WHITE PAPER on Outbound Investments
Date: 2024-01-24
Institutions: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, European Union
Subjects: European security, dual-use technology, economic policy, export (EU), export monitoring, investment abroad, know-how, regulation of investments, risk management, third country

EN 

  EN 

   EUROPEAN COMMISSION  Brussels, 24.1.2024  COM(2024) 24 final  WHITE PAPER on Outbound Investments          
 
 
WHITE PAPER 

on Outbound Investments 

1. 

INTRODUCTION: WHY A WHITE PAPER ON OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS? ......................... 2 

2.  STATE OF PLAY AND INITIAL FINDINGS ............................................................................. 4 

3.  PROPOSED NEXT STEPS: REVIEW OF CERTAIN OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS ....................... 5 

3.1.  Proposed monitoring / review of outbound investments in specific technologies ...... 6 

3.2.  Risk assessment by Member States ........................................................................... 10 

3.3.  Reporting to the Commission and other Member States........................................... 10 

3.4. 

Joint assessment and debate ...................................................................................... 11 

3.5.  Review  of  dual-use  export  license  applications  in  the  context  of  outbound 
investments, consultation among Member States and information to the Commission ...... 11 

4.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 12 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION: WHY A WHITE PAPER ON OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS? 

The  Joint  Communication  on  a  European  Economic  Security  Strategy  adopted  on  20  June 
20231 (‘the Joint Communication’) recognises the importance of open global markets for the 
success  and  economic  security  of  the  European  Union  in  terms  of  both  resilience  and 
competitiveness. It confirms that “our economies thrive on open and rules-based trade and 
investment,  on  secure  cross-border  connectivity  and  collaboration  on  research  and 
innovation”.  At  the  same  time,  it  recognises  that  potential  security  risks  could  arise  when 
sensitive technologies and investments leave the EU in a way that can threaten international 
peace and security. In particular, it refers to the risks of technology and know-how leakage 
as  a  result  of  outbound  investments  (i.e.,  investments  made  by  EU  companies  in  third 
countries) in a narrow set of advanced technologies that could enhance military and intelligence 
capacities of actors who may use these capabilities to threaten international peace and security. 

The EU already restricts the export of dual-use technologies. However, there are growing 
concerns that some sensitive technologies and know-how could end up in the wrong hands as 
a  result  of  outbound  investment  transactions  that  are  not  currently  subject  to  control 
mechanisms. For instance, this could happen if cutting edge EU technology reaches countries 
where  the  boundaries  between  civil  and  military  activities  are  blurred.  Such  technology  or 
know-how could be used to strengthen their military and intelligence capabilities that in turn 
could  threaten  our  common  EU  security.  Certain  outbound  investments  can  be  seen  as 
a“reverse side” of dual-use export transactions. 

A similar link exists between outbound investment and inbound foreign direct investment 
(FDI).  The  EU  already  has  a  framework  to  screen  inbound  FDI,  notably,  in  sensitive 
technologies. While an inbound investment into EU companies holding sensitive technologies 
by  risky  investors  could  be  restricted  or  prohibited  by  measures  imposed  under  an  FDI 
screening regime, there is a potential risk that the targeted EU companies could make those 
technologies available to the same investors by means of outbound investments. However, such 
outbound investments are currently not even subject to monitoring. This could undermine the 
effectiveness  of  our  existing  controls  and,  hence,  security  of  the  EU  as  a  whole  and  of 
individual Member States. 

Such growing concerns underline the need to look at this issue closely to understand: 

1.  What kind of investments in certain critical technologies are made from the EU; 
2.  Whether such investments may effectively put EU or Member State security at risk; 

and, if so, 

3.  To what extent such risks can be mitigated by existing tools or would justify additional 

proportionate policy action at EU or national level. 

1  

Joint  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament,  the  European  Council  and  the  Council  an  “European 
Economic Security Strategy”, Brussels, 20.6.2023, JOIN(2023) 20 final. 

