Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – EU-UK Youth Engagement (own-initiative opinion)
Date: 2024-04-24
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, cooperation in the field of education, education policy, student mobility, withdrawal from the EU, young person, youth exchange scheme, youth movement, youth policy








C_202404053EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2024/4053


12.7.2024






Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee

EU-UK Youth Engagement


(own-initiative opinion)

(C/2024/4053)


Rapporteur: 
Cillian LOHAN






Advisor


Maurizio CUTTIN




Plenary Assembly decision


21.9.2023




Legal basis


Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure




Section responsible


External Relations




Adopted in section


3.4.2024




Adopted at plenary session


24.4.2024




Plenary session No


587




Outcome of vote
(for/against/abstentions)


154/2/1




1.   Conclusions and recommendations









1.1.


As the European house of civil society, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is convinced that civil society organisations (CSOs) in both the European Union and the United Kingdom are uniquely placed to aid and facilitate EU-UK youth engagement, and thus stands ready to play its role, as reflected in this own-initiative opinion.





Youth mobility









1.2.


Given that Brexit-induced changes to mobility arrangements between the UK and the EU have had a disproportionately negative impact on young people, the EESC first and foremost urges the European Commission (EC) to approach the UK Government (UK) about the possibility of negotiating an ambitious reciprocal youth mobility partnership. This partnership should aim to set out conditions for entry and stay for purposes such as research, study, training and youth exchanges.












1.3.


That notwithstanding, the EESC urges the EC to strengthen negotiations with the UK for the full reintegration of the UK into Erasmus+, a position which is officially backed by the European Youth Forum (1) and British Youth Council (2), as well as by many other youth CSOs across the UK (3) and the EU.












1.4.


The EESC calls on the EC to confirm that the UK is welcome to negotiate to re-join Creative Europe at any time. It also encourages the EC to actively promote the issue of cross-cultural learning in its diplomatic exchanges with the UK.












1.5.


Recognising that Brexit has had a hugely negative cultural and economic impact on touring artists (4) and thus also on cultural relations between the EU and the UK, and that this issue has been raised both by the House of Lords European Affairs Committee (5) and at recent EU-UK Parliamentary Assembly meetings (6), the EESC encourages the Commission to proactively engage with the UK to address the barriers to mobility of creative professionals, possibly including a reciprocal visa waiver for creative industries or a ‘cultural exemption’ from the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).












1.6.


Recognising that the large decline in school visitors to both the UK and the EU (7) has had a considerable negative cultural and economic impact on both sides of the Channel, the EESC petitions the EC to negotiate with the UK on reciprocal travel arrangements for school visitors. This should include the introduction of a school group travel scheme that would not require pupils travelling on organised school and other types of young people’s visits to the UK or to the EU to carry individual passports. A positive first step was the decision of 28 December 2023, whereby French and EU nationals at schools in France who cross the Channel for a language-learning holiday will need to carry only a simple identity card, removing the requirement to obtain a costly visa (8).





Structured engagement









1.7.


The EESC urges the EC to negotiate with the UK to construct reciprocal youth advisory structures resembling the EU’s Youth Sounding Board initiative (9) within each side’s respective diplomatic mission.












1.8.


The EESC strongly supports the creation of a structured engagement between the EU, UK-level authorities and the devolved nations, with robust involvement of youth, including youth work and non-formal learning, to strengthen youth civil society dialogue and cooperation.












1.9.


The EESC strongly recommends that structured inclusion of youth in existing engagement structures be established on both sides. Structured and regular inclusion of UK youth sector should be enabled, promoted, and adequately funded in, for example, the EESC’s annual Your Europe, Your Say (10) youth event, the European Parliament’s annual LevelUp! (11) and European Youth Event (12) gatherings, the EU Youth Dialogue process (13) and similar initiatives.












1.10.


The EU and the UK should jointly consider creating and funding an EU-UK youth coordination forum, consisting inter alia of representatives of the European Youth Forum (14), the British Youth Council (15), Young Scot (16), the Northern Ireland Youth Forum (17), and Urdd (18), which would have a regular dialogue to discuss the most pressing issues in the area of EU-UK youth relations. These actors should be considered in the EESC’s opinion-making process through the implementation of the EU Youth Test in the EESC.












1.11.


The youth sector is not represented in either the EU or the UK domestic advisory groups (DAGs) under the TCA. Thus, the EESC calls on the EC to facilitate full and active participation of EU youth sector representatives, removing any financial barriers to participation in the EU DAG. The EESC also calls on the EC to engage with and encourage the UK to facilitate the participation of the UK youth sector in the UK DAG. Recognising the voices of young people in this body is essential to its long-term survival as a structure for furthering bilateral relations.












