Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of France
Date: 2024-06-19
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: France, budget policy, economic policy, economic recovery, economic reform, education policy, employment policy, energy policy, social policy, stability pact

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 19.6.2024  COM(2024) 610 final  Recommendation for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of France {SWD(2024) 600 final} - {SWD(2024) 610 final}  
 
Recommendation for a 

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 

on the economic, social, employment, structural and budgetary policies of France 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Articles 121(2) and 148(4) thereof, 

Having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of  29  April  2024  on  the  effective  coordination  of  economic  policies  and  on  multilateral 
budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/971 , and in particular 
Article 3(3) thereof, 

Having  regard  to  Regulation  (EU)  No  1176/2011  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  of  16  November  2011  on  the  prevention  and  correction  of  macroeconomic 
imbalances2 , and in particular Article 6(1) thereof, 

Having regard to the recommendation of the European Commission, 

Having regard to the resolutions of the European Parliament, 

Having regard to the conclusions of the European Council, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Employment Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Social Protection Committee, 

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic Policy Committee, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council3,  which 
established  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility,  entered  into  force  on  19  February 
2021. The Recovery and Resilience Facility provides financial support to the Member 
States  for  the  implementation  of  reforms  and  investment,  entailing  a  fiscal  impulse 
financed by the EU. In line with the European Semester priorities, it helps achieve the 
economic  and  social  recovery  and  implement  sustainable  reforms  and  investment,  in 
particular  to  promote  the  green  and  digital  transitions  and  make  the  Member  States’ 
economies  more  resilient.  It  also  helps  strengthen  public  finances  and  boost  growth 
and job creation in the medium and long term, improve territorial cohesion within the 
EU and support the continued implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.  

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OJ L 2024/1263, 30.4.2024 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj. 
OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1176/oj. 
Regulation  (EU)  2021/241  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  February  2021 
(OJ  L  57,  18.2.2021,  p.  17)  ELI: 
establishing 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj.  

the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility 

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(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

(5) 

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The  REPowerEU  Regulation4,  adopted  on  27  February  2023,  aims  to  phase  out  the 
EU’s  dependency  on  Russian  fossil  fuel  imports.  This  would  help  achieve  energy 
security  and  diversify  the  EU’s  energy  supply,  while  increasing  the  uptake  of 
renewables,  energy  storage  capacities  and  energy  efficiency.  France  added  a  new 
REPowerEU chapter to its national recovery and resilience plan in order to finance key 
reforms and investments that will help achieve the REPowerEU objectives. 

On  16  March  2023,  the  Commission  issued  a  Communication  on  the  ‘Long-term 
competitiveness of the EU: looking beyond 2030’5, in order to inform policy decisions 
and  create  the  framework  conditions  for  increasing  growth.  The  Communication 
frames competitiveness along nine mutually reinforcing drivers. Among these drivers, 
access to private capital, research and innovation, education and skills, and the single 
market  emerge  as  paramount  policy  priorities  for  reform  and  investment  to  address 
current productivity challenges as well as to build up the long-term competitiveness of 
the EU and its Member States.  On 14 February  2024, the Commission  followed this 
Communication  with  the  Annual  Single  Market  and  Competitiveness  Report6.  The 
report  details  the  competitive  strengths  and  challenges  of  Europe's  Single  Market, 
tracking yearly developments according to the nine competitiveness drivers identified.    

On 21 November 2023, the Commission adopted the 2024 Annual Sustainable Growth 
Survey7, marking the start of the 2024 cycle of the European Semester for economic 
policy  coordination.  The  European  Council  endorsed  the  priorities  of  the  survey 
around  the  four  dimensions  of  competitive  sustainability  on  22  March  2024.  On  21 
November 2023, on the basis of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, the Commission also 
adopted the 2024 Alert Mechanism Report, in which it identified France as one of the 
Member States that may be affected or may be at risk of being affected by imbalances, 
and for which an in-depth review would be needed. On the same date, the Commission 
adopted an opinion on the 2024 draft budgetary plan of France. The Commission also 
adopted a recommendation for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of 
the euro area, which the Council adopted on 12 April 2024, as well as the proposal for 
the 2024 Joint Employment Report analysing the implementation of the Employment 
Guidelines  and  the  principles  of  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  which  the 
Council adopted on 11 March 2024.  

On  30  April  2024,  the  EU’s  new  economic  governance  framework  came  into  force. 
The  framework  includes  the  new  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council  (EU)  2024/1263  on  the  effective  coordination  of  economic  policies  and 
multilateral  budgetary  surveillance  and  repealing  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
1466/97.  It  also  includes  the  amended  Regulation  (EC)  No  1467/97  on  the 
implementation  of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  and  the  amended  Directive 
2011/85/EU  on  the  budgetary  frameworks  of  Member  States8.  The  objectives  of  the 

Regulation  (EU)  2023/435  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  27  February  2023 
amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans 
and  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No  1303/2013,  (EU)  2021/1060  and  (EU)  2021/1755,  and  Directive 
2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1) ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj. 
COM(2023) 168 final. 
COM(2024) 77 final. 
COM(2023) 901 final. 
Council  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1264  of  29  April  2024  amending  Regulation  (EC)  No  1467/97  on 
speeding  up  and  clarifying  the  implementation  of  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  (OJ  L,  2024/1264, 
30.4.2024,  ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1264/oj)  and  Council  Directive  (EU)  2024/1265  of 

