Proof of humanity : ethnographic research of a “democratic” DAO.
Date: 2024-04-25
Institutions: European University Institute
Subjects: EU research policy, European citizenship, autonomous community, autonomy, cloud computing, decentralisation, democracy, ethnography, governance, innovation, legislation, research report, robotisation

PROOF OF HUMANITY: 
ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 
OF A “DEMOCRATIC” DAO

Authors

Sofia Cossar, Tara Merk, Jamilya Kamalova, Dr. Primavera De Filippi

Research Project Report 
April 2024

© European University Institute, 2024

Editorial matter and selection © Sofia Cossar, Tara Merk, Jamilya Kamalova, Primavera De Filippi, 2024

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC-BY 4.0) International license 
which governs the terms of access and reuse for this work. If cited or quoted, reference should be  made 
to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the series and number, the year and the  publisher.

Views expressed in this publication reflect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the Euro-
pean University Institute.

Published by

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This  research  is  funded  by  the  European  Research  Council  under  the  European  Union’s  
Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement No. 865856).

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary 

I. DAOs, Formal and Deep Democracy 

II. The Findings 

1. Constituting a Democracy 

1.a. Incomplete Early Governance Design 

1.b. Two Partnering Organizations with Colliding Expectations 

2. Citizenship and The Demos 

2.a. Heterogeneous Member Backgrounds and Interests 

2.b. Division of the Minds and Perceptions about Factions 

3. Political Deliberation 

3.a. Uncompromising or “Convex” Deliberation Mindset 

3.b. Counter-Productive Deliberation Practices and Culture 

4. The Law  

4.a. Incomplete and Vague Legislative Framework and Laws 

5. The Government 

5.a. Informal and Partisan Government Bodies and Officials 

6. Governance Platforms 

6.a Inadequate Governance Platforms 

7. Governance System 

7.a. Governance System Design Weaponizable by Factions 

III. Timeline of Events 

Conclusion 

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Authors

Sofia Cossar (CNRS) is a research member of the ERC’s BlockchainGov project. She is also a Ph.D. 
candidate in legal theory and legal tech at Université Paris II and the National Center of Scientific Re-
search in Paris.

Tara Merk (CNRS) is a research member of the ERC’s BlockchainGov project. She is also a Ph.D. 
candidate in ethnography and social sciences at Université Paris II and the National Center of Scientific 
Research in Paris.

Jamilya Kamalova (CNRS) is a research member of the ERC’s BlockchainGov project. She is also a 
Ph.D. candidate in legal theory and legal tech at the Université II and the National Center of Scientific 
Research in Paris and a researcher at the Kleros Cooperative.

Dr. Primavera De Filippi (CNRS/Harvard) is the director of the European Research Council (ERC) 
BlockchainGov project. She is also a research director at the National Center of Scientific Research in 
Paris, a faculty associate at the Berkman-Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard, a former mem-
ber of the Global Future Council on Blockchain Technologies at the World Economic Forum, a founder 
and coordinator of the U.N. Internet Governance Forum’s dynamic coalitions on Blockchain Technology 
(COALA).

Contributors

Dr. Ellie Rennie (RMIT) is a Professor at RMIT University. Her current research is looking at coordi-
nation in permissionless systems using ethnographic methods. Ellie is an Australian Research Council 
Future Fellow, working across RMIT’s Blockchain Innovation Hub, the Digital Ethnography Research 
Centre, and the ARC Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making and Society, and Metagov. 
She also chairs the Expert Panel of the First Nations Digital Inclusion Advisory Group established by 
the Australian government to close the gap on digital inclusion.

Dr. Kelsie Nabben (European University Institute) is a research member of the ERC’s Blockchain-
Gov project, undertaking a Max Weber postdoctoral Fellowship at EUI. She was a recipient of a PhD 
scholarship at the RMIT University Centre of Excellence for Automated Decision-Making & Society. As 
a researcher, she specializes in ethnographic methods to investigate the social outcomes of emerging 
technologies.

Acknowledgements

We thank all the members of the Proof of Humanity DAO who participated in our interviews, as well as 
researchers and scholars including Dr. Anna Weichselbraun, for their valuable contributions to framing 
our analysis and peer-reviewing this report.

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Executive Summary

Context: In 2021, the Proof of Humanity (PoH) project debuted as the first Sybil-resistant registry of 
“unique and singular” individuals on the Ethereum network. The project offers an economic incentive 
through  collaboration  with  the  Universal  Basic  Income  (UBI)  smart  contract,  which  distributes  $UBI 
cryptocurrency  tokens  to  registered  humans.  The  PoH  registry,  equipped  with  measures  to  combat 
fraudulent  registrations  or  bot  impersonations,  allows  users  to  challenge  suspicious  profiles.  These 
challenges are adjudicated by Kleros' Humanity Court. Within two years, over 17,000 registrants joined 
the  registry.  The  founding  organization,  Kleros  Cooperative,  announced  the  registry  would  be  gov-
erned by a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO). The launch of the PoH DAO, the first in the 
Ethereum ecosystem to implement a 1-person-1-vote liquid democracy system, challenged traditional 
token-weighted voting mechanisms in DAO governance. Despite gaining recognition and endorsement 
from influential figures like Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin, the community grappled with irrecon-
cilable long-term visions, leading to the adoption of a binding proposal to "fork" by the end of 2022, 
highlighting underlying challenges within the PoH DAO. In 2022, our team at BlockchainGov conducted 
a research study to explore the governance dynamics that led to the PoH DAO’s governance crisis and 
subsequent decision to “fork.”

Research  Methodology:  Our  ethnographic  research  was  carried  out  through  a  combination  of  on-
line participant observation, countless informal conversations, fourteen recorded semi-structured inter-
views, and a desk review of publicly available information on the PoH registry and PoH DAO.

Main research question: What governance dynamics led to the Proof of Humanity DAO's crisis and 
subsequent decision to “fork” in November 2022?

•  Research sub-question 1: To what extent can the governance dynamics of the PoH DAO be 
described and analyzed using the concepts and terminology typical of modern nation-state de-
mocracies?

•  Research sub-question 2: How could the democratic ideal and best practices of modern de-
mocracies have influenced the governance design of the PoH DAO to manage its diverse com-
munity peacefully and prevent its governance crisis?

Research Hypothesis: The decision of the PoH DAO to fork in November 2022 was the culmination of 
an enduring governance crisis stemming from an absence of robust and transparent governance mech-
anisms, processes, rules, and bodies to help manage and harmonize the interests of varied groups with-
in the organization. Without the proper governance mechanisms, the PoH DAO experienced a gradual 
and ultimately irreconcilable polarization among its members.

Findings:

1.  Constituting a Democracy

1.a. Incomplete early governance design: The PoH DAO was initiated as a pioneering venture in 
liquid democracy governance, endowed with a bold mission and a set of off-chain governance 
instruments for proposing, voting on, and implementing decisions on-chain. Despite its innova-
tive approach, it was missing key governance mechanisms. This oversight in the PoH DAO’s 
initial  governance  framework  led  to  internal  fragmentation,  as  it  did  not  offer  explicit  tools  or 
procedures for resolving disputes and achieving consensus within the community.

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1.b. Two partnering organizations with colliding expectations: Despite initially collaborating for 
mutual benefit, the two organizations involved in the launch of PoH and UBI (Kleros Cooperative 
and Democracy Earth Foundation) had vastly different, and at times colliding, expectations for 
the PoH project as a whole. These expectations partially derived from the diverse backgrounds 
and visions each organization was pursuing independently.

2.  Citizenship and The Demos

2.a. Heterogeneous members’ backgrounds and interests: Active members who participated in 
PoH DAO’s deliberations came from varied backgrounds and had very different interests in the 
project, which consolidated into polarized governance views.

2.b. Division of the minds and perceptions about factions: Community members perceived the 
PoH DAO as a split between two opposing factions and this perception was openly expressed 
on various platforms and forums. This public portrayal of the community as deeply polarized 
ultimately  became  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy,  reinforcing  perceptions,  attitudes,  and  actions  of 
mistrust toward the “other” side.

3.  Political Deliberation

3.a. Uncompromising or “convex” deliberation mindset: Numerous debates surrounding the PoH 
registry and the PoH DAO were framed as irreconcilable tradeoffs and addressed with a confron-
tational and uncompromising mentality. This prevented factions from finding common ground.

3.b. Counter-productive deliberation practices: Some of the most widespread deliberation prac-
tices  within  the  PoH  DAO  exhibited  problematic  characteristics  that  impeded  a  constructive 
deliberation environment.

4.  The Law

4.a.  Incomplete  and  vague  legislative  framework  and  legislation:  While  innovative,  the  legis-
lative framework and legislation adopted by the PoH DAO were not robust enough to prevent 
or minimize polarization. Some crucial legal provisions were missing, and the legal framework 
contained vague excerpts that allowed it to be “weaponized” by both factions.

5.  The Government

5.a. Informal and partisan government bodies and officials: The governing bodies and officials of 
the PoH DAO carried out functions similar to a state’s three branches of power. However, their 
nature reflected the implicit power structures of the PoH DAO emerging after the project’s launch.

6.  Governance Platforms

6.a. Inadequate Governance Sites or Surfaces: The nature and design of the off-chain platforms 
used  for  governance,  including  deliberation  and  voting,  made  them  relatively  inaccessible  or 
inadequate for their performed function. The PoH DAO also refrained from “dogfooding” its tech-
nological innovations for deliberation and resolution of its internal disputes, which could have 
served as good mechanisms for harmonizing its diverse community.

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7.  Governance System

7.a. Weaponizable Governance System Design: In many instances, the PoH DAO governance 
system and voting mechanism designs fell prey to the Tyranny of the Majority and the monopo-
lization of voting power by charismatic leaders of each perceived faction. 

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Preamble

In 2021, the Proof of Humanity (PoH) registry emerged as the first Sybil-resistant list of “unique and sin-
gular” humans on the Ethereum network. Giving an economic incentive for humans to join the project, 
the PoH registry went live in collaboration with the Universal Basic Income (UBI) smart contract, which 
distributed $UBI cryptocurrency tokens to all registered humans, mirroring the concept of a universal 
basic income. To maintain its integrity, the PoH registry had measures to counteract attempts by users 
to  register  multiple  times  or  use  bots  to  impersonate  humans,  commonly  known  as  “Sybils”  or  fake 
personas. Users could challenge suspicious profiles and have these cases adjudicated by a Kleros’ 
Humanity Court. The PoH registry, founded by the Kleros Cooperative, was significantly influenced in 
its  operational  and  governance  structure  through  utilization  of  Kleros  Court,  a  decentralized  dispute 
resolution system provider, which is another product developed by the Kleros Cooperative.

In under two years, the PoH registry attracted over 17.000 registrants. Drawing on the digital identity 
system it had developed, Kleros Cooperative announced the launch of the PoH Decentralized Auton-
omous  Organization  (DAO).  This  collective  was  entrusted  with  tasks  such  as  allocating  funds  from 
a common treasury and deciding the future direction of the PoH registry. Notably, the PoH DAO was the 
first in the Ethereum ecosystem to implement a 1-person-1-vote liquid democracy system. By deviating 
from the prevalent token-weighted voting mechanisms in DAO governance, which are usually criticized 
for their plutocratic tendencies, the PoH DAO marked a step forward in establishing more inclusive gov-
ernance frameworks. This achievement was consolidated by the active endorsement of many influential 
figures,  such  as  Ethereum  co-founder  Vitalik  Buterin,  who  also  joined  the  PoH  registry.  The  project 
garnered wide recognition, including a grant from Gitcoin, highlighting its status as “the first democratic 
DAO on Ethereum, and the largest Universal Basic Income experiment using cryptocurrencies to date.” 

BlockchainGov is a 5-year long (2021-2026) project funded by the European Research Council through 
a €2M grant, operating at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) in Paris, France, and 
the European Union Institute in Florence, Italy. As an interdisciplinary research team comprising legal 
scholars, social and political scientists, computer scientists, and blockchain engineers, BlockchainGov 
focuses  on  studying  the  impact  of  blockchain  technology  on  governance  and  its  consequences  for 
legitimacy and trust. Naturally, the PoH DAO offered a unique opportunity to delve into the opportuni-
ties, challenges, and theoretical implications of blockchain governance systems. Beyond our academic 
interest, in the summer of 2022, members of the PoH DAO community reached out to BlockchainGov, 
expressing concern about an ongoing polarization and increasing governance crisis within the collec-
tive. Consequently, we decided to conduct ethnographic research on the governance dynamics within 
the PoH DAO to support the community in overcoming its challenges.

Our research team was well-positioned to pursue ethnographic research of the PoH DAO for various 
reasons. Firstly, some BlockchainGov members were or had been involved with stakeholders contrib-
uting to the PoH project, providing us with insider perspectives crucial to a deeper understanding of 
the situation. Secondly, by the time community members reached out, we had already been closely 
following the developments within the PoH DAO for our own research agenda. These aspects proved 
especially useful as we moved on with our project. Over the six months in which we actively engaged 
in research to better understand the PoH registry and PoH DAO, it became apparent that the commu-
nity as a whole was facing challenges and that different parts were presenting long-term visions and 
solutions that seemed unreconcilable. Our intuition was quickly confirmed when the PoH DAO officially 
passed a binding proposal to “fork” (HIP 74) at the end of 2022.

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Research Goal

Given the community’s intention to “fork” or to split the PoH registry and the PoH DAO into two distinct 
projects, our research was oriented to enhancing the community’s comprehension and offering helpful 
insights into the PoH DAO’s governance evolution since it began, the key reasons behind its crisis, and 
why its governance system had difficulty in mediating compromises among various groups. We hope 
that these insights become valuable reference points for the PoH DAO community itself while also con-
tributing to the existing academic literature exploring the governance of DAOs.

Research Design

Given the community’s intention to “fork” or to split the PoH registry and the PoH DAO into two distinct 
projects, we adapted our research design in the following way:

•  Main research question: What governance dynamics led to the Proof of Humanity DAO’s crisis 

and subsequent decision to “fork” in November 2022?

 ○ Research  sub-question  1:  To  what  extent  can  the  governance  dynamics  of  the  PoH 
DAO  be  described  and  analyzed  using  the  concepts  and  terminology  typical  of  modern 
nation-state democracies? 

 ○ Research sub-question 2: How could the democratic ideal and best practices of modern 
democracies have influenced the governance design of the PoH DAO to manage its di-
verse community peacefully and prevent its governance crisis?

•  Research Assumption: The decision of the PoH DAO to “fork” in November 2022 should not be 
seen as inherently positive or inevitable. Firstly, duplicating the PoH registry to be managed by 
different DAOs effectively undermines the idea and advantage of having a “singular decentral-
ized registry of verified humans” that can be integrated with other DApps requiring strong Sybil 
resistance. Secondly, while diversity within any community is inescapable, strident polarization in 
DAOs can be avoided or minimized by designing better governance mechanisms.

•  Research Hypothesis: Although the community regarded itself as the "first democratic DAO in 
the  Ethereum  ecosystem,"  the  PoH  DAO  lacked  robust  democratic  governance  mechanisms. 
These mechanisms were needed to manage and align the diverse interests within the project 
effectively. This deficiency led to a gradual yet irreconcilable polarization, culminating in the de-
cision to “fork” in November 2022.

•  Methodology: We conducted our ethnographic research through online participant observation, 
fourteen semi-structured interviews, and a desk review of publicly available information about the 
PoH registry and the PoH DAO. The primary sources of data included:

 ○ Publicly  available  conversations  held  on  PoH  governance  channels  and  tools,  including 
the PoH DAO governance forum, Telegram groups, Tweets posted by PoH DAO members, 
and talks or articles authored by PoH DAO members available online.

 ○ Publicly available documents and dashboards.

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 ○ Fourteen  semi-structured  interviews  were  conducted  with  PoH  DAO  members.  In  com-
pliance with BlockchainGov’s research ethics standards, which are approved by EUI and 
CERSA, we ensured that all interviewees signed the necessary community consent forms. 
This process guaranteed that every interviewee was fully aware of and consented to the 
collection, use, and publication of the data they shared regarding the PoH DAO community, 
specifically for our research project.

 ○ Observations contributed by two members of the BlockchainGov research team, based on 

their engagement with PoH DAO stakeholders:

 » Sofia Cossar, previously a researcher at the Democracy Earth Foundation, applied for 

the role of Project Manager at PoH DAO in collaboration with Paula Berman.

