Rural areas and the geography of discontent.
Date: 2024-02-20
Institutions: Commission for Natural Resources
Subjects: EU Member State, euroscepticism, national election, parliamentary election, political motivation, public opinion, regional election, regional policy, report, rural region, vote

Commission for
 Natural Resources

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Rural areas 
and the geography 
of discontent

Created in 1994, the European Committee of the Regions is the EU’s political 
assembly of 329 regional and local representatives such as regional presidents or 
city-mayors from all 27 Member States, representing over 446 million Europeans.

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© European Union, 2024  

Partial reproduction is permitted, provided that the source is explicitly mentioned. 

More information on the European Union and the Committee of the Regions is available online 
at http://www.europa.eu and http://www.cor.europa.eu respectively.  

QG-02-24-120-EN-N ISBN: 978-92-895-3052-1 doi: 10.2863/87913 

This report has been written by Jennifer McGuinn, Arianna Cantarelli, Agnieszka 
Kulesa, Giovanni Carletti, Ivan Lichner, Margaux Truc, Marie Müller, Martin 
Hudcovsky, Martyna Gliniecka 
(Milieu Consulting SRL) 

It does not represent the official views of the European Committee of the Regions 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents 

Executive summary .............................................................................1 
Introduction .........................................................................................3 

1.  Methodology and theoretical framework ....................................5 
1.1  Theoretical framework.................................................................. 5 

1.2  Data sources and analytical approach .............................................. 8 

2.  Rural-urban trends in national and European elections .........13 
2.1  National elections ...................................................................... 13 

3.  Voting patterns in selected subnational elections .....................19 
France ...................................................................................... 19 

3.1 

3.1.1  National election (2022) ....................................................... 19 
Subnational elections (2021) ................................................. 20 
3.1.2 

3.1.3  Conclusions ........................................................................ 25 
3.2  Germany ................................................................................... 26 

3.2.1  National election (2021) ....................................................... 26 

3.2.2 

Subnational elections (2019 and 2023) ................................... 27 

3.2.3  Conclusions ........................................................................ 32 

3.3 

Italy ......................................................................................... 33 

3.3.1  National election (2022) ....................................................... 33 
Subnational elections (2022-2023)......................................... 34 
3.3.2 

3.3.3  Conclusions ........................................................................ 37 
Poland ...................................................................................... 38 

3.4 

3.4.1  National election (2019) ....................................................... 38 

3.4.2  National election (2023) ....................................................... 39 
3.4.3  Conclusions ........................................................................ 43 

3.5 

Slovakia.................................................................................... 43 

3.5.1  National election (2020) ....................................................... 43 

3.5.2 

Subnational elections (2022) ................................................. 46 

3.5.3  Conclusions ........................................................................ 48 

 
 
 
4.  Main conclusions and the way forward .....................................51 
4.1  Key findings and takeaways ........................................................ 51 

4.2  The way forward........................................................................ 53 

List of references ...............................................................................55 

Annex A ..............................................................................................63 
Annex B ..............................................................................................65 

 
 
List of tables 

Table 1 ‒ Correlation between Eurosceptic vote shares and development trap 
indicators in Member States’ national elections, by urban-rural ..................... 17 
Table 2 ‒ Average development trap index scores, rural and urban regions in the 
EU ........................................................................................................ 18 

Table 3 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, French national parliament 
elections, 2022........................................................................................ 19 

Table 4 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, French regional elections, 2021 . 22 
Table 5 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, German national elections, 2021 27 

Table 6 ‒ Comparison of AfD support at subnational and national elections, 
NUTS 3 regions in Saxony, Thuringia and Hessen ...................................... 30 

Table 7 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, Italian national elections, 2022 .. 34 
Table 8 ‒ Eurosceptic voting in rural areas in Italy’s national and subnational 
elections ................................................................................................ 36 

Table 9 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, Polish national elections, 2019 .. 39 

Table 10 ‒ Poland’s national election results, 2023 ...................................... 39 
Table 11 ‒ Support for Eurosceptic parties, 2019 and 2023 ........................... 41 

Table 12 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties in Slovakian national elections 
2020 and 2023, and 2022 subnational elections ........................................... 44 

Table 13 – Eurosceptic vote shares, Slovakian national elections ................... 45 
Table 14 – Summary statistics: Population size, NUTS 3 areas, and number of 
Eurosceptic parties by Member State ......................................................... 63 

Table 15 – Timeline of selected national and subnational elections for case 
studies ................................................................................................... 65 

List of maps 

Map 1 ‒ Euroscepticism, by Urban-rural typology, 50% minimum vote 
threshold ................................................................................................ 13 
Map 2 ‒ Euroscepticism, by urban-rural typology, 25% minimum vote threshold
 ............................................................................................................. 14 

Map 3 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), French regional 
elections, first round, 2021 ....................................................................... 23 

 
 
Map 4 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties, German subnational elections, 2019
 ............................................................................................................. 28 
Map 5 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), Italian subnational 
elections, 2022 and 2023 .......................................................................... 35 

Map 6 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), Polish national 
elections, 2023........................................................................................ 40 

Map 7 ‒ Eurosceptic vote shares (hard and soft), Slovakian subnational 
elections, 2022........................................................................................ 47 

List of figures  

Figure 1: Share of Eurosceptic NUTS 3 regions in Poland’s national elections, 
by urban-rural type, 2019 ......................................................................... 38 

 
 
 
 
Executive summary 

This study applies a  rural-urban lens to the outcomes of  recent national and 
subnational elections of European Union (EU) Member States, with the aim of 
analysing Eurosceptic (anti-EU values) voting patterns and identifying possible 
explanations for voter discontent in rural areas. Findings show high Eurosceptic 
voting in many rural areas across the EU. At national election level, this rural-
urban trend is  most marked in Member States that are the most Eurosceptic 
overall. In Italy, for instance, the largest share of support for anti-EU parties 
comes from rural areas. In Poland and Hungary, Eurosceptic support is primarily 
driven  by  rural  areas.  However,  rural  Euroscepticism  also  occurs  in  less 
Eurosceptic countries: in the Netherlands, while most regions did not reach a 25% 
vote threshold for anti-EU parties, the country’s only rural region, Zeeuwsch-
Vlaanderen, reached a 33% vote share. Similarly, in countries such as Portugal, 
Croatia and Estonia, the one or few Eurosceptic regions are all predominantly 
rural.  

Transposing the same lens to subnational elections for four case study countries 
provided further insights into the phenomenon at regional and local level:  

•  In France, the 2021 regional elections displayed a significantly lower share 
of  Eurosceptic  voting  compared  to  the  2022  national  elections. 
Nonetheless, the regions displaying Eurosceptic preferences in subnational 
elections expressed similar Eurosceptic preferences in national elections. 
The case study found that socioeconomic challenges in agriculture drive 
rural support for the leading hard-coded Eurosceptic party, Rassemblement 
National (RN),  as  well  as  cultural insecurities across  rural  areas.  The 
increase  in  Euroscepticism  between elections is  mainly  explained by 
changes in party coalitions and electoral systems. In contrast to national 
elections, regional elections are typically characterised by less partisanship, 
together with high re-election rates for incumbents and frequently divided 
government.  

•  In Germany, voter support for the only Eurosceptic party, Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) is most concentrated in the Eastern part of the country. 
Recent subnational (Landtag) elections confirm that rural and intermediate 
NUTS 3  regions are by  far the largest supporters of the AfD. Research 
suggests that discontent is rooted in migration concerns and feelings of 
uncertainty  among  local  populations.  This  is  associated  with  lower 
economic opportunities and educational standards in rural areas. Notably, 
Hessen’s 2023 Landtag elections showed the growing popularity of the 
AfD in rural areas of western Germany. Support is associated with voter 
discontent with ongoing crises, to which the AfD’s nationalist-pleasing 

1 

platform provides an appealing response.  

•  In Italy, after the dramatic success of  the Eurosceptic parties Lega and 
Fratelli d’Italia in the 2022 national elections, Eurosceptic voting in the 
subsequent  regional  government  elections  remained  significant,  albeit 
relatively lower. Rural areas continue to display a higher share of anti-EU 
votes  compared  to  intermediate  and  urban  areas.  Similar  to  France, 
differences in outcomes can be partially attributed to the use of candidate-
based lists and the weaker local roots of Eurosceptic parties. Additionally, 
subnational elections across Italy have been generally characterised by low 
and declining turnout rates.  

•  In Slovakia, support for Eurosceptic parties is stronger in the rural, eastern 
areas of the country. Eurosceptic parties enjoyed success in both regional 
and municipal elections in  2022, albeit with lower  turnouts. The most 
recent national election outcomes in 2023 indicate a significant increase in 
Euroscepticism across the country. Support was most prominent in the 
same rural areas  where Eurosceptic voting was  already  pronounced in 
subnational elections, confirming trends. Discontent is  associated with 
long-lasting, structural economic challenges in rural areas, among other 
factors.  

The  study identifies electoral patterns in  anti-EU voting (Section 4),  which 
demonstrate how rural areas can be central to the success of Eurosceptic parties 
at both national and subnational level. Overall, these findings underscore the 
potential  repercussions for  the  EU  in  neglecting rural  areas.  They  validate 
institutional actors’  concerns in  relation to  ongoing initiatives targeting the 
strengthening of rural areas (such as  long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas 
2040) and underscore their urgency, particularly in a year of important upcoming 
elections across different levels of administrative bodies in Europe. 

More broadly, the study’s conclusions provide a useful basis to reflect and debate 
the rural dimension of Eurosceptic and anti-EU sentiment, including origins and 
consequences, which impact not only the well-being of EU citizens, but the values 
and future of the EU itself. The study concludes with a series of questions for 
further reflection by European Committee of the Region (CoR) members and the 
wider stakeholder community.   

2 

Introduction 

Over  the  past  decade,  the  European Union (EU)  has  witnessed a  surge  in 
Euroscepticism and anti-EU votes during both European Parliament (EP) and 
national elections. While protest votes and oppositional political movements are 
inherent to any democratic system, they raise  legitimate concerns when they 
challenge the very foundations of  an institutional framework. Recent research, 
including the European Commission’s Directorate-General for  Regional and 
Urban Policy (DG  REGIO) study ‘The geography of  EU  discontent and the 
regional development trap’ (DG REGIO 2023 study), has aimed to map such 
voting  and  link  anti-EU  electoral  outcomes  to  regional-level  development 
indicators  such  as  persisting  economic  and  industrial  downturns,  limited 
educational opportunities and local employment prospects. However, this work 
lacks  a  rural-urban lens and  overlooks subnational and local  elections when 
assessing EU  support among the electorate. Article 174  of  the Treaty of  the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) foresees paying particular attention 
to  the protection and  development of  rural and transitioning regions, thus it 
remains imperative to map voter discontent in rural areas  to identify how EU 
policy and decision-making might be falling short of its targets and purpose.  

The escalating prevalence of anti-EU votes prompts a critical examination of how 
EU policies can effectively counter voter discontent. In view of the forthcoming 
EP elections, a thorough examination of the rural-urban dynamics within the so-
called ‘geography of discontent’ becomes central to informed decision-making on 
future  EU  support  for  rural  areas.  A  recent Eurostat  survey  revealed  that 
individuals residing in rural areas are less inclined to engage in discussions on EU 
politics compared to their urban counterparts, necessitating tailored approaches 
for outreach and participation in EU-related policy-making activities1. 

This report complements DG REGIO’s research by providing comprehensive data 
on voters' choices in rural areas  and exploring potential variations in voting 
patterns  compared  to  urban  areas,  incorporating  insights  from  selected 
subnational elections. More specifically, it (i) analyses whether specific rural-
urban patterns  emerge across  EP,  national and  subnational elections  in  the 
Member  States;  (ii)  presents  drivers  of  Eurosceptic  and  anti-EU  voting, 
particularly in rural areas; and (iii) develops broad policy recommendations for 
providing better support to rural areas in the EU. It aligns with the insights from 
the recent study2 for the European Committee of the Regions’ (CoR) Commission 

1  Eurostat (2023).  Democracy in  action:  One year  before the  European elections.  Spring  2023 survey. 
https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3093 
2 Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and Council for Advancement and Support of Education (CASE) 
(2023).  The  cost  of  non-rurality:  preparing  for  a  better  urban-rural  balance  in  EU 
funding. 
https://cor.europa.eu/en/engage/studies/Documents/Study_the_cost_of_non_rurality.pdf 

3 

 
for Natural Resources on the political repercussions of neglecting rural areas.  

Secondly, the report aims to contribute to the key messages of the CoR in the lead-
up to the 2024 EP elections and the development of post-2027 support for rural 
areas  and  strategies  to  involve  rural  citizens,  including  the  European 
Commission's forthcoming report on the long-term vision for  rural areas. The 
study also highlights the potential role of local and regional authorities (LRAs) in 
countering Euroscepticism and strengthening European democracy.  

The report is structured as follows: Chapter 1 lays out the theoretical framework 
underpinning this report, based on existing grey and academic literature exploring 
anti-EU voting patterns in Europe and rural-urban divides. It also presents the 
basic methodology developed to answer the research questions, highlighting some 
key  considerations underpinning the main findings. Chapter 2 analyses rural-
urban voting patterns in recent national and European elections, building on the 
DG REGIO 2023 study and Eurostat’s Urban-rural typology (2021). Chapter 3 
then compares anti-EU voting patterns in subnational and national elections in 
five EU countries with high Eurosceptic voting preferences3. Each case study 
provides a  quantitative breakdown of  rural-urban patterns in the most recent 
subnational elections and presents possible drivers of Eurosceptic voting at local 
and regional level for each of the territories studied. Chapter 4 summarises the 
main conclusions of this study and develops some broad recommendations to 
maintain positive support for the EU, especially in rural areas across Europe. 
These are based on potential scenarios that can be expected to unfold in the future 
if structural drivers of Euroscepticism continue to be unaddressed.  

3 The case study for Poland compares voting in rural regions in the two national elections of 2019 and 2023. 

4 

 
1.  Methodology and theoretical framework 

1.1  Theoretical framework  

Several research studies have investigated the reasons behind people voting for 
candidates or  parties that espouse anti-EU values (Euroscepticism), primarily 
focusing on personal characteristics such as education, age and income4. The 
impact of geography on anti-EU attitudes has only been considered recently5.  

Exploring the potential divide between urban and rural areas in Eurosceptic and 
anti-EU voting is a newer development. de Dominicis et al.’s 2020 working paper, 
‘The urban-rural divide  in  anti-EU vote: Social,  demographic and  economic 
factors affecting the vote  for  parties opposed to  European integration’6, was 
among the first to examine differences in anti-EU sentiment between rural and 
urban areas in the EU and the United Kingdom (UK). It found that between 2013 
and 2019, there were fewer votes for parties that oppose the EU in cities, towns, 
and suburbs compared to rural areas. The drivers of voting for anti-EU parties 
differ between rural and urban areas, with some factors overlapping.  

The research found that living in rural areas is closely tied to voting for political 
parties that are against the country’s membership in the EU. This connection is 
mainly influenced by the country’s overall situation and economic factors. The 
impact of other factors, such as age structure of the population, level of education, 
and migration, also varies depending on the level of urbanisation. Higher rates of 
unemployment,  low  voter  turnout, and  the presence  of  a  larger  number of 
individuals born outside the EU are all linked to a higher likelihood of voting for 
anti-EU parties in both rural and urban areas. In small towns, suburbs and rural 
areas, higher proportions of university graduates, people between the ages of 20-
64, and individuals from other EU countries are associated with a decrease in anti-
EU voting; however, in cities, these factors do not have an impact. In rural areas, 
by contrast, economic decline and lower levels of education contribute to more 
anti-EU sentiment7.  

4 See, for example, Lenzi, C. and Perucca, G. (2021). People or Places that Don’t Matter? Individual and 
Contextual Determinants of the Geography of Discontent. Economic Geography, 97(5), 415-445. 
10.1080/00130095.2021.1973419; Koeppen, L., Ballas, D., Edzes, A. and Koster, S. (2021). Places that don't 
matter or people that don’t matter? A multilevel modelling approach to the analysis of the geographies of 
discontent. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 13(2), 221-245. 
5  Dijkstra, L.,  Poleman, H. and Rodríguez-Pose, A.  (2018). The geography of EU  discontent. WP  12/2018. 
Luxembourg: European Union. 
6  de Dominicis, L.,  Dijkstra, L.  and Pontarollo, N. (2020). The urban-rural divide in  anti-EU vote: Social, 
demographic and economic factors affecting the vote for parties opposed to European integration. WP 05/2020. 
Luxembourg: European Union. 
7 See also: de Dominicis, L., Dijkstra, L. and Pontarollo, N. (2022). Why are cities less opposed to European 
integration  than  rural  areas?  Factors  affecting  the  Eurosceptic  vote  by  degree  of  urbanisation.  Cities, 
130, p. 103937. 