2 

 
 
 
From a geostrategic perspective, the EU is not the first to consider a policy initiative in this 
area.  Some  countries  already  control  outbound  investments,  such  as  Japan2  or  China3. 
Others, like the United States4, are developing a framework to do so.  

Developing an EU response to concerns regarding outbound investments presents a number of 
challenges: (i) determine the scope of potential concerns, (ii) understand the extent and nature 
of EU outbound investments by collecting relevant data and evidence, and (iii) assess whether 
such investments create or aggravate clearly identifiable risks to security. In a second step, the 
EU and its Member States should assess the need for proportionate and targeted responses to 
mitigate identified risks either through existing tools or new mitigating action at national and / 
or EU level.  

A comprehensive assessment requires a good understanding of outbound investments by EU 
investors and of the technology and know-how that may be transferred in the context of such 
transactions.  It  also  requires  an  in-depth  understanding  of  security  risks  related  to  such 
outbound investments in order to assess potential gaps in existing trade and investment security 
tools.  

The  present  White  Paper  describes  the  state  of  play  of  the  EU’s  initial  work  on  outbound 
investment. It outlines a way forward to understanding and addressing current challenges with 
a uniform and effective EU approach. Its aim is to invite comments and input from interested 
stakeholders  in  order  to  help  the  Commission  define  the  scope  of  a  future  Commission 
Recommendation on outbound investment in close cooperation with Member States. The High 
Representative / Vice-President (HRVP) may provide his input, where appropriate, in relation 
to possible issues concerning common foreign and security policy. This White Paper will help 
the Commission to understand the views and concerns of stakeholders and of the European 
Parliament while keeping in step with the ongoing reflections and analyses within the EU5 and 
Member States on the issue of outbound investment and economic security in general. 

2   Pursuant to certain conditions established by the “Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (Act No. 228 of 
1949)”.  The  Japanese  outbound  investment  controls  apply  to  investments  in  very  few  sectors:  fisheries, 
leather and leather products, weapons and weapons equipment manufacturing, and narcotic drugs. 

3  

In China, existing legislation includes the “Administrative Measures for Overseas Investment by Enterprises, 
by  the  National  Development  and  Reform  Commission  (2017,  No.  11)”,  the  “State  Council  Guidance  on 
Overseas  Investments  (2017,  No.  74)”,  which  identifies  encouraged,  restricted  and  prohibited  outbound 
investments,  and  the  “Catalogue  of  Sensitive  Industries  for  Overseas  Investments,  by  the  National 
Development and Reform Commission (2018, No. 251)” which lays out the sensitive industry sectors for 
overseas  investments.  These  include  weapons  and  related  equipment,  water  resources,  news  media,  real 
estate, hotel, cinema, entertainment industry, sports clubs and certain equity investment funds. We understand 
that the  various Chinese licensing and registration requirements related to outbound investments not only 
serve  the  interests  of  national  security  and  foreign  trade  control,  but  also  the  broader  “national  interest”. 
China also restricts foreign currency exports under the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. Thus, it 
appears that the Chinese outbound investment controls cover a wide set of economic sectors and a substantive 
test that goes potentially beyond a pure security assessment. 

4  Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, Advance notice of proposed rulemaking of 14 August 2023. 

5  

Including the separate, but to some extent related, risk assessment on the four prioritised critical technologies 
following the Commission Recommendation C(2023) 6689 final of 3 October 2023 on critical technology 
areas for the EU's economic security for further risk assessment with Member States. 

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2.  STATE OF PLAY AND INITIAL FINDINGS 

Ahead of the Joint Communication, the Commission launched a debate on this issue with FDI 
screening and dual-use export control authorities of Member States in the spring of 2023. To 
feed this debate, the Commission has been gathering data on outbound investments by EU 
companies.  In  the  period  from  2013  to  2022,  there  have  been  around  12.800  Merger  and 
Acquisitions transactions by EU companies in third countries corresponding to roughly EUR 
1.4 trillion and 26.000 Venture Capital investment transactions with an overall value of  EUR 
408  million.6  For  both  categories  of  outbound  investsment  transactions,  the  top  two 
destinations where the USA and the United Kingdom, which represented at least half the deals 
and approximately 70 % of the capital. Beyond these high-level information, the Commission 
has  found  some  significant  limitations  in  the  available  data,  such  as  further  details  on  the 
transactions, monetary amounts, deal characteristics, technologies involved. 