 »

Jamilya Kamalova holds a research position at the Kleros Cooperative.

The preliminary findings cited in this report were presented to the PoH DAO at the beginning of 2023. 
Our research team shared a document in English and Spanish in the PoH DAO’s governance forum. 
We also hosted two community calls, one in English and one in Spanish, to present the findings and re-
ceive feedback from PoH DAO members. The community was encouraged to submit written feedback 
through a Google form. The BlockchainGov research team integrated the relevant feedback into the 
original document in 2024 and tailored the report for academic publication.

Theoretical Background

In our effort to unveil the causes that had led to the crisis in the PoH DAO, one aspect consistently 
highlighted by the community was its status as the “first democratic DAO on Ethereum.” One of the 
interviewees said, “It was a novel development in the Ethereum ecosystem, where most projects were 
plutocratic or token-weighted voting. PoH is probably one of the first and most legitimate democratic ex-
periments with Ethereum.” This sentiment inspired us to frame our analysis using modern nation-state 
democracies as an analogy and liberal and critical democratic theory as a theoretical lens. Firstly, to 
understand what happened — particularly, how the PoH DAO governed itself. Secondly, explore ways 
the PoH DOA crisis could have been prevented or contained.

As mentioned above, our research operated under the premise that the crisis was not a positive or in-
evitable development. Our hypothesis argues that a more robustly democratic governance model could 
have better managed the PoH DAO diverse community, preventing deep-seated polarization. Examples 
of governance mechanisms in modern nation-state democracies and insights from democratic academ-
ic literature helped us address our case study. However, this exercise was conducted with caution. On 
the one hand, transitioning from legal-political systems like nation-state democracies to techno-political 
systems such as DAOs is far from a direct process. On the other hand, although modern democracies, 
especially  Western  liberal  democracies,  might  offer  frameworks  more  fitting  than  those  of  autocratic 
systems to understand how DAOs do and should govern themselves, they are not without their flaws 
and complexities. Even then, in contrast to more autocratic regimes, the “democratic ideal” and mod-
ern democracies help cultivate—as opposed to solely impose—plural and peaceful coexistence of the 
demos. For that reason, they remain a valuable frame of reference to orient the understanding of DAOs 
aspiring to inclusive governance structures.

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Report Structure

This report is structured as follows:

•  The “DAOs, Formal and Deep Democracy” section introduces the concept of blockchain technol-
ogy, DAOs, and DAO governance practices. It also narrates the origin of the PoH registry and the 
PoH DAO and contextualizes the governance crisis. Furthermore, it addresses the foundations 
of modern democracies and the democratic ideal from a historical, philosophical, and political 
science perspective by distinguishing between “formal” and “deeper” democracy.

•  The “Findings” section directly addresses the research questions by presenting findings across 
six aspects of the PoH DAO governance: constituting a democracy, citizenship and the demos, 
political deliberation, the law, the government, governance platforms, and governance system.

•  The “Timeline of Events” section details the most significant events at the PoH DAO in chrono-

logical order, spanning from August 2014 to November 2022.

•  The conclusion summarizes the research findings and proposes potential directions for future 
collaboration  with  the  PoH  DAO  and  overarching  research  on  the  governance  of  blockchain 
systems.

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I. DAOs, Formal and Deep Democracy

By definition, DAOs are internet-based collaborative groups with specific goals, utilizing smart contracts 
on blockchain networks and digital assets like tokens and cryptocurrencies to self-govern (Hassan & De 
Filippi 2021). The landscape of DAOs today is diverse, and there is no universal formula for structuring 
their governance (World Economic Forum 2022, 2023). Because of the design of the underlying block-
chain technology, DAOs are architecturally decentralized, with the generated transaction data stored 
in the many nodes that comprise a distributed ledger. However, the extent of their political decentral-
ization, defined by the number of entities with adequate power to make governance decisions, is not 
predetermined (Buterin, 2017). While anyone can initiate a DAO, it's often the case that the software 
developers and founders of the underlying technologies wield significant decision-making power, espe-
cially in the early stages. Over time, DAOs may tend towards “progressive decentralization,” whereby 
founding teams and core developers give control over the DAO governance away to the community, 
encouraging  their  participation  and  ownership  (Walden  2020). Yet,  even  when  community  members 
can vote on several issues, most DAOs remain plutocratic or “ruled by the richest” since voting rights 
are allocated proportionally to token holdings.

The advent of the “Proof-of-Personhood” concept in 2017, enabling the verification of unique and sin-
gular  digital  identities  (Borge  et  al.  2017),  marked  a  pivotal  advancement  in  DAO  governance. This 
breakthrough established the foundation for “democratizing” blockchain systems, including DAOs. Con-
cretely, it facilitated the implementation of governance mechanisms like 1-person-1-vote, steering away 
from token-weighted systems and towards more equitable representation in decision-making process-
es (Siddarth et al. 2020). The PoH registry DApp, developed by the Kleros Cooperative and governed 
by the PoH DAO, was among the first to integrate a Proof-of-Personhood protocol. Launched in 2021, 
early communications, including posts on Kleros’ blog, highlighted the PoH DAO as “the first ever truly 
democratic  1-person-1-vote  governance  system  with  open  participation,”  marking  it  as  a  significant 
innovation  for  democracy's  future  (Ragosa  2021,  James  2021). The  PoH  DAO's  governance  model 
was notable  for allowing  registered  individuals,  recognized  as “singular  and unique,”  to directly vote 
on proposals (Human Improvement Proposals, or “HIPs”) or delegate their votes via a platform called 
Snapshot. This mechanism was not a creation of the DAO itself, but a feature of liquid democracy – 
a  fusion  of  direct  and  representative  democratic  elements  that  gained  popularity  over  recent  years 
(Blum & Zuber 2015). What the PoH DAO achieved, however, was implementing liquid democracy in 
a peer-to-peer network where individuals eligible to participate in governance could “prove their person-
hood” without depending on centralized entities like companies or governments for identity verification.

Although the governance structure of the PoH DAO was innovative, it struggled to maintain unity in its 
community. Over time, factions with conflicting goals emerged, leading to growing mistrust and division. 
This discord resulted in a majority vote to "fork," or split the project into two separate entities. The abil-
ity of blockchain communities to "exit" a system or "self-organize" and "fork" at a relatively low cost is 
often seen as a benefit of decentralized, non-coercive systems (De Filippi et al. 2022). However, we 
propose that in the PoH DAO's case, the decision to fork shouldn't automatically be viewed as positive 
or unavoidable. First, duplicating the PoH registry to be managed by different DAOs effectively under-
mines the idea and advantage of having a “singular decentralized registry of verified humans” that can 
be  integrated  with  other  DApps  requiring  strong  Sybil  resistance.  Second,  while  diversity  within  any 
community  is  inescapable,  strident  polarization  in  DAOs  can  be  avoided  or  minimized  by  designing 
better governance mechanisms. Therefore, we view the decision to “fork” as a culmination of an esca-

12

lating governance crisis, the underlying causes of which our research aimed to uncover. Inspired by the 
community’s sentiment that the PoH DAO was the “first democratic DAO on Ethereum,” we decided to 
look into modern democracies as a basis for our analysis. We tried to understand the extent to which 
the concepts and terminology typical of modern democracies could be used to describe the PoH DAO’s 
governance  dynamics.  Furthermore,  we  investigated  how  the  governance  design  of  the  PoH  DAO 
could have been influenced by the democratic ideal and best practices of modern democracies, which 
might have helped prevent the crisis and the subsequent decision to “fork.”

Analyzing the PoH DAO through the lens of modern democracies involves exploring the “essence” of 
democracy drawing from historical, philosophical, and political science perspectives. Throughout our 
analysis, we relied on idealized notions of the structure of modern democracies, rather than delving into 
the messy and complex reality that any real implementation of democracy necessarily entails. Democ-
racy, derived from the Ancient Greek “demos” (people) and “kratos” (rule), is commonly understood as 
governance by the people, for the people. Ancient Athens stands as the first recorded example of 'direct 
democracy,' where citizens themselves made governance decisions. Modern democracies, however, 
predominantly operate on a 'representative' basis, with governance executed by elected officials rather 
than direct public participation. The foundation of contemporary democratic systems is often linked to 
the American and French Revolutions of the 18th century, which marked a profound transformation in 
global political thought and governance structure. This shift was further propelled by two subsequent 
“waves of democratization”: the first occurring post-World War II and the second at the conclusion of the 
Cold War (Huntington 1991). Currently, just over 30% of the world’s countries are categorized as “fully 
democratic” (World Population Review n.d.).

Renowned American political theorist Robert A. Dahl (1989) posits that “democracy” is an ethical ide-
al that no modern state-nation can fully meet. Yet, scholars identify tangible components associated 
with different academic interpretations of democracy. From the “formal” perspective of liberal political 
theory, influenced by the writings of the American Founding Fathers, democracies are institutional ar-
rangements. Namely, a collection of governance mechanisms that seek to uphold certain governance 
principles. As  such,  modern  democracies  reflect  the  attributes  of  the  political  entities  they  oversee, 
namely nation-states. According to international standards, nation-states: (1) have a stable population, 
(2) control a defined territorial region, (3) govern with authority over their territory and population, and 
(4) possess the sovereignty to manage their external affairs without external interference, as outlined 
in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, Article 1. Modern democ-
racies, especially those in the Western liberal tradition, feature unique aspects within their institutional 
framework: (5) they are rule of law systems where the law is supreme, applied equally and transparently 
to all, (6) they acknowledge certain segments of the population as citizens endowed with both rights 
and responsibilities in governance, particularly the rights to vote in public elections and to seek office, 
(7) they are governed by a supreme law or constitution that outlines: (a) the state's core principles like 
justice, fairness, equality, and prosperity, often detailed in the constitution's preamble, (b) the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of its citizens, aimed at curtailing state power, encompassing civil, political, 
economic,  social, and  cultural  rights, (c) a tripartite  government  system – executive,  legislative,  and 
judiciary, to ensure checks and balances, (d) a predominantly representative democracy as the gover-
nance model, where the electorate's voice is mediated through freely and fairly elected representatives, 
as emphasized by the universal suffrage principle (Lijphart 1999).

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Adopting the “emancipatory perspectivist” view of critical theory scholars, “democracy” is seen not as 
a universal ethical ideal but as one deeply rooted in the history, reality, and identity of a people. This 
viewpoint introduces the concept of “deep democracy,” treating democracy as a “transformative ideal” 
that urges continuous and active efforts toward a democracy that is more sensitive to context (Green 
1999,  p.  9-10).  Democracy,  from  this  perspective,  serves  as  a  guiding  principle  to  “help  rehabilitate 
bases for trust that can overcome historically well-warranted suspicions by outlining effective processes 
of participatory democratic inquiry, and by displaying the merits of a dynamic, individual-transforming, 
community-rebuilding  ethic  of  democratic  mutual  commitment”  (p.  10).  In  “Deep  Democracy:  Com-
munity, Diversity, and Transformation,” Judith Green (1999) emphasizes the inevitability of diversity in 
contemporary society and argues that embracing “deep democracy” enables us to honor diversity while 
fostering unity, finding harmony between “individual growth” and “collective well-being” (p. 63). Green 
suggests practical mechanisms to enhance democracy, including “democratic education for growth,” 
“building  cross-difference  coalitions,”  “fostering  intelligent  communication  for  transformative  inquiry,” 
and  “ensuring  coordination  and  stability  for  long-term  initiatives”  (p.  55-93). These  strategies  aim  to 
evolve formal democratic systems into vibrant networks that support the collective prosperity of com-
munities.

While “formal” interpretations of democracy provide valuable insights into the events that took place 
at the PoH DAO, “emancipatory perspectivists” offer ideas on how the crisis might have been averted. 
However, we should approach this with caution. Transitioning from legal-political systems like those of 
nation-state democracies to techno-political systems such as DAOs is not straightforward. The com-
parison  of  blockchain  systems  to  constitutional  democracies,  while  not  new  (Alston  2019),  requires 
careful consideration. DAOs have been touted as vehicles for "new forms of democracy" that promise 
stability, responsiveness  to  citizen  needs,  and  the  utilization  of collective  expertise  for  higher-quality 
decision-making (Merkle 2016). Nonetheless, replicating the democratic ideals and structures of tradi-
tional systems directly within DAOs is not feasible. DAOs necessitate a tailored approach, considering 
the  unique  aspects  of  blockchain  technology  and  governance  challenges.  Conversely,  even  though 
modern democracies, particularly Western liberal democracies, may seem like more useful models for 
understanding DAO governance compared to autocratic systems, they come with their own set of is-
sues. There is a wealth of literature, particularly in various strands of critical theory, that highlights how 
economic and social disparities can skew political power dynamics in democratic nation-states, leading 
to inadequate representation or outright marginalization of minority voices. Despite these challenges, 
exploring how to build socio-technological systems with “democracy in mind” remains an important nor-
mative task, aiming to create improved systems (Schneider 2024).

Our research suggests that although the PoH DAO was presented as democratic, it was missing crucial 
democratic governance mechanisms to manage its crisis effectively. Before we embarked on gathering 
detailed  primary  data,  the  theoretical  framework  outlined  previously  guided  our  initial  insights.  From 
a descriptive standpoint, the governance of the PoH DAO differs significantly from traditional modern 
nation-state  democracies:  it  is  not  tied  to  physical  geography,  lacks  a  government  enforced  by  the 
monopoly on violence, and does not serve a permanent population with legally enshrined rights and 
freedoms.  Nevertheless,  the  protocols,  smart  contracts  underpinning  the  PoH  DApp,  and  the  deci-
sion-making platforms online, delineate the digital “boundaries” of the DAO's domain. The PoH registry 
members (akin to “citizens”) had certain rights and permissions, such as the ability to debate and vote 
on HIPs. Some of these HIPs, once approved, were integrated into the smart contracts, enabling au-
tomatic enforcement of decisions, and enacting a novel form of “executive power.” The adjudication of 

14

disputes by the Kleros’ Humanity Court resembled the judicial branch, and the Mission Board's role in 
interpreting governance rules paralleled the judicial system’s interpretative functions in nation-states. 
The process established for adopting HIPs, essentially a “rule on how to make rules,” reflects principles 
found in state constitutions. Despite their differences, it seemed evident that there were notable paral-
lels between the governance structures of modern nation-state democracies and the PoH DAO.

Normatively,  from  a  “deep  democracy”  perspective,  the  PoH  DAO's  adoption  of  a  1-person-1-vote 
system was a positive step but insufficient for achieving substantive democracy. This superficial dem-
ocratic approach was inadequate in addressing the community’s escalating polarization. A governance 
model fostering unity and diversity requires a deeper appreciation of the community's history, realities, 
and identities. Drawing on Judith Green's insights (1999) and empirical best practices of “formal” mod-
ern democracies, potential governance mechanisms to promote unity and diversity may comprise:

1.  Crafting a foundational document akin to a “constitution” that articulates the PoH project's pur-

pose and shared values. 

2.  Creating  designated  spaces  for  educating  members  about  blockchain  technology,  democratic 

practices, and the PoH DAO's specific objectives.

3.  Encouraging the development of cross-boundary coalitions within the DAO, transcending differ-

ences in technical knowledge, geographic location, and economic background.

4.  Establish platforms or channels for open, respectful, and informed discourse where members 
can engage in democratic transformative inquiry. This involves creating a safe space for debate, 
discussion, and exchanging ideas, where all voices are heard and considered.

5.  Building frameworks for effective collaboration and enduring commitment to transformative goals, 
which includes defining clear governance roles, transparent decision-making, and methods for 
tracking and reviewing progress and accountability. Setting and periodically revisiting long-term 
objectives and strategies is also crucial.

Our  descriptive  and  normative  intuitions,  paired  with  our  research  questions,  assumptions,  and  hy-
pothesis, guided the analysis of observational and interview data as well as the timeline of events and 
drafting of research findings detailed in the rest of the report.

15

II. The Findings

Here, we present the results of our study on the development of the PoH DAO’s governance, the factors 
leading to its crisis, and the eventual decision to “fork.” Our findings draw upon our theoretical under-
standing of DAOs and “formal” and “deep” democracy perspectives, alongside a detailed timeline of 
events introduced in the next section.

1. Constituting a Democracy

The majority of modern democracies resulted from peaceful or armed revolutions led by dissatisfied 
parts  of  the  population,  which,  at  an  earlier  or  later  stage,  adopted  a  constitution  or  supreme  law. 
This section will explore how the PoH DAO was “constituted” and which aspects of its early governance 
design may have contributed to the crisis.

