COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard, including a review of the Standing Corps
Date: 2024-02-02
Institutions: Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission
Subjects: EU migration policy, European cooperation, European security, Frontex, border control, external border of the EU, illegal migration, operation of the Institutions, return migration

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 2.2.2024  SWD(2024) 75 final  COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT EVALUATION Accompanying the document REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL  on the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard, including a review of the Standing Corps {COM(2024) 75 final}  
 
 
Table of contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation ........................................................................................... 1 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? ......................... 3 

2.1 

Description of the intervention and its objectives ........................................................... 3 

2.2     Points of comparison ....................................................................................................... 9 

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? ......... 10 

Current state of play .................................................................................................................. 10 

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) ......................................................... 18 

4.1.  TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THE INTERVENTION SUCCESSFUL AND WHY?............ 18 

4.1.1. Coherence ........................................................................................................................ 18 

4.1.2. Effectiveness ................................................................................................................... 22 

4.1.2.1 Governance and organisational structure of Frontex ..................................................... 22 

4.1.2.2 Operations ..................................................................................................................... 26 

4.1.2.3. Return ........................................................................................................................... 28 

4.1.2.4. Situational awareness ................................................................................................... 30 

4.1.2.5. Capability development ................................................................................................ 35 

4.1.2.6. Cooperation with EU institutions, agencies and third countries .................................. 38 

4.1.2.7. Fundamental Rights ...................................................................................................... 43 

4.1.3. Efficiency ........................................................................................................................ 51 

4.1.3.1. Use of human and financial resources by Frontex ....................................................... 51 

4.1.3.2. Costs and benefits generated by the EBCG Regulation ............................................... 53 

4.1.4. Standing Corps ................................................................................................................ 56 

4.2.  HOW  DID  THE  EU  INTERVENTION  MAKE  A  DIFFERENCE  AND  TO 

WHOM? ................................................................................................................................ 62 

4.3.  IS THE INTERVENTION STILL RELEVANT? ................................................................. 65 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? ................................... 67 

ANNEX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION ............................................................................ 77 

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED .................................... 83 

ANNEX  III.  EVALUATION  MATRIX  AND,  WHERE  RELEVANT,  DETAILS  ON 

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (BY CRITERION) ........................... 88 

ANNEX  III.A  EVALUATION  OF  THE  EBCG  REGULATION,  DETAILS  ON 

ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ......................................................... 126 

ANNEX III.B REVIEW OF THE STANDING CORPS, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO 

THE REVIEW QUESTIONS .............................................................................................. 236 

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS ........................................................... 259 

 
 
 
ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT ............................. 265 

 
 
 
Glossary 

Term or acronym 

Meaning or definition 

ALDO 

BMVI 

CEPOL 

CF 

CIRAM 

CSDP 

CVAM 

DCAF 

DPO 

EBCG 

ECA 

Advanced Level Document Officer 

Border Management and Visa Policy Instrument 

European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training 

Frontex’s  Consultative  Forum  on  Fundamental  Rights 
Matters 

Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model 

Common Security and Defence Policy 

Common Vulnerability Assessment Methodology 

Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance 

Data Protection Officer 

European Border and Coast Guard 

European Court of Auditors 

ECRIS-TCN 

European  Criminal  Records  Information  System  –  Third 
Country National 

ED 

EDPS 

EEAS 

EES 

EFCA 

EIBM 

EMSA 

EP 

EPPO 

ETIAS 

EUAA 

Eu-LISA 

Executive Director 

European Data Protection Supervisor 

European External Action Service 

Entry/Exit System 

European Fisheries Control Agency 

European Integrated Border Management 

European Maritime Safety Agency 

European Parliament 

European Public Prosecutor’s Office 

European Travel Information and Authorisation System 

European Union Agency for Asylum 

European Union Agency for the Operational Management 
of  Large-Scale  IT  Systems  in  the  Area  of  Freedom 

 
 
EURLO 

Eurodac 

EUROPOL 

FADO 

FAR 

FRESO 

FRA 

FRM 

FRO 

FSWG 

IAC 

ICF study 

ICMPD 

ILO 

IPCR 

IRMA 

ISAA 

ISF 

ISG 

JO 

JRO 

JRS 

KPI 

LIBE 

Security and Justice 

European Return Liaison Officer 

European Dactyloscopy database 

European  Union  Agency 
Cooperation 

for  Law  Enforcement 

False and Authentic Documents Online 

Frontex Application for Return 

Frontex Return Escort and Support Officer 

Fundamental Rights Agency 

Fundamental Rights Monitor 

Fundamental Rights Officer 

Frontex Scrutiny Working Group 

Internal Audit Capability 

Study  to  support  the  evaluation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation 
and review of the Standing Corps – Final report (2023) 

International Centre for Migration Policy Development 

International Labour Organisation 

Integrated Political Crisis Response 

Integrated Return Management Application 

Integrated  Situation  Awareness  and  Analysis  on  the 
Migration Refugee Situation 

Internal Security Fund 

Inter-Service Group 

Joint Operation 

Joint Return Operation 

Joint Integration Services 

Key Performance Indicator 

European  Parliament’s  Committee  on  Civil  Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs 

 
 
MARCOM 

Allied Maritime Command 

MB 

MFF 

MS 

NATO 

NGO 

OLAF 

RBI 

RCC 

Management Board 

Multiannual Financial Framework 

Member State 

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 

Non-Governmental Organisation 

European Anti-Fraud Office 

Rapid Border Intervention 

Rescue Coordination Centre 

RECAMAS 

Return Case Management System 

SAC 

SAR 

SatCen 

SC 

SCIFA 

SCO 

SIR 

SIS 

SOP 

SPD 

SRA 

TEP 

TFEU 

TO-EIBM 

ToR 

VIS 

Schengen Associated Countries 

Search and Rescue 

EU Satellite Centre 

Standing Corps 

Strategic  Committee  on  Immigration,  Frontiers  and 
Asylum 

Standing Corps Officer 

Serious Incident Report 

Schengen Information System 

Standard Operation Procedure 

Single Programming Document 

Strategic Risk Analysis 

Technical Equipment Pool 

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 

Technical  and  Operational  Strategy  on  European 
Integrated Border Management 

Terms of Reference 

Visa Information System 

 
 
WCO 

World Customs Organisation 

 
 
1. 

INTRODUCTION 

Purpose and scope of the evaluation 

In late June 2022, the European Commission launched the evaluation of Regulation (EU) 
2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the 
European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  (EBCG  Regulation)1  to  analyse  its  implementation 
according  to  the  specific  criteria  set  out  in  the  Commission’s  Better  Regulation 
Guidelines, namely effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value.2 
The evaluation also analyses the scope and content of the EBCG Regulation and the state 
of  implementation  of  the  Regulation’s  provisions.  Beside  the  specific  criteria  listed 
above,  the  evaluation  is  subdivided  in  the  following  main  thematic  areas:  coherence, 
governance  and  organisational  structure,  operations,  return,  situational  awareness, 
capability  development,  cooperation  with  EU  institutions,  agencies,  international 
organisations  and  third  countries,  fundamental  rights,  use  of  human  and  financial 
resources,  costs  and  benefits  generated  by  the  EBCG  Regulation,  and  the  Standing 
Corps. The evaluation was in part informed by an external study3. 

Article 121 of the EBCG Regulation requires the Commission to carry out an evaluation 
of the Regulation by 5 December 2023 and every four years thereafter. The Commission 
is  also  required  to  report  to  the  European  Parliament  (EP),  the  Council  and  the 
Management Board (MB) of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (‘Frontex’ or 
‘Agency’) on the findings of the evaluation. Article 121 sets the scope of the evaluation4. 

The  EBCG  Regulation  also  calls  on  the  Commission  to  carry  out  a  review  of  the 
Standing  Corps  (SC)  created  by  the  2019  EBCG  Regulation.  The  results  of  the  review 
should be presented to the EP and to the Council by 31 December 2023. Article 59 sets 
the scope of the review5.  

1   Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on 
the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  and  repealing  Regulations  (EU)  No  1052/2013  and  (EU) 
2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, p. 1). 

ICF (2023). Evaluation of Regulation 2019/1896 on the EBCG, Final report. 

2   SWD(2021) 305. 
3  
4   Namely to assess, in particular: a) the results achieved by the Agency, having regard to its objectives, 
mandate, resources and tasks, b) the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency’s performance 
and its working practices in relation to its objectives, mandate and tasks, c) inter-agency cooperation at 
EU  level,  including  the  implementation  of  European  cooperation  on  coast  guard  functions,  d)  the 
possible  need  to  modify  the  mandate  of  the  Agency,  e)  the  financial  implications  of  any  such 
modification, f) the functioning of the standing corps, g) the level of training, specialised expertise and 
professionalism of the standing corps. 

5   The review should assess: a) the overall number and composition of the standing corps, b) the size of 
individual Member States’ contributions to the standing corps, c) the expertise and professionalism of 
the standing corps and of the training it receives, and d) the necessity to maintain the reserve for rapid 
reaction as part of the standing corps. 

1 

 
 
 
The findings  of  the review  are also included in  this  staff working  document, as the SC 
forms an integral part of the EBCG. 

The  evaluation  covers  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  from  its  entry  into 
force in December 2019 to October 20236. A wide range of stakeholders were consulted 
as part of the evaluation both directly by the Commission7 and by the external contractor 
(ICF Consulting Services Limited – (ICF)) that carried out the study, including Member 
States, the EP, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and relevant EU agencies. 
A  detailed  description  of  the  stakeholder  consultation  is  presented  in  Annex  I  and  in 
Annex  V.  In  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  an  Inter-Service  Group  (ISG) 
was set up within the Commission to accompany the evaluation process.  

The  evaluation  analyses  whether  the  EBCG  Regulation  was  successful  in  applying  the 
effectiveness,  efficiency,  and  coherence  criteria.  This  part  includes  an  analysis  of  the 
legal coherence and policy framework governing Frontex and the EBCG. The findings on 
effectiveness are divided into the key thematic areas.  

Furthermore,  the  evaluation  analyses  the  relevance  and  EU  added  value  criteria,  by 
assessing  to  what  extent  the  new  mandate  of  the  Agency,  introduced  in  2019,  has 
contributed to achieving the objectives of the EBCG as a whole, and to what extent it has 
supported Member States in implementing effective border management in full respect of 
fundamental  rights  and  contributed  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  the  Union’s  return 
policy.  Additionally,  this  section  evaluates  whether  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG  could 
have been achieved sufficiently by Member States acting alone. 

Finally, the evaluation looks at the relevance of the EBCG Regulation in the context of 
current  and  emerging  needs  and  challenges  at  EU  external  borders.  This  includes 
assessing  the  relevance  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  in  terms  of  its  overall  scope  and 
objectives, as well as the relevance of Frontex’s tasks prescribed in the Regulation. 

The external study was conducted through a mixed methods approach8 and was informed 
by  the  triangulation  of  a  variety  of  sources.  A  range  of  methodological  tools  and 
techniques were used. For more details on the methodology please see Annex II. 

The  evaluation  takes  stock  of  the  state  of  play  in  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation and identifies any inconsistencies in the legislative framework or gaps in the 
implementation, to feed into the future work of the Commission, Frontex, and Member 
States. 

The limitation of this evaluation and of the review of the SC is that the implementation of 
the EBCG Regulation is still ongoing and will only be completed in 2027. Accordingly, 
the  implementation  of  a  number  of  key  elements  of  the  Regulation  (e.g.  integrated 

It is to note that the external study covers the evaluation period from December 2019 to January 2023. 

6  
7   As required by Article 121(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 
8   Data used for the  study included information gathered  via surveys, interviews and field visits which 

gives more usable and reliable information and a solid foundation to inform the study.   

2 

 
 
capability  planning,  the  setting-up  of  the  SC,  European  integrated  border  management 
(EIBM))  is  a  work  in  progress.  While  this  situation  does  not  call  into  question  the 
validity  of  the  findings  presented  in  the  document,  it  sets  a  clear  limitation  to  the 
conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  with  respect  to  the  need  to  propose  changes  to  the 
legislation.  

Finally, as the vast majority of the provisions of the EBCG Regulation regulate Frontex, 
this evaluation primarily focuses on analysing the functioning of, and the results achieved 
by, the Agency, including its objectives, mandate, resources, and tasks. At the same time, 
the evaluation also considers the EBCG as a whole, in particular in the context of EIBM 
and the cooperation between Member States and the Agency. 

2.  WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTION? 

2.1   Description of the intervention and its objectives 

Established  by  Council  Regulation  (EC)  2007/20049,  the  European  Agency  for  the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of 
the European Union – as it was called at the time - took up its responsibilities on 1 May 
2005. The Agency was established to improve the integrated management of the external 
borders by facilitating and rendering more effective the application of existing and future 
Community  measures  relating  to  the  management  of  external  borders.  The  Regulation 
was  amended  in  2007  and  in  2011.  The  2016  EBCG  Regulation10  repealed  the  2007 
Frontex  Regulation.  Two  years  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  2016  Regulation,  the 
Commission proposed a new Regulation to reinforce the Agency, which came into force 
on 4 December 2019  (current  EBCG Regulation).  It  was  adopted without  conducting a 
prior impact assessment, largely due to the political expectation to prepare and adopt the 
proposal within a very short timeframe. The  2019 EBCG Regulation repealed the 2016 
Regulation.  Overall,  the  Agency  progressively  moved  away  from  coordination  and 
adopted  a  more  operational  role,  eventually  incorporating  the  EU’s  first  uniformed 
service with executive powers, the Standing Corps.   

The  EBCG  is  composed  of  the  Agency  and  of  the  national  authorities  of  the  Member 
States responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they 
carry  out  border  control  tasks,  as  well  as  national  authorities  responsible  for  return. 
Member  States  have  the  primary  responsibility  for  managing  their  sections  of  the 
external border and are responsible for issuing return decisions, while the Agency should 

9   Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October  2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management  of  Operational  Cooperation  at  the  External  Borders  of  the  Member  States  of  the 
European Union (OJ L 349, 25.11.2004, p. 1). 

10   Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on 
the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  and  amending  Regulation  (EU)  2016/399  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC (OJ 
L 251, 16.9.2016, p. 1). 

3 

 
 
support the Member States in applying EU measures relating to the management of the 
external borders and returns11. 

The EBCG Regulation’s general objective was to address the need for a permanent and 
reliable  solution,  by  providing  the  Agency  with  the  necessary  capabilities  to  support 
Member  States  in  addressing  migratory  challenges  and  potential  future  threats  at  the 
EU’s  external  borders  and  efficiently  managing  those  borders,  as  well  as  to  support 
returns  in  an  effective  manner.  The  Regulation  significantly  expanded  the  Agency’s 
mandate, including by:  

•  Setting  up  the  EBCG  SC,  comprising  10 000  staff,  which  is  to  be  fully 

operational by 2027;  

•  Significantly  increasing  the  Agency’s  budget  to  acquire,  maintain  and  operate 

technical equipment (e.g. patrol cars, vessels);  

•  Laying  down  the  basis  for  improved  coordination  processes  and  mechanisms 

between the Agency and national authorities; 

•  Scaling up the Agency’s support in all phases of return procedures (pre-return, i.e. 
identification  and  acquisition  of  travel  documents,  return  operations,  voluntary 
returns, post-arrival and reintegration); and 

•  Strengthening cooperation with third countries, including through the deployment 

of the SC, exchange of information and facilitation in the field of returns;  

The  intervention  logic  below  serves  to  depict  the  chain  of  expected  effects  associated 
with the EBCG Regulation, by identifying needs and objectives of the EBCG as well as 
input  and  actions  to  achieve  the  outputs,  outcomes  and  impacts  in  line  with  the  five 
evaluation criteria (relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and EU added value). 

11   Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation. 

4 

 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Intervention logic of the EBCG Regulation12 

12   ICF study (2023). Final report, p. 7. 

8 

 
 
 
2.2   Points of comparison  

The  2016  EBCG  Regulation  was  put  in  place  in  record  time  after  the  2015  migration 
crisis. Yet, more remained to be done to ensure the effective control of the EU’s external 
borders and the effective return of third-country nationals with no right to stay in the EU, 
as part of a comprehensive approach to migration. Therefore, it was imperative that the 
EBCG  could  fully  respond  to  the  level  of  ambition  and  needs  of  the  EU  to  effectively 
protect the external borders and meet future challenges.  

In  its  June  2018  conclusions13,  the  European  Council  confirmed  the  need  for  a  more 
effective control of the EU’s external borders by further strengthening the supporting role 
of  Frontex,  including  its  cooperation  with  third  countries,  through  increased  resources 
and an enhanced mandate.  

Moreover, the EP’s resolution of 30 May 2018 on the annual report on the functioning of 
the  Schengen  area14  insisted  on  the  need  for  a  prompt  introduction  of  the fully  fledged 
EIBM  strategy,  a  technical  and  operational  strategy  by  the  Agency,  and  subsequently 
also national strategies by the Member States.  

Responding to these calls, the Commission’s 2018 proposal for a new EBCG Regulation 
promoted substantial changes to the EBCG, in particular to provide the Agency with its 
own operational arm: a EBCG SC of 10 000 operational staff with executive powers to 
effectively support Member States on the ground.  

Consequently,  the  functioning  of  the  EBCG  and,  more  importantly,  the  way  strategic 
priorities for the EIBM were set, needed to be adapted. The proposed EBCG Regulation 
introduced  a  new  political  steering  of  European  integrated  border  management  by 
establishing  a  multiannual  policy  cycle,  bringing  together  European  and  national 
integrated border management strategies.  

Furthermore, the proposal also aimed to improve the capability to exchange information 
and support Member States in the area of return to increase the efficiency of returns and 
achieve  a  more  effective  and  coherent  European  return  policy.  In  September  2018,  the 
Commission adopted a legislative proposal for a targeted review of the Return Directive, 
which  aims  at  reducing  the  obstacles  to  return  and  making  return  procedures  more 
effective,  while  respecting  the  rights  of  the  irregular  migrants.  In  this  context,  the 
proposed  changes  to  the  EBCG  Regulation  further  expanded  the  scope  of  operational 
assistance to be provided by the Agency to the Member States. 

13   https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-

final/  

14   European  Parliament  resolution  of  30  May  2018  on  the  annual  report  on  the  functioning  of  the 

Schengen area (OJ C 76, 9.3.2020, p. 106). 

9 

 
 
 
Cooperation  with  third  countries  is  another  key  element  of  EIBM.  The  2018  proposal 
aimed  to  reinforce  the  cooperation  of  the  Agency  with  third  countries,  with  the  aim  of 
promoting  EIBM  and  return  standards,  to  exchange  information  and  risk  analysis,  to 
facilitate the implementation of returns with a view to increasing return efficiency, and to 
support third countries in the area of border management and migration. 

The above-mentioned elements all aimed to reinforce EIBM, so as to enable the EBCG to 
act  as  a  genuine  border  authority  to  ensure  the  protection  of  EU  external  borders,  to 
effectively manage migratory flows, as well as to contribute to guarantee a high level of 
security within the Union - a key condition to preserve the Schengen area15.  

3.  HOW HAS THE SITUATION EVOLVED OVER THE EVALUATION PERIOD? 

Current state of play 

The 2019 Regulation introduced major changes, including giving significant new tasks to 
the  Agency.  To  steer  the  implementation  and  the  rapid  operationalisation  of  the 
Regulation,  the  Agency  and  the  Commission  developed  an  implementation  roadmap  to 
better monitor progress. In November 2022, a new version of the roadmap was presented 
to  the  MB  of  Frontex.  It  aims  to  track  the  progress  of  implementation  in  the  coming 
years.  

Nevertheless,  in  December  2023,  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  is  still  work  in 
progress. 

While  the  setting  up  of  the  Standing  Corps  was  always  meant  to  be  completed  only  in 
2027,  a  number  of  external  and  internal  factors  have  impacted  also  other  parts  of  the 
implementation of the Regulation during the evaluation period: 

External  factors:  The  Covid-19  pandemic  in  2020-2021  led  to  restrictions  on  global 
travel  and  resulted  in  delays  in  the  recruitment  of  SC  staff,  as  well  as  cancellations  or 
delays  of  Frontex  activities  in  2020  and  2021.  At  the  same  time,  the  closure  of 
international  borders  and  travel  restrictions  as  a  result  of  the  pandemic  resulted  in  a 
reduced  pressure  from  irregular  migration  at  the  external  borders,  which  eventually 
resulted in a reduced need for Frontex support to Member States. 

In  2020  and  2021,  certain  third  countries  engaged  in  attempts  to  instrumentalise 
migration for political purposes, creating a new demand for increased deployments at the 
EU’s Eastern land borders. The pressure on the Eastern borders grew with the full-scale 
aggression  of  the  Russian  Federation  towards  Ukraine  in  2022,  which  created  an 
unprecedented mass influx of people fleeing the war into the EU16. 

15   COM(2018) 631 final, p. 1. 
16   Between  24  February  2022  and  3  September  2023,  over  25.6  million  entries  were  recorded  from 
Ukraine and Moldova into the EU, including nearly 22.2 million entries by Ukrainian nationals. The 
number  of  exits  by  Ukrainian  nationals  (including  exits  to Moldova)  was  nearly  19.4  million.  As  of 
5 September, the estimate number of active registrations for temporary protection in Member States is 

10 

 
 
 
In  2022  and  2023,  an  increase  of  irregular  border  crossings  towards  the  EU  increased 
again via the Western Balkan states as well as throughout the Mediterranean region17.  

Further, the implementation of the Regulation is taking place in an evolving policy and 
legal environment, with the ongoing reform of the Schengen Borders Code18, changes to 
(or developments of) new border information technology systems such as the Schengen 
Information  System  (SIS),  the  European  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation  System 
(ETIAS)19, the Entry/Exit System (EES)20, and interoperability between the different EU 
systems21.  Frontex  has  an  important  role  to  play  in  the  implementation  and/or  use  of 
these systems. 

Finally, media scrutiny and criticism from civil society intensified during the evaluation 
period  which  made  the  Agency  take  a  more  open  and  transparent  approach  in  its 
communication towards the public. 

Internal  factors:  The  evaluation  period  was  also  marked  by  significant  turmoil  for  the 
Agency itself, with an investigation by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) that lead 
to the resignation of the Agency’s former Executive Director (ED) in 2022. The Agency 
was under interim management until the appointment of the new ED, who took office on 
1 March 2023. During the interim period, the MB met every month to advise, facilitate 
and monitor the work of the Agency’s senior management.  

4 005 711, according to the data uploaded on the Temporary Protection Platform and channeled via the 
Blueprint  Network.  (Please,  note  that  the  figures  on  entries  and  exits  refer  to  the  number  of  cross-
border movements and not single individuals. One person could enter and exit the EU several times. 
The  number  of  active  Temporary  Protection  registrations  is  a  good  proxy  indicator  of  the  influx  of 
people fleeing the war in Ukraine into the EU so far).  

17   In 2022, there were 331 433 illegal border crossings registered, and in 2023 the number is 175 623 as 

of July 2023. 

18   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code  on the rules governing the movement of persons across  borders (Schengen Borders  Code) (OJ 
L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1). 

19   Regulation  (EU)  2018/1240  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  12  September  2018 
establishing  a  European  Travel  Information  and  Authorisation  System  (ETIAS)  and  amending 
Regulations  (EU)  No  1077/2011,  (EU)  No  515/2014,  (EU)  2016/399,  (EU)  2016/1624  and  (EU) 
2017/2226 (OJ L 236, 19.9.2018, p. 1). 

20   Regulation  (EU)  2017/2226  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  November  2017 
establishing  an  Entry/Exit  System  (EES)  to  register  entry  and  exit  data  and  refusal  of  entry  data  of 
third-country  nationals  crossing  the  external  borders  of  the  Member  States  and  determining  the 
conditions  for  access  to  the  EES  for  law  enforcement  purposes,  and  amending  the  Convention 
implementing the Schengen  Agreement and  Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011 
(OJ L 327, 9.12.2017, p. 20). 

21   Regulation  (EU)  2019/817  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  20  May  2019  on 
establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of borders 
and  visa  and  amending  Regulations  (EC)  No  767/2008,  (EU)  2016/399,  (EU)  2017/2226,  EU 
2018/1240,  (EU)  2018/1726  and  EU  2018/1861  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  and 
Council Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA (OJ L 135, 22.5.2019, p 27) and Regulation (EU) 
2019/818 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on establishing a framework 
for  interoperability  between  EU  information  systems  in  the  field  of  police  and  judicial  cooperation, 
asylum  and  migration  and  amending  Regulations  (EU)  2018/1726,  (EU)  2018/1862  and  (EU) 
2019/816 (OJ L 135, 22.5.2009, p. 85).  

11 

 
 
Currently, the state of play of the implementation of key areas of the EBCG Regulation is 
the following: 

Governance and organisational structure the Agency 

In  2022,  the  Agency  adopted  a  revised,  expanded  organisational  structure  (nine 
Divisions) to take account of its enhanced mandate22. In November 2023, after intensive 
discussions, the new organisational structure was approved by the Management Board to 
better reflect the core mandate and needs of the Agency, especially in the management of 
the SC.  

In line with the EBCG Regulation, in 2021, the management structure of the Agency was 
expanded  from  one  to  three  Deputy  Executive  Directors,  with  specific  thematic 
portfolios. The new ED of Frontex was appointed by the MB on 20 December 2022 and 
took office on 1 March 2023. 

Operations 

As part of its main mandate under the Regulation, during the evaluation period, Frontex 
carried  out  joint  operations  and  rapid  border  interventions,  providing  continuous 
technical and operational assistance to Member States23. Overall, 15 joint operations took 
place  in  2020,  19  in  2021  and  20  in  2022,  with  the  majority  being  maritime  joint 
operations24. In 2023, the Agency has launched 24 joint operations. Based on the results 
of the stakeholder consultation conducted by ICF, the evaluation found that the Agency’s 
extensive  support  enabled  Member  States  and  partner  third  countries  (under  status 
agreements)  to  draw  on  additional  human  resources  and  technical  equipment  when 
needed.  Frontex  has  also  a  role  in  the  development  of  European  standards  related  to 
technical  and  operational  aspects  of  border  management  and  return,  for  example 
especially  in  terms  of  border  surveillance.  A  concrete  example  of  promoting  the 
harmonisation is development of handbooks25. 

Return 

Frontex  is  tasked  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  with  assisting  Member  States  in 
implementing  return  of  third-country  nationals  with  no  legal  right  to  stay  in  the  EU. 
Frontex  offers  support  to  Member  States  in  all  phases  of  the  return  process  and 
coordinates  return  operations  at  a  technical  and  operational  level,  including  voluntary 
returns.  The  Agency  has  further  developed  its  capacity  to  organise  Frontex-led  return 
operations to further relieve the Member States from some of the organisational burden. 

22   Management  Board  Decision  46/2022  of  13  August  2022  amending  Management  Board  Decision   

43/2020 on the Agency’s amended organisational structure. 

23   Articles 37-38 of the EBCG Regulation. 
24   Frontex (2020-2022). ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Reports’. 
25   For  example,  VEGA-Handbooks  provide  guidelines  on  how  to  deal  with  children  as  a  vulnerable 

group at border crossing points. 

12 

 
 
 
The EBCG Regulation reinforced cooperation with third countries through  exchange of 
information and facilitation of returns.  

In  2022,  for  the  first  time,  the  Agency  carried  out  two  end-to-end  return  operations  to 
Albania  and  Nigeria  entirely  organised  by  Frontex,  using  charter  flights.  A  third 
operation was organised in March 2023 to Bangladesh. In 2022, Frontex recorded a 36% 
increase in the total number of people returned, compared to 2021,  including a steadily 
increasing share of voluntary returns.  

IT tools have been developed to enhance cooperation and coordination between national 
return-enforcing  authorities,  such  as  the  Integrated  Return  Management  Application 
(IRMA) for return-related operational data collection and Frontex Application for Return 
(FAR)  a  tool  that  allows  the  Agency  and  Member  States  to  organise  and  coordinate 
forced return operations (scheduled and chartered), as well as a platform where Member 
States  can  request  technical  assistance  for  voluntary  returns/departures.    To  build 
capacity  in  Member  States  for  an  end-to-end  digitalisation  of  the  return  process,  the 
Agency  developed  RECAMAS,  a  reference  model  for  an  IT  return  case  management 
system to be used by Member States to align their national IT systems.  

European Integrated Border Management 

The multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM26 was finalised with the adoption of the 
Commission’s  Communication  of  14  March  202327.  On  that  basis,  Frontex,  in  close 
cooperation  with  the  Member  States  and Commission,  prepared  the new  Technical and 
Operational  Strategy  for  EIBM  (TO-EIBM)  that  was  adopted  by  the  MB  on  20 
September 202328.  

In parallel, Member States are working on aligning their national strategies for EIBM, to 
implement the multiannual strategic policy. Member States have until the end of the first 
quarter  of  2024  to  align  their  national  EIBM  strategies  with  the  European  framework. 
The national strategies and the actual implementation will be evaluated by the Schengen 
evaluation  and  monitoring  mechanism.  The  Commission  is  required  to  evaluate  the 
implementation of the EIBM multiannual strategic policy four years after its adoption. 

Capability development 

The  Agency  expanded  its  capability  development  activities,  with  respect  to  human  and 
technical  resources,  over  the  course  of  2020-2023.  Most  targets  for  training  activities 
were met across 2020-2023.  

26   Article 8 of the EBCG Regulation. 
27   European Commission (2023). ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council establishing the multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management’. 
COM(2023) 146 final. 

28   Management Board Decision 30/2023 of 20 September 2023 adopting the Technical and Operational 

Strategy for European Integrated Border Management 2023-2027. 

13 

 
 
The Technical Equipment Pool (TEP)29 grew from 1 245 items in 2020 to 3 623 items in 
July 2023. Frontex  also  deployed major, light, and portable equipment  to existing  joint 
operations,  including  in  response  to  the  full-scale  invasion  of  Ukraine  by  the  Russian 
Federation.  

On  research  and  innovation,  technical  standards  for  maritime,  aerial,  land  border 
surveillance, and document inspection equipment were adopted30.  
In  the  context  of  integrated  planning31,  by  October  2023,  all  but  one  of  the  Member 
States  and  Schengen  Associated  Countries  submitted 
their  national  capability 
development plans to Frontex32. The multiannual plan for profiles of the SC was adopted 
in  2023  by  the  MB33.  The  multiannual  acquisition  strategy  and  its  implementation  plan 
were adopted in September 202334.  

Based  on  these  elements,  Frontex  is  yet  to  develop  the  capability  roadmap  that  is  to 
provide  a  sound  foundation  for  the  Agency  to  guide  the  development  of  the  EBCG’s 
capabilities.  

Situational awareness 

The Agency conducted its regular situational awareness activities35, including providing 
regular  risk  analysis  products,  carrying  out  vulnerability  assessments,  and  facilitating 
information  exchange  in  the  framework  of  EUROSUR.  In  April  2021,  the  European 
Commission  adopted  an  Implementing  Regulation  on  the  situational  pictures  of 
EUROSUR36.  

The Agency has been working closely with the Member State authorities and with third 
countries  in  relation  to  risk  analysis.  It  also  contributed to  EU mechanisms  such as the 
Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint and the Integrated Political Crisis Response. 

In  line  with  the  EBCG  Regulation,  Frontex  developed  two  Strategic  Risk  Analyses 
(SRA)  in  2020  and  2022.  The  2022  SRA37  provided  the  basis  for  the  Commission 
Communication on the multiannual strategic policy for EIBM. Frontex and the European 

29   Article 64 of the EBCG Regulation. 
30   Management  Board  Decision  51/2021  of  21  September  2021  adopting  technical  standards  for  the 
equipment to be deployed in Frontex activities, and Management Board Decision 36/2022 of 28 June 
2022  adopting  the  methodology  for  development  of  technical  standards  for  the  equipment  to  be 
deployed in Frontex activities. 
31   Article 9 of the EBCG Regulation. 
32   Following Management Board Decision 2/2021 of 15 January 2021 adopting the methodology and the 

procedure for establishing the national capability development plans. 

33   Management  Board  Decision  11/2023  of  22  March  2023  adopting  the  European  Border  and  Coast 
Guard Standing Corps annual planning for 2024 and indicative multiannual planning of profiles. 
34   Management Board Decision 28/2023 of 15 September 2023 adopting the Multiannual Strategy for the 

Acquisition and Management of the Agency’s Equipment. 

35   Articles 24 to 29 of the EBCG Regulation. 
36   Commission  Implementing  Regulation  (EU)  2021/581  of  9  April  2021  on  the  situational  pictures  of 
the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) (C/2021/2361, OJ L 124, 12.4.2021, p. 3). 

37   Frontex (2022). ‘Strategic Risk Analysis 2022-2032’.  

14 

 
 
Commission  also  worked 
vulnerability assessments and the Commission-led Schengen evaluation mechanism38. 

towards  greater  coherence  between 

the  Agency-led 

Cooperation 

Frontex  can  cooperate  with  third  countries  on  the  basis  of  status  agreements  and/or 
working  arrangements39. To facilitate enhanced  cooperation with  third countries, and  to 
enable the deployment of SC officers to third countries’ borders that are not shared with a 
Member State, the model status agreement was revised and adopted by the Commission 
in  December  202140.  The  EU  has  since  signed  new  status  agreements  with  North 
Macedonia (2022)41, Moldova (2022)42, Montenegro (2023)43, and Albania (2023)44. 

The Commission also adopted a model for  Frontex working arrangements in December 
202145. However, the Commission is  in consultation with the European Data Protection 
Supervisor  (EDPS)  on  revising  the  data  protection  modalities  of  the  model  working 
arrangement, which will allow Frontex to conclude new working arrangements with third 
countries.  Until  this  consultation  is  finalised,  Frontex  continues  to  cooperate  with  third 
countries  under  existing  working  arrangements  (aligned  with  the  2016  EBCG 
Regulation).  

Furthermore,  Frontex  can  cooperate  with  other  EU  institutions,  bodies,  offices  and 
agencies and international organisations based on working arrangements46. 

Fundamental rights 

Fundamental  rights  are  an  integral  part  of  EIBM47.  Virtually  all  activities  by  Member 
States  and  Frontex  in  the  context  of  border  management  (including  risk  analysis, 
trainings,  border  checks,  border  surveillance,  and  return)  have  the  potential  to  have  an 

38   Article 33 of the EBCG Regulation. 
39   Article 73 of the EBCG Regulation. 
40   European Commission (2021). ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the  Council  on  the  model  status  agreement  as  referred  to  in  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896  of  the 
European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  November  2019  on  the  European  Border  and  Coast 
Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624’. COM(2021) 829 final. 
41   Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  North  Macedonia  on  operational 
activities  carried  out  by  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  in  the  Republic  of  North 
Macedonia (OJ L 61, 27.2.2023, p. 3).     

42   Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova on operational activities carried 
out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Moldova (OJ L 91, 18.3.2022, 
p. 4) 

43   Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on operational activities carried out by the 

European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Montenegro (OJ L 140, 30.5.2023, p. 4) 

44   Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania on operational activities carried 
out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Albania. Available at: GEN 
(europa.eu) 

45   European Commission (2021). ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council: Model working arrangement as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  November 2019  on  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  and 
repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624’. COM(2021) 830 final. 

46   Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation. 
47   Article 3(2) of the EBCG Regulation. 

15 

 
 
impact  on fundamental  rights, including  on absolute rights  such as the  right to  life, the 
prohibition  of  torture  and  other  forms  of  ill-treatment,  and  the  principle  of  non-
refoulement.  The  fundamental  rights  safeguards  included  in  the  EBCG Regulation  and, 
more generally, in applicable EU law relating to border management aim to ensure that 
all activities are performed with respect to fundamental rights, in conformity with the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, Frontex is also tasked with promoting the 
application of the Union acquis in the area of border management, including the respect 
for fundamental rights48.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  strengthened  fundamental  rights  safeguards  in  the  EBCG.  In 
particular, the tasks of the FRO were extended, and FRMs were introduced to provide a 
continuous  assessments  of  the  Agency’s  fundamental  rights  compliance  in  operational 
activities.  To  implement  the  legislative  framework,  in  2021  the  Agency  updated  the 
Fundamental Rights Strategy49 and adopted the Action Plan for its implementation50. To 
enhance  the  position  of  the  FRO,  MB  Decision  6/202151  was  adopted  on  the 
independence  of  the  FRO,  as  well  as  MB  Decision  43/202252,  which  lays  down  the 
procedures and timelines for the ED and MB to act on the recommendations of the FRO 
and CF.   

The  EBCG  Regulation  provides  for  the  recruitment  of  at  least  40  FRMs  by  December 
2020. After initial delays, the Agency completed the recruitment of in total 46 FRMs in 
2022.  To  guarantee  effective  monitoring,  the  ED  adopted  the  Standard  Operating 
Procedure (SOP) for FRMs53 in 2023. The SOP aims to clarify the scope of monitoring 
and reinforces the FRMs’ right to access all areas of operational activity of the Agency, 
including land and sea patrolling, as well as to participate in debriefing interviews with 
migrants. The Agency also increased the monitoring of forced-return operations through 
the pool of forced-return monitors, which includes a number of the FRMs.  

The  Agency  has  also  adopted  implementing  rules  and  procedures  to  enhance  the 
functioning  of  its  reporting  mechanisms  (Serious  Incident  Report  (SIR)  mechanism54, 
complaints mechanism55, and supervisory mechanism on the use of force56). 

48   Article 10(1)(af) of the EBCG Regulation. 
49   Frontex (2021). ‘Fundamental Rights Strategy’. 
50   Management Board Decision 61/2021 of 9 November 2021  adopting the Fundamental Rights Action 

Plan for the implementation of the Fundamental Rights Strategy. 

51   Management  Board  Decision  6/2021  of  20  January  2021  adopting  special  rules  to  guarantee  the 

independence of the Fundamental Rights Officer and his or her staff. 

52   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of  20 July 2022 adopting the  rules for the Executive Director 
and the Management Board to inform the Consultative Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations 
and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Officer.  
53   Frontex  (2023).  ‘Standard  Operating  Procedure  (SOP)  on  roles  and  responsibilities  of  Fundamental 

Rights Monitors (FRMs) in Frontex operational activities’. Internal document.  

54   Frontex (2021). Executive Director Decision on standard operating procedure (SOP) – serious incident 

reporting. 

55   Management Board Decision 19/2022 of 16 March 2022 adopting rules on the complaints mechanism. 
56   Management  Board  Decision  7/2021  of  20  January  2021  establishing  a  supervisory  mechanism  to 
monitor the application of the provisions on the use of force by statutory staff of the European Border 

16 

 
 
 
Finally, the Agency has worked to increase the transparency of the procedure to trigger 
Article 46 of the EBCG Regulation, which concerns the decision to withdraw financing, 
or not to launch, suspend or terminate the Agency’s activities in a host country. To this 
end, the Agency has adopted the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)57 to clarify roles 
and responsibilities within the Agency to support the decision-making process of the ED 
in such cases.  

Data protection 

On  data  protection,  to  implement  the  requirements  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  of 
Regulation  2018/1725  (EU  DPR),  the  MB  adopted  MB  Decision  68/202158,  and  MB 
Decision  69/202159,  However,  these  were  under  revision  to  respond  to  the  critical 
opinions issued by the EDPS. Following the approval by the MB of the revised decisions, 
the Agency will need to implement them fully across all its operations and activities. 

Standing Corps 

One of the most important innovations introduced by the 2019 EBCG Regulation was the 
establishment  of  the  EBCG  SC60.  The  SC  was  established  to  improve  the  integrated 
management of the EU’s external borders. It incorporates four categories of staff61.  

During  the  evaluation  period,  the  Agency  was  operationalising  the  SC  in  line  with  the 
ambitious timeframe set  by the co-legislators, despite an initial  delay caused in  part by 
the  Covid-19  pandemic  and  its  impact  on  recruitments  and  training.  Nevertheless, 
Frontex has progressed with the establishment of the SC and has by now almost caught 
up with the delay incurred.  

Thus, Category 1 staff increased from 495 in 2021 to 970 as of beginning of September 
2023, and Category  2 from  347 in  2021 to  450 as  of beginning of September  202362,63. 
Most  of  the  Categories  2  and  3  of  the  SC  are,  respectively,  seconded  or  nominated  by 

and Coast Guard Standing Corps, 2021; Management Board Decision 61/2022 of 23 November 2022 
amending Management Board Decision 7/2021 establishing a supervisory mechanism to  monitor the 
application of the provisions on the use of force by statutory staff of the European Border and Coast 
Guard Standing Corps. 

57   Decision  of  the  Executive  Director,  Standard  Operating  Procedure  –  mechanism  to  withdraw  the 

financing of, or suspend or terminate, or not launch Frontex activities. 

57   Decision  of  the  Executive  Director  –  Standard  Operating  Procedure  –  mechanism  to  withdraw  the 

financing of, or suspend or terminate, or not to launch Frontex activities. 

58   Management Board Decision 68/2021 of 21 December 2021 adopting the rules on processing personal 

data by the Agency. 

59   Management  Board  Decision  69/2021  of  21  December  2021  adopting  the  rules  on  processing 

operational personal data by the Agency. 

60   Articles 54 to 58 of the EBCG Regulation. 
61   Category 1: statutory staff of Frontex deployed as members of the teams, Category 2: staff seconded 
from Member States to the Agency for long-term deployment, Category 3: staff from Member States 
who  are  ready  to be  provided  to  the  Agency  for  short-term  deployment,  Category  4:  the  reserve  for 
rapid reaction consisting of staff from Member States. 

62   The required capacity of the SC per year and category is set in Annex I of the EBCG Regulation. It has 

to reach its full capacity by 2027. 

63   Data from Frontex report on capabilities to the Management Board, 5.9.2023. 

17 

 
 
national  authorities  with  law  enforcement  and  border  management  tasks  or  with 
immigration and return duties.  

4.  EVALUATION FINDINGS (ANALYTICAL PART) 

4.1.  To what extent was the intervention successful and why?  

Due  to  the  vast  amount  of  data  collected  and  analysed,  the  different  criteria  are 
elaborated separately below. 

4.1.1. Coherence 

The coherence assessment  focuses on the internal  and external  coherence of the EBCG 
Regulation.  It  also  considers  the  Regulation’s  coherence  with  the  relevant  policy 
framework64.  

Internal coherence 

Key evaluation findings 

Overall,  the  provisions  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  are  coherent  with  one  another. 
However, the following weaknesses affect the Regulation’s internal coherence and could 
be improved: 

•  The lack of a clear definition of the objectives of the Regulation; 

• 

• 

• 

In the context of shared responsibility, uncertainties as regards the allocation of 
responsibility between Frontex and national authorities during joint operations;  

the  vagueness  of  certain  provisions  on  the  use  of  force  and  personal  data 
protection, and 
the lack of clarity and uniform application of definitions on various return related 
concepts and activities, such as voluntary return and voluntary departure. 

The  objectives  of  the  Regulation  are  broadly  defined  in  recital  120  and  Article  1. 
However,  the  Regulation  does  not  create  a  clear  link  between  its  objectives  and  the 
activities of the Agency, nor does it clearly define the objectives of the SC65,66. 

Article  4  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  defines  the  EBCG  as  a  body  comprising  both  the 
relevant Member States’ authorities responsible for border management, including coast 
guards to the extent they carry out border control tasks, national authorities responsible 
for return  and Frontex.  However, the  regulatory  provisions focus primarily on  Frontex. 
Frontex is to implement EIBM as a shared responsibility with national authorities67, in 
practice  shared  responsibility  makes  it  difficult  to  establish  accountability  in  situations 

64   The detailed findings are presented in section 4 (evaluation questions (EQ) 24-28) of Annex IIIa. 
65   Articles 5 and 54 of the EBCG Regulation.  
66   ICF study (2023), p. 15. 
67   Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation. 

18 

 
 
 
where both Frontex and national authorities are involved  in an operation68, including in 
third  countries.  In  addition,  during  joint  operations,  various  local  authorities  may  be 
present  in  areas  where  Frontex  operations  take  place,  being  subject  to  different 
jurisdictions  and  obligations.  Frontex’s  operational  staff  is  under  the  tactical  command 
and  control  of  the  host  State,  yet  both  Frontex  and  national  operational  staff  are  also 
responsible under EU law and international law, including on fundamental rights69. 

The regulation of the use of force is not sufficiently clear in Article 82 and Annex V of 
the EBCG Regulation. In defining ‘force’, the provisions do not clarify the meaning of 
‘the  use  of  any  instruments’  when  resorting  to  force70.  Annex  V  provides  general 
principles governing the ‘use of force and weapons and general practical rules on the ‘use 
of force, weapons, ammunition and equipment’ during operations and related activities. 
However, it is not clear whether the principles of using force, control, and authorisation 
are applicable to all means of force. The use of force and the circumstances in which it is 
allowed also depend on the national law of the host Member State and are further defined 
in the relevant operational plans71.  

On personal data protection, while the Agency is bound by Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 
(EU DPR)72, Articles 86 to 91 of the EBCG Regulation set specific rules applicable to the 
EBCG. The analysis found that the EBCG Regulation is not always sufficiently detailed, 
including  on  the  allocation  of  responsibilities  between  the  Agency  and  Member  States. 
Moreover, it leaves a wide margin of interpretation of some provisions (e.g. risk analysis, 
EUROSUR). Furthermore, while Frontex deems some of these constraints on processing 
the operational personal data in the EBCG Regulation too restrictive, the limitations have 
a clear purpose to ensure that data is processed only within the Agency’s legal mandate73. 
In 2021, the Agency adopted implementing rules74 on the data protection provision of the 
EBCG Regulation. However, the EDPS issued opinions on both sets of rules, which was 
the  reason  for  the  Agency  to  revise  them.  On  the  basis  of  the  drafts  provided  by  the 
Frontex DPO, the Management Board adopted the two decisions in early 2024. With the 

68   Gkliati, M. (2022). ‘The next phase of the European Border and Coast Guard: responsibility for returns 
and push-backs in Hungary and Greece’. European Papers; Fink, M. (2020). ‘Frontex: Human rights 
responsibility and access to justice’. Karamanidou, L. and Kasparek, B. (2020).  ‘Fundamental rights, 
accountability  and  transparency  in  European  Governance  of  Migration:  the  case  of  the  European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency’. Working Papers. 

69   ICF study (2023), p. 15. 
70   Annex  V  to  the  EBCG  Regulation:  ‘For  the  purposes  of  this  Regulation,  ‘use  of  force’  refers  to 
recourse by  statutory  staff  deployed  as  members  of  the  teams  to  physical  means  for  the  purposes  of 
performing their functions or ensuring self-defence, which includes the use of hands and body and the 
use of any instruments, weapons, including firearms, or equipment […]’. 

71   The detailed findings are presented in section 4 (EQ 27) of Annex IIIa. 
72   Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, 
bodies,  offices  and  agencies  and  on  the  free  movement of  such  data,  and  repealing  Regulation (EC) 
No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39). 

73   The detailed findings are presented in section 4 (EQ 27) of Annex IIIa. 
74   Management  Board Decision 68/2021 of 21 December 2021 adopting the rules on the  processing of 
personal data by Frontex and Management Board Decision 69/2021 of 21 December 2021 adopting the 
rules on processing operational personal data by the Agency. 

19 

 
 
recent  adoption  of  the  two  revised  MB  decisions75,  as  well  as  their  subsequent 
implementation  by  the  Agency,  any  further  assessment  of  the  need  to  modify  the  data 
protection provisions of the EBCG Regulation would be premature. 

On  the  definition  of  return-related  activities,  while  the  definition  of  return  in  the 
EBCG Regulation is broad and refers to the entire return process, a clearer definition of 
relevant  ‘return’-related  concepts  (e.g.  ‘voluntary  return’  and  ‘voluntary  departure’) 
would  help  facilitate  implementation  and  operational  application  of  the  mandate  on 
return. 

According  to  Article  10(ac)  of  the  Regulation,  Frontex  is  to  provide  the  necessary 
assistance for the deployment of a common information-sharing environment, including 
interoperability  of  systems,  as  appropriate.  However,  in  the  course  of  developing 
prototypes  of  IT  tools  to  assist  Member  States  in  border  management  activities,  it  has 
been  noted  that  the  legal  framework  does  not  enable  the  Agency  to  maintain  such 
information-sharing environments once they have been developed.  

External coherence 

Key evaluation findings 

The  EBCG  Regulation  is  coherent  with  other  EU-level  legislative  instruments.76 
However, the analysis revealed that:  

•  pre-existing  legal  instruments  (such  as  Regulation  656/201477)  do  not  entirely 
reflect  Frontex’s  extended  mandate  on  search  and  rescue  (SAR),  and  clearer 
definitions  on  various  return  related  concepts  and  activities,  such  as  voluntary 
return and voluntary departure, beyond the definition of return in Article 3(3) of 
the Return Directive would facilitate the operational application of the mandate 
in the area of return.  

• 

certain  provisions  of  the  EU  Staff  Regulations78  are  not  suited  to  the  statutory 
staff  (Category  1)  of  the  SC  that  carries  out  an  operational,  uniformed  service 
with executive powers. 

Regulation 656/2014, as it was adopted before the EBCG Regulation, does not capture 
Frontex’s expanded mandate in SAR under the current EBCG Regulation. Article 10(i) 
requires  Frontex  to  provide  technical  and  operational  assistance  to  Member  States  and 
third  countries  […],  in  support  of  SAR  operations  for  persons  in  distress  at  sea,  which 
may arise during border surveillance operations at sea. However, Frontex cannot conduct 

75   ICF study (2023), pp. 24 to 28. 
76   For further detail, please see also section 4.1.2.6. 
77   Regulation  (EU)  No  656/2014  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  15  May  2014 
establishing  rules  for  the  surveillance  of  the  external  sea  borders  in  the  context  of  operational 
cooperation coordinated by the European Agency  for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 93). 

78   Regulation  No  31  (EEC),  11  (EAEC),  laying  down  the  Staff  Regulations  of  Officials  and  the 
Conditions  of  Employment  of  Other  Servants  of  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the 
European Atomic Energy Community (OJ 45, 14.6.1962, p. 1385). 

20 

 
 
 
SAR  operations  independently  or  without  the  coordination  of  a  national  Rescue 
Coordination  Centre  (RCC).  This  gap  has  an  impact  on  the  ability  to  delineate 
accountability  between  Frontex  and  Member  States  (see  also  ‘internal  coherence’),  in 
particular in any case where the national RCC may decide not to initiate SAR.  

While there is no incoherence between the EBCG Regulation and the Return Directive, 
the  term  ‘assisted  voluntary  return’  was  introduced  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  without 
being defined79. The implementation of Frontex’s mandate on return could be facilitated 
by some additional clarity in this respect. 

The  Schengen  Borders  Code80  and  the  reformed  Schengen  Evaluation  Regulation81 
were found to be coherent with the EBCG Regulation.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  and  the  internal  framework  set  by  MB  Decision  25/2016  are  in 
line  with  Regulation  (EC)  1049/2001  on  public  access  to  documents82  although  the 
European  Ombudsman  reported  that  in  several  cases  the  Agency  did  not  follow  up  on 
some of the requirements, somewhat limiting transparency and access to documents83. 

Three large-scale IT systems are in place to manage external borders, the SIS, Eurodac, 
and the VIS, while three other systems are under development – the EES, ETIAS, and the 
European  Criminal  Records 
(ECRIS-TCN).  Furthermore, 
Information  System 
EUROSUR  provides  a  framework  for  information  exchange  and  cooperation  between 
Member  States  and  Frontex  to  improve  situational  awareness  and  increase  reaction 
capability at the external borders84. While there is no inconsistency within the legislative 
framework,  during  the  consultations,  it  was  highlighted  that  access  to  the  information 
systems  is  usually  provided  in  the  national  language  of  the  Member  States,  adding  a 
practical  obstacle  for  the  SC  members  (including  those  from  other  Member  States)  to 
access  the  systems  in  the  host  Member  State.  Frontex  is  developing  its  own  access  to 
SIS, and, in the case of ETIAS, the Agency will have its own case management system. 

According  to  Articles  2(15)  and  54  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  the  Agency’s  statutory 
staff,  including  Category  1  SC  staff,  is  subject  to  the  EU  Staff  Regulations.  SC  staff 
seconded by Member States (Categories 2 and 3) are typically subject to a specific legal 

79   The need to have a clear definition of voluntary return as also highlighted by FRA in its contribution to 

the Commissions evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, p. 19. 

80   Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union 
Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1). 
81   Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922 of 9 June 2022 on the establishment and operation of an evaluation 
and monitoring mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis, and repealing Regulation 
(EU) No 1053/2013 (OJ L 160, 15.6.2022, p. 1). 

82   Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 
43). 

83   European Ombudsman (2021). ‘Decision in OI/4/2021/MHZ on how the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency (Frontex) complies with its fundamental rights obligations and ensures accountability 
in relation to its enhanced responsibilities’.  

84   Article  10(1)(ab)  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  states  that  Frontex  establishes,  develops  and  operates 
information systems that enable swift and reliable exchanges of information on emerging risks in the 
management of the external borders, illegal immigration and return. 

21 

 
 
regime  created  for  law  enforcement  authorities.  For  Category  1  staff,  however,  some 
aspects  of  working  conditions,  such  as  working  time,  shift  work  and  stand-by  patterns, 
and related allowance entitlements, ranks and reclassification, specific deployment rules, 
disciplinary measures, (early) retirement, are governed by the Staff Regulations and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, or their implementing rules, which are not 
adjusted  to  or  do  not  necessarily  take  sufficiently  into  account  the  specific  nature  of 
duties and operational activities performed by the SC. 

While the application of the EU Staff Regulations to Category 1 SC staff is indeed  not 
entirely adequate for staff carrying our border guards tasks, the evaluation finds that the 
majority of those challenges, with the most relevant exception of the possibility of early 
retirement,  e.g.  allowing  shift  work  or  stand-by,  issues  related  to  sick  leave,  specific 
deployment rules, could be resolved with the adoption of new or amendment of existing 
implementing rules by the Commission and/or by the MB, in line with Article 110 of the 
Staff Regulations.    

In addition, while Category 1 staff should be able to carry out the same tasks as national 
border  guards,  including  the  use  of  firearms,  this  aspect  of  the  Regulation  does  not 
appear  to  be  properly  implemented  in  some  Member  States  that  have  not  aligned  the 
rights  of  Category  1  staff  to  those  of  their  national  border  guards.  However,  this  issue 
does  not  derive  from  EU  legislation  but  from  the  incomplete  implementation  of  the 
Regulation by those Member States.  

Finally,  The  EBCG  Regulation  is  coherent85  with  the  Common  Approach  to 
Decentralised Agencies86. 

4.1.2. Effectiveness  

4.1.2.1 Governance and organisational structure of Frontex 

Key evaluation findings 

Frontex’s governance as defined in the legislation is effective, the roles of the MB and of 
the  ED  are  clearly  differentiated.  However,  return  is  not  yet  fully  integrated  into  the 
current MB structure, with limited representation of return authorities. 

Oversight by the Commission and EP are adequate, but the Parliament could make use 
of Article 112 and engage national parliaments.  

Internal  oversight  structures  have  sufficient  independence  (Fundamental  Rights  Office, 
Data Protection Office, Internal Audit Capability (IAC)) but still need time to build their 
capacity and powers to exercise their roles in full.  

85   The  only notable divergence is that  the Common Approach provides that the management boards of 
decentralised agencies should include ‘where appropriate’, a member designated by the  EP, which is 
not provided in Article 101 of the EBCG Regulation. However, a representative of the EP is invited to 
every MB meeting (Article 104 of the EBCG Regulation).  

86   Council of the EU (2012). ‘Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the 
European Commission on Decentralised Agencies and Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies. 
The  Joint  Statement  and  the Common  Approach on  Decentralised  Agencies  has  legally  non-binding 
character’. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST 11450 2012 INIT/EN/pdf.   

22 

 
 
 
Frontex’s  organisational  structure  has  expanded  to  incorporate  the  Agency’s  new 
responsibilities, but does not adequately cover its new mandate and the  management of 
the SC. The Agency is in the process of developing a new structure. 

Governance 

The  governance  structure  established  by  the  EBCG  Regulation,  which  focuses  on 
Frontex, supports the performance of the Agency’s tasks. The Management Board is the 
main governing body of Frontex and is responsible for the Agency’s strategic decisions87. 
It comprises representatives of the heads of the border authorities of the 26 EU Member 
States  signatories  to  the  Schengen  acquis88  and  two  representatives  from  the  European 
Commission.  The  role  of  the  MB  is  appropriately  defined.  However,  the  expanding 
mandate of Frontex has led to an expanding workload for the MB. Hence there is a need 
to make strategic decision-making and oversight more efficient. According to a small 
minority  of  Member  States,  the  workload  often  leads  to  discussions  of  very  technical 
issues  that  are  not  a  priority  for  all89  and  leave  limited  time  for  high-level  strategic 
discussions  (including  on  key  documents,  like  the  Single  Programming  Document 
(SPD))90. It is to note that after the resignation of the Agency’s former ED in 2022, the 
MB  stepped  up  and  extensively  supported  the  work  of  the  interim  senior  management 
until the new ED took office in March 2023. 

One  concern  that  was  identified  in  relation  to  the  composition  of  the  MB  is  that  the 
members  of  the  MB  appointed  by  most  Member  States  do  not  represent  national 
authorities responsible for return. This impacts the effectiveness of the MB’s strategic-
level governance on return policies.  

The  European  Commission  oversees  the  work  of  EU  decentralised  agencies  and  is 
represented in  the  MB.  The EBCG Regulation  confers several  wide-ranging  powers on 
the Commission, which allow for political oversight of key Frontex activities (including 
externally).  Overall,  the  stakeholders  interviewed  considered  that  the  Commission’s 
powers  were  well  defined91.  At  the  same  time,  these  powers  are,  to  a  great  extent, 

87   Functions  of  the  MB  are  outlined  in  Article  100  of  the  EBCG  Regulation:  the  MB  establishes  the 
organisational  structure  of  Frontex,  adopts  the  budget  and  multiannual/annual  work  programmes, 
appoints  the  Executive  Director  and  Deputy  Executive  Directors,  and  ensures  adequate  follow-up  to 
findings and recommendations deriving from evaluations and audits.  

88   Frontex  (n.d).  Representatives  from  IE  are  also  invited  to  participate  in  MB  meetings,  in  line  with 
Article 104(4) of the EBCG Regulation. SACs (CH, IS, LI, NO) also participate in the Agency’s MB 
meetings,  in  line  with  Article  101(3)  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  Each  sends one representative  to  the 
MB but retains limited voting rights.  

89   ICF interviews with MS/SAC authorities (6/27). 
90   ICF interviews with MB and Frontex. 
91   ICF  interviews  with  MB  (5/5,  with  one  MS  questioning  whether  the  Commission  needs  two  MB 

representatives) and Frontex.  

23 

 
 
 
exercised via a high  number of formalised procedures, in  particular  opinions, decisions 
and approvals92, that create significant workload for the European Commission. 

The  European  Parliament  provides  political  scrutiny  and  budgetary  oversight  of  the 
Agency. The EBCG Regulation foresees that an expert of the EP may be invited to MB 
meetings  (Article  104(7)),  but  in  practice  a  permanent  observer  from  the  EP’s  LIBE 
Committee Secretariat is participating in MB meetings, with reporting function.  

The  political  scrutiny  and  budgetary  oversight  of  the  EP  appears  largely  effective 
according to  stakeholders,  with  the  EP having  enhanced  its  oversight  following  intense 
media  pressure  on  Frontex.  In  January  2021,  it  created  a  Frontex  Scrutiny  Working 
Group (FSWG) to monitor the Agency’s compliance with fundamental rights93. A report 
of  the  FSWG  on  its  investigation  was  presented  in  July  202194.  The  report  noted  that 
parliamentary  oversight  could  be  strengthened  in  relation  to  the  role  of  national 
parliaments holding their own national governments accountable95. This has highlighted 
the  need  to  use  Article  112  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  which  allows  cooperation 
between the EP and national parliaments to exercise scrutiny more effectively, in light of 
the shared responsibility of Frontex and national authorities for border management and 
return. Some external stakeholders believe that a permanent EP representative on the MB 
would enhance oversight96. However, most interviewees from the EP did not favour this 
option, given the need for the Parliament to retain independence97.  

Overall,  stakeholders  considered  the  powers  of  the  Executive  Director  to  be  well 
defined98.  in  Article  106  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  The  decision  to  expand  the 
management  structure  of  the  Agency  to  include  three  Deputy  Executive  Directors  with 
well-defined portfolios added efficiency in light  of the Agency’s expanded mandate, as 
will  moving  towards  delegated  decision-making  rather  than  relying  on  an  overly 
centralised model, which was the past practice at the Agency99.  

The  Fundamental  Rights  Officer 
for  monitoring  Frontex’s 
is 
implementation  of  its  fundamental  rights  obligations  and  reports  directly  to  the  MB. 
Certain oversight limitations have been identified in the FRO’s role (see section 4.1.9 on 

responsible 

92   Selected examples requiring adoption by the College of Commissioners: Commission prior approval to 
every  deployment  of  liaison  officers  to  third  countries  (Art.  76(5)  of  the  EBCG  Regulation); 
Commission opinion  to the  compliance of Frontex  rules on the use of force to the  Staff Regulations 
and Conditions of Employment (Art.  55(5)),  Commission opinion to the multiannual  strategy  on the 
Agency’s own technical capabilities (Art. 63(2)); Commission approval to Frontex security rules (Art. 
92),  Commission  prior  approval  to  every  draft  working  arrangement  between  Frontex  and  a  third 
country  (Art.  76(4))  or  between  Frontex  and  an  EU  bodies,  offices  or  agencies,  or  international 
organisations (Art. 68(2)).   

93   European Parliament (2022). ‘Scrutiny of Frontex’. Briefing.  
94   European Parliament (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning alleged 

fundamental rights violations’. Working Document, LIBE Committee.  

95   Strik, T. (2022). ‘European oversight on Frontex’.  
96   European  Council  on  Refugees  and  Exiles  (ECRE)  (2021).  ‘Holding  Frontex  to  account:  ECRE’s 

proposal for strengthening non-judicial mechanisms for scrutiny of Frontex’. Policy paper.  

97   ICF interviews with MEPs (3/4). 
98   Article 106 of the EBCG Regulation. 
99   ICF interviews with Frontex and the European Commission. 

24 

 
 
fundamental  rights).  Efforts  including  the  2022  MB  decision  on  the  follow-up  to  the 
FRO’s  recommendations100  have  served  to  further  strengthen  the  efficiency  and 
effectiveness of the FRO. 

The  tasks,  duties  and  powers  of  the  Data  Protection  Officer  are  specified  in  a  MB 
Decision adopted in 2021101. The DPO is independent in the performance of their duties, 
and reports directly to the MB102 as well as to the ED. A major ongoing challenge for the 
DPO  is  its  low  number  of  staff,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  manage  the  high  workload 
associated with the expanding Agency103.  

An  Internal  Audit  Capability  (IAC)  was  established  under  Article  80  of  the  Frontex 
Financial  Regulation104,  through  the  adoption  of  MB  Decision  43/2020,  to  create  an 
internal  auditing  function  within  Frontex105.  The  IAC  is  functionally  independent  and 
reports  to  the  MB  and  the  ED106.  As  a  recent  initiative,  there  is  insufficient  time  to 
evaluate its  contribution  to  enhancing  the effectiveness  of internal  governance, but  it is 
likely  to  support  internal  decision-making  and  improved  governance  in  the  future.  The 
Head  of  IAC  considers  that  there  are  sufficient  human  resources  to  carry  out  their 
function107.  

Organisational structure 

The  organisational  structure  of  the  Agency  is  not  sufficiently  aligned  with  its  new 
mandate and further changes are needed. Comparing the 2018 structure of the Agency 
(when it was a traditional EU decentralised agency) with its current structure shows that 
despite  its  expansion  in  size,  it  has  failed  to  adequately  accommodate  the  necessary 
operational  management  for  the  SC,  consisting  (primarily)  of  law  enforcement  officers 
and  specialised  equipment  and  assets.  The  split  of  competences  across  a  number  of 
divisions  is  unclear,  leading  to  a  lack  of  ownership  or  clear  processes108.  The 

100   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of 20 July 2022 adopting the rules for the Executive Director 
and the Management Board to inform the Consultative Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations 
and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Officer.  
101   Management  Board  Decision  56/2021  of  15  October  2021  adopting  implementing  rules  on  the 
application  of  Regulation  (EU)  2018/1725  concerning  the  tasks,  duties  and  powers  of  the  Data 
Protection  Officer  as  well  as rules  concerning  Designated Controllers  in  Frontex.  It  should  be  noted 
that Management Board Decision 9/2023 of 18 March 2023 repealed and replaced Management Board 
Decision 56/2021. 

102   Including on serious breaches of the data protection regulatory framework OR issues which may have 

direct impact on data processing activities conducted jointly by Frontex and Member States. 

103   ICF interview with Frontex.  
104   Management Board Decision 19/2019 of 23 July 2019 adopting the Frontex Financial Regulation. 
105   The IAC aims to ‘support Frontex to accomplish its objectives by applying a systematic approach to 
evaluate  and  make  evidence-based  and  realistic  recommendations  for  improving  the  effectiveness  of 
governance,  risk  management  and  control  processes’  (Management  Board  Decision  56/2022  of 
22 September 2022). 

106   Management  Board  Decision  56/2022  of  22  September  2022  approving  the  Frontex  Internal  Audit 

Charter. 

107   ICF study (2023), p. 34 to 38. 
108   Examples  include  the  split  management  of  the  SC  across  a  number  of  divisions;  the  split  of  the 
corporate governance division into two (creating a fragmented approach and inconsistencies, with one 
division  responsible  for  ICT,  finance  and  other  for  human  resources,  legal  and  procurement). 

25 

 
 
 
Management  Board  adopted  the  Agency’s  new  organisational  structure  in  November 
2023, which  the Agency will start  to implement in  January 2024.  On the operational 
level,  the  current  structure  results  in  multiple  reporting  channels.  Frontex  is 
currently developing new operational and chain of command (FC2)109 concepts which are 
likely  to  result  in  changes  to  how  the  SC  are  structured  and  establish  clearer  reporting 
lines. 

Overall,  the  Agency  has  a  clear  planning  process,  with  the  programming  process 
substantiated by a clear legal basis110. The Agency’s programming documents are sent 
to  the  Commission,  the  EP  and  the  Council,  and  are  endorsed  by  the  MB111.  In 
consultation with the European Commission and the MB, Frontex developed a Roadmap 
for the implementation of the EBCG Regulation. Structured according to sections of the 
Regulation, the Roadmap is continuously updated, most recently in 2023112, and helps to 
inform the MB on the implementation of its mandate113. 

4.1.2.2 Operations 

Key evaluation findings 

Overall, Frontex’s operational support is valued by Member States and has contributed 
to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG.  Frontex  brings  added  value  through  human 
resources  and  technical  means  sent  to  Member  States  and  third  countries  facing 
challenges  related  to  heightened  migratory  flows,  as  well  as  standardising  procedures 
and harmonising operational implementation of good practices at EU level.  

Some  factors,  mainly  stemming  from  implementation-related  issues  and  not  the 
Regulation itself, limit the effectiveness of Frontex’s operational response, such as  

resource planning for operations,  

•  needs assessment and proactive planning of operations, 
• 
•  availability of certain profiles,  
•  different work rules and practices of SC staff compared to Member States114,  
•  access to information and relevant databases, and  
• 

yet to be streamlined command-and-control structures115.  

During  the  evaluation  period,  Frontex  provided  extensive  technical  and  operational 
assistance  to  Member  States  through  joint  operations  (JOs)  and  rapid  border 

Moreover,  one  unit  has  responsibility  for  procurement,  while  another  oversees  budget,  with  two 
directors holding decision-making power. 

109   Pilot project in Romania (2023). 
110   Including:  EBCG  Regulation;  Management  Board  Decision  19/2019;  European  Commission 

communication C(2020) 2297; Executive Director Decision 2021-130. 

111   Articles 106(2)(c) and 115 of the EBCG Regulation. 
112   Frontex (2022). ‘Roadmap: Implementation of Regulation 2019/1896’. EMB/ESO/November/2022.  
113   The detailed findings are presented in section 3 (EQ 22) of Annex IIIa. 
114   See under coherence in section 4.1.1. The detailed findings are presented in section on the Review of 
the Standing Corps (review question (RQ) 7) Annex IIIb and in section 4 (EQ 27) of Annex IIIa. 
115   See under ‘organisational structure’ in section 4.1.2.1. The detailed findings are presented in section 3 

(EQ 22) of Annex IIIa. 

26 

 
 
 
interventions  (RBIs),  including  technical  and  operational  assistance  in  SAR  operations. 
Frontex’s  operational  support  was  mainly  in  terms  of  border  surveillance  and  border 
checks activities via JOs at the external borders. The majority of JOs and RBIs focused 
on the land and sea external borders under significant migratory pressure. Other types of 
operational  activities  are  carried  out  through  focal  points  established  at  key  border 
crossing points.  

Table 1: Frontex joint operations carried out in the period 2020-2023 

Operation 
Total  number  of 
joint operations 
and 
land 
Air, 
maritime operations 
Land 
joint 
operations 
Maritime 
operations 
Air joint operations 

2020 
15 
operations 
1 
operation 
3 
operations 
8 
operations 
1 
operation 
2 
Total  number  of 
(Greece-
rapid 
border 
Turkey) 
interventions 
Source: Frontex CAARs (2020-2022) 

joint 

2021 
19 operations 

2022 
20 operations 

2023116 
24 operations 

1 operation 

1 operation 

1 operation 

5 operations 

5 operations 

9 operations 

11 operations 

13 operations 

13 operations 

1 operation 

1 operation 

1 operation 

1  (Lithuania  – 
Belarus) 

-  

- 

Overall,  Frontex’s  operational  support  is  valued  by  Member  States  and  has 
contributed  to  managing  the  migratory  pressures  and  protecting  and  managing  EU 
external  borders.  The  core  added  value  of  Frontex  is  to  allocate  operational  resources, 
such  as  personnel  and  equipment  to  support  Member  States  in  terms  of  border 
management and return.  

Additionally, Frontex has a role to develop European technical and operational standards 
and  harmonise  practices  among  Member  States.  Frontex  has  developed  together  with 
Member  States  several  operational  guidelines  and  handbooks  that  support  this 
objective117.   

Frontex JOs are planned and implemented on the basis of the standard operational cycle, 
comprising  of  initiation,  planning,  implementation,  and  evaluation.  Eleven  Member 
States  surveyed  experienced  no  issues  with  the  joint  planning  of  operations,  while  ten 
experienced some issues, such as the operational planning of a JO being cumbersome or 
that  the  information  provided  by  Frontex  is  less  up-to-date  than  national  operational 
awareness.  

116   Number of operations for 2023 cover the period from 1 January 2023 to 12 September 2023. 
117   For  example,  Handbook  to  the  operational  plan,  VEGA  Handbook (Children  at  airports, Children  at 
land borders, Children at sea, Countermeasures at airports), Handbook on Firearms for Border Guards 
and  Customs  Officers,  Handbook  on  Risk  Profiles  on  Trafficking  in  Human  Beings,  Boarding  in 
Frontex-coordinated Joint maritime Operations: Best Practices & Guidelines. 

27 

 
 
The  Agency  has  recently  started  to  develop  a  four-category  concept  to  prioritise  the 
needs of various countries/border sections which is expected to have a positive impact on 
the planning of the deployment of SC staff and equipment.  

The  availability  of  certain  categories  of  SC  profiles  do  not  fully  correlate  with  the 
overall needs.  While  the situation has improved  over time, specific profiles are in  high 
demand and Frontex reports up to 65% gaps for certain profiles118.  

The EBCG Regulation119 refers to the use of databases, but Frontex’s access to national 
databases  depends  on  the  agreement  of  the  host  Member  State.  Challenges  in  sharing 
and accessing information were reported by nine Member States120. Only four countries 
facilitate some form  of  access  (CZ,  FR, PT and IS). Other Member  States currently do 
not  allow  Frontex  staff  to  consult  relevant  databases,  including  national  databases  for 
border  checks.  However,  where  such  access  is  provided,  the  information  is  often 
available only in the national language, which is an obstacle for SC staff.  

Frontex has not yet finalised the technical implementation of access to SIS. The current 
lack of access to relevant European databases (such as VIS, SIS), which is due to delays 
and  implementation  issues,  further  limits  the  support  the  Agency  can  provide  for 
border checks. 

4.1.2.3. Return 

Key evaluation findings 

The Agency’s extensive support in the area of return is highly valued and Member States 
see  the  added  value  of  Frontex’s  coordinating  role  and  their  ‘catalogue  of  services’ 
offered to Member States. The share of Frontex voluntary returns is increasing, while the 
Agency is still developing its service and expertise under its new mandate. 

The  digitalisation  of  the  return  process  is  a  priority  for  Frontex  and  successfully 
supports coordination with Member States. 

There is however room for improvement in the following areas: 

•  Certain  concepts  in  the  area  of  return  (such  as  voluntary  returns,  voluntary 
departures,  reintegration,  post-arrival  assistance)  are  not  defined  in  the  EBCG 
Regulation, causing ambiguity in the implementation of the Agency’s tasks121;  

•  The  lack  of  strategic  steer  by  the  MB  in  the  absence  of  the  representation  of 

national authorities responsible for return122;  

•  The EBCG Regulation does not provide for vulnerability assessment to cover the 

118   Frontex  reports  up  to  65%  shortages  for  certain  profiles,  such  as  dog  handlers,  a  47%  for  return 
specialists,  and  a  33%  shortage  for  advanced  level document  officers.  Frontex  report on  capabilities 
5./9.2023. 

119   Articles 32 and 82(10) of the EBCG Regulation. 
120   ICF interviews with MS/SAC authorities (9/27). 
121   See under coherence in section 4.1.1. The detailed findings are presented  section 4 (EQ 27) of Annex 

IIIa. 

122   See in section 4.1.2.1 on governance. 

28 

 
 
Total number 
of persons 
returned 

Of which 
voluntary 
returns 

Number of 
people 
returned via 
charter flights  

area of return, only limited risk analyses are carried out123. 

Frontex has become an essential actor in the common EU system for return, taking 
on new responsibilities related to return of people who have no legal right to stay in the 
EU.  Frontex  has  effectively  supported  Member  States  through  all  phases  of  return 
procedures.  Stakeholders  at  EU  and  national  level  value  Frontex’s  operational  and 
technical  assistance  in  return,  particularly  in  organising  joint  return  operations  (JROs), 
but also in other return-related support. 

Table 2: Key results of Frontex return operations 

Operation 

2019 

15,850 

2020 

12,072 

2021 

18,301 

2022 

24,850 

2023124 

25,283 

1% 

18% 

26% 

39% 

53% 

7,952  

10,903 on 
330 
operations to 
40 third 
countries of 
return 

9,919 
persons to 
32 countries 
of return 

10,193 
persons on 
337 
operations to 
33 countries 
of return 

3,981 

4,776 to 81 
destinations 

Number of 
people 
returned via 
scheduled 
flights 
Source: Frontex Consolidated Annual Activity Reports (2019-2022). 

8,108 
persons 107 
countries of 
return 

14,937 
persons to 
116 
countries of 
return 

7,210 on 189 
return 
operations to 
27 third 
countries of 
return 

18,073 to 
109 third 
countries of 
return 

Most Member States surveyed did not encounter any challenges when cooperating with 
Frontex  in  the  different  stages  of  the  return  process.  The  majority  reported  positive 
cooperation with  Frontex in  the field of return and also  noted indirect  benefits,  such as 
reducing  secondary  movements.  Some  Member  States125  particularly  valued  Frontex’s 
assistance with  organising charter flights,  which  are  considered a safer option to  return 
violent and difficult cases. Efforts were made to use scheduled flights for cases that could 
reasonably be returned that way. Challenges included last-minute cancellations of JROs, 
which typically reflected problems of cooperation between the organising Member State 
and the third country of destination.   

123   See in section 4.1.2.4 on situational awareness. 
124   Numbers from 2023 cover the period from 1 January 2023 to10 September 2023. 
125   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 3/27. 

29 

 
 
 
The  EBCG  Regulation  extended  the  Agency’s  mandate  to  include  the  possibility  to 
provide  assistance  to  voluntary  returns.  Since  then,  the  Agency  has  enhanced  its 
tailored support for this type of return, the support with return counselling also increased. 

Pre-return assistance was valued by Member States, with reports of good experiences 
with European Return Liaison Officers (EURLOs), who helped with acquisition of travel 
documents and facilitated return operations.  

The  value  of  the  deployment  of  Frontex  Return  Escort  and  Support  Officers 
(FRESOs) was also underlined by several countries126. 

The  Agency  is  further  developing  its  own  capacity  to  organise  Frontex-led  return 
operations,  which  is  aimed  at  further  relieving  the  Member  States  from  some 
organisational burden. 

Post-arrival support and reintegration are a relatively new area for the Agency 127. The 
lack of clear definitions creates some practical difficulties in implementation. However, 
the Agency has developed ‘working definitions’ to overcome these obstacles. As regards 
return-related digitalisation by the Agency, most Member States reported that IRMA 
and FAR are convenient and user-friendly, and the availability of useful source material 
and information in one place is useful. To build capacity in Member States for an end-to-
end digitalisation of the  return process, the  Agency developed RECAMAS, a reference 
model for an  IT  return  case management system  to  be used by Member  States to  align 
their  national  IT  systems.  The  Agency  is  able  to  provide  both  technical  and  financial 
assistance to Member States in building such systems. 

4.1.2.4. Situational awareness 

Key evaluation findings 

Situational awareness: 

Frontex has made progress towards being able to produce fully up-to-date, reliable, and 
actionable  information  through  24/7  (near)  real-time  situation  and  crisis  monitoring 
surveillance128. However, some implementation gaps exist that limit its full potential, such 
as 

• 

the lack of access to data contributing to the pre-frontier situational picture, lack 
of  access  to  intelligence  sources  and  lack  of  access  to  sufficient  data  on  events 
related to irregular migration outside border areas; 

•  divergent practices among national coordination centres; 

126   FRESO  return  team  members  escort  individuals  who  have  received  a  return  decision  from  national 
authorities,  provide  ground  support  in  returns,  and  identify  and  assist  vulnerable  groups  or  families 
with children. 

127   Article 48(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 
128   Articles 24-28 of the EBCG Regulation. 

30 

 
 
• 

insufficient implementation of operational and analysis layers. 

EUROSUR129  supports  the  provision  of  a  European  situational  picture  but  does  not 
provide complete and up-to-date situational awareness at the EU’s external borders. 

The  upgrade  of  the  EUROSUR  communication  network  to  CONFIDENTIEL  UE/EU 
CONFIDENTIAL classification level has not been implemented. 

The Agency has provided valuable contribution to EU mechanisms such as the Migration 
Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint and the Integrated Situation Awareness and Analysis 
on the Migration and Refugee Situation (ISAA reports) prepared by the Commission in 
the framework of the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) mechanism. 

Risk analysis: 

Risk  analysis130  is  one  of  Frontex’s  activities  that  are  highest  valued  by  the  Member 
States. Member States view Frontex products as highly informative, and these products 
also help inform Frontex operational activities. However, some legal and implementation 
issues persist as  

•  Frontex  products  are  not  sufficiently  tailored  to  Member  States’  operational 

needs and do not contain actionable information; and 

• 

• 

the risk analysis is incomplete when considering the full scope of EIBM, as pre-
frontier and third-country analyses is insufficient and return-related risk analysis 
is lacking; 

the EBCG Regulation limits the processing of personal data by Frontex for risk 
analysis purposes131. 

Vulnerability assessment: 

Vulnerability assessments132 allow Frontex to effectively monitor potential vulnerabilities 
at  the  EU  external  borders  and  to  work  with  Member  States  to  reduce  those 
vulnerabilities. The following legislative and implementation gaps limit the effectiveness 
of the instrument: 

• 

• 

the  methodologies  of  risk  analysis  (CIRAM)  and  vulnerability  assessments 
(CVAM) are not fully coherent with each other, and as such risk analysis cannot 
fully benefit from potential synergies with vulnerability assessments; and 

lack  of  effective  mechanism  to  enforce  the  implementation  of  the  vulnerability 
assessment recommendations.  