1.12.


The EESC welcomes the British Council’s EU/UK Youth Stronger Together project (19), offering young people aged 15-30 from the EU and the UK opportunities to connect and cooperate. The EESC believes that this project should serve as an excellent best practice model for facilitating future EU-UK bilateral youth initiatives to connect, empower and train youth.





Other forms of youth engagement









1.13.


The EESC recommends a mapping of opportunities for young people to be carried out. This could be very helpful in building capacity to educate on the practical opportunities available to them. Clear career pathways should be articulated, with a need to deliver expert knowledge to young people through schools, cooperatives, and career advice. A programme on apprenticeships, for instance for farming, should be included, based on best practice (20).












1.14.


The EESC calls for the establishment of a centralised and accessible information hub for young entrepreneurs, who continue to be impacted by Brexit by the stringent new rules governing the movement of goods and services across the Channel, and uncertainty around market access.












1.15.


The EESC recommends improved structured peer-to-peer learning, useful for CSOs, but also a model that could be replicated by local authorities and government departments. Although connections to EU networks remain generally intact in Wales, they need to be strengthened to ensure the longevity of cross-border knowledge sharing continues. A positive example is that a Welsh representative is chair of the EU-level Rural Youth Forum. However, young farmers groups are now excluded from being CEJA (21) members, with the exception of NFU Next Generation (22), which represents England and Wales.





EU Settlement Scheme and youth









1.16.


EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) procedures have had unwelcome implications also for young people. Each child must have their own EUSS application, generally filed by their parents. In some cases this requirement has not been complied with for various reasons, leading to serious consequences for children. These consequences could be avoided or mitigated by more user-friendly guidelines and possibly an awareness-raising campaign.












1.17.


Complications continue to arise in relation to the EUSS in the UK and in some EU Member States, which may have implications for children and young people. Advocacy organisations are signalling the danger of a ‘Windrush Effect’ in the UK. This is because the ‘digital only’ system may result in incidents of failure to register children among some vulnerable groups. There is a need for a backup physical support and a 24-hour helpline.












1.18.


In the EU, the data is still not up to date, especially as regards applications for residence cards to evidence Withdrawal Agreement status in countries with declaratory systems. Consequently, there is currently no way of knowing how many children and young people might face difficulties proving their status in future. There is even uncertainty in certain countries around registering children or if they need to hold cards and the process for obtaining them. Different issues are also emerging around family reunification in a number of countries. Public funding for advocacy is either non-existent or being phased out, notwithstanding a continuous and increasingly complex caseload.












1.19.


The EESC therefore urges the Commission to liaise with the UK to revisit the issue of providing a physical backup and to maintain funding to enable community groups, advocacy organisations and public authorities to provide support for as long as cases continue to emerge. The EESC welcomes the news that British in Europe will be funded for a capacity building and awareness raising project covering groups across 11 EU countries for the next 20 months under the EC’s CERV programme (23) but notes that the need for funding will also apply in EU Member States for as long as cases continue to emerge.





Unique circumstances of Northern Ireland









1.20.


Lack of funding and lack of a coordinated approach and local expertise in the allocation of funding means that, combined with cuts, youth groups and community groups are not being resourced. For example, the European Social Fund (ESF) was distributed based on local expertise by local authorities. This has proven a resilient and reliable funding model for groups like Disability Action NI (24). These initiatives are now facing closure. All this exacerbates the risks to peace in Northern Ireland. The EESC is therefore firmly convinced that these issues should be addressed with urgency to prevent young people resorting to other entities, including paramilitary organisations, for community-level support.












1.21.


The EESC encourages the EU to liaise with the respective UK and Irish governments and the Northern Ireland Executive to join forces in raising awareness of the mission of the cross-border PEACE PLUS programme designed to support peace and prosperity across Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland. In this context, all parties must be acutely aware of the fragility of the peace in Northern Ireland, which amplifies the importance of the EU’s support to the PEACE PLUS programme. The role that the EU has played in supporting this peace cannot be underestimated. As part of this, the EESC calls on all invested parties to proactively promote the merits of PEACE PLUS, communicating its vast funding opportunities through accessible and youth-friendly language.




2.   Context









2.1.


Political relations between the EU and the UK have improved significantly following the adoption of the EU-UK WA, the EU-UK TCA and the Windsor Framework. At a civil society level, relations have remained strong and amicable, based on good faith and cooperation.












2.2.