1.a. Incomplete Early Governance Design

Key takeaway: The PoH DAO was initiated as a pioneering venture in liquid democracy gov-
ernance,  endowed  with  a  bold  mission  and  a  suite  of  off-chain  governance  instruments  for 
proposing, voting on, and implementing decisions on-chain. Despite its innovative approach, it 
was missing key governance mechanisms. This oversight in the PoH DAO’s initial governance 
framework led to internal fragmentation, as it did not offer explicit tools or procedures for re-
solving disputes and achieving consensus within the community.

The initial factor leading to the PoH DAO governance crisis stemmed from the nascent stages' incom-
plete governance structures. This deficiency facilitated the consolidation of fragmentation, mistrust, and 
conflict within the community, as there were no clear mechanisms in place for reconciliation. Critical 
omissions included a consensus on the PoH DAO's animating purpose and effective conflict mitigation 
and resolution mechanisms (Alston 2022). In democratic lingo, the PoH DAO failed to adopt a “constitu-
tion” that could have served as a supreme law guiding its governance. These governance mechanisms, 
had they been included, might have helped prevent the escalation of misalignment and mistrust within 
the community.

a.  The PoH DAO launched as an innovative liquid democracy governance experiment with an 
ambitious mandate and a suite of off-chain governance mechanisms and tools. The PoH 
DAO was the first one in the Ethereum ecosystem to give one vote to each participant, which 
they  could  cast  directly  or  delegate  to  other  community  members.  The  DAO  community  was 
empowered to influence major governance aspects: the policies of the PoH registry DApp, the 
rules and parameters governing the UBI contract, and the distribution of 4,000,000 UBI tokens 
earmarked for the DAO’s operational expenses. Governance within the PoH DAO was designed 
to occur predominantly off-chain. This approach meant that discussions and voting on proposals 
took place on digital platforms outside the blockchain, with the outcomes later implemented into 
the protocol or smart contracts by developers. This method contrasts with on-chain governance 
systems, where votes are executed and recorded directly on the blockchain. To facilitate its gov-
ernance processes, the PoH DAO introduced several platforms: a governance forum open to all 
(not just PoH registry DApp members) for submitting and deliberating on HIPs; a Snapshot page 
exclusive  to  individuals  registered  in  the  PoH  registry  DApp  for  off-chain  voting  on  HIPs;  and 

16

a Kleros governor contract designed to enact Snapshot votes into tangible changes within the 
relevant smart contracts. This comprehensive framework aimed to democratize decision-making 
and foster a participatory governance culture within the PoH DAO community.

b.  This  initial  governance  setup  appeared  adequate  to  some.  Proponents  of  minimal  gover-
nance in blockchain systems might view the PoH DAO's initial governance design as adequate 
(Ehrsam 2020). Some interviewees suggested that the setup was intended to foster communi-
ty-led, democratic development of legitimate governance structures over time. Indeed, through-
out 2021 and 2022, the community enacted over 70 HIPs, signaling active engagement in gov-
ernance.

c.  However, the PoH DAO lacked two essential components that could have prevented or 

mitigated the community's eventual conflicts, which proved to be irreconcilable.

i. In “Governance as Conflict,” Eric Alston (2022) emphasizes the importance of implement-
ing mechanisms within a DAO to address conflicts, highlighting that DAOs, as vehicles of 
collective  action  among  diverse  groups,  face  inherent  challenges. The  costs  associated 
with collective action necessitate a resilient organizational design for DAOs, which should 
encompass  a  consensus  on  the  animating  purpose  driving  the  organization,  as  well  as 
strategies for mitigating and resolving potential future disputes. The purpose of an organi-
zation greatly defines its optimal governance structure. Still, disagreements in DAOs might 
arise from divergent preferences in pursuing the animating purpose, or from violations of 
established norms by members, including those in decision-making positions. Given the 
inherent nature of collective action, which includes delegating decision-making authority to 
some extent, having strategies both to prevent conflicts (ex-ante measures) and to resolve 
them when they occur (ex-post measures) is essential (Alston 2022).

ii. The PoH DAO failed to agree on a clear animating purpose from the outset, which grad-
ually led to the emergence of two significant points of tension over time.

a) On one side, there was significant debate regarding the direction of governance 
for the PoH registry. The crux of this disagreement centered on the content and exe-
cution of the rules designed to prevent fraudulent entries of “Sybils.” For some, these 
rules were required to maintain the PoH registry's integrity. To others, they were un-
fairly penalizing honest mistakes. Penalization, which involved keeping the user’s se-
curity deposit, was especially costly for those coming from less developed countries. 
Another aspect under discussion was whether the PoH registry's primary objective 
was to integrate with other DApps or to focus on strengthening its initial integration, 
the Universal Basic Income (UBI) smart contract. The absence of a formal consensus 
led to increasing polarization within the community. A notable post on the PoH DAO 
governance forum in July 2022 articulated this division: “Parts of the community [are] 
focusing on UBI, others on DApp integrations, and others on the security of the regis-
try. I believe that a statement of principles from the [Mission Board] would set a prec-
edent of reconciliation and direction for the future. What do we stand for? What do we 
want as a protocol? What does success look like?” This call for clarity highlighted the 
deepening divide and the urgent need for a unifying statement of principles to guide 
the community's efforts and reconcile differing priorities.

17

b) On the other hand, there was significant tension surrounding the governance of 
the PoH DAO itself. A key area of contention emerged over the nature and pace of 
decentralization from the founding team to the community. Although the community 
members were ostensibly granted voting rights on governance matters, the specifics 
of these powers were not clearly defined. There was ambiguity regarding whether the 
community could debate or alter certain technical aspects of the PoH registry DApp 
—  such  as  changing  the  arbitrator  for  the  PoH  registry  —  or  if  some  tasks  should 
remain with the founding team or be assigned to specially qualified individuals. This 
ambiguity extended to the ownership and management rights over the PoH DAO’s 
communication channels, including Telegram groups, and to the persons responsible 
for implementing the community’s decisions on-chain. This lack of clarity led to de-
bates over who should have the authority to make certain decisions and how these 
decisions should be executed, reflecting deeper questions about the extent of decen-
tralization and community involvement in the DAO’s operations.

iii. Preventative, or ex-ante, mechanisms for avoiding disputes could involve establishing 
a detailed project roadmap, outlining elements such as the project's vision and objectives, 
key milestones, timelines, and essential deliverables. While decentralizing decision-mak-
ing power from the founding team to the community was set up to be “progressive,” the 
DAO  did  not  propose  any  clear  and  transparent  mechanisms  for  addressing  abuses  of 
power potentially conducted by the partnering organizations. This proactive clarity could 
have aligned community expectations and efforts, thereby minimizing conflict potential.

d.  The incomplete governance design at the launch not only nurtured division but also led 
to the creation of implicit power structures, a phenomenon akin to the "tyranny of struc-
turelessness."

i. The idea of the “tyranny of structurelessness” was introduced in a speech (1970) and 
subsequent essay (1972) by Jo Freeman, who identified some of the pitfalls experienced 
by the feminist movement aiming to resist the overstructuredness and institutional hierar-
chies of traditional society. This concept highlights how the absence of formal structures 
can lead to unacknowledged hierarchies and concentrations of power, as some individuals 
or groups may assume control or influence by default. This situation can undermine the 
principles of equity and inclusivity, as decisions tend to be made by those who navigate 
the informal networks most effectively, rather than through a transparent and democratic 
process. According to Freeman, structurelessness can work only if the group of people it 
applies is relatively small and homogenous, strongly aligned on a specific task at hand, 
communicates frequently, and has a low level of specialized skills requirements. This con-
cept is particularly powerful in the context of Internet communities (Schneider 2021) and 
blockchain-based  systems  (Goldberg  2023).  In  particular,  DAOs  attempt  to  decentralize 
governance  by  empowering  community  ownership  and  participation.  When  governance 
structures are not explicitly designed ex-ante, implicit structures inevitably emerge, which 
may  erode  DAOs’  decentralizing  spirit  by  empowering  certain  groups  more  than  others, 
including founding teams or token holders.

ii.  Initially,  the  PoH  DAO  lacked  the  characteristics  Freeman  identified  as  necessary  for 
a structureless organization to function effectively:

18

a) The community grew rapidly and became quite heterogeneous. An average of 744 
humans per month became a part of the PoH registry. At the same time, throughout 
2021, community members created more than ten Telegram groups in different lan-
guages to deliberate on topics concerning the PoH registry, the UBI token, and the 
PoH DAO. 

b) Given the size and diversity of the community as a whole, frequent and construc-
tive communication amongst everyone became difficult very fast. Considering that the 
PoH registry, at its core, was a sophisticated technical project, the implementation of 
many tasks and decisions passed by the PoH DAO relied on a small subgroup with 
highly specialized technical abilities.

iii. As a result, implicit power structures emerged in the PoH DAO, which were hard to undo 
later  and  encouraged  a  lot  of  skepticism  among  different  parts  of  the  community.  Nota-
bly, the PoH DAO's relative structurelessness consolidated the influence of the partnering 
organizations,  Kleros  Cooperative  and  Democracy  Earth  Foundation,  and  their  leaders, 
Clément Lesaege and Santiago Siri. For example, attempts to institute more explicit gov-
ernance  processes,  such  as  recruiting  “workers  for  the  DAO”  (HIP  2  and  HIP  3),  were 
never implemented. Efforts to create governance bodies such as the Mission Board (HIP 7) 
assigned Kleros Cooperative and DEF representatives as interim members. The differing 
opinions of these organizations and their leading figures turned into points of reference for 
the community at large and contributed to fragmentation.

1.b. Two Partnering Organizations with Colliding Expectations

Key takeaway: Despite initially collaborating for mutual benefit, the two organizations involved in the 

launch  of  PoH  and  UBI  (Kleros  Cooperative  and  Democracy  Earth  Foundation)  had  vastly  different, 

and at times colliding, expectations for the PoH project as a whole. These expectations partially derived 

from the diverse backgrounds and visions each organization pursued independently.

Another factor we identified that contributed to the PoH DAO governance crisis was linked to the two 
organizations  involved  in  launching  the  PoH  and  UBI  projects:  Kleros  Cooperative  and  Democracy 
Earth Foundation (DEF). While initially perceiving the collaboration as mutually beneficial, Kleros Coop-
erative’s CTO, Clément Lesaege, and DEF’s founder, Santiago Siri, soon started disagreeing over the 
future direction of the PoH registry and governance approaches for the PoH DAO. Their disagreement 
was partly grounded in the different nature of their organizations. The colliding expectations of Clément 
Lesaege and Santiago Siri, as well as between other Kleros community members and DEF affiliates, 
soon became points of reference for other members of the PoH DAO and laid the ground for the future 
polarization of the community.

a.  The PoH and UBI projects were launched by two collaborating organizations. The Kleros 
Cooperative was responsible for developing the PoH registry smart contract and web application, 
whereas the UBI smart contract resulted from a joint effort between DEF and Kleros Cooperative, 
bringing to life an idea initially proposed by DEF. Both organizations had been actively involved in 
the discussions around the PoH project and its promotion since its launch in March 2021. Kleros 
Cooperative and DEF had been devoted to “blockchain technology for social good,” meaning its 

19

 
application beyond financial transactions, to areas such as dispute resolution, decision-making, 
and  wealth  redistribution. According  to  Clément  Lesaege’s  statement  (Lesaege  2022),  Kleros 
Cooperative developed the concept of a Sybil-resistant decentralized registry of humans based 
on webs of trust, reverse Turing tests, and decentralized dispute resolution. The idea was in-
spired by Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin’s posts about “hard problems in cryptocurrency” 
(Buterin 2014). DEF’s 2017 white paper presented the idea of the distribution of tokens in a Uni-
versal Basic Income (UBI) fashion to verified human identities validated through a decentralized 
“Proof of Identity” protocol (Democracy Earth 2017). In 2019, DEF founder Santiago Siri joined 
the  Proof  of  Humanity Telegram  group  created  by  the  Kleros  Cooperative,  where  enthusiasts 
exchanged ideas about digital identity and a Sybil-resistant identity registry. A paper published 
in 2020 co-authored by Santiago Siri (Siddarth et. al 2020) mentioned Kleros’ Proof of Humanity 
concept among other examples of Sybil-resistant protocols. Ultimately, Kleros Cooperative and 
DEF decided to collaborate and launch the Proof of Humanity registry with UBI as the registry’s 
first use case and incentive mechanism. According to the PoH and UBI GitHub repositories, the 
Kleros Cooperative’s team, under the leadership of the CTO Clément Lesaege, was responsible 
for designing and engineering the PoH smart contract. The UBI smart contract was developed 
under the leadership of DEF founder Santiago Siri and with assistance from some Kleros Coop-
erative’s team members. In March 2021, the PoH web app went live, with both Kleros and DEF 
being featured on the home page as “trusted parties” and Clément Lesaege and Santiago Siri 
posting about the project on their Twitter accounts. The PoH DAO was announced a month later 
(James 2021), giving the community of registered users control of the policy of the PoH registry 
and the UBI token issuance. This arrangement continued until July 2021, when a separate UBI 
DAO was formed (HIP 22).

Figure 1. Institutional ecosystem behind the launch of the PoH and UBI projects

b.  The initial collaboration was based on a perceived mutual benefit. According to our inter-
viewees, launching the UBI smart contract as the PoH registry’s first use case was perceived as 
mutually beneficial for the project to gain traction and be adopted. The PoH registry used UBI 
as an economic incentive for users to join, and in return, UBI benefited from the Sybil-resistant 
mechanisms of the registry to ensure its fair distribution among “unique and singular” individuals. 
While the Kleros Cooperative team appears to have provided most of the engineering and soft-

20

ware development resources, DEF founder Santiago helped to onboard many users to the PoH 
registry, increasing its popularity.

c.  Yet,  the  nature,  values,  and  trajectories  of  the  organizations  were  not  entirely  similar. 
While Kleros Cooperative and DEF were dedicated to working in the realm of “blockchain for so-
cial good” and applying blockchain technology beyond financial transactions, the organizations 
otherwise exhibited relatively different profiles.

i. Kleros is an open source online dispute resolution protocol which uses blockchain and 
crowdsourcing  to  adjudicate  disputes. According  to  its  website,  the  work  on  the  project 
began in 2017 by French co-founder and CTO Clément Lesaege and Argentine co-founder 
and CEO Federico Ast. Described as an open-source “justice protocol,” the project’s vision 
is to democratize access to justice in the digital world through a decentralized court system 
for the Internet Age. The project is managed by the Coopérative Kleros (Société Coopéra-
tive d’Intérêt Collectif (SCIC)), incorporated in France—a commercial company designed 
with a social purpose and collective interest, where anyone can become a stakeholder by 
submitting an application form. As of November 2022, the Kleros Cooperative team had 
over 20 people worldwide with different skill sets. The team is responsible for developing 
the Kleros Court system, which works as a decentralized third party to arbitrate disputes 
in every kind of contract, where every step of the arbitration process (securing evidence, 
selecting jurors, etc.) is fully automated. Beyond the Kleros Court, the broader ecosystem 
of applications developed by the Kleros Cooperative includes other products such as: Es-
crow, Curate, Linguo, Dispute Resolver, and, of course, Proof of Humanity.

ii. DEF is an NGO historically rooted in political activism in Argentina and powered by the 
work  of  many  volunteers,  championing  the  idea  of  decentralized  digital  democracy  and 
wealth redistribution. The DEF’s website indicates that it was founded in 2015 by Argen-
tine “code” leader Santiago Siri, Italian “voice” leader Pia Mancini, and American “finance” 
leader Herb Stephens. According to its white paper (Democracy Earth 2017), DEF is an 
organization building free, open-source software for incorruptible blockchain-based deci-
sion-making for organizations of all kinds and sizes. The project’s vision is to give every-
one, everywhere, the tools to contribute to a borderless democracy. DEF is a 501(c)3 not-
for-profit foundation in California, United States, and has been backed by Silicon Valley Y 
Combinator and Fast Forward accelerators. Beyond its legal personhood, DEF identified 
itself as a “movement” that originated in Argentina when DemocracyOS founders Santia-
go Siri and Pia Mancini started the NET political party (Partido de la Red). By 2018, DEF 
comprised approximately 10 developers and “hacktivists” from different parts of the world 
and a vast network of volunteers, including DEF’s Ambassadors. Since its inception, DEF 
has been involved in at least four digital decision-making pilots worldwide, engaging dif-
ferent stakeholders such as civil society organizations, a blockchain startup, and elected 
members of parliament in the State of Colorado, United States (Cossar & Berman 2020). 
After the launch of the UBI smart contract, DEF developed a DApp for users to keep ETH 
or DAI in their Humanitarian Smart Contract Vaults and help burn UBI tokens using yield.

d.  Over time, the leaders and the members of the two organizations began disagreeing, and 
their  views  were  adopted  by  other  PoH  DAO  members.  During  our  interviews,  many  PoH 
DAO  members  reflected  on  how  Clément  Lesaege  and  Santiago  Siri  became,  either  willingly 

21

or inadvertently, points of reference for two factions within the community: the Kleros Cooper-
ative or Kleros side and the DEF or UBI side. Both sides seemed to agree that the PoH DAO 
was a unique experiment on democratic decision-making. Yet, members affiliated with the DEF 
or UBI side considered the need for the community to actively develop governance rules as a 
virtuous and positive aspect. In contrast, some members of the Kleros community side saw this 
as a hindrance to other technical priorities, such as integrating the PoH registry with use cases 
other than UBI. These factions also disagreed about the rules and policies of the PoH registry, 
with  Kleros  Cooperative  affiliated  members  mostly  defending  the  existing  rules  as  necessary 
for maintaining the registry’s integrity and the DEF or UBI side considering them unnecessarily 
harsh and prone to punishing users’ honest mistakes.