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According to de Dominicis et al.8, encouraging economic growth and providing 
more opportunities for education and employment (including remote learning and 
work) can lessen negative feelings towards the EU in rural areas. Fostering the 
economic integration of immigrants from non-EU countries would benefit both 
migrants and the communities in which they reside, and could potentially decrease 
negative feelings towards the EU, especially in more rural areas  and smaller 
towns. 

In their 2021 study, Rodríguez-Pose and Dijkstra9 concluded that the EU, as a 
major target of anti-system and populist parties, has come under scrutiny for its 
role  in supporting less developed regions. However, research has shown that 
European Cohesion Policy has played a significant role in mitigating discontent 
and resentment in these regions, despite some parties claiming otherwise. The 
authors suggest that carefully  targeted interventions in  previously neglected 
middle-income areas could be  an effective way to address the root causes of 
Euroscepticism and anti-system voting. The EU has the potential to lead these 
interventions through its Cohesion Policy – expanding the Policy to encompass 
economic and industrial decline in middle-income regions could effectively tackle 
the issues facing these regions and reduce discontent and resentment. The primary 
takeaway from the 2023 European Week of Regions and Cities10 was the vital role 
of  strong Cohesion Policy  in  aiding regions to overcome the barriers of  the 
regional development trap11.  Similarly, Bayerlein and  Diermeier’s findings12 
reflect that while there may be limits to the effectiveness of increasing cohesion 
funding in silencing Eurosceptic or pro-integration sentiments in regions, such 
spending must be accompanied by enhanced visibility of its explicit links to the 
EU in order to ensure a positive perception of EU investments. 

The DG REGIO 2023 study13 introduces a novel perspective on comprehending 
the voting patterns of Euroscepticism by exploring the concept of the ‘regional 
development trap’. This phenomenon refers to regions that are trapped in a state 
of  economic stagnation, characterised by  lower  growth in  terms of  income, 
productivity  and  employment,  as  well  as  benchmarks  such  as  historical 
performance, country, and the EU. The study notes that the depth and intensity of 

8 Ibid; de Dominicis, L., Dijkstra, L. and Pontarollo, N. (2020). The urban-rural divide in anti-EU vote: Social, 
demographic and economic factors affecting the vote for parties opposed to European integration. WP 05/2020. 
Luxembourg: European Union. 
9 Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Dijkstra, L. (2021). Does Cohesion Policy reduce EU discontent and Euroscepticism? 
Regional Studies, 55, 354-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2020.1826040  
10 Brussels, 9-12 October 2023. 
11 European Week of Regions and Cities and European Commission (2023). Elections: leaving regions behind puts 
European project at risk. Politico. 26 October 2023. https://www.politico.eu/sponsored-content/elections-leaving-
regions-behind-puts-european-project-at-risk/  
12 Bayerlein, M. and Diermeier, M. (2022). Exchanging money for love? A regional analysis of EU Cohesion 
Policy and Euroscepticism. Kiel Working Paper, No. 2219, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), Kiel. 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/256926/1/KWP2219.pdf  
13 Rodríguez-Pose, A., Dijkstra, L. and Poelman, H. (2023). The geography of EU discontent and the regional 
development trap. WP 03/2023. Luxembourg: European Union. 

6 

 
these development traps correspond to higher levels of support for Eurosceptic 
parties. The analysis reveals the cumulative impact of being trapped in a state of 
economic  underperformance,  with  a  longer  duration  resulting  in  a  greater 
propensity  for  Eurosceptic  voting.  This  is  complemented  by  findings  by 
Vasilopoulu and Talving14, showing that ‘a non-linear association exists whereby 
poor and rich European regions tend to trust the EU more compared to the middle-
income regions, and that within-region over-time growth is associated with higher 
levels of EU trust.’ 

The DG  REGIO 2023  study confirms that a variety of  social, economic, and 
demographic factors have a  significant impact on the rise  of  Euroscepticism. 
Higher  levels  of  employment,  higher  rates  of  tertiary education, and  more 
effective government policies tend to decrease the propensity for Eurosceptic 
voting. Additionally, the presence of  a  larger proportion of  residents born in 
another EU Member State and higher population densities also show a negative 
correlation with Eurosceptic voting. Conversely, higher Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita, a larger older population, and a greater percentage of residents 
born outside the EU are found to increase support for Eurosceptic parties in most 
statistical analyses. 

The same study highlights the need for further research on three critical concerns. 
Firstly, there is a need for a deeper understanding of the factors contributing to 
the persistent underdevelopment of regions and effective strategies to overcome 
the issue. Secondly, it is  imperative to engage with the inhabitants of smaller 
cities, towns and rural areas  to comprehend the sources of  their  feelings of 
insignificance. Thirdly, the closure  of  local  public  and  private services  can 
engender feelings of disenfranchisement and marginalisation. Further research is 
warranted to identify areas where access to services is declining, ascertain the 
groups most adversely impacted, and devise policies that guarantee sufficient 
access to essential services. Addressing these overarching issues will necessitate 
redistributing attention to the territorial effects of policies.  

Florida15  notes  th  at  discontent  is  a  pervasive  characteristic  of  societal 
transformations, particularly in relation to the changing nature of capitalism. This 
is due to the shift from an industrial to a knowledge-based economy, resulting in 
economic and geographical divisions. Discontent goes beyond economic and 
cultural factors, and is linked to the geographical separation of different social 

14 Vasilopoulou, S. and Talving, L. (2023). Euroscepticism as a syndrome of stagnation? Regional inequality and 
trust in the EU. Journal of European Public Policy, 1-22. 
15 Florida, R. (2021). Discontent and its geographies. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 14(3), 
619-624. 

7 

 
groups. Effective, localised  policies  to  aid  regions  to  break  free  from  their 
development traps is crucial16. 

1.2  Data sources and analytical approach 

Applying a rural-urban lens to election data at European, national and subnational 
level  provides  a  useful contribution to  existing literature on  Euroscepticism 
among Member State voters, alongside important insights for regional and local 
policy-making. To understand whether there are specific voting patterns in rural 
areas compared to non-rural areas, this study analysed the publicly available data 
used in the DG REGIO 2023 study. These data describe vote shares obtained by 
all political parties in Member States’ (then-) latest national elections, ranging 
from 2018 to 2022.  

To  assess the extent of  Eurosceptic voting, this study uses the Comparative 
Manifestos Project's Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) dataset to understand the 
extent to  which  votes  for  national parties  in  the  EU  represent anti-EU or 
Eurosceptic sentiment. CHES-Europe has measured national party positioning on 
European integration, ideology and several EU and non-EU policies for more than 
two decades by surveying political scientists with national expertise in political 
parties and European integration. The CHES receives funding from a range of 
public and private sources across the US and Europe, and its results are publicly 
available in the form of a dataset on its website17.  

The most recent wave of the CHES was carried out in 2020. It tasked 421 political 
scientists with assessing the 2019 stances of 277 European political parties across 
all  EU Member States18. To ensure credibility and accuracy, CHES has been 
cross-referenced with earlier surveys, validating results19. Given its pluralistic 
approach based on the consensus of national political science experts, academics 
frequently rely on CHES results to categorise European parties based on factors 
such as left-right ideological orientations, main platform positions, and levels of 
populism20. The CHES dataset was also used in the  DG REGIO 2023 study. To 
assess Euroscepticism, the CHES questionnaire includes a question on parties' 
perspectives on European integration. Answers are categorised on a scale ranging 
from 1  to 7,  where a  score  of  1  signifies pronounced Euroscepticism and 7 

16 Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Dijkstra, L. (2021). Does Cohesion Policy reduce EU discontent and Euroscepticism? 
Regional Studies, 55, 354-369. https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2020.1826040  
17 https://www.chesdata.eu/  
18 Jolly, S., Bakker, R., Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., Steenbergen, M. and Vachudova, M.A. (2022). 
Chapel  Hill  Expert  Survey  Trend  File, 
(February). 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102420 
19 Steenbergen, M and Marks, G. (2007). Evaluating expert judgements. European Journal of Political Research, 
46, 347–366.  
20 Pew Research Centre (2023). Appendix A: Classifying European political parties. Attitudes in an Interconnected 
World. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/12/06/global-citizenship-appendix-a-classifying-european-
political-parties/  

1999-2019.  Electoral  Studies,  75 

8 

 
indicates complete support for European integration. This rating functions as the 
basis for Eurosceptic coding in the DG REGIO 2023 study and is also used here 
for comparability. Parties with a score below 3.5 are considered Eurosceptic. In a 
select  number of  cases  where  political parties  are  missing from  the CHES 
database, this study uses the Euroscepticism scores assigned by the DG REGIO  
2023 study. 

Similar to the DG REGIO 2023 study, this study draws a distinction between 
‘hard’  Eurosceptic  parties,  characterised  by  scores  below  2.5,  and  ‘soft’ 
Eurosceptic parties, with scores between 2.5 and 3.5. While hard Euroscepticism 
broadly aims to capture parties that explicitly support national withdrawal from 
the EU or policies opposing the European project, soft Euroscepticism reflects 
parties that are hesitant towards further European integration in specific policy 
areas21. These different types of Euroscepticism broadly map onto the widely cited 
distinction defined by leading political scientists in the academic field22. 

Separating hard and soft categories is less meaningful for an EU-wide mapping 
of  Eurosceptic voting, as  the degree of  Eurosceptic party supply is  likely to 
inherently depend on and be shaped by national contexts. By including both soft- 
and  hard-coded  parties, the  data  capture  Eurosceptic  voting  preferences  in 
Member  States  from  Eastern  Europe,  notably  Poland  and  Hungary,  where 
Eurosceptic parties tend not to oppose EU membership per se but resist further 
integration on key policy areas. In general, hard Eurosceptic parties are more 
typically found in Western Europe, while anti-EU party supply in Eastern Europe 
is limited to softer forms. 

The  analytical  approach  consisted  of  adding  Eurostat’s  2021  ‘Urban-rural 
typology’ as a categorical variable to the dataset used by DG REGIO. The rural-
urban typology was applied as NUTS 3 level23. This was then used to identify the 
urban, intermediate and rural NUTS 3 regions that reached minimum thresholds 
of 25% and 50% of vote shares for soft and/or hard Eurosceptic parties24, as coded 
by CHES and DG REGIO experts in the dataset.  

In applying Eurostat’s 2021 Urban-rural typology to election data, the analysis 
highlights some important considerations that may bias statistical outcomes. Most 

21 Rodríguez-Pose, A., Dijkstra, L. and Poelman, H. (2023). The geography of EU discontent and the regional 
development trap. WP 03/2023. Luxembourg: European Union; see also: Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002). 
The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States. Brighton: Sussex European Institute. 
22 Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002). The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States. 
Brighton: Sussex European Institute. 
23 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) classification has three levels, ranging from major 
socioeconomic regions (NUTS 1) to basic regions for the application of regional policies (NUTS 2),  to small 
regions for specific diagnoses (NUTS 3). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview  
24 In line with DG REGIO’s 2023 study, ‘hard’ Euroscepticism covers parties assessed to be opposed or strongly opposed 
to EU integration, while ‘soft’ Euroscepticism covers parties that are only somewhat opposed, e.g. only voicing concerns about 
specific policy areas of European integration.  

9 

 
notably, the division of NUTS 3 regions does not appear to be consistent across 
Member States, with region sizes varying significantly even between countries of 
comparable population size (see Annex A). One clear example is Germany, with 
a total of 401 NUTS 3 regions (compared to France and Italy, at 101 and 107 
NUTS  3  divisions,  respectively)  and  Estonia  (with  five  NUTS  3  regions, 
compared to  Latvia’s  10).  Different region  sizes  lead  to  different levels  of 
granularity  to  which  Eurostat’s 2021  Urban-rural typology  is  applied.  The 
distribution of predominantly rural, intermediate and predominantly urban NUTS 
3 regions appears to be driven by national context, which may limit the extent to 
which conclusions on rural-driven anti-EU votes can be  drawn. For instance, 
countries with centralised administrations, many of which are found in Eastern 
Europe, are typically organised with one urban region (around the capital city) 
and mostly rural and/or intermediate surrounding regions. On the other hand, 
more decentralised countries such as Spain, Italy or Germany contain a lower 
share of predominantly rural regions, likely due to the wider dispersion of urban 
centres outside the capital regions. Consequently, the NUTS 3 typology may not 
always be  useful or  meaningful for  gauging rural  voting preferences, as  any 
definition of rurality based on population density may be influenced by country-
level factors.  

Five  countries were  selected for  in-depth study. These case  studies compare 
Eurosceptic voting patterns in  national and subnational elections25, providing 
crucial qualitative insights to complement quantitative election data and address 
the potential shortcomings of NUTS-3 level statistics. To facilitate comparability 
with the national election outcomes provided by  the DG REGIO 2023  study, 
voting outcomes for subnational elections were also analysed at NUTS 3 level, 
while the CHES 2019 dataset was used where possible26 to code the Eurosceptic 
level  of  candidate parties  not  included in  the  report  on  national elections. 
Nevertheless, full comparability with national election outcomes was not always 
possible, as  differences in national and  subnational electoral systems created 
variance  in  party  supply  across  elections. Coalitions  and  shared  lists  were 
widespread at subnational level, making it difficult to isolate the number of voters 
expressing support for specific Eurosceptic parties.  

Mapping Euroscepticism in EP elections  

The European NUTS-Level Election Database (EU-NED) provides European 
election results at NUTS 3 level, to which Eurostat’s 2021 Urban-rural typology 
can be applied. EU-NED records the number of votes received by political parties 

25 The case study for Poland investigates voting outcomes in rural regions in two national elections, given the 
important outcome of the recent national parliamentary election. 
26  When not included in the CHES 2019 dataset or deemed outdated, these were independently coded by the 
research team, based on the definitions of party Euroscepticism outlined in Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002).  

10 

 
in the latest election year of the EP in every Member State.  

Methodological limitations 27 meant it was ultimately concluded that these data 
would not yield useful comparison with the outcomes of national parliamentary 
elections.  Most  notably,  parties,  coalitions  and  candidates  running  for  EP 
elections are often not the same as those running for national elections. As the 
CHES  provides data on  political parties running in  the national elections of 
Member States, its scoring cannot be applied to EU-NED28 to analyse Eurosceptic 
voting patterns at EP election level.  

The study considered an alternative approach to mapping running parties, based 
on their affiliation to EP political groups. However, the seven groups could not be 
distributed  across  an  EU-integration  axis,  as  both  Eurosceptic  and  non-
Eurosceptic European parties  occasionally belong to  the same  parliamentary 
groupings. This approach thus could not meaningfully capture Eurosceptic voting 
preferences among the European electorate. 

27 NUTS 3 level data unavailable for several Member States, including Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia. 
28 Expert judgement on the position of each party on EU integration in order to calculate a similar Euroscepticism 
score to CHES data was beyond the scope of this study.  

11 

 
 
2.  Rural-urban trends in national and European elections 

This chapter investigates whether it is possible to identify specific anti-EU voting 
patterns across the rural-urban divide in national and European elections in the 
Member States. It also looks at how possible common drivers of Euroscepticism, 
collectively summarised as ‘the development trap’ (DG REGIO, 2023), manifest 
in rural areas, compared to urban areas. 

2.1  National elections 

Map 1 ‒ Euroscepticism, by Urban-rural typology, 50% minimum vote threshold 

Source: Milieu (based on CHES and DG REGIO data collection). 

The  first  analysis  examines NUTS  3  regions  with a  50%  minimum voting 
threshold for Eurosceptic parties. Visualising this data on a map29 highlights four 
Member States where Eurosceptic parties reached a 50% vote share in national 
elections: France, Italy, Hungary and Poland. The following relevant EU-level 
voting patterns appe ar:  

•  In Italy’s 2022  national elections, 81% of  predominantly rural regions 
reached a majority vote share for Eurosceptic parties. This constitutes a 
slightly higher overall share than that of  intermediate regions (71% of 
which reached a majority vote share for hard and soft Eurosceptic parties), 

29  Data visualisations were produced with the online tool Datawrapper, which works similarly to IMAGE but 
allows authors to select their own colour schemes (essential to colour-code two separate categorical variables that 
could not be reduced to a two-colour scheme under IMAGE).  

13 

 
 
as well as predominantly urban ones (63%).  

•  In France, the urban-rural type with the highest share of regions reaching 
a 50% voting threshold for Eurosceptic parties in the 2022 national election 
was  urban regions (60%).  A  minimal difference is  observed  between 
intermediate and rural regions (45% and 41% of region types reaching the 
threshold, respectively). 

•  In Hungary, the only NUTS 3 region where Eurosceptic parties did not 
reach a 50% threshold in the 2022 national elections was Budapest, which 
is also the only predominantly urban Hungarian region under the Eurostat 
typology. This is a significant finding, which endorses previous findings on 
the rural-urban voting divide.  