This dynamic is reflected in the exceptional relations between the EESC and CSOs across the UK since 2021, which has resulted in the EESC signing memorandums of understanding with Civil Society Alliance UK, and subsequently with the Scottish Advisory Forum on Europe. It is also reflected in the visits to London, Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff carried out as part of the drafting of this own-initiative opinion, the 2023 Information Report on the Implementation of the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement (25), and in other formal and informal meetings between EESC members and UK CSOs. Additionally, the EESC has developed very good relations with the relevant representatives of the UK Mission to the EU, Scotland House, Wales House and the Northern Ireland Executive Office in Brussels.












2.3.


Key structures to monitor the implementation of the EU-UK TCA and the Windsor Framework are in place, but lack youth sector representation. A broader issue of regional representation and resources to facilitate participation in these structures (notably the DAGs) has been identified.




3.   Specific comments









3.1.


The definitive issue impacting the EU-UK relationship in the field of youth stems from the UK’s decision to exit the Erasmus+ programme. As major business, labour and third-sector stakeholders attest, re-joining Erasmus+ should be without prejudice to the UK Turing Scheme, the Welsh Taith programme and similar UK post-Brexit mobility arrangements, which are much narrower in scope and much less funded, and which could thus complement rather than replace Erasmus+.












3.2.


Although the UK sought to implement alternative models to Erasmus+, including across the national and devolved levels, youth sector representatives maintain that these do not match the voluntary youth mobility and non-formal learning opportunities nor the operational grant funding that Erasmus+ previously granted the UK youth sector. While Erasmus+ used to provide substantial structural and project-based funding to youth CSOs annually to carry out non-formal exchanges and other activities – (for instance, just under EUR 7 million spread across a total of 201 organisations in 2020), the subsequent Turing Scheme (by solely focusing on mobility for higher education students) has left a financial gap for youth CSOs previously dependent on Erasmus+. These include the British Youth Council (the UK’s national youth council), which in the immediate aftermath of Brexit saw a 40 % reduction in its annual budget, including the entirety of its international-focused budget, due to losing access to Erasmus+. As reported, the loss of this funding stream and the lack of an adequate replacement over the long term are partly to blame for the organisation’s insolvency announcement on Thursday, 21 March 2024. They also accentuate the dire financial conditions experienced by the UK youth sector as its National Youth Council – one of Europe’s oldest and most prominent – faces the risk of total collapse after 75 years of youth service.












3.3.


The loss of Erasmus+ has led to the development of two replacement schemes: the UK-wide Turing Scheme and the Welsh-specific Taith scheme. Lessons from both of these highlight that they do not offer the same variety of opportunities as Erasmus+, and operate with a smaller budget. By virtue of having a comparatively greater youth uptake, the Taith scheme offers a good example of how to improve the accessibility of applying for Erasmus+ funds – an issue many EU stakeholders continue to highlight. Lessons could also be drawn from the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 (26), which requires public bodies in Wales to think about the long-term impact of their decisions, and could be considered as comparable to the EU Youth Test. Additionally, in this context, Wales has appointed a Future Generations Commissioner for Wales (27).












3.4.


Erasmus+ has been identified as being perceived as a fund for the privileged - inaccessible to many, difficult to apply for and lacking a contact person to answer fundamental questions during the application process. This perception is not necessarily a fair reflection of reality but needs to be addressed, and has been highlighted by the effectiveness of the Welsh Taith scheme.












3.5.


Additionally, the EU should facilitate, possibly through co-funding with willing UK partners, renewed participation of young Brits in programmes, including in volunteering and non-formal learning opportunities, such as Erasmus+ until such a time that a future UK government re-joins the scheme. Inversely, the UK could do the same in its current programmes for young people inside the EU.












3.6.


UK youth CSOs express regret regarding the UK’s decision to exit Erasmus+ – a decision which they say has hindered not only the UK youth sector’s access to vital financing, but also to renowned schemes like the European Solidarity Corps and the European Union Youth Dialogue Conference – two schemes where the UK used to be a top participant.












3.7.


UK youth CSOs also reported that while they wish to see the return of Erasmus+, the scheme could be made more accessible and effective if, like Taith, it were more tailored to geographic specificities and distributed by more localised actors.












3.8.


A general desire to have the scheme’s non-formal education components better promoted was also expressed by youth CSOs, who worried that the lack of promotion of these by the EC threatened to advance the false perception that the scheme is solely accessible for middle-class students.












3.9.


Given that EUR 89,5 million in funding had been dispersed amongst 376 UK-based cultural and creative organisations between 2014 and 2018 (28), the UK’s exit from the Creative Europe scheme has significantly diminished cultural relations between the EU and the UK and its devolved administrations (29).












3.10.


Increased structural engagement of youth CSOs from the devolved regions of the UK is required to improve the effectiveness and overall representativity of both the joint EU-UK DAG and the Civil Society Forum.