2. Citizenship and The Demos

Modern democracies, structured around nation-states, are characterized by the presence of a popu-
lation and citizens—individuals endowed with the rights and obligations to participate in governance. 
These citizens are also known as the demos. In the context of the PoH DAO, examining the charac-
teristics of its demos is crucial, as these attributes may have contributed to the community's fragmen-
tation over time. This section will delve into the nuances of the PoH DAO’s demos, exploring how their 
diversity, engagement levels, and varying perspectives on governance and the project’s direction have 
influenced the evolving dynamics within the community.

2.a. Heterogeneous Member Backgrounds and Interests

Key  takeaway:  PoH  DAO  members  actively  participating  in  deliberations  came  from  varied 
backgrounds and had very different interests in the project, which consolidated into polarized 
governance views.

A significant factor in the PoH DAO governance crisis was linked to the community members’ heteroge-
neous backgrounds and interests. This issue became more and more apparent as the community grew 
in size. While the rules for becoming a member of the PoH registry were clear, participation in the PoH 
DAO was not subject to strictly defined membership rules. Voting on Snapshot was only available for 
“unique and singular humans” registered in the PoH registry. Yet, participation in other governance tools 
and platforms used for deliberation was de facto open to anyone interested in the project (e.g. Telegram 
chats). This open participation policy attracted a wide range of individuals to the project, each with very 
different interests in the project to perspectives on the PoH DAO governance and the management of 
the PoH registry. This melting pot of backgrounds and interests, combined with the conflicting visions 
articulated by leaders from Kleros community and DEF/UBI and the initial inadequacies in governance 
structure, led to an increasing polarization of viewpoints within the community.

a.  Membership rules in the PoH DAO were not clear or strict, and deliberation was de fac-
to open to anyone interested. The rules for joining the PoH registry were clear, explicit, and 
publicized in the web DApp and multiple Kleros blog posts (Ragosa & Ast 2021). One had to 
be a ‘human’ and submit personal information and biometric data in video and picture formats. 
However, the rules for joining the PoH DAO were less clearly and strictly defined. In theory, the 
PoH registry members were also PoH DAO members. They are the only ones allowed to vote on 
governance issues on the PoH Snapshot page under a 1-person-1-vote system. Yet, in practice, 

22

participation in deliberation on governance issues across different tools and platforms is open to 
anyone interested. For instance, registration in the PoH registry was not a prerequisite for post-
ing on the governance forum or joining the open PoH DAO Telegram groups. In fact, our inter-
viewees stressed that only a tiny percentage of humans registered in the PoH registry participate 
in the PoH DAO governance: “So many people registered. Sadly, they don’t get involved.”

b.  The PoH DAO active members came from different backgrounds and were interested in very 

different aspects of the project.

i. There were two important differences in backgrounds among the PoH DAO active par-
ticipants:

a) Some had high-level technical skills, while others had no prior experience with the 
blockchain or Web3 industry. 

b) A  critical  mass  of  the  most  active  PoH  DAO  members  spoke  only  Spanish  and 
identified as Argentinean or from a neighboring Latin American country. The signifi-
cance of this demographic group was reflected, for example, in the PoH DAO “official 
communications channels” (HIP 50), which were in English and Spanish, and in the 
fact that humans could pronounce the phrase in the video proof in Spanish (HIP 42).

ii. The motivations for participating in the PoH DAO varied, and included at least the fol-
lowing ones:

a) Many members were particularly focused on discussions concerning the UBI token 
exchange and its price, as they reportedly joined the PoH registry primarily to accu-
mulate UBI and secure a new source of income.

b) Others were drawn to the project with the aim of understanding and contributing to 
the technical development of the Sybil-resistant decentralized registry of humans, the 
economics of the UBI token, or both.

c) Another community faction reports having been inspired to join by Santiago Siri’s 
background as the founder of the Argentine political “Net Party” and his ideals about 
expanding digital democracy.

d)  Some  others  joined  due  to  their  professional  or  internship  experiences  with  the 
Kleros Cooperative, the organization behind the founding of the PoH project.

c.  Rather than achieving a harmonious diversity, the varied backgrounds and interests of the mem-
bers coalesced into polarized viewpoints. Key disagreements among the community were often 
approached  with  a  “convex”  mindset,  indicating  a  tendency  towards  extreme  positions  rather 
than seeking middle ground or compromise.

23

2.b. Division of the Minds and Perceptions about Factions

Key takeaway: Community members perceived the PoH DAO as a split between two opposing 
factions and this perception was openly expressed on various platforms and forums. This pub-
lic portrayal of the community as deeply polarized ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
reinforcing perceptions, attitudes, and actions of mistrust toward the “other” side.

Another  factor  that  furthered  the  PoH  DAO  governance  crisis  concerned  the  perceptions  about  the 
existing warring factions. Firstly, community members perceived the DAO as a split between two op-
posing factions and expressed it publicly on various platforms and forums. Our observations led us to 
believe that the public perception of the community as deeply polarized ultimately became a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy, reinforcing attitudes and actions of mistrust towards the opposing faction, further exacer-
bating polarization. Secondly, the majority of the PoH DAO community seemed to have agreed on the 
existence of two factions. Yet, members disagreed on every other aspect of the perceived polarization. 
Finally, the more conciliatory and neutral voices (those who did not publicly identify with one or another 
faction) did not dominate the political debate, since “being neutral” was considered “untrustworthy” by 
the polarized majority.

a.  Community members perceived the PoH DAO as a split between two opposing factions 
and expressed it publicly on platforms and forums, which led to further polarization and 
confrontational attitudes and actions. This dynamic exemplifies the concept of “self-fulfilling 
misperceptions of public polarization,” where a community is depicted in various media outlets as 
being excessively divided. This portrayal can, in turn, amplify attitudes and behaviors of dislike 
and mistrust towards the "other" group. (Ahler 2014). Despite the existence of genuine disagree-
ments within the community, the narrative of an “us versus them” on PoH DAO Telegram groups, 
Twitter threads, and the governance forum ultimately increased the antagonism.

b.  Community members agreed on the existence of two competing factions but disagreed on 
all other aspects of the perceived polarization. The disagreement manifested itself regarding: 

i. Belonging to a faction:

a) Most members actively involved in the governance of the PoH DAO identified with 
one or another faction, at least some point in time.

b) Yet,  a  relative  minority  of  those  actively  involved  in  governance  identified  them-
selves as “neutral” or not aligning with either side.

ii. Defining the factions descriptively:

a)  Some  believed  the  partnering  organizations  played  a  significant  role  in  shaping 
two  distinctive  factions:  “Kleros  vs.  UBI/Democracy  Earth,”  and  “Clément  Lesaege 
vs. Santiago Siri.” Within this group, some perceived one clear faction against a less 
organized opposing side—“Kleros vs. Anti-Kleros,” “Kleros vs. The Rest.” Others ar-
gued that as mistrust grew towards the leaders of each partnering organization, Clem-
ent and Santiago, cohesion within each faction started to break down.

24

b) Other members thought the factions were not correlated to the partnering organi-
zations but to different expectations about the PoH project:

i.  Especially  members  affiliated  with  the  Kleros  Cooperative,  expressed  that  the 
factions disagreed about the priorities for the PoH project (e.g., “Security and Syb-
il-Resistance vs. Inclusion and UBI,” “Sybil-resistance vs. Democratic Excellence,” 
“Economic and Technical Security vs. Community Ownership.”

ii.  Members  affiliated  with  DEF/UBI  or  simply  self-perceived  as  “anti-Kleros”  re-
jected that distinction. For them, the divide was caused by approaches to the PoH 
registry, where the Kleros Cooperative side would defend very harsh rules for ac-
cepting  submitted  profiles  into  the  registry,  penalizing  honest  mistakes  made  by 
users and not having a significant impact in deterring real Sybils such as duplicates 
or bots.

c) Another group argued the divide was caused by the members’ backgrounds: 

i. Their technical expertise: “Technical People vs. Non-Technical People” 

ii. Their nationality: “English Speakers vs. Spanish Speakers,” “Latinamericans vs. 
Non-Latinamerican,” and “Argentinians vs. Non-Argentinians” 

iii. Their interests in the project: “People who joined to get free money vs. People 
who joined for reasons other than the free money.” 

iii. Defining the factions normatively: 

a) Most neutral members thought each side had an equal moral standing and some-
thing valid to say. 

b) Yet, most polarized members regarded one side as the morally superior or factually 
correct one: “More robotic side vs. More human,” “Stupid vs. Non-stupid,” “Malicious 
vs. Non-malicious,” “Pragmatists vs. Idealists,” “Focuses on facts vs. Focuses on feel-
ings,”  “Dictatorial  and  anti-democratic  vs.  Defending  democratic  views  and  ideals,” 
“Values creating a successful protocol vs. Values power.”

iv. Differing views on the ability to reconcile factions:

a) A minority of mostly neutrals thought the factions’ views were not irreconcilable. In 
fact, they contended that all the parties needed each other for the project to succeed. 
They believed the problem was not that each faction held irreconcilable views but that 
they attacked each other, engaging in continuous hostility, and failing to communicate 
their views properly and work together.

b)  Most  polarized  members  thought  the  factions’  views  were  irreconcilable,  either 
because  they  simply  looked  at  things  differently  or  because  the  other  faction  was 
malicious and held factually wrong views.

25

v. Members' views on how the PoH DAO governance crisis should have been addressed:

a)  Some  members  who  self-identified  with  the  Kleros  community  side  thought  that 
encouraging individuals from other geographic areas to join and participate in gover-
nance could break the two-faction perceived division.

b) Other members, also self-identified with the Kleros community side, argued that 
the  solution  was  to  secure  more  integrations  for  the  PoH  registry  other  than  UBI, 
which would result in a wider variety of expectations about the project.

c) Another group, mostly anti-Kleros leaning, advocated for reducing Kleros Cooper-
ative’s influence on the PoH DAO governance, including by removing some members 
from the Mission Board or from the moderation and ownership of the most popular 
PoH DAO Telegram groups.

d) A  Kleros  Cooperative  affiliated  member  proposed  creating  sub-DAOs  within  the 
main PoH DAO to focus on different governance tasks such as dealing with integra-
tions versus dealing with community management.

e)  Finally,  community  members  agreed  that  the  desired  path  was  forking  the  PoH 
DAO. A decision in favor of a “peaceful fork” was adopted on 6 November 2022 with 
372 votes (78.65%) against 101 votes (21.35%).

c.  The more conciliatory and neutral voices did not dominate the political debate since “be-
ing neutral” was perceived as untrustworthy. Not all members of the PoH DAO perceived 
themselves as part of one or another faction, nor did they think the factions’ views were irrec-
oncilable. Yet, their views were not welcomed by the bulk of the active community and progres-
sively lost strength: “When these problems between the two sides started to arise, I tried to take 
a middle ground, but the community took it as an attack on each side.” As a result, individuals 
who attempted to bridge the gap or offer compromise found themselves marginalized unless they 
aligned unequivocally with one faction or the other, contributing to further community polarization.

3. Political Deliberation

All modern democracies aim to promote the citizens’ participation in governance, including by running 
for  office,  voting  for  representatives,  and  engaging  in  political  deliberation.  To  ensure  citizens’  par-
ticipation,  modern  democracies  install  proper  governance  mechanisms  and  foster  a  culture  of  civic 
engagement. In this section, we will analyze how political deliberation took place within the PoH DAO, 
and which aspects of it may have reinforced the irreconcilable divide instead of a diverse and peaceful 
coexistence.

3.a. Uncompromising or “Convex” Deliberation Mindset

Key  takeaway:  Many  issues  under  debate  about  the  PoH  registry  and  the  PoH  DAO  were 
framed as irreconcilable tradeoffs and addressed with a confrontational and uncompromising 
mentality. This prevented factions from finding common ground.

26

Another  factor  contributing  to  the  PoH  DAO  governance  crisis  involved  how  disagreements  among 
community members were framed. As the community expanded, the management of the PoH registry 
and  the  governance  of  the  PoH  DAO  increasingly  became  characterized  as  dilemmas  or  zero-sum 
choices between two conflicting and exclusive solutions. One of our interviewees pointed out that this 
framing stemmed from a “convex” decision-making mentality, more confrontational and uncompromis-
ing (Buterin 2022). Below are some of the disagreements over which the PoH DAO community began 
to split into two relatively defined sides.

a.  Several conversations revolved around the PoH registry. While there have been many, be-

low are some of the most salient points of disagreement:

i.  The  PoH  registry’s  profile  submission  policy:  The  PoH  web  app  includes  a  webpage 
specifying the steps and requirements to join the PoH registry.

a) Some members of the PoH DAO community advocated for making the rules more 
“inclusive”. To make the registry available for lower-income people, some discussed 
denominating the security deposit in a variable ETH value or a fixed value of a less 
volatile cryptocurrency. A proposal (HIP 41) was adopted allowing users to verbally 
confirm their Ethereum public address through video submission, making registration 
accessible  for  people  with  movement  or  visual  impairment. Another  proposal  (HIP 
42) was adopted for individuals to say the phrase required in the video submission in 
Spanish. The community also discussed the concept of family members’ accounts, 
whether these were desirable, and how these should be managed. 

b)  Members,  mostly  affiliated  with  the  Kleros  Cooperative  side,  staunchly  opposed 
some or most of these initiatives arguing that they could “threaten the Sybil-resistance 
of the registry and make it less secure.”

ii. The  PoH  registry's  challenge  policy: The  PoH  web  app  also  stipulated  procedures  to 
challenge profiles submitted to the PoH registry.

a)  Some  PoH  DAO  members  contended  that  the  challenge  policy  was  not  fair  nor 
compassionate  enough  towards  submitters  making  “honest  mistakes.”  A  proposal 
(HIP 8) accepted 352 pixels as the minimum dimension in video submissions. The 
motivation for the proposal was that many submitters were being challenged for in-
advertently uploading videos smaller than the required 360 pixels, a consequence of 
exporting them from WhatsApp. Another example was an adopted proposal (HIP 27) 
to accept submissions with one character mistake in the Ethereum address displayed 
in the video proof. 

b) While these proposals received comparatively more support than the ones men-
tioned above, some of the same members antagonized them, arguing that they “would 
make the registry less secure.”

iii. Sybil attacks against the PoH registry: Sybil attacks refer to creating and utilizing “fake 
virtual personas” to undermine or exert more influence in a given system. These attacks 
are  particularly  severe  when  launched  on  peer-to-peer  identity  networks  or  DApps. The 
PoH registry has been said to suffer from “profile farming” and “puppeteering,” meaning 
malicious actors effectively controlled the account of one or more registered humans to, for 

27

example, accrue more UBI or gain more voting power. Most community members agreed 
that  these  Sybils  were  harmful  and  undesirable,  but  they  disagreed  on  the  best  way  to 
address them.

a) For some, usually self-identified with the Kleros Cooperative side, the solution was 
to change the PoH registry profile submission rules and explicitly forbid Sybils (HIP 
55) (HIP 62).

b)  For  others,  self-identified  with  the  DEF/UBI  or  anti-Kleros  side,  these  initiatives 
were seen as inadvertently penalizing non-malicious actors and potentially leading to 
a state of hyper-litigiousness.

iv. Dishonest behavior in the PoH registry: “Dishonest behavior” in the PoH registry was 
not necessarily a Sybil attack but a situation where a legitimate or “real” virtual persona 
behaved contrary to what is expected from their role for their own benefit. Any registered 
human in the PoH registry could vouch for submitted profiles. Vouching was a benevolent 
act where one claimed to know a submitter was a single and unique human. Yet, the PoH 
registry was predated with “vouchchallengers,” where registered humans would vouch for 
a submitted profile that contained  visible  mistakes in the submission  just to challenge  it 
right after In the PoH registry, there was an economic incentive to challenge profiles, as 
challengers  gained  the  submitters’  deposit  if  they  won  the  challenge.  Once  again,  com-
munity members agreed that vouchallengers were undesirable. Yet, the community didn’t 
agree on a way to prevent or penalize such dishonest behavior.

a)  Some  members  identified  with  the  anti-Kleros  side  argued  for  strong  measures 
against  vouchchallengers,  including  banning  removed  vouchallengers  from  re-sub-
mitting their profiles to the registry.

b) The position of some Kleros community members was not cohesive, but they were 
mostly in line with less harsh measures against vouchallengers. Anti-Kleros commu-
nity members saw the other faction’s behavior as a result of the inherent benefits to 
the Kleros Cooperative of having profiles being challenged and adjudicated by one of 
their courts.

v.  The  PoH  registry’s  use  cases: A  document  sketching  the  initial  PoH  project  proof  of 
concept  and  posts  on  Kleros’  blog  page  (Ragosa  2021)  mentioned  that  the  PoH  regis-
try had several potential applications. But, over time, community members disagreed on 
the  importance  of  working  towards  newer  integrations  other  than  UBI. A  poll  conducted 
in  October  2022  showed  that  the  majority  of  the  105  members  who  participated  in  the 
poll thought that integrating the PoH registry with other projects was a priority. However, 
our interviews revealed that members who had joined because of the economic incentive 
thought that focusing on the UBI integration was the most critical priority. Other members, 
mainly Kleros Cooperative affiliated, contended that the UBI token had no utility and was 
merely “free money” benefiting earlycomers. They held that the real value was promoting 
the integration of the PoH registry with different DApps for various use cases. According to 
them, the integrations were regrettably going way “slower than they thought.”

