Fighting fraudulent and deceptive practices in the agri-food chain : technical report implementation of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625.
Date: 2023-12-15
Institutions: Joint Research Centre
Subjects: EU control, agri-foodstuffs, consumer protection, food fraud, foodstuff, fraud, regulation (EU), research report, supply, supply chain

ISSN 1831-9424 

Fighting fraudulent and deceptive 
practices in the agri-food chain 

Technical Report Implementation 
of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 
2017/625  

Winkler, B., Maquet, A., Reeves-Way, E. Siegener, E., 
Cassidy, T., Valinhas de Oliveira, T., Verluyten, J., Jelic, 
M., Muznik, A. 

2023 

EUR 31436 EN 

 
 
 
This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science and knowledge service. It 
aims  to  provide  evidence-based  scientific  support  to  the  European  policymaking  process.  The  contents  of  this  publication  do  not 
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authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 

Contact information  
Name: Bernd Winkler 
Address: European Commission. Grange, Dunsany, County Meath, Ireland  
Email: bernd.winkler@ec.europa.eu 

EU Science Hub 
https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu 

JRC131525 

EUR 31436 EN 

PDF 

ISBN 978-92-68-00336-7 

ISSN 1831-9424 

doi:10.2760/31366  KJ-NA-31-436-EN-N 

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023 

© European Union, 2023 

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How  to  cite  this  report:  Winkler,  B.,  Maquet,  A.,  Reeves-Way,  E.  Siegener,  E.,  Cassidy,  T.,  Valinhas  de  Oliveira,  T.,  Verluyten,  J.,  Jelic,  M., 
Muznik,  A.,  Fighting  fraudulent  and  deceptive  practices  in  the  agri-food  chain.  Technical  Report  “Implementation  of  Article  9(2)  of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625”,  Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2023, doi:10.2760/31366, JRC131525 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 

Abstract ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 

1 

Introduction..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

1.1  Policy context .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 

1.2  Methodology..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 

2 

Introduction to fraud in the agri-food chain ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 

2.1  The scope of Article 9(2) of Regulation 2017/625 ..................................................................................................................................... 5 

2.2  Approaching fraud in the agri-food chain ........................................................................................................................................................... 6 

2.3  Article 9(2) – A proactive, structured and targeted approach .......................................................................................................... 8 

3  Key elements of control arrangements for the implementation of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625

9 

3.1  Cooperation ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 

3.2  Risk-based planning .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 

3.2.1 

Understanding fraud .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 

3.2.2 

Key considerations ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 10 

3.2.3 

Data and information: sources and use ........................................................................................................................................... 11 

3.3  Performance of Article 9(2) official controls ................................................................................................................................................. 14 

3.4  Follow-up of fraud suspicion and investigations ....................................................................................................................................... 15 

3.4.1 

Exchange of information between Member States ............................................................................................................... 15 

3.4.2 

Investigations ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15 

3.5  Training and skills .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 

3.6  Marketing Standard Controls vs Food Safety Controls ........................................................................................................................ 16 

3.7  Awareness raising .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 17 

References ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 18 

Annexes .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 19 

Annex 1 Fraud categories .............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 19 

Annex 2 Factors contributing to fraud in the agri-food chain ............................................................................................................................. 20 

Annex 3 Key steps and elements of a vulnerability assessment ..................................................................................................................... 22 

Annex 4 Key elements of a vulnerability assessment ................................................................................................................................................ 23 

Annex 5 Key questions to be considered for the vulnerability assessment ........................................................................................... 24 

Annex 6 Target objects .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 26 

Annex 7 Control methods and techniques to be considered for Article 9(2) official controls .............................................. 28 

Annex 8 Examples of intentional violations perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices ........................... 29 

Supplement ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 

i 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract  

This  Technical  Report  presents  challenges,  opportunities  and  good  practice  examples  in  relation  to  the 
implementation of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625.  

Competent authorities of the Member States are required to not only detect violations of the rules governing 
the  agri-food  chain  but  also  to  identify  possible  intentional  violations  of  those  rules,  perpetrated  through 
fraudulent or deceptive practices by operators for the purpose of gaining an undue advantage.  

The purpose of this technical report therefore is to promote the uniform interpretation and application of the 
provisions of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625. 

1 

 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements  

This  report  has  been  developed  in  the  context  of  a  project  of  the  Directorate  Health  and  Food  Audits  and 
Analysis of the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety. It was carried out between 2020 and 2022 in 
cooperation with the Joint Research Centre and the involvement of experts from other Commission services 
and Member State authorities. The authors would like to thank all the stakeholders for their time and valuable 
input. 

Authors 

Winkler, B., Maquet, A., Reeves-Way, E. Siegener, E., Cassidy, T., Valinhas de Oliveira, T., Verluyten, J., Jelic, M., 
Muznik, A.  

2 

 
 
1 

Introduction  

Fraudulent and deceptive practices along the agri-food chain cost European Union (EU) businesses billions of 
euro every year. However, the impact of such practices goes beyond economic losses. Agri-food chain fraud 
can pose a threat to public health, food quality, and reputation, resulting in a loss of consumer, business and 
trading  partner  confidence in the sectors affected and in  the official control  systems.  Such trust  deficit can 
also lead to an economic deficit, not least through less tax revenue and trade. Therefore, it requires effective 
mechanisms  to  identify  fraudulent  and  deceptive  practices  and  take  appropriate  enforcement  measures. 
Competent  authorities  and  control  staff  need  to  be  aware  of  fraud  risks  and  seek  to  distinguish  between 
intentional violations of the agri-food chain rules perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices and 
other non-compliances. They also need to actively incorporate these aspects into their risk-based controls.  

The EU has recognised the importance of tackling fraudulent and deceptive practices in the agri-food chain. In 
2017, it legislated for regular risk-based controls, with appropriate frequencies, to identify possible intentional 
violations of the agri-food chain rules  perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive  practices (Article  9(2) of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625 of the European Parliament and of the Council).  

This technical report aims to help create a common understanding of the different types of fraud that exist 
and key elements for identifying and tackling fraud when carrying out official controls. It also discusses the 
challenges  faced  by  Member  States  and  provides  examples  to  help  overcome  them.  Such  challenges  stem 
from the very nature of fraud and how it is framed in the national legal context. Fraud is deliberately covert 
and often requires a specific skill set to detect. If remained uncovered there is a high risk that the fraudulent 
practices will be repeated. When a fraudulent or deceptive practice is detected, it may have to be prosecuted 
under  criminal  law,  which  is  not  necessarily  within  the  remit  of  the  competent  authorities  responsible  for 
official controls to ensure compliance with the rules referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 – 
also known as the EU Official Controls Regulation (OCR). 

Competent authorities need to identify possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities of control systems and control 
areas, just as the fraudsters do, and plan their controls according to a suitable risk assessment. This technical 
report  provides  practical  help  on  how  to  set  up  a  system  that  achieves  the  objective  of  Article  9(2)  of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625 

1.1  Policy context  

In 2019, the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions on how to better tackle and deter fraud in 
the agri-food chain and noted that: 

“Fraudulent  practices  in  the  agri-food  chain  (food  fraud)  often  leads  to  public  health  risks  and/or  financial 
losses to consumers and/or operators. It may also result in loss of confidence in the competent authorities and 
in  the  agri-food  chain  in  general.  As  a  consequence,  food  fraud  threatens  food  safety  and  the  effective 
functioning  of  the  internal  market  and  has  the  potential  to  have  significant  impacts  on  public  health, 
consumer  protection  and  legitimate  trade.  The  cost  of  fraudulent  practices  for  the  global  food  industry  has 
been estimated at around EUR 30 billion every year.” 

The  Council  also  recognised  that  the  current  legal  framework  at  EU  level  is,  in  general,  adequate  to  tackle 
food fraud and stressed, in particular, the importance of the new requirements in tackling food fraud in the 
veterinary and food safety field provided by Regulation (EU) 2017/625. Article 9(2) of this Regulation is at the 
heart of these new tools. It requires that: 

“The competent authorities shall perform official controls regularly, with appropriate frequencies determined 
on  a  risk  basis,  to  identify  possible  intentional  violations  of  the  rules  referred  to  in  Article  1(2),  perpetrated 
through  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practices,  and  taking  into  account  information  regarding  such  violations 
shared  through  the  mechanisms  of  administrative  assistance  provided  for  in  Articles  102  to  108  and  any 
other information pointing to the possibility of such violations.” 

1.2  Methodology 

In 2020 the Commission carried out a desk-study based on an online questionnaire (Supplement 1). About 63 
competent  authorities  from  21  Member  States  and  Norway  answered  the  questionnaire.  The  result  of  this 
desk study indicated that most Member States had not yet fully implemented risk-based controls to identify 
fraudulent  and  deceptive  practices  across  all  control  areas  as  required  by  Article  9(2)  of  Regulation  (EU) 
2017/625. In order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of Article 9(2) the Commission decided 

3 

 
to organise a project to collect information on potential fraud risks identified by Member State authorities and 
control methods to detect fraudulent and deceptive practices in the agri-food chain. 

Between 2020 and 2022 a series of pilot and fact-finding studies of eight Member States were carried out 
with  the  aim  to  identify  good  practice  examples  and  challenges  Member  State  authorities  face  with  the 
implementation  of  fraud  related  controls.  The  results  of  these  fact-finding  studies  form  the  basis  of  this 
report.  

The reports of the six fact findings studies are published on the following Commission’s website:  

Sweden: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4421 

Latvia: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4432 

Poland: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4461 

Germany: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4511 

Portugal: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4561 

Bulgaria: https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit-report/details/4560 

The methodology of the fact-finding studies is described in section 4.2 of the fact-finding study reports. 

