COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews
Date: 2024-03-20
Institutions: European Commission, Secretariat-General
Subjects: EU candidate countries, EU policy, EU situation, European Union, European Union membership, European integration, Western Balkans, accession to the European Union, democracy, rule of law

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 20.3.2024  COM(2024) 146 final  COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews  
 
 
Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews 

‘In a world where size and weight matters, it is clearly in Europe’s strategic and security 

interests to complete our Union... the next enlargement must also be a catalyst for 
progress’.  

President von der Leyen, State of the Union, 2023 

1.  Introduction  

Since 1957, the European Union, and the European Communities before it, have successfully 
gone  through  several  rounds  of  enlargements,  developing  into  today’s  Union  of  27  Member 
States.  Europe’s  modern  history  is  one  of  a  social  market  economy  consisting  of  liberal 
democracies getting stronger and more prosperous together.  

Pursuant  to  Article 49  of the Treaty  on European Union (TEU), ‘any European State which 
respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to 
become  a  member  of  the  Union’.  The  enlargement  countries  belong  to  the  European  family 
andare  an  intrinsic  part  of  a  Europe  united  and  free.  In  an  increasingly  volatile  geopolitical 
context, with  Russia’s war of aggression  against  Ukraine being  fought on our continent, the 
European Union remains an anchor of peace, prosperity and security.  

Enlargement is in the Union’s own strategic interest. This does not mean that enlargement 
comes  without  challenges.  That  is  true  for  the  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates, 
which will need to carry out substantive political, institutional and policy reforms to be ready 
for  membership,  and  it  is  also  true  for  the  Union,  which  will  have  to  deal  with,  inter  alia, 
increased  heterogeneity,  the  need  for  new  resources,  further  complexity  of  decision-making 
processes  and  the  need  to  maintain  undisputed  respect  for  and  continued  application  of  the 
EU’s core values.  

to  act  more  autonomously  where  needed.  Enlargement  strengthens 

A larger Union has greater geopolitical weight and influence on the global stage, including as 
an  economic  partner.  This  also  helps  reduce  external  dependencies,  enhances  resilience  and 
allows  us 
the 
competitiveness and growth potential of the Single Market, creating new economies of scale 
and  opportunities  for  EU  citizens  and  businesses.  It  boosts  energy  security  and  promotes 
higher environmental, health, social and consumer standards as well as global climate action. 
Most fundamentally, a well-managed enlargement expands and anchors democracy, the rule of 
law,  stability,  external  and  internal  security  and  respect  of  fundamental  rights  across  our 
continent.  

These  benefits  can  materialise  once  both  the  EU  and  future  Member  States  are  well-
prepared.  This  requires  full  and  sustained  political  commitment  and  engagement,  from  the 
candidates  and  potential  candidates,  but  also  from  the  EU  itself.  While  reforms  were 
necessary before, with enlargement they become indispensable.  

In the 2022 Versailles Declaration, EU Heads of State and Government  reaffirmed the EU’s 
long-term  ambitions  and  pointed  to  action  to  achieve  them.  Building  on  it,  in  the  Granada 
Declaration  of  October  2023,  Leaders  stated  that,  looking  ahead  to  the  prospects  of  a  larger 

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Union, both the EU and future Member States need to be ready, and that the EU needs to lay 
the necessary internal groundwork and to implement reforms for a stronger Union.  

The European Council in December 2023 further reiterated this point, making clear that both 
future Member States and the EU need to be ready at the time of accession, and both tracks 
should  advance  in  parallel.  Enlargement  countries  need  to  be  ready  for  accession  and 
assessed on their own merits. At the same time, the EU needs to keep its commitments and be 
ready  to  welcome  new  Member  States.  The  EU  must  deepen  as  it  widens.  We  must  start 
preparing today for the Union of tomorrow and use enlargement as a catalyst for progress. 

EU accession is and remains based on fair and rigorous conditionality, the principle of own 
merit  and  concrete  progress  on  the  ground,  in  line  with  the  ‘fundamentals  first’  approach. 
Each candidate country and potential candidate will be assessed on its own progress in 
fulfilling, in particular, the Copenhagen Criteria, which are the essential conditions that all 
enlargement countries must satisfy to become a Member State. Hence, a timeline or sequence 
of any future accession cannot be prejudged.  

The  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  of  the  European  Union  are  currently  conducting 
their  internal  assessments  on  how  to  meet  the  prospect  of  a  larger  Union,  looking  both  at 
existing provisions of the Treaties and beyond.  

This  Communication  is  the  Commission’s  contribution  to  the  discussions  leading  to  the 
adoption by  Leaders of  a roadmap for future work on enlargement and  reforms,  by summer 
2024. It looks at the implications of a larger EU in four main areas: values, policies, budget 
and  governance.  With  this,  it  lays  the  ground  for  the  pre-enlargement  policy  reviews 
announced by President von der Leyen in her 2023 State of the Union address. It considers the 
impact of enlargement on already evolving EU policies as well as the need to equip candidate 
countries and potential candidates with the tools to adapt and the EU with tools matching its 
ambition.  

2.  Getting ready for a larger Union 

Twenty  years  ago,  10  countries  joined  the  European  Union.  The  total  number  of  Member 
States  increased  from  15  to  25  countries,  to  the  current  27.  All  of  Europe  gained  from  it. 
Enlargement helped anchoring the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and made 
the  EU  the  world’s  largest  integrated  market.  It  opened  trade  and  financial  flows,  thus 
contributing to economic growth in the EU and in acceding countries alike, and strengthened 
the EU’s weight in global affairs. It doubled inward foreign direct investment as a percentage 
of  GDP  from  2004  to  2012  and  resulted  in  aggregate  welfare  gains  in  the  entire  EU.  These 
fundamental opportunities also apply to future enlargements.  

Increased  scale  brings  clear  advantages:  a  larger  Single  Market  and  labour  market,  more 
emissions  reductions,  stronger  social  convergence,  enhanced  health  protection  and  a  more 
powerful voice in the world. Yet, the EU’s policies, budget and governance will inevitably be 
impacted by a larger Union, and enlargement can potentially bring unintended consequences. 
As the Union’s policies must continue to deliver effectively, measures will need to be taken to 
reconcile the opportunities of a larger Union with the challenges it poses.  

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The EU successfully managed previous enlargements. This was achieved by adjusting EU 
policies ahead of accession; by a rigorous accession process ensuring enlargement countries 
are fully prepared in advance of accession; and through targeted assistance.  

This  approach  has  contributed  to  closing  the  gaps  between  old  and  new  Member  States. 
Formal EU accession did not come as a disruptive shock to new and existing Member States, 
but as a further stage in a smooth integration of new Member States into the EU’s policies and 
budget. This was complemented, where needed, by transitional periods after accession, such 
as the phasing-in of funds and access to the EU labour market.  

Thanks  to  the  lessons  learned  from  previous  enlargements,  the  EU  is  now  even  better 
prepared.  It  has  refined  its  enlargement  policy,  by  putting  the  fundamentals,  such  as 
democracy, rule of law and the protection of fundamental rights, even more at the core of the 
accession process. Also, as reflected in the 2020 revised enlargement methodology, it offers to 
candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  enhanced  avenues  for  ‘gradual  integration’  of 
enlargement  countries  into  selected  EU  policies,  already  before  their  accession,  by 
frontloading certain benefits and obligations of EU membership. In line with the conclusions 
of the European Council of 23-24 June 2022, this should be merit-based and reversible. The 
possibilities offered by this gradual integration will be fully exploited, with EU membership 
remaining the final objective.  