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new  framework  are  public  debt  sustainability  and  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth 
through gradual  fiscal consolidation  as  well as  reforms  and investments.  It  promotes 
national  ownership  and  has  a  greater  medium-term  focus,  combined  with  more 
effective and coherent enforcement. Each Member State should submit to the Council 
and  to  the  Commission  a  national  medium-term  fiscal-structural  plan.  National 
medium-term  fiscal-structural  plans  contain  the  fiscal,  reform  and  investment 
commitments  of  a  Member  State,  covering  a  planning  horizon  of  4  years  or  5  years 
depending on the regular length of the national legislature. The net expenditure9 path 
in  the  national  medium-term  fiscal-structural  plans  should  comply  with  the 
requirements of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, including the requirements to put or keep 
general government debt on a plausibly downward path by the end of the adjustment 
period  at  the  latest,  or  for  it  to  remain  at  prudent  levels  below  60%  of  GDP,  and  to 
bring  and/or  maintain  the  government  deficit  below  the  3%  of  GDP  reference  value 
over  the  medium  term.  Where  a  Member  State  commits  to  a  relevant  set  of  reforms 
and investments in accordance with the criteria set out in Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, 
the  adjustment  period  may  be  extended  by  3  years  at  most.  For  the  purpose  of 
supporting the preparation of those plans, on [21 June] 2024, the Commission is set to 
provide Member States with guidance on the content of the plans and the subsequent 
annual progress reports that they will need to submit and, in accordance with Article 5 
of Regulation (EU) 2024/1263, will transmit to them technical guidance on the fiscal 
adjustments  (reference  trajectories  and  technical  information,  where  applicable). 
Member  States  should  submit  their  medium-term  fiscal-structural  plans  by  20 
September  2024,  unless  the  Member  State  and  the  Commission  agree  to  extend  the 
deadline by a reasonable period of time. Member States should ensure the involvement 
of their national parliaments, and the consultation of independent fiscal institutions, of 
social partners and other national stakeholders, as appropriate. 

In 2024, the European Semester for economic policy coordination continues to evolve 
in  line  with  the  implementation  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility.  The  full 
implementation  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plans  remains  essential  for  delivering 
the policy priorities under the European Semester, as the plans help effectively address 
all  or  a  significant  subset  of  challenges  identified  in  the  relevant  country-specific 
recommendations  issued  in  recent  years.  The  2019,  2020,  2022  and  2023  country-
specific  recommendations  remain  equally  relevant  also  for  recovery  and  resilience 
plans  revised,  updated  or  amended  in  accordance  with  Articles  14,  18  and  21  of 
Regulation (EU) 2021/241.  

On  28  April  2021,  France  submitted  its  national  recovery  and  resilience  plan  to  the 
Commission, in accordance with Article 18(1) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241. Pursuant 
to  Article  19  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/241,  the  Commission  assessed  the  relevance, 
effectiveness,  efficiency  and  coherence  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan,  in 
accordance with the assessment guidelines of Annex V to that Regulation. On 13 July 
2021,  the  Council  adopted  its  Decision  on  the  approval  of  the  assessment  of  the 

29  April  2024  amending  Directive  2011/85/EU  on  requirements  for  budgetary  frameworks  of  the 
Member States (OJ L, 2024/1265, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1265/oj). 
Net expenditure as defined in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of 29 April 2024 (OJ L 
2024/1263,  30.4.2024.  ELI:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1263/oj).  Net  expenditure  means 
government  expenditure  net  of  (i)  interest  expenditure,  (ii)  discretionary  revenue  measures,  (iii) 
expenditure  on  programmes  of  the  Union  fully  matched  by  Union  funds  revenue,  (iv)  national 
expenditure  on  co-financing  of  programmes  funded  by  the  Union,  (v)  cyclical  elements  of 
unemployment benefit expenditure, and (vi) one-offs and other temporary measures. 

(6) 

(7) 

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(8) 

(9) 

recovery  and  resilience  plan  for  France10,  which  was  amended  on  14  July  2023 
following Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 to update the maximum financial 
contribution for non-repayable financial support, as well as to include the REPowerEU 
chapter11 . The release of instalments is conditional on a decision by the Commission, 
taken in accordance with Article 24(5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241, that France has 
satisfactorily  fulfilled  the  relevant  milestones  and  targets  set  out  in  the  Council 
Implementing  Decision.  Satisfactory  fulfilment  presupposes  that  the  achievement  of 
preceding milestones and targets has not been reversed. 

On 2 May 2024, France submitted its 2024 National Reform Programme and its 2024 
Stability  Programme,  in  line  with  Article  4(1)  of  Regulation  (EC)  No  1466/97.  In 
accordance with  Article  27 of Regulation  (EU) 2021/241,  the  2024 National  Reform 
Programme  also  reflects  France’s  biannual  reporting  on  the  progress  made  in 
achieving its recovery and resilience plan.  
The Commission published the 2024 country report for  France12 on 19 June 2024. It 
assessed  France’s  progress 
country-specific 
recommendations  adopted by the Council  between 2019  and  2023 and  took stock of 
France’s  implementation  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan.  Based  on  this  analysis, 
the  country  report  identified  gaps  with  respect  to  those  challenges  that  are  not 
addressed  or  only  partially  addressed  by  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan,  as  well  as 
new and emerging challenges. It also assessed France’s progress on implementing the 
European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights  and  on  achieving  the  EU  headline  targets  on 
employment, skills and poverty reduction, as well as progress in  achieving the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals.  

addressing 

relevant 

the 

in 

(10)  The  Commission  carried  out  an  in-depth  review  under  Article  5  of  Regulation  (EU) 
No 1176/2011 for France. The main findings of the Commission’s staff assessment of 
macroeconomic  vulnerabilities  for  France  for  the  purposes  of  that  Regulation  were 
published in April 202413. On 19 June 2024, the Commission concluded that France is 
no  longer  experiencing  macroeconomic  imbalances.  In  particular,  policy  action  has 
helped  in  reducing  vulnerabilities,  which  had  cross-border  relevance,  related  to 
competitiveness in a context of low productivity growth, but efforts need to continue, 
while  vulnerabilities  related  to  high  public  debt  remain.  Price  competitiveness  has 
evolved favourably since 2021, in part due to lower inflation than in trading partners. 
labour 
However,  cost  competitiveness  outcomes  have  been  more  mixed  as 
productivity has been reined in by temporary factors in the aftermath of the COVID-
19 crisis, including persistent labour hoarding in some key sectors, and policies aimed 
at increasing employment. These have resulted in robust employment growth in recent 
years.  Labour  productivity  and  competitiveness  are  expected  to  improve  going 
forward,  helped  by  planned  investments  and  reforms,  which  should  underpin  debt 
deleveraging.  Private  sector  debt  increased  markedly  during  the  pandemic,  but  was 
accompanied by a rise in the household saving rate, and by increases in equity and the 
accumulation  of  liquidity  buffers  in  firms,  which  are  now  being  used.  Credit  for 

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Council Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 on the approval of the assessment of the recovery and 
resilience plan for France (ST 10162/21; ST 10162/21 ADD 1). 
Council Implementing Decision of 14 July 2023 amending the Implementing Decision of 13 July 2021 
on  the  approval  of  the  assessment  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan  for  France  (ST  11150/23;  ST 
11150/23). 
SWD(2024) 610 final. 
SWD(2024) 100 final. 

