WHITE PAPER on Export Controls
Date: 2024-01-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Union
Subjects: EU restrictive measure, European security, Russo-Ukrainian issue, common security and defence policy, dual-use technology, export (EU), export monitoring, supply chain, trade restriction

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.1.2024  COM(2024) 25 final  WHITE PAPER on Export Controls  
 
 
WHITE PAPER 

on Export Controls 

Table of Contents 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: WHY A WHITE PAPER? ......................................................................... 2 

2.  THE 2021 DUAL-USE REGULATION: STATE OF PLAY ON IMPLEMENTATION ................... 3 

3.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF EXPORT CONTROLS ...................................... 4 

3.1.  Russia’s impact on the functioning of the multilateral export control regimes .. 4 

3.2. 

Increased recourse to unilateral export controls internationally ......................... 5 

3.3.  Recent national export controls by EU Member States......................................... 6 

4.  ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 8 

4.1.  Risk of a patchwork of export controls in the European Union ........................... 8 

4.2.  Lack of a common approach to the Union’s security and trade policy objectives 
in the area of export controls .............................................................................................. 9 

4.3.  Lack of a common EU voice internationally ......................................................... 10 

4.4.  Global supply chains and downstream impact ..................................................... 11 

4.5.  The lessons learnt from EU Sanctions against Russia ......................................... 11 

5.  PROPOSED RESPONSES .................................................................................................... 12 

5.1.  Ensure the continuation and the strengthening of uniform controls in the EU 12 

5.2.  Set up a forum for political coordination on export controls .............................. 13 

5.3.  Mechanism for better coordination of new National Control Lists.................... 13 

5.4.  Bring forward the timing of the evaluation of the Dual-use Regulation. ........... 13 

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1.  INTRODUCTION: WHY A WHITE PAPER? 
EU export controls for dual-use items1 are a key tool for international peace and security as 
well as the protection of human rights. They ensure that items such as advanced electronics, 
toxins, missile technology or nuclear components, which have civil but also military uses, do 
not  get  into  the  wrong  hands.  Dual-use  items  are  therefore  subject  to  authorisations  when 
exported outside the EU, limiting the possibility for such items to be used in war or conflict 
situations,  for  breaches  of  human  rights  or  to  enable  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass 
destruction. 

These controls generally derive from the obligations and commitments taken by EU Member 
States or the European Union as members of international non-proliferation agreements and 
multilateral export control regimes.2 This multilateral approach represents the first best way of 
developing  robust  export  controls  globally.  These  commitments  are  then  implemented  in  a 
uniform manner in the EU. 

At EU level, the framework to implement and regulate exports of dual-use goods is set out in 
Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the “Dual-Use Regulation”),3 which significantly revised EU dual-
use rules in 2021. That revision takes into account rapid technological developments and the 
increasing militarisation of emerging technologies, ensures more effective implementation and 
increases coordination between EU Member States’ national export control authorities as well 
as with the European Commission. 

Since the entry into force of the Dual-Use Regulation, the global context for export controls 
has  fundamentally  changed.  Russia’s  war  of  aggression  against  Ukraine  has  been  met  with 
unprecedented  and  rapid  deployment  of  sanctions.  This  includes  swift  imposition  of  export 
restrictions on dual-use  and sensitive items critical  for curbing the long-term war efforts  of 
Russia. This has highlighted the need for the EU to have a system of export controls that can 
deliver fast and in a uniform manner.  

At the same time, while important work has taken place at the technical level, the ability of the 
multilateral export control regimes to deliver new decisions on items subject to controls and to 
keep pace with technological developments has been hampered by certain members, creating 
gaps in the adoption of new export controls at multilateral level.  

Finally, there has been a multiplication of new national controls on emerging and advanced 
sensitive technologies by some countries, including EU Member States, outside the multilateral 
framework, creating a risk of a patchwork of control measures within the EU and fragmentation 
of the single market. These various developments have exposed Member States to geopolitical 
pressure and raised questions on the adequacy of the current EU export control framework to 
effectively contribute to the security of the EU and its Member States. 

1   Dual-use items are goods, software and technology that can be used for both civil and military  purposes. 
However,  they  do  not  include  items  of  a  purely  military  nature,  such  as  those  listed  in  the  EU  Common 
Military List (OJ C 72, 28.2.2023, p. 2–37).  

2   The main multilateral regimes under which most EU export controls are agreed are the Australia Group, the 
Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The EU 
is a member of one of the existing Multilateral Control Regimes – the Australia Group –  and an observer in 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group.     

3  Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union 
regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (OJ L 
206, 11.6.2021, p. 1–461). 

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Against  this  background,  on  20  June  2023,  the  Commission  and  the  High  Representative 
(“HRVP”) adopted a Communication on a European Economic Security Strategy.4 It calls for 
more  rapid  and  coordinated  action  at  EU  level  in  the  area  of  dual-use  export  controls  and 
making full use of the possibilities offered by the Dual-Use Regulation. 

