REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementing the prohibition of unfair trading practices to strengthen the position of farmers and operators in the agricultural and food supply chain – State of play
Date: 2024-04-23
Institutions: Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission
Subjects: EU Member State, agri-foodstuffs, application of EU law, consumer protection, food industry, restriction on competition, supplier, supply chain, unfair terms of contract

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 23.4.2024  COM(2024) 176 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS Implementing the prohibition of unfair trading practices to strengthen the position of farmers and operators in the agricultural and food supply chain – State of play {SWD(2024) 106 final}  
 
 
Contents 
1. 

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 2 

1.1. 

Background ............................................................................................................................. 2 

1.2.  Objective and scope of this Report ......................................................................................... 2 

2.  General overview on transposition ......................................................................................... 3 

3. 

Specific points of analysis ....................................................................................................... 3 

3.1. 

Scope of application and business size (Article 1) .................................................................. 3 

3.1.1. 

Chain operators and supply relationships ..................................................................... 3 

3.2. 

Prohibited UTPs (Article 3) ...................................................................................................... 3 

3.3. 

Enforcement mechanisms (Articles 4-8) ................................................................................. 4 

3.3.1. 

Designation of enforcement authorities (Article 4) ...................................................... 4 

3.3.2. 

Complaints and confidentiality (Article 5) ..................................................................... 5 

3.3.3. 

Powers of designated enforcement authorities (Article 6) .......................................... 5 

3.3.4. 

Enforcement measures and sanctions (Article 6).......................................................... 6 

3.3.5. 

Administrative, judicial enforcement and alternative dispute resolution ................... 6 

3.3.6. 

Cooperation among enforcement authorities (Article 8) ............................................. 6 

3.3.7. 

Publication of enforcement authorities’ annual activities report (Article 10) ............. 7 

3.4. 

Stricter national rules (Article 9) ............................................................................................. 8 

3.5. 

Focus on cross-border enforcement ....................................................................................... 8 

4. 

Evaluation of the Directive (Article 12) ................................................................................... 9 

5.  Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 9 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

1.1. 

Background  

On 17 April 2019 the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive (EU) 2019/633 
on unfair trading  practices in  business-to-business  relationships  in  the  agricultural  and food 
supply chain (‘the Directive’)1.  

The Directive is binding on all 27 Member States (‘MS’). It provides for a minimum level of 
harmonisation by establishing a list of prohibited  unfair trading practices  (‘UTPs’) between 
buyers and suppliers in the agricultural and food supply chain. It also lays down minimum rules 
on  the  enforcement  of  those  prohibitions  and  on  cooperation  between  the  enforcement 
authorities. MS may adopt or maintain national  rules that go beyond the UTPs listed in the 
Directive provided that these are compatible with the rules on the functioning of the internal 
market.       

The Commission (‘COM’) recognises the value of the UTP Directive as a key policy tool for 
strengthening the  position of primary producers in the food supply chain. This report is one of 
the immediate measures listed in the reflection paper addressed to the co-legislator on 15 March 
20242 aiming to respond to the current challenges in the agricultural sector and concerns raised 
by  farmers.  In  the  medium  and  longer  term,  the  Commission  also  suggests  other  measures 
forming  a  package,    including  the  launch  of  an  observatory  of  costs,  margins  and  trading 
practices  in  the  agricultural  and  food  supply  chain  to  increase  transparency,  targeted 
amendments to the Common Market Organisation Regulation3 (‘CMO’),  new rules on cross-
border enforcement of UTPs and an evaluation of the Directive by 2025.  

1.2. 

Objective and scope of this Report 

On  27  October  2021,  the  COM,  presented  a  report  on  the  state  of  the  transposition  and 
implementation  of  the  Directive  according  to  its  Article  12,  covering  the  15  MS  that  had 
notified  complete  transposition  by  31  July  2021,  as  well  as  FR  that  had  notified  partial 
transposition4.  

The present report now covers information on the state of implementation in all 27 MS and 
provides  an  overview  of  a  selection  of  MS’  transposition  choices.  It  exclusively  refers  to 
provisions that are contained in the national laws transposing the UTP Directive. 