In  the  last  years,  the  EU  has  successfully  dealt  with  the  COVID-19  pandemic,  agreed  and 
implemented  NextGenerationEU,  shown  unprecedented  unity  and  solidarity  in  the  face  of 
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and effectively addressed the energy crisis. It has 
also  solved  issues  that  had  divided  our  Union  for  years  –  from  the  Pact  on  Migration  and 
Asylum to the Economic Governance Review. We must continue on this reform path. As we 
further improve our policies at 27, we also become better prepared for a larger Union. 

A successful enlargement will also require the EU and its aspiring members to communicate 
effectively  to  their  respective  societies  on  the  accession  process  and  engage  in  constructive 
debate with their citizens on its strategic importance and benefits for all.  

The prospect of enlargement is also an opportunity to simplify EU rules and better apply the 
subsidiarity  and  proportionality  principles,  including  by  identifying  what  could  be  better 
addressed at national level. 

A) VALUES  

Article 2 TEU sets out the values on which the Union is founded, notably democracy, respect 
for  human  rights,  including  rights  of  minorities,  and  the  rule  of  law.  At  times  where  these 
values  face  challenges,  both  from  outside  and  from  within  the  EU,  it  is  crucial  that  the  EU 
protects and upholds these values and its democratic principles. Compliance with those values 
and principles is a condition for the enjoyment of all the rights deriving from EU membership. 
It  must  continue  to  be  a  priority  of  the  EU  to  ensure  a  deep-rooted  transformation  in 
enlargement  countries,  leading  to  lasting  respect  of  democracy,  equality  and  non-
discrimination, fundamental rights, including childrens’ rights and the rule of law, before and 

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after they join the EU. Member States are required to ensure that there is no regression of their 
laws implementing those values. 

The  rule  of  law  is  one  of  those  core  values.  It  ensures  that  democracy,  equality  and 
fundamental  rights  are  protected  across  the  Union.  It  creates  the  conditions  for    judicial 
independence,  fair  and  well-functioning  justice  systems,  combatting  corruption,  organised 
crime  and  state  capture,  safeguarding  fundamental  rights,  freedom  of  expression,  including 
media freedom and pluralism, and preserving checks and balances including well-functioning 
democratic  institutions  and  public  administration,  a  free  and  empowered  civil  society,  and 
effective  engagement  of  citizens –  all of which  are  at  the  centre of strong democracies.  The 
prevention of and the fight against corruption are crucial to safeguard EU values and uphold 
the  rule  of  law  and  trust  in  those  who  govern  and  public  institutions.  They  are  also 
prerequisites for a strong economy, the proper implementation of EU policies and the sound 
use of the EU budget.  

Functioning democratic institutions, the protection of fundamental rights  and the rule of law 
are a vital part of the Copenhagen Criteria and thus a fundamental precondition for joining 
the EU  in  the first  place. Continuous progress  on these fundamental  reforms determines the 
overall  pace  of  accession  negotiations.  During  the  negotiations,  enlargement  countries  must 
show tangible and continuous progress on the rule of law, as a condition for progress in the 
accession negotiations overall. Beyond accession, that progress needs to be constant. Yet the 
EU has had to deal with significant challenges to the rule of law, including in Member States.  

Over the past years, the EU has put in place dedicated tools to ensure that the rule of law is 
respected  across  the  EU,  including  the  annual  rule  of  law  reports  backed  with 
recommendations, and the Conditionality Regulation designed to protect the EU budget from 
breaches of the principle of rule of law in Member States. 

As announced by President von der Leyen in her 2023 State of the Union address, the annual 
Rule of Law Report cycle has now been extended to those enlargement countries which are 
the most advanced in their accession negotiations, in order to drive their rule of law reforms 
even further. This means that certain enlargement countries are assessed in the same way as 
current Member States. This will support their reform efforts to achieve irreversible progress 
on democracy  and the rule of law, ahead of  accession, and guarantee lasting high  standards 
after accession. 

Looking forward, the EU will need to reflect on how to further strengthen its tools to ensure 
the rule of law is truly and consistently upheld across the EU, beyond accession.  

B) POLICIES 

The European Single Market – the world’s largest integrated market – is one of the greatest 
achievements of the EU. Through its four freedoms – the free movement of goods, persons, 
services  and  capital  -  and  common  policies  it  has,  over  30  years,  fuelled  economic  growth, 
created opportunities and simplified everyday life of European consumers and businesses.  

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In order to allow its citizens to reap the full benefits of the Single Market, the Treaties have 
created the area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers that facilitates the 
free  movement  of  persons,  while  providing  for  appropriate  measures  as  regards  external 
border controls, the management of migration and asylum and the prevention and combating 
of serious and organised crime. The last enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013 provided more 
than 100 million citizens with the benefits of the Single Market, such as  lower prices, more 
choice,  quality  jobs  and  a  high  degree  of  health,  safety  and  consumer  protection,  and 
facilitated the access of EU businesses to new markets. On the tenth anniversary of the 2004 
enlargement in 2014, the combined EU GDP had grown to €13 trillion.  

While not being without challenges or unintended consequences and conscious that it should 
be  monitored  closely  and  addressed  thoroughly,  a  larger  Union  significantly  enlarges  the 
benefits  of  the  Single  Market  (as  well  as  of  the  Customs  Union).  The  next  enlargement  is 
bound to  bring  further  opportunities and  prosperity  for the Union  as  a  whole,  strengthening 
the competitiveness of the EU economy in today’s fierce global competition. This will happen 
notably through increased trade opportunities and higher productivity; greater energy security; 
reduced  critical  dependencies  on  third  countries  for  instance  on  critical  raw  materials; 
enhanced  resilience  and  more  secure  supplies;  greater  choice  of  goods  and  services  at 
competitive prices for consumers; additional benefits and lower costs of financial and banking 
services for consumers and firms, thanks to economies of scale. 

Early  and  gradual  access  to  the  Single  Market  will  also  allow  enlargement  countries’ 
economic  operators  to  further  integrate  in  European  value  chains.  To  this  end,  strategic 
partnerships in industrial ecosystems of mutual interest (e.g. raw materials, batteries, tourism, 
circular economy, machinery) could be established. 

Taking over the acquis of the Single Market is at the core of any EU accession. This entails 
full adherence to a single comprehensive set of rights and obligations, which cannot be ‘à la 
carte’  either  in  terms  of  policy  areas  or  governance.  This  raises  the  issue  of  how  to 
further  roll  out  gradual  access  to  the  Single  Market  before  accession,  both  in  terms  of 
determining target areas and the conditions for it.  

Notably, it will need to be decided whether gradually granting access to enhanced internal 
market treatment would create directly enforceable rights and obligations in the legal order 
of the Union and of the enlargement countries. The specificities of different sectors will need 
to be taken into account when considering internal market treatment before accession. It also 
needs  to  be  decided  which  safeguards  are  required,  in  terms  of  uniform  interpretation, 
application and enforcement of the EU acquis, and possibilities for the Union to react in case 
an enlargement country does not comply with its obligations. 

This reflection does not start from scratch. The tools and framework that already govern the 
relations between the EU and the enlargement countries (such as Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements  with 
the  Association  Agreements/Deep  and 
Comprehensive  Free  Trade  Areas  (DCFTAs)  with  Ukraine,  Moldova  and  Georgia)  already 
offer  major  opportunities  to  ensure  a  smooth  transition  towards  membership,  including 
gradual  integration  into  specific  areas  of  the  Single  Market.  These  frameworks  are 
complemented by additional initiatives (see box hereafter). 

the  Western  Balkans  and 

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Examples of gradual integration initiatives: 

The Priority Action Plan (PAP) under the DCFTA with Ukraine aims to provide the country 
with access to areas of the Single Market ahead of accession by including it in the EU’s Roam 
Like  at  Home,  by  preparing  the  access  to  the  Single  Euro  Payments  Area  (SEPA)  in 
accordance  with  the  relevant  procedures  and  requirements,  as  well  as  allowing  for  free 
circulation for certain industrial goods (ACAA). A similar Plan exists also for Moldova and is 
now being put in place with Georgia.  