On  the  one  hand,  official  sources  (e.g.,  FDI  data  from  national  accounts)  lack  updated  and 
detailed data on the sector or technology related to individual investment transactions, making 
it challenging to identify those outbound investments in a narrow set of critical technologies 
where  potential  risks  might  arise.  On  the  other  hand,  official  statistics  as  well  as  available 
commercial  data  sources,  classify  companies  and  transactions  according  to  official 
classification systems. These mostly describe areas of already developed technologies, but do 
not provide information on specific advanced technologies or new economic activities, such as 
artificial intelligence.  

Last July, the Commission set up an Expert Group on Outbound Investment (‘the Expert 
Group’),  aimed  at  drawing  in  knowledge  and  experience  from  Member  States  in  order  to 
examine  potential  security  risks,  gaps,  and,  if  needed,  possible  policy  actions.7  The  Expert 
Group brings together Member States’ experts from dual-use export controls, FDI screening, 
trade and foreign affairs departments. It has already met three times in 2023.  

By now, it has become clear that before analysing any possible risks, there needs to be a clear 
understanding on the scope of the exercise – effectively, “which outbound investments should 
be considered to identify risks for our common EU security” – and that concrete granular data 
at  national  level  on  relevant  outbound  investment  transactions  and,  possibly,  on  related 
activities is needed, but is currently missing. This lack of data shows  a need to build a 
shared  view  on  the  scope  of  the  issue,  as  regards  the  scope  of  transactions  and  activities 
leading to risks, the technologies potentially concerned and on whether the focus should be on 
specific countries. 

6   Source: Pitchbook data extracted in July 2023. Notes: (1) the data cover only M&A deals and VC investments, 
as greenfield investments are not included in the consulted commercial database(s); (2) the monteray amount 
for M&A deals is incomplete as values were only available for half of the deals; and (3) VC transactions are 
counted where at least one EU investor was involved, but it could be part of a group of non-EU investors and 
the total amount invested is the one reported, without further identification of the amount(s) of the relevant 
EU investments.  

7   Register of Commission expert groups and other similar entities (europa.eu).  

4 

 
 
 
The ongoing work with  Member States in the Expert  Group has led the Commission to the 
following initial findings: 

1.  There  is  a  substantial  knowledge  gap  and  a  very  limited  picture  of  the  outbound 
investments made by EU investors. Some public authorities are gathering information 
at national level (e.g., central banks or national statistical offices8). This information is, 
however, neither sufficiently granular, nor targeted enough to provide the relevant facts 
to establish whether any security risks can arise from these investments and to allow 
Member States and the Commission to carry out a proper assessment of such risks. 

2.  Member States do not systematically review and assess outbound investments for 
security purposes. Several Member States acknowledge the possibility that, as a result, 
some risks are being overlooked. 

3.  The  matter  is  both  sensitive  and  complex.  While  potential  risks  stemming  from 
certain outbound investments have a broader geopolitical dimension, it is important to 
recognise that EU outbound investments are a valuable and legitimate part of economic 
activity  in  a  global  market  place.  Therefore,  any  potential  policy  action  concerning 
outbound  investments  may  come  with  positive  and  negative  implications  for  EU 
businesses.  

4.  There is consensus among Member States and the Commission that, should any risk be 
identified,  policy  action  should  be  effective,  proportionate,  targeted,  and 
enforceable by administrations.  

5.  Before designing any new policy responses, we need to make full use of existing 
instruments  first.  In  case  policy  action  will  be  deemed  necessary  to  respond  to 
identified risks, the Commission and Member States should try, to the extent legally 
possible, to address any risks from outbound investments through existing instruments, 
such as dual-use export controls or FDI screening mechanisms, either by enhancing the 
use of these instruments or by amending them to cater for new risks.  