Taking into account that the conformity check - which consists of assessing the compatibility 
of the national implementing measures with the Directive’s provisions5 - is still ongoing, this 

1 Directive (EU) 2019/633 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading 
practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain, OJ L 111, 25.4.2019, 
p. 59. 

2 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_1493 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing 
a  common  organisation  of  the  markets  in  agricultural  products,  OJ  L  347,  20.12.2013,  p.  671.  https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32013R1308. 

4 Report from the Commission to the  European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the  Committee  of  the  Regions  on  the  state  of  the  transposition  and  implementation  of  Directive  (EU)  2019/633  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships 
in the agricultural and food supply chain. 

5 Better regulation toolbox 2023. 

2 

 
 
 
 
report  does  not  provide  a  definitive  assessment  of  the  transposition  measures.  In  addition, 
several  national  laws  have just  ‘been modified and  , this  report covers modifications to  the 
transposition laws officially notified until 1 March 2024. 

It should further be noted that national provisions that maintain or introduce stricter rules than 
those  laid  down  by  the  UTP  Directive  are  not  assessed  by  the  COM  in  the  context  of  the 
conformity  check.  These  provisions  may  be  subject  to  request  for  information  or  further 
investigation. 

This report is accompanied by a Staff Working Document (‘SWD’) providing further details, 
in particular on MS’ choices of transposition. 

2. 

GENERAL OVERVIEW ON TRANSPOSITION 

According to Article 13 of the Directive, MS had to transpose the Directive into their national 
laws by 1 May 2021. By December 2022 all MS had notified  complete transposition to  the 
Commission6.  

3. 

SPECIFIC POINTS OF ANALYSIS 

3.1. 

Scope of application and business size (Article 1) 

Six MS have opted for an application of the transposing measures regardless of the business 
size7 of suppliers or buyers. All other MS refer, to some extent, to business size measured in 
annual turnover as a proxy for the bargaining power of operators to be protected, limiting the 
scope of application of the adopted legislation or parts of it, as provided for by the Directive.  

3.1.1.  Chain operators and supply relationships 

With regard to the relationship between suppliers and buyers of agricultural and food products, 
a majority of MS has determined the sectoral and personal scope as defined in the Directive8.   

LV has expanded the scope to include relationships between suppliers and retailers (only) of 
non-food products. SK has included under the buyer’s and supplier’s definition, legal persons 
that are not  business  operators. ES opted for  the  protection of  all operators along  the chain 
(including buyers).  

3.2. 

Prohibited UTPs (Article 3) 

The Directive requires MS to ban a list of UTPs, splitting them into two groups of prohibitions: 
(i) per  se  prohibitions  or  unconditional  prohibitions  (‘black  list’)  and  (ii) conditional 
prohibitions (‘grey list’), i.e. trading practices that are prohibited unless agreed in clear and 
unambiguous terms upfront in the supply agreement or in a subsequent agreement between the 
supplier and the buyer (Article 3(2)). Each practice is specifically defined in the Directive. MS 

6 Directive - 2019/633 - EN - EUR-Lex (europa.eu). 
7 CY, EE, ES, FR, IT, SK. While maintaining the general application of the implementing legislation regardless of business 
size, some of these MS have referred to business size to provide for some exceptions or variations. E.g., in CY payment 
deadlines vary based on business size in the case of products delivered on a regular basis by suppliers of grapes for the 
production of wine to buyers with an annual turnover of less than EUR 2 000 000; Spanish legislation does not apply to hotel, 
restaurant and catering businesses with turnover of less than EUR 10 million; and businesses engaging in accommodation 
services with turnover of less than EUR 50 million.  

8 The exclusion of certain types of buyers (e.g., cooperatives) by some MS is subject to the ongoing conformity check. 

3 

 
 
 
 
may adopt or maintain national rules that go beyond the UTPs listed in the Directive provided 
that  these  are  compatible  with  the  rules  on  the  functioning  of  the  internal  market.  While 
conforming to the prescribed requirements, MS may in addition: 

•  use  general  clauses  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  prohibitions  to  practices  that  are  not 

specifically listed; 

•  add other practices to the lists; 

•  extend the scope of listed prohibitions or make them stricter; 

•  move practices from the ‘grey list’ to the ‘black list’.    