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corporate investment remains dynamic despite the tighter financial conditions. Public 
debt-to-GDP has edged down somewhat with the recovery in GDP since 2021, to just 
over  110%  in  2023.  It  is  projected  to  remain  broadly  stable  in  2024  but  to  increase 
again  in  2025  amid  continued  large  government  deficits.  The  policy  response  to  the 
identified  vulnerabilities  related  to  competitiveness  in  a  context  of  low  productivity 
growth  has  been  broadly  appropriate  and  should  support  productivity  growth  in 
coming years, but efforts need to continue. The implementation of the RRP will help 
to  further  address  the  competitiveness  challenges  while  improving  productivity 
growth. While policy action has been taken to strengthen public finances, more efforts 
are clearly needed to reduce the high public debt. The reformed Stability and Growth 
Pact,  including  the  application  of  the  Excessive  Deficit  Procedure,  offers  a  suitable 
and strong surveillance mechanism to address the fiscal sustainability risks. 

(11)  Based on data validated by Eurostat14, France’s general government deficit increased 
from 4.8% of GDP in 2022 to 5.5% in 202315, while the general government debt fell 
from 111.9% of GDP at the end of 2022 to 110.6% at the end of 2023. As announced 
in the fiscal policy guidance for 202416, the Commission is taking the first step for the 
opening of deficit-based excessive deficit procedures on the basis of the outturn data 
for  2023,  in  line  with  existing  legal  provisions.  On  19  June  2024,  the  Commission 
adopted  a  report  under  Article  126(3)  of  the  TFEU17.  That  report  assessed  the 
budgetary situation of France, as its general government deficit in 2023 exceeded the 
reference  value  of  3%  of  GDP.  The  report  concluded  that  in  the  light  of  this 
assessment,  and  after  considering  the  opinion  of  the  Economic  and  Financial 
Committee  as  established  under  article  126(4)  TFEU,  the  Commission  intends  to 
propose  in  July  to  open  an  excessive  deficit  procedure,  by  recommending  to  the 
Council  to  adopt  a  Decision  under  Article  126(6)  establishing  the  existence  of  an 
excessive deficit for France.   

(12)  On  12  July  2022,  the  Council  recommended18  that  France  ensure  in  2023  a  prudent 
fiscal  policy,  in  particular  by  limiting  the  growth  of  nationally  financed  primary 
current expenditure below medium-term potential output growth19, taking into account 
continued temporary and targeted support to households and firms most vulnerable to 
energy  price  hikes  and  to  people  fleeing  Ukraine.  At  the  same  time,  France  was 
recommended  to  stand  ready  to  adjust  current  spending  to  the  evolving  situation. 
France was also recommended to expand public investment for the green and digital 
transitions,  and  for  energy  security  taking  into  account  the  REPowerEU  initiative, 
including  by  making  use  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  other  Union 
funds.  In  2023,  according  to  the  Commission  estimates,  the  fiscal  stance20  was 

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Eurostat-Euro Indicators, 22.4.2024. 
The  increase  in  the  deficit  in  2023  was  mainly  driven  by  sizeable  revenue  shortfalls  and,  to  a  lesser 
extentlower than expected growth. 
COM(2023) 141 final. 
Report  from  the  Commission,  prepared  in  accordance  with  Article  126(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union, 19.6.2024, COM(2024)598 final. 
Council Recommendation of 12 July 2022 on the National Reform Programme of France and delivering 
a Council opinion on the 2022 National Reform Programme of France, OJ C 334, 1.9.2022, p. 79. 
Based on the Commission 2024 spring forecast, the medium-term potential output growth of France in 
2023 is estimated at 6.4% in nominal terms, based on the 10-year average real potential growth rate and 
the 2023 GDP deflator. 
The fiscal stance is defined as a measure of the annual change in the underlying budgetary position of 
the  general  government.  It  aims  to  assess  the  economic  impulse  stemming  from  fiscal  policies,  both 
those  that  are  nationally  financed  and  those  that  are  financed  by  the  EU  budget.  The  fiscal  stance  is 

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contractionary,  by  0.5%  of  GDP,  in  a  context  of  high  inflation.  The  growth  in 
nationally  financed  primary  current  expenditure  (net  of  discretionary  revenue 
measures) in 2023 provided a contractionary contribution to the fiscal stance of 0.3% 
of  GDP  and  was  in  line  with  the  Council  recommendation.  Expenditure  financed  by 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  grants  and  other  EU  funds  amounted  to  0.4%  of 
GDP  in  2023.  Nationally  financed  investment  amounted  to  4.1%  of  GDP  in  2023, 
representing  an  increase  of  0.1  percentage  points  as  compared  to  2022.  France 
financed additional investment through the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other 
EU funds. It financed public investment for the green and digital transitions, and for 
energy security, such as for the development and industrial deployment of renewable 
and  low-carbon  hydrogen  solutions,  innovation  projects  in  sustainable  agricultural 
systems, recycled materials, innovative buildings, digitalisation and decarbonisation of 
mobility  as  well  as  investments  for  the  thermal  renovation  of  buildings,  which  are 
partly funded by the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other EU funds. 