3.  PROPOSED NEXT STEPS: REVIEW OF CERTAIN OUTBOUND INVESTMENTS 

This is a complex matter which deserves a gradual step-by-step approach:  

- 

- 

first, a public consultation stage: launched by the publication of this White Paper and a 
questionnaire; 
second,  a  monitoring  stage:  the  Commission  will  draw  on  the  the  results  of  the 
upcoming  public  consultation  and  the  reactions  to  this  White  Paper  to  draft  a 

8   Some  legislation  allows  Member  States  to  (partially)  monitor  outbound  investment  transactions,  like 
balance of payment statistics gathered by Central Banks, national registries aimed at monitoring outbound 
investments for statistical purposes and similar legislation, e.g., Spain’s national regime established by Royal 
Decree 1265/1986 of 27 June 1986, Chapter VI, updated with Royal Decree 664/1999 of 23 April 1999 and 
with  Royal  Decree  571/2023  of  4  July  2023.  Further  information  may  be  gathered  through  official 
investment  guarantee  schemes,  e.g.,  the  investment  guarantee  schemes  of  Germany  and  Austria.  In 
Germany this is managed by PwC on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 
while in Austria it is managed by a bank (OeKB) on behalf of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Some national 
mechanisms  enable  Member  States  to  control  very  specific  instances  of  outbound  investments  for 
security purposes (e.g., Italy’s Golden Power regime, pursuant to Law Decree No. 21/2012, which contains 
some provisions allowing the screening of limited types of outbound investments). 

5 

 
 
 
- 

Recommendation  to  Member  States  to  monitor/review  certain  outbound  investment 
transactions involving a set of sensitive technologies over a certain period of time; 
third, a risk assessment stage: on the basis of the results of this analysis and monitoring, 
the Member States and the Commission will be in a better position to draw conclusions 
regarding the risks linked to such outbound investment transactions for our common 
EU security. 

The results of that assessment and possible proposals to mitigate any identified risks will be set 
out in a further Communication and, as necessary, any appropriate proposals. 

3.1. 

Proposed  monitoring 
technologies 

/  review  of  outbound 

investments 

in  specific 

Based on the initial findings from the work undertaken with the Expert Group, the Commission 
invites  comments  on  the  aspects  set  out  below  that  will  be  addressed  in  the  proposed 
Commission recommendation on monitoring. 

Scope of monitoring 

1.  Regarding  the  type  of  outbound  investment  transactions  to  be  monitored,  the 
Commission  considers  that  the  monitoring  should  cover  a  wide  range  of 
transactions,  including  all  kinds  of  active  investments,  while  excluding  portfolio 
investments, i.e. non-direct foreign investment with the purpose of making a financial 
investment  without  any  intention  to  influence  the  management  and  control  of  an 
undertaking, as set out in the box below. 

Member States should monitor investments of any kind by natural or legal persons resident 
or established in the EU (‘EU investors’) aimed at carrying out an economic activity outside 
the EU. Such investments should include: 

•  the  acquisition  of  a  company  or  a  stake  in  a  company  that  enables  an  effective 

participation in the management or control of the company (‘acquisition’), 

•  the absorption by one company of one or more other companies or the combination 

of two or more companies to form a new company (‘merger’), 

•  the transfer of tangible or intangible assets, including intellectual property or specific 
know-how  and  technology  process,  necessary  for  establishing  or  maintaining  an 
economic activity (‘asset transfer’), 

•  the first-time establishment of a business, including the creation of a subsidiary, a 

branch or similar ventures (‘greenfield investment’), 

•  the establishment of a venture to combine resources to achieve a joint entrepreneurial 

goal with another person (‘joint venture’), and 

•  the provision of capital to develop a sensitive technology, linked to certain intangible 
benefits like managerial assistance, access to investment and talent networks, market 
access and enhanced access to additional financing (‘venture capital’). 

The monitoring should also cover other (indirect) investments made by an EU investor, such 
as investments made through a third-country entity which is used as an investment vehicle, 
through an existing subsidiary or in the context of an existing joint venture. This includes 
the  gradual  transfer  of  assets  over  time,  investments  in  third  countries  that  result  from 
previous investments and investments aimed at circumventing existing security-related trade 
and investment controls. The monitoring should exclude portfolio investments. 