The present White Paper responds to that  call. It analyses the current situation and makes a 
number of proposals  to  address  the current  challenges, both  to  foster uniform  and  effective 
controls across the EU and to open a discussion with Member States, the European Parliament, 
and stakeholders, including the business community, on the evaluation of the functioning of 
the Dual-Use Regulation and the ability of the current framework to meet effectively the EU’s 
present and future security needs. 

2.  THE 2021 DUAL-USE REGULATION: STATE OF PLAY ON IMPLEMENTATION 

The  Dual-Use  Regulation  strengthened  the  EU’s  capacity  to  address  an  evolving  security 
environment, rapid technological developments and the evolution of global supply chains and 
international trade. 

It  includes  novel  provisions  to  enhance  the  coordination  among  Member  States  in  the 
introduction of new EU controls on cyber-surveillance and emerging technologies, to facilitate 
low-risk dual-use trade, enhance information exchange among the Member States and with the 
Commission  (including  through  the  development  of  a  dedicated  EU  electronic  licensing 
platform). It also aims for greater transparency on national licensing decisions by EU Member 
States as well as consistency in the implementation and enforcement of controls. 

These developments are complemented by measures to support EU exporters, including new 
EU  General  Export  Authorisations  for  encryption  technologies  and  for  intra-company 
technology  transfers,  alongside  streamlined  procedures  for  licensing.  The  Regulation  also 
acknowledge the key role of the industry as “the first line of defence”. It  also mandates the 
Commission and Member States to foster cooperation with international partners in an effort 
to uphold the multilateral export control systems as key elements of the international trade and 
security infrastructure. 

Actions to roll out these provisions are well underway. The Commission and the Member States 
have developed guidelines on internal compliance programmes and research compliance, as 
well as to ensure transparency about national licensing decisions as part of Member States’ 
annual  reports.5  The  Commission  and  Member  States  are  developing  guidelines  to  support 
exporters’ due diligence and enhance controls on exports of cyber-surveillance items6 as part 
of the EU’s actions to prevent trade from being  used in connection with internal repression 

4 

Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on a “European 
Economic Security Strategy” (JOIN/2023/20 final). 

5   See Commission Recommendation 2021/1700 on internal compliance programmes for controls of research 
involving dual-use items under Regulation (OJ L 338, 23.9.2021, p. 1–52) and Commission Recommendation 
2019/1318 on internal compliance programmes for dual-use trade controls (OJ L 205, 5.8.2019, p. 15–32). 
The Commission and Member States continue working on the more effective implementation of controls on 
transfers of intangibles and technology. The Guidelines on data collection and transparency are planned for 
publication beginning of 2024. 

6  The Guidelines on exports of cyber-surveillance items will be published in the first quarter of 2024. Concerns 
on the use of cyber-surveillance items have for instance led the European Parliament to establish a special 
Committee (The Pegasus Inquiry Committee) that adopted a resolution in June 2023 which also underlined 
the need for further strengthening of controls on the export of cyber-surveillance items under the Dual-Use 
Regulation. 

3 

 
 
 
and/or  the  commission  of  serious  violations  and  abuses  of  human  rights  and  international 
humanitarian law.7  

The  EU  has  also  stepped-up  cooperation  with  international  partners  as  part  of  its  efforts  to 
uphold international security, for instance under the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council 
and the development of a global coalition coordinating export restrictions on sensitive items in 
response to Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine. 

One of the most innovative elements of the Dual-Use Regulation has been the introduction of 
a mechanism (in Articles 9 and 10) to facilitate coordination of national export controls at EU 
level. This is described in more detail in sections 3 and 4 below. 

Despite good progress on the implementation of various aspects of the Dual-Use Regulation, 
there is still work to do to make full use of its potential and to optimise its contribution to peace 
and security in the current geo-political context.  

3.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF EXPORT CONTROLS 

This chapter outlines recent developments that show the limits of the current Export Control 
framework and its ability to mitigate risks that dual-use exports present for the security and the 
integrity of the internal market. The Commission sees a need for more agile and effective EU 
export controls that serve national and EU’s foreign and security policy interests and values, 
while being firmly anchored in the Union’s common commercial policy.8 

3.1.  Russia’s impact on the functioning of the multilateral export control regimes 

For decades, the established multilateral export control regimes have provided the necessary 
export  control  measures  that  today  underpin  the  EU  export  control  framework,  thereby 
responding to the Union’s security policy objectives. The EU is committed to preserving the 
effectiveness of, and strengthening, multilateral regimes.  

The multilateral system rests on the ability of the regimes to propose and agree new items for 
export  controls.  Some  of  the  multilateral  export  control  regimes  (Wassenaar  Arrangement, 
Missile  Technology  Control  Regime  and  Nuclear  Suppliers  Group)  are  under  significant 
pressure as Russia as a member is reported to be hampering the adoption of new controls, thus 

7   Other actions undertaken by the Commission and the Member States include: (i) setting up an “Emerging 
Technology Expert Group” (ETEG) to exchange information with Member States on risk assessments for 
emerging  technologies;  (ii)  setting  up  an  Enforcement  Coordination  Mechanism  to  support  the  work  of 
national  law  enforcement  agencies  throughout  the  EU;  (iii)  developing  the  Dual-use  electronic  System 
(DUeS)  to  enhance  information  exchange  between  relevant  services  in  the  Commission  and  the  Member 
States; and (iv) enhancing industry outreach and compliance as part of a “partnership with the private sector” 
e.g. through the organisation of a regular Export Control Forum. 