The reports of the two pilot studies (Austria and Ireland) where not published as their purpose was to develop 
the  methodology  for  the  above  mentioned  fact-finding  studies.  However,  the  good  practice  examples 
identified in the context of the meetings with the competent authorities were taken into consideration.  

In  addition,  structured  interviews  were  held  with  experts  from  four  other  Member  States  and  several 
Commission Services (video and telephone conferences) in order to identify potential areas of fraud risk and 
to identify methods to detect fraudulent practices. The aim of the interviews with Member State experts from 
the  national  authorities  was  also  to  get  an  understanding  of  the  national  arrangements  for  fighting 
fraudulent and deceptive practices in the agri-food chain.  

4 

 
2 

Introduction to fraud in the agri-food chain 

2.1  The scope of Article 9(2) of Regulation 2017/625 
EU legislation does not provide a definition of “fraudulent or deceptive practices” or “fraud1” in the agri-food 
chain.  

Regulation  (EU)  2017/625  refers  in  several  provisions2  to  ‘fraudulent  or  deceptive  practices’  but  does  not 
define these. Article 2(21) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1715 provides a definition of 
‘fraud  notification’,  for  the  purpose  of  cooperation  between  Member  States,  exchange  of  information,  in 
particular within the fraud network, and enforcement action, which gives indication of the key elements to be 
considered in relation to fraud: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

“A non-compliance notification in IT Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (iRASFF) concerning  

suspected intentional action by businesses or individuals  

for the purpose of deceiving purchasers and  

gaining undue advantage therefrom, 

in violation of the rules referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625.” 

The definition of ‘fraud notification’ in Article 2(21) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1715 
does not distinguish between ‘fraud’ and ‘deceptive practices’ as it refers to ‘intentional’ action (which is an 
element of fraud) for the purpose of ‘deceiving purchasers and gaining undue advantage’. However, in other 
contexts,  a  distinction  may  be  made  between  ‘fraud’  and  practices  that  while  not  been  considered  ‘fraud’ 
(because  e.g.,  they  lack  the  intentional  element)  are  misleading  or  “deceptive”  for  consumers.  In  relation  to 
this, most of the provisions 3 in Regulation (EU) 2017/625 that refer to ‘fraudulent or deceptive practices’ do 
not mention an intentional element.  

By contrast, Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 refers to the performance of official controls regularly, 
with appropriate frequencies determined on a risk basis, to identify possible intentional violations of the rules 
referred to in Article 1(2), perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices 4.  

It follows that for the purposes of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625, one of the key aspects is that the 
violation perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practise is intentional. In the context of the Directorate-
General  for  Health  and  Food  Safety  fact-finding  study  series  Member  States  mentioned  that  proving 
“intention” is considered to be a challenge for the competent authorities. However, is should be noted that for 
the purposes of Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625, the competent authorities are supposed to perform 
risk-based  controls  that  aim  at  suspected  intentional  action.  Collecting  further  evidence  that  proves  the 
intention  of  the  action  can  be  done  by  specialised  investigators  of  the  most  appropriate  law  enforcement 
authority in cooperation with the prosecutor.  

1 The Oxford Dictionary provides the following definitions for fraud and deception: “Fraud: the crime of cheating somebody in order to get 

money or goods illegally“ and “Deception: the act of deliberately making somebody believe something that is not true”. 

2 Articles 1(4)(a), 9(2), 16(2)(e), 65(4), 73(2)(a), 97(1), 98, 102(4)(b), 121(h) and 139(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625.  
3Article  1(4)(a)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625  refers  to  checks  that  identify  possible  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practices  in  respect  of  the 
marketing standards referred to in Articles 73 to 91 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013; Articles 97(1) refers to the designation of 
European Union reference centres for the authenticity and integrity of the agri-food chain to prevent, detect and combat violations 
of  the  rules  referred  to  in  Article  1(2)  perpetrated  through  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practices;  Article  98  refers  to  methods  for 
detecting violations of the rules referred to in Article 1(2) perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices, to specific analyses 
designed to identify the segments of the agri-food chain that are potentially subject to violations of the rules referred to in Article 
1(2) perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices and to collections or databases of authenticated reference materials, to 
be  used  to  detect  violations of  the rules  referred  to  in Article  1(2)  of  this  Regulation perpetrated  through  fraudulent or  deceptive 
practices; ; Article 102(4)(b) establishes the obligation of Member States to  take measures to facilitate the transmission, from other 
law  enforcement  authorities,  public  prosecutors  and  judicial  authorities,  to  the  competent  authorities,  of  information  on  possible 
non-compliance with the rules referred to in Article 1(2) which is relevant for the application of Title IV of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 
in administrative and which may constitute a possible violation of the rules referred to in Article 1(2) perpetrated through fraudulent 
or deceptive practices;  139(2) refer to “violations of the rules referred to in Article 1(2), perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive 
practices’. 

4 Similarly, Article 16(2)(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 provides that when adopting delegated acts and implementing acts provided for 
in  Section  II  of  Chapter  II  of  Title  ii  of  that  Regulation,  concerning  additional  requirements  for  official  controls  and  other  official 
activities  in  certain  areas,  the  Commission  is  to  take  into  account,  among  others,  information  on  possible  intentional  violations 
perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices.  

5 

 
                                                        
 
Fraudulent  and  deceptive  practices  can  happen  at  any  stage  of  production,  processing  and  trade  and  the 
purchaser  that  is  the  victim  of  the  fraudulent  and  deceptive  practices  can  be  an  operator  or  the  final 
consumer.  

A non-compliance with EU provisions may be the result of mismanagement by act or omission leading to an 
irregularity  including  errors  and  failings  due  to  negligence  or  unawareness.  By  contrast,  an  intentional 
violation perpetrated through a fraudulent or deceptive practice5 is a deliberate or intentional non-compliance 
(as opposed to carelessness, accident or error). There is no incentive or reason for the business to change as 
long as the nature of the non-compliance is not revealed. 

Although,  competent  authorities  need  to  consider  their  national  legislative  and  judicial  framework  when 
designing a control system for the purpose of Article 9(2), this does not imply that solely cases falling under 
the  national  penal  code  should  be  considered  in  the  context  of  Article  9(2).  Member  States  have  to  ensure 
that all provisions of the Regulation (EU) 2017/625 are effectively implemented and that the rules referred to 
in Article 1(2) are enforced. This also applies to non-compliances related to fraud regardless whether fraud is 
pursued under administrative or criminal law. 

In particular, the intention of the operator to act in a non-compliant way is difficult to prove. Article 9(2) does 
not  require  to  confirm  the  suspicion  of  fraudulent  practices.  However,  the  competent  authority  has  to  take 
appropriate  actions  to  ensure  that  investigations  are  carried  out  and  enforcement  measures  are  taken,  as 
appropriate.  This  can  be  achieved  by  handing  the  case  over  to  the  law  enforcement  authorities  or  by 
investigations performed by skilled inspectors of the competent authorities.  

compliance rather than fraud, in particular, 
When intent cannot be proven, an incident will be treated as a non
as regards enforcement measures and penalties. In this case, a practice that is misleading or “deceptive” for 
consumers,  while  lacking  an  intentional  element,  may  be  characterised/established.  However,  the  fraud 
suspicion  may  remain  which  should  be  considered  in  the  context  of  the  risk-based  planning  of  Article  9(2) 
controls. In order to ensure that a suspicion of fraudulent practices is followed-up, re-enforced checks should 
be carried out in such cases as part of risk-based controls. 

‑

Fraud by its nature includes criminal behaviour and may be linked to other type of crimes involving food, feed, 
animals  and  plants  (e.g.  illegal  fishing,  smuggling,  theft,  money  laundering,  tax  evasion,  counterfeiting)  so 
there is much to weigh up before deciding on a course of action.  

Competent  authorities  should  take  a  decision,  within  the  framework  of  their  legislative  and  administrative 
arrangements, on: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

product categories/business activities/type of operators covered by the planning and performance of 
Article 9(2) controls; 

procedures for the follow-up of a suspicion; 

hand-over  of  cases  to  law  enforcement  authorities  and  prosecutor’s  office,  including  the 
documentation,  information  and  evidence  required  for  further  investigations  and  to  build  a  legal 
case; 

procedures for the reception of intelligence or information via whistle blowing channels. 

Steps to set up a control system to tackle fraud in the agri-food chain are presented in the chapters below. 

2.2  Approaching fraud in the agri-food chain 

Fraud  affects  businesses  and  consumers.  The  consequences  are  mainly  of  a  financial  nature,  in  particular 
when the fraud is related to quality. However, fraud also constitutes risks to human, animal or plant health, 
animal  welfare  and  the  environment.  Furthermore,  the  political  risk  that  comes  with  fraud  should  not  be 
underestimated  as  fraud  cases  have  the  potential  to  undermine  consumer  trust  in  official  controls, 
governments and the industry. 

5  For  the  purpose  of  readability  of  this  document  wherever  the  term  ‘fraud’  is  used  it  refers  to  an  intentional  violation  of  the  rules 
referred to in Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices as per Article 9(2) of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625.  

6 

 
                                                        
 
Food safety, food fraud, food defence6 and food quality are interlinked. 

Article 9(2) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/625 applies beyond fraud in relation to food as it covers all control 
areas as referred to in Article 1(2) of the same regulation, and thus fraud in relation to other categories of 
products, for example plants for planting, live animals health and feed. 

This technical report will take a  broad view on fraud. The fraud categories considered in this document are 
listed on Annex 1. 