•  In Poland’s 2019 national elections, Eurosceptic parties reached a majority 
vote threshold i n 84% of predominantly rural regions, compared to 37% 
and 14% of intermediate and predominantly urban regions, respectively.  

Looking at NUTS 3 regions with at least a 25% share of voting for Eurosceptic 
parties identifies a significantly broader range of Member States as having anti-
EU voting trends.  

Map 2 ‒ Euroscepticism, by urban-rural typology, 25% minimum vote threshold  

Source: Milieu (based on CHES and DG REGIO data collection). 

At first glance, the Eurosceptic trend is confirmed as a cross-country phenomenon 
in the four countries identified in the previous analysis. In France, every mainland 
NUTS 3 region surpassed a 30% Eurosceptic vote share. Similarly, in Poland and 

14 

 
Hungary, Eurosceptic parties reached at least 40% of  the vote share in every 
NUTS 3 region. In Italy, only two provinces, Valle d’Aosta and Bolzano, did not 
reach the 25% threshold.  

Belgium, Germany, the  Netherlands,  Slovakia  and  Sweden  also  emerge  as 
countries with a significant share of NUTS 3 regions casting anti-EU votes. 

•  In Belgium, almost one-third (27%) of NUTS 3 regions reached the 25% 
threshold  for  Eurosceptic  voting;  these are  predominantly  urban  and 
intermediate areas located in Flanders. This voting pattern can be explained 
by  the fact that the Eurosceptic-coded party is  the Flemish nationalist 
group, Vlaams Belang.  

•  In Germany, Eurosceptic NUTS 3 regions were concentrated in the east of 
the country, notably in  the federated states of  Saxony, Thuringia and 
Brandenburg. Overall, the largest share of these regions were intermediate 
(60%), followed by predominantly rural areas (37%). Only one hard-coded 
party (AfD) ran in the 2021 national election, potentially explaining the low 
levels of vote share for Eurosceptic parties.  

•  In the Netherlands, 75% of NUTS 3 regions reached the 25% threshold. 
The country has one rural NUTS 3 region (Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen), which 
reached a 33% Eurosceptic vote share. Eurosceptic regions were equally 
urban and intermediate; however, among the regions that did not reach the 
25% threshold, urban areas were predominant.  

•  In Sweden, 86% of NUTS 3 regions had at least a  25% vote share for 
Eurosceptic parties. Votes  were  mostly cast  for  the hard-coded party 
Sweden Democrats (SD), compared to the soft-coded Left Party (V). Four 
out of five of Sweden’s predominantly rural regions voted Eurosceptically. 
Stockholm did not reach the 25% threshold, representing one of the two 
urban NUTS 3 regions in Sweden (the other being Västra Götalands, which 
reached a 28% Eurosceptic vote share).  

•  In  Slovakia, three regions of  interest emerge: Trenčiansky kraj  (27%, 
intermediate), Žilinský kraj (26%, intermediate) and Banskobystrický kraj 
(26%, predominantly rural). In all three cases, vote shares were equally split 
between hard-coded parties (Vlast; Ludova strana Nase Slovensko) and 
soft-coded Eurosceptic parties (Slovenska narodna strana; Sme Rodina - 
Boris Kollar).   

Five Member States with ‘outlier’ Eurosceptic regions emerged. A single NUTS 
3  region reached the 25%  voting threshold in each of  Portugal, Croatia and 
Estonia, all three of which were predominantly rural. 

15 

•  In Portugal, the Alentejo region displayed a higher Eurosceptic vote share 
than the rest of the country, which had a majority of predominantly rural 
NUTS 3 regions (16 out of 25 are rural). In particular, the Baixo Alentejo 
area reached a 31% Eurosceptic vote share in the 2022 national elections, 
driven  by  votes  for  the  hard-coded  Unitary  Democratic  Coalition 
(compared to the soft-coded Chega party). A similar pattern is found in 
Alentejo Central (24% Eurosceptic vote share) and Alentejo Literol (22% 
Eurosceptic vote share).  

•  In Estonia, all  predominantly rural areas  displayed significantly larger 
shares  of  votes  for 
the  hard-coded  party  Eesti  Konservatiivne 
Rahvaerakond (EKRE),  reaching 25%,  23%  and  21%  of  vote  shares, 
compared to 13% and 8% in the remaining two urban regions (Põhja-Eesti 
and Kirde-Eesti). 

•  In Croatia, the only NUTS 3 region reaching a significant Eurosceptic 
share was  Vukovarsko-srijemska county, located in the far  east of  the 
country. This vote share was significantly driven by support for the soft-
coded coalition, led by the Homeland Movement party (Domovinski pokret 
Miroslava Škore).  

In Latvia, one intermediate region out of six NUTS 3 regions (one urban, three 
intermediate, two  rural) reached the 25%  threshold. Similarly, two  southern 
NUTS 3 regions in Spain (Murcia and Ceuta), one predominantly urban and one 
intermediate, reached this threshold, voting for the soft-coded Vox part.  

Recent trends in Eurosceptic voting 

There is  a  growing literature  dedicated to  understanding the reasons behind 
variations and  trends in  Eurosceptic voting. On  a  broad  level30,  drivers  of 
Eurosceptic voting range from cultural factors (migration imbalances, share of 
older  people, low  levels  of  education31) to economic (wealth or  employment 
rates32)  and  geographical  factors  (population  density33,  quality  of  regional 
governments34).  

Academics  note  that  low  voter  turnout  is  one  potential  driver  of  high 

30 While cross-country trends in drivers of Euroscepticism can be identified, local contexts are better suited to explaining anti -
EU voting preferences at national level (see case studies in chapter 3).  
31 Ford, R. and Jennings, W. (2020). The changing cleavage  politics  of Western Europe. Annual Review of Political Science, 
23(1), 295-314; Di Matteo, D. and Mariotti, I. (2021). Italian discontent and rightwing  populism: determinants, geographies, 
patterns. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 13(2), 371-396. 
32  Di  Matteo,  D.  and  Mariotti,  I.  (2021). Italian  discontent and  rightwing  populism: determinants, geographies, patterns. 
Regional Science Policy & Practice, 13(2), 371-396. 
33  Rodden,  J.  A.  (2019). Why  cities  lose:  The  deep  roots  of  the  urban-rural  political  divide.  New  York:  Basic  Books; 
Rickardsson,  J.  (2021).  The  urban–rural  divide  in  radical  right  populist  support:  the  role  of  resident’s  characteristics, 
urbanisation trends and public service supply. Annals of Regional Science, 67(1), 211-242. 
34  Díaz-Lanchas, J.,  Sojka,  A.  and Di  Pietro,  F.  (2021). Of  losers and laggards:  the  interplay  of  material  conditions and 
individual perceptions in the shaping of EU discontent. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 14(3), 395-415. 

16 

 
Euroscepticism in election outcomes35. The DG REGIO 2023 study concluded 
that, contrary to expectations, higher turnout was associated with greater support 
for  hard Eurosceptic parties, suggesting widespread discontent among voters. 
According to the database used in the study, voter turnout varied significantly 
across  Member States in  the most recent national elections, from 30.5%  in 
Romania to 84% in Malta. Based on DG REGIO data, the average turnout of valid 
votes for the national elections across the EU was 63.6% (see Annex A). 

Notably, voter turnout was consistently lower in predominantly rural NUTS 3 
regions, with the exception of Austria, France, Estonia, Latvia and Sweden. The 
largest rural-urban difference in turnout was in Poland (9% higher turnout in 
urban NUTS  3  regions),  followed by  Bulgaria, Lithuania and  Hungary (7% 
difference apiece). A notable exception is Latvia, where the turnout in rural areas 
was 11% higher than urban areas.   

The DG REGIO 2023 study investigated the development trap36 as a potential 
driving factor of Eurosceptic voting. To assess how the development trap relates 
to the rural-urban divide, a simple correlation analysis was conducted37. In line 
with DG REGIO’s findings, the likelihood of being in the development trap38 was 
positively correlated to Eurosceptic voting in NUTS 3 regions, including rural 
areas. However, the correlation with Eurosceptic vote shares was less strong for 
the depth of  the development trap39. Table  1  shows the correlation between 
Eurosceptic vote shares (for hard and soft parties) and development trap indicators 
for  NUTS  3  regions  in  each  urban-rural category. The  association between 
Eurosceptic  preferences  and  the  development  trap  appears  strongest  in 
intermediate regions. In both intermediate and predominantly rural regions, the 
likelihood of being in a development trap (DT1) and the duration of stagnation 
(number  of  years  in  a  development trap)  are  more  closely  associated with 
Eurosceptic voting, compared with the perceived depth of the trap (DT2). 

Table 1 ‒ Correlation between Eurosceptic vote shares and development trap indicators 
in Member States’ national elections, by urban-rural  

Variables 

Predominantly 
regions 

rural 

Intermediate regions 

Predominantly  urban 
regions 

Correlation:  Eurosceptic 

0.08 

0.19 

0.10 

35  Guiso, L.,  Herrera,  H.,  Morelli,  M.  and  Sonno, T.  (2017). Demand and  supply of populism. London, UK:  Centre  for 
Economic Policy Research; Leininger, A. and Meijers, M. J. (2021). Do populist parties  increase voter turnout? Evidence from 
over 40 years of electoral history in 31 European democracies. Political Studies, 69(3), 665-685. 
36 In a development trap region, economic growth (GDP per capita, employment, productivity) is lower than that 
of the EU, the country in which the region is located, and/or the region itself in a previous period.  
37 While correlations indicate a relationship between variables, they are not able to indicate causation. As a result, 
this analysis is insufficient to conclude whether exposure to the development trap can be deemed a potential driver 
of Eurosceptic voting outcomes in rural areas (see DG REGIO 2023 study for causal findings).   
38 DG REGIO (2023). Development Trap Index 1. 
39 DG REGIO (2023). Development Trap Index 2. 

17 

 
 
vote share and DT1 
Correlation:  Eurosceptic 
vote share and DT2 
Correlation:  Eurosceptic 
vote share and number of 
years  in  a  development 
trap 

-0.06 

0.02 

0.09 

0.14 

0.05 

0.07 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023). 

Interestingly, the development trap indicators themselves do not appear to be 
correlated with a particular rural-urban category: the average development trap 
index scores are very similar across urban, intermediate and rural NUTS 3 regions 
(see Table 2). This suggests that no one particular urban-rural type is more likely 
to be stuck in a development trap. However, there may still be differences in how 
the development trap influences voter preferences across urban-rural types. More 
drivers and trends of Eurosceptic voting, including some dimensions captured by 
the development trap, are analysed at local level as part of the case studies in 
chapter 3. 

Table 2 ‒ Average development trap index scores, rural and urban regions in the EU 
Predominantly  urban 
regions 

Predominantly 
regions 

Intermediate regions 

rural 

DT1 (likelihood of being 
in a development trap) 
DT2 (depth of the 
development trap) 
Average number of years 
stuck in a development 
trap 

0.52 

0.74 

10 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023). 

0.53 

0.73 

10 

0.54 

0.78 

9 

18 

 
3.  Voting patterns in selected subnational elections 

This chapter focuses on anti-EU voting patterns in recent subnational elections in 
four selected countries: France, Germany, Italy and Slovakia. A fifth case study 
on Poland compares Eurosceptic voting in rural areas of the recent 2023 national 
election to that of 2019. Each case study begins with a brief overview of the 
national elections, followed by a discussion of the Eurosceptic voting within the 
selected subnational election, disaggregated by NUTS 3 unit-areas to provide a 
rural-urban lens. Lastly, the case studies assess whether subnational elections 
correspond to or could be considered to preempt national elections (or vice versa, 
see Table 16 in Annex B). The chapter also presents factors (or combinations 
thereof) influencing votes in rural areas with a high level of Eurosceptic vote 
shares. 

3.1  France  

3.1.1 National election (2022) 

In France, the urban-rural type with the highest share of regions reaching a 50% 
voting threshold for  Eurosceptic parties  in  the  2022  national  parliamentary 
election was predominantly urban regions (60%). There was a minimal difference 
between intermediate and rural regions (45% and 41% of region-types reaching 
the threshold, respectively). The two Eurosceptic parties running for elections 
were RN, coded as a hard-Eurosceptic party, and the Nouvelle Union Populaire 
Ecologique et Sociale (NUPES) coalition, coded as soft-Eurosceptic (see Table 
3). 

The administrative regions40 with significant shares of  rural and Eurosceptic 
NUTS  3  regions  were  Bourgogne-Franche,  Nouvelle-Aquitaine,  Occitania, 
Centre-Val de Loire and Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur.  

Table 3 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, French national parliament elections, 2022 

Party ID 

RN 

Party  
Rassemblement National  

Position on EU integration 
1.4 

NUPES (FI + PS + PCF 
+ EELV)  
R! 

Nouvelle union populaire écologique et 
sociale  
Reconquête!  

LR 
LÉ 

/ 

Les Républicains  
Les Ecologistes  

Ensemble ! (Majorité présidentielle)  

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 

2.9 

3.0 

5.5 
6.4 

6.8 

40 The so-called administrative regions of France correspond to Eurostat’s NUTS 2 regions. 

19 

 
 
3.1.2 Subnational elections (2021) 

The subnational analysis focuses on the 2021 regional elections, which renewed 
all  of  the metropolitan41 regional councils in  France. The fact  that France’s 
regional  councils  were  elected  one  year  before  the  national  parliamentary 
assembly makes an interesting and pressing case for the comparison of national 
and subnational voting preferences in rural and urban areas.  

Since the 2016 NOTRe law42, France has 13 regions. These are responsible for 
transportation (ports, airports, regional express trains, road  networks), public 
secondary education, vocational training, spatial planning and  environmental 
initiatives. They also manage European funds. The departments handle social 
welfare,  public  assistance,  child  welfare  services,  and  administrative 
responsibilities related to civil registration, elections, and land management. They 
also maintain and develop local infrastructure (e.g. roads) and support cultural 
and heritage initiatives43. 

France’s regional electoral system is  a  mixed two-round system, combining 
proportional representation for 75% of the seats and a majority bonus of 25% of 
the seats for the leading list in the decisive round. Initially, if a list secures over 
50% of the votes in the first round, it can claim victory; if no list reaches this 
threshold, a second round is organised in which a relative majority is sufficient to 
win. The majority bonus was added through a 2004 electoral reform and aimed to 
incentivise coalition formation. Only the first round of the 2021 regional elections 
is analysed here, as it typically reflects the diversity of political opinions within 
the electorate and often serves as  an indicator of initial public preferences – 
subsequent rounds may see strategic voting or the formation of coalitions44.  

While party affiliation is freely chosen by the candidate, list affiliation is assigned 
by the Ministry of the Interior. According to French national law, this makes the 
results clearer to the public and is an ‘essential condition’ for analysis of election 
outcomes45. A total of 26 lists were validated by the Ministry of the Interior for 
the  2021  regional  elections,  reflecting  the  main  political  formations  and 
sensibilities at the time46. In general, candidates were assigned to a list according 

41 This analysis omits the five oversees administrative regions of France.  
42 Loi portant sur la nouvelle organisation territoriale de la république (NOTRe). https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/loi-
portant-sur-nouvelle-organisation-territoriale-republique-notre  
43 Regional competences. https://www.prefectures-regions.gouv.fr/Le-savez-vous/Quelles-sont-les-competences-
d-une-region  
44 Gougou, F. (2021). The 2021 French Regional Elections: Beyond Second-Order Effects. Regional and Federal 
Studies, 33 (4). https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04016093 
45 Vie Publique (2021). Loi du 22 février 2021 portant report, de mars à juin 2021, du renouvellement général des 
conseils départementaux, des conseils régionaux et des assemblées de Corse, de Guyane et de Martinique. 
https://www.vie-publique.fr/loi/277829-loi-report-elections-regionales-departementales-juin-2021  
46  Ministère  de 
https://mobile.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats/Regionales/elecresult__regionales-
2021/(path)/regionales-2021/nuances.html  

l’intérieur  et  des  outre-mer  (2021).  Résultats  des  élections  régionales  2021. 

20 

 
to the following criteria: 

1.  If the candidate is nominated or supported by a single political grouping 
with its own list, this list is directly validated. Parties that presented their 
own lists at the 2021 subnational elections47 were: the Parti Communiste 
Français  (PCF),  France  Insoumise (FI),  the  Parti  Socialiste (PS),  La 
République en Marche, Europe Écologie – Les Verts, RN, and Debout la 
France (DLF).  

2.  If the candidate is neither nominated nor supported by a political grouping, 
or the supported party does not have its own list, the Ministry of the Interior 
assigns the candidate to a coalition list corresponding to the candidate’s 
position on the political spectrum. Such lists included: Union à gauche 
(LUG), Union au centre, Divers  gauche, Divers  centre, Divers droite, 
Union à l’extrême-droite, and Les Régionalistes.  

