  low  of  61%,  coal’s  share  in 
electricity generation is still the highest in the EU. 
However, the decarbonisation commitments set in 
the Territorial Just Transition Plans (TJTPs) and the 
paths for phasing out coal and lignite in the draft 
NECP are only partially aligned (75). 

Poland  is  considering  developing  the  3  GW 
Zarnowiec  nuclear  power  plant,  which  could 
start  commercial  operations  in  2033.  Poland 
has  six  high-voltage  alternating  current  (AC) 
interconnections that link it to the Czech Republic, 

(74)  All data on consumer empowerment are from the ACER 

Market Monitoring report 2023, i.e. based on data covering 
2022. 

(75)  See the Commission’s assessment of the draft updated 

NECP. 

45 

050100150200250Index ( 2018 S2 = 100)JPUKUSPLEU 
  
 
 
The 

increase. 

improved 

YoY 
regulatory 
environment  can  stimulate  capacity  additions, 
which  can  benefit  already  from  relatively  cheap 
labour  and  good  wind  resources.  However,  some 
significant  hurdles  in  the  permitting  procedure 
remain, such as the continuing possibility for local 
communities  in  a  10h  radius  to  block  projects. 
While  there  is  good  visibility  on  future  wind 
offshore  auctions  and  a  wind  pledge  was 
submitted  for  2024-26  for  offshore  and  onshore 
wind,  this  is  not  the  case  for  other  technologies. 
Poland  has  also  been  the  signatory  to  the 
European Wind Charter of 19.12.2023. 

for 

the  expansion  of 

remains  a  major 
The  electricity  grid 
bottleneck 
the 
renewable  energy.  The  easing  of  the  regulatory 
framework for cable pooling and direct lines, which 
entered into force in October 2023, could improve 
grid  congestion.  A  financial  guarantee  for  direct 
wires  and  a  fast-track  process  for  cable  pooling 
authorisation  would  make  these  reforms  more 
effective.  

of 

the 

transmission 

and 
Upgrades 
distribution  network  are  a  prerequisite  for 
the energy transition in Poland. Upgrading the 
internal grid is also needed to enable higher cross 
border-  exchanges  with  neighbouring  countries.  In 
this  context,  new  high-voltage  direct  current 
connections are needed between North and South, 
as  well  as  the  expansion  of  the  alternate  current 
AC network.  

investment 

Planned 
in  the  power  grid 
included  in  Poland’s  RRP  will  be  important 
but  will  not  meet  all  the  investment  needs 
for  the  grid.  The  completion  of  the  Baltic 
synchronisation remains a priority and it has been 
accelerated  to  February  2025,  following  the 
signing  of  a  political  declaration,  between  the 
countries  involved  and  the  Commission.  It  is 
important that all investment strands are on track, 
including  the  Harmony  Link,  which  faces  a  delay 
following  cancellation  of  the  tender.  A  possible 
new  routing  is  being  assessed  and  a  new  tender 
should be organised as soon as possible. To enable 
full  functionality  of  the  Harmony  Link,  Poland  is 
constructing 
lines  and 
three  new  electricity 
modernising another three in the northeast of the 
country.  The  internal  line  between  Stanisławów 

Germany,  Slovakia  and  Ukraine,  and  two  high-
voltage  direct  current  (DC)  interconnections  that 
link  it  to  Lithuania  and  Sweden.  Poland’s  total 
interconnection capacity is projected to rise to 12.5 
GW by  2025,  thus  meeting  the  15%  EU  objective 
by 2030. 

Solar capacity continued its strong growth in 
2023,  albeit  at  a  slower  pace  compared  to 
2022. Total capacity increased by more than 30%, 
reaching  15.8  GW.  The  prosumer  segment  still 
dominates  the  market,  which  has  experienced  a 
strong  acceleration  since  the  introduction  of  the 
residential  PV  program  in  2019  and  kept  up  this 
momentum after the switch from net metering to 
net billing rules in 2022.  

However,  upcoming  changes  to  an  hourly 
compensation  scheme  risk  undermining  the 
predictability of returns for prosumers. In the 
last  two  years  –  with  soaring  prices  -  the  market 
has also seen notable growth in utility-scale solar 
in  the  form  of  the  power  purchase  agreements 
(PPAs).  The  revenue  cap  in  place  until  December 
2023  has  partially  impacted  plants’  profitability. 
The  budget  for  the  programme’s  5th  round  was 
increased in October 2023, with more than 64 000 
filled  applications.  In  2023  Poland  amended  the 
Act on Renewable Energy. Changes have increased 
the  limit  for  building  permit  exemption  for  PV 
plants  and  specified  rules  for  power  purchase 
agreements. 

Graph A7.3: Poland's installed renewable capacity 
(left) and electricity generation mix (right) 

(1) "Other" includes solid biofuels, renewable municipal waste, 
liquid biofuels and biogas 
Source: IRENA, Ember 

The  amendment  of  the  “10H  rule”  in  the 
national legislation in 2023 (referring to the 
distance  of  the  10  heights  of  the  wind 
turbine)  has 
improved  the  outlook  for 
installations  of  the  onshore  wind  power.  In 
2023, wind capacity reached  almost  8GW, a 14% 

46 

 
 
and  Ostrołęka  (LitPol  Link  Stage  2)  is  included  in 
the 1st EU list of PCI-PMIs (76). 

Poland’s share of renewables in heating and 
cooling  (22.7%  in  2021)  relies  heavily  on 
biomass use, with heat pumps covering just over 
a  quarter  of  this  share.  The  targets  stated  in  the 
draft  NECP  appear  rather  unambitious,  with  very 
limited  growth  in  heat  pumps,  but  also  in  solar 
thermal  deployment,  together  with  a  continued 
reliance  on  biomass  as  the  main  contributor  to 
renewable heat.   

Poland  still  faces  significant  challenges  in 
meeting  the  2030  EU  targets  for  energy 
efficiency. 
In  2022  –  a  year  marked  by 
particularly  high  energy  prices  –  Poland’s  primary 
energy  consumption  was  6.1%  higher  than  in 
2012  but  decreased  by  5.3%  compared  to  2021. 
Final energy consumption also decreased by 3.7% 
compared to 2021, but was 12.3% higher than in 
2012.  In  this  last  year,  industry  was  the  sector 
showing the largest reduction, decreasing its final 
energy  consumption  by  7.1%.  Transport  was  the 
worst  performer  and  increased  its  final  energy 
consumption by 2.7%.  

in 

by 

29%. 

2020 

Poland  missed  the  required  level  of  energy 
savings 
This 
underachievement  can  be  explained  by  the  2017 
reform  of  the  white  certificates  scheme,  which 
required  some  learning  and  adaptations  on  the 
market  side.  The  reform  is,  however,  expected  to 
tackle the bottlenecks of the scheme and improve 
the  market  development  of  white  certificates  in 
current  obligation  period.  Furthermore, 
the 
alternative  measures  have  been  added  to  meet 
the  energy  savings  obligation.  The  improved  and 
expanded  measures  are  expected  to  significantly 
increase the level of energy savings in the current 
obligation  period  (2021-2030),  leading  to  the 
fulfilment of the obligation by Poland.  

Decarbonisation of district heating is a major 
challenge 
in  Poland.  To  comply  with  the 
progressively  more  ambitious  Energy  Efficiency 
Directive  conditions,  the  sector  will  have  to  carry 
out  significant  investment  in  new  cleaner,  non-
fossil heat sources. Such investment is planned in 
Poland’s  RRP,  however  a  large  share  of  the 
projects  might  still  consist  of  replacing  coal  with 
in  new 
gas-based  cogeneration. 

Investment 

(76)  Projects of Common and Mutual Interest.  

47 

capacities  based  on  fossil  fuels,  including  natural 
gas,  will  not  be  compliant  with  the  definition  of 
Efficient District Heating and Cooling as of 2030. 

Poland  needs  to  step  up  its  efforts  to 
improve the  energy efficiency of buildings if 
it is to  achieve a meaningful contribution  to 
the  2030  reduction  target  for  energy 
consumption in the sector of buildings.   Final 
energy  consumption 
residential  buildings 
in 
increased by 2.4% in 2022 as compared to 2021, 
while the national Long-Term Renovation Strategy 
reduce  buildings’  primary  energy 
aims 
consumption  by  4%  between  2018  and  2030. 
Heating and cooling represent the highest share of 
final  energy  consumption  in  residential  housing, 
about  82%  in  2022,  with  renewables  supplying 
23%  of  the  total  energy  used  for  heating  and 
cooling across all sectors. 

to 

installed  pumps 

Approximately  208 000  heat  pumps  were 
sold  in  2022,  an  increase  of  112%  over  the 
previous  year,  reaching  a  total  stock  of 
in  the 
around  577 000 
residential  sector.  In  H1  2023,  the  ratio  of 
residential  electricity/natural  gas  prices  was  at 
2.59,  slightly  favourable  to  the  deployment  of 
efficient  heat  pumps,  while  the  non-residential 
electricity/natural  gas  prices  ratio  was  2.06, 
favourable  to  the  deployment  of  efficient  heat 
pumps.   

Recent  legislative  changes  have  improved 
the  regulatory  environment  for  biomethane. 
The amended Polish Renewable Energy act, which 
entered  into  force  on  1  October  2023,  has 
introduced  a  definition  of  biomethanes  and 
introduces  both  guarantees  of  origin  (also  for 
renewable  hydrogen)  and  a  support  scheme, 
including a feed-in premium. The amended Energy 
Law  provides  preferences  for  the  connection  of 
biomethane facilities to the gas network.  

Poland  exhibits  considerable  manufacturing 
capacity  for  clean  technologies  and  has 
great potential for further increases, notably 
in  the  battery  and  solar  PV  supply  chain. 
There  are  several  module  manufacturing  units 
throughout the country, which all together have an 
estimated  450  MW  annual  output  capacity. 
Additionally,  a  cell  manufacturing  plant  with  a 
targeted  capacity  of  100  MW  came  online  in 
Wrocław  in  2021,  and  the  first  Polish  gigafactory 

 
 
for  cell  production 
expected to start production in 2025/2026.  

is  underway 

in  Racibórz, 

Poland is active in the production of onshore 
wind  towers  and  blades.  To  keep  pace  with 
Poland's  growing  offshore  wind  sector,  three 
large-scale assembly lines for offshore towers and 
nacelles  are  currently  in  progress  in  Szczecin  and 
Gdansk.  

Regarding  energy  storage  and  production  of 
batteries,  Poland  leads  Europe in  lithium-ion 
exports 
battery  production,  with  net 
exceeding  6  billion  EUR  in  2022.  Displaying  a 
current  capacity  of  70  GWh/y,  the  main  battery 
producer  in  Poland  is  a  Korean-owned  facility  in 
Biskupice Podgórne, which is poised to achieve an 
annual  output  target  of  115  GWh  by  2025.  A 
European  company  also  invests  in the large-scale 
battery  manufacturing  plants  with  an  estimated 
capacity of 40 GWh in 2024, that are expected to 
bolster  Poland's  leading  position  on  the  market 
and  further  contribute  to  the  EU's  goals  for 
autonomy  in  the  net-zero  industry.  Also,  essential 
production  units  for  electrolytes,  cathodes  and 
separators  are  already  operational  in  Poland,  and 
additional capacity is in development.  

Regarding  the  green  hydrogen  supply  chain, 
promising initiatives are underway in Poland. 
Two dynamic firms based in Gdansk have recently 
initiated the  production  of  electrolysers,  there  are 
other small enterprises in this sector. The National 
Strategy  for  Hydrogen,  which  is  expected  to  be 
updated,  also  features  hydrogen  prominently  in 
R&I,  production,  and  end  use  sectors.  Poland  is 
also  interested  in  supporting  the  emergence  of 
Hydrogen  Valleys,  as  part  of  the  national  and 
European priority. 

48 

 
Table A7.1:  Key Energy Indicators 

(1) The ranking of the main suppliers is based on the latest available figures (for 2022) 
(2) Venture Capital investment includes Venture Capital deals (all stages), Small M&A deals and Private Equity (PE) growth deals 
(for companies that have previously been part of the portfolio of a VC investment firm or have received Angel or Seed funding). 
Source: Eurostat, Gas Infrastructure Europe, JRC elaboration based on PitchBook data (03/2024), JRC SETIS (2024) 

49 

20192020202120222019202020212022Import Dependency [%] 45.2%42.8%40.5%46.0%60.5%57.5%55.5%62.5%of Solid fossil fuels 6.0%0.3%-3.6%8.0%43.3%35.8%37.3%45.8%of Oil and petroleum products 97.3%96.9%96.4%98.4%96.7%96.8%91.7%97.7%of Natural Gas 82.4%78.3%83.6%81.2%89.7%83.6%83.6%97.6%Dependency from Russian Fossil Fuels [%]of Natural Gas 55.0%54.9%56.6%19.6%39.7%41.3%41.1%21.0%of Crude Oil67.9%71.5%63.3%42.9%28.8%26.7%26.4%19.5%of Hard Coal64.6%73.6%66.1%12.4%43.5%49.1%47.4%21.5%2016201720182019202020212022Gas Consumption (in bcm)19.0                 20.1                 20.2                 20.7               21.3               22.9               19.7               Gas Consumption year-on-year change [%]4.5%5.5%0.6%2.6%2.9%7.1%-13.8%Gas Imports - by type (in bcm)14.7                 15.7                 15.8                 17.5               17.4               18.5               15.2               Gas imports - pipeline13.5                 14.0                 13.0                 14.0               13.6               14.4               9.0                 Gas imports - LNG1.11.82.73.53.84.16.2                 Gas Imports - by main source supplier (in bcm) (1)United States-                   0.1                   0.1                   0.9                 1.0                 1.6                 3.4                 Qatar1.0                   1.5                   2.3                   2.3                 2.3                 2.4                 2.3                 Germany2.7                   3.6                   3.0                   3.9                 3.7                 3.3                 4.4                 Russia10.9                 10.3                 9.7                   9.6                 9.6                 10.5               3.0                 20192020202120222023LNG Terminals - storage capacity m3 LNGNumber of LNG Terminals1                      1                      1                      1                    1                    LNG Storage capacity (m3 LNG)320,000          320,000          320,000          320,000        320,000        Underground StorageNumber of storage facilities10                    10                    10                    10                  7                 Technical Capacity (bcm)3.0                   3.1                   3.2                   3.2                 3.3                 20162017201820192020202120222023Gross Electricity Production (GWh) (2)166,635          170,465          170,039          163,989        158,043        179,631        179,748        -              Combustible Fuels151,234       152,295       154,428       145,269     137,254     156,279     148,579     -              Nuclear0000000-              Hydro2,622           3,034           2,387           2,665         2,937         3,101         3,018         -              Wind12,588         14,909         12,799         15,107       15,800       16,234       19,780       -              Solar124              165              300              711             1,958         3,934         8,310         -              Geothermal0000000-              Other Sources67                 62                 125              237             94               84               61               -              Gross Electricity Production [%]Combustible Fuels90.8%89.3%90.8%88.6%86.8%87.0%82.7%-              Nuclear0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%-              Hydro1.6%1.8%1.4%1.6%1.9%1.7%1.7%-              Wind7.6%8.7%7.5%9.2%10.0%9.0%11.0%-              Solar0.1%0.1%0.2%0.4%1.2%2.2%4.6%-              Geothermal0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.0%-              Other Sources0.0%0.0%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.0%-              Net Imports of Electricity (GWh)1,999              2,287              5,695              10,623          13,267          888                1,677-             -              As a % of electricity available for final consumption 1.4%1.6%3.8%7.0%8.9%0.6%-1.1%-              Electricity Interconnection [%]-               4.0%4.0%4.0%3.9%7.0%6.8%5.5%Share of renewable energy consumption - by sector [%]Electricity13.3%13.1%13.0%14.4%16.2%17.2%21.0%-              Heating/cooling14.9%14.8%21.5%22.0%22.1%21.0%22.7%-              Transport4.0%4.2%5.7%6.2%6.6%5.7%5.8%-              Overall11.4%11.1%14.9%15.4%16.1%15.6%16.9%-                 20192020202120222023VC investment (2) in clean energy tech start-ups and scale-ups (EUR Million)3.58             11.86           2.55             11.68             -                 as a % of total VC investment (3) in Poland start-ups and scale-ups1.6%4.8%0.5%3.5%-              Research & Innovation spending in Energy Union R&i prioritesPublic R&I (EUR mln)54.2             72.8             70.6             -              -              Public R&I (% GDP)0.01%0.01%0.01%-              -              Private R&I (EUR mln)66.7             72.0             -               -              -              Private R&I (% GDP)0.01%0.01%-                   -                 -                 ELECTRICITY/ENERGYCLEAN ENERGYPolandEUENERGY DEPENDNCEDIVERSIFICATION OF GAS SUPPLIES 
 
   
 
ANNEX 8: FAIR TRANSITION TO CLIMATE NEUTRALITY 

in 

the 

line 

with 

This  Annex  monitors  Poland’s  progress  in 
ensuring  a  fair  transition  towards  climate 
neutrality  and  environmental  sustainability, 
particularly  for  workers  and  households  in 
vulnerable  situations.  Upskilling  and  reskilling 
measures  will  promote  smooth  labour  market 
transitions 
Council 
Recommendation  on  ensuring  a  fair  transition 
towards climate neutrality (77) and help implement 
the  REPowerEU  plan.  Poland’s  green  economy  is 
expanding. Between 2015 and  2021, total  jobs in 
the environmental goods and services sector grew 
by  61.7%  (to  around  308 000)  (EU:  18.2%), 
reaching  almost  1.8%  of  total  employment  (EU: 
2.7%).  Between  2015  and  2022,  the  greenhouse 
gas  emission  intensity  of  Poland’s  workforce  (see 
Graph A8.1 and Table A8.1) fell very slightly from 
21.2 to 21.1 tonnes per worker, which is above the 
EU  average (14.3 tonnes per  worker in  2022) (78). 
Under  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP), 
crucial  reforms and investments for companies in 
products, services and competences of employees 
and 
transition, 
complementing  the  territorial  just  transition  plans 
and actions financed by the European Social Fund 
Plus  (ESF+).  Poland  is  the  largest  recipient  of  the 
Just  Transition  Fund  (JTF),  which  will  support  the 
transformation in five Polish regions (Dolnośląskie, 
Łódzkie, Małopolskie, Śląskie, Wielkopolskie).  

support 

green 

staff 

the 

Graph A8.1: Fair transition challenges in Poland 

Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey, EMPL-JRC GD-
AMEDI/AMEDI+ and DISCO(H) projects (see Table A8.1). 

leaving 

Employment  in  Poland’s  sectors  that  are 
most  affected  by  the  green  transition 
remains stable. Employment in Poland’s energy-
intensive  industries (79)  comprised  5.0%  of  total 
employment in 2023, a slight decrease from 5.4% 
in  2020  but  still  above  the  EU  average  (3.5%). 
Employment in mining and quarrying has fallen by 
27.2.% since 2015 (to around 167 400 workers in 
2023) due to the decline of coal and lignite mining 
in  Poland.  In  2024,  a  support  programme  for 
the  extraction  and  energy 
workers 
industries 
in  Eastern  Wielkopolskie  will  be 
launched  as  a  part  of  the  JTF.  It  will  equip  the 
estimated  2 200  outgoing  employees  with  skills, 
offering  career  guidance  and  supporting  paths  to 
in 
new  quality 
construction (see Graph A8.2), a key sector for the 
green  transition,  is  lower  than  the  EU  average 
(1.6%  vs  3.6%  in  EU  in  2023).  Nevertheless, 
almost  two  thirds  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the sector reported that skills 
shortages  are  holding  them  back  in  general 
business  activities (80).  According  to  the  European 
Labour  Authority  (ELA) (81),  labour  shortages  were 
reported  in  2023  for  several  occupations  that 
required specific skills or knowledge for the green 

job  vacancy  rate 

jobs.  The 

(77)  Council Recommendation of 16 June 2022 on ensuring a fair 
transition towards climate neutrality (2022/C 243/04) covers 
employment, skills, tax-benefit and social protection 
systems, essential services and housing. 

(78)  Workforce-related calculations are based on the EU Labour 
Force Survey. Note, in the 2023 country report for Poland, 
such indicators were calculated based on employment 
statistics in the national accounts. This may result in limited 
comparability across the two reports. 

(79)  Mining and quarrying (NACE B), chemicals (C20), minerals 

(C23), metals (C24) and automotive (C29). 

(80)  Eurobarometer on skills shortages, recruitment, and retention 

strategies in small and medium-sized enterprises. 