6 

 
 
 
Further on the scope, the Commission invites comments also on risk-based priorities 
that  might  be  established  within  the  monitoring,  such  as  those  routinely  used  by 
Member  States’  export  control  authorities  in  their  assessments  of  dual-use  export 
licence  applications.  This  could  include  prioritising  monitoring  on  the  basis  of  the 
profile of the end user and its country of establishment. 

2.  In addition, in light of the input received from the Expert Group, there are concerns that 
limiting any assessment just to the type of  activities covered in point 1 above may not 
capture potentially risky activity linked to or preparatory to such outbound investments. 
The Commission therefore also invites comments on whether it should recommend that 
Member  States  may  also  decide  to  monitor  other  critical  activities  (‘optional 
monitoring’),  such  as  research  and  development  cooperation,  or  practices  used  to 
attract  highly  specialised  personnel  in  order  to  benefit  from  their  know-how  and 
experience in certain sensitive areas, or to get access to intellectual property, as set out 
in the box below. 

Member States could consider monitoring the following activities, which may also lead to a 
risk of the leakage of sensitive technology or know-how: 

•  Research cooperation, which is to be understood as cooperation between an entity 
established  in  the  EU  and  an  entity  established  in  a  third  country  related  to  the 
transfer of tangible or intangible assets in the four critical technology areas as set out 
in section 3 below, including intellectual property and know-how. This could include 
cooperation between entities such as research and academic institutions, or between 
these institutions and private or public sector entities.This optional monitoring is to 
be  seen  in  light  of  existing  or  upcoming  Member  States’  efforts  to  develop  an 
approach for enhancing research security, also in line with the Proposal for a Council 
Recommendation on enhancing research security adopted by the Commission on 24 
January 2024.9 

•  Mobility and transfer of highly specialised personnel, including specialists in the 
four critical technology areas, or business executives with significant experience in 
the four critical technology areas. 

3.  Regarding the technology areas in which investments should be monitored, comments 
are  invited  on  whether  monitoring  should  initially  focus  on  the  most  sensitive 
technology  and  know-how.  This  could,  for  example,  cover  four  technology  areas:  
technologies  and 
advanced  semiconductors,  artificial 
biotechnologies.  These  represent  technology  areas  identified  by  the  Commission  as 
“highly  likely  to  present  the  most  sensitive  and  immediate  risks  related  to 
technology security and technology leakage” in the Commission Recommendation 
on critical technology areas for the EU's economic security for further risk assessment 
with  Member  States  of  3  October  202310.  Under  that  Recommendation,  a  risk 
assessment on these technology areas is currently being undertaken by the Commission 

intelligence,  quantum 

9   Proposal for a Council Recommendation on enhancing research security COM(2024) 26 of 24.1.2024. 

10   C(2023) 6689 final. 

7 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and Member States. It is of a broader nature covering a range of risks linked to these 
particular  technologies.  It  includes  an  initial  view  on  the  potential  for  technology 
leakage linked to outbound investments. The outcome could be used as an input for the 
more in-depth assessment of risks related to outbound investments to be performed by 
Member  States  and  the  Commission  on  the  basis  of  the  proposed  monitoring.  The 
results of this on-going assessment of critical technologies as well as reactions to this 
White  Paper  could,  for  example,  confirm  or  lead  to  changes  in  the  scope  of  the 
technologies that the Commission may recommend Member States to monitor.  

4.  With regard to the geographical coverage, the work of the Expert Group suggests that 
both the Commission and the Member States share the view that monitoring should not 
a  priori  exclude  specific  destinations.  Nevertheless,  in  light  of  the  high  number  of 
countries  and  existing  resource  constraints,  the  Commission  is  of  the  opinion,  that 
Member  States  should  best  prioritise  their  monitoring  activities  based  on  their 
assessment  of  the  risk  profiles  of  certain  countries.  The  risk  assessment  should 
include the past  behaviour of the country concerned, including  violations of the UN 
Charter. This risk profile should also assess the possibility of technologies or items to 
be  used  in  war  or  conflict  situations,  for  breaches  of  human  rights  or  to  enable  the 
proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  in  full  respect  of  the  obligations  and 
commitments  taken  by  Member  States  or  the  EU  as  members  of  international  non-
proliferation agreements and multilateral export control regimes. 