The  Growth  Plan  for  the  Western  Balkans  incentivises  the  region  to  prepare  for  EU 
membership and accelerate the necessary socio-economic and fundamental reforms, notably 
by  bringing  forward  some  of  the  benefits  of  access  to  the  Single  Market.  These  priority 
actions, including extending the EU’s Roam Like at Home to the region, preparing the access 
to  the  SEPA  in  accordance  with  the  relevant  procedures  and  requirements,  as  well  as 
allowing for free circulation for certain industrial goods and opening up some service sectors, 
will  be  implemented  making  full  use  of  the  provisions  of  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Agreements.  

This  initiative  is  undertaken  in  parallel  with  the  Common  Regional  Market  within  the 
Western  Balkans  which,  based  on  EU  rules  and  standards,  aims  to  ensure  economic 
integration  of  the  region.  The  cumulative  effect  of  regional  integration,  the  gradual 
integration into the EU’s single market and structural reforms will accelerate socio-economic 
convergence prior to their accession.  

These gradual integration processes are also  supported financially by the proposed Reform 
and  Growth  Facility  for  the  Western  Balkans,  the  Ukraine  Facility  and  the  EU  Support 
Package  for  Moldova.  They  should  ensure  the  necessary  investments  to  improve  economic 
and social convergence within an EU of 30+. 

Ensuring  early  integration  to  certain  areas  of  the  Single  Market  for  candidate  countries  and 
potential  candidates  will  require  not  only  dynamic  alignment  to  the  EU  acquis  but  also,  in 
terms of governance, a uniform and effective implementation and enforcement of all relevant 
EU rules. This is key to prevent any risk of fragmentation of the Single Market and to maintain 
trust in the respect of the rules. 

The quality,  capacity and performance of public administration is  fundamental  to  deliver on 
EU policies and implement EU legislation. Absorption of the EU acquis will be facilitated by 
an increased interaction between administrations of enlargement countries, Member States 
and  EU  institutions.  Enlargement  countries  already  participate  –  often  as  observers  –  in 
preparatory work on EU  legislation and policies, or in  the work  of  certain  EU  decentralised 
agencies,  thus  rooting  EU  standards  in  their  systems  early  on. Instruments  such  as  the 
Technical  Support  Instrument,  TAIEX  and  Twinning  should  be  even  further  expanded  to 
provide  technical  and  policy  support  to  the  public  administrations  of  future  EU  Member 
States.  Many  of  the  enlargement  countries  are  also  already  associated  to  internal  market-
relevant EU programmes, giving them similar opportunities to those of EU actors.  

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The  Commission  will  also  continue  to  support  people-to-people  programmes,  such  as 
Erasmus+,  especially  with regards to youth,  to  foster  a common European spirit, creating 
synergies for  example  with  the Regional Youth  Cooperation Office founded by the  Western 
Balkans, or the network of Young European Ambassadors in the enlargement countries.  

Importantly, the integration of enlargement countries in an enlarged Single Market will benefit 
from reforms in key policy areas identified in the forthcoming pre-enlargement policy reviews 
listed  below.  These  will also  benefit  from  the  ongoing  sectorial  reflections  and  in  particular 
the insights of two upcoming high-level reports: the High-Level Report on the future of the 
Single Market commissioned by the Presidency of the Council and by the Commission from 
Enrico Letta, and the Report on the future of European competitiveness from President von 
der Leyen’s Special Adviser Mario Draghi.  

i) Enhancing connectivity 

Benefits and challenges 

A  larger  Union  will  bolster  physical  connectivity,  with  new  transport  and  trade  routes, 
including extended European Transport Corridors, leading to lower logistical costs, smoother 
trade flows, ultimately bringing tangible benefits to consumers, citizens and businesses.  

An extended European Transport Area would offer the basis for new policy initiatives and 
investment to sustain the EU’s global leadership across the value chain  in various transport 
sectors (e.g. manufacturing of planes, cars, trucks and rolling stock, production of sustainable 
fuels, logistic and transport services including the military mobility dimension).  

Enlarging  the  Energy  Union  could  further  facilitate  energy  infrastructure  development  and 
bolster  the  EU’s  energy  security,  affordability,  and  decarbonisation.  Several  enlargement 
countries  have  considerable  potential  for  low-carbon  energy.  This  extension  could  also 
contribute to sustain the EU’s global leadership in deploying renewable energy. 

As  regards  the  Digital  Single  Market,  the  Digital  Decade  Policy  Programme  will  support 
future  Member  States  in  identifying  areas  for  action  to  meet  the  common  targets  for  digital 
skills,  infrastructures,  businesses  and  public  services.  This  would  put  digital  infrastructures 
and  technologies  at  the  service  of  sustainable,  inclusive  and  prosperous  societies.  New 
Member States will also benefit from the application of EU pioneer legislation in the area of 
personal  data  protection,  artificial  intelligence  (e.g.  AI  Act),  online  platforms  (e.g.  Digital 
Markets  Act,  Digital  Services  Act  and  platform  workers),  data  (e.g.  Data  Act  and  Data 
Governance Act) and interoperability.  

Likewise,  European  digital  connectivity  would  be  enhanced  by  deepening  roaming 
cooperation  with  enlargement  countries,  whilst  aligning  electronic  trust  frameworks  would 
facilitate trade and the movement of people.  

Further benefits should stem from an extended application of the EU cybersecurity legislative 
framework  and  the  early  application  by  enlargement  countries  of  the  EU  toolbox  for  5G 
cybersecurity. In the context of an already closely integrated cyber space, this should increase 
the collective capacity to respond to threats and incidents. 

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Much of this progress will also depend on the availability of sufficient private and public 
investment,  notably  to  ensure  the  deployment  of  secure,  resilient  and  high-capacity  digital 
communication infrastructure, and establish European Digital Innovation Hubs for supporting 
business  and  public  sector  organisations  to  address  digital  challenges  and  become  more 
competitive. Other potential challenges include regulatory convergence (such as in the areas 
of  electronic  communications,  roaming,  radio  spectrum,  electronic 
trust  services), 
cybersecurity  of  supply  chains,  given  the  exposure  of  candidate  countries  and  potential 
candidates  to  sophisticated  malicious  cyber  actors  and  the  presence  of  high-risk  vendors’ 
technology, which is a key consideration especially for the 5G networks. These challenges of 
level  of  investments  and  regulatory  convergence  are  equally  of  concern  in  the  energy  and 
transport sectors.   

Considerations for upcoming policy reviews 

The policy reviews will examine how policy initiatives to enhance resilience through industrial 
breakthrough  innovation  could  derive  greater  scale  and  support  from  Important  Projects  of 
Common  European  Interest  (e.g.  as  has  been  done  in  fields  like  semiconductors  and 
hydrogen).  Similarly,  additional  strategic  partnerships  in  ecosystems  of  mutual  interest  (e.g. 
raw  materials,  batteries,  tourism,  circular  economy,  machinery,  space)  could  be  established. 
Support  to  investments  should  focus  on  the  accelerated  development  of  the  extension  of 
energy and transport interconnections under the TEN-E and TEN-T in candidate countries and 
potential  candidates.  It  could  also  examine  how  enlargement  countries  can  build  up  the 
necessary  administrative  capacity  to  effectively  participate  in  future  cross-border  and  multi-
country strategic projects. 

