Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on enhancing research security
Date: 2024-01-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, European Commission
Subjects: EU research policy, European security, academic freedom, common security and defence policy, international cooperation, knowledge transfer, research, research and development, research body, scientific cooperation

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   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.1.2024  COM(2024) 26 final 2024/0012 (NLE)  Proposal for a COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION on enhancing research security  
 
 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  

1. 

CONTEXT OF THE PROPOSAL 

Reasons for and objectives of the proposal 

• 
As  outlined  in  the  European  economic  security  strategy,  published  in  June  20231,  a  global 
increase in geopolitical tensions and hostile economic actions, cyber and critical infrastructure 
attacks, foreign interference and disinformation have exposed risks and vulnerabilities in our 
societies,  economies  and  companies.  In  some  cases,  it  became  clear  that  Europe  should  be 
better prepared for evolving, new and emerging risks that have arisen in this more challenging 
geopolitical context. 

Critical  and  dual-use  technologies  play  a  pivotal  role  in  this  context,  with  some  of  our 
competitors  to  use  emerging  and  disruptive  technologies  to  boost  their  political,  economic, 
and military positions. This may result in European research and innovation being affected by 
malign  influence  and  being  misused  in  ways  that  affect  our  security  or  infringe  our  ethical 
norms.  

The  research  and  innovation  sector  is  particularly  vulnerable  due  to  its  openness  and 
internationalisation, which is in its DNA. Therefore, a tailor-made approach strongly rooted in 
academic freedom and institutional autonomy, principles that are fundamental to research and 
innovation, is needed to enhance research security in the research and innovation sector across 
Europe.  

Higher  education  institutions  and  research  performing  organisations  must  navigate  an 
increasingly complex and tense international landscape. It is  the EU’s duty to assist them in 
traversing  this  terrain  responsibly  and  securely  in  full  respect  of  academic  freedom  and 
institutional autonomy.  

The  proposed  Council  recommendation  offers,  for  the  first  time,  a  joint  definition  of  the 
problem  and  a  shared  sense  of  urgency.  It  provides  political  guidance  on  what  an  effective 
policy  response  could  look  like,  while  taking  into  consideration  that  much  of  the  work  on 
research  security  is  about  navigating  ‘grey  zones’  where  certain  forms  of  international 
research  and  innovation  cooperation  may  not  be  forbidden  but  are  nevertheless  undesirable 
because they pose risks to the security of the Union and its Member States or are unethical.  

• 

Consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy area 

The  European  economic  security  strategy  follows  a  three-pillar  approach: promotion  of  the 
EU's  economic  base  and  competitiveness;  protection  against  economic  security  risks;  and 
partnership  with  the  broadest  possible  range  of  countries  to  address  shared  concerns  and 
interests. Its aim is to provide a framework for a robust assessment and management of risks 
to economic security at EU, national and business level while preserving and increasing our 
economic dynamism.  

In  the  strategy  the  Commission  made  a  commitment  to  ‘propose  measures  to  improve 
research security ensuring the systematic and rigorous enforcement of the existing tools and 
identifying and addressing any remaining gaps, while preserving openness of the innovation 
ecosystem.’  The  proposal  for  a  Council  recommendation  delivers  on  this  commitment  by 
formulating  guiding  principles  for  responsible  internationalisation  and  key  policy  actions  at 

1 

Joint  communication  of  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  on  the  European  economic  security 
strategy, JOIN(2023)20 of 20.06.2023 (link). 

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national  and sectoral  level  to enhance research security  and listing initiatives at  EU level  to 
support the efforts of the Member States and the sector. 

The  proposal  for  a  recommendation  complements  and  builds  on  work  ongoing  since  the 
Commission published its communication on the Global Approach to research and innovation 
in  May  20212.  In  that  communication,  it  presented  a  strategy  to  preserve  openness  in 
international research and innovation cooperation, while promoting a level playing field and 
reciprocity underpinned by fundamental values.  

Through  its  Council  conclusions  of  September  2021  on  the  Global  Approach,  the  Council 
gave a mandate to work on tackling foreign interference in research and innovation.3 On this 
basis, important follow-up initiatives were undertaken, notably the Commission’s adoption in 
January  2022  of  a  staff  working  document  on  tackling  R&I  foreign  interference.4  The 
document  is  used  by  Member  States  and  R&I  stakeholders  as  a  basis  to  discuss  research 
security and as a source of inspiration to develop their own tailor-made guidelines and tools. 
The  European  Parliament  welcomed  the  document  in  its  resolution  of  6  April  2022  on  the 
Global  Approach.5  The  Commission  also  facilitated  peer  learning  among  Member  States 
through a mutual learning exercise and is developing an online one-stop shop that will bring 
together all relevant documents, reports and tools on research security. 

Additionally,  a  policy  debate  on  ‘Knowledge  security  and  responsible  internationalisation’ 
took place in the Competitiveness Council of May 2023, which provided invaluable insights 
and guidance for the proposal. 

• 

Consistency with other Union policies 

The proposed recommendation is part of a comprehensive package of measures following up 
on the European economic security strategy of 20 June 2023. As such, the proposal forms a 
building block in an overarching effort to enhance the EU’s economic security at large. On 3 
October  2023,  the  Commission  adopted  a  recommendation  in  which  it  identified  critical 
technology  areas  for  the  EU’s  economic  security  for  further  risk  assessment  with  Member 
States6.  The  outcome  of  this  risk  assessment  could  inform  other  measures  to  implement  the 
European  economic  security  strategy,  including  measures  to  enhance  research  security.  The 
public  consultation  launched  with  the  White  paper  on  outbound  investment  will  be 
considered, in particular when it comes to elements relevant for research and innovation. 

Additionally,  the  proposed  recommendation  is  complementary  to  and  consistent  with  a 
number of other EU initiatives, notably:  

– 

the  work  done  on  countering  hybrid  threats,  in  the  framework  of  the  EU  Security 
Union strategy7 and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence8;  

2  Commission  communication  on  the  Global  approach  to  research  and  innovation:  Europe's  strategy  for 

international cooperation in a changing world, COM(2021) 252 of 18.05.2021 (link). 

3  Council conclusions on the Global approach to R&I of 28.09.2021 (link), notably paragraphs 3, 11 and 23. 
4  European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Tackling R&I foreign interference 

– Staff working document, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 (link). 

