COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard
Date: 2024-06-11
Institutions: Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, EU statistics, access to the courts, application of EU law, digitisation, electronic government, independence of the judiciary, judicial proceedings, judicial reform, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 11.6.2024  COM(2024) 950 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard  
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION  

Effective  justice  systems  are  essential  for  the  application  and  enforcement  of  EU  law  and 
upholding the rule of law and other values the EU is founded on and which are common to the 
Member States. National courts act as EU courts when applying EU law. It is national courts in 
the first place that ensure that the rights and obligations  set in EU law are enforced effectively 
(Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). 

In  addition,  effective  justice  systems  are  also  essential  for  mutual  trust  and  for  improving  the 
investment  climate  and  the  sustainability  of  long-term  growth.  This  is  why  improving  the 
efficiency, quality and independence of national justice systems features among the priorities of 
the European Semester – the EU’s annual cycle of economic policy coordination. The 2024 annual 
sustainable growth survey (1), which sets out the economic and employment policy priorities for 
the  EU,  confirms  the  link  between  effective  justice  systems  and  Member  States’  business 
environment, and an economy that works for people (2). Well-functioning and fully independent 
justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for investment protection, 
and therefore contribute to productivity and competitiveness. They are also important for ensuring 
the  effective  cross-border  enforcement  of  contracts,  administrative  decisions  and  dispute 
resolution, essential for the functioning of the single market (3). 

In this context, the EU Justice Scoreboard gives an annual overview of indicators focusing on the 
essential parameters of effective justice systems:  

efficiency;  

- 
-  quality;  
- 

independence.  

The  2024  Scoreboard  further  develops  the  indicators  for  all  three  aspects,  including  on 
arrangements for supporting the participation of persons with disabilities as professionals in the 
justice system, and on the digitalisation of justice, which has played a crucial role in keeping the 
courts functioning during the COVID-19 pandemic and supporting their recovery in its aftermath, 
as well as more generally, to promote efficient and accessible justice systems (4). This edition of 
the  Justice  Scoreboard  solidifies  the  business  dimension  on  all  three  aspects  by  continuing  the 
presentation  of  data  on  efficiency  in  the  area  of  the  fight  against  corruption.  Finally,  the  2024 
Scoreboard presents the next steps of the justice systems’ recovery from the effects of the COVID-
19 pandemic on the efficiency of these systems. 

1   COM(2023) 901 final. 
2   Respect for the rule of law, in particular independent, quality and efficient justice systems, legal certainty and 
equality before the law are also key determinants of a business environment that fosters investment and innovation. 
COM(2023) 901 final, p. 6. 

3   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Identifying and addressing barriers to the Single Market, 
COM(2020)93, and accompanying SWD(2020)54.  

4   See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities, COM(2020)710, and accompanying SWD(2020)540. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
− The Annual Rule of Law Cycle – 

As announced in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines, the Commission has established 
a comprehensive Annual Rule of Law Cycle to deepen its monitoring of the situation in Member 
States. The Rule of Law Cycle acts as a preventive tool, promoting dialogue and joint awareness 
of rule of law issues. At the centre of the cycle is the annual Rule of Law Report, which provides 
a synthesis of significant developments – both positive and negative – in all Member States and in 
the Union as a whole. The Reports, including its 2023 edition, published on 5 July 2023, draw on 
a variety of sources, including the EU Justice Scoreboard (5). The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard has 
also been further developed to reflect the need for additional comparative information identified 
during the preparation of the 2023 Rule of Law Report, so as to support forthcoming Rule of Law 
Reports, including in the area of the fight against corruption.  

What is the EU Justice Scoreboard?  

The EU Justice Scoreboard is an annual comparative information tool. Its purpose is to assist the EU and 
Member States improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems by providing objective, reliable 
and comparable data on a number of indicators relevant for the assessment of the (i) efficiency, (ii) quality 
and (iii) independence of justice systems in all Member States. It does not present an overall single ranking. 
Rather, it gives an overview of how all Member States’ justice systems function, based on indicators that 
are of common interest and relevance for all Member States. 
The Scoreboard does not promote any particular type of justice system and treats all Member States on an 
equal footing.  
Efficiency, quality and independence are essential parameters of an effective justice system, whatever the 
model  of  the  national  justice  system  or  the  legal  tradition  on  which  it  is  based.  Figures  for  these  three 
parameters should be read together, as all three are often interlinked (initiatives aimed at improving one 
may affect another).  
The Scoreboard mainly presents indicators concerning civil, commercial and administrative cases, as well 
as, subject to availability of data, certain criminal cases (i.e. cases concerning money laundering at first 
instance courts), in order to assist Member States in their efforts to create an environment which is more 
efficient, better for investments as well as business and citizen-friendly. The Scoreboard is a comparative 
tool  which  evolves  in  the  course  of  dialogue  with  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament  (6).  Its 
objective is to identify the essential parameters of an effective justice system and to provide relevant annual 
data. 

What is the methodology of the EU Justice Scoreboard? 

The Scoreboard uses a range of information sources. The Council of Europe’s European Commission for 
the  Efficiency  of  Justice  (CEPEJ),  with  which  the  Commission  has  concluded a  contract  to  carry  out a 
specific annual study, provides much of the quantitative data. The data cover 2012-2022, and have been 
provided by Member States in accordance with the CEPEJ’s methodology. The study also provides detailed 
comments and country-specific factsheets that give more context. They should be read together with the 
figures (7). 
Data on the length of proceedings collected by the CEPEJ show the ‘disposition time’ – a calculated length 
of  court  proceedings  (based  on  a  ratio  between  pending  and  resolved  cases).  Data  on  courts’  and 

5   https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en 
6   E.g. European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on the 2017 EU Justice Scoreboard (P8_TA(2018)0216). 
7   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-

justice-scoreboard_en  

2 

 
 
 
administrative  authorities’  efficiency  in  applying  EU  law  in  specific  areas  show  the  average  length  of 
proceedings derived from the actual length of court cases. Note that the length of court proceedings may 
vary  substantially  between  areas  in  a  Member  State,  particularly  in  urban  centres  where  commercial 
activities may lead to a higher caseload. 
Other data sources, covering the period from 2012 to 2023, are: the group of contact persons on national 
justice systems (8), the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (9), the Network of the 
Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (NPSJC) (10), the Association of the Councils of State 
and  Supreme  Administrative  Jurisdictions  of  the  EU  (ACA-Europe)  (11),  the  Council  of  Bar  and  Law 
Societies  in  Europe  (CCBE)  (12),  the  European  Competition  Network  (ECN)  (13),  the  Communications 
Committee (COCOM)(14), the European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights(15), 
the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network (CPC) (16), the Expert Group on Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing (EGMLTF) (17), Eurostat (18), and the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) (19), 
the national contact points in the fight against corruption (20), and the Network of Public Prosecutors or 
equivalent  institutions  at  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union 
(NADAL Network) (21). 

8   To  help prepare  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  and  promote  the  exchange of  best  practice on  the  effectiveness  of 
justice systems, the Commission asked Member States to designate two contact persons, one from the judiciary 
and one from the ministry of justice. This informal group meets regularly. 

9   The  ENCJ  brings  together  Member  States’  national  institutions  that  are  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislature,  and  are  responsible  for  supporting  the  judiciary  in  the  independent  delivery  of  justice: 
https://www.encj.eu/ 

10   The NPSJC provides a forum that gives European institutions the opportunity to request the opinions of supreme 
courts, and brings them closer by encouraging discussion and the exchange of ideas: http://network-presidents.eu/ 
11   ACA-Europe is composed of the Court of Justice of the EU and the Councils of State or the Supreme administrative 

jurisdictions of each EU Member State: https://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/  

12   CCBE  represents  European  bars  and  law  societies  in  their  common  interests  before  European  and  other 
international  institutions.  It  regularly  acts  as  a  liaison  between  its  members  and  the  European  institutions, 
international organisations, and other legal organisations around the world: https://www.ccbe.eu/  

13   The  ECN  has  been  established  as  a  forum  for  discussion  and  cooperation  between  European  competition 
authorities in cases where Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) are applied. 
The ECN is the framework for the close cooperation mechanisms of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 . Through 
the ECN, the Commission and the national competition authorities in all EU Member States cooperate with each 
other: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/index_en.html 

14   The COCOM is composed of EU Member State representatives. Its main role is to provide an opinion on the draft 
issues: 

measures 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/comitology-register/screen/committees/C15401/consult?lang=en  

Commission 

intends 

market 

digital 

adopt 

that 

the 

on 

to 

15   The European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is a network of experts and specialist 
stakeholders. It is composed of public and private sector representatives, who collaborate in active working groups: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home  

16   The CPC is a network of national authorities responsible for enforcing EU consumer protection laws in EU and 
EEA  countries:  https://commission.europa.eu/live-work-travel-eu/consumer-rights-and-complaints/enforcement-
consumer-protection/consumer-protection-cooperation-network_en  

17   The EGMLTF meets regularly to share views and help the Commission define policy and draft new anti-money 
legislation:  https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/expert-groups-

laundering  and  counter-terrorist 
register/screen/expert-groups/consult?lang=en&do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2914  

financing 

18   Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/  
19   The EJTN is the principal platform and promoter for the training and exchange of knowledge of the European 

judiciary: https://www.ejtn.eu/en/  

20   The Commission maintains an informal group of contact persons dealing with the fight against  corruption. See 
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/corruption/how-eu-helps-member-states-fight-

also 
corruption_en. 

21   https://attorneygeneral.mt/activities/nadal-network-conference/ 

3 

 
 
 
Over the years, the Scoreboard methodology has been further developed and refined in close cooperation 
with the group of contact persons on national justice systems, particularly through a questionnaire (updated 
annually) and by collecting data on certain aspects of the functioning of justice systems. 
The  availability  of  data,  in  particular  for  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  justice  systems,  continues  to 
improve. This is because many Member States have invested in their capacity to produce better judicial 
statistics. Where difficulties in gathering or providing data persist, this is either due to insufficient statistical 
capacity, or because the national categories for which data are collected do not correspond exactly to the 
ones used for the Scoreboard. Only in very few cases is the data gap due to a lack of contributions from 
national authorities. The Commission continues to encourage Member States to further reduce this data 
gap. 

How  does  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  feed  into  the  European  Semester  and  how  is  it  related  to  the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)? 

the  shortcomings 

the  stakeholders  concerned.  Where 

The Scoreboard provides elements for assessing the efficiency, quality and independence of national justice 
systems. In doing so, it aims to help Member States make their national justice systems more effective. By 
comparing information on Member States’ justice systems, the Scoreboard makes it easier to identify best 
practices  and  shortcomings  and  to  keep  track  of  challenges  and  progress  made.  In  the  context  of  the 
European  Semester,  country-specific  assessments  are  carried  out  through  a  bilateral  dialogue  with  the 
national  authorities  and 
identified  have 
macroeconomic significance, the European Semester analysis may lead to the Commission proposing to 
the  Council  to  adopt  country-specific  recommendations  to  improve  the  national  justice  systems  in 
individual Member States (22). The RRF has made available more than EUR 648 billion in loans and non-
repayable financial support, of which each Member State would need to allocate a minimum of 20% to the 
digital transition and a minimum of 37% to measures contributing to climate objectives. So far, the reforms 
and  investments  proposed  by  Member  States  have  exceeded  these  targets,  with  an  estimated  digital 
expenditure  at  26%  and  climate  expenditure  at  about  40%.  The  RRF  offers  an  opportunity  to  address 
country-specific recommendations related to national justice systems and to accelerate national efforts to 
complete the digital transformation of justice systems. Payments to Member States under the performance-
based RRF are contingent on the fulfilment of milestones and targets. 7 100 milestones and targets were 
proposed, of which about two thirds are related to investments and one third to reforms. Under the RRF 
Regulation, before their adoption, the Commission had to assess whether the Member States’ recovery and 
resilience plans (RRPs) could contribute to effectively addressing all or a significant number of challenges 
identified in the relevant country-specific recommendations or challenges identified in other Commission 
documents adopted in the context of the European Semester (23). Following pre-financing payments as well 
as payment requests by the Member States and positive assessments by the Commission on the satisfactory 
fulfilment of the respective milestones and targets24, a total of EUR 224.32 billion in RRF grants and loans 
have been disbursed to the Member States in the last years. The fulfilment of 83% of milestones and targets 
remains to be assessed by the Commission.  
Why are effective justice systems important for an investment-friendly business environment? 

22   In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed 
country-specific recommendations on their justice systems to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, 
PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK).  There were no country-
specific recommendations in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF processes. In 2022, there were two Member States (PL 
and HU) with country specific recommendations related to judicial independence.  

23   Article 19(3)(b) and Article 24(3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the 

Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17. 

24   It is to be noted that the EU Justice Scoreboard is one of the sources of information feeding into the European 
Semester. This information does not prejudge the Commission’s assessments of the fulfilment of milestones under 
the RRF. 

4 

 
 
 
Effective justice systems that uphold the rule of law have a positive economic impact, which is particularly 
relevant in the context of the European Semester and the RRF. Where and when judicial systems guarantee 
the enforcement of rights, creditors are more likely to lend, transaction costs are reduced and businesses are 
more likely to invest, have higher confidence and are dissuaded from opportunistic behaviour. In fact,an 
effective justice system is vital for sustained economic growth. It can improve the business climate, foster 
innovation,  attract  foreign  direct  investment,  secure  tax  revenues  and  support  economic  growth.  The 
benefits of well-functioning national justice systems for the economy  are confirmed by a wide range of 
studies  and  academic  literature  (25),  including  from  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  (26),  the 
European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  (27),  the  European  Network  of  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (28),  the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (29), the World Economic Forum (30), 
and the World Bank (31). 
A study has found a strong correlation between a reduction in the length of court proceedings (measured in 
disposition time (32)) and the growth rate of the number of companies (33), and that a higher percentage – 
by 1% – of companies perceiving the justice system as independent correlates with higher firms’ turnover 
and greater productivity growth (34).  
Several surveys have also highlighted the importance of the effectiveness of national justice systems for 
companies.  For  example,  in  one  survey,  93%  of  large  companies  replied  that  they  systematically  and 
continuously review the rule of law conditions (including judicial independence) in the countries they invest 
in (35). In another survey, over half of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) replied that the cost and 
excessive length of judicial proceedings were the main reasons for not starting court proceedings over the 

25   “Justice and finance: Does judicial efficiency contribute to financial system efficiency?” Muhammad Atif Khan a, 
Fenyves: 

Shahid  Hussain,  Veronika 

Muhammad  Asif  Khan,  Mohammed  Arshad  Khan, 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845023001709  

26   IMF,  Regional  Economic  Outlook,  November  2017,  Europe:  Europe  Hitting  its  Stride,  p.  xviii,  pp.  40,  70: 

https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/REO/EUR/2017/November/eur-booked-print.ashx?la=en  

27   ECB, ‘Structural policies in the euro area’, June 2018, ECB Occasional Paper Series No 210: 

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecb.op210.en.pdf?3db9355b1d1599799aa0e475e5624651  

28   European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and the Montaigne Centre for the Rule of Law and Administration 
of Justice of Utrecht University, ‘Economic value of the judiciary  – A pilot study for five countries on volume, 
large  commercial  cases’,  June  2021:  https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-
value  and  duration  of 
1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/Reports/Economic%20value%20of%20te%20judiciary%20-
%20pilot%20study.pdf  

29   See e.g. ‘What makes civil justice effective?’ OECD Economics Department Policy Notes, No. 18, June 2013 and 
‘The Economics of Civil Justice: New Cross-Country Data and Empirics’, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers, No. 1060, August 2013. 
Forum, 
Economic 

‘The  Global  Competitiveness  Report 

2019’,  October 

30   World 

2019: 

https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2019  

31   World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law, Chapter 3: The role of law’, pp.  83, 

140: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017  

32   The ‘disposition time’ indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the 
end of a year multiplied by 365 (days). It is a standard indicator developed by the Council of Europe’s European 
Commission 
(CEPEJ): 
Efficiency 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 

Justice 

the 

for 

of 

33   Vincenzo Bove and Leandro Elia, ‘The judicial system and economic development across EU Member States’, 
the  EU,  Luxembourg,  2017: 

JRC  Technical  Report,  EUR 28440  EN,  Publications  Office  of 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC104594/jrc104594__2017_the_judicial_system_and
_economic_development_across_eu_member_states.pdf 

34   Idem. 
35   The  Economist  Intelligence  Unit,  ‘Risk  and  Return  –  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  the  Rule  of  Law’,  2015 

http://www.biicl.org/documents/625_d4_fdi_main_report.pdf, p. 22. 

5 

 
 
 
infringement of intellectual property rights (IPR) (36). The Commission’s Communications on Identifying 
and addressing barriers to the single market (37) and the Single market enforcement action plan (38) also 
provide insights into the importance of effective justice systems for the functioning of the single market, in 
particular for businesses.  

How  does  the  Commission  support  the  implementation  of  good  justice  reforms  through  technical 
support? 

Member States can draw on the Commission’s technical support available through the Directorate-General 
for Structural Reform Support (DG REFORM) under the Technical Support Instrument (TSI) (39), with a 
total  budget  of  EUR  864.4  million for  2021 to  2027.  Since 2021,  the  TSI  has been supporting  projects 
directly linked to the effectiveness of justice, such as the digitalisation of justice, reforms of judicial maps 
or better access to justice. The 2024 TSI call for proposal included a Flagship Technical Support Project on 
“Reinforcing Democracy and the Rule of Law“, with the objective of strengthening the capacity of national 
authorities with the ensuing enhancement of their judicial systems as well as improving the quality and 
efficiency of justice systems. The TSI also complements other instruments, namely the RRF, since it can 
support Member States in the implementation of their recovery and resilience plans. The RRPs include 
actions related to making justice more effective: digitalising justice, reducing backlogs, and improving the 
management of courts and cases. 

How does the Justice programme support the effectiveness of justice systems? 

With a total budget of around EUR 305 million for the period 2021-2027, the justice programme supports 
the further development of the European area of Justice based on the rule of law including the independence, 
quality and efficiency of the justice system, based on mutual recognition and mutual trust, and on judicial 
cooperation. In 2023, around EUR 41.1 million were provided to fund projects and other activities under 
the three specific objectives of the programme: 

•  EUR 11.1 million were provided to promote judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and to 
contribute to the effective and coherent application and enforcement of EU instruments as well as to 
support to Member States for their connection to the ECRIS-TCN system, 

•  EUR 16 million were provided in support to training of justice professionals on EU civil, criminal and 

fundamental rights law, legal systems of the Member States and the rule of law, 

•  EUR 14 million were provided to promote access to justice (including e-Justice), victims’ rights and 
the rights of persons suspected or accused of crime as well as to support the development and use of 

36   EU 

Intellectual  Property  Office 

(EUIPO), 

Intellectual  Property 

(IP)  SME  Scoreboard  2016: 

https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/sme_scoreboard_study_2016/Executive-
summary_en.pdf 

37   COM(2020)93 and SWD(2020)54.  
38   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Long  term  action  plan  for  better  implementation  and 
enforcement of single market rules, COM(2020)94, in particular actions 4, 6 and 18.  
39   https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/programmes/tsi 

The TSI regulation was adopted in March 2021. According to its Article 5 the aim is to support: “….institutional 
reform and efficient and service-oriented functioning of public administration and e-government, simplification of 
rules  and  procedures,  auditing,  enhancing  capacity  to  absorb  Union  funds,  promotion  of  administrative 
cooperation, effective rule of law, reform of the justice systems, capacity building of competition and antitrust 
authorities,  strengthening  of  financial  supervision  and  reinforcement  of  the  fight  against  fraud,  corruption  and 
money laundering” (emphasis added). 

6 

 
 
 
digital tools and the maintenance and extension of the e-Justice portal (in complementarity with the 
Digital Europe Programme 

Why does the Commission monitor the digitalisation of national justice systems? 

Digitalisation of justice is key to increasing the effectiveness of justice systems and a highly efficient tool 
for facilitating access to justice and increasing the quality of justice. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought 
to the forefront the need for Member States to accelerate modernisation reforms in this area. 
Since 2013, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included certain comparative information on the digitalisation 
of justice across the Member States, for example in the areas of online access to judgments or online claim 
submission and follow-up. 
The  Commission’s  Communication  on  Digitalisation  of  justice  in  the  European  Union  –  A  toolbox  of 
opportunities (40), adopted in December 2020, presents a strategy aimed at improving access to justice and 
the  effectiveness  of  justice  systems  using  technology.  As  outlined  in  the  Communication,  a  number  of 
additional  indicators  were  included  in  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  as  of  2021.  The  purpose  is  to  ensure 
comprehensive and timely in-depth monitoring of progress areas and challenges encountered by Member 
States in  their efforts towards the  digitalisation  of  their justice  systems.  Regulation  (EU)  2023/2844  on 
digitalisation  of  cross-border  judicial  cooperation  in  civil,  commercial  and  criminal  matters  (41)  allows 
natural and legal persons to communicate electronically with competent judicial authorities in the context 
of  cross-border  proceedings,  as  well  as  to  pay  court  fees  electronically.  In  this  context,  the  Justice 
Scoreboard will monitor the progress achieved by Member States in the implementation of the Regulation. 

40   COM(2020) 710 final. 
41   Regulation  (EU)  2023/2844  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  December  2023  on  the 
digitalisation of judicial cooperation and access to justice in cross-border civil, commercial and criminal matters, 
and amending certain acts in the field of judicial cooperation, PE/50/2023/REV/1, OJ L, 2023/2844, 27.12.2023. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
2. 

CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENTS IN JUSTICE REFORMS IN 2023 

In  2023,  a  large  number  of  Member  States  continued  their  efforts  to  further  improve  the 
effectiveness  of  their  justice  systems.  Figure  1  presents  an  updated  overview  of  adopted  and 
planned measures across several areas of justice systems in Member States engaged in reforming 
their justice systems. 

Figure  1:  Legislative  and  regulatory  activity  concerning  justice  systems  in  2023  (adopted 
measures/initiatives under negotiation in each Member State) (source: European Commission (42)) 

In 2023, procedural law continued to be an area of particular focus in many Member States, with 
a significant amount of ongoing or planned legislative activity. Reforms concerning the rules for 
legal  professionals  and  the  status  of  judges  also  saw  significant  activity.  The  momentum  from 
preceding years on legislation for the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
continued in 2023. Five Member States are planning to use artificial intelligence in their justice 
systems,  however,  no  legislation  was  reportedly  adopted  in  2023.  The  overview  confirms  the 
observation  that  justice  reforms  require  time  –  sometimes  several  years  –  from  their 
announcement,  until  the  adoption  of  the  legislative  and  regulatory  measures  and  their 
implementation on the ground. 

42   This information has been collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems 
for 26 Member States. DE explained that a number of judicial reforms were under way, but that the scope and 
scale of the reform process can vary within the 16 federal states. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 

KEY FINDINGS OF THE 2024 EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD 

Efficiency, quality and independence are the main parameters of an effective justice system, for 
all three of which the Scoreboard presents indicators. 

3.1. Efficiency of justice systems 

The Scoreboard presents indicators for the efficiency of proceedings in the broad areas of civil, 
commercial and administrative cases  and in specific areas where administrative authorities and 
courts apply EU law (43).  

The efficiency related indicators in 2022, in particular the number of incoming cases, clearance 
rate and disposition time, showed the first results of the efforts for recovery from the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, which affected Member States in different ways (e.g. in terms of timing or 
severity) (44). 

3.1.1. Developments in caseload 

The caseload of national justice systems decreased notably in 3 Member States, compared to the 
previous year, while increasing or remaining stable in 23. Overall, it continues to vary considerably 
between Member States (Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Number of incoming civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2020 
– 2022 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study (45)) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases.  

43   The enforcement of court decisions is also important for the efficiency of a justice system. However, comparable 

data are not widely available. 

44   More  details on the individual Member States’ situation are  presented in  the  2022 study on the functioning of 
judicial  systems  in  the  EU  Member  States  –  country  profiles,  carried  out  by  the  CEPEJ  Secretariat  for  the 
Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-and-fundamental-rights/effective-justice/eu-justice-
scoreboard_en.  

45   2022 study on the functioning of judicial systems in the EU Member States, carried out by the CEPEJ Secretariat 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-

the  Commission: 

for 
rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents  

9 

 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of incoming civil and commercial litigious cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) 
(1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 4: Number of incoming administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/per 
100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study)  

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional 
or national authorities. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. Removal from judicial procedure 
of some administrative procedures occurred in RO in 2018. Methodology changes in EL, SK and SE. In SE, migration 
cases have been included under administrative cases (retroactively applied for 2017). 

10 

 
 
 
 
  
 
3.1.2. General data on efficiency 

The  indicators  on  the  efficiency  of  proceedings  in  the  broad  areas  of  civil,  commercial  and 
administrative cases are: (i) estimated length of proceedings (disposition time), (ii) clearance rate, 
and (iii) number of pending cases. 

− Estimated length of proceedings – 

The length of proceedings indicates the estimated time (in days) needed to resolve a case in court, 
meaning the time taken by the court to reach a decision at first instance. The ‘disposition time’ 
indicator is the number of unresolved cases divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of 
a year multiplied by 365 (days) (46). It is a calculated quantity that indicates the estimated minimum 
time that a court would need to resolve a case while maintaining the current working conditions. 
The higher the value, the higher is the probability that it takes the court longer to reach a decision. 
Figures mostly concern proceedings at first instance courts and compare, where available, data for 
2012, 2020, 2021 and 2022 (47). Figures 7 and 9 show the disposition time in 2022 in civil and 
commercial litigious cases, and administrative cases at all court instances. 

Figure 5: Estimated time needed to resolve civil, commercial, administrative and other cases 
in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, until 2016, 
in  SK. LV: the sharp decrease is due to court system reform, error checks and data clean-ups of the information 
system. PT: On 1 September 2013, the new Code of civil Procedure entered into force, establishing a new regime for 
the enforcement action in Portugal. It is based on a new paradigm, which states that the proceedings that are run in 
court  must  stand  out  clearly  from  those  who  run  out  of  court.  The  authorities  are  still  working  to  implement  the 
mechanism in question. However, so far it has not been possible to adapt the collection of data and thus not possible 
to provide the necessary data for this figure. 