Fraudsters are innovative and opportunistic by nature. They are adept at identifying the weaknesses in supply 
chains  and  official  control  systems  alike.  Therefore,  competent  authorities  should  address  the  fight  against 
fraud systematically, including: 

• 

• 

• 

the  involvement  of  all  relevant  competent  authorities,  across  all  control  areas,  in  the  planning 
process; 

cooperation  within  and  between  competent  authorities,  law  enforcement  authorities,  investigation 
units and stakeholders; 

raising awareness among control staff and industry.  

Also,  the  facilitation  and  enabling  of  fraud  by  anybody  (e.g.  by  disreputable  laboratories  and  logistics 
companies) needs to be taken into account. 

The  graph  below  provides  an  overview  of  the  key  elements  of  arrangements  for  fighting  fraud  in  the  agri-
food chain: 

6 Food defence programmes protect food from intentional contamination through the use of biological, chemical, physical or radioactive 

agents 

7 

 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
2.3  Article 9(2) – A proactive, structured and targeted approach 

The performance of risk-based controls requires a proactive, innovative (“Think outside the box”) and targeted 
approach,  which  is  designed  to  achieve  the  objectives  of  Article  9(2)  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625.  This 
includes: 

• 

• 

• 

identification of fraud risks (link to national strategy, horizon scanning, signals from various sources); 

a documented planning process based on a risk assessment; 

a planning process that specifically targets the fraud risks identified (also to be taken into account: 
political  support  for  certain  areas/initiatives;  resource  availability;  prioritising  all  types  of  threats  of 
fraud or mainly food safety ones). 

8 

 
3  Key  elements  of  control  arrangements  for  the  implementation  of 

Article 9(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 

3.1  Cooperation  

The complexity in identifying fraud requires close cooperation of all stakeholders, including 

•  within and between the authorities of the Member States; 

• 

• 

between Member State authorities; 

between Member States and the Commission and 

•  with the private sector (e.g. sector associations, multinational companies); 

• 

cooperation at pan-European and international level (e.g. Europol, Interpol, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development - OECD) 

The responsibilities for fraud related control activities and the communication lines should be clarified.  

A  central  theme  for  cooperation  is  the  gathering  and  sharing  of  information  and  intelligence  as  well  as 
experience, but may also include joint control efforts in order to make best use of skills and powers.  

The  sectoral  view  does  not  always  allow  a  complete  assessment  of  the  situation.  The  interface  between 
control systems in many cases presents a weakness that good cooperation can help to overcome. While data, 
if  assessed  with  a  sectoral  view,  may  look  non-suspicious,  the  involvement  of  experts  from  different 
authorities and/or control areas may reveal patterns in the data that can hint at fraudulent behaviour and can 
help to identify high-risk operators (e.g. complex business structures with various activities and locations). 

Data and information provided by the industry may add value as the private sectors can contribute with risk 
signals and data to the planning of Article 9(2) official controls. Cooperation may also be needed in order to 
support  control  arrangements  (e.g.  parcel  services  and  online  platforms  may  have  means  to  facilitate 
anonymous purchases of the authorities).  

Furthermore,  the  use  of  mechanisms  for  the  exchange  of  information  between  competent  authorities  on 
suspicions  of  fraudulent  practices  and  criminal  investigations  (fraud  part  of  iRASFF,  Secure  Information 
Exchange Network Application - SIENA, etc.) is crucial. 

The  competent  authorities  need  to  bear  in  mind  that  effectiveness  of  information  sharing  depends  on  the 
quality  of  the  information,  the  security/confidentiality  of  the  data  systems  and  the  capability  of  the 
technological system to perform as intended. Also the timeliness of the communication is important to allow 
swift reactions, especially in cases of a potential health risk or fast expiring goods.  

Examples: 

National (or sub-national) cross-authority working group(s) can provide a forum to exchange information and 
experience and help defining cooperation in more detail.  

Memoranda of understanding between authorities are useful to define the need for cooperation, to agree on 
joint  actions,  to  share  tasks  and  to  agree  on  exchange  of  data  and  information.  It  also  facilitates  the 
establishment  of  communication  lines  with  the  aim  to  make  the  exchange  of  information  more  effective, 
secure and faster. 

Memoranda  of  understanding  between  authorities  and  the  industry  (supported  by  procedures)  can  help  to 
exchange fraud risk signals and to react to new fraud threats faster and more efficiently. However, authorities 
need  to  check  whether,  and  to  what  extent,  the  exchange  of  data  and  information  under  EU  and  national 
legislation is possible (e.g. data protection rules). 

Simulation exercises allow to verify the effectiveness of arrangements for communication and cooperation. 

3.2  Risk-based planning  

3.2.1  Understanding fraud 

Detecting  fraud  requires  good  knowledge  about  the  sector,  the  fraud  risks  and  the  way  fraudsters  operate. 
Fraud is driven by opportunity and motivation, which are the main factors to consider. Countermeasures put in 

9 

 
place  by  the  industry  and  the  competent  authorities  work  as  a  strong  “guardian”  and  reduce  the  level  of 
opportunity: 

•  Motivation: factors that lead to unethical behaviours (incentive). In many cases, this is a temptation 
related  to  a  financial  gain  or  financial  pressure,  but  non-financial  aspects  including  political  and 
social factors should not be excluded. 

•  Opportunity:  set  of  circumstances  that  allows  the  fraudster  to  commit  fraud  and  that  reduce  the 
chances that the fraudulent or deceptive practices have negative consequences for the fraudster that 
outweigh the potential benefits of the behaviour.  

•  Countermeasures: fraud prevention measures (own control systems, fraud vulnerability assessments, 
etc.)  put  in  place  by  the  producers  and  control  arrangements  of  the  competent  authorities.  Strong 
countermeasures reduce the fraud opportunity while weak measures have the opposite effect. 

Annex 2 provides some examples of factors contributing to fraud in the agri-food chain. 

Vulnerability to fraud is an equation that combines these three elements: 

3.2.2  Key considerations  

A  fraud  risk  assessment  should  be  tailored  to  the  control  areas  for  which  the  competent  authority  is 
responsible.  In  other  words,  a  one-size-fits-all  solution  across  all  sectors  does  not  exist.  Fraud  follows 
opportunity and attacks weaknesses. The best approach to risk-based planning will differ between authorities, 
control areas and Member States, but the risk-based planning should be based on a vulnerability assessment.  

A  vulnerability  assessment  is  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the  circumstances  that  make  a  control  system 
vulnerable. The  first step should  be that relevant information (signals) are collected and analysed.  The next 
steps within the planning process include the assessment of the likelihood of a deliberate non-compliance and 
of the associated risks (probability and severity of an adverse effect). Annexes 3 and 4 provide information on 
the key steps for and elements of a vulnerability assessment. 

A good fraud risk assessment helps competent authorities to understand how to identify potential fraudsters 
finding a way around existing countermeasures. 

The  competent  authorities  may  want  to  apply  more  sophisticated  models,  as  described  in  literature,  but  a 
vulnerability assessment can be achieved through: 

•  Brainstorming by (cross-sectoral) expert groups; 

•  Delphi method (multiple rounds of questions to the target group of experts): 

• 

• 

Study/research project; 

Structured process based on data analytics including the evaluation of control data in view of non-
compliances with regard to potential fraud; 

•  A combination of these approaches. 

For consideration: 

For  Member  States  with  devolved  competences,  in  particular  Member  States  with  a  large  number  of 
competent  authorities  with  limited  resources,  it  could  be  a  challenge  to  carry  out  full-scale  vulnerability 
assessments across all sectors. However, this can be overcome by developing a strategy at national level or 
by adapting existing vulnerability assessment to the local needs. 

The  starting  point  for  any  vulnerability  assessment  is  to  look  at  the  sector  in  question  from  a  fraudster’s 
perspective and ask some key questions (see also Annex 5): 

•  What are the potential threats (e.g. use of illegal substances, dilution, substitution, mislabelling) for 

the sectors in question?  

10 

 
 
 
•  What are the weaknesses that facilitate fraudulent or deceptive practices and, in particular, are there 
weaknesses  in  the  control  system  that  allow  fraud  to  happen  (versus  the  capabilities  of  the 
fraudster)? 

•  What  are  the  opportunities  (e.g.  cheap  sources  of  ingredients)  for  committing  a  fraudulent  or 

deceptive practice? 

The planning of Article 9(2) official controls should consider the most relevant target objects including time, 
types  of  operators,  type  of  activities,  business  environment,  product  groups,  incidents  and  trends  (see  also 
Annex 6): 

•  Could fraud occur outside normal working hours?  

• 

Should seasonal aspects be considered? 

•  Are operators known to be involved in criminal activities in the past? 

•  Could  operators  be  involved  in  illegal  activities  where  regional  or  cultural  differences  provide 

opportunities?   

•  Are certain activities and commercial structures more vulnerable to fraud or deception? 

• 

Is the business environment and organisation of the sector more vulnerable to fraud? 

•  Have product groups been identified as more vulnerable to fraud or deception? 

•  Are there emerging risks that increase the fraud vulnerability? 

3.2.3  Data and information: sources and use 

In  order  to  perform  a  vulnerability  assessment,  the  competent  authorities  need  good  knowledge  of  the 
industry, consumer behaviour and the market situation. The more information is available in a structured way, 
the better the basis for the assessment.  

Also the availability of databases and the capabilities of using the databases effectively for the purpose of 
Article 9(2) controls is important.  

Article 9(1) controls data  

Official controls data (Article 9(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/625) can be useful in order to identify unusual 
patterns or anomalies. 

Examples:  

Number  of  on-farm  slaughter  animals  goes  beyond  what  can  be  consumed  by  the  farmer/farm-gate  sale, 
which hints that meat from on-farm slaughter is traded commercially. 

