REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Report on Competition Policy 2023
Date: 2024-03-06
Institutions: Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission
Subjects: EU competition policy, EU financial instrument, State aid, anti-trust legislation, competitiveness, control of restrictive practices, economic recovery, merger control, restriction on competition, single market

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 6.3.2024  COM(2024) 115 final  REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION Report on Competition Policy 2023 {SWD(2024) 53 final}  
 
 
Table of Contents 

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 2 

2. Using the State aid rules and the Recovery and Resilience Facility to mitigate the negative effects 
of external economic shocks .................................................................................................................. 3 

2.1. Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework ............................................................................. 3 

2.2. The phasing out of the State Aid Covid Temporary Framework supporting the economy in the 
context of the COVID-19 outbreak was completed ........................................................................... 4 

2.3. Implementing the Recovery and Resilience Facility .................................................................. 5 

3. Ensuring that competition rules remain fit for the future – Progress on an extensive policy agenda 5 

3.1. Updating antitrust and merger rules and guidance ...................................................................... 5 

Rules on horizontal cooperation agreements adopted ........................................................................ 5 

Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation prolonged ................................................................... 7 

Merger simplification package adopted ............................................................................................. 7 

Guidelines on sustainability agreements in agriculture adopted ........................................................ 8 

No extension of the block exemption for liner shipping consortia .................................................... 8 

Preparations started for Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU .................................... 8 

Evaluation of Regulation 1/2003 continued ....................................................................................... 9 

Evaluation of the rules on technology transfer agreements ............................................................... 9 

3.2. Updating State aid rules and guidance ........................................................................................ 9 

The General Block Exemption Regulation amended ......................................................................... 9 

Revised general de minimis regulation adopted .............................................................................. 10 

Revised SGEI de minimis regulation adopted ................................................................................. 10 

Revised State aid rules for the agricultural, forestry, fishery, and aquaculture sectors adopted ..... 11 

IPCEI Code of good practices adopted ............................................................................................ 12 

Joint European Forum for Important Projects of Common European Interest ................................ 12 

Interpretative Guidelines on Regulation (EU) No 1370/2007 adopted ............................................ 12 

Evaluations ....................................................................................................................................... 12 

4. Competition policy enforcement contributed to the Commission’s principal priorities .................. 13 

4.1. Competition policy enforcement contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient 
Single Market ................................................................................................................................... 13 

Antitrust enforcement contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single Market
.......................................................................................................................................................... 13 

Merger control contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single Market ........ 16 

State aid control contributed to the digital transition and the resilience of the Single Market ........ 20 

 
 
4.2 Competition policy enforcement contributed to the green transition......................................... 22 

Antitrust enforcement contributed to the green transition ............................................................... 22 

Merger control contributed to the green transition .......................................................................... 22 

State aid control contributed to the green transition ........................................................................ 23 

4.3. Competition policy contributed to an economy that works for people ..................................... 25 

Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments ............................. 25 

Antitrust enforcement in the financial services and insurance sectors ............................................ 25 

Merger enforcement in the financial services sector ....................................................................... 26 

State aid enforcement in the financial services sector ..................................................................... 26 

State aid in insurance ....................................................................................................................... 27 

State aid in public guarantees........................................................................................................... 28 

5. New complementary Single Market tools became operational ....................................................... 28 

5.1. Digital Markets Act ................................................................................................................... 28 

5.2. Foreign Subsidies Regulation ................................................................................................... 30 

6.  Impact  of  State  aid  policy  on  the  integrity  of  the  Single  Market  and  on  the  EU’s  global 
competitiveness .................................................................................................................................... 32 

6.1 Overall picture of State aid disbursement of crisis and non-crisis aid in 2022 ......................... 34 

6.2 Crucial yet cautious use of State aid in times of crises .............................................................. 40 

6.3 Pursuing the digital and green transition and other EU priorities ........................................... 44 

6.4 Safeguarding a well-functioning Single Market for a competitive EU economy ....................... 46 

7. Measuring the impact of competition enforcement on customers ................................................... 47 

8. Modernising DG Competition’s working methods to fit current and future enforcement needs .... 48 

8.1. Digital business solutions ......................................................................................................... 48 

8.2. Data analysis and technology .................................................................................................... 49 

8.3. Whistle-blower tool strengthened ............................................................................................. 49 

9. Advocacy and outreach supporting competition policy and enforcement ....................................... 50 

10. Competition policy in a European and global context ................................................................... 50 

10.1 Joining forces in shaping a European and global competition culture..................................... 50 

Policy coherence through the European Competition Network ....................................................... 50 

A continuous and constructive inter-institutional dialogue ............................................................. 51 

10.2. Competition policy cooperation across the world ................................................................... 51 

Multilateral relations ........................................................................................................................ 51 

Bilateral relations ............................................................................................................................. 51 

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1. Introduction 

The Annual Competition Report of 2023 is addressed by the European Commission (Commission) to 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  of  the  European  Union,  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions.  It  describes  key  developments  in  EU  competition 
policy and enforcement during 2023. 

The  year  2023  was  another  challenging  year  for  the  EU.  Russia’s  continued  war  of  aggression 
against  Ukraine  and  increasing  geo-political  tensions  reminded  us  again  how  interconnected  the 
world is, not least the EU with its neighbouring countries. The Commission took swift and resolute 
action, including measures in State aid, to alleviate the negative effects on the EU economy caused 
by these events. 

There  were  also  positive  developments  in  2023,  notably  the  fact  that  the  EU  economy  proved 
resilient  to  the  impact  of  Russia’s  continued  aggression  towards  Ukraine.  By  the  end  of  2023,  EU 
energy  prices  fell  below  their  peak  in  2022.  EU  competition  policy  was  one  of  many  tools 
successfully used for the continued crisis response, the economic recovery, as well as delivering on 
the green and digital transitions. 

The  digital  revolution  has  expanded  the  global  reach  of  firms,  not  only  for  ´Big  Techs´  but  for  all 
companies.  Digitalisation  drives  economic  growth  across  all  economic  sectors.  But  rapid  market 
developments  create  new  challenges  for  competition  enforcers.  One  of  the  main  challenges  the 
Commission  faces  –  in  both  antitrust  and  merger  control  enforcement  –  is  how  to  define  relevant 
markets  when  confronted  with  dynamic  developments  in  markets.  This  is  why  the  Commission 
continued  working  on  a  new  Market  Definition  Notice  in  2023.  These  market  developments  and 
challenges also led the Commission to launch an evaluation of its investigative and decision-making 
powers for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in 2022 as set out in Regulation 1/20031. 
This  work  continued  in  2023.  The  Commission  is  also  drafting  new  Guidelines  on  exclusionary 
abuses of dominance under Article 102 TFEU. 

Close cooperation between competition authorities across jurisdictions is more important than ever. 
In November 2023, the Commission ordered Illumina to unwind its acquisition of GRAIL2, both US 
companies. Throughout the case, the Commission stayed in close contact with the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission that had similar competition concerns. 

State aid policy was also challenged by global and political trends. Building on the Temporary Crisis 
Framework3, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF)4 to 

1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. 
2 Case M.10939 - Illumina/GRAIL.  
3  Communication  from  the  Commission  Temporary  Crisis  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 131I, 24.3.2022, p. 1. 

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also  accommodate  support  measures  in  sectors  which  are  key  for  the  transition  to  a  net-zero 
economy,  in  line  with  the  Green  Deal  Industrial  Plan.  While  geopolitical  developments  may 
challenge  EU  interests,  the  EU  must  remain  true  to  the  fundamental  logic  of  State  aid  control  -  to 
prevent that State aid undermines the Single Market. Competitiveness comes from competition, not 
subsidies, and public funds should not finance investments  that the private sector would be able to 
make  itself.  This is  why  the  TCTF  rules  that  enable  support to  key  sectors  are  limited in time and 
include  strict  safeguards.  The  partial  phase-out  of  the  TCTF’s  crisis  sections  in  late  2023  and  the 
scheduled phase-out of the remaining crisis sections in 2024 send a strong signal to Member States 
and  companies  to  this  effect.  In  response  to  a  request  from  the  European  Council  that  the 
Commission ‘report to the Council on the impact of the current State aid policy on the integrity 
of  the  Single  Market  as  well  as  on  the  EU’s  global  competitiveness’5.  This  Report  contains  a 
comprehensive  overview  and  analysis  of  State  aid  and  its  impact  on  competition  in  the  Single 
Market and on EU competitiveness (see Section 6). 

In 2023, the Commission has shown when and how EU competition policy must adapt to keep EU 
markets  fair,  competitive,  and  open  for  the  benefit  of  businesses  and  consumers  alike.  The 
Commission will continue to do so going forward. 

Moreover,  as  of  May  2023,  the  Commission  applies  the  new  rules  of  the  Digital  Markets  Act 
(DMA)6 to keep digital markets open and contestable. A full report of the activities undertaken by the 
European Commission in the context of the DMA in 2023 is published in parallel to this report, as 
foreseen  in  Article  35  DMA.  And  in  October  2023,  the  notification  obligations  under  the  Foreign 
Subsidies  Regulation  (FSR)7  entered  into  force  to  address  market  distortions  caused  by  foreign 
subsidies. 

2.  Using  the  State  aid  rules  and  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  to 
mitigate the negative effects of external economic shocks 

2.1. Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework  

In March 2022, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis Framework (TCF)8 to enable Member 
States  to  support  the  economy  in  the  context  of  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine.  The 
original  TCF  included  State  aid  intended  to  deal  with  the  immediate  economic  crisis  caused  by 

4  Communication  from  the  Commission  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures  to 
support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia 2023/C 101/03, C/2023/1711, OJ C 101, 
17.3.2023, p. 3. 
5 European Council meeting (26 and 27 October 2023), EUCO 14/23, point 22(g). 
6 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable 
and  fair  markets  in  the  digital  sector  and  amending  Directives  (EU)  2019/1937  and  (EU)  2020/1828  (Digital 
Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1. 
7  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  December  2022  on  foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 330, 23.12.2022, p. 1. 
8  Communication  from  the  Commission  Temporary  Crisis  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures  to  support  the 
economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 131I, 24.3.2022, p. 1. 

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Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine,  for  example  liquidity  support  in  the  form  of  State  guarantees  and 
subsidised  loans,  aid  to  compensate  for  high  energy  prices,  and  measures  aimed  at  supporting 
electricity demand reduction. The TCF was amended twice – in July 2022 and October 2022 – as the 
crisis developed.  

In March 2023, the Commission adopted the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework9￼. This 
Framework not only enables crisis aid but also enables Member States to support key sectors for the 
transition to a net-zero economy, in line with the Green Deal Industrial Plan. 

In  particular,  the  TCTF  (i)  prolongs  until  31  December  2025  the  possibility  for  Member  States  to 
accelerate the roll-out of schemes for renewable energy, energy storage and for the decarbonisation 
of  industrial  production  processes,  (ii)  amends  the  scope  of  such  measures  to  make  easier  for 
Member  States  to  design  such  schemes  and  make  them  more  effective,  and  (iii)  introduces  new 
measures, applicable until 31 December 2025, to further accelerate investments in key sectors for the 
transition towards a net-zero economy. The TCTF enables investment support for the manufacturing 
of strategic equipment, namely batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, heat pumps, electrolysers, and 
carbon capture usage and storage, as well as for production of key components and for production 
and recovery of related critical raw materials, through schemes or individual aid up to the amount of 
subsidy  which  the  beneficiary  could  receive  for  an  equivalent  investment  in  a  third  country 
jurisdiction  outside  the  EEA,  or  the  amount  needed  to  incentivise  the  company  to  locate  the 
investment in the EEA (the so-called ‘funding gap’) whichever is the lowest. . 

In November 2023, after consultation of the Member States, the Commission prolonged until 30 June 
2024  sections  enabling  Member  States  to  grant  limited  amounts  of  aid  (sections  2.1)  and  aid  to 
compensate  for  high  energy  prices  (section  2.4),  notably  in  view  of  the  remaining  vulnerability  of 
energy markets10 where energy-intensive industries are particularly sensitive.  

In 2023, the Commission adopted 220 decisions (of which 91 amendment decisions) under the TCF and 
TCTF, approving 147 national measures notified by 27 Member States. The overall budget that Member 
States notified to the Commission under such State aid measures amounted to around EUR 77.94 billion. 
For  more  information  about  State  Aid  granted  under  these  two  instruments  please  refer  to  Section  6 
below. 

2.2. The phasing out of the State Aid Covid Temporary Framework supporting the economy in 
the context of the COVID-19 outbreak was completed 

With the effects of the coronavirus outbreak abating, the Commission started in 2023 to phase out the 
Temporary  Framework  supporting  the  economy  in  the  context  of  the  COVID-19  outbreak 

9  Communication  from  the  Commission  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition  Framework  for  State  Aid  measures  to 
support the economy following the aggression against Ukraine by Russia, OJ C 101, 17.3.2023, p. 3. 
10 Communication from the Commission – Amendment to the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework for State 
Aid  measures  to  support  the  economy  following  the  aggression  against  Ukraine  by  Russia,  OJ  C,  C/2023/1188, 
21.11.2023, p. 1. 

4 

 
 
(‘Temporary Framework for State aid measures’)11. Limited sections were given a later expiry date, 
enabling  investment  and  solvency  support  measures  to  continue  until  31  December  202312.  In 
addition,  the  Temporary  Framework  enabled  a  flexible  transition,  with  clear  safeguards  in  place, 
especially  for  the  conversion  and  restructuring  of  debt  instruments,  like  loans  and  guarantees,  into 
other forms of assistance, such as direct grants, until 30 June 202313. 

2.3. Implementing the Recovery and Resilience Facility 

Implementation  of  the  Recovery  and  Resilience  Facility  (RRF)14  –  the  centrepiece  of  the 
NextGenerationEU initiative – continued in 202315. It aims, next to and on top of Cohesion Policy, to 
promote  cohesion  among  Member  States  by  mitigating  the  social  and  economic  fallout  of  the 
COVID-19 pandemic to better prepare the EU for future challenges, notably by supporting the green 
and digital transitions.  

Most of the measures financed by the RRF do not constitute State aid. Of those that do, the majority 
can be implemented directly by the Member States, either under a block-exemption regulation16 or 
under a de minimis regulation17.  

Still,  several  measures  were  notified  for  the  Commission’s  prior  authorisation.  To  this  end,  the 
Commission published in April 2023 updated State aid guiding templates18 to assist Member States 
design, in line with State aid rules, support measures to be included in their national Recovery and 
Resilience Plans (RRPs). The updated templates make it easier for Member States to create State aid 
measures that contribute further to the implementation of the European Green Deal, while reducing 
dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerating the green transition as set out in the REPowerEU 
Plan.  In  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  more  than  50  State  aid  decisions  concerning  RRF-funded 
measures. 

3.  Ensuring  that  competition  rules  remain  fit  for  the  future  –  Progress  on  an 
extensive policy agenda 

11 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_2980 
12  Communication  from  the  Commission:  Amendment  to  the  Temporary  framework  for  State  aid  measures  to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak, OJ C 423, 7.11.2022, p. 9. 
13 Communication from the Commission Sixth Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak and amendment to the Annex to the Communication from 
the Commission to the Member States on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union to short-term export-credit insurance 2021/C 473/01, C/2021/8442, OJ C 473, 24.11.2021, p. 1. 
14 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131 
15 See: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/recovery-and-resilience-scoreboard/index.html?lang=en 
16 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1, as last amended 
by Commission Regulation (EU) 2021/1237, OJ L 270, 29.7.2021, p. 39. 
17 Commission Regulation (EU) No1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013, p. 1. 
18 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/rrf-guiding-templates_en  

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3.1. Updating antitrust and merger rules and guidance 

Rules on horizontal cooperation agreements adopted 

The  Commission  adopted  in  June  2023  revised  Horizontal  Block  Exemption  Regulations  on 
Research  and  Development  (R&D)19  and  Specialisation  agreements20  (together  HBERs), 
accompanied  by  revised  Horizontal  Guidelines21.  The  revised  rules  provide  up-to-date  guidance  to 
help businesses assess the compatibility of their cooperation agreements with  EU competition rules, 
including  types  of  cooperation  that  can  contribute  to  the  digital  and  green  transitions.  The  HBERs 
exempt  certain  pro-competitive  R&D  and  specialisation  agreements  from  the  prohibition  under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. Among other changes, the revised rules expand the scope of the Specialisation 
Block  Exemption  Regulation  to  cover  multi-party  agreements  for  more  types  of  production 
agreements and provide more flexibility for the calculation of market shares.  

The  revised  Horizontal  Guidelines  have  been  updated  to  reflect  recent  case  law  and  enforcement 
practice.  They  contain  expanded  guidance  on  information  exchange,  including  digital  forms  of 
exchange, and on joint purchasing, including the distinction between legitimate joint purchasing and 
buyer  cartels.  A  new  chapter  provides  guidance  on  the  application  of  the  competition  rules  to 
sustainability agreements. 