Situational awareness 

Frontex has  been able to contribute to improved situational  awareness  at external 
borders through its products (including risk analysis, vulnerability assessments and 24/7 
situational  monitoring). Nevertheless,  several  elements impact  its ability to  provide up-
to-date and comprehensive situational monitoring. This stems in part from limitations in 

129   Articles 18-23 of the EBCG Regulation. 
130   Article 29 of the EBCG Regulation. 
131   See under ‘internal coherence’ in section 4.1.1. 
132   Article 32 of the EBCG Regulation. 

31 

 
 
 
the  EBCG  Regulation  relating  to  processing  of  personal  data,  (see  section  4.1.1.).  A 
number of implementation issues also persist, including incomplete reporting by Member 
States  in  the  context  of  EUROSUR  and  delays  by  Frontex  in  providing  risk  analysis 
products in all four-tiers of EIBM, due to methodological and data issues (especially in 
relation to return and third-country data).  

The  situational  picture  at  the  EU  external  borders  that  EUROSUR  provides  can 
thus only be partially accurate, complete, and up-to date. A majority of Member State 
respondents to the survey agreed that the implementation of the EUROSUR framework is 
effective in terms of information exchange to improve situational awareness133. However, 
only  a  minority  agreed  that  it  has  been  effective  in  terms  of  information  exchange  to 
increase  the  reaction  capabilities  among  the  relevant  stakeholders134  or  sufficient  to 
improve  detection,  prevention  and  combating  of  irregular  migration  and  cross-border 
crime.135  

While  input  of  data  by  Member  States  remains  a  challenge,  in  particular  when  it 
comes  to  possible  double  reporting  of  similar  information  in  JORA  and  EUROSUR, 
there have been significant  improvements  in  data quality,  flow, and speed of reporting. 
One  of  the  most  notable  achievements  is  the  marked  increase  in  data  quality,  with  a 
decrease in re-entry rates136. Frontex suggested that adding a tool to monitor the quality 
of data reports by Member States could be helpful, with data quality reports potentially 
feeding  into  existing  quality  control  mechanisms  (vulnerability  assessments,  Schengen 
evaluations, etc.), which would issue recommendations where needed137.  

Although  the  Regulation  foresees  an  upgrade  of  the  EUROSUR  communication 
network  to  CONFIDENTIEL  UE/EU  CONFIDENTIAL,  this  has  not  been 
implemented. The reasons are two-fold: firstly, Frontex’s current facilities do not meet 
the requirements for such an upgrade. Secondly, the upgrade has considerable costs, with 
little  added  value  in  terms  of  the  additional  information  that  could  be  shared  via 
EUROSUR, most of which does not require CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL 
classification  level.138  This  view  was  also  supported  by  around  half  of  the  Member 
States139.  A  minority  of  Member  States  see  a  potential  advantage  in  upgrading  the 
communication  network,  as  this  could  help  to  improve  information  sharing140  and  the 
European situational picture.141  However, the only type of information identified, which 
is  classified  and  would  add  value  to  the  situational  picture,  is  the  location  of  military 

133   ICF survey of MS/SAC: 17/27. 
134   ICF survey of MS/SAC: 13/27. 
135   ICF survey of MS/SAC: 6/27.  
136   Frontex. ‘Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of EUROSUR Article 

121(5) of Regulation (EU) No 2019/1896’. 

137   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document, p. 9. 
138   ICF scoping interview; interview with Frontex. 
139   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27. 
140   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities, 2/27. 
141   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities, 3/27.  

32 

 
 
assets involved in operations, such as in the Aegean or Central Mediterranean142. One of 
the issues that  require  further  clarification is  the  accreditation of the  classified  network 
and  the  entity  that  should  take  responsibility  for  this  process  (EUROSUR  Security 
Accreditation Board or Frontex Security Accreditation Authority). 

In its report of 1 July 2022 on the functioning of EUROSUR prepared in accordance with 
Article  121(5)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896143,  Frontex  presented  the  results  of  the 
implementation process carried out so far. It shares the observations outlined above, such 
as EUROSUR contribution to the improvement of the situational awareness, the need for 
timeliness and quality of reporting as well as significant investments that would need to 
be undertaken to establish a network enabling the exchange of classified information up 
to CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL level144.  

Risk analysis 

The  EBCG  Regulation  ‘reinforces  significantly  the  analytical  products  focusing  more 
than  ever  on  prediction  and  prevention’145,  The  risk  analysis  products  generated  by 
Frontex generally perform well across a number of key qualitative metrics. Its products 
are well received at strategic level, but lack of access to intelligence information limits 
their use at operational level146, Another shortcoming identified by a minority of Member 
States was the lack of regional or locally specific analysis147. Others found the strategic 
analysis helpful but felt there was not sufficient analysis linked to the joint operations148. 

Frontex’s  operational  activities  are  generally  based  on  up-to-date  risk  analysis  and  are 
well  received  by  key  stakeholders.  It  produces  a  wide  range  of  risk  analysis  products 
specifically on its joint operations.  

Some weaknesses were identified through consultation with Member States and Frontex. 
For  example,  the  risk  analysis  produced  by  Frontex  does  not  adequately  cover  all  four 
tiers  of  EIBM149.  The  key  elements  of  EIBM  missing  from  Frontex  risk  analysis 
products  are  returns  and  third-country  information,  while  EBCG  Regulation 
stipulates that Frontex’s mandate on risk analysis is to ‘monitor migratory flows toward 
the  Union,  and  within  the  union  in  terms  of  migratory  trends,  volume  and  routes,  and 
other trends or possible challenges at the external borders and with regard to return’150.  

142   ICF interview with Frontex; ICF interview – site visit to one MS; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 7/27 

shared a positive opinion. 

143   ‘Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of EUROSUR. Article 121(5) 

of Regulation (EU) No 2019/1896’. 

144   In accordance with Article 121(5) of Regulation (EU) 2019/1896, a report is to be prepared by Frontex 
and provided to the European Council and the EP on regular basis, every two years. The next edition 
will be presented in the end of 2023. 

145   Frontex (2022). ‘Single Programming Document 2022-2024’, p. 18. 
146   ICF interviews during site visits to two MS. 
147   ICF interviews with MS national authorities: 5/27. 
148   ICF interviews during site visits to two MS. 
149   Article 29(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 
150   Article 29 of the EBCG Regulation. 

33 

 
 
Vulnerability assessment 

Vulnerability  assessments  allow  Frontex  to  monitor  potential  vulnerabilities  at  EU’s 
external borders, and to work with  Member States to reduce those vulnerabilities. Most 
Member State respondents believe that Frontex’s vulnerability assessment activities help 
to  assess  Member  States’  readiness  and  capacity  to  face  challenges  at  external  borders 
and are conducive to better preparedness151. The assessments are also seen as helpful in 
the  context  of  the  Schengen  evaluations152.  The  European  Commission  and  Frontex 
have  worked  together  to  ensure  better  synergies  between  the  two  mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, some Member States still see these mechanisms as overlapping153. 

However,  some  Member  States  expressed  concern  that  vulnerability  assessment  data 
their  authorities154.  This 
collection  places  a  heavy  administrative  burden  on 
administrative pressure is compounded by a ‘highly inefficient IT platform’, reducing the 
added  value  of  the  annual  baseline  vulnerability  assessment.  Nevertheless,  Member 
States recognise the relative recency of the vulnerability assessment system, and Frontex 
has reported an ongoing upgrade to the Vulnerability Assessment Platform (VAP) to 
deal with this problem155.  

The analysis also found that, while the data collections for risk analysis and vulnerability 
assessment  should  be  coherent  with  one  another,  the  processes  within  Frontex  are  not 
sufficiently  interlinked.  One  issue  is  that  vulnerability  assessment  data  are  not  fully 
used in risk analysis products. This discrepancy is due to a certain level of conceptual 
misalignment between methodologies. The core of the problem, as identified by Frontex 
and Member States, is that the definition of vulnerability in the common integrated risk 
analysis model (CIRAM) does not match the definition of vulnerability in the common 
vulnerability  assessment  methodology  (CVAM)156.  For  Member  States,  vulnerability 
assessments  are  a  concrete,  quantitative  and  capacity-based  system  with  measurable 
outcomes.  Conversely,  the  conceptualisation  of  vulnerability  in  CIRAM  includes  ‘pull 
factors’, reflecting broader factors influencing the arrival of migratory flows from outside 
the EU157. 

In addition, the level of confidentiality of vulnerability assessment data means that it is 
harder  to  access  this  information  for  risk  analysis.  While  the  purpose  of  vulnerability 
assessments  is  to  allow  Member  States  to  address  their  own  specific  weaknesses,  risk 
analysis  can  take  a  more  overarching  and  EU-wide  approach,  with  an  associated  lower 
level  of  sensitivity.  Frontex  also  has  separate  systems  for  producing  risk  analyses 
and vulnerability assessments, which impacts their coherence. 

151   ICF survey of MS/SAC: 14/27. 
152   ICF interviews with DG HOME and Frontex. 
153   ICF interviews with MS/SAC: 8/27; survey of MS/SAC: 4/27. 
154   ICF interviews with MS/SAC: 6/27; Survey of MS/SAC: 3/27. 
155   Frontex (2022). ‘Single Programming Document 2023-2025’, p. 41. 
156   ICF interview with Frontex. 
157   ICF interview with one MS. 

34 

 
 
Finally,  a  weakness  of  vulnerability  assessments,  that  significantly  limits  their 
effectiveness, is the lengthy and indirect enforcement system established by the EBCG 
Regulation.  The  ‘escalation  procedure’ 
in  Article  32(9)-(10)  does  not  appear 
commensurate with the gravity of the vulnerabilities identified by the Agency at the EU’s 
external  borders.  The  analysis  also  found  that  in  cases,  where  a  Member  State  fail  to 
implement a recommendation and the ED then decides in accordance with Article 32(10) 
to escalate a case to the MB, the MB decision it not taken as resolute as intended in the 
ECBG  Regulation.  There  seem  to  be  a  reluctance  to  take  these  decisions,  despite  the 
impact that these vulnerabilities might have on all Member States. 

4.1.2.5. Capability development158 

Key evaluation findings 

Capability development:  

Despite  the  legal  framework  in  place,  the  implementation  of  capability  development 
planning has suffered significant delays. 

Training: 

Frontex has a strong role in the training of the European Border and Coast Guard; an 
overall training concept is, however, still under development. 

Technical equipment:  

On  technical  resources  progress  has  been  made,  although  there  are  significant 
challenges  implementation  of  the  Regulation.  The  challenges  are  related  to  the  wider 
legislative framework, implementation and technical practicalities. 

Research and innovation: 

Frontex  was  able  to  progress  in  this  area  and  adopted  flexible  solutions  to  promote 
implementation  of  technical  standards  and  methodology  for  defining  these  standards, 
and  the  establishment  of  minimum  standards  for  border  surveillance.  Nevertheless, 
especially in terms of technical standardisation, there is still work to do. 

Capability development 

The  overarching  capability  development  planning  is  still  under  implementation.  The 
requirement  of  the  Regulation  is  to  have  a  Capability  Roadmap  that  defines  long  term 
plans  for  recruitment,  training,  acquisition  of  technical  equipment  and  research  and 
innovation, both for the Agency and Member States.  

The process has been launched by collecting existing plans of the Member States as the 
baseline.  All  but  one  Member  State  sent  their  national  capability  development  plans  to 
Frontex  by  October  2023.  In  parallel,  the  Agency  presented  the  Capability  Roadmap 
methodology to the MB in September 2023. 

158   This  section  concerns  mainly  the  development  of  technical  capabilities.  The  development  of  human 

resources is further discussed in section 4.1.4. 

35 

 
 
 
After adoption of the TO-EIBM, the Capability Roadmap is to be attached to the Strategy 
as an annex. The Roadmap is still in the making. Due to lack of this document, four years 
after the entry into force of the 2019 Regulation, there is a lack of strategic direction for 
the long-term development of the capabilities of Frontex. 

In  parallel,  Frontex  has  developed  its  multiannual  acquisition  strategy,  which  is  to 
document  short,  medium,  and  long-term  needs.  The  European  Commission  adopted  its 
opinion  in  May  2023  on  the  Agency’s  multiannual  acquisition  strategy  for  technical 
equipment and its implementation plan. The strategy was only adopted by the Agency’s 
MB in September 2023159. Only the multiannual plan for the SC personnel profiles160 was 
already adopted in 2022.  

As a result, integrated planning161 could not be fully implemented yet. There is not  any 
well-defined  understanding  yet  of  the  acquisition  needs  within  Frontex  or  the  whole 
European Border and Coast Guard. Furthermore, it is also important to note that there is 
only  four  years  left  to  spend  the  significant  financial  resources  allocated  in  the  current 
MFF to technical equipment. 

Training 

An essential part of capacity development planning is training. Frontex has implemented 
a range of training activities for Member States and third countries and met most internal 
training targets. Frontex has been updating and maintaining training standards within the 
European  Border  and  Coast  Guard,  including  Standards  for  European  Common  Core 
Curriculum for border guards and several specialised trainings for Member States162.    

The Regulation specifies that an “Agency training centre” should be established163.  Such 
decision  has  not  been  taken  in  the  period  under  evaluation.  There  are  no  long-term 
sustainability assessments or comparable analysis on financial efficiency how to organise 
the  training.  A  Frontex  training  centre,  further  utilisation  Partnership  Academies  in 
Member States, externalising some parts of the training by tendering are possible options, 
as well as a hybrid solution of the options. 

At  the  same  time,  a  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that,  in  the 
spirit  of  shared  responsibility,  the  division  of  competence  between  Member  States  and 
Frontex,  as  set  out  in  the  Regulation,  is  sufficiently  clear  and  adequate  to  meet  the 
objectives on education and training of border and coast guards164.  

Technical equipment 

159   Management Board Decision 28/2023 of 15 September 2023 adopting the Multiannual Strategy for the 

Acquisition and Management of the Agency’s Equipment. 

160   Article 54(4) of the EBCG Regulation. 
161   Article 9 of the EBCG Regulation. 
162   Frontex  organises  a  wide  variety  of  trainings,  for  example  trainings  for  risk  analysis  specialists, 

EUROSUR operators and Schengen evaluators. 

163   Article 62(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 
164   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 14/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 

36 

 
 
The  equipment  of  the  Agency  and  equipment  of  Member  States  form  a  technical 
equipment  pool  that  is  to  be  gradually  developed  and  deployed  to  the  JOs.  Frontex  is 
managing and coordinating the pool and liaising with Member States in several working 
groups in this regard. Additionally, Frontex acquires and coordinates the development of 
other equipment, which is used by European Border and Coast Guard, including the SC. 

None of the targets in terms of development of technical equipment were fully met. The 
development was slowed down due to above-mentioned delays in the strategic planning. 
The  fact  that  the  multiannual  acquisition  strategy  was  missing  until  recently  was  a 
specific challenge. 

Lack of vision for the long-term development of the capabilities of the Agency impacted 
the  efficiency  of  acquisition  within  Frontex.  For  example,  the  acquisition  of  various 
items was delayed, forcing the Agency to rely on options that proved inefficient, at least 
initially, such as  renting vehicles (and subsequent  issues with  modifying  vehicles to  its 
specific needs and replace unsuitable vehicles that had deteriorated faster than anticipated 
vehicles)165. Given that the EBCG Regulation has as an objective to establish Frontex’s 
technical equipment as the backbone of EU’s border management166, the shortcomings in 
the acquisition present a significant problem in the implementation of the Regulation167. 

Firstly, the Agency was not able to acquire in a timely manner all the equipment that was 
necessary.  This  had  an  impact  on  equipping  the  SC  with  personal  equipment.  Even 
further,  this  also  impacted  the  acquisition  of  heavy  equipment  for  the  Agency  to  be 
deployed to the joint operations as the core equipment of SC. 

There are several  reasons for the delays.  The definition of the operational requirements 
and  development  of  the  technical  standards  has  been  taking  time.  At  the  same  time, 
procurement  has  been  cumbersome,  for  example  for  the  tendering  challenges. 
Additionally,  the  budgetary  rules  are  rather  strict,  and  synchronising  the  budgeting, 
planning and actual procurement is complex.  

Frontex has suffered from bottlenecks in terms of logistics, operators of the equipment, 
and  premises  to  dock,  store  and  maintain  the  equipment.  This  goes  especially  for  the 
heavy equipment. The resource issue has not been so far taken sufficiently into account 
while developing SC and Frontex headquarters staffing plans. 

Member  States  have  faced  challenges  as  well.  Member  States  have  not  contributed 
enough  technical  equipment  to  the  pool,  compared  to  the  operational  needs.  This  is 
mostly because the national technical equipment pool has been developed historically in 
line  with  the  national  needs  and  national  budget  constraints.  Even  so,  certain  types  of 
technical  equipment  in  the  Member  States  and  SAC  are  only  available  at  very  limited 
numbers, which poses challenges in covering the national needs, let alone contributing to 

165   ICF field visit to Frontex headquarters; interview with Frontex; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
166   Recital 71 of the EBCG Regulation. 
167   See the full overview in section 2 (EQ 6) of Annex IIIa. 

37 

 
 
cover EBCG needs. Even if there has been European funding available for some time, the 
large-extend  utilisation  of  funds  has  kicked  off  only  recently.  Getting  technical 
equipment  from  the  procurement  planning  all  the  way  to  be  deployed  and  operational 
typically takes several years. Additionally, some Member States have been discouraged 
to fully utilise European funds because of the requirements to allocate it annually to the 
European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Technical  Pool  in  line  with  the  requirements  under 
ISF/BMVI168.  Finally,  there  has  not  been  strong  oversight  nor  guidance  to  ensure  that 
Member States would fulfil their obligations to deploy equipment to the joint operations. 

Lastly,  there  are  a  number  of  administrative  and  practical  issues  that  make  European-
wide operating of certain equipment very cumbersome. An important element here is that 
although technical equipment exists at national level and can be made available, there is 
not  enough  crew  to  operate  it.  In  accordance  with  the  EBCG  Regulation,  the  Member 
State needs to provide the major equipment together with its crew. The crew will be part 
of that Member State’s  contribution  to  the Standing  Corps.  In  addition,  Member States 
are facing issues with the maintenance of the technical equipment. Other issues are about 
registrations,  transport,  insurances  and  similar  issues.  Itemising  and  solving  these 
practical  issues  will  greatly  promote  development  and  utilisation  of  the  technical 
equipment.  

Frontex and Member States can improve the situation considerably by making use of EU 
Financial  Instruments  (such  as  BMVI)  to  purchase  additional  technical  equipment 
(Member States), training crews for operating technical equipment (Frontex and Member 
States), providing support in logistics and maintenance (Frontex), and Frontex increasing 
its own pool of technical equipment. 

The  overall  gaps  in  the  technical  equipment  caused  that  joint  operations  have  had 
annually  shortages  of  essential  equipment,  compared  to  operational  needs.  Light 
equipment  (such  as  hand-held  sensors)  has  been  well  available,  but  heavy  equipment 
(such as maritime vessels) not so much.  

Research and innovation 

2020 – 2023 Frontex has been supporting European capability building with research and 
innovation  in  line  with  its  mandate.  Frontex  has  been  promoting  standardisation  and 
harmonisation  of  border  management  capabilities.  Additionally,  Frontex  has  been 
promoting  and  enhancing  innovation,  and  additionally  executing  and  supporting 
research169.  The  multiannual  programming  documents  define  the  expected  results  and 
indicators. 

168   See  Article  7(1)  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  515/2014  (ISF)  and  Article  13(14)(b)  of  Regulation  (EU) 

2021/1148 (BMVI). 

169   Frontex (2023). ‘Research and Innovation’.  

38 

 
 
Frontex  has  a  mandate  to  develop  standards  in  several  areas170,  including  standards  for 
border surveillance171 but the standardisation work has still work ahead. 

4.1.2.6. Cooperation with EU institutions, agencies and third countries 

Key evaluation findings 

Frontex  activities  are  aligned  with  the  activities  of  other  EU  stakeholders,  and 
cooperation with EU agencies and the European Commission has been effective. 

Frontex’s cooperation with third countries is viewed positively by key stakeholders. The 
new  model  status  agreement172  provides  a  good  basis  for  enhanced  cooperation  with 
third  countries.  At  the  same  time,  the  Agency  could  not  conclude  any  working 
arrangement based on the new model173 during the evaluation period, as its provisions on 
personal  data  protection  must  be  revised  due  to  concerns  expressed  by  the  EDPS.  The 
revision is ongoing with close contacts between the Commission and the EDPS.  

Frontex’s cooperation with international organisations is effective, however Article 68 of 
the Regulation contains an exhaustive list of organisations that the Agency can cooperate 
with.  This  limits  cooperation  with  some  relevant  regional  organisations  or  other 
international  partners  with  which  Frontex  has  cooperated  or  has  an  ongoing 
cooperation based on the 2016 EBCG Regulation. 

Cooperation with EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 

Frontex  has  well-established  cooperation  with  the  European  Commission  to  ensure 
coherence between policy priorities and the Agency’s operations in border management 
and return.  Frontex participates in the EU mechanism for preparedness and management 
of crises related to migration (Migration Preparedness and Crisis Blueprint)174 that brings 
together Member States, the Council, the Commission, EEAS, EUAA, Frontex, Europol, 
eu-LISA and FRA, to work together on migration preparedness and crisis management. 
Frontex provides ad hoc analytical contributions to support the Council, including inputs 
to  the  Council’s  Integrated  Political  Crises  Response  (IPCR)  as  well  as  Integrated 
Situational Awareness and Analysis Reports (ISAA)175. The Agency regularly reports to 
the EP on the progress of implementation of its recommendations. 

170   Articles 16 and 64(5) of the EBCG Regulation. 
171   A task of the Agency as per Article 10(1)(z) of the EBCG Regulation. 
172   European Commission (2021). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the  Council:  Model  status  agreement  as  referred  to  in  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  November 2019  on  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  and 
repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624. COM(2021) 829 final. 

173   European  Commission  (2021).  Annex  to  the  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European 
Parliament and the Council: Model status agreement as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast 
Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624. COM(2021) 830 final. 

174   European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2020/1366 of 23 September 2020. 
175   Frontex (2021). ‘Programming Document 2019-2021’, p. 39.  

39 

 
 
 
Frontex has well-established cooperation with EU JHA agencies on the basis of working 
arrangements176  (EUROPOL,  eu-LISA,  EUAA,  CEPOL,  FRA  etc.).  Overall,  Frontex’s 
activities are coherent with the activities of other agencies. However, potential overlaps 
in mandates require close coordination and clarifications.  

Cooperation  with  Europol  is  rated  positively,  although  a  minority  of  Member  States 
stressed the importance  of ensuring complementarity and avoiding overlaps, in  view of 
Frontex tasks in the area of cross-border crime177. Overall cooperation is rated as good, 
with  regular  contact  between  the  two  agencies178.  At  the  same  time,  the  cooperation 
arrangement  between  the  two  agencies  dates  back  to  2015  and  needs  to  be  updated  in 
accordance with the requirements of the EBCG Regulation on working arrangements179.  

Some Frontex stakeholders noted that the EBCG Regulation does not sufficiently specify 
the  Agency’s  role,  limitations,  and  procedures  in  its  tasks  to  support  Europol,  Eurojust 
and national law enforcement authorities180 or that its mandate in this area is too narrow. 
Yet  the  importance  of  avoiding  overlaps  in  mandates  of  Frontex  and  Europol  has  been 
highlighted by the Commission and some Member States, which explains the perceived 
narrow  interpretation  of  Frontex’s  mandate  in  this  field181.  Moreover,  the  majority  of 
Member States agreed that the cooperation with Europol and Eurojust was already well 
defined182, and did not suggest further expanding the mandate of Frontex in this field. At 
the same time, the exchange of information between the agencies has been hampered in 
the  past,  following  two  opinions  of  the  EDPS  issued  on  7  June  2022.  These  opinions, 
notably,  had  an  effect  on  Frontex’s  “Processing  of  Personal  Data  for  Risk  Analysis 
(PeDRA)” which includes the forwarding of information on potential human smugglers 
or traffickers to Europol. These problems should be remedied with the implementation of 
the new data protection framework in Frontex (see section 4.1.1 above), and through the 
negotiation of a new working arrangement with Europol, based on the new mandates of 
both agencies.  

The  Agency  has  been  playing  an  active  role  in  European  cooperation  on  coast  guard 
functions, notably through inter-agency cooperation with the European Fisheries Control 
Agency (EFCA) and the European maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) in the framework of 
a  tripartite  working  arrangement.  The  three  agencies  work  jointly  on  multipurpose 
operations,  where  they  undertake  activities  to  support  various  coast  guard  functions 
falling  under  their  respective  remit.  Overall,  cooperation  is  rated  positively  among  the 
agencies, and the legal base for their cooperation is sound. 

176   Article 73(4) of the EBCG Regulation. 
177   ICF interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 9/27. 
178   ICF interviews with Frontex and Europol; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 14/27 agreed; 1/27 strongly 
agreed  that  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  is  clearly  defined  and  conducive  to  addressing 
specific needs and challenges at external borders. 

179   Article 68(2) and (5) of the EBCG Regulation. 
180   ICF interviews with EDPS and Frontex. 
181   ICF interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 4/27.  
182   ICF  survey  of  MS/SAC  authorities:  14/27  agreed  and  1/27  strongly  agreed  that  cooperation  with 
Europol and Eurojust is clearly defined and conducive to addressing specific needs and challenges at 
external borders. 

40 

 
 
Frontex has successfully enhanced its cooperation with CSDP missions and operations. 
In  2022,  it  signed  a  working  arrangement  with  the  European  Union  Capacity  Building 
Mission in Niger (EUCAP Sahel Niger) and in 2023 it agreed on the text of a  working 
arrangement  with  the  European  Union  Advisory  Mission  Ukraine  (EUAM  Ukraine), 
which is expected to be signed by the end of this year. The ramifications of the Russian 
aggression against Ukraine showed that the overarching mechanism for cooperation with 
CSDP missions, including those not considered as priority, could provide the necessary 
flexibility  for  Frontex  at  the  operational  level183.  EUAM  Ukraine  is  supporting  the 
development,  updating  and  implementing  the  Ukrainian  National  Integrated  Border 
Management  Strategy.  The  cooperation  between  Frontex  and  EUAM  Ukraine  will 
support this effort by providing EUAM Ukraine with the expertise of the Agency in the 
area of Integrated Border Management, standards and good practices.  

Cooperation with third countries 

Frontex can cooperate with third countries via status agreements, working arrangements, 
or through non-operational cooperation, in line with EU foreign policy objectives and its 
International  Cooperation  Strategy184.  The  EBCG  Regulation185  brought  new 
opportunities  for  cooperation  with  third  countries,  including  the  ability  for  Frontex  to 
conduct joint operational activities with executive powers anywhere on the territory of a 
third  country,  subject  to  a  status  agreement  and  an  operational  plan  negotiated  and 
concluded with the relevant third country. It also allows for the exchange of information 
with  third  countries  in  the  framework  of  EUROSUR186  through  the  inclusion  of 
EUROSUR provisions in an operational plan based on a status agreement or a working 
arrangement. Furthermore, the EBCG Regulation added new fundamental rights and data 
protection safeguards, to accommodate the evolving EU legal framework, extending the 
regulatory framework  for cooperation with third countries.  In line with Article 76(1) of 
the  EBCG  Regulation,  a  model  status  agreement  was  adopted  by  the  European 
Commission  in  December  2021187.  During  the  evaluation  period,  the  EU  signed  and 
concluded status agreements with Moldova, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania; 
negotiations with other third countries are currently ongoing. 

The  Commission  also  adopted  a  model  working  arrangement  on  21  December  2021.  
Frontex finalised  negotiations  of a number of  working arrangements based on this new 
model.  The  first  such  text,  negotiated  with  Niger,  received  a  negative  opinion  from 

183   Further details on cooperation with other EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies can be found in 

section 4 (EQ 26) of Annex IIIa. 

184   Non-operational  cooperation  (such  as  implementation  of  EU-funded  capacity-building  projects  to 
build  administrative  capacity,  transmit  know-how  or  enhance  situational  awareness  of  border 
management) also contribute to developing new partnerships that can lead to more formalised forms of 
cooperation at a later stage. 

185   Article 73 of the EBCG Regulation. 
186   Article 75 of the EBCG Regulation. 
187   European Commission (2021). ‘Model status agreement as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  13  November  2019  on  the  European  Border  and 
Coast  Guard  and  repealing  Regulations  (EU)  No  1052/2013  and  (EU)  2016/1624’.  COM(2021)  829 
final. 

41 

 
 
EDPS,  which  found  the  arrangement’s  data  protection  provisions  insufficient  for 
international  data  transfers  to  Niger.  Due  to  the  fact  that  these  provisions  are  broadly 
based  on  the  model  working  arrangement,  the  Commission  is  currently  working  with 
Frontex and the EDPS to amend the model’s personal data protection provisions. Once a 
text  has  been  agreed  with  EDPS,  the  finalisation  of  the  negotiations  of  these  new 
generation  working  arrangements  can  take  place.  Frontex  currently  has  close  to  twenty 
working  arrangements  with  third  country  authorities  in  place,  all  based  on  earlier 
iterations of the EBCG Regulation.  

The  vast  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  that  cooperation  with  third  countries  is 
clearly  defined  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  is  conducive  to  addressing  specific  needs 
and  challenges  at  external  borders188.  Overall,  Frontex’s  activities  in  the  external 
dimension are well regarded by key stakeholders and have a clear legal basis. New joint 
operations to third countries have been successfully deployed on the basis of new status 
agreements in Moldova, North Macedonia and Montenegro. 

Two  own-imitative  reports  have  been  prepared  by  the  European  Parliament  Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) in the context of status agreements: 
the Report on the negotiations on a status agreement on operational activities carried out 
by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in Senegal (2023/2086(INI)) 
and the Report on negotiations on a status agreement on operational activities carried out 
in  Mauritania 
by 
(2023/2087(INI)). 

the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency  (Frontex) 

One  legal  inconsistency  has  been  identified  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  in  relation  to 
working  arrangements  with  third  countries  (and  international  organisations).  Article 
117(5)  requires  the  Agency  to  include  ‘provisions  expressly  empowering  ECA,  OLAF 
and EPPO to conduct […] audits and investigations. However, working arrangements are 
legally  non-binding  documents.  While  Frontex  is  able  to  include  such  provisions  in  its 
working arrangements, legally speaking those cannot ‘empower’ the ECA, OLAF and the 
EPPO189. 

Cooperation with international organisations 

Cooperation  with  international  organisations  under  working  arrangements  is  limited  by 
specific provisions in Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation, which sets out an exhaustive 
list of organisations190 with which Frontex may cooperate. The justification for, or added 
value of, setting such limits in the Regulation itself is unclear, as it limits the ability of 
the  Agency  to  develop  more  structured  cooperation  with  relevant  partners,  including 
some  organisations  with  which  it  has  established  useful  cooperation  in  the  past  (e.g. 

188   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed, 1/27 strongly agreed. 
189   ICF interviews with Frontex and DG HOME.  
190   United Nations (UN), International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (COE) and Maritima Analysis and Operations 
Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N). 

42 

 
 
International  Centre  for  Migration  Policy  Development  (ICMPD),  NATO,  World 
Customs Organization).   

In practice, Frontex has working arrangements with eight international organisations and 
international  think tanks. This  includes two that  are not  listed in  the EBCG Regulation 
(DCAF,  ICMPD),  although  all  of  these  working  arrangements  pre-date  the  Regulation. 
Similarly, there is no reference in the EBCG Regulation to the Agency's cooperation with 
non-State  actors,  although  Frontex  is  also  involved  in  post-return  and  post-arrival 
activities alongside non-State actors, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs)191.  

The Agency’s external engagements are coordinated with the support of the Commission, 
and  in  cooperation  with  the  EEAS  if  necessary.  Any  new  working  arrangements  are 
subject to a Commission approval and must also be approved by the MB of the Agency. 
This  suggests  sufficient  guarantees  being  in  place  that  makes  the  added  value  of  an 
exhaustive list of organisations in the EBCG Regulation unclear.  

Frontex is able to maintain less formal cooperation with organisations outside of working 
arrangements.  With  such  organisations  Frontex  aims  to  promote  dialogue  and 
coordination in areas of mutual interest, including cooperation with the World Customs 
Organization,  ICMPD,  Allied  Maritime  Command  (MARCOM)  of  NATO  and  the 
International  Labour  Organization  (ILO)192,193.  However,  in  particular  in  the  case  of 
NATO, informal avenues do not allow the cooperation to reach its full potential. 

4.1.2.7. Fundamental Rights 

Key evaluation findings 

The EBCG Regulation, together with a number of safeguards introduced by the Agency 
through  the  implementation  of  new  rules  and  procedures,  has  established  a  robust 
foundation  for  the  respect,  protection  and  promotion  of  fundamental  rights  in  the 
Agency’s activities. 

The  fundamental  rights  framework  in  place  contributed  to  ensuring  that  the  Agency’s 
staff fully respects fundamental rights in its support to Member States. 

However, questions remain as regards the effect of the host Member States’ compliance 
with fundamental rights on the Agency, in the framework of their common activities. 

The Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) mechanism remains an important instrument for the 
Fundamental  Rights  Officer  (FRO)  to  map  and  indicate  when  fundamental  rights 
challenges occur and monitor the Agency’s compliance with fundamental rights.  

However,  a  number  of  factors  have  been  identified  that  limit  the  effectiveness  of  this 
reporting tool, such as the limited cooperation of and follow-up by national authorities. 

On the decisions to suspend, terminate or not launch Frontex activities (Article 46), the 
evaluation found that the Regulation was overall balanced. Some stakeholders consider 
that the decision-making process should have a political layer, while others oppose this 

191   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
192   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’, p. 35.  
193   ICF study (2023), pp. 77-84. 

43 

 
 
idea.  Also,  some  have  suggested  to  give  the  FRO  more  powers.  Furthermore,  some 
considered that the procedure to trigger Article 46 should be modified to include some 
intermediate steps before a decision to suspend or terminate an operation is taken. This 
would  ensure  the  continued  presence  of  Frontex  in  the  host  country  with  a  view  to 
monitoring and improving the situation.  

The EBCG Regulation aims to establish a comprehensive fundamental rights framework, 
including  horizontal safeguards, roles, procedures,  and instruments  (to be  set  up and/or 
implemented  by  the  Agency)  to  ensure  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the 
implementation of the Agency’s mandate194.  

During the evaluation period, Frontex put in place a number of measures to ensure and 
promote  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights,  including  by  adopting  and/or  implementing 
rules  and  procedures.  This  includes  the  Fundamental  Rights  Strategy  and  its 
implementing Action Plan195, rules on the FRO’s activities (including contributing to a 
wide  range  of  Agency  tools  and  procedures,  such  as  operational  plans),  the  continuous 
deployment  of  FRMs  to  all  Agency  activities  and  operations,  MB  Decisions  (on  the 
complaints  mechanism,  SIRs,  supervisory  mechanism  on  the  use  of  force,  etc.),  data 
protection safeguards and rules allowing the DPO to carry out his/her tasks effectively, as 
well  as  embedding  fundamental  rights  components  within  Frontex  trainings  and  other 
longer-term efforts to promote a fundamental rights culture within the Agency.  

Although  the  obligation  to  fully  comply  with  fundamental  rights  applies  to  the  entire 
EBCG, and therefore also to the Member States, and not only to Frontex, the regulatory 
provisions  are  focused  on  the  Agency  and  not  on  national  authorities.  However,  many 
concerns about fundamental rights reported to the FRO do not relate to Frontex’s staff or 
assets, but, rather, to alleged violations by staff of the Member States during operational 
activities jointly undertaken by the Agency and Member States. In such cases, the powers 
of  the  FRO  are  limited,  as  they  do  not  include  monitoring  the  national  authorities’ 
activities,  which  are  instead  covered  by  national  monitoring  mechanisms  (such  as  the 
national ombuds institutions) to the extent that such institutions exist196.  

While Frontex has a duty to constantly assess the fundamental rights compliance of all its 
operational  activities  through  the  work  of  its  FRMs,  under  EU  law  there  is  no  similar 
obligation  for  Member  States197,  although  the  Commission  strongly  encourages  the 
development of similar mechanisms at national level198 and is offering financial support 

194   This  section  only  addresses  the  main  issues  in  relation  to the  EBCG's  compliance  with  fundamental 

rights. Further details can be found in section 2 (EQ 14) of Annex IIIa. 

195   Management Board Decision 61/2021 of 9 November 2021  adopting the Fundamental Rights Action 

Plan for the implementation of the Fundamental Rights Strategy. 

196   FRA (2023) contribution to the Commission’s evaluation, p. 5. 
197   FRA (2023) contribution to the Commission’s evaluation, p. 5. 
198   European Commission (2023). Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  the  multiannual  strategic  policy  for  European  integrated 
border management. COM(2023) 146 final. 

44 

 
 
 
for setting up such mechanisms at the national level199. The Fundamental Rights Office’s 
monitoring of Member States’ staff involved in operational activities has at times created 
tensions with some Member States, whose authorities question the scope of the Office’s 
activities and suggest that it is overstepping its mandate200.  

The limitations of the Fundamental Rights Office’s mandate can also negatively impact 
at times the ability of the FRMs to conduct their activities, as well as call into question 
their  right  to  access  operational  areas.  Some  clarifications  were  brought  about  by  the 
2023 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for FRMs201. Although the scope of the 
FRMs’  monitoring  activities  is  limited  to  the  areas  within  which  the  Agency  operates, 
FRMs may collect relevant information and assess the fundamental rights situation, with 
regard to border and migration management, in the Member States and third countries in 
which  the  Agency  conducts  operational  activities.  This  therefore  also  includes  the 
relevant  activities  of  national  authorities.  However,  the  objective  is  not  to  evaluate  the 
conduct of national authorities but, rather, to evaluate the situation insofar as it may have 
an impact on Frontex’s activities, the Agency’s reputation, and above all its staff’s ability 
to operate in a way that fully complies with fundamental rights obligations. 

Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) 

The role of the FRO is crucial in ensuring the Agency’s respect for, and compliance with, 
fundamental  rights,  as  well  as  the  effectiveness  of  the  internal  fundamental  rights 
monitoring  and  accountability  mechanisms.  The  FRO  is  responsible  for  monitoring  the 
Agency’s  implementation  of  its  fundamental  rights  obligations  and  for  advising 
(including on his/her own initiative) the Agency on fundamental rights-related issues202.  
As highlighted during the stakeholders’ consultation203, the initial absence of obligations 
on the MB and ED had de-prioritised the need to follow-up to FRO recommendations. In 
the  case  of  Hungary,  for  example,  the  suspension  of  the  Agency’s  support  for  border 
management  took  place  five  years  after  the  first  recommendation  of  the  FRO204.  This 
situation was remedied by the adoption of MB Decision 43/2022 on actions to be taken 
as a follow-up to the FRO’s recommendations205, which stipulates clear timelines and 
procedures for the follow-up to recommendations by the FRO and Consultative Forum. 

199   HOME-Funds/2023/39:  Call  for  expression  of  interest  BMVI  SA  for  MS  national  strategies  for  a 

European integrated border management - BMVI/2023/SA/1.2.3. 

200   ICF interviews with the Fundamental Rights Office (1/5). 
201   Frontex  (2023).  ‘Standard  Operating  Procedure  (SOP)  on  roles  and  responsibilities  of  Fundamental 

Rights Monitors (FROMs) in Frontex operational activities. Internal document. 

202   Article 109 of the EBCG Regulation. 
203  ICF  interviews  with  a  civil  society  organisation/member  of  the  CF  (1/5),  and  a  civil  society 

organisation/non-member of the CF (1/4). 

204   European  Parliament  Frontex  Scrutiny  Working  Group  (FSWG)  (2021).  Report  on  the  fact-finding 

investigation on Frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations.  

205   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of 20 July 2022 adopting the  rules for the Executive Director 
and the Management Board to inform the Consultative Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations 
and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Officer. 

45 

 
 
Other challenges to the work of the FRO derived from the lack of sufficient and adequate 
human and financial resources provided to the FRO to fulfil his or her tasks. Despite 
the requirement in the EBCG Regulation to provide the Office with sufficient human and 
financial resources206 , the resources of the Fundamental Rights Office were insufficient 
for quite some time and were increased considerably only from 2021-2022, following a 
recommendation from the Agency’s MB207.  

Fundamental Rights Monitors (FRMs) 

The EBCG Regulation introduced the role of FRMs, who have the pivotal task to ‘[…] 
assess  fundamental  rights  compliance  in  operational  activity,  provide  advice  and 
assistance in that regard and contribute to the promotion of fundamental rights as part of 
EIBM’208.  

To facilitate effective monitoring, the EBCG Regulation requires that FRMs have access 
to  all  areas  in  which  the  operational  activities  of  the  Agency  take  place  and  to  all 
documents  relevant  to  the  implementation  of  those  activities.  However,  differences  in 
interpretation on the scope of the FRMs’ mandate/monitoring and access  to operational 
areas  and  documents  (including  databases)  have  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  the 
monitoring activities. In addition, limitations imposed by some national authorities to the 
FRMs’  ability  to  monitor  certain  activities,  such  as  not  allowing  their  participation  in 
(land  and  sea)  patrolling  and/or  debriefing  interviews,  further  constrained  FRMs’ 
effectiveness 
their  monitoring  capabilities.  To  guarantee  effective 
monitoring,  the  ED  adopted  the  SOP  for  the  FRMs  in  March  2023209,  which  also 
reiterates the access rights of FRMs in line with the EBCG Regulation.  

in  fulfilling 

Consultative Forum (CF) 

Unlike  the  FRO  and  FRMs,  the  CF  does  not  have  the  mandate  to  monitor  Frontex’s 
activities. Rather, it assists the Agency by providing independent advice on fundamental 
rights matters. The ED and the MB, in coordination with the FRO, may consult the CF 
on any matter related to fundamental rights210. 

Although  the  CF  may  carry  out  on-the-spot  visits  to  the  Agency’s  operations  (in  its 
headquarters and in host Member States), these visits are not aimed at fundamental rights 
monitoring. Rather, their objective is to collect information, which may be used to inform 
the  CF’s  work  to  advise  the  Agency.  Despite  the  adoption  of  MB  Decision  43/2022, 
which also aimed to improve cooperation between the Agency and the CF, including by 
setting clearer procedures and timelines regarding the response to CF recommendations, 
the Forum has argued that there are several challenges stemming from the Regulation or 

206   Article 109(5) of the EBCG Regulation. 
207   Conclusion of the Management Board of 5 March 2021. 
208   Article 109(3) and Article 110(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 
209   Frontex  (2023).  ‘Standard  Operating  Procedure  (SOP)  on  roles  and  responsibilities  of  Fundamental 

Rights Monitors (FROMs) in Frontex operational activities’. Internal document.  

210   Article 108(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 

46 

 
 
its implementation that risk limiting the impact of their work. These include insufficient 
access to information, lack of request  for consultations from the Agency or insufficient 
time  to  reply  to  requests,  and  limited  follow-up  to  the  CF’s  recommendations.  Several 
stakeholders  also  highlighted  the  difficulties  for  civil  society  organisations  to  continue 
contributing to the work of the CF on a voluntary basis, given their limited resources and 
staff211.  

Decisions to suspend, terminate or not launch activities (Article 46) 

Article  46  provides  another  important  fundamental  rights  safeguard  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation.  It  establishes  the  obligation  of  the  ED  to  suspend,  terminate  or  not  launch 
any  activity  of  the  Agency  if  the  conditions  to  conduct  such  activities  are  not  (or  no 
longer)  fulfilled,  including  in  cases  of  serious  or  persistent  fundamental  rights 
violations212.  Various  stakeholders  highlighted  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  leaves 
considerable discretion to the ED in this regard213.  

To  fill  this  gap  and  to  strengthen  the  functioning  of  Article  46,  in  2022  the  Agency 
adopted  a  Standard  Operating  Procedure  (SOP)  on  establishing  the  roles  and 
responsibilities  within  the  Agency  to  support  the  decision-making  process  of  the 
ED.214  The  SOP  also  aims  to  clarify  the  applicable  criteria  for  decisions,  setting  out  a 
gradual approach and relying on the principle of proportionality when deciding actions to 
be taken under Article 46. Whenever appropriate, mitigating/corrective measures should 
be put in place to improve and resolve the situation without triggering Article 46.  

Stakeholders’ views diverge on the design and application of Article 46.  As withdrawing 
Frontex staff from  a host country  limits or eliminates the FRO’s ability to  monitor and 
report  on  possible  fundamental  rights  violations  at  that  country’s  borders,  and  the 
Agency’s ability to contribute to improving the situation, some stakeholders even suggest 
a  ‘reverse  Article  46’,  which  could  entail  additional  safeguards  and/or  an  enhanced 
presence of the Agency in response to fundamental rights violations at the borders of the 
host Member State215.  

Stakeholders’ views similarly diverge on the authority adopting the decision referred to 
in  Article 46.  The EBCG Regulation  puts  this  responsibility on  the ED  of the  Agency. 
Some consider that this provision has the potential to place excessive public and political 
pressure  on  the  ED  alone,  without  involving  other  relevant  actors  (such  as  the  MB, 

211   ICF interviews with civil society organisations/members of the CF (3, 4, 7).  
212   Article  25  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2016/1624  (no  longer  in  force)  referred  to  the  suspension  or 
termination  of  activities  only,  without  including  the  preventive  component  (i.e.  not  launching  the 
activities).  

213   Based  on  interviews  with  civil  society  organisations/non-members  of  CF  (2/4)  and  civil  society 

organisations/members of CF (3/5) and international organisation/member of CF (1/3). 

214   Decision  of  the  Executive  Director,  Standard  Operating  Procedure  –  mechanism  to  withdraw  the 

financing of, or suspend or terminate, or not launch Frontex activities.  

215   ISF interview with Frontex and FRO (1/5). 

47 

 
 
 
European Commission, or the Council)216. On the contrary, others argue that the potential 
involvement of such actors could lead to the politicisation of the process (with the risk of 
having political actors blocking in practice the possibility of triggering Article 46)217.  

Serious Incident Reporting (SIR) mechanism 

The SIR mechanism is one of the main reporting mechanisms of the Agency and is used 
to  promptly inform  the Agency’s management and relevant  stakeholders218  of a serious 
incident  (SI).  This  section  focuses  on  the  SIRs  related  to  fundamental  rights  violations 
(so-called SIR category 1).  

The  EBCG  Regulation  only  mentions  this  mechanism  once  in  in  Article  46,  without 
however establishing any rules on the mechanism itself. Therefore, the Agency adopted a 
revised  and  enhanced  SOP  on  the SIR  procedure  in  a  2021  Decision  of the  ED,  which 
repealed and replaced the original 2014 SOP on the mechanism219. The adoption of the 
SOP  on  SIRs  is  relatively  recent  and  further  monitoring  is  needed  to  assess  its 
functioning220. 

The SIR mechanism provides important information for the FRO to monitor the Agency's 
compliance  with  its  obligations  to  respect  fundamental  rights.  The  shortcomings  of  the 
previous  SIR  mechanism,  in  particular  following  the  investigations  into  allegations  of 
Frontex’s involvement in pushbacks in 2020 and 2021, prompted the Agency to improve 
the  mechanism.  The  revised  SOP  enhances  the  role  of  the  FRO  by  allowing  the  direct 
reporting  of  situations 
that  potentially  violate  fundamental  rights,  as  well  as 
automatically  assigning  the  FRO  as  case-handler  for  all  incidents  concerning  alleged 
violations  of  fundamental  rights.221  However,  according  to  the  CF,  the  mechanism  may 
still require further improvements to be effective. For example, in the Forum’s view the 
FRO should be involved in all steps of the process, i.e. identification, categorisation and 
handling of cases, and the FRO should have the possibility to challenge previously made 
decisions on the categorisation of incidents222.  

Overall,  the  external  study  identified  some  factors  that  may  continue  to  limit  the 
mechanism’s  effectiveness.  Some  of  these  factors  have  largely  already  been  addressed, 

216   View expressed by seven MS as a follow-up to discussion in the Council’s Frontiers Working Party on 

26 May 2023. 

217   View expressed by three MS as a follow-up to discussion in the Council’s Frontiers Working Party on 

26 May 2023. 

218   SIR  mechanism  primarily  informs  Frontex  Executive  and  Senior  Management,  the  FRO,  Member 
States and third countries (where appropriate and in accordance with the relevant status agreement and 
operational plan), the MB, and other relevant stakeholders. 

219   Executive Director Decision on standard operating procedure (SOP) – serious incident reporting.  
220   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
221   Executive Director Decision on standard operating procedure (SOP) – serious incident reporting. 
222   Consultative Forum’s contribution to the Commission’s evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, p. 12. 

48 

 
 
 
 
chiefly by the introduction of the 2021 SOP on the SIR mechanism, such as the perceived 
insufficient  involvement  of  the  FRO  in  handling  reports.  Other  issues  persist,  such  as 
limited  sources  of  information,  a  problem  that  may  be  exacerbated  by  insufficient 
cooperation from national authorities during investigations and follow-up. Additionally, 
serious incident files remain “open” for long periods of time, although this is also due to 
the FRO being reluctant to close incidents if the feedback received by national authorities 
is deemed insufficient. Other overarching issues may include difficulties in ensuring that 
any established wrongdoings  are  adequately  remedied, particularly as the responsibility 
with  regard  to  following  up  on  SIRs  concerning  category  1  SC  falls  on  the  national 
authorities  of  Member  States,  as  well  as  an  overall  lack  of  transparency  (SIRs  are 
restricted  documents),  and  the  fact  that  the  mechanism  does  not  feature  avenues  for 
redress  for  any  established  injured  parties  –  although  any  victims  can  pursue  redress 
through other mechanism including legal action against the Agency. An overall lack of 
incentives  for  deployed  staff  to  submit  SIRs  was  also  noted.  The  Agency  has  already 
started  to  take  measures  to  address  this  issue.  Thus,  the  FRO  has  been  working  to 
increase  Agency  staff  awareness  of  the  SIR  mechanism  and  the  revised  SOP,  through 
training  and  briefing  activities,  as  well  as  better  advertising  the  obligation  to  report 
serious  incidents,  the  existing  mechanisms  to  protect  whistle-blowers  and  anyone 
reporting  incidents,  and  the  potential  consequences  for  not  reporting  violations  of 
fundamental  rights.  Moreover,  the  presence  of  FRMs  on  the  ground  contributes  to  a 
broader  utilisation  of  the  SIRs  mechanism:  FRMs  inform  deployed  staff  on  the  SIRs 
mechanism and encourage them to submit SIRs where appropriate and may also submit 
SIRs  themselves.  In  addition,  the  FRO  has  created  a  dedicated  SIR  team  within  the 
Fundamental Rights Office. The capacity of the SIR team will however need to increase, 
given the growing number of SC officers and new deployment activities223. 

Complaints mechanism 

Introduced  in  2016,  the  complaints  mechanism  is  an  important  component  of  the 
Agency’s  fundamental  rights  protection  framework.  Despite  being  one  of  the  main 
reporting mechanisms, over the years various stakeholders have raised concerns about its 
set up and implementation, suggesting that these may have limited its capacity to provide 
an  effective  and  accessible  tool  for  reporting,  investigating,  and  remedying  alleged 
breaches of fundamental rights224. More specifically, these concerns relate to the access, 
scope, independence, and transparency of the mechanism, the limited role of the DPO in 
the process, issues with lack of adequate follow-up to complaints, and absence of options 
for remedy and appeal. 

In particular, the complaints mechanism does not provide access to those who have not 
been  affected  ‘directly’  by  actions  or  omissions225,  nor  does  it  allow  the  possibility  to 

223   ICF interview with the Fundamental Rights Office (1/5). 
224   Consultative Forum’s contribution to the Commission’s evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, p. 8. 
225   European  Council  on  Refugees  and  Exile  (ECRE)  (2021).  ‘Holding  Frontex  to  account.  ECRE’s 

proposals for strengthening non-judicial mechanisms for scrutiny of Frontex’.  

49 

 
 
initiate a complaint ex officio226, nor to submit anonymous complaints227. This restricted 
access might be a contributing factor to the low number of complaints submitted via this 
mechanism.  On the other hand,  allowing broader access  to  the mechanism  may lead to 
the submission of frivolous complaints. Additionally, EU regulations already impose the 
obligation  to  report  wrongdoing  noticed  in  the  exercise  of  their  duties228.  Any  staff 
witnessing wrongdoings but not directly employed by the Agency, moreover, since 2021 
has  access  to  the  Agency’s  whistle-blower  mechanism.  The  EP229  and  the  European 
Ombudsman230  have  called  into  question  the  independence  of  the  complaints 
mechanism, given the role of the FRO and ED, respectively, in assessing and deciding 
on  the  complaints.  Although  the  FRO  recommends  appropriate  follow-up,  the  decision 
on the merits of the complaint lies with the ED, who should ensure proper follow-up and 
report  back  to  the  FRO.  For  complaints  concerning  national  staff,  the  merits  of  the 
complaints  are  assessed  by  the  national  authorities,  as  the  FRO  forwards  those 
complaints to the relevant Member State and sends a copy to the Member State’s national 
human rights institution or ombuds institution, as applicable, for further action.  

Where  a  complaint  relates  to  data  protection  issues,  the  ED  consults  the  DPO  before 
taking a decision231. During the consultation, it was reported that the work of the DPO in 
this area has been very limited so far232.  

Furthermore, the EBCG Regulation does not provide for the possibility of appeal within 
the complaints mechanism. The European Ombudsman found that the mechanism lacks 
scrutiny  and  indicated  that  decisions  by  the  ED  on  complaints  forwarded  by  the  FRO 
may be challenged before the European Ombudsman233.  

Return monitoring and fundamental rights 

In line with  the EBCG  Regulation234, the Agency  adopted a  code of  conduct  for return 
operations and return interventions, which reinforces the  respect  for  fundamental  rights 

226   FRA  (2018).  ‘The  revised  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Regulation  and  its  fundamental  rights 
implications.  Opinion  of  the  European  Union  Agency  for  Fundamental  Rights’.  Available  at: 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-opinion-ebcg-05-2018_en.pdf  

227   ICF 

interviews  with 

the  European  Ombudsman,  an  EU  agency  (FRA),  a  civil  society 
organisation/member  of  the  CF  (5)  and  a  civil  society  organisation/  non-member  of  the  CF  (9); 
European  Ombudsman  (2020).  ‘Decision  in  OI/5/2020/MHZ  on  the  functioning  of  the  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency's  (Frontex)  complaints  mechanism  for  alleged  breaches  of 
fundamental rights and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer’.  

228   Article 21a of the EU Staff Regulations. 
229   FSWG  (2021).  ‘Report  on  the  fact-finding  investigation  on  Frontex  concerning  fundamental  rights 

violations’. 

230   European  Ombudsman  (2020).  ‘Decision  in  Case  OI/5/2020/MHZ,  Functioning  of  the  European 
Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency's  (Frontex)  complaints  mechanism  for  alleged  breaches  of 
fundamental rights and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer’.  

231   Management Board Decision 19/2022 of 16 March 2022 adopting rules on the complaints mechanism, 

Article 10.  

232   ICF interview with Frontex. 
233   ICF interview with the European Ombudsman.  
234   Article 81(2) of the EBCG Regulation. 

50 

 
 
 
when carrying out these activities235, through a number of obligations and good practices 
to be observed/ implemented.  

The  monitoring  of  forced-return  operations  is  carried  out  by  the  pool  of  forced-return 
monitors.  The  pool  is  set  up  by  the  Agency  from  monitors  of  competent  bodies  of  the 
Member  State.  The  Agency  also  contributes  FRMs  to  the  pool236.  The  FRA  raised 
questions  about  the  governance  of  the  pool  as  the  management  of  the  pool  of  forced-
return  monitors  is  currently  assigned  to  the  FRO  (independent  but  not  external  to  the 
Agency).  The  FRA  considers  that  handing  over  this  responsibility  to  a  fully  external 
entity  could  enhance  the  independence  of  the  pool237.  Before  2021,  the  pool  solely 
comprised monitors from Member States, while the Fundamental Rights Office worked 
to train and then appoint FRMs as forced-return monitors238. 

Issues  were  reported  in  relation  to  the  limited  number  of  experts  made  available  to  the 
pool by Member States, which might limit the capacity to meet monitoring needs for all 
relevant  operations239.  In  2021,  the  FRO  recruited  three  FRMs  to  act  as  forced-return 
monitors,  and  in  2022,  six  FRMs  acted  as  forced-return  monitors  to  ensure  adequate 
capacity  to  return  monitoring  operations.  Additional  FRMs  are  consistently  trained  as 
forced-return monitors to ensure that the available monitoring capacity reflects the needs 
of Agency and Member States240,241. 

4.1.3. Efficiency 

4.1.3.1. Use of human and financial resources by Frontex 

Key evaluation findings 

Both the planned and actual allocation of human resources at the Agency are broadly in 
line with the tasks assigned by the EBCG Regulation. Apart  from the large increase in 
the  number  of  SC  Category  1  recruits,  the  distribution  of  staff  between  activities  and 
divisions has not changed substantially since the Regulation was introduced. 

Both the planned and actual allocation of  financial  resources  at  the Agency  reflect  the 
implementation of the EBCG Regulation. In 2020, the recruitment and training of the SC 
attracted a larger share of funding. Since 2021, operations and technical equipment have 
accounted for a larger share of the budget. 

Frontex  has  faced  significant  challenges  in  implementing  its  increasing  financial 
resources,  but  it  has  largely  been  able  to  adapt  its  budgetary  management  to  its  new 
mandate and to the expected operational results.  

235   Frontex  (n.d.).  ‘Code  of  conduct  for  return  operations  and  return  interventions  coordinated  and 

organised by Frontex’.  

236   Article 51 of the EBCG Regulation. 
237   ICF interview with FRA.  
238   ICF interview with the Fundamental Rights Office (1/5). 
239   ICF interview with DG HOME.  
240   ICF interview with the Fundamental Rights Office (1/5). 
241   ICF study (2023), pp. 84-101. 

51 

 
 
 
The EBCG Regulation significantly increased Frontex's resources, with its budget more 
than  doubling  and  staff  almost  tripling  between  2019  and  2022.  This  trend  is  set  to 
continue, as the EU contributions will steadily increase under the remainder of the 2021-
2027  MFF.  Frontex,  in  turn,  is  expected  to  meet  the  increasing  budgetary  targets  each 
year  and  to  translate  these  resources  into  effective  and  efficient  implementation  of  the 
Regulation. Figure 2 shows the magnitude of this increase.  

Figure 2 EU contribution to Frontex (2016-2027) 

Source: ICF, based EU budget data from MFF 2014-2020 and MFF 2021-27. 

The  adoption  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  also  led  to  a  significant  increase  in  human 
resources dedicated to operational response, including the SC. This sharp increase in its 
budget,  in  combination  with  its  expanded  mandate,  created  significant  implementation 
challenges  for  the  Agency,  which  are  expected  to  be  mitigated  over  time.  Besides  the 
general  MFF  2021-2027  reduction  in  the  Agency’s  budget  (40%),  further  reductions 
were applied by the budgetary authority to the annual budget for Frontex in 2021, 2022 
and  2023.  The  Agency’s  budget  in  those  years  was  reduced  by  EUR  61  million242,  by 
EUR  65  million  and  EUR  50  million  respectively.    Despite  the  reductions  from  their 
initial budget, the Agency recently released EUR 15 million  of its EU contributions for 
2023, EUR 57.2 million in 2022 and EUR 14.6 million in 2021. Moreover, in the years 
2019 and 2020, the Agency also released respectively 22.3 million and 98.9 million. The 
largest  budget  adjustment  in  2020  was  mainly  due  to  the  challenging  and  changing 
circumstances  caused  by  the  pandemic  situation  which  triggered  the  Agency  to  scale 
down its activities in the area of return, joint operations and onboarding of the SC as well 
as  that  many  activities,  in  particular  trainings,  meetings  and  recruitments,  have  been 
performed remotely. Based on the executed budget, implementation of the appropriations 

242   The EUR 61 million is backloaded to 2025, 2026 and 2027 (EUR 61m/3). 

52 

 
 
 
 
 
 
is sound, confirming that the Agency is still quite effective in forecasting its short-term 
budget implementation. 

Overall, the allocation of human and financial resources in  Frontex's strategic planning 
has been broadly in line with the tasks assigned to the Agency by the EBCG Regulation 
as well as with its strategic and horizontal objectives set in the SPD. Since 2021, staff has 
shifted towards strategic objectives related to operational activities rather than horizontal 
objectives, such as internal management and cooperation. The SC development drove the 
financial  resources  allocation in  2020, while  resource planning  from 2021 onwards has 
been  stable,  prioritising  operational  support,  returns,  and  horizontal  management. 
Resource  allocation  appeared  adequate  to  some  extent  for  developing  and  managing 
human resources and TEPs.  

In  adapting  its  budgetary  management  to  the  new  mandate  and  expected  operational 
results, some areas of expenditure, generally related to the implementation of the EBCG 
Regulation,  have proved particularly problematic  for the Agency  from  a  budgetary  and 
financial  management  perspective.  Moreover,  the  efficiency  of  the  Agency’s  financial 
resources allocations has varied during the years. For instance, Frontex's ability to spend 
its voted budget for infrastructure and operating expenditure decreased in 2020 and 2021 
in  comparison  to  2019,  while  'staff  expenditure'  remained  within  targets.  This  is 
indicative  of  the  difficulties  in  implementing  the  significantly  growing  budget  lines 
related to joint operations, deployment of team members and equipment. 

Moreover,  Frontex has generally been able to  spend the amounts carried  over from  the 
previous  year,  with  no  significant  difference  between  the  three  years  considered.  For 
example, EUR 159.4 million were carried forward from 2020 to 2021 (43.6 %) compared 
to EUR 102 million from 2019 to 2020 (32%). Out of this amount carried forward EUR 
20.3  million  were  cancelled,  representing  12.8%  of  the  total  appropriations  carried 
forward. For comparison, EUR 9.4 million (9%) had to be cancelled in 2020. 

EUR  240.4  million  were  carried  forward  from  2021  to  2022  (47%)  which  is  a  higher 
level compared to EUR 159.4 million from the previous year. Out of the amount carried 
forwards EUR 39.4 million were cancelled, representing 16%.  

Approximately 90%  of the amounts carried  forward under 'Infrastructure  and operating 
expenditure'  and  'operational  expenditure'  are  paid  within  the  year  following  the  initial 
commitment,  while  a  greater  proportion  (50%)  of  those  recorded  under 
'Staff 
expenditure' is returned each year, although this is small in absolute terms.  

The  most  problematic  carried  over  budget  items  under  'operational  expenditure'  are 
'Agency equipment'  and 'strengthening capacities', which includes training and research 
and innovation. In 2021, under the ‘Agency equipment’ budget item, 78% of funds were 
automatically  carried  over  (EUR  20.4  million)  and  22%  of  funds  were  cancelled, 

53 

 
corresponding to EUR 5.9 million243. These amounts have further increased in 2022, with 
respectively 85% of funds carried over and 15% cancellations, amounting to EUR 13.4 
million244.  A  key  challenge  in  this  regard  has  been  the  insufficient  clarity  on  the 
acquisition strategy and the logistics concept, linked to the delays in the adoption of the 
multi-annual acquisition strategy245.  

4.1.3.2. Costs and benefits generated by the EBCG Regulation 

Key evaluation findings 

As regards costs, while the Regulation is largely implemented via the budget allocated to 
Frontex, there are also substantial additional investments via 2014-2020 ISF and 2021-
2027 BMVI, co-financed by the EU and the Member States, as well as national funds for 
IT-related activities and EUROSUR upgrades. 

In  terms  of  benefits,  the  vast  majority  of  Member  States  see  the  operational  support 
provided  by  the  Agency  as  positive,  both  as  concerns  support  with  SC  staff  and  with 
technical  equipment.  Member  States  having  a  small  territory  and  those  with  borders 
facing  migration  routes  expressed  greater  satisfaction  with  the  support  received  from 
Frontex, particularly in terms of risk analysis, returns, and deployment of resources. 

Frontex’s activities in the area of return are recognised by Member States as providing 
benefits in time and administrative burden savings, financial savings, and the availability 
of additional resources.  

In terms of implementation, the following inefficiencies have been identified:  

•  The strategic and operational planning process imposed on Member States by the 

EBCG Regulation has proved burdensome and somewhat inefficient;  

•  Operational  and  contingency  plans  have  posed  challenges  due  to  overlaps  with 

situational awareness, and  

•  The development of the capability roadmap by Frontex was impacted by delays in 
the  finalisation  of  national  capability  plans  and  the  absence  of  the  Agency’s 
acquisition strategy, causing further delays at both EU and national level246. 

As regards the SC, 

• 

the reimbursement of Categories 2 and 3 SC officers is burdensome for Member 
States,  it  often  does  not  cover  the  full  costs  and  may  also  be  insufficient  to 
motivate experienced officers to be deployed, and  

•  Member  States  consider  the  financial  support  provided  under  Article  61  to  be 
cumbersome and inadequate, making it challenging for them to maintain staffing 
levels and meet national needs. 

243   The most important specific problems, such as the ‘principle of annuality' in the acquisition of large-
scale  equipment  (e.g.  vessels),  and  the  absence  of  an  acquisition  strategy  were  presented  in  section 
4.1.2.5 and explained in section 2 (EQ 6.2) of Annex IIIa.    

244   Budget implementation reports for the implementation period 1 January until 31 December 2021 and 

for the implementation period 1 January until 31 December 2022. 

245   The multiannual strategy for acquisition and management of the Agency’s equipment  was adopted on 

15 September 2023 with Management Board decision 28/2023. 

246   See section 4.1.2.5. 

54 

 
 
 
Member States have benefitted from EU funds247 to implement the EBCG Regulation 
and manage borders and migration. Under 2014-2020 ISF-Borders and Visa instrument, 
within the framework of targeted specific actions (up to 90% EU co-financing rate, the 
difference  being  covered  by  the  Member  States’  national  budget),  an  additional  EU 
funding  of  EUR  336.8 million  was  supporting  the  Member  States  with  the  purchase  of 
border  surveillance  equipment  (such  as  coastal  and  off-shore  patrol  vessels,  thermo-
vision vehicles, fixed wing airplanes) to be put at the disposal of Frontex.   

Furthermore,  the  2021-2027  Border  Management  and  Visa  Policy  Instrument  (BMVI), 
which  is  part  of  the  EU  Integrated  Border  Management  Fund  prioritised  and  will 
continue  to  support  the  operationalisation  of  the  EBCG.  Thus,  following  a  BMVI 
Specific Action launched in October 2022, a total EU contribution of EUR 201.1 million 
is added to Member States BMVI programmes to purchase technical equipment (such as 
coastal and offshore patrol vessels, patrol cars, fixed wing aircraft, vertical take-off and 
landing remotely piloted aircraft, etc.), to register it in the Technical Equipment Pool and 
put it at the disposal of Frontex to increase its operational capacity, in accordance with 
Article 64(14) of the Regulation (EU) 2019/1896. A similar BMVI Specific Action will 
be launched in 2024. 

This additional EU funding represents a major and targeted support to Member States to 
deliver on the operationalisation of the EBCG.  

In  addition,  BMVI  operating  support  is  funding  certain  costs  of  Member  States  to  the 
extent that they are not covered by the Frontex in the context of its operational activities 
(such  as  staff  costs,  including  training,  maintenance  or  repair  of  equipment  and 
infrastructure, etc.). It can also cover entirely (100% EU funding rate) the running costs 
incurred by the host Member State when participating, for example, to a joint operation 
or a rapid border intervention, a return operation or a return intervention takes place.  

A  significant  proportion  of  resources  from  national  budgets  is  allocated  to  IT-related 
activities,  particularly  for  EUROSUR  upgrades.  The  amount  of  IT-related  funds  for 
Member States is consistent with the increasing investments of Frontex in IT systems for 
situational  awareness,  information  exchanges  and  security,  and  these  activities  are 
expected to increase in the coming years, based on the Frontex Information Management 
Framework.  While  Frontex  handles  a  considerable  portion  of  IT  investments,  Member 
States are responsible for developing national modules to connect with EU systems and 
facilitate information exchange. 

its 
The  quantification  of 
implementation is difficult, and Frontex itself has not carried out detailed estimates, but 
the main identified issues related to the structure and deployment of the SC, the lack of 

inefficiencies  arising  from 

the  Regulation  and 

the 

247   Internal  Security  Fund  (ISF)  –  Borders  and  visa  (2014-2020);  Integrated  Border  Management  Fund 
(Border  Management  and  Visa  Policy  Instrument  (BMVI)  (2021-2027);  Asylum,  Migration  and 
Integration fund (AMIF) (2014-2020); Asylum, Migration and Integration fund (AMIF) (2021-2027). 

55 

 
 
clearly  developed  logistics  concepts,  the  lack  of  an  acquisition  strategy,  and  delays  in 
developing a clear vision for the deployment of the SC248. 

One  key  issue  is  the  administrative  burden  Member  States  face  in  relation  to  the 
reimbursement of Category 2 and Category 3 officers, including travel costs and other 
expenses, which are often insufficient to cover the full costs or to motivate experienced 
officers  to  be  deployed.  Recent  changes  in  reimbursement  reporting  requirements  for 
Member  State  staff  have  reportedly  increased  the  administrative  burden  on  Member 
States249. 

Member  States  have  pointed  out  to  similar  issues  with  regard  to  the  financial  support 
under  Article  61  (Category  2  officers  seconded  to  the  SC),  considering  the  system  as 
cumbersome and the level of financial support as  inadequate to maintain staffing levels 
and  meet  national  needs.  The  administrative  workload  leads  to  a  mobilisation  of 
resources  that  could  be  used  more  effectively  by  Member  States.  Moreover,  the 
correction coefficient for reimbursement under Article 61250 does not adequately account 
for changes in the costs of living. This issue does not derive from the Regulation per se 
but affects the efficiency of its implementation.  

In terms of possible actions to achieve simplification and cost reduction, the following 
issues could be addressed: 

• 

the streamlining and simplification of obligations on  Member  States  relating  to 
the  multiannual  strategic  planning  process  of  Frontex,  and  in  particular  of  the 
operational plans;  

•  possible  simplification  of  the  financial  support  and  reimbursement  schemes  for 
the preparation and deployment of Category 2 and Category 3 officers251, as well 
as for the financial support linked to Article 61.  

4.1.4. Standing Corps 

This  section presents  the  evaluation  findings related to  the Standing Corps (SC). These 
findings  support and contribute to  the review of the SC, in  particular the  review of the 
overall number and composition of the SC, including the size of individual Member State 
contributions,  expertise,  professionalism  and  training  of  the  SC,  as  well  as  of  the 
necessity to maintain the reserve for rapid reaction252. 

Key evaluation findings 

SC  has  been  mostly  relevant  to  supporting  Member  States  in  the  external  border 
management  and  returns.  The  deployments  are  predominantly  in  line  with  the 

248   Further details can be found in section 2 (EQ 6.2) of Annex IIIa. 
249   Interviews in a case study. 
250   As  for  Article  61(2)  of  the  Regulation,  the  financial  support  for  the  SC  is  calculated  using  as  a 
reference amount the annual salary of contractual agents in function group III, grade 8, step 1 of the 
institutions of the Union, adjusted by a corrective coefficient per Member State. 

251   ICF survey of MS: 14/27. 
252   Article 59 of the EBCG Regulation. 

56 

 
 
operational needs.  

Nevertheless, there are several factors hindering the SC ability to fully support Member 
States. These challenges to overcome are of a practical, organisational and legal nature. 

The  Agency  initially  faced  delays  in  the  recruitment  of  SC  Category  1  (statutory  staff 
recruited by Frontex). Moreover, it continues to be difficult to ensure a national balance 
of Category 1 staff. There are also gaps in certain specialised profiles of staff. 

The  Agency  initially  faced  delays  in  the  recruitment  of  SC  Category  1  staff  (statutory 
staff  recruited  by  Frontex),  in  part  due  to  the  COVID-19  pandemic.  Moreover,  it 
continues to be difficult to ensure a geographical balance of Category 1 staff. 

While  Categories  2  (long-term  secondments  from  Member  States)  and  3  (short-term 
deployments from Member States) SC are found to be experienced officers of the Member 
States, the background and training of Category 1 is not always found to be adequate to 
providing  effective  support  to  Member  States,  though  feedback  from  various  Member 
States differs. Overall, the training for Category 1 staff has been found to be relevant to 
their  tasks,  but  there  is  room  for  improvement  to  ensure  the  necessary  amount  and 
quality of the training for all the SC, especially Category 1. 

Category 4 (a reserve of the Member States for rapid border interventions) has not been 
deployed  during  the  evaluation  period.  In  the  event  of  needs  for  additional  resource, 
other  categories  have  been  sufficient.  This  supports  phasing  out  of  Category  4,  as 
planned. 

The size of individual Member States’ contributions to the SC appears largely adequate 
to meet the objectives of the EBCG Regulation. Though Member States have kept a good 
level  of  compliance  with  national  contributions,  they  face  several  challenges  in 
nominating and seconding SC to the Agency and might encounter further challenges to 
do  so  in  the  future.  Some  challenges  are  due  to  the  conditions  for  financial 
reimbursement  of  the  Agency  to  the  Member  States  and,  more  broadly,  to  the  working 
conditions of the SC. 

Deployments of SC 

The establishment of the SC has been one of the most essential novelties of the EBCG 
Regulation with its main objective to support Member States in the management of the 
Union external borders, migration management, and returns.  

SC is a new concept. It is growing into a total of 10 000 fully equipped operational staff 
by 2027, thus ensuring constant and timely availability of the resources. The objective of 
the  SC  is  to  remedy  the  shortcomings  of  the  previous  pooling  mechanism  of  the 
resources of the Member States. The contributions of each Member State to Categories 2 
and 3 are gradually increasing from 2021 to 2027. The number of SC Category 1, which 
is recruited by the Agency is increasing in parallel.  

Member States consider the deployment of the SC to be relevant in terms of needs. 
This is primarily because SC offers additional resources, when needed.   

The deployments correspond mostly to the operational needs. Recently, the deployments 
have increased proportionally most in Central and Western Mediterranean, Eastern land 

57 

 
 
borders  and  Western  Balkans  and  the  operational  area  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
migratory route has also seen an increase in deployments. Additionally, SC has provided 
significant and welcome support to the return operations.  

Number and composition of the SC 

Beyond  the  Agency,  the  EBCG  includes  the  national  authorities  responsible  for  border 
management,  including  coast  guards  where  relevant,  and  the  national  authorities 
responsible for returns.  

Three  main  groups  of  national  authorities  contribute  to  the  SC:  law  enforcement  and 
border  management  authorities,  defence  authorities,  and  authorities  with  other  duties. 
Most of the SC (97%) are seconded (Category 2) or nominated (Category 3) by national 
authorities  with  law  enforcement  and  border  management  duties.  These  include  police 
forces, border and coast guards, as well as entities with mandates concerning migration, 
integration,  return  management,  and  customs.  A  minority  of  the  SC  is  nominated  or 
seconded by defence authorities (1.8%). 

The overall number of the SC meets the operational needs in the foreseeable future. 
The building up of the SC is evolving gradually until 2027. So far, there has not been any 
evidence of factors that  would  impact the objective set  in  the Regulation. There  are  no 
changes in the operational environment either that would change the planning parameters 
to alter the objective of 10 000.  

The decision on the size of the SC was based on the operational needs analysis and actual 
deployments  at  the  time  of  the  preparations  of  the  Regulation.  At  the  time,  Member 
States  had  in  the  pool  for  deployments  of  the  joint  operations  7  000  individuals. 
Additionally, the number of border guards nominated for the  rapid  reaction  pool  was  1 
500  and  the  number  within  three  return  pools  was  1  500.  That  was  the  number  of 
personnel  considered  to  cover  the  foreseen  operational  needs.  In  line  with  this  total 
number,  by  2027,  SC  will  include253  3000  statutory  staff  of  Frontex  in  Category  1  and 
7000 from the Member States in Categories 2 and 3.  

Even  if  there  were  delays  in  setting  up  the  Category  1,  the  recruitment,  training, 
equipping  and  deployment  have  been  catching  up.  The  recruitment  of  Category  1  staff 
was significantly delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, significant progress 
has  been  made.  In  2021  Agency  counted  495  deployable  team  members.  In  2022  the 
number was already 678, reaching 970 SC Category 1 staff as of September 2023. 

253   The number of SC Category 1 staff as indicated in Annex I of the EBCG Regulation includes statutory 
staff deployed as members of the team in operational areas, staff responsible for the functioning of the 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and the ‘up to 4% support staff’ in 
line with Articles 54(7) and 54(8) of the EBCG Regulation. 

58 

 
 
In 2023, the size of the SC is planned to reach 7 500 members.254 The overall situation of 
SC  staffing  as  of  September  2023  counts  970  employed  Category  1,  450  seconded 
Category 2 and 3899 nominated Category 3255.  

However, when it comes to the composition of the SC, even if Member States consider 
the  profile  categories256  to  be  adequately  defined  in  terms  of  their  roles  and 
responsibilities,  there  are  gaps  in  the  availability  of  certain  specialised  experts.  This  is 
especially the case in respect of certain profiles such as dog handlers and advanced level 
document officers (ALDOs). The gaps in the composition of the SC can be fixed with the 
long-term recruitment and training plans on European level, as a part of better strategic 
planning. 

The  geographical  composition  of  Category  1  does  not  represent  an  EU-wide  border 
uniformed  service,  nor  does  it  reflect  the  diverse  national  backgrounds  and  working 
cultures  of  all  Member  States  in  a  representative  way.  This  is  mainly  due  to  different 
working conditions and pays in the Member States257.   

Effectiveness of deployment of SC 

Overall, the effectiveness of the deployment of SC has been satisfactory. Even if the 
deployment of Category 1 staff has been effective to some extent, there are still several 
factors that limit this effectiveness258.  

The  deployment  of  Categories  2259  and  3260  appear  to  be  more  effective.  SC  staff  of 
Categories 2 and 3 have received very positive feedback from Member States. National 
authorities value their background, professionalism, and operational support.  

For  Category  2,  the  length  of  deployment  is  particularly  valued  by  the  national 
authorities who receive them, however it creates difficulties in recruitment for Member 
States  who  second  Category  2  staff  to  the  Agency.  For  Category  3,  Member  States 
consider  these  officers  useful  to  fill  gaps  in  busy  or  intense  periods,  such  as  holidays. 
Shorter length of deployment was noted as an issue in the context of participation in joint 
operations as by the time an officer becomes familiar with  the host State’s procedures, 
they must leave, making the deployment less efficient.  

254   Category 1 – 1500, Category 2 – 500, Category 3 – 4000, Category 4 – 1500. Annex I of the EBCG 

Regulation. 

255   Data from Frontex report on capabilities to the Management Board 5.9.2023. 
256   Profiles are describing the expertise, equipping and role of the individual SC staff member. They are 

for example Dog Handlers, Coast Guard Function Officers and Return Specialists. 

257   SC staff from Greece, Romania, Portugal, Spain and Poland account for approximately 74% of all staff 

(ICF study). 

258   See detailed analysis in Annex III.B. 
259   Operational staff seconded from MSs to the Agency for a longer-term period of 24 months – Article 56 

of the EBCG Regulation. 

260   Operational  staff  for  short-term  deployments  (up  to  4  months  per  year)  -  Article  57  of  the  EBCG 

Regulation. 

59 

 
 
The  Agency  recognises  that  the  current  deployment  system  is  not  efficient  and  is 
considering improvements, such as deploying teams rather than individuals. This will be 
developed as part of the work on the definition of chain-of-command structures. In 2023, 
Frontex has been piloting a new chain of command structure, with a view of deploying 
teams  rather  than  individuals.  This  is  also  linked  to  the  restructuring  Frontex 
headquarters, to ensure lean and effective business processes. Proposal in this regard has 
been discussed with the Frontex MB at the end of 2023. 