8  The European Court of Justice confirmed in case Leifer that rules whose effect is to prevent or restrict the 
export of certain products fall within the scope of the common commercial policy and that the fact that the 
restriction concerns dual-use goods does not affect that conclusion as the nature of those products cannot take 
them  outside  the  scope  of  the  common  commercial  policy  (Judgment  of  the  Court  of  17  October  1995, 
Criminal  proceedings  against  Peter  Leifer,  Reinhold  Otto  Krauskopf  and  Otto  Holzer,  C-83/94, 
ECLI:EU:C:1995:329, paragraphs 10 to 11). In case Werner, the Court confirmed these findings and further 
explained that a measure whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain products, cannot be treated 
as falling outside the scope of the common commercial policy on the ground that it has foreign policy and 
security objectives (Judgment of the Court of 17 October 1995, Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH 
v Federal Republic of Germany, C-70/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:328, paragraph 10). 

4 

 
 
 
leaving gaps in the system.9 Given the links between the Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation 
and the multilateral regimes, it also undercuts the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the 
EU’s controls. 

As decision-making in these regimes takes place by consensus, Russia – like any other member 
–  holds  veto  power  over  any  initiative  to  amend  the  control  lists,  the  regimes,  or  their 
membership.10  It  is  reported  that  Russia  has  blocked  the  adoption  of  important  controls  on 
emerging technologies in the Wassenaar Arrangement,11 in practice hindering both the ability 
of the regime to deliver new decisions and, as a result, preventing a related update of the EU 
dual-use export control list. This raises serious questions on the capacity of multilateral export 
control regimes to deliver in times of serious geo-political tensions, and to ensure the security 
of the EU and the other members of the multilateral arrangements. The current blockage of the 
multilateral regimes seems also to have prompted some members to take individual actions that 
are  not  anchored  in  those  regimes,  thus  increasing  the  risk  of  fragmentation  of  the  Single 
Market  and,  more  generally,  reducing  the  effectiveness  of  the  multilateral  export  controls 
system. 

3.2.  Increased recourse to unilateral export controls internationally 

Since the 2021 Dual-Use Regulation, there has been increased use of unilateral export controls, 
in some cases due to expansive national security considerations and, in others, with the aim to 
address new risks posed by emerging technologies (see box below).  

Examples of unilateral export controls by third countries 

On  7  October  2022,  the  US  adopted  unilateral  export  controls  on  advanced  and  high-
performance  computing  chips  and  related  software,  as  well  as  advanced  semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment. In response to these measures, China sought consultations with the 
US under the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO in December 2022.12 The US further 
strengthened those measures in an update published on 17 October 2023.13 

9   Wolf,  K.,  ‘Testimony  before the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing  and  Urban  Affairs  “Advancing 
National  Security  and  Foreign  Policy  Through  Sanctions,  Export  Controls,  and  Other  Economic  Tools”’ 
2023, p. 13. See also Chorzempa, M. and von Daniels, L., ‘New US Export Controls: Key Policy Choices for 
Europe’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2023, p. 7. 

10   Gehrke, T. and Ringhof, J., ‘The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export 
restrictions’ European Council on Foreign Relations, 2023. Benson, E. and Putnam, M., ‘Export Controls 
and Intangible Goods’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023. 

11   Wolf,  K.,  ‘Testimony  before the  Senate  Committee  on  Banking,  Housing  and  Urban  Affairs  “Advancing 
National  Security  and  Foreign  Policy  Through  Sanctions,  Export  Controls,  and  Other  Economic  Tools”’ 
2023, p. 13. 

12   Request for consultations by China: United States - Measures on Certain Semiconductor and Other Products, 

and Related Services and Technologies (WT/DS615/1, G/L/1471 S/L/438, G/TRIMS/D/46 IP/D/44). 

13   Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, ‘Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on 
Advanced  Computing  Semiconductors,  Semiconductor  Manufacturing  Equipment,  and  Supercomputing 
at:  
Items 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3355-2023-10-17-bis-
press-release-acs-and-sme-rules-final-js/file. 

to  Countries  of  Concern’,  Press  Release  of  17  October  2023, 

available 

5 

 
 
 
 
On  23  May  2023,  Japan  adopted  export  controls  on  items  for  the  manufacturing  of 
semiconductors.14 

In 2023, China adopted a series of export controls. In particular, on 3 July 2023, it adopted 
controls covering products containing gallium and germanium; on 31 July 2023, on advanced 
unmanned  aerial  vehicles  (UAVs);  and,  on  1  September  2023,  on  graphite  and  products 
containing graphite. 

Where controls such as these have extra-territorial legal effects, they can have ramifications on 
global value chains and have an impact the capacity of EU businesses to export key cutting-
edge  technologies  and  components,  including  dual-use  items.  This  is  particularly  the  case 
where  such  controls,  even  when  justifiable  for  reasons  of  national  security  of  the  country 
proposing them, cover commercially available technologies outside those controlled through 
the multilateral regimes.  