Details on transposition choices by MS including individual practices are available in the SWD. 
Two practices included in the ‘black list’ deserve special attention as it is possible for MS to 
provide variations within certain limits:  

•  Payment  delays:  169  of  the  27 MS  are  applying  the  provisions  of  the  Directive 
distinguishing between perishable (30-days payment term) and non-perishable product 
sales (60-day term), while 1110 MS apply stricter payment delays.  

All MS, except BE, EE, HU, SE and SK, have incorporated the Directive’s definition 
of perishable products into their transposition legislation. FR has different definitions 
for  ‘perishable’  and  ‘very  perishable’  products.  HR  and  SI  have  added  to  their 
transposition  legislation  a  list  of  perishable  products,  whereas  LT  has  vested  an 
institution, authorised by the Government, with the power to approve a list of perishable 
products.  

•  Cancelling orders at short notice: All MS include the 30-day period as a minimum 
standard for cancellation, except EE, HU and SK. Six MS provide for the possibility to 
set periods of less than 30 days for specific sectors in duly justified cases (e.g. highly 
perishable goods)11.  

3.3. 

Enforcement mechanisms (Articles 4-8) 

3.3.1.  Designation of enforcement authorities (Article 4) 

All 27 MS have designated one or more authorities  (‘enforcement authorities’) to enforce the 
prohibitions  laid  down  in  Article  3  at  national  level.  The  authorities’  contact  details  and 
websites are available on a dedicated website12.  

All  MS  have  chosen  administrative  authorities  and  most  of  them  opted  to  assign  the  main 
enforcement powers to it: eleven MS assigned them to a competition authority13; six to a food 
market  authority14;  five  to  their  Ministry  of  Agriculture15;  two  to  an  authority  in  charge  of 

9 AT, CY, DE, DK, EL, ES, FR, HR, IE, IT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PL, SI. 
10 BE, BG, CZ, EE, FI, HU, LT, PT, RO, SE, SK. 
11 BE, DK, FR, IE, IT, SE. 
12https://ec.europa.eu/info/food-farming-fisheries/key-policies/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/agri-food-
  supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en.  
13 AT, BG, CZ, DK, EE, HR, LU, LV, PL, SE, SI. 
14  DE  (Federal  Office  for  Agriculture  and  Food,  designated  by  the  Federal  Ministry),  ES  (Food  Information  and  Control 
Agency (AICA)), FI (Food Market Ombudsman), HU (Food Chain Safety Office, designated by the Government), LT (Rural 
Business  and  Markets  Development  Agency)  and  PT  (Economic  and  Food  Safety  Authority  (ASAE  -  Autoridade  de 
Segurança Alimentar e Económica)). 

15 CY, IE, IT (an internal division of the Ministry), RO, SK. 

4 

 
 
 
combating unfair commercial practices in  the agri-food sector16;  two to  a government  body 
within  the  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance17;  and  one  to  an  authority  for  consumers  and 
markets18. Some have vested a Court with some of the enforcement powers regulated in the 
Directive19.  

Three MS (EL, LT20  and RO) designated two authorities, the second being  the competition 
authority.  

3.3.2.  Complaints and confidentiality (Article 5) 

Under all transposition instruments notified to the COM, not only single suppliers, but also 
producer  organisations  or  other  organisations  of  suppliers  and  associations  of  such 
organisations have the right to submit a complaint to the designated enforcement authority.  