5  Resolution of the European Parliament on a global approach to research and innovation, P9_TA(2022)0112 

of 06.04.2022 (link). 

6  Commission  recommendation  on  critical  technology  areas  for  the  EU's  economic  security  for  further  risk 

assessment with Member States, C(2023) 6689 of 03.10.2023 (link). 

7  Commission communication on the EU Security Union Strategy, COM(2020)605 of 24.07.2020 (link). 
8  Council of the EU: A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, ST 7371/22 of 21.03.2022 (link). 

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– 

– 

2. 

• 

the European rules for the export outside the EU of dual-use goods and technology as 
laid  down  in  the  EU’s  Export  Control  Regulation.9  To  help  higher  education 
institutions  and  research  performing  organisations  the  Commission  published  in 
September  2021  a  recommendation  on  compliance  programmes  for  research 
involving dual-use items10; 

the Defence of Democracy package, adopted by the Commission in December 2023 
ahead  of  the  European  elections  of  June  2024.  The  package  aims  to  tackle  foreign 
interference 
interest 
representation  activities,  while  at  the  same  time  encouraging  civic  engagement  and 
citizens’ participation in our democracies11. 

transparency  of 

levels  of 

increased 

through 

threats 

LEGAL BASIS, SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 

Legal basis 

The initiative falls under the ‘research and technological development’ policy area, where the 
EU and its Members States share competences in line with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The proposed Council recommendation is based 
on Article 182(5) in conjunction with Article 292 TFEU.  

Article 182(5) TFEU opens up the possibility of complementing the activities planned in the 
multiannual  framework  programme  by  allowing  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council, 
acting  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  legislative  procedure  and  after  consulting  the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee,  to  establish  necessary  measures  for  implementing  the 
European Research Area. 

Article 292 TFEU provides the legal basis for the Council to  adopt recommendations based 
on a proposal from the Commission. 

The  initiative  does  not  propose  any  extension  of  EU  regulatory  power  or  binding 
commitments  on  Member  States.  It  is  the  Member  States  who  will  decide,  based  on  their 
national circumstances, how they implement this Council recommendation. 

• 

Subsidiarity (for non-exclusive competence)  

The  present  proposal  is  in  conformity  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  as  provided  for  in 
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).  

While  national  governments  are  best  placed  to  reach  out  to  their  universities  and  other 
research  performing  organisations  and  support  them  in  taking  the  necessary  measures,  EU-
level cooperation and coordination is needed to ensure the proper functioning of the European 
research  area  and  to  reduce  disparities  caused  by  differences  in  national  research  security 
measures.  

Currently, awareness of the risks is not evenly spread across the EU. An increasing number of 
Member  States  and  R&I  actors  are  developing  and  introducing  dedicated  safeguarding 
measures, while others still seem largely unaware, creating vulnerabilities that could easily be 
exploited. A minimum level of consistency of approach across the EU is therefore essential. 

9  Regulation (EU) 2021/821 setting up an EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, 

transit and transfer of dual-use items (link). 

10  Commission  recommendation  on  internal  compliance  programmes  for  controls  of  research  involving  dual-

use items […], 2021/1700 of 15.09.2021 (link).  

11  Commission communication on Defence of Democracy, COM(2023) 630 of 12.12.2023 (link). 

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• 

Proportionality 

The present proposal is in conformity with the principle of proportionality as provided for in 
Article 5(4) TEU. Neither the content nor the form of this proposed Council recommendation 
exceeds  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the  objective  of  achieving  a  minimum  level  of 
consistency of approach across the EU. 

The legal  status  of this initiative should ensure ownership  and endorsement  by the Member 
States. At the same time, it should rely predominantly on self-governance by the R&I sector, 
in line with academic freedom and institutional autonomy. 

The recommendation helps Member States and research performing organisations to develop 
and implement policies and measures that are both effective and proportionate. It underscores 
the importance of international cooperation and openness following the principle ‘as open as 
possible,  as  closed  as  necessary’.  It  also  shows  which  risk  management  measures  could  be 
introduced,  fully  respecting  academic  freedom  and  institutional  autonomy,  while  avoiding 
discrimination and stigmatisation.  

• 

Choice of the instrument 

The  proposed  Council  recommendation  provides  guidance  to  Member  States  about  how  to 
identify  and  address  research  security  risks  effectively.  It  recommends  that  Member  States 
support their  research and innovation sector, taking appropriate steps to raise awareness and 
build  resilience.  Building  on  the  staff  working  document  on  tackling  R&I  foreign 
interference,  a  Council  recommendation  would  ensure  that  all  Member  States  are  actively 
involved and committed at political level.  

Alternatively,  a  Commission  recommendation  or  communication  could  be  considered.  In 
terms of content, these could in principle cover the same issues as a Council recommendation. 
However,  what  these  instruments  have  in  common  is  that  they  do  not  actively  involve  or 
commit  the  Member  States.  There  is  no  guarantee  that  the  addressees  share  the  proposed 
approach and the sense of urgency.  

A legally binding initiative, such as a directive or regulation, regulating international research 
and innovation cooperation in such a way that risks are properly identified and addressed by 
Member  States  would  guarantee  legal  consistency  across  the  Union.  However,  the  main 
downside of a binding instrument in this specific context is that it would be very difficult to 
conceive it in such a way that the division of competence between the EU and the Member 
States as well as the principles of academic freedom and institutional autonomy are respected. 

For  these  reasons,  a  proposal  for  a  Council  recommendation  is  considered  to  be  the 
appropriate policy instrument to address the issues at hand. 

3. 

• 

RESULTS OF EX-POST EVALUATIONS, STAKEHOLDER 
CONSULTATIONS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENTS 

Ex-post evaluations/fitness checks of existing legislation 

Not applicable. 

• 

Stakeholder consultations 

The proposed Council recommendation builds on the Commission’s staff working document 
on  tackling  R&I  foreign  interference  of  January  2022.  Throughout  2023,  a  mutual  learning 

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exercise on tackling R&I foreign interference took place, with experts from 13 Member States 
exchanging  national  experience  and  expertise.  In  addition,  three  dedicated  meetings  on 
research security with Member State experts took place in the context of the EU Knowledge 
Network on China (EUKNOC).  