3.3.  Recent national export controls by EU Member States 

Currently, the European Union does not have the necessary legal provisions to adopt at EU 
level uniform export controls independently from what is adopted in the multilateral regimes, 
except in very limited areas.15  
Prior to the 2021 Dual-Use Regulation, Member States notified their national measures16 to the 
Commission, which were subsequently published on an annual basis in the EU Official Journal 
in the form of an information note.  

The entry into force of the 2021 Dual-Use Regulation created a new way for the publication 
and coordination among Member States of “national control lists”17. Pursuant to Article 9 of 
the Dual-Use Regulation, the Commission on one hand publishes an annual information note 
including all “national measures” notified to it by Member States, and on the other hand, a so-
called “EU compilation of national control lists”.18  

14   Amendment to the “Ministerial Ordinance Partially Revising the Ministerial Ordinance Specifying Goods 
and Technologies Pursuant to the Provisions of the Appended Table 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and 
at: 
Foreign 
the 
https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/anpo/law09-2.html#230523. 

Appended 

Exchange 

available 

Order”, 

Table 

the 

of 

15   The  2021  Dual-Use  Regulation  introduced  the  possibility  of  new  EU  autonomous  controls  for  cyber-
surveillance items (Article 5). However, this provision remains untested, is limited to cyber-surveillance items 
and would require coordinated actions by all Member States. The 2021 Dual-Use Regulation also introduced 
the possibility for Member States to coordinate controls under their national control lists (Articles 9 and 10), 
but this has proven unlikely to deliver uniform controls as described in section 4.1. 

16   “National measures” refer to actions of various kinds taken by Member States including, for example, national 
general export control authorisations, designation of competent authorities, designation of customs offices, 
but also national control lists described hereunder. 

17  National  control  lists  refer  to  measures  adopted by  Member  States  pursuant  to  Article  9  of  the  Dual-Use 
Regulation, whereby they decide to subject to authorisation dual-use items that are not listed in Annex I of 
the  Dual-Use  Regulation  and  hence  not  subject  to  any  control.  Member  States  are  entitled  to  adopt  such 
national control lists for reasons of public security, including the prevention of acts of terrorism, or for human 
rights consideration.  

18   The  last such information note was published as “Information on  measures adopted by Member States in 
conformity with Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 22 and 23 [of the Dual-Use Regulation]” (OJ 2023/C 208/06). 
The EU compilation was for the first time published on 20 October 2023 as a “Compilation of national control 
lists under Article 9(4) [of the Dual-Use Regulation]” (OJ C C/2023/441). 

6 

 
 
 
While the publication of “national measures” has no particular legal effect in other Member 
States,  the  publication  of  the  EU  Compilation  of  national  control  lists  gives  other  Member 
States the possibility to apply such controls directly to their exporters. In other words, they can 
also decide to subject to authorisation (and potential denial) the items listed in the Compilation 
of  national  control  lists  at  the  initiative  of  other  Member  States.  This  mechanism  aims  to 
facilitate a quicker introduction and coordination of national export controls, so that the Union 
can react rapidly to the serious misuse of existing technologies or to new risks associated with 
emerging technologies (see section 4.1.). 

In the first half of 2023, several Member States have adopted national control lists (see below) 
which  have  triggered  for  the  first  time  this  new  coordination  mechanism.  Some  of  these 
national control lists for instance seek to limit the export of critical technologies outside the 
Union, in some cases building on the discussions taking place within the multilateral regimes.19 
The Commission understands that some Member States may be considering the possible need 
for  national  controls  given  the  current  difficulties  to  agree  on  new  control  items  at  the 
multilateral regimes. The increase of national controls seen in 2023 may therefore continue, 
which amplifies the need for enhanced efforts to ensure coherence and effectiveness. 

Examples of National Control Lists adopted or proposed by Member States 

On 23 June 2023, the Netherlands adopted a national control list setting out new export 
controls  on  semiconductors  manufacturing  equipment.  Such  controls  reflected  the  rapid 
advances  in  semiconductors  technology  and  involved  discussions  with  international 
partners.20 

On 31 May 2023, Spain adopted a national control list imposing new export controls on 
quantum computing, additive manufacturing and other emerging technologies for reasons 
of public security.21 

On 28 June 2023, Lithuania adopted a national control list prohibiting exports of a list of 
customs classification encompassing, among others, aircraft engines, machinery as well as 
measuring and electronic devices. These controls are aimed at addressing the threat to the 
security of Lithuania posed by the military aggression of foreign states against Ukraine and 
sought to reduce this threat by limiting technical capabilities of foreign states to wage a war 

19   To date, three Member States have notified to the European Commission the adoption of national control lists 
proposed  for  coordination  of  controls  by  Member  States,  with  two  of  them  already  included  in  the 
Compilation of national control lists published on 20 October 2023. 