19 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1066 of 1 June 2023 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  certain  categories  of  research  and  development  agreements,  OJ  L  143, 
2.6.2023, p. 9. 
20 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/1067 of 1 June 2023 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of specialisation agreements, OJ L 143, 2.6.2023, p. 20. 
21  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Guidelines  on  the  applicability  of  Article  101  of  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, OJ C 259, 21.7.2023, p. 1. 

6 

 
 
Source: European Commission. 

Motor Vehicle Block Exemption Regulation prolonged 

The EU has a specific regime for vertical agreements in the motor vehicle sector, the Motor Vehicle 
Block Exemption Regulation (MVBER)22, which was set to expire on 31 May 2023. In April 2023, 
the Commission prolonged the MVBER for five years until 31 May 2028. The Commission limited 
the prolongation to five years to be able to react in a timely manner to market developments, such as 
those resulting from vehicle digitalisation, electrification, and new mobility patterns.  

The Commission also updated the Supplementary Guidelines23 for the sector. Vehicle-generated data 
is  becoming  an  increasingly  important  factor  of  competition  for  repair  and  maintenance  operators. 
The revised Guidelines will help companies in the automotive sector assess the compatibility of their 
vertical agreements with EU competition rules, while ensuring that aftermarket operators, including 
garages, continue to have access to vehicle-generated data necessary for repair and maintenance. 

22 Commission Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 of 27 May 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on 
the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  categories  of  vertical  agreements  and  concerted  practices  in  the  motor 
vehicle sector, OJ L 129, 28.5.2010, p. 52 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/822 of 17 April 2023 
on amending Regulation (EU) No 461/2010 as regards its period of application, OJ L 102I, 17.4.2023, p. 1. 
23 Commission Notice: Supplementary guidelines on vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor 
vehicles  and  for  the  distribution  of  spare  parts  for  motor  vehicles,  OJ  C  138,  28.5.2010,  p.  16  as  amended  by 
Communication  from  the  Commission  Amendments  to  the  Commission  Notice  –  Supplementary  guidelines  on 
vertical restraints in agreements for the sale and repair of motor vehicles and for the distribution of spare parts for 
motor vehicles 2023/C 133 I/01, OJ C 133I , 17.4.2023, p. 1. 

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Merger simplification package adopted 

In April 2023, the Commission adopted the Merger simplification package. It includes: (i.) a revised 
Implementing Regulation24, (ii.) a Notice on Simplified Procedure25, and (iii.) a Communication on 
the  transmission  of  documents26.  The  package  aims  to  simplify  and  expand  the  scope  of  the 
Commission's  review  process  of  unproblematic  mergers  (simplified  cases).  It  also  reduces  the 
amount of information required for notifying transactions and  introduces electronic notifications as 
default. The Notice lists in more detail the circumstances where the Commission may investigate a 
case  under the  normal  review  procedure  even  though  it  formally  qualifies  for  simplified  treatment. 
The merger simplification rules entered into force on 1 September 2023. 

Guidelines on sustainability agreements in agriculture adopted 

Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between companies that restrict competition, such as those 
between  competitors  that  lead  to  higher  prices  or  reduced  quantities.  However,  Article  210a  of 
Regulation 1308/2013 (CMO Regulation)27 excludes certain restrictive agreements in the agricultural 
sector from the scope of this general prohibition when such agreements are indispensable to achieve 
sustainability standards. After a public consultation in the first half of 202328 on the draft Guidelines 
on  article  210a  of  the  CMO  Regulation29,  the  Commission  adopted  the  Guidelines  in  December 
2023.  The  Guidelines  aim  to  facilitate  the  adoption  of  sustainability  agreements  in  agriculture  by 
explaining how to fulfil the conditions for exclusion set out in Article 210a of the CMO Regulation 
and by providing concrete examples.  

No extension of the block exemption for liner shipping consortia 

Liner shipping services involve the regular, scheduled carriage of non-bulk cargo transport along a 
specific  route.  They  are  regularly  provided  by  several  shipping  companies  organised  in  consortia. 

24 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) [2023/914] implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,  OJ L 
119, 5.5.2023, p. 22. 
25  Commission  Notice  on  a  simplified  treatment  for  certain  concentrations  under  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No 
139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 160, 5.5.2023, p. 1. 
26  Communication  from  the  Commission  –  Communication  pursuant  to  Articles  3(2),  13(3),  20,  and  22  of 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/914 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the 
control  of  concentrations  between  undertakings  and  repealing  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  802/2004,  OJ  C 
160, 5.5.2023, p. 1. 
27  Regulation  (EU)  2021/2117  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  2  December  2021  amending 
Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, (EU) 
No  1151/2012  on  quality  schemes  for  agricultural  products  and  foodstuffs,  (EU)  No  251/2014  on  the  definition, 
description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products and 
(EU) No 228/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union, OJ L 435, 
6.12.2021, p. 262. 
28 Public consultation on the draft guidelines for sustainability agreements in agriculture, from 10.01.2023 to 
24.04.2023, see: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/public-consultations/2023-sustainability-agreements-
agriculture_en 
29 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/about/reaching-out/sustainability-guidelines-agri-food-supply-
chain_en  

8 

 
 
The Consortia Block Exemption Regulation (‘CBER’) allows liner shipping companies to collaborate 
within certain boundaries without violating EU competition law. At the time of adoption in 2009, the 
primary  objective  of  this  exemption  was  to  facilitate  cooperation  among  shipping  lines  to  enhance 
operational  efficiency,  optimise  vessel  utilisation,  and  improve  service  quality.  However,  after 
evaluation, the Commission found that the number of consortia covered by the CBER was relatively 
low. The CBER’s effectiveness and efficiency is therefore limited. The Commission decided not to 
extend the block exemption and let it expire on 25 April 202430. 

Preparations started for Guidelines on the application of Article 102 TFEU 

In  March  2023,  the  Commission  published  a  call  for  evidence  for  the  future  Guidelines  on  the 
application of Article 102 TFEU to exclusionary conduct31. The Guidelines will reflect EU case law 
as  well  as  the  extensive  experience  gained  by  the  Commission  in  the  enforcement  of  Article  102 
TFEU.  The  Commission  will  publish  a  draft  of  the  Guidelines  for  public  consultation  and  will 
carefully consider stakeholders’ submissions.  

Evaluation of Regulation 1/2003 continued 

Regulation  1/200332  and  its  implementing  act,  Regulation  773/200433  establish  a  procedural 
framework aimed at ensuring the effective and uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in 
the  EU.  New  challenges  for  the  enforcement  of  competition  rules  have  emerged  over  time,  for 
example  related  to  the  digitalisation  of  the  economy  and  the  increasing  complexity  of  antitrust 
investigations. Following a public consultation in 202234, the Commission continued its evaluation in 
2023.  To  this  end,  the  Commission  organised  a  workshop  with  a  wide  variety  of  stakeholders  in 
October 2023. The Commission has also commissioned an evaluation support study. Throughout the 
evaluation, the Commission is liaising with the NCAs.  

30 Communication to the Commission Expiry of Commission Regulation (EC) No 906/2009 of 28 September 2009 
on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty of the certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), 10.10.2023, C(2023) 6700 final. 
31 Call for Evidence regarding guidelines on exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings, from 27.03.2023 to 
24.04.2023, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13796-EU-competition-
law-guidelines-on-exclusionary-abuses-by-dominant-undertakings_en 
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1. 
33  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  773/2004  of  7  April  2004  relating  to  the  conduct  of  proceedings  by  the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 123, 27.4.2004, p. 
18. 
34  Public  consultation  on  the  EU  antitrust  procedural  rules  -  evaluation,  from  30.6.2022  to  6.10.2022,  see: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13431-EU-antitrust-procedural-rules-
evaluation_en 

9 

 
 
Evaluation of the rules on technology transfer agreements 

In  November  2022,  the  Commission  launched  an  evaluation  of  the  Technology  Transfer  Block 
Exemption  Regulation  (TTBER)35  and  the  accompanying  guidelines36.  This  work  continued 
throughout 2023. The evaluation will allow the Commission to decide whether the TTBER should be 
allowed to expire, be prolonged, or revised.  

3.2. Updating State aid rules and guidance 

The General Block Exemption Regulation amended 

In  June  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  targeted  amendment  to  the  General  Block  Exemption 
Regulation  (GBER)  to  further  simplify  and  speed  up  support  for  the  EU's  green  and  digital 
transitions, while ensuring the functioning of the Single Market37. The revised GBER grants Member 
States  more  flexibility  to  design  and  implement  State  support  measures  in  key  sectors  for  the 
transition  to  climate  neutrality  and  to  a  net-zero  industry.  In  addition,  it  will  help  speeding  up 
investment and financing for Clean Tech production in the EU, in line with the Green Deal Industrial 
Plan38.  

The  revised  GBER  increases  and  streamlines  the  possibilities  to  grant  State  aid  for  environmental 
protection  and  energy.  Moreover,  it  facilitates  the  support  of  Important  Projects  of  Common 
European  Interest  (IPCEI)  in  the  research  and  development  fields  and  extends  the  possibilities  for 
training and reskilling employees. It also facilitates the granting of aid in form of regulated prices for 
electricity,  gas  or  heat  by  including  this  category  into  the  scope  of  the  GBER.  The  revised  GBER 
also  increases  the  notification  thresholds  for  environmental  aid  as  well  as  Research,  Development 
and Innovation (RDI) aid. In addition, the revised GBER clarifies and streamlines the possibilities for 
risk  finance  aid  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  (SMEs).  The  provisions  concerning  fixed 
and mobile broadband networks are also clarified and expanded in key areas, such as the possibility 
to  finance  active  mobile  equipment  and  new  provisions  for  backhaul  networks.  The  GBER  was 
prolonged until the end of 2026 and the provisions of the GBER have been aligned with the revised 
Regional Aid Guidelines, the Climate, Environmental protection and Energy aid Guidelines, the Risk 
Finance  Guidelines,  the  Research,  Development  and  Innovation  Framework  and  the  Broadband 
Guidelines. 

35  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  No  316/2014  of  21  March  2014  on  the  application  of  Article  101(3)  TFEU  to 
categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 93, 28.3.2014, p. 17. 
36 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU to technology 
transfer agreements, OJ C 89, 28.3.2014, p. 3. 
37  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2023/1315  of  23  June  2023  amending  Regulation  (EU)  No  651/2014  declaring 
certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty and 
Regulation (EU) 2022/2473 declaring certain categories of aid to undertakings active in the production, processing 
and marketing of fishery and aquaculture products compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 
and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), C/2023/4278, OJ L 167, 30.6.2023, p. 1. 
38  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Green Deal Industrial Plan for the 
Net-Zero Age, COM(2023) 62 final. 

10 

 
 
Revised general de minimis regulation adopted 

In  December  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  the  new  general  de  minimis  regulation39,  while  the 
previous  de  minimis  regulation  expired  on  31  December  2023.  The  Regulation  exempts  small  aid 
amounts from the scope of EU State aid control because they are deemed to have no effect on trade 
between  Member  States  and  not  to  distort  or  threaten  to  distort  competition.  The  exemption  from 
State aid control for small aid amounts significantly reduces the administrative burden for companies 
-  in  particular  SMEs  -  and  Member  States.  The  main  changes  are  an  increased  ceiling  of  EUR 
300 000 over three years to adjust to inflation and the introduction of a mandatory de minimis register 
at  national  or  EU  level  to  increase  transparency.  While  under  the  previous  regulation,  businesses 
were required to keep track of de minimis aid received, the new de minimis Regulation includes the 
obligation  for all  Member  States  to  provide as  from  2026  complete  information  on  de  minimis  aid 
granted in a central register at national or EU level and to check that any new grant of aid does not 
exceed the relevant ceiling.  

Revised SGEI de minimis regulation adopted 

In  December  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  Regulation  (EU)  2023/2832  on  the  application  of 
Articles  107  and  108  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union  to  de  minimis  aid 
granted  to  undertakings  providing  services  of  general  economic  interest  (SGEI)40.  This  Regulation 
entered into force on 1 January 2024 and replaces Regulation (EC) No 360/201241, which expired on 
31 December 2023. The Commission decided to increase the SGEI de minimis aid threshold to EUR 
750 000 per undertaking providing an SGEI over any three-year period. 

Revised State aid rules for the agricultural, forestry, fishery, and aquaculture sectors adopted 

In January 2023, the revised Agricultural Block Exemption Regulation (ABER) and Fishery Block 
Exemption  Regulation  (FIBER),  and  the  Guidelines  for  State  aid  to  the  agricultural  and  forestry 
sectors and in rural areas (Agricultural Guidelines) entered into force42. The Guidelines for State aid 
in  the  fishery  and  aquaculture  sector  (Fisheries  Guidelines),  endorsed  by  the  Commission  in 
December 2022, apply from April 202343. 

39 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2831 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L, 2023/2831, 15.12.2023, p.1. 
40 Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/2832 of 13 December 2023 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of 
general economic interest, OJ L, 2023/2832, 15.12.2023, p.1. 
41 Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of  the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of 
general economic interest Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8.  
42  Communication  from  the  Commission  -  Guidelines  for  State  aid  in  the  agricultural  and  forestry  sectors  and  in 
rural areas 2022/C 485/01, OJ C 485, 21.12.2022, p. 1. 
43 Communication from the Commission - Guidelines for State aid in the fishery and aquaculture sector, OJ C 107, 
23.3.2023, p. 1. 

11 

 
 
The  ABER  and  the  FIBER  extend  the  scope  of  block-exempted  measures.  The  new  rules  block-
exempt up to 50% of cases which had to be notified under the old framework. The new Agricultural 
Guidelines and Fisheries Guidelines reflect the Commission's case experience as well as the current 
EU strategic priorities, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common Fisheries Policy, 
the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and the European Green Deal, the Farm to 
Fork  Strategy  as  well  as  the  Biodiversity  Strategy.  The  revised  Fisheries  Guidelines  help  Member 
States  to  meet  the  ambitious  EU  green  targets  by  improving  energy  efficiency  and  mitigating  the 
effect of climate change. 

In October 2023, the Commission adopted an amendment to the de minimis regulation for the fishery 
and  aquaculture  sector44.  The  revised  regulation  increases  the  de  minimis  aid  ceiling  per  company 
over  three  years,  from  EUR  30 000  to  EUR  40 000.  Moreover,  the  processing  and  marketing  of 
fishery and aquaculture products are no longer covered by the Fishery de minimis Regulation but by 
the General de minimis Regulation. 

IPCEI Code of good practices adopted 

The  IPCEI  Communication45  sets  the  eligibility  and  compatibility  criteria  that  the  Commission 
applies in the assessment of State aid granted for Important Projects of Common European Interest 
(IPCEI). Following the assessment and subsequent approval of State aid for a number of IPCEI, the 
Member  States  and  the  Commission  gained  experience  in  assessing  State  aid  for  IPCEI.  Based  on 
this  experience,  the  Commission  prepared  in  May 2023  a  code  of  good  practices  for  the  design  of 
IPCEI46, allowing a streamlined assessment. This Code does not express an applicable legal position 
or constitute a legally binding approach for the IPCEI’s direct participants. It also does not create any 
further rights, nor imposes any new obligations.  

Joint European Forum for Important Projects of Common European Interest 

In the Autumn of 2023, the Commission launched the Joint European Forum for Important Projects 
of Common European Interest (JEF-IPCEI)47, which met for the first time on 20 October 2023. The 
forum  -  a  partnership  between  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  -  covers  the  entire  IPCEI 
lifecycle and aims to increase the effectiveness of the design, assessment (based on existing State Aid 
rules) and implementation of IPCEI as well as identifying areas of strategic EU interest for potential 

44  Commission  Regulation  (EU)  2023/2391  of  4 October  2023  amending  Regulations  (EU)  No 717/2014,  (EU) 
No 1407/2013,  (EU)  No 1408/2013  and  (EU)  No 360/2012  as  regards  de  minimis  aid  for  the  processing  and 
marketing of fishery and aquaculture products, and Regulation (EU) No 717/2014 as regards the total amount of de 
minimis aid granted to a single undertaking, its period of application and other matters, OJ L 2391, 05.10.2023, p.1. 
45  Communication  from  the  Commission  Criteria  for  the  analysis  of  the  compatibility  with  the  internal  market  of 
State  aid  to  promote  the  execution  of  important  projects  of  common  European  interest  2021/C  528/02OJ  C  528, 
30.12.2021, p. 10. 
46 DG COMP Code of good practices for a transparent, inclusive, faster design and assessment of IPCEIs, 17 May 
2023, see: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-
05/IPCEIs_DG_COMP_code_of_good_practices.pdf 
47 Joint European Forum for IPCEI - European Commission (europa.eu) 

12 

 
 
future IPCEI. The JEF-IPCEI works towards these objectives by better aligning potential new IPCEI 
with the policy objectives of the EU industrial strategy. The JEF-IPCEI will meet several times per 
year. 