46   Length of proceedings, clearance rate and number of pending cases are standard indicators defined by CEPEJ: 

http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp 

47   The  years were chosen to keep the eight-year perspective with 2012 as a  baseline, while at the same time not 
overcrowding the figures. Data for 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 are available in the CEPEJ 
report. 

11 

 
 
 
 
Figure  6:  Estimated  time  needed  to  resolve  litigious  civil  and  commercial  cases  at  first 
instance in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, litigious civil/commercial cases concern disputes between parties, e.g. disputes 
about  contracts.  Non-litigious  civil/commercial  cases  concern  uncontested  proceedings,  e.g.  uncontested  payment 
orders. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include all instances in CZ and, up to 2016, in SK. IT: 
the temporary slowdown of judicial activity due to  strict restrictive  measures to address the COVID-19 pandemic 
affected the disposition time. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 7: Estimated time needed to resolve litigious civil and commercial cases at all court 
instances in 2022 (*) (1st, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) The order is determined by the court instance with the longest proceedings in each Member State. No data are 
available for first and second instance courts in BE and BG, for second instance courts in NL, for second and third 
instance courts in AT or for third instance courts in DE and HR. There is no third instance court in DE and MT.. 
Access to a third instance court may be limited in some Member States.  

12 

 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at first instance in 2012, 2020 
– 2022 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Administrative law cases concern disputes between individuals and local, regional or national authorities, under 
the CEPEJ methodology. Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include courts of all instances in CZ 
and, until 2016, in SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. CY: in 2018, the number of resolved 
cases increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an administrative 
court was set up in 2015. 

Figure 9: Estimated time needed to resolve administrative cases at all court instances in 2022 
(*) (1st and, where applicable, 2nd and 3rd instance/in days) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  The  order  is  determined  by  the  court  instance  with  the  longest  proceedings  in  each  Member  State.  No  data 
available for second instance courts in BE, CZ, HU, MT, AT, PL, RO, SI, SK and FI, for third instance courts in 
CY, LT, LU and MT. The supreme, or other highest court, is the only appeal instance in CZ, IT, CY, AT, SI and FI. 
There is no third instance court for these types of cases in LT, LU and MT. The highest Administrative Court is the 
first and only instance for certain cases in BE. Access to third instance courts may be limited in some Member States. 
DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

13 

 
 
 
 
 
− Clearance rate – 

The clearance rate is the ratio of the number of resolved cases over the number of incoming cases. 
It measures whether a court is keeping up with its incoming caseload. When the clearance rate is 
around 100% or higher, it means the judicial system is able to resolve at least as many cases as 
come in. When the clearance rate is below 100%, it means that the courts are resolving fewer cases 
than the number of incoming cases. 

Figure 10: Rate of resolving civil, commercial, administrative and other cases in 2012, 2020 – 
2022 (*) (1st instance/in % — values higher than 100% indicate that more cases are resolved than 
come in, while values below 100% indicate that fewer cases are resolved than come in) (source: 
CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and  other  non-criminal  cases.  Methodology  changes  in  SK.  IE:  the  number  of  resolved  cases  is  expected  to  be 
underreported due to the methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

14 

 
 
 
Figure 11: Rate of resolving litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st 
instance/in %) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. IE: the number of resolved cases is expected to be underreported due to the 
methodology. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

Figure 12: Rate of resolving administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/in %) 
(source: CEPEJ study) 

(*)  Past  values  for  some  Member  States  have  been  reduced  for  presentation  purposes  (IT  in  2012=279.8%); 
Methodology changes in EL and SK. DK and IE do not record administrative cases separately. In CY, the number of 
resolved cases has increased because cases were tried together, 2 724 consolidated cases were withdrawn and an 
administrative court was set up in 2015. 

15 

 
 
 
 
 
 
− Pending cases – 

The number of pending cases expresses the number of cases that remains to be dealt with at the 
end of the year in question. It also affects disposition time. 

Figure 13: Number of pending civil, commercial and administrative and other cases in 2012, 
2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Under the CEPEJ methodology, this category includes all civil and commercial litigious and non-litigious cases, 
non-litigious land and business registry cases, other registry cases, other non-litigious cases, administrative law cases 
and other non-criminal cases. Methodology changes in SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances 
in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. 

Figure 14: Number of pending litigious civil and commercial cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) 
(1st instance/per 100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Methodology changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 
2016, in SK. IT: different classification of civil cases introduced in 2013. Data for NL include non-litigious cases. 

16 

 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Number of pending administrative cases in 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (1st instance/per 
100 inhabitants) (source: CEPEJ study) 

(*) Past values for some Member States have been reduced for presentation purposes (EL in 2012 = 3.5). Methodology 
changes in EL and SK. Pending cases include cases before courts of all instances in CZ and, until 2016, in SK. DK 
and IE do not record administrative cases separately. 

3.1.3. Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

This section complements the general data on the efficiency of justice systems and presents the 
average length of proceedings (48) in specific areas of EU law. The 2024 Scoreboard builds on 
previous data for competition, electronic communications, the EU trademark, consumer law and 
anti-money  laundering.  A  sixth  area  was  added  last  year,  to  include  data  on  anti-corruption 
proceedings, and this has been solidified with another year of data (49). The now six areas have 
been selected because of their relevance for the single market and the business environment. This 
edition continues with the overview of efficiency of administrative authorities with updated figures 
on  the  areas  of  competition  and  consumer  protection.  In  general,  long  delays  in  judicial  and 
administrative proceedings may have negative impacts on rights stemming from EU law e.g. when 
appropriate remedies are no longer available or serious financial damages become irrecoverable. 
For  business  in  particular,  administrative  delays  and  uncertainty  in  some  cases  can  lead  to 
significant costs and undermine planned or existing investments (50).  

48   The  length of proceedings in specific areas is calculated in calendar days, counting from the day on which an 
action or appeal was lodged before the court (or the indictment became final) until the day on which the court 
adopted  its  decision  (Figures  16-23).  Values  are  ranked  based  on  a  weighted  average  of  data  for  2013  and 
2020-2022 for Figures 16, 18, 19 and 20, and for 2014 and 2020-2022 for Figures 21 and 22. For Figure 17, data 
cover 2020-2021. For Figure 23, the data cover 2021-2022. Where data were not available for all years, the average 
reflects the available data presented in the chart, calculated based on all cases, a sample of cases or, in very few 
countries, estimations. 

49   Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

50   Figure 18 of the Retention and Expansion of Foreign Direct Investment, Political Risk and Policy Responses, 2019 

the World Bank Group. 

17 

 
 
 
 
– Competition – 

The effective enforcement of competition law is essential for an attractive business environment 
as it ensures a level playing field for businesses. It promotes economic initiative and efficiency, 
creates  a  wider  choice  for  consumers  and  helps  reduce  prices  and  improve  quality.  Figure  16 
presents the average length of cases brought against decisions of national competition authorities 
applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
(51).  Figure  17  presents  the  average  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national  competition 
authorities when applying Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. 

Figure  16:  Competition:  average  length  of  judicial  review  in  2013,  2020  –  2022  (*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Competition Network) 

(*) IE and AT: the scenario is not applicable as the authorities do not have powers to take respective decisions. AT: 
data include cases decided by the Cartel Court involving an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, but not based 
on appeals against the national competition authority. An estimation of length was used for IT. An empty column can 
indicate that the Member State reported no cases for the year in question. The number of cases is low (below five a 
year) in many Member States. This can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case (e.g. 
MT were there was only one case).  

51   See Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25, in particular 
Articles 3 and 5.  

18 

 
 
 
 
Figure  17:  Competition:  average  length  of  proceedings  before  the  national  competition 
authorities  in  2020-2022  (*)  (in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  European 
Competition Network) 

(*) The results for all three years (2020, 2021 and 2022) have been updated in light of an agreement between all 
Member States on when do they consider a case to be opened. For this reason, the data in the above figure cannot be 
compared to the data published in previous EU Justice Scoreboards. CZ: The administrative proceedings before the 
Czech NCA consist of two instances. The second instance represents the review procedure within the authority. After 
the adoption of the first instance decision, the parties to the proceedings have the right to lodge an appeal to the 
Chairman of the Czech NCA who then issues the second instance decision. The second instance decision of the Czech 
NCA’s Chairman is the subject to the judicial review.  DK: In 2021, there was a change in the Danish competition 
regime caused by the transposition of the ECN+ Directive. As part of this, there was a change in the fining system 
where fines changed from criminal to civil. Consequently, handling of court cases changed from being handled by the 
public prosecutor to being handled by the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (DCCA) which now brings 
the cases to the civil courts with a claim for a fine after the DCCA has made a decision on substance, i.e. that the 
undertaking has infringed the competition rules. As part of the introduction of civil fines, the DCCA now has the power 
to settle cases out of court with a civil fine in cases where the undertaking admits the infringement of the competition 
rules, there is case law on the level of the fine  for comparable infringements, and the infringement as well as the 
evidence for the infringement is clear. This new power has resulted in an increase of decisions made by the DCCA in 
2022. IT: In 2022, nine proceedings opened by the Italian Competition Authority (three under Article 101 TFEU and 
six  under  Article  102  TFEU)  are  not  taken  into  account  because  they  closed  with  undertakings.  In  2021,  six 
proceedings opened by the Italian Competition Authority (five under Article 101 TFUE and one under  Article 102 
TFUE)  are  not  taken  into  account  because  they  closed  with  undertakings.  Proceedings  I833  -  Gare  Consip  per 
acquisizione beni e servizi per informatica e telecomunicazioni –, opened by the Italian Competition Authority under 
Article 101 TFEU, are not taken into account because at the end of the proceedings did not find any breaches of 
Article 101 TFUE. CY: The length of proceedings is attributed to delays caused by recalls and re-examinations of 
cases and repetitions of procedures in order to comply with applicable administrative law and court decisions. Also, 
other factors that have contributed to the length of proceedings are the nature and complexity of the cases, the deadline 
extensions at the requests of the parties and the COVID-19 pandemic. LV: For 2020, this particular case was formally 
opened on 28 December 2018. Whereas only on 16 July 2020, it was recognised that the potential infringement may 
affect  trade  between  Member  States.  AT:  Competition  law  is  enforced  in  a  mixed  administrative/judicial  system, 
whereby the (administrative) Federal Competition Authority investigates cases of suspected infringements and, where 
appropriate, files applications to the (judicial) Cartel Court for decisions on the substance. The length of proceedings 
under  the  newly  agreed  methodology  therefore  now  covers  the  combined  duration  of  proceedings  before  the 
administrative NCA and the judicial NCA. Investigations and proceedings leading to decisions in 2021 and 2022 were 
impeded  and  delayed  by  the  effects  and  limitations  caused  by  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Moreover,  data  include 
proceedings  relating  to  a  large  scale  cartel  in  the  construction  sector.  Due  to  the  size  of  this  case  proceedings 

19 

 
 
 
 
triggered by the same first investigative measure were (and still are being) led and concluded successively, gradually 
distorting the average length of proceedings. PT: Regarding proceedings which have led to several final decisions in 
different dates (e.g. staggered decisions for different undertakings in the same case, either all settlement decisions or 
a combination of decisions involving the settlement and “normal” procedure), the NCA reports each decision (and 
respective  duration)  separately.  This  approach  follows  the  instructions  of  the  questionnaire,  which  requests  the 
number  of  final  decisions,  and  takes  into  account  the  efficiency  gains  achieved  in  the  proceedings  which  involve 
settlement  procedures.  SK:  There  is  a  two-instance  administrative  procedure  for  competition  law  matters.  The 
duration of proceedings was calculated from the first investigative measure until the final administrative decision of 
the second instance. 

– Electronic communications – 

The objective of EU electronic communications legislation is to raise competition, to contribute to 
the  development  of  the  single  market  and  to  generate  investment,  innovation  and  growth.  The 
positive effects for consumers can be achieved through effective enforcement of this legislation 
which can lead to lower prices for end users and better quality services. Figure 18 presents the 
average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against  the  decisions  of  national  regulatory  authorities 
applying EU law on electronic communications (52). It covers a broad range of cases, ranging from 
more complex ‘market analysis’ reviews to more straightforward consumer-focused issues.  

Figure 18: Electronic communications: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2020 – 2022 
(*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Communications Committee) 

(*) The number of cases varies from one Member State to another. An empty column indicates that the Member State reported no 
cases for the year (except PT for 2020, and RO no data). In some instances, the limited number of relevant cases (BG, CY, MT, 
NL, SK, FI, SE) can make the annual data dependent on one exceptionally long or short case and result in wide variations from 
one year to the next. DK: quasi-judicial body in charge of 1st instance appeals. EE: The average length of judicial review cases 
in 2013 was 18 days. ES, AT, and PL: different courts in charge depending on the subject matter.  

52   The  calculation  has  been  made  based  on  the  length  of  cases  of  appeal  against  national  regulatory  authority 
decisions  applying  national  laws  that  implement  the  EU  regulatory  framework  for  electronic  communications 
(Directives  2002/19/EC  (Access  Directive),  Directive  2002/20/EC  (Authorisation  Directive),  Directive 
2002/21/EC (Framework Directive), Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), as well as other relevant 
EU law such as the radio spectrum policy programme and Commission spectrum decisions, excluding Directive 
2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications. 

20 

 
 
 
 
– EU trademark – 

Effective  enforcement  of  intellectual  property  rights  is  essential  to  stimulate  investment  in 
innovation.  EU  legislation  on EU trademarks (53) gives the national  courts a significant  role to 
play, in acting as EU courts and taking decisions that affect the single market. Figure 19 shows the 
average length of EU trademark infringement cases in litigation between private parties. 

Figure 19: EU trademark: average length of EU trademark infringement cases in 2013, 2020 
– 2022 (*) (1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the European Observatory 
on infringements of intellectual property rights) 

(*) FR, IT, LT, LU: a sample of cases used for data for certain years. DK: data from all trademark cases (not only 
EU) in Commercial and Maritime High Courts; for 2018 and 2019, no data on average length due to changes in data 
collection system. EL: data based on weighted average length from two courts. ES: cases concerning other EU IP 
titles are included in the calculation of average length.  

– Consumer protection – 

Effective enforcement of consumer law ensures that consumers benefit from their rights and that 
companies  infringing  consumer  laws  do  not  gain  an  unfair  advantage.  Consumer  protection 
authorities and courts play a key role in enforcing EU consumer law (54) within the various national 
enforcement  systems.  Figure  20  illustrates  the  average  length  of  judicial  review  cases  against 
decisions of consumer protection authorities applying EU law.  

For consumers or companies, effective enforcement can involve a chain of actors, not only courts 
but also administrative authorities. To shed more light on this enforcement chain, the length of 
proceedings by consumer authorities is presented. Figure 21 shows the average length of time it 
took for administrative decisions by national consumer protection authorities in 2014 and 2020-
2022 from the moment a case is opened. Relevant decisions include declaring infringements of 

53   Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union 

trademark (OJ L 154, 16.62017, p. 1-99). 

54   Figures 20 and 21 relate to the enforcement of the Unfair Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), the Consumer Sales and 
Guarantees Directive (1999/44/EC), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005/29/EC) and the Consumer 
Rights Directive (2011/83/EC), and their national implementing provisions. 

21 

 
 
 
 
substantive rules, interim measures, cease and desist orders, initiation of court proceedings or case 
closure. 

Figure 20: Consumer protection: average length of judicial review in 2013, 2020 – 2022 (*) 
(1st instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation 
Network) 

(*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of 
relevant consumer rules. The number of relevant cases for 2020 is low (fewer than five) in IE and FI. An estimate of 
average length was provided by EL and RO for certain years.  

22 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Consumer  protection:  average  length  of  administrative  decisions  by  consumer 
protection  authorities  in  2014,  2020  –  2022  (*)  (1st  instance/in  days)  (source:  European 
Commission with the Consumer Protection Cooperation Network) 

(*) DE, LU, AT: scenario is not applicable as consumer authorities are not empowered to decide on infringements of 
relevant consumer rules. An estimate of average length was provided by DK, EL, FR, RO and FI for certain years.  

– Money laundering – 

In  addition  to  depriving  criminals  of  resources  for  perpetrating  their  illicit  acts  and  effectively 
dismantling  organised  crime  networks,  tackling  the  prevention  of  and  the  fight  against  money 
laundering55 is crucial for the soundness, integrity and stability of the financial sector, confidence 
in  the  financial  system  and  fair  competition  in  the  single  market  (56).  Money  laundering  can 
discourage foreign investment, distort international capital flows and negatively affect a country’s 
macroeconomic performance, resulting in welfare losses, thereby draining resources from more 
productive economic activities (57). The Anti-money laundering Directive requires Member States 
to maintain statistics on the effectiveness of their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing (58). In cooperation with Member States, an updated questionnaire was used to collect 
data on the judicial stages in national anti-money laundering regimes. Figure 22 shows the average 
length of first instance court cases dealing with money laundering criminal offences.  

55   EU legislation addresses the fight against money laundering through Directive (EU) 2018/1673  of the European 

Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money laundering by criminal law. 

56   Recital  2  of  Directive  (EU)  2015/849  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20 May  2015  on  the 

prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing. 

57   IMF factsheet, March 8, 2018: https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-

Money-Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism  

58   Article 44(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849. See also revised Article 44 of Directive (EU) 2018/843, which entered 

into force in June 2018 and had to be implemented by Member States by January 2020.  

23 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  22:  Money  laundering:  average  length  of  court  cases  in  2014,  2020  –  2022(*)  (1st 
instance/in days) (source: European Commission with the Expert Group on Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism) 

(*) No data for 2022: BG, DE, IE and PL. For PT: the database was filtered, for each and every judicial county, by the relevant 
criteria to reach the information related to money laundering files; regarding the average number of days, the dates of infraction 
and the date of final decision or closure were considered. CY: Serious cases, before the Assize Court, are on average tried within 
a year. Less serious offences, before the District Courts, take longer to be tried. SK: data correspond to average length of the 
whole proceedings, including at appeal court. 

– Anti-corruption – 

Corruption is an impediment to sustainable economic growth, diverting resources from productive 
outcomes,  undermining  the  efficiency  of  public  spending  and  deepening  social  inequalities.  It 
hampers the effective and smooth functioning of the single market, creates uncertainties in doing 
business  and  holds  back  investment.  Corruption  is  particularly  complex  to  tackle  since,  unlike 
most  crimes,  both  parties  involved  in  a  corruption  case  are  generally  interested  in  maintaining 
secrecy about it. This also contributes to a general difficulty to quantify the true magnitude of the 
corruption phenomenon  across the EU. Corruption is  a particularly  serious crime with  a cross-
border dimension  addressed in  Article 83(1) of the Treaty  on the  Functioning  of the  European 
Union that can only be effectively tackled by common minimum rules across the European Union. 
On 3 May 2023, the Commission put forward a proposal for a Directive on combating corruption 
by criminal law; accompanied by a joint communication on the fight against corruption (59). The 
proposal for a directive updates and harmonises EU rules on the definitions of and penalties for 
corruption  offences,  to  ensure  high  standards  against  the  full  range  of  corruption  offences  (i.e. 
bribery, but also misappropriation, trading in influence, abuse of functions, as well as obstruction 
of justice and the illicit enrichment related to corruption offence) to better prevent corruption and 

59   Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

24 

 
 
 
 
to improve enforcement. In cooperation with Member States, a new questionnaire was developed 
in 2022 to collect data on the length of court proceedings before first instance courts in bribery 
cases, which is presented in Figure 23 below (60).  

Figure  23:  Corruption  (bribery):  average  length  of  court  cases  in  2021  and  2022  (*)  (1st 
instance/in  days)  (source:  European  Commission  with  the  National  Contact  Points  for  Anti-
corruption) 

(*) No reply to this question from DE, IE, ES, IT, CY, MT, PL, SK and SE. NL: In this calculation, the period starts to run at the 
date the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) summoned the defendant to appear in court: the period ends on the day when the judge 
of first instance delivers the final verdict. The  average processing time for the aforementioned 35 cases is 645 days. However, 
account must be taken of the fact that a case is often not ready for the hearing at the moment the period starts to run. As a result, 
it takes some time before the case is presented for hearing. The average lenth from first hearing until delivery of the final verdict 
is 194 days. 

60   This data collection has focussed on the criminal courts of first instance, which usually contribute the most to the 

overall length of criminal proceedings until the judgment becomes final. 

25 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.4. Summary on the efficiency of justice systems 

An efficient justice system manages its caseload and backlog of cases, and delivers its decisions 
without undue delay. The main indicators used by the EU Justice Scoreboard to monitor the 
efficiency  of  justice  systems  are  therefore  the  length  of  proceedings  (disposition  time  or 
average time in days needed to resolve a case), the clearance rate (the ratio of the number of 
resolved cases to the number of incoming cases) and the number of pending cases (that remain 
to be dealt with at the end of the year). 

General data on efficiency 

The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard contains data on efficiency spanning more than 10 years (2012-
2022). This time-span makes it possible to identify certain trends and takes account of the fact 
that it often takes time for the effect of justice reforms to be felt. 

The data from 2012 to 2022 in civil, commercial and administrative cases shows positive trends 
in  most  cases.  After  the  dip  in  efficiency  observed  in  2020,  possibly  due  to  the  COVID-19 
pandemic, 2021 saw a return to the efficiency levels of 2019, and 2022 saw further improvement. 
This  shows  the  effect  of  the  measures  taken  by  Member  States  to  make  their  systems  more 
resilient to future disruptions and to address the immediate problems created by the years of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 

There were some positive developments in the Member States that have been considered, in the 
context of the European Semester, to be facing specific challenges (61). 

•  From 2012, based on the existing data for these Member States, and despite the COVID-
19 pandemic, in 11 Member States, the length of first instance court proceedings in 
the broad ‘all cases’ category (Figure 5) decreased or remained stable. For the ‘litigious 
civil  and  commercial  cases’  category  (Figure 6)  the  length  of  first  instance  court 
proceedings continued to decrease or remained stable in 10 Member States. Compared 
to the previous year, figures 5 and 6 show a decrease in the length of proceedings for 8 
and  for  18  Member  States,  respectively,  in  some  cases  to  below  2020  levels.  In 
administrative cases (Figure 8), the length of proceedings since 2012 has decreased or 
remained stable in about 20 Member States. Compared to the previous year, 14 Member 
States saw a decrease in the length of proceedings in administrative cases in 2022. 

•  The Scoreboard presents data on the length of proceedings in all court instances for 
litigious civil and commercial cases (Figure 7) and administrative cases (Figure 9). Data 
show that in five of the Member States identified as facing challenges with the length of 
proceedings  in  first  instance  courts,  higher  instance  courts  have  performed  more 

61   In  the  context  of  the  European  Semester,  the  Council,  on  the  basis  of  the  Commission’s  proposal,  addressed 
country-specific recommendations (CSRs) on their justice systems to seven Member States in 2019 (HR, IT, CY, 
HU, MT, PT and SK) and eight Member States in 2020 (HR, IT, CY, HU, MT, PL, PT and SK). There were no 
CSRs in 2021 due to the ongoing RRF process. In 2022, there were two Member States (PL and HU) with CSRs 
related to judicial independence. As of 2023, a dedicated CSR reflects the implementation of the national Recovery 
and Resilience Plans (RRPs) for each Member State. In addition, in 2023 the justice system was mentioned for 
two Member States (HU, PL). New challenges, not covered by the RRPs, can also be addressed in specific CSRs. 
In 2023, only PL received a CSR on its justice system, which was based on the 2022 CSR.  

26 

 
 
 
 
efficiently. However, for five other Member States facing challenges, the average length 
of proceedings in higher instance courts is even longer than in first instance courts. 

• 

In the broad ‘all cases’ and the litigious civil and commercial cases’ categories (Figures 
10 and 11), the overall number of Member States whose clearance rate is over 100% 
remained  the  same  as  last  year.  In  2022,  20 Member  States,  including  those  facing 
challenges, reported a high clearance rate (more than 97%). This means that courts are 
generally able to deal with the incoming cases in these categories. In administrative cases 
(Figure 12), in 2022, in 9 Member States the clearance rate remained broadly the same 
as in 2021. While the clearance rate in administrative cases is generally lower than for 
other  categories  of  cases,  10 Member  States  continue  to  make  good  progress.  In 
particular,  seven of  the  Member  States  facing  challenges  report  an  increase  in  the 
clearance rate for administrative cases since 2012. 

•  Since  2012,  the  situation  has  remained  stable  or  continued  to  improve  in  four  of  the 
Member States facing the most substantial challenges with their backlogs, regardless of 
the category of cases (Figure 13). In 2022, despite the increase in the number of pending 
cases, in six Member States the number of pending cases remained stable in litigious 
civil  and  commercial  cases  (Figure 14)  and  in  administrative  cases  (Figure 15). 
However,  significant  differences  remain  between  Member  States  with  comparatively 
few pending cases and those with a high number of pending cases. 

Efficiency in specific areas of EU law 

Data on the average length of proceedings in specific areas of EU law (Figures 16-23) provide 
an insight into the functioning of justice systems in concrete types of business-related disputes. 

Data on efficiency in specific areas of EU law are collected based on narrowly defined scenarios, 
so the number of relevant cases may be low. However, compared to the calculated length of 
proceedings  presented  in  the  general  data  on  efficiency,  these  figures  provide  for  an  actual 
average length of all relevant cases in specific areas in a year. It is worth noting that Member 
States where the general data on efficiency do not appear to show challenges nonetheless report 
significantly  longer  average  case  lengths  in  specific  areas  of  EU  law.  At  the  same  time,  the 
length of proceedings in different specific areas may also vary considerably  within the same 
Member State. 

Another figure introduced last year focuses on the length of criminal proceedings, particularly 
those involving bribery, revealing the level of efficiency in that area of EU law.  