3.  If  the candidate is  nominated or  supported by more than one political 

group, the situation falls into one of the two previous cases. 

Not every list was presented in each region. Firstly, parties can choose the regions 
in which to run for election. For instance, the Liste de La République en marche 
(LREM)  of  Emmanuel  Macron  was  presented  in  all  regions  except  one. 
Additionally, parties can choose whether to present their own list or run under a 
coalition list in each region. The PS, for example, presented a total of nine lists in 
coalition with other left parties (under the LUG list). However, in the five regions 
where the potential for a radical right-wing victory was most pronounced, they 
worked  with Europe Ecologie  Les  Verts  (EELV)  to  form  broader  left-wing 
coalitions (under the Liste d'union à gauche avec des écologiste (LUGE) list). On 
average, 8.8 lists were presented per region 48.  

For  the  2021  subnational  elections, two  hard  Eurosceptic parties  could  be 
identified according to the 2019 CHES data. Both are situated on the right side of 
the political range, notably RN  and  DLF. Additionally, there were  two  soft 
Eurosceptic parties, both occupying the left side of the spectrum: FI and the PCF. 
Table 4 shows the CHES score of the parties that presented their own lists at the 
2021 regional elections49. 

The right-wing party, DLF, presented its own list in four regions and supported 
the LR list in another region. The radical right party, RN, stood in all regions 
under its own list. The radical left party, FI, ran its own list in two regions, while 

47 In at least one administrative region. 
48 Gougou, F. (2021). The 2021 French Regional Elections: Beyond Second-Order Effects. Regional and Federal 
Studies, 33 (4). https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04016093 
49 All  but one of the lists analysed were directly associated with a political group. These lists were the ones with 
CHES scores available. The only coalition list (LUGE) that was retained was that of the PS and EELV, two parties 
for which a CHES score was available, and which were always consistent in terms of party coalition across regions. 
This was not the case for the other party coalitions (such as LUG) which, despite having the same list name, were 
formed by different parties in different regions. 

21 

 
 
the PCF had its own list in one region. 

Table 4 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, French regional elections, 2021 

List ID 

Party IDs 

Party 

Position 
integration 

on 

EU 

LRN 
LDSV 
LFI 
LCOM 

LLR 
LSOC  
LUGE 

LECO 

LREM 

RN 
DLF 
FI 
PCF 

LR 
PS 
PS and EELV 

EELV 

REM 

Communiste 

Rassemblement National 
Debout la France 
France Insoumise  
Parti 
Français 
Les Républicains  
Parti Socialiste 
Liste  d'union  à  gauche 
avec des écologiste 
Europe  Écologie  –  Les 
Verts 
La  République 
Marche 

en 

1.4 
1.43 
2.9 
3.0 

5.5 
6.1 
6.3 

6.4 

6.8 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 
Note: *Calculated by Milieu, taking the CHES average for the parties under coalition.  

Voter turnout reached a historic low, with just 33.3% of the French electorate 
participating in the first round and 34.7% in the second round of elections. RN 
received an aggregate vote share of 19.1% across regions but failed to win a 
majority in any region, contrary to initial expectations. The other small radical 
right party, DLF, as well the radical left parties, FI and PCF, did not reach the 
second round in any of the regions where they presented a list 50.   

An  analysis of  the election results shows a  significantly lower  incidence of 
Eurosceptic voting in the NUTS 3 regions compared to the national parliamentary 
elections. The percentage of votes for Eurosceptic parties did not reach 50% in 
any region in 2021, a striking difference from the 2022 national elections, when 
45% of all NUTS 3 regions exceeded this threshold. Lowering the threshold of 
analysis, Eurosceptic parties reached a 25% vote share in 27 NUTS 3 regions 
(28% of the total regions). Eurosceptic voting NUTS 3 regions at the subnational 
level mainly comprised predominantly rural areas (52%) and intermediate regions 
(41%). Compared to the national elections, rural areas were significantly less 
likely to vote Eurosceptic parties. While 96% of  predominantly rural regions 
reached a 25% Eurosceptic vote share in national elections, this rural level of 
support dropped to 26% in the subnational elections. 

50 DLF’s  maximum share of the vote was 9.1% in a department in the Grand-Est region, while it received an 
average of 3% in all the regions where it presented a list. The PCF only stood in Corsica, where it won a maximum 
of 3.5%, while the FI, which stood in Brittany and Occitania, won a maximum of 5.9%; Bendjanballah, S. and 
Sauger, N. (2021). France: Political Developments and Data for 2021. European Journal of Political Research 
Political Data Yearbook, 61, 160–170. doi: 10.1111/2047-8852.12374.  

22 

 
 
Map 3 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), French regional elections, 
first round, 2021 

Source: Milieu, based on data from France’s Ministry of the Interior51.  

The administrative (NUTS 2) regions with the highest proportion of votes for 
Eurosceptic parties were Grand-Est, Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, Occitanie and 
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, corresponding mainly to the regions that supported 
hard Eurosceptic parties in the national elections of the same year. However, it 
the definition of Eurosceptic parties changed considerably between 2021 and 
2022.  

That change in definition is the main reason for the difference in support for 
Eurosceptic parties in the  subnational and national elections. In  the national 
elections, the PS and EELV joined forces with the Eurosceptic parties, FI and the 
PCF, to form the NUPES coalition, which according to the CHES score was a 
soft-coded Eurosceptic list (see Table 4).  

However, the four NUPES parties mainly ran separately in the 2021 regional 
elections, and neither the PS nor the EELV are considered Eurosceptic by the 
CHES. Without the support of the mainstream PS and the growing EELV, the soft 
Eurosceptic parties (FI and PCF) could only secure a negligible share of the vote 
in the regional elections, in line with their historical trend. The hard Eurosceptic 
DLF was also generally unable to secure many votes when running its own list, 
both in the 2021 regional elections and the 2022 national elections. 

51  Ministère 
L'intérieur 
elections.interieur.gouv.fr/resultats/regionales-2021/index.php  

des  Outre-Mer 

de 

et 

(n.d). 

https://www.archives-resultats-

23 

 
 
Among the hard Eurosceptic parties, it is more relevant to consider the vote share 
of the RN (formerly the Front National), which has always been recognised by 
academics as the primary actor in France’s Eurosceptic landscape52,53. Although 
the RN did not win a majority of votes in any region in the 2021 subnational 
elections, it won 19.2% of the total votes in the second round (across all regions), 
making it the second most popular party after the LR (20.1%). From a macro-
trend perspective, the RN share of the vote has increased significantly over the 
years: in the 2010 regional elections, it was 11.7%, while in 2015  it reached 
28.4%. In the national parliamentary elections, RN’s success ranged from 3.6% 
in 2012 to 6.06% in 2017 and 17.8% in 2022, marking the third-highest number 
of seats in parliament (after the NUPES coalition and the presidential majority 
Ensemble!), a historical record for the RN. The RN’s inability to win a majority 
of seats in any region might therefore be seen as an exception, rather than a trend, 
in light of  previous and subsequent elections at both national and subnational 
level. 

Support for political parties such as the RN has been the subject of research for 
some time. The RN has attracted attention for its political positions, including on 
immigration,  nationalism  and  Euroscepticism54.  Ivaldi  and  Gombin  (2015) 
highlight the significant role  of  socioeconomic challenges, particularly those 
affecting the agricultural sector, as a key factor driving rural support for the RN. 
They noted that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has historically protected 
farmers by ensuring income stability amid growing international competition in 
national agricultural markets, fostering strong support for European integration 
among French farmers. However, recent perceptions of the CAP’s diminished 
effectiveness among certain sub-groups of farmers have led to dissatisfaction with 
EU policies within these segments and contributed to their support for the RN’s 
national protectionist stance55.  

According to Goldhammer (2015)56 and Cremer (2023)57, there is a cultural driver 
behind RN support. People living in rural areas, less exposed to the benefits of 

52 Likay, X., Rieble L. and Theuer L. (2020). Euroscepticism in France: An analysis of Actors and Causes. Working 
paper, No. 132/2020. Institute for International Political Economy Berlin. 
53 Ivaldi G. (2018). Contesting the EU in times of crisis: The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism in 
France. Politics, 28(3), 278-294. 
54 Likay, X., Rieble L. and Theuer L. (2020). Euroscepticism in France: An analysis of Actors and Causes. Working 
paper, No. 132/2020. Institute for International Political Economy Berlin ; Ivaldi G. (2018). Contesting the EU in 
times of crisis: The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism in Fra nce. Politics, 28(3), 278-294; Cremer, T. 
(2022). The Rise of the Post-Religious Right: Christianism and Secularism in the French Rassemblement National. 
Party Politics, 29(1). 
55 Ivaldi, G. and Gombin. J. (2015). The Front National and the New Politics of the Rural in France. In D. Strijker, 
G. Voerman and I. Terluin (Eds.). Rural Protest Groups and Populist Political Parties. Wageningen: Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, pp. 243–263. 
56 Goldhammer, A. (2015). Explaining the Rise of the Front National: Political Rhetoric or Cultural Insecurity? 
Review of L’Insécurité culturelle by Laurent Bouvet and Marine Le Pen prise aux mots: Décryptage du nouveau 
discours frontiste by Cécile Alduy, Stéphane Wahnich. French Politics, Culture & Society, 33(2), 134-142. 
57  Cremer, T.  (2022). The  Rise  of  the  Post-Religious  Right:  Christianism and Secularism in  the  French 
Rassemblement National. Party Politics, 29(1). 

24 

 
globalisation, are more and more affected by the so-called sense of ‘Insécurité 
Culturelle’. This is a series of deep-rooted cultural crises and insecurities, such as 
economic insecurity, fear of unfamiliar cultural and religious practices, crime and 
terrorism, which French people, especially  those living  outside urban areas, 
increasingly associate with the EU and its policies. The RN capitalised on these 
concerns58. 

Overall, the party results in the national and subnational elections were very 
different. The 2021 regional elections were characterised by the complete re-
election of incumbents, all from the two mainstream parties of the French political 
spectrum, the PS and LR. In addition, LREM, the governing coalition, and RN, 
the increasingly popular main Eurosceptic party, failed to win a majority in any 
of  the regions, performing below  expectations. The  2022  national elections 
instead saw the re-election of the ruling coalition (LREM) and the confirmation 
of the historic rise of the RN. In terms of the political offer, the elections were 
significantly influenced by a new coalition, NUPES, made up of FI, PCF, PS and 
EELV, which was created to stop the advance of the extreme right, and which, 
despite achieving a good result, failed to do so.  

The extent to which the 2021 subnational elections might be considered a possible 
predictive model  of  the 2022  national elections remains limited. Academics 
consider French regional elections to be second-order national elections, mostly 
focused on candidates rather than parties, and centred on local rather than national 
issues. Gougou (2020) adds that French subnational elections are increasingly 
characterised by a decreasing impact of partisanship on voting, a high level of 
incumbent re-election, and a high level of divided government, which is rarely the 
case at national level59. 

3.1.3 Conclusions 

Despite coming just one year apart, the 2021 regional elections had significantly 
different results to the national election the following year. No NUTS-3 region 
reached a 50% Eurosceptic vote share in the regional elections, but 27 regions 
exceeded 25%, mostly rural or intermediate areas. The regional elections saw the 
re-election of incumbents from the PS and LR and the underperformance of the 
LREM and RN. This difference can be explained by the fact that French regional 
elections are increasingly seen as  secondary to national elections, prioritising 
candidates over parties and focusing more on local issues. In addition, regional 
elections are increasingly characterised by less partisanship, together with high 
incumbents  and  frequently  divided  government. 
re-election  rates  for 

58 Goldhammer, A. (2015). Explaining the Rise of the Front National: Political Rhetoric or Cultural Insecurity? 
Review of L’Insécurité culturelle by Laurent Bouvet and Marine Le Pen prise aux mots: Décryptage du nouveau 
discours frontiste by Cécile Alduy, Stéphane Wahnich. French Politics, Culture & Society, 33(2), 134-142. 
59 Gougou, F. (2021). The 2021 French Regional Elections: Beyond Second-Order Effects. Regional and Federal 
Studies, 33(4). https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04016093 

25 

 
Socioeconomic challenges in agriculture drive rural support for the hard-coded 
Eurosceptic party, RN, as well as cultural insecurities across rural areas.  

3.2  Germany 

3.2.1 National election (2021) 

No  NUTS  3  region in  Germany reached the 50%  vote  share threshold for 
Eurosceptic parties. However, trends emerge when the threshold is lowered to 
25%. Eurosceptic regions were concentrated in eastern Germany, and the largest 
share  of  these  regions  were  intermediate  (60%),  closely  followed  by 
predominantly rural areas (37%). Eurosceptic-voting regions were located across 
three federal states: 

•  In Saxony, nine out of 13 regions surpassed a 25% Eurosceptic vote share. 
Of these, two (out of two) were predominantly rural, six (out of seven) were 
intermediate, and one (out of four) were predominantly urban.  

•  In Thuringia, 13 out of 23 regions voted more Eurosceptic. This comprised 
70% of predominantly rural areas, compared to 46% of intermediate areas. 
As a state without urban NUTS 3 regions, the trend of urban areas voting 
less Eurosceptically cannot be inferred at state level.   

•  In  Brandenburg, only  two  of  18  NUTS  3  regions reached the  25% 

threshold, and both were rural. 

CHES data identifies one German political party as a (hard) Eurosceptic actor: 
AfD. Established in 2013, this far-right nationalist party was represented for the 
first time in the 2014 EP elections. Since then, it has enjoyed steady growth, 
becoming the third-largest party in German national elections in 2017 based on 
vote counts60, and acquiring 94  of  the 709  seats of  the Bundestag (national 
parliament). Its success at the time was closely interlinked with the European 
migrant crisis61, specifically the 2015 immigration politics of Angela Merkel, 
which allowed many migrants in need to stay in Germany. As a Eurosceptic party, 
the AfD’s  main goals  include opposing immigration and  limiting European 
integration; in some German federated states, the party is  even considered by 
some as  anti-democratic. As  the AfD  is  the only political party in  Germany 
considered Eurosceptic, its vote share can be directly transcribed into indicators 
for Euroscepticism. 

Federal  Returning  Officer 

60 
https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse/bund-99.html  
61  Peters,  B. 
in  Germany.  Suddeutsche  Zeitung. 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/  

election  2017.  Statistisches  Bundesamt. 

(n.d.).  5  Reasons  for 

(2023).  Bundestag 

the  far  right 

rising 

26 

 
 
Table 5 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, German national elections, 2021 
Party ID 

Position on EU integration 

Party  

AfD 

FW 

Linke 

DieTier 
CSU 

FDP 

CDU 

Piraten 

SPD 

Grüne 

Alternative für Deutschland 

Freie Wähler 

Die Linke 

Tierschutzpartei 
Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern 

Freie Demokratische Partei 

Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 

Piratenpartei Deutschland 

Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 

Bündnis ’90; Die Grünen 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 

3.2.2 Subnational elections (2019 and 2023) 

1.9 

4 

4.7 

5 
5.7 

5.8 

6.3 

6.5 

6.5 

6.8 

In Germany, subnational elections are organised at federal state parliament level 
(Landtagswahlen)  and  municipal level  (Kommunalwahlen).  This  case  study 
focuses on Landtag elections, where electoral data is organised by NUTS 3 units 
and thus provides a comparable approach to rural-urban analysis with other case 
studies. Landtags are responsible for the control of the state government and the 
adoption of state laws. Only parties that win at least five seats in a Landtag can be 
represented at federal level in the national parliament.  

Thuringia and Saxony, two of the most representative regions of Euroscepticism 
in  Germany,  were  selected  for  analysis  at  subnational  level.  Both  held 
Landtagswahlen in 2019. To complement Thuringia and Saxony, which are both 
historically and culturally east German states, a third, historically western state, 
Hessen, was also included in the subnational analysis. Although Hessen did not 
demonstrate significant Eurosceptic voting in the 2019 national elections (the 
average AfD  vote share across  NUTS 3  regions was  9.3%), the subnational 
Landtagswahlen took place in October 2023, providing valuable very recent data 
for  the analysis of  Eurosceptic voting preferences and significant changes in 
voting trends. 

Elections comprise two votes: the first is dedicated to a representative and the 
second to a party. The two votes are independent, i.e. the representative does not 
have to be from the same party supported by the second vote. While the second 
(party) vote dictates the initial shares of seats available for each party, the first 
(representative) vote goes  on  to dictate how the allocated seats are  filled  in 
practice, by determining which representatives are elected via direct mandate. If 
a  party  obtains  more  seats  with  the  second  vote  than  the  number  of  its 
representatives elected at the constituency level with the first vote, the remaining 
seats are filled with other candidates from the party list. 