Interpretative Guidelines on Regulation (EU) No 1370/2007 adopted 

In  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  revised  version  of  the  Interpretative  Guidelines  on  Regulation 
(EU)  No  1370/2007  on  land  public  service  obligations48.  The  aim  of  the  guidelines  is  to  provide 
further guidance to Member States and stakeholders on the application of several provisions of that 
Regulation, in view of the changes brought about by the 4th Railway Package and the relevant case 
law of EU Courts. 

Evaluations 

In line with the Better Regulation Guidelines, DG Competition continued its evaluations of the rules 
for State aid to banks in difficulty49 and for aid in the form of public guarantees50. 

4. Competition policy enforcement contributed to the Commission’s principal 
priorities  

Preserving  market  discipline  by  effective  enforcement  of  the  EU  competition  rules  is  of  vital 
importance  to  the  green  and  digital  transformation  of  the  EU  economy  as  well  as  building  an 
economy that works for people. Moreover, enforcing the competition rules contributes to the removal 
of remaining barriers to the Single Market and eliminates market restrictions. By its nature the Single 
Market  helps  increase  the  economic  resilience  of  the  EU  economy  by  strengthening  incentives  to 
invest, innovate, diversify supply chains and find new business opportunities. 

4.1.  Competition  policy  enforcement  contributed  to  the  digital  transition  and  a  strong  and 
resilient Single Market 

By  making  markets  work  better  for  consumers,  businesses  and  society,  competition  policy  plays  a 
crucial  role  as  the  EU  strives  for  global  digital  leadership.  The  digital  transition  has  a  profound 
impact on every aspect of the economy and society. By stimulating change and driving innovation, 
competition  policy  helps  the  EU  to  unlock  the  full  potential  of  the  digital  age.  Enforcement  in 
antitrust contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single Market. 

48  Commission  notice  on  interpretative  guidelines  concerning  Regulation (EC)  No 1370/2007 on public  passenger 
transport services by rail and by road 2023/C 222/01, C/2023/3978, OJ C 222, 26.6.2023, p. 1.  
49 Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks 
in the  context of the financial crisis (“2013 Banking Communication”), OJ C 216, 30.7.2013, p. 1 and the related 
communications:  2009  Recapitalisation  Communication  (2009/C10/03),  2009  Impaired  Assets  Communication 
(2009/C72/01),  2009  Restructuring  Communication 
(2009/C195/04),  2010  Prolongation  Communication 
(2010/C329/07), 2011 Prolongation Communication (2011/C356/02). 
50  Commission  Notice  on  the  application  of  Articles  87  and  88  of  the  EC  Treaty  to  State  aid  in  the  form  of 
guarantees, OJ C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10. 

13 

 
 
Antitrust enforcement contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single Market 

The central processing unit (CPU) is one of the core components in any computer, so it is crucial for 
the  entire  digital  sector  that  the  market  for  CPUs  remains  competitive.  In  2009,  the  Commission 
fined  Intel  EUR  1.06  billion  for  an  infringement  of  Article  102  TFEU.  Intel  was  found  to  have 
engaged in two forms of illegal conduct51. Intel gave rebates to computer manufacturers on condition 
that  they  bought  all,  or  almost  all,  of  their  x86  CPUs  from  Intel  (‘conditional  rebates’).  Intel  also 
made  direct  payments  to  computer  manufacturers  to  halt  or  delay  the  launch  of  specific  products 
containing  competitors'  x86  CPUs  (‘naked  restrictions’).  In  2022,  the  General  Court  partially 
annulled the initial Commission decision of 2009, as regards the conditional rebates. Following this, 
in September 2023, the Commission re-adopted a decision imposing a fine on Intel of EUR 376.36 
million for the naked restrictions. 

Digital  music  subscription  services  are  widely  used  by  consumers  in  the  EU,  which  makes  it 
important that competition in this sector works well. To this end, the Commission issued in February 
2023  a  Statement  of  Objections52  to  Apple  informing  the  company  about  its  preliminary  view  that 
Apple  abused  its  dominant  position  by  restricting  application  developers'  ability  to  inform  iPhone 
and iPad users of alternative music subscription services. The Commission took the preliminary view 
that Apple's anti-steering obligations are unfair trading conditions in breach of Article 102 TFEU. 

In  a  Statement  of  Objections  issued  in  June  2023,  the  Commission  informed  Google  of  its 
preliminary  view  that  Google  infringed  Article  102  TFEU  by  distorting  competition  in  the 
advertising  technology  industry  (adtech)53.  Google  is  present  at  all  levels  of  the  adtech  supply 
chain. If competition is reduced for adtech services, it would have a broad impact in the digital 
sector  because  not  only  Google’s  direct  competitors  would  be  negatively  affected  but  also 
publishers and the advertisers themselves.  The Commission is  concerned  that Google favoured 
its  own  online  display  adtech  services  to  the  detriment  of  competitors,  advertisers  and  online 
publishers.  The  Commission’s  preliminary  finding  is  that  Google  abused its  dominant  position 
by favouring its own ad exchange AdX in the ad selection auction run by its adserver, DFP, and 
by  favouring  AdX  in  the  way  its  ad  buying  tools  Google  Ads  and  DV360  place  bids  on  ad 
exchanges. 

Forming a cartel is one of the most serious infringements of competition. Cartels cause serious harm 
to  the  economy  without  enhancing  any  efficiency.  By  charging  higher  prices  and  limiting  output, 
horizontal  cartels reduce  economic  efficiency  and  welfare.  They  discourage  businesses  from 
developing new products and technologies, thereby reducing innovation and consumer choice. 

51 Case AT. 37990 - Intel.  
52 Case AT.40437 - Apple - App Store Practices (music streaming).  
53 Case AT.40670 - Google – Adtech and Data-related practices.  

14 

 
 
In  September  2023,  the  Commission  penalised  for  the  first  time  a  cartel  in  the  defence  sector  and 
imposed a fine on Diehl of EUR 1.2 million for participating together with its competitor RUAG54 in 
a cartel concerning the sale of military hand grenades.  RUAG was not fined because it revealed the 
cartel  to  the  Commission  under  the  EU  leniency  programme.  The  Commission  found  that  the 
companies split national markets  between themselves across the EEA during almost 14 years. Both 
companies admitted their involvement in the cartel and agreed to settle the case. 

In  October  2023,  the  Commission  also  adopted  a  decision  against  a  cartel  in  the  pharmaceutical 
sector. It fined Alkaloids of Australia, Alkaloids Corporation, Boehringer, Linnea and Transo-Pharm 
a  total  of  EUR  13.4  million  in  a  settlement  procedure  for  participating  in  a  long-lasting  cartel 
concerning pharmaceutical ingredient N-Butylbromide Scopolamine/ Hyoscine (SNBB) necessary to 
produce abdominal antispasmodic drugs55. C2 PHARMA was not fined because it revealed the cartel 
to the Commission under the EU leniency programme. The six companies coordinated and agreed to 
fix  the  minimum  sales  price  of  SNBB  to  their  customers  (distributors  and  generic  drug 
manufacturers) and to allocate quotas. In addition, the companies exchanged commercially sensitive 
information.  

In November 2023, the Commission fined  Rabobank EUR 26.6 million for participating in a cartel 
concerning the trading of certain Euro-denominated bonds with Deutsche Bank56. The latter was not 
fined  as  it  revealed  the  cartel  to  the  Commission  under  the  EU  leniency  programme.  The 
Commission’s  investigation  revealed  that  between  2006  and  2016  the  two  banks,  through  some  of 
their traders, exchanged commercially sensitive information and coordinated their trading and pricing 
strategies. 

In  November  202357,  the  Commission  informed  six  companies  and  one  trade  association  of  its 
preliminary  view  that  they  have  breached  antitrust  rules  by  colluding  to  increase  the  prices  of 
automotive starter batteries sold to car producers in the EEA. 

Finally,  in  the  groceries  sector,  the  Commission  continued  in  2023  its  investigation  into  possible 
restrictions by Mondelez of parallel trade between Member States for chocolate, biscuits, and coffee 
products.58 The Commission also started an investigation into alleged market foreclosing practices in 
energy drinks markets and made unannounced inspections at Red Bull59.  

In 2023, the Commission carried out unannounced inspections in a variety of sectors, for example in 
the  fragrance60,  energy  drinks61,  fashion62,  medical  devices63,  construction  chemicals64,  and  online 
food delivery65 sectors. 

54 Case AT.40760 - Hand grenades. 
55 Case AT.40636 - SNBB. 
56 Case AT.40512 - Euro-denominated bonds. 
57 Case AT.40545 - Automotive starter batteries. 
58 See:https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_281  
59 See:https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_1802 
60 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_1532  

15 

 
 
Judgment of the General Court in the Videogames case66 
In September 2023, the General Court upheld the Commission’s infringement decision against Valve in 
the  Videogames  case.  In  its  decision,  the  Commission  found  that  Valve  and  five  publishers  of  PC 
videogames  had  entered into  anticompetitive  agreements/concerted practices  restricting  parallel imports 
the 
of  PC  video  games  by  means  of  geo-blocking.  The  General  Court  confirmed 
agreements/concerted practices were anticompetitive by object in so far as they were intended to restrict 
parallel  imports  and  that  the  legal  and  economic  context  was  not  such  as  to  call  this  into  question. 
Moreover, the General Court confirmed that Article 101(1) TFEU refers to all agreements and concerted 
practices that distort competition, irrespective of the market where the parties operate.  
The  General  Court  also  clarified  the  relationship  between  EU  competition  law  and  copyrights.  The 
General  Court  confirmed  that  the  granting  of  licenses  (including  exclusive  licenses)  as  such  is  not 
contrary to Article 101 TFEU. However, additional territorial limitations of licenses making it impossible 
to access the protected subject matter from outside the territory covered by the license, may have an anti-
competitive object and be caught by Article 101 TFEU.  

that 

Merger control contributed to the digital transition and a strong and resilient Single Market 

Merger control  underpins  the  Commission’s  key  priorities  when  it  comes  to  digital innovation  and 
transformation, avoiding creation of excessive market power, foreclosure, and elimination of  market 
entrants. In 2023, the Commission continued to enforce its merger control rules to protect consumers 
from price increases but also from a deterioration of other important parameters of competition such 
as quality, choice, and innovation. 

In  2023,  the  Commission’s  merger  control  activities  remained  at  a  high  level.  The  Commission 
adopted  333  merger  decisions  in  various  sectors  (in  2022  the  Commission  adopted  368  merger 
decisions)  of  which  271  were  approved  following  a  simplified  procedure.  The  Commission 
intervened in 11 proposed acquisitions, of which 9 transactions were approved subject to conditions 
and  one  was  prohibited.  One  notified  transaction  was  abandoned  by  the  parties  and  withdrawn  in 
Phase II. 

The Commission blocked Booking’s acquisition of eTraveli 
In September 2023, the Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition of  eTraveli  by Booking67. The 
Commission  found  that  the  transaction  would  have  strengthened  Booking’s  dominant  position  in  the 
market  for  hotel  online  travel  agencies  (OTAs),  leading  to  higher  costs  for  hotels  and  possibly  for 
consumers.  The  Commission  conducted  an extensive  analysis  of  the  proposed commitments  offered  by 
Booking and found that the proposed remedies were not sufficiently comprehensive and effective and did 
not eliminate entirely the identified competition concerns. 

61 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_1802  
62 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2352  
63 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4517  
64 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5061  
65 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_5944  
the  General  Court  of  27.9.2023 
66  Judgment  of 
ECLI:EU:T:2023:587. 
67 Case M.10615 - Booking Holdings/eTraveli Group.  

in  Case  T-172/21,  Valve  v  European  Commission, 

16 

 
 
Source: European Commission. 

The Commission fined Illumina and GRAIL for implementing their merger without prior approval  
In July 2021, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into Illumina's acquisition of GRAIL. In 
September  2022,  the  Commission  blocked  the  transaction  over  concerns  that  it  would  have  significant 
anticompetitive effects, stifling innovation and reducing choice in the market for blood-based early cancer 
detection tests68.  However, in  August  2021,  while the Commission's  review  was still  ongoing,  Illumina 
publicly announced that it had completed its acquisition of GRAIL. In July 2023, the Commission fined 
Illumina  and  GRAIL  approximately  EUR  432  million  and  EUR  1,000  respectively,  for  implementing 
their  proposed  merger  before  approval  by  the  Commission69.  The  Commission  concluded  that  Illumina 
and GRAIL knowingly and intentionally breached the standstill obligation during the Commission's in-
depth investigation. This is a very serious infringement which undermines the effective functioning of EU 
merger  control.  The  fine  imposed  on  Illumina  corresponds  to  the  statutory  limit  of  10%  of  Illumina's 
turnover.  In  its  decision,  the  Commission  noted  that  GRAIL,  as  the  target  company,  was  aware  of  the 
standstill  obligation  and  played  an  active  role  in  the  infringement.  However,  given  that  it  was  the  first 
time it imposed a fine for ‘gun-jumping’ on a target company, the Commission decided to only impose a 
symbolic fine of EUR 1,000 on GRAIL. 
In October 2023, the European Commission adopted a decision, ordering restorative measures consisting 
of  divestment  measures  requiring  Illumina  to  unwind  the  acquisition  of  GRAIL.  The  decision  also 
included transitional measures that Illumina and GRAIL need to comply with until Illumina has dissolved 
the transaction70. 

68 Case M.10188 - Illumina/GRAIL.  
69 Case M.10483 - Illumina/GRAIL (Art. 14 procedure). See: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3773  
70 Case M.10939 - Illumina/GRAIL. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_4872 

17 

                     
 
 
Source: European Commission.  

In  2023,  the  Commission  continued  to  safeguard  competition  for  fixed  network  infrastructure.  The 
Commission  approved  in  March  2023  the  acquisition  of  VOO  and  Brutélé  by  Orange,  subject  to 
conditions71.  The  Commission  was  concerned  that  the  proposed  transaction  would  (i)  reduce  the 
number of operators from three to two in areas covered by VOO and Brutélé's own fixed networks, 
eliminating Orange as an innovative and significant competitive constraint, (ii) significantly reduce 
competition in the markets where Orange, VOO and Brutélé are close competitors, and (iii) increase 
the  likelihood  of  coordination  between  the  remaining  operators  in  areas  covered  by  VOO  and 
Brutélé’s  own  fixed  networks.  To  address  the  Commission's  competition  concerns,  Orange 
committed to grant competitor Telenet access for at least 10 years to VOO’s and Brutélé’s existing 
fixed network infrastructure in the Walloon region and parts of Brussels, as well as to Orange's future 
fibre-to-the-premises network. 

In May 2023, the Commission accepted commitments offered by Microsoft as a condition to approve 
its acquisition of Activision Blizzard72. The Commission was concerned that the proposed acquisition 
would allow Microsoft to harm competition (i) for the distribution of console and PC video games, 
including  multi-game  subscription  services  and  cloud  game  streaming  services;  and  (ii)  for  the 
supply of PC operating systems. Microsoft committed to  provide (i) a free license to consumers in 
the EEA that would allow them to stream, via any cloud game streaming services of their choice, all 
current and future Activision Blizzard PC and console games for which they have a license, and (ii) a 
corresponding free license to cloud game streaming service providers to allow EEA-based gamers to 
stream  any  Activision  Blizzard's  PC  and  console  games.  These  commitments  fully  address  the 

71 Case M.10663 - Orange / VOO / Brutélé. 
72 Case M.10646 - Microsoft / Activision. 

18 

 
 
 
competition concerns identified by the Commission. The commitments have a duration of 10 years, 
and their compliance will be monitored by an independent trustee working under the supervision of 
the Commission. 

Source: European Commission.  

In July 2023, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition by Broadcom of VMware, subject 
to  conditions73.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the  transaction  may  restrict  competition  in  the 
market  for  hardware  components  which  interoperate  with  VMware's  virtualisation  software.  To 
address 
the  Commission's  competition  concerns,  Broadcom  offered  several  access  and 
interoperability commitments to both existing and future competitors in the market. Considering the 
commitments  offered  by  Broadcom,  the  Commission  concluded  that  the  merger  would  no  longer 
raise competition concerns. 

In  July  2023,  the  Commission  approved  the  proposed  acquisition  by  Advent  of  GfK,  subject  to 
conditions74.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the  transaction,  as  initially  notified,  would  have 
raised serious competition concerns (i) in the market for retail measurement services for fast moving 
consumer  goods;  and  (ii) in  the market  for consumer  panel  services.  The  Commitments  offered  by 
Advent  remove  the  overlaps  between  NielsenIQ's  and  GfK's  activities  in  the  German  and  Italian 
markets for consumer panel services as well as the possibility for NielsenIQ to foreclose competitors 
in the markets for retail measurement services for fast moving consumer goods and consumer panel 
services. 