Finally, the 2024 Scoreboard provides insight on the efficiency of the overall enforcement chain, 
which  is  important  for  a  positive  business  and  investment  environment.  For  example,  in 
competition law cases, there is a chart focusing on the length of proceedings before the National 
Competition Authority and of the judicial review of the decisions of this authority.  

The figures for specific areas of EU law show the following trends. 

•  For judicial review of competition cases (Figure 16), as the overall caseload faced by 
courts  across  the  EU  increased,  the  length  of  judicial  review  decreased  or  remained 
stable in five Member States, while it increased in five. Despite the moderately positive 
trend, five Member States reported an average length exceeding 1 000 days in 2022. For 
proceedings before the national competition authorities (Figure 17), seven Member 

27 

 
 
States reported that proceedings took less than 1 000 days. Among the Member States 
cited as experiencing issues with efficiency in the judicial review of competition cases, 
three are  among  the  most  efficient  when  it  comes  to  proceedings  before  the  national 
competition authorities. 

•  For  electronic  communications  (Figure 18),  the  caseload  faced  by  courts  decreased 
compared to previous years, continuing the positive trend observed in 2020 regarding 
reductions in length of proceedings. In 2022, five Member States registered a decrease 
in the average length of proceedings or figures remained stable, compared to 2021, and 
nine showed an increase. 

•  For  EU  trademark  infringement  cases  (Figure 19),  in  2022  the  overall  caseload 
slightly increased in comparison to 2021. However, while three Member States managed 
their  caseload  more  efficiently,  registering  reduced  or  stable  lengths  of  proceedings, 
five saw a clear increase in the average length of proceedings. 

• 

In the area of EU consumer law, the possible combined effect of the enforcement chain 
consisting  of  both  administrative  and  judicial  review  proceedings  can  be  seen 
(Figures 20 and 21). In 2022, six Member States reported that their consumer protection 
authorities took on average less than three months to issue a decision in a case covered 
by  EU  consumer  law  in  four other  Member  States,  they  took  more  than  six months. 
Where decisions by the consumer protection authorities were challenged in court, trends 
in the length of the judicial review of an administrative decision in 2022 diverged, with 
increases  in  five  Member  States,  and  decreases  in  four,  compared  to  2021.  In 
two Member States, the average length of a judicial review is still over 1 000 days. 

•  Effective measures to combat money laundering are crucial to protecting the financial 
system,  ensuring  fair  competition  and  preventing  negative  economic  consequences. 
Over-long court proceedings may hamper the EU’s ability to fight money laundering or 
reduce the effectiveness of efforts in this field. Figure 22 presents updated data on the 
length of judicial proceedings dealing with money laundering offences. It shows that, 
while in 12 Member States first instance court proceedings take up to a year on average, 
they take up to 2 years on average in 5 Member States, and in 4 Member States they take 
up to 3.5 years on average (62). 

•  Corruption is a particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension. It has negative 
economic consequences and can only be effectively tackled by common minimum rules 
across the EU. The Scoreboard presents  figures  on the length of judicial proceedings 
dealing with bribery cases. Figure 23 shows varying levels of data availability among 
Member States, and differences in the average length of proceedings before first-instance 
criminal  courts.  Looking  at  2022  data,  in  eleven  Member  States,  proceedings  are 
concluded within about a year, while in the remaining seven where data are available, 
proceedings  can  last  up  to  two years.  Overall,  the  complexity  of  prosecuting  and 
adjudicating  bribery  offences  reflects  the  serious  nature  of  the  crime.  This  is  also 
reflected in the length of proceedings. 

62   Directive (EU) 2018/1673 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on combating money 
laundering by criminal law will eliminate certain legal obstacles that may delay prosecution, such as a rule that 
prosecution for money laundering can only start when the proceedings for the underlying predicate offence have 
been concluded. Member States were required to transpose the Directive by 8 December 2020. 

28 

 
 
 
3.2. Quality of justice systems 

There is no single way to measure the quality of justice systems. The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard 
continues to examine factors that are generally accepted as relevant for improving the quality of 
justice. They fall into four categories: 

1) access to justice for the public and businesses; 

2) adequate financial and human resources; 

3) putting in place of assessment tools; 

4) digitalisation. 

3.2.1. Access to justice 

Accessibility is required throughout the whole justice chain to enable all people, including persons 
with disabilities, to obtain relevant information – about the justice system, about how to make a 
claim and the related financial aspects,  about the state of play of proceedings up until  they are 
complete – and to access the judgment online.  

– Legal aid, court fees and legal fees – 

The  cost  of  litigation  is  a  key  factor  that  determines  access  to  justice.  High  litigation  costs, 
including court fees (63) and legal fees (64), may hinder access to justice. Litigation costs in civil 
and commercial matters are not harmonised at EU level. Governed by national legislation, they 
vary from one Member State to another.  

Access to legal aid is a fundamental right enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU (65). It allows access to justice to people who would not otherwise be able to bear or advance 
the costs of litigation. Most Member States grant legal aid based on the applicant’s income (66). 

Figure 24 shows the availability of full or partial legal aid in a specific consumer case involving a 
claim  of  EUR  6 000.  It  compares  the  income  thresholds  for  granting  legal  aid,  expressed  as  a 
percentage  of  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  each  Member  State  (67).  For  example,  if  the 
threshold for legal aid appears to be at 20%, it means that an applicant with an income 20% higher 
than  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  their  Member  State  will  still  be  eligible  for  legal  aid. 
However, if the threshold for legal aid appears to be below 0, this means that a person with an 
income below the poverty threshold may not be eligible for legal aid. 

63   Court fees are understood as an amount to be paid to start non-criminal legal proceedings in a court or tribunal. 
64   Legal fees are the bill for services provided by lawyers to their clients. 
65   Article 47(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
66   Member  States  use  different  methods  to  establish  the  eligibility  threshold,  e.g.  different  reference  periods 
(monthly/annual income). In 14 Member States there is also a threshold tied to the applicant’s personal capital. 
This is not taken into account for this figure. In BE, BG, IE, ES, FR, HR, HU, LT, LU, NL and PT, certain groups 
of  people  (e.g.  individuals  who  receive  certain  benefits)  are  automatically  entitled  to  receive  legal  aid  in 
civil/commercial disputes. Additional criteria that Member States may use, such as the merits of the case, are not 
reflected in this figure. Although not directly related to the figure, in several Member States (AT, CZ, DE, DK, IT, 
NL, PL, SI) legal aid is not limited to natural persons. 

67   To collect comparable data, each Member State’s Eurostat poverty threshold has been converted to a monthly 
income.  The  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  is  set  at  60%  of  the  national  median  equivalised  disposable 
household 
ilc_li01, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/ilc_li01/default/table?lang=en 

Income  and  Living  Conditions,  Eurostat 

income.  European  Survey  on 

table 

29 

 
 
 
Nine Member States operate a legal aid system that provides for 100% coverage of the costs linked 
to litigation (full legal aid), complemented by a system covering partial costs (partial legal aid), 
the latter applying eligibility criteria different from that of the former. Nine Member States operate 
only  a  full  or  partial  legal  aid  system.  In  four  Member  States,  the  courts  have  discretion  over 
granting legal aid.  

Figure 24: Income threshold for legal aid in a specific consumer case, 2023 (*) (differences in 
% from Eurostat poverty threshold) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (68))  

(*) Calculations are based on 2022 at-risk-of-poverty (AROP) threshold values. BE, DE, ES, FR, HR, IE, IT, LT, 
LU, NL, SI, SK, FI: legal aid has to also take into account the applicant’s disposable assets. EL: Beneficiary of legal 
aid is a person whose capital annual income does not exceed the 2/3 of the lowest annual salaries as provided by the 
existing legislation. LU: A partial legal aid regime was introduced. There is no specific threshold, the granting of the 
legal aid depends on the overall financial and family situation of the applicant. HR: no data provided. 

Recipients  of  legal  aid  are  often  exempt  from  paying  court  fees.  Only  in  six  Member  States 
(Bulgaria, Czechia, Greece, Austria, Malta and Poland) are recipients of legal aid not automatically 
exempt from paying court fees. In Czechia, the court decides on a case-by-case basis whether or 
not to exempt a legal aid recipient from paying court fees. In Luxembourg, litigants who benefit 
from legal aid do not have to pay bailiff fees. Figure 25 compares, for two scenarios, the amount 
of the court fee presented as a proportion of the value of the claim. If, for example, in the figure 

68   The 2023 data are collected using replies from Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to 
a questionnaire based on the following specific scenario: a dispute of a consumer with a company (two different 
claim  values  indicated:  EUR  6 000  and  the  Eurostat  AROP  threshold  for  each  Member  State).  Given  that 
conditions for legal aid depend on the applicant’s situation, the following scenario was used: a single 35-year-old 
employed  applicant  without  any  dependant  or  legal  expenses  insurance,  with  a  regular  income  and  a  rented 
apartment.  

30 

 
 
 
 
below the court fee is 10% of a EUR 6 000 claim, the consumer will have to pay a EUR 600 court 
fee to start judicial proceedings. The low value claim is based on the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty 
(AROP) threshold for each Member State.  

Figure 25: Court fee to start judicial proceedings in a specific consumer case, 2023 (*) (amount 
of court fee as a proportion of the value of the claim) (source: European Commission with the 
Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) (69)) 

(*)  Calculations  are  based  on  2022  at-risk-of-poverty  (AROP)  threshold  values.  ‘Low  value  claim’  is  a  claim 
corresponding  to  the  Eurostat  poverty  threshold  for  a  single  person  in  each  Member  State,  converted  to  monthly 
income (e.g. in 2022, this value ranged from EUR 269 in BG to EUR 2266 in LU). BE: 24€ contribution to the Fund 
for the second line legal aid; Court registry fees: 50€ or 165€ Afterwards, if dismissed/convicted: possibly 1350 € for 
the procedural indemnity. NL: Court fees values correspond to a litigant with less than EUR 30 000 annual income. 
SE: The court fee is valid if value of claim exceeds € 2329.  

Figure 26 presents, for the first time, the rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific 
ciminal case based on a case study (70). Respondents have provided how much lawyers would get paid 
from the public budget in the described fictional scenario. 

69   The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute 
between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP 
threshold for each Member State).  

70   Mr X is a national of your country, he is single, unemployed and has no children. He was caught red-handed when 
selling green vegetable matter in front of a high school in the capital city of your country. The police found cash 
and 12 resealable plastic bags on him, each containing 5 grams of the green vegetable matter resembling marijuana. 
He  was  committed  to  the  police  station  and  detained.  You  have  been  appointed  as  his  legal  aid  counsel.  You 
travelled 30 minutes (10 km) with your motor vehicle to the police station. You spent 3 hours with advising Mr X 
and assisting his interview with the police. You travelled 30 minutes (10 km) with your motor vehicle back to your 
office. Next day, you attended the bail hearing (1 hour); you travelled 2x30 minutes (2x10 km). Mr X called you 
twice during his pre-trial detention; each call lasted 20 minutes. You talked to the investigator over the phone for 
20 minutes. You spent 2 hours with studying the file and 1 hour with drafting a motion for his release on bail. 
Subsequently, you attended 3 hearings before the trial court, each lasting 2 hours and each involving 2 travels of 
30 minutes (3x2x10 km). You spent also 3x1 hour for preparation for each of the court hearings, and 3x1 hour for 
advance preparation for the meeting with the client. 

31 

 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence lawyers in a specific criminal case, 2023 
(*) (source: European Commission with the Council of Bar and Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) 
(71)) 

(*) The data is gathered based on a specific case study. The amounts are all in EUR, and where needed they were 
converted from national currencies72. To take account of the economic differences between Member States the added 
value of the fee and exepense were divided by the comparative price level indices expressed in percentage where the 
EU average is 100%, DK is 149% and BG is 59%73. This adjusts the sum of fee and expenses that the lawyers receive. 
AT:  The  Austrian  legal  aid  system  is  state  funded  and  based  on  the  solidarity  of  all  Austrian  lawyers  who  all 
participate on a rotation based system in the legal aid system. In general, the single individual lawyer does not receive 
any direct remuneration for legal aid services. Instead, the Austrian state pays a yearly lump sum to the Austrian Bar 
for the total of legal aid services rendered by all lawyers. The Austrian Bar distributes this sum to the regional Bars 
on the basis of the number of registered lawyers who provided legal aid services and on the basis of the number of 
legal aid cases, which were handled by the regional Bars. The money is used for the lawyers’ social security and 
pension scheme which is not state funded. 

– Accessing succession procedures – 

Non-contentious judicial procedures, such as in the area of succession or family law, are frequently 
done by notaries, aiming at unburdening courts and in that way potentially enhancing the efficiency 

71   The data, referring to income thresholds valid in 2022, have been collected using replies from Council of Bar and 
Law Societies in Europe (CCBE) members to a questionnaire based on the following scenario: a consumer dispute 
between an individual and a company (two different claim values indicated: EUR 6 000 and the Eurostat AROP 
threshold for each Member State).  

72   Conversion made using the European Central Bank’s Euro Foreign Exchange Reference Rates applicable on 30 
June 2023 - BGN 1.9558, CZK 23.742, DKK 7.4474, HUF 371.93, PLN 4.4388, RON 4.9635, SEK 11.8055. 

73   https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00120/default/table?lang=en&category=t_prc.t_prc_ppp  

32 

 
 
 
 
and quality of the justice system. Figure 27 serves as an initial exploration in this regard, mapping 
which authorities are involved in succession procedures in the Member States. 

Figure 27: Authorities  involved  in succession procedures, 2023 (*) (source: e-Justice Portal 
(74)) 

(*) Data were retrieved from the e-Justice Portal and validated in cooperation with the Group of Contact Persons on 
National Justice Systems. BE: There is no legal obligation to consult a notary in each case, except for certain type of 
cases (e.g. a holographic or international will, judicial partition or division of real estate). In certain situations, the 
court of first instance or justice of the peace may be required to act. BG: An acceptance of succession is normally 
submitted by a written application to the district judge. Notaries are essential for publishing wills, describing the state 
of the will, noting its unsealing, and attaching the paper, all initialed by relevant parties. CZ: A district court has the 
jurisdiction  to  handle  all  succession  proceedings,  but  usually  instructs  a  notary  to  manage  the  proceedings.  That 
notary then acts and takes decisions in the proceedings on behalf of the court. DK: The probate court (in the district 
court) ensures that the estate of a deceased person is settled and distributed correctly. In practice, it will often be the 
heirs themselves who distribute the inheritance. In some cases, succession cases need to be handled by a trustee who 
usually is a lawyer. The trustee is responsible for settling and closing the estate in collaboration with the probate 
court. The probate court can decide whether the distribution must be handled by a trustee. DE: In principle, it is the 
probate court of the local court at the testator’s last usual place of residence in Germany that is competent to deal 
with  matters  of  inheritance.  EE:  Notaries  oversee  succession  proceedings  if  the  testator's  last  residence  was  in 
Estonia. If the last residence was in a foreign country, Estonian notaries handle proceedings for Estonian property 
when not possible abroad or when foreign proceedings exclude or lack recognition in Estonia, irrespective of EU 
regulations. IE: The Dublin Probate Office and fourteen District Probate Offices handle the issuance of Grants of 
Probate for cases with a will and Letters of Administration for cases without a will. These offices are part of the Irish 
Courts Service. EL: The succession court or the district civil court of the capital city of the State has jurisdiction on 
succession-related matters. Notaries, the Greek consular authorities and tax authorities are also competent to draw 
up and safeguard wills.ES: Notaries determine the parties’ entitlement to inherit the estate by law in the absence of 
disposition of property. In case of disputes between the parties concerned, it will be settled by the courts. FR: Matters 
of succession are dealt with by notaries - their involvement is mandatory if the estate includes immovable property 

74   https://e-justice.europa.eu/166/EN/succession  

33 

 
 
 
 
and optional if there is no immovable property. In the event of a dispute, the regional court has exclusive subject-
matter and territorial jurisdiction. HR: Probate proceedings in the first instance are conducted before a municipal 
court or before a notary public, as a trustee of the court. IT: The declaration of acceptance or renunciation occurs 
through a declaration issued by a notary or a clerk of the competent court in the jurisdiction where the succession is 
opened.CY: The competent authority is the District Court of the last domicile of the testator/deceased. LT: The notary 
and the court at the place of the opening of the succession are competent in matters of succession. LU: The heir or 
heirs assign all transactions for the settlement of the estate to a notary chosen by them or appointed by the testator. 
HU: Legal matters related to the estate are generally settled in probate proceedings conducted by a notary public. If 
there  is  a  legal  dispute  between  the  interested  parties,  this  may  not  be  settled  by  the  notary  public  but  in  court 
proceedings.  MT:  Courts  have  general  jurisdiction  to  decide  disputes  related  to  successions.  When  there  are  no 
disagreements or disputes on successions, notaries and lawyers are usually engaged. NL: The notary is the competent 
authority with respect to inheritance law. If the heir wishes to waive the inheritance or accepts it on condition that the 
charges do not exceed the entitlement,  he  or she must submit a declaration to the court. AT: For the purposes of 
carrying out the process in sucession matters, the district court relies on the services of a notary acting in the capacity 
of a court commissioner. PL: Applicants refer matters of succession to a notary or the court with jurisdiction over the 
testator’s last place of residence. PT: If the inheritance is contested, either the courts or notary’s offices can conduct 
the inventory. RO: The competent bodies for non-contentious succession procedures are notaries, while courts of first 
instance are responsible for contentious succession proceedings. SK: The district court appoints a notary to handle 
the  case.  Generally,  acts  by  the  notary  are  considered  as  acts  by  the  court,  with  a  few  exceptions.  FI:  Various 
authorities have jurisdiction over matters relating to the administration of succession. The district court is involved, 
but only regarding cases relating to the estate. SE: The distribution of the inheritance is mostly carried out without 
the  involvement  of  the  authorities.  Inheritance  disputes  are  also  resolved  by  an  ordinary  court  of  competent 
jurisdiction. 

34 

 
 
 
 
– Accessing alternative dispute resolution methods – 

Figure  28  shows  Member  States’  efforts  to  promote  the  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute 
resolution (ADR) methods with specific incentives. These may vary depending on the area of law 
(75).  

Figure 28: Promotion of and incentives for using ADR methods, 2023 (*) (source: European 
Commission (76)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  68  points.  Aggregated  indicators  based  on  the  following  indicators:  1)  website  providing 
information on ADR; 2) media publicity campaigns; 3) brochures for the general public; 4) provision by the court of 
specific  information  sessions  on  ADR  upon  request;  5)  court  ADR/mediation  coordinator;  6)  publication  of 
evaluations on the use of ADR; 7) publication of statistics on the use of ADR; 8) partial or full coverage by legal aid 
of costs ADR incurred; 9) full or partial refund of court fees, including stamp duties, if ADR is successful; 10) no 
requirement for a lawyer for ADR procedures; 11) judge can act as a mediator; 12) agreement reached by the parties 
becomes enforceable by the court; 13) possibility to initiate proceedings/file a claim and submit documentary evidence 
online; 14) parties can be informed of the initiation and different steps of procedures electronically; 15) possibility of 
online payment of applicable fees; 16) use of technology (artificial intelligence applications, chat bots) to facilitate 
the  submission  and  resolution  of  disputes;  and  17)  other  means.  For  each  of  these  17  indicators,  one  point  was 
awarded for each area of law. IE: Administrative cases fall into the category of civil and commercial cases. EL: ADR 
exists in public procurement procedures before administrative courts of appeal. ES: ADR is mandatory in labour law 
cases. PT: For civil/commercial disputes, court fees are refunded only in the case of justices for peace. SK: The Slovak 
legal order does not support the use of ADR for administrative purposes. FI: Consumer and labour disputes are also 
considered to be civil cases. SE: Judges have procedural discretion on ADR. Seeking an amicable dispute settlement 
is a mandatory task for the judge unless it is inappropriate due to the nature of the case.  

75   The methods for promoting and incentivising the use of ADR do not include compulsory requirements to use ADR 
before going to court. Such requirements may raise concerns about their compatibility with the right to an effective 
remedy before a tribunal enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 

76   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Specific arrangements for access to justice – 

The 2022 EU Justice Scoreboard presented a dedicated figure on specific arrangements to facilitate 
equal access to justice of persons with disabilities and the 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard continued 
a  deeper  exploration  of  selected  specific  arrangements  that  facilitate  equal  access  to  justice  to 
persons at  risk of discrimination overall and two specific groups:  older  persons and victims of 
violence against women and domestic violence. The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard takes stock of 
selected  specific  arrangements  for  supporting  the  participation  of  persons  with  disabilities  as 
professionals in the justice system. 

Council  Directive  2000/78/EC  (the  “Employment  Equality  Directive”)77  prohibits  direct  and 
indirect discrimination in the field of employment and occupation based on inter alia disability. 
The  Employment  Equality  Directive  also  requires  employers 
to  provide  reasonable 
accommodation for persons with disabilities. This is also in line with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities78. In this context, the European Commission committed in its 
Strategy  for  the  Rights  of  Persons  with  Disabilities  2021-2030  to  support  Member  States  in 
boosting the participation of persons with disabilities as professionals in the justice system and 
collect  good  practices  on  supported  decision-making79.  Figure  29  shows  a  series  of  relevant 
measures  in  this  regard,  supporting  the  participation  of  persons  with  disabilities  to  work  as 
professionals in the justice system on an equal basis with others.  

77  Council  Directive  2000/78/EC  of  27  November  2000  establishing  a  general  framework  for  equal  treatment  in 

employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16–22. 

78  United Nations, 2006, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Treaty Series, 2515, 3. 
79   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  Union  of  Equality:  Strategy  for  the  Rights  of  Persons  with 
Disabilities 2021-2030, COM/2021/101 final. 

36 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Specific arrangements for supporting the participation of persons with disabilities 
as professionals in the justice system, 2023 (source: European Commission (80)) 

BE: General provisions exist in this area and apply when a person with a disability works for the civil service. CZ: 
“National Plan for the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities for the Period 2021-2025” is 
in place, as adopted by the Government, which expressly supports the employment of persons with disabilities in the 
public sector, which includes also courts. General conditions are in place for persons with disabilities under the Act 
No. 262/2006 Coll., Labour Code and the Act No. 435/5004 Coll., on Employment. DK: The Danish judicial system 
also has a policy of equality which states that everyone regardless of age, gender, disability, race, religion or ethnic 
affiliation  must  be  treated  equally  in  connection  with  employment,  promotion  ect.  and  professional  and  personal 
development. FR: For candidates with disabilities, special arrangements may be put in place, such as additional time 
or special arrangements for preparing or carrying out the tests (Article 34-1 of Decree No 72-355 of 4 May 1972 on 
the National School of the Judiciary). Legislation on the opening, modernisation and accountability of the judiciary, 
subject to the decision of the Constitutional Council, establishes, in the status of judges and prosecutors, a principle 
of equal treatment for magistrates with disabilities. Thus, both the appointing authorities and the heads of courts must, 
in so far as is compatible with the particular features of the judicial organisation, take the measures appropriate to 
each specific situation to enable members of the judiciary with disabilities to develop a career project and take up 
posts of a higher level as well as to receive training tailored to their needs throughout their working life. IE: There 
are measures in place in general provisions in employment law in support of persons with disabilities (which would 
include persons working in the Courts Service and justice system). EL: Provisions of the Civil Service Code apply, 
which  protect  both  their  status  and  their  working  conditions  (flexible  working  hours,  trade  union  representation, 
salary,  protection  against  illegal  dismissal,  etc.).  Labour  legislation  in  general  protects  the  employment  status  of 
people with disabilities. A training program on the rights of persons with disabilities was included in the planning of 
the Training Institute of the National Center for Public Administration and Local Government was held in 2022 and 
2023. LT: The specifics of the implementation of the labor relations of employees with disabilities are provided for 
by the Labor Code. The Occupational Safety and Health Law also establish guarantees for the people with disabilities. 
The Procedure for Reducing the Caseload of Judges, approved by the Judicial Council in 2019 provides that in cases 

80   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

37 

 
 
 
 
where a judge submits a request to the president of the court to reduce the caseload and adds to it the conclusion of 
the health care institution, which justifies the level of less than 100 percent capacity set for him/her, the workload of 
the judge is reduced. LV: Article 7 of the Labor Law stipulates that in order to promote the introduction of the principle 
of  equal  rights  in  relation  to  persons  with  a  disability,  an  employer  has  an  obligation  to  take  measures  that  are 
necessary in conformity with the circumstances to adjust the work environment, to facilitate the possibility of persons 
with a disability to establish employment relationship, perform work duties, be promoted to higher positions or be 
sent to occupational training or further education, insofar as such measures do not place an unreasonable burden on 
the employer. LU: In order to facilitate access of persons with disabilities to their work place within the justice system, 
their means of transportation from home to work and back to their home are planned with a specialized transportation 
service. The ADEM (Administration de l’emploi) is in charge of vocational guidance and training of persons with 
disabilities. The Service national de la sécurité dans la Fonction publique and its Service psychosocial are contact 
points in matters of employment and working conditions, including pay and protection from dismissals for each and 
every professional within the justice system. MT: The Commission for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
seeks to ensure that all disabled persons employment rights are safeguarded irrespective of which section of the public 
or private sector they are employed in. The CRPD ensures this by proposing legislative amendments and educating 
the public about their rights and by monitoring and implementing equality measures such as Workplace Accessibility 
Tax  Deduction  Scheme  that  supports  employers  in  making  the  necessary  structural  changes  that  would  ensure 
accessibility to disabled employees. NL: Advisors HR (Banenafspraak) (pro)actively search for suitable candidates 
with  disabilities  for  vacancies  within  the  Prosecution  Office.  Adaptations  needed  in  a  training  or  course  can  be 
requested. Persons with a disability are almost always placed in regular positions with a regular employment contract, 
so grading and terms of employment as a civil servant (in accordance with CAO Rijk). AT: All measures affect the 
entire  public  service.  There  are  no  specific  measures  for  the  judiciary  beyond  this.  PL:  Support  for  people  with 
disabilities in accessing employment, in terms of employment and working conditions, as well as vocational counseling 
and training, is regulated in legal acts of a general nature which also apply to people taking up employment within 
the judicial system. PT: The National Strategy for the Inclusion of People with Disabilities 2021-2025 covers private 
and public sectors. Law No. 38/2004 defines the general legal regime for people with disabilities. Decree-Law No. 
29/2001 establishes the employment quota system for people with disabilities, with a degree of functional incapacity 
equal to or greater than 60%, in all bodies of the central, autonomous regional and local administrations, and Law 
No. 4/2019 establishes a system of employment quotas for people with disabilities, with a degree of incapacity equal 
to or greater than 60%, having in mind its recruitment by the private and public sectors not covered by the scope of 
Decree-Law no. 29/2001. RO: There are no special provisions on this topic since the persons are with disabilities are 
treated  in  an  equal  manner  as  the  other  persons.  SI:  Slovenia  does  not  have  specific  legislation  to  support  the 
participation of people with disabilities as professionals in the justice system, but there are laws and regulations that 
generally support the employment of this group of people. Persons with disabilities are employed on the basis of the 
Vocational  Rehabilitation  and  Employment  of  Persons  with  Disabilities  Act,  which  applies  to  all  employers  in 
Slovenia. SK: General provisions on employment of the persons with disabilities are in place, which apply also to the 
justice system. FI: Accessibility of the premises and accessibility of the documents has been taken into account in 
court  houses.  There  are  no  further  special  arrangements  to  support  persons  with  disabilities  in  their  access  to 
employment in the justice system.  