(81)  Based on the European Labour Authority 2024 EURES Report 
on labour shortages and surpluses 2023, i.e., data submitted 
by the EURES National Coordination Offices. 

50 

0.00.51.01.52.0Greenhouse gasemissions per workerEmployment inEnergy-intensiveindustriesEducation & trainingin Energy-IntensiveIndsutriesEnergy povertyTransport poverty(proxy)Carbon inequalityPL Latest vs EU LatestEU LatestPL 2015 vs EU Latest 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine.  In 
2022,  10.3%  of  the  population  at  risk  of  poverty 
(AROP)  (EU:  20.1%)  and  5.5%  of  lower  middle-
income  households  (in  deciles  4-5)  (EU:  11.6%) 
were  unable  to  keep  their  homes  adequately 
warm. On the other hand, in January 2023, 36.0% 
of  AROP  spent  a  considerable  proportion  of  their 
budget (more than 6%)  on private transport fuels 
(EU: 37.1%) (85). 

Environmental  inequalities  remain  a  critical 
issue in Poland, particularly those related to 
air pollution. In 2021, the consumption footprint 
for 20% of the population with the highest income 
is  1.9  times  higher  than  the  footprint  of  the 
poorest  20%  (EU:  1.8) (86).  For  both  groups,  the 
footprint  is  highest  for  food  and  housing.  The 
average levels of air pollution in 2021 stood above 
the EU average (18.1 vs 11.4 µg/m3 PM2.5), with 
all  the  population  living  in  regions  exposed  to 
critical levels of air pollution (87). This has led to a 
significant  impact  on  health,  affecting  vulnerable 
groups in particular, and around 47 300 premature 
deaths annually (88). 

including 

transition (82), 
roofers,  building  and 
related  electricians  and  building  construction 
labourers. 

In 

improved. 

Upskilling  and  reskilling  in  energy-intensive 
energy-intensive 
industries 
industries,  workers’  participation  in  education  and 
training  increased  from  4.3%  in  2015  to  7.9%  in 
2023, but it is still below the EU average (10.9%). 
In  Poland,  only  36%  of  SMEs  think  that  the  skills 
required  for  greening  business  activities  are 
becoming more important (EU: 42%) (81). If Poland 
matches  its  projected  contribution  to  the  EU’s 
renewable  energy  target,  between  5 100  and  9 
000  additional  skilled  workers  will  be  needed  for 
the  deployment  of  wind  and  solar  energy,  which 
may  require  an  investment  in  skills  of  EUR  16.6-
20.7  million (83).  Specific  investments  under  the 
RRP and the JTF provide training to reskill workers 
in regions affected by the transition, together with 
a  broader  training  offer  at  regional  level  and 
flexibility  mechanisms  to  encourage  in-company 
training.  The  JTF  allocated  EUR  518.6  million  for 
skills  in  the  five  regions  undergoing  the  fair 
the  green 
transition.  The  ESF+  strengthens 
transition through various measures that promote 
and  support  the  deployment  of  green  skills. 
Importantly,  the  ESF+  will  support  a tool  that  will 
analyse  and  forecast  the  demand  for  jobs  and 
skills in the green and digital economy. In addition, 
the  REPowerEU  chapter  of  the  RRP  proposed  a 
review  of  the  sectoral  qualification  frameworks 
that will expand lists of green skills for training in 
key 
construction,  water 
management  and  waste  management  as  well  as 
renewable energy sources.  

such  as 

sectors 

Energy  poverty  indicators  have  improved 
significantly  in  Poland.  The  share  of  the 
population unable to keep their homes adequately 
warm  decreased  from  7.5%  in  2015  to  4.9%  in 
2022,  below the  EU  average  (9.3%) (84).  However, 
the  indicator  increased  by  1.7  percentage  points 
between  2021  and  2022,  despite  energy  price 
measures  implemented  in  Poland,  due  to  supply 
constraints caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and 

(82)  Skills and knowledge requirements are based on the 

European Skills Competences and Occupations (ESCO) 
taxonomy on skills for the green transition. 

(83)  EMPL-JRC AMEDI+ project. 

(84)  Energy poverty is a multi-dimensional concept. The indicator 
used focuses on an outcome of energy poverty. Further 
indicators are available at the Energy Poverty Advisory Hub. 

(86) Affordability of private transport fuels is one key dimension 

of transport poverty. The indicator has been developed in the 
context of the EMPL-JRC GD-AMEDI/AMEDI+ projects. 
Methodology explained in Economic and distributional 
effects of higher energy prices on households in the EU. 

(86)  Developed in the context of the EMPL-JRC DISCO(H) project. 
Methodology explained in Joint Research Centre, 2024. 
Carbon and environmental footprint inequality of household 
consumption in the EU. JRC137520. The EU average refers to 
EU27 without Italy (household income data not available for 
IT in the HBS) 

(87)  Two times higher than the recommendations in the WHO Air 

Quality Guidelines (annual exposure of 5µg/m3). 

(88)  EEA - Air Quality Health Risk Assessment 

51 

 
 
 
Table A8.1:  Key indicators for a fair transition in Poland 

Source: Eurostat (env_ac_ainah_r2, lfsa_egan2d, ilc_mdes01), EU Labour Force Survey (break in time series in 2021), EMPL-JRC 
GD-AMEDI/AMEDI+ and DISCO(H) projects. 

Graph A8.2: Job vacancy rate in transforming 
sectors and mining and quarrying 

B - Mining and quarrying 
C - Manufacturing 
D - Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
E - Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 
F - Construction 
H - Transportation and storage 
Source: Eurostat jvs_a_rate_r2. 

Poland  is  making  progress  in  implementing 
policies for a fair transition in the context of 
the  Council  Recommendation  of  June  2022, 
with  further  efforts  needed  in  the  areas  of 
education and training. Poland has put in place 
different  measures  with  EU  support  (see  above). 
Further action is needed to promote education and 
training  for  green  competences,  skills  and  jobs. 
Particular attention needs to be given to workers in 
energy-intensive  industries  and  the  expanding 
sectors (89). 

(89)  Based on the monitoring review of the Council 

Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards 
climate neutrality, which took place in October 2023. 

52 

0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%3.5%4.0%BCDEFHEU 2023PL 2023PL 2015IndicatorDescriptionPL 2015PLEUGHG per workerGreenhouse gas emissions per worker – CO2 equivalent tonnes21.220.5 (2022)14.3 (2022)Employment EIIEmployment share in energy-intensive industries, including mining and quarrying (NACE B), chemicals (C20), minerals (C23), metals (C24) and automotive (C29)5.3%5.0% (2023)3.5% (2023)Education & training EIIAdult participation in education and training (last 4 weeks) in energy-intensive industries4.2%7.9% (2023)10.9% (2023)Energy povertyShare of the total population living in a household unable to keep its home adequately warm7.5%4.9% (2022)9.3% (2022)Transport poverty (proxy)Estimated share of the AROP population that spends over 6% of expenditure on fuels for personal transport28.9%36.0% (2023)37.1% (2023)Carbon inequalityRatio between the consumption footprint of the top 20% vs bottom 20% of the income distribution1.91.9 (2021)2.7 (2021) 
 
   
 
 
  
 
PRODUCTIVITY 
ANNEX 9: RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY AND CIRCULARITY 

The green transition of industry and the built 
environment,  in  particular  decarbonisation, 
resource  efficiency  and 
is 
Poland’s 
essential 
competitiveness (90). In this regard, priorities for 
Poland  are  waste  management  and  the  use  of 
circular materials in industry and construction. 

circularity, 

boost 

to 

is 

The  pace  of  Poland’s  circular  economy 
transition 
insufficient  to  achieve  the 
Circular  Economy  Action  Plan  goals.  The 
material  footprint  increased  from  6.7  to  18.1 
tonnes per capita between 2016 and 2022, above 
the  EU  average  of  14.9  tonnes  per  capita.  Waste 
generation  increased  to  4.5  tonnes  per  capita, 
narrowing 
the  difference  between  Poland’s 
performance and the EU average of 4.8 tonnes per 
capita.  The  2022  Eco-Innovation  Scoreboard 
placed  Poland  in  the  ‘catching-up  group’,  with  a 
score  of  67.4.  As  of  September  2023,  Poland 
totalled  57  awarded  EU  Ecolabel  licences  and 
1 974  products  with  the  EU  Ecolabel,  showing  a 
good  take-up  of  products  and  licences.  However, 
after a peak in 2021, the number of new Ecolabels 
–  both  licences  and  products  –  have  decreased. 
Poland  could  make  better  use  of  the  potential  of 
the 
the 
decarbonisation of industry. 

circular  economy,  also 

to  drive 

Graph A9.1: ETS emissions by sector since 2013 

Source: European Commission 

Greenhouse gas emissions covered by the EU 
emissions  trading system  (ETS)  in  Poland (91) 
continue  to  be  dominated  by  the  power 
sector, which accounted for 71% in 2023. This is 

(90)  See also Annexes 6, 7 and 12. 

(91)  This analysis excludes air travel. For more details and the 
data sources, see Weitzel, M; van der Vorst, C. (2024), 
Uneven progress in reducing emissions in the EU ETS, JRC 
Science for policy brief, JRC138215, Joint Research Centre. 

of 

the 

importance 

significantly  more  than  the  EU  average  (57%), 
underlining 
energy 
transformation  in  Poland  to  reduce  exposure  to 
carbon  costs.  In  2023,  emissions  from  the  power 
sector  were  21%  lower  than  in  2019  and  35% 
lower  than  in  2013.  In  2023,  Poland’s  industry 
emissions  covered  by  the  EU  ETS  came  mostly 
from cement and lime production (25%), industries 
classified  as  ‘other’  (30%) (92),  and  refineries 
(20%), as well as from the metals industry (16%) 
and 
Industry 
emissions have been increasing since 2013, except 
for  a  dip  in  2020  due to the COVID-19  pandemic 
and  reduced  manufacturing  capacity  but  declined 
in  2023.  In  2023,  industry  emissions  were  15% 
higher than in 2013, albeit only 7% higher than in 
2019.  Overall,  in  2023,  Poland’s  ETS  emissions 
were 17% lower than in 2019 and 26% lower than 
in 2013.  

chemicals  production 

(10%). 

reduce 

industry  and 

There  is  an  opportunity  to  improve  the 
efficiency  of 
its 
pollution.  Poland’s  secondary  material  use  rate 
decreased  from  10.4%  in  2017  to  8.4  in  2022, 
which  is  below  the  EU  average  of  11.5%.  By 
contrast,  resource  productivity  increased,  but  the 
distance to the EU average is still big: 1.49 versus 
2.45  purchasing  power  standards  per  kilogram  in 
2022.  The  impact  of  particulate  matter  emissions 
from  Poland’s  industries  on  air  quality  was  way 
higher  than  the  EU  average.  PM2.5  emissions  per 
economic output (EUR’10) (93) decreased from 0.31 
to 0.28 grams between 2017 and 2020, versus an 
EU  average  of  0.07  grams/EUR’10  in  2020.  A 
similar  trend  was  reported  for  PM10  emissions, 
which decreased from 0.37 to 0.33 grams/EUR’10 
between 2017 and 2020 – versus an EU average 
of 0.10 grams/EUR’10 in 2020. 

steady 

progress 

Despite 
in  waste 
management  in  the  past  decade,  there  is 
room  for  improvements.  The  municipal  waste 
recycling  rate 
in  2022. 
However,  with  38.7%  in  2020,  the  country  has 
failed  to  meet  the  EU  2020  target  of  recycling 
50%  of  municipal  waste.  Poland  is  among  the 
countries that  are  not  on track  to meet the  2025 
EU  packaging,  plastic  packaging,  and  municipal 

increased  to  40.9% 

(92)  Other than cement and lime production, chemicals, metals, 

refineries, and power generation. 

(93)  In 2010 prices. 

53 

00.20.40.60.8105010015020020132014201520162017201820192020202120222023Emissions relative to 2013Mt CO2eCement & LimeChemicalsMetalsRefineriesPower generationOtherPoland (both axes) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table A9.1:  Circularity indicators 

Source: Eurostat, European Environment Agency 

waste  recycling  targets  (of  65%,  50%  and  55%, 
rate  of  plastic 
recycling 
respectively).  The 
packaging  was  31.5%  in  2019,  below  the  EU 
average. The country has moved away from heavy 
reliance  on  landfills  but  is  still  at  risk  of  missing 
the 2035 EU landfilling target of 10%. Innovation 
in waste treatment has slowed down to 17 patents 
registered in 2021, versus 70 in 2015. 

Graph A9.2: Treatment of municipal waste 

Resilience of the built environment remains a 
source of concern. Land take is one of the main 
drivers of biodiversity loss in Poland. In 2018, the 
soil sealing index (94) stood above the EU average: 
105.4  versus  103.4.  In  2012-2018,  net  land  take 
stood  way  above  the  EU  average  and  decreased 
by  only  18%  compared  with  2006-2012.  Poland 
would  need  to  take  measures  to  decrease  its 
pressure  on  land  to  achieve  the  8th  Environment 
Action  Programme  objective  of  reaching  no  net 
land take by 2050. Poland has introduced climate 
adaptation strategies for the built environment but 
is  still  lacking  a  whole-life  carbon  approach. 
Poland took action to protect  the population from 
extreme  flood  events,  supported  by  the  European 
Regional  Development  Fund.  The  measures 
implemented  in  2014-2020  cover  15.2%  of  the 
population and will be extended to 15.9%. 

Source: Eurostat 

Poland  could  use  its  built  environment  more 
efficiently.  The  residential  and  non-residential 
floor  areas  are  below  the  EU  average  but  have 
increased  at  a  higher  pace  than  the  EU  average, 
with respectively 32.62 m2 (EU average: 54.42 m2) 
and 13 m2 per capita (EU average: 18 m2) in 2020. 
In 2020, Poland submitted a long-term renovation 
plan  to  decarbonise  the  buildings  stock.  Circular 
economy strategies are mentioned, but they could 
be more widely integrated into the planning. 

and 

demolition 

is  still  potential  for 

improving 
There 
waste 
construction 
management  in  Poland.  The  amount  of  waste 
generated  from  construction  and  demolition 
activities  per  capita  remains  well  below  the  EU 
average.  The  proportion  of  backfilling  has 
increased  since  2014  and  stood  at  39%  in  2020, 
above  the  EU  average  of  9.9%.  Poland’s  recovery 
rate  decreased  from  93%  in  2010  to  74%  in 
2020,  achieving  the  Waste  Framework  Directive’s 
target for 2020. The most recent value from 2021 
shows a significant improvement, reaching 94%. In 
Poland,  75%  of  the  population  is  connected  to  at 
least  secondary  wastewater  treatment,  which  is 
below the EU average of 81%. 

(94)  It measures the variation of soil sealing over the years, with 

2006 as the baseline (2006=100). 

54 

329336346362364010020030040050020182019202020212022Kg per capita Waste treatment to be determinedLandfill/disposalTotal incineration (including energy recovery)Composting and digestionMaterial recyclingEU-27201820192020202120222023EU-27Latest yearIndustryResource productivity (purchasing power standard (PPS) per kilogram)1.21.31.31.41.5-2.52022Circular material use rate (%)10.59.27.39.18.4-11.52022Eco-innovation index (2013=100)59.161.060.563.967.4-121.52022Recycling of plastic packaging (%)35.731.5----40.72021Cost of air emissions from industry (EUR bn)53.144.934.250.0--352.72021Built environmentRecovery rate from construction and demolition waste (%)84.0-74.094.2--89.02020Soil sealing index (base year = 2006)105.4-----103.42018Non-residential floor area (m2 per capita)12.712.913.0---18.02020Waste backfilled (%)26.1-38.9-13.8-9.92020 
      
 
 
      
 
ANNEX 10: DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION 

infrastructure 

/  connectivity  and 

transformation  by  2030, 

Digital  transformation  is  key  to  ensuring  a 
resilient and competitive economy. In line with 
the  Digital  Decade  Policy  Programme,  and  in 
particular  with  the  targets  in  that  Programme  for 
digital 
this  Annex 
describes  Poland’s  performance  on  digital  skills, 
digital 
the 
digitalisation  of  businesses  and  public  services. 
Where relevant, it makes reference to progress on 
implementing  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Plan 
(RRP).  Poland  allocates  21%  of  its  total  RRP 
(EUR  7.4 billion) (95).  Under 
budget  to  digital 
Cohesion Policy,  an additional  EUR 5.7 billion (8% 
of  the  country’s  total  Cohesion  Policy  funding)  is 
allocated 
digital 
transformation (96). 

country’s 

the 

to 

The  Digital  Decade  Policy  Programme  sets 
out  a  pathway  for  EU’s  successful  digital 
transformation  by  2030.  Poland’s  national 
roadmap outlines the actions it intends to take to 
reach the objectives and targets at national  level. 
The first Report on the State of the Digital Decade 
highlighted the need to accelerate and deepen the 
collective efforts to reach the EU-wide targets and 
objectives (97).  Among  others,  a  digitally  skilled 
population 
the  development  and 
adoption  of  digital  technologies  and  leads  to 
productivity  gains  and  new  business  models.  It 
also  leads  to  higher  inclusion  and  participation  in 
an environment, increasingly shaped by the digital 
transformation (98). 
technologies, 
infrastructure  and  tools  all  play  a  role 
in 
addressing 
the  current  structural  challenges, 
including  strategic  dependencies,  cybersecurity 
and climate change. 

increases 

Digital 

(95)  The share of financial allocations that contribute to digital 
objectives has been calculated using Annex VII to the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility Regulation. 

(96)  This amount includes all investment specifically aimed at or 
substantially contributing to digital transformation in the 
2021-2027 cohesion policy programming period. The source 
funds are the European Regional Development Fund, the 
Cohesion Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, and the Just 
Transition Fund. 

(97)  European Commission (2023): Report on the State of the 

Digital Decade 2023, 2023 Report on the state of the Digital 
Decade | Shaping Europe’s digital future (europa.eu). 

(98)  See for example OECD (2019): OECD Economic Outlook, 

Digitalisation and productivity: A story of complementarities, 
OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2019 Issue 1 | OECD 
iLibrary (oecd-ilibrary.org) and OECD (2019): Going Digital: 
Shaping Policies, Improving Lives – 
Summary, https://www.oecd.org/digital/going-digital-
synthesis-summary.pdf. 

55 

The  low  level  of  basic  digital  skills  is  a  key 
challenge  for  Poland  in  the  human  capital 
dimension. The proportion of Poland’s population 
with  at  least  basic  digital  skills  is  below  the  EU 
average.  Also,  ICT  specialists  account  for  a  lower 
percentage of the workforce in Poland (4.3%) than 
the EU average (4.8%)  and the same can be  said 
about  the  percentage  of  female  ICT  specialists. 
The share of persons with a degree in ICT among 
all graduates remains also below the EU average. 
The  RRP  includes  measures  that  aim  to  increase 
the  level  of  digital  competences  in  the  society, 
introduce more digital themes into education, and 
to  provide  digital  equipment  to  schools.  These 
measures  are  expected  to  help  increase  the  level 
of digital skills. 

Poland  has  a  mixed  performance  on  the 
indicators  for  digital 
infrastructure  and 
connectivity.  The  very  high-capacity  network 
(VHCN)  coverage  (81.1%)  is  higher  than  the  EU 
average  (78.8%)  and  the  RRP  includes  significant 
investments supporting the roll-out of connectivity 
infrastructure as well as some relevant legislative 
action. On the other hand, the overall 5G coverage 
stands  at  71.9%,  considerably  below  the  EU 
average of 89.3%. The development of 5G is late 
primarily  due  to  the  delayed  authorisation  of  the 
5G pioneer bands. Only the 3.4-3.8 GHz band has 
been  assigned  so  far.  The  launch  of  selection 
procedure  for  the  assignment  of  the  700  MHz 
band, expected in 2024, has yet to be announced. 
Swift  execution  of  the  5G  spectrum  auction  is  of 
utmost importance as it would enable investment.  

Poland  is  still  far  below  the  EU  average  for 
most  indicators  on  the  digitalisation  of 
businesses. The proportion of SMEs with at least 
a  basic  level  of  digital  intensity  (50%)  is  much 
lower than the EU average (58%). The adoption of 
advanced digital technologies (52%) is also below 
the EU average for data analytics solutions, cloud 
computing, or artificial intelligence (55%). The RRP 
includes  an  investment  supporting  the  digital 
transformation of businesses with the use of cloud 
computing. In 2022, 2.9% of enterprises in Poland 
reported  ICT  service  outage  due  to  cyberattacks 
ransomware  attacks,  denial  of  service 
(e.g. 
attacks). Over the same year, 20.7% of enterprises 
developed  or  reviewed  their  ICT  security  policy 
within the previous 12 months. 