In May 2023, the Commission approved the proposed acquisition of OMV Slovenija by MOL, subject 
to  conditions75.  Both  companies  are  active  in  the  retail  fuel  supply  sector.  The  approval  was 

73 Case M.10806 - Broadcom / VMware.  
74 Case M.10860 - Advent / GfK. 
75 Case M.10438 - MOL / OMV Slovenija.  

19 

 
 
 
conditioned  on  the  divesture  by  MOL  to  the  Shell  Group  of  39  fuel  stations  in  Slovenia.  The 
Commission took the view that the divested assets constituted a viable business that would enable the 
Shell Group to effectively compete with the merged entity in the Slovenian market. 

In  June  2023,  following  an  in-depth  investigation  and  subject  to  conditions,  the  Commission 
approved  the  acquisition  of  Lagardère  by  Vivendi76.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the 
transaction, as initially notified, would harm competition in the book publishing and press magazines 
sectors, respectively. To address the Commission’s concerns, Vivendi offered to divest its publishing 
business as well as its celebrity press magazine Gala. The Commission concluded that the divested 
assets constitute a viable business that would enable a potential buyer to effectively compete with the 
merged entity. 

In  December  2023,  the  Commission  approved  the  proposed  merger  between  Chr  Hansen  A/S  and 
Novozymes  A/S,  subject  to  conditions77.  The  Commission  had  concerns  that  the  transaction  would 
have  raised  serious  competition  concerns  regarding  the  manufacture  of  lactase  using  genetic 
modification  technology  because  Novozymes  had  a  strong  market  position  and  Chr  Hansen  was  a 
potential  entrant.  The  commitments  create  a  business  with  the  necessary  production  assets  and 
research and development capabilities to become a viable competitive producer of lactase. 

State aid control contributed to the digital transition and the resilience of the Single Market 

Investments in digital infrastructure, technologies and services are key drivers of economic growth, 
not  only  in  the  digital  sector  but  in  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Such  investments  are  necessary  to 
achieve  the  policy  objectives  set  out  in  the  Digital  Decade  Policy  Programme78.  State  support  for 
risky  investments  in  the  digital  sphere  can  be  necessary  to  address  market  failures  (that  is  to  say 
when relying on private initiatives only would result in investment levels that are too low from the 
society point of view). 

In  April  2023,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  2.9  billion  French  aid  measure  to  support 
STMicroelectronics  and  GlobalFoundries  in  the  construction  of  a  new  microchips  manufacturing 
facility in France79. The measure will strengthen Europe's security of supply,  resilience, and digital 
sovereignty in semiconductor technologies, in line with the objectives set out in the European Chips 
Act Communication80. 

76 Case M.10433 - Vivendi / Lagadère. 
77 Case M.11043 - Novozymes/Christian Hansen.  
78 Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the 
Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030. 
79 Case SA.102430 - France – Project Liberty – New semiconductor manufacturing plant by STMicroelectronics and 
GlobalFoundries. 
80  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Chips Act for Europe, COM(2022) 45 final. 

20 

 
 
In  June  2023,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  680  million  Spanish  scheme,  which  was  funded 
thanks  to  the  RRF,  to  roll  out  equipment  and  infrastructure  for  high-performing  5G  standalone 
networks in underserved rural areas81. 

In November 2023, the Commission approved EUR 172 million of aid (including support from the 
European Regional Development Fund) for the deployment in Portugal of fixed networks providing 
at  least  1  Gbps  download  speed  and  150  Mbps  upload  speed  under  usual  peak  time  conditions  in 
areas  where  networks  do  not  provide  at  least  100  Mbps  of  download  speed  under  usual  peak  time 
conditions82. 

innovation  and  first 

IPCEI in microelectronics and communication technologies 
In  June  2023  the  Commission  approved  an  Important  Project  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI) 
which  supports  research, 
industrial  deployment  of  microelectronics  and 
communication  technologies  across  the  value  chain  (IPCEI  ME/CT)83.  Fourteen  Member  States84  will 
provide  up  to  EUR  8.1  billion  in  public  funding,  which  is  expected  to  unlock  an  additional  EUR  13.7 
billion  in  private  investments.  As  part  of  the  IPCEI,  56  companies  including  SMEs  and  start-ups  will 
carry  out  68  projects.  These  projects  are  part  of  the  wider  IPCEI  ME/CT  ecosystem  involving  over  30 
associated  participants,  including  universities,  research  organisations  and  companies  located  in  five 
additional  EU  Member  States85  and  Norway.  The  IPCEI  ME/CT  enables  the  digital  and  green 
transformation  by  (i)  creating  innovative  microelectronics  and  communication  solutions,  and  (ii) 
developing  energy-efficient  and  resource-saving  electronics  systems  and  manufacturing  methods.  The 
projects will contribute to the technological advancement of many sectors, including communications (5G 
and  6G),  autonomous  driving,  artificial  intelligence,  and  quantum  computing.  They  will  also  support 
companies active in energy generation and distribution and will be used in their green transition. The first 
products are scheduled to be introduced to the market in 2025 with completion of the overall project in 
2032. The IPCEI ME/CT is expected to create some 8,700 direct jobs and many more indirect ones. 

IPCEI in cloud and edge technologies 
In  December  2023  the  Commission  approved  an  IPCEI  to  support  research,  development  and  first 
industrial deployment of advanced cloud and edge computing technologies across multiple providers in 
Europe  (IPCEI  CIS)86.  Seven  Member  States87  will  provide  up  to  EUR  1.2  billion  in  public  funding, 
which is expected to unlock additional EUR 1.4 billion in private investments. As part of this IPCEI, 19 
companies, including SMEs, will carry out 19 highly innovative projects. IPCEI CIS is the first IPCEI in 
the cloud and edge computing domain. It concerns the development of the first interoperable and openly 
accessible European data processing ecosystem, the multi-provider cloud to edge continuum. 

81 Case SA.104933 - Spain – Support for 5G equipment and infrastructure. 
82 Case SA.105187 – Portugal – Deployment of fixed access networks. 
83  Cases  SA.101202  (Austria),  SA.101141  (Czechia),  SA.101143  (Finland),  SA.101193  (France),  SA.101129 
(Germany),  SA.101210  (Greece),  SA.101151  (Ireland),  SA.101186  (Italy),  SA.101201  (Malta),  SA.101171  (The 
Netherlands), SA.101175 (Poland), SA.101192 (Romania), SA.101200 (Slovakia) and SA.101150 (Spain). 
84  Austria,  Czechia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Malta,  The  Netherlands,  Poland,  Romania, 
Slovakia and Spain. 
85 Belgium, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, and Slovenia. 
86 Cases SA.102498 (France), SA.102517 (Germany), SA.102520 (Hungary), SA.102519 (Italy), SA.102516 (The 
Netherlands), SA.102527 (Poland) and SA.102514 (Spain). 
87 France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, and Spain. 

21 

 
 
 
 
4.2 Competition policy enforcement contributed to the green transition 

Competition policy contributes to the EU’s environmental objectives and climate targets, for example 
the decarbonisation of the economy, the transport sector shift from fossil fuels to alternative fuels and 
the  development  of  clean  technologies.  Competition  law  enforcement  contributes  to  the  European 
Green  Deal88  by  keeping markets  efficient,  fair,  and  innovative.  It also  safeguards  the  free  flow of 
resources necessary for the circular economy and the Green Deal’s objectives. 

Antitrust enforcement contributed to the green transition 

In  2023,  the  Commission  continued  to  take  action  against  anti-competitive  market  behaviour  that 
could hinder the green transition.  

In  December  2023,  the  Commission  fined  Lantmännen  ek  för  and  its  subsidiary  Lantmännen 
Biorefineries  AB  (formerly  named  Lantmännen  Agroetanol  AB)  a  total  of  EUR  47.7  million  for 
colluding  to  influence  the  price  formation  mechanism  for  ethanol  in  Europe89.  When  blended  with 
petrol, ethanol can be used as biofuel for engines. The Commission had settled the case with a second 
cartel member in 2021 and closed its investigation against the remaining suspected cartel member in 
2023. 

The Commission also continued its investigations into the synthetic turf industry90 and into a possible 
collusion  concerning  the  recycling  of  end-of-life  passenger  vehicles91  to  determine  whether  the 
companies active in these sectors have violated EU antitrust rules. 

Merger control contributed to the green transition 

In 2023, the Commission remained vigilant in enforcing merger control rules in markets key to the 
circular  economy  and  the  attainment  of  sustainability  goals.  The  Commission  endeavoured  to 
preserve  competition  against  the  rise  of  excessive  market  power,  foreclosure  risks  and  barriers  to 
market entry. In doing so, the Commission consistently considered sustainability aspects of mergers 
in  sectors  such  as  renewables,  recycling  infrastructure,  gas  and  electricity  infrastructure,  and  e-
mobility services.  

In  February  2023,  the  Commission  approved  the  acquisition  of  MBCC  by  Sika  subject  to 
conditions92. The investigation focused on the impact of the transaction on the industry’s efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions from concrete production. In particular, the innovative chemical admixtures 
produced by the parties can help minimize the content of carbon intensive materials – such as cement 
–  in  concrete  mixes.  The  transaction,  as  initially  notified,  would  have  substantially  reduced 

88  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  the  European  Green  Deal, 
COM(2019) 640 final. 
89 Case AT.40054 - Ethanol benchmarks. 
90 See:https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3133  
91 See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1765  
92 Case M.10560 - Sika / MBCC. 

22 

 
 
competition  in  the  markets  for  chemical  admixtures  and  concrete  admixtures.  To  address  the 
Commission's concerns, Sika offered to divest MBCC's chemical admixture businesses in the EEA, 
Australia,  Canada,  New  Zealand,  Switzerland,  the  UK,  and  the  U.S.  The  divestiture  removed  the 
horizontal overlaps between the parties in chemical admixture markets in the EEA. The Commission 
considered  that  the  purchaser  of  this  stand-alone  business  would  be  able  to  act  as  a  viable 
competitive force on a lasting basis. 

In  October  2023,  the  Commission  approved  the  proposed  acquisition  of  Thales’  ground 
transportation business (GTS) by Hitachi Rail. The approval is conditional on full compliance with 
commitments offered by Hitachi Rail, such as the sale of Hitachi Rail’s mainline signalling platforms 
in France and in Germany for interlockings, overlay and re-signalling projects93. 

State aid control contributed to the green transition 
In  2023,  the  Commission  approved  a  number  of  State  aid  measures  intended  to  support  the  green 
transition of the EU, supporting for example renewable energy, industrial decarbonisation and clean 
mobility.  

In January and December 2023, the Commission approved under the CEEAG94 two Danish schemes 
to  support  the  roll-out  of  carbon  capture  and  storage  technologies95,  96  with  a  combined  budget  of 
EUR 1.45 billion. The measures contribute to the achievement of Denmark's climate targets and the 
Green Deal, in particular the 2050 climate neutrality goal.  

In February 2023, the Commission approved under the CEEAG a EUR 2.08 billion French measure 
to  support  offshore  wind  energy  generation97.  The  same  month,  the  Commission  also  approved  a 
EUR  1.1  billion  German  scheme  to  support  rail  transport  operators  using  electric  traction  in  the 
context of spikes in electricity prices98. The measure will contribute to ensuring that the rail sector 
remains competitive while preserving the environmental performance of electric rail, in line with the 
objectives of the Commission's Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy99 and of the European Green 
Deal100.  

93 Case M.10507 - Hitachi Rail / Ground Transportation systems business of Thales. 
94 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy, 
OJ C 80, 18.2.2022, p. 1. 
95 Case SA.102777 - Denmark – State aid scheme for Carbon Capture and Storage.  
96 Case SA.108284 - Denmark – RRF – State aid scheme for Carbon Capture and Storage. 
97 Case SA.100269 - France – Parc éolien flottant en mer dans une zone au large du sud de la Bretagne. 
98  Case  SA.105120  -  Germany  –  Electricity  brake  for  rail  –  Temporary  cost  containment  of  electricity  price 
increases – rail transport operators. 
99  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy – putting European 
transport on track for the future, COM(2020) 789 final. 
100  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the 
European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  the  Regions,  the  European  Green  Deal, 
COM(2019) 640 final. 

23 

 
 
The  Commission  approved  in  May  2023  two  Dutch  schemes  with  a  total  budget  of  approximately 
EUR 1.47 billion aimed at reducing nitrogen deposition on nature conservation areas101.  

In August 2023, the Commission approved under the CEEAG, a EUR 350 million State aid scheme 
for  the  deployment  of  high-power  recharging  infrastructure  for  electric  vehicles  along  the  German 
motorways102.  

In  December  2023,  the  Commission  approved under  CEEAG  a  EUR 17.7  billion  Italian  scheme103 
supporting  the  construction  and  operation  of  a  centralised  electricity  storage  system.  The  measure 
will  be  implemented  over  a  ten-year  period  and  will  facilitate  the  integration  of  renewable  energy 
sources in the Italian electricity system, therefore contributing to the achievement of the Green deal 
objectives. 

In 2023 the Commission approved, both under the CEEAG and under the TCTF, a number of State 
aid measures with an overall aid amount of approximately EUR 9 billion in several Member States 
(Spain, Poland, Belgium, France, Germany and Czechia) to decarbonise the production processes of 
large  industrial  greenhouse  gas  emitters,  primarily  in  the  steel  sector  but  also  in  other  energy-
intensive sectors.104 

In 2023 the Commission approved eight national schemes under section 2.8 TCTF, with an overall 
aid amount of approximately EUR 9 billion. These national schemes aim to accelerate, in line with 
the Green Deal Industrial Plan, investments in sectors strategic for the transition towards a net-zero 
economy  (including  batteries,  solar  panels,  wind  turbines,  heat  pumps,  electrolysers  and  carbon 
capture  and  storage  equipment)  in  Spain  (EUR  2.5  billion)105,  Hungary  (EUR  2.4  billion)106, 

101 Case SA.106555 - The Netherlands – National scheme for closure of livestock husbandry units aiming at reducing 
nitrogen  emissions,  and  Case  SA.106559  –  The  Netherlands  –  National  cessation  scheme  on  peak  load  livestock 
sites (LBV Plus).  
102 Case SA.105414, Germany - Aid scheme for High Power Charging infrastructure for electric vehicles along the 
motorways in Germany.  
103 Case SA.104106 - Italy - Support for the development of a centralised electricity storage system in Italy. 
104 Case SA.104904 - Spain - ArcelorMittal Spain (Gijon), Case SA.105006 - Poland - RRF-Aid to LOTOS Green H2 
Sp. z o.o., Case SA.104897 - Belgium  - Project ArcelorMittal (Ghent), Case SA.104903 - France – ArcelorMittal 
France,  Case  SA.105244  -  Germany  -  Aid  to  ThyssenKrupp  for  project  tkH2Steel,  Case  SA.104686  -  Czechia  – 
TCTF: Modernisation Fund – Programme ENERG ETS.  
105  Case  SA.107094,  Spain  -  RRF  –  TCTF  -  Integrated  action  line on  the  industrial  value  chain  –  Batteries;  Case 
SA.108653, Spain. RRF – TCTF - Scheme for projects of equipment necessary for the transition towards a net-zero 
economy. 
106  Case  SA.107689,  Hungary  -TCTF  -  Scheme  for  accelerated  investments  in  sectors  strategic  for  the  transition 
towards a net-zero economy. 

24 

 
 
Germany (EUR 3 billion)107, Slovakia (EUR 1 billion)108, Italy (EUR 100 million)109, Austria (EUR 
60 million)110 and Belgium (EUR 50 million)111. 

4.3. Competition policy contributed to an economy that works for people 

Contribution of EU competition policy to innovation and fairness in payments 

In  2023,  the  Commission  continued  its  monitoring  of  the  application  of  the  Interchange  Fee 
Regulation (IFR)112. A study on new developments in card-based payment markets primarily related 
to  the  application  of  the  IFR  was  finalised  in  December  2023.  Furthermore,  the  Commission 
published an open call for tender for a study on competition in online payment services in June 2023.  

DG Competition also contributed to the Commission’s work on regulatory initiatives forming part of 
‘An  Economy  that  works  for  people’  aligning  them  with  competition  policy  principles.  This  work 
stream  included  Commission  proposals  on  the  Digital  Euro,  Financial  data  access  (Open  Finance) 
and payments (Open Banking: review of the second Payment Services Directive). 