Figure 30 complements Figures 20 and 21 on efficiency of proceedings in the area of consumer 
law  by  showing  specific  selected  measures  undertaken  by  EU  Member  States  to  increase 
awareness on the new European model of collective redress (81) aimed at improving consumers’ 
access to justice in mass harm situations.  

81   As  introduced  by  Directive  (EU)  2020/1828  on  representative  actions,  https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-
topic/consumer-protection-law/representative-actions-directive_en, for the protection of the collective interests of 
consumers.  

38 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Specific arrangements for representative actions protecting the collective interests 
of consumers, 2023 (*) (source: European Commission (82)) 

(*) Data on training is not reported for: IE, EL, FR, LU, PL, BE: Special chambers in the French-speaking and 
Dutch-speaking Company Courts of Brussels (1st instance) and the Brussels Court of Appeal (2nd instance) have 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  in  collective  redress  actions.  EL:  Respresentative  actions  are  heard  before  the  Multi-
Membered  First  Instance  Court.  No  specialised  courts  or  judges  are  foreseen..  LV:  Consumer  Rights  Protection 
Center is starting to implement representative actions legislation in practice. MT: Art 8 of the Representative Actions 
(Consumers) Act (Cap.635) provides the procedure for representative actions including how consumers can join a 
representative action. NL: There are no specialised courts but a national expert group of judges from several courts. 
SI:  The  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  four  district  courts  –  Ljubljana,  Maribor,  Celje  and  Koper  -  is  established.  SK: 
Municipal Court Bratislava IV, District Court Banská Bystrica and Municipal Court Košice are competent to hear 
collective actions. Consumers are able to join the collective action through any notary in Slovakia. 

The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard extends the analysis of child friendly-justice. Figure 31 looks at 
a  broader  variety  of  specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly  justice  (both  civil  and 

82   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and the European 

Judicial Training Network. 

39 

 
 
 
 
criminal/juvenile justice proceedings). Figure 32 explores a broader range of specific arrangements 
available when a child is involved as a victim or as a suspect/accused person. 

Figure  31:  Specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly  justice/proceedings  (both  civil  and 
criminal/juvenile justice proceedings), 2023 (*) (source: European Commission (83). 

(*)Children: persons under 18 years of age. 

83   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

40 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Specific  arrangements  for  child-friendly  proceedings  with  children  involved  as 
victims or suspects or as accused persons, 2023 (*) (source: European Commission (84)) 

(*) Children: persons under 18 years of age. 

3.2.2. Resources 

Sufficient resources, including the necessary investments in physical and technical infrastructure, 
and  well  qualified,  trained  and  adequately  paid  staff  of  all  kinds,  are  necessary  for  the  justice 
system to work properly. Without adequate facilities, tools or staff with the required qualifications, 
skills and access to continuous training, the quality of proceedings and decisions is undermined. 

– Financial resources – 

The figures below show the actual government expenditure on the operation of the justice system 
(excluding prisons), both per inhabitant (Figure 33) and as a proportion of gross domestic product 
(GDP) (Figure 34). 

84   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems.  

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: General government total expenditure on law courts in EUR per inhabitant, 2012, 
2020 – 2022 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*) Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2022 (from highest to lowest). Data for 2021-2022 
for EL, ES, FR and NL are provisional. Data for BE, CY, HU, PT and RO for 2022 are provisional. Data for 2019-
2022 for DE are provisional. Data for BG and PL have a break in series in 2022.  

Figure 34: General government total expenditure on law courts as a percentage of GDP, 2012, 
2020 – 2022 (*) (source: Eurostat)  

(*)Member States are ordered according to their expenditure in 2021 (from highest to lowest). Data for other years 
is provisional for BE, DE, ES, FR and PT. 

Figure 35 presents the ratio of annual salaries of judges and prosecutors compared to the average 
annual  salary  in  the  country.  For  each  country,  the  bars  present  these  ratiosfor  judges  and 
prosecutors at the beginning of their respective careers, and at their peak. By virtue of Article 19(1) 
TEU, Member States have to ensure that both their courts as a whole and the individual judges are 
independent in the fields covered by Union law. While temporary reduction in remuneration in the 
context of austerity measures has not been considered in violation of this provision, the Court of 

42 

 
 
 
 
Justice of the EU has stated that the receipt by members of the judiciary of a level of remuneration 
conmensurate with the importance of the functions carried out constitutes an essential guarantee 
of judicial independence (85). 

Figure  35:  Ratio  of  annual  salaries  of  judges  and  prosecutors  with  annual  average  gross 
salary in the country in 2022 (*) (source: Council of Europe’s European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) Member States specific comments on the data are accessible in the CEPEJ study (86).  

Figure 36 presents, for the first time, the ratio of annual salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert 
staff compared to the average annual salary in the country. For each country, the first two  bars 
present the ratios for judicial expert staff at the beginning of their respective careers, and after ten 
years into the service, while the third and fourth bars present the ratios for prosecutorial expert 
staff at the beginning of their respective careers, and after ten years into the service.  

85   Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  Case  C‑64/16  Associação  Sindical  dos  Juízes 
Portugueses, (ECLI:EU:C:2018:117) para. 45, “Like the protection against removal from office of the members 
of the body concerned (see, in particular, judgment of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C-506/04, EU:C:2006:587, 
paragraph 51), the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the 
functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.”  

86   https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-

law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en#documents  

43 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Ratio of annual salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff with annual full-
time adjusted average gross salary in the country in 2022 (*) (source: European Commission 
and Eurostat (87)) 

(*) Indicator developed in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. Data on salaries 
refers to the minimum gross annual starting salary, in 2022, in euro, and minimum gross annual salary after ten years 
of experience, in 2022, in euro. The gross salary is calculated before any welfare costs and taxes have been paid. 
Bonuses that are regularly paid to all staff irrespective of their personal circumstances are included (for example 
13th  salary  that  is  paid  without  exception  to  staff  in  the  court/public  prosecution).  Bonuses  linked  to  personal 
circumstances (for example family allowances depending on the number of children) are excluded from the amount. 
Unless  indicated  otherwise,  the  minimum  salary  value  from  among  the  staff  categories  falling  into  the  respective 
group of staff is used. The ratio was calculated against the Eurostat indicator ‘Average full time adjusted salary per 
employee’, nama_10_fte, for 2022. Judicial staff refers to expert staff at courts of first instance contributing to the 
judicial proceedings/involved in the decision making, such as assistant judges, Rechtspfleger, assistants to judges 
auxilliares de justice, court registrars. Public prosecution staff refers to expert staff at the lowest level of prosecution 
offices  contributing  to  the  proceedings/involved  in  decision  making  such  as  assistants  of  prosecutors,  trainee 
prosecutors. The specific categories referred to by the individual Member States within these two broader groups and 
represented  in  the  chart  are,  respectively;  J:  refers  to  judicial  staff,  P:  refers  to  prosecutorial  staff.  BE: 
griffier/greffier (J), secretaris/secrétaire (P). The data provided include the holiday pay and end-of-year bonus. BG: 
judicial assistant (J), prosecutorial assistant (P). CZ: higher judicial officer (J), public prosecution staff (P).  DK: 
assistant judge (J), prosecutor trainee (P). The assistant judge salary after ten years of experience is based on average 
salary. DE: not indicated. EE: law clerk (J), assistant prosecutor (P). IE: judicial assistant (J), legal executive (P). 
EL: court registrar (J). ES: Letrados de la Administración de Justicia (J), Cuerpo de Auxilio Judicial (P). FR : legal 
assistant/clerks (J), legal assistant/clerks (P). HR: judicial assistant (J), assistant of prosecutor (P). IT: judicial court 
staff  belonging  to  III  area  and  economic  segment  F1  (J),  judicial  court  staff  belonging  to  III  area  and  economic 
segment F2 (J), public prosecution staff belonging to III area and economic segment F1 (P), public prosecution staff 
belonging to III area and economic segment F2 (P). CY: registrar (J). LV: assistant to judge (J), Lawyer-consultant, 

87   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems and Eurostat. The 
source of data on annual average gross salary used for calculating the ratios in Figures 35 and 36 differ (in Figure 
35, they are provided by CEPEJ, using information provided by their national correspondents, while in Figure 36, 
the source is Eurostat). Therefore, the ratios are not directly comparable between the two figures.  

44 

 
 
 
 
lawyer in the field of criminal law, lawyer – analyst (P). Judicial staff consists of assistants of judges only. There is 
no  range  of  salaries  in  this  category.  In  relation  to  the  category  "assistant  to  judge",  the  indicated  data  was  the 
maximum salary in 2022. The salary for all assistants to judges are the same in first instance courts. For example, if 
the assistant of judge receives the highest evaluation mark in the annual evaluation process, then he or she can already 
receive the maximum salary within the first working year. As regards the staff of the Prosecution Office, the data is 
an average of the salary for the indicated positions. Staff at both levels of the Prosecution Office has a set salary that 
does not depend on the years worked in the office. LT: Judicial assistants (senior judicial assistants) (J), assistants of 
prosecutors and assistants of the chief prosecutors (P). The salary values of judicial and public prosecution assistant 
and  clerical  staff  is  an  average  of  specific  salaries  within  a  given  category.  LU:  Référendaires:  Employé  A1  (J), 
Référendaires: Employé A1 (J). HU : Agent of the public prosecutor's office (P). MT: judicial assistant (J), trainee 
lawyer (P). NL: Not available due to missing Eurostat indicator of average full time adjusted salary per employee. 
AT: Judges in training/legal assistants/auditors/judicial officials (Rechtspfleger) (J), prosecutor in training (P). The 
data represents statutory  salary  rates.  Staff  members or different salary  groups are  grouped together in one staff 
member category, with an average value given based on the statutory salary and renumeration rates. PL: assistant 
judge (J). The data is an average of specific salaries within a given category. RO: trainee prosecutor (P). RO only 
has the category "trainee prosecutor" - not "assistants of prosecutors" nor other categories of expert staff contributing 
to the proceedings/involved in decision making. Consequently, only the starting salary for trainee prosecutors was 
provided. The category of judicial staff in courts of first instance did not exist in Romania in 2022, hence no data is 
provided for that category. SI: judicial assistant (J), senior judicial adviser (P). SK: assistant (J), legal trainee (P). 
FI: trainee judge (J), prosecutor’s assistant (P). SE: law clerk step 1 (J), trainee public prosecutor (P).  

– Human resources – 

Adequate  human  resources  are  essential  for  the  quality  of  a  justice  system.  Diversity  among 
judges,  including  gender  balance,  adds  complementary  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  and 
reflects the reality of society. 

Figure 37: Number of judges, 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) This category consists of judges working full-time, in accordance with the CEPEJ methodology. It does not include 
the Rechtspfleger/court clerks that exist in some Member States. AT: data on administrative justice have been part of 
the data since 2016. EL: since 2016, data on the number of professional judges include all the ranks for criminal and 
civil justice as well as administrative judges.  IT: Regional audit commissions, local tax commissions and military 
courts are not taken into consideration. Administrative justice has been taken into account since 2018.  

45 

 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Proportion of female professional Supreme Court judges 2021 – 2023 (*) (source: 
European Commission (88)) 

(*) The data are sorted by 2023 values, from the highest to the lowest.  

Figure 39: Number of lawyers, 2012, 2020 – 2022 (*) (per 100 000 inhabitants) (source: Council 
of Europe’s European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study) 

(*) In accordance with the CEPEJ methodology, a lawyer is a person qualified and authorised  by national law to 
plead and act on behalf of their clients; to engage in the practice of law; to appear before the courts or advise and 
represent their clients in legal matters (Recommendation Rec (2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer). DE: no distinction is made between different groups 
of lawyers in Germany. FI: since 2015, the number of lawyers provided includes both the number of lawyers working 
in the private sector and the number of lawyers working in the public sector.  

88   European 

Institute 

for  Gender  Equality,  Gender  Statistics  Database:  https://eige.europa.eu/gender-

statistics/dgs/indicator/wmidm_jud_natcrt__wmid_natcrt_supcrt/datatable  

46 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Training – 

Judicial training makes an important contribution to the quality of judicial decisions and the justice 
service delivered to citizens. The data set out below cover judicial training on communication with 
parties and on social media.  

Figure 40: Availability of training in communication for judges, 2023 (*) (source: European 
Commission (89)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 16 points. Member States were given 1 point if they have initial training and 1 point if they 
have continuing training (maximum of 2 points for each type of training) on the topics displayed above.  

89   2023 data collected in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network.  

47 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.3. Assessment tools 

Regular  evaluation  could  make  the  justice  system  more  responsive  to  current  and  future 
challenges,  thereby  improving  its  quality.  Surveys  (Figure  41)  are  essential  for  assessing  how 
justice systems operate from the perspective of legal professionals and court users.  

Figure 41: Topics of surveys  conducted among court users or legal professionals,  2023 (*) 
(source: European Commission (90)) 

(*) Member States were given one point per survey topic indicated regardless of whether the survey was conducted 
at national, regional or court level.  

90   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

48 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Digitalisation 

The use of information and communication technologies (ICT) can strengthen the Member States’ 
justice systems and make them more accessible, efficient, resilient and ready to face current and 
future challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted a number of challenges affecting the 
functioning of the judiciary and showed the need for the national justice systems to further improve 
their digitalisation.  

Earlier editions of the EU Justice Scoreboard provided comparative data on certain aspects of the 
ICT in justice systems. As announced in the Commission’s Communication on the digitalisation 
of justice in the EU of 2 December 2020 (91), the Scoreboard has been substantially augmented 
with  further  data  on  digitalisation  in  the  Member  States.  This  should  allow  for  more  in-depth 
monitoring of progress areas and outstanding challenges. 

Citizen-friendly justice requires that information about national judicial systems is not only easily 
accessible but is also tailored to specific groups of society that would otherwise have difficulties 
in accessing the information, including persons with disabilities. Figure 42 shows the availability 
of online information and specific public services that can help people access justice. 

91   Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Digitalisation of justice in the European Union: A toolbox 
of opportunities’ COM(2020)710 and accompanying SWD(2020)540.  

49 

 
 
 
Figure 42: Availability of online information about the judicial system for the general public, 
2023 (*) (source: European Commission (92))  

(*) DE: Each federal state as well as the federal level decide individually which information to provide online. 

92   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

50 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Digital-ready rules – 

The use of digital solutions in civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases often requires 
appropriate regulation in national procedural rules. Figure 43 illustrates the possibilities set out by 
law for various actors to use distance communication technology (such as videoconferencing) for 
court and court related procedures, and reflects the current situation on the admissibility of digital 
evidence.  

Figure  43:  Procedural  rules  allowing  digital  technology  in  courts  in  civil/commercial, 
administrative  and  criminal  cases,  2023  (*)  (source:  European  Commission  (93))

(*) For each Member State, the first column presents procedural rules for civil/commercial cases, the second column 
for administrative cases and the third column for criminal cases. Maximum possible: 12 points. For each criterion, 
two points were given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases, respectively 
(in criminal cases, the possibility of hearing the parties was split to cover both defendants and victims). The points 
are divided by two when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For those Member States that do not distinguish 
between civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points has been given for both areas EL, LU: 
none for administrative cases. 

93   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

51 

 
 
 
 
 
 
– Use of digital tools – 

Beyond digital-ready procedural rules, courts and prosecution services need to have appropriate 
tools  and  infrastructure  in  place  for  distance  communication  and  secure  remote  access  to  the 
workplace (Figure 44). Adequate infrastructure and equipment is also needed for secure electronic 
communication  between  courts/prosecution  services  and  legal  professionals  and  institutions 
(Figures 45 and 46). 

ICT, including innovative technology, plays an important role in supporting the work of judicial 
authorities. It therefore contributes significantly to the quality of justice systems. The availability 
of various digital tools at the disposal of judges, prosecutors and judicial staff can streamline work 
processes, ensure fair workload allocation and lead to a significant time reduction. 

Figure 44: Use  of  digital  technology  by  courts  and  prosecution  services,  2023  (*)  (source: 
European Commission (94)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  7  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  courts  and  prosecution  services, 
respectively, use a given technology and 0.5 point was awarded when the technology is not always used by them. 

Secure electronic communication can contribute to improving the quality of justice systems. The 
possibility  for  courts  to  communicate  electronically  between  themselves,  as  well  as  with  legal 
professionals and other institutions, can streamline processes and reduce the need for paper-based 

94   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

52 

 
 
 
 
communication and physical presence, which would lead to a reduction in the length of pre-trial 
activities and court proceedings. 

Figure 45: Courts: electronic communication tools,  2023 (*) (source: European Commission 
(95)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for courts. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. FI: the tasks of notaries do not 
relate to courts. Therefore, there is no reason to provide them with secure connection. 

Prosecution services are essential for the functioning of the criminal justice system. Access to a 
secure  electronic  channel  of  communication  could  facilitate  their  work  and  thus  improve  the 
quality  of  court  proceedings.  The  possibility  for  secure  electronic  communication  between 
prosecution services and investigating authorities, defence lawyers and courts would enable a more 
expedient and efficient preparation of the proceedings before the court. 

95   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

53 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Prosecution service: electronic communication tools,  2023 (*) (source: European 
Commission (96)) 

(*)  Maximum  possible:  5  points.  For  each  criterion,  one  point  was  given  if  secure  electronic  communication  is 
available for prosecution services. 0.5 was awarded when the possibility does not  exist in all cases. Availability of 
electronic  communication  tools  within  prosecution  service  includes  communication  with  lawyers  employed  by  the 
prosecution service. 

– Online access to courts – 

The ability to carry out specific steps in a judicial procedure electronically is an important aspect 
of the quality of justice systems. The electronic submission of claims, the possibility to monitor 
and advance a proceeding online or serve documents electronically can tangibly facilitate access 
to justice for citizens and businesses (or their legal representatives) and reduce delays and costs. 
The availability of such digital public services would help bring courts one step closer to citizens 
and businesses, and by extension increase public trust in the justice system. 

96   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

54 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  47:  Digital  solutions  to  initiate  and  follow  proceedings  in  civil/commercial  and 
administrative cases, 2023 (*) (source: European Commission (97)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all civil/commercial 
and administrative cases, respectively. 0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exist in all cases. For 
those Member States that do not distinguish civil/commercial and administrative cases, the same number of points 
has been given for both areas.  

The use of digital tools for conducting and following court proceedings in criminal cases can also 
help  guarantee  the  rights  of  victims  and  defendants.  For  example,  digital  solutions  can  enable 
confidential  remote  communication  between  defendants  and  their  lawyers,  allow  defendants  in 
detention to prepare for their hearing and help victims of crime avoid secondary victimisation. 

97   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

55 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: Digital solutions to conduct and follow court proceedings in criminal cases, 2023 
(*) (source: European Commission (98)) 

(*) Maximum possible: 6 points. For each criterion, one point was given if the possibility exists in all criminal cases. 
0.5 point was awarded when the possibility does not exists in all cases. 

– Access to judgments – 

Ensuring online access to judgments increases the transparency of justice systems, helps citizens 
and businesses understand their rights and can contribute to consistency in case-law. Appropriate 
arrangements for publishing judicial decisions online are essential for creating user-friendly search 
facilities (99) that make case-law more  accessible to legal  professionals  and the general public, 
including persons with disabilities. Seamless access to and easy reuse of case-law makes the justice 
system algorithm-friendly, enabling innovative ‘legal tech’ applications that support practitioners.  

The  online  publication  of  court  decisions  requires  balancing  a  variety  of  interests,  within  the 
boundaries set by legal and policy frameworks. The General Data Protection Regulation (100) fully 
applies to the processing of personal data by courts. When assessing what data to make public, a 
fair balance has to be struck between the right to data protection and the obligation to publicise 
court decisions to ensure the transparency of the justice system. This is particularly true when there 
is a prevailing public interest that justifies the disclosure of those data. In many countries, the law 
or  practice  requires  the  anonymisation  or  pseudonymisation  (101)  of  judicial  decisions  before 

98   2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 
99   See  Best  practice  guide  for  managing  Supreme  Courts,  under  the  project  Supreme  Courts  as  guarantee  for 

effectiveness of judicial systems, p. 29. 

100  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 

101  Anonymisation/pseudonymisation is more efficient if assisted by an algorithm. However, human supervision is 

needed, since the algorithms do not understand context. 

56 

 
 
 
 
publication,  either  systematically  or  upon  request.  Data  produced  by  the  judiciary  are  also 
governed by EU legislation on open data and the reuse of public sector information (102). 
The availability of judicial decisions in a machine-readable format (103), as displayed in Figure 50, 
facilitates an algorithm-friendly justice system (104). 

Figure  49:  Online  access  to  published  judgments  by  the  general  public,  2023  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (105))  

(*) Maximum possible: 9 points. For each court instance, one point was given if all judgments are available for civil/commercial 
and administrative and criminal cases respectively, 0.75 points when most judgments (more than 50% are available) and 0.5 points 
when some judgments (less than 50%) are available. For Member States with only two court instances, points have been given for 
three court instances by mirroring the respective higher instance court of the non-existing instance. For those Member States that 
do not distinguish the two areas of law (civil/commercial and administrative), the same number of points has been given for both 
areas. BE: for civil and criminal cases, each court is in charge of deciding on the publication of its own judgments.  DE: each 
federal state decides on online availability of first instance judgments.  AT: for first and second instance, judges decide which 
judgments are published. Decisions of the Supreme Court that reject an appeal without substantial reasoning are not published. 
Decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court taken by a single judge are published if the judge concerned decides to publish 
them.  Furthermore,  decisions  only  containing  legal  issues  where  there  already  is  continuous  jurisprudence  of  the  Supreme 
Administrative  Court and  non-complicated decisions  concerning discontinuance  of proceedings  are  not  published.  NL:  courts 
decide on publication according to published criteria. PT: a commission within the court decides on the publication. SI: procedural 
decisions with little or no significance for the case-law are not published; from decisions in cases, which are identical in substance 

102  Directive 2003/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on the re-use of public 
sector information (OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 90) and Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (OJ L 172, 26.6.2019, p. 
56). 

103  Judgments modelled according to standards (e.g. Akoma Ntoso) and their associated metadata are downloadable 
free of charge in the form of a database or by other automated means (e.g. Application Programming Interface). 
104  See also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European strategy for data, COM(2020) 66 final, 
Commission White Paper on Artificial Intelligence – A European approach to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 
65 final, and Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council on Best Practices regarding the Online Publication of Court Decisions (OJ C 362, 8.10.2018, 
p. 2). 

105  2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

57 

 
 
 
 
(e.g. bulk cases), only the leading decision is published (together with the list of case files with the same content). Individual higher 
courts decide which judgments can be published. SK: decisions on several types of civil cases, such as in inheritance matters or 
determining of paternity are not published. FI: courts decide which judgments are published. 

Figure  50:  Arrangements  for  producing  machine-readable  judicial  decisions,  2023  (*) 
(civil/commercial,  administrative  and  criminal  cases,  all  instances)  (source:  European 
Commission (106))  

(*) Maximum possible: 24 points per type of case. For each of the three instances (first, second, final) one point can 
be given if all judicial decisions are covered. If only some judicial decisions are covered at a given instance, only half 
a point is awarded. Where a Member State has only two instances, points have been given for three instances by 
mirroring the respective higher instance as the non-existing instance. For those Member States that do not distinguish 
between administrative and civil/commercial cases, the same points have been allocated for both areas of law.  ES: 
The use of the General Council for the Judiciary (CGPJ) database for commercial purposes, or the massive download 
of information is not allowed. The reuse of this information for developing databases or for commercial purposes 
must follow the procedure and conditions established by the CGPJ through its Judicial Documentation Centre. IE: 
anonymisation of judgments is done in family law, child care and other areas where statute requires or a judge directs 
the identities of parties or persons not to be disclosed. 

106  2023 data collected in cooperation with the group of contact persons on national justice systems. 

58 

 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5. Summary on the quality of justice systems 

Easy access, sufficient resources, effective assessment tools and digitalisation all contribute to a 
high-quality  justice  system.  The  public  and  businesses  expect  high-quality  decisions  from  an 
effective justice system. The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard makes a comparative analysis of these 
factors. 