Poland  is  still  performing  below  the  EU 
average  regarding  digitalisation  of  public 
services. Poland scores below the EU average for 

 
 
 
 
In  terms  of  access  to  e-health  records,  Poland 
scores well above the EU average with a score of 
90  out  of  100.  The  RRP  supports  developing  new 
and  upgrading  existing  public  e-services  and 
scaling up their availability. 

two 

availability of digital public services. In April 2023, 
Poland  notified  its  Public  Electronic  Identification 
Scheme,  which 
electronic 
includes 
identification  (eID)  means.  Moreover,  Poland  has 
another  eID  means  –  profil  mObywatel  (‘mCitizen 
profile’)  –  which  was  released  in  July  2023  as  a 
new  feature  in  the  public  mobile  application 
mObywatel. The same app also provides access to 
several  public  services  and  the  online  patient 
account  that  is  needed  for  the  mandatory  e-
prescription  system  and  enables  interaction  with 
the  health  system  on  other  administrative  issues. 

Table A10.1:Key Digital Decade targets monitored by the Digital Economy and Society Index indicators 

(1) The 20 million target represents about 10% of total employment. 
(2) The fibre to the premises coverage indicator is included separately as its evolution will also be monitored separately and taken 
into consideration when interpreting VHCN coverage data in the Digital Decade. 
(3) At least 75% of EU enterprises have taken up one or more of the following, in line with their business operations: (i) cloud 
computing services; (ii) big data; (iii) artificial intelligence.   

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 

56 

EUDigital Decade target by 2030 2022202320242024(EU)Digital skillsAt least basic digital skills43%43%44%56%80%% individuals20212021202320232030ICT specialists (1)3.7%3.7%4.3%4.8%20 million% individuals in employment aged 15-7420212022202320232030Digital infrastructure/connectivityFixed very high capacity network (VHCN) coverage70%71%81%79%100%% households20212022202320232030Fibre to the premises (FTTP) coverage (2)52%60%75%64%-% households2021202220232023Overall 5G coverage34%63%72%89%100%% populated areas20212022202320232030Digitalisation of businessesSMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity40%NA50%58%90%% SMEs2021202320232030Data analyticsNANA19%33%-% enterprises20232023Cloud19%19%47%39%-% enterprises2021202120232023Artificial intelligence3%3%4%8%-% enterprises2021202120232023AI or cloud or data analytics (3)NANA52%55%75%% enterprises202320232030Digitalisation of public servicesDigital public services for citizens57606479100Score (0 to 100)20212022202320232030Digital public services for businesses70737385100Score (0 to 100)20212022202320232030Access to e-health recordsNA869079100Score (0 to 100)2022202320232030Poland 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX 11: INNOVATION 

This  Annex  provides  a  general  overview  of  the 
performance  of  Poland’s  research  and  innovation 
system,  which  is  essential  for  delivering  the  twin 
transition and ensuring long-term competitiveness. 

‘emerging 

innovation 
Poland  remains  an 
performer’, but it is reducing its performance 
gap  with  the  EU.  According  to  the  2023 
Innovation  Scoreboard (99),  Poland’s 
European 
performance  has  been  steadily  improving,  at  a 
faster  rate  than  the  EU  average  with  which  it  is 
catching  up.  Despite  this  progress,  additional 
actions need to be taken up to continue to narrow 
the gap (Poland score is 62.8% of the EU average). 

Graph A11.1: R&D expenditure as % of GDP, 2010-
2022 

Source: Eurostat 

Overall  improvements  are  largely  due  to 
increasing  business  R&D  expenditure,  but its 
sustainability  can  be  questioned  given 
persisting  bottlenecks.  Business  enterprise 
expenditure  on  R&D  has  steadily  increased  since 
2016, rising from 0.64% of GDP to 0.96% in 2022. 
Over  the  same  period,  public  expenditure  on  R&D 
almost caught up with its 2015 level to represent 
0.50%  of  GDP  (EU  average  0.73%);  however,  the 
environment-related  government  R&D  budget 
remains  very 
the  OECD 
average (100).  These  efforts  will  be  supported  by 
substantial  investments  in  R&I  from  the  cohesion 
policy  and  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  (RRP). 

low,  well  under 

(99)  2023 European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS), country profile: 
Poland ec_rtd_eis-country-profile-pl.pdf (europa.eu). The EIS 
provides a comparative analysis of innovation performance 
in EU countries, including the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of their national innovation systems (also 
compared to the EU average). 

(100) Source: OECD Economic Policy Reforms 2023, country profile: 
Poland. Poland reached 0.6% against 2.8% on average for 
OECD countries of total government R&D. https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/3d57043c-
en.pdf?expires=1701780327&id=id&accname=oid031827&
checksum=505D2E586C8A9213EAA6C2F90C8182AA. 

57 

it 

that 

forward, 

important 

Going 
the 
is 
sustainability  of  these  investments  is  ensured  in 
view  of  the  2030  strategy  for  responsible 
development  that  set  the  target  of  2.5%  of  GDP 
dedicated to R&I by 2023. This must be supported 
to  solve 
by  complementary  measures  able 
pressing  bottlenecks:  shortage  of  a  highly  skilled 
research  workforce,  threats  to  academic  freedom 
and a weak public science base. 

Poland  faces  shortages  of  skills  in  the 
science,  technology,  engineering  and  maths 
(STEM) fields, limiting the quality of research 
output  and  the  impact  of  R&I  investments. 
Skills  shortages  are  illustrated  by  the  decreasing 
number  of  graduates  in  the  STEM  fields (101)  and 
the  low  number  of  new  doctorate  graduates (102) 
(see  Annex  15:  Education).  Moreover,  this  is  not 
compensated  by  foreign  graduates  as  the  Polish 
R&I  ecosystem  has  difficulty  in  attracting  foreign 
doctorate  students (103).  This  struggle  for  human 
capital  is  magnified  by  a  decline  in  academic 
freedom,  which  has  been  falling  below  the  EU 
average  since  2016  and  is  decreasing (104).  ‘The 
-  Research  Universities’ 
Excellence 
programme should help create top-level, research-
based education in higher education institutions. 

Initiative 

Research  outputs  must  be  improved  to  be 
able  to  support  the  competitiveness  of  the 
economy.  As  shown  by  the  share  of  Polish 
scientific  publications  within  the  top  10%  most 
cited  publication  worldwide (105),  the  quality  of 
public research is still below the EU average. This 
is strengthened by international co-publications as 
%  of  the  total  number  of  publications  for  which 

(101) New graduates in science and engineering per thousand 

population aged 25-34 have been decreasing from 17.1 in 
2017 to 12.0 in 2020 and 12.1 in 2021. Source: Eurostat. 

(102) The number of PhD graduates among people aged 25-34, 
remains low, at 0.4%, which was below the EU-27 average 
of 1.1%. Source: Eurostat. 

(103) The share of foreign doctorate students as a percentage of 
all doctorate students in Poland, which was 8% in 2020, 
below the EU average (24%). Source: 2023 EIS. 

(104) According to the Academic Freedom index, the Polish index 
decreased from 2016 to reach 0.74 in 2022, below the EU 
average of 0.90. 

(105) Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% 

most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications 
of the country was 5.23% in Poland in 2020, below the EU 
average of 9.6%. Source: Science-Metrix. 

00.20.40.60.811.21.41.62010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022As % of GDP R&D Intensity (GERD as % of GDP)Public expenditure on R&D (GOVERD + HERD) as % of GDPBusiness enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP 
 
      
 
 
 
Table A11.1:Key innovation indicators 

(1) EU average for the last available year or the year with the largest number of country data. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, DG JRC, Science-Metrix (Scopus database and EPO’s Patent Statistical Database), Invest EU 

Poland’s  venture  capital  market 
is  slowly 
expanding but is still weak, hindering the ability to 
commercialise innovation. Similarly, while R&D tax 
incentives 
innovation 
to  promote  business 
activities have been improving, they remain below 
the EU average (0.034% of GDP vs 0.100%). Both 
these  points  are  reflected  by  the  overall  low 
number of patent applications per billion GDP filled 
under  PCT.  This  challenge  is  more  prominent  in 
SMEs, as the number taking up product or business 
the  EU 
process 
averages (109). A forthcoming study on the existing 
R&D tax incentive scheme should provide insights 
for improvements in this regard. It will also be key 
to improve Poland’s R&I performance in the green 
and  digital  fields,  areas 
is 
currently lagging behind (110). 

in  which  Poland 

remains  below 

innovations 

Poland,  despite  recent  progress,  remains  well 
below the EU average (106). 

Science-business 
remain  weak, 
linkages 
hindering the uptake of research output into 
the  economy.  Both  the  share  of  public-private 
scientific co-publications as a share of all scientific 
publications (5.4 against 7.6 in 2022) and the level 
of  business  financing  for  public  R&D  expenditure 
remain well below the EU average (0.014% of GDP 
against  0.054%  in  2021).  However,  Poland  is 
putting  in  place  initiatives  to  drive  forward;  for 
example,  the  Key  National  Clusters  initiative  that 
aims  at  strengthening  cooperation  between 
companies or industry and R&I actors (107) and also 
via  the  measures  on  the  development  of  cluster 
offer for companies of the European Funds for the 
Modern  Economy  of  the  Agency  for  Enterprise 
Development (108) that will facilitate the connection 
between businesses and research organisations. 

innovation 

is  crucial  for  the 
Business 
competitiveness of the Polish economy and in 
view  of  the  green  and  digital  transition. 

(106) International co-publications as % of total number of 
publications was 39.8% in 2022 for 55.5% for the EU 
average. Source: Science-Metrix. 

(107) Source: European Cluster Collaboration Platform. 

ECCPfactsheet_Poland_2022_final.pdf 
(clustercollaboration.eu). 

(108) Source: STIP Compass, OECD. 

(109) Respectively 43.5% and 39.6% of EU performance. Source: 

European Innovation Scoreboard 2023. 

(110) Business R&D expenditure in information industries of Poland 
was 0.2% against 0.4% of GDP (2019 or latest) for the 
OECD average. Source: OECD. Concerning green domains, it 
fell from 10.3% to 7.8% from 2020 to 2021, which is below 
the EU average of 14.7%. 

58 

EUaverage (1)R&D intensity (GERD as % of GDP)0.721.001.391.431.46:2.24Public expenditure on R&D as % of GDP0.530.530.510.530.50:0.73Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD) as % of GDP0.190.470.870.900.96:1.48Scientific publications of the country within the top 10% most cited publications worldwide as % of total publications of the country 3.004.205.23:::9.6Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications per billion GDP (in PPS)0.50.70.56:::3.4Public-private scientific co-publications as % of total publications3.33.94.85.15.4:7.6Public expenditure on R&D financed by business enterprise (national) as % of GDP0.0240.0190.0150.014::0.054New graduates in science & engineering per thousand pop. aged 25-3415.916.512.012.1::16.9Public support for business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD)Total public sector support for BERD as % of GDP0.0300.0820.1910.202::0.204R&D tax incentives: foregone revenues as % of GDP000.0290.034::0.104Share of environment-related patents in total patent applications filed under PCT (%)12.114.47.8:::14.7Finance for innovation and economic renewalVenture capital (market statistics) as % of GDP0.0070.0060.0180.0220.027:0.085Human capital and skills availabilityGreen innovation 2022Key indicators Quality of the R&I systemAcademia-business cooperationPoland20102015202020212023 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX 12: INDUSTRY AND SINGLE MARKET 

Robust  growth  over  the  past  decade  has 
reduced the income gap between Poland and 
the  EU  average.  Growth  has  been  driven 
primarily  by  a  combination  of  foreign  direct 
investment,  inflows  of  EU  funds,  rising  labour 
force participation and productivity improvements. 
In the 2023 IMD Competitiveness Ranking, Poland 
ranked 43rd out of 64 countries, moving up seven 
places  compared  to  2022 (111).  There  is  some 
regarding 
scope  for 
improvement,  especially 
government  efficiency 
is 
relatively  high,  and  some  government  and  legal 
institutions  continue  to  function  poorly),  while 
trade and employment indicators are the strongest 
assets.  

(business  regulation 

Graph A12.1: Nominal labour productivity per hour 
worked (EU=100) 

Source: Eurostat 

Poland  has  experienced  rapid  productivity 
growth  in  the  last  decade,  but  significant 
potential  for  catching  up  with  EU  averages 
remains.  Labour  productivity  per  hour  worked 
increased by 0.7 in 2023 and grew by an average 
of around 2.5% in the last decade (it grew by less 
than  1%  in  the  EU  as  a  whole).  However, 
productivity is still one of the lowest in the EU and 
stands  at  65%  of  the  EU  average  (see  Graph 
A12.1).  Low-productivity  sectors  (e.g. agriculture 
and  construction)  account  for  25%  of  GDP  (less 
than  19% 
low 
unemployment  and  high  employment  rates  mean 
that much of the future improvement should come 
from  a  growing  capital  stock,  improvements  in 
efficiency  and  a  shift  to  higher  added  value 
activities.  Since  2015,  total  factor  productivity 
(TFP) has grown at an average rate of 2.2% (4.2% 
in  2022),  against  an  average  of  0.8%  in  the  EU. 

the  EU) (112).  Poland’s 

in 

(111)  IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2023. 

(112)  McKinsey & Company, 2023, Lifting Poland’s ambitions. On 

The  OECD (113)  suggests 
the 
manufacturing TFP growth in 2009-2019 was due 
to productivity improvements within firms. 

that  most  of 

and 

that 

Higher  private  investment  rates  could  boost 
Poland’s long-term growth and facilitate the 
shift  toward  a  greener  model (114).  Poland’s 
investment  to  GDP  ratio  was  17%  in  2022  (see 
Graph  A12.2),  considerably  below  the  EU  average 
(22.9%) 
countries 
(Hungary: 28.2%,  Czechia:  26.8%).  Substantial 
investment  needs  persist  across  the  economy, 
notably  for  the  green  transition.  The  most 
important  barriers  to  investment  are  uncertainty 
about  the  future  (93%  of  Polish  respondents 
against  78%  in  the  EU),  energy  costs  (90%  in 
Poland,  83%  in  the  EU)  and  availability  of  skilled 
staff (83% in Poland, 81% in the EU) (115).  

peer 

of 

in 

the 

regulatory 

environment; 

legislative  process 

Investment  performance  is  hampered  by  a 
a 
burdensome 
deterioration 
that 
increases  uncertainty  for  investors;  a  low  level  of 
automation and robotisation in Polish industry (116); 
and  skills  mismatches  and  labour  shortages  that 
drive up labour unit costs. The IMF estimates that 
EU  funds  would  boost  investment  in  2024-2026, 
raising  the  level  of  output  by  about  1%  by 
2025 (117). 

In  addition,  investment  in  innovation  and  its 
diffusion  is  much  lower  than  in  the  rest  of 
the EU (as measured, for instance, by spending on 
R&D  or  the  number  of  patents  per  capita 
(see Annex  11).  Firms  in  Poland  have  one  of  the 

(113)  OECD Economic Surveys Poland, 2023. 

(114)  Over the medium and longer term, public infrastructure 
investment can raise the productivity of existing assets 
(physical and human capital), but this is far from guaranteed. 
About a third of public investment spending in Poland has 
not resulted in any increase in the level or quality of 
infrastructure that would have been achieved by the most 
efficient comparator country. This efficiency gap is higher 
than the EU average (IMF Selected Issues Paper, Post-
pandemic potential growth and scarring, Country Report 
No 2022/059). 

(115)  EIB Investment Survey - European Union Overview, 2023. 

(116)  For industry, the level of robotisation tends to be relatively 
low. According to a 2021 study, Poland had 42 robots per 
10 000 industry workers, lower than the level of around 130 
robots in Czechia and Slovakia and below the best 
performers such as Sweden with 262 robots per 10 000 
industry workers (OECD, 2023).  

the cusp of a new era. 

(117)  IMF, Article IV, 2023. 

59 

404550556065707580852014201520162017201820192020202120222023PolandCzechiaHungarySlovakia 
 
       
 
 
 
 
lowest average shares of investment in intangible 
assets. In this sense, the new Unitary Patent, which 
was  created  in  June  2023,  could  help  stimulate 
investment in innovation because the system ends 
complex  validation  requirements  and  reduces 
litigation costs. 

Sustainable  investment  in  clean  sources  of 
energy  is  necessary  in  order  to  support 
sustainable  economic  growth  and  meet 
energy  transition  goals.  Despite  progress  in 
increasing  renewable  energy,  Poland  remains  one 
of the most carbon-intensive economies in the EU. 
Polish  industry  accounts  for  25.2%  of  total  gross 
value  added  and  21.6%  of  total  employment 
(significantly above the EU averages) and industry 
is  responsible  for  around  22%  of  Poland’s 
greenhouse gas emissions. The National Industrial 
Strategy  adopted  in  2021  recognises  the  Green 
Deal  as  an  opportunity  for  Polish  producers, 
especially  in  low-  and  zero-carbon  technologies 
(see Annex 7).  

Graph A12.2: Investment, % GDP 

Source: Eurostat 

renewable 

accelerate 

administrative 

procedures 
Streamlining 
would 
energy 
deployment.  Wind  and  solar  permitting  times  in 
Poland  exceed  EU  limits,  despite  some  measures 
to  improve  the  permitting  processes  (e.g. clear 
deadlines  and  more  digitalisation).  For  onshore 
wind, the permitting time is more than 80 months, 
while for solar it is above 20 months, which is well 
above  the 
in  the  revised  RED 
(2018/2001) (118).  

limits  stated 

content  of  Poland’s  exports  is  estimated  to  have 
increased  from  29.5%  in 2008  to  30.2% in  2020 
(above the OECD average of 27.6%). Supply chain 
issues  affected  the  automotive  industry  in  2022 
(11%  of  industrial  production  and  3.4%  of  GDP), 
but  the  diversity  of  Poland’s  industrial  base  has 
cushioned the impact. Poland is also a crucial link 
in  the  supply  chain  for  several  critical  raw 
materials,  especially  coking  coal  for  steelmaking 
processes  (24%  of  EU  supply),  copper,  silver  and 
elemental sulphur.  

in 

are 

Ensuring 

highlight 

the  EU-27).  63%  of 

Public  trust  in  government  and  business 
perceptions  of  effectiveness  in  investment 
protection 
judicial 
low. 
independence is key to a good investment climate. 
A  recent  Eurobarometer  published  in  June  2024 
shows  that  59%  of  Polish  respondents  rate  the 
judicial system as either fairly or very bad in terms 
of  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (just 
respondents 
35% 
complained  of  interference  or  pressure  from  the 
government  and  politicians  (57%  in  the  EU-
27) (119).  In  addition,  55%  of  companies  are  not 
confident  that  their  investments  are  protected  by 
the law and courts in Poland (46% in EU), and they 
particularly 
non-
transparent  administrative 
frequent 
changes  in  legislation  and  concerns  about  the 
quality  of  the  law-making  process.  Furthermore, 
Poland’s  scores  in  all  six  governance  dimensions 
measured  by  the  World  Bank’s  World  Governance 
Indicators  have  deteriorated  since  2017 (120). 
However,  the  courts’  overall  performance  has 
improved, with a shortening of the estimated time 
needed  to  conclude  litigious  civil  and  commercial 
cases.  The  government  appointed  in  December 
2023  took  action  to  address  concerns  about  the 
rule  of 
independence  and 
judicial 
presented  an  Action  Plan  with  concrete  steps  in 
February  2024.  Finally,  Poland 
implemented 
measures to strengthen certain aspects of judicial 
protection  through  the  reform  of  the  disciplinary 
judges,  as  required  by 
regime  applicable  to 
Poland’s Recovery and Resilience Plan. 

unpredictable, 
conduct, 

law  and 

Polish industry has benefited from the easing 
of  supply  chains.  Poland  has  successfully 
integrated  into  global  supply  chains.  The  foreign 

(118)  EMBER, 2023, PEP2040: progress or disappointment? 

(119)  Eurobarometer 520, 2024, Perceived Independence of the 
National Justice Systems in the EU among Companies. 

(120)  The six indicators are: voice and accountability; political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism; government 
effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of 
corruption. World Bank, World Governance Indicators 2022. 