28

b.  Many other conversations involved the PoH DAO governance. Below are some of the most 

salient points of disagreement:

i. The “size of the state”: One point of contention was the extent and nature of governance 
decisions entrusted to the PoH DAO. The announcement of the DAO outlined the various 
topics that the community could deliberate and vote upon, encompassing issues related 
to the PoH DApp and the UBI contract before the PoH DAO and the UBI DAO evolved 
into distinct entities (James 2021). In practice, PoH DAO members debated and voted on 
various issues. These ranged from “the rule on how to make rules” or how HIPs should be 
adopted, the structure and functioning of the governance bodies, and the management of 
the PoH registry, to the ultimate decision to fork.

a) Akin to proponents of a “bigger state,” some DAO members thought the strongest 
virtue of the PoH project was the extensive, open, and continuous democratic delib-
eration dynamic.

b) Contrarily, and similar to adherents of a “smaller state” in traditional politics, some 
others preferred little to no governance at all. These members considered that having 
a DAO deciding on many aspects of the PoH project was a hindrance instead of a 
benefit, mainly because it slowed down the patching and refactoring of the PoH reg-
istry software.

ii. The “governing bodies and officials”: While the PoH DAO was supposed to decide about 
the project management, in reality, many decision-making positions were held by members 
of the founding organization, the Kleros Cooperative. According to a comment made by 
Clément Leseage in the governance forum (HIP 49), Proof of Humanity is maintained by 
the Kleros Cooperative and involves paid team in the PoH project including software de-
velopers working on the smart contract and web applications, a manager working on inte-
grations, moderators maintaining PoH Telegram channels, and Kleros’ co-founders helping 
other projects integrate with PoH. Two of the four members of the interim Mission Board 
were also the Kleros’ co-founders. Clément Leseage was also re-elected to the Mission 
Board  in  May  2022. Additionally,  DEF  members  also  had  influence  over  the  PoH  DAO 
decision-making process. Some interviewees alleged that UBI founder, Santiago Siri, was 
the largest holder of UBI tokens. Santiago was also a member of the interim Mission Board 
and was re-elected in May 2022, just like Clément Leseage.

a) For some, having members of the partnering organizations de facto occupying so 
many  decision-making  positions  in  the  DAO  was  “illegitimate  and  anti-democratic” 
and posed a “severe conflict of interests.” 

b) For others, mostly Kleros-leaning, this feature was a positive trait that implied a 
synergy of interests. According to them, members of the PoH founding organization 
wanted the project to succeed and, thus, would make decisions and manage it with 
that idea in mind. 

iii. The state “agora”: Following HIP 50, the officialization of the PoH platforms and tools for 
deliberation, such as Telegram groups, was also subject to debate. The proposal showed 
disagreement  on  aspects  about  the  ownership  and  nature  of  the  “agora”,  or  the  public 
space to deliberate about governance issues.

29

a)  Some  PoH  DAO  community  members  considered  the  ownership  of  deliberation 
tools  and  platforms  by  the  Kleros  Cooperative  to  be  illegitimate,  while  most  Kleros 
community members did not see it as problematic.

b)  Some  PoH  DAO  community  members  considered  that  the  official  deliberation 
spaces had to be clearly defined to prevent future liabilities in the eyes of regulators, 
including potential accusations of commission of illegal activities. For others, having 
“official” chat groups was inherently coercive and against the principle of self-organi-
zation. According to them, the PoH DAO had to have as many groups and chats as it 
wished while adopting clear codes of conduct.

c.  Finally, one particular debate revolved around an issue affecting both the PoH registry and the 

PoH DAO governance:

i. The PoH registry’s dispute resolution system: In June 2022, a proposal was submitted to 
“Change the Arbitrator” of the PoH registry (HIP 49). The PoH registry utilized the Kleros 
Humanity Court to resolve disputes arising from challenges to submitted profiles pending 
registration.  The  reasons  for  challenging  a  profile  included  incorrect  submission,  being 
a duplicate, being a non-human (a bot), or being a deceased person.

a) Community members favoring “changing the arbitrator” were mostly at odds with 
the Kleros side. This faction agreed on two points:

i.  Firstly,  from  their  perspective,  the  design  of  Kleros’  dispute  resolution  system 
was far from perfect. It abided by “legal positivism,” where disputes were resolved 
not  based  on  moral  principles  but  on  what  was  explicitly  established  in  positive 
norms or the smart contract rules. Additionally, the system was money-driven, with 
economic incentives leading to “hyper-litigation.”

ii. Secondly, members of the community considered that utilizing Kleros as a dis-
pute resolution service provider hindered the autonomy of the DAO and gave Kle-
ros’ jurors and Kleros Cooperative staff incentives and power to intervene in the 
PoH DAO governance to maintain the status quo. This concern was closely linked 
to their dissatisfaction and sense of inability to make changes to the established 
Kleros Court model controlled by the Kleros Cooperative, resulting in a heightened 
level of conflict within the community.

b)  Community  members  against  changing  the  arbitrator  mostly  self-identified  with 
the  Kleros  community  side.  They  considered  the  Kleros’  dispute  resolution  system 
to work as intended and not exhibit any fundamental flaws. They also believed that 
Kleros jurors and Kleros Cooperative staff participating in the PoH DAO were positive 
traits contributing to the success of the PoH DAO. They believed that utilizing Kle-
ros’ dispute resolution system did not lead to a “governance gridlock,” but reinforced 
a principle  of separation  of powers where the PoH DAO legislates, and Kleros ad-
judicates, and fair and impartial justice since decisions were based on explicit rules 
instead of political factors.

30

3.b. Counter-Productive Deliberation Practices and Culture

Key  takeaway:  The  deliberation  practices  and  culture  within  the  PoH  DAO  exhibited  many 
problematic characteristics that impeded a constructive deliberation environment.

Another factor we analyzed was the deliberation practices and culture within the PoH DAO. Delibera-
tion is a core component of any democratic decision-making process. In the case of blockchain-based 
DAOs, it may involve the submission and public discussion of proposals on a wide array of issues: from 
the DAO's mission and vision, the allocation of DAO-owned funds, the hiring of personnel, the election 
of governance roles and governance bodies, to the design of governance mechanisms. Likewise, the 
organizational culture within a DAO refers to the shared values and beliefs that influence how members 
behave and relate to one another. In this respect, the PoH DAO exhibited many problematic character-
istics that impeded a constructive deliberation environment.

a.  The  excessive  fragmentation  of  the  deliberation  space  led  to  greater  confirmation  bias 
and lower participation. When the spaces for community deliberation break down, it is easier 
for them to turn into fragmented echo chambers where like-minded individuals reinforce their ex-
isting beliefs. In essence, the absence of a unified deliberation space facilitates the appearance 
of  deliberation  groups  not  necessarily  based  on  shared  discussion  topics  but  on  confirmation 
bias (Brugnoli et al. 2019). Moreover, excessive fragmentation of communication spaces may not 
increase but rather lower community engagement. Community members may become confused 
about which spaces they should be participating in and, thus, may refrain from participating at 
all. Public deliberation in the PoH DAO community seemed to have occurred in very fragmented 
environments, including many communication channels and groups within them: a governance 
forum website, a Discord server, several Telegram groups, and a Reddit page. Participation in 
groups in some of these communication platforms, especially Telegram, was “open” to members 
with similar interests and opinions and progressively “restricted” to dissident voices through the 
banning of accounts. This environment seems to have furthered the already-existing polarization 
and hindered the participation of “newcomers” who may have struggled to discern which gover-
nance tool or platform they should use for meaningful engagement.

b.  The “implicit feudalism” in deliberation platforms was left rather unchecked. To conduct 
deliberation, online communities such as DAOs necessarily rely on existing digital communica-
tions platforms. These platforms give an outstanding amount of power to ”administrators” and 
“moderators,” a phenomenon usually referred to as “implicit feudalism” (Schneider 2021). The 
nature  of  the  spaces  used  by  online  communities  for  deliberation  necessarily  introduces  new 
forms of hierarchies which themselves require democratic legitimation. Yet, these spaces live en-
tirely outside the blockchain-enabled DAO infrastructure. As such, it is extremely important to de-
fine and transparently enforce rules on the ownership of the governance tools and platforms, the 
election of administrators and moderators, and the codes of conduct for deliberation. From May 
2021, PoH DAO members introduced several proposals to regulate and legitimize roles in com-
munication channels, such as “moderator” and “admin,” and define a code of conduct for com-
munication practices. These initiatives include HIP 16, HIP 18 (which was submitted but not ad-
opted), HIP 19, HIP 50, and HIP 71 (which was adopted in replacement of HIP-16). Despite these 
efforts, ownership, and moderation of governance tools, groups, and platforms continued to be 

31

contentious issues. Firstly, the HIPs mentioned before did not address the issue of “ownership” 
of the communication channels. This vacuum led to the crisis of June 2022, when members of 
the Kleros Cooperative informed other community members that they “owned” the “original” PoH 
Telegram groups. This statement was perceived by a large part of the PoH DAO as “illegitimate,” 
stirring conflict that culminated with the adoption of HIP 50. Some PoH DAO members regarded 
the “official” Telegram groups created by HIP 50 as “undesirable” or even “coercive.” Secondly, 
moderation had been associated with instances of abuse of power. Interviewees argued that the 
binding HIPs on moderation and codes of conduct had not been fully or transparently enforced. 
Members  of  both  factions  continuously  accused  each  other  of  moderating  and  administrating 
Telegram groups illegitimately, including by silencing and removing members without a warning 
or without a justified reason, thus limiting “free speech” and “silencing the opposition.” The lack 
of an impartial PoH DAO body to enforce or evaluate the enforcement of deliberation moderation 
rules increased the recurrence of these accusations.

c.  Language barriers lead to miscommunication. Multilingualism, or a community integrated by 
native speakers of many languages (Clyne 2017), while potentially advantageous, can become 
a source of weakness if not effectively managed within a community (Gazzola et al. 2020). When 
a DAO does not adopt an explicit language policy or tools to integrate language minorities, mul-
tilingualism can hinder effective communication and lead to misunderstandings, confusion, and 
tension among community members (Annamalai 2003). Within the PoH DAO, members speak 
diverse languages, with a significant portion being native Spanish speakers, alongside English, 
Portuguese, Russian, and Chinese speakers. However, the PoH DAO did not adopt clear rules 
on the language(s) used for deliberation and official communications across different platforms. 
Additionally, no official mechanisms were devised to integrate language minorities, such as the 
hiring of translators and interpreters as DAO workers. As a result, communication and deliber-
ation were de facto conducted predominantly in English and Spanish, even in the absence of 
formally agreed-upon rules. This situation exacerbated mistrust and misunderstandings among 
PoH DAO members, primarily between Spanish and non-Spanish speakers, as evidenced by our 
interview data in section 2b. 

d.  Pseudonymity turned into antisocial behavior. Anonymity and pseudonymity in digital com-
munications can have dual effects, fostering both “prosocial” and “antisocial” behavior, which can 
either  facilitate  or  impede  constructive  deliberation  (Kabay  1998). These  qualities,  which  pre-
serve privacy, can encourage participation in deliberation from individuals who may fear or prefer 
not to disclose their identities. However, they can also be utilized for engaging in aggressive or 
dishonest communications, whether spontaneously or in an organized manner. Within the PoH 
DAO governance tools and platforms, particularly Telegram, Discord, and the governance forum, 
individuals could deliberate using various usernames, including pseudonymous ones. Many in-
terviewees aligned with different factions expressed having witnessed or suffered from system-
atic  and  widespread  acts  of  misinformation,  impersonation,  trolling,  doxing,  personal  threats, 
and  harassment.  Examples  include  the  continuous  use  of  discriminatory  slurs  and  memes  in 
Telegram groups (including groups dedicated to this purpose), the disclosure of personally iden-
tifiable information about community members in public forums, and the circulation of videos dis-
playing fictional characters perpetrating acts of violence against particular community members. 
Given the pseudonymous nature of these practices and the lack of robust enforcement of codes 
of conduct and accountability mechanisms, we cannot confirm whether these acts of harassment 

32

and discrimination were spontaneous or pre-arranged by specific factions or groups within them. 
However, these practices evidently contributed to the distrust and hostility within the community, 
exacerbating the governance crisis, while allowing perpetrators to hide behind the anonymity of 
their usernames.

e.  The  community  polarization  fueled  unreasonable  deliberation.  Democratic  deliberation 
does not necessarily require consensus; expressions of dissent and disagreement are integral 
to a healthy democratic environment. However, the ideal of democratic deliberation requires that 
individuals  engage  in  “reasonable  discussions  despite  disagreements”  (Esterling  et  al.  2015). 
This involves expressing dissent in a respectful and constructive manner, grounded in solid and 
informed arguments rather than personal or subjective beliefs, with the ultimate goal of working 
towards a final consensus (Andersen 2022, Strickler 2017). Communities characterized by par-
tisan polarization often experience “deliberative failures,” where parties either avoid cross-party 
deliberation altogether or resort to attacks and provocations against opposing factions (Wolken-
stein 2020). Within the PoH DAO, the most contentious HIPs, including HIP 49 or HIP 72, sparked 
attacks and provocations from members of opposing factions. Some PoH DAO members, both 
affiliated  with  factions  and  neutral  observers,  observed  that  deliberation  became  increasingly 
unreasonable  over  time:  “They  have  started  attacking  each  other  and  just  making  proposals 
that would just reverse whatever the other party cares most about.” Even when proposals were 
made in good faith, they were met with skepticism, and community members noted: “Everything 
that is done by one faction is interpreted in the worst possible way by the other faction (...). They 
have no more trust in each other and don’t want to cooperate. Every time someone wants to 
reconcile, someone else out of that faction might do something that's considered an attack, and 
then all attempts break down.” Succumbing to extreme partisan polarization and unreasonable 
deliberation undermines the legitimacy of the governance process as a whole and diminishes the 
chances of overcoming a governance crisis.

f.  “Neutral” members succumbed to political apathy. Political apathy is characterized by the 
decision  or  attitude  to  disengage  or  not  participate  in  a  political  system,  typically  one  that  is 
democratic  or  participatory  in  nature  (DeLuca  1995). There  are  many  reasons  for  community 
members to develop political apathy, including “fatigue” or feeling bothered by the inconvenience 
of having to participate in governance decision-making too often (Augenblick & Nicholson 2016), 
and  “alienation”  resulting  from  lack  of  identification  with  the  political  system  (Schwartz  1973). 
In the PoH DAO, while participation was qualitatively and quantitatively way higher than in oth-
er DAOs, it still remained low when compared to the number of people registered in the PoH 
registry. Observations gleaned from interviews conducted with individuals who self-identified as 
neutral, alongside discussions on the governance forum and Telegram, highlight “fatigue” and 
“alienation”  as  two  primary  factors  contributing  to  non-participation  in  governance  processes. 
When neutral members succumb to political apathy, the likelihood of mitigating extreme partisan 
polarization decreases, along with the prospects of resolving a governance crisis.