27 

When compiling election data for comparison with national election outcomes, 
the subnational data screening took only the second vote into account, as it allows 
comparability with data for the 2021 national election (also disaggregated by 
party).   

Map 4 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties, German subnational elections, 2019 

Source: Milieu, based on Saxony, Thuringia and Hessen state data portals62. 
Note: Eurosceptic vote share thresholds for Saxony and Thuringia are set at 25%; for Hessen, 20%.  

At the Landtag elections for Saxony in 2019, the AfD reached a 25% vote share 
in 11 of the 13 NUTS 3 regions. This success was driven by high electoral support 
in all  intermediate and rural regions. Only the two city-regions, Leipzig and 
Dresden, expressed limited support, with 17% and 21% of votes for the AfD, 
respectively.  

Despite the large vote share achieved by the AfD in Saxony, electoral results did 
not directly translate into proportionate power in the state government, with the 
party able to fill only 35 of its 38 allocated seats (out of 119 total Landtag seats). 
This was because the AfD had significantly higher success with the second vote, 
but was unable to fill its seats with elected representatives and its list of candidates 
was not sufficient to fill the remaining seats. One explanation for such divergence 
between voter preferences across the two votes is that AfD support was primarily 
a protest vote against the incumbent state government. Therefore, while voters 
expressed  support for  the  AfD  as  a  party,  identification with specific  AfD 
candidates remained low  and  representative-elected seats  remained empty in 

62 Hessen: https://bundestagswahl.statistik.hessen.de/b_2021/html/landkreise+kreisfreie-staedte/413000; Saxony: 
https://wahlen.sachsen.de/landtagswahl-2019-wahlergebnisse.php; Thuringia: 
https://wahlen.thueringen.de/datenbank/wahl1/wahl.asp?wahlart=LW&wJahr=2019&zeigeErg=Land 

28 

 
 
practice.  

The AfD was not able to secure a prominent role in state government despite the 
election results because the Landtag of Saxony is a majoritarian electoral system. 
As a result, parties must cooperate to form coalitions to reach a  majority seat 
share. In 2019, a coalition between the CDU, the Grüne (Greens), and the SPD 
was formed as an absolute majority government, excluding the AfD.  

In Thuringia, the AfD won the majority of the votes in 10 of 23 NUTS 3 regions, 
with the Eurosceptic vote equally split between intermediate and predominantly 
rural areas. It achieved 22 of the 90 seats of the Thuringia Landtag. The turnout 
for voters under 30 years was unexpectedly high63. At the same time, the Grüne, 
the leading party for climate-friendly politics and normally with quite a young 
audience, achieved lower results than previously, suggesting a shift in preference 
among the younger electorate.  

In Hessen, in 2023, Eurosceptic support saw a distinct rise in popularity compared 
to the 2021 Bundestag elections. While none of the NUTS 3 regions reached a 
20% vote share in 2021 at the national elections, 11 reached this threshold in 2023 
at the most recent subnational elections. Before the 2023 Landtag election, the 
leading party in Hessen was the CDU, which entered a coalition with the Grüne. 
The AfD nevertheless secured 28 of 133 seats in the new election of October 2023, 
becoming the second-strongest party  in  Hessen 64. This  represents an  overall 
increase of  5.3% in  its popularity compared to 201865. This gain is  partially 
explained by the general upward trend for populist parties presenting simplistic 
solutions in times of multiple crises.  

Voter preference at national elections does not always align with voting trends at 
subnational level (see Table 6). In Thuringia and Saxony, the AfD saw an overall 
stable evolution in popularity in the national elections, compared to subnational 
elections occurring two years prior. On the other hand, compared to the 2019 
national elections, Eurosceptic voting in Hessen increased at the 2023 Landtag 
elections, potentially indicating a continuing upwards trend of Eurosceptic voting 
for other German states.  

Differences in voting patterns according to the urban-rural divide are also worth 
noting. Predominantly rural areas appear to be the largest basis of support for the 

63  Reuter, B. (2019. Landtagswahlen 2019 in Ostdeutschland: Nirgendwo wählte die Jugend so rechts wie in 
Thüringen. Tagesspiegel, 28 October 2019. https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/nirgendwo-wahlte-die-jugend-so-
rechts-wie-in-thuringen-4113457.html     
64  Hessenschay 
https://www.hessenschau.de/politik/landtagswahl-2023-in-hessen-das-endgueltige-ergebnis-steht-fest-
v1,offizielles-wahlergebnis-100.html  
65 Endt, C., Schach, D. and Troger, J. (2023). Alle Ergebnisse der Landtagswahl in Hessen. Zeit Online, 9 October 
2023. https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2023-10/hessen-landtagswahl-2023-wahlergebnisse-live#gewinne-
und-verluste  

(2023).  Endgültiges  Ergebnis 

der  Landtagswahl 

in  Hessen 

steht 

fest. 

29 

 
AfD across all three states. While rural Eurosceptic support remained stable in 
Saxony in the Bautzen and Nordsachsen regions, AfD support appears to be 
increasing in rural NUTS 3 regions in both Thuringia and Hessen. Perhaps most 
notably, in Hessen, the AfD was able to reach the previously unmet 20% threshold 
in all six predominantly rural regions at the 2023 Landtag election. 

Predominantly urban areas in Saxony and Hessen remained significantly less 
Eurosceptic, with the exception of Bergstraße in Hessen and Sächsische Schweiz-
Osterzgebirge in Saxony. Finally, changes to intermediate regions (by far the most 
common NUTS 3 region in the three selected states) remained relatively stable. 
In Saxony, the city-region Chemnitz, nominated in January 2021 as the 2025 
European Capital of Culture, showed lower support for the AfD at the national 
elections compared to its Landtag election two years prior. In Thuringia, voting 
patterns also remained similar between the two elections, with the intermediate 
region Schmalkalden-Meiningen displaying an increase in Eurosceptic support at 
the national election. In Hessen, four out of  10  intermediate regions showed 
increased support for the AfD in 2023. 

Table  6 ‒ Comparison of  AfD support  at  subnational and  national  elections, NUTS  3 
regions in Saxony, Thuringia and Hessen 

Land 

Number of NUTS 3 regions reaching a minimum vote share for the AfD (25% for 
Saxony and Thuringia, 20% for Hessen) 

Urban-rural typology 

Most recent subnational 
election  

National election (2021) 

Saxony 

Predominantly urban 

Intermediate 

Predominantly rural 

Thuringia  

Predominantly urban 

Intermediate 

Predominantly rural 

Hessen 

Predominantly urban 

Intermediate 

Predominantly rural 

2/4 

7/7 

2/2 

- 

5/13 

5/10 

1/10 

4/10 

 6/6 

1/4 

6/7 

2/2 

- 

6/13 

7/10 

0/10 

0/10 

 0/6 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023), CHES data (2019) , Saxony, Thuringia and Hessen state data 
portals66. 

The timeframe of elections is very significant when considering the factors that 
could have driven changes in Eurosceptic voting in Germany. Between 2019 and 
2021, the COVID-19 pandemic was a major influence on people's beliefs and 
needs.  The  importance  of  a  common  regulation for  human health  and  the 
interconnectedness due to globalisation and trade may have been perceived as a 
reason  to  amplify  support for  European  integration. Nonetheless,  persistent 

66 Hessen: https://bundestagswahl.statistik.hessen.de/b_2021/html/landkreise+kreisfreie-staedte/413000; Saxony: 
https://wahlen.sachsen.de/landtagswahl-2019-wahlergebnisse.php; Thuringia: 
https://wahlen.thueringen.de/datenbank/wahl1/wahl.asp?wahlart=LW&wJahr=2019&zeigeErg=Land 

30 

 
 
 
Eurosceptic voting in  subnational elections, as  seen  in Hessen’s very  recent 
Landtag  elections (October  2023),  suggests that anti-EU sentiments remain 
prevalent among certain parts of  the population. This may be  the result of a 
growing  pessimism  among  the  German  public  regarding  German  parties’ 
capability to solve the problems facing Europe67. 

Less educated and unemployed voters tended to display greater support for the 
AfD,  compared  to  highly  educated  people  and  high-income  earners68. The 
proportion of foreign nationals also plays a role in voters' choices: areas with 
fewer foreign national residents, such as rural areas, are associated with lower 
tolerance of diversity and thus greater support for nationalist and xenophobic 
parties like  the AfD. The fact that there may be  a  tendency in rural, eastern 
German areas towards low education, income, employment and fewer foreigners 
provides support for these hypotheses and may explain why the AfD received 
exceptional support in Saxony and Thuringia. Indeed, AfD supporters are least 
likely to associate the EU with the term ‘prosperity’ (42% hardly or not at all, 
compared to just over 10% of CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP and Die Linke voters) or 
with ‘security’ (52% hardly or not at all, compared to just over 10% of CDU/CSU, 
SPD and Die Linke voters)69. 

Nevertheless, the AfD  recently gained in popularity in  western Germany, as 
evident  in  Hessen.  Alongside  voters’  discontent  with  the  current  national 
government, the AfD offers nationalist-pleasing programmes, which, especially 
during the current crises  and  inflation, have  proven very  convincing  to  its 
audience nationwide. As the only Eurosceptic party in Germany, the AfD does 
not have  an  equal competitor and  does  not  share votes  with another party, 
contributing to higher vote shares70. After a prominent leader of the AfD left the 
party in 2022, when internal conflicts divided the party and lowered its credibility, 
the AfD was able to present itself as more united than before. Despite the fact that 
the AfD is becoming increasingly radical71, it also appears to be progressively 

67 Neu, V. (2023). Die europafreundlichen Deutschen - Repräsentative Umfrage zu Einstellungen zu Europa in der 
deutschen  Bevölkerung.  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung  e.  V.  https://www.kas.de/de/monitor-wahl-und-
sozialforschung/detail/-/content/die-europafreundlichen-deutschen  
68 Giebler, H. and Regel, S. (2018). Who votes right-wing populist? : Geographical and individual factors in 
seven German state elections. 
69 Neu, V. (2023). Die europafreundlichen Deutschen - Repräsentative Umfrage zu Einstellungen zu Europa in der 
deutschen  Bevölkerung.  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung  e.  V.  https://www.kas.de/de/monitor-wahl-und-
sozialforschung/detail/-/content/die-europafreundlichen-deutschen 
70  Das  Erste,  Panorama  (2023).  AfD-Umfragehoch:  Nicht  einer,  sondern  acht  Gründe,  9  June  2023. 
https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/AfD-Umfragehoch-Nicht-einer-sondern-acht-
Gruende,afdanalyse102.html  
71  Halasz,  G.  and  Schmidt,  M.  (2023).  Radikal  ist  auch  egal.  Tagesschau,  12  May  2023. 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-726.html  

31 

 
more accepted nationwide72. However, recent polling data73 show that three-
quarters of Germans remain pro-European, with only 5% viewing German EU 
membership negatively. While AfD supporters are the only voters expressing 
concerns about EU membership, there is  internal division, with only 42% in 
support of  leaving  the  EU.  Some  81%  of  AfD  supporters  have  expressed 
reservations on the further promotion of European integration.  

National and subnational election data are not always comparable. Given that 
voters’  choices  are  strongly linked  to  the  specific  electoral  context, voting 
preference at local level cannot be directly transferred to national level and vice 
versa, because voters are likely to have different priorities at regional and national 
level. An illustrative example is the COVID-19 crisis, which occurred between 
the subnational elections of Saxony and Thuringia and the 2021 national election. 
Indeed, following a 2021 policy brief from the European Council on Foreign 
Relations74, German politics is seeing a separation of two major positions due to 
the recent COVID-19 pandemic. While one side is oriented towards the EU and 
supports the integration of Germany with the institutions, the other targets a more 
national-interest-oriented government. The solution to align both could be  to 
strengthen the representation of national interests at EU level, while emphasising 
the national benefits due to the EU.  

3.2.3 Conclusions 

The analysis of the regional elections in 2019 in Thuringia and Saxony and 2023 
in Hessen identifies different voting patterns between east and west Germany, as 
well as between urban, rural, and intermediate areas. While Euroscepticism is 
stronger in less dense areas, the success of the AfD, especially in urban west 
Germany,  remains low.  The  AfD  is  strongly  represented in  rural  areas  in 
Thuringia and Saxony. Nonetheless, recent voting outcomes in Hessen suggest 
that it is rising in rural areas of western Germany too.  

The immigration crisis in 2015, especially in Germany, contributed to the rise of 
the  AfD  and  therefore to  extended Euroscepticism voting patterns.  Experts 
identified the actions and well-functioning moments of governments as one of the 
most  impactful reasons  influencing  voter  behaviour  towards  or  away  from 
Euroscepticism.  

72  Das  Erste,  Panorama  (2023).  AfD-Umfragehoch:  Nicht  einer,  sondern  acht  Gründe,  9  June  2023. 
https://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/AfD-Umfragehoch-Nicht-einer-sondern-acht-
Gruende,afdanalyse102.html  
73 Neu, V. (2023). Die europafreundlichen Deutschen – Repräsentative Umfrage zu Einstellungen zu Europa in 
der  deutschen  Bevölkerung.  Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung  e.  V.  https://www.kas.de/de/monitor-wahl-und-
sozialforschung/detail/-/content/die-europafreundlichen-deutschen 
74 Leonard, M. And Puglierin, J. (2021). How to Prevent Germany from becoming Eurosceptic. European 
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep33813  

32 

 
The main drivers  for  Euroscepticism today, particularly in  the three regions 
analysed, Thuringia, Saxony and Hessen, are based less on specific events than 
reflective of an ongoing perceived uncertainty of future developments and the 
possible disadvantages citizens believe they face75. This case study shows that 
rural areas are generally more affected by Euroscepticism, possibly due to lower 
economic wealth and education standards, echoing some of the development trap 
indicators identified and associated with Euroscepticism by the DG REGIO 2023 
study. 

To  avoid  rising  trends  towards  nationalism,  some  experts  note  that 
Euroscepticism must be taken seriously at national level and actively addressed 
through acknowledgment of  voters’ demands. For  instance, placing  national 
interests at the center of international negotiations will demonstrate the power of 
the EU, while reinforcing national priorities76. 

3.3  Italy 

3.3.1 National election (2022) 

The 2022 national election saw the victory of the centre-right wing coalition of 
Fratelli d’Italia (FDI), Lega per Salvini Premier (Lega) and Forza Italia (FI). The 
elections eventually led to the formation of a government led by Giorgia Meloni, 
the party leader of FDI. The coalition is characterised by two hard Eurosceptic 
parties (FDI and Lega) and one non-Eurosceptic party (FI).  

Overall, 81% of predominantly rural NUTS 3 regions gave a majority vote share 
to Eurosceptic parties. This constitutes a slightly higher overall share than that of 
intermediate regions (71% of which gave a majority vote share to hard and soft 
Eurosceptic parties) or predominantly urban areas (63%). The only rural NUTS 3 
areas  where  Eurosceptic  parties  did  not  reach  a  50%  vote  share  were  the 
autonomous province Bolzano, in the Südtirol region (21%), Siena province in 
Tuscany (42%), Benevento province  in  Campania (46%)  and Vibo  Valentia 
province in Calabria (46%). 

(n.d.).  5  Reasons  for 

75  Peters,  B. 
in  Germany.  Suddeutsche  Zeitung. 
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/  
76 Leonard, M and Puglierin, J. (2021). How to prevent Germany from becoming Eurosceptic. European Council 
on  Foreign  Relations,  9  June  2021.  https://ecfr.eu/publication/how-to-prevent-germany-from-becoming-
eurosceptic/   

the  far  right 

rising 

33 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, Italian national elections, 2022 

Position on EU integration 

Party 

Lega per Salvini Premier (Lega) 

Fratelli d’Italia (FDI) 

Italexit per L’Italia (IpI) 

Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) 

Forza Italia (FI) 

Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra (AVS) 

Südtiroler Volkspartei (Svp) - Patt 

Azione - Italia Viva – Calenda (AZ-IV) 

+Europa (+E) 

1.7 

1.9 

2 

3.5 

4.9 

5.3 

5.9 

6 

6.8 

6.8 

Partito Democratico - Italia Democratica e Progressista 
(PD) 

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 

3.3.2  Subnational elections (2022-2023) 

Regional elections77 are held every five years and take place at different times. 
They involve both the election of the regional council and the appointment of the 
President of the Region78. They are characterised by a proportional system, with 
a majority bonus for the winning party or coalition. This system incentivises the 
creation of  multi-party coalitions. This analysis examines the elections in six 
different regions in 2022 and 2023, notably Sicily (September 2022), Lazio and 
Lombardy (February 2023), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (April 2023), Molise (June 
2023), and the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano (October 2023), 
which  form  the  Trentino-Alto  Adige/Südtirol  region.  The  fact  that  these 
subnational elections occurred either in the same year or the year following the 
2022 national parliamentary election provides an interesting case for comparison 
and possible trend analysis.  