60 

0510152025302013201420152016201720182019202020212022% GDPPoland Business investmentPoland Government investmentEU-27 Total investmentPoland Total investmentHungary Total investmentCzechia Total investment 
       
 
 
The  lack  of  adequate  public  consultations 
weighs  on  the  stability  and  predictability  of 
the  business  environment.  Public  consultations 
are infrequent and non-transparent. Despite recent 
improvements, in 2023 24% of the draft laws that 
entered  into  force  had  no  documented  public 
consultation  (the  average  in  the  last  decade  is 
38.5%)  and  in  49%  of  them  the  government  did 
not reply to social partners. Furthermore, the time 
allowed  for  companies  to  prepare  for  changes  in 
the law has decreased. In 2023, laws dealing with 
business  regulations  entered  into  force  with  a 
vacatio  legis that  lasted  an  average  of  30.9  days 
(down from 53.2 in 2011) (121).  

Access to finance has substantially improved 
in Poland in recent years. More than half of the 
firms  in  Poland  (54%)  financed  at  least  some  of 
their  investment  through  external  finance  (EU 
average:  43%).  Bank  finance  was  the  most 
important  source  of  financing  for  around  80%  of 
Polish firms (122).  

Financing  conditions  for  private  investment 
tightened  significantly  in  2023  (creating  a 
more  challenging  environment)  and  interest 
rates  for  new  loans  increased  sharply.  The 
Polish central bank has registered a decline in the 
stock  of  current  loans  (by  5.1%  in  Q3 2023 
compared to rises of 2.4% in the previous quarter 
and 11.7% in Q1 2023) as well as some slowdown 
in  Q3 2023 
loan  growth  (4% 
in 
compared  to  4.8%  in  Q2 2023  and  6.7%  in 
Q1 2023). 

investment 

Inflation  is  affecting  the  capacity  of  Polish 
businesses  to  pay  on  time.  62%  of  Polish 
companies consider that they are struggling to pay 
their suppliers on time (56% in the EU on average) 
and 66% of Polish businesses are more concerned 
than  ever  about  clients’  ability  to  pay  on  time 
(EU: 59%).  The  payment  gap  is  16  days  on  B2B 
operations  (down  from  17  days  in  2021)  and  17 
days  for  the  public  sector  (down  from  22  days  in 
2021).  In  2023,  more  companies  report that they 
were asked to accept longer payment delays over 
last  12  months (123).  Furthermore, 
the 
the 

(121)  Grand Thornton Barometer, 2024, Analysis of the stability of 

the legal environment in the Polish economy. 

(122)  European Investment Bank, 2023, EIB Investment Survey 

percentage  of  SMEs  experiencing  late  payments 
rose  to  68.4%  in  2023,  which  is  above  the  EU 
average of 48.7% (see Table A12.1). 

Significant progress has been made in recent 
years,  but  there  is  still  substantial  scope  to 
further  digitalise  the  economy  and  increase 
productivity. 61% of Polish SMEs enjoy at least a 
basic  level  of  digital  intensity,  which  falls  below 
the  EU  average  of  69%  (and  the  2030  EU  target 
of  90%  established  by  the  digital  decade  policy 
programme).  Adoption  of  advanced  digital 
technologies  is  relatively  low  among  Polish  firms, 
with  19%  using  cloud  computing  services  (EU 
average:  34%)  and  32%  using  electronic 
information sharing (EU average: 38%).  

The low level of digital skills and the limited 
number  of  highly  skilled  managers 
is 
considered  as  one  of  the  main  barriers  to 
growth  for  Polish  firms (124).  The 
lack  of 
management  support  is  a  barrier  to  innovation, 
especially  for  SMEs.  According  to  the  European 
Innovation  Scoreboard  2023,  the  percentage  of 
SMEs  with  product  innovations  was  43.5%  (EU 
average:  100),  while  the  rate  of  SMEs  with 
innovations  in  business  was  39.6%  (EU  average: 
100).  

The  overall  level  of  digitalisation  of  Polish 
government  services  is  among  the  lowest  in 
the  EU.  In  2022,  as  many  as  63%  of  internet 
users  relied  on  e-government  services  (below  the 
EU  average  of  74%).  Furthermore,  Poland  has 
progressed  to  the  preliminary  stage  of  technical 
the  Once-Only  Technical 
implementation  of 
System  (OOTS) (125).  As  part  of  the  Single  Digital 
Gateway  Regulation (126),  the  system  will  enable 
the automated cross-border exchange of evidence 
between  competent  authorities,  improving  online 
access  to  information,  administrative  procedures 
and  assistance  within  the  EU.  The  onboarding  of 
Polish  competent  authorities  is  crucial  for  the 
system  to  function  smoothly  and  to  reduce 
administrative burden.  

Poland  is  well  integrated  into  the  Single 
Market.  Around  70%  of  its  foreign  trade  takes 
place  within  the  EU.  However,  further  efforts  are 

(124) OECD Economic Surveys, Poland, 2023. 

2023: European Union overview.  

(125)  Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1463. 

(123)  Intrum, 2023, European Payment Report 2023. 

(126)  The SDG Regulation, Regulation (EU) 2018/1724. 

61 

 
 
 
needed to reduce the transposition and conformity 
deficits,  which  are  above  the  EU  average.  This 
would  improve  the  smooth  functioning  of  the 
single  market  in  Poland.  Poland  resolved  80%  of 
all SOLVIT cases it handled as lead centre (below 
the  EU  average  of  88%  –  see  Table  A12.1). 
However,  all  the  case-handling  indicators  point  to 
understaffing of the Polish SOLVIT centre in 2023.  

of 

restrictiveness 

regulated 
restrictiveness  of 
Regulatory 
professions in important business services is 
high  in  Poland  (according  to  the  Commission’s 
selected 
assessment 
professional  services (127).  This  is  notable  in  the 
case  of  architects,  civil  engineers,  tax  advisers, 
lawyers  and  patent  agents (128).  As  regards  retail, 
the regulatory environment has been made stricter 
in recent years with the introduction of a retail tax 
and a complete ban on shops opening on Sundays.  

in 

Poland’s  overall  performance  on  public 
procurement  is  below  the  EU  average:  it 
attracts  too  few  bidders  (especially  for  a  large 
country)  and  the  procedures  can  be  lengthy  and 
complex.  Contrary  to  expectations,  the  public 
procurement law that entered into force in January 
2021  did  not 
immediately  address  the  key 
weaknesses  in  public  procurement  in  Poland (129). 
Therefore,  the  public  procurement  system  still 
suffers  from  the 
low  number  of  companies 
submitting tenders. This results in a high share of 
(see  Table A12.1),  which  has 
single  offers 
remained  at  an  exceptionally  high  level  for  years 
(54%  in  2023  and  above  50%  over  the  last  5 
years).  Data  also  shows  a  decreasing  trend  in 
SMEs interest in public procurement (130): contracts 
with  SME  participation  was  55%  and  SME  bids 
58% in 2022, both rates below EU averages (131).  

(127) COM(2021) 385 final. 

(128)  Regulatory barriers to competition remain slightly above the 
OECD average, as measured by the 2018 edition of the 
OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicator. 

(129)  According to the Polish Public Procurement Office, the value 

of public contracts awarded in 2022 under the Public 
Procurement Act amounted to PLN 274.8 billion, around EUR 
63.8 billion (2021: PLN 184.6 billion), which represented 
8.93% of GDP. 

(130) Report of the President of the Public Procurement Office 

(PPO) for 2022 

(131) Single Market Scoreboard 

62 

 
 
Table A12.1:Industry and the Single Market 

Source: (1) AMECO, (2) Eurostat, (3) Single Market Scoreboard, (4) OECD, (5) COMEXT and Commission calculations, (6) EIB 
Investment Survey, (7) Intrum Payment Report, (8) SAFE survey, (9) EIF SME Access to Finance Index 
* Own Commission calculations for the EU27 average  

63 

POLICY AREAINDICATOR NAME20192020202120222023EU27 average*Net Private investment, level of private capital stock, net of depreciation, % GDP15.64.43.64.14.23.8Net Public investment, level of public capital stock, net of depreciation, % GDP122.11.81.62.91.2Real labour productivity per person in industry (% yoy)24.9-0.31.26.83.2-1.24Cost competitivenessNominal unit labour cost in industry (% yoy)23.32.45.85.316.39.83Single Market integrationEU Trade integration, % (Average intra-EU imports + average intra EU exports)/GDP235.735.139.243.538.342.9Transposition deficit, % of all directives not transposed30.81.81.52.11.60.7Conformity deficit, % of all directives transposed incorrectly31.81.61.61.71.51.1SOLVIT, % resolution rate per country386.790.088.091.380.088.3Number of pending infringement proceedings3314039373125.9RestrictionsEEA Services Trade Restrictiveness Index40.050.050.050.050.050.05Single bids, % of total contractors3515150525428.6Direct Awards, %3667988.1Material Shortage (industry), firms facing constraints, %513.96.920.029.914.917.2Labour Shortage using survey data (industry), firms facing constraints, %569.861.562.563.466.323.3Vacancy rate, % of vacant posts to all available ones (vacant + occupied)21.2250.71.31.30.92.5Concentration in selected raw materials, Import concentration index based on a basket of critical raw materials60.180.180.190.210.240.22Installed renewables electricity capacity, % of total electricity produced20.20.20.20.350Investment obstaclesImpact of regulation on long-term investment, % of firms reporting business regulation as major obstacle734.135.534.332.034.022.2Bankruptcies, Index (2015=100)278.771.850.847.354.7105.6Business registrations, Index (2015=100)2105.092.4103.6108.3106.3120.2Payment gap - corporates B2B, difference in days between offered and actual payment8-1710171615Payment gap - public sector, difference in days between offered and actual payment8-209221716Share of SMEs experiencing late payments in past 6 months, %971.866.365.565.268.448.7EIF Access to finance index - Loan, Composite: SME external financing over last 6 months, index values between 0 and 1100.650.690.650.53-0.49EIF Access to finance index - Equity, Composite: VC/GDP, IPO/GDP, SMEs using equity, index values between 0 and 110 0.100.200.240.09-0.17ECONOMIC STRUCTUREShortagesStrategic dependenciesBUSINESS ENVIRONMENT - SMEsBusiness demographyLate paymentsAccess to financeHEADLINE INDICATORSEconomic StructureSINGLE MARKETCompliancePublic procurement  
 
     
 
ANNEX 13: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 

Poland’s  public  administration  is  essential 
for  the  economy’s  competitiveness  by,  in 
particular,  shaping  the  conditions  for  the 
twin  transitions  and  creating  a  favourable 
business  environment.  Perceived  government 
effectiveness  in  Poland  scores  significantly  below 
the  EU  average  and  continues  to  decrease (Graph 
A13.1).  The  public  finds  the  public  administration 
to  be  complex,  and  lacking  transparency  on  its 
decisions and the use of public money (132). 

Graph A13.1: Government effectiveness 

Average value over 2018-2022 and change over 2018-2022. 
The GDP per head bar shows the mean value of the 
government effectiveness indicator for the group of EU 
countries belonging to the same GDP per head cluster as 
Poland (EU countries are ranked in terms of their GDP per 
head and grouped into three equally sized clusters). 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 

Poland’s  civil  service  faces  challenges  in 
making employment conditions appealing (133). 
The  amendment  of  the  Civil  Service  Act  of  April 
2023 aims to make the recruitment process more 
flexible and adapt the rules on working time. Some 
other  planned  measures 
include  employer 
branding,  improved  training,  strengthening  the 
integrity  culture  and  quality  assurance.  However, 
these  do  not  address  underlying  issues  such  as 
remuneration  or  career  development.  The  decline 
in  gender  parity  in  senior  civil  service  positions 
also continued in 2023. 

improved 

Poland  has 
its  digital  public 
administration.  However,  there  is  still  room  for 
further  progress  in  the  overall  maturity  of  online 
services,  digital  skills  and  e-government  use 
(Graph A13.2). To this end, the Polish recovery and 
resilience  plan  (RRP)  supports  developing  new 
interoperable digital public services and upgrading 
existing ones.  

national 

Poland’s 

Improving 
fiscal 
framework  continues  to  be  a  challenge.  The 
Supreme  Audit  Office  does  not  qualify  as  an 
it  does  not 
independent  fiscal  institution  as 
produce  or  endorse  the  macroeconomic  forecast 
underpinning  budgetary  planning.  Moreover,  the 
country’s  performance  on  the  national  medium-
term budgetary framework and the strength of its 
fiscal rules index are clearly below the EU average. 

are 

weak (134). 

Procedures for assessing and selecting public 
investment projects and carrying out  ex post 
reviews 
Standardised 
methodologies for project assessments are only in 
place  for  EU-financed  investments  but  could  be 
government-funded 
applied 
investments.  Project  selection  procedures  vary 
across  ministries.  There  are  no  standard  criteria 
for  project  selection  and  prioritisation  at  central 
government  level.  Lastly,  ex post  reviews  focused 
on  implementation  policies  and  procedures  are 
often only required for EU-financed investments. 

all  major 

to 

to 

are 

civil, 

independence 

The  overall  performance  of  ordinary  and 
administrative  courts  continues  to  be  stable 
and  concerns  regarding  the  rule  of  law  and 
being 
judicial 
addressed (135).  In  ordinary  courts,  the  estimated 
time  needed 
commercial, 
resolve 
administrative  and  other  cases  in  2022  further 
decreased (from 107 days in 2021 to 100 days in 
2022).  However,  times  are  increasing  in  litigious 
civil and commercial cases in first instance courts. 
Nevertheless, the rate of solving civil, commercial, 
administrative  and  other  cases  continues  to 
increase. The quality of the justice system is good 
level  of 
overall,  and  there 
the 
digitalisation.  Lastly, 
government took action to address concerns about 

in  February  2024, 

is  an  advanced 

(132) European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 526, 2023. 

(133) 2022, Annual Report of the Head of the Civil Service in 

Poland. 

(134) Belu Manescu, C. (2022), ‘New evidence on the quality of 
public investment Management in the EU’, European 
Economy Discussion Paper No 177, European Commission. 

(135) For more details see the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard and 
the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report (forthcoming). 

64 

-0.4-0.20.00.20.40.60.81.01.2PLEU-27GDP perhead clusterChange 2018-2022Average 2018-2022 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Table A13.1:Public administration indicators 

High values denote a good performance, except for indicator # 6. (2) 2023 value. If unavailable, the latest value available is 
shown. (3) Measures the user centricity (including for cross-border services) and transparency of digital public services as well as 
the existence of key enablers for the provision of those services. (4) Defined as the absolute value of the difference between the 
percentage of men and women in senior civil service positions.  
Flags: (b) break in time series; (d) definition differs; (u) low reliability.  
Source: E-government activities of individuals via websites, Eurostat (# 1); E-government benchmark report (# 2); Open data 
maturity report (# 3); Labour Force Survey, Eurostat (# 4, 5, 7); European Institute for Gender Equality (# 6); Fiscal Governance 
Database (# 8, 9); OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (# 10). 

the  rule  of  law  and  judicial  independence  and 
presented  an  Action  Plan  with  concrete  steps. 
Poland  also  implemented measures to  strengthen 
certain  aspects  of  judicial  protection  through  the 
reform  of  the  disciplinary  regime  applicable  to 
judges,  as  required  by  its  RRP.  Against  this 
backdrop,  the  Commission  concluded  on  6  May 

2024  that  there  is  no  longer  a  clear  risk  of  a 
serious  breach  of  the  rule  of  law  in  Poland. 
Consequently,  on  29  May  2024,  the  Commission 
withdrew  its  reasoned  proposal  under  the  Article 
7(1) TEU procedure.  

Graph A13.2: a) Use of public authorities’ websites or apps (left side); b) e-government maturity (centre); 
c) share of individuals with basic or above basic overall digital skills (right side) 

(1) 2023 data. Indicators a and c: % of people who used the internet in the last year. 
Source: Eurostat and e-government benchmark report. 

65 

20%40%60%80%100%Interacting withauthoritiesDownloading  /printing officialformsMaking anappointmentReceive officialcommunications / documentsSubmit onlinetax declarationRequestdocuments,benefitsa) E-government usersPLEU-270%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%PLEU-27c) Digital skills202320210102030405060708090100PLEU-27b) E-government benchmark scoreUser centricityTransparencyKey enablersCross-border services2022PL20192020202120222023EU-27(2)1n/an/an/a62.666.475.02n/a58.054.962.268.775.830.80.91.01.01.00.8467.969.470.0 (b)70.671.652.958.6 (b)7.113.2 (b)18.919.417.969.69.69.612.018.69.273.33.13.2 (b)3.13.01.580.50.40.40.4n/a0.791.11.21.11.1n/a1.410n/an/a1.76n/an/a1.7Medium-term budgetary framework indexIndicator (1)E-government and open government dataShare of internet users within the last year that used a public authority website or appE-government benchmark overall score (3) Open data and portal maturity indexEducational attainment level, adult learning, gender parity and ageingShare of public administration employees with higher education (levels 5-8, %)Participation rate of public administration employees in adult learning (%)Gender parity in senior civil service positions (4)Ratio of 25-49 to 50-64 year olds in NACE sector OPublic financial management Strength of fiscal rules indexEvidence-based policy makingRegulatory governance 
 
   
 
      
 
FAIRNESS 
ANNEX 14: EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES IN LIGHT OF 
THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF SOCIAL RIGHTS 

The  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  is  the 
compass  for  upward  convergence  towards 
better  working  and  living  conditions  in  the 
EU.  This  Annex  provides  an  overview  of  Poland’s 
progress in implementing the Pillar’s 20 principles 
and EU headline and national targets for 2030 on 
employment, skills and poverty reduction. 

Table A14.1:Social Scoreboard for Poland 

Update of 25 April 2024. Members States are categorised 
based on the Social Scoreboard according to a methodology 
agreed with the EMCO and SPC Committees. Please consult 
the Annex of the Joint Employment Report 2024 for details on 
the methodology. 
Source: Eurostat 

The  Polish  labour  market  is  performing  well 
overall,  but  some  challenges  persist.  The 
Polish economy remained weak in the first half of 
2023,  but  there  was  slight  growth  in  2023.  The 
employment rate of people aged 20-64 reached a 
record  high  of  77.9%  in  2023  (vs  75.3%  in  the 
EU),  and  the  unemployment  rate  stood  at  2.8%, 
among the lowest in the EU. At the same time, the 
proportion of temporary contracts (12.3% in 2023 
for  people  aged  15-64)  remains  high.  The  same 
applies to the share of solo self-employed (14.8% 
in  2022).  Despite  limited  progress,  no  impactful 
measures  have  been  taken  by  Poland  in  2023  to 
strengthen consultations with and the involvement 
of social partners in the legislative process, nor to 
improve the overall quality of social dialogue. The 

66 

limited  scope  and  duration  of  consultations  on 
legislative  proposals  has  not  changed,  and 
collective bargaining coverage remains one of the 
lowest in the European Union (136). Poland is one of 
the main EU countries hosting people from Ukraine 
who benefit from temporary protection (22.7% of 
all  beneficiaries  in  October  2023,  or  960 620 
persons).  Based  on  a  survey  published  in  January 
2023, 4 out of 10 of them had found employment, 
their  original 
of  which  51%  work  outside 
profession, and below the level for which they are 
qualified,  and  10%  work 
their  original 
profession, but in a lower position (137). 

in 

Persons  with  disabilities  continue  to  face 
obstacles to labour market participation and 
gender  inequalities  in  employment  persist. 
Despite  a  slight  decrease  in  2022  (from  34.2 
percentage  points  (pps)  in  2021  to  31.3pps),  the 
disability  employment  gap  is  still  well  above  the 
EU average of 21.4 pps. Disability or illness is one 
of  the  main  reasons  for  economic  inactivity  in 
Poland (138).  In  2020,  69%  of  all  working-age 
people  with  a  legally  documented  disability  were 
economically  inactive.  The  share  of  young  people 
with  disabilities  and  who  are  not  in  employment, 
education or training (46%) is one of the highest in 
the  EU.  The  tertiary  education  gap  (age  30-34) 
was 21.4 pps in 2020-21 (vs 11.3 pps in the EU). 
While large regional disparities remain, the labour 
market  participation  of  women  further  improved 
and  their  employment  rate  was  above  the  EU 
average in 2023 (72% vs 70.2%), as was the case 
for the first time in 2021. The gender employment 
gap  also  improved,  dropping  3 pps  since  2020  to 
11.8  pps  in  2023,  but  remains  above  the  EU 
average  of  10.2  pps,  contributing  to  gender  pay 
and pension gaps. The especially low employment 
rate of women aged 55-64 (47% vs 58.1% in the 
EU  in  2023)  is  largely  the  result  of  the  different 
statutory retirement ages for men (65 years)  and 
women  (60  years).  The  participation  rate  of 
children  less  than  3  years  of  age  in  formal 
childcare increased by 6 pps in 2021, mainly as a 
result  of  EU  funding,  but  dropped  by  1.3 pps  in 

(136) EMCO Social Dialogue Review 2023 

(137) Raport: Sytuacja zawodowa uchodźców z Ukrainy w Polsce | 

Totalizator Sportowy - Fundacja 

(138) https://www.oecd.org/cfe/leed/Policy-highlights-Regional-

economic-inactivity-Poland.pdf 

20.33.744.39.111.83.977.92.80.8149.915.916.738.5731.35.615.92.3Critical situationTo watchWeak but improvingGood but to monitorOn averageDynamic labour markets and fair working conditionsEmployment rate(% of the population aged 20-64, 2023)Unemployment rate(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2023)Long term unemployment(% of the active population aged 15-74, 2023)Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per capita growth(index, 2008=100, 2022)Social protection and inclusionAt risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate (% of the total population, 2022)At risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE) rate for children(% of the population aged 0-17, 2022)Impact of social transfers (other than pensions) on poverty reduction(% reduction of AROP, 2022)Disability employment gap (percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2022)Housing cost overburden (% of the total population, 2022)Children aged less than 3 years in formal childcare (% of the under 3-years-old population, 2022)Self-reported unmet need for medical care (% of the population aged 16+, 2022)Better than averageBest performersPolicy areaHeadline indicatorEqual opportunities and access to the labour marketAdult participation in learning (during the last 12 months, excl. guided on the job training, % of the population aged 25-64, 2022)Early leavers from education and training(% of  the population aged 18-24, 2023)Share of individuals who have basic or above basic overall digital skills(% of the population aged 16-74, 2023)Young people not in employment, education or training(% of the population aged 15-29, 2023)Gender employment gap(percentage points, population aged 20-64, 2023)Income quintile ratio (S80/S20, 2022) 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
2022  and  is  much  lower  than  the  EU  average 
(15.9%  vs  35.9%  in  the  EU).  In  Poland,  76%  of 
crèches are private, which results in high costs for 
parents (139).  The  ESF+  and  the  Recovery  and 
Resilience  Facility  (RRF)  support  the  development 
of  quality  standards  for  childcare  and  the  new 
edition of the Maluch Plus programme, which aims 
to create more than 100 000 new childcare places. 
Finally,  the  employment  rate  of  older  workers, 
especially those with low skills, lags behind the EU 
average.  Addressing  all  these  challenges  would 
support  Poland’s  progress  towards  its  national 
employment rate target of 78.3% by 2030.  