Antitrust enforcement in the financial services and insurance sectors 

In 2023, the Commission continued its investigation into Apple’s conduct related to mobile payment 
services. In its Statement of Objections issued in 2022113, the Commission provisionally found that 
Apple  restricted  competition  by  abusing  its  dominant  position  in  the  mobile  wallet  market  on  iOS 
devices, by limiting access to the Near Field Communication (NFC) functionality on iPhones for in-
store payments thereby reserving access to Apple Pay.  

In November 2023, the Commission fined the members of a cartel concerning the trading of certain 
Euro-denominated bonds114. 

In  travel  health  insurance  services,  the  Commission  investigated  an  alleged  breach  of  competition 
law by Czechia. Legislation adopted by Czechia conferring to a public  company the exclusive right 
to operate in the Czech market for travel health insurance services for foreigners could constitute a 
breach of Article 102 TFEU in conjunction with Article 106 TFEU. The exclusive right granted by 
the State excluded competing insurance providers. DG Competition’s investigation was closely co-
ordinated  with  the  parallel  investigation  of  the  DG  for  Financial  Stability,  Financial  Services  and 
Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA). In July 2023, the Commission addressed to Czechia a Letter of 

107 Case SA.108068, Germany -TCTF - Aid to support the transition to a net-zero economy. 
108  Case  SA.109989,  Slovakia  -TCTF  -  State  aid  scheme  for  providing  Extraordinary  Investment  Aid  in  sectors 
strategic for the transition to a net-zero economy. 
109 Case SA.108953, Italy – TCTF - RRF - Investment aid scheme for the production of electrolysers. 
110  Case  SA.109170,  Austria  -  TCTF  –  Scheme  for  accelerated  investments  in  sectors  strategic  for  the  transition 
towards a net-zero economy. 
111  Case  SA.109169,  Belgium  -  RRF-TCTF:  Decarbonisation  of  Walloon  companies  -  Enhancing  investments  in 
value chains linked to the energy transition. 
112 Regulation (EU) 2015/751 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29.4.2015 on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, OJ L 123, 19.5.2015, p. 1. 
113 Case AT.40452 - Mobile Payments, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2764 
114 Case AT.40512 - Euro-denominated bonds (EDB).  

25 

 
 
Formal  Notice,  concluding  that  the  Czech  law  breached  Article  56  TFEU  and  the  Solvency  II 
Directive115.  Following  the  Commission’s  intervention,  Czechia  amended  the  legislation  by 
abolishing the exclusive right of the public undertaking. 

In  motor  insurance,  following  the  adoption  in  2022  of  a  Commission  decision  into  the  access 
conditions to a data sharing system administered by Insurance Ireland, the Commission continued to 
monitor Insurance Ireland’s compliance with the  binding commitments the company made116. As a 
result of the commitments, new companies were granted access to Insurance Ireland and to the data 
sharing system. The commitments continue to apply until 2032. 

Merger enforcement in the financial services sector 

In 2023, the Commission reviewed mergers across a variety of financial service markets, including 
banking, insurance, payment services, and other specialised financial services. 

On  25  May  2023,  the  European  Commission  unconditionally  approved  the  merger  between  Credit 
Suisse  and  UBS117.  The  Commission  found  that  the  merger  would  not  significantly  reduce 
competition in the markets where the parties’ activities overlap within the EU. Due to the financial 
difficulties faced by Credit Suisse, the Commission decided to grant the merging firms a derogation 
from the standstill obligation, and allowed UBS to implement certain measures, including the closing 
of the transaction.  

In 2023, the Commission continued monitoring mergers in the financial services industry to identify 
transactions  that  may  warrant  referral  to  the  Commission  under  Article  22  of  Council  Regulation 
(EC) No 139/2004 (EU Merger Regulation)118. In August 2023, the Commission accepted requests 
by  three  Member  States  and  one  EFTA  Country  to  assess  the  proposed  acquisition  of  Nasdaq's 
European power trading and clearing business by European Energy Exchange AG. The Commission 
considered that the proposed merger met the criteria for referral under Article 22 of the EU Merger 
Regulation. In particular, the transaction combined the only two providers of services facilitating the 
on-exchange  trading  and  subsequent  clearing  of  Nordic  power  contracts.  The  Commission 
investigation is on-going119. 

State aid enforcement in the financial services sector 

In  November  2023,  the  Commission  approved an amendment  to  the  support measures  approved in 
2022  in  support  of  the  resolution  of  Getin  Noble  Bank,  one  of  the  ten  largest  Polish  banks.  The 
amended support measure facilitated the sale of a bridge bank set up in the resolution process. The 

115  Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25  November 2009 on the taking-up 
and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (recast) OJ L 335, 17.12.2009, p.1. 
116 Case AT.40511 - Insurance Ireland - Insurance claims database and conditions of access.  
117 Case M.11111 - UBS / Credit Suisse. 
118 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1. 
119 Case M.11241 - EEX / NASDAQ POWER  

26 

 
 
measures also aimed to maximise the recovery value for the Polish Resolution Fund by carving out 
from the bank a portfolio of impaired assets120. 

Moreover,  the  Commission  prolonged  certain  existing  schemes  whereby  Member  States  can 
subsidise the restructuring or orderly market exit of  banks in distress. For Poland, the Commission 
authorised  the  extension  of  both  the  scheme  for  the  liquidation  of  credit  unions  (in  place  since 
February 2014)121 and the scheme for the resolution of cooperative and small commercial banks (in 
place  since  December  2016).122  For  Ireland,  the  Commission  authorised  two  prolongations  of  the 
restructuring  scheme  for  credit  unions  (in  place  since  October  2014)123  and  the  extension  of  the 
orderly  winding-up  scheme  for  credit  unions  (in place  since  December  2011)124.  For  Denmark,  the 
Commission approved the second re-introduction of the winding-up scheme for small banks.125 

In  November  2023,  the  Commission  approved  the  re-introduction  of  Hercules,  an  asset  protection 
scheme in Greece126.The re-introduced scheme will be in place until the end of 2024 and will assist 
banks in securitising and moving non-performing loans off their balance sheets.  

On  21  September  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  new  decision  on  the  past  FITD  (Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme) measures to support Banca Tercas127. This new decision followed the annulment 
by the Court of Justice128 of the 2015 Commission Decision129. In its new decision, the Commission 
concluded  that  the  support  granted  by  the  FITD  to  Banca  Tercas  was  not  imputable  to  Italy  and 
therefore did not constitute illegal State aid. 

State aid in insurance 

In February 2023, the Commission approved a EUR 1.5 billion French State Fund, set up to protect 
travellers  if  travel  organisers  become  insolvent130.  The  Fund  will  ensure  that  consumers  are 
adequately  protected  despite  insufficient  insurance  cover  sometimes  offered  by  private  insurance 
providers, following the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the tourism sector. 

120 Case SA.109418, Poland - Amendment to the liquidation aid to Getin Noble S.A. in resolution (SA.100687). 
121 Case SA.108852 - Poland – Thirteenth prolongation of the Credit Unions Orderly Liquidation Scheme. 
122  Case  SA.108989  -  Poland  -  Eighth  prolongation  of  the  resolution  scheme  for  cooperative  banks  and  small 
commercial banks and amendment of the offered commitments. 
123  Case  SA.106983  -  Ireland  -  17th  Prolongation  of  the  Restructuring  and  Stabilisation  Scheme  for  the  Credit 
Union Sector; Case SA.109639 - Ireland – 18th Prolongation of the Restructuring and Stabilisation Scheme for the 
Credit Union Sector. 
124 Case SA.107306 - Ireland - 19th prolongation of the Credit Union Resolution Scheme 2023-2024. 
125  Case  SA.106526  -  Denmark  –  Prolongation  of  the  second  re-introduction of  the  winding-up  scheme  for  small 
banks. 
126 Case SA.109365 - Greece - Re-introduction of the Hercules Scheme. 
127 Case SA.39451 – Italy – Banca Tercas. 
128 Judgment of the Court of Justice of 2.3.2021 in Case C-425/19 P, European Commission v Italian Republic and 
Others, EU:C:2021:154. 
129 Case SA.39451 – Italy – Banca Tercas. 
130 SA.104022 – France - State guarantee fund for travel operators.  

27 

 
 
State aid in public guarantees 

In  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  two  decisions  regarding  Slovakia131  and  Denmark132  under  the 
Guarantee  Notice133.  In  the  decisions,  the  Commission  approved  methodologies  used  to  determine 
market-conform  guarantee  premiums.  These  premiums  serve  as  a  reference  when  calculating  the 
State aid element included in public guarantees. 

5. New complementary Single Market tools became operational 

5.1. Digital Markets Act 

The  Digital  Markets  Act (DMA)134  is  an internal  market legislation  harmonising  the  obligations of 
so-called  gatekeepers  across  the  EU.  It  became  fully  applicable  in  May  2023.  The  DMA  aims  to 
make the digital sector more contestable and put an end to unfair practices by companies acting as 
‘gatekeepers’ in the online platform economy. A gatekeeper may be able to act as a de-facto private 
rule-maker, acting as a gateway between business users and end-users, allowing it to engage in unfair 
behaviour and undermine market contestability.  

When an  online  digital  platform  meets  the  thresholds  and  criteria  set out in the  DMA,  it  has to  be 
notified  to  the  Commission  for  designation  as  a  gatekeeper135.  Companies  formally  designated  as 
gatekeepers have to comply with a set of obligations set out in the Regulation136. In April 2023, the 

131 Case SA.109147 - Slovakia - Calculation of aid elements in the provision of guarantees to SMEs. 
132 Case SA.109413 - Denmark - Prolongation and amendment of calculation method for Danish guarantee scheme 
(SA.60070). 
133  Commission  Notice  on  the  application  of  Articles  87  and  88  of  the  EC  Treaty  to  State  aid  in  the  form  of 
guarantees, OJ C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10. 
134 Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable 
and  fair  markets  in  the  digital  sector  and  amending  Directives  (EU)  2019/1937  and  (EU)  2020/1828  (Digital 
Markets Act), OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1. 
135 Under the DMA, the online digital platform is considered to have a significant impact on the Single Market if the 
following  cumulative  criteria  are  met:  (1.)  The  presumed  gatekeeper  must  generate  EU-wide  turnover  of  at  least 
EUR  7.5  billion;  have  an  average  market  capitalisation  exceeding  EUR  75  billion  and  provide  the  same  core 
platform services in at least three Member States. (2.) The presumed gatekeeper operates a platform service working 
as a gateway for business users to reach end users with at least 45 million monthly active end users and a minimum 
of 10 000 yearly active business users. (3.) The presumed gatekeeper must benefit from an entrenched and durable 
market position over the last three financial years. 
136 For example, companies designated as gatekeepers under the DMA must allow third parties to inter-operate with 
the  gatekeeper’s  own  services  in  certain  specific  situations;  allow  their  business  users  to  access  the  data  they 
generate  when  operating  the  platform;  provide  platform  advertisers  with  the  tools  and  information  necessary  for 
verifying  advertisements  hosted  by  the  gatekeeper;  allow  business  users  to  promote  their  offers  and  conclude 
contracts  with  customers  outside  the  gatekeeper’s  platform.  Designated  gatekeepers  are,  for  example,  prohibited 
from  treating  their  own  products  and  services  more  favourably  in  ranking  than  similar  products  and  services  or 
products  offered  by  third parties;  they  can  no  longer  prevent  consumers  from  linking up  to  businesses  outside  its 
platforms; they cannot prevent users from un-installing any pre-installed software or app or track end users outside 
the core platform service for the purpose of targeted advertising without consent. 

28 

 
 
Commission adopted implementing rules setting out how certain proceedings under the DMA will be 
conducted137. 

In  September  2023,  the  Commission  designated  six  companies  as  gatekeepers:  Alphabet138, 
Amazon139,  Apple140,  ByteDance141,  Meta142,  and  Microsoft143.  In  total,  22  core  platform  services 
provided  by  these  gatekeepers  were  designated144.  For  three  core  platform  services  (Gmail, 
Outlook.com  and  the  Samsung  Internet  Browser),  the  Commission  concluded  that  -  although  they 
meet the quantitative thresholds under the DMA to qualify as gatekeepers - Alphabet, Microsoft and 
Samsung provided sufficiently substantiated arguments showing that these services do not qualify as 
gateways for their respective core platform services. 

In  parallel  to  these  designations,  the  Commission  opened  in  September  2023  four  market 
investigations to further assess Microsoft's and Apple's submissions arguing that, despite meeting the 
thresholds,  some  of  their  core  platform  services  do  not  qualify  as  gateways.  For  Microsoft  these 
platforms  are  Bing,  Edge  and  Microsoft  Advertising,  and  for  Apple  it  is  iMessage.  These 
investigations aim to ascertain whether Microsoft and Apple should be designated as gatekeepers in 
relation  to  the  services  in  question.  These  investigations  aim  to  ascertain  whether  the  services  in 
question should be designated as gatekeepers. The investigations should be completed by February 
2024.  Moreover,  the  Commission  opened  a  market  investigation  to  further  assess  whether  Apple 
should  be  designated as  gatekeeper in  relation  to  its  operating  system  iPadOS,  despite  not meeting 
the thresholds. This investigation should be completed by September 2024. 

Following their designation, gatekeepers have until March 2024 to comply with the full list of ‘Do’s 
and Don’ts’ under the DMA. However, some of the obligations started to apply from the moment of 
designation,  for  example  the  obligation  to  inform  the  Commission  of  intended  acquisitions.  By 
March 2024, gatekeepers must submit detailed compliance reports outlining how they comply with 

137 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/814 of 14 April 2023 on detailed arrangements for the conduct 
of certain proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, OJ L 102, 17.4.2023, p. 6. 
138  Case  DMA.100011  -  Alphabet  –  OIS  Verticals;  Case  DMA.100002  -  Alphabet  –  OIS  AppStores;  Case 
DMA.100004  -  Alphabet  –  Online  search  engines;  Case  DMA.100005  -  Alphabet  –  Video  sharing;  Case 
DMA.100006  -  Alphabet  –  Number  independent  interpersonal  communication  services;  Case  DMA.100009  - 
Alphabet  –  Operating  systems;  Case  DMA.100008  -  Alphabet  –  Web  browsers;  Case  DMA.100010  -  Alphabet  – 
Online advertising services. 
139  Case  DMA.100018  -  Amazon  –  Online  intermediation  services  –  marketplaces;  Case  DMA.100016  -  Amazon, 
Online advertising services. 
140 Case DMA.100013 - Apple – Online intermediation services – app stores; Case DMA.100025 - Apple – operating 
systems; Case DMA.100027 - Apple – web browsers. 
141 Case DMA.100040 - ByteDance – Online social networking services. 
142  Case  DMA.100020  -  Meta  –  Online  Social  networking  services;  Case  DMA.100024  -  Meta  –  Number 
independent interpersonal communication services; Case DMA.100035 - Meta – Online Advertising services; Case 
DMA.100044 - Meta – Online intermediation services – Marketplace. 
143  Case  DMA.100017  -  Microsoft  –  online  social  networking  services;  Case  DMA.100023  -  Microsoft  – number-
independent interpersonal communications services; Case DMA.100026 - Microsoft – operating systems. 
144  Non-confidential  versions  of  the  Commission  decisions  are  published  at  the  Commission’s  DMA  page,  see: 
https://digital-markets-act-cases.ec.europa.eu/gatekeepers 

29 

 
 
the obligations of the DMA. To address non-compliance with the obligations, the Commission can 
impose  fines  of  up to  10%  of  the company’s  worldwide  turnover.  Moreover,  in  case  of  systematic 
non-compliance, higher fines and proportionate behavioural or structural remedies may be imposed 
on such companies. 

In  November  2023,  three  gatekeepers  challenged  their  designations  under  the  DMA.  ByteDance 
appealed to the General Court the Commission's decision to designate it as a gatekeeper in relation to 
its online social networking service TikTok145. The company argues that the TikTok platform does 
not act as a gateway but is rather a challenger in the digital space. ByteDance also applied for interim 
measures before the General Court in December 2023. Apple appealed to the General Court, arguing 
that  the  Commission  should  not  have  designated  it  as  a  gatekeeper  in  relation  to  its  online 
intermediation  service  App  Store146.  Apple  also  appealed  the  Commission’s  decision  to  open  a 
market  investigation  into  its  iMessage147.  Finally,  Meta  appealed  to  the  General  Court  seeking 
clarifications concerning its designation in relation to Messenger and Marketplace148. 

The Commission (with DG COMP and DG CNECT in the lead) is the central enforcer of the DMA 
but  works  in  close  cooperation  with  the  National  Competition  Authorities  within  the  European 
Competition  Network  (ECN)  in  accordance  with Articles  37  and  38  of  the  DMA.  The  rules  in  the 
DMA are without prejudice to the enforcement of the EU competition rules and national competition 
rules for unilateral conduct. 

