Opinion of the European Central Bank of 31 may 2024 on the extension of the register of lobbying (CON/2024/18)
Date: 2024-05-31
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: legal basis

EN 

ECB-PUBLIC 

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 

of 31 May 2024  

on the extension of the Register of Lobbying  

(CON/2024/18) 

Introduction and legal basis 

On  2  May  2024  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the  Irish  Minister  for  Public 

Expenditure, National Development Plan Delivery and Reform (hereinafter the ‘Minister’) for an opinion on 

the Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015 (Designated Public Officials) Regulations 2024 (hereinafter the ‘draft 

regulations’). 

The ECB’s competence to deliver an opinion is based on Articles 127(4) and 282(5) of the Treaty on the 

Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU)  and  the  third  indent  of  Article 2(1)  of  Council  Decision 

98/415/EC1, as the draft regulations relate to the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). In accordance with the first 

sentence of Article 17.5 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank, the Governing Council 

has adopted this opinion. 

1. 

Purpose of the draft regulations 

1.1.  The purpose of the draft regulations is to expand the scope of the Regulation of Lobbying Act 20152 

(hereinafter  the  ‘2015  Act’)  to  include  certain  members  of  the  CBI  as  designated  public  officials 

(DPOs).  In  this  respect,  under  the  2015  Act,  the  Minister  may  prescribe  descriptions  of  public 

servants by reference to their roles, levels of remuneration, grades or similar factors3 who are then 

designated as DPOs under the 2015 Act. In determining whether or not to prescribe any description 

of public servants the Minister must have regard to the public interest  and any  recommendations 

made under the 2015 Act4.  

1.2.  Under the draft regulations, persons holding the following roles in the CBI are prescribed as DPOs: 

the  Governor,  Deputy  Governor,  Chief  Operations  Officer,  Director,  Chief  People  Officer,  Chief 

Information Officer, Registrar of Credit Unions, and the Chief of Staff/Advisor to the Governor 5.  

1.3.  Under the 2015 Act, where a person subject to the 2015 Act makes, manages, or directs the making 

of any relevant communication to a DPO 6 in the circumstances outlined in the 2015 Act (hereinafter 

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Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions (OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42). 

Regulation of Lobbying Act 2015. 
Section 6(2) of the 2015 Act. 

Section 6(3) of the 2015 Act. 
Section 3 of the draft Regulations. 
Section 5 of the 2015 Act 

 
 
 
 
 
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a  ‘lobbyist’),  the  lobbyist  is  required  to  report  that  interaction  to  the  Standards  in  Public  Office 

Commission (hereinafter the ‘Commission’)7, which maintains a Register of Lobbying. As noted by 

the Minister in the consultation request, the objective of introducing the Register of Lobbying was to 

make information available to the public on the identity and intentions of those communicating with 

DPOs.  

1.4.  As communications  by or  on  behalf of Union  institutions are excepted communications under the 

2015 Act, such communications do not have to be registered8. 

1.5.  The 2015 Act does not impose any obligations on DPOs with regard to the registration and reporting 

of lobbying. DPOs are, however, subject to certain restrictions on post-term employment as a lobbyist 

and may, from 1 June 2024, be sanctioned for breaching these restrictions9.  

1.6.  The designation of certain members of the CBI as DPOs in accordance with the 2015 Act formed 

part of the Irish Government’s Programme for Government. In its Programme for Government, the 

Government committed to expanding the scope of the Register of Lobbying so that the lobbying of 

senior officials in bodies like the CBI, which have significant policymaking or development functions, 

would be reported on the same basis as the lobbying of DPOs of central and local government 10. 

The draft regulations also seek to bring similarly senior members of other public bodies within the 

scope of the 2015 Act. 

2. 

Observations  

2.1  This opinion addresses the designation by the Minister in the draft regulations of certain members of 

the CBI as DPOs in accordance with the 2015 Act. In particular, the members of the CBI designated 

in  the  draft  regulations  include  members  of  the  ECB’s  Governing  Council,  General  Council,  and 

Supervisory  Board,  who  take  part  in  the  ECB’s  decision-making  process,  as  well  as  alternate 

members of these bodies and certain CBI staff members. 

2.2  Article 130 TFEU requires that, when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 

conferred  upon  them  by  the  TFEU,  the  Treaty  on  the  European  Union  and  the  Statute  of  the 

European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, neither the ECB nor a national 

central bank (NCB) nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions 

from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from 

any other body. The aim of Article 130 TFEU is to shield central banks from political pressure and to 

enable them to effectively  pursue  the objectives attributed to their  tasks through the independent 

exercise of the specific powers conferred on them for that purpose. However, the recognition that 

central banks have such  independence  does not have the consequence of exempting them  from 

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Section 12 of the 2015 Act 

Sections 5(4) and 5(5)(c) of the 2015 Act 
Sections 22 and 22A of the 2015 Act 
Programme  for  Government:  Our  Shared  Future,  2020,  p.  121,  available  on  the  Irish  Government’s  website  at 
https://www.gov.ie/en/. 