At the same time, integrated planning is under development. This will have an impact to 
the  operational,  contingency,  and  capacity  development  plans.  There  is  still  room  for 
improvement to ensure that all the necessary plans are coordinated on European level and 
that the plans of Frontex and Member States are synchronised261. 

The Regulation262 requires that the deployment of the SC focuses on operational tasks at 
the operational areas. This provision puts a limit to the possible deployment of SC to the 
Agency’s headquarters. At the same time, it seems that the Agency lacks certain staff at 
the  Frontex  headquarters  that  would  facilitate  the  overall  management  of  the  SC  and 
related  support  functions.  In  Frontex’s  view,  only  4%  statutory  staff  for  supportive  or 
monitoring  functions  are  insufficient263.  Others  suggest  that  the  revision  of  the  internal 
processes  and  procedures  of  the  Agency,  including  the  development  of  clear  concepts 
and business processes in terms of the present and future needs for general administrative 
support,  operational  support,  and  size  of  operational  activities  could  significantly 
increase  the  effectiveness  of  the  Agency’s  headquarters.  A  clear  overview  is  likely  to 
emerge as  a result of the ongoing  development  of a new  command  structure of the SC 
and the upcoming wider re-organisation of the Agency to align its structure better with its 
mandate (see section 4.1.2.1). In the meantime, the deployment of some operational staff 
of the SC to the Agency’s headquarters can only be justified for certain narrowly defined 
profiles264. 

The  reserve  for  rapid  reaction  (SC  Category  4)  has  not  been  relevant  to  supporting 
Member States with border management tasks, as no Category 4 staff were deployed in 
2021,  2022  or  2023  so  far.  Annex  I  to  the  EBCG  Regulation  foresees  phasing  out  this 
reserve, with  Category 4 no longer containing  any SC staff from  2025. Category 4 has 
been  a  temporary  bridging  solution,  while  the  SC  in  the  Categories  1  –  3  has  been 
increasing  to  become  large  enough  to  address  any  unforeseen  needs.  During  the 
evaluation period, in cases where rapid border interventions were needed, resources from 
other categories (especially Category 3) were available and sufficient to cover the needs. 

The size of individual Member States’ contribution 

261   There  are  a  number  of  practical  issues  affecting  the  effectiveness  of  deployments  that  are  explored 

below. 

262   Article 54(2) of the EBCG Regulation. 
263   Article 54(7) of the EBCG Regulation; interviews with Frontex. 
264   Management  Board  Decision  15/2023  of  31  March  2023  amending  Management  Board  Decision 
5/2023 adopting the profiles to be made available to the European Border and Coast Guard standing 
corps for 2024. 

60 

 
 
The  size  of  individual  Member  States’  contributions  to  the  SC  appears  largely 
adequate to meet the objectives of the Regulation. The Agency has been able to answer 
all the requests for assistance by Member States. Where needs have not been met, this is 
due to the type (i.e. profiles), rather than the size, of the contributions. The latter should 
be tailored and adapted to deployment needs during implementation. The non-activation 
of the Category 4 to date also indicates that the available resources in Categories 1, 2 and 
3 have been sufficient to meet the needs.  

Member States' obligations to contribute to the Standing Corps, including the individual 
Member  States  contributions,  are  based  on  the  distribution  key  agreed  for  the  rapid 
reserve  pool  established  by 
the  previous  EBCG  Regulation  (Regulation  (EU) 
2016/1624). The Commission’s proposal for that Regulation based the distribution on at 
least 3% of a border guard force of a Member State without land or sea external borders, 
and at least 2% for Member States with land or sea external borders. This proposal could 
not gather support in the Council negotiations. Instead, intensive negotiations within the 
Council led to a distribution key that is applied to the current distribution in annexes II-
IV of the Regulation. As regards the proportionality of national contributions  to the 
SC,  the  current  distribution  of  the  contribution  requirements  is  taking  into  account  the 
size of the Member States, population, resources and national capabilities to contribute. 
When  looking  at  only  the  national  territory  and  share  of  EU  population,  the  analysis 
found  that  most  Member  State  contribute  a  fair  share  to  the  SC,  while  five  Member 
States contribute more (HR, DK, HU, LV, RO) and two Member States contribute less 
(FR and ES).  However, the analysis also found that the size of the national contributions 
is proportionate to national capabilities, with a span of individual contributions varying 
from  a  minimum  of  0.14%  to  a  maximum  1.5  %  of  the  national  law  enforcement 
capacities265.  

Expertise, professionalism and training of the SC 

Frontex implemented a range of training activities for Member States and third countries 
and  met  most  internal  training  targets.  Although  Frontex  successfully  delivered 
assistance  (including  by  establishing  common  training  standards),  almost  half  of  the 
Member States noted the lack of training for Categories 2 and 3 staff, or for Member 
States’  own  staff.  The  effectiveness  of  the  implementation  of  training  activities  was 
hindered  by  implementation  issues,  as  well  as  by  some  legislative  issues.  The  biggest 
training-specific  issues  were:  (1)  insufficient  capacity  within  Frontex  to  deliver  all 
training activities, (2) the lack of high-quality trainers (partly due to the lack of a trainer 
profile  in  the  SC  and  to  inadequate  compensation  for  trainers),  and  (3)  difficulties  in 
finding and managing host training centres. 

Following their recruitment, Category 1 staff must undergo necessary border guard- or 
return-related training, taking into account their previous qualifications and professional 
experience. The training is mandatory before deployment.  

265   See the detailed analysis in section on review of the SC (RQ 9) of Annex IIIb. 

61 

 
 
The  majority  of  Category  1  staff  reported  that  the  training  was  effective  in  preparing 
them  to  perform  specific  tasks,  such  as  border  checks  and  border  surveillance-related 
tasks, including refusal of entry, authorisation of entry, and patrolling. However, several 
national authorities reported that SC Category 1 staff are not sufficiently experienced at 
the  time  of  their  deployment266.  They  noted  that  Category  1  staff  needs  additional 
training, particularly  those without a law  enforcement background. This  means that the 
training requirements and training curricula need further improvement. 

As  explained  above,  national  authorities  value  the  expertise,  professionalism  and 
operational support provided by deployed Categories 2 and 3 staff. As regards Category 
1  staff,  a  number  of  implementation  issues  seem  to  impact  the  effectiveness  of  their 
deployment.  

Firstly,  there  are  some  inefficiencies  in  the  selection  of  the  Category  1  staff  to  be 
deployed  by  the  Agency,  as  well  as  some  concerns  about  their  background  skills  and 
interviewed  and 
competences.  According 
representatives of Member States, the statutory staff deployed often have different skills 
from those needed in the field. 

to  several  Category  1  SC  officers 

Another limiting factor is that Category 1 staff is unable to perform certain tasks; e.g. the 
EBCG  Regulation  does  not  contain  detailed  rules  on  obligations  related  to  executive 
powers, use of lethal force and carrying firearms. Different Member States have different 
legislation  dealing  with  the  powers  and  treatment  of  officers/vehicles  with  law 
enforcement  status  and  not  all  have  adjusted  their  legislation  to  enable  the  full 
implementation  of  the  Regulation.  In  such  cases  Category  1  staff  may  only  be  able  to 
provide limited support to the local authorities. 

The limited English-speaking staff at local level in Member States means that deployed 
SCOs cannot effectively carry out their duties unless paired with English-speaking local 
officers.  In  some  contexts,  such  as  the  Eastern  border,  knowledge  of  Russian  or 
Ukrainian is  a useful skill; however, the deployment does not systematically reflect the 
staff’s language skills. 

Finally, logistical concerns were reported as obstacles in the efficient implementation of 
duties, including carrying weapons and appropriate winter uniforms. E.g. in the absence 
of logistical  hubs  in  the Member States,  Category 1 staff  must collect  their  weapons  at 
the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw and then can travel only on the day of deployment, 
and not the day before. Moreover, all Category 1 staff received full-service uniforms, and 
250  were  also  equipped  with  protective  glasses,  flashlights,  tactical  belts,  gloves  and 
multitool  kits  as  well  as  with  bulletproof  vests  and  helmets  where  needed267.  The  gaps 
with the personal equipment have been gradually closing.  

266   ICF  field  visits  to  two  MS;  interviews  with  MS  national  authorities:  7/27;  ICF  survey  of  MS/SAC 

national authorities: 3/27. 

267   Frontex (2023). ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022’.  

62 

 
 
4.2.  How did the EU intervention make a difference and to whom? 

Key evaluation findings 

Frontex’s new mandate contributed to achieving the objectives of the EBCG as a whole. 

The objectives of the EBCG could not have been achieved sufficiently by Member States 
acting alone. 

The objective of Union policy in the field of external border management is to develop 
and  implement  European  integrated  border  management  at  national  and  Union  level, 
which  is  a  necessary  corollary  to  the  free  movement  of  persons  within  the  Union.268 
Frontex’s new mandate, as introduced by the EBCG Regulation, contributes to achieving 
the  objectives  of  the  EBCG  as  a  whole,  as  it  supports  Member  States  to  implement 
effective  border  management.  In  addition,  the  establishment  of  the  EIBM  multiannual 
strategic  policy  cycle  by  the  Regulation  contributes  to  reaching  the  objective  of  ‘the 
gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders’, defined 
by Article 77(2)(d) of the TFEU.  

Frontex’s  mandate  has  been  designed  in  the  framework  of  shared  responsibility,  with 
Frontex’s  tasks  designed  to  ensure  support  to  Member  States  in  the  effective 
management of the external borders and returns. To date, the key areas of support from 
Frontex  to  Member  States  have  been  deployments  of  the  SC,  operational  support, 
situational awareness, return, capacity-building, deployment of technical equipment, and 
international cooperation. 

For a great majority of Member States, the areas of Frontex’s mandate considered most 
conducive to addressing the specific needs and challenges at the external borders include: 
1)  situational  awareness  (especially  monitoring  migratory  flows  and  carrying  out  risk 
analysis269,  as  well  as  supporting  the  development  and  operation  of  EUROSUR270);  2) 
return271;  and  3)  joint  operations272.  A  majority  of  Member  States  also  highlighted:  4) 
international  cooperation  (with  third  countries)273;  capacity-building  (training274  and 
technical  assistance)275,  as  well  as  the  management  of  the  False  and  Authentic 
Documents Online (FADO) system276. 

The  ability  of  the  Agency  to  provide  situational  awareness  products  is  viewed 
positively  by  the  Member  States  and  perceived  to  provide  added  value.  EUROSUR 
situational  awareness  products,  which  serve  various  stakeholders,  and  EUROSUR 

268   Recital 1 of the EBCG Regulation. 
269   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
270   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.  
271   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
272   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 22/27 agreed or strongly agreed.  
273   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 21/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
274   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
275   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
276   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed or strongly agreed.    

63 

 
 
 
 
Fusion  Services  products  (including  maritime  and  aerial  surveillance),  add  significant 
operational value to Member States lacking such capabilities, as well as  Member States 
requiring  additional  capacity  for  these  analyses.  Risk  analysis  products  provide  wide 
coverage  across  thematic  and  geographical  areas  and  provide  Member  States  with  a 
comprehensive view of risks at all EU borders.  

The emphasis of the EBCG Regulation on fundamental rights has enabled the Agency 
to develop and implement a robust framework for continuous monitoring of the Agency’s 
compliance  with  EU  and  international  law,  and  in  particular  with  all  relevant 
fundamental  rights  obligations.  This  framework  includes  the  role  of  the  FRMs,  the 
independent  office  of  the  FRO,  but  also  mechanisms  such  as  the  SIRs  and  complaints 
mechanism, all of which have been discussed in greater detail above. These contribute to 
ensuring that the Agency can uphold EU values in its activities and operations, and may 
be  replicated  at  national  level  by  Member  States,  particularly  in  the  context  of 
implementing  the  EBCG-wide  overarching  components  of  the  Fundamental  Rights 
Action  Plan  or  the  development  of  national  EIBM  strategies,  which  should  feature  the 
respect  for  fundamental  rights  as  an  overarching  component.  Additionally,  Frontex  has 
contributed  significantly  to  the  development  of  an  EBCG-wide  culture  of  respect  for 
fundamental  rights  in  border  management.  This  ongoing  objective  is  being  pursued 
through  several  avenues,  including  chiefly  the  advisory  role  of  the  FRMs,  who  make 
themselves  available  to  Agency  and  Member  States  staff  on  matters  concerning 
fundamental  rights  compliance,  and  the  contribution  by  the  Agency  to  Member  States’ 
trainings  and  training  programmes:  fundamental  rights  components  and  considerations 
are  embedded  throughout  all  Frontex  training  curricula,  in  a  way  that  is  practical  and 
operationally relevant.  

Frontex’s enhanced mandate in return has been positively received and the Agency has 
become  an  essential  actor  in  the  common  EU  system  for  returns,  taking  on  new 
responsibilities  in  relation  to  the  return  of  with  no  legal  right  to  stay  in  the  EU.  In 
addition  to  assisting  with  returns,  including  voluntary  returns,  the  Agency  also 
to  harmonisation  and  capacity-building  of  national  IT  return  case 
contributed 
management  systems  and  their  digitalisation  and  modernisation  in  line  with  the 
RECAMAS model. Post-return reintegration activities also provide significant EU added 
value, especially  as some  Member States may lack presence to  support reintegration in 
certain third countries. 

As a result of the ongoing establishment of the SC, the Agency is able to deploy staff and 
equipment  in  response  to  needs  identified  by  Member  States  through  joint  operations 
and rapid border interventions. Frontex brings EU added value to the Member States by 
providing  additional  human  resources  and  equipment,  as  well  as  coordinating  joint 
operations  and  other  operational  activities.  At  an  EU  strategic  level,  the  EBCG 
Regulation  provides  for  a  mechanism  to  allocate  or  relocate  resources  (assets  or 
personnel) to the sections where irregular migration flows are of greatest concern. Even 
though  this  process  is  not  entirely  running  smoothly  yet,  and  the  scale  of  support  will 

64 

 
continue  to  grow,  past  and  ongoing  joint  operations  or  RBIs  have  supported  Member 
States effectively.  

The  implementation  of  EIBM  requires  collective  actions  by  both  national  authorities 
and  the  EU.  It  should  be  developed  at  EU  and  national  level,  in  the  context  of  shared 
responsibility  between  Frontex  and  Member  States'  national  authorities277.  As  the 
Commission  Communication  on  the  EIBM  and  the  TO-EIBM  are  yet  to  be  translated 
into the Member States’ national EIBM strategies, the assessment of EU added value is 
not  possible  at  this  stage.  The  Commission  will  carry  out  an  evaluation  of  the 
multiannual policy cycle four years after its adoption278. 

The  development  of  integrated  capability  planning  (national  capability  development 
plans,  Agency’s  multiannual  acquisition  strategy  and  other  multiannual  plans,  and 
capability  roadmap)  should  lead  to  more  effective  development  of  capabilities  across 
Member  States.  However,  this  is  still  work  in  progress,  no  definite  conclusion  can  be 
drawn on its added value. 

Member  States  consider  that  the  training  of  the  EBCG,  in  particular  the  common 
training  standards  provided  by  Frontex,  have  contributed  to  improving  the  training  of 
national border guards279, developing and strengthening border management capabilities 
in  their  Member  State280,  facilitating  cooperation  among  Member  States’  border  and 
coast  guards’  training  institutions281,  mainstreaming  fundamental  rights  in  national 
training programmes282, and ensuring a harmonised and common approach to EU border 
and coast guard training in the Member States.  

As the implementation of EIBM as  the shared responsibility of national authorities and 
Frontex283,  there  is  overall  consensus  among  Member  States  that  the  objectives  of  the 
EBCG Regulation  could not be achieved  sufficiently  by  Member States alone. The 
majority of Member State respondents felt that this was particularly true in the areas of: 
1)  returns284;  2)  risk  analysis  contributing  to  a  comprehensive  situational  awareness285, 
and  3)  border  control  measures  at  the  external  borders286.  Some  Member  States 
highlighted that measures within the Schengen area remain primarily the competence of 

277   European  Commission  (2018).  ‘Progress  Report  on  the  implementation  of  the  European  Agenda  on 
Migration. Annex 6: The main elements for developing the European Integrated Border Management 
Strategy’.  

278   In 2027, in accordance with Article 8(7) of the EBCG Regulation. 
279   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 
280   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed.  
281   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27 agreed, 3/27 strongly agreed. 
282   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed, 2/27 strongly agreed. 
283   Article 1 of the EBCG Regulation. 
284   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 2/27 strongly disagreed; 20/27 disagreed. 
285   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27 strongly disagreed; 16/27 disagreed.  
286   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities: 17/27 disagreed. 

65 

 
 
Member States287. The activities of the Agency at the external border and in return should 
always complement the efforts of Member States288,289. 

4.3. 

Is the intervention still relevant? 

Key evaluation findings 

The EBCG Regulation remains relevant to addressing the current needs and challenges 
at  external  borders,  although  a  minority  of  Member  States  believe  that  certain  aspects 
could  be  better  addressed  in  the  Regulation  (such  as  hybrid  threats,  secondary 
movements, returns from third countries to other third countries). 

In  terms  of  scope,  the  EBCG  Regulation  largely  cover  the  activities  of  Frontex  rather 
than  the  whole  EBCG.  This  somewhat  limits  the  scope  of  the  governance  and 
fundamental rights mechanisms introduced. 

The scope of responsibility of the Agency in respect of cross-border crime is limited but 
also leaves room for interpretation on the boundaries of Frontex’s supporting role. 

Overall, Frontex activities remain relevant to support Member States, including via joint 
operations, return, situational awareness, capacity-building, and cooperation with third 
countries.  

The  continued  migratory  pressure  and  outlook  for  the  next  decade  indicate  that  the 
Regulation will remain relevant290. While the absence of clearly defined objectives in the 
Regulation  makes  the  comparison  between  the  original  objectives  and  the  future  needs 
less straight-forward, trends  in  threats  and risks of irregular migration and cross-border 
criminal  activities have  remained high  since 2019 and are likely  to  continue, making it 
highly  probable  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  remains  relevant  to  the  current  and 
emerging  needs  and  challenges  in  external  border  management.  Member  State 
authorities  largely  agreed  with  this,  highlighting  in  particular  the  tasks  that  are  seen  as 
part of the core Frontex mandate, i.e. external border management and return. However, 
it  is  difficult  to  fully  assess  the  extent  to  which  the  EBCG  Regulation  addresses  needs 
and challenges in external border management, due to its ongoing implementation. 

the  Regulation  can  be 

The  main  underlying  objective  of 
interpreted  as  the 
implementation  of  EIBM  at  national  and  Union  level.  By  defining  the  key 
components  of  EIBM,  the  Regulation  sets  the  objectives  of  and  the  scope  for  the 
Agency’s activities in support of the implementation of EIBM as a whole. The strategic 
guidance  for  the  EBCG  comes  from  the  EIBM  multiannual  strategic  policy  cycle; 
however, the Commission’s Communication was finalised only in March 2023, the TO-
EIBM adopted in September 2023, and they are in the process of being translated into the 

287   ICF  survey  of  MS/SAC  authorities:  10/27  neither  agreed  nor  disagreed;  6/27  agreed.  1/27  strongly 

agreed.  

288   Recital 12 of the EBCG Regulation 
289   ICF study (2023), pp. 111-114. 
290   Frontex (2022). ‘Strategic Risk Analysis’, p. 38. 

66 

 
 
 
 
national strategies by the Member States291. Therefore, its relevance and impact cannot be 
evaluated yet.   

The  EIBM  multiannual  strategic  policy  cycle  also  only  serves  to  further  emphasise  the 
continued relevance of the Agency’s work on compliance with fundamental rights, as 
the respect for fundamental rights is an overarching component of EIBM. Despite some 
setbacks and delays, overall, since the entry into force of the EBCG Regulation, Frontex 
has  made  significant  progress  in  the  implementation  of  all  aspects  of  its  multifaceted 
framework for good governance and compliance with fundamental rights, as exemplified 
by the successful – albeit delayed – recruitment of 46 FRMs, six more than are requested 
by  the  EBCG  Regulation.  At  EBCG  level,  the  Agency  has  a  key  role  to  play  in 
encouraging  the  development  of  a  culture  of  respect  for  fundamental  rights  in  all 
components  of  the  EBCG,  including  the  national  authorities  of  the  Member  States. 
Ongoing  processes  involving  the  Member  States,  such  as  the  implementation  of  the 
overarching  components  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  Action  Plan,  as  well  as  the 
development of the national EIBM strategies, assures the continued relevance and need 
for the Agency’s work and assistance in this realm. 

Frontex’s  activities  themselves  also  remain  relevant  in  addressing  the  needs  and 
challenges present at the EU external borders, although there is room for improvement to 
increase effectiveness in some aspects of their operations292.  As explained in section 4.2, 
Member States consider that the most relevant activities of the Agency are in the areas of 
situational awareness, returns and joint operations.  

In  addition,  the  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  that  the  implementation  of  the 
EUROSUR framework has been effective in terms of information exchange to improve 
situational  awareness293,  but  less  so  in  better  detecting,  preventing,  and  countering 
irregular immigration, or contributing to the protection and saving lives of migrants294.  

In addition, Frontex’s work in the external dimension (including working arrangements 
and deployments on the basis of status agreements)  is relevant in helping to implement 
measures  in  third  countries,  especially  countries  of  origin  and  transit  of  irregular 
migration, and measures in neighbouring countries. Frontex has also  continued to build 
partnerships and synergies with relevant international organisations. 

One specific area where it is difficult to assess the relevance of the Agency’s activities is 
their contribution to fight against cross-border crime. While the TFEU and the EBCG 
Regulation  limit  the  Agency’s  mandate  in  this  respect,  the  lack  of  a  definition  of  the 
possible ‘operational assistance’ that the Agency can provide in the detection, prevention, 
and combating of cross-border crime leaves the exact interpretation open. However, the 
applicable legislation is clear that the Agency’s mandate does not include ‘investigations’ 

291   To be finalised by the end of the first quarter of 2024. 
292   See details in section 1 (EQ 2 and EQ 3) of Annex IIIa and section 4.1.2.9 above. 
293   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities:  17/27.   
294   ICF survey of MS/SAC authorities:  6/27.  

67 

 
 
or ‘support to investigations of crime’, which clearly fall within the remit of Europol and 
Eurojust.  

Overall,  Frontex  has  undertaken  significant  effort  to  provide  human  and  technical 
resources  to  enhance  the  Member  States’  ability  to  tackle  migratory  challenges  or 
challenges  related  to  cross-border  crime.  This  stage  of  the  implementation  of  the 
Regulation allows a preliminary assessment of their relevance but a full assessment will 
only be possible once the Agency’s mandate is fully implemented. 

5.  WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED? 

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 

Overall,  the  EBCG  Regulation  remains  relevant  to  addressing  current  and  future 
emergencies  at  EU  external  borders.  Irregular  migration  continues  to  be  a  major 
challenge and is at the top of EU’s policy and political agenda, requiring a common and 
coordinated response by all Member States. The Regulation contributed to the effective 
development  and  implementation  of  all  components  of  EIBM  and,  despite  the  short 
timeframe so far, has resulted in the establishment and deployment of the first-ever EU 
uniformed service – the EBCG Standing Corps. 

Stakeholders  agreed  that  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  could  not  have  been 
achieved  sufficiently  by  Member  States  acting  alone.  Frontex’s  new  mandate,  as 
introduced  by  the  EBCG  Regulation,  contributes  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the 
EBCG  as  a  whole,  as  it  supports  Member  States  to  implement  effective  border 
management,  in  the  context  of  their  shared  responsibility.  As  such,  the  evaluation 
confirms the EU added value of the Regulation.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  is  to  a  large  extent  legally  coherent  internally  and  externally, 
however, the evaluation identified some smaller inconsistencies in both respects. 

The effectiveness of the Regulation and Frontex’s activities across various thematic areas 
was  impacted  by  a  number  of  external  (e.g.  the  Covid  pandemic)  and  internal  factors. 
Some of those stems from the Regulation itself, such as a lack of sufficient legal clarity 
or  gaps,  while  others  are  the  product  of  organisational,  technical,  logistical,  and 
operational  shortcomings  in  the  implementation  of  the  Regulation  by  Frontex  and  to 
some extent by the Member States. Effective implementation was also impacted by some 
wider legal limitations identified in national and broader EU legislation.  

Overall,  the  fact  that  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  has  a  significantly 
longer timeframe than this evaluation can cover, creates an important limitation to the 
conclusiveness of the assessment of the Regulation under the evaluation criteria.  

Scope and objectives of the EBCG Regulation 

While the scope of the Regulation covers the entire EBCG, the governance framework 
and fundamental rights safeguards contained in the EBCG Regulation apply largely only 
to  Frontex.  The  EIBM  multiannual  policy  cycle  aims  to  improve  integrated  border 

68 

 
managements in the EU, however its implementation has just started, therefore its impact 
cannot be assessed yet. 

The  EBCG  Regulation  does  not  have  clearly  defined  objectives  (beyond  its  recitals) 
which makes the achievement of those objective less measurable.  

However,  the  evaluation  found  that  the  Agency’s  operational  activities  provide 
significant support in the management of external borders and returns that is appreciated 
by Member States. The same applies to the Agency’s activities in third countries based 
on status agreements and working arrangements.  

The area where the  achievement of the objectives of the Regulation appear hindered to 
some  extent  is  related  to  the  status  of  the  SC,  in  particular  Category  1.  While  the 
Regulation  has  never  intended  to,  nor  can  it,  provide  Frontex  with  a  law  enforcement 
mandate295, the SC works together with national authorities that do have law enforcement 
powers,  and  are  subject  to  specific  national  frameworks  regulating  in  particular  their 
working conditions and the use of force. The application of the EU Staff Regulations 
to the Category 1 SC staff presents challenges, as the Staff Regulations were not intended 
to  meet  the  needs  of  an  operational  service  with  executive  powers,  resulting  in 
inconsistencies  in  areas  such  as  working  conditions,  selection  procedures,  deployment 
locations, leave entitlements, disciplinary measures, etc. It appears however that the Staff 
Regulations  provide  possibilities  to  address  the  majority  of  the  identified  problems 
without  the  need  for  changes  in  legislation  (e.g.,  Commission  decisions  and/or  MB 
decisions).  

The  absence  of  a  law  enforcement  mandate  and  a  corresponding  legal  base  have  also 
generated  various  interpretations  of  the  exact  boundaries  of  Frontex’s  tasks  in 
contributing to the prevention, detection and countering cross-border crime. While 
more nuanced provisions in the Regulation could facilitate its application, the ‘Schengen’ 
legal  bases  in  the  TFEU  provide  a  clear  answer  to  the  question  while  only  migrant 
smuggling, trafficking in human beings and terrorism are mentioned among the tasks of 
the Agency in the Regulation, and no other forms of crime296.  

Governance and organisational structure of Frontex 

295   The legal bases of the EBCG Regulation, namely Article 77(2)(b) and (d) and Article 79(2)(c) of the 
TFEU, pertain to border checks, asylum, and immigration policies (Title V, Chapter 2 TFEU) and not 
police cooperation (Chapter 5 TFEU). 

296   Cf.  also Recital 41 of the Regulation stating:  Given its activities at the external borders, the Agency 
should  contribute  to  preventing  and  detecting  cross-border  crime,  such  as  migrant  smuggling, 
trafficking  in  human  beings  and  terrorism,  where  it  is  appropriate  for  it  to  act  and  where  it  has 
obtained  relevant  information  through  its  activities.  It  should  coordinate  its  activities  with  Europol, 
which  is  the  agency  responsible  for  supporting  and  strengthening  Member  States'  actions  and  their 
cooperation  in  preventing  and  combating  serious  crime  affecting  two  or  more  Member  States.  The 
cross-border dimension is characterised by crimes that are directly linked to unauthorised crossings of 
the external borders, including trafficking in human beings or smuggling of migrants.” 

69 

 
 
 
The governance structure of Frontex is well-established within the EBCG Regulation. 
It includes clear tasks for the MB, ED, and oversight by the European Commission, EP, 
and  the  Council,  in  line  with  the  Common  Approach  on  Decentralised  Agencies. 
Additional  processes  have  been  put  in  place  to  ensure  improved  follow-up  to  FRO’s 
recommendations by the MB and ED. However, the fact that the primary responsibility 
of external  border management is  preserved by  Member States also  means  the existing 
governance framework covers only Frontex and not the EBCG as a whole. 

Some problems have been identified in relation to the implementation of the Regulation. 
Firstly,  return  authorities  are  not  sufficiently  represented  in  the  MB  as  Member 
States’  delegates  typically  come  from  border  management  authorities,  which  are  not 
necessarily responsible for returns.  In addition, the agenda of the MB is overburdened 
which leaves little room to provide the Agency with strategic guidance.  

The  European  Parliament  is  yet  to  make  use  of  Article  112,  which  provides  for 
cooperation with national parliaments that would significantly increase the scrutiny of the 
EBCG as a whole, including national authorities. 

Finally,  Frontex  is  currently  working  on  a  new  organisational  structure  that  is  more 
closely  aligned  with  its  new  mandate,  since  the  current  structure  proved  to  be  partly 
inadequate to support the effective deployment of the SC. The ongoing development of 
operational  command-and-control  processes,  if  integrated  and  aligned  with  operational 
and administrative support divisions and units, as well as with the executive leadership, 
should lead to more effective and efficient coordination and use of resources. 

Operations 

The  operational  support  provided  by  Frontex  is  valued  by  Member  States  and  has 
contributed  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG.  Frontex  provides  added  value  by 
offering additional human resources and technical equipment to Member States and third 
countries  facing  migratory  challenges,  as  well  as  through  the  standardisation  of 
procedures and harmonisation of operational good practices at EU level.   

However,  a  range  of  legal  and  practical  factors  limits  the  effectiveness  of  Frontex’s 
operational response. 

Firstly, as explained under scope and objectives, the treatment of Category 1 SC staff as 
regular staff subject to the EU Staff Regulations is perceived as operationally disruptive 
and limiting the overall added value of the SC. 

Secondly,  the  lack  of  a  clear  command-and-control  structure  for  the  SC  hampers 
operational  effectiveness.  Multiple  reporting  channels,  including  the  functional  line  of 
reporting  and  the  Coordinating  Officer,  create  inconsistencies.  Frontex  is  currently 
developing a pilot for a new command-and-control structure to increase effectiveness. 

70 

 
 
 
 
 
Thirdly, while the situation has  improved  during the evaluation  period, the availability 
of  different  profiles  does  not  fully  correlate  with  the  needs  of  the  Agency  and  of 
Member  States.  Frontex  reports  major  gaps  for  certain  profiles  (e.g.  dog  handlers, 
ALDO). 

Fourthly,  several  organisational  issues  limit  the  operational  effectiveness  of  Frontex, 
including  practical  issues  with  weapons  transportation  and  the  lack  of  equipment, 
uniforms and advanced logistical support during deployments. In addition, deployments 
to Member States are also made more problematic by language barriers. 

Finally, the effectiveness and efficiency of Frontex operations at border crossing points is 
impacted by the limited access to key databases by the SC, including SIS and national 
databases. This is only partially a language limitation; it is rather due to the fact that only 
four Member States adapted legally and technically their systems and procedures to 
allow SC staff to effectively conduct border checks and query the necessary databases.  

Return 

Frontex has become an essential actor in the common EU system for return, taking on 
new responsibilities and tools related to return of people who have no legal right to stay 
in the EU. Frontex has effectively supported Member States through all phases of return 
procedures.  Stakeholders  at  EU  and  national  level  value  Frontex’s  operational  and 
technical  assistance  on  return,  particularly  organising  JROs  and  providing  other  return-
related  support.  For  Member  States,  Frontex  support  in  return  is  also  believed  to  bring 
time savings and reduced administrative burden, as well as financial savings. 

While there is no incoherence between the EBCG Regulation and the Return Directive, 
the term ‘assisted was voluntary return’ was introduced in the EBCG Regulation without 
being defined. The implementation of Frontex’s mandate on return could be facilitated by 
some additional clarity in this respect. 

The EBCG Regulation does not provide separately for the processing of personal data 
in  the  context  of  return  activities,  despite  the  expanded  mandate  of  the  Agency.  While 
Chapter V of the EU DPR provides a derogation for ‘important reasons of public interest’ 
for  the  transfer  of  personal  data  to  third  countries,  that  the  Agency  currently  relies  on, 
Frontex  would  need  to  negotiate  arrangements  with  third  countries  should  there  be 
regular or structural data transfer in the future.  

As  far  as  implementation  is  concerned,  return  is  not  fully  embedded  yet  in  some  of 
Agency’s key activities, such as vulnerability assessments and risk analysis. 

Situational awareness 

Situational  awareness  tasks  of  Frontex  remain  one  of  the  highest  EU  added  value 
activities of the EBCG Regulation. Frontex produces multiple risk analysis products, and 
is  progressing  towards  providing  a  fully  up-to-date,  reliable  and  actionable  information 
through 24/7 (near) real-time situation and crisis monitoring surveillance. Lack of access 

71 

 
to  intelligence  data  from  Member  States  (as  well  as  EU  sources,  such  as  the  EEAS 
Intelligence Centre) and limitations on collection of open-source intelligence and certain 
categories  of  data  (such  as  on  incidents  linked  to  secondary  movements,  especially 
outside border areas) restrict the level of situational awareness at the EU borders. Frontex 
is, and should remain, an important contributor to EU-level situational awareness related 
to regular and irregular migration towards and within the European Union. 

EUROSUR  has  contributed  to  establishing  a  European  situational  picture,  providing  a 
common  framework  for  information  exchange,  improving  situational  awareness  and 
increasing  reaction  capabilities.  The  volume,  quality,  flow,  and  speed  of  the  data 
exchanged  has  increased  in  recent  years.  However,  EUROSUR  is  impacted  by 
inconsistent national implementation, as not all Member States report border events with 
the same completeness or regularity. NCC practices differ in incident formats and timing, 
leading to lower quality data. 

Stakeholders  question  the  added  value  of  upgrading  the  EUROSUR  communication 
network  to  CONFIDENTIEL  UE/EU  CONFIDENTIAL  classification  level,  due  to 
very limited categories of information requiring such level and the high implementation 
costs. 

There is a lack of clarity as to the type of personal data that EUROSUR can process, as 
Articles 28 and 89 of the EBCG Regulation are not fully aligned. This leaves room for 
various interpretations. The EDPS is currently working on an opinion on EUROSUR. It 
is  yet  to  be  seen  if  the  implementation  of  the  new  MB  decisions  on  the Agency’s  data 
processing activities will sufficiently address this issue.  

Vulnerability  assessment  is  valuable,  allowing  Frontex  to  monitor  vulnerabilities  in 
Member States’ border management capabilities and follow up with a coherent reporting 
system.  The  complementarity  between  vulnerability  assessments  and  Schengen 
evaluations  has  been  broadly  achieved,  although  a  few  Member  States  point  to  some 
overlaps in data collection.  

The enforcement of the outcome of the vulnerability assessment process needs to be 
strengthened to ensure that recommendations are followed up and acted upon, and their 
implementation is reported by Member States.  

Finally,  inconsistency  of  definitions  between  the  methodologies  underpinning  risk 
assessments (CIRAM) and vulnerability assessments (CVAM) limits the contribution of 
vulnerability assessments to risk analysis. 

Capability development 

72 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capability-building is a key activity of the Agency both in terms of human resources and 
technical equipment297. 

The EBCG’s integrated capability development planning is not sufficiently advanced. 
Many  Member  States  submitted  their  national  capability  development  plans  with 
significant  delay, the Agency’s  multiannual  acquisition strategy  was adopted and being 
implemented  with  significant  delay,  therefore  the  capability  roadmap  for  the  EBCG 
could not be developed yet. Accordingly, it is too early to evaluate and draw conclusions 
on the process established by the Regulation.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  does  not  go  into  details  on  the  strategic  direction  of  capability 
planning.  Overall,  building  up  the  Agency’s  own  capabilities  in  terms  of  technical 
equipment is rather difficult due to a lack of understanding of the capability needs of the 
EBCG, delays in capability planning and the lack of a strategic direction and vision for 
the long-term development of capabilities at the Agency. In addition, there are some legal 
requirements  (outside  of  the  EBCG  Regulation)  that  create  major  difficulties  for  the 
Agency  with  the  purchase  of  highly  specialised  equipment  requiring  multiannual 
delivery, such as the annuality principle and the staff hiring matrix that does not enable 
the  Agency  to  hire  highly  specialised  staff.  Finally,  current  implementation  problems 
include  the  lack  of  sufficient  integration  between  acquisition  and  logistics;  lack  of 
logistical infrastructure for new equipment; issues with customs and transportation, with 
the  recognition  of  equipment  across  Member  States’  jurisdictions  and  issues  with  the 
registration and maintenance of vehicles in the Member States. 

Frontex supported capability development in research and innovation by promoting and 
delivering  standardisation  and  harmonisation  of  border  management  capabilities, 
promoting, and delivering innovation in border management capabilities, and executing 
and supporting research. 

Cooperation with EU institutions, bodies, offices, agencies and third countries 

Frontex’s  cooperation  with  EU  institutions  works  well.  The  Agency  has  negotiated 
numerous  working  arrangements  with  other  EU  agencies  (e.g.  EFCA,  EMSA)  and 
conduct  effective  cooperation  on  that  basis.  Inter-agency  cooperation  with  other  Union 
agencies,  notably  with  the  EU  Agency  for  Asylum  and  with  Europol  and  with  the 
Commission in the context of implementing the relevant provisions of the Regulation on 
migration  management  support  teams,  as  well  as  with  other  Union  Agencies 
implementing EU policies in the justice and home affairs area (FRA, eu-LISA, EUAA, 
EMCDDA,  CEPOL  and  Eurojust)  should  be  further  strengthened.  Such  cooperation 
should  be  aimed  at  gaining  efficiency  both  in  administrative  and  operational  terms.  In 
particular,  strengthening  the  cooperation  with  FRA  should  be  prioritised  in  order  to 
reinforce  the  fundamental  rights  culture  in  all  activities  of  the  Agency.  Furthermore,  a 

297   The issues related to the Standing Corps are addressed in the relevant sections. 

73 

 
 
 
new  working  arrangement  should  be  signed  with  Europol  to  enhance  the  Agencies’ 
ability  to  work  better  together  in  countering  cross-border  crime,  in  particular  migrant 
smuggling and trafficking in human beings.  

The  work  of  Frontex  in  the  area  of  external  cooperation  is  viewed  positively  by 
Member States and is seen as effective and efficient. Frontex’s work is coordinated with 
the  Commission  and  relevant  EU  agencies  to  ensure  that  it  contributes  to  the  wider 
objectives  of  EU  external  action.  Nevertheless,  some  implementation  challenges  have 
been identified, as well as limitations on cooperation set by the EBCG Regulation itself.  

Frontex  has  faced  delays  in  the  conclusion  of  new  working  arrangements  with  third 
countries, in line with the EBCG Regulation. While the new model working arrangement 
was  adopted  by  the  Commission  in  2021,  its  revision  is  pending  due  to  ongoing 
discussions  between  the  Commission  and  the  EDPS  on  provisions  regarding  the 
protection  of  personal  data.  The  new  model  status  agreement  was  adopted  by  the 
Commission in 2021 as well, enabling the EU to sign new status agreements, and Frontex 
to  launch  joint  operations  to  North  Macedonia  and  Moldova.  A  new  status  agreement 
was  signed  with  Montenegro  and  Albania,  with  negotiations  currently  ongoing  with 
Serbia. 

The  exhaustive  list  of  international  organisations  set  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  may 
have  somewhat  limits  Frontex’s  ability  to  develop  new  partnerships  in  response  to 
emerging needs. 

Fundamental rights 

In  implementing  the  EBCG  Regulation,  Frontex  established  numerous safeguards  to 
protect and promote the respect of fundamental rights, by adopting and/or implementing 
rules  and  procedures.  The  main  conditions  set  by  the  Agency  include  the  Fundamental 
Rights Strategy and implementing Action Plan, the activities of the Fundamental Rights 
Office (including contributing to  a wide  range of  Agency tools  and procedures  such  as 
operational  plans,  the  work  of  the  FRMs,  as  well  as  relevant  MB  Decisions  on  the 
complaints  mechanism,  SIR  mechanism,  supervisory  mechanism  on  the  use  of  force, 
independence of the FRO, etc.), data protection safeguards, and DPO activities. 

The analysis highlighted the EBCG Regulation’s lack of clear delineation between the 
responsibilities  of  Frontex  and  the  Member  States,  and  the  respective  obligations  in 
the  area  of  compliance  with  fundamental  rights.  Should  such  precise  delineation  be 
possible to define in the context of shared responsibility, it would bring more clarity on 
the  scope  of  the  mandate  of  the  FRO  and  for  the  FRMs’  monitoring  activities.  Some 
clarification was brought by the SOP on FRMs in 2023, although its effect is still to be 
seen. 

Article 46 of the EBCG Regulation leaves discretion to the ED’s decision. The adoption 
of the 2022 SOP on Article 46 provided clarity on the steps and the information that the 
ED  has  to  take  into  account  before  taking  a  decision.  The  solution  established  in  the 

74 

 
 
Regulation, as complemented by the SOP, appears overall balanced. Stakeholder views 
vary  whether  the  decision-making  power  outlined  in  Article 46  should  be  with  the  ED 
alone  or  assigned  to,  or  otherwise  involve,  other  actors  (e.g.  MB,  Commission  or 
Council). On the one hand, by assigning the decision to trigger Article 46 to the ED, the 
EBCG  Regulation  may  risk  placing  excessive  public  and  political  pressure  on  the  ED 
alone. On the other hand, the potential involvement of political actors could lead to the 
further  politicisation  of  the  process  (with  the  risk  of  having  actors  in  practice  blocking 
the possibility of triggering Article 46 altogether). 

The  mechanism  for  serious  incident  reporting is  not  regulated  in  the Regulation.  The 
Agency  successfully  developed  this  mechanism  (SOP  in  2021)  that  is  an  important 
instrument  in  the  toolbox  of  the  FRO  to  map  and  indicate  challenges  and  monitor  the 
Agency’s  compliance  with  fundamental  rights.  There  are  some  factors,  however,  that 
limit the effectiveness of the SIR mechanism, such as the limited sources of information, 
lack  of  redress 
limited  cooperation  and  follow-up  from  national  authorities, 
opportunities).  

Data protection framework 

The evaluation found that initially, the Agency, had a broader interpretation of its scope 
of  personal  data  processing  activities  than  it  was  intended  by  the  EBCG  Regulation. 
However,  the  origin  of  this  interpretation  cannot  generally  be  attributed  to  gaps  in  the 
rules  on  processing  of  personal  data.  However,  one  difficulty  in  implementation  may 
derive from the allocation of responsibilities between the Agency and the Member States, 
because  the  EBCG  Regulation  (Article  88)  requires  the  Agency  and  the  host  Member 
State to determine in a transparent manner the responsibilities for compliance with data 
protection  obligations  before  each  joint  operation,  return  operation,  return  intervention, 
pilot  project,  rapid  border  intervention  or  migration  management  support  team 
deployment. The MB decisions on personal data processing were revised by the Agency, 
following strong criticism by the EDPS. The new MB decisions aim to address the data 
protection  aspects  of  the  Agency’s  operational  activities.  However,  as  these  were  only 
adopted in early 2024, their impact cannot be assessed yet. 

Stakeholders  pointed  to  interpretation  issues  in  relation  to  Frontex’s  limited  supporting 
role  in  the  fight  against  cross-border  crime  and  on  the  purpose  (and  limits)  of 
processing operational personal data. The explicitly narrowed possibilities for Frontex to 
process operational personal data frame its role and scope of responsibilities in this area. 

Use of resources 

The  allocation  of  human  and  financial  resources  to  Frontex  has  been  broadly  in  line 
with the tasks assigned to the Agency by the EBCG Regulation and with its strategic and 
horizontal objectives, although Frontex has faced a significant challenge in implementing 
its increasing financial resources. Despite reductions from its initial annual budgets, the 
Agency  has  released  different  amounts  of  its  EU  contributions  each  year.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Agency  has  largely  been  able  to  adapt  its  budgetary  management  to  the  new 

75 

 
mandate  and  the  expected  operational  results  over  time.  Moreover,  it  has  been  mostly 
able to spend the amounts carried over from the previous year, although some problems 
persist  with  the  management  of  the  budget  assigned  to  'Agency  equipment'  and 
'strengthening capacities'. 

Costs and benefits generated by the EBCG Regulation 

The  potential  costs  for  Member  State  linked  to  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation appear to be in the form of increased funding to certain activities, such as the 
upgrade of IT systems, and compliance with the multiannual strategic planning process 
of Frontex, including developing operational, contingency and capability plans.  

Member  States  can  benefit  from  EU  funds,  especially  the  Internal  Security  Fund  – 
Borders  and  Visa  (ISF-B)  for  and  the  most  recent  funding  for  border  management,  the 
Border  Management  and  Visa  Policy  Instrument  (BMVI),  for  the  development  of  the 
European  integrated  border  management.  The  availability  of  these  funds  is  of  direct 
benefit  to  Member  State,  enabling  them  to  acquire  assets  and  undertake  activities  that 
they would not otherwise have had access to.  

Potential  benefits  for  businesses  and  citizens  are  difficult  to  measure,  with  evidence 
remaining limited and, as some are indirect effects, hard to quantify.  

The  benefits  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  for  Member  States  can  only  be  expressed  in 
operational terms (explained in the previous sections). Both Frontex and EIBM delivers 
significant  contribution  to  the  management  of  the  EU’s  external  border  and  in  return 
operations,  which  leads  to  results  that  Member  State  could  not  have  achieved  on  their 
own. 

Standing Corps 

The conclusions and lessons learnt are explained in the Commission Report to the EP and 
to the Council on the evaluation of the EBCG Regulation, including a review of the SC298 
and in Annex IIIb. 

298   [TO COMPLEMENT WITH REFERENCE AFTER ADOPTION] 

76 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX I:   PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 

1. Lead DG, Decide reference, Work Programme reference  

DG Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) is the lead DG. The agenda planning (Decide) reference assigned to the evaluation and 
the review is PLAN/2022/1328. There is no reference to the evaluation and the review in the Commission Work Programme 2023. 

2. Derogations granted and justification 

In conducting the evaluation and the review, no exceptions from the usual procedural requirements described in the Better Regulation 
Guidelines were required. Public consultation did not take place as the evaluation and the review of the Standing Corps focused on 
structural and operational matters of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) and it was concluded that a public consultation 
would  not  bring  specific  added  value.  However,  as  part  of  the  evaluation  and  the  review,  the  public  was  given  the  possibility  to 
respond  to  the  call  for  evidence.  Furthermore,  extensive  targeted  consultation  of  relevant  stakeholders  was  planned  and  took  place 
during the evaluation process.  

3. Organisation and timing 

The  call  for  evidence  for  the  initiative  was  published  on  the  Commission’s  ‘Have  Your  Say’  webpage299  and  was  open  between  5 
September and 3 October 2022. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for engaging an external contractor to carry out the study to support 
the evaluation of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and the review of the Standing Corps were drawn up in July of the 
same year. A request for service was issued on 1 September 2022, and a contractor selected by an evaluation committee consisting of 
staff from DG HOME in November 2022300. The kick-off meeting for the study took place on 14 December 2022 and the final report 
was submitted, after one-month extension, on 25 July 2023. 

299  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13557-European-Border-and-Coast-Guard-Frontex-standing-corps-review-and-

evaluation-of-Regulation_en  

300  The call for service was issued via framework contract HOME/2018/ISFB/PR/EVAL/0017 Lot 1 Migration. Two contractors submitted a bid to carry out the  

78 

 
 
 
 
 
In  line  with  the  Better  Regulation  Guidelines,  an  Inter-Service  Group  (ISG)  was  set  up  within  the  Commission  to  accompany  the 
evaluation  process.  Several  Directorates-General  (DGs)  within  the  Commission  and  the  European  External  Action  Service  (EEAS) 
were invited to nominate representatives to the ISG301. 

DG  HOME  chaired  the  ISG  meetings.  The  ISG  was  regularly  consulted  over  the  course  of  the  evaluation  process,  typically  in 
conjunction  with  the  submission  of  specific  draft  reports  by  the  contractor  responsible  for  carrying  out  the  external  study.  These 
consultations took place both in regular meetings, and via written consultations. The following list provides an overview of the ISG’s 
work over the course of the evaluation and review process: 

•  The  ISG  was  convened  for  the  first  time  on  12  July  2022  in  order  to  receive  a  presentation  of  the  evaluation  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation and the review of the standing corps and to discuss and provide feedback on the draft ToR prepared for the external 
contractor. The meeting also served as an opportunity to discuss and comment on the call for evidence and the draft consultation 
strategy, which e.g. described how the external contractor should carry out targeted consultations with relevant stakeholders in the 
context of the study, in cooperation with and under the supervision of DG HOME and the ISG. The participants were invited to 
provide additional written feedback after the meeting; 

•  On 23 December 2022, the ISG received the draft Inception Report for written comments and subsequent approval. As per annex 
3  to  the  draft  Inception  Report,  the  minutes  of  the  kick-off  meeting  between  the  external  contractor  and  DG  HOME  that  took 

study. The evaluation committee considered a number of criteria, namely: compliance with the technical specifications described in the Terms of Reference; 
demonstrated understanding of the objectives and the context of the request, appropriateness of the expected results, the quality of preliminary assessment of 
difficulties, mitigation and control measures; clarity, suitability and efficiency of the proposed methodology; and the quality of the project management, team 
organisation and structure. The Commission awarded the contract to ICF. 

301  The DGs invited to participate in the ISG included: the Secretariat-General of the Commission (SG); Legal Service (LS); Budget (BUDG); Defence Industry 
and Space (DEFIS); Human Resources and Security (HR); Justice and Consumers (JUST); Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), Statistical Authority of 
the European Union (ESTAT); European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR); Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE); Mobility 
and  Transport  (MOVE);  International  Partnerships  (INTPA);  Internal  Audit  Service  (IAS);  European  Anti-Fraud  Service  (OLAF);  Joint  Research  Centre 
(JRC). 

79 

 
 
 
 
 
place  on  14  December  2022  were  shared  with  the  members  of  the  ISG.  On  the  basis  of  the  ISG’s  written  feedback,  the  draft 
Inception Report was further revised by the external contractor;  

•  On 18 January 2023, a revised draft of the  Inception Report was circulated by email  to  the members of the  ISG for additional 
comments, and was subsequently accepted in February 2023 after revisions were made to reflect the additional comments of the 
ISG; 

•  The ISG received the draft Interim Report on 22 March 2023 with the possibility to provide written feedback. Furthermore, the 
ISG was convened on 29 March 2023 to receive a presentation by the contractor of this draft Interim Report and to flag potential 
issues;  

•  In March 2023, at the request of the contractor, DG HOME agreed to extend the deadline of the submission of the Final Report by 

four weeks, due to the delayed response of some stakeholders to the contractor’s surveys; 

•  On 26 April 2023, a revised draft Interim Report was submitted to the ISG for possible additional comments. On 3 May 2023, 
following the consultation with the ISG, the revised Interim Report was accepted by the Commission, under the condition that the 
comments of the ISG to the revised Interim Report are subsequently taken into account in the draft Final Report; 

•  On  31  May  2023,  the  draft  Final  Report  was  submitted  by  the  contractor  to  DG  HOME  and  was  circulated  by  e-mail  to  the 

members of the ISG for final review with subsequent feedback provided by DG HOME for the finalisation of the report; 

•  The ISG held a meeting on the draft Final Report on 19 June 2023. This consultation was followed by a final discussion on the 

comments to the draft Final Report between the study team and DG HOME on 22 June 2023;  

•  On  30  June  2023,  the  external  contractor  re-submitted  draft  Final  Report  to  DG  HOME  for  the  final  round  of  comments. 
Following the submission of comments, the final version of the study for the acceptance by the Commission was received on 25 
July 2023; 

•  The Commission accepted the Final Report on 26 July 2023;  

•  The ISG was consulted during the drafting of this Staff Working Document.  

80 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Consultation of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board 

Not applicable; the evaluation and the review were not subject to consultation and scrutiny of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board.  

5. Evidence used together with sources and any issues regarding its quality 

The  evaluation  and  the  review  primarily  drew  on  the  supporting  study  entitled  “Study  to  support  the  evaluation  of  the  European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and review of the Standing Corps”302, commissioned by DG HOME in 2022 and carried-
out by the external contractor (ICF). The objectives of the study were to provide the necessary data, analysis and assessment for the 
Commission’s  evaluation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  to  identify  the  EU  legislation,  including  the  fundamental  rights  framework, 
applicable  to  Frontex,  to  assess  the  coherence  of  the  legal  framework  applicable  to  the  EBCG  and  particularly  to  Frontex,  and  to 
assess the compliance of the Agency with the objectives and provisions of the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies. The 
study assessed the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and EU added value of the EBCG Regulation, and supported  the 
review of the Standing Corps (SC), including the functioning, composition, size of Member States’ contributions, number of the staff 
members, level of training, expertise, and professionalism. 

The study was guided by an evaluation framework setting out the guidelines and principles for the analysis. Beside an in-depth review 
of relevant documentation, including legal documents, policy and strategic documents, programming and internal business documents, 
Agency’s outputs and publications, financial and other documents. the study also relied on extensive targeted consultations in the form 
of surveys and interviews with relevant stakeholders, as well as on field visits to Frontex operations. More specifically, the external 
contractor conducted three surveys targeting Member States, Frontex SC staff, and Fundamental Rights Monitors (FRMs). ICF also 
conducted  149  interviews  with  stakeholders,  five  field  visits  (to  Bulgaria,  Finland,  Greece,  Italy,  and  Romania)  to  Frontex’s 
operations, and a visit to Frontex’s headquarters in Warsaw.  

302 [Insert link to the study when published].  

81 

 
 
 
 
 
During the process, the Commission provided updates and consulted Member States in the Frontiers Working Party of the Council on 
2 February, 12 April, 26 May and 13 July 2023, with Member States having the possibility to provide comments, including written 
comments, and exchange views. Furthermore, Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) provided input to 
the evaluation at its informal meeting on 13 July 2023. 

The Commission also provided an update to and received comments from the Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG) of the LIBE 
Committee of the European Parliament (EP) on 27 April 2023. 

With regard to quality assurance, the wide scope of the study posed certain challenges, particularly during the analysis phase of the 
study.  However,  close  consultations  with  DG  HOME  and  the  ISG  and  identification  of  key  priority  areas,  helped  the  analysis  to 
remain focused throughout the process. The complexity and the technical nature of some of the evidence collected was resolved by 
involvement  of  external  panel  of  experts  with  appropriate  knowledge  (e.g.,  on  fundamental  rights  and  data  privacy,  migration  and 
security,  border  management  and  EUROSUR),  to  guide  the  analysis.  Internal  quality  assurance  by  the  project  director  and  QA 
managers with relevant thematic and methodological expertise was also provided by ICF.  

The fact that the implementation of the Regulation is still on-going created constrains for a full analysis and for the conclusiveness of 
the findings. This limitation is however acknowledged across the reporting areas examined in the evaluation and in the review. 

6. Use of external expertise 

Apart from the study  carried out  by the external contractor, the Commission  Expert Group on the implementation  of the  European 
Border and Coast Guard Regulation was consulted twice. On 6 April 2022, the Group discussed the upcoming review of the SC and 
the  evaluation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  The  Commission  presented  the  legal  framework  and  provided  an  overview  of  the  process 
including the involvement of the Member States and the Agency. A follow-up meeting of the EBCG Expert Group was organised on 
17 January 2023. The purpose of the meeting was to present the external contractor and assure the engagement of Member States in 
the evaluation process. 

82 

 
 
 
On  the  request  of  the  Commission303,  the  Fundamental  Rights  Agency  (FRA)  and  Frontex’s  Consultative  Forum  on  Fundamental 
Rights Matters (CF) submitted their contribution on the Regulation’s impact on fundamental rights and freedoms. In its contribution of 
15  May  2023,  the  FRA  highlighted  six  priority  areas  relating  to  fundamental  rights  which  may  require  legislative  adjustments  and 
assessed that the evaluation and review offer an opportunity to reflect on how best to improve the fundamental rights situation at the 
external borders of the EU. The contribution of the CF, submitted on 2 June 2023, outlined their main observations with regards to 
enhanced  implementation  of  the  fundamental  rights  safeguards  of  the  Regulation.  It  concluded  that  enhanced  implementation  or 
potential amendments should lead to eliminating gaps in responsibility and accountability.          

Additional information on the stakeholder consultation is provided in Annex V. 

303  In line with Article 121(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 

83 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL MODELS USED 

1. Methodology and analytical model 

The supporting study, conducted by the external  contractor was guided by a methodological approach, which was divided into four 
tasks, in line with the original ToR: 1) Inception; 2) Data collection; 3) Analysis; 4) Reporting. 

Figure 1: Overview of the methodological approach 

84 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       Source: ICF elaboration 

The inception task started with the project set up and contractor’s team mobilisation to establish project processes and protocols. This 
included setting-up  communication  with  the  external  panel  experts, who  advised the study team  across key tasks of the study.  The 
expert panel was composed of experts in 1) fundamental rights and data privacy; 2) migration and security; 3) border management, 
and 4) EUROSUR.  

A kick-off meeting of the external contractor with DG HOME was held on 14 December 2022 to ensure a common understanding of 
the  objectives  of  the  study.  Seven  scoping  interviews  were  carried  out  with  the  European  Commission,  as  well  as  with  key 
stakeholders within Frontex. 

The study team also conducted a preliminary assessment of available sources and prepared a secondary data collection plan, including 
reviewing secondary sources and developing a list of internal Frontex documents and data required to answer some of the evaluation 
questions.  

The preparatory work helped in the development of a baseline analysis, an overview of the situation prior to the adoption of the EBCG 
Regulation.  It  also  led  to  the  revision  of  the  original  intervention  logic,  refinement  of  the  evaluation  framework  and  of  the 
methodology.  In  the  process,  the  study  team  also  refined  its  stakeholder  engagement  plan,  reprioritising  certain  stakeholders  and 
redesigned some of the initial data collection tools to engage different groups of stakeholders, and adjusted certain analysis tools.  

The inception task was finalised with the submission and acceptance of the Inception Report by the Commission in February 2023.  

The  data  collection  task  started  with  desk  research  and  an  in-depth  review  of  relevant  documentation,  including  legal  documents, 
policy and strategic documents, Frontex programming and internal business documents, Agency’s outputs and publications, financial 
documents,  etc.,  relevant  for  the  main  thematic  areas  of  Frontex’s  mandate  (e.g.  returns,  operations,  fundamental  rights,  capacity-
building,  cooperation,  situational  awareness,  SC).  The  study  team  used  desk  research  to  map  available  data  sources  and  evidence 
against the evaluation questions and to identify key data gaps. In interviews with Frontex divisions and units, the study team explored 
the  availability  of  additional  data  to  address  these  gaps.  This  process  continued  throughout  the  study.  Identification  of  information 
gaps consequently informed stakeholder consultation and the need to request additional statistics and data from other stakeholders.  

Beside the review of the relevant documents the study also relied on the extensive targeted consultations in the form of surveys and 
semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders, as part of the next step in the data collection exercise. These surveys targeted 
three stakeholder groups, namely Member State authorities, including Schengen Associated Countries (SACs), SC staff, and FRMs. 
The surveys collected factual information about the implementation of specific activities and results of the EBCG, as well as opinions 

85 

 
 
 
and views on the five evaluation criteria and key evaluation questions. National authorities were asked to consult all relevant internal 
departments and authorities to ensure that they could provide comprehensive answers to the different elements of the evaluation and 
present  a  consolidated  national  response.  Interviews  targeted  Frontex  staff,  Member  State  authorities,  EU-level  stakeholders 
(including the Commission, EP, EU agencies), civil society and international organisations, and third countries’ authorities. 

Both, surveys and the interview questionnaires were developed and refined by the external contractor in consultation with DG HOME 
and the ISG to ensure that the questions were fine-tuned to the needs of the study and captured all relevant elements. The interview 
questionnaires were further fine-tuned in line with emerging evidence (including after the submission of the Interim Report, to address 
outstanding data gaps). In both cases, the external panel of experts also provided feedback. 

In  addition,  six  thematic  case studies were conducted by the team  and  with  the support of relevant  external  experts. Thematic case 
studies focused on deployment, capacity-building, return, EUROSUR, fundamental rights and governance, thus supporting an in-depth 
assessment of the main pertinent themes of the evaluation. Building on the data collection activities, the study team analysed Frontex 
activities  along  these  thematic  areas,  identifying  possible  challenges,  and  their  possible  links  to  the  EBCG  Regulation  and/or  its 
implementation. The results of the case studies fed into the corresponding evaluation questions.  

The data collection task concluded with five field visits to Frontex operations, as well as a sixth final visit to Frontex headquarters in 
Warsaw. Several of the external panel experts with previous border management expertise took part in the field visits. The final visit 
to Frontex headquarters was the closing step of data collection phase. Among others, the visit allowed the team to address final data 
gaps.  

The  analytical  task  included  several  steps.  Firstly,  the  data  collected  was  systematically  mapped  against  the  evaluation  (sub-) 
questions, judgement criteria and indicators in the evaluation framework. This allowed the study team to reflect on the quality of the 
data  collected  and  identify  potential  gaps  that  needed  to  be  filled  to  provide  robust  answers  to  the  evaluation  questions.  This 
information was then filled in by targeted search in the collected documentation or by requested follow-up information.  

The evidence gathered was analysed by qualitative analysis of information and stakeholder feedback and quantitative analysis  of the 
survey results, data and statistics. 

Subsequently, the study team synthetised and triangulated all data collected. These triangulation methods reduced systematic bias and 
distortion during data analysis thereby improving the credibility of the findings. The triangulation of data set the stage for analysis of 
evaluation criteria. The study team worked to provide answers to all the evaluation questions in the evaluation framework. All drafters 
started by structuring  their responses along  the  evaluation  questions, although the questions were grouped thematically (and  not  by 
evaluation criterion).  

86 

 
 
 
In  the  final,  reporting  stage,  the  study  team  submitted  three  reports  to  the  Commission.  The  reports  were  reviewed  by  the  external 
panel  of  experts  assembled  to  support  the  study  team,  as  well  as  by  the  project  director  and  quality  assurance  managers  before 
submission. Furthermore, each report underwent review by the ISG before finalisation. The three deliverables are: 1) Inception report; 
2) Interim report; 3) draft Final Report. 

Initially  validation  workshop  was  foreseen,  however  a  formal  meeting  between  the  study  team  and  DG  HOME  was  subsequently 
organised on 22 June 2023, to discuss emerging findings and conclusions and to fine-tune the conclusions and recommendations. This 
was preceded by an ISG consultation of the draft Final Report on 19 June 2023, which allowed for a wider discussion on comments 
provided to the draft Final Report.  

2. Limitations 

In  the  initial  phases  of  the  study,  the  limitations  were  mostly  related  to  timing  issues  as  both  inception  and  data  collection  tasks 
coincided with holidays period, which led to potential delays. Furthermore, initial response rate to survey from certain stakeholders 
was low, and submission of some key data delayed. This resulted in delaying certain activities, such as field visits. Nevertheless, the 
quick  mobilisation  of  the  team  at  inception,  swift  organisation  of  the  kick-off  meeting  as  well  as  responsiveness  by  the  ISG  in 
providing the necessary feedback allowed to close the inception stage relatively quickly.  

Repeated  reminders  to  the  stakeholders  to  provide  responses  and  to  follow-up  on  missing  data  together  with  the  extension  of  the 
deadline for survey submission ensured that sufficient data was finally collected during data collection phase. In addition, during the 
field visit to the Frontex headquarters the study team had the possibility to address any remaining data gaps.  

The tight timeline of the study and delays in earlier phases of the process left the contractor with shorter time to conduct the analysis. 
Nevertheless, the consequent extension of the study by one month allowed for sufficient time to finalise not only data collection but 
also the analysis.  

In addition to the limited time, the wide scope of the study (including large scope of Frontex mandate, wide external legal framework, 
etc.)  posed  a  challenge  for  the  contractor,  particularly  during  the  analysis  phase.  Close  consultations  with  DG  HOME  and 
identification of key priority areas, helped the analysis to remain focused throughout the process.  

Another  issue  linked  with  data  referred  to  the  difficulties  in  quantifying  most  of  the  financial  and  human  resources  received  by 
Member  States  and  to  consequently  do  a  full  analysis  of  costs  and  benefits  generated  by  the  EBCG  Regulation.  To  mitigate  this 

87 

 
 
 
limitation,  it  was  agreed  to  re-focus  on  costs  incurred  by  Frontex  and  the  use  of  relevant  EU  funds  by  the  Member  States  and  the 
qualitative evidence was used to identify costs and benefits for Member States.  

Divergent opinions of key stakeholders were addressed by the triangulation of evidence and balancing out different opinions during 
consultation process with the expert panel. The complexity and the technical nature of some of the evidence collected was resolved by 
involvement of external panel of experts with appropriate knowledge to guide this kind of analysis. Internal quality assurance by the 
project director and QA managers with relevant thematic and methodological expertise was also provided by ICF throughout analysis 
and reporting phase. 

The fact that the implementation of the Regulation is still on-going created constrains for a full analysis, however, this limitation is 
acknowledged across the reporting areas that are still being implemented.  

88 

 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III. EVALUATION MATRIX AND, WHERE RELEVANT, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (BY CRITERION) 

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 

Judgement criteria 

Indicators (non-exhaustive list) 

Data sources and methods 

EQ1.  Relevance  of  scope  and  objectives:  To  what  extent  did  the  scope  and  objectives  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  remain  relevant  to  current  and  emerging  needs  and 
challenges over the implementation period?  

EQ1.1. To what extent are the scope and objectives of EBCG Regulation aligned with current needs and challenges in external border management and in implementing the EU 
return policy? 

EQ1.2. To what extent are the scope and objectives of EBCG Regulation adept to addresses emerging and potential future challenges and threats at the external borders and in 
the field of return? 

EQ1.3. Are there any gaps, in terms of remaining needs or challenges, which should be addressed/remain unaddressed by the EBCG Regulation? 

e
c
n
a
v
e
l
e
R

  The  changes 

introduced  by  EBCG 
/  were  not/partially] 
Regulation 
suitable  to  address  other  problems  and 
challenges identified. 

[were 

The  scope  of  the  EBCG  Regulation 
[are/are  not/partially]  relevant  to  the 
current needs over the implementation 
period. 

The  objectives  of  the  Agency  are 
relevant to the current needs over the 
implementation period. 

The  objective  related  to  protection  of 
external  borders 
[is/is  not/partially] 
relevant to the current needs over the 
implementation period. 

Qualitative indicators: 

Mapping and typology of current needs and challenges by stakeholder type and 
by policy area. 

Mapping  and  typology  of  emerging  needs  and  potential  future  challenges  by 
stakeholder type and by policy area. 

Degree  of  alignment  between  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  the 
problems and challenges identified. 

Suitability  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  to  support  the  objectives  of  European 
integrated border management. 

Degree to which the current problems identified had been reported / reflected in 
evaluations and studies prior to and after 2019. 

Degree of importance of the identified gaps, in terms of their potential impact on 
the objectives of the EBCG Regulation 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research  

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Legal analysis 

89 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  objective  of  implementation  of 
integrated 
border 
European 
management 
not/partially] 
[is/is 
relevant to the current needs over the 
implementation period. 

The  objective  related  to  return  policy 
[is/is  not/partially] 
the 
current needs over the implementation 
period. 

relevant 

to 

The  objective  related 
to  migration 
not/partially] 
[is/is 
management 
relevant to the current needs over the 
implementation period. 

related 

The  objective 
internal 
security  [is/is  not/partially]  relevant  to 
the 
the 
needs 
current 
implementation period. 

over 

to 

The  objectives  [could  /  could  not]  be 
better  addressed  by  adopting  other 
regulatory / non-regulatory measures. 

The  challenges,  needs  and  priorities 
[have / have not] evolved since 2019. 

The  EBCG  Regulation  addresses 
current  and  emerging  as  well  as 
potential 
and 
developments,  which  are  relevant  for 
the 
types 
identified. 

stakeholder 

different 

needs 

future 

Some  of  the  problems  identified  were 
not captured by the EBCG Regulation.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  [is  /  is  not]  a 
suitable 
the  new 
challenges or elements identified. 

to  address 

tool 

Suitability  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  to  cover  any  identified,  unaddressed 
problems. 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Perceptions/views  from  stakeholders  and  experts  considering  that  the  changes 
introduced  by  EBCG  Regulation  [were  /  were  not/partially]  suitable  to  address 
other problems and challenges identified. 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  suitability  of  EBCG  Regulation  to 
address emerging and potential future needs and challenges. 

Stakeholder  and  expert  perception  on  whether  there  was  room  for  further 
alignment  between  the  objectives  and  scope  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  the 
current and emerging needs and challenges. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of current or emerging needs or problems that are not addressed by the 
current Regulation. 

Number  of  activities  (e.g.,  operations,  trainings,  publications  etc.)  covering 
EBCG Regulation objectives. 

Annual  allocation  of  resources  to  thematic  areas  identified  as  objectives  in  the 
EBCG Regulation. 

Budget  utilisation  –  Actual money  spending  on  areas  identified  as  priorities,  as 
well  as  spending  rate,  i.e.,  percentage  of  actual  money  spending  compared  to 
resources allocated. 

Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) Indicators: 

1)Detections of illegal border-crossing between Border Crossing Points (BCPs) 

2)Detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs 

3)Detections of suspected facilitators 

4)Detections of illegal stay 

5)Refusals of entry 

6)Asylum applications 

7)Detections of false documents 

8)Return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals 

90 

 
 
 
9)Returns of illegally staying third-country nationals 

EQ2. To what extent have the EBCG and in particular Frontex activities (Art. 10 of the EBCG Regulation) been relevant in addressing the needs/challenges presented 
at the EU external borders? Are they still relevant in view of current needs and challenges and have the needs and challenges evolved over time?  

EQ2.1. To what extent have the EBCG and in particular Frontex activities been relevant in addressing the needs/challenges presented at the EU external borders and in the field 
of return?  

EQ2.2. Are the activities of EBCG and in particular Frontex still relevant in view of current needs and challenges? 

EQ.2.3. To what extent and how have the needs and challenges evolved over time? 

(Art.  10  of 

The  EBCG  and  in  particular  Frontex 
activities 
the  EBCG 
Regulation) 
[have  been/  have  not 
been / have partially been] relevant in 
the  needs  of  different 
addressing 
the  EU  external 
stakeholders  at 
borders.  

The  EBCG  and  in  particular  Frontex 
activities  [have  been/  have not  been  / 
in 
have  partially  been] 
addressing  the  challenges  presented 
at the EU external borders.  

relevant 

The  EBCG  and  in  particular  Frontex 
activities  are  aligned  with  the  scope 
and 
the  EBCG 
Regulation.  

objectives 

of 

The  activities  of  EBCG  and 
in 
particular  Frontex  [are/are  not  /are 
partially]  relevant  in  view  of  current 
needs and challenges. 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research  

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Legal analysis 

Quantitative indicators: 

Mapping  of  number  and  type  of  activity  implemented  annually  (e.g.,  number  of 
operations launched, number of working arrangements with TCs, number of inter-
agency  cooperation  arrangements,  number  of  standing  corps  officers  deployed, 
number  of  people  rescued,  number  of  smugglers  identified,  quantity  of  drugs 
seized, etc.)  

Mapping of number and type of outputs/practical results of activities implemented 

Number of staff / stakeholders implementing activities 

Duration / time scope of activities 

Budget utilisation – Actual money spending on activities as per article 10 EBCG 
Regulation, as well as spending rate, i.e., percentage of actual money spending 
compared to resources allocated. 

FRAN Indicators 

EDF-RAN (European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network) 

Return Data Collection indicators. 

Qualitative indicators: 

Mapping and typology of current needs and challenges by stakeholder type and 
by policy area. 

Mapping  and  typology  of  emerging  needs  and  potential  future  challenges  by 
stakeholder type and by policy area. 

Degree to which needs and challenges have evolved over time. 

Degree  of  alignment  between  the  Frontex  activities  with  the  needs  of  different 

91 

 
 
 
 
 
 
stakeholders  

Degree of alignment between the Frontex activities with the challenges presented 
at the EU external borders. 

Degree  of  alignment  between  objectives  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  the 
problems and challenges identified. 

Level  of  achievement  of  the  specific  objectives  foreseen  by  the  Strategic 
Framework and reflected in the Single Programming Document’s Strategic Action 
Areas:  1)  Reduced  Vulnerability  of 
the  External  Borders  based  on 
Comprehensive Situational Awareness; 2) Safe, Secure and Well-Functioning EU 
External Borders; 3) Sustained European Border and Coast Guard Capabilities 4) 
Implement and support European Integrated Border Management to ensure safe 
and  well  managed  EU  external  borders  5)  Reinforce  the  external  dimension 
aimed at multiplying  Frontex operational impact  through cooperation  6)  Develop 
Upgraded Management System Aimed at Ensuring Accountability, Regularity and 
Legality of All Frontex Activities  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Perceptions  from  stakeholders  and  experts  considering  that  Frontex  activities 
have  been  relevant  in  addressing  the  needs  of different  stakeholders  at  the  EU 
external borders. 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Frontex  activities  are 
adapted to emerging needs and challenges. 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Frontex  activities  are 
aligned with the scope and objectives of the EBCG Regulation. 

Stakeholders’ perceived quality of the activities delivered. 

EQ.3. How did Member States make use of Frontex in the protection of EU external borders and migration management through: 

EQ3.1. Joint Operations and rapid border interventions 
EQ3.2. Joint Return Operations 
EQ3.3. Risk Analysis 

Degree to which Member States have 
made use of Frontex in the protection 
of  EU  external  borders  by  organising 
joint operation 

and  rapid  border  interventions  (as 

Quantitative indicators: 

Results in the context of Joint Operations carried out annually (number of person 
days or asset days by type of border; apprehensions, seizures, etc.) 

Desk  research,  including  Joint  Operation 
Final  Evaluation  Reports,  Risk  Analysis 
Annual reports and the biannual Strategic 
Risk Analysis 

Type  of  technical  and/or  operational  assistance  provided  by  Frontex  by 
coordinating and organising joint operations 

Targeted surveys 

92 

 
 
 
 
 
 
opposed 
national/international level) 

to  other  operations  at 

Degree to which Member States have 
made use of Frontex in the protection 
of  EU  external  borders  by  organising 
joint return operation and rapid border 
interventions  (as  opposed  to  other 
operations  at  national/international 
level) 

Extent  to  which  the  operations  were 
relevant to the objectives of protection 
of  EU  external  borders  and  migration 
management 

Degree to which Member States have 
made  use  of  Frontex  in  carrying  out 
risk  analysis  (as  opposed  to  other 
operations  at  national/international 
level) 

Number  and 
national/international level 

type  of  other 

(alternative)  operations  organised  at 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Legal analysis 

Type of technical equipment deployed in joint operations 

Number of Rapid border interventions carried out annually 

Number and type of Return Operations (breakdown by Joint and National) carried 
out  annually,  and  indicators  linked  to  related  results  (e.g.  number  of  persons 
escorted; number of flights, etc);  

Number and type of Risk Analysis and related products carried out annually. 

Number  of  Standing  Corps  deployed  (by  types  of  border  crossings,  functions, 
EU/third countries).  

Qualitative indicators: 

Level  of  achievement  of  focus  areas  of  the  Single  Programming  Document’s 
Strategic  Action  Areas  (e.g.,  Provide  effect-oriented  and  flexible  operational 
response;  Position  Frontex  as  an  important  player  in  the  area  of  combatting 
cross-border crime; Support migration management by ensuring effective returns) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Member  States  have 
made use of Frontex in the protection of EU external borders by organising joint 
operation. 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Member  States  have 
made use of Frontex in the protection of EU external borders by organising return 
operation.  

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Member  States  have 
made use of other (alternative) operations at national/international level. 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Member  States  have 
made use of Frontex in carrying out risk analysis (as opposed to other operations 
at national/international level). 

EQ.4.  How  is  the  upgrade  of  the  communication  network  (Article  14)  up  to  CONFIDENTIAL  UE/EU  CONFIDENTIAL  relevant  for  the  functioning  of  the  EBCG  and  its 
operational needs, including the exchange of information in EUROSUR?  

The  upgrade  of  the  communication 
network 
to 
UE/EU 
CONFIDENTIAL 

(Article 

14) 

up 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  resources  involved  in  the  operationalisation  of  the  upgraded 
communication network. 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research  

93 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONFIDENTIAL is [is not] relevant for 
the  functioning  of  the  EBCG  and  its 
the 
operational  needs, 
exchange 
in 
EUROSUR. 

including 
information 

of 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Legal analysis 

Budget utilisation and budget allocated to the upgraded communication network, 
in comparison to previous communication network’s budget. 

Number  of  people  trained  for  the  use  of  the  new  communication  network 
systems. 

Metrics  on  the  use  of  the  network  (e.g.  number  of  classified  documents  / 
information  units  shared;  number  of  Member  States  exchanging  information  via 
the network); 

Amount of EU classified information  at CONFIDENTIAL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL 
level that would be exchanged. 

Qualitative indicators: 

Level  of  success  of  operations  in  relation  to  the  role  of  the  upgraded 
communication networks  

Extent of reduced vulnerability of external borders, and well-functioning of the EU 
external border management, as a consequence of the upgraded communication 
network 

Level  of  achievement  of  objectives  under  Focus  Area  1.2  “Create  an  EBCG 
environment  and  community  of  intelligence-led  operational  activities”,  of  the 
Single Programming Document’s Strategic Objective 1 “Reduced vulnerability of 
the external borders” 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders  and  experts’  views  on  the  relevance  for  EBCG  operations  of  the 
novelties introduced in the communication network 

Stakeholders’ opinions on the resilience and security of IT systems 

Stakeholders’  view  on  the  level  of  guaranteed  confidentiality  of  information 
shared 

Stakeholders’  view  on the scope  of  the communication  network  (a multipurpose 
network, not limited to EUROSUR only) 

s
e
n
e
v
i
t
c
e
f
f

E

EQ5. How and to what extent did Frontex meet its core objectives and priorities as set out in the EBCG Regulation? How has the EBCG as a whole and in particular the 
Agency progressed and achieved results with respect to each specific component of the European integrated border management?  

EQ 5.1 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States in protecting and managing EU external borders through operational activities? 
EQ 5.2 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States through all phases of return procedures? 
s
EQ 5.3 How and to what extent did Frontex reduce vulnerabilities at external borders through improved situational awareness (including the extent to which risk analysis contributed 

94 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to the improvement of situational awareness)?  
EQ 5.4 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States through capacity building activities? 
EQ 5.5 How and to what extent did Frontex implement horizontal activities (education & training; research & innovation; fundamental rights) through intra-agency and inter-agency 
cooperation?  
EQ 5.6 How and to what extent did Frontex promote and respect fundamental rights through all Agencies’ activities? 

Desk  research  (e.g.  Single  Programming 
Documents,  Consolidated  Annual  Activity 
Reports,  Commission  opinions  to  Frontex 
Single Programming, ECA Special Report 
on Frontex, etc.) 

Stakeholder semi-structured interviews  

Targeted surveys 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

[met/did  not  meet/partially 
Frontex 
met]  its  core  objectives  and  priorities 
as set out in the EBCG Regulation. 

Frontex achieved tangible results  and 
outputs  that  can  be  directly  linked  to 
its core objectives and priorities.  

Frontex  supported  [did  not/partially] 
Member  States 
in  protecting  and 
managing  the  EU  external  borders 
through  operational  activities  and 
integrated planning, in particular, Joint 
Operations,  Joint  Return  Operations 
and Risk Analysis.  

Frontex  supported  [did  not/partially] 
capacity  building  activities 
through 
training,  research  and  development 
and human and technical resources.  

all 

Frontex  supported  [did  not/partially] 
Member  States  in  the  area  of  return 
of 
phases 
through 
return 
procedures 
decisions, 
(return 
voluntary  returns,  post-arrival  and  re-
strengthen 
and 
integration) 
cooperation with third countries, in line 
with the EU’s comprehensive external 
engagement.  