33

4. The Law 

Modern democracies typically operate under a body of law that is binding on actions occurring within 
their territory or involving their nationals. This legal framework comprises primary rules, which impose 
duties or regulate conduct, and secondary rules, which confer powers or establish procedures for creat-
ing, amending, and repealing rules. In this section, we will examine the legislative framework of the PoH 
DAO and specific pieces of legislation, arguing that they were not robust enough to prevent community 
polarization and the ensuing governance crisis.

4.a. Incomplete and Vague Legislative Framework and Laws

Key takeaway: While innovative, the legislative framework and legislation adopted by the PoH 
DAO were not robust enough to prevent or minimize polarization. Some crucial legal provi-
sions were missing, and others contained vague excerpts that facilitated it being “weaponized” 
by both factions. 

An  additional  factor  that  fueled  the  PoH  DAO  governance  crisis  was  associated  with  its  “legislative 
framework” and the enactments within it. By November 2022, the PoH DAO had adopted approximately 
75 binding decisions. If viewed akin to a state, the majority of those HIPs, jointly with the PoH registry 
policies, the rulings of the Kleros Humanity Court, and the decisions of the Mission Board, constituted 
the DAO’s “corpus iuris” or body of law—a set of enforceable rules governing the behavior within the 
PoH DAO’s jurisdiction. This body of law comprised primary rules (e.g., HIP 41) and secondary rules 
(e.g., HIP 5). However, the legal framework and body of law were not robust enough to prevent or mini-
mize progressive polarization. Some crucial legal provisions were missing, and others contained vague 
excerpts that facilitated it being “weaponized” by both factions.

a.  The PoH DAO had not adopted some crucial legal provisions lacking since the launch. 
We argued that the DAO suffered from a Tyranny of Structurelessness. One of the factors that 
contributed to this phenomenon was the absence of governance rules at the time of the launch. 
While the PoH DAO didn’t have a formal off-chain “constitution”, or single document outlining 
secondary rules, some of the DAO’s binding decisions could be said to have had “constitutional” 
character. These decisions addressed, even if indirectly, aspects of separation of powers (HIP 
2, HIP 3, HIP 7, HIP 16, HIP 21, HIP 23) and the rule-making process (HIP 5). Even then, the 
PoH DAO didn’t establish provisions on aspects that could have served as solid deterrents to the 
community’s progressive polarization:

i. Firstly, the shared values and ideals of the PoH DAO: Following the spirit of the preamble 
of a nation-state constitution, the PoH DAO should have come to an agreement on what 
principles it was inspired by—Was it “inclusion”? Was it “innovation”?

ii. Secondly, the “citizens” of the DAO: The PoH DAO should have been clear on who had 
the right and obligation to participate in governance. Was it only humans registered in the 
registry? Could participating individuals who were not part of the PoH registry be equally 
considered “citizens”?

34

iii. Thirdly, the “fundamental rights and obligations” of the members of the PoH DAO: Many 
rights and freedoms protected in most modern democracies could have been reinterpreted 
and adapted to participation in the PoH DAO. The right (and obligation) to vote, the right 
to  freedom  of  speech,  the  right  to  information,  the  right  to  renounce  “citizenship”  (to  be 
removed from the registry, along with all metadata), the right to privacy—all of these had 
the potential of cultivating a healthy culture of political participation and prevent most of the 
disputes that arose among PoH DAO members and the “government officials.”

iv.  Fourthly,  important  aspects  on  “separation  of  powers  and  check-and-balances”:  The 
PoH DAO failed to stipulate clear restraints on political power exercised by decision-mak-
ers from the partnering organizations. Mechanisms known to modern democracies could 
have also served as inspiration by defining the bodies and officials that could undertake 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, their responsibilities and the way these should 
have been exercised, the ways for those powers to control each other, as well as mech-
anisms to hold decision-makers to account if they failed to meet their responsibilities or 
committed abuses of power.

v. Fifthly, a process for “constitutional amendments”: This point refers to the process used 
to amend “constitutional” rules, usually more stringent than the one stipulated for ordinary 
rules. Within the PoH DAO, the closest to a process of constitutional amendments was HIP 
10, which stipulated that some provisions ought to remain untouched for a period of time. 
However, it appears that HIP 10 was never implemented in practice. Without this process, 
the permanence of important rules is not assured, and the body of law becomes victim to 
the agenda of the quantitatively larger faction at any particular time, a phenomenon called 
the “Tyranny of the Majority.”

b.  HIP  5  contained  vague  language,  potentially  used  for  “lawfare”  strategies.  According  to 
HIP 5, proposals posted on the PoH DAO governance forum could pass from “phase 1: ideation” 
to “phase 2: specification” based solely on the discussion “garnering momentum from the com-
munity,” without any formal requirements. For legal scholars, this vague legal provision would be 
indefinitely applicable to multiple cases, as it leaves the determination of when “momentum” is 
garnered open-ended. Vagueness in legal provisions can have various implications for lawmak-
ing, interpretation, and adjudication (Keil & Poscher 2017). It can, for instance, be exploited for 
lawfare, which involves “using - or misusing - law as a substitute for traditional military means 
to achieve an operational objective” (Dunlap Jr 2008). In the polarized environment of the PoH 
DAO community, factions could potentially manipulate the concept of “momentum” to advance 
their  agendas.  One  faction  could  artificially  generate  “momentum”  or  unilaterally  interpret  the 
level of interest in a proposal as sufficient to advance it from phase 1 to phase 2. Conversely, an 
opposing faction could undermine any perceived “momentum” or interpret the level of interest 
differently to prevent a proposal from progressing. In both scenarios, the provision enables pro-
posals to advance not based on their content or the genuine needs of the PoH DAO, but rather 
on the intentions of competing factions to assert their influence and hinder their opponents.

35

5. The Government

Modern democracies are typically governed by a system in which a government or a collection of bodies 
and officials are tasked with making binding decisions. Primarily, Western liberal democracies adhere 
to a representative model, wherein the government operates based on the principles of the separation 
of powers and checks and balances among distinct branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. In this 
section, we will delve into the “government” structure of the PoH DAO and examine its potential role in 
exacerbating the governance crisis.

5.a. Informal and Partisan Government Bodies and Officials

Key takeaway: The governing bodies and officials of the PoH DAO carried out functions sim-
ilar  to  a  state’s  three  branches  of  power.  However,  their  nature  reflected  the  implicit  power 
structures of the PoH DAO emerging after the project’s launch.

Another factor that furthered the PoH DAO crisis concerned its “governing bodies and officials.” After 
the  project’s  launch,  governing  bodies  inadvertently  arose  and  exercised  functions  similar  to  a  na-
tion-state’s three branches of power. However, their nature reflected the implicit power structures that 
emerged from the “Tyranny of Structurelessness.” On top of that, the PoH DAO lacked some important 
bodies and officials that could have reconciled some faction-leaning views. All these factors drove the 
community further apart.

a.  In a democratic nation-state, power is typically divided among three branches of power. 
These branches include the legislative power, responsible for making laws; the executive power, 
tasked with enforcing the law; and the judicial power, which interprets the law and resolves dis-
putes. The legislative and executive branches are often called “political powers” because they 
represent different perspectives on the desired direction of a community. In contrast, the judiciary 
is considered a “fair and impartial power.” Judges within this branch are expected to carry out 
their roles without being influenced by political bodies or responding to their political views. Some 
positions within the political branches are usually elected or appointed and serve for a fixed term. 
Conversely, positions within the judiciary, or non-political positions, are typically appointed rath-
er than elected. Judges in these positions serve until their death, retirement, or removal due to 
conviction.

b.  Governance within the PoH DAO was structured around entities analogous to the legisla-
tive, executive, and judiciary branches. The PoH DAO membership acted similarly to the leg-
islative power. Upon its announcement, PoH DAO members were granted authority to deliberate 
and decide (legislate) on issues such as the PoH registry DApp. The PoH DAO Mission Board 
operated in a similar manner to a judiciary interpreting the law. According to HIP 21, it was not a 
management body, but it had broad powers to interpret the rules of the DAO. The Kleros Human-
ity Court, while a service provider, had been given the power to adjudicate on cases limited to 
challenges to profiles submitted to the PoH registry. Developers and members of the Kleros Co-
operative, along with the Kleros governor contract that translated Snapshot votes into on-chain 
decisions,  took  on  a  role  similar  to  the  executive  power.  Volunteers  and  elected  or  appointed 
community members also took on administrative tasks, such as managing communication chan-
nels and submitting proposals from the governance forum to Snapshot.

36

 
c.  Decision-makers  represented  implicit  power  structures  emerging  from  the  Tyranny  of 
Structurelessness.  The  PoH  and  UBI  projects  were  launched  after  a  collaboration  between 
Kleros Cooperative and DEF. One of the consequences of launching the PoH DAO with an in-
complete governance structure was that implicit power structures would inevitably emerge and 
be hard to remove. As such, most individuals in decision-making positions were either leaders or 
members of the Kleros Cooperative or the DEF, or PoH DAO members aligning with the voiced 
expectations of these organizations. Most of the PoH DAO votes were delegated to Kleros Co-
operative CTO Clément Lesaege and DEF founder Santiago Siri. The interim Mission Board (HIP 
7) consisted of four members, two of which belonged to the Kleros Cooperative and two to the 
DEF. According to a comment made on the HIP 49 thread, members of the Kleros Cooperative 
team, including the co-founders, eight developers, one integration manager, two moderators or 
community managers, were in charge of the executive and administrative tasks such as helping 
with smart-contract reviews, working on integrations, and moderating and managing PoH DAO 
Telegram channels. The Kleros governor, a self-executing smart contract, was also developed 
by the Kleros Cooperative. Finally, the Kleros Humanity Court belonged to the Kleros dispute 
resolution system developed by the Kleros Cooperative.

d.  The PoH lacked crucial governing bodies and officials to help reconcile extreme faction-leaning 

views.

i. Firstly, the PoH DAO did not hire its “DAO workers.” The DAO workers were supposed to 
serve a function similar to a state’s civil servants, meaning they would be hired based on 
professional merit and take on administrative tasks within the three branches of power. The 
PoH DAO announced the recruitment of “workers of the DAO,” including a project manager 
and a developer, in April 2021 (HIP 2, HIP 3, HIP 13). Despite several candidates having 
applied for the position, the process stalled due to deadlocks in the Mission Board, and the 
positions were never filled. Instead, as mentioned above, the functions were implicitly ex-
ercised by leaders and members of Kleros Cooperative and DEF or community members 
in line with their views.

ii. Secondly, the PoH DAO lacked an impartial and fair adjudication body. While the Kleros 
Humanity Court was responsible for resolving disputes about profiles submitted to the PoH 
registry, the PoH DAO did not have a fair and impartial governing body to intervene in any 
other disputes. During our interviews, the most cited disputes included the alleged arbitrary 
application of the code of conduct for PoH Telegram channels (HIP 19), the alleged arbi-
trary application of the rules to elect administrators of communication channels (HIP 16), 
and  Snapshot  proposers  (HIP  34),  and  the  failure  to  fulfill  responsibilities  as  an  elected 
member to the Mission Board (HIP 60). These disputes could have been handled by an 
impartial and independent governing body with the power and responsibility to adjudicate.

iii. Thirdly, the PoH DAO lacked a governing body and appropriate procedure to ensure 
accountability  in  cases  of  abuse  of  power. Through  2021  and  2022,  there  were  several 
allegations of abuse of power by Mission Board Members, which led to Clément Lesaege’s 
destitution (HIP 72) followed by the ultimate elimination of the Mission Board as a govern-
ing body (HIP 75). An impartial and dedicated governing body should have dealt with these 
grave  allegations  with  the  power  to  impeach  elected  officials,  similar  to  what  happens 
within states.

37

6. Governance Platforms

In modern democracies, governance takes place across a spectrum of platforms, encompassing both 
physical and digital spaces. Traditional governance occurs in physical polling places during elections 
and in governmental institutions such as legislative assemblies, where representatives deliberate and 
make decisions on behalf of the electorate. Additionally, governance can extend to digital platforms, 
including official websites. This section will delve into how the PoH DAO governance system was de-
signed, examining the digital platforms and interfaces utilized, as well as their influence on community 
polarization and conflict.

6.a Inadequate Governance Platforms

Key takeaway: The nature and design of the off-chain platforms used for governance, including 
deliberation and voting, made them relatively inaccessible or inadequate for their performed 
function. The PoH DAO also refrained from “dogfooding” its own technological innovations for 
deliberation and resolving its internal disputes, which could have served as good mechanisms 
for harmonizing its diverse community.

Another factor that furthered the PoH DAO crisis revolved around the governance platforms. The PoH 
DAO heavily relied on off-chain governance, where governance decisions were not automatically trans-
posed  into  the  PoH  smart  contract. Among  the  most  popular  ones  was  the  PoH  governance  forum, 
where  members  would  submit  and  debate  on  HIPs;  more  than  a  dozen Telegram  groups,  including 
“official”  and  “non-official  ones,”  thematic  groups,  and  groups  for  certain  language  speakers,  where 
the  community  communicates  on  an  ongoing  basis;  and  the  PoH  Snapshot  page,  where  proposals 
were voted on by DAO members registered in the PoH registry. Yet, the nature and design of these 
governance tools may have contributed to the community's polarization. Firstly, some of them were not 
entirely accessible to some members. Secondly, others were designed in ways detrimental to their pur-
pose. Finally, the PoH DAO failed to “dogfood” its own tools by leveraging its own blockchain solutions.

a.  Some governance platforms  were  not entirely accessible  to some  members.  During  our 
interviews, PoH DAO members mentioned that some platforms used to deliberate and vote were 
difficult to navigate: “Snapshot has always been difficult for me. I could never get used to enter-
ing, reading, and following the discussion in the forum [either].” Some interviewees were con-
cerned that most of the community was unaware that voting on Snapshot didn’t involve paying 
transaction fees, as it is the usual case when transacting on a blockchain. When digital platforms 
used for governance are relatively challenging to navigate and utilize, it is often the neutral mem-
bers who bear the brunt of discouragement from participating in decision-making processes with-
in an already highly polarized community. Unlike factions with entrenched interests, these neutral 
members may lack strong incentives to engage actively in deliberation and voting. The added 
complexity of navigating cumbersome platforms may further deter their involvement, exacerbat-
ing feelings of exclusion and disengagement. As a result, the voices of neutral members, who 
could potentially serve as mediators or bridge-builders within the community, became marginal-
ized, leading to a further entrenchment of polarization and a deepening of the governance crisis.

b.  Some governance platforms were designed in ways that were detrimental to their intend-

ed purpose.