New  joint  purchasing  instruments  taking  inspiration  from  the  EU  Energy  Platform  could 
associate  enlargement  countries  to  secure  strategic  commodities,  such  as  hydrogen  and  raw 
materials critical to the EU’s energy transition, digital transition and the competitiveness of the 
EU economy.  

In a larger Single Market,  a responsible uptake of new digital products  and  technologies on 
financial  markets  could  make  a  difference.  Early  involvement  of  enlargement  countries  in 
activities 
the  EU 
Cybersecurity Reserve and closer partnership with the EU Cybersecurity Agency) would also 
be  mutually  beneficial.  A  broader  use  of  digital  solutions  is  instrumental  to  cutting  or 
avoiding red tape both in the existing and future Member States.  

the  EU’s  cybersecurity  capacities  (including 

increasing 

through 

Gradual integration 

The  further  integration  of  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  into  these  respective 
parts of the Single Market will be underpinned by strengthening regulatory convergence and 
infrastructure links with the EU. The Western Balkans Investment Framework is stepping up 
support  to  put  in  place  the  necessary  transport,  energy,  environment  (waste  and  water 
management),  digital  and  social  infrastructure  as  set  out  in  their  Economic  and  Investment 
Plan (EIP). Similar work is underway with Moldova and Georgia through the respective EIPs 
for  the  Eastern  Partnership.  As  part  of  the  Ukraine  Facility,  the  Ukraine  Plan  will  set  out 

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reform  and  investment  priorities,  and  the  Investment  Framework  will  catalyse  private  and 
public investments along those priorities in the country. 

Through the Energy Community Treaty, work continues on alignment with the EU energy, 
environment  and  climate  acquis  and  on  the  extension  of  the  Trans-European  Networks  for 
Energy  (TEN-E)  to  improve  energy  interconnections  between  the  EU,  the  Western  Balkans, 
Ukraine,  Moldova  and  Georgia.  The  synchronisation  of  Ukraine’s  and  Moldova’s  electricity 
grids  to  the  continental  European  network  strengthens  energy  security  and  creates 
opportunities for electricity trade. 

Similarly,  the  Trans-European  Transport  Networks  (TEN-T)  are  extended  to  improve 
transport  connectivity  with  the  EU  and  support  these  countries  in  implementing  the  EU 
transport  acquis,  including  under  the  Transport  Community  Treaty,  where  the  Commission 
will  consider  options  to  further  deepen  the  participation  of  Ukraine,  Moldova  and  Georgia. 
Progressive  alignment  with  the  EU  aviation  acquis  is  pursued  through  existing  aviation 
agreements.  

Reinforcement  of  and  investments  in  Solidarity  Lanes  as  permanent  links  also  bring  an 
important  contribution  in  this  respect,  alongside  a  host  of  other  initiatives  in  the  transport 
sector, such as the participation of enlargement countries to EU agencies and programmes in 
the area of transport.  Enhanced customs  cooperation can  facilitate gradual  integration into 
the Customs Union. Better connectivity will also facilitate military mobility. Through various 
Global Gateway initiatives, including the Economic and Investment Plans, the Digital Agenda 
for the Western Balkans and the Ukraine Investment Framework under the Ukraine Facility, 
the  EU  is  already  mobilising  considerable  public  and  private  investment  to  support  digital 
transformation of the candidate countries and potential candidates (and in the case of Ukraine, 
its reconstruction and modernisation). 

Furthermore, the EU started the process to bring Ukraine and Moldova into the EU Roam Like 
at Home area, whilst facilitating voluntary roaming arrangements between telecom operators 
in the EU and in the Western Balkans, Ukraine and Moldova as well as the preparation of a 
Regional Roaming Agreement, which will contribute to reduce roaming prices in the Eastern 
Partnership region by up to 87% in the next years.  

Other  important  initiatives  include  the  EU-Ukraine  strategic  partnership  on  critical  raw 
materials,  which  could  serve  as  an  example  for  similar  partnerships  with  other  enlargement 
countries. 

ii) Keeping our climate and environment commitments 

Benefits and challenges  

As more countries adhere to the EU’s ambitious climate and environmental commitments and 
acquis,  a  larger  Union  will  positively  contribute  to  addressing  climate  change  and 
biodiversity  loss,  notably  by  expanding  EU  decarbonisation  efforts.  The  enlargement 
countries have strong potential in terms of renewable energies and energy efficiency and are 
home to important natural resources and biodiversity. 

 9 of 22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implementing  the  EU’s  ambitious  green  agenda  will  also  entail  challenges.  Several 
enlargement  countries  have  highly  polluting  industries,  under-performing  water  and  waste 
management  infrastructures,  rely  substantially  on  coal  for  electricity  production  and  have  a 
high greenhouse gas emission profile and high air pollution levels. At the same time, they have 
a  strong  potential  for  renewable  energy  (especially  solar  and  wind)  and  pollution  reduction 
through the introduction of modern abatement technologies. The green transition, in particular 
the  deployment  of  renewable  energy  on  land  and  offshore,  needs  to  be  accelerated.  Their 
industrial and building stock will require refurbishment to enhance their energy efficiency and 
facilitate  a  just  transition  from  a  coal-based  economy.  Significant  efforts  will  be  needed  to 
move  towards  a  circular  economy  and  achieve  sustainable  consumption,  production  and 
resource use. This will require adequate investments, namely to cater for impacts on specific 
regions, sectors and workers.  

The inclusion of new countries in the EU Emissions Trading System would provide a powerful 
tool to decarbonise their economies and raise national financing needed for the transition. The 
impact of increase of both supply and demand of allowances on carbon price levels need to be 
assessed under the reviews. 

Considerations for upcoming policy reviews 

Against  this  backdrop,  the policy  reviews  would  have  to  examine  how  to  best  support  the 
enlargement  countries  in  aligning  with the  EU’s  climate  and  green  industrial  policies.  They 
would also analyse to what extent new challenges can be addressed by the  EU’s climate and 
green  industrial  policy    while  safeguarding  our  ambitions  and  ensuring  predictability.  The 
policy reviews would finally examine whether and to what extent new Member States would 
need  dedicated  financial  support  to  ensure  that  the  EU  remains  on  track  to  meet  its  climate 
and broader environmental commitments.   

The  green  transition  of  industries  in  enlargement  countries  should  benefit  from  a  European 
growth-enhancing  business  environment  that  is  geared  towards  the  development  and  use  of 
clean  technologies  and  high  energy  and  resource  efficiency.  This  requires  setting  the  right 
incentives and mobilising the adequate mix of private and public sector investment.  

Finally,  the  policy  reviews  could  look  into  some  key  enablers  such  as  public  and  private 
investment needed to develop the renewable energy potential, green innovation or skills.  

Gradual integration  

Some  of  the  climate  and  energy-related  challenges  related  to  enlargement  are  already  being 
mitigated by the transformation efforts underway in the enlargement countries, under various 
initiatives.  

As  Contracting  Parties  to  the  Energy  Community,  the  Western  Balkans,  Ukraine,  Moldova 
and  Georgia  have  adopted  binding  2030  energy  and  climate  targets  aligned  to  EU  ambition 
and are preparing their National Energy and Climate Plans due in June 2024 thus contributing 
to their gradual integration into the EU energy market.  

Work is also ongoing on developing carbon pricing, including the necessary Greenhouse Gas 
emissions monitoring framework.   