The development of the proposal was also informed by a call for evidence, which was open 
for public feedback on the ‘Have your say’ webpage from 6 December 2023 until 3 January 
2024.  The  Commission  received  56  contributions,  almost  40%  came  from  academic  or 
research institutions. In addition to the call for evidence, a targeted consultation meeting took 
place  on  15  December  2023,  with  participation  of  representatives  of  the  main  EU-level 
stakeholder organisations in research and innovation. 

• 

Collection and use of expertise 

In addition to the input received during the consultation process, the proposal is underpinned 
by  extensive  evidence,  reports  and  studies  collected  over  recent  years.  Key  sources  of 
evidence include a large and still growing body of guidance documents on research security 
developed by Member States and sectoral organisations12, as well as reports on the issue by 
think tanks, stakeholder organisations and advisory councils.  

Due  consideration  has  also  been  given  to  the  research  security  policies  that  some  of  our 
international  partners  have  implemented  over  the  past  years,  and  to  the  insights  and 
experience  they  gained  while  doing  so.  This  includes  the  policies  of  countries  such  as  the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada13. In the context of the multilateral 
dialogue on values and principles14, a workshop on research security took place in December 
2023, in which international partners actively participated. 

• 

Impact assessment 

An  impact  assessment  has  not  been  carried  out,  given  the  complementary  approach  of  the 
activities  to  Member  State  initiatives  and  the  non-binding  and  voluntary  nature  of  the 
proposed activities.  

The impact of the recommendation largely depends on the engagement and the readiness to 
act  of  Member  States  and  sector  organisations  and  is  therefore  impossible  to  assess  in 
advance.  Provided  that  the  Council  adopts  the  proposal  and  Member  States  commit  to 
implementing  its  recommendations  with  the  support  of  the  sector,  the  proposal  has  the 
potential to enhance research by raising awareness and building resilience throughout Europe. 

• 

Regulatory fitness and simplification 

The proposal is not linked to the Commission’s REFIT legislative simplification programme. 
Nonetheless,  every  effort  is  made  to  make  efficient  use  of  scarce  resources,  including  by 
using  existing  European  research  area  governance  structures  and  by  relying  on  existing 
reporting  structures.  Also,  the  proposed  recommendation  emphasises  that  unnecessary 
administrative  burden  for  the  sector  should  be  avoided  when  introducing  safeguarding 
measures  and  that  in  the  context  of  research  funding  the  time-to-grant  should  not  be 
unnecessarily delayed.  

12  See for instance the ‘annotated collection of guidance for secure and successful R&I cooperation’ (2022) that 

DLR-PT compiled at the request of the Commission (link). 

13  More information can for instance be found on the following websites: for the US (link), for the UK (link), 

for Australia (link), and for Canada (link).  

14  More information on the multilateral dialogue on values and principles can be found here: link. 

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• 

Fundamental rights 

One of the proposal’s main objectives is to support Member States and research performing 
organisations  in  ensuring  that  international  research  and  innovation  cooperation  does  not 
violate  fundamental  values  and  human  rights.  The  recommendation  has  protecting 
fundamental academic values, notably academic freedom and research integrity, at its core.  

4. 

BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS 

While this initiative will not require additional resources from the EU budget, the measures in 
this recommendation will mobilise sources of funding at EU, national and sector level. 

For the ‘European Centre of Expertise on Research Security’ that the Commission intends to 
establish, the existing Horizon Europe budget would be mobilised. In terms of organisational 
set-up  several  options  are  under  consideration,  which  the  Commission  will  further  explore 
taking  into  account  the  Member  States’  and  stakeholders’  preferences  as  regards  its 
functionalities. 

5. 

• 

OTHER ELEMENTS 

Implementation plans and monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements 

To support Member States and stakeholders as they implement the recommendation, full use 
will be made of the existing European research area governance structures. It is expected that 
research security will be reflected in the next European research area policy agenda for 2025-
2027, which is currently under preparation in dialogue with Member States and stakeholders.  

Commission  reporting  will  rely  on  the  already  existing  biennial  reporting  on  the  Global 
Approach  to  Research  and  Innovation.  The  next  report  is  envisaged  for  mid-2025.  Member 
States  are  invited  to  submit  national  action  plans  on  how  they  intend  to  implement  the 
recommendation within 9 months of its adoption.  

• 

Explanatory documents (for directives) 

Not applicable. 

• 

Detailed explanation of the specific provisions of the proposal 

The overall aim of the initiative is to  help  Member States, higher education  institutions and 
research  performing  organisations,  both  public  and  private,  address  research  security  risks. 
This will ensure that research, innovation and higher education activities are not misused or 
captured in a way that affects the security of the EU and its Member States or are unethical. 
To this end, the proposed Council recommendation contains the following sections: 

– 

– 

After introducing  the issue at  stake  and the political  background of the proposal  in 
the  recitals,  its  scope  is  explained.  A  definition  of  ‘research  security’  is  proposed, 
which draws on the main elements of the various definitions in use internationally. It 
is also clarified which organisations and stakeholders are primarily addressed in the 
context of the recommendation. 

Then,  principles  for  responsible  internationalisation  are  proposed.  These  principles 
are conceived in such a way that they can be used to underpin the formulation and 
design  of  a  policy  response  to  research  security  at  any  level  (EU,  national  or 
individual  research  performing  organisations).  The  principles  draw  on 
the 
responsible 
and 
approaches 

guidance  on 

in  national 

sectoral 

taken 

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internationalisation. From the response to the call for evidence, it can be concluded 
that these principles clearly resonate with the stakeholder community.  

The following section contains the actual recommendations to the Member States. It 
is divided in four subsections. The first subsection formulates what public authorities 
are recommended to do for the research and innovation sector in terms of creating a 
support  structure  and  providing  guidance.  The  second  subsection  addresses  the 
pivotal role national funding organisations have in enhancing research security. The 
third  subsection  elaborates  on  what  Member  States  are  recommended  to  do  to 
support  higher  education  institutions  and  research  performing  organisations  when 
introducing safeguarding measures and policies. 

The  final  subsection  outlines  a  number  of  supporting  actions  and  initiatives  of  the 
Commission for which the Member States’ facilitation is needed.  

The  final  section  specifies  how  the  follow-up  to  the  recommendation  is  facilitated 
and monitored.  