(13)  The key projections in the 2024 Stability Programme can be summarised as follows. 
The  macroeconomic  scenario  underpinning  the  budgetary  projections  foresees  real 
GDP growth at 1.0% in 2024 and 1.4% in 2025, while it projects CPI inflation at 2.5% 
in 2024 and 1.7% in 2025. The general government deficit is expected to decrease to 
5.1% of GDP in 2024 and 4.1% of GDP in 2025, while the general government debt-
to-GDP ratio is set to increase to 112.3% by the end of 2024 and 113.1% by the end of 
2025. After 2025, the general government deficit is projected to decrease gradually to 
3.6% of GDP in 2026 and 2.9% in 2027. Therefore, the general government balance is 
planned  to  go  below  the  3%  of  GDP  deficit  reference  value  in  2027.  In  turn,  after 
2025, the general government debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to decrease gradually to 
112.9% in 2026 and 112.0% in 2027.  

(14)  The  Commission  Spring  2024  Forecast  projects  real  GDP  to  grow  by  0.7%  in  2024 
and 1.3% in 2025, and HICP inflation to stand at 2.5% in 2024 and 2.0% in 2025. 

(15)  The Commission Spring 2024 Forecast projects a government deficit of 5.3% of GDP 
in 2024, while the general government debt-to-GDP ratio is set to increase to 112.4% 
by the end of 2024. The decrease of the deficit in 2024 mainly reflects the withdrawal 
of  most  emergency  energy-related  measures  and  0.3%  of  GDP  expenditure  savings 
adopted in February, partly offset by the brisk projected increase in interest payments 
on  public  debt  to  around 2.0%  of  GDP,  pushed  by  higher  rates  on  new  issues. 
Moreover, the projection also includes the 0.1% of GDP impact of an exceptional tax 
on  energy  producers  and  financial  profits.  The  increase  of  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  in 
2024 mainly reflects the impact of a high primary deficit and rising interest payments, 
whereas  the  debt-reducing  effect  stemming  from  nominal  growth  would  be  more 
moderate than in recent years. Based on the Commission’s estimates, the fiscal stance 
is projected to be contractionary by 1.1% of GDP in 2024. 

(16)  Expenditure amounting to 0.2% of GDP is expected to be financed by non-repayable 
support  (“grants”)  from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  in  2024,  compared  to 
0.2%  of  GDP  in  2023,  according  to  the  Commission  Spring  2024  Forecast. 
Expenditure  financed  by  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  grants  will  enable  high-

measured as the difference between (i) the medium-term potential growth and (ii) the change in primary 
expenditure  net  of  discretionary  revenue  measures  (and  excluding  temporary  emergency  measures 
related to the COVID-19 crisis) and including expenditure financed by non-repayable support (grants) 
from  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  other  Union  funds.  A  negative  (positive)  sign  of  the 
indicator indicates an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy. 

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quality investment and productivity-enhancing reforms without a direct impact on the 
general government balance and debt of France. 

(17)  On  14  July  2023,  the  Council  recommended21  that  France  ensure  a  prudent  fiscal 
policy,  in  particular  by  limiting  the  nominal  increase  in  net  nationally  financed 
primary  expenditure22  in  2024  to  not  more  than  2.3%.  When  executing  their  2023 
budgets  and  preparing  their  Draft  Budgetary  Plans/budgets  for  2024,  Member  States 
were invited to take into account that the Commission would propose to the Council 
the opening of deficit-based excessive deficit procedures based on the outturn data for 
2023.  According  to  the  Commission  Spring  2024  Forecast,  France’s  net  nationally 
financed  primary  expenditure  is  projected  to  increase  by  1.8%  in  202423,  which  is 
below  the  recommended  maximum  growth  rate.  This  is in  line  with  what  was 
recommended by the Council.  

(18)  Moreover,  the  Council  recommended  that  France  take  action  to  wind  down  the 
emergency energy support measures in  force, using the related savings to  reduce the 
government  deficit,  as  soon  as  possible  in  2023  and  2024.  The  Council  further 
specified  that,  should  renewed  energy  price  increases  necessitate  new  or  continued 
support  measures,  France  should  ensure  that  these  were  targeted  at  protecting 
vulnerable  households  and  firms,  fiscally  affordable,  and  preserve  incentives  for 
energy savings. According to the Commission Spring 2024 Forecast, the net budgetary 
cost24 of emergency energy support measures is estimated at 0.9% of GDP in 2023 and 
projected  at  0.2%  in  2024,  and  0.0%  in  2025.  In  particular,  the  cap  on  regulated 
electricity prices, implemented via a decrease in the domestic tax on final  electricity 
consumption  (TICFE)  and  direct  subsidies  to  compensate  electricity  suppliers,  is 
assumed  to  remain  in  force  in  2024.  If  the  related  savings  were  used  to  reduce  the 
government deficit, as recommended by the Council, these projections would imply a 
fiscal  adjustment  of  0.6%  of  GDP  in  2024,  whereas  net  nationally  financed  primary 
expenditure25  provides  a  contractionary  contribution  to  the  fiscal  stance  of  1.0%  of 
GDP in that year. The emergency energy support measures are projected to be wound 
down  as  soon  as  possible  in  2023  and  2024.  This  is  in  line  with  what  was 
recommended by the Council. Moreover, the related savings are projected to be fully 
used  to  reduce  the  government  deficit.  This  is  also  in  line  with  the  Council 
recommendation.  