These six regions have distinctive traits, offering a variety of valuable insights 
and  providing  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  Italian  territory  and 
socioeconomic landscape. Sicily is one of the two regions belonging to the Islands 
macro-region and one of the five regions with a special statute. It has the lowest 
GDP  per  capita  among these  regions,  and  the  second-lowest overall,  after 
Calabria79. Regional elections were held simultaneously with the 2022 national 
election. Lombardy is the most populated region and historically one of the most 
dynamic from an economic standpoint, with the second-highest GDP per capita 

77 Administrative regions of Italy correspond to NUTS 2 level.  
78 Dipartimento per le riforme istituzionali (2020).  Leggi regionali - il sistema elettorale, i costi della politica, la 
partecipazione 
locali. 
degli 
https://www.riformeistituzionali.gov.it/media/1372/dossier-leggi-regionali-web-14dic_def.pdf 
79  Eurostat  (2023).  Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  at  current  market  prices  by  NUTS  2  regions. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nama_10r_2gdp__custom_8594081/default/table?lang=en  

l’ordinamento 

cittadini 

politica, 

vita 

enti 

alla 

dei 

34 

 
 
 
in the country. Since 1994, it has been governed by centre right-wing coalitions. 
Lazio is the country's second most populous region, where Rome, the capital, is 
located. In contrast to Lombardy, it has been governed by different coalitions over 
the past three decades. Friuli-Venezia Giulia, located in  the northeast of  the 
country and having a special statute, contributes an extra layer of variation to the 
case selection. The same may be said of Molise, where each constituent province 
is classified as rural. Lastly, Trentino-Alto Adige, another region with a special 
statute, features a unique administrative system, as the only region in which the 
two constituent provinces, Trento and Bolzano, enjoy a special statute and hold 
separate elections. The Autonomous Province of Bolzano has the highest GDP 
per capita in the country and the majority of its population is part of the German-
speaking minority. Overall, therefore, the six regions selected for analysis can be 
deemed representative of the Eurosceptic voting preferences in regional elections.  

In the 2022-2023 subnational elections, centre-right wing coalitions emerged 
victorious  across  the  board,  with  Bolzano  Autonomous  Province  the  only 
exception. These coalitions mainly comprised the hard Eurosceptic parties FDI 
and Lega, alongside the more moderate FI, other minor parties and, with different 
levels of importance, civic lists. These are lists established to participate in local 
elections. In regional elections, these lists are often run in tandem with other 
parties in support of a specific candidate. On the centre and left political spectrum, 
different coalitions were formed for elections. In Lazio and Trento Autonomous 
Province, the main centre-left party, the PD, ran in an alliance with AZ-IV; and 
in Lombardy and Molise, with the M5S, a soft Eurosceptic party. In Sicily, these 
three parties ran independently, as in the national election.  

Map 5 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), Italian subnational elections, 
2022 and 2023 

35 

       
Source: Milieu. For Sicily80 and Molise81, data are taken from the regional website and are provisional. For Friuli-
Venezia Giulia 82 and the Autonomous Provinces of Trento 83 and Bolzano84, results are taken from ad hoc websites 
created by the regional administrations. For Lombardy and Lazio, data come from Eligendo, the electoral portal 
of the Ministry of the Interior85. 

The prevalence of Eurosceptic voting is lower in the selected NUTS 3 regions 
than in the 2022 national elections. The Eurosceptic vote share is above 50% in 
only seven of the 34 provinces. Additionally, an overall decline in Eurosceptic 
voting across the rural NUTS 3 regions is evident when comparing the national 
and  regional elections. Indeed,  while  six  of  the  seven  rural  regions  had  a 
percentage of Eurosceptic voting higher than 50%, this number decreased to two 
out seven in the subnational elections, with only Viterbo and Rieti having a 
Eurosceptic vote share above  50%.  Rieti is  the only NUTS  3  region where 
Eurosceptic voting increased (see Table 8).  

Table 8 ‒ Eurosceptic voting in rural areas in Italy’s national and subnational elections 
Rural NUTS 
3 region 

Hard or soft 
Eurosceptic 
- 
parties 
national  
(%) 

Soft 
Eurosceptic 
- 
parties 
national  
(%) 

Hard 
Eurosceptic 
- 
parties 
subnational  
(%) 

Hard or soft 
Eurosceptic 
- 
parties 
subnational  
(%) 

Soft 
Eurosceptic 
– 
parties 
subnational  
(%) 

Hard 
Eurosceptic 
parties - 
national  
(%) 

Bolzano 

Campobasso 

Isernia  

Mantova 

Rieti 

17.03 

28.74 

31.97 

44.61 

47.06 

20.84 

54.66 

52.05 

52.64 

60.32 

0.21 

25.91 

20.08 

8.02 

13.26 

9.00 

24.91 

24.68 

42.67 

55.81 

Viterbo 

45.35 
Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and regional election data. 

48.33 

12.82 

61.16 

9.70 

32.70 

30.11 

46.99 

61.93 

52.18 

0.70 

7.79 

5.43 

4.32 

6.12 

6.83 

Several reasons could explain this trend. Firstly, regional civic lists supporting 
right-wing candidates may have taken votes away from the FDI and Lega. For 
example, in Molise, the region of Campobasso and Isernia, the centre-right list Il 
Molise che Vogliamo won 9.9% of the vote. In Mantova, the Lombardia Ideale - 
Fontana  Presidente  list,  which  supported the  centre-right  incumbent  Attilio 
Fontana, won 6.7% of the vote. By contrast, in the provinces of Rieti and Viterbo, 
the only rural areas where the Eurosceptic vote was above 50%, the civic list 
supporting the centre-right candidate Francesco Rocca (Lista Civica Francesco 

Liste 

2022 

80 Assessorato Regionale delle Autonomie Locali e della Funzione Pubblica (2022). Elezioni Regionali del 25 
Settembre 
. 
Voti 
- 
http://www.elezioni.regione.sicilia.it/regionali2022/rep_4/votiListeProvinciali.html 
81  Regiona Molise (2023). Elezioni regionali 2023. Dati aggiornati al 30/06/2023 14:29 (Dati Non Ufficiali). 
https://elezioni2023.regione.molise.it 
82  Regione  Autonoma  Friuli-Venezia  Giulia  (2023).  Elezioni  regionali  del  2  e  3  Aprile  2023. 
https://elezioni.regione.fvg.it/consultazioni/ELZ_REG/2023-04-02 
83  Provincia  Autonoma  di  Trento  (2023).  Elezioni  provinciali  22  Ottobre  2023.  https://www.elezioni-
2023.provincia.tn.it./index.html 
84 
https://elezioniprovinciali.provincia.bz.it/it/elected 
85 Eligendo (n.d.). L’Archivio. https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=R 

Provinciali 

provinciali 

Autonoma 

Provincia 

Bolzano 

Elezioni 

(2023). 

2023. 

di 

36 

 
Rocca Presidente) achieved more modest results (3.4% and 3.7%, respectively).  

A second reason for the decline in voting for Eurosceptic parties could be the 
generally poor performance of the M5S in the regional elections, especially in 
Isernia e  Campobasso, where party support fell from 25.91% and 20.08% to 
5.43% and 4.32%, respectively. It may also reflect the party's traditionally weak 
local roots, as some commentators have argued86.  

Another factor explaining this trend could be low voter turnout. These subnational 
elections were characterised by low and decreasing turnout rates, ranging from 
37.2% in  Lazio87  to  71.5%  in Bolzano88 (representing quite an  outlier). The 
elections in Sicily  alone showed increased turnout compared to the previous 
regional  elections,  albeit  remaining  quite  low  (48.6%)89.  Electoral  turnout 
decreased in all  rural territories across the six  regions, with the exception of 
Bolzano, where it increased (from 62.2% to 71.5%). Political scientist Roberto 
d'Alimonte highlights the issue of low turnout in his analysis of the results of the 
Lazio and Lombardia elections90. A poll by Demopolis91 points to dissatisfaction 
and lack of trust in the current parties and candidates as the driving factor for the 
low turnout (51% of  respondents), followed by the predictable victory of the 
centre-right in both regions (40% of respondents). These motivations may have 
discouraged Eurosceptic voters from participating in the local elections. Similar 
factors may also have depressed turnout in the other regions.   

The  Cattaneo Institute  outlines  the rural-urban divide  in  voting  patterns in 
Lombardy92. Smaller towns tend to be more centre-right, while larger cities such 
as  Milan tend to  be  more  centre-left. There are  no  clear  patterns in  Lazio, 
according to the Institute.  

3.3.3 Conclusions 

Regional elections in  2022  and 2023  consistently saw  centre-right coalitions 
emerging  victorious,  except  for  the  unique  case  of  Bolzano.  This  trend 
underscores a prevailing political landscape favouring the centre-right (which 
includes Lega and FDI, both hard Eurosceptic parties). The Eurosceptic vote in 

di 

Area 

(2023). 

Regione 

ITALIA 

Eligendo 

Provincia 

Regionali 

Autonoma 

86 Il Post (2020). Il Movimento 5 Stelle si è incartato. https://www.ilpost.it/2020/01/08/crisi-movimento-5-stelle/  
87 
LAZIO. 
12/02/2023 
https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=R&dtel=12/02/2023&tpa=I&tpe=R&lev0=0&levsut0=0&le
vsut1=1&es0=S&es1=S&ms=S&ne1=12&lev1=12 
88 
https://elezioniprovinciali.provincia.bz.it/it/turnout 
89  Regione Siciliana (2022). Elezioni regionali, in  Sicilia affluenza al 48,62%. Dalle 14 al via allo scrutinio. 
https://www.regione.sicilia.it/la-regione-informa/elezioni-regionali-sicilia-affluenza-al-4862-dalle-14-allo-
scrutinio#:~:text=Per%20le%20elezioni%20regionali%20in,stata%20del%2046%2C75%25   
90  D’Alimonte,  R. 
https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2023/02/17/regionali-2023-lombardia-e-lazio/ 
91  Demopolis (2023). Il  voto alle Regionali in  Lazio e  Lombardia nell’analisi post elettorale di  Demopolis. 
https://www.demopolis.it/?p=10899  
92 Istituto Cattaneo (2023). Elezioni regionali 2023. Cosa dice il recupero della Lega su FDI.  

(2023).  Elezioni  regionali.  Che  cosa  ha  causato  l’astensione  record.  Cise. 

provinciali 

Bolzano 

Elezioni 

(2023). 

2023. 

37 

 
the regional elections was lower than in national elections, but Euroscepticism 
remains more prevalent in rural areas than in intermediate and urban ones. This 
trend may be influenced by various factors. Civic lists might have diverted votes 
from Eurosceptic parties, while dissatisfaction and lack of trust in current parties, 
which drove  down  turnout,  may  have  discouraged Eurosceptic voters  from 
participating, shaping electoral outcomes. Indeed, the subnational elections were 
generally  characterised  by  low  and  declining  turnout rates.  The  significant 
decrease in support for the M5S, specifically in Isernia and Campobasso, might 
also have impacted the Eurosceptic vote. 

3.4  Poland 

The Polish case study compares the 2019 national elections from a rural-urban 
perspective with the most recent 2023 national elections. In an interesting turn of 
events, the 2023  national elections had unprecedented voter turnout, with an 
opposition coalition government formed despite the governing Eurosceptic party 
winning the election. The 2023 national elections show a significant decline in 
support for Eurosceptic parties in Poland. 

3.4.1 National election (2019) 

In Poland’s 2019 national elections, Eurosceptic parties reached a majority vote 
threshold in 84% of predominantly rural regions, compared to 37% and 14% of 
intermediate and predominantly urban regions, respectively. Eurosceptic regions 
were  predominantly  located  in  the  southwestern  half  of  the  country.  The 
Eurosceptic votes went mostly to the soft-coded Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), 
compared to  a  smaller share  of  votes  cast for  the hard-coded Konfederacja 
Wolność i Niepodległość. 

Figure 1: Share of Eurosceptic NUTS 3 regions in Poland’s national elections, by urban-
rural type, 2019 

i

g
n
h
c
a
e
r
e
p
y
t
n
o

i

g
e
r
3
S
T
U
N

f
o
%

t
f
o
s
d
n
a
d
r
a
h
r
o
f
e
r
a
h
s
e
t
o
v
%
0
5

s
e

i
t
r
a
p

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

14 %

1

84 %

37 %

2
Total number of urban regions: 14
Total number of intermeidate regions: 27 
Total number of rural regions: 32

3

Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 

38 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties, Polish national elections, 2019 

Party  

Position on EU integration 

Komitet Wyborczy Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość 
Komitet Wyborczy Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) 

Komitet Wyborczy Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 
Komitet Wyborczy Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 

Koalicyjny Komitet Wyborczy Koalicja Obywatelska PO, N, 
IPL, Zieloni 
Source: Milieu, based on DG REGIO data (2023) and CHES data (2019). 

1.4 
3 

5.1 
6.6 

6.7 

3.4.2 National election (2023) 

The 2023 national elections in Poland took place on 15 October 2023 and showed 
an unprecedented voting turnout of 74.4% (61.7% in 2019). The elections put the 
right-wing populist party, PiS, which had been governing for two consecutive 
terms, in a  difficult position. PiS got 35.38% of  votes in 2023, compared to 
43.59% in 2019. Despite receiving the most votes in the 2023 elections, the 
‘democratic opposition’ parties formed a coalition of the Koalicja Obywatelska93, 
Trzecia Droga94 and Nowa Lewica95 to establish a government. The coalition 
government intends to improve Poland’s relationship with the EU, which has been 
strained in  recent years  due  to  the previous government’s judicial policies, 
resulting in fines and frozen funds. 

The lower house of the Polish parliament, Sejm, has 460 deputies and requires a 
231 majority.  

Table 10 ‒ Poland’s national election results, 2023 

Name of the committee 

Komitet Wyborczy PiS 

Koalicyjny Komitet Wyborczy Koalicja 
Obywatelska PO, N, IPL, Zieloni 

Koalicyjny Komitet Wyborczy Trzecia Droga 
Polska 2050 Szymona Hołowni, Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe 

Komitet Wyborczy Nowa Lewica 

Komitet Wyborczy Konfederacja Wolność i 
Niepodległość 

Percentage of 
votes 

Number of 
mandates 

Position on EU 
integration in 2019 

35.4% 

30.7% 

14.4% 

8.6% 

7.2% 

194 

157 

65 

26 

18 

3.0 

6.7 

New party (part of 
the alliance, Polskie 
Stronnictwo Ludowe, 
scored 5.1) 

6.6 

1.4 

Source: CASE, based on National Electoral Commission. 

During Poland’s 2023 national elections, Eurosceptic parties achieved a majority 
vote threshold in 63% of mainly rural regions, compared to 19% of intermediate 

93 Koalicja Obywatelska is a coalition of Koalicja Obywatelska PO, N, IPL, Zieloni. 
94 Trzecia Droga is a coalition of Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe and Polska 2050. 
95 Nowa Lewica is a coalition of Nowa Lewica, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna, Unia Pracy and Razem. 

39 

 
 
regions and none of the predominantly urban regions. The Eurosceptic regions 
were mainly located in the eastern part of the country (Podlaskie, Podkarpackie 
and  Lubelskie  Voivodeships).  Similar  to  2019,  the  majority  of  votes  for 
Eurosceptic parties were cast for the soft-coded PiS, with a smaller share of votes 
going to the hard-coded party Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość. In 2023, 
the decline in  Euroscepticism support in  the predominantly rural  regions is 
evident, falling to 63% from 84% in 2019.  

Map 6 ‒ Vote share for Eurosceptic parties (hard and soft), Polish national elections, 
2023 

Source: Milieu and CASE, based on National Electoral Commission. 

This decline is closely linked to the overall decrease in support for the ruling soft 
Eurosceptic party, PiS, in all 32 primarily rural regions (-8.4%, on average). The 
most notable declines in support for PiS were observed in the Nowotarski region 
(-14.1%),  and  the  Nowosądecki  region  (-13.3%),  both  in  Małopolskie 
Voivodeship. Nonetheless, 20  of  the 32  predominantly rural  regions  saw  a 
majority of votes going to hard or soft Eurosceptic parties. 

The hard Eurosceptic party, Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość, experienced 
a rise in support in most of the 32 rural regions, with only three regions recording 
no change compared to the previous election. On average, party support increased 
by 1.3%. The Łomżyński and Suwalski regions, both in Podlaskie Voivodeships, 
saw the highest increase in support for the hard Eurosceptic party, at 4.1% and 
3.1%, respectively.  