– 

– 

– 

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2024/0012 (NLE) 

Proposal for a 

COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 

on enhancing research security 

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 

Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union,  and  in  particular 
Article 292, first and second sentence in conjunction with Article 182(5) thereof, 

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, 

Whereas: 

(1) 

(2) 

(3) 

Openness, international  cooperation, and academic freedom are at the core of world-
class  research  and  innovation.  Yet,  with  growing  international  tensions  and  the 
increasing  geopolitical  relevance  of  research  and  innovation,  our  researchers  and 
academics  are  increasingly  confronted  with  risks  to  research  security  when 
cooperating  internationally  resulting  in  European  research  and  innovation  being 
affected  by  malign  influence  and  being  misused  in  ways  that  affect  our  security  or 
infringe  our  ethical  norms.  It  is  therefore  vital  that  European  higher  education 
institutions  and  research  performing  organisations,  both  public  and  private,  are 
supported  and  empowered  to  address  these  risks.  Precise  and  proportionate 
safeguarding measures are needed to keep international cooperation open and safe. 

Open science ensures that science is made as accessible as possible for the benefit of 
science, the economy and society at large while international cooperation contributes 
to  tackling  global  challenges  effectively.  Academic  freedom  implies  that  researchers 
are  free  to  conduct  their  research  and  choose  the  research  methods  as  well  as  their 
research partners from around the globe, while international mobility of research talent 
enriches  scientific  enquiry  and  is  essential  for  fostering  innovation  and  achieving 
scientific breakthroughs. 

Growing  strategic  competition  and  the  return  to  power  politics  are  leading  to 
increasingly  transactional  relations  between  States.  This  shift  has  resulted  in  threats 
that are more diverse, unpredictable, and oftentimes hybrid1. Given the pivotal role of 
technology  for  political,  economic,  and  military  pre-eminence,  some  of  the  EU’s 
competitors  are  seeking  global  primacy  in  emerging  and  disruptive  technologies  to 
enhance  their  military  and  intelligence  capabilities  while  actively  pursuing  civil-
military fusion strategies. 

(4) 

Hybrid  threats  may  affect  all  relevant  sectors,  however,  owing  to  its  openness, 
academic  freedom,  institutional  autonomy  and  worldwide  collaboration,  the  research 
and innovation sector is particularly vulnerable. EU-based researchers and innovators 

1  Hybrid threats refer to when, state or non-state, actors seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of the EU to their 
own  advantage  by  using  in  a  coordinated  way  a mixture of  measures  (i.e.:  diplomatic,  military,  economic, 
technological) while remaining below the threshold of formal warfare (link). 

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are  targeted  to  capture  state-of-the-art  knowledge  and  technology,  at  times  using 
methods  that  are  deceptive  and  covert  or  through  outright  theft,  but  more  often 
exploiting  seemingly  bona 
to 
jeopardising  our  security,  these  hybrid  threats  could  affect  academic  freedom  in 
Europe. 

international  academic  cooperation.  Next 

fide 

(5) 

(6) 

Higher  education  institutions  and  other  research  performing  organisations  are  thus 
navigating an increasingly challenging international context, with risks of undesirable 
transfer of critical knowledge and technology to countries of concern, where it may be 
used to strengthen the capabilities of their military, or for purposes that are in violation 
of  fundamental  values.  While  not  always  legally  prohibited,  these  collaborations  are 
undesirable as they pose significant security and ethical concerns. 

In  accordance  with  institutional  autonomy  and  academic  freedom,  higher  education 
institutions and other research performing organisations are primarily responsible for 
developing  and  managing  their  international  cooperation.  Public  authorities  at  all 
levels  should  provide  them  with  assistance  and  support,  empowering  them  to  take 
informed decisions and  manage the risks  to  research security  involved, ensuring that 
international  cooperation  in  research,  innovation  and  higher  education  remains  both 
open and secure. 

(7) 

In  recent  years,  discussions  on  strengthening  research  security  have  been  ongoing  at 
the EU level, where several initiatives have also been undertaken: 

– 

– 

– 

– 

In  May  2021,  the  Commission  published  its  communication  on  the  Global 
approach  to  research  and  innovation2,  outlining  a  new  European  strategy  for 
international  research  and  innovation  policy.  The  Council  responded  in 
September  2021  through  the  adoption  of  Council  conclusions3  giving  a 
political mandate to working jointly on research security.  

Several  safeguards  were  introduced  in  the  EU’s  framework  programme  for 
research and innovation 2021-2027, Horizon Europe4, giving effect to the EU’s 
distinctive responsibility as one of Europe’s largest research funders.  

In November 2021, the Council adopted the ERA policy agenda 2022-2024 as 
part  of  its  conclusions  on  Future  governance  of  the  European  Research  Area 
(ERA)5, in which tackling foreign interference is included in one of its priority 
actions. 

In  January  2022,  following  up  on  its  commitments  stemming  from  both  the 
Global  approach  and  the  ERA  policy  agenda,  the  Commission  published  its 
staff working document on tackling R&I foreign interference6. Additionally, to 

2  Commission  communication  on  the  Global  approach  to  research  and  innovation:  Europe's  strategy  for 

international cooperation in a changing world, COM(2021) 252 of 18.05.2021 (link). 

3  Council conclusions on Global approach to R&I of 28.09.2021 (link), notably paragraphs 3, 11 and 23. 
4  The  Horizon  Europe  regulation,  EU  2021/695  of  28.04.2021  (link),  provides  inter  alia  for  a  security 
appraisal  of  all  projects  selected  for  funding  (Article  20),  the  possibility  to  exclude  entities  based  in  or 
controlled by third countries from certain calls (Article 22(5)), as well as to add eligibility criteria to those set 
out in paragraphs 2 to 5 to take into account specific policy requirements or the nature and objectives of the 
action (Article 22(6)) and the right for the Commission or the relevant funding body to object to transfers of 
ownership of results, or to grants of an exclusive license regarding results (Article 40(4)). Similar provisions 
are included in the European Defence Fund and the European Space Programme. 

5  Council conclusions on Future governance of the European Research Area (ERA) of 26.11.2021 (link). 
6  European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Tackling R&I foreign interference 

– Staff working document, Publications Office of the European Union, 2022 (link).  

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– 

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facilitate  peer  learning  among  Member  States,  a  Mutual  Learning  Exercise 
(MLE) took place throughout 2023. 
The Commission’s communication on ‘A European Strategy for Universities’7 
recalls  that  higher  education  institutions  have  a  unique  position  at  the 
crossroads  of  education,  research,  innovation,  thus  playing  a  critical  role  in 
achieving  the  European  Education  Area8  and  the  European  Research  Area, 
identifies  foreign  interference  in  higher  education  institutions  as  a  threat  and 
supports the implementation of the guidelines on foreign interference. The role 
of higher education institutions in protecting European democratic values is at 
the core of the strategy. 