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Moreover, the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, designed to align the region to the 
ambitions  of  the  Green  Deal,  facilitates  regulatory  reforms  and  investments  in  the  region, 
particularly  in  the  areas  of  energy  transition,  sustainable  mobility,  air,  water  and  soil 
depollution,  the  circular  economy,  biodiversity  protection  and  ecosystems  restoration  or 
sustainable food production. 

To  support  these  efforts,  the  EU  mobilises,  promotes  and  accelerates  private  and  public 
investments in the green transition through its Economic and Investment Plans (EIP) for the 
Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, the Ukraine Facility, the New Growth Plan for 
the Western Balkans, the Energy Support Package for the Western Balkans, or the Central and 
South  Eastern  Europe  energy  connectivity  High-Level  Group  focusing  on,  for  instance 
renewable  energy  sources,  the  energy  efficiency  ‘renovation  wave’,  domestic  and  cross-
border infrastructure , energy transition (especially away from coal) and regulatory alignment. 
To ensure maximum efficiency, the participation of enlargement countries in EU agencies and 
programmes in this area should be further intensified.   

The  EU’s  support  has  also  been  instrumental  in  strengthening  Moldova’s  and  Ukraine’s 
energy sector, providing emergency energy equipment, facilitating their integration in the EU 
energy market and the EU energy platform. This has reduced Moldova’s energy dependence 
on  Russia.  Another  example  of  EU  support  concerns  the  electricity  cable  that  is  being 
considered to connect the rest of Europe with Georgia. 

iii)  Improving  food  quality,  safety  and  security  through  a  competitive,  sustainable  food 
sector 

Benefits and challenges 

One  of  the  key  challenges  of  future  enlargement,  will  be  to  strengthen  the  EU’s  common 
agricultural policy’s ability to support a sustainable and competitive agri-food production 
model,  while  accommodating  the  needs  of  farmers  and  fishers  in  both  current  and  future 
Member States as well as the variety of farming models in a wider Union. This will have to be 
managed in a way that the internal market, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as 
the  Common  Fisheries  Policy  (CFP)  are  preserved,  without  creating  undue  shocks  or  major 
disruption towards achieving its policy objectives. 

Ukraine is one of the most important global food producers, notably on the grain market. Its 
integration in the EU will help the EU’s food security and position in the global agricultural 
trade, but the size and structure of its agricultural production will need to be given appropriate 
attention. 

The  objectives  of  the  CAP  remain  valid  in  a  wider  Union.  Enlargement  will  require  a 
thorough assessment of its long-term effects on the viability and sustainability of agricultural 
policies  in  an  EU  30+,  paying  appropriate  attention  to  the  size  and  structure  of  agricultural 
holdings,  the  structure  of  agriculture  in  each  economy,  coupled  with  the  diversity  of 
agriculture  models,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  long-term  socio-economic  and  environmental 
challenges the sector faces. Ensuring a level playing field for the agricultural sector between 
current and future Member States will be essential. 

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Considerations for upcoming policy reviews 

The policy reviews will examine  the candidate countries and potential candidates’ ability to 
apply  the  EU  legislation  on  direct  farm  support  schemes  and  to  implement  the  common 
market organisations for various agricultural and fisheries products. The role of farming and 
fisheries for the quality of life in rural and coastal areas, its environmental impact and overall 
contribution to sustainability of local communities will need to be fully taken into account.   

Policy reviews will also analyse how to ensure the full compliance, and effective and coherent 
application of other related policies that guarantee high safety and quality standards in areas 
such  as  food  safety,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  measures,  animal  health  and  welfare, 
environment etc. 

Gradual integration 

The stabilisation and association process for the Western Balkans sets out common political 
and economic goals -including with regard to the agricultural sector, supported by economic 
and financial instruments to accompany the transition process. The region also benefits from 
funding  under  the  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession  for  Rural  Development,  including  on 
sustainable agriculture and rural agro-business. 

Similarly,  the  implementation  of  Association  Agreements  with  Georgia,  Moldova,  and 
Ukraine  via  regulatory  harmonisation  and  active  support  to  farmers  and  businesses  have 
strengthened agricultural and food safety reforms. Roll-out of fast and affordable internet in 
rural areas also acts as a powerful enabler for the development of rural areas. 

iv) Creating the conditions for social, economic and territorial convergence 

Benefits and challenges 

Membership of the Economic Union brings tangible benefits to the citizens and the economy, 
such as lowering transaction costs, spurring investment, intraregional trade, economic growth 
and  stronger  social  rights.  It  also  provides  access  to  larger  and  more  diversified  financial 
markets, thus reducing financing costs and provides consumers with more choices and lower 
prices.  

Moreover, the single currency in the Monetary Union eliminates exchange rates fluctuations 
and associated transaction costs for companies and citizens alike. Enlarging the Economic and 
Monetary  Union  to  new  members  would  also  support  economic  resilience  of  the  EU  as  a 
whole by facilitating the creation of diversified cross-border value chains. It would also help 
bolster the role of the EU and of the Euro in the global economy.  

Successful  integration  in  an  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  requires  economic  and  social 
convergence  and  effective  coordination  of  economic  and  social  policy  making  between 
Member  States  to  maximise  the  opportunities  it  brings  and  to  avoid  major  disparities  at  the 
national  or  regional  level  and  negative  spill-overs  in  the  case  of  adverse  economic  shocks.  
The minimum standards for workers’ protection set in the EU acquis and the European Pillar 
of Social Rights are the foundation for this social convergence, together with sound industrial 
relations.  In  particular,  well-functioning  labour  market  structures  and  institutions,  effective 

 12 of 22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social  protection  systems  and  strong  social  dialogue  will  be  crucial  to  ensure  a  cohesive 
enlarged Union, leaving no one behind and ensuring a level-playing field.  

Enlargement  will  have  a  considerable  impact  on  the  EU’s  cohesion  policy.  The  policy  has 
proven successful in  contributing  and amplifying the benefits  of the single market,  reducing 
territorial  disparities  and  spurring  upward  socio-economic  convergence  between  Member 
States and regions. The EU’s cohesion policy objectives remain valid in a wider Union, both 
in  current  and  future  Member  States.  However,  the  limited  administrative  capacity  of 
implementing  authorities  and  beneficiaries  in  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates, 
will  create  challenges  for  absorption  and  the  quality  of  investment.  Improving  this  capacity 
with  technical  assistance,  phasing-in periods and  other measures – such as training  - will be 
key  to  ensure  that  the  EU  support  effectively  contributes  to  upward  socio-economic  and 
territorial convergence and that the Union’s financial interests are protected. As was the case 
in  previous  enlargements,  there  is  a  need  for  a  comprehensive  reflection  on  the  future  of 
Cohesion policy in the EU. 

Finally,  extending  the  EU  tax  acquis  would  be  clearly  beneficial,  as  it  would  spur  cross-
border activity and trade in the EU for citizens and companies, creating a level playing field. 
However, the existing unanimity requirement in the Council on tax matters will be even more 
challenging in a larger Union, inviting to consider  qualified majority voting in this area. The 
same would be true for certain aspects of other EU policies (e.g. elements of social policy).  

Considerations for upcoming policy reviews 

To  address  challenges  linked  to  the  governance  of  economic  and  social  convergence 
policies within a wider group of Member States, the policy reviews will need to reflect inter 
alia on how to close legislative and enforcement gaps (e.g.,  economic and fiscal policy, free 
movement, social security coordination, labour law, consumer protection, health and safety at 
work).  While  the  fundamental  value  of  free  movement  needs  to  be  ensured,  additional 
measures  would  be  needed  to  mitigate  the  risks  of  social  dumping  or  brain  drain  and 
depopulation.  In  this  respect,  an  early  involvement  of  social  partners  from  future  Member 
States  is  essential,  including  when  adapting  existing  legislation,  adopting  new  rules  and 
enforcing them.    