(19) 

In  addition,  the  Council  also  recommended  that  France  preserve  nationally  financed 
public  investment  and  ensure  the  effective  absorption  of  Recovery  and  Resilience 
Facility  grants  and  other  EU  funds,  in  particular  to  foster  the  green  and  digital 
transitions.  According  to  the  Commission  Spring  2024  Forecast,  nationally  financed 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

Council  Recommendation  of  14  July  2023  on  the  2023  National  Reform  Programme  of  France  and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2023 Stability Programme of France, OJ C 312, 1.9.2023, p. 86. 
Net primary expenditure is defined as nationally financed expenditure net of  (i) discretionary revenue 
measures, (ii) interest expenditure, (iii) cyclical unemployment expenditure, and (iv) and one-offs and 
other temporary measures. 
This  takes  into  account  0.0%  of  GDP  one-off  measures  in  2024,  as  well  as  -0.1%  of  GDP  in  2023 
relating to Court decisions. 
The figure represents the level of the annual budgetary cost of those measures, including revenue and 
expenditure and, where applicable, net of the revenue from taxes on windfall profits of energy suppliers. 
This contribution is measured as the change in general government primary expenditure, net of  (i) the 
incremental  budgetary 
impact  of  discretionary  revenue  measures,  (i)  one-offs,  (iii)  cyclical 
unemployment  expenditure  and  (iv)  expenditure  financed by  non-repayable  support  (grants)  from  the 
Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  and  other  EU  funds,  relative  to  the  medium-term  (10-year)  average 
potential nominal GDP growth rate, expressed as a ratio to nominal GDP. 

EN 

7 

  EN 

 
public investment is projected to remain stable at 4.1% of GDP in 2024. This is in line 
with  what  was  recommended  by  the  Council.  In  turn,  public  expenditure  financed 
from  revenues  from  EU  funds,  including  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  grants,  is 
expected to remain stable at 0.4% of GDP in 2024. 

(20)  Based on policy measures known at the cut-off date of the forecast and on a no-policy-
change  assumption,  the  Commission  Spring  2024  Forecast  projects  a  government 
deficit  of  5.0%  of  GDP  in  2025.  The  decrease  of  the  deficit  in  2025  at  unchanged 
policies  mainly  reflects  the  expected  growth  rebound.  The  general  government  debt-
to-GDP ratio is set to increase to 113.8% by the end of 2025. The increase of the debt-
to-GDP ratio is mainly driven by high primary deficits and rising interest payments. 

(21)  Tax  expenditures  in  France  are  numerous  and  imply  a  heavy  budgetary  burden.  The 
budget  law  for  2023  estimated  that  the  budgetary  cost  of  the  465  listed  tax 
expenditures in 2022 amounted to EUR 88 billion (3.3% of GDP), excluding the effect 
of  the  tax  credit  on  employment  and  competitiveness  (crédit  d'impôt  pour  la 
compétitivité et l'emploi, CICE), which was withdrawn in 2019. In particular, the tax 
credit on research  (crédit  d’impôt  recherche,  some EUR 7 billion), the tax credit for 
home  employees  (crédit  d’impôt  pour  l'emploi  d'un  salarié  à  domicile,  EUR  5.7 
billion), the 10% allowance on pensions and retirement arrangements (abattement de 
10 % sur les pensions et retraites, EUR 4.4 billion) and the 10% rate for improvement, 
conversion,  fitting-out  and  maintenance  works  (taux  de  10  %  pour  les  travaux 
d’amélioration,  de  transformation,  d’aménagement  et  d’entretien,  EUR  4.3  billion) 
were  the  largest  ones  in  the  2023  budget  law.  Since  2013,  despite  many  attempts  to 
control  the  cost  and  number  of  tax  expenditures,  they  have  increased  by  more  than 
16%  in  real  terms.  While  tax  expenditures  may  be  motivated  by  economic  or  social 
policy objectives, they are not necessarily the most cost-efficient instrument and may 
in some cases lead to severe economic distortions. As signalled by the French Court of 
Auditors,  tax  expenditures  reduce  the  efficiency  and  transparency  of  the  French  tax 
system,  introduce  a  significant  degree  of  complexity  and,  more  broadly,  induce 
allocative  efficiency  losses  due  to  the  distortion  in  individual  decisions.  The 
multiannual  public  finance  programming  law  for  2023-2027,  adopted  in  November 
2023, introduced specific provisions to limit the budgetary impact of tax expenditures, 
control their number and make them more efficient, while also aiming to improve the 
transparency  of  communication  to  Parliament  in the  context  of  the  annual  budgetary 
process.  However,  past  attempts  have  shown  limited  success  in  reducing  tax 
complexity  and  the  budgetary  cost  associated  with  tax  expenditures.  As  tax 
expenditures by definition fall outside the scope of the established budgetary controls 
on  expenditure,  their  containment  would  require  a  similar  degree  of  monitoring, 
complementary to the spending review initiated by the government under the recovery 
and resilience plan.  

(22)  At  57.3%  of  GDP  in  2023,  France’s  public  expenditure  remains  well  above  the  EU 
average.  The  Commission  2024  spring  forecast  projects  a  similar  gap  in  2024  and 
2025.  Hence,  fiscal  consolidation  in  France  calls  for  decisive  action  on  public 
spending. The new spending review mechanism, adopted with the 2023 budget law in 
the  context  of  the  recovery  and  resilience  plan,  has  the  potential  to  support  such 
consolidation and public debt reduction. The main objective of this new mechanism is 
to conduct regular evaluations of public spending aiming to identify the most efficient 
expenditures favouring growth,  social inclusion and the green and digital transitions, 
while  attaining  expenditure  savings  where  inefficiencies  are  detected.  A  first  report 
with  concrete proposals  was submitted to  the Parliament in  July  2023. However, the 

EN 

8 

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(23) 

translation  into  concrete  and  quantified  saving  measures  in  the  2024  budget  law 
appears  limited.  Going  forward,  fiscal  consolidation  would  benefit  from  regular 
integration of quantified expenditure saving targets from spending reviews into future 
annual and multiannual budgetary planning. 

In accordance with Article 19(3), point (b), and Annex V, criterion 2.2 of Regulation 
(EU) 2021/241, the recovery and resilience plan includes an extensive set of mutually 
reinforcing reforms and investments to be implemented by 2026. These are expected 
to  help  effectively  address  all  or  a  significant  subset  of  challenges  identified  in  the 
relevant  country-specific  recommendations.  Within  this  tight  timeframe,  proceeding 
swiftly  with  the  effective  implementation  of  the  plan,  including  the  REPowerEU 
chapter, is essential to boost France’s long-term competitiveness through the green and 
digital transition, while ensuring social fairness. To deliver on the commitments of the 
plan  by  August  2026,  it  is  essential  for  France  to  continue  the  implementation  of 
reforms and investments. The systematic involvement of local and regional authorities, 
social  partners,  civil  society  and  other  relevant  stakeholders  remains  essential  to 
ensure  broad  ownership  for  the  successful  implementation  of  the  recovery  and 
resilience plan.  