The  European  Parliament  adopted  on  9  March  2022  a  resolution  on  ‘Foreign 
interference  in  all  democratic  processes  in  the  European  Union,  including 
disinformation’  in  which  it  calls  for  strengthening  academic  freedom, 
improving transparency of foreign funding as well as mapping and monitoring 
of foreign interference in the cultural, academic and religious spheres9.  

From  a  broader  security  and  defence  perspective,  work  is  ongoing  in  the 
framework  of  the  EU  Security  Union  strategy10  as  well  as  the  Strategic 
Compass  for Security and Defence11 aiming at  a shared assessment of threats 
and  challenges  and  greater  coherence  in  actions  in  the  area  of  security  and 
defence,  including  through  different  instruments  to  detect  and  respond  to 
hybrid threats in an EU Hybrid Toolbox.   

In  the  domain  of  EU  export  control  rules  for  dual-use  goods  and  technology, 
the EU’s  Export Control  Regulation12 is  of significant  importance to  research 
security.  To  help  higher  education  institutions  and  research  performing 
organisations, 
a 
recommendation  on  compliance  programmes  for  research  involving  dual-use 
items13. 

the  Commission  published 

in  September  2021 

(8) 

The  Commission  and  the  High  Representative  adopted  a  joint  communication  on 
European economic security strategy14 which aims to ensure that the Union continues 
to  benefit from  economic openness,  while minimising  risks  to  its  economic security. 
The Strategy proposes a three-pillar approach: promotion of the EU's economic base 
and  competitiveness;  protection  against  risks;  and  partnership  with  the  broadest 
possible  range  of  countries  to  address  shared  concerns  and  interests.  In  each  of  the 
pillars, research and innovation have a key role to play.  

(9) 

Following  up  on  this  joint  communication,  the  Commission  has  identified  critical 
technology  areas  for  the  EU's  economic  security  for  further  risk  assessment  with 

7  Commission communication on a European strategy for universities, COM(2022)16 of 18.01.2022 (link). 
8  Commission  communication  on  achieving  the  European  Education  Area  by  2025,  COM(2020)625  of 

30.09.2020 (link). 

9  European Parliament resolution on Foreign interference in all democratic processes in the European Union, 

including disinformation, P9_TA(2022)0064 of 09.03.2022 (link). 

10  Commission communication on the EU Security Union Strategy, COM(2020)605 of 24.07.2020 (link). 
11  Council of the European Union: A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, ST 7371/22 of 21.03.2022 

(link). 

12  Regulation (EU) 2021/821 setting up an EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, 

transit and transfer of dual-use items (link). 

13  Commission  recommendation  on  internal  compliance  programmes  for  controls  of  research  involving  dual-

use items […], 2021/1700 of 15.09.2021 (link).  

14  Joint communication on European economic security strategy, JOIN(2023)20 of 20.06.2023 (link). 

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Member  States  in  its  recommendation  of  3  October  202315.  Risk  assessments  have 
already  been  launched  as  a  matter  of  priority  on  four  of  the  ten  identified  critical 
technology  areas,  namely  advanced  semiconductors,  artificial  intelligence,  quantum 
and  biotechnologies.  The  outcome  of  risk  assessments,  when  finalised,  could  inform 
other  measures  to  implement  the  European  economic  security  strategy,  including 
measures to enhance research security. 

(10)  The  joint  communication  on  the  European  economic  security  strategy  furthermore 
announced that the Commission would propose measures to enhance research security 
by ensuring the use of the existing tools and identifying and addressing any remaining 
gaps, while preserving the openness of the research and innovation ecosystem. 

(11) 

In  terms  of  gap  identification  referred  to  in  the  previous  point,  discussions  with 
Member  States  and  stakeholder  organisations  demonstrate  an  urgent  need  among 
policymakers and practitioners for more conceptual clarity, a shared understanding of 
the  issues  at  hand  as  well  as  of  what  constitutes  a  policy  response  that  is  both 
proportionate and effective.  

(12)  An  increasing  number  of  Member  States  has  developed  or  is  in  the  process  of 
developing  policies  aimed  at  enhancing  research  security.  While  these  efforts 
generally  contribute  to  raising  awareness  and  boosting  resilience,  an  uncoordinated 
multiplication of national  measures would result in  a patchwork of national  policies, 
disparities  among  Member  States,  and  thereby  fragmentation  of  the  European 
Research  Area.  EU  level  coordination  is  therefore  needed  to  provide  for  a  level-
playing field and to protect the integrity of the European Research Area.  

(13) 

(14) 

(15) 

It should be emphasised that research security safeguards can only be truly effective if 
consistently applied at all levels, including EU, national, regional as well as the level 
of  individual  public  and  private  research  performing  organisations,  so  as  to  avoid 
loopholes and circumvention. 

In specific cases, compliance to relevant EU legislation and rules could benefit from 
interpretative guidance.  This  applies in  particular to  export control  rules, notably the 
intangible transfer of technology (ITT), the visa requirements for foreign researchers16, 
as well as the interpretation of certain open science and intellectual asset management 
requirements from a research security perspective. 

It is important that hybrid threats affecting the research and innovation ecosystem are 
structurally assessed, enhancing situational awareness among policymakers by relying 
on the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), in particular the Hybrid Fusion 
Cell,  the  work  of  the  European  Centre  of  Excellence  for  Countering  Hybrid  Threats 
(Hybrid CoE)17 as well as ENISA in relation to cybersecurity threats18 

(16)  Taking into account that a significant share of research and innovation takes place in 
the private sector, it is key to develop targeted guidance and tools for business, notably 
research-intensive start-ups and small and medium sized companies. While the risks to 

15  Commission  recommendation  on  critical  technology  areas  for  the  EU’s  economic  security  for  further  risk 

assessment with Member States, C(2023) 6689 of 03.10.2023 (link). 

16  Directive (EU) 2016/801 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
of  research,  studies,  training,  voluntary  service,  pupil  exchange  schemes  or  educational  projects  and  au 
pairing of 11.05.2016 (link). 