Gradual integration 

Within  the  EU,  coordination  of  economic  and  social  policy  happens  in  the  context  of  the 
European Semester. The European Semester country-specific recommendations, proposed by 
the  European  Commission  and  adopted  by  the  Council,  also  underpin  the  financial  support 
provided through the NextGenerationEU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF).  

Since 2015, the European Semester is being replicated in enlargement countries: all candidate 
countries  and  potential  candidates  submit  annual  Economic  Reform  Programmes  to  the 
European Commission, focusing on reforms to boost competitiveness and improve conditions 
for  inclusive  growth  and  job  creation.  These  are  assessed  by  the  European  Commission  and 
the  European  Central  Bank  and  discussed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  with  the  enlargement 
countries. In the future, stronger alignment between the two processes could be considered. 

 13 of 22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  the  case  of  the  Western  Balkans,  the  Economic  Reform  Programmes  will  focus  on  the 
macro-fiscal  framework  and  be  supplemented  by  the  Reform  Agendas  related  to  the  new 
Western  Balkans  Reform  and  Growth  Facility.  The  Reform  Agendas  will  identify  a  set  of 
priority reforms, broken down into measurable steps which will serve as payment conditions.  

In the case of Ukraine, the Ukraine Plan which is the main tool for delivering the Facility, sets 
out the government’s priorities, the sequencing of key reforms and investment priority areas, 
which will bring about  economic growth  and resilience, foster its  integration into the Single 
Market, and ensure Ukraine gradually align its legislation with the EU acquis. 

In  addition,  pre-accession  assistance  helps  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  in 
transforming  their  societies,  legal  systems  and  economies  –  be  it  in  the  form  of  grants, 
infrastructure  investments  or  technical  assistance  to  facilitate  political,  social  and  economic 
reforms. This brings societies closer to the European Union’s values and standards, allowing 
them  to  prosper  in  the  Economic  Union  upon  accession  and  to  contribute  to  the  economic 
resilience of the EU as a whole. Many of the enlargement countries are also already associated 
to relevant EU programmes, such as the Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) strand of 
European  Social  Fund  (ESF).  The  participation  of  enlargement  countries  in  EU  agencies  in 
this  area  should  be  further  intensified,  notably  the  collaboration  with  the  European  Labour 
Authority and in the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work.  

Territorial  cooperation,  including  cross-border  and  transnational  cooperation  programmes, 
already  enables  the  enlargement  countries  to  work  together  and  with  neighbouring  EU 
Member States in key social and economic sectors (including border connectivity as well as 
people-to-people  actions).  Examples  include  the  EU  Macro-regional  Strategies  for  the 
Adriatic, Ionian and Danube Regions, the Common Maritime Agenda for the Black Sea or the 
Interreg  cross-border  programmes  implemented  with  Ukraine  and  Moldova,  which  received 
additional funding in 2023. 

v) Delivering strong security commitments, migration and border management 

Benefits and challenges  

In  an  increasingly  challenging  geopolitical  context,  a  larger  Union  with  a  bigger  population 
would increase its weight in world affairs and in multilateral settings – if it is able to act in 
a united, fast and decisive manner. This external unity and ability to act requires, in the first 
place, an underlying shared vision and a strong degree of common analysis and views among 
Member  States.  Yet,  a  larger  Union  might,  at  least  initially,  bring  a  greater  diversity  of 
external policy interests and agendas.  

New  Member  States  will  contribute  to  and  benefit  from  additional  security  commitments: 
members  of  the  European  Union  must  act  in  a  spirit  of  solidarity  when  one  of  them  is  the 
object of a terrorist attack, hybrid campaign or victim of a natural or man-made disaster under 
Article  222  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  (TFEU).  Furthermore,  under 
Article 42(7) TEU, if one Member State is the victim of an armed aggression, the others have 
an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter.  

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An  enlarged  Union  should  not  bring  with  it  new  challenges  in  the  form  of  unresolved 
bilateral disputes. The EU will continue contributing to their solution and keep pressing for 
good neighbourly relations as a key element of the enlargement process. Special arrangements 
and irrevocable commitments must be put in place to ensure that acceding countries are not 
in a position to block the accession of other candidates.  

Enlargement means that a new members’ external borders become the external borders of the 
European Union. Robust and effective external border management must therefore also be part 
of the accession process. The new borders of an enlarged Union can also bring advantages in 
the  shape  of  new  security  assets  and  experience  that  can  benefit  the  Union,  particularly  as 
regards  its  security  and  defence  dimension  which  is  under  permanent  and  continued 
development. 

A  larger  Union  will  bring  new  challenges  to  the  protection  and  control  of  the  EU’s 
external  border for goods  as  well as  for persons.  These include organised  and cross-border 
crime, drug trafficking, the prevention of irregular migration and the  smuggling of migrants, 
trafficking in human beings, the instrumentalisation of migrants for political purposes as well 
as the trafficking of arms, or other dangerous or illicit goods.  

Internal security, and in particular the effective prevention of and fight against terrorism and 
serious  and  organised  crime,  are  a  prerequisite  for  a  functioning  democracy  and  the  free 
exercise  of  fundamental  rights.  This  includes  measures  to  counter  cybercrime,  money 
laundering,  prevent  and  combat  trafficking  in  human  beings.  Also,  serious  and  organised 
crime  are  frequently  linked  to  corruption  and  undermining  state  institutions.  Enhanced  joint 
action to deliver on internal security is a key prerequisite for a successful accession and, at the 
same time, will reinforce the internal security of the EU as a whole. 

Furthermore, full accession to the Schengen area without internal border controls requires 
full implementation of the Schengen acquis as well as its flanking measures of consistent and 
effective security policies and migration and border management. Reflection on practical ways 
to ensure such consistency in an enlarged Union will be required. 

As  regards  migration,  a  larger  Union  will  have  the  benefit  of  being  able  to  better  deploy  a 
whole-of-route approach to migration management as well as a better contribution to global 
responsibility sharing for migration and protection. The Western Balkans, currently a region of 
transit  to  the  EU,  are  already  key  partners  in  joint  efforts  to  ensure  effective  migration 
management  and  address  challenges  jointly  such  as  migrant  smuggling  and  irregular 
migration.  It  is  essential  to  continue  strengthening  the  migration  and  asylum  systems  of  the 
region along the lines of the comprehensive approach enshrined in the Pact on Migration and 
Asylum, notably with support of the EU’s agencies, and to ensure alignment of visa policies 
with those of the EU for effective migration management. 

Considerations for upcoming policy reviews 

As a global actor, a larger Union has to remain open, resilient and economically successful – 
and a reliable partner in the world. A truly geopolitical EU must be able to defend its values 
and preserve its open strategic autonomy and stability while being able to enforce its interests 
on a global scale.  

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To this end, EU-unity and swift decision-making are key. The policy reviews should look into 
the  Union’s  credibility  and  ability  to  act  externally  which  depends  critically  on  efficient 
decision-making. For the moment,  different  areas of the EU’s  external  action are subject  to 
different  decision-making  mechanisms,  bringing  challenges  in  areas  of  external  action 
governed by unanimity in the Council, notably the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In a 
Union  of  30+  Member  States,  this  bears  the  risk  of  being  too  slow,  too  reactive  and  too 
defensive, offering strategic competitors room to exacerbate divisions between Member States.  