Table A14.2:Situation of Poland on 2030 
employment, skills and poverty reduction targets 

1. Adult Education Survey, adults in learning in the past 12 
months, special extraction excl. guided on-the-job training 
2. Change in the number of persons at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion (AROPE), reference year 2019 
Source: Eurostat, DG EMPL. 

Poland  continues  to  experience  labour  and 
skills  shortages.  In  2023,  Polish  employers 
reported  one  of  the  largest  yearly  increases  in 
their hiring outlook (+18%). Still, 66% of them had 
difficulties  in  filling  open  positions (140)  and  75% 
reported  difficulties  in  finding  the  talent  they 
needed (141). In 2023, 44.3% of people aged 16-74 
had at least basic digital skills (vs 56% in the EU). 
The  rate  of  adult  participation  in  learning  (in  the 
previous  12  months)  at  20.3%  in  2022,  was  far 
below  the  EU  average  of  39.5%,  and  is  down 
slightly  (by  0.6pps)  from  2016.  Together  with 
demographic  and  other  challenges,  this  situation 
undermines  Poland’s  potential  to  increase  its 
economic  competitiveness.  The  ESF+  supports 
flexible  upskilling  and  reskilling  opportunities  as 
well  as  investments  in  vocational  education  and 
training (VET). As part of its recovery and resilience 
plan (RRP), Poland has begun to create a network 
of  120  Sectoral  Skills  Centres  to  increase  the 

(139) https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/dzieci-i-

rodzina/dzieci/zlobki-i-kluby-dzieciece-w-2020-roku,3.8.html  

(140) https://go.manpowergroup.com/meos 

(141)https://go.manpowergroup.com/hubfs/Talent%20Shortage%2

in 

supply  of  skills  in  key  sectors  and  increase  the 
quality  of  VET  through  a  greater  engagement  of 
employers 
learning.  The 
the  process  of 
REPowerEU chapter of the RRP introduced a review 
of  the  sectoral  qualification  frameworks  that  will 
improve  the  supply  of  green  skills  in  key  sectors. 
While  these  measures  aim  to  contribute  to 
reaching  the  national  target  of  at  least  51.7%  of 
all  adults  participating  in  training  every  year  by 
2030, additional efforts are still needed. 

Poverty  rates  in  Poland  are  below  the  EU 
average,  but  challenges  remain.  In  2022,  the 
share  of  people  at  risk  of  poverty  or  social 
exclusion  in  the  total  population  (15.9%)  and 
among children (16.7%) were below the respective 
EU  averages  of  21.6%  and  24.7%.  However,  due 
to  persistent  gaps  in  access  to  social  protection, 
the  at-risk-of-poverty  rate  is  much  higher  for 
people  in  non-standard  forms  of  work  such  as 
temporary 
(19.4%),  workers  with 
part-timers 
contracts  (7.8%)  and  the  self-employed  (29.8%), 
compared  to  people  with  permanent  full-time 
contracts  (4.2%).  Older  people  are  at  a  slightly 
higher  risk  of  poverty,  especially  women  (18%  vs 
10.8%  for  older men).  Pensions  currently  perform 
well in terms of their adequacy, with an aggregate 
replacement  ratio  of  0.61  vs  0.58  in  the  EU. 
However,  there  are  challenges  in  the  context  of  a 
rapidly  ageing  population  combined  with  low 
statutory and effective retirement ages, especially 
for  women.  Additional  social  policies  and  actions 
are needed to reach the national target of at least 
1.5 million fewer people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion by 2030. 

care 

(LTC) 

system 

long-term 

The 
is 
inadequate  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  ageing 
population.  Quality  and  access  to  professional 
LTC  remains  very  limited,  while  the  share  of  the 
population  over  65  years  of  age  is  expected  to 
reach  21.9%  in  2030  and  29.1%  in  2050.  The 
share  in  need  of  LTC  already  exceeds  the  EU 
average  (34.8%  vs  26.6%  in  the  EU  in  2019). 
There is a high level of unmet needs for LTC, with 
46.7%  of  people  over  65  reporting  a  lack  of 
assistance in personal care or household activities. 
Poland  is  well  below  the  EU  average  in  providing 
public  LTC  services  (3.4%  vs  5.8%  in  the  EU  in 
2019) (142) and care responsibilities fall mainly on 
families. The public LTC system is underdeveloped 
and  fragmented,  while  spending  is  among  the 

02022/MPG_2022_TS_Infographic-Poland.pdf  

(142) Ageing Report 2021, share of 65+ in public home care. 

67 

IndicatorsLatest dataTrend            (2016-2023)2030 targetEU target 77.9(2023)20.3(2022)-702(2022)Poverty reduction2 (thousands)-1,500-15,000Employment (%)78.378Adult learning1 (%)51.760 
 
   
 
 
 
in 

lowest  in  the  EU  (0.5%  vs  1.7%  of  GDP  in  EU  in 
2022) (143). There are challenges in relation to the 
their  working 
workforce 
the  sector  and 
conditions.  The  ESF+  supports  measures 
to 
deinstitutionalise  social  and  medical  LTC,  and 
provides  support  for  LTC  staff,  for  example 
trainings 
their 
supervision 
effectiveness, prevention of work-related diseases 
and  burnout.  The  RRP  supports  a  strategic  review 
of LTC to identify the priorities for reform, and to 
develop a law to implement the reforms. 

increasing 

and 

(143) Ageing Report 2024, Public LTC expenditure %GDP 

68 

 
 
ANNEX 15: EDUCATION AND TRAINING 

This  Annex  outlines  the  main  challenges  of 
Poland’s education and training system based 
on  the  2023  Education  and  Training  Monitor  and 
the  2022  OECD  Programme  for  International 
Student Assessment (PISA) results (144). 

Performance  in  basic  skills  decreased  in 
Poland  more  than  the  EU  average,  moving 
away  from  the  EU  target.  The  proportion  of 
students  not  meeting  minimum  proficiency  levels 
in  all  three  areas  of  basic  skills in the  2022  PISA 
survey increased to 23% in mathematics, 22.2% in 
reading  and  18.6%  in  science  (Graph  A15.1).  The 
underachievement  rate  grew  more  than  the  EU 
average  since  2018:  in  mathematics  by  8.3 pps 
(EU  6.6 pps),  in  reading  by  7.5 pps  (EU  3.7 pps), 
and  in  science  by  4.8 pps  (EU  2 pps).  The  school 
system  reorganisation  launched  in  2017  (phasing 
out  lower-secondary  schools)  and  one  of  the 
longest  periods  (26  weeks)  of  school  closures  in 
the  EU  due  to  COVID-19  are  likely  to  have 
contributed to the worsening of results (145). 

Graph A15.1: Underachievement rates by field, 
PISA 2012, 2018 and 2022 

limiting Poland’s future productivity and innovation 
capacity. 

Teacher shortages  have  become more acute, 
and the teaching profession is not attractive 
to  young  graduates.  National  statistics (146) 
confirm  shortages  of  teachers  across  Poland, 
mainly due to lack of candidates. The proportion of 
primary  and  secondary  school  teachers  aged  25-
34 decreased from 18.8% in 2015 (EU 16.6%) to 
12%  in  2021  (EU  15.8%) (147).  In  PISA  2022, 
headteachers  reported  a  high  increase  of  teacher 
shortages:  47.5%  of  15-year-olds  attended 
schools  whose  capacity  to  provide  instruction 
could  be  hindered  by  lack  of  teaching  staff 
compared  to  2.6%  in  2018.  The  shortages  could 
also  contribute  to  students’  poorer  results.  From 
January  2024,  Poland  introduced  a  30%  increase 
in  teacher  salaries  at  all  levels  of  education,  and 
33%  for  new  teachers.  To  support  this  cost,  the 
central educational subsidy has been increased by 
36.2%  over  2023  levels.  Further  measures  are 
likely needed to improve the attractiveness of the 
teaching profession, and the quality and relevance 
of teacher education in line with evolving students’ 
needs. 

Equity  in  education  worsened,  and  there  are 
high  inequalities  between  different  school 
types.  The  increase  in  the  proportion  of  students 
underachieving  in  mathematics  was  much  higher 
among  disadvantaged  students  (13.5 pps)  than 
among  advantaged  students  (2.8 pps).  Thus,  the 
socio-economic  gap  widened  by  10.6 pps  since 
2018,  with  39.1%  of  disadvantaged  students 
lacking  basic  mathematics  skills.  Following  the 
school system reorganisation (above), the common 
general education was reduced from 9 to 8 years, 
while  research  shows  that  extending  general 
education  benefits  disadvantaged  students.  The 
highest proportion of students underperforming in 
basic skills is clustered in vocational  schools level 
I: 66% in mathematics, 65% in reading, and 55% 
in science. Planned reforms of the core curricula to 
enhance  key  competences  may  help  reduce 
inequalities in  the  future  if  matched  by evidence-
based 
effective 
to 
implementation,  and  adequate 
teachers.  Enhancing  learning  for  sustainability  in 

preparation, 

evaluation, 

support 

Source: OECD (2023). 

the  overloaded  knowledge-
Additionally, 
implemented  after 
based  core  curricula 
2016,  and  hasty  implementation  of  the 
reorganisation,  which  created  challenges 
(such  as  overcrowded  schools),  hindered 
learning  and  teaching.  The  decreased  basic 
skills  are  a  barrier  for  Poland’s  competitiveness. 
The  decreased  proportion  of 
top-performing 
students  (below  10%)  in  all  three  areas  risks 

(144) OECD (2023), PISA 2022 Results (Volumes I and II). 

https://doi.org/10.1787/19963777. 

(145) IBE (2023). Umiejętności polskich piętnastolatków. 

https://ibe.edu.pl/images/badania/PISA2022/PISA2022_najw
azniejsze_wyniki_badania.pdf 

(146) MRPiPS (2024) https://barometrzawodow.pl//forecast-card-

zip/2024/report_pl/raport_ogolnopolski_2024.pdf. 

(147) Eurostat, UOE, [educ_uoe_perp01]. 

69 

05101520253035PLEUPLEUPLEUMathematicsReadingScience%2012201820222030 EU target 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table A15.1:EU-level targets and other contextual indicators under the European Education Area 
strategic framework 

Notes: b = break in time series; d = definition differs; e = estimated; p = provisional; u = low reliability; : = data not available. 
Source: 1,3,4,5,7,8,9,10,12=Eurostat; 11= Eurostat, Adult Education Survey; 2,6=OECD, PISA. 

schools (148), (149),  and  meaningful  embedding  of 
ICT  in  education  are  needed  for  the  green  and 
digital transitions. 

Participation  in  early  childhood  education 
and care has stagnated. In 2021, the rate was 
90.4%,  returning  to  the  2019  level  (90.3%).  The 
low  participation  of  3-year-olds  (76.2%)  may 
further affect disadvantaged children. 

Although  early  school  leaving  remains  low 
(3.7%),  integrating  high  numbers  of  migrant 
children  and  inclusive  education  remain  a 
challenge. As of February 2024, around 180 000 
displaced  children  from  Ukraine  were  enrolled  in 
kindergartens and schools (150); an estimated 53% 
of  school-aged  children  from  Ukraine  remain 
outside the Polish schooling system, and systemic 

support  measures  are  needed (151), (152).  While 
Poland  fosters  inclusive  measures,  the  disability 
gap  in  education  remains  also  wide  (see  Annex 
14).  A  relevant  strategy  could  enable  better 
understanding  of  the  objectives,  stakeholders’ 
involvement, and progress monitoring. 

Tertiary  educational  attainment  rate  has 
increased,  but  quality  challenges  persist.  In 
2023,  the  proportion  of  people  aged  25-34 
holding  a  tertiary  diploma  increased  significantly 
(by  4.6  pps)  since  2022,  exceeding  the  EU-level 
target and breaking the recent declining trend. The 
gender  gap  in  favour  of  women  (19.0  pps), 
however,  remains  far  above  the  EU  average.  In 
2021,  the  proportions  of  entrants  in  science, 
technology,  engineering  and  mathematics  at 
20.5%,  and  at  3.3%  in  ICT,  were  below  the  EU 
respectively).  An 
average 

(28.1%  and  4.9% 

(148) Batorczak & Klimska, 2020. DOI:10.21697/seb.2020.18.2.02  

(151) CEO, 2024. https://ceo.org.pl/dzieci-uchodzcze-w-polskich-

(149) UNGCN Poland https://edukacjaklimatyczna.org.pl/raport-

szkolach-co-mowia-nowe-dane/ 

podsumowujacy-2022/  

(152) NIK, 2024. https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/ksztalcenie-

(150) Info of the Ministry of National Education. 

dzieci-cudzoziemcow.html  

70 

96%76.4%2013,d91.8%201388.2%e92.2%90.4%202192.5%2021,dReading< 15%10.6% 18.0%14.7% 22.5%22.2%202226.2%2022Mathematics< 15%14.4% 22.1%14.7%22.9%23.0%202229.5%2022Science< 15%9.0% 16.8%13.8%22.3%18.6%202224.2%2022< 9 %5.7% 12.6%4.8%b10.5%3.7%9.5%Men7.8%14.5%5.8%b12.1%4.9%11.3%Women3.5%10.6%3.7%b8.7%2.4%7.7%Cities4.3%b11.2%3.6%b9.4%3.2%8.6%Rural areas6.9%b14.0%5.3%b11.0%3.4%9.9%5By country of birthNative5.7% 11.3%4.8%b9.2%3.6%8.2%EU-born:u26.2%:bu22.4%:u21.0%Non EU-born:u30.1%:bu23.0%:u21.6%6Socio-economic gap (percentage points)22.7:20.729.531.3202237.220227Exposure of VET graduates to work-based learning≥ 60% (2025) ::: :58.4% 64.5%45%40.8%34.1%43.5%38.7%46.3%43.1%Men32.1%29.1%33.8%33.3%37.0%37.6%Women49.9%39.2%53.7%44.2%56.0%48.8%Cities54.4%b43.5%59.8%49.0%61.3%53.3%Rural areas28.7%b24.8%30.4%27.7%33.5%31.7%Native40.8%35.4%43.3%39.7%45.8%44.2%EU-born:u29.3%:u36.7%:u40.2%Non EU-born:u24.2%68.3%31.0%58.2%37.1%11Participation in adult learning (age 25-64)≥ 47% (2025) ::20.9%201637.4%201620.3%202239.5%202210.4%201322.7%201316.6%23.8%21.3%202124.5%2021Tertiary educational attainment (age 25-34)8Total8By gender9By degree of urbanisation10By country of birth12Share of school teachers (ISCED 1-3) who are 55 years or over1Participation in early childhood education (age 3+)2Low-achieving 15-year-olds in:Early leavers from education and training(age 18-24)3Total3By gender4By degree of urbanisation201220182023IndicatorTargetPolandEU-27PolandEU-27PolandEU-27 
 
 
 
  
 
academic  career 
is  not  attractive  to  young 
graduates:  academic  staff  aged  25-34  made  up 
only  14.7%  of  the  total  in  2021  (EU  20.9%). 
Improving  the  quality  and  relevance  of  higher 
education  in  Poland  are  significant  challenges. 
While  participation  in  VET  is  high,  it  remains 
limited in lifelong learning (see Annex 14). 

71 

 
ANNEX 16: HEALTH AND HEALTH SYSTEMS 

A  healthy  population  and  an  effective, 
accessible  and  resilient  health  system  are 
prerequisites  for  a sustainable  economy and 
society.  This  Annex  provides  a  snapshot  of 
population health and the health system in Poland. 

Life  expectancy  at  birth  in  Poland  has  been 
lower than in the EU overall and remained so 
both  before  and  during  the  COVID-19 
pandemic.  There  was  a  significant  drop  in  life 
expectancy in Poland between 2019 and 2021 due 
to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  As  mortality  from 
COVID-19 fell in 2022 compared to 2021 (153), life 
expectancy  increased  again,  although  not  to  pre-
pandemic  levels.  Both  preventable  and  treatable 
mortality rates are higher in Poland than in the EU 
in 
overall.  At 
economically active age groups, as a share of total 
mortality  and  relative  to  the  workforce  size,  is 
among the highest in the EU. The rate of mortality 
from  treatable  causes  has  stagnated  since  2014, 
in  2020  and  2021. 
and  even 
Behavioural 
the  Polish 
population, such as tobacco smoking, poor diet and 
consequent  obesity,  and  alcohol  consumption,  are 
key drivers of preventable mortality rates. In 2021, 
diseases of the circulatory system (‘cardiovascular 
diseases’)  and  cancer  were  the  main  causes  of 
death, followed by COVID-19. 

increased 
risk 

time,  mortality 

factors  among 

same 

the 

data  suggest  that  in  2022  total  health  spending 
increased to 6.7% of GDP. Around one third of the 
total  health  expenditure  in  2021  was  spent  on 
inpatient  care,  followed  by  outpatient  care  and 
pharmaceuticals.  Related  to  this,  in  2022,  there 
was an increase of 4.1% in outpatient medical and 
dental  consultations  compared  to  the  previous 
year.  Public  health  spending  as  a  proportion  of 
total  health  spending  (72.5%  in  2021)  is  lower 
than  the  EU  average  (81.1%).  However,  according 
to  provisional  data  in  2022  this  increased  to 
74.9%  against  an  average  of  70.9%  for  the 
previous 10 years. Consequently, the share of out-
of-pocket  payments  for  healthcare  in  Poland 
(19.9% in 2021) is higher than in the EU average 
(14.5%),  although,  according  to  provisional  data 
for  2022,  this  decreased  to  below  18%.  Public 
spending  on  health  is  projected  to  increase  by 
1.1 percentage  points  (pps)  of  GDP  by  2070 
(compared  to  0.6 pps  for  the  EU  overall)  due  to 
demographic pressures (see Graph 16.2 and Annex 
21). 