(24)  As  part  of  the  mid-term  review  of  the  cohesion  policy  funds,  in  accordance  with 
Article  18  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/1060,  France  is  required  to  review  each 
programme  by  March  2025,  taking  into  account,  among  other  things,  the  challenges 
identified in the 2024 country-specific recommendations, as well as its national energy 
and climate plan. This  review  forms the basis for the definitive allocation of the EU 
funding  included  in  each  programme.  While  France  has  made  progress  in 
implementing  cohesion  policy  and  the  European  Pillar  of  Social  Rights,  challenges 
remain.  In  2023,  France  registered  moderate  growth  across  the  country,  albeit  with 
significant  persisting  differences  across  regions,  some  of  which  show  long-term 
sluggish  growth.  There  are  considerable  development  disparities  between  outermost 
and metropolitan regions, as well as between urban and non-urban areas. Accelerating 
the implementation of cohesion policy programmes is crucial. The priorities agreed in 
the programmes remain relevant. It is particularly important to continue supporting the 
research,  development  and  innovation  activities  at  regional  level,  in  particular  by 
boosting  regional  innovation  ecosystems,  strategic  skills  and  attracting  talent.  The 
need to increase the digitalisation and innovation capacity of businesses, especially in 
regions  in  a  development  trap,  also  deserves  specific  attention.  Priorities  that 
contribute  to  the  green  transition  remain  key,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the 
production of renewable energy, the development of smart energy systems and energy 
efficiency  measures,  and  climate  change  adaptation.  In  the  outermost  regions,  the 
supply  of  drinking  water,  wastewater  treatment  and  municipal  waste  collection  and 
management remain fundamental. The active inclusion of disadvantaged groups such 
as  people  with  a  migrant  background  remains  important,  as  well  as  targeted 
investments  in  upskilling  and  reskilling  in  line  with  labour  market  needs  and  with 
particular attention to disadvantaged groups. It is also key to continue anti-poverty and 
social  inclusion  measures,  with  particular  attention  to  children,  access  to  affordable 
housing  and  the  prevention  of  housing  evictions.  France  could  also  make  use  of  the 
industrial 
Strategic  Technologies  for  Europe  Platform 
transformation. France could in particular further develop the skills, technologies and 
infrastructure needed and stimulate the involvement in new strategic value chains (net-
zero industry, critical raw materials, decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries). 

to  support 

initiative 

EN 

9 

  EN 

(25)  Beyond the economic and social challenges addressed by the recovery and resilience 
plan  and  other  EU  funds,  France  faces  several  additional  challenges  related  to  skills 
shortages,  inequalities  in  the  education  system  and  the  deterioration  of  educational 
outcomes, teachers’ working conditions and training, and also challenges related to the 
business environment, research, development and innovation and the green transition. 
Tackling  these  challenges  would  help  boost  the  skills  of  workers  and  learning 
outcomes  and  increase  labour  productivity.  In  addition,  it  could  also  improve  the 
efficiency of French businesses, in turn increasing the competitiveness of the French 
economy.  Further  boosting  competitiveness  and  labour  productivity  would  also 
contribute to underpinning the sustainability of public finances.  

(26)  The shortage of skilled workers is among the main obstacles to recruitment. In 2022, 
this  was  particularly  the  case  in  industry,  the  ICT  and  health  sectors  as  well  as  in 
occupations  that  require  skills  for  the  green  transition26.  In  addition,  45%  of  French 
small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs)  reported  finding  it  very  difficult  to  hire 
staff with the right skills, against 38% in the EU. 83% of French firms cite labour and 
skills  shortages  as  one  of  the  main  barriers  to  investment,  against  81%  in  the  EU. 
Moreover,  the  lack  of  adequate  skills  hampers  investments  in  the  decarbonisation  of 
industry.  Despite  investment  in  upskilling  and  reskilling  workers,  also  supported  by 
the Recovery and Resilience Facility, difficulties remain, in particular in reaching the 
low-skilled27  and targeting entries into training for priority sectors. The evaluation of 
past and recent investments, such as the Skills Investment Plan (plan d’investissement 
dans les compétences), highlights that only 25% of training concerns a priority sector 
and  20%  of  training  targets  occupations  suffering  from  skills  shortages.  Also,  only 
around 25% of low-qualified adults participated in learning in 2022. The effectiveness 
of  measures  that  support  upskilling  and  reskilling  may  suffer  from  the  declining 
performance in  the educational  system, as  basic skills  form  the basis  to benefit from 
further  education  and  training.  While  the  Skills  Investment  Plan  has  been  renewed 
until 2027, the means dedicated to it have decreased.  

(27)  Despite  high  public  spending  on  education,  the  French  education  system  recently 
registered  a  noticeable  decline  in  performance,  further  marked  by  the  significant 
impact  of  the  socio-economic  background  of  pupils.  According  to  the  2022 
Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA)  survey,  28.8%  of  15-year-
olds  underperformed  in  mathematics  in  France  vs  29.5%  in  the  EU,  26.9% 
underperformed in reading vs 26.2% in the EU and 23.8% underperformed in science 
vs  24.2%  in  the  EU.  This  results  in  scores  around  the  EU  average,  which  has  also 
worsened  considerably.  The  share  of 
increased 
significantly  since 2018  in  all three subjects.  At  the same time, there is  a significant 
decline in the share of top-performing students, especially in mathematics and reading. 
The  declining  proficiency  in  basic skills  is  further pronounced  among  disadvantaged 
15-year-old  students,  including  those  with  a  migrant  background  who  face  twice  the 
risk  of  underachievement  than  their  native-born  peers  with  native-born  parents. 
Improving  the  students’  performance  in  basic  skills  is  crucial,  starting  from  an  early 
age.  Total  expenditure  on  primary  education  in  France  is  slightly  lower  than  in  the 
OECD  on  average28.  Several  measures  were  implemented  in  recent  years  to  reduce 
inequalities  at  school,  such  as  the  halving  of  class  size  in  ‘priority  education  areas’. 

low-achieving  students  has 

26 
27 
28 

DARES, ‘Les tensions sur le marché du travail en 2022’, Dares Resultats n°59, November 2023. 
Persons with at most lower secondary education (i.e. ISCED 0-2). 
https://data.oecd.org/eduresource/education-spending.htm#indicator-chart.  