17  The  Hybrid  CoE  is  an  autonomous,  network-based  international  organisation  countering  hybrid  threats, 

established in 2017, based in Helsinki (link). 

18  The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, is the Union’s agency dedicated to achieving a high 

common level of cybersecurity across Europe (link). 

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(17) 

which  companies  are  exposed  may  be  similar,  their  situation  differs  from  higher 
education  institutions  and  research  performing  organisations.  In  this  light,  attention 
should be drawn to the existing rules, including those on the control of exports of dual-
use  items,  the  screening  of  foreign  investments  as  well  as  the  ongoing  work  on  the 
monitoring of outbound investments. 

In the preparation of this recommendation, due attention has been paid to experience 
from  Member  States,  as  well  as  from  the  EU’s  partners,  both  in  bilateral  and 
multilateral  settings.  It  takes  into  account  policy  lessons  from  key  partners,  while 
emphasising  that  an  approach  should  be  formulated  that  suits  the  unique  European 
context. Continued efforts are being made with our partners to exchange information 
and  experience,  share  good  practices  and  to  seek  ways  to  align  safeguard  measures, 
including  through  the  multilateral  dialogue  on  values  and  principles,  as  part  of 
association negotiations and joint S&T steering committee meetings in the context of 
international science and technology agreements, as well as in multilateral fora,  such 
as G7, OECD and NATO, and relevant multilateral export control arrangements. 

(18)  Research  security  is  a  concern  that  is  gaining  increasing  attention  and  the  ongoing 
debate  on  the  risks  involved  and  how  to  best  manage  them  is  intensifying. 
Consequently,  there  is  a  need  to  further  raise  awareness,  facilitate  peer  learning 
between Member States and relevant stakeholder organisations, as well as contribute 
to a learning approach that is both flexible and agile.   

SCOPE 

1. 

For the purposes of this recommendation, ‘research security’ refers to managing risks 
related to: 

(a) 

the undesirable transfer of critical knowledge, know-how and technology that 
may  affect  the  security  of  the  EU  and  its  Member  States,  for  instance  if 
channelled to military purposes in third countries; 

(b)  malign  influence  on  research,  where  research  can  be  instrumentalised  by  or 
from  third  countries  in  order  to  diffuse  certain  narratives  or  incite  self-
censorship  among  students  and  researchers  infringing  academic  freedom  and 
research integrity in the EU; 

(c) 

ethical  or  integrity  violations,  where  knowledge  and  technologies  are  used  to 
suppress or undermine fundamental values, whether in the EU or elsewhere. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  recommendation,  ‘international  cooperation’  should  be 
understood  as  cooperation  of  public  and  private  research  performing  organisations 
and  higher  education  institutions  with  research  and  innovation  organisations  and 
companies  based  outside  the  EU.  Research  and  innovation  organisations  and 
companies based in the EU but owned or controlled from outside the EU should be 
considered on the basis of a risk appraisal. 

In the context of this recommendation, ‘risk appraisal’ refers to a process in relation 
to international research and innovation cooperation in which a combination of main 
risk factors is taken into consideration. The combination of those factors determines 
the risk level. The key elements to be assessed can be grouped in four categories:  

– 

The  risk  profile  of  the  EU-based  organisation  entering  into  the  international 
cooperation: consider the organisation’s strengths and vulnerabilities, including 
financial dependencies, relevant to the research project; 

2. 

3. 

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The research and innovation domain in which the international cooperation is 
to take place: consider whether the project focusses on a research domain, e.g. 
a  critical  technology  area,  or  involves  methodology  or  research  infrastructure 
considered  particularly  sensitive  from  a  security  or  ethical/human  rights 
perspective; 

The risk profile of the third country where the international partner is based or 
from where it is owned or controlled (e.g.: is the country subject to sanctions or 
does  it  have  a  flawed  rule  of  law  or  human  rights  protection  track  record,  an 
aggressive civil-military fusion strategy or limited academic freedom); 

The risk profile of the international partner organisation: perform due diligence 
into the organisation you envisage to cooperate with to find out whether it has 
links to the government or the military, the affiliations of the researchers/staff 
involved as well as the partner’s intentions regarding the end-use or application 
of the research results. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  Recommendation,  the  ‘research  and  innovation  sector’ 
covers all research performing organisations and higher education institutions across 
the Union, both public and private. In light of the importance of other stakeholders, 
such  as  technology  transfer  offices,  internationalisation  agencies,  chambers  of 
commerce  and  research  intensive  companies,  this  recommendation  can  be  equally 
relevant  to  all  other  actors  in  the  EU’s  research  and  innovation  ecosystem.  Where 
relevant, education-related international cooperation activities could be considered as 
well. 

4. 

PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONALISATION 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

Continue  to  promote  and  defend  academic  freedom  and  institutional  autonomy, 
taking  into  account  that  responsibility  for  international  research  and  innovation 
cooperation  primarily  lies  with  higher  education  institutions  and  other  research 
performing organisations;  

Continue  to  promote  and  encourage  international  cooperation  in  research  and 
innovation with partners in third countries that is both open and secure, in line with 
the  principle  ‘as  open  as  possible,  as  closed  as  necessary’,  ensuring  that  research 
outputs  are  findable,  accessible,  interoperable  and  reusable  (FAIR),  with  due 
consideration to applicable restrictions, including security concerns; 

Ensure  proportionality  of  measures:  where  safeguards  are  introduced,  these  should 
not  go  beyond  what  is  strictly  necessary  to  mitigate  the  risks  at  stake  and  avoid 
unnecessary administrative burden. The objective is to de-risk, not to de-couple; 

Steer research security measures to safeguarding economic security, including Union 
and  national  security,  and  defending  shared  values,  including  academic  freedom, 
while avoiding protectionism and unjustified political instrumentalisation of research 
and innovation; 

Promote  self-governance  within  the  sector,  empowering  researchers  and  innovators 
to  take  informed  decisions,  underscoring  the  societal  responsibilities  of  higher 
education  institutions  and  other  research  performing  organisations,  building  on  the 
principle that ‘with academic freedom comes academic responsibility’;   

Adopt  a  whole-of-government  approach,  which  brings  together  relevant  expertise 
and  skills,  ensures  a  comprehensive  approach  to  research  security  and  fosters 
coherence  of  governmental  actions  and  messaging  towards  the  research  and 

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7. 

8. 