Outliers in farm animal databases can indicate suspicious activities (e.g. too many animals born vs number of 
females).  

In particular where data show suspicious patterns, anomalies (deviations from the norm) or where the data 
analysis  show  sudden  changes  (increase  of  production  of  a  certain  type  of  commodity)  this  may  raise  a 
suspicion of fraudulent practices.  

Example:  

A company has successfully entered the market with a new product and suddenly increases the production. Is 
this plausible taking into consideration the current production capacities? 

Control data on fraud 

The results of Article 9(2) controls should be critically reviewed and used for future control programmes with 
the aim to improve the control approach and methodology. The assessment may result in the intensification, 
continuation or reduction of certain controls or in a change of the control methodology.  

Member States may also consider to establish a risk register based on the results of Article 9(2) (and Article 
9(1))  controls  in  which  operators  and  their  subsidiary  companies  are  listed  which  were  involved  in  any 
investigation related to fraudulent or deceptive practices. 

11 

 
 
 
Examples:  

Samples are taken and tested for food authenticity, but the samples of consecutive years are compliant or at 
least  do  not  indicate  any  fraud  suspicion;  the  competent  authority  may  consider  reducing  the  number  of 
samples or stop the control activity entirely. 

Where the non-compliance rate is high and there is ground to suspect fraud, Article 9(2) controls should be 
intensified.  

Article 9(2) controls identify fraud cases, but the evidence is not sufficient to launch criminal proceedings: the 
competent authority may improve the methodology in order to support criminal investigations, as appropriate.  

Also the results of investigations should be used for planning Article 9(2) controls and each case should be 
analysed in order to determine whether it was an isolated case or whether there is a likelihood that similar 
fraud may occur more frequently.  

Example:  

A  whistleblower  informs  the  police  that  a  meat  processing  plant  uses  substances  illegally  for  its  meat 
products. Investigations find that the operators used sulphite in minced meat. Article 9(2) controls should be 
used to find out whether this is a common fraudulent practice in the production of similar products, e.g. by 
using sulphite test paper during Article 9(1) controls at operators selected for this purpose on a risk-basis.  

Control campaigns and monitoring 

Although  one-off  control  campaigns  cannot  be  considered  sufficient  to  implement  the  provisions  of  Article 
9(2)  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625,  they  are  an  effective  way  of  indicating  whether  a  certain  fraud  risk 
exists, which is essential information to feed into the planning process in order to take a decision whether the 
campaign results warrant controls on a regular basis.  

In  general,  fraud  is  not  regionally  or  nationally  restricted  and  therefore  addressing  cross-border  aspect  of 
fraud requires close cooperation at all levels. EU coordinated actions and coordinated programmes provide an 
opportunity  for  Member  State  authorities  to  contribute  to  the  fight  against  fraud  in  the  agri-food  chain  at 
European, pan-European and international level and to gain experience from their participation. The European 
Commission plays an important role in this, but depends on the active engagement of the Member States in 
these actions and programmes. Member States should in addition also set up their own priority programmes 
and monitoring projects. 

The  European  anti-fraud  office  (OLAF)  works  with  customs  authorities  and  market  surveillance  authorities 
within  the  EU  and  customs  authorities  from  across  the  world,  through  individual  investigations  or  joint 
customs  operation.  OLAF  also  participates  in  targeted  operations  led  by  Europol  and  Interpol,  like  Opson 
(which targets international trade in counterfeit or sub-standard food and beverages,  as well as food fraud 
and adulteration) or Silver Axe (which targets the illegal trade of plant protection products).  

In  the  context  of  coordinated  control  plans,  Directorate-General  for  Health  and  Food  Safety  works  closely 
together  with  the  Knowledge  Centre  for  Food  Fraud  and  Quality  (KC-FFQ)  established  within  the  Joint 
Research Centre as well as with OLAF. 

Information and data from the industry 

In general, medium-sized and larger enterprises have good market knowledge and may pick up fraud signals 
before  the  information  is  available  to  the  authorities.  Agreeing  with  the  industry  (e.g.  producer  and  trade 
associations) on exchange of information on a regular basis may be beneficial for improving the vulnerability 
assessment. However, competent authorities should use informal information from individual enterprises with 
care and critically review its reliability. 

Notifications, complaints and intelligence 

Although it is a challenge to deal with complaints, they may be a useful source of information to feed into the 
planning  process. In particular,  where the follow-up of individual  complaints confirmed fraudulent practices, 
which have the potential to go beyond an isolated case. 

Example:  

A complaint reveals that one operator used illegal substances. If the investigations reveal the supplier of the 
substance also delivered to other operators, this may indicate a wider spread issue. 

12 

 
Notifications  of  potential  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practices  including  other  competent  authorities  or  other 
Member  States  should  be  analysed.  Competent  authorities  may  consider  these  notifications  for  their  own 
planning process.  

Example:  

Where one Member State finds that several establishments are involved in fraudulent or deceptive practices 
there would be grounds to suspect that similar cases occur in other Member States as well.  

Not  all  information  is  easily  accessible.  In  particular,  law  enforcement  authorities  and  special  investigation 
units gather information from covert  human intelligence sources, law enforcement partners and  undercover 
investigations.  Although  the  details  of  the  intelligence  sources  and  information  may  not  be  shared, 
intelligence  can  be  used  to  identify  widespread  issues  and  may  hint  at  fraud  risks  that  can  be  addressed 
through Article 9(2) controls. It should be noted that sensitive data should only be used in close cooperation 
and agreement with all involved enforcement authorities to avoid that investigations are undermined.  

However, there are open sources that should be used in order to pick-up fraud signals: 

Publicly available information 

• 

• 

• 

• 

social media 

advertisements  

statistics 

etc. 

Example:  

Advertising  car  boot  sales  or  sales  of  agri-food  products  online  without  proper  identification  may  indicate 
fraudulent or deceptive practices. 

Horizon scanning and emerging risk assessment 

Horizon scanning is a method used for the early detection and assessment of new developments and trends 
using a range of available data sources in order to be prepared for future threats. 

The following information should be considered: 

•  Natural  disasters,  extreme  weather  events  and  climate  change  (e.g.  impact  on  harvests  and 

international trade) 

•  Alerts  and  disease  outbreaks  (European  Union  Notification  System  for  Plant  Health  Interceptions  - 
EUROPHYT, iRASFF, Organic Farming Information System - OFIS, International Food Safety Authorities 
Network  -  INFOSAN,  World  Organisation  for  Animal  Health  -  OIE,  EU  Animal  Diseases  Information 
System - ADIS, Trade Control and Expert System - TRACES, etc.)  

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Emerging risks resulting from a newly identified hazard (e.g. European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
opinions, diseases and epidemics) 

Fraud  specific  information  (iRASFF-FF,  JRC  Food  Fraud  Monthly  Reports,  OECD  Network  on  Illegal 
Trade of Pesticides- ONIP) 

Research and scientific papers (e.g. new food processing technology) 

Trade  data  and  updates  on  trade  agreements  (Statistical  office  of  the  European  Union  -  Eurostat, 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database - UN Comtrade) 

Trends in consumer behaviour (studies, news) 

Information on the geopolitical situation in the world 

Examples:  

A plant pest outbreak may trigger the use of unauthorised pesticides.  

Crop failure in one country may put pressure on domestic producers to find ingredients for their products on 
the market or may lead to price increases. 

Other signals 

13 

 
The competent authorities should define their information needs and make use of official controls in order to 
collect additional data or to pick up signals systematically. 

Example:  

The price range of farm inputs (e.g. pesticides) or ingredients may be useful to know, as very low prices may 
indicate  fraud  or  illegal  trade  or  higher  prices  may  increase  the  pressure  on  the  operators  and  the  fraud 
vulnerability  increases.  Such  information  may  be  collected  anonymised  and  not  operator  specific  for  data 
protection purposes. 

Also analysing own-control data from a fraud perspective should be considered.  

Example:  

The competent authorities should have oversight of the results of own controls of operators in order to allow 
the  identification  of  falsified  results.  If  the  results  of  the  own  controls  of  one  operator  are  all  acceptable, 
while the experience from the majority of other operators is different, this may indicate that the own-control 
results are potentially falsified.  

3.3  Performance of Article 9(2) official controls 

Article 9(2) official controls can be implemented by using a wide range of different methods and techniques 
or by combining them (see also Annexes 7 and 8).  

In some cases, Article 9(1) and Article 9(2) official controls can be combined. In some cases a control method 
may even be suitable to implement Article 9(1) and Article 9(2) official controls at the same time. However, 
this should be demonstrated in a documented manner. 

Examples:  

In the context of Article 9(1), a competent authority has incorporated a quick qualitative screening method to 
detect the illegal use of sulphite on meat and/or in meat preparations at certain type of operators that have 
been  identified  in  the  context  of  the  Article  9(2)  vulnerability  and  risk  assessment.  In  this  example,  some 
Article 9(1) controls are complemented with fraud related control aspects. 

The competent authority establishes a control programme for plant protection products. It includes sampling 
and testing of products to verify that their composition complies with the authorisation. If demonstrated by a 
vulnerability and risk assessment one and the same type of control arrangement can be suitable and used for 
the purpose of Article 68 of Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 and Article 9(2) controls. 

A  control  body  applies  at  organic  farms  a  sampling  and  testing  procedure  that  allows  to  establish  whether 
finding of pesticides are the result of spray drift or illegal use of the pesticide. 

However, in many  cases, official controls planned and performed for the purpose of  Article 9(1) will not be 
sufficient and additional control measures are required, including: 

Targeted controls or audits of operators, activities, products or locations/geographical  areas that  have been 
identified as vulnerable to fraud. These controls usually solely focus on the relevant fraud aspects identified 
through the vulnerability assessment. 