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every rule of law and to shield them from any kind of legislation11. Moreover, the ECB has itself put 

in place measures with a purpose similar to those of the 2015 Act.  

2.3  First, in view of Article 130 TFEU and to avoid conflicts of interest, the ECB has a Code of Conduct 

for high-level ECB Officials (hereinafter the ‘Single Code’)12. The Single Code requires members and 

alternates of the ECB’s decision-making bodies (hereinafter ‘high-level ECB officials’) to sign upon 

their appointment, a declaration of adherence to the Single Code. The Single Code provides good 

governance  safeguards  for  relations  with  interest  groups  and  also  includes  guiding  principles 

regarding  communication  with  external  parties.  High-level  ECB  officials  commit  to  safeguarding 

confidential  information  in  accordance  with  their  obligations  and  to  avoid  any  appearance  that 

potentially market-sensitive information may not be available to the widest possible public audience 

at the same time. To enhance transparency and accountability, members of high-level ECB bodies 

must, as a general rule, include information on their meetings with external parties in their published 

meeting  calendars  to  the  extent  that  such  information  relates  to  their  role  as  high-level  ECB 

officials 13. While these measures aim to ensure independence and avoid conflicts of interest, they 

do not exclude regular contact and interaction with external stakeholders who can provide relevant 

input and information that helps to understand the dynamics of the economy, the financial markets 

and the banking sector, and the broader societal context14. 

2.4  Second, high-level ECB officials are also subject to post-employment notification obligations and are 

required to make  a request to the  ECB’s Ethics Committee to issue  an  opinion  on the applicable 

cooling-off periods prior to the taking up of a specific prospective gainful occupational activity15. The 

Single  Code  also  states  that  high-level  ECB  officials  may  only  engage  in  a  gainful  occupational 

activity with any entity engaged in lobbying in relation to the ECB after the expiry of the relevant time 

period following the end of their term of office or from the date of cessation of their function as a 

member  of  a  high-level  ECB  body 16.  In  this  regard,  an  application  for  consent  made  to  the 

Commission by a DPO where applicable under the 2015 Act17 would be in addition to the concurrent 

obligation of the high-level ECB official to consult the ECB’s Ethics Committee. Recommendations 

of the ECB’s Ethics Committee pertain only to a DPO’s former role as a high-level ECB official and 

are also in addition to further ethical rules applicable to high-level ECB officials under national law18.  

2.5  Finally,  the  ECB,  NCBs  and  national  competent  authorities  (NCAs)  participating  in  the  Single 

Supervisory Mechanism are required to take the necessary measures to ensure that their members 

of staff and members of their bodies act independently and maintain neutrality when meeting with 

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See judgment of the Court of Justice of 10 July 2003, Commission v ECB, C-11/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:395, paragraphs 
134 to 136. See also paragraph 2.3 of Opinion CON/2019/15. All ECB opinions are published on EUR-Lex. 
See Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (OJ C 478, 16.12.2022, p. 3). 

See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2019/15 and, generally, the Single Code. 
See paragraph 2.4 of Opinion CON/2019/15. 

Article 17 of the Single Code. 
Article 17 of the Single Code. 
As required under section 22(1) of the 2015 Act. 

See Article 2 of the Single Code. 

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external parties, in particular with representatives from the financial services industry19. The ECB, 

NCBs  and  NCAs  are  also  required  to  have  a  mechanism  in  place  to  assess  and  avoid  possible 

conflicts  of  interest  arising  from  post-employment  occupational  activities  undertaken  by  their 

members of staff and the members of their bodies, including appropriate notification requirements 

and cooling-off periods20.  

2.6 

In view of the above considerations, the ECB considers that the draft regulations, including the post-

term employment restrictions, would not impair the independent performance of the CBI’s  ESCB-

related tasks 21. 

This opinion will be published on EUR-Lex. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2024. 

[signed] 

The President of the ECB 

Christine LAGARDE 

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See Articles 4 and 5 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] of the European Central Bank of 2 November 2021 laying down 
the principles of the Eurosystem Ethics Framework (ECB/2021/49) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 7); and Articles 4 and 5 
of  Guideline  (EU)  2021/2256 of  the  European  Central  Bank of 2 November 2021  laying down the  principles  of  the 
Ethics Framework for the Single Supervisory Mechanism (ECB/2021/50) (OJ L 454, 17.12.2021, p. 21). 
See Article 6 of Guideline (EU) [2021/2253] (ECB/2021/49) and Article 6 of Guideline (EU) 2021/2256 (ECB/2021/50)  

See paragraph 2.5 of Opinion CON/2019/15.  

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