3.11.


The EU Youth Strategy (30) states that ‘Member States should encourage youth and other stakeholders to set up joint initiatives, for example in education, employment, digital, sport, sustainability and international cooperation, using the full potential of EU funding’. This section of the new EU Youth Strategy could serve as a basis for devising relevant joint initiatives between EU and UK youth.












3.12.


The UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) is the government’s domestic replacement for the European Structural and Investment Programme. The UKSPF is a fund worth GBP 2.6 billion. However, the UKSPF cannot be compared to ERDF or ESF funding (to which Northern Ireland no longer has access due to Brexit), where these programmes were developed in partnership with local authorities, all of which have direct knowledge of the real issues on the ground. On the other hand, the UKSPF does not involve local authorities in the development of the programme, which is potentially detrimental for addressing local issues.












3.13.


Initiatives like PEACE PLUS and the Shared Island Youth Forum have been instrumental to maintaining stability in Northern Ireland by funding civil society groups and youth organisations. However, increased paramilitary activity (31) has been reported in Northern Ireland despite these schemes, resulting from Northern Irish youth feeling increasingly left behind, especially on a community level. This has been also recently highlighted by the UK Parliament’s Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (32), and is a sentiment which was evident in the EESC’s interactions with key Northern Irish stakeholders and in the survey data collected for this opinion report.












3.14.


The unique situation in Northern Ireland means that issues around rights are particularly sensitive. This may be most appropriately addressed through the establishment of a sub-group on rights within the UK-EU Joint Consultative Working Group. This might be able to contribute to addressing concerns around non-diminution of rights, as specified in the GFA/Belfast Agreement.






Brussels, 24 April 2024.


The President


of the European Economic and Social Committee

Oliver RÖPKE
               





(1)  
            https://www.youthforum.org/files/231207-PP-Erasmus.pdf.

(2)  
            https://www.byc.org.uk/uk-young-ambassadors/2024/advocating-for-erasmus-in-parliament-and-beyond [Note: Amid the uncertainty created by the British Youth Council’s insolvency announcement on Thursday, 21 March 2024 (see point 3.2), all mentions to the organisation from here on out shall remain directed to them so long as it stands. In the event that the legal entity fully collapses, the opinion’s mention to the British Youth Council shall be re-interpreted to focus on the elected pool of international ‘UK Young Ambassadors’ and their successor structure.].

(3)  
            https://1.yem.org.uk/embrace-erasmus.

(4)  
            https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/aug/22/music-industry-workers-no-work-in-eu-since-brexit.

(5)  
            https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9658/.

(6)  
            https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/d-uk/activities/inter-parliamentary.

(7)  
            https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2023/749799/EPRS_ATA(2023)749799_EN.pdf.

(8)  
            https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/12/28/uk-lifts-brexit-obstacles-for-french-students-and-schoolchildren_6382995_7.html.

(9)  
            https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/youth/youth-sounding-board_en#current-youth-sounding-board.

(10)  
            https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/initiatives/your-europe-your-say.

(11)  
            https://youth.europa.eu/news/join-us-level-i-care-i-vote_en.

(12)  
            https://european-youth-event.europarl.europa.eu/en/previous-editions.

(13)  
            https://youth.europa.eu/get-involved/eu-youth-dialogue/previous-eu-youth-dialogue-consultations_en.

(14)  
            https://www.youthforum.org/.

(15)  
            https://nya.org.uk/byc/.

(16)  
            https://young.scot/.

(17)  
            https://niyf.org/.

(18)  
            https://www.urdd.cymru/en/.

(19)  
            https://www.britishcouncil.be/programmes/education/stronger-together.

(20)  
            https://www.wwf.org.uk/wales/land-of-our-future.

(21)  
            https://www.ceja.eu/home.

(22)  
            https://www.ceja.eu/who-we-are/people.

(23)  
            https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/citizens-equality-rights-and-values-programme_en.

(24)  
            https://www.disabilityaction.org/.

(25)  
            https://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/information-reports/implementation-eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement-including-protocol-ireland-and-northern-ireland.

(26)  
            https://www.futuregenerations.wales/about-us/future-generations-act/.

(27)  
            https://www.futuregenerations.wales/.

(28)  
            https://www.ietm.org/en/node/11501.

(29)  
            https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/cult-committee-meeting_20240124-1430-COMMITTEE-CULT.

(30)  
            https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0269.

(31)  
            https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/paramilitaries-grooming-young-and-preying-on-single-mothers-report-finds/a23525029.html.

(32)  
            https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5804/cmselect/cmniaf/43/report.html.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4053/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)