EN 

10 

  EN 

 
While  first  evaluations  point  to  the  measure’s  positive  impact  on  the  educational 
outcomes of pupils, it does not benefit the 70% of disadvantaged pupils living outside 
the priority areas. In 2023, the Ministry of Education encouraged a better social mix in 
schools by setting a non-binding target to reduce social segregation in public schools 
by  20%  by  2027  and  signing  a  memorandum  of  understanding  with  private  schools. 
Moreover, the measure adopted in September 2023, which introduced a weekly hour 
of differentiated teaching in French and mathematics for all pupils, has the potential to 
strengthen basic skills. However, the impact of these measures on learning outcomes 
still needs to be felt, and further evaluations will be warranted. Adapting resources and 
methods  to  local  circumstances  and  students’  needs  could  further  help  improve  the 
performance and equity of the education system. 

(28)  Although teachers benefited from a pay rise in 2023, concerns over the attractiveness 
of  the  profession  remain,  and  teacher  shortages  weigh  on  educational  outcomes. 
France has one of the highest student/teacher ratios in the EU. In addition, increasing 
the reliance on temporary teachers with lower levels of qualifications and experience 
and lower access to training than permanent ones could affect teaching quality. Steps 
have  been  taken  to  improve  teaching  conditions,  including  the  reinforcement  of 
training in French and mathematics for primary teachers. Nevertheless, there is scope 
to  further  expand  these  measures,  notably  by  better  aligning  initial  and  continuous 
training  with  the  evolving  needs  of  all  students  and  providing  teachers  and  schools 
with greater autonomy. In particular, while OECD report29  shows that giving schools 
a high degree of autonomy can have a positive impact on pupils’ performance (when 
coupled  with  accountability),  the  Court  of  Auditors  warns  that  in  practice  head 
teachers have limited scope to adapt to students’ needs and local circumstances30.  

(29)  Despite several reforms for administrative simplification, firms in France still perceive 
the  administrative  burden  as  heavy,  which  weighs  on  innovation  and  productivity. 
According to a 2022 survey, 49% of businesses find the complexity of administrative 
procedures to be ‘a very serious problem’ (among the highest percentages in the EU 
and above  the EU average of  33%)31. France estimates  that the excessive number of 
rules  costs  at  least  3%  of  GDP  per  year32.  In  line  with  the  suggestions  of 
stakeholders33   to  ease  the  administrative  burden,  priority  could  be  given  to  limiting 
the  number  of  documents  that  have  to  be  submitted  (‘tell-us-only-once  principle’), 
generalising the digitalisation of procedures while maintaining a point of direct contact 
with the administration. Priority could also be given to either replacing  authorisation 
schemes with simple declarations of compliance with applicable conditions or, for the 
more  sensitive  sectors,  simplifying  authorisations  by  reducing  decision  times  and 
adopting tacit approval where it is not yet applicable.   

29 

30 

31 

32 

33 

Lastra-Anadón, C. and S. Mukherjee (2019), "Cross-country evidence on the impact of decentralisation 
and school autonomy on educational performance", OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism, No. 
26, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c3d9b314-en.  
Cour  des  comptes,  Mobiliser  la  communauté  éducative  autour  du  projet  d’établissement,  Rapport 
public thématique, 2023. 
European Commission,  Flash Eurobarometer 507, Businesses’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU, 
Report, July 2022, p. 58. 
See  the  simplification  action  plan  of  April  2024,  available  at  https://presse.economie.gouv.fr/plan-
daction-simplification/, p. 8. 
See  the  final  report  of  the  consultation  of  January  2024,  Entrepreneuses,  entrepreneurs  :  quelles 
at 
mesures 
https://www.economie.gouv.fr/actualites/mesures-consultation-simplification-entreprises. 

concrètes 

simplifier 

available 

pour 

vous 

vie 

?, 

la 

EN 

11 

  EN 

 
(30)  France provides substantial  public  funding to  support business  R&D  and innovation. 
Among  the  EU  countries,  it  devotes  one  of  the highest  shares  of  its  GDP  to  support 
business R&D (0.45% of GDP in 2021)34. However, business R&D is stagnating and 
remains below the EU average (1.43% of GDP in 2022). According to the 2023 EIB 
Investment Survey, only 30% of French firms (99.8% of which are SMEs) invested in 
developing new products, processes and services. This is one of the lowest shares in 
the  EU.  Against  a  background  of  stagnating  academia-business  cooperation-related 
indicators35  and  declining  attractiveness  of  academic  careers, 
the  Research 
Programming Law and other announced measures, some of which are included in the 
recovery  and  resilience  plan,  are  expected  to  improve  the  efficiency  of  the  research 
system  by  strengthening  the  link  between  science  and  the  economy,  and  making 
research careers more attractive. Nevertheless, the impact of these measures will take 
time to materialise and then be visible in the indicators. A costly tax credit on research 
is  in  place,  although  evaluations  revealed  major  weaknesses36.  The  evaluation 
conducted  by  the  National  Commission  for  the  Evaluation  of  Innovation  Policies  in 
2021  indicated  that  the  scheme  had  no  significant  effects  on  larger  firms,  despite 
support being concentrated on them. There is therefore scope to better target this R&D 
scheme in order to increase R&D output, while containing its costs. Other measures to 
support  innovation  are  much  smaller,  but  better  target  SMEs.  They  include  in 
particular  the  innovation  tax  credit  and  the  status  of  young  innovative  companies 
(Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes), which provides social and fiscal benefits for start-ups 
that meet specific R&D intensity and growth criteria.  