20   Letter by the Netherland’s Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation of 8 March 2023 to the 
https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/oep-

Parliament, 

at: 

Dutch 
7b25ba07017fbcc4a9d285cc013849f6516f03bd/pdf. 

available 

21   Order  ICT/534/2023  of  26  May  2023,  available  at  https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2023/05/31/pdfs/BOE-A-

2023-12785.pdf  

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
of aggression in Ukraine.22 The June Resolution was amended recently on 15 November 
2023.23 

On 10 November 2023, Finland launched a public consultation on draft national measures 
that,  if  adopted,  would  include  controls  on  emerging  technologies  such  as  integrated 
circuits, quantum computers and additive manufacturing equipment.24  

4.  ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK 

4.1.  Risk of a patchwork of export controls in the European Union 

Already before 2021, Member States had the possibility to adopt national controls outside the 
EU framework. However, the evolving geopolitical context, the increasing recourse to export 
controls and the emerging dynamics in the implementation of coordinated controls under the 
2021 EU Dual-Use Regulation make more visible the risk of a patchwork of export controls 
for the European Union having a negative impact on the security interests of the Union and its 
Member States.  

The  publication  of  a  first  EU  Compilation  of  national  control  lists  on  20  October  2023 
represented an important step for EU export controls. It offers, for the first time, the possibility 
for  Member  States  to  coordinate  their  national  export  controls  at  EU  level,  further  to  the 
procedures set out in Articles 9 and 10 of the Dual-Use Regulation. Nevertheless, the initial 
implementation  by  Member  States  of  these  provisions  suggest  that  there  are  potentially 
important shortcomings which may impact the effectiveness of the EU export control system. 

First, there is a lack of transparency and insufficient consultation. While the current framework 
provides the possibility for Member States to propose national control lists, it does not require 
them  to  inform  and  consult  each  other  or  the  Commission  prior  to  their  adoption.  Such 
consultation and broader consideration of possible EU-wide impacts of national controls are 
particularly important as they could be relied on by other Member States, impact businesses 
and supply chains in other Member States or trigger reactions from third countries against the 
EU as a whole or several Member States, and not just the Member State adopting the control.25 

Second, there is no certainty about how or when other Member States may take up the controls 
published in a Compilation of national control lists. The Member State adopting the original 
control will not know if it has been taken up by others, nor will it know about decisions to 

22   Resolution No. 512 of 28 June 2023, ‘On the Application of National Control Measures Pursuant to Article 
9  of  Regulation  (EU)  2021/821  of  the  European  Parliament  and  Council’,  available  at:  https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/e136d18116b211eea9b3de7dd350a34e?positionInSearchResults=6&se
archModelUUID=f43633e4-8d0d-4761-b5f5-adb027d53453.  

23   The 

November 

https://e-
seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/0f49a4e0857011ee9ee3e4a7f62b7a26?positionInSearchResults=2&sear
chModelUUID=e121fc54-2c6c-4133-b8f0-26af9214c826  

Resolution 

available 

2023 

at: 

is 

24  Public consultation available at: https://valtioneuvosto.fi/hanke?tunnus=UM008:00/2019. 

25    To note that it is the Commission that would be called upon to defend the measures of an individual Member 
State  on  behalf  of  the  EU  if  those  measures  were  challenged  by  a  third  country  at  the  World  Trade 
Organization. Equally, it would be the EU acting under the new Anti-Coercion instrument in the face of third 
country action in response to Member State export controls, seeking to change those Member State measures 
or ensure that they would not be followed at EU level or by other Member States. 

8 

 
 
 
 
 
authorise exports in another Member State based on its controls.26 A majority of Member States 
are implementing, or planning to implement, controls on the published Compilation of national 
control lists as “catch-all” measures.27 While this is a fully legitimate choice of the Member 
States concerned, such implementation does not create a generally applicable rule nor one that 
is made public. If each exporter has to be informed individually in the framework of a “catch-
all”  procedure,  it  is  potentially  administratively  heavy  and  may  not  capture  all  possible  of 
exporters of the relevant item.  

Third, even if the Dual-Use Regulation gives the possibility for Member States to take over 
other Member States export controls, their national law may not allow them to do so, or at least 
limit  their  ability  to  publish  such  measures.28  Consequently,  there  is  no  publicly  available 
information about which national controls apply in which Member State. This has a negative 
impact on their capability to contribute to predicable, timely and uniform implementation of 
export controls by all Member States.  

Fourth, this situation presents a risk of “forum shopping”. National export controls adopted by 
one Member State only apply to exports leaving the EU territory, but not to trade within the 
internal market. A Spanish exporter may find that their dual-use products cannot be exported 
outside  the  Union  from  Spain  to  a  third  country,  but  may  be  sold  to  customers  in  another 
Member State, which does not apply a similar control. It could then legally be re-exported from 
there to the third country. This would clearly undercut the national controls and render them 
ineffective. It could also place companies located in the Member States where controls apply 
at  a  competitive  disadvantage. Additionally, it  may lead to  importers changing  their supply 
chains and even deter Member States from introducing certain controls for commercial reasons. 