Quantitative indicators: 

Mapping of number and type of activities implemented annually (e.g., number of 
operations launched, number of working arrangements with TCs, number of inter-
agency  cooperation  arrangements,  number  of  standing  corps  officers  deployed, 
etc) 

Outputs  and  specific  results  achieved  from  activities  (e.g.,  number  of  people 
rescued, number of smugglers identified, quantity of drugs seized, etc.)  

Mapping of number and type of outputs/practical results of activities implemented 
per activities set out in the Annual Work Programmes  

Progress  towards  strategic  and  horizontal  objectives  as  set  out  in  multi-annual 
programming documents  

Progress towards achievement of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) as set out in 
multi-annual Programming document 

Budget utilised for each activity  

Qualitative indicators: 

Level of achievement of Frontex’s objectives and priorities  

Degree  to  which  the  results  achieved  can  be  attributed  to  specific  Frontex 
activities 

Level of Frontex’s contribution to specific components of the European integrated 
border management, including inter alia: 

border  control,  including  measures  to  facilitate  legitimate  border  crossings  and 
detection of cross-border crime 

Frontex  supported  [did  not/partially] 
improved situational awareness.  

         search and rescue operations for persons in distress at sea 

[successfully/unsuccessfully] 
Frontex 
activities 
implemented 
through 
intra-
Agency cooperation and integration.  

horizontal 
inter-agencies  and 

         risk and threat analysis 

information exchange and cooperation between Member States 

95 

 
 
 
 
          
          
 
Frontex 
[successfully/unsuccessfully] 
promoted  and  respected  fundamental 
rights 
the  Agency’s 
activities.  

through  all 

Frontex,  together  with  the  Member 
[successfully/unsuccessfully] 
States, 
ensured  the  effective  implementation 
of  European 
border 
management.  

integrated 

has 

[has 

EBCG as a whole and in particular the 
not/partially] 
Agency 
progressed  and  achieved  results  with 
respect to each specific component of 
the  European 
integrated  border 
management  (Art.  3  of  the  ECBG 
Regulation). 

cooperation with third countries in particular on neighbouring third countries and 
countries of origin or transit for illegal immigration 

         technical and operational measures related to border control 

         return of third-country nationals 

         use of state-of-the-art technology including large-scale information systems 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Frontex  [successfully] 
met the objectives and priorities set out the EBCG Regulation 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Frontex  [successfully] 
contributed  to  each  specific  component  of  the  European  integrated  border 
management 

EQ6. How effective has the implementation of the EBCG Regulation by the Member States and by Frontex been? What factors contributed to a successful delivery and 
what obstacles were encountered?  

EQ6.1 How effective has been the implementation of operational activities? 
EQ6.2 How effective has been the implementation of capacity building activities? 
EQ6.3 How effective has been the implementation of horizontal activities? 
EQ6.4 How effective has been the observance and promotion of and fundamental rights?  

implementation  of 

the  EBCG 
The 
Regulation by the Member States and 
by 
[not 
has 
been/partially been] effective. 

Frontex 

been 

implementation  of 

the  EBCG 
The 
operational  activities  by  the  Member 
States  and  by  Frontex  been 
[not 
been/partially been] effective. 

implementation  of 

the  EBCG 
The 
capacity  building  activities  by 
the 
Member  States  and  by  Frontex  been 
[not been/partially been] effective. 

The 

implementation  of 

the  EBCG 

Quantitative indicators: 

Mapping of number and type of activities implemented annually (e.g., number of 
operations launched, number of working arrangements with TCs, number of inter-
agency  cooperation  arrangements,  number  of  standing  corps  officers  deployed, 
etc) 

Outputs  and  specific  results  achieved  from  activities  (e.g.,  number  of  people 
rescued, number of smugglers identified, quantity of drugs seized, etc.) 

Desk  research  (e.g.  Single  Programming 
Documents,  Consolidated  Annual  Activity 
Reports,  Commission  opinions  to  Frontex 
Single Programming, ECA Special Report 
on Frontex, relevant action plans from the 
EIBM and Joint Operation Final Evaluation 
Reports etc.) 

Stakeholder semi-structured interviews  

Qualitative indicators: 

Level  of  achievement  of  the  Single  Programming  Document’s  Strategic  and 
Horizontal Objectives (e.g., Reduced Vulnerability of the External Borders; Safe, 
Secure  and  Well-Functioning  EU  External  Borders;  Develop  an  upgraded 
Management System aimed at ensuring Accountability, Regularity and Legality of 
all Frontex activities, etc.) 

Targeted surveys 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

96 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
horizontal  activities  by  the  Member 
States  and  by  Frontex  been 
[not 
been/partially been] effective. 

The  observance  and  promotion  of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  context  of 
EBCG  by  the  Member  States  and  by 
Frontex been [not been/partially been] 
effective. 

There  are  certain  identifiable  factors 
that  contributed 
to  a  successful 
delivery  and  implementation  of  the 
EBCG  Regulation  by  the  Member 
States and by Frontex. 

are 

certain 

There 
identifiable 
obstacles  encountered  in  the  delivery 
and 
the  EBCG 
Regulation by the Member States and 
by Frontex. 

implementation  of 

Level  of  implementation  of  operational  activities  by  Frontex  under  the  EBCG 
Regulation 

Level of implementation of capacity-building activities by Frontex under the EBCG 
Regulation 

Level  of  implementation  of  horizontal  activities  by  Frontex  under  the  EBCG 
Regulation 

Level  of  observance  and  promotion  of  fundamental  rights  by  Frontex  under  the 
EBCG Regulation 

Level  of  cooperation  at  strategic  and  operational  level  amongst  Member  States 
and with the assistance of Frontex 

Extent  to  which  shared  responsibility  of  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation was effective/ successful  

Identification  of  success  factors  encountered  by  (i)  Member  States  and  (ii) 
Frontex in the implementation of the EBCG Regulation 

Identification  of  obstacles  encountered  by  Frontex  in  the  implementation  of  the 
EBCG Regulation 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and experts’ opinion  on  the extent  of the  effectiveness  of  Frontex 
and Member States’ activities in implementing the EBCG Regulation  

Stakeholders and experts’  opinion on main  challenges  and main  strength  in the 
implementation of the EBCG Regulation 

EQ7.  What external factors have affected progress towards the objectives and how are they linked to the EBCG Regulation?  

There  are  certain  identifiable  factors 
that  boosted/hindered  the  progress 
towards 
the 
objectives, including:  

the  achievement  of 

Overall budget management and rules 
at  EU 
impacted 
level  may  have 
planning and resource allocation;  

Third country cooperation factors may 
have  impacted  JOs,  returns,  or  other 
cooperation activities;  

Qualitative indicators: 

Nature  of  the  external  factors  identified  (crisis  at  the  external  borders; 
fundamental rights complaints) 

Mapping of Frontex initiatives to respond to external factors (e.g., Flexibility index: 
extent to which Frontex is able to adapt and deploy) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  considering  that  the  effectiveness  of  achieving  the 
objectives was positively/negatively impacted by internal/external factors. 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research  

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

97 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinions  on  what  factors  may  have  boosted/hindered  the  effectiveness  of 
achieving the objectives 

Overall  migration  situation  or  events 
(eg.  COVID,  crisis  at  Belorussian 
border,  war  in  Ukraine)  may  have 
shifted resources to new priorities. 

Member  State  (in)actions  may  have 
limited  or  delayed 
the  effective 
implementation  or  achievement  of 
objectives  by 
(e.g. 
implementation  of  EUROSUR,  or 
vulnerability assessment) 

the  Agency. 

The  achievement  of  objectives  was 
positively/negatively 
by 
certain 
internal/external 
identifiable 
factors.  

impacted 

EQ8. How has Frontex contributed to better coordination and cooperation between the relevant stakeholders, in particular in and between Member States in the context 
of European Integrated Border Management?  

EQ8.1 How did Frontex contribute to establishing and developing mechanisms for operational cooperation to implement the concept of European Integrated Border Management 
(EIBM), including establishing the Multiannual Strategic Policy Cycle; translating Commission strategic steering into the Technical and Operational EIBM strategy, and facilitating 
and fostering the implementation of the Technical and Operational strategy for EIBM across the EBCG)? 

Frontex has [not /partially] contributed 
to  better  coordination  between  the 
relevant  stakeholders,  in  particular  in 
and  between  Member  States  in  the 
context 
Border 
of 
Management. 

Integrated 

Frontex has [not /partially] contributed 
to  better  cooperation  between  the 
relevant  stakeholders,  in  particular  in 
and  between  Member  States  in  the 
context of EIBM. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of working arrangements concluded with stakeholders 

Share of stakeholders involved in Frontex activities in the context of EIBM 

Estimate  of  risk  analyses  or  analytical  products  produced  and  shared  with 
stakeholders, particularly Member States 

Metrics linked to EUROSUR use that demonstrate coordinated approach   

Qualitative indicators: 

Extent  to  which  Single  Programming  Document’s  Horizontal  Objective  1,  Focus 
Area  4.1  has  been  achieved,  i.e.,  “Establish  and  develop  mechanisms  for 
operational cooperation to implement the concept of the EIBM” 

Typology and extent of support provided to stakeholders 

Level  of  cooperation  at  strategic  and  operational  level  amongst  Member  States 

Baseline analysis 

Desk  research,  including  the  thematic 
evaluation  of  the  European  integrated 
border  management  (EIBM)  strategies 
and  the  2019  technical  and  operational 
strategy for EIBM (TO EIBM) 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

98 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and with the assistance of Frontex 

Extent and quality of information exchange between Frontex and Member States 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  degree  to  which  Frontex  [successfully] 
contributed to each specific component of the EIBM 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  the  effectiveness  of  Frontex  initiatives  in  coordinating 
initiatives in the context of EIBM 

Stakeholders’ level of satisfaction about Frontex role in EIBM activities 

EQ9. Are Frontex operational activities based on an up-to-date and comprehensive risk analysis?  

EQ 9.1 To what extent did Frontex produce reliable and actionable information through 24/7 (near) real-time situation and crisis monitoring surveillance, to inform its operational 
activities? 
EQ 9.2 To what extent did Frontex produce risk analysis (pre-warning and forecasting) within all four tiers of EIBM to inform its operational activities?  

Desk 
Operational Plans, Risk analysis reports 

research, 

including 

Frontex’ 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Frontex  operational  activities  based 
on an up-to-date risk analysis. 

Frontex  operational  activities  based 
on  a  comprehensive  risk  analysis, 
integrating data from multiple sources, 
including  Member  States 
data, 
vulnerability 
EUROSUR, 
third 
assessments, 
countries  (eg.  AFIC),  open  sources, 
partner EU agencies; 

liaison  officers, 

Frontex  risk  analyses  provide  data 
which fulfils the operational needs;   

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  risk  analyses  and  related  products  conducted  and  linked  to  specific 
operational activities;  

Number of (mega-)trends identified 

Number of risk analysis centres and networks set up 

 Qualitative indicators: 

Typology of (mega-)trends identified 

Extent  to  which  FRAN  Indicators  are  achieved  through  Frontex  activities  (e.g., 
detention of illegal-border crossing, returns, detections of false documents, etc.) 

Extent of achievement of Single Programming Document Focus Areas objectives 
(e.g., 1.1, 1.2., 1.3.) 

Extent of development of risk analysis capabilities 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  views  on  the  suitability  of  Frontex’s  risk  analysis  to 
serve operational activities/ 

Stakeholders and experts’ opinions on the level of activities’ compliance with risk 
analysis conclusions 

99 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EQ10. How and to what extent has Frontex delivered relevant assistance to Member States in the training of national border/coast guards, including the establishment 
of common training standards?  

Frontex [successfully / unsuccessfully] 
relevant  assistance 
delivered 
to 
in 
the 
training  of 
Member  States 
border/coast 
guards, 
national 
including 
of 
the 
common training standards. 

establishment 

training 

integrated 

Frontex  Common  Core  Curriculum 
was  successfully 
into 
programmes, 
national 
contributing 
to  harmonisation  of 
border  and  coast  guarding  education, 
improved 
and 
interoperability;  

competence 

Frontex  Common  Core  Curriculum 
[has/ has not] proven to be effective in 
practice. 

Relevant  documents,  including  Common 
Core  Curricula,  European  Joint  Master, 
interviews 
questionnaires  with 
Frontex  (including  with  Standing  Corps 
categories 2 and 3) 

and 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number and types of trainings delivered (with relevant metrics such as number of 
training hours) 

Number of border/coast guards trained 

Number of training guidelines/standards produced and delivered  

Budget allocation and utilisation for training activities 

Share of stakeholders agreeing on sufficient time being dedicated to trainings 

Relevant indicators from feedback forms from trainees  

 Qualitative indicators: 

Evidence of Member States’ needs assessment carried out 

Extent  of  achievement  of  Single  Programming  Document’s  Strategic  Objectives 
(e.g, SO. 3 – Sustained European Border and Coast Guard Capabilities) 

Extent to which objectives and structure of trainings are in line with the objectives 
of the EBCG Regulation and the needs identified through risk analysis 

Extent of cooperation with stakeholders in the designing of training activities 

Satisfaction score (CSAT) of the internal and external stakeholders 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Trainees’ level of satisfaction 

Trainers’ level of satisfaction  

Stakeholders’ opinion and feedback on trainings  

EQ11. How has Frontex supported Member States by deploying its technical equipment in the Member States?  

has 

[successfully 

/ 
Frontex 
unsuccessfully]  supported  Member 
States  by  deploying 
technical 
equipment in the Member States.  

its 

Quantitative indicators: 

Agency’s share of the pool for technical equipment 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research  

Types and number of equipment procured between 2019 – 2022;  

Extent  of 

technical  equipment  deployed 

to  provide  assistance,  per 

Information  from  OperaEvo  and  Annual 
Bilateral Negotiations 

100 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews 

Thematic case studies 

category/typology  of  equipment  (e.g.,  IT  equipment,  logistic  equipment,  military 
equipment, etc.) 

Asset days reported in JOs / Rapid Border Interventions 

Budget allocated and utilised to develop technical equipment   

 Qualitative indicators: 

Extent to which technical equipment matches defined operational needs 

Extent to which technical equipment and resources are made available  

Level  of  achievement  of  strategic  objectives  (e.g.,  SO.2  –  Focus  Area  2.1: 
Provide effect-oriented and flexible operational response) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  the  suitability  of  technical  equipment  to  respond  to 
operational needs 

Stakeholders’ level of satisfaction about the cooperation with Frontex on sharing 
technical equipment  

Stakeholders’ experience with the deployment of technical equipment with focus 
on timing, efficiency, responsiveness, etc.  

 EQ12.  How  has  Frontex  cooperated  with  authorities  in  third  countries?  How  has  Frontex  facilitated  cooperation  between  Member  States  and  authorities  in  third 
countries? To what extent has this cooperation been framed within a broader framework of the EU’s external action?  

Frontex 
has 
unsuccessfully] 
authorities in third countries. 

cooperated 

[successfully 

/ 
with 

has 

[successfully 

Frontex 
/ 
unsuccessfully]  facilitated  cooperation 
between  Member 
and 
authorities in third countries. 

States 

Quantitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Number of  working  arrangements and agreements  concluded  with  authorities  in 
TCs 

Share of cooperation activities with TCs, including countering irregular migration, 
countering cross-border crimes, rescuing people etc.  

Number of liaison officers in third countries 

Number of trainings of TCs’ national border guards 

Number of operations conducted in/in cooperation with TCs 

Qualitative indicators: 

including 

research, 

Desk 
International 
cooperation Strategy 2021-2023, reporting 
on 
and 
operational  activities  to  the  Management 
Board 

international 

cooperation 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured  interviews,  including  with 
relevant  CSDP  missions  and  operations 
and respective EU Delegations, as well as 
EEAS (CPCC, ISP, SecDefPol) 

Extent and typology of operational and technical assistance to authorities in TCs 

Thematic case studies 

101 

 
 
 
 
 
Extent of achievement of Single Programming Document’s Horizontal Objectives 
2  “Reinforce  the  external  dimension  aimed  at  multiplying  Frontex  operational 
impact through cooperation with […] third countries” 

Extent to which TCs’ border management capacities have been supported 

Extent  and  quality  of  information  sharing  between  Frontex,  Member  States  and 
TCs, including in the EUROSUR framework  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  extent  to  which  Frontex  coordinate  operational 
cooperation between Member States and TCs 

Stakeholders  and  experts’  opinions  on  the  quality  of  the  support,  expertise, 
equipment etc. provided by Frontex to TCs 

Stakeholders and experts’ opinions on the effectiveness of cooperation with TCs 
for achieving Frontex’s operations objectives 

EQ13. How has Frontex cooperated with the EU agencies, CSDP Missions and Operations and international organisations, in particular  on the coast guard functions 
with EFCA and EMSA and with relevant national/international organisations?  

EQ13.1 How has the Agency cooperated with international organisations and does the EBCG Regulation allow the Agency to cooperate with all international organisations that are 
relevant for carrying out its tasks efficiently?  
EQ13.2 How has the Agency cooperated with EU agencies? 
EQ13.3 How has the Agency cooperated with CSDP Missions and Operations? Is the existing framework of cooperation sufficient? How could it be improved? 

has 

[successfully 

/ 
Frontex 
unsuccessfully]  cooperated  with  the 
EU  agencies,  CSDP  Missions  and 
international 
and 
Operations 
organisations, 
the 
in  particular  on 
coast  guard  functions  with  EFCA  and 
EMSA 
relevant 
national/international organisations. 

with 

and 

The  EBCG  Regulation  allows  [does 
not  allow]  the  Agency  to  cooperate 
with all international organisations that 
are  relevant  for  carrying  out  its  tasks 
efficiently. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of working arrangements and agreements concluded 

Number of inter-agency studies, reports, collaborations 

Number  of  activities  performed  in  cooperation  with  CSDP  Missions  and 
Operations 

Qualitative indicators: 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured  interviews,  including  with 
Maritime  Analysis  and  Operations  Centre 
(MAOC  –  N),  NATO 
–  Narcotics 
MARCOM,  European  Coast  Guard 
Functions 
(ECGFF),  CSDP 
missions  and  operations  and  EEAS 
(CPCC, ISP, SecDefPol)  

Forum 

Typology  of  support  provided  to  EU  Institutions  and  EU  Delegations,  CSDP 
Missions and Operations, international organisations 

Thematic case studies 

Level  of  achievement  of  Strategic  Objective  2  Focus  Area  2.3  “reinforcing  the 
cooperation between Frontex, EMSA and EFCA for the development of European 
cooperation on Coast Guard Functions” 

102 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alignment with guidelines and objectives agreed with EMSA and EFCA 

Frontex’s  level  of  cooperation  in  cost  guard  functions  with  EU  agencies  and 
international organisations   

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinions  on  the  quality  and  effectiveness  of  the  coordinate 
approach  between  Frontex  and  EU  institutions,  agencies,  delegations,  CSDP 
Mission and Operations, and international organisations 

EQ14. How has Frontex promoted and respected fundamental rights through all the Agency’s activities? 

EQ14.1. In which ways has Frontex created the conditions for ensuring and promoting the respect of fundamental rights in its activities?  
EQ14.2.  How  has  the  Serious  Incident  Reports  (SIRs)  mechanism  been  implemented  to  provide  an  effective  procedure  to  report  and  investigate  potential  fundamental  rights 
violations?  
EQ14.3. How has the complaints mechanism provided an effective and accessible tool for reporting, investigating, and remedying perceived breaches of fundamental rights?  
EQ14.4.  How  effective  is  the  fundamental  rights  framework  established by  the  EBCG  Regulation  in  ensuring  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights in the  course  of  executing  the 
Agency’s mandate, including by empowering FRMs to conduct thorough and impartial monitoring activities?  
EQ14.5 How effectively has Frontex monitored return operations organised and coordinated by the Agency? (Article 50(5) of EBCG Regulation)? 

has 

[successfully/ 
Frontex 
and 
unsuccessfully] 
respected  fundamental  rights  through 
all the Agency’s activities. 

promoted 

Frontex  has  created  [not  created]  the 
conditions for ensuring and promoting 
the  respect  of  Fundamental  Rights  in 
its activities in specific ways.  

The  Serious  Incident  Reports  (SIRs) 
mechanism  has  been  implemented 
to 
[successfully/ 
provide  an  effective  procedure 
to 
report 
investigate  potential 
fundamental rights violations. 

unsuccessfully] 

and 

The  complaints  mechanism  has  [has 
not]  provided  an  effective  and 
reporting, 
accessible 
investigating, 
remedying 
perceived  breaches  of  fundamental 
rights 

and 

tool 

for 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  Serious  Incident  Reports  (SIRs)  submitted  by  deployed  staff  and 
follow-ups  (investigation  in  cooperation  with  involved  Member  State,  actions  to 
address identified shortcomings, redress, etc. 

Number of and complaints received by the Agency and follow-up actions taken 

Estimates of the use of the complaints mechanism and follow-ups (actions taken 
to address identified shortcomings, redress, compensation, etc) 

Number of legal complaints against Frontex 

Number of trainings delivered on fundamental rights operations 

Baseline analysis 

including  Fundamental 
Desk  research, 
Rights  Officer  reports,  Action Plan  for  the 
implementation  of 
rights 
related recommendations (i.e. FSWG, WG 
FRaLO), Consultative Forum reports 

fundamental 

Targeted 
Consultative Forum 

surveys, 

including 

with 

Semi-structured 
Fundamental Rights Agency 

interviews, 

including 

Staff  involved  in  developing  a  fundamental  rights  strategy  and  in  fundamental 
rights related activities 

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Budget allocation and utilisation for fundamental rights related activities 

 Qualitative indicators: 

Level of compliance of Frontex’s operations and activities with fundamental rights 
legislation (E.g., EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; Fundamental rights norms in 
EU JHA acquis, etc.) 

103 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fundamental  rights 

The 
framework 
established  by  the  EBCG  Regulation 
in 
was  effective 
ensuring 
of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  course  of 
executing the Agency’s mandate 

[not  effective] 
protection 

the 

The  expanded  role  of  the  oversight 
and  monitoring  provided  by 
the 
Fundamental Right Officer contributes 
to  higher  level  of  compliance  with 
human rights standards. 

Level of compliance with FRA and external evaluators recommendations  

Quality and effectiveness of fundamental rights’ training contents 

Extent  of  possibility  to  scrutinise  compliance  with  fundamental  rights  in  Frontex 
activities 

Level of achievement of Single Programming Document’s Horizontal objective 3 
“Develop  an  upgraded  Management  System  aimed  at  ensuring  Accountability, 
Regularity and Legality of all Frontex activities” 

Extent to which objectives foreseen in the Fundamental Rights Strategy are met 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders and experts’ views on the extent of effectiveness of the operations’ 
fundamental rights monitoring  

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  Fundamental  Rights  Strategy 
and its level and quality of implementation 

EQ15. How has Frontex supported Member States in the area of return through all phases of return procedures (forced returns, voluntary returns, post-arrival and re-
integration)? 

EQ15.1.  How  has  the  Agency  supported  Member  States  specifically  in  the  area  of  post-arrival  and  post-return  activities  including  the  roll-out  and  functioning  of  the  Joint 
Reintegration Services and other return programmes in third countries?  
EQ15.2. Which role has the Agency in building synergies and connecting Union-funded networks and programmes in the field of return in third countries?  
EQ15.3. How has Frontex supported Member States in terms of coordinating return operations led by Member States?  
EQ15.4. How has Frontex provided support to Member States in terms of organising Frontex-led operations?  

has 

Frontex 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully]  supported  Member 
States in the area of return through all 
phases  of  return  procedures  (pre-
return,  returns,  post-arrival  and  re-
integration). 

has 

Frontex 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully]  supported  Member 
States specifically in the area of post-
arrival  and  post-return  activities 
including  the  roll-out  and  functioning 
of  the  Joint  Reintegration  Services 
and  other  return  programmes  in  third 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  returns  supported  by  Frontex  (forced  returns  and  voluntary  returns 
and departures ) 

Number of personnel deployed on return procedures 

Budget allocation and utilisation for return procedures 

Number  of  pre  -  return  procedures  (e.g.  identification  missions)  carried  out, 
including in coordination with Member States and TCs 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Number of Frontex-led operations 

Qualitative indicators: 

Extent to which FRAN indicators are met 

104 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
countries.  

The  Agency  has  a  specific  role  in 
building  synergies  and  connecting 
Union-funded 
and 
programmes  in  the  field  of  return  in 
third countries. 

networks 

has 

Frontex 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully]  supported  Member 
States  in  terms  of  coordinating  return 
operations led by Member States. 

has 

[successfully/ 
Frontex 
unsuccessfully]  provided  support  to 
Member States in terms of organising 
Frontex-led operations. 

Extent  of  achievement  of  Single  Programming  Documents’  Strategic  Objectives 
such  as  “Safe,  Secure  and  Well-Functioning  EU  External  Borders”,  and  Focus 
Areas such as “Support migration management by ensuring effective returns” 

Degree 
experiencing challenges with their return systems 

to  which  Frontex  has  provided  assistance 

to  Member  States’ 

Level and quality of organisation and coordination of return operations 

Extent  to  which  the  non-binding  reference  model  for  reference  IT  systems  for 
return  case  management  provide  effective  support  to  Member  States’  border 
guards 

Technical, including IT, equipment provided by Frontex 

Level of assistance provided in voluntary returns 

Support provided by Frontex to Member States in the areas of return through all 
phases  of  return  process  (Art.  48  of  EBCG  Regulation)  in  compliance  with 
fundamental rights 

Support provided by Frontex to Member States in strengthening cooperation with 
third countries, in line with the EU’s comprehensive external engagement 

Support  provided  by  Frontex  to  Member  States  in  post-arrival  and  post-return 
activities, including the roll-out and functioning of the Joint Reintegration Services 
and other return programmes in third countries 

Support  provided  by  Frontex  to  Member  States  in  organising  and  coordinating 
return operations led by Member States and Frontex-led operations 

Analysis  of  organisation  and  coordination  of  return  operations,  including  Joint 
Return Operations carried out 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders and experts’ opinion on the role of Frontex in implementing returns 
operations  

Stakeholders’  view  on  the  effectiveness  and  quality  of  Frontex’s  support  to 
Member States and TCs on returns  

EQ16.  How  has  the  exchange  of  information  in  the  framework  of  EUROSUR  improved  situational  awareness  and  reaction  at  the  external  borders  of  EU  Member 
States? This concerns the cooperation between Member States as well as with third countries.  

EQ16.1  How  has  the  Agency’s  and  Member  States’  implementation  of  the  EUROSUR  framework  been  effective  in  terms  of  information  exchange  in  order  to  improve  the 
situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities among the relevant stakeholders, including in  the detection, prevention and combating of irregular immigration and 

105 

 
 
 
 
 
cross-border crime as well as in contributing to the protection and saving the lives of migrants? 
EQ16.2  How  did  the  Agency  manage  to  integrate  EUROSUR  with  the  rest  of  the  operational  activities?  Are  there  any  duplications  between  EUROSUR  and  other  operational 
information channels?  

The  exchange  of  information  in  the 
framework  of  EUROSUR  improved 
situational 
improve] 
not 
[did 
awareness  and 
the 
external  borders  of  EU  Member 
States.  

reaction  at 

The  Agency’s  implementation  of  the 
EUROSUR  framework  has  been  [not 
been] effective in terms of information 
exchange  in  order  to  improve  the 
situational  awareness  and  increase 
the  reaction  capabilities  among  the 
relevant stakeholders, including in the 
detection,  prevention  and  combating 
of  irregular  immigration  and  cross-
border crime as well as in contributing 
to  the  protection  and  saving  the  lives 
of migrants. 

The  Agency  manage 
EUROSUR 
[successfully/unsuccessfully]  with  the 
rest of the operational activities.  

integrate 

to 

There  are  [are  not]  any  duplications 
between  EUROSUR 
other 
operational information channels. 

and 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of EUROSUR activities conducted in support of MS/TCs 

Number of events entered into EUROSUR (by MS and Frontex) 

Number of analytical reports shared in EUROSUR (by MS and Frontex) 

Other relevant quantitative indicators from EUROSUR to be provided by Frontex 

Qualitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Desk 
research, 
evaluation report of 2022 

including  EUROSUR 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured  interviews,  including  with 
EU SatCen, EMSA, EFCA, EASA, Frontex 
staff 

Level of cooperation between Frontex and MS/TCs through EUROSUR 

Extent to which information is exchanged through EUROSUR 

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Level  of  achievement  of  Single  Programming  Document’s  Strategic  Objectives, 
such as “Reduced Vulnerability of the External Borders based on Comprehensive 
Situational Awareness” 

Extent  to  which  the  development  of  operational  technical  capacities  and  IT 
systems such as EUROSUR has been sustained 

Extent to which TCs’ information exchange capabilities have been strengthened  

Extent to  which  reporting is adapted  to  and compliant  with EU  legal framework, 
including fundamental rights 

Quality of cross-border crime-related EUROSUR data collected and reported 

Level  of  complementarity  and/or  inter-changeability  between  EUROSUR  and 
other information exchange channels 

Mapping of operational standards created to support EUROSUR 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  and  experts’  opinion  on 
level  of  operationalisation  of 
EUROSUR’s  information  exchange  network  and  its  compliance  with  EU  law 
standards, including fundamental rights and data protection  

the 

i
c
i
f
f

E

 EQ17. Costs and benefits:  What are the costs and benefits generated by EBCG (not only financial, but also operational) in each Member State, in Frontex and overall?  

y
c
n
e
EQ17.1 Are there significant differences in cost and benefits in the Member States, and if so, what is causing them?  

106 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EQ17.2 Have there been administrative costs or savings for citizens and business?  

There  are  certain  costs  generated  by 
EBCG 
in  each  Member  State,  in 
Frontex and overall. 

There  are  certain  benefits  generated 
by  EBCG  in  each  Member  State,  in 
Frontex and overall. 

There  are 
[are  not]  significant 
differences in cost and benefits in the 
Member States. 

Certain  factors  contribute  to  potential 
significant  differences 
in  cost  and 
benefits in the Member States. 

have 

There 
been] 
been 
administrative  costs  or  savings  for 
citizens and business. 

[not 

Quantitative indicators: 

Direct costs (to Member States and Frontex) generated by the EBCG, including 
financial  and  operational  costs  (e.g.,  budget  allocated  and  utilised 
for 
increasing/improving IT, military, coordination and logistic equipment) 

Number of human resources employed on EBCG activities – specific attention to 
vacancy rate and turn-over rate 

Estimate on the time required for adopting/implementing major changes 

Number of external services used 

Qualitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 
Desk  research,  including  Frontex  final 
evaluation  report  for  each  joint  operation 
from  Frontex 
from 
evaluation  report  on  Flexible  Operational 
Activities in Return for the relevant years 

the  Agency  and 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews,  

Thematic case studies 

Typology of costs identified and stakeholders targeted (e.g., administrative costs, 
one-off costs, recurrent costs) 

Scale  and  quality  of  benefits  generated  both  in  Member  States  and  TCs  (e.g., 
trainings  delivered,  operations  concluded,  exchange  of  information  conducted, 
working arrangements concluded, etc.) 

Perception of the efficiency of resource allocation in view of factors such as the 
priorities defined and the need for trained staff  

Efficiency in using available facilities, equipment, etc. 

Evidence of activities not being implemented due to a lack of human or financial 
resources 

Degree  to  which  the  financial  and  human  resources  allocated  to  Frontex 
increased after the implementation of the EBCG Regulation 

 Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ opinion on whether the benefits are greater than the costs incurred 

EQ18. What factors have influenced the efficiency of the implementation of the EBCG Regulation? How and to what extent?  (e.g. governance and set-up, clear division 
of competences between Member States and Frontex, policy framework, legal base, etc) 

factors 

Certain 
the 
efficiency of the implementation of the 
EBCG Regulation. 

influenced 

Quantitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Estimate on the time required for adopting/implementing major changes 

Desk research 

EU 

budgetary 

rules 

and 

the 

Number  of  tools  (e.g.,  IT  equipment,  infrastructure  etc.)  which  required  major 

Targeted surveys 

107 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

multiannual 
framework 
financial 
impacted (or not) the efficiency of the 
EBCG 
of 
implementation 
Regulation 

the 

Member  State 
country 
/ 
budgetary  rules  have  /  not  impacted 
the efficiency of implementation of the 
EBCG Regulation; 

third 

changes 

Number of trainings delivered and people trained 

Budget allocated and utilised for adapting to novelties introduced with the EBCG 
Regulation 

Qualitative indicators: 

Extent  to  which  major  changes  needed  to  be  introduced  to  comply  with  EBCG 
Regulation  

Extent  to  which  human  resources  have  been  capable  to  efficiently  adapt  to 
novelties 

Cost categories where inefficiencies can be identified  

Additional costs incurred due to the inefficiencies identified 

Evidence of activities not being implemented due to a lack of human or financial 
resources 

Degree  to  which  the  financial  and  human  resources  allocated  to  Frontex 
increased after the implementation of the EBCG Regulation 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders and experts’ views on factor hindering/boosting the efficiency of the 
EBCG Regulation 

Proportion  of  stakeholders  who  consider  that  internal  and  external  factors  have 
facilitated/hindered the efficiency of the Regulation 

EQ19. Are there any inefficiencies of the implementation of the EBCG Regulation? What is the simplification and cost reduction potential of the Regulation?  

inefficiencies 

Certain 
implementation 
Regulation have been identified. 

the 

of 

of 

the 
EBCG 

There is certain simplification and cost 
reduction potential of the Regulation. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Cost categories where inefficiencies can be identified  

Number of Frontex activities where inefficiencies can be identified 

Number of cost categories which can be simplified 

Additional costs incurred due to the inefficiencies identified  

Percentage of inefficiency costs on the total cost of the activities  

Number and type of administrative inefficiencies identified  

108 

research, 

Desk 
implementation 
period 2019-2023 

including 
reports  covering 

Budget 
the 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews,  

Thematic case studies 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative indicators: 

Degree of alignment between budget allocated and expenditure  

Evidence of activities not being implemented due to a lack of resources 

Existence  of  administrative  processes  and  obligations  that  are  significantly 
burdensome 

Alternative or additional measures to increase results  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether 
(administrative and operational) can be identified  

inefficiency 

in  Frontex’s  activities 

Stakeholders’ opinion on the scope of further simplification and burden reduction  

EQ20.Do the resources that have been allocated to Frontex correspond to the tasks assigned to the Agency by the EBCG Regulation?  

resources 

The 
that  have  been 
allocated  to  Frontex  correspond  [do 
not correspond] to the tasks assigned 
the  EBCG 
to 
Regulation. 

the  Agency  by 

Quantitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Allocation of budget per activity and actual budget utilised per activity 

Cost categories where inefficiencies can be identified  

Number of Frontex activities where inefficiencies can be identified 

Percentage of inefficiency costs on the total cost of the activities  

Budget allocated to hiring new resources  

Turnover rate, vacancy rate 

Qualitative indicators: 

Degree of alignment between budget allocated and expenditure  

Evidence of activities not being implemented due to a lack of resources (human 
and financial) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ opinion on whether the resources allocated to Frontex are sufficient 
to carry out tasks assigned 

research, 

Desk 
implementation 
period 2019-2023 

including 
reports  covering 

Budget 
the 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews,  

Thematic case studies 

EQ21.  How  has  Frontex  used  its  human  and  financial  resources  to  achieve  the  objectives  set  out  in  its  work  programmes  during  the  2019-2023  period?  Is  the 
distribution of resources adequate for meeting these objectives?  

109 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
has 

Frontex 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully]  used  its  human  and 
financial  resources  to  achieve  the 
objectives  set  out 
its  work 
programmes  during  the  2019-2023 
period? Is the distribution of resources 
these 
adequate 
objectives. 

for  meeting 

in 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of human resources employed on EBCG activities – specific attention to 
vacancy rate and turn-over rate 

Allocation of budget per activity and actual budget utilised per activity 

Cost categories where inefficiencies can be identified  

Number of Frontex activities where inefficiencies can be identified 

Percentage of inefficiency costs on the total cost of the activities  

Budget allocated and utilised for adapting to novelties introduced with the EBCG 
Regulation 

Qualitative indicators: 

Degree of alignment between budget allocated and expenditure  

Evidence of activities not being implemented due to a lack of resources (human 
and financial) 

Degree  to  which  the  financial  and  human  resources  allocated  to  Frontex 
increased after the implementation of the EBCG Regulation 

Extent  to  which  major  changes  needed  to  be  introduced  to  comply  with  EBCG 
Regulation 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ opinion on whether the resources allocated to Frontex are sufficient 
to achieve the work programmes’ objectives 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether  the  resources  allocated  to  Frontex  have  been 
allocated effectively within the Agency 

EQ22.    How  and  to  what  extent  has  the  governance  and  organisational  structure  of  the  Agency  enabled  Frontex  to  perform  its  tasks,  having  regard  to  its  size, 
composition and organisation? 

The  governance  and  organisational 
structure  of  the  Agency  has  enabled 
[has  not  enabled]  Frontex  to  perform 
its  tasks,  having  regard  to  its  size, 
composition and organisation. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Baseline analysis 

Number of human resources covering governance and organisational positions 

Desk research 

Turnover rate  

Budget  allocated  and  actual  expenditure  for  governance  and  organisational 
activities 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

110 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of human resources employed on EBCG activities 

Legal analysis 

Allocation of budget per activity and actual budget utilised per activity 

Qualitative indicators: 

Degree of alignment between governance costs and tasks performed 

Degree of alignment between budget allocated and expenditure for all activities  

Extent  to  which  governance  costs  are  proportionate  to  size,  composition  and 
organisation of Frontex 

Existence  of  administrative  processes  and  obligations  that  are  significantly 
burdensome 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether  the  organisation  structure  enabled  Frontex  to 
carry out tasks assigned 

EQ23.  How have the Agency's procedures and working practices been conducive to performing its tasks?  

EQ23.1 How have the Agency’s internal coordination mechanisms (including Director briefings) helped facilitate cooperation at horizontal level? 
EQ23.2 Have the Agency’s human resources been deployed effectively? 
EQ23.3 How have the Agency’s strategies, action plans, operating procedures and guidelines supported the performance of its tasks? 

 The  Agency's  procedures  and  working 
practices have  [have not]  been  conducive 
to performing its tasks. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of human resources employed on EBCG activities  

Allocation of budget per activity and actual budget utilised per activity 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Budget allocated and utilised for developing working practices and procedures 

Semi-structured interviews  

Number  of  new  working  practices  (e.g.,  codes  of  conduct,  working  guidelines, 
etc.) produced 

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Qualitative indicators: 

Extent  to  which  human  resources  have  been  capable  to  efficiently  adapt  to  the 
Agency’s procedures and working practices 

Degree of alignment between governance costs and tasks performed 

Existence  of  administrative  processes  and  obligations  that  are  significantly 
burdensome 

111 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ opinion on whether the resources allocated to Frontex are sufficient 
to carry out tasks assigned 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether  new  working  procedures  are  aligned  with  the 
Agency’s objectives  

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether  new  working  procedures  are  aligned  with  the 
EBCG Regulation’s objectives and tasks foreseen 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  whether  new  working  procedures  have  facilitated 
working performances  
EQ24.  To what extent are Frontex data collection for the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments coherent?  

Frontex  data  collection  for  the  risk 
vulnerability 
and 
analysis 
assessments are [are not] coherent. 

The 
the 
information  collected  via 
vulnerability  assessment  process  is 
and 
accurate, 
up-to-date, 
the 
for 
comprehensive  allowing 
preparation  of  an  effective 
risk 
analysis,  serving  operational  and 
strategic needs;  

Quantitative indicators: 

Categorisation of data gaps in vulnerability assessments by Member State, type, 
thematic area covered etc. 

Existence and nature of overlaps between the different types of data collected 

Existence and nature of exploited / unexploited synergies between data collected 

Existence  and  frequency  of  use  of  internal  data-sharing  exchange  mechanisms 
and processes 

Existence  and  frequency  of  use  of  mechanisms  and  processes  to  involve 
Frontex’s staff members responsible for the different activities in the design and 
planning process of data collection  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders and experts’ views on coherence of data collected 

Stakeholders’ perceptions of obstacles and areas for improvement  

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

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EQ25.  To what extent have the objectives and activities of the EBCG been coherent with other relevant EU policies and objectives? (e.g. migration and asylum, EU visa 
policy, EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), etc) 

The  objectives  and  activities  of  the 
EBCG  have  been  [have  not  been] 
coherent  with  other 
relevant  EU 
policies and objectives. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of references to EBCG’s activities in EU policy reports  

Number and typology of cooperation and coordination mechanisms established in 
order  to  ensure  coherence  and  complementarity  of  activities  at  EU  level  and  to 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

112 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

avoid overlaps 

Qualitative indicators: 

Degree  of  coherence  of  EBCG’s  activities  with  the  objectives  and  activities  of 
other EU institutions, bodies and agencies, as well as relevant policies 

Extent  to  which  Frontex  participates  in  boards  /  working  groups  or  other 
cooperation  mechanisms  with  other  EU  Agencies  (Europol,  Eurojust,  eu-LISA, 
FRA, etc). 

Existence  and  nature  of  the  synergies between  EBCG’s  activities  and  other  EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies 

Existence  of  unexploited  synergies  between  EBCG’s  activities  and  other  EU 
institutions, bodies and agencies 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ perceptions of the level of coordination of activities and processes 
across  EU  Institutions,  bodies  and  agencies  to  avoid  overlaps  and  promote 
synergies  (including  the  work  of  the  Commission  (DG  INTPA/NEAR)  in  third 
countries  in  the  context  of  EU  development/  neighbourhood  cooperation  in  the 
areas of border management/ return/ integration) 

EQ26.  To what extent have Frontex activities been coherent with the activities of other stakeholders in European Integrated Border Management?  (e.g. EU institutions, 
EU JHA agencies, etc.) 

EQ26.1 To what extent have the objectives and activities of the EBCG been coherent with the objectives and activities of other EU institutions, bodies and agencies?   

Frontex  activities  have 
[have  not] 
been  coherent  with  the  activities  of 
other  stakeholders 
Integrated 
Border Management. 

in 

Frontex activities have been coherent 
with activities of Member States;  

Frontex activities have been coherent 
relevant  EU 
with 
institutions and agencies; 

those  of  other 

Frontex activities have been coherent 
with those of partner third countries; 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of references to Frontex activities in stakeholders’ reports 

Number  and  typology  of  cooperation  and  coordination  mechanisms  established 
with stakeholders 

Qualitative indicators: 

Number  and  quality  of  agreements  with  relevant  stakeholders,  facilitating 
coherence of activities;  

Degree  of  coherence  of  Frontex  activities  in  EIBM  with  the  objectives  of  other 
stakeholders 

Existence and nature of synergies between Frontex activities in EIBM and other 
stakeholders’ activities 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

113 

 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Existence of unexploited synergies between Frontex activities in EIBM and other 
stakeholders’ activities 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ perceptions of the level of activities’ coordination between Frontex 
and other stakeholders 

EQ27. To what extent are the various pieces of EU legislation regulating the operations of the EBCG coherent with one another? To what extent do they comply with EU 
law on personal data, other fundamental rights, Regulation 656/2014 and the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies?  

The  various  pieces  of  EU  legislation 
regulating the operations of the EBCG 
have  [have  not  been]  coherent  with 
one another. 

The  various  pieces  of  EU  legislation 
comply  [do  not  comply]  with  EU  law 
on  personal  data  protection,  other 
fundamental 
Regulation 
rights, 
656/2014 and the Common Approach 
on Decentralised Agencies. 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Qualitative indicators: 

Categorisation  of  EU  legislation  contents  related  to  EBCG’s  operations  by  type, 
thematic area covered etc. 

Existence  and  nature  of  overlaps  between  the  different  EU  legislation  contents 
related to EBCG’s operations  

Existence and nature of exploited / unexploited synergies between EU legislation 
contents related to EBCG’s operations  

Existence  and  nature  of  synergies  between  EU  legislation  regulating  EBCG’S 
operations and EU fundamental rights legislative framework  

Existence  and  nature  of  synergies  between  EU  legislation  regulating  EBCG’S 
operations and EU data protection legislative framework 

Existence  and  nature  of  synergies  between  EU  legislation  regulating  EBCG’S 
operations and Regulation 656/2014 

Existence  and  nature  of  synergies  between  EU  legislation  regulating  EBCG’S 
operations and the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders  and  experts’  views  on  the  existence  of  synergies  /  unexploited 
synergies between EU legislation on EBCG’s operations  

Stakeholders  and  experts’  views  on  the  existence  of  coherence  between  EU 
legislation on EBCG’s operations and EU legislation  on fundamental rights, data 
protection, Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies, etc.  

EQ28.  How  are  Frontex’s  internal  procedures,  including  planning,  monitoring  and  reporting  ensuring  that  its  activities  are  internally  coherent?  How  have  the 
Management Board’s activities contributed to ensure this internal coherence?  

114 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
internal 

Frontex’s 
procedures, 
including  planning,  monitoring  and 
reporting  are 
internally 
coherent. 

[are  not] 

Frontex  has  [has  not]  made  specific 
internal 
that 
to  ensure 
efforts 
procedures are coherent. 

its 

The  Management  Board’s  activities 
have  [have  not] contributed  to  ensure 
this internal coherence. 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  Frontex  internal  procedures  which  refer  to  other  internal  procedures 
documents 

Qualitative indicators: 

Categorisation  of  Frontex’s  internal  procedures  by  type,  thematic  area  covered 
and subject delivering the procedure / supervising its application  

Existence  and  nature  of  exploited  /  unexploited  synergies  between  the  different 
procedures 

Existence  and  frequency  of  use  of  internal  information  and  knowledge-sharing 
exchange mechanisms and processes 

Existence  and  frequency  of  use  of  mechanisms  and  processes  to  involve 
Frontex’s  staff  members  responsible  for  the  different  activities,  including  the 
Management Board, in the design and planning process  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ opinion on existence of synergies and coherence among Frontex’s 
internal procedures 

Stakeholders’  view  on  the  role  of  the  Management  Board  in  contributing  to 
internal coherence 

EQ29.  How  has  the  new  mandate  of  Frontex  introduced  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  contributed  to  achieving  the  objectives  of  the  EBCG  as  a  whole?    (for  example, 
Deployment of Standing Corps, expanded EUROSUR remit, management of False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) system) 

The  new  mandate  of  Frontex 
introduced  by  the  EBCG  Regulation 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully] 
contributed to achieving the objectives 
of the EBCG as a whole. 

Qualitative indicators: 

Categorisation of novelties introduced with the EBCG Regulation 

Mapping  of  activities  carried  out  to  comply  with  novelties  introduced  with  the 
EBCG Regulation 

Mapping of synergies between the novelties introduced, the activities carried out 
and the objectives of the EBCG  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders  and  experts’  opinion  on  the  existence  of  synergies  between  the 
novelties introduced, the activities carried out and the objectives of the EBCG 

Stakeholders and experts’ opinion on the role of the new Frontex’s mandate for 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

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115 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
achieving the EBCG’s objectives 

EQ30. How has the new mandate of the Agency contributed to supporting Member States in implementing effective border management?  (e.g. Deployment of Standing 
Corps, expanded EUROSUR remit, management of False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) system) 

The  new  mandate  of  the  Agency 
[successfully/ 
unsuccessfully] 
to  supporting  Member 
contributed 
implementing  effective 
in 
States 
border management. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  operations  conducted  in  Member  States  in  cooperation  with  / 
coordinated by Frontex 

Number of protocols, procedures etc. shared with Member States 

Number of trainings conducted with Member States’ border guards 

Qualitative indicators: 

Extent to which Frontex is building interoperability among Member States through 
successful introduction of common practices/standards 

Extent to which Frontex is used as information hub disseminating information 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ perceptions on the role of Frontex at the national level  

Stakeholders’ perceptions on the role of EBCG operations in support to Member 
State operations 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Stakeholders’ perceptions on the usefulness of EBCG’ outputs to inform Member 
States activities and operations 
EQ31. Could the objectives of the EBCG Regulation have been achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone?  

116 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of 

the  EBCG 
The 
objectives 
[could  not 
Regulation  could  have 
have]  been  achieved  sufficiently  by 
the Member States acting alone. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  operations 
cooperation/coordination from EBCG 

conducted  by  Member  States  without 

Counterfactual analysis 

the 

Baseline analysis 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Legal analysis 

Number  of  working  procedures,  trainings,  protocols  developed  by  the  Member 
States alone  

Number  of  information  sharing  platforms  created  and  managed  by  the  Member 
States alone 

Number of completed/partially completed/not completed activities  

Qualitative indicators: 

Mapping of best practices developed by and shared among Member States 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ perceptions on the role of EBCG at the national level  

Stakeholder perceptions on the impact of the limitation of activities by the EBCG 
on the achievement of its objectives  

Stakeholder perceptions on the role of Member States on the achievement of the 
EBCG Regulation’s objectives  

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REVIEW OF STANDING CORPS 

RQ1. How has the deployment of the Standing Corps been relevant in supporting Member States in the protection of EU external  borders, migration management and 
returns?  

The  deployment  of 
the  Standing 
Corps has been relevant in supporting 
Member States in the protection of EU 
migration 
borders, 
external 
management and returns. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of Standing Corps recruited and trained 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Number of Standing Corps who completed the training 

Semi-structured interviews  

Number of operations where the Standing Corps have been deployed 

Thematic case studies 

FRAN Indicators (e.g., Returns procedures, Detections of false documents etc.) 

Field visits 

Number  of  activities  where  the  Standing  Corps  are  involved  (returns,  rescuing, 
smugglers identification, etc.) 

financial support and other resources and assets mobilised to support the training 
and deployment of the Standing Corps 

117 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of Standing Corps deployed in third countries 

Number  of  Standing  Corps  already  trained  vis-à-vis  number  of  Standing  Corps 
expected to be trained to date 

Qualitative indicators: 

Activities conducted by the Standing Corps in operations 

Role  of  the  Standing  Corps  in  carrying  out  activities  related  to  the  FRAN 
Indicators  (e.g.,  assistance  in  return  related  activities,  Detection  of  illegal  stays 
etc.) 

Mapping  of  the  role  of  the  Standing  Corps  in  carrying  out  border  management, 
migration management and return activities 

Extent  to  which  the  Single  Programming  Document’s  Strategic  Objective  3 
“Sustained European Border and Coast Guard Capabilities” has been achieved 

Presence of structures and procedures to ensure that the members of the teams 
(Standing  Corps)  can  be  held  civilly  and  criminally  liable),  particularly  in  the 
context of their deployment in third countries 

Extent to which the Standing Corps have been effective in ensuring the Member 
States an equally adequate support in the areas of (a) protection of EU external 
borders,  (b)  migration  management  and  (c)  returns  (identifying  the  areas  still 
needing improvement)?  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ view on the role of the Standing Corps in the activities conducted in 
cooperation with Member States  

Stakeholders’ opinion on the role the Standing Corps have in improving Member 
States’ operations to protect borders and manage migration 

Standing Corps’ level of satisfaction with the training received 

Competent  authorities’  level  of  satisfaction  with  the  operations  of  the  Standing 
Corps 

RQ2. The EBCG Regulation requires the deployment of all Standing Corps members (with few exceptions) in the field, excluding them from contributing to the activities 
conducted in the Headquarters. Is this limiting the capacity of the Agency to implement its full mandate?  

The deployment of all Standing Corps 
members in the field is [is not] limiting 
to 
the  capacity  of 

the  Agency 

Qualitative indicators: 

Activities conducted by the Standing Corps in operations 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

118 

 
 
 
 
 
implement its full mandate. 

Activities  conducted  by  the  Agency  in  the  Headquarters  (e.g.,  administrative 
activities) (including in light of MB Decisions 41/2022 and 42/2022) 

Typology of expertise needed for conducting activities in the Headquarters 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  the  impact  of  the  Standing  Corps  not  contributing  to 
Headquarters activities to the Agency’s capacity to implement its mandate 

Stakeholders’ opinion on the added value of involving the Standing Corps in the 
activities in the Headquarters  

RQ3. How has the reserve for rapid reaction as part of the Standing Corps been relevant in supporting Member States, in light of the increased number of categories 1, 
2 and 3 staff?  

The reserve for rapid reaction as part 
of  the  Standing  Corps  has  been  [has 
in  supporting 
not  been] 
Member  States, 
the 
light  of 
increased  number  of  Categories  1,  2 
and 3 staff. 

relevant 
in 

Quantitative indicators:  

Extent  of  practical  deployment  of  the  reserve  for  rapid  reaction  of  the  Standing 
Corps (Category 4)  

Trends in the share (%) of SCs Cat. 4 within the SC 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Frequency  in  which  the  rapid  reacting  mechanism  involving  SCs  Cat.  4  have 
been deployed 

Field visits 

Number of SCs Cat. 4 effectively trained vs Number of SCs Cat. 4 forecasted to 
be trained by date  

Budget allocated to the recruitment, training, deployment of SCs Cat. 4  

Qualitative indicators: 

Areas  of  deployment/activity  types  in  which  the  Member  States  most  deployed 
the SCs Cat. 4 

Areas of operation in which the SCs Cat. 4 are most effectively trained and areas 
needing further training 

Factors  hindering  /  confirming  /  favouring  the  role  of  SCs  Cat.  4  in  ensuring 
Member States adequate support in case of rapid reaction  

Opinion-based indicators: 

Share  (%)  of  stakeholders  considering  SCs  Cat.  4  as  relevant  in  supporting 
Member States for rapid reaction operations  

Extent to which stakeholders consider the actual level of preparation of SCs Cat 4 

119 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adequate for rapid reaction 

Share  of  stakeholders  confirming  that  the  number  of  SCs  Cat.  4  is  adequate  to 
the current needs of the Agency in terms of its rapid reactions’ capacity 

Extent  to  which  stakeholders  agree  on  the  numerical  adequacy  and  effective 
preparation of the current SCs Cat. 4 contingent in light of current and emerging 
trends of crisis scenarios / border management requiring the mobilisation of rapid 
reaction mechanisms  

Share  of  stakeholders  outlining  that  the  budget  allocated  to  SCs  Cat.  4  is 
inadequate 

RQ4. Which are the national authorities of Member States and Schengen Associated Countries which provide contributions to the Standing Corps (Categories 2 and 3)?  

Certain 
[to  be  specified]  national 
authorities  of  Member  States  and 
Associated  Countries 
Schengen 
which  provide  contributions  to  the 
Standing Corps. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number  of  National  authorities  providing  contributions  to  the  Standing  Corps 
(Categories 2 and 3) 

Qualitative indicators: 

Nature of contributions provided 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

National Authorities providing contributions to the Standing Corps, per typology of 
National Authority and of contribution provided 

Extent  to  which  the  contributions  to  the  SCs  Cat  3  provided  by  MSs  /  SAC  is 
provided by the same national authority types (e.g., Ministry of Interior) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Share  (%)  of  stakeholders  agreeing  that  the  national  authorities  of  MSs  /  SAC 
providing  contributions  to  SC  Cat.  3  ensure  an  adequate  coverage  of  the  skills 
required by the Agency mandate’s objectives 

RQ5. How has the number of Standing Corps members, the composition (e.g. Standing Corps categories) and geographical distribution of the Standing Corps meet the 
operational needs of the Agency?  

the  composition 

The  number  of  Standing  Corps 
(e.g., 
members, 
Standing  Corps  categories)  and 
geographical 
the 
Standing Corps has met [has not met] 
the operational needs of the Agency. 

distribution 

of 

Quantitative indicators: 

Desk research 

Number of standing corps members per category per Agency’s planned number  

Targeted surveys 

Number of standing corps members per geographical distribution per operational 
needs of the Agency 

Number of activities which involve the Standing Corps, per category of Standing 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

120 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corp and geographical distribution 

Number of operations which involve the Standing Corps, per category of Standing 
Corp and geographical distribution 

Field visits 

Qualitative indicators: 

Operational needs of the Agency  

Activities which respond to the operational needs of the Agency that involve the 
Standing Corps 

Evidence of operational needs of the  Agency not being fully/partially covered for 
lack of resources, including Standing Corps 

Extent  to  which  the  Single  Programming  Document’s  Strategic  Objective  3 
“Sustained European Border and Coast Guard Capabilities” has been achieved 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’ view on the role of the Standing Corps in achieving the operational 
needs of the Agency 

Stakeholders’  view  on 
the 
effectiveness of the deployment of SCs in achieving the operational needs of  the 
Agency 

factors  hindering 

/  contributing 

to  enhance 

RQ6.  How  has  the  Agency  been  effective  in  the  recruitment  and  training  of  the  Standing  Corps  category  1?  Does  the  recruitment  ensure  professionalism  and 
geographical balance?  

[has  not]  been 
The  Agency  has 
the 
effective 
recruitment  and 
in 
training  of 
the  Standing  Corps 
Category 1.  

The  recruitment  ensures  [does  not 
ensure] 
and 
geographical balance. 

professionalism 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of Standing Corps category 1 recruited, per area of expertise and state 
of origin (vacancy rate, turnover rate) 

Number of Standing Corps positions vacant 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Number  of  Standing  Corps  Category  1  recruited  and  allocated  to  specific 
activities  

Field visits 

Number  of  Standing  Corps  Category  1  recruited  and  not  allocated  to  specific 
activities 

Number of Standing Corps Category 1 trained 

Number of trainings delivered to Standing Corps Category 1 

Qualitative indicators: 

121 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specificities of the recruitment process 

Timing of the recruitment process 

Standing Corps’ level of satisfaction with the recruitment process  

Contents of the trainings 

Standing Corps’ level of satisfaction with the trainings 

RQ7.How has the Agency been effective in the deployments of the Standing Corps Category 1?  

The  Agency  has  been  [not  been] 
effective  in  the  deployments  of  the 
Standing Corps Category 1. 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of Standing Corps Category 1 deployed 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Number of operations conducted with the presence of Standing Corps Category 1 

Semi-structured interviews  

Qualitative indicators: 

Thematic case studies 

Typology  of  operations  where  the  Standing  Corps  Category  1  have  been 
deployed  

Field visits 

Timing for the deployment of the Standing Corps Category 1 in operations 

Operations that would require the deployment of Standing Corps Category 1   

Opinion-based indicators: 

MS views on the effectiveness of deployment 

RQ8.How has the Agency been effective in the deployment of the Standing Corps Categories 2 and 3?  

The  Agency  has  been  [not  been] 
effective  in  the  deployments  of  the 
Standing Corps Categories 2 and 3 

Quantitative indicators: 

Number of Standing Corps Categories 2 and 3 deployed 

Number of operations conducted with the presence of Standing Corps Categories 
2 and 3 

Qualitative indicators: 

Typology of operations where the Standing Corps Categories 2 and 3 have been 
deployed  

Timing  for  the  deployment  of  the  Standing  Corps  Categories  2  and  3  in 
operations 

122 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operations  that  would  require  the  deployment  of  Standing  Corps  Categories  2 
and 3   

Opinion-based indicators: 

MS views on the effectiveness of deployment 

RQ9. To what extent is the size of individual Member States' contributions to the Standing Corps adequate to meet the objectives of the EBCG and proportionate to 
these?  

The size of individual Member States' 
contributions to the Standing Corps is 
adequate  [not  adequate]  to  meet  the 
objectives 
and 
proportionate to these. 

the  EBCG 

of 

Quantitative indicators: 

Size of Member States’ contributions to the Standing Corps 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

(Estimate) Ratio between Standing Corps and activities to be conducted 

Semi-structured interviews  

Qualitative indicators: 

Thematic case studies 

Extent  to  which  Standing  Corps’  activities  are  required  for  achieving  EBCG 
objectives 

Field visits 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Experts’ opinion on the adequacy of the Member States’ contribution to meet the 
EBCG objectives 

RQ10. How are the Member States’ capabilities coherent with the size of the Members States’ contributions to the Standing Corps? Have the contributions impacted 
capabilities available for other needs (e.g. CSDP missions and operations)?  

The  Member  States’  capabilities  are 
[are  no]  coherent  with  the  size  of  the 
Members  States’  contributions  to  the 
Standing 
the 
Have 
contributions 
impacted  capabilities 
available  for  other  needs  (e.g.  CSDP 
missions and operations) 

Corps? 

Quantitative indicators: 

Size of Member States’ contributions to the Standing Corps 

Size of Member States’ capabilities 

Ration between capabilities and contributions 

Qualitative indicators: 

Desk research 

Targeted surveys 

Semi-structured interviews  

Thematic case studies 

Field visits 

Typology  of  operations  where  Member  States’  capabilities  are  involved  (e.g., 
Standing Corps, CSDP missions, etc.) 

Opinion-based indicators: 

Stakeholders’  opinion  on  the  impact  of  Member  States’  contributions  to  the 
Standing Corps to capabilities available for other needs 

123 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III.A EVALUATION OF THE EBCG REGULATION, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS  

This part of Annex III presents detailed answers to the evaluation (sub-)questions for each of the evaluation criteria. 

1.  Relevance 

EQ1. Relevance of scope and objectives: To what extent did the scope and objectives of the EBCG Regulation remain relevant 
to current and emerging needs and challenges over the implementation period?  
EQ1.1. To what extent are the scope and objectives of EBCG Regulation aligned with current needs and challenges in external 
border management and in implementing the EU return policy? 
EQ1.2.  To  what  extent  are  the  scope  and  objectives  of  EBCG  Regulation  adept  to  address  emerging  and  potential  future 
challenges and threats at the external borders and in the field of return? 
EQ1.3. Are there any gaps, in terms of remaining needs or challenges, which should be addressed/remain unaddressed by the 
EBCG Regulation? 

The EBCG Regulation  remains largely  relevant  for  responding to  the current  and  emerging  needs and challenges, particularly with 
regard to the tasks that are part of the core Frontex mandate, including external border management and return. Trends in the threats 
and  risks  of  irregular  migration  and  cross-border  criminal  activities  have  remained  high  since  2019  and  are  likely  to  continue, 
indicating that the Regulation and its broad objectives will remain relevant also in the future304. In 2019, a total number of 141 846 
detections of illegal border-crossing along the EU’s external borders was reported305. This number fell to around 124 000 in 2020306. A 
year later, in 2021, the total number of illegal border-crossing was just short of 200 000307 and has further increased to around 330 000 

304   Frontex (2022). ‘Strategic Risk Analysis’, p. 38. 
305   Frontex (2020). ‘2019 in brief’, p. 9. Available at: frontex_inbrief_website_002.pdf (europa.eu) 
306   Frontex  (2021).  ‘Irregular  migration  into  EU  last  year  lowest  since  2013  due  to  COVID-19’.  Available  at:  https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-

centre/news/news-release/irregular-migration-into-eu-last-year-lowest-since-2013-due-to-covid-19-j34zp2 

307   Frontex (2022). ‘EU’s external borders in 2021: Arrivals above pre-pandemic levels’. Available at: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-

release/eu-external-borders-in-2021-arrivals-above-pre-pandemic-levels-CxVMNN 

124 

 
 
 
 
in  2022308.  In  2023  a  17%  increase  has  been  reported  from  January  to  September  compared  to  the  same  period  of  last  year, 
corresponding to 279 350 irregular border crossing detected309. However, it is difficult to fully assess the extent to which the EBCG 
Regulation addresses needs and challenges in external border management, due to the ongoing status of its implementation.  

The scope of the EBCG Regulation encompasses the EBCG, comprising Frontex and the national authorities responsible for border 
management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks, and the national authorities responsible for 
return  activities  (Article  4).  However,  the  Regulation  largely  focuses  on  the  activities  and  governance  of  Frontex310  rather  than  the 
whole  EBCG,  since  Member  States  retain  primary  responsibility  for  the  management  of  their  external  borders  (Article  7).  This 
somewhat limits the scope of the EBCG Regulation and its relevance to the whole of the EBCG, creates a certain legal ambiguity and 
can impact the overall efficiency of the Regulation’s implementation. An example of this may be the EBCG Regulation’s focus on 
instituting a comprehensive framework for promoting and protecting the respect for fundamental rights in the management of the EU’s 
external  borders. While  the Regulation  introduces concrete  and detailed  measures for the Agency, stakeholders have noted that the 
Regulation fails to “sufficiently operationalise corresponding duties for Member States”, resulting in a divergence that has negative 
implications  on the  ability  to  guarantee  that  fundamental  rights  are  upheld  uniformly  across  European  border  management.  The  15 
components of the European Integrated Border Management (EIBM) (Article 3), which feature fundamental rights as one of the three 
overarching  components,  aim  to  mitigate  this  by  setting  out  thematic  and  overarching  policy  priorities  and  strategic  guidelines  to 
support the implementation of EIBM both by Frontex and Member States. 

Some  stakeholders  pointed  to  a  lack  of  clearly  defined  objectives  in  the  Regulation  that  they  see  as  a  weakness  in  relation  to  the 
achievement  of  the  Regulation’s  objectives311.  The  main  underlying  objective  of  the  Regulation  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
implementation of EIBM at national and Union level. By outlining the key components of EIBM, the Regulation sets the scope for the 
Agency’s activities (and thus helps to set objectives) in supporting the implementation of EIBM as a whole. However, this does not 

308   Frontex 

(2023). 

since  2016’.  Available 
https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-s-external-borders-in-2022-number-of-irregular-border-crossings-highest-since-2016-
YsAZ29  

in  2022:  Number  of 

crossings  highest 

external  borders 

irregular  border 

‘EU’s 

at: 

309   Frontex  (2023).  ‘Arrivals  in  the  Central  Mediterranean  slow  in  September’.  Available  at:  https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-

release/arrivals-in-the-central-mediterranean-slow-in-september-o9Qe64 

310   Interview with Frontex. 
311   Interviews with MB and Frontex. 

125 

 
 
 
 
provide a clear set of strategic objectives to guide the implementation of the Regulation. The policy priorities and strategic guidance 
for the EBCG come from the Multiannual Strategic Policy for EIBM (Article 8), which was established in March 2023312. It has just 
been translated into the new Technical and Operational Strategy by Frontex, adopted by its Management Board (MB) in September 
2023313, and Member States are yet to adjust their national strategies for EIBM to the new requirements. Therefore, it remains to be 
seen to which extent the Commission’s Communication is sufficient to provide a clearer set of objectives for the EBCG as a whole.  

The scope of responsibility of the Agency in respect of cross-border crime is limited but also leaves room for interpretation of what 
the  limits  of  Frontex’s  supporting  role  are.  The  Agency  provides  various  types  of  support  to  Member  States  at  border  checks314. 
Stakeholders  were  clear  that  the  Agency’s  mandate  does  not  include  ‘investigations’  or  ‘support  to  investigations  of  crime’,  which 
clearly fall within the remit of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), Eurojust and national law 
enforcement authorities. However, the lack of a definition of the operational assistance activities linked to ‘detection, prevention, and 
combating’ cross-border crime leaves  room for various interpretations to the Member States and to Frontex with a clear risk of the 
Agency getting involved in operational activities falling outside of the scope of the Treaty provisions that form the legal bases of the 
Regulation.  

While no gaps  have been identified in  the Regulation that would negatively  impact  its relevance to  address  emerging  and potential 
future challenges at the external borders, its future relevance can only be conclusively assessed once it is implemented in its entirety. 

EQ2. To what extent have the EBCG and in particular Frontex activities (Art. 10 of the EBCG Regulation) been relevant in 
addressing  the  needs/challenges  presented  at  the  EU  external  borders?  Are  they  still  relevant  in  view  of  current  needs  and 
challenges and have the needs and challenges evolved over time?  
EQ2.1. To what extent have the EBCG and in particular Frontex activities been relevant in addressing the needs/challenges 
presented at the EU external borders and in the field of return?  

312   European  Commission  (2023).  ‘Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  establishing  the  multiannual  strategic 

policy for European integrated border management’. COM(2023) 146 final. 

313   Management Board Decision 30/2023 of 20 September 2023 adopting the Technical and Operational Strategy for European Integrated Border Management 

2023-2027. 

314   Interviews during site visits and with Frontex.  

126 

 
 
 
 
EQ2.2. Are the activities of EBCG and in particular Frontex still relevant in view of current needs and challenges? 
EQ.2.3. To what extent and how have the needs and challenges evolved over time? 

Frontex’s activities remain relevant in addressing the needs and challenges present at EU external borders.  

Frontex  provided  extensive  operational  assistance  to  Member  States  through  joint  operations  (JOs)  and  rapid  border  interventions 
(RBIs), including technical and operational assistance to support Search and Rescue (SAR) operations. Through its maritime, land and 
air operations, Frontex assists with the management of EU’s external borders, including border surveillance and border management. 
With high levels of irregular migration and persistent threat of trafficking in human beings into the EU, operations have been highly 
relevant to needs, enabling Member States facing migratory flows to draw on additional human resources and technical equipment, 
and facilitating the standardisation of procedures and harmonisation of operational implementation of good practices at EU level.  

The  deployment  of  the  SC  has  corresponded  to  irregular  migration  pressures  on  migratory  routes.  Member  States  on  the 
Central/Western  Mediterranean  and  Eastern  Borders  and  Western  Balkans  migratory  routes  have  received  the  highest  proportional 
increase of human resources deployed. Member States on the Eastern Mediterranean route have also seen an increase  – albeit more 
limited – in deployments. 

Although the deployment of the SC has been relevant to migration and return management, their ability to provide relevant support to 
Member States has been hindered by practical, organisational and legislative limitations. 

An effective and humane return policy is an integral part of the EU migration and asylum policy. According to the data provided by 
Member States to Eurostat, in 2022315, over 430 000 third-country nationals were ordered to leave the EU because they have no legal 
right to  stay in the EU316. In this  context, Frontex’s assistance to  Member  States in  implementing returns of illegally staying third-
country nationals who are subject of an enforceable return decision is highly relevant.  

315   Eurostat: Third country nationals ordered to leave – annual data (rounded). 
316   See: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/irregular-migration-and-return/return-and-readmission_en  

127 

 
 
 
 
On  situational  awareness,  Frontex  produces  a  significant  volume  of  quality  risk  analysis  products  designed  for  use  in  the  Member 
States  and  contributes  to  EU  mechanisms  such  as  the  Migration  Preparedness  and  Crisis  Blueprint  and  the  Integrated  Political  Crisis 
Response (IPCR). Vulnerability assessments have proved relevant to Member States in promoting awareness of capability limitations 
and  enabling  an  appropriate  reaction  mechanism  through  the  form  of  simulation  exercises  and  the  Executive  Director  (ED) 
recommendations.  

The  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  that  the  implementation  of  the  EUROSUR  framework  has  been  effective  in  terms  of 
information  exchange  to  improve  situational  awareness317.  However,  only  a  minority  believe  that  the  information  requested  in 
EUROSUR  is  relevant  to  improving  detection,  prevention  and  combating  of  irregular  immigration  and  cross-border  crime,  or 
contributing to the protection and life-saving of migrants318, with almost half of the respondents neither agreeing or disagreeing with 
the statement, or providing no answer319.  

A great majority of Member States believe that the training component of Frontex’s mandate is relevant in addressing their needs and 
challenges320.  However,  Member  States  would  prefer  more  specialised  training  on  topics  that  are  relevant  to  addressing  current 
challenges, such as the use of EUROSUR, risk analysis and advanced level document inspection, for either Category 2 or 3 SC staff or 
for Member States themselves.  

Frontex  has  undertaken  significant  effort  to  provide  human  and  technical  resources  to  facilitate  Member  States’  tackling  migratory 
challenges  or  challenges  related  to  cross-border  criminal  activity.  The  availability  of  certain  profiles  and  types  of  equipment  is 
insufficient, which might mean that Member States have certain needs that cannot currently be met. It is unclear how maritime border 
management  capabilities  will  be  developed.  The  present  training  and  acquisition  strategies  are  geared  towards  land  and  air  border 
capabilities, while the needs for maritime border management are much greater in terms of financial and human resources. 

317   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 17/27.   
318   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 6/27.  
319   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 11/27.  
320   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 15/27 agreed, 7/27 strongly agreed. 

128 

 
 
 
 
Frontex’s work in the external dimension is relevant in helping to implement the four-tier-access control model of EIBM. The four-tier 
model includes measures in third countries – especially countries of origin and transit of irregular migration (first tier) and measures 
with neighbouring countries (second tier). Frontex has also continued to build partnerships and synergies with relevant international 
organisations. 

EQ.3.  How  did  Member  States  make  use  of  Frontex  in  the  protection  of  EU  external  borders  and  migration  management 
through: 
EQ3.1. Joint Operations and rapid border interventions 

During the evaluation period, Frontex provided extensive technical and operational assistance to Member States. Frontex’s operational 
support was mainly in terms of border surveillance and border checks activities via JOs at the external borders. The majority of JOs 
and RBIs focused on the land and sea external borders under significant migratory pressure. Other types of operational activities are 
carried out through focal points established at key border crossing points.   

Almost 80% of Frontex’s JOs budget is devoted to operations at sea on important irregular migration routes to the EU. The main focus 
of  maritime  operations  is  border  surveillance,  although  other  key  activities  are  often  carried  out,  including  border  checks.  Frontex 
allocates most of the remaining 20% of its JOs’ budget to establishing focal points at airports and land borders.  

While most of the operational  budget  is  spent  at  the maritime  external  borders  – the  cost  of deploying  sea vessels, helicopters and 
surveillance planes is high – patrol cars, drones and thermal imaging vehicles at land borders are also perceived as highly relevant. 
JOs  Focal  Points  Air,  Land  and  Sea  are  an  important  platform  for  the  deployment  of  first-line  and  second-line  experts  (document 
experts, debriefers, intelligence officers, etc.) at  border crossing points along  the external  land and sea borders and in  the main EU 
airports,  where  they  assist/reinforce  the  detection  of  cross-border  crime.  At  key  border  crossing  points,  the  Focal  Point  concept 
functions throughout the year. Focal Points also host common actions and operations initiated by other law enforcement agencies (e.g. 
Europol).  

129 

 
 
 
Most  Member  States  surveyed  participated  in  JOs321,  with  about  half  participating  in  operational  activities  to  fight  cross-border 
crime322 and document fraud323. 

During the evaluation period, two RBIs interventions were initiated by Greece and one in Lithuania in response to the Belarus crisis 
(in 2021). Greece and Lithuania valued the support received, but Lithuania reported that significantly more resources were received 
than  requested,  which  presented  challenges.  In  Romania,  at  the  beginning  of  Russia’s  full-scale  invasion  of  Ukraine  in  2022,  local 
authorities preferred to supplement the resources for an ongoing operation (JO Terra) rather than initiate and manage an RBI. This is 
because  an  RBI  requires  lists  of  needs  (profiles  and  types  of  equipment),  new  budgets,  identification  of  additional  human  and 
technical resources by all contributing Member States, and solutions for complex logistical problems in a very short timeframe. Local 
authorities preferred to receive additional resources more flexibly under the umbrella of regional Frontex JO. 

Operation 
Total  number  of  joint 
operations 
Air,  land  and  maritime 
operations 
Land joint operations 
Maritime 
operations 

joint 

Table 1: Frontex joint operations carried out in the period 2020-2023 

2020 
15 operations 

2021 
19 operations 

2022 
20 operations 

2023324 
24 operations 

1 operation 

1 operation 

1 operation 

1 operation 

3 operations 
8 operations 

5 operations 
11 operations 

5 operations 
13 operations 

9 operations 
13 operations 

321   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 22/27. 
322   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 15/27. 
323   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 14/27. 
324   Number of operations for 2023 cover the period from 1 January 2023 to 12 September 2023. 

130 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Air joint operations 
Total  number  of  rapid 
border interventions 
Source: Frontex CAARs (2020-2022) 

1 operation 
2 (Greece-Turkey) 

EQ3.2. Joint Return Operations 

1 operation 
1 (Lithuania – Belarus) 

1 operation 

1 operation 

-  

- 

Frontex  is  responsible  for  coordinating  return  operations  at  a  technical  and  operational  level,  including  voluntary  returns.  In  2022, 
Frontex recorded an increase of 36% in the total number of persons returned (compared to 2021), with a steady increase in the share of 
voluntary returns.  

Stakeholders at  the EU and national  level  valued Frontex’s operational  and technical  assistance  in  return, particularly  in  organising 
return operations and other return-related activities. At least 55% of Member States surveyed did not encounter any challenges when 
cooperating with Frontex in the different stages of the return process. 

Some Member States325 particularly valued Frontex’s assistance in organising charter flights, which are considered a safer option to 
return violent and difficult cases. Two Member States with small caseloads commented that Joint Return Operations (JROs) provide 
an opportunity to return the most difficult cases in a more controlled environment, which would be very inefficient in national return 
operations. Efforts were made to use scheduled flights for cases that could reasonably be returned that way.  

Challenges  included  last-minute  cancellations  of  JROs,  which  typically  reflected  issues  such  as  last-minute  submission  of  asylum 
applications or difficulties in cooperation between the organising Member State and the third country of destination.  

EQ3.3. Risk Analysis 

325   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 3/27. 

131 

 
 
 
 
The Agency’s risk analysis products are well received at  strategic level, but lack of access to  certain intelligence information limits 
their use at operational level326. These products, especially annual and strategic risk analysis reports327, are primarily used by Member 
States to feed information into their own national-level analyses328.  

A  minority  of  Member  States  have  reported,  to  some  extent,  using  Frontex’s  risk  analysis  products  directly  for  their  operational 
planning329,330. However, it is not clear that the relevance and/or usefulness of Frontex’s risk analysis products is sufficient to support 
the operational planning of a majority of Member State331 information, which is not typically shared with Frontex by Member States.  

Another shortcoming identified by a minority of Member States was the lack of regional or locally specific analysis332. Others found 
the strategic analysis helpful, but felt there was not sufficient analysis linked to the JOs333. Risk analysis on specific Member States 
may overlap with national risk analyses, adding limited value to the Member States in question, which is already aware of the level of 
risk at its own external borders334. Timeliness of reporting may also limit Member States’ ability to use Frontex’s risk analysis in their 
operational planning, with quarterly reports sometimes issued with two-month delays, ‘way too late’ for operational planning335. 

EQ.4.  How  is  the  upgrade  of  the  communication  network  (Article  14)  up  to  CONFIDENTIAL  UE/EU  CONFIDENTIAL 
relevant for the functioning of the EBCG and its operational needs, including the exchange of information in EUROSUR? 

326   Interviews during two site visits. 
327   Interviews with two MS/SAC. 
328   The ECA (2021) report revealed similar results: 95% of the 20 MS/SAC surveyed reported that their national risk analyses were informed by Frontex’s risk 

analysis.  

329   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 5/26. 
330   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 12/27 agreed; 9/27 neither agreed nor disagreed, 4/27 disagreed.   
331   Criminal intelligence (from various sources), as well as military and civilian intelligence agencies, with operations in third countries bordering EU, provide 

Member State authorities with useful information on risks and threats.  

332   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 5/27. 
333   Interviews during two site visits. 
334   Interview with one MS. 
335   Interview with one MS.  

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Although  the  Regulation  foresees  an  upgrade  of  the  EUROSUR  communication  network  to  CONFIDENTIEL  UE/EU 
CONFIDENTIAL, this has not been implemented. The formal reason is that Frontex facilities do not meet the requirements for such 
an upgrade, but nor have the purpose and added value of the upgrade been clearly defined. 

Frontex pointed out the considerable cost of upgrading the communication network, with little added value in terms of the additional 
information that could be shared via EUROSUR336. The data in EUROSUR do not require EU confidential classification level, and 
there  would  be  extensive  costs  to  set  up  the  technical  infrastructure  for  the  secure  network.  This  would  include  a  data  center  with 
Faraday  cage,  secure  areas,  network  segregations,  and  certified  network  equipment.  Frontex  concluded  that  it  ‘is  challenging  to 
identify a real business need to have a secure network up to CONFIDENTIEL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL classification level’337. Some 
Frontex stakeholders highlighted that upgrading to this higher level would have similar financial costs but could have higher added 
value338. 