A vast majority of MS’ transposition instruments have provided for means to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the complainant’s identity, the disclosure of which could be harmful to their 
interests or those of their members or suppliers21. These safeguards should normally be adopted 
upon the supplier’s request22; however, some national transposition measures also provide for 
an  authority’s  initiative  in  this  regard23.  In  most  cases,  the  complainants  are  requested  to 
identify the information for which they request confidentiality24. By contrast, under Polish law, 
the  complainant’s  identity  and  information,  whose  disclosure  could  be  detrimental  to  the 
complainant, is always kept confidential unless the complainant allows disclosure in writing. 
In ES, the law provides for the protection of the identity of the complainant also during judicial 
proceedings. In some MS, the transposing instruments include the possibility to discontinue 
the  proceedings  where  their  continuation  would  cause  confidential  information  to  be 
disclosed25. In LT, the enforcement authority has discretion to reject a confidentiality request 
if the specific information has an evidentiary value in establishing the infringement. However, 
anonymous complaints are explicitly addressed in their legislation. 

3.3.3.  Powers of designated enforcement authorities (Article 6) 

Most MS assign the designated enforcement authorities the powers prescribed by  Article 6, 
namely:  

• 

• 

investigatory and monitoring powers26; 

the  power  to  take  decisions  when  an  infringement  of  the  prohibitions  laid  down  in 
Article 3 has occured 27; 

16 EL, MT.  
17 For FR, the DGCCRF (General Directorate for Competition policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control); for BE, the DG 

for Economic Inspection of the FPS Economy. 

18 NL. 
19 So, in particular, for the power to impose sanctions (AT, FI, FR).  
20 The second enforcement authority has only competence on practices engaged by retailers with significant market power. 
21 However, in some MS (e.g., LV, PT, SE) confidentiality is ensured for identity only but not for other sensitive information. 
22 All MS except AT, FI, FR, LV, PL, SE. Among these, BG law sets out that the complainant’s identity must always remain 

confidential. 

23 e.g. HU. 
24 BE, BG, CY, DK, EL, ES, IE, IT, LU, NL SI. 
25 AT, BE, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, IT, MT, PT.  
26 All MS. 
27 All MS except EE, ES, FI, SI, SK. 

5 

 
 
 
• 

• 

the power to require the buyer to end the prohibited trading practice28;  

the power to impose, or initiate proceedings to impose fines and other equally effective 
penalties29 and interim measures addressed to the author of  the infringement, in line 
with national rules and procedures30 and 

• 

the power to publish the decisions taken31.  

In  nine  MS,  the  enforcing  authority  also  has  the  power  to  validate  commitments  to  be 
undertaken by the infringer32, or to issue warnings33 or recommendations if an infringement 
occurs34.  

3.3.4.  Enforcement measures and sanctions (Article 6) 

Enforcement measures encompass a wide range of instruments, including sanctions, remedies, 
and commitments. The most common measures available to national enforcement authorities 
are financial sanctions (fines or other equally effective penalties), which are provided for in all 
27 MS.  

3.3.5.  Administrative, judicial enforcement and alternative dispute resolution  

Most measures and enforcement mechanisms can be deemed administrative enforcement. 

Some MS’ transposition acts explicitly refer to both administrative and judicial enforcement. 
The Austrian and Finnish legislations set out that certain powers (e.g. penalties) are reserved 
to the court, whereas (in FI) other measures (such as injunctions) may be adopted by both the 
administrative  and  the  judicial  authority.  In  FR,  the  administrative  authority  may  issue 
injunctions  and  administrative  fines,  whereas  the  court  may  adopt  injunctions,  corrective 
measures  and  civil  penalties  (amendes  civiles).  The  Bulgarian  legislation  stipulates  that  the 
institution  responsible  for  specific  proceedings  under  the  transposing  legislation  must  not 
prevent a party to a supply agreement from seeking redress by means of another established 
procedure, implicitly acknowledging the role of other enforcers, including courts. The Latvian 
legislation stipulates that, concurrently with the Competition Council, under procedures laid 
down in the law on civil procedure, a court can also establish whether or not an infringement 
of the transposition law took place. 

Some MS use a system of parallel remedies without, however, providing for specific rules of 
coordination between administrative and judicial authorities. 

3.3.6.  Cooperation among enforcement authorities (Article 8)  

Pursuant to Article 8(3), the COM has set up a public website35, providing contact details of 
national enforcement authorities and links to their respective websites. Additionally, the COM 
has set up a digital forum to facilitate the exchange of information.  