In  light  of  the  factors  above,  the  Commission  sees  a  risk  that  the  existing  coordination 
mechanism among Member States cannot deliver the uniform, timely and effective controls 
system that the EU needs. This should be addressed in order to enhance European and global 
security,  ensure  a  more  level  playing  field  and  protect  the  integrity  of  the  internal  market; 
especially in times of significant geopolitical tensions and blockage of the multilateral regimes. 

4.2.  Lack of a common approach to the Union’s security and trade policy objectives in 

the area of export controls 

Decision-making in the field of export controls is currently led by Member States in light of 
their national security implications. For example, the introduction of new export controls is 
mostly  determined  by  Member  States  within  the  multilateral  export  control  regimes  in  the 
absence of a common EU voice. Even the limited alternative routes introduced by the Dual-

26   Under the Dual-Use Regulation, Member States that deny an export on the basis of a national control list of 
another Member State are required to inform the Commission and the other Member States of such decision. 
However, Member States do not need to inform about the absence of controls or the authorisation of exports. 

27   “Catch-all” controls are generally understood to be controls that are applied by Member States to items that 
are not listed in Annex I to the Dual-Use Regulation (so called “EU control list”), so the controls apply to 
items that have not yet been agreed under the multilateral control regimes. Most notably, Article 4 of the 
Dual-Use Regulation requires exporters to seek an export authorisation if they are informed by the competent 
Member State authority that an item that they export may be intended for one of certain sensitive end-uses 
detailed in Article 4. Such information generally takes the form of a non-public individual notification to the 
relevant exporter.  

28   Some Member States do not have  the legal basis to adopt national controls under Article 9. Additionally, 
some Member States’ national laws do not allow them to adopt public and transparent controls under Article 
10. Rather, they need to resort to individual non-public notifications to exporters.  

9 

 
 
 
Use  Regulation  for  new  controls29  depend  on  the  initiative  of  Member  States  and  their 
voluntary coordination on the basis of their national risk assessments. 

The Commission is committed to strengthening its support for the work of multilateral regimes 
as the best route to identify and accept the export controls that underpin the EU export control 
framework. 

Nevertheless, the recent developments described above raise the question whether an additional 
legal provision should be considered to allow the possibility of introducing new common EU 
controls in a faster, streamlined fashion outside the option of the ordinary legislative procedure. 
This would address the Union’s security and trade policy objectives. This could also remediate 
the current risks of fragmentation and allow for a swifter EU-wide reaction, where needed, to 
security  risks  as  regards  emerging  technologies  which  have  not  yet  been  controlled  at 
multilateral level. Additionally, it would increase the ability of the EU to act jointly and geo-
politically  in  response  to  third  countries’  calls  for  new  export  controls  on  emerging 
technologies. It would also allow a common EU risk assessment of controls that have an impact 
on the EU’s trade relations and on supply chains across the EU. 

4.3.  Lack of a common EU voice internationally 

While export controls agreed in multilateral regimes form the bedrock of EU export controls 
and  are  regularly  incorporated  in  lists  of  dual-use  items  under  the  Dual-Use  Regulation, 
Member States’ membership in such regimes is uneven.30 As a result Member States that are 
not  members  of  some  of  the  multilateral  regimes  cannot  take  part  in  the  decision-making 
processes  for  new  controls  which  are  subsequently  incorporated  under  the  Dual-Use 
Regulation.  They also  lack a  forum  to  voice their concerns on non-proliferation and export 
control issues covered in the multilateral regimes to which they are not members. 

Furthermore, in contrast to many other areas of the EU’s external policies and as mentioned 
above, there is no common EU voice in multilateral regimes and other international fora where, 
or in the margins of which, export control issues are discussed. Currently, Member States do 
not coordinate their positions on the introduction of new controls before multilateral regimes 
meetings with the aim of defining a common EU position. Moreover, in contrast to the normal 
rule for the external action of the Union that concern trade in export-controlled items, it is the 
Member  States  that  participate  and  engage  in  these  regimes  rather  than  the  Union, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  outcome  of  those  regimes’  discussions  is  subsequently 
incorporated in the EU dual-use legal framework. 

The  lack  of  a  common  EU  voice  exposes  individual  Member  States  to  strong  geopolitical 
pressures and with a weaker negotiating position. Against the backdrop of a geopolitical race 
for technology leadership and control of strategic technologies, Member States with specific 
technological capacities find themselves under increasing pressure from third countries. Allies 
or like-minded partners may seek alignment with controls designed based on their own security 
assessemnts and interests, while third countries likely to be subject to controls may threaten 
individual Member States with retaliation. Better EU level coordination and joint action would 
act as a counterweight to such pressures, give Member States the stronger negotiating hand that 
comes from the scale of the single market, and ensure any controls are based on a European 
assessment of risks and own interests.  

29   See footnote 15 above for further details on Articles 5, 9 and 10 of the Dual-Use Regulation. 

30   Currently, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia are not party to the 

Missile Technology Control Regime; and Cyprus is not party to the Wassenaar Arrangement. 