Time Period covered and Information to be collected 

5.  With regard to the time period covered, in order to develop a sufficient basis to identify 
and assess the level of outbound activity and associated risks within a reasonable period 
of  time,  the  Commission  considers  that  the  monitoring  should  cover  both  new  and 
ongoing transactions and certain past transactions. This should involve Member States 
assessing transactions in the selected technology areas  completed since 1 January 
2019. Comments are also invited on this suggested time period. 

6.  With regard to information to be gathered, the proposed monitoring should provide 
Member States and the Commission with the necessary data and information in 
order  to  assess  risks  linked  to  outbound  investments  in  the  selected  technology 
areas. This data and information should be shared with other Member States and the 
Commission  through  the  Expert  Group.  The  Commission  invites  comments  on  the 
information to be gathered as set out in the box below. 

The monitoring should enable Member States to gather all necessary information for the risk 
assessment, including as minimum: 

• 

• 
• 

• 

Information on the parties to the investment transaction, including the full place of 
incorporation of legal  persons and (based on the best  information  available to  the 
Member State) the ultimate owner(s) of any parties involved in the transaction, 
the type and approximate value of the investment, 
the  products,  services  and  business  operations  related  to  critical  technologies 
concerned by the investment, 
the date on which the investment is planned to be completed or has been completed, 

8 

 
 
 
 
•  based  on  the  best  information  available  to  the  Member  State,  information  about 
previous and planned or contemplated future transactions entered into by the parties 
to the investment transaction. 

Regarding  other  related  activities,  that  could  be  subject  to  the  optional  monitoring,  this 
information could at a minimum include: 

• 

information on the persons involved in the activity, including the full name, address 
and nationality of natural persons or the registered address and place of incorporation 
of legal persons, 

•  based on the best information available to the Member State, an exact description of 

• 
• 

the activity, 
the critical technologies concerned by the activity, 
the  date  on  which  the  activity  has  commenced,  is  foreseen  to  commence,  or  has 
ended, 

•  based  on  the  best  information  available  to  the  Member  State,  information  about 
previous  and  planned  or  contemplated  future  activities  undertaken  by  the  same 
persons involved in a current activity. 

Any data collected should be protected appropriately and, where necessary, classified before 
being shared with other Member States and the Commission. 

Other aspects of monitoring: who is responsible at a national level, what tools should be 
used and how will Member States ensure stakeholder involvement? 

7.  In order to ensure that monitoring work can be taken forward, the Commission is of the 
opinion  that  Member  States  should  designate  an  authority  responsible  for  the 
monitoring and should ensure that the competent national authorities, where possible, 
apply existing instruments, including dual-use export controls, to counter any risks they 
have identified in the monitoring to be recommended. 

8.  Monitoring tools and exchange with stakeholders: for the monitoring process to be 
effective, Member States will need to ensure that they have adequate monitoring tools 
and sources of information, and if this is not the case, they should consider adapting 
existing  tools  or  put  new  ones  in  place  for  the  purpose  of  the  proposed  monitoring 
activities set out above. 

Existing monitoring and other tools that could be used or adapted for this purpose 
include  reporting  obligations  to  central  banks  or  national  statistical  offices  and 
similar  institutions  for  statistical  and  balance  of  payment  purposes,  notification 
requirements to national export control authorities for the export, brokering, technical 
assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items as well as any investment transactions. 
Member States should also consider official investment guarantee schemes or official 
export  credits  schemes  as  a  source  of  relevant  data.  Any  data  collected  should  be 
protected appropriately and, if appropriate, classified before being  shared with  other 
Member States and the Commission.  