Similarly, when asked whether they believe that the upgrade of EUROSUR to CONFIDENTIAL UE/EU CONFIDENTIAL will allow 
them to share and input additional information and improve the European situational picture, around half of the responding Member 
States were not in favour339, stating that this would have limited benefit because other networks allow such information to be shared. 
Critics of the idea highlighted that: 1) higher classification will not actually allow them to share additional information340; 2) could 
further  limit  access  to  EUROSUR  data341;  3)  cost  of  the  upgrade342.  A  minority  of  Member  States  see  a  potential  advantage  in 
upgrading  the  communication  network,  as  this  could  help  to  improve  information  sharing343  and  would  improve  the  European 
situational picture344. The only type of information specifically identified, which is classified and would add value to the situational 

336   Scoping interview; interview with Frontex. 
337   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
338   Scoping interview; interview with Frontex. 
339   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27 shared a negative opinion. 
340   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
341   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27. 
342   Survey of MS/SAC authorities, 2/27.  
343   Survey of MS/SAC authorities, 2/27. 
344   Survey of MS/SAC authorities, 3/27.  

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picture, includes the location of military assets involved in operations where joint operations take place, such as the Aegean or Central 
Mediterranean345. 

is  currently  considering  alternative 

Frontex 
CONFIDENTIAL level, as required by the EBCG Regulation.  

technical  solutions 

to  enable  communication  at  CONFIDENTIEL  UE/EU 

When it comes to the processing of the EU classified information (EUCI) and sensitive non-classified information (SNCI), specific 
rules should be provided in the security rules of the Agency, subject to the prior approval by the Commission and adopted by the MB 
in  accordance  with  Article  92  and  100(2)(ac)  of  the  Regulation.  There  appears  to  be  some  divergence  between  Article  92  of  the 
Regulation which covers a broader spectrum of security-related aspects of the functioning of the Agency than what is provided for in 
Article 100(2)(ac) which is  limited to  the processing of EUCI  and SNCI only.  This  issue, however, has been successfully resolved 
during the implementation process through the adoption of the security rules of the Agency of 30 July 2022346. 

2. Effectiveness  

EQ5. How and to what extent did Frontex meet its core objectives and priorities as set out in the EBCG Regulation? How has 
the EBCG as a whole and in particular the Agency progressed and achieved results with respect to each specific component of 
the European integrated border management?  
EQ 5.1 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States in protecting and managing EU external borders through 
operational activities? 

Frontex reports the results of operational activities involving both its co-financed assets and host Member States’ assets. Therefore, it 
is not possible to attribute results solely to Frontex’s contribution. Stakeholders at EU level and Member States agreed that despite a 
volatile  and  unpredictable  environment,  Frontex  maintained  its  footprint  in  JOs,  including  an  exponential  increase  in  operational 
results in 2022. 

345   Interview with Frontex; interview during one site visit; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 7/27 shared a positive opinion. 
346   Management Board Decision 45/2022 of 30 July 2022 adopting Security Rules of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 

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Overall,  Frontex’s  operational  support  is  valued  by  Member  States  and  has  contributed  to  managing  the  migratory  pressures  and 
protecting and managing EU external  borders. Frontex adds value to Member States by providing human resources and equipment, 
standardising  procedures,  and  harmonising  operational  implementation  of  good  practices  at  EU  level.  While  at  least  30%  of  the 
Member  States  surveyed  did  not  experience  any  issues  during  Frontex  operations,  those  that  have  experienced  difficulties  reported 
issues  related  to  planning  of  operations,  command-and-control,  language,  availability  of  SC  profiles,  different  work  practices  and 
work rules, and sharing/access to information. Some of the factors hampering the effectiveness of Frontex support to Member States 
in protecting and managing EU external borders through operational activities are further elaborated in the response to EQ 6. 

EQ 5.2 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States through all phases of return procedures? 

Overall, Frontex has become an essential actor in the common EU system for return, taking on new responsibilities in the return of 
migrants. Frontex offers support to Member States in all phases of the return process – from pre-return and identification missions to 
post-return, including  reintegration. The majority of respondents  did  not  face any challenges when cooperating with  Frontex in  the 
different stages of the return process. They have reported positive cooperation with Frontex in the field of returns and noted indirect 
benefits, such as time savings and reduced administrative burden347, financial savings348, swifter execution of returns349 and reducing 
secondary movements. 

Pre-return  assistance  was  valued  by  Member  States,  with  reports  of  good  experiences  with  European  Return  Liaison  Officers 
(EURLOs),  who  helped  with  re-documentation  and  facilitated  return  operations.  Particular  added  value  was  reported  by  Member 
States without representation in the third country.  

The provision of technical expertise and assistance is one of the key areas where Member States enjoyed support from Frontex. The 
deployment  of  Frontex  Return  Escort  and  Support  Officers  (FRESOs)  was  valued  by  several  countries.  Frontex  support  with 

347   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 9/27. 
348   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 10/27. 
349   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 9/27. 

135 

 
 
 
 
 
identification missions was also highlighted. With small caseloads to many third countries, it is seen as more cost-effective and less of 
an administrative burden to join an identification mission with another Member State.  

The EBCG Regulation extended the Agency’s mandate to include the possibility to provide assistance with voluntary returns. Since 
then, the Agency has enhanced its tailored support for this type of return. Voluntary returns made up 40% of all returns in 2022 - a 
significant share of Frontex’s returns350. A majority of Member States surveyed did not experience any issues in the Agency’s support 
to voluntary returns and departures.  

However,  several  factors  hindered  its  effectiveness  in  return  operations  and  return-related  activities.  Some  of  the  provisions  in  the 
EBCG  Regulation  do  not  reflect  the  operational  reality,  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not  recognise  the  interdependence  of  border 
management  and  return  in  the  migration  management  process,  it  is  not  always  clear  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  if  ‘returns’  are 
considered part of border management. This creates uncertainty as regards the application of some provisions, such as ‘contingency 
planning’ (Article 9(4)).  

A  related  aspect  is  the  lack  of  a  specific  governance  framework  for  the  area  of  return.  While  the  EBCG  Regulation  extended  the 
Agency’s  return  mandate,  the  governance  structure  of  Frontex  has  remained  unchanged  so  far.  Stakeholders  at  EU  level,  including 
Frontex, commented that competences in the area of return are typically scattered across different institutions in the Member States 
and there is  no single interlocutor, creating communication difficulties. Member States also  have different  models of implementing 
returns,  which  hinders  operational  cooperation.  Currently,  the  National  Focal  Point  of  Contact  (NFPOC)  is  responsible  for  such 
communication;  however,  the  case  study  in  Bulgaria  shows  that  lack  of  clear  division  of  responsibilities  and  overlapping 
responsibilities  in  the  area  of  return  between  authorities  hosting  the  NFPOC,  and  other  competent  authorities  may  create 
inefficiencies.  

On  return  interventions,  Article  52  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  envisages  that  Frontex  will  carry  out  return  interventions,  providing 
Member States with enhanced technical and operational assistance, and Article 2(28) defines ‘return intervention’ as ‘deployment of 
return  teams  and  organisation  of  return  operations’.  In  Article  53(1),  the  drafting  (‘may’  clause)  to  some  extent  contradicts  this 

350   Frontex Consolidated Annual Activity Reports (2019-2022). 

136 

 
 
 
 
definition. The concept does not cover the whole range of activities that the Agency can deliver to support Member States. To date, no 
Member State has requested a return intervention from Frontex. However, Frontex provides support by deploying SC return specialists 
and FRESOs in a more predictable and long-term manner. 

EQ 5.3 How and to what extent did Frontex reduce vulnerabilities at external borders through improved situational awareness 
(including extent to which risk analysis contributed to the improvement of situational awareness)? 

Frontex has been able to contribute to improved situational awareness at external borders through its products, including risk analysis, 
vulnerability  assessments  and  24/7  situational  monitoring.  A  majority  of  respondents  to  the  Member  State  survey  declared  that 
Frontex’s activities contribute to comprehensive situational awareness and building a situational picture through 24/7 (near) real-time 
situation pictures, crisis monitoring and surveillance351. 

The EBCG Regulation ‘reinforces significantly the analytical products focusing more than ever on prediction and prevention’352 and 
risk analysis remains one of Frontex’s highest-value activities. The risk analysis products generated by Frontex generally perform well 
across  a  number  of  key  qualitative  metrics.  The  Risk  Analysis  Unit  produced  over  1,200  regular  risk  analysis  products  in  2022, 
excluding  weekly  and  monthly  risk  analysis  reports  on  joint  operations.  Recent  technological  developments  (e.g.  new  IT,  use  of 
business  applications)  and  increased  cooperation  with  European  Maritime  Safety  Agency  (EMSA)  and  European  Fisheries  Control 
Agency (EFCA) have also improved risk assessment and directly impacted the preparedness of Member States353. Cooperation with 
the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen) also improved Frontex’s ability to keep its risk analyses up to date354. 

Vulnerability assessments are a useful tool in allowing Frontex to monitor potential vulnerabilities at EU’s external borders, and to 
work  with  Member  States  to  reduce  those  vulnerabilities.  Additional  synergies  with  the  complementary  Schengen  evaluation 
mechanism contribute to added coherence. The European Commission and Frontex have worked together to ensure better synergies 

351   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27. 
352  Frontex (2022). ‘Single Programming Document 2022-2024’, p. 18. 
353   Interview with Frontex. 
354   Interview with SatCen. 

137 

 
 
 
 
between the two mechanisms and report improvements in this regard. Nevertheless, some Member States still see these mechanisms as 
overlapping355. 

A  majority  of  Member  States  respondents  believe  that  Frontex’s  vulnerability  assessment  activities  help  to  assess  Member  States’ 
readiness and  capacity to face  challenges at external  borders  and  are conducive to  better preparedness356. The assessments  are also 
seen as helpful in the context of the Schengen evaluations357. 

Nevertheless, several elements impact its ability to provide up-to-date and comprehensive situational monitoring. This stems in part 
from limitations in the EBCG Regulation related to processing of personal data by Frontex (including in the context of EUROSUR 
and for risk analysis purposes) and is partially due to certain implementation issues (including incomplete reporting by Member States 
in the context of EUROSUR and delays in Frontex providing risk analysis products in all four-tiers of EIBM). 

The extent to which the Agency’s ability to deliver risk analysis might be limited is to a certain degree affected by the existing rules 
on processing of personal data as well as by limits on collection of potentially useful information from different types of open sources 
(such  as  Social  Networks).  The  objectives  of  the  return-related  risk  analysis  are  not  clear  (data  to  produce  such  analysis  is  largely 
unavailable  from  Member  States  or  is  gathered  at  disproportionate  costs  in  comparison  with  the  benefits).  As  further  elaborated  in 
response to EQ 9, Frontex risk analysis is also incomplete when considering the full scope of EIBM, as pre-frontier and third-country 
analyses is insufficient. 

The  lack  of  access  to  intelligence  information  is  also  one  possible  impediment  to  producing  actionable  and  operationally  relevant 
information, particularly with respect to the pre-frontier situational picture. Data made available from the EEAS’ EU intelligence and 
Situation Centre (Intelligence Analysis and Reporting) is not available to the Frontex Situation Centre (despite being available to all 
Member States’ Ministries of the Interior). Member States rarely share intelligence data with Frontex and, if they do so at all, it is on a 
bilateral basis358.  

355   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 8/27; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27. 
356   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 14/27. 
357   Interviews with DG HOME and Frontex. 
358   Interview with Frontex. 

138 

 
 
 
 
Another  aspect  that  continues  to  undermine  the  overall  EU  situational  awareness  is  the  reporting  linked  to  interception  of  migrant 
movements  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  authorities  responsible  for  border  management359.  In  a  number  of  Member  States,  the 
movements of irregular migrants are established not within the border zone, but after they have moved further into the Member States 
(whether  arriving  by  sea  or  land).  Data  on  such  incidents  remains  outside  the  view  of  Frontex.  For  instance,  one  Member  State 
reported  that  situational  monitoring  comprises  both  interceptions  in  border  areas,  as  well  as  by  police  within  the  country. 
Consequently, in recent years, about 80% of irregular migrants (entered into Eurodac) are identified from inside the country360. 

A  number  of  implementation  issues  have  also  been  identified,  including  incomplete  reporting  by  Member  States  in  the  context  of 
EUROSUR and delays in Frontex providing risk analysis products in all four-tiers of EIBM, due to methodological and data issues, 
especially  in  relation  to  return  and  third-country  data.  Consequently,  analytical  products  are  not  always  sufficiently  tailored  to 
Member States’ operational needs or, as is the case with risk analysis, do not contain actionable information. 

When it comes to vulnerability assessment, Member States pointed to several issues in the vulnerability assessment process. A small 
group expressed concern that vulnerability assessment data collection is highly cumbersome and places a heavy administrative burden 
on  their  authorities361.  This  administrative  pressure  is  compounded  by  a  ‘highly  inefficient  IT  platform’,  with  restrictive  access, 
recurring  technical  errors  and  lost  data,  reducing  the  added  value  of  the  annual  baseline  vulnerability  assessment.  Nevertheless, 
Member States recognise the relative recency of the vulnerability assessment system, and Frontex has reported an ongoing upgrade to 
the Vulnerability Assessment Platform to deal with this problem362.  

The  analysis  also  found  that,  while  the  data  collections  for  risk  analysis  and  vulnerability  assessment  should  be  coherent  with  one 
another, the processes within Frontex are not sufficiently interlinked. One issue is that vulnerability assessment data are not fully used 
in risk analysis products. This discrepancy is due to a certain level of conceptual misalignment between methodologies. The core of 
the  problem,  as  identified  by  Frontex  and  Member  States,  is  that  the  definition  of  vulnerability  in  the  Common  Integrated  Risk 

359   Interviews with Frontex. 
360   Site visit in one MS. Based on Ministry of the Interior migration statistics.  

361   Interviews with MS/SAC: 6/27; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 3/27. 
362   Frontex (2022). ‘Single Programming Document 2023-2025’, p. 41. 

139 

 
 
 
 
 
Analysis  Model  (CIRAM)  does  not  match  the  definition  of  vulnerability  in  the  Common  Vulnerability  Assessment  Methodology 
(CVAM).  For  Member  States,  vulnerability  assessments  are  a  concrete,  quantitative  and  capacity-based  system  with  measurable 
outcomes. Conversely, the conceptualisation of vulnerability in CIRAM includes ‘pull factors’, reflecting broader factors influencing 
the arrival of migratory flows from outside of the EU.  

In  addition,  the  level  of  confidentiality  of  vulnerability  assessment  data  means  that  it  is  harder  to  access  this  information  for  risk 
analysis.  While  the  purpose  of  vulnerability  assessments  is  to  allow  Member  States  to  address  their  own  specific  weaknesses,  risk 
analysis can take a more overarching and EU-wide approach, with an associated lower level of sensitivity. Frontex also has separate 
systems for producing risk analyses and vulnerability assessments, which impacts their coherence. 

Finally, one weakness of vulnerability assessments, that significantly limits their effectiveness, is the lengthy and indirect enforcement 
system  established by the EBCG Regulation.  The ‘escalation  procedure’  in  Article 33(9)-(10) does not  appear to  be commensurate 
with  the  gravity  of  the  vulnerabilities  identified  by  the  Agency  at  the  EU’s  external  borders,  but  even  within  the  existing  legal 
framework, the MB does not follow up on the ED’s recommendations in a timely manner.  

EQ 5.4 How and to what extent did Frontex support Member States through capacity building activities? 

The Agency expanded its capability development  activities over the course of 2020-2023. Frontex implemented a range of training 
activities  for  Member  States  and  third  countries.  Most  targets  for  training  activities  were  met  across  2020-2022.  While  precise 
assessment of the training activities is not yet available, in 2023, Frontex continued to provide training as a cross-sectoral horizontal 
task.  For  2023,  Frontex  planned  to  deliver  a  number  of  dedicated  training  for  the  SC  (at  both  basic  and  specialised  levels  as 
appropriate), for border management and return, addressing specific operational elements relevant to their tasks and responsibilities 
and  raising  necessary  awareness  on  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights.  For  example,  Frontex  remains  committed  to  maintaining  the 
highest  standards  of  training  for  Category  1  officers  and  as  part  of  this  commitment,  for  example,  an  annual  ongoing  training 
programme on use of force has been implemented progressively to provide Category 1 officers with the essential skills and knowledge 
regarding  the  use  of  force363.  One  of  the  defined  objectives  withing  the  training  activities  for  2023  was  also  to  strengthen  EBCG 

363   Quarterly Report on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s Capabilities, Q2/2023. 

140 

 
 
 
 
capacities with specialised training courses and products in IBM related areas, supporting the implementation of Frontex mandate. The 
programming  for  2023  also  foresees  development  and  implementation  of  common  educational  standards,  effective  training 
methodologies and quality assurance system364. 

Although Frontex successfully delivered assistance, including by establishing common training standards, almost half of the Member 
States noted the lack of training for either Category 2 or 3 staff, or for Member States. 

The  Regulation  requires  that  capability  development  is  guided  by  the  Agency’s  multiannual  planning  of  resources  and  national 
capability development plans, leading to a capability roadmap. All but one national capability development plan have been finalised, 
following  the  adoption  of  the  Methodology  and  Procedure  for  Establishing  National  Capability  Development  Plans  through  MB 
Decision 2/2021 in 2021 (Article 9(6))365. However, the latter document does not detail how to assess and present capabilities, which 
may have contributed to the late submission of the plans by a number of Member States and could complicate the establishment of the 
Agency’s capability roadmap. However, as the roadmap is work in progress, the actual impacts can only be assessed at a later stage.  

The multiannual strategy for the acquisition of the Agency’s equipment366 was adopted by the Agency‘s MB in September 2023. As a 
result, integrated planning (Article 9) could not be fully implemented yet  and there were no well-defined short, medium,  and long-
term acquisition needs within Frontex or the EBCG as a whole, nor a strategic direction and vision for the long-term development of 
the  capabilities  of  the  Agency.  This  impacted  the  efficiency  of  acquisition  within  Frontex,  which  in  turn  impacted  the  Technical 
Equipment Pool (TEP). For example, the acquisition of various items was delayed, forcing the Agency to rely on options that proved 
inefficient, at least initially, such as renting vehicles367. Given that the EBCG Regulation focuses on Frontex’s technical equipment as 
the backbone of EU’s border management, this presents a significant problem. 

364   Management Board Decision 13/2022 of 16 March 2022 on adopting the preliminary Annual Work Programme for 2023 and the final draft estimates of the 

Agency's revenue and expenditure, including the draft Establishment Plan for 2023 (as part of it). 

365   Management Board Decision 2/2021 of 15 January 2021 adopting the methodology and the procedure for establishing the national capability development    

plans. 

366   Adopted on 15 September 2023 by the Agency’s Management Board. 
367   Field visit to Frontex headquarters; interview with Frontex; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 

141 

 
 
 
 
Nevertheless,  the  TEP  grew  from  1  245  items  in  2020  to  3  623  items  in  July  2023.  Frontex  also  deployed  major  equipment,  light 
equipment  and  portable  equipment  to  existing  JOs  in  response  to  the  full-scale  invasion  of  Ukraine  by  the  Russian  Federation.  In 
2020-2023, Frontex supported capability-building through TEP. Activities included the management and coordination of the pool, as 
well as the provision of operational, logistical and technical support and expertise. The TEP includes major equipment (ME)368, light 
equipment  (LE),  and  portable  equipment  (PE).  Each  year,  the  MB  decides  on  a  minimum  number  of  items  of  technical  equipment 
(MNITE) needed for the TEP to respond to the needs of the Agency in the following year. Equipment is (co-)owned by the Member 
States or by the Agency. The TEP also includes the Rapid Reaction Equipment Pool (RREP) and the equipment made available by the 
Member States and Frontex, services contracted by the Agency, technical equipment co-financed from the ISF Specific Actions fund, 
and technical equipment made available by host Member States. 

Frontex  provided  a  significant  amount  of  PE  (as  well  as  other  equipment  for  the  SC)369.  The  provision  of  technical  resources  was 
somewhat effective in maintaining and raising the level of cooperation at strategic and operational level among Member States, and 
with the assistance of Frontex.  

In  2020-2023,  Frontex  supported  capability-building  in  research  and  innovation  by  promoting  and  delivering  standardisation  and 
harmonisation  of  border  management  capabilities,  promoting  and  delivering  innovation  in  border  management  capabilities,  and 
executing and supporting research370. In its multiannual programming documents, the Agency set out relevant key activities, linked to 
expected  results  and  indicators.  Essentially,  these  activities  amounted  to  several  main  areas  of  support,  assisting  Member  States, 
building EBCG capability, and responding to specific needs:  

•  Technical standards for the equipment to be included in the capability pools and to be deployed in the activities of the Agency; 
•  A comprehensive research and innovation platform to enable research and facilitate the dissemination of research information; 

368   Regulation (EU) 2021/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing, as part of the Integrated Border Management Fund, 
the  Instrument  for  Financial  Support  for  Border  Management  and  Visa  Policy  refers  to  ‘large-scale  operating  equipment  for  border  management  […] 
purchased by the Member States’ (‘that shall be registered in the technical equipment pool’) (Article 13(14(b)). 

369   Management Board Decision 57/2022 of 29 October 2022 adopting the Annual Implementation Report 2021; Frontex (2023). ‘Draft Annual Implementation  

Report 2022’. 

370   Frontex (2023). ‘Research and Innovation’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/innovation/research-and-innovation/research-and-innovation-at-frontex/   

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•  Assisting  the  Commission  in  implementing  EU-funded  border  management  research  through  the  development  of  the  Senior 

User role of Frontex in selected topics of EU Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation;  

•  Piloting  border  management-related  technological  solutions  and  research  findings  fostering  further  development  of  EBCG 

capabilities. 

EQ  5.5  How  and  to  what  extent  did  Frontex  implement  horizontal  activities  (education  &  training;  research  &  innovation; 
fundamental rights) through intra-agency and inter-agency cooperation?  

As part of its synergies with EU partners externally371, Frontex specifies cooperation372 with eight EU agencies373. That cooperation 
also supports the implementation of horizontal components of EIBM, including on fundamental rights (together with FRA), research 
and  innovation  (Europol,  European  Union  Agency  for  the  Operational  Management  of  Large-Scale  IT  Systems  in  the  Area  of 
Freedom  Security  and Justice (eu-LISA), SatCen, etc.),  and education and training (European Union  Agency for Law Enforcement 
Training (CEPOL), European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), EMSA, EFCA, etc.). Joint activities are carried out under the EU 
Agencies  Network  (EUAN),  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Agencies’  Network  (JHAAN),  and  the  EU  Innovation  Hub  for  Internal 
Security, where Frontex is an active member, contributing to the Networks’ activities and meetings.  

Progress in research and innovation activities accelerated in 2021 and 2022. Frontex was able to meet most of the 2021 and 2022 goals 
of its research and innovation activities from the development of minimum requirements for equipment, the organisation of industry 
days  and  conferences  and  the  delivery  of  studies  and  guidelines/handbooks,  to  the  development  of  the  Research  for  Innovation 
Network,  assistance  to  the  Commission  on  selected  Horizon  topics  (research  proposals  and  progress  review),  and  work  under 
Innovation  Cells,  among  others.  Importantly,  technical  standards  were  developed  in  2020  (minimum  requirements  for  aerial  and 
terrestrial  equipment)  and  released  in  2021  through  MB  Decision  51/2021  (technical  standards  for  maritime  equipment,  technical 
standards  for  aerial  equipment,  technical  standards  for  land  border  surveillance  equipment,  and  technical  standards  for  document 
inspection  equipment)  in  cooperation  with  Member  States  and  the  Commission374.  In  2022,  a  methodology  for  the  development  of 

371   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’.  
372   Frontex (2023). ‘EU partners’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/we-build/eu-partners/eu-agencies/e  
373   CEPOL, EFCA, EMSA, EUAA, eu-LISA, European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), Europol, and FRA. 
374   Management Board Decision 51/2021 of 21 September 2021 adopting technical standards for the equipment to be deployed in Frontex activities. 

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technical  standards  was  adopted  through  MB  Decision  36/2022375.  Frontex  provided  support  to  the  development  of  Common 
Minimum  Surveillance  Standards  for  Land  Borders  and  Common  Minimum  Surveillance  Standards  for  Maritime  Borders,  and 
completed the maintenance process for the standards adopted in 2021. Many activities are still ongoing in 2023 (e.g. the development 
of a knowledge platform with information on the new border checks procedures, EES support package, common minimum standards 
for border surveillance, Research Study on High Altitude Pseudo Satellites, Border Checks and Migration Management Equipment: 
solutions for Interoperability, etc.)376. 

The  Agency  continues  to  provide  training  on  relevant  fundamental  rights  standards  and  practices.  The  Fundamental  Rights  Officer 
(FRO)  cooperated  with  the  Training  Unit  of  the  Agency  to  include  fundamental  rights  aspects  in  various  training  sessions  (basic 
training  following  deployment,  training  for  FRMs,  training  for  SC’  members,  sessions  on  monitoring  systems,  training  specific  to 
Units,  refresher  training  and  training  to  national  authorities  and  third  country  officials)377.  The  Fundamental  Rights  Office’s  staff 
provided around 140 training days over 2022378.  

Cooperation  with  FRA  has  helped  to  establish  high  fundamental  rights  standards  in  the  training.  However,  FRA  has  reported  that 
Frontex has recently outsourced training to Member States’ authorities, which makes it difficult to assess the extent to which those 
previous high standards have been incorporated into these new models. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  recruitment  of  FRMs  in  2020,  the  Agency  has  provided  specific  training  for  FRMs.  During  the 
consultation, 26 of 34 FRMs indicated that the courses prepared them for the role of FRM only to some extent.379 More specifically, 
15 out of 34 indicated that the training did not sufficiently address the practical aspect of monitoring. To improve training for FRMs, 
the  FRO  is  engaging  with  the  Training  Unit  of  the  Agency  to  discuss  changes  to  the  training  programme  and  how  to  improve  its 
effectiveness380.  

375   Management Board Decision 36/2022 of 28 June 2022 adopting the methodology for development of technical standards for the equipment to be deployed in  

Frontex activities. 

376   Frontex (2023). Results of Research & Innovation activities. 
377   Frontex (2021). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
378   Frontex (2022). ‘2022 in brief’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/In_Brief_2022/2022_in_brief.pdf 
379   Survey of FRMs: 15/34. 
380   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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EQ 5.6 How and to what extent did Frontex promote and respect fundamental rights through all Agency’s activities?   

The EBCG Regulation aims to establish a comprehensive fundamental rights framework, given that it includes horizontal safeguards 
as well as a number of roles, procedures and instruments, to be set up and/or implemented by the Agency, to ensure the protection of 
fundamental  rights  in  the execution of the Agency’s mandate. Nonetheless,  more could  be done to better streamline the  respect  for 
fundamental rights in the structure and procedures of the Agency. While stakeholders note that potential improvements in this regard 
could  be  achieved  by  revising  the  Regulation,  such  as  enshrining  in  the  Regulation  the  obligation  to  report  witnessed  violations  of 
fundamental rights, a significant part of the work to be done is perhaps less due to gaps in the Regulation but is related more to gaps in 
its implementation381. Therefore, it is positive to note the significant progress achieved by the Agency and its FRO since the entry into 
force of the Regulation, while recognizing that the Agency is undergoing a process of implementation and transition in management, 
and hence remaining vigilant to identify areas where improvement can be achieved in the short to medium term. 

Respect for fundamental rights has to be ensured in all Agency’s activities; the FRO seeks to make sure that it is a mandatory element 
during  all  stages  of  activities  (planning,  implementation,  and  monitoring/evaluation).  To  guarantee  fundamental  rights  compliance 
during operational activities, the Agency draws up operational plans that include general instructions on how to safeguard fundamental 
rights during the operational activity of the Agency382. In this respect, the FRO provides, among others, opinions on the operational 
plans, and may recommend to the Agency to adopt additional specific fundamental rights safeguards and practical measures during the 
operations383. This  activity is  crucial to  uphold  fundamental  rights  in  an operational  context, provided that the input by the  FRO is 
sought in a timely and proactive manner and taken into consideration. However, the Fundamental Rights Office stated that although 
the Agency adopted some of the measures proposed by the FRO, the input is frequently subject to negotiations and is, in practice, read 
by the Operational Response Division of the Agency only, even if the FRO is advising the Agency as a whole384.  

381   Input from the CF. 
382   Article 38 of the EBCG Regulation. 
383   Listed among the tasks of the FRO in Article 109 of the EBCG Regulation.  
384   Based on an interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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On the inclusion in  the operational  plan of  conditions  for compliance with  fundamental  rights, the FSWG found limitations, which 
include unclear conditions in the operational plans for the cooperation by the host Member State with the FRO385. The FRO is asked to 
provide a fundamental rights assessment for each operational plan on an annual basis, but also in the evaluation of each operation at 
the  end  of  the  operational  year.  Overall,  the  expanded  role  introduced  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  for  the  oversight  and  monitoring 
provided  by  the  FRO  can  be  considered  as  a  contributing  factor  to  higher  level  of  compliance  with  fundamental  rights  across  the 
activities and operations of the Agency and its staff. Nevertheless, stakeholders such as FRA have flagged concerns with regard to the 
ability  of  the  Agency  to  consistently  guarantee  a  similarly  high  level  of  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  other  increasingly 
important aspects of its work, including processing of personal data386. On this point, the Agency has aimed to largely address these 
concerns through the incipient  adoption  by year end  of the revised implementing rules on processing personal  data and operational 
personal data, which have been revised following critical opinions by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). 

In 2021, the Agency updated the Fundamental Rights Strategy387 and approved an Action Plan388 to implement the Strategy, indicating 
key  time-bound  action  points  to  ensure  that  the  Agency’s  work  is  aligned  with  fundamental  rights.  The  Action  Plan  also  includes 
overarching  EBCG  components,  whose  implementation  is  applicable  to  all  components  of  the  EBCG,  rather  than  exclusively  the 
Agency. 

The EBCG Regulation introduced the role of the FRMs. Regrettably, the Agency failed to fulfil its commitment required by the EBCG 
Regulation to recruit at least 40 FRMs by December 2020. It was not until August 2021 that the first deployment of FRMs took place. 
However,  the  Agency  now  has  46  FRMs,  who  have  been  fully  trained  and  who,  in  2022,  spent  almost  1  000  days  in  the  field 
monitoring Frontex activities and operations (without counting forced-return monitoring activities)389. 

385   European Parliament Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG) (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning fundamental rights  

violations’. 
386   Input from FRA. 
387   Frontex (2021). ‘Fundamental Rights Strategy’. 
388   Management Board Decision 61/2021 of 9 November 2021 adopting the Fundamental Rights Action Plan for the implementation of the Fundamental Rights   

Strategy.  

389   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2022.’.  

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To  guarantee  high  professional  standards  in  the  area  of  return,  the  Agency  adopted  the  Code  of  conduct  for  return  operations  and 
return  interventions  coordinated  or  organised  by  the  Agency390.  The  EBCG  Regulation  requires  that  the  Code  assures  returns  are 
carried  out  with  full  respect  for  fundamental  rights.  Together  with  the  Code  of  conduct  for  staff  participating  in  the  operational 
activities,  this  Code  stresses  the  Agency’s  commitment  to  fully  respecting,  upholding  and  fulfilling  fundamental  right-related 
obligations in the area of return operations. The analysis shows that the EBCG Regulation and Code for Return seek to achieve this by 
delineating  a  number  of  obligations  and  good  practices  to  be  observed/implemented.  To  ensure  compliance,  the  Agency  adopted 
changes to increase the monitoring level of return operations. Despite this framework and instruments, the analysis identified some 
challenges that might impact how effectively the Agency is carrying out monitoring activities.  

In 2021 and in 2022, the Agency adopted rules on the supervisory mechanism for the use of force, which provide a framework for the 
Agency to monitor the application of the provisions on the use of force by the statutory staff391.  

The Agency continued to provide training on relevant fundamental rights standards and practices. To this end, the FRO cooperated 
with the Training Unit of the Agency to include fundamental rights aspects in various training sessions and ensure that fundamental 
rights  components  are  embedded  in  an  operational  and  practical  manner  throughout  Frontex  training  curricula.  The  Fundamental 
Rights Officer staff provided around 140 training days over 2022392.  

An  internal  culture  that  is  attentive  to  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights  is  a  prerogative  for  the  Agency’s  compliance  with  the 
fundamental  rights  framework  established  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  its  implementing  rules.  The  Agency,  and  the  FRO 
particularly,  have  been  making  efforts  to  foster  a  culture  that  is  respectful  of  fundamental  rights  among  staff.  For  instance,  the 
increasing presence of the FRMs is valuable to inform deployed staff on practices in line with fundamental rights, identify potential 

390   Frontex, Code of Conduct for return operations and return interventions coordinated and organised by Frontex.  
391   Management Board Decision 7/2021 of 20 January 2021 establishing a supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on the use of 
force by statutory staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps, 2021; and Management Board Decision 61/2022 of 23 November  2022 
amending  Management  Board  Decision  7/2021  establishing  a  supervisory  mechanism  to  monitor  the  application  of  the  provisions  on  the  use  of  force  by 
statutory staff of the European Border and Coast Guard standing corps. 

392   Frontex (2022). ‘2022 in brief’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/In_Brief_2022/2022_in_brief.pdf  

147 

 
 
 
 
violations, and encourage the use of reporting mechanisms393. A culture of respect for fundamental rights can also be pursued through 
more proactive and consistent involvement of the CF, relying more regularly upon the expertise on fundamental rights aspects of the 
Agency‘s activities and processes its members provide. Recently, the collaboration between Agency and the CF has improved, in part 
due  to  changes  in  the  Agency’s  management,  with  the  ED  that  better  acknowledged  the  value  of  the  CF  and  sought  to  involve  its 
members more proactively, but also due to the implementation of internal documents such as MB Decision 43/2022 on the follow up 
to recommendations by FRO and CF. Nevertheless, more can be done to facilitate the CF’s ability to provide its advice and support to 
the  Agency.  To  achieve  this,  the  CF’s  suggested  involving  the  CF  in  a  more  timely  and  comprehensive  manner,  loosening  the 
confidentiality requirements imposed onto the CF to enable its members to seek consultations within their networks, and making CF 
recommendations immediately publicly available, thereby also enhancing Agency’s accountability394. 

Similarly,  mechanisms  such  as  the  complaints  mechanism  and  Serious  Incident  Report  (SIR)  mechanism  provide  not  only  an 
important avenue to report potential wrongdoings and have them investigated, but also present important information avenues for FRO 
and  Agency  to  address  fundamental  rights-related  issues  where  they  may  arise.  Nevertheless,  stakeholders  have  noted  that 
inconsistencies or lack of clarity in the EBCG Regulation risk undermining the effectiveness of these mechanisms by, for example, not 
providing avenues for appealing decisions by the FRO or not establishing rules on the timely cooperation of national authorities with 
investigations of complaints that concern them395.  

Additionally, while recommending to increase the awareness of the complaints mechanism among potential complainants, the CF also 
recommended facilitated reporting. This may entail lowering the threshold for submitting reports, giving the FRO more flexibility in 
assessing  whether  a  complaint  has  a  merit,  but  also  introducing  a  simplified  method  to  access  the  complaint  mechanism  and  for 
example make it more accessible to children and vulnerable persons.  

393   Based on interviews with the Fundamental Rights Office and a civil society organisation/member of the CF.  
394   Input from the CF. 
395   Input from FRA. 

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Despite these positive changes, some stakeholders remain of the opinion that the overall culture of the Agency should change and that 
there  remains  considerable  work  to  be  done  to  achieve  a  substantive  cultural  shift  within  Frontex396.  In  this  regard,  continuing  to 
increase communication on fundamental rights matters and establishing open channels for dialogue within the Agency is essential. By 
fostering an environment  that encourages open discussions and addresses concerns related to  fundamental  rights,  the Agency could 
actively promote a culture that prioritizes the respect of, and compliance with, fundamental rights397. In parallel, it is important for the 
Agency  to  continue  to  explore  ways  to  embed  fundamental  rights  in  relevant  Agency’s  processes  and  activities;  for  example,  as 
mentioned by FRA, to strengthen among others the fundamental rights component of vulnerability assessments398. This effort, which 
must  be  continuous  in  nature,  will  largely  materialise  through  Agency  documents  aimed  to  operationalise  legal  provisions  of  the 
Regulation, as has for example been the case with the adoption of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on the SIR mechanism or 
on the decision-making process in the context of Article 46 as ED decisions. Nevertheless, as also noted by the CF, it is crucial that 
further operationalisation of Regulation provisions makes these provisions effective, usable, and transparent, without redefining them 
or risking to curtail their powers, scope, or effects399. 

These efforts should be complemented by continued attention to ensure that the resources available to the Fundamental Rights Office, 
including personnel, are reflective of the rapid growth of the Agency and its increased number of activities and deployments. The pace 
of the growth of the Fundamental Rights Office and Data Protection Office staff, being the Offices most entrusted with supporting the 
Agency in guaranteeing compliance with fundamental rights, should credibly match the pace of growth of the Agency, as also noted 
by interviews with stakeholders400. 

EQ6.  How  effective  has  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  by  the  Member  States  and  by  Frontex  been?  What 
factors contributed to a successful delivery and what obstacles were encountered?  
EQ6.1 How effective has been the implementation of operational activities? 

396   Based on interviews with a Member of the European Parliament, a civil society organisation/member of the CF, and international organisations/members of 

the CF.  

397   Based on an interview with the Fundamental Rights Office.  
398   Input from FRA. 
399   Input from the CF. 
400   Input from FRA, interview with Frontex DPO. 

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Overall,  Frontex’s  operational  support  is  valued  by  Member  States  and  has  contributed  to  managing  the  migratory  pressures  and 
protecting and managing EU external borders.  

However, the following issues were identified during the evaluation:  

•  Operational planning: Frontex JOs are planned and implemented on the basis of the standard operational cycle. Eleven 
Member  States401  surveyed  experienced  no  issues  with  the  joint  planning  of  operations,  while  10402  experienced  some 
issues.  One  Member  State,  for  example,  found  the  operational  planning  of  a  joint  operation  to  be  cumbersome.  Two 
Member  States  stated  that  national  operational  awareness  is  usually  more  up-to-date  than  the  information  provided  by 
Frontex products. Similarly, One Member State noted that the Agency’s analyses of national operational planning are not 
immediately useful, being overly general and insufficiently focused on the situation at the country’s external borders (while 
recognising that this may reflect the low threat level at the borders). One Member State reported delays in the MMO 2022 
and pointed to Frontex’s bureaucratic approach to both operational activities and fundamental rights. 

•  Member  States  believe  that  the  annual  bilateral  negotiations  process  works  well  overall,  despite  being  informed  by 
individual national perspectives. In the past, there was no clear concept for prioritising the needs of various countries, but 
the recently developed four-category prioritisation concept (critical/high/medium/low) has improved matters. One Member 
State reported that the joint planning process coordinated by the Operational Response Division works well, despite being 
administratively burdensome during the annual planning and operation.  

•  Command-and-control:  The  evaluation  found  that  the  lack  of  a  clear  command-and-control  structure  hindered  its 
operational effectiveness. Command-and-control issues were reported by six Member States. Multiple reporting channels, 
including  the  functional  line  of  reporting  and  the  Coordinating  Officer,  create  inconsistencies.  The  delay  in  creating  an 
organisational  structure  adapted  to  the  needs  of  the  managing  of  the  SC,  has  also  contributed  to  multiple  unclear  and 
inefficient  command  structures.  Frontex  is  developing  a  new  Frontex  operational  control-and-command  (FC2)  concept, 
which has been the subject of a pilot project that took place in Romania with overall positive feedback from Frontex staff 
and the host Member State. The results of the pilot are to be further analysed and presented to the MB in November 2023, 

401   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 11/27. 
402   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 10/27. 

150 

 
 
 
 
and the concept  should then be trialled on a larger scale,  with  multiple Frontex deployments  in  different  Member States 
slated  to  follow  the  FC2  structure  in  2024.  FC2  aims  to  establish  an  operational  structure  with  clear  reporting  lines  and 
swift decision-making capabilities from headquarters to the field. The aim is to empower staff to  be more mobile on the 
ground, as the current silo approach does not allow resources to be flexibly relocated from one domain to another.  

•  Organisational  and  logistical  issues  undermining  effectiveness:  Several  organisational  issues  undermine  operational 
effectiveness,  organisational  image  and,  in  some  cases,  staff  morale.  These  include  practical  issues  with  weapons 
transportation, lack of equipment and uniforms, and poor advanced logistical support. Limitations and difficulties related to 
logistics  such  as  availability  of  patrol/service  vehicles  (need  to  rent  unmarked  vehicles)403,  non-availability  of  adequate 
fuelling  and  maintenance404.  Overall,  the  lack  of  advanced  logistical  support  (expected  to  be  provided  via  the  antenna 
offices)  in  assisting  SC  staff  with  car  rentals  and  accommodation,  as  well  as  changes  of  deployment,  undermined  the 
effectiveness of deployments. 

•  SC profiles and training: As the SC was just being established, Member States reported that the availability of different 
profiles did not fully correlate with the overall needs. The availability of certain profiles has gradually improved over time 
(crew members and Frontex tactical support officers are planned to cover 100% of the needs addressed for the second half 
of 2023405). Specific profiles are in high demand. Illustrative for the same period are the needs addressed to the EBCG for 
border  guard  officers  (8089  deployments),  advanced  level  document  officers  (1735),  and  debriefing  officers  (1225). 
However, Frontex reports up to 65% shortages for certain profiles, such as dog handlers, 47% for return specialists, and a 
33% shortage for advanced level document officers. Some Member States experienced issues with the level of training and 
preparedness during deployment. 

•  Access to information and relevant databases: Challenges in sharing and accessing information were reported by nine 
Member  States  and  confirmed  during  field  visits406.  Only  four  Member  States  facilitate  some  form  of  access.  Other 
Member States currently do not allow Frontex to consult relevant databases, including national databases for border checks. 

403   Case studies in two Member States. 
404   Case study in one Member State. 
405   Frontex report on capabilities to the Management Board, 5.9.2023. 
406   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 9/27. 

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However, where such access is provided, the information is often available in the national language, which is an obstacle 
for Frontex officers.  

Frontex has not yet finalised the technical implementation of access to Schengen Information System (SIS), as provided by Regulation 
(EU) 2018/1861  and Regulation  (EU) 2018/1862.  In order to  perform effective border checks, Frontex officers need access  to SIS, 
Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) and relevant national databases. The current lack of access to relevant European 
databases  (such  as  SIS),  which  is  due  to  delays  and  implementation  issues,  further  limits  the  support  the  Agency  can  provide  for 
border checks. 

Certain aspects of the application of the EU Staff Regulations to Category 1 SC staff are found to hinder effectiveness of operational 
performance.  The  current  legal  framework  is  not  adapted  to  reflect  the  role  of  Frontex  SC  staff,  including  their  functions  as  a 
uniformed, armed service with executive powers. In Member States typically law-enforcement officers’ employment is regulated by 
special legislation, different  from  the one of civil servants,  foreseeing  early  retirement, special working hours, pay, and  conditions, 
including for deployment; This situation is seen as disruptive at an operational level by some Member States and Frontex, which limits 
the operational effectiveness of the SC, as the EU Staff Regulations has not been created to meet the needs of an operational service 
with executive powers, resulting in inconsistencies in areas such as working conditions, selection procedures, deployment locations, 
leave entitlements, disciplinary measures, and complaints mechanisms.  

Several  Member  States  reported  that  Frontex  officers  cannot  perform  tasks  independently  due  to  practical/logistical  limitations. 
Examples include having no access to databases via the national interface due to language limitations, with over half of the Member 
States reporting language issues arising during Frontex operations, or security clearance requirements. 

EQ6.2 How effective has been the implementation of capacity building activities? 

One  horizontal  observation  spanning  the  three  areas  of  capacity  building  (training,  research  and  innovation,  human  and  technical 
resources, particularly the provision of technical resource support) is that overarching capability planning – the strategic direction for 
the  capability-building  activities  –  was  incomplete  as  of  September  2023.  All  but  one  Member  State  sent  their  national  capability 
development plans to Frontex (Article 9(4)), but no multiannual acquisition strategy (Article 63(2)) documenting short, medium and 
long-term needs, and therefore no capability roadmap (Article 9(8)), was presented under the evaluation period by Frontex. There is a 

152 

 
 
 
lack  of  strategic  direction  and  vision  for  the  long-term  development  of  the  capabilities  of  the  Agency.  The  multiannual  acquisition 
strategy  for  technical  equipment  was  submitted  to  the  European  Commission  for  an  opinion  in  November  2022;  the  Commission 
adopted  its  opinion  in  May  2023.  It  was  adopted  by  the  MB  in  September  2023.  Only  the  multiannual  plan  for  the  SC  (Article 
54(4)(e)) was adopted in 2022. The fact that overarching capability planning is incomplete makes capability development a difficult 
process.  

Other challenges related to capacity-building include: 

•  The principle of annuality poses a challenge for Frontex when acquiring complex equipment that takes months or years to 
build, test and deliver. In these cases, the procurement process often cannot be completed within a single financial year. To 
overcome  this,  Frontex  has  to  use  multiple  contracts,  or  commission  and  decommission  funds,  which  leads  to 
inefficiencies. 

•  A significant challenge is the lack of clarity in the acquisition strategy and logistics concept for equipment. Insufficient and 
poorly defined acquisition needs meant that Frontex has delays in acquiring various items, resorting to inefficient options 
like renting vehicles instead of investing in its own fleet, with rental conditions not necessarily appropriate for the use of 
the vehicles, resulting in complex procedures and high maintenance costs. The strategic and operational planning process 
has  not  adequately  addressed  equipment  needs  in  terms  of  types,  quantities,  and  acquisition  plans  for  different  types  of 
borders  (maritime,  air,  and  land)  in  the  short,  medium,  and  long  term.  This  was  largely  the  result  of  delays  in  the 
preparation and adoption of the Agency's multiannual strategy for the acquisition of equipment. 

Some legislative and operational/implementation issues hindered the implementation and deployment of technical resource support at 
procurement  and  deployment  stage,  such  as  lack  of  infrastructure  for  equipment,  and  issues  with  customs  and  transportation, 
adaptation of equipment to local environments, recognition of technical equipment across jurisdictions, registration and maintenance 
of vehicles, and flags (in the maritime context).  

Challenges  related  to  training  activities  during  2020-2023  included  limited  availability  of  trainers  and  locations,  COVID-19 
restrictions, low administrative support, and delays in planning and capability development. Financial data showed fluctuating funding 
and a large volume of activities that may not have been fully implemented. 

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The effectiveness of the implementation of training activities was hindered by operational/implementation issues, as well as by some 
legislative issues. More concretely, implementation of training for the SC has highlighted various issues hindering the effectiveness of 
training activities, identified by both Frontex and Member States407, including:  

•  Lack of high-quality trainers408: Frontex recruits trainers from the Member States and within its own staff. Member States 
have valuable and up-to-date expertise that they can teach, and their trainers can take their teaching experience at Frontex back 
to  their  country  (enabling  the  harmonisation  of  training).  However,  the  (best)  trainers  in  Member  States  are  not  always 
available. Three Member States noted the lack of communication between Frontex and the National Training Coordinators409, 
but  trainer  availability  is  also  influenced  by  poor  payment  for  trainers  (Article  45,  57(2);  95(6),  56(2);  56  and  57  EBCG 
Regulation) and the somewhat low Daily Subsistence Allowance rate. There is no profile for trainers among the SC (decided 
by MB decision, as per Article 54(4)), following the rules for deploying SC staff (Article 54(2), 54(7)), despite the SC having 
relevant hands-on experience to share. 

•  Training facilities410: Frontex has difficulties in attracting a sufficient number of training schools to host their training because 
of its long duration and the relatively high number of learners. Frontex has allocated over EUR 20 million in grants over the 
past three years to Member States’ police academies to host Frontex training of SC Category 1 officers411. This puts pressure 
on guaranteed training in the long term, and possibly on the quality of the training facilities. Frontex has also dealt with a lack 
of clarity on the rules that apply to its trainees (as opposed to host Member States’ trainees) at training centres, including rules 
for code of conduct, discipline, rules that apply to training (for example, on physical training, the use of force), rules relating to 
the use of firearms (in case of accidents), and rules when not passing certain assessments. The EBCG Regulation specifies that 
the ‘Agency training centre’ should be established, upon decision of the MB (Article 62(3)). Such decision was not taken in the 
period under evaluation. There is no clarity, and no clear assessment of the financial efficiency for Frontex (i.e. assessment of 
building an operating its own training centre vs. grants-based trainings) and the long-term viability of the present approach. 

407   Interviews with Frontex and MS/SAC authorities: 2/27; scoping interviews. 
408   Field visits to two Member States; interviews with Frontex and MS/SAC authorities: 2/27.  
409   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 3/27. 
410   Interviews with Frontex. 
411   See calls for proposals at: https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/grants/  

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The effectiveness of training activities is thus somewhat complicated by the shared responsibility of the implementation of the EBCG 
Regulation with Member States. At the same time, a majority of Member States agreed or strongly agreed that, in the spirit of shared 
responsibility,  the  division  of  competence  between  Member  States  and  Frontex,  as  set  out  in  the  EBCG  Regulation,  is  sufficiently 
clear and adequate to meet the objectives on education and training of border and coast guards412. From a design point of view, there 
appears to be a satisfactory level of involvement from both sides413. 

Some legislative and operational/implementation issues hindered the implementation and deployment of technical resource support at 
procurement  and  deployment  stage,  such  as  lack  of  infrastructure  for  equipment,  and  issues  with  customs  and  transportation, 
adaptation of equipment to local environments, recognition of technical equipment across jurisdictions, registration and maintenance 
of vehicles, and flags (in the maritime context).  

When  it  comes  to  research  and  innovation,  Frontex  supported  capability-building  in  research  and  innovation  by  promoting  and 
delivering  standardisation  and  harmonisation  of  border  management  capabilities,  promoting  and  delivering  innovation  in  border 
management  capabilities,  and  executing  and  supporting  research414.  In  its multiannual  programming  documents,  the  Agency  set  out 
relevant  key  activities,  linked  to  expected  results  and  indicators.  Essentially,  these  activities  amounted  to  several  main  areas  of 
support, assisting Member States, building EBCG capability, and responding to specific needs:  

•  Technical standards for the equipment to be included in the capability pools and to be deployed in the activities of the Agency; 
•  A comprehensive research and innovation platform to enable research and facilitate the dissemination of research information; 
•  Steering  EU-wide  border  management  research  through  the  development  of  the  Senior  User  role  of  Frontex  in  the 

implementation of EU framework programmes for research and innovation;  

•  Piloting  border  management-related  technological  solutions  and  research  findings  fostering  further  development  of  EBCG 

capabilities. 

In the area of research and innovation, the extent to which the Agency has been able to ‘proactively monitor and contribute to research 
and  innovation  activities  relevant  for  European  integrated  border  management  including  the  use  of  advanced  border  control 

412   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 14/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 
413   Interviews with Frontex. 
414   Frontex (2023). ‘Research and Innovation’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/innovation/research-and-innovation/research-and-innovation-at-frontex/ 

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technology, taking into account the capability roadmap referred to in Article 9(8)’ (Article 66(1)) and to assist Member States and the 
Commission in ‘identifying key research themes’ taking into account the capability roadmap (Article 66(2)), cannot be fully assessed, 
as the roadmap in question does not yet exist.  

The analysis further revealed several minor issues hindering the development of relevant capabilities, innovation, and standardisation 
and harmonisation of capabilities, e.g. difficulties with regard to the adoption of standards for technical equipment,  or the adoption of 
a  methodology  for  defining  standards,  the  lack  of  a  clearer  link  between  capability  development  plans  and  risk  and  vulnerability 
assessments415,  as  well  as  lengthy  internal    processes416    and  by  interdependencies  with  other  work417.  Additional  information  on 
research and innovation is included in replies to EQ 5.4., EQ 5.5. and EQ 6.3. 

EQ6.3 How effective has been the implementation of horizontal activities? 

The effectiveness of the implementation of research and innovation activities was only slightly impeded by (mainly) legislative issues, 
with  practical  solutions  applied.  The  EBCG  Regulation  does  not  contain  a  clear  reference  to  the  adoption  of  technical  standards 
(through an MB decision), the adoption of a methodology for defining standards (Articles 16, 64(5)), or the adoption/publication of 
minimum standards for border surveillance (a task of the Agency as per Article 10(1)(z)). It could also be clearer on the mandate of 
the Agency on research and innovation, following the developments during the evaluation period.  

EQ6.4 How effective has been the observance and promotion of fundamental rights? 

The  EBCG  Regulation  aims  to  establish  a  comprehensive  fundamental  rights  framework.  Accordingly,  it  includes  horizontal 
safeguards,  roles,  procedures  and  instruments  (to  be  set  up  and/or  implemented  by  the  Agency)  to  ensure  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights in the implementation of the Agency’s mandate. The EBCG Regulation describes EIBM as a shared responsibility 

415   Interview with Frontex. 
416   For example, the procurement process, leading to a delay in the delivery of handbooks. 
417   Some  planned  activities  could  not  be  started  by  the  relevant  unit  within  Frontex  because  of  their  interdependence  with  the  progress  on  the  new  Frontex 

headquarters and API legislation. 

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of the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management, while recognising that Member States retain primary 
responsibility for the management of their sections of the external borders. Member States, in close cooperation with the Agency, must 
carry  out  the  management  of  the  external  borders  and  the  enforcement  of  return  decisions  in  full  compliance  with  Union  law, 
including the respect for fundamental rights418.  

Article 3(2) of the EBCG Regulation reinforces that fundamental rights are an overarching component in the implementation of EIBM 
by the EBCG (comprising the Member States and the Agency). Although the respect of fundamental rights also applies to the Member 
States  and  not  only  to  Frontex,  there  are  different  limitations  to  the  scope  of  the  instruments  established  by  the  EBCG  Regulation 
(Frontex or Member State staff) and different rules and procedures apply (for example, different procedures for SIRs and complaints 
related  to  Frontex’s  staff  and  national  staff).  The  analysis  highlighted  these  limitations  and  their  consequences,  particularly  for  the 
activities  of  the  FRO  and  FRMs.  Many  concerns  about  fundamental  rights  reported  to  the  FRO  do  not  relate  to  Frontex’s  staff  or 
assets, but, rather, to alleged violations by Member States’ staff during operational activities in which Frontex is also participating in 
some capacity. In such cases, the powers of the FRO are limited, as they do not include monitoring the national authorities’ activities, 
which are instead covered by applicable national monitoring mechanisms (such as the national ombuds institutions). The Fundamental 
Rights  Office’s  monitoring  of  Member  States’  staff  involved  in  operational  activities  has  on  occasions  created  tension  with  some 
Member States, whose authorities question the extent of the Office’s activities and suggest that it is overstepping its mandate419. The 
limitations of the Fundamental Rights Office’s mandate can also hamper the activities of FRMs and their access to operational areas. 
Some national authorities have sought to bring diverging interpretations of the limits of FRMs’ access to operational areas and, thus, 
monitoring. For some host Member States, the activities of national staff in the context of the joint operation are not covered by the 
Fundamental Rights Office’s mandate and thus should not fall under the monitoring of the FRMs420. 

Some clarification was brought by the 2023 SOP for FRMs421. Although the scope of the FRM’s monitoring actions is limited to areas 
where the Agency is operational, FRMs may collect information and assess the situation of fundamental rights, related to border and 

418   Article 7 of the EBCG Regulation.  
419   Interviews with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
420   Interviews with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
421   Frontex  (2023).  ‘Standard  Operating  Procedure  (SOP)  on  roles  and  responsibilities  of  Fundamental  Rights  Monitors  (FRMs)  in  Frontex  operational 

activities’. Internal document.   

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migration  management,  in  the  Member  States  and  third  countries  in  which  the  Agency  conducts  operational  activities,  including 
relevant activities of national authorities. This is not to evaluate Member States’ authorities per se, but, rather, to evaluate the situation 
insofar  as  it  may  have  an  impact  on  Frontex’s  activities,  on  its  reputation,  and  above  all  on  its  ability  to  conduct  its  activities  and 
operations in full compliance with fundamental rights. 

The  analysis  also  focused  on  the  observance  of  fundamental  rights  in  Frontex’s  operations  to  support  Hungary  (on  border 
management), Lithuania, Greece and for the operation in the Central Mediterranean. It also explored Frontex’s cooperation with third 
countries, highlighting the main fundamental rights considerations. According to several stakeholders, these operations might present 
high  risks  to  fundamental  rights422.  The  Agency  (based  on  FRO  recommendations)  adopted  some  mitigating  measures  to  seek  to 
ensure that violations of fundamental rights do not occur in the context of its support to Member States, and that there is no risk of 
Frontex’s staff and/or assets being involved, even indirectly, in violations. Although the personnel of the Agency has not been found 
to  have  operated  in  violation  of  fundamental  rights,  including  in  previous  formal  investigations  such  as  by  the  FSWG423,  there  are 
concerns about the potential indirect involvement of the Agency through inaction, by failing to suspend or terminate an operation in 
line  with  its  obligations  stemming  from  Article  46  of  the  EBCG  Regulation424,  or  where  violations  of  fundamental  rights  may  be 
perpetrated by staff of national authorities, without knowledge or participation of the Agency but in the context of JOs. 

Nevertheless, a question remains on the extent to which the Agency makes full use of its current toolbox to ensure compliance with 
fundamental rights, including adopting the decision referred to in Article 46 of the EBCG Regulation. The latter was triggered in only 
one  case  to  date  –  Frontex’s  support  to  border  management  in  Hungary,  despite  fundamental  rights  concerns  being  raised  by 
stakeholders for other operations. 

EQ7. What external factors have affected progress towards the objectives and how are they linked to the EBCG Regulation? 

422   Interviews with civil society organisations/non-members of the CF, civil society organisations/ members of the CF, an international organisation/member of  

the CF, and the Fundamental Rights Office. 

423  FSWG (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning fundamental rights violations’; Management Board Decision 39/2020 of  
26  November 2020 on the establishment of the Management Board Working Group on Fundamental Rights and Legal and Operational Aspects of  
Operations (FRALO WG). 

424   Interviews with civil society organisations/non-members of the CF, civil society organisations/members of the CF and an international  

organisation/member of the CF, and the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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The years considered for the evaluation of the Regulation were heavily influenced by external factors and crisis, such as the COVID-
19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus.  

The overall disruptive impact of COVID-19 on the implementation of the EBCG Regulation cannot be underestimated. As a result, 
Frontex  was  not  able  to  implement  all  of  its  activities,  recruitment  and  deployment  of  the  SC  was  delayed,  and  financial 
implementation  was affected. Disruptions  in  the global supply chain  made the provision  of  the technical  equipment more  complex, 
leading to delays in availability. The closure of international travel reduced the pressure of irregular migration at the external borders 
of the EU, reducing the need for Frontex support from Member States. 

The  unpredictable  geopolitical  environment  of  recent  years  has  further  meant  that  Frontex  has  had  to  adapt  quickly  to  unforeseen 
challenges  at  external  borders,  impacting  its  ability  to  plan  and  diverting  its  resources  away  from  anticipated  activities.  The  most 
challenging  events  have  been  the  Belarus  border  crisis  and  the  creation  of  an  artificial  migration  route  on  Europe’s  Eastern  border 
(requiring the deployment of additional resources at Europe’s Eastern land borders), as well as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by 
the  Russian  Federation  in  February  2022  (creating  an  unprecedented  mass  influx  of  people  into  the  EU  as  they  fled  the  war  in 
Ukraine). At the same time, a steep rise in irregular migration was observed: in 2022, around 330,000 irregular border crossings were 
detected  at  the EU’s  external  border, the highest number of irregular border crossings  since 2016, and in  the  first  seven  months  of 
2023 the increase was of roughly 13% compared to the same period in 2022.  

Implementation of the EBCG  Regulation  took  place in  an evolving policy environment,  including  ongoing  reform  of the Schengen 
Borders Code (Regulation 2016/399/EU), the new Visa Code, changes to or developments of new border information technology (IT) 
systems (SIS, European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), Entry/Exit System (EES), Visa Information System 
(VIS)) and interoperability between EU information systems (Regulations (EU) 2019/817 and 2019/818); as well as changes to key 
partner agencies’ mandates, such as Europol and EUAA.  

The  evaluation  period  was  a  period  of  significant  turmoil  for  the  Agency  itself,  with  an  investigation  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF)425, a critical report from the European Court of Auditors (ECA426), significant media scrutiny, and criticism from civil 

425   See: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-000861-ASW_EN.html  

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society, eventually resulting in a change to the Agency’s leadership in 2022. On 20 December 2022, the MB appointed a new ED, 
Hans Leijtens427.  

EQ8. How has Frontex contributed to better coordination and cooperation between the relevant stakeholders in particular in 
and between Member States in the context of European Integrated Border Management?  
EQ8.1 How did Frontex contribute to establishing and developing mechanisms for operational cooperation to implement the 
concept of European Integrated Border Management (EIBM), including establishing the Multiannual Strategic Policy Cycle; 
translating  the  Commission’s  strategic  steering  into  the  Technical  and  Operational  EIBM  strategy,  and  facilitating  and 
fostering the implementation of the Technical and Operational strategy for EIBM across the EBCG)? 

The multiannual  strategic policy for EIBM,  as envisaged in  the EBCG Regulation  (Article 8), was established in  March 2023.  The 
Agency has adopted the technical and operational strategy for EIBM (TO-EIBM) in September 2023, which forms the first stage of 
implementation. The TO-EIBM identifies actions to translate strategic guidelines for the 15 EIBM components for the Member States 
and  the  Agency.  Member  States  are  currently  implementing  their  national  strategies  for  EIBM,  therefore,  its  impacts  cannot  be 
evaluated yet. Other key aspects of EIBM (integrated planning) are yet to be finalised and cannot be evaluated at present. 

The concept of EIBM has developed gradually, becoming legally binding with the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. The 2016 
EBCG  Regulation  set  out  the  Agency’s  objective  to  develop  and  implement  EIBM.  The  2016  and  2019  EBCG  Regulations  also 
outlined the main components of EIBM, with the 2019 EBCG Regulation including the 15 components that constitute EIBM.  

The  2019  EBCG  Regulation  specifically  sets  the  EIBM  policy  cycle  as  a  strategic  governance  framework  for  the  effective 
implementation of EIBM. The policy cycle is intended to provide the strategic direction to inform the implementation of EIBM over 
five years.   

426   See: https://www.eca.europa.eu/bg/publications?did=52964  
427   Frontex  (2022).  ‘Management  Board  appoints  Hans  Leijtens  as  new  Frontex  Executive  Director’.  Available  at:  https://www.border-security-

report.com/management-board-appoints-hans-leijtens-new-frontex-executive-director/  

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To inform the implementation of EIBM as outlined in the 2016 EBCG Regulation, Frontex developed a first TO-EIBM428, which was 
adopted in May 2019. At the time of drafting the TO-EIBM, the 2019 EBCG Regulation was in the process of being finalised and, 
when adopted, set a new framework for the Agency’s activities. As such, Frontex has since focused on the implementation of its new 
mandate rather than the operationalising of its existing TO-EIBM.  

The  first  step  in  creating  the  EIBM  policy  cycle  as  envisaged  in  the  2019  EBCG  Regulation  was  the  publication  of  the  Frontex 
Strategic Risk Analysis in 2020429, followed by the publication of a Commission policy document developing a multiannual strategic 
policy on EIBM in May 2022430. This was followed by the adoption of the Commission Communication establishing the multiannual 
strategic policy for EIBM in March 2023, which used the 2022 Strategic Risk Analysis431 as a basis.  

In  its  programming  documents,  Frontex  emphasises  that  strategic-level  EIBM-related  activities  depend  on  the  establishment  of  the 
policy  cycle.  As  mentioned  above,  Frontex  has  adopted  a  new  TO-EIBM  in  September  2023,  which  will  help  Member  States  in 
drafting their national strategies for EIBM and ensure better alignment with Frontex programming documents432. The revision of the 
TO-EIBM is supported by the MB EIBM Working Group established in June 2022433.  

Additional elements related to EIBM, including integrated planning (Article 9), are not yet fully implemented. Not all Member States 
have  finalised  their  national  capability  development  plans.  These  plans,  as  well  as  the  Frontex  Multiannual  Acquisition  Strategy 
(adopted in September 2023) should subsequently inform the preparation of the Frontex capability roadmap, which is the final step of 
the EBCG’s integrated planning.   

While the full implementation of EIBM is pending, some enhanced coordination in the area of EIBM has been achieved through the 
implementation  of  the  Frontex  mandate  overall,  which  includes  close  coordination  with  Member  States  in  several  thematic  areas 

428   https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Key_Documents/IBM/EU_IBM_Brochure_EN.pdf  
429   Frontex (2020). ‘Strategic Risk Analysis 2020’.  
430   European Commission (2022). ‘Developing a multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management in accordance with Article 8(4) of 

Regulation (EU) 2019/1896’. COM(2022)303 final.  

431   Frontex (2022). ‘Strategic Risk Analysis 2022.’  
432   Interview with Frontex. 
433   Management Board Decision 33/2022 of 7 June 2022 establishing the Management Board Working Group on European Integrated Border Management. 

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(returns,  joint  operations,  capacity-building,  situational  awareness,  etc.).  This  is  further  supported  by  the  deployment  of  Frontex 
Liaison Officers (FLOs) in Member States (Article 31), a move rated positively by the majority of Member States434.  

EQ9. Are Frontex operational activities based on an up-to-date and comprehensive risk analysis?  
EQ 9.1 To what extent did Frontex produce reliable and actionable information through 24/7 (near) real-time situation and 
crisis monitoring surveillance, to inform its operational activities? 
EQ  9.2  To  what  extent  did  Frontex  produce  risk  analysis  (pre-warning  and  forecasting)  within  all  four  tiers  of  EIBM  to 
inform its operational activities? 

Frontex  conducts  and  supports  various  situational  awareness  activities  to  underpin  EU  border  management  decisions  that  are 
intelligence-driven and to plan for targeted operational  responses. Frontex’s operational  activities are generally based on up-to-date 
risk  analysis and are well received by key stakeholders. The Agency produces a wide range of risk analysis products specifically on 
its  JOs.  These  products  are  made  available  through  the  regular  channels  of  FOSS/CIRCABC,  as  well  as  through  daily  or  weekly 
briefing sessions for SC and national border control staff.  

The Frontex Situation Centre is responsible for 24/7 situation monitoring, early alerts and a comprehensive and up-to-date situational 
picture of the external borders and the pre-frontier area of the EU. The Agency dispatches information to national authorities on the 
situation at the external borders through the European situational picture, as well as consistently reporting on events occurring in areas 
where it is deployed in an operational capacity. Frontex uses and supports EUROSUR, through EUROSUR fusion services, to reflect 
the  situation  at  the  European  borders  on  a  24/7  basis.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  gaps  in  Frontex’s  ability  to  provide  complete, 
consistent and timely situational awareness. 

To a certain extent, this has resulted in a patchwork of national situational pictures rather than a single, uniform European situational 
picture435. In addition to the exemptions for land and sea border crossing points, Member States were not required to report illicit air 

434   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed or strongly agreed that the network of Frontex Liaison Officers (FLOs) fostered cooperation and dialogue be- 

tween Frontex and national authorities in the context of EIBM; 6/27 did not provide an answer or neither agreed nor disagreed. 

435   European Court of Auditors (ECA) (2021). ‘Special Report 8/2021: Frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date.’  

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border crossings, either at air border crossing points or into national airspace, until 5 December 2021436. As a consequence of these 
(permanent  and  previously  temporary)  measures,  the  situation  at  the  EU  borders  was  not  adequately  reported  in  a  near-real-time 
capacity437. 

Frontex highlighted examples of RBIs based on its risk analysis, namely at the Greek/Turkish border in February 2020438. They cited 
the Ukraine crisis as a prime example of Frontex’s ability to monitor migration flows immediately.  

During the field visits, a number of Member States’ authorities commented on the usefulness of these products during operations. For 
SAR  operations,  risk  analysis  is  received  as  a  post-event  assessment  that  allows  a  better  understanding  of  the  situation  (SAR  are 
usually urgent and generally do not allow for preparatory action)439. Тhe SC receives weekly risk analysis updates. They stated that 
they were regularly informed and that these updates were helpful440. In Greece, local police receive weekly reports from Frontex about 
the whole operational area, which the interviewee considers useful, as well as monthly reports on the operational area441. Meanwhile 
for JO Terra, some stakeholders pointed out that they can attend daily risk analysis briefings442, but most do not and the briefings often 
have limited added value (much of the reporting focuses generally on areas where most of the issues are, but not specifically on the 
border sections with which they are concerned).    

Some weaknesses were identified through consultation with Member States and Frontex. For example, the risk analysis produced by 
Frontex  does  not  adequately  cover  all  four  tiers  of  EIBM,  leading  to  delays  in  full  implementation  of  Article  29(3)  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation, which states that ‘the risk analyses referred to in paragraph 2 shall cover all aspects relevant to European integrated border 
management with a view to developing a pre-warning mechanism’443.  

436   Article  123  of  the  EBCG  Regulation;  the  Regulation  contains  a  provision  (in  force  until  5  December  2021)  stating  that  Member  States  could  provide 

information on border checks and air border surveillance on a voluntary rather than mandatory basis. 

437   European Court of Auditors (ECA) (2021). ‘Special Report 8/2021: Frontex’s support to external border management: not sufficiently effective to date.’  
438   Frontex (2021). ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2020’. 
439   Interview with one MS.  
440   Site visits interviews in two MS.  
441   Interview with a MS.  
442   Interview with one MS; site visit in one MS. 
443   Article 29(3) of the EBCG Regulation. 

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The  key  elements  of  EIBM  that  are  missing  from  Frontex  risk  analysis  products  are  returns  and  third-country  information.  Some 
stakeholders suggested the need to add return to Frontex risk analysis products (as well as to vulnerability assessments) to ensure that 
they capture all components of EIBM. Frontex also highlighted the need to incorporate returns into risk analysis444,445,but there are a 
number of challenges. The first is the lack of clarity regarding the purpose of analyzing the risks linked to returns. For instance, if the 
main objective is to assess the risk of unsuccessful returns (for example, at strategic level), there will be a need for specific types of 
information  to  be  collected  both  at  Member  State  level  (risk  of  absconding,  for  example),  or  in  third  countries  (risk  linked  to 
compliance with international agreements, or security threats), neither of which is presently collected. Returns are not covered under 
the vulnerability assessment and national capacity for successful returns is unclear. If, for instance, an aspect of return is successful 
‘reintegration’ of returnees, procedures and data to make such assessment are not available. Frontex and Member States are currently 
discussing the types of return indicators that could be added to the risk methodology.  

In the context of the fourth tier of EIBM, ‘activities inside the EU/Schengen Area and between EU and Schengen countries’ is one 
area  that  can  improve  risk  analysis.  Stakeholders,  particularly  those  from  Member  States  authorities  without  land  or  sea  external 
borders,  consider  that  secondary  movements  are  not  sufficiently  covered  in  Frontex’s  risk  analysis  products.  There  are  some 
significant gaps in data on incidents with movement and detection of irregular migrants outside internal border areas.  

EQ10.  How  and  to  what  extent  has  Frontex  delivered  relevant  assistance  to  Member  States  in  the  training  of  national 
border/coast guards, including the establishment of common training standards? 

A great majority of Member States reported that the training of border and coast guards, and return experts, as per Frontex’s mandate, 
is clearly defined and conducive to addressing their needs446. Member States noted that the education and training of the EBCG, in 
particular  the  common  training  standards,  provided  by  Frontex  contributed  to  improving  training  of  national  border  guards447, 
developing  and  strengthening  border  management  capabilities  in  Member  States448,  facilitating  cooperation  among  Member  States’ 

444   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
445   Frontex (n.d.). ‘Regulation Review RAU contribution’. (Unpublished, provided to ICF). 
446   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 15/27 agreed, 5/27 strongly agreed. 
447   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 
448   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed. MS/SAC’ overall satisfaction with the extent to which training activities tailored for them met broader objec-   

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border and coast guard training institutions449, successfully mainstreaming fundamental rights in the national training programmes450, 
and  ensuring  a  harmonised  and  common  approach  to  EU  border  and  coast  guard  training  in  the  Member  States451.  Both  the 
implementation of specialised training on the EES and ETIAS, for example, and the implementation of the Common Core Curricula 
(CCC) guaranteed strategic cooperation among Member States (with the assistance of Frontex, to some extent).  

While Member States valued Frontex’s assistance in training national border/coast guards as part of the SC, at least 14 Member States 
noted that the training for Category 2 or 3 or for Member  States was not  frequent enough, due to the focus on the training for SC 
Category 1452.  

As further elaborated under EQ  6.2, the biggest  training-specific issues  were:  (1) insufficient capacity within Frontex to deliver  all 
training  activities,  (2)  the  lack  of  high-quality  trainers  (partly  due  to  the  lack  of  a  trainer  profile  in  the  SC  and  to  inadequate 
compensation for trainers), and (3) difficulties in finding and managing host training centers. 

EQ11. How has Frontex supported Member States by deploying its technical equipment in the Member States? 

Frontex  provided  a  total  of  2  194  items  to  the  technical  equipment  pool  for  use  by  the  SCin  the  second  quarter  of  2023453.  The 
provision  of  technical  resources  was  somewhat  effective  in  maintaining  and  raising  the  level  of  cooperation  at  strategic  and 
operational level among Member States, and with the assistance of Frontex.  

Nevertheless, a number of shortcomings were identified by the Agency: 

tives (such as developing and strengthening border management capability) is coherent with the higher extent of cooperation of national stakeholders in the    
design of training activities.  

449   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27 agreed, 3/27 strongly agreed. 
450   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed, 2/27 strongly agreed. 
451   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 17/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 
452   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 10/27; field visits to three MS; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
453   Among which: 1) Aerial Surveillance Services (through Framework Contracts for manned and unmanned aircrafts), including 16 Fixed Wing  Aircrafts, 2) 
Services for transportation by land, sea, and air, and in support of returns and readmissions, 3) 86 Patrol Cars, 4) 100 Mobile Offices and other deployable 
facilities, 5) 13 Mobile Surveillance Systems, 6) 1 977 items of portable equipment, including equipment for border checks, as well as portable surveillance 
equipment, including optical and thermal imaging. Quarterly Report on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s Capabilities Q2/2023.              

165 

 
 
 
 
• 

• 

In 2020, there were some gaps in the percentage of technical equipment needs met, and shortages in almost every category 
of  technical  equipment  following  the  annual  bilateral  negotiations  (in  particular,  for  fixed-wing  aircraft),  and  in  the 
percentage of RBI Aegean 2020 covered. Two additional resources requests were needed454; 
In  the  years  2021,  2022  and  2023,  there  were  shortages  in  specific  technical  equipment  (mainly  fixed-wing  aircrafts, 
helicopters, coastal patrol vessels, offshore patrol vessels) following the annual bilateral negotiations.  

On the one hand, certain Member States encountered challenges in acquiring TE, primarily due to conflicting national priorities and 
the  requirement  to  contribute  to  shared  resources.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  Member  States  have 
consistently delivered on their legal obligations in this regard. A persistent issue remains that Member States  do not make available 
the equipment that was purchased via EU-funding, to the Agency, although it is mandatory to do so for the equipment that is regulated 
by Article 64(14) of the EBCG Regulation. Not making this equipment available results in Frontex not being able to use these types of 
large-scale  equipment  in  addressing  the  challenges  at  the  external  borders  in  support  of  Member  States455.  A  minority  of  Member 
States indicated challenges or obstacles in obtaining technical equipment assistance from Frontex456, with some stating that Frontex’s 
progress in this area has not been sufficiently fast457.  

Availability issues identified in the stakeholder consultations included: 

•  Initial lack of use of force equipment for deployed SC at border crossing points. This issue has since been resolved;458 
•  Lack of mobile surveillance system and patrol cars459 (the latter was also noted by Frontex); 
•  Pauses  between  the  deployment  of  different  fixed-wing  aircraft  in  JO  Opal  Coast  due  to  lack  of  sufficient  planes,460  or 

between the deployments of other types of equipment461 (also noted by Frontex); 

454   Management Board Decision 41/2021 of 15 July 2021 adopting the Annual Implementation Report 2020. 
455   Frontex (2023). ‘Draft Annual Implementation Report 2022’. 
456   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 3/27; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 10/27, 13/27 did not answer.  
457   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 2/27. 
458   Field visit in one MS. 
459   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
460   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 2/27. One comment stated that during Joint Operation Opal Coast, the live-streaming function of the fixed-wing aircraft was 

often unavailable and the plane’s tracking device was switched off several times. 

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•  Lack of lorry scanners with technical operators462;  
•  Lack of Offshore Patrol Vessels and aircraft463; 
•  Not enough heavy equipment (ME) in general464; 
•  Not enough crews deployed with heavy equipment (ME), which limits the operational use of said equipment465; 
•  Some compatibility issues of Frontex provided equipment with the technical equipment already in use by national border 

guards were also mentioned466. 

Key  stakeholders  within  Frontex  confirmed  that  the  demand  for  technical  equipment  was  higher  than  could  be  met467.  The  annual 
bilateral  negotiations  capture  needs  at  a  specific  point  in  time,  but  those  needs  may  subsequently  fluctuate468.  The  effectiveness  of 
training  activities  is  thus  somewhat  complicated  by  the  shared  responsibility  of  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  with 
Member States. At the same time, a majority of Member States agreed or strongly agreed that, in the spirit of shared responsibility, the 
division of competence between Member States and Frontex, as set out in the EBCG Regulation, is sufficiently clear and adequate to 
meet  the  objectives  on  education  and  training  of  border  and  coast  guards.  From  a  design  point  of  view,  there  appears  to  be  a 
satisfactory level of involvement from both sides. 

The  effectiveness  of  the  provision  of  technical  resource  support  within  and  by  Frontex  was  hindered  by  incomplete  capability 
planning,  broader  legislative  issues  (for  example,  with  the  Financial  Regulation,  the  EU  Staff  Regulations),  issues  with  the  EBCG 
Regulation, and operational/implementation problems in the planning, procurement and deployment of technical resources.   

461   Field visit in one MS; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
462   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
463   Field visit in one MS. 
464   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 1/27; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
465   Field visit in one MS. 
466   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. One MS reported initially having issues with this, but not anymore, purchasing equipment according to Frontex specifi-   

cations. 

467   Interview with Frontex.  
468   Interviews with Frontex and MS/SAC national authorities: 3/27. 

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EQ12.  How  has  Frontex  cooperated  with  authorities  in  third  countries?  How  has  Frontex  facilitated  cooperation  between 
Member  States  and  authorities  in  third  countries?  To  what  extent  has  this  cooperation  been  framed  within  a  broader 
framework of the EU’s external action? 

Overall,  Frontex’s  activities  in  the  external  dimension,  especially  cooperation  with  third  countries,  is  well  regarded  by  key 
stakeholders  and  has  a  clear  legal  basis469.  Under  the  Regulation,  Frontex  can  cooperate  with  third  countries  via  status  agreements, 
working arrangements, or through non-operational cooperation470.  

The EBCG Regulation (Article 73) brought new opportunities for cooperation with third countries, including the ability for Frontex to 
conduct joint operational activities with executive powers anywhere on the territory of a third country, subject to a status agreement 
and an operational plan. It also allows for the exchange of information with third countries in the framework of EUROSUR (Article 
75) through the inclusion of EUROSUR provisions in an operational plan based on a status agreement or a working arrangement.  

Frontex’s  engagement  with  third  countries  sits  within  the  broader  framework  of  EU  external  action,  as  outlined  in  its  International 
Cooperation  Strategy  (2021-2023)  and  is  an  integral  part  of  EIBM.  Frontex  aims  to  contribute  to  EU  external  action  policy  and 
promote EIBM standards through EU and Member State initiatives471. The great majority of Member States agreed that cooperation 
with  third  countries  is  clearly  defined  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  is  conducive  to  addressing  specific  needs  and  challenges  at 
external borders472.  

The  EBCG  Regulation  added  new  fundamental  rights  and  data  protection  safeguards,  improving  the  clarity  of  requirements  for 
cooperation with third countries. The high level of scrutiny by EU institutions exists to provide safeguards and ensure that cooperation 
with third countries is in line with EU external action and compliant with fundamental rights and data protection principles. 