The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  have  repeatedly  pointed  to  this  issue  and 
advocated tapping into the existing provisions of the Treaty on European Union to move 
towards qualified majority voting in a few key areas of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy,  via  the  activation  of  the  so-called  ‘passerelle  clauses’.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Commission has underlined the need for Member States to resort to ‘constructive abstention’ 
under  Article  31(1)  TEU  whenever  their  isolated  position  on  a  given  topic  would  otherwise 
obstruct unanimity in the Council. The potential of all these possibilities must be fully tapped 
into, well before and irrespective of the next enlargement.  

Gradual integration  

Continuous  work  will be  needed  to  forge  further  convergence  on  the  EU’s  geostrategic 
vision, interests and priorities. Enlargement countries must embrace and promote EU values 
firmly  and  unequivocally,  ahead  of  their  accession.  They  already  now  need  to  progressively 
align with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) before accession, including 
restrictive  measures.  While  several  candidate  countries  and  potential  candidates  consistently 
maintain full alignment already now, the record of others needs to be improved, as a matter of 
priority,  including  on  sanctions,  particularly  on  Russia  and  Belarus.  Alignment  with  the 
CFSP is an essential signal of shared values and strategic orientation in the new geopolitical 
context.  

Building on ongoing CSDP engagement, existing projects and programmes, capacity building 
in  areas  such  as  hybrid  threats,  including  foreign  information  manipulation  and  interference 
(FIMI), and cybersecurity should be further developed, both as a comprehensive offer open to 
all as well as tailored support to specific needs and requests, as a means of strengthening the 
Union’s  collective  resilience  and  security  against  such  external  threats.  In  addition, 
enlargement  countries  should  seek  early  integration  in  other  EU  security  and  defence 
initiatives,  such  as  specific  projects  under  the  Defence  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation 
(PESCO) and in the European Defence Agency, as well as in programmes relevant to military 
mobility. With Framework Participation Agreements in place with all candidate countries and 
potential  candidates,  they  are  already  contributing  to  Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy 
(CSDP)  crisis  management  missions  and  operations  –  some  of  them  benefitting  from  such 
CSDP  missions  and  operations  themselves.  As  a  result  of  the  assistance  which  enlargement 
countries may receive under the European Peace Facility, their military and defence capacities 
to participate in CSDP missions and operations will be strengthened. 

Participation  of  enlargement  countries  in  the  Hybrid  Risk  Surveys  will  help  develop  an 
appropriate framework for provision of support in becoming more resilient to hybrid threats, 
allowing them to make their own democratic choices free from malign interference.   

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Furthermore, by the  time the next  enlargement takes place,  the Union’s defence dimension 
will  have  developed  considerably.  As  the  EU  Strategic  Compass  on  Security  and  Defence 
goes well beyond traditional CSDP, enlargement countries will have to be ready to commit to 
its implementation across its different strands of work (act, invest, secure, partner), including 
to  the  EU  Rapid  Deployment  Capacity.  In  case  they  would  decide  to  participate  in  the 
European  Defence  Agency,  they  would  be  ready  to,  inter  alia,  align  their  national  defence 
programming  with  the  EU  Defence  Capability  Development  Priorities  and  the  Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence. They could also decide to participate in PESCO as participating 
Members States.  

In parallel, in the current contested geopolitical environment, continued efforts to strengthen 
the  resilience  of  the  space  industry  and  of  the  Union’s  Defence  Technological  and 
Industrial Base, in line with the European Defence Industrial Strategy, will remain a key 
priority.  In  the  specific  case  of  Ukraine,  the  proposal  for  a  European  Defence  Industry 
Programme foresees to treat Ukraine as much as possible as a Member State. In the future, a 
reflection could be undertaken on how and under which conditions to extend the participation 
of the enlargement countries in other Union programmes related to the defence industry. This 
would  contribute  to  avoiding  duplication  and  unnecessary  costs  whilst  promoting  greater 
interoperability.  

In  the  area  of  integrated  border  management,  work  will  need  to  focus  not  only  on 
compliance  and  implementation  of  legislation  but  also  the  development  of  operational 
capacities for the  control  of goods  and persons at the external  borders. This  will require EU 
support to police and border guards, including through strong engagement of EU agencies in 
close  coordination  with  EU  Member  States.  Already  now,  there  is  strong  cooperation  of 
enlargement countries with Member States’ customs and border authorities as well as the EU’s 
justice and home affairs agencies – Eurojust, Frontex, Europol, the European Asylum Agency 
–  often  underpinned  by  formal  agreements.  This  is  increasingly  delivering  results  on  the 
ground. Modernisation and digitalisation of border and customs procedures will be crucial. All 
enlargement countries should continue their work to align themselves to the EU’s visa policy.  

EU action will also  need to  include support to judicial  authorities to  strengthen international 
cooperation  on  investigation  and  prosecution  of  organised  crime  of  which  smuggling  of 
migrants  and  trafficking  in  human  beings,  arms  and  drugs  is  a  significant  part.  Cooperation 
should  continue  through  participation  in  the  European  Multidisciplinary  Platform  Against 
Criminal Threats to tackle the most pressing criminal threats and dismantle high-risk criminal 
networks. Enlargement countries need to remain committed to strengthening internal security 
by  enhancing  their  operational  law  enforcement  cooperation  with  EU  Member  States  and 
agencies. 

C. BUDGET 

The precise financial impact of enlargement will primarily depend on its timing and scope, on 
the result of the accession negotiations which remain merits based, and on the applicable EU 
acquis  at  the  moment  of  accession.  In  any  event,  enlargement  should  be  factored  in  the 

 17 of 22 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflections  leading  to  the  next  Multiannual  Financial  Framework  (MFF),  including  by 
already providing the necessary legal basis to incorporate EU enlargement related expenditure 
and revenues as needed.  

Enlargement  is  however  far  from  being  the  only  topic  that  will  put  pressure  on  the 
future  long-term  EU  budget.  Global  volatility,  significant  security  threats,  the  financial 
impact of post-COVID recovery and the need to rein in national budgetary trajectories are key 
features  to  be  considered.  The  specific  needs  of  a  larger  Union  come  in  addition  to  the 
inevitable need for a modernised, simpler and more flexible EU budget that adequately caters 
for these challenges as well as for key areas requiring common investment, coordinated action 
and joint reforms, such as the green and digital transitions, research and innovation or security 
and defence. The EU budget as it stands is already structurally stretched to its limits. 

Enlargement is thus an opportunity – but not the trigger – to review the financial sustainability 
and  modernisation  of  all  key  policy/spending  areas  (agriculture  and  rural  development, 
cohesion, connectivity, migration and border management, etc). EU policies and programmes 
may need to be redesigned for the next MFF, independently of the enlargement context. This 
review should also cover specific EU spending instruments currently outside the MFF and the 
EU budget. 

However, future EU spending programmes should be developed with future enlargement 
in mind.   

The EU’s preparedness also calls for reforming its own resources system, which is the most 
credible  way  forward  to  face  the  financial  impact  of  the  recovery  efforts  and  the 
implementation  of  EU  priorities  (in  particular  the  repayments  of  NextGenerationEU 
borrowing  and  the  financing  of  the  Social  Climate  Fund)  while  cushioning  impacts  on 
national budgets. Additional contributions from new Member States, albeit modest at the start, 
are  also  to  be  considered.  In  addition,  financial  contributions  from  third  countries  having 
access  and  participating  to  the  Single  Market  (EEA-EFTA  States,  Switzerland)  should  be 
commensurate to the benefits they would gain from a larger Union. 