Comments are invited on the tools that might be needed for effective monitoring, their 
feasibility  and the balance to  be struck in  terms of  the burden that such information 
collection may represent and the need to ensure a sufficient basis to monitor and assess 

9 

 
 
 
 
 
outbound  activity  and  risks  in  the  sectors  selected.  In  addition,  the  Commission 
considers  it  will  be  important  for  Member  States  to  consult  relevant  stakeholders, 
including business, academia and civil society as part of their monitoring activity. 

3.2.  Risk assessment by Member States 

Drawing on the results of the proposed monitoring, the Commission considers that Member 
States should perform the following initial risk assessment to identify either the presence or the 
absence of risks to security. The assessment should be based on the information gathered by 
monitoring  outbound  investments,  and  possible  additional  activities  that  they  choose  to 
monitor, as specified above.  

To structure the risk assessment, the Commission believes that the following elements could 
guide the assessment by Member States.  

•  The assessment should be as comprehensive as possible. Work should give priority to 
those transactions or activities which would present a risk for the security of the EU as 
a whole and it should also try to assess the degree of likelihood that any negative impact 
materialises.  

•  The assessment should identify elements of risks and potential vulnerabilities such as 

the main types of threats and threat actors and any relevant geopolitical factors.  

•  The assessment should take into account, inter alia, the context of the transaction, the 
value chain and supply chain of the technology involved, the evolution of risks as well 
as  relevant  technological  developments,  and  the  global  interconnectivity  of  the 
ecosystem of the critical technology concerned, including research activities. 

•  Member  States  could  consider  following  similar  methodologies  to  those  used  in 
reviewing  dual-use  export  licence  applications  and  for  screening  foreign  direct 
investment transactions. 

This risk assessment should enable each Member State to identify and analyse vulnerabilities 
that may have a potential impact on the security of the EU as a whole or on Member States’ 
security, and the likelihood of a related adverse impact materialising. The elements above to 
frame the risk assessment will be further developed in the future Commission Recommendation 
taking into account the ongoing work in the Expert Group with Member States, the results of 
the public consultation and the reactions to this White Paper, with a view to develop a common 
methodology. This will ensure a consistent and EU-wide risk assessment from all the Member 
States. Where possible, Member States and the Commission should look for synergies between 
different assessments of security risks under the framework of the Joint Communication.  

3.3.  Reporting to the Commission and other Member States 

Time  will  be  needed  for  Member  States  to  establish  monitoring  of  new  and  on-going 
transactions and to assess on the basis of available information what has happened since 2019.  
The Commission therefore proposes that Member States conduct this monitoring within a 12 
month-period from the adoption of a Commission Recommendation. This period, combined 
with  the  initial  consultation  stage  up  to  summer  2024,  should  allow  them  to  put  such  a 
monitoring system in place and carry out their initial assessment. During this time, Member 
States  and  the  Commission  would  continue  exchanging  information  and  views  in  the 

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framework of the Expert Group to ensure that, to the extent feasible, the monitoring and risk 
assessment follow a common methodology. 

Member States should report to the Commission and other Member States on the outcome of 
the  monitoring  and  the  outcome  of  their  analysis  and  risk  assessment.  If  risks  related  to  a 
combination of certain factors or patterns that characterise any types of outbound investments 
likely to affect EU or Member States’ security are identified, Member States should provide 
the Commission with the combinations of risk factors and describe these patterns.  

3.4. 

Joint assessment and debate  

The  Commission  proposes  that  the  outcome  of  the  monitoring  and  risk  assessment  to  be 
undertaken  by  Member  States  is  to  be  shared  with  the  Commission  and  the  other  Member 
States, in accordance with the appropriate classification level. Based on the shared input, the 
Expert Group would discuss the outcome of the monitoring and risk assessment with a 
view to consolidate the overall results and help the Commission prepare a final comprehensive 
risk assessment and ensure a shared understanding of risks. Other stakeholdrs may be also 
consulted at this stage, as appropriate. 

This  will  be  a  useful  reference  point  for  any  debate  on  further  policy  choices  and  the 
possible need for mitigating measures or other policy responses.  