469   Relevant articles of Section 11 of the EBCG Regulation. 
470   Non-operational  cooperation  (such  as  implementation  of  EU-funded  capacity-building  projects  to  build  administrative  capacity,  transmit  know-how  or 
enhance situational awareness of border management) also contribute to developing new partnerships that can lead to more formalised forms of cooperation 
at a later stage.  

471   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’, p. 36.    
472   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed, 1/27 strongly agreed. 

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Currently, Frontex cooperates with some third countries under status agreements based on the 2016 EBCG Regulation (negotiations 
on new agreements in line with the new model status agreement have been concluded or are ongoing). In line with Article 76(1) of the 
EBCG  Regulation,  a  model  status  agreement  was  adopted  by  the  European  Commission  in  December  2021473.  Four  new  status 
agreements already follow the revised model, in line with the 2019 EBCG Regulation (Moldova, North Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Albania) The first-ever JO with executive powers on the territory of a third country was launched in Albania in 2019474. Since then, 
Frontex has launched operations in Montenegro (2020), Serbia (2021), and North Macedonia (2023)475.  

One  of  the  implementation  challenges  reported  by  Frontex  is  the  voluntary  nature  of  Member  States  participation  in  operational 
activities stemming from a status agreement on the territory of a third country. This lack of obligatory participation  creates gaps in 
operational needs and does not allow Frontex to fully perform its activities. This is also true in relation to technical equipment, with 
the  current  legal  framework  foreseeing  (co-)  financing  of  technical  equipment  only  in  the  context  of  a  participating  and/or  hosting 
Member State476. 

The Commission  also  adopted a model  working  arrangement on 21  December 2021.  Frontex finalised negotiations of  a number of 
working arrangements based on this new model. The first such text, negotiated with Niger, received a negative opinion from EDPS, 
which  found  the  arrangement’s  data  protection  provisions  insufficient  for  inter-national  data  transfers  to  Niger.  Because  these 
provisions are broadly based on the model working arrangement, the Commission is currently working with Frontex and the EDPS to 
amend the model’s personal data protection provisions. Once a text has been agreed with EDPS, the finalisation of the negotiations of 
these  new  generation  working  arrangements  can  take  place.  Frontex  currently  has  twenty  working  arrangements  with  third  country 
authorities in place, all based on earlier iterations of the EBCG Regulation.  

473   European Commission (2021). ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Model status agreement as referred to in 
Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast  Guard and repealing 
Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624’. COM(2021) 829. 
474   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’, p. 4.    
475   Frontex (2023). ‘Draft Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022’.  
476   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation EMB/2023’, p. 2. 

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Frontex has access to other means to cooperate with third countries as well. Article 73(4) of the EBCG Regulation links cooperation 
with  third countries within the framework of  working  arrangements to  be undertaken ‘where  available’. This allows the  Agency to 
undertake other types of cooperation (capacity-building, technical assistance, etc.), which can serve as a trust-building tool before a 
more formalised agreement is concluded. 

Another  important  mechanism  is  the  deployment  FLOs  to  third  countries,  which  are  hosted  in  EU  Delegations  in  those  countries, 
ensuring  EEAS  support  to  Frontex  activities.  By  2022,  Frontex  had  deployed  six  FLOs,  covering  14  countries477.  From  a  Member 
State perspective, the role and contribution of FLOs is not always clear. The site visits to Greece and Bulgaria, for instance, found no 
contact between the Member States authorities and the FLO in neighbouring Turkey478, suggesting that the role and added value for 
the management of the EU-Turkey border could be improved. On the other hand, the Frontex headquarters’ perspective was somewhat 
different, as the Risk Analysis Unit received various types of useful data from the Turkey-based FLO. 

Although  related  to  cooperation  of  Member  States  with  third  countries  and  therefore  not  strictly  relevant  from  perspective  of  the 
Agency,  it  is  worth  noting  that  almost  all  Member  States  (three  missing)  and  SACs  have  provided  the  Commission  so  far  with 
information  on  the  existing  bilateral  or  multilateral  agreements  related  to  border  management  and  return  concluded  with  third 
countries  as  required  by  Article  76(3)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896.  Frontex  has  been  receiving  this  information  bilaterally  from 
Member States and SACs already. No draft provisions of the new agreements have been provided to the Commission for consultation 
in accordance with Art. 76(3) of the Regulation. 

EQ13. How has Frontex cooperated with the EU agencies, CSDP Missions and Operations and international organisations, in 
particular on the coast guard functions with EFCA and EMSA and with relevant national/international organisations? 
EQ13.1 How does the agency cooperation with international organisations and does the EBCG Regulation allow the Agency to 
cooperate with all international organisations that are relevant for carrying out its tasks efficiently?  

477   Frontex (2023). ‘Draft Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022’, Activity 5.1.1. 
478   Interviews with two MS.   

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Cooperation with international organisations under working arrangements is limited by specific provisions in Article 68 of the EBCG 
Regulation,  which  sets  out  an  exhaustive  list  of  international  organisations479  with  which  Frontex  may  cooperate.  According  to 
Frontex,  this  limits  the  ability  of  the  Agency  to  develop  more  structured  cooperation  with  relevant  partners,  including  some 
organisations  with  which  it  has  established  useful  cooperation  in  the  past  (e.g.,  ICMPD,  DCAF,  NATO,  WCO).  The  Agency’s 
external  work is  coordinated with  the support of the Commission,  any new working  arrangements are subject  to  the Commission’s 
prior  approval  and  must  also  be  approved  by  the  MB.  This  suggests  sufficient  mechanisms  to  steer  the  Agency  in  the  external 
dimension and provide oversight of its cooperation with the right partners, making the added value of including an exhaustive list of 
organisations in the EBCG Regulation unclear. Similarly, there is no reference in the EBCG Regulation to the Agency's cooperation 
with non-State actors, although Frontex is also involved in post-return and post-arrival activities alongside non-State actors, such as 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)480. 

Concrete forms of cooperation can differ. For example, a number of these international organisations take part in the CF and cooperate 
with  Frontex on the promotion  of EIBM that is  fully compliant with  human rights  (such as the  CoE, OSCE/Office for  Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the United Nations Human Rights Office 
(OHCHR),  International  Organization  for  Migration  (IOM)).  Other  areas  include  cooperation  linked  to  border  management/cross-
border crime more broadly (including with Interpol, OSCE, and MAOC-N).  

In practice, Frontex has working arrangements with eight international organisations. This includes two that are not listed in Article 68 
of the EBCG Regulation (DCAF, ICMPD). These working arrangements pre-date the Regulation.  

Frontex  is  able  to  maintain  less  formal  cooperation  with  organisations  outside  of  working  arrangements.  With  such  organisations 
Frontex aims to promote dialogue and coordination in areas of mutual interest, including cooperation with the WCO, ICMPD, Allied 
Maritime Command (MARCOM) of NATO and the ILO481. 

479   United  Nations  (UN),  International  Criminal  Police  Organisation  (Interpol),  Organisation  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE),  Council  of 

Europe (COE) and Maritima Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N). 

480   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
481   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’, p. 35.  

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In its analysis  of the  EBCG Regulation,  Frontex  emphasised the importance of  expanding  Article  68 to  ensure that  it can  maintain 
effective cooperation on customs, especially in relation to cross-border crime482. Article 68(4) of the EBCG Regulation explicitly calls 
for cooperation between the Agency and the Commission, Member States, and the EEAS in activities relating to customs, including 
risk  management.  Frontex  cooperates  with  customs  on  coastguard  functions,  joint  operational  activities,  training,  and  information 
sharing (among others)483.  

Although  Article 68 of the EBCG Regulation  does not  foresee NATO  as a cooperation partner,  Frontex has had different  forms  of 
cooperation with NATO in the past, with NATO contributing to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and migration in the 
Mediterranean  Sea,  deploying  a  maritime  force  in  2016  to  provide  intelligence,  surveillance  and  reconnaissance  (Operation  Sea 
Guardian)484. NATO has developed close cooperation with a number of EU operations in the Mediterranean (e.g. EUNAVFOR Med 
Operation Sophia)485, and has in the past agreed on the modalities of cooperation with Frontex operations (e.g., in the Aegean Sea)486. 

EQ13.2 How has the Agency cooperated with EU agencies? 

Cooperation with specific agencies depends on areas of common interest. For example, cooperation with the EFCA and the EMSA is 
established  to  support  the  implementation  of  the  European  cooperation  on  coast  guard  functions.  Through  a  Tripartite  Working 
Arrangement,  the  three  agencies  support  within  their  respective  mandates,  one  another  and  national  authorities  responsible  for 
coastguard functions, including via information-sharing, surveillance and communication services, capacity-building and risk analysis. 
The three agencies work jointly on multipurpose operations, where they undertake activities to support various coastguard functions 
falling  under  their  respective  remit487.  Overall,  cooperation  is  rated  positively  by  both  agencies,  and  the  legal  base  for  their 

482   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation’. Internal document, p. 7  
483   Frontex (2019). ‘Smart borders: bringing Frontex and customs closer together’.  
484   Drake, N.R. (2018). ‘Efficiency and relevance of EU-NATO operations in the Mediterranean as a cure for irregular migration.’  
485   See: 

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm#:~:text=NATO%20is%20contributing%20to%20international%20efforts%20to%20stem,international
%20law%20and%20the%20law%20of%20the%20sea 

486   European Commission (2016). ‘Modalities of the cooperation between Frontex and NATO in the Aegean Sea’. Statement. Available at:  

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_16_601  

487   Interviews with Frontex, EFCA, EMSA. 

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cooperation is sound. However, as Frontex’s functions deal with elements outside of EMSA and EFCA’s mandates, the two agencies 
would  like  greater  clarity  on  Frontex’s  core  functions  and  thematic  areas  and  the  legal  implications  of  operating  outside  territorial 
waters for coast guard functions.   

Overall cooperation with Europol is rated as good, with regular contact between the two agencies488. A minority of Member States 
stressed the importance of ensuring complementarity and avoiding overlaps, in view of Frontex tasks in the area of cross-border crime.  
Europol  cited some instances where  Frontex took on tasks that fell within the Europol  remit,  requiring follow-up clarifications, for 
example where both agencies issued risk analysis products related to the impact on EU security of the Russian Federation’s aggression 
towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, Europol believes that communication between the two agencies is effective, and that it is possible to 
resolve such issues. Some Frontex stakeholders noted that the EBCG Regulation does not sufficiently specify the role, limitations, and 
procedures in its tasks to support Europol, Eurojust and national law enforcement authorities489 or that its mandate in this area is too 
narrow. Yet the importance of avoiding overlaps in mandates of Frontex and Europol has been highlighted by the Commission and 
some Member States, which partly explains the narrow interpretation of Frontex mandate in this field490. Moreover, the majority of 
Member  States  agreed  that  the  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  was  already  well  defined491,  and  did  not  suggest  further 
expanding  the  mandate  of  Frontex  in  this  field. A  new  working  arrangement  between  the  Agencies  would  be  needed  to  clarify  the 
details of their cooperation under their enhanced mandate.  

In  line  with  the  respective  mandates  of  Frontex  and  EUAA,  the  two  agencies  are  expected  to  coordinate  their  activities  to  support 
Member States on returns. They are also expected to cooperate on Migration Management Support Teams (Article 40) as well as in 
other common operational activities, such as shared risk analysis, training, and support to Member States with contingency planning 
(recital 53))492.  

488   Interviews  with  Frontex  and  Europol;  survey  of  MS/SACs  authorities:  14/27  agreed;  1/27  strongly  agreed  that  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  is 

clear-ly defined and conducive to addressing specific needs and challenges at external borders. 

489   ICF interviews with EDPS and Frontex. 
490   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 4/27.  
491   Survey  of  MS/SAC  authorities,  14/27  agreed  and  1/27  strongly  agreed  that  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  is  clearly  defined  and  conducive  to 

addressing specific needs and challenges at external borders. 

492   Interviews with Frontex and EUAA. 

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Frontex cooperates with CEPOL on capacity-building and contributes to the EU Strategic Training Needs Assessments (EU-STNA), 
which identifies training needs in the area of internal security and its external dimension493. Frontex contributes to CEPOL webinars 
and online modules and provides trainers and speakers. Frontex believes that the two mandates are complementary and can effectively 
reinforce one another, but has also specified the need to ensure close coordination and clear division of training tasks494. 

FRA  is  a  member  of  the  CF  and  also  participates  in  the  ETIAS  Fundamental  Rights  Guidance  Board.  A  representative  of  FRA  is 
invited  to  Frontex  MB  meetings  when  the  agenda  includes  points  related  to  fundamental  rights.  FRA  assisted  Frontex  to  establish, 
develop the concept for implementing the relevant provisions, and recruit the FRMs495. 

Frontex has increased its cooperation with eu-LISA. The two agencies exchange expertise and best practice on training, information 
and communications technology (ICT)-related projects and services, research and development. The collaboration between eu-LISA 
and  Frontex  takes  place  within  the  framework  of  the  implementation  of  ETIAS,  EES  and  interoperability.  eu-LISA  also  assisted 
Frontex to implement its access to the SIS, as well as with capacity-building for Frontex officers, with training modules developed by 
eu-LISA. 

EQ13.3  How  has  the  Agency  cooperated  with  CSDP  Missions  and  Operations?  Is  the  existing  framework  of  cooperation 
sufficient? How could it be improved? 

Frontex has successfully enhanced its cooperation with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. The 
war in Ukraine showed that having a more overarching mechanism for cooperation with CSDP missions could provide the necessary 
flexibility for Frontex to establish swift cooperation with those CSDP missions not previously considered a priority.  

Cooperation  with  CSDP  missions  and  operations  is  limited  to  the  areas  specified  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  (Article  68(1)(j),  which 
include ‘(i) the promotion of European integrated border management standards; (ii) situational awareness and risk analysis’. Current 

493   CEPOL (2022). ‘European Union Strategic Training Needs Assessment 2022-2025’. Available at: https://www.cepol.europa.eu/publications/european-union-

strategic-training-needs-assessment-2022-2025  

494   Interview with Frontex. 
495   Interview with Frontex. 

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cooperation efforts vary depending on the country of interest and the mandate of the specific mission or operation. In practice, Frontex 
has  a  working  arrangement  with  one  CSDP  mission  (EUCAP  Sahel  Niger)  and  one  CSDP  operation  (Operation  UNAVFORMED 
Irini). It has also opened discussions with the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine and EUBAM Libya496. Not all CSDP missions 
or operations have mandates that are aligned with the tasks of Frontex, but those focused on civilian security and capacity-building are 
more natural partners. 

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CCPC) within EEAS confirmed that it is in regular contact with Frontex to explore 
areas  of  cooperation  with  the  CSDP  missions.  EEAS  sees  considerable  added  value  in  being  able  to  draw  on  Frontex  expertise. 
Interviews  with  different  divisions  of  the  EEAS497  acknowledged  general  cooperation  (both  operationally  and  on  policy)  between 
Frontex and the EEAS, albeit with some room for improvement. Overall, EEAS sees the EBCG Regulation as sufficient to facilitate 
its cooperation with Frontex.  

EEAS  highlighted  that  CSDP  missions  can  provide  strong  support  to  Frontex,  as  they  usually  have  well-established  contacts  with 
authorities in their host countries and have a solid awareness of the local situation498. Frontex has indicated its interest in enhancing 
cooperation  with  CSDP  missions,  an  interest  shared  by  the  EEAS,  which  suggested  including  cooperation  with  CSDP  missions 
explicitly in Article 10 of the EBCG Regulation to raise awareness of potential cooperation499. 

EEAS  favours  having  one  overarching  working  arrangement  for  all  CSDP  missions,  so  as  to  enhance  flexibility  of  cooperation. 
Negotiating a working arrangement can reportedly take between one and one-and-a-half years, which does not allow for adaptation to 
unexpected needs. The ability to develop swift cooperation between a CSDP mission and Frontex in response to new threats would 
have been beneficial in the case of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in early 2022. Frontex was active on the EU side of the 
Eastern border but did not have a status agreement with Ukraine500 or a working arrangement with EUAM Ukraine, limiting its ability 
to  cooperate  with  both.  However,  one  difficulty  with  having  an  overarching  cooperation  agreement  is  the  fact  that  not  all  CSDP 

496   Frontex (2022). ‘Draft Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2021’, Activity 5.2.1. 
497   Interviews with EEAS.  
498   Interview with EEAS. 
499   Interview with EEAS. 
500   Frontex did have a working arrangement in place with the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service. 

175 

 
 
 
 
missions operate in third countries that are set as a priority by Frontex (on the basis of specifications set out in the EBCG Regulation). 
Any potential overarching working arrangement would likely need to include a mechanism for prior approval by the Commission and 
MB before launching cooperation with a new CSDP mission. 

EQ14. How has Frontex promoted and respected fundamental rights through all the Agency’s activities? 
EQ14.1. In which ways has Frontex created the conditions for ensuring and promoting the respect of Fundamental Rights in 
its activities?  

Frontex  has  put  in  place  a  number  of  conditions  to  ensure  and  promote  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights,  by  adopting  and/or 
implementing rules  and  procedures. This  includes adoption  of the  Fundamental  Rights Strategy and  the  implementing Action Plan, 
involving  the  FRO  extensively  in  the  activities  of  the  Agency  (contributing  to  a  wide  range  of  tools  and  procedures,  such  as 
operational  plans),  the  deployments  of  FRMs  in  the  field  (almost  1000  days  in  2022),  adopting  relevant  MB  Decisions  (on  the 
complaints mechanism, SIRs, supervisory mechanism on the use of force, etc.), data protection safeguards and Data Protection Officer 
(DPO) activities, and training and efforts to promote a fundamental rights culture within the Agency.  

The research shows that these elements have the potential to guarantee fundamental rights compliance by the Agency, and significant 
progress has certainly been made despite some setbacks and initial delays, such as adopting MB Decisions and recruiting 40 FRMs – 
although  Frontex  now  has  46  operational  FRMs  –  which  may  pose  risks  to  delivering  on  the  commitments  to  ensure  respect  for 
fundamental rights. See further details in EQ 5.6 and 6.4. 

EQ14.2.  How  has  the  Serious  Incident  Reports  (SIRs)  mechanism  been  implemented  to  provide  an  effective  procedure  to 
report and investigate potential fundamental rights violations?  

From  a  fundamental  rights  perspective,  the  SIR  mechanism  provides  important  information  for  the  FRO  to  monitor  the  Agency's 
compliance with its obligations to respect fundamental rights. It also provides the Agency with an important tool to predict potential 
risks  of  fundamental  rights  violations,  which  can  be  mitigated  through  better  training,  increased  scrutiny,  greater  deployments  of 
FRMs,  or  safeguards  and  other  considerations  being  included  in  the  Operational  Plans.  However,  the  research  found  a  number  of 
factors that continue to limit its effectiveness. Some of these factors, crucial among them an insufficient involvement of the FRO in 
handling reports, have been addressed in the 2021 adoption of the revised SOP on SIRs, which repealed and replaced the original SOP 

176 

 
 
 
from  2014.  Other  factors  persist,  such  as  limited  sources  of  information,  which  can  be  exacerbated  by  regularly  facing  perceived 
insufficient cooperation during investigations and follow-up from national authorities, difficulty in ascertaining/imposing sanctions, as 
well as lack of transparency (SIRs are restricted documents) and avenues for redress501. 

Early on, the Working Group on fundamental rights and legal operational aspects of operations in the Aegean Sea (FRaLO)502 and the 
FSWG  pointed  out  the  insufficient  involvement  of  FRO  in  handling  SIRs  (before  2021).  The  functioning  of  the  SIR  mechanism 
assumes a shared culture of high attention to fundamental rights protection within the Agency and among all participants in Frontex’s 
activities, who should report not only evidence but also suspected cases of violations. However, the FSWG found that some deployed 
border guards who needed to submit a SIR through the chain of command were discouraged from submitting the report503.  

Other challenges reported include the long processing time for individual SIRs (limited staff, for example), insufficient cooperation 
from national authorities during investigations, and inadequate follow-up from national authorities504.  

SIRs are followed up through the recommendations made by the SI-Handler in a final report and through the reporting on patterns of 
SIRs  to  the  MB,  while  continuous  follow-up  is  ensured  by  the  FRO.  A  model  is  now  being  tested  with  one  Member  State  where 
dedicated liaisons have been appointed to facilitate closer interaction with the FRO505.    

The  analysis  highlighted  the  absence  of  sanctions  for  failing  to  report  SIRs  related  to  fundamental  rights  violations,  and  the 
insufficient indications of the sanctions applicable to those responsible and how often they are imposed.   

SIRs could lead to disciplinary measures for failing to comply with the Code of Conduct. However, Frontex indicated that for SIRs 
category 1, the responsibility and sanctions are more difficult to ascertain and impose, as these typically relate to national authorities’ 
actions (with some rare exceptions pending)506.    

501   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
502   Management Board Decision 39/2020 of 26 November 2020 on the establishment of the Management Board Working Group on Fundamental Rights and   

Legal and Operational Aspects of Operations.  

503   FSWG (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning fundamental rights violations’. 
504   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
505   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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SIRs are treated as restricted documents, limiting stakeholders’ access and, potentially, the transparency and accountability of Frontex 
insofar as it has taken/not taken action.   

The low number of SIRs initially may indicate that the mechanism was not fully utilised and/or not functioning well, as the number of 
SIRs was low compared to the potential fundamental rights violations documented by independent organisations. In 2022, the Agency 
reported a continuously increasing number of SIRs related to fundamental rights (72 SIRs category 1, of which 8 remained open in 
April 2023). By November 2023, the FRO had opened 43 SIRs concerned with fundamental rights507. 

The  shortcomings  of  the  SIR  mechanism,  in  particular  following  the  investigations  into  allegations  of  Frontex’s  involvement  in 
pushbacks,  prompted  the  Agency  to  improve  the  mechanism.  One  initiative  was  the  adoption  of  an  amended  SOP  on  the  SIR 
mechanism  in  2021,  which  replaced  the  2014  SOP  on  SIRs  and  enhanced  the  role  of  the  FRO  by  allowing  for  direct  reporting  of 
situations that potentially violate fundamental rights, as well as automatically assigning the FRO as case-handler for alleged violations 
of fundamental rights508.  

To ensure increased reporting, the FRO took steps to increase Agency staff awareness of the SIR mechanism and the revised SOP, 
through  training  and  briefing  activities.  In  addition,  the  FRO  created  a  dedicated  SIR  team  (around  six  staff  members)  within  the 
Fundamental Rights Office. The capacity of the SIR team is considered sufficient for now, although there is a need to increase the 
resources allocated, given the growing number of SCOs and new deployment activities509. The work of FRMs could be considered a 
contributing factor to the growing number of SIRs. The presence of FRMs on the ground encourages deployed staff to submit SIRs510, 
and FRMs are also able to submit SIRs themselves should they witness, or be made aware of, incidents that merit doing so.   

506   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
507   Frontex (2023). ‘Fundamental Rights Office’. Internal document. 
508   Executive Director Decision on standard operating procedure (SOP) – serious incident reporting. 
509   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
510   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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The adoption of the SOP on SIRs is relatively recent and further monitoring is needed to assess the functioning of the SIR mechanism 
under the new rules511. Overall, the SIR mechanism remains an important instrument in the toolbox of the FRO to map and indicate 
fundamental rights challenges and monitor the Agency’s compliance with its fundamental rights obligations. 

EQ14.3.  How  has  the  Complaints  Mechanism  provided  an  effective  and  accessible  tool  for  reporting,  investigating,  and 
remedying perceived breaches of fundamental rights?  

Overall, the analysis found that the good functioning of the complaints mechanism is limited by a number of factors related to its set 
up  and  implementation.  There  is  some  lack  of  clarity  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  (the  procedure  referenced  in  Article  111(5))  and 
potential inconsistencies between the EBCG Regulation and MB Decision 19/2022. To strengthen the mechanism’s functioning, the 
Agency and the FRO have taken positive steps and worked to raise awareness of the mechanism, while MB Decision 19/2022 adopted 
rules to develop the mechanism further. Nevertheless, some of the issues remain. 

Despite being one of the main reporting mechanisms, there are concerns about the set up and implementation of this mechanism. The 
Agency  registered  a  low  number  of  complaints  initially  (before  2021),  18  in  2019  (7  admissible),  and  24  in  2020  (7  admissible). 
However, from 2021, the number increased significantly, with 27 complaints in 2021 (6 admissible)512 and 69 in 2022 (9 admissible, 
10 under admissibility assessment). As of 1 September 2023, 37 complaints have been registered, with four deemed admissible and a 
further  seven  pending  assessment.  This  gives  a  total  of  some  200  complaints  under  the  mechanism,  with  an  admissibility  rate  of 
around 20%513. The inadmissibility may derive from different factors, such as complaints not concerning operational activities of the 
Agency,  complaints  not  directly  affecting  the  individuals  submitting  them  or  lack  of  fundamental  rights  issues,  working  relations 
between the Agency’s and its staff, etc.  

Over the years, a number of stakeholders have raised concerns about  the set up and implementation  of the complaints mechanism, 
suggesting  that  these  may  have  limited  its  capacity  to  provide  an  effective  and  accessible  tool  for  reporting,  investigating,  and 
remedying  alleged  breaches  of  fundamental  rights.  More  specifically,  these  concerns  relate  to  access,  scope,  independence,  and 

511   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 1/27. 
512   Frontex (2022). ‘Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’. 
513   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office.  

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transparency  of  the  mechanism,  the  limited  role  of  the  DPO  in  the  process,  issues  with  follow-up  to  complaints,  and  absence  of 
remedy and appeal.  

The complaints mechanism does not provide access to those who have not been affected ‘directly’ by actions or omissions514, nor does 
it allow the possibility to initiate a complaint ex officio515 (whereas it is possible for the FRO to initiate SIRs category 1 based on third-
party information and sources) nor to submit anonymous complaints516. This restricted access might be a contributing factor to the low 
number of complaints submitted via this mechanism. 

The EP517 and the European Ombudsman518 called into question the independence of the complaints mechanism, given the role of the 
FRO and ED respectively, in  assessing  and deciding on the complaints. Although  the FRO recommends appropriate follow-up, the 
decision on the merits of the complaint lies with the ED, who should ensure proper follow-up and report back to the FRO. The EBCG 
Regulation does not establish the criteria to be used by the ED to decide the merits of the complaint, nor was this addressed by MB 
Decision 19/2022. For complaints concerning national staff, the merits of the complaints are assessed by the national authorities, as 
the  FRO  forwards  those  complaints  to  the  relevant  Member  States  and  sends  a  copy  to  the  Member  States’  national  human  rights 
institution for further action, according to their mandates.  

Where a complaint relates to data protection issues, the ED consults the DPO before taking a decision519. During the consultation, it 
was reported that the work of the DPO in this area has been very limited so far520. There is also a risk of overlap between FRO and 

514   European Council on Refugees and Exile (ECRE) (2021). ‘Holding Frontex to account. ECRE’s proposals for  strengthening non-judicial mechanisms for 

scrutiny of Frontex’.  

515   FRA (2018). ‘The revised European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications. Opinion of the European Union  

Agency for Fundamental Rights’.  

516   Interviews with the European Ombudsman, FRA, a civil society organisation/member of the CF (5) and a civil society organisation/ non-member of the CF; 

European Ombudsman (2020). ‘Decision in OI/5/2020/MHZ on the functioning of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency's (Frontex)  
complaints mechanism for alleged breaches of fundamental rights and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer’.      

517   FSWG (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning fundamental rights violations’. 
518   European  Ombudsman  (2020).  ‘Decision  in  Case  OI/5/2020/MHZ,  Functioning  of  the  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  Agency's  (Frontex)  complaints 

mechanism for alleged breaches of fundamental rights and the role of the Fundamental Rights Officer’.  
519   Management Board Decision 19/2022 of 16 March 2022 adopting rules on the complaints mechanism.  
520   Interview with Frontex. 

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DPO activities in relation to data protection complaints, as the processing of personal data requirements is regulated as a fundamental 
right, limiting DPO involvement521.  

Another challenge is transparency, as the EBCG Regulation does not establish the criteria to be used by the ED for the decisions on 
the complaints, giving them considerable discretion522.   

The  low  number  of  complaints  received  could  be  due  to  the  lack  of  awareness  and  engagement  by  Frontex  officers  in  providing 
information on the mechanism to individuals (such as new arrivals).  

The FSWG523 and the European Ombudsman524 stressed the inadequate and delayed follow-up to complaints. Regarding complaints 
about  Frontex  staff,  two  civil  society  organisations  expressed  doubts  about  the  follow-up  to  complaints  and  the  extent  to  which 
corrective measures are implemented within the Agency525. For complaints about national staff, the FRO reported that the follow-up 
from the national authorities has been inadequate526.  

On  the  admissibility  of  complaints,  the  complainants  have  no  remedy  to  appeal  the  decision  by  the  FRO  that  a  complaint  is  not 
admissible.  The  only  possibility  provided  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  is  for  the  complainants  to  submit  new  evidence  when  the 
complaints are declared inadmissible or unfounded; in such cases, the FRO reassesses the complaint527. The FRO’s decision does not 
prevent  the  complainant  from  pursuing  redress  through  other  avenues,  such  as  the  national  or  European  courts,  or  relevant  entities 
such as the Ombuds institutions. 

The EBCG Regulation does not provide for the possibility of appeal within the complaints mechanism. The European Ombudsman 
found  that  the  mechanism  lacks  scrutiny  and  indicated  that  decisions  by  the  ED  on  complaints  forwarded  by  the  FRO  may  be 

521   Interview with Frontex. 
522   Interview a with civil society organisation/non-member of the CF.  
523   FSWG (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning fundamental rights violations’. 
524   Interview with the European Ombudsman. 
525   Interviews with civil society organisations/members of the CF.  
526   Frontex (2022). ‘Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
527   Article 111(5) of the EBCG Regulation. 

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challenged  before  the  European  Ombudsman528.  When  individuals  experience  a  violation  of  their  fundamental  rights  that  is 
subsequently  ascertained  through  the  complaints  mechanism,  a  clear  remedy  is  missing  (such  as  a  compensation  fund  or  other 
concrete remedies).  

Following pressure from EU-level stakeholders (EP, European Ombudsman529, etc.) and attention from civil society organisations, the 
Agency started a process to strengthen the complaints mechanism, in particular to review the implementing rules.  

To increase the effectiveness of the complaints mechanism, the FRO increased awareness by updating the complaint form, introducing 
a  new  online  submission  tool,  and  distributing  information  about  the  mechanism  to  various  Frontex  operational  areas.  Regular 
reporting  suggests  that  this  has  helped  raise  awareness  of  the  mechanism  among  potential  complainants,  although  this  also  differs 
between areas. In general, steps such as translating the leaflets and posters about the mechanisms, or simplifying the online procedure, 
have a positive impact on use of the mechanism. The FRO also provided input on the new rules of the complaints mechanism and held 
training  sessions  for  Frontex  staff  at  headquarters  and  in  the  field,  as  well  as  for  local  partners  during  the  monitoring  of  Frontex 
operational areas to build capacity530. The Agency’s recent awareness-raising actions might be considered contributing factors to the 
increasing number of complaints submitted.  

In 2022, the MB adopted Decision 19/2022 on the Agency’s rules on the complaints mechanism to respond to the need to develop an 
adequate framework to ensure the further development and independence of the complaints mechanism531.  

EQ14.4. How effective is the fundamental rights framework established by the EBCG Regulation in ensuring the protection of 
fundamental  rights  in  the  course  of  executing  the  Agency’s  mandate,  including  by  empowering  FR  Monitors  to  conduct 
thorough and impartial monitoring activities?  

528   Interview with the European Ombudsman.  
529   The European Ombudsman launched an inquiry in 2020. The findings were published in June 2021 and included recommendations to make the complaints 

mechanism effective and address its shortcomings. 

530   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
531   Management Board Decision 19/2022 of 16 March 2022 adopting rules on the complaints mechanism.  

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The analysis found that the overall effectiveness of the framework is somewhat limited by gaps and lack of clarity within the EBCG 
Regulation, as well as by implementation issues.  

Respect  for  fundamental  rights  is  a  legal  obligation  of  the  EBCG  (Member  States’  authorities  and  the  Agency)  under  EU  and 
international  law532.  To  comply  with  these  EU  and  international  obligations,  and  as  the  Agency  must  carry  out  its  activities  in 
compliance with fundamental rights, the EBCG Regulation provides for horizontal safeguards, such as Articles 1, 3, 5, 46, and data 
protection safeguards in Articles 89 to 92, specific roles (FRO, FRMs, CF, cooperation with FRA), and procedures and instruments 
(codes of conduct, SIR procedure, complaints mechanism, supervisory mechanism on the use of force) to ensure the protection and 
monitoring of fundamental rights, The Agency also adopted the Fundamental Rights Strategy and implementing Action Plan to deliver 
on its obligations.  

Although  Article  5  requires  the  Agency  to  contribute  to  the  continuous  and  uniform  application  of  Union  law,  it  refers  to  external 
borders  only  and  it  not  explicitly  cover  the  Agency’s  activities  on  return,533  although  this  is  indicated  in  other  provisions  (such  as 
Article  48).  This  may  be  considered  a  gap  in  the  text  and  the  respect  of  fundamental  rights  by  the  Agency  in  all  areas  covered  by 
Frontex’s mandate, including in the area of return, could be reflected better in this provision.  

Article 46 provides for another important fundamental rights safeguard of the EBCG Regulation, as it reinforces the obligation of the 
ED  to  suspend,  terminate  or  not  launch  any  activity  of  the  Agency  that  could  violate  fundamental  rights.534  Various  stakeholders 
highlighted that the EBCG Regulation leaves considerable discretion to the ED in this regard.535  

To strengthen the functioning of Article 46, the Agency adopted the SOP in 2022, establishing the roles and responsibilities within the 
Agency  to  support  the  decision-making  process  of  the  ED.536  The  SOP  also  aims  to  clarify  the  applicable  criteria  for  decisions.  It 

532   Recital 103 and Article 80 of the EBCG Regulation. 
533   FRA (2018). The revised European Border and Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications. Opinion on the revised European Border and 

Coast Guard Regulation and its fundamental rights implications.  

534   Article 25 of the Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 (no longer in force) referred to the suspension or termination of activities only, without including the preventive 

component (i.e. not launching the activities).   

535   Based on interviews with civil society organisations/non-members of CF (2/4) and civil society organisations/members of CF and international  

organisation/member of CF. 

183 

 
 
 
 
suggests  taking  a  gradual  approach  and  using  the  principle  of  proportionality  when  deciding  actions  to  be  taken  under  Article  46. 
Whenever appropriate, mitigation/corrective measures should be put in place so as to resolve the situation without triggering Article 
46. The Regulation, together with the SOP, seem to provide a balanced solution to ensure the functioning of the mechanism. 

The views of stakeholders differ on the consequences of triggering Article 46, as withdrawing would limit monitoring and reporting of 
fundamental rights violations at EU level. Some stakeholders suggested a ‘reverse Article 46’ that could entail additional safeguards 
and/or  enhanced  presence  of  the  Agency  in  response  to  Member  States’  violations  at  the  borders,  to  monitor/ensure  compliance 
(instead of withdrawing)537. Another topic addressed during the consultation was related to the authority adopting the decision referred 
to in Article 46. By delegating the decision to trigger Article 46 to the ED, the EBCG Regulation may risk placing excessive  public 
and political pressure on the ED alone, without involving other relevant actors (such as the MB, European Commission, or the Council 
of the European  Union). On the other hand, the  potential involvement of such actors could  lead to the politicisation  of the process 
(with the risk of having political actors blocking in practice the possibility of triggering Article 46). A third option could be to retain 
the ED’s current final decision-making powers, but to seek to depoliticise the process, and the potential triggering of Article 46. This 
could  be  achieved  by  establishing  a  clear  and  standardised  decision-making  process  that  also  provides  the  Agency  with  a  series  of 
interim  measures,  of  a  technical  nature,  that  can  be  implemented  to  seek  to  improve  the  situation  on  the  ground.  These  measures 
should be devised in close cooperation between the FRO and the Agency’s operational units and would represent a standard toolset 
available  to  the  ED  to  prevent  needing  to  trigger  Article  46.  Among  others  they  could  include  heightened  presence  of  FRMs, 
additional  ad  hoc  trainings,  or  the  temporary  assignment  of  monitoring-related  responsibilities  to  the  deployed  members  of  the 
standing  corps,  for  example,  to  ensure  that  Frontex,  also  in  the  interest  of  shared  responsibility,  actively  collaborates  with  the  host 
state to minimise and prevent the identified fundamental rights violations, rather than opt to leave a situation that poses fundamental 
rights-related risks. 

536  Decision of the Executive Director, Standard Operating Procedure – mechanism to withdraw the financing of, or suspend or terminate, or not launch Frontex 

activities.  

537   Interview with Frontex and FRO. 

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To  complement  and  implement  the  legislative  framework,  the  EBCG  Regulation  requires  the  Agency  to  draw  up,  implement  and 
develop a Fundamental Rights Strategy538. The Fundamental Rights Strategy was initially adopted in 2011 and updated in 2021. Its 
objective is to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights in the performance of the daily tasks of the Agency related to EIBM539. 
In  2021,  the  MB  approved  an  Action  Plan  to  implement  the  Fundamental  Rights  Strategy.  The  Action  Plan  from  2021  provides 
practical  fundamental  rights  safeguards  that  guide  the  implementation  of  the  Agency’s  operational  activities,  integrated  into  the 
Agency’s Annual Work Programme, towards the achievement of its mission and operational goals within EIBM540. The Action Plan 
has a section addressed exclusively to the Agency and another section concerning the EBCG as a whole. 

When setting out fundamental rights compliance with relevant EU and international law, Article 80(1) of the Regulation refers to the 
Member  States  and  the  Agency  (EBCG).  However,  in  relation  to  the  Fundamental  Rights  Strategy,  it  addresses  the  Agency  only, 
creating an asymmetry in the fundamental rights framework541.  

Overall,  the  expanded  role  introduced  by  the  EBCG  Regulation  for  the  oversight  and  monitoring  provided  by  the  FRO  may  be 
considered to contribute to a higher level of compliance with fundamental rights across the activities and operations of the Agency and 
its staff. Nevertheless, certain  factors have hindered the  effectiveness  of the FRO’s  role. These include limitations arising  from  the 
FRO position within the Agency, the scope of the FRO mandate and constraints on the monitoring and investigative powers, and the 
advisory role and limited follow-up to FRO recommendations.  

Particularly  important  are  the  FRO’s  opinions  on  all  operational  plans,  provided  that  input  is  requested  in  a  timely  and  proactive 
manner  and  that  the  opinions  received  by  the  FRO  are  adopted  in  full.  However,  although  the  Agency  has  adopted  some  of  the 
measures proposed by the FRO, the input is subject to negotiations and is, in practice, read by the Operational Response Division of 
the Agency only, even if the FRO is advising the Agency as a whole542.  

538   Article 80 of the EBCG Regulation. 
539   Frontex (2021). ‘Fundamental Rights Strategy’.  
540   Management Board Decision 61/2021 of 9 November 2021 adopting the Fundamental Rights Action Plan for the implementation of the Fundamental Rights  

Strategy.  

541   Interview with FRA.  
542   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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As highlighted during the stakeholders’ consultation, the absence of an obligation on the MB and ED has de-prioritised the follow-up 
to FRO recommendations. In the case of Hungary, for example, the suspension of the Agency’s support for border management took 
place five years after the first recommendation of the FRO543.  

To address this issue, the MB adopted Decisions 6/2021544 and 43/2022545. As the 2021 MB Decision 6/2021 on the independence of 
the FRO did not provide specific procedures on follow-up to FRO recommendations, the MB adopted a separate Decision 43/2022, 
laying down the procedures, including timelines and deadlines, for the ED and MB to act on the recommendations of the FRO and 
CF546.  

Other challenges to the work of the FRO have at times derived from the improper or lack of implementation of some of the EBCG 
Regulation’s provisions. For example, the Regulation requires that sufficient and adequate human and financial resources are provided 
to the FRO to fulfil its tasks547. Despite this obligation, the capacity of the Fundamental Rights Office was insufficient for quite some 
time and was increased considerably only from 2021-2022. Although this issue is now resolved with regard to the human resources 
available to the FRO, the DPO faces a similarly concerning issue, due to its very limited capacity. The situation risks jeopardizing the 
Agency’s ability to fully respect the fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data, or to comply with applicable data 
protection rules and legislation. 

The  EBCG  Regulation  introduced  the  role  of  FRMs,  who  have  the  pivotal  task  to  ‘[…]  assess  fundamental  rights  compliance  in 
operational  activity,  provide  advice  and  assistance  in  that  regard  and  contribute  to  the  promotion  of  fundamental  rights  as  part  of 
EIBM’548.  To  facilitate  effective  monitoring,  the  EBCG  Regulation  requires  that  FRMs  have  access  to  all  areas  in  which  the 

543   European Parliament Frontex Scrutiny Working Group (FSWG) (2021). Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning alleged fundamental 

rights violations. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/238156/14072021%20Final%20Report%20FSWG_en.pdf  

544   Management Board Decision 61/2021 of 9 November 2021 adopting the Fundamental Rights Action Plan for the implementation of the Fundamental Rights  

Strategy. 

545   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of 20 July 2022 adopting the rules for the Executive Director and the Management Board to inform the Consultative 
Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Officer.  

546   Management Board Decision 43/2022. 
547   Article 109(5) of the EBCG Regulation. 
548   Article 109(3) and Article 110(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 

186 

 
 
 
 
operational  activity  of  the  Agency  takes  place  and  to  all  documents  relevant  to  the  implementation  of  that  activity.  However,  the 
national authorities of some Member States have raised different interpretations of the scope of the FRMs’ mandate/monitoring and 
their  ability  to  access  to  operational  areas  and  documents  (including  databases),  which  has  hindered  the  effectiveness  of  the 
monitoring  activities.  In  addition,  limitations  imposed  by  some  national  authorities  in  carrying  out  some  of  their  activities,  such  as 
participating  in  (land  and  sea)  patrolling  and/or  debriefing  interviews,  further  constrained  FRMs’  effectiveness  in  fulfilling  their 
monitoring capabilities. 

To guarantee effective monitoring, the ED adopted the SOP for the FRMs in March 2023549. The SOP aims to clarify the scope of 
monitoring for FRMs. This is limited to the Agency’s operational activities (in line with Article 110(2) EBCG Regulation). However, 
for the FRO to comply with his advisory role to the Agency (including under Article 46), the SOP indicates that FRMs may collect 
information  and assess  the situation of fundamental rights, related to  border  and migration management, in  the Member  States and 
third countries in which the Agency conducts operational activities, including relevant activities of national authorities. This is in order 
to facilitate the evaluation of the situation in areas where the Agency operates, as this may have an impact on Frontex’s activities, on 
its  reputation,  and  above  all  on  its  ability  to  perform  all  its  tasks  in  a  way  that  is  fully  compliant  with  international  and  EU  law, 
including fundamental rights550.  

While the new rules clarify the scope of monitoring and suggest a non-explicit connection between the activity of the FRMs and the 
FRO/SIR  role  in  Article  46,  the  SOP  could  have  gone  further,  for  instance  clarifying  the  extent  to  which  information  collected  on 
national authorities could be used by the FRO, or the limits between the FRO/FRMs monitoring and national monitoring by relevant 
entities551.  

549   Frontex (2023), ‘Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on roles and responsibilities of Fundamental Rights Monitors (FROMs) in Frontex operational  

activities’. Internal document.  

550   Frontex (2023), ‘Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on roles and responsibilities of Fundamental Rights Monitors (FROMs) in Frontex operational  

activities’. Internal document.  

551   Interview with Fundamental Rights Office. 

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Stakeholders also highlighted the transparency of FRMs’ reports. These reports are not generally publicly available, which may limit 
the  transparency  of  the  mission’s  findings  and  the  monitoring  system  overall552.  However,  certain  findings  of  FRMs’  missions  are 
presented to the public, as the FRO Annual Reports draw on information from FRMs.  

Unlike the FRO and FRMs, the CF does not have the mandate to monitor Frontex activities. Rather, it assists the Agency by providing 
independent advice on fundamental rights matters. The ED and the MB, in coordination with the FRO, may consult the CF on any 
matter related to fundamental rights553. Although the CF may carry out on-the-spot visits to the Agency’s operations (its headquarters 
and those in host Member States), these visits  are not  aimed at fundamental rights  monitoring.  Instead, their objective is  to  collect 
information, which may be used to inform the CF’s work to advise the Agency (for instance, to become familiar with the operational 
context).  Despite  being  an  important  instrument,  several  challenges  stemming  from  the  EBCG  Regulation  itself  and/or  its 
implementation,  risk  limiting  the  impact  of  the  CF’s  work.  These  challenges  include  insufficient  access  to  information,  lack  of 
requests  for  consultations  from  the  Agency  or  insufficient  time  to  reply  to  requests,  and  limited  follow-up  to  the  CF’s 
recommendations. Several stakeholders also highlighted the difficulties for civil society organisations to continue contributing to the 
work of the CF on a voluntary basis, given their limited resources and staff554.  

In light of the limited direct results of the CF’s work and insufficient follow-up by the Agency, various stakeholders noted that there 
have  been  internal  discussions  about  the  added  value  of  CF  membership555.  One  member  reported  that  consulting  the  CF  seems  a 
‘tick-box exercise’ for the Agency rather than an effective tool for members to provide significant input to the work of Frontex556.   

In  line  with  the  CF’s  suggestions557,  the  Agency  established  a  procedure  to  follow-up  on  CF  and  FRO  advice558.  The  new  rules 
introduce a timeframe for follow-up and provide for a procedure to ensure the accountability of the ED, including the MB’s obligation 
to issue conclusions urging the ED to comply with their obligations559.  

552   Interviews with two civil society organisations/members of the CF.  
553   Article 108(1) of the EBCG Regulation. 
554   Interviews with civil society organisations/members of the CF.  
555   Interviews with a civil society organisation/non-member of the CF, and civil society organisations/members of the CF. 
556   Interview with a civil society organisation/member of the CF. 
557   Consultative Forum (2022). ‘Annual Report 2021’. Available at: https://prd.frontex.europa.eu/document/ninth-consultative-forum-annual-report-2021/ 

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More  recently,  also  other  positive  developments  were  observed  following  the  resignation  of  the  previous  ED  and  the  subsequent 
attention,  both  under  the  ED  ad  interim  and  the  new  ED,  to  fundamental  rights  within  the  Agency.  Stakeholders  reported  that 
cooperation between the Agency’s management and the CF has improved, and access to information has been enhanced560.  

In line with Article 55 of the EBCG Regulation, the supervisory mechanism on the use of force (point (a) of Article 55(5)) provides a 
framework for the Agency to monitor the application of the provisions on the use of force by the statutory staff of the SC deployed as 
members of the team. In 2021, the MB (Decision 7/2021) adopted implementing rules on the supervisory mechanism on the use of 
force561. Despite this, the FSWG found that these rules fail to guarantee that sufficient fundamental rights expertise is involved in the 
decision-making  in  these  cases562.  To  address  concerns  on  the  functioning  of  this  supervisory  mechanism,  MB  Decision  61/2022 
amended  the  2021  Decision  in  relation  to  the  role  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Force  (ACUF)  with  regard  to  the 
supervisory mechanism563.  

More  recently,  in  line  with  the  EBCG  Regulation’s  obligations564,    the  Agency  adopted  two  codes:  the  Code  for  participants  in 
operational  activities565,  and  the  Code  in  the  field  of  return566.  Although  not  a  codification  of  legislation,  these  codes  envisage 
common  standardised  procedures  and  principles  that  contribute  to  increasing  knowledge  of  fundamental  rights’  respect  among 
operational staff. 

558   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of 20 July 2022 adopting the rules for the Executive Director and the Management Board to inform the Consultative 

Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental Rights Officer.  

559   Articles 1, 2 and 6 of the Management Board Decision 43/2022. 
560   Interviews with civil society organisations/members of the CF (5/5), and international organisations/members of the CF. 
561   Management Board Decision 7/2021 of 20 January 2021 establishing a supervisory mechanism to monitor the application of the provisions on the use of 

force by statutory staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps.  

562   FSWG (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations’. 
563   Management  Board  Decision  61/2022  of  23  November  2022  amending  Management  Board  Decision  7/2021  establishing  a  supervisory  mechanism  to 

monitor the application of the provisions on the use of force by statutory staff of the European Border and Coast Guard Standing Corps. 

564   Article 81of the EBCG Regulation. 
565   Frontex (n.d.). ‘Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities’.  
566   Frontex (n.d.). ‘Code of Conduct for all persons participating in Frontex activities’.  

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EQ14.5 How effectively has Frontex monitored return operations organised and coordinated by the Agency? (Article 50(5) of 
EBCG? 

The  Agency  adopted  a  Code  of  conduct  for  return  operations  and  return  interventions,  which  reinforces  the  need  to  respect 
fundamental  rights  when  carrying  out  these  activities567.  To  ensure  compliance,  the  Agency  adopted  changes  to  increase  the 
monitoring level of return operations. Despite this framework and instruments, the analysis identified some challenges (such as level 
of contribution to the forced-return monitors pool) that might impact the Agency’s effectiveness in carrying out monitoring activities.   

The monitoring of forced-return operations is carried out by the pool of forced-return monitors. The pool is set up by the Agency from 
monitors of competent bodies of the Member States. The Agency also contributes FRMs to the pool568.  

The governance of the pool of forced-return monitors is one of the issues raised by FRA, as the management of the pool of forced-
return monitors is currently assigned to the FRO (independent but not external). An external entity could enhance the independence of 
the pool569. Before 2021, the pool solely comprised monitors from Member States, while the Fundamental Rights Office worked to 
train and then appoint FRMs as forced-return monitors570. 

Issues were reported in relation to the limited number of experts made available to the pool by Member States, which might limit the 
capacity to meet monitoring needs for all relevant operations571. 

Experts  from  the  FRO  participate  in  these  activities,  and,  with  the  recruitment  of  FRMs,  they  started  participating  in  forced-return 
operations. In 2021, three FRMs were recruited to act as forced-return monitors, and an additional number of FRMs served as forced-
return monitors when their capacity was requested to ensure adequate monitoring of flights. Throughout 2023, additional monitors are 

567   Frontex (n.d.). ‘Code of conduct for return operations and return interventions coordinated and organised by Frontex’.  
568   Article 51 of the EBCG Regulation. 
569   Interview with FRA.  
570   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
571   Interview with DG HOME.  

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being trained as forced-return monitors, to ensure the monitoring capacity is adequate to respond to the needs of Agency and Member 
States572. 

Regarding the monitoring level, the FRO reported that in the first half of 2020, 59 out of 72 operations by charter flights with Frontex 
support had monitors on board; while, in the second half of same year, 92 monitors participated in return operations by charter flights, 
of  which  68  were  deployed  from  the  pool  upon  Member  States’  request573.  For  2021,  the  FRO’s  Annual  Report  indicated  that  the 
FRMs monitored 18 return operations574. 

Starting from 2022, the FRO published Observations to return operations conducted in the 1st and 2nd half of 2022. In the first half of 
2022,  out  of  the  136  forced-return  operations  by  charter  flights  supported  by  Frontex,  104  were  covered  by  monitors  present  on 
board575. For the second half of 2022, monitors were present for 104 of the total 151 of return operations by charter flights supported 
by Frontex576. 

On the FRMs' level of participation in these monitoring activities, in 2021 they monitored a total of 18 return operations supported by 
the Agency577, while in 2022 they covered 40 return flights and 20 pre-departures578. In 2023 (until 1 September) FRMs monitored 30 
return operations, in addition to those covered by the other monitors from the forced-return pool579. 

To  strengthen  fundamental  rights  safeguards  in  monitoring,  the  Fundamental  Rights  Office  contributed  to  the  training  for  forced-
return  monitors  and  created  networks  to  increase  trust  between  monitors  and  national  authorities,  and  international  and  national 
organisations580.  

572   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
573   Frontex (2021). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2020’. 
574   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
575   Frontex (2022). ‘Fundamental Rights Officer’s Observations to return operations conducted in the 1st half of 2022, 1 January – 30 June 2022’.   
576   Frontex (2023). ‘Observations to Return Operations conducted in the 2nd half of 2022’.  
577   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
578   Frontex (2022). ‘2022 in brief’. 
579   Based on an interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 
580   Frontex (2022). ‘Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  

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During the consultation, several concerns were raised about Frontex’s support to Hungary with return operations. FRO recommended 
that the Agency should not be involved in the return of third-country nationals who are seeking international protection in Hungary581, 
while the CF suggested the introduction of mitigating measures to address potential risks associated with return decisions issued by 
Hungarian authorities582.  

To address these concerns, the Agency put in place mitigating measures583. For example, it amended the individual form to be filled in 
by  Hungarian  authorities  for  each  returnee  and  handed  to  Agency  staff  carrying  out  the  joint  operations.  The  form  now  includes 
questions on the possibility to claim asylum ensured by the national authorities to the individual subject to the return decision. Despite 
this change, concerns persist, with one stakeholder noting that, without additional safeguards, it cannot be excluded that the Agency is 
involved in return operations that could pose risks to fundamental rights584. 

EQ15. How has Frontex supported Member States in the area of return through all phases of return procedures (pre-return, 
forced returns, voluntary returns, post-arrival and re-integration)? 
EQ15.1.  How  has  the  Agency  supported  Member  States  specifically  in  the  area  of  post-arrival  and  post-return  activities 
including the roll-out and functioning of the Joint Reintegration Services and other return programmes in third countries? 

Frontex has effectively supported Member States through all phases of return procedures. Post-arrival support and reintegration are a 
relatively new area for the Agency, due to the recent expansion of its mandate. While Article 48(1) of the EBCG Regulation provides 
for Frontex to assist Member States with post-arrival and post-return activities, these activities are not clearly defined. The Regulation 
only refers to activities that happen after the return as ‘post-arrival’ and ‘post-return assistance’. There is no reference to the common 
term ‘reintegration’ in the Regulation. Under the Joint Reintegration Services (JRS), Frontex has a working definition of post-arrival 
as ‘support upon arrival till a maximum three days after arrival’ and post-return as ‘support to help a returnee build a new livelihood in 
the  country  of  return  provided  within  12  months  after  departure’.  EU  stakeholders  commented  that  the  lack  of  clear  definitions  of 

581   Frontex (2022). ‘Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
582   Consultative Forum (2022). ‘Annual Report 2021’.  
583   Frontex (2022). ‘The Fundamental Rights Officer Annual Report 2021’.  
584   Interview with the Fundamental Rights Office. 

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post-return  and  reintegration  activities  creates  operational  challenges  and  legal  uncertainty.  The  business  processes  of  reintegration 
services are very different to other forms of assistance offered by the Agency, which stakeholders find problematic.  

Some Member States585 reported that they do not (yet) have any experience in participating/requesting Frontex’s assistance as part of 
JRS. Those countries that received assistance reported positive experiences overall.  

Some  Member  States586  believe  that  the  Agency  should  be  given  a  mandate  to  organise  self-governed  return  operations  from  third 
counties  to  third  countries,  in  order  to  prevent  secondary  movements  to  EU  from  neighbouring  third  countries  and  build  effective 
return capacity. 

EQ15.2. Which role has the Agency in building synergies and connecting Union-funded networks and programmes in the field 
of return in third countries?  

EURLOs helped Member States with re-documentation and facilitated return operations. This added particular value in third countries 
where Member States did not have a consular presence. The European Centre for Returns Division (ECRET) stated that the annual 
nature of the financial cycle hinders the effectiveness of operational planning and implementing activities in line with the operational 
cycle.  The  deployment  of  EURLOs  to  countries  like  Iraq  requires  a  longer  deployment  than  one  year.  The  annual  tenders  for 
reintegration partners do not allow for longer-term capacity-building or relationship-building in third countries of return. Additionally, 
the procurement processes create additional administrative burden for both Frontex and reintegration partners. This was confirmed in 
interviews with the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), which observed inefficiencies in the process that 
did not allow for longer-term capacity-building.  

EQ15.3. How has Frontex supported Member States in terms of coordinating return operations led by Member States? 

Frontex coordinates forced-return operations from individual Member States (national return operations) or jointly from more than one 
Member State (JROs), and with the use of means provided by third countries (collecting return operations). The returns are carried out 

585   12 MS/SAC. 
586   Three MS. 

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by Member States by air (charter and scheduled flights), sea, and land. Returns by charter flights are carried out by airplanes chartered 
by either Member States or Frontex, while returns by scheduled flights are implemented on regular commercial flights. The Agency 
can also provide escort officers to Member States, either ad hoc (for a specific operation) or through long-term deployment of an SCO 
with the relevant profile.  

EQ15.4. How has Frontex provided support to Member States in terms of organising Frontex-led return operations? 

In 2022, for the first time, the Agency organised and carried out two end-to-end return operations with charter flights to Albania and 
Nigeria. Survey respondents reported no issues with the first end-to-end Frontex operations in 2022 and participating Member States 
were positive in their feedback. A third operation was successfully organised in March 2023 to Bangladesh. 

EQ16. How has the exchange of information in the framework of EUROSUR improved situational awareness and reaction at 
the  external  borders  of  EU  Member  States?  This  concerns  the  cooperation  between  Member  States  as  well  as  with  third 
countries.  
EQ16.1 How has the Agency’s and Member States’ implementation of the EUROSUR framework been effective in terms of 
information exchange in order to improve the situational awareness and increase the reaction capabilities among the relevant 
stakeholders, including in the detection, prevention and combating of irregular immigration and cross-border crime as well as 
in contributing to the protection and saving the lives of migrants? 
EQ16.2  How  did  the  Agency  manage  to  integrate  EUROSUR  with  the  rest  of  the  operational  activities?  Are  there  any 
duplications between EUROSUR and other operational information channels? 

Although EUROSUR largely supports the provision of a European situational picture, it is unable to fully provide complete and up-to-
date  awareness  of  the  situation  at  the  EU’s  external  borders.  Challenges  include  possible  contradictions  in  the  text  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation,  as  well  as  incomplete  implementation.  The  upgrade  of  the  communication  network  to  CONFIDENTIAL  UE/EU 
CONFIDENTIAL classification level has not taken place, and its value has been questioned, given the cost of the upgrade.    

Previously identified issues continue to persist: 

•  Cooperation levels differ: not all Member States and SACs report border events;  

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•  National  coordination  centres'  practices  differ:  reported  incident  formats  and  timing  varies  across  Member  States,  leading  to 
poor data quality. Some countries create incident reports for each individual, while others only created incident reports covering 
several people;  

•  Development and integration of new capabilities are not fully implemented: the operational and analysis layers of EUROSUR 

have not been implemented comprehensively. 

All Member States and SACs complied with the obligation under Article 21(1) of EBCG Regulation to notify the Commission on the 
establishment of the National Coordination Centres. Subsequently, the Commission circulated this information to the Member States 
and SACs and to the Agency in accordance with the Regulation. 

All  Member  States  and  SACs  complied  with  the  obligation  under  Article  89(1)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896  to  notify  the 
Commission on the details of the national authority designated as a data controller. 

The situational picture at the EU external borders that EUROSUR provides can thus only be partially accurate, complete and up-to 
date. A majority of Member States respondents to the study survey agreed that the  implementation of the EUROSUR framework is 
effective  in  terms  of  information  exchange  to  improve  situational  awareness587.  However,  only  a  minority  agreed  that  it  has  been 
effective  in  terms  of  information  exchange  to  increase  the  reaction  capabilities  among  the  relevant  stakeholders588  or  sufficient  to 
improve detection, prevention and combating of irregular migration and cross-border crime589.  

While input of data by Member States remains a challenge, there have been significant improvements in data quality, flow, and speed 
of reporting. One of the most notable achievements is the marked increase in data quality, with a decrease in re-entry rates590. Frontex 
suggested  that  adding  a  tool  to  monitor  the  quality  of  data  reports  by  Member  States  could  be  helpful,  with  data  quality  reports 

587   Survey of MS/SAC: 17/27. 
588   Survey of MS/SAC: 13/27. 
589   Survey of MS/SAC: 6/27.  
590   Frontex. ‘Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the functioning of EUROSUR Article 121(5) of Regulation (EU) No 2019/1896’. 

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potentially  feeding  into  existing  quality  control  mechanisms  (vulnerability  assessments,  Schengen  evaluations,  etc.),  which  would 
issue recommendations where needed591.  

The volume of data has increased in recent years – albeit with limitations due to technical roadworks as part of the implementation 
process – leading to a more efficient and effective flow of information592.  

Despite these successes, some areas require further attention. The delay in data entry remains rather  high,  albeit with  exceptions in 
some Member States. Data latency in EUROSUR is not close to real-time, which makes the information less actionable. This needs to 
be addressed to ensure close to real-time, automated reporting593,594. 

Frontex further highlighted possible contradictions between Articles 28 and 89 of the EBCG Regulation, which impacts on the type of 
personal  data  it  can  process  in  the  context  of  EUROSUR,  and  may  then  impact  the  effectiveness  of  the  services  provided  by 
EUROSUR595. These limitations include contradictions regarding the use of open source intelligence in the context of EUROSUR.  

Moreover,  Frontex  pointed  out  to  a  legal  unclarity  regarding  the  scope  of  the  EUROSUR  Security  Accreditation  Board,  being  an 
independent  security  accreditation  authority  for  the  ‘European  component’  of  EUROSUR  (in  line  with  Commission  Delegated 
Regulation  2021/581) and the authority that  should  be in  charge of accrediting  the communication network. Currently, the Frontex 
Communication Network (Article 14) (on which EUROSUR runs) is under Frontex Security Accreditation Authority (SAA), which 
falls under the Frontex ED. As such, there could be overlaps between ESAB’s role in EUROSUR and the ED’s role as SAA for other 
systems running on (at least partly) the same network. 

Finally, at a technical level, the cooperation between Frontex’s Risk Analysis Unit and EUROSUR has been described as the closest 
and most useful by  Frontex staff, but  there  are some technical  issues with  the integration of information from  the  Joint  Operations 
Reporting  and  Analysis  Framework  (JORA)  and  EUROSUR.  Frontex’s  decision  to  temporarily  sever  the  link  between  the  two 

591   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
592   Interview with Frontex. 
593   Interviews with Frontex and EU Institution. 
594   Survey of MS/SAC: 3/27. 
595   Interviews with Frontex.  

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information frameworks – due to the increase of classification level to confidential – led to a duplication of information channels, with 
one Member State reporting that they abandoned reporting via EUROSUR in favour of JORA to avoid double reporting. 

3. Efficiency 

EQ17.  Costs  and  benefits:  What  are  the  costs  and benefits  generated  by EBCG  (not  only  financial, but  also  operational)  in 
each Member State, in Frontex and overall?  
EQ17.1 Are significant differences in cost and benefits in the Member States, and if so, what is causing them?  
EQ17.2 Have there been administrative costs or savings for citizens and business? 

Most of the costs associated with the EBCG Regulation have been borne by Frontex, i.e. the EU budget. In particular, Frontex budget 
steadily increased each year from EUR 329.6 million of opening EU contributions in 2019, to EUR 788.9 million in 2023,  with the 
Agency’s  closing  budget  almost  doubling  between  2019  and  2022.  The  growth  is  set  to  continue  during  the  current  Multiannual 
Financial Framework (2021-2027) at an annual rate of approximately 16% until 2027596. In line with the extended mandate given to 
the Agency by the EBCG Regulation, the financial resources dedicated to the SC, the Agency’s equipment and horizontal operational 
support  increased  significantly,  as  also  shown  in  the  Agency‘s  Single  Programming  Documents  2022-2024  and  2023-2025. 
Nevertheless, Member States have also incurred costs in fulfilling the obligations and activities outlined by the Regulation. 

Apart from financial transfers from Frontex and resource pooling (which aims to achieve economies of scale and scope), the identified 
benefits are primarily non-monetary. They include harmonising procedures among Member States and sharing best practices. 
Main findings on the financial and non-financial costs borne by Member States: 

•  A  significant  proportion  of  resources  from  national  budgets  is  allocated  to  IT-related  activities,  particularly  for  EUROSUR 
upgrades.  The  amount of  IT-related funds for Member States is  consistent  with  the increasing  investments  of  Frontex in  IT 
systems  for  situational  awareness,  information  exchanges  and  security,  and  these  activities  are  expected  to  increase  in  the 
coming years, based on the Frontex Information Management Framework. While Frontex handles a considerable portion of IT 

596   For additional details on the opening EU contributions to the Agency from 2019 to 2027 and on the closing contributions from 2019 to 2022 please refer to   

Annex IV – Overview of benefits and costs. 

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investments,  Member  States  are  responsible  for  developing  national  modules  to  connect  with  EU  systems  and  facilitate 
information exchange. 

•  Member States have used EU funds597 to implement the EBCG Regulation and manage borders and migration. These funds 
benefit  Member  States  and  also  foster  their  contribution  to  increase  Frontex  operational  capacity,  by  registering  also  the 
acquired means of transport and border surveillance in the Agency’s technical equipment pool.   

•  The  allocated  amount  to  Member  States  programmes  (incl.  the  Schengen  Associated  Countries)  from  the  2014-2020  ISF-
Borders  and  Visa  is  EUR  2.4  billion,  while  under  2021-2027  Border  management  and  Visa  Policy  Instrument  (BMVI),  it 
amounts  to  EUR  4.2  billion  –  these  two  instruments  supporting  to  a  significant  extent  also  the  implementation  of  EBCG 
Regulation by the Member States.  

•  Under the 2014-2020 ISF-B, by means of three Specific Actions launched in 2015, 2017 and 2018, an additional total amount 
of EUR 335.8 million598 has been supporting Member States with the purchase of border surveillance equipment to be put 
at the disposal of Frontex (up to 90% EU co-financing rate of the total eligible expenditure).  

•  Under 2021-2027 BMVI, a similar specific action was launched in 2022 for the purchase by the Member States of equipment 
to  be  put  also  at  the  disposal  of  Frontex,  in  total,  EUR  201.1  million  EUR  being  added  to  the  Member  States  BMVI 
programmes. A similar BMVI specific action is envisaged to be launched in 2024.  

•  The strategic and operational planning process imposed by the EBCG Regulation on Member States has proved burdensome 
and somewhat inefficient. Operational, capability and contingency plans have posed challenges due to overlaps with situational 
awareness  tools  (vulnerability  assessment)  and  other  mechanisms,  burdening  smaller  Member  States  with  limited  resources. 
The  development  of  national  capability  plans  was  delayed,  causing  further  delays  at  both  EU  and  national  level.  The 
requirement for advance planning of TE deployment has been problematic for Member States, exacerbated by limited guidance 
and the novelty of the process. However, these challenges are expected to decrease in the future. 

The main benefits of the EBCG Regulation for Member States: 

597   Internal Security Fund (ISF) – Borders and visa (2014-2020); Integrated Border Management Fund (Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-   

2027); Asylum, Migration and Integration fund (AMIF) (2014-2020); Asylum, Migration and Integration fund (AMIF) (2014-2020). 

598   See https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-06/db_2021_programme_statement_internal_security_fund.pdf (p. 3). 

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•  The majority believe that the objectives of the Regulation could not have been adequately achieved by Member States alone, 
except for measures within the Schengen area where views are more neutral. Smaller countries and those with borders facing 
migration routes expressed greater satisfaction with the support received from Frontex, particularly in terms of risk analysis, 
returns, and deployment of resources. Differences in perceived benefits can be attributed to variations in operational needs and 
levels of support received. Issues such as resource availability, deployment speed, reimbursement values, and filling quotas for 
secondments and deployments may impact the overall perception of Frontex's support. 

•  The availability of TE provided by Frontex to Member States has increased, particularly in light and portable TE (total increase 
in TE from 2019 and 2020 was of 51% for the TE available and of 61% for the asset-days, while in these percentages reached 
respectively 65% and 68% for the first quarter of 2023), In addition,  major TE, such as vessels and aircraft, have seen a shift 
towards the Central/Western Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Eastern Borders, and Western Balkans migratory routes. 
The deployment of TE aligns with migratory pressures and the type of border to be surveyed. While stakeholders supported the 
concept  of  a  TEP  to  reduce  costs  for  Member  States,  availability  and  deployment  challenges  remain.  Some  Member  States 
faced  obstacles  in  purchasing  TE,  mostly  due  to  reported  discrepancies  between  emerging  national  priorities  and  the  legal 
obligation of making EU co-funded equipment available to the Agency (as stated in Article 64(14) of the EBCG Regulation). 
Issues with equipment availability and maintenance procedures were also reported.  

•  The SC is perceived positively by Member States for its contribution to border management activities. The number of officers 
and  deployments  has  increased,  particularly  for  Member  States  facing  Central/Western  Mediterranean,  and  Eastern  Borders 
and  Western  Balkans  migratory  routes.  However,  there  are  challenges  with  the  adequacy  of  individual  Member  State's 
contributions and the reimbursement of costs, which has led to additional expenses for some countries. Budgetary restrictions, 
recruitment difficulties, and administrative workload were also identified as issues. 

•  Member  States  greatly  value  the  support  provided  by  Frontex  on  returns,  recognising  advantages  such  as  time  and 
administrative burden savings, financial savings, and the availability of additional resources. Estimated (self-reported) savings 
from  four  Member  States  for  2022  range  from  EUR  190,000  (in  the  case  of  Estonia)  to  EUR  34.3  million  (in  the  case  of 
Malta)599.  The  FAR  system  was  praised  for  its  ease  of  use  and  cost  reduction.  Frontex's  adaptability  during  the  COVID-19 

599   Figures to be taken cautiously: since self-reported, their comparability is unclear. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent these are net financial benefits or                     

simply transfers of costs from Member States to Frontex. 

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pandemic  and  the  freeing-up  of  national  staff  through  the  deployment  of  Frontex  officers  was  also  acknowledged.  Indirect 
benefits include the reduction of secondary movements and networking opportunities.  

Businesses  operating  in  areas  relevant  to  Frontex  activities  (e.g.  equipment,  logistics)  could  in  principle  benefit  from  centralised 
procurement  procedures  managed  by  Frontex,  as  well  as  for  a  possible  harmonisation  of  standards  which  can  result  from  Frontex 
activities.  However,  these  are  indirect  effects  hard  to  detect  and  assess,  especially  in  the  years  under  consideration  due  to  the 
challenges with procurement processes experienced by Frontex. 

There is  limited anecdotal evidence of indirect  effects  for  citizens, too  partial  for any projection  at  EU level  or quantification. The 
activities in the area of returns of Frontex and the participation of Member States to JROs have contributed to a larger use of charter 
flights for the return of citizens, instead of commercial flights. 

EQ18. What factors have influenced the efficiency of the implementation of the EBCG Regulation? How and to what extent? 
(e.g. governance and set-up, clear division of competences between Member States and Frontex, policy framework, legal base, 
etc.) 

Key external and internal factors influenced the efficiency of the implementation of the EBCG Regulation.  

The overall disruptive impact of COVID-19 on the implementation of the EBCG Regulation cannot be underestimated. As a result, 
Frontex  was  not  able  to  implement  all  of  its  activities,  recruitment  and  deployment  of  the  SC  was  delayed,  and  financial 
implementation was affected. Disruptions  in  the  global supply chain  made the provision  of TE more complex, leading  to  delays in 
availability.  

The  unpredictable  geopolitical  environment  of  recent  years  has  further  meant  that  Frontex  has  had  to  adapt  quickly  to  unforeseen 
challenges  at  external  borders,  impacting  its  ability  to  plan  and  diverting  its  resources  away  from  anticipated  activities.  The  most 
challenging events have been the Belarus border crisis and the creation of an artificial migration route on Europe’s Eastern border, as 
well as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022. For an Agency in transition, having to react 
quickly in such a challenging environment leaves less room for the proper development of its own internal procedures and processes. 

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At the same time, Frontex’s ability to step-up its operational support to Member States on the Eastern border has highlighted the added 
value of the Agency. 

• 

A number of internal factors impacting the efficiency of Frontex activities have been identified. 
Firstly, instances of a lack of legal coherence have created challenges impacting on the implementation of Frontex mandate, including: 
Inefficiencies stemming from the application of the EU Staff Regulations to the  Category 1 SC, as the Staff Regulations are 
not best suited to an operational, uniformed and armed services (e.g., complex travel management for numerous deployments 
of individuals leading to cumbersome administrative process and delays in reimbursements of staff, misalignment of working 
hours, etc.). 
Interpretation  issues  in  relation  to  the  scope  of  Frontex’s  supporting  role  in  the  fight  against  cross-border  crime  and  on  the 
purpose  (and  limits)  to  processing  operational  personal  data  (Article  90).  The  explicit  narrowed  possibilities  for  Frontex  to 
process operation data (Articles 90 and 10(1)(q)) frame its role and scope of responsibilities in this area. Although the EBCG 
Regulation  is  clear  on  the  purpose  of  operational  personal  data  processing,  the  MB  69/2021  leads  to  some  ambiguity,  as 
stressed by the EDPS. 

• 

Furthermore, additional internal challenges impacting on efficiency are: 

•  The  current  organisational  structure  of  Frontex,  which  does  not  fully  support  the  implementation  of  its  mandate.  This  is 
especially true of the SC, which is overseen by several Divisions, leading to multiple reporting lines as well as a lack of clear 
structure for the SC.  

•  Operational  issues  faced  by  SC  staff  when  deployed  (including  lack  of  access  to  databases)  leads  to  inefficiencies  in  the 

support they are able to provide on the ground. 

•  Procurement issues; the implementation of Frontex activities faced challenges in the procurement of TE, exacerbated by the 
disruptions  caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  These challenges include gaps in  the current  hiring  matrix,  which does  not 
include highly specialised operational staff to assess technical specifications; adapting TE to different terrains and navigating 
varying standards across Member States. Inefficient procurement choices (including leasing of cars instead of purchase) can 
result  in  financial  costs  (higher  insurance  and  maintenance  expenses)  and  non-financial  costs  (delays,  duplication  of  costs, 
damage to Frontex's image).   

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When asked about the division of competences between Frontex and Member States, overall, both Member States and Frontex felt that 
this was clear and did not lead to additional inefficiencies600. 

EQ19.  Are  there  any  inefficiencies  in  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation?  What  is  the  simplification  and  cost 
reduction potential of the Regulation? 

The most substantial issues that create inefficiencies were linked to:  

•  Structure and deployment of the SC: the present deployment mode of SCOs is based on individual deployments. While such 
flexibility  is  well  founded  in  some  instances  (e.g.  ALDO  experts  at  BCPs),  in  others  (e.g.  large  groups  of  BGOs)  it  is 
inefficient. Frontex is considering within its new structure approaches to setup SC organisational units. Eliminating individual 
officers  having  to  arrange  logistics  for  accommodation,  transportation,  transfer  of  personnel  equipment  (firearms),  etc,  will 
help raise efficiencies of scale. 

•  Lack  of  clearly  developed  logistics  concept,  absence  of  antenna  offices:  As  some  of  the  case  studies  showed,  lack  of  local 

arrangements forced SCOs to drive excessive distances to fuel service vehicles601, or to find accommodation602.  

•  The delayed adoption of the Agency’s acquisition strategy (September 2023) and delays in developing a clear vision for the 
deployment of the SC, resulting in reliance on rented or short-term leased vehicles. Such solutions are often not feasible for 
border  guard  needs  (e.g.  need  to  have  vehicles  of  certain  colour,  or  to  install  various  equipment  –  communication,  special 
lights, etc). The high costs borne by Frontex for rentals in 2023603, could also be sufficient to purchase number of vehicles for 
Frontex needs. No analyses have been done by Frontex on buy vs. lease vs. rent.  

•  The decision to use Member States training centres instead of developing Frontex own training facility. The current reliance on 
MS training centres leads to high costs. No analysis has been done so far by Frontex to assess if in the mid to  long run, the 
current grants-based approach is more efficient than the development of the Agency’s own training facility. 

600   Survey with MS/SAC; Frontex interview. 
601   Case study in one MS. 
602   Case study in one MS. 
603   See:  Frontex  rental  requirements,  https://frontex.europa.eu/innovation/announcements/invitation-to-frontex-online-vehicle-rental-industry-day-6-july-2022-

hIMZZy, and tender: https://etendering.ted.europa.eu/cft/cft-display.html?cftId=13380  

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•  Decision to split the entry of incident information between JORA and EUROSUR. NCCs reported that presently, they need to 
re-enter manually JORA incident data into EUROSUR (as well as their national systems), indicating in some instances triple 
entry of identical information604 Previously such information was simultaneously entered into both systems.  

Several  other  inefficiencies  linked  to  administrative  burden  resulting  from  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  were 
identified: 

•  Member States face additional  costs and administrative burdens related to  the reimbursement of Category 2 and Category  3 
officers,  including  travel  costs  and  other  expenses,  which  are  often  insufficient  to  cover  the  full  costs  or  to  motivate 
experienced  officers  to  be  deployed.  Recent  changes  in  reimbursement  reporting  requirements  for  Member  State  staff  have 
reportedly increased the administrative burden on Member States605. 

•  Similar  issues  arise  with  the  financial  support  under  Article  61  for  officers,  with  a  cumbersome  administrative  system  and 
inadequate reimbursement levels making it challenging for Member States to maintain staffing levels and meet national needs. 
The  administrative  workload  leads  to  a  mobilisation  of  resources  that  could  be  used  more  effectively  by  Member  States. 
Moreover, the correction coefficient for reimbursement under Article 61 does not adequately account for changes in the costs 
of living, but is not related to the implementation of the Regulation per se.  

•  The  EBCG  Regulation  imposes  a  number  of  obligations  on  Member  States  relating  to  the  multiannual  strategic  planning 
process of Frontex, which may lead to potential duplication of efforts and thus present a potential for simplification. Member 
States highlighted that the operational plans (art. 9) overlap with the situational awareness tools to some extent, as well as with 
other  mechanisms  (e.g.,  SCHE-VAL606).  While  the  situational  awareness  tools  can  help  Member  States  with  the  operational 
planning, it can overburden resources.  

The above processes need further analysis with a view to achieving simplification and cost reduction.  

604   Interviews with two MS.  
605   Interview with one MS. Reportedly SC officers internally deployed from one border to a JO, also created significant additional workload – instead of bulk re- 
porting  of  costs,  individual  receipts  and  reporting  from  each  officer  was  introduced  by  Frontex.  As  personnel  has  a  frequent  rotation  schedule  (e.g.  bi-
weekly), this forces Member States to continuously report on costs and provide resubmission request. 

606   Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism.  

See: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/schengen-borders-and-visa/schengen-area/schengen-evaluation-and-monitoring_en  

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EQ20.  Do  the  resources  that  have  been  allocated  to  Frontex  correspond  to  the  tasks  assigned  to  the  Agency  by  the  EBCG 
Regulation? 

The allocation of human and financial resources in Frontex's strategic planning has been broadly in line with the tasks assigned to the 
Agency by the EBCG Regulation (Article 10).  

Between 2020 and 2023, human resources were more uniformly distributed across Frontex tasks than financial resources. Since the 
beginning  of  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  the  number  of  staff  allocated  to  operational  response  tasks  increased 
slightly,  from  24%  of  the  total  in  2020  to  30%  in  2023.  Situational  awareness  followed  the  opposite  trend,  although  it  remained  a 
relatively staff-intensive task. The share of human resources allocated to returns remained stable. The proportion of personnel focused 
on  the  development  of  SC  and  technical  equipment  pools  remained  broadly  unchanged.    In  2020,  immediately  after  the  entry  into 
force of the EBCG Regulation, the share of planned financial resources for the hiring and training of SC was highest, at 28%  of the 
total607. Similarly, the financial resources allocated to situational awareness were relatively higher in 2020, which may be linked to the 
upgrade of the EUROSUR system while the opposite was true for operational response and technical equipment. As these estimates 
were  made  at  the  beginning  of  the  year,  the  relatively  lower  allocation  for  operational  response  should  not  be  interpreted  as  a 
consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The proportion of funds assigned to returns remained fairly stable between 2020 and 2023. 