9. 

innovation  sector,  including  concrete  steps  to  upskill  and  reskill  the  relevant 
workforce; 

While  pursuing  a  risk-based  approach,  adopt  policies  that  are  country-agnostic, 
identifying and addressing risks to research security wherever they emanate from, as 
this  is  the best  guarantee that  a balanced  approach to  opportunities and risks in  the 
research and innovation cooperation is maintained and that evolving developments in 
the  threat  landscape,  including  the  emergence  of  new  threat  actors,  are  not 
overlooked; 

Ensure  that  every  effort  is  made  to  avoid  all  forms  of  discrimination  and 
stigmatisation, direct as well as indirect, that could occur as unintended side-effects 
of  safeguarding  measures  and  ensure  full  respect  of  fundamental  rights  and  shared 
values;  

Acknowledge the dynamic nature of research security shaped by evolving risks, new 
insights,  and  geopolitical  contexts,  which  requires  a  learning  approach  with 
periodical reviews being carried out to  ensure research security policies remain up-
to-date, effective and proportionate. 

HEREBY RECOMMENDS THAT MEMBER STATES 

with  full  regard  to  institutional  autonomy  and  academic  freedom,  and  in  accordance  with 
national circumstances and their responsibility for national security:  

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

Work  towards  developing  and  implementing  a  coherent  set  of  policy  actions  to 
enhance  research  security,  making  best  use  of  the  elements  listed  in  this  section, 
while 
responsible 
taking 
internationalisation;  

the  aforementioned  principles 

into  account 

for 

Engage  in  dialogue  with  research  and  innovation  stakeholders  with  a  view  to 
defining responsibilities and roles, and developing a national action plan, formulating 
national  guidelines  where  relevant,  and  listing  relevant  measures  and  initiatives  to 
boost research security, together with a timeline for their implementation.  

Create  a  support  structure,  e.g.:  a  Research  Security  Advisory  Hub,  to  help 
researchers  and  innovators  deal  with  risks  related  to  international  cooperation  in 
research  and  innovation.  Bringing  together  cross-sectoral  expertise  and  skills,  it 
should  provide  information  and  advice  that  research  performing  organisations  can 
use  to  take  informed  decisions,  weighing  opportunities  and  risks  of  a  prospective 
international  cooperation  as  well  as  other  services  for  which  the  research  and 
innovation  sector  has  a  clear  need,  including  awareness  raising  activities  and 
trainings. 

Strengthen the evidence base for research security policymaking, through analysis of 
the threat landscape, including from a cybersecurity perspective, as well as through 
conducting or commissioning policy-relevant research. 

Pay  specific  attention  to  those  critical  technologies  identified  by  the  Commission 
recommendation  on  critical  technology  areas  for  the  EU's  economic  security  for 
further risk assessment with Member States19, and to the outcomes of such collective 
risk assessments.  

19  Commission  recommendation  on  critical  technology  areas  for  the  EU's  economic  security  for  further  risk 

assessment with Member States of 03.10.2023 (link). 

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6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

Reinforce  cross-sectoral  cooperation  within  government,  notably  bringing  together 
policy-makers  responsible  for  higher  education,  research  &  innovation,  foreign 
affairs, and intelligence & security.  

Facilitate  information  exchange  with  public  and  private  research  performing 
organisations  on  the  aforementioned  analysis  and  research,  including  through 
classified and non-classified briefings or dedicated liaison officers. 

Gain  insight  in  the  resilience  of  the  sector  as  well  as  the  effectiveness  and 
proportionality  of  the  applicable  research  security  policies,  including  possibly 
through regular resilience testing and incident simulations.  

In order to ensure compliance with the applicable EU’s export control rules for dual-
use  items  and  the  sanctions  adopted  pursuant  to  Article  29  TEU  and  Article  215 
TFEU,  take  national  measures  notably  on  intangible  technology  transfer  (ITT),  as 
well as to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of sanctions regimes that 
are  relevant  to  research  and  innovation,  such  as  those  prohibiting  the  transfer  of 
certain technologies. 

Proactively  contribute  to  the  EU’s  one-stop-shop  platform  on  tackling  R&I  foreign 
interference  by  sharing  tools  and  resources  developed  through  public  funding  with 
the aim to facilitate the cross-border uptake of these tools and resources and deliver 
them in a user-friendly and accessible manner. 

Develop,  together  with  the  private  sector,  targeted  information  and  guidance  for 
business involved in private research and innovation, including for research-intensive 
start-ups and small and medium size companies. 

Consider,  where  relevant,  and  based  on  risk-assessment,  the  application  of  the 
measures contained in this recommendation to international cooperation activities in 
higher education, including to student and staff mobility activities.  

Role of research funding organisations 

13. 

Engage with research funding organisations to ensure that:  

(a)  Research security is  an integral  part of the  application process  that takes into 
account the different factors that, taken together, define the risk profile of the 
project. The objective is to stimulate beneficiaries to think through the context 
in  which the R&I  cooperation takes place and what  motivations and (hidden) 
agendas could play a role, ensuring potential risks and threats are identified up 
front with the aim to avoid as much as possible problems at a later stage.  

(b)  Research projects selected for funding that raise concerns (‘red flags’) undergo 
a  risk  appraisal  proportionate  to  their  risk  profile,  resulting  in  agreeing 
appropriate  safeguard  measures  addressing  the  identified  risks  while  ensuring 
that  the  time-to-grant  is  not  unnecessarily  delayed,  and  avoiding  any 
unnecessary administrative burden. 

(c)  When applying safeguarding measures in national funding programmes, those 

applied in relevant EU funding programmes are taken into account.  

(d)  Applicants are seeking assurances, for instance through agreeing a partnership 
agreement, from prospective partners for projects with a high risk profile that 
the research results will be used in a manner that upholds fundamental values, 
including respect of human rights.  

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(e)  Adequate  expertise  and skills  are available within the funding  organisation  to 
address research security concerns as well as to have adequate monitoring and 
evaluation  measures  in  place to  oversee projects  at  different  stages,  including 
keeping  track  of  incidents  and  taking  credible  measures  in  case  of  non-
compliance.  

Support to higher education institutions and other research performing organisations 

14. 