40 

 
                                                     
 
 
 
 
Table 11 ‒ Support for Eurosceptic parties, 2019 and 2023  

NUTS 3 region 

Hard Eurosceptic party 
(Konfederacja Wolność 
i Niepodległość) 

Soft  Eurosceptic party 
(PiS)   

Predominantly urban 

Intermediate 

Predominantly rural 

-0.5% 

+0.3% 

+1.3% 

Source: CASE, based on National Electoral Commission. 

-7% 

-6.5% 

-8.4% 

Hard 
Eurosceptic parties 

and 

soft 

-7.6% 

-6.2% 

-7.1% 

A  2023  study  commissioned  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture  and  Rural 
Development found that if a referendum were held on Poland’s EU membership, 
57.5% of citizens residing in rural areas would vote in favour of remaining in the 
EU, while 10.9% would vote against it. Of the respondents, 11% would abstain 
from voting, and 20.6% were uncertain about their stance96. Compared to the 2021 
and 2022 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development polls, the tendency to 
remain part of the EU is stable, while those opposing are in decline.  

The PiS  party’s stronghold in rural areas has been challenged by  a  series of 
controversial decisions by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in 
recent years. In 2020, the current government tried to enforce a  new piece of 
legislation, ‘Five for Animals’, to prohibit fur farming, ban the use of animals for 
entertainment purposes, or limit ritual slaughter for religious purposes as a step 
towards implementing the CAP, which includes animal welfare standards97. This 
has led to massive protests by Polish farmers, who felt themselves portrayed as 
backward, greedy,  and  cruel, resulting in  the  PiS  abandoning the  proposed 
legislation. 

In 2023, farmers in Poland expressed their frustration over the 30-50% decrease 
in domestic grain prices, linked to an influx of grain from war-torn Ukraine98. 
Although the EU has placed a temporary embargo on Ukrainian grain import on 
five Ukrainian neighbours, including Poland, the situation forced farmers to sell 
the grain below value or store it for another season. The embargo was lifted in 
September 2023, just before the elections, and was portrayed by the ruling party 

96 Market Research World (2023). Polska wieś i rolnictwo 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/arimr/jak-
rolnicy-oceniaja-arimr--raport-za-2023-rok-opublikowany  
97 Michalski, B. (2020). Piątka dla zwierząt”. Ustawa dobra, ale. … GazetaPrawna.pl, 17 September 
2020. https://prawo.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/1491087,piatka-dla-zwierzat-ochrona-zwierzat-uboj-
rytualny-cyrki.html 
98 Bartkiewicz, A. (2023). Kosiniak-Kamysz o poparciu wsi dla PiS: Jest 41ise gospodarna I socjalna. 
Rzeczpospolita, 14 April 2023. https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art38318581-kosiniak-kamysz-o-poparciu-
wsi-dla-pis-jest-wies-gospodarna-i-socjalna; Kowalczyk, G. (2023). Te wybory rozstrzygną się na wsi. 
‘PiS nie czuje się już tak mocny’. Business Insider, 3 August 2023 
https://businessinsider.com.pl/gospodarka/te-wybory-rozstrzygna-sie-na-wsi-pis-nie-czuje-sie-juz-tak-
mocny/tsypc8q 

41 

 
as  an  EU  decision  harming  Polish  farmers99.  The  Ministry  of  Economic 
Development and Technology implemented a  local legal act to ban the grains 
import, yet transit remains legal100. 

While Euroscepticism and populism in the west of Europe tend to consolidate 
around market liberalism and currency integration, in eastern Europe, right-wing 
populists often reinforce the narrative of  ‘national sovereignty’, particularly, 
national identity and culture, threatened by the supposed ‘imperialist nature’ of 
the EU101. This was evident during recent election campaigning in Poland. The 
president of the PiS party spoke in Przysuchy village about folk culture as an 
imperative  part  of  the  national  culture102.  The  opposition  leader,  a  former 
president of the Council of Europe, was portrayed as having German descent and 
being driven by  the German and the EU  agenda, rather than Polish national 
interest103.  

The hard-coded party Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość appeals to those in 
the rural regions who are strongly discontent with the EU’s agricultural policy 
and the agrarian politics of the PiS. Konfederacja Wolność i  Niepodległość is 
strongly opposed to any animal rights-related EU policies104. Politicians from 
Konfederacja Wolność i  Niepodległość were present during farmers’ protests 
against Ukrainian grain imports and were received favourably by protesters105. Its 
position  was  also  consistent with  the  party’s  general  anti-Ukrainian stance 
throughout  the  electoral  campaign.  However,  Konfederacja  Wolność  i 
Niepodległość did not take all of the vote share lost by PiS; other parties, such as 

and 

2023. 

Poland. 

Society, 

European 

rolnictwa. 

99 Money.pl. (2023). Zakaz importu zboża z Ukrainy. Jest decyzja KE. www.money.pl, 15 September 
2023. https://www.money.pl/gospodarka/zakaz-importu-zboza-z-ukrainy-jest-decyzja-ke-
6941769280412352a.html 
100 Żaczkiewicz-Zborska, K. (2023). Już obowiązuje nowe embargo na zboże z Ukrainy. Prawo.pl, 19 
https://www.prawo.pl/biznes/obowiazuje-nowe-embargo-na-zboze-z-
September 
ukrainy,523113.html  
101 Csehi, R. and Zgut, E. (2020). ‘We won’t let Brussels dictate us’: Eurosceptic populism in Hungary 
and 
53–68. 
Politics 
https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2020.1717064  
102 PolskieRadio24.pl. (2023). Jarosław Kaczyński: Pis jest partią polskiej wsi. nie pozwolimy zrujnować 
polskiego 
2023. 
https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/artykul/3257599,jaroslaw-kaczynski-pis-jest-partia-polskiej-wsi-nie-
pozwolimy-zrujnowac-polskiego-rolnictwa   
103  PolskieRadio24.pl.  (2023).  Konferencja  PiS.  Poręba:  dlaczego  Tusk  brzmi  po  niemiecku? 
PolskieRadio24.pl, 22 March 2023. https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/artykul/3138655,konferencja-pis-
poreba-dlaczego-tusk-brzmi-po-niemiecku  
104 GazetaPrawna.Pl. (2021). Konfederacja: Jeśli zostanie wprowadzony zakaz  chowu klatkowego, to 
nasze 
2021. 
wykończone. 
https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/kraj/artykuly/8202494,konfederacja-zakaz-chowu-
klatkowego-rolnictwo.html  
105 Gmiterek-Zabłocka (2023). Konfederacja kusi rolników. ‘W PiS widać  marazm, a ci przynajmniej 
obiecują’. TOK  FM, 6 April 2023. https://www.tokfm.pl/Tokfm/7,189654,29635696,wieslaw-gryn-z-
oszukanej-wsi-wielu-rolnikow-jest-za-konfederacja.html  

PolskieRadio24.pl, 

GazetaPrawna.pl, 

rolnictwo 

zostanie 

October 

22(1), 

July 

9 

2 

42 

 
Christian democratic party, Trzecia Droga, also gained support106. 

The 2023 elections highlighted the importance of votes from rural regions due to 
the potential threat to the ruling PiS. Rural regions were more likely to elect 
mandates from the ruling party, as two-thirds of rural area voters had voted in 
favour of the PiS during the 2019 elections. The -8.4% decline in support for the 
PiS party in the predominantly rural regions eventually led to fewer mandates 
from previously secure areas. Key issues linked to EU and national agricultural 
policies have been identified as drivers of  this decline in support across rural 
areas.  

3.4.3 Conclusions  

The 2023 national elections in the rural regions of Poland saw a decline in support 
for the soft-Eurosceptic ruling party PiS by an average of -8.4%, as well as an 
increase  in  support  for  the hard-Eurosceptic party  Konfederacja Wolność  i 
Niepodległość by an average of 1.3%. PiS supporters did not shift entirely to 
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość; some also moved towards the Christian 
democratic party, Trzecia Droga. 

Rural areas were key to the ruling party PiS, and such a significant decline in 
supporters  had  a  profound  impact  on  the  election  outcome.  Support  for 
Eurosceptic parties decreased by  an average of  -7,1% in predominantly rural 
regions. However, some of their more extreme opponents might radicalise due to 
a  crisis among Polish farmers, which is associated with EU agrarian policies. 
Declines in  votes  for  the ruling party  in  2023  in  rural  areas  reflect Polish 
agricultural politics, which is closely linked to EU policies. However, the support 
for EU membership among the rural population remains stable, with over 50% 
strongly in favour and only 11% strongly opposed107. 

3.5  Slovakia 

3.5.1 National election (2020) 

No Slovakian NUTS 3 region reached a majority (50%) vote share in the 2020 
national elections. However, lowering the threshold, Eurosceptic parties  just 
surpassed  a  25%  vote  share  in  three  regions:  Trenčiansky  kraj  (27%, 
intermediate), Žilinský kraj (26%, intermediate) and Banskobystrický kraj (26%, 
predominantly rural). In all three cases, vote shares were equally split between 
hard-coded Eurosceptic parties (Vlast; Ludova strana Nase Slovensko) and soft-

2023. 

106  TVN24  (2023). Opozycja  zmobilizowała niegłosujących. Na  PiS głosował  żelazny  elektorat. 15 
https://tvn24.pl/wybory-parlamentarne-2023/wybory-parlamentarne-2023-jak-
October 
glosowali-wyborcy-poszczegolnych-komitetow-z-2019-roku-7392891  
107 Market Research  World. (2023). Polska wieś  i rolnictwo 2023. https://www.gov.pl/web/arimr/jak-
rolnicy-oceniaja-arimr--raport-za-2023-rok-opublikowany  

43 

 
coded parties (Slovenska narodna strana; Sme Rodina - Boris Kollar). 

Following the 2020  elections, a  substantial shift occurred, with the previous 
governmental parties unable to establish a government and ultimately finding 
themselves in  opposition. A  new  and highly significant party, HLAS-Social 
Democracy  (HLAS-SD),  emerged  through  the  splintering  of  the  formerly 
influential  governmental  party,  SMER-Social  Democracy  (SMER-SD).  The 
SMER-SD party began to embrace increasingly anti-European stances on diverse 
issues, such as  vaccination, environmental protection, and  migration policy, 
gradually evolving into a Eurosceptic party. It changed its name from SMER-SD 
to SMER - Slovak Social Democracy (SMER-SSD), signalling a shift towards 
Slovakia and away from the EU. Within the far-right spectrum of political parties, 
the former leader also experienced a split, giving rise to a new nationalist and 
strong Eurosceptic party, REPUBLIKA. Table 12 presents the new picture of 
Euroscepticism, grounded in the definitions of party Euroscepticism outlined by 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002). Parties recognised as soft or hard Eurosceptics 
are marked with 1, and non-Eurosceptics are marked with 0.  

Table 12 ‒ Euroscepticism of political parties in Slovakian national elections 2020 and 
2023, and 2022 subnational elections 

Party name   

Position on EU integration 
(2020 elections) 

Authors’ expert judgement 
(2022 and 2023 elections) 

Vlast  

Ludova strana Nase Slovensko  

Slovenska narodna strana S 

Sme Rodina - Boris Kollar  

Sloboda a Solidarita 

Obycajni Ludia a Nezavisle Osobnosti 

Krestanskodemokraticke hnutie 

Smer - socialna demokracia (SMER-SD) 

DV  

MKO  

ZA LUDI  

MOST-HID  

Spolu - obcianska demokracia  

REPUBLIKA 

HLAS – SD 

Progresívne Slovensko 

ALIANCIA - Maďari. Národnosti. 
Regióny 

Demokrati 

1 

1.3 

3.1 

3.1  

4.1 

4.8 

5.2 

5.2 

6 

6.1 

6.5 

6.7 

6.9 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

1 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

1 

- 

- 

0 

0 

- 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Source: CASE, based on DG REGIO data (2023), CHES data (2019), Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002). 
Note: Parties in table received 98.7% of votes in the national elections of 2023; ‘–‘ indicates parties that did not 
participate in the given election.  

44 

Interestingly, the most recent national election outcomes in  2023  indicate a 
significant increase in Euroscepticism. Two main factors may explain this sudden 
rise:  1)  the influence of  Russian propaganda, which is  particularly potent in 
Slovakia108’  and  2)  the populism of  some  parties, which elevated  the anti-
European movement as an election issue. This was evident in the 2023 exit polls, 
where 17% of respondents voted for SMER-SSD because they believed it would 
protect national interests. In addition, 7% of votes for HLAS-SD and 8% for KDH 
stemmed from the same reasoning. The remainder of the political parties elected 
to parliament (typically pro-European) achieved 1% or less of their vote shares 
based on protection of national interests reasoning.   

Table 13 – Eurosceptic vote shares, Slovakian national elections  

NUTS 3 Region 

Urban-rural type 

Share of Eurosceptic 
votes (2020) 

Share of Eurosceptic 
votes (2023) 

Bratislavsky 

Kosický 

Nitrianský 

Trenčiansky 

Žilinský 

Predominantly urban 

Intermediate 

Intermediate 

Intermediate 

Intermediate 

Banskobystrický  

Prešovský 

Predominantly rural 

Predominantly rural 

15.6% 

21.9% 

21.0% 

26.5% 

26.5% 

25.6% 

24.1% 

28.9% 

34.6% 

37.7% 

46.4% 

43.2% 

39.6% 

36.6% 

Trnavský 

34.6% 
Source: Milieu and CASE, based on Slovak Statistical Office (SSO) data and DG REGIO data (2023). 

Predominantly rural 

18.4% 

Further developments are  uncertain, however, as  some of  the votes cast  for 
Eurosceptic parties were protest votes against the previous government, rather 
than squarely rooted in Euroscepticism. This artificially overestimates the level 
of  Euroscepticism.  In  addition,  the  HLAS-SD,  as  a  member  of  the  new 
governmental coalition, ensured that the new government’s programme statement 
stated that the pro-European orientation of the country will continue. On the other 
hand, the same document mentions the introduction of ‘the concept of a sovereign 
Slovak foreign policy while fully respecting the Slovak Republic's membership 
in the European Union’109. This creates some ambiguity about a future increase in 
Euroscepticism and  underscores the importance of  Eurosceptic votes for  the 
implementation of Eurosceptic policies. 

108 Beňo, M. (2023). News digest: New Globsec survey confirms Slovak affinity for Russian propaganda. The 
Slovak Spectator, 31 May 2023. https://spectator.sme.sk/c/23176148/news-digest-new-globsec-survey-confirms-
slovak-affinity-for-russian-propaganda.html 
109 Vláda Slovenskej republiky (2023). Programové Vyhlásenie Vlády Slovenskej Republiky 2023 – 2027. Lepšie, 
Pokojnejšie A Bezpečnejšie Žiť. 
https://rokovania.gov.sk/download.dat?id=7B1CACA32A9047C2BA213ABA2CA73F0D-
CDB47A73EBABAA5AD10EEC58538A591F 

45 

 
3.5.2 Subnational elections (2022) 

The  Slovakian  subnational  elections  of  2022  were  distinctive  in  that  they 
encompassed both regional elections (eight self-governing regions at NUTS 3 
level)  and  elections  for  the  administration  of  municipalities  (2,928  local 
administrative units (LAU2)110). As the regional (NUTS 3) divisions in Slovakia 
are geographically vast, this case study includes the results of local municipal 
elections into aggregate voting outcomes to allow a more granular insight into 
how local and rural-urban voting patterns intersect. There were four different 
subnational elections: elections for the chair of the self-governing region and a 
separate vote for members of the self-governing region council, with a similar 
division for the election of the mayor of the municipality and members of the 
municipality councils. 

The  predominance of  Eurosceptic parties  was  primarily concentrated in  the 
central and eastern regions of  Slovakia. The three regions of  interest in the 
analysis of the 2020 national election demonstrated relatively consistent shares of 
Eurosceptic votes in the 2022 subnational elections. From the regional elections 
point of view, Trenčiansky kraj attained an even larger share of Eurosceptic votes 
in the regional elections, at 42%. However, the other two regions of interest, 
Žilinský kraj and Banskobystrický kraj achieved comparatively lower shares, at 
21% and 19%, respectively. Similar shares of votes for Eurosceptic parties were 
attained in Košický kraj. In contrast, the Bratislavský kraj and Trnavský kraj – the 
most economically developed regions – recorded the lowest shares of Eurosceptic 
votes in  the regional elections. At municipal election level, similar shares of 
Eurosceptic votes were obtained in all three regions of interest, ranging from 23% 
to 26%. However, even more pronounced results were achieved in the eastern part 
of country, in Prešovsky kraj (30%) and Košický kraj (27%). These differences 
were mainly driven by the type of election victory in regions or municipalities: 
the Trenčiansky kraj at regional level, as well as Prešovský and Košický kraj at 
municipal level, had landslide victories, while in others the winners of elections 
were determined by small margins. 