38

i. Telegram, when used for deliberation, does not have a robust default design to conduct 
a  mass-scale  organized  debate.  The  Telegram  platform  focuses  on  instant  messaging, 
communication, group messaging, and internet calls. Its user interface is clean and simple. 
However, as the participants in a Telegram group chat grow in size, it is harder to mod-
erate  conversations  among  them.  Furthermore,  as  the Telegram  groups  grew,  following 
conversations and discussions became increasingly difficult and chaotic. We experienced 
this firsthand as researchers, choosing to rely predominantly on the governance forum to 
anchor our arguments while keeping the general sentiment from Telegram groups (which 
formed the primary point of discussion) in mind throughout our interpretations. By default, 
a Telegram group is one chat room where all participants can pseudonymously send in-
stant messages. As such, “avatars” or fake virtual personas can participate in these groups 
and send spam messages or contain offensive, violent content or misinformation. While 
one can install bots to remove users who behave inappropriately and create subgroups 
within Telegram groups (similarly to having channels), Telegram is less suitable than plat-
forms such as Discord, Slack, or even the PoH governance forum webpage.

ii. Telegram, when used for binding polls, does not ensure a 1-person-1-vote. The issue of 
holding polls in PoH DAO Telegram groups and whether the results should be considered 
binding is problematic in and of itself. Unless the Telegram group was integrated with the 
PoH registry, there is no way to ensure each “unique and single person” can vote on the 
poll only once. Based on the democratic spirit of the PoH DAO, even if Telegram polls were 
used  for  sentiment-gathering,  it  was  not  the  most  appropriate  tool  for  the  task  at  hand. 
Strong faction-leaning individuals can create many avatars to stir public sentiment or affect 
poll results.

iii. Snapshot, used for voting, does not ensure voters’ anonymity. One of the features of vot-
ing on Snapshot was that it tied each Ethereum public address to the option they had chosen. 
While this is not directly “doxxing” a person, in the context of the PoH DAO, one can match 
the Ethereum address to the appropriate profile listed in the PoH registry. Each registered 
profile displays a picture and a bio description, among other biometric data. Ensuring voters’ 
anonymity is another crucial feature of a democratic environment the PoH Snapshot page 
does not provide. Again, neutral community members or members who don’t want to vote 
following “party lines” may refrain from doing so, fearing facing retaliation.

c.  The PoH DAO did not “dogfood” its own tools leveraging on its own blockchain solutions. 
Most of the platforms used to govern the PoH DAO were off-chain or not blockchain-based. Yet, 
considering how innovative the project was, it could have benefited from using its own techno-
logical inventions.

i. The PoH DAO did not have communication channels that were exclusive to registered 
profiles only. This led to issues associated with the legitimacy of the voted decisions, par-
ticularly in platforms open to anyone to join, such as Telegram groups, as described in the 
previous section. It also fostered a lack of trust among the users, where participants could 
question the nature of each other’s intentions. Deliberation could have benefited from to-
ken-gated deliberation spaces linked to registered and verified identities. Token-gating de-
liberation restricts participation to blockchain token holders. Suppose the PoH DAO had 
designed a space for UBI token holders registered in the PoH registry, instead of users who 

39

merely acquired UBI in an exchange. In that case, governance deliberations could have 
ensured participants had “real stakes” and wished for the best possible outcome for the 
project, including the PoH DAO itself. This could have led to a less polarized environment 
or, at least, to one where polarization was genuinely organic.

ii. Disputes related to internal PoH DAO governance issues lacked decentralized resolution 
mechanisms. While one faction of the PoH DAO was clear enough about their discontent 
with the Kleros dispute resolution system, internal DAO disputes (including issues such as 
the application of moderation rules or alleged abuse of power) were resolved in an entirely 
off-chain and unstructured manner. These disputes were addressed by recommendation 
and interpretation of a highly political governance body, such as the Mission Board. Unfor-
tunately, the founding organization, Kleros Cooperative, with its expertise in decentralized 
dispute resolutions, did not consider proposing any solutions to give this process a higher 
sense of fairness and transparency. A solid dispute-resolution solution could have helped 
prevent community polarization.

7. Governance System

As opposed to ancient Greek direct democracies, the governance system of most Western nation-states 
is a representative democracy. The PoH DAO implemented a unique approach by incorporating ele-
ments  of  liquid  democracy,  blending  both  direct  and  representative  models.  In  this  section,  we  will 
analyze  the  role  of  this  hybrid  system  in  contributing  to  the  governance  crisis  within  the  PoH  DAO 
community.

7.a. Governance System Design Weaponizable by Factions

Key takeaway: In many instances, the PoH DAO governance system and voting mechanism 
designs  fell  prey  to  the Tyranny  of  the  Majority  and  the  monopolization  of  voting  power  by 
charismatic leaders of each perceived faction.

A final factor contributing to the PoH DAO governance crisis was its governance system and voting 
mechanism. The PoH DAO launched as the first DAO in the Ethereum ecosystem to implement a liquid 
democratic governance system based on a voting mechanism of 1-person-1-vote. In September 2022, 
delegations became quadratic instead of direct. Most proposals subject to ballot on the PoH Snapshot 
page were tailored as single choice and adopted under a simple majority rule. The Snapshot design 
meant that voting was an open and transparent process. In other words, the voters’ identities were not 
anonymous— one could trace how the Ethereum addresses voted and pair them up with the Ethereum 
addresses of the profiles registered in the PoH registry. These elements combined did little to prevent 
the liquid democratic governance system from decaying into a Tyranny of the Majority and the monop-
olization of voting power by charismatic leaders of each of the perceived factions. As a result, the PoH 
DAO governance system and voting mechanism, at least up until September 2022, may have amplified 
the existing community polarization instead of helping breach it.

a.  Liquid democracy as a legitimate governance system faces two inherent dangers. Broadly 
speaking, liquid democracy is a hybrid governance model combining aspects of representative 
and direct democracy. The members of a given organization can decide whether to vote directly 

40

on an issue, abstain from voting, or delegate their votes to a representative. Depending on its 
specific configuration, members can also withdraw their votes from the representatives they have 
delegated to. This governance system faces two dangers, partly inherited from its democratic 
predecessors. Firstly, the Tyranny of the Majority: Classic and modern political thinkers, includ-
ing James Madison, Alexis de Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill, warned that democracies may 
decline in situations where a quantitatively larger group continues to “win” the decision-making 
instances, thus suppressing the voices of minorities (Cossar 2018). Secondly, the monopoliza-
tion of voting power in the hands of few: Since directly voting on issues costs time and expertise, 
liquid democracies may suffer from an “abundance of delegations” towards a few based on their 
perceived qualities, such as charisma or expert knowledge (Democracy Earth 2017).

b.  These dangers are not inevitable. The Tyranny of the majority can be mitigated with higher 
thresholds for adopting decisions, such as supermajority requirements (McGann 2004). In re-
placement of 1-person-1-vote, it can also resort to quadratic voting, where members can allocate 
several votes according to the degree or intensity of their preference and thus win a ballot even 
if they are quantitatively a minority (Posner & Weyl 2017). The monopolization of voting power in 
the hands of a few can also be avoided. Instead of direct delegations, the PoH DAO ultimately 
adopted  quadratic  delegations  (HIP  63),  which  penalized  delegating  many  votes  to  the  same 
person. A DAO can also offer tools for members to easily inform themselves about a specific 
ballot, reducing the time and expertise they need to vote directly on issues.

c.  Yet, the design of the PoH DAO governance system and voting mechanisms may have 
actually amplified these dangers and, with them, the community polarization. Beyond im-
plementing quadratic delegations in September 2022 (HIP 63), the PoH DAO did not take other 
measures to contain the “Tyranny of the Majority” nor monopolize voting power. Many debates 
framed as dilemmas and approached with a “convex” mentality led to proposals being passed 
with a little more than 50% of the votes. Some members expressed: “The Argentinean commu-
nity has way too many votes. It worries me a bit because, ideally, you would have at least 4 or 
5 factions and not one single community that would be able to win every election,” illustrating 
the importance of community makeup. Interviewees also observed that Kleros Cooperative CTO 
Clément Lesaege and DEF founder Santiago Siri monopolized most of the voting power through 
delegated votes. The fact that votes on the PoH Snapshot page were not anonymous by design 
may have amplified these dangers—members wishing to vote differently than their faction may 
have refrained from doing so, fearing retaliations.

41

III. Timeline of Events

This section presents a timeline of significant events at the PoH DAO, spanning from August 2014 to 
November 2022. It's crucial to note that, despite our team's rigorous efforts to comprehensively under-
stand the situation, it's impractical to document every single event that has impacted the governance 
of the PoH project and the subsequent crisis in the PoH DAO. Therefore, we've focused on highlighting 
the events that have been most extensively and publicly discussed within the community, as evidenced 
by our analysis of governance platforms and the interviews we conducted. The timeline below is ar-
ranged  chronologically,  starting  from  the  initial  conceptualization  of  the  PoH  idea  and  culminating  in 
the community's vote in favor of “forking,” along with key developments that occurred shortly after the 
decision to split the project.

August 2014 

•  Ethereum  founder  Vitalik  Buterin  shared  a  blog  post  on  “Hard  problems  in  Cryptocurrencies” 
highlighting, among others, the pressing need to develop anti-spam and anti-Sybil attack algo-
rithms. The blog post would become a source of inspiration for developing the Proof of Humanity 
Sybil-resistant registry of humans.

July 2019

•  Democracy Earth Foundation (DEF)’s founder Santiago Siri participates in Episode 2 of #Hu-
mansofEthereum on “reimagining democracy using tools like quantitative voting” and questions 
on “how to distinguish humans (Etherean or otherwise) from replicants.” 

August 2019

•  An initial Proof of Humanity paper is drafted and the development of the Proof of Humanity proj-

ect kickstarts.

September 2019

•  Kleros Cooperative launches a “Proof of Humanity” Telegram group to discuss the creation of a 
Sybil-resistant registry for humans. Kleros Cooperative’s CEO (President) Federico Ast invites 
DEF’s founder Santiago Siri to join. The Telegram group grows to attract new members curious 
about the underlying idea.

October 2019

•  Kleros Cooperative holds a meetup at the Ethereum Developer Conference (Devcon) 5 about 

“Proof of Humanity.”

February 2020

•  Kleros  Cooperative  CEO  (President)  Federico Ast  gives  a  presentation  at  Ethereum  London, 
mentioning the Proof of Humanity Telegram group and Proof of Humanity as one of Kleros’ use 
cases.

42

March 2020

•  Kleros Cooperative CTO Clément Lesaege gives a talk at the Ethereum Community Conference 

(EthCC) on “Proof Of Humanity, a Sybil-resistant list of humans.”

November 2020

•  Kleros Cooperative’s “Proof of Humanity” project is mentioned in one of the first articles on Proof 
of Personhood Protocols to date, titled “Who Watches the Watchmen: A Review of Subjective Ap-
proaches for Sybil-Resistance in Proof of Personhood Protocols,” co-authored by DEF’s founder 
Santiago Siri.

•  Kleros Cooperative hosts a virtual conference on “Humans on The Blockchain,” with Santiago 

Siri as an invited guest.

January 2021

•  Kleros Cooperative team member Damjan Malbašić shares a post on Kleros’ blog page on how 
to create unique human digital identities to enable social blockchains and democracy online. The 
post mentions Santiago Siri and DEF’s work in the realm of voting technologies.

February 2021

•  Kleros Cooperative CEO (President) Federico Ast posts on Twitter that the final product review 

meeting before the launch of Proof of Humanity had been held.

March 2021

•  Kleros Cooperative and DEF members announce the launch of the Proof of Humanity smart 
contract, the Proof of Humanity web DApp, and the UBI smart contract in a series of posts 
on the Kleros’ blog (here, here, and here) and a series of Tweets from Kleros Cooperative’s CTO 
Clément Lesaege (here) and DEF’s Founder Santiago Siri (here).

•  The POH governance forum is launched. Initial conversations in the General Chat channel on 
the forum include topics such as the amount of ETH to be deposited during a profile submission 
and ways to mitigate a possible price increase of ETH as “one of the aspirations is to extend 
UBI universally.”

April 2021

•  Kleros  Cooperative  Operations  Director  Stuart  James  publicly  announces  the  launch  of  the 
Proof of Humanity DAO in a post on the Kleros blog. The DAO is introduced as the first “truly 
democratic 1-person-1-vote governance system with open participation,” a “truly egalitarian vot-
ing mechanism backed by on-chain transparency ensures no member can vote more than once.” 
The article argues that the DAO is expected to develop its governance processes through “HIP - 
Humanity Improvement Proposals” posted on the PoH DAO forum and voted on a PoH Snapshot 
page. Approved proposals on on-chain governance are supposed to be “automatically translated 
into code enforcement by the Kleros governor.” Initially, the PoH DAO members are expected 
to deliberate and decide on 1) The Proof of Humanity DApp (parameters such as submission 
deposits, and amount of vouchers required for registration), 2) The UBI contract (UBI issuance 
rate), and 3) An allocation of 4,000,000 UBI.

43

•  PoH founder and Kleros Cooperative CTO Clément Lesaege submits two proposals (HIP 2 and 
HIP 3) to recruit “workers for the DAO,” including a project manager and a software developer. 
Candidates ought to submit a proposal, be interviewed by volunteers of the DAO, complete one 
recruiting exercise drafted by volunteers of the DAO, receive feedback from the volunteers—first 
privately and then publicly—, and then have their proposals submitted to a vote. The proposals 
are adopted on Snapshot (HIP 2 and HIP 3) and become binding.

•  PoH DAO member Jrag submits a proposal (HIP 5) to “adopt a proper PoH DAO Governance 
process to ensure HIP quality.” The proposal presents a 3-phase process, in which each phase 
has  a  different  duration  and  passing  requirements  for  a  proposal  to  be  adopted  and  become 
binding. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  member  Mads  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  7)  to  “institute  a  management  board,”  a 
governance body later on referred to as the “Mission Board,” in charge of “managing the DAO re-
sources (employees, websites, money) in accordance with democratic decisions.” The proposal 
declares that the “informal managers” by that time, “4 Kleros members, and 2 Democracy.Earth 
members” become formalized as the management board for a “period of 1 year after adoption.” 
Elections for the positions are set to be held thereafter. PoH founder and Kleros Cooperative 
CTO  Clément  Lesaege,  Kleros  Cooperative  CEO  (President)  Federico Ast,  DEF  founder  and 
UBI  founder  Santiago  Siri,  and  DEF  co-founder  Herb  Stephens  became  mission  board  mem-
bers. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

May 2021

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits a proposal (HIP 8) to “accept 352 as the minimum di-
mension in video submissions.” The proposal emerges from a debate within the community 
after several profiles are challenged for inadvertently submitting the video proof with 352 pixels, 
instead of the required 360 pixels, after exporting the videos from WhatsApp. The proposal is 
adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding. 

•  PoH DAO member Mads submits a proposal (HIP 10) to “create a decision locking mecha-
nism” to make some decisions harder to reverse later and signal to the world they would remain 
untouched for some time. The proposal was adopted on Snapshot and became binding.

June 2021

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits a proposal (HIP 16) to “make admin roles of communi-
cation  platforms  eligible.” The  community-managed  channels  include  but  are  not  limited  to, 
the PoH governance forum website, Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, Discord, WhatsApp, Instagram, 
and Telegram. The proposal states that elections will be held separately for each platform, using 
Tokenlog. The  proposal  explains  the  role  of  the  administrator  and  the  requisites  for  obtaining 
“community-managed” badges in communication channels. The proposal is adopted on Snap-
shot and becomes binding. 

•  PoH  founder  and  Mission  Board  member  Clément  Lesaege  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  18)  on 
“communication roles” to institute a mechanism to determine the position of administrator in 
the social communication tools that are recognized as official by the DAO, either social media 
(Twitter, Reddit) or communication channels (Telegram groups). HIP 18 conflicts with some as-
pects of HIP 16. The proposal passes to Phase 2 but it is not adopted on Snapshot.

44

•  PoH DAO member Paula Berman submits a proposal (HIP 19) to establish a “code of conduct 
for PoH Telegram channels.” The code of conduct establishes threats, sexually explicit mate-
rial, discriminatory jokes and language, personal insults, doxxing, among others, as reasons for 
being banned from the channel. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  member  Mads  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  21)  to  “amend  the  rules  of  the  ‘Mission 
Board’” which clarifies the scope of power and “adds two tie-breaking mechanisms - a 5th board 
member and a tie-breaking vote.” The Mission Board is intended to have a “broad power to in-
terpret the rules of the DAO, including filling in details not specified in a proposal.” The proposal 
is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding. Justin Kalland gets elected as the 5th Mission 
Board member one month later.

July 2021

•  PoH DAO members, including Santiago Siri, Clément Lesaege, RustyTheGamer, and fraserd-
scott  submit  a  proposal  to  “create  a  UBI  DAO”  (HIP  22). The  governance  of  the  PoH  smart 
contract and the UBI smart contract is now carried out in different Snapshot pages and governed 
following  different  voting  principles.  For  PoH  DAO,  1-person-1-vote.  For  UBI  DAO,  votes  are 
based on the voting power of $UBI token holders following a quadratic voting scheme. The pro-
posal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  Kleros  Cooperative  Integration  Lead  Jimmy  Ragosa  gives  a  talk  at  EthCC  4  dedicated  to  the 

issues of DAO Governance and the “Proof of Humanity DAO” experiment.