28 All MS except AT, HU. 
29 All MS (for AT: Cartel Court’s power; for FI: Court’s power). 
30 Specifically foreseen in the national transposition measures in: BG, DK, EL, FI, FR, ES, IE, LT, LU, LV, NL, PT, RO. 
31 All MS except CZ, LV,  PT. 
32 BE, BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL. 
33 BE, FI, LV. 
34 EL. 
35 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/agri-food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en. 

6 

 
 
 
 
After having closely accompanied MS in their respective transposition process through regular 
meetings, providing answers to questions of implementation, and over 50 individual written 
replies concerning implementation, the COM facilitated the setting up of the UTP Enforcement 
Network (‘the Network’). Composed of representatives of the national enforcement authorities, 
the  Network  engages  in  discussions  concerning  the  Directive’s  application  based  on  MS’ 
annual reports (Article 10(2)). It aims to ensure a common approach concerning the application 
of the rules set out in the Directive and the sharing of good practices, of new developments and 
of  new  enforcement  tools.  Additionally,  it  may  issue  recommendations  as  part  of  its 
collaborative efforts in enhancing the enforcement framework.  

Since its inception in June 2022, the Network met twice at the level of heads of the enforcement 
authorities and twice at technical level. Moreover, it came together in focus meetings to have 
in-depth discussions on specific topics of technical nature. Five such focus meetings have taken 
place since 2022. Themes discussed were for instance the calculation of turnover thresholds, 
cross-border enforcement, and buying alliances. The discussion on cross border enforcement 
allowed to identify possible areas of improvement detailed in section 3.5. 

3.3.7.  Publication of enforcement authorities’ annual activities report (Article 10) 

To  enhance  accessibility  to  the  annual  reports  as  published  by  the  national  enforcement 
authorities  on  their  websites  (Article  10(1)),  the  COM  intends  to  publish  a  consolidated 
overview of links thereto on the UTP webpage36 in 2024. 

Considering that the application of national transposition laws to new agreements began on 1 
November 2021, and at the latest 12 months after the publication of these laws for existing 
contracts, different transposition timelines could be observed accross MS. This divergence led 
to variations in the number of enforcement cases reported so far37. Some MS focus on providing 
guidance to suppliers and buyers to ensure compliance with the rules, while others conducted 
agri-food  sector  inquiries  or  opened  a  number  of  own  initiative  investigations  (i.e. 
investigations not based on complaints or hints). In 2023 around 75% of own initiative cases 
and investigations are from ES due to past enforcement experience and available resources. 
269 infringements (about 27% of the closed investigations) were detected, leading to an overall 
financial sanction of over EUR 22 million. The level of financial sanctions varies within the 
EU.  

The most frequently detected UTPs were late payments for perishable (after 30 days) or non-
perishable (after 60 days) agricultural and food products (50% and 13%), payments not related 
to a specific transaction (7%), payments requested from the supplier for marketing actions (7%) 
as well as for stocking, displaying and listing (7%). About 41% of the UTPs detected had been 
identified at retail level (47% in 2022), 36% at the level of processing (27% in 2022) and 22% 
at the level of wholesale (25% in 2022).  

An overview of aggregated data on MS’ enforcement activities in 2022 and partly for 202338 
is available in the SWD. 

36 https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/agri-food-supply-chain/unfair-trading-practices_en. 
37 The reporting of the number of cases may also depend on the enforcement authorities’ internal rules and may therefore lead 

to under- or over-statement of the cases.  

38 By the deadline of 15 March 2024 only 18 MS had sent their annual report to the COM. 

7 

 
 
 
In  this  context it is  worth underlining that the number of enforcement  activities carried out 
depends  on  the  availability  of  human  resources  in  the  respective  authorities  whose  primary 
allocation to enforce UTP laws differs between MS39.  

3.4. 