Control  campaigns,  if  organised  on  a  regular  basis,  can  be  a  cost  efficient  but  also  an  effective  way  of 
implementing Article 9(2) official controls. The frequency  of these campaigns  should  be defined in the risk- 
based planning (e.g. twice a year, every second year): 

• 

• 

Road controls. 

Sampling campaigns. 

•  Comprehensive  traceability  of  a  selected  number  of  products  and  their  ingredients  throughout  the 

entire production and trade chain. 

The methods and techniques used in the implementation of official controls in accordance with Article 9(2) of 
the Regulation (EU) 2017/625 may also provide a good vehicle to promote controls in general to a very high 
standard,  which  usually is  more time consuming and costly (e.g.  comprehensive traceability of supplies and 
verification  of  invoices  by  means  of  cross-checks,  comprehensive  mass-balance),  where  this  is  not  already 
part of official controls carried out in accordance with Article 9(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/625. 

14 

 
The  work of  dedicated investigation teams and enforcement authorities, which operate mainly in a  reactive 
mode,  can  contribute  to  Article  9(2)  official  controls  by  using  intelligence  collected  to  establish  a  proactive 
approach and perform targeted controls or audits on a regular basis. 

Example:  

Dedicated  investigation  units  of  the  competent  authorities  or  of  other  enforcement  authorities  establish, 
based  on  experience  and  intelligence,  a  control  programme  for  targeted  controls  or  audits  on  high-risk 
products or operators on a regular basis. 

The  increasing  importance  of  e-commerce  provides  new  opportunities  for  marketing  products  and  animals 
(e.g. puppies) online, but also for trading illicit products (e.g. falsified documents) on web-based platforms and 
the dark web. The latter is the hidden collective of internet sites only accessible by a specialised web browser.  
This makes it difficult for competent authorities without a specific law enforcement background and technical 
expertise  to  monitor  these  marketplaces.  Although  easily  accessible,  it  is  also  a  challenge  to  monitor  web-
based  trade  and  not  all  competent  authorities  have  automated  screening  tools.  However,  based  on  the 
vulnerability  and  related  risk-assessment,  the  screening  of  social  media  platforms  and  the  most  relevant 
online market places is indispensable.  

Examples:  

Online  platforms  have  an  interest  to  minimise  the  risk  of  offering  illicit  products  on  their  websites.  Public-
private  partnerships  can  be  used  in  order  to  identify  vulnerable  products  and  to  target  vendors  of  illicit 
products. 

In  some  cases,  it  is  essential  to  physically  obtain  the  product  in  order  to  check  the  label  or  to  perform 
authenticity tests. This can only be done through “mystery shopping” which is an anonymised test purchase 
(Article 36 of the Regulation (EU) 2017/625). 

3.4  Follow-up of fraud suspicion and investigations   

3.4.1  Exchange of information between Member States 

European Commission developed and manages an IT system - the Administrative Assistance and Cooperation 
System (AAC) – which enables Member States and the Commission sharing information on suspicion of non-
compliances and potential intentional violations of the EU agri-food chain legislation in a secure manner. In 
2021,  AAC  has  been  integrated  into  the  Rapid  Alert  System  for  Food  and  Feed  (iRASFF).  The  competent 
authorities  in  the  Member  States  concerned  shall  provide  each  other  with  administrative  assistance  in 
accordance  with  Articles  104  to  107  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625.  This  shall  facilitate  cross-border 
investigations and can help to collect information and evidence required to conclude on the case. The quality 
and timeliness of the information exchange is crucial.  

3.4.2 

Investigations 

Investigations  are  mainly  reactive  in  order  to  respond  to  any  suspicion  of  non-compliance  or  fraud  (Article 
137  of  the  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625).  Investigations  into  fraud  require  the  use  of  specific  techniques  for 
gathering evidence and should only be carried out  by sufficiently skilled staff of the competent authorities, 
the  police  or  other  enforcement  authorities.  This  may  include  the  observation  of  suspects,  confiscation  of 
computers and wire/email tapping. 

Special  investigation  units  of  the  competent  authorities  and  of  other  enforcement  authorities  in  several 
Member States have proven that investigations by highly trained staff plays a crucial role in fighting fraud. 
These specialised Units have highly skilled staff and over time gained experience and deep knowledge of the 
motives and methods applied by fraudsters. It would be of the utmost importance that competent authorities 
use this knowledge to feed into the planning process of Article 9(2) official controls. As regards the competent 
authorities, they should establish a close relationship to the investigation units of other authorities in order to 
know when and how to report a suspicion of fraud to these units.  

Member States also need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to facilitate the transmission of information 
on possible non-compliance with the rules referred to in Article 1(2) of the OCR from other law enforcement 
authorities, public prosecutors and judicial authorities, to the competent authorities. 

15 

 
As regards the follow-up of cases, in particular where the competent authorities hand the case over to other 
enforcement  authorities,  it  is  crucial  for  the  competent  authorities  to  follow-up  on  the  outcome  of 
investigations, prosecution and judicial review in order to: 

•  Understand how the prosecutors and courts assessed the case and whether the information collected 

by the competent authorities was suitable and sufficient.  

• 

Feed  that  knowledge  and  any  other  relevant  information  back  into  the  planning  process  and  raise 
awareness based on the lessons learnt.  

Example: 

Potential fraud cases are handed over by the competent authorities to other law enforcement authorities (e.g. 
police) together with a form for reporting back the outcome of the investigations. 

3.5  Training and skills 

Fraud  investigations  require  different  skills  than  routine  inspections.  Not  only  is  the  approach  different,  in 
many  cases  additional  powers  are  required.  Inspectors  should  not  be  encouraged  to  perform  fraud 
investigations, unless they have received appropriate training and instructions.  

For consideration: 

An  inspector  of  the  competent  authorities  without  specific  training  in  fraud  investigations  may  not  be  in  a 
position  to  decide  on  the  best  way  to  approach  a  complex  case  or  on  what  evidence  is  required  by  the 
prosecutor.  An  official  control  that  is  carelessly  performed  may  warn  the  operator  and  may  undermine 
investigations by specialised law enforcement authorities (e.g. police and tax authorities).  

It  is  not  required  to  train  all  competent  authorities’  inspectors  on  the  performance  of  fraud  investigations. 
However, all official control staff should have a basic understanding of fraudulent or deceptive practices and 
clear instructions on the steps to be taken when a suspicion of fraud arises. Official control staff should have 
a good level of awareness in order to collect fraud signals during regular controls and to distinguish between 
a non-compliance in general, intentional violations perpetrated through fraudulent or deceptive practices and 
deceptive practices that lack an intentional element and should be trained, as appropriate, on specific Article 
9(2) controls arrangements and methods. 

3.6  Marketing Standard Controls vs Food Safety Controls 

EU marketing standards shall ensure that the market is supplied with agricultural products of certain standard 
and quality. Regulation (EU) 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishes a common 
organisation  of  the  markets  for  agricultural  products  and  Regulation  (EU)  1306/2013  of  the  European 
Parliament and of the Council requires that Member States perform checks to ensure compliance with these 
rules. Some of the food products covered by this legislation are highly vulnerable to fraud and need particular 
attention in the context of risk-based planning of controls. 

While in some Member States the food safety authorities perform these checks, in others the responsibility is 
with other authorities. In the latter case, close cooperation between the food safety and marketing standard 
control authorities is needed in order to ensure that fraudulent practices are  detected and followed-up and 
that information are exchanged, as appropriate.  

Pursuant  to  Article  1(4)(a)  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625,  the  latter  Regulation  becomes  applicable  where 
checks  pursuant  to  Article  89  of  Regulation  (EU)  No  1306/2013  identify  possible  fraudulent  or  deceptive 
practices  in  respect  of  the  marketing  standards  referred  to  in  Articles  73  to  91  of  Regulation  (EU)  No 
1308/2013 7.  The  provisions  of  Regulation  (EU)  2017/625  applicable  to  marketing  standards  include  the 
provisions  on  administrative  assistance  and  cooperation  (Articles  102  to  108)  and  the  provisions  on 
enforcement  action  (Articles  137  and  138).  Further,  the  provisions  of  Implementing  Regulation  (EU) 
2019/1715 on exchange of fraud notifications in the fraud network in iRASFF apply.  

7  A  reasonable  suspicion  of  fraud/deceptive  practice  based  on  facts  must  be  established  (a  fraud  notification  in  iRASFF  is  a  possible 

case).Mere hypotheses are not sufficient, yet the suspicion does not need to be confirmed. 

16 

 
                                                        
 
3.7  Awareness raising 

Raising awareness of fraud risks can help prevent fraudulent and deceptive practices, as operators will better 
understand the vulnerabilities and risks they are facing. This is in particular relevant for smaller and medium 
size companies who have not yet considered fraud risks. They will also better understand that they may not 
only be subject to fraud but may, under certain circumstances, become involved in fraudulent practices, e.g. 
when buying products that are at a price below market value, from sources that are not reliable and do not 
allow to trace back the product.  

17 

 
 
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Galanakis, C, Food Authentication and Traceability, Academic Press, 2020. 

Hellberg,  R.,  Everstine,  K.,  Sklare,  S.,  Food  Fraud  -  A  Global  Threat  with  Public  Health  and  Economic 
Consequences, Academic Press, 2020. 

Manning, L., MeiSoon J., Food fraud vulnerability assessment: Reliable data sources and effective assessment 
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Pustjens,  A.,  Weesepoel,  Y.,  van  Ruth,  S.,  Food  Fraud  and  Authenticity:  Emerging  Issues  and  Future  Trends, 
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Rezazade, F., Summers, J., OngLai Teik, D., A holistic approach to food fraud vulnerability assessment, Food 
Control, 131 (January 2022). 