Accessibility 

The 2024 Scoreboard looks again at a number of elements that contribute to a people-friendly 
justice system: 

1)  The availability of legal aid and the level of court fees have a major impact on access to 
justice, in particular for people living in poverty or at risk of poverty. Figure 24 shows that in 
three Member States, people whose income is below the Eurostat poverty threshold may not 
receive legal aid. The level of court fees (Figure 25) has remained largely stable since 2016, 
although in six Member States court fees were higher than in 2022, in particular for low-value 
claims. The burden of court fees continues to be proportionally higher for low-value claims. 
Difficulties in claiming legal aid combined with high court fees in three Member States could 
deter  people  living  in  poverty  from  attempting  to  access  justice.  The  2024  EU  Justice 
Scoreboard also presents, for the first time, the rate of legal aid paid to criminal defence 
lawyers in a specific ciminal case, showing that a wide disparity exists among the Member 
States in the amounts lawyers would get paid from the public budget (Figure 26).  

2)  The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, for the first time, provides an overview of authorities that 
are  involved  in  succession  procedures  in  the  Member  States  (Figure  27).  While  in  5 
Member States the procedures take place only in courts and in 2 Member States it is carried 
out only by notaries, in 13 Member States a part of the procedure is before courts and part 
before notaries. In four Member States, courts entrust notaries to act in their place and in three 
Member States, other bodies are involved, too.  

3)  The  2024  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  continues  to  analyse  the  ways  in  which  Member  States 
promote  voluntary  use  of  alternative  dispute  resolution  methods  (ADR)  (Figure 28), 
including the possibility of using digital technologies. In 2023, the overall promotion effort 
increased, with nine Member States reporting more means of promotion, in particular about 
ADR methods in consumer disputes. The number of ways used to promote ADR methods is 
still  lower  for  administrative  disputes  than  for  other  disputes  but  has  also  increased  since 
2023. 

4)  For the first time, the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard takes stock of specific arrangements to 
support  the  participation  of  persons  with  disabilities  as  professionals  in  the  justice 
system. Figure 29 shows that 20 Member States have specific measures in place to support 
persons  with  disabilities  in  their  access  to  employment  in  the  justice  system  that  may  go 
beyond general provisions on employment of persons with  disabilities. 20 Member States  
provide information on the rights of persons at risk of discrimination, 16 provide vocational 
guidance and training for persons with disabilities working in the justice system, 18 Member 
States support employees with  disabilities regarding  employment and working conditions, 
including pay and protection from dismissals, and 14 have measures to support persons with 
disabilities  working  in  the  justice  system  regarding  their  membership  and  involvement  in 

59 

 
 
organisations of workers of the justice system. 

5)  Also for the first time, the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard presents specific selected measures 
for representative actions protecting the collective interests of consumers. Figure 30 shows 
that 21 Member States have at  least  one such measure in  place. From among the selected 
measures, specific arrangements to inform consumers about the actions and the outcomes and 
measures to train judges in effective management of representative actions belong to the most 
widespread ones, with 10 Member States having them in place, respectively.  

6)  Figure 31 shows that all Member States have some specific arrangements for child-friendly 
justice  and  proceedings,  both  as  regards  civil  and  criminal  justice  proceedings.  15 
Member  States  have  all  8  of  the  monitored  specific  arrangements  in  place,  including,  for 
example, a specifically child-friendly designed website and helplines to provide information 
about the justice system or measures in place to hold children separately from adults when 
they  are  deprived  of  their  liberty.  In  all  Member  States,  the  privacy  and  personal  data  of 
children  involved  in  judicial  or  non-judicial  proceedings  are  protected  in  accordance  with 
national law. Furthermore, all Member States have child-friendly specialised settings/hearing 
rooms in which children are being heard. A mapping of specific arrangements for child-
friendly proceedings with children involved as victims or suspects or as accused persons 
(Figure 32)  shows,  for  example,  that  26  Member  States  provide  information  about  the 
victim’s or suspect’s rights and the proceedings in a child-friendly way and in 18 Member 
States, criminal proceedings involving children are treated as a matter of urgency.  

Resources 

High-quality  justice  systems  in  Member  States  depend  on  sufficient  financial  and  human 
resources. This  requires appropriate investment  in  physical  and  technical  infrastructure, initial 
and  continuing  training, and  diversity  among  judges,  including  gender  balance.  The  2024  EU 
Justice Scoreboard shows the following. 

7)  In terms of financial resources, overall, in 2022, general government spending on law courts 
continues to show significant differences between Member States in spending levels of both 
per inhabitant and as a percentage of GDP (Figures 33 and 34). There are 7 Member States 
that increased their expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 2022 (a slowdown compared to 
2021) while 22 Member States marked an increase in expenditure per capita.  

8)  The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard continues to explore the situation in the Member States as 
regards  salaries  in  the  justice  system.  It  presents,  for  the  second  time,  the  ratio  of  annual 
salaries of judges and prosecutors compared to the average annual salary in the country 
(Figure 35). For the first time, it also presents the ratio of annual salaries of judicial and 
prosecutorial expert staff compared to the average annual salary in the country (Figure 36). 
Both figures show wide-ranging differences among the Member States. Moreover, Figure 36 
reveals that in 17 Member States, judicial expert staff at the beginning of their careers receives 
less than the national average salary. In 18 Member States, this is also the case of the public 
prosecution expert staff.  

9)  Women  still  account  for  fewer  than  50%  of  judges  at  supreme  court  level  in  20 Member 
States  (Figure 38),  while  in  7  Member  States  half  or  more  judges  at  supreme  courts  are 

60 

 
 
female. Figures for the three-year period from 2020 to 2023 show diverging levels and trends 
between Member States. 

10) To improve communication with vulnerable groups (Figure 40), all Member States provide 
training on communicating with asylum seekers and/or with people from different cultural, 
religious, ethnic or linguistic backgrounds. Furthermore, 20 Member States provide training 
on the use of social media and communication with the media (slight increase from last year), 
and 13 raise awareness and provide training on dealing with disinformation (a slight decrease 
from last year). 

Assessment tools 

11) The use of surveys among court users and legal professionals (Figure 41) was lower in 2023 
than in the preceding years, with 13 Member States not conducting any surveys. General level 
of trust in the justice system, accessibility of the court service and the conduct of the hearing 
are  recurring  topics  for  surveys,  but  only  3 Member  States  inquired  about  the  needs  and 
satisfaction of non-native speakers and 4 about the needs and satisfaction of children. 

Digitalisation 

Since 2021, the EU Justice Scoreboard has included a large, detailed section on aspects related 
to the digitalisation of justice. Although Member States already use digital solutions in different 
contexts and to varying degrees, there is significant room for improvement. 

12) 26 Member States provide some online information about their judicial system, including 
websites with clear information on accessing legal aid, on court fees and on eligibility criteria 
for reduced fees (Figure 42). The situation  remains stable  compared to  last  year but  some 
differences still exist between Member States at the level of information and the degree to 
which it responds to people’s needs. For example, 11 Member States provide education on 
legal rights to the general public through online interactive learning tools. 26 Member States 
provide clearly visible and understandable information on legal aid. 

13) Six Member States have digital-ready procedural rules (Figure 43), which allow fully or 
mostly for the use of distance communication and for the admissibility of evidence in digital 
format only.  In  21 Member States,  this is  possible only  in  a limited number of situations. 
Nonetheless, there has been steady overall progress in this regard since 2020.  

14) Figure 44 reveals the use of digital technology by courts and prosecution services. It shows 
that  Member  States  do  not  fully  use  the  potential  allowed  by  their  procedural  rules  (cf. 
Figure 43). Member States’ courts, prosecutors and court staff already have various digital 
tools  at  their  disposal,  such  as  case-management  systems,  videoconferencing  systems  and 
teleworking  arrangements.  However,  further  progress  could  still  be  achieved  in  electronic 
case allocation systems, with automatic distribution based on objective criteria.  

15) Courts in all Member States have some secure electronic tools for communication at their 
disposal although only 13 Member States have such tools for all types of communication that 
are monitored and for all cases (Figure 45). Around a fifth of the Member States still lack 
tools for digital communication with notaries, detention facilities or bailiffs/judicial officers. 
All  Member  States  also  provide  for  secure  electronic  communication  within  the 
prosecution  services  (Figure 46).  All  Member  States  except  for  one  provide  for  secure 

61 

 
 
electronic communication between prosecution services and courts. Four Member States still 
lack  tools  for  electronic  communication  between  the  prosecution  services  and  defence 
lawyers. 

16) In  civil/commercial  and  administrative  cases,  24  Member  States  provide  individuals  and 
businesses (or their legal representatives) with online access to their ongoing or closed cases 
(Figure 47), albeit to varying degrees. As regards digital solutions to conduct and follow court 
proceedings in criminal cases, Figure 48 shows that victims can submit written statements 
online either partly or fully in 17 Member States. However, in 11 Member States, defendants 
and victims do not have possibilities for following or pursuing their case electronically. 

17) Online access to court judgments (Figure 49) has remained stable compared to last year. It 

is mainly judgments from the highest instances that are made accessible online. 

18) As in previous years, the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard analyses arrangements for producing 
machine-readable  judicial  decisions  (Figure 50).  All  Member  States  have  at  least  some 
arrangements in place for civil/commercial, administrative and criminal cases although there 
is  considerable  variation  between  them.  In  general,  there  is  a  tendency  to  introduce  more 
arrangements, particularly for downloading the judgments free of charge (databases and other 
automated  solutions),  for  modelling  judgments  to  make  them  machine-readable,  or  for 
anonymising/pseudonymising  judgments  using  algorithms.  In  2022,  8 Member  States 
reported improvement compared to the previous year, while the situation in 10 Member States 
remained  stable.  Justice  systems  with  arrangements  for  modelling  judgments  in  line  with 
standards to make them machine-readable seem to have the potential to achieve better results 
in the future. 

62 

 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Independence 

Judicial independence, which is integral to the task of judicial decision-making, is a requirement 
in EU law stemming from the principle of effective judicial protection referred to in Article 19 
TEU, and from the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal enshrined in Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (107). That requirement presumes:  

(a) external independence, where the relevant body exercises its functions autonomously, without 
being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking 
orders  or  instructions  from  any  source  whatsoever,  thus  being  protected  against  external 
interventions or pressure that could impair the independent judgment of its members and influence 
their decisions; and  

(b)  internal  independence  and  impartiality,  where  an  equal  distance  is  maintained  from  the 
parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with regard to the subject matter of those 
proceedings (108), and when individual judges are protected from undue internal pressue within the 
judiciary (109).  

Judicial independence is vital to guarantee that all the rights that individuals derive from EU law 
will be protected and that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in 
particular the value of the rule of law, will be safeguarded (110). Preserving the EU legal order is 
fundamental for all people and businesses whose rights and freedoms are protected under EU law.  

A high level of perceived independence of the judiciary is  vital  for the trust which justice in a 
society governed by the rule of law must inspire in individuals. It also contributes to a growth-
friendly  business  environment,  as  a  perceived  lack  of  independence  can  deter  investment.  The 
Scoreboard includes indicators  for the judiciary’s independence  relating to  the  effectiveness of 
investment protection. In addition to indicators on perceived judicial independence from various 

107  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN 
108  Court of Justice, judgment of 16 November 2021, Criminal proceedings against WB and Others, Joined Cases C-
748/19 to C-754/19, judgment of 6 October 2021,  W. Ż., C-487/19, judgment of 15 July 2021,  Commission v. 
Poland, C-791/13, judgment of 2 March 2021, AB, C-824/18, judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and Others, 
C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 122; judgment of 5 November 2019, 
Commission  v  Poland,  C-192/18, 
judgment  of  24  June  2019,  Commission  v.  Poland,  C-619/18, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531  paras.  73  and  74;  judgment  of  27  February  2018,  Associação  Sindical  dos  Juízes 
Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para.  44; judgment of 25 July 2018,  Minister for Justice and Equality, 
C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 65. 

109  Supreme Courts, as final instance courts, and higher/appeal courts in general, are essential to secure the uniform 
application of the law in Member States. Nevertheless, hierarchical judicial organisation should not undermine 
individual  independence  (Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  22).  Superior  courts  should  not  address 
instructions to judges about the way they should decide individual cases, except in national preliminary rulings or 
when  deciding  on  legal  remedies  according  to  the  law  (Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12,  para.  23).  A 
hierarchical  organisation  of  the  judiciary  in  the  sense  of  a  subordination  of  judges  to  higher  instances  in  their 
judicial decision-making activity would be a clear violation of the principle of internal independence, according 
to the Venice Commission (Venice Commission, Report on the independence of the judicial system, Part I: the 
independence of courts, Study No. 494/2008, 16 March 2010, CDL-AD(2010)004, paras. 68 - 72). Any procedure 
for the unification of case-law must comply with fundamental principles of separation of powers, and even after 
such  a  decision  of  a higher/Supreme  Court,  all  courts  and judges  must  remain  competent  to  assess  their  cases 
independently  and  impartially,  and  to  distinguish  new  cases  from  the  interpretation  previously  unified  by  a 
higher/Supreme Court (2022 EU Justice Scoreboard, p. 45). 

110  Court of Justice, judgment of  5 June 2023, Commission v. Poland, C-204/21, ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 354 

and the case law cited. 

63 

 
 
 
sources, the Scoreboard presents a number of indicators on how justice systems are organised to 
protect judicial independence, in certain types of situations where independence could be at risk. 
Reflecting input from the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), the Network 
of  the  Presidents  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Courts  of  the  EU  (NPSJC),  the  Network  of  Public 
Prosecutors or equivalent institutions at the Supreme Judicial Courts of the Member States of the 
European  Union  (Nadal  Network),  and  from  the  national  contact  points  in  the  fight  against 
corruption, this edition of the Scoreboard shows indicators on the composition of the Councils for 
the  Judiciary,  the  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  of  court  presidents  and  national 
prosecutors,  and  provides  an  initial  overview  of  the  material  and  personal  scope  of  asset 
declarations, as well as the verification and sanctions done by the specialised bodies involved in 
the collection and verification of asset declarations, that were presented in last year’s publication.  

3.3.1. Perceived judicial independence and effectiveness of investment protection 

Figure  51:  How  the  general  public  perceives  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*) 
(source: Eurobarometer (111) - light colours: 2016, 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2024)  

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad 
or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are 
ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some 
Member States have the same  percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by  the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad. 
Figure 52 shows the main reasons given by respondents for a perceived lack of independence of 
courts and judges. Respondents among the general public who rated the independence of the justice 

111  Eurobarometer survey FL540, conducted between 14 and 27 February 2024. Replies to the question: ‘From what 
you know, how would you rate the justice system in (your country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
see: 
judges?  Would  you 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys;  FL519 
(2016),  also  available  at: 
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/screen/home. 

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

(2023),  FL503 

(2022),  FL435 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

64 

 
 
 
 
system  as being  ‘fairly  bad’ or ‘very bad’ could choose between three reasons  to  explain  their 
rating. The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 51.  

Figure 52: Main reasons among the general public for the perceived lack of  independence 
(share of all respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (112)) 

112  Eurobarometer survey  FL540, replies to the question: ‘Could  you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (our country): very much, somewhat, not 
really, not at all?’ if reply to Q1 is 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. 

65 

 
 
 
 
Figure  53:  How  companies  perceive  the  independence  of  courts  and  judges  (*)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (113) - light colours: 2016, 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2024) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and 
judges is very good or fairly good (total good); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good, then 
they are ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is fairly bad 
or very bad (total bad); if some Member States have the same percentage of total good and total bad, then they are 
ordered by the percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very good; if some 
Member States have the same  percentage of total good, total bad and of very good, then they are ordered by  the 
percentage of respondents who stated that the independence of courts and judges is very bad.  

Figure 54 shows the main reasons given by companies for the perceived lack of independence of 
courts and judges. Respondents which rated the independence of the justice system as being ‘fairly 
bad’ or ‘very bad,’ could choose between three reasons to explain their rating. The Member States 
are listed in the same order as in Figure 53. 

113  Eurobarometer survey FL541, conducted between 14 February and 5 March 2024, replies to the question: ‘From 
what you know, how would you rate the justice system in (our country) in terms of the independence of courts and 
judges?  Would  you 
see: 
https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-
justice-scoreboard_en#surveys;  from  2021,  the  sample  size  of  companies surveyed was  enlarged  to 500 for  all 
Member States except for MT, CY and LU, where the sample was 250. In previous years the sample size was 200 
for all Member States except for DE, ES, FR, PL and IT, where the sample was 400. FL520 (2023), FL504 (2022), 
FL436 (2016) also available at: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/screen/home.  

fairly  bad  or  very  bad?’, 

is  very  good, 

fairly  good, 

say 

it 

66 

 
 
 
 
Figure 54: Main reasons among companies for the perceived lack of independence (rate of all 
respondents - higher value means more influence) (source: Eurobarometer (114)) 

114  Eurobarometer survey  FL541; replies to the question: ‘Could you tell me to what extent each of the following 
reasons explains your rating of the independence of the justice system in (your country): very much, somewhat, 
not really, not at all?’ if the response to Q1 was 'fairly bad' or 'very bad'. 

67 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Promoting, facilitating and protecting investments are key priorities within the EU single market. 
EU law aims to maintain a harmonious equilibrium between protecting investments and pursuing 
other public interest goals that enhance the welfare of its citizens. Figure 55 shows, for the third 
time, the indicator on how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the 
law and courts as regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State. 

Figure 55: How companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the law and 
courts (*) (source: Eurobarometer (115) - light colours: 2022 and 2023, dark colours: 2024) 

(*) Member States are ordered first by the combined percentage of respondents who stated that they are very or fairly 
confident in investment protection by the law and courts (total confident).  

Figure 56 shows the main reasons given by companies for the perceived lack of effectiveness of 
investment protection. Respondents which rated their level of confidence as 'fairly unconfident' or 
'very unconfident', could choose four reasons to explain their rating (and some indicated “other”). 
The Member States are listed in the same order as in Figure 55. 

115  Eurobarometer survey FL541 , conducted between 14 February and 5 March 2024, replies to the question Q3: 'To 
what  extent  are  you  confident  that  your  investments  are  protected  by  the  law  and  courts  in  (your  country)  if 
something goes wrong?' For the purpose of the survey, investment was defined as including any kind of asset that 
a  company  owns  or  controls  and  that  is  characterised  by  the  commitment  of  capital  or  other  resources,  the 
expectation of gain or profit or the assumption of risk. 

68 

 
 
 
 
Figure  56:  Main  reasons  among  companies  for  their  perceived  lack  of  effectiveness  of 
investment  protection  (rate  of  all  respondents  -  higher  value  means  more  influence)  (source: 
Eurobarometer (116)) 

While EU law may not solve every challenge investors may face in their activities, it does provide 
high level of protection for the rights of EU investors within the single market. This framework 
permits  access  to  the  market,  operations  on  the  market  and  retreat  from  the  market  across  all 
Member States. Investors retain the ability to invoke their rights before administrative bodies and 
courts.  

116  Eurobarometer  survey  FL541;  replies  to  the  question:  'What  are  your  main  reasons  for  concern  about  the 

effectiveness of investment protection?' if the response to Q3 was 'fairly unconfident' or 'very unconfident'. 

69 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2. Structural independence 

The guarantees of structural  independence  require rules,  particularly  on the composition  of the 
court and the appointment, length of service and grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of 
its members, that are such as to dispel any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the 
imperviousness of the court to external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before 
it (117). They must, in particular, be such as to preclude not only any direct influence, in the form 
of instructions,  but also types of influence that are more indirect  and that are liable to  have an 
effect on the decisions of the judges concerned (118). 

European standards have been developed, particularly by the Council of Europe, for example in 
the  2010  Council  of  Europe  Recommendation  on  judges:  independence,  efficiency  and 
responsibilities  (119).  The  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  presents  certain  indicators  on  issues  that  are 
relevant when assessing how justice systems are organised to safeguard judicial independence. 

This edition of the Scoreboard contains new indicators on: authorities involved in the appointment 
of  court  presidents  (Figures  58  and  59)  (120);  national  frameworks  regarding  asset  declarations 
(Figures 60, 61 and 62) (121); authorities involved in the appointment of (first-level) prosecutors 

117  See Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2023, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (Maintien en fonctions d’un 
juge), C-718/21, EU:C:2023:1015, paras. 76-77, and the case-law cited,   judgment of 5 June 2023, Commission 
v. Poland, C-204/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 355; judgment of 16 November 2021,  Criminal proceedings 
against  WB and  Others,  Joined  Cases  C-748/19  to  C-754/19, para.  67;  judgment of 6 October  2021,  W.Ż.,  C-
487/19, para. 109; judgment of 15 July 2021,  Commission v. Poland, C-791/19, para. 59; judgment of 2 March 
2021,  A.B.,  C-824/18,  para.117;  judgment  of  19  November  2019,  A.  K.  and  Others  (Independence  of  the 
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18,EU:C:2019:982, paras. 121 and 
122; judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531 paras. 73 and 74; judgment of 
25 July 2018, LM, C-216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, para. 66; judgment of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical 
dos Juízes Portugueses, C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, para. 44. See also paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)12 Judges: Independence, Efficiency and Responsibility (adopted by the Committee of Ministers 
of  the  Council  of  Europe  on  17  November  2010)  and  the  explanatory  memorandum.  These  provide  that  the 
authority  taking  decisions  on  the  selection  and  career  of  judges  should  be  independent  of  the  executive  and 
legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half of the members of the authority 
should be judges chosen by their peers. However, where the constitutional or other legal provisions prescribe that 
the head of state, the government or the legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of 
judges, an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the judiciary (without prejudice to 
the  rules  applicable  to  councils  for  the  judiciary  contained  in  Chapter  IV)  should  be  authorised  to  make 
recommendations or express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.  

118  See  Court of Justice, judgment of  5 June 2023,  Commission v. Poland, C-204/21,  ECLI:EU:C:2023:442, para. 
355; judgment of 2 March 2021, A.B., C-824/18, para. 119; judgment of 19 November 2019,  A. K. and Others 
(Independence  of  the  Disciplinary  Chamber  of  the  Supreme  Court),  C-585/18,  C-624/18  and  C-625/18, 
EU:C:2019:982, para. 123; judgment of 24 June 2019,  Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, EU:C:2019:531 para. 
112.  

119  See  Recommendation  CM/Rec(2010)12  Judges:  Independence,  Efficiency  and  Responsibility,  adopted  by  the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 17 November 2010 and the explanatory memorandum (‘the 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12’). 

120  The  figures  are  based  on  the  responses  to  an  updated  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close 
association with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for 
the Judiciary or that are not ENCJ members (CZ, DE, EE, CY, AT and PL) were obtained in cooperation with the 
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 

121  Figures are based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 

with the national contact points in the fight against corruption. 

70 

 
 
 
(Figures 63 and 64) and dismissal of Prosecutors General (Figure 65) (122); and (vi) a first overview 
of the authorities involved in the appointment of Constitutional Court members (Figure 66) (123). 
It also presents an updated overview of the composition of the Councils for the Judiciary (Figure 
57) (124) and updated figure on the independence of bars and lawyers (Figure 67) (125). The figures 
present the national frameworks as they were in December 2023. 

The figures presented in the Scoreboard do not provide an assessment or present quantitative data 
on the effectiveness of the safeguards. They are not intended to reflect the complexity and details 
of the procedures and accompanying safeguards. Implementing policies and practices to promote 
integrity  and  prevent  corruption  within  the  judiciary  are  also  essential  to  guarantee  judicial 
independence. Ultimately, the effective protection of judicial independence also requires, beyond 
whatever  necessary  norms,  a  culture  of  integrity  and  impartiality  shared  by  magistrates  and 
respected by the wider society. 

– Composition of the Councils for the Judiciary – 

Councils for the Judiciary are essential bodies for ensuring the independence of justice. It is for 
the  Member  States  to  organise  their  justice  systems,  including  deciding  on  whether  or  not  to 
establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, European standards, in particular Recommendation 
of the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe CM/Rec (2010)12, recommend that ‘not less 
than half the members of [Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from 
all levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary’ (126).  

Figure  57  shows  an  updated  overview,  already  presented  in  the  2016  and  2020  EU  Justice 
Scoreboards, of the composition of the Councils for the Judiciary (127) according to the nomination 
process.  In  particular,  it  shows  whether  the  members  of  the  councils  are  judges/prosecutors 
proposed and selected/elected by their peers, members nominated by the executive or legislative 
branch,  or  members  nominated  by  other  bodies  and  authorities.  The  Figure  is  a  factual 
representation of the composition of the Councils for the Judiciary and does not make a qualitative 
assessment of their effective functioning. 

122  Figures are based on responses to pilot questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close cooperation with the 
Network of Public Prosecutors or equivalent institutions at the Supreme Judicial Courts of the Member States of 
the European Union – the Nadal Network. 
123  Figure has been drawn by the Commission. 
124  Figure is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 
with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that are not ENCJ members (PL) 
were obtained in cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU.  
125  Figure  is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 

with the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE). 

126 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12, para. 27; see also 2016 CoE action plan, C item (ii); Opinion no.10(2007) of 
the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) to the attention of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on the Council for the Judiciary at the service of society, para. 27; and ENCJ, Councils for the Judiciary 
Report 2010-11, para. 2.3 

127  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  are  independent  bodies,  established  by  law  or  under  the  constitution,  that  seek  to 
safeguard  the  independence  of  the  judiciary  and  of  individual  judges  and  thereby  to  promote  the  efficient 
functioning of the judicial system. 