The  adopted  or  forecasted  budgets  for  2022  and  2023  show  that  the  financial  resources  committed  to  operational  expenditure 
increased  significantly  following  the  introduction  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  The  commitments  for  operational  response  activities  – 
European Standing Corps, Agency equipment, and horizontal operational support – increased most608. The data show that relatively 
high amounts were committed to the development of the SC in 2020. As these figures account for the budget amendments triggered by 
the  COVID-19  pandemic,  they  reflect  any  logistical  or  procurement  difficulties  encountered  in  2020  and  2021.  In  particular,  after 
internal transfers and reductions, commitments for return activities and information and data analytics were affected more than those 
assigned to the SC609. 

607   The average for 2021-2023 is just below EUR 400,000, compared to EUR 1.87 million in 2020. 
608   102% increase for European Standing Corps, 53% increase for Agency equipment, 52% increase for Horizontal operational support, from 2019 to 2022. 
609   Frontex (2020). 'Final Annual accounts 2020'. Frontex (2021). 'Final Annual accounts 2021'. 

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EQ21.  How  has  Frontex  used  its  human  and  financial  resources  to  achieve  the  objectives  set  out  in  its  work  programmes 
during the 2019-2023 period? Is the distribution of resources adequate for meeting these objectives? 

Frontex  has  effectively  allocated  its  human  and  financial  resources,  aligned  with  its  strategic  and  horizontal  objectives  and  the 
implementation  requirements  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  Since  2021,  staff  have  shifted  towards  strategic  objectives  related  to 
operational  activities  rather  than  horizontal  objectives  such  as  internal  management  and  cooperation.  The  SCs  development  drove 
financial resources allocation in 2020, while resource planning from 2021 onwards has been stable, prioritising operational support, 
returns, and horizontal management. 

Taking into account the total staff of the Agency, including the recruited permanent SC, it is clear that the human resources dedicated 
to  operational  response  and  management  increased  significantly  in  the  years  following  the  adoption  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  The 
staff of the ETIAS Central Unit  and the FRO also appear to have increased in relative terms. Conversely, the proportion of human 
resources devoted to internal management decreased. However, if the Category 1 SC are excluded, the proportion of non-deployable 
human  resources  allocated  to  operations  remained  unchanged  over  the  years.  The  same  is  true  for  returns  and  international 
cooperation. Instead, the proportion of staff allocated to capacity-building and situational awareness decreased. The relative growth of 
staff  allocated  to  ETIAS  and  FRO  can  also  be  observed  here.  Finally,  the  proportion  of  staff  working  in  internal  management 
decreased, while executive management increased slightly in relative terms. 

Overall, the Agency can count on approximately 1,000 staff in the Agency’s headquarters and can recruit up to 4% of the total number 
of the SC set out in Annex I for supporting functions related to the establishment of the SC (up to 400 by 2027).  At the same time, 
while the EBCG Regulation states that the SC need to be deployed in operational areas, a substantial number of the SC staff members 
were deployed in the different entities of the Agency’s headquarters. This triggered discussions on the need for certain SC profiles to 
be deployed at the headquarters to perform operational functions (see Annex III.B - Review of the SC).  

The  activities  related  to  the  enforcement  and  monitoring  of  fundamental  rights  constitute  an  additional  horizontal  responsibility 
throughout the Agency's operations. Indeed, Frontex allocates a portion of its available human and financial resources to maintaining 

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its fundamental rights framework610 and 'Fundamental rights activities' constitutes a separate category of expenditure in its budgets. 
This  indicates  that  although  the  allocation  of  resources  to  fundamental  rights  activities  increased  following  the  introduction  of  the 
EBCG Regulation, the amounts committed in the budgets did not keep pace. However, this issue was resolved in 2022. 

Frontex faces a significant challenge in implementing its increasing financial resources, despite their initial annual budgets have been 
reduced by the budgetary authority. Besides the general MFF 2021-2027 reduction in the Agency’s budget (40%), further reductions 
were applied to the annual budget for Frontex in 2021, 2022 and 2023. The Agency’s budget in those years was reduced by EUR 61 
million611, by EUR 65 million and EUR 50 million respectively. Despite these cuts, the Agency recently released EUR 15 million of its 
EU  contributions  for  2023,  EUR  57,2  million  in  2022  and  EUR  14,6  million  in  2021.  Moreover,  in  the  years  2019  and  2020,  the 
Agency also released respectively 22,3 million and 98,9 million (mainly due to the challenging circumstances caused by the COVID-
19 pandemic). At the same time, based on the executed budget, the implementation of the appropriations is sound, confirming that the 
agency is still quite effective in forecasting its short-term budget implementation. Moreover, the Agency has largely been able to adapt 
its budgetary management to the new mandate and expected operational results. Some areas of expenditure, generally related to the 
implementation  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  have  proved  particularly  problematic  from  a  budgetary  and  financial  management 
perspective.  

Frontex's ability to spend its voted budget within the year was lower in 2020 and 2021 than in 2019, but only for 'infrastructure and 
operating expenditure' and for 'operational expenditure', while 'staff expenditure' remained within targets. Nevertheless, Frontex has 
generally been able to spend the amounts carried over from the previous year, with no significant difference between the three years 
considered. The implementation analysis of these appropriations indicates that the great majority (about 90%) of the amounts carried 
forward  under  'Infrastructure  and  operating  expenditure'  and  'operational  expenditure'  are  paid  within  the  year  following  the  initial 
commitment, while a greater proportion (50%) of those recorded under 'Staff expenditure' is returned each year, although this is small 
in absolute terms.  

610   Corresponds to Key Activity 6.4.1 in the Agency's SPDs. 
611   The 61 million is backloaded to 2025, 2026 and 2027 (EUR 61m/3). 

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A  more  in-depth  analysis  of  budget  implementation  of  'operational  expenditure'  reveals  that  'Agency  equipment'  and  'strengthening 
capacities',  which  includes  training  and  research  and  innovation,  are  particularly  problematic  budget  items,  due  to  relatively  low 
payments and relatively high carry-over cancellations (for instance, in the monthly budget implementation reports covering 2021 and 
2022,  the  Agency  reported  22%  cancellations  of  carried-over  funds  under  ‘Agency  equipment’  in  2021  and  15%  in  2022, 
corresponding respectively to EUR 5.9 million and EUR 13.4 million). A key challenge in this regard has been the insufficient clarity 
on  the  multiannual  acquisition  strategy  and  logistics  concept,  linked  to  the  delays  in  the  adoption  of  the  multiannual  acquisition 
strategy612. On the other hand, expenditure related to the SC displays low percentages of returned appropriations. 

EQ22.  How and to what extent has the governance and organisational structure of the Agency enabled Frontex to perform its 
tasks, having regard to its size, composition and organisation? 

The  governance  structure  in  the  EBCG  Regulation  focuses  on  Frontex  and  supports  the  performance  of  its  tasks.  In  addition, 
effectiveness and efficiency improvements could be achieved through greater strategic guidance from the MB, simplifying some of the 
approval procedures within the European Commission, and enhancing internal resources in key offices (e.g. DPO).  

Looking at governance in the context of the EBCG Regulation, the focus remains on the governance of Frontex itself and not of the 
national authorities, as Member States retain primary responsibility and competence for management of their borders. The governance 
model of Frontex is largely in line with the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies613. The roles of the MB and ED – as well 
as  the  accountability  of  the  ED  to  the  Commission,  Council  and  EP  –  are  well-defined  in  the  EBCG  Regulation,  with  the  Agency 
expected to report fully on its activities to the EP, to the Council and to the Commission. Several independent  internal bodies were 
established within the Agency to support its governance, including a DPO, FRO and IAC.  

The expanding workload of the MB in line with the expanding mandate of Frontex represents a challenge. However, there appears less 
of  a  need  to  redefine  MB’s  role,  but  rather,  an  impetus  to  simplify  its  procedures  to  make  its  decision-making  and  oversight  more 

612   The  multiannual  strategy  for  acquisition  and  management  of  the  Agency’s  equipment  has  been  adopted  on  15  September  2023  with  Management  Board 

decision 28/2023. 

613   Interview with European Commission, Secretariat-General. 

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efficient. According to a small minority of Member States, the expanding  mandate creates a high workload for MB members, often 
leading  to  discussions  of  very  technical  issues  that  are  not  a  priority  for  all614  and  leaving  limited  time  for  high-level  strategic 
discussions (including on key documents, like the Single Programming Document (SPD))615. Attempts to steer discussions within the 
MB towards more strategic topics are seen as an improvement616. For many Member States, the national authorities represented at the 
MB are not those responsible for return activities, impacting the effectiveness of strategic-level governance on return policies617.  

The creation of an Executive Board (EB) to support the MB was seen as a positive step in helping to identify and analyse strategic 
issues618.  The  MB  and  the  EB  are  supported  by  the  Working  Group  on  Budget  and  Accounts619,  which  undertakes  the  preparatory 
work on accounts and budget to facilitate decision-making by the MB, as well as dealing with human resources and audits.  

Strategic guidance by the MB may be strengthened by the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM, which will allow the MB and 
its  dedicated  Working  Group  on  EIBM  to  guide  and  oversee  the  development  of  the  technical  and  operational  strategy  and  its 
implementation processes620.  

With  regard  to  the  European  Commission,  overall  the  stakeholders  interviewed  felt  that  the  Commission’s  powers  were  well 
defined621. At the same time, the high volume of responsibilities confers a high workload, including very formalised procedures, such 
as having to issue a formal opinion, approval or recommendation, which may require an approval of the College of Commissioners 
(sometimes on quite technical issues).  

614   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities. 
615   Interviews with MB and Frontex. 
616   Interview with DG HOME.  
617   Interviews with two MS.  
618   Interviews with MB, DG HOME, Frontex. 
619   The  Management  Board  Working  Group  on  Budget  and  Accounts  was  established  by Management  Board  Decision  25/2014  of 27  November  2014;  then 
reinforced by Management Board Decision 33/2016 of 19 October 2016, which adopted a new concept; Management Board Decision 23/2021 of 25 March 
2021 stipulates that the Working Group on Budget and Accounts should support the Executive Board. 

620   European Commission (2022). ‘Developing a multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management in accordance with Article 8(4) of the 
Regulation  (EU)  2019/1896’.  COM(2022)303  final;  European  Commission  (2023).  ‘Communication  establishing  the  multiannual  strategic  policy  for 
Europe-an Integrated Border Management’. COM(2023) 146 final.  

621   Interviews with MB (with one Member State questioning whether the Commission requires two representatives) and Frontex.  

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The political scrutiny and budgetary oversight of the EP appears largely effective according to stakeholders, with the EP enhancing its 
oversight following intense media pressure on Frontex. In January 2021, it created a FWSG to monitor the Agency’s compliance with 
fundamental rights622. A report of the Working Group on its investigation was presented in July 2021623.  

The report by the EP’s FSWG noted that parliamentary oversight could be strengthened in relation to the role of national parliaments 
holding  their  own  national  governments  accountable624.  This  has  highlighted  the  need  to  use  Article  112  of  the  EBCG  Regulation, 
which  allows  for  cooperation  between  the  EP  and  national  parliaments  to  exercise  scrutiny  more  effectively.  This  is  especially 
relevant in the context of the shared responsibility of Frontex and national authorities.   

Some external stakeholders believe that a permanent EP representative on the MB would enhance oversight625. However, interviewees 
from the Parliament did not favour this option, given the need for the EP to retain independence626.  

On the powers of the ED assisted by three Deputy Executive Directors, the stakeholders overall considered the powers of the ED to be 
well defined in Article 106 of the EBCG Regulation. The decision to expand the management structure of the Agency to include three 
Deputy Executive Directors with well-defined portfolios is seen to add efficiency in light of the expanding Agency mandate, as well 
as moving towards delegated decision-making rather than relying on an overly centralised model627,  but additional decentralisation at 
division level could be beneficial, to better account for the Agency’s growing size and tasks.  

The current organisational structure of the Agency is not sufficiently aligned with its new mandate and suggests an underestimation of 
the  human  and  administrative  resources  needed  to  support  the  expanding  mandate,  therefore  further  changes  are  needed.  In  2018, 

622   European Parliament (2022). ‘Scrutiny of Frontex’. Briefing. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698816  
623   European Parliament (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations’. Working Document,  

LIBE Committee. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/238156/14072021%20Final%20Report%20FSWG_en.pdf   

624   Strik, T. (2022). ‘European oversight on Frontex’. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/european-oversight-on-frontex/   
625   European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2021). ‘Holding Frontex to account: ECRE’s proposal for strengthening non-judicial mechanisms for 

scrutiny of Frontex’. Policy paper. Available at:  https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Policy-Papers-07.pdf  

626   Interviews with MEPs. 
627   Interviews with Frontex and the European Commission. 

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Frontex  comprised  four  divisions  and  one  unit628.  As  of  2022,  it  has  nine  divisions629,  each  with  a  coordination  office  to  facilitate 
horizontal  cooperation.  Comparing  the  2018  structure  of  the  Agency  with  its  current  structure  shows  that  despite  its  expansion  in 
response  to  its  new  mandate,  it  still  failed  to  adequately  accommodate  the  necessary  operational  management  for  the  SC.  The 
transformation from a traditional EU agency administration into an operational agency able to deploy, manage and logistically support 
a 10 000-strong SC, consisting (primarily) of officers and specialised equipment and assets, is still incomplete.  

According to the updated Roadmap for EBCG Regulation implementation (November 2022), the Agency plans to carry out a broad 
functional  evaluation  of  the  workload  and  available  competencies  of  staff,  including  considering  possible  reallocations  between 
divisions and units in 2023 to ensure that all units have the staff to ensure the timely implementation of the EBCG Regulation. The 
need for a functional review was emphasised by the IAC, which pointed to the need to ensure that the new structure corresponds to the 
needs of the Agency (outputs, needs, key functions and outcomes).  

Discussions are ongoing on how best to embed the SC into the organisational structure of the Agency. The SC is currently overseen by 
a  number  of  divisions,  which  creates  ambiguity.  On  the  operational  level,  this  results  in  multiple  reporting  channels,  including  the 
functional  line  of  reporting  and  the  Coordinating  Officer.  SC  officers  are  not  clearly  informed  that  they  should  report  to  their 
Coordinating  Officer  on  the  ground  and  sometimes  perceive  their  functional  manager  as  their  line  of  reporting.  It  also  means  that 
functionally, Deployment Management Division staff have responsibility for SC (including writing their performance reviews) though 
they have no clear understanding of the day-to-day work each SC staff performs. 

The  Agency  waited  for  the  appointment  of  a  new  ED  (in  post  as  of  March  2023)  to  start  internal  discussions  about  possible 
reorganisation630. The new organisational structure of the Agency is expected to be adopted by the MB in November 2023.  

EQ23. How have the Agency's procedures and working practices been conducive to performing its tasks?  

628   Management Board Decision 4/2018 of 9 March 2019 amending Management Board Decision 18/2017 of 14 June 2017 on the new organisational structure 

of the Agency.  

629   Management Board Decision 46/2022 of 13 August 2022 amending Management Board Decision 43/2020 on the Agency’s amended organisational  

structure.  

630   Interview with Frontex. 

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EQ23.1 How have the Agency’s internal coordination mechanisms (including Director briefings) helped facilitate cooperation 
at horizontal level? 
EQ23.2 Have the Agency’s human resources been deployed effectively? 
EQ23.3 How have the Agency’s strategies, action plans, operating procedures and guidelines supported the performance of its 
tasks? 

Frontex internal horizontal coordination mechanisms should be strengthened to improve the execution of the Agency’s tasks.  

In 2022, the European Commission’s Internal Audit Service (IAS) highlighted the lack of sufficient internal coordination mechanisms 
as  one  weakness  within  Frontex631.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fragmented  organisational  structure,  as  well  as  to  insufficient  existing 
horizontal coordination mechanisms. 

Key forums for horizontal coordination include regular director briefings, which allow for updates from the director of each division 
to  the ED. Each division  has a coordination office, which has met regularly  with  the Frontex Executive Management Bureau in  an 
attempt  to  improve  and  operationalise  internal  coordination632.  Nevertheless,  there  is  reportedly  room  for  further  improvement,  to 
ensure better coordination across divisions and units633.  

Resource allocation seems to have been somewhat adequate for developing and managing human resources and TEPs. However, the 
analysis of the Agency's planned resource allocation and key performance indicators (KPIs) indicate that the efficiency of financial 
resources has varied considerably over the years and understaffing might have been an issue for the development of the SC.   

In  consultation  with  the  European  Commission  and  the  MB,  Frontex  developed  a  Roadmap  for  the  implementation  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation. Structured according to sections of the Regulation, the Roadmap is continuously updated, most recently in 2022634, and 
helps  to  inform  Frontex  programming  documents  and  the  implementation  of  its  mandate.  However,  this  Roadmap  has  provided  an 

631   European Commission (2022). ‘Final audit report on governance, stakeholder management and external communication in the European Border and Coast  

Guard Agency’, p. 2. 
632   Interview with Frontex. 
633   Interviews with Frontex. 
634   Frontex (2022). ‘Roadmap: Implementation of Regulation 2019/1896’. EMB/ESO/November/2022.  

211 

 
 
 
 
overview of steps to be taken in a horizon of 1-2 years, focused on more immediate and short-term priorities. As such, at this point in 
time,  there  is  no  Roadmap  in  place  indicating  when  exactly  the  Regulation  will  be  implemented  in  full.  Beyond  the  Roadmap, 
progress and planning related to information and communications technologies (ICT)-related activities (including EUROSUR, FADO 
and ETIAS) are also reported in the Frontex Information Management Framework and ICT Strategy 2022-2027. 

4. Coherence 

EQ24. To what extent are Frontex data collection for the risk analysis and vulnerability assessments coherent? 

While the data  collections for risk analysis and  vulnerability assessment should be coherent  with one another, the processes within 
Frontex are not sufficiently interlinked. One issue is that vulnerability assessment data are not fully used in risk analysis products. This 
discrepancy is due to a certain level of conceptual misalignment between methodologies. In addition, the level of confidentiality of 
vulnerability assessment data means that it is harder to access this information for risk analysis.  

Frontex has separate systems for producing risk analyses and vulnerability assessments, which impacts their coherence. These systems 
are managed by separate units (Vulnerability Assessment  Unit  and Risk Analysis Unit), based on separate administrative  processes 
and separate sources of information. Data collected as part of vulnerability assessments are classified, making them harder to share 
and access. While the purpose of vulnerability assessments is to allow Member States to address their own specific weaknesses, risk 
analysis can take a more overarching and EU-wide approach, with an associated lower level of sensitivity. A high-level stakeholder at 
Frontex  underlined  that  these  processes  –  particularly  vulnerability  assessments  –  should  be  treated  separately  as  a  matter  of  trust 
between the Member States and Frontex635. 

The  Frontex  vulnerability  assessment  methodology  is  structured  around  a  single  overall  process,  resulting  in  annual  baseline 
assessments.636  From  an  institutional  perspective,  Frontex’s  vulnerability  assessment  and  risk  analysis  processes  are  coherent,  bear 
little to no overlap in data collection (with one being broadly internally focused and the other outwardly focused), and are inherently 
complementary processes. There is alignment, at least in principle, between the guidelines for each process.  

635   Interview with Frontex. 
636   Management Board Decision 39/2016 of 23 November 2016 on adopting the Common Vulnerability Assessment Methodology. 

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In practice, however, there is incoherence between vulnerability assessment and risk analysis. While risk analysis is meant to include 
‘vulnerabilities’, the Frontex vulnerability assessment  does not  feed into its  risk analysis. The core of the problem,  as identified by 
Frontex  and  Member  States,  is  that  the  definition  of  vulnerability  in  CIRAM  does  not  match  the  definition  of  vulnerability  in 
CVAM637.  For  Member  States,  vulnerability  assessments  (as  conducted  by  the  Vulnerability  Assessment  Unit)  are  a  concrete, 
quantitative  and  capacity-based  system  with  measurable  outcomes.  Conversely,  the  conceptualisation  of  vulnerability  in  CIRAM 
includes  ‘pull  factors’,  reflecting  broader  factors  influencing  the  arrival  of  migratory  flows  from  outside  the  EU638.  In  terms  of 
migratory  movement,  Member  States’  capabilities  in  dealing  with  border  management  crises  do  not  represent  a  pull  factor  for 
migrants.  

The  day-to-day  management  of  these  processes  falls  on  Frontex.  Two  interviewees  at  Frontex  stated  that  the  two  processes  were 
definitionally intertwined but needed to be further integrated for the sake of the quality of situational awareness more broadly639.  

Stakeholders raised questions about the level of access to vulnerability assessment data. Even without the conceptual conflict between 
CIRAM and vulnerability assessment, the level of classification of vulnerability assessment data creates an issue in Frontex’s ability 
to  access  and  integrate  those  data  in  risk  analysis.  Perceived  political  sensitivity  among  Member  States  means  that  the  level  of 
classification  of  these  data  are  set  at  a  higher  level,  hindering  associated  EU  institutions’  access  (compared  to  the  wider  range  of 
publicly  available  risk  analysis  data  and  products)640.  According  to  Frontex,  Member  States  are  reluctant  for  their  vulnerability 
assessment data to enter the risk analysis process and therefore be available for scrutiny of other actors outside the one-to-one basis 
with Frontex. 

EQ25.    To  what  extent  have  the  objectives  and  activities  of  the  EBCG  been  coherent  with  other  relevant  EU  policies  and 
objectives?  (e.g.  migration  and  asylum,  EU  visa  policy,  EU's  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy,  Common  Security  and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), etc.) 

637   Interview with Frontex (headquarters visit). 
638   Interview with one MS. 
639   Interviews with Frontex.  
640   Interview with DG HOME. 

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Overall, the objectives and activities of the EBCG are coherent  with other relevant EU policies and objectives. The Commission is 
specifically tasked with providing additional oversight and support to ensure coherence of Frontex activities with wider EU policies. 
As stated in the EBCG Regulation, the Commission should ensure consistency between EIBM and other Union policies in the field of 
the Union's external action and, in particular, the CSDP641. 

The  adoption  of  the  International  Cooperation  Strategy  provides  an  overarching  framework  for  ensuring  the  coherence  of  Frontex 
activities  with  other  EU  policies,  as  it  is  grounded  in  the  EU  legal  and  policy  framework,  including  the  Common  Approach  on 
Decentralised  Agencies.  The  Strategy  was  drafted  in  consultation  with  relevant  EU  partners  DG  HOME,  Neighbourhood  and 
Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), International Partnerships (DG INTPA), the EEAS, Member States and SACs, and the CF642 
to  ensure  coherence  and  synergies  with  other  EU  actors.  It  highlights  the  guiding  policies643  Frontex  uses  to  prepare  its  external 
priorities644. 

The  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum645  builds  on  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  foresees  the  Agency  contributing  to  several 
dimensions of the Regulation, especially given its enhanced role in returns646.  The New Pact mainly focuses on the roles of the former 
European  Asylum  Support  Office  (EASO)  (now  EUAA)  and  Frontex.  In  principle,  the  New  Pact  is  coherent  with  the  Agencies’ 
practices. However, significant parts are yet to be adopted by the co-legislators, making it difficult to fully evaluate coherence at this 
point647.  

641   Recital 89 of the EBCG Regulation. 
642   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’, p. 9.  
643   For  example,  the  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum;  the  Commission  proposal  to  recast  the  Return  Directive,  the  new  European  Security  Union;  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy; the European Development Policy, such as the European Consensus on Development; the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM); the European Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the EU; as well as 
region-specific strategies, such as the Commission Strategy on the Western Balkans, complemented by the Zagreb Declaration, the joint Council and the 
EEAS Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020, and the EU Strategy with Africa. 

644   Frontex (2021). ‘Frontex International Cooperation Strategy 2021-2023’.  
645   Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the           

Regions on a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 23.9.2020 COM(2020) 609 final. 

646   Interviews with European Commission Secretariat-General (2), and EEAS (1). 
647   Interviews  with  European  Parliament  (2/4);  for  an  overview,  see  European  Commission  (2023).  ‘State  of  Play:  New  Pact  on  Migration  and  Asylum’. 

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_23_1850   

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The  renewed  EU  Security  Union  Strategy648,  adopted  on  24  July  2020,  highlights  Frontex's  supporting  role  in  contributing  to  the 
prevention and identification of cross-border crime, including terrorism, at the external borders through border control, and reflects its 
enhanced mandate to strengthen EU coordination so as to support Member States to address common challenges.  

The  CSDP  is  an  essential  part  of  the  EU’s  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  described  in  the  Treaty  of  the  European 
Union (TEU) and serving as the main framework for CSDP missions649. Article 21 of the TEU ‘recalled that multilateralism is at the 
core  of  the  EU’s  external  action.  Accordingly,  EU  partners  can  participate  in  CSDP  missions  and  operations’650.  The  EBCG 
Regulation is aligned with these frameworks and establishes guidelines and objectives for the cooperation between Frontex and CSDP 
missions651.  

Frontex’s work in the external dimension is coherent with the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans (2022)652 and the EU Action 
Plan  for  the  Central  Mediterranean  (2022)653.  The  priorities  set  out  in  the  Action  Plans  include  strengthening  border  management, 
ensuring  swift  asylum  procedures,  taking  action  against  the  smuggling  of  migrants,  and  return.  It  emphasises  the  cooperation  of 
Western Balkan countries with Frontex under the framework of existing and new Status Agreements. The Action Plan for the Central 
Mediterranean  refers  to  Frontex’s  work  in  the  area  of  returns,  the  role  of  Frontex  and  Member  States  in  carrying  out  targeted 
assessments  of  the  situation  in  the  Central  Mediterranean  and  reinforcing  support  through  joint  operations,  as  well  as  the  need  to 
conclude the working arrangement between Frontex and EUBAM Libya, and intensify cooperation with EUCAP Sahel Niger. 

EQ26.  To what extent have Frontex activities been coherent with the activities of other stakeholders in European Integrated 
Border Management?  (e.g. EU institutions, EU JHA agencies, etc) 

648   Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee  

and the Committee of the Regions on the EU New EU Security Union Strategy. COM(2020) 605 final.  

649   Legrand, J. (2022). ‘Common security and defence policy’. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf  

650   Legrand, J. (2022). ‘Common security and defence policy’. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_5.1.2.pdf  
651   Interview with EEAS. 
652   European Commission (2022). ‘EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans.’  
653   European Commission (2022). ‘EU Action Plan for the Central Mediterranean.’   

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EQ26.1 To what extent have the objectives and activities of the EBCG been coherent with the objectives and activities of other 
EU institutions, bodies and agencies? 

Overall,  Frontex  activities  are  coherent  with  the  activities  of  other  EU  institutions  and  justice  and  home  affairs  (JHA)  agencies. 
Frontex  has  well-established  cooperation  with  key  EU  agencies,  but  some  stakeholders  nevertheless  emphasized  the  need  to  avoid 
duplication of tasks (especially with Europol).  

There may be instances where Frontex’s coherence with other EU agencies comes from the design of the regulations and directives 
used to determine priorities. The founding regulations of Frontex and other agencies are part of different Union policies set out in the 
Treaties, which also establish limitations to their competences. Overall, cooperation with other agencies is considered satisfactory and 
coherent,  although  potential  overlaps  in  mandates  require  close  coordination  and  clarifications  (for  example,  between  Frontex  and 
Europol). In this respect, a minority of Member States stressed the importance of ensuring complementarity and avoiding overlaps, in 
view of Frontex tasks in the area of cross-border crime654. Europol cited some instances where Frontex took on tasks that fell with the 
Europol remit, requiring follow-up clarifications, for example where both agencies issued risk analysis products related to the impact 
on  EU  security  of  Russia’s  invasion  of  Ukraine.  Nevertheless,  Europol  believes  that  communication  between  the  two  agencies  is 
effective, and that it is possible to resolve such issues.  

Frontex  notes  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  does  not  sufficiently  specify  the  role,  limitations  and  procedures  in  its  tasks  to  support 
Europol, Eurojust and national law enforcement authorities655. Some Frontex stakeholders stated that the current interpretations of its 
mandate  in  this  area  are  thus  too  narrow.  Yet  the  importance  of  avoiding  overlaps  in  mandates  of  Frontex  and  Europol  has  been 
highlighted by the Commission and some Member States, which explains the perceived narrow interpretation of Frontex mandate in 
this  field656.  Moreover,  the  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  that  the  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  is  already  well 
defined657, and did not suggest a need to further expand the mandate of Frontex in this field. 

654   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 9/27. 
655   Interviews with EDPS and Frontex. 
656   Interviews with MS/SAC authorities: 4/27.  
657   Survey  of  MS/SAC  authorities,  14/27  agreed  and  1/27  strongly  agreed  that  cooperation  with  Europol  and  Eurojust  is  clearly  defined  and  conducive  to 

address-ing specific needs and challenges at external borders. 

216 

 
 
 
 
 
Frontex  cooperates  with  the  European  Commission  to  ensure  coherence  in  the  context  of  different  EIBM  activities.  For  example, 
Frontex now has a strengthened role in EU-funded security research and innovation. The ToR between the Commission and Frontex658 
recognise the Agency’s key understanding and expertise on the standards, requirements and capability needs of the EBCG community, 
enabling it to assist DG HOME, which manages the security research part of the main funding instrument for research and innovation 
in Europe (Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) and Horizon Europe (2021-2027).  

Frontex contributes regularly  to  meetings  and situational  awareness  products  issued in  the remit of the Migration Preparedness  and 
Crisis  Blueprint  Network,  where  close  cooperation  is  ongoing  also  on  forecasting  and  contingency  planning.  Frontex  is  also  a  key 
source for the Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis reports (ISAA), produced in the context of the activation of the IPCR 
mechanism  on  migration.  The  use  of  data  collected  by  Frontex  ensures  harmonization  of  sources  and  methodology  across  the  EU. 
However, efforts are still needed to ensure EU-wide near-real time reporting of operational data.  

To help to coordinate its external work, Frontex established an informal EBCG Expert Working Group on technical assistance to third 
countries  (EXT-TA)  in  2022,  which  includes  representatives  of  international  cooperation  entities  of  Member  States  border 
management authorities and works in cooperation with other EU policy and funding initiatives659. This should help to foster synergies 
in the future. 

EQ27.  To  what  extent  are  the  various  pieces  of  EU  legislation  regulating  the  operations  of  the  EBCG  coherent  with  one 
another? To what extent do they comply with EU law on personal data, other fundamental rights, Regulation 656/2014 and the 
Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies?  

Internal coherence 

658   DG HOME (2020). ‘Terms of Reference between DG Migration and Home Affairs and Frontex regarding the role of the European Border and Coast  

GuardAgency in the parts of the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation which relate to border security’.  
Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files_en?file=2020-02/20200206_tor-ec-dg-home-frontex.pdf   

659   Frontex (2023). ‘Draft Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022’, Activity 5.2.2. 

217 

 
 
 
 
While  the  EBCG  Regulation’s  provisions  are  generally  coherent  with  one  another,  the  following  issues  have  been  identified  as 
possible areas for improvement:  

Although the objectives of the EBCG Regulation are mentioned in the preamble and in Article 1, they are defined broadly, with no 
dedicated chapter or provision, and the Regulation does not clearly outline the links between the general objectives and the Agency’s 
activities. That lack of clarity is also evident in the objectives of the SC. The EBCG Regulation focuses on the composition and tasks 
of the Standing Corps, rather than clearly defining the objectives to be achieved.  

While Article 4 of the EBCG Regulation defines the EBCG as a body comprising both the relevant MSs’ authorities responsible for 
border management and Frontex, the provisions focus primarily on the Agency. For example, the governance structure concerns only 
Frontex and foresees governance mechanisms for the Agency but not for the EBCG as a whole. Section 1 (Protection of fundamental 
rights) sets out the general provisions addressed to the EBCG as a whole, while Section 2 (Processing of personal data by the EBCG) 
only sets out specific provisions and rules for the Agency. 

Although the EBCG Regulation reiterates that Frontex implements EIBM as a shared responsibility with national authorities (Article 
7), it is difficult to establish the responsibility of each actor (including for potential wrongdoing), especially given the involvement of 
multiple actors at national level660.  

Frontex cooperates with different national authorities, but these authorities are not all represented on the MB (such as authorities in 
charge of returns). For JOs, various local authorities may be present in areas where Frontex operations take place, spanning different 
jurisdictions and obligations, depending on their legal nature and the legal order to which they are subject. Frontex’s operational staff 
is under the tactical command and control of the host State, yet both Frontex and national operational staff are still responsible under 
EU  law  and  international  law,  including  the  EU  and  international  level  fundamental  rights  frameworks.  Article  84  of  the  EBCG 
Regulation attributes liability for damages under Frontex operations to the host State, but creates a situation where different authorities 
may avoid responsibility for wrongdoing. This difficulty in determining responsibility is compounded by its reliance on operational 

660   Gkliati, M. (2022). ‘The next phase of the European Border and Coast Guard: responsibility for returns and push-backs in Hungary and Greece’. European 
Papers;  Fink,  M.  (2020).  ‘Frontex:  Human  rights  responsibility  and  access  to  justice’.  Available  at:  https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/frontex-human-rights-
responsibility-and-access-to-justice/  

218 

 
 
 
 
plans  (which  contain  the  most  detailed  description  of  the  specific  authority  and  decision-making  powers),  which  are  generally  not 
made public.  

Despite  the  EBCG  Regulation  setting  out  mechanisms  for  accountability  (such  as  the  monitoring  activities  of  the  FRO661,  or  the 
complaints mechanism662), there is uncertainty about accountability  where both Frontex and national border management actors are 
involved in operations663. This has a considerable impact on the Agency’s perceived ability to respect and comply with fundamental 
rights, opening questions about the responsibility of national authorities and limiting FRO monitoring.  

The analysis found inconsistencies within the EBCG Regulation in relation to the use of force (Article 82 and Annex V). In defining 
‘force’, the EBCG Regulation  does not  clarify what  is  meant  by ‘the use of any instruments’ when resorting  to  force  664. Annex V 
provides  general  principles  governing  the  ‘use  of  force  and  weapons’  and  general  practical  rules  on  the  ‘use  of  force,  weapons, 
ammunition  and  equipment’  during  operations  and  related  activities.  However,  it  is  unclear  whether  the  principles  of  using  force, 
control, and authorisation are applicable to all means of force. 

There are discrepancies between the staff addressed by Article 82 and Annex V of the EBCG Regulation. The Annex contains rules on 
the use of force and weapons applicable to statutory staff of the Standing Corps deployed as members of the teams, whereas Article 82 
provides details on the use of force and weapons for all members of the teams and thus also applies to other categories of operational 

661   Articles 109 and 110 of the EBCG Regulation. 
662   Article 111 of the EBCG Regulation. 
663   Fink, M. (2020). ‘Frontex: Human rights responsibility and access to justice’. Available at: https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/frontex-human-rights-
responsibility-and-access-to-justice/; Border Violence Monitoring Network (2022). ‘Submission to the EU Commission on the evaluation of the 
implementation of Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)’; Karamanidou, L. and Kasparek, B. (2020). 
‘Fundamental rights, accountability and transparency in European governance of migration: the case of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’. 
Working Papers; European Parliament (2022). ‘European Parliament Scrutiny of Frontex’. Available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698816/EPRS_BRI(2021)698816_EN.pdf; Karamanidou and Kasparek highlight that the terms 
used throughout the text of the EBCG Regulation to describe Frontex tasks – such as 'coordination', 'cooperation', 'facilitation', and 'support - are not defined 
in the Regulation; interviews with Frontex and civil society organisations/members of the CF.  

664   Annex V to the EBCG Regulation: ‘For the purposes of this Regulation, ‘use of force’ refers to recourse by statutory staff deployed as members of the teams  
to  physical  means  for  the  purposes  of  performing  their  functions  or  ensuring  self-defence,  which  includes  the use  of hands  and body  and  the  use  of  any 
instru- ments, weapons, including firearms, or equipment […]’. 

219 

 
 
 
 
staff.  The  EBCG  Regulation  adopts  different  formulations  on  the  purposes  for  which  force  could  be  used,  which  might  jeopardize 
strict implementation of the rules and allow wider use of force665. It also establishes an absolute prohibition on abusive or arbitrary use 
of force or coercive measures but does not define ‘arbitrary and abusive use of force’. 

There are some inconsistencies and clarity issues in the fundamental rights framework set out by the EBCG Regulation, affecting the 
overall coherence. First, Article 109 of the EBCG Regulation provides that one of the tasks of the FRO is to monitor ‘the Agency’s 
compliance with fundamental rights, including by conducting investigations into any of its activities’, although these activities are not 
detailed in the text. Although the wording ‘any activities’ allows for a very wide scope of FRO action, increased clarity would better 
guarantee FRO involvement and provide a more specific basis for action. The same Article provides that ‘the management board shall 
ensure  that  action  is  taken  with  regard  to  recommendations  of  the  fundamental  rights  officer’,  without  clarifying  what  that  action 
might be. 

Secondly,  the  EBCG  Regulation  does  not  regulate  the  functioning  of  the  serious  incident  reports  (SIRs)  mechanism.  SIRs  are 
mentioned only in Article 46, as the ED takes them into account when triggering Article 46(4) and (5). Article 46 leaves considerable 
discretion to the ED, with some relevant indications found in the operational plans666.   

Thirdly, on the complaints mechanism the analysis found that regardless of the good functioning of the mechanism, Article 111(2) of 
the  EBCG  Regulation  leaves  a  gap  concerning  cases  in  which  the  alleged  perpetrators  of  fundamental  rights  violations  may  be 
individuals involved in Frontex’s activities but not part of Frontex’s or Member States’ staff and employed by the Agency via external 
contractors (such as cultural mediators), also due to lack of clarity in Article 111(5) and potential inconsistencies of the Regulation 
with MB Decision 19/2022.  

665   Article 82 of the EBCG Regulation adopts different formulations, such as ‘for the purposes of performing their functions or ensuring self-defence’,  

‘achieve the legitimate law enforcement objective’, ‘achieve the immediate law enforcement aim’, ‘to ensure the performance of the Agency’s duties’ and ‘
legitimate self-defence and legitimate defence of members of the teams or of other persons’. 

666   In January 2022, the European Ombudsman suggested that Frontex publish comprehensive summaries of its operational plans, which define  

the parameters of its operations, and the analysis on which the Executive Director decides to suspend, terminate or not launch an activity due to fundamental 
rights concerns; European Ombudsman (2021). ‘Decision in OI/4/2021/MHZ on how the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) complies with 
its 
at: 
ensures 
https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/151369  

responsibilities’.  Available 

accountability 

fundamental 

obligations 

enhanced 

relation 

rights 

and 

its 

in 

to 

220 

 
 
 
 
 
Some  unclarities  within  the  EBCG  Regulation  in  relation  to  personal  data  protection  was  identified.  On  the  allocation  of 
responsibilities  between  the  Agency  and  the  Member  States,  the  EBCG  Regulation  (Article  88)  requires  the  Agency  and  the  host 
Member State to determine in a transparent manner the responsibilities for compliance with data protection obligations. However, the 
MB  Decisions  refers  to  the  operational  plans  for  the  allocation  of  data  protection  roles  and  responsibilities.  Considering  that  the 
operational  plans  are  not  publicly  available  and  that  only  the  publication  of  the  summary  of  the  plans  is  required  on  the  Agency’s 
website, this might have implications for data protection. It is not always clear directly from the EBCG Regulation and relevant MB 
Decisions  who  is  the  data  controller,  data  processor,  data  supervisor,  or  the  applicable  rules  (i.e.  without  assessing  the  applicable 
provisions of the operational plans).  

On processing personal data, MB Decision 68/2021 provides that Frontex may process special categories of data if strictly necessary 
to achieve the purposes referenced in points (a), (c) and (e) of Article 87(1) of the EBCG Regulation. However, the EDPS found that 
the Agency does not have a legal basis to process special categories of data and should include clear and precise provisions governing 
the scope and application of such processing, as well as accompanying safeguards667.  

According to Frontex, Article 87 is not sufficiently clear, as the purposes indicated in Article 87 cross-reference other articles of the 
EBCG  Regulation  for  which  the  need  to  process  personal  data  are  not  clear668.  This  is  reported  for  Article  87(1)(d,  e),  on  the 
facilitation of information exchange with law enforcement authorities of the Member States, Europol or Eurojust and for risk analysis. 
Frontex also highlighted a gap in the text, as Article 87(2) does not mention third countries among the entities that can provide it with 
personal data for the purposes foreseen in Article 87(1). In practical terms, the Agency could transmit personal data to the host third 
country, but not receive it669.  

On the processing operational personal data, according to Article 90 of the EBCG Regulation, the Agency, in the performance of its 
tasks under Article 10(1)(q), may process  operational personal  data it has collected while monitoring migratory flows, carrying out 
risk  analyses,  or  in  the  course  of  operations  for  the  purpose  of  ‘identifying  suspects  of  cross-border  crimes’670,  in  accordance  with 

667   EDPS (2022). ‘Supervisory Opinion on the rules on processing of personal data by Frontex, Case 2022-0148’. 
668   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
669   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
670   In line with its tasks established in Article 10(1)(q) of the EBCG Regulation. 

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Chapter IX of the EU DPR. Frontex may only exchange such personal data with Europol or Eurojust671, and with the competent law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States672.  

This means that in performing its tasks the Agency processes personal data under the general part of the EU DPR, whereas it applies 
Chapter  IX  of  the  EU  DPR  for  the  processing  of  operational  personal  data  indicated  in  Article  90  of  the  EBCG  Regulation.  As 
underlined  by  the  EDPS,  Article  90  read  together  with  Article  10(1)(q)  defines  the  purpose  of  this  data  processing.  Accordingly, 
Frontex  can  do  so  in  the  context  of  the  performance  of  its  tasks  under  Article  10(1)(q)  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  for  the  sole 
purpose of ‘identifying suspects of cross-border crime’673. 

However, Frontex indicated that the purpose of processing operational person data for the ‘identification of suspects of cross-border 
crime’  is  too  restrictive  for  the  Agency.  For  Frontex,  the  current  Article  90  limits  the  possibility  of  successfully  engaging  in  its 
operational  activities,  without  proper  mechanisms  to  exchange  information,  secure  communication  channels  and  other  crucial 
provisions to ensure national ownership of data, handling codes, data retention and logging obligations when communicating between 
Europol  and Eurojust674.  The Agency suggested that  Article 90 could  be amended to  extend the purpose for processing operational 
personal  data  and  to  provide  the  Agency  with  a  law  enforcement  mandate675.  However,  considering  the  current  division  in  the  EU 
Treaties between border control and law enforcement and the reference to specific law enforcement bodies, it is to note that  Frontex 
has  only  a  support  role  linked  to  the  border-crossing  element  of  the  fight  against  cross-border  crime,  which  is  conducted  by  the 
appropriate entities. 

The  explicit  narrowed  possibilities  for  Frontex  to  process  operation  data  (Articles  90  and  10(1)(q))  frame  its  role  and  scope  of 
responsibilities  in  this  area,  as  reflected  in  MB  Decision  69/2021  on  the  rules  on  processing  operational  personal  data  by  the 

671   Article 90(2)(a) of the EBCG Regulation: ‘[…] where they are strictly necessary for the performance of their respective mandates and in accordance with 

Article 68.’ 

672   Article 90(2)(b) of the EBCG Regulation: ‘[…] where they are strictly necessary for those authorities for the purposes of preventing, detecting,  

investigating or prosecuting serious cross-border crime.’ 

673   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
674   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
675   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  

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Agency676. Although the EBCG Regulation is clear on the purpose of operational personal data processing, the MB Decision leads to 
some ambiguity, as stressed by the EDPS: ‘some wording in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Annex [to the MB Decision] lends itself to 
conclude that collection of operational personal data is a primary task of Frontex, which is not the case […]’677.  

According to Frontex, the current framework poses limitations to the exchange of operational data with entities not mentioned by the 
EBCG  Regulation  or  relevant  MB  Decisions,  but  may  nevertheless  be  important  partners,  such  as  OLAF  or  the  European  Public 
Prosecutor Office (EPPO)678. 

For personal data transfers to third countries and international organisations, the Agency may proceed in accordance with Chapter V 
of the EU DPR insofar as such transfer is necessary to the performance of its tasks. In the context of personal data transfer to third 
countries,  the  Agency  can  cooperate  with  third  countries  through  a  number  of  instruments.  To  date  it  has  cooperated  with  third 
countries  on  the  basis  of  status  agreements,  working  arrangements  or  other  types  of  documents  (such  as  Memorandum  of 
Understanding (MoU) and letter of intent)679. Where those working arrangements provide for the transfer of personal data, and where 
provided for by the EU DPR, Frontex is required to request prior authorisation from the EDPS680. 

The European Commission model  working arrangement was drafted in  accordance with Article 76(2) of the EBCG Regulation and 
adopted  in  2021.  However,  the  EDPS  indicated  that  the  model  lacked  essential  data  protection  safeguards  and  any  working 
arrangement predicated on that draft model needs to be supplemented to ensure compliance with EU data protection law681.  

Data protection considerations also arise in the area of returns. The EBCG Regulation does not provide separately for the processing 
of personal data in the context of return activities, despite the increased mandate of the Agency. Article 86(3) of the EBCG Regulation 

676   Management Board Decision 69/2021 of 21 December 2021 adopting the rules on processing operational personal data by the Agency. 
677   EDPS (2022). ‘Supervisory Opinion on the rules on processing operational personal data by Frontex, Case 2022-0247’.  
678   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
679   Interview with Frontex (1). 
680   Article 73(4) of the EBCG Regulation.  
681   EDPS (2022). ‘Comments on the model working arrangements between the European and Coast Guard Agency and the authorities of third countries’. 

Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publication/20-07-
03_edps_comments_on_model_working_arrangements_between_ebcg_and_authorities_of_third_countries_en.pdf  

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establishes that the transfer must take place under the conditions laid down in Chapter V of the EU DPR. Frontex reported that it relies 
on the Member States to do the transfers, or uses derogations on a case-by-case basis, as foreseen under Article 50 of the EU DPR682. 
However,  it  is  uncertain  whether  the  wording  of  Article  50  of  the  EU  DPR  extends  to  cover  ongoing  data  exchanges  with  third 
countries, as distinct from occasional transfers, and systematic use of such derogations by Frontex could amount to inappropriate use.  

Article 89 of the EBCG Regulation, on EUROSUR, is an important data protection provision. Article 89 regulates the processing of 
personal data in the framework of EUROSUR, and limits the categories of personal data processed to ship and aircraft identification 
numbers,  while  subsequently  allowing  the  processing  of  other  personal  data  when  ‘exceptionally  required’  and  ‘limited  to  what  is 
necessary  to  the  purposes  of  EUROSUR  in  accordance  with  Article  18’.  The  lack  of  clarity  was  not  addressed  by  MB  Decision 
68/2021,  which, as  noted by the EDPS, does not  contain any specific rules on the processing of personal  data in  the framework of 
EUROSUR and lacks key data protection elements (such as purpose, controller, safeguards)683.  

The various modalities for Frontex to cooperate with third countries and exchange information, as laid down in the EBCG Regulation, 
is complex, making reference to various provisions, and at times unclear, particularly where it involves the use of EUROSUR. Article 
89 refers to exchanges of information with third countries within the framework of EUROSUR, and subjects those transfers to Chapter 
V of the EU DPR (transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations).  

Despite having working arrangements or status agreements in place, the Agency reports that it has to consider the specific situation of 
third countries and to examine effective impediments to fundamental rights that could be derived from such transfers (in line with the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Schrems II judgment684)685. 

682   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  
683   EDPS (2022). ‘Supervisory Opinion on the rules on processing of personal data by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, Case 2022-0148’. 
684   CJEU Case C-311/18, 2020. Available at:  

https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=228677&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12312155  

685   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document.  

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The EDPS and Frontex reported that the definition of ‘pre-frontier area’ in Article 2 of the EBCG Regulation, when read with Article 
29,  might  allow  a  very  wide  interpretation  that  would  enable  the  Agency  to  extend  its  satellite  surveillance  and  application  of 
EUROSUR worldwide, without limitation686. 

External coherence 

Overall,  the  EBCG  Regulation  is  coherent  with  other  EU-level  legislative  instruments  as  well  as  with  the  Common  approach  to 
Decentralised Agencies, however, the following areas could benefit from improvement:  

Although  Regulation  656/2014  (Sea  Borders  Regulation)  and  the  EBCG  Regulation  are  generally  coherent,  the  former  does  not 
capture  Frontex’s  expanded  mandate  in  SAR  under  EBCG  Regulation.  Article  10(i)  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  states  that  Frontex 
provides  technical  and  operational  assistance  to  Member  States  and  third  countries  in  accordance  with  Regulation  656/2014  and 
international law, in support of SAR operations for persons in distress at sea, which may arise during border surveillance operations at 
sea.  However,  under  international  law,  SAR  is  a  national  competence,  therefore  Frontex  cannot  conduct  SAR  operations 
independently or without the coordination of a national Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC)687. 

Overall,  this  complex  legal  situation  has  an  impact  on  establishing  accountability  vis-a-vis  international  law  (notably,  the  United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and SAR Convention), particularly in a scenario where a Rescue Coordination 
Centre may opt not to initiate SAR after assessing information on a vessel in potential distressed submitted by Frontex688. Hence, it 

686   Interviews with EDPS and Frontex. 
687   Frontex (2023). ‘How search-and-rescue works’. Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/focus/how-search-and-rescue-works-83WoGT  
688   ‘Cooperation  on  SAR  in  EU  remains  challenging:  with  Frontex  given  a  new  mandate  in  coast  guard  operations,  the  coordination  between  Frontex  and 
Member States has become rather more complex than facilitated’ (International Maritime Organization (IMO) (2017). 'Record of views of the inter-agency 
meeting 
at: 
https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Documents/Record of views Inter-agency meeting with the maritime industry on mixed 
migration  30  October  2017_Final.pdf;  Statewatch  (2021).  ‘To  SAR  or  not  to  SAR,  part  1:  Why  is  Frontex  expected  to  save  lives  at  sea?’.  Available  at: 
https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/2021/to-sar-or-not-to-sar-part-1-why-is-frontex-expected-to-save-lives-at-sea/#_ftn9;  Border  Violence  Monitoring 
Network (2022). ‘Submission to the EU Commission on the evaluation of the implementation of Regulation 2019/1896 on the European Border and Coast 
Guard  Agency  (Frontex)’.  Available  at:  https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13557-European-Border-and-Coast-Guard-

migration’. 

Available 

maritime 

industry 

mixed 

with 

the 

on 

225 

 
 
 
 
 
remains difficult to distinguish accountability in situations where both Frontex and national border management actors are involved 
(see internal coherence)689.   

The EBCG Regulation and the Return Directive (2008/115/EC) are coherent with one another. However, the term ‘assisted voluntary 
return’ was introduced in the EBCG Regulation without being defined and has no direct correlation with the  definitions provided in 
the Return Directive (which only defines ‘return’ and ‘voluntary departure’)690. 

Council Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 2004 on the organisation of joint flights for removals from the territory of two or  more 
MSs of third-country nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders does not apply to Frontex. Nevertheless, the Agency has 
the power to coordinate or organise return operations (Article 50(1) EBCG Regulation). However, Article 50 is unclear on the  legal 
framework for return operations and on coordination between Frontex operations and other types of operations. It does not clearly set 
out a specific framework for return operations organised by Frontex, nor does it refer to the potential coordination between Frontex's 
operations and those carried out within the framework of Council Decision 2004/573/EC. The absence of clear legal provisions risks 
differences  between  Frontex-organised  return  operations  and  those  organised  by  Member  States  based  on  Council  Decision 
2004/563/EC691. 

There are challenges in applying the EU Staff Regulations and conditions of employment692 to the EBCG Regulation and the SC, as 
they are not  in  all cases  the  best  suited to  an operational,  uniformed, and  armed service with  executive powers.  A number of tasks 
carried out by Frontex are by their nature law enforcement tasks, requiring special law enforcement training, use of firearms, and other 

Frontex-standing-corps-review-and-evaluation-of-Regulation/F3347064_en; Salzano L. (2021) 'Frontex accountability: an impervious path'. Available at: EU 
Law Analysis: Frontex accountability: an impervious path   

689   Frontex (2023) How Search and Rescue works. Available at: How Search and Rescue works (europa.eu) ; European Parliament (2021). ‘Search and rescue 

in the Mediterranean’. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/659442/EPRS_BRI(2021)659442_EN.pdf  

690   Interviews with DG HOME and Frontex; Frontex (2020). ‘State of play of the implementation of the EBCG Regulation in view of the current challenges’.  

Available  at:  https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7607-2020-INIT/en/pdf;  it  mentions  that  ‘further  elaboration  (of  these  terms)  is  needed’ 
(p.16); Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation’. Internal document. 

691   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation’. Internal document. 
692   Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the staff regulations of officials and the conditions of employment of other servants of the European  

Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community.  

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powers, which some MSs assign only to law enforcement personnel (such as the use of special regime vehicles, inspection of personal 
document, or access to certain databases). Within the SC (Categories 2, 3, and 4), these tasks are implemented by law enforcement 
officers. However, not all Member States’ legislation allows SCs staff to carry weapons on their territory and Frontex is not always 
recognised  as providing  law enforcement  services. Hence, the challenges do not  solely derive  from  the application of the EU Staff 
Regulations but  also  arise from  national  legislation limitations and national  authorities' willingness to  allow SC Category 1 staff to 
perform certain tasks.  

As a result, certain aspects of shift work and stand-by patterns, ranks, recognition of hardship, specific deployment rules outside the 
mission guide, disciplinary proceedings, rights, and entitlements are not suitable for the SC693. For instance, SCOs may work shifts 
under the operational command of a Team Leader from a certain Member State, who will work according to their national rules. The 
hours of work may not correspond to Frontex hours of work, which derive from EU Staff Regulations. This misalignment in working 
hours could create challenges for both Frontex as an Agency and for its officers in the field.   

The Schengen Evaluation Regulation links to the EBCG Regulation through the risk analysis (Article 29) and vulnerability assessment 
(Article 32) carried out by Frontex. The reformed 2022 Schengen Evaluation Regulation aims to strengthen cooperation and synergies 
with  Frontex  and  avoid  duplication  with  other  EU  mechanisms  (notably  the  Frontex  vulnerability  assessment)694.  However,  the 
vulnerability assessment and risk analysis (feeding in the preparation of the Schengen evaluations) do not include fundamental rights 
considerations, while the reform  of the Schengen Evaluation  Regulation  strengthened the  evaluation of the respect  for  fundamental 
rights  under  the  Schengen  acquis  (e.g.  with  the  FRA)  providing  a  thorough  fundamental  rights  analysis  feeding  in  the  Schengen 
evaluations and participating as an observer - in return).  

The Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 2016/399) refers to the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at 
the External Borders of the Member States established by Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, which was repealed by the 2016 
Frontex  Regulation  (2016/1624).  In  2021,  the  European  Commission  presented  a  proposal  to  amend  the  Schengen  Borders  Code, 

693   Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of the EBCG Regulation: Standing Corps’. Internal document. 
694   Articles 8 and 10 of the Council Regulation (EU) 2022/922.  

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which fully reflects the competences of Frontex in supporting Member States. The analysis did not find inconsistencies between the 
two current texts, nor were any discrepancies reported by stakeholders during the consultation. 

The EBCG Regulation (Article 114) indicates that the Agency is subject to Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 on public access to documents 
when handling applications for access to documents695. Overall, the EBCG Regulation and the internal framework set by MB Decision 
25/2016 are in line with Regulation (EC) 1049/2001. The analysis did not find inconsistencies between the legal texts.  

The evaluation also looked at the coherence of the EBCG Regulation with the Common approach to Decentralised Agencies, which is 
not  a  legislative  document,  and  concluded  that  the  Regulation  is  coherent  with  the  Common  Approach696.  Frontex’s  structure  and 
governance is  generally  in  line with the principles set  out  in  the Common Approach, such as the appointment of Frontex's ED, the 
procedures  in  place  to  regularly  inform  the  EP about  the  Agency's  activities,  and  procedures  for  dismissal.  However,  the  Common 
Approach  provides  that  the  MBs  of  decentralised  agencies  should  include  ‘where  appropriate’,  a  member  designated  by  the 
parliament, which is not provided in Article 101 of the EBCG Regulation, partly due to the important independent control function of 
the  EP  over  the  Agency697.  However,  an  expert  from  the  EP  attends  the  meetings  of  the  MB698.  Other  requirements  set  out  in  the 
Common Approach, on accountability, controls and transparency requirements, are in line with the EBCG Regulation. 

EQ28.  How are  Frontex’s internal  procedures, including planning, monitoring and reporting ensuring that its activities are 
internally coherent? How have the Management Board’s activities contributed to ensure this internal coherence? 

695   Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 

Commission documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, pp. 43-48).  

696   Council of the EU (2012). ‘Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on Decentralised Agencies and  

Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies. The Joint Statement and the Common Approach on Decentralised Agencies has legally non-binding  
character’.      

697   Article 101 of the EBCG Regulation describes the composition of the MB, which comprises one representative of each Member State, and two  
representatives of the Commission (see: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2021). ‘Holding Frontex to account’. Policy paper. 
Available at: https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Policy-Papers-07.pdf  

698   Article 104(7) of the EBCG Regulation. 

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Frontex  internal  procedures,  including  planning,  support  the  coherence  of  its  activities  at  least  to  some  extent.  For  an  Agency  in 
transition,  having  to  react  quickly  in  a  challenging  environment  leaves  less  room  for  the  proper  development  of  its  own  internal 
procedures and processes. Overall, the Agency has a clear planning process, with the programming process substantiated by a clear 
legal basis699. Existing documents set out the requirements informing the preparation of the Agency’s programming documents, which 
are sent to the Commission, the EP and the Council, and are endorsed by the MB700.  

There appears to be an overall lack of a depository on rules of procedure, workflows, etc., which was highlighted during interviews 
with the IAC. In its 2022 report to the MB on its progress on implementing recommendations from the IAS and ECA audits, Frontex 
highlighted  that  the  Frontex  Internal  Structure  and  Rules  of  Procedure  (FISRoP)  are  currently  being  revised  and  a  comprehensive 
review of the organisational structure of the Agency may take place701. 

The split of competences across a number of divisions is unclear, leading to a lack of ownership or clear processes702. The need for a 
functional review was emphasised by the IAC, which pointed to the need to ensure that the new structure corresponds to the needs of 
the Agency (outputs, needs, key functions and outcomes). 

Strategic guidance by the MB may be strengthened by the multiannual strategic policy cycle for EIBM, which will allow the MB and 
its dedicated Working Group on EIBM to guide and oversee the development of the technical and operational strategy for EIBM and 
its implementation processes703. The importance of ensuring effective oversight of the Agency by the MB was highlighted at the time 

699   Including:  EBCG  Regulation;  Management  Board  Decision  19/2019;  European  Commission  communication  C(2020)  2297;  Executive  Director  Decision 

2021-130. 

700   Articles 106(2)(c) and 115 of the EBCG Regulation; Article 32 Frontex Financial Regulation; the programming process works in a two-year cycle,  

starting with the internal preparation (N-2); process of adoption and finalisation (N-1) and implementation (N), followed by reporting in the Consolidated 
Annual Activity Report. (N+1) and discharge of the budget (N+2).  

701   Frontex (2022). ‘Agenda Point 6: Explanatory note the Implementation of IAS and ECA recommendations.’ 
702   Examples include the split management of standing corps across a number of divisions; the split of the corporate governance division into two (creating a  

fragmented approach and inconsistencies, with one division responsible for ICT, finance and other for human resources, legal and procurement). Moreover,  
one unit has responsibility for procurement, while another oversees budget, with two directors holding decision-making power. 

703   European Commission (2022). ‘Developing a multiannual strategic policy for European integrated border management in accordance with Article 8(4) of   

Regulation (EU) 2019/1896’. COM(2022)303 final; European Commission (2023). ‘Communication establishing the multiannual strategic policy for Europe 
an Integrated Border Management’. COM(2023) 146 final.  

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when  Frontex  experienced  intense  media  scrutiny  about  alleged  fundamental  rights  violations.  The  MB  had  to  ensure  closer 
oversight704,  in  light  of  the  EP’s  criticism  that  it  had  not  played  a  ‘more  proactive  role  in  acknowledging  the  serious  risk  of 
fundamental rights violations and in taking action to ensure that Frontex fulfils its obligations705. A new MB Decision706 was adopted 
in 2022, ensuring improved procedures for following up on recommendations by the FRO and CF. This enhanced oversight by the MB 
is  expected  to  decrease  somewhat  with  the  new  Executive  Director  in  place707.  This  points  to  a  need  for  a  level  of  flexibility, 
especially by the MB, to ensure additional political steering of the Agency, where necessary. The approval rights of the MB ensure 
that it cannot be bypassed in key decision-making processes.  

The  SC  is  currently  overseen  by  a  number  of  divisions,  which  creates  ambiguity.  On  the  operational  level,  this  results  in  multiple 
reporting channels, including the functional line of reporting and the Coordinating Officer. SCOs are not clearly informed that they 
should report to their Coordinating Officer on the ground and sometimes perceive their functional manager as their line of reporting. It 
also means that functionally, Deployment Management Division staff have responsibility for Standing Corps (including writing their 
performance reviews) though they have no clear understanding of the day-to-day work each SC staff performs. Frontex is currently 
developing a new Frontex operational control and command (FC2) concept, which is being piloted in Romania in 2023 and which will 
likely result in a change to the way the Standing Corps are structured, including ensuring clearer reporting lines. 

5. EU Added Value 

EQ29. How has the new mandate of Frontex  introduced by the EBCG Regulation contributed to achieving the objectives of 
the EBCG as a whole?  (for example, Deployment of Standing Corps, expanded EUROSUR remit, management of False and 
Authentic Documents Online (FADO) system) 

704   Interviews with MB and Frontex.  
705   European Parliament (2021). ‘Report on the fact-finding investigation on Frontex concerning alleged fundamental rights violations’. Working Document, 

LIBE Committee, p.6. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/238156/14072021%20Final%20Report%20FSWG_en.pdf   

706   Management Board Decision 43/2022 of 20 July 2022 adopting the rules for the Executive Director and the Management Board to in 

form the Consultative Forum of the follow-up to its recommendations and to ensure that action is taken with regard to recommendations of the Fundamental 
Rights Officer’.  
707   Interview with MB. 

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Frontex’s new mandate, as introduced by the EBCG Regulation, contributes to achieving the objectives of the EBCG as a whole, as it 
supports  Member  States  to  implement  effective  border  management.  As  stated  in  the  first  recital  of  the  EBCG  Regulation,  the 
‘objective  of  Union  policy  in  the  field  of  external  border  management  is  to  develop  and  implement  European  integrated  border 
management at national and Union level, which is a necessary corollary to the free movement of persons within the Union’708. Article 
77(2)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines the Union’s goal for ‘the gradual establishment of an 
integrated  management  system  for  external  borders.’  Indeed,  the  concept  of  EIBM  developed  gradually  and  only  became  legally 
binding with the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624.  

Frontex’s mandate has been designed in the framework of shared responsibility, with Frontex’s tasks designed to ensure support to 
MSs in  the effective management of external  borders. To date, the key areas of support from Frontex to  Member States have been 
deployment of the SC, operational support, situational awareness, return, capacity-building, deployment of technical equipment, and 
international cooperation. 

The implementation of EIBM, which aims to reinforce the protection of the EU’s external borders, requires collective actions by both 
competent national authorities and the EU. The concept itself underlines that EIBM should be developed at EU and national level, in 
the context of shared responsibility between Frontex and Member States' national authorities709. 

EQ30. How has the new mandate of the Agency contributed to supporting Member States in implementing effective border 
management?  (for example, Deployment of Standing Corps, expanded EUROSUR remit, management of False and Authentic 
Documents Online (FADO) system) 

For a great majority of Member States, the areas of Frontex’s mandate considered most conducive to addressing the specific needs and 
challenges  at  external  borders  include:  1)  situational  awareness  (especially  monitoring  migratory  flows  and  carrying  out  risk 

708   Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing  

Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624 (OJ L 295, 14.11.2019, pp. 1-131). 

709   European Commission (2018). ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration. Annex 6: The main elements for developing  
the European Integrated Border Management Strategy. Available at: http://www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/CE/2018/COM_2018_250_EN_ACTE7_f.pdf   

231 

 
 
 
 
analysis710, as well as supporting the development and operation of EUROSUR711); 2) return712; and 3) joint operations713. A majority 
of Member States also highlighted: 4) international cooperation (with third countries)714; capacity-building (training715 and technical 
assistance)716, as well as the management of the FADO system717. 

The  ability  of  the  Agency  to  provide  situational  awareness  products,  including  via  an  enhanced  EUROSUR  mandate,  is  viewed 
positively  by  the  Member  States  and  perceived  to  provide  added  value.  EUROSUR  situational  awareness  products,  which  serve  a 
number of stakeholders (including the European  Commission), as well as EUROSUR Fusion Services products (including maritime 
and  aerial  surveillance),  add  significant  operational  value  to  Member  States  lacking  such  capabilities,  as  well  as  MSs  requiring 
additional  capacity  for  these  analyses.  Risk  analysis  products  provide  wide  coverage  across  thematic  and  geographical  areas  and 
provide Member States with a comprehensive view of risks at all EU borders. 

Frontex provides an  extensive ‘catalogue of services’ supporting  Member States in  all areas of return. Member States  with  smaller 
caseloads were particularly positive about the high added value of Frontex’s JROs via charter flights, which provided an opportunity 
to return the most difficult cases in a more controlled environment. In addition to assisting with returns, including voluntary returns, 
the  Agency  also  contributed  to  harmonisation  and  capacity-building  of  national  return  case  management  systems  and  their 
digitalisation and modernisation through the RECAMAS framework. Post-return reintegration activities also provide significant EU 
added value, especially as some Member States may lack diplomatic or development presence to support reintegration in countries of 
return.  

As a result of the ongoing establishment of the Standing Corps, the Agency is able to deploy staff and equipment in response to needs 
identified by Member States through joint operations. Frontex brings EU added value to the Member States by providing additional 

710   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
711   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.  
712   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 23/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
713   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 22/27 agreed or strongly agreed.  
714   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 21/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
715   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
716   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 20/27 agreed or strongly agreed.   
717   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed or strongly agreed.    

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human resources and equipment, as well as coordinating joint operations and other operational activities. At an EU strategic level, the 
EBCG  Regulation  provides  for  a  mechanism  to  allocate  or  relocate  resources  (assets  or  personnel)  to  the  sections  where  irregular 
migration flows are of greatest concern. Even though this process is not yet running smoothly and the scale of support will continue to 
grow, past and ongoing joint operations or RBIs have supported Member States effectively.  

In theory, the national capability development plans, Agency capability development plan, and capability roadmap will lead to more 
effective development of capabilities across Member States. As these processes are being developed and not all elements are finalised, 
no definite conclusion can be drawn on the added value. 

Member  States  believe  that  the  education  and  training  of  the  European  border  and  coast  guards,  in  particular  the  common  training 
standards provided by Frontex, have contributed to improving the training of national border guards718, developing and strengthening 
border management capabilities in their Member States719, facilitating cooperation among Member States’ border and coast guards’ 
training institutions,720 mainstreaming fundamental rights in national training programmes721, and ensuring a harmonised and common 
approach to EU border and coast guard training in the Member States. 

EQ31. Could the objectives of the EBCG Regulation have been achieved sufficiently by the Member States acting alone? 

The objectives of the EBCG Regulation could not have been achieved sufficiently by Member States acting alone.  

The EBCG is composed of both the national authorities responsible for border management including coast guards to the extent that 
they  carry  out  border  control  tasks,  as  well  as  the  national  authorities  responsible  for  return  and  Frontex.  The  EBCG  Regulation 
provides for the implementation of EIBM as the shared responsibility of national authorities and Frontex722, and the objectives and 
implementation of the EBCG Regulation as jointly shared by Member States and the Agency. 

718   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 18/27 agreed, 4/27 strongly agreed. 
719   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed. 
720   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27 agreed, 3/27 strongly agreed. 
721   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 16/27 agreed, 2/27 strongly agreed. 
722   Article 1 of the EBCG Regulation. 

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Considering the areas of EIBM activity outlined in the EBCG Regulation, the overall consensus among Member States is that all four 
tiers could not have been achieved sufficiently by Member States acting alone. The majority of Member States respondents considered 
that this was particularly true in the areas of: 1) returns723; 2) risk analysis contributing to a comprehensive situational awareness724; 
and 3) border control measures at the external borders725. Some Member States highlighted that measures within the Schengen area 
remain primarily the competence of Member States rather than Frontex726. The activities of the Agency should always complement the 
efforts of Member States727. 

ANNEX III.B REVIEW OF THE STANDING CORPS, DETAILS ON ANSWERS TO THE REVIEW QUESTIONS  

RQ1.  How  has  the  deployment  of  the  Standing  Corps  been  relevant  in  supporting  Member  States  in  the  protection  of  EU 
external borders, migration management and returns?  

The deployment of the SC has been operationally mostly relevant supporting Member States at the external borders. As the creation of 
the SC has been a key addition to the Agency’s mandate, as it forms a permanent resource to get resources for the Member States728. 
The competences and executive powers of the SC have been widening the usability and predictability of the support of Frontex.  

723   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 2/27 strongly disagreed; 20/27 disagreed. 
724   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27 strongly disagreed; 16/27 disagreed.  
725   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 17/27 disagreed. 
726   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 10/27 neither agreed nor disagreed; 6/27 agreed. 1/27 strongly agreed.  
727   EBCG Regulation, recital 12.  
728   ICF study (2023), pp. 137-138. “The findings are based on an extensive data collection and analysis exercise  conducted as part of the formal evaluation of 
the EBCG Regulation (see Annex 3). Data collection included an in-depth review of documents, a survey of 500 Standing Corps staff, a survey of Member 
State national authorities, five field visits to Frontex operations (which included interviews with national and Frontex staff on the ground), and additional 
interviews with Frontex, Member States’ authorities and EU stakeholders (including the Commission, European Parliament and EU agencies).” 

234 

 
 
 
 
 
 
The SC has been aimed especially to be on the ground, supporting the Member States at the external borders, working side-by-side 
with Member States competent authorities in the external border control and return. It has been designed to be deployed based on the 
needs  –  risk  analysis-based  planning  and  requests  of  the  host  Member  States.  The  needs  may  emerge  either  based  on  long  term 
planning or ad-hoc needs. JOs or RBIs can address both cases729. 

10 000 strong operational staff as SC is a new concept to ensure availability of the resources. It is to remedy the shortcomings of the 
previous pooling mechanism of the resources of the Member States. The numbers of contributions for each Member State to Category 
2 and 3 of the SC are gradually increasing for the period between 2021 and 2027. Similarly, the number of SC in Category 1 recruited 
by the Agency is increasing730.  Even if the implementation of the Regulation is on its way, and SC is not yet close to completion, 
building up the in progressing731. 

Overall,  the  Member  States  consider  the  deployment  of  the  SC  to  be  relevant  in  terms  of  Member  States’  needs.  This  is  primarily 
because SC offers additional resources, when needed732.  

The  deployments  mostly  correspond  to  migratory  pressures  along  migratory  routes.  Member  States  impacted  by  the  Central  and 
Western Mediterranean and Eastern Borders and Western Balkans migratory routes have received the highest proportional increase of 
deployments.  Member  States  on  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  migratory  route  has  also  seen  an  increase  in  deployments.  The  SC  has 
provided significant and welcome support also to return operations733. 

When  it  comes  to  SC  effectiveness,  it  is  mostly  a  question  of  training  and  equipping  of  the  deployed  staff  to  different  kinds  of 
assignments. This is because various kinds of profiles are needed for different tasks in different operational situations. Member States 

729   Articles 7, 10 and 36 of the EBCG Regulation. 
730   Annexes I-III of the EBCG Regulation.  
731   Frontex (2022). ‘Annual Implementation Report; Frontex (2023). ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2022’. 
732   ICF study (2023), p. 138. Survey of MS/SAC authorities. 
733   ICF study (2023), p. 138. Interviews with and survey of MS. 

235 

 
 
 
 
consider the profile categories to be adequately defined in terms of their roles and responsibilities734. However, the profiles needed for 
specific deployment are not always available and Member States face challenges when recruiting some specialists735. 

The effectiveness of the SC has been diminished by some practical issues. If a border guard is deployed to another country, several 
issues, including practical, organisational, and procedural obstacles set certain limitations to the full utilisation of the deployed staff. 
This is mostly due to the host country’s legislation or practices. For example, the SC has limited access to key databases, including 
SIS  and  national  databases.  This  is  only  partially  a  language  limitation;  it  is  because  only  four  Member  States  adapted  legally  and 
technically their systems and procedures to allow SC staff to effectively conduct border checks and query the necessary databases736. 
Additionally, the host Member State may have language limitation to liaise with SC737. 

These issues have to be addressed during the ongoing implementation of the Regulation. Despite room for improvement in the hosting 
capacity and usability of SC, it can be concluded that SC has been relevant and has added value for Member States. 

RQ2.  The  EBCG  Regulation  requires  the  deployment  of  all  Standing  Corps  members  (with  few  exceptions)  in  the  field, 
excluding them from contributing to the activities conducted in the Headquarters. Is this limiting the capacity of the Agency to 
implement its full mandate? 

The purpose of the Regulation is to ensure that SC is deployed to the operational areas, to support Member States in the operational 
work on the ground as the member of the teams. This means that the Regulation limits the possibility of posting of Standing Corps 
staff to headquarters of the Agency, or to perform non-operational tasks738. 

In addition to the approximately 1 000 headquarters staff, the Regulation allows the Agency to recruit up to 4% of the total number of 
the SC set out in Annex I as statutory staff to be used for “supportive or monitoring functions for the establishment of the SC for the 
planning and management of its operations and for the acquisition of the Agency's own equipment”739. 

734   ICF study (2023). Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 13/27 
735   ICF study (2023), p. 138. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 10/27. 
736   ISF study (2023), p. 150. Interview with Category 1, 2 and 3 of the SC. 
737   ICF study (2023), p. 150. Interviews with MS/SAC authorities. 
738   Articles 54, 55, 56 and 57 of the EBCG Regulation. 
739   Article 54 of the EBCG Regulation. 

236 

 
 
 
 
When  the  recruitment  of  SC  staff  was  launched  in  2020,  the  Agency  had  to  redistribute  its  internal  resources  to  manage  this 
administratively  complex  task,  placing  additional  strain  on  its  resources.  This  initially  created  a  mix  between  the  support  tasks 
performed by the 4% statutory staff recruited as part of SC and Frontex’s headquarter staff, distributed within several Divisions with 
responsibility  for  the  management  of  the  SC.  This  includes  staff  in  Human  Resources,  the  Deployment  Management  Division,  the 
Operational Response Division, and others740. 

Some Frontex stakeholders are of the view that the 4% limitation is too restrictive and not sufficient to manage the administratively 
complex  processes  linked  to  SC  planning  and  management.  Others  acknowledge  that  inefficiencies  may  partly  stem  from  internal 
processes, which could be streamlined and improved. This would ensure more efficient planning and deployment, among others741.  

The Agency has not yet developed a clear concept about the present and future needs for general administrative support, operational 
support and size of operational activities taking place at the headquarters, vis-à-vis the overall size of the SC. Such clear view is likely 
to emerge because of the ongoing development of a new command structure for the SC and of the wider reorganisation of the Agency. 
The development of a management structure for the SC is essential for the implementation of the current Regulation, and for the need 
to ensure effective business processes, avoid overlapping, excess administration and to set clear responsibilities742. 

In the meantime, the deployment of some operational staff of the SC to the Agency’s headquarters is justified for certain profiles. This 
is providing some flexibility for Frontex, in line with MB Decisions 27/2021, 8/2022 and 5/2023. In accordance with the relevant MB 
Decisions,  the  SC  profiles  which  could  be  posted  in  the  Headquarters  include  Debriefing  Officers,  Cross-Border  Crime  Detection 
Officers,  Frontex  Tactical  Support  Officers,  Advanced  Level  Document  Officers,  Return  Specialists,  Forced  Return  Escort  and 
Support Officers, and Information Officers, which operate multi-purpose aerial surveillance743.  

Additional problems arise in relation to the places of deployment. The Agency's headquarters in Warsaw is the place of employment 
for Frontex’s statutory staff, despite not  being recognised as a place of deployment. This is  creating administrative challenges. The 
division between statutory staff employed at the headquarters and statutory staff deployed in operations is reflected in the employment 

740   ICF study (2023), p. 139-140. Interviews with Frontex. 
741   ICF study (2023), p. 140. Interviews with Frontex.  
742   ICF study (2023), p. 140. Interviews with Frontex. 
743   Management  Board  Decisions  27/2021, 8/2022  and 5/2023;  Frontex  (2022).  ‘Final  Audit  report  on  recruitment,  training  and deployment  of  the Standing 

Corps in the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’. 

237 

 
 
 
 
contracts of  Frontex staff. Frontex staff are divided into two categories:  Category A1 includes staff working  at  headquarters, while 
Category A2 refers to “deployed staff” of the SC744. 

However,  both  categories  of  SC  staff  have  Warsaw  as  their  place  of  employment.  The  current  set-up  entails  several  practical  and 
administrative  challenges,  including  significant  workload  to  process  long-term  missions  and  claims  for  rent,  accommodation,  and 
reimbursement745.  

There  are  also  several  other  administrative  and  practical  issues  deriving  from  the  difference  between  the  place  of  long-term 
deployment and the place of employment. For instance, because SC staff are officially employed in Warsaw but do not reside there or 
in their deployment location, they are unable to obtain vehicle license plates746. 

The implementation of the rules needs to be reviewed, as the Agency proceeds with the reforms in the planning and reorganisation. 
Additionally, administrative issues and human resource management related issues in terms of place of employment and deployment 
must be solved in a sustainable manner. 

RQ3.  How  has  the  reserve  for  rapid  reaction  as  part  of  the  Standing  Corps  been  relevant  in  supporting  Member  States,  in 
light of the increased number of categories 1, 2 and 3 staff?  

The  reserve  for  rapid  reaction  from  the  Member  States’  staff  is  the  Category  4  of  SC747.  During  the  review  period,  it  has  not  been 
relevant to supporting Member States with border management tasks. No Category 4 staff were deployed in 2021748 or 2022749. The 
Regulation phases out Category 4 Standing Corps in 2025. 

Category 4 has been formed and ready to be deployed “in the event that other categories of operational staff are fully deployed for a 
rapid  border  intervention”.  It  is  to  assist  Member  States  in  circumstances  when  Member  States  are  facing  ‘specific  and 

744   ICF study (2023), p. 141 and Frontex (2022). ‘Final Audit report on recruitment, training and deployment of the Standing Corps in the European Border  

and Coast Guard Agency’, pp. 31-32. 
745   ICF study (2023). Interviews with Frontex. 
746   ICF study (2023), p. 141. 
747   Article 58 of the EBCG Regulation. 
748   Management Board Decision 57/2022 of 29 October 2022 adopting the Annual Implementation Report 2021. 
749   Frontex (2023). ‘Annual Implementation Report 2022’, p. 9. 

238 

 
 
 
 
disproportionate  challenges’750  at  their  borders.  Nevertheless,  resources  from  other  categories,  especially  Category  3,  have  been 
available and sufficient to cover the needs.  

For  example,  following  increased  tensions  at  the  border  between  Lithuania  and  Belarus,  the  Agency  launched  a  rapid  border 
intervention in Lithuania in 2021. The intervention lasted from mid-July until the end of November 2021. Lithuania received support 
primarily via the activation of Category 3 short-term deployments. The Regulation allows for the redeployment of available members 
of  the  SC  or  deployment  of  additional  staff  in  case  of  launching  a  rapid  border  intervention.  Similarly,  Category  4  staff  were  not 
deployed in response to  the mass influx of persons arriving from  Ukraine in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 
February 2022, as other resources were available751. 

The  post-COVID  19  period  had  generally  low  levels  of  irregular  migration  pressure.  This  is  when  deployment  needs  for  Standing 
Corps  was  quite  low.  Several  Member  States  believed  Category  4  may  no  longer  be  relevant752.  This  is  becoming  clearer,  as  the 
numbers in the Categories 1 – 3 are increasing year by year, and the Member States have factually re-allocated Category 4 staff to the 
other Categories of the SC. It seems that phasing out of Category 4 is feasible, as planned. 

