Case C-111/24 P: Appeal brought on 8 February 2024 by German Khan against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2023 in Case T-333/22, Khan v Council
Date: 2024-02-08
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: EU restrictive measure, Russo-Ukrainian issue, economic sanctions, entrepreneur, international sanctions, natural person, ownership, principle of legal certainty, right to an effective remedy, right to justice








C_202402597EN.000101.fmx.xml












Official Journal of the European Union


EN
C series













C/2024/2597


22.4.2024






Appeal brought on 8 February 2024 by German Khan against the judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) delivered on 29 November 2023 in Case T-333/22, Khan v Council


(Case C-111/24 P)

(C/2024/2597)
Language of the case: French

Parties


Appellant: German Khan (represented by: T. Marembert and A. Bass)

Other party to the proceedings: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:






—


set aside the judgment of the General Court of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T-333/22);










—

accordingly, dispose of the action on the merits and:





—


set aside Council Decision2022/429 of 15 March 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns the appellant;










—


set aside Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/427 of 15 March 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns the appellant;










—


set aside Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 pf 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns the appellant;










—


set aside Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, in so far as it concerns the appellant.














—


in the alternative, set aside the judgment of the General Court of 29 November 2023, Khan v Council (T-333/22) and refer the case back to the General Court;










—


in any event, order the Council to pay the costs.





Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of its appeal, the appellant puts forward eight pleas in law:
The first plea alleges an infringement of Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, an infringement of essential procedural requirements and of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice by insufficient reasoning. The judgment under appeal infringes the right to an effective remedy and the appellant’s right to his reputation by failing to examine all of the arguments concerning the Council’s allegations concerning criterion (d) of Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Article 3(1) of Regulation 269/2014, as amended, being incorrect.
The second plea alleges that the General Court misapplied Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 12014/145, as amended, and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation 269/2014, as amended, in so far as the interpretation in the judgment under appeal of the concept of ‘leading’ business persons is incorrect.
The third plea alleges an infringement of Article 29 TEU and Article 215(2) TFEU. The judgment under appeal errs when it finds that the provisions referred to enable penalties to be applied to categories of persons who do not have sufficient connection with the regime on which the EU intends to exert pressure.
The fourth plea alleges an infringement of the principle of legal certainty, of the right to property and of freedom to conduct a business. The interpretation in the judgment under appeal of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and of Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation 269/2014, as amended, is not compatible with the principles referred to.
In the context of the fifth plea, it is argued that the General Court distorted the meaning and scope of the Council’s item of evidence No. 2 and of the appellant’s annex C5 by failing to respond to the appellant’s line of argument. Moreover, the reasoning in the judgment under appeal is insufficient and contradictory, contrary to Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
Both the sixth and the seventh pleas allege an infringement of Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145, as amended, and of Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation 269/2014, as amended. It is argued that the General Court distorted the evidence, breached essential procedural requirements and breached the duty to state reasons under Article 296 TFEU and Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice by failing to provide sufficient reasons. First, the judgment under appeal infers from the sole fact, which is disputed, of Bank Alfa being included in a list of significant taxpayers, that the banking sector is a source of substantial revenue to the Russian government.
Second, the interpretation in the judgment under appeal of the concept of economic sectors providing ‘a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation’ is incorrect.
Lastly, the eighth plea takes as its basis an alleged infringement of the principle of a fair trial and of equality of arms, an infringement of the principle that the parties should be heard and that the General Court misunderstood the scope of its power of judicial review. The judgment under appeal is alleged to have infringed the principles referred to, in finding, in paragraph 104 that ‘
            the Interfax bulletin of 15 March 2022 stating that Alfa Bank had announced a change in the structure of its share ownership, and indicating that the appellant was no longer a “co-owner”, adduced with no other official supporting document and with no indication, in particular, as to the exact date of that change or the identity of the person to whom the appellant’s shares had been transferred, is not sufficient to demonstrate the transfer of the appellant’s shares
            ’, placing the appellant at a substantial disadvantage.


ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2597/oj
ISSN 1977-091X (electronic edition)