Stricter national rules (Article 9) 

According to Article 9 of the Directive, MS may introduce stricter rules to ensure a higher level 
of protection, provided they are compatible with the rules on the functioning of the internal 
market. This can either concern a stricter scope, as mentioned above, or practices not mentioned 
in the Directive, such as e.g. the prohibition to sell or buy below production costs, to re-sell at 
a loss or below purchase price or any other obligation to respect a certain price level. 

“Sales or purchases below cost” and “re-sale at a loss” are not specifically governed by the 
Directive or the Common Market Organisation Regulation.  While four MS have introduced a 
provision on “sale or purchase below production cost”40, three MS did so for a provision on 
“re-sale at a loss”41 and two for another obligation to respect a certain price level42.  

Focus on cross-border enforcement 

3.5. 
In 2019, 17% of the EU agricultural products consumed in a MS originated in another MS43. 
The  exchanges  of  information  on  general  enforcement  approaches  in  the  Network  are 
considered  beneficial  and  a  success  of  the  Directive.  Discussions  among  enforcement 
authorities in the Network suggest that the general obligation in Article 8 to provide each other 
with mutual assistance in cross-border investigations may not always provide a sufficient legal 
basis to ensure effective and efficient cooperation and enforcement. This is especially the case 
for cross-border cases where the buyers involved in trading practices are located in a different 
MS  than  the  one  where  the  supplier  is  based.  Such  situations  require  the  exchange  of 
confidential  information,  the  possible  adoption  of  enforcement  measures  against  a  buyer 
established  in  another  MS  than  that  of  the  enforcement  authority  of  the  supplier,  or  the 
reallocation of cases across the network of enforcement authorities, as well as the collection of 
fines. It can also entail issues related to languages used in the exchanges. Such difficulties can 
also  be  affected  by  the  different  choices  concerning  the  types  of  enforcement  authorities 
designated by MS (e.g., competition authorities have legal tools available that allow them to 
collaborate together more easily than with other enforcement authorities). Moreover, buyers of 
agricultural and food products may source products in multiple MS which suggests a need for 
coordinated  action of  enforcement  authorities.  In this context, the COM  considers that new 
rules on cross-border enforcement against unfair trading practices may become necessary44. 
These  new  rules  would  aim  at  improving  the  exchange  of  information  across  competent 
enforcement authorities or providing for the possibility of coordinated actions against buyers 
in a cross-border context. 

Part of the discussions in the Network also focused on the cross-border nature in handling 
UTP complaints with regard to buying alliances45. While it is worth noting that buying 

39 For example, according to the German Evaluation Report, limited personnel resources coupled with extensive 

investigative efforts pose challenges for the work of the enforcement authority. 
https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/_Internationales/aussenwirtschaftspolitik/evaluierungsbericht-
agrarolkg.html. 
40 ES, HR, HU, IT.  
41 ES, HU, RO. 
42 ES, IT. 
43 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=comnat:SWD_2021_0317_FIN (p 17, figure 7). 
44 Commission's additional measures to support EU farmers (europa.eu). 
45 Four national enforcement authorities (CZ, FR, IT, SE) investigated or are currently investigating buying centers 
or buying alliances at the European level. 

8 

 
 
 
alliances are subject to the UTP Directive as any other buyer and there is thus no particular 
reason to treat them differently, the network highlighted in its exchanges the challenges 
related to their location, in some cases outside the EU and the pressure exerted on the 
resources of the enforcement authority. 

A JRC report46 of May 202047 states that national and European buying alliances can play a 
role in fostering competition in the food supply chain and have a positive impact on consumer 
prices48. At the same time, it also concludes that the role of buying alliances on upstream actors, 
such as  farmers is not  clear  and warrants further investigation. The COM intends to update 
these results in the course of 2024. 

4. 

 EVALUATION OF THE DIRECTIVE (ARTICLE 12) 

The  Directive  stipulates  that  by  1  November  2025,  the  Commission  shall  carry  out  a  first 
evaluation49 of the Directive. The evaluation will be based on the outcome of a support study, 
in  the  framework  of  which  appropriate  targeted  consultations  to  all  stakeholders  involved, 
suppliers and buyers, will be organised. 