Graph A16.2: Projected increase in public 
expenditure on healthcare over 2024-2070 

Graph A16.1: Life expectancy at birth, years 

Baseline scenario 
Source: European Commission / EPC (2024) 

Spending  on  prevention  decreased,  contrary 
to  the  trend  observed  in  most  Member 
States.  Poland  is  one  of  the  few  EU  countries  in 
which  spending  on  preventive  care  as  a  share  of 
total  healthcare  expenditure  fell  in  2019  (2.1%), 
2020 (1.9%) and 2021 (2.1%) against an average 
of  2.6%  for  the  previous  5 years.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  figure  for  the  EU  overall  more  than 
doubled  between  2019  and  2021,  from  2.9%  to 
6.0%. Proportionally, budget shares for prevention 
across  the  EU  increased  most  for  emergency 
response,  disease  detection  and  immunisation 
programmes. Another measure to safeguard public 
the  use  of 
health 
antimicrobials.  The  situation 
in  Poland  had 
improved  significantly,  with  daily  consumption  in 
2021 falling to 85% of the 2019 figure. However, 

rationalisation  of 

is 

Source: Eurostat 

Health spending  relative  to  GDP  in  Poland is 
among the lowest in the EU. Health expenditure 
per  capita  (adjusted  for  differences  in  purchasing 
power) is  less  than  half the  EU  average.  In  2021, 
total  health  spending  amounted  to  6.4%  of  GDP, 
compared to 10.9% for the EU overall. Provisional 

(153) Based on data provided directly by Member States to the 

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, under 
the European Surveillance System. 

72 

77.877.778.076.575.577.280.981.081.380.480.180.6201720182019202020212022PolandEU6.64.40.61.102468EUPoland% of GDP20242070increase 
 
   
 
   
 
Table A16.1:Key health indicators 

Note: The EU average is weighted for all indicators except for doctors and nurses per 1 000 population, for which the EU simple 
average is used. Doctors’ density data refer to practising doctors in all countries except Greece, Portugal (licensed to practise) and 
Slovakia (professionally active). Nurses’ density data refer to practising nurses in all countries except Ireland, France, Portugal, 
Slovakia (professionally active) and Greece (hospital only). 
Source: Eurostat Database; except: * OECD, ** Joint Questionnaire on non-monetary healthcare statistics, *** ECDC, **** Council 
Recommendation on stepping up EU actions to combat antimicrobial resistance in a One Health approach. 

in 2022 it went back to the 2019 levels and was 
well  above  the  EU  average.  According  to  the 
Council  Recommendation  on  stepping  up  EU 
actions  to  combat  antimicrobial  resistance  in  a 
One  Health  approach,  Poland  is  supposed,  by 
2030,  to  reduce  total  consumption  of  antibiotics, 
in  community  and  hospital  settings  combined,  by 
27% from the 2019 level. 

in 

of 

number 

graduates 

Although  still  below  the  EU  average,  the 
density of doctors and nurses in Poland, and 
these 
the 
professions,  have  been  slowly  increasing.  In 
2021,  the  numbers  of  practising  doctors  and 
nurses  increased  in  absolute  terms  by  3 829  and 
3 610  respectively,  compared  to  the  previous 
year (154).  However,  according  to  the  Statistics 
Poland (155), in 2022 the proportion of doctors over 
50  years  old  increased  to  56%  from  55%  the 
previous  year,  and  the  share  of  nurses  over  50 
increased  to  66%,  from  61%  the  previous  year. 
This 
long-term 
accessibility of health services. 

raises  concerns  about 

the 

EU  funds  support  substantial investments  in 
healthcare  in  Poland.  Historically,  the  health 
system  in  Poland  has  been  underfunded.  This  is 
reflected  in  the  low  availability  of  key  diagnostic 
(medical imaging) technology. Poland is among the 
EU  countries 
that  allocated  a  considerable 
proportion  of  their  recovery  and  resilience  plan 
(RRP)  to  investment  in  health.  Under  its  RRP, 
loans  for 
Poland 

is  using  both  grants  and 

(154) Statistics | Eurostat (europa.eu) 

The 

reform 

investment 
total  of 
in  health,  worth  a 
EUR 4.2 billion (7% of the total RRP budget). Under 
the  grant  component  of  the  RRP,  Poland  has 
committed to three reforms (with four subsequent 
investments). 
introduces 
first 
comprehensive  measures  to  restructure  public 
hospitals.  The  second  reform  improves  the  match 
between  needs  and  availability  of  medical 
professionals in Poland. The third reform improves 
the quality and efficiency of the healthcare system 
by  supporting  research  and  development  in  the 
fields  of  medicine  and  health.  Under  the  loan 
component,  Poland  is  proposing  a  reform  with  a 
subsequent 
investment).  The  reform  aims  to 
introduce  a  regulatory  framework  to  help  attract 
of  medicines  and  active 
the 
pharmaceutical substances to Poland and increase 
output. 

production 

Complementary  investments  in  healthcare, 
of  around  EUR 2.6  billion,  are  planned  under 
the  cohesion  policy  funds  in  2021-2027. 
Poland will invest around EUR 2.15 billion from the 
European  Regional  Development  Fund  in  health 
infrastructure,  health  equipment,  mobile  health 
assets and digitalisation of healthcare. Poland will 
also  deploy  EUR 426 million  from  the  European 
Social  Fund  Plus  to  improve  the  accessibility, 
effectiveness  and 
the  health 
system (156). 

resilience  of 

(155) Statistics Poland / Topics / Health / Health / Health and 

(156) The EU cohesion policy data reflect the status as of 13 May 

health care in 2021 

2024. 

73 

20182019202020212022EU average (latest year) Treatable mortality per 100 000 population (mortality avoidable through optimal quality healthcare)133,1133,7144,2145,9NA93.3 (2021)Cancer mortality per 100 000 population291,2283,4279,7259,9NA235.4 (2021)Current expenditure on health, % GDP 6,36,56,56,46,710.9 (2021)Public share of health expenditure, % of current health expenditure71,571,872,372,5NA81.1 (2021)Spending on prevention, % of current health expenditure 2,32,11,92,1NA6.0 (2021)Available hospital beds per 100 000 population654617619627NA525 (2021)Doctors per 1 000 population2,43,33,33,4NA4.1 (2021)*Nurses per 1 000 population5,15,65,65,7NA7.9 (2021)Total consumption of antibacterials for systemic use, daily defined dose per       1 000 inhabitants per day ***24,423,618,520,223,619.4 (2022) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
ANNEX 17: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AT REGIONAL LEVEL 

Annex 17 showcases the economic and social 
regional  dynamics  in  Poland.  It  provides  an 
analysis  of  economic,  social  and 
territorial 
cohesion  in  the  Polish  regions  and  assesses 
investment  and  subnational  reform 
emerging 
social 
needs 
development and competitiveness in the country. 

foster  economic  growth, 

to 

of 
Overview 
performance at regional level 

economic 

and 

social 

Map A17.1:  GDP per capita (PPS) in Poland, by 
NUTS-2 region 

Source: Eurostat, DG REGIO elaboration 

an 

ongoing 

Since  its  accession  to  the  EU,  Poland  has 
experienced 
economic 
convergence  towards  the  EU  average.  The 
average  annual  real  GDP  growth  per  capita  was 
higher  than  in  the  EU  (1.44%)  for  all  Polish 
regions.  Importantly,  no  Polish  regions  were  in  a 
development trap during in 2003-2021 (157). 

(157) Region is classified to be in a development trap if it has 
experienced an extended period (>16 years) of below-
average growth in GDP, productivity and employment during 
2003-2021. 

74 

capital 

developed (158) 

However,  regional  disparities  in  GDP  per 
capita  have  continued  to  widen  for  the  past 
decade.  Disparities  between  the  eastern  regions 
and  the  rest  of  the  country  persist.  In  2022,  the 
region 
most 
Warszawski  Stołeczny  had  a  GDP  per  capita  (in 
PPS)  corresponding  to  162%  of  the  EU  average. 
The  other  regions  lag  behind,  with  a  GDP  per 
capita  ranging  from  84-89%  (Wielkopolskie  and 
Dolnośląskie  thanks  to  their  capital  cities)  to  a 
mere  54-59%  in  the  5  least  developed  eastern 
regions 
(Lubelskie,  Podkarpackie,  Warmińsko-
Mazurskie, Świętokrzyskie and Podlaskie) (Figure1). 

city 

Disparities  in  GDP  per  capita  were  mainly 
driven  by  variations  in  labour  productivity 
the  country.  Labour  productivity, 
across 
measured  as  gross  value  added  per  person 
employed,  stood  at  84%  of  the  EU  average  (in 
PPS)  in  2022.  The  capital  city  region  had  a 
significantly  higher  productivity  level  (139.7%) 
while  all  other  regions  fell  below  the  EU  average. 
(Lubelskie, 
The 
Świętokrzyskie, 
and  Warmińsko-
Mazurskie) bordering Belarus and Ukraine had the 
lowest productivity levels (58-63.9%).  

developed 

Podlaskie 

regions 

least 

The  employment  is  relatively  low,  and  the 
workforce  is  low  skilled  in  less  developed, 
mostly  post-industrial  or  non-rural  regions 
with a large unproductive agricultural sector 
defining a urban – non-urban divide. In 2023, 
the  share  of  people  (aged  25-64)  with  tertiary 
educational attainment reached 62% in the capital 
city region, which was well  above the EU  average 
(35.1%),  but  in  most  other  regions  it  remains 
below.  One  region  (Łódzkie) (159)  is  in  a  talent 
development trap and several other regions are at 
risk  of  falling  into  the  same  category  of  regions 
experiencing  the  effects  of  young  people  leaving 
their non-urban regions (160). 

(158) The terms ‘Less/least developed’, ‘more/most developed’ 
refer to regions compared to other regions in this country. 
These terms should not be confused with the classification 
for fund eligibility criteria.   

(159) Łódzkie is part of the 11 pilot regions which receives expert 

support in 2024 under Pillar 1 of the talent booster 
mechanism (Inforegio - Talent Booster Mechanism 
(europa.eu)) to develop strategic thinking and actionable 
frameworks to address the challenges they face when it 
comes to attracting, developing and retaining talent. 

(160) Communication from the Commission to the European 

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map A17.2:  Poland, Regional Competitiveness 
Index, 2022 edition 

Map A17.3:  Share of RES in electricity production 
in 2022 

Source: STRATEG system 

Investment in R&D (1.4% vs 2.3% in the EU) 
was  low  and  concentrated  in  the  capital 
region.  In  2021,  only Małopolskie  and the  capital 
city  region,  allocated  2.5-2.7%  of  GDP  to  R&D. 
However, 
(Lubuskie, 
in  several  other  regions 
Mazowiecki  Regionalny  and  Świętokrzyskie), 
expenditure on R&D was 0.5% of GDP or lower.  

Greenhouse  gas  emissions  was  one  of  the 
highest  in  the  EU,  with  around  72%  of 
electricity generated from coal. Polish regions 
have  increased  greenhouse  gas  emissions  since 
1990 (163).  Industrial  transformation  and  clean 
energy transition remains a challenge. The Silesian 
economy particularly relies on mining and carbon-
intensive  industries  as  the  coal  mining  industry 
employs 76 200 workers or 10% of all workers in 
the  corporate  sector.  Initially,  installed  capacities 
for  renewable  energy  sources  (RES)  doubled 
between  2012  and  2016,  in  particular  for  wind, 
but as of 2016, large scale wind RES investments 
slowed  down  due  to  building  permits  restrictions. 
That  said,  Poland  has  experienced  solar  energy 
boom  with  some  regions,  such  as  Lubelskie  and 
Podkarpackie  regions  quickly  catching  up,  thanks 
to  substantial  investments  from  EU  cohesion 
policy funding (164). 

Air  quality  remains  a  major  challenge  in 
Poland  especially  in  southern  and  central 
regions. Polish cities are among the most polluted 
in Europe. According to the European Environment 
Agency,  each  year  as  many  as  44 000  Poles  are 
estimated  to  die  prematurely  from  conditions 

Source: DG REGIO, JRC 

are 

All regions are ranked below the EU average 
in  terms  of  competitiveness  in  2022 (161), 
except  for  the  capital  city  region  (Figure  2). 
Next  to  that,  regional  disparities  in  innovation 
performance 
the 
evident 
country (162).  Notably,  only  two  regions  were 
classed  as  moderate  innovators  (the  capital  city 
region and Małopolskie) while all the other regions 
were classed as emerging innovators. A recent rise 
in  energy  prices  as  well  as  rising  labour  costs 
created additional pressure on the competitiveness 
of businesses, particularly SMEs.  

throughout 

Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Harnessing 
talent in Europe’s regions, COM(2023) 32 final EUR-Lex - 
52023DC0032 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu) 

(161) 2022 Regional Competitiveness Index, EU-27 = 100. 

(163) 8th Cohesion Report, European Commission, 2022.  

(162) Regional Innovation Scoreboard: 

https://ec.europa.eu/assets/rtd/ris/2023/ec_rtd_ris-regional-
profiles-poland.pdf  

(164) “Rola dofinansowań w fotowoltaicznym boomie Dodatkowy 
materiał do raportu Rynek Fotowoltaiki w Polsce 2022”, 
Instytut Energetyki Odnawialnej, Warsaw June 2022. 

75 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A17.1:Selected indicators at regional level in Poland 

(1) The data on the share on RES in electricity production as regards Mazowiecki refers to NUTS 1 makroregion Województwo 
Mazowieckie (Warszawski Stołeczny i Mazowiecki Regionalny). 
Source: Eurostat, EDGAR database; STRATEG system 

linked  to  poor  air  quality.  This  pollution  comes 
mainly  from  low  stack  furnaces  in  single  family 
houses. In  2018,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European  Union  held  that Poland  breached  EU  air 
pollution  directives.  Buildings  often  have 
low 
technical  standards  and  approximately  70%  of 
houses  are  poorly  insulated.  10.5%  of  Poles  are 
at-risk-of-energy  poverty  as  they  are  unable  to 
keep their home sufficiently warm.  

Investments  in  water  supply  and  sewage 
treatment,  which  are  crucial  for  climate 
adaptation,  have  significantly  increased  in 
last  decade  with  support  of  EU 
the 
funding (165),  driven  by  the  need  to  comply 
with EU directives. Despite this, Poland still has 
to  comply  with  the  Urban  Wastewater  Treatment 
Directive  (the  deadline  for  compliance  was  on 
31 December 2015).  An 
is 
ongoing (166). 

infringement  case 

(165) As of 14 December 2023, Additional population served by 
improved wastewater treatment reaches 1.6 million 
population equivalent but upon the closure of the 
programmes 2014-2020, the result is expected to exceed 
3.5 million population equivalent. 

(166) On 9 February 2022, the European Commission referred this 
case to the Court of Justice of the European Union against 
Poland (case number INFR (2017)2183) in connection with 
the failure to comply with the directive concerning the 
treatment of urban wastewater (Directive 91/271/EEC). 

Demographic  changes  in  Poland  linked  to  a 
lower  birth  rate,  an  ageing  population  and 
migration  linked  to  the  Russian  war  of 
aggression  on  Ukraine  put  considerable 
strain  on  the  economy  and  public  services, 
with  some  regions  experiencing  heightened 
levels  of  material  and  social  deprivation. 
While  the  integration  of  displaced  Ukrainians  has 
benefited the labour market, numerous challenges 
persist.  The  population  has  increased  sharply  in 
the capital city region (+7.1 per 1 000 inhabitants) 
and  moderately  in  developed  regions,  including 
Wielkopolskie, Małopolskie and Pomorskie (+1.1 to 
+2.9  per  1  000  inhabitants).  In  contrast,  other 
regions  registered  a  fall  in  population,  notably 
Świętokrzyskie,  Łódzkie,  Lubelskie  and  Opolskie 
observed at least a 4.5% drop in their population.  

Due  to  the  influx  of  Ukrainian  refugees,  the 
education  system  was  unevenly  overloaded. 
In  the  2022/23  school  year,  over  192  000  of  the 
estimated 500 000 displaced Ukrainian children in 
Poland  were  enrolled  in  schools  and  preschools, 
significantly  increasing  total  pupil  numbers (167). 
The  government  has  heavily  relied  on  support 
from civic society organisations to meet the needs 
of Ukrainian refugees.  

(167) Union of Polish Cities (2022), Urban hospitality: 

unprecedented growth, challenges and opportunities. 

76 

Region nameGDP per head (purchasing power standard/PPS)GDP per head growthProductivity (GVA, PPS) per person employedPopulation aged 25-64 with tertiary educational attainmentRegional competitivenessR&D expenditureShare of RES in electricity production (1)Total population aged >65Population growthEU27 = 1002022Average % change on the preceding year 2013-2022EU27 = 1002022% of population aged 25-64 2023EU27 = 1002022% of GDP2021% of total electricty production   2022% of total population2023Average annual change per 1000 residents2013-2021European Union (27 MS)1001.4410035.11002.3NA21.31.9Polska793.988437.988.81.42119.9-1.2Małopolskie713.8975.140.594.32.520.618.31.9Śląskie834.1589.636.696.919.521-3.7Wielkopolskie843.9983.133.684.80.952.218.41.1Zachodniopomorskie653.6872.436.882.10.662.621.2-2.8Lubuskie653.587231.182.10.335.720.1-2.4Dolnośląskie893.8597.239.789.11.410.320.8-1.1Opolskie633.3971.730.183.50.65.621-4.5Kujawsko-pomorskie653.8569.731.182.1154.620.1-2.5Warmińsko-mazurskie553.6962.531.275.81.295.619.6-3.6Pomorskie803.8185.142.490.41.863.918.42.9Łódzkie753.7175.633.586.11.16.322-4.8Świętokrzyskie553.2458.933.776.70.520.822.5-5.7Lubelskie543.6658.534791.151.621.1-4.7Podkarpackie543.8863.832.982.71.349.519.3-1Podlaskie593.9663.93678.80.980.320.1-3.2Warszawski stołeczny1623.82139.762118.82.7NA18.37.1Mazowieckie733.887.732.280.30.47.319.5-3.6 
 
 
 
  
 
The  recent  changes  to  the  tax  system  have 
led  to  fragmentation  in  the  system  of  local 
government  finances.  Predictability  of 
the 
system has been affected by a growing role of ad 
hoc financing in response to a deterioration in the 
local  governments.  The 
financial  situation  of 
system  of  compensating  for  revenue 
losses 
related to tax reform has proven to be inadequate. 
Spending  efficiency  can  be  impacted  by  the 
concentration of transfers to the local government 
units  at  the  end  of  the  year  and  the  surge  in 
investment  funds  allocated  to  small  rural  and 
limited 
urban-rural 
implementation capacity. 

municipalities 

with 

Investment  and  subnational  reform  needs 
ahead 

comply  with 
the  Urban  Wastewater 
Treatment Directive  (UWWTD).  The investment 
projects  aim 
ensure  adequate  urban 
wastewater  collection  and  treatment  in  order  to 
comply with the UWWTD. It is therefore crucial to 
ensure financing of climate adaptation solutions at 
all levels.  

to 

A pressing area is the provision of funding to 
ensure  access  to  basic  public  services  and 
education  integration  strategies  in  response 
to  the  refugee 
integration  of 
Ukrainian  refugees  into  the  Polish  social  system 
requires a wide range of assistance. The increased 
demand  for  educational 
resources  such  as 
classroom  space  to  teaching  personnel,  calls  for 
substantial investments.  

influx.  The 

business-science 

Increasing  innovation  and  competitiveness 
remains  a  high  priority  for  cohesion  policy 
investments.  It  is  key  to  strengthen  technology 
transfer,  R&D&I  activities  of  businesses,  increase 
the 
and 
commercialisation  of  R&D&I  results  as  well  as  to 
reinforce  the  participation  in  European  research 
and 
and 
networks, 
programmes, in particular in less developed Polish 
regions.  It  is  crucial  to  invest  in  the  development 
of skills in the smart specialisation sectors and in 
innovative business models.  

cooperation 

innovation 

platforms 

support 

plan 
energy 

Both  cohesion  policy  programmes  and  the 
include 
resilience 
recovery  and 
substantial 
and 
to 
environment  measures.  Accelerating  the  clean 
energy  transition  remains  a  crucial  objective  for 
the implementation of the cohesion policy funds in 
the  2021-27  programming  period.  Shifting  from 
coal,  speeding  up  green  investments  aiming  to 
boost clean energy production as well as net-zero 
technologies  manufacturing  and  reduce  energy 
consumption,  remain  a  high  priority.  The  adverse 
effects  of  a  fast  phasing  out  of  coal  combustion 
and  extraction  need  to  be  mitigated  at  regional 
level  by  supporting  the  most  affected  territories 
and  workers.  These  efforts  will  be  more  effective 
when  combined  with  regional  and  local  measures 
supporting  energy  poor  households.  Poland  could 
also  benefit  from  the  opportunities  under  the 
Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform  to 
in  critical  technologies  to 
boost 
support industry transformation. 

investments 

Investment  in  infrastructure  is  needed  in 
over  1  000  agglomerations  which  do  not 

77 

in 

Investment 

A  key  priority  is  to  improve  the  workforce's 
capacity  in  green  and  digital  sectors.  This 
includes  reskilling  workers  currently  employed  in 
the coal mining industry to meet the emerging job 
renewable  and  climate-neutral 
demands 
industries. 
education 
infrastructure  is  also  crucial  to  develop  skills 
tailored  for  green  jobs.  Promoting  upskilling  and 
reskilling  in  digital  skills is  essential  to  bridge  the 
gap  between  the  demand  for  and  the  supply  of 
digitally-skilled  professionals.  Improving  people's 
digital  skills  can  positively  impact  sectors  like 
healthcare,  which 
in  urgent  need  of 
modernisation to meet people's needs.  

local 

in 

is 

To  facilitate  these  investments,  together 
with  the  reform  areas  identified  in  the 
recovery  and  resilience  plan,  there  is  a 
specific  need  to  address  bottlenecks  to 
investment at the subnational level. 

approach 

Some  local  authorities  face  difficulties  in 
securing  their  own  contribution  to  EU  co-
financed  projects  under  the  cohesion  policy 
programmes. This calls for measures to improve 
financing  system.  A  more 
the  subnational 
consolidated 
the 
predictability of the financing would lead to higher 
quality planning, more reliability and in turn better 
prospects for successful implementation of 2021-
2027  cohesion  policy  projects.  More  attention 
needs  to  be  paid  to  spending  needs  and  to 
measures  that  would  help  local  governments  in 
co-financing 
the 
cohesion policy. 

investments  planned  under 

increase 

to 

 
varying 

boilers,  with 

The  effectiveness  of  the  national  clean  air 
priority  programme  needs  to  be  improved 
through  law  enforcement  mechanisms.  The 
regional  Anti-Smog  Resolutions  require  single 
family households to replace non-compliant solid-
fuel 
timelines  and 
technological  restrictions. These  timelines  need  to 
be  maintained  to  preserve  the  pace  of  the  heat 
source transition and advance clean air ambitions. 
communication  and  educational 
Tailor-made 
activities 
targeting  homeowners  on  health, 
economic and societal harmfulness of air pollution 
are  key.  Another  challenge  for  the  programme  is 
the  prioritisation  and  effective  use  of  various 
sources of funding to achieve the required effect.  