(31) 

In the French energy mix, the share of fossil fuels somewhat increased in 2022, while 
the share of renewables was a low 14.6%. In addition, France missed its EU objective 
for  2020  on  renewable  energy  with  a  significant  shortfall.  Despite  an  increase  in 
installed renewable capacity in 2022 driven by the significant increase in solar energy, 
France  is  lagging  behind  on  deploying  renewable  energy,  especially  for  electricity 
production  and  heating,  with  a  view  to  the  2030  targets.  In  a  context  where  the 
additional nuclear power plants announced would take time to build and electrification 
needs  are  expected  to  grow  fast37,  the  swift  deployment  of  renewables  would 
contribute  to  France’s  energy  security  of  supply  while  reducing  its  dependence  on 
fossil  fuels.  In  March  2023,  France  enacted  a  law  on  the  acceleration  of  renewable 
energy production, which entails a time-bound bottom-up identification of ‘renewables 
acceleration  areas’  by  the  municipalities.  Its  swift  implementation  is  warranted. 
However,  by  mid-April  2024  less  than  20%  of  the  municipalities  had  embarked  on 
identifying these areas. Moreover, one of the implementing acts has still not set out the 

34 

35 

36 

37 

Commission calculations. The support is a sum of tax incentives amounting to 0.28% of GDP (OECD 
data,  last  updated  in  April  2024)  and  of  direct  support  (through  grants,  etc.)  amounting  to  0.16%  of 
GDP (Eurostat data, last updated on 17 March 2024). 
Namely, public-private scientific co-publications as % of total number of publications (source: Science-
Metrix,  August  2023);  public  expenditure  on  R&D  financed  by  businesses  (national)  as  %  of  GDP 
(source: Eurostat, rd_e_gerdfund); and public expenditure on R&D financed by businesses (national) as 
% of total public expenditure on R&D (source: Eurostat). 
OECD  (2020),  ‘How  effective  are  R&D  tax  incentives?  New  evidence  from  the  OECD  microBeRD 
project’, Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Note, OECD, Paris.  
Conseil  d’analyse  économique  (2022),  Focus  N°090-2022  ‘Renforcer  l’impact  du  Crédit  d’impôt 
recherche’ Philippe Aghion, Nicolas Chanut et Xavier Jaravel. 
RTE 
(https://assets.rte-
france.com/prod/public/2023-10/2023-10-02-bilan-previsionnel-2023-principaux-resultats.pdf),  see  in 
particular p. 31. 

(2023)  Bilan  prévisionnel  2023,  French  power 

system  outlook 

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12 

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regionalised objectives of the multiannual energy plan (programmation pluriannuelle 
de  l’énergie),  which  is  not  yet  published.  There  is  also  still  a  need  to  simplify 
connection  procedures 
the  distribution  grid  for  self-consumption.  Further 
investment  in  electricity  grids  and  flexibility  solutions  such  as  storage  are  needed  to 
integrate increased volumes of renewable energy and ensure security of supply.  

to 

(32) 

In view of the close interlinkages between the economies of euro area Member States 
and of their collective contribution to the functioning of the Economic and Monetary 
Union,  in  2024  the  Council  recommended  that  the  euro  area  Member  States  take 
action,  including  through  their  recovery  and  resilience  plans,  to  implement  the 
recommendation  on 
the  euro  area.  For  France, 
recommendations  (1),  (2),  (3)  and  (4)  help  implement  the  first,  second,  third  and 
fourth euro area recommendations.  

the  economic  policy  of 

HEREBY RECOMMENDS that France take action in 2024 and 2025 to:  

1. 

2. 

3. 

Submit  the  medium-term  fiscal-structural  plan  in  a  timely  manner.  In  line  with  the 
requirements  of  the  reformed  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  limit  the  growth  in  net 
expenditure38 in 2025 to a rate consistent with putting the general government  debt 
on a plausibly downward trajectory over the medium term and reducing the general 
government  deficit  towards  the  3%  of  GDP  Treaty  reference  value.  Reduce  the 
complexity of the tax system by better targeting tax expenditures, removing the least 
efficient  ones  and  limiting  their  overall  budgetary  impact.  Continue  the  efforts  to 
enhance  the  quality  of  budgetary  measures,  including  by  setting  up  quantitative 
targets  for  expenditure  savings  in  budgetary  planning  within  the  established 
framework for spending reviews. 

Continue with the swift and effective implementation of the recovery and resilience 
plan,  including  the  REPowerEU  chapter,  ensuring  completion  of  reforms  and 
investments  by  August  2026.  Accelerate  the  implementation  of  cohesion  policy 
programmes.  In  the  context  of  their  mid-term  review,  continue  focusing  on  the 
agreed  priorities,  while  considering  the  opportunities  provided  by  the  Strategic 
Technologies for Europe Platform initiative to improve competitiveness.  

Further address skills shortages, including in green transition occupations, and foster 
participation  in  training,  in  particular  among  the  low-skilled.  Improve  the 
performance and equity of the education system. Strengthen the teaching profession, 
including by improving working conditions and training.  

38 

According  to  Article  2(2)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2024/1263,  ‘net  expenditure’  means  government 
expenditure net of interest expenditure, discretionary revenue measures, expenditure on programmes of 
the  Union  fully  matched  by  revenue  from  Union  funds,  national  expenditure  on  co-financing  of 
programmes funded by the Union, cyclical elements of unemployment benefit expenditure, and one-offs 
and other temporary measures. 

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4. 

Improve  the  business  environment  by  reducing  the  administrative  burden.  Foster 
business  R&D  intensity,  including  by  better  targeting  public  support  schemes. 
Accelerate the energy transition by deploying renewable energies faster, including by 
adopting  secondary  legislation,  setting  up  the  ‘renewables  acceleration  areas’  and 
promoting storage technologies.  

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

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