Beyond  the  EU  budget,  enlargement  countries  will  also  benefit  from  a  wider  array  of 
funding  opportunities.  Future  Member  States  will  be  able  to  draw  on  the  European 
Investment  Bank’s  and  the  European  Investment  Fund’s  enhanced  expertise  and  financial 
capability, as well as from other EU financing partners as Team Europe. 

In order to absorb certain budgetary effects of enlargement more smoothly, the EU has a well-
established  and tested  financial toolbox for  accession. It  combines  caps,  phasing-in  periods, 
the due consideration of statistical effects, increased resort to financial engineering, as well as 
emergency brakes and safety nets for current Member States. 

In  parallel,  there  will  also  be  a  need  to  look  at  how  pre-accession  tools,  such  as  the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession, can be fine-tuned to better prepare for accession and the 
transition  towards  participating  in  EU  programmes  and  instruments  post-accession.  Some 

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novelties  already  introduced  under  the  MFF  2021-20271  may  inspire  future  pre-accession 
tools.  In  the  case  of  Ukraine,  the  international  support  to  recovery  and  reconstruction  will 
have to be specifically considered in this context. 

D. GOVERNANCE 

Since  2022,  notably  following  the  Conference  on  the  Future  of  Europe,  there  have  been 
reflections  on  EU  institutional  reforms  in  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  Member 
States, think tanks and academia. With the prospect of enlargement, this debate has gained a 
new sense of urgency.  

So far, no consensus has been found on how best to approach this issue. While some call for a 
reform  of  the  current  EU  Treaties,  in  particular  the  European  Parliament,  others  suggest 
specific  adaptations  through  the  activation  of  the  untapped  possibilities  enshrined  in  the 
Treaties. Finally, some argue that the Treaties were designed to be ‘enlargement proof’. 

While the Commission has indicated its support to Treaty change, “if and where it is needed”, 
it  believes  that  the  EU’s  governance  can  be  swiftly  improved  by  using  to  the  full  the 
potential of the current Treaties.  

Questions around the EU’s capacity to act exist already in a Union of 27 Member States. This 
concerns in particular unanimity voting rules in the Council. While most decisions are now 
taken  by  qualified  majority  in  the  Council,  in  some  areas,  decisions  need  to  be  taken  by 
unanimity in the Council, as is the case for tax, foreign policy and certain social matters. In a 
larger Union, unanimity will be even more difficult to reach, with increased risks of decisions 
being blocked by a single Member State.  

The  Treaties  already  foresee  ‘passerelle  clauses’2  allowing  for  a  shift  from  unanimity  to 
qualified  majority  voting  within  the  Council  in  key  areas.  To  be  activated,  these  clauses 
require a unanimous decision either from the Council of the European Union or the European 
Council. In 2018 and 2019, the Commission made concrete proposals to that effect in the areas 
of foreign policy, tax policy, social policy, energy and climate policy, but these have not been 
taken forward. Since then, different solutions, such as new emergency brakes or the extension 
of constructive abstentions have been tabled.  

Some Member States resist moving from unanimity to qualified majority voting as they fear 
becoming isolated on matters of essential strategic national interest. The Commission believes 
it is  possible to  move away from  unanimity without putting  at  risk Member States strategic 
interests. This can be done by combining the activation of the Treaties’ ‘passerelle clauses’ 
with appropriate and proportionate safeguards to accommodate such strategic national 

1  e.g.  better  performance  orientation,  including  financial  support  for  the  delivery  of  reforms,  policy 
conditionality etc. 
2 The Treaties provide for two general ‘passerelle clauses’ under Article 48(7) TEU and six  -specific passerelle 
clauses  aimed  at  modifying  decision-making  in  the  following  areas:  CFSP  (Article  31(3)  TEU);  family  law  with 
cross-border implications (Article 81(3) TFEU); social policy (Article 153(2) TFEU); environmental policy (Article 
192(2) TFEU); MFF (Article 312(2) TFEU) and enhanced cooperation (Article 333 TFEU). 

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interests.  In  practice,  this  would  mean  that  the  Council  or  European  Council  decision 
activating the passerelle could be accompanied by European Council conclusions that provide 
for  the  possibility  for  one  or  several  Member  States  to  invoke  exceptional  national  interest 
grounds  to  continue  discussions  to  reach  a  satisfactory  solution,  or  to  seize  the  European 
Council to deliberate on the matter.  

In addition to voting methods, the Treaties allow for Member States to integrate at different 
speeds. Examples range from enhanced cooperation, which is possible in particular in areas of 
shared competence – like in the case of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office - to opt-ins 
and opt-outs where so provided for in the EU Treaties or the inclusion of new Member States 
in the Permanent Structured Cooperation. Such ‘differentiation’  can be part of the equation 
within  a  larger  Union  at  30+  Member  States,  using  the  range  of  tools  and  mechanisms 
available under the current EU legal framework. These flexibility options work only as long as 
the  core  policies,  as  well  as  all  fundamental  principles  and  values  of  the  European  Union 
remain shared and respected by all Member States.  

In  line  with  the  European  Council's  call  for  accelerated  accession  process,  the  enlargement 
process  itself  could  be  looked  at.  The  possibility  of  empowering  the  Council  to  decide  by 
qualified majority could be explored for certain interim steps of the enlargement process. 
The  closing  of  the  negotiating  chapters  should  continue  to  be  taken  by  unanimity  of  all 
Member  States,  as  will  the  final  decision  on  the  actual  accession  of  a  new  member  to  the 
European Union. 

Finally,  an  enlarged  Union  of  30+  Member  States  triggers  immediate  questions  on  the 
composition  of  the  EU  institutions.  For  the  European  Commission,  the  Treaties  already 
allow  to  choose  having  a  smaller  executive  (corresponding  to  two  thirds  of  the  number  of 
Member States) or maintaining  the current  system  of one  member per  Member State, as the 
European Council has so far opted for.  

An enlarged Union  will also inevitably entail more work for the EU institutions in many 
areas, from policy conception and analysis to implementation, enforcement, sound financial 
management and administration, in addition to the various new tasks taken up by the Union in 
the  last  few  years.  EU  agencies  and  bodies  (e.g.  Europol,  Frontex,  Eurojust,  European 
Supervisory  Authorities)  or  networks  (e.g.  the  European  Competition  Network,  Erasmus+ 
National Agencies) will equally be impacted. The upcoming enforcement workload will have 
to  be  featured  in,  as  it  is  crucial  to  preserve  the  integrity  and  functioning  of  the  European 
Union. 

3. Conclusion  

The present Communication shows that a larger Union is of strategic importance, as it holds 
significant political and economic potential, both externally and internally. Maximising these 
opportunities  will  depend  on  our  ability  to  identify,  define  and  anticipate  areas  for 
improvement,  and  to  set  out  a  clear  strategy  on  how  to  advance  on  the  parallel  tracks  of 
enlargement  and  EU  reforms.  It  feeds  into  the  discussions  in  the  European  institutions  and 
Member States on enlargement.     

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This  Communication  kicks  off  the  work  on  the  in-depth  policy  reviews,  announced  by 
President von der Leyen in her 2023 State of the Union address. The Commission will carry 
out  these  reviews  in  early  2025.  The  reviews  may  take  different  forms  depending  on  the 
sectors and should benefit from stakeholders’ input on the specific impacts of a larger Union 
on individual policies. Building on the outcome of the reviews, substantive reform proposals 
in  individual  sectors,  including  the  preparation  of  the  Commission’s  proposal  for  the  next 
multiannual financial framework (MFF), could then be a second step in this process. 

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