RQ4. Which are the national authorities of Member States and Schengen Associated Countries which provide contributions to 
the Standing Corps (categories 2 and 3)?  

The  European  Border  and  Coast  Guard  includes  by  the  national  authorities  of  Member  States  responsible  for  border  management, 
including coast guards, where relevant, and the national authorities responsible for returns753. This defines the scope of the national 
authorities, and sets the bar to evaluate, if the Regulation is implementable and implemented as meant. 

There  are  three  main  group  of  national  authorities  that  contribute  to  the  SC:  authorities  that  can  be  described  predominantly  law 
enforcement and border management authorities, predominantly defence authorities, and authorities with other duties. Most of the SC 
(97%) are long term seconded (Category 2) or short term nominated (Category 3) by national authorities with law enforcement and 
border  management  duties.  These  include  police  authorities,  border  and  coast  guards,  as  well  as  migration,  integration,  return 

750   Preambles of the EBCG Regulation. 
751   Frontex (2023). ‘Annual Implementation Report 2022’, p. 9. 
752   ICF study (2023), p. 141. Interviews with MS/SAC national authorities: 2/27; survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27. 
753   Preambles of the EBCG Regulation. 

239 

 
 
 
 
management, and customs. Only a minority of the SC is nominated or seconded by defence authorities (1.8%), including the French 
and Portuguese Navy, the Armed Forces of Malta and the Defence Command of Denmark, or by other authorities (0.2%), such as the 
General  Inspectorate  of  Aviation  within  the  Ministry  of  Interior  (Romania)  or  the  Prison  and  Probation  Service,  responsible  for 
returns. In this regard, there is lots of versatility754. 

Some  of  the  contributing  agencies  have  a  combination  of  law  enforcement  and  border  guard  tasks,  but  there  are  also  specialised 
agencies, depending on the contributing country. In several countries, law enforcement or customs officers conduct tasks, which are 
external border control tasks in the Union acquis. It is not possible to strike a clear-cut universal definition to the Agencies that fall 
under the definition of European Border and Coast Guard. For Category 2, for example, Germany relies almost entirely on the federal 
police, but for Category 3 it includes 16 other regional police forces, as well as Customs and Criminal Police. The local police forces 
have also a major role in other Member States, such as Latvia, Greece, France, where police forces have a relevant role in the border 
management755. 

It  seems  that  multiple  relevant  agencies  of  the  Member  States  contribute,  depending  on  the  national  organisation,  competences, 
institutional setup, and policies. This ensures the distribution of the burden across the Member State and ensures the participation of 
the suitable and competent professions, as envisaged by the Regulation.  

RQ5. How has the number of Standing Corps members, the composition (e.g., Standing Corps categories) and geographical 
distribution of the Standing Corps meet the operational needs of the Agency?  

The  detailed  composition  of  the  SC  meets  the  Agency’s  operational  needs  only  to  some  extent756.  Nevertheless,  it  is  essential  to 
analyse, which challenges are related to the transitional period of the launching of the SC, and which are structural problems that may 
need addressing in terms of the implementation going forward. 

By 2027 the SC is to comprise of 10 000 officers. This includes 3000 Category 1 statutory staff hired by the Agency. Additionally, 1 
500 will be seconded from the Member States for long term (Category 2) and the remainder 5500 to be nominated by the Member 

754   ICF study (2023), p. 142. 
755   ICF study (2023), p. 142. 
756   ICF study (2023), pp. 142-145. 

240 

 
 
 
 
States for short term deployments (Category 3)757. Category 3 is deployed predominantly to fill in the gaps that cannot be covered by 
the longer deployments with Category 1 and 2. At present, it is yet to see to what extent the size of the SC will be sufficient in the 
years to come758. 

So far, initial  delays in  recruitment  of Category  1 staff, and related delays in  the training and equipping have had an impact  to  the 
perception of Member States. The gaps are visible in certain profiles, such as dog handlers and Advanced level document officers759. 

The implementation process of the SC has just recently started. In 2020, a task force for deployment management was set up to ensure 
the full operationalisation of the SC. An information campaign for the recruitment of the first  candidates was launched. During the 
same year, 495 SC Category 1 were recruited, trained, and equipped. In 2022 and 2023, the number increased respectively to 678 and 
970 SC Category 1 in comparison to the targets of 1000 and 1500 provided in Annex I of the EBCG Regulation760. 

Table 2761 is to provide an overview of the capacity of the SC762 in the years 2021, 2022 and 2023. The main gap was in Category 1, a 
small gap in Category 2, but due to plentiful short-term deployments of Member States, de facto there were no major gaps affecting 
the deployments.  

Table 2: Overall Development of the Standing Corps 2021 - 2023 

Year  
Category 

Regulation’s 
Requirement 
by Category 

Actual  
Recruited (CAT1) or 
Committed (CAT 
2,3,4) 

Note 

757   Annex I of the EBCG Regulation. 
758   ICF study (2023), p. 142-143. 
759   ICF study (2023), p. 142-143. 
760   ICF study (2023), p. 143. The number of Standing Corps Category 1 staff as indicated in Annex I of the EBCG Regulation includes statutory staff deployed 
as members of the team in operational areas, staff responsible for the functioning of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and 
the ‘up to 4% support staff’ in line with Articles 54(7) and 54(8) of the EBCG Regulation. Therefore, the number of deployable team members is always less 
than the overall number required by the Regulation. 

761   Annual Implementation Report 2021; Quarterly Reports on the European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s Capabilities (Q4 2022). 
762   Annex I, II and III of the EBCG Regulation and the number of officers recruited and nominated in each Category. 

241 

 
 
 
 
2021 
1 
2 
3 

4 
2022 
1 
2 
3 

4 
2023763 
1 
2 
3 
4 

1000 
400 
3600 

1500 

1000 
500 
3500 

1500 

1500 
500 
4000 
1500 

495 
37 

7752 (primary: 3444)  This  number  exceeds  the  minimum  requirement  of 
the  Regulation  as  it  includes  both  deployed  and 
others, who were dedicated to the Standing Corps as a 
reserve. The length of the deployment periods varies. 
Full commitments, even if no deployments 

1500 

678 
461 

7809 (primary: 3419)  This  number  exceeds  the  minimum  requirement  of 
the Regulation as it includes both deployed and other, 
who  were  dedicated  to  the  Standing  Corps  as  a 
reserve. The length of the deployment periods varies. 
Full commitments, even if no deployments 

1500 

970 
450 
3899 
1500 

This means that the building up of the SC and gaining experiences out of it is only in a very early stage. In the future, more structured, 
planned and thoroughly implemented quality and quantity of the SC can be expected. Overall, the SC is still in implementation phase, 
and it is therefore not yet possible to draw conclusions on its overall size. Nevertheless, despite the identification of inefficiencies that 

763   Latest data from Frontex report on capabilities to the Management Board 5.9.2023. 

242 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
need  to  be  addressed,  Member  States  acknowledge  the  overall  added  value  in  the  deployment  of  the  SC  and  the  size  of individual 
Member States contributions to the SC appears to be largely adequate.  

The predictability and coordination of the capacity building and staffing of the SC will improve with the adoption of the Capability 
Roadmap764.  It will be looking to the future of the recruitment and training, as a part of EIBM governance process. The Roadmap is 
scheduled to be adopted by the Agency’s MB still in 2023 and will be annexed to the Technical and Operational Strategy for EIBM 
Strategy765. 

In  addition  to  quantity,  the  quality  of  the  SC  must  be  considered  in  the  planning.  In  terms  of  the  composition  of  SC’  categories, 
Member States reported gaps and deficiencies in certain profiles. This means that the capacity building to ensure certain categories of 
the experts must be considered while developing the Capability Roadmap. 

Table 3 provides an overview of coverage rate of Frontex’s needs for each profile in the SC, measured as the ratio of the availability 
of the various profiles over the identified needs766 by category, for 2021, 2022 and 2023. The gaps identified for profiles such as Dog 
Handler and Forced Return Escort and Support Officer (FRESO) are evident. Some of these gaps are because Member States struggle 
to provide the Agency with staff that fit the requested profiles. 

Profile 

Advanced Level Document Officer 

Border Guard Officer 

Crew Member 

Table 3: Gaps in the SC Profiles 2021, 2022 and 2023 

% of Needs Fulfilled 
in 2021 

% of Needs Fulfilled in 
2022 

96% 

72% 

N/A 

64% 

59% 

100% 

% of Needs Fulfilled 
in 2023 
66% 

84% 

100% 

764   Articles 9, 62, 63 and 66 of the EBCG Regulation. 
765   Article 9 of the EBCG Regulation. 
766   ICF study (2023), p. 145. Based on Frontex Annual Implementation Reports. 

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Coast Guard Function Officer 

Cross-border Crime Detection Officer 

Debriefing Officer 

Dog Handler 

Forced Return Escort and Support Officer 

Frontex Tactical Support Officer 

Information Officer 

Motor Vehicle Crime Detection Officer 

Return Specialist 

100% 

89% 

375% 

43% 

55% 

79% 

78% 

94% 

74% 

N/A 

66% 

87% 

24% 

51% 

99% 

93% 

77% 

90% 

100% 

94% 

94% 

33% 

100% 

100% 

88% 

72% 

57% 

It appears that the gaps that have been experienced so far are gradually reducing, as the numbers of the categories in the SC approach 
the planned end state in 2027. Nevertheless, the profiles in the different categories require constant fine-tuning and the need to recruit 
and  train  the  staff  must  be  taken  into  consideration  while  developing  the  Capability  roadmap  that  will  define  the  recruitment  and 
training plans for the Agency and Member States for years to come.  

RQ6.  How  has  the  Agency  been  effective  in  the  recruitment  and  training  of  the  Standing  Corps  category  1?  Does  the 
recruitment ensure professionalism and geographical (national) balance? 

244 

 
 
 
 
Training and equipping are an integral follow-up to the recruitment, to have operational resource ready to be efficiently deployed. The 
establishment of the  SC required significant  recruitment, which was also  impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The SC members’ 
selection procedures turned out to be rather comprehensive, time consuming and complex767. 

Most Category 1 staff are satisfied with the different aspects of the recruitment and induction procedures, including the submission of 
their  application,  physical  test,  medical  check,  and  clarity  of  the  employment  offer768.  Nevertheless,  administrative  resources  for 
recruitment and processes of recruitment may be reviewed and streamlined as a part of the implementation of the Regulation. 

However,  there  is  an  imbalance  in  the  geographical  representation  within  SC  Category  1.  The  Agency  should  not  only  draw  the 
versatility  and  expertise  all  around  Europe,  but  also  try  to  ensure  a  national  balance  and  that  the  Standing  Corps  is  perceived  as  a 
European representation of the Member States’ Border and Coast Guard. The current workforce does not represent an EU-wide border 
uniformed service, nor does it reflect  the diverse national  backgrounds and working  cultures of all Member States. Standing Corps 
staff from Greece, Romania, Portugal, Spain and Poland account for approximately 74% of Category 1 staff769. 

This is firstly, because in the implementation of the Regulation, there are no national quotas for Category 1.  

Secondly,  there  are  factors  that  may  reduce  the  attractiveness  of  the  statutory  staff  positions.  An  essential  factor  is  remuneration, 
benefits – including family benefits and working conditions - compared to the conditions in the home country service770. 

Thirdly, different Member States treat Category 1 staff differently for the duration of their recruitment by Frontex. There are practices 
between forcing to leave service permanently, to allow re-applying to home service after the Category 1 employment, to granting long 
term leave of absence and allowing the smooth return home. This has impact to predictability and benefits of the potential applicants 

767   ICF study (2023), p. 145-146. Frontex (2022). ‘Final audit report on recruitment, training and deployment of the Standing Corps in the European Border and 

Coast Guard Agency’; interviews with EU agencies (2/8) and Frontex. 

768   ICF study (2023), p. 146. Survey of Standing Corps Category 1: very satisfied or satisfied with: submission of application (86%), information on the  

recruitment process (63%), physical test (57%), medical check (69%), clarity of the employment offer (63%), and timing of the recruitment process (51%).  

769   ICF study (2023), pp. 146-147. Based on Frontex Annual Implementation Report 2022. 
770   ICF study (2023), p. 147. Interviews with Frontex and MS: 6/27.  

245 

 
 
 
 
to Category 1. Of the SC Category 1 staff with previous law enforcement experience, around 93% reported having resigned from their 
previous employer or taking a long period of unpaid leave771. 

The  primary  reasons  for  joining  SC  Category  1  staff  include  career  ambition  (65%),  job  satisfaction  (63%)  and  salary  (57%).  The 
online survey suggests that recruits’ profiles are overwhelmingly male, with an age range between 40 and 49772.  

13  of  the  27  Member  States  considered  that  the  recruitment  of  Category  1  staff  does  not  ensure  professionalism  and  geographical 
balance773. Looking into diversity and national balance is an essential issue in terms of next steps of the implementation. 

Training is an integral part of the recruitment. Following their recruitment, given the specific skills required, Frontex statutory staff 
cannot be deployed immediately. It must undergo necessary border guard or return-related training, including training on fundamental 
rights. The training is considering their previous qualifications and professional experience of the SC specifically, the Agency has the 
mandate to provide the members of the SC with specialised training relevant to their tasks and powers774. 

The picture of the amount, quality and impact of the training is somewhat mixed. The recent external evaluation of the training found 
that  new  recruits  consider  themselves  ready  to  perform  their  tasks,  such  as  border  checks  and  border  surveillance-related  tasks, 
including  refusal  of  entry,  authorisation  of  entry,  and  patrolling.  The  national  authorities  expressed  concerns  about  the  level  of 
professionalism of the recruits with no law enforcement background775. 

Currently Frontex has a limited capacity to deliver training on its own. The training of the SC in all categories is heavily relying on the 
support and commitment of the Member States training resources, such as trainers and training facilities. In terms of implementation 

771   ICF study (2023), p. 147. Survey of the Standing Corps. 
772   ICF study (2023), p. 147. Survey of the Standing Corps. 
773   ICF study (2023), p. 147.  Survey of MS: 4/27 national authorities agreed that the recruitment of Standing Corps Category 1 ensures professionalism and 

geographical balance, while 5/27 preferred not to answer, and another 5/27 neither agreed nor disagreed.   

774   Articles 55 and 61 of the EBCG Regulation.  
775   ICF  study  (2023),  pp.  148–149.  Field  visits  to  MS/SAC;  interviews  with  MS/SAC  authorities:  7/27;  survey  of  MS/SAC  national  authorities.  ICF  study 
(2023), annex, p. 215. Referring to survey of MS/SAC authorities 10 out of 27 Member States noted issues related to the levels of training and preparedness 
of SC officers during deployments.   

246 

 
 
 
 
 
of  the  Regulation,  the  commitment  of  the  Member  States  to  support  the  training  with  resources,  curricula  development,  exercises, 
facilities and other forms of hands-on-support is needed. Without long term predictable commitment of the Member States the training 
system cannot be ensured776. 

Beside of the challenges, according to the data of 2020 and 2022, most formal targets for training activities were met for those years. 
Also, a recent external evaluation of the Extended Basic Training Programme (EBTP) found the content of the training to be highly 
relevant to the needs and expectations of the Agency, Member States and trainees, as well as coherent with the EBCG Regulation777.  

Nevertheless, the overall quality, substance and quantity of the training needs further follow-up and analysis to provide reliable picture 
of  the  development  needs.  This  is  a  part  of  the  Capability  roadmap  development  that  will  provide  long  term  view  for  the  training 
development for Frontex and Member States with a view to ensuring the necessary quality and quantity of staff in the long term. At 
the  same  time,  ensuring  long  term  training  plans  with  proper  European  resources,  utilisation  of  Partnership  Academies  in  Member 
States and adequate finetuned curricula are an essential part of the implementation of the regulation778. 

RQ7. How has the Agency been effective in the deployments of the Standing Corps Category 1?  

The  overall  added  value  of  SC  is  discussed  in  RQ1,  the  size  and  composition  of  SC,  including  the  different  profiles  in  RQ5  and 
training  level  of  Category  1  in  RQ6.  According  to  Member  States  the  effectiveness  of  Category  1  staff  of  the  SC  has  been  only 
somewhat effective779. 

Firstly, the training of the different profiles has an impact to the composition of the SC, and its possibilities to be deployed effectively 
to the required tasks. It seems that Member States expect especially Category 1 staff to provide additional support in the specialised 
areas. These areas of specialisation lack  experts  available from Member  States. This  sets  requirement of quality  and  content of the 

776   ICF study (2023), p. 149. Field visits to MS/SAC; interviews with Frontex and MS/SAC national authorities: 2/27; Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of  

the EBCG Regulation: Standing Corps’; ICF (2023). ‘Evaluation of the design and functioning of the Extended Basic Training programme for the standing 
corps designed and delivered for the extended mandate and tasking as foreseen in the EBCG’; interviews with Frontex and Member States: 2/27. 

777   ICF study (2023), p. 147-148. A survey to MS/SAC. ‘Evaluation of the design and functioning of the Extended Basic Training programme for  

the standing corps designed and delivered for the extended mandate and tasking as foreseen in the EBCG.’ 

778   Articles 9 and 55 of the EBCG Regulation.  
779   ICF study (2023), p. 149. 

247 

 
 
 
 
training of profiles in Category 1. The survey of the SC has shown that the training may be too theoretical and could be developed to 
provide more practical skills to work in the daily working environment at the borders780. 

Secondly,  one  issue  was  identified  in  relation  to  the  planning  of  deployments.  The  current  planning  process  and  the  Agency’s 
interpretation of data protection rules do not allow the planning team to have full access to the information regarding expertise of the 
Category 1 staff members. This has led to a situation that staff members have been allocated to wrong tasks in the operations, creating 
negative perceptions. Additionally, the planning process has deployed some staff members to the operations, whose expertise was not 
needed on the ground781. Duration of deployments is also a matter of effectiveness. Member States considered the longer deployment 
period to be of higher the added value782. 

Thirdly, there are some unclarities of the role of  SC. SC was never meant to become a law enforcement agency, with investigative 
competences783.  The lack of investigative competences  is  perceived as a weakness  or  as a gap784. In this regard, there is  a space for 
improvement in terms of developing the Standard operational procedures, operational plans785 and briefing this to the staff to better 
itemise  the  tasks  and  competences  of  the  Category  1,  as  well  as  for  Member  States  to  review  their  national  law  and  practices786  to 
enable the effective deployment of Category 1 staff. This issue is applicable to all the Categories, but it has been interpreted to be most 

780   ICF study (2023), p. 150. Survey of the Standing Corps; interview with Frontex. 
781   ICF study, p. 149-150. Survey of the Standing Corps. 
782   ICF study (2023), p. 151. Interviews at the on-site visits in two selected MS/SAC. 
784   The  legal  basis  for  EU  action  in  the  field  of  intra-EU  law  enforcement  cooperation  is  based  on  87  TFEU:  "the  Union  shall  establish  police  cooperation 
involving  all  the  Member  States'  competent  authorities,  including  police,  customs  and  other  specialised  law  enforcement  services  in  relation  to  the 
prevention,  detection  and  investigation  of  criminal  offences",  but  it  is  not  about full  law  enforcement  competences, which  is  in  the  hands  of  MS.  EBCG 
Regulation is about TFEU Art. 77 and 79. 

784   ICF study (2023), p. 150. Interviews with two MS/SAC; ICF Study (2023), p. 26; Frontex (2023). ‘Evaluation of EBCG Regulation’. Internal document. 
785   Article 82(2) of the EBCG Regulation: “The performance of tasks and the exercise of powers by members of the teams, in particular those requiring 

executive powers, shall be subject to the authorisation of the host Member State on its territory as well as to applicable Union, national or international law, 
in particular Regulation (EU) No 656/2014, as described in the operational plans referred to in Article 38.” 

786   ICF study (2023), p. 19. 

248 

 
 
 
 
challenging  for  Category  1787.  The  Regulation  grants  SC  executive  powers,  use  of  force,  carrying  service  weapons788.  Nevertheless, 
criminal investigation789 are not in the mandate of the Agency790.    

Fourthly, certain aspects of the EU Staff Regulations do not seem to be suited to the needs of SC Category 1, who would need to work 
in the nightshifts, weekends, longer shifts, stand-by, if needed. The current rules limit the effectiveness of the SC deployments791.  

Additionally,  logistical  concerns  were  reported  as  obstacles  in  the  efficient  implementation  of  duties.  The  establishment  of  logistic 
hubs might reduce the need to use working time to pick up equipment, uniforms and weapons. Developing logistical arrangements and 
administrative rules, operational effectiveness was an issue. The host Member State can also contribute to the implementation of the 
smooth logistical arrangements, for example in terms of storing the equipment and weapons safely792. 

The SC has limited access to the relevant data bases, such as Schengen Information System and the national databases. This hinders 
SC ability to provide relevant support carrying out first-line border checks and related tasks793. 

Finally, the host Member States’ authorities’ language skills seem to be an issue. The limited English-speaking staff at local level in 
Member States means that SC cannot effectively carry out their duties unless paired with English-speaking local officers. Even if in 

787   ICF study (2023), pp. 115-116. Interviews with Frontex indicate that question of law enforcement status is understood to solve several issues, including to 

grant additional competences. 

788   Article 55 and Annex V of the EBCG Regulation. 
789   Law enforcement agency is referring to a national agency. For example, Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying 
the  exchange  of  information  and  intelligence  between  law  enforcement  authorities  of  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union  defines  ‘competent  law 
enforcement authority’: a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised by national law to detect, prevent and investigate offences or criminal 
activities and to exercise authority and take coercive measures in the context of such activities. Agencies or units dealing  especially with national security 
issues  are  not  covered  by  the  concept  of  competent  law  enforcement  authority.  Every  Member  State  shall,  by  18  December  2007,  state  in  a  declaration 
deposited  with  the  General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  which  authorities  are  covered  by  the  concept  of  ‘competent  law  enforcement  authority’.  Such  a 
declaration may be modified at any time.” 

790   ICF study (2023), p. 116. 
791   ICF study (2023), p. 150.  
792   ICF study (2023), pp. 150-151.  
793   ICF study (2023), p. 150. Interviews with Category 1, 2 and 3 SC. 

249 

 
 
 
 
some cases a common language can be found, lack of communication is a question of safety, security and a source of frustration for 
SC and the host country794.  

RQ8. How has the Agency been effective in the deployment of the Standing Corps Categories 2 and 3?  

Category 2 refers to operational staff seconded from Member States to the Agency for a long-term period of typically two years795. 
Category 3 refers to operational staff for short-term deployments for up to four months796. 

Based on the very positive feedback from Member State authorities, the Agency has been effective in deploying Categories 2 and 3 
SC797. Nevertheless, there are some challenges with Category 1, which are described in previously in chapter RQ7. 

Member States are satisfied with the experience of Categories 2 and 3, especially when it comes to the competences of the staff. The 
national authorities value their background, professionalism, and value in operational support798. 

The length of deployment of Category 2 is valued by the host Member States. Member States consider Category 3 useful to fill in the 
gaps in busy periods. The deployment periods are hoped to be longer, even if the picture of the prolongation option is mixed, referring 
to the work-life balance concerns and relatively low remuneration to attract volunteers799. 

When it comes to the deployment planning of Frontex, the Agency recognises that the current deployment system is not efficient. As 
the  amounts  of  deployments  are  increasing  very  quickly,  the  old  planning  models  are  not  enough.  Frontex  is  in  the  process  of 
developing a new deployment model, aiming to deployment of functional teams rather than individual staff members800. 

RQ9.  To  what  extent  is  the  size  of  individual  Member  States'  contributions  to  the  Standing  Corps  adequate  to  meet  the 
objectives of the EBCG and proportionate to these?  

794   ICF study (2023), p. 45. Survey of MS/SAC: 14/27; ICF study (2023), p. 122 and p. 155. Interviews with three MS/SAC; ICF Study (2023), p. 162.  
795   Article 56 of the EBCG Regulation. 
796   Article 57 of the EBCG Regulation. 
797   ICF study (2023), p. 151. 
798   ICF study (2023), p. 151.  
799   ICF study (2023), p. 151. 
800   ICF study (2023), p. 151. 

250 

 
 
 
 
The SC appears largely adequate to meet the objectives of the Regulation, namely the development and implementation of a system 
for the integrated management of the external borders and for ensuring the functioning of the Schengen area. The Agency has been 
able to answer all the requests for support by Member States, suggesting that overall contributions are adequate to meet the objectives. 
Where needs have not been met, this is due to the type of expertise (i.e. profiles) rather than the volume of contributions801. 

The  operational  needs  must  be  assessed  taking  into  consideration  future  needs,  risk  and  new  phenomena,  vulnerabilities  of  the 
Member States that need to be supported, types of borders (land, sea, air), types of terrains, climate, infrastructure and similar factors.  
The determining the optimal size of the SC entails a complex analysis802. 

In the survey such opinion was shared by half of the responding Member States who agree that the size of individual contributions to 
the Standing Corps is adequate to meet the objectives of the EBCG Regulation803. 

Focusing exclusively on the views of Member States, while half of the responding Member States find the size of  the contributions 
adequate, a minority of respondents disagree with this conclusion804. Some Member States’ representatives hope that the contributions 
should be more needs based, and there should not be binding quotas to contribute to the categories. Even if there must be predictability 
and continuity in the commitment of the Member States, it can be concluded that there is still room for improvement when it comes to 
the implementation of smart and flexible planning by Frontex805. 

The capability roadmap will define the long-term recruitment and training needs for the Standing Corps. Implementation of this will 
roll out in the Agency’s Single Programming Document, acquisition strategy and other strategic plans, as it will in the Member State’s 
capability development plans. Year by year, the planning system of the Agency is moving to more needs based and flexible direction. 
The existing and foreseen operational needs of the host Member States will be the main driver for the confirmed deployments806. 

801   ICF study (2023), p. 152. 
802   ICF study (2023), p.152-153. Interviews with Frontex; case study; interviews with two MS. 
803   ICF study (2023), p. 153. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 11/27 positive (total 22 answers to the question). 
804   ICF survey (2023), p. 153. Survey of MS/SAC authorities11/27 positive (total 22 answers to the question). 
805   ICF survey (2023), p. 153. 
806   ICF study (2023), p. 153. 

251 

 
 
 
 
There are a number of criteria that can be used to analyse the contribution of individual Member States. Table 4 below is figuring the 
comparison  by  some  selected  criteria.  When  evaluating  the  contributions,  it  is  possible  to  compare  Member  States  for  example  in 
terms of territory relatively to the total territory of all Member States (including Schengen associated countries) and the share of their 
population  relatively  to  the  total  population  of  all  of  them.  These  two  criteria  are  compared  to  the  share  of  the  Member  States’ 
contributions to Category 2 and Category 3 according to the Regulation, and the share of the actual Member States’ contribution to the 
Standing Corps’ deployment in 2021 for both Category 2 and Category 3 officers (expressed in man-days)807. 

The comparison shows that some Member States (HR, DK, HU, LV, RO) contribute more than both their share of the population and 
territorial size, and some Member States (ES, FR) contribute significantly less than their share. Most Member States contribute a fair 
share to the overall number of SC staff, even if calculated with a limited and selective criterion.  

Table 4: A sample of comparison criteria to evaluate the proportionate amounts of Member States’ contributions 

Member State 

Share of EU territory 

Share of EU 
Population 

Share of CAT 2 
Committed 

Share of CAT 3 
Committed 

Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czechia 
Denmark 

1.9% 
0.7% 
2.5% 
1.3% 
0.2% 
1.7% 
0.9% 

2.0% 
2.5% 
1.5% 
0.8% 
0.2% 
2.3% 
1.3% 

2.4% 
2.1% 
2.8% 
4.5% 
0.6% 
1.5% 
2.1% 

3.3% 
2.3% 
1.7% 
3.0% 
0.3% 
5.6% 
2.0% 

807   This methodology has been used by ICF study (2023), p. 154-155. 

Share of 2021  
CAT2&3  
deployment man 
days 
2.9% 
1.3% 
2.1% 
3.1% 
0.2% 
2.6% 
3.4% 

252 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 

1.0% 
6.9% 
12.4% 
7.9% 
2.9% 
2.1% 
1.6% 
6.7% 
1.4% 
1.4% 
0.1% 
0.0% 
0.8% 
8.7% 
6.9% 
2.1% 
5.2% 
1.1% 
0.5% 
11.3% 
9.2% 
0.9% 

0.3% 
1.2% 
14.9% 
18.2% 
2.3% 
2.1% 
0.1% 
12.9% 
0.4% 
0.6% 
0.1% 
0.1% 
3.9% 
1.2% 
8.3% 
2.3% 
4.2% 
0.5% 
1.2% 
10.4% 
2.3% 
1.9% 

1.3% 
2.1% 
10.7% 
12.4% 
3.9% 
4.7% 
0.2% 
7.3% 
2.1% 
3.0% 
0.6% 
0.6% 
3.4% 
1.5% 
7.1% 
1.9% 
5.2% 
2.6% 
2.6% 
6.9% 
2.6% 
1.1% 

3.0% 
4.8% 
8.9% 
17.1% 
2.2% 
4.8% 
0.4% 
6.8% 
3.6% 
3.2% 
0.3% 
1.2% 
2.0% 
0.7% 
5.4% 
1.6% 
3.7% 
2.5% 
1.6% 
5.2% 
1.9% 
1.1% 

1.5% 
1.9% 
6.0% 
15.9% 
2.4% 
5.0% 
0.3% 
8.1% 
4.8% 
2.6% 
0.3% 
1.1% 
3.6% 
0.9% 
6.5% 
6.7% 
7.2% 
1.4% 
1.8% 
3.3% 
2.2% 
0.7% 

This  comparison  is  only  showing two factors that  that influences the size of Member States’  contribution.  The contributions  of the 

253 

 
 
 
 
Member  States  to  the  SC  were  the  result  of  a  political  compromise,  based  on  the  historical  contributions,  population,  size  of  the 
Member State, resources, such as number of competent agencies, external borders and capabilities to contribute808. 

RQ10. How are the Member States’ capabilities coherent with the size of the Members States’ contributions to the Standing 
Corps? Have the contributions impacted capabilities available for other needs (e.g. CSDP missions and operations)?  

Member States are also financially supported to increase the amount of border guards809. Member States get also support in the training 
and other capacity building measures by Frontex810. The challenge is not overall numbers of contributions, but more lack of specific 
profiles (expertise) and seasonal challenges during holidays and peak seasons811. 

The  concept  of  SC  gives  Member  States  and  Agency  a  predictable  long-term  view  to  the  contributions,  and  it  allows  effective 
planning and capability development. This is a welcome reform compared to the previous capacity pooling models812. 

Table 5 below presents an analysis of the proportionality of Member States’ contributions, comparing the potential impact that these 
contributions have on the overall law-enforcement capacity of a Member States813. A few Member States expressed concern about the 
overall numbers814. Though the national quotas for the contributions to the standing corps are assessed as proportionate Member States 
face some challenges when complying with the national quotas set in the EBCG Regulation. Some of the main challenges reported 
include lack of personnel815, lack of personnel willing to be deployed816 and busy periods of the year817. 

808   This methodology has been used by ICF survey (2023), p.154-155. 
809   Article 61 of the EBCG Regulation. 
810   Article 62 of the EBCG Regulation. 
811   ICF study (2023), p. 41.  
812   ICF  study  (2023),  p.  138  and  European  Commission  (2018).  ‘Proposal  for  a  regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  the  European 

Border and Coast Guard’. 
813   ICF study (2023), pp. 157-158.  
814   ICF study (2023), pp. 158-159. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 2/27. 
815   ICF study (2023), pp. 158-159. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 4/27 “to great extent”, 11/27 “to some extent”, 7/27 “to a limited extent” 
816   ICF study (2023), pp. 158-159. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 3/27 “to a great extent”, 8/27 “to some extent”, 9/27 “to a limited extent”. 
817   ICF study (2023), pp. 158-159. Survey of MS/SAC authorities: 6/27 “to a great extent”, 3/27 “to some extent”, 8/27 “to a limited extent”. 

254 

 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Example of a way to calculate the ratio between Member States’ contributions to Categories 2 and 3 and their 
indicative national enforcement capacity818 

Member 
State 

Category 
2 

Category 
3 

Total number of 
Standing Corps 
from law 
enforcement 
authorities 

Total 
Contributions 
to CAT2&3 

Indicative 
national law 
enforcement 
capacity 

Total 
contributions 
versus national 
law enforcement 
capacity % 

Austria 

Belgium 

Bulgaria 

Croatia 

Cyprus 

Czechia 

Denmark 

Estonia 

Finland 

France 

Germany 

11 

10 

13 

21 

3 

7 

10 

6 

10 

50 

58 

216 

153 

114 

201 

21 

369 

130 

196 

316 

585 

218 

128 

127 

222 

24 

376 

76 

202 

N/A 

562 

227 

163 

127 

222 

24 

376 

140 

202 

326 

635 

1,126 

1,184 

1,184 

31,897 

38,828 

29,170 

20,576 

4,828 

40,113 

11,300 

4,070 

7,503 

215,948 

250,558 

0.71% 

0.31% 

0.43% 

1.07% 

0.49% 

0.93% 

0.67% 

4.96% 

N/A 

0.26% 

0.47% 

818   As there are large differences in the institutional setup and competent agencies in the scope of European Border and Coast Guard, this data must be evaluated  

taking into consideration differences in reporting this. 

255 

 
 
 
 
Greece 

Hungary 

Iceland 

Italy 

Latvia 

Lithuania 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Netherlands 

Norway 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Slovakia 

Slovenia 

Spain 

Sweden 

Switzerland 

18 

22 

1 

34 

10 

14 

3 

3 

16 

7 

33 

9 

24 

12 

12 

32 

12 

5 

146 

317 

24 

446 

234 

208 

18 

79 

130 

47 

355 

106 

245 

162 

103 

345 

127 

72 

164 

339 

25 

480 

244 

222 

21 

82 

146 

54 

388 

115 

269 

174 

115 

377 

139 

77 

94 

339 

6 

343 

20 

N/A 

18 

7 

131 

54 

N/A 

71 

238 

174 

115 

377 

100 

N/A 

256 

56,232 

37,559 

640 

237,910 

7,663 

7,849 

2,039 

2,243 

50,628 

N/A 

97,899 

45,588 

49,670 

21,167 

7,242 

175,082 

20,942 

18,663 

0.16% 

0.9% 

0.93% 

0.14% 

0.26% 

N/A 

0.88% 

0.31% 

0.25% 

N/A 

N/A 

0.15% 

0.47% 

0.82% 

1,5% 

0.21% 

0.47% 

N/A 

 
 
 
According to the collected data, the contributions to the SC did not have a significant impact on the resources for other International or 
European missions or operations, including Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  Nevertheless, about a half of the Member 
States  found  contributions  to  the  SC  having  impact  to  the  other  commitments819.  This  means  that  Member  States  should  consider 
commitments in the other policy areas while updating their Capability development plans, including long-term recruitment. 

ANNEX IV. OVERVIEW OF BENEFITS AND COSTS 

819   ICF study (2023), p. 160. The result is based on survey of MS/SAC authorities. 

257 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview of costs and benefits identified in the evaluation  

EU institutions 

Member States 

Businesses and citizens 

Quantitative  

Comment  

Quantitative  

Comment  

Quantitative  

Comment  

compliance 
(adjustment, 

Direct 
costs 
administrative 
regulator 
one-off)820 

charges: 

Costs identified  

compliance 
(adjustment, 

Direct 
costs 
administrative 
regulator 
recurrent  

charges: 

Year-to-year 
increase  in  opening 
contribution in 2019-
2023  of  appr.  22% 
(25% from 2020) 
Difference 
between 
opening  and  closing 
in 
contribution 
general  between  7% 
and  9%,  with  a  peak 
(22.6%), 
in  2020 
the  EBCR 
where 
started 
Regulation 
being 
implemented, 
also  due  to  external 
factors 

National  co-funding 
technical 
of 
equipment 
(ranging 
and 
between  10% 
25%,  in  addition  to 
the  EU  contribution 
of  up  to  90%  of  the 
total  eligible  costs) 
purchased  via  EU 
Funds  available  for 
this  purpose  (ISF  B 
for 
the  2014-2020 
period  and  BMVI  for 
2021-2027 period.  

Additional  costs  for 
Standing 
Corps 
staff, 
including 
shares  of  their  costs 
not  covered  by  EU 
financial 
contribution  as  per 
Art. 61 of the EBCG 
Regulation,  specific 
equipment 
and 
training needs,  

Overall  contribution 
to Frontex budget 
Opening 
EU 
approx. 
contribution: 
EUR  329.6  million 
(2019),  428.2  EUR 
million  (2020),  EUR 
514.2  million  (2021), 
EUR  704.7  million 
(2022),  EUR  788.9 
million  (2023),  EUR 
925  million 
(2024), 
EUR  1,049.9  million 
(2025),  EUR  1,130.4 
million  (2026),  EUR 
1,177.3million 
(2027)821 
Closing 
EU 
Contribution:  approx. 
EUR  307.3  million 
(2019),  EUR  339.2 
million  (2020),  EUR 

820   The EU contribution has been treated as a recurrent cost for the EU.  
821   The EU contribution for 2023 is per OJ L 58, 23 February 2023 (SEC03.pdf (europa.eu), pages 866 and 867; the figures for 2024-2027 are as per  

the Financial programming from January 2023.  

258 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
499.6  million  (2021), 
EUR  647.5  million 
(2022) 

costs 

Enforcement 
(monitoring, 
inspection, 
litigation): one-off 

costs 

Enforcement 
(monitoring, 
inspection, 
litigation): recurrent  

Indirect 
costs 
(indirect  compliance 
or transaction costs) 

- 

Direct benefits: one-
off 

Benefits identified  

- 

- 

- 

in 

Differences 
in  EU 
opening  and  closing 
(see 
contributions 
above)  represent  an 
increase 
EU 
budget  available  for 
other uses822 
On  the  other  hand, 
cancellations  can  be 
signal  of  issues  with 
planning of resources 
and  activities  and/or 
inefficiencies 
in 
implementation 

Pooling of resources 
is 
for  TE) 
(e.g. 
help 
to 
meant 
achieving  economies 
of 
scale  and  of 
scope) 
Harmonisation 
of 
across 
procedures 
Member  States  and 
sharing 
best 
of 
practices823.  

Direct 
recurrent  

benefits: 

EU 
contribution 

Funds 
to 

More  efficient  use 
resources 
of 

Member  States  used 
the  EU  funding  (in 

When 
requested 

not 
by 

822   Cancellations are treated as one-off benefits. While common to all EU agencies, their occurrence and amounts vary.  
823   Survey of MS/SAC authorities: three MS. 

259 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
particular 
ISF 
Borders and Visa and 
BMVI,  as  well  as 
AMIF)  for  increasing 
their  own  operational 
to 
capacity 
EBCG 
implement 
Regulation 

least 

Frontex,  Member 
States  can  use  the 
purchased 
under 
equipment 
the 
targeted 
specific  actions  of  
ISF  Borders  and 
Visa  and  BMVI  for 
at 
eight 
months  per  year 
for national use. 
The 
benefits 
returns, 
difficult 
estimate. 
Furthermore,  it  is 
to  what 
unclear 
extent 
these  may 
represent  financial 
benefits or they are 
simply  transfers  of 
costs from Member 
States to Frontex. 

financial 
form 
are 
to 

of 

of 

of 
and 
best 

through  pooling  of 
and 
resources 
centralisation 
of 
some processes 
Harmonisation 
practices 
sharing 
practices 
Better  and  more 
direct  cooperation 
with Member States  
The  actual  use  by 
the 
Frontex 
- 
equipment 
purchased  by 
the 
Member  States  with 
- 
support 
EU 
depends 
the 
on 
actual  registration 
of  the  equipment  in 
the 
technical 
equipment  pool,  the 
compliance with the 
requirements  to  put 
Frontex’s 
it 
at 
and, 
disposal 
ultimately, 
the  bi-
lateral  agreements 
between  the  Agency 
and  owner  Member 
States. 

national 
EBCG 
and 
components 
Frontex’  operational 
capacity 
ISF-Borders  and  Visa 
(2014-2020):  Overall, 
EUR  2.4  billion  EU 
allocation  to  Member 
States 
programmes, 
out  of  which  approx. 
EUR  336.8  million  to 
strengthen  European 
Cost 
Board 
and 
Agency 
Guard’s 
technical 
equipment 
pool.  
2021-2027: 
BMVI 
Overall,  EUR 
4.2 
billion  EU  allocation 
States 
to  Member 
An 
programmes. 
amount 
201.1 
of 
million  was  added  in 
2023 to Member States 
programmes 
the 
purchase  of  equipment 
to  further  strengthen 
including 
EBCG, 
operational 
Frontex 
capacity. 
AMIF 
2014-2020: 
overall budget of EUR 
the 
7.6  billion 
period 
AMIF 
2021-2027:  
overall budget of EUR 
the 
10.1  billion  for 

for 

for 

260 

 
 
 
 
period 
Returns 
States 
Member 
identified: 
time 
savings  and  reduced 
administrative  burden, 
quicker 
and 
better 
execution of returns 

Indirect 
one-off 

Indirect 
recurrent  

benefits: 

benefits: 

These  are 
indirect 
effects hard to detect 
and assess 
It 
anecdotal 
is 
evidence,  insufficient 
for 
quantification 
and projection at EU 
level  

Businesses  operating 
in  areas  relevant  to 
activities 
Frontex 
equipment, 
(e.g. 
in 
logistics)  could 
principle 
benefit 
from 
centralised 
procurement 
managed by Frontex, 
from  possible 
and 
harmonisation 
of 
standards 

261 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX V. STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATION - SYNOPSIS REPORT  

This Annex presents the synopsis of the stakeholder consultation activities undertaken by the external service contractor as part of the 
Study to support the evaluation of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the review of the Standing Corps. It 
also includes short overview of other targeted stakeholder consultations carried out by the Commission and contributions received by 
the Commission.  

Consultation objectives 

The consultation followed the consultation strategy, developed and agreed by the ISG prior to the launch of the supporting study. The 
consultation strategy defined consultation scope and objectives and provided initial mapping of stakeholders to be consulted by using 
various  methods  and  data  collection  tools,  taking  into  consideration  that  in  line  with  the  study’s  ToR,  and  in  order  to  ensure  a 
comprehensive and representative collection of views other relevant stakeholders might be identified during the inception process. As 
part  of  the  consultation  strategy,  a  non-exhaustive  list  of  possible  specific  consultation  topics  and  information  required  from  each 
stakeholder was drawn-up.  

The goal of the consultation strategy was to ensure that across a series of consultation activities, all relevant stakeholders at EU and 
national level were given an opportunity to express their views on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added 
value  of  the  EBCG  Regulation  and  in  particular,  of  the  Agency.  More  specifically,  the  consultation  aimed  to  gather  views  of  the 
stakeholders to be subsequently able to evaluate the application of the EBCG Regulation and the activities of the Agency. 

Bearing in mind that the focus of the evaluation and the review was on structural and operational matters, the consultation strategy did 
not  foresee  a  public  consultation.  However,  the  public  was  given  a  possibility  to  respond  to  the  call  for  evidence  for  the  initiative 
which was published on the Commission’s 'Have Your Say' webpage. During the feedback period set from 5 September 2022 until 3 
October 2022 six feedbacks were received, namely by: Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research, Humboldt-
University Berlin (Germany), Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (Belgium), I Have Rights (Greece), 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  (Estonia),  Statewatch  (United  Kingdom),  and  Border  Violence  Monitoring  Network  (Germany).  The 
contributions were published on the Commission’s website.   

A short overview of their responses show that Border Violence Monitoring Network referred to alleged fundamental rights violations 
in  operations  where  Frontex  is  involved  and  analysed  EBCG  accountability  from  several  angles.  It  recommended  an  increased 
mandate for all institutions at the EU level that have oversight over Frontex operations. Statewatch called for full implementation of 
the  current  Regulation  and  made  some  proposals  with  regard  to  the  implementation  of  specific  articles  (e.g.  Art.  10).  Estonian 

262 

 
 
 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  underlined  certain  unclarities  in  current  provisions  but  assessed  that  more  time  is  needed  for  full 
implementation of the Agency’s mandate and harmonisation of processes with Member States. I Have Rights commented mainly on 
Article 46, while Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants among others recommended certain measures to 
increase  accountability  of  the  Agency  in  the  area  of  fundamental  rights.  Finally,  Berlin  Institute  for  Empirical  Integration  and 
Migration Research focused on legal  framework for data collection and analysis as well as on the framework for the suspension of 
operations.  

Stakeholder consultation overview 

During the consultation process a broad range of stakeholders was consulted, both at the European, national and international level. To 
reach such a diverse pool of stakeholders, the contractor used different targeted consultation methods and tools.   

The first step of the consultation was the launch of three surveys. These surveys targeted three stakeholder groups, namely: Member 
States authorities (including Schengen Associated Countries), SC staff, and FRMs.  

The  Member  States  authorities  survey  was  divided  into  thematic  sections.  National  authorities  were  asked  to  consult  all  relevant 
internal departments and authorities (such as Ministries of the Interior, border management and return authorities) to ensure that they 
could  provide  comprehensive  answers  to  the  different  elements  of  the  evaluation.  This  process  allowed  for  internal  consultation  at 
national level and for each Member State to present a consolidated national response. 

The  study  team  also  developed  a  survey  for  SC’  members.  The  survey  included  questions  for  all  categories,  as  well  as  category-
specific questions. 

Finally,  the  study  team  prepared  a  survey  for  FRMs.  This  was  transmitted  to  Frontex  contact  points  and  the  FRO  for  further 
dissemination.  

263 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of surveys 

Stakeholder group 

Member State authorities  

Standing Corps  

FRMs 

Survey inputs 

27 responses 

529 responses 

34 responses 

Following  the  launch  of  the  surveys,  the  study  initially  planned  to  conduct  up  to  130  interviews  with  key  stakeholder  groups, 
including: Frontex staff, Member States authorities, EU-level stakeholders (including the Commission, EP, EU agencies), civil society 
and international organisations, and third countries’ authorities. 

In  addition  to  five  scoping  interviews  at  the  inception  phase,  the  study  team  eventually  carried  out  149  interviews,  more  than 
originally foreseen. This final number does not take into account final follow-up interviews with Frontex during the field visit to the 
Headquarters in Warsaw (as these were follow-up interviews with units and divisions already interviewed previously). The interviews 
mostly took place online (with the exception of the field visits to Member States and the visit to Frontex), and often, when preferred 
by Member States, in a combined format, with several authorities present, allowing for in-depth discussions. The team also took the 
opportunity to conduct additional interviews during some of the field visits and the visit to Frontex headquarters.  The results of the 
interviews were analysed and compared to other sources of information.  

Finally, five field visits to Frontex operations in Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Italy and Romania were organised. Over two-three days, 
the study team met with central-level national authorities and visited land border crossing points or coordination centres of maritime 
operations to conduct on-site interviews with national and Frontex staff. Findings from the field visits helped to inform the review of 
the SC, as well as Frontex operations overall, their relevance and added value to Member States. Several of the external panel experts 
with previous border management expertise participated in the field visits. Also, a sixth and final visit to Frontex headquarters took 
place, which allowed the team to focus its discussions on emerging findings and address final data gaps.  

264 

 
 
 
 
Table 2: Overview of interviews, by stakeholder group 

Stakeholder group 

Interviews 

MB representatives 

AT, DK, ES, NL, PL  

Member State 
authorities (with 
multiple authorities, 
either in a joint 
format or as separate 
interviews) 

EU level (except 
Frontex) 

AT, BE, BG, CH, CZ, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HR, HU, IT, LT, 
LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SI, SE, SK and CH, IS, NO 

Field visits to BG, EL, FI, IT, RO 

DG HOME  

DG INTPA 

DG JUST 

DG MARE 

DG NEAR 

EASA  

EDPS 

EEAS  

EMSA 

EUAA 

eu-LISA 

European Parliament (LIBE Committee) 

265 

 
 
 
 
Stakeholder group 

Interviews 

European Ombudsman 

Europol 

EFCA 

FRA 

SatCen 

Secretariat-General of the European Commission  

Frontex 

Deputy Executive Director  

Executive Management Bureau 

Governance Support Centre 

Deployment Management Division  

Capacity-Building Division  

European Centre for Returns Division 

Situational Awareness and Monitoring Division  

Operational Response Division 

International and European Cooperation Division  

Data Protection Office  

Fundamental Rights Office  

Internal Audit Capability 

Standing Corps staff 

266 

 
 
 
 
Stakeholder group 

Interviews 

Frontex Liaison Officers 

CF member: 3 

CF member: 5 

Non-members of CF: 4 

2 (Moldova and Montenegro) 

International 
organisations 

Civil society 
organisations 

Third-country 
authorities 

Table 3: Overview of interviews completed for the Final Report 

Stakeholder group 

Total interviews 

Member State authorities  

EU level (except Frontex) 

Frontex 

63 

33 

39 

International organisations 

CF members: 3 

Civil society organisations 

CF members: 5 

267 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-members of CF: 4 

Third-country authorities 

Total 

2  

149 

Results of consultation activities 

The  following  section  provides  a  summary  of  the  key  findings  for  each  category  of  stakeholders  consulted,  sub-divided,  where 
possible, by key themes. 

Member State authorities 

As Member State authorities were one of the main relevant stakeholder groups, they were consulted via (i) survey (27 responses); (ii) 
interviews (63 conducted) and (iii) as part of the field visits (5 organised). This allowed for triangulation of comparative data (survey), 
as well as more in-depth insights of Member States’ views and experiences (interviews and field visits). 

Implementation of the EBCG Regulation in the context of EIBM 

A  majority  of  survey  respondents  from  relevant  Member  State  authorities  agreed  or  strongly  agreed  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  is 
relevant to current challenges and needs at external borders, in particular: meeting situational awareness and risk analysis  needs (23 
out of 27); using state-of-the-art identification technologies (19 out of 27); supporting return activities (14 out of 20); and in light of 
increased cross-border crime and cross-border migrant smuggling and trafficking activities (18 out of 27). A majority also agreed that 
the Regulation was relevant to facilitating legal border crossing and legitimate travellers (16 out of 27) and increasing passenger and 
cargo flows (14 out  of 27). Only a minority agreed or strongly  agreed that it addresses increased international  migration, including 
secondary (intra-EU) migratory movements (9 out of 27), terrorism, and hybrid threats (8 out of 27). 

When  asked  whether  they  believed  the  current  EBCG  Regulation  remains  relevant  to  address  current  and  emerging  needs  and 
challenges of external border management, Member State authorities agreed that it largely does overall. However, some stressed that it 

268 

 
 
 
 
 
is difficult to fully assess the extent to which the EBCG Regulation addresses needs and challenges in external border management, 
due  to  its  ongoing  implementation.  Nevertheless,  stakeholders  affirmed  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  addresses  most  current  and 
emerging needs and challenges at this stage, particularly in relation to those tasks that are seen as part of the core Frontex mandate, 
including external border management and return. 

With regards to possible gaps not yet addressed by the EBCG Regulation, Member States emphasised the importance of first ensuring 
full implementation of the current EBCG Regulation before deciding on substantive revisions. The majority believed that the EBCG 
Regulation  has  gaps,  with  different  gaps  identified  by  individual  respondents  (for  example  in  the  area  of  hybrid  threats).  One 
respondent highlighted the need to ensure complementary with the work of Europol and avoiding overlaps in mandates. 

Shared responsibility under EIBM 

A majority of Member States agreed or strongly agreed that, in the spirit of shared responsibility, the division of competences between 
MSs  and  Frontex,  as  set  out  in  the  EBCG  Regulation,  is  sufficiently  clear  and  adequate  to  meet  the  objectives  on  education  and 
training of border and coast guards (18 out of 27). A great majority of Member States also believed that the training of border and 
coastguards and return experts component of Frontex’s mandate was clearly defined and conducive to addressing the specific needs 
and challenges.  

Considering the areas of EIBM activity outlined in the EBCG Regulation, the overall consensus among Member States is that all four 
tiers of the EIBM could not have been achieved sufficiently by Member States acting alone. The majority of respondents felt that this 
was particularly true in the areas of: 1) returns (22 out of 27); 2) risk analysis contributing to a comprehensive situational awareness 
(20 out of 27); and 3) border control measures at the external borders (17 out of 27). There is overall support for Frontex helping to 
coordinate measures in third countries, with some comments highlighting that Frontex could do more to ensure unified and coherent 
action. 

269 

 
 
 
Capacity-building 

Frontex  implemented  a  range  of  training  activities  for  Member  States  and  third  countries  and  met  most  internal  training  targets. 
Although  Frontex  successfully  delivered  assistance  (including  establishing  common  training  standards),  almost  half  of  the  Member 
States noted the lack of training for either Category 2 or 3 of SC staff, or for Member States.  

Member  States  noted  that  the  biggest  training-specific  issues  included  insufficient  capacity  within  Frontex  to  deliver  all  training 
activities, the lack  of high-quality  trainers (partly due to  the lack of a trainer profile in  the SC and to  inadequate compensation for 
trainers), and difficulties in finding and managing host training centres. A great majority of Member States reported that the training of 
border and coastguards and return experts, as per Frontex’s mandate, is clearly defined and conducive to addressing the specific needs 
and challenges (20 out of 27). 

Member  States  noted  that  the  education  and  training  of  the  EBCG,  in  particular  the  common  training  standards,  by  Frontex 
contributed  to  improving  training  of  national  border  guards  (22  out  of  27),  developing  and  strengthening  border  management 
capabilities  in  their  Member  States  (16  out  of  27),  facilitating  cooperation  among  Member  States’  border  and  coastguards  training 
institutions  (16  out  of  27),  successfully  mainstreaming  fundamental  rights  in  the  national  training  programmes  (18  out  of  27),  and 
ensuring a harmonised and common approach to EU border and coast guard training in the Member States (21 out of 27). 

Situational awareness, risk analysis and vulnerability assessment  

A majority of Member States (16 out of 27) declared that Frontex’s activities contribute to comprehensive situational awareness and 
building a situational picture through 24/7 (near) real-time information, crisis monitoring and surveillance. Similarly, the majority of 
respondents agreed that Frontex’s risk analysis products are comprehensive, timely, up-to-date, adequately sourced, and successful in 
monitoring migration flows. 

A  majority  of  Member  States  agreed  that  the  implementation  of  the  EUROSUR  framework  is  effective  in  terms  of  information 
exchange to improve situational awareness (17 out of 27). However, at the same time, the majority do not see the current scope of 
EUROSUR  and  the  information  requested  as  sufficient  to  improve  detection,  prevention  and  combating  of  irregular  migration  and 

270 

 
 
 
cross-border crime, or to contribute to protecting and saving the lives of migrants, with almost half of the respondents neither agreeing 
or disagreeing with the statement or providing no answer (11 out of 27).  

Operations 

Most Member States (22 out of 27) participated in JOs, while about half (15 out of 27) participated in operational activities to fight 
cross-border crime and operational activities related to document fraud (14 out of 27). Overall, at least 30% did not experience any 
issues in the course of a Frontex operation. When issues are reported these include language issues; availability of SC profiles; joint 
planning; different work practices and work rules; and sharing/access to information. While 11 Member States did not experience any 
issues with the level of training of SCOs, 10 noted issues related to the level of training and preparedness of SCOs during deployment. 

Return 

The majority of survey respondents did not face any challenges when cooperating with Frontex in the different stages of the return 
process. Some Member States particularly valued Frontex’s assistance with organisation of charter flights, as a safer option to return 
disruptive, extremely violent and difficult cases. Efforts were made to use scheduled flights for cases that can reasonably be returned 
using that mode. Two Member States with small caseloads commented that joint return operations provide an opportunity to return the 
most  difficult  cases  in  a  more  controlled  environment.  Pre-return  assistance  was  also  valued  by  the  Member  States  with  good 
experience and responsiveness from EURLOs. 

In  addition  to  the  consultations  in  the  context  of  the  study,  Member  States  were  also  consulted  in  the  framework  of  the  Council's 
preparatory  bodies  (Working  Party  on  Frontiers  and  SCIFA),  where  certain  aspects  were  discussed,  such  as  Frontex's  objectives, 
results and performance, shared responsibility, governance, fundamental rights and Article 46, processing and protection of personal 
data, external dimension and functioning and composition of the SC.  

In the context of these consultations, Member States acknowledged the key importance of the EBCG evaluation and of the review of 
the SC. At the same time several Member States stressed that the mandate given to the Agency in 2019 should be fully implemented 
before the Regulation is revised.   

271 

 
 
 
With regard to Frontex’s objectives, results and performance, several Member States welcomed the support provided by Frontex. 
There  was  consensus  among  intervening  Member  States  that  Frontex  should  focus  on  border  management  and  return.  However, 
several Member States also believed that Frontex should play a strong role in law enforcement, in particular as regards fighting cross-
border crime and human smuggling. Some Member States pointed to  new tasks on implementing the Pact,  notably registration and 
screening.  

Regarding  the  shared  responsibility,  Member  States  generally  believed  that  there  is  a  right  balance  between  the  responsibility  of 
Member States and the Agency, underlining that the Member States have the main responsibility for the management of their part of 
the  external  borders  and  that  Frontex’s  role  was  to  support  and  supplement  Member  States  in  this  regard  with  standing  corps 
deployments, equipment and knowledge.   

Concerning  the  governance  aspects,  more  than  half  of  Member  States  considered  that  the  current  composition  of  the  MB  was 
appropriate and allows for a proper discussion and decision-making process on strategic, operational and policy issues. When it comes 
to the list of tasks, Member States however agreed that the documents in general should be better prepared by prior discussion in the 
EB  and  that  Member  States’  experts  with  technical  expertise  should  be  involved  in  the  preparatory  process,  to  avoid  technical 
discussions at the MB level and allowing the MB to focus on strategic issues.   

On fundamental rights, Member States acknowledged the importance of full compliance of Frontex’ work with fundamental rights 
and  welcomed  the  Fundamental  Rights  Office.  One  of  them  warned  against  duplication  of  work  (e.g.,  with  FRA).  In  this  context, 
Article  46  was  also  touched  upon.  In  this  respect,  some  Member  States  advocated  for  a  more  prominent  role  of  the  MB  when 
triggering the mechanism, while others have focused more on finding the right balance between the respect for fundamental rights and 
national security and effective border management, also emphasizing that operations should not be undermined. Some Member States 
were of the opinion that suspension of activities does not necessarily ensure the respect for fundamental rights and others considered 
that a withdrawal of Frontex from Member States facing pressure would create a threat to the Schengen Area.   

 On data protection, Member States mainly referred to bilateral agreements as an adequate tool to solve issues in this regard.   

272 

 
 
 
On  the  external  dimension,  several  Member  States  called  for  more  and  stronger  status  agreements  or  their  swift  implementation, 
stronger presence in third countries and the need to provide operational support to the Western Balkans partners. Suggestions to link 
external action better to existing action plans and to react better to developments along the main migration routes were heard.  

Regarding  the  Standing  Corps,  many  Member  States  highlighted  elements  of  effectiveness  and  quality  of  operational  support  and 
responding to needs rather than simply aiming at reaching the target number of 10,000. One the other hand, one Member State insisted 
on the formation of the SC by the set deadline. 

Frontex (including CF) 

The  study  team  conducted  extensive  online  interviews  with  Frontex  units  and  divisions,  as  well  as  a  two-day  visit  to  Frontex 
headquarters in Warsaw.  

Frontex described the challenges in applying the EU Staff Regulations to the EBCG Regulation and the SC, as their provisions, such 
as those related to shift work and stand-by patterns, ranks, recognition of hardship, specific deployment rules outside of the mission 
guide,  disciplinary  proceedings,  rights,  and  entitlements,  are  not  best  suited  to  an  operational,  uniformed,  and  armed  service  with 
executive  powers.  The  lack  of  an  appropriate  legal  framework  applicable  to  such  service  has  negatively  affected  recruitment, 
management, and deployment of the SC.  

During  interviews,  the  Agency  expressed  view  that  its  current  organisational  structure  is  not  sufficiently  aligned  with  its  new 
mandate and further changes are needed. The transformation from a traditional EU agency administration into an operational agency 
able to deploy, manage and logistically support a 10,000-strong SC, consisting (primarily) of law enforcement officers and specialised 
equipment and assets, is still incomplete.  

Another emerging key finding from the consultations with the Agency relates to issues in  processing personal data, including the 
general rules governing processing of personal data by the Agency (Article 86), the main purposes of processing of the personal data 
(Article 87), as well as provisions concerning processing of personal data collected during JOs (Article 88). According to the Agency, 
the Regulation contains vague and unclear provisions on the possibility and scope of the Agency to process operational personal data. 
Consequently,  Frontex  cannot  fully  and  successfully  engage  in  operational  activities  without  proper  mechanisms  to  exchange 

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information, secure communication channels and other crucial provisions to ensure national ownership of data, handling codes, data 
retention  and  logging  obligations  (when  communicating  with  Europol/Eurojust).  The  question  remains  as  to  whether  the  current 
framework impedes possible cooperation on exchange of personal data with entities not mentioned by the EBCG Regulation or MB 
decisions, but that are nevertheless important JHA partners in many domains (for example, OLAF or EPPO). 

A survey for SC’ members subsequently received 529 responses. The objective of the survey was to gather the inputs of SCOs on their 
background and their experience with recruitment, training and deployment. Most of the respondents were Category 1 SC (76.4%), 
followed by Category 2 SC (15.5%) and Category 3 SC (8.1%). Most of the officers were deployed as BGOs (58%) and had a law 
enforcement background (93%). Almost half of the respondents were between 40 and 49 years old (47%), with the next-largest age 
group aged 30-39 years old (35%). The vast majority of respondents were male (87%). 

The study team  also  prepared a survey for FRMs.  The survey aimed to gather information  on FRMs’ training and main challenges 
encountered during monitoring activities. However, based on the survey results, only a small number of FRMs have been deployed as 
forced-return monitors so far. Of the 34 responses, 21 indicated that have not yet been deployed as forced-return monitors and were 
unable to answer related questions.  
In the context of the consultation process, the Commission also received a joint contribution of the CF. The overarching finding is that 
overall, the challenges faced by Frontex in achieving full compliance with fundamental rights appear to be less related to shortcomings 
and gaps in the EBCG Regulation and have more to do with gaps in the implementation of key provisions, such as the delay in the 
recruitment  of  the  required  number  of  FRMs.  Moreover,  the  CF’s  contribution  acknowledges  that  the  implementation  of  the 
Regulation  is  still  ongoing,  and  that  therefore  an  in-depth  evaluation  would  be  premature.  Accordingly,  the  CF  concludes  that  the 
Regulation “is in no need of immediate revision and that priority should be given to improving its implementation”824. 

This conclusion is reflected throughout the CF’s feedback, wherein each area is described both in terms of lacking implementation and 
(where  applicable)  potential  amendments  to  the  EBCG  Regulation.  Nevertheless,  even  where  amendments  are  suggested, 
improvements  could  arguably  be  obtained  through  other  mechanisms,  such  as  MB  or  ED  decisions.  For  example,  the  CF  suggests 
making  its  recommendations  publicly  available,  but  MB  Decision  43/2022  seeks  to  address  this  by  establishing  that  the  CF’s 

824   Joint contribution of the CF concerning the evaluation of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, submitted on 2 June 2023. 

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recommendations must also be transmitted to the EP. In a similar way, the Agency could explore whether it could introduce, by way 
of MB or ED Decision, an improved empowerment scheme for the CF’s members to reduce the burden on the CF’s organisations and 
to encourage active participation and candidacies for its Chairmanship. Another suggestion by the CF is to review the impact of the 
Frontex codes of conduct after a certain period. This could be achieved without amendments to the Regulation, as it would also appear 
to  be  in  the  Agency’s  best  interest.  The  CF  also  recommends  that  the  Agency  should  as  much  as  possible  make  its  technical  and 
operational assistance to the MSs conditional upon agreements to uniformly abide by these fundamental rights obligations. Today, this 
is  achieved,  and  should  be  consistently  achieved,  through  for  example  the  negotiations  on  the  Operational  Plans  of  any  new  joint 
operation or other activity825. 

With regard to other areas highlighted by the CF, some improvements have already been pursued and are in the implementation phase. 
For example, according to the CF’s feedback the complaints mechanism and SIRs mechanisms could merit greater detail in the EBCG 
Regulation.  The  Agency  has  already  recently  sought  to  improve  the  mechanism  through  a  revised  SOP  for  each  mechanism,  and 
additional adjustments could be pursued once the current improvements have been implemented and evaluated. These could include 
stronger obligations on reporting of witnessed incidents, either in revised SOPs or even in the Code of Conduct. Similarly, some of the 
CF’s concerns with regard to limitations to the FRO’s powers have been addressed by the ED’s Decision, in the context of the SOP on 
the operations of the fundamental rights monitors. This document reiterates the FRMs’ access rights, among others, including  to all 
operational areas of the Agency and to the data necessary to conduct evaluations and assessments. While the document is not legally 
binding for the Member States, the Agency could make its support to Member States conditional on full observance of its provisions. 
This  would  also  serve  to  better  mitigate  the  risk  of  reputational  damage  to  the  Agency.  Overall,  the  CF’s  feedback  provides 
reassurances  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  is  acceptably  fit  for  purpose  to  ensure  that  the  Agency  complies  with  fundamental  rights 
across all its operational activities. Even more so, the feedback provides an important supporting document for the Agency on how to 
further  pursue  the  objective  of  full  fundamental  rights  compliance,  through  enhanced  implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Regulation,  rather  than  by  amending  it.  A  comprehensive  consideration  and  implementation  of  the  CF’s  feedback  by  the  Agency 
would also allow for a subsequent assessment of the overall, enhanced fundamental rights framework of the Agency and its ability to 
meet the challenges associated with the Agency’s broader mandate under the EBCG Regulation.’ 

825   Joint contribution of the CF concerning the evaluation of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, submitted on 2 June 2023. 

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EU stakeholders 

During the consultation process various EU level stakeholders were consulted. Among others, a total of 13 interviews were carried out 
with  the  European  Commission  and  one  scoping  interview  was  organised  with  the  Commission’s  MB  representative.  During  the 
consultation process, four interviews were carried out with Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) of the LIBE Committee.  

One EU stakeholder assessed that the governance model of Frontex is largely in line with the Common Approach on Decentralised 
Agencies. The interviewees referred to the new Pact, which builds on the EBCG Regulation and foresees the Agency to contribute to 
several  of the dimensions  in  the Regulation,  especially  given its new role in  returns. The new Pact  is  considered coherent  with  the 
Agency's practices, although the fact that the EU has not yet finalised negotiations on the new migration legislation foreseen in the 
Pact, makes the coherence assessment difficult.  

A reference was also made to the renewed EU Security Union Strategy826 adopted in 2020 that highlights Frontex's role in tackling 
cross-border crime and terrorism at the external borders and reflects its enhanced mandate.  

One of the stakeholders highlighted the lack of sufficient internal coordination mechanisms as a weakness within Frontex827. This is 
partly due to the fragmented organisational structure, as well as to insufficient horizontal coordination mechanisms. 

When it comes to coherence and consistency of Frontex activities with wider EU policies, in the field of the Union's external action 
and,  in  particular,  the  CSDP,  stakeholders  consider  that  the  EBCG  Regulation  is  aligned  with  CFSP  and  CSDP  frameworks  and 
establishes guidelines and objectives for cooperation between Frontex and CSDP missions. Frontex’s work in the external dimension 
is also coherent with the EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans (2022)828, which emphasises the cooperation of Western Balkans 
countries with Frontex under the framework of existing and new status agreements. 

826   European  Commission  (2020).  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council,  the  Council,  the  European 

Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the EU Security Union Strategy’. COM(2020) 605 final.  

827   European Commission (2022). ‘Final audit report on governance, stakeholder management and external communication in the European Border and Coast  
       Guard Agency’, p. 2. 
828   European Commission (2022). ‘EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans.’  

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Interviews revealed that the political scrutiny and budgetary oversight of the EP appears largely effective, with the EP enhancing its 
oversight, also with the creation of the FSWG in January 2021, and by withholding twice (in 2019 and in 2022) the approval of the 
Agency's budget, which according to one respondent has an important political significance.  

Nonetheless,  the  final  report829  by  the  FSWG  noted  that  parliamentary  oversight  could  be  strengthened  with  national  parliaments 
holding  their  own  national  governments  accountable.  In  this  respect,  one  respondent  highlighted  the  opportunity  to  make  use  of 
Article 112 of the EBCG Regulation, which allows for cooperation between the EP and national parliaments to exercise scrutiny more 
effectively. In the opinion of some external stakeholders a permanent EP’s representative to the MB of the Agency could also enhance 
the  oversight.  However,  other  stakeholders  expressed  doubts  on  a  permanent  representative,  given  the  perceived  need  for  the 
Parliament to retain independence. Rather, an interviewee stressed the need for the EP to be more systematic in executing its oversight 
function over the Agency and suggested the possibility to set up permanent Parliamentary Scrutiny Group.  

On Article 46 of the EBCG Regulation, the discussion focused on whether the decision referred to in Article 46 should be kept with 
the ED alone or delegated to the political actors. One interviewee raised concerns on the potential involvement of the MB, considering 
that  the  MB  is  a  political  body  whose  members  mainly  represent  Member  States’  authorities,  and  are  as  such  not  willing  to  take 
decisions  against  other  Member  States  because  of  political  interests  and  considerations.  A  role  for  the  MB  could,  however,  be 
envisaged in the sense that the MB should be more demanding towards the ED’s action in cases that there are serious fundamental 
rights violations. According to two interviewees, the decision on triggering Article 46 should stay with the ED provided that a more 
proactive  approach  would  be  adopted.  Another  representative  proposed  introducing  inter-institutional  agreements  between  Frontex, 
Council and EP on the decision to trigger Article 46 or alternatively, ensuring Member States’ appropriate political representation in 
the MB of the Agency to make sure that the decision adopted by the Agency would be supported politically by national authorities. 

During interviews, two representatives referred to the appointment of Frontex’s ED and highlighted the EP’s lack of sufficient access 
to information on the candidates to the position, which was clear during the appointment process of the current ED (2023). 

829   European  Parliament  (2021). ‘Report  on  the  fact-finding  investigation  on  Frontex  concerning  alleged fundamental rights  violations’.  Working  Document, 

LIBE Committee. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/238156/14072021%20Final%20Report%20FSWG_en.pdf   

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Overall, four stakeholders indicated issues with the implementation of the EBCG Regulation rather than with the legislative text and 
expressed not being in favour of a new legislative proposal. Efforts should keep focusing on the implementation level. 

In addition to the above, the EP’s FSWG was informed by the Commission also of the interim results and preliminary findings of the 
study. The Commission highlighted the main evaluated aspects, emphasizing among others the evaluation of the fundamental rights 
framework, particularly provisions of Article 46. The Commission emphasized the on-going status of the implementation of the 2019 
Regulation, which made it difficult to evaluate the full effect of the mandate. Delays in recruitment of the SC, the issues related to its 
geographical  balance  as  well  as  the  effectiveness  and  appropriateness  of  training  were  mentioned.  The  consistency  of  the  legal 
framework with broader EU legislation and the Common Approach for Decentralised Agencies was mentioned and further analysis of 
the Commission anticipated in this regard. Finally, international cooperation was underlined. 

During the discussion, members of the FSWG inquired mostly about the geographical and gender balance, flexibility, and deployment 
of the standing corps and on the Commission’s role in the MB. Attention was given to the fundamental rights aspects and concerns 
regarding pushbacks. The importance of the common EU spirit within the SC and the EBCG in general was stressed. Call for EU SAR 
framework was expressed. One member enquired about the OLAF report and raised issues of the gender balance of the SC and of its 
attractiveness. References were made to Article 46. In this respect one member expressed some prudence before its modification. On 
the  other  hand,  in  the  opinion  of  another,  modifying  it  would  also  not  justify  its  non-application.  Questions  were  raised  on  the 
possibility of assessing its effectiveness given the fact that so far, the Article has never been applied830. 

Other  EU-level  stakeholders  consulted  included  EASA,  EDPS,  EEAS,  EMSA,  EUAA,  eu-LISA,  European  Ombudsman,  Europol, 
EFCA,  FRA,  and SatCen, for a total of 15 interviews. They were consulted on specific issues pertaining to  the EBCG  Regulation, 
depending  on  their  remit  and  focus.  In  their  comments  interviewees  inter  alia  mentioned  some  degree  of  overlap  and  incoherence 
between  the  objectives  and  activities  of  the  EBCG  with  the  objectives  and  activities  of  other  EU  institutions,  bodies,  and 
agencies. One  stakeholder  highlighted  the  necessity  to  increase  the  mainstreaming  of  fundamental  safeguards  in  many  areas  of  the 
Regulation and to reflect on the activities of the FRMs, with a view to fully utilise their potential, which is currently not the case. 

830   Commission’s presentation of the interim results of the study on the EBCG Regulation evaluation, FSWG meeting, 27 April 2023. 

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As a relevant stakeholder, FRA was consulted both as a member of the CF and in its own right831. Its assessment of fundamental rights 
issues finds that at times there is an asymmetry between the safeguards that the EBCG Regulation foresees for the Agency and for the 
Member States as in this respect the Regulation appears to set a greater degree of obligations on the Agency than on its national-level 
counterparts,  an  assessment  which  is  echoed  by  the  CF.  This  asymmetry  may  create  accountability  gaps  and  differences  in  the 
fundamental  rights  standards  observed  from  one  operational  area  to  another,  particularly  between  deployments  under  the  aegis  of 
Frontex  and  deployments  by  Member  States  in  third  countries  outside  the  Frontex  framework.  Moreover,  it  could  enhance  the 
reputational  risk  for  the  Agency,  and  appears  incongruous  particularly  in  the  context  of  EIBM,  which  features  strong  fundamental 
rights  safeguards  along  the  lines  of  those  implemented  by  the  Agency  but  applies  to  all  components  of  the  EBCG.  However,  the 
ongoing implementation of EIBM may suffice to effectively bridge at least some of these asymmetries, as Member States will need to 
produce and subsequently adopt national EIBM strategies. 

On  the  other  hand,  overall  FRA  finds  that  the  internal  fundamental  rights  mechanisms  of  the  Agency  are  robust  and  expected  to 
function  effectively  following  the  ongoing  implementation  period,  although  some  improvements  could  be  obtained  by  way  of 
legislative adjustments focusing on the complaints mechanism and on fundamental rights assessments, particularly in the context of 
Article  46.  Nevertheless,  non-legislative  initiatives  (e.g.  on  the  decision-making  on  Article  46  or  revising  the  SOP  on  the  SIRs 
mechanism) have demonstrated that there is a potential to improve the situation without further modifying the Regulation.  

FRA also notes some additional issues concerning data protection that also affect EUROSUR, mostly stemming from perceived lack 
of legal clarity in the corresponding articles of the EBCG Regulation on data protection. Nevertheless, this evaluation comes during a 
time of drafting the implementing rules for the processing of personal data and operational personal data by the Agency. Therefore, 
while the EBCG Regulation arguably has some gaps and limitations on the subject of data protection, the objective is to bridge these 
by  adopting  MB  Decisions  on  data  protection  and  subsequently  fully  implementing  them.  With  regard  to  FRA’s  finding  that  the 
fundamental rights provisions concerning EUROSUR could be improved, similar opportunities may arise in the context of processes 
such as the drafting of the EUROSUR Handbook, in which the FRO is comprehensively involved. Additionally, FRA flags a concern 
with  regard  to  the  limited  resources  available  to  the  Data  Protection  Office  of  Frontex,  but  this  is  not  regulated  by  the  EBCG 

831   FRA contribution to the evaluation of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation, 15 May 2023. 

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Regulation. Rather, it should indeed be a priority for the Agency’s management to ensure that its DPO is adequately staffed to address 
not  only  the  current,  high  volume  of  data  protection-related  requests,  but  also  the  upcoming  increase  in  tasks  connected  to,  among 
others, the operation of ETIAS. 

According to FRA, the EBCG Regulation also does not address relevant fundamental rights provisions in its articles on vulnerability 
assessments  and  the  multiannual  strategic  policy  cycle,  whereas  Regulation  (EU)  2022/922  revising  the  Schengen  evaluation  and 
monitoring  mechanism  does  so  more  comprehensively.  This  causes  significant  discrepancies  as  synergies  should  be  maximised 
between  the  two  and  can  lead  to  an  underreporting  and  lack  of  consideration  for  the  fundamental  rights  aspects  of  vulnerability 
assessments. 

Lastly, with regard to return monitoring, FRA finds that greater independence in monitoring could be achieved if the pool for forced-
return monitoring was managed not by Frontex but by an entity not associated with the Agency. This finding is in line with FRA’s 
assessments of forced-return monitoring systems in Member States, because monitoring conducted by the same authority overseeing 
the return operations is determined to be not independent enough to qualify as “effective” according to the Return directive. However, 
FRA also finds that thus far, the forced-return monitors have conducted their tasks without interference or obstruction, despite being 
technically under the management of the Agency. 

International organisations and civil society organisations  

The study team carried out three interviews with international organisations that are members of the CF. The team also interviewed 
five civil society organisations that are members of the CF and four others that are not part of the CF.  

The interviews aimed to gather the views of stakeholders on Frontex’s compliance with fundamental rights. The views of international 
organisations and civil society organisations were largely aligned, with stakeholders’ concerns focusing on the limited functioning of 
Frontex’s  fundamental  rights  framework.  One  international  organisation,  for  example,  highlighted  the  importance  of  better 
mainstreaming fundamental rights in all operational activities of the Agency.  

Key concerns of stakeholders regarding main elements of the fundamental rights framework relate to the Article 46 and the fact that in 
this respect the EBCG Regulation leaves ample discretion to the ED’s decision.  

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Some interviewees also highlighted the Agency’s limited follow-up to the FRO’s recommendations.  

On  the  FRMs’  access  to  operational  areas,  an  interviewee  indicated  that  particularly  in  one  Member  State  the  FRMs  encountered 
difficulties, such as delays in receiving approval by Member States’ authorities and proposals to visit different locations and/or be part 
of  other  activities.  According  to  another  organisation,  the  FRMs’  monitoring  activity  does  not  include  proper  shadowing  of  border 
guards. 

As regards the SIRs mechanism, various civil society and international organisations raised the lack of follow-up on SIRs by Member 
States’ authorities, the absence of sanctions for failing to report SIRs (related to fundamental  rights violations), and the insufficient 
indication on which sanctions are applicable to those responsible and how often they are imposed.  

In  relation  to  the  complaint  mechanism,  various  interviewees  raised  concerns  on  the  scope  of  access  to  this  mechanism,  on  the 
discretion left to the ED in the decisions of complaints, and on limited awareness of the mechanism among the legal practitioners and 
civil society organisations. Regarding complaints towards Frontex staff, two of the interviewed civil society organisations expressed 
doubts regarding the follow-up to complaints and the extent to which corrective measures are being implemented within the Agency.  

At operational level, a number of stakeholders discussed the risks to fundamental rights in some of Frontex’s operations and Frontex’s 
potential indirect involvement, referring particularly to the support to Hungary, Lithuania, Greece and in the Central Mediterranean, 
and cooperation with third countries. 

For the organisations that are members of the CF, the interviews covered specifically the overall functioning of the CF, whether the 
conditions set out in Article 108 of the EBCG Regulation enabled the CF to provide valuable fundamental rights advice, and the main 
challenges  encountered  in  the  CF’s  work.  In  this  respect,  the  main  issue  reported  by  the  CF’s  members  and  some  civil  society 
organisations (non-members of the CF) is the lack of or improper follow-up to the CF’s recommendations. An interviewee reported 
that the consultation of the CF seems a ‘ticking box exercise’ for the Agency rather than an effective tool for the CF’s members to 
contribute significantly to Frontex’s work.      

During the consultation, some interviewees reported on the considerable workload and efforts required to contribute to the work of the 
CF. Providing expertise on a voluntary basis limits the possibilities for CF’s members to share meaningful input to the work of the CF. 

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This is particularly relevant for the civil society organisations given their limited resources and staff. This also affects the possibility 
for smaller civil society organisations to take up the role of Chairs of the CF.  

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