10 

 
 
 
It also limits the EU’s ability to operate as a geopolitical actor and engage on an equal footing 
with other States that also help to set the agenda for sensitive technology areas such as the US, 
China and Japan. This is particularly concerning at a time when the parameters for control of a 
range  of  critical  emerging  technologies  are  being  defined  in  multilateral  and  plurilateral 
settings, or by unilateral action by the States concerned. 

The  emergence  of  a  common  EU  voice  would  foster  coherence  of  EU  and  Member  State 
positions and would be complementary to the continued participation of EU Member States in 
the multilateral regimes.  

4.4.  Global supply chains and downstream impact 

As set out in the European Economic Security Strategy, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the 
risks  that  highly  concentrated  supply  chains  can  pose  to  the  functioning  of  the  European 
economy. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine showed how an overreliance on a single 
country,  especially  one  with  systemically  divergent  values,  models  and  interests,  reduces 
Europe’s strategic options and puts our economies and citizens at risk. In this light, the EU 
continues to diversify its supply chains, and to increase its collective preparedness, resilience, 
and deterrence to non-market policies and practices and to economic coercion. 

The  EU  is  committed  to  work  with  third  countries  and  in  multilateral  fora  in  ensuring  that 
export  controls  do  not  unduly  disrupt  strategic  supply  chains  and  are  consistent  with  the 
applicable exceptions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Additionally, within the 
partnership strand of the Economic Security Strategy, the EU is working with countries that 
share such concerns to address the risks of supply chain disruptions by third countries.   

4.5.  The lessons learnt from EU Sanctions against Russia 

The EU’s response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine led to unprecedented and 
rapid expansion of sanctions against Russia. Notably, export restrictions were some of the first 
sanctions adopted and included the expansion of export prohibitions on dual-use and sensitive 
items immediately after Russian’s military aggression against Ukraine in February 2022.31 

These  export  restrictions  have  become  a  key  tool  to  limit  the  Russian  military  industrial 
complex’s access to sensitive technologies and impede their use in Russian weapons systems. 
To ensure the effectiveness of these  export restrictions, the EU has engaged in far-reaching 
efforts to counter the circumvention and backfilling of sanctioned items and ensure consistent 
enforcement.  

The implementation of EU sanctions against Russia has also led to a notable increase in the 
sharing of information amongst and between competent regulatory authorities, such as export 
control  authorities  and  customs,  and  in  the  case  of  risk  information,  via  the  Customs  Risk 
Management  System  (CRMS2)  managed  by  the  Commission.32  This  is  important  to  ensure 
effective implementation of the measures across the EU.33 

31   These  supplemented  the  measures  that  the  EU  already  imposed  on  exports  of  certain  dual-use  goods  and 

technology in July 2014.  

32   CRMS2  acts  as  a  single  point  of  reference  for  Member  States  to  access  information  relevant  to  risk 

management related to the implementation of sanctions and circumventions threats. 

33   In  the  context  of  DUeS  (the  electronic  system  provided  in  Article  23(6)  of  the  Dual-Use  Regulation, EU 
Member States have shared sanction-related information related not only to denials (as it is done under the 
Dual-Use Regulation), but also regarding authorisations given for certain limited exports to Russia. This is 
further  supported  by  the  adoption  of  the  Customs  Reform  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  May  2023, 
including a new Customs Authority and Data Hub that will help deliver on an improved EU approach to risk 
management. 

11 

 
 
 
Such restrictions are comparable to dual-use export controls from a technical and procedural 
standpoint34, although it is important to note that the EU sanctions regime and EU dual-use 
export control framework are separate instruments with different legal bases, objectives and 
decision-making rules. 

Nevertheless, the export restrictions in the EU Sanctions against Russia confirmed the potential 
of  export  controls  as  an  effective  tool  to  address  the  EU’s  security  challenges  if  delivered 
swiftly, uniformly and in coordination with international partners. 

5.  PROPOSED RESPONSES 

As the Economic Security Strategy anticipated, the need for more rapid and coordinated action 
at  EU  level  in  the  area  of  export  controls  has  become  pressing  as  an  uncoordinated 
multiplication of national controls by Member States would create loopholes and undermine 
the effectiveness of export controls and the integrity of the Single Market. This risk is more 
pronounced  in  the  current  rapidly  changing  technology  environment,  where  divergences 
between Member States would weaken the economic security of the EU as a whole.35 

In  light  of  the  above,  the  European  Commission  will  propose  action  both  in  the  short  and 
medium-term to address the concerns. The HRVP may provide his input, where appropriate, 
in relation to possible issues concerning common foreign and security policy. 

5.1.  Ensure the continuation and the strengthening of uniform controls in the EU 

In the short-term, the Commission believes that it is important to seek immediate solutions for 
the expansion of Annex I to the EU’s Dual Use Regulation36 to include those items that were 
not adopted by the multilateral export control regimes due to the blockage by certain members, 
in particular Russia, but which were supported by Member States within those regimes. This 
could be done by means of a targeted proposal to introduce such controls in the current EU 
control list set out in Annex I to the Dual-Use Regulation.  