October 2021

•  PoH Founder and Mission Board Member Clément Lesaege submits a proposal on “Snapshot 
administration”  (HIP  23)  to  have  Mission  Board  members  put  proposals  to  the  vote  on  the 
Snapshot page while providing protection in case the Mission Board or Snapshot were to censor 
proposals. The proposal is not adopted.

December 2021

•  PoH  Founder  and  Mission  Board  Member  Clément  Lesaege  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  31)  on 
“Clarification on UBI DAO rules” which states that the rules of the UBI DAO rules are the same 
as the POH DAO rules at the time of HIP 22 unless stated otherwise in a UBI DAO proposal. 
This includes rules on the voting period, deposits on the Kleros Governor application, challenge 
period, delegations, and the process to pass proposals. The proposal was adopted on Snapshot 
and became binding.

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits a proposal (HIP 33) to kickstart a conversation about the 
importance of protecting the PoH registry against “profile farming,” whereby a person recruits 
humans to register to PoH, collect their accrued UBI, and potentially increase the person’s power 
over the DAO, and “puppeteering” or the action of one person taking control over another per-
son’s account to perform attacks on the platform. HIP 33 was submitted after several accusations 
regarding profile farming had already been raised against various individuals engaging in profile 
farming (both in the South American context and within Kleros) and the community had engaged 
in debates on how to deal with profile farming.

45

January 2022

•  PoH  DAO  members  Juanu  and  Mizu  submit  a  proposal  (HIP  27)  to  “allow  1-character  mis-
takes in displayed addresses” due to the number of profiles getting challenges based on these 
grounds. The proposal gets adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits a proposal (HIP XX) to remove Clément Lesaege from 
the Mission Board due to “anti-dao and anti-democratic maneuvers,” including claims of “ob-
structing normal governance procedures, an unsuccessful attempt to remove a valid admin from 
the Telegram group, disregarding serious security threats to the registering process, systemat-
ically  obstaculizing  any  process  that  helps  humans  register,  making  Proof  of  Humanity  a  dis-
pute-creating machine, stalling the hiring process of DAO workers, among others. The proposal 
is not adopted.

•  PoH  Founder  and  Mission  Board  Member  Clément  Lesaege  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  34)  on 
“Snapshot proposers” specified as Mission Board members and their delegates, people em-
ployed by the DAO, and people elected through a proposal, who would have the ability to make 
and remove proposals on Snapshot to avoid spamming while refraining from giving the Mission 
Board power to censor views. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  members  and  Kleros  Cooperative  affiliated  members  NingFid,  Senryu,  and  Fnanni 
submit a proposal (HIP 36) on the “registration validity extension and change of renewal pe-
riod” which addresses “the costs to register” in order “to maintain the momentum in registration 
and remain as the largest on-chain identity system.” The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and 
becomes binding.

•  The TIME publishes an article on “How Blockchain Could Solve the Problem of Digital Identity.” 
The article initially features Santiago Siri as a founder of PoH. The TIME edited the article a 
few days later, stating Santiago Siri was not the founder of PoH. This incident later became cited 
as an example of Santiago Siri's desire to leverage others to refer to himself as a founder of PoH, 
which Kleros Cooperative saw as untrue and misleading.

•  PoH DAO members Ludoviko, Juanumusic, and 0xjean.eth submit a proposal (HIP 38) to “elect the 
first batch of Snapshot proposers.” The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

February 2022

•  PoH DAO member Mads submits a proposal (HIP 39) on election rules for officials to the Mis-
ion Board, since most posts were to expire in June 2022. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot 
and becomes binding. 

March 2022

•  PoH DAO member nicobilinkis.eth submits a proposal (HIP 41) to allow verbal confirmation for reg-
istering users and thus make the registering process more accessible for humans, including people 
with movement or vision impairment. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  UBI founder and PoH DAO Mission Board member Santiago Siri appears as an invited guest on 
the Gitcoin Founder Kevin Owocki’s podcast episode. He is introduced and referred to as a founder 
of PoH. 

46

May 2022

•  From  21-28  May  2022,  the  PoH  DAO  conducts  the  first  Mission  Board  elections  through  a 
binding ballot on Snapshot. Four members are elected: UBI founder Santiago Siri, Kleros Coop-
erative team member Jean, PoH founder Clément Lesaege, and Juanu, a software developer 
and  community  member  who  had  previously  been  involved  with  the  development  of  the  UBI 
token. Mission Board member Justin Kallard retains his position, which has not expired yet.

•  PoH DAO members Lety and nicobilinkis.eth submit a proposal (HIP 42) to allow first-time regis-
trants to the PoH registry, or those who renew it, to say in Spanish the phrase required in the 
video submission. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

June 2022

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko reintroduces the proposal (HIP 48) to remove Clément Lesaege 
from the Mission Board due to “anti-dao and anti-democratic maneuvers.” The proposal pass-
es to Phase 2, but it is not adopted.

•  Approximately twenty PoH DAO members submit a proposal (HIP 49) to “change the arbitrator” 
that solves the disputes over challenged profiles at PoH to form a new one that better serves the 
interests of the PoH community. The proposal passes to Phase 2, but it is not adopted.

•  PoH  DAO  member  Ludoviko  reintroduces  the  discussion  on  the  importance  of  protecting  the 

registry against “puppets” and “farming attacks” from HIP 33.

•  Avraham Eisenberg published on his Substack channel “DeepFiValue” titled “The Kleros experi-
ment has failed”. The post criticizes Kleros as a blockchain arbitration system due to the alleged 
activities of “whales” or big holders of Kleros’ native token, PNK. He alleges that Kleros Coop-
erative CTO Clément Lesaege was able to influence the decision of the so-called “Unslashed 
case” by having a disproportionately larger stake.

•  PoH DAO members ask in the PoH Telegram group channels for Kleros’ to explain the situation 

behind the “Unslashed case”.

•  PoH founder and Mission Board member Clément Lesaege replies to a Twitter thread published 
by FatManTerra on the “Unslashed case” on how the jurors voted on the case stating that “@
Kleros_io

• 

is only a judicial system, not a legislative one. In those cases the legislator was the Unslashed 
protocol so Kleros did apply the rules given by Unslashed” and also explains the PNK distribution 
among jurors.

•  Members  get  banned  from  the  Telegram  Group  @proofofhumanityenespanol  after  allega-
tions of toxicity, “trolling,” and inappropriate language. The banned members see this action as 
censorship of dissident voices. Clément Lesaege sends a message stating that the Telegram 
group belonged to the Kleros Cooperative from a legal and technical standpoint because Kleros 
Cooperative CEO Federico Ast had created it as part of his job for the Cooperative. Santiago 
Siri replies that the Telegram Group belongs to the DAO, and his message is supported by other 
community members.

47

•  PoH founder and Mission Board member Clément Lesaege and UBI founder and Mission Board 
member Santiago Siri agree on 4 points of consensus to “be able to continue working to-
gether.”

July 2022

•  After the events in the Telegram Group @proofofhumanityenespanol, PoH DAO members Ludo-
viko and Valen submit a proposal (HIP 50) to “clarify which Telegram group and Twitter ac-
counts belong to PoH DAO.” The proposal suggests adopting two specific Telegram groups 
and two new Twitter accounts, one in Spanish and one in English for each platform, as the “of-
ficial comms channels” belonging to the PoH DAO. The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and 
becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  and  Kleros  Cooperative  team  member  NingFid  submits  a  post  on  the  acceptable 
management of family member’s PoH accounts, including those belonging to small children, 
adults, and old persons or parents. The community deliberates on whether to tighten or loosen 
the PoH registration policy.

•  PoH DAO and Kleros Cooperative team member Greenlucid submits a proposal (HIP 55) against 
“puppeteers” to ensure explicit Sybil resistance. The member proposes to allow challenging 
puppeteered submissions as a duplicate. The proposal remains in Phase 1.

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits a proposal (HIP 58) on the removal of “vouchallengers” 
defined as the ones vouching for registered humans to challenge them right after. The proposal 
passes to Phase 3.

•  Clément Lesaege publishes an on the “recent drama” in Proof of Humanity in Spanish and 
English. The article mentions financial issues of Democracy Earth, Santiago Siri pretending to be 
a founder of Proof Of Humanity, the situation with the Telegram groups, and HIP 49 “aka protocol 
self-destruction.” 

•  On Twitter, Santiago Siri argues that Clément Lesaege’s article is part of a “smear campaign.” 

•  PoH DAO and Mission Board member Juanu submits a post where he resigns from his posi-

tion.

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko opens an election thread for the Mission Board member vacancy. 

August 2022

•  PoH DAO member Ludoviko submits proposal (HIP 60) for the “removal of Justin Kalland of 
the Mission Board” due to his inactivity. The proposal passes to Phase 2, but it is not adopted. 

•  Elections for the vacant Mission Board seat were held on Snapshot between candidates Valen 

and Green. Valen is elected as a member of the Mission Board.

September 2022

•  Santiago Siri submits a post on the alleged “farming of delegations” or profiles created which 
were “automatically delegating voting power to Clément Lesaege.” This post should be evaluat-
ed in the context of ongoing discussions that began to emerge before HIP 33 and was addressed 
in various subsequent HIPs, without being fully resolved. 

48

•  Clément Lesaege submits a proposal (HIP 62) on “explicitly forbidding the farming of pro-

files.” The proposal is understood as being addressed by previously submitted HIP 55.

•  Clément Lesaege starts a conversation in the PoH forum about whether the PoH DAO should 

fork, alongside a poll in which the majority of votes favor forking.

•  Santiago Siri introduces a proposal on Snapshot to suspend delegations until “proper legislation” 
is adopted on the “farming of delegations.” The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes 
binding.  

•  PoH  DAO  community  submitted  a  proposal  (HIP  63)  on  quadratic  Delegations  on  the  PoH 
DAO Snapshot to “help prevent clientelism and vote gerrymandering.” The proposal is adopted 
on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  member Arkayana  submits  a  proposal  (HIP  68)  that  provides  an  implementation 
strategy and the requirements for a second arbitrator. The proposal remains in Phase 1.

October 2022

•  Santiago Siri gives a presentation at the Ethereum-organized event DevCon in Bogotá, Co-
lombia, on UBI. The moderator introduces Santiago Siri as a “founder of Democracy.Earth Foun-
dation (....) that has built UBI on Ethereum and launched the Proof of Humanity Protocol.” Clé-
ment Lesaege, in attendance, shouts “a liar,” claiming that he cannot be presented as a person 
who created Proof of Humanity. 

•  Avraham Eisenberg’s successful attack on Mango Markets sparks additional discussions on the 
previous “Unslashed Case” around the legitimacy of “whale” participation in Kleros courts that 
has prevented similar attacks.

•  PoH DAO members submit a proposal (HIP 71) on the “election of moderators” of “official 
groups” and “community channels” of the DAO. HIP 71 establishes the responsibility, elec-
tion, and implementation of election results of moderators and derogates HIP 16. It is one of the 
only proposals on PoH DAO governance issues to be submitted solely in Spanish. The proposal 
is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

•  PoH  DAO  members  reintroduce  proposal  (HIP  72)  requesting  the  removal  of  PoH  founder 
Clément as Mission Board Member, adding that the events taking place during Santiago Siri’s 
presentation at DevCon showed that Clément Leseage was not aligned with the democratization 
and decentralization and respect for the privacy of individuals being registered in the DAO. The 
proposal is adopted on Snapshot with 50.43% of the votes and becomes binding.

•  Approximately  105  PoH  DAO  members  finalize  an  experiment  through  pol.is  in  an  attempt  to 
decide on the priorities for the project. The results showed that 94% agreed that they should 
aim for Proof Of Humanity to be used by a lot of protocols, 91% considered that they needed 
a dispute resolution mechanism that is secure and reliable, and 95% coincided with the state-
ment that responsibilities and expectations of a role should be clear and comprehensive before 
an individual is elected or hired.

49

November 2022

•  Clément Lesaege, PoH founder, Santiago Siri, UBI founder, and Andrei, PoH DAO member, sub-
mit a proposal (HIP 74) on a “Peaceful Fork”. The proposal lists the resources that will remain 
in PoH v1 and not be modified. The proposal also lists the list of resources to be deployed in PoH 
v2, which will be forked into “PoH-Origin (Kleros Coop)” and “Open-PoH (UBI).” The proposal is 
adopted on Snapshot with 78.65% of the votes and becomes binding.

•  PoH DAO members submit a proposal (HIP 75) to remove the Mission Board member role. 

The proposal is adopted on Snapshot and becomes binding.

Conclusion

Proof of Humanity remains a leading project in the blockchain-based digital identity space and a pioneer 
in advancing new forms of governance in the DAO ecosystem. In this report, we present our findings 
from  6  months  of  ethnographic  research  conducted  via  participant  observation,  fourteen  semi-struc-
tured  interviews,  and  desk  review.  Given  the  increasing  tensions  that  unfolded  within  the  PoH  DAO 
community and the overall emphasis placed on it being the first experiment of “democratic governance” 
in the Ethereum ecosystem, our research was guided by the question: What governance dynamics 
led to the Proof of Humanity DAO’s crisis and subsequent decision to “fork”?

We structured our observations influenced by salient themes prevalent in liberal and critical democratic 
theory: (1) constituting a democracy, (2) citizenship and the demos, (3) political deliberation, (4) the law, 
(5) the government, and (6) governance platforms, and (7) governance system. Our main findings can 
be summarized as follows: 

1.  Constituting a democracy: PoH DAO was initiated by two organizations that, upon closer ex-
amination, held significantly divergent and occasionally conflicting expectations for the Proof of 
Humanity (PoH) project. The minimal governance structures and lack of common agreement on 
the animating purpose of the project, as well as mechanisms to prevent and mitigate conflict, led 
to the perspectives of Kleros Cooperative and DEF becoming focal points for the wider PoH DAO 
community. This situation played a significant role in fostering polarization within the community. 

2.  Citizenship and the demos: The PoH DAO's membership was characterized by various back-
grounds, interests, and aspirations for the project, alongside frequently conflicting views on its 
governance and future direction. Although a consensus existed on the community's factionalized 
state, there was less agreement on the nature of these factions and various other aspects of the 
observed polarization. However, the very perception of factional divides, coupled with the public 
expression of these views, appeared to deepen and solidify the divisions within the community.

3.  Political  deliberation:  Debates  about  the  management  of  the  PoH  registry  and  governance 
of the PoH DAO often took the form of dilemmas and were approached with a confrontational, 
inflexible  attitude,  complicating  efforts  to  bridge  differences  among  community  members  and 
factions. This challenging dynamic was exacerbated by a deliberation culture that, at times, was 
unproductive and problematic, making compromise even more elusive across the community. 
Several factors contributed to this unconstructive atmosphere, including the excessive segmen-
tation of discussion spaces, a diminished trust due to reliance on anonymity or pseudonymity in 
certain forums, an unregulated "implicit feudalism" by administrators and communication group 
owners, language barriers, miscommunications, and a general political disengagement.

50

4.  The law: The PoH DAO adopted rules and procedures akin to a nation-state’s legislative frame-
work and legislation. While innovative, these rules were not robust enough to prevent polariza-
tion. Over time, particularly vague formulations came to be weaponized by both factions. The 
DAO failed to pass legislation on four fundamental issues: defining membership rules, defining 
the  fundamental  rights  and  obligations  of  DAO  members,  clarifying  the  separation  of  powers 
between various decision-making bodies, and establishing a special amending process for rules 
considered of higher order. 

5.  The government: The decision-making bodies and individuals in the PoH DAO carried out func-
tions similar to a nation-state’s three branches of power: executive, legislative, and judicial. The 
nature of these bodies and individuals reflected the implicit power structures of the PoH DAO 
emerging after the project’s launch. 

6.  Governance platforms: The technological nature and design of the off-chain platforms used for 
governance, including for deliberation and voting, made them relatively inaccessible or inade-
quate for their performed function. 

7.  Governance system: The liquid democracy governance system and the voting mechanisms of 
the PoH DAO were not robust enough to prevent tyranny of the majority or the monopolization of 
voting power in the hands of charismatic leaders. 

Overall, our findings indicate that many core features of traditional democratic governance were lacking 
within the PoH DAO, preventing the community from reconciling the underlying differences that persist-
ed since the project’s inception.

51

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Research Project Report  
April 2024

doi:10.2870/107946
ISBN: 978-92-9466-546-1
QM-09-24-203-EN-N