5.2. Foreign Subsidies Regulation 

The Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR)149 closes a regulatory gap, 
making it possible to address foreign subsidies that distort competition in the Single Market. While 
State aid granted by EU Member States are subject to the EU State aid rules, subsidies granted by 
countries outside of the EU to individual firms active in the EU Single Market were not scrutinised 
before the entry into force of the FSR. The FSR entered into force in January 2023, started to apply 
in  July  2023  and  the  notification  obligation150  applies  since  October  2023.  In  July  2023,  the 
Commission  adopted  the  FSR  Implementing  Regulation151.  The  Commission  is  now  able  to 

145 Case T-1077/23 - Bytedance v Commission. 
146 Case T-1080/23 - Apple v Commission - Gatekeeper Designation and iMessage Classification. 
147 Case T-1079/23 - Apple v Commission – iMessage Market Investigation. 
148 Case T-1078/23 - Meta Platforms v Commission. 
149  Regulation  (EU)  2022/2560  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  14  December  2022  on  foreign 
subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L330, 23.12.2022, p. 1. 
150 Under the FSR, concentrations must be notified where the acquired company, one of the merging parties, or the 
joint  venture  is  established  in  the  EU  and  generates  an  EU  turnover  of  at  least  EUR  500  million  and  where  the 
parties to the transaction were granted combined aggregate foreign financial contributions of at least EUR 50 million 
over the past three years. Public procurement procedures must be notified to the Commission, where the estimated 
contract  value  is  at  least  EUR  250  million,  and  the  bid  concerned  involves  combined  aggregate  foreign  financial 
contributions of at least EUR 4 million per third country over the past three years. 
151 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1441 of 10 July 2023 on detailed arrangements for the conduct 
of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, OJ L 177, 12.7.2023, p. 1. The Implementing Regulation 

30 

 
 
 
 
investigate and redress, when appropriate, the distortive effects caused by foreign State support. This 
includes the power to open own-initiative investigations if there are indications that a foreign subsidy 
distorts the EU Single Market. 

A  notified  merger  cannot  be  completed,  and  an  investigated  bidder  cannot  be  awarded  the  public 
procurement  contract  while  under  investigation  by  the  Commission.  If  this  obligation  is  not 
respected,  the  Commission  can  impose  fines  of  up  to  10%  of  the  company's  annual  turnover.  The 
Commission  can  also  prohibit  the  completion  of  a  subsidised  merger  or  the  awarding  of  a  public 
procurement contract to a subsidised bidder. 

After it started to apply in July 2023, the Commission received submissions from firms concerning 
the  application  of  the  FSR.  Since  the  start  of  the  notification  obligation  on  12  October  2023,  DG 
Competition  has  started  pre-notification  discussions  in  41  cases  and  has  received  11  merger 
notifications under the FSR.152 

Source: European Commission. 

covers  procedural  aspects  and  contains  notification  forms  for  merger  transactions  involving  foreign  financial 
contributions and for foreign financial contributions in public procurement procedures. 
152 For enforcing the Foreign Subsidies Regulation in foreign financial contributions to public procurement 
procedures, see: https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/public-procurement/foreign-subsidies-
regulation_en.  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
6. Impact of State aid policy on the integrity of the Single Market and on the 
EU’s global competitiveness  

•  The European model is rooted in a strong social market economy, delivering inclusive economic 
prosperity based on sustainable growth, fair competition, open trade and economic security. The 
Single  Market  is  at  the  core  of  the  EU’s  competitiveness  and  the  Commission  is  committed  to 
ensuring a level playing field in the Single Market and globally. 

•  Against  this  background,  State  aid  rules  have  undergone  an  in-depth  review  process  in  this 
mandate  to  ensure  that  they  are  fit  for  the  green  and  digital  transition  and  contribute  to  a 
competitive and resilient EU economy. The rules have been updated where relevant and provide 
effective tools  for  Member  States  to  address  public investment  needs  for  key  priorities  such  as 
environmental  protection  and  decarbonisation,  regional  cohesion,  breakthrough  innovation,  as 
well as for manufacturing capacity in strategic sectors, notably for the transition towards a net-
zero  economy.  The  most  recently  available  data  show  that  in  2022,  Member  States  disbursed 
EUR 112 billion of (non-crisis) State aid, corresponding to 0.7% of EU GDP.  

•  The unprecedented crises triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the Russian invasion 
of  Ukraine  made  it  necessary  for  the  Commission  to  use  the  full  flexibility  of  the  State  aid 
toolbox, notably via targeted and temporary rules, to enable Member States to limit the impact of 
the crises on the EU economy, while putting in place safeguards to protect the Single Market. 

•  The  data  and  analysis  of  the  actual  implementation  of  the  COVID-19  Temporary  Framework 
(which  is  fully  phased  out)  has  shown  that  the  State  aid  granted  by  each  Member  State  was 
significantly  lower  than  the  amounts  approved  (around  30%)  and  largely  corresponded  to  the 
economic damage suffered by the Member State during the crisis in terms of GDP loss. 

•  The most recently available data shows that Member States granted EUR 141 billion in crisis aid 
in 2022 and the first half of 2023, corresponding to 0.6% of the EU GDP in that period, to limit 
the  economic  impact  of  the  Russian  invasion  of  Ukraine.  Currently  available  data  shows  that 
Member  States  have  granted  under  20%  of  the  amounts  approved.  There  are  divergences  in 
spending between Member States, which in part likely reflect varying fiscal capacity, but these 
may also in part be explained by differences in the impact of the energy crisis and in the size of 
the economies. 

•  Finally, point 86 in the Temporary Crisis and (Transition) Framework (TCTF) is a useful addition 
to the toolbox, to accelerate the transition towards a net-zero economy and to address risks of new 
investments  in  sectors  strategic  for  the  transition  towards  a  net-zero  economy  being  diverted 
outside the EU in favour of third countries due to subsidies. This provision allows individual aid 
up to the amount of subsidy which the beneficiary could receive for an equivalent investment in a 
third country jurisdiction outside the EEA, or the amount needed to incentivise the company to 
locate the investment in the EEA (the so-called ‘funding gap’) whichever is the lowest. 

•  The  Commission  constantly  works  to  ensure  that  State  aid  rules  remain  fit  for  purpose  and  to 
monitor  the  implementation  of  aid  measures,  with  the  aim  of  enabling  well  targeted  public 
support to the EU’s priorities and long-term competitiveness, as well as temporary measures to 
address crises, while limiting undue competition distortions in the Single Market. 

32 

 
To  protect  the  fairness  and  proper  functioning  of  the  Single  Market,  the  TFEU  generally  prohibits 
State aid by Member States that distorts or threatens to distort competition. State aid control ensures 
that  competition  between  companies  takes  place  on  the  merits  rather  than  based  on  the  level  of 
government  support,  thus  avoiding  subsidy  races  and  the  favouring  of  companies  from  Member 
States with ‘deeper pockets’. At the same time, in some circumstances government interventions can 
be necessary for a well-functioning and equitable economy. Therefore, the TFEU leaves ample room 
for State aid to support policy objectives, if it is necessary, proportionate, and appropriate to achieve 
those objectives without unduly distorting competition on the Single Market. By focusing on aid that 
is legitimate and effective and by avoiding overcompensation, State aid control also maximises the 
utility of limited public resources.  

In  October  2023,  the  European  Council  recalled  its  invitation  to  the  Commission  to  report  to  the 
Council on the impact of the current State aid policy on the integrity of the Single Market as well as 
on  the  EU’s  global  competitiveness.  Indeed,  when  evaluating  the  impact  of  State  aid  policy,  it  is 
crucial to consider the double challenge it faces from an internal and external perspective. State aid 
control  must  fulfil  its  mandate  to  avoid undue  distortions to competition  within  the  Single  Market, 
while allowing the EU economy to stay at the forefront of innovation and lead the twin transitions in 
the current challenging geopolitical climate.  

The  Commission  regularly  and  continuously  collects  data  on  the  implementation  of  State  aid 
measures by Member States to monitor its impact: 

-  First, the Commission prepares an annual “State aid Scoreboard” based on data submitted 
by  Member  States153  on  their  expenditure  (i.e.,  amounts  disbursed)  under  approved  aid 
measures, including a quantification of the aid element of the expenditure, i.e., the advantage 
granted by the aid154. The most recent data cover 2022.  

-  Second,  in  view  of  the  significant  amounts  of  aid  disbursed  in  recent  crises,  i.e.,  in  the 
context of the COVID-19 pandemic and in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, 
the Commission on an exceptional basis has launched  periodical surveys to collect timely 
information on the aid actually granted (i.e., amounts to which companies have received a 
legal  entitlement,  while  disbursement  may  happen  over  time)  by  Member  States  under 
approved crisis measures. The most recent survey covers 2022 until end-June 2023. While in 
the  context  of  the  annual  reporting  the  Member  States  are  also  required  to  provide  a 
quantification of the aid elements, in response to those crisis surveys, Member States report 

153  The  information  is  based  on  the  annual  reporting  by  Member  States  pursuant  to  Article  6(1)  of  Commission 
Regulation (EC) 794/2004. The accuracy of the data remains the responsibility of Member States. 
154 The aid element depends on the form of the aid. For grants, the advantage passed on to the beneficiary normally 
corresponds to the budgetary expenditure. For other aid instruments, the advantage to the beneficiary and the cost to 
government may differ. In the case of guarantees, for example, the beneficiary avoids the risk associated with the 
guarantee,  since  it  is  carried  by  the  State.  Such  risk-carrying  by  the  State  should  normally  be  remunerated  by  an 
appropriate premium. Where the State forgoes all or part of such a premium, this represents the aid element. 

33 

 
 
on  nominal  amounts  of  the  aid  granted,  to  simplify  the  data  collection  and  lessen  the 
administrative burden. 

6.1 Overall picture of State aid disbursement of crisis and non-crisis aid in 2022  

According  to  the  most  recent  annual  reports  of  Member  States,  in  2022,  the  27  Member  States 
disbursed EUR 227.98 billion, corresponding to 1.43% of their 2022 GDP, on State aid for both non-
crisis and crisis measures (the latter mainly based on the Temporary Crisis Framework to respond to 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine).  

The total expenditure is significantly reduced compared to the previous year (a reduction of around 
the 35% when adjusting for inflation). First, the reduction was mainly driven by the reduction in the 
total  expenditure  for  COVID-19  measures  in  light  of  the  phase-out  of  the  COVID-19  Temporary 
Framework by end-June 2022. The reduction in COVID-19 measures amounted to EUR 76.66 billion 
(around -60% if compared to the previous year, adjusting for inflation), representing 0.48% of EU27 
GDP. Second, aid for non-crisis objectives also dropped significantly, by around 28%, from around 
EUR 155.55 billion (in constant prices) in 2021 to EUR 112 billion in 2022 (see further below). 

Table  1:  Total  State  Aid  expenditure,  aid  elements  in  percentage  of  GDP,  breakdown  between 
COVID-19 related State aid, TCF related State aid and non-crisis State aid measures 

In  relative  terms,  looking  at  the  distribution  of  State  aid  expenditure  (crisis  and  non-crisis)  at  the 
Member State level as a share of national GDP, there is a significant dispersion of spending across 
Member States, although significantly reduced compared to 2021. The Member States spending the 
most spent around 1.8-2.1% of their national GDP (Hungary and Germany), while the Member States 
spending the least spent around 0.3%-0.6% of their national GDP (Ireland, Cyprus and Luxembourg). 

The overall picture derived from those data is that, while there are significant differences between the 
aid amounts disbursed by Member States (with, unsurprisingly, large Member States disbursing the 
highest amounts of aid in absolute terms), the picture is more nuanced looking at relative State aid 
expenditure compared to GDP.  

34 

 
 
 
Furthermore, a significant part of the expenditure in Germany in 2022 relates to crisis aid for an ad 
hoc  situation  concerning  two  systemic  energy  utilities  that  required  public  support  after  the 
disruption of gas deliveries as a result of Russia’s war in Ukraine (see further below).  

It should also be noted that Member States may have granted significant support to their economies 
and  households  through  other  –  non-State  aid  –  measures.  This  means  that  the  overall  support  to 
economies  and  households  differs  from  the  data  derived  from  annual  reports  from  Member  States 
mentioned above, that exclusively refer to disbursements under measures that qualify as State aid. 

Table  2:  Total  State  Aid  expenditure  by  Member  State  in  2022,  aid  elements  in  EUR  billion, 
breakdown  between  COVID-19  related  State  aid,  TCF  related  State  aid  and  non-crisis  State  aid 
measures 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
Table  3:  Total  State  aid  expenditure  by  Member  State,  as  %  of  2022  national  GDP,  breakdown 
between  COVID-19  related  State  aid,  TCF  related  State  aid  and  other  (non-crisis)  State  aid 
measures 

Focusing on non-crisis aid in 2022, compared to 2021, the amount disbursed by Member States fell 
in nominal terms in 20 Member States. The reduction was particularly marked in Germany (-59% in 
nominal terms, adjusted for inflation), Croatia (-52%) and Malta (-50%), as well as Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Luxembourg,  and  Hungary,  where  it  fell  by  approximately  40%.  A  substantial  reduction,  of  more 
than  the  20%  was  also  observed  in  Poland  and  Lithuania  (both  around  -28%)  and  Estonia  (-22%). 
Non-crisis aid also went down in Finland (-18%), Slovenia (-17%), Czechia (-14%), the Netherlands 
and Austria (-12% in both countries), France and Cyprus (-11%), Ireland (-9%), Belgium and Italy (-
6%).  

Conversely, non-crisis aid substantially increased in Portugal (+66% in nominal terms, adjusted  for 
inflation),  Denmark  (+44%)  and  Spain  (+30%).  In  Slovakia,  non-crisis  aid  increased  by  14% 
compared to 2021, in Greece by 4%. Romania and Sweden both reported the same level of support 
for non-crisis measures in 2021 and 2022. 

Overall,  the  reduction  in  non-crisis  State  aid  appears  mainly  driven  by  a  reduction  in  the  aid 
disbursed for environmental protection, including for energy savings, from around EUR 77.3 billion 
in 2021 to EUR 41.5 billion in 2022. Further analysis is needed, but the reduction may be explained 
in part by the alternatives provided by the Temporary Crisis Framework, introduced in March 2022, 
and its subsequent amendments that enabled Member States to provide aid to accelerate the rollout of 
renewable energy and aid for the decarbonisation of industrial processes. Nevertheless, the data show 
(see Table 4) that aid disbursed for environmental protection remains by far the largest category of 
non-crisis State aid and has remained between four times and twice as high even in times of crisis as 
compared to ten years ago (in constant prices, adjusted for inflation).  

36 

 
 
 
Table  4:  State  Aid  expenditure  excluding  crisis  aid  between  2012  and  2022,  aid  elements  in  EUR 
billion in constant prices, breakdown by objective of the aid 

37 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Non-crisis State Aid expenditure, breakdown by objective of the aid 

38 

 
 
 
 
Table 6: Total State aid expenditure by Member State, in nominal amounts (EUR billion in constant 
prices),  breakdown  between  COVID-19  related  State  aid,  TCF  related  State  aid  and  other  (non-
crisis)  State  aid  measures,  2012-2022  (the  order  of  the  Member  States  is  based  on  the  cumulative 
expenditure) 

39 

 
 
6.2 Crucial yet cautious use of State aid in times of crises  

Due to the multiple crises in recent years, the possibilities set out in the TFEU to allow State aid in 
‘exceptional  occurrences’  or  ‘to  remedy  a  serious  disturbance  in  the  economy  of  a  Member  State’ 
have been used extensively. These provisions have enabled the Commission, for example, to approve 
State  aid  measures  to  address  the  consequences  of  the  COVID-19  pandemic  on  the  economy,  and 
more  recently,  the  energy  crisis  that  resulted  from  Russia’s  aggression  against  Ukraine  (under  the 
Temporary  Crisis  Framework  –  TCF  –  and  subsequently  the  Temporary  Crisis  and  Transition 
Framework – TCTF, both referred to as TC(T)F).  

To have an overview of aid granted under the COVID-19 Temporary Framework, the Commission 
carried  out  surveys  covering  the  period  between  March  2020,  when  the  Framework  entered  into 
force,  until  end-2021.  The  evidence  collected  on  the  actual  implementation  of  the  Framework 
showed that State aid granted by each Member State (EUR 940 billion, representing around 30% of 
the amounts approved, i.e. EUR 3.1 trillion) matched the economic damage suffered by the Member 
State during the crisis in terms of GDP loss.155 This sent a reassuring message in view of potential 
concerns  on  the  level  playing  field  across  Member  States  due  to  significant  dispersion  across 
Member States. The COVID-19 Temporary Framework has now been fully phased out. 