The  management  of  refugees  and  migrants 
and  their 
integration  requires  not  only 
funding  but  also  strategic  planning.  Regional 
and national authorities need to work on long-term 
strategies in education, social inclusion and access 
to  the  job  market  for  refugees  and  migrants, 
which  would  ensure  implementation  of  adequate 
measures.  This 
clear 
benchmarks, regular assessments, and transparent 
reporting mechanisms. 

requires  establishing 

78 

 
MACROECONOMIC STABILITY 
ANNEX 18: KEY FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENTS 

Polish  banks  have  a  stable  commercial 
profile  with  low  foreign  exposure.  The  local 
banking  sector  remains  one  of  the  largest  in 
central  and  eastern  Europe,  with  total  assets 
equivalent to over 90% of the country's economic 
output,  and  is  by  far  the  main  component  of  the 
Polish  financial  sector.  Polish  banks  are  a  strong 
economic pillar that has been crucial in sustaining 
the  country’s  economic  expansion.  The  sector’s 
structure has not materially changed recently, with 
little  ongoing  M&A  activity.  It  is  largely  owned  by 
Polish capital, with the state controlling about half 
of  total  banking-sector  assets.  Local  lenders  are 
well-diversified, modern,  and  competitive.  The top 
lenders  control  around  59.2%  of  total 
five 
banking-sector assets. The banking system overall 
is resilient, liquid and enjoys a comfortable capital 
level  (capital  adequacy  ratio  of  19.7%),  sufficient 
to  weather  even  major  macroeconomic  shocks. 
Banks  have  complied  with  the  newest  minimum 
requirements  for  own  funds  and  eligible  liabilities 
that entered into force in January 2024. However, 
the  banking  system  is  not  free  from  potential 
vulnerabilities and continues to face challenges. 

Graph A18.1: Credit growth 

interest-rate-easing  cycle  back 

cycle    in  2021-2022  has  greatly  increased  the 
sector's  profitability,  as  rising  interest  rates  have 
been swiftly passed on to borrowers. Both in 2022 
and  2023,  growth  in  net  interest  income  and  net 
interest margin (NIM) remained the primary driver 
of banks’ profitability. However, the trend of rising 
NIM is now gradually diminishing. The central bank 
in 
started  an 
September  2023,  which  is  bound  to  impact  the 
sector’s  earnings  over  the  next  12-18  months. 
Although  banks'  traditional  risks  (such  as  credit 
risk,  market  risk,  interest-rate  risk,  and  liquidity 
risk)  do  not  currently  threaten  financial  stability, 
the  banking  sector  does  face  some  other 
challenges.  For  example,  local  banks  continue  to 
face around 150 000 court cases related to legacy 
foreign-exchange  (FX)  housing  loans.  The  risks 
stemming  from  these  exposures  continue  to  be 
the  biggest  challenge  for  the  sector,  despite  the 
progress  with  voluntary  settlements  made  over 
the  last  3  years  and  vast  provisioning  expenses 
already  made. 
the  widespread 
Similarly, 
government-decreed  payment  holiday  in  2022-
2023  for  mortgage  borrowers  gave  rise  to 
financial-stability  concerns  given  its  very  general 
application  and  related  costs.  The  continuation  of 
this  support  programme  in  2024,  albeit  more 
limited in scope, will continue generating costs for 
local lenders, while at the same time impeding the 
transmission of monetary policy. 

in 

the 

Bank 
lending  has  dropped  along  with 
tightening  financial  conditions,  but  credit-
risk  metrics  have  not  materially  increased. 
Lending to the non-financial sector slowed sharply 
in the second half of 2022. It continued to drop on 
an  annual  basis  in  2023,  although  the  cycle  now 
appears to have passed its low point, and demand 
for  credit  turned  slightly  positive  on  a  year-on-
year  basis 
last  quarter  of  2023. 
Consequently,  the  non-financial  sector’s  debt-to-
GDP ratio continued decreasing over 2023, falling 
to about 60% of GDP, roughly half the EU median. 
Rapidly  rising  interest  rates  have  until  now  had 
little impact on non-performing loan (NPL) metrics. 
The NPL  ratio increased in 2023 by just 10 bp to 
4.4%  on  average.  On  the  corporate  side,  the 
financing 
non-financial 
of 
corporations (NFCs), with a relatively low share of 
bank  loans  (in  2023,  corporate  bank  loans  were 
just  15%  of  GDP),  minimised 
equivalent  to 
domestic  firms’  vulnerability 
interest-rate 
volatility.  However,  smaller  firms  are  relatively 

structure 

local 

to 

Source: ECB 

the  major 

Monetary  tightening  has  largely  supported 
profitability.  Despite 
impact  of 
increased  CHF  loan  reserves  and  2022-2023 
credit  holidays,  the  Polish  banking  system  has  in 
recent years proved its ability to remain profitable 
and continue financing the economy. Local lenders 
generated  return  on  equity  of  7.3%  in  2022  and 
are on track to double that performance in 2023. 
Given  the  prevalence  of  variable-interest-rate 
loans  in  Poland,  the  monetary-policy-tightening 

79 

-10-505101520200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120222023Total privateNFCHH% 
 
 
  
 
Table A18.1:Financial Soundness Indicators 

(1) Last data: Q3 2023. 
(2) Data is annualized. 
(3) Data available for EA countries only, EU average refers to EA area. 
Source: ECB, Eurostat. 

more  impacted  by  higher  rates  than  their  larger 
peers.  Households  have  remained  rather  well 
insulated  from  major  financial  distress,  thanks  to 
both  the  relatively  strong  labour  market  and  the 
mortgage-loan  repayment  holidays.  In  particular, 
the low unemployment rate played a major role in 
bolstering the ability of Polish families to properly 
service  their  bank  debt.  In  the  future,  overall 
lending growth to the non-financial sector appears 
to  be  headed 
recovery, 
supported 
subsidised-mortgage 
the 
schemes  on  the  household  side,  and  improving 
growth prospects on the NFC side. 

towards  a  modest 

through 

Borrowers 

Banks  are  facing  several  challenges  amidst 
geopolitical  uncertainty.  As  in  previous  years, 
the  biggest  risk  to  financial  stability  in  Poland  is 
still  the  legal  issue  associated  with  the legacy  FX 
mortgage-loans 
are 
portfolio. 
increasingly  taking  legal  action  to  challenge  the 
terms  of  their  FX-loan  agreements  following  a 
string  of  pro-consumer  rulings  from  the  Court  of 
Justice  of  the  European  Union.  About  150  000 
claims had been already filed by the end of 2023 
despite  banks  offering  voluntary  settlements  to 
avoid  litigation.  This  trend  is  set  to  continue  and, 
along  with 
increase 
provisions made by lenders to face legal risks. The 
2022-2023  payment  holidays  for  mortgagors 
have been another major factor of unpredictability 
for the banking system. The scheme, introduced by 
the  government  back  in  2022,  covered  all  local-
currency  mortgage 
the 
programme  has  been  a  major  success  from  the 
standpoint of borrowers. It allowed many families 

holders.  Overall, 

requirement 

the 

to 

it, 

to  smoothly  manage  a  period  of  spiking  interest 
rates  and  remains  one  of  the  key  reasons  behind 
low credit-risk metrics. However, given the lack of 
targeting  in  the  scheme,  this  measure  ended  up 
being very costly for local banks. The extension of 
the  scheme  was  launched  in  May  2024  and  is 
more  targeted  than  the  2022-2023  measure, 
which  should  lower  the  cost  of  the  programme. 
Lastly, banks continue to hoard a large amount of 
local sovereign bonds on their balance sheets. The 
value of that portfolio is equivalent to 20% of the 
aggregate  balance  sheet  of  Polish  banks.  Just 
about  44%  of that portfolio  is  marked-to-market, 
with  valuations  directly 
impacting  the  banks’ 
capital  levels,  and  the  liquidity  position  of  the 
system  is  appropriate.  Nevertheless,  the  size  of 
this  portfolio  creates  a  risk  in  the  event  of  major 
market  volatility  due  –  for  instance  –  to  major 
global geopolitical tensions.  

in 

Risks  associated  with  real-estate  exposures 
remain  manageable.  Prices 
the  Polish 
residential  real-estate  (RRE)  sector  have  been 
growing  steadily  in  the  last  decade  and  have 
accelerated in the past year. Despite this, there do 
not  seem  to  be  signs  of  major  overvaluations  of 
RRE. This reduces the possibility of a considerable 
price  adjustment  and,  by  extension,  reduces  the 
threat  of  a  possible  drop  in  collateral  value  on 
banks’  balance  sheets.  Mortgage  lending  climbed 
significantly  in  the  second  quarter  of  2023.  The 
‘2%  Safe  Mortgage’ 
government-subsidised 
scheme  made  mortgages  more  affordable  in  an 
environment  characterised  by  high  interest  rates 
and  inflation.  Additionally,  the  interest-rate buffer 

80 

2017201820192020202120222023EUMedianTotal assets of the banking sector (% of GDP)95.592.592.3102.1100.492.895.7257.0184.6Share (total assets) of the five largest banks (%)47.549.549.854.356.657.3--69.6Share (total assets) of domestic credit institutions (%)154.853.354.056.657.456.558.4-62.9NFC credit growth (year-on-year % change)8.66.62.9-6.44.59.60.7-2.4HH credit growth (year-on-year % change)6.45.66.51.55.0-4.41.0-1.4Financial soundness indicators:1        - non-performing loans (% of total loans)6.66.26.16.05.04.34.41.81.8- capital adequacy ratio (%)18.017.917.819.617.918.020.119.620.1- return on equity (%)26.97.06.93.14.87.312.39.913.2Cost-to-income ratio (%)157.256.756.054.254.549.842.352.844.9Loan-to-deposit ratio (%)193.793.291.980.377.476.272.593.380.2Central bank liquidity as % of liabilities0.00.30.00.00.00.00.0-0.7Private sector debt (% of GDP)77.376.774.276.171.363.5-133.0118.4Long-term interest rate spread versus Bund (basis points)310.3280.2260.0200.8232.0491.1337.0107.7104.2Market funding ratio (%)48.045.744.648.047.745.0-50.839.8Green bonds outstanding to all bonds (%)3-------4.02.71-34-1011-1718-2424-27Colours indicate performance ranking among 27 EU Member States. 
 
  
 
advised by the local supervisor for RRE, and banks’ 
prudent  stance  on  lending  more  generally,  have 
decreased  the  probability  of  financial-stability 
risks  in  the  RRE  area.  For  the  commercial  real-
estate segment, 2023 has been a challenging year 
given  the  high-interest-rate  environment.  The 
number of deals has more than halved compared 
to  2022  in  most  commercial  real-estate  sub-
segments.  Investors  have  become  very  selective, 
and  financing  has  become  more  challenging. 
Nevertheless,  Poland  remains  one  of  the  more 
attractive investment markets in the region. 

Graph A18.2: House price index and mortgages 

Source: ECB. 

81 

-10-5051015202502040608010012014016018020020102013201620192022House price index (lhs)Adjusted loans, lending for house purchase (rhs)yoy% change2015=100 
  
ANNEX 19: TAXATION 

This  annex  provides  an 
indicator-based 
overview  of  Poland’s  tax  system.  It  includes 
information on the tax structure (the types of tax 
that Poland derives most of its revenue from), the 
tax  burden  on  workers,  and  the  progressivity  and 
redistributive  effect  of  the  tax  system.  It  also 
provides 
tax  collection  and 
compliance.  

information  on 

Poland’s  tax  revenues  are  relatively  low  in 
relation  to  GDP  and  rely  on  consumption 
taxes more than the EU average.  Table A19.1 
shows that Poland’s tax revenues as a percentage 
of GDP were considerably below the EU aggregate 
in 2022, even though they had increased by about 
3 pps  since  2010.  The  share  of  labour  taxes  as  a 
proportion  of  total  tax  revenues  was  significantly 
below  the  EU  aggregate,  but  revenues  from 
consumption  taxes  and  environmental  taxes  were 
above  the  EU  aggregate,  as  a  share  of  both  GDP 
and  total  taxation  (see  Graph  A19.1).  Revenues 
from capital and property taxes were close to the 
EU aggregate. As regards environmental taxes, the 
contribution of energy taxes was relatively high in 
2020  (7.1%  of  tax  revenue)  when  compared  with 
the  EU  average  of  4.3%  (see  Graph  A19.1). 
However, transport taxes represented only 0.5% of 
tax revenue (the EU average was 1%). This means 
that  there  would  be  room  to  introduce  a  tax  on 
passenger  cars  with  a  tax  base  related  to 
emissions.  Pollution  and  resources  taxes  only 
account for 3.2% of environmental taxes, so there 

Table A19.1:Taxation indicators 

could be potential to strengthen the application of 
’polluter  pays’  principle.  Poland  only 
the 
implemented  two  of  the  six  main  types  of 
pollution  and  resources  taxes  (i.e.  taxes  on  waste 
landfilling  and  plastic  products).  There  remains 
scope  to  expand  waste  disposal  taxes  (including 
incineration).  Moreover,  Poland  does  not  have 
taxes  on  NOx  emissions,  discharge  of  waste  into 
water,  fertilisers  and  pesticides  (for  more  on 
policies  related  to  environmental  sustainability, 
see Annex 6). 

labour 

tax  burden  was 

less 
Poland’s 
progressive  than  the  EU  average  in  2023. 
Graph A19.2 shows that the labour tax wedge for 
Poland  in  2023  was  below  the  EU  average  for 
single  people  at  all  earnings  levels,  but  it  is 
somewhat  less  progressive  (increasing  less  as  a 
function  of  earnings).  Second  earners  at  a  wage 
level of 67% of the average wage, whose spouses 
earn the average wage, were also subject to a tax 
wedge that was somewhat below the EU average. 
At  the  same  time,  the  tax  wedge  for  second 
earners  was  substantially  higher  than  the  tax 
wedge  for single earners at the same wage level. 
In  2022,  the  ability  of  the  Polish  tax  and  benefit 
system to reduce income inequality (as measured 
by  its  ability  to  reduce  the  GINI  coefficient)  was 
still comparatively low (Table A19.1). 

Major  2022  tax  reforms  (‘Polish  Deal’  and 
‘Low  Taxes’)  reduced  the  overall  tax  burden 

(1) Forward-looking effective tax rate (OECD). 
(2) A higher value indicates a stronger redistributive impact of taxation. 
(*) EU-27 simple average. 
(**) Forecast value for 2022, if available. For more details on the VAT gap, see European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Taxation and Customs Union, 2023, VAT gap in the EU, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2778/911698. 
For more data on tax revenues as well as the methodology applied, see the Data on Taxation webpage, 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation-1/economic-analysis-taxation/data-taxation_en. 
Source: European Commission and OECD 

82 

PL2010202020212022202320102020202120222023Total taxes (including compulsory actual social contributions) (% of GDP)31.635.636.734.537.940.040.440.2Labour taxes (as % of GDP)11.914.314.213.620.021.320.720.3Consumption taxes (as % of GDP)12.512.413.412.110.810.711.211.0Capital taxes (as % of GDP)7.28.99.08.87.18.08.68.9Of which, on income of corporations (as % of GDP)2.02.32.62.82.42.53.03.4Total property taxes (as % of GDP)1.41.71.61.51.92.32.22.1Recurrent taxes on immovable property (as % of GDP)1.11.11.11.01.11.21.11.0Environmental taxes as % of GDP2.72.52.92.82.42.22.32.0Tax wedge at 50% of average wage (Single person) (*)32.333.633.629.430.333.931.732.131.831.7Tax wedge at 100% of average wage (Single person) (*)34.234.934.933.834.341.040.139.940.040.2Corporate income tax - effective average tax rates (1) (*)15.015.015.019.519.019.0Difference in Gini coefficient before and after taxes and cash social transfers (pensions excluded from social transfers) (2) (*)4.74.64.74.68.68.18.27.9Outstanding tax arrears: total year-end tax debt (including debt considered not collectable) / total revenue (in %) (*)39.925.040.935.5VAT Gap (% of VAT total tax liability, VTTL)(**)20.111.13.39.75.4PolandEU-27Tax structureProgressivity & fairnessTax administration & compliance 
 
 
 
        
 
Graph A19.1: Tax revenues from different tax types, % of total revenue 

Source: European Commission 

health 

insurance 

for  employees,  especially  at  lower  earnings. 
The  reforms  raised  the  tax-free  amount  to 
PLN 30 000  (about  EUR  7 000),  decreased  the 
lower personal income tax rate from 17% to 12% 
and increased to PLN 120 000 (about EUR 28 000) 
the threshold above which the 32% upper tax rate 
applies, while abolishing the partial deductibility of 
contributions. 
compulsory 
Universal tax credit was extended. The reform also 
reduced  the  tax  burden  on  workers  delaying 
retirement beyond the statutory age, thus creating 
incentives to increase the effective retirement age. 
These  measures  are  estimated  to  have  reduced 
the  tax  burden  for  most  groups  of  employees, 
especially  at  lower  earnings  (by  about  3 ppts  for 
those  earning  67%  of  the  average  wage) (168). 
tax  burden  for  self-employed 
However, 
increased  due 
insurance 
contributions.  

to  higher  health 

the 

(168)  Calculations by European Commission, Joint Research 
Centre, based on the EUROMOD model, version I5.0+. 