71 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure  57:  Composition  of  the  Councils  for  the  Judiciary  (source:  European  Network  of 
Councils for the Judiciary and Network of Presidents of Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU (128)) 

(*) BE: Judicial members are either judges or prosecutors; BG: the Supreme Judicial Council was reformed and the 
former Prosecutorial chamber was turned into a Supreme Prosecutorial Council. The Supreme Judicial Council is 
now composed of 15 members, 8 of which are judges elected by their peers, 5 of them are  members elected by the 
National Assembly (without the possibility of electing prosecutors or investigative magistrates in these positions), and 
2 of them are the Presidents of the Supreme Cassation Court and Supreme Administrative Court. DK: The Board of 
the National Courts Administration  is composed of twelve members  (all are formally appointed by the Minister of 
Justice): a Supreme Court judge nominated by the Supreme Court, two high court judges nominated by the Eastern 
High Court and Western High Court respectively, a court president nominated by the presidents of the district courts, 
two district court judges nominated by the Danish Association of Judges, a representative of the other academic staff 
nominated by the Danish Association of Deputy Judges, two representatives for the administrative staff nominated by 
trade unions, a lawyer nominated by the Danish Bar and Law Society, two members with managerial and societal 
insight  nominated  by  the  Employment  Council  and  the  Rectors'  College,  respectively  In  addition  a  Judicial 
Appointments  Council  exists, which  prepares  proposals  for  judicial  appointments  (half  of  its  members  are  judges 
selected by their peers);  IE: The figure reflects the composition of the  Judicial Council, member of the  European 
Network of Councils for the Judiciary, established on 17 December 2019. The first plenary session of the Judicial 
Council, comprising all of the judges of Ireland, was held on 7 February 2020. ES: Members of the Council coming 
from  the  judiciary  are  appointed  by  the  Parliament  —  the  Council  communicates  to  the  Parliament  the  list  of 
candidates  who  have  received  the  support  of  a  judges’  association  or  of  twenty  five  judges;  EL(civil  &  criminal 
judiciary): the council has the total of 11/15 members,  out of which 7/11 are judges. Judges and prosecutors are 
chosen by a lot. EL (admininistrative judicary): the council has the total of 11/15 members, out of which 10/14 are 
judges, who are chosen by a lot. FR: The Council has two formations — one with jurisdiction over sitting judges, the 
other with jurisdiction over prosecutors; the Council includes one member of the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State) 
elected by the general assembly of the Conseil d’Etat; IT-CSM: Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura (covering 
civil and criminal courts, and the prosecution service); according to the Constitution, the President of the Republic, 
the first President at the High Court of Cassation and the Prosecutor General at the Hight Court of Cassation are 
members  ex  officio.  IT-CPGA:  Consiglio  di  presidenza  della  giustizia  amministrativa  (covering  administrative 

128  The Figure is based on the responses to an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association 
with the ENCJ. Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that are not ENCJ members (PL) 
were obtained in cooperation with the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the EU. 

72 

 
 
 
 
courts); LU: Conseil National de la Justice is composed of nine effective members and nine substitute members. The 
procedure  for  election  of  the  substitute  members  is  identical  as  the  one  for  the  effective  members.  MT:  The 
Commission for the Administration of Justice is composed of ten members: the President of MT, as Chairman (having 
only a casting vote in case of a tied vote); the Chief Justice, as Deputy Chairman; the Attorney General; two members 
elected  from  among  the  Judges  of  the  Superior  Courts;  two  members  elected  from  among  the  Magistrates  of  the 
Inferior Courts; one member appointed by the Prime Minister and one lay member appointed by the Leader of the 
Opposition; and the President of the Chamber of Advocates. NL: Members are formally appointed by Royal Decree 
on a proposal from the Minister of Security and Justice. PL: Candidate judges-members are proposed by groups of 
at least 2 000 citizens or 25 judges. From among the candidates, the deputies’ clubs select up to nine candidates, from 
which a committee of the lower chamber of the Parliament (Sejm) establishes a final list of 15 candidates, who are 
appointed by the Sejm. On 6 March 2024, the Polish government tabled a draft law on the National Council for the 
Judiciary to remove doubts as to its independence and empower judges to appoint judges-members of the Council, 
instead of the Sejm.. On 17 September 2018, the European Network of Councils for the Judicary decided to suspend 
the membership of the National Council for the Judiciary (KRS) because it no longer met the requirements of the 
ENCJ  that it is independent of the Executive and Legislature in a manner which ensured the independence of the 
Polish Judiciary. PT: The figure refers to the composition of the Conselho Superior da Magistratura. In addition, a 
High Council for the Administrative and Tax Courts (Conselho Superior dos Tribunais Administrativos e Fiscais) and 
a  High  Council  for  the  Public  Prosecution  (Conselho  Superior  do  Ministério  Público)  also  exist.  RO:  elected 
magistrates are validated by the Senate; SI: Non-judge members are elected by the National Assembly on a proposal 
from the President of the Republic. FI: The Government formally appoints the  board of directors of the National 
Courts Administration for a term of five years at a time from among the candidates proposed to it. 

– Appointment of court presidents – 

Court presidents  exercise an important  role  as they are  usually assigned  powers to  manage the 
court.  In  performing  their  tasks  (which  vary  between  Member  States),  court  presidents  are  to 
protect the independence and impartiality of the court and of individual judges. It is for the Member 
States to organise the procedure of selection, appointment or election of court presidents in such a 
way  that  not  only  the  fulfillment  of  conditions  as  to  their  capabilities  but  also  their 
independence and impartiality is ensured129.  

According to the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) Opinion No 19 (2016) on the 
role of court presidents, the procedures for the appointment of court presidents should follow the 
same  path  as  that  for  the  selection  and  appointment  of  judges130.  This  includes  a  process  of 
evaluation of the candidates and a body having the authority  to select and/or appoint judges in 
accordance  with  the  standards  established  in  the  2010  Recommendation  (131).  The  system  of 
selection and appointment of court presidents should include, as a rule, a competitive selection 
process based on an open call for applications of candidates who meet pre-determined conditions 
laid down in the law (132). The European standards provide that safeguards of irremovability from 
office as a judge should apply equally to the office of court president, that the procedure in the 
case of pre-term removal of court presidents be transparent and that any risk of political influence 

129 ‘The  minimum qualification to become president of a court is that the candidate  should have all the necessary 
qualifications and experience for appointment to judicial office in that court’. Consultative Council of European 
Judges (CCJE) Opinion No 19 (2016) The Role of Court Presidents, 10 November 2016 (the 2016 Opinion), para. 
34: https://rm.coe.int/opinion-no-19-on-the-role-of-court-presidents/16806dc2c4 

130  Since 2019, the Court of Justice issued a number of rulings on judicial appointments and requirements of EU law 
in  that  respect.  See  notably  judgment  of  judgment  of  29  March  2022,  Getin  Noble  Bank,  C‑132/20, 
EU:C:2022:235, paras. 82 to 84 and 107; judgment of 20 April 2021, C-896/19, Repubblika v Il-Prim Ministru, 
EU:C:2021:311, paras. 56 to 57, and the case-law cited:  

131  Para. 38 of the 2016 Opinion.  
132  Para. 38 of the 2016 Opinion. 

73 

 
 
 
in this process should be firmly excluded, whereby the participation in this process of executive 
authorities should thus be avoided (133). 

Figure  58  shows  an  overview  of  the  bodies  and  authorities  which  propose  candidates  for 
appointment as court presidents and the authorities that appoint them, as well as the authorities 
that are consulted as part of the process (e.g. judges, Councils for the Judiciary).  

Figure  58:  Appointment  of  court  presidents:  proposing  and  appointing  authorities  (*) 
(source: European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and Network of Presidents of Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the EU (134)) 

(*) BE: proposal: The Decision on the proposal is taken by the council for the judiciary on the mandatory advice of 
the president of the court; appointment: the King through a Royal decree drafted by the Minister of Justice. BG: 
proposal: common assembly of the court; the minister of justice, the candidate him/herself; appointment: Supreme 
Judicial  Council.  CZ:  The  figure  reflects  the  appointment of  the presidents  of  first  instance  courts/district  courts. 
proposal:  president  of  the  regional  court  in  accordance  with  the  result  of  selection  procedure  announced  by  the 
regional court; appointment: Minister of Justice. For other court presidents (presidents of regional courts and of high 
courts), President appoints on a proposal from the Minister of justice and in accordance with the result of the selection 
procedure  announced  by  the  Ministry.  DK:  proposal:  Judicial  Appointments  Council  based  on  application  of 
candidates to open positions; appointment: Minister of Justice. EE: The presidents of the first and second instance 
courts are appointed by the Minister of Justice after having heard the opinion of the full court for which the president 
is being appointed and receiving the approval from the Council for Administration of Courts. IE: proposal: Judicial 
Appointment Commission; appointment: President, upon nomination from the Government. DE: proceedings at the 
level of the federal states differ greatly. In half of the 16 federal states, judicial electoral committees participate in the 
recruitment. In some of the federal states, this matter is dealt with completely by their state Ministry of Justice, whereas 

133  Paras. 45 and 47 of the 2016 Opinion. 
134  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 
Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary are not ENCJ 
members, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC. 

74 

 
 
 
 
in other federal states the authority to decide on recruitment and on the (first) appointment has been transferred to 
the presidents of the higher regional courts. Some federal states provide for mandatory participation of a council of 
judges. Others require a joint appointment by the competent minister and a conciliation committee if the council of 
judges objects. In some federal states, judges are elected by the state parliaments and have to be appointed by the 
state executive. IT: proposal: Council; appointment: President of the Republic. CY: There is no proposing authority. 
The President and members of the Appeal Court, the Administrative Presidents of the District Courts, or the President 
of a Court of a Specialised Jurisdiction (depending on the position of the appointment), as well as the President of the 
Cyprus  Bar  Association  and  the  Attorney  General,  can  only  submit  their  opinions/views  ;  appointment:  Supreme 
Judicial Council. LV: proposal: Judicial Candidacy Selection Committee; appointment: Judicial Council. LT: The 
figure reflects the appointment of  chairpersons of regional and district courts.  proposal: Selection Commission of 
Candidates to Judicial Office + mandatory advice from the Judicial Council; appointment:  President.  Parliament 
appoints chairpersons of the Court of Appeal. LU: proposal: National Council for Justice; appointment: Grand-Duke. 
MT: The Chief Justice is appointed by the President acting in accordance with a resolution of Parliament supported 
by  the  votes  of  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  all  the  members.  FR:  proposal:  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy; 
appointment: President of the Republic. CZ: Figure reflects the framework in place regarding the presidents and vice-
presidents  of  the  district  courts,  regional  courts  and  high  courts.  ES:  Although  the  formal  appointment  of  court 
presidents is done by a Royal Decree signed by the King (in his capacity as Head of State) and the Minister of Justice, 
neither the King nor the Minister can object to the binding proposal for appointment made by the Council for the 
Judiciary. HU: Figure reflects the appointment of presidents of district courts, who are appointed by the regional 
court presidents. The President of the National Office for the Judiciary appoints the regional court presidents and the 
regional appeal court presidents. The judges at the district court form an opinion on the applicants to the vacancy by 
a secret ballot. AT: Proposal: special chamber of the court, higher court and supreme court; appointment: the Federal 
President on advice of the Minister of Justice. PL: The Minister of Justice appoints from the judges in a given court. 
PT: The presidents of the courts of first instance are selected and appointed by the Judicial High Council from among 
judges.  The  Presidents  of  the  Courts  of  Appeal  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice  are  elected  by  their  peers.  FI: 
proposal:  Judicial  Appointments  Board;  appointment:  President.  SE:  proposal:  Judges  Proposal  Board; 
appointment: Government.  

Figure  59  presents  the  competences  of  the  executive  power  and  parliament  in  appointing 
candidates  as  court  presidents  upon  submission  from  the  proposing  authorities  (e.g.  judges  or 
Council  for  the  Judiciary).  The  height  of  the  column  depends  on  whether  the  executive  or 
parliament have the possibility to reject a candidate for the court president, whether it can choose 
only among the proposed candidates, or whether it can choose and appoint any other candidate, 
even  if  they  are  not  proposed  by  the  competent  authority.  If  a  candidate  is  not  appointed,  an 
important  safeguard  is  the  obligation  to  provide  reasons  (135)  and  the  possibility  for  a  judicial 
review of the decision (136). The figure is a factual presentation of the legal system and does not 
make a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of the safeguards. 

135 Judgment of 20 April 2021 in case C-896/19, Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru, para. 71.  
136 Judgment of 19 November 2019 in joined cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, AK et al., para. 145.  

75 

 
 
 
Figure 59: Appointment of court presidents: competence of the executive and parliament (*) 
(source: European Network of Councils for the Judiciary and Network of Presidents of Supreme 
Judicial Courts of the EU (137))  

(*) BG: The President of the Republic has the right to veto the proposed candidate. Then the the  Supreme Judicial 
Council  has  to  vote  again  on  the  candidates  that  were  proposed  to  them.  If  it  re-elects  the  same  candidate,  the 
President is obliged to appoint them. CZ: The law does not explicitly state whether the President has the power not 
to appoint a candidate for a position of court president. There is also no case-law on this matter. DK: The Judicial 
Appointments Council can only propose one candidate for the position of court president to the Minister of Justice 
and  the  recommendation  must  be  justified.  The  Minister  of  Justice  has  the  formal  appointment  authority.  Only  in 
exceptional cases would the Minister of Justice not follow the Council's recommendation. In such a case, the Minister 
must inform Parliament's Legal Committee. In practice this has never happened. EE: The Minister of Justice may, 
but is not obliged to set up a selection board for the position of the president of the court. If the Minister of Justice 
decides to set up a selection board, which proposes a candidate for the position of a court president, that proposal is 
also not binding. If a candidate for the position of a court president is not appointed, they can turn to the administrative 
court to challenge the result of the competition. IE: The figure reflects the competence of the  Government. Under 
Article 13.9 of the Constitution (i.e. a constitutional requirement rather than a practice), the President’s power of 
appointment is only exercisable on the advice of the  Government. ES: The Head of State (the King) as appointing 
authority must mandatorily follow the proposal of the Council for the Judiciary concerning judicial appointments and 
promotions. The King has therefore no discretion and no obligation to provide reasons. The decision of the King takes 
the form of a Royal Decree, is published in the Official Gazette and may not be challenged as such. It is the previous 
decision by the Council to propose a candidate for judicial appointment or promotion that can be appealed, initially 
through an administrative appeal (decided by the Plenary of the Council) and subsequently through a judicial review 
before the Administrative Division of the Supreme Court. FR: The appointment of heads of court (for both courts of 
appeal and courts of first instance) is the sole responsibility of the Superior Council of Magistracy, which makes 
proposals and takes decisions. The appointing authority referred to is the President of the Republic, who must formally 
appoint the judges through a decree with no discretion on the matter. If the candidate has been selected by the Council 
for an interview, the members of the Council will explain to the candidate why they have not been selected. This is a 

137  Data collected through an updated questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the ENCJ. 
Responses to the updated questionnaire from Member States that have no Councils for the Judiciary are not ENCJ 
members, were obtained through cooperation with the NPSC. 

76 

 
 
 
 
practice introduced by the Council, not provided for by law. IT: Following a proposal by the Supreme Council for 
Magistracy (CSM) or the Council for the judiciary for administrative judges (CPGA), which are in practice binding 
proposals, the President of the Republic issues a decree on the appointment of the President of the Supreme Court or 
the President of the Council of State, respectively,  with no discretion in this regard. LT: A candidate to a judicial 
office shall be appointed by President’s decree and a candidate who was not appointed has no grounds to request a 
judicial review of this act. The candidate can request that the Supreme Court carry out a special judicial review of 
the selection procedure based on procedural issues with the way the Selection Commission arrived at its opinion. 
(This opinion is not binding on the President of the Republic). MT: The authority presented is Parliament. PL: The 
Minister of Justice appoints from the judges in a given court. SK: Although it has never happened, if a candidate for 
a Court President were to not be appointed, the appointing authority/body would be required to provide them with 
the reasons for the decision, and there would be a possibility of a review before the Supreme Administrative Court or 
the Constitutional Court. FI: The President would give reasons for the decision, although this is not mentioned in the 
law.  

– Anti-corruption – 

Corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon, present both in the public and private sector.  It has 
negative  impacts  on  prosperity  and  economic  growth,  social  cohesion,  and  on  sustainable 
development. National anti-corruption frameworks are monitored by the Commission through the 
annual Rule of Law Report and also under the European Semester and the Recovery and Resilience 
Plans and, if relevant, as part of the assessment under the Conditionality Regulation138. On 3 May 
2023, the Commission presented a Communication on the fight against corruption, and a proposal 
for  a  Directive  on  combating  corruption  by  criminal  law  (139).  These  documents  indicate  the 
importance of the prevention of corruption, in order to foster a culture of integrity. The obligation 
for certain public officials to disclose assets is recognised as an important tool in this regard.  

The  2024  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  builds  on  last year’s  figures  and  presents  an  overview  of  the 
powers of national bodies involved in the area of prevention of corruption, focusing specifically 
on asset disclosure. Asset disclosure by public and elected officials is an essential tool to prevent 
corruption and to strengthen integrity. The figures set out the material scope (Figure 60) and the 
personal scope (Figure 61) of national frameworks with regard to asset declaration systems, and 
show  whether  there  are  mechanisms  for  transparency,  verification  of  asset  declarations  and 
sanctions (Figure 62). Systems at national level can be different depending on the personal scope 
(e.g. members of Parliament often operate under a different “declaration regime” than judges and 
prosecutors). However, figures 60 and 62 do not differentiate on the basis of this personal scope, 
only  verifying  if  any  aspect  of  the  asset  declaration  system  has  one  of  the  indicated  elements 
included. The data displayed does not provide for a comprehensive picture of detailed systemic 
weaknesses in law and practice.  

138  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a 

general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020). 

139  Proposal for a Directive on combatting corruption COM (2023) 234 and Joint Communication on the fight against 

corruption JOIN(2023) 12 final. 

77 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 60: National  frameworks  regarding  asset  declarations  -  material scope  (*)  (Source: 
European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption (140))  

(*) BE: The legal obligation of asset declaration includes not only sole ownership on assets but also of assets owned 
in community or co-ownership. BG: Declarants are obligaed to declare assets and financial interests exceeding a 
threshold of BGN 10 000 (± EUR 5 110 EUR). CZ: Declarants are obliged to declare incomes exceeding a threshold 
of CZK 100 000 (± EUR 3 950 ) per calender year and received during time in office but not directly resulting from 
the  public office  itself.  DE:  Addressess  are  obliged  to  declare  only  such  interests  held  in  private  corporations  or 
partnerships that amount to a threshold of more than five per cent, unless the activity of the private corporation or 
partnership relates exclusively to letting, leasing and management of private property. ES: Declarants are obliged to 
declare movable property exceeding a threshold of EUR 6 000 unit value and to declare held-for-trading financial 
assets  exceeding  a  threshold  of  EUR  100 000  .  Other  assets  to  be  declared  include  administrative  franchises, 
intellectual and industrial property rights. FR: The declaration obligation also covers liabilities (loans and debts) 
and property that is divided into parts or held in joint ownership. Declarants are obliged to declare miscellaneous 
movable property, cash and other assets, including company current accounts and stock options exceeding a threshold 
of EUR 10.000. The income to be declared covers both earned income and investment income. HR: The only income 
to  be  declared  is  earned  income.  Declaration  obligations  of  judges  cover  both  acquired  and  inherited  property. 
Declarants  are  obligaed  to  declare  movable  property  (except  for  household  items  and  clothing)  exceeding  an 
individual threshold of 398.000 EUR. Only direct ownership of enterprises must be disclosed. HU: The data displayed 
does not pre-empt any assessment under any applicable EU legislation, including the Conditionality Regulation or 
the  RRF  Regulation  and,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  beneficial  ownership  and  private  equity  funds,  immovable 
property/ real estate. IT: Movable property only needs to be declared if registered in public registries. LV: Declarants 
are obliged to declare cash and non-cash savings, loans and debts exceeding a total threshold of 20 minimum monthly 

140  Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

78 

 
 
 
 
wages (2022: EUR 500). LT: Declarants are obliged to declare monetary and unrecovered funds, several movable 
property  and  securities  exceeding  a  threshold  of  EUR  1 500.  AT:  Unless  authorized  by  a  parliamentary 
Incompatibility Committee, members of the federal government, state secretaries, members of provincial governments, 
the president of the National Council and the heads of parliamentary groups are generally not allowed to exercise 
employment next to their official duty and therefore cannot declare such income; members of parliament must declare 
their  secondary  activities.  Members  of  the  federal  government,  state  secretaries  and  members  of  provincial 
governments are obliged to declare trusts and private equity funds exceeding a threshold of EUR 14 500. RO: Cash 
property can but does not need to be declared. Declarants are obliged to declare movable property, bank accounts/ 
funds/ investments and financial liabilities exceeding a threshold of EUR 5 000; movable assets that were sold in the 
prevoius year exceeding a threshold of 3.000 EUR; gifts and advantages received from institutions, companies etc. 
exceeding  a  threshold  of  EUR  500.  The  asset  declaration  also  provides  for  a  EUR  5 000  threshold  in  regards  to 
precious  metals,  jewelry,  art  and  worship  pieces,  collections  of  art  and  numismatics,  objects  that  are  part  of  the 
national or universal cultural heritage. SI: Assets exceeding the threshold of  EUR  10 000 (per category) must be 
declared  by  amount,  not  by  specific  details  to  the  kind  of  asset.  This  information  can  be  obtained  in  official 
administrative procedure. FI: Certain declaration thresholds apply, wich vary depending on the status and position 
of  the  declarant  and  the  asset  to  be  declared.  Thresholds  range  between  EUR  5 000  (for  outside  duty  income  of 
members  of  parliament)  to  EUR  200 000  (for  guarantees  and  liabilities).  Sources  of  income:  earned  income  and 
income from investments: Income received from secondary occupations is reported. Public sector wages and salaries 
are public as are tax data. Ministers do not need to declare their annual income or income from their investments in 
the declaration of private interests. Nonetheless, the same publicity of tax information applies to ministers as to anyone 
else.  Assets:  Movable  Property:  Not  covered  by  the  declaration  of  private  interests.  Nonetheless,  the  content  of 
declarations of private interests has been standardised and the Government has introduced a register of gifts to which 
information  on  gifts  received  by  ministers  is  entered  (VN/23634/2020).  Provisions  on  the  declaration  of  private 
interests of members of Parliament are laid down in Parliament's Rules of Procedure. Financial interests: Trusts and 
Private Equity Funds: The State Civil Servants Act provides that state civil servants ‘…shall provide an account of 
his or her business activities, holdings in companies and other assets’. SE: Swedish public officials are obliged to 
report direct or indirect holdings of financial instruments pursuant to the Act on the Obligation for Certain Public 
Officials to Report Holdings of Financial Instruments and the Government Ordinance on the Obligation for Certain 
Public Officials to Report Holdings of Financial Instruments. 

79 

 
 
 
 
Figure 61: National  frameworks regarding asset  declarations - personal  scope (*)  (Source: 
European Commission with the National Contact Points for Anti-corruption (141)) 

(*) BE: Declarations must be submitted anually to the Court in a sealed envelope. CZ: In addition to the personal 
scope provided, asset declaration also applies to public officials handling public funds of more than 250.000 CZK (± 
9.880 EUR), making decisions related to public procurement, making decisions in administrative proceedings or being 
involved in criminal proceedings. DE: Members of the federal government are not obliged to make asset declarations 
as they are not allowed to perform any secondary employment. For civil servants, secondary employment is restricted 
but if carried out, they have to notify and immediately report any changes, especially to the compensation paid. The 
same applies to judges and prosecutors. Public service employees must notify their employer in a timely manner of 
any  additional  paid  employment.  Under  certain  conditions,  additional  activities  can  be  subject  to  restrictions  or 
prohibited.  EL:  Declarations  have  to  be  provided  annually  and  one  year  after  the  end  of  their  mandate.  EL: 
Declarations have to be provided annually and one year after the end of their mandate.  ES: : As regards ‘public 
officials of the institution in charge of asset declarations’, only the head of the OCI (Conflict of Interest Office) is 
obliged to submit a declaration. As regards ‘political advisors or cabinet members of members of government’, only 
the heads of cabinet are obliged to submit declarations. Family members are obliged to submit asset declarations 
only  in  exceptional  cases.  Not  all  senior  public  officials  at  central  level  are  civil  servants..  HR:  Declarations  of 
Members of the Commission for the Resolution of Conflic of Interest have to be provided additionally 12 months after 
leaving office. Judges are obliged to report any significant change in property after taking office. FR: Declarations 
of the President have to be provided at the beginning and end of their term of office in order to assess whether there 
has been substantial changes in the assets following and in connection with their office. Spouses are only obliged to 
submit asset declarations in the case of a marriage under the regime of legal community based on profit. IT: Cabinet 
members are obliged to submit asset declarations only if they are public officials/civil servants. Cabinet members 
appointed externally, e.g. as an advisor, professor or assistant, are not obliged to asset declaration. Family members 
of first and second degree and non-separated spouses are obliged to submit asset and income declarations if the family 
member or spouse consents. LV: In addition to the personal scope provided, asset declaration also applies to members 

141  Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

80 

 
 
 
 
of the Public Procurement Commission, insolvency administrators, sworn notaries, sworn bailiffs. LT: In addition to 
the personal scope provided, asset declaration also applies to electoral candidates, civil servants and their family 
members, notaries and their family members, members of the military, members of the Board of Bank or other credit 
institutions and their family members, some members of political parties and their family members. LU: Members of 
Government are obliged to submit an additional limited declaration to the Prime Minister prior to their appointment. 
Members of Parliament are obliged to inform their Chairman of any change affecting their declaration within 30 
days; Councillors and Members of Government are obliged to issue a new declaration in the event of a change. HU: 
The  data  displayed  does  not  pre-empt  any  assessment  under  any  applicable  EU  legislation,  including  the 
Conditionality Regulation or the RRF Regulation. MT: Spouses are obliged to submit asset declarations on;y in the 
case that the assets forms part of the community of acquests. NL: Public officials of the institution in charge of asset 
declarations’ generally have to submit asset declarations, but there is variety depending on the institution. Senior law 
enforcement  officials  from  the  National  Police  are  required  to  submit  asset  declarations.  Senior  officials  of  the 
boarder guard only need to submit asset declarations if these qualify as ancillary activities. Declarations on family 
members are only mandatory for senior police officials. Prosecutors, border guards and judges only need to provide 
asset declarations for ancillary activities. Political advisers are obliged to declare assets similarly to civil servants. 
Top civil servants declare their assets at the start of their mandate, as soon as a new assignment or responsibility 
affects the financial interests, or when the financial interests changes AT: Declarations on the national level have to 
be  provided  within  three  months  of  taking  office  and  then every  second  year and  after  resigning  from  office. For 
declarations on the provincial, regional and local level, there are individual regulations. As regards the declarations 
of members of Parliament, they have to be provided within one month from the moment of joining the house and the 
same applies in case of subsequent changes concerning the commencement of an occupation; the income declarations 
must be reported annually by 30 June for the previous calendar year. PT: In addition to the personal scope provided, 
asset declaration also applies to the Ombudsman, the Representatives of the Republic in the Autonomous Regions of 
Azores and Madeira, the Members of the Judicial High Council, of the Administrative and Tax Courts High Council 
and of the Public Prosecution Service High Council. RO: In addition to the personal scope provided, asset declaration 
also applies to members of the Superior Council of Magistracy, assimilations of judges and prosecutors, specialized 
auxiliary  staff  of  the  courts,  the  People’s  Advocate  and  its  deputies,  diplomatic  and  consular  staff,  persons  with 
management  and  control  positions  within  the  educational  system  and  state  units  of  public  health  system,  persons 
working in trade union federations, confederations and public institutions, members of the National Councils and the 
Financial Supervision Authority and the Intelligence Service.  The assets of the spouse and the dependent children 
need  to  be  declared  by  the  deponent  in  their  disclosure.  Moreover,  in  case  of  trade  union  federations  and 
confederations, only the president, vice-president, secretaries and treasuries are under the obligation to submit an 
asset disclosure. In regards to the Romanian Intelligence Service, the obligation lies only for the director, first deputy 
and their deputies. Moreover, the assets of the spouse and the dependent children need to be declared by the deponent 
in their disclosure. In addition, the public officials and dignitaries are required by law to declare their assets and 
interests annually (by June 15th), and within 30 days of starting and leaving office. SI: In addition to the personal 
scope provided, asset declaration also applies to individuals in charge of public procurement exceeding 100.000 EUR. 
Asset  declarations  of  spouses,  family  members  and  connected  individuals  of  declarants  can  be  requested  by  the 
Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. FI: Only those senior law enforcement officials and board members of 
Special Operations Executive are obliged to declare their assets that fall under the Civil Servant Act’s definition of 
high level officials. Declarations have to be provided as soon as taking office, when there are substantial changes and 
regularly  on  annual  basis.  SE:  Minor  children  and  spouses  are  only  obliged  to  submit  asset  declarations  if  the 
declarant is a member of government. Financial instruments held by a minor child who is under the guardianship of 
the reporting person shall be reported. Members of Government also declare financial assets of their spouses and 
partners. If it is necessary with regard to the existence of inside information within an authority, the Government may 
decide that those who are part of the authority's management shall be obliged to report their holdings of financial 
instruments.  In  such  cases  senior  public  officials  at  central  level  such  as  heads  of  central  executive  authorities, 
Secretaries-General,  Directors-General,  etc  are  covered  by  the  reporting  obligation.  The  authority  may,  in  turn, 
decide that other employees and contractors that have access to inside information as a part of their employment must 
be covered by the same reporting obligations. Senior public officials and their employees and contractors only have 
to provide a declaration of their holding of financial instruments in cases of dealing with delicate inside information 
and if the government requests such information. 