Similarly, to have an overview of the aid granted under the TC(T)F or in line with its principles, 
the Commission carried out surveys covering the period between March 2022, when the TCF entered 
into force, and June 2023 (there is insufficient data available for the second half of 2023). During this 
period, the Commission approved nearly EUR 730 billion in State aid under the TC(T)F or in line 
with  the  same  principles.  The  input  collected  from  Member  States  in  the  surveys  shows  that  EUR 
141  billion  was  actually  granted  to  companies,  representing  only  19.3%  of  the  aid  approved  and 
corresponding to 0.6% of the EU GDP in 2022 and the first half of 2023156. It is worth noting that 
Member States may formally grant the full aid amount at a given time in one year yet put it at the 
beneficiaries’ disposal over several years (so that the amounts may not have been (fully) paid out in 
2022 or the first half of 2023). 

During the period in question, Germany granted EUR 72.8 billion, representing 52% of the EUR 141 
billion,  followed  by  Italy,  which  granted  EUR  39.2  billion,  and  Spain,  with  EUR  12.1  billion.  In 
absolute terms, the three largest spenders have granted 88% of all the aid. In relative terms, Hungary 
was the largest spender, having granted an amount corresponding to 1.35% of its GDP in 2022 and 
the  first  half  of  2023.  The  second  largest  spender  in  relative  terms  was  Italy  (1.32%  of  GDP), 
followed by Germany (1.23% of GDP) and Romania (0.85% of GDP). 

155 DG COMP Policy Brief “Looking back at the State aid COVID Temporary Framework: the take-up of measures 
in the EU” dated October 2022, available here. 
156 The information made available to the Commission by Member States is  preliminary and data may be subject to 
correction by Member States. 

40 

 
 
 
Table  7:  State  aid  granted  in  nominal  amounts  until  June  2023  under  the  TC(T)F  or  based  on  its 
principles in absolute amounts (left chart) and as percentage of national GDP (right chart) 

Looking  closer  at  the  aid  granted  by  Germany,  85%  of  the  total  amount  was  granted  to  two 
beneficiaries: it covers the recapitalisations of Uniper SE (EUR 33 billion) and SEFE GmbH (EUR 
6.5 billion) and loans and subsidised loans made available to these two companies under a German 
umbrella  scheme  (credit lines  of  EUR 16  billion and  EUR  7  billion  respectively157,  which  may  not 
have  been  drawn).  These interventions  were  necessary  to  avoid the  collapse  of  these  two  systemic 
energy  utilities  that  had  outstanding  long-term  contracts  which  they  could  no  longer  honour 
following Russia’s drastic reduction of gas supplies to Germany. Given their systemic position on the 
market, their collapse would have had severe consequences for their customers and more generally 
on the German as well as the European energy market. 

Furthermore, these survey figures should be read while keeping several additional considerations in 
mind. They exclusively refer to measures that qualify as State aid and that have been notified to and 
approved  by  the  Commission.  Moreover,  they  represent  the  nominal  amount  of  State  aid  granted 
using  different  instruments  (for  example,  direct  grants,  equity,  loans  and  guarantees),  which  have 
different  distortive  impacts  on  competition.  When  looking  at  the  aid  granted  through  different 
instruments, aid elements should be considered, as they represent the actual advantage passed on to 

157 The size of the credit lines was reduced due to improving market conditions. 

41 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the  undertaking  and  may  constitute  a  better  metric  for  a  fair  comparison  of  aid  granted  through 
repayable and non-repayable instruments. This is because non-repayable instruments, such as grants, 
are generally more distortive of competition compared to repayable instruments such as guarantees or 
soft loans.  

The  aid  element  can  be  estimated  in  different  ways  depending  on  the  type  of  instrument:  for  non-
repayable  instruments,  the  advantage  passed  on  to  the  beneficiary  normally  corresponds  to  the 
nominal  amount,  which  is  the  budgetary  expenditure  itself.  For  repayable  aid  instruments,  the 
advantage  to  the  undertaking  and  the  cost  to  government  may  differ.  The  aid  element,  and  the 
budgetary expenditure, is generally (much) lower than the nominal amount. For aid instruments such 
as loans or guarantees, the advantage to the undertaking and the cost to government is respectively 
the lower interest rate and the reduced guarantee fee actually paid by the undertaking compared to 
the one that would have been paid at market values. 

In  this  respect,  considering  the  estimated  aid  elements,  Germany,  has  granted  around  0.9%  of  its 
GDP for 2022 and the first half of 2023, mainly in the form of equity interventions, again notably for 
the  recapitalisations  of  the  systemic  energy  suppliers  Uniper  and  SEFE  (55%  of  the  total  aid 
granted).  The  next  largest  State aid  spenders are  Hungary  (approximately  0.68%  of  its  own  GDP), 
Spain  (0.45%)  and  Portugal  (0.41%).  Italy  and  Romania  have  granted  a  smaller  share  of  their 
respective  GDPs  when  looking  at  aid  elements,  reflecting  the  large  use  of  repayable  instruments, 
mainly guarantees. 

Further, Member States have implemented horizontal fiscal policy measures to mitigate the impact of 
high  energy  prices  on  households  and  business.  These  are  mostly  measures  that  do  not  qualify  as 
State aid. Based on the estimates in the Commission’s Autumn economic forecast158, in 2023, the net 
budgetary  cost  of  such  energy  measures159  amounted  to  around  EUR  165  billion,  corresponding to 
0.97% of EU27 GDP, down from EUR 195 billion and 1.2% of EU27 GDP in 2022.  

In  absolute  terms,  the  measures  implemented  by  Germany,  France,  and  Italy  had  the  highest  net 
budgetary  cost  in  2023,  of  EUR  59.4  billion,  EUR  22.8  billion and  EUR  21.4  billion  respectively, 
representing  altogether  63%  of all  the energy  fiscal  measures in the EU  (respectively around 36%, 
14%,  and  13%  of the total  EU  spending  on energy  fiscal  measures).  These  are  followed  by  Spain, 
with EUR 13.5 billion (8% of the total) and the Netherlands, with EUR 10.6 billion (6% of the total). 

158  European  Commission's  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  (2023),  European  Economic 
Forecast,  Autumn  2023.  Available  at:  https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/document/download/4139ef72-9eb3-
4fad-a116-ee87979f4d35_en?filename=ip258_en.pdf.  The  budgetary  impact  reflect  the  measures  put  in  place  or 
announced  before  the  end  of  October  2023.  For  Slovakia,  the  forecast  estimates  have  been  updated  after  the 
submission of the 2024 Draft Budgetary Plan on 12 December 2023. 
159 For the purposes of these estimations, 'energy measures' are defined as: (1) measures that have a direct impact on 
the marginal cost of energy consumption for households and/or firms (‘price measures’); (2a) measures that provide 
temporary  income  support  to  households;  (2b)  measures  that  provide  compensation  to  firms  other  than  price 
measures  (both  ‘income  measures’);  and  (3)  revenues  from  (new  taxes  or  levies  on)  windfall  profits  by  energy 
companies. 

42 

 
 
In all other Member States, the net budgetary cost was between 3% (Poland) and 0.01% (Greece) of 
total EU spending on energy fiscal measures.  

In relative terms as a share of their 2023 GDP, the measures implemented by Slovakia, Croatia and 
Malta had the highest net budgetary cost (1.89%, 1.77% and 1.6%, respectively). They are followed 
by  Austria  (1.56%)  and  Germany  (1.45%).  Hungary  (1.34%),  Portugal  (1.25%),  Czechia  (1.18%), 
Italy (1.04%) and the Netherlands (1.03%) had a budgetary cost above the EU27 average (0.97%). 

From  a  macroeconomic  perspective,  the  past  years  were  marked  by  several  complex  and  dynamic 
factors. The COVID-19 pandemic gradually subsided, with restrictions lifted, and at the same time 
the  Russian  aggression  in  Ukraine  escalated,  with  the  subsequent  crisis  as  well  as  the  risk  of 
escalation  in  the  Middle  East  increasing  geopolitical  tensions.  These  events  have  had  significant 
implications for economic conditions in the EU and its Member States. According to the Commission 
2024 Winter Economic Forecast160, growth in both the EU and euro area has been more modest than 
expected (0.5% in 2023, a slight decrease from the 0.6% projected in the previous Autumn Forecast). 
At  EU  level,  last  year’s  modest  growth  is  largely  due  to  the  momentum  of  the  post-pandemic 
economic rebound in the previous two years, while the decline in headline inflation in 2023 has been 
faster than expected, and largely driven by declining energy prices.  

These  factors  and  the  respective  exposure  of  a  Member  State’s  economy  have  had  significant 
implications for their economic performance and also for the implementation and evaluation of State 
aid measures adopted in response. Among the Member States having granted the largest amounts of 
aid  in  relative  terms  or  in  terms  of  estimated  aid  elements,  the  German  and  Hungarian  economies 
slightly contracted in 2023 (by 0.3% and 0.8%, respectively), while Spain experienced above average 
growth (2.5%). Similarly, among Member States having granted the least amount of aid in relative 
terms  or  in  terms  of  estimated  aid  elements,  Denmark  experienced  average  growth  (0.5%)  and 
Cyprus above-average growth (2.4%), while the Estonian economy contracted by 3.5%. This shows 
that  it  is  not  possible  to  draw  even  tentative  conclusions  about  the  impact  of  State  aid,  viewed  in 
isolation,  on  GDP  growth,  as  this  impact  is  combined  with  the  effects  of  multiple  other  factors, 
considering the heterogeneity and uncertainty of the context in each Member State.  

The analysis above and the data presented, illustrate the importance of assessing the impact of crisis 
aid  beyond  the  ‘headline  figures’,  but  also  the  lack  of  data  at  this  stage  to  assess  correlations  or 
causality. Member States may have had varying energy sensitivities to the war in Ukraine, differently 
structured  economies  –  in  particular  in  terms  of  size  or  importance  of  heavy  or  energy  –intensive 
industries  –  and/or  differently  structured  energy  sectors.  Furthermore,  Member  States’  ability  to 
support companies may differ significantly. While State aid is approved subject to clear safeguards to 
ensure  that  it  is  necessary,  proportionate  and  does  not  unduly  distort  competition,  temporary  rules 
should be phased out as soon as market conditions justify it. This is why the remaining crisis sections 
of the TCTF are set to expire in June 2024. 

160European Economic Forecast – Winter 2024, Institutional Paper 268, February 2024  

43 

 
 
6.3 Pursuing the digital and green transition and other EU priorities 

Although  the  State  may  play  an  important  role  to  create  the  appropriate  circumstances  in  the 
economy to deliver competitiveness, many of its actions to that effect may not entail State aid in the 
sense of Article 107(1) TFEU, and State aid measures are usually not sufficient on their own in this 
respect. 

That being said, State aid rules offer many possibilities for Member States to fulfil policy objectives 
supporting a well-functioning and equitable economy, and to address market failures. In this respect, 
the review of State aid rules has sought to ensure that they are fit for purpose and aligns them with 
the EU’s green, digital, and resilience objectives.  

By  the  end  of  2023,  the Commission  finalised  the  review  of  almost all major  State aid  guidelines. 
The revised guidelines specify how Member States can support their economies, especially to invest 
in green and digital technologies, without  unduly distorting competition in the Single Market while 
contributing to global competitiveness161.  

-  To  support  the  green  transition,  the  Climate,  Environmental  Protection  and  Energy  Aid 
Guidelines (CEEAG) and the ETS State aid Guidelines facilitate aid to green the economy in 
line  with  the  EU  Green  Deal,  while  helping  to  safeguard  the  competitiveness  of  the  EU 
economy. They enable Member States to support the roll-out of renewable energy generation, 
to  decarbonise  industrial  production,  and  to  support  energy-intensive  users  subject  to 
international competition.  

-  Member  States  may  also  design  their  support  measures  for  renewable  energy,  storage  and 
decarbonisation of the industry under the TCTF. These rules aim to give an urgent boost to 
and  accelerate  the  roll-out  of  renewable  energy  and  decarbonised  production  processes. 
While the support schemes must be set-up and aid granted by 2025, aid can be disbursed also 
in  the  following  years.  Experience  with  this  simplified  framework  will  inform  further 
reflections for the future. 

-  State  aid  rules  also  respond  to  global  competitiveness  challenges:  for  example,  the  TCTF 
enables Member States to set up simple and effective schemes to support the production of 
strategic equipment necessary for the net-zero transition (namely batteries, solar panels, wind 
turbines,  heat-pumps,  electrolysers  and  equipment  for  carbon  capture  usage  and  storage,  as 
well as for production of key components and for production and recycling of related critical 
raw materials).  

-  Where  there  is  a  real  risk  of  investments  in  such  strategic  equipment  being  diverted  away 
from the EU due to subsidies in third jurisdictions, Member States can provide State aid up to 

161  The  Commission  can  exceptionally  also  approve  aid  outside  guidelines  and  directly  under  the  TFEU.  For 
instance,  on  27  July  2023,  the  Commission  approved  a  EUR  28.8  million  Austrian  aid  measure  to  support  the 
modernisation of Sandoz GmbH penicillin production site in Tyrol, which will help to maintain in the EU the last 
fully  integrated  production  of  amoxicillin,  contributing  to  the  security  of  supply  of  essential  and  live-saving 
medicines, see Case SA.62915, Austria - Aid for maintaining Sandoz penicillin production in Kundl (Tyrol). 

44 

 
 
the  amount  of  support  available  for  an  equivalent  investment  in  the  alternative  location,  or 
the amount needed to incentivise the company to locate the investment in the EEA (the so-
called ‘funding gap’) whichever is the lowest. 

-  EU  State  aid  rules  also  play  a  fundamental  role  in  supporting  the  digital  transition.  For 
example,  the  new  Broadband  Guidelines  are  aligned  to  the  latest  market  and  technological 
developments,  including  very  high-capacity  networks  and  5G  deployment.  Furthermore,  in 
view of the extraordinary strategic relevance of semiconductors, the Commission has set out 
criteria for approving State aid up to the funding gap for the establishment in the EU of first-
of-a-kind facilities defined in the EU Chips Act. 

-  Another  example  is  the  Regional  Aid  Guidelines  (RAG),  supporting  investments  in  less 
developed  regions  of  the  EU  including  for  green  and  digital  objectives.  In  2021,  the 
Commission increased overall maximum aid intensities to support the European Green Deal 
and Digital Strategy objectives, thereby enabling additional incentives for such investments 
in the disadvantaged areas of the EU. 

-  Finally,  Important  Projects  of  Common  European  Interest  (IPCEI)  are  an  important 
State  aid  tool,  which  ensures  that  cutting-edge  technologies  are  developed  and  deployed  in 
the  EU.  IPCEIs  enable  Member  States  to  pool  State  resources  in  strategic  sectors  and 
technologies  of  common  EU  interest  where  the  market  alone  does  not  always  deliver,  for 
example  microelectronics,  hydrogen,  and  cloud  services.  IPCEIs  enable  strategic,  jointly 
designed,  cross-border  innovative  research  and  development  activities,  and  their  first 
industrial  deployment.  They  also  enable  open  infrastructure  projects.  These  initiatives 
generate  significant  spill-over  effects  across  the  EU.  With  the  2023  amendment  of  the 
General  Block  Exemption  Regulation  (GBER),  the  Commission  has  also  facilitated  the 
possibility for SMEs to participate in such IPCEIs. 

Thus,  in  2022,  industrial  aid162,  including  based  on  above-mentioned  guidelines,  amounted  to 
EUR 106.85 billion in total, accounting for approximately 0.26% of EU GDP and corresponding to 
EUR 238  per  capita  in  the  EU.  Of  this,  as  mentioned  above,  aid  disbursed  for  environmental 
protection, including for energy savings, has been the main policy objective in the last ten years and 
amounted  to  EUR  41.5  billion  in  2022,  representing  38.8%  of  total  industrial  aid,  approximately 
0.1%  of  EU  GDP  and  corresponding  to  EUR  92  per  capita.  Furthermore,  the  aid  disbursed  under 
IPCEI measures in 2022 amounted to EUR 1.04 billion and investment aid under the RAG to support 
the batteries sector amounted to EUR 262 million. 

In terms of process, most State aid measures that are unlikely to raise competition concerns may be 
implemented  directly  by  Member  States  based  on  the  criteria  of  the  GBER,  without  requiring 
advance notification to and approval by the Commission. In 2022, Member States implemented 2203 

162 Industrial aid refers to State aid expenditure, in aid element, in 2022 as reported in annual reports, excluding State 
aid with the following policy objectives: ‘Culture’, ‘Heritage conservation’, and ‘Compensation of damages caused 
by natural disasters’. The analysis also excludes crisis aid, i.e., State aid expenditure provided in the context of the 
COVID-19 crisis and State aid expenditure in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

45 

 
 
measures under State aid block exemptions, corresponding to 84% of all new State aid measures and 
93%  of  new  measures,  if  crisis  measures  (which  are  based  on  notifications  under  the  COVID-19 
Temporary  Framework  and  the  TC(T)F,  or  based  on  their  principles)  are  excluded.  This  trend  is 
expected to continue in 2024 as a result of the adoption in June 2023 of a targeted amendment of the 
GBER, which further simplifies and speeds up support for the EU’s green and digital transitions.  