83 

Graph A19.2: Tax wedge for single and second 
earners, % of total labour costs, 2023 

The second earner tax wedge assumes a first earner at 100% 
of the average wage and no children. For the methodology of 
the tax wedge for second earners, see OECD, 2016, Taxing 
Wages 2014-2015. 
Source: European Commission 

Poland  is  relatively  advanced  in  digitally 
transforming  its  tax  administration,  which 
can  help  reduce  tax  arrears.  Tax  arrears 
currently  amount  to  around  25%  of  total  tax 
revenue. This is below the EU average, but that is 
inflated by large values in a few EU countries (see 
tax 
Table  A19.1).  Digitalisation  of  Poland’s 
administration  started  in  2016,  when  Poland 
implemented SAF-T (the international standard for 
the  electronic  exchange  of  accounting  data).  The 
corresponding  reporting  obligation  was  initially 
imposed  only  on  large  companies  but  was  later 
extended  to  small  companies.  2019  saw  the 
introduction  of  a  requirement  to  make  split 
payments  (by  which  purchasers  make  parallel 
payments  to  the  supplier’s  account  and  a  VAT 
account)  and  the  modernisation  of  VAT  reporting. 
A  system  of  structured  e-invoices  was  introduced 

30.332.434.336.037.72025303540455050100150Tax wedge, % of total labour costsEarnings as % of the average wageSingle earner - PLSingle earner - EU averageSecond earner -  PLSecond earner -  EU average50.627.322.139.435.125.5Tax revenue shares in 2022, Poland (outer ring) and EU (inner ring)Taxes on labourTaxes on consumptionTaxes on capital7.43.90.50.90.30.22.82.51.62.70246810Poland -environmentaltaxationEU -environmentaltaxationPoland -propertytaxationEU - propertytaxationEnvironmental and property taxation as % of total tax revenue, Poland and the EUEnergy taxesTransport taxesResource/pollution taxesRecurrent property taxesOther property taxes 
 
 
   
        
in  2021  that  allows  the  issue  and  receipt  of 
electronic  structured  invoices  via  the  national 
invoice system. The introduction of an obligation to 
issue  invoices  through  that  system  was  planned 
for  2024,  but  a  draft  law  adopted  by  the 
government  on  30  April  2024  postpones  the 
mandatory 
introduction  of  the  structured  e-
invoicing system to 1 February 2026.  

Poland’s  VAT  gap  decreased  significantly  in 
2021.  Poland  has  been  improving  VAT  collection 
since  2015.  Poland  recorded  one  of  the  fastest 
increases  in  VAT  compliance  in  the  EU  between 
2016  and  2018.  In  2021,  the  VAT  gap  (the  gap 
between  revenues  actually  collected  and  the 
theoretical  tax  liability)  decreased  by  more  than 
two thirds to 3.3% (see Table A19.1). Even though 
many  Member  States  saw  a  decrease  of  the  VAT 
gap  in  this  period,  which  was  at  least  partly 
related  to  the  COVID-19-induced  economic  crisis, 
Poland’s decrease was more pronounced than the 
one seen by the EU average. A significant increase 
of  nearly  20% 
the  value  of  electronic 
transactions and an approximately 8.5% decline in 
the  bankruptcy  rate  have  probably  increased  VAT 
compliance.  Poland  has  not  only  improved  digital 
transformation  by  implementing  and  extending 
SAF-T  but  has  also  introduced  measures  against 
fraud and evasion.  

in 

Some  special  VAT  rates  are  being  kept  in 
2024.  Due  to  a  wide  application  of  exemptions 
and  reduced  rates,  the  actionable  VAT  policy 
gap (169)  is  among  the  highest  in  the  EU   and  has 
increased  in  recent  years (170).  Most  of  Poland’s 
COVID19-related  relief  measures  on  VAT  and 
excise taxes have been discontinued, but the 2024 
Budget Law extends some reduced VAT rates into 
2024. The 0% VAT rate for food was kept in place 
until 31 March 2024. 

(169) The actionable policy gap excludes exemptions on imputed 

rents (the notional value of home occupancy by 
homeowners), the provision of public goods and services, and 
financial services, which are unlikely to be taxed. 

(170)  CASE – Center for Social and Economic Research (project 
leader) and Economisti Associati (consortium leader), VAT 
gap in the EU report 2023, p. 111. 

84 

 
 
ANNEX 20: TABLE WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INDICATORS 

Table A20.1:Key economic and financial indicators 

(1) domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks, EU and non-EU foreign-controlled subsidiaries and EU and non-EU foreign-
controlled branches. 
(2) NIIP excluding direct investment and portfolio equity shares. 
Source: Eurostat and ECB as of 2024-5-17, where available; European Commission for forecast figures (Spring forecast 2024). 

85 

2004-072008-122013-2020212022202320242025Real GDP (y-o-y)5.43.33.56.95.60.22.83.4Potential growth (y-o-y).4.03.63.24.43.12.82.8Private consumption (y-o-y)4.13.23.06.15.5-1.03.03.5Public consumption (y-o-y)4.01.73.75.00.52.85.72.3Gross fixed capital formation (y-o-y)12.32.13.91.22.713.13.56.0Exports of goods and services (y-o-y)10.04.95.812.37.43.41.73.5Imports of goods and services (y-o-y) 12.02.75.816.16.8-2.03.04.2Contribution to GDP growth:Domestic demand (y-o-y)5.72.73.24.63.72.13.43.5Inventories (y-o-y)0.7-0.30.13.41.4-5.30.00.0Net exports (y-o-y)-1.00.80.2-1.10.63.3-0.6-0.1Contribution to potential GDP growth:Total Labour (hours) (y-o-y).0.50.40.72.00.60.20.0Capital accumulation (y-o-y).1.81.41.11.21.51.51.5Total factor productivity (y-o-y).1.71.81.51.31.11.21.3Output gap-0.11.4-0.20.71.8-1.1-1.2-0.6Unemployment rate15.79.35.53.42.92.83.02.9GDP deflator (y-o-y)3.22.91.75.310.610.74.54.2Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP, y-o-y)2.43.71.15.213.210.94.34.2HICP excluding energy and unprocessed food (y-o-y)1.63.01.34.210.310.74.53.7Nominal compensation per employee (y-o-y)3.06.15.24.79.113.410.17.1Labour productivity (real, hours worked, y-o-y)2.73.33.00.92.40.72.93.4Unit labour costs (ULC, whole economy, y-o-y)0.43.12.50.47.313.37.03.6Real unit labour costs (y-o-y)-2.70.20.8-4.6-3.02.32.4-0.5Real effective exchange rate (ULC, y-o-y)3.0-1.1-0.1-2.70.59.47.81.2Real effective exchange rate (HICP, y-o-y)4.1-0.8-0.4-0.50.58.7..Net savings rate of households (net saving as percentage of net disposable income)2.21.93.62.0-2.9...Private credit flow, consolidated (% of GDP)6.56.83.63.73.00.9..Private sector debt, consolidated (% of GDP)46.370.777.971.263.457.0..of which household debt, consolidated (% of GDP)17.333.235.432.226.423.6..of which non-financial corporate debt, consolidated (% of GDP)29.037.542.539.037.033.3..Gross non-performing debt (% of total debt instruments and total loans and advances) (1)3.95.74.73.32.9...Corporations, net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)0.94.13.72.85.29.28.68.2Corporations, gross operating surplus (% of GDP)22.422.822.724.026.826.125.124.7Households, net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) (% of GDP)-1.7-2.2-0.4-1.4-3.9-1.8-1.4-1.8Deflated house price index (y-o-y).-5.43.73.5-1.9-1.9..Residential investment (% of GDP)3.43.32.42.32.22.1..Current account balance (% of GDP), balance of payments-5.2-5.0-0.9-1.3-2.61.60.80.6Trade balance (% of GDP), balance of payments-2.6-2.42.83.31.96.1..Terms of trade of goods and services (y-o-y)1.5-0.51.2-2.0-3.53.00.50.0Capital account balance (% of GDP)0.91.61.70.70.50.2..Net international investment position (% of GDP)-44.2-60.6-56.7-39.8-33.3-31.4..NENDI - NIIP excluding non-defaultable instruments (% of GDP) (2)-10.4-23.1-17.00.72.75.1..IIP liabilities excluding non-defaultable instruments (% of GDP) (2)36.852.153.743.740.637.5..Export performance vs. advanced countries (% change over 5 years)..17.128.820.523.8..Export market share, goods and services (y-o-y)8.90.05.0-1.4-0.92.2-1.8-0.1Net FDI flows (% of GDP)-3.5-1.8-2.0-3.8-3.6-2.3..General government balance (% of GDP)-3.6-5.4-2.6-1.8-3.4-5.1-5.4-4.6Structural budget balance (% of GDP)..-2.5-2.4-4.6-4.5-4.8-4.3General government gross debt (% of GDP)45.952.151.453.649.249.653.757.7forecast 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
ANNEX 21: DEBT SUSTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 

This  annex  assesses  fiscal  sustainability 
risks  for  Poland  over  the  short,  medium  and 
long  term. 
It  follows  the  multi-dimensional 
approach  of  the  European  Commission’s  2023 
Debt Sustainability Monitor, updated based on the 
Commission 2024 spring forecast. 

1  –  Short-term  risks  to  fiscal  sustainability 
low.  The  Commission’s  early-detection 
are 
indicator  (S0)  does  not  point  to  any  major  short-
term  fiscal  risks  (Table A21.2) (171).  Government 
gross financing needs are expected to increase to 
around  13-14%  of  GDP  over  2024--2025  partly 
due 
reflecting  a 
mismatch  between  the  payment  and deliveries  of 
military 
(Table A21.1, Table 1). 
Financial markets’ perceptions of sovereign risk is 
stable,  as  confirmed  by  the  ratings  of  the  main 
agencies.  

to  stock-flow  adjustments 

investment 

2  –  Medium-term  fiscal  sustainability  risks 
appear high.   

The DSA baseline shows that the government 
debt  ratio  is  expected  to  increase  rapidly  in 
the  medium  term  (to  around  85%  of  GDP  in 
2034)  (Graph 1,  Table  1) (172).  The  debt  increase 
relies  on  the  assumption  of  a  structural  primary 
deficit  of  2.6%  of  GDP  as  of  2024.  Compared  to 
historical  data  running  from  1980,  this  does  not 
appear  ambitious.  Indeed,  almost  90%  of  past 
fiscal  positions  were  more  stringent  than  the  one 
assumed  in  the  baseline.  (Table  A21.2) (173).  The 

(171) The S0 is a composite indicator of short-term risk of fiscal 
stress. It is based on a wide range of fiscal and financial-
competitiveness indicators that have proven to be a good 
predictor of emerging fiscal stress in the past.  

(172) The assumptions underlying the Commission’s ‘no-fiscal 

policy change’ baseline include in particular: (i) a structural 
primary deficit, before ageing costs, of 2.6% of GDP from 
2024 onwards; (ii) inflation converging linearly towards the 
10-year forward inflation-linked swap rate 10 years ahead 
(which refers to the 10-year inflation expectations 10 years 
ahead); (iii) the nominal short- and long-term interest rates 
on new and rolled over debt converging linearly from current 
values to market-based forward nominal rates by T+10; (iv) 
real GDP growth rates from the Commission 2024 spring 
forecast, followed by the EPC/OGWG ‘T+10 methodology 
projections between T+3 and T+10 (average of 1.9%); (v) 
ageing costs in line with the 2024 Ageing Report (European 
Commission, Institutional Paper 279, April 2024). For 
information on the methodology, see the 2023 Debt 
Sustainability Monitor. 

(173) This assessment is based on the fiscal consolidation space 

indicator, which measures the frequency with which a tighter 
fiscal position than assumed in a given scenario has been 

debt  increases  notwithstanding  a  still  favourable 
but, in absolute terms, declining snowball effect of 
around  -0.4%  of  GDP  annually  on  average  over 
2025-2034.  On  the  other  hand,  large  stock-flow 
adjustments  in  2024  and  2025  are  expected  to 
contribute  to  the  increase,  mainly  due  to  pre-
financing  of  large  military  investments  to  be 
delivered in the following years.  

the 

four 

interest-growth 

The  baseline  projections  are  stress-tested 
against 
deterministic 
alternative 
scenarios to assess the impact of changes in 
key  assumptions  relative  to  the  baseline 
(Graph 1).  Under  the  historical  structural  primary 
balance  (SPB)  scenario  (i.e.  the  SPB  returns  to  its 
historical  15-year  average  of  -2.0%  of  GDP)  the 
debt ratio would be lower than under the baseline 
by  about  5 pps.  in  2034.  However,  under  the 
adverse  interest-growth  rate  differential  scenario 
(i.e. 
differential 
deteriorates by 1 pp. compared with the baseline), 
the  debt  ratio  would  be  higher  than  under  the 
baseline  by  around  6 pps.  in  2034.  Under  the 
financial  stress  scenario 
rates 
temporarily  increase  by  1 pp.  compared  with  the 
baseline)  the  government  debt  ratio  would  be 
higher by 0.4 pps. in 2034. Finally, under the lower 
(i.e.  the 
structural  primary  balance  scenario 
projected  small  deterioration  in  the  SPB  from 
2023 to 2024 is increased by 50%) the debt ratio 
would  be  higher  than  under  the  baseline  by 
0.8 pps. in 2034. 

interest 

rate 

(i.e. 

These 

indicate 

The  stochastic  projections 
low 
sensitivity  of  these  projections  to  plausible 
unforeseen  events  (174). 
stochastic 
simulations  indicate  a  99%  probability  that  the 
debt  ratio  will  be  higher  in  2028  than  in  2023, 
implying  medium 
the  uncertainty 
risks.  Yet, 
surrounding  the  baseline  debt  projections  (as 
measured by the difference between the 10th and 
90th debt distribution percentiles, reaching around 
20% of GDP in five years’ time) is low (Graph 2).  

observed in the past. Technically, this consists in looking at 
the percentile rank of the projected SPB within the 
distribution of SPBs observed in the past in the country, 
taking into account all available data from 1980 to 2023. 

(174) The stochastic projections show the joint impact on debt of 

10 000 different shocks affecting the government’s 
budgetary position, economic growth, interest rates and 
exchange rates. This covers 80% of all the simulated debt 
paths and therefore excludes tail events. 

86 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
increase  in  ageing-related  public  spending  (0.9 
pps.). The current distance of the government debt 
ratio  to  the  60%  reference  value  marginally 
reduces  the  fiscal  adjustment  need  (-0.1 pps.) 
(Table A21.1, Table 2).  

4  –  Finally,  several  additional  risk  factors 
need to be considered in the assessment.  On 
the one hand, risk-increasing factors are related to 
the  recent  increase  in  interest  rates  compared  to 
historical  rates,  potential  legal  costs  associated 
with Swiss franc-denominated  loans, the negative 
net  international  investment  position  and  some 
exposure  to  non-performing  loans.  On  the  other 
hand,  relatively  stable  financing  sources  (with  a 
large  domestic  investor  base)  and  the  currency 
denomination  of  debt  (over  three-quarters  of 
outstanding debt is denominated in local currency).  

3  –  Long-term  fiscal  sustainability  risks 
appear  overall  medium.  This  assessment  is 
based  on  the  combination  of  two  fiscal  gap 
indicators,  capturing  the  required  fiscal  effort  to 
stabilise  debt  (S2  indicator)  and  bring  to  60%  of 
GDP  (S1  indicator)  over  the  long  term (175).  This 
assessment  is  driven  by  an  unfavourable  initial 
budgetary  position  and  projected 
in 
ageing costs.  

increase 

The  S2  indicator  points  to  medium  fiscal 
sustainability  risks.  The  indicator  shows  that, 
relative  to  the  baseline,  the  SPB  would  need  to 
improve  by  4.6  pps.  of  GDP  to  ensure  debt 
stabilisation  over  the  long  term.  This  result  is 
underpinned  by  an  unfavourable  initial  budgetary 
position  (3.5 pps.)  and  the  projected  increase  in 
ageing-related  costs  (contribution  of  1.1 pps.). 
Ageing costs’ developments are primarily driven by 
a  projected  increase  in  health-care  (0.9 pps.)  and 
long-term care spending (0.7 pps.), partly offset by 
a projected decrease in public pension expenditure 
(-0.6 pps.) (176)  (Table A21.1,  Table 2).  As  a  result, 
while a number of investments and reforms in the 
RRP  contribute to  supporting  the  efficiency  of the 
Polish  health  and 
long-term  care  systems, 
additional  measures  may  be  required  to  further 
improve its fiscal sustainability. 

The  S1  indicator  points  to  medium  fiscal 
sustainability risks. The indicator shows that the 
country  needs  to  improve  its  fiscal  position  by  4 
pps. of GDP to reduce its debt to 60% of GDP by 
is  mainly  driven  by  the 
2070.  This  result 
unfavourable 
position 
the  projected 
(contribution  of  3.3 pps.)  and 

budgetary 

initial 

(175)The S2 fiscal sustainability indicator measures the 

permanent SPB adjustment in 2025 that would be required 
to stabilise public debt over an infinite horizon. It is 
complemented by the S1 indicator, which measures the 
permanent SPB adjustment in 2025 to bring the debt ratio to 
60% by 2070. The impact of the drivers of S1 and S2 may 
differ due to the infinite horizon component considered in the 
S2 indicator. For both the S1 and S2 indicators, the risk 
assessment depends on the amount of fiscal consolidation 
needed: ‘high risk’ if the required effort exceeds 6 % of GDP, 
‘medium risk’ if it is between 2% and 6% of GDP, and ‘low 
risk’ if the effort is negative or below 2% of GDP. The overall 
long-term risk classification combines the risk categories 
derived from S1 and S2. S1 may notch up the risk category 
derived from S2 if it signals a higher risk than S2. See the 
2023 Debt Sustainability Monitor for further details. 

(176) Sustainability challenges of the pension system are 

highlighted in chapter 3.  

87 

 
 
 
Table A21.1:Debt sustainability analysis - Poland 

Source: Commission services. 

Table A21.2:Heat map of fiscal sustainability risks - Poland 

Source: Commission services. 

88 

BaselineHistorical SPBLower SPBAdverse 'r-g'Financial stressOverallMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMHIGHMEDIUMLOWDebt level (2034), % GDP85.480.286.291.685.8Debt peak year20342034203420342034Fiscal consolidation space89%79%90%89%89%Probability of debt ratio exceeding in 2028 its 2023 level99%Difference between 90th and 10th percentiles (pps. GDP)19.6(1)Debtlevelin2034.Green:below60%ofGDP.Yellow:between60%and90%.Red:above90%.(2)Thedebtpeakyearindicateswhetherdebtisprojectedtoincreaseoveralloverthenextdecade.Green:debtpeaksearly.Yellow:peaktowardsthemiddleoftheprojectionperiod.Red:latepeak.(3)Fiscalconsolidationspacemeasurestheshareofpastfiscalpositionsinthecountrythatweremorestringentthantheoneassumedinthebaseline.Green:highvalue,i.e.theassumedfiscalpositionisplausiblebyhistoricalstandardsandleavesroomforcorrectivemeasuresifneeded.Yellow:intermediate.Red:low.(4)Probabilityofdebtratioexceedingin2028its2023level.Green:lowprobability.Yellow:intermediate.Red:high(alsoreflectingtheinitialdebtlevel).(5)thedifferencebetweenthe90thand10thpercentilesmeasuresuncertainty,basedonthedebtdistributionunder10000differentshocks.Green,yellowandredcellsindicateincreasinguncertainty.(Forfurtherdetailson the Commission's multidimensional approach, see the 2023 Debt Sustainability Monitor)LOWHIGHMEDIUMMEDIUMMEDIUMShort termMedium term - Debt sustainability analysis (DSA)Long termOverall                               (S0)Overall Deterministic scenariosStochastic projectionsS2S1Overall(S1 + S2)Table 1. Baseline debt projections20212022202320242025202620272028202920302031203220332034Gross debt ratio (% of GDP)53.649.249.653.758.160.463.166.269.472.675.879.082.185.4Changes in the ratio-3.6-4.40.44.14.42.32.73.13.23.23.23.23.23.2of whichPrimary deficit0.71.93.03.22.93.03.23.33.33.33.33.33.23.2Snowball effect-5.3-6.2-2.8-1.3-1.7-0.8-0.5-0.2-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.1-0.10.0Stock-flow adjustments1.0-0.10.22.13.30.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.00.0Gross financing needs (% of GDP)7.57.69.313.314.211.912.412.913.313.714.014.414.715.1S1S2Overall index  (pps. of GDP)4.04.6of which Initial budgetary position3.33.5Debt requirement-0.1Ageing costs0.91.1of which    Pensions-0.2-0.6     Health care0.70.9     Long-term care0.40.7Education0.00.1Table 2. Breakdown of the S1 and S2 sustainability gap indicators3040506070809010020212022202320242025202620272028202920302031203220332034Graph 1. Deterministic debt projections Historical SPB scenarioLower SPB scenarioFinancial stress scenarioAdverse 'r-g' scenarioBaseline% of GDPp10p20p40p60p80p9030405060708020212022202320242025202620272028% of GDPGraph 2. Stochastic debt projections 2024-2028MedianBaseline