There are two  routes  to  do so.  A first  route is  a Commission legislative proposal  under  the 
ordinary legislative procedure, to allow an update of Annex I which would need to be jointly 
adopted  by  both  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council.  A  potential  second  route  is  a 
Commission Delegated Act. The Dual-Use Regulation delegates the amendment of its Annex 
I to the Commission provided that the conditions for the use of delegation are met, in particular 
that such an amendment reflects international commitments taken by the Member States on 
these new items. The Commission can consider this second route if in the future Member States 
are in a position to confirm that they have taken on such commitments internationally.     

Introducing new items for export controls under Annex I to the Dual-Use Regulation would 
avoid the limitations of national controls explained above in section 4.1. It would allow uniform 
controls throughout all 27 Member States, adopted at the same time in all EU official languages 
and made public. This set of single EU controls  would protect the internal market and help 

34   For example, Annex VII part A of Regulation 833/2014 (“Russia Sanctions Regulation”), which lists items 
subject to export restrictions to Russia, follows a similar structure as Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation. In 
addition, Art 2(6) of the Russia Sanctions Regulation stipulates that the rules and procedures of the Dual-Use 
Regulation are applicable mutatis mutandis to these export restrictions.    

35   Joint  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council  and  the  Council  on  “European 

Economic Security Strategy” (JOIN/2023/20 final). 

36   By contrast to national controls by Member States, items included in Annex I of the Dual-Use Regulation are 
uniformily and simultaneously controlled by all Member States in application of Article 3 of the Dual-Use 
Regulation.  

12 

 
 
 
level  the  playing  field  among  EU  exporters.  It  would  also  increase  the  effectiveness  of  EU 
controls and the efficiency of controls across Member States, for example by making a more 
efficient use of legislative and regulatory resources in the Member States. 

5.2.  Set up a forum for political coordination on export controls 

In  light  of  the  increasing  geopolitical  pressures  described  above,  Member  States  and  the 
Commission should have a forum to discuss developments at the appropriate senior level to 
foster common EU positions, take account of the single market dimension of export control 
developments,  and  prepare  and  coordinate  action  at  international  level.  This  could  take  the 
form of an export control policy forum. 

5.3.  Mechanism for better coordination of new National Control Lists 

Also in the short-term, the Commission considers it crucial to improve the coordination of new 
National  Control Lists  introduced by EU Member States. This  responds to  situations where 
Member  States  may  decide  to  adopt  national  control  lists  with  respect  to  items  that  they 
consider to be at risk but which are not yet controlled at the multilateral level.   

Before the end of its term, the Commission intends as a first step to adopt a Recommendation 
proposing to enhance such coordination. The measure would recommend that Member States 
notify to other Member States and to the Commission any new National Control List prior to 
adoption;  and  that  other  Member  States  have  the  possibility  to  comment  on  the  envisaged 
National Control List, where they consider that the list is likely to to affect their public security 
and  to  provide  the  Member  State  proposing  such  controls  with  relevant  information.  The 
Commission would also be ready to make comments or adopt opinions in situations where it 
considers that the new National Control List are likely to affect the public security of more than 
one Member State or the Union’s interest.37  

This  voluntary  approach  to  enhance  coordination  would  have  the  potential  to  increase 
transparency  surrounding  the  adoption  of  new  National  Control  Lists  by  Member  States; 
facilitate the coordination of controls  among  Member States under Articles 9 and 10 of the 
Dual Use Regulation; and allow competent national authorities to take into account potential 
risks or impacts of their decisions for other Member States and for the Union. 

5.4.  Bring forward the timing of the evaluation of the Dual-use Regulation. 

The Dual-Use Regulation foresees its evaluation between 2026 and 2028. However, the rapid 
pace of events in last three years leads the Commission to conclude that the evaluation should 
be advanced to the first quarter of 2025 to assess and subsequently potentially make proposals 
to  remedy  shortcomings  in  its  effectiveness  and  efficiency  –  some  of  which  have  been 
highlighted in this White Paper. 

37   The  Union interest would consider  all available information and consist of an appreciation of the various 
interests at stake taken as a whole. This would include the interests of Union economic operators such as 
upstream and downstream industries as well as projects or programmes of Union interest within the meaning 
of the Regulation (EU) 2019/452.  

13 

 
 
 
This evaluation will be supported by a comprehensive study in 2024 but will also be able to 
draw on the results of the evaluation of a number of technologies critical for the EU’s economic 
security, as announced in a Commission Recommendation38 adopted on 3 October.39  

This evaluation will be done in consultation with Member States and stakeholders and will be 
accompanied  by  a  public  consultation.  This  should  enable  stakeholders  to  identify 
shortcomings to the effectiveness and efficiency of the current framework and propose possible 
solutions to these in view of the challenges identified in this White Paper. 

* 

* 

            * 

38   Commission Recommendation of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU's economic security 

for further risk assessment with Member States (C(2023) 6689). 

39   This is in line with the Member States ambition to better control the export of technologies. See for example 
the statements of Secretary of State for European Affairs of France Laurence Boone on the need for the EU 
to complete its doctrine on which technologies it is willing to export and to where at the Peterson Institute on 
28 March 2023, available at https://www.piie.com/events/european-approach-economic-statecraft. 

14