81 

 
 
Figure  62:  National  frameworks  regarding  asset  declarations:  transparency,  verification, 
sanctions  (*)  (Source:  European  Commission  with  the  National  Contact  Points  for  Anti-
corruption (142)) 

(*)‘Transparency of asset declarations (online + on paper)’ is to be read as ‘Submission of asset declarations (online 
+ on paper)’. If “only on request” is selected as an option, it  by default means that the “online” and “on paper” 
options are not possible. DE: Information relates to the German Parliament (Bundestag) only. On Transparency – 
BE: Annual publication only of remunerations received for mandates, functions and occupations. CZ: Declarations 
of  judges,  prosecutors  and  members  of  armed  forces  are  not  published.  EE:  Access  to  asset  declarations  is  only 
granted upon identification. EL: Asset Declarations are published only for politically exposed individuals and for 3 
years.  FR:  Asset  declarations  of  members  of  the  government  and  of  the  Transparency  Authority  (HATVP)  are 
published on the HATVP website. Declarations of senators as well as members of the French and EU parliaments can 
be consulted at the prefecture. Declarations of other declarants are not published. CY: Asset declarations of spouses 
and children are not published. LV: Asset Declarations made by officials subject to the Law of Official Secret are not 
published. LT:The majority of declarations are published. For some officials, data is kept confidential. HU: The data 
displayed does not pre-empt assessments under any applicable EU legislation, including the Conditionality Regulation 
or the Recovery and Resilience Plan in general and, in particular with a view to the transparency and publication, as 
not all categories of officials as listed above in Figure 61 are required to make their asset declarations public (e.g. 
judges), while also the form of publication is in some cases not adequate to allow for public monitoring or effective 
verification. Only asset declarations of the President of the Supreme Court, the President of the National Office for 
the Judiciary and the Prosecutor General as well as senior political leaders are published. Declarations are removed 
one year after the end of mandate. NL: For members of the House of Representatives registries are available online 
for the general public in regards to recent years, and available only on request for preceeding years. SI: Only asset 
declaration changes are published and only for top-level politicians (MPs, ministers) and officials of key institutions 
(i.e. Constitutional Court judges) for a period of one year after termination of the mandate. Disclosed information is 
highly  anonymised  and  objectivized.  FI:  Earned  income  information  is  not  published.  Declarations  of  ministers' 
private  interests  are  available  online  on  the  websites  of  both  the  Government  and  Parliament,  and  Government 
communications containing declarations of private interests in paper form can be requested, for example, from the 
Registry of the Prime Minister's Office (in accordance with the Act on the Openness of Government activities). SE: 
Only some asset declarations – e.g. of the members of the government – are available upon request if not subject to 
secrecy. Asset declarations can be requested in accordance with the principle of public access to information, but may 
be subject to secrecy. The members of Goverment and state secretaries have given their consent to disclose their asset 
declarations. On Verifications –BE and SI: Verifications are carried out only upon suspicion of wrongdoing. IT: The 
Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) verifies the asset declarations of members of Government only. HU: The data 

142  Data collected through a questionnaire drawn up by the Commission in close association with the National contact 

points in the fight against corruption. 

82 

 
 
 
 
displayed does not pre-empt assessments under any applicable EU legislation, including the Conditionality Regulation 
or the Recovery and Resilience Plan in general and, in particular with a view to the transparency and publication, as 
not all categories of officials as listed above in Figure 60 are required to make their asset declarations public (e.g. 
judges), while also the form of publication is in some cases (e.g. of member of Parliament) not adequate to allow for 
public monitoring. Furthermore, the sanction system to address failures of compliance is still to be reformed. MT: 
Verification  is  carried  out  directly  after  submission,  but  can  be  repeated  following  a  request  by  other  competent 
authorities.  AT:  There  is  no  formal  verification  process  provided  by  law,  but  because  of  regular  disclosing 
obligations, any extraordinary increases of assets will be noticed by the Court of Audit and shall be reported to the 
President of the National Council/Provincial Parliament. An Incompatibility Committee may also request officials to 
provide further information on their assets in case of suspicion. RO: Verifications are carried out only following a 
notification by the media or a natural/legal person including the focal point or following the failure of the declarant 
to submit asset declarations. On Sanctions – BG: Only cases of inexplicable assets of more than BGN 5 000(±EUR 
2 550) are referred to the National Revenue Agency or to the Commission for Illegal Assets Forfeiture. FR: Sanctions 
include fines, imprisonment and the nullity of the appointment for certain public officials as well as a ban on holding 
public office. IT: The National Anticorruption Authority (ANAC) reviews the publishing of declarations of Members 
of the Government and of the Senate on the relevant websites. RO: Failure to disclose or failure to disclose within the 
legal  timeframe  is  sanctioned  with  a  fine  and  may  trigger the  evaluation  procedure.  Nonetheless,  the  verification 
procedure can also be triggered ex-officio, from information gathered through the media or other sources. FI: For 
false declarations: Measures under civil service law are also possible sanctions. 

– Safeguards relating to the functioning of national prosecution services in the EU – 

Public prosecution plays a major role in the criminal justice system and in cooperation between 
Member States in criminal matters. The proper functioning of the national prosecution service is 
crucial for the effective fight against crime, including economic and financial crime, such as money 
laundering,  and  corruption.  According  to  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice  relating  to  the 
European  Arrest  Warrant  Framework  Decision  (143),  the  public  prosecutor’s  office  can  be 
considered a Member State judicial authority for the purposes of issuing and executing a European 
arrest  warrant  whenever  it  can  act  independently,  without  being  exposed  to  the  risk  of  being 
subject, directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, 
such as a Minister for Justice (144).  

The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no uniform 
model for all Member States. However, the Council of Europe has noted a widespread tendency 
to  have  a  more  independent  prosecutor’s  office,  rather  than  one  subordinated  or  linked  to  the 

143  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 

Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 1). 

144  Court  of  Justice,  judgment  of  27  May 2019,  OG and  PI  (Public  Prosecutor’s  Office  of  Lübeck  and  Zwickau), 
Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, paras 73, 74 and 88, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456; judgment of 27 May 2019, 
C‑509/18, para 52, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457; see also judgments of 12 December 2019, Parquet général du Grand-
Duché  de  Luxembourg and  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Public  Prosecutors  of  Lyon  and  Tours),  in  Joined  Cases  C-
566/19 PPU  and  C-626/19,  ECLI:EU:C:2019:1077;  Openbaar  Ministerie  (Swedish  Prosecution  Authority),  C-
625/19 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1078, and Openbaar Ministerie (Public Prosecutor in Brussels), C-627/19 PPU, 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:1079; judgment of 24 November 2020, AZ, C-510/19, para 54, ECLI:EU:C:2020:953. See also 
judgment  of  10  November  2016,  Kovalkovas,  C-477/16  PPU,  paras  34  and  36,  ECLI:EU:C:2016:861,  and 
judgment of 10 November 2016, Poltorak, C-452/16 PPU, para 35, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858, on the term ‘judiciary’, 
‘which must […] be distinguished, in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers which characterises 
the operation of the rule of law, from the executive’. See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability 
and ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendation 
xii. 

83 

 
 
 
executive (145). According to the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, an effective and 
autonomous prosecution service committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights in the 
administration of justice is one of the pillars of a democratic state (146). 

Procedures for appointing national prosecutors may influence the extent of the independence of a 
prosecution service. Whatever the model of the national justice system or the legal tradition in 
which it is anchored, European standards provide that Member States take effective measures to 
guarantee that public prosecutors are  able to  fulfil their professional  duties and  responsibilities 
under  appropriate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  (147)  and  without  unjustified  interference 
(148).  

Figure 63 presents the appointment procedures  for national prosecutors. It does not include the 
appointment of Prosecutors General or other assimilated management positions. The figure shows 
the diversity of models of organisation of the prosecution service across Member States gathering 
around  the  executive  power  or  the  judiciary.  The  figure  also  shows  the  role  of  the  Prosecutor 
General  and  Councils  for  the  Judiciary/Prosecutorial  Councils  as  important  actors  in  the 
appointment of prosecutors.  

145  CDL-AD(2010)040-e Report on European Standards as regards the Independence of the Judicial System: Part II - 
the  Prosecution  Service  -  Adopted  by  the  Venice  Commission  -  at  its  85th  plenary  session  (Venice,  17-
18 December 2010), para. 26. 

146  In a democratic society, both courts and the investigative authorities must remain free from political pressure. The 
concept of independence means that prosecutors are free from unlawful interference in the exercise of their duties 
so as to ensure full respect for and application of the law and the principle of the rule of law and that they are not 
subject to any political pressure or unlawful influence of any kind. Independence applies not only to the prosecution 
service  as  a  whole,  but  also  to  its  particular  bodies  and  to  individual  prosecutors.  Whatever  the  model  of  the 
national justice system or the legal tradition in which it is anchored, European standards provide that Member 
States take effective measures to guarantee that public prosecutors are able to fulfil their professional duties and 
responsibilities  under  appropriate  legal  and  organisational  conditions  and  without  unjustified  interference. 
See Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE) Opinion No. 15 (2020) on the role of prosecutors in 
emergency situations, in particular when facing a pandemic; Opinion No. 16 (2021) on the Implications of the 
decisions of international courts and treaty bodies as regards the practical independence of prosecutors, para. 13. 
See also Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), paras. 
4,  11  and  13.  Opinion  No.  13(2018)  Independence,  accountability  and  ethics  of  prosecutors,  adopted  by  the 
Consultative  Council  of  European  Prosecutors  (CCPE),  recommendations  i  and  iii;  Group  of  States  against 
corruption  (GRECO),  fourth  evaluation  round  'Corruption  prevention  -  Members  of  Parliament,  Judges  and 
Prosecutors', a large number of recommendations ask for the introduction of arrangements to shield the prosecution 
service from undue influence and interference in the investigation of criminal cases. 

147  Recommendation Rec(2000)19 on the role of public prosecution in the criminal justice system, adopted by the 

Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 6 October 2000 (the 2000 Recommendation), para. 4. 

148  The 2000 Recommendation, paras 11 and 13. See also Opinion No. 13(2018) Independence, accountability and 
ethics of prosecutors, adopted by the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE), recommendations i 
and iii. 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63: Appointment  of  prosecutors:  proposing  and  appointing  authorities  (*)  (Source: 
European Commission with the NADAL (149)) 

(*) BE: Proposal for appointment: Council for the Judiciary. Decision on appointment: Head of State under the responsibility of 
the Minister of Justice. CZ: Proposal for appointment: Prosecutor General. Decision on appointment: Minister of Justice. DK: 
The  HR  office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  has  the  power  to  appoint  or  reject  candidate  prosecutors  (first  instance 
prosecutors). Candidates to become prosecutors must send an application to a joint recruitment panel consisting of representatives 
from the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Director of Prosecution, the Office of the National Commissioner of the Police, The 
Civil Agency, the Danish Data Protection Agency, the Independent Police Complaint Board and the Directorate for the Probation 
Service. The candidates must specify in their application that they candidate for becoming prosecutors. Applications stating that 
the candidate want to become a prosecutor are forwarded by the panel to the HR Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
The HR Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions decides, which candidates will be invited to an interview at the HR Office of 
the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions.  After  this  interview  the  HR  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  decides  if  the 
candidate can proceed to an interview with the HR Office of the Prosecution Service in a specific Police District. After this interview 
the  HR  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  decides on appointment or  rejection of  the candidate.  EE:  Proposal  for 
appointment: prosecutors' competition committee for specialised prosecutors, district prosecutors and assistant prosecutors; chief 
prosecutors for senior prosecutors. Decision on appointment: Prosecutor General. IE: Proposal for appointment: a recruitment 
competition under a recruitment licence issued by the Commission on Public Service Appointments (CPSA) held normally by the 
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (or potentially by the Public Appointment Service). Decision on appointment: Director 
of  Public  Prosecutions.  ES: Proposal for  appointment:  National Prosecutor  following a  report  from  the  Fiscal  Council,  after 
hearing the Superior Fiscal Council of the respective Autonomous Community in the case of posts in the Public Prosecutor's Offices 
of its territorial scope. Decision on appointment: the Government.  EL: Proposal for appointment: Ministry of Justice annually 
issues  a  ministerial  decision  concerning  the  entrance  examination  to  the  National  School  of  Judges  for  candidate  Public 
Prosecutors. The selection process -held by a five-member committee- currently consists of written and oral exercises. Once they 
enter the Greek National School of Judges, the successful candidates, start a 16-month course of study in both theory and practice. 
This training is followed by an examination used to rank them by order of merit. Depending on their rank, they will be appointed 
to the competent court. Decision on appointment: Candidates are appointed as Public Prosecutors by a Presidential decree. FR: 
Proposal for appointment: Minister of Justice on non- binding advice of the Council of the Judiciary. Decision on appointment: 
President  of  the  Republic.  IT:  Decision  on  appointment:  after  the  proposal  of  the  Council,  the  Minister  of  Justice  issues  a 
ministerial decree, without any discretion not to appoint or to appoint any other candidate than the proposed candidate prosecutor. 
CY: Proposal for appointment: Attorney General. Decision on appointment: Public Service Commission with the opinion of the 
Attorney General. LT: Proposal for appointment: Prosecution Selection Commission (composed by two prosecutors nominated by 
the Collegiate Council, two prosecutors nominated by the Prosecutor General and one member nominated by each the President 
of the Republic, the Speaker of the Seimas and the Prime Minister). Decision on appointment: Prosecutor General. LU: Proposal 

149  Data  collected  through  a  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close  association  with  the  NADAL 

Network of Prosecutors. 

85 

 
 
 
 
for  appointment:  Тhe  National  Council  for  Justice,  proposes  a  nomination  to  the  Grand-Duke.  Decision  on  appointment:  the 
Grand-Duke without any discretion. HU: Proposal/decision on appointment: Senior Prosecutor. Proposal for dismissal: Senior 
Prosecutor. NL: Proposal for appointment: Minister of Justice. Decision on appointment is taken by royal decree (the appointing 
authority has an obligation by constitutional practice to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for the post of prosecutor). 
AT:  Proposal  for  appointment:  Independent  Personnel  Body  (Personalkommission)  consisting  of  four  members,  who  must  be 
public prosecutors. Decision on appointment: Federal President delegates the decision to the Minister of Justice.  PL: Proposal 
for and decision on appointment: Prosecutor General - who is also the Minister of Justice - upon a motion of the National Public 
Prosecutor. A competent public prosecutor's office’s board gives an opinion on a candidate for the post of prosecutor. According 
to the Action Plan by the Polish Government of 20 February 2024, there is the intention to split the office of the Minister of Justice 
and the Prosecutor-General. RO: Proposal for appointment: Superior Council of Magistracy. Decision on appointment: President 
(the appointing authority has an obligation by law to follow the proposal to appoint the candidate for the post of prosecutor). SI: 
Proposal for appointment: Minister of Justice on the opinion of the Council for the Prosecution Service. Decision on appointment: 
Government. SK: Proposal for appointment: Chairman of the Selection Board of the General Prosecutor´s Office. Appointment: 
Prosecutor  General.  FI:  Appointment:  Prosecutor  General.  SE:  Proposal  for,  decision  on  appointment:  Director  of  human 
resources of the Swedish prosecution authority, on the opinion of the Prosecutor General. 

Figure  64  presents  an  overview  of  the  discretionary  powers  that  the  executive  has  over  the 
appointment  of  national  prosecutors,  as  well  as  the  right  to  a  judicial  review  in  case  of  non-
appointment.  

Figure  64:  Appointment  of  prosecutors:  competence  of  the  executive  and  Prosecutors 
General (*) (Source: European Commission with the NADAL (150)) 

(*) The figure presents the national frameworks as they were in place in January 2024. For each Member State, one 
point was given if the executive can reject a proposed candidate and choose another candidate among those proposed, 
one  point  was  given  if  there  is  no  obligation  by  the  executive  to  state  reasons  for  not  appointing  a  candidate 
prosecutor, two points were given if the executive can reject a candidate and choose any other candidate, and two 
points  were  given  if  there  is  no  judicial  review  in  case  of  non-appointment.  The  Member  States  for  which  the 
Prosecutor General  is the appointing authority are marked with an asterisk (*). BE: The Minister of Justice may 
refuse to appoint the candidate proposed by the High Council of Justice, but the case will then be referred back to the 
High Council of Justice, which may either present the same candidate with a different or better motivation, or present 
another  candidate.  The  Minister  of  Justice  does  not  have  the  power  to  appoint  another  person  himself.  DE:  The 
employer must inform the applicant of the negative selection decision. The public employer must award the positions 
according to the suitability, performance and aptitude of the applicants (selection of the best). Compliance with this 
principle can be reviewed in court. If the plaintiff is successful, the public employer must make the selection decision 
again, taking into account the court's legal opinion. However, the decision does not have to be in favour of the plaintiff. 
IE: As a civil service body, all competitions are run in compliance with the Code of Practice for Appointments to 
Positions in the Civil Service and Public Service. The Codes of Practice are published by the Commission for Public 

150  Data  collected  through  a  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close  association  with  the  NADAL 

Network of Prosecutors. 

86 

 
 
 
 
Service Appointments (CPSA). If a candidate is dissatisfied following a selection process, they have a right under the 
Code to request a review of a decision made during the process or make a complaint that the selection process followed 
was unfair. Candidates are also entitled to feedback in relation to their performance in a competition. ES: According 
to Articles 27 of the 2022 Public Prosecutor´s Rules of Procedure (Reglamento) candidates who do not pass the course 
and those who could not take or complete the course due to duly justified force majeure may repeat it in the next call 
for  a  free  competition,  which  they  will  join  with  the  new  promotion,  in  the  terms  provided  in  the  Statute  of  the 
Autonomous  Body  Center  for  Legal  Studies,  approved  by  Royal  Decree  312/2019,  of  the  26  of  April  26.  If  these 
candidates fail this second course too, they will be definitively excluded and will be deprived of any expectation of 
entering into the Public Prosecutor Service based on the selective examinations they had passed (Likewise Article 309 
of  the  LOPJ  in  relation  to  the  Judiciary).  So  failure  to  complete  the  training  course  is  the  only  reason  for  not 
appointing a candidate as Public Prosecutor and the reasons are linked to the final marking outcome this result is 
public but is not under the remit of the appointing authority. NL: It is theoretically possible for the Minister of Justice 
to decide not to appoint a candidate prosecutor, but in practice this never happens. There is an intensive selection by 
an  independent  committee  within  the  public  prosecutor's  office  of  trainee  prosecutors  before  being  appointed  as 
trainee prosecutor. The Minister does not appoint a prosecutor before receiving advise from the public prosecution's 
office. The appointment by the Minister is merely a formality. After the training period, the trainee is appointed as 
prosecutor by the Crown on the recommendation of the Minister. There is no review or appeal procedure specifically 
for rejection of a Minister's decision on appointing a trainee prosecutor or prosecutor. This is, however, a government 
decision  affecting  the  candidate,  which  can  always  be  appealed  before  a  civil  court.  It  will  then  become  a  labor 
dispute. AT: The candidate may appeal to a Commission for Equal Treatment, which may find a violation of the law. 
It is also possible to claim compensation for lost income in the course of a civil lawsuit. Neither of those measures 
can change the decision on the appointment. SE: The Swedish Prosecution Authority is the only authority involved in 
recruiting  prosecutors  and  chooses  who  to  appoint or  reject.  Only  candidate  prosecutors  who  have  applied  for  a 
specific position as a prosecutor can be considered. 

87 

 
 
 
 
Figure 65 presents the procedure for dismissing of the Prosecutor General. It shows the proposing 
and dismissing authorities, as well as the availability of review (e.g. by a court or a Constitutional 
Court).  

Figure 65: Dismissal  of  the  Prosecutor  General  (*)  (Source:  European  Commission  with  the 
NADAL (151)) 

(*)  BE:  The  Public  Prosecutor  who  represents  the  Public  Prosecutor  before  the  Disciplinary  Tribunal  and  the 
Attorney General who represents the Public Prosecutor at the hearing of the Disciplinary Court of Appeal give an 
opinion  and  propose  a  disciplinary  sanction  (cf.  art.  418§2  of  the  Judicial  Code).  If  the  Disciplinary  Tribunal 
considers that a magistrate of the Public Prosecutor's Office should be dismissed, the Disciplinary Tribunal forwards 
a reasoned proposal for dismissal to the King. The King may depart from the decision to make a reasoned proposal 
for dismissal and impose, instead of the competent authority, any other disciplinary penalty referred to (see Article 
418(3) of the Judicial Code). Review by the Disciplinary  Court of Appeal.  BG: Proposal: Supreme Prosecutorial 
Council. Dismissal: President of the Republic. Review by the Supreme Administrative Court. CZ: Proposal: Minister 
of Justice. Dismissal: Government. Review by the Supreme Administrative Court. DK: Proposal: Minister of Justice. 
Dismissal: the King. Dismissal or removal of the Director of Public Prosecutions must as any other civil servant be 
based on a reasoned argument relating to the circumstances of the institution (e.g. insufficient funds or restructuring) 
or to the conduct of the employee (e.g. lack of aptitude, too much absence due to sickness or cooperation problems). 
The  Minister  of  Justice  decides  on  the  removal  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  but  must  make  a 
recommendation about this to HM the King, who has the final authority to carry out the dismissal.Before making a 
recommendation to HM the King, the Minister of Justice must follow the procedure below: The Director of Public 
Prosecutions must like any other public employee, be given the opportunity to comment on the facts of the case and/or 
make objections regarding the intended dismissal. Furthermore, in regards to civil servants (including the Director 
of Public Prosecutions) it follows from section 31 of the Civil Servants Act that both the employee and the employee 
organization having negotiating rights must be given the opportunity to make a statement prior to the implementation 
of  the  contemplated  dismissal.  Finally,  according  to  the  Civil  Servants  Act  a  hearing  under  the  guidance  of  an 
independent judge must be held before a civil servant (including the Director of Public Prosecutions) is dismissed for 
professional  misconduct.  Review:  Decisions  on  dismissal  of  a  civil  servant  may  be  tried  before  the  courts.  DE: 
Proposal and Dismissal: Minister of Justice. EE: Proposal and Dismissal: Minister of Justice.  EL: Proposal and 

151  Data  collected  through  a  questionnaire  drawn  up  by  the  Commission  in  close  association  with  the  NADAL 

Network of Prosecutors. 