Robson,  K.,  Dean,  M.,  Haughey,  S.,  Elliott,  C.,  A  comprehensive  review  of  food  fraud  terminologies  and  food 
fraud mitigation guides, Food Control, 120 (February 2021). 

Ryan, J.; Food Fraud, Academic Press, 2015. 

Silvis, I.,  van Ruth, S.,  van  der Fels-Klerx, H., Luning, P., Assessment of food fraud vulnerability in the spices 
chain: An explorative study, Food Control, 81 (November 2017): 80-87. 

Spink, J., Ortega, D., Chen Chen, Felicia Wu, Food fraud prevention shifts the food risk focus to vulnerability, 
Trends in Food Science & Technology, 62 (April 2017): 215-220. 

Ulberth, F., Tools to combat food fraud – A gap analysis, Food Chemistry, 330 (15 November 2020). 

van  Ruth,  S.,  Huisman,  W.,  Pieternel,  A.,  Luning,  Food  fraud  vulnerability  and  its  key  factors,  Trends  in  Food 
Science & Technology, 67 (September 2017): 70-75. 

van  Ruth,  S.,  Luning,  P.,  Silvis,  J.,  Yang,  Y.,  Huisman,  W.,  Differences  in  fraud  vulnerability  in  various  food 
supply chains and their tiers, Food Control, 84 (February 2018): 375-381. 

18 

 
 
 
 
Annexes  

Annex 1 Fraud categories 8 

For the purpose of this technical report the following fraud categories should be considered by the competent 
authorities: 

•  Adulteration and product tampering:  

Addition  of  a  foreign  or  inferior  quality  substance  or  element;  by  replacing  a  more  valuable 
substance  or  element  with  less  valuable  or  inert  ingredients,  so  that  they  no  longer  match  the 
implicit or explicit claims associated with the agri-food product. 

o  Substitution: 
o  Dilution: 
o  Removal: 
o  Unapproved/undeclared enhancement and concealment 
o  Unapproved/undeclared treatment, process or product 

•  Counterfeit 

Intellectual Property Right (IPR) infringement, including any aspects of the genuine agri-food product 
or  packaging  being  replicated,  for  instance  the  process  of  copying  the  brand  name,  packaging 
concept or processing method for economic gain.  

•  Document Forgery  

The  process  of  creating,  adapting,  altering,  misrepresenting  or  imitating  documents  such  as 
certificates,  passports,  analytical  test  reports,  declarations  of  compliance  and  other  identification, 
administrative documents.  

•  Grey market activities 

Production,  theft,  and  diversion  involving  unauthorised  sales  channels  for  agri-food  products 
(traceability issues).  

•  Misdescription/mislabelling/misbranding 

Placing of explicit false claims or distorting the information on the label/packaging). 

o  Expiry/production date 
o  Nutrition/health claims 
o  Geographical claims (excluding PGO, PDI, TSG) 
o  Quality terms 
o  Quantity (weight and volume) 

8  The  categories  used  in  this  annex  are  based  on  discussions  with  Member  States’  experts  at  the  meetings  of  the  EU  Food  Fraud 

Network.. 

19 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
Annex 2 Factors contributing to fraud in the agri-food chain  

Factors related to “motivation” (Incentives) 

Direct financial benefit 

Pressure 

Socio-economic and personal aspects  

Factors related to “opportunity” 

• 

Tax evasion 

Shortage of supplies 

Low  value  products  trade  in  big  quantities  (low  value  - 
high volume) 
•  High value products 
• 
•  Avoidance of costs  
•  Competition 
• 
•  Demand higher than regular production 
• 
Lack of access to new technology 
• 
Lack of access to markets  
• 
Restrictions  and  administrative  hurdles  (e.g.  business 
expansion 
to  administrative 
procedures) 
Reputation of the business owner 
Financial  or  economic  crisis  put  pressure  on  private 
personal situation of company owners. 

lengthy  process  due 

• 
• 

Ability to detect fraudulent or deceptive 
practices 

Does the industry have fraud prevention systems in place for the 
identified threat(s)? 

Business culture  

Complexity of official control systems  

Do the official control systems deal with the threat(s)? 

How  complex  is  the  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practice  and  are 
specific skills needed to identify it? 

Example: High level of repeated non-compliance may indicate that 
certain groups or types of operators are not reliable and may not 
pay  attention  to  fraud  threats  (from  suppliers)  or  commit  fraud 
themselves (“rotten apples”). 

Example: Subnational authorities are the competent authority and 
each  is  keeping  its  own  register(s)  of  operators.  This  may  make 
cross-checks and traceability time consuming and fraudsters may 
use  this  in  their  favour.  This  could  be  an  operator  who  is  kept  in 
the  register  of  a  competent  authority  as  “inactive”  but  trades 
illegal products in the jurisdiction of another competent authority. 

Weaknesses  as  regards  the  control 
arrangements and legal framework 

What control measures are missing and could be incorporated into 
the control arrangements? 

Is access to appropriate laboratory capacities ensured? 

Does the competent authority have the powers to perform all the 
required controls? 

Are  the  penalties  included  in  the  applicable  national  legislation 
sufficiently deterrent?  

Are  there  overlaps  or  missing  interfaces  between  competent 
authorities  (e.g.  food  safety  controls/controls  in  relation  to 
Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 and marketing standard controls)? 

Are  the  arrangements  of  the  competent  authorities  and  national 

20 

 
 
 
 
legislation  flexible  enough  to  react  to  new  requirements  (e.g. 
verification of own-control results, controls outside normal working 
hours)? 

Complexity  of  the  sector  and  supply 
chains 

Fraudsters  may  use  non-transparent,  complex  and  fast  moving 
supply chains. 

Complex  business  structures  may  also  be  used:  e.g.  same  owner 
with multiple companies trading (on paper) from one to the other 
leading  to  complex  paper  trails  of  goods,  in  particular  if  re-
grouping and/or changing of batch numbers occur.  

A similar approach can be applied with multiple production/storage 
sites of the same company. 

21 

 
 
 
Annex 3 Key steps and elements of a vulnerability assessment 

22 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 4 Key elements of a vulnerability assessment 

23 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 5 Key questions to be considered for the vulnerability assessment  

Information and data 

Organisation  of  the  sector/industry 
and sector specific information  

Is unethical behaviour known or likely? (e.g. from notifications including information shared through the Administrative Assistance 
and Cooperation Network for Food Fraud (AAC-FF). 

Are operators certified to private schemes and apply fraud prevention measures? 

Are supply chains complex? 

Are supply chains transparent and are the stakeholders involved known? 

Is the level of competition high? 

Is the sector involved in activities related to products, which are in demand due to traditional, ethnical or cultural differences?  

Emerging  risk  assessment,  horizon 
scanning, market surveillance 

Have emerging risks been identified? 

Does horizon scanning provide indications that emerging risks may occur in the near future? 

Does horizon scanning indicate fraud in certain countries because of new developments? 

Does horizon scanning provide information on new technology or trends that can trigger or facilitate fraud? 

Media screening 

Is there a set of “key words” used by fraudsters that sell products online? 

Is there a social media platform that certain operators/groups of operators prefer to sell illegal/counterfeit products? 

Is  there  professional  media  (e.g.  farmers’  journal,  agriculture  machinery  magazine)  where  anonymous  advertisements  can  be 
published? 

Do media platforms keep a record of complaints on repeated offenders (not respecting rules of selling)? 

controls 
Official 
intelligence based information 

data 

and 

Do official controls data show anomalies or patterns hinting at fraudulent or deceptive practices? 

Can  intelligence  based  information  and  experience  gained  from  fraud  cases  be  used  for  the  planning  of  Article  9(2)  official 
controls? 

Data collected by the private sector 

Are  useful  information  and  data  collected  by  the  private  sector  (e.g.  trade  and  producer  associations)  available  and  can  they  be 
used by the authorities? 

24 

 
 
 
 
Identification of drivers of fraud 

Incentives 

Are there incentives to misuse the tax system (tax evasion)  

Do subsidies and access to public funds trigger fraudulent behaviour? 

Are there products that could be sold with a high profit – sale of high quantities with a low margin or sales of premium products 
with a high margin? 

Can a fraudster commit fraud to avoid investment costs?  

Opportunities/weaknesses 

Does  identifying  the  fraudulent  or  deceptive  practice  require  certain  skills  or  techniques?  Do  the  control  systems  already  cover 
these issues? 

Are there weaknesses/gaps in the official control arrangements or are there control methods not performed or to a low level due to 
resource restrictions? Could these control methods contribute to fighting fraud? 

Are there weaknesses/gaps in EU and/or national legislation that could facilitate fraud? 

Are the interfaces between control arrangements of different authorities strong or is there an additional need for cooperation and 
joint efforts? Is there a cross-reference of different databases? 

Does  the  industry  have  reliable  fraud  prevention  systems  in  place  and  do  the  authorities  have  an  oversight  or  take  them  into 
account when planning Article 9(2) official controls? 

Is there a good level of awareness amongst operators regarding fraud risks? Is there a need for information campaigns? 

Vulnerability assessment 

Use of information  

Has/Have a strategy/procedures been developed for the vulnerability assessment? 

Who should be involved? 

How should the data/information be used best? 

Is there a need to elaborate tools for the vulnerability assessment (IT tools)? 

Performance 

Have the key aspects of the vulnerability assessment been considered? 

Are the process and the results documented? 