110 Eurostat maintains a system of local administrative units (LAUs), which are the building blocks of the NUTS. 
Level  2  LAUs  consist  of  municipalities  or  equivalent  units 
the  27  EU  Member  States. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/local-administrative-units  

in 

46 

 
 
 
 
 
Map 7 ‒ Eurosceptic vote shares (hard and soft), Slovakian subnational elections, 2022 

Source: CASE, based on SSO data. 

The  main distinction between  the  subnational  and  national  elections is  the 
reversed logic of  the voting system. In Slovak national elections, the primary 
choice revolves around the party, followed by individual candidates. Conversely, 
in subnational elections, citizens are primarily running for positions, with the 
backing of political parties. Citizens also have the option to run for office in local 
or regional elections as independent candidates with no affiliation to a political 
party, with such candidates garnering more than 37% of votes in the subnational 
elections. In national elections, by contrast, citizens cannot run for office without 
being part of the candidate list of a political party. 

The data used for the analysis were gathered by the SSO, which is responsible for 
calculating results for both the candidates111 and parties112. As candidates were 
frequently  supported  by  a  coalition  of  parties,  the  analysis  considered the 
candidate Eurosceptic if the majority of those parties were Eurosceptic. In the 
subnational elections, there is no threshold limiting the parties' involvement and 
almost 50 parties supported the candidates. This is almost double the number of 
parties running for national election in 2023.     

Despite the distinct nature of  the national and  subnational elections, certain 
conclusions can be drawn. The trends observed in the 2020 national elections were 
mirrored in the 2022 subnational elections. Notwithstanding the limitations posed 
by  the  differing  voting  logic,  it  can  be  concluded  that  stated  support  for 
Eurosceptic parties slightly decreased in  the subnational elections. This  was 
partially due to the fact that more than one-third of votes were given to formally 
independent candidates. Looking solely at candidates supported by parties, the 
share for Euroscepts was actually higher in the regions of interest. Nevertheless, 
the 2020 distribution of Eurosceptic votes across regions persisted in 2022. The 
outcomes of the 2023 national election showed a significant surge in support for 

111 Elections to bodies of self‑governing regions 2022. https://volby.statistics.sk/osk/osk2022/en/index.html 
Elections to bodies of communal self‑government 2022. https://volby.statistics.sk/oso/oso2022/en/index.html 
112 National elections 2023. https://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/nrsr2023/en/vysledky_hlasovania_strany.html 

47 

 
 
Eurosceptic parties across all regions. The three regions of interest registered the 
highest proportion of Eurosceptic votes in both the 2022 subnational and 2023 
national elections. 

Banskobystrický kraj is a rural area facing structural economic challenges. The 
absence of infrastructure investment and limited job opportunities compel people 
to migrate from the region, often relocating to the capital, Bratislava, or other 
cities in the western part of the country. In the past, the self-governing region was 
led by far-right neo-Nazi politician Marián Kotleba, whose tenure halted access 
to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds)113, fuelling further 
support for Eurosceptic parties in the region.  

The other two regions of interest (Trenčiansky kraj and Žilinský kraj) are the 
centre of  the  manufacturing sector,  transforming  from  agriculture to  heavy 
industry pre-1989. Locals tend to attribute a lot of the successes in the regions to 
strong state intervention in the economy during that time. These regions are now 
in a development trap, as their convergence with the EU average has slowed; they 
are also growing at a much slower pace than in the first two decades of the 21st 
century. Paradoxically, these regions rely heavily on exporting the goods they 
produce (automotive parts), but prefer to vote for parties that are, in some areas, 
Eurosceptical. 

The  three  regions  of  interest  have  maintained  their  position  as  leaders  in 
Euroscepticism. Key factors influencing the level of Euroscepticism are: 

•  Shift of winning party SMER-SSD to a Eurosceptic party during its term in 

opposition (2020-2023);  

•  Lasting structural problems in some rural areas (‘hunger valleys’); 
•  Development trap of intermediate regions, as they fail to sustain the recent 

pace of growth in development; 

•  Tradition  of  strong  government  interference  in  past  development  of 

intermediate regions (rosy retrospection). 

It  can  be  expected that the  national development in  Euroscepticism will  be 
mirrored regionally. The failure to address longstanding issues in specific regions 
may influence that proportion, but the primary factor shaping attitudes toward the 
EU will be determined at national level. 

3.5.3 Conclusions 

Success in local elections does not automatically translate into national election 
outcomes. Some parties that were successful in regional elections were unable to 

113 Krbatová, L. (2015). Kotleba nečerpá eurofondy, vláda mu zoberie právomoci. Pravda, 25 February 2015. 
https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/346835-kotleba-mari-cerpanie-eurofondov-fico-zvazuje-ze-mu-vezme-
pravomoci/ 

48 

 
secure seats in  the national parliament. Additionally, the number of  political 
parties participating in subnational elections (almost 50) is double that of parties 
running in the national election (25 parties). Arguably, regional elections are seen 
as less significant than national elections. This is evident in voter turnout, which 
is below 50% in regional elections, while national elections typically attract two-
thirds of  eligible  voters. The narrative of  national elections revolves around 
fundamental choices for the future development of the entire country and policy-
setting,  while  regional  elections  are  perceived  as  decisions  about  policy 
implementers at  local  level,  with limited  options for  decision-making. This 
implies lower relevance of Eurosceptic votes at regional level. 

49 

 
4.  Main conclusions and the way forward 

This study investigated the growing tendency towards Eurosceptic and anti-EU 
voting in rural areas. It was mainly data driven, looking at voting patterns in recent 
national and subnational elections within EU regions. The findings were diverse 
across the Member States, reflecting varying national contexts. Country case 
studies explored results at subnational level and considered possible drivers of 
anti-EU voting within specific rural areas. The key findings and takeaways are 
presented below, followed by some considerations of the way forward, in light of 
ongoing efforts to better align EU policies with the reality in rural areas. 

This issue is particularly important in a  year of elections with the potential to 
reshape the EU. Accordingly, a  series  of  questions for  further reflection and 
debate aim to explore the reasons for the growth in anti-EU sentiment in some 
rural  areas  and  possible  actions  to  prevent political  parties  and  their  rural 
supporters from turning away from the EU as a solution to their problems. 

4.1  Key findings and takeaways 

Eurosceptic parties with anti-EU platforms can be found across the political 
spectrum, from right  to  left, conservative to  the  more  social democratic.  
Euroscepticism emerges as a  reaction to discontent with policies or  practices 
associated  with  the  EU,  rather  than  with  a  certain  political  ideology. 
Euroscepticism manifests itself in  different ways  across  the Member States, 
depending on history, culture, geography and socioeconomic conditions. The 
distinction between ‘hard’ Euroscepticism (parties that explicitly support national 
withdrawal  from  the  EU  or  policies  opposing  the  EU  project)  and  ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism (parties that are hesitant towards further European integration in 
specific policy areas) recognises key differences across the EU. 

The data analysed here show that electoral support for Eurosceptic parties 
is more likely to come from rural, rather than urban or intermediate areas. 
However, very different patterns emerge across the  Member States. This 
finding was previously identified in the literature and was validated by the results 
of  recent  elections across  the EU,  as  well  as  subnational elections in  four 
countries. The case studies identified several drivers of Eurosceptic voting at local 
level. These included limited economic opportunities and stagnant economic 
development  (echoing DG  REGIO’s  development  trap  thesis),  demographic 
challenges, high external migration, lower education and disinformation, and the 
appeal of nationalist agendas in times of crisis and uncertainty. 

In countries where Eurosceptic voting is common, voters in rural areas are 

51 

 
more likely to support and drive the Eurosceptic majorities. This pattern is 
evident in Hungary, Poland and Italy in particular. In key national elections, anti-
EU rhetoric has succeeded in echoing the concerns and priorities of rural voters.  

Eurosceptic voting can start at the subnational level and then gain wider 
national attention and support. This case is best illustrated by Germany, where 
the AfD has recently gained popularity among rural voters throughout the country, 
despite having historically enjoyed success only in the eastern part of the country. 
Similar patterns have the potential to unfold in Portugal, Croatia, Spain, Latvia 
and Estonia, where recent national elections identified individual rural regions as 
‘outlier’ supporters of Eurosceptic parties (see Map 2). 

The importance of subnational elections should not be overlooked. Previous 
studies looked at national elections, but while elections at subnational level may 
be  challenging to analyse due to their structure (particularly the presence of 
candidate lists), and the diverse levels of competence of local and regional elected 
bodies or officials, they nevertheless have the potential to drive Eurosceptic party 
consolidation of disaffected voters, very often in rural areas. In addition, where 
subnational entities have legislative powers, these elections have more potential 
to directly influence EU policies through the European Council. 

Existing political parties have the potential to alter their platforms, policy 
positions, ideological stance  and  priorities  in  response  to  evolving  voter 
preferences, including discontent within rural areas. Some political parties 
will naturally seek to capitalise on existing discontent for popular support and 
electoral gains. This was evident in Slovakia, where a formerly moderate, centrist 
party already in power (SMER-SD) shifted to adopt an anti-EU stance in response 
to discontent within primarily rural areas (SMER-SSD). Where a party already 
has mainstream voter support, this can lead to a  rapid shift in national policy 
platforms. 

Some EU policies have inevitable disproportionate impacts on rural areas, 
driving discontent and giving governments the opportunity to blame difficult 
decisions on the EU. Rural areas frequently depend on agriculture and the CAP 
has  gone  through a  series  of  important revisions in  recent years,  linked to 
environmental  and  other  challenges.  Changes  to  rules  on  animal  welfare 
stemming from the Farm to Fork Strategy under the European Green Deal and 
trade  agreements  with  third  countries  also  created  complications  for  rural 
livelihoods. As seen in the France and Poland case studies, these policies can 
create socioeconomic, cultural and other challenges for rural areas, which can then 
be  linked  to  Eurosceptic voting patterns. Without clear  communication and 
remedies, it is natural for disaffected populations to view the EU as the source of 
their  problems  and  respond  to  anti-EU messaging  by  political  parties  and 
candidates.  

52 

4.2  The way forward 

Concerns about rural areas being left behind to deal with their unique social, 
cultural  and  economic  challenges  are  not  new,  and  several  important  EU 
initiatives  seek  to  mitigate  these  persisting  patterns  of  discontent.  The 
Commission’s long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas 2040 provides a roadmap 
for  addressing social  and  economic challenges  in  rural  regions,  preventing 
isolation and strengthening employment, digital connectivity, demography and 
development. The 2040 vision includes a Rural Pact to engage national, regional 
and  local  authorities  in  addressing unmet rural  needs. Increasing  synergies 
between national, regional and territorial governance actors through a strategic 
framework will provide the opportunity for all stakeholders to adapt actions to the 
needs and requirements of rural areas, translating EU initiatives into targeted and 
integrated  support  to  those  areas  facing  structural  economic,  social  or 
demographic risks. One element is to include EU instruments that already provide 
key sources of support to rural areas, such as the CAP or Cohesion Policy funding.    

The CoR’s Logroño Declaration (2023) highlights the need to address the long-
term structural challenges faced by rural areas and points to several tools for better 
targeted  policy  action.  These  include  better  quantitative  monitoring  of 
vulnerabilities  in  rural  areas,  taking  a  ‘rural-proofing’  approach  in  the 
development of EU policies, and placing rural areas at the forefront of the digital 
transition to increase their attractiveness to businesses, bridging the rural-urban 
digital divide to support education and connectivity. In line with the findings of 
this  study,  policy  priorities  include  improving  counterstrategies  to  online 
disinformation and a stronger role for citizens’ dialogues in the decision-making 
process to ensure greater alignment and synergy between institutional policy-
making, local needs and voter outlook. Such initiatives should be aligned with the 
Commission’s pledge to strengthen the participation of citizens and civil society 
organisations  in  policy-making,  as  per  the  recently  proposed  Defence  of 
Democracy package. 

The  findings  of  this study  validate  the concerns expressed  in  the  ongoing 
initiatives and  underscore their urgency, particularly in  a  year  of  important 
elections at EU, national and subnational level. For the CoR and its members, the 
findings and key conclusions, some of which directly relate to the current EU-
wide protests, provide an opportunity to debate some critical questions about the 
rural  dimensions  of  Eurosceptic  and  anti-EU  sentiment,  its  origins  and 
consequences, which impact not only the well-being of the EU’s citizens, but the 
values and future of the EU itself. 

53 

 
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62 

Annex A 

Table 14 – Summary statistics: Population size, NUTS 3 areas, and number of Eurosceptic parties by Member State  

Member 
State 

Population 
(2023) 

Voter turnout 
(total valid 
votes, as a 
percentage of 
the 
electorate) 

Number of 
NUTS 3 
regions (2021 
coding) 

Number 
of urban 
NUTS 3 

Number of 
intermedia
te NUTS 3 

Numbe
r of 
rural 
NUTS 
3 

Year of 
national 
election 

Total 
number 
of 
parties 

Numbe
r of 
hard 
parties 

Numbe
r of 
soft 
parties 

AT 

BE 

BG 

CY 

CZ 

DE 

9,104,772 

11,754,004 

6,447,710 

920,701 

10,827,529 

5,932,654 

DK 

84,358,845 

EE 

EL 

ES 

FI 

1,365,884 

10,394,055 

48,059,777 

5,563,970 

75.0 

82.4 

34.2 

64.1 

64.7 

75.6 

83.6 

59.9 

55.0 

63.0 

65.9 

35 

44 

28 

1 

14 

4 

13 

1 

0 

2 

7 

19 

20 

1 

8 

24 

12 

7 

0 

4 

401 

95 

196 

110 

11 

5 

52 

59 

19 

4 

3 

29 

10 

12 

5 

0 

15 

32 

6 

2 

2 

8 

17 

1 

63 

2019 

2019 

2022 

2021 

2021 

2021 

2019 

2019 

2019 

2019 

2019 

5 

20 

28 

10 

8 

10 

11 

6 

8 

17 

8 

1 

1 

5 

0 

3 

1 

4 

1 

4 

0 

1 

0 

4 

0 

1 

1 

0 

0 

0 

0 

1 

0 

FR 

HR 

HU 

IE 

IT 

LT 

LU 

LV 

MT 

NL 

PL 

PT 

68,070,697 

3,850,894 

9,597,085 

5,194,336 

58,850,717 

2,857,279 

660,809 

1,883,008 

542,051 

17,811,291 

36,753,736 

10,467,366 

RO 

19,051,562 

SE 

SI 

SK 

10,521,556 

2,116,792 

5,428,792 

47.7 

43.9 

68.6 

62.6 

60.5 

43.9 

83.2 

60.4 

84.1 

78.8 

59.4 

54.1 

30.5 

80.9 

69.2 

65.1 

101 

15 

21 

20 

8 

107 

10 

1 

6 

2 

40 

73 

25 

42 

21 

12 

8 

1 

1 

1 

30 

1 

0 

1 

2 

22 

14 

3 

2 

2 

0 

1 

33 

7 

13 

1 

56 

7 

1 

3 

0 

17 

27 

6 

12 

14 

3 

4 

53 

13 

6 

6 

21 

2 

0 

2 

0 

1 

32 

16 

28 

5 

9 

3 

2022 

2020 

2022 

2020 

2022 

2020 

2018 

2022 

2022 

2021 

2019 

2022 

2020 

2022 

2022 

2020 

6 

16 

4 

9 

10 

10 

10 

13 

2 

13 

5 

10 

7 

8 

21 

13 

1 

2 

1 

1 

3 

0 

0 

2 

0 

2 

1 

1 

0 

1 

3 

2 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

0 

2 

1 

0 

3 

1 

1 

1 

1 

2 

2 

Source: Milieu, based on Eurostat and DG REGIO study data (based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and DG 
REGIO data collection 

64 

Annex B  

Table 15 – Timeline of selected national and subnational elections for case studies 

France 

Germany 

Italy 

Poland 

Slovakia 

2019 

- 

State parliamentary 
election (Saxony, 
Thuringia) 
- 

National 
parliamentary 
election 
- 

2023 

- 

State parliamentary 
election (Hessen) 

Regional elections 
(Lombardia, Lazio, 
Friuli Venezia-
Giulia, Molise, 
Trentino-Alto Adige) 

National 
parliamentary 
election 
Regional elections 
(all regions) and 
municipal 
administrations 

2020 

2021 

2022 

- 

- 

- 

- 

National 
parliamentary 
election 

Regional elections 
(all administrative 
regions) 
Federal parliamentary 
election 

National 
parliamentary 
election 
- 

National 
parliamentary 
election 
Regional elections 
(Sicily) 
- 

- 

- 

- 

- 

65 

 
 
 
EN

ISBN 978-92-895-3052-1 
doi:10.2863/87913

QG-02-24-120-EN-N

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