To feed into this evaluation, the COM has been conducting, inter alia, annual surveys across 
all EU countries, starting with a baseline survey in 202050.  
Moreover, some MS have already  carried out  their own first  evaluations, such as DE51 and 
SE52. 

5. 

CONCLUSIONS 

The UTP Directive aims at tackling through minimum harmonisation at EU level the previous 
landscape of fragmented national legislations. By December 2022, all MS had transposed this 
Directive into their national laws. 

A  large  majority  of  MS  have  adopted  a  level  of  protection  beyond  the  minimum  level 
established  by  the  Directive.  Stricter  national  rules  than  that  of  the  Directive  are  possible, 
provided  they  respect  the  EU’s  internal  market  rules.  MS  generally  follow  the  sectoral 
approach and apply the Directive only within the agri-food chain. In terms of scope, over half 
of the MS depart from the turnover categories as defined in the Directive, some apply the rules 
regardless of the turnover of the operators concerned. Most MS have expanded the  list of UTPs 
by making the Directive’s prohibitions more stringent for example by turning ‘grey’ practices 
into ‘black’ practices or by adding more prohibitions of trading practices than the ones in the 
Directive.  By  contrast,  the  MS  that  did  not  have  legislation  in  place  before  the  Directive 

46 A Statement by the European Parliament on buying alliances called on the COM to carry out an in-depth analysis on the 

extent and effects of national and international buying alliances which resulted in the referred JRC report. 

47 JRC Publications Repository - Retail alliances in the agricultural and food supply chain (europa.eu). 
48  In  2023,  the  COM  closed  investigations  into  two  international  retail  alliances.  The  COM  found  no  evidence  of 
anticompetitive  effects  and  found,  instead,  that  the  rebates  obtained  by  the  alliances  contributed to  the  retailers'  overall 
pricing  strategies,  allowing  them  to  reduce  retail  prices  to  match  or  undercut  competitors'  pricing”,  see:  Antitrust: 
Commission closes antitrust investigations into AgeCore and Coopernic’  MEX/23/3847 (Brussels, 13 July 2023). 

49 Agricultural & food supply chain – combating unfair trading practices (europa.eu). 
50 Unfair Trade Practices (europa.eu). 
51 DE evaluation. 
52 SE evaluation. 

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generally aligned with the Directive’s  scope. The conformity check assessing the compatibility 
of national implementing measures with the Directive, is still not finalised though. 

The  network  of  national  enforcement  authorities  has,  in  a  series  of  meetings,  collaborated, 
exchanged  best  practices  on  the  enforcement  of  this  new  Directive  and  worked  on  ways  to 
strenghten collaboration in some areas such as cross border enforcement.  The launch of the 
new  observatory  of  production  costs,  margins  and  trading  practices  in  the  agri-food  supply 
chain will further contribute to increasing transparency and trust. 

Improving  the  position  of  farmers  in  the  food  supply  chain,  supporting  their  income  and 
ensuring  a  fair  remuneration  are  important  policy  objectives  with  a  view  to  support  the 
competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the agricultural sector. Perceived inequalities 
and concerns about the viability of agricultural activity related to among others the possible 
imbalances  in  bargaining  power  to  the  detriment  of  farmers,  have  fuelled  recent  farmers’ 
protests.  The measures covered by the aforementioned reflection paper show the significance 
the COM attaches to strengthening the position of farmers in the food supply chain. 

While  being  a  recent  instrument,  the  UTP  Directive  provides  an  answer  to  some  of  these 
concerns,  by  allowing  farmers  and  relatively  weaker  suppliers  in  the  food  supply  chain  to 
operate  more  securely  and  efficiently  thanks  to  fairer  trading  practices,  and  to  express 
themselves and complain more easily. Enforcement is gaining traction and will contribute to 
an  ever-growing  degree  of  protection  of  farmers  and  weaker  suppliers.  The  evaluation 
scheduled for 2025 will be the moment to reflect on the possible need to adjust the Directive 
itself and its parameters in terms of scope or practices at stake.  

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