25 

 
 
Annex 6 Target objects 9 

Target object 

Time 

Operators/activities 

Business environment 

Products/product 
groups 
(examples  of  vulnerable 
products) 

o  To be considered (examples) 

• 
• 
• 
• 

Seasonal production (and higher demand) 
Seasonal shortage of supply 
Special occasions (Easter, Christmas) 
Risk that fraud is committed outside normal working hours (e.g. night 
shift, weekends). 
Paper traders and brokers with a high turnover of consignments  
E-commerce traders without a physical production or sales facility 

• 
• 
•  Wholesalers with a history of traceability non-compliances 
•  Operators  being  part  of  a  complex  business  structure  (subsidiary 

companies in multiple countries). 

•  Operators that have been involved in tax evasion, money laundering or 

Supply chain shortage 

other types of fraud/crime). 
Processing of composite products 
Parallel production in organic farming 
Involvement of intermediaries 

• 
• 
• 
•  Complex supply chains 
•  High competition 
• 
•  Honey/maple syrup 
•  Olive oil 
• 
Eggs  
• 
Spices 
• 
Frozen high quality meat (addition of lean meat from other species to 
the trim) 
Fish species and fresh tuna (colouring, histamine) 
Fruit juices (dilution and food improvement agents) 

• 
• 
•  Coffee/tea 
•  Maize/corn  fed  chicken  (use  of  unauthorised  quantities  of  feed 

additives). 

•  Chicken meat (water content) 
•  Mixed minced meat (composition, additives) 
•  Quality labelled products  
•  Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages 
• 
Special diets (e.g. free-from-products) 
•  Milk powder  
• 
Food waste 
•  Animal  by-products  (e.g.  Category  1  rendering  plants  and  Category  3 

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

processing plants on the same or adjacent sites) 
Food contact materials (bamboo/wood) 
Parallel trade on plant protection products 
Plant protection products likely to be smuggled/illegal imports  
Plants for planting traded with plant passports 
Puppy dogs (illegal trade) 
The pandemic increased the risk of deceptive/fraudulent health claims 
regarding  Covid-19:  products  sold  via  the  internet  were  being 
advertised  as  having  a  positive  effect  on  the  immune  system  or  as 

Incidents 

9  This  list of  target  objects  is the  result  of examples  collected  from  literature,  meetings  with Member  States’  experts and  fact-finding 

studies of Member States carried out by the Commission between 2020 and 2022. 

26 

 
 
                                                        
 
protection against infection by coronavirus. 

•  Wildfires  in  important  honey-producing  regions  causing  a  significant 

• 

drop in honey production  
Sudden increase/decrease in demand/prices/availability of certain (raw) 
material as a result of e.g.  
o  pest outbreak,  
o 
o  war, 
o 
o  withdrawal  of  certain  active  substances  /  products  from  the 

severe weather conditions or natural disasters, 

trade restrictions,  

market (e.g. certain effective pesticides, biocides). 

Facilitators 

Facilitators support fraudulent practices knowingly/carelessly/unintentionally  

•  Operators selling authorised substance for illicit use 
•  Verification  of  laboratory  results  of  own  controls  can  help  to  identify 
operators  that  do  not  inform  the  competent  authority  about  non-
compliant  results  and  sell  products  unfit  for  purpose  or  falsify 
certificates. 

27 

 
 
 
 
 
Annex 7 Control methods and techniques to be considered for Article 9(2) official controls10  

Collecting signals for the planning process 

Extended sampling and testing programmes 
for non-authorised/illegal substances 

Using  samples  from  “vulnerable”  products 
taken for other purposes 

Targeted actions 

Sudden increase of production or sales 

• 
•  Data  for  comparable  groups  of  operators/activities 
(own control system results, price level of ingredients, 
complexity of the operation) 
Reports  of  non-compliances  including  information 
shared  in  accordance  with  Articles  102  to  108  of 
Regulation (EU) 2017/625 

• 

Plant protection products and residues 
Food and feed additives 
Food supplements and unauthorised substances 
Products with nutritional and/or health claims 

•  Other  
• 
• 
• 
• 
•  Unapproved/illegal veterinary drugs 
•  Use of novel ingredients/foods 
•  Honey  taken  for  residue  testing  could  also  be 

• 

• 

analysed for exogenous sugars. 
Table  eggs  -  traceability  checks  to  be  used  to  verify 
labelling 
Intensified  cross-checks  of  commercial  documents 
and  comprehensive  traceability  of  supplies  back  to 
the  suppliers  in  order  to  ensure  the  integrity  of  the 
food chain. 

•  Comprehensive  mass-balance  to  verify  that  the 
operator  can  account  for  all  quantities  of  raw 
materials,  waste,  work-in-progress  and  finished 
products. 

10    The  control  methods  and  techniques  have  been  selected  based  on  literature  reviews,  discussions  with  Member  States’ experts and 
fact-finding studies carried out by the Commission between 2020 and 2022. A non-exhaustive indicative list of items that can be 
subject to Article 9(2) official controls is presented in column 2. 

28 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
Annex  8  Examples  of  intentional  violations  perpetrated  through  fraudulent  or  deceptive 
practices11 

Food and food safety and food contact material 

Fraudulent/deceptive 
practices  

Illegal  production  of  meat 
products  

Comment 

Control measure 

Products distributed to local restaurants 

Traceability 

Meat  from  home  slaughter  entering 
commercial production and trade chain  

Analysis of data for plausibility 
and traceability 

Car  boot  sale  of 
traditional meat products 

illegally  produced 

Media  screening  and  targeted 
controls  

Illicit  production  methods  and 
use of illegal food additives 

Mechanically  separation  of  pre-packed 
dairy  products  and  re-use  of  dairy 
products 

Non-declared irradiation of foodstuffs 

Tuna  -  addition  of  dyes,  nitrites  or 
nitrates and carbon monoxide treatment 

of 

intelligence 

and 
Use 
experience  from  cases  in  order 
to perform targeted controls 

Testing  of  irradiation  signals 
(e.g.  Thermoluminescence  (TL) 
instruments) 

Traceability of ingredients 

Targeted 
monoxide 
equipment) 

controls 

(carbon 
treatment 

Laboratory testing 

Use of illegal colorants e.g. Sudan red 

Traceability of ingredients 

Laboratory testing 

Addition of melamine to Soy drinks 

Laboratory testing 

fish 

(“ice  coating”)  – 
Glazing  of 
additional  layer  of  frozen  water  on  fish 
filets without appearing on the label 

Gravimetric procedures 

Use  of 
consumption and mislabelling 

ingredients  unfit  for 

Re-labelling - 'use by' date  

microbiological  analyses,  total 
volatile basic nitrogen   

Substitution, 
mislabelling 

dilution 

and 

Undeclared or wrongly declared species: 

•  Meat  logs  (cold  stores)  –  e.g. 

horse meat 

•  Kebabs  
• 

Fish  offered  at 
restaurants 
(complete species substitution) 
•  Cow  milk  instead  of  sheep  or 

buffalo milk 

Traceability 
auction halls) 

(fish 

suppliers, 

testing,  monoclonal 
DNA 
antibody-based 
ELISA 
techniques,  Mass  Spectrometry 
(Matrix  Assisted 
of  proteins 
Ionization- 
Laser  Desorption 
Mass 
Time-of-Flight 

11  A non-exhaustive indicative list of examples of fraudulent activities and control measures that have been selected based on literature 
reviews, discussions with Member States’ experts and fact-finding studies carried out by the Commission between 2020 and 2022.  

29 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
Spectrometry  -  MALDI-TOF  MS, 
Liquid Chromatography coupled 
to  tandem  Mass  Spectrometry 
LC-MS/MS) 

Qualitative  and  quantitative 
laboratory testing 

High  value 
quantities than indicated on the label: 

ingredients  with 

lower 

•  Mixed  pork-beef  minced  meat 
higher 
significantly 

with 
quantities of pork meat 
Processed  game  pate  without 
game meat 

• 

•  Olive  oil  blended  with  cheaper 
plant based or mineral oils 
•  Quinoa flour replaced by maize 

or soy flour 

•  Gluten-free  products 

ingredients 

with 
gluten 

replace 
containing 

Coffee  -  Substitution  of  Robusta  beans 
for Arabica beans 

Visual  inspection,  traceability, 
16-O-methylcafestol,  Nuclear 
Magnetic Resonance (NMR) 

Lower  grade  products  that  are  labelled 
as olive oil, argan oil)  

Sensory 
technologies, traceability 

analysis,  multiple 

Spices – Oregano mixed with other plant 
material (olive tree leaves) 

Physical 
methods, sensory analysis 

and 

analytical 

Addition  of  plant  proteins  and  other 
fillers (melamine, urea) to milk powder 

Near-Infrared (NIR) technology 

Addition  of  sugar  and  sugar  syrups  to 
honey 

Addition of water to fruit juices and milk 
products  

profiling, 
Proton-NMR 
Elemental 
Analysis/Liquid 
Chromatography  -Isotope  Ratio 
Mass  Spectrometry 
(EA/LC-
IRMS) 

Isotope 
Mass 
Ratio 
Spectrometry - IRMS, NMR, Gas 
(GC) 
Chromatography 
with 
technique 
statistical methods. 

coupled 

Counterfeits  

Soft-drinks,  sweets,  alcoholic  beverages 
of trademarks  

Cooperation  with 
(labels, closures) 

industry 

Illegal  products  and  falsified 
documents 

Melamine 
material  

in  bamboo  food  contact 

Targeted  screening  for  illegal 
aids, 
additives, 
traceability, 
of 
verification 
declarations of compliance 

pro-cessing 

30 

 
 
 
 