6.4 Safeguarding a well-functioning Single Market for a competitive EU economy 

As the Commission’s October 2023 Report on EU policy initiatives for the promotion of investments 
in clean technologies163 demonstrates, the EU has been leading the green transition both domestically 
and globally, thanks to decisive actions taken in line with the European Green Deal, not least in State 
aid policy. In this mandate, the Commission used the inbuilt flexibility of State aid rules to adapt to 
the needs of Member States and companies, to enable the EU economy to seize the green and digital 
transitions and to respond to crises, while putting in place safeguards to avoid undue distortions to 
competition and preserve a level playing field within the Single Market.  

Indeed,  the  Commission  is  committed  to  ensuring  a  level  playing  field  in  the  Single  Market  both 
from an internal and external perspective. When competition is distorted by foreign subsidies to the 
detriment  of  competitors  and  consumers,  the  Commission  will  use  its  tools  such  as  trade  defence 
instruments  and  the  Foreign  Subsidies  Regulation  (FSR),  where  appropriate.  The  FSR  started  to 
apply  on  12  July  2023  and  sends  a  strong  message:  the  EU  economy  remains  open  to  trade  and 
investment, but it will not be undermined or taken advantage of by foreign subsidies distorting the 
Single Market.  

At the same time, while third countries are also implementing significant aid programs, such as the 
US  Inflation  Reduction  Act,  the  available  data  on  its  impact  on  the  EU  economy  is  so  far  not 
conclusive.  The  concrete  effects  of  the  IRA  on  EU  investment  can  only  be  assessed  in  the  longer 
term due to the long-term investment cycles and long-lasting capital assets of the clean technology 
industry. 

This  is  also  because  competitiveness  cannot  be  built  on  subsidies  alone.  There  is  no  obvious 
correlation  between  overall  economic  performance  and  the  subsidies  granted.  Many  other  factors 
come into play such as innovation, cost efficiency and human capital. Companies must feel the need 
to innovate, to find more efficient solutions, and to invest. An effective enforcement of competition 
policy stimulates businesses to innovate and invest and ensures  that the businesses that succeed are 
those offering the best products to consumers at affordable prices. At the level of society, businesses 
should expect trustworthy and transparent institutions and public authorities, a stable macroeconomic 
and  regulatory  framework,  legal  certainty,  access  to  necessary  skills  and  to  high-quality 
infrastructure, all supporting an investment-friendly business environment. 

163 COM(2023) 684 final 

46 

 
 
This is what the Single Market offers, along with one of the world’s largest integrated market areas. 
And  this  is  where  its  competitiveness  has  come  from.  But  the  Single  Market  is  not  a  static 
achievement. The health and the competitiveness of the EU economy depend on joint and continuous 
efforts to tend to the Single Market and to ensure that it remains aligned with economic realities. And 
to  deliver  the  EUR  650  billion  required  annually  for  the  twin  transition  and  for  our  economic 
resilience164 – investments will primarily have to come from the private sector, regardless of Member 
States’  fiscal  capacity.  Moreover,  EU  funding  remains  necessary  to  address  financing  needs  while 
avoiding fragmentation of the Single Market due to varying levels of national (temporary) State aid 
support, and to reduce regional disparities. Not least, remaining barriers that impede effective trade in 
and across the Single Market must be addressed to allow companies to benefit from the full potential 
of the Single Market.165 

7. Measuring the impact of competition enforcement on customers 

DG Competition estimates that direct customer savings generated by the Commission’s antitrust and 
merger  enforcement  over  the  period  2012-2022  amount  to  between  EUR  145  -  250  billion.  On 
average,  antitrust  and merger  enforcement  generated  approximately  EUR  13  to  23  billion  of  direct 
benefits  for  customer  per  year.  Overall  customer  benefits  of  competition  enforcement  also  include 
indirect  or  deterrent  effects  of  enforcement  as  well  as  positive  effects  on  innovation  and  quality. 
These effects are more difficult to quantify or estimate, but they are likely to be more significant than 
the  direct  customer  savings.  Complementary  recent  modelling  of  the  macro-economic  effects  of 
competition enforcement suggests that antitrust and merger enforcement of the kind performed by the 
Commission during the last 10 years is likely to have a positive impact on real EU GDP relative to 
the  baseline in the  range of  0.6%  to  1.1% (the  equivalent of  an  uplift  of  EUR  80  to  150  billion  in 
2019 GDP) in the medium to long term166. 

for  2022 

to  2030,  see  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-

164 The overall additional investment needs to meet the objectives of the twin transitions have been estimated at 
around  EUR  650  billion  annually 
policy/strategicplanning/strategic-foresight/2022-strategic-
foresightreport_en#:~:text=It%20is%20estimated%2C%20at%20lower,regions%20in%20Europe%20and%20beyon
d, and https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_23_3194. 
165  In  the  COM(2024)77  -  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “The 2024 Annual Single Market and 
Competitiveness Report” , the Commission has provided an analysis of the Single Market and its competitiveness, 
structured along nine competitiveness drivers: the functioning of the Single Market, access to private capital, public 
investment and infrastructure, research and innovation, energy,  circularity, digitalisation, education and skills, and 
trade and open strategic autonomy. 
166  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  for  Competition,  Directorate-General  for  Economic  and  Financial 
Affairs, Joint Research Centre, Archanskaia, E., Cai, M., Cardani, R., et al., Modelling the macroeconomic impact 
of competition policy: 2021 update and further development, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022. 

47 

 
 
Table 8: Customer savings (midpoints) 2012-2022 

Source: DG Competition based on internal data. 

In 2023, DG Competition continued its work on the ‘State of EU Competition’ project. The purpose 
of  this  project  is  to  explore  the  evolution  of  market  and  industry  concentration  across  different 
sectors  and  Member  States  and  identify  potentially  malfunctioning  sectors.  It  will  also  assess  and 
document the benefits of competition, inter alia based on price concentration analyses at sector level, 
macro-economic modelling, and a survey among enterprises. For this purpose, DG Competition will 
be able to draw on the results of two preparatory studies, one conducted by the OECD (final report 
expected  in  2024)  and  another  by  an  external  consultant  (final  report  received  December  2023, 
publication forthcoming.) 

8. Modernising DG Competition’s working methods to fit current and future 
enforcement needs 

8.1. Digital business solutions 

In  2023,  DG  Competition  continued  the  transformation  of  its  working  methods  in  line  with  the 
Commission’s revised Digital Strategy167. The use of the CASE@EC case handling application was 
extended.  In  parallel,  work  on  replacing  the  old  case  management  system  for  antitrust  and  cartel 
enforcement with CASE@EC progressed well in 2023 and is expected to be completed in 2024. 

In  2023,  DG  Competition  also  continued  improving  and  digitalising  its  communications  with 
external parties. The  COMP Cases application168 - which allows the publication of cases and helps 
citizens and external stakeholders to better access, search, and export public data on competition data 
-  was  revamped.  Moreover,  ECN2  -  the  collaboration  tool  used  in  the  European  Competition 
Network – now supports enforcement cooperation under the FSR. In addition, many of the tools used 

167  Communication  of  the  Commission,  European  Commission  digital  strategy  -  Next  generation  digital 
Commission, C(2022) 4388 final, 30.6.2022. 
168 See: https://competition-cases.ec.europa.eu/search 

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for  DG  Competition’s  enforcement  activities  were  upgraded,  for  instance  eRFI169,  eLeniency170, 
eConfidentiality171,  as  well  as  the  State  Aid  Notification  (SANI2)172  and  Reporting  (SARI2)173 
applications. DG Competition is continuously improving the handling of the ever-larger volumes of 
case-related  submissions.  In  2023,  eDiscovery  -  used  by  case  teams  to  review  large  amounts  of 
documents – was revamped, improving functionality and user experience.  

8.2. Data analysis and technology 

The Chief Technology Officer’s Team  - DG Competition’s unit for  data analysis and technology –
continued and developed its activities in 2023. The team advises the Competition Commissioner and 
the Director-General. It also guides and oversees all data and technology-related initiatives and work 
streams  of  DG  Competition.  The  Chief  Technology  Officer’s  Team  functions  as  a  centre  of 
excellence for digital investigative tools and data science supporting DG Competition’s enforcement 
instruments.  It  also  provides  state-of-the-art  Forensic  IT  (FIT)  support  as  well  as  intelligence  and 
investigative assistance. Finally, the unit plays an active role in the network of digital investigation 
experts in the ECN working group on data protection and competition enforcement. 

DG  Competition  ensures  that  all  procedures  remain  compliant  with  data  protection  rules,  while 
making  sure  this  protection  is  not  abused  to  hamper  or  delay  investigations.  In  2023,  the  General 
Court in Case T-451/20, Meta held that the Commission was entitled to process personal data for the 
purposes  of  a  competition  investigation  and  that  the  procedural  safeguards  applied  by  the 
Commission  are  fully  compliant  with  the  Commission’s  obligations  under  EU  data  protection 
rules174. 

8.3. Whistle-blower tool strengthened 

The Commission operates a whistle-blower tool, a facility where members of the public can report 
anonymously if they have detected suspected cartel activity or other anti-competitive activities such 
as abuse of a dominant market position. In January 2023, the Commission extended the scope of the 
anonymous whistle-blower tool, enabling individuals and companies to also report suspected merger-
related and State aid infringements175. 

169 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/mergers/procedures/erfi_en 
170 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/antitrust-and-cartels/leniency/eleniency_en 
171 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/index/it-tools/econfidentiality_en  
172 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/legislation/forms-notifications-and-reporting_en 
173 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/state-aid/overview_en 
174  Judgement  of  the  General  Court  of  24.5.2023  in  Case  T-451/20,  Meta  Platforms  Ireland  v  Commission, 
EU:T:2023:276. 
175 See: https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/index/whistleblower_en. 

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9. Advocacy and outreach supporting competition policy and enforcement 

In 2023, the Commission continued with its competition policy advocacy and outreach activities at 
multiple  levels  to  support  the  effectiveness  of  EU  competition  policy,  most  prominently  with 
Executive Vice-President Vestager participating in events and press conferences, giving interviews, 
and  participating  in  social  media.  Senior  managers  at  DG  Competition  participated  in  outreach 
activities in Member States. These activities complement DG Competition’s external communication 
initiatives such as press releases, policy briefs, newsletters, and social media.  

In 2023, the Commission launched the Markets for People itinerant debate series, taking place in five 
mid-sized cities in five different EU countries between April 2023 and early 2024. The Commission 
invites  personalities  from  different  policy  fields  to  debate  the  economic  and  social  impact  of 
competition policy on people’s lives. The locations, speakers and topics are determined together with 
National  Competition  Authorities,  the  Commission’s  Representations  in  Member  States,  and  local 
Europe  Direct  centres.  The  first  debate  was  held  in  April  2023  in  Modena,  Italy,  the  second  in 
Salzburg, Austria in June 2023, the third debate in Salamanca, Spain in October 2023 and the fourth 
debate in Brno, Czechia in December 2023. 

In June 2023, also as part of its ongoing evaluation of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission celebrated 
twenty years of EU antitrust enforcement under Regulation 1/2003 with a conference in Brussels. It 
brought  together  enforcers,  private  practitioners,  in-house  counsel,  and  academics  to  discuss  and 
reflect on the achievements, needs and challenges of the current antitrust procedural framework.  

10. Competition policy in a European and global context 

10.1 Joining forces in shaping a European and global competition culture 

Policy coherence through the European Competition Network 

Since 2004, the Commission and the NCAs in all EU Member States cooperate through the European 
Competition  Network  (ECN)176.  The  objective  of  the  ECN  is  to  ensure  that  EU  antitrust  rules  are 
applied  in  an  effective  and  coherent  manner  against  companies  engaging  in  business  practices  that 
restrict  competition  and  that  are  liable  to  affect  trade  between  EU  Member  States.  In  2023,  the 
Commission continued to safeguard the coherent application of Regulation 1/2003 through the ECN. 
The  Regulation  contains  two  key  mechanisms  supporting  cooperation.  First,  NCAs  inform  the 
Commission  about  any  new  investigation  at  the  stage  of  the  first  formal  investigative  measure. 
Second, NCAs consult the Commission before adopting certain types of decisions. In 2023, 140 new 
investigations were launched within the network and  88 envisaged decisions were submitted to the 
Commission. 

176 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 43 
and OJ C 374, 13.10.2016, p. 10. 

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Other work streams within the ECN also ensure a coherent enforcement of competition policy in the 
EU. ECN members meet regularly to discuss cases, policy issues and matters of strategic importance. 
In  2023,  48  meetings  across  horizontal  working  groups  and  sector-specific  sub-groups  were 
organised,  where  competition  experts  from  the  various  authorities  exchanged  views  and  explored 
best practices. 

A continuous and constructive inter-institutional dialogue 

The  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  the 
European Committee of the Regions are key partners to the Commission in the continuing dialogues 
on competition policy.  

In  the  European  Parliament,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participated  in  2023  in  several 
exchanges  of  views  or  structured  dialogues,  including  with  the  Economic  and  Monetary  Affairs 
Committee,  the  Internal  Market  and  Consumer  Protection  Committee,  the  Employment  and  Social 
Affairs  Committee  and  the  Legislative  Affairs  Committee.  In  addition,  Executive  Vice-President 
Vestager  participated  in  plenary  debates  on  competition  policy  and  on  the  EU  response  to  the  US 
Inflation Reduction Act.  

In  the  Council,  Executive  Vice-President  Vestager  participated  in  2023  in  exchanges  of  views  and 
debates on competition policy matters and on long-term competitiveness and productivity, including 
in several meetings of the Competitiveness Council (Internal market and industry). 

10.2. Competition policy cooperation across the world 

Multilateral relations 

In 2023, the Commission continued its active engagement in international competition fora such as 
the OECD Competition Committee, the International Competition Network, where the Commission 
continued  its  three-year  co-chair  role  in  the  Merger  Working  Group,  and  the  United  Nations 
Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD).  The  Commission  continued  its  endeavours  to 
improve international rules regarding subsidies. Reforming the subsidy rules is one of the EU’s main 
priorities for the modernisation of WTO trade rules.  

Bilateral relations 

In March 2023, the Commission and the U.S. Competition Authorities held the third meeting of the 
Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue, discussing cooperation efforts to ensure and promote 
fair  competition  in  the  digital  sector.  In  the  EU-U.S.  Trade  and  Technology  Council,  the  4th 
ministerial meeting was held in May 2023. 

In  2023,  the  Commission  continued  its  cooperation  in  competition  policy  with  third  countries, 
including  technical  cooperation  programmes  with  several  Asian177  and  African178  countries.  The 

177 See: https://asia.competitioncooperation.eu/  

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Commission  continued  negotiations  to  conclude  Free  Trade  Agreements  (FTAs)  with  Australia, 
India, Indonesia, Thailand and ESA5179. 

As regards candidate countries180 and potential candidates181 for EU enlargement, the Commission’s 
main policy objective is to assist them with a perspective to join the EU in meeting the membership 
criteria defined by the Treaty on European Union and by the European Council182. For example, the 
Commission assists  candidate countries and potential candidates to align their legal frameworks on 
antitrust, mergers and State aid with the EU acquis and to develop well-functioning and operationally 
independent competition authorities. 

In November 2023, the European Commission adopted its 2023 Enlargement Package, providing a 
detailed  assessment  of  the  state  of  play  and  the  progress  made  by  the  Western  Balkans,  Türkiye, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine on their respective paths towards the EU183. Considering the results 
achieved by Ukraine and Moldova, and the ongoing reform efforts, the Commission recommended 
that  the  European  Council  open  accession  negotiations  with  both  countries,  provided  that  certain 
steps are taken184. 

In the case of Georgia, the Commission recommended that the European Council grant Georgia the 
status of a candidate country on the understanding that a number of steps will be taken185. 

178 See: https://africa.competitioncooperation.eu/  
179 Five Eastern and Southern Countries: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. 
180  Countries  granted  candidate  country  status  by  the  European  Council  on  the basis  of  a  recommendation  by  the 
European  Commission:  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Georgia,  Moldova,  Montenegro,  North  Macedonia, 
Serbia, Türkiye and Ukraine.  
181 Potential candidate for EU membership: Kosovo. 
182 For more details on the membership criteria, see:  https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-
policy/conditions-membership_en  
183 See : https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en  
184 On 14 December 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. 
The European Council invited the Council to adopt the respective negotiating frameworks once the relevant steps set 
out in the respective Commission recommendations of 8 November 2023 are taken. 
185 On 14 December 2023, Georgia was granted candidate status by the European Council, on the understanding that 
the relevant steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 are taken. 

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