Encourage  and  support  higher  education  institutions  and  other  research  performing 
organisations to  

(a)  Create  a  sector-wide  platform  of  stakeholders  to  facilitate  information 
exchange,  peer  learning,  development  of  tools  and  guidelines,  and  incident 
reporting. Consider resource pooling to make best use of scarce and scattered 
resources and expertise; 

(b) 

Implement  internal  risk  management  procedures  in  a  structural  manner, 
including  through  risk  appraisal,  due  diligence  into  prospective  partners  and 
escalation to higher levels of internal decision-making in case of elements that 
raise concerns (‘red flags’), while avoiding unnecessary administrative burden; 

(c)  Whenever entering  into research  partnership agreements with  foreign  entities, 
including  through  Memoranda  of  Understanding,  insist  on  including  key 
framework  conditions,  such  as  respect  for  fundamental  values,  academic 
freedom,  reciprocity  and  arrangements  on  intellectual  assets  management, 
including the dissemination and valorisation of results, licensing or transfer of 
results  and  spin-off  creation,  and  ensure  there  is  an  exit  strategy  in  place  in 
case the conditions of the agreements are not complied with;   

(d)  Assess  risks  related  to  foreign  government-sponsored  talent  programmes  in 
higher education and research, notably focusing on any undesirable obligations 
imposed  on  their  beneficiaries,  and  guarantee  that  foreign  government-
sponsored  on-campus  providers  of  courses  and  trainings  abide  by  the  host 
institution’s mission and rules; 

(e) 

Invest  in  dedicated  in-house  research  security  expertise  and  skills,  assign 
research  security  responsibility  at  the  appropriate  organisational  levels,  and 
invest  in  cyber  hygiene  and  in  creating  a  culture  in  which  openness  and 
security are in balance; 

(f)  Develop  training  programmes,  including  online  courses,  for  practitioners  and 
new staff members, as part of their on-boarding, as well as curricula aimed at 
training  the  next  generation  of  security  advisers  and  policy-makers.  Train 
recruiters to check and detect, as part of a structural vetting process, elements 
that  raise  concerns  (‘red  flags’)  in  applications  for  research  positions, 
especially those in critical research domains;  

(g)  Ensure  in  scientific  publications  and  all  other  forms  of  dissemination  of 
research results full transparency of funding sources and affiliations of research 
staff,  avoiding  that  foreign  dependencies  and  conflicts  of  interest  or 
commitment affect the quality and content of the research; 

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(h) 

Introduce  compartmentalisation,  both  physical  and  virtual,  guaranteeing  that 
for  areas,  such  as  labs  and  research  infrastructure,  data  and  systems  that  are 
particularly sensitive, access is granted on a strict need-to-know basis, and, for 
online systems, robust cybersecurity arrangements are in place;  

(i)  Ensure  that  all  forms  of  discrimination  and  stigmatisation,  both  direct  and 
indirect,  are  prevented,  that  individual  safety  is  guaranteed,  with  particular 
attention  to  coercion  of  diaspora  by  the  state  of  origin  and  other  forms  of 
malign  influence,  which  could  give  rise  to  self-censorship  and  may  have 
security  implications  for  the  foreign  researchers,  doctoral  candidates  and 
students involved, and that incidents are reported. 

Supporting actions at union level 

15. 

Fully cooperate in view of facilitating  the actions which the Commission has taken 
or  intends  to  take  to  support  implementation  of  this  recommendation,  and  in 
particular:  

(a)  Making  full  use  of  the  open  method  of  coordination,  notably  the  ERA 
governance structures, to raise awareness, to facilitate peer learning, as well as 
to facilitate consistency of policies;  

(b)  Establishing  a  European  Centre  of  Expertise  on  Research  Security  as  a  focal 
point,  linked  to  the  Commission’s  one-stop-shop  platform  on  tackling  R&I 
foreign  interference,  contributing  to  creating  an  EU-wide  community  of 
practice and maintaining a structural dialogue with stakeholder organisations as 
well as to policy-relevant research into research security and analysing trends 
and patterns across the Union; 

(c)  Enhancing, in cooperation with the High Representative, situational awareness 
among  policymakers  by  structurally  assessing  hybrid  threats  affecting  the 
research and innovation ecosystem;  

(d)  Developing a resilience testing methodology that can be used at national level 
on  a  voluntary  basis  by  higher  education  institutions  and  public  and  private 
research performing organisations; 

(e)  Continuing its work, together with the Member States and with involvement of 
the  stakeholders,  on  assessing  risks  of  critical  technologies20,  as  well  as 
engaging  in  a  dialogue  to  ensure  information  sharing  and  consistency  of 
approach regarding risk appraisal and research security safeguards in national 
funding programmes and those in relevant EU funding programmes;  

(f)  Developing tools and resources, both country-agnostic and country-specific, to 
support  higher  education 
institutions  and  public  and  private  research 
performing organisations to perform due diligence into prospective partners; as 
well as organising, together with EU-level stakeholder organisations, a biennial 
Stakeholder Forum on Research Security; 

(g)  Preparing interpretative guidance, where necessary, on the development of risk 

appraisal procedures as well as on the application of relevant EU legislation;  

(h)  Engaging with the research and innovation sector to assess how best to increase 
transparency of research funding sources and affiliations of researchers; 

20  Commission  recommendation  on  critical  technology  areas  for  the  EU's  economic  security  for  further  risk 

assessment with Member States of 03.10.2023 (link). 

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(i) 

Strengthening the dialogue with international partners on research security, as 
well  as  taking  initiatives  to  bring  about  a  common  EU  voice  on  the  topic  in 
multilateral fora.  

REPORTING  

1. 

2. 

It  is  recommended  that  Member  States  implement  this  recommendation  as  soon  as 
practicable. They are invited to share their action plan (referred to in point 2  of the 
recommendations  to  the  Member  States)  with  the  Commission  by  [insert  date  9 
months  after  adoption  by  Council]  setting  out  the  corresponding  measures  to  be 
taken  to  boost  research  security,  taking  into  account  their  respective  starting 
positions. 

 The progress made in implementing this recommendation will be monitored by the 
Commission,  using  ERA  governance  monitoring  and  reporting  frameworks,  in 
cooperation with the Member States and after consulting the stakeholders concerned, 
and  report  to  the  Council  every  two  years,  as  part  of  its  biennial  reporting  on  the 
Global Approach to Research & Innovation. After in-depth assessment and in light of 
the future evolution  of the geopolitical  situation, further steps and measures can be 
proposed. 

Done at Brussels, 

For the Council 
The President 

EN 

18 

  EN