88 

 
 
 
 
Dismissal: Minister of Justice. IE: Proposal: Committee consisting of I) the Chief Justice, (II) the Chairman of the 
General Council of the Bar of Ireland, (III) the President of the Incorporated Law Society, (IV) the Secretary to the 
Government,  and (V) the Senior Legal Assistant in the Office of the  Attorney General may submit a report to the 
Government  recommending  removal  from  office.  The  Government  makes  the  ultimate  decision..  Dismissal: 
Government. Review: Constitutional Court. ES: Proposal: Government, after consulting the General Council of the 
Judiciary  (CGPJ).  Dismissal:  the  King.  In  2007,  the  law  was  amended  to  introduce  additional  safeguards.  The 
Government has no powers to discharge the Prosecutor General solely at its discretion. Review: Constitutional Court. 
IT:  Proposal  and  Dismissal:  Council  for  the  judiciary.  Review:  Supreme  Court.  LV:  Proposal:  Council  for  the 
judiciary; Parliament; President of the Supreme Court. Dismissal: Parliament. LT: Proposal: Parliament. Dismissal: 
President. There is no regulation and no practice as regards a review procedure. LU: Proposal: National Council 
for  Justice.  Dismissal:  Disciplinary  court.  Review:  Administrative  Court.  HU:  Proposal:  President.  Dismissal: 
Parliament. Based on the proposal of the President of the Republic, the Parliament may, by virtue of its decision, 
remove  the  Prosecutor  General  from  his/her  office  if  the  Prosecutor  General  is  unable  to  fulfil  the duties  arising 
fromhis/her  mandate  for  reasons  falling  beyond  his/her  control.  Based  on  the  proposal  of  the  President  of  the 
Republic, the Parliament shall pronounce the Prosecutor General’s forfeiture of office in a decision if the Prosecutor 
General  fails  to  fulfil  his/her  duties  arising  from  his/her  mandate  for  reasons  falling  within  his/her  control  or 
committed a crime established in a final and absolute judgment or otherwise becomes unworthy of his/her office. If 
the Prosecutor General’s mandate ceases because one of the conditions of appointment to a prosecution position set 
forth in the Prosecutors’ Status Act  are  no longer  fulfilled, the President of the Republic shall determine the  fact 
thereof. Moreover, the President of the Republic shall determine the conflict of interests with regard to the Prosecutor 
General.  The  Prosecutor  General’s  mandate  shall  cease  upon  the  determination  of  the  conflict  of  interests.  AT: 
Proposal:  Ministry  of  Justice.  Dismissal:  Supreme  Court.  MT:  Proposal:  Parliament  (2/3  majority).  Dismissal: 
President. NL: Proposal: Minister of Justice. Dismissal: the Crown. Review: Minister of Justice. A prosecutor general 
can object to a decision to fire him. The Minister of Justice decides on this objection. PL: There is no possibility of 
dismissing the Prosecutor-General who is at the same time the Minister of Justice. Therefore, the only procedure that 
would entail such effect is the procedure of removing from office a member of the Council of Ministers (in this case: 
the  Minister  of  Justice).  PT:  Proposal:  Government.  Dismissal:  President.  RO:  Proposal:  Minister  of  Justice. 
Dismissal: Parliament. The dismissal of the prosecutor general is made by the President of Romania, on the proposal 
of  the  Minister  of  Justice,  with  the  opinion  of  the  Section  for  Prosecutors  of  the  Superior  Council  of  Magistracy. 
Review: Supreme Court. SI: Proposal: Prosecutorial Council. Dismissal: National Assembly (Parliament). Prior to 
making the decision, the National Assembly shall send the proposal to the Government to procure its opinion. Review: 
Administrative court. SK: Proposal: Parliament. Dismissal: President. Review: Constitutional Court. FI: Proposal: 
Minister  of  Justice.  Dismissal:  President.  Review:  Supreme  Administrative  Court.  SE:  Proposal  and  Dismissal: 
National Disciplinary Board. 

– Constitutional jurisdictions – 

Constitutional justice is a key component of checks and balances in a constitutional democracy. 
As noted by the Venice Commission, there is no general requirement to establish a constitutional 
court (152). There are various ways to ensure conformity of the legislative and executive action 
with the Constitution, such as a priori review of constitutionality and a posteriori control, either 
by  a  Constitutional  Court  or  by  judicial  instances  exercising  control  in  concrete  cases  of 
application of legislative or executive action. Constitutional jurisdictions play a crucial role in the 
effective application of EU law, ensuring the integrity of the EU legal order, and determining the 
fundamental  principles  that  constitute  the  rule  of  law.  As  early  as  1970,  the  Court  of  Justice 
recognised  the  constitutional  traditions  common  to  Member  States  as  the  basis  of  European 
protection of fundamental rights (153). More recently, the Court of Justice noted that the principles 

152  Venice Commission, Compilation of Venice Commission opinions, reports and studies on constitutional justice, 

p. 6; Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist, para. 108. 

153  CJEU, judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114. 

89 

 
 
 
of the rule of law, as developed in the case law of the Court on the basis of the EU treaties, have 
their source in common values that are also recognised and applied by Member States in their own 
legal systems (154).  

The  organisation  of  justice,  including  the  establishment,  composition  and  functioning  of  a 
constitutional court, falls within the competence of Member States (155). In addition, constitutional 
courts, when they exist, may or may not be part of the judiciary. However, as noted by the Court 
of  Justice,  when  exercising  that  competence,  Member  States  are  required  to  comply  with  their 
obligations deriving from EU law and, in particular, with the values on which the EU is founded 
(156). The Venice Commission  has noted that the composition  of Constitutional  Courts and the 
procedure for appointing  judges to  the Constitutional  Court  are  among  the most important  and 
sensitive questions of constitutional adjudication and for the preservation of a credible system of 
the rule of constitutional law. It underlined the need to ensure both the independence of the judges 
of  the  Constitutional  Court  and  to  involve  different  state  organs  and  political  forces  in  the 
appointment process so that judges are seen as being more than the instrument of one or the other 
political force (157). The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard builds on last year’s figures on the different 
solutions  adopted  in  Member  States  to  ensure  the  protection  of  constitutional  rights  at  highest 
instance and their competences158, and Figure 66 presents an initial overview of the bodies and 
authorities  that  propose  candidates  for  their  appointment  as  members  of  the  highest  instance 
exercising constitutional jurisdiction, and of the authorities that appoint them. 

Figure 66: Members of the highest instance exercising constitutional jurisdiction: proposing 
and appointing authorities (*) (source: European Commission) 

(*)The jurisdictions considered for the purposes of this chart are: BE: Cour Constitutionnelle, Grondwettelijk Hof 
(Constitutional  Court  of  Belgium).  BG:  Конституционен  съд  на  Република  България  (Constitutional  Court  of 

154  CJEU, judgments of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21, EU:C:2022:97, para. 237, 

and of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, EU:C:2022:98, para. 291. 

155  CJEU, judgment of 20 April 2021, Repubblika, C‑896/19, EU:C:2021:31. 
156  CJEU,  judgment  of  22 February  2022,  RS  (Effect  of  the  decisions  of  a  constitutional  court),  C-430/21, 

EU:C:2022:99, para. 38. 

157  Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2004)043, para 18. 
158  2023 EU Justice Scoreboard, Figures 63 and 64. 

90 

 
 
 
 
 
Republic  of  Bulgaria).  CZ:  Ústavní  soud  (Constitutional  Court  of  Czechia).  DK:  Højesteret  (Supreme  Court  of 
Denmark).  DE:  Bundesverfassungsgericht  (Federal  Constitutional  Court).  All  courts  are  competent  to  review  the 
constitutionality of legislation. The review consists of whether an act is adopted in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in the Constitution and the Standing Orders of Parliament and if the content of the act complies with the 
Constitution. EE: Riigihokus (The Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court en 
banc).  IE:  Cúirt  Uachtarach  na  hÉireann  (Supreme  Court  of  Ireland).  EL:  Areios  Pagos  (Supreme  Court)  and 
Symvoulio Tis Epikrateias (Council of State). There is no constitutional court. Each judge has the power to assess the 
constitutionality  of  the  law  (Article  87,  paragraph  2  of  the  Constitution:  ‘judges  shall  be  subject  only  to  the 
Constitution and the laws; in no case whatsoever shall they be obliged to comply with provisions enacted in violation 
of  the  Constitution’).  ES:  Tribunal  Constitucional  de  España  (Constitutional  Court  of  Spain).  FR:  Conseil 
Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council). HR: Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske (Contitutional Court of the Republic 
of  Croatia).  IT:  Corte  Costituzionale  (Constitutional  Court).  CY:  Ανώτατο  Συνταγματικό  Δικαστήριο(Supreme 
Constitutional Court. LV: Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia). LT: 
Lietuvos  Respublikos  Konstitucinis  Teismas  (Constitutional  Court  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania).  LU:  Cour 
constitutionnelle  de  Luxembourg  (Constitutional  Court  of  Luxembourg).  HU:  Alkotmánybíróság  (Constitutional 
Court of Hungary). All courts can carry out a decentralised form of ‘constitutional’ review against directly effective 
treaties. MT: Constitutional Court. NL: Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands) -The Dutch 
Supreme  Court  functions  as  a  court  of  cassation  in  civil,  criminal  and  tax  cases.  AT:  Verfassungsgerichtshof 
(Constitutional Court of Austria). PL: Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional Tribunal of Poland).159. PT: Tribunal 
Constitucional (Constitutional Court) RO: Curtea Constituțională (Constitutional Court of Romania).  SI: Ustavno 
sodišče Republike Slovenije (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia). SK: Ústavný súd Slovenskej republiky 
(Constitutional  Court  of  Slovakia).  FI:  Korkein  oikeus  ja  Korkein  hallinto-oikeus  (Supreme  Court  and  Supreme 
Administrative  Court  of  Finland).  There  is  no  constitutional  court  in  FI.  All  courts  can  carry  out  ex  post 
constitutionality  reviews  in  concrete  cases,  with  the  Supreme  Court  and  Supreme  Administrative  Court  being  the 
highest instance in each branch of the judiciary. SE: Högsta Domstolen Högsta och Förvaltningsdomstolen (Supreme 
Court  and  Supreme  Administrative  Court  of  Sweden).  All  courts  can  review  the  compatibility  of  laws  with  the 
Constitution  or  with  superior  statutes  when  adjudicating  concrete  cases  and  must  disapply  any  incompatible 
provisions. 

BE: The Court is composed of twelve judges, appointed for life by the King from a list of two candidates  for each 
vacancy proposed alternately by the House of Representatives, and the Senate by a majority of at least two-thirds of 
the  members  present.  BG:  The  Constitutional  Court  consists  of  12  judges,  one-third  of  whom  are  elected  by  the 
National  Assembly,  one-third  are  appointed by  the  President,  and  one-third  are  elected  by  a  general  assembly  of 
judges from the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court.  CZ: The Constitutional Court 
consists of 15 judges appointed for 10 years. Judges are appointed by the President of Czechia after obtaining consent 
from the Senate (Upper Chamber of Parliament). DE: the Constitutional Court consists of 16 judges, half of which 
are proposed and appointed by the Bundestag (lower chamber of Parliament; by an election committee composed of 
12 members proportionally representing the parties represented in the Bundestag) and half by the Bundesrat (upper 
chamber of Parliament, representing the Federal States). If a position remains vacant for over 2 months, the election 
committee has to request that the Constitutional Court itself propose candidates for election as judge. DK: Judges are 
formally  appointed  by  the  King  on  the  basis  of  recommendation  from  the  Judicial  Appointments  Council 
(Dommerudnævnelsesrådet).  The  only  exception  is  the  President  of  the  Supreme  Court,  who  is  appointed  by  the 
Supreme  Court’s  own  judges.  EE:  Every  year,  on  the  proposal  of  the  Chief  Justice,  the  Supreme  Court  en  banc 
appoints two new members to the Constitutional Review Chamber and relieves the two most senior members of the 
duties of the members of the Constitutional Review Chamber, taking into account the opinion of and bearing in mind, 
as much as possible, the equal representation of the Administrative Law, Criminal and Civil Chambers within the 
Constitutional Review Chamber. IE: Proposal by the Government and appointment by the President of the Republic. 
Nevertheless, the process that leads to the proposal by the Government is informal and could take any form. EL: The 

159  The European Commission has referred Poland to the Court of Justice of the European Union for violations of EU 
law  by  its  Constitutional  Tribunal,  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_842,(case  C-
448/23,  Commission  v  Poland,  pending);  this  infringement  procedure  includes  the  consideration  that  the 
Constitutional  Tribunal  no  longer  meets  the  requirements  of  an  independent  and  impartial  tribunal  previously 
established by law. 

91 

 
 
 
 
presidents of the three highest courts (Council of State, Supreme Court, Court of Audit) are appointed according to 
the  same  procedure;  proposal  by  the  government  and  appointment  by  the  President  of  the  Republic.  ES:  The 
Constitutional Court consists of 12 members appointed by the King; of which four are appointed based on a proposal 
from Congress by a three-fifths majority of its members; four are proposed by the Senate (Senado), requiring the same 
majority; two are appointed based on a proposal by the Government, and two based on a proposal from the General 
Council of the Judiciary. FR: Three members shall be appointed by decision of the President of the Republic, who 
also appoints the President of the Council. Three members are appointed by the President of the National Assembly 
and  three  by  the  President  of  the  Senate.  The  former  Presidents  of  the  Republic  are  also  members  for  life  of  the 
Constitutional  Council.  IT:  The  Constitutional  Court  consists  of  15  judges,  one-third  of  whom  are  appointed  by 
Parliament (meeting in joint session), one-third are appointed by the President of the Republic (who does not have 
direct executive powers), one-third by supreme courts. LV: The Constitutional Court is comprised of seven Judges, 
who are confirmed into office by the majority vote of the Saeima – with at least 51 votes. Three Judges are confirmed 
upon the proposal by at least ten members of the Saeima, two upon the proposal by the Cabinet of Ministers, and two 
upon the proposal of the Plenary Session of the Supreme  Court. The Plenary Session of the Supreme Court selects 
from among the judges of the Republic of Latvia. LT: The Constitutional Court consists of nine justices appointed for 
a  nine-year  unrenewable  term  of  office.  Parliament  appoints  the  judges  from  the  candidates  nominated  by  the 
President of the Republic of Lithuania, the Speaker of the Parliament, and the President of the Supreme Court. LU: 
The  Constitutional  Court  is  composed  of  the  President  of  the  Superior  Court  of  Justice,  of  the  President  of  the 
Administrative Court, two advisors to the Court of Cassation, and of five magistrates appointed by the Grand Duke, 
on  the  joint  opinion  of  the  Superior  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Administrative  Court.  HU:  All  15  members  of  the 
Constitutional Court are elected by Parliament voting with a two-thirds majority, upon proposal of a parliamentary 
committee.  MT:  The  Constitutional  Court  is  comprised  of  three  judges,  appointed  by  the  President,  acting  in 
accordance with the recommendation made by the Judicial Appointments Committee. NL: A Committee of Supreme 
Court judges draws up a list of six candidates and submits this to the House of Representatives, which selects and 
ranks  three  candidates  and  invites  only  the  person  ranked  first  for  an  interview.  The  selected  candidate  is  then 
nominated  by  the  Minister  of  Justice  for  appointment.  AT:  The  Constitutional  Court  consists  of  12  judges,  the 
President  and  Vice-President.  6  judges,  the  President  and  Vice-President  are  appointed  by  the  President  of  the 
Republic upon a proposal from the Government. Three judges each are appointed by the President upon a proposal 
from the Nationalrat (lower chamber of Parliament) and the Bundesrat (upper chamber of Parliament representing 
the regions) respectively. PL: The Constitutional Court consists of 15 judges who are proposed and appointed by the 
Sejm (lower chamber of the Parliament); according to statutory legislation, the President of the Republic receives an 
oath from office from the appointed judges but, as ruled by the Constitutional Court, the President of the Republic has 
no discretion in that respect and must receive the oath without undue delay. PT: The Constitutional Court is composed 
of 13 judges, 10 of which are selected and appointed by Parliament, and the remaining 3 judges are co-opted by the 
judges  appointed  by  Parliament.  The  judges  appointed  by  Parliament  prepare  a  list  of  candidates  and  select  the 
remaining three judges, through suffrage by secret ballot. RO: The Constitutional Court consists of nine members 
serving nine-year terms which cannot be extended, with three members each appointed by the President, the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies. Three members are renewed every 3 years. SK: The Constitutional Court consists of 
13 judges appointed for 12 years. The judges are appointed by the President of the Slovak Republic, on the proposal 
of the SK Parliament. FI: For both the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court the appointing authority 
is  the  President  of  the  Republic,  with  no  nomination  phase.  SE:  All  permanent  judges  are  appointed  by  the 
Government for an indefinite period of time upon recommendation by the Judges Proposals Board. The procedure is 
the same for the courts of first instance, the courts of appeal and the Supreme Courts.  

– Independence of bars and lawyers in the EU – 

Lawyers and their professional associations play a fundamental role in ensuring the protection of 
fundamental rights and the rule of law (160). A fair system of administering justice requires that 

160  ‘Lawyers  play  an  important  role  in  protecting  the  rule  of  law  and  judicial  independence,  while  respecting  the 
separation of powers and fundamental rights.’, ‘Access to a lawyer and rule of law’, Presidency discussion paper 

92 

 
 
 
 
lawyers  be  free  to  pursue  their  activities  of  advising  and  representing  their  clients.  Lawyers’ 
membership of a liberal profession and the authority deriving from that membership helps maintain 
their  independence,  and  bar  associations  play  an  important  role  in  helping  to  ensure  lawyers’ 
independence. European standards set out the freedom of exercise of the profession of a lawyer 
and  the  independence  of  bar  associations.  These  standards  also  set  out  the  basic  principles  for 
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers (161).  

Figure 67: Independence of Bars and lawyers, 2023 (*) (source: European Commission with the 
CCBE (162))  

(*) Based on the survey results, Member States could score a maximum of 9 points. The survey was conducted at the beginning of 2023. For the 
question on guarantees of the confidentiality of the lawyer/client relationship, 0.5 points were awarded for each scenario fully covered (search and 
seizure of e-data held by the lawyer, search of the lawyer’s premises, interception of lawyer/client communication, surveillance of the lawyer or 
their premises, tax audit of the law firm and other administrative checks). For all other criteria fully met, 1 point was awarded. No points  were 
awarded if the criterion was not met. MT: 2020 replies, adapted to the new methodology. EE: The Ministry of Justice has broad supervisory powers 
over the organisation of the legal aid system. LT: According to the Law on the Bar, disciplinary action against lawyers can be taken by the Bar 
Council. However, it also lays down that the Minister of Justice also has such a right. If the Minister of Justice decides to initiate disciplinary 
action against a lawyer, the Bar has no say in such proceedings, and the case goes directly to the Disciplinary Court. The Disciplinary Court 
consists  of five  lawyers, who are  members  of  the  Bar.  Three of  the  five are elected by  the  General Assembly of  the  Bar, and  another  two are 
appointed by the Minister of Justice. PL: The Ministry of Justice has a supervisory role over the Bar, organising bar examinations and setting the 
amount  of  minimal  legal  fees  (following  non-mandatory  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Bar  Council).  SI:  Disciplinary  proceedings  are  conducted 
exclusively within the Bar Association itself. An appeal is possible against the decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the first instance, which 
is considered by the Disciplinary Committee of the second instance. There is no possibility of appeal against the decisions of the Disciplinary 
Committee  of  the  second  instance.  This  is  determined  in  Article  65  of  the  Attorneys  Act:  ‘The  decisions  of  the  disciplinary  bodies  of  the  Bar 
Association shall be enforceable.’; SK: Primarily, it is the independent Supervision Committee of the Slovak Bar Association that files a petition 
based on the complaint. However, the Minister of Justice may also initiate a disciplinary proceeding if ‘a lawyer performed an action which might 
be viewed as a professional misconduct under the legal rules which were in force so far, the Chair of the Supervision Committee or the Minister of 
Justice (acting in their capacity of a petitioner) may submit an application for the commencement of the disciplinary proceeding under this Act to 
the appropriate Bar´s governing body within the time limit which applied to commencement of the disciplinary proceeding under the legal rule 
which was in force so far.’ FI: The Bar Association is under the supervision of the Chancellor of Justice as public authority. The Chancellor 
has supervisory authority over attorneys as regulated in the Advocates Act. 

the  meeting  of 

for 
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6319-2022-INIT/en/pdf.  

the 

Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Council  on  3  and  4  March  2022: 

161  Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
162  The 2023 data is collected through replies by CCBE members to a questionnaire. 

93 

 
 
 
 
3.3.3. Summary on judicial independence 

Judicial independence is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy before a court 
or  tribunal,  as  enshrined  in  Article  47  of  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  EU,  and 
indispensable for ensuring effective judicial protection, as required under Article 19 of the Treaty 
on European Union. It is a fundamental element of an effective justice system and essential for 
upholding the rule of law. It is vital for ensuring the fairness of judicial proceedings and the trust 
of the public and businesses in the legal system.  The national judicial systems  must therefore 
fully  respect  the  requirements  as  regards  judicial  independence  following  from  EU  law  as 
interpreted by  the Court  of Justice of the EU  and  take due account  of  European standards on 
judicial independence. The 2024 Scoreboard shows trends in the general public's and companies' 
perceptions  of  judicial  independence.  This  edition  also  presents  some  new  indicators  on 
appointment  of  court  presidents  and  authorities  involved  in  the  appointment  of  national 
prosecutors, on dismissal of Prosecutors General, on bodies involved in the verification of asset 
declarations, and on the appointment of members of highest instances that exercise constitutional 
jurisdictions. The structural indicators do not in themselves allow for conclusions to be drawn 
about the independence of the judiciaries of the Member States, but represent possible elements 
which may be taken as a starting point for such an analysis. 

a)  The  2024  Scoreboard  presents  the  developments  in  perceived  independence  from 
surveys  of  the  general  public  (Eurobarometer  FL540)  and  companies  (Eurobarometer 
FL541):  

o  The  eighth  Eurobarometer  survey  among  the  general  public  (Figure  51)  shows 
that  the  perception  of  independence  has  improved  or  remained  stable  in  19 
Member States when compared to 2016, including 4 of the Members States facing 
specific  challenges.  Compared  to  last  year,  the  general  public’s  perception  of 
independence improved or remained stable in 17 Member States as well as 6 of 
the Members States facing specific challenges, although in two of those Member 
States  facing  challenges163,  the  level  of  perceived  independence  remains 
particularly low.  

o  The eighth Eurobarometer survey among the companies (Figure 53) shows that 
the perception of independence has improved or remained stable in 19 Member 
States when compared to 2016, including 5 of the Members States facing specific 
challenges.  Compared  to  last  year,  the  companies’  perception  of  independence 
improved or remained stable in 18 Member States and in 7 Members States facing 
specific challenges. In two Member States, the level of perceived independence 
remains particularly low.  

o  Among the reasons for the perceived lack of independence of courts and judges, 
interference  or  pressure  from  government  and  politicians  was  the  most  often 
stated  reason,  followed  by  pressure  from  economic  or  other  specific  interests. 
Compared to previous years, both reasons remain notable for the three Member 
States where perceived independence is very low (Figures 52 and 54).  

o  Among  the  reasons  for  good  perception  of  independence  of  courts  and  judges, 

163  See footnote 22. 

94 

 
 
 
 
40%  and  39%  of  all  respondents  among  the  general  public  and  companies, 
respectively, named the guarantees provided by the status and position of judges 
as the main reason for their answer.  

b)  Since  2022,  the  EU  Justice  Scoreboard  has  presented  the  results  of  a  Eurobarometer 
survey on how companies perceive the effectiveness of investment protection by the 
law and courts as regards, in their view, unjustified decisions or inaction by the State 
(Figure 55). Administrative conduct, stability and quality of the law-making process, as 
well  as  effectiveness  of  courts  and  property  protection  still  remain  key  factors  of 
comparable significance for confidence in investment protection (Figure 56). Compared 
to last year, confidence in investment protection improved in 13 Member States.  

c)  Figure 57 presents an updated overview of the composition of Councils for the Judiciary 

in countries where such bodies exist.  

d)  Figures 58 and 59 present the situation regarding the appointment of court presidents in 
all  Member  States.  Figure  58  shows  the  authorities  proposing  candidates  for  their 
appointment as court presidents and the authorities that appoint them. Figure 59 presents 
the competences  of the  executive power and parliament in  appointing  court presidents 
upon submission from the proposing authorities.  

e)  For the second time, the EU Justice Scoreboard presents a series of indicators dedicated 
to anti-corruption. The publication shows a comparative view of the material (Figure 60) 
and personal (Figure 61) scope of asset declarations in Member States, and the availability 
of verification, transparency and sanctions mechanisms (Figure 62). 

f)  Figures  63  and  64  present  the  situation  regarding  the  appointment  of  prosecutors  in 
Member  States.  Figure  63  shows  the  authorities  proposing  candidates  for  their 
appointment  as  national  prosecutors  and  the  authorities  that  appoint  them.  Figure  64 
presents the competences of the executive power or the Prosecutor General in appointing 
national prosecutors upon submission from the proposing authorities. 

g)  Figure  65  presents,  for  the  first  time,  the  authorities  involved  in  the  dismissal  of 

Prosecutors General. 

h)  Introduced for the first time in this edition of the Scoreboard, Figure 66 presents an initial 
overview of the authorities involved in proposing and appointing members of the highest 
instance court exercising constitutional jurisdiction. 

i)  Figure  67  shows  that,  although  in  nine  Member  States  the  executive  plays  some 
supervisory role as  regards the Bar, the independence of lawyers is  generally  ensured, 
allowing lawyers to freely pursue their activities of advising and representing their clients.  

4. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard presents a wide-ranging picture of the effectiveness of justice 
systems  in  the  Member  States.  It  shows  that  efforts  to  improve  the  efficiency,  quality  and 
independence  of  the  justice  systems  are  underway  in  many  jurisdictions.  However,  challenges 
remain to ensure the public’s full trust in the legal systems of all Member States. The information 
in the EU Justice Scoreboard contributes to the monitoring carried out in the framework of the 
European Rule of Law Cycle and feeds into the Commission’s annual Rule of Law report.  

95