3.5.  Review  of  dual-use  export  license  applications  in  the  context  of  outbound 
investments,  consultation  among  Member  States  and  information  to  the 
Commission 

In  parallel  to  the  proposed  monitoring  and  review,  in  light  of  the  close  links  explained  in 
Section 1 above between dual-use export controls and outbound investments, the Commission 
is of the opinion that Member States, when reviewing licence applications for exports of dual-
use  items,  should  pay  particular  attention  where  such  applications  are  linked  to  outbound 
investments,  and  any  risks  these  may  present.  This  could  offer  useful  insights  for  the 
monitoring work.  

Since priority should be given to the use of existing instruments, the Commission considers 
that  Member  States  should  in  such  cases  give  particular  consideration  to  applying  existing 
instruments  to  address  potential  concerns  when  relevant,  including  “catch-all”11  export 
controls,  to  mitigate  the  risks  of  such  technology  contributing  to  destabilising  military 
application, proliferation of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or human rights violation, 
that could create a threat to international and regional peace and security.  

To  the  extent  legally  possible,  the  Commission  invites  Member  States’  export  control 
authorities to consider consulting with other Member States and informing the Commission, 
when reviewing dual-use export licence applications in the context of outbound investments in 

11   “Catch-all” controls are generally understood to be controls that are applied by Member States to items that 
are not listed in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2021/821 (the “Dual-Use Regulation”), the so called ‘EU control 
list’, so the controls apply to items that have not yet been agreed under the multilateral control regimes. Most 
notably, Article 4 of the Dual-Use Regulation requires exporters to seek an export authorisation if they are 
informed by the competent Member State authority that an item that they export may be intended for one of 
certain sensitive end-uses detailed in Article 4. Such information generally takes the form of a non-public 
individual notification to the relevant exporter.  

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the four critical technology areas, which are likely to have an impact on the security of other 
Member States. This consultation could be done informally and modelled on the cooperation 
mechanism  established  for  foreign  direct  investment  screening  under  Regulation  (EU) 
2019/452. 

Within the same deadline as the monitoring exercise, the Commission proposes that Member 
States report to the Commission and to other Member States on the implementation of export 
controls in this context, including on the number and content of licence applications received 
for  exports  taking  place  specifically  in  the  context  of  an  outbound  investment.  During  this 
period, Member States and the Commission will continue exchanging information and views 
on these matters in the framework of the Expert Group. 

4.  CONCLUSION 

This White Paper maps out the first policy initiative, which the Commission takes in the field 
of  outbound  investments.  Recognising  its  complex  and  sensitive  nature,  the  Commission 
proposes a gradual approach, working closely with the Member States’ authorities through the 
Expert Group on Outbound Investment  

In  order  to  structure  responses  to  the  ideas  set  out  in  this  White  Paper,  the  Commission  is 
launching a public consultation based on a detailed questionnaire that stakeholders, including 
business, academia and civil society are invited to fill out.  

It will only be possible to design adequate responses to protect the security of the EU and 
its Member States on the basis of comprehensive assessments. In shaping such responses, 
priority should be given to making full use of existing instruments rather than establishing new 
ones.  Any  responses  should  be  proportionate,  precisely  targeted  and  enforceable  to 
address  the  risks  identified  for  each  type  of  outbound  investment  or  activity  and  critical 
technology area.  

Work in the Expert Group on Outbound investment will continue in 2024 together with the 
consultation  of  stakeholders.  The  Commission  will  also  seek  the  views  of  the  European 
Parliament and like-minded partner countries.  

Timewise, the next steps are therefore the following: 

•  January 2024: adoption of the White Paper on outbound investments; 
•  January – April 2024: public consultation on the proposed monitoring and review of 

certain existing outbound investments and related activities; 

•  Summer  2024: assessment of the results of the consultation and adoption of a 

Commission Recommendation to Member States to launch the proposed monitoring 
and review; 

•  Summer 2025: conclusion of the proposed monitoring and review by Member States 

and risk assessments of outbound investment transactions; 

•  Autumn 2025: Assessment by the Commission of the need and possible content of 

policy responses in this field. 

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