 
Feed and feed safety 

Fraudulent/deceptive 
practices  

Unauthorised substances 

Substitution, dilution 

Comment 

Control measure 

Addition  of  additives  in  illicit  quantities 
for 
fed 
feed 
chicken/yellow chicken meat) 

chicken 

(maize 

Testing for Canthaxanthin and 
Zeaxanthin 

Non-authorised medicated feed 

Laboratory testing 

Replacement  of  high  quality  with  low 
quality  feed  (addition  of  enhancers, 
contaminated feedingstuffs) 

Laboratory testing 

Illegal use 

Non-authorised  feed  derived  from  the 
food chain (ungraded fats and oils) 

Traceability,  various  types  of 
tests for fats and oils 

Animal health 

Fraudulent/deceptive practices   Comment 

Tampering – animal identification   Animal  eradication  programmes  and 
farmer  compensation  may  set  negative 
incentives 

Deliberate  introduction  of  animal 
diseases 

Control measure 

Plausibility checks 

testing 

in  order 

DNA 
to 
identify  the  strain  and  origin 
of pathogen  

Illegal trade with puppy dogs 

Falsified vaccine passports  

Traceability 

Forensic checks of ear tags 

Laboratory testing 

Road controls 

Targeted  controls  at  border 
control posts 

Animal by-products and derived products 

Fraudulent/deceptive practices   Comment 

Control measure 

Diversion  of  Category  1,  2  and  3 
material into the food chain  

Paper traders and operators processing 
different  categories  of  animal  by-
products  to  be  considered  for  Article 
9(2) official controls 

Traceability  

Mass balance checks 

Targeted road controls 

Animal welfare 

Fraudulent/deceptive practices   Comment 

Control measure 

Illegal  trade  with  puppy  dogs  and  Falsified documents  

Traceability  

31 

 
 
 
 
 
 
cats 

Non-authorised 
transports of animals  

long-distance 

Falsified  journey  logs,  rest  periods  not 
respected  

TRACES monitoring 

Road controls 

No equipment for supplying feed and/or 
water to animals 

Illegal  transport  of  downer  cows 
to slaughterhouses 

May  occur  with  the  knowledge  of  the 
official veterinarian 

Targeted controls 

Transport by illegal means  

Transport on non-approved vessels  

Vehicles  not  able  to  maintain  the  cool 
chain 

Targeted  controls  at  border 
control posts 

Pesticides use and plant protection products  

Fraudulent/deceptive practices   Comment 

Control measure 

Trade with illicit products  

Counterfeit, non-authorised and illegally 
imported or EU produced products 

Illicit use of pesticides  

Use of non-authorised substances  

Unauthorised use of legal products 

formulation 
Traceability, 
analysis, 
residue 
targeted 
controls,  targeted  controls  at 
border control posts  

Formulation 
targeted residue controls 

analysis, 

Quality labelling  

Fraudulent/deceptive 
practices  

Mislabelling  

Comment 

Control measure 

Applying  the  organic  quality  label  to 
conventional  products  and  products 
which  do  not  comply  with  Protected 
(PDO), 
Designation 
Protected  Geographical 
Indication 
(PGI),  and  Traditional  Specialties 
Guaranteed (TSG) specifications 

Origin 

of 

Traceability of products and their 
ingredients  throughout  the  entire 
supply chain. 

of 

Verification 
documents  across 
authorities and control bodies. 

commercial 
competent 

Addition of non-organic ingredients  

Applying  processes  that  are  not 
in line with organic standards 

Sales  of  produce  during  conversion 
period as organic 

Increased 
unannounced/targeted controls; 

level 

of 

Use  of  non-authorised  substances 
(e.g. industrial fertiliser, pesticides) 

Application 
processes 

of 

non-authorised 

Higher  stocking  densities  of  animals 
than allowed 

Appropriate 
sampling  designs 
allowing  to  distinguish  between 
spray drift and use of pesticides. 

Increased 
full 
number 
traceability  exercises  from  farm 
to fork. 

of 

Building  capacity  for  fertiliser 
testing.  

32 

 
 
 
Plant Health  

Fraudulent/deceptive 
practices  

Comment 

Control measure 

Illegal import of high value plants 
(e.g. bonsai)  

Importing  plants  without  the  proper 
phytosanitary certificate  

Traceability 

Tampering with plant passports 

Falsified  plant  passports  for  transport 
plants to protected zones 

Increased 
level 
unannounced controls, 

of 

Imports  of  seeds  from  non-
equivalent  countries  or  declared 
as feed 

Tampering  of  recording  systems 
or  kilns  for  heat  treatment  of 
wood packaging material 

High  energy  costs  may  be  a  motivator 
for  saving  energy  by  apply  measures 
that  are  not  efficient  (placing  of  the 
sensor  at  the  warmest  spot  instead  of 
the coldest spot) 

Traceability 

Use of Eurostat data to verify 
the  Combined  Nomenclature 
(CN)  Codes 
imported  and 
launch controls  

Target  controls at the time of 
treatment  

33 

 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplement 

Supplement 1 Questions contained in the online questionnaire use for the 2020 desk study 12 

Member State [name] 

Administrative Level [central, regional, sub-regional] 

Legal apects 

Please  provide  the  text  of  fraud  definition  applicable  to  food  fraud  as  used  by  the  Competent  Authority. 
Please provide a legal reference [free text]. 

Responsibilities of the competent authority 

Please  complete  the  survey  for  the  control  areas  for  which  your  authority  has  responsibility  for  the 
coordination, planning and performance of Article 9(2) related controls: 

Coordination 

Competence for legislation and policy 

Competence for planning and performing controls 

Control areas: 

1.  Food and Food Safety 

2.  Genetically Modified Organisms 

3.  Feed and Feed Safety 

4.  Animal Health 

5.  Animal By-Products 

6.  Animal Welfare 

7.  Plant Pests 

8.  Plant Protection Products and use of Pesticides  

9.  Organic Production 

10.  Geographical Indications (PDO/PGI/TSG) 

11.  Import controls 

Article 9(2) related controls - control areas (Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/625) 

If arrangements are not (yet) in place, what is the timeline? [free text] 

Please provide additional information on the specialised Units (organisation, responsibilities, etc.), if relevant. 
[free text] 

Please  provide  additional  information  on  the  enforcement  authorities  (e.g.  do  they  have  specialised  food 
fraud experts?) [free text] 

Where inspectors of the Competent Authority perform investigations, please describe the process including 
when the case will be handed over to the prosecutor. [free text] 

Planning of food fraud related controls in relation to Article 9(2) 

Please  provide  a  short  description  of  the  risk  criteria  applied  for  the  planning  of  Article  9(2)  controls,  per 
control area [free text]: 

Risk criteria applied by the Competent Authority 

12 The EuSurvey website (https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/home/welcome) was used.  

34 

 
 
                                                        
 
Documented Procedures in relation to Article 9(2) 

Regarding  planning:  Please  indicate  to  what  extent  the  planning  of  Article  9(2)  related  controls  is 
coordinated across the 11 sectors mentioned above [free text]. 

Regarding the performance of food fraud  related controls: What types of documented  procedures are in 
place and what aspects are covered? [free text] 

Performance of food fraud related controls in relation to Article 9(2) 

[free text] 

Cooperation and Coordination in relation to Article 9(2) 

Please  indicate  if  specific  arrangements  have  been  put  in  place  in  order  to  facilitate  the  exchange  of 
information on food fraud cases between Competent Authorities? [free text] 

Formalised communication lines (memorandum of understanding) [Yes/No/in preparation] 

Committees/working groups/other [Yes/No/in preparation] 

Please provide a short description (e.g. authorities involved) [free text]. 

Please  indicate  if  specific  arrangements  have  been  put  in  place  in  order  to  facilitate  the  transmission  of 
information  on  suspicion  of  fraud  between  the  competent  authority  and  police,  public  prosecutors  and 
judicial authorities? [Yes/No/in preparation] 

Other food fraud related activities 

Please provide a short description (e.g. authorities involved) [free text]. 

Please provide additional information on the specialised Units (organisation, responsibilities, etc.), if relevant. 
[free text] 

Please  provide  additional  information  on  the  enforcement  authorities  (e.g.  do  they  have  specialised  food 
fraud experts?) [free text] 

Where inspectors of the Competent Authority perform investigations, please indicate the process including 
when the case will be handed over to the prosecutor. [free text] 

E-commerce: 

Have  specific  measures  been  put  in  place  in  order  to  deal  with  fraudulent  activities  in  relation  to  e-
commerce? [free text] 

Please  provide  a  short  description  of  the  measures  taken  in  order  to  detect  fraud  in  the  area  of  e-
commerce [free text]. 

Goods entering the  Union - Suspicion of non-compliance and intensified official controls  (Article 
65) 

Please  provide  information  on  the  arrangements  put  in  place  in  order  to  implement  Article  65  (e.g. 
procedures, guidelines) [free text]. 

Additional information 

Is there any other relevant information that you consider important in the context of this survey? [free text] 

35 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 

In person 

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct centres. You can find the address of the centre nearest you online 
(european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en). 

On the phone or in writing 

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 

— by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 

— at the following standard number: +32 22999696, 

— via the following form: european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en. 

FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 

Online 

Information  about  the  European  Union  in  all  the  official  languages  of  the  EU  is  available  on  the  Europa  website  (european-
union.europa.eu). 

EU publications 

You  can  view  or  order  EU  publications  at  op.europa.eu/en/publications.  Multiple  copies  of  free  publications  can  be  obtained  by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local documentation centre (european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en). 

EU law and related documents 

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(eur-lex.europa.eu). 

Open data from the EU 

The  portal  data.europa.eu  provides  access  to  open  datasets  from  the  EU  institutions,  bodies  and  agencies.  These  can  be 
downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. The portal also provides access to a wealth 
of datasets from European countries.